Yugoslavia and Macedonia Before Tito: Between Repression and Integration 9781350989931, 9781786730732

Table of contents :
Cover
Author Bio
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
List of Illustrations
List of Maps
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Names and Terms
On the Establishment of Yugoslavia
The Current State of Research
Aims of this Study
Regarding Sources
1. The Politics of the 1920s
A Difficult Start for the New State
The ‘Macedonian Party’
Uprising in Vardar Macedonia?
Relaxation of the Tension 1924–5
1927: Intensified Terror and Counter-Terror
2. Political Developments in the 1930s
Hopes in a Dictatorship
1931: Coerced Constitution and Sham Parliamentarism
The Stojadinović Era, 1935–9: Economic Recovery, Political Revival
Movement among the Macedonian Intelligentsia
The ‘Lučists’
‘Even the last shepherd became an official here, if only he was from Serbia and a Serb’
The ‘25th Anniversary of South Serbia’s Liberation’
The Macedonian Parliamentarians
Contacts between the Macedonian Movement and the United Opposition
In Expectation of Changes
The Understanding with the Croats
Skopje as Seat of the ‘Serbian Lands’
Macedonia and the War
Measures against ‘Autonomism’ and ‘Separatism’
3. Economy and Finances
The Yugoslav Economy
Vardar Macedonia: ‘Passive’ Region or Garden of Eden?
Industry
Crafts and Trade
Finances
The 100-Million-Dinar Loan
Investments and Development?
Skopje as a Model City
4. Agriculture
Agricultural Reform and Colonisation
Crops and Agricultural Problems
The Loan System
Animal Breeding
The Agricultural Policy of the Stojadinović Government
‘The Most Crying Grievance’: The Tobacco Monopoly
Opium: The Demise of a Lucrative Industry
5. The Educational System
The Elementary Schools
Secondary School Education
‘Nationalisation and Assimilation’ through the Schools?
University Education
6. Transport and Communications
The Road Network
The Railway
The Media
Language
Conclusion
The ‘Classical’ or the ‘Primitive’ South?
Officials, Teachers and Gendarmes
The Economy
Modest Investments
The Failure of Yugoslav Integration
The Unsuccessful Serbianisation of Macedonia
‘Macedonia for the Macedonians’
The Elites in a Dilemma
Macedonia as a Special Case within Yugoslavia?
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Nada Bosˇkovska studied General History at Zurich University with a focus on Eastern Europe, Slavic Studies and Economic and Social History. After lengthy periods of study and research in Moscow, St Petersburg, Skopje and Belgrade, she attained her PhD from Zurich University in 1996. Her PhD dissertation was published in 1998 and titled Die russische Frau im 17. Jahrhundert. Since September 2003, she has been Professor of Eastern European History at the Historical Seminar of Zurich University. She is a member of the editorial board of the journal Jahrbu¨cher fu¨r Geschichte Osteuropas and has led several research projects funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. She is a member of the board of the Foundation for the Advancement of Studies in Hungarian History, Language and Culture, a member of AcademiaNet (a database of leading women scientists) and has organised several international conferences on the Yugoslav/Balkan region. A specialist in Central European and south-east European history, she is the editor of two book series (Beitra¨ge zur Geschichte der Russlandschweizer; Die Schweiz und der Osten Europas) and a co-editor of the book series Zu¨rcher Beitra¨ge zur Geschichtswissenschaft. She has also authored two Germanlanguage books.

‘Nada Bosˇkovska’s book on the history of Yugoslav Macedonia in the interwar period represents an exemplary scholarly source and is a pioneering study, which fills a serious gap in the political history of the first Yugoslavia and in the social and economic history of south-east Europe. Moreover, it is a highly readable and welcome corrective to the limited Macedonian historiography too often prevalent in Skopje, Sofia, Belgrade and Athens today.’ Stefan Troebst, University of Leipzig

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO Between Repression and Integration

NADA BOSˇKOVSKA

Published in 2017 by I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London • New York www.ibtauris.com Copyright q 2017 Nada Bosˇkovska First published in German in 2009 by Bo¨hlau Verlag The right of Nada Bosˇkovska to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Every attempt has been made to gain permission for the use of the images in this book. Any omissions will be rectified in future editions. References to websites were correct at the time of writing. Library of Balkan Studies 6 ISBN: 978 1 78453 338 0 eISBN: 978 1 78672 073 3 ePDF: 978 1 78673 073 2 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available Typeset in Garamond Three by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

In memory of my grandparents, who lived in six different states, without leaving their village.

CONTENTS

List of Illustrations List of Maps Acknowledgements

xi xiii xv

Introduction Names and Terms On the Establishment of Yugoslavia The Current State of Research Aims of this Study Regarding Sources

1 2 10 13 17 21

1. The Politics of the 1920s A Difficult Start for the New State The ‘Macedonian Party’ Uprising in Vardar Macedonia? Relaxation of the Tension 1924 – 5 1927: Intensified Terror and Counter-Terror

23 23 38 45 48 51

2. Political Developments in the 1930s Hopes in a Dictatorship 1931: Coerced Constitution and Sham Parliamentarism The Stojadinovic´ Era, 1935– 9: Economic Recovery, Political Revival Movement among the Macedonian Intelligentsia The ‘Lucˇists’ ‘Even the last shepherd became an official here, if only he was from Serbia and a Serb’ The ‘25th Anniversary of South Serbia’s Liberation’

69 69 74 78 84 88 92 94

viii

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

The Macedonian Parliamentarians Contacts between the Macedonian Movement and the United Opposition In Expectation of Changes The Understanding with the Croats Skopje as Seat of the ‘Serbian Lands’ Macedonia and the War Measures against ‘Autonomism’ and ‘Separatism’

100 102 105 112 116 118 122

3. Economy and Finances The Yugoslav Economy Vardar Macedonia: ‘Passive’ Region or Garden of Eden? Industry Crafts and Trade Finances The 100-Million-Dinar Loan Investments and Development? Skopje as a Model City

129 129 131 136 140 142 149 153 160

4. Agriculture Agricultural Reform and Colonisation Crops and Agricultural Problems The Loan System Animal Breeding The Agricultural Policy of the Stojadinovic´ Government ‘The Most Crying Grievance’: The Tobacco Monopoly Opium: The Demise of a Lucrative Industry

162 162 172 180 181 186 187 200

5. The Educational System The Elementary Schools Secondary School Education ‘Nationalisation and Assimilation’ through the Schools? University Education

209 209 223 232 236

6. Transport and Communications The Road Network The Railway The Media Language

248 248 252 257 264

CONTENTS

ix

Conclusion The ‘Classical’ or the ‘Primitive’ South? Officials, Teachers and Gendarmes The Economy Modest Investments The Failure of Yugoslav Integration The Unsuccessful Serbianisation of Macedonia ‘Macedonia for the Macedonians’ The Elites in a Dilemma Macedonia as a Special Case within Yugoslavia?

270 270 272 275 277 278 281 284 287 288

Notes Bibliography Index

293 339 351

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures Figure 1.1 A Detachment of the ‘Union against the Bulgarian Bandits’, Strumica 1924 or 1925

28

Figure 1.2 Muslim Women in Veles

29

Figure 3.1 Ohrid

152

Figure 3.2 The Hygiene Institute in Skopje

156

Figure 3.3 The People’s Health Home in Prilep

157

Figure 3.4 Kratovo

159

Figure 4.1 Peasants from the Vicinity of Bitola

174

Figure 4.2 Peasant Family from the Village of Babino: Krste with his Sons Tanas and Nikola, and their Families, c.1929

176

Figure 4.3 A Young Couple from Galicˇnik

183

Figure 4.4 A Tobacco Field being Tilled

189

Figure 4.5 Tobacco Harvest

191

Figure 5.1 Macedonian Teachers on a Course in Belgrade, 1923

215

Figure 5.2 Singer Sewing Course in Tetovo, 1926

235

Figure 6.1 Camel Caravan in the Region of Strumica in the 1920s

250

Figure 6.2 Skopje 1929, on the Left Side, on the Banks of the River, the National Theatre

268

xii

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

Tables Table 3.1 Sum Banovina was Supposed to Receive (Dinars) – Sums Actually Received

145

Table 3.2 Yearly Amounts Budgeted (Dinars) and Realised

146

Table 3.3 Distribution of the Allocations among the Respective Banovinas

147

Table 3.4 List of Projects for Banovina: Budget and Purpose

150

Table 3.5 Redefined Scale of the Banovina’s Needs

151

Table 5.1 Secular Schools in the Vardar Banovina 1929–30

224

Table 5.2 Schools/Schoolrooms in the Banovinas in 1935

224

Table 5.3 Ratios of High Schools to Students in these Banovinas

227

Table 5.4 Illiteracy at the End of the 1930s as a Percentage of the Population

233

Table 5.5 Young People, Born in Yugoslavia, Studying at University in 1938

241

Table 6.1 The Number of Kilometres of Road in Each Banovina for Every 100,000 Inhabitants in 1934

252

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1 Composition of Yugoslav territory before the Unification in 1918

xvi

Map 2 Administrative Boundaries of Yugoslavia 1922–9

xvii

Map 3 Administrative Boundaries of Yugoslavia 1929–39

xviii

Map 4 Administrative Boundaries of Yugoslavia before and after the Agreement (sporazum) in 1939

xix

Map 5 Vardar Macedonia

xx

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to warmly thank all those who have accompanied me during the course of my work on this book and who have assisted me in one way or another. This book first appeared in German in 2009; I would like to thank I.B.Tauris for making the English edition possible. I am indebted to the staff of the Institute for National History in Skopje, as well as of all the archives and libraries in Skopje, Bitola, Belgrade and London, who supported me competently and obligingly in my search for material. I thank the Serbian Orthodox Parish of the Holy Trinity in Zurich for permission to use photographs from the Katharina Jovanovits Library, as well as the State Archives of the Republic of Macedonia, which made available photographs from its collections. Financially the research for this book was made possible by the Cantonal Commission for the Promotion of Emerging Scholars and the Swiss National Science Foundation. The SNCF also supported the original publication. I owe a great debt of thanks to these institutions. I could also rely on my teacher and PhD supervisor Carsten Goehrke during the period of my habilitation studies. He has always encouraged and supported me. For discussions, suggestions, and practical aid, I also wish to thank Nadezˇda Cvetkovska, Heiko Haumann, Ljubodrag Dimic´, Alenka Lape, Maja Miljkovic´, Zoran Todorovski, Stefan Troebst, Vera Veskovik´Vangeli (†), Petar Zajkovski and Lina Zˇila. In Skopje, Ivan Katardzˇiev was an especially important and frequent partner in discussion, whom I would like to thank for his support. Particular thanks are owed to Vera and Dragi Nikoloski in Skopje, who hosted me on many occasions and always took wonderful care of me. The same applies to Ivan Bosˇkovski in Belgrade, my uncle who unfortunately has passed away, and despite the very acute shortage of petrol would not let anything stop him from driving me to the archive every day. Without the constant and reliable support of my husband, Walter Leimgruber, and the patience and understanding of our children Vera and Nikola, this work would not have been possible.

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Map 1 Composition of Yugoslav territory before the Unification in 1918. Source: Holm Sundhaussen. Geschichte Jugoslawiens 1918 – 1980 (Stuttgart, 1982), pp. 24 –5.

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Kingdom of Serbia (borders of 1878)

Kingdom of Montenegro (borders of 1913)

Bosnia and Herzegovina (from 1878 under a joint Austrian and Hungarian administration; until 1908 under Ottoman authority)

Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia (real union with Hungary)

Kingdom of Hungary

Austrian crown lands Carinthia, Carniola, Styria, Dalmatia and coastal land

Serbia's southern border until 1876/78

Serbia's southern border from 1878

State and administrative border before 1918

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32

Map 2 Administrative Boundaries of Yugoslavia 1922 – 9. Source: Martin Mayer. Elementarbildung in Jugoslawien (1918 –1941). Ein Beitrag zur gesellschaftlichen Modernisierung? (Munich, 1995), pp. 222 –3.

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Map 3 Administrative Boundaries of Yugoslavia 1929 –39. Source: Martin Mayer. Elementarbildung in Jugoslawien (1918 –1941). Ein Beitrag zur gesellschaftlichen Modernisierung? (Munich, 1995), pp. 222 –3.

Banovina of Drava LJUBLJANA

Banovina of Danube

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Banovina of Croatia

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LEGEND: Boundaries of banovinas* established in 1929 Boundaries of the banovina of Croatia since 1939

Skopje

Banovina of Vardar

* Large administrative unit headed by ban

Map 4 Administrative Boundaries of Yugoslavia before and after the Agreement (sporazum) in 1939. Source: Frontiers and Internal Territorial Division in Yugoslavia (Belgrade, 1991), p. 49.

Map 5 Vardar Macedonia. Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of: Doklestic´, Ljubisˇa. Kroz historiju Makedonije. Izabrani izvori (Zagreb, 1964), p. 280.

INTRODUCTION

The events in Yugoslavia during the 1990s demonstrated once again how destabilising the Balkans can be for Europe. This is especially the case when the region of former Yugoslavia is not firmly anchored within a larger system – whether in the form of large empires, such as the Hapsburg and the Ottoman, or due to the ideologically based spheres of influence of the Great Powers, as after World War II. When the balance of power is upset, this reveals the region’s strategic significance, and all of Europe must concern itself with this usually gladly forgotten corner. In the near future, it will no longer be so easy to exclude south-east Europe from the Western European horizon. Therefore, it is now more important than ever to make an effort to understand it. Ivo Andric´, the Yugoslav Nobel Prize winner for Literature, can help us to see the problem with a scene he recalled from his childhood. He once experienced how his mother became desperate as she tried to make a call from Visˇegrad to Sarajevo: ‘What should I do, I understand every word, but there they can’t hear me’. ‘You see’, goes the commentary of Andric´, ‘it is similar today . . . I understand everything that is written and thought in Paris, London and Vienna. But there they can’t understand us’.1 In terms of geography, this book is concerned with Vardar Macedonia, roughly within the borders of the former Socialist Republic and the presentday Republic of Macedonia. In the period between the two world wars, the period examined here, this territory never formed a single administrative unit. It was a characteristic for the subdivision of Yugoslavia in this period that careful attention was paid to breaking up the historical regions. Yet some of them, alongside Macedonia – Slovenia and Croatia – even before, under Hapsburg or Ottoman rule, had not experienced a single administration for a long time. Nonetheless, the local populations remained conscious of the unity of these respective regions all the same. The administrative structure of the kingdom of Yugoslavia means that the available statistical data generally does not correspond with the territory of

2

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

Vardar Macedonia. Where possible, an attempt has been made to adapt this data. Especially for the 1930s, figures are given repeatedly for the entire Vadar Banovina, which consisted 60 per cent of Macedonia, but also included the greater part of Kosovo and South Serbia. In addition, this study will mainly be concerned, in ethnic terms, with the Slavic Macedonian population. It would exceed the framework of this book (and require additional language skills), to cover also the position of the minorities, as there are practically no previous works on this subject. Publications which deal with the largest minority in Yugoslavia, the Albanians, usually cover only Kosovo, and mention the Albanians in Macedonia only in passing. Insofar as it is possible, this study will, however, in some places, cast a glance at the other population groups, such as when the educational system is being discussed.

Names and Terms Those concerning themselves with the Balkans have to reckon with difficulties in the use of geographical designations, for as soon as you open your mouth, you are forced to take up a political position. It does make a difference whether you say ‘Kosovo’ or ‘Kosova’, write ‘Macedonia’ or ‘FYROM’. For the parties involved, there is no doubt as to which is correct and appropriate. Outsiders, on the other hand, are confronted with a difficult decision, and can only escape the dilemma at best by the use of a slash (/); in the spoken word, however, they must decide for one version or the other, and thereby are forced to take sides. In the case of Macedonia the question of geographical and national designations is especially problematic, as an astounded world opinion was forced to acknowledge in the years after the independence of the Republic of Macedonia in 1991. The resistance of Greece to the name of its northern neighbour persists, and no agreement is in sight. During the interwar period the issue of what to call this territory was also an explosive political question. A variety of different designations can be found in the sources for the section of the country that is the subject of this study. Varying according to the author, mention is made of ‘Macedonia’ – both with and without adjectives such as ‘Serbian’ or ‘Yugoslav’ – ‘South Serbia’, ‘Povardarje’, ‘South’, and ‘Vadar Banovina’. During the lengthy rule of the Ottomans there was no administrative unit called Macedonia – just as there was no Serbia or Bulgaria in this sense either. Nonetheless, these designations were widely used by educated Europeans, who were interested in the European parts of the Turkish Empire. Macedonia can already be found on the first printed map, which was

INTRODUCTION

3

published in Bologna in 1477.2 This map is historical and shows ancient Macedonia. But also on the ‘Regina Europa’ in Sebastian Munster’s ‘Cosmographia’ – which was first published in Basel in 1544 – we find Macedonia, situated between Sclavonia and Graecia. During the course of the Early Modern period, contemporary political maps were published, on which, apart from the Ottoman names (for example Beglerbeglicz de Rome´lie), European names were used: Mace´doine, Servie, Bulgarie, Albanie and others.3 The English doctor Edward Brown, who travelled through the Balkans in 1669, differentiated, as if it needed no explanation at all, between the regions of Serbia, Macedonia (which for him started immediately after Skopje) and Bulgaria.4 When the Balkan nationalist movements took up all these names in the nineteenth century and assisted their much more widespread usage, there was therefore nothing artificial about this, nor in the case of Macedonia. It is certainly not true – as is frequently maintained – that this name was only rediscovered in writings from ancient times by European geographers in the nineteenth century. Regarding the rough geographical borders of Macedonia, which remained under Ottoman rule until 1912 – that is around 540 years, longer than any other region in the Balkans – there was relative unity among the geographers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They described Macedonia as a territory, which was bordered in the north by the Shar Mountains, in the south by Mount Olympus and the Pindus range, in the east by the Rhodope Mountains, and in the west by Lake Ohrid. In total, it was a territory of around 63,000 square kilometres, in which at the start of the twentieth century some 2 million people may have been living.5 A map from 1885 gives a very precise outline of this region.6 In the interwar period the term ‘Macedonia’ soon became scorned in Yugoslavia. In the course of efforts to underline as belonging to Serbia all of the territories newly won in the Balkan Wars – Vardar Macedonia, Kosovo, Metochia, Sanjak – this whole region was declared to be ‘South Serbia’, but without claiming that it was a single administrative unit. The term was a neologism, created for purely national-political calculation and forced upon the region. In any case, it did not prove so easy to suppress the accustomed designation. Even in April 1928, the Minister of War had to intervene to stop the military post for the South Serbian detachment using the abbreviation ‘MAK’ as its address. He ordered that ‘Sth. Serbia’ (Juzˇ. Srbija) and never ‘MAK’ should always be used – ‘since this term corresponds neither with history, nor with our national interests’.7 Foreign sources of the interwar period mostly refer to ‘Macedonia’.8 ‘South Serbia’ is used more rarely and is applied especially when the writer feels obliged to stick to the Serbian designation for reasons of diplomacy.

4

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

In 1929 there was an administrative restructuring of the Yugoslav state territory. In place of the 33 districts (oblasti) there were now the prefecture of Belgrade and nine Banovinas, which apart from one were named after rivers9 and had nothing in common with the historical regions. Only the Drava Banovina corresponded very closely to Slovenia. The choice of river names for the territories took place as an effort to banish the ‘tribal designations’ and to develop a Yugoslav consciousness. Macedonia now formed the main part of the Vardar Banovina. Theoretically, from now on it would not have been politically opportune to continue using the term ‘South Serbia’, since in this name the Serbian ‘tribe’ is mentioned. However, allegiance to Yugoslavia could not compete with ‘tribal particularism’, such that even the term ‘South Serbia’ did not disappear from common usage. Those who wanted to avoid using this term at the end of the 1930s, but did not dare to use the term ‘Macedonia’, spoke of the ‘South’ and of Povardarje (the Vardar Region). **** A word is necessary also regarding the name of the state. Until 1929, the state founded at the end of 1918 was called the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Kingdom SHS); in 1929 it was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, the designation ‘Yugoslavia’ and for practical reasons the adjective ‘Yugoslav’, was already used frequently in the 1920s, especially abroad.10 In this book therefore the term Yugoslavia will also be used for the 1920s. Family names will be given, as they are found in the sources, that is, the Macedonian names generally in the Serbianised form. If the geographical terms already present some problems, then the controversies are much greater, when one speaks about the occupants of this region. Macedonia is known for its ethnic diversity. What this mace´doine consisted of in the final phase of the Ottoman Empire is a heavily and passionately discussed question. Undisputed is that living in Macedonia were Turks, Albanians, Jews, Vlachs, Greeks and Roma, as well as other smaller ethnic groups. The main controversy concerns the Christian Slavic majority. A bitter struggle emerged around the national identity of these people in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. They still lived under Ottoman rule, in contrast to their neighbours, who in the course of the century – not without outside help – had been liberated. A national consciousness was still alien to most of them; for their self-identification, but also for their classification from the perspective of the authorities, it was in the first place decisive that they were Christians; in second place followed allegiance to the Greek Patriarch or the Bulgarian Exarchate. Depending on this, the Slavic Christians of Macedonia were classified as Greeks or

INTRODUCTION

5

Bulgarians and usually designated themselves also accordingly. This was a formal religious, and not an ethnic, category. On this basis, a village could, without difficulty, be transferred between these two allegiances, according to which religious authority it found itself under or – not rarely as a result of violence applied by bands – was forced to accept. On the other hand, all of the Muslims counted as ‘Turks’ whether ethnically they actually were Turks, Slavs, Albanians, Tartars or Cherkassians. The weakness of the Ottoman Empire, its predictable collapse, and the considerable strategic significance of Macedonia awakened the appetites of the neighbouring states. As this territory had been in turn part of all the mediaeval empires of its neighbours, before its conquest by the Ottomans, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece could all equally support their claims on historical grounds. For this reason, they looked for further legitimations and found one, which was more appropriate to the times: the national identification of the majority population there. Initially it was Bulgaria and Greece which set about, with a great propaganda campaign, to convince the Christians in Macedonia (and public opinion in Europe) that they were Bulgarians or Greeks. For this purpose, apart from churches, they also built numerous schools. In addition, partisans also forced their way in, who propagated the respective national credo with the force of weapons and pressured the population into one or another allegiance. Soon the Serbs appeared as the third force in this competition. Until 1875, their interest had mainly been focused on Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serbian population there. After the occupation of this province by the Hapsburg monarchy (1878) and especially after its annexation (1908), they directed their attention instead to Macedonia. The Serbs also began to open schools and send in partisans in the 1890s. In 1912, the rivals joined forces and together, and with the support of Montenegro, they drove the Ottomans almost completely from the Balkan Peninsula. After a further war over the booty, the partition of Macedonia between Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria was sealed in the Treaty of Bucharest on 10 August 1913. The borders established then are largely the same as they are today. After this, the three countries had a free hand to continue their national programmes in the respective acquired territories (Aegean, Vardar and Pirin Macedonia) now without competition and to mould Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians from the Slavic population living there. However, this did not prove to be as easy as the governments had imagined. Even after decades of the various indoctrinations, many of the ordinary people remained confused regarding their national identity – if they understood at all what was meant by that and did not continue to confuse this attribute with their religious affiliation. For others, in contrast, another consciousness had

6

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

developed – a Macedonian one – which originally emerged as a reaction to the impositions of the neighbours: we are not that, which the others force us to be in their own interest; we are the residents of Macedonia – that is, Macedonians. But very early on there were also representatives, who – as happened also in the other national movements – began to investigate the Macedonian language and cultural traditions and who spoke expressly of a ‘Macedonian ´ org´i Pulevski (1838– people’. This finds its most explicit personification in G 95), a bricklayer and autodidact from Galicˇnik in the mountains of western Macedonia, who as a migrant worker ( pecˇalbar) was already well-travelled in his younger years. Pulevski was engaged in a manner that (according to Hroch) was typical for Phase A of national development,11 among other things as a language researcher. He established the grammar for the Macedonian language (Slognica recˇovska) and in 1875 he was the editor of a Dictionary of the Three Languages (‘S[lavic] Macedonian, Albanian [arbanski] and Turkish’). In his mother tongue, which he called ‘Macedonian’ or also ‘Slavic-Macedonian’, he maintained: A nation is when people, who are of one race and speak the same language, who live together and maintain friendships, share the same customs, songs, and holidays, this is called a nation, and the territory in which the nation lives, is called the fatherland of this nation. Therefore, the Macedonians are a nation and their territory is Macedonia.12 This definition by Pulevski contains the most important elements that belong to the characterisation of a nation, as according to Benedict Anderson, for example.13 Outlined is an imagined limited (hereditary) community, with a common language and culture, friendly relationships among equals and a single territory. Whether the striving for an independent state is necessarily connected to the idea of a nation has been hotly debated. Hroch is critical of the modern theories of nationalism (Gellner, Hobsbawm, Breuilly), which always clearly link nationalism with political independence, as this is not confirmed by empirical research. Most of the movements in the nineteenth century sought to achieve autonomy.14 Here, however, is not the place to investigate the origins of Macedonian nation-building. It should simply be demonstrated that at the time of the establishment of the Yugoslav state in 1918, the self-designation ‘Macedonian’ had already established itself among the Christian Slavs. There is considerable evidence for this, above all among foreign observers. The German Social Democrat Hermann Wendel, who travelled through Macedonia in August and September 1920, systematically asked the people who they were. In Bitola he established that: ‘The Slavs call themselves, as

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7

everywhere, Makedonci, standing between Serbs and Bulgarians, [they] can be like this or like that’.15 In Prilep: ‘On the bridge, boys are playing; one is not embarrassed by the questions. “I am a Serb, but those,” and he points to the others, “are Macedonians.” – “Where are you from then?” – “From Nisˇ!”’16 And in Resen: ‘Swarms of young boys around the car. “Well, what are you?” Uncomprehending shy looks. “He is a Turk!,” cries the chorus. “So? And you?” – “Macedonians!” they reply like a shot from a pistol’.17 Edmond Bouchie´ de Belle also confirmed in 1922 that if one asked a Slavic peasant from the area of Ostrovo (in Greece) or Monastir (Bitola, in Yugoslavia), what he is, in nine out of ten cases he replied that he was a Makedon. His conclusion therefore was: ‘Un observateur de bonne foi classera donc a` part cette population a` laquelle le nom de ›Slaves Mace´doniens‹ ou simplement de ›Mace´doniens‹ paraıˆt le mieux convenir [An observer of good faith will classify this population for which the name ‘Macedonian Slavs’ or simply ‘Macedonians’ seems to be the most fitting as separate].’18 R.A. Gallop, Third Secretary at the British Consulate in Belgrade, spent a week in Vardar Macedonia in April 1926 and observed: Those of the latter [Macedo-Slavs] that I met were equally insistent on calling themselves neither Serbs nor Bulgars, but Macedonians . . . There seemed to be no love lost for the Bulgars in most places. Their brutality during the war had lost them the affection even of those who, before the Balkan War, had been their friends. Oliver C. Harvey of the British Foreign Office visited the Greek and Yugoslav parts of Macedonia in April and May 1926 and came to the conclusion: The Slavophone population of Serb Macedonia definitely regard themselves as distinct from the Serbs. If asked their nationality, they say they are ‘Macedonians,’ and they speak the Macedonian dialect. Nor do they identify themselves with the Bulgars, although the latter seem undoubtedly to be regarded as nearer relatives than the Serbs. On the Slavic population in the north-west of Greece he noted: ‘These of course constitute the much advertised “Serb minority.” . . . But they are no more Serb than the Macedonians of Serbia – they speak Macedonian, and call themselves Macedonians and sentimentally look to Bulgaria rather than to Serbia.’19 Colonel A.C. Corfe, the New Zealand president of the mixed Commission of the League of Nations for the Greek-Bulgarian population exchange, reported in 1923, after a journey through western Aegean Macedonia

8

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

(Greece), that the people there usually said: ‘We are Macedonians, not Greeks or Bulgars. Give us a good father and we will be good children. We don’t want bands of any sort coming to our villages. We want to be left in peace’.20 Even a Greek military report from 1925 confirms the self-identification of the greater part of the population as ‘Macedonians’. The author noted that the inhabitants in the vicinity of Florina (Mac. Lerin), who were mostly Slavs, could be divided into three categories: the fanatical supporters of Bulgaria (voulgarofrones); fanatical supporters of Greece (ellinofrones); and those supposedly ‘indifferent to nationality’, who mainly wanted to live in peace. This last group, which formed between half and three-quarters of the population, called themselves makedhones. From a quarter up to a half were supporters of Bulgaria, while a Greek national consciousness was only identified in individual families.21 Here we see for the first time that an affirmation of nationality, which did not fit into the prescribed scheme, is not recognised and is classified instead as indifference. A report by a correspondent of the Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung, Gerhard Christoph, from February 1931, illustrates very well the complex structure of the national question in Vardar Macedonia, and therefore deserves to be quoted more extensively here. Christoph was determined to find out what the ordinary people considered themselves to be. In a hostel on the border to Albania, the following conversation took place between him and the innkeeper, a peasant: ‘Tell me, innkeeper,’ I ask in passing, ‘what are you actually?’ ‘I am a Pravoslav,’ he replies. But I did not mean his religious confession. I ask further. ‘I am now a Serb,’ he says. Now – that means since the Serbs have conquered this land. I am not interested, however, in his citizenship, but in his nationality’. Then the correspondent asked the peasant, what he was during the Turkish period. The answer was: ‘We were Exarchites.’ Christoph wanted a more precise answer and dug deeper: ‘You were a Bulgarian?’ –‘Yes, we worked for the Begs – we were Bulgarians.’ The journalist was not, however, satisfied by this, as Bulgarian in this case meant a dependent peasant, just as Vlach, ‘until the start of the Romanian propaganda’ was the word for a nomadic shepherd. The correspondent then tried another approach: ‘What language do you speak?’ I asked the peasant . . . ‘I am a Macedonian,’ he replies, ‘you know, the Serbs maintain that our language is a Serbian dialect, the Bulgarians say that we speak Bulgarian. What can you do about it . . .’ It does not seem to disturb him. ‘Look here,’ he

INTRODUCTION

9

continues, ‘there on the wall hangs the hat, which I used to wear. The Serbs say it is a Bulgarian hat, and therefore I now wear a Serbian cap. The Turks here are also not permitted to wear their Fez, because the country now belongs to Serbia. What can you do about it.’22 Despite all the toing and froing, the statement of the innkeeper is quite clear: he saw himself as a Macedonian; it was the others who wanted to make him believe he spoke Serbian or Bulgarian, and they could determine which hat he was supposed to wear. Certainly among the Slavic Christians in Macedonia there were also people who had no national consciousness or who felt that they were something else in terms of ethnicity. Wendel met such people now and again too. In front of a cafe in Prilep, he spoke to, among others, a man in a sheepskin hat who had returned from America: The sheepskin hat and his companions were asked if they were Macedonians, but they were not keen to reveal their language straight away, looking around shyly; it did not appear that they were anything other than Serbs. But in the end, once he had gained their trust, they poured out their hearts to the German. Yes they had gone to Bulgarian schools, they had belonged to the Exarchite Church, Bulgarian had remained so much a part of their being, their souls still belonged, what a miracle!, to the Bulgarians.23 The tension of the situation in which the Macedonians found themselves, as they had been subjected for decades successively to the representatives of nationalist propaganda from various changing authorities, is demonstrated by the desperate and resigned words of the father of a schoolchild in eastern Macedonia, who explained to the authorities in 1924: Don’t expect from me that I feel myself to be a Serb. The Bulgarians have put it into my head for an eternity that I am a Bulgarian. The only thing that I can now say is that I am a Macedonian. Take my children, educate them as Serbs, and they will become Serbs. I have nothing against it. But don’t demand any more from us older people.24 One can maintain, therefore, that the great mass of the Christian Slav population called themselves Macedonians, which could mean an already explicit national consciousness or simply a regional sense of belonging to a group, that was bound up, however, with a clear distinction from other ethnic groups, such as Turks, Vlachs, Albanians or immigrant Serbs. It is also of significance that outsiders

10

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

meant the Slavic population, when they spoke of ‘Macedonians’ or the ‘Macedonian element’, such as the British ambassador Howard Kennard, who in his 1926 report about his journey through Macedonia and Kosovo names the ‘Albanian population’, ‘Turks’, ‘Kutzo-Vlachs’, and ‘Macedonian elements’.25 The British Vice Consul, Footman, differentiated between a ‘Macedonian peasant’ and ‘Albanian and Turkish elements’.26 Kennard’s successor, Nevile Henderson, also meant the Slavic inhabitants with the term ‘Macedonians’,27 just like Weigand, who, however, viewed them as ethnic Bulgarians.28 The Swiss criminologist and Serbophile Rudolph Archibald Reiss was very explicit in 1918: ‘A mon avis on ne peut appeler le Mace´donien ni Bulgare, ni Serbe, mais Mace´donien tout court [In my opinion, one cannot call the Macedonian neither Bulgarian nor Serb, but simply Macedonian]’. A small part of the population had become Serbophile or Bulgarian in spirit (but not in ‘racial’ terms) through the Serbian or Bulgarian Churches respectively. ‘Mais je re´pe`te que la grande masse des habitants est reste´e mace´donienne [But I repeat that the big mass of the population remained Macedonian]’.29 Swiss female Methodist missionaries in Macedonia in 1938 spoke quite naturally of ‘Macedonians’ and the ‘Macedonian language’. That by this they meant ethnic categories is shown clearly by the fact that one of them, who came from Lausanne, called herself ‘French’ in a conversation with a local Turk and introduced her female colleague from Canton Zu¨rich as a ‘German’.30 In addition, it naturally also occurred that people spoke of the ‘Macedonians’ when they meant the entire population of the territory, since there was no other term available for this.31 On the other hand, nobody would have had the idea, for example, of describing the Albanians or the Turks as ‘Macedonians’. The non-Slavic ethnic groups appear also not to have taken up this designation for themselves; in any case this cannot be found in the sources. The Muslims in Debar, for example, in part described themselves as Albanians, in part as Turks.32 Only Wendel cites once two Muslims, who say they are Macedonians,33 although their ethnic identity is not clear, possibly they were indeed Muslim Macedonians. This should provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate why the Slavic inhabitants of Macedonia, who form the main focus of this study, are called Macedonians. They also possessed without doubt a collective identity, and in the sense of Elwert’s definition, they bore the hallmarks of an independent ethnic group.34

On the Establishment of Yugoslavia In 1918, Vardar Macedonia – henceforth, for convenience, simply described as Macedonia – became part of the the new Yugoslav state, which was

INTRODUCTION

11

proclaimed on 1 December, and received the name Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Two characteristics of this state that were linked to each other were decisive for its development during the interwar years. Firstly it comprised a large number of territories, which in every respect differed from each other considerably. For centuries, the individual parts, especially the former Hapsburg north-west and the south-east, which for a long time had been under Ottoman rule, had pursued a completely different historical and cultural path. Their way of life, values, religion, cultural and economic development varied greatly from one to another. In addition, there was a distinct economic difference, although even the comparatively developed north, above all Croatia, has to be viewed as backward in comparison with the rest of Europe. If that was not all enough of a burden, the state still faced the task of reconstructing the southern parts of the country, which had suffered enormous destruction in the Balkan Wars and especially in World War I. But even within the Catholic Central European north-western and the Byzantine Ottoman influenced regions there were great differences. The historical legacy, as well as the needs and ambitions of the Slovenes, who had belonged to the Austrian part of the monarchy, was not the same as that of the Croats, who had been under Hungarian rule. In the kingdom of Serbia quite different conditions prevailed than in Macedonia, which had been under Ottoman rule until 1912. The other important factor was the unprepared, rather overhasty formation of the state, which happened more or less by chance, without a consensus being arrived at first on the most important constitutional questions. Already on 7 December 1914, under the impression of its military victories against the Hapsburg monarchy, Serbia had specified as one of its official war aims: ‘Struggle for the liberation and unification of all our unfree brothers, the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.’ The fortunes of war turned then against Serbia, as is known, and there was no support among the Entente for its aim of dissolving the Hapsburg monarchy and forming a southern Slav state. In the first years of the war the Entente was above all concerned to gain further allies (namely Italy and Bulgaria).35 Even in 1918, strong political forces in Western Europe still did not want to hear anything about the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. In this situation, the British historian and publicist R.W. Seton-Watson played an important role in changing opinion in the West, as from the start of the war he had argued in favour of the founding of a Yugoslav state.36 The Slovenes and Croats remained loyal to the monarchy until 1918 and considered the formation of a South Slav state only within its borders. The unification efforts of the Serb government were only supported by the Yugoslav Committee, a grouping of South Slav personalities from the

12

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

monarchy living abroad, the founding of which had been initiated in 1914 by the head of the Serbian government, Nikola Pasˇic´, but which only formally came into existence in May 1915. Significantly most of the Croatian members were from Dalmatia; these people were primarily afraid of Italian imperialism. The union with Serbia to form a Yugoslav state only became a necessity for the Southern Slavs of the monarchy, when the defeat of the Central Powers became likely and they realised that in the peace negotiations they would have to participate on the losing side. This situation became more severe, when the Italians set about occupying those territories in Dalmatia which had been promised to them in London in 1915 by a secret treaty with the Entente as a reward for their joining the war. In this situation the Croats were forced, above all under pressure from the Dalmatian delegates, to seek a rapid unification, without being able to negotiate the modalities in advance. Only Stjepan Radic´, the leader of the Croat Republican Peasants’ Party, spoke out against an immediate union.37 In Macedonian circles, there emerged just before the Paris Peace Conference an effort to work towards a Balkan Federation, in which a united and autonomous Macedonia would be a part. The supporter of this idea was the Macedonian colony in St Petersburg. The Federation should encompass Bulgaria, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Greece and Albania, or also just the Slavic states among them.38 The Macedonian student organisations in Switzerland also advocated an independent Macedonia under the protection of the Great Powers. They demanded the territory should be occupied by their troops, to put an end to the killing, and apply the principle of selfdetermination, to be guaranteed by a plebiscite. They also demanded that representatives at the Peace Conference be permitted to express the wishes of the Macedonian people. All this, however, remained completely without success, so that in the last session of the conference they proposed the equally unsuccessful idea of constituting Macedonia as an autonomous unit, which would then join the new Yugoslav state.39 The decision of the Paris Peace Conference to leave Macedonia divided into three parts, which was pushed through by the representatives of Serbia and France, was a severe shock for Macedonian public opinion.40 In some places the population refused to recognise this fact. For example, in Veles in January 1920, everyone hoped ‘that Macedonia would be independent. The morale of the population is good.’41 The basic differences between the ideas of the Slovenian and Croatian politicians on the one side and the Serbian ones on the other, regarding the structure of the state, soon showed themselves. The federalist and unitary concepts of the state confronted each other irreconcilably. The Serbian government was supported in its position at least by France, which already made it known in October 1918 that it favoured a unitary Yugoslavia along

INTRODUCTION

13

the lines of Poland and Italy. Every form of federalism would be ‘divisive’ and would weaken the country.42 For the Entente Powers a strong Yugoslavia was of great importance as a bulwark against revisionist neighbours and against the Bolshevik Soviet Union. The foreign policy situation was also difficult. Yugoslavia saw itself surrounded by a group of revisionist-minded neighbours, which had lost territories to the new state (Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria) or had not received as much as they had hoped (Italy). The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO), based in Bulgaria, operated partisan groups that carried out attacks with the aim ‘of making life impossible for the ruling authorities’.43 Only relations with Romania could be described as friendly, while the treatment of the Slavs in Greece – who understood themselves to be Macedonians and were designated differently by each of the other parties involved – and the Free Trade Area in Thessaloniki, repeatedly ensured disagreements between Belgrade und Athens. Relations with Albania were also changeable, as Albanian groups, and sometimes also IMRO groups, continued to operate from Albanian territory. In view of all these problems, these questions present themselves: what was supposed to hold this new state together? Which ideology of integration would take the lead? As in the words of Ernest Renan, a customs union is not a fatherland.44 In Macedonia the question was a dual one, as this territory was on the one hand supposed to be part of Serbia, and on the other hand an integral part of Yugoslavia.

The Current State of Research The history of Yugoslavia in the interwar years has by no means been exhaustively treated. In view of the significance of this period for the subsequent development of this region up to the present day, the achievements of previous scholarship are rather modest. The Yugoslavia of the interwar years was the first modern attempt to restructure this space outside large empires. The expectations of the nationally charged and, for the first time, united southern Slav peoples, which had finally liberated themselves from what they considered to have been foreign rule, were high. The failure of the kingdom of Yugoslavia and the experience of frustration by all concerned led to the political radicalisation of significant parts of the population, which burdened the entire subsequent development of Yugoslavia. A course was set, also in the economic field, which subsequently could no longer be changed. The choice of publications on Yugoslavia between the two world wars in Western European languages is modest.45 The available works also cover a very narrow field: they are dedicated mainly to foreign policy questions and

14

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

the main domestic political problem, namely the Serb-Croat relationship in its various aspects. Problems regarding other nationalities or social-historical questions, however, have so far scarcely been touched upon. One of the numerous gaps has been filled by the work of Martin Mayer on elementary education in interwar Yugoslavia.46 During the 1990s, the historiography of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has devoted itself increasingly – as applies also to the other successor states – to the previously neglected period between the two world wars.47 In the future further research contributions are to be expected. The history of Vardar Macedonia has been covered to a considerably lesser extent. In Western European languages there are only very few recent contributions. Most works, which generally cover much longer time spans and deal with the period of interest here only in passing, are already of an older date.48 Among the more recent studies, above all those of Stefan Troebst must be mentioned. He has concerned himself with the interwar period in several works. He has been especially interested in the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO), which operated against the Yugoslav state from bases in Bulgaria, and also in the international implications of the ‘Macedonian Question’.49 The dissertation of Spyridon Sfetas is also concerned with Macedonia as an object of contention.50 While it is often good and interesting regarding factual details, in terms of its analysis, it is heavily laden with ideology. The accusation he directs against the ‘historians in Skopje’, namely that they would scarcely have any space for research that is not tied to a purpose,51 can, at least in part, also be the thrown back at him. His perceptions, always caught up in his Greek-national standpoint, lead again and again to strange interpretations of the facts. As with the previous two authors, the book of Constantinos Farmakis also deals with the international aspects of the Macedonian issue between 1878 and 1961.52 The study of history in the Republic of Macedonia, which has only really existed since the end of World War II, has naturally concerned itself most intensively with the history of Macedonia. Since its beginnings it has been tied to a national and Marxist perspective and regarding the former this still largely applies today. Yet even the latter principle, which placed the actions and fate of the Communist Party (CP) of Yugoslavia in the centre of interest, still plays a role in some current works. To a certain extent this is all understandable, since the CP of Yugoslavia played a large part in ensuring that after World War II the partial Republic of Macedonia for the first time achieved a certain degree of statehood, and also that, within this entity, Macedonian nation-building – also with active support from the historiography – could develop itself further. Only then was it possible for

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15

‘the purposeful, organized, and institutionalized effort of a growing number of members of the forming nation to achieve the previously lacking attributes of national independence’.53 Narrowing the perspective to Communist actors, however, had the consequence that other currents, even national ones, which were not based on the left of the political scene or which followed another line than that of the Tito partisans, did not receive appropriate attention and research. Only slowly has a change of thinking started here. This is demonstrated above all in the attempt to rehabilitate individual exponents, who until a short time ago were seen as ‘non-persons’, such as the partisan and first chairman of ASNOM, Metodija Andonov-Cˇento, who was sentenced to 11 years in prison in 1946 because he advocated a united Macedonia, to be achieved through a referendum.54 Regarding historical time periods, for a long time the Ottoman period and World War II were in the foreground; the interwar period, on the other hand, was scarcely researched. In recent years, as in all Yugoslav successor states, this period has attracted increasing interest. For an initial overview of the interwar period from the Macedonian standpoint there are several useful essays.55 The works of Ivan Katardzˇiev and Aleksandar Hristov should be mentioned as the most important large synthetic contributions. Katardzˇiev presented a solid examination in his two-volume monograph published in 1977.56 The author approaches his work explicitly from a Macedonian standpoint; the Macedonian people are to be portrayed as the subject of his history.57 The work essentially deals with the Macedonian national question and the organisations and parties connected with it in all three parts of geographical Macedonia – that is also in Greece and Bulgaria. The various splinter groups of the IMRO as well as the Comintern, the Communist parties of the Balkan countries and the workers movement all take up a lot of space. The more comprehensive political, economic and social situation in Vardar Macedonia, however, forms only a small part of the voluminous work. The living conditions of the population and Yugoslav policy are treated relatively superficially under the headings ‘Repression’, ‘Denationalisation’, ‘Serbianisation’, and ‘Exploitation’. Katardzˇiev recently published the continuation of this work covering the 1930s.58 In the four-volume edition of Aleksandar T. Hristov on the ‘Founding of the Macedonian State, 1878 – 1978’, Volume 2 (234 pages) is dedicated to the period from 1919 to 1941.59 Like Katardzˇiev, Hristov also deals with all of geographical Macedonia and puts the main emphasis on questions related to the history of ideas. Regarding the Yugoslavian section, in the centre once again lie the CP of Yugoslavia, the Comintern, and the (united) IMRO.

16

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

Alongside these works, some local studies can be found, in which the 1920s and the 1930s are considered, either specifically or within a larger time frame.60 Other works, however, are dedicated to thematic questions, such as industry, the educational system, colonisation or the middle-class parties.61 The works of Risto Hristov on the economy in the countryside and in the cities deal primarily with economic, but at the same time also with social questions.62 The contribution of Blazˇe Ristovski consists especially in describing the significant personalities in Macedonian history.63 The already mentioned increased attention paid to the interwar period occurs mainly through the preparation of biographies concerning individual leading figures or by the publication of memoirs.64 Historians in Bulgaria and Greece also concern themselves with Macedonian history. Their works are also mostly heavily laden with ideology and subordinated to political aims. Since the independence of the Republic of Macedonia, in both countries the increased production of nationalistically coloured works on the history of Macedonia can be observed.65 On the Bulgarian side, especially the works of Kostadin Palesˇutski and Dimita˘r Gocev are to be mentioned for the period of interest here.66 For them – even if their analysis comes to different conclusions – similar questions are in the foreground to those of their Macedonian colleagues, namely the IMRO, the Communist parties and the Comintern. The social and economic conditions, as well as the complete Yugoslav framework, form a briefly sketched background to these questions.67 Bulgarian historiography with regard to Macedonia remains in the service of the state ideology, even if this has slightly changed. This process can be easily observed in the case of Palesˇutski. In 1983, in his presentation of the events in Vardar Macedonia in the interwar period, he combined the nationalist-Bulgarian and Communist viewpoints. Thus the socalled May Manifesto of 6 May 1924, in which the Comintern, the Communist Balkan Federation and the IMRO temporarily worked together, met with his complete support.68 Ten years later, under changed political conditions in Bulgaria, the same author now saw things only from a strictly Bulgarian nationalist standpoint. The idea of a Balkan Federation was abstract and remained purely propaganda, as it was a distraction from the national problems in the Balkans. The annexation of Macedonia to Bulgaria as an alternative solution for the Macedonian question had been pushed completely into the background.69 The greater Bulgarian tendency of the research of Palesˇutski becomes apparent also in the final sentence of the conclusion of his 1998 book: ‘To this day, Macedonia remains partitioned and denationalized.’70 With this he means that the Slavic inhabitants of the Republic of Macedonia, who understand themselves to be Macedonians with regard to nationality and have expressed this view, are really denationalised Bulgarians.

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17

Serbian historiography has until recently concerned itself little with Macedonia in the interwar period. That seems to be gradually changing. Some younger historians in Belgrade have in the meantime written articles on the Vardar Banovina or ‘South Serbia’. Most important so far is the work of Vladan Jovanovic´, which is rich in information.71 The author examines comprehensively the conditions in Macedonia, the Sanjak, Kosovo, and Metochia, in the period between 1918 and 1929. In his mainly descriptive work, he initially examines the state institutions systematically, before turning to the political conditions, the economy, culture and society. Overall one can say that the available, not very numerous studies – with the exception of the work of Vladan Jovanovic´, which is confined to just a part of the period under investigation here – circle around a relatively small complex of questions: Western research interests itself up to now above all for the international implications of the ‘Macedonian question’; the works stemming from the former socialist Balkan countries were up until a short time ago branded by Marxist historical theory, in which additionally the nationalist perspective – which actually should be alien to Marxism – has to be integrated. National interests dominate also a good part of the postsocialist historical writing. The most recent works from Macedonia itself are above all dedicated to specific personalities or concentrate on individual thematic or chronologically limited areas.

Aims of this Study In terms of domestic politics, the newly founded kingdom saw itself confronted by great challenges. For far-sighted politicians it had to be clear that one would have to work toward the rapid penetration of all parts of the country with common state structures, if Yugoslavia was going to survive. Additionally, a degree of equalisation between the very different regions was unavoidable. These were necessities that presented themselves with reference to different parts of the country. This study will examine the manner in which the centre in Belgrade took up these tasks. The following main questions remain at the heart of the matter: how did Belgrade try to gain control over this newly acquired territory and consolidate it? And how was it to be integrated into the new state on a long-term basis? As it had belonged to the Ottoman Empire for more than 500 years, Macedonia was in every respect (economic, in terms of transport, culturally) tied into a different, moreover, pre-modern system. Now for the first time (if one ignores the period from 1912 to 1918, which was too short and turbulent for changes) it was tied into a state that understood itself as modern, which wanted to regulate all aspects of life.72 With what means was it attempted to transform this part of the

18

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

country into a part of Serbia and of Yugoslavia? And how far was this successful? Furthermore, it is of great importance how the affected population reacted to the attempts at integration and assimilation at all costs by the state. An attempt will be made to clarify what function this region took on within the new state. Two alternatives in particular will be examined, which can be characterised as ideal types: the economically backward Macedonia could be dominated politically and culturally, and exploited economically. The older historiography spoke of ‘internal colonisation’, as, for example, in Michael Hechter’s study of England.73 This concept, however, is seen as problematic, as the legal status of colonies is basically quite different from that of the motherland. Since 1991, Hans-Heinrich Nolte has developed the concept of the ‘internal periphery’. In the context of the theory of world systems, the state is the focus of attention and an examination is conducted to see whether the conditions are organised in such a way that people living in the centre profit from this at the expense of regions on the periphery. The economy, social structure, religion, ideology and politics all serve as areas of investigation.74 Yugoslavia could also adopt a policy that aimed to reconstruct the newly acquired and severely war-damaged territories in the South as fast as possible, to promote them economically, introduce social and cultural changes, make possible political participation – in a word, work towards the modernisation of this region which was perceived to be heavily influenced by the Ottomans and very backward. This study aims to use the concept of internal peripheries, and an examination of the possible modernisation efforts, to show what the path of integration chosen by the centre in Belgrade actually looked like. What role was assigned to the South? Was it to some extent seen as the periphery, or was there serious debate about its undeniable problems, were solutions worked out? Was a programme developed in this connection and was it implemented? Who was concerned with Macedonia politically? How did it look with regard to the participation of local elites? What was the attitude of the population towards the government in Belgrade? The Yugoslav state, which could not legitimate its existence historically, was underpinned by modern ideology: it consisted allegedly of three names but one nation of Yugoslavs. However, against the claims of the ideologues, this nation still first had to be established. How far was this successful? Did a national consciousness develop in Vardar Macedonia, and if so, what kind? Was the self-identification as ‘Macedonians’, established above, reinforced and developed further? Was there an increase in identification with the Serbs, or did the stirrings of a Yugoslav nation develop?75 Above, the term ‘Belgrade Central’ was used. It appears to be suited, as it preserves the double function of Belgrade as the centre of both Yugoslavia and

INTRODUCTION

19

Serbia. The policy toward Macedonia was, on the one hand, determined by Serbian interests, but on the other hand in the first Yugoslavia there was never a territorial structure, which would have annexed ‘South Serbia’ administratively to ‘prewar Serbia’. On account of this, the events there were theoretically not an internal Serbian matter. The writing of history in Macedonia starts with the assumption that the assimilation of Macedonia was attempted on a purely repressive path. Through economic exploitation, police and military repression and forced denationalisation, it was attempted to Serbianise the newly acquired territory as fast as possible. That repression was an important part of the Macedonia policy, at least in the 1920s, cannot be doubted. Around the middle of the decade, 35,000 men of the security forces (soldiers, border troops, gendarmes, Chetniks) were given the task of maintaining peace and order in the region; 12,000 of the 17,000 gendarmes in the kingdom were stationed in Macedonia.76 During 1928, while the average across the country was one gendarme for every 674 inhabitants, in Macedonia there was one gendarme for every 102 inhabitants.77 Equally unquestioned is the fact that at this time in various ways an attempt was made to transmit to the population a Serbian national consciousness and thereby to legitimate the attachment of Macedonia to Serbia or Yugoslavia, and thereby stave off Bulgarian claims. It is the aim of this work, however, to examine to what extent other paths for integrating the south were followed. The question should be looked into whether the will existed to develop the region, which was perceived as very backward, and to make the local population into loyal citizens, rather than merely holding them in check as ‘subjects’. Beyond this, the question is also whether Yugoslavia, which in its totality was one of the least developed countries in Europe, had the capability at all to promote its backward regions. Did the central government succeed in winning over local elites for cooperation and thereby secure at least the participation of certain classes? Did the Serbian elite at a certain time move away from the idea of Serbianisation and propagate instead an overarching loyalty to Yugoslavia, which at the latest during the period of the royal dictatorship was supposed to be the actual state ideology?78 Were there groups within the population which accepted this offer to identify with the Serbian or Yugoslav nation? What political, economic and ideological categories were used in connection with Macedonia, and what image of ‘South Serbia’ was used in propaganda and how did these variables change in any case over time? Stefan Troebst has pointed out that under the Slovenian Interior Minister Anton Korosˇec in 1928 ‘a kind of development policy’ was taken up, which, however, on account of the frequent changes of government, remained a short-lived and ineffective matter.79 Palesˇutski noted that in the early and

20

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

mid-1930s, the opposition parties had almost completely stopped viewing the Macedonians as Serbs.80 And finally some key evidence: in the elections of 11 December 1938, mainly locals stood as candidates in Macedonia, whereas in 1927, 20 Serbs and two Macedonians had been elected.81 During this period, therefore, a local leadership elite must have established itself, which was ready to cooperate with the state. Yet so far these are only isolated indications of changes of course, as the 1930s has scarcely been researched. The available studies of the interwar period mostly cover the time up until the start of the royal dictatorship. This work should contribute to filling a gap in the literature by examining whether, and if so how, the policy towards ‘South Serbia’ changed in the period under examination and what consequences this had. On the other hand, it is also the aim to show how the population in Macedonia reacted to the measures from Belgrade. How was the settlement of colonists from other parts of the country received? How did people react to repression by the police and the military? Did the population respond to the changes in the 1930s? Alongside the activities of the IMRO both underground and abroad, did a legal political opposition also form internally? The previous studies of Macedonian researchers recognise and illuminate only the activities of the IMRO and the left side of the political spectrum. This intensively researched aspect will largely be excluded here. Instead an examination will be made of whether and how the middle-class parties worked for an improvement of the political and economic situation in their region and what results they thereby achieved. Only in passing, as far as is necessary, will foreign policy be illuminated, which is – as already mentioned – well documented. The question will also be pursued as to whether the policy toward Macedonia was stamped as purely Serbian or whether politicians from other parts of the country were also actively involved, either as part of the ruling coalition or in the opposition. In Macedonia in any case, there was at least in the politically active circles (for example among students) great interest in the Croat question, in the ‘Understanding’,82 and in cooperation, ‘since everything that the Croats are demanding, the Macedonians demand also’.83 The frame of reference for this investigation is Yugoslavia, unlike most Macedonian works, which always have the entire geographical region of Macedonia as their subject, including the Bulgarian and Greek parts. The Macedonian historians have tended to view the Serbian-dominated Yugoslavian state as one of the three opposing forces of the (entire) Macedonian people (the two others being Greece and Bulgaria). This study, on the other hand, is conceived as a contribution to the history of the Yugoslav state in the interwar period. The main chronological focus of the work is the 1930s, which have so far been studied even less than the 1920s.

INTRODUCTION

21

No single methodology will be used as the basis for this study; rather, various different approaches will be used in order to match the different facets of the questions being addressed. In part, this concerns questions of political history and the actions of those in power and political parties. With regard to the economy and infrastructure, it will be examined whether concepts and strategies were available to stimulate a spurt of development in the southern parts of the country.84 Thereby social aspects will repeatedly come into the field of vision. Furthermore, the analysis of educational policy is of importance, as education and especially its foundation, learning to read, is an important prerequisite for social mobilisation as well as economic development and therefore modernisation. In this sphere it is possible to rely on previous works, which in part have already been mentioned. This broad and methodologically complex approach should make it possible to draw the most comprehensive possible picture of Vadar Macedonia during the interwar period. Two areas that will not be examined in the framework of this study, namely the legal system and the Church, would be very fruitful areas for further research.

Regarding Sources For this study, primarily collections of the Yugoslav State Archives (Arhiv Jugoslavije) in Belgrade were used. Extensive materials from Belgrade archives could be examined in the Macedonian State Archive (Drzˇaven arhiv na Republika Makedonija, DARM) in Skopje, where they are available in the form of photocopies or microfilms. Here some information will be provided on the most important collections that were utilised. The archival collections in Belgrade as in Skopje contain large gaps. Thus the collection of the Interior Ministry in the Arhiv Jugoslavije is disappointing. It proves to be, in view of the importance of this Ministry, very modest and must have been correspondingly purged or suffered losses in some other manner. The materials of the Ministry of Education, on the other hand, present themselves as rich and fertile, among other reasons because papers from the Ministries of the Interior and the Army can be found there, as both constantly interfered in the affairs of the Ministry of Education. Very informative are the military files from the Military-Historical Institute (Vojnoistorijski Institut) in Belgrade, which are accessible as photocopies in the Archive of the Institute for National History in Skopje. The Army reports are revealing because they also provide information about many small everyday incidents: who behaved in what way and what they are supposed to have said. They comprise one of the rare sources in which the mood of the population is expressed – although filtered through the lens of this institution – and

22

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

where, in part, authentic quotations can be found. For the second half of the 1930s, the collection of ‘Milan Stojadinovic´’ is of great interest. The collection of the Central Press Office proved to be very fertile. The correspondent in Skopje reported regularly about events in the Vardar Banovina and also periodically wrote overview articles, for example, on the press landscape or on the economic situation in the Banovina. In Skopje only a meagre remnant of the Banovina Administration records can be found in the State Archive (Drzˇaven arhiv na Republika Makedonija). The greater part of this collection is lost and is suspected by Macedonian historians to be in Bulgaria, where it was supposedly taken during the occupation in World War II. For an external view of the situation in Yugoslavia and Macedonia, British materials in particular were used, which are archived in the British National Archives (former Public Record Office (PRO)) in Kew. These consist primarily of the correspondence between the British embassy in Belgrade – which also controlled a Vice Consulate in Skopje – and the Foreign Office. The yearly reports of the embassy have been published in the Croatian language.85 Also used were some documents from the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation (Archiv vnesˇnej politiki Rossijskoj Federacii) in Moscow.86 Under the rubric ‘external view’ also fall the works of foreign visitors to Yugoslavia as well as the correspondence of the British historian and publicist Robert William Seton-Watson. The latter was not only a profound expert on conditions in Yugoslavia, but was also in frequent contact with many personalities of political and cultural life there. Through his activities as a publicist, furthermore, his view of things was not without influence on public opinion in Great Britain and also upon the foreign policy of this great power. The knowledge gained from reading contemporary publications, especially the newspapers and journals, have made an especially valuable contribution. Not unexpectedly, it proved to be difficult to find self-testimonies of contemporaries. Several politicians (for example Milan Stojadinovic´, Vladko Macˇek, Aleksandar Cvetkovic´) have written memoirs or recollections. But especially what the ordinary people were thinking – what values, wishes, and goals they had – is very difficult to establish. For most of the period the regime was repressive: informants were lurking everywhere. Therefore hardly anyone dared to express his views openly, in case they did not correspond with the official line. Evidence of the views of ordinary people can be found most readily in letters, such as those to the Union of South Serbs in Belgrade (Udruzˇenje Juzˇnosrbijanaca) or in the requests and appeals for clemency addressed to the royal court.

CHAPTER 1 THE POLITICS OF THE 1920s

A Difficult Start for the New State The domestic and foreign political fields of conflict mentioned in the introduction led to unrest in large parts of the country that endured for several of years. In 1918–19, there was violence between Muslims and Orthodox Christians in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Montenegro, a civil war took place between ‘Whites’ (Pro-Serbs) and ‘Greens’ (supporters of the former Montenegrin king, Nicholas). The ‘Greens’ resisted the new state until 1924.1 Only in December 1924 did the Montenegrin Uprising come to an end.2 The disturbances were stronger than average in the southern parts of the country. Despite large contingents of the Army and the gendarmerie being deployed, anarchic conditions reigned, for example, in Kosovo and those parts of western Macedonia, settled mainly by Albanians, although a variety of reasons were believed to be the cause. While some people saw the banditry as a reflection of political dissatisfaction, others found the reason for the violence in the distinguishing features of the local society, such as the blood feud, and estimated the part played by anti-state sentiments as small. Nonetheless, it seemed to be clear that, above all, the Albanians in the countryside did not feel at home in the new state.3 In eastern Macedonia, left of the Vardar River, the attacks by the IMRO operating out of Bulgaria, as well as the state counter-measures, spread fear and terror. In 1921, the IMRO set its sights especially on the Serbian colonial villages, in order to direct the attention of international public opinion toward the Macedonian problem and to force the issue to be raised at the Genoa Conference (10 April to 19 May 1922). A corresponding appeal was submitted by the Macedonian Brotherhood in Bulgaria to the League of Nations on 6 April 1922.4 The Interior Ministry of the kingdom expected an intensification of the actions, so the Department for Public Security took preventive measures. Among other things, an Extraordinary Commissioner

24

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

for ‘South Serbia’ (and also one for Sanjak) was appointed. One of his responsibilities was to coordinate the conduct of the police, the gendarmerie, and the military in combating this activity. The other authorities on the spot were subordinated to him.5 The Macedonian question, however, was not put on the agenda in Genoa.6 The aim of the IMRO was to destabilise the Yugoslav state and find a new solution for Macedonia. Whether this would mean first autonomy and finally the entrance of Macedonia into a Balkan Federation or annexation by Bulgaria – also after an initial period of autonomy – is not always clear to discern within the complex history of the IMRO and its splinter groups and was also subject to change. For the politically interested part of the Macedonian population at the beginning of the 1920s, the membership of Vardar Macedonia in the Yugoslav state was also by no means definitive, as the territory had only fallen to the kingdom of Serbia in 1913 and had been occupied by Bulgaria during World War I. The outcome of the war then resulted in Vardar Macedonia returning to Serbia and, as a part of the latter, it now found itself in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Various scenarios regarding an alternative future were in circulation. A part of the large number of emigrants in Bulgaria7 were in favour of annexation to Bulgaria. Others demanded an independent Macedonia as a protectorate of the League of Nations or England and France.8 According to the Bulgarian Vasil Kolarov, who in 1922–3 was the General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, the great mass of Macedonian emigrants wanted an honest autonomous policy and no annexation. In the leadership, on the other hand, there were still people who were in contact with the Bulgarian nationalists.9 What people in Vardar Macedonia itself thought about this is harder to establish, since nobody there could speak openly about it. Hermann Wendel, however, reports about a young man from Bitola, who demanded ‘an autonomous Macedonia with its own government and Parliament in Skopje within the framework of a Southern Slav Federal State’.10 The students from Ohrid, who were studying in Graz and Vienna, also dreamed of an autonomous Macedonia, as the Yugoslav General Staff knew.11 A Serbian nationalist high school teacher in Prilep was also convinced of this, as he informed the Interior Ministry in 1926, that the young students from Macedonia [sic] in Vienna, Graz, Berlin, Paris and Montpellier were discussing an autonomous Macedonia, the theory of Macedonian nationality and about having their own Macedonian language. Recently one senses both here and also among these student groups abroad a lively joy, which comes from the hope that the possibility of an imminent splitting off of an independent Macedonia exists and that the Macedonian Committee12 will be successful in this question.13

THE POLITICS OF THE 1920S

25

Activity directed towards autonomy in Macedonia itself was only possible with difficulty on account of the permanent observation. Corresponding manifestations were more likely to be risked in Belgrade. The student Dragomir Saratinovic´-Saratin from Prilep agitated for an independent Macedonia and for a Balkan Federation in 1927 at the time of the parliamentary elections using the protection of the autonomy of the university. Nonetheless, he was arrested at the exit of the university and was taken to Prilep, which he was not permitted to leave.14 When an autonomous Macedonia was demanded, generally this meant a united Macedonia in its geographical borders, as was also formulated by Todor Aleksandrov.15 For those in power in Serbia any form of autonomy was completely unthinkable. Already during the Peace Conference in 1919, Serbia, with the support of France, had resisted determinedly and successfully an Italian proposal of autonomy for Macedonia within the SHS state. In 1924, the Foreign Minister Momcˇilo Nincˇic´ explained to the British ambassador that this territory was the cradle of the Serbian race and any intervention by the League of Nations would not be tolerated. M. Nincic was very emphatic that he would never admit that the provisions of the treaty [Treaty for the Protection of Minorities] apply to the so-called Bulgarian Macedonians. The phraseology of the clauses, the words ‘race and religion’ had been specially chosen so as not to include this case: otherwise he said, the Serbs would never have signed either that treaty or the Treaty of Neuilly.16 Public opinion in England did feel some sympathy for Macedonia in 1924, but it was clear to the British politician that no regime in Serbia would take up a different position.17 Accordingly during the entire interwar period with regard to Macedonia, the British advocated maintaining the status quo. In addition, for example, in 1924 the British ambassador in Belgrade, Alban Young, was of the opinion that the assimilation of the Macedonians with the rest of the Serbian population would give the Balkans more peace than a new Macedonian state scarcely capable of surviving, as desired by Todor Aleksandrov.18 The measures for suppressing the IMRO had far-reaching consequences, especially for the population of eastern Macedonia, which more and more became caught between the anvil and the hammer. The gendarmerie strove to gain complete control over the relevant localities and their population, and to prohibit freedom of movement. The peasants were partly forbidden to graze their cattle in the meadows, to go into the forests, and farm remote pieces of land. Constant interrogations spread fear and uncertainty and demonstrated

26

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

the power of the state.19 The population felt the imposition of having to supply the units of the Army as extremely oppressive, such that they proposed fighting against ‘the bandits’ themselves, if only the soldiers were withdrawn. As the prefect (nacˇelnik) of Kumanovo wrote, that was certainly the intention behind putting the burden of the Army onto the population.20 Next to the large number of soldiers and gendarmes, the ‘Union against the Bulgarian bandits’ (Udruzˇenje protiv bugarskih bandita) was also intended to provide security. This organisation was founded by the authorities on 9 September 1923 in the eastern Macedonian town of Sˇtip and placed under the leadership of Mihaljo Kalamatijevic´, who on 2 October 1922 was wounded himself during an assassination attempt. The Union raised uniformed and armed ‘counter-bandits’ (kontracˇeti) that were paid by the state. Among its membership were also renegades from the IMRO. In every place a village head was appointed, who led this local militia. At strategically important locations, shacks were erected in which farmers were to be on guard throughout the year and occasionally in the coldest months froze to death.21 As a further measure a curfew was introduced: after 6.00 pm, nobody was permitted to remain in the fields; in the event of a violation shots would be fired without warning.22 Membership in the ‘Union against the Bulgarian bandits’ was theoretically voluntary, but in reality, according to the British deputy Consul in Skopje, it was coerced.23 According to the reports of the French General Consul in Thessaloniki, M.E. Dobrowolski, at the same time similar things were taking place in Greece: the rural population of Macedonia was supplying the groups of partisans (Komitadji, komiti) with food and clothing and keeping them informed about the measures taken by the gendarmerie. On account of this, the Greeks arrested large numbers of ‘Bulgarian’ peasants. On account of his 20 years of experience in Macedonia, Dobrowolski was of the opinion that the Serbs, like the Greeks, were exaggerating the importance of the Komitadji partisans, in order to justify their population policy in Macedonia. He was convinced that both states were pursuing the same goal with similar means: rendre la vie impossible aux populations dont on veut se de´barrasser, pre´cipiter l’e´migration par des mesures de police pre´sente´es comme indispensables pour purger le pays des bandes qui s’y trouvent, s’emparer des terres, des [maisons], des instruments de culture abandonne´s ou confisque´s et les donner a` ces immigrants croates, slove`nes ou grecs d’Asie Mineure, suivant le [cas], pour y former une [majorite´] permettant au vainqueur de re´gner sans conteste sur le pays. [make life impossible to the populations one wanted to get rid of, enhance the emigration by police measures which are presented as

THE POLITICS OF THE 1920S

27

indispensable for the cleansing of the land from the bands, take over the deserted or confiscated land, houses, agricultural tools and give them to these Croat, Slovenian or Asian Minor Greek immigrants – depending on the case – to form a majority which allows the winner to reign the country without contest.] However, in the view of Dobrowolski, as a result of the great losses during World War I, Serbia had insufficient population strength to send emigrants to Macedonia, rather Croatia was better suited to act as the ‘supplier’. For Greece, in contrast, the refugees from Asia Minor provided the necessary reserves.24 The lawyer S. Tatic´, who worked in Strumica, was also of the opinion in 1924 that the danger from the partisans was being blown up out of proportion. The press, in its craving for sensation, was exaggerating excessively the insecurity of the situation in the South and thereby scaring the officials and also possible investors. Yet here personal security and the security of property were greater than anywhere else in the country.25 Indeed, the low level of crime in Macedonia was always being stressed, yet this could do nothing to improve the image of the region, which had been spoiled by the politically motivated assassinations. The authorities were eager to find out the extent to which the local population really supported the IMRO and what their attitude toward the state was. Yet it was not easy to achieve clarity on this point. The prefect (sreski nacˇelnik) of the Kavadarci District, who was supposed to deliver a report on the political mood in his jurisdiction, was scarcely able to fulfil this assignment, as according to his observations, the population already under Turkish rule had learned to be mistrustful. He had visited all the communities in the districts (srezovi) Strumica, Dojran and Gevgelija, and asked the inhabitants about the work of the authorities. On this trip he had only come across two people who complained. The prefect, however, did conclude by any means that this circumstance was due to the satisfactory activity of the authorities, but assigned it, doubtless correctly, to insufficient trust. He thought that this people could only be won over through the schools and the teachers, and for this reason recommended urgent investment in education.26 The tense situation in Macedonia and the tough measures of the authorities served to prompt the parliamentarians from this region to take action. Already on 15 December 1920, only two weeks after elections to the constitutiongranting assembly, the representatives of the Democratic Party from Macedonia and Kosovo – mostly non-locals – formed within the Democratic Club the ‘Group of Parliamentarians of South Serbia’, which had its own secretariat. Although political heavyweights like Kosta Stojanovic´ and Kosta Kumanudi were among them, the Club disapproved of this development. But the group

28

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

Figure 1.1 A Detachment of the ‘Union against the Bulgarian Bandits’, Strumica 1924 or 1925 (DARM, 1.870.2/1919 –1941)

insisted on their existence and continued to work. They laid before the party leadership, the Democratic Club and the government, the special concerns of the region they represented, of which the most important were: 1. In ‘South Serbia’ nothing should be done without consulting first the local population and their parliamentary representatives. For pacification it is only permitted to go after individual enemies of the state, but under no circumstances the mass of the population. 2. The constitution and the law must be fully observed and not remain a fiction as until now, or only be applied in the sense of party interests. State policy has to be conducted and not party policy. Economic and social reforms are to be included in the party programme. 3. In domestic policy the security of property and persons must be guaranteed. Also needed is an honest bureaucracy with as many local forces and people as possible who know the region and are trusted by the local population. When these things cannot be achieved, idealistic young university graduates should be appointed. Abuse of office is to be given exemplary punishment, in order that trust can be won. For the pacification operations an executive committee should be established in Skopje under the direction of a respected politician, who has the entire state apparatus at his disposal, as this region cannot be ruled from Belgrade. 4. Tobacco and opium production has to be increased and its processing freely permitted. For the purposes of levying a tax the Banderole System is to be

THE POLITICS OF THE 1920S

Figure 1.2

29

Muslim Women in Veles (Mazedonien, p. 51)

introduced. Tobacco will be ever more important for ‘South Serbia’, as the planting of poppies and vineyards has declined. 5. Above all, the repair and construction of the transport links is of great importance, as without them ‘South Serbia’ cannot live.27 In retrospect, it is impressive how precisely the most important problems of Macedonia were already formulated at this early point, presented in an

30

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

adequate manner, and suggestions for solutions proposed. It was precisely on these points that the population there felt the pinch in its shoes 20 years later. The question of the constitution, on the other hand – whether the country should be structured centrally or federally – which in 1921 was so important for the Croats, does not appear to have been an issue in Macedonia. The repressive character of the regime in this region of the country did not permit any voices critical of the government. In addition, there was no political organisation, like the Croat Peasants Party, which could be the vehicle for an opposition. The Communist Party was forbidden, and the other influential parties, the ‘Radicals’ and the ‘Democrats’, belonged to the Serbian centralist camp on the question of the constitution. The agreement of the Muslim party, Dzˇemijet, with the centralist constitution was bought by concessions to the Albanian and Turkish estate owners.28 The representatives from Macedonia were divided among two parliamentary Clubs (‘Democrats’ and ‘Radicals’) and had to see that the decisive forces in these Clubs had no understanding for the needs of their region. Primarily party politics were pursued and people looked out for their personal careers. The ‘Democrats’ of ‘South Serbia’ protested against this kind of work with a memorandum, which they wanted to raise in their Club, but it never came to this.29 Neither the Club nor the government would listen to the Macedonian ‘Group of Parliamentarians’ and the above-mentioned initiatives remained without consequences. In this connection, the Democratic representative, Mihailo Sˇusˇkalovic´, complained that everyone viewed the state as his dowry and ultimately only used it for his own interests; he noted the lack of a shared guiding principle. Every opponent became an enemy of the state, and was denounced as a separatist, autonomist, constitutional revisionist, godless, enemy of the monarchy and wrecker of the state. He accused the Radical Party of favouring the reactionary Begs,30 in order to keep ‘South Serbia’. He also harshly criticised his own party. The ‘Democrats’ had won a good number of seats in the south, namely 24, but those elected were not to the liking of the party leadership. They were trying to split the group and to win over individuals with concessions for their constituency or for them personally. But many of these promises were not fulfilled. According to Sˇusˇkalovic´, some left the Club for this reason and wanted to found a new Democratic Club together with the leftist groups from other parties, the Democratic Peasants Dissident Club (Agrarni demokratski disidentski klub), which should primarily be active socially and economically in the village. Sˇusˇkalovic´, a doctor who was born in Sarajevo as a Serb, who according to his own account had been an activist for the Serbian national cause (nacionalni radnik) for 30 years in this region, complained bitterly that the government

THE POLITICS OF THE 1920S

31

did not treat ‘South Serbia’ as the liberated cradle of the Serbian people and the main axis of the state, but rather as a conquered territory in which only the intentions of the conqueror and his privileged classes were implemented. The people were viewed as incapable of upholding their share in the state. ‘“South Serbia” has remained until today a stepchild, in no branch of the state administration has anything improved.’31 The comments of Sˇusˇkalovic´ summarise very well the dilemma which faced policy towards Macedonia since the founding of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes: theoretically for Belgrade, ‘South Serbia’ was a regained part of the core territory of Serbia: the brothers there were finally liberated from the Turks and reunited with the north. In addition, the territory was of strategic importance for the new state. In practice, however, Macedonia was treated like enemy territory, the population experienced mistrust and scorn. Immediately after the establishment of the state, Macedonia and Kosovo were the only regions to be administered with special decrees (uredbi), which had already been enforced from 1913 to 1915.32 As soon as Serbia had reconquered Macedonia in October 1918, it imposed these decrees once again. It prohibited the local population from any political activity and threatened the most severe punishments for anti-state propaganda.33 In the parliamentary session on 21 May 1919, the representative Antonije Todorovic´ from Macedonia complained bitterly about the administration by decrees ‘without us and for us’.34 The government in Belgrade in the spring of 1919 was still dominated by the fear that at the peace conferences it might be decided to hold a plebiscite in Macedonia. Nikola Pasˇic´, who was conducting the negotiations in Paris, urged Prime Minister Stojan Protic´ from there, to make preparations in case of this eventuality so that the population did not vote to join Bulgaria. The Muslim Begs could order the Muslims and Albanians to vote ‘for Serbia, for Yugoslavia’. Protic´ should send the best teachers and officials to ‘Old Serbia [Kosovo and Metochia] and Macedonia’, as well as the Red Cross and all the humanitarian organisations, to help the poor. ‘Don’t spare any expense, in order to save Old Serbia and Macedonia [for Serbia]’ – but all this was to be done secretly. Even if a plebiscite did not take place, all these efforts would still not have been wasted.35 The discriminatory regulations mentioned above were removed again on 16 August 1919, when it became clear at the Paris Peace Conference that the Macedonian question would not be resolved to the disadvantage of Serbia. After this, the Serbian constitution of 1903 was applied to Macedonia.36 The early call for the ‘best officials’ for Macedonia was to remain a lasting demand, but the ‘good’ officials did not want to go to this region under any circumstances. As it was explained in a 1921 newspaper article, life in ‘South Serbia’ entailed many unpleasant situations. Particular types of food were not

32

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

available, anarchy reigned, the people were ‘uncultivated’, it was scarcely possible to find an acceptable accommodation: the ‘apartments’ presented themselves as cottages full of pests. On top of this, everything was more expensive than in the north – including Belgrade! No wonder, therefore, that the civil service posts in the South were very unpopular and the officials were frequently exchanged. The author suggested on account of this that the best officials should be sent there for three years and that afterwards they should be permitted to go to the posting of their choice. In addition, these years of service should count double. Due to the high living costs, the extra pay should be 50 per cent more, not just 25 to 35 per cent, and it should be the duty of the state to build apartments and hotels.37 According to the observations of the German Social Democrat Hermann Wendel, the Serbian officials and officers in Macedonia felt as if they were in ‘a colony far from the world, in exile, in Siberia; the men cut a grin-and-bear-it patriotic face and count the days, the women sigh: Oh Kragujevac! Oh Valjevo! Oh Negotin! They scarcely dare to sigh: Oh Belgrade!’38 This is not a surprise, as even Skopje itself in 1930 was still a place which could stir little enthusiasm among more demanding souls: ‘It continues however to be a dirty, unpleasant and unhealthy place. It is a centre for malaria, which is generally the curse throughout the whole of Macedonia’. Yes, there were many new buildings, but when it rained, the mud stood knee-deep.39 Not only officials felt as if they had been exiled to a colony as a punishment, the impression was widespread, that Serbia was treating Macedonia like a colony. One author thought, in 1922, that not one single honest and capable official had come to this territory, but only convicts and people with a skeleton in the cupboard, who bled the population dry. If you asked a supervisor: ‘Why was Macedonia being treated in this way?’ The answer was: ‘Because they are nearly all Bulgaromans (bugarasˇi)!’40 The dissatisfaction with the existing regime in broad circles of the Macedonian population expressed itself at the ballot box with a high vote for the Communists, which represented an alternative to the ruling parties. Already in the local elections on 22 August 1920, the CP was successful in some places and formed the executive in Veles, Kavadarci, Kumanovo and in various villages. In the second round of voting the Communists were victorious also in Skopje.41 In the first parliamentary elections of the new state on 28 November 1920, 22 parties or groups put up candidates. In the entire country, only 65 per cent of those entitled to vote went to the polls, and only a little over half of them voted for the governing ‘Democrats’ and ‘Radicals’, although they had deployed all possible forms of pressure. Of the 419 seats, 92 went to the Democratic Party, 91 to the Radicals, 59 to the Communists (one seat was

THE POLITICS OF THE 1920S

33

later taken away from them), and 50 to the Croatian Republican Peasants’ Party of Radic´, which thereby went from being an unimportant group to the most important representative of Croatian interests. The Agrarians (Peasants’ Union) won 39 seats, the Slovenian People’s Party 27, and the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation 24.42 In Macedonia the electoral turnout at 56.3 per cent was below the national average.43 The most votes, namely 38 per cent, went to the Communists, who won 15 representatives in Macedonia. Eleven elected parliamentarians belonged to the Democratic Party, five to the Dzˇemijet, and two to the Radical Party.44 The good result for the Communists fed mistrust towards the population of Macedonia, which henceforth was viewed as Communist and unreliable. After these results, there was a search for those to blame within the government apparatus. The Interior Minister recommended the punishment of all those responsible, who had permitted people to vote for the Communists. Thus the prefect of Sˇtip levied a fine of 100 dinar on all the policemen, except for those in whose jurisdiction the middle-class parties had won.45 The success of the Communists alarmed the authorities even more, as it was connected with the IMRO. The prefect of Tikvesˇ therefore gathered all the district heads and the gendarmerie commanders and agreed, among others, the following measures to combat communism as well as the IMRO: . . . . . . . . .

Certain villages should be isolated and in general the shepherds – as a suspiciously mobile part of the population – were to be observed. The inhabitants of the villages Gradec, Konjsko, Petrovo and Serminin were to be resettled. The garrisons in the towns of the south-east (for example in Kavadarci, Valandovo and Strumica) had to be reinforced. Communist officials were to be removed. The payment for informers should be raised. The gendarmerie posts were to be reinforced by personnel from Serbia. Movements from one community to another were henceforth to require permission. The local priests were to be replaced by priests from within the ‘old borders’, i.e. Serbia. After the reinforcement of the garrisons a start should be made immediately on the collection of taxes and conscription for the military, as Communist agitation had been directed especially against these two measures.46

Already one month after the electoral success, the activity of the Communist Party was suppressed with the infamous obznana of 29–30 December 1920,

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on the pretext that a putsch was being prepared. The packet of measures in the decree included a ban on all propaganda activity by the CP, trade unions and the Communist Youth Organisations, and the introduction of press censorship and a ban on gatherings. Mass arrests of Communists, confiscations, and the dissolution of all Communist local authorities followed. On 2 August 1921, following two assassination attempts, the government banned the Communist Party, the representatives lost their seats, and more than 2,300 Communists were arrested.47 Whilst in the course of the first half of the 1920s the politically motivated violent conflicts declined in other parts of the country, for many years this was certainly not the case in Macedonia. The year 1923 was marked by especially severe incidents. On 16 January, the partisan group of Jovan Brlo murdered 23 colonists in Kadrifakovo near Sˇtip and set the village ablaze. Six weeks later, on 2 March, Komitadji arrived in the village of Garvan near Radovisˇ and killed two soldiers in an exchange of fire with the Army. In response, the prefect (zˇupan) of Sˇtip, Dobrica Matkovic´, had all the male inhabitants of Garvan shot without trial: in total there were 28 people, including three youths. According to the Central Press Bureau, between 14 April 1922 and 9 March 1930, 63 attacks were carried out in Vardar Macedonia, which in response drew increased state reprisal measures in the form of mass arrests and physical abuse.48 Around 35,000 people (soldiers, border troops, gendarmes, Chetniks) were deployed, in order to secure peace and order.49 In 1927, the number of Yugoslav soldiers in the border area outnumbered those of the Bulgarians fourfold or fivefold.50 Securing the border was of course necessary, but it was only a means and not the real purpose, in the opinion of an author in the Zagreb newspaper, Slobodna tribuna, on 10 March 1923. ‘The Macedonians, our unfortunate brothers, must finally also get to feel the positive sides of government power’, namely that it also means ‘a decent school, a good road, an honest State Administration and public security’. And that the taxes corresponded to the achievements.51 Reality was, however, still very distant from this. On 2 August 1923, Serb gendarmes fired shots into the crowd, which was celebrating the day of St Elijah (Ilinden) and the twentieth anniversary of the anti-Ottoman uprising in 1903; they killed ten people.52 The Communist newspaper in Belgrade, Radnik, described, in its edition on 30 August 1923, the manner in which the villages in south-east Macedonian were ‘purged’ of komiti: the Army would usually surround a village and gather the peasants. An officer addressed them, making them aware of the ban on supporting the partisans and demanding the surrender of their weapons. Immediately after this the abuse started. Whilst a section of the soldiers and gendarmes were busy beating the men, the others went through the village, raping, plundering and setting things

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on fire.53 The Ottoman troops used to proceed in exactly this manner, when they searched a village for weapons and partisans.54 According to the historian Vladimir Dedijer, who bases himself on material which the Institute for National History in Skopje has collected, between 1918 and 1929 in Vardar Macedonia, some 25,000 peasants and citizens passed through the prisons; 1,400 peasants were the victims of political murders, 17 villages and 1,342 farmhouses were burned down by the security forces. In 1928 alone, there were 16 political trials with 171 defendants.55 It may have been the escalation of terror and counter-terror which in 1923 caused Zˇivojin (Zˇika) Lazic´, the Head of the Department for Public Security within the Interior Ministry, to consider also other types of measures apart from repression. In a letter to the society Sveti Sava he drafted a political programme for Macedonia, which at this time was still very often referred to by this name. The head of the Security Department was convinced that the goal should be to unite Macedonia again with Serbia in such a way that the hundreds of years of ‘separation’ could no longer be felt. One had to pay close attention to ‘Old Serbia’ and Macedonia – from the economic, cultural and national standpoint – especially Macedonia, the sick and infected side (zarazena strana) of our national body . . . Above all one must heal it from foreign influence, which has left deep traces there . . . This cold and suspicious people, our brothers of the bloody Bregalnica56 and the unfortunate Placˇkovica,57 have to be warmed with love from Sˇumadija.58 In his opinion, this people had to be rescued from the darkness, in which it had been stumbling around for almost half a century – that is since the start of the Bulgarian propaganda. Then the unification would be easy. And one can say with certainty that the root of the Croatian question, as all separatist questions, lies in the Macedonian question, for if Macedonia was more closely tied to Sˇumadija and grew to be a part of it, small-minded separatist longings would not be in a position to shake the building of State and destroy its very foundations. Lazic´ envisaged that a well thought out educational offensive was the best method to bring closer that ‘element’, which was still not aware of its freedom and unity. He still feels himself to be a ‘Macedonian’ and will say this to foreigners in our shared house. It appears to him that we are not his brothers, who have

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liberated him, but conquerors. This false consciousness of conquest has to be replaced by reality and these misled brothers have to be steered to the actual understanding of their situation. The Bulgarian prism, through which he sees everything around him – since the organization of the komiti is always before his eyes – has to be removed, to make it possible for him to see clearly the historical development, which has decided his fate. He has to be convinced, that he is in his own house and is his own master. The school was the best-suited place to start. The Interior Ministry – and not, for example, the Education Ministry – held the view that the teaching staff should be recruited from reliable locals, who were trained in Serbia and then sent back to Macedonia. During the four years of training these youths would be soaked in the spirit of Sˇumadija and ‘born again’, thereby becoming ‘pure national crystal’. Lazic´ recommended to begin with Sˇtip in eastern Macedonia, which on the one hand he viewed as the centre of the Bulgarian propaganda, but where he suspected there were many talented male and female students in the high school. Because the female soul is more gentle, more sensitive, and more receptive to the impressions of its surroundings, and because the High School in Sˇtip has a considerable share of female students, and because the woman is at the same time a mother, who also educates her children at home, it is recommended also to select some of the suitable female students for the teacher training courses. The society Sveti Sava was requested by the Interior Ministry – and this was the purpose of the letter – ‘to take up this suggestion and to try to implement it’.59 This letter of the Head of the Security Department is a powerful piece of evidence, as it serves as an ideal type for many aspects of the way Macedonia was viewed and treated by Belgrade. On the ideological level it demonstrates the tendency to look back to the Middle Ages, when Macedonia – alongside large parts of the rest of the Balkans – for a time had belonged to the Serbian Empire. This condition of unity had now to be restored. The period when Serbian identity was seen to have been especially damaged was interestingly not the more than 500 years of Ottoman rule, but rather during the previous half century, during which Bulgaria subjected the still Ottoman Macedonia to an intensive propaganda campaign and covered it with schools and its church organisation. This perspective is revealing, as the Turks were no longer a factor in the Balkans, while Bulgaria still played a major role in the Macedonian question, precisely in the 1920s. The intellectual confusion of Macedonia,

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which partly found expression in that it had fallen victim to Bulgarian propaganda, had to be cured by excessive love. It is significant – and this would remain the case until the end of the 1930s – that anyone who designated himself to be a ‘Macedonian’ was declared to be a ‘Bulgaroman’ (bugarasˇ). For Lazic´ it becomes clear that he considered Macedonia to be central for the stability of the new state: if Serbia is strong thanks to a reliable, incorporated Macedonia, it is possible to confront the separatist tendencies of the Croats with confidence. The conclusion of the letter is revealing. The Ministry does draw up scenarios for the spiritual and national ‘reunification’ with Macedonia, but it tries to avoid paying the costs involved and wants to delegate implementation to the Saint Sava Society. The Interior Ministry was fully aware of the scale of the task involved in integrating Macedonia. In a letter of 28 December 1923 to the Education Minister Milosˇ Trifunovic´, it stated clearly that the population there was not Serbian, and if Macedonia was to remain within the Yugoslav borders, the people had to be Serbianised. Among other things it recommended: The previous solitary action of the police and the military for the defence of peace and order must be accompanied by a cultural and educationalpolitical action. In this, cultural groups of fighters (cˇeti) and educationchetniks must be deployed . . . Priests, teachers, doctors, judges, professors, police and finance officials, economists, officers, and others – they must all become our national missionaries. Among our intellectuals down there a movement has to be initiated for the establishment of humanitarian associations, sport, chevaliers, falconry, singing, theatre, shooting, and people’s educational societies, for the creation of reading rooms and setting in motion absolutely everything necessary that can strengthen the national consciousness and our culture, and especially our influence.60 The ideas and needs of the Macedonian population were heading in a different direction, as a document from 1920 shows. On 30 January of that year, soon after the town of Strumica in the south-eastern tip of the country fell to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from Bulgaria, the population there sent a delegation to Belgrade, which presented the Chairman of the Cabinet, alongside expressions of loyalty, praise for the Serbian Army and thanks for their liberation, its proposals and demands in 12 points. Among other things, these were desired: . .

opening a full high school for boys and girls; installing regular telegraph and telephone communications, as well as a bus line to the railway station in Udovo;

38 . . .

. .

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

a construction plan should be drawn up for the city, which was largely destroyed by fire in 1913, and a loan for the reconstruction approved; the peasants should be given loans for the purchase of draught animals and equipment; in addition, the demand that the rivers be regulated and the swamps drained, in order to remove the source of malaria and so that agricultural land could be won; with the sale of the latter the costs of the improvements could be covered; the establishment of a hospital and of pharmacies; the solution of the agricultural question, as in Strumica and its surroundings, 80 per cent of the population worked on the land of the Turkish estate owners.

The petitioners also demanded, however, that the garrison be reinforced and the border secured against incursions from outside.61 The letter from the population of Strumica is remarkable in two respects. First, one is struck by the self-confidence with which the demands are placed before the highest authority. In the letter the hope is even expressed that it might be received by the heir to the throne. The authors clearly assumed that their concerns would be taken seriously. This assuredness probably came from the conviction that the state, to which they had fallen from out of the hands of the enemy, Bulgaria, really was going to make a positive example of them. Second, the contents are impressive as they represent an almost complete plan for the development of the towns, which also accurately sketches the needs of the whole of Vardar Macedonia. Demanded here are better transport and communications links, credits as well as investments in education, the health system and in agriculture. A construction plan, as demanded for Strumica in 1920, was only taken up, even in Skopje, in 1929, when with Josif Mihailovic´ a convinced urbanist became the mayor.

The ‘Macedonian Party’ The efforts to represent Macedonia’s interests more efficiently in the Parliament, the skupsˇtina, as described by Sˇusˇkalovic´, were not abandoned after the sobering experience of the initial years. The elections on 18 March 1923 provided an opportunity for forces to regroup. In this connection an article on 10 March 1923, in the newspaper Ilinden, produced by Macedonian emigrants in Sofia, pointed out that, by chance, in all three countries among which Macedonia had been divided, elections were to take place, and proposed putting up Macedonian lists everywhere. In the Serbian part, such a list was scarcely permitted, but

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‘sons of Macedonia’, who had been elected for other parties, could group together after the election to achieve the same goal.62 Indeed, the parliamentarians from Vardar Macedonia tried to found an independent ‘Macedonian Party’ during the course of 1923. Accounts of these events are sparse and contradictory, such that some things remain unexplained. The first reports of a ‘Macedonian group’ can be found in the newspaper Vecˇernja posˇta on 20 July 1923. There it states that on the initiative of the Democratic Representatives Gligor Anastasijevic´ and Trajko Plavsˇevic´ a youth organisation with the name ‘Macedonian group’ (Makedonska grupa) was founded in Kumanovo, which was to unite the young ‘Democrats’. Anastasijevic´ held conferences to this end in both Skopje and Kumanovo. Some ‘Radicals’ also from ‘South Serbia’ were supposed to join them. The movement was to bear the name ‘Macedonian national youth’ (Makedonska nacionalna mladina). The goal of the organisation was the cultural and political promotion of Macedonia.63 In the Zagreb newspaper Slobodna tribuna on 15 September 1923, Gligor Anastasijevic´ spoke more extensively about this topic in an interview. He criticised the fact that in the meantime the situation in Macedonia was worse than in 1919. Nobody was sure of their life, and everyone had to expect that they would be arrested and abused. ‘The prisons were fully packed, above all with peasants, who were accused of having contacts with the Komitadjis (komiti)’. More than a few people died from physical abuse. Regarding the events in Garvan, he had demanded a parliamentary inquiry, but the majority had opposed this. Asked about the ‘Macedonian Party’, Anastasijevic´ denied its existence. The initiators had not imagined a Macedonian political group but rather a comprehensive organisation which should unite the entire spectrum of political life in Macedonia, so that more could be achieved for the population there: more security and respect, equal rights with the rest of the country, and freedom. This organisation should possess the necessary clout, to demand greater means from the state for cultural and economic development and also to receive it. Anastasijevic´ had established that those people were successful in Parliament, who advocated for their region with closed ranks. The organisation had no separatist, autonomous, or anti-state goals. This movement was rather to win back the trust of the citizens in the state. Later, when the movement was established, it would be dissolved within a statewide group. The people in Macedonia had received this idea enthusiastically. Obstructing this action would be a new sin and new violence.64 Apparently the first advance in this direction was made in the Democratic Club – as in 1920. Anastasijevic´ complained in October 1923 that in his party the interests of the Macedonian parliamentarians did not reach beyond

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the Club. All of political life was absorbed by the Croatian Question; Macedonia was not receiving any attention at all, which was why chaos reigned there. This region, which in every respect fulfilled its duties to the state, was being overlooked and existential problems like public security, the agrarian question, transport routes, the renewal of production, the condition of the forests, emigration and many others were not being tackled. Anastasijevic´ believed that the fragmentation among Macedonian parliamentarians was the reason for this desolate state of affairs. Therefore, he and some of his friends intented to do everything they could to overcome this ‘passion for party’ in Macedonia, which was skilfully fostered from Belgrade. To this end, a Macedonian parliamentary group was to be formed, which would be based on an independent organisation among the people. According to Anastasijevic´, the Democratic Club condemned this plan in its meetings of 20, 22 and 25 July 1923, as it could be of benefit to the separatists and autonomists. In response, Anastasijevic´ resigned from the Club and from the leadership of the Democratic Party.65 The parliamentarians from Kavadarci blamed the ‘Democrats’ and the other parties for systematically obstructing the problems of Macedonia from being put on the agenda of the Parliament. All of the efforts of the Macedonian democratic parliamentarians in this respect since 1919 had only ended in their not being given any recognition at all within the Club of the ‘Democrats’.66 The complaints of Anastasijevic´ about the attitude of his own party render the view of the Bulgarian historian Palesˇutski untenable. He is of the opinion that the entire Democratic Party wanted to establish a Macedonian Party – as a response to the Muslim Dzˇemijet, with whose help their political opponents, the ‘Radicals’, increased their vote in Macedonia.67 The press in Belgrade, which leaned towards the Radical Party, condemned the attempt to form a Macedonian group, as a move towards separatism, and tried to discredit the leading figures. Politika maintained, on 1 August 1923, that the leaders of the movement were acting in large part from personal motives, namely to acquire posts as ministers and to gain power, influence and wealth. Experience had shown that these could be achieved more easily in a small party than in a large one, where the most important posts were already occupied. Belgrade had shown that it only gave up something when it was blackmailed. If everybody was resorting to extortion – why not also the Macedonians? The author of the article did concede, however, that there were deficiencies, and accused the Democratic Party of also being in part responsible for the mess. Twenty-four of the democratic parliamentarians from ‘South Serbia’ supported all government motions, without ever receiving a single kilometre of road or rail in return. Such expenditures were reserved for the Croats or Slovenes. The parliamentarians from the South could not

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even dream of ever receiving a ministerial post, and the implementation of any kind of programme was completely unthinkable. Yes, they were not even consulted regarding questions on which they were doubtless competent. But all the same, the newspaper condemned the formation of a Macedonian Party as ‘a simple crime against the Nation’, as thereby the prospects of advancing towards Thessaloniki and Varna were diminished. This could only succeed in the name of South Slavdom, to which the Bulgarians also belonged. If the Yugoslavian policy was not going to be successful and one had to fight against the Croats, then it would be better to do this while one was still living in the same house, so that the neighbours didn’t interfere. The parliamentarians from the south were obliged to look for a remedy for the difficult circumstances in ‘South Serbia’. However, in order to achieve this they had to work with the existing parties. The newspaper established with relief that in the meantime a communique´ issued by the Parliamentary Club of the Democrats had denied the reports of a Macedonian Party.68 In Politika on 20 September 1923, the same author was already making fun of the same initiative, which a few weeks earlier he had feared: Gligor Anastasijevic´ had propagated the idea of a Macedonian Party at a gathering in the Hotel ‘Balkan’ in Skopje. About ten respected people were present and all of them had expressed their support, but nobody offered to become the chairman or a member of the leadership committee. ‘Therefore, the whole project is reminiscent of the fable, in which the mice wanted to hang a bell around the cat’s neck.’69 The chief editor of a newspaper published in Bitola, Juzˇna zvezda, which identified with the Serbs, expressed himself very angrily without mincing his words. He maintained in an article on 19 August that a ‘Macedonian Party’ did not exist in any part of ‘South Serbia’. For such a grouping there were none of the necessary preconditions and no supporters; it would be very difficult to win the support of the people for this kind of adventure. In his opinion, these false reports were spread from Zagreb, and Radic´ was trying brazenly ‘to poke in his dirty fingers and also make this region filthy’.70 An informant of the Soviet Union reported, however, that Grigor Anastevicˇ [sic] had founded the new Makedonci party, and almost all the parliamentarians from Macedonia had joined it. The ‘Democrats’ were furious, as many members of their party had defected. The party represented the political and economic interests of Macedonia and was therefore viewed as separatist.71 Anastasijevic´ himself later linked this initiative with the difficult situation in that year, especially after the massacre in Garvan on 3 March. According to his account, though, at that time there were efforts on a broad front to establish a reformist party. The idea for this was developed in certain circles in Croatia and Serbia. The initiators were Prof. Markovic´ from Belgrade,

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S. Mihajlovic´, Milan Grol, Toma Lelovic´, Gunius (director of the newspaper Slobodna tribuna), the dentist Pavelic´ and others. For the founding of this party a meeting was organised in Susˇak under the direction of Prof. Vojo Marinkovic´ from Belgrade. From Macedonia, Anastasijevic´ took part. The meeting did not, however, lead to the desired results, and after this setback the initiators from Macedonia shifted their activity to the practical level. They strove to achieve the election of Macedonians within the local party organisations, the local councils and the local administrations. The same applied to vocational organisations. On the other hand, on the party lists, the Serbs were to have priority. In this manner, in the community councils of Veles, Sˇtip, Ohrid, Prilep, Strumica, Bitola, as well as in some villages, the majority of members became Macedonians. The crowning achievement of this development was to be the group of Macedonian parliamentarians. This was all within the bounds of legality.72 Regardless of how far the attempt to organise the representatives from Macedonia more forcefully actually got – it failed in the end due to the determination of the government, which was not prepared to tolerate any political or even cultural grouping with the label ‘Macedonian’. Not for nothing did this term disappear even from official terminology at precisely this time. Until then, it was still natural to speak of ‘Macedonia’, but afterwards almost only the designation ‘South Serbia’ can be found. Serbian nationalist circles also changed their usage. In the Bitola newspaper Juzˇna zvezda for example, so far as can be determined, the term ‘South Serbia’ appears for the first time in the above-cited article of 19 August 1923. But the failure certainly also had its roots in that circumstance, which the derider in Politika made fun of: the mice had too much fear – and too little power – to be able to place a bell around the cat’s neck. What remained were advances by individual parliamentarians or groups formed as needed to deal with specific events or concerns. Anastasijevic´ asked the Interior Minister in Parliament, for example, about the circumstances of the death of the mayor of Konjsko, who was allegedly shot by border troops while try to escape. Four peasants from this village were also killed in the incident.73 On 30 January 1924, nine representatives directed a letter to the Cabinet, in order to protest against the forcible recruitment of Macedonians for the construction of the railway line Veles – Sˇtip, as for the population this forced labour (kuluk) left a bad taste in the mouth. The parliamentarians demanded the withdrawal of this measure and threatened that otherwise they would leave the Parliament.74 Macedonian parliamentarians (for example, Besˇirovic´, C´irkovic´) repeatedly demanded the dissolution of the ‘Counter-Chetas’ (kontracˇeti), which met with great displeasure from the correspondent of the Belgrade newspaper Politika.75

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In April 1924, a new attempt at forming a group was undertaken – actually in agreement with the IMRO. The declaration of 29 April 1924, in which the (newly directed) goals of the IMRO were set out, stated among other things: ‘[The Central Committee] will form independent parliamentary groups in the Parliaments of the Balkan States formed from the Macedonian parliamentarians, who will express their solidarity with the other parliamentary groups and political parties, which accept this platform in its entirety’.76 According to Markov, a member of the leadership of the Independent Workers’ Party of Bulgaria, the IMRO leader, Aleksandar Protogerov, challenged the Yugoslav government to give the Macedonians the opportunity to represent their interests legally, ‘that is, one is striving to found a legal Macedonian Party’.77 In any case, four Macedonian parliamentarians (Gligor Anastasijevic´, Trajko Arsic´, Dimitar Trajkovic´, Risto Nastic´) together with two Federalists from Montenegro, two representatives from Bosnia-Herzegovina and two Socialists, formed the Neutral Club. The activities of the Club appear not to have left much of an impression, as public opinion scarcely registered its existence.78 The Macedonian section at least does not appear to have been inactive, as on 5 December 1924, the newly appearing paper of the ‘Radicals’ in Skopje, Nasˇa Stara Srbija, reported that in the Skopje electoral district a ‘Macedonian List’, with Gligor Anastasijevic´ at its head, was going to be prepared. Also participating were Spira Kitincˇevic´ and Tihomir Mirkovic´; they were doing so because they were not satisfied with the planned candidates. This action might also be extended to the other electoral districts.79 Indeed, the paper reported on 19 December that the democratic dissident Anastasijevic´ was preparing his own list in the Kavadarci electoral district, which was, however, likely rather to increase the chances of the ‘Radicals’.80 All the same it viewed this movement as very corrosive and classified these ‘fellows’, who wanted to put up the ‘Macedonian List’, despite their small number, as more dangerous than the Communists. For a while the Communists were fighting for various stupidities, these people wanted to serve ‘our enemies’ directly. But the newspaper was certain that the well-organised authorities in ‘South Serbia’ would surely prevent this.81 In the elections of 1925, such a party actually appeared on the list in the Kavadarci District, but it was just a small group, which only received several hundred votes. Anastasijevic´ himself was not elected.82 That the Macedonian List failed miserably is not really surprising. The manipulation of the electoral process operated especially reliably in Macedonia, which was full of security forces. David Footman, the British Vice Consul in Skopje, reported in 1926 to his embassy in Belgrade that an ‘ignorant but not unintelligent peasant’, with whom he was acquainted, had

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told him that during the last elections only those people were allowed to vote who were known to be supporters of the ‘Radicals’.83 Not only among the ‘Democrats’ but also in the Radical Party the Macedonian members expressed the desire to put up their own list in the elections of 1925. The central leadership denied this vehemently and made it known that they would nominate the candidates themselves. In addition, it was clear within the administration that throughout all of Macedonia, with the exception of the districts of Skopje and Veles, only the government list would be permitted.84 Nasˇa Stara Srbija in its edition of 5 December 1924 also complained that no locals had been put on the electoral lists.85 The result was that in February 1925, 17 Serbs and only four Macedonians were elected to Parliament.86 On 12 December 1924, the king and queen arrived in Skopje for a visit to Macedonia lasting several days; on 17 December, they consecrated the Memorial for the ‘Heroes, who died in 1912–18 for the liberation and the unification’.87 It is perhaps valid to see the visit and the consecration in connection with the efforts to fight against the ‘Macedonian’ tendencies in this region. The idea of a Macedonian Party was clearly still not quite dead in 1928. On 5 March 1928 the Ministry of the Army and the Fleet demanded from the Education Minister, Milan Grol, that the teacher Milivoje Madzˇarevic´, from Kratovo, immediately be transferred out of ‘South Serbia’. He was namely the most important trusted aid of the known priest Trajko Arsic´, who wanted to form a ‘Macedonian Party,’ which he was also working on secretly now. This Madzˇarevic´ is always in the company of members of the ‘Youth Union’ [Omladinsko Udruzˇenje], which works insidiously for the Macedonian cause. After this, Madzˇarevic´ was transferred to the Vranje District in Serbia.88 The Youth Union is most probably a reference to the youth organisation of the IMRO, which was uncovered in 1927 and whose members had been tried the preceding December – this will be dealt with below. The specific concerns of the Macedonian population were also put forward outside Parliament – with an equal lack of success. At the end of 1923, a delegation from Kavadarci travelled to Belgrade and was received by Prime Minister Nikola Pasˇic´ on 5 December.89 The delegates presented in essence the following points: 1. They demanded as the purchase price for tobacco a price close to that of one of the neighbouring states, if the world market price could not be paid yet.

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2. Education should be accorded more importance. Pasˇic´ learned to his astonishment that in a region with 92,000 inhabitants there were only 29 school buildings, of which only eight were operating. The Strumica District possessed only three schools. 3. The benefits of the agricultural reform should also extend to the local population [i.e., not only to colonists from other parts of the country], above all to those who previously had worked for the owners of large estates. 4. The delegation complained about the lack of security. The Komitadji were forcing the peasants to swear an oath to the Committee, for which they were then punished by the state.90 In 1926, a delegation of citizens from Kavadarci visited the Minister for Agriculture, V. Jovanovic´, with the request to provide help with the construction of a reliable water supply, as the water was very unhealthy where they lived. Jovanovic´ promised support.91 Clearly this was a repeat, in part, of those demands which had already been formulated by nearby Strumica in 1920. At the heart still lay education, agriculture and public health.

Uprising in Vardar Macedonia? The domestic political developments were closely connected to the foreign political situation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Tensions with Italy repeatedly nourished the rumour of an impending uprising in Vardar Macedonia. In the spring of 1923, the IRMO wanted to start a largescale offensive in order to agitate the Balkans and to thwart the agreement at the Lausanne Peace Conference (20 November 1922 to the end of January 1923). The goal of the organisation was to prevent Vardar Macedonia remaining part of Yugoslavia in the long term. The IMRO initially sought in this connection official military help from the German government and was fairly confident of receiving this, mainly because France had just occupied the Ruhr. It encountered diffidence, however, in Germany. The uprising had to be abandoned and it was postponed until the following spring.92 In the autumn of 1923, Aleksandr Abramovicˇ-Cˇetuev reported to the Presidium of the Executive Committee of Comintern that ‘the uprising in Macedonia is being prepared completely openly’.93 The Macedonian parliamentarian Riza Trajkovic´, a member of the IMRO and the Serbian Republican Party, made contact secretly at the beginning of February 1924 with members of the Provincial Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party in Skopje, in order to sound out the possibilities for cooperation. Trajkovic´ presented on this occasion the following:

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In the spring of 1924, the IMRO will probably carry out an uprising in ‘Serbian Macedonia,’ which will result in the intervention of the Great Powers and a change in the political regime in ‘Serbian Macedonia.’ The IMRO wishes that during the uprising the Communist Party will block the troop movements of the Yugoslav Army by attacks on bridges and roads. It also asked that for the moment communist work in the villages of Macedonia be interrupted and restricted only to the urban centres. Trajkovic´ was convinced that the Croat peasant leader Radic´ would attack at the same time.94 The emigrants in Bulgaria were also of the opinion that by these means the Macedonian question would be solved. Naum Tomalevski, a representative of the autonomists, announced that after the melting of the snow in 1924, 5,000 youth representatives would cross the border alone. For two months the autonomists had been collecting dues from all the Macedonians in Bulgaria, then also from the wealthy Bulgarians. The Jews of Sofia were pressured for money more strongly than any other group; they had to contribute 20 million Leva;95 4 million Leva was extorted from the Armenian community of the capital96 and further millions from the tobacco factories.97 The informant of the Soviets, however, assessed the chances of such an uprising as bad. Nobody would support it.98 The Yugoslav security forces prepared themselves nonetheless. The Soviet ‘sources’ reported that in February 1924, at a secret meeting of the Heads of the Army units (nacˇal’niki cˇastej) under the direction of the commandant of the Third Army District in Skopje, the following measures for combating the Komitadji were decided: Colonisation of the border region from the spring of 1924 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Formation of counter-chetas. Stop paying rewards for the killing of important Komitadjis. Increased activity by agents among the population. The arming of trustworthy citizens. Regrouping of the Army units (a regiment from Bitola should be moved to the area of Lake Dojran). 6. Reinforcement of the Army by calling up to two yearly age-groups. 7. Construction of a strategic railway line Kumanovo–Palanka and Veles – Sˇtip – Carevo Selo, in order to be able to transport punitive expeditions quickly. 8. Repression of those sections of the population that support the Komitadji.

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It becomes clear here that important measures to improve the infrastructure, such as the construction of railways, or for the apparent development of the countryside (colonisation of land areas lying unused) originated primarily from military-strategic considerations and in any case only on a secondary level in order to meet the economic needs of the region. Many of the measures taken, however, according to the report, ended in a fiasco or could not be implemented. The Montenegrins settled as colonists proved to be separatists and joined forces with the Committee in Bulgaria. The Parliament protested against the calling up of two yearly age-groups in the region of the Third Army. Only the stopping of the rewards demonstrated a degree of success. In the region of Strumica the system of informants led to good results.99 According to the British Vice Consul in Skopje, the agents of the secret police were everywhere – in the towns and villages, in the cafe´s and trains, on the markets.100 At the end of February rumours popped up that the IMRO had decided, however, not to attack in the spring of 1924. But the ‘source’ of the Soviets did not know the reasons for this. It suspected that the organisation was afraid that the Bulgarian prime minister Cankov could stab them in the back.101 According to the report of the Serbian-speaking ‘source 126/6’, Yugoslavia had assured France that Cankov would soon break with Aleksandrov’s IMRO.102 A Soviet ‘source’ was of the opinion, in May 1924, that the autonomists no longer represented a threat for Serbia, as they had been completely dissolved in Macedonia. The regime could even afford to permit their return from abroad and an amnesty was planned.103 Indeed, this amnesty was then granted.104 The British for their part exercised pressure on the Bulgarian government, in order to forestall Aleksandrov’s plan, as otherwise they feared that the Kingdom SHS (of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) would invade Bulgaria. In such an eventuality, they would not be capable of protecting Bulgaria from the consequences.105 The Bulgarian Foreign Minister Kalfov promised to take measures,106 whereupon numerous Macedonian activists were arrested.107 Despite the initial rumours of an uprising, in the end it remained very calm on the Bulgarian frontier in 1924, while on the border to Albania and in Sanjak there were many incidents, although in the assessment of the British embassy these did not have a political background, but were of a criminal nature: Albanian bandits (kacˇaci) were plundering the region.108 However, in Belgrade it was becoming ever clearer that the situation in Macedonia was unsustainable and more effective measures than just military ones had to be taken. In 1924– 5, a letter was received by the government containing 24 proposals on how the situation could be improved. The catalogue included, on the one hand, proposals for increased controls and

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repression, and, on the other, for taking into account much more the needs of the local population. The author is unknown, but clearly it was a significant personality, who recommended changing the entire police apparatus in ‘South Serbia’ and deploying generally much better-trained personnel in future. All the local officials, on the other hand, with the exception of the national propagandists, should be relocated to within the ‘old borders’ – i.e., to Serbia. Since the activity of the parties was having such a negative effect, this was to be prohibited for two years. The gendarmerie, which had been reduced from 20,000 to 17,500 men, should be increased again by around 3,000 men. For those who had contacts with the ‘Bulgarian’ partisans and hid them, the author proposed the death penalty and the resettlement of their families. Beyond this, the catalogue contained a few proposals that were not of a repressive character: the Agrarian Law should be implemented in such a way that primarily the local population and not the colonists would receive land, since otherwise it will cause bad blood. In addition, the concerns of the population should be dealt with swiftly and in accordance with the law. The proposals for the education sector were explosive. The number of high school students should be reduced, while in every place four-class middle schools should be retained, but the high schools with eight classes should be got rid of everywhere except in Skopje and Bitola. The author recommended also the closing of the Philosophy Faculty in Skopje, which had been opened in 1920. As a counter-move he advised the construction of 1,000 elementary schools, which the communities were to pay off in 20 annual instalments.109 The direction of these last recommendations is clear. The goal was the reduction or even the elimination of higher education and the promotion of elementary school education. Since the resettlement of the local officials (also the teachers) was demanded at the same time, the combination of these measures would have meant that the schoolchildren would only be taught by Serbian teachers, and in order to obtain a higher education, the young people would have to move to another part of the country. Educational policy, however, will be examined in more detail later on in this work.

Relaxation of the Tension 1924– 5 The plans of the IMRO for an uprising fell apart in 1924, mainly because in the spring of 1924 the Croat deputies gave up their policy of obstruction and the newly formed government coalition of the ‘Democrats’ was supported by the Slovenian People’s Party and the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation. The hopes for a new start in Yugoslavia, however, did not last long. Pasˇic´ and Pribic´evic´ refused any compromise with the Croats and Slovenes. Radic´, on the other hand, sought support from abroad for the Croatian cause and in

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1924 joined the Peasants’ International in Moscow. The ‘Radicals’ and the royal court in response worked against the consolidation of the government under the ‘Democrat’ Davidovic´ and the understanding with the Croats. On 15 October 1924, the king demanded Davidovic´’s resignation and thereby brought down the government, which had a secure majority in the Parliament, which was now complete for the first time.110 The year 1925 began with a blow against the Croat Republican Peasants’ Party (HRSS) of Stjepan Radic´. On 1 January, the HRSS was banned and its archive was confiscated. The Party’s joining of the Peasants’ International, which made the HRSS a part of the Third Communist International, was given as the justification. In addition, it had maintained relations with the Macedonian Revolutionary Committee. Five party leaders were arrested; Radic´ was initially able to go into hiding, but was then tracked down.111 While he was sitting in prison, his nephew recognised the monarchy and the constitution in the name of the party on 27 March. In April the HRSS parliamentarians decided to strike the epithet ‘Republican’112 from the party’s name. From 2 July, negotiations on the formation of a government were conducted between the HSS and the ‘Radicals’, which were brought to a successful conclusion after ten days. In the new government, the Croatian Peasants’ Party received four ministries: Agricultural Reform, Post and Telegraph, Trade and Industry, and Forests and Mining. Towards the end of the year, Radic´ joined the Cabinet as Education Minister.113 With that the largest Croatian party, which previously had boycotted the Parliament, was given governmental responsibility for the first time. A new start seemed possible. The annual report of the British embassy for 1925 rated this event as very significant. It was the end of the separatist and federalist efforts in Croatia. However, one could not assess how long the agreement was likely to last. Radic´’s qualities as a minister were devastatingly criticised by the British. He did not demonstrate any administrative talent, and his daily indiscretions were exceedingly wearisome for his colleagues in the government. But ‘Turkish’ and ‘Balkan’ Belgrade was also not spared, as the British alleged that it was susceptible to corruption and intrigues. One was fully absorbed by such matters, instead of working to establish an administrative system, through which the various constituent parts of the country would become united and satisfied. The writers regretted in particular that the agricultural and tax reforms did not budge, as in their opinion inadequacies in these two areas contributed most to the dissatisfaction. Nonetheless, they thought that the centrifugal forces were weaker than in the preceding years and that it was less likely that in Croatia or somewhere else a separatist movement would form – as long as unforeseen events did not intervene. They placed great hopes on the

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resignation or death of the ‘senile’ Pasˇic´. Then new forces could clear away the lethargy and corruption. Also the king, who was generally respected for his farsightedness and tact, would then have more room to manoeuvre. Overall, Yugoslavia had greater prospects for success, i.e., for becoming Europeanised, than its neighbours.114 The British Yugoslav expert and friend of the country, R.W. SetonWatson, came to a completely different – and, as the future would show, more accurate – conclusion on his visit to Belgrade in 1925. He made a note: Je constate with growing alarm already a deterioration, false methods of government 1) All the best men in the country, with principles and ideas, with few exceptions more and more a` coˆte´, and this in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia almost equally. All the intriguers and Macher on top 2) Methods of Favouritism, Corruption.115 Both sources agreed though, that all sides had to be blamed for weaknesses and failures. The relaxation in Serb–Croat relations in 1925 coincided with a decline in partisan activities in Macedonia. The energetic-to-the-point-of-recklessness measures of the government slowly bore fruit. There were still many incursions from Bulgaria, but the groups consisted now of at most ten men and could be repulsed, inflicting many casualties upon them. In order to secure the border, the authorities adopted various measures: evacuation of the villages, cutting down of forests, the sending out of strong patrols by the Army and the gendarmerie, formation of special mobile pursuit units in which the local population also had to participate. They were also successful in making the movements of the couriers of the rebels much more difficult, such that the organisation reported difficulties in collecting money. In the opinion of the British, support for the IMRO among the population was in any case noticeably less than in earlier years.116 It also appeared to the Interior Minister at the beginning of 1925 that the population on the left of the Vardar had been won over in favour of the government and against the komiti. In his opinion, this was not least thanks to a church celebration, which had been held in Kratovo in honour of D ¯ ord¯e (George) of Kratovo. The Interior Minister wanted to apply the apparently good effects of such actions also in the west of Macedonia, where partisan groups were still active. He proposed to the Minister for Religion, that one of the measures against the groups (cˇeti) would be to hold ‘public rallies of a religious-national character’. He pointed out that in the area around Ohrid, the ‘King’117 and Saint Jovan Vladimir, who had ruled there in the Middle Ages, were viewed positively in the memory of the population. By a stroke of

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fortune, the saint was martyred in 1016 at the hands of the Bulgarians. Therefore the Interior Minister proposed to awaken the memory of this ‘figure of light’ through a celebration and thereby to link the old Serbian past of this ‘King’ and this region with the present and so inspire the national feelings of the inhabitants. To supplement the celebration, a popular biography with a picture of an icon on the cover should be published and sold cheaply. This martyr was especially well suited because his bodily remains were located in Elbasan and the saint was also honoured by the Orthodox Albanians, so that one could also stress the bonds of friendship there. The Minister for Religion was given the task by the Interior Minister of taking all this into his own hands.118 Here it becomes clear how the Interior Ministry exploited the other ministries in order to implement its policies. Especially striking was the instrumentalisation of the Ministry of Education, as will be shown. The activation of Serbian Saints illustrates also a further characteristic of the politics of this period toward Macedonia: much weight was placed upon actions of a symbolic significance, from which the authorities promised themselves a good effect for a low price. Further evidence for this is the fact that during the entire interwar period, whenever possible, public opening ceremonies and consecrations were always organised on historically significant dates. The domestic and foreign political situation became so relaxed in 1925, that the king at the insistence of Ljuba Davidovic´, the head of the Democratic Party, amnestied 7,500 prisoners from ‘South Serbia’.119 With regard to the Croat question, however, the thaw did not last very long. On 19 November 1925, Radic´ withdrew once again his party’s declaration of loyalty of March 1925 and pulled out from the government on 14 April 1926. The fragile coalition of the ‘Radicals’ and the Croat Peasants’ Party held on until the start of 1927, but remained without success. Both sides insisted on their known positions and unleashed unprecedented campaigns of incitement after the break-up.120

1927: Intensified Terror and Counter-Terror The initially confident reports from the British embassy about the development of Yugoslavia became ever more pessimistic from the middle of the 1920s. Especially after the agreement with Radic´, the British had expected that there would be some political changes. But in 1927 they registered with disappointment that there was still not an efficient government in power, that there were no good people, that the ‘Turkish mentality’ still ruled and that the politicians rather concerned themselves with small intrigues than with the large problems of the country. It was their opinion that since its establishment, very

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little had been achieved to put things on the path to a healthy and strong state.121 The responsibility for this lay not only on the side of the government, but they also regretted that the Croatian and Slovenian intelligentsia had not produced any parties with more practical programmes. If they had, then it was their opinion that the unification of the kingdom would have been much easier.122 A French Army report from January 1927, entitled ‘Renseignement de Mace´doine’, provides very detailed information about the situation in Macedonia. The report was classified as ‘secret’ and was prepared by an ‘informateur particulirement compe´tent et bien place [a particularly competent and well placed informant]’, whose name was kept anonymous. His most important comments were: the administrative regime in Macedonia had become milder; above all in the towns the population no longer had that oppressed and frightened expression (‘air accable´ et craintif’), which two years previously had been so characteristic. Nonetheless, the young, who had been educated in the Serbian high schools and universities, proved to be more nationalistic ‘dans le sens bulgare-mace´donien [in the Bulgarian Macedonian sense]’ than the generation before the World War. Everywhere partly legal and partly illegal circles of Macedonian youths had formed, for example in the style of sports clubs. In addition, there were secret political groupings, which had to be taken much more seriously. Of these, some were independent and others were linked to the IMRO. All in all, the situation was much less stable than it appeared. In the previous years, according to the report, the political tendencies of the ‘Bulgar-Macedonian’ population and their methods of resistance had changed considerably. One did not find any supporters for the annexation of Macedonia by Bulgaria any longer. The motto now was: ‘We are neither Serbs nor Bulgarians, but only Macedonians.’ The enlightened Macedonians accused the Bulgarians bitterly of all the ills from which they were suffering: the Serbian –Bulgarian Treaty of 1912, in which Bulgaria had agreed in principle to the partition of Macedonia; the fact that Bulgaria, when it occupied Macedonia in 1915, did not grant it any autonomy, and that at Versailles it was neither able nor willing to defend the idea of autonomy. As the ‘Bulgarian Macedonians’, together with the numerous Muslims in the country (over 350,000), were of the opinion that Macedonia ‘doit devenir autonome dans le cadre de l’e´tat yougoslave comme la Croatie ou la Slove´nie [must become autonomous in the frame of the Yugoslav state like Croatia and Slovenia]’. They had understood very well that it was pointless to fight against the Serbian administrative methods with violence. The resistance to Serbian rule therefore had to be conducted with legal means, in the field of politics as well as in the realm of economics. Two or three years before, a movement took place which emerged as ‘pe´ne´tration mace´donienne’ in the administration and

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in the communal authorities. One said that one was a Serb, but was deeply Macedonian. As the Macedonian intellectuals were firmly rooted in the country, they were elected as local officials or even nominated for relatively important posts. Furthermore, the ‘Bulgarian Macedonians’ had the intention of allying with the Turks in order to get Macedonians elected into the Parliament. At the moment there are only two there: the Radical Lazarev and the Democrat Puzderliev. According to this report, the positions between the leadership of the IMRO in Sofia and the circles that lived in the country had distanced themselves from each other quite considerably. While the IMRO turned against any form of arrangement with the ‘oppressors’, the Macedonians in the country were in favour of an agreement with the Serbs who were already living there. They wanted the IMRO to adapt its tactics to the situation and not to do anything without getting their assent first. The author was of the opinion that with respect to the incursions the IMRO would have to give way. The rumour was circulating again that the IMRO was preparing an uprising with Italian support. For this purpose, Italy is supposed to have made 5 million lire available to the IMRO. According to the author of the secret report, this was difficult to verify, but for several months Italian agents had been flooding the country, pretending to be travellers, merchants and the like. They were travelling around collecting military information and especially studying the Yugoslav– Albanian border. The IMRO had already spread the rumour that a Yugoslav– Italian conflict could bring Macedonia autonomy. The Italian government had given assurances concerning this regard. The author judged this propaganda to be very dangerous for Yugoslavia [sic] in the event of a conflict, as it was believed by part of the Macedonian population. He was himself of the opinion that Italy was only interested in Dalmatia and the metal and coal regions in Slovenia. It was only using Macedonia as a means to extort Yugoslavia so that it would make concessions in Dalmatia and Slovenia.123 This French analysis displays great similarity to a report, written at the same time, by an anonymous Bulgarian diplomatic correspondent from the section ‘Asia and Eastern Europe’, who had travelled through Vardar Macedonia, so that the source for both reports might be the same. This would also explain why the Macedonians in the French report are so automatically described as ‘Bulgarian’. The Bulgarian diplomatic correspondent maintained further that the political ideal of autonomy for Macedonia within the borders of Yugoslavia was somewhat nebulous, since what was intended was the unification of the three parts of Macedonia. However, cultural autonomy and self-administration had priority. The Macedonians were not opponents but strong supporters of Yugoslavia in its current borders. They were prepared to

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defend this Yugoslavia, but on the condition that they received the possibility of developing their own cultural and national life. They wished that Macedonia would be administered by Macedonians and not by foreign officials, which plundered the population. In addition, in all institutions the use of the local language should be permitted.124 Both reports agree in confirming that at this point the Macedonian autonomists had emancipated themselves from the IMRO that was directed from Bulgaria and were now trying to achieve an improvement of their status within Yugoslavia. A ‘Macedonianisation’ of the civil service from below and the possibility of developing their own culture and language were being set as goals. The regime, however, was far away from accommodating any of these expectations. Lazic´, the Head of Security in the Interior Ministry, agreed with the Zˇupan of Ohrid in proposing that locals should no longer be employed in government offices, as they spoke ‘Bulgarian’.125 In order to achieve their goals, the Macedonians were also not permitted to organise themselves on a regional nor an ethnic basis. In truth, no official ban to this effect was issued, but according to the British ambassador Kennard the situation was clear; nobody dared even consider establishing a Macedonian Party.126 The authorities also gave parties from other regions of the country, other than Serbia, no chance to establish a foothold in Macedonia. In the run-up to the parliamentary elections on 11 September 1927, the Croat Peasant leader Radic´ initially announced he would put forward a list in the south on which next to his own party the various Macedonian opposition parties would also be represented.127 However, he then had to pull back. The newspaper in Skopje, Nasˇa Stara Srbija, maintained that this happened because of the poor chances for success.128 Kennard reported otherwise: in the summer of 1927, the Croats tried to conduct an election campaign tour in Macedonia. But they were attacked by the ‘hooligans’ of Sokol and Orjuna,129 as well as by other Serbian nationalist organisations in cahoots with the police. ‘Practically speaking only Radicals or Democrats can offer themselves for election in South Serbia.’130 As a result, these two parties gained quite a few seats in Macedonia. Therefore, leading up to the elections even high-ranking politicians made the effort to travel to the out-of-the-way province. The results could be decisive for the composition of the Parliament, although as the British Vice Consul in Skopje maintained, ‘at least three quarters of the voters go to the polls here in a state of complete ignorance and mistrust and without any political convictions other than those that originate from fear and dislike of the local officials’.131 Especially the Radicals held their majority in the Parliament, thanks to the seats in Macedonia.132

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In the countryside, according to comments by Footman, more direct pressure was exerted on the voters. The elites, on the other hand, acted in his opinion out of opportunism. He knew many doctors, lawyers and teachers from the former Hapsburg lands, Macedonian merchants, and Turkish and Albanian estate owners, who were not connected to each other by anything other than their aversion to the Radical Party and nonetheless were members of it, as it was most efficient at offering protekcija [as in the original].133 Also in a later report, Footman emphasised the purely opportunistic membership of many in the Serbian parties: ‘Bulgarian sympathies are hidden under a cloak of noisy adherence to one or other of the great Serb parties. Party wires are pulled and issues are confused.’ The official view, that the inhabitants of ‘South Serbia’ were Serbs, promoted this state of affairs in his opinion: one has to give the ‘Serbs’ in Macedonia the right to vote, whereby they attain a certain importance, so that one cannot withhold from them lesser positions and this or that trophy of party politics.134 The somewhat scornful words of Footman are missing the insight of his superior, Ambassador Kennard, that members of the Macedonian elite, who wanted to participate normally in political and social life and also in power, had absolutely no other choice than to join one of these two parties. Only candidacy for one of the parties granted in the first place a legal platform, in order to be able to express an opinion on political questions, initially in the election campaign and then in the Parliament. Mita Dimitrijevic´ from the Kocˇani District addressed a call to the voters during the electoral campaign in 1927, which was written in a Serbian-Macedonian language mixture and in which the following demands were raised: . . . . . . . . . . . .

calming of the situation in Macedonia; respecting citizens’ rights; general amnesty and return of the emigrants; war on corruption; right of the local population to do their service in their own communities; right to use one’s own language when contacting the local authorities; return of the land to those who work it; more fairness in the tax system; improvement of the transport routes in the Bregalnica District; opening of agricultural and trade schools; overcoming of the effects of war; struggle for the unification of all Southern Slavs from the Adriatic to the Black Sea.

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Precisely for these reasons in the 1920s, ever more efficient means were used to prevent Macedonians from being elected. In 1923, 8 Serbs and 6 Macedonians were elected to the Parliament; in 1925 there were 17 Serbs and 4 Macedonians; in 1927 for 20 Serbs there were now just 2 Macedonians.135 The Macedonian politicians, who joined the Serbian parties, found themselves in a dilemma. Among those sections of the population that were ‘Macedonian’ and favoured ‘autonomy’, they met with rejection. Mita Dimitrijevic´, who formulated the above-cited concerns of the Macedonian population, was generally unpopular. Ca˘rnusˇanov’s description of him as a ‘clever demagogue’,136 taken alongside characterisations such as ‘the well-known charlatan from Belgrade’137 and ‘Mita the chamber pot’ – because he was supposedly the king’s chamber pot138 – appears to be more of a compliment. The systematic prevention of the legal formation of Macedonian associations of any kind was also a topic in the trial of 20 young people, which was conducted on 5 – 8 December 1927. Dimitrije Ðuzelovic´ from Dojran was arrested on the street in Skopje on 29 May 1927, because he had on him an edition of the newspaper published in Bulgaria Makedonija. A wave of arrests followed at all the Yugoslav universities, which affected around 70 people altogether. Soon it became known that here a youth organisation of the IMRO had been uncovered. Most of those arrested were released with warnings, but 20 remained under arrest as ringleaders.139 Ten of them were ultimately found not guilty, but the others received exemplary long sentences: Ðuzelovic´ received 35 years in prison, the others between 5 and 25 years.140 The report of the British embassy spoke of a ‘heavy punishment’ and that the students had probably been physically abused in prison.141 According to Footman, even Serbian officials thought that most of the accused, youths with no idea what they were doing, should never have been arrested.142 Most were released early, and in 1935 only Cˇkatrovic´ still found himself in prison, the only one who had to serve out his full ten years.143 The press followed the trial, which took place in Skopje under strict security144 and attracted considerable attention – the Belgrade newspaper Politika, for example, had extensive reports on its front pages145 – such that the accused had a unique forum at their disposal, to air their concerns. The reporter of the Belgrade paper Vreme noted also the enormous public interest and the presence of the representative Punisˇa Racˇic´.146 Ðuzelovic´ and his co-defendants were accused of being a youth organisation of the IMRO (Mladesˇka Makedonska Tajna Revolucionarna Organizacija, MMTRO) and having been given the task of preparing a revolution. The main prosecution witness, a postal employee from Gevgelija, maintained that the MMTRO was working for an independent Macedonia. If that should prove impossible, annexation by Bulgaria or the creation of a

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Federal State of the Southern Slavs with Macedonia as an autonomous unit would have been their aim. Ðuzelovic´ and most of the others denied being members of this organisation, and claimed that the confessions had been extorted by physical abuse while they were being held for questioning. He and another of the accused, Sˇopovic´, admitted that they were working to achieve a union of all Southern Slavs.147 In his closing speech, Ðuzelovic´ spoke for more than an hour on his idea of unifying the Southern Slavs, who previously had been ruled by the Great Powers applying the principle of divide et impera. Macedonian youth had to seize the initiative to achieve this unification, as they were less dependent on the political parties and the ruling political elites. For this reason, one would have allied with the youth in Bulgaria and Serbia. He was never in favour of Macedonia breaking away, but for its unification. That is why he did not think he was guilty. He also mentioned the official corruption in Macedonia and the economic crisis. Another accused, Dimitrije Cˇkatrovic´, a technology student from Sˇtip, stressed that in 1923 in Belgrade and later in Prilep and Sˇtip he had tried to found a cultural society, but that this was forbidden by the police. And he also spoke out during the trial against the dissolution of the state and against the independence of Macedonia, which would not be sustainable on its own. Haralampije Fukarevic´, an engineer from Prilep, in his closing speech attacked the government in a remarkably open and undaunted fashion. He described the elections of 1920 as the only free elections and pointed out that at that time Macedonia had voted for the Communists. His criticism was also directed against the agricultural reform, the credit policy of the banks and the compulsory purchasing of tobacco, in which not everything was above board. In contrast to other parts of the country, the young were forbidden to organise locally. All the parliamentarians from ‘South Serbia’ should also be organised in a political unit. He also described in detail how he had been abused in Belgrade after his arrest. Sterije Bazdovic´, a medical student from Krusˇevo, denounced the discrimination against Macedonia. Until 1912, trade and industry had flourished, now everything was destroyed, and the youth of Macedonia were sitting in the dock. Manojlo Cˇucˇkovic´ and Blagoje Manevic´ attacked the Belgrade press, which had blown everything up out of proportion.148 The statements of the accused confirm to a large extent the analysis of the above-cited French report. The young men spoke out against the annexation of Macedonia by Bulgaria. However, in this situation they had no other choice if they did not want to make themselves guilty of treason. Ðuzelovic´, nonetheless, did not shy away from speaking of a Balkan Federation, which was equally risky, as this would also have been linked to changing the status quo. Furthermore, the young people demanded

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opportunities for the cultural and economic development of their region and an end to discrimination.149 The suspicion in the analysis from January 1927, that the IMRO would have to give way regarding the incursions from Bulgaria, was not confirmed at all: quite the opposite. The second half of 1927 was marked by a renewed increase in activity, a development that the British Vice Consul in Skopje above all put down to actual or intended Italian encouragement. Attacks against institutions and representatives of the state were carried out systematically. The greatest resonance was achieved by the murder of General Mihajlo Kovacˇevic´, the commander of the garrison in Sˇtip, on 9 October.150 This assassination produced a large-scale operation by the security forces in response, which affected countless numbers of people. An appeal by the ‘Macedonian citizens’ to the public, under the title: ‘The Golgotha of the Macedonian People. Macedonians Accuse. Appeal’, which was published in Vienna in the Fe´de´ration Balkanique on 1 February 1928, denounced the arbitrariness of the authorities, especially the police and the gendarmerie. After the assassination, in all the villages from Kumanovo to Gevgelija there were bitter complaints about the cruelty of the police. Thousands were languishing for months in investigative custody, where they were also tortured, and then it turned out they were innocent. According to the article, it was worst in the villages, where people were arbitrarily beaten and raped. Around Sˇtip the villages were emptied, the peasants fleeing into the forests or into the towns. ‘For the Gendarmerie and police here, the life of a Macedonian is not worth any more than the life of a hare.’ Numerous cases of murdered citizens are cited, in which it is known that they were killed by the gendarmes. The author of the appeal demanded basic protection for the population. If there is no relief, then one should order a general massacre und wipe out all Macedonians, so that all the cruelty, which we are currently experiencing, will once and for all come to an end. Then both the supporters of Protogerov and also the police of Vukic´evic´ will get some peace, and above all, we, the Macedonian citizens, who have to suffer from their revenge attacks, will have peace. The authors sent this appeal to numerous newspapers and magazines in Belgrade and Zagreb, the rectors of the universities in Zagreb, Belgrade and Ljubljana, the Parliamentarian Clubs as well as selected politicians, cultural artists and members of government institutions.151 Only the Communist newspaper Borba in Zagreb published selected parts of the appeal. The authors had, as they wrote, originally intended forming a delegation which would

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present the facts before Parliament. But they were afraid that most of the delegates would not survive this. A little later, still in February, the same addressees received a further appeal in which it was stressed that the names of the authors could not be released under any circumstances. But they could name numerous further victims of state terror.152 The Yugoslav security forces were very restless and nervous towards the end of 1927. On the one hand this was due to the defensive alliance between Italy and Albania, which had been concluded in November of that year. This meant that Albania was already closely tied to Italy.153 On the other hand, there was also an increase in actions by the IMRO, which were supported by Italy. The IMRO had recently been operating with mobile and inconspicuous small units, the so-called trojki und petorki (three-man and five-man groups), against which there was no defence. An incident from the end of October 1927 illustrates the helplessness of the enormous security apparatus. According to the report of the British Vice Consul, the authorities discovered that several active members of the IMRO had arrived in Skopje. In response they surrounded the entire city with military and gendarmerie personnel; in the suspected quarters every house was searched. These measures, however, did not produce any success and the people they were looking for continued their journey to Albania without being discovered. In their favour was the fact that most of the population supported the IMRO, if not always voluntarily, and on the other hand they had little sympathy for the state. ‘Outside the public services there are very few inhabitants of Macedonia who have any real feelings of loyalty towards Serbia.’ According to Footman, among the intellectuals there were some pro-Bulgarians, but the greater part of the population was equally indifferent to both Serbian and Bulgarian claims. Yet so long as the Serbs could not offer protection, the people did not dare to provoke the enmity of the IMRO.154 Due to the precarious security situation, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Velimir Vukic´evic´, invited the Zˇupans, as well as the commanders of the gendarmerie and the police in Macedonia, to attend one of its meetings, at which they proposed further steps, and in December 1927 they offered these suggestions to the prime minister and the Interior Minister. They suggested taking both security precautions and more general measures. Regarding security, they proposed various procedures, including the following: .

Increasing the number of border troops and reinforcing the gendarmes again up to 20,000, after this strength had been reduced the previous year to 17,500 to save money.

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Doubling the number of railway guards on the line Ristovac –Gevgelija by the Transport Ministry. At that time, 3,000 local inhabitants had to assist every day with guarding the line, unpaid, frequently without adequate clothing or any shelter in the cold season. If more railway guards were available, that would reduce the number of these people and thereby reduce dissatisfaction. Expanding the network of informants. Every official must have his trusted contacts among the population.155

They proposed these general measures: . .

.

. .

. .

.

. . .

Intensified settling of nationally conscious colonists. In this way security would increase, and assimilation would be advanced stealthily. Closing the faculty [of philosophy] in Skopje. This would ensure that those who wanted to study would do so at universities in a different national environment. The teacher training college in Prilep should also be moved to the north. Reclassifying the full high schools – except those in Skopje and Bitola – as half high schools. In addition the teachers must consist of nationally reliable staff, which at the moment was often not the case. In doing this, as few women as possible should be taken on, as all the directors complained that they were bad inside the schools, and outside they are completely useless. Instead of the abolished high schools, agricultural and craft schools should be opened, which must also have a national impact. All ‘Exarchite’156 teaching staff should be transferred to the north without delay and be replaced by national forces. Even those among them who were very loyal could not act in a national and assimilationist direction; very often they were in any case suspect and unreliable [from a national standpoint]. The Exarchite priests should be replaced by nationally conscious and cultivated representatives of their class. Local officials, who had been subject to Bulgarian propaganda, should be transferred to the north, and only after three or four years, when most of them had married should they be permitted to return, once their national loyalty had been bolstered. Somewhere 1 million dinar has to be found, in order to support the Sokol movement, as it was very useful for spreading national awareness and was also popular. Other associations also needed support. In the villages reading courses should be instituted. Libraries and reading rooms with selected books should be established in order to win citizens for the state. Loans should be granted only to loyal citizens.

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The explicit intent of these measures was not only to put an end to partisan activity, but also, within a short time, to assimilate the population completely. Then the Bulgarians would no longer interest themselves in Macedonia and perhaps could also be won for a closer association [with Yugoslavia].157 If one compares this catalogue with the measures that were suggested two or three years earlier by a high-ranking person, it is noticeable that a large part of the demands are the same. The greatest difference is that in 1927 only repressive measures were considered and there was no discussion of making concessions to the local population. Three demands were repeated and therefore had not been implemented: increasing the number of gendarmes, downgrading the high schools, and closing the Philosophy Faculty in Skopje. According to a report in the Belgrade newspaper Vreme on 16 December 1927, alongside the security precautions, however, measures for the ‘renewal and building-up (podizanje) of South Serbia’ were also decided. Primarily this consisted of a two-billion dinar loan, which was to be raised abroad. A large part of it was to be deployed in ‘South Serbia’. ‘The Ministers for Construction, Education, Transport, and Public Health will all have large loans placed at their disposal, with which they can build new schools, roads, bridges and railway lines and can also erect a large number of new hospitals.’158 Vreme reported that in the Clubs of all the parties, dissatisfaction with the conditions in ‘South Serbia’ had grown. In the Radical Club, as in the Democratic Club, demands for decisive reforms in the administration of the South could be heard. The current corps of officials has to be exchanged for a more capable one.159 The Skopje newspaper Nasˇa Stara Srbija reported in the edition of 14 December 1927, that in the morning the talks in the Interior Ministry between the Grand Zˇupans (heads) of the districts (oblasti) Vranje, Skopje, Sˇtip and Bitola had been continued. Also participating in the conference were Zˇika Lazic´, Milovanovic´, the deputy Interior Minister, as well as Antic´, the Head of the Administration Department. Exclusively under discussion was the quality of the civil servants, especially those of the other ministries. The officials of the Interior Ministry were mobile; the Interior Minister could assign and transfer them according to necessity and so create an exemplary corps of civil servants. In the view of the participants, deficits and needs existed, especially in the Education Ministry,160 which – as will still be discussed in the chapter on the educational system – was under great pressure from the Interior Ministry. One result of these efforts was that various ministers addressed their subordinate posts in Macedonia with orders to improve the quality of their work. The Justice Minister sent a circular dated 21 December 1927 to all the

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chairmen of the courts of first instance in ‘South Serbia’ about measures for combating anti-state and enemy actions. He instructed the courts to work efficiently, especially in these regions, to distance themselves from party sympathies and to be active by giving speeches about the law among the people – twice a month. This was to be understood as an additional unpaid task, as the officials in Serbia had to be, according to the letter, national fighters for the dissemination of culture and for achieving the love of the people for the shared homeland. Together with other offices of the state they should work to convince the population ‘that the nature of our possession is lasting and that our administration is good’. He ‘recommended’ that they should send him a confidential report every month on what had been done in this regard.161 On 20 December 1927, the Interior Minister assigned a similar task to his direct subordinates in the region, the Grand Zˇupans. Associations should be founded and close contact with the local population nurtured. His officials were also not permitted to forget that next to their regular duties they also had a second task, namely a national and missionary one, on account of which they also enjoyed benefits. The Interior Minister wanted to be told who was not doing a good job in this respect.162 The Minister for Social Policy addressed his letter to the directors of the children’s homes in Bitola und Skopje – these were the only institutions subordinated to him in Macedonia.163 The Minister for Construction instructed supervisors to ensure that officials dealt with the ‘local citizenry’ both officially and in private matters, in such a way that ‘the already existing love for our State will be strengthened’, and as is worthy of a progressive and cultivated state.164 One can reasonably doubt whether these instructions were implemented effectively. The civil service posts in Macedonia were, in any case, very unattractive. Burdening the officials with additional, unpaid tasks alongside the high living costs did not make these positions any more appealing. But even the good intentions of individual officials were doomed to failure by the omnipotence and arbitrariness of the police. The Director of Construction in Skopje, for example, was of the opinion that the officials really did deal with the ‘local’ citizenry in an understanding, humane and brotherly manner. He was very disturbed, however, by the conduct of the lower police, the ‘uneducated and uncultivated gendarmes, detectives, and other representatives of the police ( povereniki)’, and by the irresponsible attitude of the district heads (sreski poglavari) and the Grand Zˇupans, ‘not to mention that the majority of them were not up to the demands of their positions and lacked the most urgently required moral qualifications for this task’. The organs of the police cursed the people with oaths insulting their mothers (majku ti bugarsku) and accused them of being supporters of the Bulgarians and enemies

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of the state, so that even among the most patriotic and loyal people, feelings of bitterness and hate were generated. The Director of Construction was outraged that the Gand Zˇupan did not receive reports from anyone except police officials. When he tried to make a report personally, the Gand Zˇupan interrupted him with the words: ‘Don’t bother, we know better.’165 Howard Kennard, the British ambassador in Belgrade, wrote a report on 25 October 1927 for Sir William F. Erskine, the ambassador in Sofia, about the situation in ‘Serbian Macedonia (or Southern Serbia as you must call it here)’. Kennard complained initially about how it was difficult for him to gain an impression of conditions in Macedonia as an official representative, as he was always accompanied by officials. On his informational tour in May 1926, he had no opportunity to question the local population without witnesses. He did, however, meet with many official representatives – members of the military, Gand Zˇupans, civilian officials, priests – which overall made not a bad impression on him. One had to take into consideration in his opinion that Macedonia was unattractive and the better officials avoided being transferred there. In contrast to the local critics, he found that the quality of the administration was definitely better than one or two years previously, although one could not expect Western standards. Much was being done to improve the transport links, to combat malaria, build schools and generally to improve living standards. If the authorities in Macedonia were more repressive than in other parts of the country, then in his opinion this was mainly due to the IMRO’s activities. In this assessment one can clearly hear the arguments of the official representatives of Yugoslavia, from which Kennard received his information. Although he was aware of its bias, he was not able to resist the effects of state propaganda. Nonetheless, he described graphically the unpleasant situation of the Macedonian peasants between the anvil and hammer: one day the Komitadji arrived and demanded money, accommodation and supplies; the next day the gendarmes locked them up on account of this support. The Macedonian is really a peaceable, fairly industrious agriculturist and if the S.C.S. Government gives him adequate protection, education, freedom from malaria and decent communications, there seems no reason why he should not become just a Serbian in sentiment as he was Bulgarian ten years ago. Whatever the Macedonian had been originally – he was neither a Serb nor a Bulgarian. The Exarchate (that is, the Bulgarian Church) has Bulgarianised him, just as now, under favourable circumstances; he could be Serbianised – if it were not for the IMRO’s activities. Kennard suspected that the Italians lay

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behind it. He was receiving much propaganda material from the Association d’Etudiants Mace´doniens a` l’Etranger [Association of Macedonian Students Abroad] in Vienna, the newspaper La Mace´doine from Geneva and ‘other stuff of the kind’. It was all printed on good quality paper and certainly cost a lot of money. The British ambassador was not of the opinion that the people were deliberately beaten in order to ‘de-nationalise’ them. Such excesses happened during interrogations in order to extract information. Also in this case he saw the causes of police brutality in the activities of the Komitadji. Since the report was sent to the embassy in Sofia, which certainly was confronted with quite different information about the situation in Macedonia, Kennard saw himself obliged to explain his generally positive assessment and to relativise the abuses: Please do not think that I am in any way biased in these people’s [the Serbs] favour, as I am only too alive to their shortcomings and I am fully aware that graft, maladministration, and bullying prevails in Macedonia, just as it does in other parts of this primitive Kingdom or indeed the Balkans generally. I should not, however, think that matters were worse in this respect there than anywhere else.166 The Vice Consul David Footman was also of the opinion that the Macedonians, like other dissatisfied ‘elements’, also saw the problems that prevailed throughout the country only in relation to themselves.167 Nonetheless he gave consideration to how the dissatisfaction of the peasants could be tackled. In this he started from a certain premise: ‘As has so often been pointed out, the Macedonian peasant is not politically minded.’ Much more, complaints were concerned especially with two other fields: he was unhappy because he did not receive a fair price for his produce, and because the officials did not treat him well. According to Footman, fortunately the more far-sighted Serbs were open to such issues.168 Erskine, the ambassador in Bulgaria, was also of the opinion that Alban Young, the former ambassador in Yugoslavia, had been right when he said that these people did not have greater problems than others in the Balkans. They simply did not want to pay as much in taxes as the other regions of Yugoslavia.169 Nonetheless, the overall opinion of members of the British embassy about Serbian officials in Macedonia and the conditions there cannot have been so good, as the annual report of the embassy for 1928 viewed – the appointment of good officials, preferably Slovenes or Croats – as the most effective measure to improve things in Macedonia. Unofficially the British embassy lobbied for this. Due to the poor climate and other conditions, it was very difficult to motivate officials to serve in ‘South Serbia’. The Slovene Anton Korosˇec, initially Interior

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Minister in 1928 and from July also the prime minister, assured the British ambassador that measures had been taken to improve the work of the local administration.170 When a British loan for Yugoslavia was being negotiated in 1928, the Foreign Office wanted to urge the British Finance Ministry (the Treasury) that it should be made a provision of the loan that the money should be used primarily for improving conditions in ‘South Serbia’.171 Kennard recommended draining the swamps, fighting malaria, providing higher wages for the officials and arranging the overall improvement of the administration. He saw this as the only way out of the completely deadlocked situation in the South. All these points had been described as satisfactory by the ambassador after his journey in May 1926, on which he was so carefully accompanied by the Yugoslav authorities. The ‘correct medicine’, in his view, would have been, in any case, breaking up the IMRO, which, however, he did not think that the Bulgarians were capable of doing.172 Like the British embassy in Belgrade, Anton Korosˇec was also tied up in contradictions over conditions in the South. At the start of May 1928, he undertook as Interior Minister a journey through Macedonia and is supposed to have reported very positively about his impressions there. The administration was excellent, the people loyal. Nonetheless, he considered it necessary to promise reforms. In Parliament, Pribic´evic´ and Radic´ then engaged him in a skirmish, above all because he had made the Serbian position into his own, that the reasons for the current treatment of Macedonia were to be found abroad. The Macedonian organisations in Bulgaria were very disappointed by the results of the journey.173 The positions of the British representatives in Belgrade and Sofia on the Macedonian question were influenced to an amazing degree by the respective attitudes of the host countries. Kennard was seriously disturbed by the understanding which the British embassy in Sofia generally showed for the Bulgarian point of view, and insisted on conducting pragmatic power politics: I always insist that we must look at this question [the ‘Bulgarian’ minority in Macedonia] from the practical and not the sentimental point of view. If we now encourage the raising of the question of principle, the whole Macedonian question will come on the tapis and Heaven knows where it will end . . . While I do not in any way wish to criticise the Legation at Sofia, would it not be possible to suggest to them that they would do well to restrain their ardour in this connection as it cannot serve any useful purpose form the practical point of view?174 He himself supported, as is obvious from the above, the Yugoslav perspective and had in this respect the backing also of the Foreign Office. On one occasion

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this even went so far that Charles Dodd of the embassy in Sofia was reproved for the length of his reports about the ‘Macedonian imbroglio’. Orme Sargent informed him that the Foreign Minister did not have time to read such extensive reports about ‘a question of relatively minor importance’.175 This summarised quite clearly the weight of Macedonia for Great Britain. For the British, the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans had the highest priority, so that it appeared as superfluous to be concerned with issues that were not going to change this policy. The subsequent British ambassador in Sofia, Sidney Waterlow, by contrast, viewed things from a distinctly ‘sentimental viewpoint’, as Kennard called it. He could imagine an autonomous and unified Macedonia, although on the other hand he did not find it desirable to create even more small states. ‘Yet one’s mind keeps flying back in this direction, as one goes over the problem day after day, only to find Alps upon Alps of hopelessness arise.’176 He also saw a Federation of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as a possible solution, in which Macedonia would be reunited as a more or less self-governing entity. ‘What a blessing that would be!’ This variant appeared to be fantastic, but could perhaps nonetheless come true, in view of the problems that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were having with the status quo. But Waterlow misread in his utopian visions both the Yugoslav, as well as the British, standpoint. Both states were completely against any territorial changes. The extent of Waterlow’s naivete´ is revealed by his conviction that Bulgaria was engaging itself in Macedonia, not for expansionary reasons, but out of empathy.177 For the British representatives in Yugoslavia, Belgrade appeared to be one of the most restless small capitals in Europe. It was rare that more than a few weeks passed without some incident occurring, which at first glance threatened the peace in the Balkans. Scarcely had the climate with one of the neighbours relaxed than there was excitement on another border. The year 1928 was, however, relatively calm.178 It also remained quiet on the Bulgarian border. After the assassination of Velimir Prelic´, the police chief in Skopje on 13 January 1928, General Naumovic´ became the Gand Zˇupan. This appointment did not find any support among the politicians and Macedonian intellectuals, according to the assessment of the British. Yet the people welcomed a firm hand, which put an end to the violence. Attacks only still came from Albania, and these were mainly ‘as it appears’ of a criminal nature, not political.179 The calming down in the east of the country also had a great deal to do with the fact that the IMRO was divided after the murder of its leader Aleksandar Protogerov on 7 July 1928, and in the following years was mainly occupied with internal struggles and the settling of scores.180 The domestic political situation, however, more than made up for the peaceful state of foreign policy. On 21 January 1928, the Croat Peasants’

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Party (HSS) and the Independent Democratic Party (SDS), which represented the Serbs in Croatia, held a widely publicis joint Congress in Zagreb and thereby formed an unexpected precˇanski front, that is a union of the parties on Croatian territory against Belgrade. This coalition shut down the orderly work of the Parliament with ‘systematic obstructionism’, which was made easy by the liberal procedural regulations. In every session numerous ‘urgent motions’ were submitted, so that the Parliament was unable to deal with its ordinary business. Tension and frustrations were building up.181 The opposition sharply attacked the government. At the beginning of March, Radic´ was excluded from the Parliament for three days because he had insulted the name of the king. Pribic´evic´ declared quite openly in Osijek: ‘If the Vukic´evic´ and Davidovic´ government wants to work in the present Skupsˇtina, it will have to call in policemen at every session.’182 In the assessment of the British, however, the king and several politicians were slowly coming to realise that concessions would have to be made to the precˇani, even if a change of the 1921 constitution in the sense of more decentralisation was necessary. The disunity within the government over this, however, prevented any concrete steps being taken. Also when the Parliament convened again on 8 June, political work was still impossible. On 11 June, four Croat representatives, who had been banished for creating a disturbance, demanded to be readmitted to Parliament and were forcibly removed.183 The highpoint of the tensions and the bankruptcy of the parliamentary system were reached on 20 June, when Punisˇa Racˇic´, a Montenegrin representative of the Radical Party, shot five parliamentarians of the HSS. Two of them died of their wounds immediately; Stjepan Radic´ died on 8 August. In Macedonia people were not especially astonished, as the British ambassador noted: ‘The crime of Punisˇa Racˇic´ was not greeted with much surprise in Skopje, as it reflected the methods, with which the Nationalists have maintained the predominance of the Radical Party in “South Serbia” since the end of the war.’184 After these dramatic events the opposition demanded new elections, which, however, were refused. Eventually Korosˇec succeeded on 27 July, with great effort and to the surprise of everybody, in forming a government from the Radicals, the Democrats, the Slovenian People’s Party and the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation, which had a comfortable majority in the Parliament. With Korosˇec, who was also the Interior Minister, for the first time a non-Serb became prime minister. The opposition, which mainly consisted of Croatian parties, as expected, rejected the new government. At a rally in Zagreb at the beginning of August, they denied the Parliament’s authority to pass resolutions for the whole country. They demonstrated their determination to struggle for the reconstruction of the state, so that all parts of the country

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received equal rights. The Federalist Ante Trumbic´ and the Frankist Ante Pavelic´ joined the opposition. With that, all the representatives from Croatia were united in one movement.185 When the Democrats under Davidovic´ withdrew from the governing coalition, Korosˇec threw in the towel and resigned on 28 December 1928.186 In the final consultations of the king with the party leaders, Macˇek and Pribic´evic´ demanded a federalist solution and a new constitution, while the government parties resisted this. In view of this uncompromising attitude, the king, who already had a strong position, seized power for himself on 6 January 1929. The evaluation of the situation by the British embassy, after ten years of the existence of the Kingdom SHS, was devastating. In its assessment, the central government had scandalously failed to place the relations between the various regions of the country on a new basis. This had produced the impression that only a drastic revision of these relationships could still save the kingdom. In all parts of the country one hears demands for equality with Serbia. One believes here generally that only the king could still find a way out of the culde-sac. The writer of the report, however, believed that the king mainly lacked proper statesmen, such that he even regretted that Pasˇic´ and Radic´ were no longer among the living. The future looked bleak to him.187

CHAPTER 2 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1930s

Hopes in a Dictatorship In view of the above-mentioned devastating verdict of the British embassy on the parliamentary system, it is not surprising that the British – and not only them – thought that the royal dictatorship, declared on 6 January 1929, could really get things done. The new ambassador, Nevile Henderson, saw it as a necessary evil for a limited period of time, so that Yugoslavia could finally receive a solid foundation. In general some progress was to be observed, as the regime was finally carrying out those things the Parliament had always only talked of doing.1 And in reality the passing of laws finally moved forward. The skupsˇtina had worked especially slowly: in 1925, 13 laws were passed; in 1926, 19; in 1927, 14; in 1928, however, 51. And that in a state in which several inherited legal systems existed alongside each other, leading to inequality and irritation. Now in 1929 alone, 200 in part long overdue laws were passed by decree. Among the most important steps was the standardisation of the penal and civil codes, and of taxes. By abolishing entire ministries and the dismissal of officials, an attempt was made to downsize the bloated administrative apparatus. In 1925 the bureaucracy had 280,000 employees – that is twice as many per head of the population as in Bulgaria.2 Corruption, a further scourge that was a cause for constant complaint, had supposedly already declined considerably on the lower levels in the first year of Alexander’s rule. The closing of numerous high schools was done to reduce the number of intellectuals (and thereby the numbers of those applying for positions in the civil service).3 The greatest achievement in terms of domestic policy, in the view of the British ambassador, was the introduction of Banovina Councils, which was a move towards more local self-administration. Nevile Henderson paid the king tribute also for his idealism and his proposed vision of Yugoslavianism.4 The king also tried to

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make direct contact and to celebrate with his people. At the turn of the year 1929/30, he received hundreds of delegations from every part of the country.5 On 19 January 1930, peasants from Croatia, both men and women, led by the nephew of Radic´,6 visited him and the capital – an act which was meant to symbolise reconciliation with the Croats. In deed and in truth a further centralisation took place under the royal dictatorship. By the law of 3 October 1929, new administrative units were introduced, namely the nine Banovinas: Drava, Sava, Littoral, Vrbas, Drina, Danube, Morava, Zeta and Vardar. At the head of each stood a Ban appointed by the king, and the prefecture of Belgrade. The Vardar Banovina, with 36,672 square kilometres, was the second largest in terms of area and in 1931, with 1.57 million inhabitants, was in third place with respect to population size. Its largest component part was Vardar Macedonia with an area of some 25,000 square kilometres (68 per cent of the area of the Banovina) and a population of 950,000 (60.5 per cent); in addition, the Banovina included the southern part of Serbia and parts of Kosovo-Metochia. The division into districts (srezovi) remained the same as in the 1920s.7 In the constitution of 1931, the Banovina Council was theoretically converted from an appointed to an elected body, which could issue laws and discuss the budget. In practice the legally established self-administration rights of the Banovinas were not granted. Thus according to the community law of 1933 and the town community law of 1934, the organs at the local level were supposed to be determined by the people in public elections, but in 1939 they were still appointed from above. The decisions of the communal executive authorities could be overridden by the higher authorities if they were ‘damaging’ for the state.8 In 1933 a planned law giving greater autonomy to the Banovinas had been ready for a year, but was never put before Parliament.9 The British ambassador who departed in 1929, Howard Kennard, was much more critical in his assessment of the royal dictatorship than his successor Nevile Henderson. In his report for the Foreign Minister, Kennard thought that the king needed more success than he could show, as a dictatorship needs to show quick results, otherwise it did not have any justification for its existence in the eyes of the population. In Belgrade wild rumours were circulating that the dictatorship would soon come to an end. In the assessment of the ambassador, the king could show the least progress with respect to the relationship between the Serbs and the Croats – and this was one of the most burning domestic political problems. Slovenia, on the other hand was not dissatisfied, but there the Belgrade authorities had also never interfered strongly.10 In May 1930, R.W. Seton-Watson sent a memorandum to several selected people (Masaryk, Benesˇ, Maniu and Vaida from Romania, Nevile Henderson),

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in which he expressed an opinion on the situation in Yugoslavia and delivered a devastating verdict on the new regime. He opposed the seizure of power by the king, who thereby had taken too much on his shoulders, and had seen a ‘non-party Cabinet of high officials’ as a solution to the parliamentary crisis. Thus the king had thrown all of his personal prestige onto the scales, without having a path of retreat in case everything should go wrong. In the meantime it was clear that the dictatorship would not be of such short duration, as had been maintained initially. In addition, Seton-Watson was disappointed that the king, as was the case already before the seizure of power, preferred to push courtiers and soldiers into office, while avoiding men with support among the population. The elimination of the old parties had in his opinion created an increase in power among three groups: the bureaucracy, the military, and, as he put it, certain individuals, who gave up their principles and placed themselves in service of the throne. Every day the police state became more clearly evident. The British historian and publicist condemned equally the new structure of the state, which was based on the suppression of the old names and historically grown structures in the administrative units: ‘It [the regime] has rejected the only sound basis on which to build up the unity of the state, namely the historical provinces, which have their justification, not only in history and sentiment, but in geography, economics and cultural differences’.11 Seton-Watson was deeply disappointed by the development in Yugoslavia and asked himself in a letter to Milan C´urcˇin whether he could not have done something more worthwhile with the last 25 years of his life.12 The editor of the liberal Zagreb newspaper Nova Evropa, which Seton-Watson had founded himself, replied to him imploringly: ‘I repeat, the regime is not Jugoslavia, and you cannot after 25 years send to the devil all of us who are working for the same purposes and ideals like yourself!’13 With respect to Macedonia, however, a new start did appear to be possible. The king showed clear interest in this region. In 1930 he visited Skopje for the first time since 6 January 1929 – even before Zagreb.14 Kennard also had good news for the Foreign Office in an early report. On 27 May 1929, he reported to Austin Chamberlain that in an audience the king had confirmed reports of the ‘satisfactory conditions’ in ‘South Serbia’. This region had really profited the most from the change of regime. The king now wants to carry out an agricultural reform there, in which officers were to take care of distributing the large estates of the Begs to the ‘Macedonian population’.15 Indeed, already in February 1929 the king ordered from his Court Marshal an expose´ on ‘South Serbia’,16 especially regarding the areas south of the line Sˇar-Planina – Skopje, which was a roundabout way of describing Macedonia. He was particularly interested in the economic conditions.

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The Court Marshal demanded from the relevant local offices primarily a list of those Turks, who wanted to emigrate or could be easily persuaded to do so, and their landed property.17 The British Foreign Ministry, however, did not trust the nice picture which Kennard painted. In a letter of 6 June 1929, the ambassador was requested to inform himself and report the reasons why the king was so satisfied with the situation in ‘South Serbia’.18 In September Kennard was specific: the greatest successes were to be found in the administration. Better people had been sent there, the standard of efficiency and ‘honesty’ had considerably improved. The worst influences of politics upon the administration – previously a major problem – could be alleviated.19 These findings of Kennard retrospectively discredited his own already cited report of 26 May 1926, in which he had given the officials in Macedonia a very good reference – at least in comparison with the rest of Yugoslavia.20 The hope, encouraged from above, that under the new regime things would be somewhat better in the official apparatus, was cherished also by the population, as expressed, for example, in complaints to the king, which remarked that unfortunately, even after 6 January 1929, there were still officials without a conscience.21 In reality, one could, at least in the initial period, judge the effects of the royal dictatorship for Macedonia as positive, if also with a more cynical explanation. The tightening up of the official apparatus, which was experienced by the population as parasitic, could only have a favourable effect. The removal of political rights, on the other hand, was, according to Katardzˇiev, without significance for Macedonia, as citizens’ rights in any case had never been fully in effect there.22 The report of the British Vice Consul in Belgrade, C.L. Blakeney, who travelled around Macedonia in April 1930, left in doubt, however, the longer-term success of the struggle against corruption and caused the Foreign Office to come to quite different conclusions than those Kennard had drawn in May 1929: Serb-Macedonia itself is being ruled with an iron hand . . . Unfortunately, the subordinate local officials appear to be in many cases venal in the extreme, a fact that gives rise to much criticism of the Central Government, which is only indirectly to blame for this state of affairs. Although the inhabitants doubtless would prefer to be under Bulgarian rule, they would accept that of Yugoslavia, if they could go about their daily business undisturbed.23 Peace and security were still taken care of in Macedonia, as during the 1920s, by a large number of security forces. The British Military Attache´,

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Major W.H. Oxley, who accompanied Vice Consul Blakeney on his journey, received the following details from official representatives. In the Vardar Banovina in total 54,700 men were deployed, of which there were: 37 companies of border guards (with an average of 100 men) gendarmerie armed peasants three divisions of the regular Army

3,700 10,000 25,000 16,000

In all villages that lay within 30 kilometres of the Bulgarian border, after dark it was only permitted to travel using the main roads. In Oxley’s opinion, however, this was not an imposition, since in any case people went to bed when the sun went down. The first Ban, Zˇika Lazic´, placed great hopes on the 25,000 armed peasants. He explained to Oxley that the population should be made responsible for their own security. Blakeney was also impressed by the security in Macedonia and compared the situation with the Turkish period, when one could only move through the country accompanied by a heavily armed escort. Yet: ‘[T]he only way the Serb could achieve this was by terrorism and the free and general use of the big stick’. But Blakeney did have a certain understanding for these crude methods, as the Serb ‘had not only to deal with the brigands, but also with a population who regarded him as an invader and unwelcome foreigner and from whom he had and could expect no assistance’.24 With regard to Macedonia, Seton-Watson was pessimistic and mistrustful: The appointment of Bishop Varnava25 is directly political and foreshadows a continuance of the strong hand in Macedonia . . . This regime, like its predecessors, appears to understand nothing but forcible methods and to be incapable of the slightest concession to local sentiment . . . The fact that the Croat problem unquestionably claims precedence over all other problems in the state, and therefore over the Macedonian [problem], renders the latter in some ways more, not less, dangerous.26 The personal decisions of the king already showed that a policy of the strong hand was intended. The first Ban, Zˇika Lazic´, had been head of the Section for Public Security in the 1920s and in this position he had been heavily engaged in combating the komiti and kacˇaci (Albanian partisans) and therefore was seen as a ‘specialist in Macedonian matters’. ‘Before the dictatorship he was the irreplaceable head of the so-called State Security, a head of the Okhrana or the GPU. He was subordinated only to the king’.27 On 13 July 1928, a student carried out an assassination attempt against him, from which, however, he

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soon recovered.28 In the acerbic formulation of Pribic´evic´, he transformed the Yugoslav police into a ‘band of robbers’ and introduced mediaeval torture methods for political prisoners in the prisons.29 In his field of activity he left behind a corresponding reputation. The next Ban, Dobrica Matkovic´, also knew Macedonia well, as he had served there as a Gand Zˇupan. It was he, who in March 1923, had 28 men and boys shot in the village of Garvan, after two soldiers were killed in a battle with Komitadjis. Seton-Watson counted it in the regime’s favour, that in recent years much had been done for the welfare of the population. But he still noted, however, that due to the policy of Serbianisation, the latter were very dissatisfied and still nurtured the hope they would be able to take affairs into their own hands.30 He deceived himself though, concerning the supposed efforts of the regime to improve the material situation. It was mainly the good price for raw opium, which in the 1920s had led to a certain rise in living standards.31

1931: Coerced Constitution and Sham Parliamentarism In order to counter growing dissatisfaction with the continuance of the dictatorship, the king declared a new constitution on 3 September 1931, using his extended powers, and established a sham Parliament with two chambers. The ministers, however, were only answerable to the king.32 Of the 96 members of the smaller chamber, the Senate, the king appointed half himself; the others were elected, yet not by the population but by holders of office. The House of Representatives (skupsˇtina) had at least 306 members, who were elected for four years. In order to prevent the division of the party landscape along ethnic lines, as had been the case in the 1920s, a law, introduced on 19 September 1931, only permitted parties who did not have a religious, racial or regional basis, and which received the support of at least 60 people in every administrative district. The elections, from which women continued to be excluded, took place publicly, directly and according to the majority electoral system. Two-thirds of all the seats were granted to the victorious party list. The leaders of the old, now forbidden parties called for a boycott of the first elections carried out under these rules on 8 November 1931, so that only the government list stood at the election.33 Soon after these ‘elections’ the regime founded the Yugoslav Radical Peasants’ Democracy – renamed in 1933 the Yugoslav National Party (Jugoslovenska nacionalna stranka) – as the government party. This was intended to signal liberalisation and a return to party politics. The particularist nationalisms, which had proved themselves to be so destructive in the 1920s, were countered in a declaration of Yugoslavianism on 4 July 1930, that is of allegiance to an overarching Yugoslavian

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(national-) consciousness, as a binding ‘general popular ideology’.34 This approach was, however, destined to fail. The Croat opposition, for example, could not be won over by this Yugoslavianism decreed from above. Vladko Macˇek, the leader of the Croat Peasants’ Party after the death of Radic´, expressed this quite clearly in a letter to Seton-Watson on 24 February 1932: one has to look the fact in the eye, that a Yugoslav people does not exist. In Yugoslavia there is the Slovene People, the Croat, the Serbian, and the Bulgarian. In addition, Montenegrins lived there, who have a state consciousness without a national consciousness; there are the Macedonians, who until today were without a national consciousness. Only when they received free speech, could one say which propaganda has been victorious there. Then there was still the Bosnian Muslims, the bulk of whom also possessed no national consciousness. The intelligentsia, however, today feels itself to be Croatian, even when they don’t dare to say so. In order to save the state, Macˇek wanted to return to the starting point in 1918. Croatia and Montenegro had to receive recognition of their state sovereignty and be able to elect their own parliaments. The inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as the Vojvodina should decide in plebiscites whether they would form their own units or should become part of Serbia, Croatia or Montenegro. After this division, the Parliaments of Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and eventually also Bosnia and the Vojvodina could conclude a federal treaty, in which the shared tasks would be set down.35 The demand for a fresh start and for a revision of the constitution in the sense of a federal system, therefore, remained central for the Croat Peasants’ Party. Various changes in the government during the course of 1932 raised some hope that the regime could undertake steps in the direction of reforming the structure of the state. Thus Dimitrija Sˇalev, a Macedonian living in exile, wrote on 27 July 1932, to the British Labour Member of Parliament (MP) Ben Riley, that he suspected there would soon be a change of government. ‘Et si les e´le´ments de la vraie de´mocratie sont charge´s de constituer le Gouvernement, nous aurons peut-eˆtre une organisation fe´de´rative du pays [And if the elements of true democracy are entrusted to constitute the government, then maybe we will have a federalist organisation of the country]’.36 But when nothing happened, the opposition regrouped and appealed to the public. In a manifesto, the ‘Zagreb Points’37 of 7 November 1932, the coalition of the HSS and the SDS (now both banned) sharply criticised the regime. They condemned the dictatorship and Serbian hegemony, and demanded a return to 1918 and a new state structure, in which all interests would be taken into account.38 The point plan resounded throughout the country and caused other opposition groups to make similar resolutions.

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The supporters of the former Slovenian People’s Party formulated, in their somewhat more mildly phrased ‘Ljubljana Points’, their demands for democratisation and restructuring the state.39 The opposition in the Vojvodina also shared this desire. According to Pribic´evic´, all the parties there wanted autonomy.40 At the end of January 1933, the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation (JMO) joined the protest wave with the ‘Sarajevo Points’.41 In 1933 the Serbian opposition politicians Aca Stanojevic´ and Ljuba Davidovic´ also demanded political rights and the reconstruction of the state.42 The regime, however, remained deaf to these demands. There was no sign at all of a relaxation of political life. The outcome of the point plans was that Macˇek was put on trial and sentenced to three years in prison, Korosˇec was detained on the island of Hvar until October 1934, and other participants had fines imposed on them.43 The next elections were local elections that took place on 15 October 1933. In the Vardar Banovina, in 440 municipalities 1,113 candidates stood, of which 1,084 belonged to the government party, the Yugoslavian National Party. Seventy per cent of those entitled to vote went to the polls.44 The manner, in which these elections were manipulated by the regime, is demonstrated by the example of the Bukovo community near Bitola. A few days before the election, the police chief of the district (okolija) summoned two respected peasants from each village and intimidated them, so that they would not dare to give their votes to the disfavoured candidate Bogoja Fotev, who was standing with his own list. Fotev complained about this to the Electoral Inspector, who informed him, however, that the police chief had acted correctly. He could not permit a Communist to be elected in one of the largest communities close to the city. To the retort of Fotev, that the district court in Bitola had registered and approved his list, the inspector said that the police, not the court, were responsible for maintaining peace and order. Furthermore, his list was especially suspicious, because it was not aligned with any of the Serbian parties. In the end, only the inhabitants of Bistrica voted for Fotev’s list, because the peasant from this village, who was supposed to communicate the instructions and threats from the police chief had neglected to do this, due to his loyalty to Fotev.45 The years of the royal dictatorship with the sharp reactions of the regime to all statements of the opposition and a strict censorship of the press lay like a lead blanket smothering political life in the country. Those who still wanted to be active had to do so using outwardly innocuous associations, like the young activists in Prilep, who in 1932/3 founded a sobriety lodge and used this legal form for illegal activities.46 Such activities were not, however, particularly common. The period of the royal dictatorship coincided with the Great Depression, so that generally, and especially also in Macedonia, lethargy

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spread. Agricultural prices, including those for raw opium and tobacco, collapsed; for the largest sector of the population economic survival became the most important task. The foreign policy situation of Yugoslavia in the years of the royal dictatorship presented itself in a similar dark light to that in domestic policy. Tense-to-hostile relations continued to prevail with almost all the neighbouring states. In 1934, however, there were several diplomatic successes. On 9 February, the Balkan Pact was concluded between Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece and Turkey, which was primarily directed against the revanchism of Bulgaria. In Yugoslavia the Agreement was viewed as an achievement. But Sundhaussen points out correctly that precisely because of the absence of Bulgaria, the pact primarily preserved the existing tensions in south-east Europe.47 In order to escape from foreign political isolation – which first of all pre-supposed moving closer to Yugoslavia – the new government in Bulgaria, which had just come to power by a putsch on 19 May 1934, decided to break up the IMRO. A further reason for this decision lay in concerns about the integrity of the state, since the IMRO in the Bulgarian part of Macedonia, their basis, had established a kind of state within a state, which had provoked concern and disapproval in ever greater circles of Bulgarian public opinion. On 14 June 1934, all parties were banned and thereby also the IMRO. That this, until then powerful, organisation, which was armed to the teeth, could subsequently be dissolved with any problem demonstrates how closely the connections between the Bulgarian government and the organisation must have been.48 After this, the king of Yugoslavia made a successful visit to Sofia on 27 September. Relations with Albania were also improved, and a move towards Turkey followed. The relationship with Italy, however, remained tense. The British ambassador had been convinced for years that Italy was working towards the destruction of Yugoslavia, using all means – short of war.49 Also in domestic policy the king appears to have considered taking a new direction. He clearly planned to release Macˇek from prison and to tackle the Serb-Croat problem together with him.50 The murder of King Alexander by a Macedonian-Croatian group of conspirators on 9 October 1934 in Marseille pre-empted these plans. The shock was great throughout Yugoslavia and temporarily the people were united in mourning the king. The British ambassador said somewhat pathetically that through the manner of his death, the king had made the greatest contribution to that which was closest to his heart, namely Yugoslavia.51 However, the mourning naturally could not last long as an integrating factor. For the still under-age King Petar three regents were appointed: Prince Paul, a cousin of the murdered king; Radenko Stankovic´, Professor of Medicine, a friend of Alexander, who had been Minister of Education from

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1932 until 1934; and Ivo Perovic´, a lawyer, who from 1931 was the Ban of the Sava Banovina.52 The appointments show the effort to give the court, the Serbs and the Croats each a share of power, as the most important political elements. The chosen men as such, however, did not demonstrate any outstanding qualities. While the British ambassador was at least enthusiastic about the anglophile Prince Regent Paul,53 the merciless, often also unfair, Svetozar Pribic´evic´, described all three as ‘nobodies’. Perovic´ was also ‘une brute’, who was hated in Croatia and Dalmatia.54 But Seton-Watson also found that the regents were not able to fill the power vacuum. They lacked experience, unity and prestige; the dictatorship remained without a dictator.55 He thereby identified, just like the British ambassador in 1928, an acute lack of outstanding personalities, who could take matters into their own hands.

The Stojadinovic´ Era, 1935 –9: Economic Recovery, Political Revival On 6 February 1935, the Jevtic´ government dissolved Parliament and announced new elections for 5 May. Political life heated up across the board. In contrast to 1931, the old parties did not call for a boycott, but became active and presented a united front. The HSS, the Democrats, the Agrarians, the JMO, and a part of the Radicals, formed themselves into a United Opposition (Udruzˇena opozicija) and placed Macˇek at the head of their electoral list. Even the Communists, which Macˇek wanted nothing to do with, supported this effort. At the same time, the fascistic Dimitrije Ljotic´ and the former Interior Minister Bozˇa Maksimovic´ each put up their own lists. The electoral campaign and the election itself were accompanied by gross irregularities and falsifications. The government party received 1,747,000 votes and 303 seats, the opposition 1,076,000 votes and, due to the majority electoral system, only 67 representatives. The Croat Peasants’ Party protested immediately and demanded new democratic elections. In the Vardar Banovina, with the help of the usual intimidations and forged ballots, the government camp won 44 representatives, the opposition only one. The majority of the elected representatives were not of Macedonian origin; many of them did not even live in the Banovina.56 The result provoked from Pribic´evic´ the malicious comment: ‘La Mace´donie [sic ], naturellement, a vote´ presque a l’unanimite´ pour le gouvernement [Macedonia [sic ] voted, of course, almost unanimously for the government]’.57 For the Jevtic´ government the good results of the United Opposition meant a defeat, which led to its fall. At the end of June, Prince Paul entrusted

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Milan Stojadinovic´, who was rather counted as one of the opponents of the dictatorship, with forming a government. Seton-Watson viewed this choice positively: ‘Prince Paul, the most important regent, has gained in stature and liberated himself from Jevtic´ and Zˇivkovic´’.58 Stojadinovic´, one of the richest men in the country, had previously been the Finance Minister. The Slovene Korosˇec and Spaho, the leader of the JMO, then left the United Opposition and joined the government,59 but the Croat opposition did not take part. On 19 August 1935, Stojadinovic´ founded as a new governing party, the Yugoslavian Radical Union (Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica – JRZ), which encompassed the former Radical Party, the Slovenian People’s Party and the Bosnian Muslims.60 The founding of this party was supposed to demonstrate, both internally and externally, that the dictatorship had come to an end; furthermore, it served to break up the old parties. But even when these remained banned, politics had now clearly revived. The police terror eased off, the newspapers were no longer censored in advance, and some 10,000 political prisoners were amnestied.61 In foreign policy, Yugoslavia under the leadership of the Prince Regent and Stojadinovic´ turned ever more strongly away from France and its partners in the Little Entente and towards Berlin and London. Improved relations with Italy remained something to be desired.62 While the Croatian electorate was almost entirely represented by the Croat Peasants’ Party, the Serbian political camp had been divided since the introduction of the royal dictatorship. One tendency demanded the reintroduction of political rights and the democratic system, the others thought that it was too early for this. The governing JRZ had in principle written ‘concern for citizens’ freedoms’ into the party programme.63 The struggle for political positions within the government, however, was by no means decided by this. In an undated anonymous tract, which comes from after the May 1935 elections, the government was expressly warned not to grant political rights ‘too early’. This tract is of interest, as it reveals, warts and all, the positions of that significant part of the Serbian political class which thought primarily in nationalistic categories. The author warned Milan Stojadinovic´, the new prime minister, against jumping over ‘historical stages’, since states and nations could only establish themselves under absolutist regimes that lasted for decades. In addition, one was dealing in every respect with a very heterogeneous people, with ‘Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Serbs from over there (srbi precˇani), Germans, Hungarians, Turks, Albanians, Romanians, Exarchites’,64 among whom, beyond this, there were many ‘anational elements’: The Exarchists, that is the Bulgaromanian (bugarasˇki) elements in South Serbia, have been in opposition to every government since their

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liberation. Why? Because basically they are against the State as such, which they do not view as their own (and unfortunately they are still in the majority in South Serbia). The State and the dynasty would be in great shape [ironic, ed.], if one were to permit these and other such elements, to decide freely and independently, that is, in accordance with their own discretion and mood, which government should take care of the State and protect the interests of the monarchy and the dynasty.65 Once again one finds here an attitude toward the Macedonians which is dominated by mistrust and condescension, which had remained unchanged since 1918 and 1919, when Macedonia was still ruled by decree and the population not only de facto, but also de jure possessed no political rights. Furthermore, the assessment of Serbia’s interests is very revealing: it is the monarchy and the dynasty, whose preservation are given priority above all else. As anational elements the author also identified the ‘magyarfriendly Serbs’ (srbi mad¯aroni, who, in addition, were all supposedly Freemasons), who were demanding a special status for the Vojvodina. The Croats also had been in opposition to the government since the founding of the state, because they could not get overcome their hatred of the Serbs and of Orthodoxy, with which Austria had poisoned their souls. The last elections have shown that anti-State and anti-dynastic tendencies were still fully present in the Croat people. They were also expressed in the Vojvodina after the elections, and they would have shown themselves during and after the elections in South Serbia, if this had not been prevented using various means and great efforts, and if it was not still being prevented.66 This passage confirms that measures were being taken against anti-government stirrings in Macedonia with still greater energy and effort than elsewhere. Stojadinovic´ himself, according to his memoirs, assessed the Macedonian question as follows: As head of the government I was of the opinion that the Macedonian problem depends on the administration of this territory and that with the end of repressive methods, as had been implemented for a period there by Interior Minister Zˇika Lazic´ and the Ban of the Vardar Banovina Dobrica Matkovic´, the way was cleared to bring complete order to this region, namely by giving attention to its economic and cultural progress.

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In this way the reasons for that dissatisfaction would be removed, which forms the basis for the activity of the IMRO. And this was what actually happened during his period of government; Vancˇo Mihajlov was no longer a problem.67 Mihajlov and the IMRO, whose leader he was, no longer represented a problem, not due to the efforts of the Stojadinovic´ government but because the Bulgarian state removed its support and broke up this organisation in 1934. The extent to which the Stojadinovic´ government really brought economic and cultural progress will still be shown. David Footman, however, the former British Vice Consul in Skopje, who travelled privately through Yugoslavia in 1935, saw the matter similarly to Stojadinovic´. He viewed the Macedonian question at this point in time as already solved: ‘The Serbs are there and they are going to stay there.’ Now and then there were anti-Serb outbursts among a few students. The secret police grabbed these young people and beat them in the police station in Skopje. But slowly peace returned, for roads and railways were being built, and the economic connections to the north strengthened. The struggle was past, now it only needed some time. In foreign policy sympathy reigned between the Serbian and Bulgarian peoples.68 In 1936, however, Stojadinovic´ was still of the opinion that in the Vardar Banovina ‘special circumstances’ prevailed, which demanded proceeding against political enemies with complete consequence. He instructed the Vice Ban to keep in close check the activities of the United Opposition and members of the former Glavni Odbor (Main Committee) of the former Radical Party, that is, the political opponents of Stojadinovic´ from his own former home party.69 Parallel to this the flourishing of the government party JRZ in the Vardar Banovina was closely followed. The local representatives reported regularly on this. On 13 December 1935, Dusˇan Perovic´, representative for the Negotino District, informed Ugrin Joksimovic´, the chairman of the Banovina organisation of the JRZ, that the population of the Negotino and Kavadarci districts (srezovi) were not joining the party, but in contrast were leaving it out of disappointment that their voice was not being heard at all and none of their demands were being fulfilled. The most important concern was the opening of the four-class high school in Kavadarci for both districts. Perovic´ was now under pressure from the people to lead a delegation to the regents on this issue, which, however, he refused, and on account of which he was forced to resign.70 This example makes apparent the moral cowardice of many Macedonian representatives, which was the subject of subsequent accusations by politicians such as Spiro Hadzˇi Ristic´ and Jordan Ac´imovic´ against their parliamentary colleagues. The branch of the JRZ Party was in a chaotic condition in Skopje, where a bitter power struggle was playing out between Spiro Hadzˇi Ristic´ and Cˇaslav

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Nikitovic´ (a Serb), on the one side, and Ugrin Joksimovic´ and Panta Jovanovic´ on the other. All four were strong personalities and unwilling to give way. Two local groups were formed, which each denied the legitimacy of the other and each sought support from their ‘leader’ (vod¯ ) Stojadinovic´.71 In April 1936, the dispute was temporarily resolved. The two groups merged with Panta Jovanovic´ as President and Hadzˇi Ristic´ and Dragutin Matovic´ as Vice Presidents.72 Joksimovic´ was able to report to Stojadinovic´ that the development of the party was going well everywhere and 90 per cent of the (former) Radicals had joined the JRZ. Only in Kumanovo were there officials, who leaned toward the opposition, such as the director of the ‘Monopoly’, who should be dismissed for this reason.73 Also in Kocˇani, two members of the local JRZ fought a bitter electoral campaign for the community presidency. The loser Jovan Dvojakovic´ was reportedly vilified by his opponent as a ‘Serbian spy’,74 which gave him in turn the opportunity, to portray his rival as an anational element. These, in part, bitter internal party feuds are not a surprise, since the old parties had been banned. Due to this, everyone who wanted to exert political influence or simply only wanted to enjoy the benefits that participation in power offered in every respect, now – regardless of their views – had to get on with each other inside one party, the JRZ. Intrigues and power struggles were on the schedule, such that in Macedonia it was a proven and favoured tactic to denigrate opponents as bugarasˇ, ‘Exarchites’, or ‘Communists’, and to portray oneself by contrast as an upright (Serbian) nationalist.75 Such insults were also practised before the parliamentary elections in 1938.76 The government party JRZ was able to consolidate its position in the Vardar Banovina up to the communal elections in November/December 1936 to such an extent that it was in a position to develop lively activities in the run-up, while the agitation of the opposition remained very weak. The abovementioned measures of the government to suppress the activities of its opponents clearly bore fruit. The Ban in any case saw himself able to assure the prime minister that the opposition would under no circumstances win in more than 10 per cent of the districts.77 Shortly before the election, on 15 November 1936, Stojadinovic´ visited Skopje and promised to develop ‘South Serbia’ economically. There people were not disinclined to believe his promise, for as Finance Minister in 1935 he had been responsible for ensuring that Skopje received a loan of 36 million dinars on favourable conditions and that the pipes for the water supply of the city could be imported at a reduced customs rate. In view of these achievements and his promise, the town council on 9 December 1936 passed a resolution to grant Stojadinovic´ honorary citizenship of Skopje.78

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After years of repressive administration under the Bans Lazic´ and Matkovic´, after the May elections in 1935, the political scene revived again also in Macedonia. The Ban Dragoslav Ðordevic´ brought it to the attention of the prime minister that the opposition in the Vardar Banovina was very active, especially the Democratic Party, which secretly was founding organisations on the model of the trojki and petorki.79 With these designations the Ban was referring to the groups of three and five used by the IMRO and thereby suggesting that the Democrats were especially dangerous. The Belgrade city administration also reported to the prime minister, that the Democrats were forming parties in secret, for example, in Kumanovo. Regarding this it appeared to be of especial cause for concern that the United Opposition was attracting primarily ‘Bulgaromans’. According to the statement of a Serb, the wish was generally present in Kumanovo to elect parliamentarians from among the ranks of the locals. The Serb could understand this, as in his opinion the ‘South Serbs’ were treated tactlessly. For example, when the tobacco planters were paid in 1935, the taxes for 1936 and even 1937 were already being withheld. When he intervened with the Head of the Tax Administration, this one said that he had been instructed by the Finance Office to collect as much tax as possible and that he was sticking to this. Therefore one should not be surprised that after so many years there were still ‘Bulgaromans’.80 The opposition parties really did attract some interest in Macedonia. When Ljuba Davidovic´, the leader of the Democrats came to Skopje on 29 December 1935, despite bad weather 4,000 people, including many Albanians and Muslims, assembled in the hall and on the street, having travelled from throughout the entire Banovina. Mihajlo Mihajlovic´, the Head of the Youth Movement of the United Opposition in Skopje also spoke at this gathering. He used ‘Macedonian dialect’ and stressed that ‘not a single Macedonian’ in the Vardar Banovina was a Ban or a prefect, or held any other important position. The Serb Davidovic´ repeatedly used the term ‘Macedonian’in his speech: this, however, went too far. He reproached the Youth politician for his speech, which he could not approve.81 The incident makes clear that those Macedonian groups, which not only demanded general political rights but also certain concessions to Macedonia, could not find a corresponding partner among the Serbian parties. Since it was still impossible to found a Macedonian Party – parties on a ‘tribal basis’ were now explicitly forbidden – these circles were left with no possibility of conducting legal political activity. The most acute problem in interwar Yugoslavia, the Croat question, was naturally not solved by the introduction of the royal dictatorship, and it also could not be suppressed. At the latest, after the Zagreb Points of November 1932, it was more virulent than ever. In 1936, R.W. Seton-Watson visited the

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country for the first time in seven years. In order to get a comprehensive picture, he conducted discussions with a whole series of politicians, representatives of industry, diplomats and personalities in public life. He established that in the meantime in Belgrade, the existence of a burning Croatian problem, which was in need of swift solution, could no longer be denied. With respect to the reconstruction of the state, Zagreb was demanding a federation of seven units: Slovenia, Croatia-Dalmatia, BosniaHerzegovina, Serbia, Vojvodina, Macedonia and Montenegro. Belgrade, on the other hand, only wanted to concede the first four, and even BosniaHerzegovina only reluctantly. Macˇek could forego the last two, but he saw himself compelled to demand a certain administrative autonomy also for Macedonia and Montenegro. According to Seton-Watson, in the Vojvodina at least 90 per cent of the Serbs were in favour of autonomy, not to mention the minorities, who did not want to continue being exploited financially.82 For Macˇek the federalisation of the country could, however, be considered in various ways. Ultimately it was important for him that Croatia represented one piece – who else might form a unit could be negotiated. He could even imagine a dual model: the Drava Banovina (Slovenia) and the Vrbas Banovina (the north-western part of Bosnia) would belong to Croatia, the rest to Serbia. If it should come to a war, the Serbs, however, would have to make still more concessions83 – that is give up more territory to Croatia. On the side of the government, the insight grew that gestures towards Croatia were necessary. Possibilities were sought to demonstrate generosity. According to a paper from the Fourth Section of the Justice Ministry, in the first half of January 1936, there were 444 political prisoners: 192 had been convicted for Communist propaganda, 172 as Croat terrorists, 66 for terrorist acts in ‘South Serbia’, and 15 for various crimes against public security. In March 1936, the Ministry proposed granting an amnesty to the 172 ‘Croat terrorists’. Against this, amnestying the Communists was out of the question, and the same applied to the prisoners from ‘South Serbia’, since they had been convicted of very serious crimes. The Croats who had been proposed for pardoning, on the other hand, had allegedly received too harsh sentences, displayed good conduct and would have been eligible for release on probation anyway, which had not yet happened due to the lack of a suitable opportunity.84

Movement among the Macedonian Intelligentsia The demands for autonomy and federalisation, mainly as they were expressed from 1932 to 1933 in Croatia, Slovenia and Vojvodina, also had their supporters in Macedonia, if it was once again the young intelligentsia outside

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the Banovina that first openly articulated this. In April/May 1935, the Macedonian members of the Communist Youth Organisation (SKOJ) at the University of Zagreb began the first preparations for the establishment of the cultural association Vardar. The founding meeting took place on 29 October 1935; on 2 January 1936, the administration of the Sava Banovina approved the statutes. These were taken over and adapted in April 1936 by the Macedonian students of the University of Belgrade and were already approved by Belgrade University on 5 June.85 On the activities of the associations, there is a report by the administration of the city of Belgrade, which was forwarded to the Education Ministry by the Interior Ministry on 12 March 1937. The report states that recently the academic society Vardar in Zagreb, in which ‘Macedonian students’ were united, had increased its propaganda work among the academic youth at the University of Zagreb. Members of Vardar increasingly held lectures, for example, in the academic club of the HSS and the SDS, where they explained that the Macedonian people was a united entity and that there was a Macedonian question, which was linked to the Croat one. The speakers expressed their agreement with the programme and the views of the Croat people and demanded on their part an autonomous Macedonia, in which the Macedonian people could decide for themselves on their government and where they belonged. ‘Furthermore they will have the opportunity’, according to the report, ‘to conduct so-called propaganda concerts in Croatia, at which they sing Macedonian songs in the Macedonian language and acquaint the Croat people with the Macedonian question’. ‘Nationally correct’ students from ‘Serbian families in South Serbia’ were excluded from the society. The Belgrade city administration was concerned about the MacedonianCroatian cooperation and alarmed by the announcement of Vardar that it wanted to fight ‘in free Croatia for a free Macedonia’ and publish a newspaper called Vijesnik in Latin script – that is, in Croatian. The author felt it was ‘characteristic’ that among the leaders of the ‘movement’ there were people who had received scholarships from the Vardar Banovina. On the basis of this report from Belgrade the Interior Ministry demanded that the Education Ministry do something to stop Vardar, insofar as the laws and the autonomy of the university permitted.86 At the end of the university year 1935/6, around 200 out of 479 students from the Vardar Banovina in Belgrade signed a resolution which they had delivered to Macˇek by a student from the Sava Banovina. In the letter they requested that alongside the struggle for an independent Croatia, he also should work for the independence (samostalnost) of Macedonia, since everything

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that the Croats demanded, was also demanded by the Macedonians, and they promised him, in the next elections, and also otherwise, to work with all their strength for the success of the opposition and the independence of Macedonia. The students intended to distribute pamphlets in which they wanted to call upon the people to support them in their work for Macedonia’s independence.87 The prefect of Kocˇani was convinced that Macˇek was finding ever more supporters in this region, above all among the youth, not because they knew him, but exclusively because they thought that with his help they could obtain a ‘separate’ Macedonia (zasebnu Makedoniju).88 In the summer of 1936, the movement was carried from the universities in Zagreb and Belgrade to Macedonia. On 28 August 1936, a meeting took place in Ohrid of students, intellectuals and politicians from various parts of Macedonia, at which a political platform was announced: 1. The Macedonian people have the right to a free national life within a Yugoslavian Federation. 2. This demand can only be fulfilled if the ‘monarcho-fascist dictatorship’ and the hegemony are abolished and a far-reaching democracy is introduced. 3. Therefore, the Macedonian people, together with the other peoples and the progressive forces in Yugoslavia, will fight for the release of political prisoners, for the right to freedom of speech, for freedom of the press and for the lifting of all the anti-democratic laws. 4. The Macedonian people demand that democratic relations are initiated with the Soviet Union and that a friendship treaty is signed with that country. 5. The immediate calling of fresh elections is demanded to take place using a secret ballot. The style and the demands reveal that the Communists were the driving force behind this movement known as the MANAPO (Makedonski narodni pokret – Macedonian People’s Movement).89 The reaction of the regime to the activity of the young intellectuals from Macedonia did not take long. Initially the students belonging to the Vardar association had their stipends withdrawn, then in 1937 followed a ban of the associations: first on 27 April 1937 in Belgrade, then at the start of June also in Zagreb. The statutes of an association with the same name at the Faculty for Philosophy in Skopje were never even approved.90 As already in the 1920s, not only associations with political tendencies were banned but every kind of Macedonian organisation was blocked, while those of other ethnic groups were not uncovered or even promoted. In Bitola,

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for example, in 1937 the Sports Club Jedinstvo (Unity) was established, which immediately had 400 members and whose leadership was dominated by Vlachs (cincari). The club pursued the goal of standing up to the alleged ‘Bulgaromans’ in the town and was not hindered by the regime, even though the Vlachs were seen as pro-Greek. The humanitarian organisation Kora hleba (Crust of Bread) on the other hand, which was founded by Macedonian inhabitants (bugarasˇi) of the town, immediately caught the attention of the authorities, which largely obstructed its work.91 In a letter to Stojadinovic´, the Ban of the Vardar Banovina, Marko Novakovic´, judged that the movement among the intellectuals in Macedonia was of little importance. He took the view that the national problem was not in the foreground and the young intellectuals, who leaned to the left, were unhappy dreamers with no influence on the people. It appeared to him that it was much more important that the economic situation had improved, especially among the peasants. According to the Ban, the people were more satisfied and praised the Stojadinovic´ government.92 This assessment makes a reassuring impression and stands in contradiction to a report by the Head of the Banovina Administration, according to which in 1937 students in Skopje demanded the introduction of a professorship for the Macedonian language and literature that was refused by the faculty leadership. Anyway, it was usual for the youth to communicate with each other orally and in writing, only in the ‘South Serbian dialect’. Plays were also written and performed in this idiom. Precisely the youths who were educated by the state disappointed the expectations that were placed in them. Therefore, the Head of the Administration proposed educating the children in the schools in a purely Serbian spirit again and not in the Yugoslavian one any more. Only a good Serb could also be a good Yugoslav.93 In July 1937, an informant let Stojadinovic´ know that in the south ‘Bulgaroman elements’ were agitating strongly for the establishment of a ‘Macedonian Federalist Party’. The movement ‘is not insignificant, and is taking on serious and broad dimensions’.94 The informant was probably thinking of the ‘Lucˇists’. However, such a party was not established, as the movement did not find the determination and energy that was claimed here. In view of the attentiveness of the authorities, anti-government demonstrations at times took place using more subtle forms. In July 1937, a pamphlet circulated which was signed by numerous citizens and in which a call was made to visit the French Consulate between 11 and 12 o’clock on 14 July, the French National Holiday, in order to register in the guest book there. This should express the value placed on freedom, equality and fraternity. The text ended with the appeal: ‘Long live the French people, long live the

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rights of the people, long live freedom, fraternity, and equality.’95 The reference to the absence of these values in Yugoslavia was more than clear. But open protest or even revolt was also dared. One such event occurred on 1 August 1937 in Gradsko, a small town south of Veles, when the community representatives (opsˇtinski cˇasniki) were elected. The teacher Momcˇilo Markovic´ from the nearby village of Ulanci, the official doctor of the Banovina Ilic´, and the candidate Popovic´ led a crowd of 400 people to the community building and to the election committee. It was their goal to obstruct the work of the committee and to set on fire the community house and the electoral returns. According to the report, the mob shouted: Down with State violence! Down with the Prefect! Down with the gendarmes! We want to defend ourselves, using force against force! We want to escort our candidate to the election office, as well as disband the electoral committee and dismiss its President. They have thrown our candidate out of the room! Down with the Police! The three leaders had armed the crowd with shrapnel bullets from the armoury in Gradsko. These were then hurled at the gendarmes, which then deployed ‘cold steel’, causing two people to suffer serious injuries and eight to suffer light wounds. The wife of the teacher had told her husband not to get involved, but he went anyway and shouted at her: ‘Go home! I am going and will die if it is necessary!’ The teacher was the most important ringleader, so that the prefect and the school supervisor requested urgently that he be sent away from Ulanci.96 The background to the incident is not clear from the report, but clearly some citizens here tried to resist manipulation of the elections.

The ‘Lucˇists’ A part of the autonomist and Macedonian strand of the intellectual movement grouped themselves around Lucˇ (Light), according to its subtitle, a ‘journal for cultural, economic, and social questions’, which appeared from June 1937 until May 1938, and according to the editorial in the first edition, wanted to gather together ‘all the intellectuals from the South’. Lucˇ was launched by young Macedonian intellectuals, who in the assessment of the Ban, Marko Novakovic´, formed a very mixed group. Among them were ‘good nationalists’ (in the Serbian sense) and ‘good Yugoslavs’; some were leftists and autonomists like Spira Kitincˇevic´, an industrialist from Skopje.97 This political diversity was confirmed also by the Central Press Office. Some participants were supporters of the United Opposition, others, however, belonged to the governing Yugoslav Radical Union, yet most were unaligned.98 Aleksandar

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Cvetkovic´, Vice Ban of the Vardar Banovina at the end of the 1930s and also a ‘Lucˇist’, recalled the difficult start of the journal. Arsic´, the chief editor, had problems finding authors for the paper. Only when D ¯ ord¯e Kiselinovic´, a hard99 working writer, joined up did things improve. According to Novakovic´, the group did not adhere to any specific ideology. One advocated for the local idiom for culture, history, and for the retention of the geographical term Macedonia. Others, in his opinion, wanted to make a name for themselves politically through the journal, which is why they claimed that the youth of ‘South Serbia’ were repressed and couldn’t get any government jobs. That the political tendency was not cohesive is shown by the tensions which emerged when it became known that a group around Kitincˇevic´ was trying to get in contact with Macˇek. Furthermore, the Ban thought that the paper, in the meantime – in May 1938 – had become more moderate. The ‘local ultranationalists’ – that is the Serbian ones – demanded, however, the suppression of the journal. Personally the Ban did not consider this necessary, but he proposed, if one wanted to do this in a discrete manner, transferring to other Banovinas the state officials among the ‘Lucˇists’, who were the staunchest contributors to the paper. If one wanted to ban the paper, however, this had to be done by the State Prosecutor.100 While the Ban reacted in a relatively unconcerned manner in 1938, his subordinate, the Head of the Education Department, had sent a very alarming report in November 1937 to the Education Ministry. He condemned the tendency in Lucˇ of uniting exclusively the intellectuals from the south. The tone was set by people, whose national correctness (ispravnost) could be doubted with good reason. In many articles, he sensed the desire to separate off the south from the former community, as was constantly emphasised; to bring together ‘our’ intellectuals and get to know ‘our’ people. He also found it a cause for concern that the ‘local dialect’ was being promoted, and not only to portray local subjects – as had been customary in the newspapers since the 1920s – but also for modern literary works and even for daily use. The school students in Skopje spoke the written language [i.e., Serbian] less and less outside school and publicly expressed the necessity and the right to speak exclusively the ‘local jargon’. The journal was financed by subscriptions and also contributions from ‘autonomously-minded citizens’101 or, as the correspondent of the Central Press Office put it, ‘outstanding former Exarchites’. According to the report of the correspondent ‘the majority of those working for this paper were . . . Macedonians’, and the newspaper had ‘the open tendency of [being] a Macedonian action’. The correspondent viewed it as especially serious that officials were involved, as they were being exploited for the agitation with the argument:

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If civil servants are allowed to do this, why should we as citizens not be able to . . . The situation is very serious and we have to give it to our full attention. For it bears the autonomist characteristics of the Macedonian action, and is based on the politics and ideology of Dr. Macˇek.102 Jovan Petrovic´, a Serb who lived in Skopje, delivered in May 1938 his own interpretation of the ‘Lucˇist’ movement. His comments are revealing, insofar as they sketch the political mood. According to Petrovic´, relatively few Serbs lived in ‘so-called Macedonia’ and the ‘local Macedonians . . . view [us] as usurpers, invaders, and exploiters, they are always hostile towards us and work in unity and systematically to drive us out on every issue’. Even the young, who might be more easily assimilated, according to Petrovic´, stood together and well-organised for autonomy. But because the Croat question was stagnating, the ‘Bulgarian Committee’ no longer existed and relations with Bulgaria were good; the Macedonians, who previously had been in favour of annexation to Bulgaria, had now reoriented themselves somewhat. They were now in favour of ‘Macedonia for the Macedonians’ and supported this slogan: to get as many people into Parliament as possible, regardless of which party, to fight there for autonomy within Yugoslavia. That was the programme of the people around Lucˇ and the goal of the well-known Exarchite Spira Kitincˇevic´. Petrovic´ advised being careful not to appoint such people to leading positions and not to let them enter Parliament in large numbers. On the contrary, as many Serbs as possible should sit in Parliament. It would be best to counter these tendencies with economic well-being, with clever policies for tobacco and poppy production, and in all respects a good economic policy. But many high-ranking officials still had no idea about the south103 – a point on which he was not wrong. The memoirs of Aleksandar Cvetkovic´, a senior official in the Banovina Administration and himself a member of Lucˇ, throw a somewhat ambiguous light on this group. He says that Lucˇ was in accordance with the Macedonian line, but the various members did not know what they wanted: ‘every one of us was dissembling and lied to each other. There was no honesty.’104 Here it becomes very clear that the editorial group, at least, was united around the goal – autonomy – but not on the route to get there. While some hoped to gain concessions from the government toward the Macedonian cause, others bet on the opposition. In this connection it was not without significance that a good number of its members were officials. Without doubt they had a different relationship to the state and to the regime than outsiders. Overall, despite its criticism of the regime, the journal does not show any hostility toward the state; on the contrary in individual contributions there are explicit calls for loyalty to the state. The editorial of November/December 1937, for

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example, called upon ‘all positive and creative forces, to support us once again in this project, and thereby make possible that with united efforts we work for the economic, cultural, social, and national strengthening of our native country Yugoslavia and its beautiful future’.105 In order to break up the ‘Lucˇists’, the Banovina Administration suspended and transferred – as Novakovic´ had proposed – those members who were employed there; Borisav Arsic´, Milosˇ Jakovlevic´ and Dimitrije Karadzˇic´.106 After this the movement was very disoriented. The Ban was convinced in any case that their influence was confined to the city107 – a calculation with which one can agree. The peasantry was much more strongly politicised by their experiences with the agents of the ‘Monopoly’ than by the agitation of intellectuals. For the more radical Macedonians on the other hand, Lucˇ was not critical enough. Ðuzelovic´, for example, accused the journal of being a paper of the Banovina Administration and tied to the regime.108 This viewpoint has also been taken by Macedonian historians, such as Slavka Fidanova. In her opinion the government had established Lucˇ itself with the intent to pull the movement of the dissatisfied masses away from the influence of the Communist Party and to put them in the hands of the ‘Macedonian cˇarsˇija’,109 who were prepared to arrange themselves with the regime in exchange for minor concessions.110 The comments above demonstrate, however, that this interpretation is mistaken. While the Ban Marko Novakovic´ rather played down the autonomy movement in Macedonia, there were groups which greatly exaggerated the extent of its unity and organisation. The chairman of the Chetnik Association in Skopje maintained in a letter to Stojadinovic´ that a new Macedonian organisation had existed there for some time which was even more dangerous than the previous one, by which he doubtless meant the IMRO. According to his words, it supported the theory that the Macedonians were neither Serbs nor Bulgarians, but Macedonians, which was particularly attractive to the youth. This organisation, whose central leadership was located in Chicago, had its branches in even the smallest places, whereby students and travelling salesmen served as couriers. A new arrival from Chicago, Nufrija Novakovic´-Kostic´ from Leunovo (western Macedonia), lived in Belgrade and was very active. The organisation, at the head of which was allegedly the Lucˇist Spira Kitincˇevic´ from Skopje, was working for autonomy and subsequently wanted to set up a Macedonian state. It intended also to found a ‘Macedonian Party’, and to this end was getting advice from Macˇek. Communism, on the other hand, was weakly developed here.111 There is no evidence in other sources, however, that any of the autonomously minded groups had such a tight organisation at its disposal.

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‘Even the last shepherd became an official here, if only he was from Serbia and a Serb’ The political dissatisfaction of the Macedonian intelligentsia was in part based in the fact that they saw themselves as cheated out of career opportunities. Since the founding of the Yugoslav state in 1918, Macedonia was covered in a colonialist manner by a foreign, primarily Serbian, bureaucracy. Local forces were employed at best in the lowest ranks at the community level. The regime did not try to justify this practice even with the argument that there were insufficient educated locals – which certainly would have been an accurate statement. Against this one could have countered immediately, however, that even a large number of the officials from Serbia in no way met the formal requirements. The motivations for this practice were clear and openly nationalistic: the locals counted as not sufficiently reliable and were frequently dismissed, because they spoke ‘Bulgarian’ or ‘in dialect’, or were actual or alleged supporters of the IMRO. In addition, Serbian officials appeared better suited to inculcate a Serbian national consciousness in the population. But as the more well-educated Macedonians that had graduated from Yugoslav schools and universities, and of whom one could no longer say that they were Exarchite followers, gradually became available, the greater was their frustration, since their most important potential employer – the state – passed them over. Another aspect of the dissatisfaction was that the population did not want to be administered by foreigners, who very often stayed in their posts only a short time, did not know the local conditions, and not infrequently displayed arrogance and open scorn towards the local population. The bitterness over the preferential treatment of the Serbs is expressed in the words, which a legal trainee (sudski pripravnik) is supposed to have said in 1938 in Prilep to a communal official: How long will you Serbs still be the judges in this country? Everyone, even the last shepherd became an official here, if only he was from Serbia and a Serb, and so in Serbia you can’t find any shepherds for the sheep . . . The Serbian officials want the highest wages, because they are Serbs. In this country one has to introduce the Federation, as only this will provide well-being for all, otherwise blood must flow in this country.112 In the Stojadinovic´ era, the failure to take into account the local elite, especially with regard to filling the higher and top-ranking positions, was openly discussed, both by opponents and supporters of the regime. The young opposition politician Mihajlo Mihajlovic´ complained in December 1935 that in the Vardar Banovina there was not a local Ban or prefect, nor anyone local

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in any other important post.113 In a letter from a local politician in Bogomila to Prime Minister Stojadinovic´, written in 1936, it was stressed that throughout the entire Vardar Banovina people were waiting longingly for the representative Tosˇa (Todor) Zˇivkovic´ from Veles to become the Ban.114 But things never got this far; up to the end of the interwar period no local ever achieved this position. From Macedonians that made it comparatively far, it was expected that they should wait their turn. The long-serving parliamentarian Mita Dimitrijevic´ from the Kocˇani District was very bitter that as the vice president of the Parliamentary Finance Commission, after the resignation of the last Commission president, he was not, as was customary, appointed as his successor. Instead, Vjekoslav Miletic´ received the post, and Dimitrijevic´ was supposed to show understanding that Miletic´, as the only Croat in the Club of the Regime Party JRZ, who actually was supposed to receive a ministerial post, had to be taken care of. Dimitrijevic´, however, was by no means inclined to take a back seat. He did not want to be sacrificed by Stojadinovic´ and threatened to leave Parliament.115 His resistance was clearly crowned with success: in February he received the desired post.116 The Macedonians were also blatantly under-represented in all other key positions in the state. In order to make up for this deficit that was causing increased dissatisfaction, several representatives of the Vardar Banovina worked with a proposed list of candidates for higher offices with Ugrin Joksimovic´ at the top, which they had delivered to Stojadinovic´ in December 1936.117 In March 1937, Spiro Hadzˇi Ristic´ proposed to the prime minister that he should appoint Spasoje Pesˇic´ as the Representative of the Vardar Banovina within the Agrarian Bank, as he was from Skopska Crna Gora. Shortly before, Toma Popovic´, born in Vranje, that is a Serbian, had been appointed as the Banovina representative at the National Bank. According to Hadzˇi Ristic´, now there was an opportunity to do something to counteract the criticism ‘that people from Vranje und Leskovac [towns in Serbia], who came to the South after the war, were taking the most important posts’.118 In August 1938, Ugrin Joksimovic´ suggested that if one really had to transfer the current Vice Ban, the local Nikola Dimitrijevic´ should be appointed, as he was a ‘a great [Serbian] nationalist’. In this way, one could ‘shut up all of those people who were claiming that people from the Vardar Banovina were not being considered for such positions’.119 As a consequence of all this dissatisfaction, after the elections in December 1938, Panta Jovanovic´, the mayor of Skopje, was indeed appointed as Minister for the Post Office. This gave the government its first member from Macedonia. On 1 January 1939, Jovanovic´ expressed his thanks to the regents and the prime minister as ‘from their great love for South Serbia, they had decided to entrust me with one of the more important ministries in the

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current government’.120 The minister, who according to various sources in Skopje was very unpopular on account of his arrogance and incompetence,121 was soon dismissed from this post in the next government reshuffle only a few weeks later in February 1939. His successor was another Macedonian, Jovan Altiparmakovic´, but he also lasted only until the next government reshuffle following the Agreement with the Croats in August.122 After this there were no more Macedonian ministers. The appointment of locals to senior administrative posts, as was increasingly demanded in Macedonia, ran into stiff opposition from Serbian nationalists as soon as attempts were made to implement it. In Bitola, for example, the Serbs resented the appointment of Teodosije Robe, the former mayor, to the administrative council of the ‘Monopoly’ and of Ðord¯e Donovic´, the mayor of Resen, to become a member of the Prizad society. According to the critics, in this way, everyone was being rewarded for working against the interests of the state.123

The ‘25th Anniversary of South Serbia’s Liberation’ In 1937, it was 25 years since Macedonia’s ‘liberation’ from Turkish rule. This anniversary presented the regime in Belgrade with a welcome opportunity to make a gesture towards the Macedonianist movement led by the intelligentsia and to stress Serbia’s efforts on Macedonia’s behalf, both through the act of ‘liberation’ and in the time since then. The anniversary itself was celebrated in great style between 31 October and 2 November 1937. Prince Regent Paul and the most important members of the government travelled to Skopje for the celebrations.124 Two statues were ordered in Zagreb for the main square, one for King Peter I, ‘the great liberator’, and one for the ‘chivalrous’ Alexander I, ‘the unifier’.125 The statues were to be dedicated during the anniversary. Stojadinovic´ issued personal instructions in advance for planning the event, to ensure that everything made a good impression. One of the statues was not ready in time, but the other could be inaugurated, so that Stojadinovic´ was satisfied: the main thing was to give the whole event on this day the character of a national celebration. It should be similar to the one in Nisˇ, but even better, with more visitors, a great throng of people. Please ensure that the peasants are grouped according to regions and their respective national costumes. He went on to give detailed instructions about decorating the scene with flags, the lighting in the evening, and the procession. Even the correct kind of

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stand for the dignitaries was important to him. The Ban had also to ensure that a theatre director from Skopje or Belgrade was on the organising committee.126 On the one hand, these enormous efforts for appearances were undoubtedly inspired by the impressive spectacles that Nazi Germany was staging at this time. Stojadinovic´ was known to be an admirer and imitator of the ‘Third Reich’. On the other hand, it can be viewed as a metaphor for all Macedonia policy in the interwar period: pathetic speeches and nationalist demonstrations had to make up for the lack of real achievements, which might have actually brought progress to the ‘liberated’ territory. A considerable outpouring of publicity accompanied the event. The most important publication was a 1,069-page anniversary volume entitled Commemorative Book on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Liberation of South Serbia 1912– 1937 (Spomenica dvadesetpetogodisˇnjice oslobod¯enja Juzˇne Srbije 1912– 1937), in which all aspects of ‘South Serbia’ and its progress since the liberation were described. Numerous articles appeared in the newspapers that mainly stressed the seemingly rapid development of ‘South Serbia’. Petar M. Jovanovic´, a former teacher living in Belgrade, who claimed to know every village in ‘South Serbia’, was outraged by an especially rose-tinted piece in Politika on 17 June 1937 (‘A Quarter of a Century of Liberation in South Serbia’), written by its correspondent in Skopje, B. Antic´. In a letter to Stojadinovic´, Jovanovic´ explained: It is not true that enormous efforts and sums were expended to bring South Serbia up to the level of the other regions of the country. Just look how many schools in South Serbia are still closed today, because there are ‘no funds’ to employ teachers. Stupid officials were still cursing the peaceful inhabitants of this region, in which there was scarcely any crime, as ‘Bulgarians’ (Majku ti bugarsku, naucˇic´u te pameti).127 The enforced usage of the term ‘South Serbia’ can be seen as a reaction to the Macedonian movements, as in accordance with Yugoslav ideology, after 1929 geographical names that included any sign of ‘tribal identity’, that is also the word ‘Serbia’, were not be used officially. The southernmost part of the country had been known as the ‘Vardar Banovina’ since its ‘liberation’. The fact that the territory ‘liberated’ in 1912 was not identical with the Banovina was a welcome pretext to officially encourage the extensive use of the term ‘South Serbia’ officially and thereby to emphasise that this part of the country belonged to Serbia. Those who said nothing about the elaborately staged anniversary made themselves suspect, as for example the journal Lucˇ. They were reproached

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because in the October edition there was not a single word about this celebration. When asked, the main representatives of the journal explained that they saw these events from a different standpoint and did not want to say anything so as not to destroy the ‘mood’, that they had created with the establishment and publication of the journal so far.128 With this the editors were expressing their opposition to the staged events of the regime surprisingly openly and doubtless also reflecting the opinion of a large part of the population. Despite the efforts of the Ban to play things down, the Macedonian intelligentsia movement was proving increasingly unsettling for the regime. Interior Minister Korosˇec called a meeting about the national situation in ‘South Serbia’ on 31 May 1938, which was attended by the following office holders: Dr Jovan Hadzˇivasiljevic´, the General Secretary of the Serbian organisation Sveti Sava; Dragoslav Lazic´, Department Head (nacˇelnik) in the Interior Ministry; Miloje Smiljanic´, Department Head in the Foreign Ministry; Bosˇko Bogdanovic´, deputy head of the Central Press Office; Milan Jovanovic´, director of the press agency, Avala, and former correspondent of the Central Press Office in Skopje; and sub-inspector Cvetan Ðord¯evic´. Korosˇec explained that he had heard that the ‘South Serbian intelligentsia’ was preparing an operation, which was not in the spirit of ‘our national and state policy’. It was going to be stressed that people had to speak Macedonian. The minister wanted to hear what those present had to say on this topic. Ðord¯evic´ thought that after the suppression of the activities of the ‘Committee’ [1934], it had recommended to its supporters in ‘South Serbia’ that they switch to legal activities. This had become easier, as there was no longer such a watchful eye being kept on officials, especially teachers and priests. Bogdanovic´ proposed as a countermeasure maintaining a good administration with excellent officials, the introduction of a proper newspaper and the ‘liquidation’129 of the Exarchite teachers and priests. Lazic´ pointed to the continuous propaganda on Bulgarian radio, which was directed at the ‘Bulgarians’ in the ‘enslaved territories’. Smiljanic´, Department Head in the Foreign Ministry, considered that this movement was not such a great danger. He thought that the operation, which he suspected was directed rather from Zagreb than Bulgaria, could easily be suppressed. Korosˇec promised to lobby the parliamentarians and senators to support the intended measures.130 None of these were new; they were all the same proposals that had been made since 1918, which had been tried, but so far had not produced any results. The speculation about those behind the movement show that the regime, in spite of its extensive system of informants, did not have any leads and without evidence, simply looked to the

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‘usual suspects’, that is Zagreb and Bulgaria. However, they did not even consider that the movement might be genuinely Macedonian. The economist Strahinja Arsic´, who lived in Skopje, expressed quite different views and ideas in a letter he sent to Stojadinovic´ in July 1938 to inform him about the actual conditions in the ‘Povardarje’ and offer suggestions for resolving the Macedonian question. He explained that around 50 ‘fervent Serbs’ in Skopje and a few others in other towns had usurped privileged positions and claimed to speak for the region. These people had to be removed from such trusted and influential positions – he would be very pleased to prepare a corresponding list. The young, by contrast, had been waiting for 20 years for the chance to participate in the state and had become desperate owing to their lack of prospects. Stigmatised by the ‘fervent Serbs’ as bugarasˇi, the young people were forced to go abroad and form trojki and petorki there or to die in the Spanish Civil War. According to Arsic´ there was no reason to vilify the youth in this way. In contrast, they were the greatest fighters for Yugoslavianism. As these people were neither Serbs nor Bulgarians, but South Slavs, that is, Yugoslavs. Tribal loyalties were not so important for them as for the others, therefore they could easily become Yugoslavs. He was convinced that the term Macedonia was purely geographical and that there was no such thing as a Macedonian people, just Slavs from Macedonia, who wanted to differentiate themselves from the Serbs and Bulgarians and no longer be treated as their prey. That was why the national term ‘Macedonia’ had been created. The people mentioned at the beginning wanted at all costs to make ‘South Serbs’ out of the ‘Povardarci’ and not Yugoslavs. Arsic´ thought that the terms ‘South Serbs’ and ‘South Serbia’ had to be scrapped and replaced by ‘Yugoslavs from Macedonia’. The term ‘Macedonia’ must be permitted. Next Arsic´ gave his assessment of the state’s economic policy. For 20 years, news of the economic progress in ‘South Serbia’ had been trumpeted, although there had been none. On the contrary: over the previous two decades these regions had experienced terrible poverty and exploitation. Until the liberation all the towns in Povardarje had been flourishing and the people had been well off. Almost every house had possessed a jug holding gold pieces. Craftsmanship, temporary migration for work (pecˇalba) and good prices for tobacco, raw opium and silk cocoons had brought large amounts of gold into the region, blessed at that time. Now by contrast, all the towns apart from Skopje were experiencing a decline. The wealth there was not in the hands of the ‘Povardarci’ but rather of the Jews and newcomers. There were no longer any Macedonian cˇorbadzˇii (influential, wealthy tradesmen), nor was there any gold, as everyone had plundered this region. In his opinion, incompetent people had signed the Opium Agreement, the agricultural reform had come

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too late, colonisation had been unwise and unsuccessful, and the tobacco policy was bad. Greater slavery existed now than at the time of the worst sultans. His recommendation was to begin immediately with promoting the economy and appointing new people from Belgrade to implement this to use the region’s great natural riches in close cooperation with the youth from Povardarje.131 Even though this analysis idealises the past to a great extent, it nonetheless precisely grasps the mistakes of the interwar period, which will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 3 on the economy. Especially the criticism of the failure to offer Macedonian youth any chances to develop themselves and thereby bind them to the state was fully justified. At almost the same time, Stojadinovic´ received a report from the Ban in which the latter painted a very rosy picture of the economic situation in the Vardar Banovina – as he had also done one year before. ‘The people have money’, reported Novakovic´. As proof of this he gave the income in the towns. The peasants had bought much more equipment in the previous autumn and spring than at any time in the previous seven years. There were few unemployed, and the harvest was good, as were the prices for silk cocoons. The prices for olives and cotton were fixed, rice production was flourishing, and cotton production was expanding. And the people trusted the regime.132 This assessment was partly correct. From 1935 the economic situation had improved considerably; agricultural prices rose, mainly thanks to the Trade Agreement with Germany, which also benefited the Macedonian peasants. But one could not speak of a general state of well-being. Only against the background of the severe economic crisis in the first half of the 1930s could this be called a considerable improvement. In spite of such positive reports, the Interior Ministry was still alarmed by the increased political activity in Macedonia. In the summer of 1938 a ‘friend’ was dispatched, who travelled through the larger Macedonian towns in 13 days and sent a report to an official of the Ministry, which contained certain contradictions. The good news for the government was that the spy had discerned a new mood towards Bulgaria in the political centres of Skopje, Veles, Bitola and Sˇtip; he invoked the start of a whole new era. In a short time, especially since the Treaty of Friendship (24 January 1937), the old longing for Bulgaria had disappeared and the people were now looking to Belgrade. This mood had to be exploited and one needed now to focus all attention on ‘South Serbia’. The bad news was that the young intelligentsia in the larger towns had developed the idea of an autonomous Macedonia within the framework of Yugoslavia. A local patriotism was developing, there was talk of preserving the Macedonian language and culture and that all the Macedonians scattered

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throughout Yugoslavia needed to be organised. In Skopje, it was mainly the Lucˇists who supported this tendency. In Veles the doctors under the leadership of Pop Andovic´ supported it, in Prilep Pop Zdravkovic´ was the spokesman, in Bitola Robe,133 and in Sveti Nikole Dr [Toma] Klenkovic´. The ‘friend’ viewed the movement as very dangerous, especially as all the named people were supporters of the governing party, such that the authorities did not really know how to deal with them. But that part of the intelligentsia which did not support the idea was passive and did nothing. Yet in his opinion this new proMacedonian operation had no real support among the population. They were sensing instead a degree of freedom everywhere, which was unprecedented in Macedonia. Nobody thought about the Committee (IMRO) any more or about Bulgaria. In the view of the informant, those favouring autonomy were now trying to get their people to infiltrate the authorities and thereby gain influence over the population. The ‘friend’s’ recommendations resembled those of the previously cited economist Arsic´ and went in the direction of doing more about the economy, as it would make the people of this region even more nationally correct than those in the Sˇumadija, that is in Serbia’s heartland. There were, however, many irregularities in the purchase of tobacco and poppy seeds, which caused people to blame the Serbs. Stojadinovic´ had been received initially with joy and hope here on his visit, but he had then alarmed and disappointed people when he surrounded himself with the ‘invaders’ (uljezi) – that is those who had immigrated into the region – and who were much disliked there. An additional measure urgently recommended by the informant was to stop any further travel to Bulgaria, as many people were entering the region from there and sowing seeds of unrest. They admonished their relatives living here that they were Bulgarians and that they must preserve their language. Bulgaria would play the leading role in the Balkans, especially once Yugoslavia had become a federation, which is what they were working towards. Overall, however, in spite of everything, the ‘friend’ did observe an improvement in ‘South Serbia’ from the national and economic perspective. He recommended that the other symptoms could best be eliminated by dealing with the root cause.134 Another observer of the mood of the population had come to quite different conclusions just three weeks earlier. An anonymous ‘Old Radical’ spoke out against the resettlement of the Turks in a letter to Stojadinovic´, for ‘who will support our State nationality policy if the loyal Turks leave – certainly not the Macedonians. At least not for several decades’. According to his version, nobody had greeted Prime Minister Stojadinovic´ on the streets of Skopje during his visit, only those people at the railway station who had been brought there. Even his appearance in Prisˇtina went off better thanks to the

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colonists and the Albanians that had been ordered to go there. This author also proposed improving the situation by offering economic advice: ‘View the tobacco question as a matter of life and death for the South – and solve it using economic means.’135 The tobacco question, which will be discussed in more detail later, was indeed decisive. If the state had solved this to the satisfaction of the peasants, his standing in Macedonia would have been quite different.

The Macedonian Parliamentarians Whilst among the Macedonian intelligentsia, especially the youth, there was movement towards a regional and national consciousness; among the representatives from the Vardar Banovina in Parliament almost nothing of the kind could be detected. Most of them belonged to the governing party and many of them were not natives of the province, but Serbs. Jordan Ac´imovic´, the representative from Strumica, where he was the district doctor, was one of the few that frequently spoke out completely openly in Parliament about Macedonia’s problems. In addition, he repeatedly and sharply criticised his colleagues from the Banovina for their passivity and accused them of never coming forward to represent the interests of the region. In his opinion it was time for them to step up and address openly the real economic conditions in Macedonia.136 Ac´imovic´ was the most burning advocate for Macedonia in Parliament, even though he still regarded himself as a Serb. His father, who was from Veles in Macedonia, had migrated to Vranje in Serbia and started a family there. The nine children, as he put it, naturally had to grow up as Serbs. Ac´imovic´’s advocacy for Macedonia consistently ran into opposition from the Serb nationalist parliamentarians from the Vardar Banovina, who would interrupt, shouting: ‘there is no Macedonia!’ – as soon as he used the word ‘Macedonia’. He found himself in the unpleasant position as a Serb, of having to defend the Macedonians in order to be a ‘true representative of his constituency’. I don’t know why it is so hard for you to say that you are Macedonians (Branko Todorovic´: That is the theory of Macedonianites. It is a disgrace that a representative from the Vardar Banovina can talk in this manner about a purely Serbian province! Not a single South Serb would approve of your speech! Noise)137 Ac´imovic´ had no understanding at all for the suppression of the term ‘Macedonia’. He had learned in school before the Balkan Wars that there

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was Old Serbia [Stara Srbija ¼ Kosovo-Metochia] and Macedonia. In contrast ‘South Serbia’ was a new designation, which encompassed both of these regions.138 With regard to the parliamentary representatives from the Vardar Banovina, Ac´imovic´ confirmed that things were in a sorry state. Before the December elections in 1938, 19 ‘South Serbian’ parliamentarians were from within Serbia’s ‘old borders’, that is, they were Serbs. Seven of them – including the especially active interrupter Todorovic´ – did not even live in the region that they represented; they had never seen ‘South Serbia’. Only 18 of the representatives were Macedonians, but of these, Ac´imovic´ was convinced that only half of them enjoyed the trust of the population.139 With complete frankness, unlike everyone else, and in biting terms, he criticised the absence of political freedom in the South, where the prefects decided everything. For the senatorial elections on 6 February 1938, the only option was the list of the Yugoslav Radical Union, against which just one person, a Serb,140 voted. ‘Gentlemen, if Hitler had conducted the elections in South Serbia – I doubt if he could have achieved such a result.’ During the communal elections in Bosilevo in Strumica County (srez), a uniformed police stenographer sat in the polling station and at the door stood a group of armed men. Ac´imovic´ was able to get all of these menacing overseers removed, so that he narrowly won the election in this constituency. The parliamentarian was also disturbed by the authorities’ continued mistrust of the local population. According to his appeal, ‘South Serbia’ was peaceful and law-abiding, so there was no reason for the prefect to view everyone with suspicion.141 He raised the same demands that the representatives around Sˇusˇkalovic´ had proposed in the 1920s, and that were still just as valid more than a decade later: Not to discriminate against the local population in the state administration, not to impose representatives on them against their will, not to overlook them as civil servants in favour of officials from other regions, and not to denigrate them as had been the case up until now, as they were not responsible for what had happened in the past. Ac´imovic´ categorically denied that there were any bugarasˇi in the South. The police only used this term to defame local inhabitants, if they couldn’t find any proof that they were Communists. The representative was incensed by the ‘false and insulting’ statement of Interior Minister Korosˇec that there was a ‘Bulgaroman’ problem (bugarasˇki problem) in the South. Ac´imovic´ was convinced that the people there only gave their money to the ‘Committee’ when it was extorted by the threat of violence. It was not their

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fault that until 1930, the ‘Committee’ was able to do more or less as it pleased in Macedonia.142 Representative Stavre Trpkovic´ also made critical comments, especially about the thin network of juridicial institutions in the South. The people had to cover immense distances and take on a considerable financial burden in order to obtain justice. Everyone claimed to have the interests of ‘South Serbia’ close to their hearts, but nobody acted accordingly. Trpkovic´ proposed that since the crime rate in the Vardar Banovina was the lowest in the entire country, the money that was saved on prison costs be used for the building of schools and making justice more accessible. However, he was not surprised by this neglect, since there were some parliamentarians who represented ‘South Serbia’ and did not even know where their constituencies were located.143

Contacts between the Macedonian Movement and the United Opposition A hectic period of activity started in connection with the elections scheduled for 11 December 1938, which had been brought forward by the Prince Regent at the behest of Stojadinovic´. The prime minister hoped to emerge from the election in a stronger position.144 At the start of July he travelled quickly through much of the South as part of a political campaign and was well received there.145 In the run-up to the elections the usual in-fighting over places on the party list developed. Stojadinovic´ made a personal commitment to ensure that the unpopular Panta Jovanovic´ was added to the list of candidates. Prior to this, the representative Stojadin Dimitrijevic´ from Tetovo had warned the prime minister that Jovanovic´ was unpopular and recommended that care be taken to ensure that throughout the Banovina only those people be put on the list, who enjoyed support among the population.146 Stojadinovic´ countered such critics by arguing that the election was not concerned with personalities but about the government and that Skopje could not honestly complain about that.147 He was convinced that he was pursuing policies favourable for the south and that he would be rewarded at the polls accordingly. But the opponents of the government also had to find places on the lists in Macedonia and therefore they needed allies. Since they were unable to put up their own list – that would not have been tolerated – they were forced to try to join forces with the United Opposition. The administration of the Vardar Banovina informed the Interior Ministry that a delegation from ‘South Serbia’, headed by Ðuzelovic´, a professor in Cˇacˇak, had handed a memorandum to Macˇek during his visit to Belgrade in mid August. In 1927, Ðuzelovic´ had belonged to the group of young intellectuals that had been sentenced to long

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terms of imprisonment for membership in the IMRO youth organisation. Obviously, he somehow still had been able to obtain a post in the civil service following his release. In Dimitrije Cˇkatrovic´, the delegation also contained another person that had been convicted in the same trial.148 In the memorandum given to Macˇek, the Macedonian people were described as being united in spirit with Macˇek. It had always been against the regimes in Belgrade and viewed Macˇek as its great teacher, who showed them the new direction, onto the path of legal struggle and against violence. According to the report, the meeting was heavy with emotion and pathos. The entire delegation and also the recipient cried on reading the memorandum. Macˇek said that his old back was not able to carry the heavy burden which the Macedonian people were offering him, but he wanted to try to help them. He recommended that they organise themselves and demonstrate staying power. In the front room of Macˇek’s apartment the delegation met with the Serb Sava Kosanovic´, a member of the (former) Independent Democratic Party (SDS), who reacted sharply because Ðuzelovic´ and his companions were acting alone instead of joining the United Opposition. He also condemned them for ‘inventing’ the Macedonian people. There was no such thing and in any case that was not a political question. Ðuzelovic´ defended himself, saying that they were afraid that if they joined forces with a Serbian party, then a leader might be forced upon them and then [their own interests] would not be properly represented. A week after Macˇek’s return to Zagreb, Mihajlo Mihajlovic´, a Lucˇist, travelled there to meet with August Kosˇutic´ of the Croatian Peasants’ Party. Kosˇutic´ informed him that Macˇek’s chancellery was going to support the Macedonian autonomist movement, and also advised not to join up with any Serbian group of the United Opposition.149 Without doubt the regime had a spy within this group, as the authorities were always precisely informed and knew the contents of the memorandum, although only two copies existed, of which one had been handed to Macˇek, while the other had remained with Ðuzelovic´. For those Macedonian candidates that did not want to join a Serbian party and did not feel that they were in the right place with the Croatian Peasants’ Party, it was impossible for them to get a place on a list. The Democrats, for example, refused to accept the Lucˇists and their friends on their list if they were not members of the Democratic Party. From those people who had the reputation of being ‘Autonomists’, they demanded a special declaration. Jovan Jovanovic´-Pizˇon, the leader of the Peasants Union (Agrarians), was prepared to accept several Macedonian intellectuals as his candidates on Macˇek’s list, but only those which his trusted confidante, Dr Milenko Filipovic´, an agronomist and university professor, had guaranteed were not extremists.150

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The elections of 11 December 1938, were accompanied once again by intense pressure on the electorate, not only from the government but also by the HSS, as reported by the British embassy.151 But the government also had other, more subtle means at its disposal. For example, the Ban of the Vardar Banovina proposed to Stojadinovic´ that those teachers that were working for the opposition should be removed from their jobs and sent to work in the education section of the Banovina Administration until the election,152 so that they would be effectively confined to barracks and thereby prevented from campaigning in their home districts. Ugrin Joksimovic´ had another idea, which moreover was also attractive to the population of the Vardar Banovina: he asked Stojadinovic´ to announce an amnesty until 1 December for minor infractions of the law, such as tobacco crimes or cutting wood. This would make a good impression on the population of ‘South Serbia’ and thereby contribute to an electoral victory.153 Another favourite machination used to get votes in the provinces, operated as follows: a well-known Belgrade politician, a minister if possible, from whom the voters hoped to gain corresponding influence, was put up as a candidate for a constituency in Macedonia and then elected. However, he didn’t take up his seat, but allowed an unknown replacement to take his place instead. The voters were getting fed up with this trick though. Therefore, after the election in 1938, the JRZ in Kumanovo requested that the Justice Minister, Milan Simonovic´, should not pass on his seat to anyone else, as the seat had only been won thanks to the promise given that the minister would retain his seat.154 The population in the Vardar Banovina also needed to be informed about everything that the Stojadinovic´ regime had done for them. Shortly before the elections on 3 December 1938, an exhibition was opened in the hall of the Officers’ House in Skopje on the third anniversary of Stojadinovic´’s government, which was intended to demonstrate the progress made during this time. The head of the Central Press Office, Dr Kosta Lukovic´, pointed out in his speech that in three years in ‘South Serbia’ new industrial businesses had been established; he mentioned that work had started on the ‘monumental’ Banovina Palace, and that the railway station with a customs office, warehouse and apartments for the customs officials were all under construction. Already completed were a new Post Office and several modern schools.155 In the run-up to the elections, the correspondent of the Central Press Office reported from Skopje that demands from the ‘Macedonians’ that only locals should stand as candidates in the elections, are increasingly being heard. Some Macedonian intellectuals state openly that they would campaign for Macedonian

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candidates regardless of whether they were on the list of the VO [United Opposition] or of the JRZ.156 The Ban also pointed out to Stojadinovic´ that ‘the people didn’t like it when external candidates were forced upon them’.157 It can be regarded as a victory for this rather diffuse movement that in these elections primarily local candidates actually contested the seats.158 On Stojadinovic´’s government list almost all the candidates were from Macedonia,159 and this strategy paid off: while throughout all of Yugoslavia the result was very close – Stojadinovic´’s list received 1.64 million votes, that of Macˇek 1.36 million – the government won the Vardar Banovina with 75.17 per cent of the votes, taking 42 seats. Macˇek’s list received 24.8 per cent, but due to the majority electoral system, it only won three seats. The opposition received the most votes in those places, where it was supported by both the Macedonian People’s Movement (MANAPO) and the Communists.160 The good results for the government list in the Vardar Banovina were also a product of overwhelming support from the non-Slavic minorities (Albanians, Turks, Roma, Vlachs, Jews and Greeks), as well as from the Muslim Slavs, of which almost 98 per cent voted for the government. Among the ‘Serbs’, that is, the Macedonians, the level of support was 65 per cent.161 If the elections had been free and secret, the already cited Jovan Petrovic´ announced in advance that in Skopje 75 per cent of the electorate would have voted for the opposition.162 According to C´ira Manevic´, the former mayor of Kumanovo, the opposition promised the electorate ‘that with us on December 12, immediately after the elections, there would be a new situation and Macedonia would become independent’. In the villages word was spread that the hour of liberation had come, that nobody needed to be afraid and that people should go to the polls and vote for the opposition.163 This is a clear sign that part of the population still dreamed of gaining their independence. But since the elections were not free, it is not possible to say how large this part was.

In Expectation of Changes The appeal to the population not to have any fear is an important indication of that which changed in Macedonia in the last two years before the break-up of Yugoslavia. For centuries fear had been a constant companion for the people in this region. The English doctor Edward Brown encountered it on his journey in 1669: ‘In Macedonia the men and women would betake themselves into the Woods to avoid us; and we took the pains sometimes to ride after them, to undeceive them of their folly, and needless frights.’164 In 1903–04, after the suppression of the Ilinden Uprising by the Ottoman Turks, the British

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journalist Henry N. Brailsford described vividly how fear ruled in Macedonia and made the people sick. ‘Fear is the dominant, the ever-present motive.’ He met people who had gone mad because of certain terrible experiences and children that – like their ancestors 200 years previously – fled from all strangers and yelled: ‘Turks! Turks!’ ‘In that world of night-mare a massacre is always possible’. That was precisely the point: massacres in the late Ottoman period where by no means a daily occurrence, as Brailsford assured, but at any time and for next to no reason one might suddenly happen, one was never sure of one’s life.165 In the interwar period fear continued to exist at a high level. An already cited report prepared for the French Army spoke in January 1927 of the people having a ‘downcast and scared’ look in recent years.166 As already noted, in the 1920s and also later, tens of thousands of peasants passed through the prisons in Macedonia and experienced the customary beatings and tortures, several thousand people167 were killed or died as a result of physical abuse, many disappeared without a trace, allegedly having emigrated to Bulgaria. The gendarmes ran riot in the villages, abused the men and raped countless numbers of women. At the (public) elections, overseers armed with clubs posted in front of the polling stations ensured that the right list was successful. But now, at the end of the 1930s, fear was gradually subsiding, and the prospects for ‘South Serbia’ started to look much better. In 1934 the ‘White Terror’ had abated, and with the dismantling of the IMRO in Bulgaria, by 1935 the general political situation had improved considerably. An example demonstrates that fear was overcome and political convictions could be shown openly. On 9 January 1939, Spira Dilev-Dilevic´ (as he called himself)168 sent a letter to the Ban Marko Novakovic´. In it he dealt quite openly with the problem that the Macedonians, who, as he put it, belonged to the Exarchy, were not satisfied either with their treatment by the authorities, or by the Serbs as private individuals, ‘who take up the stance of overlords towards us, looking down on us and treating us as if we belonged to a lower caste and were secondclass citizens’.169 In a letter to the leaders of state in Belgrade, he criticised the fact that over the previous 20 years neither the domestic policy towards ‘us Macedonians’ nor the foreign policy towards Bulgaria had changed; they both remained characterised by arrogance and mistrust. Not even during the period when the Slovene Korosˇec was Interior Minister did anything change. For Dilev this was proof that ‘in practice in the Ministry irresponsible functionaries and dark forces rule and the Ministers were only cyphers’. On the basis of concrete personal experience, he complained about the chicanery of the authorities. While Turks, Jews, Vlachs, Greeks and Serbs received passports within half a day, Macedonians encountered great difficulties, especially when they wanted to travel to Bulgaria. Obtaining a

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passport took so long, that frequently the reason for the journey had already passed by and it arrived too late. Dilev said openly that he wanted to go to Bulgaria for personal reasons and possibly also on account of political matters, but had been waiting in vain three months for his passport. He did not understand this obstruction, since he was a ‘public worker in the national Slavic field’. In addition, the police had been watching him for the last 20 years, without ever being able to prove anything negative against him. They couldn’t understand that one didn’t hate the Serbs merely because one was not supporting them. The same applied to the Bulgarians. These gentlemen were doing Serb interests a disservice with their mean-spiritedness.170 Dilev described himself as one of the founders of the Macedonian Revolutionary Committee, who had been elected by the people 30 years before as a ‘vojvoda’ and leader. He openly presented his solution of the Macedonian question, which he saw in the establishment of a state stretching from the Adriatic to the Black Sea (‘Balkan-Slavia’), in which one South Slav people would live, although everyone would have the freedom to call himself as he pleased, and to belong to the tribe and religion, which he preferred. Dilev’s dauntless attitude had personal reasons. As he explained, he had nothing except Macedonia to which he had devoted his entire life, and for which he had foregone family and career.171 The signs of an impending solution to the Croat question in 1939 further mobilised political energy in Macedonia. On 5 March, a ‘Peasants’ Conference’ took place in Skopje, which the correspondent of the Central Press Office considered quite significant. He viewed it as an important political event, as it was attended by 2,000 people. If one included those following the proceedings over a loudspeaker, then there were more than 3,000 attendees – a large number for Skopje. But only a few of these people could really be viewed as supporters of the Peasants’ Party; numerous officials, teachers, priests and many left-leaning young people attended. The conference was the start of a publicity campaign linked to the establishment of a section of the Peasants’ Party (Zemljoradnicˇka stranka) in the Banovina.172 The conference was convened mainly because of the urgent need for political organisation. Several speakers addressed the gathering along these lines, as the time for resolving the Croat question was fast approaching and this would unleash a debate over the internal structure of the state, one needed to be prepared for this. The parliamentarian Ilija Cˇulevic´ addressed those present as ‘dear brother Macedonians’, and attacked those policies currently being pursued in the South.173 The words with which the Ban Vladimir Hajdukveljkovic´ opened the Ban Council meeting three days later, on 8 March 1939, sounded like an oath sworn against these unpredictable tendencies. He called them the people’s

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representatives of that Banovina, which had preserved Serbianism, and which represented the cradle and the Piedmont for all Serbians.174 In contrast, the fine arts’ painter Metodija Lepavac-Lemeto from Prilep said to an acquaintance in Belgrade in July 1939 that the Macedonian people in Yugoslavia was going through a difficult period, but that now one could sense a special mood, that was smouldering, and that could catch fire, if a suitable man came forward to lead this oppressed people.175 Even reports by the security forces proved the Ban’s words to be misplaced. The Main General Staff reported to several ministries in August about the bad state of the national [Serbian] cause in Ohrid, as well as in the rest of the Banovina. Everywhere local officials were dominant; in the administrative offices people spoke the local dialect. A senior official reportedly told a teacher: ‘In the Vardar Banovina all the better posts belong to the locals, the Serbs only get what remains.’176 Indeed, at the end of the 1930s, it became increasingly difficult to appoint Serbs to the more important civil service posts, as in the meantime local resistance had become too strong. In May 1940, when it was a question of appointing a new head of the Education Section in the Banovina Administration, the nationalist Serbian Ban hit upon a new tactic. He proposed the Macedonian Tomo Smiljanic´, with the justification that here people wanted to prevent a Serb from Serbia (srbijanac) being assigned to this post. For this reason he recommended appointing the ‘greatest Serb’ among the locals, ‘a convinced supporter of our Serbian standpoint in the South’.177 In Skopje numerous soldiers attracted attention with their expressions of opposition to the state. On 17 September 1939, during a football match between teams from Belgrade and Skopje, there were chants of: ‘Down with the Belgraders and Belgrade’, ‘We Macedonians want [to be] like Zagreb’ – which had just received its autonomy. A junior cavalry sergeant knocked off a soldier’s cap, the Serbian sˇajkacˇa, and said: ‘Throw it away, what’s that doing on your head!’ These incidents, among others, led the Staff of the Third Army District to suspect the existence of an organisation working for Macedonian autonomy, which sought to persuade conscripts from these territories on a given sign at an opportune moment to desert with their weapons and rally at a designated place. Until then they would disobey orders and undermine the morale of the troops.178 Several times it was alleged that a well-organised Macedonian group existed, similar to the IMRO before,179 but this was never proven. In the summer of 1939, the prefect in Kavadarci looked into the statement in one of the Army reports, according to which there was allegedly a ‘Macedonian separatist movement in Kavadarci’. He was not able to discover such an organisation, but reported, however, that in Kavadarci there was almost nobody who did not consider himself exclusively as a Macedonian, not

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knowing any other national identity. If necessary, people might regard themselves as a ‘Yugoslav’, but only with great difficulty, or not at all, as a Serb. He also encountered this attitude among the officials at the state and the local level. The prefect stressed that this had been the case since he took office in 1930, and warned against turning a blind eye to this truth.180 In fact, for example, the Ban Zˇika Lazic´ already learned in 1931 from an informant, that there was a group of people in Kavadarci who were plotting to remove all the ‘nationally-minded’ (that is Serbian) supporters from the administration, to subject them to economic pressure and, if possible, to drive them out.181 This nebulous Macedonian autonomist organisation was only a nightmare dreamed up by the authorities. Various Macedonian groups and societies did exist that represented and propagated an autonomist or separatist viewpoint, but they were only loosely organised and partly hostile to each other, as we saw in the case of Ðuzelovic´ and the ‘Lucˇists’. It would in any case have been very difficult to build up an effective organisation, given the intense efforts of the authorities to prevent any kind of opposition forming in Macedonia. In the last years before Yugoslavia became entangled in World War II (6 April 1941), the Serbian opposition also expressed explicit criticism of the regime’s policies in Macedonia. For example, the Ban Novakovic´ reported that the leader of the Peasants‘Union, Jovan Jovanovic´-Pizˇon, said to him during a private encounter: ‘Why do you terrorize the people in Macedonia and force them to call themselves Serbs?’, and ‘Why do you send them down there, they don’t know Macedonia at all.’182 Even the new government could no longer ignore this development completely. When the Chairman of the Cabinet, Dragisˇa Cvetkovic´, visited Skopje on 28 May and 29, 1939, with an impressive entourage,183 the newspaper Skopski glasnik established to its satisfaction that finally for the first time in perhaps 15 years, a prime minister had told the truth about ‘South Serbia’, instead of succumbing to the usual homilies about progress and prosperity. Cvetkovic´ spoke about ‘primitiveness on all sides’, a ‘very low standard of living’, and ‘unorganized national production’. He also noted bluntly that: ‘Despite all the efforts of these hardworking people, South Serbia remains far behind the other regions of our homeland with respect to the economy and culture.’ The prime minister conceded that until now ‘South Serbia’ had been given too little attention and gave his word to ensure personally that the economy developed and living standards improved. In his opinion, it was most important that the ‘sons of the country’ were well-educated and received leading positions.184 Already in October of the same year Cvetkovic´ visited Macedonia again and conducted a tour around the region together with ministers and other officials.185 At a conference with parliamentarians and local representatives he appealed to those who had been born here, as well as those who arrived as immigrants to

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live together in harmony and contribute to raising the region’s cultural level. On his part he promised that the next parliamentary elections would be held in secret, as without genuine representatives of the people the Party [JRZ] would not achieve any success in these regions.186 As a good-will gesture, on September, 1939, the government announced an amnesty for political prisoners.187 The appointment of Aleksandar Andrejevic´ as Ban in September 1939 was intended also as a concession to the Banovina. Andrejevic´ was admittedly again not a Macedonian, but had worked there from 1922 until 1935 as a judge and court president, and had been on the city council in Skopje. Certain hopes were therefore placed on him in the Banovina, since he was well aware of the region’s needs.188 However, he only remained in the post for one year and did not especially stand out. Aleksandar Cvetkovic´ did not have a very high opinion of him, partly because Andrejevic´ was convinced that he knew the Macedonians well and therefore did not like to be given instructions.189 The designation ‘Macedonia’, which can be seen as a metaphor for the political demands to be recognised and granted self-determination, increasingly gained ground against the official term ‘South Serbia’ in the years before the war, even among the Serbian politicians in the opposition. It had already been in use earlier by members of the Peasants’ Union and by the Democrats, but on 24 March 1940, all the speakers of the Democrats at their party conference in Skopje used the term ‘Macedonia’ and assured that the people in the south would receive equal treatment and civil rights, if they, the Democrats got into power. The suspicious listeners, however, were not inclined to believe these words. They were convinced that the opposition also thought in national terms and would ban the name Macedonia as soon as they came to power. The Democrats also tried to create a mood favourable to them by pointing to the amnesty of 7,500 prisoners from the South, which they had initiated during the short period of their rule in 1925. In the ‘South’, however, one only responded: ‘Yes and? They were the ones who had arrested them in the first place.’190 On the Serbian nationalist side academics were sent into the ring to repel the advances being made by the term ‘Macedonia’. Prof. Nikola Vulic´, a renowned classical linguist, archaeologist and historian, who had conducted numerous excavations in Macedonia, gave a speech in the Serbian Cultural Club in Belgrade, which was also published on 6 November 1939, in the Belgrade newspaper Vreme under the headline ‘South Serbia or Macedonia’. Vulic´ vehemently expressed the view that this region under no circumstances could be called ‘Macedonia’, and actually also not ‘South Serbia’, but only simply ‘Serbia’.191 He also maintained that the region between Ristovac and Gevgelija had never been called Macedonia, denied the existence of a

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Macedonian nationality and was outraged by the ‘ignorant people’, who demanded that the ‘Macedonian’ language should become a written language.192 In Macedonia there was considerable anger over Vulic´’s comments. He received anonymous letters, but nobody could denounce him openly in public. Viktor Ac´imovic´, a journalist from Tetovo, then decided to publish his own newspaper, in order to give Vulic´ an appropriate reply.193 In the first edition of Juzˇna stvarnost (Southern Reality), which was published in December 1939, he responded to the professor: Nobody can doubt the name Macedonia, just as little as one can call into question the name and individuality of the Serbian, Slovenian, Croatian, and other peoples of Yugoslavia, and the Macedonian people itself knows that very well and feels itself as such (although you, as an academic, do not know, what an average inhabitant of Macedonia knows), as the national question in Macedonia was and is still open. Well, Mr. Vulic´, Macedonia exists, and it exists because (what do you think?), because the Macedonian people exist, and that applause in the Belgrade Cultural Club was just the hand-clapping of the ‘elitist gathering of intellectuals in the capital’. We from Macedonia are not applauding, but have also laughed in spite of our outrage.194 This issue of Juzˇna stvarnost remained the only one. The paper was immediately banned and Ac´imovic´ arrested for spreading propaganda in favour of an independent Macedonia.195 On 3 December 1939, Vulic´ confronted a group of Macedonian students in Zagreb who strongly contradicted him in the discussion. They represented those young intellectuals, who, despite great efforts, had not been Serbianised by the educational institutions, and who now demanded recognition and equal treatment for Macedonia and the Macedonians. Kocˇo Racin, a Communist and a poet, said: ‘Perhaps we would die, if we were not in [in a State] together, but nonetheless, we want people to recognize our name.’ He could not believe that Vulic´ had never heard that the people of this region knew it as Macedonia. Had he never heard the songs mothers sang about the struggle for liberation? ‘The Serbs say: you are not that, which you are, but that which you are supposed to be: Serbs!! You have fought against us, in order to wipe out any memory. You have destroyed us economically.’ Vulic´ in contrast questioned whether any government until now had deliberately disadvantaged and oppressed these people. Ancˇic´, another student, countered Vulic´: ‘If you ask the last peasant, he will say that he is a Macedonian . . . If you have heard that certain people say

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that they are Serbs, then they have said this out of fear.’ The student Ljubcˇe said: ‘We view ourselves as slaves. We are not part of another people and not a minority! We demand our national, political, and economic liberty.’ Ljubcˇe recounted, among other things, how he had experienced the attempts at Serbianisation: In school I was ordered to pay half a dinar [in punishment] for every Macedonian word . . . I was not allowed to say anywhere that I was a Macedonian, but rather a Serb, otherwise I was an anti-state element, which was why I was chased out of school in my second year of High School. With reference to the Macedonian language, the following discussion developed between Vulic´ and the students: Vulic´: ‘You want your own language? What do you need it for?’ Panko: ‘So that our old people can understand us!’ Racin: ‘This language exists, it is not an invention.’ Vulic´: ‘I recognize the Macedonian language,’ he shakes hands with Racin, ‘but why don’t you want to speak Serbian?’ Racin: ‘Because you force us to do it: speak Serbian! We know this language, but why should we adopt a foreign language? Do you adopt the Bulgarian or the German language?’ Vulic´ wanted to get a picture of the extent of the movement and asked: ‘In whose name are you speaking? Or: how many people are with you?’ Ljubcˇe replied: ‘That is hard to say, since we don’t have the opportunity to assemble publicly in Macedonia. At this moment, everyone is speaking for himself.’ Ðord¯e said that in order to have a strong and large Yugoslavia, it would be best to grant the Macedonian part its ‘individuality’ within the present-day borders of Yugoslavia. ‘If you don’t give us any autonomy, you are giving the Bulgarians material, so that the “Bulgaromania” spreads again.’196

The Understanding with the Croats Already in 1935, the time began to be ripe for a compromise with the Croats. Prince Regent Paul and also the influential General Petar Zˇivkovic´, Minister of the Army and the Fleet, no longer opposed it.197 But even though the Prince Regent and also the Chairman of the Cabinet, Milan Stojadinovic´, remained in contact with Macˇek, initially no progress was made. In all discussions Macˇek demanded as a precondition the cancellation of the

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currently valid constitution. The Prince Regent, however, refused this categorically, as he saw it as his duty to pass on to the next king without any changes, the state that had been temporarily entrusted to him.198 On 8 October 1937, Macˇek and the Serbian opposition parties then reached a short-term agreement which contained as its most important points: restoration of the democratic system, revision of the constitution, and free elections for a constitutional parliament, which should lay the basis for a federalist reorganisation of the country. The government and the Serbian public were distraught by this outcome.199 The Austrian ‘Anschluss’ on 13 March 1938, brought Greater Germany to the Yugoslav border. With this powerful neighbour at the door, the necessity for a domestic political compromise to be reached with the opposition in general, and especially with the Croats, became acute. Interior Minister Korosˇec announced to the Senate on 24 March 1938, that the government wanted to propose in Parliament giving the Bans extensive authority with the aim of promoting decentralisation. A great degree of self-administration in the regions was to be introduced in stages, which automatically would also mean democratisation.200 Yet for the proponents of a federalist state structure, this offer was too unattractive to bring any movement into the discussion. According to a report by the British ambassador, the events in Czechoslovakia in the autumn of 1938201 spurred on the autonomous feelings of the Croats even more. Macˇek became increasingly intransigent and among other things instructed his followers not to obey the order to put out flags on the anniversary of the unification of Yugoslavia (1 December).202 On 15 January 1939, the Croatian Peasants’ Party increased the pressure with a declaration by its parliamentary representatives. In it the Croatian people’s deputies expressed their unlimited faith in the ‘leader of the Croatian people, Dr. Vlatko Macˇek’, and gave him a free hand to ‘undertake everything necessary, so that a genuine self-determination (samoopredelenje) of the Croatian people can be achieved’. Sabres were rattled, if also ambiguously, yet still unmistakably: The Croatian people hopes, that in its justified struggle to live in deserved peace, it will not be forced to resort to self-defence. Otherwise the Croatian people’s representatives, in the name of the Croatian people, deny any responsibility for the events that might occur in this part of Europe despite its best efforts.203 In January 1939, the Prince Regent declared himself ready ‘to do everything compatible with the Constitution to satisfy Croatian demands’. A change of the constitution, however, was still out of the question for him.204

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Macˇek sounded out the possibilities in the direction of the threatened ‘self-defence’ and in this he went so far, according to the diary entries of the Italian Foreign Minister Graf Ciano in March 1939, as sending a negotiator to Italy, who was to obtain the financial means there for an uprising in Croatia and for its separation from the Yugoslav state.205 This initiative by Macˇek doubtless stood in connection with the creation of the Slovak state on 15 March 1939. Seton-Watson, who was not aware of Macˇek’s feelers, but feared something in this direction was afoot, was very concerned about such a prospect. On 21 March, he sent a letter to the well-known sculptor Ivan Mesˇtrovic´ in order to warn his Croatian friends against choosing the path of Slovakia: ‘I write to beseech you to talk this letter over with Macˇek and urge on him the desperate dangers of following any such line as Slovakia’s.’ He urged them to make a compromise with the Serbs, as it was now most urgent: ‘Croatia must act and act quickly in the sense of union, or disaster and enslavement will come.’206 In reality this scenario initially did not come to pass, but after tough negotiations between Cvetkovic´, Macˇek and their experts,207 the Agreement (sporazum) of 26 August 1939 was reached, which gave the newly formed ‘Banovina of Croatia’ wide-ranging autonomy. This development filled SetonWatson with great confidence. Yugoslavia now had, in his opinion, the strongest government since the foundation of the state, in which all the most important political groups were represented. Other groups, such as the Macedonians and the Montenegrins, and even the non-Slav minorities, are looking with relief at the development of the situation, though of course awaiting some practical signs of improvement in their own status. It may thus be claimed that never since the Union has Yugoslavia presented so united a political front. It seemed likely to him that there must be a Slovenian Parliament and also one too for the ‘Serbian lands’ (Serbia, Vojvodina, Syrmia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Eastern Bosnia).208 This assessment by Seton-Watson, who otherwise was a critical observer with a good sense of judgement, can only be explained by a generous portion of wishful thinking and from relief that Croatia had not chosen the ‘Slovakian path’. It cannot have escaped him that nobody was satisfied with the compromise in Yugoslavia. For the Serbian nationalists the concessions went too far, and the Serbian opposition allied with Macˇek was distraught that he had made a deal with the government on his own. The Croats, on the other hand, saw the ‘Agreement’ only as the first step in the right direction, which had to be followed by others. Macˇek himself declared to a German publicist

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on 10 August 1940, somewhat encoded, that he had waited in vain for foreign intervention before the Agreement: So he took the path to Belgrade, after nobody had decided to come to Zagreb. There he found a government, which under strong foreign political pressure, was ready to make peace with the Croats . . . Asked about the aim of his policy, he explained: ‘Within the framework of the Yugoslav State, Croatia must achieve completely equal rights, and equal rights then means leadership, for at the moment when the Croats have secured the same position that the Serbs possess, thanks to their higher culture and their better organization, they will already have the upper hand within the State’ . . . What Macˇek had in mind, is a greater Croatian territorial unit from Gorz [Italy] to Fu¨nfkirchen [Hungary], and from Marburg [Slovenia] down to Bocca di Cattaro [Montenegro], in which if possible all Slovenes, Germans, Hungarians, and Serbs should sacrifice their ethnic stubbornness to the one true Peasants’ Party of Stefan Radic´.209 In Macedonia the Agreement with the Croats was impatiently awaited, and the people were enthusiastic about it, for example, in the Bregalnica region of eastern Macedonia.210 One immediate consequence of the Agreement, however, was that again not a single place could be found in the Cabinet for a Macedonian, as now the Croats had to be more strongly represented. Thus, for the entire interwar period, only a single representative from the ‘classical South’ served as Minister for the Post Office and Telegraph for exactly eight months. Behind the joy over the sporazum (Agreement) there was now the conviction that a basic change in the state needed to be made, and that other parts of the country should receive similar concessions. The reports of the Army and gendarmerie units in Macedonia immediately after the sporazum mentioned that this had aroused the desire among the ‘Macedonian separatists’ of achieving the same rights and that the corresponding propaganda would start among the population. The autonomy movement, as explained in more detail above, became stronger, especially among the intelligentsia, and, ‘what is worse, there are also a certain number of local officials among them’. The ‘Bulgaromans’ and the Macedonian autonomists spread the rumour: Italy was going to liberate Macedonia and annexe it to Bulgaria. The draft report prepared by the Staff of the Third Army District on 4 October 1939 stressed also that among the Macedonian youth there was a strong current which wanted to retain the Macedonian dialect. In the towns, especially in Bitola, it was heard everywhere in the streets. People sang ‘Bulgarian’ songs, which they had caught on the radio or that had been

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introduced for reasons of propaganda. The autonomists also spread hatred against the immigrant Serbs and against the Serbs in general. With regard to foreign policy, at this time all the population’s sympathies were with the invaded Poles, while according to the report everyone was turning against Germany and wishing its defeat.211 In October the situation remained unchanged. The ‘separatists’ were still claiming the same rights, as the Croats had received, or even autonomy, but the people remained calm and were waiting upon developments. International developments weighed on people’s minds more heavily than domestic politics.212 After the Agreement with the Croats, the supporters of the government expected, like the opposition, the announcement of new parliamentary elections, so that the struggle for places on the lists started anew. In one Army report the diverging interests of the locals and the Serbs are reflected: The old nationalistic politicians say that they are disadvantaged, because almost all the places are being given to locals, who one day, following the example of the Croats, could raise the question of autonomy in Parliament, and they are of the opinion that one should at least take the appointed Senators from among their ranks, in order to have a guarantee that ‘a clear desire’ is not perhaps expressed from this region, which would be contrary to interests of the State.213 Elections did not, however, take place, as the governing party wanted first to deal with the reorganisation of the country.214

Skopje as Seat of the ‘Serbian Lands’ At the government level, plans were being hammered out for Macedonia which were heading in a completely different direction from that which the autonomists and the largest part of the population desired. Seton-Watson had already spoken of the ‘Serbian Lands’ on 21 September 1939, to which Macedonia also belonged. An article in a Skopje newspaper appearing with the programmatic title, Juzˇna Srbija (South Serbia), on 3 February 1940, maintained that according to the sporazum of 26 August 1939, Yugoslavia would consist of three parts: of the Serbian, the Croatian, and the Slovenian. Actually the sporazum itself had no such condition, but a decree of 27 August could be interpreted in this manner. The author of the newspaper article raised the question of the ‘Serbian Banovina’, which would cover an enormous area and about its capital. To him, Skopje appeared to have been created for this role on account of its geographical location. In the rest of the article the author heaped praise on the city and its inhabitants. He pointed out that in

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ancient times, in the mediaeval period (capital under the Nemanjic´ dynasty), and under Ottoman rule, Skopje had been an important political and economic centre. He noted also that its inhabitants, in comparison to those of other regions of Serbia, were among the most thrifty, hard-working and capable. These qualities would be fully appreciated once it had become the seat of the Serbian Banovina. Crowning it all would be the completion of national unity.215 Some representatives of Macedonia’s political class, like the city council, were also very taken with the idea that Skopje’s prestige could be upgraded to this extent.216 The representative Stojadin Dimitrijevic´ from Tetovo demanded at the JRZ party conference on 25 February 1940 that the establishment of a Serbian Banovina with Skopje as the capital had to take place before the next elections. Voja Ðukic´ was also in favour of a Serbian Banovina with Skopje as its centre. Mihajlo Kalamatijevic´, on the other hand, thought it was too early to demand the Banovina in a resolution. First the party leader Cvetkovic´ had to decide.217 On 14 March 1940, the Belgrade newspaper Pravda permitted itself to probe these speculations. According to inside information it had received, plans for the final reconstruction of the state were being drawn up, which might look something like this: in the form of the Drava Banovina, Slovenia’s borders had already been determined. Under the name ‘Serbian lands’ (Srpske zemlje) a new region with its capital in Skopje would be created, which would have its own parliament and government. Within this framework autonomous districts (oblasti) with centres in Nisˇ, Novi Sad, Sarajevo and Cetinje were planned. Belgrade would remain the seat of the Parliament for the entire state and also the central government.218 These plans clearly did not develop any further, as no concrete orders for their implementation are known. There only exists an undated ‘draft for a decree on the organisation of the Serbian land [sg., sic)]’ (nacrt uredbe o organizaciji srpske zemlje), which contains roughly the same details as in the Pravda article. These indicated that the Vrbas, Drina, Danube, Morava, Zeta and Vardar Banovinas will be united into the ‘Serbian lands’ – with a common capital in Skopje. The Banovinas would be converted into self-administered provinces, but still keeping their names and administrative centres.219 From the Serbian standpoint, such a reorganisation would have been a very smart move with regard to Macedonia. Skopje would have been seriously upgraded as the seat of such a large territorial unit and at the same time, as the centre of the ‘Serbian lands’, it would have been subjugated from the ‘national’ perspective. Thanks to this function and the inevitable growth of the Serbian bureaucracy, it could probably have become rapidly Serbianised. In addition, it would have been out of the question for the centre to be granted autonomy. This idea for a new organisation of the state,

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however, rapidly disappeared without a trace in the sources. If one compares the extensive territorial claims made under the label ‘Serbian lands’ with the maximum Croatian demands, as presented by Macˇek, for example, in a conversation with a German journalist, then the incompatibility of the two plans becomes immediately clear: large territories were claimed by both sides. This was the real reason why these plans were not pursued any further.

Macedonia and the War The political upheavals in Europe after 1938, and especially the revision of borders before and after the start of World War II, made it appear realistic for the first time since the peace conferences that also in Macedonia there might be a change in the status quo. The bad experiences with Serbia overshadowed for a part of the Macedonian population the equally bad, but less recent, memories of the Bulgarian occupation during World War I, such that these circles looked optimistically towards Bulgaria. An Army report from 30 August 1939 mentioned active Bulgarian propaganda efforts in the Vardar divisional district, where people liked to listen to Radio Sofia, which had better reception than Radio Belgrade. ‘Bulgarian’ songs were sung, and sometimes one heard shouts of ‘Long live Bulgaria’, ‘Down with Yugoslavia’. According to the report, there were rumours that Italy (known popularly by the male name ‘Tale’) would take Macedonia from Yugoslavia and give it to his son-in-law Boris, the Bulgarian king; Germany, known as ‘Gero’, would take the north. According to the report, students were spreading propaganda in favour of an autonomous Macedonia. Serbs and nationalists had already been asked if they wanted to sell their houses.220 As in all the Army reports, it is in this case hard to determine how widespread sympathy for Bulgaria really was. The Yugoslavian civilian authorities, like the military, characterised all those engaged in anti-Yugoslav activity or expressing support for autonomy as ‘Bulgaromans’. One can therefore assume that those who could not imagine an independent Macedonia, after 20 years of hated Serbian rule, saw Bulgaria as the lesser evil. Whilst, as already mentioned, at the start of the war, sympathies lay with the victim Poland and her allies, this attitude changed with time. The political system during the years of peace had consolidated the status of Macedonia as ‘South Serbia’. One should recall the attitude of the British, who intervened to prevent any change in the status quo. After the great military successes of the revisionist power Germany, it appeared that now a new order was possible for Macedonia and was almost within its grasp. An anonymous messenger in June 1940 informed the prime minister, everywhere in

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‘South Serbia’ in the houses and on the streets, children could be heard singing this song: God punish England and France, because they took free Macedonia away from us! Long live Greater Germany, That will give us a free Macedonia. According to the reporting agent, another equally common song shows that this Macedonia would encompass all of its parts: Little girl, oh little girl, Tell me, how far does Macedonia reach? Macedonia, Macedonia reaches from Nisˇ Through Kumanovo, Sˇtip, and Kocˇani as far as Agais.221 That such songs were actually sung over a wide area can be seen from an incident in the western Macedonian town of Kicˇevo. On 13 October 1939, a group of soldiers sang something quite similar there: ‘Germany, Italy, liberate Macedonia – England and France want Macedonia to be under Yugoslavia.’222 These songs quite clearly show the disappointment felt towards the Allies. According to a report from the Vardar Gendarmerie Regiment on 26 May 1940, the people appeared outwardly content with the political situation, but they dreamed of the creation of an independent Macedonia, although there were different opinions about this. The older inhabitants sympathised more with a Bulgarian Protectorate; the younger ones wanted an independent Macedonian state or at least a Macedonian Banovina on the Croatian model. After the German blitzkrieg, the autonomists in Skopje were more open in their comments and gatherings were more numerous. On the other hand, a majority of Albanians, according to the report, wanted a ‘free Greater Albania’ under an Italian Protectorate, towards which their leaders were working, and in which they were also being supported by Catholic priests, who had been travelling a noticeably great amount recently.223 In Prespa County one can sense in the people, ‘especially since the Czechoslovakian crisis . . . the growing conviction that now it will also be our turn and that Macedonia / as the term “South Serbia” is not recognized by anyone here / will finally experience its liberation from Serbian slavery, even though in Prespa County there is complete freedom’. According to the Army report, these expectations had been spurred on by the revision of the Romanian border in favour of Hungary and Bulgaria, as now the hope existed that if the

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Axis powers were victorious, the Yugoslav borders would also be revised, which would make possible Macedonia’s independence or her annexation to Bulgaria. This was why sympathy for the Axis powers was so visible in Prespa County and grew with their victories. Yet this was not expressed in public presentations, but only in private conversations. According to the report, one could see the satisfaction on the faces of the listeners, when listening to radio reports about the victories of the Axis powers. The Serbs, who were doing their service here, were viewed as foreigners, oppressors and invaders.224 In Macedonian historiography, these sympathies for the Axis powers, documented also elsewhere, are ignored as they don’t match the picture of a straight-line development of growing Communist influence in Macedonia, which culminated in the struggle for liberation against the Fascists and the socialist revolution. These left-wing forces in Macedonia expected liberation from another direction. On 18 October 1939, some people from Veles sang anti-state Macedonian songs, as well as the Internationale, in a pub and said: ‘The Serbs will no longer order us around, now Russia will come and drive out all the Serbs.’225 This group did not expect anything good from Bulgaria, the Communists warned: The place of the Serbian gendarmes will be taken by Bulgarians, the place of the Serbian tax collectors will be taken by Bulgarians &c. The Macedonians will be persecuted by the Bulgarian authorities, as they are persecuted today by the Serbian imperialists.226 In August, G.W. Rendel, the British ambassador in Sofia, was of the opinion that ‘a fairly large section of the Macedonians’ saw Russia as their saviour, while there certainly was also a number who were short-sighted enough to want to enter into intrigues with Italy and Germany.227 The Communist paper Bilten condemned those Macedonians, who expected liberation from the Axis. Hitler and Mussolini, on the contrary, would only introduce an even more oppressive slavery. It was also a mistake to believe that Hitler would build factories in Macedonia; he only wanted cheap raw materials for his industry.228 Accordingly, the Macedonian Communists’ declared goal was a free Macedonian Republic.229 The increasingly autonomist tendencies in Macedonia, which had received further impetus from the reordering of Europe, were registered with growing concern in Serbia and led people to reconsider the reasons for this. In an article published on 2 March 1940 in the Belgrade business paper Trgovinski glasnik, which was republished a week later in the newspaper Glas Pologa in Tetovo, the author came to the following conclusions that were not at all new: he viewed it as the most crass mistake that even ‘the most talented people from

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the South’ had been shown little trust and had not been considered for positions in either the state, or their own regional, administrations during the last 20 years. It was also wrong that the best representatives of the ‘Serbian race’ had not been sent to the South. However, the author thought that it was still possible to correct these mistakes.230 In its report of 14 October 1940, the Staff of the Third Army District did not content itself with the alarming discovery that the Serbian national cause was in a very sad state in Prespa County and that over the previous 20 years nothing had improved, but rather on the contrary everything had got much worse and soon could no longer be restored. It also included an analysis of why things had deteriorated so much: the blame lay primarily with the politicians and ‘partisans’ ( partizani), who had always described conditions in this region falsely and presented themselves as nationalist fighters. The Macedonian Committee, when it existed, the Exarchite clergy and teachers today, as well as the familial relationships in Bulgaria, together with the Bulgarian nationalist propaganda, have exploited our negligence and patriotic blindness, to defeat our Serbian nationalist cause one hundred per cent, such that the latter can no longer be spoken of, even though a sea of blood was sacrificed by Serbia’s best sons for these our historic southern territories. As far as the commander was aware, the national situation in Bitola, Prilep, Ohrid, Veles, Gevgelija, Krusˇevo, and other counties was not any better. The students were working intensively to spread and consolidate Macedonian national consciousness, ‘unfortunately’ under the direction of some state officials from these regions, who concealed their work as cultural or sporting activities. In order to improve the situation, the commander proposed several measures. First of all came once again the demand to remove all local officials and priests and to replace them with reliable, experienced, and honest people from other parts of the country, who in addition must work actively in the national education of the people there. ‘Bulgaromans’ and ‘separatists’ should be detained. All local officers were to be transferred to Montenegrin and Serbian regiments. And there was an important point at the end: he recommended raising the living standard of the population through material aid and thus to ‘promote this region, economically, culturally, and socially, as from the liberation up until today nothing of this nature had been done’. This last point appeared to be so important to him because it served as a major argument in the propaganda of the ‘Bulgaromans’ and ‘separatists’.231

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Measures against ‘Autonomism’ and ‘Separatism’ Belgrade responded on various levels to the increasing political activity and stronger demands for autonomy and recognition of the name Macedonia. On the one hand, people who were active in this direction were called to account and in some cases indicted. On the other hand, a strictly confidential directive was issued by the government to the administration of the Banovina, to prepare a list of ‘enemies of the State’. In the event of a mobilisation, these prople should be placed under observation or interned in camps. In 1940, instructions then indeed came to arrest certain people who were on the list. They were picked up at night and taken to the Ivanjica camp in Serbia.232 On 25 February 1940, a branch of the Serbian Cultural Club was established in Skopje to support the struggle on the ideological front.233 The Cultural Club, whose statutes had been approved by the Interior Ministry on 15 January 1937, had been founded by well-respected members of Serbian society and was led by its President Slobodan Jovanovic´. After the Agreement with the Croats in the autumn of 1939, which the Club opposed, its activities took on an increasingly political character and it became active in those places, where it saw that the Serbian national idea was threatened, that is initially in the Vojvodina, which held great significance for Serbia and where the Croatian Banovina made territorial demands. Then it was also active in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where it advocated for the Serbian character of the entire region. Branches were even established in the Croatian Banovina. In 1940, it was active in the South with two main objectives. The struggle against the term ‘Macedonia’, which Professor Vulic´ had already led with his lecture in the Cultural Club in the autumn of 1939, and also resisting the recognition of a Macedonian nation was a second prime concern.234 At the beginning of 1940, the government’s propaganda instrument, the Central Press Office, had to concede, as in the Army reports, that the integration and assimilation of the South had by no means been successful. Therefore, it commissioned its correspondent in Skopje, Todor Manevic´, who was from Sˇtip in eastern Macedonia, to make proposals for a more intensive and successful propaganda in our southern territories and for their rapid spiritual union with the central Serbian territories, with the Pomoravlje and the Sˇumadija, with which South Serbia must form an unbreakable bond of unity, after such a long period. Manevic´ established – after all other means had failed – that only one still remained: money – but not in order to buy certain personalities, but rather to make large investments, so that the mass of the population felt an improvement

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in their living conditions. Once and for all, one had to take up the improvement of the land, modernise agriculture, create health centres, open up the South for tourism, develop mining, reforest the bare mountains, and appoint people to the 500 unfilled teaching jobs. In other words, the demands and proposals were still exactly as they had always been, even more than 20 years after the establishment of the state. Manevic´ also criticised cultural policy openly and fearlessly, as in his opinion it led to atrophy, since every local initiative was throttled, while those organisation that were tolerated and supported, collapsed, as they were directed from the outside and the local people stayed away from them. In his opinion, for example, the movement around the journal Lucˇ was categorised without reason as politically orientated and anational. He also criticised the decision to deny permission to the cultural society Vardar, which was suspected of only tolerating Macedonians among its members. Yet the intellectuals, who were engaged there, had now founded the society Seljacˇka samopomoc´ (Peasant SelfHelp), under the chairmanship of an agricultural engineer from the Sˇumadija. The local intellectuals did want to work together with people from the north, but these should not be ‘patented fighters in the nationalist struggle’.235 The poverty in terms of cultural and other organisations, which Manevic´ complained of, can be demonstrated using numbers. In 1936, there were 28,557 associations of all kinds throughout all of Yugoslavia, but only 1,644 in the Vardar Banovina. The greatest discrepancy was with regard to educational associations (prosvetni drusˇtva). The Vardar Banovina had the fewest (88), while the Vrbas Banovina, which otherwise was normally at the bottom in terms of educational and cultural matters, had 144 and the Drava Banovina even had 1,020. Only the (smaller) Morava Banovina with 97 associations was in a similar category to the Vardar Banovina,236 which might also reflect the lack of a tradition for such associations in the Ottoman and Orthodox influenced regions. Furthermore, many of the associations may have largely existed only on paper. A teacher from Kocˇani explained in 1929 how the associations functioned – or rather didn’t function in his county. Apart from the Sokol, all of the associations were badly organised. Frequently they were only established for show, in order to demonstrate to those above that there was some cultural and national activity, but then nobody took care of the organisation, as with the reading rooms for example.237 That the teacher was not describing an exceptional case is demonstrated by the findings made by the Central Press Office correspondent. In 1935, following extensive investigations, he discovered that many of the 162 people’s libraries and reading rooms in the Banovina only existed on paper and the others only exceptionally developed larger programmes.238 It was similar with the

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cooperatives that were organised from above. If the availability of credits was announced, they sprang up like mushrooms out of the ground, but one half only existed on paper; the other half was withering away.239 The previously mentioned plan for a Banovina of the ‘Serbian lands’ can be named as one defensive political measure intended against the movement for autonomy. Another is the appointment of Zˇivojin Rafajlovic´, a strong Serbian nationalist, as Ban in the summer 1940. On receiving him in July, Josif Mihailovic´, the Macedonian mayor of Skopje, stressed to him: ‘In its internal development, our people has overcome that period of guardianship, which one could still understand in the first days of liberation, and expects that its local wishes and needs are finally taken into account.’240 Rafajlovic´, who was described by his deputy Ban Aleksandar Cvetkovic´ as senile, sclerotic and not very intelligent, as a person who didn’t understand anything that went beyond the material taught in his Serbian elementary school books,241 immediately undertook a journey through the Vardar Banovina in which he attempted to intimidate the population. In Ohrid he held a ‘fear inspiring’ speech; in Resen he threatened that his hand could be gentle, but could also crush things, and told his listeners that here even the stones were Serbian. When it came to the annual budget, he demanded a doubling of the confidential credit from 400,000 up to 800,000 dinars, which, however, was stopped by the Banovina Council at the insistence of the deputy Ban.242 Academics were again put to work. Vulic´ published at least one further article with the same purpose and spirit as his lecture in the Serbian Cultural Club.243 In autumn, the deputy Foreign Minister informed the Serbian Academy, that the Foreign Ministry (!) would like to support research on ‘South Serbia’ by the Academy, as well as publications in this field. In response, the president of the Academy, Aleksandar Belic´, held a first meeting with several members244 on 9 October 1940, in which it was decided to set up within the Academy a ‘Commission for Researching Cultural Monuments’ (Odbor za proucˇavanje kulturnih starina). With all the openness one could wish for, the protocol stated: ‘The purpose for which this commission has been formed, is the scientific confirmation of our national aspirations.’245 The Banovina Committee of the governing party JRZ was also sent into battle against the autonomous tendencies. A meeting took place on 14 October 1940 in which the prime minister personally participated and during which he stressed that ‘South Serbia’ could not have its own solution, but only in connection with all the other parts of Serbia – here the idea of the ‘Serbian lands’ is being sounded out. ‘South Serbia is tied organically, politically, and spiritually to all parts of Yugoslavia via Belgrade, its spiritual and political centre.’ A resolution was drawn up and read by Jovan Altiparmakovic´, in which it was laid down that:

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In conclusion the Banovina committee underscores expressly that the Vardar Banovina is marching resolutely with Belgrade as the carrier and centre of the political and national ideology of all Serbian territories. It will only seek a solution for its economic, social, cultural, and political problems within this union. The connectedness of all these regions in the past, our life together, our national history, and the oldest cultural monuments show clearly that our historic South ties its fate and its future resolutely to the great Yugoslav homeland, which grants the only guarantee for a better future for all who live there.246 The confidential monthly report of the Staff of the Third Army District for October 1940 shows, however, among the population that a completely different mood prevailed: Propaganda being spread in favour of an ‘independent Macedonia’, occasional speeches about the size and fame of the same, pamphlets, pictures and the exultation of deceased ‘Macedonians’ from the recent past, propaganda speeches even at the graves, the ever stronger advocacy of the local officials for the rights, which one has to grant also to this country, ‘the South’, as well as people listening openly and incessantly to Radio Sofia, make absolutely plain the current, in no way enviable, attitude of the local classes of the population, that is [they show] that this population is not at all favourable to our State and is awaiting an unavoidable change in the previous construction and order of the State. The report also discussed the above-mentioned conference of the Banovina Committee of the Yugoslav Radical Union and established that the ‘Bulgaromans and autonomists’ were bitter about the statement of the prime minister and decried the local participants in the conference as traitors to the Macedonian people and servants and spies of the Serbs.247 Probably not by chance, exactly on the first day of the conference, on 14 October, in Skopje the first issue of the new daily newspaper Glas Juga (Voice of the South) appeared which was dedicated to an important ‘national’ task. It was the intention of the responsible managers, to awaken the consciousness of the local population through this [newspaper] and to raise sensibilities for the collective, which was why the entire idea was taken up with great enthusiasm and the paper was granted State subsidies. But the first edition was already a great disappointment in this respect. From the speech of the Minister for the Army and the Fleet not only were whole

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passages omitted, in addition the terms ‘Serb’ and ‘South Serbia’ were ‘maliciously’ left out – apparently by the Central Press Office correspondent, who was also the chief editor of this new newspaper. This post was held for the first time by a Macedonian, the already mentioned Todor Manevic´ from Sˇtip. For this reason, the reporter had suggested removing the subsidy to the relevant offices, if the paper continued in this direction. The monthly report complained also that the increasingly spreading movement for autonomy among the population might even profit from a recent faux pas by the authorities. The Ministry for the Army and the Fleet had namely created a stamp, on which stood: ‘Commission for the collection of booty in the Macedonian theatre of war’ (Komisija za skupljanje plena sa makedonskog vojisˇta), and thereby had used the tabooed term ‘Macedonia’ themselves. According to the Army report, next to the autonomists, the Communists were also extremely active, who were able to profit from the very difficult economic situation. Therefore the author recommended starting with the announced public works as soon as possible, in order to reduce the number of unemployed and to take the wind out of the sails of the Communists.248 In addition the report mentioned numerous anti-state expressions by individuals, who had spoken out against the Serbs, against Yugoslavia, and in favour of an independent Macedonia. Expressions friendly to Bulgaria were also recorded.249 Especially revealing is the statement by a 70-year-old peasant from Kocˇani, who insulted the queen and the state. Among other things he reportedly said: ‘Now Greece will disappear, then Turkey, and then also this shit-State, and Bulgaria will expand its borders and so will we’. In the investigation this old peasant answered the question about his religion, saying he was a Bulgarian.250 Here it becomes clear that, in 1940, simple people, or in any case the older among them, could not distinguish between religious and national affiliation, that the designation ‘Bulgarian’ could still mean one’s former membership of the Bulgarian Church, the Exarchy. In the present case, this aspect is underlined further by the aversion to Greece and Turkey, which were not involved in the Macedonian question during the interwar period, as here these terms do not refer primarily to the states but rather to the hostile religious denominations. In the first half of this peasant’s life, the Greek Patriarchy and the Bulgarian Exarchy had fought bitter and sometimes bloody battles over the Orthodox parishes in what at that time was Ottoman Macedonia. Those who were subordinated to the Patriarchy counted as ‘Greeks’, those belonging to the Exarchy were ‘Bulgarians’. And the ‘Turks’, as the centuries-long oppressors and foes, also had their fixed place in the list of the peasant’s enemies. That the cause of Serbian nationalism was lost in Macedonia is demonstrated also by one particular incident, as well as in the contents of

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all the Army reports. On 8 December 1940, a parents’ evening took place in the high school in Prilep, as the director was concerned about the situation in his school. He urged the 200 assembled parents to ensure that their children used their ‘Serbian mother tongue’ and not this ‘strange language’. Furthermore, the children split themselves into Serbians and Macedonians. Metodija Andonov-Cˇento, ‘a known autonomist and separatist’ from the town,251 who had been released from detainment only two weeks previously, replied: neither you, nor anyone else, can forbid our children from using our Macedonian language either at home or at school, for we are Macedonians and our children are Macedonian children . . . If the existing political authority does not grant us our political and national right to independence within a federal State, the day will come when this country is no longer called South Serbia but Macedonia, and will be an independent State. Yugoslavia consists of several provinces with various nations and these can only live together in a federation. After this evening Cˇento was immediately arrested again and remained in prison until the capitulation.252 The hopes that the Macedonians placed in the Soviet Union, Italy and Germany, alarmed the British. The ambassador in Sofia, G.W. Rendel, thought that ‘the Macedonians would accept any “autonomous” Macedonian state which a great power succeeds in establishing’.253 The Vice Consul in Skopje, Thomas, reported to the Foreign Office at the start of 1941 that 90 per cent of the ‘Slavic Macedonians’ were autonomists – also the Communists were primarily autonomists – and that there really was a ‘Macedonian problem’, that ‘has in no way been artificially created by interested propaganda’. In his opinion, it was in the interest of Yugoslavia to satisfy Macedonia’s aspirations. It appeared to him, however, to be unlikely, ‘in view of the instinctive dislike of the Serbs engendered by 20 years of Serbian rule, that anything short of autonomy would be acceptable’.254 As Rossos correctly observed, Rendel and Thomas were not the first to point to this mood in Macedonia. Yet for the first time the Foreign Office was prepared to concern itself with autonomy as a possible solution.255 But in the meantime it was now too late for any kind of insight, regardless of by whom, as war was knocking at the door. In the summer of 1940, the Court Minister Milan Antic´ compared the situation of Yugoslavia, which was trying to preserve a neutral position, with that of a traveller who was being followed by hungry wolves: occasionally they throw these beasts a bone in the hope of thereby gaining some time in order to get to safety. The country did

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everything not to provoke Germany, while avoiding joining the Axis. Its position became ever more uncomfortable, as it was being encircled by members of the Tripartite Pact successively: on 20 November 1940, Hungary joined the Pact, three days later Romania followed suit and on 1 March 1941, Bulgaria. From February on, the Yugoslav government was also under strong pressure to join, although the Germans wanted to make it easy for them: Yugoslavia was assured that it would not have to provide any support in the war and that it would not even have to permit German troops free passage or transport through its territory. As a reward, Yugoslavia should receive access to the Aegean in the new Europe. Whether these promises would have been kept is by no means certain. In any case, the government wrestled its way through to joining the Pact, which took place on 25 March. Just two days later on 27 March, just after midnight, Serbian officers under the leadership of Air Force General Dusˇan Simovic´ carried out a putsch. The still just underaged King Petar was declared to be old enough to take the throne.256 The coup d’e´tat and the ensuing anti-fascist demonstrations in several Yugoslavian cities led immediately to Hitler’s decision to destroy Yugoslavia ‘militarily and as a State’ with ‘unrelenting force’. On 6 April, Belgrade was bombed without a declaration of war and the country was invaded from Austria, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.257 The Yugoslav Army, which during the interwar years had swallowed a large part of the state budget at the cost of other departments,258 failed miserably and capitulated after only 12 days. At this time not only the equipment proved itself to be inadequate, but the leadership was also incapable. Disorganisation and chaos reigned. The High Command was not even able to make contact with its units, which in large part were wandering across the country without any leadership.259 In addition, all those who felt they had been neglected or oppressed by this state – and that included many people – had little inclination to fight for its retention. Especially many Croat soldiers and units deserted; there were even some clashes between Serbs and Croats.260 The foreign troops were greeted initially as alleged liberators from the Serbian yoke in some places outside Serbia and Montenegro. It did not take long though for the new yoke to be imposed. A number of Macedonian autonomists put themselves at the disposal of the Bulgarians (for example, Kitincˇevic´, Ðuzelovic´ and Cˇkatrovic´). They welcomed the end of Serbian rule, but immediately came under new foreign rulers. If they had imagined that Macedonia and the Macedonians would play a more important role in Greater Bulgaria than they had in Yugoslavia, they were mistaken. In the constitution that consolidated Bulgarian rule on 25 April 1941 – characterised as ‘Macedonia’s liberation’ in contemporary Bulgarian sources – Macedonia was in practice annexed in contravention of international law. It was immediately forbidden to call oneself a Macedonian.261

CHAPTER 3 ECONOMY AND FINANCES

The Yugoslav Economy The establishment of the Yugoslav state not only united territories with quite starkly varying degrees of economic development, but also regions that over the previous centuries had been oriented towards different centres and scarcely maintained any economic relations with each other. For example, the share of foreign trade between Serbia and Croatia-Slavonia had only formed about 1 per cent of the total volume of foreign trade conducted by these two territories.1 Old economic areas were cut apart and new borders put up. In return the Hapsburg – Ottoman border line, which had shaped this region for centuries, disappeared. The economically more backward former Ottoman territories, which in addition had suffered great destruction and enormous human losses, saw themselves confronted with comparatively strong competition from the more developed former Hapsburg parts of the country, which had survived World War I virtually unscathed. The Slovenian economy was especially able to profit from the new situation. Whereas in the Hapsburg framework it had belonged rather to the less well-developed parts, it now found itself in new surroundings, in which it hardly had any competition. The upshot was a rapid industrialisation, stimulated by strong demand from the domestic market.2 Overall, Yugoslavia, like the other Balkan states, was an agricultural country. In 1931, 75 per cent of all people employed worked in agriculture and forestry, and only 11.4 per cent in industry, mining and crafts. Only in Slovenia did the economic structure diverge significantly from the national average. The respective numbers were 60.6 and 21.1 per cent.3 Nevertheless, only the industrial sector was promoted, and the first such laws were already issued in 1919. In the first decade of the interwar period, the state allocated between 28 and 39 per cent of its expenditure to state-owned businesses.4 The British Vice Consul criticised the corresponding neglect of agriculture that

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resulted and maintained justifiably that without any purchasing power among the peasants, there would be no market for industrial products.5 The annual reports by the British embassy in Yugoslavia during the 1920s always stress the bad economic situation, especially for industry, and the high cost of living.6 The local agricultural products were expensive, due to low productivity, high margins for the merchants, and inefficient means of transport. This also applied to industrial products, which also were of poor quality, such that their sale could only be guaranteed by protectionist state measures. ‘Yugoslavia is without doubt a country, in which bad products are sold at a high price’, the British commented. The bulk of consumers consisted of peasant men and women, who knew little about the quality of consumer goods and could not afford really good products.7 In the eyes of the British, Yugoslavia made two other big mistakes: it spent too much on the Army and despite a serious shortage of money it was too mistrustful of foreign investment. A country that was so rich in natural resources could easily, in their view, exploit these with the aid of foreign money. On the other hand, the foreign investors also remained sceptical. On the one hand favourable conditions were not created for them; on the other unpaid prewar debts to France and Great Britain blocked the path to loans from these countries.8 Thus the condition of the entire Yugoslav economy presented itself in a not very favourable light even before the Great Depression. The latter then plunged this agricultural country into a deep and lasting depression, especially due to the price scissors that opened up between agriculture and industry and because of the industrialist countries’ protectionist measures. In 1932, Yugoslav exports were only one-third of their value in 1929. Only from 1935, clearly later than in the industrial countries, did a slow recovery set in. As the peasants had suffered most during the crisis, their purchasing power has ‘declined to zero’, as the Agricultural Bank concluded.9 Support for agriculture, which found itself in a desperate situation, was then also a priority for Milan Stojadinovic´, in charge of the government from 24 June 1935. Stojadinovic´ was a finance specialist and one of the richest businessmen in the country, who had been Finance Minister in the previous government. It was clear to him that the country could not recover unless something was done for the peasant population, which represented the bulk of both the producers and consumers. The main line of attack therefore was debt-reduction and providing favourable loans. With respect to industry the government decided to support those branches that were not dependent on foreign raw materials, and on the other hand to develop those industries that used the available resources. This policy was intended also to serve local agriculture, which cultivated a range of plants useful in industry.

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In addition, the government supported those branches that were important for national defence.10 Stojadinovic´ also set about implementing the public works programme, which had already been announced in November 1933, to combat unemployment and improve the country’s infrastructure. First of all a credit of more than one billion dinars was issued, which was to be used for constructing public buildings and transport routes, mainly ‘to give bread to people in the passive regions’. On 13 April 1938, it was decided to issue a domestic loan of more than four billion dinars, of which 1.5 billion was designated for railway construction; this project, however, was postponed. In 1937, almost 40,000 people were engaged in railway construction, the largest deployments being in Serbia (9,048), Bosnia-Herzegovina (8,556), and Macedonia (5,308).11 However, a lot of the money from the work-creation projects went abroad, as many contracts were given to foreign companies. And administrative and organisational costs also swallowed at least one-fifth of the total amount spent.12 From 1934 Yugoslavia had found a buyer for its agricultural products in Germany, which paid more than the world market price, if only through the clearing agreements. Germany’s position as foreign trade partner became ever more important, initially due to the sanctions against Italy following the Abyssinian War, and then because of Germany’s territorial expansion. In 1938, Germany imported 36 per cent of the total value of all Yugoslav exports.13 Because of its dominant position as the most important trading partner, Germany could dictate the terms of trade: in 1939 Yugoslavia had to pay 14 dinars for 1 Reichsmark, while in the markets in Zurich and London the rate was only 7 dinars.14 From 1935 to 1936, Yugoslavia ran budget surpluses,15 and otherwise the economic situation was looking good, in part due to the excellent harvests in the years from 1936 to 1938.16 In 1935 – 7, the development of industry was generally good.17 These positive tendencies had scarcely any effect on the low living standards, however, especially for the mass of the rural population, as prices remained high due to exorbitant indirect taxes. As a result, social unrest and strikes were not uncommon.18 Although the economy was improving noticeably, it was not sufficient to create jobs at the same rate as the population was expanding. In 1940, there were still 757,030 people registered as unemployed.19

Vardar Macedonia: ‘Passive’ Region or Garden of Eden? Even before the founding of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the redrawing of borders resulting from the Balkan Wars meant a significant

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rupture for the economy of the Macedonian geographical region, as this territory, which had been a functioning economic area for centuries, was broken up into pieces. The fate of the city of Bitola is exemplary, as after Thessaloniki it had been the most important economic and business centre in European Turkey. Its location on the fringe of a new state and the severe destruction inflicted by World War I, as well as by an ammunition explosion in 1920, were severe blows to the city, from which it never recovered. Bitola also felt the effects of the establishment of the Albanian state in 1912. Under Ottoman rule, the market in Bitola had supplied central and southern Albania with manufactured items and craft products, colonial goods, grains, and flour. All of Albania was orientated economically towards the Vardar territory. The new borders put a stop to the traditional flow of goods, and in addition, Albania as an independent state began to develop its own economy and turned towards Italy for political reasons.20 The losses and destruction due to the wars were also critical, especially the impact of World War I. To get an idea of the enormous burden this entailed, one has to conceive that on the so-called ‘Thessaloniki Front’, which ran directly across Macedonia, 600,000 men stood facing one another on each side of the front line. That is one soldier for every two residents of the region.21 By the end of the war, entire villages and the town of Dojran were erased from the face of the earth, wiped out in battles along a front that existed for three years. The towns of Strumica, Valandovo, Gevgelija, Bitola and others were heavily damaged, and their populations had largely fled. Trenches and barbed wire scarred the countryside. Before the war, 2.1 million mulberry trees had stood there, which made Macedonia, after France, Italy and Spain, the fourth-largest producer of silk cocoons. In the course of the war, most of them were destroyed.22 In theory, there was a good chance for Macedonia to recover from the war years. Raw materials were available, as well as more than enough manpower and the new Yugoslav market. But to achieve this development, protection and reconstruction measures were needed. But of the reparations that Serbia received – Yugoslavia asserted claims for 450 million dinars per year until the Hoover Moratorium in June 1930 – almost nothing reached this heavily damaged territory. Vardar Macedonia also received very little of the reconstruction aid expended after the war.23 Efforts to achieve tax reductions or favourable conditions for the creation of new industries remained without success. Transport problems and high customs fees hindered also the export of those goods that were produced.24 In 1928, Vid Ðurd¯evic´, Secretary of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Skopje, blamed ‘our responsible leaders’ for not managing to sign a single trade agreement quickly with even one neighbouring country, to which ‘South Serbia’ exported its products,25

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although the Chamber had pressed this upon them since its founding in 1922.26 Such treaties existed with Czechoslovakia, Italy, Austria, Great Britain and Germany, which benefited other regions of the country, but not Vardar Macedonia, which only found buyers for its exports – raw opium, cattle, grain, fruit, sheep fat, milled products and soap – in Albania, Greece and Turkey. Nearby Thessaloniki was potentially a large market, which experienced strong growth after 1922 due to the large number of refugees from Asia Minor. If a trade agreement had existed with Greece, Macedonia could have exploited this economic upswing much better. But as Ðurd¯evic´ complained, exports to the city faced all sorts of obstacles from the Greek authorities. On the other hand, Albania put up prohibitive customs tariffs. A treaty on cross-border traffic with this neighbour had been waiting three years for ratification,27 while ‘the Greeks are conquering eastern Albania piece by piece and our historical border towns fall daily into ever more serious economic distress’. According to Ðurd¯evic´, Turkey represented an interesting potential market that should be exploited, as relations existed due to the recent emigrants. More than all other regions of the kingdom, Macedonia was dependent on exports and their regulation, as it could not sell its products in other parts of Yugoslavia, as there was no demand for them there. Ðurd¯evic´ estimated that due to the absence of trade treaties, exports had fallen by at least 50 per cent.28 According to the report of an unknown Bulgarian diplomatic correspondent in Thessaloniki from 1927, all of the trade with the Aegean Islands and Asia Minor had to be conducted via Trieste rather than the port of Thessaloniki.29 The neglect of the South was also reflected in the fact that of the 150 million dinars which the National Bank granted for the promotion of exports in 1923, only 600,000 dinars were distributed among the former Ottoman territories (Macedonia, Kosovo and Sanjak).30 The British Vice Consul Footman, however, painted an optimistic picture in November 1927. In his opinion, the ‘business conditions’ in ‘South Serbia’ were good, in any case in comparison with the north. Apart from the bitterness about the tobacco monopoly, the peasants were not doing badly, which could be attributed mainly to the boom in Thessaloniki, which had grown strongly due to the many refugees there. The conclusion of a Trade Agreement with Greece gives cause to hope that this good condition will continue to endure. Footman’s conclusion: ‘Though badly administered Southern Serbia is not at the moment relatively less prosperous than other parts of the Kingdom.’31 What prompted Footman to make such an assessment is not clear. But, in any case, he found himself in the company of other commentators, who from the beginning of the 1920s were filled with great optimism regarding the

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potential for development in ‘South Serbia’. They pointed to the region’s richness in natural resources (minerals, forests and various other products like rice, cotton, silk, tobacco and poppy seeds) and considered that with the right support and investment in the transport routes, much could be achieved.32 The governing Radical Party was brimming with optimism. In its publication Samouprava, in 1927 the conviction was expressed that ‘South Serbia’ would play a great role in the economic rebirth (Preporodisˇte) of the country ‘with its inexhaustible natural riches’, it was only necessary to solve the current problems – transport, colonisation and agricultural credits. This would be done very quickly, as the ‘key leaders’ had recognised the importance of ‘South Serbia’ and were willing to satisfy its most important needs.33 How the region should be characterised economically was also debated within Macedonia itself. Dr Teodosije Robe, from Bitola, where he served as mayor from December 1936, stressed the Vardar Banovina’s potential in an article in the Belgrade newspaper Narodna odbrana in 1931, and protested against the common characterisation that frequently mentioned it in the same breath with the Zeta (Montenegro) and Littoral (Dalmatia) Banovinas as a ‘passive region’. Could you call a region passive, which met not only its own grain needs but also produced surpluses for export, which earned more than 50 million dinars? A region that exported 800 to 1,000 waggons of beans worth between 30 and 40 million, and cattle and animal products worth almost 200 million, as well as 30 million dinars of chrome, silk cocoons for more than 30 million, and raw opium worth 100 million; and which supplied the entire country with tobacco, whose value at a good price was 300 million? Despite the primitive and out-of-date means of production, according to Robe, the Vardar Banovina altogether was anything but a passive region.34 While Robe was stressing Macedonia’s potential and the contribution of the Banovina to the entire country, the deputy Ban, who in 1932 desperately attempted to get the regular state funds allocated to the Banovina actually released, saw things from a different perspective. In a letter to the Finance Minister, he stressed that half of the districts were underdeveloped.35 From 1935 the Banovina made official efforts that proved to be in vain to be categorised as ‘passive’, in order to receive increased support.36 The discrepancy in these assessments was justified, as on the one hand there really were large swaths of the region, especially in western Macedonia, which had to be categorised as ‘passive’ and where worker migration ( pecˇalba) was necessary for survival.37 On the other hand, the products listed by Robe also existed, yet they contributed little to the prosperity of the producers, but rather caused considerable sums to flow into the coffers of the state and made a

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few merchants wealthy. In September 1928, the Macedonian Communist Kosta Racin sharply attacked the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Skopje in an article published in Borba. According to his account, it was using its power to direct exports and set the purchase prices to exploit the peasants legally, such that all the profits flowed into the pockets of its members. He described those sitting in the Chamber as accomplices in the imperialistic policies of those in power in Belgrade and the Serbian bourgeoisie in Macedonia, as pillars and instruments of the exploitative policies.38 Throughout the entire period this Chamber was dominated by businessmen from Serbia, which incurred the ire of the local population.39 As formulated by Racin, the allegations made against the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Skopje were too sweeping, as it consistently lobbied in Belgrade on behalf of the economy in its respective region and sharply criticised government policy. Already on 25 January 1929, that is, shortly after the imposition of the dictatorship, it sent an unrequested report to the king on ‘Industry in South Serbia with a Special View also of the other Branches of Economic ctivity.’40 The author was the previously mentioned Secretary of the Chamber Vid Ðurd¯evic´, who had written the speech originally for the meeting of industrial corporations in autumn 1928. He stressed the great possibilities for lucrative special cultures, emphasised the hard-working nature of the inhabitants and was generally at this time, shortly before the Great Depression, cautiously optimistic. It appeared to him that industry was capable of development to such an extent that certain branches could satisfy the needs of the local population and even export to other parts of the country and also abroad, as in the markets of the neighbouring countries the products were competitive due to the close proximity.41 The Great Depression also put an abrupt end to the tentative positive trend of development in Macedonia. Vid Ðurd¯evic´ still considered in 1931 that conditions in the Vardar Banovina were more favourable than in other regions, precisely because of the low level of development. All classes of the population were used to keeping their standard of living low and there ‘all possible types of work were done in all possible ways, as the branches of the economy had not become specialized, which was especially true for trade and craft production’.42 This assessment was, however, premature as the crisis only started to affect Macedonia noticeably in 1932, when unemployment set in. In 1936, 33,692 people were registered as unemployed at the Labour Exchanges in Bitola und Skopje.43 Of great significance for the crisis in Macedonia was the decline in the prices for raw opium, which was also linked to other developments. This will be discussed in more detail subsequently.

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Industry Macedonian historians of the socialist era maintain, in conformity with their ideology, that the Industrial Revolution ‘as a quantitative leap in the modernization of production’ started in Macedonia in the middle of the nineteenth century. At the same time it was noted that the technical equipment was very simple, the numbers of workers few, and that output in terms of quantity and quality remained modest.44 In practice there was still scarcely any industry in Vardar Macedonia according to the real meaning of the word in the interwar period. The importance of this branch of the economy was in last place behind agriculture, animal husbandry, trade and crafts. The share of Macedonian industry as a part of Yugoslav industry was only between 0.1 and 0.2 per cent for a population that represented 5 per cent of the total. Of the 50 industrial plants that existed in Macedonia in 1925, most were steam-driven mills, which supplied the local population and the Army with flour. Right behind the mills in second place was the production of soap. A further relatively important branch was the manufacture of edible oil from poppy seeds. The producers, who were mostly based in Veles, suffered, however, from cheap Dutch competition and from the export of poppy seeds to Germany, such that they had difficulties obtaining sufficient raw materials.45 Ðurd¯evic´ therefore demanded prohibitive export tariffs for poppy seeds.46 After a hard fight against the oil factories in the northern part of the country, the Chamber of Industry and Commerce achieved the imposition of a tariff on foreign oilbearing fruits.47 In the second half of the 1920s there was a modest upswing in the economy, which, however, came to an abrupt end due to the Great Depression of 1929. In 1932, about 30 companies had to shut down their operations.48 As the South was viewed as unsafe, foreign investment was almost completely absent here.49 In 1933, of 128 industrial companies only three were in foreign hands: the brewery in Skopje (Czech capital), a mill in Bitola (Italian), and the power plant in Tetovo (Swedish).50 In view of these realities, it appears to be just ideological rhetoric to accuse foreign capital of sharing some of the responsibility for suppressing the initiative of Macedonian entrepreneurs.51 According to the above-mentioned report of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in January 1929, the number of industrial enterprises in ‘South Serbia’ – that is in Macedonia, Kosovo, Metochia, and the Sanjak – had increased from 14 to 104 since the founding of the state.52 One could be satisfied with this growth, noted the Chamber, if the region did not possess so much more potential:

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Given the favourable conditions, which our province offers for the development of industrial activity, much better results could have been achieved over the last decade, which also means that those State leaders, who have guided our economic policy over the last ten years, deserve anything but praise. As an example of the misguided policy, the chrome-mining works were given. These used the 24-kilometre-long narrow-gauge track from Tetovo to Skopje, which the railway directorate treated as an industrial railway, meaning that they demanded a yearly rental fee of 240,000 dinars from the mines and denied all of the otherwise usual price reductions on this section. The Chamber, at the request of the local population, had tried in vain to have the railway opened up to the public. That such a long stretch served as an industrial section was unknown anywhere else.53 As the Chamber correctly concluded, industry in ‘South Serbia’ had it especially difficult, as it was the weakest in the country and had to contend not only with foreign competition, but also with domestic rivals, with industries that had been able to develop in the past behind the protection of privileges, reductions and protective tariffs. Bulgaria and Greece also knew how to implement protective regulations, such that the Chamber demanded on several occasions, at least temporary tax exemptions, protective measures, and favourable transport rates for industry in ‘South Serbia’ and in 1926 also prepared a corresponding draft law. By 1929, however, the Ministry of Trade and Industry had not even responded at all to this proposal. All the demands remained unfulfilled. The Chamber also accused the government of not taking sufficient account of the situation in the South when passing its laws. For example, a new decree on the issuance of industrial bonds (Uredba o izdavanju industrijskih obveznica) was passed, which prescribed that only companies with a capital of at least 10 million dinars could sell stock. The Chamber pointed out that not a single company in ‘South Serbia’ was able to meet these conditions, as the businesses were either not stock companies or did not have sufficient capital at their disposal. The Chamber had tried in vain to draw attention to these points during the drafting of the decree. But the actions of the regional authorities also provoked criticism from business owners. The District (oblast) Skopje, for example, wanted to levy a sales tax (trosˇarina) on vehicles (mainly lorries and tractors). In this poorly developed region in terms of technology, this meant for the Chamber a return to the caravans and the wooden plough. Also the planned introduction of a consumer tax on raw opium of five dinars per kilogram was criticised as completely senseless, as the opium was not consumed domestically at all.

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Furthermore, ‘the capitalists’ in Thessaloniki would make a greater profit from this than the producers. Vid Ðurd¯evic´ also harshly criticised the budget of the independently administered territory of Skopje, as it envisaged spending 8 million dinars on administration (wages, allowances, rents, office materials) in 1929. Thereby two-thirds of the 12 million dinars, which according to D ¯ urd¯evic´ was the maximum that could be gained in revenue, would be spent on ‘unproductive items’. In construction, 1.1 million dinars were planned for wages and travel costs against 3 million for the construction of roads and other structures. In this way, as on the national level, the administration swallowed the lion’s share of the available financial means. The Secretary of the Chamber, however, did not place blame for the weak industrial development just with the state offices. An important handicap in his eyes was the character of the ‘South Serbs’, which was distinguished by extreme thriftiness – in principle, this was a good precondition for growth – but it also had a tendency to treasuring up. For example, the peasants only sold raw opium for gold. In this way large sums were concealed at home instead of being invested in financial institutions where it would have been available to the economy.54 This flight into hoarding gold can be explained from the Ottoman past, when there was a lack of security in every respect and there was scarcely any kind of banking system. Therefore, favourable government loans were even more important for industry in the South, as was demanded by Vid Ðurd¯evic´55 – yet this call also went unanswered. At the end of the 1930s the Secretary of the Industrialists’ Society still had to admit that industry in ‘South Serbia’ had to develop without bank capital, just using the personal means of the entrepreneurs, who were almost all traders and craftsmen. He criticised the National Bank for favouring certain industrial centres and even specific individuals when granting credits and demanded the decentralisation of this institution and the streamlining of its procedures.56 The few industries that did develop in Macedonia during the interwar period were concentrated in the booming capital Skopje, where 40.5 per cent of the companies were located, distributed among just a small number of branches. Over one-third of the investments were in tobacco-processing, where 66.4 per cent of the labour force was employed. In second place was the food branch and in third the textile industry. Generally these were small and medium-sized firms: in 1940, of the 111 companies engaged in industry and mining only 15 employed more than 100 workers. In 77 of them, by contrast, there were between 11 and 50 people. Overall the number of workers was 10,853, which corresponded to only 1.8 per cent of the entire Yugoslav labour force. The Macedonian historian Zografski accuses the leadership in Belgrade of deliberately holding back Macedonia’s economic development.57 Such an intention cannot, however, be proven. In 1938, the economist Todor Mirovic´

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posed the question in the journal Lucˇ, why the economy in the Povardarje was neglected by the state. He saw the reasons primarily in ignorance and indifference. He was convinced that there were too few officials in the ministries who were familiar with the problems and the needs of the South. Hardly anyone had bothered to inform themselves about the situation at all. Mirovic´ also criticised the passivity of the local intelligentsia. These people should concern themselves more with the needs of their region, appeal to public opinion, and urge the responsible political and economic offices to solve the problems.58 From an examination of the sources, one really gets the impression that in Belgrade indifference and incompetence were decisive, assisted by corruption, which the British delegation saw as an important cause of the general economic malaise in the country. This prevented the economic problems from being properly understood and dealt with.59 Everyone with an influential position first ensured that his own personal economic problems were solved. One could certainly accuse the Macedonian elite of pussyfooting and a lack of activity. One should not forget, however, that they comprised only a very small group that had no real power. When it came to distributing the meagre resources of the state, the Slovenian, Muslim, Serbian and Croatian interest groups were in a much stronger position. As has already been shown, throughout the entire interwar period the government prevented the formation of any Macedonian political or even cultural groups, which could have exerted any influence. And when Mirovic´ observes that the officials in the ministries had no idea about the South, then this was mainly because no officials from the South were working there who either interested themselves in the region or had the requisite expertise. In this way the political discrimination against Macedonia led directly also to its economic neglect. From its own resources, Macedonia was not able to establish any industry worthy of the name and which would have been able to withstand the existing foreign and domestic competition. Everything needed was missing: primarily capital, a tradition of entrepreneurship, a qualified labour force, and not least, a minimal network of transport and communications. In this respect the state failed completely, as will be discussed in more detail in an ensuing chapter. It should only be pointed out here that between 1918 and 1930 only the railway line Veles – Sˇtip – Kocˇani was constructed – for strategic reasons. The railway connection to the export market in Albania, on the other hand, which the Chamber of Industry and Commerce demanded from its inception in 1922,60 was never realised. Under these circumstances it did not help much that security was excellent and criminality was lower than anywhere else in the country, or that all kinds of natural resources were available: hemp, cotton, tobacco, poppy seeds, raw

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opium, flax, sunflowers, rice, peanuts, silkworms, castor oil plants, chestnuts, resin, mushrooms, all sorts of grains, fruits, vegetables, wood, cattle, game and the like.61 These all remained buried treasures, or they enriched others, such as the state treasury in the case of tobacco. In view of this industrial weakness, it is not surprising that the middle class remained a very small group, which comprised primarily Serbian immigrants and local Jews. Only very few Macedonians could be included in this class. The Chamber of Industry and Commerce was also dominated by Serbs. The modest local business elite were based more upon trade rather than industrial production. Those businessmen who did not want to bend to the omnipresent pressure of Serbianisation found themselves in a difficult position. And there were more than just a few of them. As was explained in a strictly confidential report prepared for the Central Press Office, most Macedonian businessmen and merchants, especially the wealthiest among them, left a lot to be desired in terms of ‘national correctness’ in the Serbian sense.62 At the same time they wanted to run their businesses, and therefore did not want to expose themselves too much. The founding of societies and associations, important institutions for the middle class, was largely prohibited, unless they had a Serbian national character. For these reasons, it was not easy for this class of local inhabitants to organise themselves efficiently. The attempt to integrate them into social life, where bourgeois behaviour was linked to the desired national consciousness, appears to have been largely resisted by the local lower and upper middle class, as an example demonstrates. When in October 1936 the festive showing of the ‘nationalist propaganda and educational film’ Oj letni sivi sokole (‘Fly, Grey Falcon’)63 under the patronage of the Ban was announced, the organisers felt compelled to stress that invitations were only valid for those people named personally. It is desired that there is no repetition of what has often occurred at festive film screenings, that namely the recipient of the invitation and the admission of honour passes them on to one of their sons, who then gives it to one of their friends. Or that respected craftsmen, who are sent invitations and admissions of honour give them to their apprentices.64

Crafts and Trade In the Ottoman period the conditions for craftsmen in Macedonia were relatively good. They could serve a large market and had no serious competition to fear. That part of Macedonia, which became part of Yugoslavia, however, was caught up in a state in which there were much more

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economically developed regions than was the case in Greece or Bulgaria. The products of the Macedonian craftsmen were not able to survive against industrial products from Slovenia and Croatia, which were cheaper and better suited to the different tastes of the customers.65 But foreign goods also forced their way immediately onto the market. The German Social Democrat Hermann Wendel experienced the Skopje bazaar in late summer 1920 as follows: ‘. . . trades are dying out, swept away by Europe’s shipments of goods; already in their shop stalls razors from Solingen, headscarves from Chemnitz, and pocket lighters from who knows where are mixed with the fine and delicate eastern knick-knacks’.66 New times knocked over the craft industries without delay.67 In addition, the emigration of a large part of the Turkish population meant the loss of key customers for traditional crafts. In Parliament representatives sought to draw attention to the problems of this branch of the economy, such as its indebtedness. The craftsmen were unable to meet their obligations to the banks, as their customers, the peasants could not pay their debts to the craftsmen. According to data from the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Skopje, the 12,000 craft businesses in the Banovina had debts to private banks and individuals worth 66 million dinars. The craftsmen were also hit by the debt relief given to the peasants in 1936, as they were the creditors. This entire branch of industry withered away and scarcely earned its numerous members sufficient to get by. The Macedonian representative Spiro Hadzˇi Ristic´ demanded that the government provide support for the craftsmen of the South from the ‘fund for promoting craftwork’, which was at the disposal of the Ministry for Crafts and Industry.68 The impotence of the craftsmen solidified from 1926 repeatedly into anger against the Moravian shoe giant ‘Bata’, which in the words of the parliamentarian, Cˇaslav Nikitovic´, had ‘slipped into’ Yugoslavia ‘unobserved’ and posed an existential threat to the craftsmen who worked with leather.69 On 11 January 1936, the shoemakers from Sˇtip organised a protest meeting and requested protective measures against ‘Bata’ in a telegram.70 The cry for the company to be banned from Yugoslavia was heard repeatedly. In 1937, this company possessed more than 400 shops in the country and operated with clever marketing. Nikitovic´ noted with dismay, that in 1934 he had seen with his own eyes how: ‘Bata’ in Skopje attracted customers with gypsy music.71 After agriculture and cattle breeding, trade was the third most important branch of ‘South Serbia’s’ economy, which, as mentioned above, suffered in the 1920s from the lack of treaties with the neighbouring states. Of especial importance was the import trade, while exports were limited to just a few goods, mainly raw opium, silk cocoons, grain, some fruits, cattle, cheese, oil and leather.72 It was a great handicap that the Macedonian merchants did not succeed in making direct contact with the purchasers of their wares, but

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remained dependent on the mediation of the merchant houses in Thessaloniki, which naturally were able to extract the majority of the profits for themselves.

Finances The economic weakness of Vardar Macedonia resulted in low tax revenues, which in turn meant that the public purse could only make a small contribution to boosting the economy. As already mentioned, in terms of area, the Vardar Banovina was in second place, just behind the Sava Banovina, and in terms of population it was the third largest administrative unit.73 But its budget did not reflect this status at all. For 1930, expenditures of just 80 million dinars were planned, which were to come from direct taxes (banovinski prirez, one-third of revenues), sales taxes (banovinska trosˇarina), and taxes and income from industries. From the Yugoslav state the Banovina received 16.2 million dinars for tasks, which had been transferred to it in the course of the administrative reorganisation in 1929. Half of the budget went to the Technical Department for the construction of roads and related projects, correcting rivers, land improvement, the laying of water pipes, and so forth. The Agriculture Department received 13 million dinars.74 In 1935–6 the Vardar Banovina had taken in the lowest revenues of all the regions, namely 28.65 million dinars against 129.06 million by the considerably smaller, but much richer Drava Banovina (Slovenia). By 1938–9, it had improved its position, as in last place was now the Vrbas Banovina – that is northern Bosnia – while the Vardar Banovina, also ahead of the Zeta Banovina (Montenegro), came in third from last.75 The lack of capital was also not resolved by issuing loans. In 1933, the Vardar Banovina had less in loans than all the other Banovinas, namely 71.271 million dinars against 239.043 million in the Sava, and 228.220 million in the Drava Banovina.76 In this situation the Banovina had little room to manoeuvre. If the state, which collected direct taxes, did not fulfil its responsibilities, it would find itself in an impossible situation. As an example, the struggle over finances at the beginning of the 1930s will be examined more closely. In the course of 1931, the Finance Ministry was warned several times because it had not paid to the Banovina the money it was entitled to. On 20 May, the Ban, Zˇika Lazic´, initially wrote himself, then repeatedly the head of the Finance Department, D. Vidakovic´, wrote. In his letter on 6 November, he stressed that by withholding the money the Ministry had put the administration of the Banovina in a very unpleasant position, especially with regard to maintaining its 15 hospitals. On 25 December 1931, Vidakovic´ had ‘for the fifth time, the honour of asking the Ministry to issue an order’ for the allocated funds to be

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transferred.77 Next year things carried on in the same manner. In October the Head of finances requested the 5.6 million dinars, which were in the Banovina’s budget for 1932– 3 under the heading ‘State aid’ and were supposed to cover the costs of the hospitals, which had become the responsibility of the Banovina in 1929. As nothing had been received from this money up until then, the Banovina had to maintain the hospitals at the expense of other recipients of state funds. At the same time Vidakovic´ pointed out that from the previous yearly budget 13,079,577 dinars78 was still outstanding and from the year before it was 1,753,069.79 As in 1932 the former Ban of the Vardar Banovina, Lazic´, was now the Interior Minister, Vidakovic´ turned to his former boss with the request to intervene with the Finance Minister to ensure that at least the funds for the hospitals were paid.80 Until 1932 the Banovina just about managed to make ends meet, as it still had at its disposal some money left from the period before the administrative reform, which it managed carefully, as deputy Ban Janic´ije Krasojevic´ stressed. But at the end of 1932 these reserves had been exhausted, such that in the last quarter wages could no longer be paid. At this time the state owed the Banovina almost 18 million dinars, a sum, which represented exactly onethird of the budget for 1932– 3. For the last quarter the Banovina needed 8.3 million in order to meet all of its obligations. As revenues of only 3.6 million were expected, the request was sent to the Finance Ministry to transfer at least 4.5 million.81 However, the Finance Ministry sent a negative reply: the Banovina cannot be given anything, as it could have covered all the expenses for 1931– 2. The deputy Ban responded to this that the Banovina had only received just one-third of its official allocation for the years 1930 to 1932. He also reminded them that these subventions were not any form of aid, but rather the regular payment for financing those institutions, which had been transferred from the state to the regions (oblasti). Krasojevic´ stressed further that the Vardar Banovina in the pevious three years had received ‘INCOMPARABLY less funds than any other Banovina over the last three years’. The Morava Banovina (Southern Serbia) for example, which in no way could be described as passive, has received 24,111,339.37 dinars, but the Vardar Banovina, in which half of the districts are passive, only 9,647,742 dinars. According to the deputy Ban, his Banovina has been doing everything possible to save money and therefore has avoided a budget deficit until now.82 This thriftiness, however, was used against them, for now, as shown above, it was argued that the Banovina could get by without the money. The deputy Ban, however, did not give in. He inquired among the other Banovinas about the fund allocations which they had received over the past three years since the introduction of the new administrative units and received replies from all the others apart from the Vrbas and the Littoral Banovinas.

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He did not want to draw a direct comparison with those that were more passive than his own province (Zeta, Vrbas and Littoral), but he pointed out that the Drava Banovina had received 35.6 million, the Drina Banovina 29.4 million, the Morava Banovina 24.1 million, the Sava Banovina 42.7 million and the Danube Banovina 18 million. For the deputy Ban the situation was clear: ‘It is more than obvious that the distribution and the transfer of the allocations have been implemented in an unfair manner.’ These comparative numbers also show that the small contributions to the south cannot be explained by the general economic crisis and the bad financial condition of Yugoslavia: the available means were received by other parts of the country. Precisely in this period of limited resources and an intensified battle for their distribution, the weak political position of the Vardar Banovina is revealed with great clarity. When despite numerous letters still no money arrived from Belgrade, Krasojevic´ sent his Head of Finances personally to the Finance Minister. The latter had promised to transfer 2 million in February 1933 and 3 million more in March. The Head of Finances presented the urgent request to make 2 million available as soon as possible, as many officials had already been waiting for their salaries for several months.83 Only two weeks later another outraged letter from the deputy Ban followed, as the Banovina had been refused again, when it tried to cash in credit notes for war damages worth 289,400 dinars. The minister knew very well how badly the Banovina was doing in comparison with the others. ‘Mr Minister might allow me to express that I cannot understand this treatment of the Vardar Banovina’. For Krasojevic´ it was incomprehensible that in Skopje one had to wait for months even for such small sums. He threatened that the Banovina could no longer fulfil its obligations and would not take responsibility for the consequences.84 In September 1933, the same tune was playing again: of the 1933–4 yearly budget allocation, nothing had been received, so that no money was available for building and maintaining roads.85 The situation of the hospitals remained critical: in the hospital in Leskovac water and electricity had been cut off, in Vranje no more food was being delivered.86 Upon hearing this, the Finance Ministry finally approved 2,428,905.50 dinars on 21 September 1933.87 However, approval did not automatically mean that the funds actually arrived. Frequently one had to exert pressure and wait for months for the payment to come through. Therefore, the deputy Ban was at pains to stress that the Banovina received much less than all the others. A document prepared on 13 October 1933 by the Head of Finances for the Banovina addressed to the Budget Department of the Finance Ministry, listed all the omissions of the Ministry as follows:

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Table 3.1 Sum Banovina was Supposed to Receive (Dinars) – Sums Actually Received88

1930 –1 1931 –2 1932 –3 1933 –4

Supposed to receive (dinars)

Sums actually received

10.800.811 13.099.517 5.600.000 4.857.811

9.047.742 NOTHING 3.100.000 NOTHING

In a letter dated 3 February 1934, Krasojevic´ again included a listing of how much each Banovina had actually received, and emphasised that for the Vardar Banovina this was just 40 per cent of the 34 million it was entitled to. The National Theatre in Skopje threatened to sack all the members of its company, on account of the missing subsidies. In order to avoid a considerable loss of prestige, the deputy Ban had authorised subsidies for two months. But if at least 2,765,500.10 dinars were not transferred, ‘I can’t even think of it, what might happen and where it will all end, as the closing of these institutions, whose support is the responsibility of the Banovina, cannot be permitted, regardless of the financial situation’. The demands of the Banovina had in any case been reduced to an indispensable minimum.89 But the state not only created considerable problems for the Banovina by not transferring the money it was owed. It also failed to meet its obligations in other respects. The Ministry for the Army and the Fleet ran up debts of more than half a million dinars in the hospitals for treating members of the Army, the gendarmerie, and the border troops, which it did not pay. In response the deputy Ban turned fairly desperately to the Minister for Social Policy and People’s Health with the request to intervene both with the Army Ministry regarding the payment of these debts and also with Finance Ministry for the settlement of the outstanding allocations. Otherwise around half of the hospitals would have to be closed.90 The state, which collected the taxes, damaged the Banovina also in the basic distribution of these revenues. Almost all direct taxes paid by the taxpayers to the state tax authorities were claimed by the state for itself, and only minimal sums were received by the Banovina. For this reason, in 1933 only just 3 million was taken in at the Banovina level instead of the predicted 14 million.91 In the summer of 1935, the Ban Dragoslav D ¯ ord¯evic´ intrigued against the dedicated and stirring deputy Ban, a Serb from Vranje, which lay within the Banovina. He asked the Prime Minister Milan Stojadinovic´ to send Krasojevic´ into retirement, as he did not work much and was also an intriguer and ‘bon viveur’. But more importantly, he was viewed as being the man of Vasilije Trbic´ and Jovan Aleksic´. For around Aleksic´, there was an alleged group of

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‘ours’ and ‘locals’ (nasˇinci and tukasˇnji), who in the Ban’s words, were against everyone born north of Vranje.92 Krasojevic´ was to be dismissed because he had engaged himself too much for the interests of the Banovina and the local population, and too little for the Serbian national cause. These machinations by the Ban reveal how little he felt himself to be responsible for the Banovina, of which he was the head. The financial woes of the Banovina were also exacerbated by the inefficiencies of the tax collection system. For example, the head of finance found out that often the money supposed to be paid to be released from compulsory labour was never collected by the communities or the revenues were applied to their own local needs. Just the city of Skopje on its own owed the Banovina several million dinars for this reason. The deputy Ban demanded a report from city president Josif Mihailovic´ within 24 hours and collection of the money within a month, ‘if necessary by using executive means’.93 The city countered that many taxpayers had received inflated assessments and had disputed them, which had resulted in delays.94 In addition, the city lacked sufficient personnel for this work.95 In the 1930s the Banovina never succeeded in collecting as much income as it had budgeted for: Especially the revenues from the Banovina’s direct taxes (banovinski prirezi), which were collected by the state, and from the sales tax (trosˇarina) remained well below expectations.96 From 1936 to 1937, the situation improved, once the state started delivering those taxes collected by the Finance Ministry, in accordance with the budget calculations.97 By 1939 the yearly allocation had dwindled to just 4 million dinars. At this time the Banovina had already been trying for four years to be categorised as passive, in order to receive increased subsidies.98 Table 3.2

Yearly Amounts Budgeted (Dinars) and Realised

Year

Budgeted

1930 –1 1931 –2 1932 –3 1933 –4 1934 –5 1935 –6 1936 –7 1937 –8 1938 –9 1939 –0

79,489,811 74,783,494 53,919,292 38,404,069 38,110,925 35,400,000 40,517,454 54,459,356 54,046,760 55,680,500

Realised 58,201,518 38,807,084 33,116,418 26,622,777 30,645,553 23,556,434 32,861,377 46,799,021 48,973,317 8,084,558 (1.4. –31.7.1939)

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Table 3.3 Distribution of the Allocations among the Respective Banovinas Banovinas Drava Littoral Morava Drina Zeta Vrbas Sava Danube Vardar

Millions of Dinars 2.90 17.73 9.00 15.00 21.79 15.90 6.80 6.00 4.00

The distribution of the allocations among the respective Banovinas looked like this at the end of the 1930s:99 Apart from the small and well-placed Drava Banovina, the Vardar Banovina received by far the least funds. In view of its size and economic weakness, in this way it was being crassly disadvantaged. This doubtless reflected the fact that it was scarcely represented at all in the decisive political institutions at the state level. Since it was equally poorly represented in the financial committees, the acute shortage of money was also not relieved by the granting of loans. In the budget debate on 22 March 1934, the representative Spiro Hadzˇi Ristic´ expressed gross dissatisfaction with the credit policy of various state financial institutions: the Mortgage Bank, Agrarian Bank, Postal Savings Bank, and especially the National Bank, which strongly discriminated against the South.100 Indeed, frustration was considerable with this credit policy that was viewed as unfair, as without favourable state loans the residents of the Vardar Banovina were compelled to borrow money at usurious interest rates from private sources. The Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Skopje asked the National Bank to support the businessmen of the Banovina with credits. According to the Secretary of the Chamber, only businesses that had not gone bankrupt due to the world economic crisis remained, which had survived thanks to the great efforts of the owners, who in addition ‘often, together with their families, just [lived] from bread and salt’.101 On top of this, when loans were granted in Macedonia, Serbs were usually given priority. According to the report by an unknown Bulgarian diplomatic correspondent in 1927, 48 per cent of the loans issued by the branch of the Yugoslav National Bank in Veles went to Serbian merchants.102 Of the 23.78 billion dinars in credits, which the National Bank issued throughout the country between 1922 and 1929, Macedonia received

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925 million or 3.8 per cent, while 49.5 per cent or 11.84 billion flowed to Serbia – of that more than 10 billion to the capital Belgrade! From a credit of over 1.787 billion, which was approved in 1929, Serbia received 793 million103 or 44 per cent. For this state of affairs, it was certainly not unimportant that during the entire interwar period the four above-named state banks were all under Serbian chairmanship. Only the Postal Savings Bank had a Croatian president from September 1939 until April 1941.104 The north-western regions of the country were, however, not dependent to the same extent on the state banks as was the case in the South, as in Ljubljana and Zagreb there were private financial institutions that had considerable means at their disposal.105 The structural character of the financial problems in the Vardar Banovina is made clear by a comparison of the capitals of the respective Banovinas, which was made by the city council in Skopje in 1935. In 1932 Skopje had 68,616 inhabitants and a budget of 23 million dinars, of which 3 million was income from city-owned companies. Per inhabitant the city had 338 dinars at its disposal. Slightly poorer than Skopje was only the Montenegrin capital Cetinje with 333 dinars per head. In Banja Luka it was 495 and in Sarajevo 419 dinars. A completely different dimension prevailed in Zagreb, which for its 185,581 inhabitants had an income of 252.3 million dinars, of which 110.9 million came from the city-owned companies. The city could spend 1,311 dinars for each resident. Ljubljana, with 59,765 inhabitants was a similar size to Skopje, and it received revenues of almost 79 million dinars, almost half of which came from its own companies. Its expenditures ran to 95.036 million or 1,590 dinars per head.106 The low rate of investment in Skopje is reflected in the extent of indebtedness. The city had by far the lowest amount of debt per inhabitant, namely 181 dinars. It was followed by Cetinje with 223 dinars, while the former Hapsburg cities also represented a different world in this respect: Ljubljana had 2,771 dinars of debt per inhabitant, Zagreb 1,124, and Split 1,572. It is notable that the small Serbian town of Nisˇ (35,465 inhabitants) had managed to pile up 1,313 dinars of debt per inhabitant by 1933107 and had thereby become strongly developed. In Macedonia, at all levels, in the communal authorities as well as in the Banovina, there was a great fear of taking on debt, as in view of the poverty of the population servicing the interest was seen as too great a burden.108 And this closed the vicious circle, which this region could not escape from without external help. But it clearly could not even rely upon such help even in the event of a catastrophe. In December 1935 flooding caused a large amount of damage, estimated at a cost of 8.2 million dinars, and which primarily affected the road network.

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Skopje turned to the state with an appeal for aid, to which Belgrade responded only by approving 1 million for repairs to the roads, which were in any case their responsibility.109 The idea that the public purse could be financed with revenue from staterun companies and that even a large part of the budget could be covered in this manner, took quite some time to become recognised in Macedonia. A town council member in Bitola wrote an article in 1935, which publicised this possibility by comparing his own town with Maribor in Slovenia. Maribor with 33,739 inhabitants had a budget of almost 46 million dinars in 1935, while Bitola was of a similar size, but only had just 7 million at its disposal. Almost half of the revenue produced in Maribor (22 million) came from the public utilities (electricity generation, water works, gas lighting, etc.). The sales tax was the most important revenue source in Bitola producing 3.2 million, while in Maribor it also raised 3 million, but this represented only a marginal element in the town’s overall budget there.110 Skopje tried to take this path and create a revenue source by establishing its own energy supply. While the construction of a power plant was successful, another project – the slaughter and refrigeration house – was not completed. Lack of capital and resistance within the city itself were primarily responsible for this failure.

The 100-Million-Dinar Loan That Macedonia scarcely benefited from the billons in loans issued in the second half of the 1930s, which were designed to help the economically weak regions, is shown by the Vardar Banovina’s plans to initiate important investment projects itself on the basis of a large loan. The Drina Banovina served as the model, as it had solved some of its most urgent problems with an investment of 35 million dinars. In July 1939, the Ban Hajdukveljkovic´ addressed a proposal to the prime minister which included a series of measures for developing the Vardar Banovina and required 1.6 billion dinars in support. The list of projects reveals the great needs of the Banovina and demonstrates also that since 1918 scarcely any of the major problems had been solved (see Table 3.4). Yet from the start it was clear that it was impossible to obtain a loan of this magnitude. Therefore, the plan was initially to get a loan of at least 100 million dinars in order to make a start on the most important tasks.111 The driving force behind this project was Jovan Altiparmakovic´ from Bitola, who was the Postal Minister at this time. He saw the main priorities in the health sector, the drinking water supply, road construction, and also in promoting agriculture.112

150 Table 3.4

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO List of Projects for Banovina: Budget and Purpose

Millions in Dinars 14 9 290 140 110 350 250 45 20

Purpose 5 new vocational schools 4 agricultural and 2 cattle-breeding schools, 21 tree nurseries and 1 viniculture school Regulation of 28 rivers Melioration of 24 plains, which would open up 62,000 hectares of land for use schools (without high schools) 1,753 kilometres of existing roads to be made useable by improvements 500 kilometres of new roads 9 hospitals and 110 health clinics (above all, to combat malaria and tuberculosis) 464 communities to be supplied with healthy drinking water

In mid July 1939, the Ban organised a meeting on this matter in the Banovina Administration, inviting representatives of all the interested offices.113 His successor, Aleksandar Andrejevic´, requested on 17 October 1939, that all members of the Banovina Council and a number of other institutions present written reports giving their assessment of the plan.114 The consensus in favour of getting the loan was very strong, despite the uncertain political situation in Europe. Several members of the Banovina Council, who had consulted with local authorities and ‘respected citizens’, noted that their agreement to the loan represented the opinion of the population in their district (srez). The institutions and associations that were asked also supported the project almost without exception. The 13 members of the 73-person council, who opposed the loan, were of the opinion that given the poverty of the population, one could not place any further burdens on them. They pointed out that not even the existing taxes could be collected in full.115 The Chamber of Industry and Commerce therefore suggested that instead of a direct tax, servicing of the debt should be covered by raising a sales tax on spirits and wine, which previously had been taxed only on that part sold in pubs and restaurants. It also suggested building a slaughter and refrigeration house, as it was not sure that the city of Skopje would actually build one. The Chamber also took advantage of this opportunity to criticise the state once again. It did approve of the loan, but at the same time it complained that the Banovina was forced to take up loans for public projects, which the state was really supposed to carry out.116 The chairman of the Carriage-Drivers’ Association in the city and district of Skopje – who incidentally also expressed gratitude that for the first time in the Banovina the

ECONOMY AND FINANCES Table 3.5

Redefined Scale of the Banovina’s Needs

Millions of Dinars

Purpose

4.5 15.0 2.5 2.0 35.0 10.0 10.0 17.0 3.0 2.0 43.0 6.0 15.0 10.0 8.0 37.0 6.0

151

Buildings for around 12 district (srez) administrations, as many communities could not finance these themselves Slaughter and refrigeration house Introduction of American Vines Agricultural courses River corrections Reforestation Construction of primary schools Construction of high schools in Prilep, Strumica, Bitola, Sˇtip, Skopje Construction of citizen’s schools in Kavadarci, Kocˇani, Debar, Resen Construction of a domestic science school in a place to be determined Improvement of the transport routes Hydrotechnical works Draining of marshes, water irrigation projects Water supplies to the villages Modern hotel in Ohrid121 Health system Vocational schools122

opinion of the small and middling people was being sought on such an important matter – expressed a widely held conviction among the population that the Vardar Banovina had hitherto always been disadvantaged, whether it was with regard to reparations or the issuing of loans.117 According to Altiparmakovic´, the conclusion of the loan ran into obstacles, but the Banovina Committee of the government party JRZ was instructed to put this question on the agenda once again.118 This setback should be seen in the context that after the reorganisation of the government in the wake of the Agreement with the Croats in August 1939, once again there were no ministers from Macedonia sitting in the government, who could promote the project and now in any case the government had set other priorities – in favour of Croatia. Clearly the implementation of the loan was seriously put in doubt, as the Ban considered raising the loan abroad, if necessary.119 In the session of the Banovina Council on 11 March 1940, all 65 council members present spoke in favour of the loan, which prompted the Ban to request in a letter to Prime Minister Cvetkovic´, that he work within the government for approval of the loan.120 The redefined scale of the Banovina’s needs, as put forward by the various departments, was presented by the Ban in this session as follows:

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Figure 3.1 Ohrid (Hielscher, Jugoslavien, p. 171). What strikes the eye, as in all photographs of the countryside during the interwar period, are the deforested mountains.

The list shows that the Banovina had finally decided to tackle the most important problems that had accumulated. Forty million was budgeted for education, 37 million for the health system, 43 million for transport routes, and 66 million for reclaiming agricultural land and protection against erosion. Adding up the positions reveals that the reported needs would still have required more than double the amount of the loan. On 12 September 1940, the administrative council of the State Mortgage Bank decided to grant a long-term loan of 100 million dinars at an interest rate of 7 per cent. The Banovina, however, did receive some support, as the state took on the annuities for 80 per cent of the loan,123 while for the remaining 20 million, the Banovina was supposed to pay the debt servicing using income from the planned slaughterhouse.124 On 2 October 1940, the corresponding contract was signed between the State Mortgage Bank on the one side, and the kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Vardar Banovina on the other.125 On 5 February 1941, the Belgrade newspaper Politika was able to inform its readers in detail about the how the money would be spent and report that the Banovina Administration had already received 20 million dinars and the work had already started. The next and subsequent instalments each of 40 million were to be transferred on 1 April of this and the following year.

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The plans for almost all of the work were complete, such that implementation could begin, as soon as the loans were received.126 It is striking that the successful closing of the loan coincided with the plans for the establishment of an administrative unit of ‘Serbian Lands’.127 The loan was intended to develop ‘South Serbia’ economically and win over its population, as an important element that would strengthen Serbia’s position against the north-western parts of the country. However, on 6 April 1941, the war started with the German attack on Yugoslavia.

Investments and Development? The first senior officials appointed in Macedonia as heads of administrative units soon recognised the need for state intervention, in order to develop economically those territories newly won in the Balkan Wars and to integrate them within the state. The prefect in Tikvesˇ, Vojislav Banovic´, in his report of 9 November 1921 to the Interior Ministry, demanded that the water purification department urgently take care of every place in which there was no healthy drinking water. In order to relieve the shortage of officials, he recommended a ‘colonial’ policy, which meant that only those officials who had previously served three years in the southern parts of the country could serve in places with more than 20,000 inhabitants. Furthermore, the state should build apartments for the civil servants, as well as hotels with ceremonial halls, and provide the possibility for unmarried officials to get a good meal.128 He recommended to the Interior Ministry that Strumica and Dojran needed to be connected by rail, thereby orienting these territories toward the north, so that they no longer came under the sway of the propaganda spread from the south and the east. In addition, the construction of buildings for courts, the police, customs, military, postal services, and telegraph offices should be started without delay, ‘as among the people word spread that we would only be staying temporarily and for this reason we were also doing nothing to construct buildings, and therefore they were waiting for something and also did not want to build anything themselves’.129 However, the Interior Ministry was told by the Building Ministry that nothing could be done for the construction of public buildings in new Serbia until the country had been divided up into new administrative units (oblasti)130 – that is, he was confronted by an overweening bureaucracy that was concerned primarily with its own affairs. The prefect of the Bregalnica oblast in east Macedonia criticised the neglect of his territory in every respect (school system, transport, industry, agriculture, cattle-raising and forestry). In his opinion, precisely this border region should be viewed as precious for the state.131 A sharp analysis of the

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mistakes made in ‘South Serbia’ – and at the same time a criticism of the obsession with the Croat question – could also be read in the Belgrade newspaper Vreme on 19 October 1923: From the start, we should have thrown our entire effort, all of our idealism, and our creative spirit into these territories. But unfortunately our attention and valuable hours were taken up elsewhere. We fought against Croatian and Slovenian windmills and waited breathlessly to see if Radic´ was coming or not, whether this or that current would succeed. In this period we lost valuable hours in our South, declaring our love and beating our breasts due to the sacrifices made, but not undertaking anything that could let the people there sense that in us they had really had found the right brothers. One can say that in the first four years absolutely nothing was done, other than permitting the parties wheeling and dealing [ partizanstvo ] to get out of hand to the point of madness . . . What could this pitiable people think of us and our frequently expressed love? What conclusions were the people to draw, who believed, after their inhuman life during the Turkish period, that liberation would at least mean security of person and property, but did not experience this at all! In the view of the paper, the South needed actions and not words. The people there must receive something visible. Until now, in four years not a single road had been improved, not a school had been built, and that which existed already was left to its fate.132 A short time later, the newspaper ploughed again in the same furrow. Only when ‘South Serbia’ was doing well, could one allow oneself to indulge in splitting hairs ‘with the confusing mysticism of Radic´ and the mercenary calculating Jesuitism of Korosˇec’. And if among these western competitors there was even a spark of interest for anything outside their inner circle, they would also recognise the historical necessity of looking after ‘South Serbia’. For the central axis of Morava–Vardar forms the backbone of the state.133 For outsiders the need for development programmes in Macedonia was also more than clear: One cannot help thinking that every penny that the Yugoslav Government spends on development schemes in the Vardar Banovina designed to bring money into the pockets of the peasants, would be money well spent, and that organizations, like the Trepca Mines at Mitrovica, and the Alatini Mines near Skopje, which employ several thousand men, are the very best propaganda that the Government can indulge in.134

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Those circles that wanted to give ‘South Serbia’ priority before the north-west were already fighting a lost battle, however, due to the form of the state’s establishment. Their interests would have served the Greater Serbian option much better. But as things stood, they couldn’t get their policy implemented, due to the way that power was distributed. The conflict with Croatia, which was determined politically and united behind the Peasants’ Party, as well as being comparatively potent economically, dominated domestic political life throughout the entire interwar period. As was demonstrated above, it is not possible to speak of any promotion of the economy in the South. Were there any other kinds of investment? One of the most important fields of activity was the repeatedly demanded draining of the numerous swamps that caused Macedonia to be a malaria-infested region, even at quite high altitude. In certain areas (Kratovo, Kriva Palanka) between 60 and 70 per cent of the population were affected by malaria, in Struga the rate of infection in 1923 was even 80 per cent of the inhabitants. The death rate was very high, especially among infants and small children. In Monospitovo, in the swamps near Strumica, of 151 children born before 1924, only 20 per cent reached the age of 5.135 The British Vice Consul in Skopje, David Footman, commented maliciously in 1927: Distinguished visitors to Skopje are always taken to visit the large and well-equipped Institute of Tropical Diseases, an imposing monument of American generosity.136 But they are never told that no preventive measures are taken against polluted water and mosquito breeding grounds, partly through lack of funds, but chiefly through the absence of any effective machinery for co-operation with other Ministries or with the Municipalities and Communes.137 The report of the Department for Hydrotechnical Works within the Banovina Administration, dated 30 June 1930, contains mostly references to work that had started and declarations of intent, but up to this time not a single large improvement project had been completed.138 Footman reported on 12 March 1928 that the drainage work near Struga, which he had examined two years earlier, was progressing only very slowly.139 Even in Skopje, in the 1929–30 school year, of the one-third of elementary school children who were sick, 42 per cent suffered from malaria.140 In Bitola in 1937, 60 per cent of the garrison was still suffering from this disease.141 The schools and people’s health institutions that were established in the 1920s were essentially financed by the Rockefeller Foundation.142 Of the buildings constructed by the state, most were gendarmerie stations: between 1918 and 1930, 103 of these buildings were constructed in Macedonia at a

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cost of 26.5 million dinars. Only the number of new schools was greater (121), but these were not erected by the state but by the local communities.143 A survey done in 1929 of cultural institutions, revealed by contrast only a very modest number.144 The most progress was made in the 1920s with regard to the drinking water supply. Ninety-four localities in the Banovina received water pipes or wells at a cost of more than 11 million dinars. In another 25 places preparatory work was underway, and studies had been conducted in 50 communities.145 Since much of the work was carried out by the population themselves, in this sector quite a bit could be done at a relatively low financial cost. How inexpensive these works were can be seen from the example of Ohrid. There the water supply, which was installed in 1930, cost around 583,000 dinars,146 about the same as a village school building. Until 1937 a total of 689 structures were built in 411 places for a total cost of 25 million dinars.147 Despite these efforts, however, in 1939 there were still 464 places without access to good drinking water.148 Very little was done with regard to the reforestation of 360,000 hectares of deforested territory, which had been characterised as an urgent task. Between 1918 and 1926, the state did not plant more than 200 hectares of forest, although the cost per hectare was just equivalent to the monthly pay for a gendarme.149 In 1933, the necessity of an investment programme for the South was still relevant and widely understood: ‘Therefore, we MUST have a special

Figure 3.2

The Hygiene Institute in Skopje (Katharina Jovanovits Library, Zurich)

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program for South Serbia with respect to schools, the economy, transport, agriculture, and administration.’150 The insights and convictions of the officials on the spot, who were able to appreciate the needs of the region and of the population, did not make it through to the decision makers. Only when the elections were coming up did the senior politicians make any efforts on behalf of the region, travelling around and made promises. For example, Milan Stojadinovic´ promised in Bitola to regulate the Crna River and to build the railway line from Bitola to Ohrid, and thereby left behind a good impression. ‘But as ever’, the residents of Bitola were suspicious and only wanted to believe it once it was done. According to an anonymous observer, one could win over the population of this whole region, if one really got on with carrying out these infrastructure projects.151 The inhabitants of Bitola did not neglect to remind Stojadinovic´ of his promise by sending a delegation with 13 representatives. They handed him five written demands, the first of which was the regulation of the Crna and the improvement of the Pelagonia Plain. The second concern was the expansion of the high school, so that it could hold all the schoolgirls and schoolboys, and the third was the construction of a further tobacco storehouse, so that the entire harvest of the entire region could be received there and the poor would be given work.152 The suspicions of the residents of Bitola were not for no reason and were more than justified: the railway line from Bitola to Ohrid was never built, and the regulation of the Crna River, planned from 1925,153 was only achieved in 1959, under socialist rule.

Figure 3.3 Zurich)

The People’s Health Home in Prilep (Katharina Jovanovits Library,

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The draining of the marshes was never seriously attempted, as it would have been very expensive. By 1937, still none of the drainage projects had been completed, since 1918 the state had only spent 6.8 million dinars and the Banovina a good half a million on this.154 The representative Jovan Zdravkovic´ from the Morava Banovina sharply criticised the government in 1938 because nothing had been done against malaria in ‘South Serbia’. He went on to criticise the government as throughout the country only the large cities, primarily Belgrade and Zagreb, were being developed, while the villages were being completely neglected.155 The Banovina Council member Todor Nisˇandzˇijevic´ from Kocˇani wrote on 25 October 1939 that in his district malaria had ‘mown down’ 30 per cent of the population.156 While in the 1930s the number of people suffering from malaria could be sharply reduced across the country, this sickness remained a hostage of the Vardar, Littoral and Vrbas Banovinas.157 There were a series of health facilities built,158 but the main source of the trouble, the swamps, were not dealt with. As a result, in 1939 malaria was still endemic in 35 of the 44 districts in ‘South Serbia’, in which between 350,000 and 600,000 people were suffering from the disease.159 For their treatment less than one dinar per patient was available each year.160 The representative Jordan Ac´imovic´, a doctor from Strumica, accused the government of spending much more for the treatment of malaria patients in the Littoral Banovina than in the Vardar Banovina. In ‘South Serbia’ during the summer there several severely sick people in every house, such that nobody could work in the fields. According to Ac´imovic´, the situation was desperate. Before elections it had already been promised a hundred times that the Strumica District would get a hospital. The nearest one was 90 kilometres away, and there was no railway line going there. So there was nothing left for those who were sick, except to lie at home and trust in God. The promised draining of the Monospitovo Swamp was also not carried out.161 Here it should be recalled that the citizens of Strumica had already demanded the draining of this swamp in a letter to the king in 1920. That things could be done differently is shown by the example of Greece, which by 1930 had converted the steppes into arable land and drained the marshes.162 In Vardar Macedonia, the WHO only declared malaria to have been wiped out in 1973, after great efforts by the health authorities and the deployment of considerable financial resources.163 Only in the 1930s were serious development efforts undertaken, for example, in agriculture, which will be examined later. On 3 April 1936, the Banovina received approval of a 20.3-million dinar loan from the 57-million dinar state fund for public works.164 A decision by the Council of Ministers dated 8 October 1938, placed a loan of 50 million dinars at the disposal of the Ministry for Social Policy and People’s Health, designated to provide urgently

ECONOMY AND FINANCES

Figure 3.4

159

Kratovo (Hielscher, Jugoslavien, p. 188)

needed aid to the ‘passive’ regions. This money was intended for conducting public works on non-state roads.165 In 1938, a domestic loan of 4 billion dinars was intended to be used for public works and for solving a series of problems in connection with agriculture. Stojadinovic´ informed members of his party that a good part of this loan would be used in the Vardar Banovina. He also promised the establishment of an ‘Institute for Promoting the Economy of the southern territories’, so that ‘South Serbia’ could make even more progress.166 However, when one examines concrete projects, it turns out the money was all spent somewhere else instead. A proposal made on 12 May 1938, envisaged spending 225 million on improvement and regulation work

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from the above-mentioned loan, as well as 188,318 million from the Improvement Fund. The Banovinas and interest groups were also to make a contribution. In the Vardar Banovina it was planned to spend 56 million, of which 23 million would come from the loan, 24.03 million from the fund, the Banovina would contribute 3.15 million, and 5.655 million would come from interest groups. The largest amount of aid was assigned to the Zeta Banovina (66.624 million), the least to the Danube Banovina (47.82 million). Only in the wealthy Drava Banovina (Slovenia) were the interest groups (6.35 million) and the Banovina (6.35 million) supposed to come up with more funds than in Macedonia.167 Until the end of 1938, 702 hectares had been completely improved in the Vardar Banovina, while in the Sava Banovina it was 488.833 hectares and in the Danube Banovina 744.623 hectares.168 From the funds for public buildings, the lion’s share of 106.875 million was assigned to Belgrade. For agricultural institutions, in contrast, 10 per cent of the construction cost was to be covered.169

Skopje as a Model City On 3 December 1938, shortly before the parliamentary elections, an exhibit opened in the hall of the Officers’ House in Skopje on the third anniversary of the Stojadinovic´ government, which was designed to show the progress made during this time. It was not by chance that the opening remarks were made by Kosta Lukovic´, the head of the Central Press Office – that is the propaganda arm of the government. In his speech he celebrated in detail the achievements of the regime in the fields of industry, agriculture, health (fighting malaria), education and transport: ‘Skopje, the city of the Tsar’,170 has become a modern city with water canalisation, an electricity plant, a Post Office, an imposing railway station, and modern schools. A radio studio, the building for the ‘Museum of South Serbia’, and the monumental construction of the Banovina Palace were all well on their way to completion. Alongside newly cobbled streets, Skopje had also acquired quite a lot of industry.171 In truth, it was primarily the city of Skopje, which experienced rapid development in Macedonia during the interwar period. In the 1920s, there was a boom in private construction, which it was not at all possible for the infrastructure of the city to keep pace with.172 The city administration at that time proceeded without a plan, and all around Skopje everyone could build just how he liked, and there were not even any streets. Only in 1929, following a change in the city government, when the architect specialising in urban planning, Josif Mihailovic´, became mayor, a Macedonian from Tresoncˇe in western Macedonia – a traditional source of master builders – was a start made on planned development.173 In 1930, the city demanded money to the

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tune of 132 million dinars from the government either out of reparations payments or goods of the same value, as well as a loan of 100 million, for its communal projects in the years 1931 – 4. It received certain basic assurances, but was repeatedly kept waiting and constantly had to submit new requests with detailed itemised lists.174 After the Hoover Moratorium in June 1930, however, the source of the reparations payments, on which Skopje had been counting, dried up. In 1936 the State Mortgage Bank granted the city a long-term loan of 36 million dinars, which was used primarily for the construction of a hydroelectric power plant on the River Treska.175 The mayor Mihailovic´ travelled repeatedly to the court and the ministries in Belgrade, in order to accomplish those things that Skopje needed.176 In 1938 the city received a new loan of 15 million dinars,177 and at the end of the year it was possible to prise free some more money. The new mayor Panta Jovanovic´ and his deputy travelled to Belgrade and made their case in several different ministries. Stojadinovic´ received them and reminded them that promoting Skopje and ‘South Serbia’ was one of the points in his plan for the ‘rebirth’ of the country. The Finance Ministry gave its approval for a loan of 5 million dinars for the construction of a customs office. The issue of the freight railway station was also solved to the satisfaction of the city, as the required funds were promised. Skopje also received 6 million dinars from the re-pavement fund for the construction of a bridge in the city centre. The city requested of the Social Ministry that it build workers’ apartments on the left bank of the Vardar River to be paid for with state funds, and offered to provide the land for this. From the Post Minister they demanded the immediate delivery of an automatic telephone switchboard for the city, as the building to house it was already completed. There was some commotion regarding this in the city, as the rumour spread that no automatic telephone switchboard had been bought for Skopje, but one had been for Split, where an appropriate building had not yet even been started. The delegates wrung a promise from the minister to give to Skopje the switchboard that had been bought for Split, as the economy of the city was very interested in the resolution of this issue.178 The approach taken by Skopje and its successes demonstrate that only those people had a chance to be heard in Belgrade, who presented their case relentlessly and self-confidently, and who also had good contacts there. This applied to Josif Mihailovic´, who was popular at court, and also for Panta Jovanovic´, who was in Stojadinovic´’s good books. These relationships would scarcely have been sufficient, however, if it had not also been about the ‘imperial city’ Skopje as a model city of the South, which after the sporazum (Agreement) was intended to be developed as the capital of the planned unified ‘Serbian Lands’.

CHAPTER 4 AGRICULTURE

Agricultural Reform and Colonisation When the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was established, in different parts of the country both large estates and peasant dependency relationships existed. It was a declared goal of the new state to end these and to give the land to those who worked it. On 25 February 1919, the government issued the ‘Preliminary Decrees in Preparation for the Agricultural Reform’ (Prethodne odredbe za pripremu agrarne reforme), which basically envisaged the abolition of dependency relationships as well as the expropriation of the large estate owners and their compensation, which would be guaranteed by the state. The amount and the procedures for this compensation were still to be determined by a subsequent law.1 Implementation was assigned to the Ministry for Agricultural Reform, which was established on 12 February 1920.2 A flood of decrees and regulations, however, made the reform exceedingly complicated, and the provisional solution remained in effect until in 1931, in Macedonia in practical terms until 1933. Ending the dependency relationships did not proceed at the same pace everywhere. In Bosnia-Herzegovina it was already completed in 1921: the Muslim owners of large estates were expropriated and compensated by the state, the land was given to the peasants. For Macedonia, a law was only passed on 5 December 1931, which was supposed to liquidate the dependency relationships.3 It intended to compensate the expropriated landowners with government bonds. On 24 June 1933, however, a new law was passed, which stated that compensation would be in cash, which meant that the Macedonian owners of large estates fared much better than all of the others.4 Of the 501 large estates (‘Chiftliks’) that existed in Macedonia after World War I, the state bought 318; the others were sold by the estate owners themselves. The last 49 estates were only expropriated after World War II.5 The slow pace of the agricultural reform led to considerable uncertainty

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regarding ownership relations and negatively affected the peasants, who remained uncertain as to what now actually belonged to them.6 Colonisation policies can scarcely be separated from the agricultural reform. Immediately after the Balkan Wars, when Vardar Macedonia became a part of the kingdom of Serbia, the idea was proposed to settle colonists in areas that were unpopulated or had been abandoned during the Balkan Wars.7 After World War I, the colonisation project was taken up again and linked to the agricultural reform. On 24 September 1920, the ‘Decree on the Settling of the New Southern Territories’ was issued, which applied to Kosovo as well as Macedonia. Families of colonists from the entire kingdom and optionists8 from abroad received the right to settle in these regions. In principle, local residents could only receive land within their own residential district. Each family of colonists was entitled to at least five hectares of land, which after ten years would become their own property. If the family had several male members over the age of 16, it would receive for each of them, according to their age, a further two to five hectares of land.9 The Nationalist Goals of Colonisation The policy of colonisation was from the start pursued with the intention of achieving certain crucial national-political goals. This becomes clear from the statements by D ¯ ord¯o Krstic´, who was responsible for the implementation of colonisation policy in 1927– 28 as Senior Commissioner for Agriculture. According to his testimony, this programme represented ‘a broadly interpreted cultural and economic task of a national character’. In addition, especially in Kosovo, it was of direct and indirect importance for public security and ‘had proved itself to be an important, and will become, in the case of an intelligent colonisation policy, a still more important factor in the nationalisation and assimilation of these regions’. Other goals included raising hygienic standards in the villages and promoting the development and ‘nationalisation’, that is the Serbianisation, of the towns. It had also to be the aim of a planned colonisation policy according to Krstic´, ‘to change from the ground up the former patriarchal and primitive way of living and working and in this manner to accelerate the total “rebirth” of South Serbia’.10 Krstic´, a judge in the Supreme Court, was appointed Senior Commissioner for Agriculture in May 1927, in order to restore order to the colonisation policy. In 1928, at the conclusion of his term, he described in a book the omissions and mistakes of the initial years in very critical terms. Whilst he viewed colonisation in Kosovo, Metochia and in the area around Skopje as successful, he found it ‘unpleasant’ to speak about colonisation in the rest of ‘South Serbia’. ‘There our incompetence and the influence of irresponsible leaders were most clearly manifested.’11 Colonisation was started hastily and

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unsystematically, as for various reasons speed seemed to be of the essence. On the one hand the demand for land was strong, but on the other, due to the insecure situation in the South it was the intention ‘to scatter there as many as possible of the strongest national elements’. But there was no legal basis for this and also there were no appropriately trained personnel available. In the initial years, the state did not provide any assistance to the colonists rather it was the ‘friends from the war’ who helped out: the American Mission and the English Society of Friends of Serbia, which constructed houses for a small number of settlers and obtained equipment. Most of the colonists, however, remained without support and some of them had to return home.12 In the decree of 24 September 1920, the types of land subject to colonisation were defined for the first time. In this decree and in the ‘Law on the Settlement of the Southern Territories’, of 11 June 1931, the following categories of land were made available for colonisation: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

unused state land; communal land, which exceeded the needs of the community; land, which had been permanently abandoned by its owners; the property of outlaws (odmetnici, which usually meant Komitadjis); land, which under the agricultural reform could be split off from the large estates.13

It is not difficult to recognise that these guidelines sowed the seeds for arbitrariness on the side of the officials and dissatisfaction among the peasants. When were the needs of a community deemed to have been exceeded? Had a property really been abandoned permanently? Who was counted as an outlaw? In order to attract as many colonists as possible into a distant region that was considered unsafe and unattractive, the possibilities and the fertility of the land were strongly exaggerated, either intentionally or from ignorance. The South was portrayed almost as a Garden of Eden. Several representatives in Parliament joined in with this chorus and compared the quality of the land with that in the Vojvodina.14 The newspaper of the Radical Party, Stara Srbija, published in Skopje, lauded ‘South Serbia’ in 1922 with the following words: ‘The richness of this region is inexhaustible. Entire territories have not been worked for centuries.’ The writer Stanislav Krakov blew into the same horn four years later: ‘Almost everywhere in South Serbia the earth produces a double harvest.’15 These descriptions may have been close to the truth with regard to Kosovo, which really had very fertile land and a healthy climate, but for Macedonia this was a complete exaggeration. But even the British ambassador Kennard was surprised on his journey in May 1926 how much fertile land there was in Macedonia.16 Kennard made

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here the same mistake that other observers without specialist knowledge also made: he considered those lands fertile that had, however, serious disadvantages, which at first glance could not be recognised. This was to be the undoing of more than a few colonists. The local population had not left the land unworked for no reason: One needs furthermore to know, that the majority of the land, which comes into question for the colonists, first needs to be cleared, or drained, or irrigated, or supplied with drinking water, or cleared of malaria; frequently it is land of mediocre quality. And on account of these natural deficiencies the land was not settled in recent times. For all these interventions, it would have required considerable financial means, experts, and a systematic approach – none of these things were available in sufficient quantities. This critic disputed, however, that land, which had already been made fertile had been taken away from the local population by the colonists, as was alleged.17 On strategic grounds, the territories close to the border with Bulgaria were especially strongly impacted by colonisation policy. The Army authorities would have liked to place ‘reliable’ families of colonists from the ‘old parts of the country’, that is from Serbia, in every village along the frontier. In the village of Dolani near Sˇtip, 121 families had already been settled by 1920, although land there was already in short supply before. Sixteen settler families and their possessions had arrived in Veles on 30 railway cars, and the military mobilised from among the village population the necessary people and draught animals to transport them the 45 kilometres to Dolani. Colonies were also established along important transport routes and at points, where partisans attacked, that is in some instances also in places that were unsuited for agriculture or where there was insufficient land. The implementation of colonisation was conducted under largely chaotic circumstances, as Kennard also discovered.18 For example, the amount of land available was not clearly established, nor whether it was really unoccupied. The settlement commissions were also entitled to distribute private land, if the owners were offered adequate compensation. This led to abuses, in which land was taken away from the local population and they had to wait years for its replacement and had to fight for it. The Communist newspaper Radnik, published in Belgrade, reported in an article dated 24 May 1924 that in Macedonia the local peasants even had fields they had planted taken away from them and given to colonists.19 On 10 July 1924, the entire communal property of the town of Strumica was made available for colonisation. As there was no land register, the owners could only demonstrate their property rights

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with other documents, for example with tapii, Ottoman ownership documents. It was only on 5 April 1937, that the above-mentioned decision regarding Strumica was reversed, although it had already been recognised as unlawful in 1931.20 As a result, considerable uncertainty prevailed in Strumica regarding property ownership for 13 years. The neighbouring village of Dabilja experienced similar conditions, as its entire land holdings were put into the agricultural reserve on 27 July 1925. Those who submitted an application could provisionally retain their land. Only in 1932 and 1934 did definitive land assignments take place.21 Up to the end of 1923, 2,139 families had already been settled in Macedonia; then colonisation stagnated, and in the following years it almost came to a complete halt, as the state no longer made the necessary funds available.22 In addition, many of the colonists became disillusioned and moved back. An instructive example, which also illustrates starkly the incompetence of the authorities, was the settlement of Nova Batanja in the district of Ovcˇe Pole, which was founded in 1924–5 and had been settled by 163 families of optionists from Hungary. They arrived well-equipped and even brought with them items such as pianos. They liked Ovcˇe Pole at first, as it reminded them of their home on the Hungarian plain. But one bad harvest followed another and despite generous government support, the colonists had to sell their last down blanket, in order to survive. The majority left the colony as a result. In 1928 only 18 families remained, including those settlers who had been sent along later to try to save the decaying colony.23 In 1930 these 18 households only contained 60 people.24 Nova Batanja is a good example of how those who did not know the local conditions could be deceived in their assessment of the land. The land on which the colony was established contained salt. There, where the land might have been fertile, it could not be cultivated due to lack of water for even the ground water contained salt and was unusable. The Ottomans in their time had in part brought water in using aqueducts.25 Slijepcˇevic´ compared the establishment of this colony with the story of peasants, who built a watermill and only then noticed that they had no water. Only a few kilometres away the conditions would have been much better, as Slijepcˇevic´ heard from someone who knew the place. But a parliamentarian had selected the site for the colony and wanted it to be established there.26 According to Krstic´, the failure of the colony in Nova Batanja was a severe setback for their national prestige among the optionists from Hungary.27 What Slijepcˇevic´ only hinted at with regard to Nova Batanja was stated more bluntly by D ¯ ord¯o Krstic´. He saw interference by the (Macedonian) representatives as one of the main problems hindering colonisation. In certain circles they had stirred up support for an end to colonisation, as it would

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allegedly be dangerous to ‘the correct economic development of the local elements’. The representatives for the Bitola District struck Krstic´ as having an especially negative influence, as they opposed colonisation very successfully, even though some of them had previously been ‘national workers’, that is, propagandists for the Serbian cause. For example, they supported the community of Prilep, which resisted the settlement of a few Chetniks there. And he suspected that other colonists had intentionally been given unsuitable land – just as Slijepcˇevic´ had hinted also for Nova Batanja. Krstic´ was convinced that the representatives wanted to be re-elected and therefore aligned themselves with the wishes of the local population. In the elections colonisation was by far the most important issue. The officials on the spot, such as the agricultural officers and their district economists, also showed themselves to be from indifferent to hostile towards colonisation. Clearly negative and obstructive was the attitude of the local mayors, who mostly consisted of locals. The administrative and police authorities also treated the colonists poorly, which according to Krstic´ was not surprising, ‘since our administrative and police personnel in South Serbia up until now, with a few honourable exceptions, have not been the bearers of culture and progress, but have served rather as instruments of brutal repression and for settling party-political scores’. Krstic´ also did not spare the highest responsible offices from his sharp criticism, denouncing their ignorance of conditions in the South, a lack of knowledge that reigned not only among the parties, but also in the state administration. From what he had observed, nobody had seriously concerned himself with the local conditions on the spot. During nine years, 23 ministers had taken turns dealing with agricultural reform, of which only four had visited ‘South Serbia’. The devastating conclusion of the former Senior Commissioner for Agriculture was that in some areas it would have been better to have done nothing in terms of agricultural policy from 1919, ‘as such a chaos was instigated, that scarcely any minister can come to terms with it’. The agricultural reform should have been placed on a sound legal basis and removed from the influence of the political parties. Krstic´ identified as the main problem the deployment of unqualified and very often unreliable officials at all levels. The senior commissioners were frequently not up to the task; not infrequently people were appointed as district commissioners, who had been dismissed from other posts elsewhere. The technical personnel consisted mainly of exiled Russians, whose abilities were very mixed, such that commonly, as shown above, completely unsuitable land was also included within the agricultural reserve. ‘This entire manner of proceeding discredited the reform in the eyes of those who knew the work of the agricultural authorities and undermined completely the authority of the State

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administration in those territories.’28 Krstic´ accused the state of not having taken colonisation seriously enough and of having implemented it without paying sufficient attention to the details. He could not avoid making an unflattering comparison with Greece, which, under much more difficult circumstances, had settled 116,842 Greek families from Turkey with 459,964 members within just two years and built 40,973 houses for them (while 50,368 houses had been taken over from the Turks that had left).29 There were far more colonies in Kosovo than in Macedonia and they were comparatively successful, as the land there was of an excellent quality, the climate was favourable, and sufficient water was available.30 The goal of increasing the Serbian proportion of the population, however, was a clear failure. As the Serbian Cultural Club regrettably had to note, the proportion actually declined slightly from 49.5 per cent in 1921 to 49.3 per cent in 1936.31 According to Krstic´, the assimilation of the Albanians in Kosovo and Metochia, an important aim of colonisation, was supposed to be conducted through the settlers. In Macedonia, on the other hand, the state administration had to take on this task, as the number of colonists was too small. In addition, there were also differences in mentality that obstructed progress, which Krstic´ formulated as follows: ‘The Macedonian is egotistical, miserly, distrustful, and very conservative. Our settler, in contrast, spends a lot, is social, open, trusting, and liberal. It is not a surprise that two such diametrically opposed natures with different moral characteristics don’t agree immediately.’ It would have been most suitable to have settled Serbs, in order to assimilate the Macedonians completely. Therefore, Krstic´ criticised it as a big mistake that Montenegrins were settled, who were not even proper peasants.32 In this respect, however, Krstic´’s criticism was misplaced. Of the 2,870 families of colonists that received land in Macedonia up until the end of 1929, the largest group consisted of Serbs (1,036), while only 220 and 133 families respectively came from the poor regions of Dalmatia and Montenegro, which suffered from a shortage of land. Many more Macedonian families, namely 6,203, had received grants of land, although much smaller ones than those going to the colonists.33 In view of the disorganisation and confusion that accompanied the poorly implemented settlement programme, it is not surprising that the local population was hostile to both colonisation and the colonists.34 At best, the colonists remained isolated islands which had no contacts with their surroundings. Frequently, however, conflicts arose. Krstic´ admitted that the locals were convinced that the settlers enjoyed certain privileges. But in his opinion there was no basis for this.35 The report of the agricultural commission (agrarno poverenstvo) in Strumica to the senior commission in Skopje on 1 May 1936, highlights certain points of

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conflict. In part, the settlers had made claims for families of 10 to 15 members and had received correspondingly large tracts of land, which they also retained, even when only one or two people actually arrived. That part of the land, which they were unable to work themselves, was then leased by the new owners to locals at a high price. The latter expressed their bitterness, for example, by destroying the fruit trees before they were handed over to the new settlers.36 A peasant from the vicinity of Strumica commented: ‘It is difficult to see the colonists receiving complete allocations, while the locals in Ilovica have only received 40 percent.’ In contrast to the colonists, he had also not received any grazing land. ‘I have lost my trust in the State of Yugoslavia, which does not treat us equally compared to the other citizens from within the old borders.’37 In spring 1936, the head of the community (kmet) in Strumica harshly criticised the work of the ‘Agrar’, condemned the distribution of land to those coming in from outside and threatened that with the help of a friend he would take the land away from them and distribute it to local people.38 In Lisicˇe near Skopje, a large riot broke out in 1936, when colonists arrived accompanied by the Serbian authorities to take possession of the vegetable gardens and the village meadow. The whole village assembled armed with pitch forks and shovels and fought a pitched battle against the advancing settlers. In 1940, almost four years later, the trial that resulted from this incident was still going on.39 The colonists for their part had it anything but easy. Their new surroundings did not welcome them and viewed them as uninvited invaders, who were favoured by the state. Despite the support they received the living conditions were also difficult for them. They suffered especially badly from malaria, particularly the children. In Monospitovo near Strumica, in one year 40 out of 73 new-born infants died. From Valandovo that was located close by, out of 150 families of colonists, all but ten moved away, as due to malaria in some families their numbers had dwindled to around half. Infant mortality among the colonists was 50 per cent, because in assigning the settlements no attention had been paid to where people came from and whether they were accustomed to the living conditions.40 Stanislav Krakov, a writer, wrote in 1926 about the Kadrifakovo Colony in Ovcˇe Pole, that the colonists had been waiting for four years for better days. Not a single tree had grown in front of the houses, the cattle were wasting away, and in this year the drought had destroyed everything. The colonists, who had come from the Lika region – the barren Dalmatian back lands – were starving.41 The settlement in Kadrifakovo suffered, as already has been mentioned before, a particularly tragic fate, as on 16 January 1923, it fell victim to an attack. A group of Komitadjis killed 23 colonists for alleged usurpation of property from the locals and set the village ablaze. Of 52 families living there at the time, only 19 remained in the village and the others fled.42

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Until the end of October 1940, a total of 153,163 hectares of land were reserved for the purposes of agricultural reform in Macedonia. Of these 33,823 hectares went to 4,129 families of colonists, while 52,121 hectares were distributed or redistributed among 18,266 local families; 28,070 hectares went to the villages for communal grazing and 32,033 hectares remained undistributed.43 Overall the number of colonists that were settled was relatively small. They also received considerably less land than was distributed to local families. However, it is not possible to say precisely how much additional land local families actually received, as those peasants were also counted as ‘beneficiaries’ of colonisation, who only received land as compensation for that which the agricultural commission had previously taken away to distribute among the colonists.44 Nonetheless, it seems that the significance assigned to colonisation in Macedonian historiography – for example, by Apostolov and Katardzˇiev – as an ‘instrument of denationalisation’ is exaggerated. In his book, Apostolov gives the impression that local families scarcely received anything from the land distribution. Only in the appendix can one find the above-cited figures, which show that this was not the case. The declared goal of ‘nationalizing and assimilating’ the population was not achieved at all. The colonists remained few in number and lived as isolated outsiders in an environment, which did not welcome their presence. It can be counted as a success for the resistance that Macedonian politicians, officials and peasants, mounted against the colonists that the government did not succeed in settling a much larger number of them. Yet even the attempt at colonisation and the manner in which it was implemented made people bitter. The local population certainly did not consider that there was surplus land in Macedonia, which could be distributed to outsiders. Statistics confirm that this conviction was not mistaken: according to the 1931 census, in Macedonia 40.7 per cent of the farms possessed less than two hectares of land, 22 per cent even less than one hectare.45 Therefore, it appeared to the locals completely unfair that newly arrived families received more land than they had themselves, that they could use the railway for their transfer for free, that they in part received houses built for them, and that they were exempted from taxation for a certain period (initially for three years, later for five years).46 The greatest bitterness was felt by those who had to surrender their own land to the colonists and did not know what they would receive to replace it, or even whether they would ever get any compensation at all. The Economic Aims of Colonisation Next to the national goals, which took precedence, economic intentions were also being pursued through colonisation. A small part of the settlers came

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from comparatively progressive regions (optionists from Hungary and from the Julian Alps, and peasants from Slovenia). In addition, the colonists received material support from the state and from various charities, so they could buy better equipment, good seeds superior livestock breeds, fertilisers and other chemical aids. There were also doctors, agricultural engineers, and other trained people among the colonists.47 The hope was that these settlers with their – so it was believed – progressive, exemplary farms, would serve as role models and thereby accelerate development in the region overall. In 1937, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the ‘liberation of our South’, the Belgrade newspaper Vreme stressed in an article the outstanding role, which the ‘national’ interest had played in colonisation, and celebrated the ‘outstanding results’, which had been attained. This was mainly the achievement of the colonists, thanks to ‘our well-known racial stamina, hardiness, ambition, and above all, our developed sense of national consciousness’. All of ‘South Serbia’ had by now been exposed to the progressive farms of the colonists, which had been established across the region rationally and according to plan. Apparently without being conscious of contradicting himself, the author stressed at the same time that the majority of the colonists were poor and came from ‘passive’ regions.48 The locals assessed the success somewhat differently from the propagandists in Belgrade. At the end of 1939, the Association of Merchants of the City and District of Skopje concluded in a report written for the attention of the Ban, that colonisation brought no advantages and in no way promoted the modernisation of production methods, as the colonists frequently had no understanding of agriculture and merely traded in the allotted land. The association insisted that in future when swamps were drained (e.g., near Bitola), the land reclaimed must be distributed to the local population, for example, to people who had left in search of work, who had dreamed for centuries of having fertile land in the plain.49 In 1937, a critic expressed similar ideas: And now a paradox. While peasants from our old-Serbian and Macedonian village have to look for work far away, because they have no land and therefore cannot remain in the village, colonists are being brought into the same regions. Instead of giving the peasants a chance of finding work on his own fields, the little land that had become available thanks to the agricultural reform was being given to settlers.50 Colonisation might perhaps have brought urgently needed impulses to agriculture, if it had been combined with qualitative improvements and land reclamation efforts through drainage, irrigation and river regulation. As has

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already been shown, however, such cost-intensive projects were not implemented. The way colonisation was conducted in Macedonia resulted only in a redistribution of land. Therefore it comes as no surprise that no modernisation impulse from ‘progressive’ colonists resulted; at most in a few isolated spots, there may have been some movement in this direction. Most of the settlers came rather from less developed regions themselves, many were inexperienced as farmers.51 But those who arrived equipped with pianos and down blankets came from such an alien environment, that they could scarcely serve as role models and were unable to cope with the harsh realities of their new home. Productive economic activity was not possible without monetary investment and without the support of higher offices. The use of better ploughs together necessarily with stronger draught animals, and the planting of more productive crop varieties, lay outside the realm of possibility for an individual peasant family. These were changes that had to be conducted in an organised manner and required as prerequisites a certain financial basis, as well as education. The agricultural reform and colonisation also produced terrible confusion with regard to property rights, which became a very serious problem that lasted for more than ten years, making it impossible for many peasants to farm normally, as – together with the lack of a land register – it precluded them from receiving state loans. If the Macedonian peasant, in comparison to his neighbour from the Banat, who ploughed using six horses and an iron plough, still harnessed his cows to a wooden plough, it had little to do with a conservative attitude, but much to do with poverty.

Crops and Agricultural Problems In interwar Yugoslavia three-quarters of all those working were engaged in agriculture, which made this by far the most important branch of the economy, as was the case throughout south-east Europe. Only in Slovenia was the proportion significantly less, but it still stood at 60.6 per cent.52 Yugoslavia suffered even more than its neighbours from agricultural overpopulation, which was aggravated by another severe problem, the shortage of capital: so many people had to be fed from the land that there was nothing left for investment, which might have improved productivity.53 In addition, most of the farms were very small. At the beginning of the 1920s, 67 per cent of the peasant farms in the Kingdom SHS had less than five hectares of land.54 According to European standards, this was not sufficient to survive, as it did not produce any surplus for the market, tied up labour with unproductive work and thereby hindered the accumulation of wealth. Their owners did not participate in the market, either as producers or as consumers.

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The small size of properties guaranteed social peace, but at the same time consolidated the backward methods of production.55 Agriculture here was simply not in a position to modernise itself from its own resources. The low level of development in industry, however, meant that the state nevertheless financed itself primarily from agriculture, the productivity of which had sunk further due to the dissolution of large estates and their fragmentation into small farms by the agricultural reform. Tomasevich calculated that in 1931– 2 the peasants had to hand over around 40 to 50 per cent of their cash income to the state.56 What they received in return was more than modest. Investment in agriculture continued to be neglected, while most of the income was spent on the Army, the excessive bureaucracy, and state-run industry. But without agricultural modernisation, in the long term no successful industrialisation is possible. Modernisation of a traditional small-farm economy is a long-term task, which has to be achieved in many steps, for example, by spreading knowledge about agriculture, promoting cooperatives, making available cheap loans, measures for the reallocation and consolidation of agricultural land holdings as well as for irrigation and drainage, etc. Only by first raising productivity in agriculture could purchasing power be increased and agricultural raw materials produced for industry and for export.57 But politicians sought quick successes, as otherwise they would not remain in office long enough to implement long-term strategies. This applied especially in interwar Yugoslavia, where countless governments replaced each other in quick succession and where a minister hardly ever remained in office for more than a year. From the end of World War I, the agricultural countries of south-east Europe were already feeling the powerful competition from the efficient grain producers in the USA, Canada, Australia and Argentina. Nonetheless, immediately after the war prices for agricultural products were high and the British embassy could comment that in 1924 the ‘majority’ of the peasants in Yugoslavia ‘lived well’.58 But by 1926 the agricultural crisis had already started. The excess of supply on the world market caused prices to fall by 60 per cent. The deflationary policies of the state caused the peasants to become indebted to private financial institutions, which demanded interest rates of 60 per cent and more. In 1933– 4, agricultural prices reached rock bottom at more than 40 per cent below the level in 1926. At the start of the 1930s the general economic crisis intensified the problem of agricultural overpopulation even more.59 This cyclical crisis dramatically aggravated the structural problems of Yugoslav agriculture. While between 1929 and 1934 export prices declined by 48 per cent, import prices declined by only 25 per cent.60 Therefore, most modernisation plans had to be abandoned due to lack

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Figure 4.1

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Peasants from the Vicinity of Bitola (Mazedonien, p. 90)

of money. For example, the import of agricultural machines and artificial fertiliser stopped completely. The high level of state indebtedness meant that more than one-fifth of state expenditures went to servicing the debt. Only in the summer of 1933 did Yugoslavia declare its insolvency and achieved a moratorium on the payment of its foreign debts. The Great Depression also meant that economic factors started to influence foreign policy to an ever greater extent. Germany, which was a large potential market for raw materials and agricultural products from Yugoslavia, increasingly gained in influence, while the significance of France declined.61

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The climate and soil conditions in Macedonia were conducive for a wide variety of agricultural products – grains, fruit, vegetables, tobacco, poppy seeds, rice, cotton, peanuts – which in some cases could not be grown anywhere else in the country. This prompted many superficial observers during the interwar period to become euphoric and assume that the region was a veritable garden of paradise. Especially in the reports by correspondents of the Central Press Office in Skopje, these kinds of exaggerated statements were customary. In an undated piece on the Macedonian question from the second half of the 1930s, in a revealing subordinate clause, for once the truth was told. It concerns the Bulgarian claims to Macedonia: Even though the Bulgarian peasant knew that Macedonia is stony, infertile, infested with malaria, and poor, that a large Muslim mass of Turks and Albanians are also present there . . . he was enthusiastic about this Macedonia up until he occupied it and saw it with his own eyes62 Another popular view of the Macedonian peasant was a romanticising one, which extolled the picturesque aspect of the villages, the famous local dress, the interesting customs, and the well-ordered, morally elevated patriarchal society, stressing in part the exotic special products, but ignoring the poverty and material need.63 This approach to peasant life was, however, not unusual at this time. Also the Croat Peasants’ Party clung to an idealised and outmoded image of the peasant and lacked any concept for contemporary life on the land and modern modes of production. The fact was that agriculture in Macedonia had to cope with considerable disadvantages, which need to be taken carefully into consideration: there were prolonged periods of drought, many deforested areas, soil erosion, as well as extensive swamplands. In many places the ground was such that it could not store water for long. In 1922, out of the 26,776 square kilometres in Macedonia, only 5,030 (18.24 per cent) were productive. But even there productivity was low, for grain it was only about half the level in France.64 An additional factor, which had an impact on the low quality of the products, was the lack of knowledge among the population. If they had known how to, for example, the cattle farmers could have produced better and more desirable types of cheese and other milk products without much extra effort. The hides and wool also could have done with better preparation for the needs of the market. The vegetable-growers were very far from rational production.65 Scarcely any commentators omitted to mention the ‘primitive’ production methods. In 1925, in Vardar Macedonia 61,059 wooden ploughs were counted against only 31,583 iron ploughs and these were also distributed unevenly. While in the Bitola District (oblast) somewhat fewer wooden than iron ploughs were used

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(20,940: 21,495), the relationship in eastern Macedonian Bregalnica (12,750: 1,294) and in the Skopje district (27,379: 8,794) was completely different. In many places the puny draught animals were in no condition to pull iron ploughs. Agricultural machines were not in use, just as people also had no idea how to optimise the seeds planted.66 Threshing was done ‘in the old Roman way’ – as noted by the Swiss commentator Rudolph A. Reiss.67 Agriculture in eastern Macedonia suffered until the dissolution of the IMRO in 1934 from the frequent requisition of the men for days on end to chase after the partisans.68 The severe structural problem throughout Yugoslavia of the small size of the farms was especially critical in Macedonia: there they were tiny. Half of the peasant families had at most two hectares of land and therefore were not even able to feed themselves.69 Not least among the causes of this situation was the division of land, which resulted also in the small property holdings being split up in various places, so that much time was expended getting from one parcel of land to another. Greece was initially a very good export market for agricultural products from Vardar Macedonia. From 1925, however, the competition from overseas became noticeable, as they started to export grain there. Cattle and plant products for industry could still be exported well to the southern neighbours up until 1928. From 1929 the export of cattle began to suffer from Turkish competition, which was transported by ship and therefore could be sold at cheaper prices.70 The Great Depression also had a big impact on Macedonian agriculture. Here it was primarily the fall in prices for tobacco and raw opium

Figure 4.2 Peasant Family from the Village of Babino: Krste with his Sons Tanas and Nikola, and their Families, c.1929 (Photograph in the possession of the author)

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that were significant. The peasants also suffered because local craftsmen, protected by customs barriers, could still sell their wares at almost the same price as before the crisis, while the purchasing power of the peasants declined steeply.71 Only in 1935 did a slow recovery set in. The wide range of, in part, very valuable agricultural products, was repeatedly stressed as having potential. But this could never be adequately exploited. The Secretary of the Skopje Chamber of Industry and Commerce, Vid D ¯ urd¯evic´, complained in his report from January 1929, that the peasants in ‘South Serbia’, despite hard work and favourable natural conditions, produced much less than others elsewhere. He blamed this essentially on five circumstances: primitive growing methods, expensive middlemen in the opium business, inadequate transport routes, unregulated trade relations with the neighbouring states, and the ‘negative tobacco policy’ of the State Monopoly Administration.72 The most important products, tobacco and raw opium, will be dealt with in their own sections. Another example is rice which, like all the others, was cultivated and processed using the simplest methods, which led to low productivity. From one hectare only 1,200 kilograms were harvested, while in Asia it was 2,500, in North America 2,260, and in Italy, depending on the quality of the land, as much as 3,000– 6,000 kilograms. Macedonian economists were convinced that by optimising cultivation, the Vardar Banovina could not only supply the whole country with rice but also produce surpluses for export.73 The rice-growing area was doubled between 1931 and 1936, but this only meant an increase to 3,032 hectares.74 In 1937, Yugoslavia was still importing rice from Italy every year valued between 60 and 80 million dinars.75 Until the collapse of the opium poppy branch at the beginning of the 1930s, mainly poppy seeds were produced in the way of oil-bearing fruits. The economist Robe pointed out that rape-seed and sunflowers could also thrive in Macedonia. And he stressed that the region south of Veles was very well-suited for early vegetables, but market-gardening there was scarcely developed.76 In fact the Vardar Banovina still had little market-gardening in 1938 (3.38 per cent of agricultural lands). During the 1930s, the share of produce for industrial use grew only slightly from 2.57 per cent of agricultural land in 1932 to 3.47 per cent in 1938. The main product remained grain, which was unchanged at 78 per cent of the agricultural area,77 although in this sector the foreign as well as the domestic competition was very great, as economists stressed.78 A further branch, which was in decline until the end of the interwar period, was silkworm cultivation. Until the Balkan Wars, Macedonia produced 1,500 tons of silk cocoons per year. In World War I the mulberry trees in the region

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of Gevgelija and Dojran were largely destroyed, so that production collapsed to only 80 tons in 1919. After this there was again a certain recovery: in 1929 500 tons of cocoons were produced.79 In Strumica and its vicinity almost every household was breeding silkworms in 1924, as this required only one month of light ‘female’ work, whereas the profit was respectable.80 This changed abruptly in 1924, however, when the bottom dropped out of the price. While the gross income from this branch of production was still 66.66 million dinars in 1924, it had declined to 17.5 million in 1929, and to only 1.38 million by 1934. The price per kilo shrank in this period from 154 dinars to just 6 dinars. In the years 1931 to 1934, the price did not even cover a quarter of the production costs.81 A part of the problem were the trader cartels in Thessaloniki, which dominated purchasing in the 1920s and paid less than they did for the poorer quality Italian silk.82 But market conditions deteriorated especially because of the competition from synthetic silk, which could be imported into Yugoslavia without paying any customs duties. In the neighbouring countries of Greece and Bulgaria, by contrast, domestic production was protected and the import of synthetic silk was forbidden for as long as there was still domestic natural silk available.83 By 1939 silk worm cultivation was still being pursued in only three districts, where it comprised the only source of income.84 No silk factories existed in Macedonia. In 1931 the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Skopje had demanded in vain that one should be constructed in the cultivation district of Gevgelija.85 The producers tried to counter the difficult conditions in 1930 and 1931 by founding cooperatives. Initially good results were achieved through this, but the collapse in the price in 1933– 4 and the currency restrictions seriously affected the branch. In 1935 the cooperatives were sitting on 300 tons of unsold cocoons worth 4 million dinars. In a letter to the Prince Regent, dated 2 June 1935, the cooperatives complained about the discrimination against their region. In the north, for example, in Novi Sad, the entire production was purchased by the state. They demanded this also for the South, since all citizens should be treated equally. Until now this demand had not been met, even though the state silk factory in Novi Sad lacked sufficient raw materials. If this path could not be taken, went the demand, all importers must also be forced to buy domestic cocoons.86 The variable treatment arose from the fact that silk production, different from the case of tobacco, was regulated differently in each region. In the Vardar Banovina silkworm cultivation was unregulated, while in the Sava and Morava Banovina concessions were issued. In the Danube Banovina, by contrast, there was a state monopoly.87 In this particular case there was a prompt reaction in Belgrade: the Ministry of Agriculture decided already on 13 June 1935, to issue a credit to

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the factory in Novi Sad, so that it could buy cocoons.88 And then in October 1936, protective measures were introduced in accordance with the proposals of the cooperatives: customs duties were introduced on imported silk, and domestic supplies had to be completely purchased first, before it was permitted to bring in imports. From the import duties a fund was established for the support of silkworm cultivation.89 It turned out, however, that good intentions and the introduction of the required laws were still not enough. As will be seen clearly also from other examples, in order for things to end well, every project has to be pursued by the interested parties with great care and vigour right to the end. Despite these measures, silkworm cultivation stagnated in the Vardar Banovina, as the above-mentioned fund established by the Agriculture Ministry was mostly used to pay off the debts of the silk factory in Novi Sad.90 The same measures proved more effective in the case of cotton growing, which subsequently made very good progress as a result.91 This probably was because the planting of cotton, in contrast to silkworm cultivation, was only practised in Macedonia, so that no other more influential region was able to get its hands on the funds set aside for the promotion of this branch. In a report from 1934 on the economy, education and health, the correspondent of the Central Press Office tried to emphasise the progress made in agriculture. He pointed out that each district had at least one agricultural specialist, who gave advice and led training courses. In this manner 53 courses were held in 1932 with 1,500 lectures, which attracted an audience of 7,000 people altogether. There were two lower agricultural schools, at which 200 trainees were taught. The king owned a model estate of 1,500 hectares in Demir Kapija, as well as a model vineyard and a fruit garden, from which the people received saplings for free. Of the 100,000 ploughs, some 20,000 were already of a modern type.92 In 1936, the correspondent Josip Buksˇa was commissioned to write an article for the Press Office entitled: ‘A Short Overview of the Progress Made in the Vardar Banovina from Liberation until Today’, which contained largely the same arguments as the piece in 1934.93 Despite all the correspondents’ efforts to paint a glowing picture – it was a meagre result for a region, in which as they said themselves, three-quarters of the population lived from agriculture. The politicians in the Banovina, for their part, complained that the central institutions neglected the region. Especially Prizad, the Privileged Stock Company for Purchasing Agricultural Produce, repeatedly gave cause for complaint.94 In 1935 the newspaper Vardar accused it of discriminating against the Vardar Banovina. For, while the prices for grain in the rest of the country were paid from the loading station, here they were only paid from Skopje. At a gathering of the Banovina’s economic representatives, it was said

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that overall the state behaved like a stepmother towards the South in terms of economic policy.95 An explanation lay in the fact that in Prizad there were no representatives from the Vardar Banovina, which in 1937 became the subject of criticism in Parliament.96 Only in 1939 did Macedonia receive any representation, when D ¯ ord¯e Donovic´, the mayor of Resen, took his seat in Prizad. At the same time, Teodosije Robe, the former mayor of Bitola, became a board member of the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration, which was of great importance for Macedonia. Both of these decisions were sharply criticised retrospectively by the (Serbian) ‘Nationalists’ in the Banovina.97 In Parliament, Spiro Hadzˇi Ristic´ vehemently attacked the government on 5 March 1937 regarding the rice imports from Italy and the very low prices that were being paid to domestic rice growers. But no less severe was his criticism of his parliamentary colleagues from Macedonia, whom he accused of cowardice and pussyfooting (just as Jordan Ac´imovic´ cited above had done): And you, my friends, who are also representatives from the South, why do you remain silent? Also raise your voice here! . . . My voice here will be the voice of the people, which is more courageous than you, here . . . I don’t speak as a member of the Opposition, but as a man who informs the government and the public about the desperate voice of our people. You know very well how difficult it is to grow rice. You know very well that our hard-working people stand in water to grow it. You know very well that our people, this hard-working people, get malaria from this work.98 Vid Obradovic´ concluded in 1937 in his study of the ‘Village in South Serbia’, that in Macedonia indeed many things flourished, yet ‘The hard-working south-Serbian peasant never has as much of these things as he requires, in order to satisfy his needs, which are at a very low level’. That tobacco, cotton and silk, poppy seeds and rice didn’t bring any rewards, was in his opinion because almost all of the products of the region were controlled by cartels and the producers of these goods had to sell them at the price the cartel dictated. His conclusion was that living conditions in Macedonian villages could only improve by a radical social and economic reorganisation,99 which was out of the question in the interwar period.

The Loan System One of the biggest problems for the peasants of Yugoslavia was lack of access to favourable loans. In order to relieve this problem, in April 1929 the Privileged Agricultural Bank was founded.100 But while in other parts of the

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country the peasants were able to enjoy low-interest loans immediately after its establishment, in the South this was not possible due to formalities. Clearly nobody had concerned themselves with the far-reaching consequences that resulted for this region from the firmly fixed regulations: due to the lack of land registries, which had not existed under the Ottoman Empire, and which had not been created in the ten years since the founding of the state, the peasants of Macedonia could not obtain any loans from the Agricultural Bank.101 Even at the end of the 1930s, land in the South had still not been registered,102 which proved to be a considerable disadvantage for agriculture in various respects. For example, this created problems for raising taxes. Due to the absence of a land registry, property was often measured using the naked eye, so that frequently peasants were taxed on more land than they actually possessed.103 There were also cases in which peasants still had to pay taxes for decades on land that had been taken away from them for colonisation purposes.104 From 1930 until 1934, only 5 million dinars flowed from the Privileged Agricultural Bank to Macedonia, which represented only 0.96 per cent of the total sum loaned throughout the country. In the same period the Danube Banovina received 304 million dinars, or 57.44 per cent and the Zeta Banovina (Montenegro) more than 18 million dinars (4.43 per cent).105 The lack of favourable long-term loans and the widening price scissors drove the peasants into the arms of loan sharks. Due to their horrendous interest rates, the peasants were not even able to pay off their debts even when they had a good harvest.106 Of the loan, 58.53 per cent had to be placed with private individuals. This condition meant that only in cases of extreme need were debts incurred, which meant that generally the money was not used for investment, but for urgent immediate needs, frequently for simple survival, as a third of the indebted families produced insufficient food to get through to the next harvest. The policy of the Privileged Agricultural Bank meant that in 1932 the peasants in the Vardar Banovina where the least indebted in the whole country, with an average of 6,088.64 dinars per farm, of which a large part was owed by the colonists. In equally poor Montenegro by contrast, the average amount of indebtedness was almost double this amount (11,276.50 dinars).107 When on 25 September 1936, the decree on the liquidation of peasants’ debts was issued – 50 per cent of the debts were written off – the peasants in Macedonia benefited the least from this measure.

Animal Breeding Raising animals played a very important role in Macedonia during the Ottoman period. The deforested mountain regions served as an extensive

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summer pasture for sheep and goats, in the winter the animals were driven to the pastures in the Aegean parts. Raising animals fed not only more than 10 per cent of the population, it also represented a very profitable branch of the economy.108 World War I had a serious impact on animal raising, and by 1921 in many places only one-tenth of prewar cattle stocks remained.109 In 1931 there were again 2 million sheep, 600,000 goats, 500,000 horned cattle, 100,000 horses, donkeys, and mules, 140,000 pigs and 3 million domestic birds.110 The most serious blow for cattle farmers, however, was the loss of the traditional winter pastures in Aegean Macedonia. From 1913 these lay in Greek hands and were outside the country. The French geographer Jacques Ancel concluded at the end of the 1920s that transhumance (pastoral migration) slowly died out and the men increasingly emigrated and did not return.111 Vid Obradovic´ also saw a link between work emigration ( pecˇalba) – which by the end of the interwar period provided the main source of income for 50,000 families in Macedonia112 – and the end of pastoral migration. The herds now had to be housed during the winter, which required capital. For this reason in 1937, according to information from the head of the Labour Exchange, Rastko Puric´, 50,000 people were living abroad, most of them men. In addition to them, Obradovic´ calculated that the same number was forced to look for work in the city or with the ‘Monopoly’.113 But even use of the summer pastures was limited due to the precarious security situation. In the Albanian border region the gendarmerie demanded that the herds left the summer pastures well before sunset.114 Cattle-raising also suffered from government policies. The forests and pastures, which had previously belonged to the villages, were now transferred to the state that rented them out to private individuals able to pay for them.115 This brought the traditional structure of inherited pasture rights into confusion and adversely affected the poor residents of the villages, who no longer had access to pasture areas. The people were angry about this and could not understand that the state had taken something away from them which even the Turks had not touched.116 Despite all these difficulties, cattle-raising still remained the second-most important economic branch in Macedonia after agriculture.117 The Slaughter and Refrigeration House in Skopje The main purchaser of Macedonian small livestock was Greece, where 3,000 wagons were sent every year at the end of the 1930s.118 The practice of exporting live animals was already known to be uneconomic, which was why a consensus insisted that Skopje urgently needed a slaughter and refrigeration house, in which fruits, vegetables and cheese could also be stored. The project of a modern slaughterhouse developed into an endless saga, which could not

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Figure 4.3

183

A Young Couple from Galicˇnik (Mazedonien, p. 203)

be brought to a successful conclusion, and which also demonstrates the incapacity of the local authorities and the indifference of the central powers in equal measure. As early as 23 September 1920, there was a report in the newspaper, Socijalisticˇka zora, on the need for such a facility. In 1927, included on a list of 17 objects that were needed in the view of the city council were also a slaughterhouse and a cattle market.119 Three years later, Hranislav Joksimovic´ demanded from the Head of the Health Service in the city that

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a new slaughterhouse be built as he viewed this as one of the most important tasks facing the local council.120 In any case, at that time Skopje was lacking in almost everything that one would expect in a modern city, such that its needs were enormous: the water supply, the canalisation needed to be built, and the streets needed paving; it needed schools, bridges, markets, an electricity supply, public buildings, a customs office, a large railway station, and other things – and this all during the global economic crisis. At this time Skopje had other priorities and pursued primarily the water supply and the construction of a power station. In 1937, once the economy had started to recover, the city’s mayor announced: ‘It is now time to stop the export of live animals, for which the Greeks pay us prices at levels they want.’121 The slaughterhouse, which had never disappeared from the plans, again moved to the foreground. Two years later, however, no progress had been made. In the city the need to be independent of the Greek merchants was again seen as a great necessity, as these paid ridiculously low prices for the livestock and received alongside meat also leather and wool without any extra costs.122 On 10 November 1939, the city council decided to apply for an interest-free loan of 16 million dinars from the state to finance the construction.123 But in the meantime there was also a private company that was interested in the project. The Privileged Silo Stock Company (Privilegovano a.d. za silose), which wanted to put up a series of buildings in ‘South Serbia’, primarily silos, also had its eye on building a slaughterhouse near the railway station.124 In the spring of 1940, this company approached the city council with its plans, which it estimated would cost 30 million dinars. It also stressed that only by constructing these buildings would it be possible to break through the cartel ring of foreign merchants, on whose markets the products of ‘South Serbia’ were sold. In this way, one could earn millions, which would otherwise go abroad. Then for ‘South Serbia’ the allegedly over flooded markets, the imaginary animal diseases and other such things, ‘which every day destroy the material wealth of an especially hard-working section of our people’, would disappear. The company proposed founding the ‘Slaughter and Refrigeration Stock Company in Skopje’ (Klanica i hladnjacˇa a.d. u Skoplju), in which the Privileged Silo Stock Company would hold 51 per cent of the shares (15.3 million dinars), the Office for Promoting Foreign Trade 3 million dinars, the State Mortgage Bank, the Privileged Agricultural Bank, the Postal Savings Bank, and the Privileged Export Company each with 2 million, and the city of Skopje and businessmen from the Vardar, Morava and Zeta Banovinas would participate with a total of 3.7 million. The headquarters of the Company would be based in Belgrade. In the city council opposition emerged to the conditions, especially that the headquarters would be in Belgrade. One of the councillors thought that Skopje should build the slaughterhouse itself in order to enjoy the profits

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to come. Above all the community should be careful that it did not lose it former income from the old slaughterhouse. University Professor Radovanovic´ warned of the need to ensure that the slaughterhouse does not lead to the exploitation of ‘South Serbia’, but to its benefit.125 So the snake bit its own tail: the city was not capable of acting all on its own, but at the same time had reservations about surrendering control and allowing private companies to participate in the project. The fear of giving away too many benefits and exploitation sat deep and had a paralyzing effect. A few months later, the Ban tried to secure a different source of finance. He had learned that there was a fund for the promotion of foreign trade, from which the Sava and Drava Banovinas had received considerable sums for the construction of export slaughterhouses in Zagreb und Ljubljana. In 1928 it was decided that the South should also receive a certain level of support for the same purpose. However, this decision was never implemented. Therefore, the Ban requested from Prime Minister Cvetkovic´ in October 1940 the sum of 5 to 10 million dinars for the export slaughterhouse in Skopje.126 Yet this attempt apparently also failed, as finally the 9.5 million dinars for the construction of the slaughterhouse were included in the Banovina’s plans for a loan of 100 million dinars.127 When this money started to flow in 1941, the war was already casting a dark shadow over everything. The course of events with regard to the slaughterhouse project is typical for conditions during the interwar period: Zagreb and Ljubljana knew how to tap into state funds, in this case money for the promotion of exports. They knew about this possibility, they took care of it and were able to exert the necessary influence to succeed. The decision on the same matter with regard to Skopje, however, was never implemented. On the one hand the city did not have any lobbyists and on the other it appears to have lost sight of the fact that it was entitled to state funds for many years itself. The recurring complaints about the practices of the Greek merchants, which were viewed as exploitative in Macedonia, were not unfounded. Already in 1921, Rudolph A. Reiss had commented that the middlemen in Thessaloniki had succeeded in alienating the buyers of Macedonian products. They buy up everything in the interior of the country at very low prices and sell them at very high prices to the English and American exporters. The foreign merchants no longer enter the Vardar Valley, but stop at the mouth of the Vardar, much to the detriment of the merchants in Serbian Macedonia. Yet it was not only the fault of the Greeks that the situation developed so unfavourably, as Reiss noted. The difficulties, which foreign clients

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encountered in travelling to Macedonia, also made its contribution.128 But even when conditions had improved in Macedonia with regard to security and comfort, it was not possible to win over foreign clients. This would have required considerable marketing efforts that would have exceeded what was possible for the Macedonian producers and merchants. Only a state agency would have been able to do this. Nonetheless, one has to criticise the local organisations as they often did less than what lay within their capabilities. A small, but illustrative, example: the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Skopje, that always stressed how much it did for the interests of the Banovina, was asked in 1931 to make available some samples for a textile exhibition in Zagreb – some sheep, woollen products, cotton, silk, hemp plants, spinning tools, and the like. For unknown reasons the Chamber was unable to comply with this request!129

The Agricultural Policy of the Stojadinovic´ Government The first attempts at promoting agriculture were undertaken in 1929, at the start of the royal dictatorship. On 16 April and 6 September, laws establishing the Privileged Agricultural Bank and for promoting agriculture were passed, respectively. The latter envisaged the expansion of the system of agricultural training schools, the creation of model farms and test stations, as well as measures for improving the capacity to export products.130 The Great Depression soon put an end to these efforts. Improvements in agriculture only got underway in 1935, as the economy started to recover and as Stojadinovic´ and his governing party JRZ turned to address these questions and in part adopted the reforms planned originally in 1929. The party programme of JRZ intended to give special support to agriculture on account of the mainly agricultural character of the country. In particular, it planned to make cheap loans available to facilitate the reduction of indebtedness and to promote the operation of cooperatives. The reason for this turn towards the villages was because after the Great Depression they were suffering badly and the rural population had completely lost its creditworthiness and purchasing power. Since the peasants comprised the bulk both of producers and consumers, they could not be left in this dire condition, as otherwise the entire economy would collapse. The most important measures, both carried out in 1936, were the reduction of debts and also of the tax burden on the peasants by one third. An additional line of attack was the improvement of the types and breeds and also in the distribution of seeds. In 1936, a plan for the promotion of cattleraising was prepared, according to which well-suited breeds were to be bred specially; on 1 April 1937, the cattle-raising support fund started its work.131 And finally, it was the declared goal to supply the country as far as possible

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using its own resources in terms of raw materials and vegetable products used in industry, not least as a strategy of ‘national defence’. In connection with these measures, more than 30 decrees and implementation regulations were issued between 1935 and 1937. In 1937, each Banovina was finally also given its own Chamber of Agriculture. The Stojadinovic´ government was also quite active in the field of foreign trade, in an effort to find markets for the country’s agricultural produce. After the Trade Treaty of 1 May 1934, Germany became an ever more important partner, as it was committed to buy Yugoslav agricultural products at prices above world market levels via the Clearing System.132 However, the period up until the start of the war in April 1941 was too brief to be able to assess the success of the promotional efforts of the government with regard to agriculture. Macedonia benefited from the state measures, introduced on 4 July 1935, in support of cultivating vegetable products useful in industry, especially cotton and rice,133 as well as raising prices for tobacco and raw opium. The latter, however, only took place at the end of the 1930s. Essentially though, as has been demonstrated elsewhere in this chapter, the dissatisfaction with government policy in Macedonia continued in the second half of the 1930s. The Banovina still felt that it was being neglected.

‘The Most Crying Grievance’: The Tobacco Monopoly Tobacco policy serves as an excellent example for demonstrating certain aspects of the attitude of the Yugoslav state towards Macedonia in the interwar period. Tobacco was one of the most important agricultural products of the region, comprising some 50 to 60 per cent of the harvest throughout Yugoslavia.134 The parliamentarian Spiro Hadzˇi Ristic´ described the significance of tobacco and poppy seeds for the south as follows: ‘What pigs and grain are for North Serbia and the Vojvodina, the forests and ores for Bosnia, fish and olive oil for Dalmatia, that is what opium and tobacco are for South Serbia.’135 For Vid D ¯ urd¯evic´, the Secretary of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Skopje, therefore it was clear: the welfare and development of the inhabitants of the Vardar Banovina depended on the solution of a single economic problem, namely the tobacco question. He was convinced that this would require little effort and no great financial means, but in return with one blow it would raise the material situation and thereby also the spiritual culture of the people in the South several levels. The climate, the topography, and the earth south of Skopje were excellently suited for growing tobacco, while the ground was often unusable for other crops and without tobacco

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would have lain fallow. In the 1920s, Macedonia produced on average 6 million kilograms per year of a very labour-intensive, small-leaved, aromatic tobacco of Thracian origin, whose quality was only surpassed in a few places in Greece or Turkey. But, in the opinion of experts, some 20 to 25 million kilograms could easily be produced. In the Ottoman Empire tobacco production had been subjected to state control since 1883,136 which, however, did not restrict production at all. The state bought the tobacco according to its quality and daily price. After the Balkan Wars, Serbia’s Monopoly Law was extended to Macedonia and its cultivation restricted, such that it was reduced to one-third of the previous amount. During the occupation period in World War I, the Bulgarians introduced ‘banderolas’. Under this system the state earned money from tobacco by selling banderolas – a strip of paper carrying a tax stamp – which had to be sealed around all tobacco products that were sold. Otherwise it did not interfere in the tobacco trade. After the war, the administration of what was now the Yugoslav state again restricted production. Annual domestic consumption was relatively constant at around 10 million kilograms. In certain years, 1920 and 1925 for example, not even this amount was produced in the country itself.137 The tobacco monopoly meant that the state determined the area to be planted and took over the entire harvest at prices which it set unilaterally itself. As a result in 1923 the purchase price was only one-fifth of the price in 1912.138 In the Turkish period the tobacco industry had its consumers within the domestic Ottoman market. The Serbian Monopoly Administration showed that it was incapable of opening up new markets, and soon turned to restricting production,139 such that the income of the producers shrank considerably due to the low prices and the reduced area planted. The Yugoslav state was only able to export tobacco again at the end of the 1920s.140 The best results were achieved in 1932, when in the first nine months 4.325 million kilograms valued at 186.146 million dinars was exported, which represented a price of 43.04 dinars per kilogram. Although this amount does not appear especially large, it was the second largest source of income from exports, after wood for construction (309.139 million dinars). In third place came pigs with 185.583 million dinars.141 These numbers show what sources of revenue the state could have generated, if it had succeeded in opening up export markets and raising exports. For the businessmen in Macedonia it was clear that the only way to get out of the economic crisis lay in freeing the production of tobacco and its export from government restrictions. They were convinced that ‘South Serbia’ could produce 40 million kilograms of first-class tobacco on its own.142

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Figure 4.4

189

A Tobacco Field being Tilled (Mazedonien, p. 54)

The population was not used to having a tobacco monopoly of this kind and attacked it severely. In February 1923, the economic newspaper Privredni glasnik, which was published in Skopje, criticised the very low prices, which resulted in reduced production and smuggling. Already at that time the absence of any local representatives in the ‘Monopol’ – as the State Monopoly Administration was generally called – was criticised, especially as this was the region that produced the most tobacco. And the introduction of banderolas was

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also demanded then, or at least permission for the producers to sell half of the harvest on the free market.143 Finally the state doubled the purchase price for the harvest of 1923.144 In this and the following year prices were good, especially in comparison with later on. But at around 20 dinars per kilogram they were less than half those in Greece, where the producers received 50 dinars.145 Nonetheless, according to the observations of the Economist Urosˇ Stajic´ this income made a visible difference to the living standard of the population. Whole new quarters were established in the small towns and villages; the poor could build houses and buy some land. According to Stajic´, this also improved the attitude towards the state considerably.146 But already in 1925 prices fell again and for the harvest of 1927 the producers only received a price per kilo of eight dinars for medium quality. On account of this the tobacco monopoly became, as David Footman, the British Vice Consul in Skopje, commented, definitively ‘the most crying grievance’ of the peasants and also the rest of the population in the South. Dissatisfaction with the price was great, as it was commonly known that in Bulgaria and Greece, which practised the banderola system, much higher prices were paid. According to Footman’s research, even for the lowest quality, Greek producers received more than twice what was paid by the ‘Serbian Monopoly’. For the higher categories the discrepancy was even greater. Competent experts estimated that by introducing banderolas, production would increase to 15 million kilograms and with the price set at a rather low 20 dinars the peasants would earn 300 million dinars instead of the 40 million they received in 1927. According to Footman, the ‘Monopoly’ also did not enjoy any popularity, because it was associated with complicated procedures (for issuing permits, for weighing, collecting, etc.), which were implemented generally by incompetent and corrupt officials, such that the peasants were subjected to considerable chicanery.147 In a 1927 pamphlet the Yugoslav Communists pointed out the discrepancies between the various prices: on the free market one kilogram of tobacco cost 50–65 dinars,148 while the state paid the tobacco planters 10–20 dinars and for consumers the tobacco cost 200–400 dinars.149 These figures make clear the enormous profit-taking that the Monopoly Administration practised for the benefit of the state coffers at the expense of the producers’ families. The abovementioned modest price upturn in 1923 and 1924 indicates that living standards in Macedonia could have been notably higher with a less exploitative tobacco policy, which would have also resulted in much greater satisfaction with the state. Comparisons with the neighbouring states, that were also agriculturally based and produced the same kinds of tobacco, could not be ignored and were

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Figure 4.5

191

Tobacco Harvest (Photograph in the possession of the author)

made repeatedly. Bulgaria in particular offered itself, as its economic structure did not differ much from that in Yugoslavia and there tobacco was mostly grown in the Macedonian part of the country.150 An author calculated in 1933 that, under much worse natural conditions, Bulgaria produced two and a half times as much tobacco as Yugoslavia, which realised 31 per cent of its export income.151 In 1928–30 it was even 41.5 per cent and in Greece 55 per cent.152 The Yugoslav authorities justified the restriction of the area planted because of the fear that the domestic black market would otherwise increase, thereby reducing income from the ‘Monopoly’. They were also convinced that the market could not absorb any more tobacco. The author countered that the market for cereals was much more saturated, yet nobody thought of curtailing production.153 The inability of the Monopoly Administration to extract more capital from tobacco for the state and for the producers is demonstrated by the following figures: between 1923 and 1927 the Kingdom SHS exported a total of 6.5 million kilograms of tobacco, while Bulgaria exported 135.5 million kilograms, Turkey 164 million, and Greece as much as 214 million kilograms. Up until 1938 nothing changed very much with regard to this relationship. In addition, the proportion of exports in relation to the total production of these countries was also much higher than in Yugoslavia.154 The organisation of tobacco growing in Bulgaria could certainly have served as a model for Yugoslavia. Growing tobacco was free and unrestricted there and was generally conducted by cooperatives, which were supported extensively by the Bulgarian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank. Processing

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the tobacco was done in part by cooperatives and in part by private companies. Sale of tobacco was free and the state did not influence the price at all. The treasury took its cut domestically through the banderolas and no taxes were levied on exported tobacco.155 Especially after the collapse in purchase prices in 1925, the producers felt they were being unfairly treated by the ‘Monopoly’ and tried to protect their interests. However, they did not have many options. On 7 March 1928, Jovan Kosta Bombolovic´ from Prilep sent a letter, on behalf of ‘all of the tobacco producers in South Serbia’, especially those in Prilep, to the ‘Association of South Serbs’ (Udruzˇenje Juzˇnosrbijanaca) in Belgrade. In it he described in his Prilep Macedonian, which he tried to give a touch of Serbian bureaucratic jargon, the needs of the tobacco producers. At between 6 and 18 dinars per kilogram the prices were too low; sometimes just 2 dinars were paid, namely then, when it was claimed that the tobacco was ‘burned’ (spalen). In each case, however, at most 20 out of 200 kilograms were ruined. And so the tobacco producers emerge from the Independent Monopoly Administration with tears in their eyes, as a member of the family, who had worked for the entire year, receives less than 200 dinars in wages. And frequently there is also a loss . . . today one receives 3–6 dinars per kilo even for spinach . . . Bombolovic´ asked the Association to prove to the ‘Monopoly’ that the tobacco from Prilep was among the best in Yugoslavia. But by the ‘Monopoly’ it was graded as fifth or sixth class; the other classes are dead for us . . . it is a very sad thing, people are dying of hunger, and that is a loss for the State and for everyone. Instead of going forward, one goes backward. Instead of the people being able to live freely from their work, from growing tobacco, we end up in such a condition that the State has to support us with charity, with wagonloads of corn. The Association was asked to stand by its countrymen in their time of great need.156 Indeed the ‘Association of South Serbs’ took up the matter and asked one of its members, the tobacco specialist Jovan V. Veljic´, who had previously worked for Oriental Tobacco, for his opinion. He gave a devastating verdict on the Monopoly Administration, which he found to be bloated and which processed the tobacco so badly that it could no longer be sold abroad. In order not to have to be bothered with sales, it had adopted the idea of reducing production to just the amount required for domestic consumption. The consequence of this bad state of

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affairs was that many people emigrated from the tobacco growing regions, while some of the producers no longer grew first-class tobacco, because this was being incorrectly graded. Veljic´ proposed that the Monopoly Administration should also grant the producers a quota available for export alongside the amount permitted for domestic consumption. This tobacco could be bought directly from the producers by agents authorised by the Monopoly Administration. The Monopoly Administration should obligate the private merchants to build warehouses for processing tobacco in the larger towns, where the population could find work.157 The unrestricted production of tobacco for export was one of the most important demands raised by economists and producers.158 Linked to that was the necessity of finding export markets. The Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Skopje therefore demanded from the government in January 1935 that it should develop markets for tobacco by obliging the countries that sold industrial goods to Yugoslavia to accept tobacco in return. The Chamber also once again demanded higher tobacco prices more in line with world market prices. In this way the tobacco producers would be able to meet their obligations to the state.159 At the end of the 1920s it looked as if some improvements would be made. At this time the Monopoly Administration was planning to establish a tobacco factory in Veles and in 1928 it purchased a property for this purpose.160 The Director of the State Monopoly stressed in a newspaper interview in September 1929 the importance of the correct method of drying tobacco and the need for long-term loans for the construction of the necessary facilities. The absence of suitable buildings for drying tobacco was indeed a serious problem and led to a considerable loss of quality, as the tobacco was dried in the open air and was therefore exposed to wind, weather and dust.161 As noted above, this adversely affected the possibility of exporting the product. The Monopoly Administration appeared also to concern itself with the quality of the seeds and the varieties of tobacco being grown, as the director spoke of establishing a breeding station and described increasing exports as an important goal.162 It is likely that these plans soon fell victim to the developing world economic crisis, or perhaps were abandoned due to personnel changes. The factory was never built; in 1938 a parliamentarian from Macedonia demanded that this finally be done.163 There were tobacco factories throughout Yugoslavia164 – only none in Macedonia, the most important growing region. Apart from one, all of these factories were built before World War I.165 The exception is, however, significant: in the 1920s the ‘Monopoly’ built one of Europe’s largest and most modern tobacco factories in Nisˇ, where no tobacco was grown, but which lies in Serbia. Construction started in 1924

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and after some interruptions, it was completed in 1930.166 The establishment of a tobacco factory in Veles, as noted, did not occur; instead the Monopoly Administration budgeted in 1940 the sum of 20 million dinars to expand the factories in Bosnia-Herzegovina.167 The tobacco question was one of the most important political issues in the South, which occupied public discussion and economists in the region throughout the entire interwar period. Debates took place repeatedly over how the South could profit more from its tobacco. The demand for unregulated production was illusory and was not supported on all sides, as there was also the fear that if the market was opened up, as had been the case with raw opium, that instead of being exploited by the state the peasants would be exploited by the merchants. Nonetheless it was viewed as necessary that the ‘Monopoly’ paid decent prices and was engaged in production, by making available good varieties, constructing drying facilities, and establishing a research institute.168 Vid D ¯ urd¯evic´ knew that the state would not surrender control over the lucrative tobacco monopoly, and therefore in 1931 he proposed allowing the ‘Monopoly’ to retain the processing and sale of tobacco for domestic consumption, only it should have to buy tobacco just like any other purchaser. This would motivate the producers, as they would earn more and pay more taxes. In ‘South Serbia’ surpluses of 10 – 15 million kilograms could be produced for export, which would represent a value of one billion dinars at world market prices. The warehouses needed for sorting and fermenting should in his opinion be financed by private companies and cooperatives.169 This was not only Ðurd¯evic´’s private opinion, but also that of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Skopje, of which he was the Secretary. Already in 1927, the then vice president of the Chamber and tobacco expert Spiro Hadzˇi Ristic´ had proposed making tobacco production for export unrestricted. After this the Chamber asked the relevant offices several times to adopt this measure, strengthened by the ratification of the Opium Agreement in 1929, which led to the collapse in prices for raw opium.170 There was indeed a change in the law, but it contained new pitfalls. The 1931 law did permit free production for export, but the peasant families had to decide whether they were growing for export or for the ‘Monopoly’.171 One can vividly imagine the dilemma they faced: should they decide for very low prices but secures sales with the ‘Monopoly’, or for completely uncertain export opportunities? That it was difficult for the peasants to find export possibilities on their own is demonstrated by the failure of the ‘Vardar Cooperative for Tobacco Export’ (Vardarska zadruga za izvoz duvana), founded on the initiative of Spiro Hadzˇi Ristic´ in 1933.172 From the area around

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Skopje, 205 cooperative members joined together and in 1935 for the first time they produced 100,000 kilograms of tobacco for export.173 However, the Cooperative encountered great difficulty in selling the tobacco. Three years after its establishment, it was sitting on 170,000 kilograms of unsold tobacco and had to be liquidated. According to Hadzˇi Ristic´ a German expert had praised the quality of the wares, but found the amount on offer insufficient. Foreign buyers demanded large quantities, which a cooperative was unable to manage.174 In 1938 Hadzˇi Ristic´ urgently demanded that the Monopoly Administration concern itself with exports to Germany, as this country was annually importing 40 million kilograms of oriental tobacco from Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey.175 The purchase prices remained low throughout the Great Depression driving producers to despair. In 1933, income from tobacco growing was only 21 million dinars, as against 120.4 million in 1926. The price per kilo had halved in this period from 14 to 7 dinars.176 On 2 January 1933 a delegation of businessmen, parliamentarians and senators visited the prime minister and demanded that the price be raised to 20 dinars.177 Around Skopje there were large-scale protests by the producers, such that a delegation from the city council also travelled to Belgrade in order to demand a better purchase price from the responsible officials.178 In February 1933 the ‘Main Producers’ Cooperative for Tobacco Growing in the District and City of Skopje’ (Glavna duvanska proizvod¯acˇka zadruga za srez i grad Skoplje) sought an audience with the king for a delegation of 20 people. This approach was decided at a meeting of the tobacco producers on 14 February 1933. In their letter they pointed out that 40,000 households planted tobacco in ‘South Serbia’, and therefore the entire region was economically dependent on it. For the 1932 harvest most of them had received on average less than 10 dinars per kilogram, many less than 5, whereas the production costs were estimated to be 17 dinars. From the stated low prices the purchase commission still made various reductions: 12 per cent for dampness, 12 per cent for the commission’s administrative costs, 15 per cent for hail insurance. The population of ‘South Serbia’, which had become dependent solely on tobacco since the end of opium production, was ruined by it.179 The producers were embittered not only by the very low prices, but also by the renewed planting restrictions, which meant that in 1934 only 5 million kilograms of tobacco could be harvested – only half of domestic consumption. All of 753,000 kilograms could be exported, which brought in 25.4 million dinars. Notwithstanding this, the Foreign Trade Office claimed in a 1935 publication – under the shadow of the dwindling production and export figures of the previous years – that they had taken numerous measures to promote exports, and ‘everything possible had been done . . . to increase production’.180

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Low prices and planting restrictions were the most important reasons for the great dissatisfaction with the tobacco monopoly – and as a result also with the state – but by no means the only ones. There was outrage too at the wages paid in the warehouses, where tobacco was sorted and fermented. Mainly women and young girls from the age of 14 were employed there under very unhealthy working conditions, as they comprised the cheapest labour force.181 In the summer it was humid and hot in these drying houses, while in winter the women and men froze, and in addition they were constantly exposed to harmful nicotine. In 1936 the average daily wage for this work was 10.27 dinars.182 Nonetheless they all were glad to find employment there. The tobacco drying houses were one of the few sources of work, especially for the urban poor.183 Subject to criticism was also the bloated bureaucratic apparatus of the ‘Monopoly’,184 which was not only expensive, but also delivered the producers into the hands of numerous all-powerful officials. In February 1930 five tobacco producers from Bitola complained about the prices on behalf of local growers in a telegram to the prime minister and the king. It was argued that the prices did not even cover half of their costs and the producers demanded supplementary payments,185 but the local inspector of the ‘Monopoly’ responded by denouncing the petitioners as bad producers. He resented their ‘temerity’ in addressing the king directly and proposed that they should be prohibited from planting for a year.186 In 1937, 200 tobacco farmers from Prilep, who declared that they would not agree to the purchase price, were punished with a prohibition from planting.187 Such a verdict deprived the producers’ families of their means of subsistence and had a correspondingly strong disciplinary effect. Also part of this tough approach towards the producers were astronomic penalty fines for black-market trading and the smuggling of tobacco, which were collected mercilessly. A peasant from the Prilep County, who was unable to pay a fine, was sentenced to 234 days in prison, which he was forced to start precisely at the beginning of the main working season.188 When he called up the Finance Ministry, it denied any possibility of complying with his request for a pardon.189 For these ‘smugglers’ it was completely impossible to come up with the exorbitant sums. C´amile Memetovic´ from Skopje, who had some tobacco found in front of her door, received a fine of 4,200 dinars, which could be absolved by 84 days in prison (50 dinars/day).190 On 26 November 1938, 20 tobacco farmers from the Kicˇevo District explained in a petition to the Minister of Justice how they had become ‘tobacco smugglers’. When in 1937 the time had come for the officials of the ‘Monopoly’ to weigh the tobacco, due to the very unfavourable weather it was not completely dry. Despite the objections of the peasants it was

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weighed. When it was given subsequently, now completely dry, to the purchase commission, there was a discrepancy of 50, 100, or more kilograms. The producers were then suspected of having defrauded the commission of the missing amounts, which led the Finance Office in Skopje to impose fines of from 5,000 to 20,000 dinars – a decision that was implemented by the Administrative Court. The peasants, who in any case were scarcely able to pay their taxes, saw no possibility of raising such sums, unless they sold everything that they owned. As they had no legal recourse open to them, they applied for a pardon.191 Every planter who smoked some of his own tobacco was also treated as a black-marketeer. This logic completely exceeded the common sense of the people. A peasant levied with such a fine and embittered about the high penalty said to the lawyer Bozˇo Blagojevic´: ‘Is it just, sir, to own a vineyard and not be allowed to eat a single grape from it?’192 A further source of dissatisfaction was the grading. The need to assign a quality grade to the tobacco gave the inspectors plenty of room to manoeuvre. The producers often thought that their tobacco was unjustly assigned a poor grade and too large a quantity classified as spoiled. In addition, important supporters of the government are believed to have received much better prices than the small producers. For this reason, the tobacco producers from around Skopje sued Mihajlo Dragovic´, the Director of the Department for Unprocessed Tobacco on 19 December 1931. According to the complaint, he classified the tobacco of the Begs, the Muslim large estate owners, as good and that of the small producers as bad. In addition, he compelled the peasants to buy a book he had written himself (‘Practical Instructions for Tobacco Planting’). Every producer automatically had 50 dinars deducted for this book on selling their tobacco, which was the equivalent of three or four days’ wages. The peasants found that the slim book was too expensive, in their view it was not worth more than 20 dinars and for the tobacco growers quite useless. On account of this compulsory purchase, the producers felt that they had been robbed of around 100,000 dinars,193 while Dragovic´ had profited handsomely. At the end of 1939 the complaint was raised that the Vardar Banovina was discriminated against in comparison with Herzegovina. This was linked to the fact that Herzegovina was now part of the newly establish autonomous Banovina of Croatia, which was able to achieve better conditions and get a Croatian, Juraj Sˇutej, appointed as Finance Minister, who played the key role in setting the price levels was. The Macedonian tobacco producers complained that their tobacco, which was renowned to be of better quality, only attained the same prices as the Herzegovinian tobacco.194 It was also argued that the small-leaved oriental tobacco weighed less and required a lot more work to

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produce.195 Until 1939 there had been no doubt about the leading position of Macedonian tobacco. In 1935, for example, a publication of the Foreign Trade Office described tobacco from the Vardar Banovina as ‘de la plus fine qualite´ [of the finest quality]’.196 In Herzegovina, of course, people had a different opinion. A Kasim Gujic´ from Ljubusˇki, one of main centres of tobacco production there, countered that previously Herzegovina had been intentionally disadvantaged in order to destroy the peasantry of the Croatia Banovina economically. In order to rectify this injustice, reforms of the monopoly had been introduced at the end of 1939.197 The promotion of Herzegovinian tobacco into a higher grade shows that the state – here acting through the Monopoly Administration – had to make concessions and correct its previous policy, if it encountered an opponent that could exert strong political pressure, like the newly established Croatian Banovina. The government had only just reached an ‘Agreement’ with the Croatian opposition and had to make concessions on various levels. In Macedonia, however, nobody was in a position to exert any pressure. There were no political organisations and no office holders at a high level, who could take up the economic concerns of this region. The Vardar Banovina was not even granted a representative on the Board of Directors of the Monopoly Administration.198 At the same time, the revenues that accrued to the state thanks to this region were enormous. In 1938, the representative for Mariovo, Svetozar Tasic´, calculated for the Parliament that this region was the best milking cow for the country. For the budget year 1937– 8, income of 1.428 billion dinars was projected for the tobacco monopoly, of which 1.227 billion came from Macedonia.199 The annual net revenue from tobacco had been roughly of this order since the establishment of the state. From 1926 to 1931 it was relatively constant at around 1.7 billion dinars per year,200 in 1933 and 1936 it was above 1.4 billion, and in 1938, 1.66 billion.201 Such profits were only possible because the state bought tobacco at considerably below its actual value. The Bulgarian historian Palesˇutski observed correctly that the income of the state was not affected by the extent of the area under cultivation. The profit was secured by forcing down the prices when necessary.202 In this way the Macedonian population was financing a good part of the needs of the state, while living itself in terrible poverty. In return it received very little. The parliamentarian Tasic´ counted the very well-known failings of the governments: there was a lack of transport routes, river improvements were overdue, as well as drainage projects, and in many places there was still a lack of drinking water.203 Only under Stojadinovic´ did the demands of the tobacco producers to some extent find a sympathetic ear. In 1935 the purchase price was raised and for

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1936 a further increase of 20 per cent was decided. The model Tobacco Station (duvanska ogledna stanica) in Prilep was soon going to be transformed into a Tobacco Institute.204 On 5 November 1937, the 25th anniversary of the ‘Liberation of Prilep’, the foundation stone of the Tobacco Institute was indeed laid, which was supposed to be dedicated to research.205 Since, however, nothing further happened in this respect, Blagojevic´ said in 1939: ‘We want to believe that the announced establishment of the Tobacco Institute in Prilep will not remain an empty promise . . . ’.206 On his visit to Skopje on 15 November 1936, Stojadinovic´ pointed out that in 1935 tobacco production had considerably increased. He promised that purchasing this year would be conducted accurately and justly, thereby admitting that previously this had not been the case.207 In March 1938, the Senator Spiro Hadzˇi Ristic´ declared himself to be very satisfied with Stojadinovic´’s tobacco policy, which affected 500,000 people in the South according to his statement. Various levies had been abolished and the price as well as the daily wage in the stations had been raised. The Monopoly Administration had also built additional stations.208 These measures, however, were still not enough. The impoverished town of Bitola, which had very many unemployed, had to send part of the tobacco from its collection area to Nisˇ for processing. An article in Bitoljske novine, on 19 June 1938, therefore demanded the building of an additional station, which would create jobs.209 The price increases permitted were welcomed, but also criticised at the same time as being insufficient. Blagojevic´ demanded of the ‘Monopoly’ in 1940 that it should raise the purchase prices for tobacco drastically, as living costs had more than doubled in the past year.210 The question remains, why the state did not change its tobacco policy, in spite of constant criticism and great dissatisfaction, as it sowed bitterness and poverty by forcing the peasant families in Macedonia to sell their most important product well below its value, which they had grown through considerable hard work. The most important part of the answer is that the state monopolies211 throughout the entire interwar period secured one-fifth to one-quarter of all state revenues,212 without making any great effort. The state was practically able to obtain these sums almost entirely from the domestic consumption of tobacco. The task of opening up export markets, and thereby enabling producers to have larger growing quotas, was not taken up by the state monopoly. There are certainly no indications that any efforts in this direction were ever made. One was satisfied with simply protecting the fiscal interests of the state. And this could be done most easily by controlling the price, which lay solely in the hands of the ‘Monopoly’. Changes with regard to the tobacco monopoly were also not open to discussion, because the state had already used its revenue as a security for its

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first overseas loans, such as the loan of 100 million dollars received from the American Bank Blair in 1922.213 For a French loan of more than 300 million Francs in 1923, which was to be used for buying French equipment for the railways, the telegraph, and especially for the Army, the revenues from the monopolies and the customs also served as a guarantee.214 In 1932 the revenue from the tobacco monopoly was also used primarily for servicing the national debt.215 A third reason for the immobility of the state was the lack of political pressure already mentioned above. There simply was not any powerful group which engaged itself on behalf of the interests of the Vardar Banovina. This marginalisation becomes more than clear, given the fact that this region was not represented at all on the Board of the Monopoly Administration. Individual economists, the Chamber of Industry and Commerce, senators and parliamentarians such as Hadzˇi Ristic´ did manage to bring the sore points to public attention, raising them regularly in debates in Parliament and the Senate. Yet because they lacked any power, the state did not need to concern itself with their interventions. The petitions to the royal court by representatives of communities or organisations also failed to produce any results. The families of producers for their part had no room for manoeuvre. Growing tobacco was for them the only possible source of cash income, especially after the collapse of poppy cultivation after 1930. The only alternative lay in emigration – until this possibility was also largely suppressed by the industrial countries as a result of the Great Depression. Finally one must speak of a striking indifference towards this region, the frequently invoked ‘classical South’. The people there were viewed as poor and primitive. Individual ideologues may have spoken about the necessity of giving them prosperity and culture, but clearly, nobody felt themselves to be personally responsible for making a material contribution to raising living standards in this region. And when it actually came down to distributing money and means, those who controlled the levers of power remained committed instead to their own region and their own voters.

Opium: The Demise of a Lucrative Industry The Ottomans introduced the growing of poppy seeds to Macedonia in the second half of the nineteenth century, when cotton production collapsed due to cheap imports from the USA, India and Egypt. From 1880, opium poppies were being widely planted,216 as, like tobacco, it proved to be ideally suited for this region. It not only flourished and was of a high quality, it could also be grown in areas where the soil was not suited for other plants –

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for example, in sandy soils. In addition, the poppy plants fertilised the soil, such that a wheat field that had previously grown poppies produced a larger harvest. From the seeds, excellent cooking oil could be extracted, while the remains from the extrusion could be used for feeding cattle in winter. Thus the labour was not for nothing, if during the harvest summer rains washed away the leaking sap from the broken capsules.217 Raw opium also had other favourable qualities for the producers: it was of a high value per kilogram and was easy to store and transport. However, the prices were subject to strong fluctuations. While demand remained fairly stable, supply varied considerably depending on the harvest.218 In contrast to tobacco, family plots were somewhat rare as poppy growing took place in three short phases that were each very labour-intensive, requiring additional workers. For this reason, it was commonly residents of the towns, pensioners and businessmen, who engaged in this business, and sometimes also borrowed money, in order to pay the wages of extra workers they employed. Small producers sold their raw opium on the nearest market to a local trader or the agent of an export company. The latter ultimately also bought up the goods from the traders. These transactions were done according to appearance only – that is without establishing precisely the quality of the opium.219 In the 1920s the cultivation of ‘opium’, as it was generally called, was an important branch of the economy in Vardar Macedonia. The raw opium produced there was very well-suited for pharmaceutical uses on account of its high morphine content.220 In this decade Vardar Macedonia delivered on average 19 per cent of all the opium processed by the pharmaceutical industry; a further 61 per cent was produced in Turkey. Macedonian opium was less wellsuited for use as a drug, precisely because of the high morphine content; it was too strong and therefore not very pleasant. Smokers were mainly supplied by the producers in India (66 per cent) and Persia (31 per cent).221 The price for raw opium rose again in the fall of 1923 after a low in 1921– 2 and remained at a high level until the spring of 1930. As a result the cultivated area doubled from 6,000 hectares in 1924 to a peak of 12,900 hectares in 1929222 and this was 61 per cent more than that used for tobacco (8,000 hectares).223 In 1924 and 1925 the net income of the producers, who were growing opium as a business, was 8,000–10,000 dinars per hectare.224 In 1926– 9, prices could be described as especially good, both for raw opium and also for the seeds. In 1930 and 1931, the prices for both fell drastically, so that many producers stopped growing it. There remained especially the small family businesses, which did not have to employ any day labourers and carried on with the loss-making trade by exploiting themselves. The collapse of the price in 1930 was due to three circumstances, which were partly linked to

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each other. Firstly, 1930 was a good harvest in both Macedonia (140 metric tons) and Turkey (480 metric tons)225 – that is in the two regions that supplied the pharmaceutical industry throughout the world with 80 per cent of its demand for raw opium. However, this overproduction does not explain why the prices remained at rock bottom for the remainder of the 1930s. For this, the ‘Second Geneva Opium Agreement for Reducing Poppy Production’ was of significance, which had been signed on 19 February 1925, and came into effect on 25 September 1928. Already in November 1924, when the preparatory meetings started, the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Skopje recognised the danger for ‘South Serbia’ if cultivation were to be banned and demanded that the Ministry for Trade and Foreign Affairs protect the interests of the region.226 However, resistance to the Americans, the driving force behind the treaty, was impossible, which is why the negotiating delegation sought instead to extract as large as possible a quota for Macedonia and also to achieve direct sales (that is no longer via the merchants in Thessaloniki).227 And at this time they indeed succeeded in saving opium production,228 but only because the Convention did not really start taking effect until 1929. Yugoslavia ratified it on 4 September 1929, and committed itself to cutting production. The main producers of opium for smoking, however, were not affected by the treaty: Persia did not sign it, and it did not in any case apply to colonies and protectorates.229 This meant that the British colony of India, which made two-thirds of the opium consumed as a drug, was not touched by it.230 Another decisive factor for the price decline was the formation of a cartel, when in December 1929, the German, English and Swiss producers got together under the leadership of the Merck Company based in Darmstadt and were joined in 1930 by the French businesses. By the end of 1931 all of the European chemical companies had joined.231 The price movements show clearly the success of the cartel: while in 1931 the prices for raw opium had fallen to one-third compared with the end of the 1920s, the chemical companies were able to more than treble the prices for the end products compared with before232 – and this was during the Great Depression, when all other prices were falling. Blagojevic´ calculated in 1939 that from one kilogram of raw opium, which was bought from the farmers for 200 dinars, products were made which cost 4,500 dinars in the pharmacy – a price differential, which could in no way be justified by the manufacturing costs of the chemical companies.233 The restrictions imposed by the Convention and the decline in prices effectively brought opium growing in Macedonia to a standstill. In 1928, 146,582 kilograms of opium were still being exported at 1,000 dinars per kilogram. By 1935 exports had sunk to 36,679 kilograms, for which a price per kilogram of only 200 dinars was paid.234 Due to this, revenues declined

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from 146.582 million to 7.34 million dinars. An important branch of the economy thereby had sunk into insignificance. The contraction of poppy growing also brought the edible oil industry – one of the few in the South at all, which had also prospered – into great difficulties, as it ran out of raw material.235 Therefore, it is no surprise that Yugoslavia’s adherence to the Convention was subjected to heavy criticism and the demand was made that Yugoslavia should leave it again. After all, numerous states had not signed the Convention.236 However, there were also voices, if only a few, which stressed that Yugoslavia simply had no other choice. The leader of the Croat Peasants’ Party, Stjepan Radic´, as a delegate present during the negotiations, could clearly see in advance the consequences for the peasants in the South. But since the Great Powers were behind the Convention, in Yugoslavia there was a fear of reprisals, such as a boycott, if the country refused to join the Convention.237 The producers were also aware of the consequences of joining the Convention and they tried everything in their power to prevent it. Poppy growers from Sˇtip sent a telegram to the king on 12 April 1930, in which they asked him to do everything, so that the decision of the League of Nations would not place poppy growing in question, as thousands of inhabitants from their region would otherwise lose their livelihoods.238 A further sore point of the opium question, as with tobacco – if it was also a slightly different problem – was how it was purchased. Like almost all of Macedonia’s export products, raw opium was purchased by trading companies in Thessaloniki and sold on by them to the processing states.239 This lucrative trade lay almost exclusively in the hands of the Scialom and Wittal-Saltiel companies, which thanks to their monopoly style position paid less for the high quality Macedonian than they did for the low quality Asiatic raw opium.240 Local traders, however, were unable to displace the Greeks for various reasons. According to the British Vice Consul in Skopje they lacked experience and also the skills needed to win the trust of the large opium processors. And they also, just like the producers, lacked capital. The officials of the National Bank, in the view of the Vice Consul, should remind themselves that the role of their institution was primarily financial and not political.241 In 1925 the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Skopje had lobbied without success for the National Bank to grant loans for opium production, in order to break the monopoly of the Scialom Company.242 Only from 1928 did the National Bank grant loans for the opium trade. It was hoped that in this manner it would be possible to drive out the Greek purchasers and gain a reputation for Yugoslav goods with the consumers, as the traders from Thessaloniki sold the Macedonian raw opium as if it were Greek. But not for the first time, the good intentions of the state proved to be poorly considered and executed. The Secretary of the Chamber of Industry and

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Commerce in Skopje, Vid D ¯ urd¯evic´, already noticed at the start of 1929 that the conditions required for obtaining a loan were hard to meet,243 in which he was right, as the success obtained proved to be much less than expected. The credits from the National Bank were issued to banks in Skopje, but the centres of production for opium lay elsewhere. If the businesses there wanted to take up the loan offer, they were confronted with a considerable amount of red-tape and expenses. Of the 30 million dinars, which the National Bank had approved for this purpose, ultimately only 7 million was used. The State Mortgage Bank experienced a similar lack of success. It also approved loans in 1930 for the purchase of opium and of poppy seeds, as well as for production costs. It also did not issue these loans itself, but granted them to banks, of which some misused the funds for other purposes, such that this loan funding was soon withdrawn again.244 When a few years later Footman made a private journey through Macedonia, he was forced to observe that the opium traders in Veles had still not managed to export directly to France or Germany, and that they continued to be very disgruntled about their dependence on the large companies in Thessaloniki.245 The state, which apparently felt that it was co-responsible for the problems of the opium growers in Macedonia, tried to ameliorate the worst effects of the Geneva Convention and the monopoly position of the Greek merchants by intervening itself in the purchase and sale of opium. It did this through the already mentioned Prizad Company, which was founded in June 1930, and subsequently controlled a sub-department called Juzop (Jugoslovenski zavod za izvoz opiuma – Yugoslav Institute for the Export of Opium), which over time established a monopoly position. Prizad soon gained an equally bad reputation among the producers and the Macedonian public as that of the ‘Monopoly’. There were numerous complaints about abuses involving the agents of the company, who frequently – in contrast to the representatives of the Greek trading houses – simply did not have enough money to hand to buy up all the opium that was on offer.246 And Prizad was no less exploitative than the foreign merchants, as it paid lower prices than the Scialom Company. The activities of Prizad ultimately only made the situation worse. As mentioned above, the morphine content was not established by any systematic method, but rather was simply estimated by the Prizad-buyers using a rule of thumb.247 In this way the company bought up opium estimated at 8– 10 per cent morphine content, which on resale to the Americans by some miracle had increased to 16 per cent.248 While on the world market, prices for raw opium had begun to recover again after 1931, due to Prizad they continued to fall further in Yugoslavia.249 Without processing the raw opium at all, the company managed to get several times the original purchase price abroad. For this reason, Spiro Hadzˇi Ristic´ described the purchases of opium as ‘theft’.250 The fact that in 1936

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a private factory for alkaloids had started operating in Skopje, which could process between 24,000 and 36,000 kilograms of raw opium a year, did nothing to change the low prices. Together with the existing factory in Slovenia, these facilities could use half of the entire domestic harvest.251 These factories used their domestic monopoly to depress prices just like the foreign companies.252 Subsequently in the media and in Parliament, alongside the renunciation of the Geneva Convention, there were also repeated calls for abolishing Prizad.253 Even organisations loyal to the government, like the ‘Cultural League for South Serbia’ (Kulturna Liga za Juzˇnu Srbiju), took the same line.254 The demands for cancelling the Geneva Convention remained in vain. On the contrary: the new Opium Decree of 10 December 1938, which came into force on 14 January 1939, made the situation even worse, as it included draconian punishments for smuggling, which had developed because Prizad paid lower prices than the Greek merchants.255 So all of the measures intended to protect opium producers ultimately only turned against them. Prizad was founded in order to cut out the intermediate traders. But in the end the monopoly this company enjoyed only resulted in even lower prices and – as with tobacco – it gave free rein to the various machinations of its agents. For the Macedonian producers, the agreement made by Yugoslavia with Turkey in order to obtain a better position against the pharmaceutical cartel, also proved instead to be disadvantageous. They were only to sell their products together through an office in Istanbul, with Turkey receiving a quota of 75 per cent while Yugoslavia received one of 25 per cent. Yet the USA, for example, would much rather have bought Macedonian raw opium that was of higher quality and more profitable, as customs duties were levied according to weight regardless of the morphine content. Now though they had to buy mainly Turkish opium.256 Milan Stojadinovic´ was the first representative of the government, who, on the occasion of his visit to Skopje on 15 November 1936, criticised the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention: We were in too much of hurry to sign an international agreement in Geneva, according to which we concerned ourselves with the health of the Chinese and other people in the Far East, but when we signed this Convention, we didn’t ask ourselves: and who will concern themselves with the lives and livelihoods of our poor farmers in the South, who up to now have lived from poppy growing and are unable to find any other income or source of bread.257 Cancellation of the Convention, however, was never seriously considered as Yugoslavia could not afford to step out of line again. In 1939, the producers

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did, for the first time, receive higher prices again for raw opium.258 The increased demand arising from the war259 led once again in 1940 to a clear increase up to 25 dinars per unit of morphine, which for an average content of 15 units per kilogram led to a price of 550 to 600 dinars against 300 to 350 in the previous year. Since in the meantime, however, the cost of living had also risen sharply, this price increase did not result in a real improvement in income and dissatisfaction in the South remained.260 Similar to tobacco, in the case of pharmaceutical opium, the state proved to be incapable of looking after a very valuable product – that could have brought considerable income for Macedonia – in such a way that both its own fiscal interests, as well as the welfare of the producers, were served. When it did, for once, introduce well-intentioned measures as in the case of the bank loans, they were so badly implemented that they failed. Once again this case demonstrates how disastrous it was if measures were decided in Belgrade, without consulting those who were affected or understood the situation on the spot. The interventions of the Prizad Company developed into a complete fiasco. Clearly nobody was capable of learning from the experience of the ‘Monopoly’ and distancing themselves from a mindset that was only focused on increasing state revenue – and that in a very shortsighted manner. The local businessmen proved for their part unable to compete with the long-established, large trading houses in Thessaloniki. The latter had capital, experience, contacts, the customers’ trust, and were connected to the world through major ports. Regardless of the product being traded – Greek dominance in the export trade was impossible to break. Holm Sundhaussen rejects old explanations for the backwardness of the agrarian sector in south-eastern Europe: Neither dependency on abroad nor ‘unfair exchange’ between the industrial and agrarian states, nor shortage of land or shortage of capital, but rather lack of motivation and competence prove themselves to be not the only, but rather the actual causes for the missed agricultural revolution in the Balkan region. He also did not see overpopulation as valid, as the intensification processes not only discourage, but can also serve to stimulate. Which one of the two occurs depends – according to Sundhaussen and Daskalov – on the ability of society to react and adapt. These capabilities can grow slowly or be deliberately promoted. In the Balkan area, however, neither of these two occurred,261 so that motivation and competence were lacking among the farmers. Competence depends on raising the educational level, as there are many techniques, which

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require only a little capital, but require knowledge (rational crop rotation, use of organic fertiliser, new plant breeds, simple techniques like the drying of plums). The political elites for their part seriously underestimated the agricultural sector’s significance for social and economic development.262 This assessment is largely accurate for Macedonia, where the rural population struggled with great uncertainties. The state’s efforts to change this remained only marginal. There were just two agricultural schools at the lowest level. The number of courses – in an unaccustomed language – did not correspond with what was needed at all. Only very late, in the second half of the 1930s, were efforts made to introduce new techniques, to improve the quality of seeds and breeding animals, and to bring new types and breeds into circulation. Previously it was optimistically expected that the settling of colonists from agriculturally more progressive regions would to some extent lead to a spurt in Macedonia’s development. Yet at the same time the state largely left these colonists out in the cold. The roles played by shortage of capital and unfair exchange should not, however, be underestimated. Most Macedonian farmers were so poor that they were incapable of making any investments at all. Favourable loans would have been helpful to them. On the other hand, it was not always due to ‘primitive’ modes of production that agriculture was not profitable. In many branches in Macedonia, all of the increased value earned by producers was skimmed off by others: on the one side by the state through an excessive tax burden and very low purchase prices, especially for tobacco; on the other by the well-organised domestic and especially foreign cartels, which dictated very low prices for all Macedonia’s export items – cattle, raw opium, silk cocoons, cheese – so that the profit from these products was accumulated by the trading houses in Thessaloniki and the Western European pharmaceutical companies. Despite very hard work, the farming families were left with hardly any return; in many cases they did not even get back their own costs of production. Unfair exchange, therefore, did play an important role. For the integration of Yugoslavia as a unitary state it was disadvantageous that Macedonia’s economic connections with the other parts of the country – or even also just with Serbia – were largely neglected. Agriculture and cattleraising – the most important economic branches in the region – were scarcely brought into the economic circulation of the country. Macedonia could not sell its products in the north. The customers were located, as in Ottoman times, in the neighbouring territories to the east, south and west. Only now national borders had gone up everywhere there, which greatly hindered the exchange of goods. Of decisive significance was the fact that Thessaloniki, previously the port and trading centre for the entire Macedonian region, now lay abroad. The 90 kilometres from the border town of Gevgelija to

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Thessaloniki could be impassable, if Greek policy so desired. Or, the journey could take one month due to chicaneries, as was complained of in a 1924 newspaper article,263 and was very expensive. There, where an exchange between Macedonia and the rest of Yugoslavia did take place, it bore the hallmarks of a colonial relationship: Macedonia’s raw materials were bought up at very low prices, while industrial goods from the northern regions, like those imported from abroad, flooded the region, ruining the craftsmen and preventing the establishment of local industries.

CHAPTER 5 THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

The Elementary Schools The significance of elementary education for the development of a modern society is well known and does not need explaining in detail here. Especially with regard to the economic sphere the connection is clear. Thus one knows from experience with developmental aid that people already achieve better returns per hectare when they can add and subtract. Other important areas, where education plays a large role, are political participation and national integration. In a modern state a people can only exercise their political rights if they can at least read and write.1 And only such citizens can be reached by national propaganda. A state which conceives of its leadership elite as modern must therefore assign school education a high priority. In the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1921, half of the population (51.4 per cent) could neither read nor write. Only in Albania, Portugal and Spain was the proportion of illiterates higher.2 However, the rate of illiteracy was very unevenly spread across the country. Whilst in the former Hapsburg territories it was very low (Slovenia: 8.85 per cent) or comparatively low (Croatia/Slavonia: 32.65 per cent), in Serbia it was 64.4 per cent, rising in Bosnia to 80.56 per cent and reached its highest level in those parts that had been under Ottoman rule for the longest period: ‘South Serbia’ had a rate of 83.86 per cent.3 The low level of literacy in 1920 reflected the poor record of school attendance: throughout the country only half of the children attended school. Also in this respect the regional differences were striking. Whilst in Slovenia 90 per cent of the children went to school, in Croatia-Slavonia it was 82 per cent, but only 40 per cent in Macedonia and Kosovo. The low level of school attendance was only secondarily linked to the poverty of the population. The main obstacle was the lack of schools. The obligation to go to school, which in 1929 was doubled to eight years, could only be implemented in Slovenia.4

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The figures show clearly that elementary school education, especially in the southern parts of the country, represented a large and urgent task. However, the start of the school system in Macedonia after World War I was very difficult. In those schools that were still standing, everything was lacking. The furniture, as well as the doors and windows, had all been burned as firewood by the troops quartered there during the war. Initially the children had to bring chairs with them from home. Sanitary facilities were lacking, as were schoolbooks. The Bulgarian occupants had burned all the Serbian books together with the school archives; the Bulgarian books, however, could no longer be used now under the Serbian regime. But there was especially a shortage of teachers, and where there were some, of apartments for teachers.5 In 1918, in the entire country, there were only 11,000 teachers for 5,600 elementary schools.6 Here Serbia’s heavy casualties during World War I made their presence felt, as especially in the ranks of the educated class there was now a gaping hole. According to the law regarding the elementary schools it was the responsibility of the school communities to build and maintain schools, while the teachers were civil servants. The community taxes (opsˇtinski prirez) were supposed to be used to pay for the schools, but they were insufficient and were frequently only disbursed too late. In addition, according to the report of the school inspector, the communities had suffered to such an extent during the war that they were in absolutely no condition to be able to do anything for the schools.7 The considerable importance of school education for integrating Macedonia within Serbia was stressed from the start, whereby usually in the same breath it was complained that precisely in this area not enough was being done. The Swiss Serbophile Rudolph A. Reiss criticised that, until 1921, in contrast to the reconstruction of buildings in the field of education little had been done. Yet in his opinion the school was one of the most powerful instruments, for making out of the ‘otherwise stubborn [zatucani] Macedonians’, even out of the ‘Bulgoromans’ among them, excellent Serbs. In Resen, for example, people made the following calculation: in the Turkish period there were 15 elementary schools and a (Bulgarian) high school. Now there were seven elementary schools and no high school. The numerous villages on the left bank of the Crna River, which were in the front-line area during the war, no longer have a single school. In almost all of the areas visited by Reiss there was a lack of every kind of educational facility. ‘In Macedonia one has to establish schools that are centres of education and of nationalisation.’ He recommended sending only Serbian teachers there, not Croats or Slovenes, who were not suited for it. On the one hand they might conceive such a deployment as banishment; on the other it was a matter in this

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case of an important patriotic mission, which everyone who was sent there had to know and understand. Despite the glaring shortage of educational facilities, Reiss recommended closing the foreign schools, as they were of no use at all and ‘unworthy of the great Serbian People’. He considered that they were bad – one could not even learn proper Serbian there.8 The Serbian officials on the spot also complained about the lack of schools. The District Head in Kavadarci, who experienced that the population was very suspicious towards the authorities, thought that the people could only be won over through the schools and the teachers, and he recommended that there had to be investment in education. He was also of the opinion that was not common among the officials that with just a few exceptions the teachers were doing excellent work.9 The prefects (nacˇelnici okruga), actually officials of the Interior Ministry, also kept an eye on the schools and wrote reports and recommendations, which their Ministry forwarded to the Education Ministry. Their proposals all stressed the need to do more for education in these areas, such as building apartments for the teachers.10 In his report on 9 November 1921, Vojislav Banovic´, the prefect in Tikvesˇ, insisted that educational policy had to be changed. Great sacrifices had to be made for the schools, as only through them could this people be ‘nationalized’. The more schools that were built, the less gendarmerie barracks would be necessary. Not force but schools should kindle love for the state. ‘One can rule with bayonets, but one cannot sit on them’.11 In 1922, however, the schoolhouses in ‘South Serbia’ were still in a desolate state and represented a disgrace, as the Skopje newspaper Juzˇna Srbija complained. The author of the article demanded that the communities, counties (srezovi) and districts (okolii) should receive more autonomy in the field of education, as if one were to wait for an improvement in the condition of the state, it might take a long time.12 In fact it was the communities on their own who built the urgently needed elementary schools. Only a small fraction of the 198 new schools built in Vardar Macedonia between 1921 and 193013 received any contribution from the state. And the cost of building a school house was expensive, costing on average between 400,000 and 500,000 dinars.14 In 1931, Vevcˇani in the Struga District, which was large and comparatively wealthy, prepared to build a schoolhouse. The estimated cost of 600,000 dinars was, however, far beyond the resources of the village, such that the school was still not finished in October 1932. At the request of the peasants, the state and the Banovina promised help, but this never arrived. On account of this, the teacher repeatedly went to see the District Head and made himself very unpopular, such that the latter did nothing for the school, but he did request the transfer of the annoying teacher to the ‘worst of all the villages in the District’.15

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Despite the recognised need for something to be done, the money placed at the disposal of the Education Ministry remained constantly meagre. Its share of the state budget rose from 2.48 per cent in 1919–20 only up to 5.71 per cent in 1928– 9. In 1927 the local self-administration units spent 6.2 per cent of their budget on education. At the beginning of the 1920s, expenses for the military and the gendarmerie by contrast swallowed 22 per cent of the state budget. The in any case small expenditures were additionally spread very unevenly across the country. In 1928–9, the most money for education per 10,000 inhabitants was spent in Slovenia (116.6 dinars), and the least was in Bosnia-Herzegovina (31.2 dinars). Macedonia and Kosovo received 69.2 dinars, a sum that was similar to the amount for Serbia and Croatia.16 In 1935, the proposed state budget for education in the Vardar Banovina was all of 600,000 dinars and according to the plans of the Finance Ministry it was first going to be cut by 20 per cent. Mita Dimitrijevic´ and three other representatives from the Banovina subsequently intervened with the prime minister arguing that the means were insufficient and that education in the South was very important.17 The lion’s share of educational expenditure went to the higher schools and universities. As in all other fields, political instability and the high turnover in personnel at the Education Ministry and in the administrative apparatus resulting from that, made it difficult to implement a planned approach to the issue.18 The ‘National’ Task of the Schools and the Local Teachers A large problem alongside the lack of school buildings and the poor condition of the existing ones was also the already mentioned severe shortage of teachers. Like all other officials, the teachers were very reluctant to go to Macedonia and left the area again at the earliest possible opportunity. In order to motivate teachers from other parts of the country, especially from Serbia, extra local allowances were granted. In addition, from 1920 eight months of service in ‘South Serbia’ counted as a full year for pension purposes. From 1 September 1923 the ratio was even increased to 1:2.19 The local teachers, who in part had received their training in Bulgarian ‘Exarchite’ institutions, were viewed by the authorities with great suspicion. Essentially they were counted as enemies of the state and had first to prove that this was not the case. The people are being isolated from the state by the teachers and are walling themselves in even more, ‘like a Chinese Wall’, in the opinion of the District Head in Galicˇnik in 1919.20 According to an Army report prepared in the autumn of 1926 in the Bitola region (oblast), about the 470 elementary school teachers, of which 111 were ‘Exarchite’ teachers (all of them men): ‘Around 360 are Serbian trainees, but among them are a large

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number of women, if not almost half.’ This was a disadvantage, as women were seen as not well-suited for the ‘national task’. The Army report described it as a great mistake that ‘Bulgarian’ teachers were still being employed. The reasons given reveal educational policy priorities very clearly: ‘In a village it is better to have no school at all than a school with a teacher, who teaches the children that they are Macedonians.’ It would, however, be wrong to dismiss the ‘Exarchite’ teachers – they are after all citizens – ‘but in the interest of our common Serbian cause one should pension off all the older ones and remove the younger ones from South Serbia and re-assign them within Serbia’s old borders’.21 These were the findings of a member of the Army, but they were passed on without comment by Zˇika Lazic´, the head of the Security Department within the Interior Ministry, to the Educational Ministry – ‘to be noted and for the necessary measures to be taken’. In 1927 the Ministry of Education sent an emissary to Prilep, who was to examine carefully the teacher training college and the high school there. This operation was probably connected with the arrest of Dimitrije Ðuzelovic´ and his like-minded comrades at the end of May, who had been accused of forming an IMRO youth organisation and of plotting against the state. As a result, the regime was alarmed about youth activities and it is very likely that other institutions apart from the schools in Prilep were under closely scrutiny. According to the emissary’s report sent on 30 June 1927, the ‘Exarchite’ teachers were one of the reasons it was difficult to awaken the ‘national spirit’ in the population. They were members of organisations hostile to the state and through them communication with the ‘Bulgarian Committee’ was being maintained. And they kept alive false opinions about the provisional character of the current state of affairs. The emissary had also discovered that some teachers in Prilep had founded the Association for Literature, Science and Culture (Knjizˇevnonaucˇno-kulturno drusˇtvo) Sv. Kliment Ohridski, which wanted to counter the (Serbian-leaning) Association of Sv. Sava and develop ideas that were ‘hostile to the state’. It was the great merit of the director of the high school in Prilep that he found a way to destroy this Association. This reporter also urgently recommended the transfer of the ‘Exarchite’ teachers, in such a way that no two of them were sent to the same place nor were even working close to each other.22 Two years later the country-wide reduction of high schools was exploited to close down both the high school and the teachers training college in Prilep. One of the main concerns of the authorities was that the Macedonian teachers spoke ‘in dialect’ with the children and could instil in them a false national consciousness. The school supervisor in Bitola complained on 26 March 1927 to the director of a school that Jerina Markovic´ka, a teacher of the third class born in Strumica, was frequently using ‘dialect’ as the

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‘written language’, just like her students. In addition the children openly said: ‘We are Macedonians and speak the Macedonian language.’ The teacher was suspected to have taught them this. She explained in her response on 27 June 1927 that the children had asked to her surprise: ‘Mrs. Teacher, we can’t understand what you are saying, we would like you to speak Macedonian with us.’ She wanted to convince them that there was no such thing as the Macedonian language, but up until then there had not been enough time for her to succeed in this. According to the teacher, this class had had a number of different teachers, so they were not very good at the ‘written language’. In his letter to the Education Department in Bitola, the school supervisor did not believe that the children had asked to use ‘dialect’ on their own initiative. He was decisively of the opinion that finally those teachers unsuited for this region had to be got rid of.23 The number of cases in which Macedonian teachers were transferred to Serbia or Bosnia, just because they spoke the ‘local dialect’, even if it was only outside the classroom, or because they had been trained in an ‘Exarchite institution’, was countless. But many of the teachers who did not intentionally use the Macedonian dialect, also gave rise to criticism because they had not mastered the Serbian language sufficiently, even if they completed the corresponding courses in Belgrade. They allegedly spoke ‘Bulgarian’ repeatedly and also taught the children in ‘Bulgarian’, but at the same time instructed the children ‘that they were Macedonians and not Serbs’.24 A teacher from Tetovo defended himself against the accusation that he taught the children in the Bulgarian language. As a former ‘Exarchite’ teacher, he had completed an 18-month course and passed an exam set by a state commission in pedagogy and in the ‘national group of subjects’ (language, history, geography, culture, as well as the Church History of the Serbs).25 He made an effort not to make any mistakes: but if he did speak incorrectly, then it was not in the ‘language of the Bulgarian people’, but ‘in the pure provincial language of South Serbia’, and he hoped any small linguistic mistakes he made would be forgiven.26 Even those authors that otherwise claimed that the ‘Exarchite’ teachers were good and conscientious workers, had to admit that many of them were badly stumbling over the ‘written language’.27 The complaints about Macedonian teachers, who only inadequately knew the Serbian language, were still resounding in the 1930s. Correspondingly, the knowledge of Serbian in the general population was frequently poor, even among the educated, as an example demonstrates: in the short letter of the pharmacist and graduate, Anastas J. Filipovic´, which he sent to the town council in Bitola on 6 November 1939, numerous grammatical errors can be found.28

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Transfers of teachers were also widely practised in other parts of the country, but there usually in connection with affinity for the ‘wrong’ political party, that is to say, the party that at that time was no longer in power.29 In Macedonia, by contrast, the striking criteria were those of ‘National correctness’. Suspicions were easily aroused. Frequently it was argued that someone had behaved suspiciously during the Bulgarian occupation.30 Others caught the eye, as they did not do any ‘public work’ outside the classroom.31 One could also appear suspicious if one did not celebrate the slava, seen as the typical Serbian feast.32 A teacher was accused, among other things, of keeping the picture of the most important Serbian saint, Sava, and other historic paintings in his drawer and not even hanging it up in the school room on the occasion of the Saint Sava holiday. ‘This fact is most revealing about the true attitude of this teacher’. He and another colleague from the same county (srez) should therefore be transferred to ‘nationally pure regions.’33 The manner in which the Saint Sava holiday was celebrated appeared to be a sensitive issue and served well as a reliable way of measuring the national correctness of the teaching staff. A school inspector reported as follows about his journey on 27 January, that is in the middle of winter, to a remote village, in order to check on a suspected teacher in this regard: With two other teachers, I convinced myself that together with the students he had put up the decorations in way that could not be criticized and the programme with songs and speeches was in its

Figure 5.1 Macedonian Teachers on a Course in Belgrade, 1923 (DARM, 1.870.2/1919 – 41)

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place, but one could clearly see that for his part, the teacher had not put in any enthusiasm or love, but that he was only doing the work, which fed him.34 The Muslims also had to celebrate Saint Sava.35 In 1934, the Education Ministry wanted to declare this day a state school holiday, but it encountered strong resistance from the Catholic Church.36 In 1929, the move made by the director of the citizens’ school in Kocˇani against one of his teachers, who was ‘Macedonian and as such unfavourable for the region there’ and stayed away from all national demonstrations, proved to be a boomerang. The teacher was able to clear his name subsequently, but the denouncer received a reprimand from the Education Minister because he had described the teacher as a ‘Macedonian’ in official correspondence.37 The lapse by the director demonstrates that unofficially among the Serbs it was usual to use the term ‘Macedonian’. Dismissals and transfers initiated by the Interior Ministry on grounds of ‘state and national interest’ were also very common throughout the 1930s.38 There were also school supervisors, however, who had gradually become fed up with the hounding of local teachers, and who preferred to judge the quality of the teaching personnel based on other criteria than their national reliability. The county school supervisor in Skopje exploded in 1929, when a 64-year-old teacher in Galicˇnik was exposed by the gendarmerie because Bulgarian books were found in his possession. It was alleged that he educated his (own) children – who certainly had been grown-ups for some time – in accordance with these school books. The supervisor complained to the Gand Zˇupan that everyone – the gendarmerie, the police, and the Army – were coming down on the teacher and were allowed to accuse him of hostility to the state simply on the basis of owning Bulgarian books.39 In a letter dated 4 March 1929, addressed to the Education Department in Bitola, the school supervisor in Kicˇevo County opposed the planned transfer of local teachers. He defended all the accused, who had all been described as nationally unreliable. Most were good workers, who taught the children in a nationally correct manner. ‘In accordance with my deep conviction, our wellunderstood state interest requires that we leave these people in peace and give them the trust, which they are longing for.’ In his opinion, one should not assign them any more importance than they deserved. On the other hand, he thought it was appropriate to show the teachers, and all those around them, that they belonged ‘to us’.40 On 25 July 1929, he confirmed in a letter to the prefect of Kicˇevo County once again that the three male and two female teachers in question, the only former Exarchites in the entire county, had not given any cause for criticism and should be left in their schools.41 This official

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was one of very few who considered how the teachers and the population might feel themselves, and was prepared to advocate trust and cooperation instead of controls and punitive measures. He recognised that the loyalty of the local population could only be gained in this manner. Such insights, however, achieved nothing at the higher levels of the administration. In the 1930s the Banovina Administration complained repeatedly because the Education Ministry transferred what were, in their opinion, good teachers without even consulting the Banovina.42 The eminently political character of the transfers is underlined by the fact that frequently they took place at the request of the Interior Ministry or the Ministry of the Army and the Fleet. Thus it was the latter, which in a letter dated 6 June 1927, demanded of the Education Ministry that all ‘Exarchite’ teachers be removed from ‘South Serbia’.43 On 5 March 1928, it demanded again that ‘all local officials from South Serbia subordinated to your Ministry be removed’.44 The Macedonian teachers should not only learn the language within ‘the old borders’, but also how ‘to think and work like a Serb’.45 The Education Ministry for its part requested that the Interior Ministry safeguard the security of the schools and the teachers, as, especially in the border regions to the east, all the teachers from Serbia did not stay long.46 The Education Ministry largely complied with the requests of the other ministries for transfers, if also, in view of the shortage of teachers, not with enthusiasm.47 In 1932, 302 teaching positions in Macedonia remained unfilled and in 57 schools there were no teachers at all. Therefore, it is no surprise that the classes had around 60 children.48 In individual villages in the remote valley of Mariovo, in 1939 there were still more than 100 children per teacher.49 At the beginning of 1928, the Education Ministry really turned the tables on the Ministry of the Army and the Fleet and asked it to assist them with finding teachers. It made a request to interrupt the training of 120 cadets at the School for Reserve Officers in the Infantry and the Artillery, who had passed teacher training courses, and for them to be assigned to serve as teachers in Macedonia. In this manner, 89 teachers with ‘solid national character’ arrived from Serbia on 1 February 1928, to be assigned to work in the Macedonian schools.50 The concern about the correct political, and above all, national sentiments of the teachers is not surprising, if one considers that the transmission of education was only of secondary importance in view of the ‘national tasks’. According to the first National School Law, issued in 1929, it was the school’s task, ‘through teaching and education in the spirit of the unity of the State and the Nation and of religious tolerance, to make out of the students, decent, loyal, and active members of the State, the People, and of the social community’.51 Reading and writing classes had the aim of ‘developing awareness of national unity and of national pride’.52 It was expected of the teachers that they eradicate the ‘false

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conceptions’, which the children received at home and strengthened their national feelings.53 Ultimately the teachers were supposed almost on their own to make good Serbs out of the people in Macedonia and educate them as well, on the side. In a circular issued by the Education Minister Kosta Kumanudi, dated 24 January 1928, the ideal conduct of teachers was laid down, which was to be especially valid in those regions, which previously had been under foreign rule. Alongside much else, a teacher should especially remain at school, if at all possible, on Sundays and Holidays, as on these days almost the only opportunity existed for coming into close contact with the people. He should under no circumstances make fun of the people’s customs, but rather wipe out the ugly traditions tactfully and carefully, and consolidate or introduce the good ones (like for example, the slava feast, advent customs, and others).54 According to the school inspector in the Skopje district, it was one of the most important duties, especially for the teachers in the elementary schools, ‘to win the people for our general cause and to work towards anchoring in them the awareness that this ground had always been only Serbian’. In the winter, the school inspector had already prepared a list of those teachers who should be transferred, and hammered home again that now ‘the time has come to finally cleanse this region from all suspicious and lazy elements, and to ensure that the elementary school is placed in reliable hands’.55 For the struggle against teachers and priests, who were suspected of cooperating with the Macedonian Committee in Bulgaria, the Commandant of the Military District (vojni okrug) of Kicˇevo dreamed up a special measure in 1934: he proposed taking the children of such people as hostages and then making it clear to the parents, ‘that YOUR CHILDREN will NOT live’, if peace and order was not restored.56 However, apparently nobody wanted to take it this far. There is no evidence that this idea was pursued any further. The consequence of the systematic removal of local teachers was that in the school year 1931 – 2, of the 2,920 teachers in the schools of the Vardar Banovina, only 28.7 per cent had been born there. Reservations were shown not only towards the Macedonian teachers, but also to the Montenegrin ones, if partly for other reasons. According to inspector’s reports they were keen on picking an argument, pedantic and arrogant.57 This provoked the hatred of the local population, which was then transferred against the entire state.58 But the Montenegrin teachers also gave the authorities some concerns regarding their national correctness: On account of this [due to arrogance etc.] one should keep them out of the Vardar Banovina as far as possible, or only send those Montenegrin teachers here, of which one knows for sure that they are in favour of the unity of Yugoslavia.

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The only suitable officials for this Banovina came ‘from the old Vojvodina, the stony Lika, the Sˇumadija, and from other regions with a pure conception of the unity of the State, a beautiful language, and who hold honourable views about this uneducated and in every respect backward people’.59 The obsession with ‘nationalisation’, as the only criteria for the success of schools, is expressed also in a report by the correspondent of the Central Press Office from 31 May 1930. Milan Jovanovic´ found that over the previous 10 years, especially the schools in Veles had made progress. This consisted in the fact that, as he convinced himself personally, all the children spoke Serbian, although they frequently ‘out of spite also spoke Bulgarian or something similar, that was garbled (unakarateno), terrible’. He had heard that assimilation was progressing faster in the villages than in the towns, as there the people had been ‘poisoned’ for longer and more intensively. In the villages by contrast, there had been no Bulgarian schools [in the Ottoman period], such that Serbian teachers now get better results there.60 The Hunger for Education among the Population The desire for education, especially among the Christian population, was also present to a strong degree in the countryside, and the people were ready and willing to build and maintain schools. In 1923, the prefect in Prespa stressed, in a letter dated 3 December to the Gand Zˇupan of the Bitola District that the population in several villages had done everything and had built new schools together with apartments for the teachers, but that the state was not filling these posts. The citizens came to him and asked him to work for the appointment of teachers. The peasants felt that it was ‘unjust that their children remained blind and uneducated, as they had done everything that had been asked of them to support the building of schools’. The prefect asked the Gand Zˇupan, to press this concern with the Education Minister. Just two days later the Gand Zˇupan passed this request on to the Education Minister, and on 16 January, the instruction of the minister was issued to fill the vacant positions in the District of Bitola.61 Whether this actually happened is another question. But in this moment clearly the will and intention to act were present. In 1927, the community of Sveti Nikole had also built a school house at considerable material sacrifice and complained in 1931 about there being too few teachers, such that the children could not complete their schooling.62 Up until the end of the interwar period schools remained a priority concern for the population. The Ban Novakovic´ wrote in 1937 to Stojadinovic´ that every village wants to have a school and many are being built.63 According to a letter of the Banovina Administration on 14 November 1935, the peasants in a village near Strumica respected their school ‘like a church . . . as they have

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consecrated it with great honour’.64 The short-term Macedonian Post Minister Jovan Altiparmakovic´ was convinced in 1939 that nowhere else in Yugoslavia were the schools so cherished as in the Vardar Banovina. According to his statements, no other region had found so much money itself for the establishment of elementary schools. Peasants had even gone into debt in order to build a school.65 But the state continued to meet its responsibilities in an unsatisfactory manner. According to the representative Stamenko Stosˇic´ from Kriva Palanka, more than 50 per cent of the schools newly built by the population had to be closed, because the state did not want to pay for a teacher.66 Hundreds of teaching posts remained unoccupied throughout the interwar period. On 9 September 1939, the Banovina reported to the Education Ministry that the school year had begun with 393 schools or classes in the villages that did not have a teacher. It complained that many single teachers left the region again after only a few years, those territories, for which their fathers and brothers had given their lives.67 In 1940, there were even 550 classes without teachers; 250 schools were not operating at all. The problems of recruiting teachers were largely the same as 20 years before: many people left after only a short time, others never even started their service, but managed somehow to get transferred again straight away. The wishes of the Ban Rafajlovic´, formulated in a letter to the Education Minister Korosˇec, still sounded just like the corresponding desires at the beginning of the 1920s: the Ban demanded that all the teaching posts be occupied, primarily with teachers from the Serbian regions. At the same time care should be taken regarding the type of candidates sent to the South. He wanted the available ‘Exarchite’ teachers transferred as unsuitable and those of retirement age were to be pensioned immediately. This last demand had already been made in 1926 using precisely the same words by the Head of the Security Department in the Interior Ministry, Zˇika Lazic´. Rafajlovic´ also disseminated proposals for resolving the teacher shortage. It should be demanded of the newly appointed teachers that they remained for at least two or three years. In return they could subsequently be transferred to the place of their choice. This was how officers were handled, who had to go to ‘difficult places’. And finally he proposed the reintroduction of bonuses that had been abolished (service years counting double, special supplements). ‘I make this proposal after having seen the local conditions on the spot personally’.68 The newspaper published in Tetovo Glas Pologa commented as follows on the flight of teachers from Macedonia: ‘That means our Banovina is still “Siberia” to the teachers, just as 20 years ago. And that is how it is. Both from a moral and a material standpoint.’ The article continues by noting that

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even the least political change would result in the transfer or dismissal of numerous teachers, not to mention other chicaneries. The cost of living was still too high, while the allowances had been removed without warning, in order to demonstrate that the situation in this region had normalised. The newspaper established that in the Danube Banovina, which lay in second place regarding literacy, every year 14 dinars per head were expended on education, while in the Vardar Banovina by contrast it was only 7 dinars. ‘We are interested: When will people see that the problems, which persist in this region, can only be solved by an intensive education of the people?’69 In 1932, two letters from the Interior Minister Zˇika Lazic´ to the Education Minister achieved at least some short-term effect. As the former Head of the Security Department at the Interior Ministry and as the first Ban of the Vardar Banovina, Lazic´ knew Macedonia very well. He was surprised and angry, because in the 1932– 3 school year there were 248 classes without teachers in the Banovina, and he requested the Education Minster to fill these positions quickly, as it was very important to improve this backward people culturally. In his second letter, Lazic´ stressed that the parliamentarians and also individual respected personalities from ‘South Serbia’ complained with good reason about the shortage of schools and teachers. Lazic´ thought that one could save on teachers everywhere else in the country, but not in ‘South Serbia’, where literacy needs to be expedited, especially also with respect to awakening national feelings. Particularly in view of the foreign propaganda – meaning the Bulgarian – which is conducted on account of the so-called ‘Macedonian question’, every year without a teacher is of great damage to the country. Already on 7 November, only just two weeks after the second letter, most of the positions were apparently filled.70 Here it is clear that the Yugoslav state was not in a position to pursue consistently a policy that was seen as rational and necessary. It depended rather on the constellation of personalities at any particular moment, whether measures were taken or not. The willingness of the population to make sacrifices for the construction of schools, which is clearly recognisable in the sources, was linked to the considerable hunger for education that the German ethnographer Gustav Weigand encountered in Macedonia in 1924. According to his observations, the ‘Bulgarian’ peasant, who had achieved a degree of prosperity, had a burning desire for his sons to be properly educated. These became craftsmen in the towns, and their children merchants in the homeland, or emigrated and were successful.71 Alongside the constantly repeated demand for more schools and teachers, the sharp increase in the proportion of children from peasant backgrounds in the high schools is a good indicator of this desire for education. In the 1920 –1 school year their share was only 7.52 per cent, just six years later it had risen to 20.57 per cent.72

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There were also groups in the population, however, that more or less boycotted the school system. In 1929, the Muslims (mainly Turks) comprised 34.5 per cent of the population in Skopje, but only 19.6 per cent of the schoolchildren were Muslims; especially the girls were missing.73 In some Turkish villages in Macedonia in 1928, not a single girl attended school.74 The Muslims had demanded autonomy in school affairs after the establishment of the state, which the state did not wish to permit. Even so, in Macedonia alongside Serbo-Croat, Turkish was a language of instruction, which was used in some schools, especially in western Macedonia.75 These schools were also attended by Albanian children. The Albanians were supposedly satisfied with this situation and did not demand school instruction in Albanian. In the view of the Banovina Administration, the Albanians thought it was right that, as before 1912, their children were instructed in Turkish. It is most unlikely that this claim was accurate. In Debar, for example, Albanian teachers were wanted, even though only a few of the inhabitants, who described themselves partly as Turkish and partly as Albanian, spoke Albanian. Debar was only four kilometres from the Albanian border, such that these demands, in the view of the author of the report, were due to the influence of Albanian ‘chauvinists’, who dreamed of a Greater Albania.76 This appeal did not meet with success; no Albanian schools were established in the interwar period. That the population wanted their children to be taught in their mother tongue, despite the contrary claims of the Banovina Administration, is demonstrated by the fact that in the 1930s around 1,000 children living in the border area went to school in Albania. In addition, underground schools were established in Yugoslavia, which were at least in part financed from Albania.77 On the other hand, Albanian was not ostracised like the Macedonian language. One could study Albanian philology at the University of Belgrade (from 1905) and in Zagreb (from 1916).78 Since there were too few Turkish schools, many Muslims would rather not send their children to school at all than have them taught in the Serbian educational facilities. There were representatives of the authorities who had no problem with this and expressed the opinion that one should leave the numerically quite large Muslim population uneducated and not insist that they be taught by Serbian teachers.79 Therefore, illiteracy among the Muslims, whether they were Turks, Albanians or Macedonians, remained particularly high. In the interwar period, more than 80 per cent of the Albanians were still illiterate.80 In the schools of advanced education, where only Serbian was used, the Muslims were almost completely unrepresented. The difference between the sexes was especially marked among the Muslims, but can also be noted among the rest of the population in Yugoslavia. The proportion of girls in the elementary and high schools in 1919–20 lay at

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one-third and scarcely changed up to 1938.81 In 1931, throughout the country 44.3 per cent of men were literate, but only 14.5 per cent of women.82 Precisely a lack of literacy among women makes it difficult to overcome traditional ways of thinking and behaving, which is a prerequisite for economic development.83 At the end of the interwar period the severe school situation in Macedonia was anything but resolved; as everywhere in Yugoslavia, due to high population growth and stagnant construction during the Great Depression, it had instead got worse. In 1932 the Vardar Banovina had more than 1,098 elementary schools with a total of 2,393 classes; until 1936 the number increased slightly to 1,148 schools and 2,572 classes, only to fall back behind the 1932 total by 1938: 1,073 schools with 2,620 classes. Against this, the number of school children climbed from 111,220 to 132,716 in 1936, and then to 143,756 in 1938. Average class size rose as a result between 1932 and 1938 from 46.5 to 54.9, which was not far from the overall average in Yugoslavia of 53.8. The situation was similar in all of the Banovinas, as in none of them was school construction being given high priority. Nonetheless, access to schools and therefore the extent to which children were covered, varied considerably. During 1932 in the Drava Banovina, where there was one school for every 1,357 inhabitants, in the worst-covered Vrbas Banovina it was only one school for every 2,606 inhabitants. The Vardar Banovina, where the elementary schools were assigned so much significance for the national cause, stood quite well compared with the rest of Yugoslavia with one school for every 1,434 inhabitants.84 Overall quite a bit had been invested in the elementary schools, to which the local population had made an outstanding contribution. Nonetheless, at the end of the interwar period, with one school for every 1,718 inhabitants, apart from Albania, Yugoslavia had the weakest school network in Europe. At the end of the 1930s, the European average was one school for every 995 inhabitants.85

Secondary School Education The Struggle for the High Schools Alongside the – in view of the great need – overall inadequate support in the field of education, there were also certain problematic structural developments in Yugoslavia. The Annual Report of the British embassy for 1924 criticised that, in the SHS Kingdom, technical schools were being neglected in favour of high schools and universities. There were too many university graduates who then could not find a job.86 The Croatian Peasant Party politician Stjepan Radic´ concluded in 1925 in his function of Education Minister that in this agricultural country far too much emphasis was placed on the middle school. He argued in favour of getting rid of certain classes and

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schools and making all middle school students also learn a craft in exchange.87 This one-sided focus on further education through the high schools was also marked in Macedonia, as the following statistics show. Table 5.1

Secular Schools in the Vardar Banovina 1929– 3088

Elementary schools High schools Sec. mod. Schools Teachers’ training colleges

Number

Classes

Boys

Girls

Total

1,153 15 12 1

2,411 179 39 10

70,255 3,939 447 191

36,008 2,086 172 209

102,263 6,025 619 400

A comparison by region shows clearly that the Vardar Banovina did not have as many schools of further education as most other regions: Table 5.2

Schools/Schoolrooms in the Banovinas in 193589

Banovina

High schools

Elementary schools90

Teacher training colleges

Sec. mod. schools

Drava Sava Vrbas Littoral Drina Zeta Danube Morava Vardar Belgrade

15/213 36/432 4/42 11/114 14/214 19/172 27/346 14/173 15/178 15/168

851/2733 1794/3590 471/822 578/1165 663/1668 746/1385 1102/4365 976/2244 1124/2512 44/255

5/31 9/63 1/7 2/15 5/31 3/18 5/37 4/20 1/10 2/19

4/240 49/255 12/55 23/100 17/82 12/46 32/168 2/8 14/51 5/33

In Macedonia, from before the Balkan Wars the population was accustomed to the idea that further education meant ‘high school’ and a relatively dense network of schools existed at this level. Before 1912, under Ottoman rule, there had been 40 Bulgarian pre-high schools and four full high schools in Vardar Macedonia, alongside also Serbian and Greek schools.91 All these institutions were sustained by the corresponding neighbouring countries, which is why the selection of school type is not surprising. For the Serbs, Bulgarians, and Greeks it was not a matter of spreading practical knowledge among the youth abroad in the Ottoman Empire, but a question of disseminating national propaganda there. Probably the biggest mistake made by the Serbian educational system in Vardar Macedonia after 1918 was that the schools remained dedicated to this

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former goal, although Serbia, or rather Yugoslavia, now as ruler of this region should have had other objectives, namely educating citizens, who could participate in the economic, political, and cultural life of the country. After the Balkan Wars, the Serbian state closed all non-Serbian schools and opened in Macedonia two high schools (with eight classes) and eight pre-high schools (with four classes).92 Until 1926 the network of high schools was expanded throughout the country. In Macedonia their number had risen by that date up to 15, of which nine had eight classes.93 Towards the end of the 1920s the closing of high schools came under discussion throughout the country. There were too many graduates, who were trying to join the civil service and could not get a job there. In addition, there was a shortage of qualified teachers. From 1929 the number of high schools was reduced throughout Yugoslavia, in 1931 an entrance exam was introduced and also school fees.94 In Macedonia, the high schools in Kavadarci, Kicˇevo, Resen and Strumica, as well as the teacher training college in Prilep, were closed in 1929. That latter had only been opened in 1922. The full high schools in Veles, Kumanovo, Ohrid, Prilep, and Sˇtip were down-graded to pre-high schools. Only two schools in Skopje (one for boys and one for girls) and one each in Bitola and Tetova remained as full high schools, whose diploma opened the door to studying at university. Pre-high schools continued to exist in Kumanovo, Veles, Sˇtip, Gevgelija, Prilep, Ohrid and Debar, although the latter was then also closed in 1932.95 In 1932, throughout the country only 26 per cent of high schools were for four years,96 but in Macedonia the share of pre-high schools was 60 per cent. This sensitive decimation of the high schools was widely condemned both at the time by the local population, and also subsequently in the historiography of the Republic of Macedonia. The Macedonian historians are convinced that this law was designed specifically for Macedonia and was only implemented there, in order to obstruct intellectual development and the formation of an intelligentsia in this part of the country. The closures were carried out, because these schools, against the expectations of those in power, had not contributed to the denationalisation of the Macedonians.97 Contemporary commentators were also convinced that the high school closings envisaged in the 1928 financial law would hit ‘South Serbia’ the hardest.98 Among the population and the young generation directly affected, the measure was met with outrage. Even in 1939, a young Macedonian complained to the Serbian nationalist Nikola Vulic´ about the continuing serious shortage of high schools in Macedonia up until 1935, while ‘you have a Full High School in very town from C´uprija to Aleksinac . . . Every government has deliberately promoted cultural backwardness and the oppression of [national] consciousness in Macedonia. Those are the facts’.99

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Very soon various ways were sought to reverse the measure. For example, individuals and organisations turned to the ‘Association of South Serbs’ in Belgrade with the request to lobby for the reopening of the higher classes. The craftsmen’s guild in Prilep pointed out in its letter of 22 June 1930 that the citizens were supporting at their own expense a private high school for the fifth and sixth classes. The craftsmen argued for the reopening of the higher classes using those arguments, which seemed to them to promise the best chances of success. Education was necessary for the spiritual and national training of the youth so that the events of history as well as the Serbian language can flow into their souls, which is absolutely necessary ‘for our spiritual union’. A boarding school was also demanded. Parents were now sending their children, filled with fear, to other towns, where, in the absence of parental oversight, they were exposed to the undesirable developments of modern society. Those in Prilep addressed their request for the reopening also to the Education Minister. The town promised in return to put up a new, larger building, together with the Kolo srpskih sestara, a Serbian nationalist women’s association.100 While then, as shown, among the authorities the motto was ‘rather no school than a school without nationally correct teachers’ and the Muslim population largely boycotted the school system, for the Christian population in Macedonia a Serbian school was preferable to having no school. On the basis of their experience with Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek schools in the late Ottoman period, for the Macedonians it was clearly taken for granted that national propaganda was being disseminated in educational institutions. The ‘Association of the South Serbs’ tried to support the concerns of the population by sending a letter to the minister. In 1932, it also advocated the reopening of the upper high school classes in Debar. The line of argument used was again here primarily ‘national’: Albania has opened ‘Bulgarian’ schools on its territory; one now has to oppose this and stop the children form going to school there.101 In a letter of 12 August 1934, the Association brought the other neighbour, Greece, into the picture and calculated for the Education Minister: after 1932, ‘our South’ only had just four full high schools, six half high schools and a single teacher training college, and that in a Banovina with an area of 37,389 square kilometres with about 1.6 million inhabitants. In Greek Macedonia, which was of a similar size (34,892 sq. km, 1.4 million inhabitants), there were by contrast 20 full high schools, 29 half high schools, 7 higher girls’ schools, 9 private middle schools, 6 teacher training colleges, and 5 kindergarten colleges. In two regions, where until the Balkan Wars, the same conditions had prevailed, the picture now looked completely different – that is, a very different educational policy was being pursued – the Association

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reproached the Education Minister. But they also drew comparisons with other parts of Yugoslavia and could not avoid mentioning the ‘neglect of the extreme South’. According to their information, there were the following ratios of high schools to students in these Banovinas: Table 5.3

Ratios of High Schools to Students in these Banovinas

Drava Banovina Zeta Banovina Vardar Banovina

High schools/ 1 million inhabitants

High school students/ 1 million inhabitants

13.0 18.0 9.5

8,800 7,500 4,200

The Drava Banovina also possessed two state and three private teacher training colleges, the Zeta three state ones. The Association therefore demanded the reopening of the full high schools in Ohrid, Veles and Sˇtip, the teacher training college in Prilep and the half high schools in Strumica, Kicˇevo and Kratovo. In the other small towns, vocational schools (strucˇne sˇkole) suited to the economic structure of the region were to be opened.102 Since this intervention initially remained without success, on 30 January 1935, it was decided that the President together with several members should present their case to the Education Minister.103 At the next meeting on 13 February, there was a discussion among the members about the best educational policy to pursue. The Senator Svetozar Tomic´ was of the opinion that the budget did not permit the opening of schools and that we should not demand so many Full High Schools, which will only create an intellectual proletariat, whose number grows day by day. It would be more useful to demand the opening of Technical Schools, for example, Agricultural Schools, Animal Husbandry Schools, and the like, of which there were too few in South Serbia. Another member contradicted this, however, with the argument that in the South the need for high schools, and indeed for all schools, was so great, as the South should also dispose over as many educated citizens as possible who would work devotedly for the cultural progress of the immediate home region. Senator Tomic´ was not opposed to the South having its intellectuals, but he was afraid ‘that the same thing would happen as in Montenegro (the Zeta Banovina), which had produced a large number of middle school graduates, who, once at the University, lacked the means for their support and moved to the left, causing daily disturbances at the University’. Another

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member stressed that one was not asking for new schools, but rather for the reopening of those that had been closed. Then Rista Daskalovic´ responded, arguing ‘passionately’, it was not right that the Vardar Banovina was being neglected and he stressed ‘that we want officials from our own region, our own Professors, who will examine our youth’.104 This viewpoint won, so that the Association continued fighting for the high schools. Association member Gligorije Hadzˇi Tasˇkovic´, a retired high school director, became active in Macedonia. He wrote to the Ban and the directors of the affected half high schools and urged them to form committees of respected citizens in their towns, to work for the opening of full high schools and to support the efforts for a general improvement of educational conditions by the ‘Association of South Serbs’.105 Shortly thereafter, the authorities attempted to shut down the activities of the Association. At the Plenary Meeting on 5 June 1935, the President explained that the campaign for the construction of schools in the South had been characterised as ‘political’, but that the organisation was a humanitarian one and was not supposed to concern itself with such matters. Hadzˇi Tasˇkovic´ countered this by arguing, quite to the contrary, that according to the officially approved statutes, it was the duty of the Association to do this. There it stood quite clearly that it was their task to overcome obstacles in the path of the cultural and educational development of the South. Hadzˇi Tasˇkovic´ considered the moment opportune for an intervention with the Education Minister, as in his recent speech in Novi Sad he had admitted that the Banovinas were treated differently with regard to the availability of schools. Hadzˇi Tasˇkovic´ asked himself how did the authorities know about this campaign at all,106 and he threatened to resign from the board if the question of education continued to be dealt with in this manner. A Dr Pitovic´ proposed inviting all the parliamentarians from the South – they had expressed this desire themselves – to a meeting to discuss the matter.107 It is possible, that in the summer it was the product of these efforts that during the budget debate, Representative Stevan Simic´ from Kratovo criticised using the closing of high schools in ‘South Serbia’ as a means to save money, while other regions, where there were many more such schools, remained spared, such that he directly complained of the preferential treatment given to the Drava Banovina.108 At their plenary meeting on 29 July 1935, the Association decided that in view of the great bitterness among the people, they should renew efforts to open the schools. The campaign was also supported by the towns in the Banovina.109 This time they met with some success. In Sˇtip and Ohrid state full high schools were opened, in Kumanovo and Veles self-administered

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ones,110 and in Strumica a half high school.111 The desire in Kumanovo for a full high school was not met for financial reasons. The self-administered high school was permitted to run fifth and sixth classes, but this had to be paid for by the communal authorities.112 Subsequently, the local section of the governing party JRZ insisted repeatedly that a state full high school be opened.113 In 1938, the Interior Minister then urged the Education Minister to convert this high school into a state institution, as several teachers were Communists. Since nothing had so far been achieved by individual transfers, now a new, stricter, more capable and ‘nationally correct’ director was to be appointed and the teaching staff were to be selected according to the same criteria.114 In Parliament Todor Zˇivkovic´ from Veles demanded in February 1938, that the state should again pay for the upkeep of the ‘self-administered’ schools, as this was a great burden on the communities.115 With time, the efforts made by the various parties led to success. By the school year of 1940 –1, Macedonia was again up to ten full, and five half high schools and the discrepancy compared to other parts of the country was again somewhat less.116 In 1938, in the Vardar Banovina there were 10,150 male and female high school students – 8.7 per cent of the total for all of Yugoslavia. In 1932, it had been 7.8 per cent. With a share of the population at 11.3 per cent, however, the Vardar Banovina was still clearly underrepresented.117 In addition, by 1940 only 47 per cent of the students, who had graduated from a mid-level educational institution (high school, teacher training college, business academy, religious institute) in Macedonia, had also been born there.118 That is the majority of the graduates were the children of Serbs that had migrated into the region. It is striking how few teacher training colleges there were in the Vardar Banovina, although there were frequent complaints about the shortage of teachers. During the 1940–1 school year, only the training college in Skopje was operating. Only one-third of its graduates had been born in Macedonia.119 In the Drina Banovina by contrast, there were three state-run teacher training colleges functioning (plus a private one), the Drava Banovina had two (also plus a private one), the Danube Banovina four, the Morava Banovina also four, and the Zeta Banovina two.120 One gains the impression that there was a deliberate effort to keep down the number of Macedonian teachers, as they continued to be viewed as unreliable from the national standpoint. Those, who nonetheless still chose this training, were supposed to have to complete it in Serbia, as was deemed desirable already in 1923 by Zˇika Lazic´, at that time head of Security in the Interior Ministry.121 Particularly in the 1920s, like in the elementary schools, there was a shortage of qualified, and especially of ‘nationally correct-minded’, teachers in the high schools. There were frequent complaints that in every high school

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several Russian emigrants were employed and in some places, only two or three Serbs.122 Local teachers were even less common. Many Macedonian schoolchildren felt that the Serbian teachers discriminated against them and humiliated them. They were especially outraged by the ban on using their mother tongue. Some of the schoolchildren at the boys’ high school in Skopje founded the ‘Macedonian Literary Group’, which later developed into the Macedonian Revolutionary Youth Organisation. The goal of this organisation, according to the recollections of one of its members, was to struggle for the complete freedom of the Macedonian people as well as for the recognition of its individuality with the right to its own schools, instruction in the Macedonian language, and its own administration, officials and judges. The members strove to get the Macedonian nation recognised and given an equal status to the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. However, the struggle of the group did not get very far, as they could not agree on their methods.123 As already mentioned, Macedonian historiography has shown no understanding for the efforts of the state to reduce the number of high school graduates and redirect education. Katardzˇiev accuses the regime of promoting vocational schools instead of mid-level schools, although craft professions were dying out.124 In 1930 there were 73 technical schools in the entire Banovina and four mid-level technical schools.125 Interestingly these schools were scarcely ever mentioned in the education debates that took place at the time. As they predominantly prepared students for craft professions, they did not appear to have been seen as part of education in the narrower sense. It is certainly wrong to play these two branches off against each other. A national economy needs vocational schools at various levels alongside the academic educational paths, particularly such an underdeveloped economy as that in interwar Yugoslavia. Especially an expansion of the agricultural schools would undoubtedly have made a great deal of sense, to facilitate more intensive and rational production methods. It would also certainly have been a step in the right direction, if the government had used the decrease in the high schools and the propagation of other types of schools to introduce developments that were better suited to the specific economic needs of the region. Nonetheless, documents and statements exist which demonstrate that the closing of schools in Macedonia was conducted not for reasons connected with education but on political grounds. As was shown in Chapter 1 on the 1920s, already in 1924 – 5 it was proposed, for example, to abolish almost all high schools in Macedonia and to close the Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje in order to improve the situation in general and especially to improve security. In the summer of 1927, as we saw, an emissary of the Education Ministry investigated the teacher training college and the high school in Prilep and found that they were of doubtful reliability from a political standpoint.

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In December 1927, the Interior Ministry together with the security forces again took up the suggestions from 1924 to 1925 and demanded that the faculty in Skopje be closed, so that the students would have to register at universities in a different national environment. The teacher training college in Prilep was to be moved to the north and full high schools only retained in Skopje and Bitola. It was recommended to replace the closed high schools with agricultural and craft technical schools, which were also to fulfil national tasks.126 The closing of the high schools was also viewed as punishment for the truculent behaviour of the population. An official representative, who in May 1929 visited Macedonia and the universities at which Macedonians were studying, showed himself in his report that he was very disappointed by several young men from ‘South Serbia’, whom he had personally recommended for scholarships and who were ‘Bulgaroman’. In his opinion, the counties of Bregalnica, Sˇtip, and, above all Bitola did not ‘deserve’ a single full high school, as the graduates there were ‘against us . . . What we do in the mornings at school, is undone in the afternoon at home . . . The only solution to this situation is Boarding School instruction’. Two months later on 27 August 1929, the king issued a decree that ordered the closures.127 The Serbian nationalist newspaper Nasˇ Jug had also suggested, in its issue on 13 January 1929, getting rid of the large number of high schools as quickly as possible and in their place establishing just a few mid-level boarding schools. There the students could be isolated from the harmful surroundings.128 The Citizens’ Schools The four-year citizens’ schools (grad¯anske ˇskole), which followed the first four years of elementary school, until the mid 1920s only existed in the former Hapsburg lands.129 Thereafter they were also introduced throughout the rest of the country. In Macedonia there were eleven citizens’ schools from 1927 to 1928,130 of which two were subsequently closed again.131 In 1931, the Ban Zˇika Lazic´ resisted the closing of citizens’ schools in eastern Macedonia, as on the other side of the border the Bulgarians were running preparatory high schools. Therefore Lazic´ demanded that the schools be better equipped, even if it was at the expense of the corresponding schools in the Vojvodina. In the previous two years the citizens’ schools, in contrast to all other Banovinas, had not received any state aid. In this type of school instruction was given by officials alongside their regular jobs, but in the South there were too few members of the intelligentsia, who were able to teach as a second occupation. The Ban therefore suggested forcing teachers to come to Macedonia, as many of them did not want to come voluntarily, especially on account of the unfavourable health conditions there.132

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The citizens’ schools were vocational and were intended to deliver a practical education, suited for the economy of the region. However, in Macedonia this type of school did not enjoy a good reputation among the population. Why this was so, was put succinctly by Marko Vujadinovic´ in an article in the newspaper Vardar on 30 November 1936. The author went into battle for the citizens’ schools and expressed the opinion that it was time finally to get rid of the notion that only those schools were of value, which offered the chance of getting a job working for the state. The citizens’ schools were meant to educate the ‘small people’ and make good workers out of them. The author was convinced that craftsmen, tradesmen, workers and progressive farmers needed a more sound general education than they received in the four years of elementary school. According to his observations, the members of these classes were also prepared to make the possibility of higher education available to their children, so that they could better themselves. The problem, however, lay in the fact that the parents believed that education had to lead to social advancement and a respected job. But if the children were to do the same job as themselves, in their eyes a better education was not necessary. Vujadinovic´ also criticised the fact that Skopje did not have a single citizens’ school and that mistakenly these were established in small places, where the preconditions did not exist for them to prosper.133 The low popularity of the citizens’ schools can be seen from the numbers: in 1938 there were 10,150 high school students in the Vardar Banovina, but only 797 trainees in the citizens’ schools.134

‘Nationalisation and Assimilation’ through the Schools? The most important declared goal of saturating Macedonia with educational institutions, insofar as it was actually implemented and not just postulated, was the ‘nationalisation’ of the population there, that is, the awakening and consolidation of a Serbian national consciousness. Considerable energy was expended in order to achieve a ‘nationally correct’ teaching staff, which was primarily to lead the youth onto the Serbian path, but also to influence their surroundings in other ‘national’ ways during their free time. Ideally male Serbian teachers were to be employed in Macedonia, while the local ‘Exarchite’ staff was to be retrained, transferred or retired. The enormous task of establishing schools everywhere in a country with such a high level of illiteracy and such a fast rate of population growth, was not reflected by the expenditure and effort made in the educational sector at all. The rate of illiteracy remained high until the end of the 1930s, with the Vardar Banovina alongside the Vrbas Banovina remaining worst of all:135 The state left the local communities largely on their own, when it came to the elementary schools. In Macedonia the schoolhouses, which the

THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM Table 5.4 Banovina Drava Sava Littoral Morava Drina Zeta Vardar Vrbas

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Illiteracy at the End of the 1930s as a Percentage of the Population Illiterate as percentage of population 5.6 37.7 57.4 62.0 62.1 66.0 70.0 72.6

inhabitants had built at considerable sacrifice, stood empty because the state did not appoint any teachers – either in order to save money or because it couldn’t find any suitable candidates. For the expansion of the universities ten times the sum was expended than that made available for financing the elementary schools.136 Like other officials, the teachers from other regions were also very reluctant to work in Macedonia. At the same time, it proved to be impossible to exclude the locals completely from the schools. It is therefore not surprising that soon sober reality set in about the possibilities with regard to the schools. While the quality of education suffered severely due to the frequent changes of teacher and the chronic shortage of teaching personnel, the degree of success with regard to ‘nationalisation’ was more than doubtful. The fact is that during the entire interwar period, as has been shown elsewhere, hardly anyone in Macedonia described themselves as ‘Serbian’. And even in the 1930s, there were numerous Macedonian teachers, who did not know the Serbian language particularly well, or didn’t really want to master it. It would have required a longer period of time and more far-reaching changes in the lives of the people for the Serbian official language to have displaced the Macedonian dialect. Eugen Weber, who has described the process in France by which the various dialects were driven out by the French language, which took from around 1880 until 1920, stressed that it was a slow, hesitant progression, which was strongly promoted by industrialisation and then by World War I, when soldiers from all parts of the country served together in the trenches. This process also succeeded especially because the French language came to represent both mobility and social and economic betterment.137 In Macedonia the elementary schools did not manage to achieve a comparable transformative effect, as they were left very much on their own. The social and economic changes, which might have brought the acceptance of the Serbian language and Serbian national consciousness, or have made its acceptance necessary, remained minimal.

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In addition, in Macedonia, Serbian national consciousness had to compete with its Macedonian, and partly also with its Bulgarian, counterpart. Regarding the youths trained in high schools, it had already been established in the 1920s that this had not developed in the desired direction, so that to some extent as a punishment numerous high schools were closed – the recalcitrant population had not ‘deserved’ them. Ten years later, from the standpoint of the ‘nationalists’, the situation looked even worse. On 28 March 1939, a high school teacher from Bitola made a sobering report to the Commander of the Vardar Divisional Region about his activities at the school. He had been working for ten years in Bitola, and had led since 1930 the Pupils’ Association (d¯acˇka druzˇina) and now he came to a sober conclusion: among the school students the situation was unfavourable from a national standpoint. The community of school students was split into two camps: one which comprised the ‘nationalists’ and the ‘Serbian arrivals’ (srbi dosˇljaci), as they were called here. The larger group was formed by ‘the locals and the Macedonians in general’. This second group hated the Serbs and despised the (Serbian) nationalist Macedonians, whom they viewed as traitors. During the elections to the board of the Pupils’ Association, the second group wanted only Macedonians to be elected. The author of the report managed with great effort to get an arrival on the board, but then the others worked to get him ejected again. With great concern, the teacher confirmed that during the Czechoslovak Crisis, the school students in the eighth class were celebrating. They were confident that they would also receive liberation in the form of some kind of autonomy. In 1938 a good student refused to write anything on the essay topic ‘Why I must love my Fatherland’. In the course of the ensuing investigation he commented that for Yugoslavia he had no feelings and he could not describe something he did not feel. On the orders of the Education Ministry, this student was permanently banned from all the high schools in the country. The Teachers’ Council, however, would not have classified his offence so severely. The author of the report also had to confirm that the students only spoke the ‘correct standard language’ in the presence of the teacher; ‘the rest of the time in the school, on the street, and in their homes, they deliberately don’t want to express themselves correctly and only speak the local dialect, which has been ruined by Bulgarian propaganda’. The teacher had even heard one student ask another on the street if he was not ashamed to speak Serbian. In the opinion of the teacher, his colleagues did not do enough for the national education of the youth; only three or four of them took this task seriously and were hated by the above-mentioned second group on account of this. One colleague even received threatening letters.

THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Figure 5.2

235

Singer Sewing Course in Tetovo, 1926 (DARM, 1.870.2/1919 – 41)

The author also proposed measures for improving the situation. First would be to increase the number of teachers, who were known as ‘national workers’. Then orders have to be issued, that the students must speak correctly both inside and outside the school. He proposed that one of his colleagues, who had spread an ‘autonomous spirit’ among the students, should be transferred to the north. This teacher had said to the religious instructor: ‘Who called upon you to liberate us?’, and cursed the Serbs and the Montenegrins. To a parliamentarian he had expressed the opinion that one had to form an autonomous Macedonian government in which there would be ministers from Macedonia. To the great outrage of the writer, this person was even the director of the boarding school.138 Here the Macedonian mood of autonomy shortly before the war, which was described in Chapter 2, can be clearly seen. Its opponents suggested once again the same defensive measures as ever, measures that had already proved over the past 20 years to be either impossible to implement or unsuccessful. The youths attending high schools were also influenced by the Macedonian university students at home and abroad, who made an effort to get in contact with the high school students. Thus, for example, some Macedonian students regularly visited the boarding schools in Kragujevac and Negotin (both in Serbia), ostensibly to give the high school students there some extra tuition. But in reality though, according to an anonymous letter written to Prime Minister Stojadinovc´, they sought contact with the ‘South Serbian’ high school attendees in order to prevent them being turned into so-called

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‘Janissaries’,139 that is, an elite that has become alienated from their homeland and put into the service of their oppressors.

University Education The Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje In a letter of 11 December 1919, the Education Minister Pavel Marinkovic´ informed the Rector of Belgrade University he was going to propose to the government the imminent opening of a Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje and wanted to get the opinion of the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade beforehand. Such a faculty appeared to the Education Minister to be necessary on political-national grounds and of great national and cultural significance.140 The Rector, no less than the renowned geographer and anthropologist Jovan Cvijic´, was also convinced of the necessity of having in such a faculty a centre of ‘our civilisation’, so that Macedonia would not continue to be neglected any longer.141 Already in the draft for the university regulations it was found to be important that students from the northern ‘nationally conscious’ regions also studied in Skopje.142 It soon turned out indeed that from the ‘national’ perspective this was a correct demand. In 1921, the first dean of the faculty justified his request for increased financial means because there was an element that was hostile towards ‘us’ here. A form of student life had already developed which was distant from and alien to ‘our’ national ideals. The anational, or even nationally hostile elements, had to be swamped by bringing in, for example, hundreds of students from nationally conscious regions. This would not solve the problem, but it would take away its sting and move things in the right direction.143 The faculty was opened on 15 December 1920 with ten professors.144 In the first term 33 students were enrolled – 20 men and 13 women. Already in 1924 there were more women students than men. During the 1920s, the winter term 1925– 6 had the largest number of students, namely 144 (66 men, 78 women).145 In the second half of the 1930s, the number of students was around 160, now with a slightly larger number of men than women.146 From the start, the local students, as the founders had intended, were in the minority. In 1924, only 45 had been born in ‘South Serbia’, while 36 came from Serbia. Alongside them 3 Croats and 21 Russian exiles studied in Skopje.147 The staff were also selected in accordance with the ‘national’ goals that had been set. In 1933, of the 22 people employed at the university, from the dean to the housekeeper, nobody was born in Macedonia.148 By 1939 hardly anything had changed in this regard. Only one assistant (Haralampije Polenakovic´) and a trainee librarian were locals.149 ‘National correctness’ was

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also required to obtain a place in the student hostel, whose foundation stone had been laid on the St Sava Holiday and the tenth anniversary of the faculty on 27 January 1931 and which was opened on 1 November 1934.150 Like the school system, the faculty was also supposed to fulfil large, primarily national goals – only, as also with the schools, they were not allowed to cost very much. In the first two and a half years the faculty only had a budget of 81,000 dinars for material expenses – a sum, as one of the lecturers wrote, with which one could scarcely heat and light the buildings properly, let alone equip the faculty.151 Whilst in the 1926–7 financial year the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade received 1,150,000 dinars, that in Zagreb had to make do with 110,000 dinars and that in Skopje with 150,000 dinars, although the latter was a new institution and would still have needed investment. Over the following years nothing changed regarding this dire financial situation. In 1926 –7 the government even wanted to close down the University of Ljubljana, which had only been founded in 1919, due to lack of money. The faculty in Skopje, whose student numbers declined after 1926–7, was also threatened with the same scenario.152 At the meeting – already mentioned several times – in December 1927, which took place at the invitation of the Chairman of the Cabinet, Velimir Vukic´evic´ and where the Zˇupans as well as the commanders of the gendarmerie and the police in Macedonia were gathered, the closing of the faculty was demanded in order to ensure that those who wanted to study would have to do so at universities with a more favourable national environment.153 The Rector of Belgrade University saw himself compelled to defend the work of his faculty in Skopje, praising the professors and stressing that they also participated in the general cultural work in the south. He pointed out that a Scientific Society had been established in Skopje, which mainly researched ‘South Serbia’ and formed a counterweight to the activity of the Macedonian Institute in Sofia. The Rector further underlined that the faculty was also fulfilling its national mission, as it was collecting the local youth and even those people who had previously studied in Bulgaria. Some had become loyal and upstanding ‘national workers’. While previously a part of the students had held Bulgarian high school diplomas, by 1929 the faculty was only accepting those students, who had diplomas from ‘our High Schools’ and thereby in the opinion of the Rector demonstrated the right prerequisites to develop themselves at the faculty in a national direction and then pass on the national way of thinking to the younger generation. ‘The greater the number of students, the stronger will be our cultural influence in South Serbia’. Furthermore, he acclaimed the faculty for achieving with much devotion and success those political, national and cultural tasks (please note the order they come in), which were

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assigned to it on its foundation. Voices that said the institution had failed in its purpose and therefore demanded its abolition should be restrained by the highest educational authorities. The faculty by contrast should receive still more attention and financial support, so that it could fulfil its great mission. A pivotal point of the criticism was clearly that too few young people enrolled from ‘nationally conscious regions’. For them to become the majority, at the suggestion of the Rector, recipients of scholarships should be obliged to spend at least several terms studying in Skopje.154 The danger of being closed down was averted for the moment. In 1930 the Education Minister even approved on the tenth anniversary an expansion to include the natural sciences. The possibility of implementing this, however, was only reached in 1937– 8 with the creation of several new lecturer positions.155 In 1931, though, the spectre of being closed down again popped up, if only briefly. The administration of Belgrade University learned that a decree had been prepared under which the medical faculty in Belgrade was to be abolished and the Faculty for Forestry and Agriculture transferred to Skopje. Both of these faculties had only recently been opened at considerable expense. Henceforth medicine could only still be studied in Zagreb. The same decree, which had been prepared without consulting Belgrade University, also proposed abolishing the existing faculties in Skopje and Subotica.156 For political reasons, these proposed amputations and consolidations were never actually implemented.157 But the manner in which the government treated the universities and disposed over their resources in this case, first approving and establishing faculties, just to abolish them again straightaway, reveals much about the mismanagement, lack of consistent planning, and frequent changes of personnel in the ministries, as well as the lack of responsibility and incapacity among those responsible. It is possible that in Skopje nobody ever heard about the threatening decree in 1931, at least no response to it could be found in the files. At the beginning of 1933, however, rumours again spread throughout the city that the faculty was going to be closed. In response respected citizens and institutional representatives gathered around the city president and resolved that everyone with any influence should lobby in support of the faculty, as it was of incalculable value for ‘South Serbia’.158 A campaign committee was established, which, among other things, publicised the minutes of its meetings concerning the future of the university.159 The students160 and the Belgrade ‘Association of South Serbs’ also worked for the retention of the faculty.161 After this its existence seems not to have been placed seriously in question again.162 However, in 1934 it had to fend off an unexpected attack from Zagreb. The history professors of the university there very much wanted to appoint the historian Josip Matasovic´, who was teaching in Skopje, but they did not have any open

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positions. For this reason they requested that the Education Ministry should transfer him to together with his salary from the faculty in Skopje to Zagreb. The Education Ministry actually passed this request on to Skopje, where it was rejected as outrageous, as the faculty’s budget for 1933–4 had been cut and, in any case, it had too few professors and lecturers.163 The complaints about inadequate funding and lack of personnel continued throughout the 1930s, even when the financial position of the state had clearly improved once again. In the annual reports one can sense a degree of embitterment about this neglect.164 The loans for the library, training colleges, and institutes were nothing compared to those at other philosophical faculties, which in any case were well-established and already equipped.165 In view of the eminent political and ‘national’ tasks, which were intended for the faculty, it is not surprising that the political apparatus kept a watchful eye on both the students and the lecturers from the start. When, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary, members of the teaching staff were to be decorated with medals, the Ban Zˇika Lazic´ prepared an extensive report on the lecturers for the Minister of Education and made suggestions as to who should be honoured. Those who attracted the most attention for their activism in the ‘national’ cause received good marks. On the other hand, there was no chance for the Croat C´ire Truhelka, who had written negatively about the king during the war and now had argued in an article that in ‘South Serbia’ the slava was not a local tradition. He should be retired, recommended Lazic´. According to the report, among the Croatian professors the best was still Milan Prelog, as he was oriented toward Yugoslavia. However, he did not make much effort, had not brought his family with him and spent as much time as possible in Zagreb. ‘Only for reasons of political finesse and opportunism could one consider him [for a decoration]’. Petar Kolendic´, who under the Hapsburgs had been considered a ‘good Catholic Serb’ from Dubrovnik, behaved quite coldly here and did not engage himself outside his teaching. One would only have to consider him, for the same reasons, if Prelog received a decoration. Those people were also considered, who had ‘distinguished’ themselves only through long years of service and against whom nothing negative could be said.166 Already when it was established, plans existed for expanding the Philosophical Faculty to include the natural sciences. Only during the 1930s, however, was this expansion slowly put into effect. The budget for 1931–2 envisaged an expansion, which then was not implemented, due to the financial setbacks arising from the Great Depression. In 1934, the faculty tried again and demanded the expansion, again using ‘national’ arguments: the expansion was a necessity, as up until now this region had been little researched, and

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then mainly by foreigners. ‘The national needs and national prestige demand that for once our scientists research all the advantages of this part of our homeland, which can be done best and with most success by scientists who are based in this region itself.’167 There were also circles which demanded the expansion into a full university and especially the opening of law faculty, as many young people from ‘South Serbia’ studied this subject and because one needs to research the rich customary law of this region.168 In fact, just in 1936 there were 288 students from the Vardar Banovina enrolled at the Law Faculty in Belgrade,169 that is, far more than at the entire Philosophical Faculty in Skopje. In 1938, a total of 777 young people from the Vardar Banovina were studying throughout the country; 351 of them had chosen law, 135 were enrolled at philosophical faculties, 66 studied medicine, and 50 agriculture and forestry.170 On the one hand, law was the best preparation for serving in the bureaucracy; on the other hand, it also offered the possibility of a self-employed career. In 1936, a series of articles appeared in the newspaper Vardar which argued for the opening of a faculty of law.171 The lawyer Stevan Trivunac conceded that a faculty of agriculture might appear to be much more useful, but still advocated a faculty of law, as this would promote an awareness of citizenship among the people.172 But these voices were not successful; instead, in 1936–7 the first professorship in natural sciences was advertised.173 The Faculty of Philosophy had low student numbers throughout the interwar period. The Macedonian students were not interested in the subjects that were offered there and they remained a minority in Skopje. According to the newspaper Jugoslovenski glasnik on 1 February 1931, three-quarters of the students were Serbs from Kosovo, Prizren, the Sanjak, Montenegro and Serbia.174 Towards the end of the 1930s the proportion of local students increased slightly,175 but most young women and men from Macedonia continued to enrol in Belgrade, Zagreb and abroad, with a particular inclination towards law, economics, medicine, and veterinary medicine. For the students from other parts of the country, on the other hand, Skopje had little attraction. Thus the faculty remained essentially an educational institution mainly for the sons and daughters of Serbian officials in the Vardar Banovina. More than 60 per cent of the students in 1930–1 were the children of officials.176 Macedonian Students in the Rest of Yugoslavia and Abroad Those who could afford it, or received a scholarship, enrolled at the universities in Belgrade or Zagreb. According to a compilation made by the Education Department of the Banovina Administration, in 1936, 758 young people from the Vardar Banovina were studying at university,177 61 of them abroad, 478 in

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Belgrade178 (including 288 at the Faculty of Law), 130 in Zagreb (including 49 at the Technical School for Economics and Trade and 35 at the Faculty for Veterinary Medicine), 81 in Skopje, 6 in Subotica at the Faculty of Law, and 2 in Ljubljana.179 In comparison with the other Banovinas, the number of students was low, as only the Vrbas Banovina had fewer students. In 1938, 13,346 young people born in Yugoslavia were studying at university. They were divided among the respective Banovinas as follows: Table 5.5

Young People, Born in Yugoslavia, Studying at University in 1938180

Banovina

Studying at university

Vrbas Vardar Morava Littoral Drina Zeta Drava Danube Sava Belgrade prefecture Unknown

468 777 932 1,100 1,111 1,562 1,748 2,128 3,068 426 26

If Belgrade was clearly a popular place to study in the 1930s, in the 1920s one could hear variously the conviction that the population in ‘South Serbia’ tried to avoid sending its youth to study in Belgrade, as they would rather they studied in Zagreb or abroad.181 A Serbian high school director in Prilep said in 1926 that the school graduates from Macedonia generally avoided the Yugoslav universities and preferred to study abroad. But he also found that Belgrade University enjoyed very little sympathy. He was very suspicious about this behaviour, as it was well known that the Macedonians were frugal, and therefore he was surprised that they could afford the luxury of sending their children to expensive universities abroad. From this, he concluded that the ‘Macedonians’ intentionally and systematically avoided local universities on national grounds. He suspected that money from Bulgaria lay behind this.182 Studying abroad, where the students’ political activity could no longer be kept under control, was also viewed with suspicion by the Interior Ministry, which is why it tried to direct the students from Macedonia into certain channels. On 18 October 1924, it issued guidelines for studying abroad,

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which were submitted to the Education Ministry. According to these, students from ‘South Serbia’ were only allowed to study in England or France, obviously because both of these states counted as friendly. The intention was to protect Macedonian youth from the IMRO’s influence. But clearly this regulation was not implemented, as young people also studied in other countries, especially in Austria. In 1927, Muslim students were prohibited from studying in Albania.183 In this year the Macedonian students also once again came under scrutiny. It was established that the ringleaders of the IMRO youth organisation that was exposed in 1927 were young men from Veles who were studying in Vienna and Graz. ‘This case also proves how damaging it is for our national interest, to allow the youth from South Serbia, which previously stood under the influence of Bulgarian propaganda, to study abroad.’ Therefore, the Interior Minister demanded that these students no longer be given permission to travel abroad.184 The young educated elite, which graduated from the end of the 1920s, could no longer be described as ‘Exarchite’, as they had generally completed their high school and university education inside the country. The state could now hope to reap the harvest, which it expected from the ‘nationally correct’ education of the youth. Now it could also start to integrate the intellectuals into its efforts to ‘nationalise’ the South. A strictly confidential report by the correspondent of the Central Press Office on 7 December 1930 described how just such an attempt played out. In those days a ministerial official (possibly from the Interior Ministry) and a lawyer were present in Skopje; they had come to establish an ‘Association of South Serbians’ (Udruzˇenje Juzˇnosrbijanaca), in accordance with the spirit of the minister’s intentions. The starting point of the idea lay, as the correspondent reported, with a group of ‘South Serbian intellectuals’ in Belgrade, linked to the ‘Association of South Serbians’ there, who had the intention of forming an ‘Association of South Serbian Intellectuals’ based in Belgrade. The new society should include several different sections; for example, one each for work with the high school students, with the academic youth, with civil servants, with self-employed intellectuals, with craftsmen, and with the villages. The goal was to reach out to the youth and older people, to help the state in creating a ‘national intelligentsia in the South’. It was naturally understood that the Association should exercise the strictest possible control over those members, who might be suspicious from a ‘national-political’ standpoint. The starting assumptions of the founders, according to the correspondent, were as follows: in the Povardarje there were not very many intellectuals, who could be taken seriously, as since 1918 too little had been done with regard to education. Trade (cˇarsˇija) lay in the hands of locals, who in the majority were non-Serbs and doubtful Yugoslavs, since among them were many Turks, Albanians,

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Vlachs, Jews and ‘Bulgaromans’ (bugarasˇi). The people had still not yet been ‘converted’ ( preobrac´en) and the intelligentsia was not national, or in any case of dubious national sentiment, even though it had been educated at the expense of the state. ‘Given this situation, one has to consider an organisation of intellectuals, as it is of immediate nat[ional] interest, and it should be founded as soon as possible, before it is too late.’ The correspondent could only add to this analysis by the founders that indeed trade was not nationally inclined. Even the Orthodox Slavic merchants in Skopje, including the richest among them, frequently gave officials cause to doubt their patriotism and loyalty. Therefore, one could not expect that the cˇarsˇijlii, among whom the correspondent also counted the self-employed intelligentsia, would always be in solidarity with the Association based in Belgrade. ‘It will take at least ten years until South Serbia, or its Slavic part, feels itself to be Serbian or Yugoslav.’ Therefore, in the opinion of the correspondent, it would be useful to have an association of intellectuals, ‘which will steer the hearts and minds of the youth and lead their nationalism in that direction, which Belgrade and our national politics desires’. This conception of the Association imagined in Belgrade encountered determined resistance from the Macedonian intellectuals in Skopje. They demanded that the Association have its centre in Skopje, receive another name – clearly they wanted to avoid the term ‘South Serbia’ – and restrict its membership to people from the Vardar Banovina; the Old Serbians from the Sanjak185 should not interfere. In addition, they wanted to allow traders, craftsmen and peasants to join. All of these conflicting positions were expressed at a conference chaired by the Ban. The ‘Southern Serbs’ in Belgrade described ‘those down there’ as provincials and petty bourgeois, while the intellectuals in Skopje viewed the Belgraders as people become too distant from their homeland, who did not understand the economic, cultural and other problems there. They feared that the founders of the ‘Association of Intellectual Forces of South Serbia’ only wanted to polish their own images, as in this period – the royal dictatorship was less than a year old – when party politics was forbidden, many people wanted to make a mark as activists in the public sphere, to prepare the ground for their return to politics. The intellectuals in Skopje feared that this also applied to the founders of the planned association; they accused them of initiating the project in a secretive, underhand, and rather overhasty manner. Those in Belgrade responded that it was their goal to give the intelligentsia in the south a model ‘type’ – whatever that was supposed to mean – and to mould them into this ‘model’ of an intellectual from Serbia. They resisted the idea of expanding the Association’s activities too much, as their resources were inadequate for organising also the cˇarsˇija and the

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villages. They would prefer to leave that to the Sokol, the Narodna odbrana and other organisations. The correspondent saw many advantages from such an Association. Since 1918 the situation in the South of our country had changed to such an extent that both Sofia and also the IMRO no longer know what ‘Macedonia’ looks like. Someone has to tell them, and it will be more believable if it comes from the South Serbs themselves rather than from us in northern Serbia. But I think that an official intervention in Belgrade will give this Association a reputation, as well as a goal, a firm basis, and leadership. I am convinced that one needs not only to organize the Vardar Banovina, but also the entire territory of former South Serbia. He also spoke in favour of a limited life-span for the Association and confining it to the intellectuals.186 In a letter of 19 September 1930 to the Minister for Construction, the Interior Minister explained the purpose of the planned Association. According to his comments, experience had shown that the ‘Bulgarian Committee’ seduced the youth from ‘South Serbia’ and used them for its purposes, so that they worked against the state. Here he was referring in particular to the revelations in connection with the trial in December 1927. In any case, the state must do something and the Interior Ministry had decided to conduct a campaign with the youth of ‘our South’, which should bring back to the right path those who had been seduced and protect the others from foreign propaganda. In this delicate matter, which also served the national interest, the Ministry was relying upon a few tested young people, born in the southern regions, who until now in their press comments and in other ways had given sufficient guarantee that they were willing to help and to carry out this task. One of these young people was Dimitrije Karadzˇic´ and it was on his account that the Interior Ministry was approaching the Ministry of Construction. He was employed as an engineer in Herzegovina. Since the centre of the above-mentioned campaign was supposed to be in Skopje, the Interior Minister requested that Karadzˇic´ be transferred to Skopje.187 But precisely this Karadzˇic´, whom the Central Press Office correspondent described as an engineer from Belgrade, was someone the Skopje group would rather not have in the Association.188 These struggles over an organisation of educated youths from Macedonia reveal a conflict between the Macedonian intellectuals in Belgrade that the government wanted to instrumentalise, and the intellectuals living on the spot, who tried to resist this. Those in Belgrade appeared not to be against playing along with this game. They lived at the centre of state power and appear to have been of the opinion that only with this power one could achieve

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something for the South, but not against it. The intellectuals in Macedonia above all wanted to put a stop to two things that had been customary until then: remote control by Belgrade and individuals cutting a high profile for personal and political reasons at the expense of the common goal. What they strove for, in contrast to the Belgraders, was an expansion of the activities to a broader circle of the population, that is a more comprehensive, political move. This while also being well aware that the intellectuals formed only a very small group. From these organisational efforts emerged ultimately the ‘Yugoslav Youth of the Vardar Banovina’ (Jugoslovenska omladina Vardarske banovine), which was founded on 10 January 1931,189 as Dimitrija Sˇalev noted, on the orders of Lazic´,190 the former Head of the Yugoslav Security Service, who at this time was serving as Ban in the Vardar Banovina. The locals therefore got their way regarding the name and limiting the association to the Vardar Banovina. The regime also failed to instrumentalise the organisation. This entire ‘Operation’, from which the Interior Minister had expected so much, failed miserably and even turned into a boomerang for the regime years later. The ‘Yugoslav Youth of the Vardar Banovina’, which changed its name into ‘Yugoslavian Rebirth’ (Jugoslovenski preporod) in 1934, to give it a broader basis without the regional designation, operated only very weakly and by 1936 had de facto ceased functioning. Legally it was still in existence, but after 1936 not a single meeting took place. Then it was precisely young intellectuals from this group, now calling themselves just ‘Rebirth’ (Preporodisˇte), who together with others initiated the journal Lucˇ in the first half of 1937. These so-called ‘Lucˇists’ had, as already demonstrated in a previous chapter, no unifying ideology, but their efforts could not please the state, as at least a part of them campaigned for the use of the Macedonian language, for the recognition of their own independent history and culture, and for the retention of the geographical designation Macedonia. Others criticised the oppression of the local youth, who were denied access to state employment.191 Even Karadzˇic´, for whom the Interior Minister had taken such great pains in 1930, worked for Lucˇ, and was seen at the end of the 1930s as a fighter for an autonomous Macedonia, and an ‘irreconcilable opponent of all things Serbian’.192 As a civil servant, he was transferred to Serbia, yet this ‘greatest autonomist’ was ultimately able to return to his job as Head of the Technical Department in the Banovina Administration in Skopje. On his transfer to Sˇabac, ‘this “Macedonian,” said in front of several engineers from the Banovina: “I am leaving, but you must know, I will return as the Governor of Macedonia.”’193 The willingness of the young intellectuals to cooperate with the state in 1930 indicates that in this, still relatively early, period of the royal

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dictatorship they were prepared to support the Yugoslav idea, which was supposed to replace the particularist nationalisms. They appeared to see a chance for a new start. However, they were soon to be disappointed when they noticed that the regime was not serious about Yugoslavism, and that by ‘national’ it continued to mean ‘Serbian’. As has already been discussed in Chapter 2 on politics in the 1930s, young people studying at the universities in Zagreb and Belgrade from 1936, when political life became active once again, played a significant role in the movement of the young Macedonian intelligentsia and founded the Association Vardar, which was banned again in 1937. In Skopje at the Faculty for Philosophy the student association Pokret (Movement), which was dominated by the Communists, existed somewhat longer, until it was also banned on 6 April 1938.194 Nonetheless, the intellectuals continued their efforts at organisation. On 17 March 1940, the Association ‘Peasant Self-Help’ (Seljacˇka samopomoc´) was founded; its initiators were the engineer Boro Atanackovic´ and also Kiro Miljovski. This group aimed to raise the South to a higher level in terms of culture, education, and the economy. Among its first members were 50 intellectuals from Skopje – doctors, agronomists, professors and teachers.195 Immediately after its founding, three sections were formed: health, agriculture and law service. Members of the organisation, which was structured as a cooperative, regularly visited the villages around Skopje and gave advice to the peasants on various issues.196 According to the account of the correspondent of the Central Press Office, originally these intellectuals had wanted to found the cultural association Vardar, but this was not permitted by the authorities, because, as one believed in Skopje, the initiative came from the locals and membership was to be restricted only to them.197 The activities of the members of Seljacˇka samopomoc´ very quickly expanded beyond the cultural and economic fields, and became political. Thus on 19 May 1940, Professor Epaminonda Jovanovic´ gathered peasants and townspeople on the edge of Skopje and made a speech reinforcing the ‘self-consciousness of the Macedonian People’.198 The authorities did not want to see any more of this and banned the organisation a short time afterwards.199 Another group, which gathered together numerous intellectuals and respected businessmen, was the mountaineering society Planinar, which had around 400 members by the middle of 1940. Not much is known about its activities, but it was viewed suspiciously by ‘national-minded’ circles, because they did ‘not have a single proper Serb’ among their members – who in part were the same people as in the Peasant Self-Help. It also attracted attention and suspicion that the mountaineers were constantly travelling around all of ‘South Serbia’ in groups.200

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The small educated elite, which gradually developed in Macedonia, had slim chances for attaining positions corresponding to their education. Essentially this was a problem throughout Yugoslavia, since industry had developed in only a few spots and was not able to generate a larger number of jobs. Despite the hypertrophic official apparatus, the state could only employ a part of the graduates from the higher educational institutions. There was such a great degree of mistrust towards the Macedonian candidates, however, that they had practically no prospects of achieving a senior position in the civil service. In 1933, for example, the Agricultural Ministry in Belgrade employed 150 people, of whom only two had been born in Macedonia.201 Theoretically that might also have something to do with the work location in Belgrade. But in the Banovina Administration in Skopje the picture was exactly the same: in 1933, not a single official or employee was from Macedonia.202 This employment policy changed little up to the end of the 1930s, even when it became increasingly subject to criticism: Macedonians continued to be scarcely represented at all in the higher administrative posts.203 This was especially linked to the fact that the General Staff had to give its approval whenever a senior official was appointed. In Macedonia its influence was particularly strong, as was that of its intelligence service, which always had the last word and this continued to be the case right up to the end.204 The frustration felt by the Macedonian educated elite about its lack of prospects was aired increasingly in the 1930s, as the numbers of those affected increased and political life became less restricted. With reference to this it should be noted that due to the lack of other possibilities on the job market, doctors, pharmacists and architects were no less dependent on state positions than, for example, lawyers.205 For this reason, towards the end of the interwar period, an active effort was made to get locals appointed to key positions. In the labour office in Skopje, for example, after the departure of the Serbian president, nasˇinci (‘our people’) were brought in there as officials, while the Serbs allegedly received death threats, ‘so that they no longer trample upon this Macedonian land’.206 The deputy Ban Aleksandar Cvetkovic´ resisted vigorously when the Ban Hajdukveljkovic´ wanted to appoint 70 young Serbs in the Banovina Administration, although 200 job applications from locals had been lying in the drawer for years. Cvetkovic´ had also to press his case against the Director of the General Department, a Serb from Croatia, who did not want to employ any locals, but exclusively Serbs.207 As we have seen, this harsh discrimination had the result that the youth intellectuals increasingly turned away from the Yugoslav option and their Macedonian consciousness grew much stronger.

CHAPTER 6 TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

The Road Network The type and geographical extent of social and state integration are influenced considerably by the condition of the transport system. Whether a State imposes its will everywhere within its territory, is essentially also a question of the quality of the transport and information networks at its disposal.1 Well-developed communications and transport routes are of not inconsiderable significance for the economic development of a country as well. At the end of 1918, Yugoslavia inherited a difficult legacy in this respect. Those territories, which the kingdom of Serbia brought into the new state, were, in any case, poorly developed in terms of transport. World War I then also largely destroyed most of this modest infrastructure. In the former Hapsburg lands of Slovenia, Croatia and the Vojvodina, where the transport system was more developed and largely spared from destruction, the situation was more favourable; however, in these parts of the country all the roads led to Vienna and Budapest, and therefore with regard to the new political system, in the wrong direction. The roads in Bosnia-Herzegovina were primarily of a strategic nature and were of only limited economic use. The Yugoslav authorities only slowly grasped, however, the importance of transport routes for the economy and for the penetration of the country by state institutions.2 According to a British report, in 1923 there were around 50,000 kilometres of roads in Yugoslavia, of which most were in bad condition. In June 1923, to improve the situation, the population was subjected to compulsory forced labour on the roads. All citizens aged between 18 and 50 – with the exception of students, soldiers, officials, invalids and the poor – had

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to work for one week in road construction every spring and fall, send a replacement, or buy their way out of this obligation by paying a tax.3 There was general agreement about the deplorable state of the roads in Macedonia. The writer Stanislav Krakov, who travelled through the south in 1926 and confirmed the bad condition of the streets, bridges, churches and monasteries, heard everywhere the same complaint: ‘There are no loans’. On one occasion, however, he was astonished: ‘In the village of Krusˇje I experienced for the first time an unusual surprise in South Serbia: I saw workers, who were repairing the road and the bridges.’ In this area around Resen he encountered for the first time good roads and genuine progress, which he attributed to the ‘Americanisation’ of the population there. There was nowhere else in the south, where so many men migrated to America and returned home again, as soon as they had put some money aside.4 The British ambassador Kennard, who travelled through Macedonia at about the same time as the writer Krakov, namely in May 1926, gave a more positive picture: I travelled by car over 1,500 kilometres of road, which were distinctly superior to anything in the Belgrade area, and I noticed a considerable amount of repair on bad sections. Many of these roads may have a military rather than an economic importance, but, given the lack of funds and the general condition of roads in Jugoslavia, one cannot say that they have been neglected.5 An explanation for this thoroughly positive assessment can, perhaps, be found in the fact that Kennard always travelled in cars provided by the local administration and in the company of officials, so that doubtless only the best roads were taken and possibly repairs had been conducted, Potemkin-style, just before the trip. In its Annual Report for 1927, the British embassy concluded, in spite of Kennard’s apparently good experiences, that in road building not much was done on account of a lack of funds. But even that which was repaired soon had to be patched up again due to poor engineering work.6 One can also assume that the forced labour imposed on the population for road repairs did little to improve road quality. When the British Vice Consul in Belgrade, C.L. Blakeney, travelled through ‘Serbia-Macedonia’ by car in the spring of 1930, his hair was constantly standing on end on account of the state of the roads, as he put. On the drive from Skopje to Bitola the travellers had to turn back shortly after Debar, because the bridge had been washed away a few days before. Civilian and military authorities had assured him the night before that the stretch was still passable. The 1,600 miles of road, which Blakeney and the Military Attache´ Major Oxley put behind

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them were, according to the Vice Consul, the worst that one could imagine; in places even the floor of the car was flooded. In his report Blakeney proudly stressed that their British Wolseley ‘Messenger’ nonetheless never broke down. Yet in his opinion, the roads in Serbia were not any better: the only time when the travellers got stuck and had to be pulled out was between Nisˇ und Vranje.7 Contrary to appearances – serious efforts were undertaken to improve the roads in Macedonia, as the need to do something was only too obvious. At the end of World War I, the destruction carried out by the retreating Germans, Austrians, and Bulgarians was so extensive, that in Macedonia only 260 kilometres of road remained in a normal condition. Subsequently, on the territory of the Vardar Banovina up until 1930, 219,323 million dinars were expended to build 1,250 kilometres of new gravel roads and to repair another 1,570 kilometres. In total between 1918 and 1930, 680,729 million dinars was spent on improving roads and bridges.8 The problem with these respectable investments, however, was that they were only conducted from a military and strategic perspective, as Macedonia was viewed as an insecure territory, threatened from across the border in which large numbers of troops were concentrated. Roads were built so that troops could be quickly redeployed. The economic needs of the region had no influence on planning. In 1937, there was a total of 4,200 kilometres of state and Banovina roads, of which 600 kilometres were rated as very good, 1,300 kilometres as good,

Figure 6.1 Camel Caravan in the Region of Strumica in the 1920s (Katharina Jovanovits Library, Zurich)

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1,400 kilometres as useable ( prolazni), and 900 kilometres as difficult to travel on (tezˇe prolazni). Since 1918, work costing 884 million dinars had been conducted for construction and maintenance of the roads. Of this sum, however, the state and the Banovina had only made available 331 million dinars. The greater part, 353 million, was contributed by the population in the form of labour.9 In an article leading up to the 25th anniversary of ‘South Serbia’s liberation’, the Belgrade newspaper Politika spoke in the highest terms about the road network in the south: ‘With regard to the roads, South Serbia can be compared today with the most progressive provinces of our country.’ A great deal had been achieved in this field, such that the peasant no longer had any trouble getting to the nearest market.10 The parliamentarian, Stamenko Stosˇic´ from Kriva Palanka, who spoke in Parliament on 23 February 1937, saw this quite differently, stressing that the agricultural products of ‘Vardar Macedonia’ simply rotted due to the poor transport routes. He complained that every time before the elections, ‘in order to secure the vote to Parliament of a member of the Royal Government’, loans worth millions for road construction were concluded, but never actually used. Then he commented further that the people in his electoral district had done their compulsory labour service for ten years for the construction of the road Kriva Palanka– Varosˇ – Trgovisˇte– Vranje. But now its completion was delayed, because that part of the work was left unfinished, to which the state was supposed to contribute and which did not even cost 1 million dinars. With bitterness he concluded that the government neglected ‘South Serbia’ and deprived the people there of any hope that things would ever improve.11 The Representative Ac´im Popovic´ calculated in the parliamentary session on 24 March 1934 that the Vardar Banovina had the weakest road network in the country. He compared the number of kilometres of road in each Banovina for every 100,000 inhabitants and presented the following results: Popovic´ was outraged that in view of these ratios, the Vardar Banovina had only received 10 million from the loan of more than a billion dinars. Other Banovinas had been treated much more generously and had, in his opinion, in places built luxurious roads, ‘while we in the Vardar Banovina have state roads, which cannot even be used on foot’.12 The 10 million dinars which the Banovina was allotted from this large sum were destined for the main axis Skopje– Veles–Gevgelija.13 This was the only construction plan in Macedonia which was considered in connection with this loan – in seventeenth place on the priority list. By contrast, four projects impacted Slovenia and numerous others were in Croatia or Serbia.14 Half of the billion was assigned to state roads and bridges, which meant that the linking up of smaller places within the Banovinas continued to be neglected. But it was precisely in these areas that there was the greatest need. In Veles

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Table 6.1 The Number of Kilometres of Road in Each Banovina for Every 100,000 Inhabitants in 1934 Drava Morava Sava Vrbas Littoral Zeta Danube Vardar

387 287 246 192 170 170 118 101

County, for example, in 1938 there were only connections that could be driven by car between the individual urban centres (Veles –Skopje, Veles – Sˇtip, Veles – Prilep, Veles – Gradsko, the last still under construction). But these were also in a very bad condition and could only really be used during the summer. By contrast, the villages were completely cut off, as they could only be reached using paths, such that the usual means of transport remained draught horses and mules. In addition, in the entire Veles County there only four bridges still standing, the others had been washed away in the spring – that is almost a year ago.15 In his book on the making of the French nation, Eugen Weber has shown very impressively how little changes if a region is only crossed along the main axes and only towns are connected with each other. The surrounding countryside, which does not lie directly along these routes, remains untouched and only experiences changes when it is opened up by secondary roads – by ‘roads and railways, which according to their names are secondary, but according to their significance are primary’.16 In Macedonia the Banovina roads and paths were still in a miserable condition in 1940. Of 3,053 kilometres, only 600 could be driven all-year-round using motorised vehicles, a situation that caused the Head of the Technical Department in the Banovina to comment: ‘Such a desolate state of the Banovina routes, as is presented here in the Vardar Banovina, surely cannot be found in any other Banovina.’17

The Railway The greater part of the railway network in the kingdom of Serbia was also destroyed during World War I, so that after the founding of the Yugoslav state initially reconstruction was needed. After this, new lines were to be built in order to connect previously isolated stretches of land. But the Adriatic Railway received first priority, as it was meant to link the coast with the interior. Apart from Rijeka, all the other ports were cut off from the rest of the country.

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That work on this railway line, which was categorised as very important, and should have been financed primarily from the Blair Loan in 1922, only started in 1936, drastically illustrates the inability of the Yugoslav state to take action. An essential problem, which led to the delays and caused the state authorities to lose their way, was the conflict between the respective port cities, which all wanted to be the terminus of this railway.18 At the end of World War I there were the following railways in Macedonia: Skopje– Veles– Gevgelija (170 kilometres), Skopje–Kumanovo–Tabanovci (52.5 kilometres) and Skopje– Volkovo –General Jankovic´ (42.8 kilometres). In addition, during the war the occupying forces had built two narrow-gauge lines (Gradsko – Prilep – Bitola and Skopje – Tetovo – Gostivar – Struga – Ohrid) covering 284 kilometres in total. All this infrastructure as well as stations and bridges were systematically destroyed by the retreating forces of the Central powers.19 The railway lines Skopje–Thessaloniki and Skopje–Kosovska Mitrovica were reconstructed again very quickly after the war, such that Skopje became an important junction for supplying not only Macedonia, but also other parts of the country, including also much of Belgrade’s needs. As a result the city developed quickly into an economic centre.20 But for smaller places, the effect, by contrast, was partly negative. Sˇtip, for example, had to accept that now many people from its catchment area travelled to Skopje by rail when they needed something.21 Prilep, which had been an important trade centre until the construction of the Thessaloniki– Kosovska Mitrovica line in 1878, had experienced something similar already. On completion of the line, the town lost its significance to Bitola and other places.22 In the 1920s the transport routes were planned primarily from a militarystrategic perspective. The parliamentarian Jovan C´irkovic´ from Bitola, who engaged himself for the interests of ‘our region’, objected on 7 July 1922, in a letter to the Transport Minister, that the entire, in any case modest, capacity of the railway in the South was taken up by munitions transports, which caused considerable damage to the economy.23 While the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Skopje demanded in vain a railway line to the export market in Albania,24 due to pressure from the Army a stretch of railway heading east (Veles – Sˇtip – Kocˇani) was built, in order to secure the border with Bulgaria.25 At that time there was still the optimistic expectation that the expansion of the railway network would make rapid progress. The Belgrade newspaper Politika reported on 18 March 1926 that the following year it would be the turn of the stretch Sˇtip – Radovisˇ – Strumica. Projected, again on strategic grounds, was also the link Kocˇani – Carevo in eastern Macedonia with a possible extension to Berovo. ‘And when the first locomotives drive through this region, that will mean the end of

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Komitadji operations is coming.’ As a side-effect this railway line would also serve economic goals.26 It was intended to finance the line Skopje–Tetovo –Gostivar –Kicˇevo – Brod– Prilep– Bitola –Ohrid in western Macedonia with funds from the Blair Loan issued in 1922. Yet this railway stood right at the bottom of the list of priorities, such that only a very small part of it was actually built,27 as the money was used up beforehand – to a large extent not for railway construction as intended, but in order to pay the interest on Serbian war debts to the USA.28 Only the stretch Bitola– Prilep, the shortest and easiest, and therefore also by far the cheapest, was completed and started operating on 7 April 1931. The connecting railway line Prilep– Veles was financed using other means and opened in January 1936.29 The brouhaha surrounding the opening of the rail section Prilep–Veles demonstrates how little the authorities in Belgrade cared about local conditions and feelings. The Railway Head Office announced that the banquet to celebrate the opening would take place in Bitola – which really had nothing to do with the entire occasion – because for them the food in Prilep was too expensive. The local city authorities there protested immediately in a telegram: ‘The wishes of the citizens are that the celebration and banquet should take place in Prilep, since we have been waiting for it [the railway line] for centuries.’30 Nonetheless on 19 January 1936, the meal was eaten in Bitola in the presence of the Transport Minister Mehmet Spaho.31 This snub to the city of Prilep was not in accordance with the instructions issued by the Marshall’s Office, which were to give great importance to the opening to the railway line Veles – Prilep, since the railway was located in a region, in which the now peacefully resting King [Alexander] took a special interest, and because the construction of this line represents one of the largest efforts by our State to raise the living standard in Macedonia (sic).32 The Head Office’s pettiness, however, largely negated this effect. For the population the rail link between Skopje and Ohrid was an important concern, since western Macedonia was very poorly connected. Furthermore, Ohrid was a region with good potential for tourism. There was the narrow-gauge railway from the war, but this had only a very limited capacity. The passenger trains needed 21 hours to cover a distance of 233 kilometres.33 The train, known locally as the ‘tea kettle’, was also notorious for frequently coming off the tracks. During the journey, which David Footman undertook in the 1930s, this happened five times.34 The British ambassador Kennard had had the pleasure in May 1926:

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The discomfort was extreme, as the train only travelled 10 kilometres an hour, with such curves that the engine was facing one most of the time for considerable stretches. Carriages were derailed three times during the journey of 200 kilometres, but the passengers resignedly assisted in putting them on the rails again.35 In November 1936 the Prime Minister Milan Stojadinovic´ promised to link Ohrid with Skopje via Tetovo – Gostivar, as well as through Bitola. He also agreed to making connections with the Bulgarian and Albanian railways. ‘That’s our plan for the railway lines in the south. And we will pursue this plan systematically, energetically, and relentlessly, until we have realized it.’36 Such an expansion would have made Macedonia into a transport hub for the southern Balkans. That these plans were originally taken seriously can be seen from the fact that in Skopje a large, representative railway station was built, the foundation stone of which was laid on 10 October 1937, in the presence of Transport Minister Spaho. The city president of Skopje did not miss the opportunity to once again press in favour of the connection Skopje–Ohrid– Bitola.37 In these years the preparatory work was done for various routes in the region. The preconditions appeared to be good to start on a generous expansion of the railway network, as since 1935– 6 the state budget had achieved considerable surpluses. Against this background, on 13 April 1938, a decree establishing a 6 per cent domestic loan for four billion dinars was issued. The funds were to be used for national defence measures and for expanding the transport network, including one and half billion just for railroad construction. At the same time a six-year economic plan was being prepared. The loan was supposed to give the country a powerful impulse after the years of economic crisis.38 Stojadinovic´ announced to his party members in Macedonia that a large part of this loan would be spent in the Vardar Banovina.39 Despite these great promises, not a single metre of track was laid in Macedonia after 1936. Of the long-awaited line Skopje–Ohrid, not even the much-reduced variant Skopje– Gostivar was completed. On 25 March 1938, the representative for Gostivar County, Ugrin Joksimovic´, complained that the construction of this railway was repeatedly being postponed, although the foundations along the route had been prepared two years before and the stretch did not pose any great technical challenges. Its construction, according to Joksimovic´, could also create jobs for the migrants working abroad, who had to return.40 In Bitola a normal-track line to Struga, via Resen and Ohrid, was demanded in vain, which would have been important for tourism, as well as for the economy, and for trade with Albania.41

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Of 960 kilometres of public railway lines at the end of the interwar period, 255 kilometres, that is, more than one quarter, were still narrow-gauge stretches, with a width of only 60 centimetres. Despite the bad experiences made with the narrow-gauge railways, the connection Sˇtip –Radovisˇ – Strumica towards the end of the 1930s was planned from scratch as a Decauville Railway (60-centimetre track width), although the terrain did not present any great obstacles and construction was quite cheap. Lucˇ sharply criticised these plans. Nowhere else on earth would something like this still be built, as these railways were completely unable to meet the economy’s needs.42 The foundations for this stretch had been prepared, but construction had not yet begun.43 The reasons for the stagnation in railway construction in Macedonia, the rapid expansion of which had still been seriously planned in 1936, have hitherto not been examined closely. It appears, however, that once again the weight shifted in favour of other parts of the country, as soon as the planning phase was over and money was actually distributed. During the second half of the 1930s, the financial means intended for railway construction flowed primarily to Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.44 Also the repeatedly postponed Adria Railway was, as mentioned above, started only in 1936. In addition, in view of the threatening danger of war, increasing sums were spent on national defence. Beyond that, however, it is difficult to determine what actually happened to the domestic loan of more than 4 billion. It apparently could not be realised as had been envisaged.45 In Macedonia only the railway station in Skopje was completed, one of the most modern and beautiful in the country, as Prime Minister Cvetkovic´ stressed; even in the entire Balkan region, as another witness46 commented. The ‘monumental railway station’, which had cost more than 18 million dinars (and which was destroyed by the large earthquake in 1963, as were many other representative buildings from the interwar period), was officially opened on 1 December 1940, the anniversary of the founding of Yugoslavia.47 Cvetkovic´ justified the construction of such a generously proportioned railway station with the important role which the South had played in the past and would also play in the future.48 In reality the splendid building had to serve as a consolation prize for all the stretches of railway that remained unbuilt. During the entire interwar period, to recapitulate, only the connections Veles– Sˇtip– Kocˇani and Veles – Prilep– Bitola, covering a total distance of 217 kilometres, were built as new construction. Originally planned were the construction of 1,600 kilometres and the development of the entire Vardar Banovina.49 The responsibility for this discrepancy lies primarily with Belgrade, which kept changing the priorities, but not exclusively. The politicians in

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Macedonia also share part of the blame. As was the case regarding the Adria Railway, there were conflicts about the routes the railways should take. Everyone tried to get the line to pass through his electoral district, numerous commissions became involved in the planning, such that prolonged delays resulted.50

The Media The press history of Vardar Macedonia has not been written at all for the interwar period. For numerous papers one does not even know exactly when they were first published and when – or why – they ceased publication. In the literature one comes across contradictory information on this. Even the correspondent of the Central Press Office in Skopje passed on partially inaccurate information about the publication dates to his superiors in Belgrade. Nonetheless, it is clear that the number of publications overall was quite modest; hardly any newspapers were published daily, and many papers existed for only a short period. The most common reason for this was lack of money. Those newspapers which did not receive any support from the state struggled continuously with considerable financial worries. Many of the subscribers paid very irregularly and allowed debts to run up for years. Papers like Glas Pologa (The Voice of Polog), Novi sjaj (The New Blaze) and many others regularly appealed to their readers to pay their subscriptions. If expenditure rose, due, for example, to an increase in the cost of paper, soon the very existence of the paper was at stake.51 Due to the frequent closures, the number of publications was constantly fluctuating. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify certain patterns. In the 1920s there was a series of, in part, short-lived papers; in Nasˇa Stara Srbija (Our Old Serbia, 1 December 1924 to 1929) there even existed for several years a daily newspaper. A number of papers were published in Bitola.52 This – relative – abundance was because several of the newspapers were organs of the parties and their youth organisations, which wanted to establish themselves in the new territories. In Bitola, for a time (1922? to 1925?), there even appeared the organ of the local Radical Party under the name Makedonija, while the paper of the local Democratic Party was called Jugoslavija (1922 to ?). But by the middle of the 1920s, most of these papers no longer existed. From 1926, a monthly literary periodical appeared in Skopje, initially as Mesecˇni pregled (Monthly Review), then under the name Juzˇni pregled (Southern Review). From the start the journal also published songs and folk tales in Macedonian dialects. It was edited by Petar Mitropan, the lecturer for Russian Language at the Faculty for Philosophy in Skopje, and soon acquired a good

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reputation, such that poets and writers from all over Yugoslavia published there.53 It was able to keep going longer than any other publication in Macedonia, namely until December 1939,54 when it was closed down without giving a reason or taking leave from its readers. Especially the academic section of the journal gave local writers space and the possibility of being published.55 The reasons for its closure have not yet been investigated. At the start of 1939, the journal had still received 12,000 dinars in subsidies from Stojadinovic´, which had been sent to the Ban Marko Novakovic´ for him to pass on.56 It is possible that the new government cut the subsidies. In the first two years of the royal dictatorship, the in any case weak publishing activity in Macedonia practically came to a complete halt. During these years apparently only the Official Journal of the city of Skopje and the Official Almanac of the Vardar Banovina were published.57 In 1930, this unsatisfactory situation caught the attention of the liberal Berlin Newspaper Company Rudolf Mosse AG, which examined the possibility of founding a daily newspaper in Skopje. A representative of the company inquired among the Belgrade newspapers about their sales in the Vardar Banovina and negotiations were started with the largest printing house in Skopje, Krajnicˇanac. The idea was to publish a ‘strictly neutral’ paper with primarily an economic profile.58 This plan, however, came to nothing. This was due on the one hand to the financial problems, with which the Rudolf Mosse AG was struggling from 1930, until it went bankrupt in 1932 and then was bought up with government money. On the other hand, the preconditions did not exist in the Banovina for an influential local newspaper as a profitable business concern. In 1933 the correspondent of the Central Press Office explained the reasons for this in a convincing analysis: the large Belgrade papers Politika, Pravda and Vreme had permanent correspondents and gave some coverage to the Vardar Banovina. These newspapers were available in Skopje on their day of publication and, despite their size, still cheap. A large obstacle was the limited potential readership, since the majority of the population was illiterate. The correspondent also subtracted the 600,000 Muslims in the region, by which he meant to indicate that these people lived in their own spiritual world and were not interested in the Christian press. But also the non-Muslims of this former Ottoman territory were not used to reading the newspaper; only the officials, the townsfolk, and the young generation felt this need. All attempts to launch a daily newspaper in Skopje were unsuccessful, in view of the overpowering competition in Belgrade and due to the small circulation and resulting high price.59 In 1930, in the Central Press Office, however, there was a different opinion. When the founding of a daily newspaper for the Vardar Banovina was discussed, the correspondent in Skopje, Milan Jovanovic´, was surprised that

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nobody had done this earlier, since Politika and Vreme only arrived in the capital of the Banovina at 11.00am.60 Three years later, Jovanovic´ may have become sobered by the difficulties, which Vardar had to struggle against. A paper named Vardar had already appeared in the Ottoman period. In 1925, a newspaper was again published under this name. The editor was Milosav Jelic´, who subsequently worked for Politika. Due to lack of money, Vardar already had to be shut down in 1926. From 1929, Skopje and the Vardar Banovina no longer had any newspaper of their own. This was perceived as a shortcoming, which was why Milan Jovanovic´, a journalist from Belgrade, started the third edition of Vardar on 1 May 1932. Initially the paper appeared as a Sunday newspaper; from 3 November 1932, it came out twice weekly, and one year later, from 1 October 1933, it was three times per week.61 In 1933, Vardar, which had a circulation of only 5,000, employed around ten reportedly local editors, and according to the correspondent of the Central Press Office, represented an attempt, despite all the difficulties, to give ‘South Serbia’ a serious local paper, which was put together by locals. However, up until then, due to a lack of newspapers, there were also no journalists, so they had first to be trained. From 1934, Vardar was then supposed to appear as a daily newspaper.62 In reality Vardar was subordinated to the Central Press Office – that means, the Propaganda Department of the Cabinet. The newspaper was financed by it and was edited by its correspondent Milan Jovanovic´. Until July 1933, the Press Office expended a total of 350,000 dinars for the newspaper. Jovanovic´ regretted that the paper was not able to be published more frequently, for he was convinced that the newspaper could support ‘that process of “assimilation,” which was taking place there on its own’. He therefore urged his superiors to make clear to the decision makers in Belgrade and Skopje the importance of the paper, in order to make it possible for it to appear more frequently. He proposed that the printing house Nemanja reduce the price by 33 per cent, as the Government Presidium had bought the printing house itself and given it to the Banovina Administration as a gift, so that from the profits it could publish such a paper in Skopje, or at least subsidise one.63 Jovanovic´ was successful with his appeal. Up until 30 November 1934, Vardar appeared three times per week, from 1 December 1934 until 29 July 1935 daily, then still six times per week. If locals ever really had formed the majority of the editors, this was in any case no longer true in 1935. Only two out of six employees were Macedonians.64 Milan Jovanovic´ remained until his transfer to Belgrade in 1935 the chief editor and publisher of the newspaper.65 After a short interlude, another employee of the Central Press Office served as chief editor until June 1936.66 On 3 November 1936, the publication of the newspaper

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was stopped. According to the publisher the reason was that the Central Press Office had cut its monthly subsidies from 30,000 to 10,000 dinars.67 On 12 November, the newspaper appeared again, but now with only four pages.68 Just one month later, on 10 December 1936, its publication was stopped completely.69 This brought an end to the largest newspaper to appear in the Banovina. With the departure of Jovanovic´ the paper had lost its driving force and an important advocate at the Central Press Office. Just as he was the motor behind its launch, so his exit meant the end. The existence of the newspaper was dependent entirely on financial support from the Central Press Office; it did not succeed in putting down any local roots. After 1932 also other, smaller press offerings were published, of which most, as in the 1920s, were only of an ephemeral nature. In 1935, more than 1,200 titles were published in Yugoslavia, but only 12 in the Vardar Banovina. Only the Vrbas Banovina, with three newspapers, had less, while in the Sava Banovina, 341 papers appeared.70 Up to 1938 the picture changed little: of the 1,223 titles registered throughout the country, 20 were in the Vardar Banovina, of which 16 appeared in Skopje, but none on a daily basis.71 But the desire for one’s own daily newspaper persisted in certain circles even after the collapse of Vardar. In 1938, several businessmen in the Banovina were taken with the idea of publishing a paper, which would mainly be concerned with economic problems, but should also represent the interests of ‘South Serbia’ on social and educational issues. A committee was formed in order to clarify things.72 If this ever met, it must have come to a negative conclusion. The businessmen, who repeatedly complained about the lack of their own newspaper, were not willing to invest their own money in such a venture. The risk was clearly too great.73 For political reasons, the Central Press Office also showed renewed interest in the Macedonian press. At a conference called by Interior Minister Korosˇec on 31 May 1938, Bosˇko Bogdanovic´, the deputy chief, recommended establishing a serious daily newspaper as a tool against the Macedonian movement of ‘South Serbian intellectuals’.74 In 1940, Todor Manevic´, the correspondent in Skopje, the first native Macedonian to be appointed to this position, also lobbied his superiors in favour of a daily newspaper, as the press in the south was so to speak non-existent: in Skopje the Official Journal was published once a week, the Muslim paper Nasˇ dom (Our Home), as well as Nasˇa recˇ (Our Word), the mouthpiece of the leftist youth, appeared irregularly; in Tetovo Glas Pologa was published, and that was everything. Manevic´ also demanded that the opening of the Radio Station, which was already in preparation, be expedited.75 The efforts of the correspondent bore fruit; on 14 October 1940, the eight-page daily newspaper Glas Juga (Voice of the south) started to appear under his chief editorship, which, according to an

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Army Office in Skopje, was supposed to awaken national consciousness and a sense for the entire [nation] and therefore was subsidised. But the paper did not fulfil these expectations and already in its first issue it gave cause for complaint. The Staff of the Third Army District was – as already mentioned elsewhere – outraged that the terms ‘Serb’ and ‘South Serbia’ had been cut from the speech of the Minister for the Army and the Fleet.76 Otherwise though the newspaper did not expose itself much in terms of domestic politics and it devoted plenty of space to cultural life. In addition, the contents were strongly influenced by the topic of the war. Alongside the press publications mentioned so far, which in part were directly financed by the regime, or consisted of official organs of the political parties, there were also illegal and legal papers that were critical of the government, as well as newspapers published by enemies of the state. On the one hand, the illegal Communist Party undertook several attempts to publish an official organ (Iskra – Spark, 1922 –3, 1933, 1941; Radnicˇka zora – Worker’s Dawn, 1924; Bilten, 1934, 1940), and on the other, leftist- and autonomist-minded groups tried to get their opinions heard among the public and to raise concerns, which did not make it into the official press. In view of the censorship that prevailed in this period, it is understood, of course, that these newspapers and journals were permitted only a very short lifespan. The Head of the Department for Public Security in the Banovina served as the censor. At the end of the 1930s, a certain Mirko Adzˇic´ held this job, who according to the memoirs of Cvetkovic´, was a stubborn Serb and censored everything, which was not concerned with Serbianism.77 One of the earliest and most interesting attempts to publish a critical, but legal, journal was the appearance of Lucˇ (Light) in 1937–8, which has already been discussed extensively above. Leftist intellectuals launched the paper Nasˇa recˇ (Our Word) on 25 February 1939, as a legal instrument of the Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) for Macedonia. The paper appeared bi-weekly covering eight pages, with a circulation of 1,500 to 2,000 copies.78 Important topics were agriculture, life in the countryside in general, the position of workers and women, as well as the poverty of the people. Additionally, almost every issue included literary texts published in the Macedonian language.79 Again and again, individual issues were banned, until the publication of the newspaper was completely suppressed. The editors then continued to issue the paper, twice under a new name. On 6 June 1939, an issue appeared as Nasˇ glas (Our Voice) and was immediately banned. In mid June the newspaper was then called Nasˇ list (Our Paper), which was also forbidden straight away. After waiting for several months, the party organ was again published as Nasˇa recˇ on 21 November 1939, and continued to appear until 6 January 1941. The journal, which for

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two years represented a forum for critical essays, was able to cover its costs from sales.80 In December 1939, the journalist Viktor Ac´imovic´ started the newspaper Juzˇna stvarnost. List za sva kulturna pitanja Makedonije (Southern Reality: Paper for all Macedonia’s Cultural Questions) in Tetovo. The immediate occasion for the launch was the already mentioned Macedonia Lecture by Nikola Vulic´ in the Serbian Cultural Club. Ac´imovic´ proposed publishing a riposte to the editors of Nasˇa recˇ, but they were afraid of the consequences: the paper would be banned, those responsible arrested, and nothing would be achieved. After this, Ac´imovic´ decided to publish a newspaper himself and give Vulic´ an appropriate response. In this he profited from his good contacts in Slovenian Maribor, where his father-in-law lived, who paid for the publication costs of the newspaper. Ac´imovic´ remained in Slovenia for a month and prepared three issues, of which the first appeared at the beginning of December with a printrun of 3,000 copies.81 The reply to Vulic´, as well as the political and social questions of Macedonia, formed the main focus of the first issue, which was printed partly in Cyrillic and partly in Latin script. Still for December a special issue dealing with the tobacco question was announced, then in monthly intervals, further special editions on ‘other important questions of our province’ were due to appear.82 The paper attracted considerable interest in Macedonia, in Skopje the 500 available copies were sold out within one or two days.83 Juzˇna stvarnost was banned already after the first issue and Ac´imovic´ arrested on the accusation that he had agitated for an independent Macedonia.84 In January 1940, he was interned as a ‘known communist’ and ‘a danger to the public peace and order’ and sent to the camp in Bilec´e.85 In summary, it can be said that throughout the entire interwar period there was never a press landscape in Macedonia that was worthy of the name. The preconditions for it were as unfavourable as one could imagine. Relevant traditions from the Ottoman period did not exist; there was a shortage of readers in this part of the country, whose population even at the end of the 1930s consisted 70 per cent of illiterates.86 Of those who did interest themselves in newspapers, many simply could not afford them. On the other hand, there were the large established Belgrade papers, which already dominated the field. So a series of minor papers came and went, which appeared in small editions, with low circulation, and for a relatively short period. Only the official publications and those products, like Vardar, which had sizeable government subsidies at their disposal, were able to survive for a longer time. No newspaper could exist on a purely commercial basis, as the circulation numbers were too small. The papers critical of the regime were exposed to constant persecution and were banned sooner or later. Therefore, it was impossible for them to establish

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a public opinion via the press, or to reach wider circles and present the problems of Macedonia, as well as their own concerns and ideas, for general discussion. Insofar as they could exert influence at all, this remained limited to Skopje. The local elite therefore lacked a forum, which would have enabled them to express and present themselves, and thereby establish them as a cultural and political force. Surprisingly, the regime also exploited the potential of this medium too little. A good and strong daily newspaper, as many local people desired and as was advocated by the Central Press Office, would have provided the opportunity to influence the population in the desired manner. Yet support for the newspaper Vardar, which only had a print-run of 5,000 copies, was too expensive for those in power. They were satisfied with blocking critical voices and relied otherwise on the Belgrade newspapers. In this they overlooked, however, the tendency of a readership to identify with a newspaper to much greater extent, if it is locally anchored. Only right at the end of the period, once the Macedonian autonomy movement could no longer be overlooked, was an attempt made to resist this political development with the daily newspaper Glas Juga. In the interwar period, the radio established itself as a new medium, which in the 1930s reached more than a quarter of Europe’s population. There were radio stations in Yugoslavia from 1925; in 1929 stations existed in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana.87 However, the regime also failed here to exploit the medium’s possibilities for its policy in Macedonia. The need for a strong broadcasting station in Skopje was only recognised in 1939, when those in power noticed people were listening to Radio Sofia a great deal and with pleasure, and also getting better reception than on Radio Belgrade. Since, however, only a few residents owned radios, it became customary for people to gather in front of restaurants that had radios, and then to discuss and comment on the contents of the broadcast. The restaurant owners therefore soon became suspected of spreading Macedonian separatist propaganda, and the police authorities banned listening to the radio in public.88 The Army reports demanded that the broadcast station in Belgrade be strengthened as soon as possible and also to build one in Skopje.89 As a result, work on the station in Skopje was speeded up; it had already been planned from 1930 and the building had been completed for some time – but like many other projects, this one also had been put on the back burner. Even once this facility was given urgent attention in 1939, still its opening, initially projected for April 1940,90 had to be postponed until January 1941, due to delays in deliveries. By then, however, it was too late for the ‘patriotic mission’, for which Radio Skopje had been intended.91

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Language From the foundation of the state, the official ideology maintained that the kingdom’s population comprised peoples with three names – Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The languages of these peoples – Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian – were the official languages. Next to them, there were also a few recognised minorities (like the Hungarians, Germans, Italians, Romanians and Turks), which were permitted to run their own schools. The Albanians found themselves in a less clear-cut situation, as their ethnic identity was not questioned and their language was not forbidden. But no Albanian schools were permitted, and the possession of Albanian books, which could only come from Albania, was punishable.92 The Macedonians were viewed officially as Serbs and their language in any case as a Serbian dialect. The schools in particular were assigned the role of helping the ‘correct’ Serbian language to establish itself. However, the teaching staff were completely overwhelmed by this task. As long as the living conditions of the people did not change considerably, there was no reason for the people to change their language. In the schoolroom those children that went to school at all spoke Serbian as best they could. At home they had no reason to do so. The Serbian language was not attractive enough, knowing it offered no advantages. Those who remained in the village on their farm did not need it. The closeness of Serbian to the mother tongue meant that one could more or less make oneself understood to the officials. In addition, this language was generally associated with negative experiences: it was the officials, gendarmes, tax-collectors, tobacco buyers and other representatives of authority, who used it, generally to impose demands, make claims, impose fines, conduct interrogations, etc. The educated Macedonian youths, which passed through Serbian institutions, also for various reasons did not take leave of their linguistic roots; on the contrary, it was precisely these people, who in the second half of the 1930s demanded increasingly openly the recognition of the Macedonian language. An important reason for this refusal lies in the mistrust and discrimination with which the young intelligentsia were treated by the state and its representatives, and as a consequence found themselves excluded from any career prospects. They found themselves forced into being different, which then hardened into a permanent mindset; they could not be integrated within a Yugoslav or Serbian intelligentsia, but rather understood themselves as a Macedonian avant-garde, which at the same time did not want to lose touch with its origins. One of the students, who participated in the discussion with Nikola Vulic´ in 1939, replied to the professor’s question: ‘You want your own language? What do you need it for?’ with the words: ‘So that our old

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people can understand us!’93 As the youths, even with a good education, did not have a path to an urbane, Yugoslav future, they remained loyal to their origins and their mother tongue. The claim that Macedonian was only a Serbian dialect was already denied in the 1920s by Macedonian students, who saw in it a separate language.94 In the 1930s, the official Serbian view was increasingly rejected. A teacher born in Kumanovo, an ‘Autonomist’, who stressed that he was not a Serb, even spoke the ‘local dialect’ in school, which, however, he did not view as a way of speaking, but as an independent language.95 Dimitrije D ¯ uzelovic´, one of the main defendants in the trial of December 1927, in a speech in 1937, which he held in Serbian Kraljevo specifically on the holiday of St Sava, the most important Serbian saint and ‘Enlightener’, defended ‘our Macedonian language’, which Kyrill and Method had recognised as the fourth internationally recognised cultural language, after Hebrew, Latin and Greek.96 Foreigners, who came into close contact with the local population, such as the Swiss Methodist and Missionary, Ro¨sli Isler, naturally spoke about a ‘Macedonian language’.97 The linguistic decision whether what the Macedonians spoke was a Serbian dialect or an independent language did not in any case lie in the hands of those in power. There are no objective criteria which provide a clear definition of what a language is. Modern linguistics refuse on principle to distinguish languages on the basis of the differences in their structural characteristics, or also on account of their mutual ability to be understood. A Bavarian is scarcely able to understand a north German, but it would never occur to him to speak of there being two different languages. Therefore, in social linguistics a language is defined by the (language-) consciousness of the speaker.98 Accordingly, if the Macedonian women and men were of the opinion that they were speaking their own language, for which throughout the entire interwar period, despite repression and censorship, plenty of evidence can be found, then this language existed, even if there was no possibility to codify it. Nonetheless, it was also used as a written language, if it is also difficult to say to what extent. Occasionally during the 1920s one-act plays were put on in Macedonian. In 1922, three or four issues of the illegal paper Iskra, the mouthpiece of the local Communist Party, were published in the dialect of the city.99 At the end of the interwar period, it was again the Communists who promoted the Macedonian language. The appeals by the ‘District Committee of the Communist Party in Macedonia’ and other Communist appeals from 1940 on were written in Macedonian and usually ended with the slogan: ‘Long live free Macedonia!’ or ‘Long live the free Macedonian Republic!’100 In Bilten, the illegal publication of the Regional Committee of the Macedonian Communist Party, a large proportion of the articles were published in Macedonian.

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Private correspondence was also conducted in the Macedonian dialects. In 1939 the Interior Ministry obtained possession of a letter, which a student in Belgrade, according to the authorities, had written to his friend in Kicˇevo in a ‘Macedonian dialect’ (makedonsko narecˇje).101 A Dimko Kostic´ from Bitola wrote a card in local dialect, on 13 January 1941, to his lawyer in Prilep.102 On 5 February, he wrote to him again, and on this occasion he started in Serbian, only to switch without warning into Macedonian after the usual introductory phrases.103 Macedonian colloquial language was also not entirely banned from all published writings; after all ‘the people in South Serbia’ spoke ‘the language of Dusˇan’s Law Book, an old Serbo-Croatian dialect’.104 From the start, in books and newspapers, folk tales, poems and songs from ‘South Serbia’ were occasionally reprinted in the local idiom.105 The Macedonian language was also used in newspaper articles, to cite locals and thereby conjure up a certain local colour.106 For this reason, Vardar even had to put up with criticism from the Bulgarian newspaper Nezavisimost, which claimed that the ‘MacedonianBulgarian’ dialect could not be written in Serbian letters at all.107 At the end of the 1930s the Macedonian sections in newspaper articles became more frequent and longer, especially in the form of direct speech.108 Particularly those newspapers published in Macedonia used this means in order to bring to prominence their own language and culture, so as to speak directly to their public. The newspaper Novi sjaj, which appeared in Bitola, included a Macedonian poem or song in every issue. In 1937 satires were published about the gazda (Master) Pancˇe, in which the short framing introduction was always published in Serbo-Croatian, whereas the Pancˇe stories, which made up more than 90 per cent of the text, were in Bitola dialect.109 Another place where the Macedonian language also found an entrance was in the theatre. During the 1920s a new theatre building was constructed in Skopje for 20 million dinars, which was given a ceremonial opening on 26 October 1927, the day of ‘Skopje’s liberation’.110 The large amount of money expended indicates that the state expected considerable benefit in the ‘national’ sense from this cultural institution. The Gand Zˇupan of the Bregalnica District certainly expressed a generally shared conviction among the authorities, when he wrote: ‘that the theatre with its historical repertoire is a school for the development of national sentiment’.111 Already during the first season in the new house, a piece was staged in Kumanovo dialect, namely Lencˇe Kumanovcˇe (Lena from Kumanovo) by the author Vasil Iljoski, who was born in Krusˇevo in 1903. With this, however, the theatre had dared too much. The play was soon taken off the programme and the author, an assistant teacher at the Kumanovo High School was transferred.112 It is likely that the closure of the play was connected with the

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student trials, which took place in Skopje in November and December 1927. The Macedonian cause should really not have received too much publicity. The director of the theatre at the time said years later that he had put on the play after conferring with linguists at the Faculty for Philosophy in Skopje, with artists, and with the city authorities. The experiment was, however, a fiasco; the piece could only be played three or four times in front of a small audience, made up exclusively of ‘South Serbs’. He thought the reason was that the author was too young and inexperienced in drama.113 The composition of the audience for Lencˇe Kumanovcˇe remained an exception; the theatre was attended primarily by Serbian officials, which could not really have been the intention of the authorities. It was then perhaps also the absence of the Macedonian audience, which resulted in the mid 1930s in permission being granted for plays to be performed ‘in dialect’. Thus in 1936– 7, the withdrawn play of Vasil Iljoski from 1927 was put on again.114 Macedonian authors were requested to put on stage plays reflecting life in the South. In response Anton Panov wrote the drama Pecˇalbari (Work Migrants) ‘in pure dialect’, in which he wanted to show, that we can also contribute to the construction of a shared Yugoslav culture, that we are not spiritual half-breeds (duhovni polutani), but that perhaps it will even be us, who will speak a new spiritual word in the Balkans, which will mean a step forward to a general brotherly marching together.115 After some hesitation by the management of the theatre, which initially did not want to stage the commissioned work, it was shown in Skopje in November and December 1936.116 Pecˇalbari was successful, and in the words of the director of the Belgrade National Theatre, who had also worked in Skopje before, not on account of the dialect, but because Panov had captured well on stage a social problem that affected all of ‘South Serbia’. The play was even successful in Belgrade.117 Then, however, these performances were taken off with the justification that ‘the showing of theatre plays in dialect could contribute to the creation of an independent dialect within the country’. The Director of the National Theatre in Skopje, who in 1938 again supported performances ‘in dialect’, on the contrary, saw no such danger. In order to create an official common language from numerous dialects, in his opinion, it would need alongside strong authors also much time and systematic work. But this region was only just beginning to produce a few authors. Furthermore, the writers themselves, once they had achieved a certain degree of success, tended – according to the director – to write in that

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Figure 6.2 Skopje 1929, on the Left Side, on the Banks of the River, the National Theatre (Photograph in the possession of the author)

language which gave them access to a greater readership. That was clearly a development in Slovenia. In favour of performances ‘in dialect’, it was his conviction, was the fact that it is ‘our’ (meaning: a Serbian) dialect, and that it was psychologically important, that the ordinary theatregoers felt at home there, learned to treasure it, and thereby became receptive for everything that it represented; that means also for the spirit of the shared state community. On these grounds, the director argued in favour of lifting the ban and systematically building up a repertoire of plays in dialect, as this would help to integrate this region faster and more enduringly into the totality.118 The Education Minister allowed himself to be persuaded by this clever and farsighted argument and on 14 October 1938, he permitted the National Theatre in Skopje ‘to put on the play in dialect for a trial period’.119 But the short life-span, which the kingdom of Yugoslavia was still granted, was not sufficient to establish whether the Macedonian population could really be educated to visit the theatre, in order to influence them in the desired direction using this cultural medium. The trend in the late 1930s was rather in the opposite direction: the Macedonian language increasingly became the crystallising point for the autonomy movement. And permitting its use in the theatre only served to promote this development. The regime faced a dilemma in its attempt to suppress the local dialects. On the one hand Macedonia was viewed as Serbia’s ‘classical South’, as ‘the cradle of Slavic writing and knowledge at all in the mediaeval period’,120 in which the language of Stefan Dusˇan remained alive. How was it then that the locals spoke ‘incorrectly’ and one had to take measures against them? The way

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out was to accuse the Macedonian teachers and officials of speaking ‘Bulgarian’121 as many of them had been educated in institutions belonging to the Bulgarian Exarchate, and to maintain that the local language had been ruined by ‘Bulgarian elements’. With this approach, nothing stood in the way of a rigorous campaign against the use of this language, which qualified almost as treason. The Serbian language, however, despite all the efforts made and its closeness to the Macedonian dialects, did not manage to establish itself outside those spheres where its use was compulsory. And even there, local officials and teachers often simply ignored the regulations. The linguistic assimilation of the population was a complete failure. On the contrary, towards the end of the 1930s the Macedonian language forced its way into ever more public areas. Hagen Schulze has named several factors for the successful homogenisation in France: the spread of literacy, which favoured the standardisation of the language, the development of the transport network, and the intensification of trade and industry. In addition, this all played out over a much longer period of several centuries.122 As Eugen Weber has shown, this process, which produced the unification of the French nation and the French language, was only concluded after World War I. ‘When the national society became more significant than the various local societies, national language was able at last to override its local rivals and other particularisms as well’.123 In Yugoslavia the time available for the process of unification was much too short. In addition none of the above-mentioned social, economic and infrastructure developments were significantly pursued. A Yugoslav national society did not develop. On the contrary, the particularist nationalisms came to the fore much stronger than ever: the established Serbian, the consolidated Croatian and Slovenian, as well as the growing Macedonian Nationalism.

CONCLUSION

The ‘Classical’ or the ‘Primitive’ South? Right up until the 1870s, the peasants of large parts of France, essentially south of an imaginary line from St Malo to Geneva, appeared to the townspeople, for example the Parisians, as uncivilised wild men, worse still than many natives in the colonies. They could neither read nor write, did not understand French, believed in witches, and were, in the eyes of their countrymen from the north, ugly, suspicious, underhand, fearful and fatalistic. In their territories, which were populated by wolves and not connected to any transport networks, hardly anybody ventured other than soldiers and officials. Although these people worked hard from early in the morning until late in the evening, sometimes even at night by moonlight, they had scarcely anything to eat or wear, and in addition to all this were exploited by loan sharks. From life they expected nothing but hardship.1 The difference between a resident of Paris and such a peasant could not be any greater. And yet by the end of World War I a development had been completed that made ‘Frenchmen’ out of both of them. The Serbian officials and few travellers who came to Macedonia in the 1920s encountered similar conditions. They stumbled upon a population which lived in extreme poverty, from very primitive means, had no healthcare facilities, and scarcely had access to any transport or communications networks. Eighty per cent of the population was illiterate; they did not understand the Serbian official language and were viewed by the visitors as suspicious, egoistic, thrifty and very conservative.2 For some the ‘South Serb’ was dirty, lazy and superstitious.3 To turn these people into Serbs, officials, teachers, as well as gendarmes and policemen were sent there. Since Macedonia, which presented itself in such a desolate condition, had belonged – if only briefly – in the fourteenth century to the glorified Serbian Empire of Tsar Stefan Dusˇan and Skopje had even been its capital, there had to

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be a reason for the decline that had occurred in the meantime. Without difficulty, this was found in the more than five-century-long ‘slavery’ under the ‘merciless Turkish exploiter’. The Turks had not only kept the people in backwardness, but also broken their personal pride and degraded them, which was why they now despised themselves and their like.4 These negative verdicts were, however, only one aspect of the picture, which Serbia’s media and science gave of Macedonia. Overall the positive depictions, through which its population was to be brought closer to the Serbs, outweighed by far. Observers repeatedly noted willingness to work, an intact family morality, patience and thriftiness as outstanding virtues of the people in the south, who lived within patriarchal structures. ‘The Macedonians’ or ‘South Serbs’ were also viewed as agile, intelligent, entrepreneurial and culturally talented. Especial admiration was always earned by their songs and music.5 The Ban Zˇika Lazic´ praised the vardarci for their ‘wonderful attributes’ such as hard work and endurance, a desire for progress, honesty, piety, devotion to homeland and the king, as well as obedience to the authorities, and depicted them as a model for the entire country.6 The exaggeration of the human qualities of the Macedonian inhabitants reflected the mythologising of the country as ‘our classical South’, ‘the most valuable territory of our Kingdom’ and ‘our golden apple . . . an inheritance, left to him [the Serb] by Tsar Dusˇan’.7 For one priest this piece of earth was even ‘the land promised by God to our forefathers’.8 On account of the great sacrifices that were made for its liberation during the Balkan Wars, Macedonia had become especially valuable. It significance for the present, was made visible by the frequently used image of the MoravaVardar Valley as the backbone of the state. According to this view, the stability of the shared state was based primarily on the connection between the Morava and Vardar parts, which thereby secured the main transport artery from Central Europe to the Mediterranean Sea.9 It was repeatedly stressed: without ‘South Serbia’ no strong Yugoslavia, as whoever had controlled this territory in the past, was powerful; he who had to surrender it lost with it his dominance.10 Nonetheless, in 1941 Yugoslavia was not a powerful country that was capable of resisting the Axis attack with a united front. Its Army was disoriented and capitulated after a short time; a good part of the population viewed the conquerors as liberators. It was demonstrated that it was not sufficient to rule a territory, but that a country needs integrating factors if it wants to last and have powers of resistance. In particular, Yugoslavia did not succeed in actually creating the supposed ‘three-named nation’ of Yugoslavs, which was intended to support the state structure. If the minorities by definition were not included within this nation of ‘South Slavs’, it would still

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have comprised 86 per cent of the population and could have formed a sound basis for stability.

Officials, Teachers and Gendarmes The strategic significance of Macedonia prompted the desire among Serbian politicians after the Balkan Wars to unite the newly conquered territories with Serbia in such a way that they could never split themselves off again. Nikola Pasˇic´ assumed that it would require 30 years of peace to achieve this.11 Yet only one year after the Treaty of Bucharest (10 August 1913), which certified the partition of Macedonia between Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria, World War I broke out, which changed Serbia’s political agenda fundamentally. Zˇika Lazic´, the Head of Security in the Interior Ministry during the 1920s, then Ban of the Vardar Banovina and thereafter Interior Minister, formulated it like this: The events did not permit the unification [of Macedonia and Serbia] to proceed along the natural path to its conclusion, but instead through a certain fatality they cast in front of us the liberation and unification of our three tribes. So the unification of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes occurred even before the Serbs had been unified themselves . . . A child was born, before it was ready.12 According to Lazic´ then, first a strong united Serbia should have been created and only later Yugoslavia. This was an interpretation, which was certainly widespread among Serbian circles and can also be found in the concluding article of Spomenica, the commemorative volume published in 1937 on the twenty-fifth anniversary of ‘South Serbia’s liberation’. The author was of the opinion that Belgrade should have concerned itself more with ‘that holy task, which had been placed on the Kingdom of the Serbs in the War of Liberation’. By the ‘holy task’, the author meant the rapid integration of the newly conquered territories, their saturation with institutions, and cultural and economic development. The extent, to which he thought that the priorities within the kingdom of Yugoslavia had been misplaced can be seen from the following bitterly subversive sentence: ‘But nevertheless, from the funds that remained after the expenses for the north-western territories, very much was done for [South Serbia’s] social and economic progress.’13 ‘South Serbia’ had to be content with the crumbs that fell from the table that had been set for the north-west – Croatia and Slovenia. The fact was that after World War I, the strategic situation was different from before. The kingdom of Serbia had been a landlocked continental state

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which had sought access to the sea in the Balkan Wars. Since its advance to the Adriatic had to be renounced, mainly due to pressure from the Hapsburg monarchy, Macedonia with the port Thessaloniki had become attractive to Serbia. The Yugoslav state that came into existence in 1918, however, had acquired the eastern Adriatic coast. This meant that the importance of Macedonia had considerably declined, despite assurances to the contrary. The tasks left to be done in Macedonia after the establishment of the Yugoslav state remained the same as before World War I, and they were certainly recognised. Hereby one can distinguish between superficial and deeper-lying problems. A lasting topic, which distracted from the failed structural developments, was the ‘bad administration’, which referred to the professional and personal failings of the officials that mainly came from Serbia. Most critics were of the opinion that it would be sufficient to deploy well-trained, motivated, honest and incorruptible officials in order to make the Macedonian population completely satisfied. A lawyer from Strumica expressed these expectations as follows: ‘Good words and a gentle manner of proceeding will make proud Yugoslavs and good citizens of this country . . . out of this roused and impressionable element.’14 Of course corrupt and arrogant officials, as well as violent gendarmes, represented a plague for the population, and scarcely helped to win them for the state. Without question, an efficient administration would have been of great importance for a state that understood itself as modern. However, with regard to corruption and incapacity, the officials in Macedonia only differed to a limited extent from their colleagues in the rest of the country, as, for example, the British embassy maintained. Throughout the entire country, the administration represented an extended arm of party politics. Not qualifications, but loyalty criteria and clientelism were decisive for appointments even to minor posts, so that the bureaucracy was not able to develop into a technically competent auxiliary elite. In consequence, a potential pillar of stability for an institutionalised plurality of power was lost to the state.15 Incidentally, at the end of the Ottoman period, ‘honest officials’ had already been viewed as a panacea. The British journalist H.N. Brailsford clearly recognised this over-optimism: ‘One smiles a little when the appointment of honest officials is suggested as a remedy for Turkish misrule.’16 The ritualised criticism of the bad administration in the south, on which all blame was heaped, ultimately served only to distract from the deeperlying causes for the dissatisfaction of the population. One of the reasons can be seen from the above-cited quote: namely a milder form of the paternalistic and arrogant, but otherwise colonial, attitude of the central government towards Macedonia; an attitude – notable especially during the 1920s, but also thereafter – which led Belgrade to make decisions

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about Macedonia without finding it necessary to at least consult the parliamentarians of this region first. A concern of deep significance, on the other hand, was the development of the education system. Between 1878 and 1885, that is in the key phase, when that process was started, which Eugen Weber so uncannily and briefly summarised in the title of his book, Peasants into Frenchmen, the state in France raised its yearly expenditure on education from 53.6 million to 133.7 million Francs – ‘enough to set money flowing through the country and to convince the undecided of the virtues of the new policies’.17 Apart from in Slovenia, the deficits in the educational system were great throughout the entire SHS Kingdom, and the task for the state was gigantic. In this respect, quite a bit was done in Macedonia in the 1920s. The number of elementary schools increased, the state opened high schools as well as teacher training colleges, and founded the Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje. The expansion of the educational system enjoyed priority, since at that time the conviction still reigned that the youth could be won for the Serbian national cause through the appropriate influence in the schools. In addition, on this territory, for a variety of reasons there was an immediate need to take action. On the one hand, the school system was completely at rock bottom after the war years; on the other the population unmistakably and insistently demanded more schools. Thirdly, a large number of ‘Exarchite’ teachers held positions in Macedonia, who had to be replaced or retrained, in order eliminate their unwanted influence. The share of education within the state budget, however, remained small throughout the interwar period and made up only a few per cent, of which the largest part went to higher education. Care for the elementary schools was left up to the local authorities, which in Macedonia were in any case very poor. Nonetheless, many of them, especially in the Christian regions, within the realms of possibility, did much for the schools, especially building schoolhouses; they often did enough to make the unpleasant discovery that the state was not even prepared to pay for a teacher to make use of the new schoolhouse. Therefore, during the entire period, the number of schools remained insufficient and, especially in the 1930s, in no way kept pace with population growth. A great handicap to the healthy development of the school system was the complete priority given to the ‘national mission’, as opposed to the educational one. The teachers were primarily given the task of educating children to become Serbian patriots. Anyone who was suspected of not wanting to serve this goal was transferred to the north. In this regard, all local teachers were viewed as suspect, and frequently they were forced to change their jobs as a result of pressure from the Interior or War ministries. Better no

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teacher than one who was not nationally ‘correct’, was the motto. So it is not surprising that even up to the end of the 1930s, the authorities did not even come close to eliminating illiteracy, especially among the female population. It was not even possible to implement four years of compulsory school, let alone the eight years, which had been decided in 1929. The closing of most of the high schools in Macedonia after 1929 shows that educational policy was a plaything of domestic policy. Although the numbers of high school students were much lower than in other parts of the country, an even more radical cut was made, as the youth had not developed in the desired direction from the ‘national’ standpoint. The outrage over this drastic cut and the damage done to the image of the state among the population were great. The attempt at steering national consciousness through the schools proved a failure. The government was also not successful in suppressing the Macedonian language. A similarly unrestrained battle was also fought in French schools to banish the local languages – such as Basque, Breton and Occitanian – and to enforce the use of French. But it was not punitive measures that ultimately enabled the official language to become established, but rather the peasants’ realisation that the skills they had learned in school were indeed useful.18 Only in combination with economic and social progress and good prospects for improvement were the schools capable of producing a change in the population’s use of language. In this regard, it was also significant that the authorities in Macedonia did not succeed in improving literacy very much. It was not possible under these circumstances to establish Serbian as the ‘dominant language’,19 which could displace the local dialects and undermine the esteem in which they were held.

The Economy While the necessity of expanding the school system was immediately clear to the respective ministries, there was no plan for economic development in the 1920s, even though the territories conquered from the Ottomans were clearly viewed as primitive and backward. The low living standard and economic under-development appeared to be merely local problems from Belgrade’s perspective; the state felt itself to be primarily concerned with the question of security. The incursions by partisans from Bulgaria, and partly also from Albania, dominated their viewpoint and nourished the belief that the difficulties in Macedonian were mainly of external origin. All bad things were blamed upon this nuisance, so that the view was widespread that if only the infiltrations could be stopped, the peasants in the south would be the most satisfied in the country. This conviction meant that other reasons for the desolate situation in Macedonia did not need to be

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considered. As a result, all priority was given solely to security policy. Massive forces were to suppress the incursions from abroad and their support among the local population. Those suffering were the locals, who were at the mercy of the terror measures employed by both sides and, in part, were scarcely still able to go about their work. The first half of the 1920s, due to the good prices for agricultural products and for raw opium as well as the secure markets in Greece, was still distinguished by a positive economic trend. After the middle of the decade, however, this began to be reversed in the run-up to the Great Depression. The price scissors that opened up hit Macedonia hard as it was an overwhelmingly agricultural region. Especially the steep fall in prices for raw opium, due to a variety of reasons, had a catastrophic impact. Only after the end of the economic crisis, with the inauguration of Milan Stojadinovic´’s government, is it possible to speak of a comprehensive economic policy. Until then the state had scarcely concerned itself with agriculture – in which throughout the country three-quarters of all those employed were engaged – but instead simply skimmed off the profits. In 1935, this branch of the economy found itself in such a desolate condition that it could no longer be overlooked. Debt relief, reduction of the tax burden, improvements in the types and breeds, expansion of plant production for industry, promotion of exports, better prices: these were all measures introduced by the government to benefit agriculture. At the same time largescale public construction projects were to reduce the numbers of unemployed and improve the infrastructure. Although these steps, especially the price increases, were welcomed in Macedonia, no major improvements were achieved in agriculture as a result. The state retained its tobacco monopoly and despite the increases still paid prices that were too low, as the cost of living was also rising significantly. Until World War II, nothing changed in the structure of the Macedonian economy. The region continued to conduct mainly fairly unproductive agricultural and cattle farming, and also cultivated certain plants for industrial use. Almost none of the raw materials produced were processed in Macedonia itself. They were either exported or delivered to factories in other parts of the country. Only the factory for alkaloids established in Skopje in 1936 processed a part of the raw opium. The cattle still had to be exported live to Greece because the planned slaughter- and refrigeration house in Skopje was never built. Cheese made from sheep’s milk was the only manufactured product that was exported. The marginal importance of industry had the consequence that the middle class, especially among the locals, remained a very small group. In addition, it was made very difficult for this group to organise itself

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politically if they didn’t want to do so strictly in accordance with Serbian nationalist precepts. As a result, this class remained politically and socially almost completely without influence. In the high esteem for education, as demonstrated by the construction of schools in the villages and the struggle to reopen the high schools after 1929, however, a central component of the ‘middle-class paradigm’20 found its way into the Christian part of this largely peasant society. This process had already commenced in the nineteenth century when the Balkan states that had become independent started to compete with each other for nationalist propaganda reasons in the construction of schools in Macedonia that still belonged to the Ottoman Empire. In the interwar period the thirst for education remained strong, but due to a shortage of school institutions, it was only after World War II that it led to more comprehensive literacy among the population.

Modest Investments A constant theme was the completely inadequate infrastructure. It was generally acknowledged that the transport system in Macedonia needed to be expanded considerably. Very little was actually done, although loans were taken on and domestic bonds were issued for the improvement of the Yugoslav transport network. The projects in Macedonia stood so low on the list of priorities, however, that the money was usually used up well beforehand. In addition, those railway and road connections that were built, especially those during the 1920s, were primarily in accordance with military rather than economic needs. The modest investments in the transport infrastructure did have an impact on some urban centres, especially Skopje. But the way of life and economic practices in the countryside, which remained cut off from the few main transport routes, were not touched by this at all. Only by improving the secondary roads, which was the responsibility of the Banovina Administration and the local communities, could a difference have been made here. Yet these administrative institutions lacked the required funds. The construction of roads and railways in much of Macedonia was in any case technically demanding and therefore expensive on account of the topographical characteristics of the region. Only towards the end of the period under consideration did the state start to provide support for work on the secondary roads, and then mainly out of social-political considerations – as workcreation measures. The ratio between the urban and the rural populations also did not experience any notable changes. It is worth remarking, however, that in

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‘South Serbia’ a comparatively large proportion of the population, namely 24 per cent (1931), lived in the cities and smaller towns – a number that otherwise was only reached in the Vojvodina, while all other regions had much lower shares. This influx into the towns had taken place in the nineteenth century and at the start of the twentieth century as a result of the insecurity and arbitrariness prevailing in the villages at the end of the Ottoman Empire. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that the south had experienced a strong urbanisation on the basis of these ratios, as in the towns more than a quarter of the population was engaged in agricultural occupations. The exceptions were only Skopje and Bitola, where this proportion was only 15 and 14.2 per cent respectively.21 The most important change in the countryside was the ending of dependency relationships through the agricultural reform, although living conditions and methods of production scarcely altered. Although quite a bit was invested in the health system during the interwar period, overall health care remained very rudimentary, as in 1918 there had been almost nothing on which to build. The establishment of a modern Hygiene Institute in Skopje and the related people’s health homes and health stations marked the determination to deal with malaria and other infectious diseases. As the draining of the swamps, however, was not conducted, in 1939 malaria was still endemic in 35 out of 44 counties in ‘South Serbia’. In other branches of the health system things did not look better. The density of the service network remained low, such that coverage especially in the rural areas was completely inadequate. In the Vardar Banovina in 1936, there were seven hospital beds for every 10,000 inhabitants – only the Vrbas Banovina (northern Bosnia), which once again was the bottom-ranked region, had still less capacity with only 3.8 beds.22 In a village in the region of Skopska Crna Gora, a mountainous area very close to Skopje, 40 children died in 1939 from an outbreak of whooping cough and smallpox, because there was not a doctor’s practice for miles.23 Infant mortality rates were above 40 per cent in some communities.24

The Failure of Yugoslav Integration Eugen Weber has shown that French culture only became ‘truly national’ at the end of the nineteenth century. Only then was the process of acculturating rural France to its urban counterpart completed. Prior to this the regional and local cultures were destroyed and absorbed by the dominant Parisian civilisation and by the schools. The state took away the rights of the local communities to use the forests, pastures, hunting and fishing grounds in the name of progress, freedom, productivity and the common good.

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As in Macedonia, also in parts of France, the officials were received with great hostility, while they themselves had the feeling that they were serving in a colony. Nonetheless, in France the ‘colonised’ also perceived some of the benefits. Between 1880 and 1910, roads and railways were built, which connected the most distant corners with the market and brought them into contact with the way of life in the modern world. The greatly expanded school system transmitted the language, values and patriotism of the dominant culture. Military service also spread these lessons to all parts of the country.25 The people, however, were most convinced by the fact that progress, productivity and the common good did not just remain empty promises, but were also made good. Why did Yugoslavian nation-building fail? The reasons are numerous. Firstly, one cannot stress enough the difficulty of the task. Too many vastly different territories entered the Yugoslav state at once and had to be integrated in a very short period. Enemies, who had fought each other on the battlefield the day before, now had to build a new state together. This task would also have confronted a better organised, richer, and more modern state than interwar Yugoslavia with insoluble problems. In many respects, however, the kingdom was badly prepared. It was ruled by a small number of officials, military personnel and wealthy townspeople, the ‘Balkan version of the bourgeoisie’, as Jozo Tomasevich called them. This group was not primarily concerned with the common good, but rather their own interests and they instrumentalised politics to this end. Since the state owned important companies and monopolies, high office also meant the opportunity to become rich, such that the willingness of this clique to share power declined correspondingly. Under these circumstances corruption, nepotism and intrigue flourished.26 The holders of power represented not only a small group from the social perspective, but also in ethnic terms the circle was small: the Macedonians as well as the minorities remained excluded throughout the entire period. The Croats largely kept themselves apart until they were able to cut themselves a piece of the state. Only the Serbs, Slovenes and Muslims belonged almost always to the ruling group. The dominant parties were ‘primarily interest groups of the political elite for the administration of power’. They were leadership parties with clientelist structures, and in reality without a programme – except for a national one – in which the grass roots scarcely participated at all in the formation of political intent.27 In 1939, Macˇek’s authoritarian rhetoric and that of the Croatian Peasants’ Party after the sporazum created the autonomous Banovina of Croatia, shows clearly that the opposition parties did not differ much in principle in their understanding of the state and of government from those who exercised power: there too, electoral fraud, and the repression and

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terrorisation of political opponents were daily occurrences and even the lowest positions were handed only to party members.28 Even more so than ‘good officials’ the country lacked ‘good politicians’ with an eye for the common good and not just for their own advancement, their own electoral district, and their particularist nationalism. For the failure of Yugoslav nation-building it was of great significance that in contrast to France, there was no centre that was sufficiently weighty to acculturate the rest of the country. Yet the centralist constitution of 1921 was actually intended to prescribe precisely this path. Serbia, which understood itself as the Piedmont of Yugoslavia, and which on account of its contribution to unification claimed for itself the dominant position, was too small for this task, and in economic terms, not nearly strong enough. In addition, the wars from 1912 to 1918 had not only exhausted it economically, but also inflicted large demographic losses. The tally just for World War I was 1.2 million dead and half a million invalids. The Belgrade historian Dimic´ spoke of a negative selection, which had the effect that in all spheres of social life not necessarily the best people achieved positions of influence.29 Serbia had too few resources for this new large country and did not serve as a centre of gravity. Weighty and economically more powerful parts of the country, such as Slovenia and especially Croatia, countered its efforts at hegemony with bitter resistance. They did not want to be dominated and especially not to be assimilated to a culture, which they regarded as inferior. If Serbia had actually achieved the kind of hegemony it intended the development of Yugoslavia would have taken a different course. Instead a political deadlock ensued, which did not satisfy anybody politically and also hindered the country’s economic development. It failed, among other reasons, on account of strong resistance from the already existing nationalisms, which had successfully emerged in the Balkan states that came to existence during the nineteenth century: after the founding of the state the formation of the nation was implemented with the aid of centralism.30 In the kingdom of Yugoslavia the conflict was intensified because the decisive phase of Croatian nation-building, as Sundhaussen correctly maintains, came not in the nineteenth century, but in the 1920s. Only then did nationalism become a mass phenomenon and ceased to be just an ideology of the elite. The daily confrontations with Serbia’s centralising policy served as a useful tool to promote this process.31 It makes sense that the broad masses of the Croatian population wanted to cling onto their particularist nationalism, which had just consolidated their unity, and not subordinate themselves immediately to the concept of a state and a nation imposed from above. That is if there ever was such an overarching national idea at all. Yugoslavianism, which after 1929 was theoretically the unifying

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state ideology for overcoming ‘tribal borders’, did not change anything with regard to the national question. It remained nebulous and was not understood by most people, let alone felt. The ‘tribes’ had much rather hoped that they could enjoy their own nationalisms unhindered within the new state. In the Serbian schools education was still aimed at instilling Serbian national consciousness; thus the nationalistically oriented teaching materials from the 1920s were scarcely changed in the 1930s.32 For the Serbs ‘national’ continued to mean ‘Serbian’ and not ‘Yugoslav’. In view of this starting point, which scarcely changed, refusal to compromise was one of the most important characteristics of the political leadership in both Serbia and Croatia.

The Unsuccessful Serbianisation of Macedonia What failed for the entire state, could, however, have been successful with regard to Macedonia, as on this level the preconditions were considerably more favourable. A comparatively large, strong and experienced Serbian state stood opposite the small and in every respect weak Macedonia, which was to be firmly attached through ‘nationalisation and assimilation’. This goal was to be achieved in two ways simultaneously. On the one hand Serbian rule was legitimated on pre-modern grounds by reaching back to the mediaeval period and claiming that Macedonia was part of the inheritance of Stefan Dusˇan, or even a country promised to the Serbs by God. On the other hand, the modern concept of the nation was employed, which was to be propagated by the equally modern means of the school. The use of symbols, people, and dates from Serbian history, as well as myths, combined both of these approaches. The ideologues believed they held a strong hand with these trumps. Nonetheless, they were not successful; only a small part of the population described themselves, usually out of opportunism, as ‘Serbs’ or ‘South Serbs’. But the attitude of the authorities also remained ambivalent. On the one hand the Macedonians were told that they were Serbs, on the other they noticed at every turn that they were not treated as being equal to the Serbs. Certain officials clearly let them know that in their eyes they were Bulgarians. For the authorities it was easiest to stamp all those that didn’t acknowledge being Serbs as bugarasˇi, as supporters of the Bulgarians. That these people might have a different consciousness, however, was not considered. This becomes clear in a report by an official of the Trade Ministry, who in March 1921 travelled through the district of Ohrid and who noted, among other things, that at first glance there were no bugarasˇi, but this impression was mistaken: ‘There are some, like the majority of the ordinary people, who reply, when you ask them who they are: “We are Macedonians”’.33 Although already in the second half of the 1920s there were hardly any supporters of annexation

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by Bulgaria to be found, and politically active groups in opposition to the government propagated the phrase, ‘We are neither Serbs nor Bulgarians, but only Macedonians’,34 this was not taken seriously and did not lead to any basic change in the attitude of Belgrade towards Macedonia. The advantages of such an attitude are clear to see: according to this doctrine, everyone who advocated for the local language and culture, or supported autonomy was a ‘Bulgaroman’ and therefore also an enemy of the state, who had to be suppressed. In this way the problem could be externalised and simplified. The recognition of the Macedonians as the fourth Yugoslav ‘tribe’, on the other hand would have required a complete rethinking of Serbia’s national ideology and of the constitutional basis of the state. Such an idea was simply not permitted. The unforeseeable political consequences that might result also prompted external powers, such as the British, not even to consider recognising a Macedonian nationality: Indeed, once the existence of a Macedonian nationality is even allowed to be presumed, there is a danger that the entire Peace Settlement will be jeopardized by the calling into question, not merely of the frontiers between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, but also of those between Yugoslavia and Greece and between Yugoslavia and Albania. The Foreign Office therefore recommended that the British government should ‘refuse to recognise a distinct Macedonian nationality requiring either independence, or absorption by Bulgaria, or else a degree of autonomy which Yugoslavia would not willingly concede’.35 The main reason for the failure to assimilate Vardar Macedonia was that Serbian policies were not aimed at integration, but right to the end bore the hallmarks of colonialism and remained exploitative. There was no emancipation and participation by the locals. The financial resources were administered centrally from Belgrade, Macedonia’s economy remained focused on the production of raw materials, which in any case were purchased by the state at rock-bottom prices it set itself. Political measures and repression strengthened the economic dependence: all attempts made by the Macedonian elite to organise themselves were suppressed, while the security apparatus kept the population in a state of fear. The locals were discriminated against with regard to appointments to state jobs, the issuing of loans, and in the agricultural reform in favour of recent arrivals. Subsequently, the two population groups remained segregated. The political agenda was dominated by the Croatian Question, while one believed that the dissatisfaction in Macedonia could be kept under control through repressive methods. The political class in Belgrade felt only mistrust

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and scorn towards the Macedonian population, which, however, was disguised by the phrase the ‘classical South’ and its pure Serbian inhabitants. Their sense of superiority was expressed, for example, in that the Serbs expected gratitude, as most of them were genuinely convinced that in 1912 they had selflessly liberated Macedonia at a great cost in blood. ‘We Serbs have liberated YOU . . . The ugliest characteristic is ingratitude’, Professor Vulic´ reprimanded the Macedonian students in December 1939.36 Gratitude was also expected from the former Hapsburg territories, which from the Serbian perspective had also been liberated. Materially the state also secured considerable and stable revenues for itself from this region in an equally colonial manner through the tobacco monopoly, linked to low prices, without having to expend much effort to attain this. Greater revenues could only have been achieved by raising the living standards, which would then have produced greater tax income. This, however, would have required comprehensive investments and considerable administrative effort over a longer period of time. For this the necessary political will and technical competence was lacking. Hardly anyone in Belgrade, neither in the government or in the administration, seriously concerned themselves with conditions in Macedonia. The ministers and officials frequently changed posts, the difficult journeys into the poorly developed South were unpopular and only undertaken just before elections. In the local administration, inconstancy and ignorance generally prevailed, as the officials frequently came from other parts of the country and would preferably have left Macedonia today rather than tomorrow. Among the highest officials on the spot, the Bans, there was not a single Macedonian, and on average they only remained in office for one year. On top of this, was the failure of the respective offices to cooperate with each other, neither on the horizontal level – for example, between the respective ministries – nor vertically – between the state and local authorities. At the same time, however, it was clear to many politicians that something constructive definitely needed to be done in Macedonia. To conceal the lack of implementation, progress was always measured against the very low level in the Turkish period and was estimated to be correspondingly high in comparison. The political actors were, as already mentioned, on the one hand interested in their own careers, but on the other hand also in their own region, with which they were connected and where they at the very least had been elected. The absence of emancipation, or the semi-colonial position of Macedonia, was especially clearly expressed by the fact that they were not permitted to represent their own interests – others had to do this for them, which generally did not happen or only did to an inadequate extent. Up to 1939, not a single minister was from Macedonia. It was certainly not by chance that the 100-million loan for the development of the Vardar Banovina was successfully

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initiated at a time when a Macedonian held a ministerial post for one year. Among the senior officials, as well as in important institutions like state banks, monopoly administrations, Prizad, the Railway Head Office and others, there were almost no Macedonians to be found. Even the parliamentarians that were put up for election by the Serbian parties, in large part did not come from there. Moreover, in the Banovina Administration locals could hardly make any progress. Therefore it is not surprising that the interests of this region were frequently the last to be taken into account. The Serbian politicians in power in Belgrade mistakenly believed that they could achieve a ‘correct national’ attitude among the Macedonian population through repression and ideology alone, without the state having to act positively there at all. The Serbian gendarmes, teachers and officials, who according to the unanimous reports earned too little and therefore were inclined to corruption, were mostly inadequately trained, and generally wanted nothing more than to leave the region as soon as possible – they were supposed to ‘nationalise and assimilate’ Macedonia practically on their own. Only in the second half of the 1930s, was serious consideration given to following words with deeds and actually investing in the region. But there still remained a disparity – a wide ditch – between what Stojadinovic´ promised in Skopje und Bitola, and that which actually flowed south in terms of financial means. And in the meantime, especially among the youth, a movement had established itself, which was working towards autonomy.

‘Macedonia for the Macedonians’ The authorities’ Serbianisation measures were unsuccessful not only for the reasons outlined above, but also because the population had already acquired a national consciousness, which first had to be driven out. As was explained already in the introduction, the Slavic Christians distinguished clearly between the Serbs and themselves, in that the majority chose to call themselves ‘Macedonians’. Others felt that they were Bulgarians. Both of these designations, however, were not permitted in Yugoslavia and were persecuted. In this situation, Yugoslavianism could have been an alternative for those, who were willing to participate in the state, without having to acquire a Serbian identity. There are actually some indications that initially this option enjoyed a certain degree of support. For example, the state youth organisation Orjuna (Organisation of the Yugoslav nationalists) enjoyed a certain success at the start and reached a total of 700 members in Skopje. But when its Serbian nationalist character became increasingly recognisable,

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Macedonian youth largely dropped out, such that the membership of Orjuna in Skopje had fallen to less than 20 by 1926.37 At the beginning of the royal dictatorship, when Yugoslavianism was propagated with fresh energy, the Macedonian intellectuals certainly showed themselves as being prepared to participate in organisations stamped with the trade-mark ‘Yugoslavian’. There was also some readiness to identify as Yugoslavian among the ordinary people: ‘Recently it has occurred that these people [bugarasˇi] frequently reply to you that they are “simple Macedonians,” just as they also sometimes say that they are “Yugoslavs”’.38 Borisav Arsic´, the main editor of the journal Lucˇ, advocated for a united and strong Yugoslavia in April 1938, in view of the strengthened German Reich on account of the ‘Anschluss’, and declared stressing Serbianism, Croatianism, Slovenianism, Bulgarianism, etc., to be outdated romanticism, unnecessary and damaging atavism. He did not mention Macedonians alongside these other nationalities, as he viewed their lack of a strongly developed nationalism as an advantage: But we, from the South in our previous historical existence did not have such tribal-political creations, and our activity was expressed more in the cultural deeds of a pan-Slavic, or mainly of a South Slavic character. We had always been bearers of the idea of an integral Yugoslavianism, were emancipated . . . from any kind of tribal particularism. Starting from this point, we are of the opinion that our calling is chiefly to commit ourselves to ensuring that the Yugoslav nation achieves its full expression . . . Thereby we will soon become the most orthodox Yugoslavs and as the strongest supporters of the Yugoslav we will play a very important role in the creation of an integrated Yugoslavia39 The acknowledgement of a Yugoslav identity proved itself, however, to be only an apparent solution. Those in power were not at all serious about Yugoslavianism, especially in Macedonia. Very soon the opinion was openly expressed that someone could only be a good Yugoslav, if, first of all, he were a good Serb.40 Those who identified themselves as Yugoslavs, therefore, were only trying to conceal by this fac ade their incorrect national attitude. In the 1930s, a Macedonian student had to experience this in Belgrade, when he put down ‘Yugoslav’ as his nationality on a form. ‘That means, you are a Bulgarian’, someone told him. ‘You ask me, what I am. Macedonian. – That means, you are a Bulgarian. You set off bombs.’41 Identification as a Yugoslav was clearly seen as a betrayal of the Serbs. And indeed, it was used mostly as a way not to declare oneself a Serb. But nonetheless, if one had left open the Yugoslav option to the people in Macedonia and not insisted that they convert

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to Serbianism, many people that were in favour of the state might have taken this path to find a way to identify with it. The continued treatment of Macedonia as if it were a stepchild by Belgrade was one of the contributory factors that led Macedonian national consciousness to gain ground in the second half of the 1930s and above all to be more openly expressed. The number of educated Macedonian women and men was gradually increasing. Young people were reaching adulthood who had completed their entire education in Yugoslavia and not, as in the Ottoman period, when one had studied at a university in Bulgaria, another in a Greek school in Thessaloniki, a third at a Turkish high school, and a fourth in a Serbian institution, where they had been subjected to the respective nationalist attempts to influence them. In this sense, a more homogeneous generation was now growing up in Vardar Macedonia, which resisted Serbianisation and increasingly identified itself as Macedonian – but which also made it clear that Bulgaria was not an option for them. Nonetheless, this new elite, since it refused to accept conversion to Serbianism, was unable to participate in social and political life within the state. This ethnically motivated exclusion from positions and offices in turn led to a still greater national contrast42 and to the strengthening of Macedonian identity within the educated class. It is therefore not surprising that this intelligentsia became increasingly open to the old idea of autonomy for Macedonia, a notion that had existed since the end phase of the Ottoman Empire, and which never disappeared completely throughout the entire Yugoslav period. The increased political freedom after 1935 made it possible to express this aim with less danger than before. In the second half of the 1930s Macedonia was not so much under the cosh of the security forces as in the decade prior to this. Especially after the dissolution of the IMRO in Bulgaria in June 1934, the situation became noticeably less tense, such that people’s fear gradually began to wane. Greater political freedoms meant that everything that had not been done in Macedonia since the foundation of the state was being criticised much more strongly than before. The lack of infrastructure, the poor economy, that fact that the improved financial condition of the state had hardly any impact in the south and Macedonia profited too little from the state work-creation programmes, the absence of any representation in all branches of the state, and much more, were now all openly discussed. As in other parts of the country (Croatia, the Vojvodina), in Macedonia the conviction grew that with autonomy the region could become better developed. Finally, the success of the Croats in 1939 as well as the border changes in Central and Eastern Europe, leading up to and during World War II, led large sectors of the Macedonian population to hope that a change in the status quo,

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perhaps even the reunification of all the segments of Macedonia, had moved into the realm of possibility. The opposition politicians and autonomists in Macedonia sought contact in the 1930s with Vladko Macˇek, the leader of the Croatian Peasants’ Party, hoping to receive support from this side for their cause. For the Croatian politicians, however, the position of Croatia within the state had first priority; how the rest of the country looked, how many autonomous units it was divided into, was for them a sideshow, they could declare themselves to be satisfied with different variations. The Macedonian Communists already thought in 1935, that Macˇek simply wanted some of the Serbs’ power.43 The dissatisfaction in the South was only of interest to the Croatian Peasants’ Party as long as it served to weaken the Yugoslav state. But essentially Macedonia was also seen by the Croatian and Slovenian politicians as a ‘Serbian problem’. This is demonstrated, for example, by the policy pursued by the Slovene Anton Korosˇec towards Macedonia, when he became Interior Minister as well as prime minister in 1928, and again as Interior Minister in the 1930s, which did not differ significantly from that of the Serbian members of the government. In 1928 he made overly positive comments about conditions in Macedonia, and in 1938 he opposed the Macedonian intelligentsia movement and spoke of the bugarasˇi problem in the south. Under him Macedonian policy was also still marked by arrogance and mistrust.44 The conclusion of A. Jakirs, that in Dalmatia during the interwar period people did not get one step closer to any sort of ‘Yugoslav synthesis’, and that instead the respective Croatian, Slovenian and Serbian national identities had intensified,45 also applies to Macedonia. A Yugoslav nation state did not develop, which is not surprising, since the processes of state building and nation-building would have had to take place simultaneously. In France the state had already existed for some time, when at the end of World War I the nation finally came to be formed throughout the entire country. In Yugoslavia the ethnic nationalities, which could develop without a state, consolidated themselves instead, and derived their own dynamic from opposing those in power and from their obstructed and failed integration.

The Elites in a Dilemma The gradually forming educational, but also economic, elite in Macedonia was confronted with a dilemma. Those in the country, who wanted a perspective for the future, had to arrange themselves with the given political circumstances, which demanded identifying oneself as a Serb – or at least giving people that impression – and if necessary joining a Serbian party. This attracted devastating criticism for the people concerned, from those inclined to Macedonianism as well as from Macedonian emigrants in Bulgaria. Dimitrija Sˇalev, formerly a town

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councillor in Skopje, who lived in exile after 1929 and fought for the rights of the ‘Bulgarians’ in Yugoslavia there, designated all locals that received official positions as ‘Mace´doniens corrompus par les autorite´s [Macedonians, corrupted by the authorities]’.46 A good example for this group is Jovan Altiparmakovic´, a lawyer in Bitola, who had studied in Sofia, made a rapid political career and even became Postal Minister in 1939 for several months. The illegal Communist paper Bilten called him a ‘Macedonian traitor’ and ‘Judas’, who had sold Macedonian interests and himself to the Serbs.47 For the pro-Bulgarian IMROnewspaper published in Geneva, La Mace´doine, he was a ‘renegade’, ‘megalomaniac and a materialist’, a tool of the regime.48 The Croatian Finance Minister Sˇutej, however, perceived him as a bugarasˇ.49 According to his political opponent Teodosije Robe, Altiparmakovic´ was also disliked in Bitola and its environs.50 Yet he received praise from the journalist Todor Manevic´, because as a minister he supported all actions, which had as their aim the cultural and economic promotion of the south.51 Altiparmakovic´ was without doubt a capable man, who engaged himself for Macedonia’s interests, but who given this political constellation could hardly please anyone in his homeland. Similar things can be said about Spiro Hadzˇi Ristic´, one of Macedonia’s most outstanding personalities in this period, who was cursed in La Mace´doine as a ‘traitor born in Tetovo, a chauvinistic Serb’.52 Regardless of what Hadzˇi Ristic´ felt that he was – as president of the Chamber of Industry and Trade, as a representative and as a senator, he always engaged himself energetically for Macedonia’s interests. Pussyfooting and passivity, allegations often made against the local intelligentsia and Macedonian politicians,53 were not his thing. However, those who dared to oppose the regime openly, were forced to the fringes of society, had no occupational or political prospects, and were put in jail or forced to emigrate. Sydney Waterlow, a British representative in Sofia, described, in a letter dated 23 April 1930, the expulsion to Bulgaria of ‘thousands of the more intelligent elements in Serbian Macedonia’ as ‘decapitation’.54 In addition, these emigrants, like many of the older generation, then took a different national-political direction in Bulgaria. While in Vardar Macedonia in the 1930s support for Macedonianism and the idea of Macedonian autonomy within Yugoslavia or in the framework of a broader Balkan Federation gained ground among the youth, it was mainly emigrants in Bulgaria, which saw the Macedonians as Bulgarians that they wanted to save from Serbian rule.

Macedonia as a Special Case within Yugoslavia? An important reason why Yugoslavia did not grow together was that most of the non-Serbian parts of the country felt that they were exploited, or at least

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disadvantaged, or neglected. An exception was Slovenia, where the most important political party, the Slovenian People’s Party, supported Belgrade and in return received political control over its territory.55 The British embassy in Belgrade avowed in 1928 that the Slovenes were the most satisfied of all the non-Serbian parts of the country and paid tribute to them for managing to preserve at least the appearance of good relations with Belgrade. The Slovenes apparently felt more impatience towards the Croats than towards the Serbs.56 The Slovenes were certainly not happy with the political system in the 1920s, but they were prepared to accommodate themselves to it and participate in it. They rejected the aggressive methods of the Croats, as they preferred to reach an arrangement with Belgrade. Therefore, the Slovenian People’s Party gave up its demand for a revision of the centralist constitution and in exchange pragmatically focused on achieving as much actual local selfadministration as possible. This policy of cooperation was rewarded, for example, in 1929 when the entire Slovenian territory was united in the Drava Banovina. In 1935 officials of the former Slovenian People’s Party again entered the government and joined the ranks of the new government party organisation, the JRZ.57 The most important reason for Slovenian cooperation was that, in contrast to the Croats, they were afraid of their likely fate in the event that Yugoslavia was dissolved. ‘If the Kingdom was not the best of all possible worlds for the Slovenes, it was at least the best world actually available to them.’58 The mood in Croatia was quite different as they felt that they were being exploited and demanded that every part of the state should be able dispose of its own tax income itself.59 The Croats repeatedly complained about the flow of funds from their region to Serbia. In 1938 this thesis was supported and made popular by the book of Rudolf Bic´anic´ on ‘The Economic Basis of the Croatian Question’.60 Although some of his claims did not stand up to closer examination, at the time the book was very influential.61 The Croats continued to complain about Serbian domination of the administration, the Army, and politics and felt that they were discriminated against in appointments to government jobs. According to official statistics from 1937, in the higher state service, from the royal court to the National Bank, 269 Serbs and only 30 Croats were employed. In the 34 interwar governments, a Croat never served as prime minister or took charge of any of the important ministries (such as Defence or Interior).62 The crass underrepresentation of the Croats in the political sphere did have a specific reason: between 1920 and 1938 the Croatian Peasants’ Party, which garnered almost all Croatian votes, boycotted Parliament for all but two years.63 Therefore, the Croats largely manoeuvred themselves outside the circles of power.

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Dissatisfaction prevailed also in other parts of the country, for example, in the wealthy Vojvodina, which was seeking autonomy, as it felt that it was being economically exploited, or in Montenegro that claimed it was neglected.64 The latter had less cause for complaint than other regions, since it had benefited previously from a redistribution of financial means. Despite greater economic weakness it was better looked after in the health and educational fields than the Vardar and Vrbas Banovinas.65 BosniaHerzegovina was also unhappy, and with more reason than Montenegro, although more had been invested in this part of the country than was collected here in tax income.66 Nonetheless, only 176 kilometres of narrow-gauge railway were built, for example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the interwar period.67 The Vrbas Banovina in particular, that is northern Bosnia with Banja Luka as its capital, remained in last position in many areas (health, education, transport, cultural institutions) until World War II. The inhabitants of Macedonia therefore shared their great dissatisfaction with the political conditions in the country with many other of its residents, especially the Croats. But the starting positions were nonetheless quite different. The Croats were recognised as a ‘tribe’ of the supposed Yugoslav nation and could organise themselves politically, culturally and in terms of religion, and also participate in the state leadership. In this respect the statistics regarding political offices are very revealing: from the foundation of the state in December 1918 until the ‘Agreement’ with the Croats on 26 August 1939, no fewer than 656 ministers took office, including 452 Serbs, 137 Croats, 49 Slovenes, and 18 Bosnian Muslims.68 The predominance of the Serbs was overwhelming. But the other ‘tribes’ of the ‘Yugoslav nation’ still had a certain share of power, while the Macedonians and other ethnic groups remained completely excluded. The Hungarians, the Germans, Italians, Turks and Romanians were at least recognised as minorities and could claim protection from the Minorities’ Treaties. The Macedonians, however, like also the Albanians, had none of these possibilities – every attempt to found a Society, which even had the slightest hint of being a political or cultural organisation, was quickly suppressed. They were not only excluded from the leadership and administration of the state, but also largely even from the administration of their own Banovina. Only the Muslim inhabitants were permitted to establish their own party – the Dzˇemijet – for a short period in the first half of the 1920s. What share did the situation in Macedonia have in Yugoslavia’s lack of stability and ultimate collapse? The Serbian nationalists always stressed the importance of the ‘Morava-Vardar Axis’ for the existence of the state. In the 1920s Macedonia and the IMRO represented a large foreign policy problem, which damaged relations with Bulgaria and Italy. Domestically this region

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mainly tied down security forces. In the 1930s, especially from 1934 up until shortly before the war’s outbreak, Macedonia did not cause the state any great problems. At no point, was the Macedonian question nearly as burdensome for the state as the Croatian one. Despite the great dissatisfaction, Macedonia was far away from a political and national mobilisation like that in Croatia. The well-organised movement of autonomists, which the authorities feared in the second half of the 1930s as the IMRO’s successor, simply did not exist. Due to the destruction of Yugoslavia by external forces in April 1941, it remains uncertain, how the state would otherwise have continued to develop. A decree issued on 27 August 1939, envisaged that the agreements made with regard to the Croatian Banovina ‘could be extended to the other Banovinas by Royal Decree’.69 The plans described for a Banovina of the ‘Serbian lands’ show clearly that those in power in Serbia wanted to go in a completely different direction than Macedonia’s population, which hoped for autonomy more than ever at the end of the 1930s and suffered under Serbian rule. This collision of their respective interests allows one to suspect that the Macedonian question would have intensified if there had been a further federalisation of the state. With regard to the question of nation formation, the Macedonian example is instructive in various respects. It shows that it is not possible to force a national consciousness on a population from outside, if this is done using only ideological and repressive means. The duplicitous attitude under which the Macedonians were officially declared to be Serbs, but unofficially were cursed as Bulgarians and largely excluded from the political and economic life of the country, could never result in a successful ‘assimilation’. On the contrary, those treated in this manner increasingly felt that they were ‘different’ and found their way to their own national consciousness. For this development the treatment by the dominant population group proved to be hardly less important than the internal conditions like common language, history, culture and religion. External pressure on a group creates, if it is experienced primarily as force and not in large part as an offer to participate, increased selfisolation from external forces and the strengthening of feelings of belonging internally. In this way the Serbian policy of discrimination towards the Macedonians contributed quite a bit towards their nation-building. The Macedonian example also shows that in an environment, which is fixated on national identity, nobody can remain indifferent. The aggressive propaganda activity of Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece in Ottoman Macedonia forced the local Slav Christians there, simple peasants, to decide for one national identity, before they were ready for this and before they could establish a native national movement. If there were even signs of such a development, they were immediately wiped out by the foreign propaganda machines.70

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Carsten Wieland has correctly pointed out that external circumstances can be decisive for the success of a national movement. Demands that are ignored can die away, while those that are supported can far exceed the expectations of their initiators.71 Nonetheless, in Macedonia none of the identities forced upon it from outside could establish themselves. As was shown in the introduction, around 1920 at the latest the majority of the Christian Slav population – in the Yugoslav as well as in the Greek part of Macedonia – chose the self-description ‘Macedonian’. Interestingly, this was ‘not heard’ by the others, since at this time the nationality ‘Macedonian’ had not become established, so that either it was said that these people did not have a national consciousness (because they did not fit into the given categories ‘Greek’, ‘Bulgarian’, or ‘Serbian’), or rather ‘Macedonian’ was immediately translated as ‘Bulgaroman’, as was done by the Serbian authorities. In any case, Macedonian consciousness had established itself to such an extent in the interwar period that neither the Yugoslav nor the Greek authorities were able to displace it, despite great efforts. The founding of the People’s Republic of Macedonia within Yugoslavia after the war and the successful development of Macedonian national consciousness thereafter were, accordingly, not the work of the Communist Party and Tito, as is often claimed, who supposedly created a Macedonian nation almost from nothing, or rather invented it. Instead it reflected much more Phase C of Miroslav Hroch’s model, in which a development can continue – accelerated and now without external influences – which had taken its first hesitant steps in the nineteenth century, ´ org´i Pulevski, and which survived despite, or perhaps for example, with G precisely because of, the various nationalist pressures from the neighbours, really taking root during the interwar period.

NOTES

Introduction 1. Ivo Andric´, Liebe in einer kleinen Stadt. Ju¨dische Geschichten aus Bosnien (Frankfurt a.M., 1996), p. 9. 2. S. Ptolomaios, Tabula decima et Ultima Europae (Alexandria). Narodna i universitetska biblioteka Kliment Ohridski, Skopje. See: http://www.unet.com.mk/oldmacedonianmaps/ 5.htm (12 September 2005). 3. For example, N. Sanson, Estats de l’Empire des Turqs en Europe (Paris, 1696). The British Library (BM-MR 43.315/1.2.), London. See: http://www.unet.com.mk/oldmacedonianm aps/5.htm (12 September 2005). 4. Edward Brown, A Brief Account of Some Travels in Hungary, Servia, Bulgaria, Macedonia (London, 1673). In English sources the term ‘Macedonia’ can be found from 725 (first mention in a Chronicle). Hristo Andonov-Polyanski, ‘Great Britain and Macedonia’, Macedonian Review 15, 1985, p. 233. 5. According to, for example, Jena Schultze, Makedonien. Landschafts- und Kulturbilder (Jena, 1927), pp. 1 – 4. 6. In the south, Macedonia extends on this map up to the then borders of the kingdom of Greece. F. Bianconi, Carte commerciale de la province de Mace´doine (Paris, 1885). The British Library (BL-MR 43.315.35), London. See: http://www.unet.com.mk/oldmacedonianm aps/12.htm (12 July 2005). 7. Mile Bjelajac, Vojska Kraljevine SHS/Jugoslavije 1922– 1935 (Belgrade, 1994), p. 264. As cited by Vladan Jovanovic´, Jugoslovenska drzˇava i Juzˇna Srbija 1918– 1929. Makedonija, Sandzˇak, Kosovo i Metohija u Kraljevini SHS (Belgrade, 2002), p. 8. 8. The French historian and geographer Jacques Ancel, for example, always spoke of Mace´doine iougoslave. A few times he used Serbie du Sud and then he wrote it using inverted commas. Jacques Ancel, La Mace´doine. Etude de colonisation contemporaine (Paris, 1930), pp. 3, 72, 101. 9. Drava Banovina, Sava Banovina, Danube Banovina, Vrbas Banovina, Drina Banovina, Zeta Banovina, Morava Banovina, Vardar Banovina, Littoral Banovina. 10. As by the British embassy in Belgrade. See for example, Zˇivko Avramovski (ed.), Britanci o kraljevini Jugoslaviji. Godisˇnji izvesˇtaji Britanskog poslanstva u Beogradu 1921–1938, 2 vols, vol. 1 (Zagreb, 1986), pp. 210, 212–13. 11. In this phase the nationalist movement is prepared by the efforts of intellectuals. The language and customs of the non-dominant ethnic group, their history, folk songs, etc., are studied. Miroslav Hroch, ‘Nationales Bewusstsein zwischen Nationalismustheorie und der

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12.

13. 14.

15.

16. 17. 18. 19.

20.

21.

22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

NOTES TO PAGES 6 –10 Realita¨t der nationalen Bewegungen’, in Formen des nationalen Bewusstseins im Lichte zeitgeno¨ssischer Nationalismustheorien. Vortra¨ge der Tagung des Collegium Carolinum in Bad Weissee vom 31. Oktober bis 3. November 1991, ed. Eva Schmidt-Hartmann (Munich, 1994), p. 44. ‘Narod se velit ljudi koji se od eden rod i koji zboruvajet ednakov zbor i koji zˇivuvajet i se drugarat eden so drugi i koji imajet ednakvi obicˇaji i pesni i veselja, tije ljudite gi vikajet narod, a mestoto vo koje zˇivuvat narod se velit otecˇestvo od toj narod. Taka i Makedoncive se narod i mestoto nivno e Makedonija’. Tome Sazdov, Znameniti makedonski prerodbenici od Galinik (Skopje, 1995), pp. 64, 69. Benedict Anderson, Die Erfindung der Nation. Zur Karriere eines folgenreichen Konzepts. Erw. Ausg (Berlin, 1998), pp. 14– 16. Hroch, ‘Nationales Bewusstsein,’ pp. 49 – 50. For a discussion of the differences between a nation and an ethnicity, see Holm Sundhaussen, ‘Nationsbildung und Nationalismus im Donau-Balkan-Raum’, in Forschungen zur Osteuropa¨ischen Geschichte 48, 1993, pp. 233 – 57. Hermann Wendel, Kreuz und quer durch den slawischen Su¨den Von Marburg bis Monastir – Von Belgrad bis Buccari – Krainer Tage (Frankfurt a.M., 1922), p. 86. The emphasis is in the original. Ibid., p. 83. Nisˇ lies in Serbia. Ibid., p. 95. Edmond Bouchie´ de Belle, La Mace´doine et les Mace´doniens (Paris, 1922), p. 44. PRO, FO 371/11405; ibid., FO 371/11245, pp. 2 – 3, cited as in Andrew Rossos, ‘The British Foreign Office and Macedonian national identity, 1918– 1941’, Slavic Review 53, 1994, pp. 383– 4. PRO, FO 371, 8566, Bentinck (Athen) to Curzon, 20 August 1923, Enclosure 4 –5. As cited in: Rossos, ‘Macedonianism and Macedonian nationalism on the left’, Review 40/3, 1996, p. 25. Anastasia Karakasidou, ‘Transforming identity, constructing consciousness: Coercion and homogeny in northwestern Greece’, in The Macedonian Question: Culture, Historiography, Politics, ed. Victor Roudometof (Boulder, CO, 2000), p. 64. NZZ, 1 February 1931, First Sunday Edition, p. 3. ‘Na¨chtliches Gespra¨ch in einem mazedonischen Chan’. Emphasis as in the original. Wendel, Kreuz und quer durch den slawischen Su¨den, p. 84. AJ, f. 66, 62/161, 1924, pov. O.N. br. 55, Belgrade, 12 February 1924, as cited by: Marija Jovanovik´, Prosvetno-politicˇkite priliki vo Vardarska Makedonija (1918 – 1929) (Skopje, 1983), p. 155. AVPRF, fond 4, opis’ 48, papka 296, delo 54325, Nr. 1. PRO, FO 371, 12856, C 1955, p. 64. Footman Memorandum. Skopje, 5 March 1928. Ibid., 14317, C 6037, pp. 203– 4. Nevile Henderson an O. Sargent, 23 July 1930. Gustav Weigand, Ethnographie von Makedonien. Geschichtlich-nationaler, sprachlichstatistischer Teil (Leipzig, 1924), pp. 34– 5. Rapport du professeur dr R.-A. Reiss de l’universite´ de Lausanne sur la situation des Mace´doniens et des Musulmans dans les nouvelles provinces grecques (Paris, 1918), p. 7. Missionsbote (1938), pp. 35– 6: ‘Unsere mazedonische Missionarin berichtet!’; Missionsbote (1944), pp. 82– 5: ‘Erlebnisse und Erfahrungen mit der Bibel im Balkan’. In a text from 1940 in the Macedonian language, the following solution to this conceptual dilemma is proposed: ‘The Macedonian Nation is composed of the Macedonian Slavs, and the Macedonian People is comprised of all those who live in Macedonia: Macedonian Slavs, Turks, Albanians, Jews, Vlachs, Greeks, and Serbs’. Hristo Andonov-Polyanski (ed.), Dokumenti za borbata na makedonskiot narod za samostojnost i za nacionalna drzˇava, 2 vols (Skopje, 1981), p. 179.

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32. DARM, 1.1042.10.20/62. Report of the Banovina Administration on schools with Albanian and Turkish children before and after 1912, 18 March 1930. 33. Wendel, Kreuz und quer durch den slawischen Su¨den, p. 77. 34. According to Elwert, ethnic groups are ‘groups that encompass and extend beyond families, and affirm for themselves a . . . collective identity. In this the descriptive criteria, which establish the boundaries of the group are subject to change’. Georg Elwert, ‘Nationalismus und Ethnizita¨t. U¨ber die Bildung von Wir-Gruppen’, Ko¨lner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 41, 1989, p. 447. 35. Milorad Ekmecic, ‘Serbian war aims’, in The Creation of Yugoslavia 1914– 1918, ed. Dimitrije Djordjevic (Santa Barbara, CA, 1980), pp. 19 – 21. 36. Sundhaussen, Geschichte Jugoslawiens, p. 91. 37. Josef Matl, ‘Die Entstehung des jugoslawischen Staates’, Su¨dosteuropa¨ische Arbeiten 63, 1965, pp. 59, 63– 78; John Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country (Cambridge, 1996), p. 108. 38. Aleksandar T. Hristov, Sozdavanje na makedonskata drzˇava 1878 –1978, 4 vols, vol. 2 (Skopje, 1985). pp. 81, 85. 39. Aleksandar Hristov and Mihailo Minoski, Idejata za federacija vo makedonskoto nacionalnoosloboditelno dvizˇenje i negovite programski osnovi (1893 – 1935). Zbornik na dokumenti (Skopje, 1994), pp. 129– 30; Hristov, Sozdavanje 2, pp. 93, 102 –3. 40. Stefan Troebst, Mussolini, Makedonien und die Ma¨chte 1922 – 1930: Die ‘Innere Makedonische Revolutiona¨re Organisation’ in der Su¨dosteuropapolitik des faschistischen Italien (Cologne, Vienna, 1987), pp. 17– 20. 41. Makedonija, no. 13, 17.1.1920. As cited by Aleksandar Trajanovski, ‘Veles i velesˇko niz periodicˇnite dopiski vo vremeto na Vasil Glavinov’, in Vasil Glavinov i negovoto vreme. Materijali od trkaleznata masa odrzˇana vo Titov Veles na 26 – 12 –1989. po povod 60godisˇninata od smrtta na Vasil Glavinov i 120 godini od rag´anjeto (Titov Veles, 1990), p. 81. 42. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, p. 108. 43. Todor Aleksandrov in an interview with The Times on 4 January 1924. As cited by Spyridon Sfetas, Makedonien und die interbalkanischen Beziehungen (1920 – 1924) (Munich, 1992), p. 209. 44. Ernest Renan, ‘Was ist eine Nation?’, in Was ist eine Nation? Und andere politische Schriften (Vienna, Bozen, 1995), p. 55. 45. On the other hand, several works have been published recently which are devoted to Eastern Europe in the interwar period (or in the twentieth century) in general; for example, Richard Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century (London, New York, 1994); Derek H. Aldcroft and Steven Morewood, Economic Change in Eastern Europe since 1918 (Aldershot, 1995); Ivan T. Berend, Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II (Berkeley, CA, 1997); Hans Lemberg (ed.), Ostmitteleuropa zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen (1918 – 1939). Sta¨rke und Schwa¨che der neuen Staaten, nationale Minderheiten (Marburg, 1997); Alice Teichova (ed.), Central Europe in the Twentieth Century: An Economic History Perspective (Aldershot, 1997); Erwin Oberla¨nder (ed.), Autorita¨re Regime in Ostmittel und Su¨dosteuropa, 1919 – 1944 (Paderborn, 2001). 46. Martin Mayer, Elementarbildung in Jugoslawien (1918–1941). Ein Beitrag zur gesellschaftlichen Modernisierung? (Munich, 1995). Marie-Janine Calic worked on a similar topic in her essay: Marie-Janine Calic, ‘Bildung als Entwicklungsproblem in Jugoslawien (1918–1941)’, in Allgemeinbildung als Modernisierungsfaktor: Zur Geschichte der Elementarbildung in Su¨dosteuropa von der Aufkla¨rung bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg. Beitra¨ge zur Tagung vom 29. Oktober bis 2. November 1990 in Berlin, eds Norbert Reiter and Holm Sundhaussen (Berlin, 1994), pp. 103–26. In addition, Calic has written a well-grounded study on the social history of a territory that made up part of the former Yugoslavia, which also deals with the interwar

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47.

48.

49.

50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

55.

56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

NOTES TO PAGES 14 –16 period: Marie-Janine Calic, Sozialgeschichte Serbiens 1815–1941: Der aufhaltsame Fortschritt wa¨hrend der Industrialisierung (Munich, 1994). See for example, Smiljana Ðurovic´, ‘Dali su postojale ekonomske granice unutar jugoslovenskog istorijskog prostora 1918–1941?’, Istorija 20. veka 10/1–2 (1992), pp. 111–24; Mira Radojevic´, Udruzˇena opozicija 1935–1939 (Belgrade, 1994); Mile Bjelajac, Vojska Kraljevine SHS/Jugoslavije (Belgrade, 1994); Ljubodrag Dimic´, Kulturna politika u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1918–1941, 3 vols (Belgrade, 1996); Branka Prpa-Jovanovic´, ‘Jugoslavija kao moderna drzˇava u vid¯enju srpskih intelektualaca 1918–1929’, unpublished PhD, Belgrade, 1996; Dragan Tesˇic´, Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica u Srbiji 1935–1939 (Belgrade, 1997); Ljubomir Petrovic´, Jugoslovenska drzˇava i drusˇtvo u periodici 1920–1941 (Belgrade, 2000); Branislav Gligorijevic´, Kralj Aleksandar Karadjordjevic´, 3 vols (Belgrade, 2002); Nebojsˇa A. Popovic´, Slobodan Jovanovic´ i jugoslovenska drzˇava (Belgrade, 2003). For example, Elisabeth Barker, Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics (London, New York, 1950); Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia (Thessaloniki, 1964); Stephen Palmer and Robert King, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question (Hamden, CT, 1971). For example: Stefan Troebst, ‘Wien als Zentrum der makedonischen Emigration in den zwanziger Jahren’, in Mitteilungen des bulgarischen Forschungsinstituts in O¨sterreich 2, 1979, pp. 68 – 86; Stefan Troebst, ‘Die IMRO und die Ausenpolitik der Weimarer Republik (1919 – 1933)’, in 21 Beitra¨ge zum II. Internationalen Bulgaristik-Kongress Sofia 1986 (Munich, 1986), pp. 389 – 420; Stefan Troebst, Mussolini, Makedonien und die Ma¨chte 1922 – 1930: Die ‘Innere Makedonische Revolutiona¨re Organisation’ in der Su¨dosteuropapolitik des faschistischen Italien (Cologne, Vienna, 1987); Stefan Troebst, ‘“Macedonia heroica”: Zum Makedonier-Bild der Weimarer Republik’, Su¨dostforschungen 49 (1990), pp. 293 – 364. Sfetas, Makedonien. Ibid., p. 453. Constantinos Farmakis, Die ‘makedonische Frage’ in der deutschen Politik. Ein Beitrag zum Nationalita¨tenproblem auf dem Balkan (Frankfurt a.M., 1994). Hroch, ‘Nationales Bewusstsein,’ pp. 42–3. Orde Ivanoski, ‘Zosˇto besˇe suden Metodija Andonov Cˇento?!’, in Cˇento. Cˇovek, revolucioner, drzˇavnik. Zbornik na materijali od Trkaleznata masa odrzˇana na 26.11.1991 godina vo Prilep (Prilep, 1993), pp. 90– 2. ASNOM (Antifascist Assembly for the Liberation of Macedonia) was Macedonia’s highest legislative and executive organ and met for the first time during the war in 1944, on 2 August, the anniversary of the Ilinden Uprising against the Ottomans in 1903. For example, Aleksandar Apostolov, ‘Specificˇnata polozˇba na makedonskiot narod vo Kralstvoto Jugoslavija’, Glasnik 16/1 (1972), pp. 39–62; Dancˇo Zografski, ‘Karakteristike ekonomskog stanja, socijalne strukture i nacionalnog pitanja u Makedoniji 1919–1941’, Acta historico-oeconomica Iugoslaviae 7 (1980/81), pp. 181–92. Ivan Katardzˇiev, Vreme na zreenje. Makedonskoto nacionalno prasˇanje meg´u dvete svetski vojni (1919 – 1930), 2 vols (Skopje, 1977). Ibid., vol. 1, p. 5. Ivan Katardzˇiev, Makedonija sproti Vtorata svetska vojna. Letopis za politikata na denacionalizacija na makedonskiot narod (Skopje, 1999). Hristov, Sozdavanje. See for example, Manol Pandevski and G´org´i Stoev-Trnkata, Strumica i Strumicˇko niz istorijata (Strumica, 1969); Aleksandar Apostolov, Zletovska oblast. Geografsko-istoriski osvrt (Skopje, 1974); Prilep i Prilepsko meg´u dvete svetski vojni 1918– 1941 (Materijali od Naucˇniot sobir odrzˇan na 1, 2 i 3 juni 1988.), 3 vols (Prilep, 1991).

NOTES TO PAGE 16 –17

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61. Kosta Sidovski, Razvitokot na industrijata na teritorijata na denesˇna SR Makedonija vo periodot meg´u dvete svetski vojni (1918–1941) (first edition 1960; Skopje, 1980); Slavko Milosavlevski, Jugoslovenskite socijalisti-komunisti i makedonskoto prasˇanje (1918–1945) (Skopje, 1992); Milosavlevski, Sociologija na makedonskata nacionalna svest II (Skopje, 1997); Svetozar Naumoski, Naprednoto ucˇitelstvo vo vardarskiot del na Makedonija meg´u dvete svetski vojni (1918–1941) (Skopje, 1992); Nadezˇda Cvetkovska, Grag´anskite partii vo Vardarskiot del na Makedonija (1935–1941) (Skopje, 1996); Zoran Todorovski, Vnatresˇnata makedonska revolucionerna organizacija 1924–1934 (Skopje, 1997); Aleksandar Apostolov, Kolonizacijata na Makedonija vo stara Jugoslavija (first edition, 1966; Skopje, 1989); Marija Jovanovik´, Prosvetno-politicˇkite priliki vo Vardarska Makedonija (1918–1929) (Skopje, 1983). 62. Risto Hristov, Seloto vo Vardarskiot del od Makedonija meg´u dvete svetski vojni. Socio-ekonomski istrazˇuvanja (Skopje, 1993); Risto Hristov, Trudbenicˇkite opsˇtestveni sloevi vo Makedonija (1919 – 1941) (Skopje, 1994). 63. See also, for example, Blazˇe Ristovski, Dimitrija Cˇupovski (1878–1940) i Makedonskoto naucˇno-literaturno drugarstvo vo Petrograd. Prilozi kon proucˇuvanjeto na makedonsko-ruskite vrski i razvitokot na makedonskata nacionalna misla, 2 vols (Skopje, 1978); Blazˇe Ristovski, Vasil Ikonomov (1848–1934). Prilog kon proucˇuvanjeto na makedonskiot kulturnonacionalen razvitok (Skopje, 1985); Blazˇe Ristovski, Portreti i procesi. Prilozi za razvitokot na makedonskata kulturno-nacionalna misla, 3 vols (Skopje, 1989). 64. See for example, Vasil Glavinov i negovoto vreme. Materijali od trkaleznata masa odrzˇana vo Titov Veles na 26-12-1989. po povod 60-godisˇninata od smrtta na Vasil Glavinov i 120 godini od rag´anjeto (Titov Veles, 1990); Mihajlov, Ivanoski, Vlado; Ivanoski, Orde, Kuzman Josifovski – Pitu. Vreme – zˇivot – delo (1915 – 1944). Prilozi od naucˇniot sobir odrzˇan na 23 i 24 fevruari 1994 godina vo Prilep (Skopje, 1995); Vlado Ivanoski and Veskovik´, Vera Pavel Sˇatev. Vreme – zˇivot – delo (1882 – 1951). Prilozi od naucˇniot sobir odrzˇan na 15 i 16 mart 1992 godina vo Kratovo (Skopje, 1996); Dimcˇe Adzˇi Mitreski, Sek´avanja za nastani i za licˇnosti od makedonskoto revolucionerno dvizˇenje. Izbor, predgovor i redakcija Kuzman Georgievski (Skopje, 1997); Aleksandar Krstevski-Kosˇka, Bogoja Naumov Fotev (1900 – 1993) (Skopje, 1998). Also the work of Vera Veskovik´-Vangeli, Borbata za nezavisna makedonska republika od Ilinden do ASNOM (Skopje, 1995), consists mainly – although the title gives no indication of this – of brief portraits of several of the protagonists. 65. See, for example, the activity of the ‘Macedonian Scientific Institute’ (Makedonski naucˇen institut) in Sofia, which in 1990 was brought back to life again after 43 years, and the ‘Institute for Balkan Studies’ in Thessaloniki. 66. Kostadin Palesˇutski, Makedonskiot va˘pros v burzˇoazna Jugoslavija 1918–1941 (Sofia, 1983); Kostadin Palesˇutski, Makedonskoto osvoboditelno dvizˇenie sled pa˘rvata svetovna vojna (1918– 1924) (Sofia, 1993); Kostadin Palesˇutski, Makedonskoto osvoboditelno dvizˇenie 1924–1934 (Sofia, 1998); Dimita˘r Gocev, Makedonskata inteligencija v perioda 1891–1941 g. (Sofia, 2006); Dimita˘r Gocev, Mladezˇkite nacionalni organizacii na makedonskite ba˘lgari, 1919– 1941 (Sofia, 1988). 67. Similar things can be said about the work of a contemporary, which is, however, devoted to a single aspect, the Macedonian Secret Revoultionary Youth Organization: Kosta Ca˘rnusˇanov, Prinos ka˘m istorijata na makedonskata mladezˇka tajna revoljucionna organizacija (Sofia, 1996). Ca˘rnusˇanov had previously been a member himself of this organisation’s cadre. 68. Palesˇutski, Makedonskiot va˘pros, pp. 218– 19. 69. Palesˇutski, Makedonskoto osvoboditelno dvizˇenie, p. 257. 70. Ibid., p. 364. 71. Jovanovic´, Jugoslovenska drzˇava. Maja Miljkovic´-Ðurovic also works on Macedonia: ‘Komitske akcije na tlu Juzˇne Srbije 1920– 1928’, Istorija 20. veka, 1996/1, pp. 113 – 30;

298

72.

73. 74. 75.

76. 77. 78.

79. 80. 81. 82. 83.

84.

85. 86.

NOTES TO PAGES 17 –22 Maja Miljkovic´-Ðurovic, ‘Zdravstvena zasˇtita u Vardarskoj Makedoniji 1919– 1929’, Istorija 20. veka, 15/2, 1997, pp. 129– 40. On the conflicts that emerge from such a constellation, see Holm Sundhaussen, ‘Institutionen und institutioneller Wandel in den Balkanla¨ndern aus historischer Perspektive’, in Institutionen und institutioneller Wandel in Su¨dosteuropa, ed. Johannes Chr. Papalekas (Munich, 1994). Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536– 1966 (London, 1975). Hans-Heinrich Nolte, ‘Innere Peripherien. Das Konzept in der Forschung’, in Innere Peripherien in Ost und West, ed. Hans-Heinrich Nolte (Stuttgart, 2001), pp. 12, 15. The literature on nations, nationalism and nation-building by now fills entire libraries. Here it is possible only to point to a few selected works. Useful for the questions addressed in this work is the understanding of nation as an ‘imagined community’, as it is proposed by Anderson. Anderson, Die Erfindung der Nation, pp. 14 – 17. See also Karl W. Deutsch, Nationenbildung – Nationalstaat – Integration (Du¨sseldorf, 1972); Ernst Gellner, Nationalismus und Moderne (Berlin, 1991); Klaus-Detlef Grothusen, ‘Modernisierung und Nationsbildung. Modelltheoretische U¨berlegungen und ihre Anwendung auf Serbien und die Tu¨rkei’, Su¨dostforschungen, 43 (1984), pp. 139 – 80; Hagen Schulze, Staat und Nation in der europa¨ischen Geschichte (Munich, 1994); Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, 1990); Hroch, ‘Nationales Bewusstsein’; Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism (Boulder, CO, 1977); Holm Sundhaussen, ‘Nation und Nationalstaat auf dem Balkan. Konzepte und Konsequenzen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert’, in Der Balkan. Eine europa¨ische Krisenregion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, ed. Ju¨rgen Elvert (Stuttgart, 1997). A useful overview of the richness of the concept is offered by: Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism (London, New York, 1998). Mihailo Apostolski et al., Istorija na makedonskiot narod. Vol. 3: Periodot meg´u dvete svetski vojni i narodnata revolucija (1918–1945) (Skopje, 1969), pp. 40 – 1. Jovanovic´, Jugoslovenska drzˇava, p. 95. Hans Lemberg, ‘Unvollendete Versuche nationaler Identita¨tsbildungen im 20. Jahrhundert im o¨stlichen Europa: die “Tschechoslowaken”, die “Jugoslawen”, das “Sowjetvolk”’, in Nationales Bewusstsein und kollektive Identita¨t, ed. Helmut Berding (Frankfurt a.M., 1994). Troebst, Mussolini, p. 296. Palesˇutski, Makedonskiot va˘pros, pp. 74– 6. Cvetkovska, Grag´anskite partii, p. 207; Katardzˇiev, Vreme na zreenje 2, pp. 231 – 7. Andonov-Polyanski, Dokumenti za borbata 2, pp. 154 – 5. Thus in a letter from 200 students from the Vardar Banovina in Belgrade, which they had brought to the leader of the Croat Peasant Party, Vladko Macˇek, in 1936, via a student from the Sava Banovina. ‘Od aktivnosta na naprednite studenti na Belgradskiot univerzitet vo 1936 godina (Nekolku neobjaveni dokumenti).’ Published by Aleksandar Apostolov. Istorija 12/1– 2, 1976, pp. 48–9. Letter of the Ministry of the Army and Navy to the Ministry of Education, 24 July 1936. For an overview, see Holm Sundhaussen, ‘Die verpasste Agrarrevolution. Aspekte der Entwicklungsblockade in den Balkanla¨ndern vor 1945’, in Industrialisierung und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in Su¨dosteuropa, ed. R. Scho¨nfeld (Munich, 1989). Avramovski (ed.), Britanci o kraljevini Jugoslaviji. Copies of these documents were kindly made available to me by the Moscow-based historian Lina Zˇila.

NOTES TO PAGES 23 – 30

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Chapter 1 The Politics of the 1920s 1. Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca; London, 1984), pp. 146– 50. 2. Nasˇa Stara Srbija, 20 December 1924, p. 2. 3. Milan Vukic´evic´, ‘O uzrocima nemira u Kosovskoj i Podrimskoj Srbiji’, Novi zˇivot 7, 1921, pp. 161–5. 4. Sfetas, Makedonien, pp. 110– 11. 5. AJ, f. 14, 177/650, pp. 94–5. Letter to the leadership (nacˇelstvo) of the District (okrug) Skopje. Belgrade, 8 May 1922. 6. Sfetas, Makedonien, pp. 110– 11. 7. Reports about the number of Macedonian emigrants and refugees from Vardar and Aegean Macedonia in Bulgaria range between at least 100,000 to 300,000. Their offspring today may number more than 1 million. Aleksanda˘r Grebenarov, Legalni i tajni organizacii na makedonskite bezˇanci vo Ba˘lgarija (1918 – 1947) (Sofia, 2006), p. 9. 8. DARM, M-341, 3. Armee, Pov.br. 506. Urgent, coded telegram from the delegated General Tuzakovic´ to the Commandant of the Third Army District, 6 August, [1919]. Telegram no. 951. 9. Makedonskij vopros v dokumentach Kominterna. Tom 1, cˇast’ 1: 1923–1925. Sost. L.I. Zˇila, V.T. Popovskij (Skopje 1999), p. 79. Stenogram (French) of the 13 Session of the 6th Conference of the Communist Balkan Federation, 15 November 1923. 10. Wendel, Kreuz und quer durch den slawischen Su¨den, pp. 101 – 2. 11. DARM, 1.1038.8.24/1. Letter of the Main General Staff to the Education Ministry, Belgrade, 23 September 1926. 12. Intended is really the Central Committee, the leadership organ of the IMRO. 13. DARM, 1.1038.8.21/1. Vl. Nesˇkovic´, Prilep, 18 December 1926. 14. Jovanovik´, Prosvetno-politicˇkite priliki, p. 176. 15. Interview for The Times, 4 January 1924. As cited by Sfetas, Makedonien, p. 209. 16. Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939. Series 1, Vol. 26: Central Europe and the Balkans 1924 (London, 1985), pp. 88, 90. Sir A. Young to MacDonald. Belgrade, 20 February 1924. 17. AVPRF, f. 144, op. 7, p. 102, d. 6, pp. 78– 82, 86 – 7. Report of ‘Source 103’. 18. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1:26, p. 44. Sir A. Young to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. Belgrade, 16 January 1924. 19. Katardzˇiev, Vreme na zreenje 1, pp. 29– 30. 20. AJ, f. 14, 177/650, p. 161v. The Prefect (nacˇelnik) of the District (okrug) Kumanovo to the ‘Commissar for South Serbia’. Kumanovo, 8 September 1922. 21. Apostolov, Kolonizacijata, pp. 162– 3n267. 22. Katardzˇiev, Vreme na zreenje 1, pp. 33– 5. 23. David John Footman, Balkan Holiday (London, Toronto, 1935), p. 85. 24. ‘Les te´moignages diplomatiques francais sur la question nationale mace´donienne apre`s la premie`re guerre mondiale’. Published by Darinka Petreska. Review 40/3 (1996), pp. 175 – 7. M.E. Dobrowolski, French General Consul in Thessaloniki, to Foreign Minister Poincare´ in a report of 19 July 1922. 25. Sl. Tatic´, ‘Strumica i Strumicˇka oblast’, Nova Evropa 10, 1924, p. 348. 26. DARM, 1.1037.6. Pov.br. 287. Kavadarci, 20 April 1921. 27. Govor Dr. M. Sˇusˇkalovic´a, pp. 1, 25– 7. Speech, given on 27 June 1922, on the occasion of the 1922 budget debate. 28. Frank Wende (ed.), Lexikon zur Geschichte der Parteien in Europa (Stuttgart, 1981), p. 340. 29. Govor Dr. M. Sˇusˇkalovic´a, p. 12. 30. Muslim estate owners.

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NOTES TO PAGES 31 –39

31. Govor Dr. M. Sˇusˇkalovic´a, pp. 28– 9, 31. 32. Aleksandar Apostolov, ‘Specificˇnata polozˇba na makedonskiot narod vo Kralstvoto Jugoslavija’, Glasnik 16/1, 1972, p. 40. 33. Govor Dr. M. Sˇusˇkalovic´a, p. 7. 34. Stenografski zapisnici Privremenog narodnog predstavnisˇtva Kraljevstva Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca. II. sveska: od 21– 40 sastanka (Zagreb, 1920), p. 540. 35. Banac, The National Question, p. 319. 36. Palesˇutski, Makedonskiot va˘pros, pp. 47– 9. 37. Vukic´evic´, Prilog, pp. 297– 8. 38. Wendel, Kreuz und quer durch den slawischen Su¨den, p. 92. 39. PRO, FO 371, 14316, C 4116, pp. 131–2. Report of C.L. Blakeney, Belgrade, 16 May 1930. 40. Marko Bosˇkovic´, Drimkolac. Namenjeno brac´i zemljodelcima u Makedoniji i Staroj Srbiji (Belgrade, 1922), pp. 7 – 8. 41. Velimir Brezovski et al. (eds). Devedeset denovi na skopskata crvena opsˇtina (Skopje, 1970), pp. 16, 19 – 23, 85. 42. Alex N. Dragnich, The First Yugoslavia: Search for a Viable Political System (Stanford, CA, 1983), pp. 14– 27. 43. Cvetkovska, Politicˇkite partii vo parlamentarnite izborni borbi vo vardarskiot del na Makedonija (1919 –1929) (Skopje, 2004), p. 275. 44. Cvetkovska, Makedonskoto prasˇanje vo jugoslovenskiot parlament meg´u dvete svetski vojni (Skopje, 2000), p. 55. 45. Palesˇutski, Makedonskiot va˘pros, pp. 52– 8. 46. Katardzˇiev, Vreme na zreenje 1, p. 28. 47. Palesˇutski, Makedonskiot va˘pros, pp. 52– 8. 48. Apostolov, Kolonizacijata, pp. 160– 1. 49. Mihailo Apostolski et al. (eds), Istorija na makedonskiot narod. Vol. 3: Periodot meg´u dvete svetski vojni i narodnata revolucija (1918–1945) (Skopje, 1969), pp. 40 – 1. 50. Todorovski, VMRO 1924 –1934, p. 147. 51. Slobodna Tribuna, 10 March 1923, p. 4. Signed: Drag. Mit. 52. Stephen Palmer and Robert King, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question (Hamden, CT, 1971), p. 29. 53. Izvori za istorijata na SKM. Vol. 1/2: Dokumenti i materijali 1921–1941. Ed. and comment. by Ivan Katardzˇiev. Skopje 1985, pp. 79 – 80. 54. See for example, an eye-witness report from the beginning of the twentieth century in: Nada Bosˇkovska, ‘Spaziergang durch Babino. Makedonische Dorfgeschichte(n)’, in Zwischen Adria und Jenissei. Reisen in die Vergangenheit. Werner G. Zimmermann zum 70. Geburtstag, eds Nada Bosˇkovska, Carsten Goehrke, Caspar Heer, and Anna Pia Maisse (Zurich, 1995), p. 22. 55. Vladimir Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito – prilozi za biografiju (Belgrade, 1953), p. 193. 56. A river in eastern Macedonia. 57. A mountain in eastern Macedonia. 58. A region in central Serbia. 59. ‘Dva dokumenta za prouuvanjeto na nacionalniot razvitok na makedonskiot narod meg´u dvete svetski vojni’, Publ. by Kliment Dzˇambazovski, Istorija 9/2, 1973, pp. 284 –5. The letter is dated 15 August 1923. 60. Vlado Kartov, ‘Specificˇnite osobenosti na prosvetnata politika na vladeacˇkite rezˇimi na Kralstvoto SHS odnosno Jugoslavija sprema makedonskiot narod’, Istorija 11/1, 1975, p. 112. 61. AJ, f. 138, 7/51a, p. 639. Belgrade, 30 January 1920. 62. Andonov-Polyanski, Dokumenti za borbata, pp. 264 – 6.

NOTES TO PAGES 39 – 46

301

63. Ivan Katardzˇiev, ‘Obidi za konstituiranje na makedonska politicˇka partija po Prvata svetska vojna’, Istorija 18/1– 2, 1982, pp. 40– 2. 64. Slobodna tribuna, 15 September 1923, p. 2. 65. Pirin, 28 October 1923, p. 3. 66. Katardzˇiev, ‘Obidi’, pp. 44– 6. 67. Palesˇutski, Makedonskiot va˘pros, pp. 64– 6. 68. Milosav Jelic´, ‘Makedonska partija’, Politika, 1 August 1923, p. 1; Milosav Jelic´, Letopis Juga. Listine – zapisi – dnevnik – pomenik (Belgrade, 1930), pp. 91 – 4. 69. ‘Zato cela namera ima izgled one basne kad su misˇevi resˇavali da obese zvono macˇku o vrat’. Jelic´, Letopis Juga, p. 117. 70. Juzˇna zvezda, 19 August 1923. Article by Dr Petar Lazarevic´, chief editor of the newspaper from 5 April 1923, at the latest. 71. Makedonskij vopros v dokumentach Kominterna I, p. 14. 72. Katardzˇiev, ‘Obidi’, pp. 47– 9. 73. Stenografske belesˇke 1923– 24/1, p. 494. 74. Katardzˇiev, ‘Obidi’, pp. 51– 2. 75. Jelic´, Letopis Juga, pp. 124– 5. 76. Andonov-Polyanski, Dokumenti za borbata 2, p. 86. 77. Izvori za istorijata na SKM (Skopje, 1985), pp. 134 –5. 78. Katardzˇiev, ‘Obidi’, pp. 52– 3. 79. Nasˇa Stara Srbija, 5 December 1924, p. 2. 80. Ibid., 29 December 1924, p. 1. 81. Ibid., 2 January 1925, p. 1. 82. Palesˇutski, Makedonskiot va˘pros, pp. 64– 6; Katardzˇiev, ‘Obidi’, p. 54. 83. PRO, FO 371, 12210, C 908, p. 93. Report of Kennard for December 1926, 27 January 1927. 84. AVPRF, f. 144, op. 7, p. 102, d. 6, pp. 44, 47. Report of ‘source 126’, 14 May 1924. 85. Nasˇa Stara Srbija, 5 December 1924, p. 1. 86. Apostolski et al., Istorija na makedonskiot narod 3, p. 38. 87. Nasˇa Stara Srbija, 13 December 1924, p. 1; 15 December 1924, p. 1; 18 December 1924, pp. 1 – 2. 88. DARM, 1.1038. 8, Strogo pov. br. 677. 89. As members of the delegation, there were, for example: Aleksandar Grozdanovic´, head of the community of Kavadarci, Vlado Netkovic´, chairman of the Union of Tobacco Growers in Kavadarci, Hadzˇi Vasile Nestorovic´, an elderly and respected businessman. In Belgrade they were accompanied by Andon Besˇirovic´, a parliamentarian, and Riste Trajkovic´, a former parliamentarian. 90. Vreme, 6 December 1923, p. 4. 91. Politika, 9 February 1926. Deputacija iz Kavadara. 92. Sfetas, Makedonien, pp. 146– 7, 211. 93. Makedonskij vopros v dokumentach Kominterna I, p. 55. Vienna, 5 September 1923. The report was written in the German language. 94. AVPRF, f. 144, op. 7, p. 102, d. 6, pp. 78– 82. Report of ‘source 103’, 1924. 95. Ibid., f. 67, op. 3, p. 101, d. 7, no. 131, pp. 7 – 14. Russian translation of a report of the Bulgarian ‘source no. 131’. 96. Ibid., op. 3, p. 101, d. 7, pp. 33– 4. Report of the French intelligence service in Belgrade of 10 February 1924. 97. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1:26, p. 250. Erskine to MacDonald. Sofia, 21 June 1924. 98. AVPRF, f. 67, op. 3, p. 101, d. 7, no. 131, pp. 7 – 14. Russian translation of a report by Bulgarian ‘source no. 131’.

302

NOTES TO PAGES 47 –55

99. Ibid., op. 3, p. 101, d. 7, pp. 23– 5. Report of ‘source no. 126’; AVPRF, f. 144, op. 7, p. 102, d. 6, pp. 78–82. Report of ‘source no. 103’, 1924. 100. Footman, Balkan Holiday, p. 85. 101. AVPRF, f. 144, op. 7, p. 102, d. 6, pp. 78– 82, 86– 7. Report of ‘source no. 103’, 1924. 102. Ibid., d. 8, p. 26. Report of the ‘source 126/6’ on the foreign policy of Yugoslavia [sic ] in April 1924. 103. Ibid., d. 6, pp. 44, 47. Report of the ‘source 126’. 14 May 1924. 104. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1:26, p. 255. Young to MacDonald. Belgrade, 23 June 1924. 105. Ibid., p. 99. Telegram of MacDonald to William F. Erskine. Foreign Office, 22 February 1924. 106. Ibid., p. 104. Telegram of William F. Erskine to MacDonald. Sofia, 25 February 1924. 107. Ibid., p. 120. Telegram of Erskine to MacDonald. Sofia, 5 March 1924. 108. Avramovski, Britanci 1, p. 248. Annual report for 1924. 109. Katardzˇiev, Vreme na zreenje 1, pp. 36– 41. 110. Holm Sundhaussen, Experiment Jugoslawien. Von der Staatsgru¨ndung bis zum Staatszerfall (Mannheim, 1993). p. 51. 111. Ferdo Cˇulinovic´, Jugoslavija i izmed¯u dva rata, 2 vols, vol. 2 (Zagreb, 1961), pp. 443 –4. 112. The British report mistakenly uses the term ‘Radical’ here. 113. Avramovski, Britanci 1, pp. 311– 15. Annual report for 1925. 114. Ibid., pp. 310– 11. 115. H. Seton-Watson, R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: Correspondence 1906– 1941; Vol. 2: 1918– 1941 (London, 1976), p. 135. 116. Avramovski, Britanci 1, pp. 327– 8. 117. Jovan Vladimir (c. 990– 1016) was the ruler, but he did not have the title of king. 118. AJ, f. 74, 50/69, 305. The Minister of the Interior to the Minister for Religion. Belgrade, 23 January 1925. 119. DARM, 1.1042.2.11/31. Telephone report to the Central Press Office on 29 December 1935. 120. Werner (ed.), Osteuropa-Handbuch, Jugoslawien (Cologne, 1954), p. 313; Sundhaussen, Experiment Jugoslawien, p. 53. 121. Avramovski, Britanci 1, pp. 456– 8. Annual report for 1927. 122. Avramovski, Britanci 1, pp. 387– 90. Annual report for 1926. 123. ‘Les te´moignages diplomatiques franc ais’, pp. 181– 4 (emphasis as in the original). 124. DARM, 1.471.7, delo ‘razna nezavedena prepiska’, 13 January 1927. 125. Ibid., 1.1038.8.17/1– 2. Cited in a letter of the Interior Ministry, Dept. for Public Security, to the Education Ministry. Belgrade, 3 February 1927. 126. PRO, FO 371, 12856, C 1311, p. 35. Kennard to A. Chamberlain. Belgrade, 16 February 1928. 127. Izvori na istorijata na SKM, I/2, pp. 182– 3. 128. Nasˇa Stara Srbija, 4 August 1927, p. 1. 129. Sokol: Falcon (a sporting and decidedly ‘nationalist’-oriented youth organisation); Orjuna: ‘Organisation of the Yugoslav nationalists’, also a youth organisation. 130. PRO, FO 371, 12856, C 1311, p. 35. Kennard to A. Chamberlain. Belgrade, 16 February 1928. 131. Ibid., 12210, C 6691, pp. 241– 5. Footman, 30 July 1927. 132. Ibid., 12210, C 6098, p. 235. O. Forbes, report for June 1927. Belgrade, 13 July 1927. 133. Ibid., 12210, C 6691, pp. 241– 5. Footman, 30 July 1927. 134. Ibid., 12092, C 9610, p. 100. Report of Footman. Skopje, 21 November 1927.

NOTES TO PAGES 56 – 61

303

135. Katardzˇiev, Vreme na zreenje 2, pp. 231– 3. 136. Ca˘rnusˇanov, Prinos, p. 256. 137. DARM, 1.1042.6.44/232. Cited from Makedonija on 10 November 1931, the organ of the Macedonian emigrants in Bulgaria, according to a report by the Bulgarian correspondent of the Central Press Office, 13 November 1931. 138. Sek´avanja od Aleksandar Cvetkovik´. Sredila Katica Josifova. MS, Skopje, 1973 [Arhiv INI, Sl. IV. 772], p. 34. 139. Ca˘rnusˇanov, Prinos, pp. 11–13. 140. The maximum legally permitted punishment was 20 years. Vreme, 11 December 1927, p. 5. 141. Avramovski, Britanci 1, pp. 431– 3. Annual report for 1927. 142. PRO, FO 371, 12092, C 9610, p. 100. Report of Footman. Skopje, 21 November 1927. 143. AJ, f. 74, 50/69, pp. 349– 50. Application for clemency to the Court from 22 relatives in Prilep, which was refused, as had been earlier appeals from his mother living in Sofia. 26 May 1935. Cˇkatrovic´ had received various disciplinary punishments and had even escaped from prison once. 144. Skopje was surrounded by a ring of gendarmes, the court president was guarded. Avramovski, Britanci 1, pp. 431– 3. 145. See Politika on 10 November and 6 –9 December 1927. 146. Vreme, 16 November 1927, p. 3. Racˇic´ was the ‘Radical’ representative, who, on 20 June 1928, shot at Croat representatives in Parliament. 147. Vreme, 6 December 1927, p. 4; 7 December 1927, p. 4. 148. Politika, 9 December 1927, pp. 2 – 3; Vreme, 9 December 1927, p. 4. 149. A research task of its own would be to follow the subsequent paths of these young men and to examine why during World War II Ðuzelovic´ and Cˇkatrovic´ decided to enter the service of the Bulgarian occupiers. Were they as youths already supporters of the Bulgarian option, or did they, between 1941 and 1945, try to make the best of the situation for themselves? Both were tried in 1945– 6 for collaboration, were sentenced to death and executed. 150. PRO, FO 371, 12092, C 9610, p. 105. Report of Footman. Skopje, 21 November 1927; ibid., 12211, C 9342, Kennard to the FO, 16 November 1927; Avramovski, Britanci 1, pp. 431 – 3. Annual report for 1927; ibid., p. 497. Annual report for 1928. 151. Including to Svetozar Pribic´evic´, Stjepan Radic´, Ljuba Davidovic´, Slobodan Jovanovic´, Miroslav Krlezˇa and Ante Trumbic´. 152. Andonov-Polyanski, Dokumenti za borbata 2, pp. 25 – 30. 153. Katardzˇiev, Makedonija, pp. 66– 7. 154. PRO, FO 371, 12092, C 9610, p. 99. Report of Footman. Skopje, 2 November 1927. 155. Andonov-Polyanski, Dokumenti za borbata 2, pp. 21 – 3. Participating were: Voj. Tomic´ (Commandant of the Gendarmerie), B. Katanic´, Head of the Department for Public Security in the Interior Ministry, Ant. Vildovic´, Gand Zˇupan of the Skopje District, D. Matkovic´, Gand Zˇupan of the Bitola District, M. Mihajlovic´, Gand Zˇupan of the Bregalnica District. 156. Actually the word ‘Exarchist’ designates those forces, which had received their training in institutions of the Bulgarian Exarchate. The term was used, however, also for Macedonians generally, who did not feel themselves to be Serbs. 157. Andonov-Polyanski, Dokumenti za borbata 2, pp. 23 – 5. 158. Vreme, 16 December 1927. 159. Ibid., 23 December 1927, p. 1. 160. Nasˇa Stara Srbija, 14 December 1927, p. 1.

304 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166.

167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187.

NOTES TO PAGES 62 –70 DARM, 1.1040.23.3/18 – 20. Ibid., pp. 21 – 3. DARM, 1.1040.23.4/27. Ibid., 12/65 – 7. Ibid., The Director of Construction to the Minister for Construction, Pera Markovic´. Skopje, 10 April 1928. PRO, FO 371, 12091, C 8807, pp. 140– 6. Erskine had requested this report, which was largely identical to that, which Kennard sent to Foreign Minister Chamberlain on 26 May 1926, shortly after his trip. See AVPRF, f. 4, op. 48, p. 296, d. 54325, Nr. 204. PRO, FO 371, 12856, C 1311, p. 39. Footman in the report of 4 February 1928. Ibid., C 1955, p. 63/2. Memorandum of Footman. Skopje, 5 March 1928. PRO, FO 371, 12091, C 8807, pp. 147–8. Erskine to Kennard. Sofia, 9 October 1927. Avramovski, Britanci 1, pp. 545– 6. Annual report for 1928. PRO, FO 371, 12856, C 1383, p. 341. From O. Sargent, 24 February 1928. Ibid., pp. 42 – 5. Kennard to Sargent, 16 February 1928. Ibid., 12856, C 3645, p. 98. Letter of the British ambassador in Bulgaria, R. Sperling. Sofia, 10 May 1928. PRO, FO 371, 12857, C 9206, pp. 33– 5. Kennard to O. Sargent of the Foreign Office. Indexed. Belgrade, 8 December 1928. Ibid., p. 57. Sargent to Dodd, 17 December 1928. PRO, FO 371, 14316, C 4187, pp. 154– 60 (quoted on p. 160). Waterlow to R. Vansittart, 21 May 1930. Ibid., 14318, C 8171, pp. 178– 9. Waterlow to Nevile Henderson, 30 October 1930. Avramovski, Britanci 1, p. 497. Annual report for 1928. Ibid., p. 545. Todorovski, VMRO 1924 –1934, p. 247. Vladko Macˇek, In the Struggle for Freedom (London, 1957), p. 109. Jutro, 12 June 1928, p. 2. As cited by Rudolph Matt Susel, The Slovenes and Yugoslavia: The Political Relationship, 1918 –1929 (Ann Arbor, 1982), p. 300. Avramovski, Britanci 1, pp. 525– 7. Ibid., p. 545. Ibid., pp. 529– 30. Susel, The Slovenes, p. 306. Avramovski, Britanci 1, pp. 499– 500. Annual report for 1928.

Chapter 2

Political Developments in the 1930s

1. Avramovski, Britanci 1, pp. 643– 4. 2. John Lampe, ‘Belated modernization in comparison: development in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to 1948’, in Diverse Paths to Modernity in Southeastern Europe: Essays in National Development, ed. G. Augustinos (New York, 1991), p. 41. 3. Avramovski, Britanci 1, pp. 590– 1. Annual report for 1929. 4. Ibid., pp. 643– 5. Annual report for 1930. 5. La Yougoslavie, 28 December 1929, p. 1; ibid., 1 January 1930. 6. Ibid., 22 January 1930. 7. The Sava Banovina was somewhat larger with 40,535 square kilometers. Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Opsˇta drzˇavna statistika. Statisticˇki godisˇnjak 1932, pp. 40–1; Gligor Todorovski, ‘Politicˇkite celi vo admiistrativno-teritorijalnite delbi i popisite na naselenieto vo Vardarska Makedonija po prvata svetska vojna do 1941 godina’, in Prilozi za Ilinden VI (Krusˇevo, 1987), p. 113.

NOTES TO PAGES 70 –76

305

8. Skopski glasnik, 18 March 1939, p. 1. 9. Avramovski, Britanci 2, p. 146. 10. PRO, FO 371, 13707, C 7092, pp. 177– 9. Report of Sir Howard Kennard to the Foreign Minister Arthur Henderson. Belgrade, 16 September 1929. 11. Seton Watson, R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs 2, pp. 193 – 6, 200. 12. Ibid., p. 206. 23 September 1930. 13. Ibid., p. 209. 14 November 1930. 14. Avramovski, Britanci 1, p. 671. 15. PRO, FO 371, 13707, C 3716, pp. 112– 112A, 118. 16. AJ, f. 74, 219/313, p. 252. The Court Marshal to the Minister for Agricultural Reform. Belgrade, 9 February 1929. 17. Ibid., p. 256. The Court Marshal to the Gand Zˇupans of Skopje, Sˇtip, and Bitola. Belgrade, 21 February 1929. 18. PRO, FO 371, 13707, C 3716, pp. 112– 112A, 118. 19. Ibid., C 7092, pp. 177– 9. 16 September 1929. 20. AVP RF, f. 4, op. 48, p. 296, d. 54325, no. 204. Report of Kennard to Chamberlain, 26 May 1926. 21. AJ, f. 74, 55/76, p. 183. Skopje, 10 August 1931. 22. Katardzˇiev, Makedonija, p. 13. 23. PRO, FO 371, 14317, C 5316, p. 74. Central Department, 1 July 1930. 24. Ibid., 14316, C 3840, pp. 114– 15. Report by Major W.H. Oxley and short report by Vice Consul Blakeney. Belgrade, 9 May 1930. 25. Varnava, born in Montenegrin Plevlje, had been the Metropolitan in Skopje since 1920 and became Patriarch in 1930. He was viewed as a reactionary with strong Serbian nationalist tendencies. 26. Seton-Watson, R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs 2, pp. 198 – 9. Memorandum from May 1930. 27. Ibid., p. 242. August Kosˇutic´ (Vice President of the HSS) to Seton-Watson. Vienna, 3 July 1932. 28. Avramovski, Britanci 1, p. 504. 29. Seton-Watson, R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs 2, p. 244. Svetozar Pribic´evic´ to Seton-Watson. Paris, 5 July, [1932]. 30. Ibid., pp. 198– 9. Memorandum of May 1930. 31. Regarding this, see the section on raw opium in Chapter 4 ‘Agriculture’. 32. Miroslav Stiplovsˇek, ‘Die verfassungsrechtliche Lage und die Autonomiebestrebungen Sloweniens im jugoslawischen Staat 1918– 1941’, O¨sterreichische Osthefte 39, 1997, pp. 34 – 5. 33. Avramovski, Britanci 2, pp. 38–41. 34. Dimic´, ‘Srbija i Jugoslavija. Prostor, drusˇtvo, politika’, Istorija 20. veka 15, 1997, pp. 26 – 7. 35. Seton-Watson, R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs 2, p. 220. 36. AJ, f. 37, 22/174, p. 321. D. Sˇalev to Ben Riley. Geneva, 27 August 1932. 37. The choice of words was programme, as the ‘Zagreb Points’ state: non-binding draft treaty, preliminary specification of the main points of the future State Treaty. 38. Branko Petranovi and Momilo Zeevi, Jugoslavija 1918 – 1988. Tematska zbirka domumenata (Belgrade 1988), pp. 335– 6. 39. Stiplovsˇek, ‘Die verfassungsrechtliche Lage’, p. 36. 40. Seton-Watson, R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs 2, p. 261. Svetozar Pribic´evic´ to Seton-Watson. Paris, 13 January 1933. 41. Holm Sundhaussen, Geschichte Jugoslawiens 1918– 1980 (Stuttgart, 1982), p. 81.

306

NOTES TO PAGES 76 –82

42. Avramovski, Britanci 2, p. 181. 43. Dusˇan Bilandzˇic´, Stojan Kesi, Vuk Vinaver and Zˇivorad Blei (eds), Hronologija radnicˇkog pokreta i SKJ 1919– 1979. Vol. I: 1919– 1941 (Belgrade, 1980), p. 204; Avramovski, Britanci 2, p. 147. 44. Apostolski et al., Istorija na makedonskiot narod 3, pp. 83 – 4. 45. Krstevski-Kosˇka, Bogoja Naumov Fotev, pp. 87– 8. 46. Adzˇi Mitreski, Sek´avanja, pp. 49, 51. 47. Sundhaussen, Geschichte Jugoslawiens, p. 88. 48. Todorovski, VMRO 1924 –1934, pp. 240, 248. 49. Avramovski, Britanci 2, pp. 223– 4, 227, 228. 50. Seton-Watson, R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs 2, p. 359. Seton-Watson in a memorandum for the Foreign Office on 21 September 1939; Sundhaussen, Geschichte Jugoslawiens, p. 82. 51. Avramovski, Britanci 2, pp. 227, 228. 52. Ibid., p. 266. 53. Ibid., p. 230. 54. Seton-Watson, R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs 2, p. 297. Svetozar Pribic´evic´ to Seton-Watson. Paris, 5 November 1934. 55. Ibid., p. 359. Seton-Watson in a memorandum for the Foreign Office on 21 September 1939. 56. Apostolski et al., Istorija na makedonskiot narod 3, pp. 90 – 3. 57. Seton-Watson, R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs 2, p. 309. Svetozar Pribic´evic´ to Seton-Watson. Paris, 15 May 1935. 58. Ibid., pp. 359– 60. Seton-Watson in a memorandum for the Foreign Office on 21 September 1939. 59. Apostolski et al., Istorija na makedonskiot narod 3, pp. 90 – 3. 60. Markert (ed.), Osteuropa-Handbuch, Jugoslawien, p. 318. 61. Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle; London, 1974), p. 250. 62. Smiljana Ðurovic´, Drzˇavna intervencija u industriji Jugoslavije (1918 – 1941) (Belgrade, 1986), pp. 197– 8. 63. Ibid., p. 200. 64. AJ, f. 37, 9/48/176– 7. Undated, anonymous tract [after the elections of 1935]. 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid., pp. 181– 2. 67. Milan M. Stojadinovic´, Ni rat ni pakt. Jugoslavija izmed¯u dva rata (Buenos Aires, 1963), p. 419. 68. Footman, Balkan Holiday, p. 88. 69. AJ, f. 37, 51/315, pp. 38. 21. Stojadinovic´ to the Vice Ban. Belgrade, 21 April 1936. 70. Ibid., f. 37, 15/95, p. 6. Ugrin Joksimovic´ to Milan Stojadinovic´. Belgrade, 15 January 1936. 71. Ibid., p. 13. Ugrin Joksimovic´ to Milan Stojadinovic´. Belgrade, 5 April 1936. 72. DARM, 1.1042.2.15/42. Telephone report to the Central Press Office. 27 April 1936. 73. AJ, f. 37, 15/95, p. 14. Ugrin Joksimovic´ to Milan Stojadinovic´. Belgrade, 5 May 1936. 74. Ibid., 51/315, p. 51. The Vice Ban to Stojadinovic´. Skopje, 17 June 1936. 75. Thus C´ira Manevic´, the former Mayor of Kumanovo, about his successor. AJ, f. 37, 60/375/391 –404. Numerous letters to Stojadinovic´ from 19 August 1937. 76. AJ, f. 37, 60/375/295. Letter from Cˇobrevic´, Town President of Ohrid, to ‘Uvazˇeni Gospodine Pretsednicˇe i Dragi Vod¯o’ [‘dear Mr President and dear Leader’]. Ohrid, 15 November 1938.

NOTES TO PAGES 82 –91 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87.

88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95.

96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101.

102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110.

307

Ibid., 51/315, p. 71. Paunovic´ to Stojadinovic´. Skopje, 19 September 1936. DARM (PO Skopje), 6.1.10.453– 4. AJ, f. 37, 51/315, p. 9. Letter from ¯Dord¯evic´ to Stojadinovic´. Skopje, 24 July 1935. Ibid., 9/55/918– 20. Report of the Belgrade City Administration, 24 February 1935. DARM, 1.1042.2.11/29 –38. Telephone report to the Central Press Office. 29 December 1935. Citation on p. 32. Seton-Watson, R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs 2, pp. 320 – 7. Memorandum [London], 10 November 1936. Radojevic´, ‘BiH u raspravama’, p. 25. Macˇek to D. Jovanovic´ in December 1936. DARM, 1.1041.2.5./18– 22. Belgrade, 4 March 1936. Paper of the Head of 4 Section of the Justice Ministry [draft]. Cvetkovska, Grag´anskite partii, pp. 88– 9, also notes 255, 256. ‘Od aktivnosta’, pp. 54– 5. Ibid., pp. 48 – 9. Report by the Commandant of the Vardar Gendarmerie Regiment, cited in the letter from the Ministry for the Army and the Fleet to the Education Ministry. Belgrade, 24 July 1936. DARM, 1,1037.10, Pov. br. 15, 17 July 1936; Pov. br. 495, 3 December 1936. Cvetkovska, Grag´anskite partii, pp. 89– 95. Ibid., p. 97. AJ, f. 37, 9/55/923– 4. Report from 1937, author unknown. Ibid., 51/315, p. 128. Novakovic´ to Stojadinovic´. Skopje, 7 October 1937. Katardzˇiev, Makedonija, pp. 55– 6. AJ, f. 74, 219/312, pp. 171– 2. 9 July 1937. Note without an addressee, signed with V.M. DARM, 1.1042.2.38/99. Telephone report to the Central Press Office, 12 July 1937. The pamphlet was signed, among others, by Aleksandar Ðord¯evic´, doctor, Antonije Grubisˇic´, lawyer, Dimitrije Jovanovic´, pharmacist, Dusˇan Nedeljkovic´, university lecturer, Isak Albahari, bank director, Milenko Filipovic´, university lecturer, Mihajlo Kujundzˇic´, former President of the Parliament, Stevan Trivunac, lawyer. DARM, 1.1037.10, Pov. br. 987, 3 August 1937. AJ, f. 37, 51/315, p. 161. The Ban Novakovic´ to Milan Stojadinovic´. Skopje, 15 May 1938. DARM, 1.1042.10.50/350 – 3. Report for the Central Press Office, 23 May 1938. Sek´avanja od Aleksandar Cvetkovik´, p. 138. AJ, f. 37, 51/315, p. 161. The Ban Novakovic´ to Milan Stojadinovic´. Skopje, 15 May 1938. Andonov-Polyanski, Dokumenti za borbata 2, pp. 151 –3. Letter of the Head of the Education Department of the Vardar Banovina to the Head of the Department for Middle School Education in the Education Ministry. Skopje, 12 November 1937. DARM, 1.1042.10.50/350 – 3. Report for the Central Press Office, 23 May 1938. AJ, f. 37, 9/55/932– 4. Report of Jovan Petrovic´ from Skopje, 14 May 1938. Sek´avanja od Aleksandar Cvetkovik´, p. 57. Lucˇ 1/6 – 7, 1937, p. 209. DARM, 1.1042.1.139/318. 13 October 1938. AJ, f. 37, 51/315, p. 254. Novakovic´ to Stojadinovic´. Skopje, 28 January 1939. DARM, M-1890, k. 113. Cˇacˇak, 9 June 1938. Cˇarsˇija: actually the business district of a city. In association with this, it is a reference to the political influence of the representatives of commerce, trade, and industry. Slavka Fidanova, ‘KPJ vo Makedonija vo vremeto od 1929 godina do aprilskata vojna’, Istorija 16/1, 1980, p. 89.

308

NOTES TO PAGES 91 – 98

111. AJ, f. 37, 9/55/951– 2. Andra Stojkovic´, Chairman of the Chetnik Association in Skopje, to Stojadinovic´. Belgrade, 8 September 1938. 112. Ibid., 9/55/949. The Minister for the Army and the Fleet to the Prime Minister. Belgrade, 6 August 1938. 113. DARM, 1.1042.2.11/29 –38. Telephone report to the Central Press Office. 29 December 1935. Citation, p. 32. 114. AJ, f. 37, 60/375/376. Jovan Simonovic´ (Community President?) of Bogomila to Stojadinovic´. Bogomila, 28 April 1936. 115. Ibid., 54/348, p. 200. Dimitrijevic´ to Stojadinovic´. Belgrade, 25 January 1936. 116. Ibid., p. 210, Dimitrijevic´ to Stojadinovic´. Belgrade, 18 February 1936. Miletic´, still became Minister for Physical Education at the end of 1937, but only until the reorganisation of the government on 25 August 1938. Avramovski, Britanci 2, pp. 571, 680. 117. AJ, f. 37, 15/95, p. 46. Ugrin Joksimovic´ to Milan Stojadinovic´. Belgrade, 25 December 1936. They proposed: . . . . . .

Stojan Stojadinovic´, construction engineer, born in Mavrovo and now living in Belgrade: Member of the Mortgage Bank; C´ira Manevic´, former Mayor of Kumanovo: Member of Prizad; Nikola Momirovic´, former Director of the Tetovo Bank: Member of the Agrarian Bank; Nikola Sapundzˇic´, former Mayor of Skopje: Member of Monopoly Executive; Vasilije Puzderlijevic´, Merchant from Sˇtip: Member of the Administrative Council of the Sugar Factory; Nikola Jovanovic´, former Consul in Bitola: Member of the Lottery.

118. AJ, f. 37, 54/352, p. 632. Hadzˇi Ristic´ to Stojadinovic´. Belgrade, 21 March 1937. 119. Ibid., 15/95, p. 99. Ugrin Joksimovic´ to Milan Stojadinovic´. Gostivar, 9 August 1938. 120. DARM, 1.1042.2.89/202– 23. Telephone report to the Central Press Office, 1 January 1939. 121. AJ, f. 37, 60/375, p. 334. Letter from 11 people to Milan Stojadinovic´. Skopje, 27 July 1936; ibid., f. 37, 60/375, pp. 340– 1. Letter from Andra Lekic´ to Stojadinovic´. Skopje, 22 September 1936; ibid., f. 37, 9/55/922. Report from 1937, author unknown; ibid., f. 37, 9/55/930. Report from Jovan Petrovic´ in Skopje, 14 May 1938. 122. The Croat Josip Torbar now received the office of Post Minister. 123. Arhiv INI, k. XXXV/6, Nr. 676. The staff of the Vardar-Division District (Vardarska divizijska oblast) to the Commandant of the Third Army District. Bitola, 9 December 1939. 124. DARM, 1.1042.2.51/124. Telephone report to the Central Press Bureau, 1 November 1937. 125. Ibid., 1.715, not ordered. Address by the chairman of the committee, Al. Jovanovic´, to all ‘South Serbs’. 126. AJ, f. 37, 51/315, pp. 135– 7. Stojadinovic´ to the Ban Novakovic´. Belgrade, 27 September 1937. 127. Ibid., 60/375, pp. 423– 4. P. Jovanovic´ to Stojadinovic´. Belgrade, 18 June 1937. 128. Andonov-Polyanski, Dokumenti za borbata 2, pp. 151 – 3. Letter from the Head of the Education Department in the Vardar Banovina to the Head of the Department for Middle School Education in the Education Ministry, Skopje, 12 November 1937. 129. This does not mean their physical liquidation, but rather their transfer or dismissal. 130. AJ, f. 37, 22/174/340– 2. Conference protocol. 131. Ibid., 22/174/343– 8. July 1938. 132. Ibid., 51/315, p. 175. Novakovic´ to Stojadinovic´, Skopje, 20 July 1938.

NOTES TO PAGES 99 –106

309

133. In the report he was called ‘Robev’. 134. Ibid., 9/55/947– 8. Interior Ministry file dated 4 August 1938. ‘Subject: Report of our friend from the South’. 135. Ibid., 9/55/946. Anonymous letter (signed: ‘Stari Radikal’) to Stojadinovic´, 10 July 1938. 136. Stenografske belesˇke, 1937, knj. 4, p. 195. LXI redovni sastanak, 22 July 1937; ibid., 1937/38, knj. 2, p. 135. XI redovni sasatanak, 15 February 1938. 137. Ibid., 1937/38, knj. 2, pp. 132– 5. XI redovni sastanak, 15 February 1938. 138. Ibid., 1938, knj. 3, p. 302. XXIV redovni sastanak, 2 March 1938. 139. Ibid., 1937/38, knj. 2, pp. 136, 140. XI redovni sastanak, 15 February 1938, J. Ac´imovic´. 140. 483 people were entitled to vote (parlamentarians, local officials, mayors, etc.), of which 464 voted for Ugrin Joksimovic´’s list; one person voted for the opposition, 18 abstained. AJ, f. 37, 51/315, p. 153. Novakovic´ to the Chairman of the Cabinet. Skopje, 7 February 1938. 141. Stenografske belesˇke, 1938, knj. 3, p. 303. XXIV redovni sastanak, 2 March 1938. 142. Ibid., 1937/38, knj. 2, p. 137. XI redovni sastanak, 15 February 1938. 143. Ibid., 1938, knj. 3, p. 54. XXI redovni sastanak, 26 February 1938. 144. Cˇulinovic´, Jugoslavija 2, p. 131. 145. Avramovski, Britanci 2, p. 679. 146. AJ, f. 37, 54/348, p. 271. S. Dimitrijevic´ to Stojadinovic´. Belgrade, 26 October 1938. 147. Ibid., 51/315, p. 193. Stojadinovic´ to Novakovic´. Belgrade, 29 October 1938. 148. The other delegation members were: Toma Klenkovic´, ‘a known autonomist from Sv. Nikola’; Sotir Trencˇevic´, from Resen, a trainee lawyer in Belgrade; C´iril Dimkovic´, mayor of Strumica; Bozˇa Sˇajinovic´, merchant and former mayor of Struga; Sotir Ac´imovic´, law student from Bitola; Rampe Levkovic´, trainee lawyer from Prilep; Metodija AndonovCˇento, merchant from Prilep; and four students, who joined the group in Belgrade. 149. AJ, f. 37, 22/174/349– 50. Report of the Interior Ministry, 9 September 1938. 150. DARM, 1.1042.1.141/323. Report for the Central Press Office, 27 October 1938. 151. Avramovski, Britanci 2, pp. 681– 2. 152. AJ, f. 37, 51/315, p. 231. Novakovic´ to Stojadinovic´. Skopje, 19 November 1938. 153. Ibid., 15/95, p. 120. Ugrin Joksimovic´ to Milan Stojadinovic´. Belgrade, 15 November 1938. 154. AJ, f. 37, 60/375, p. 422. The Mayor of Kumanovo and the chairman of the local branch of the JZR to Stojadinovic´. Kumanovo, 17 December 1938. 155. DARM, 1.1042.2.87/197 – 200. Telephone report on 3 December 1938. 156. DARM, 1.1042.1.130/307. Report for the Central Press Office on 1 September 1938. 157. AJ, f. 37, 51/315, p. 178. The Ban Novakovic´ to Milan Stojadinovic´. Skopje, 21 September 1938. 158. Cvetkovska, Grag´anskite partii, p. 107. 159. Katardzˇiev, Makedonija, p. 42. 160. Cvetkovska, Grag´anskite partii, pp. 120– 1. 161. Radojevic´, Udruzˇena opozicija, pp. 72– 3. 162. AJ, f. 37, 9/55/930. Report by Jovan Petrovic´ from Skopje, 14 May 1938. 163. Ibid., 60/375, p. 420. C´. Manevic´ to Stojadinovic´. Kumanovo, December 1938. 164. Brown, A Brief Account, p. 74. 165. H.N. Brailsford, Macedonia. Its Races and their Future (London, 1906), pp. 36 – 7. 166. ‘Les te´moignages diplomatiques franc ais’, pp. 181– 4 (emphasis in original). 167. The numbers given vary considerably depending on the source. On this, see Dimitar Galev, Beliot teror vo Jugoistocˇna Makedonija 1910–1941, 2 vols, vol. 2 (Sˇtip, 1991), pp. 387 – 8; Todorovski, VMRO 1924 –1934, pp. 154 – 5.

310

NOTES TO PAGES 106 –113

168. He placed the Macedonian version of his name (Dilev) in front of the Serbianised form (Dilevic´) in order to express his protest against Serbianisation. 169. AJ, f. 74, 50/70, pp. 359– 60. Skopje, 9 January 1939. 170. Ibid., pp. 355– 8. Skopje, April, 8, 1939. 171. Ibid., pp. 361– 3, 376, 378. Dilev-Dilevic´ to King Petar II, ‘when he has ascended to the throne’. Skopje, 3 April 1939. 172. DARM, 1.1042.1.148/337 – 8. 8 March 1939. 173. Ibid., 1.1042.2.93/207– 8. Telephone report to the Central Press Office, 5 March 1939. 174. Ibid., 1.1042.2.94/209. Telephone report to the Central Press Office. 8 March 1939. 175. Arhiv INI, k. XXXV/6, Nr. 632. Main General Staff, Intelligence Section, to the Commandant of the Third Army District. Belgrade, 31 July 1939. 176. AJ, f. 66, 79/220. Main General Staff to the Education Ministry. Belgrade, 21 August 1939. 177. AJ, f. 66, 99/289, StPov.64, Skopje, 17 May 1940. 178. Arhiv INI, k. XXXV/6, Nr. 662. The Staff of the Third Army District to its Artillery Commander. Skopje, 24 September 1939. 179. Cf. AJ, f. 37, 9/55/951– 2. Andra Stojkovic´, Chairman of the Cˇetnik Union in Skopje, to Stojadinovic´. Belgrade, 8 September 1938. 180. Arhiv INI, k. XXXV/6, Nr. 634. Part of a report by the Banovina Administration on 24 August 1939. 181. AJ, f. 74, 50/69, pp. 323– 6. The Ban Zˇika Lazic´ to the Presidium of the Cabinet. Skopje, 3 April 1931. 182. Ibid., f. 37, 51/315, p. 254. Novakovic´ to Stojadinovic´. Skopje, 28 January 1939. 183. He was accompanied by ministers Altiparmakovic´, Krek, Besˇlic´, Pantic´, and the President of the Parliament Milan Simonovic´. DARM (PO Skopje), 6.1.13.150. 184. Skopski glasnik, 3 June 1939, pp. 1 – 2. 185. Arhiv INI, k. XXXV/6, Nr. 668, pp. 1 – 2. Draft of the Staff of the Third Army District for the October 1939 monthly report. Skopje, 4 November 1939. 186. Skopski glasnik, 14 October 1939, p. 2. 187. Juzˇna stvarnost, December 1939, p. 5. 188. Skopski glasnik, 16 September 1939, p. 1. 189. Sek´avanja od Aleksandar Cvetkovik´, p. 105. 190. ‘Pa, oni su ih hapsili – oni ih i pustili’. DARM, 1.1042.1.152/359. 25 March 1940. 191. Juzˇna stvarnost, December 1939, p. 1. 192. Pravda, 11 July 1940, p. 6. 193. Ac´imovic´ in a conversation with Katardzˇiev. Ivan Katardzˇiev, ‘Za vesnikot “Juzˇna Stvarnost”. Prilog kon proucˇuvanjeto na makedonskiot pecˇat pred pocˇetokot na Vtorata svetska vojna’, Istorija 7/2, 1971, pp. 114–15. 194. Juzˇna stvarnost, Dezember 1939, p. 1. 195. Arhiv INI, k. XXXV/6, Nr. 681. The Vardar Gendarmerie Regiment to the Commander of the Third Army District. Skopje, 12 December 1939. 196. Arhiv INI, Sl. IV. 21. Diskusija s profesorom Vulic´em na sastanku dne 3. XI. 1939 god., pp. 6, 10 – 13. 197. Seton-Watson, R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs 2, p. 310. A. Kosˇutic´ to SetonWatson. Vienna, 4 July 1935. 198. Macˇek, In the Struggle, p. 181. 199. Avramovski, Britanci 2, pp. 517– 18; Seton-Watson, R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs 2, pp. 360 – 1. Memorandum by Seton-Watson for the Foreign Office. Oxford, 21 September 1939. 200. Politika, 25 March 1938, p. 4.

NOTES TO PAGES 113 –120

311

201. 29 September: Munich Conference; 1 to 10 October: Annexation of the Sudeten German territories. 202. Avramovski, Britanci 2, pp. 681– 2. 203. Petranovi and Zeevi, Jugoslavija 1918– 1988, p. 423. 204. Macˇek, In the struggle, p. 185. 205. Petranovi and Zeevi, Jugoslavija 1918– 1988, pp. 424 – 5. Macˇek implicitly disputes this in his memoirs. Macˇek, In the Struggle, p. 187. 206. Seton-Watson, R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs 2, pp. 355 – 6. Seton-Watson to Ivan Mesˇtrovic´. [London] 21 March 1939. 207. Macˇek, In the Struggle, pp. 191– 2. 208. Seton-Watson, R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs 2, pp. 363 – 4. Memorandum of Seton-Watson for the Foreign Office. Oxford, 21 September 1939. 209. ‘Bericht eines ungenannten deutschen Publizisten u¨ber sein Interview mit Vlatko Macˇek vom 10. August 1940’, as cited by Johann Wuescht, Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich (Stuttgart, 1969), pp. 298, 300. 210. Arhiv INI, k. XXXV/6, Nr. 658. Monthly report for August 1939 by the Staff of the Bregalnica Divisional Area. Sˇtip, 30 August 1939. 211. Ibid., Nr. 666, pp. 1 – 2. Staff of the Third Army District, draft of the monthly report for September 1939. Skopje, 4 October 1939. 212. Ibid., Nr. 668, pp. 1 – 2. Staff of the Third Army District, draft of the monthly report for October 1939. Skopje, 4 November 1939. 213. Ibid., Nr. 673, p. 1. Staff of the Third Army District, monthly report for November 1939. Skopje, 4 December 1939. 214. Dejan Aleksik´, ‘Nasˇa recˇ’, 1939– 1941. Od istorijata na napredniot pecˇat Makedonija (Skopje, 1960), p. 63. 215. Stjepan Roca, Juzˇna Srbija (Split, 1928), p. 1. 216. DARM, 1.1042.2.104/243. Telephone report to the Central Press Office. 20 February 1940. 217. Ibid., 106/246 – 9. Telephone report to the Central Press Office. 25 February 1940. 218. Pravda, 14 March 1940, p. 7. 219. Petranovi and Zeevi, Jugoslavija 1918– 1988, pp. 434 – 5. 220. Arhiv INI, k. XXXV/6, Nr. 657, pp. 1 – 2. Monthly report by the staff of the Vardar Divisional District for August 1939. Bitola, 30 August 1939. 221. ‘Bog ubijo Angliu i Franciu, / zasˇto nam uze slobodnu Makedoniju! / Bog da zˇivi veliku Germaniju, / koja c´e nam dati slobodnu Makedoniju!’ ‘Mome, mori mome, / kazˇi dokle je Makedonija? / Makedonija, Makedonija je od Nisˇa, / preko Kumanova, Sˇtipa, Kocˇana pa sve do Egejskog mora’. AJ, f. 138, 7/51a, p. 666. A retired Colonel and former parliamentarian writing anonymously to the Chairman of the Cabinet, D. Cvetkovic´. Belgrade, 8 June 1940. 222. ‘Nemcˇijo, Italijo, oslobodi Mac´edoniju – Anglija i Francija sakat da Mac´edonija je pod Jugoslaviju [sic!]’. Arhiv INI, k. XXXV/6, Nr. 668, pp. 4– 5. Draft monthly report by the staff of the Vardar Divisional District for October 1939. Skopje, 4 November 1939. 223. Ibid., Nr. 644. Weekly report by the Vardar Gendarmerie Regiment on 26 May 1940 to the Commander of the Third Army District. 224. Ibid., Nr. 646. The Staff of the Third Army District on the situation in Prespa County to the Ban, the Ministry for the Army and Fleet, and the Head of the Main General Staff. Skopje, 14 October 1940. 225. Ibid., Nr. 673, p. 3. Monthly report by the Staff of the Third Army District for November 1939. Skopje, 4 December 1939. 226. Bilten 1940/3, 3 September 1940. Published in: Izvori za istorijata na SKM, II /2, p. 149.

312 227. 228. 229. 230. 231.

232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247.

248. 249.

250. 251. 252.

NOTES TO PAGES 120 –127 Rossos, The British Foreign Office, p. 393. Bilten 1940/4, 30 October 1940. Published in Izvori za istorijata na SKM, II /2, pp. 180–1. Iskra 1941/1, January. Published in Izvori za istorijata na SKM, II /2, p. 198. Glas Pologa, 9 March 1940, p. 1. Arhiv INI, k. XXXV/6, Nr. 646. The Staff of the Third Army District on the situation in Prespa County to the Ban, the Ministry for the Army and Fleet, and the Head of the Main General Staff. Skopje, 14 October 1940. Sek´avanja od Aleksandar Cvetkovik´, pp. 97–9. DARM, 1.1042.2.105/245. Telephone report to the Central Press Office. 25 February 1940. Dimic´, Kulturna politika vol. 1, pp. 508–14; Nebojsˇa A. Popovic´, ‘Srpski kulturni klub 1937–1941’, Istorija 20. veka 1989/1–2, pp. 110–12, 129–32. DARM, 1.1042.1.151/357 – 8. Report for the Central Press Office. 25 March 1940. Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Statisticˇki godisˇnjak 1936, pp. 410 – 11. DARM, 1.1038.8.53/10. Kocˇani, 14 March 1929. Ibid., 1.1042.10.42/261 – 2. Report of 16 February 1936. Mirovic´, ‘Jedan pogled na privredu Povardarja’, Lu 2, 1938, pp. 135 – 6. Skopski glasnik, 6 July 1940, p. 1. Sek´avanja od Aleksandar Cvetkovik´, p. 106. Ibid., pp. 49 – 52. Pravda, 11 July 1940, p. 6. Nikola Vulic´, Radoslav Grujic´, Jovan Erdeljanovic´, Vladimir Petkovic´, Vladimir C´orovic´ and Veselin Cˇajkanovic´. AJ, f. 66, 79/223. Protocol of the meeting. Emphasis as in the original. DARM, 1.1042.2.116/290, 293. Telephone report to the Central Press Office. 14 October 1940. Arhiv INI, k. XXXV/6, Nr. 647, pp. 2 – 4. The Staff of the Third Army District to the Commander of the Vardar Divisional District. Monthly report for October 1940. Skopje, 3 November 1940. Ibid. e.g.: On 22 September, Mirko Ðord¯evic´ from J. Vinica said on the occasion of a dispute while distilling schnaps (liquor): ‘You are Serbs, get out of my house, I’ll f. . . your State [ j . . . vam drzˇavu ], I’ll f. . . your Yugoslavia, I’ll f. . . your King, I am a Macedonian, I don’t recognize this State’. M. Ðord¯evic´ had already been punished several times for insulting the state and the king. On 5 October, in Kumanovo, one Trajko Jovanovic´ hired musicians, celebrated, took the whole group back to his house and shouted on his way through the streets: ‘Long live Macedonia, forwards Macedonia, down with Serbia, down with Yugslavia. I’ll f. . . their mother [c´u im majku ], a time will come and we will avenge ourselves, we demand an independent [samostalnu ] Macedonia’. One Stojan Stojcˇic´ from Konopnica, Kriva Palanka County, said durng his labour deployment in Kiselica on the Bulgarian border in front of several witnesses: ‘People, what we are doing here is senseless, a lot of money is being wasted here for nothing. This here was Bulgarian and will remain Bulgarian. Our elders say that is was Bulgarian all the way to Nisˇ’. Arhiv INI, k. XXXV/6, Nr. 647, pp. 4–8. The Staff of the Third Army District to the Commander of the Vardar Divisional District. Monthly report for October 1940. Skopje, 3 November 1940. Ibid., p. 8. AJ, f. 138, 7/51a, p. 665. An anonymous letter from a retired Colonel and former parliamentarian to the Chairman of the Cabinet, D. Cvetkovic´. Belgrade, 8 June 1940. Risto Bunteski, ‘Politicˇkite stavovi za resˇavanjeto na makedonskoto nacionalno prasˇanje na Metodija Andonov-Cˇento’, in Cˇento. Cˇovek, revolucioner, drzˇavnik. Zbornik na materijali od Trkaleznata masa odrzˇana na 26.11.1991 godina vo Prilep (Prilep, 1993), p. 41.

NOTES TO PAGES 127 –131

313

253. Rendel to the Foreign Office, Sofia, 15 August 1940. As cited by Rossos, The British Foreign Office, p. 393. 254. PRO, FO 371/29785. Campbell (Belgrade) to Halifax, 6 January 1941. Enclosure, ‘Report on the General Situation in Southern Serbia by Mr Thomas, British Vice-Consul at Skoplje’. As cited by Rossos, The British Foreign Office, pp. 393 – 4. 255. Rossos, The British Foreign Office, p. 394. 256. Hans Knoll, Jugoslawien in Strategie und Politik der Alliierten 1940–1943 (Munich, 1986), pp. 46 – 8, 147– 8, 178– 9. 257. Ladislaus Hory and Martin Broszat, Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat 1941–1945 (Stuttgart, 1964), p. 51. 258. Even in the crisis year 1932 – 3, 2.12 billion dinars out of 7.57 billion dinars (¼ 28 per cent) were intended for the military. Ðurovic´, Drzˇavna intervencija, p. 328. 259. Cˇulinovic´, Jugoslavija 2, pp. 234– 7. 260. Hory and Broszat, Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat, p. 51. 261. G´org´i Malkovski, Profasˇisticˇkite i kolaboracionisticˇkite organizacii i grupi vo Makedonija 1941– 1944 godina (Skopje, 1995), p. 11.

Chapter 3 Economy and Finances 1. John Lampe, ‘The two Yugoslavias as economic unions: Promise and problems’, in Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea 1918–1992, ed. Dejan Djokic´ (London, 2003), p. 184. 2. Zˇarko Lazarevic´, ‘Gospodarski vidiki slovenskega zˇivljenja v Jugoslaviji do druge svetovne vojne’, in Slovenci in Makedonci v Jugoslaviji, eds Bozˇo Repe, Dusˇan Neak and Jozˇe Prini (Ljubljana, Skopje, 1999), pp. 67– 8. 3. Kemal Hrelja, ‘Bitna obiljezˇja privredne i socijalne strukture u Bosni i Hercegovini izmed¯u dva svjetska rata’, Acta historico-oeconomica Iugoslaviae 7, 1980, p. 129. 4. Alice Teichova, Kleinstaaten im Spannungsfeld der Grossma¨chte. Wirtschaft und Politik in Mittel- und Su¨dosteuropa in der Zwischenkriegszeit (Munich, 1988), p. 70. 5. PRO, FO 371, 12856, C 1955, p. 63/2. Footman memorandum. Skopje, 5 March 1928; Avramovski, Britanci 1, pp. 501– 2. 6. Avramovski, Britanci 1, pp. 191, 262, 334, 341, 347, 399, 470 – 1, 500. 7. Ibid., pp. 477– 8. 8. PRO, FO 371, 12856, C 1955, p. 63/2. Footman memorandum. Skopje, 5 March 1928; Avramovski, Britanci 1, pp. 501– 2, 592–3. 9. Rumen Daskalov and Holm Sundhaussen ‘Modernisierungsansa¨tze’, in Hatschikjan, Magarditsch and Stefan Troebst (eds), Su¨dosteuropa. Gesellschaft, Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur. Ein Handbuch (Munich, 1999). pp. 105–35, here p. 123; Calic, Sozialgeschichte Serbiens, pp. 352 – 3. 10. Ðurovic´, Drzˇavna intervencija, p. 209. 11. Ibid., pp. 205– 6. 12. Calic, Sozialgeschichte Serbiens, pp. 409– 10. 13. Rothschild, East Central Europe, p. 275. 14. DARM, 1.1042.2.100/231– 2. The head of the Agrarians, Jovan Jovanovic´, at the Party Confernce in Dracˇevo on 18 June 1939. Telephone report for the Central Press Office, 18 June 1939. 15. Ðurovic´, Drzˇavna intervencija, p. 207. 16. Avramovski, Britanci 2, pp. 598, 701. 17. Ðurovic´, Drzˇavna intervencija, p. 209. 18. Avramovski, Britanci 2, pp. 598, 701.

314 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

NOTES TO PAGES 131 –137 Calic, Sozialgeschichte Serbiens, p. 408. Mirovic´, ‘Jedan pogled’, pp. 24– 5. Mihailo Apostolski in Politika, 30 March 1978. Apostolov, ‘Specificˇnosti u resˇavanju agrarnog pitanja u vardarskom delu Makedonije 1919– 1941. godine’. Acta historico-oeconomica Iugoslaviae 7, 1980, p. 172. Ibid., pp. 41 – 3. Risto Hristov, ‘Gradskoto stopanstvo vo Vardarska Makedonija meg´u dvete svetski vojni niz arhivski izvori’, Istorija 24– 5/1– 4, 1988/9, pp. 95 – 8. Ðurd¯evic´, ‘Privreda Juzˇnoj Srbiji’, Juzˇni pregled 2, 1928, pp. 420 –2. A trade and shipping treaty was signed with Greece on 2 November 1927 and it was ratified on 1 November 1928. Markert (ed.), Osteuropa-Handbuch, Jugoslawien, p. 336. Todorovik´, ‘Stopanski problemi na Makedonija, so poseben osvrt na dejnosta na trgovsko-industriskata komora vo Skopje’, Glasnik 18/2, 1974, p. 25. It was ratified on 17 May 1929. Markert (ed.), Osteuropa-Handbuch, Jugoslawien, p. 335. Ðurd¯evic´, ‘Privreda’, pp. 420– 2. DARM, 1.471.7.3/233. Berlin, 13 January 1927. Todorovik, ‘Stopanski problemi’, p. 25. PRO, FO 371, 12092, C 9610, pp. 102, 105. Report by Footman. Skopje, 21 November 1927. Ljub. Olic´. Privredni razvitak Juzˇne Srbije. In: Juzˇna Srbija 1/6, 1922, pp. 232 –5. Reprinted in: Nasˇa Stara Srbija, 10 July 1927, p. 1. Teodosije A. Robe, ‘Ekonomska vrednost Vardarske banovine’, Narodna odbrana, 1931, pp. 486 – 7. DARM, 1.119.15.2/19 – 19v. Letter of the Deputy Ban to the Finance Minister Milorad Ðord¯evic´. Skopje, 28 December 1932. Ibid., 16.4/166 –7, 168v. Report of the Head of the Finance Department in the Banovina Administration. August 1939. Rastko S. Puric´, Rabotnicˇki jug (Skopje, 1937), p. 124. Izvori za istorijata na SKM, I/2, p. 211. AJ, f. 138, 7/51a, p. 665. An anonymous letter from a retired colonel and former parliamentarian to the Chairman of the Cabinet, D. Cvetkovic´. Belgrade, 8 June 1940. Ibid., f. 74, 51/71, pp. 13– 39. ‘Industrija Juzˇne Srbije sa narocˇitim pogledom na ostale grane privredne radinosti’ – Speech by the Secretary of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Skopje on the economy in ‘South Serbia’. Skopje, 10 January 1929. Ibid., p. 15. Vid Ðurd¯evic´, Tesˇkoc´e i izgledi privrede na Jugu (Skopje, 1931), p. 9. Puric´, Rabotnicˇki jug, pp. 75, 81. Dano Zografski, ‘Entstehung und Entwicklung der Industrie in Makedonien bis zum Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges’, O¨sterreichische Osthefte 31, 1989, pp. 531 – 4. AJ, f. 74, 51/71, pp. 22–3. Speech of the Secretary of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Skopje on the economy in ‘South Serbia’, 10 January 1929. Ðurd¯evic´, ‘Privreda’, pp. 362– 3. Ðurd¯evic´, Tesˇkoc´e, p. 46. Zografski, ‘Entstehung und Entwicklung’, p. 546. Lazar Lazarov, ‘Raspravite vo Parlamentot na Kralstvoto Jugoslavija okolu Makedonija i Makedoncite’, Glasnik 33/2, 1989, p. 108. Milan R. Gavrilovic´, Privreda Juzˇne Srbije (Skopje, 1933), p. 112. As in Lazarov, ‘Raspravite’, p. 128. Including 36 mills, 12 mining companies, 8 textile factories. AJ, f. 74, 51/71, pp. 24– 7.

NOTES TO PAGES 138 –145 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73.

74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89.

315

Ibid., pp. 32 – 9. Ðurd¯evic´, ‘Privreda’, pp. 363– 4. Cˇeda Vitkovic´, Secretary of the Industrialists’ Society, in Skopski glasnik, 15 April 1939, p. 5. Zografski, ‘Karakteristike’, pp. 186– 7. Mirovic´, ‘Jedan pogled’, p. 139. Avramovski, Britanci 2, p. 354, Annual report for 1935. Todorovik´, ‘Stopanski problemi’, p. 25. Puric´, Rabotnicˇki jug, p. 87. DARM, 1.1042.1.11/37– 42. Report by the correspondent. Skopje, 7 December 1930. The film shows the camp in the Sokol District, Novi Sad in Bled, including a visit by the royal family. Vardar, 25 October 1936, p. 2. Vardar, 24 October 1936, p. 4. Palesˇutski, Makedonskiot va˘pros, p. 35. Wendel, Kreuz und quer durch den slawischen Su¨den, p. 68. AJ, f. 74, 51/71, pp. 16–17. Paper presented by the Secretary of the Skopje Chamber of Industry and Commerce on the economy in ‘South Serbia’, 10 January 1929. Lazarov, ‘Raspravite’, p. 126. Parliamentary session on 5 March 1937. Stenografske belesˇke, 1936/37, knj. 2, pp. 942– 5. XXXVIII redovni sastanak, 5 March 1937. Cˇaslav Nikitovic´. AJ, f. 37, 60/375/374. Stenografske belesˇke, 1936/37, knj. 2, pp. 942–5. XXXVIII redovni sastanak, 5 March 1937. AJ, f. 74, 51/71, pp. 16– 17. Paper by the Secretary of the Skopje Chamber of Industry and Commerce on the economy in ‘South Serbia’, 10 January 1929. Vardar Banovina: 36,672 square kilometres, 1,574,000 inhabitants (1931). The Sava Banovina was 40,535 square kilometres with 2,704,000 inhabitants. Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Statisticˇki godisˇnjak 1932, pp. 40–1. Almanah banovina. Vardarska banovina (u dodatku: Vrbaska banovina i Zetska banovina) (n.p., 1931), pp. 34– 5. Dimic´, Kulturna politika vol. 1, p. 145. Ibid., p. 107. DARM, 1.119.15.1/1 – 4. Ibid., 2/13. Vidakovic´ to the Finance Minister. Skopje, 3 October 1932. Ibid., 2/14. Vidakovic´ to the Finance Minister. Skopje, 15 October 1932. Ibid., 2/15. Brief vom 20. 10. 1932. Ibid., 2/17 –17v. The Deputy Ban Krasojevic´ to Finance Minister Milorad Ðord¯evic´. Skopje, 18 November 1932. Ibid., 2/19– 19v. Letter of the Deputy Ban to the Finance Minister M. Ðord¯evic´. Skopje, 28 December 1932. Emphasis as in the original. Ibid., 3/20. Letter to the Finance Minister Milorad Ðord¯evic´. Skopje, 25 February 1933. Ibid., 3/21–21v. Letter to the Finance Minister Milorad Ðord¯evic´. Skopje, 10 March 1933. Ibid., 3/26. Letter from Krasojevic´ to the Finance Minister Ðord¯evic´. Skopje, 7 September 1933. Ibid., 3/50. 31 August 1933. Telegram from Krasojevic´ to the Finance Minister. DARM, 1.119.15.3/24v. Ibid., 3/31. Emphasis as in the original. It should be noted that the Banovina had to pay for numerous such institutions: in total it maintained 14 hospitals, 38 fruit-tree nurseries, 3 grape-vine nurseries, 3 agricultural schools, 3 model plants (ogledne stanice), a children’s home in Skopje, an old people’s home in Bitola, 2 citizens’ schools, and 36 vocational schools for girls. In addition it covered

316

90.

91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125.

NOTES TO PAGES 145 –152 the material expenses for 15 state high schools, 12 citizens’ schools, and 4 state craft schools for boys. Ibid., 3/56– 7. Letter of 3 February 1934. Ibid., 3/30 – 30v. The Deputy Ban to the Minister for Social Policy and People’s Health. Registered letter, 4 October 1933. Ibid., 1.119.15.3/33. The Deputy Ban to the Minister for Social Policy and People’s Health. 25 October 1933. Ibid., 3/47. Krasojevic´ to the Finance Ministry. 27 December 1933. AJ, f. 37, 51/315, pp. 4–5. Letter from Ðord¯evic´ to Stojadinovic´. Skopje, 23 July 1935. DARM, 1.119.15.3/39 – 40. 24 November 1933. Ibid., 3/43 –43v. Ibid., 3/61. Letter from the City Council to the Banovina Administration. Skopje, 23 February 1934. Ibid., 7/66 –7. Compilation of the Banovina’s bookkeeping. Skopje, 17 August 1939. DARM, 1.119.16.4/167v– 8v. Report by the Head of the Finance Department in the Banovina Administration. August 1939. Ibid., 4/166 – 7, 168v. Ibid., 4/232 – 3. No date, probably 1939, before the sporazum. Lazarov, ‘Raspravite’, p. 119. Ðurd¯evic´, Tesˇkoc´e, pp. 39– 40. DARM, 1.471.7.3/233. Berlin, 13 January 1927. Hristov, Trudbenicˇkite, p. 22. Jozo Tomasevich, Peasants, Politics and Economic Change in Yugoslavia (Stanford, CA, 1955), p. 242. Lampe, ‘Belated modernization’, p. 39. DARM (PO Skopje), 6.1.9.15. Ibid. DARM, 1.119.16.4/166– 7, 168v. August 1939. Report by the head of the Finance Department in the Banovina Administration. Twenty-eight parliamentarians led by Hadzˇi Ristic´ then addressed a request to Stojadinovic´ for the rest of the money. AJ, f. 37, 54/352, p. 607. Belgrade, 28 March 1938. Ðord¯e Simonovic´, Town Council member in Bitola, in Novi sjaj, February – March 1935, p. 2. The parliamentarian M. Stojanovic´, in Juzˇna Srbija, 17 July 1939, p. 1. Interview in: Juzˇna Srbija, 24 July 1939, p. 1. DARM 1.119.16.2/5 – 6. Presentation by the Ban before the Banovina Council. Transcription written on 3 August 1940. Ibid., 4/58. Ibid., 4/46 –127. Ibid., 4/140 – 1. Skopje, 20 November 1939. Ibid., 4/129. 21 October 1939. DARM, 1.1042.2.100/246. Telephone report to the Central Press Office. 25 February 1940. Ibid., 107/253 – 4. Telephone report to the Central Press Office. 8 March 1940. DARM, 1.119.16.16/234. Here there must be a mistake. The report of the official responsible names the sum of 3 million. Ibid., 3/43. 15 January 1940. Ibid., 2/5 –10. Presentation of the Ban before the Banovina Council. Transcript of 3 August 1940. Ibid., 12/181 – 181v. Ibid., 4/206. File of the Finance Minister: ibid., 4/239 – 41. Ibid., 13/184v.

NOTES TO PAGES 153 –156

317

126. Politika, 5 February 1941. Millions in Dinars 7.0 9.5 3.0 12.0 12.5

15.0 11.0 5.0 20.0 5.0

127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141.

142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147.

Purpose Agriculture (including for vine cultures and almond plantations) Export slaughterhouse in Skopje Animal hospital polyclinic Reforestation and regulation of wild streams Education (elementary schools, teachers’ apartments, domestic science schools in the country, high schools, girls’ boarding school in Skopje) Banovina roads Improvements Drinking water supply in the countryside Social and health institutions Technical middle school in Skopje and trade academy in Bitola

The corresponding report in Pravda dated 14 March 1940. DARM, 1.1037.6., Pov. br. 928. Kavadarci, 9 November 1921. Ibid., Pov. br. 287. Kavadarci, 20 April 1921. Ibid., Pov. br. 18571. Kavadarci, 30 September 1921. Ibid., Pov. br. 504. Report by the Prefect to the Interior Ministry, Department of Public Security. Sˇtip, 9 July 1921. Vreme, 19 October 1923, p. 2. Ibid., 6 December 1923, p. 2. PRO, FO 371, 14316, C 3840, p. 115. Report by the British Military Attache´ Major W.H. Oxley. Belgrade, 9 May 1930. Ancel, La Mace´doine, pp. 38–42, 44. The Institute was built in 1925 with funds from the Rockefeller Foundation. PRO, FO 371, 12092, C 9610, p. 101. Report by Footman. Skopje, 21 November 1927. DARM, 1.1042.10.31/191 – 8. PRO, FO 371, 12856, C 1955, p. 63. Report by Kennard to A. Chamberlain, 12 March 1928. Hran[islav] M. Joksimovic´, Higijenske, socijalne i prosvetne prilike u skopskim sˇkolama i program rada u buduc´nosti (Belgrade, 1932), p. 21. Patrick Zylberman, ‘Mosquitos and komitadjis. Malaria and borders in Macedonia (1919 – 1938)’, in Facing Illness in Troubled Times: Health in Europe in the Interwar Years, 1918– 1939, eds Iris Borowy and Wolf D. Gruner (Frankfurt a.M., 2005), p. 332. Linda Killen, ‘The Rockefeller foundation in the first Yugoslavia’, East European Quarterly 24, 1990, p. 364. DARM, 1.1042.10.32/199 – 200. Compilation by the Banovina Administration. Skopje, 25 June 1930. See for example, ibid., 10.1/1– 2; 2/3; 3/4– 5; 4/6 –7; 5/8 – 9; 6/10– 11; 7/12. Ibid., 10.31/191– 8. DARM, 1.119.6.7/113v. Spomenica dvadesetpetogodisˇnjice oslobod¯enja Juzˇne Srbije 1912 – 1937 (Skopje, 1937), pp. 781 – 2.

318

NOTES TO PAGES 156 –162

148. Juzˇna Srbija, 17 July 1939, p. 1. 149. Jovanovic´, Jugoslovenska drzˇava, p. 384. At the beginning of the 1950s, UNESCO and the Yugoslav government named reforestation and alleviating the damage to the forests as the most important economic problem in the Republic of Macedonia. Pierre Bouvarel, Sur le reboisement et l’ame´lioration des foreˆts en Mace´doine Yougoslave [Paris, 1955], p. 5. 150. DARM, 1.1042.1.36/141. Report by the correspondent of the Central Press Office in Skopje. December 1933. Emphasis as in the original. 151. AJ, f. 37, 9/55/922. Report for 1937, unknown author. 152. AJ, f. 37, 60/375/176. No date. 153. DARM, 1.119.6.7/100v. 154. Spomenica, p. 785. 155. Stenografske belesˇke, 1937/38, knj. 2, p. 300. XII redovni sastanak, 17 February 1938. 156. DARM, 1.119.16.4/69. 157. Dimic´, Kulturna politika vol. 1, pp. 69– 70. 158. DARM (PO Skopje). 6.1.4.197. 159. According to Cˇedomir Simic´, former Director of the Hygiene Institute in Skopje, at a meeting of the Serbian Doctors’ Society. Skopski glasnik, 11 November 1939, p. 3. 160. AJ, f. 37, 51/315, p. 128. Novakovic´ to Stojadinovic´. Skopje, 7 October 1937. 161. Stenografske belesˇke, 1938, knj. 3, pp. 942 – 3. XXXII redovni sastanak, 10 March 1938. 162. Jacques Ancel, Peuples et nations des Balkans. Ge´ographie politique (Paris, 1941), p. 205. 163. Boris G. Andonovski, ‘Epidemiolosˇki osvrt na najcˇestite zarazni bolesti vo Bitola i Bitolsko za vreme na Stara Jugoslavija i okupacijata na Bugarija’, Prilozi, Bitola, 26/44 – 5, 1986, p. 80. 164. DARM, 1.1042.10.48/307. 165. DARM (PO Bitola), 2.1.20.22/246. 166. DARM, 1.1042.2.78/171 – 5. Telephone report to the Central Press Office, 4 July 1938. 167. AJ, f. 81, 3/8/11, pp. 654, 663. 168. Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Statisticˇki godisˇnjak 1938/39, p. 185. 169. AJ, f. 81, 3/8/11, p. 610. The proposal intended for Belgrade: Opera: 30 million; Stadium: 30 million; Palace of Justce: 12 million; Building for the Building Ministry: 23 million; Higher Pedagogic School: 2 million. 170. An allusion to the fact that in the middle of the fourteenth century Skopje had been the capital of Tsar Dusˇan. 171. DARM, 1.1042.2.87/197 – 200. Telephone report to the Central Press Office on 3 December 1938. 172. Sluzˇbeni list Vardarske banovine, 12 June 1932. 173. DARM (PO Skopje), 6.1.11.92– 5. Discussion of the budget for 1937– 8. 174. Ibid., 7.449 – 50. 175. Ibid., 9.205 – 8, 258. 176. Ibid., 9.3 –4 (1935). 177. Ibid., 11.230. 178. Ibid., 11.333 – 4.

Chapter 4 Agriculture 1. Petranovic´ and Zecˇevic´, Jugoslavija 1918– 1988, pp. 275 – 6. 2. Markert (ed.), Osteuropa-Handbuch, Jugoslawien, p. 310.

NOTES TO PAGES 162 –170 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

319

Apostolov, Kolonizacijata, pp. 140– 1. Tomasevich, Peasants, pp. 359– 60. Apostolov, Kolonizacijata, pp. 143– 4. Hristov, Seloto, p. 100. Apostolov, Kolonizacijata, p. 39. Optionists were ‘Yugoslavs’ living in the neighbouring countries, who decided to opt for citizenship of the Kingdom SHS. Pero Slijepcˇevic´, ‘Kolonizacija u Juzˇnoj Srbiji’, Nova Evropa 8/4 – 5, 1928, p. 117. Ðord¯o Krstic´, Kolonizacija u Juzˇnoj Srbiji (Sarajevo, 1928), pp. vi – vii, 43. Emphasis in the original. Ibid., pp. 24 – 5. Slijepcˇevic´, ‘Kolonizacija’, p. 118. Apostolov, Kolonizacijata, pp. 73– 4. Ibid., pp. 75 – 7. Stara Srbija, 9 April 1922, p. 1; Stanislav Krakov, Kroz Juzˇnu Srbiju (Belgrade, 1926), p. 19. AVPRF, f. 4, op. 48, p. 296, d. 54325, no. 1 (Report of Kennard, 1926). Slijepcˇevic´, ‘Kolonizacija’, p. 116. Slijepcˇevic´ was a professor in German at the Faculty for Philosophy in Skopje. AVPRF, f. 4, op. 48, p. 296, d. 54325, Nr. 1. Izvori za istorijata na SKM, I/2, p. 122. Apostolov, Kolonizacijata, pp. 96– 8, 110– 15. DARM, 1.121.1.99/245v. Apostolov, Kolonizacijata, p. 123. Krstic´, Kolonizacija, pp. 25– 6; Slijepcˇevic´, ‘Kolonizacija’, p. 119. Kraljevina Jugoslavija. Administrativna podela. I knjiga: Vardarska Banovina. Sredio Tih. J. Arand¯elovic´ (Belgrade, 1930), p. 106. Ancel, La Mace´doine, p. 66. Slijepcˇevic´, ‘Kolonizacija’, p. 119. Krstic´, Kolonizacija, p. 26. Ibid., pp. vi, 41, 45–52, 56– 8, 97. Ibid., pp. 64 – 5. Ibid., pp. 5 – 6. Popovic´, ‘Srpski kulturni klub’, p. 130. Krstic´, Kolonizacija, p. 84. Ancel, La Mace´doine, p. 104. AVPRF, f. 67, op. 3, p. 101, d. 7, pp. 23– 5. Report of ‘Source no. 126’; ibid., f. 144, op. 7, p. 102, d. 6, pp. 78– 82. Report of ‘Source 103’, 1924. Krstic´, Kolonizacija, pp. v –vi. DARM, 1.121.1.99/249 – 50v. Ibid., 1.97/205– 8. Strumica, 29 April 1936. Ibid., 1.99/248– 9. Report of the Agricultural Commission in Strumica to the Senior Agricultural Commission in Skopje, 1 May 1936. Bilten 1940– 3, published in Izvori za istorijata na SKM, II /2, p. 154. Apostolov, Kolonizacijata, pp. 156– 7. Krakov, Kroz Juzˇnu Srbiju, pp. 113– 14. Apostolov, Kolonizacijata, pp. 160– 1. Ibid., Appendix V. Vano Burzevski, ‘Ekonomskata polozˇba na makedonskite selani meg´u dvete svetski vojni’, Glasnik 25/2 – 3, 1982, p. 94.

320 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57.

58. 59. 60.

61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80.

NOTES TO PAGES 170 –178 Hristov, Seloto, p. 99. Krstic´, Kolonizacija, p. 5. Ancel, La Mace´doine, p. 104. Vreme, 25 October 1937. DARM, 1.119.16.4/144 – 6. 14 December 1939. Vid Obradovic´, ‘Selo Juzˇne Srbije u stvarnosti i knjizˇevnosti’, in Selo i seljasˇtvo. Studije i lanci (Sarajevo, 1937), p. 132. AVPRF, f. 4, op. 48, p. 296, d. 54325, Nr. 1 (Report by Kennard 1926). Hrelja, ‘Bitna obiljezˇja’, p. 129. Tomasevich, Peasants, pp. 316, 319. In 1931 the share was equally large: 67.8 Prozent. Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Statisticˇki godisˇnjak 1936, p. 86 (Evaluation of the Census conducted on 31 March 1931). Dimic´, ‘Srbija i Jugoslavija’, p. 19. Tomasevich, Peasants, p. 702. ¨ ber Nutzen und Nachteil der phasenverschobenen U¨bernahme von Holm Sundhaussen, ‘U Ergebnissen der agrarischen und industriellen Revolution. Das Beispiel der Balkanla¨nder vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg’, in Wirtschafts- und Kulturbeziehungen zwischen dem Donau- und Balkanraum seit dem Wiener Kongress, ed. Horst Haselsteiner (Graz, 1991), pp. 122–3. Avramovski, Britanci 1, p. 265. Annual Report for 1924. Zdenka Sˇimoncˇic´-Bobetko, ‘Karakteristike ekonomskog razvoja u Hrvatskoj u med¯uratnom razdoblju (1918–1941)’, Acta historico-oeconomica Iugoslaviae 7, 1980, pp. 24–7. Daskalov and Sundhaussen, ‘Modernisierungsansa¨tze’, in Su¨dosteuropa, Gesellschaft, Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur. Ein Handbuch. Hg. v. Magarditsch Hatschikjan und Stefan Troebst, Mu¨nchen 1999, p. 124. Sundhaussen, Geschichte Jugoslawiens, pp. 84– 6. DARM, 1.1042.10.72/519 – 20. Obradovic´, ‘Selo Juzˇne Srbije’, pp. 127– 9. Ancel, La Mace´doine, pp. 53–4. Puric´, Rabotnicˇki jug, pp. 126– 7. Hristov, Seloto, pp. 88– 92. R.A. Rajs, ‘Ekonomsko stanje u Juzˇnoj Makedoniji’, Novi zˇivot 6, 1921, p. 352. Even in the 1970s threshing machines were still not being used in the more remote districts. Apostolov, ‘Specificˇnosti u resˇavanju’, p. 175. Overall, 18,718 families did not possess any land, 30,901 only a little around their house, 66,392 up to 1 hectare, 47,413: 1 – 2 hectares, 80,907: 2– 5 hectares, 46,690: 5 – 10 hectares, 16,534: 10– 20 hectares, 3,944: 20– 50 hectares, 7.244: 50 – 100 hectares. Nasˇa recˇ, no. 22, 11 November 1940. Gavrilovic´, Privreda Juzˇne Srbije, pp. 121–3. Daskalov and Sundhaussen, ‘Modernisierungsansa¨tze’, p. 124. AJ, f. 74, 51/71. ‘Industrija Juzˇne Srbije sa narocˇitim pogledom na ostale grane privredne radinosti’, p. 15. Skopje, 10 January 1929. Robe, ‘Ekonomska vrednost’, pp. 537– 8. DARM 1.1042.10.46/279 –81. Report of the Central Press Office. 1 July 1936. Lazarov, ‘Raspravite’, pp. 125– 6. Robe, ‘Ekonomska vrednost’, pp. 537– 8. Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Statisticˇki godisˇnjak 1932, p. 79; Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Statisticˇki godisˇnjak 1938/39, p. 164. Robe, ‘Ekonomska vrednost’, pp. 501– 2. Katardzˇiev, Vreme na zreenje 1, pp. 69– 76; Apostolov, Specificˇnata polozˇba, p. 52. Tatic´, Strumica, p. 347.

NOTES TO PAGES 178 –182

321

81. Katardzˇiev, Vreme na zreenje 1, pp. 69– 76; Apostolov, Specificˇnata polozˇba, p. 52, has other, in part higher, in part lower, numbers. 82. Nasˇa Stara Srbija, 21 April 1927, p. 2. 83. Atanas Anastasijevic´, ‘Privredno podizanje Juzˇnih Krajeva’, in: Lucˇ II/1 – 2, 1938, pp. 5 – 12, here p. 9. 84. Skopski glasnik, 15 July 1939, p. 2. 85. Ðurd¯evic´, Tesˇkoc´e, p. 50. 86. AJ, f. 74, 51/71, pp. 165– 7. Letter from the silk cooperatives in Gevgelija to the Prince Regent. Belgrade, 2 June 1935. 87. La Yougoslavie e´conomique, p. 72. 88. AJ, f. 74, 51/71, p. 168. Decision by the Agricultural Ministry. Belgrade, 13 June 1935. 89. Ibid., f. 37, 51/315, p. 82. Paunovic´ to Stojadinovic´. Skopje, 11 November 1936. 90. Ibid., p. 154. The Ban Novakovic´ to Stojadinovic´. Skopje, 16 March 1938. 91. Ibid., p. 82. The Ban Novakovic´ to Stojadinovic´. Skopje, 11 November 1936; ibid., p. 154. The Ban Novakovic´ to Stojadinovic´. Skopje, 16 March 1938. 92. DARM, 1.1042.10.39/233 – 5 [1934]. 93. Ibid., 1.1042.10.46/279 – 81. Report for the Central Press Office. 1 July 1936. 94. It was founded in June 1930 and was meant to reduce the loss of income for agricultural producers by providing purchase and price guarantees. Calic, Sozialgeschichte Serbiens, pp. 354 – 5. 95. Vardar, 30. 7. 1935, pp. 1 –2. 96. Stenografske belesˇke, 1936/37, knj. 2, pp. 942– 5. XXXVIII redovni sastanak, 5 March 1937. Cˇ. Nikitovic´. 97. Arhiv INI, k. XXXV/6, Nr. 676. The Staff of the Vardar Divisional District to the Commandant of the Third Army District. Bitola, 9 December 1939. 98. Stenografske belesˇke, 1936/37, knj. 2, pp. 937–43. XXXVIII redovni sastanak, 5 March 1937. 99. Obradovic´, ‘Selo Juzˇne Srbije’, pp. 127– 9, 132. 100. Ðurovic´, Drzˇavna intervencija, p. 109. 101. Ðurd¯evic´, Tesˇkoc´e, pp. 43– 4. 102. Stenografske belesˇke Senata, 1937/38, knj. 1, pp. 248– 9. XIII redovni sastanak, 24 March 1938. Hadzˇi Ristic´ raised this topic for discussion. 103. Risto Hristov, ‘Selskoto stopanstvo na Vardarska Makedonija meg´u dvete svetski vojni niz arhivski izvori’, Istorija 23/1 –2, 1987, pp. 163 – 5. 104. Burzevski, ‘Ekonomskata polozˇba’, p. 108. 105. Hristov, Seloto, pp. 192– 200. 106. According to the Head of the Finance Department of the Banovina Administration in 1931, see: Almanah banovina, p. 31. 107. Hristov, Seloto, pp. 192– 200; Apostolov, Kolonizacijata, p. 132. 108. Makedonija kako prirodna i ekonomska celina (Skopje, 1978; original edition Sofia, 1945), p. 311. 109. Rajs, ‘Ekonomsko stanje’, p. 353. 110. Almanah Kraljevine Jugoslavije. IV. jubilarni svezak. Po zvanicˇnim podacima sastavio Viktor Manakin (Zagreb, 1932), p. 621. 111. Ancel, La Mace´doine, p. 23. 112. Vasa Cˇubrilovic´ in: Nasˇa recˇ, Nr. 2, 11 March 1939. 113. For an average daily wage of 15 dinars. Obradovic´, ‘Selo Juzˇne Srbije’, pp. 127 – 9. 114. AJ, f. 74, 51/71, p. 83. Report of the Skopje branch of the National Bank on ‘Economic Conditions in South Serbia in 1930’. Skopje, 5 January 1930 [should be 1931]. 115. Hristov, Seloto, pp. 216– 17. 116. AJ, f. 74, 51/71, p. 84. Report of the Skopje branch of the National Bank on ‘Economic Conditions in South Serbia in 1930’. Skopje, 5 January 1930 [should be 1931].

322

NOTES TO PAGES 182 –190

117. Ibid., 51/71, p. 15. Presentation by the Secretary of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Skopje on the South Serbian economy, 10 January 1929. 118. DARM (PO Skopje), 6.1.14.104– 8. Privilegovano a.d. za silose to the City Council. Meeting on 4 April 1940. 119. Ibid., 6.1.15.25. 25 August 1927. Among those things listed were: water supply, canalization, power plant, tram, 2 communal baths, 2 covered markets, 2 open markets, city savings bank, 2 bridges over the Vardar, 4 elementary schools, old people’s home, health clinic, and paving the streets. For this a sum of 182 million was proposed. The largest piece was 40 million for the canalisation. 120. Skopski glasnik, 13 December 1930, p. 2. 121. DARM (PO Skopje), 6.1.11.90– 1. 122. Skopski glasnik, 5 August 1939, p. 1. 123. Ibid., 18 November 1939, p. 2. 124. Juzˇna Srbija, 2 October 1939, p. 2. 125. DARM (PO Skopje), 6.1.14.104– 8. Privilegovano a.d. za silose to the City Council. Meeting of 4 April 1940. 126. DARM, 1.119.16.4/238. Letter from the Ban to the Head of the Cabinet. Skopje, 17 October 1940. 127. Politika, 5. 2. 1941. 128. Rajs, ‘Ekonomsko stanje’, p. 352. 129. Ðurd¯evic´, Tesˇkoc´e, p. 37. 130. Markert (ed.), Osteuropa-Handbuch, Jugoslawien, p. 315. 131. DARM, 1.1042.10.48/321– 6. It is notable that in this connection people spoke without hesitation of ‘indigenous Macedonian’ races. 132. Ðurovic´, Drzˇavna intervencija, p. 204. 133. Ibid., p. 209. 134. Apostolov, Specificˇnata polozˇba, p. 48. 135. Ðurd¯evic´, ‘Privreda’, p. 313. 136. Sidovski, Razvitokot, p. 216. 137. Ðurd¯evic´ in Almanah banovina, pp. 56– 8. 138. Ruth Trouton, Peasant Renaissance in Yugoslavia 1900– 1950: A Study of the Development of Yugoslav Peasant Society as Affected by Education (London, 1952), p. 143. 139. Avramovski, Britanci 1, p. 339. 140. Tobacco exports according to La Yougoslavie e´conomique, p. 49:

1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934

Mio. kg

Mio. dinar

3.381 1.206 2.944 5.815 4.616 0.753

138.2 62.6 123.9 237.4 143.2 25.4

141. Avramovski, Britanci 2, p. 127. 142. AJ, f. 74, 51/71, p. 89. Report by the Skopje branch of the National Bank on ‘Economic Conditions in South Serbia in 1930’. Skopje, 5 January 1930 [should be 1931]. 143. Zitiert nach Slobodna Tribuna, 13. 2. 1923, pp. 5 – 6.

NOTES TO PAGES 190 –196

323

144. Avramovski, Britanci 1, p. 213. 145. Almanah banovina, pp. 56– 8. 146. Urosˇ Stajic´ in Ekonomist, 1928, p. 154. As cited by Borislav Iv. Blagojevic´, Selo nasˇeg juga i njegovi problemi (Belgrade, 1939), pp. 44– 6. 147. PRO, FO 371, 12856, C 1955, p. 63/2. Memorandum by the British Vice Consul in Skopje. Skopje, 5 March 1928. 148. This figure is based on the prices in Greece and Bulgaria, as there was no free market in Yugoslavia. 149. Andonov-Polyanski, Dokumenti za borbata, p. 138. 150. Troebst, Mussolini, p. 109. In this region the IMRO secured a large part of its income through an additional ‘tax’ on tobacco. 151. Gavrilovic´, Privreda Juzˇne Srbije, pp. 22– 3. 152. The Balkan States. I. Economic. A Review of the Economic and Financial Development of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Roumania, and Yugoslavia since 1919 (London, 1936), p. 27. 153. Gavrilovic´, Privreda Juzˇne Srbije, pp. 22– 3. 154. Mirovic´, ‘Jedan pogled’, p. 91. 155. Anast. Bungurovic´, ‘Nasˇ jug i “Monopol” duvana’, in: Lucˇ I, 1937, pp. 233 – 55. 156. Arhiv MANU, f. 103, arh. ed. 1. Prilep, 7 March 1928. 157. Ibid., Belgrade, 20 April 1928. 158. For example, in 1931, see Robe, ‘Ekonomska vrednost’, pp. 553, 554. 159. Katardzˇiev, Vreme na zreenje 1, pp. 63– 7. 160. Stenografske belesˇke, 1937/38, knj. 2, p. 360. XIV redovni sastanak, 18 February 1938. Todor Zˇivkovic´. 161. Blagojevic´, Selo, pp. 33– 4. 162. Politika, 30 September 1929. 163. Stenografske belesˇke, 1937/38, knj. 2, p. 360. XIV redovni sastanak, 18 February 1938. Todor Zˇivkovic´. 164. For example, in Nisˇ, Sarajevo, Ljubljana, Mostar, Travnik, Banja Luka, Zagreb, Senj. 165. Blagojevic´, Selo, pp. 42– 3. 166. Vreme, 9 September 1930. 167. Aleksik´, ‘Nasˇa recˇ’, p. 140. 168. See for example, Blagojevic´, Selo, pp. 36– 7. 169. Almanah banovina, pp. 56– 8. 170. Ðurd¯evic´, Tesˇkoc´e, pp. 14– 21. 171. Skopski Glasnik, 26 December 1931. 172. Vardar, 25 February 1933; Jugoslovenski Lloyd, 20 November 1935. 173. Jugoslovenski Lloyd, 20 November 1935. 174. Politika, 12 November 1938, p. 6. 175. Stenografske belesˇke Senata, 1937/38, knj.1, pp. 249– 50. XIII redovni sastanak, 24 March 1938. 176. Katardzˇiev, Vreme na zreenje 1, pp. 63– 7. 177. Obzor, 5 January 1933. 178. DARM (PO Skopje), 6.1.8.5. Protocol of the meeting on 16 January 1933. 179. AJ, f. 74, 219/313, pp. 191– 3. Letter from the Cooperative to the King. Skopje, 22 February 1933. 180. La Yougoslavie e´conomique, pp. 49– 50. 181. The proportion of female workers was 56 per cent. Sidovski, Razvitokot, p. 223. 182. Juzˇna stvarnost, December 1939, p. 3. 183. Bitoljske novine, 19 June 1938, p. 1. 184. Blagojevic´ in: Skopski glasnik, 9 November 1940, p. 1.

324

NOTES TO PAGES 196 –201

185. AJ, f. 74, 51/71, pp. 56– 7, 62– 3. 186. Ibid., p. 59. Skopje, 25 February 1930. 187. AJ, f. 37, 15/96, p. 183. The Prilep Section of the JRZ Party to Stojadinovic´, 4 March 1937. 188. Ibid., f. 74, 51/71, p. 68. Request for a pardon addressed to the King. Prilep County, 15 May 1930. 189. Ibid., p. 69. Belgrade, 14 August 1930. 190. Ibid., pp. 74 – 5. Letter from those convicted to the King. Skopje, 11 February 1935. 191. AJ, f. 37, 60/375/220. 192. Blagojevic´, Selo, pp. 42– 3. 193. AJ, f. 74, 51/71, pp. 119– 20. Belgrade, 19 December 1931. 194. DARM, 1.1042.2.100/246. Telephone report for the Central Press Office. 25 February 1940. 195. Bilten 1940/1. Published in: Izvori za istorijata na SKM, II /2, p. 108. 196. La Yougoslavie e´conomique, p. 49. 197. Juzˇna Srbija, 6 January 1940, p. 3. 198. AJ, f. 37, 15/95, p. 83. Ugrin Joksimovic´ to Milan Stojadinovic´. Belgrade, 26 November 1937. 199. DARM, 1.869.1, Govori narodnog poslanika g. Svetozara Tasic´a u Narodnoj Skupsˇtini u 1938 godini. I. Po budzˇetu Ministarstva poljoprivrede. II. Po budzˇetu Ministarstva gradjevine. Bitolj [no date], pp. 10– 12. 200. ‘Le tabac yougoslave’, in La Revue bleue, 16 January 1932. 201. Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Statisticˇki godisˇnjak 1938/39, p. 486. 202. Palesˇutski, Makedonskiot va˘pros, p. 40. 203. DARM, 1.869.1, [no date], Govori narodnog poslanika, pp. 10 –12. 204. Ibid., 1.1042.10.46/281. Report by Josip Buksˇa for the Central Press Office. 1 July 1936. 205. AJ, f. 74, 219/313, p. 235. Invitation telegram to the King for the laying of the foundation stone. 2 November 1937. 206. Blagojevic´, Selo, p. 42. 207. Vardar, 16 November 1936, p. 4. 208. Stenografske belesˇke Senata, 1937/38, knj. 1, pp. 249– 50. XIII redovni sastanak, 24 March 1938. 209. Bitoljske novine, 19 June 1938, p. 1. Signed: V.N.P., probably Vojislav N. Protic´, lawyer. 210. Skopski glasnik, 9 November 1940, p. 1. 211. Apart from tobacco, but much less lucrative, there were also monopolies for: salt, petroleum, matches and cigarette papers. Ko¨nigreich Jugoslawien 1919 – 1929. Published by the Central Press Office of the Chairman of the Cabinet (Belgrade, 1930), p. LV. 212. Ðurovic´, Drzˇavna intervencija, p. 298; Ko¨nigreich Jugoslawien. p. LV. 213. Avramovski, Britanci 1, p. 127. Annual report for 1922. 214. Ibid., p. 201. Annual report for 1923. 215. ‘Le tabac yougoslave’, in: La Revue bleue, 16 January 1932. 216. Todor Mirovski, ‘Opiumovoto proizvodstvo vo Makedonija i meg´unarodnite spogodbi za opiumot i negovite derivati’, Pregled 1/2, 1951, pp. 34, 37. 217. Mihajlo Cˇucˇkovic´, Opiumsko pitanje i izgledi na preorijentaciju privrede Juzˇne Srbije (Skopje, 1939), pp. 17– 19. 218. Sava Obradovic´, Pitanje opiuma (Belgrade, 1932), pp. 82 – 4. 219. Ibid., pp. 93, 95. 220. Mirovski, ‘Opiumovoto proizvodstvo’, p. 45.

NOTES TO PAGES 201 – 208 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232.

233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263.

325

Obradovic´, Pitanje opiuma, pp. XLI V, 198. Ibid., pp. 99 – 101. Almanah banovina, p. 47. One hectare usually produced 12 kilograms of raw opium. Blagojevic´, Selo, p. 48. Obradovic´, Pitanje opiuma, pp. xlv, 99–101. Nasˇa Stara Srbija, 2 December 1924, p. 1. Ibid., 1 June 1925, p. 1. Ibid., 19 April 1927, p. 2. Apostolov, Specificˇnata polozˇba, pp. 48– 9; Mirovski, ‘Opiumovoto proizvodstvo’, p. 50. Obradovic´, Pitanje opiuma, p. xliv. Ibid., pp. 104– 5. Ðurd¯evic´, Tesˇkoc´e, pp. 26–7. In 1928 one kilogram of raw opium still had a price of 1,000 dinars. It declined to 550 in 1930, was still 250 in 1934, and reached its lowest level in 1935 and 1936 at 200 dinars. In 1939 a recovery started (320 dinars), which continued in 1940 (450 dinars). Mirovski, ‘Opiumovoto proizvodstvo’, p. 52. Blagojevic´, Selo, p. 59. Apostolov, Specificˇnata polozˇba, pp. 48– 9. Ðurd¯evic´, Tesˇkoc´e, p. 46. Vardar, 30 July 1935, pp. 1 – 2; Cˇucˇkovic´, Opiumsko pitanje, pp. 20 – 1. According to Blagojevic´, Selo, pp. 53– 4. AJ, f. 74, 51/71, p. 118. Avramovski, Britanci 1, p. 148. Nasˇa Stara Srbija, 19 April 1927, p. 2. PRO, FO 371, 12856, C 1955, p. 63/2. Footman Memorandum. Skopje, 5 March 1928. Todorovik´, ‘Stopanski problemi’, pp. 38– 9. AJ, f. 74, 51/71, p. 21. Lecture by the Secretary of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Skopje on the South Serbian economy, 10 January 1929. Gavrilovic´, Privreda Juzˇne Srbije, pp. 165–70. Footman, Balkan Holiday, p. 72. Hristov, ‘Selskoto stopanstvo’, pp. 160– 2. Hristov, Seloto, pp. 204– 5, 208. Mirovic´, ‘Jedan pogled’, pp. 88– 9. Burzevski, ‘Ekonomskata polozˇba’, p. 106. Lazarov, ‘Raspravite’, pp. 120– 2. Parliamentary session on 5 March 1934. DARM, 1.1042.10.46/282. Report for the Central Press Office. 1 July 1936. Apostolov, ‘Posledice velike ekonomske krize (1929–1935) za makedonsku agrarnu privredu’, Jugoslovenski istorijski cˇasopis 12/3 –4, 1973, pp. 183 – 5. Katardzˇiev, Vreme na zreenje 1, pp. 67– 9; Lazarov, ‘Raspravite’, pp. 117 –19 (Hadzˇi Ristic´ 1934); Mirovic´, ‘Jedan pogled’, pp. 88– 9. AJ, f. 74, 219/313, p. 249, undated. Cˇucˇkovic´, Opiumsko pitanje, p. 5; Blagojevic´, Selo, p. 55. Blagojevic´, Selo, pp. 55– 6. Vardar, 16 November 1936, p. 4. Interview in Juzˇna Srbija, 24 July 1939, p. 1. Glas Juga, 25 December 1940, p. 3. B.I. Blagojevic´ in: Skopski glasnik, 31 August 1940, p. 1. Erroneously, the newspaper has the date of 31 September on page 1. Daskalov and Sundhaussen, ‘Modernisierungsansa¨tze’, pp. 120 – 1. Sundhaussen, ‘Die verpasste Agrarrevolution’, pp. 56 – 7, 60. Nasˇa Stara Srbija, 2 December 1924, p. 1.

326

NOTES TO PAGES 209 –216

Chapter 5 The Educational System 1. Calic, ‘Bildung als Entwicklungsproblem’, p. 113. 2. Ibid., p. 104. 3. Jovanovik´, Prosvetno-politicˇkite priliki, p. 271. According to information from the Ministry of Education. 4. Ibid., pp. 117, 175, 184. 5. Jovanovik´, Prosvetno-politicˇkite priliki, pp. 100, 103 – 5. 6. Mayer, Elementarbildung, p. 107. 7. Jovanovik´, Prosvetno-politicˇkite priliki, pp. 107–10. 8. R.A. Rajs, ‘Pisma iz Mac´edonije’, Novi zˇivot 7, 1921, pp. 12 –14. 9. DARM, 1.1037.6. Pov. br. 287. Kavadarci, 20 April 1921. 10. Ibid., M-2042, unpaginated. Letter from the Interior Ministry, State Security Dept. to the Education Ministry. Belgrade, 23 November 1921. 11. DARM, 1.1037.6. Pov. br. 928. Kavadarci, 9 November 1921. 12. Dragomir S. Obradovic´, ‘Prosvetni pregled’, in: Juzˇna Srbija 1/6, 1922, pp. 235 – 8. 13. Jovanovik´, Prosvetno-politicˇkite priliki, p. 301. 14. Dimic´, Kulturna politika vol. 2, p. 102. 15. DARM, 1.1038.4.122/3 – 4. Letter of the District Head to the Banovina Administration. Struga, 5 October 1932. This worst village was Lokov. 16. Dimic´, Kulturna politika vol. 1, pp. 83– 6, 111. 17. AJ, f. 37, 54/348, p. 163. Letter to Stojadinovic´, 1 November 1935. 18. Mayer, Elementarbildung, pp. 202– 204. 19. Jovanovik´, Prosvetno-politicˇkite priliki, p. 121. 20. Ibid., p. 117. 21. DARM, 1.1038.8.15/1– 3. Letter from the Ministry of Interior, Dept. of Public Security (Zˇiv. Lazic´) to the Ministry of Education. Belgrade, 19 November 1926. 22. Ibid., 29/1 –4. Report to the Education Minister. Belgrade, 30 June 1927. 23. Ibid., 32/1 –5. 24. DARM, 1.1038.8.15/1 – 3. Letter from the Ministry of Interior, Dept. for Public Security (Zˇiv. Lazic´), to the Education Ministry. Belgrade, 19 November 1926. 25. Kartov, Specificˇnite osobenosti, p. 99. 26. DARM, 1.1038.8.18/3. Tetovo, 24 February 1927. 27. Aleksandar Donkovic´, ‘Prosvetne prilike na jugu’, Nova Evropa 18, 1928, pp. 107 – 9. 28. DARM (PO Bitola), 2.1.19.93/323. The pharmacist requested the payment of 1,186.47 dinars for medicines, which he had issued to the poor of the town in the months of July, September, and November 1939. 29. Mayer, Elementarbildung, pp. 129– 30. 30. DARM, M-2042, unpaginated. Letter from the Inspectorate of the Education Ministry for the region (oblast) of Skopje to the Education Ministry, Dept. of Elementary Schooling. Skopje, 9 June 1920. 31. DARM, 1.1038.8.37/2 – 6. 32. DARM, M-2042, unpaginated. Confidential proposal for the transfer of teachers out of the Vardar Banovina. Skopje, 28 July 1930. 33. DARM, 1.1038.4.8/1 – 3. Information from the Banovina‘s Educational Department, cited in a letter from the Interior Minstry, Department of State Security, to the Education Ministry. Belgrade, 24 January 1931. 34. Ibid., 8.26/5. Report by the School Inspector T. Komarcˇic´ to the Gand Zˇupan of Skopje. Skopje, 2 June 1927.

NOTES TO PAGES 216 –220

327

35. Seton-Watson, R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs 2, p. 270. Kosˇutic´ to Seton-Watson. 2 February 1933. 36. Dragi Kostadinovski, Vardarskiot del od Makedonija pod jurisdikcija na srpskata pravoslavna crkva (1919 – 1941) (Skopje, 1995), p. 86. 37. DARM, 1.1038.8.53/1– 3. File of the Education Ministry. Belgrade, 14 November 1929. 38. Ibid., 4.42/1. The Minister of the Interior Zˇivojin Lazic´ to the Minister of Education Ilija Sˇumenkovic´, 2 February 1934. 39. DARM, 1.1038.8.68/8 – 9. 25 July 1929. 40. Ibid., 65/12. 41. Ibid., 65/38. 42. DARM, 1.1038.4.43/1 – 4. The Banovina Administration to Interior Minister Lazic´. Skopje, 26 November 1932. The Ban turned to Lazic´, so that he, as someone who knew the Banovina, could vouch for a particular teacher with the Education Mimister. Ibid., 53/1. Letter from the Ban to the Education Minister. Skopje, 30 September 1935. 43. DARM, 1.1038.8.25/1. 44. Ibid., 34/1. 45. Ibid., 40/2. Ministry of the Army and the Fleet to Education Minister Kosta Kumanudi. Belgrade, 23 January 1928. 46. DARM, M-2042, unpaginated. Letter from the Education Minister to the Interior Ministry, 15 November 1921. 47. Ibid., 1.1038.8.40/4s. Letter from the Education Minister K. Kumanudi to the Minister of the Army and the Fleet, Stevan Hadzˇic´. Belgrade, 6 February 1928; ibid., 8.41/4, Education Minister to the Minister of the Army and the Fleet. Belgrade, 10 January 1928. Regarding the reluctance of the Education Minister, see ibid., 8.51/4 – 5. Skopje, 2 July 1928. 48. Mayer, Elementarbildung, pp. 109– 10. 49. DARM (PO Bitola), 2.3.3.1/1 –2. ‘Izvesˇtaj obavljene revizije Arhijerejskog namesnika sreza Morihovskog u osnovnim sˇkolama na kraju sˇkolske godine 1938/39. u srezu Morihovskom’. Bitola, 29 March 1939. 50. Jovanovik´, Prosvetno-politicˇkite priliki, pp. 182–3. 51. As cited by Mayer, Elementarbildung, p. 118. 52. Teaching plan from 1933. As cited in ibid., pp. 123 – 4. 53. DARM, 1.1038.4.45/2. The Banovina Education Section to the Education Ministry. Skopje, 10 July 1934. 54. DARM (PO Bitola), 2.16.1.48/135– 135. 55. DARM, 1.1038.8.51/4 – 5. Letter to the Education Ministry. Skopje, 2 July 1928. 56. Ibid., 4/1– 4. Cited in a letter from the Ministry for the Army and the Fleet to the Education Ministry. Belgrade, 6 March 1934. Emphasis as in the original. 57. Dimic´, Kulturna politika vol. 2, pp. 107– 8. 58. DARM, M-2042, unpaginated. Letter of the Education Minister to the Edeucation Department of the Vardar Banovina. Belgrade, 8 September 1932. 59. Dimic´, Kulturna politika vol. 2, pp. 107– 8. Without specific sources for the quotes. 60. DARM, 1.1042.1.1/3 – 6. 61. Ibid., 1.1038.4.4/1– 2. 62. Ibid., M-2042, unpaginated. The Community President of Sv. Nikola to the District Head of Ovcˇe Pole. 28 September 1931. 63. AJ, f. 37, 51/315, p. 142. Novakovic´ to Stojadinovic´. Skopje, 16 December 1937. 64. DARM, 1.1038.4.61/2.

328 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70.

71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81.

82. 83.

84.

85. 86. 87. 88. 89.

90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96.

NOTES TO PAGES 220 –225 Juzˇna Srbija, 24 July 1939, p. 1. Lazarov, ‘Raspravite’, p. 123. 23 February 1937. DARM, M-2042, unpaginated. Pov. IV, br. 349. Letter of 9 September 1939. DARM, 1.1038.4.120/1 – 2. Glas Pologa, 16 March 1940, pp. 1 – 2. DARM, 1.1038.4.22/6. Letter of the Interior Minister Lazic´ to the Education Minister Dragutin Kojic´ on 19 October 1932; ibid., 121/1 – 2. Letter of Lazic´ on 21 October 1931. Both letters bear a comment by the Interior Minister dated 7 November 1932, noting that most of the posts had been filled in the meantime. Weigand, Ethnographie, p. 43. Jovanovik´, Prosvetno-politicˇkite priliki, p. 355, Table 79; p. 360, Table 84. Joksimovic´, Higijenske, pp. 15– 18. DARM (PO Bitola), 2.16.1.43/105– 1091. Report dated 12 March 1928; ibid., 2.16.1.44/110 – 116. Report dated 19 March 1928. Jovanovik´, Prosvetno-politicˇkite priliki, pp. 324–6, Tables 35 – 8. DARM, 1.1042.10.20/58– 62. Report by the Banovina Administration on schools with Albanian and Turkish children before and after 1912. Skopje, 18 March 1930. Muhamet Pirraku, ‘Kulturno-prosvetni pokret Albanaca u Jugoslaviji (1919– 1941)’, Jugoslovenski istorijski ˇcasopis 17, 1978, pp. 360, 364. Michel Roux, Les Albanais en Yougoslavie. Minorite´nationale, territoire et de´veloppement (Paris, 1992), p. 207. Jovanovik´, Prosvetno-politicˇkite priliki, pp. 250–1. Roux, Les Albanais, p. 207. Jovanovik´, Prosvetno-politicˇkite priliki, p. 350, Table 71. In 1938, 38.1 per cent of the elementary school children and 31.3 per cent of the high school students were girls. Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Statisticˇki godisˇnjak 1938/39, pp. 360, 362. Dimic´, ‘Srbija i Jugoslavija’, pp. 22– 3. Holm Sundhaussen, ‘Alphabetisierung und Wirtschaftswachstum in den Balkanla¨ndern in historisch-komparativer Perspektive’, in Allgemeinbildung als Modernisierungsfaktor. Zur Geschichte der Elementarbildung in Su¨dosteuropa von der Aufkla¨rung bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg. Beitra¨ge zur Tagung vom 29. Oktober bis 2. November 1990 in Berlin, eds Norbert Reiter and Holm Sundhaussen (Berlin, 1994), pp. 31– 2. Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Statisticˇki godisˇnjak 1932, pp. 318–19; Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Statisticˇki godisˇnjak 1936, pp. 350–1; Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Statisticˇki godisˇnjak 1938/39, pp. 360–1. Mayer, Elementarbildung, pp. 98– 9. Avramovski, Britanci 1, p. 269. Ibid., p. 329. Annual report for 1925. Almanah banovina, p. 43. DARM, 1.1038.15.49/3 –7. Information collected by the Statistical Department of the Ministry of Education about the number of schools and schoolrooms in the country. Belgrade, 26 August 1935. ‘Elementary Schools with Higher People’s Schools’. Jovanovik´, Prosvetno-politicˇkite priliki, pp. 21– 2. Full high schools existed in Skopje and Bitola, pre-high Schools in Veles, Sˇtip, Ohrid, Resen, Kumanovo, Tetovo, Kriva Palanka, and Kratovo. Katardzˇiev, Vreme na zreenje 1, p. 77. Jovanovik´, Prosvetno-politicˇkite priliki, pp. 211–16. Mayer, Elementarbildung, p. 75. Spomenica, pp. 935– 7. Mayer, Elementarbildung, p. 112.

NOTES TO PAGES 225 –231

329

97. Apostolski et al., Istorija na makedonskiot narod 3, p. 71; Jovanovik´, Prosvetno-politicˇkite priliki, p. 225. 98. Donkovic´, ‘Prosvetne prilike na jugu’, pp. 107– 9. 99. Arhiv INI, Sl. IV. 21. Diskusija s profesorom Vulic´em na sastanku dne 3. XII. 1939 god., pp. 10 – 11. 100. Arhiv MANU, f. 103, arh. ed. 17. Prilep, 22 June 1930. 101. Ibid., arh. ed. 29. Letter from the Chairman to the President of the Cabinet. Belgrade [September 1932]. 102. Ibid., arh. ed. 54. This assessment of the situation and the demands is based on the presentation of member Gligorije Hadzˇi Tasˇkovic´, a retired High School Director. 103. Ibid., arh. ed. 64, pp. 170– 1. Protocol of the Board Meeting on 30 January 1935. 104. Ibid., arh. ed. 65, pp. 27– 9. Protocol of the meeting on 13 February 1935. 105. Ibid., arh. ed. 67, pp. 39– 40. Meeting protocol for 27 March 1935. 106. Clearly, like every other group, the ‘Association of South Serbs’ was infiltrated by informants. In the plenary meeting on 10 January 1936, the President Jovanovic´ reported that in a telphone conversation the Head of the General Police Department had alleged that ‘politics were being conducted in the Association’. Ibid., arh. ed. 80, pp. 93 – 5. 107. Ibid., arh. ed. 70, pp. 56– 9. 108. Glas Pologa, 17 August 1935, p. 4. 109. Arhiv MANU, f. 103, arh. ed. 73, pp. 71– 3. Protocol of the plenary meeting on 29 July 1935. 110. This means that the towns had to bear the costs themselves. 111. Arhiv MANU, f. 103, arh. ed. 74, p. 79. Protocol of the plenary meeting on 27 September 1935. 112. AJ, f. 37, 15/95, p. 28. Milan Stojadinovic´ to Ugrin Joksimovic´. Belgrade, 8 September 1936. 113. Ibid., 15/96, p. 247. Kumanovo, 23 December 1937. 114. AJ, f. 66, 101/298. Pov.br. 11226. Letter from the Ministry of the Interior to the Education Minister Dimitrije Magarasˇevic´. Belgrade, 9 March 1938. 115. Stenografske belesˇke, 1937/38, knj. 2, p. 360. XIV redovni sastanak, 18 February 1938. Todor Zˇivkovic´. 116. AJ, f. 38, 64/169. Umetnicˇke sˇkole i akademije [until 1929– 30]. 117. Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Statisticˇki godisˇnjak 1932, p. 320; Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Statisticˇki godisˇnjak 1938/39, p. 362. 118. Marjan Dimitrijevski, ‘Prosvetnite priliki vo Makedonija neposredno pred aprilskata vojna 1941 godina’, Glasnik 32/1, 1988, p. 119. 119. Ibid. 120. AJ, f. 38, 64/169. ‘Spisak drzˇavnih i privatnih ucˇiteljskih sˇkola sˇkolske 1940/1941 godine’. 121. ‘Dva dokumenta za proucˇuvanjeto na nacionalniot razvitok na makedonskiot narod meg´u dvete svetski vojni’. Publ. by Kliment Dzˇambazovski, Istorija 9/2, 1973, pp. 284 –5. Letter from Lazic´ to the Society of St Sava. 15 August 1923. 122. Donkovic´, ‘Prosvetne prilike na jugu’, pp. 107– 9; Kartov, Specificˇnite osobenosti, p. 95. 123. Adzˇi Mitreski, Sek´avanja, pp. 25– 6, 31– 2. 124. Katardzˇiev, Vreme na zreenje 1, p. 73. 125. AJ, f. 38, 64/169. Statistiscal List of the Educational Institutions in the Vardar Banovina, 1 June 1930. 126. Andonov-Polyanski, Dokumenti za borbata, p. 24. 127. Katardzˇiev, Vreme na zreenje 1, pp. 83– 5. 128. Ibid., p. 46.

330

NOTES TO PAGES 231 – 238

129. Mayer, Elementarbildung, pp. 110– 11. 130. In Kocˇani, Berovo, Kratovo, Kriva Palanka, Sveti Nikole, Strumica, Kavadarci, Resen, Debar, Gostivar and Radovisˇ. 131. Spomenica, pp. 939– 41. 132. DARM, M-2042, unpaginated. 133. Vardar, 30 November 1936, p. 2. 134. Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Statisticˇki godisˇnjak 1938/39, pp. 362 – 3. 135. Glas Pologa, 28 January 1939, p. 4. The Danube Banovina was missing from this list. 136. Calic, ‘Bildung als Entwicklungsproblem’, p. 106. 137. Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870– 1914 (London, 1977), pp. 77– 9, 84. 138. Arhiv INI, k. XXXV/6, Nr. 627. The Staff of the Vardar Divisional District to the Commander of the Third Army District. Bitola, 28 March 1939. 139. AJ, f. 37, 22/174/351. Report by an unknown author, undated. 140. DARM, M-1833, k. 7, Pov. Br. 17839. 141. Ibid., M-1831, k. 1. Report by the Rector of Belgrade University to the Education Minister Bozˇa Maksimovic´ on the occasion of the ten-year anniversary, p. 2. 142. DARM, M-1833, k. 7, 1906. 143. D. Miljovska, ‘Za studentskoto progresivno dvizˇenje na Filozofskiot fakultet vo Skopje’, Istorija 7/2, 1971, p. 97. 144. Classes were given in Classical Philology, Yugoslav Literature, The History of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Byzantinism, Serbian Language and Slavic Philology, German Language and Literature, French Language and Literature, Geography and Anthropo-Geography, General History, Ethnology with Ethnography, as well as practical courses in the French Language. Jovanovik´, Prosvetno-politicˇkite priliki, pp. 265 – 6. 145. Ibid. 146. See the Annual Report of the Dean: DARM, M-1831, k. 3. 147. Jovanovik´, Prosvetno-politicˇkite priliki, pp. 268–9. 148. DARM, 1.1042.10.36/224 – 5. 149. Ibid., 1.1038.15.33/9 –12. List of staff members from December 1939. 150. Ibid., M-1840, k. 21, ‘Izvesˇtaj filozofskog Fakulteta u Skoplju za 1930/1931 sˇkolsku godinu’, pp. 1 – 2; DARM, M-1831, k. 2, 21/1; ibid., k. 3, ‘Izvesˇtaj Filozofskog fakulteta u Skoplju za sˇkolsku 1934/35 god’, pp. 1 –3. The student hostel bore the name ‘King Peter the Liberator’ and cost around 1.54 million dinars. Macedonia had been ‘liberated’ from Ottoman rule under King Peter during the Balkan Wars of 1912– 13. 151. Prvosˇ Slankamenac, Sˇkole u Juzˇnoj Srbiji (n.p., n.d.; special printing from Letopis Matice Srpske 307/III), unpaginated. 152. Jovanovik´, Prosvetno-politicˇkite priliki, p. 269. 153. Andonov-Polyanski, Dokumenti za borbata, 2, pp. 23 – 5. 154. DARM, M-1831, k. 1. Draft report of the Rector of Belgrade University to the Education Minister Bozˇa Maksimovic´, c. 1929, p. 7. 155. Ibid., M-1890, k. 116. Br. 1435, Budget breakdown and justification. 156. Ibid.,1.1038.15.1/1– 4. Letter from the Rector of Belgrade University on 26 August 1931 to the Education Minister Bozˇa Maksimovic´. 157. Mayer, Elementarbildung, p. 76. 158. DARM (PO Skopje), 6.1.8.5. Protocol of the Committee Meeting on 16 January 1933. 159. Ibid., 8.87. Protocol of the Committee Meeting on 29 April 1933. 160. DARM, M-1831, k. 1, Draft resolution. 13 January 1933. 161. Arhiv MANU, f. 103, arh. ed. 32. Belgrade, 14 January 1933.

NOTES TO PAGES 238 –244

331

162. DARM, M-1890, k. 116. Br. 1125. Skopje, 26 June 1933. 163. Ibid., 1038.15.5/1. Letter by the Dean on 14 June 1934. 164. Ibid., M-1831, k. 3, ‘Izvesˇtaj Dekanata Filozofskog fakulteta u Skoplju za sˇkolsku 1935/1936 god’, pp. 4 – 5. 165. Ibid., k. 3, ‘Izvesˇtaj Dekanata Filozofskog fakulteta u Skoplju za sˇkolsku 1936/1937 god’, p. 7. 166. DARM, 1.1038.15.3/1 – 3. Skopje, 8 February 1931. 167. Ibid., M-1831, k. 3, ‘Izvesˇtaj Filozofskog fakulteta u Skoplju za sˇkolsku 1934/35 god’, p. 78. 168. Spomenica, pp. 947– 9, 1058. 169. ‘Od aktivnosta’, pp. 33– 4. 170. Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Statisticˇki godisˇnjak 1938/39, pp. 380 – 1. 171. Vardar, 3 September 1936, p. 1; 4 September 1936, p. 1 (both articles by Milivoj Pavlovic´). 172. Ibid., 8 September 1936, p. 1. 173. DARM, M-1831, k. 3, ‘Izvesˇtaj Dekanata Filozofskog fakulteta u Skoplju za sˇkolsku 1936/1937 god.’, p. 7. 174. Ibid., 1.1042.6.53/312. Report of 6 February 1931. 175. From the Vardar Banovina, to which a part of Kosovo and southern Serbia also belonged, came: . . .

. .

In the Winter Term 32/33: 58 out of 179 students (DARM, M-1853, k. 47, Br. 2391, 4 December 1934); In the Winter Term 34/35: 65 out of 175 (ibid., k. 47); In the Winter Term 37/38: 63 out of 156 (ibid., k. 3, Br. 2001, 30 November 1937; ‘Statisticˇki pregled slusˇacˇa Filozofskog fakulteta u Skoplju u Zimskom semestru sˇkolske 1937/1938 godine’); In the Winter Term 39/40: 83 out of 199 (ibid., k. 48. ‘Spisak slusˇaoca Filozofskog fakulteta u zimskom semestru sˇkolske 1939/40 g’); In the Winter Term 40/41: 127 out of 280 (ibid., k. 48. ‘Spisak studenata Filozofskog fakulteta u zimskom semestru sˇkolske 1940/41 godine’).

176. Joksimovic´, Higijenske, pp. 12– 14. 177. DARM, M-2042, unsorted. Pov. IV, br. 148, 15 April 1936. 178. If all the names are counted, however, the Department comes to a total of 479 people. ‘Od aktivnosta’, pp. 37– 48. 179. Ibid., pp. 33 – 4. 180. Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Statisticˇki godisˇnjak 1938/39, pp. 380 – 2. 181. AJ, f. 14, 177/650, p. 128 verso. Report from the first half of the 1920s, undated [the first page is missing; the report was written almost certainly by the ‘Commissar for South Serbia’, Zˇivojin Budimirovic´]. 182. DARM, 1.1038.8.21/1. Vl. Nesˇkovic´ to the Education Minister. Prilep, 18 December 1926. 183. Jovanovik´, Prosvetno-politicˇkite priliki, pp. 177–9. 184. DARM, 1.1038.8.16. Confidential letter from the Interior Minister (also the Chairman of the Cabinet) to the Education Minister on 29 June 1927. 185. The term ‘South Serbia’ covered all the territories, which Serbia had conquered from the Ottomans in 1912– 13, including not only Macedonia and the Kosovo, but also the Sanjak. 186. DARM, 1.1042.1.11/37 – 42. Skopje, 7 December 1930. 187. Ibid., 1.1040.23.42/451 – 2. 188. Ibid., 1.1042.1.11/37 –42.

332 189. 190. 191. 192. 193.

194. 195.

196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205.

206.

207.

NOTES TO PAGES 245 –251 Katardzˇiev, Makedonija, p. 47. AJ, f. 37, 22/174, p. 318. D. Sˇalev to Ben Riley. Geneva, 27 August 1932. Ibid., 51/315, p. 161. The Ban Novakovic´ to Milan Stojadinovic´. Skopje, 15 May 1938. DARM, 1.1042.10.50/351– 2. Report for the Central Press Office. Skopje, 23 May 1938. AJ, f. 138, 7/51a, p. 666. An anonymous letter from a retried Colonel and former parliamentarian to the Chairman of the Cabinet, D. Cvetkovic´. Belgrade, 8 June 1940. Simo Mladenovski, ‘Napredni studentski pokret na Filozofskom fakultetu u Skoplju 1936– 1941’, Jugoslovenski istorijski ˇcasopis 17, 1978, p. 436. DARM, 1.1042.2.109/261 – 2. Telephone report for the Central Press Office. 19 March 1940. It remains unclear whether this blocked organisation was the student association Vardar, or whether subsequently another attempt was made to form a group of the same name. Aleksik´, ‘Nasˇa recˇ’, pp. 245–6. DARM, 1.1042.2.109/261 – 2. AJ, f. 138, 7/51a, pp. 666– 7. An anonymous letter from a retired colonel and former parliamentarian to the Chairman of the Cabinet, D. Cvetkovic´. Belgrade, 8 June 1940. Aleksik´, ‘Nasˇa recˇ’, p. 247. AJ, f. 138, 7/51a, pp. 666– 7. An anonymous letter from a retired colonel and former parliamentarian to the Chairman of the Cabinet, D. Cvetkovic´. Belgrade, 8 June 1940. AJ, f. 38, 64/170. ‘Spisak cˇinovnika i sluzˇbenika Ministarstva poljoprivrede’. 20 May 1933. Ibid., Vardarska banska uprava [20 May 1933]. Sek´avanja od Aleksandar Cvetkovik´, p. 107. Ibid., pp. 110– 12. Wolfgang Ho¨pken, ‘Strukturkrise oder verpasste Chance? Zum Demokratiepotential der su¨dosteuropa¨ischen Zwischenkriegsstaaten Bulgarien, Jugoslawien und Ruma¨nien’, in Ostmitteleuropa zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen (1918–1939). Sta¨rke und Schwa¨che der neuen Staaten, nationale Minderheiten, ed. Hans Lemberg (Marburg, 1997), p. 99. Arhiv INI, k. XXXV/6, Nr. 670, pp. 1 – 6. Report by two workers, members of the trade union Jugoras, to the Commandant of the Third Army District. Skopje, 8 November 1939. Sek´avanja od Aleksandar Cvetkovik´, pp. 42–3.

Chapter 6

Transport and Communications

1. The transport historian Fritz Voigt, as cited by Daskalov/Sundhaussen, ‘Modernisierungsansa¨tze’, p. 115 (without giving a specific source). 2. Dimic´, ‘Srbija i Jugoslavija’, p. 15. 3. Avramovski, Britanci 1, p. 211. 4. Krakov, Kroz Juzˇnu Srbiju, pp. 73– 5. 5. AVP RF, f. 4, op. 48, p. 296, d. 54325, Nr. 1. 6. Avramovski, Britanci 1, p. 492. 7. PRO, FO 371, 14316, C 4116, pp. 128, 132, 136 – 7. Report by C.L. Blakeney. Belgrade, 16 May 1930. 8. AJ, f. 38, 64/169. K. Pov. Nr. 175. Information compiled by Banovina Administration. Skopje, 1 July 1930. 9. Spomenica, p. 758. 10. Politika, 21 October 1937 (B. Antic´).

NOTES TO PAGES 251 – 257 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

333

Lazarov, ‘Raspravite’, pp. 122– 4. Ibid. DARM, 1.1042.10.48/306, 309. La Yougoslavie e´conomique, p. 136. Stenografske belesˇke, 1937/38, knj. 2, pp. 358– 9. XIV redovni sastanak, 18 February 1938. Todor Zˇivkovic´. Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, pp. 206, 218. DARM, 1.119.16.3/34.[1940]. Smiljana Ðurovic´, ‘Problemi ekonomske integracije Jugoslavije 1918– 1941 godine’, Istorija 20. veka 11/1 – 2, 1993, pp. 184– 6. Apostolski et al., Istorija na zˇeleznicite, p. 151; Zografski, ‘Entstehung und Entwicklung’, p. 546. Gavrilovic´, Privreda Juzˇne Srbije, p. 153. Footman, Balkan Holiday, p. 78. Juzˇna Srbija, 2 October 1939, p. 2. Bitoljski radikal, 27 July 1922. Todorovik´, ‘Stopanski problemi’, p. 25. Apostolski et al., Istorija na zˇeleznicite, p. 149. Politika, 18 March 1926. Avramovski, Britanci 1, p. 128. Annual report for 1922. Lampe, ‘Belated Modernization’, p. 35. Apostolski et al., Istorija na zˇeleznicite, pp. 181, 183. AJ, f. 37, 60/375/318. Telegram from the Deputy Mayor to Milan Stojadinovic´. Prilep, 17 January 1936. AJ, f. 74, 219/313, p. 220. Report by the Emissary of the King, the General of the Third Army District, Vojislav Nikolajevic´, on this occasion. Skopje, 21 January 1936. Ibid., p. 224. Apostolski et al., Istorija na zˇeleznicite, p. 189. Footman, Balkan Holiday, pp. 44– 5. AVP RF, f. 4, op. 48, p. 296, d. 54325, Nr. 1. Vardar, 16 November 1936, p. 4. DARM, 1.1042.2.45/112 –13. Telephone report for the Central Press Office, 10 October 1937. Ðurovic´, Drzˇavna intervencija, pp. 206– 8; Markert (ed.), Osteuropa-Handbuch, Jugoslawien, p. 319. DARM, 1.1042.2.78/171 – 5. Telephone report for the Central Press Office. 4 July 1938. Stenografske belesˇke Senata, 1937/38, knj. 1, pp. 255 – 6. XIV redovni sastanak. 25 March 1938. Bitoljske novine, 19 June 1938, p. 1. Signed: V.N.P., possibly Vojislav N. Protic´, lawyer. Mirovic´, ‘Jedan pogled’, pp. 136– 7. Apostolski et al., Istorija na zˇeleznicite, p. 183. Ðurovic´, Drzˇavna intervencija, p. 206. The book by Ðurovic´, Drzˇavna intervencija, for example, contains nothing concrete about this. Luan Starova, Zeit der Ziegen (Zurich, 1999), p. 6. DARM, 1.1042.2.126/331 – 4. Telephone report for the Central Press Office. 1 December 1940. Ibid., 128/337 – 41. Telephone report for the Central Press Office. 27 January 1941. Spomenica, p. 760. Apostolski et al., Istorija na zˇeleznicite, p. 149.

334

NOTES TO PAGES 257 –262

51. Glas Pologa, 16 December 1939, p. 1. 52. For example, Razvitak (Development), Bitoljski radikal (Bitola Radical), Bitoljski vesnik (Bitola Herald), Juzˇna zvezda (South Star). 53. DARM, 1.1042.10.35/219 – 22 [1933]. 54. The poor state of research on the press is reflected, for example, in the fact that B. Mokrov and T. Gruevski in their overview of the Macedonian press from 1885 to 1992 maintain that only the first issue of this journal ever appeared. Boro Mokrov and Tome Gruevski, Pregled na makedonskiot pecˇat (1885– 1992) (Skopje, 1993), p. 60. 55. H. Polenakovic´ in: Glas Juga, 27 December 1940, p. 2. 56. A J, f. 37, 51/315, p. 252. The Head of the Cabinet to Novakovic´. Belgrade, 5 January 1939. 57. Almanah Kraljevine Jugoslavije, p. 618. 58. DARM, 1.1042.10.38/231 –2. Letter from the correspondent Jovanovic´ to the Head of the Central Press Office. 5 December 1930. 59. Ibid., 35/219 – 22. 60. AJ, f. 38, 9/36. Jovanovic´ to the Head of the Administrative Department of the Central Press Office. Skopje, 6 June 1930. 61. Spomenica, pp. 902– 3. 62. DARM, 1.1042.10.35/219 – 22. 63. AJ, f. 38, 9/36, Pov.br.193. Jovanovic´ to the Information Department of the Central Press Office. Skopje, 1 July 1933. 64. DARM, 1.1042.10.41/255 – 6. Report by the correspondent for the Central Press Office. 21 August 1935. 65. Ibid., 41/250. Jovanovic´ to the Ban, 17 November 1935. 66. Ibid., 44/275; ibid., 47/295. 11 July 1936. 67. Ibid., 44/297. Report of 3 November 1936. 68. Ibid., 44/298. Report of 12 November 1936. 69. Ibid., 44/299. Report of 10 December 1936. 70. Drava: 209, Danube: 138, Littoral: 36, Drina: 33, Zeta: 19, Morava: 14, Belgrade: 398. La Yougoslavie d’aujourd’hui. Publie´ par la section de la presse au ministe`re des affaires e´trange`res (Belgrade, 1935), p. 321. 71. Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Statisticˇki godisˇnjak 1938/39, pp. 392 – 3. 72. Juzˇna Srbija, 6 August 1938, p. 2. 73. DARM, 1.1042.1.151/358. Report for the Central Press Office. 25 March 1940. 74. AJ, f. 37, 22/174/340– 2. Protocol of the conference. 75. DARM, 1.1042.1.151/358. Report for the Central Press Office. 25 March 1940. 76. Arhiv INI, k. XXXV/6, Nr. 647, pp. 1 –2. Monthly report by the Staff of the Third Army District for October 1940. Skopje, 3 November 1940. 77. Sek´avanja od Aleksandar Cvetkovik´, p. 115. 78. Dejan Aleksik´, ‘Za karakterot i ulogata na ‘Nasˇa recˇ (1939–1941)’, Istorija 15/1, 1979, pp. 56 – 8, 74. 79. Aleksik´, Nasˇa recˇ, p. 44. 80. Ibid., pp. 321, 324– 6. 81. Ac´imovic´ in a conversation with Katardzˇiev. Katardzˇiev, ‘Za vesnikot “Juzˇna Stvarnost”’, pp. 114 – 15. 82. Juzˇna stvarnost, Nr. 1/1, December 1939, p. 4. 83. Katardzˇiev, ‘Za vesnikot “Juzˇna Stvarnost”’, pp. 123 – 4n23. 84. Arhiv INI, k. XXXV/6, Nr. 681. The Vardar Gendarmerie Regiment to the Commandant of the Third Army District. Skopje, 12 December 1939. 85. Katardzˇiev, ‘Za vesnikot “Juzˇna Stvarnost”’, p. 125. 86. Glas Pologa, 28. 1. 1939, p. 4.

NOTES TO PAGES 263 –266

335

87. DARM, 1.1042.2.128/344– 5. Telephone report for the Central Press Office, 27 January 1941. The Croatian Departmental Minister Torbar at the opening ceremony for the Radio Station in Skopje, 27 January 1941. 88. Arhiv INI, k. XXXV/6, Nr. 634. The Staff of the Third Army District to the Commandant of the Vardar Gendarmerie Regiment. Skopje, 15 July 1939; ibid., Nr. 673, p. 3. Monthly report by the Staff of the Third Army District for November 1939. Skopje, 4. 12. 1939. 89. Ibid., Nr. 657, pp. 1 – 2. Monthly report by the Staff of the Vardar Divisional District for August 1939. Bitola, 30 August 1939; ibid., Nr. 647, 660. 90. Juzˇni pregled, 1930, p. 64; Juzˇna Srbija, 24 July 1939, p. 1. 91. DARM, 1.1042.2.128/337 – 41, 344–5. Telephone report for the Central Press Office. 27 January 1941. 92. Pirraku, ‘Kulturno-prosvetni pokret’, pp. 368, 370. 93. Arhiv INI, Sl. IV. 21. Diskusija s profesorom Vulic´em na sastanku dne 3.XII.1939 god, pp. 12 – 13. 94. DARM, 1.1038.8.21/1. Vl. Nesˇkovic´, high school teacher in Prilep, to the Interior Ministry. Prilep, 18 December 1926. 95. Ibid., 1.1037.10, Pov. br. 144. The Prefect of Zˇegligovo to the Banovina Administration, Education Department. Kumanovo, 18 September 1940. 96. Lucˇ I, 1937, pp. 113– 22. In the ninth century, the two brothers from Thessaloniki translated church books from Greek into the Slavic language of their region and thereby created the first written Slavic language. 97. ‘Unsere mazedonische Missionarin berichtet!’ In: Missionsbote, 1938, p. 35. 98. Torsten Szobries, Sprachliche Aspekte des nation-building in Mazedonien. Die kommunistische Presse in Vardar-Mazedonien (1940 – 1943) (Stuttgart, 1999), p. 31. 99. Vlado Kartov, Borbata na makedonskiot narod za nacionalno samoopredeluvanje (1912 – 1941) (Skopje, 1987), pp. 283– 6. 100. Izvori za istorijata na SKM, I/2, pp. 323, 325, 327, 343, 363, 367, 370, 379. 101. Among other things could be read: ‘About Belgrade itself I don’t want to write you much. You know it. It is the same as before. Its appearance has changed a little, but it really does not interest me at all. I think that it also hasn’t won a place in your heart’. In the report the letter is quoted in Serbian. AJ, f. 66, 99/289, Pov.br. 62679. The Interior Ministry to the Education Ministry. Belgrade, 22 November 1939. 102. ‘Gosp. Janko//Primi pozdrav od mene Dimcˇe zeto na pok. Vele ribaro do vasˇ [sic!] G. Janko//G. Janko sˇo stana so parnicata dali je ukoncˇa i dali ima da ne izraduvasˇ molim odgovorete’. DARM (PO Bitola), 2.492.7.75/342. 103. ‘Gosp. Janko//Zdravi smo sˇto od boga i Vama zˇelim dobro zdravlje vasˇu kartu dobio sam i potpuno razbraf rezultato sˇto mi pisˇete za parnicata nije ovde dobifme poziv za vo sreski sud ovde ne poziva na saslusˇanje na 10 ovoj mesec na 8 sato dojdite te cˇekame bez drugo spozdrav//Dimko Kostic´ handzˇija Kralj Marka 82 Bitolj’. DARM (PO Bitola), 2.492.7.75/344. 104. Stjepan Roca, Juzˇna Srbija (Split, 1928), p. 11. 105. Examples: Juzˇna zvezda, 5 July 1922, 12 July 1922; Jugoslavija, 20 March 1927, p. 3; Juzˇni pregled, Nr. I/5– 6, 1927, pp. 225– 8; Roca, Juzˇna Srbija, pp. 3, 65, 66, 95– 7; Vardar, 6 August 1933, p. 6; 9 September 1933, p. 5. 106. Jelic´, Letopis Juga, pp. 24– 5. 107. Politika, 10 November 1926; Jelic´, Letopis Juga, p. 154. 108. Student, 15 March 1938. ‘Kako zˇive studentkinje u Skoplju’. 109. Novi sjaj, e.g., Mart-April 1937, p. 3, Avgust-Septembar 37, pp. 3 – 4.

336

NOTES TO PAGES 266 –275

110. DARM, 1.1042.10.23/102– 5. Accounting statement of Director Vojinovic´ on 6 July 1930; DARM (PO Skopje), 6.1.15.26. 111. DARM 1.1038.8.10/9. The Gand Zˇupan of the Bregalnica District, Brzakovic´, to the Prefect ( poglavar) of Kocˇani County. Sˇtip, 26 October 1924. 112. Miodrag Drugovac, ‘Vasil Iljoski: “Begalka”’, in Sto godini makedonska drama. Izbor, predgovor i belesˇki: Rade Siljan (Skopje, 1992), p. 282. 113. DARM, 1.1038.15.22/5 – 6. Belgrade, 8 September 1938. 114. Drugovac, ‘Vasil Iljoski’, p. 279. 115. Arhiv MANU, f. 103, arh. ed. 52. Panov to the Union of South Serbs. Belgrade, 7 July 1934. 116. DARM, 1.340.2, 1.936, Br. 2631, 20 December 1936. 117. Ibid., 1.1038.15.22/5 –6. Belgrade, 8 September 1938. 118. Ibid., 22/8 –11 July 1938. 119. Ibid., 22/4. 120. Almanah banovina, p. 39. 121. ‘We have paid very dearly for this our historic province and it is our duty, to take all necessary measures without restraint to achieve the quickest possible assimilation, and to order things in such a manner as is desirable. It is worse than a terrible development that Bulgarian is being spoken inside an office of the State’. DARM, 1.1038.8.17/1 – 2. The Gand Zˇupan of the Bitola District, cited in a letter from the Interior Ministry, Dept. for Public Security to the Education Ministry. Belgrade, 3 February 1927. 122. Schulze, Staat und Nation, pp. 173– 4. 123. Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, p. 89.

Conclusion 1. Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, pp. 3 – 19, 39, 494. 2. Krstic´, Kolonizacija, p. 84; Jovan Erdeljanovic´, ‘Etnicˇki polozˇaj Srba Stare Srbije i Makedonije med¯u Juzˇnim Slovenima’, Nova Evropa X, 1924, pp. 332 – 3. 3. A Vasilije Prvulovic´, teacher, in: Vardar, 11 November 1933, pp. 3 – 4. 4. Erdeljanovic´, ‘Etnicˇki polozˇaj’, pp. 332– 3; Aleksander Donkovic´, ‘Glavnije crte u mentalitetu nasˇega Juga’, Nova Evropa 18/4 þ 5, 1928, pp. 129 – 35, here pp. 131 – 4. 5. M.S. Jovanovic´, ‘O Makedoniji’, Novi zˇivot 14, 1923, pp. 106 – 8; Donkovic´, Glavnije crte, pp. 131 – 4. 6. Politika, 4 August 1930. 7. Almanah banovina, p. 23; Nasˇa Stara Srbija, 19 August 1927, p. 2. 8. Lj.S. Mitrovic´, ‘Makedonijo, mila kolevko nasˇa. Listak iz slavne nam istorije’, Crkva i zˇivot 1, 1922, p. 278n1. 9. Spomenica, p. 1057. 10. Nasˇa Stara Srbija, 19. 8. 1927, p. 2; Vardar, 6 July 1933, pp. 1 – 2. 11. Spomenica Nikole Pasˇic´a 1845– 1925 (Belgrade, 1926), p. 121. Cited as in Apostolov, Kolonizacijata, p. 32. 12. ‘Dva dokumenta’, p. 284. Letter from Lazic´ to the St Sava Society, 15 August 1923. 13. Milivoje Pavlovic´ in Spomenica, pp. 1053– 5. 14. Tatic´, Strumica, p. 348. 15. Ho¨pken, ‘Strukturkrise’, pp. 111– 12. 16. Brailsford, Macedonia, p. 9. 17. Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, p. 309. 18. Ibid., pp. 313– 14. 19. Anderson, Die Erfindung der Nation, pp. 45– 6.

NOTES TO PAGES 277 –286

337

20. Klaus Roth, ‘Bu¨rgertum und bu¨rgerliche Kultur in Su¨dosteuropa. Ein Beitrag zur Modernisierungsdiskussion’, in Soll und Haben. Alltag und Lebensformen bu¨rgerlicher Kultur, ed. Ueli Gyr (Zurich, 1995), p. 252. 21. Spomenica, pp. 799, 805. 22. In the Drina Banovina it was 15.2 per cent and in the Drava Banovina 37.3. Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Statisticˇki godisˇnjak 1936, p. 417. 23. Politika, 17 March 1939, p. 10. 24. Nasˇa recˇ, 1 February 1940, pp. 3 – 4. Results of an investigation, which the General Secretary of the Yugoslav Association for the Protection of Children, Slobodan Zˇ. Vidakovic´, carried out in 1937 and 1938 in 1,840 villages throughout the country ( ¼ 40 per cent of all villages). 25. Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, pp. 486– 9, 491– 4. 26. Tomasevich, Peasants, pp. 246– 7; Seton-Watson, R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs 2, p. 135; Arnold Suppan, ‘Sozialstruktur und Gesellschaft im Donauraum zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen: Ein Vergleich zwischen der Tschechoslowakei, Ungarn, O¨sterreich und Jugoslawien’, East Europe Quarterly 24, 1990, pp. 266 – 7. 27. Ho¨pken, ‘Strukturkrise’, pp. 101– 2. 28. AJ, f. 37, 9/51/735. The anonymous report details attacks and murders by Macˇek’s uniformed citizens’ militia in September and October 1939 in Zagreb; see also Aleksandar Jakir, Dalmatien zwischen den Weltkriegen. Agrarische und urbane Lebenswelt und das Scheitern der jugoslawischen Integration (Munich, 1999), pp. 438 – 9. 29. Dimic´, ‘Srbija i Jugoslavija’, p. 16. 30. On this, see Sundhaussen, ‘Nation und Nationalstaat auf dem Balkan’, pp. 80 – 1. 31. See Sundhaussen, Nationsbildung, pp. 247– 8. 32. Charles Jelavich, ‘Education, textbooks and South Slav nationalisms in the interwar era’, in Allgemeinbildung als Modernisierungsfaktor. Zur Geschichte der Elementarbildung in Su¨dosteuropa von der Aufkla¨rung bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg. Beitra¨ge zur Tagung vom 29. Oktober bis 2. November 1990 in Berlin, eds Norbert Reiter and Holm Sundhaussen (Berlin, 1994), pp. 136, 139. 33. DARM, 1.1037.6. Belgrade, 5 April 1921. 34. ‘Les te´moignages diplomatiques franc ais’, pp. 181– 4. 35. PRO, FO 371, 14317, C 5316, pp. 77–8. Report of the Central Department. 1 July 1930. 36. Arhiv INI, Sl. IV. 21. Diskusija s profesorom Vulic´em na sastanku dne 3. XII. 1939 god., p. 3. 37. Izvori na istorijata na SKM, I/2, pp. 176– 7. Situation report by an unnamed member of the Independent Workers’ Party [1926]. 38. DARM, 1.1042.1.36/132. The correspondent of the Central Press Office [December 1933]. The two Macedonian priests of a church in Skopje, who served there between 1928 and 1941, put on the marriage announcement forms for local couples in the box for ‘nationality’ either nothing, or they wrote ‘Eastern Orthodox Yugoslavs’ (istocˇnopravoslavni jugosloveni); for all those who came from within the prewar borders of Serbia, however, they wrote ‘Serbian’. Kostadinovski, Vardarskiot del, p. 112. 39. Arsic´ is clearly thinking here of a unification between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, in order to create an ‘integrated country of the South Slavs’. Borisav Arsic´, ‘Ansˇlus i Jugosloveni’, in Lucˇ II, pp. 113– 15, here p. 115. 40. DARM, 1.1037.10, Pov. br. 15, 17.7.1936; ibid., Pov. br. 495, 3 December 1936; Katardzˇiev, Makedonija, pp. 55– 6. 41. Arhiv INI, Sl. IV. 21. Diskusija s profesorom Vulic´em na sastanku dne 3. XII. 1939 god., pp. 12 – 13. 42. See regarding this, Hroch, ‘Nationales Bewusstsein,’ pp. 51 – 2.

338 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70.

71.

NOTES TO PAGES 287 –292 Adzˇi Mitreski, Sek´avanja, p. 75. AJ, f. 74, 50/70, pp. 355– 8. Skopje, 8 April 1939. Dilev-Dilevic´. Jakir, Dalmatien, p. 391. AJ, f. 37, 22/174, p. 316. D. Sˇalev in a letter to the British Labour MP Ben Riley. Geneva, 27 August 1932. Bilten 1940– 1. Published in: Izvori za istorijata na SKM, II/2, p. 108. La Mace´doine, 1 January 1934, p. 2. DARM, 1.1042.1.152/359. 25 March 1940. AJ, f. 37, 60/375/168. Letter from Teodosije Robe to M. Stojadinovic´. Bitola, 18 December 1937. Juzˇna Srbija, 24 July 1939, p. 1. La Mace´doine, 1 January 1934, p. 2. Social report by Mirovic´, ‘Jedan pogled’, p. 139. PRO, FO 371, 14318, C 7382, p. 124v. September/October 1930. Susel, The Slovenes, pp. 319– 21. Avramovski, Britanci 1, p. 542. Stiplovsˇek, ‘Die verfassungsrechtliche Lage’, pp. 25 – 30, 38 – 41. Susel, The Slovenes, pp. 319– 21. Ivo Belin in: Nova Evropa 28, 1935, pp. 331– 6. Rudolf Bic´anic´, Ekonomska podloga hrvatskog pitanja (Zagreb, 1938). Dragnich, The First Yugoslavia, pp. 135– 45. Jakir, Dalmatien, p. 427. Dragnich, The First Yugoslavia, p. 140. Seton-Watson, R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs 2, p. 270. A. Kosˇutic´ to SetonWatson. [Vienna], 2 February 1933. Avramovski, Britanci 1, pp. 325– 6. Annual report for 1925; see also, for example, Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Statisticˇki godisˇnjak 1938/39, pp. 362 – 3, 401 – 4. Avramovski, Britanci 1, p. 324. Hrelja, ‘Bitna obiljezˇja’, p. 134. Rothschild, East Central Europe, p. 279. The Macedonian Post Ministers Jovanovic´ and Altiparmakovic´ are probably counted as Serbs here. Snezˇana Trifunovska (ed.), Yugoslavia through documents. From its creation to its dissolution (Dordrecht, 1994), p. 201. To name one example: the book of Krste Misirkov, Za makedonckite raboti, was almost completely bought up and destroyed in Sofia in 1903, and he was physically attacked, so that he was forced to flee back to St Petersburg. Blazˇe Ristovski, Krste P. Misirkov. Prilog: Odbrani tekstovi (Skopje, 1983), p. 15. Wieland, ‘Ethnic Conflict’, pp. 224– 5.

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INDEX

Ac´imovic´, Jordan, 81, 100, 158 Ac´imovic´, Viktor, 111, 262 agriculture animal breeding, 181 barriers to modernisation, 172 colonisation policy, see colonisation policy cotton growing, 179 crisis in, 173 critiques of policy, 179 fertile land, 164 as government priority, 130 Great Depression, 174, 176 land reform, 162 loan system, 180 opium industry, 177, 200 reform, 162 silkworm cultivation, 177 slaughterhouse in Skopje, project for, 182 Stojadinovic government policy, 130, 186, 198 tobacco policy, 187 Yugoslavia as agricultural country, 129 Albania Albanian minority in Yugoslavia, 2, 10, 23, 100, 119, 168, 222, 264 establishment of, 132 illiteracy, 209 IMRO activities, 47, 53, 66, 275 Italy and, 59, 132 Macedonian students in, 226, 242 relations with, 13, 77 trade with, 132, 133, 139, 253, 255 Aleksandrov, Todor, 25, 47 Alexander I, King assassination 1934, 77

constitution of 1931, 74 dictatorship 1929– 34, 68, 69 interest in Macedonia, 71, 254 Macedonia visit 1924, 44 statue of, 94 Yugoslavianism policy, 74 Allied (Entente) Powers, establishment of Yugoslavia, 11 Altiparmakovic´, Jovan, 94, 124, 149, 220, 288 Anastasijevic´, Gligor, 39, 40 –3 Andonov-Cˇento, Metodija, 15, 127 animal breeding, see agriculture Arsic´, Borisav, 91, 285 Arsic´, Strahinja, 97 Austria Anschluss with Germany, 113, 285 trade with, 133 Austria-Hungary, see Hapsburg Empire Balkan Federation, 12, 16, 24, 25, 57, 288 Balkan War 1912, 5 Bombolovic´, Jovan Kosta, 192 Bosnia-Herzegovina ethnic violence 1918– 19, 23 parliamentary representation, 43 political reform demands, 76 Brailsford, Henry N., 106 Britain, see United Kingdom Brown, Edward, 3, 105 budget, see economy Bulgaria and Balkan Pact 1934, 77 chronological scope of current study, 20 historical research on Macedonia, 16

352

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

IMRO and, 77 influence in Macedonia, 35, 36 Macedonia annexation 1941, 128 Macedonia claims, 5, 19, 175 Macedonia occupation 1915, 52 Macedonian migrants in, 24 Macedonians’ support for, 118, 119 prevention of Macedonia uprising 1924, 47 radio propaganda to Macedonia, 96 Serbian – Bulgarian Treaty 1912, 52 Tripartite Pact, 128 United Kingdom and, 65 Yugoslavia invasion, 128 Chamberlain, Austin, 71 chemical industry cartel, 202 Christoph, Gerhard, 8 Ciano, Count Galeazzo, 114 civil service, see government policy in Macedonia colonisation policy agriculture investment and modernisation, lack of, 171 critique of, 163, 166 economic aims, 170 impact on Bulgaria border area, 165 implementation of, 165 land made available for, 164, 170 local responses to, 168, 171 nationalisation aims of, 163, 170 success of, 168 communications, see language; media; transport Communists Bulgarian historical perspective, 16 and Croatian (Republican) Peasants’ Party, 49 electoral success, 32 historical perspective on Macedonia, 14 in Macedonia, see politics in Macedonia suppression of, 33 and United Opposition, 78, 105 young intelligentsia, 85, 86, 111 constitution, see politics in Yugoslavia Corfe, A.C., 7 crafts, see economy Croatia autonomy, 84, 113, 115, 155, 279, 287 Croat question, 83 establishment of Yugoslavia, 11

government compromise with, 112 Italian annexation of Dalmatia, 12 Italian support for, 114 opposition to government, 67 political reform demands, 75 Croatian (Republican) Peasants’ Party 1935 election protests, 78 banning of, 49 boycott of Parliament, 287 constitutional revision demands, 75 Croatian autonomy, 113, 115, 155, 279, 287 Croatian support for, 79, 289 electoral success, 33 establishment of Yugoslavia, 12 idealised view of peasantry, 175 inclusion in government, 49 leadership, see Radic´, Stjepan and Macedonian autonomists, 103 Macedonian support for, 107 and Opium Convention 1925, 203 opposition to Yugoslavianism, 75 ‘Republican’ removed from name, 49 withdrawal from government, 51 culture education, see education language, 264 media, 257 theatre, 266 Cvetkovic´, Aleksandar, 22, 88, 90, 110, 114, 117, 124, 151, 185, 247, 256, 261 Dalmatia, Italian annexation of, 12 Democrats constitutional policy, 30 Democratic Club, 27, 39, 41 Democratic Peasants Dissident Club, 30 electoral success, 30, 32, 54 in Macedonia, see politics in Macedonia support for, 48 development of infrastructure, see infrastructure development Dilev-Dilevic´, Spira, 106 Dobrowolski, M.E., 26 – 7 Dodd, Charles, 66 draining of malarial marshes, 155 economy agriculture, see agriculture barriers to development, 132

INDEX budget allocation, 143 crafts, 140 economic policy assessed, 275 establishment of Yugoslavia, 129 finance, 142 Great Depression, 135, 174, 176 industry, see industry infrastructure development, see infrastructure development loans agricultural loans system, 180 public works and regional development, 131, 149 Macedonia policy assessment, 97 Macedonian views on, 134 regional development loans, 149 Skopje, development of, 160 Stojadinovic´ government, 276 success, 131 tax revenue, 142 transport, see transport urbanisation, 277 Vardar Macedonia, 131 World War I damage, 132 Yugoslav economy, 129 education elementary education, 209 illiteracy rates, 233 nationalisation task of, 212, 232 people’s desire for, 219 schools building of, 155 numbers of, 224 secondary education citizens’ schools, 231 high school closures, 48, 223 high school numbers, 227 university education Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje, 236 Macedonian students in rest of Yugoslavia and abroad, 240 student numbers, 241 emigrants, see migrants Entente (Allied) Powers, establishment of Yugoslavia, 11 Erskine, William F., 63, 64 farming, see agriculture finance, see economy

353

Footman, David, 10, 43, 55, 56, 59, 64, 81, 133, 155, 190, 204, 254 France chemical industry cartel, 202 and establishment of Yugoslavia, 12 and Macedonian autonomy, 12, 25, 119 trade with, 204 views on Yugoslavia, 52, 106 Gallop, R.A., 7 Germany Anschluss with Austria, 113, 285 chemical industry cartel, 202 German minority in Yugoslavia, 264, 290 IMRO and, 45 and Macedonian autonomy, 118 relations with, 79, 120, 127 trade with, 98, 131, 133, 136, 174, 187, 195, 204 Tripartite Pact, 128 views on Yugoslavia, 6, 32, 141, 221 Yugoslavia invasion, 128, 153 Gocev, Dimita˘r, 16 government policy in Macedonia 25th Anniversary of liberation from Turkish rule, 94 assessment of, 97 central government appointments, 93, 115 civil service appointments, 31, 92 civil service improvements, 61, 72 colonisation policy, 163 education, see education political restrictions, 54 prevention of 1924 uprising, 46 repressive measures, 31, 33, 51, 86, 122 security measures, 59, 72 Serbianisation policy assessed, 281 Stojadinovic´ government, see Stojadinovic´, Milan unification with Serbia, 35, 272 Great Britain, see United Kingdom Great Depression, see economy Greece historical research on Macedonia, 16 local support for IMRO, 26 Macedonia claims, 5 malarial marshes, draining of, 158 trade with, 133

354

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

Hadzˇi Ristic´, Spiro, 81, 93, 141, 147, 180, 187, 194, 199, 204, 288 Hapsburg Empire Macedonia administration, 2 World War I, 11 Harvey, Oliver C., 7 health policy assessment of, 278 Hygiene Institute in Skopje, 156 malarial marshes, draining of, 155, 158 Henderson, Nevile, 10, 69, 70 Hitler, Adolf, 101, 120, 128 Hristov, Aleksandar T., 15 Hristov, Risto, 16 Hungary Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia, 264 Tripartite Pact, 128 Yugoslavia invasion, 128 illiteracy, see education immigrants, see migrants IMRO aims of, 24, 45 attacks by, 13, 23, 275 break up of, 77, 81 Bulgarian support for, 77, 81 Communists and, 33 French report on, 53 German support for, 45 internal conflicts, 66 Italian support for, 53 leadership, see Aleksandrov, Todor; Protogerov, Aleksandar Macedonia uprising 1924, 45 and ‘Macedonian Party’ 43 research on, 14, 15, 16, 20 small-group operations, 59 support for, 50, 59 suppression of, 25 youth organization, 56 industry as government priority, 130 overview, 136 infrastructure development awareness of need, 153, 156 malarial marshes, draining of, 155, 158 recommendations, 153 school buildings, 155 water supply, 156

Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, see IMRO Italy Albania and, 59, 132 Croatia and, 114 Dalmatia annexation, 12 hostility to Yugoslavia, 77 Italian minority in Yugoslavia, 264, 290 and Macedonian autonomy, 25, 119 relations with, 79, 120, 127 support for IMRO, 53 trade with, 133, 177 Jevtic´, Bogoljub, 78, 79 Jovanovic´, Milan, 96, 219, 258 – 9 Jovanovic´, Panta, 82, 93, 102, 161 Jovanovic´, Petar M., 95 Jovanovic´, Vladan, 17, 45, 82 Jovanovic´-Pizˇon, Jovan, 103, 109 JRZ (Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica), see Yugoslavian Radical Union Katardzˇiev, Ivan, 15 Kennard, Howard, 10, 54, 55, 63, 65, 70, 71, 72, 164, 165, 249, 254 Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, see Yugoslavia Kolarov, Vasil, 24 Korosˇec, Anton, 19, 64, 65, 67, 68, 76, 79, 96, 101, 106, 113, 154, 220, 260, 287 Kosovo, colonisation policy, 168 Kovacˇevic´, General Mihajlo, assassination of, 58 Krstic´, Ðordo, 163, 166 land, see agriculture language, 264 Lazic´, Zˇivojin (Zˇika), 35 – 7, 54, 61, 73, 80, 83, 96, 109, 142 – 3, 213, 221, 229, 231, 239, 245, 271, 272 loans, see economy Lucˇist movement, 88 Macedonia administration, 1, 2 administrative restructuring 1929, 4 agriculture, see agriculture backwardness, perceptions of, 270

INDEX Balkan War partition 1912, 5 Bulgaria and, see Bulgaria capital city, see Skopje current historical research, 14 current study aims, 17 economy, see economy education, see education establishment of Yugoslavia, 12 ethnic diversity, 4 ethnic scope of current study, 2 geographical scope of current study, 20 geographical terminology, 2 government policy in, see government policy in Macedonia Greece and, see Greece historical boundaries, 3 IMRO, see IMRO independence 1991, 2 industry, see industry language, 264 migration, see migrants mythologising as ‘classical South’, 271 national consciousness, 1, 4, 5, 284 politics, see politics in Macedonia positive portrayal of, 271 role within Yugoslavia, 18 Serbia and, see Serbia Skopje, see Skopje sources of current study, 21 ‘South Serbia’, see South Serbia as special case within Yugoslavia, 288 statistical data, 1 thematic scope of current study, 21 transport, see transport Vardar Banovina, see Vardar Banovina Yugoslavian integration, see government policy in Macedonia ‘Macedonian Party’, see politics in Macedonia Macˇek, Vladimir (Vladko), 22, 68, 75, 76, 77, 78, 84, 85, 86, 89, 91, 102, 103, 105, 112, 113, 114, 118, 287 malarial marshes, draining of, 155 Manevic´, Todor, 122, 126, 260, 288 Marxism, see Communists media, 257 migrants to Macedonia colonisation policy, 163

355

Croatian, 27 Greek, 27 Montenegrin, 47 Serbian, 27, 116 Macedonian migrants in Bulgaria, 24, 38, 46 Montenegro Balkan War 1912, 5 migrants in Macedonia, 47, 168 parliamentary representation, 43 uprising 1918– 24, 23 nationalism, see politics in Macedonia newspapers, 257 Nincˇic, Momcˇilo, 25 Nolte, Hans-Heinrich, 18 Novakovic´, Marko, 87, 88, 91, 98, 106, 109, 219, 258 Obradovic´, Vid, 180, 182 opium, see agriculture Ottoman Empire Balkan War defeat 1912, 5 eclipse by Bulgaria, 36 Macedonia administration, 2, 4 Oxley, W. H., 73, 249 Panov, Anton, 267 Parliament, see politics in Yugoslavia Palesˇutski, Kostadin, 16, 19, 40, 198 Pasˇic´, Nikola, 12, 31, 44, 48, 272 Paul, Prince Regent, 77, 78, 79, 94, 102, 112, 113, 178 People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, see Yugoslavia People’s Republic Peter, King coup d’e´tat 1941, 128 regency, 77 statue of, 94 Petrovic´, Jovan, 90, 105 politics in Macedonia 25th Anniversary of liberation from Turkish rule, 94 Alexander I’s interest, 71, 256 alternative futures for Macedonia, 24 aspirations and concerns, articulation of regional, 28, 37, 44 autonomy movement aspirations, 24, 84, 86 and Croatian autonomy, 115

356

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

elites’ identification with Serbia, 289 growth in confidence, 105 Lucˇist movement, 88 national consciousness, 1, 4, 5 United Opposition links with, 102 young intelligentsia, 56, 84, 96, 98 Bulgarian influence, 35, 36 Communists banning of, 30 electoral success, 32 and IMRO, 45 Macedonian Republic as goal, 120 measures against, 33, 84 support for, 91, 126 Democrats electoral success, 30, 33 ‘Group of Parliamentarians’ 27, 30 and ‘Macedonian Party’ 39 parliamentary representation, 27, 30, 33 early tension 1918– 24, 23 fear, reduction of, 106 government policy, see government policy in Macedonia increased tension 1927– 9, 51 local elections 1933, 76 Lucˇist movement, 88 ‘Macedonian Party’, 38 Macedonian uprising, threat of, 45 Neutral Club, 43 opposition parties, support for, 83 parliamentary elections 1920, 33 1925, 44 1927, 54 parliamentary representation, 100 political organisations, lack of regional, 30 political violence, 34, 41, 58 Radicals and ‘Macedonian Party’, 39 parliamentary representation, 30, 33 support for, 44 reduced tension 1924– 5, 48 Skopje as capital of ‘Serbian Banovina’, 116 World War II, 118 young intelligentsia, 56, 84, 96, 98 politics in Yugoslavia 1920s, 23

1930s, 69 administrative reform, 69 Alexander I’s dictatorship, 69 Balkan Pact 1934, 77 Banovinas (administrative areas), establishment of, 70 constitution of 1921, 67, 280 of 1931, 70, 74 constituent assembly, 27 federalism proposals, 75 new constitution, demands for, 68, 75, 113, 289 observance of, 28 question of, 30, 282 Serbian constitution of 1903, 31 early political difficulties, 23 foreign policy, 77, 79 instability 1928–9, 66 local elections 1920, 32 1933, 76 1936, 82 Macedonia, see politics in Macedonia nationalist tendencies within, 79 parliament constitution of 1931, 74 groups within, 27 parliamentary elections 1920, 32, 57 1923, 38 1925, 43, 44 1927, 25, 54 1931, 74 1935, 78, 83 1938, 20, 82, 93, 101, 104, 160 prime ministers, see Jevtic´, Bogoljub; Korosˇec, Anton; Pasˇic´, Nikola; Protic´, Stojan; Stojadinovic´, Milan Regency, 77 Stojadinovic´ government, see Stojadinovic´, Milan Yugoslavianism policy, 74 press, 257 Protic´, Stojan, 31 Protogerov, Aleksandar, 43, 58, 66 public health, see health policy public works, loans for, see economy Pulevski, G´org´i, 6

INDEX Radic´, Stjepan, 12, 33, 41, 46, 48, 49, 51, 54, 65, 67, 68, 75, 115, 154, 203, 223 Radicals constitutional policy, 30 electoral success, 32, 54 press support for, 40 Radical Club, 30 railways, see transport regional development, see economy Reiss, Rudolph Archibald, 10 Riley, Ben, 75 Ristovski, Blazˇe, 16 roads, see transport Romania Romanian minority in Yugoslavia, 264, 290 Tripartite Pact, 128 Yugoslavia invasion, 128 schools, see education Serbia establishment of Yugoslavia, 11 historical research on Macedonia, 17 Macedonia claims, 5 and Macedonian autonomy, 25 Macedonian elites’ identification with, 289 migrants in Macedonia, 27, 116, 168 Serbian – Bulgarian Treaty 1912, 52 Serbianisation policy assessed, 281 Seton-Watson, Robert William, 11, 22, 27, 50, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 78, 79, 83, 84, 114, 116 Sfetas, Spyridon, 14 silkworm cultivation, see agriculture Skopje as capital of ‘Serbian Banovina’, 116 development as model city, 160 Faculty of Philosophy, 236 finance, 148 Hygiene Institute, 156 National Theatre, 266, 268 slaughterhouse project, 182 Slovenia economic success, 129 political reform demands, 76 South Serbia 25th Anniversary of liberation from Turkish rule, 94 administration of, 24

357

Alexander I’s interest, 71 boundaries of, 2 designation, 2, 3, 4, 42 government investment in, 61 ‘Group of Parliamentarians’, 27, 30 Macedonia inclusion, 3 neglect of, 40 Serbia and, 19, 31 Stojadinovic´, Milan agreement with Croats, 112 agriculture policy, 130, 186, 198 archive, 22 domestic policies, 130 economic policy, 276 election of 1938, 102, 105 and Geneva Opium Convention, 205 government of, 79, 160 Macedonia policy, 80, 87, 91, 92, 98, 104, 145, 157, 159, 160, 219, 284 and Nazi Germany, 95 railway expansion plans, 255 Yugoslavian Radical Union, 79 Sundhaussen, Holm, 206 Sˇusˇkalovic´, Mihailo, 30, 38, 101 Tatic´, S., 27 taxation, see economy theatre, 266 Thomas, Mr (British Vice Consul in Skopje), 127 tobacco, see agriculture Tomic´, Svetozar, 227 Trajkovic, Riza, 45 transport railways, 252 – 7 roads, 248 transport policy assessed, 277 Tripartite Pact, 128 Turkey trade with, 133 Turkish minority in Yugoslavia, 264, 290 ‘Union against the Bulgarian bandits’, 26, 28 United Kingdom Bulgaria and, 65 chemical industry cartel, 202 diplomats in Yugoslavia, see Footman, David; Henderson, Nevile; Kennard, Howard

358

YUGOSLAVIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE TITO

and Macedonian autonomy, 25, 119 National Archives, 22 prevention of Macedonia uprising 1924, 47 support for Yugoslav state, 11 trade with, 133 views on Yugoslavia agriculture, 164, 173 communications networks, 249 economy, 130, 133 Macedonian autonomy, 25, 127, 282 Macedonian identity, 7, 10 Macedonian internal situation, 63 Macedonian politics, 54 support for Yugoslav state, 11 Yugoslav government, 49, 51, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 78, 79, 114 Yugoslavia relations, 79 United Opposition electoral success, 78 foundation of, 78 and Lucˇist movement, 88 Macedonian autonomist links with, 102 support for, 83 in Vardar Banovina, 81 universities, see education urbanisation, 278 Vardar Banovina establishment of, 70 local elections 1933, 76 Macedonia as part of, 4, 70 size of, 70 Stojadinovic´ government policy, 81 Vardar Macedonia, see Macedonia Vojvodina autonomy aspirations, 84 political reform demands, 76 Vulic´, Nikola, 110, 112, 122, 124, 224, 262, 264, 283 water supply, see infrastructure development Waterlow, Sidney, 66, 288 Wendel, Hermann, 6, 9, 10, 24, 32, 141 World War I destruction of railways, 252 economic damage, 132 establishment of Yugoslavia, 11

World War II politics in Macedonia, 118 Tripartite Pact, 128 Yugoslavia invasion, 128, 153 Young, Alban, 25, 64 Yugoslavia administrative restructuring 1929, 4 agriculture, see agriculture Albania and, 13 Austria and, 13 Bulgaria and, 13 Communist era, see Yugoslavia People’s Republic current historical research, 13 economy, see economy education, see education Entente (Allied) Powers and, 11 establishment of, 10 finance, see economy German invasion 1941, 128, 153 Greece and, 13 Hungary and, see Hungary importance for Europe, 1 integration approach, 13, 17 integration policy assessed, 278 Italy and, see Italy name of, 4, 11, 18 overhasty formation of, 11 politics, see politics in Yugoslavia Romania and, 13 territorial diversity, 11 Tito era, see Yugoslavia People’s Republic transport, see transport Tripartite Pact, 128 Turkey and, see Turkey Yugoslavia People’s Republic, Macedonia and, 15 Yugoslavian Radical Union (JRZ) agriculture policy, 186 Banovina Committee, 124, 151 education policy, 229 foundation of, 79 parliamentary election 1938, 104 political rights policy, 79 and Serbian Banovina proposal, 117 Slovenian membership, 289 South Serbia policy, 124 support for, 110 in Vardar Banovina, 81, 151, 229