Yuan Shih-K'ai [2 ed.] 0804707898, 9780804707893

Table of contents :
Preface to the Second Edition
Contents
One Youth, 1859-1882
Two Korea, 1882-1895
Three The Army, 1895-1899
Four The Governor, 1899-1901
Five The Viceroy, 1901-1907
Six Eclipse, 1908-1911
Seven The Revolution, 1911
Eight The President, 1912-1913
Nine The Strong Man, 1913-1915
Ten The Emperor, 1915-1916
Eleven Downfall, 1916
Twelve An Appraisal
Appendix: The Hsiaochan Officers and Their Careers Under Yuan Shih-k'ai
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Yuan Shih-k’ai

Jerome Ch’en

Yuan Shih-k’ai SE C O N D E D I T IO N

S T A N FO R D U N IV E R S IT Y PRESS Stanford, California 1972

The first edition of this book. Yuan Shih-k’ai (1859-1916): Brutus Assumes the Purple, was published in 1961 by George Allen & Unwin Ltd. (originating publishers) and Stanford University Press. The present edition, which has been revised throughout by the author and completely re­ designed and reset, was published in 1972 by Stanford Uni­ versity Press.

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 1961,1972 by Jerome Ch’en Printed in the United States of America ISBN 0-8047-0789-8 l c 76-153815

For Barbara

Preface to the Second Edition

I n t h e years since the first edition of this book appeared, a large body of primary source materials on Yuan Shih-k’ai has been pub­ lished, chiefly in Taiwan. At the same time, scholars in China and the West have made considerable progress toward an understand­ ing of the disintegration of the Ch’ing Empire and the rise of the Chinese republic. In spite of occasional excursions into Maoist studies, I have not lost interest in this earlier period and have been reshaping my views as frequently as time and energy allow. My re­ visit to Yuan Shih-k’ai is thus an attempt to take cognizance of new scholarly developments. In the intervening years. Dr. Victor Purcell, whose comments on the manuscripts of this book were invaluable to me. Sir Percival David, to whom the first edition was dedicated, and Sir Stanley Unwin, who handled the publication of the first edition, have died. My revisit to Yuan Shih-k’ai is therefore a nostalgic one that evokes losses but many pleasant memories as well. I also remember the days when I did my research traveling on the London underground between home and office and wrote in the office, which I shared with six others, mostly Cantonese. Lon­ don seemed to me then too boisterous, and research and writing were the most effective insulation. Since I changed jobs and came to northern England, I have found a quiet room, a happy home, and again insulation through my work. It is probably time to make another move. A steady factor in these years has been the affection between my daughter and myself, which has given me, and still does, a great deal of strength. Now to her this edition is dedicated.

J.C. Leeds

Contents

One

Youth, 1859-1882

1

Two

Korea, 1882-1895

8

Three

The Army, 1895-1899

29

Four

The Governor, 1899-1901

44

Five

The Viceroy, 1901-1907

55

Six

Eclipse, 1908-1911

77

Seven

The Revolution, 1911

Eight

The President, 1912-1913

90 109

Nine

The Strong Man, 1913-1915

*34

Ten

The Emperor, 1915-1916

159

Eleven

Downfall, 1916

179

Twelve

An Appraisal

195

Appendix: The Hsiaochan Officers

217

Notes

221

Bibliography

235

Index

249

Yuan Shih-k’ai

OUTER M O N G O L I A

China in 1900

ONE

Youth, 1859-1882

H ia n g ch en g is a small, undistinguished town in central Honan, an area impoverished by floods and droughts. It is far from the seats of traditional learning and the modern civilization that began to take root in China after i860. A little to the north of Hiang­ cheng, a farmer named Yuan Shou-ch'en made his home and brought up four sons. One of these, born on September 16, 1859, was named Shih-k’ai. It was a time of foreign invasion and armed rebellion. AngloFrench expeditionary troops occupied Peking, the imperial capi­ tal, and the Manchu emperor was in exile in Jehol. Meanwhile the rebels, the Taiping (1850-64) and the Nien (1852-68), devas­ tated the lower reaches of the Yangtze and Yellow rivers, as well as the Hwai region. In the spring of i860, as the Nien drove into central Honan and threatened the security of Hiangcheng, Yuan Shou-ch'en took his family to the Yuan clan fortress east of town. (At that time, it was quite common for a large clan to build a fortress for protection against rebels roaming the loess plain.) This refuge belonged to General Yuan Chia-san, a prominent military leader who was then fighting the rebels.1 The general, a classical scholar, had not been touched by modem ideas; indeed, all the members of his clan could be called traditionalists. At the fortress, the general's adopted son, Tu-ch'en, who was childless, became very fond of the sturdy infant Shih-k’ai and later adopted him. This arrangement brought the boy into an influential military family and had an important effect on his career.2 Yuan Tu-ch'en took Shih-k'ai to Shantung in 1866 and secured a classical scholar of some fame to prepare him for a career in the imperial civil service. But the boy found studying less attractive than boxing or riding. According to one story, he once scared his

2

YOUTH

teacher by catching fireflies, crushing them, and painting his face with the paste so that it glowed in the dark.8 As a youth, Yuan became interested in geomancy and physiognomy. He ate and drank excessively, although he did not smoke opium. Despite his overindulgence, few of his fellow students could match him physi­ cally.4 Yuan Tu-ch’en, who held the lucrative office of salt gabelle in­ spector for the Kiangnan district, died when Yuan was fourteen. His real father died two years later, but Yuan did not have to ob­ serve the usual three years of mourning because he had been adopted. He was therefore eligible to take the autumn examina­ tion for the first degree in 1876.® Since he had devoted so much of his time to riding, boxing, and debauchery. Yuan's failure in the examination was not unexpected. Soon after, at the age of seven­ teen, he found consolation in an early marriage. He and his bride, whose family name was Yü, took up residence in Chenchow, Honan, where two years later their first son, K'e-ting, was born.* While in Chenchow, Yuan met a poor scholar named Hsü Shihch’ang, who was working as a private tutor.6 Before long, they were close friends and sworn-brothers. A year older than Yuan, Hsü already held the second degree when they met. Financed by Yuan, Hsü went to Peking in 1879 to take the metropolitan exam­ ination for the third and highest degree, which he finally obtained in 1886. Shortly after Hsü’s departure, Yuan again took the autumn examination and again he failed.7 Convinced that it was beyond him to obtain the three degrees necessary for a civil service career, he now decided on a career in the army. At the age of twenty-one, he went to Tengchow, near Chefoo in Shantung, to seek a post in the Ch'ing Brigade, which was commanded by a friend of his adopted father’s. General Wu Ch’ang-ch’ing.8 At General W u’s headquarters, he met yet another scholar, Chang Chien, who gave him lessons in poetry and prose.® Yuan addressed Chang as “Sir,” for he was six years younger and pos­ sessed only a “purchased title” as a secretary-to-be of the Grand Secretariat of the Imperial Court. In 1902, as the viceroy of Chihli * Shen Tsu-hsien and Wu K’ai-sheng, 1: 2b~3b. The January 17, 1919, issue of Hua-tzu jih-pao (The Chinese Mail of Hong Kong) reported that Yuan’s first wife died in Tientsin on January 14, 1919. It is not known how many concu­ bines he had, but according to one of his sons (Yuan K’e-wen, pp. 16-18), he had 16 sons and 14 daughters.

YOUTH

3

(now Hopei) and the imperial commissioner of trade for northern China, he addressed Chang, then a great scholar and industrialist, as “my brother.“ Chang wrote in reply, “Now that your rank is more exalted, my address is consequently less deferential.“10 Chang, impressed by the young man’s ability and astuteness, recommended Yuan to the general for a more important post. At the same time, he exhorted Yuan to give up any lingering hopes for a civil career. Through Chang’s influence, Yuan was made an aide-de-camp in charge of training and discipline in the brigade.11 The leisurely, peaceful years from 1880 to 1882 ended abruptly when a mutiny broke out in Seoul, the capital of Korea. Since the country was then under China’s suzerainty, the acting viceroy of Chihli, Chang Shu-sheng, dispatched General Wu’s brigade to quell the riot. Yuan Shih-k’ai was a member of this force. The king of Korea, the son of Prince Heung Sung of the house of Yi, was gentle and kind but unable to rule. Upon his accession to the throne in 1864 at the age of twelve, his father had taken the title of Tai Won Kun and assumed the authority of a regent. Described by his contemporaries as having “bowels of iron and a heart of stone,“12 Tai Won Kun was rapacious and unscrupulous but nonetheless able. He remained in control of the government even after his son came of age. In foreign affairs, despite contacts already established with the United States, Great Britain, Ger­ many, and France, he stubbornly pursued a policy of isolationism. The turbulent experiences of China and Japan since being opened to the West convinced him that tranquility could be achieved only by seclusion. Korea’s unimportance in world trade made this xeno­ phobic policy possible. The regent was inflexible in enforcing the policy; and he could be violent too, as in 1866, when he ordered the slaughter of some 2,000 Korean Catholics. Forces within the area were a more dangerous threat to Tai Won Kun’s plan than was the West, for Korea’s commercial insignifi­ cance did not diminish her strategic importance for China, Japan, and Russia. Korean isolationism was viable only so long as China acquiesced in it, Japan was too weak to challenge China, and Rus­ sia remained minimally interested in the Far East. But as Japan rapidly gained strength in eastern Asia after 1870, her interest in Korea grew. In 1868, 1869, and 1872, she tried to establish diplo­ matic relations with Tai Won Kun’s government, but he refused.

4

YOUTH

These failures provoked considerable frustration and political dis­ sension in Japan. Only the size and prestige of the old Manchu Empire restrained her from setting out to conquer Korea. In 1873, Iwakura Tomomi’s government sent Soyijima Taneomi to China to ratify a Sino-Japanese trade treaty and also to sound out China's attitude toward Korea. The Tsungli Yamen, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, reaffirmed its de­ termination to maintain suzerainty over Korea at any cost. At the same time, the Yamen made it clear that Korea was responsible for her own internal administration, and that she had the right to choose between war and peace.18 In fact, Korea could not possibly have waged a war without China’s consent. In this sense, the Yamen’s reply was ill-advised and rashly encouraged Japan’s aspirations. It served to intensify the debate on Korea among the various samurai factions. The situation became so heated that the Iwakura mission had to return hastily from the United States to stop a military expedition against Korea. Although Iwakura and the other moderates won the day, Korea remained a volatile issue in Japanese politics, as shown by the assassination attempt against Iwakura, the rebellions led by Eto and Saigo, and the Formosan expedition. On October 18, 1875, a small Japanese man-of-war approach­ ing Kanghwa Island (off the western coast of Korea) to obtain fresh water was fired on by Korean shore batteries. When the Japanese commander sent a boat under a flag of truce to investigate the attack, it was also fired on. Later a Japanese war vessel bombarded the shore in retaliation. Japanese marines were landed and sacked the town on the island. Still not satisfied, the Japanese govern­ ment sent more warships to Pusan, threatening further destruction unless a treaty was concluded. Japan and Korea subsequently held negotiations in Seoul in early 1876 and reached an agreement to be submitted to China for ratification. According to the treaty, Japan recognized Korea as a sovereign state with full power to conduct her own affairs under China’s overlordship. The two na­ tions were to exchange diplomatic missions, and the Korean ports of Inchon and Wonsan were to be opened to Japanese trade. The Tsungli Yamen's attitude was conciliatory so long as Japan was willing to respect China’s suzerainty. In its reply to Japan, the Yamen once again stated that China did not wish to interfere

YOUTH

5

with Korea's own affairs. “If Japan has a mind to restore friendly relations with Korea, she should deal with her directly.14 Tai Won Kun and his followers naturally opposed the treaty. But another political party had grown up in Korea, centered around the queen, whose family, the Mins, were the country's larg­ est noble landholders. Convinced that Korea's weakness made in­ tercourse with foreigners inevitable, the queen and her party sup­ ported the treaty. (Although this support suggested pro-Japanese sympathies, an implication that the regent later exploited, it was motivated primarily by practical anti-isolationist considerations. In fact, the Mins were of Chinese origin.) China’s complacency and the refusal of Viceroy Li Hung-chang to take military action dur­ ing the Kanghwa episode strengthened the queen's hand. The treaty was signed on February 27, 1876. Defeated but undaunted, Tai Won Kun eventually had an op­ portunity for revenge. On July 23, 1882, some Korean troops in Seoul found that their rice ration was rotten and had been mixed with sand. Considering that this was the first ration they had re­ ceived for a whole year, it is not surprising that about 10,000 sol­ diers mutinied. Their leaders went to see Tai Won Kun, who prom­ ised to deal with the matter himself. At the same time, he denied any responsibility for the incident, instead blaming it on the cor­ ruption of the queen's party and the export of rice by Japanese mer­ chants residing in Korea. The regent's explanation had the de­ sired effect. On the same day, the soldiers killed several of their Japanese military instructors and besieged and burned the Japa­ nese legation. The Japanese minister, Hanabusa Yoshitada, es­ caped in a British ship, but some of his staff were savagely beaten to death. The next day, the rioters looted a number of famous houses in the capital, including the royal palace and Tai Won Kun's own residence. It was rumored that the queen had been poisoned. The chief minister, Min Thae Ho, was seen fatally wounded in a ditch. His son, Min Yong Ik, who was the queen's nephew, shaved his head, disguised himself as a Buddhist monk, and escaped to Japan. Although the mutiny had begun as an ex­ pression of grievances, it now became a movement against Japan and the queen. Tai Won Kun, having settled his grudge, rein­ stated himself as the civil and military dictator of the country. Japan reacted swiftly. On July 31 and August 1, 700 marines and

6

YOUTH

another 700 infantrymen landed in Korea, while the Japanese for­ eign minister. Count Inouye Kaoru, hurried to the scene of the riot. As it turned out, the queen had escaped, her maid having taken the poison meant for her. Before leaving the palace, she had ap­ pealed to China for help. Although Li Hung-chang was in mourn­ ing for his mother, Chang Shu-sheng, acting on his instructions, sent the Ch’ing Brigade and three warships to Korea. The naval vessels reached Inchon on August 10, and the infantry landed at Masampo ten days later. The dispatch of troops did not mean that Li was resolved to use force to obtain a Korean settlement. Rather he intended to move in before the Japanese could act and to make a gesture of appeasement to his political opponents at home. He knew that his Hwai Army, China’s best fighting force, was not strong enough to defeat the Japanese. The gunboats, too, were ill-equipped. Li's German adviser, C. von Hanneken, had sug­ gested that they be supplied with modern ammunition from Krupp, but this was financially impossible. The Ch'ing Brigade, consisting of 3,000 soldiers in six corps, landed in Korea as a force sent by the Celestial Empire (t'ien-ch’ao) to help an unfortunate vassal state. But its discipline was appall­ ing, and Yuan Shih-k'ai had to order several executions to stop the soldiers from plundering the Koreans. After the Chinese set up their headquarters on the outskirts of Seoul, General Wu Ch'ang-ch’ing and the commanding officers of the gunboats. Ting Ju-ch'ang and Ma Chien-chung, met to decide how to carry out Li Hung-chang's orders. The next day, Wu, Ting, and Ma paid a courtesy call on Tai Won Kun, who, along with his sons and grandsons, received them politely. His residence was exquisitely furnished, and the commanders were impressed by the regent's refined taste. As Ma Chien-chung noted in his journal, “This old man is very deep.’*16 Later that day, Tai Won Kun went to Gen­ eral Wu's headquarters, where the guest and his hosts, including Yuan Shih-k'ai, exchanged lengthy written communications. Pres­ ently the Chinese sent away the 500 guards escorting the regent and forcibly seized him. Marching through the rain. Ting and a company of soldiers took Tai Won Kun to Masampo, a port on the southern coast. There the Chinese warship Teng-yin-chou was waiting to take the regent to Tientsin, where he was held prisoner for the next three years.16

YOUTH

7

With the chief troublemaker thus eliminated, the crisis of 1882 was peacefully settled. On August 30, Japan and Korea signed the Chemulpo Treaty, which gave Japan the right to garrison troops in Seoul to protect the legation. These forces were to be withdrawn after a year if no further incidents had occurred and the Japanese minister deemed their presence no longer necessary. Korea, for her part, realized that since China lacked the strength to protect her, she must develop the power to defend herself. The king therefore proposed to train a corps of 500 soldiers in modern warfare and appointed Yuan Shih-k’ai, a young man of twenty-three, to under­ take the task.17 Also, since China promised to purchase the ma­ chinery necessary to equip modern arsenals in Korea, a group of Korean students were sent to Tientsin to study engineering. In a memorial to the throne on October 10, Li Hung-chang rec­ ommended that Yuan Shih-k’ai be promoted for his part in settling the crisis.18 The emperor approved Yuan’s Korean appointment two days later, also awarding him the rank of sub-prefect and the privilege of wearing peacock feathers in his hat, a much-coveted decoration. His friend Chang Chien was given the rank of magis­ trate, along with the privilege of wearing peacock feathers of the fifth rank. Both were to remain in Korea.

TW O

Korea, 1882-1895

was a noticeable change in the political situation in Korea after the removal of Tai Won Kun. The government was still weak and corrupt, the currency debased by inflation, and the country threatened with starvation. But the queen and her party now faced no serious opposition. In foreign affairs, the new leaders were basi­ cally pro-Chinese. China respected Korea's right to govern her­ self, whereas Japan urged her to adopt progressive measures that many Koreans considered loathsome. The enmity between Korea and Japan was quite strong, as the British diplomat G. N. Curzon remarked:

T h er e

The race hatred between Koreans and Japanese is the most striking phe­ nomenon in contemporary Chosan [Korea]. Civil and obliging in their own country, the Japanese developed in Korea a faculty for bullying and bluster that is the result partly of national vanity, partly of memories of the past. The lower orders ill-treat the Koreans on every possible oppor­ tunity, and are cordially detested by them in return.1

Still, there was ambivalence in the Koreans' attitude toward their contending neighbors. They liked the Chinese but scorned their weakness, hated the Japanese but admired their strength. Japan continued to approach Korea cautiously. She encouraged her citizens to settle there, and by 1884 there were about 12 times as many Japanese as Chinese in Korean trading centers. Further, Japan took every opportunity to foster political opposition to the queen. Koreans also visited Japan, and many of them, including Kim Ok Kiun, Hong Yong Sik, and Pak Yong Hio, were willing to listen to her suggestions on Korean modernization. Kim, a charming young nobleman, was by far the ablest of these and came to be regarded as the leader of an expanding pro-Japanese party. On the king's command, he had gone to Japan in 1881 to escape

K O RE A

9

Tai Won Kun’s ruthless dictatorship. When the crisis subsided in 1882, he returned home with the Japanese minister, Hanabusa. At that time, the Korean court was selecting an envoy to negotiate a loan of 120,000 francs from Japan, and Kim was suggested for the post. He declined the position, instead recommending the king's brother-in-law, Pak Yong Hio. But Kim did go with the delegation as an adviser. After the mission, he stayed in Japan, widening his contacts with Japanese political leaders. He made a deep impression on his European and Japanese friends; in turn, he became thoroughly convinced of the merits of European civi­ lization as reflected in Japan's social and economic progress. He learned of Japan's ambitions toward his own country in an inter­ view with Count Inouye, who confided to him: “Our armament programs are not solely for our own defense, but also aim at assist­ ing your country to achieve full independence."2 Kim's other Japa­ nese friends further intimated that if he could gain power in Korea, the two countries might accomplish a great deal together. So induced, Kim decided to return home. There he found the pro-Chinese Min party firmly in control. Although the Chinese troops stationed in Seoul had been reduced from 3,000 to 1,500, the modern Korean army had grown to four battalions under Yuan Shih-k'ai and four Korean commanders.* Yuan was on excellent terms with the king and queen, and early in 1883 king had even requested that he be made a marshal of the new army. Although General Wu Ch’ang-ch'ing did not agree. Yuan remained in charge of training.8 About 5,500 men strong and equipped with some 3,000 PeabodyMartini rifles, the army was one pillar in the Min party's power structure. The other, strangely enough, was a German sent to Korea in 1883 by Sir Robert Hart, the British inspector-general of the Imperial Maritime Customs of China. Although he was a European acting on behalf of the Chinese government, P. G. von Möllendorf dressed and behaved like a Korean. Headstrong and opinionated but undoubtedly able, he controlled the finances of the Korean government. * The Korean commanders were Min Yong Ik, Yi Jo Yun, Han Kiu Chik, and Yun Thae Jun, in charge of the Right, Left, Front, and Rear Palace Guard battalions, respectively. L. H. Foote to the Secretary of State, December 17. 1884.

IO

KO R EA

Kim began at once to try to undermine the power of the Min party, his efforts encouraged by international developments. China was embroiled in a military conflict with France in Annam that threatened to break into a full-scale war. With China's attention and energy thus diverted from Korea, the queen's position became more vulnerable. Soon after Kim’s return, the king received him in an audience. At this critical meeting, Kim explained the advan­ tages of a pro-Japanese policy, emphasizing that if Japan joined France to defeat China, she might decide to annex Korea. (Ironi­ cally, a few months later Sir Harry Parkes, the British minister to China, warned the Tsungli Yamen of the growing militarism in Japan and the danger of a Franco-Japanese coalition.4) Claiming that China could no longer protect Korea adequately in the mod­ ern world, Kim maintained that to preserve her own integrity, Korea must make an alliance with Japan and reach a détente with Russia. The king found Kim's argument cogent and well informed, and promised to seek his advice on every important matter. In fact, he gave Kim control over colonization and later over for­ eign affairs. The rise of the pro-Japanese party alarmed the Chinese repre­ sentatives in Seoul. But the military leaders. General Wu Chao-yu and his deputy, were indecisive, and Kim described the Chinese consul-general, Ch'en Shu-t'ang, as a “boneless slug."5 It was left to Yuan, a relatively junior official, to inform Li Hung-chang of the danger. In a confidential message to Li on November 12, 1884, Yuan summarized the political situation in Seoul: Because of the conflict with Fiance, China cannot deal with an emeigency in Korea with armed forces. The king and many of his ministers are now planning to seize this opportunity to shake off our control in order to achieve full independence. Their policy may be carried out through making alliances with other neighboring powers. Kim Yun Sik, Yun Thae Jun, Min Yong Ik, and others are opposed to this plan, but the king is rather displeased with them. I fear that in three years' time the result of this policy will become evi­ dent.6

Yuan did not have to wait three years, although his firm control of the Korean army, and Möllendorf's of the treasury, made it ex­ tremely difficult for the pro-Japanese to challenge the Min party directly. Their hope of success lay either in winning the soldiers over or in assassination. The former would inevitably take a long

K O RE A

i

time. Even though the Japanese minister and his American col­ league, Lucius H. Foote, believed Han Kiu Chik of the Front Bat­ talion to be sympathetic to the pro-Japanese cause, Han’s assistance would not be enough in an open conflict against the pro-Chinese. Kim’s party therefore had to resort to covert tactics. On November 8, 1884, Kim and his comrades met in secret. One of them reported that a few days earlier Yuan had alerted his troops to sleep in their tunics and boots. The Japanese minister, Takezoye Shinichiro, responded by ordering his garrison soldiers to practice shooting during the night of November 11. Although Takezoye was acting on his own initiative, the king and the inhabi­ tants of Seoul were shocked and frightened. Rumors ran wild. Yuan imposed a curfew in the neighborhood of his camp as a pre­ caution, and so did the Korean commanders.7 The activities in Seoul, too feverish to remain completely clan­ destine, could not fail to arouse anxiety among all concerned. Throughout the night of November 17, Yuan Shih-k’ai held lengthy talks with Min Yong Ik of the Right Battalion and the Chinese commander-in-chief, Wu Chao-yu, Anally returning to his own camp at dawn. A week later, the British consul-general, W. G. Aston, warned Kim Ok Kiun, “Something is bound to hap­ pen very soon, and people like Your Excellency ought to be more careful.’’8 Kim was unperturbed. On the next day, he and Take­ zoye discussed a detailed plan for a coup d’etat. Takezoye rejected a proposal to kidnap the king and take him to Kanghwa Island; but he agreed to supply three million yen as initial financial back­ ing for the new government when it was constituted. He also con­ sented to send his troops to the palace as soon as the coup took place. Before Kim left, the Japanese minister asked, “How am I to send troops to the king’s aid?’’ Kim smiled and replied, “Your Excellency will get a message from His Majesty.’’ Kim added that the message would be delivered by the king’s brother-in-law, Pak Yong Hio.® Parting on this note, the two agreed to have no further contact until the day of action. On November 30, Kim and his followers met to complete their plans. They decided to stage the coup on December 4, when Hong Yong Sik, the newly appointed postmaster-general and a pro-Japa­ nese leader, was giving a banquet to mark the completion of the general post office building. All the important members of the gov-

12

KOREA

emment, including the four commanders of the Palace Guard, were invited. During the party, members of the pro-Japanese group would set fire to the palace of the heir-apparent. Hopefully the commotion would draw all the guardsmen there, leaving the royal palace unprotected. The pro-Japanese conspirators and the Japa­ nese garrison troops would then rush to the palace, seize the king, force him to proclaim a new government, and issue reform edicts. The banquet took place as planned. About 20 people were pres­ ent, including Korean Foreign Minister Kim Hong Chip; Com­ manders Min Yong Ik, Han Kiu Chik, and Yi Jo Yun; Japanese Secretary Shimamura and his interpreter, Kawamata; American Minister Foote and his secretary, C. L. Scudder; Customs Inspector Möllendorf; Chinese Consul-General Ch’en Shu-t’ang; and Brit­ ish Consul-General Aston. In addition to the host, the pro-Japa­ nese included Pak Yong Hio and Kim himself. The Japanese min­ ister and many others declined the invitation with the excuse of a slight indisposition. The seats were arranged in an interesting way. The most hon­ ored place went to Foote, the senior foreign representative, and the four lowest places to the Chinese and British consuls and two of the commanders. Kim was seated between the two Japanese, since he could converse with them in their own tongue. The com­ manders were seated near the door so that they could leave quickly if necessary. The servants were ordered to serve the dinner slowly to give the conspirators ample time for their deed. But trouble de­ veloped when the pro-Japanese were unable to set fire to the heirapparent's palace. They hurriedly sent a man to Kim for further instructions. Leaving the table, Kim sent orders to burn any build­ ing they could. Later another messenger reported more failures and even worse news that the police had become suspicious of their activities. The panicking conspirators wanted to come back to the post office and kill their enemies in the banquet hall; Kim firmly rejected this proposal, advising them to find a place near the post office to finish their assignment. Kim’s second absence from the table aroused suspicion among the guests. Finally, as tea and des­ sert were being served, a great commotion broke out and shouts of “fire!" filled the hall. Kim and the others rushed to the windows to see a blaze raging nearby. It was then about ten o’clock.10 The three commanders excused themselves. Min Yong Ik, the first to

K O RE A

*3

leave, soon returned, bleeding badly from wounds on the head, neck, and shoulders. The Chinese consul-general left at once to inform Yuan Shih-k’ai of the ominous events. Foote sent for an American physician, while the wounded man was taken to Möllen­ dorfs house. When Yuan arrived with some Chinese troops, the post office was deserted. He went immediately to the Japanese legation, where he learned that Min was being treated at Möllendorfs house. On his arrival there, he found a young man with a pistol guarding the entrance. This was Möllendorfs assistant, T'ang Shao-i, whose courage impressed Yuan. This meeting was the beginning of a friendship of far-reaching consequences. Meanwhile, after escaping from the post office through a win­ dow, Kim and his friends had rushed to the Japanese legation. They asked to see the minister, but Shimamura told them to go to the royal palace. Joined there by their fellow conspirators, they disarmed the few guardsmen on duty and broke into the king’s bedchamber. Kim told the king and queen that Chinese soldiers were trying to burn down the post office and advised them to seek help from the Japanese minister. The queen, skeptical of Kim’s story, insisted that the help of the Chinese also be sought. The king ordered two messengers to be sent immediately, one to the Japanese legation and the other to the Chinese headquarters, but Kim saw to it that the latter never set out. Further, Kim urged the king to send a personal message to the Japanese minister. Indeed, handing the king pencil and paper, he forced him to write, “To the Japanese minister: Come and protect us.” This was de­ livered by the king's brother-in-law, as planned. At this moment. Commander Han Kiu Chik arrived at the pal­ ace, but without his troops. Thus all he could do was to try to protect himself by staying near the king. Soon after, the “indis­ posed” Japanese minister and Pak Yong Hio led two companies of garrison troops to a small palace near the royal palace. Here the king, the queen, and the heir-apparent were lodged, surrounded by the pro-Japanese party and heavily guarded by Japanese sol­ diers and Japanese-trained Korean cadets. The safety of the king and queen was a matter of paramount concern in the capital. High officials flocked to the palace to see what had happened. The two commanders still at large, perhaps

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dazed by the speed of events, went to the royal palace, like Han, without their men. Within a few hours, the pro-Japanese had ex­ ecuted the three military leaders, the chief Korean minister and his deputy, and the minister in charge of army recruitment. The chief eunuch of the court was hacked to pieces. Before dawn, a new government was proclaimed, with Pak Yong Hio command­ ing the Left and Right battalions and So Kwang Pom command­ ing the Front and Rear battalions. Kim himself took control of the treasury. The next morning Foote, Aston, and the German consul-gen­ eral, Captain Zembsch, were summoned to an audience with the king. When they arrived at the palace with their staffs, they saw Korean and Chinese troops massed around the entrances, which were blocked by Japanese soldiers. It was some time before the diplomats were admitted to the hall where the royal family was lodged. Inside, they found still more Japanese soldiers flourishing bayonets. The king had a short, inconclusive talk with them, while the pro-Japanese leaders and the Japanese minister looked on. It was evident that the audience was designed to stop rumors about the king's safety.11 There was also anxiety at the Chinese headquarters, where for a time no one knew what had become of the king. And there was indecision as well. With the capital in chaos, the Chinese com­ mander, General Wu Chao-yu, and his deputy wanted to telegraph Li Hung-chang for instructions. Ch'en Shu-t'ang gladly seconded this suggestion, but Yuan Shih-k’ai vehemently objected on the obvious grounds that time was short.12 Since the king and his heir had disappeared, Yuan suggested installing the king's nephew, a seven-year-old boy, as the temporary head of state; his superiors rejected the proposal. Meanwhile, the conspirators were also plan­ ning to dethrone the king. Hong Yong Sik wanted to intern him on Kanghwa Island, whereas Japanese Minister Takezoye insisted that he be exiled to Tokyo. Before they could reach an agreement, the situation took a sharp turn. After the audience at the palace, Aston went to the Chinese con­ sul to tell him of the king’s safety. Möllendorf later confirmed the report. Although comforting, this news gave rise to a delicate problem. The Chinese had a legitimate right to protect the king, but they did not want to provoke Japan into a war over the mat-

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ter. The situation called for tact and caution. On December 6, the Chinese commander sent the king a message; but Kim would not allow the messenger to enter the palace, demanding instead that the commander and Yuan come in person. Pak Yong Hio’s brother drafted and dispatched a reply reiterating this demand. (He was to pay for this act with his life: Yuan later had him killed.) Yuan accepted the challenge and, taking 600 soldiers with him, went to see the king, only to be denied admission. News that the conspirators might kidnap the king leaked out the same day, forcing the Chinese and the Korean conservatives to take action. Yuan favored an all-out attack and managed to obtain his superiors* approval. Soon some 4,500 Chinese and Korean troops were marching on the palace. Shortly after they arrived, fighting broke out. It is not clear who fired the first shot. Kim re­ corded, “At 2:30 a letter to Takezoye was delivered. Before he had time to open it, we heard confused shots. The news that Chi­ nese troops were fighting their way in from the southeast side threw the whole palace into a panic/’18 Though Kim evaded the issue here, the Japanese explicitly claimed, both in notes to the Korean government and in statements at the Tientsin negotiations (where the conflict was finally resolved), that the Chinese opened fire on the Japanese garrison. For their part, the Chinese and the king of Korea maintained that the Japanese fired the first shot. According to Yuan’s biography, Jung-an ti-tzu-chi, “Yuan sent his assistant, Ch’en Ch’ang-ch’ing, to march ahead of the troops with a huge visiting card. Before he had proceeded very far inside the walls, he was shot at from the palace. Yuan therefore ordered his troops to attack.”14 Foote had nothing to say on the question, but Aston believed that the Korean cadets within the palace walls were the first to fire. An independent observer. Young J. Allen, agreed. The question seems likely to remain open. General Wu Chao-yu was a timid, vacillating man, reluctant to assume responsibility and fearful of starting a general war. He was perhaps incapable of launching an attack. But these very shortcomings had prompted him to give Yuan command of the main body of men in the action, whereas Wu and his deputy led the left and right wings. Anxious to end the episode. Yuan was much more bellicose; and in light of the overwhelming strength of the Chinese and Korean force, he might have been tempted to attack.

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As for the Japanese, they could just as well have opened fire. Surrounded by a superior force, they might have felt desperate enough to fight their way out at any cost, especially since their plan was to take the king with them to Inchon. Yet, like the Chinese, they were not united. Some in the pro-Japanese party were still determined to escape with the king. But the Japanese minister, realizing the hopelessness of the situation, now opposed this plan even more adamantly. Yuan continued the siege until sundown but made little prog­ ress. When the Japanese counterattacked. General Wu was over­ come by terror and had to be carried from the firing line. His wing collapsed, and the one led by his deputy hid under the palace walls without firing a single shot. Inside the palace, there was panic and confusion. While the pro-Japanese leaders were fully occupied with their defense, the queen and the heir-apparent seized a chance to flee to the Chinese camp. Not unexpectedly, the king’s pleas that he be allowed to join them were ignored by Kim and his col­ leagues. When night fell, there was a lull in the fighting. At dawn on December 7, Takezoye decided to fight his way out. He ordered the conspirators to escort the king to the Chinese camp, arguing that he and his garrison had come on the pretense of protecting the king, an explanation that was becoming increas­ ingly flimsy. “I am going to retreat and to plan for the future,” he said. Kim inquired, “How can you plan for the future without us?” The Japanese minister replied, “I shall take you and your colleagues with me.”15 The postmaster-general, Hong Yong Sik, accompanied the king to a temple north of the small palace, where they were met by Chinese soldiers. Hong was executed on the spot. Meanwhile, the Japanese party, together with Kim and the other pro-Japanese leaders, fought their way to Inchon, where they boarded a liner for Japan. The three-day crisis thus came to an end. The king then summoned his ministers to reconstitute the cen­ tral government and to restore foreign relations. A delegation was sent to the Japanese capital for discussions and another to Peking to express gratitude for the Chinese intervention. The Peking delegation had another mission; it took along some 100,000 taels of silver to purchase luxuries for the queen—at a time when Yuan was borrowing money from the Chinese paymaster to relieve the

K O R EA

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families of the ministers and commanders killed in the coup. Yuan was indignant over this extravagance, declaring that ‘‘such heart­ less people ought to perish!”16 Yuan had worked incessantly during the crisis. Although he was only twenty-five, his biographers say that his hair was already half gray.17 Chang Chien, who had by then returned to China, com­ mented on Yuan's handling of the situation in a letter to one of Yuan's relatives: Shih-k'ai has both courage and tenacity, but unfortunately he also has bureaucratic habits, and so he does not always live up to people’s expecta­ tions. In spite of this, he is fit to be a prime minister. Please ask him to take care what he does in that chaotic country.18

The people of Seoul put up stone tablets to recognize Yuan's ser­ vice.19 Two treaties resulted from the attempted coup — the Seoul Treaty between Japan and Korea and the Tientsin Treaty be­ tween Japan and China. The Seoul negotiations began on Janu­ ary 7, 1885, and ended two days later in an agreement of three main points: (1) The Korean government was to offer an official apology to Japan; (2) Korea undertook to compensate Japan for the loss of Japanese life and property during the disturbance; and (3) the legation garrison was to be increased to 1,000 men. This treaty dealt only with the direct consequences of the crisis; the wider implications had to be settled between China and Japan. Count I to aifd Saigo Tsugumichi went to Tientsin, where I to and Li Hung-chang began negotiations that lasted from April 3 to April 15. They spent much of the time squabbling over the authen­ ticity of the king's message to Takezoye and the question of who fired the first shot. Eventually, on April 18, China and Japan signed a three-point treaty. Both would withdraw all their troops from Korea (including the legation garrison) within four months, and both would urge the king of Korea to strengthen his own de­ fense forces. They also agreed to inform each other when either deemed it necessary to send troops to Korea. The last point was the most significant, since it put Korea under the suzerainty of Japan as well as China. From a potential disaster, Japan had won a political concession of considerable importance. After the Tientsin Treaty and China's defeat by France in Annam, Korea not surprisingly sought help from other quarters to

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preserve the precarious balance of power on which her national integrity depended. Through Möllendorf, the Min party was now holding secret discussions with Russia to obtain protection. When Li Hung-chang heard this, he decided to reconsider his Korean policy. Yuan Shih-k’ai was therefore recalled to Tientsin for con­ sultation. At Yuan’s suggestion, Möllendorf was dismissed. Two Americans were appointed in his place—H. F. Merrill as the cus­ toms officer and the king’s economic adviser, and O. N. Denny as the king’s political adviser.20 Li and Yuan also agreed to release Tai Won Kun, the aged prince interned near Tientsin. Li and the Chinese court were now convinced of Tai Won Kun’s loyalty and realized the need to foster an opposition to the once pro-Chinese Min party. Finally, Li knew that he must send an able man to Korea to carry out his new policy and to regain the influence China had lost through the Tientsin Treaty. Yuan was the natural choice, for he alone had the background and contacts the position re­ quired. Having obtained Yuan’s consent to this appointment, Li reported to the Manchu throne on September 6, 1885: The reason for the appointment of a commissioner for trade is to station a high-ranking official there whose dudes are to report polidcal develop­ ments in that country___Yuan Shih-k’ai twice went to the king’s aid; his meritorious deeds have earned him the admiradon of Korean officials and the common people alike, and he has shown great promise and loy­ alty. Further, he is a close friend of Kim Yun Sik, Kim Hong Chip, and the other Korean ministers___ When Ch’en Shu-t’ang was there in charge of commercial affairs, other diplomadc representatives in Seoul considered him lower in rank than a consul-general. This made it rather difficult for him to behave according to etiquette on social occasions. It seems advisable that Your Majesty ap­ point a consul-general [tsung-ling-shih] as other countries have done.21

Imperial approval was granted soon after, and Yuan returned to Korea with the vague title of a commissioner for trade of the third rank, equivalent to the rank of a senior prefect. He arrived in Seoul on October 5, 1885, with Tai Won Kun and T ’ang Shao-i, formerly Möllendorf’s assistant and now Yuan's. T'ang had been educated in the United States, and Yuan probably recommended him for the post because of his knowledge of English, as well as for his courage during the coup. None of the Korean royal family went to meet the returning father of the king; the atmosphere in Seoul was one of apprehen­ sion and even enmity against the former regent. No sooner had

KO R E A

19

Tai Won Kun landed than one of his most trusted aides was poisoned and two others were executed at the queen's order. These acts marked the first split between Yuan and his former comradein-arms Min Yong Ik, now commander-in-chief of the Korean Palace Guard and the leader of the Min party.22 The exact nature of Yuan's position soon came into question. When Yuan's card was presented to G. C. Foulk, the new American minister in Seoul, Foulk was shocked to read "H.I.C.M. Resident, Seoul." Foulk had been informed that the appointment was sig­ nificant,28 but he was disturbed by the translated term resident, which implied far-reaching authority in Korean affairs. Other con­ temporaries acknowledged that Yuan was indeed acting in this more important capacity. According to J. H. Longford, "Yuan, Li Hung-chang's deputy, little if at all less able and astute than the great chief, was at the capital no longer as a commissioner, but as resident, a semigubernatorial office, and he was de facto the king of Korea. Nothing was done without consulting him, nor without his sanction."24 And the celebrated Putnam Weale re­ corded that Yuan returned to Seoul triumphantly as "imperial resident."25 Foulk did not like the title and sought an explanation from Li Hung-chang. Li replied: Because some policies of the Korean government may have wide implica­ tions endangering the peace and order of that country, a Chinese official must be available in Seoul for direct consultation. Therefore His Im­ perial Chinese Majesty commanded the creation of a post to meet this requirement. Its functions are different from those of a minister, hence it has a different name---Yuan Shih-k’ai does not hold the title of minister, nor is his rank clearly marked, but he has the same authority and status as other ministers in Seoul.25

China's difficulty in selecting an adequate title for this post is clear. As Korea's suzerain, she could not appoint a minister. Nor could she send a resident outright, since she had repeatedly declared a policy of noninterference in Korea's internal affairs. The previous experiment of stationing a consul-general (shang-wu wei-yuan) was a failure, as Li had told the emperor. Thus Yuan was sent ostensibly as a commissioner for trade but actually as a political resident. Later events were to reveal the extent of his authority. Yuan arrived amidst rumors that Kim Ok Kiun was returning to Korea with a Japanese expeditionary force.27 Apparently this story

20

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originated with the Mins, who feared an alliance between Kim and Tai Won Kun, their two old enemies. The rumor persisted till the end of the year, prompting China, Britain, and the United States to send gunboats to Inchon; but nothing happened. Yuan's appointment also coincided with reports of a secret agreement be­ tween Russia and Korea, given substance in part by the arrival of a Russian chargé d’affaires in Seoul, K. I. Waeber. Yuan did not wait long, therefore, to present an essay to the king entitled “On Treachery.” (The fact that this message was called an essay instead of a note or a memorial was in itself interesting.) In the essay. Yuan emphasized China's magnanimous policy toward Korea. As a close neighbor, China would never shirk her responsibility to defend Korea; yet at the same time, she had no thought of encroaching on Korea's autonomy. Under Russian or Japanese protection. Yuan warned, Korea would never enjoy such a great measure of sovereignty. He ended on a harsh note: all attempts to ally with Russia should cease, and the pro-Japanese traitor Kim Ok Kiun should be quietly eliminated by assassination.28 The king received the essay but did not act on it. Accordingly, Li and Yuan decided to try to purge the anti-Chinese elements from the Korean government, with the help of T ai Won Kun. The Mins successfully exploited Tai Won Kun's unpopularity, however, isolating him politically and forcing him to live in semiretirement. Yuan also arranged to have a confidant, Kim Yun Sik, appointed foreign minister, but Kim was suddenly dismissed in June 1886. The attempt to foster opposition to the Min party, ironically reminiscent of Japan's policy, was fruitless. Meanwhile, the Mins continued to flirt with Russia. Möllen­ dorf remained in Seoul long after his dismissal, and various mem­ bers of the Min party frequently visited St. Petersburg. The situa­ tion soon reached a climax. On August 13, 1886, Yuan telegraphed Li Hung-chang the text of a secret document to Waeber, the Rus­ sian chargé d'affaires, from the Korean home secretary: My country,. . . nominally autonomous, is still under the control of an­ other power. His Majesty the King of Korea is deeply ashamed of this fact and is resolved to adopt reform policies in order to strengthen his country and free it from foreign domination. Yet there are many obstacles to this.. . . It is therefore sincerely hoped that the Russian government will agree to protect Korea whenever it becomes necessary. If Korea's in­ terests are threatened by another power, it is hoped that Russia will send warships to her assistance.20

KOREA

21

The message was dated the 10th day of the 7th month of the 495th year since the founding of the kingdom—August 11, 1886. Yuan claimed that he received a copy of the document from Min Yong Ik, who had smuggled it out of the palace. (According to Yuan, the Japanese minister assured him that two copies of the message did in fact exist.) Fearing an open clash with Russia, Yuan wanted to kidnap the king and his pro-Russian retinue, staging a coup like the one against Tai Won Kun in 1882.80 Li Hung-chang, however, was more cautious. He asked the king bluntly whether the document was authentic or not, while the Chinese minister in St. Petersburg consulted the Russians. Both the king and the Rus­ sian Foreign Ministry categorically denied any knowledge of the message.81 By now, news of the document had created a considerable stir in Seoul. On or around August 16, O. N. Denny, the king's ad­ viser, visited Yuan and demanded to see the copy. (Min Yong Ik was also present.) When Yuan refused, a heated argument broke out. Denny “vigorously charged Mr. Yuan with being the sole author of any such information."82 Denny then went to Tientsin to persuade Li Hung-chang to remove Yuan from Korea; the old viceroy would not listen. Yuan's relations with Denny, which until that time had been fairly amiable,88 deteriorated badly. This whole incident revealed Yuan's lack of diplomatic experi­ ence. As it turned out, the document was indeed a forgery. It had been written by British Consul-Gëneral Baber, who alone of all the foreign representatives in Seoul had failed to denounce it as a fraud.84 Baber was probably trying to create an excuse for pro­ longing the British occupation of Port Hamilton, located on an island between Korea and Cheju Island. Britain had occupied the port in May 1885, fearing that Russia's influence in Korea and the Far East might grow to actual domination. Baber's successor, Consul-General Parker, uncovered the intrigue. He reported it in detail to H. F. Merrill, who wrote to his superior at the Imperial Customs of China, Sir Robert Hart, “Parker had found out that Baber alone was responsible. Having invented the story of Korea requesting Russian protection, Baber forged the document which deceived Yuan Shih-k'ai."85 It is not certain if Min Yong Ik collaborated with Baber in the forgery. At any rate, he tried to use the document to discredit Yuan and check China's increasing interference in Korean affairs. How-

22

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ever devious Min's methods, his scheme can be seen as yet another attempt to maintain a balance among the foreign powers in Korea. Summoned by Li to Tientsin to explain his dubious part in the incident, Min delayed as long as possible. Finally, under great pressure, he went to Chefoo in August 1887 to meet with Sheng Hsiian-huai, one of Li's trusted lieutenants. Unable to justify his actions, Min was exiled to Hong Kong. To appease Yuan Shih-k'ai, the king sent a courtier to ask what could be done to counteract China’s suspicion of Korea. Yuan pro­ posed that Kim Yun Sik be reinstated as foreign minister, and the king complied. Later, however, Kim and his deputy forged a royal mandate to borrow 5,000 yen from Japan for themselves. When the deception became known, both culprits were banished. Korea's attempt to shake off Chinese domination continued after the Russian affair. The exiled Min Yong Ik developed a new plan. He advised the king to appoint two plenipotentiaries, one to the United States and the other to Europe. O. N. Denny was to help secure recognition of these officials. Min's plan was shrewd, since China herself did not have a representative of this status any­ where in the world. Thus the Korean envoys would hold a higher rank, and presumably be treated with more respect, than their Chinese colleagues. Yuan, fully aware of the implications of this policy, argued that Korea did not have enough trade with either the United States or Europe to justify the appointments. Li Hungchang insisted that even if the appointments were necessary, they must be sanctioned by the Chinese emperor. The Korean court was determined. At midnight on September 23,1887, the envoy to the United States left Seoul, stopping on the outskirts of the city to await further instructions. When Yuan heard this, he demanded that the envoy be recalled. Although the king did so a few hours later, he protested Yuan's interference vigorously and at length to the Chinese government. China even­ tually agreed to allow the appointments on three conditions: (1) At his assigned capital the envoy should report to the Chinese repre­ sentative, who would introduce him at the country's foreign min­ istry; (2) the Chinese representative must accompany the envoy to every social event he attended; and (3) the Korean envoy must consult his Chinese colleague on all important matters. The Ko­ rean government found it impossible to accept these terms. Ne-

K O RE A

23

gotiations continued for nearly two years without an agreement. Denny was furious over Yuan's interference, and another quarrel broke out between them. Since the U.S. State Department did not back Denny strongly in this matter, his position was extremely awkward; and in the end he had to go. He left his post as the king's adviser in 1888. Immediately thereafter he published a book, China and Korea, in which he called Yuan a “smuggler, conspira­ tor, and diplomatic outlaw."86 In 1889, there was another attempt to depose Yuan, but it too failed. During his ten-year incumbency (1885-95), Yuan worked industriously and resolutely to keep Korea in China's sphere of influence. At times he overplayed his hand, making enemies and provoking criticism. On the whole, however, Li Hung-chang was well satisfied with Yuan's performance and twice had him pro­ moted. Yuan took only two short leaves in this decade—one in early 1886 and the other from September 1891 to May 1892, upon the death of his mother. On both occasions, his assistant, T'ang Shao-i, served as his deputy. Besides overseeing Korea's affairs. Yuan worked to increase China's economic influence there. He went about this in three main ways. First, in 1885 he introduced a telegraph service to com­ pete with the submarine cable between Pusan and Nagasaki. As Korea's only overland line of communication with the outside world, this service had considerable political and strategic sig­ nificance, and was an important personal triumph for Yuan. (It bedevilled Sino-Korean relations toward the end of the decade, however, when Korea tried to assume control of the line by re­ placing the Chinese operators with her own.) Second, Yuan's at­ tempt to expand Sino-Korean trade met with some success. He en­ couraged Chinese merchants in Korea to send a petition to Li Hung-chang asking that the Chinese Merchant Steamship Navi­ gation Company run a regular semimonthly service between Chefoo or Shanghai and Inchon. The merchants, then transporting their goods via Japanese ships at exorbitant rates, proposed to pay 12,000 yen annually for this service. Sheng Hsüan-huai, who controlled the Chinese company, rejected the offer, arguing that the sum would not cover expenses. Li mediated an agreement be­ tween Yuan and Sheng by promising to subsidize the venture with another 12,000 yen annually. The service began operation in 1888

KOREA

*4

but had little success. Third, Yuan negotiated two loans for the Korean government from a Cantonese firm in Seoul, T'ung-shunt'ai; the government used the money, some 200,000 taels of silver, to pay for a ship it had bought on credit from a German company. Japan was China's chief economic rival in Korea at this time, although the abortive coup of 1884 had somewhat curtailed Japa­ nese activity in Korean politics. Japan was the principal buyer of Korean commodities, accounting for 95 percent of Korea's exports in 1891. She exported cotton goods to Korea in exchange for rice, soybeans, and gold. The rice was important in alleviating Japan's chronic food shortage; when Korea prohibited its export in 1889 because of a poor crop, Japan protested vigorously. Korean gold was also important to Japan, enabling her to adopt the gold stan­ dard. Japan established banks in Pusan and other Korean trading ports. She not only lent money to the Korean government but also minted some of its coinage. By 1892, the Japanese population in Korea had reached 10,000. As Table 1 shows, however, China was gradually challenging Japan's economic supremacy. Chinese ex­ ports to Korea rose continuously from 1886 to 1892, a develop­ ment that Japan could not watch without apprehension. She be­ came even more determined to sever Korea from China. Events were soon to provide the opportunity she had been awaiting. In April 1894, Kim Ok Kiun was murdered by the son of Hong Yong Sik, the postmaster-general whom the Chinese had executed after the attempted 1884 coup. Hong’s son bitterly resented the other pro-Japanese leaders for giving his father the dangerous asTable 1. Chinese and Japanese Goods Imported at Inchon, Wonsan, and Pusan

Year 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892

Value in U.S. dollars Chinese goods Japanese goods 331,342 454,015 742,661 860,338 1,101,585 1,660,075 2 ,148,254 2 ,055,555

1,377,342 2,064,353 2 ,080,787 2 ,196,115 2 ,299,116 3,086,897 3,226,468 2 ,555,675

Percentage China Japan 19% 17 26 28 32 32 40 45

81% 83 74 72

68 68 60 55

Li Ch'ing-yüan, C h ’a o -h s ie n c h in -ta i- s h ih (A history of modern Korea), Chinese trans. by Ting Tse-liang and Hsia Yü-wen (Peking, 1955), p. 73.

so u rc e :

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25

signment of returning the king, and he had long been planning his revenge. After winning Kim’s trust, Hong traveled with him from Japan to Shanghai, where the shooting occurred. Acting on Li Hung-chang’s instructions, the Shanghai authorities arrested Hong and sent him to Seoul, along with Kim’s body. The king immedi­ ately gave Hong a high post in the government and had Kim’s body displayed publicly in eight provinces, then quartered—all against the advice of Li, Yuan, and the British minister to China, N. R. O’Conor.87 At about the same time in Tokyo, a Korean tried, unsuccessfully, to assassinate Pak Yong Hio, another promi­ nent leader of the 1884 coup. Later the man confessed that he had acted on his king’s orders. In a subsequent debate, many mem­ bers of the Japanese Diet charged that these attacks were hostile acts against Japan, and urged the government to take action. How­ ever, both Premier Ito and Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu refused to be provoked into a premature confrontation.88 The incident that finally brought the Sino-Japanese rivalry to a head was the Tong Hak Rebellion. The Tong Hak Society was a religious sect founded in Korea in i860. Its tenets, a mixture of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism, envisioned the purification of society through the purification of individuals. As its name sug­ gests— tong hak means “Eastern learning”—the sect was strongly antagonistic to Western culture, especially Roman Catholicism. After 1864, the society swung radically toward political activism, organizing protests against excessive taxation, government corrup­ tion, and foreign encroachment. In 1892 and 1893, it expressed these views in two petitions, which the government ignored. The society continued to grow. The famine of 1893 drove many hungry people into the sect and led to a short-lived revolt. The next year, the exorbitant taxes imposed on the people in the south lent more force to the Tong Hak appeal; another revolt occurred.89 This time the insurgents, with substantial popular support, had some success—to the point where the Korean army was unable to put down the rebellion. At a loss, the king turned to China for help.40 The 1885 treaty between China and Japan stipulated that if either nation sent troops to Korea, the other must be informed. The king requested aid at the end of May 1894. On June 2, an interpreter from the Japanese legation called on Yuan to express Japan’s anxiety over her trade and the safety of her people in

26

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Korea. He asked why China had not sent troops to pacify the re­ bellion, adding that Japan had “no other designs if China dis­ patched her troops.“ The next day, the Japanese chargé d'affaires assured Yuan that Japan wanted China to intervene in Korea.* In response to these requests, Li Hung-chang sent 1,500 men of his Hwai Army to Korea and informed the Japanese government of his decision. On the very day the troops sailed, the Japanese consul in Tientsin urged Li to dispatch Chinese soldiers to Korea. Li did not know that Japanese forces were also on their way to Inchon on the pretext of protecting Japanese nationals and prop­ erty. When Yuan learned this, he was alarmed and went to the Japanese chargé for an explanation. The chargé once more as­ sured him that Japan had no designs. The presence of both Chinese and Japanese forces in Korea overshadowed the local rebellion. On June 10, as the tension rose sharply, the Russian and French legations began to evacuate their staffs. Two days later, with 1,000 Japanese soldiers in Seoul, Japa­ nese Minister Otori told Yuan that Japan intended to participate in the campaign against the rebels. She would withdraw her men as soon as the rebellion was quelled and peace and order were re­ stored. Li Hung-chang, who had no thought of waging a war against Japan, now realized how precarious the situation was. He ordered his troops to halt at Kwangju, south of Pyongyang, and Yuan and Otori entered into a verbal agreement to the effect that neither country would send more troops to Korea. The Korean government, faced with this explosive situation, now requested Li to withdraw his troops, explaining that “the rebels, having heard of the arrival of the troops from the Celestial Empire, are terrified and know that their days are numbered.“41 Through shrewd maneuvering, Japan had by now seized the initiative from Li Hung-chang. Her troops in Korea had increased from 1,000 on June 12 to 15,000 on June 21, outnumbering the Chinese two to one. Moreover, they were deployed at strategic points, including Inchon, Pusan, and Seoul. China found herself in an extremely awkward position. Her soldiers had come to Korea to suppress the rebels in the south; but this was now im­ possible because Japanese troops were blocking the way. A with• Yuan to Li, in Li Hung-chang, Telegrams, chiian 15, p. 34a. Because of these reports. Yuan was blamed for leading Li into a disastrous war.

KO R EA

27

drawal at this point would mean the surrender of China’s suzer­ ainty over Korea, thus exposing China’s frontier to Japanese pene­ tration. Li became irresolute. Facing the dilemma of how to protect China’s interests and still avoid a war, Li turned to diplomatic channels. First he made di­ rect contacts with Japan to try to secure a withdrawal of all troops. When this failed, he asked the British and Russian ministers to China, O’Conor and Cassini, to try to mediate a modus vivendi. On June 28, representatives of Britain, Russia, the United States, and France sent joint notes to the Japanese and Chinese ministers requesting simultaneous troop withdrawals. China agreed, but Japan did not. Count Mutsu, recalling this diplomatic failure in his memoirs, said that it “gave my country a free hand and per­ sonally I was pleased.”42 On the day the diplomats delivered their notes, Japan demanded that the king of Korea declare his country independent and re­ form his government. In response, the king appointed Kim Hong Chip premier to negotiate with Japan. Mutsu again recorded,“ The issue of political reform was in fact devised to settle the complex problem between Japan and China. . . . We intended to use it either to promote a peaceful solution . . . or, if that was impossible, to hasten a final showdown.”48 Conducted under extreme duress, the negotiations showed little progress. On July 22, Japanese troops broke into the palace, seized the king, the queen, and their children, and imprisoned them at the Japanese legation. In place of the kidnapped monarch, Japan reinstated the aged Tai Won Kun as regent. In China, members of the Grand Council—especially Grand Secretary Weng T ’ung-ho, who served as both the imperial tutor and the president of the Board of Revenue—launched a relentless attack on Li Hung-chang’s bungling appeasement.* The scholar Chang Chien, Yuan’s friend, advised Weng and the war party.44 Yuan himself advocated a strong policy toward Japan. In despair, Li resolved to fight and dispatched more soldiers to Korea. On July 25, the British steamer Kowshing, carrying 1,220 Chinese soldiers, was intercepted and sunk off the coast of Korea by the • The Grand Council opposed settling the Korean situation with the help of a third power. See CJCC, 2: 581 and 4: 480, and Li Hung-chang, Telegrams, chüan 16, p. 22b.

28

K OR EA

Japanese cruiser Naviwa. Two days later, the imprisoned king was forced to declare war against his suzerain. On July 31, the tenno declared war against China; the Chinese emperor responded with a declaration the next day. China and Japan fought from July 1894 to March 1895, first in Korea and then in Manchuria and on the Yellow Sea. China was soundly defeated in all three major campaigns. Sir Robert Hart commented, “China has given no offense—has done no wrong— does not wish to fight, and is willing to make sacrifices: She is a big ‘sick m an/ convalescing very slowly from the sickening effects of peaceful centuries, and is being jumped on when down by this agile, healthy, well-armed Jap—will no one pull him off?’*45 Early in July 1894, after the failure of the four-power mediation. Yuan had asked the Tsungli Yamen to recall him, since his pres­ ence in Seoul was no longer necessary. His request denied, the once powerful resident became a pathetic figure. No one called on him, and all his servants deserted him. He soon fell ill, and T ’ang Shao-i carried on the routine work of his office. Finally, through Li Hung-chang's efforts, the Tsungli Yamen summoned Yuan to report on the situation in Korea. He was to go directly to Peking without stopping to see Li in Tientsin, a reversal of nor­ mal procedure that signified Li’s declining power.46 Yuan began this melancholy journey on July 19 and arrived a week later. On August 4, Li sent Yuan to Pyongyang as quartermaster of the Chi­ nese army.47 Before reaching the city, Yuan received news of its fall. He stayed in Manchuria with Chou Fu and Hu Yü-fen, two Chinese officers, supplying provisions and equipment to the forces fighting there. This gave him another opportunity to witness the corruption and utter inefficiency of the Hwai Army—and its shat­ tering defeat. A provocative experience, it may have helped him decide to resume his career as a military instructor. Indeed, even as the Chinese were retreating from Manchuria, Hu Yü-fen sug­ gested to Yuan that he organize an army of his own.48 The signing of the Shimonoseki Treaty on April 17, 1895, marked the end of the war and the beginning of a new epoch in China, indeed in the Far East as a whole. In many ways, it was to be the worst period China had seen since being opened to the West.

TH REE

The Army, 1895-1899

T h e war and peace of 1895 ended China's suzerainty over Korea, as well as her sovereignty over Taiwan and Penghu (the Pesca­ dores). In addition, China was to pay Japan an indemnity of 200 million taels of silver in eight installments, a debt that virtually reduced her maritime customs service to a collection agency for Japan. She was forced to allow Japan to build factories on her soil; and by the application of the most-favored-nation clause, many other countries gained this right as well. A period of intense competition was thus inaugurated—in Lord Salisbury's words, the “battle of concessions.'' One of the war's most profound effects was the sense of panic that now seized the Chinese mind. The defeat had revealed serious defects in the policy of self-strengthening that China had pursued since the 1860's. Under the self-strengthening policy, new armies had been trained, a navy established, and arsenals and factories built. With these as security, China had enjoyed peace and order for nearly 30 years. But the peace was a precarious one. The dynasty's safety depended largely on the strength of the Hwai Army and the North­ ern Fleet. It was because Li Hung-chang knew the real limitations of those forces that he had accepted the Japanese challenge so re­ luctantly. Others with less precise knowledge blamed Li for follow­ ing a weak, irresolute policy and urged him to be firmer. After his ruin, Li was sent on a long tour. Wang Wen-shao assumed the positions of viceroy of Chihli and commissioner for trade; but the real power fell into the hands of Jung-lu. Jung-lu's immediate task was to secure the imperial capital, not so much against a foreign invasion as against a possible internal uprising of those disaffected by the government's policy. Stunned by the defeat of 1895, most government officials—including Chang Chih-

30

THE ARMY

tung, the powerful viceroy of Hupei and Hunan—saw no other answer to China's problems than to intensify the efforts at self­ strengthening. They continued to regard China's traditional social and political systems as nearly perfect but admitted her military and technological weakness. All that she needed, they felt, was a modem, efficient army and a developed industrial economy to support it. Eventually, their policy led to the establishment of the Newly Created Army (Hsin-chien Lu-chiin). Outside government circles, however, the self-strengthening pol­ icy now became an object of ridicule. There were many critics— and they did not mince words. Li had become "a laughingstock among all barbarian peoples," wrote one.1 Another was less harsh, but still outspoken: Have we not seen Li Hung-chang's navy, foreign-style army, and military and medical schools? Have we not seen Chang Chih-tung’s colleges, found­ ries, and Self-Strengthening Army? Those were the results of Li's efforts for 30 years and Chang's for 15. If we allow other Li's and Chang's to pur­ sue the same policy for another 50 years, to proceed at the same snail's pace,. . . in the end, we shall have another crop of schools and foreignstyle troops, who in another emergency will turn and run for their lives as their predecessors did in 1895.2

Far more radical than the official leaders, the partisans of this school of thought advocated the adoption of a constitution and a thorough reform of the government. They refused to trust the cor­ rupt, archaic administrative machine with any modernization pro­ gram. To them, the survival of the country was far more impor­ tant than the preservation of Confucian values and imperial pre­ rogatives. Their efforts culminated in the reform of 1898.8 Yuan Shih-k'ai had a role in both the army modernization and the reform movement, and he soon realized their incompatibility. As an important military instructor, Yuan’s principal duty was to defend the dynasty; as a sympathizer of reform, his principal duty was to protect the interests of the nation. From 1895 on, especially after 1900, the interests of the dynasty and those of the nation grew further and further apart. Yuan's personal fortune was caught up in this larger historical process, and he had to make choices at several critical points in a turbulent era. Let us look at the army first. In the 1860's, self-strengthening had been financed by the newly

THE ARMY

3»

reorganized and expanded maritime customs service, which pro­ vided more than one-third of the government’s annual revenues. Now these revenues were pledged against foreign loans raised to pay the war indemnity. Without them, the new fighting force could not be larger than the old one. Further, modernization had to be confined to the army. China could not afford to revive her dream of becoming a maritime power, which France and Japan had shattered in the wars of 1884 and 1895. In fact, she could not really afford to maintain her existing ground forces—the surviving units of the Hwai Army, plus a traditional army of some 800,000 archers and lancers equipped with a few outmoded Mausers— while training new troops. But the situation at the time demanded just that. The remnants of the Hwai Army included General Nieh Shihch’eng’s Tenacious Army and General Sung Ch’ing’s Resolute Army. Along with General Tung Fu-hsiang’s Kansu Army, which was little more than a band of brigands, these forces were respon­ sible for the defense of the imperial capital and northern China. Although the soldiers showed a certain bloodthirsty bravery, they numbered only 70,000, lacked training and discipline, and were ill-equipped with guns of various makes and calibers. The des­ perate need for a new army was obvious. Late in 1894, at a crucial stage of the war, the German adviser von Hanneken had submitted a modernization plan to both the Grand Council and the Tsungli Yamen. He proposed training 100,000 troops, with Sir Robert Hart in control of the funds. Weng T ’ung-ho, the grand secretary and imperial tutor, favored the idea, considering it “China’s only way to survive.”4 Weng's initiative here, as later in the reform movement, was a move to fill the power vacuum created by Li Hung-chang’s downfall. The British Min­ ister O’Conor put forward a similar suggestion on army train­ ing; moreover, he thought that Hart was the person best suited to take full control. Under Weng’s instructions, with the Grand Council’s and Jung-lu’s approval, Hu Yü-fen worked out a de­ tailed program for army modernization. His plan emphasized uni­ form equipment, established ranks, and training by foreign in­ structors. Northern China was to be responsible for training 50,000 soldiers, southern China for 30,000, and Hupei and Hunan for 20,000—at an estimated total cost of 14 million taels of silver.

3*

THE ARMY

Other important officials memorialized the throne on this sub­ ject, including Chang Chih-tung and Wang Wen-shao. Sheng Hsüan-huai, Li Hung-chang's lieutenant in commercial and in­ dustrial affairs, presented a plan for training a new army. He put the number of new troops required at 300,000, insisting that the traditional forces (the Bannermen and the Green Standard) be de­ mobilized. A soldier would serve for 14 years—three in the stand­ ing army with full pay, three in the reserves, three as a retained soldier, and five in a militia unit. After the first three years, a soldier could return to civilian life, though he would be expected to take part in maneuvers; throughout the 14 years, he was to be exempted from other forms of state labor. The Grand Council's less ambitious program fixed the quota for the first four months at 4,000 to 5,000 men. Hsiaochan, located between Peking and Tientsin, was selected as headquarters for the new force. It was here that Li Hung-chang had maintained the barracks of his Hwai Army for over 20 years. Hu Yü-fen, not Yuan Shih-K'ai, was appointed supervisor, and von Hanneken was named the chief instructor. Hu, a competent and enlightened official, could not get along with the German, because, as he said, Hanneken was greedy and arrogant. Before long he gave up army administration in favor of building railways, and Yuan Shih-k'ai was then brought in to succeed him. Yuan's knowledge and experience made him the best qualified candidate of all his contemporaries. Further, he had a spotless reputation and had shown considerable interest in the work. In May 1895, shortly after the end of the war, he wrote to Li Hungtsao, a member of the Grand Council: The weakness of our troops does not lie so much in quantity as in quality, not so much in their physical strength as in their lack of training. Worst of all, they lack uniform organization, a unified command, and stem dis­ cipline. They are impossible to control and do not have enough spirit to face an enemy.. . . Under these circumstances, we should do our best to rectify the mis­ takes of the past—by eliminadng superfluous units, cutting excessive ex­ penses, dismissing incompetent officers, and tightening up discipline. In addition, we should select a few highly respected generals and give them the freedom and the financial support necessary to reorganize our exist­ ing troops into several big units; these should be stationed at strategic points. We ought to employ foreign instructors to assist in the work of reorganization. Both our own traditional methods and European meth-

THE ARMY

33

ods should be adapted, after careful deliberation, to create a new system. . . . At the same time, military academies to train selected cadets must be set up and staffed with foreign experts; later these cadets should be sent abroad for further study. On their return, they should be given a military command according to their abilities.®

As a result of this letter. Yuan was called to the capital in June for consultation. He and Hu Yü-fen, and indeed a host of others, fully realized the meaning of the assignment, both for the nation and for the man selected.* Rivalry between the two was inevitable. In July, Hu wrote to Li Hung-tsao describing Yuan as arrogant.6 Chang P’ei-lun, another highly placed lieutenant of Li Hungchang, also wrote to Li Hung-tsao to criticize Yuan: I have had several talks with him and found him boastful and utterly unreliable. His past history shows that he is conceited, extravagant, lech­ erous, ruthless, and treacherous. Sir, you are right to treat him as the son of a friend, but gravely wrong to esteem him as a man of rare qualides. I am compelled to speak up about him; for having misled Li Hungchang, he may now attempt to mislead you and indeed our country.7

In spite of these personal attacks, Li Hung-tsao had formed a dis­ tinctly good impression of Yuan; so had Jung-lu and Weng T ’ungho.8 But one fact weighed heavily against him: Yuan had joined Liang Ch'i-ch’ao's Strengthening Study Society, a reformist orga­ nization. After Hu's resignation, Jung-lu asked Yuan to make a report on army training. Yuan did so at great length, advocating the use of German methods.9 Seconded by Jung-lu, Li Hung-tsao recom­ mended Yuan for the position. Yuan had strong support in other quarters as well: both the notorious, powerful Prince Ch'ing and the grand eunuch, Li Lien-ying, favored his appointment. On De­ cember 8, 1895, the Grand Council presented a memorial to the throne recommending that Yuan be made commander of the Newly Created Army and supervisor of its training. Yuan was then thirty-six years old. The army at Hsiaochan was made up of ten corps and num­ bered 3,000 infantrymen, 1,000 artillerymen, 250 cavalrymen, and 500 engineers. The infantry was divided into two regiments, con• The assignment was especially important in light of Chiang Kai-shek’s ap­ pointment as the director of the Whampoa Academy and Lin Piao’s as the director of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College.

34

THE ARMY

sisting of units armed with rapid-fire guns, units with heavy artil­ lery, and reserve units. The engineers were divided into bridge­ building, fortification, ordnance, repair, surveying, mine-laying, and telegraph detachments. There were also four administrative bureaus: supply, ordnance, transport, and foreign affairs (intelli­ gence). According to Yuan’s report to the Grand Council, foreignstyle training should be continued, and the number of drill in­ structors increased from two (a German and a Norwegian) to five. He also proposed to expand the army from 5,000 to 7,000 men. According to a wage scale Yuan devised, the total monthly payroll would amount to 70,000 taels of silver. This and other expenses were to come from the Board of Revenue.10 Yuan’s chief-of-staff was his old friend Hsii Shih-ch’ang, who knew nothing of military affairs.* T ’ang Shao-i, Yuan’s assistant in Korea, continued on as his secretary. The German-trained Manchu General Yin-ch’ang, who was the head of the military academy at Tientsin, recommended four of his best students to Yuan: Feng Kuo-chang, Tuan Ch’i-jui (also German-trained), Wang Shih-chen, and Liang Hua-tien. Liang later drowned during a night maneu­ ver, but the other three assumed important positions in the army. Feng became Yuan’s aide-de-camp and headed the infantry school; Tuan commanded and instructed the artillery corps; and Wang held a similar post with the engineering corps. As Yuan understood it, the army’s duties were “to defend the honor of the country and to suppress violence on behalf of the people.”11 By “country” (kuo), he did not mean the Chinese na­ tion but the throne, the realm, the dynasty. In classical parallel sentences, his recruitment notices stressed over and over again the graciousness of the throne and the corresponding debt of gratitude owed by the people.12 Indeed, an important goal of the soldiers’ training was to “consolidate their loyalty” to the throne.13 If the army was to perform its imperial duties, Yuan felt it must emulate Western models.14 Like most of the Chinese who were not xéno­ phobes, Yuan tended to idealize the West. He once remarked, for example, “In the West there is not a single civilian who does not understand military affairs. Conversely, every soldier is an edu• Hsii had had a checkered career since he and Yuan had parted as young men. Although he held a chin-shih, the highest degree, he was not an out­ standing scholar and had not won a promising appointment. (He was also hindered by the death of his mother, which interrupted his career.) At Hsiaochan, he was actually working under a man with no degree.

THE ARMY

35

cated man."16 Imitating the West, as Yuan had suggested to Li Hung-tsao, meant simplifying the army's organization, concentrat­ ing power in a few hands, and making discipline more stringent— all tasks he undertook at Hsiaochan. He organized the new army differently from both the traditional forces and Li Hung-chang’s Hwai Army. His system was soon adopted by the other army units reorganized under Jung-lu.16 In firm personal control of the operations at Hsiaochan, Yuan con­ centrated on developing professionalism and discipline among the troops.17 Just as he had established rigorous standards for his re­ cruits,* Yuan imposed stem regulations on their conduct; theft, rape, rioting, and desertion all carried the death penalty.18 He also took special steps to discourage opium smoking. Finally, to pre­ vent embezzlement, the soldiers were paid individually under Yuan's supervision, as opposed to the customary practice of issuing the money to the commanding officers. (Even so, in April 1897, a censor wrote a memorial to the emperor charging Yuan with bru­ tality and corruption. In response to this, Jung-lu went to Hsiao­ chan to investigate in person. On his return, he paid an unquali­ fied tribute to Yuan's accomplishments. Two years later, when Yuan and the censor met again in Shantung, all was forgiven and forgotten; in fact Yuan took the man into his secretariat.19) Yuan’s army was equipped primarily with foreign goods—in­ cluding arms, tools, tunics, boots, canvas tents, raincoats, blankets, field glasses, drums, telephones, arid medicine.20 The infantry was armed with standardized Mauser rifles, the cavalry with both Mau­ sers and lances, and the artillery with Maxim machine guns and six-gun batteries of one- to six-pounders. The officers came from two major sources: they were either grad­ uates of the Peiyang Military Academy in Tientsin or veterans without much formal education. The former prided themselves on their scholarly knowledge, the latter on their battle experience.21 Yuan's way of reducing tension between the two groups was to emphasize their common duty to the throne, as well as his own expectations of them.22 A great moment in Yuan's career came when the British rear• They should be twenty to twenty-five years of age, at least 4 feet, 8 inches in height, able to lift 100 pounds, and able to walk %i/t miles an hour. They should not be physically deformed or addicted to opium, and should have no criminal record. Yuan Shih-k’ai, ed., Hsin-chien lu-chiin, pp. 85-87.

36

THE ARMY

admiral Lord Charles Beresford visited Hsiaochan in October 1896. The admiral was deeply impressed by the sturdy Shantung men under Yuan's command. “By Western standards," he com­ mented, “Yuan Shih-k’ai’s troops were the only completely equipped force in the empire."23 On December 10, 1896, a year after his appointment. Yuan re­ ported to the throne the formation of a full-scale division, con­ sisting of eight infantry battalions (8,000 men), two artillery bat­ talions (2,000 men), two cavalry battalions (1,000 men), and one engineering battalion (1,000 men). The force was further divided into two wings, or brigades.24 For his achievements. Yuan was pro­ moted to the rank of provincial judge of Chihli in July 1897.20 His reputation was growing. Wu Ju-lun, a great scholar, had writ­ ten him in January 1896: “I have heard that your troops have adopted Western military techniques. This is undoubtedly the most urgent task of our time."26 Above all, both Jung-lu and Weng T ’ung-ho continued to admire and trust Yuan. Their favor was especially important: Jung-lu was a firm supporter of the Dow­ ager Empress Tz’u-hsi, and Weng was the emperor’s tutor. The Newly Created Army continued to grow. Meanwhile, Chang Chih-tung’s Self-Strengthening Army was taking shape in Hankow and Wuchang, and General Nieh Shih-ch'eng was reor­ ganizing his Tenacious Army. Although Nieh’s troops numbered nearly 10,000, only slightly fewer than Yuan's, they were inferior in training and equipment. From these separate efforts, the de­ fense of the empire was gradually consolidated. At the beginning of 1898, there were five armies stationed around the capital: Gen­ eral Nieh at the entrance to Tientsin, General Sung Ch'ing at the northeast pass to Peking, Jung-lu on the outskirts of Peking, Gen­ eral Tung Fu-hsiang near Chichow, and Yuan himself at Hsiao­ chan. Although untested in battle, the Hsiaochan troops were re­ puted to be the strongest. Being a shrewd man, Yuan was fully aware of their importance to the dynasty and to his own personal career. The Newly Created Army was Yuan’s power base, just as the Hwai Army had been Li Hung-chang’s. And as everyone clearly understood, it was no coincidence that the loss of the Hwai Army led to Li's eclipse. Yuan was not exclusively concerned with military matters dur­ ing this period. His experiences in Korea, especially the 1895 war.

THE ARMY

37

had convinced him that a rigid adherence to tradition was re­ sponsible for the decline of China and Korea. He believed that the need for reform extended beyond the military. In fact, the demand for thoroughgoing reforms had been growing since 1895. In that year, K’ang Yu-wei, a commoner and a candidate in the metropolitan examination, had joined more than a thousand oth­ ers in petitioning the throne for immediate reform. K’ang and his comrades, including Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and T ’an Ssu-t’ung, also or­ ganized societies all over the country to promote their cause. To show his support. Yuan joined one of them. By June 1898, K’ang and the other reformers had presented seven “letters” to Emperor Kuang-hsii, as well as essays on Peter the Great, the Meiji Restoration, and the tragedies of Poland and Turkey. When this material was delivered to the Southern Study of the palace, Weng T ’ung-ho read it with interest and admiration.27 Shortly after the 1895 treaty, the aging tutor discussed reform with the young monarch. News of this leaked out to the dowager em­ press, who subsequently denied Weng access to the Southern Study. This reproof cut short the first attempt at reform; but it was pri­ marily through Weng’s advocacy that the emperor eventually de­ cided to adopt the drastic measures K’ang proposed. Meanwhile, the battle of concessions was being raged ruthlessly. In 1898, Germany acquired a lease on the land around Kiaochow Bay. As compensation, Russia seized Port Arthur and Dairen, which were subsequently leased to her. Similarly, Britain and France encroached on China’s sovereignty in the southwest. A fear of dismemberment, of being “cut up like a melon or handed out like beans,” suddenly seized the country, giving impetus to the reform movement. K’ang Yu-wei hurried to Peking to make an­ other urgent plea for reform. Weng T ’ung-ho, calling K’ang a hundred times more competent than himself, suggested to the emperor that the reformer be placed in charge of China’s affairs. The ultimate aims of the reformers—national power and wealth —did not differ radically from those of the self-strengtheners; nor did the economic programs of the two schools differ greatly. In one major respect, however, the reformers disagreed with their prede­ cessors. They believed that the West’s success in the worldwide competition among nations for wealth and power was due to her superior institutions and administrative methods. China must

38

THE ARMY

adopt Western institutions if she was to preserve her national integrity. In essence, the reform of 1898 proposed to change China's tra­ ditional educational and examination systems so that they would produce the kind of civil servants China needed. The reformers also proposed to open channels of communication between the rulers and the people by creating societies for political discussion. These societies would eventually lead to the establishment of a parliament and a constitution. In other words, the reform meant no less than a total restructuring of the Confucian Empire into a modern nation-state with a constitutional monarch. The imperial proclamation of reform was issued on June 11, 1898. K’ang was appointed head of the Office of the Constitution, and his power over the emperor was considerable. Five days after the proclamation, the emperor granted him an audience of nine hours. The Hundred Days’ Reform was under way. The conserva­ tives, led by the dowager empress, were alarmed by this rapid de­ velopment and took steps to abort it. Weng T'ung-ho was relieved of all his duties and “graciously commanded to go home”; Jung-lu was appointed viceroy of Chihli and commander of the Peking police; and plans were made for the empress and emperor to in­ spect the army at Tientsin, at a date to be determined later. Following these moves, the conservatives transferred General Nieh Shih-ch’eng’s Tenacious Army from Taku to Tientsin and Tung Fu-hsiang’s Kansu Braves from Chichow to the outskirts of Peking. It became obvious to the reformers that their ultimate fate depended on the attitude of the military leaders, especially on that of Yuan Shih-k’ai, who had previously expressed sympathy with the movement. On September 14, Yuan was ordered to Pe­ king for an audience with the emperor. They met on September 16, and immediately afterward Yuan was promoted from provin­ cial judge to vice-president of the Board of War, in full command of all military training in the empire. The next morning, Yuan went to the palace to express his gratitude; at that time, the em­ peror informed him of the irrevocable decision to pursue the re­ form. On September 18, Yuan visited Li Hung-chang and later Prince Ch’ing. At dusk, he received a telegram from Jung-lu, urging him to return to Tientsin at once because of reports that British and

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Russian gunboats were sailing toward Chefoo. Yuan and his secre­ tary were drafting a reply when the porter announced the arrival of an uninvited guest, T ’an Ssu-t’ung. T ’an was a young reformer and philosopher of considerable reputation. At this time, he held an important post in the Grand Council. A full record of this cru­ cial meeting is found in Yuan’s journal: I know of him as a newly appointed and trusted adviser to His Majesty. His unheralded visit at this hour must mean that he has serious matters to consult me about, so I put down the writing-brush and go out to greet him. Mr. T 'an is in informal clothes. Having congratulated me on my promotion, he says he wants to talk to me alone. This strikes me as odd, but I lead him to a chamber at the back of the temple. Our conversation begins with the usual compliments and then turns to physiognomy. T 'an sees in me the makings of a great military leader. Suddenly he asks, “Are you going to say good-bye to His Majesty on the 20th?“ I refer to the news of British warships approaching the coast and tell him that I will request His Majesty’s permission to leave tomorrow for Tientsin. T'an replies, “Our worries lie at home, not abroad.'' I immediately ask for an explanation and he says, “Mr. Yuan, you have just been granted an ex­ ceptional favor, for which, I am sure, you are anxious to show your grati­ tude. His Majesty is in grave danger, and you, Mr. Yuan, are the only one who can help!'' My face turns pale and I repeat, “My family has received imperial kindness for generations; of course I must place myself entirely at His Majesty's command. But I am afraid I do not understand what you mean by danger.’’ T ’an explains, “Jung-lu has recently proposed to de­ throne and murder the Emperor. Did you know that?” I deny any knowl­ edge of it, for I often see His Excellency Jung-lu at Tientsin and know him, in both word and deed, to be an upright and loyal man. I suggest that the rumor is completely groundless. But T 'an says, “Mr. Yuan, you are a straightforward man and therefore may not be aware of his guile. He is outwardly nice to you, but in fact he is both suspicious and jealous of you. Your long, hard work has won admiration from people at home and abroad, and yet you have been promoted only once. Why? It is en­ tirely due to Jung-lu's obstruction. The other day Mr. K’ang spoke highly of you to His Majesty, but the Emperor merely said that according to the Empress and Jung-lu, you were arrogant and disobedient. Many people can prove this. It is perfectly tru e.. . . Your recent promotion did not come at all easily. If you really mean to help His Majesty out of the present difficulty, I have a plan.” Mr. T ’an then produces a piece of paper,. . . on which are these words: “Jung-lu plans to dethrone and murder H.M. Traitor! Must be done away with as soon as possible—else H.M.'s position is untenable. Yuan leaves for Tientsin on the 20th. Give him a mandate in the Vermilion Pencil, ordering him to arrest and execute Jung-lu. Yuan takes over the viceroyalty and the commissionership. Make known Jung-lu’s treachery

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THE ARMY

to the public. Stop telegraph and railway services. Yuan and his troops should then come to Peking to guard the Forbidden City and besiege the Summer Palace. Commit suicide in H.M.’s presence if plan rejected/' I am petrified and ask why I should besiege the Summer Palace. "The old ro tten ----- [the Dowager Empress] must be eliminated, or our coun­ try will perish/’ T ’an explains, “but that will be my job. You need not bother/’ I tell him, “Her Majesty's regency of over 30 years has seen China safely through many disasters. She is widely loved. My soldiers are taught to be loyal; I cannot turn them into rebels/’ T 'an goes on, “I have recruited scores of brave men and have sent for many more from Hunan. They will be here soon. It is my job to do away with the old ro tte n ----- ; you need not trouble yourself. What you, Mr. Yuan, must do is first kill Jung-lu and second besiege the Summer Palace. If you refuse, I shall die here and now. My life is now in your hands just as yours is in mine. We must come to a decision tonight before His Majesty receives me in audi­ ence.’’ The conversation continues: I: “This is a grave matter that cannot be decided in haste. I would sooner die than give you my word tonight Furthermore, I do not believe that His Majesty will grant his permission without due consideration/’ T ’an: “I have ways to make sure of that. I can promise that you will get a mandate in the Vermilion Pencil on the 20th." He speaks with authority and inflexibility. Since he is in the sovereign’s trust, I am wary of refusing him outright I fear that unpre­ dictable harm may come my way. All I can do under the circumstances is to find excuses and avoid committing myself. I explain to him, “Tien­ tsin is a cosmopolitan city. The assassination of the Viceroy there is bound to arouse a great outcry among the inhabitants, Chinese and for­ eigners alike; it may provide the foreign powers with an excuse to inter­ vene and carve China up like a melon. Moreover, the armies of Generals Sung, Tung, and Nieh each number about 40,000 to 50,000 men. There are also other troops [near Tientsin], including 70 corps of the Hwai Army. Several thousand Manchu forces are stationed at the capital. I have only 7,000 men, of whom 6,000 can be thrown into battle. How can I possibly hope to succeed in what you ask me to do? As soon as I make a move, the capital will be heavily guarded. The sovereign’s position will certainly become untenable/’ “But Mr. Yuan/' T ’an argues, “I am sure you can strike a lightning blow. As soon as you act, a mandate in the Vermilion Pencil will be issued to all our armies; the foreign embassies will be informed as well. No one will dare oppose you.” I then note, “Most of my army’s supplies are stored in T ientsin;. . . I must have time to accumulate ammunition and provisions before taking action.” “I shall ask His Majesty to give you a mandate in the Vermilion Pencil,” T ’an suggests, “while you go on with your preparations. When you are ready, please let me know, so that we can act in concert” “I am not thinking of my own safety,” I add, “but what will we do if news of the plan leaks out, placing His Majesty in danger? No, nothing should be put in writ­ ing. There must be no mandate in the Vermilion Pencil. Please allow me time to think. I shall let you know within two or three weeks.”

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But T ’an is insistent: “His Majesty wants this to be done quickly. We must come to a decision tonight so that I can report back to him. In fact, I can show you a mandate in the Vermilion Pencil now/’ When T ’an shows it to me, I see it is written in black ink. The handwriting is exqui­ site and the style similar to the sovereign’s. It reads: “We have resolved to reform, but the old ministers are reluctant to lend their support. We cannot force the pace, lest Her Gracious Majesty, the Dowager Empress, be displeased. We hereby command Yang Jui, Liu Kuang-ti, Lin Hsü, and T ’an Ssu-t’ung to find a better approach.” The overall tone of the mandate suggests that the four men named want to quicken the pace of reform, whereas His Majesty refuses to do so. I therefore say, “This is not in the Vermilion Pencil, and it mentions neither the execution of His Excellency Jung-lu nor the siege of the Summer Palace.” T ’an offers this explanation: “The copy in the Vermilion Pencil is with Lin Hsü; this one was made out for me by Yang Jui. There is no doubt of its authenticity. It was issued three days ago. I was upset that Lin Hsü did not let me have it at once. His negligence may have harmful conse­ quences. The better approach referred to here implies both points you have raised.” His explanation confirms my suspicion of a forgery. There seems no point in continuing the discussion, so I make my position clear: “Heaven above me, I, Yuan-Shih-k'ai, have never been ungrateful to His Majesty. I will not put my liege lord in jeopardy. The whole subject must be thought over carefully and a foolproof plan devised. I must con­ fess that I have no courage to become a public enemy.” T ’an remains inflexible.. . . I have also noticed that something like a weapon bulges out from under his jacket. I have a feeling that he is deter­ mined not to leave empty-handed. Therefore I tell him, “There will be a military review in Tientsin next month, where all the armies will con­ gregate. If His Majesty cares to give us even a scrap of paper, who dares to disobey and what cannot be accomplished?” “That is too far away,” T ’an claims. “His Majesty might be murdered before then.” I say that I do not believe anything of the kind will happen___T ’an asks, “If the ceremony is called off, what then?” I reply, “The ceremony is being pre­ pared and thousands of taels have already been spent on it. I do not think that Their Majesties will change their minds. Furthermore, I shall request His Excellency Jung-lu to make sure that the Empress does not revoke her decision. I shall see to that.” T 'an warns me, “It is now en­ tirely up to you either to repay the sovereign’s kindness, to help him out of his predicament. . . or to betray him, to endanger his life in order to obtain power and wealth.” I retort, “What sort of man do you think I am? My family has received imperial benevolence for three generations now. Do you think I am so ungrateful as to turn traitor? I will risk my life for my Emperor and my country.” T 'an is visibly moved. He stands up, salutes me, and calls me a good man---On the 20th, I bid farewell to His Majesty. . . . When I arrive at Tien­ tsin, it is already dusk. I pay a visit to His Excellency Jung-lu at once and report the latest developments at the palace. I say that His Majesty is loyal to the Empress, but that there are rogues forming cliques in the

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capital and endangering the throne. The blame lies with those serving His Majesty. In order to maintain peace, it is necessary to protect the sovereign. Since it is already midnight, I ask permission to leave and promise to return tomorrow. The next morning, His Excellency comes to see me instead. It is then that I report everything to him in detail. Jung-lu turns pale and cries, “If I have any intention of assassinating the Emperor, Heaven may condemn me to death!. . . ” I plead with him, “His Majesty had nothing to do with this at all. If anything happens to him, I will take poison!“28

Liang Ch’i-ch’ao records the same incident in his biography of T 'an Ssu-t'ung: On the evening of September 18, he [T’an] went to the Hua-fa Temple to see Yuan. He asked him openly, “What do you think of His Majesty?“ Yuan replied, “A great and sagacious ruler.“ T ’an asked further, “Do you know about the plot behind the forthcoming military ceremonies in Tientsin?“ Yuan said that he did. Then Mr. T 'an showed a confidential edict to Yuan and said, “You, Sir, are the only man who can help our wise Emperor. The decision is entirely yours.“ Mr. T ’an also touched his own neck with his hands and added, “If you decide against it, please go to the Summer Palace to report to Her Majesty. You will get wealth and power there.” Yuan retorted sternly, “W hat kind of man do you think I am? We both serve our sovereign and receive his favor. The duty of pro­ tecting him is not yours alone. Tell me what to do.” T ’an went on, “Jung-lu's scheme will be carried out at the military ceremonies. Your army and the two commanded by Tung and Nieh are under his control. He is going to use you all as instruments in his plan. But T ung and Nieh are nothing; only you, Mr. Yuan, are a strong man. You can crush the other two armies and protect His Majesty. The decision to restore authority to His Majesty and establish order at the palace is completely yours.” Yuan declared, “At the ceremony, if His Majesty rides into my headquarters and gives me the order to execute the villains, I shall cer­ tainly do my best, together with you and your friends___’’ Mr. T ’an asked, “Will it be easy to deal with a cunning man like Jung-lu?” Yuan replied with anger in his eyes, “When His Majesty comes to my head­ quarters, I shall kill Jung-lu as if slaughtering a dog.“29

Yuan's account differs considerably from Liang’s and from other records as well. Several points of interest emerge. First, although a radical, T 'an Ssu-t'ung would not resort to the threats Yuan described. They were simply not in keeping with his character. Furthermore, he would have known the futility of threatening a man renowned for his bravery and physical strength. Second, the confidential mandate shown to Yuan was very likely a genuine one in the Vermilion Pencil. T 'an was a strong advocate

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of seeking Yuan's help, and it is utterly inconceivable that he would attempt to induce Yuan into such an important undertak­ ing with only a copy of the document. Third, in both accounts above. Yuan willingly pledged his sup­ port to the emperor and promised not to betray the reformers' trust. According to him, he did not tell Jung-lu about the re­ formers' plan until the morning of September 21, after the con­ servatives had staged a coup in Peking, imprisoning the emperor and ending the reform. But the question remains, what did he and Jung-lu talk about from sunset to midnight on the 20th? (One source reports that Yuan arrived at Tientsin even earlier that day, on the 3:00 p .m . train.80) Every account except Yuan's agrees that he went to see Jung-lu right away and made a full report on the activities in the capital. According to the Shanghai newspaper Shen pao, Jung-lu immediately telegraphed Yuan's alarming news to the empress;81 many other sources say that Junglu left for Peking by train to appeal to the empress personally for action. There was time for either or both. On September 21, the empress went from the Summer Palace, about six miles west of Peking, to the imperial palace, interned the emperor, and proclaimed her second regency. With the help of British and Japanese friends, K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'ich'ao escaped abroad, but six other reform leaders were arrested and put to death. The offices that had been abolished were re­ stored; the changes in the examination system were reversed; all the reformers in the civil service were dismissed and punished. The reform came to an end. On September 25, Jung-lu was recalled to Peking. Yuan Shihk'ai took over the viceroyalty and commissionership until Yü-lu was appointed three days later. On September 29, the empress richly rewarded Yuan; he was to remain her henchman until her death in 1908.

FOUR

The Governor, 1899-1901

L ik e the Hundred Days' Reform, the Boxer Uprising was a direct result of foreign aggression. It began in the peninsular province of Shantung. Shantung had escaped much of the foreign interference suffered by the other coastal provinces since 1840. But the arrival of missionaries to set up churches in the villages led to cultural confrontation, resentment, property disputes, and litigations. The situation was aggravated in the spring of 1898, when Germans came to build railways and to mine. The Shantung peasants were renowned for their physical and mental toughness. (Most of Yuan Shih-k’ai’s recruits at Hsiaochan came from this province.) At the same time, they were superstitious and backward. Apart from the experience of endless hardship, their main sources of knowledge were rudimentary, often heretical religious tenets preached by popular sects, and myths. During the second half of the nineteenth century, stories and myths became increasingly popular in China as an escape from ugly reality—a development made possible by the introduction of the modern printing press. Many Chinese believed in such phenomena as physical invulnerability, the emission of lethal lights from the eyes, the nostrils, and the fingertips, and the existence of invisible generals and armies far stronger than the visible ones. As the for­ eigners’ weapons became, in the words of a Chinese epithet, “in­ conceivably and obscenely advanced,” the magic tricks of the Chi­ nese grew more elaborate and allegedly more powerful. Although some considered this extreme belief in magic absurd, it reflected strong popular feelings toward the foreigners. The Boxers based their policy on these beliefs and feelings. The Boxer Movement and the Hundred Days’ Reform had a similar goal: the strengthening of China’s central government. If phrased more elegantly, the Boxers' slogan, “Support the Ch’ing

TH E GOVERNOR

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and wipe out the foreigners,” might have won the sympathy of many reformers. One eyewitness of the movement. Sir Robert Hart, described it as “patriotic in origin and justifiable in its fundamental ideas.”1 Another, Putnam Weale, described it as a “blight” attacking the foreigners: “We are accused by the whole population of North China.”2 C. F. Remer was even more explicit: “The movement may be regarded as evidence of a growing feeling of national patriotism in China.”8 But the similarity between the Boxers and the reformers ends here. The reformers were all scholarly gentry, well versed in China’s traditional political philosophy and acquainted with Western statecraft. They argued their case in a highly literate man­ ner. They had little trust in those in power and wanted to replace them with a new kind of official. In contrast, the Boxers were un­ sophisticated, crude, and violent. Their main tactics were slaugh­ ter and plunder. They had little trust in the gentry, proposing instead an alliance between the court aristocrats and the peasantry. The movement began to attract official attention early in 1898, but the provincial authorities took no effective steps against it. In terms of doctrine, it was regarded as no more heretical than the Christian churches; nor was it considered politically subversive. From May 1898 to March 1899, the Boxers gained substantial pop­ ular support for their brutal activities. Among their victims were Christian missionaries and converts and foreign engineers. The situation took a sharp turn in March, when Germany sent troops to Ichow in southern Shantung to protect her missionaries. The Peking government, fearing unpleasant consequences, cashiered the governor, Chang Ju-mei, and appointed Yii-hsien, a Manchu, in his place. The new governor soon fell under the spell of the Boxers. Instead of suppressing them, he became an enthusiastic sponsor of the movement. The Boxers went on killing and burn­ ing, violence for which the central government had to pay com­ pensation. The Germans demanded 100,000 taels for the loss of life and property at Ichow, and another 60,000 taels for damages to the Tsaochow churches in the summer of 1899. Toward the end of the year, clashes between Boxers and Christians became even more frequent. On December 6, 1899, Yü-hsien was recalled, and Yuan Shih-k’ai was appointed acting governor of Shantung, a post that soon became permanent. This important appointment was not unexpected. Yuan was

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already a senior official—a vice-president of the Board of Works since June 1899. After the collapse of the reform. Yuan's horizon had widened considerably, perhaps a sign of the empress's increas­ ing reliance on him. Military training remained his primary re­ sponsibility; and in 1899 he made two major defense proposals, that the empire's modem forces be increased to 10,000 men, and that the army be made self-sufficient in military supplies. But his memorials now covered an extensive range of topics, including tax reform, coal-mining, and foreign relations.4 The government had been consulting him for some time about the Boxer problem. In July 1899, he submitted a memorial on the religious incidents in Shantung, suggesting that the unrest there could be stopped by sending a well-disciplined force to police the area. He also sug­ gested that local officials be informed of the provisions in China’s treaties and agreements so they would be in a better position to deal with foreign representatives. Yuan himself was the only man with the experience and the military force necessary for the job. Further, he knew the province and its people well. Two corps of Yuan's troops had been dispatched to Shantung in May 1899 for the ostensible purpose of a joint maneuver with the provincial garrison. On his appointment. Yuan took the rest of his division with him. But this does not mean he was to wield a heavy hand; on the contrary, his instructions from the throne were to proceed with caution. He was to see that conflicts between the common people and the Christians were handled fairly, and he was not to rely solely on military force, “lest the people be frightened into revolt."5 (Yuan received the opposite advice from a former local official in Shantung, Lao Nai-hsiian, who had made a special study of the Boxers and felt that they should be sup­ pressed at any cost.) The first thing Yuan did was to test the Boxers' claim of invul­ nerability. A number of Boxers willing to put themselves to the test were killed by his firing squad. Previous demonstrations had reportedly left the Boxers unscathed (proving only, one supposes, that Yuan's marksmen were more accurate than their predeces­ sors). Yuan charged that even in force the Boxers were ineffective, nothing that once 400 to 500 of them attacked a single church and failed to take it. “How can they wipe out foreigners? Even if they could recruit millions of people and roam around everywhere, spreading like bush fires, what effect would they have?"®

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Yuan proposed both long-range and short-range measures against the Boxers. In the long run, he hoped to promote under­ standing between the common people and the Christians; more immediately, however, he was determined to maintain law and or­ der and to liquidate the bandit elements and the Boxer leaders. He was firmly against the government’s plan to organize the rebels into militia units: Leaving aside the impossibility of reassembling those already dispersed and restoring those already suppressed, it would be difficult for the gov­ ernment to find capable people to lead the militia. Qualified officials and gentry simply would not undertake such a task. Even if they could be persuaded, how could they understand the feelings and aims of the Box­ ers, who after all practice a heresy and use magical incantations? How could they control them? Further, the militia has always been financed by the ordinary people. T o organize hundreds of thousands into new militia units would require a huge sum of money. Where would it come from if not from the people? Please allow me to speculate on the evil consequences of all this. As soon as bandits can use the name of militia and heretical sects are given legitimate authority, they will operate openly; it will be impossible to disband them again. Unchecked, they will seize the opportunity to satisfy their own selfish ends. How then can general chaos and widespread suffering among the common people be prevented?7

Yuan’s suppression of the movement was both severe and thor­ ough, prompting the anxious dowager empress to demand that he be more lenient. The situation in Shantung had quieted down, however, especially after the famous Pingyuan incident of October 1899.8 The rebels fled to the more open province of Chihli. During the turbulent year of 1900, Yuan laid a foundation of stability in his province. As Putnam Weale recorded, “Shantung is all right, never fear. . . . The provincial governor is a strong Chinaman, one Yuan Shih-k’ai.”9 To suppress the Boxers, Yuan requested that his division be ex­ panded. In response, Peking instructed him to reorganize the 20 corps of the provincial garrison into a vanguard for his army. Feng Kuo-chang, who, like Tuan Ch’i-jui and Wang Shih-chen, now held a rank equivalent to prefect, was placed in charge of this work. The morale of the officers and men was high, thanks to their success against the rebels. Yuan's Right Division was far stronger than any of the other divisions of the Imperial Guard Army— Jung-lu's Central, Sung Ch'ing's Left, Nieh Shih-ch'eng's Front, and Tung Fu-hsiang's Rear divisions. It also had the good fortune

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to be stationed some distance away from the Metropolitan Prov­ ince, where the Boxer War broke out in 1900. Once the Shantung Boxers entered Chihli, they received support from many Manchu dignitaries, including Yii-lu, the viceroy. Through these officials, they won the favor of the august dowager empress. Rebels and officials collaborated in attacks on Christians and all those suspected of foreign contacts. Killing and plunder­ ing were the order of the day. Hu Yii-fen, the commissioner for railway affairs, was nearly killed and had to flee to Yuan Shih-k'ai for protection. Tung Fu-hsiang's Kansu Army was particularly ac­ tive in supporting the Boxers. Nieh Shih-ch’eng, who questioned how effective the Boxers' magic was and what good the movement could do the country, tried to oppose the rebels. After receiving a severe rebuke from the empress for what she called rash action, Nieh backed down. Jung-lu was of two minds. He was afraid of what might happen if the Boxers continued to provoke the foreign powers, but he was also afraid of the empress's wrath. In June 1900, the Boxer forces besieged the legation quarter in Peking. The embassies expected reinforcements on the 11th. When none came, hope soon dwindled to despair. A chancellor of the Japanese legation volunteered to break through the blockade to find out what had happened. His driver soon returned to report that the chancellor had been decapitated and his body mutilated by Tung Fu-hsiang's army near the Temple of Heaven. News of the murder and the siege reached the capital of Shan­ tung on the 12th. Yuan sent a telegram to Jung-lu, exhorting him either to protect the legations or to evacuate all the diplomats from Peking. At the same time, he telegraphed Sheng Hsiian-huai in Shanghai: “About 8,000 foreign troops near Tientsin and Peking; 10,000 more on their way. Dare not surmise what will happen. Please advise me. Do Viceroys Liu K'un-i and Chang Chih-tung have any good suggestions?”10 As the junior governor, Yuan was not in a position to advocate an independent policy and assume leadership. But this telegram strongly hinted to the other provin­ cial leaders that something must be done to secure southern and eastern China, something more than the talk of reinstating Li Hung-chang as viceroy of Chihli. It also implied Yuan's willing­ ness to cooperate with them in a concerted action. Sheng, Li Hungchang's lieutenant and a key man in economic matters, had per-

THE GOVERNOR

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haps the best contacts with foreigners in Shanghai, where he re­ sided but was in the enviable position of not being a local official. Thus Yuan sent the telegram to him instead of directly to Liu or Chang. Yuan’s first message was ignored, but the second fell on sym­ pathetic ears. Dissension between Peking and the southeastern provinces inevitably grew, as the capital looked on the Boxers as an effective force against foreign encroachment and the provin­ cial leaders saw them as members of an absurd but dangerous movement. Provincial criticism was temporarily silenced, however, by a Boxer victory. Sir E. H. Seymour, the British naval commander at Tientsin, was anxious to lift the siege of the legations and, with some 2,000 soldiers, attempted to fight his way to Peking. From June 10 to June 18, his force clashed with the Boxers and Nieh Shih-ch’eng’s and Tung Fu-hsiang’s divisions. The British were compelled to retreat after suffering heavy casulties. To many conservatives, this proved the Boxers’ abilities. The empress at once called her offi­ cials to the palace for a conference; here they resolved to award the Boxers 100,000 taels of silver and to set up altars of worship everywhere. They also decided to attack the legations. Jung-lu was appointed commander of the operation. Still indecisive, he wrote to Liu K’un-i in Nanking, forecasting the lamentable results of a weak country’s provoking several strong ones. By then eight nations—Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United States—had formed a loose alliance and had dispatched forces to Taku. On June 17, the strong fortress there fell, exposing Tientsin to attack. But in the capital, provoca­ tions continued. The German Minister von Ketteler was murdered at the order of a Manchu prince on June 20, and the next day the empress declared war. A battle for Tientsin began soon after­ ward. General Nieh Shih-ch’eng died in action on the outskirts of the city on July 9, and five days later his troops were completely scattered. The Left Division was now under the command of Gen­ eral Ma Yü-k’un, who firmly believed in the Boxers’ invincibility and ordered an attack with disastrous results. On August 5, when the city of Tientsin fell, his division was put out of action. With the city went the biggest arsenal in northern China. On the same day, the viceroy of Chihli, Yü-lu, committed suicide.

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The victorious expeditionary forces then drove toward Peking, where on August 13, outside the city wall, they engaged in a fierce battle against General Tung Fu-hsiang's troops. The empress, in a desperate attempt to rally her supporters, called a conference in the palace on the 14th, but no one attended. The next day, only hours before the expeditionary forces entered the city, the em­ press, the emperor, and their entourage fled in disguise. The siege of the legations was lifted, and the infamous sack of Peking began. While disaster fell on Tientsin and Peking, peace reigned in the southeast. Local authorities declined to follow Peking's lead and adopted a policy of protecting their own territories. In a memorial to the throne on June 19, Yuan recommended this policy as the best way to save the empire from catastrophe and to protect the economic resources of the southeast, which were vital to the dy­ nasty. Through Sheng Hsüan-huai, he arranged a rapprochement with the British based at Chefoo. He and his senior colleagues, notably Li Hung-chang of Kwangtung, Chang Chih-tung of Hupei, and Liu K'un-i of Kiangsu, maintained a friendly attitude toward the foreign powers throughout the whole episode. Yuan's initial diffidence gradually gave way, as he perceived the urgent need for action to preserve peace in the southeast. Having advocated the recall of Li Hung-chang at the beginning of the Boxer troubles, Sheng Hsüan-huai now wrote Yuan in a telegram dated July 14: “Ho-fei [Li Hung-chang] is too old. Sir, you are the man of destiny."11 Day by day, Yuan's position became increasingly important. His office in Tsinan, close to the capital, was the center of telecom­ munications between the court, the provinces, and the Chinese legations overseas. He was not only the best-informed man in the empire but also the strongest, since by now the four other divi­ sions of the imperial army had been destroyed, leaving Yuan's force the only modern army in northern China. The stage was cleared for his entrance; supreme power was suddenly within his grasp. Power did not just fall into his hands; his own astute judgment helped. It was clear that after the Boxer crisis northern China would once again be a power vacuum, as it had been after the downfall of Li Hung-chang five years earlier. The much coveted viceroyalty of Chihli would have to be given to a strong man. Among those eligible for the post, Li Hung-chang himself had the

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most prestige at home and abroad and the greatest seniority and experience, not to mention a large number of henchmen hold­ ing key posts all over the empire. Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i were also possible choices, for they too were senior officials with their own military forces. However, if security was the supreme consideration. Yuan's army might just tip the balance. At all events, its destruction would have eliminated him from consid­ eration. When the empress commanded Yuan to dispatch troops to Tien­ tsin on June 17, he sent only a token force of 3,000 men under the command of Sun Chin-piao. After reaching Tehchow in northern Shantung, they were ordered to return because Yuan heard of their lack of discipline; he replaced them with six battalions under Hsia Hsin-yu's command, which were not units of the Right Divi­ sion. These delaying tactics gained a day or two of precious time. On June 20, two days after Seymour's defeat, the empress confi­ dently ordered Yuan to recall Hsia's troops. This was swiftly done. Two days later the situation changed, and urgent calls for help came from Peking. Yuan replied that Hsia's troops, having just returned, could not be sent again. Sheng Hsüan-huai begged him to reconsider, but Yuan remarked, “The critical illness is under­ going a change. Better not hurry with medicine.’’12 At the beginning of July, when Li Hung-chang himself urged Yuan to lead his troops to Chihli to suppress the Boxers, Yuan replied, “If I lead my troops to save the foreign ministers at Peking without imperial sanction, I am afraid I shall be defeated on the way. This I really cannot do.’’18When Sheng Hsüan-huai entreated him again, he replied, “The less we talk about it, the better."14 However, as a gesture of Yuan's loyalty to the throne, Hsia Hsinyu's small contingent eventually arrived at Peking, only to be swept away in the tide of events. To persuade the empress of his undying loyalty. Yuan was the first to send money, silks, and even food to the imperial traveling lodge. Although Shantung was a relatively poor province, his con­ tribution to the 1901 indemnity was to be the second-largest from a provincial governor. When there was talk that the foreign powers should demand the termination of the empress's regency, he was the first to oppose the idea. He left no room for anyone to stand between him and his mistress. It would be unfair to blame Yuan alone for lack of action in

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the Manchu interest in 1900; other viceroys and governors did less. Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i, for example, declined Yuan's suggestion that troops be sent to Chihli and Shansi to mop up the Boxers after the fall of Peking. Li Hung-chang flatly re­ fused to lend any support to the Boxers or the government, re­ maining utterly passive throughout the whole episode until he was recalled to sue for peace. At the end of 1899, when both the Boxer Movement and a plot to dethrone the emperor were gaining force, the empress had sent Jung-lu to see Li, who was living in semiretirement in the capital and was anxious to leave. Jung-lu's mis­ sion was to ask Li to find out whether foreign diplomats would favor the accession of Ta-o-ko (P’u-chün). Li replied, “If Her Ma­ jesty would appoint me to a viceroyalty somewhere, the ministers will come to congratulate me. I shall then find out what you want to know."15 A few days later, Li's appointment to the viceroyalty of Kwangtung and Kwangsi was announced. The more the situa­ tion in the north deteriorated, the more his services would be needed, for he was the only elder statesman who could command respect abroad in the aftermath of the Boxer War. In June, the empress ordered Li to come to Peking, but he re­ fused. At the beginning of July, he was again urged to come; this time he took a boat and went as far as Shanghai, where he reported he had fallen ill and needed further time for medical treatment. He became well again after the fall of Peking and arrived at Tien­ tsin in September, under Russian escort, as China's plenipotentiary to the peace negotiations. Prince Ch'ing was his colleague. On September 7,1901, after lengthy discussions, the belligerents signed a peace protocol, under which several princes, presidents of boards, and governors were punished as war criminals. Tung Fu-hsiang, the commander of the Kansu Army, was cashiered (he died in dis­ grace in 1908). A prince and a vice-president were sent to Germany and Japan, respectively, to offer the government's apology for the murders of von Ketteler and the Japanese chancellor. In addition, China agreed to stop purchasing weapons and ammunition from abroad for two years and to pay an indemnity of 450 million taels (67.5 million pounds) over 30 years, with revenues from the cus­ toms and the salt gabelle as security. Li Hung-chang was also appointed viceroy of Chihli, and as viceroy his most pressing task was to restore order. He took com-

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mand of the remnants of Jung-lu's Central Division and sum­ moned Hu Yü-fen to Peking to gather together what was left of Nieh Shih-ch'eng's and Sung Ch'ing's troops. At the same time, he had to negotiate for the evacuation of Russian troops from Manchuria, for the tsar had taken advantage of the chaos in China to occupy the whole imperial domain. These heavy duties broke Li's feeble health. On November 7, 1901, he dictated a valedictory memorial to the empress from his deathbed: “I have looked for men of ability all over the nation. I can find no one better than Yuan."16 He recommended Yuan as his successor. Thus ended Yuan's incumbency in Shantung. He had improved the methods of tax collection during these two years, resulting in a surplus of more than a million taels in 1901. This enabled him to expand his army and to provide for the dowager empress, in exile first at Taiyuan and then in Sian. Yuan spent more than 900,000 taels on military development, and when he took over the viceroyalty of Chihli, his army was 20,000 strong. In July 1901, he was ordered to assume command of a large section of Chang Chihtung's Self-Strengthening Army, stationed in Kiangsu. Chang at once telegraphed Viceroy Liu K'un-i for an explanation. In re­ sponse, Liu sent a memorial to the throne advising against the change; so did Yuan. Neither protest was heeded. Thus Yuan gained a regiment and an enemy. Shortly before Yuan left Shantung, he put the finishing touches on his plan to establish a provincial college in Tsinan for children from seven to fourteen years of age. The college was to be divided into three levels: a preparatory section, involving eight years of lessons in the classics, history, astronomy, geography, and mathe­ matics; a secondary section, involving four years of advanced les­ sons in the same subjects; and a third section, involving four years of specialized study in such subjects as languages, commerce, and engineering. An American missionary was appointed the chief in­ structor. The college, financed by provincial estate taxes, was even­ tually completed, though by that time Yuan had left Tsinan.17 Yuan was well prepared for the post in Chihli. In his day, success in Chinese politics depended more on personal contacts and the right connections than on principles. A high official had to know, and be known by, other dignitaries and had to have a sizable secre­ tariat (mu-fu) of trusted lieutenants.18 By 1901, Yuan had impor-

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THE GOVERNOR

tant backers in the court—including Li Lien-ying, the grand eu­ nuch; Na-t'ung, the president of the Board of Revenue; Prince Ch'ing; and the empress herself. Among his lieutenants were HsU Shih-ch’ang, his sworn-brother; T ’ang Shao-i, his loyal assistant; a large number of officers who had served under him since Hsiaochan; and many civilian subordinates—including Yin Ming-shou, Juan Chung-shu, and Chou Hsiieh-hsi. The relationship between Yuan and his colleagues was often compared to that between mas­ ter and his disciples, and it was occasionally reinforced by other ties, such as marriages between their children. Although Yuan's appointment as acting viceroy of Chihli and commissioner of trade for northern China was announced on the day of Li Hung-chang’s death, he could not accept this powerful office without the proper ritual, without showing his humility. In more practical terms, it seemed wise to show some concern for the feelings of senior statesmen like Chang Chih-tung, Liu K'un-i, and Jung-lu, and to appear reluctant to leave Shantung without completing his ambitious programs there. He therefore immedi­ ately telegraphed the empress declining the imperial favor. On the same day, Sheng Hsiian-huai urged him to accept this key post in the north, but Yuan replied in an apparently firm tone: My waning health and confused mind do not permit me to do as I am commanded. If I go. Shantung will certainly fall into chaos like Mukden. How can Chihli look after itself, if both Shantung and Mukden are in turmoil? My departure from Tsinan can only harm the delicate situation. Please think it over and drop this matter altogether.10

Sheng, reading between the lines and anxious to be on good terms with this new dignitary, initiated a proposal to add Shantung to the long list of the viceroy's responsibilities. Jung-lu seconded it, and the empress granted her approval in mid-November. Yuan accepted his new seal of authority on the 17th. Three days later, he relinquished the gubernatorial office in Tsinan to a subordi­ nate and began his journey to Chihli.

F IV E

The Viceroy, 1901-1907

S in ge Tientsin, the traditional seat of the viceroy of Chihli, was under foreign military occupation until August 8, 1902, Yuan was forced to establish temporary headquarters at Paoting, the pro­ vincial capital. From there, with the help of Tuan Ch’i-jui and Ni Ssu-ch’ung, he directed a mopping-up campaign against small bands of Boxers still roaming the countryside.1 Although he also called on the Manchu Bannermen, they proved utterly useless; Yuan's Right Division was responsible for the success of the oper­ ations. With peace and order restored early in 1902, Yuan was able to proceed with his long-term policies. The young viceroy's major task was to secure the defense of northern China from the Amur River to the Shantung peninsula. Since his total force of some 20,000 soldiers was too thin for this, military expansion was imperative. Yuan could not expect any financial help from the depleted imperial treasury in this under­ taking; nor could he count on regular revenues from his devas­ tated province. Thus he had to tap such sources as the customs office at Tientsin, the coal mines at Kaiping, and the railways, controlled by Sheng Hsüan-huai. In these and other matters, there were foreign interests to be considered, especially the Russian and Japanese ambitions in Manchuria, so Yuan's role in formulating foreign policy also grew. But first let us look at his defense policies. The department of military administration in Paoting consist­ ed of three offices—planning, training, and supplies—headed by Tuan Ch'i-jui, Feng Kuo-chang, and Liu Yung-ch'ing, respec­ tively. Yuan himself was chief of the department. Another trust­ ed aide, Wang Shih-chen, was given command of the First Brigade and was placed in charge of training other troops in Chihli. Yuan's plan, approved by both the throne and the Grand Coun-

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cil, was to standardize the organization and the training of China’s armies—and their equipment, once the 1901 protocol’s ban on importing arms was lifted. First, Yuan started to reorganize what was left of the Hwai Army and the traditional Green Standard of archers, enlisting new soldiers to replace the old and the sick. In a memorial dated February 20, 1902, he suggested recruiting 6,000 men on the basis of standards similar to those used at Hsiaochan. A noncommissioned officer was to receive five taels of silver a month and a private soldier a little over four taels. Each man was to serve three years in the standing army, after which he could return to civilian life. For the next five years, he would be regis­ tered as a member of the army reserve, drawing one tael a month. Finally, he would serve as a retained soldier for three years at half his reserve salary. In short, a recruit would serve 11 years alto­ gether, spending the last eight in civilian life except for a month of training each year.2 This plan was reminiscent of the one pro­ posed by Sheng Hsüan-huai after the 1895 war, although it was less ambitious. Yuan aimed to raise only one division in addition to his own by the end of 1902—a goal realized in October, when Ma Yü-k’un assumed command of the new Left Division.8 Meanwhile, a group of Manchus at the court were planning to organize their own division out of the 7,000 Manchu and Han Bannermen presently under arms. In June 1902, as a demonstra­ tion of goodwill, the Manchus gave nearly half of these troops to Yuan to train. He accepted the assignment, despite the distrust implicit in the plan to form a racially elite division. He graciously recommended T ’ieh-liang, a Manchu member of the Board of War, to command the new force; this was the nucleus of another division.4 A fourth division was formed almost by accident. The 1901 protocol prohibited China from stationing troops within six miles of Tientsin after the withdrawal of the foreign occupation force. To counter this restriction, Yuan set up a police college in Paoting, which had trained some 2,000 policemen by the time Tientsin reverted to Chinese control in August 1902. When Yuan moved his office there, the college and the police force, commanded by Tuan Chih-kuei, moved too. (The occupation troops also left 1,000 officers and constables to maintain order in the city.) Later, dur­ ing the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the police were organized into a division.®

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57

As war clouds gathered over Russia and Japan, China's need for weapons became more urgent; soon the prohibition against importing arms was lifted. Meanwhile, the Northern Army (Paiyang Chün) was entering a new phase of development. On De­ cember 4, 1903, the Commission for Army Reorganization was established in Peking with Prince Ch'ing as commissioner and Yuan and T'ieh-liang as assistant commissioners. Yuan's old friend Hsü Shih-ch'ang was named chief-of-staff, and the three depart­ ments of administration, command, and training went to Yuan's faithful aides Wang Shih-chen, Tuan Ch'i-jui, and Feng Kuochang.6 It was obvious that Prince Ch'ing's position was titular, designed to silence possible Manchu opposition to the ambitious young viceroy. This worried T'ieh-liang. As the junior vice-presi­ dent of the Board of War, he had not favored the creation of a body that would supersede the board, and he was disturbed by Yuan's growing power. Still, he realized that he was not strong enough to challenge his rival. At the beginning of 1904, the troops under Yuan's direct con­ trol numbered 60,000, divided as follows: the Right Division, 7,000; the Left Division, 10,000; a new division completed early in 1903, 9,000; Chiang Kuei-t'i's units, 5,000; the Self-Strengthen­ ing Regiment, 2,000; the Bannermen in training, 3,000; and the 20-corps vanguard of the Right Division, stationed in Shantung and commanded by Chang Huai-chih, 24,000. Yuan estimated that in view of the imminent Russo-Japanese conflict, an additional 30,000 soldiers were required to defend Chihli and Peking. In a plan drafted for the commission, he set the total cost of expansion at three million taels, one-third of which he offered to supply from the treasury of Chihli. The Board of Revenue was to be respon­ sible for the rest.7 The expansion was approved and was carried out according to plan. In 1905, there were six divisions in Chihli and Shantung. The First Division evolved from T'ieh-liang's Bannermen, the Second was the Left Division, the Third a mixture of the SelfStrengthening Regiment and new recruits, the Fourth Yuan's own Right Division, the Fifth the vanguard of the Right Division, and the Sixth the Tientsin police force. Yuan frequently changed com­ manders to prevent the men from forming personal loyalties.8 He attached special importance to the Fourth and Sixth divisions, which were always controlled by his most trusted officers, notably

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Tuan Ch’i-jui, Feng Kuo-chang, and (later) Li Ch’un. During the formation of the Sixth Division, one Chao Ping-chun caught Yuan's eye. Chao was a mysterious figure. Apart from the fact that like Yuan he came from Honan, no one knew much about him. He began his career under Yuan as a jail warden and was later selected to train the police force. When the Ministry of Po­ lice was created in 1905, Chao emerged as the only expert in the field and was made the ministry's vice-president. Yuan alone was responsible for Chao's meteoric rise, and Yuan alone received his loyalty. Though the Russo-Japanese War was a power struggle between those two nations only, Manchuria became the battleground. China declared her neutrality and managed to maintain it, thanks largely to Yuan's military forces. After the war, the empress dis­ patched Chao Erh-hsün, Hsi-liang, and Hsü Shih-ch'ang to Man­ churia to "organize relief and rehabilitation." In fact, their main tasks were to reorganize the Banner troops and to secure the sur­ render of a group of bandits known as the Red Beards (hung hutzu). Nurtured and used by both belligerents, the bandits throve under the conditions of war. The administration of Manchuria underwent a drastic change at this time. The imperial domain was divided into three prov­ inces, to be headed by a viceroy and three governors. Hsü Shihch'ang was appointed viceroy, T'ang Shao-i governor of Fengtien, Chu Chia-pao governor of Kirin, and Tuan Chih-kuei governor of Heilungkiang. As the Times commented, "It is a notable fact that every one of these new posts is entrusted to a Chinese instead of a Manchu and every one to a Chinese who owes his advance­ ment to Yuan Shih-k'ai."9 To ensure effective control, Yuan sent a brigade led by Wang Ju-hsien to reinforce the troops already in Manchuria under Chang Hsün. T'ieh-liang also sent a division and a brigade of his men there. All these troops were placed un­ der the authority of Hsü Shih-ch'ang.10 After the Russo-Japanese War, Yuan's influence spread from Chihli and Shantung to other areas, including northern Kiangsu, Honan, and the Hwai River area. The six divisions were deployed as follows: the First, under T'ieh-liang, at Paoting and Peking; the Second, under Ma Lung-piao, in northeastern Chihli; the Third, under Ts'ao K'un, in Manchuria; the Fourth, under Wu

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59

Feng-ling, at Hsiaochan and Machang; the Fifth, under Chang Huai-chih, in Shantung; and the Sixth, under Tuan Ch’i-jui, near Nanyuan outside Peking. Wei Kuang-t’ao was forming a new divi­ sion, as were Chou Fu and Tuan-fang in Nanking—the Seventh and Ninth divisions, respectively. Elsewhere, some ten brigades were being trained, including reorganized units of the Green Stan­ dard and the Eighth Division, formed from Chang Chih-tung's Self-Strengthening Army and commanded by Chang Piao.11 One impetus for military expansion was the growing revolu­ tionary sentiment in China. In the hope of intimidating potential troublemakers both at home and abroad, it was decided to hold annual maneuvers as a demonstration of strength. The first such display in Chinese history was held in October 1905 at Hokien in Chihli. The operation itself was ill-planned and chaotic, and the final parade had to be called off because of a sandstorm.12 The next maneuvers, held a year later at Changteh in Honan, were considerably more organized. Tuan Ch’i-jui and Chang Piao di­ rected the 33,000 participants; T ’ieh-liang and Yuan Shih-k’ai served as inspectors. All in all, it was a precise, well-executed affair that did not fail to impress the 487 foreign spectators.18 Before these events. Yuan was being criticized with increasing frequency. A plot against him was well under way in the inner court. As early as 1903, when the Commission for Army Reorgani­ zation was established, a censor spoke harshly of him: The viceroy, just over forty years of age, has performed no outstanding service but has received favors far greater than those conferred on Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang___It is a long-standing tradition that the Imperial Guard in the Forbidden City must be Bannermen, and yet now the viceroy's troops are found throughout the palaces___Yang Shih-ch'i is made a counselor and Hsii Shih-ch’ang a member of the Grand Secre­ tariat, so the viceroy's henchmen are in the Inner Court as well. The appointment of Na-t'ung to the Grand Council has aroused a great deal of unfavorable criticism. With Prince Ch'ing’s approval, the viceroy has extended his power into vitally important offices. Why does the prince trust and rely on him ten times more than Jung-lu ever did?14

The censor commented specifically on the Commission for Army Reorganization: “The venerable Prince Ch’ing knows nothing about military affairs, and T ’ieh-liang has still to prove his worth. The commission is in fact entirely in the viceroy’s hands. Its three departments are all headed by his men.”15 He warned that “mili-

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tary force, if not coupled with an enlightened civil administra­ tion, is not enough to keep the state from harm." He even com­ pared Yuan to the third-century usurper Ssu-ma Chao by quoting from the ancient chronicles of the Three Kingdoms: "His designs are clear even to the men in the street."16 Yuan immediately submitted his resignation from the commis­ sion to show his loyalty to the throne; it was not accepted. Mean­ while, T'ieh-liang was forming the Manchu Cabal in an attempt to strengthen Manchu power in both the government and the army. Severely weakened by the Boxer Uprising, the central gov­ ernment encouraged these efforts. Indeed, the empress and her advisers had little choice. On the one hand, the throne’s folly had shocked and silenced the ch’ing-i scholars and officials who com­ posed the traditional Confucian orthodoxy.17 On the other hand, regional leaders continued to show the independence they had exercised during the uprising. The throne saw the cabal as a po­ tential force to fill the power vacuum. Yuan, afraid to disobey the empress by resigning outright, had to appease his rivals. After the second maneuvers in October 1906, he voluntarily surrendered command of four divisions to a Manchu, Feng-shan, retaining only the Second and Fourth divisions under his direct control.18 Feng-shan soon began to sell officers’ posts at prices ranging from 500 to 3,000 taels. He abolished saluting and reinstated the traditional practices of bowing and kneeling on one knee.19 These actions provoked Ts’en Ch'un-hsüan, the viceroy of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, into censuring both the commander and his patron, T ’ieh-liang.20 In order to retain control over Feng-shan, T ’iehliang refused to grant him the title of vice-minister of the army, which carried with it the privilege of memorializing the throne directly.21 Tension between the two steadily increased, until Fengshan was assassinated in Kwangtung on October 25, 1911.22 Under Feng-shan’s command, the northern divisions abandoned Yuan’s original demobilization plan.28 As a result, the average age of the soldiers was to rise considerably by the time of the 1911 revolution. Another important development during this period was that some of Yuan’s old comrades from Hsiaochan—Wang Ying-k’ai, Chao Kuo-hsien, Liu Yung-ch’ing, Wu Feng-ling, and even Ma Lung-piao—served their new Manchu commander too loyally. Later, when Yuan reassumed control of the army at the

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61

height of the revolution, he stripped these officers of their com­ mands. It is significant that when Yuan gave up the four divisions in January 1907, only Tuan Ch'i-jui resigned his commission, probably with Yuan's approval.24 This fact testifies to Tuan's special position among Yuan’s officers. The Manchus also gained power in military administration. The Commission for Army Reorganization was absorbed into the new Ministry of the Army in November 1909, with T'ieh-liang as minister and Shou-hsim and Yin-ch'ang as vice-ministers. Still, these changes did not mean that Yuan had lost all his influence. The German-trained Yin-ch’ang was close to him, and Prince Ch'ing retained significant authority in the ministry. Several of Yuan's men held key posts as well. Wang Ying-k'ai was deputycommander of the four transferred divisions (though Yuan later found reason to question his loyalty), Hsü Shih-ch'ang oversaw the troops in Manchuria, Chang Huai-chih commanded the Fifth Division in Shantung, and Wang Shih-chen took over the newly created Seventh Division in northern Kiangsu. Two other aspects of Yuan's defense policies, instruction and finance, ought to be discussed. Since the foreign expeditionary force had destroyed Li Hung-chang’s military academy in Tien­ tsin, Yuan had to make do with an officers' training class in Paoting. Under the directorship of Lei Chen-ch'un, the eight-month course included such subjects as trigonometry and ballistics. Rudi­ mentary as it was, Tientsin-Paoting was to become one of the two officers' training centers in the empire. On December 12, 1902, Yuan decreed that a selected number of officers from Honan, Shan­ tung, and Shansi would be sent to Paoting for training, whereas officers fom Kiangsu, Anhwei, Kiangsi, and Hunan would attend the other center at Wuchang. He thus managed to serve both his country's ends and his own: China would have the officers she so urgently needed; he would have personal contact with troops un­ der other commands.26 Several military schools were built in Tientsin in 1903. The Paoting class was transferred there, and the military academy was restored to offer a two-year course. Also located in the city were a staff college, a noncommissioned officers' training school, a school of topography, and a school for training traditional offi­ cers in modem methods. Under Tuan Ch’i-jui, the military acad-

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emy, the most important one of all, expanded to offer a 12-year course. By 1906, nearly a thousand commissioned and noncommis­ sioned officers had graduated from one of the Tientsin schools. To put this figure into perspective, there were 35 military schools in China in 1906, with an enrollment of 787 commissioned offi­ cers, 3,448 officer candidates, and 2,072 noncommissioned officers. Tientsin was both the best and the largest training center in the whole country. An interesting feature of Yuan's training program was the adop­ tion of a new alphabet, composed of more than 40 letters and based on the Peking pronunciation, to overcome illiteracy.26 An­ other important feature was the increasing use of Japanese meth­ ods and practices. After the Boxer War, soldiers were ordered to replace their old tunics with Japanese-style uniforms, boots, and caps.27 (Although the caps required cutting the traditional queue, by 1909 even members of the Imperial Guard had conformed to the new style.28) Chinese military training was predominantly in­ fluenced by the Japanese after 1900. There were a large number of Japanese instructors in China's defense units; and many Chi­ nese, including several officers of Yuan's Right Division, were sent to study in Japan. In the 1908 officers' examination sponsored by the Ministry of the Army, most of the successful candidates had had Japanese training.29 Even when Japan herself adopted new German military techniques after 1909, China continued to use the old Japanese methods. The financial aspect of Yuan's defense program is a complex matter. The 1901 protocol's stipulation that China could not im­ port arms and ammunition for two years provided some relief for the imperial treasury in a time of extreme financial difficulty. Neither Yuan nor Chang Chih-tung demanded any funds for the purchase of arms in this period. The army expansion was financed almost entirely with local resources. A good deal of financial jug­ gling went on; in 1903, for example, Yuan used one million taels earmarked for relief and rehabilitation to pay for training 6,000 new recruits.80 Table 2 shows how financial responsibilities were shared for the six divisions that were completed by 1905. Total military expenditures at that time were slightly more than nine million taels. This figure swelled to 60 million taels in 1908 and to nearly 68 million in 1910.

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Table 2. Sources of Revenue for the New Chinese Army, 1905

Annual expenses

Division

( m illio n s o f ta els )

Sources

First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth

1.640 1500 1500 1.498 1500 1.498

nhihii Board of Revenue Board of Revenue Shantung and Hupei Shantung and the Board of Revenue Board of Revenue

s o u r c e : T u n g - f a n g ts a - c h ih ,

no. 7,1905, pp. 125-27.

It is impossible to determine what proportion of the annual de­ fense expenditures went toward purchasing weapons from abroad; all we know is that the importing of arms resumed in 1903, and that the main supplier was Japan. The flow of arms was inter­ rupted by the Russo-Japanese War and China’s neutrality, but it began again in 1906 and 1907 at an increased rate. This might have caused the rise in the military budgets of those two years. But, at this point, we are more interested in how Yuan managed to raise the funds necessary for the defense of the north than in how the money was spent. Chihli was impoverished after the Boxer Uprising, so Yuan had to look for ways to supplement the usual provincial revenues. He posted T ’ang Shao-i to the customs office in Tientsin, but its rev­ enues had to be deposited in foreign banks to repay the 1895 in­ demnity. Next, with the help of Jung-lu and Lu Ch’uan-lin, the president of the Board of Revenue, Yuan established a bank in Tientsin, hoping to issue notes and to attract enough private de­ posits to meet the province’s financial needs. Indeed, banking was considered a profitable business in China in the early 1900’s. But this venture did not produce the expected results. Yuan floated public loans in 1905, the first provincial loans in Chinese history. The total amount was fixed at 4.8 million taels, the annual inter­ est rate at 7 per cent, and the sinking fund at 1.2 million taels. Yuan’s biographers call the experiment a spectacular success, claiming that the bonds of larger denominations were sold out “in a short period of time.”81 But Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, the 1898 re­ former, has a different story to tell: “Only some 100,000 taels' worth were sold; consequently, it was necessary to resort to com-

THE VICEROY

pulsory allocation. A big county [of the province] was ordered to buy 29,000 taels* worth and a small one 12,000---- Even so, the total sale was less than one million.**32 Under the general circum­ stances, it is not surprising that Yuan turned to two lucrative semigovernmental enterprises for money as well as power: the Kaiping Coal-Mining Company and the railways. The Kaiping Company, situated in the northeastern comer of Chihli, was founded by Li Hung-chang in 1875. Although under official control, the company was financed by private capital. One of the largest investors was Chang I, better known abroad as Chang Yen-mou. As the company’s director-general at the time of the Boxer Uprising, Chang was arrested in Tientsin by the allied ex­ peditionary force. Fearing that the mines might fall into the hands of the Russians or the Japanese, Chang turned for help to G. Detring, a German serving under Sir Robert Hart as the customs in­ spector of Tientsin. Detring advised Chang to protect the company by transforming it into a British limited company. In June 1900, Chang held discussions with Herbert Hoover, then an agent of the British firm Bewick Moreing and Company. On July 30, 1900, an agreement of sale was concluded, by which all the Kaiping prop­ erties were transferred to the British company. The old Chinese shares, valued at 1.5 million taels, were to be replaced by 375,000 new one-pound shares. The total capital of the new company was to be registered in London as one million pounds. Not satisfied with these conditions, Chang refused to put his name to the docu­ ment; but Detring, without any authorization from Chang or the company, signed on their behalf. Although the face value of the old shares was only 165,000 pounds at the current rate of exchange, C. A. Moreing himself, in a letter to Detring on November 9, 1900, reckoned their actual value at no less than 850,000 pounds. This was one reason why Chang refused to sign. Negotiations continued until two other documents, an agreement of transfer and a memorandum, were signed on February 19,1901. The first confirmed the original terms of sale; the second purported to make concessions to Chang. The new Kaiping Company was to be a Sino-British limited company and Chang himself was made a permanent director, with the same power as other directors residing in China. On the basis of these trivial changes, Chang reported to the throne in June 1901 that the new company had added foreign capital to bring its total assets

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to one million pounds, 50 per cent of which belonged to the old company. The aging empress, completely untutored in modem economics, approved Chang's report in the usual manner: “All right.“83 She was unaware of the fact that one of the empire's ma­ jor coal-mining enterprises was no longer Chinese. The matter came to a head in November 1902, when the Chi­ nese staff of the new company quite innocently hoisted the Chi­ nese Imperial Standard beside the Union Jack. The British rep­ resentative in Peking, Sir Ernest Satow, at once lodged a protest at the newly created Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Wai-wu-pu). Only then was it revealed to the Manchu government that the new company was not a Chinese concern. At this time. Yuan asked Chang about the ownership, but he received only lies and evasions in reply. Chang said that the Kaiping property had not been sold to the British company, and that he had already briefed a lawyer in Britain to fight the matter out in court. Though he promised Yuan a definite answer by January 1903, Yuan was still waiting in February. The viceroy then sub­ mitted a memorial to the throne, arguing that the transaction was invalid because Chang had not signed the agreement of sale. The empress, no wiser than before about the situation, instructed Yuan to see that Chang recovered the mines without delay. The two unauthorized sellers, Chang and Detring, reacted quite differently to the imperial command. Not only was Chang related to the dowager empress through his wife, he was duty-bound to obey his superior, the viceroy of Chihli. Detring, for his part, cared nothing about Yuan's authority or that of any other Chi­ nese. According to Sir Robert Hart, Detring drew up an attack on Yuan and sought Hart's advice about it. Hart replied: What I suggest. . . is this: (1) Remove any allusion to Yuan by taking out passages marked in blue; (2) Let it be a simple résumé of the facts of the case and the arguments they support; (3) Address it—not to the Wai-wupu—but to Yuan himself; he will see that it cannot be taken or treated as an attack on himself, but as a simple statement of the case for his con­ sideration, and it may thus, without irritating him, supply him with a ladder to climb down by.84

Instead of taking Hart's advice, Detring addressed his statement directly to the Wai-wu-pu and sent a copy to Yuan, who promptly returned the document. Meanwhile nearly a year had slipped away, and Chang had not

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produced a definite answer to Yuan's repeated inquiries. As a re­ sult, two weeks before Detring's statement, Chang was dismissed from his post as vice-president of the Board of Works. To spare him a complete loss of face, the empress gave him an official title of the third rank and sent him to London as the plaintiff in the case against the Moreing Company. The case, heard by Justice Joyce, lasted from January 19 to Feb­ ruary 13, 1905. Several points were revealed during the hearings. First, Herbert Hoover admitted that he had actually gone so far as to threaten Chang I in an attempt to complete the transaction. Second, as Justice Joyce pointed out, the documents did not even provide that the shareholders of the Chinese company receive the 375,000 one-pound shares in payment for their property. Third, Chang I had signed two other documents. One, written during his imprisonment in Tientsin and dated June 23, 1900, entrusted Detring with the care of the company's property; the other, dated May 17, 1900, instructed Detring to borrow foreign capital or to float shares in foreign markets in order to transform the company into a joint Sino-foreign enterprise. Neither document had autho­ rized Detring to sell. The presentation of the Chinese case was hindered by Chang's ignorance of English and the lack of a com­ petent legal interpreter. As a result, there were several misunder­ standings between Chang and his counsel. In the end. Justice Joyce ruled that the memorandum of Febru­ ary 19, 1901, defining the company as a joint Sino-British enter­ prise, was binding, and that if the British company did not com­ ply within a reasonable time, it would not be allowed to retain the Kaiping property. The court was prepared to issue an injunc­ tion to this effect, and it ordered the defendants to pay the costs of the case. When the Moreing company appealed the decision, Joyce's verdict was substantially upheld and the case dismissed. It is not surprising that Chang I's report to the throne differed from the reports in the Times, on which my account is based. Chang emphasized the fact that he, the plaintiff, was awarded the costs. Though he was honest enough to admit that the memoran­ dum was binding, he concluded that the company remained a commercial enterprise under the supervision of the Chinese gov­ ernment: “Our country has recovered its sovereignty over the mines, and the Chinese director his equal power [with the foreign

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6?

directors] in the administration of the company. However, it is impossible to change the joint status of the concern.”85 This dis­ tortion of the facts did not escape Yuan's notice. In a memorial to the throne, he noted Chang's evasiveness and expressed deep sus­ picion of the claim that control of the company had been recov­ ered. Yuan again urged the court to instruct Chang I to abrogate the memorandum and return the property to its original status. “Yuan did not care f o r . . . the London decision,” as Hart put it.86 But in fact there was nothing either he or the empress could do to alter the situation. Yuan was undoubtedly right to inquire into the Kaiping owner­ ship, whatever the reasons for his interest in the mines. His view, according to the revolutionary Tokyo paper Min pao, was that foreigners should be permitted to tap China's mineral resources but should not be permitted to own them.87 Chang was relegated to political oblivion as a result of the inquiry, but he took with him 75,000 new Kaiping shares and 340,000 taels of silver.88 Having failed to recover the Kaiping mines to finance his arma­ ment projects. Yuan at once planned to set up a rival coal-mining company in Luanchow, some 15 miles east of Kaiping. Prelimi­ nary surveys were made in 1906 under the supervision of Chou Hsüeh-hsi, Yuan's economic adviser. In 1907, the Luanchow CoalMining Company was registered as a private limited company un­ der government supervision. The initial investment was estimated at eight million taels, a quarter of which was to come from the treasury of Chihli. The company's head office was to be in Tien­ tsin, right under Yuan's wing. But his incumbency in Chihli did not last long enough for him to see the results of this project. When appointed to the viceroyalty. Yuan was also made com­ missioner of the nation's railways. After the Boxer War, Britain had temporarily assumed military control over the railways south of the Great Wall and Russia over those in Manchuria. Yuan initi­ ated discussions on the matter with British and Russian represen­ tatives, and on October 16, 1903, the lines were handed back to China. At this point, a word about Chinese railway administration before the Boxer Uprising is in order. Authority was divided between the commissioners of trade for northern and southern China. Since Li Hung-chang held a great deal of this power, his

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economic adviser, Sheng Hsüan-huai, played a major part in both building and running the lines. After Li's downfall in 1895, Sheng was charged with embezzlement and corruption and was cashiered pending an investigation by Wang Wen-shao and Chang Chihtung, the viceroys of Chihli and Hupei, respectively.89 Chang was in an embarrassing position. He had been instrumental in the de­ cision to build a Peking-Hankow line and had been placed in charge of the Hanyang Foundry, built to supply rails for the lines. Just as he began investigating Sheng's activities, both the railway and the foundry ran into dire financial difficulties. A tantalizing situation thus arose: the political future of each man was in some sense dependent on the other. The temptation to bargain was irresistible, even to the scrupulous Chang Chih-tung. As a result of the inquiry, Chang and Wang recommended that Sheng be placed in charge of building and administering the railways and of running the Hanyang Foundry. According to their argument, the 1895 war had proved that new lines and unified control were necessary to transport troops and provisions in an emergency. Thus the National Railway Company was created with Sheng as its di­ rector. The transfer of the railways from Sheng to Yuan was of the utmost importance to the new viceroy. First of all, he could dis­ patch troops without paying expensive fares; second, he could use the revenues from the lines to finance his army; and third, he could use the lines as security for foreign loans. Since the railways were so valuable, it was almost inevitable that Yuan, the new rail­ way commissioner, would clash with Sheng, the director of the Na­ tional Railway Company, over their control. Though rich and powerful, Sheng was vulnerable to attack. He was greedy and inefficient. A great deal of money had been bor­ rowed during his directorship, and yet very little had been accom­ plished. In accumulating a vast personal fortune through his mo­ nopoly of railway, telegraph, and shipping services, Sheng made enemies; and since he lived in Shanghai, he had no opportunity to appease his critics in Peking. Sheng’s greatest blunder in terms of his career came in August 1899, when he granted the RussoChinese Bank the right to participate in the construction of the Peking-Hankow Railway. This, in the words of Lord Salisbury, was "an act of deliberate hostility" against Britain. In his instruc-

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tions to Sir Claude MacDonald, the British minister in Peking, Salisbury said: A concession of this nature is no longer a commercial enterprise and becomes a political movement against the British interests in the Region of Yangtze. You should inform the Tsungli Yamen that Her Majes­ ty's Government cannot possibly continue to cooperate in the friendly manner in matters of interest to China, while preferential advantages are conceded to Russia in Manchuria and to Germany in Shantung. These or other foreign powers should also be offered special openings or privileges in the Region of Yangtze.. . . After consultation with the Admiral you may give them the number of days or hours you think proper within which to send their reply.40

The Tsungli Yamen, confronted with this barefaced gunboat di­ plomacy, “conceded everything,"41 a severe blow to Sheng’s repu­ tation. Shortly after Yuan took over the railways, Sheng's father died. According to tradition, he was supposed to observe the ritual of mourning in semiretirement. Therefore, on the day after the death, he sent Yuan this telegram: “The only one who really knows me, after Wen-chung [Li Hung-chang], is Your Excellency. You should select able assistants to take over the railways and for­ eign trade from me in order to solve the outstanding problems concerning them."42 Sheng's situation was now hopeless. Seeing this, he climbed down voluntarily, with the expectation that Yuan would cover up any irregularities and deal with any unresolved problems. Sheng also acted suddenly, thereby hoping to throw trade and communications into complete chaos. But Yuan did not fall into the trap. With equal poise, he immediately sent Sheng a telegram, urging him to stay on and promising to assist him in every possible way. To reinforce his words. Yuan traveled south at the end of 1902 to consult with Chang Chih-tung in Hankow and Sheng in Shanghai. He again asked Sheng to give up what he called “jobs for an accountant" in favor of more important work, for as he had candidly expressed earlier, Sheng was capable of running a ministry.48 His unstinted praise reassured Sheng, who stayed on as the nominal head of the National Railway Company until 1906. The change in control meant a change in policy. Whereas Sheng advocated nationalizing the railways. Yuan opposed it because it would eliminate a source of revenue for his army. In this matter,

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Yuan represented regional rather than central interests, and his laissez-faire attitude had wide approval. Indeed, Yuan was not even consistent on the question of Chinese control of the railways. On the one hand, he proposed that a line between Peking and Kalgan be constructed entirely with Chinese capital and labor. Planning began in 1902, with Yang Shih-ch’i in charge of the administra­ tion of the project and Chan T ’ien-yu (Tien Jow Jeme), an Ameri­ can-trained engineer, in charge of the technical aspects. Though hazardous both to construct and to operate, the 100-mile line was completed in 1908. It was an impressive national achievement, initiated and sponsored by Yuan. On the other hand, Yuan ap­ proved a scheme put forward by E. H. Harriman, the American railway magnate, for joint American-Japanese ownership and op­ eration of the Southern Manchurian Railway. An agreement was reached in September 1905, but it was never put into effect, largely due to Japan’s lack of interest.44 Having acquired control over the railways. Yuan next moved to break Sheng’s monopoly of the telegraph service. In January 1903, immediately after his visit to Sheng in Shanghai, Yuan was ap­ pointed commissioner of telegraph communications.45 He pro­ ceeded to gather a large group of assistants to run the railways and the telegraph lines for him. These included his old colleagues T ’ang Shao-i and Hu Yü-fen, as well as new recruits like Yang Shih-ch’i and Liang Shih-i. Liang was especially important. In 1906, when Sheng finally resigned as railways director on the grounds of ill health and T'ang succeeded him, Liang was made superintendent of five railways; the Peking-Hankow, ShanghaiNanking, Taokouchen-Tsinghwa, Chengting-Taiyuan, and Kaifeng-Loyang lines.46 Yuan's asssistants also had their henchmen. Together they formed an extremely influential political group known as the Communications Clique, which was no less valu­ able to Yuan than his Northern Army. Except for short intervals, members of the clique held firm control of the lucrative Ministry of Communications and also the Bank of Communications, estab­ lished in 1907. Now we turn to the political aspects of Yuan’s incumbency in Chihli. In foreign affairs, the most important single event that demanded his time and attention was the Russo-Japanese War.

T H E V I C E R OY

7*

When the war erupted, his main task was to preserve China's neu­ trality. Afterward, when China was asked to endorse the Treaty of Portsmouth, he was appointed, along with Prince Ch'ing and Grand Secretary Ch’ü Hung-chi, to meet with the Japanese rep­ resentatives. Held in Peking at the end of 1905, the discussions focused on Manchuria. Since Prince Ch’ing was indisposed most of the time. Yuan was the real leader of the Chinese delegation. He convinced his colleagues to approve the treaty, and an agree­ ment was signed on December 12. Japan's unexpected victory had great impact all over the world, especially in China. For one thing, an Asian state had defeated a European power, a white man's country. For another, a constitu­ tional government had again proved stronger than despotic one. As the Chinese saw it, the issue was that simple: the constitutional Japan had prevailed over the autocratic Russia. The leading news­ papers in China all agreed. Wai-chiao pao claimed that “Russia's defeat is . . . the result of her autocracy."47 In an article entitled “Constitution the Panacea," Nan-fang pao compared ruling a country to piloting a boat: “The destination must be determined before the voyage begins, or the vessel will drift and get nowhere. A constitution is to a state as a compass is to a captain."48 Chungwai jih-pao concluded that Russia's weakness would have re­ mained unexposed, and the question of the relative merits of a constitutional monarchy and an autocratic monarchy unanswered, had it not been for this war."49 The premise that a constitutional monarchy was better than an autocracy was now generally accepted among Chinese officials and intellectuals. The only uncertainty was whether the people were ready for the new form of government. Many memorialists who advocated constitutional reform, including Chang Chih-tung, Chou Fu, Chao Ping-lin, and Yuan, believed that a preparatory stage was necessary. Yuan especially stressed this need.50 Seven years before, at the time of the Hundred Days' Reform, the dowager empress had sternly opposed a constitution, which would necessarily curtail the power of the throne. But now even she was convinced of the merits of reform and was ready to yield to popular demand. She therefore agreed to send five high-ranking officials abroad to study constitutional government. Those ap­ pointed were Tsai-tse, Tai Hung-tz'u, Shao-ying, Tuan-fang, and

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Hsü Shih-ch'ang. On the day the officials were to set out, a ter­ rorist threw a bomb at them in the station, slightly injuring Tsaitse and Shao-ying. The attacker, Wu Yiieh, a revolutionary with anarchist views, was killed on the spot. When the delegation finally sailed from Shanghai on December 19, 1905, Shang Ch'i-heng and Li Sheng-to had replaced Shao-ying and Hsü Shih-ch'ang. At the same time, an advisory body on constitutional matters, the Institute of Political Studies, was set up. The officials' report submitted to the throne on their return in August 1906, became the main document for study. The author was widely believed to be a young man from Hunan named Yang Tu, a friend of a mem­ ber of the officials' staff. Incorporating aspects from various East­ ern and Western constitutions, the report laid out a detailed plan for the adoption of a constitution in China. On the basis of this work, Yang became the chief expert at the Institute.51 On October 25, 1906, an edict was issued to reorganize the central government. The Inner Cabinet of grand secretaries, the Grand Council (the highest policy-making body, though its pow­ ers had been gradually waning), the Censorate, the Han-lin Acad­ emy, and the Imperial Clan Office all remained unchanged. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had succeeded the Tsungli Yamen in 1901, and the Ministry of Education, which was created in 1903, also remained intact. The traditional Board of Civil Offices and the Ministry of Police were combined into the Ministry of Civil Offices. The Board of War was divided into the Ministries of the Army and the Navy and the Military Consultative Council. The Board of Rites became the Ministry of Rites, the Board of Revenue the Ministry of Finance, the Board of Punishment the Ministry of Justice, the Suzerainty Bureau the Ministry of Suzer­ ainty, and the Temple of Justice the Supreme Court. The Board of Works and the Ministry of Commerce merged into the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce. New departments includ­ ed the Ministry of Communications, the Audit Council, and the Political Consultative Council (Tzu-cheng Yuan), which was sup­ posedly the forerunner of a parliament. Each ministry had a presi­ dent and two vice-presidents, offices open to Manchus and Han Chinese alike. An imperial proclamation of equality between the two races was issued in August 1907, and intermarriage was offi­ cially approved. Even the post of Tartar general could now be held

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73

by a Han Chinese. Yuan and Tuan-fang played an active role in these reform measures. Yuan further advocated abolishing the tra­ ditional examination system.62 In conjunction with these national developments. Yuan experi­ mented with local self-government in Chihli. First, he created a bureau to deal with the self-government of Tientsin. In addition, he set up an institute where gentry and merchants could learn about self-government. Some institute members were sent to Japan for four months on a fact-finding mission.68 Soon an executive council was organized to consolidate and regulate the self-govern­ ment movement in the county of Tientsin. The council's main tasks were to assist the government in dealing with public prop­ erty, education, opium prohibition, public works, public hygiene, water conservation, tax collection, and the reform of social cus­ toms.64 These government-sponsored activities culminated in the 1907 Tientsin municipal election, the first local election ever held in China. Of the 13,567 eligible voters, only 1,300 went to the polls at first. After much persuasion and explanation in the newspapers, 8,763 eventually voted. Even Yuan had to admit that the threeyear experiment had produced meager results.66 With the help of Dr. C. D. Tenney, an American misisonary, Yuan also sponsored educational reforms.66 He continued to pro­ mote a phonetic alphabet, for example, in order to spread the Peking dialect. He left primary education to the gentry and the merchants, concentrating official efforts on adult and higher edu­ cation. The government tried to set up girls' schools in Peking and Tientsin, mainly for the daughters of upper-class families. These attempts met with little success due to social inhibitions, a lack of funds, and the custom of foot-binding, which severely limited the girls' mobility.67 The parallel development of the movements for constitutional and educational reform inevitably led to the establishment of colleges of law and teachers' training.68 In 1902, Yuan proposed that Peking University offer special courses for government officials.69 He was so aware of the inadequate train­ ing received by Chinese officials that he urged his subordinates to tour Japan before taking up their posts.60 There are other examples of Yuan's progressive bent. He encour­ aged handicraft industries and agricultural experimentation. He established parks in Tientsin and introduced trams and electric

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lighting there.61 Finally, he waged a vigorous and remarkably suc­ cessful campaign against opium in Chihli.62 In sponsoring reforms, the throne had moved largely out of ex­ pediency. Its proposals were double-edged, designed to enhance the power of the government and to appease the surging demand for change. In the 1906 government, for instance, there were seven Manchus and only four Han Chinese. This could hardly lessen the growing animosity between the two races. Further, reactionary members of both races were conspiring against the more progres­ sive forces. In September 1907, Yuan Shih-k’ai and Chang Chihtung were promoted to the highest policy-making body on which Han Chinese were allowed to sit, the Grand Council. At the same time. Yuan was placed in charge of the Foreign Ministry and Chang in charge of the Ministry of Education. It was expected that they would cancel out each other's influence, for apart from their opposition to the traditional examination system, these two old rivals had almost nothing in common. Though a native of Chihli, Chang's long service in central China made him a natural ally of the Hunanese conservatives in the capital. Led by Ch'ü Hung-chi, this group was plotting with the Manchu Cabal against Yuan.68 Even after this “promotion," Yuan was still a powerful man. His friend Yang Shih-hsiang, Yang Shih-ch'i's brother, became the new viceroy of Chihli. The army remained loyal to Yuan for the most part, and his colleagues and protégés still held many impor­ tant posts. His support of the dowager empress had never waned, and he displayed his devotion to her with lavish gifts. On her seventy-third birthday, for example, he gave her two gowns of fox fur, a large piece of calambac wood inlaid with precious stones, a pair of filigree and pearl phoenixes, and a branch of coral as tall as a man. Earlier, during the anxious period of the RussoJapanese War, he had given her an automobile and had brought an Indian circus to court to entertain her. Yuan's chief enemy in the court was the powerless emperor. Yuan feared that when the empress died and the emperor was restored to full authority, his betrayal in 1898 would be revenged. If the emperor should die before the senile empress—as he well might, considering his ill health—Yuan's future would depend on who was chosen to succeed him. When the discussions were held

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to select an heir. Yuan supported Prince P’u-lun over P’u-i, the two-year old son of Prince Ch’un, the emperor’s brother. The nomination of P’u-i would bring his father to power as regent— with. Yuan feared, disastrous results for his own career.04 As it turned out, the emperor did not outlive the empress; he died on November 14, 1908, and she a day later. The empress’s valedictory edict named P’u-i successor to the throne and appointed Prince Ch’un regent. The emperor’s valedictory edict, the authenticity of which is still open to question, urged the regent to punish Yuan Shih-k’ai for his evil acts during the Hundred Days’ Reform. Immediately after the deaths, a censor, Chao Ping-lin, submitted a memorial to the regent charging that Yuan had unduly furthered his own interests and had incurred the deceased emperor’s disap­ proval.06 It was said that Prince Ch’un wanted to execute Yuan at once but that Chang Chih-tung stopped him. On January 2, 1909, the following edict was issued: The Grand Councillor and President of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yuan Shih-k’ai, in dmes past has received repeated promotions at the hands of their departed Majesties. Again on our accession, we honored him by further rewards as an incentive to him to display his energy, for his ability was worth using. Unexpectedly, Yuan Shih-k’ai is now suffer­ ing from an affection of the foot; he has difficulty in walking, and it is hardly possible for him to discharge his duties adequately. We command Yuan Shih-k’ai to resign his offices at once, returning to his native place to treat, and to convalesce from, the ailment. It is our resolution to show our consideration and compassion.66

The edict, which carefully refrained from saying a word in praise of Yuan’s service to the throne, was issued in the name of the infant emperor, now officially called Hsiian-t’ung, and counter­ signed by the regent and all the grand councillors except the indis­ posed Prince Ch’ing and Yuan himself. There was no sign that anything was wrong with Yuan’s health. Vigorous as ever, he personally presented the Chinese side in a negotiating session with the Japanese minister at the end of De­ cember. On January 2, he attended a Grand Council meeting and was affably received by the regent. But for the time being his pub­ lic career was over. Putnam Weale recalls the anxious mood in the capital: “Everyone remembers that day in Peking when popular rumor declared that the man’s last hour had come.’*67 In a long article, the Times praised Yuan’s unusual ability, progressive out-

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look, and great service to the throne, concluding, “this is the man whom the Manchus have driven with indignity from office.”68 Yuan had no choice but to relinquish all his offices. He gave his residence in Peking to his trusted general Tuan Ch'i-jui, and his family went to stay in Tientsin for safety.69 Instead of going back to his native town, Hiangcheng, Yuan had a retreat built on the outskirts of Changteh, an important railway junction in northern Honan. He good humoredly named it the Garden for Cultivating Longevity (Yang Shou Yuan). There, for the next three years, he was to “convalesce” and watch the rising tide of revolution.

S IX

Eclipse, 1908-1911

T h e 1895 war against Japan ended an epoch in modern Chinese history. Before it, the adequacy of the country's political system had scarcely been questioned; afterwards, many enlightened people began to search for a political alternative to solve China's manifold problems. Two attempts at change, the reform move­ ment of the literati in 1898 and the uprising of the peasantry in 1900, proved abortive. Yet the search for a viable system went on, primarily under the leadership of a young medical student named Sun Wen (Sun Yat-sen), who advocated revolution. In 1894, Dr. Sun had gone to Tientsin to present a letter to Vice­ roy Li Hung-chang expounding his theories on how to strengthen China through reform. Li was impressed, but on the eve of the great war he understandably put the question aside. Convinced that it was futile to appeal to an obsolete administration for change. Sun went to Hawaii. There, on November 24, 1894, with the help of the Chinese secret societies, he formed what was to be­ come China's first revolutionary group, the China Revival So­ ciety. The society's constitution did not specify revolution as the means of political change, but as the war progressed. Sun's views became more radical. When the Hong Kong branch of the society was established on February 18, 1895, each of its members had to take this oath: “Drive out the Tartars, revive China, establish a federal government."1 It was a revolutionary program, committing its supporters to the use of violence. From 1895 on, the government considered Sun an outlaw. Offi­ cial communications repeatedly referred to him as the brigand Sun Wen. Since it was not safe for him to return to China, Sun went to Europe in 1896 and recruited many followers among Chi­ nese students in France, Belgium, and England. The tour was

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profitable in other ways as well. In Europe and later in America, Sun gained valuable political experience. He observed both the working of democracy and the growing interest in socialism. These, together with his patriotism and his hatred of despotism, became the basis for his Three Principles of the People: nationalism, de­ mocracy, and people's livelihood. At the same time. Sun’s long travels alienated him to a certain extent from his comrades at home, who considered him too westernized and idealistic. He was not always realistic in assessing the Chinese political situation, and some of his aims were too abstract for even his educated fellow revolutionaries to grasp. Only the first of the three principles, for example, had any real meaning for his followers. From 1900 to 1911, revolutionary nationalism was in fact little more than racial antagonism to the Manchus. In part, this was due to the participation of the secret societies, which had a long record of anti-Manchu activities, in the revolutionary movement. It was also due to the effort of the revolutionaries to explain China’s weakness in Darwinian terms: China was weak and poor because she was ruled by an inferior race, not because the Chinese them­ selves were unfit for survival. Finally, the nervous reaction of the Manchus to the fiasco of 1900 heightened racial tensions. Afraid that they were losing the Mandate of Heaven, they became ex­ tremely jealous of the power still in their hands. At the height of the Boxer crisis, an independent army rebelled against the government in the middle reaches of the Yangtze, at­ tempting to win independence from the Manchus. Two years later. Hung Ch’uan-fu, a nephew of the Taiping leader Hung Hsiuch’uan, rose against the Manchus in Canton and proclaimed a Great Ming Empire. Both these revolts, as well as others that fol­ lowed, were quickly put down by the government. Still dissent continued. On April 26, 1902, Chang T ’ai-yen, an eminent scholar and revolutionary, called a meeting in Tokyo to commemorate the 242d anniversary of the destruction of the Ming dynasty. A year later, a revolutionary named Tsou Yung published a pamphlet in Shanghai entitled Ke-ming chiin (The revolutionary army), in which he described the Manchus as barbarians draped in animal skins and wearing horns on their heads. The Recovery Society (Kuang-fu Hui), founded in 1903, and the Dragonflower Society (Lung-hua Hui) and the Society of Justice (Chih-kung Hui), founded in 1904, were all anti-Manchu.

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With the establishment of the Alliance Society (T’ung-meng Hui) in Tokyo in August 1905, the Chinese revolutionary move­ ment entered a new period of growth and activism. The 1,300 Chi­ nese students at the founding meeting elected Sun chairman of the society. Later that year. Sun announced his Three Principles of the People in the first issue of the society's paper. Of all his aims— driving out the Tartars and reviving China, establishing a repub­ lic, and distributing the land equally—the last aroused the most skepticism among the society's rank and file. Likewise, Sun's proc­ lamation of the five civil rights in 1906 made little impression on his followers. The movement's primary goals remained to over­ throw the Manchus and to abolish the monarchy. As the name Alliance Society suggests. Sun and his comrades were anxious to cooperate with other revolutionary organizations on the mainland of China. They set up five underground branches of the society in China and five branches abroad, with the head­ quarters remaining in Tokyo. In 1909, the Alliance Society be­ came the Chinese Revolutionary Party. Its membership oath was altered to “Drive out the Tartar Ch'ing, establish the Chinese re­ public, carry out the program of the people's economic welfare." The revolutionaries—first from various small groups, then from the Alliance Society, and finally from the party—staged some ten revolts in the provinces south of the Yangtze and attempted seven assassinations before overthrowing the Manchu regime in 1912. These activities kept the revolutionary spirit high and also helped spread the radicals' influence. The most significant acts of in­ dividual terrorism were Wu Yiieh's 1905 attempt on the lives of the five officials delegated to study constitutional reform, Wang Ching-wei's attempt on the life of the regent in 1910, and P'eng Chia-chen's assassination of Liang-pi, a leader of the Manchu Cabal, in January 1912. These and other sensational events punc­ tuated the rapid development of the revolutionary movement, which by 1908 was one of the main political forces in China. Another major force at work in the years 1908-11 was the Con­ stitutional Party, which aimed to preserve the dynasty by adopting a constitution. This group included the 1898 reformers and some of the dignitaries of the court in Peking. The reformers had re­ mained loyal to the powerless emperor, placing their hope in his restoration after the death of the empress. In 1906, an imperial proclamation promising a constitution in the near future en-

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couraged them to think that their program might be put into practice, although they themselves were still outlaws in China. As a result, they decided to transform their monarchist organization into the National Constitution Society. In 1907, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao organized the Political Information Society in Tokyo with these principal goals: a responsible parliamentary government, legis­ lative and judicial independence, regional autonomy and a clear definition of central and local power, and a cautious diplomatic policy that respected the legitimate rights of both China and the treaty powers. The reformers* enthusiasm rose even higher when Prince Ch*un became regent in 1908. But their hopes that the re­ gent would pick up where Emperor Kuang-hsü had left off in 1898 were soon dashed by an edict prohibiting the activities of the Po­ litical Information Society. The society's support for the throne put it at odds with the Alliance Society; at no time before 1911 did a rapprochement beween the two seem possible. At the court, the lack of powerful personalities was all too evi­ dent. In a dispatch published on September 7, 1909, Dr. G. E. Morrison, the correspondent for the Times of London, lamented “the deplorable weakness of the central government, where since the fall of Yuan Shih-k*ai, there seemed to be no man competent or willing to assume responsibility.** The regent himself proved incapable of ruling firmly. In the words of one court official, “The prince is a hard-working man. He reads all the state papers, but without much understanding; and he loves to write decisions on them, but these are often quite incomprehensible___Indeed, he is very disappointing. He normally sits through an audience in complete silence. When he is asked to pronounce his decision, he just mumbles.*** R. F. Johnston, the emperor's tutor, agreed: He is well-intentioned, tries in his languid and ineffectual way to please everyone, succeeds in pleasing no one, shrinks from responsibility, is thoroughly unbusinesslike, is disastrously deficient in energy, willpower, and grit, and there is reason to believe that he lacks both physical and moral courage. He is helpless in an emergency, has no original ideas, and is liable to be swayed by any smooth talker. After he became regent, however, the flattery of sycophants tended to make him obstinately tena­ cious of his opinions, which almost invariably turned out to be wrong. • Chin Liang, pp. 111-12. Even the regent's own son mentions his "indistinct" speech and calls the regency "the three most unsuccessful years of his life.” Aisin-Gioro Pu Yi, pp. 19-20.

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During several years of fairly intimate contact with Prince Ch’un, I came to b e . . . deeply impressed by his fatal tendency to do the wrong thing or choose the wrong course in matters affecting the imperial house or the interests of the young emperor, his son.2

The princes surrounding the regent were shallow men. Said one observer, “They dress lavishly in furs and feathers and scamper hither and thither between the palace halls. When they are free, they spend their time with their falcons and horses.“8 Yuan was only one of the commanding figures gone from the scene by 1909. His dismissal was preceded by the deaths of Li Hung-chang, Jung-lu, and, most important of all, the dowager empress; then in October 1909 Chang Chih-tung also died. These losses were an especially hard blow for a government already seriously weakened by the Boxer War. The decline of the cKing-i orthodoxy left the government without a sound ideological basis and offered the revolutionaries a chance to challenge the Manchus. To make things worse, the court was far from being united on matters of state. In an attempt to establish a new basis for its authority, the gov­ ernment had announced the principles of the proposed constitu­ tion in September 1908. Though allowing debate on public issues by representatives of the people, the throne reserved absolute de­ cision-making power for itself—a half-hearted gesture rejected by constitutionalists and revolutionaries alike. Before her death, the dowager empress had also approved a nine-year time schedule for adopting a constitution. On assuming power, the regent made similar efforts to undercut critics and win support for the govern­ ment. His most important act was to summon the provincial po­ litical councils that had been provided for in earlier reform edicts. This gave the constitutionalists a chance to increase their influ­ ence, with results that were not so favorable for the government as it might have hoped. Through the councils, advocates of con­ stitutional reform submitted four petitions demanding the elec­ tion of a parliament and the establishment of a responsible gov­ ernment by 1911. Yuan's old friend Chang Chien, now an out­ standing industrialist, played an active part in this movement. Chang and his colleagues won the support of several provincial governors, as well as a promise from the regent to shorten the pre­ paratory period from nine to five years. In another gesture, the

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regent convened the Political Consultative Council (Tzu-cheng Yuan) in Peking in October 1910. Neither the council nor its mem­ bers had any real power, however, and it accomplished nothing. In April 1911, in another outward show of reform, the regent organized China’s first cabinet. It consisted of 13 members—nine Manchus and four Han Chinese. Since five of the Manchus be­ longed to the imperial clan, the cabinet was nicknamed the Clan Cabinet. The four Han Chinese were Deputy Prime Minister Hsü Shih-ch’ang, Foreign Minister Liang Tun-yen, Minister of Edu­ cation T ’ang Ching-ch’ung, and Minister of Communications Sheng Hsiian-huai. The feeble and corrupt Prince Ch’ing was made prime minister. The composition of the cabinet disappoint­ ed even Chang Chien, a staunch supporter of the monarchy, who commented, “It is contrary to the tradition of the dynasty to en­ trust the army, the navy, and all other important ministries to members of the imperial clan. This move has altered nothing and has only made the situation more untenable. The country is rapidly disintegrating___It is frightening.”4 Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, an­ other firm monarchist, said in obvious despair, “Having been dis­ appointed in this, now the people can only turn to the other [al­ ternative].”5 In the end, the regent’s policies gained him none of the allies he so badly needed. Indeed, they gained him new enemies. His sham of a constitution had turned the monarchists away; a num­ ber of other measures antagonized many loyal Han Chinese. As soon as he had assumed power, for example, he appointed Tsait’ao, Yü-lang, and T ’ieh-liang, all Manchu noblemen, to take charge of training an imperial army. To fill the shortage of Man­ chu officers in the army, he established an elite school, like the one in Tokyo, for Manchu cadets. In the first year of his regency, the prince assumed command of all the armed forces in the em­ pire and set up the Military Consultative Council, composed of five members of the imperial clan. Meanwhile, the Ministry of the Army went to Yin-ch’ang and the Ministry of the Navy to Tsai-hsün. T ’ieh-liang and Feng-shan were given important field commands. All these men were Manchus. Compelled by the need to strengthen the government in the face of growing revolutionary sentiment, the regent planned to create at least 36 new infantry divisions. This reckless expansion pro-

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gram accounted to a large extent for an alarming jump in the de­ fense budget, from nine million taels in 1905 to 68 million in 1910. Where was the money to come from? The regent turned to the source that Yuan Shih-k’ai had discovered as viceroy of Chihli — the 5,800 miles of railways, which could be pledged against foreign loans. During the short three-year regency, the government contracted railway loans worth nearly 185.4 million yuan, or 40 per cent of the total borrowed through such loans from 1887 to 1911. Of the regent's nine loans, four were from Japan; the United States accounted for only a small share. This was clearly a change from Yuan Shih-k’ai’s pro-American policy to the pro-Japanese policy of the Manchu Cabal and Sheng Hsiian-huai. Another, even more significant change in railway policy in­ volved state control. Only if the lines were nationalized could the government use them freely as security for foreign loans. Such a shift in policy would inevitably lead to a clash between the regent and the Communications Clique. The regent had a natural ally in Sheng Hsiian-huai, who was eager for an opportunity to restore his control over the railways and the telegraph service. Shortly after the regency began, a censor submitted a memorial accusing the minister of communications, Ch'en Pi, and his chief lieutenant, Liang Shih-i, of negligence and irregularities. The regent at once appointed two grand secretaries to investigate: Sun Chia-nai, a highly respected but powerless figure, and Na-t'ung, a close friend of Yuan Shih-k'ai. As a result of the investigation, Hsü Shih-ch'ang, who had lost his viceroyalty in Manchuria, took over the Communications Ministry and Liang Shih-i retained con­ trol of the Railway Bureau. Hsü's appointment actually strength­ ened Yuan's influence in the government. But when the first cabinet was formed in 1911, Hsü was removed from the scene with an empty promotion to deputy prime minister. Sheng stepped in to take charge of communications. The battle of the railways had begun. Before Sheng's appointment, seven censors and court officials had presented a joint memorial charging Liang Shih-i with nepo­ tism, embezzlement, and abuse of authority. Sheng's first action was to send Liang back to Kwangtung to direct the Canton-Kowloon Railway; then he instructed the new director of the Communica­ tions Bank, Li Hung-chang's son, Li Ching-ch'u, to audit Liang's

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account. The Railway Bureau itself was abolished. Three months later, Duke Tsai-tse and several other high officials urged the gov­ ernment to nationalize all the railways in China. Sheng adopted this as his official policy, but Hsii Shih-ch'ang did not endorse it. The first step was to take control of four trunk lines: Peking-Hankow-Canton, Peking-Kalgan-Kyakhta, Peking-Mukden-Huichun, and Chengting-Taiyuan-Tatung-Puchow-Ili. A progressive Manchu named Tuan-fang was sent to Hankow to supervise the con­ struction of railways in Szechwan and Kwangtung. In theory, only a state system would serve China's interests. Private enterprise could be depended on to serve the major cities, but no private company could be expected to bear the cost of the far-flung rail network China needed for military purposes, migra­ tion, famine relief, and the like. An efficient national railway system, however, presupposes a clean, incorruptible administration people can trust, which obviously did not exist in China at this time. The government aroused even more suspicion by announc­ ing that when the railways were nationalized, the shareholders would not be recompensed for their shares in cash but would instead be given promissory notes. Needless to say, the shareholders did not attach much value to these notes. In an attempt to improve the government's position, Sheng Hsüan-huai borrowed heavily from abroad. But his action only deepened the suspicion that the so-called state system meant little more than pawning all the rail­ ways in order to buy the arms needed to preserve the precarious Manchu rule. In September 1911, a revolt against nationalization broke out in Szechwan, and Viceroy Chao Erh-feng was beheaded by the people. Protests against nationalization were also raised in Hunan and Kwangtung. These events precipitated the outbreak of the revolution in Wuchang on October 10, 1911. Seeing the disastrous results of his railway policy, Sheng at once sent a telegram to Yuan Shih-k'ai, asking him to come out of seclusion. Yuan replied, “My weakening body is constantly trou­ bled by illness. The coming of autumn does it no good. . . . I be­ seech you to recommend someone else."6 But Sheng needed help badly. Five days later, he tried again: “Please think of your im­ portant duties. How can you possibly be happy in the wilderness? It is better for you to come too soon than too late.''7 Yuan still did not budge: “All the troops in Hupei have mutinied, and there is

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no money left in the provincial treasury. What can I do with my bare hands? General Yin-ch’ang saw me a few days ago, and he was full of hope. I think he will soon suppress the rebels/’8 These repeated refusals sealed Sheng’s fate. On October 23, his assistant, Tuan-fang, was assassinated in Szechwan. Three days later, the government announced Sheng's dismissal, promising that he would never again hold an official post. Sheng’s successor was T ’ang Shao-i. In the Garden for Cultivating Longevity, Yuan was by no means living in seclusion. At fifty-two years of age and in excellent health, he retained his extraordinary appetite for food and drink. Yang T u and Yang Shih-ch’i, the brother of the viceroy of Chihli, lived with Yuan at the Garden, and General Feng Kuo-chang often brought him news of his old subordinates. The prime minister. Prince Ch’ing, was still in close contact with Yuan; the deputy prime minister was his long-time friend Hsü Shih-ch’ang; another loyal friend, Chao Ping-chun, continued to control China’s police force; and Yuan’s eldest son, K’e-ting, was a senior secretary in the Ministry of Communications. These people kept Yuan well in­ formed about the activities in and around the court. As the situ­ ation deteriorated during 1911, their visits to the Garden became more frequent. In the spring of that eventful year. Yuan had an unexpected but welcome visitor—his old friend and teacher Chang Chien. After this pleasantly nostalgic meeting, Chang wrote in his diary, “We talked about the past and the present. I found that, after an in­ terval of 28 years, his powers of judgment and observation had become both mature and incisive. He is head and shoulders above the lot.”9 These remarks were especially significant considering Chang’s visit to Peking to urge the emperor to abdicate.10 Two days after the Wuchang uprising began. Yuan had another visitor. It was his faithful aide General Feng Kuo-chang, who, as commander of the First Imperial Army, was on his way to Hupei to quell the rebellion. Yuan had this laconic advice for him: “Go slowly and wait and see.”11 Two days later, the regent appointed Yuan viceroy of Hupei and Hunan, and placed him in charge of pacification. The recall signified the court’s capitulation, but Yuan declined on the same grounds that had been given for his dis­ missal: “My foot is not yet healed.”12 The revolutionaries in Hupei

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also sent emissaries to Changteh to seek Yuan’s assistance. They promised that if the revolution was successful. Yuan would become president of the Republic of China. Yuan’s eldest son showed considerable interest in the offer, for he would then become the “heir-apparent”; but the old master remained uncommitted. He knew that time was on his side.13 Frantic in the face of Yuan’s nonchalance, the regent and his uncle, Prince Ch’ing, hurriedly sent Hsii Shih-ch’ang to find out what could be done to satisfy him. Yuan announced his condi­ tions on October 20; he demanded that the regent call a national assembly in 1912, form a responsible government, repeal the edict prohibiting party activities, pardon the Wuchang rebels, appoint Yuan supreme commander of all the armed forces, and guarantee sufficient funds, equipment, and provisions for these forces.14 On the same day, the regent proclaimed a general amnesty for the rebels, but he hesitated on the other five conditions. The two armies now fighting the revolutionaries in Hupei were under the command of Feng Kuo-chang and Tuan Ch’i-jui. Yuan’s announcement undoubtedly influenced them, and in the following week there were several minor government setbacks on the Han­ kow front. Now completely intimidated, the regent bowed to Yuan’s demands, appointing him to replace Yin-ch’ang as com­ missioner of all the armed forces in Hupei. The government troops scored a victory that very day. But Yuan remained in the Garden for Cultivating Longevity. The Times reported on Octo­ ber 23 that he refused to go to the front because of his bad foot. Yuan himself explained his hesitation differently, complaining that the army had lost its espirit de corps under the incompetent officials in control since his retirement. Meanwhile, three provinces—Shensi, Hunan, and Kiangsu— had declared independence from the government; by the end of November, 15 of the 18 provinces in China proper claimed inde­ pendence.15 The desperate regent, now with less than half the empire under his rule, wanted to crush the rebels by force of arms, but Yuan thought that “it was easier to deal with the military situation in the south than the political labyrinth in Peking.”16 He preferred to combine military and political tactics, and he had an opportunity for such maneuvers. He was sought after by both sides; he alone was capable of holding China together and leading

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her toward either a constitutional monarchy or a constitutional republic. Since the regent was responsible for Yuan’s disgrace. Yuan owed him no special allegiance. But then he had no com­ mitment to the republican cause either. His detachment from both sides gave him the freedom to bargain. At this point, his main con­ cern was to consolidate the north so as to strengthen his bargain­ ing position with the south. In the north, there were those who wanted to overthrow the Manchu regime immediately; this group was led by two Japanesetrained generals, Chang Shao-tseng and Wu Lu-chen. There were also die-hard monarchists, including Liang-pi and the regent him­ self, who were prepared to fight to the last drop of blood. Both these factions were too extreme for Yuan’s strategy in 1911. In October, General Chang and his Twentieth Division were sta­ tioned in Luanchow near Peking. On the 29th, along with three other commanders, he submitted 12 proposals to the throne, which included demands for a national assembly and a responsible gov­ ernment. Chang also consulted General Wu Lu-chen at this time about staging a mutiny against Peking.17 General Wu, the commanding officer of the Sixth Division, was then stationed at the important railway junction Shihkiachwang. His help was sought from all quarters: by General Chang to plan a mutiny, by the Manchu Cabal to get rid of Yuan, by the regent to put down General Chang, and by General Yen Hsi-shan to sup port his recent bid for independence in Shansi.18 On November 2, Wu went to Luanchow to hold secret discussions with General Chang; two days later, he talked with General Yen. The three agreed to join forces to stage a coup in or near Peking and to hamper Yuan’s military operations in Hupei. Trainloads of arms and ammunition from Peking to Hankow now went no further than Shihkiachwang. Then, at midnight on November 6, General Wu was assassinated by a brigade commander from his own division, Chou Fu-lin, who had served under Yuan at Hsiaochan and was his confidant.* Early the next morning. General Ts’ao K’un, another Hsiaochan man, arrived at Shihkiachwang with his Third Division to take over the garrison duties. Ts’ao was un* Chang Kuo-kan, p. 205. Some claimed that Manchu conservatives plotted the murder. See Min-li pao (The People Stand Up), November 9 and 16, 1911, and Yen Hsi-shan, pp. 25-27.

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doubtedly one of Yuan’s trusted subordinates. With the key man of the alliance eliminated, the coup was nipped in the bud. Yen Hsi-shan recalled all his troops to Shansi, and Chang Shao-tseng relinquished his command on November 19 and went to live in Tientsin as a private citizen. Frightened by the generals’ activities around Peking, the regent had issued an edict apologizing for maladministration on the day after Chang Shao-tseng announced the 12 proposals. He had also promoted Chang, pardoned all political offenders convicted since 1898, and instructed the Political Consultative Council to draft a constitution. In only three days, the council presented a document of 19 articles to the regent, who then took it to the Ancestral Temple and swore to put it into practice. On November 7, he ap­ pointed Yuan Shih-k’ai prime minister of what was called a re­ sponsible government.19 The regent’s surrender to Yuan was now complete. Suddenly Yuan’s famous ailment was cured; in fact, the patient had already left for the front to inspect his troops.20 At the same time. Yuan dispatched a truce delegation to meet with lead­ ers of the revolutionary forces. On November 13, 1911, leading 2,000 troops of the Third Di­ vision, Yuan returned to Peking with full military pomp.21 He was immediately given an audience, where amid official pronounce­ ments of optimism, he avowed his loyalty to the throne. The next day. Yuan announced a cabinet of ten Han Chinese and one Manchu. The appointment of a Manchu to the Ministry of Suzerainty was as much a matter of necessity as a gesture: the Mongols and the Tibetans were loyal only to the Manchu throne. Shortly afterwards, Japanese Minister Ijuin paid a visit to the new prime minister and subtly inquired about his attitude toward the monarchy. To this astonishing feeler, Yuan replied, “Since I am appointed prime minister by His Majesty, how can anyone say that I do not support the Ch’ing Imperial Court?”22 The way Yuan phrased his answer suggests a certain disingenuousness. His loyalty to the monarchy seemed to be dependent only on his official position. In fact, in 1911 and 1912, Yuan’s views were very close to those of the constitutionalists. The six conditions he had announced on October 20 as the basis for ending his retirement were echoed in a resolution offered by the constitutionalists a few days later in the

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Political Consultative Council.28 The resolution asked for the abolition of the Clan Cabinet, a constitution subject to approval by representatives of the people, a pardon for all political offend­ ers, and the immediate convocation of a national assembly. To establish a constitutional monarchy, it was necessary either to fight until the revolutionary forces were totally destroyed or to negotiate a political compromise. From the start of the uprising. Yuan had favored the second course—thus his truce delegation to the revolutionaries and his advice to Yin-ch’ang and Feng Kuochang “to induce a settlement along the lines of compromise/'24 Yuan might have been convinced that the Chinese were not yet intellectually prepared for a republican regime; he might have been inclined to support a constitutional monarchy, as the paper Shih pao speculated.25 But certainly there were strong personal considerations undercutting this inclination. Like Li Hung-chang, whom the Manchus had also treated shabbily, Yuan had become cynical toward the Ch’ing dynasty and regarded it as expendable. For Yuan, loyalty to the dynasty was primarily a personal matter. He had owed his allegiance to the old dowager empress, but he probably did not have the same feeling toward the boy emperor or the Dowager Empress Lung-yü, Kuang-hsü’s widow. He had had almost no contact with either of them before 1911; he had not even supported P’u-i as the heir-apparent. His antagonism toward the Manchus was not lost on the revolu­ tionaries. One of them, Wang Ching-wei, whom Yuan had just released from a Peking jail, remarked perhaps a little wishfully, “Shih-k’ai is now favorably disposed toward republicanism. His interests are therefore also the interests of the revolution/'26

SE V E N

The Revolution, 1911

T wice in the twentieth century, China found herself in the grip of a revolution; both times the causes were painfully clear. However, the fact that the Revolution of 1911 broke out at Wuchang needs some explanation. The Self-Strengthening Army (later the Eighth Division) and the Twenty-first Brigade, supervised by Chang Chih-tung and com­ manded by Chang Piao and Li Yuan-hung, respectively, had long been centers of revolutionary political activity. Chang Chih-tung and Jui-cheng, his successor as viceroy of Hupei, recruited many Japanese-trained cadets as officers. While in Japan, these cadets had learned radical political doctrines as well as military skills. As a result, the central China branch of the Revolutionary Party had many members and sympathizers among the low-ranking officers of the two commands. The control of these units was the key to the success of the October uprising. On the eve of the Double Tenth, as the October uprising is com­ monly called, the Eighth Division numbered about 10,000 and the Twenty-first Brigade about 3,000. Tuan-fang had taken nearly half the division to Szechwan to quell the railway riots. The other 5,500 division troops remained in Wuchang, along with some 1,500 brigade members. When the revolt broke out. Viceroy Jui-cheng and General Chang Piao hastily fled across the river to Hankow, leaving behind all but 500 noncombatant troops. Thus nearly all the troops in Wuchang went over to Li Yuan-hung, who commit­ ted them to the revolutionary cause. Li’s troops started action on the night of October 9; two days later, they were already the mas­ ters of Wuchang, Hankow, and Hanyang. Fighting and casualties were light. Though the Manchu government reacted quickly, rush­ ing two armies under Feng Kuo-chang and Tuan Ch’i-jui to the

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area, a serious counterattack did not begin until Yuan Shih-k'ai replaced Yin-ch’ang as commander-in-chief. Ironically, Hankow was recovered as quickly as it fell, in two days. General Feng Kuochang recovered Hanyang on November 27, for which he was made a baron. Yuan immediately called Feng back to Peking, however; he also ended the attack on Wuchang, claiming that the army lacked money and that he did not want to inflict further suffering on the people. The loss of Hankow and Hanyang could have been fatal to the revolutionary cause had T'ieh-liang and Chang Hsün been able to hold Nanking for the government. But the rebels cap tured the city on December 2; they then agreed to the three-day cease-fire that Yuan had been trying to arrange for some time.* These operations in fact had more political than military signifi­ cance. The recovery of Hankow was accompanied by Yuan's a p pointment as prime minister, for example, and that of Hanyang by his peace overtures. The revolutionaries, by the same token, delayed the truce agreement until they had taken Nanking, in order to boost their morale and strengthen their bargaining posi­ tion. Yuan's assessment of the political situation before the truce was far more realistic than that of either the Manchus in Peking or the revolutionaries in Wuchang and Nanking. The Manchu regime was immensely unpopular, and as it declined, so did the influence of the constitutional monarchists. On the eye of the revo­ lution, then, there were only two powerful political forces in China —the revolutionaries and Yuan Shih-k'ai and his Northern Army. Yuan alone stood between the rebels and the overthrow of the Manchu government, as both sides were quick to realize. Li Yuanhung and Huang Hsing, the commander-in-chief of the Revolu­ tionary Army, solicited Yuan's support for their cause by offering him the presidency of the republic. To prevent such an alliance, the regent made Yuan prime minister. Yuan himself knew that without him the ramshackle imperial house would collapse, and in the Hankow and Hanyang compaigns he discovered that the revolutionaries were reluctant to engage him in a determined battle. Meanwhile, most of the provincial leaders who had declared for independence were in fact sitting on the fence. The governor of * The truce was negotiated by the British minister, Sir John Jordan, and the British consul at Hankow, whose help Yuan had sought.

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Shantung, for example, telegraphed a memorial to the throne ex­ plaining his action and promising to withdraw the declaration as soon as the situation became stable. The viceroy of Manchuria, Chao Erh-hsün, although refusing to declare for independence, set up a peace maintenance society that operated side by side with the local government. The governor of Anhwei, Chu Chia-pao, dis­ banded the revolutionary troops in his province, announced inde­ pendence, and then ran away three days later. Kiangsi had three different military governors in a hundred days, Szechwan two in­ dependent governments, and Kiangsu thirteen military governors. In Hunan and Kweichow, local warlords, secret societies, and revo­ lutionaries struggled for power. The intellectual leaders of the revolutionary movement, whose concern for ideology and ultimate goals put them out of touch with their anti-Manchu allies in the army and the secret societies, were unable to control the situation. Their goals and warnings were largely ignored; the revolution was not accompanied by social reform. It was a sham and the indepen­ dence of the provinces a farce.1 There was never much question that the whole issue would be submitted to negotiation. Preliminary peace talks were under way as early as October 28, according to reports in the Times. Immedi­ ately after Hanyang was retaken. Yuan had proposed a cease-fire, without success. But once the three-day truce was negotiated, the fighting was to all intents and purposes over. Both sides readily agreed to extend the armistice, and the peace-making began. On December 1, the prime minister stated his policy: For centuries China has been known as an autocratic country. But the autocracy is far from being absolute. The people neither respect the gov­ ernment’s authority nor understand its responsibilities. At the moment, one can arouse their support only by advocating anarchy or the complete abolition of taxes. This [pathetic state of affairs] must be ascribed to the prolonged lack of a responsible government. There are two schools among the Chinese progressives—the demo­ cratic republicans and the constitutional monarchists. I am not at all sure that the Chinese people are sufficiently prepared to accept citizen­ ship in a republic, or that republicanism as put forward by its Chinese exponents has popular support. The present political crisis is entirely due to the utterances of a handful of party leaders. This is a fact over­ looked by foreign observers. T o create a strong government, we must go to the majority of the people for consultation, not to a few for advice. Apart from what has already been said, there are other divergent views

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and interests in China—those presented and represented by intellectuals, soldiers, landlords, and merchants. If these differences are left unrecon­ ciled and small factions are allowed to thrive, the country will certainly disintegrate. Although the Ch’ing government has no policy to rally the people behind it, the 19 articles proclaimed as the Principles of the Constitution promise to entrust the supreme power of the state to the people. If one compares the system of a constitutional monarchy, which re­ stricts the power of a king, with one or another of the various systems that our people want to try in China, one must come to the conclusion that the former is the only lasting solution [of our problem]. I am positive that my love for my people is no less strong than that of the republican radicals. But I am wary of the means by which the pro­ posed reforms are to be carried out. I fully realize the weight of my duty, and my only objectives are to restore law and order and to see that plans beneficial to our country are put into practice without mishap. Personal fame and power are not my concern. I remain hopeful about the outcome of the proposed peace negotia­ tions. All those who love China wish to find a settlement that will satisfy all parties concerned, will restore peace, and will establish a strong gov­ ernment. I know that some of my fellow citizens, sensible as they are, are willing to entertain the thought of China’s destruction. Thus it is impor­ tant that we and the republicans find a way to end the bloodshed, to break down the walls of misunderstanding, and to remove all that has caused inconvenience to the people. In my opinion, the declarations of independence by some provincial authorities have had very little effect on the peace negotiations. The gov­ ernment has had almost no control over the provinces, and a state of semi-independence, declared or not, has existed for some time. In fact, not all the provinces have severed their relations with the government. Some are still in the hands of conservatives of independent tendencies, whose main objectives for the time being are to maintain law and order and to protect the people and their property. The stronger the republi­ cans are, the more independent these conservatives will become. Hence I propose to call on all the people to deliberate on the question of a suitable political system. This is a question of immense importance. It should be discussed with a cool head and a warm heart. Emotional outbursts can lead nowhere. I submit that the present dynasty and its reigning monarch should be retained in a constitutional monarchy. Discrimination between Manchus and Hans should be eliminated. However, my most important concern is the preservation of China. I rely on patriots of all parties to sacrifice some of their policies in order to cooperate with me in achieving this goal. Only by so doing, can China escape partition or disintegration and the lamentable consequences. For

the sake of our country, we must establish a strong government at once,

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because the danger is mounting day by day. I hope the progressives will not permit our country to sink lower; it is also my sincere wish that they cooperate with me wholeheartedly in seeking an adequate solution to every major issue. [My italics.] These high sounding wishes of mine may lead to misinterpretations of my true intentions. I am aware of the attacks on me from all quarters. But I shall not permit myself to be influenced by them and shall never shirk my supreme duties. All I am trying to do is to prevent China from breaking into pieces.2

Five days after this statement, the regent abdicated and was for­ bidden by Empress Lung-yü to participate further in politics. The abdication, which ended a long power struggle between the regent and the empress, eliminated perhaps the staunchest opponent of republicanism. At the same time. Yuan was given full authority to negotiate a settlement with the revolutionaries. The composition of the government's peace delegation was in­ teresting. It was headed by the American-trained T ’ang Shao-i, who was obviously sympathetic to republicanism.3 Indeed, before the delegation left Peking, he told a foreign friend that “the only solution will be a republic."4 T'ang was assisted by the reticent Yang Shih-ch’i, who was believed to be a monarchist. Judging from his later career, however, Yang was little more than Yuan's mouth­ piece. The third delegate. Yen Hsiu, did not make the journey. Yang Tu, Wei Ch'en-tsu, and Wang Ching-wei went along as ad­ visers. Each province also appointed a representative to the dele­ gation. As the prospects for peace improved, the Revolutionary Party met in Shanghai, and later in the British concession in Han­ kow, to work out a common policy. Early in December, the party members agreed to set up a provisional government in Nanking. They also elected a seven-man peace delegation, led by Wu T'ingfang and including Wang Ching-wei, the same man advising the government negotiators. The imperial delegation arrived in Han­ kow during the election. At the revolutionaries' request, all the delegates traveled to Shanghai, where they held their first meeting in the British concession on December 18. Meanwhile, informal peace negotiations were taking place in Nanking between representatives of Tuan Ch'i-jui and Huang Hsing, the commanders-in-chief of the two contending armies. This military parley had the blessing of political leaders on both

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sides. In a small bookshop on December 20, the representatives at Nanking concluded a five-point agreement: (1) A republican government will be established as the only government of China; (2) the imperial house will be treated with generosity and courtesy; (3) the man responsible for overthrowing the Manchu regime shall be made president of the republic; (4) the soldiers of the north and south, including both Hans and Manchus, will be treated with due con­ sideration and will not be held responsible for destruction during the revolutionary war; and (5) temporary administrative councils will be created in the provinces to maintain peace and order.5

This agreement became the basis for the formal discussions just getting under way in Shanghai. On the morning of December 18, T ’ang Shao-i and Wu T ’ingfang and their respective delegations met in the municipal coun­ cil building to hear Wu's four-point peace plan: the abolition of the Manchu government in Peking, the creation of a republican government, the granting of a generous annuity to the emperor after his abdication, and the provision of relief funds for poor and aged Manchus. The two delegations agreed on an indefinite armis­ tice in seven provinces, including Hupei and Kiangsu. When the delegates met again three days later, Wu insisted that, as a prerequisite for further negotiations, the imperial representa­ tives must accept the first two points of his plan. This was a grave demand, which T ’ang had no authority to grant. He therefore asked for an adjournment to seek instructions from the govern­ ment. In his telegram, T ’ang pointed out the perils facing the im­ perial house and suggested that the choice between a republic and a monarchy might best be made at a national assembly. He also sent a personal message to Yuan, advising him to follow in the foot­ steps of George Washington, since “the fall of the dynasty is im­ minent.”6 Wang Ching-wei, for his part, telegraphed Yuan K’eting. Yuan’s eldest son, and asked him to explain the situation to his father. At the same time, Wang exhorted his revolutionary comrades in the south to be patient. On receiving the messages. Yuan consulted Prince Ch’ing about the possibility of convening a national assembly. On the next day, a court conference was held to discuss the matter. Prince Ch’ing spoke in favor of summoning an assembly, whereas Yü-lang and Duke Tsai-tse strongly opposed the proposal. Yuan and Prince

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Ch’ingarguedsuccessfully; on December 28, Empress Lung-yü per­ sonally approved the plan in an edict that J. O. P. Bland called “the death warrant of the dynasty.’* While the hopelessly divided Manchus quarreled among them­ selves, the revolutionaries were heartened by the homecoming of Sun Yat-sen. Sun was elected the first president of the provisional government almost immediately, with the inauguration scheduled for January 1, 1912. On the day of the election, T ’ang and Wu sat down to their negotiations for the third time. T'ang, acting on Yuan’s instructions, submitted a proposal to convene a national assembly, which would then choose between a republic and a mon­ archy. Two more sessions followed to work out the details of the convention—its time, place, and composition. It was agreed that the assembly would meet in Shanghai on January 8. On January 1, 1912, Sun Yat-sen was sworn in as the first presi­ dent of the provisional government in Nanking. The oath ran as follows: To overthrow the despotic Manchu government, to consolidate the Re­ public of China, and to plan for the welfare of the people, I, Sun Wen, will faithfully obey the wishes of the citizens, be loyal to the nation, and perform my duty in the interest of the public, until the downfall of the despotic government, until the complete restoration of peace in this country, and until the republic has been firmly established and duly recognized by all the nations of the world. Then I, Sun Wen, shall re­ linquish the office of provisional president. I hereby swear this before the citizens.7

This curious oath defined not only what Sun was to do but also when and how he was to give up his post. In essence, this meant that even Sun’s comrades did not consider him fit to be president of the republic. They, like most of their contemporaries, favored Yuan Shih-k’ai and had tentatively agreed on him before Sun’s re­ turn from Denver, Colorado. Thus they did not set up the provi­ sional government to exclude Yuan but to provide an organiza­ tional structure that would define his duties and powers. After the ceremony, just as he had done after his election, Sun tele­ graphed Yuan to confirm the promise that he would relinquish his position once Yuan announced support of the republic. Yet Yuan was not to be satisfied by a mere promise, however firm. He moved to seize the initiative from the revolutionaries. In

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a telegram to Wu T ’ing-fang, he charged that T ’ang Shao-i had overstepped his authority in signing the agreement on the com­ position of the proposed national assembly and the method of nominating delegates. Through Liang Shih-i, Yuan asked T ’ang to resign, which he did. Yuan then personally took charge of the negotiations, and they soon came to a standstill. The situation was volatile and unpredictable. On January 2, the same day Yuan forced T ’ang’s resignation, 68 officers of the Northern Army declared their unwavering support for the dynasty. At the same time, the Chinese envoys abroad sent a memorial fav­ oring abdication. Yuan’s intentions were subject to various inter­ pretations. J. O. P. Bland thought that he was determined to save the monarchy and had been betrayed by his supposed allies: He [Yuan] would have won if T ’ang Shao-i, as imperial delegate to the revolutionaries, had not betrayed his confidence, and if he had received from the British and American governments support which he had every right to expect. For the solution of crisis in December depended essen­ tially upon his obtaining a foreign loan. Had he obtained it, not only would public opinion in the south have given him credit for prestige abroad, but many waverers would have immediately joined themselves to him as the ultimate disperser of loaves and fishes.8

In fact, since his recall Yuan had shown no sign of being so singleminded as Bland assumed. He had even told his close associate Liang Shih-i, and later his son K’e-ting, that he favored a repub­ lican government.0 Dr. Morrison of the Times conjectured that Yuan might indeed have republican leanings, though he did not suggest that this entailed disloyalty to the throne: “I have reason to believe that he would accept such a post [the presidency] if to the wishes of the Convention [the National Assembly in Nanking] were added the wishes of the Manchus, whose dynasty he has served so faithfully.”10 The revolutionaries, for their part, were indignant over the deadlocked negotiations. One member of the delegation, Li Hsiehho, put it bluntly: “The gravest miscalculation in the past month was the agreement to negotiate peace. Since the choice between the republic and the empire is clear-cut and there can be no comprom­ ise, I see no point in discussing either peace or war [with the north].”11 Ts’en Ch’un-hsüan, a former high government official who sympathized with the revolution, sent a telegram to Yuan

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blaming him completely for the breakdown. Sun Yat-sen tele­ graphed details of the peace negotiations to the foreign ministers in Peking and accused Yuan of obstructionism. Reiterating his willingness to turn over his office to Yuan, Sun claimed that Yuan had already agreed to accept it. But then, Sun went on. Yuan had abruptly demanded the dissolution of the provisional government in Nanking. Calling this impossible. Sun ended on a harsh note: the revolutionaries would make concessions to Yuan only if he was willing to give the republic his full support. In Peking, the members of an underground cell of the Revolu­ tionary Party, led by one Chang Hsien-p'ei, were doing more than complaining about Yuan. They were plotting to get rid of him. Although they had decided as early as December 9 to assassinate him, Wang Ching-wei talked them out of it. Now in mid-January, with Wang in Shanghai, there was no one to counsel moderation in the face of Yuan's latest provocations—obstructing the peace talks and arresting party members in Tungchow. Chang and his comrades reviewed the situation and decided to kill Yuan on Jan­ uary 16, when, they learned, he would drive from his office to the palace to present an important memorial to the empress. Tour small groups of party supporters were stationed along the route waiting for Yuan. At 11:15 a .m ., his audience over. Yuan started back. His carriage had just passed the Tung-hua Gate when Chang Hsien-p'ei and nine of his comrades, who had been lying in wait in a nearby teashop, threw four homemade bombs. Though all four exploded, killing 12 guards, none hit the carriage directly. One of the horses drawing the carriage was killed and the other fell to the ground, overturning the vehicle. Yuan emerged unhurt, was quickly helped onto a horse, and rode away. His escort searched the teashop and arrested all the assailants. Three were executed; the remaining seven were later released at the request of foreign correspondents in Peking.12 Yuan's genius lay in his ability to exploit every situation to the fullest. At Chao Ping-chun's suggestion, he immediately tele­ graphed Wang Ching-wei and accused the revolutionaries of break­ ing their promise not to start any trouble during the peace negotia­ tions. Wang answered that these revolutionaries were in fact ban­ dits. On receiving this reply, Yuan ordered further arrests in and around Peking.18 The assassination attempt and Yuan's vigorous retaliation dis-

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99

pelled the last trace of distrust in the minds of his opponents at the court—an especially significant development in light of the critical memorial Yuan had just presented to the empress. Partly to avoid the bitter quarrels the memorial was sure to provoke, Yuan used the attempt on his life as an excuse to request a month's sick leave. More important, he knew that his retirement, however temporary, would be fatal to the feeble regime. Seen in this light, the request for a sick leave was in fact a threat by which Yuan hoped to compel the empress and her kinsmen to agree to the me­ morial’s proposal. The empress, understanding Yuan’s meaning, promptly exempted him from the obligation to attend court con­ ferences but refused to grant him leave. In addition, she conferred on him the title of marquis of the first class, an honor that only one other Han Chinese, Tseng Kuo-fan, had received from the Manchu throne. According to custom, Yuan respectfully declined the honor three times before finally accepting on January 26.14 The memorial of January 16 was a petition from the cabinet as a whole urging an early abdication.15 A court conference was hasti­ ly called for the next day to discuss the memorial. Prince P’u-lun and Prince Ch’ing advocated an imperial proclamation of a repub­ lic, whereas Prince Kung, Duke Tsai-tse, and the ex-regent strenu­ ously objected. The empress hugged the young emperor in her arms and wept. Two days later, another conference was held at the palace to consider two main issues. The first concerned a proposal presented by two of Yuan’s deputies, Liang Shih-i and Chao Ping-chun, to set up a provisional government in Tientsin. By superseding both the imperial government in Peking and the revolutionary govern­ ment in Nanking, Yuan hoped to unify the nation and secure his own political supremacy. He hoped, too, to obtain more favorable terms for the imperial house after the abdication. All the princes rejected his plan. The second issue was how to finance the civil war against the revolutionaries. With no money in the imperial treasury. Yuan was asking for 12 million taels, the provincial gov­ ernors for 30 million, and Feng Kuo-chang for some 6 million. Of all the issues, this question troubled the princes most of all—but not enough to save the dynasty. Though together they had several million taels deposited in foreign banks, none was willing to sacri­ fice his personal fortune. On January 26, the cabinet met in emergency session at Yuan’s

ÎO O

THE REVOLUTION

residence. Returning home from the meeting late in the evening, Liang-pi, the army chief-of-staff and a leader of the Manchu Cabal, was attacked by a fanatic revolutionary. The assailant was killed at once, and Liang died the next day. Since the Manchu leader had consistently opposed Yuan’s peace policy, it was thought that Yuan conspired in the murder.16 The cabinet had met to discuss a telegram from more than 40 commanding officers of Yuan’s troops urging the Manchu emperor to abdicate.17 Only 24 days before, these same generals had pledged to fight to the death for the throne.* In the atmosphere of fear gripping the capital after the attacks on Yuan and Liang-pi, the telegram dealt a lethal blow to the dynasty. The imperial kins­ men, up to this time hesitant and indecisive, were forced to recon­ sider their position out of concern for their physical safety. At the court conference on January 27, the empress screamed hysterically to Yuan’s deputies, “My own and the boy’s [the emperor’s] lives are in your hands. Go and tell Yuan Shih-k’ai, tell him nicely, that he must save us!”18 Finally, at the last court conference three days later, the empress made the crucial decision on her own initiative: she would proclaim a republic by imperial decree.19 The government’s capitulation broke the deadlock in the peace negotiations. With the abdication of the emperor and the estab­ lishment of a republic secured, debate resumed on the last two points of Wu T ’ing-fang’s plan—a generous annuity for the em­ peror and a pension for poor and aged Manchus. The two sides soon reached agreement on these matters and worked out the de­ tails of the abdication ceremony. Yuan’s friend Chang Chien was asked to draft the Manchu sovereign’s last edict.20 On February 12, the prime minister led the whole cabinet into the Yang-hsin Hall, where they were joined by the imperial kins­ men and the court officials. They came to pay their last tribute to their liege and to witness the end of a rule that had lasted 267 years. Presently the empress and the boy emperor arrived and ascended their thrones. A eunuch presented the abdication edict to Her Ma­ jesty for final approval. As she read it, tears streamed down her • Tuan Ch’i-jui and Chang Hsün both signed the abdication telegram. Though Feng Kuo-chang did not, his support for the republic is reported in Lin-shih cheng-fu kung-pao (The Provisional Government Gazette), Nanking, no. 10, February 8,1912.

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101

face; all her vassals prostrated themselves on the ground, quite overcome by grief and fear. Suddenly the empress stopped, wept bitterly, and handed the document to Shih-hsii and Hsii Shihch’ang to be sealed with the imperial seal. Then, one by one, the members of the cabinet signed their names to the document. In silence and dignity, the last audience was adjourned. Later the edict was published in the name of the emperor. It read as follows: We have today received from the Dowager Empress Lung-yii an edict stating that because of the uprising by the Army of the People, with the cooperation of the people of the provinces, the one answering the other like an echo, the whole empire is in turmoil and the people have endured much tribulation. We therefore specially appointed Yuan Shih-k’ai to instruct commissioners to confer with the representatives of the Army of the People about convening a national assembly, at which the future of the government should be decided. For the past two months, there has been a wide divergence of opinion between the north and the south, each strongly maintaining its own views; the general results have been the stagnation of trade and the deployment of troops. As long as the form of government remains undecided, unrest will continue in the country. It is clear that the majority of the people favor the establish­ ment of a republican form of government; the southern and central provinces first held this view, and lately the officers in the north have adopted the same sentiments. This universal desire clearly expresses the Will of Heaven, and it is not for us to oppose the desires and incur the disapproval of millions of the people merely for the sake of the privi­ leges and powers of a single house. It is right that the general situation should be considered and due deference given to the opinion of the people. We, with the Emperor at our side, hereby hand over the sover­ eignty to the people as a whole and declare that the constitution shall henceforth be republican, wishing to satisfy the demands of those within the confines of the country, hating disorder and desiring peace, and anx­ ious to follow the teaching of the sages, according to which the country is the possession of the people. Yuan Shih-k'ai, having been elected Prime Minister some time ago by the Political Consultative Council, is able at this time of change to unite the north and the south. Let him then, with full power so to do, orga­ nize a provisional republican government, conferring therein with the representatives of the Army of the People, that peace may be assured to the people, and that the complete integrity of the territories of the five races—Hans, Manchus, Mongols, Muhammadans, and Tibetans—is at the same time maintained in a great state under the title of the Republic of China. We, the Dowager Empress and the Emperor, will retire into a life of leisure, free from public duties, spending our years pleasantly, enjoying the courteous treatment accorded to us by the people, and

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watching with satisfaction the glorious establishment and consummation of the perfect government.* The document was sealed with the imperial seal and signed by all the members of the cabinet: Prime Minister Yuan Shih-k’ai, Act­ ing Minister of Foreign Affairs Hu Wei-teh, Minister of the Inte­ rior Chao Ping-chun, Acting Minister of Finance Shao-ying, Min­ ister of Education T ’ang Ching-ch’ung, Minister of the Army Wang Shih-chen, Minister of the Navy T ’an Hsüeh-heng, Minister of Justice Shen Chia-pen, Minister of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce Hsi-yen, Minister of Communications Liang Shih-i, and Minister of Suzerainty Ta-shou. This document was far from an unconditional surrender to Nan­ king. It did not even recognize the existence of the provisional government, instead referring to the revolutionaries as the Army of the People. It instructed Yuan Shih-k’ai to organize a provi­ sional republican government in order to unify the north and the south. This, in essence, was Yuan’s original proposal for a provi­ sional government in Tientsin. Further, according to Chang Chien and Liang Shih-i, Yuan himself inserted the phrase ‘‘with full power so to do.” So it was Yuan rather than the Nanking govern­ ment who inherited the Will of Heaven. Whatever he was to do was not to be done as a usurper.21 As soon as the abdication was announced. Yuan telegraphed a lengthy message to the provisional governors, using the odd title of plenipotentiary ( 1590-1628 (1913), 1924-50 (1914), 2289-2342 (1915), 2645-59 (1916). -------- . Parliamentary Debates. Nos. 185 and 186, 1908. -------- . Parliamentary Papers. “The Chinese Revolution.” May 1912. -------- . Parliamentary Papers (Blue Books). “Despatch from Her Maj­ esty’s Minister at Tokyo Forwarding Copy of the Treaty of Peace Con­ cluded Between China and Japan on April 17, 1895.” Han Min [pseud.]. Tang-tai Chung-kuo jen-wu chih (Contemporary emi­ nent Chinese). Shanghai, 1939. Ho Chung-hsiao. Ch’en Ying-shih hsien-sheng nien-p*u (A chronological biography of Ch’en Ch’i-mei). Shanghai, 1946. Ho Hui-chien. “Chu Han shih-tai chih Yuan Shih-k’ai” (Yuan Shih-k’ai accredited to Korea), in Ling-nan University, ed., Li-shih cheng-chih hsiieh-pao (Journal of History and Politics), no. 2, June 12, 1947. Houn, Franklin W. (Hou Fu-wu). Central Government of China, 19121928: An Institutional Study. Madison, Wis., 1957.

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*39

Hsiang-hai Chien-k’e [pseud.]. Ke-ming tsung-t'ung Li Yuan-hung hsiaoshih (A brief history of the revolutionary president Li Yuan-hung). Can­ ton, 1911. Hsieh Pin. Min-kuo cheng-tang shih (A history of political parties in the Republic of China). Shanghai, 1925. Reissued Taipei, 1962. Hsü Chih-yai. Min-kuo shih-chou chi-shih pen-mo (Chronicles of the first ten years of the Republic of China). Shanghai, 1922. Hsii Ch’in. “T ’o-hsien-chi” (Flight from danger), in Wu Hsien-tzu, Hsiencheng-tang shih (A history of the constitutionalist party). San Francisco, 1952.

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Index

Aglen, Sir Francis A., 149 Allen, Young J., 15 Alliance Society (T’ung-meng Hui), 79 »114 Amur River, 55 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 151 Anhwei, 61,92,114,131-37 p a ssim , 167, 179,191,219 Annam, 10,17 Anti-Japanese Military and Political College, 33n Anti-Manchuism, 78-79,91,203-4 Anti-monarchists, 179-92 p a ssim Ariga Nagao, 156-57,176 Army, Chinese, 30-36,55-63,161 —Divisions: First, 57t; Second, 57t, 60, 133; Third, 57f, 87t, 107,137,182; Fourth, 57-60 passim ; Fifth, 57-61 passim ; Sixth, 57ft, 87,133,189; Seventh, 59,61,182,185; Eighth, 59, 90,182; Ninth, 59; Twentieth, 87; Central, 47,53; Front, 47; Left, 47,49, 56f; Rear, 47; Right, 47 »5 »»55 »57 » —Hwai Army, 6,23-36 p a ssim , 40,56, 214,217 —Imperial Guard Army, 47,49,217t —Newly Created Army, 30-36 passim ; careers of individual officers of, 217-220 —Northern Army, 57,70,91,97, i6of, 186,217-18 —Standard Regiments, 161,217,220 Army of the People (Revolutionary Army), 91,101-4 p a ssim Aston, W. G., 11-15 p a ssim Austria, 49,148 Baber, British consul-general in Seoul, 21 Bank of China, 175,189 Bank of Communications, 70, 83-84, »49 . »75 . »89

Bannermen, 32,56fr, 59,103t, 128,208 Banque de l’Indochine, 117 Banque Sino-Belge, 118 Belgium, 77,121, i25f, 148,156 Beresford, Lord Charles, 36 Bewick Moreing and Company, 64,66 Bland, J. O. P., g6f, 116 Board of Political Affairs, 146-47,1470, 15 7 - 5 8 »

173

» 181

Board of Revenue, 27,34,54,57,63,72 Board of War, 38,56t, 72 Board of Works, 46,66,72 Bowden Smith, Miss, British teacher,

!95n

Boxer Uprising, 44-52,60-68 passim , 78, 81,124,140,198-206 passim , 214, 2igf Bryan, William Jennings, 141 Buddhism, 5,25,194 Cabinets, 82,88f, 111-12,120-21,125, *37» !43» 146. See a lso in d iv id u a l m in istrie s

Canton, 78,84,133 Cassini, Russian minister to China, 27 Central Command, 160 Chahar, 217s Chang Chen-wu, 121-22,136 Chang Ch’i-yiin, 196-97 Chang Chien: influence on Yuan of, 2-3; posts appointed to, 7,112,174, 187; advises Weng, 27; as reformer, 8if; and abdication edict, 100,102; assesses Yuan, 17, 85,172; resists monarchy, 179 Chang Chih-tung, 29-32 pa ssim , 36, 48-54 p a ssim , 59,62,68-75 passim , 81,90,198 Chang Ching-yao, 179-86 p a ssim Chang Feng-hui, 114,135 Chang Hsien-p’ei, 98 Chang Hsün: military career of, 58,91,

250

INDEX

115. »33-37 p a ssim , 143,180,217; politics of, loon, 145,172,182,191, 213-14 Chang Huai-chih, 57-61 pa ssim , 217 Chang I (Chang Yen-mou), 64-67 Chang Ju-mei, 45 Chang P’ei-lun, 33 Chang Piao, 59,90 Chang Shao-tseng, 87t Chang Shu-sheng, 3,6 Chang Shu-yuan, 219 Chang T ’ai-yen, 78,106 Chang Tso-lin, 137,172,214 Chang Tsung-hsiang, i2on, 1470 Chang Yen-mou (Chang I), 64-67 Changsha, 185,200 Changteh, 59,76,86 Chao Erh-feng, 84 Chao Erh-hsiin, 58,92,174 Chao Kuo-hsien, 60-61,217 Chao Ping-chun, 58,85,98f, 102,112, 119-25 p assim , 130-31 Chao Ping-lin, 71,75,199,204 Chao Ti, 115 Chaoch’ing, 190 Chaochow, 155,217 Chefoo, 2 ,221,39,50,153 Cheju Island, 21 Chekiang, 114,135,180,189, 218, 220 Chemulpo Treaty, 7 Ch’e Ch’ing-yun, 217 Chenchow, 2 Ch’en Ch’ang-ch’ing, 15 Ch’en Chen-hsien, i2on Ch’en Ch’i-mei, 112,134t Ch’en Chiung-ming, i33ff, 185 Ch’en 1, 116,179-83 p a ssim , 187-92 passim

Ch’en Kuang-yuan, 217 Ch’en Pi, 83 Ch’en Po-ta, 197 Ch’en Shu-t’ang, 10-14 p a ssim , 18 Ch’en T ’ien-hua, 202 Ch’en Wen-yun, 217 Cheng Ju-ch’eng, 184 Cheng-chih Hui-i (Political Council), i44f, 164,166 Chengtu, 183 Ch’eng Ch'ien, 134 Ch’enç Teh-ch’uan, 131t Ch’i-ying, 204f Chiang Ch’ao-tsung, 217 Chiang Kai-shek, 33n, 1970, 203,204n, 213 Chiang Kuei-t’i, 57,120,145,217 Chiang Tso-pin, i2on, 121 Chichow, 36,38 Ch’ien Neng-hsun, 1470

Chih-kung Hui (Society of Justice), 78 Chihfeng, 217 Chihli (now Hopei): viceroys of, 2f, 5, 29, 38,48-54 p a ssim , 74, 83, 85, 209; military history of, 47-59 p a ssim , 115, 119; economy of, 63,67,127; Yuan’s reforms in, 73-74,209-10 Chin Pang-p’ing, 156-57 China: foreign policy of, 4-7,26-29, 44-52,58,140-44,151-58,176-78; economy of, 21-24,30-31,50,63-64, 117-28 p a ssim , 147-51 pa ssim ; decline of, necessitating reform, 29-30, 36-38, 77; political system of, 71-73, 81-82, 92-114 passim, 138-40, 144-47, 161-76 p a ssim , 189-93 p a ssim , 207-10 p a ssim China Revival Society, 77 C h in a 's D e s tin y , 203 Chinese Revolutionary Party, see Revolutionary Party Ch’ing Brigade, 2,6 Ch’ing dynasty: 88-89,93 »105 >»®4 »»*>7 » 199,208,213L See also Manchu Empire, Manchu government Ch’ing, Prince: 33,38,52-61 passim , 71,75, 82, 85t, 95-99 p a ssim C h 'in g -i officials, 81, 198,1980, 204 Ch’iu Ch’ang-chin, 218 Chou Chün, 19m Chou Fu, 28,59,71 Chou Fu-lin, 87,218 Chou Hsiieh-hsi, 54,67, i2on, 121,125t Chou Hung-yeh, 1270 Chou Tzu-ch’i, i2on, 1470,174-78 p a ssim , 192 Chou Yü-ching, 131 Ch’ou-an Hui (Society of Planning for Peace and Stability), 168,172,175,209 Christians, 45-48 p a ssim Chu Ch’i-ch’ien, i2on, 125, i47n, 162-63, »72 *73 »»77 »»79 Chu Chia-pao, 58,92 Chu Jui, 135,189 Ch’u Ch’i-hsiang, 220 Ch’ü Hung-chi, 71,74 Ch’un, Prince, 75, 80-94 p a ssim Chung Lin-t’ung, 218 Chungking, 183 “Citizens’Association,” 139 Clan Cabinet, 82, 89 Clemenceau, Georges, 139 Clennell, W. J., 200,20on Coal mining, 64-67 Commission for Army Reorganization, 57-61 p a ssim , 2i8ff Communications Clique, 70, 83,149,172 Communists, 197, 206,213

INDEX Confucian Empire, 38,197-98 Confucianism, 25,195-96, 214; values of, 30,110,206,208,2i2f; disintegration of bureaucracy of, 60,198,205,208; Yuan’s revival of, 110, i62f, 213 Conger, Mrs. Sarah, 205 Constitution: and Constitutional Party, 79-80; regent’s, 81-82; requested by Political Consultative Council, 89; provisional, 108,121,138,144-46; Yuan in conflict with, 111,144, 209- 10; attempts to draft a perma­ nent, 1i2f, 138,145-46. See also Constitutional movement Constitutional Compact Conference, 145-46,164,211-12 Constitutional movement, 30,38,71-73, 21013. See also Constitution Council of State, 146,164,169,172-74, 180,188 Crisp, Charles Birch, 123-24,125-26 Culkin, Dr. Ethel M., 129 Curzon, G. N., 8 Dairen, 37,153 Dalai Lama, 141 Dane, Sir Richard, 127,148 Darwin, Charles, 78,109. See also Social Darwinism Denny, O. N., 18-23 p a ssim Detring, G., customs inspector of Tientsin, 64s Deutsche-Asiatische Bank, 117,134 Double Tenth, 90 Dowager empress, see Tz’u-hsi. Dragonflower Society (Lung-hua Hui),

78

Education, and office holding, 208-12 p a ssim

Eliot, Charles William, 167 England, see Great Britain Europe, 9,22,77 f, 125,150-54 pa ssim , 164,176,201 .S e e also West, the, a n d in d iv id u a l co u n trie s by n a m e E x h o r ta tio n to L e a rn in g , 198

Fan Yuan-lien, 112, i2on Feng Kuo-chang, 115,137,174,183,192; military career of, 34,47,55-58 pa ssim , 85L 90-91,99,133,160,218; and revolution, 85-91 p a ssim , 99, loon; and Yuan’s monarchy, 165-66, 167,172,174,179-82 passim-, and Yuan’s downfall, 184-91 p a ssim Feng Yii-hsiang, 185,189 Feng-shan, 60, 82,220 Fengtien, 58,172,219

251

Finance Ministry, Chinese, see Ministry of Finance Flaherty, A. J., 20on Foote, Lucius H., 90-15 passim Foreign Ministry, Chinese, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs Foulk, G. C., 19 France, 3, 27,37,49,77,148,177L and war with China, 10,17,31 Fukien, 114L 131-35 p a ssim , 155 Garden for Cultivating Longevity (Yang Shou Yuan), 76,85 Germany, 3,146,156, 212; interests in China of, 37,69; and Boxer Uprising, 45» 49» 52; diplomacy of, 134,141,178; and Japan, 151,153 Giles, Bertram, 200 Goodnow, F. L., 150,167-70 Grand Constitutional Era (Hung-hsien Empire), 175-81 passim , 187, 210 Grand Council, 27,27n, 31-34 passim , 55 - 56 ,59,72,74,204 Grand Secretariat, 2,59,72 Great Britain, 3, 37,67-69 passim , 77, 146,165,168,195,210; diplomacy of, 2of, 49L 65, i4off, 151,156L 177,184; and loans, 124,134,148 Green Standard, 32,56,59 Han Chinese, 101,165,174, 208,2o8n; and Manchus, 72-73,74,82,93,203-4; in cabinets, 82, 88 Han Kiu Chik, gn, 11-14 passim Han-lin Academy, 72 Hanabusa Yoshitada, 5,9 Hankow, 36,69, 84-94 pa ssim , 103,121, 136,148 Hanneken, C. von, military advisor to Li Hung-chang, 6 ,31t Hanyang, goff, 103,154 Hanyang Foundry, 68 Hanyehp’ing Company, 154 Harriman, E. H., 70 Hart, Sir Robert, 9,21, 28,31,45,64,65, 149

Heilungkiang, 58,106,219 Heung Sung (Tai Won Kun), 3-9, 18-21,27 Hiangcheng, 1,76,194 Hioki Eki, 152,1563,176,178,185 HoFeng-lin, 218 Ho Feng-yii, 218 Ho Tsung-lien, 218 Hokien, 59 Honan, if, 58-61 p a ssim , 76,127,174, 191-94 p a ssim , 219; military history of, 103, ii4d, 160

252

INDEX

Hong Kong, 22,77 Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, 117,126,134 Hong Yong Sik, 8-16 p a ssim ; son of, 24-25 Hoover, Herbert, 64,66 Hopei, see Chihli Hsi Hsin-yu, 51,217 Hsi-liang, 58 Hsi-yen, 102 Hsiaochan, 32-36 pa ssim , 340,44,54-60 passim , 87,131,166, 217-20 Hsin-chien Lu-chün (Newly Created Army), 30-36 p a ssim Hsiung Hsi-ling, 111,116,124,137,150 Hsiung K’e-wu, 134! Hsü Shih-ch’ang, 2,34,54,57,61,101, 214; as official, 58f, 71-72, 82-86 p assim , 146-47,158; and Yuan’s monarchy and downfall, 174,179, i86ff, 192 Hsü Shih-ying, i2on Hsü Shu-cheng, 161 Hsüan-t’ung (P’u-i), Emperor, 75,80, 8on, 85, 88f, 95,99-106 p a ssim , 213 Hu Han-min, 132,207n Hu Wei-teh, 102, i2on Hu Ying, 168 Hu Yü-fen, 28-33 p a ssim , 48,52-53,70 Huang Hsing, 91,94-95,112,115Ï, 12223,129-34 pa ssim Huang Yen-p’ei, 196 Huang Yuan-jung, 123 Huichow, 185 Hukow, 133® Hulun, 103 Hunan, 30^40,61,72,74,202,214,219t; and revolution, 84, 86,92,207-8; during Yuan’s rule, 114,131-37 passim , 179-92 passim Hundred Days’ Reform, see Reform Movement of 1898 Hung Ch’uan-fu, 78 Hung Hsiu-ch’uan, 78 Hung Shu-tsu, 130É Hung-hsien Empire, 175-81 p a ssim , 187, 210 Hupei, 30t, 50,63,68,128,133,160,182, 2igf; and revolution, 84-90 passim , 95; during Yuan’s rule, 122,135t, 179, 182 Huxley, Thomas, 109,199 Hwai Army, 6,26-36 p a ssim , 40,56, 214, 217 Hwai region, 1,191 Hwai River, 58,115,137,172

Ichang, 175 Ichow, 45 Ijuin, Japanese minister to China, 88 Imperial Guard Army, 47,59, 217t Imperial Maritime Customs, 9,21, 30-31,149 Inchon, 4,6,16,20-26 p a ssim India, 141,202 Inouye Kaoru, 6,9 Institute of Political Studies, 72 Ishii Kikujiro, 176 Italy, 49,141 Ito, Count, Japanese premier, 17,25 Iwakura Tomomi, 4 Jaochow, 200 Japan, 31,63,7of, 106,151,180, i98n, 201,214; and Korea, 3-20 p assim , 24-28 p a ssim , 77,197, 214; progressivism of, 9,62, 73,90, 210; and Boxer Uprising, 49,52; and Manchuria, 55, 176; loans from, 83,118,121,127, 143 ~44 »*48; and “Second Revolution,” 134, 137 >14S> recognizes China, 141-44 passim ; demands on China of, 151-58; and monarchist movement, 176-79, 184-86, i86n Jehol, l, 217t Johnston, R. F., 80 Jordan, Sir John, gin, 124,141-42, 175-76,184; and loan negotiations, 125,148; and Yuan, 140,164,177,189, 193,195; and Japanese, 152,156t, 177t, 184 Joyce, Justice, 66 Juan Chung-shu, 54 Jui-cheng, 90 Jung-lu, 29-36 p a ssim , 38-43,47®, 52®, 59.81

Kaiping Coal-Mining Company, 55, 64-67 Kanghwa Island, 4f, 11,14 K’ang Yu-wei, 37f, 43,186-88 p a ssim , 196 Kansu, 133 Kansu Army, 31,38,48, 52 Kawamata, Japanese interpreter, 12 K e -m in g c h ü n (The revolutionary army), 78,199 Ketteler, von, German minister, 49,52 Khutukhta, leader of Mongolia, 143 Kiangpei, 219t Kiangsi, 92,114,132-37 p a ssim , 188-91 p a ssim , 200,219 Kiangsu: and revolution, 86,92,103;

INDEX during Yuan’s rule, 127,133-37 passim, 143,174 Kiangyin, 189 Kiaochow, 37,151 Kim Hong Chip, 12,18,27 Kim Ok Kiun, &-20 passim, 24-25 Kim Yun Sik, 10,1&-22 passim King of Korea, 3,7-28 passim Kingtehchen, 175 Kirin, 58,219 Kiukiang, 132-33,155,185,200,218 Konavaloff, adviser in Audit Depart­ ment, 127 Korea, 3-28,36-37,195,206 Ku Cho-t’ang, 218 Kuang-fu Hui (Recovery Society), 78 Kuang-hsii, Emperor, 7, i8f, 22,36-43 passim, 50,74-75» 79f»i36 Kung, Prince, 99,204 Kung-chin Hui, 131 Kunming, 181 Kuo Feng-shan, 217 Kuo Pao-ch'ang, 175 Kuomintang, 114-26 passim, 143,161, 166,168,179-80,185, 204,212; Yuan’s campaign against, 128-38,145f, 208. See also Revolutionary Party Kwangju, 26 Kwangsi, 52,60,180-86 passim, 217 Kwangtung, 60,83 f, 114,132-36 passim, *53 »175 »217; and Yuan’s downfall, 180-90 passim Kweichow, 92,135-36,145,180-85 passim, 207 Laichow, 151 Langley, Sir Walter, 125,164, i77f, 184, 193,195 Lao Nai-hsuan, 46 Lei Chen-ch’un, 61,133,179, 218 Legislative Assembly, 146 Li Ch’ang-t’ai, 182,218 Li Ching-ch’u, 83-84 Li Ching-hsi, 145,174 Li Ch’ing-yiian, 24n Li Ch'un, 58, i33ff, 180,188-89, 218 Li Hsieh-ho, 97,168 Li Hung-chang, 14,28-35 passim, 52®, 61-69 passim, 77,81,83,89; and Yuan, 7,10,19,22,38,53,59,214; and Korea, 5f, 17-27 passim; power structure of, 36,140, 208; and Boxer War, 48-52, 204 Li Hung-tsao, 32-35 passim Li Lieh-chun, 132-35 passim, 182 Li Lien-ying, 33,54

253

Li Po-yiian, 205 Li Sheng-to, 72 Li Yuan-hung: military career of, gof, 115» 133» 183; political career of, 105, 112,122,136, i38f, 145,179,187-93 passim; made a prince, 174 Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, 42t, 82,130,166,168, 186,212; as reformer, 33,37,80,82, 106, i7gf, 201-2,203; on finance, 63-64,150; on government bodies, 113, i37f, 180-81,187; as minister of justice, 137,164,187; and Yuan's downfall, 171-93 passim Liang Hua-tien, 34 Liang Ju-hao, 125,143 Liang Shih-i, 97,176,187,192; political career of, 70, 83,99,102,111,119; an