Yeltsin's Russia and the West 9780313013843, 9780275965389

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Yeltsin’s Russia and the West

YELTSIN’S RUSSIA AND THE WEST Andrew Felkay

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Felkay, Andrew. Yeltsin’s Russia and the West / Andrew Felkay. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–275–96538–4 (alk. paper) 1. Russia (Federation)—Politics and government—1991– 2. Russia (Federation)—Foreign relations. 3. Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich, 1931– DK510.763.F45 2002 327.470171′3′09049—dc21 2001059071 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2002 by Andrew Felkay All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2001059071 ISBN: 0–275–96538–4 First published in 2002 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

I. Title.

To my wife, Marcia Felkay, for her unfailing help.

Contents

Introduction

1

1. The Making of a Rebel

7

2. From Engineer to Party Activist

13

3. Falling from Grace and Reemergence 4. The Way to the Top

31

5. Struggle for Power

41

6. Yeltsin Takes Control

21

53

7. The Demise of the Soviet Union

67

8. Yeltsin Wins a New Constitution

77

9. Yeltsin and the West—The Early Years 10. Backlash of the Imposed Democracy 11. Cooling of Pro-Western Policies 12. Yeltsin Holds On

85 99

107

123

13. The 1996 Presidential Election

139

14. The Struggle against NATO’s Expansion 15. Government Reshuffle and Economic Crisis 16. Challenges at Home and Abroad

185

159 173

viii

Contents

17. Kosovo 197 18. The Search for a Successor 211 19. Yeltsin Had the Last Word 227 Conclusion 237 Selected Bibliography 249 Index 253

Introduction

On August 19, 1991, at 6:45 A.M. the phone rang in my Moscow apartment.1 One of my Russian colleagues was calling, and she sounded really perturbed. “Turn on your television set,” she said, “something terrible has happened. Gorbachev has fallen ill or died; he has been replaced.” I instantly turned on the television, but only classical music was broadcast on all four available channels. Within a few minutes the music was interrupted by a solemn official announcement: “Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, for reasons of health, is unable to fulfill his obligations as president of the USSR, and in accordance with Article 127 of the Constitution of the USSR, the powers of the presidency are being transferred to the vice president of the USSR, Gennady Ivanovich Yanayev.”2 Consequently, it was announced that in order to prevent disorder or possibly chaos, an eight-member Governmental Emergency Committee was formed to cope with the situation. The members were the most conservative Communists of the Gorbachev government and two leaders of pro-Communist mass organizations. The news was ominous. The sudden disappearance and replacement of the much-admired personifier of reforms in the Soviet Union was a great shock to all those who were hoping for the country’s democratization. The broadcast signaled a palace coup. To appease the still-powerful Left, Gorbachev had placed conservative Communists in key positions in his government. Western observers had serious doubts about those appointments, but Gorbachev believed that he could keep them under control.

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Yeltsin’s Russia and the West

I was saddened by this apparent sudden “left turn,” but given the uncertainties, my main concern was the welfare and safety of my twelve American students who were just about to complete their four-week study tour at the Diplomatic Academy of the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union. The group’s return date was set for August 23. They were housed in the northeastern part of Moscow, near the end of the Sokolniki metro line, and traveled by a chartered bus to their classes in downtown Moscow. On that day, the bus came as usual, and the driver assured our small group that en route everything was “normal.” So we headed downtown. Along the way, the usual crowds of people were going to work, traffic was moving normally, people were beginning to line up at certain stores, and everything appeared calm. At the Diplomatic Academy, Russian colleagues were arriving with the news that there were tanks moving into position in the center of the city. Others reported seeing barricades at certain approaches to the White House (which housed the Russian Federation’s Parliament and the government, while the Soviet government was in the Kremlin) to obstruct the passage of tanks and troop carriers. Everybody was anxious to find out just what was happening. The Russian news sources were useless; television went off the air. For those Muscovites who were able to receive it, CNN (Cable News Network) came to the rescue. In 1990, the Diplomatic Academy purchased a parabolic antenna with the payment it had received for the summer program from students of Kutztown University in Pennsylvania. Thus, in August 1991, the whole staff, professors, students, secretaries, and even the service personnel crowded into the TV room to see what was happening in Moscow by watching CNN. Ironically, I had to translate from English into Russian. CNN was showing columns of tanks and troop carriers moving into key positions in Moscow. Tanks were stationed on bridges, in front of the government buildings, and at major thoroughfares. CNN was also showing a huge crowd of Muscovites gathering and milling about in front of the White House. In effect, they were forming a human barricade in defense of the building. The most dramatic event was shown just past noon, when the recently elected president of the Russian Republic, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, came out of the White House and climbed on one of the few tanks that had come to defend it. Yeltsin read his recently drafted proclamation denouncing the illegal takeover and called for resistance against the putschists.3 The huge crowd cheered the Russian president. Suddenly, Yeltsin had become the symbol of resistance against the conspirators. After seeing the tanks and the massive crowd around the White House, the American students had to experience the “action” for themselves. No power could hold them back. I, having already witnessed the damage Rus-

Introduction

3

sian tanks can inflict when they start firing in a city (in 1956 Hungary), also ventured out cautiously to witness the unfolding historic events in Moscow. Until that date, Gorbachev had been the darling of the Western world. He was also the hero of the recently liberated former Soviet satellites. But on August 19, 1991, Boris Yeltsin, the president of Russia, captured the imagination of the world and in Gorbachev’s absence he emerged as the de facto leader of democratic forces in the Soviet Union. While Gorbachev was universally admired abroad for introducing major domestic reforms, perestroika and glasnost, and significantly reducing tension between East and West, by the late 1980s, he was seriously losing credibility at home. His glasnost, openly discussing mistakes and criticizing domestic and foreign policies, had succeeded beyond expectations; but perestroika, the restructuring and overhauling of the economy, faltered. Years had passed and the Russian people did not see the promised improvements. In the West, Yeltsin was viewed as a foil to Gorbachev. In 1985, when he was made first secretary of the Moscow City Communist Party Committee, he received some positive notices by Western journalists. It was pointed out that under his jurisdiction municipal services improved, stores were better supplied, and Yeltsin himself was seen riding on buses and on the metro. It was reported that he was making personal inspections and holding corrupt managers responsible. In those days, Gorbachev got credit for bringing new and energetic leaders into the party’s top echelons. Yeltsin did not resurface in the Western media until 1987, when it was reported that at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party celebrating the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Yeltsin harshly criticized the lack of progress of the perestroika and the bureaucratic party leadership. This criticism resulted in his falling out of Gorbachev’s favor and eventual dismissal from his Moscow party post in 1987, as well as his removal from the Politburo in February 1988.4 In 1989, Yeltsin reasserted himself in politics and became a thorn in Gorbachev’s side. The pro-Gorbachev media viewed Yeltsin as a spoiler. Yeltsin’s visit to the United States in September 1989 also did not earn him accolades. In 1991, as the representative of the Russian Republic’s Parliament, he sought to establish direct relations with the European Parliament, and later, when he asked for Gorbachev’s resignation, he was reprimanded by the European Union and severely criticized by the press.5 However, as Gorbachev’s popularity was waning at home, Yeltsin’s star was rising. As elected chairman of Russian Supreme Soviet in 1990, and elected president of the Russian Republic, Yeltsin, in fact, set up an alternate power structure to Gorbachev’s leadership of the Soviet Union. After August 19, 1991, Yeltsin prevailed beyond doubt.

4

Yeltsin’s Russia and the West

On August 22, 1991, when a still somewhat bewildered Gorbachev reappeared in Moscow, a triumphant Yeltsin was there to meet him. Without consulting the Soviet leader, Yeltsin acted decisively as president of the Russian Republic. He moved against the Communist Party, suspended Communist publications, and banned the party’s activities in the Russian Republic. He took advantage of his newly minted image as the champion of democracy and savior of the reforms. Gorbachev was unable to catch up with the fast-moving events. Western leaders greeted Gorbachev’s reappearance in the Kremlin with a sigh of relief. They assumed that the man with whom they “could do business”6 was safely back in power, but it was no longer business as usual. The Soviet Union was disassembling. Its constituent parts, all fifteen union republics, declared not only their sovereignty within the Union, but also their independent statehood. All the newly formed republics had their own leaders, and Gorbachev had no country left to lead. The reality of the swiftly moving events caught up with him, and on December 26, 1991, he submitted his resignation. Yeltsin’s Russia, although shorn from the ethnic republics, but with a territory encompassing eleven time zones, a population of 147 million, and an enormous nuclear arsenal, emerged in place of the Soviet Union. The West, in spite of its proGorbachev sympathies, had to accept the fact that it had to deal with Russia’s elected president, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. Since that time, Boris Yeltsin became the dominant factor in Russia’s relations with the West. More than sixty years ago, Winston Churchill stated, “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.”7 To expand on the quotation, the key to understanding Russia is to understand the country’s leaders, and the way each leader balanced national interest with self-interest. Historically, strong rulers have always rescued Russia from foreign domination, disorder and possibly chaos. Many strong-willed autocrats, who did not shy away from using the cruelest means to achieve their ends, have ruled Russia.8 None of Yeltsin’s predecessors believed in democracy as it was understood and practiced in the West. Gorbachev tried to create “socialism with a human face” in the Soviet Union, but without letting go of the one-party control. The August 1991 events showed just how Gorbachev lost control of the country. Once again, a strong hand was needed to bring the country, or what was left of it, out of chaos. After the long stagnation of the Brezhnev era, a rapid succession of geriatric leaders, and the unfulfilled promises of Gorbachev, the Russian people had enough of the Communist rule and the endless sacrifices in the name of a better future. The people in the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union

Introduction

5

were also getting ready to find their own way without Moscow, with the population of the three Baltic republics leading the way. In the Russian Republic, by overwhelmingly electing Yeltsin as president in June 1991 and rallying behind him in August, it was clearly demonstrated that the Russian people were ready for a change. Yeltsin was in the position to fill the power vacuum that had been created by the demise of the Communist Party, and he was ready to bring about the much-anticipated changes. The changes, which Yeltsin promulgated both in domestic and foreign affairs, were revolutionary. During his long tenure, Yeltsin put his personal imprint on practically all aspects of Russian life. It is the primary intent of this book to carefully analyze the impact of Boris Yeltsin on the evolving new relationship between the Western democracies and Russia. But separating the process of formulating foreign policy from domestic political developments would be a folly. The two processes have been intertwined and have affected one another. From the onset, Yeltsin kept both reins of decision making firmly in hand, and used each to keep his immense but often bewildered country on the path he was charting for it. Accordingly, the book will study Yeltsin’s successes and failures. It will assess his effectiveness in moving his country toward democracy and market economy, and show his attempts to integrate Russia into the ranks of advanced democracies. In order to better understand Yeltsin’s policies and attitudes toward the West, a whole series of questions must be answered. How did his worldview develop? To what extent did the country’s history and political culture influence him? What caused him to rebel against the very system that propelled him to the top? How was he affected by his interaction with Western decision makers, and how did he react to those Western foreign policy decisions that impinged on Russia? How did he see Russia’s role in world affairs?

NOTES 1. August 19, 1991 was the date of the announcement of the putsch attempted by the conservative Communists. 2. Pravda, August 20, 1991. Translations from Russian to English are made by the author unless otherwise noted. 3. Hundreds of copies were mimeographed by rather primitive means. Some were hand corrected, while others were signed by pro-reform oriented notables. Nevertheless, these pamphlets were quickly spread by supporters and were posted everywhere—in subway stations, on trees, and on buildings. 4. Major Western newspapers with Moscow bureaus—among them, the New York Times and the Washington Post—were giving up-to-date developments

6

Yeltsin’s Russia and the West

from the Soviet Union. For chronology see: Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: Random House, 1994), p. xiii. 5. Yeltsin himself quotes from the Le Monde, Berliner Zeitung, and the New York Daily News. Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, p. 25. 6. The phrase originated with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of England upon Gorbachev’s official visit in 1985, as an heir apparent to the ailing Communist Party boss, Chernenko. 7. George Seldes, ed., The Great Quotations (New York: Pocket Books, 1969), p. 851. 8. The examples are too numerous to elicit them all, but consider Ivan IV (the Terrible), who brought the opposing boyars under control with his dreaded personal army, the oprichniki; and Peter the Great, who hanged hundreds of his rebellious palace guards outside the Kremlin, and Westernized his country by coercion, having built a new capital, St. Petersburg, on the islands of the Neva (or, as the historian Kluchevsky put it, the city was built on the bones of the thousands of serfs and prisoners who were forced to work there and died in the swamps). Peter, not unlike Ivan IV, had done away with his own son. Consider also Nicolas I, the “Gendarme of Europe,” who crushed nationalist aspirations of Poles and Hungarians; and Stalin, the cruelest of them all, whose victims numbered in millions, but under his reign the Soviet Union emerged as a major world power.

1 The Making of a Rebel

In an attempt to account for a major decision maker’s behavior, one is tempted to search for clues in that person’s origins, family background, childhood, upbringing, education and other early socializing influences. In Yeltsin’s case, only a limited number of reliable sources are available.1 In his autobiographical book, Against the Grain, Yeltsin described his humble origins, and the utter poverty of his youth. He was born on February 1, 1931, in the village of Butka, in the Talitsky District of Sverdlovsk Province. His ancestors, the Yeltsins and the Starygins (his mother’s family) for generations lived and worked in that village. It is worth noting that Yeltsin’s grandfather, Ignaty, was a well-to-do peasant, who, during the years of Stalinist forced collectivization, was declared to be a kulak,2 and his possessions were confiscated. To avoid further prosecution, Ignaty went into northern exile. Yeltsin’s parents, Nikolai Ignatevich Yeltsin and Klavdia Vasilyevna Starygina, were married in 1930, and Boris was their first child. Yeltsin related the story of his baptism as it was told to him by his mother. The anecdote itself was told in a lighthearted manner, but it had more serious implications. The village had no priest in residence, and all the baptisms were performed only once a month. By the time it was the Yeltsin baby’s turn, the priest was already quite inebriated from all the congratulatory toasts, and just when he had immersed Boris in the baptismal font, he was distracted by some parishioners and forgot about the baby already in the holy water. It took a few seconds until the baby’s mother realized the danger

8

Yeltsin’s Russia and the West

and quickly fished him out of the tub. The priest, upon noticing the ordeal, pronounced the infant lively and tough, and named him Boris.3 The interesting aspect of the story is the fact that in spite of the Stalinist persecution of religion and the official antireligious propaganda, the religious rituals were still practiced in the countryside, and Boris Yeltsin became a member of the Russian Orthodox Church. Yeltsin described his early childhood as living in near poverty. He drew a sketchy picture of life in an impoverished collective farm. The Yeltsins lived in a small hut, and had a horse and a cow, but when the horse died, they could not replace it, and the cow did not last much longer. In 1932, to provide for his family, Boris’s father, Nikolai, left the village with his younger son, Adrian, in search of work at construction sites. Eventually, Nikolai found work in Kazan and moved his family to Berezniki, in Perm Province. Living conditions for workers and their families were pitiful. The Yeltsins shared a twenty-room, barracks-like clapboard hut with nineteen other families. After the birth of a brother and sister, the Yeltsins had six people in the room, in addition to a goat.4 Disaster struck the family in 1934, when Yeltsin’s father, while working at a construction site in Kazan, was arrested for anti-Soviet agitation. He was sentenced, under Article 58–10 of the Soviet penal code, to three years of corrective labor in one of Stalin’s notorious gulags. Nikolai Yeltsin’s “crime” was that he had associated with a fellow worker who refused to sign over part of his paycheck for an official loan. He was also denounced as the son of a former kulak conspiring against the state.5 Yeltsin claimed that his father never talked about his incarceration. He described his father as a rough and quick-tempered person, noting that he had also inherited such traits. Nikolai Yeltsin was a strong disciplinarian, whose means of punishing his children was the belt. On the other hand, he was also depicted as a would-be inventor, always tinkering, calculating and drawing up designs, but never able to realize his plans. His mother, Klavdia, would always try to prevent the whipping of young Boris. She was described as a kind, loving and helpful person, who was always ready to help her neighbors by sewing clothes. By age six, young Boris was in charge of his siblings and other chores around the house. He and his mother worked at a nearby collective farm during the summers to earn some extra income. Yeltsin maintained that from early on he stood out among other children for his energy and drive. He was elected as class leader, even though he attended different schools. He always did well in his studies, but he was also a prankster and a ringleader. His good grades were in contrast with his low marks in discipline. As a youngster, he organized some dangerous stunts among his peers and took part in

The Making of a Rebel

9

gang-type rumbles. He even managed to get expelled from primary school. At the graduation ceremony, he stood up and charged his homeroom teacher with unprofessional behavior and pronounced her unfit to teach children. His diploma was withdrawn the following day. But even by age fourteen, the young Boris was determined not to accept the school’s “unfair” decision. He appealed to the higher authorities, and eventually turned to the local Communist Party committee for his reinstatement. On the basis of his complaint, the case was investigated, the teacher was fired, and Boris received his diploma.6 Yeltsin’s memories of his high school years in Sverdlovsk were much more favorable; he took up sports at that school. He tried skiing, gymnastics, decathlon, wrestling and boxing, but his love for volleyball prevailed. He practiced that sport day and night, although two missing fingers on his left hand adversely affected his playing. The injury was the result of a dangerous game. After the outbreak of World War II, young Boris and his comrades were playing war. They wanted to see what was in a hand grenade. Boris managed to steal one from the guarded ammunition dump (ironically, the ammunition was kept in the local church). He and his friends took the grenade to a distant forest, and while his friends took cover, Boris began to break the grenade open with a stone. It exploded, and resulted in the loss of his two fingers. While still in the ninth grade, Yeltsin organized an excursion to find the distant source of the river Yaiva, a trip that also almost ended in disaster. After a very long and exhausting hike, the group was trying to get home by a rowboat. On their way downstream, they all came down with typhoid fever.7 That dangerous adventure had other severe consequences. Yeltsin and his fellow students had to stay in the hospital for three months. His companions decided not to go back that year to tenth grade, but Yeltsin began to study for the final examinations. He was told that there were no provisions for home study, but the young Yeltsin persevered. Once again, he turned to the higher authorities and to the Communist Party for help. By that time, Yeltsin was known in Sverdlovsk for his volleyball prowess and other achievements in sports.8 Thanks to these accomplishments and his brashness, he was allowed to take his examinations as an external student. Having passed his exams, Yeltsin was ready to enter a higher institute of learning. At first he was toying with the idea of shipbuilding, but then decided that he would like to become a civil engineer. His grandfather insisted that before entering the engineering school, Boris must build something with his own hands—it was to be a bathhouse. In fact, the experience of building the structure by himself helped Boris pass the entrance examination to the Ural Polytechnic Institute. At the institute, he excelled in volley-

10

Yeltsin’s Russia and the West

ball, which on an average took up six hours of his day. He studied late at night, and slept only three to four hours. He was selected to play on Sverdlovsk’s senior team and traveled with them all over the Soviet Union. At the institute, he coached both the men’s and women’s volleyball teams. Traveling with the volleyball team was not enough for young Yeltsin; after his first year at the institute, he decided to see the country. With the most meager means, he set out by train, hitchhiking and walking to cover as much territory as possible. In two months, he managed to get to the Black Sea, Moscow, Leningrad and many other cities in between. During the following academic year, with volleyball during the day and studying at night, Yeltsin overexerted himself and fell ill with a very high fever. A long hospital stay was prescribed to heal his already severely damaged heart, but Yeltsin checked himself out within days. Gradually, despite his weakness, he started to play volleyball again, and worked his way back to health. He constantly put himself under extra pressure. Because of his preparation for a volleyball championship, he hardly gave himself enough time to complete his graduation dissertation, but he managed it.9 Yeltsin graduated from the institute in 1955. At age twenty-four, he was ready to join the world of the technically trained young Soviet adults. In his reminisces, he barely mentioned the devastation of World War II, or the ramifications of the Stalin era. In his book, Struggle for Russia, Yeltsin did write about the scare he had when at age three his father was taken away by the KGB. World War II was noted only in connection with the grenade incident when he lost his two fingers. Poverty and dismal housing conditions did get more play in Yeltsin’s autobiographical notes. Looking back as a person who was living in very comfortable circumstances, Yeltsin could clearly see the poverty of his early years. But at that time, most of his neighbors, especially those who shared the twenty-room boardinghouse with the Yeltsins, lived under the same near destitute circumstances. As far as Boris’s upbringing was concerned, it was not different from other poor children with an authoritarian father and kinder, gentler mother. Despite the uninspiring environment, Yeltsin appeared to be an assertive child with leadership qualities. Mischief and risk taking were part and parcel of his growing up. On one occasion, he instigated his classmates to jump out of their first-floor classroom window so that the unpopular teacher would not find anyone in the classroom, and as the teacher went searching for them, the kids sneaked back. Yeltsin’s denunciation of his primary school homeroom teacher at a graduation ceremony was unheard of. It took a great degree of self-righteousness and courage to confront an authority figure. There were other examples of risk taking. In the spring, the nearby Zyrynka stream swelled and logs were floated down it. Yeltsin, while still in

The Making of a Rebel

11

elementary school, organized a game to jump from log to log to reach the far side of the river. The slightest miscalculation would have landed the children in the fast-moving, icy and log-filled river. The already discussed grenade incident also entailed great hazard—not only the foolish attempt to break the grenade apart, but even to obtain it was fraught with danger. Yeltsin had to crawl through barbwire, climb through a window and avoid being seen by the armed guard who would have shot anyone trying to steal from the ammunition depot. What made young Yeltsin attempt these and other perilous stunts? Can these acts be attributed to youthful recklessness, innate curiosity or, perhaps, to showing off and proving himself to his peers? One can only conjecture, probably all of the above. At the same time, these acts of daring were accompanied by high academic achievements. Yeltsin devoted a great deal of his energy to volleyball, often to the detriment of his time for studying, but not, as he claimed, at the expense of his grades. Making a name for himself in sports carried definite advantages in the Soviet system. Among other things, it earned him recognition and prestige, and also gave him an opportunity to do some traveling around the country. Yeltsin’s inquisitiveness was demonstrated by his extensive cross-country journey after his freshman year. In the early 1950s, he managed to see the most historically and culturally significant sites west of the Ural Mountains. He avoided commenting on political or social conditions. He did tell about the police stopping him and asking for his destination, but by giving a fictitious address—every city had a Lenin Street—he was able to continue his trip. One thing is certain: with his drive, energy, mental agility, physical abilities and self-assertion, he stood out from the crowd.

NOTES 1. Primarily, Yeltsin’s own autobiographical books are available: Boris Yeltsin, Against the Grain: An Autobiography, trans. Michael Glenny (New York: Summit Books, 1990); Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: Random House, 1994); Boris Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon (Moscow: ACT Publisher, 2000); and Leon Aron, Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). In addition, official biographies, newspaper sketches, magazine articles and interviews will be considered. 2. Well-off peasants during Stalin’s collectivization campaign were labeled as kulaks and they were targeted as opponents of the socialized agriculture. Yeltsin himself does not mention the incident. This information is gleamed indirectly from the “Agency Panorama,” via http://.nns.ru/restricted/persons/eltzin).html. 3. Yeltsin, Against the Grain, p. 22.

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4. Ibid., p. 23. 5. Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, pp. 94–98. In his first book, Against the Grain, which was written still under the Soviet regime, Yeltsin does not even mention his father’s arrest. In 1994, he not only discusses the case, but he quotes from the actual KGB folder #5644. 6. Yeltsin, Against the Grain, pp. 27–28. 7. Ibid., pp. 29–31. 8. Sports were always encouraged and financed by the state in the Soviet Union, and talented athletes from a tender age were rewarded and subsidized. Yeltsin’s ability to cut through the red tape must be partially attributed to his success in sports. 9. Yeltsin, Against the Grain, pp. 34–37.

2 From Engineer to Party Activist

Having completed his graduation thesis on constructing a television tower, which was a rarity in the mid-1950s, Yeltsin was ready for his first employment assignment.1 In September 1955, after a summer of volleyball playing, Yeltsin started to work at the huge Uraly tyazhtrubstroi (Ural Heavy Pipe Construction Trust). As a recent graduate, he was offered a foreman’s job at a construction site. However, Yeltsin realized that the theories he had learned at the Ural Polytechnic Institute were far removed from practice,2 and instead of accepting the position, he decided to learn all the construction trades that he would have to oversee. In one year, he learned twelve construction trades, spending about one month at each. To learn the tricks of the trade, he sometimes worked double shifts. He did not necessarily master all the trades, but he experienced the hardships of the various occupations. He noticed the dangerous conditions of workers who mixed concrete and had to deliver their product by pushing wheelbarrows on narrow planks of the scaffolding. Driving a dump truck with 180,000 miles on it made him aware of the poor condition of the equipment the workers were forced to use.3 After the year was up, he accepted the originally offered foremanship, and found the job relatively easy, but he encountered different types of problems. For example, the construction workers were notorious for their pilfering. Yeltsin cracked down on that, and insisted that the workers account for the materials used. From time to time, he had to work with convicts, who of-

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ten threatened the young foreman. Yeltsin also noticed mistakes in planning, structural problems and difficult climatic conditions that had to be overcome to complete his projects. Consequently, he was promoted to chief engineer at a different work site. At his new assignment, Construction Directorate No.13, Yeltsin had an ongoing conflict with the general manager, who kept giving him written reprimands and asked the City Committee of the Communist Party to dismiss him. By then Yeltsin had his own party sponsors. Yeltsin was blamed for an accounting error, and the quarrel ended up in court, where the judge ruled against the general manager. It had become clear to Yeltsin that in order to protect himself and pave his way to further promotions he must join the Communist Party. In 1961, he was admitted into the party. Yeltsin related a humorous incident when he was interviewed for membership. An antagonistic member of the committee wanted to trip him up by asking the candidate where Karl Marx had discussed an obscure definition in das Kapital. Yeltsin had no idea where the issue was discussed, but half-jokingly named a volume and page number. Of course, the questioner himself did not know the answer, so he ended up complimenting Yeltsin on his knowledge of Marx.4 Yeltsin entered the party with all sincerity, but the party’s arbitrariness bothered him. When he was admitted, the party’s interference with the economy was taken for granted, and he objected only to the numerous meetings that he was expected to attend. Apparently, the Communist Party membership combined with his professional skill paid off. At age thirty-two he was named general manager of a huge industrial complex with thousands of people working for him. Yeltsin described his own management style as head of the construction complex as “tough.” He always rewarded good work, but would not let anyone get away with shoddy work. After working in the construction industry for fourteen years, in 1969 he received an invitation to head the construction department of the Sverdlovsk District Regional Committee of the Communist Party. This new assignment was clearly a promotion with higher pay, and it opened up new possibilities for further advancement.5 Yeltsin rose rapidly within the Party. From section chief he was made secretary of the Regional Committee, and about a year later, he was sent to a two-week ideological training course at the Academy of Social Sciences in Moscow under the auspices of the party’s Central Committee. While attending the program, Yeltsin was summoned to the Central Committee, met with its secretaries, and with the veteran Politburo member, Mikhail Suslov. Eventually, he was taken to Leonid Brezhnev, who, without much ceremony, let Yeltsin know that he had been selected by the Politburo to become

From Engineer to Party Activist

15

the first secretary of the Sverdlovsk District Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The appointment was unexpected because usually the second secretary was to fill the vacancy. But in Yeltsin’s case, he was highly recommended to the top leadership by the outgoing first secretary of the district.6 On November 12, 1976, the Sverdlovsk District Party Committee unanimously voted in favor of Yeltsin’s appointment. As a rule, at the local level, no one ever dared to question the Politburo’s recommendation. Thus, Yeltsin become the person in charge of the Soviet Union’s industrial heartland. Understandably, he wrote modestly about his activities as the party boss. In fact, Yeltsin was in charge of not only the city of Sverdlovsk, one of the Soviet Union’s largest cities with 1.2 million people (now reverted to its pre-Revolutionary name, Yekaterinburg), but also the entire region of 75,193 square miles and a population of 4.72 million.7 The authority of a regional party secretary was all-encompassing because it affected all aspects of life in the region. It was also an assured step toward becoming a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC of the CPSU). Yeltsin remained in this highly influential post until 1985. In 1978, in addition to his party position, he was elected to be a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. From 1984 through 1985, he moved up to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the highest administrative organ of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin’s participation in the Supreme Soviet, although prestigious, was mostly symbolic. Regardless of the level within the administrative organs of the Soviet Union, the real decision-making power was in the hands of the Communist Party. Yeltsin pointed out that the power of the first secretary within a province was practically unlimited—he was god, a czar and master of the province. Such power was intoxicating and very susceptible to abuse—a frequent occurrence in the Brezhnev era. Yeltsin wrote disparagingly about the “stagnation of the Brezhnev era.”8 He, on the other hand, moved energetically to improve his region’s housing, food supplies, transportation system and, at the same time, to fulfill the required production quotas. He held meetings with young and old, workers and managers, scientists and other professionals. He listened to their problems and tried to alleviate as many as he could, but with all his power as first secretary, he could not ensure the welfare of all the people. Yeltsin claimed that he personally never abused his privileges, and shunned the cult of personality. In the beginning of his term, his picture appeared once in a local newspaper, but after a good-natured rebuke from his Central Committee liaison, he made sure to avoid that kind of publicity.9

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His attempt to speak up against the complacency of the Brezhnev era at a Communist Party Congress turned out to be of no consequence. Yeltsin attributed the lack of interest in his “fiery speech” to his relative newness in the Central Committee, and to the fact that he was little known even to potential supporters. In the early 1980s, a fellow first secretary from the Stavropol region, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, was on the move toward higher party leadership. Yeltsin described their first encounters as amiable and mutually beneficial. Gorbachev’s district needed steel and construction material from the Urals, while Yeltsin’s region needed food products from Stavropol. The two first secretaries were in the position to circumvent the central bureaucracy and assist each other directly.10 Relations remained cordial between the two party functionaries even after Gorbachev’s appointment to secretary of the Central Committee’s agricultural sector. Upon meeting, the two men usually embraced and were addressing each other informally.11 Yeltsin credited Gorbachev for his hard work in trying to improve the faltering Soviet agriculture. One of the controversial events of Yeltsin’s tenure as first secretary was the demolition of the Ipatyev house. In 1918, in the basement of that house, the Bolsheviks executed Tsar Nikolas II and his family. The bodies of the victims were removed and buried in a nearby forest, but the Ipatyev house remained standing until 1977. The notorious house was becoming a place of curiosity after the Western media began to air various broadcasts about the execution of the royal family. According to Yeltsin, to prevent the possibility of the place becoming a shrine, the Politburo issued a “secret” directive to have the Ipatyev house razed. Regardless of what Yeltsin thought about the order, as a product of the Soviet system, he was not about to challenge the Politburo’s decision. In the stealth of the night, he sent bulldozers to the house, and by morning the Ipatyev house was completely demolished, the site was cleared and eventually paved over.12 Yeltsin insisted that he was not responsible for the “senseless decision,” and he hoped that when the Politburo’s documents became declassified, that incident and many others would clearly show where the responsibility lay. Brezhnev died on November 10, 1982, and the leadership was passed on toYuri Andropov. Andropov wanted to tighten the slack work ethic of his countrymen and get the country moving, but soon after taking control he succumbed to illness and died in February 1984. He was succeeded by seventy-two-year-old Konstantin Chernenko, a Brezhnev protégé, who also died after thirteen months in office. By that time, it was clear to the Soviet leadership that a younger and more energetic person should assume the leadership of the party and the country. In March 1985, the fifty-four-year-

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old Mikhail Gorbachev was selected as the new Soviet leader. That choice had a direct effect on Yeltsin’s career. In search of like-minded leaders, Gorbachev offered Yeltsin a position in the Central Committee in Moscow. Despite some problems bordering on catastrophe in the Ural region,13 Yeltsin was quite comfortable in managing his district. At first, Yeltsin declined the offer to head the Central Committee’s construction section. Undoubtedly, being a big fish in the small pond was more attractive than becoming a small fish in a large pond. It should be reiterated that Yeltsin’s “pond” was far from little. The Sverdlovsk District was the country’s third largest in terms of industrial production, with numerous cities, towns and villages. For nine years, he was the “boss” of the district, which provided him a secure home base. Moscow was remote and, to some extent, a different world for the provincial party secretary. But Moscow has always had a mythical pull on every Russian; it was the center of power, and anyone who wanted to move up in the Soviet hierarchy had to go there. Yeltsin was well aware of that, but the position Gorbachev offered him as section head, not even a secretary in the Central Committee, was demeaning. As an excuse for not accepting the offer, he listed his ongoing projects and many of his still unfulfilled tasks in his district. Yeltsin wrote that after his initial refusal he received a follow-up call from Yegor Ligachev, an influential member of the Politburo (later one of Yeltsin’s arch nemeses). Ligachev pointed out that Yeltsin really did not have a choice because he had been selected for the position in Moscow by the Politburo, and party discipline required him to accept it.14 On April 12, 1985, Yeltsin started his new career in Moscow. By June, he was promoted to secretary of the Central Committee in charge of construction. Yeltsin was not awed by the power of the Central Committee. He knew the problems of the construction industry and he threw himself into the work. At first, he was disappointed on account of his subordinate status. The hierarchical and highly bureaucratic system of the Central Committee irked him; he found it was unsuitable for his freewheeling work style. According to Yeltsin, his promotion as the secretary in the Central Committee for the country’s construction industry was the result of normal progression. He had a few snide comments about Gorbachev. Gorbachev had also moved up from being a provincial first secretary, like Yeltsin, but the Stavropol region was inferior to the Urals, so Yeltsin’s promotion was overdue. Although both of them were in Moscow in the Central Committee, they hardly had any personal contact. Yeltsin hinted that probably Gorbachev was aware of Yeltsin’s better qualifications and for that reason avoided him.15 Traveling around the country in conjunction with his job, Yeltsin came across more and more corruption at the highest levels. In Uzbekistan, one

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corrupt party leader was removed, but his replacement was just as corrupt. As a rule, traveling dignitaries like Yeltsin were wined and dined and the local hosts picked up all their bills. Yeltsin objected. When he tried to advise Gorbachev about the corruption in Uzbekistan, Gorbachev refused to heed his report. In the midst of drawing up plans about improving the construction industry, Yeltsin was again summoned to the Politburo. On December 22, 1985, in the presence of the Politburo, Gorbachev offered Yeltsin the position of first secretary of the city of Moscow. Two days later, the serving first secretary, Viktor Grishin, was excused from that post “on his own request,” and Yeltsin was installed. He tackled his new position with zeal, writing that he wanted to energize and revitalize the city’s stultified municipal leadership. Yeltsin proceeded to set in motion a massive firing of Grishin’s men. To revitalize the city management, he dismissed or sent into retirement several high-level local party officials and scores of middle- and lower-echelon bureaucrats.16 Aleksandr Korzhakov, his officially assigned security guard, later confidant and friend, even after his dismissal, wrote that as the first secretary of Moscow, Yeltsin indeed worked very hard. He was putting in very long days; he even worked in his car, and paid unexpected visits to food stores to check the availability of provisions. At first, Yeltsin was relatively unknown in Moscow, so store clerks or managers did not recognize him; when he entered as an average Muscovite, he obtained a realistic picture of what was going on. Shortcomings were noted, and those responsible were ordered to remedy the situation. Occasionally, he sent his security guard ahead to investigate certain stores. Yeltsin often attended openings of enterprises, even kindergartens, and he always delivered an inspiring speech. People began to believe in him, his energy, his capacity to work, and that he would be able to improve their lives.17 In retrospect, Gorbachev talked disparagingly about Yeltsin’s activities as party boss in Moscow. He accused Yeltsin of cheap populism, such as riding the Moscow metro, trolleys and buses; going shopping; and giving self-serving press conferences. Yeltsin was by then an alternate (nonvoting) member of the Politburo, but kept undermining the party’s unity, and publicly criticized its top leadership by saying that the Politburo was old and filled with mastodons who should be replaced. Gorbachev further accused him of vengefulness, adding that Yeltsin “does not forgive anything.”18

NOTES 1. Yeltsin’s participation in the national volleyball championship put him under time pressure in preparing his thesis. Graduates of Soviet institutions and

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universities had no choice of employment; They were arbitrarily assigned by the authorities to a position. 2. Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: Random House, 1994), pp. 43–44. 3. Ibid., pp. 45–47; Yeltsin identifies only ten of the twelve trades; he worked as: carpenter, woodworker, glazier, plasterer, painter, bricklayer, concrete mixer, stonemason, dump truck driver and crane operator. 4. Ibid., pp. 50–51. 5. The Soviet system operated on two tracks: an administrative/technical and a Communist Party track. At each level, the party was overseeing the work of the administrative/technical personnel. There was an overlap, because all responsible positions required party membership, but the party functionaries had to be involved and sanction all major decisions. The party had its own channels of communication, which could circumvent and go beyond respective administrative/ technical levels. 6. Boris Yeltsin, Against the Grain: An Autobiography, trans. Michael Glenny (New York: Summit Books, 1990), pp. 62–63. 7. “Sverdlovsk Region,” http://www.earthpage.com/fotw/flags/ru-sve.html. 8. Brezhnev came to power in 1964 by ousting Nikita S. Khrushchev. By the time Yeltsin moved up in the party ranks in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the aging and ailing Brezhnev and the entrenched leadership were primarily concerned with preserving their own privileged positions, that is, the status quo. 9. Yeltsin, Against the Grain, p. 68. 10. Ibid., p. 71. 11. The Russian language distinguishes between the formal and informal “you.” The informal address in the adult world is reserved to family members and close friends. 12. Yeltsin described the house as one of many such old houses in Yekaterinburg. An old photograph shows it otherwise; it was a substantial mansion. To make such a building disappear must have been quite a serious undertaking. In 1997, the regional governor, Eduard Rossel, ordered the construction of a memorial church at that site with Yeltsin’s hearty approval. See: http://inetserver. e-reliz.ru/xxage/en/albom/apage06–1.htm#begin. 13. Yeltsin notes that on December 31, 1978, at the Bioloyarsk nuclear power station, fire broke out that was threatening the nuclear generators. It appeared so dangerous that hundreds of buses were lined up to evacuate nearby villagers. Luckily, a major emergency was prevented. Although Yeltsin does not elaborate in his book about the outbreak of anthrax in the region, he does mention it in passing. Yeltsin, Against the Grain, pp. 75–77. 14. Ibid., pp. 88–89; see also: David Remnick, Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia (New York: Random House, 1997), pp. 17–18. 15. Yeltsin, Against the Grain, p. 92. 16. “Zhiznenny put” [Life Story], http://www.nns.ru/restricted/persons/eltzin5.html.

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17. Aleksandr Korzhakov, Boris Yeltsin: Ot rassveta do zakata [Boris Yeltsin: From Sunrise to Sunset] (Moscow: Interbuk Publisher, 1997), pp. 55–56. 18. Remnick, Resurrection, pp. 18–19.

3 Falling from Grace and Reemergence

Regardless of how well Yeltsin performed as first secretary of Moscow, as soon as he began to criticize Gorbachev, the general secretary of the Communist Party, and Ligachev, the second most influential member of the Politburo, Yeltsin’s further advancement in the party was doomed. Yeltsin was becoming impatient with the lack of progress of perestroika (the restructuring and overhaul of the economy). By September 1987, two years had passed since Gorbachev announced his new economic restructuring policies, but there were still no real reforms forthcoming. Gorbachev was vacillating in his push for systemic changes. Entrenched bureaucrats from the Brezhnev era were slowing significant progress on all fronts. Yeltsin called for the replacement of the tired old leaders, and bringing forth of younger, brighter and more energetic people. He also advocated cutting back on special privileges for top officials, and rooting out bribery, graft and corruption. In his attempts to “clean house,” Yeltsin stirred up the plush sanctuaries of the party elite where the leaders placed their offspring or relatives, such as the Moscow Institute of Foreign Relations, the Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Trade. These venerable institutions and ministries enabled their members to travel abroad—a special privilege very few Soviet citizens enjoyed. But by calling attention to and tampering with the perks of the select few, Yeltsin alienated many of his Central Committee colleagues, who were the prime recipients of these special benefits. The higher one moved in the party hierarchy, the more perks

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one enjoyed. The privileges ranged from special hospitals, vacations and stores; comfortable apartments, dachas and cars; and home delivery of food, just to mention a few. Yeltsin noted that Communism had already been achieved on the top by quoting Karl Marx: “to each according to his needs.” He added, “and did they have needs.”1 Despite an ever-sharpening conflict developing between Yeltsin and Ligachev, the party’s second in command, Yeltsin still hoped that Gorbachev would listen to his suggestions of changes and incorporate them into a forthcoming speech celebrating the 70th anniversary of the 1917 October Revolution. Before the holiday, at a session of the Politburo on September 12, a draft of Gorbachev’s speech was distributed for comments and discussions. Yeltsin found, upon reading the draft, that none of his critical ideas had been incorporated in the speech. Not willing to let that pass, when his turn came to speak, Yeltsin proposed that some twenty items be included. He felt that Gorbachev should, among other things, mention in his speech a pointed criticism of the ineptness of party apparat, the party’s attitudes regarding the past, and ideas where the country should be heading. Upon hearing such a long list of critical comments, Gorbachev stormed out of the meeting and did not return for thirty minutes. Then he launched a personal attack on Yeltsin. Apparently, long-accumulated resentments came to surface. Instead of responding to Yeltsin’s suggestions, Gorbachev declared that Yeltsin was wrongheaded, everything in Moscow was going poorly, and all that Yeltsin had to offer was destructive criticism. This confrontation in the presence of the entire Politburo was the beginning of the end of Yeltsin’s party career.2 After the September meeting of the Politburo, Yeltsin realized that he had gone too far in criticizing Gorbachev, and upon returning home, wrote him a letter of resignation. Yeltsin reiterated that he couldn’t work with Ligachev, and he stated that the other Politburo members, who originally had supported perestroika, were no longer living up to that commitment. He complained that the Communist Party’s organization was untouched by perestroika. To some extent, he blamed his own volatile temperament for his nonconformity and outspokenness. Such traits made him unsuitable to work in the Politburo, as evidenced by the way his relations with other members had deteriorated. He requested to be excused from membership of the Politburo and also from his position of first secretary of the Moscow Committee of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union).3 The letter remained unanswered for two weeks. Yeltsin followed it up with an address at the actual 70th anniversary session of the Central Committee. After Gorbachev’s long, self-congratulatory speech, Yeltsin asked to speak. He openly attacked the Communist Party itself, saying that it

Falling from Grace and Reemergence

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needed restructuring, new leadership, and to avoid mistakes of the past such as the cult of personality. He also stated that the perestroika must be streamlined, and unnecessary duplications eliminated. At the end of his speech, Yeltsin asked to be excused from his duties in the Politburo and, eventually, from his obligations in the Moscow City Committee.4 An incensed Gorbachev rose to respond. He distorted Yeltsin’s resignation request by implying that Yeltsin wanted to be exempt from his Politburo membership, but intended to turn to another forum for his Moscow post. He accused Yeltsin of trying to split the party. Then Gorbachev turned to the attending membership to comment on Yeltsin’s disruptive speech. Taking their cues from the general secretary, Yeltsin’s colleagues in the Central Committee one after the other denounced him. No one came to his defense, and some of the critics used to be his friends. As a consequence of that meeting, Yeltsin became an outcast, although the official verdict of his removal from the top had to wait until the next meeting of the appropriate party organs. Since the November 7 celebration took place before Yeltsin’s official “sentencing,” and he was still a member of the Politburo, he decided to attend the festivities on Red Square. On the reviewing stand, as it was customary, the Politburo members met with foreign dignitaries. While Yeltsin noted the coolness of his Russian colleagues, he claimed that Cuban leader, Fidel Castro, and the Polish Wojciech Jaruzelski greeted him especially warmly.5 The ongoing tension must have worn Yeltsin out, or perhaps he caught a so-called “diplomatic illness”6 just before the final decision in his case was about to come up on the agenda of the Moscow City Committee. On November 9, 1987, he was taken to the hospital with a severe headache and chest pains. He was ordered to stay in bed, and even his wife was not allowed to visit him. Dimitri Simes, who was an advisor to Richard Nixon on Soviet affairs, wrote that doctors at Clinical Hospital No. 1 confidentially revealed to him that Yeltsin had experienced a “nervous breakdown, and acute psychological withdrawal.”7 On November 11, while still in his sickbed, Yeltsin received a phone call from Gorbachev, who insisted that Yeltsin attend the plenary meeting of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU. Gorbachev reassured him that the doctors would attend to him. Yeltsin’s security guard, Korzhakov, wrote that Yeltsin was indeed in very bad shape, but still decided to go to the plenum. The doctors, who had previously forbidden him to get out of bed, obediently prepped him up to leave the hospital. They sedated him with very powerful painkillers. When used in high concentration, the type of analgesic that was used causes severe disorientation and, in Yeltsin’s case, the doctors pumped into him an “almost deadly dose.” Yeltsin practically ceased to react to his environment, and appeared

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completely hypnotized. In this mental and physical condition, he went to the plenum.8 Dragging him out of his sickbed was the last straw; Yeltsin could never forgive such an inhumane treatment. He had only vague recollections of what actually happened at that plenum, hardly remembering what he himself had said (later, when he read it in the papers, he was in shock). At that meeting, he was thoroughly savaged by his colleagues, and the formal motion for accepting his resignation was made. In February 1988, at the regular session of the Politburo, on Gorbachev’s motion, Yeltsin was formally exempted from his posts. Gorbachev hinted that he should retire for health reasons, and actually, Yeltsin’s doctors concurred. It seemed that at age fifty-seven, Yeltsin had become a has-been, but although his future appeared bleak, he was not ready to become a pensioner. While Yeltsin was still in the hospital, Gorbachev offered him a ministerial posting as first vice-chairman of the State Committee on Construction, which was a strange appointment. Yeltsin himself speculated on the reasons why Gorbachev kept him around. For all practical purposes, Gorbachev should have insisted on Yeltsin’s retirement, or he could have sent him to a far away country as an ambassador. Perhaps Gorbachev considered Yeltsin to be harmless as long as he was removed from the party leadership. The real power lay within the Communist Party, which made all the decisions, and administrative organs carried them out. As long as Yeltsin was in the state administration, he did not appear to present a threat or a challenge. Ironically, Yeltsin’s new position, to some extent, was liberating. Although the party hacks were avoiding him, average Muscovites, friends from Sverdlovsk, and even some dissidents sought out his company. Western journalists were getting more interested in him. Yeltsin’s activities as a popular party boss in Moscow had already been noted, and his previously unheard of public criticism of the Communist Party and its leadership intrigued the journalists. Despite his long indoctrination and official Soviet propaganda, Yeltsin described the Western journalists as competent, professional and ethical. The Soviet press ignored him; if anything, there were only some vague negative references to him in the official press. Rumors circulated that Yeltsin was a Stalinist-type leader, which he resented—how could he be, his father having been taken to the gulag? His contacts with the intellectuals were limited, but a few kept in touch with him. Thanks to his family’s unfailing support, Yeltsin slowly regained his health and balance; and at his new position, he was quickly regaining his civil engineering skills.9 Gorbachev made a serious miscalculation by allowing Yeltsin to stay in the capital. Another mistake was offering Yeltsin the ministerial rank, be-

Falling from Grace and Reemergence

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cause that position entitled him to keep his membership in the Central Committee. The Central Committee took its cues from the Secretariat, which acted on the decisions of the Politburo. Nevertheless, all important policy decisions had to go through the formality of the Central Committee’s approval. Decisions, as a rule, were handed down from above; the Central Committee took the initiative on very few occasions. Yeltsin and Gorbachev had practically no contact with one another. At meetings of the Central Committee, they exchanged little more than formal greetings. Other members of the leadership cautiously avoided Yeltsin as much as possible.10 As Gorbachev’s perestroika was faltering, his glasnost (openly discussing mistakes and criticizing domestic and foreign policies) was succeeding beyond his expectations. More and more of the past was revealed: mistakes, mismanagement, abuses by the party and even secret international treaties were publicly discussed. The Communist Party began to take some tentative steps toward openness and more participatory democracy. Under those circumstances, the 19th All Union Conference of the CPSU was planned. Sensing the mood of the country, Gorbachev called the conference to give him a mandate for more political democracy. The selection of the delegates for this conference was more open than any previous party congresses or conferences. The conservative wing of the party attempted to limit the selection of reform-oriented delegates. Yeltsin, who normally would have been nominated as a delegate from his position (ministers were usually automatically nominated), did not see his name on the list. Yeltsin wanted to resurrect his political career at that conference by publicizing what had actually taken place at the closed October plenum that led to his dismissal. He therefore felt that his participation was essential. When his nomination was not forthcoming, he used his past contacts in Sverdlovsk and Moscow to put his name up for nomination. But the local lists of nominating delegates were screened and trimmed by higher levels of the party organs and limited to cooperative party members. Yeltsin’s name was consistently removed from the approved lists. The Sverdlovsk City Committee eventually allowed Yeltsin’s candidacy to go forward, but the regional committee vetoed that nomination. When Yeltsin’s supporters began to raise a fuss, the Central Committee allowed his name to appear on the ballot in Karelia, a relatively insignificant region of the Soviet Union, where he was eventually elected. If Yeltsin’s participation could not be denied, the leadership did not want him to be a member of an important delegation such as Moscow or Sverdlovsk.11 There were important innovations on the conference’s agenda: a twoterm limit for top level government and Communist Party officials, separation of the work of the government and the party organization, mandatory re-

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tirement age of seventy even for Politburo members, and multiple candidates for elections. In Soviet terms, these were revolutionary proposals—the decisions of this conference set the stage for the first competitive elections in the Soviet Union. Thanks to glasnost, the entire conference was televised, and the unprecedented debate kept the population glued to their sets.12 Speaker after speaker criticized the faltering perestroika and the privileges of the party elite. Even Gorbachev was criticized for wanting to serve simultaneously as party general secretary and head of the government. Conservatives attacked the press for excessive negativism, and along those lines, Gorbachev warned about the responsibility that should go along with the freedom of the press. Sparks really started to fly when, on the last day of the conference, Yeltsin insisted on being given a chance to speak. This would not be easy, for sitting in the balcony with the Karelian delegation, he was physically far removed from the rostrum. Distance, however, was not the issue. His request to speak went unanswered; when the list of the speakers was read, his name was not on it. Yeltsin decided to seize the microphone. He descended from the balcony and marched down the aisle toward the rostrum. Suddenly, the delegates realized Yeltsin’s intention, and the presidium also saw him approaching. Yeltsin walked up to the rostrum directly toward Gorbachev and demanded to speak, challenging Gorbachev to put his request to a vote by the whole conference.13 Trying to outmaneuver Yeltsin, Gorbachev asked him to be seated, and after a short consultation with presidium members, he asked Yeltsin to go to the presidium’s anteroom. Yeltsin refused, afraid that security would not allow him to return if he had left the hall. His stubbornness paid off, and he was finally allowed to speak. As expected, he was unrepentant for his previous criticism, and spoke in the same vein as before. In the beginning of his speech, he responded to criticism directed against him: Why did he give interviews to foreign journalists and not to the Soviet press? Because the Soviet press refused to print his articles, or even to interview him. Why did he sound incoherent at the Moscow City Committee’s plenum? Because he was dragged out of his sickbed and pumped up with so much medication that he could hardly speak. Yeltsin did not hide his conflict with Ligachev, blaming him for the slow progress of the perestroika. He went on to advocate universal, direct and secret elections across the board, in the party, trade unions, and Supreme Soviet. He stated that the responsibility for the preceding ten, fifteen, twenty years of stagnation lay not only with Brezhnev, but also with many of the same people who were still members of the party’s top leadership. Yeltsin called for meaningful changes: “The nation should not be trapped by permanent, unchanging administration.”14

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27

Yeltsin went on to criticize the unplanned nature of perestroika, and the continuous delays to achieve even minimal objectives. But as far as glasnost was concerned, he pointed out that the party’s Politburo and the Central Committee’s Secretariat should open up their proceedings and publish the budgets. People should be able to see where the money went and how their leaders lived. Quoting Lenin: “All power to the Soviets,” Yeltsin wanted the party’s bloated apparat to be significantly reduced, especially those departments that dealt with the economy. Finally, he appealed to the conference to exonerate him in connection with the October 1987 resolutions, which condemned him. He claimed that his only mistake was that he had made his critical remarks at the wrong time—during the anniversary celebration of the October Revolution.15 Yeltsin’s remarks did not go unanswered. Ligachev counterattacked, savaging Yeltsin, denouncing him as a destructive force, and accusing him of playing into the hands of the enemy. The sycophants followed Ligachev, and Yeltsin’s rehabilitation did not take place. The Yeltsin versus Ligachev confrontation was delayed for six hours before it was shown on nationwide television. The Russian public had never before seen anything like that; people began to view Yeltsin as the new and positive progressive force and Ligachev as the conservative Old Guard.16 Yeltsin’s vindication occurred on March 27, 1989, when he was overwhelmingly elected to the Congress of People’s Deputies, from Moscow electoral district No.1. As a result of one of the resolutions of the 19th Conference of the CPSU, on that date, for the first time in the Soviet Union, multicandidate elections were held. Yeltsin received 89.6 percent of the vote in the district. His antiestablishment stance had certainly found a strong echo, and his victory was a setback to the conservative elements in the party. In accordance with the election law, a people’s deputy could not simultaneously be a member of the government; therefore, Yeltsin submitted his resignation from his ministerial post. But simply being elected was not enough for Yeltsin, who aimed to become a member of the governing organ of the Congress, the Supreme Soviet. Rumors had it that he might even challenge Gorbachev for the chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet. Initially, such a challenge seemed unrealistic to Yeltsin. Nevertheless, Gorbachev invited him to discuss his plans; at that time, however, Yeltsin himself was uncertain of how things would develop.17 The election to the Supreme Soviet was not easy. The party-dominated majority kept voting against the nonconformist, progressive candidates, and Yeltsin, despite his huge election success, did not get the sufficient number of votes for a seat in the Supreme Soviet. It is difficult to ascertain what was going on behind the scenes at the first session of the Congress of People’s

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Deputies. Gennady Burbulis, whose roots went back to Sverdlovsk and who later played a very prominent role in Yeltsin’s entourage, actually nominated Yeltsin to the chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet as an alternative to Gorbachev. Yeltsin declined for reasons of party discipline.18 However, when Yeltsin did not get enough votes to become a member of the Supreme Soviet, another deputy, from Siberia, Aleksey Kazannik, yielded his seat to Yeltsin. It appeared that former associates and close Yeltsin supporters had prevailed on Kazannik to move over.19 At that time, no one could have anticipated the momentous consequences of Kazannik’s generosity. In the Supreme Soviet, Yeltsin was elected to chair the Committee on Construction and Architecture. In addition to that assignment, Yeltsin took an active part in the formation of the Inter-Regional Group of Deputies (IRGD). In July 1989, the Kremlin did not welcome that group, whose members felt that radical solutions were needed to cope with the country’s numerous problems. On July 29–30, 316 deputies attended the IRGD’s first organizational meeting, including ninety members of the Supreme Soviet. Many others also indicated an interest in participating in the group,20 which elected five co-chairmen, among them Yeltsin and Andrei Sakharov.21 The IRGD advocated private property versus the state monopoly; land ownership by the peasant; decentralization of power; economic independence of the republics; and elimination of all structural and financial limitations of enterprises. Yeltsin believed that the formation and mere existence of parties would not solve the country’s problems, but the country must gradually grow into a multiparty system.22 Even though the IRGD was not an opposition party, it began to function as such. The appearance of an organized opposition was of great interest in the West. The Western media closely followed the emergence of the IRGD, and its outspoken leaders were getting more and more printer’s ink. Gorbachev was getting all the attention in international affairs, but domestically, the formation of sharp battle lines between the conservative, Communist Old Guard and the liberal, avant-garde IRGD fascinated the media. Yeltsin emerged as one of the chief spokesmen of the opposition. He was remembered as the popular Moscow party boss, the Politburo member who had criticized not only his fellow Politburo members, but also Gorbachev. His removal from top leadership should have made him disappear from the political scene, but instead he reemerged and was gathering momentum. The sensation-hungry Western media would not let such a colorful person fade away, and all the publicity eventually led to Yeltsin’s invitation to the United States.

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NOTES 1. Boris Yeltsin, Against the Grain: An Autobiography, trans. Michael Glenny (New York: Summit Books, 1990), pp. 125, 157. 2. Ibid., pp. 128–129. 3. Ibid., pp. 178–181. 4. Ibid., pp. 188–192. 5. Ibid., pp. 197–198. 6. Perhaps Yeltsin did not want to face the committee, and by being in the hospital, he could be excused from his post due to ill health. Also, by missing the actual meeting, he would not have to answer to any questions and hear the denunciations. 7. Dimitri K. Simes, After the Collapse: Russia Seeks Its Place as a Great Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), pp. 51–52. 8. Aleksandr Korzhakov, Boris Yeltsin: Ot rassveta do zakata [Boris Yeltsin: From Sunrise to Sunset] (Moscow: Interbuk Publisher, 1997), p. 65. 9. Yeltsin, Against the Grain, pp. 207–208. 10. Ibid., p. 208. 11. Ibid., pp. 217–219. 12. New York Times, June 30, 1988; see also: Hedrick Smith, The New Russians (New York: Random House, 1990), pp. 117–120. 13. Yeltsin, Against the Grain, pp. 221–223. 14. Ibid., p. 229. 15. Ibid., pp. 224–236. 16. Smith, The New Russians, p. 119. 17. Yeltsin, Against the Grain, pp. 243–244. 18. http://www.nns.ru/restricted/persons/eltzin5.html; Yeltsin never mentioned the actual nomination. 19. Later, in 1993, Kazannik, a doctor of jurisprudence and professor at the University of Omsk, worked on the Russian Constitution and served as procurator general in the government until 1994; http://www.nns.ru/restricted/persons/eltzin5.html. 20. Smith, The New Russians, p. 475. 21. Andrei Sakharov, former nuclear scientist turned radical dissident and Nobel Peace Prize winner. In December 1986, Gorbachev released him from domestic exile. 22. Yeltsin, Against the Grain, pp. 249–251.

4 The Way to the Top

Through his own initiative and energy, Boris Yeltsin, the ambitious and bright young boy of humble origins, born in the small village of Butka in the Ural Mountains, had risen close to the top of the Soviet system. Being a nonconformist, he turned from an initial supporter of Gorbachev’s perestroika (restructuring and overhauling the economy) into a harsh critic of its slow progress. Consequently removed from his top-level party posts, an undeterred Yeltsin found a new path to voice his criticism. Once elected to the Supreme Soviet, the governing body of the Congress of People’s Deputies, he set out to transform it from a purely administrative function into an actual decision-making organ. From this new vantage point, Yeltsin challenged Gorbachev’s policies. Thanks to glasnost (discussing mistakes and criticizing domestic and foreign policies), Yeltsin was making headlines at home and abroad. Up to that point, Yeltsin had not traveled abroad, not even to Soviet-dominated satellites. He did crisscross the Soviet Union for the first time after his freshman year, during his summer vacation, and later he traveled extensively with his volleyball team. He had plenty of opportunities for job-related travel while working in the Central Committee’s Construction Section. Even after his demotion from his party function, he was able to travel under the aegis of the Ministry of Construction. Until 1989, Yeltsin’s interest was focused on domestic affairs. Foreign affairs, the Soviet Union’s

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role in the world and life abroad received practically no mention in his autobiographical writings. Yeltsin’s overall orientation was local.1 Under those circumstances, how well was Yeltsin prepared to travel abroad, especially to the United States? In mid-September, he accepted an invitation from the Esalen Institute’s Soviet American Exchange Program, and made a whirlwind eight-day trip to the United States.2 Originally, the trip was planned for two weeks, but the Central Committee restricted Yeltsin’s travel to one week, and the shortened visit played havoc with the preplanned schedule. The organizers hoped to fit all the events and appearances into one week. Yeltsin facetiously noted that he had read Karl Marx’s theory of exploitation of man by man under capitalism, and during his short stay he had a chance to experience it personally. After his long overseas flight, he traveled from state to state, city to city, giving six or seven speeches each day. He slept only two to three hours at night, and soon he was walking around like a zombie.3 During his visit, he met with President George Bush,4 Secretary of State James Baker III, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, senators, university presidents, intellectuals, students, industrialists, bankers and many “ordinary Americans.” Yeltsin’s insistence on meeting with President Bush presented quite a dilemma in the White House. Until that time, SovietAmerican relations had improved significantly under Gorbachev. Would a meeting with Gorbachev’s critic jeopardize future progress? Would such a meeting offend Gorbachev? But at the same time, how could the president avoid the growing criticism of his administration that the United States was basing its relations with the Soviet Union solely on Gorbachev? It was also a matter of protocol. How could the president justify an official meeting with a lower-level politician? Dimitri K. Simes, a Soviet affairs expert, urged the president to meet with Yeltsin, whom he considered an important political figure, as the co-chairman of the reform caucus: “Not to see him would send a disheartening message to the reform-people in the Soviet Union.”5 Yeltsin’s pronouncement during a television interview in New York did not help his cause. He said that Gorbachev had only six months to one year to lead the country to progress or face a “revolution from below.”6 Soon after Yeltsin’s arrival, a meeting with Secretary of State James A. Baker III was arranged, but practically to the last days of his stay in the United States, no invitation from the White House was forthcoming. At Yeltsin’s last scheduled stop before visiting the nation’s capital, while addressing a group in Baltimore, he received an invitation to meet with National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft in the White House. During that meeting, President Bush dropped in, greeted the visitor and reiterated his

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support for Gorbachev’s perestroika. To de-emphasize the significance of the encounter, no official photographs were released. Marlin Fitzwater, White House press secretary, pointed out that the president did not want to provide Mr. Yeltsin with a “platform of dissent.” Yeltsin tried to convey the same message to Mr. Scowcroft and Secretary of State Baker: how the United States could help save the floundering reforms in the Soviet Union by direct financial investments and establishing “state to state relations” as opposed to dealing only with the central government. The substance of Yeltsin’s meetings with U.S. officials appeared to be less significant than the fact that he was received at the highest level. The sheer force of his personality and energy were responsible for his success. It did not take him long to realize that in America, self-promotion, self-aggrandizement and being controversial would pave the way to get attention. During his visit, he skillfully juggled his appointments, making quick changes to give preference to higher-ups. He did not miss his meeting in the Capitol Building with a group of eight senators led by Bill Bradley, democrat from New Jersey. He presented his ideas by advocating private investments in the Soviet Union instead of government-to-government grants or loans. He also inquired about the functioning of the U.S. Congress. Senator Bradley was rather dismissive about the encounter: “He did not go into a description in any detail of what he himself would do, his plan if he had any. . . . You can’t just tell American businessmen to go lose money in the Soviet Union.” Another senator, Barbara Mikulski, democrat from Maryland, was also scheduled to receive Yeltsin with another group of distinguished guests, but he did not show.7 Even though Yeltsin’s American tour was shortened from the original schedule, he wanted to squeeze in as many lectures and meetings as possible. As mentioned earlier, according to his own version, he was really pushing himself, and at times, he was running on two hours of sleep at night. This sleep depravation took its toll, and at certain public forums Yeltsin appeared to be groggy and somewhat dazed. His unsteady demeanor also gave rise to the accusation that he had just partied too much and was drunk. Achieving his “diplomatic objectives,” it is worth noting that during his short visit, Yeltsin was able to see a lot, and what he did see made quite an impression on him. A visit to a food store overwhelmed and, to some extent, saddened him. The wealth of more than 30,000 food items in the supermarket, unimaginable to a Russian, was just one of the experiences that revealed to him the painful shortages his countrymen were enduring. In a bright and spotlessly clean Korean-owned grocery in New York City, he noted not only the great variety of fresh fruits, but also the efficiency of a single grocer politely serving all the customers. He did not hesitate to debunk the ambitious

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old Soviet saying “to catch up and even overtake America.” He remarked that such empty slogans had done great damage to Russians because they existed only for the sake of propaganda and were only misleading the people. He continued: “We will never catch up with them and never leave them behind. . . . We must strive for a better life for our people.”8 Yeltsin’s knowledge of the United States, like that of most Soviet citizens, was confined to the officially sanctioned Communist Party line. As a member of the party hierarchy, he did have access to confidential briefings on foreign affairs, but that material was also tainted. In school, he must have read only “progressive” American and Western authors, like Jack London and Mark Twain. In his autobiographical writings, Yeltsin gave no indication of his awareness of American politics, the capitalist market economy, or culture. While in New York, he was taken to the Metropolitan Museum of Art, where he headed straight to the Flemish painters and then to the impressionists. He did pause for a few seconds in front of the giant Andy Warhol poster of Mao.9 It is safe to say that Yeltsin’s first impressions of America were very positive. He summarized his thoughts by saying, “The Americans know how to work. They enjoy life, and they are humane. They live very well.”10 He added: “All my impressions of capitalism, of the United States, of Americans that have been pounded into me over the years by the Short History of the Communist Party—all of them changed 180 degrees during the day and a half I have been here.”11 This and later visits to the United States and other prosperous Western democracies must have significantly influenced the formulation of his eventual political agenda. Yeltsin was well compensated for his lectures in the United States. After expenses for himself and his four-man entourage, he ended up with $100,000, which he generously signed over to the Soviet anti-AIDS campaign by sending a shipment of 100,000 syringes to Moscow to be distributed to eleven children’s hospitals.12 Yeltsin’s magnanimous charitable action went practically unnoticed both in the United States and in the Soviet Union. News reports showed him stumbling, occasionally incoherent, and drinking numerous toasts. Such news stories obviously created serious doubts about Yeltsin’s sobriety13—was it jet lag, over-exhaustion, or lack of sleep that made Yeltsin appear drunk, or did he really drink too much? Presidential advisor and scholar Dimitri Simes, having encountered Yeltsin at a meeting of the Council of Foreign Relations in New York, and later in less formal settings, appraised him in a highly complimentary manner. He found him to be a politician of great charisma and self-confidence, with natural intelligence. Simes questioned the vagueness of Yeltsin’s economic and political views; nevertheless, he predicted a great future for

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Yeltsin. He did attest to the fact that Yeltsin drank too much, as compared to the sober Gorbachev, which made him less attractive to President Bush and his close advisors. But Simes saw even some merit in Yeltsin’s imbibing: Drinking would make the populist Yeltsin appear to the Russians, as just “one of the regular guys.”14 The Italian newspaper La Repubblika was less charitable in reporting that Yeltsin was hopelessly drunk throughout his visit to America. The journalist, Vittorio Zuucconi, even quoted the exact quantities of liquor that Yeltsin had consumed. The article further stated that no charitable donation would be forthcoming because Yeltsin had spent his entire honorarium on video recorders, cassettes, fine clothing and other presents for himself, and when in a supermarket, he wanted “everything.” The same article was hastily reprinted in the Pravda, the Communist Party’s official newspaper.15 Yeltsin’s American hosts objected by saying that he did drink occasionally but the Italian article had grossly misrepresented Yeltsin’s behavior.16 When the Italian journalist was challenged as to his sources, he could not specify them. Encountering an unprecedented stormy protest from its readers, the Pravda issued an apology to Yeltsin for having reprinted the Italian newspaper’s unsubstantiated charges.17 Yeltsin was aware of the fact that his American trip would be criticized by his conservative opponents, but considered the swift reprinting of the Italian article to be the lowest blow. According to him, those accusations were outright lies. Also, a popular Soviet television newscast showed a ninety-minute special on Yeltsin’s trip, in which the video had been heavily edited to show him at his worst: wobbly and slow-speaking. Yeltsin had a simple explanation for his behavior: the hectic schedule forced him to take sedatives and indeed, from time to time he felt groggy. As for his specific reaction to the article in the La Repubblika, Yeltsin ridiculed the writer who had given the “exact” amount of alcohol Yeltsin had consumed: “Only a weak-headed foreigner could have been brought to his knees by that amount of alcohol.”18 Such unsubstantiated and prefabricated attacks on Yeltsin might have had the opposite of the desired effects. By the late 1980s, the Soviet reading public was sufficiently sophisticated to read between the lines of the controlled official media. Thus, in spite of the attacks, Yeltsin’s popularity was growing. Soon after Yeltsin’s return from the United States, there was another curious incident that once again cast him in a negative light. On September 28, 1989, he was involved in a much-publicized incident of being pushed or falling from a bridge into a small river. According to Yeltsin, after meeting with some of his constituents, he was driven to visit an old friend in the village of Uspenskoye. Before reaching his friend’s dacha, he dismissed the

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driver and wanted to walk a short stretch to his friend’s place. He had to cross a small bridge, but just as he got on the bridge, a car pulled up next to him, and suddenly he found himself in the very cold water. He barely managed to swim the “few hundred yards” ashore, where he collapsed. Unable to reach his friend’s house, he “staggered” to a nearby police station, where they instantly recognized Yeltsin and “did not ask any questions.” As he was warming up, he asked the people at the station not to tell anyone about the incident. Eventually, his wife and daughter came to fetch him. Yeltsin implied that his enemies had staged the incident and that it was an attempt on his life. Later, he explained that he did not file an official statement because he feared that the workers in the Zelenograd area, where he had just given a rousing speech, and even in Moscow, might have staged a strike if they heard of this unseemly provocation on their representative.19 He feared that a strike might have brought on the imposition of martial law, which would have jeopardized or even put an end to perestroika. Despite Yeltsin’s urging, the event was not hushed up; his opponents were more than ready to exploit it. The minister of interior, Vadim V. Bakatin, launched an investigation and reported to the Supreme Soviet that there was no attempt on Yeltsin’s life, implying that a drunken Yeltsin might have just stumbled into the river. The Bakatin report further stated that had Yeltsin really fallen from the bridge, he would have been seriously hurt since the bridge was fifty feet above shallow water. Later, in an attempt to rebut that embarrassing episode, Yeltsin claimed that Bakatin’s report was false because even the simplest fact was wrong—the bridge was only fifteen feet above the water. At the time of the report in the Supreme Soviet chamber, Yeltsin went to the microphone and the only thing he said was: “It’s my private life, so to speak.”20 Aleksandr Korzhakov, Yeltsin’s former security guard, had his own version of the river incident. By that time, he had retired from the KGB and worked in a plastic center cooperative. Around midnight, he had received an urgent call from Yeltsin’s younger daughter, Tatyana (her married name is Dyachenko). She sounded panic-stricken, saying that her father was missing. A worried Korzhakov advised her to contact the police station that Yeltsin’s car would have passed on the way from a public meeting. Soon after the first call, Tatyana called back Korzhakov and told him that her father had been “thrown off” the bridge at the Nikolina Hill, and was at the police station in terrible shape. On hearing the news, Korzhakov thought: “Finally, Gorbachev must have decided to finish off his dangerous competitor.” Korzhakov also implied that as a former associate of Yeltsin, he himself might have been in danger; nevertheless, he decided to go and assist his former boss.21

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Korzhakov described that he hurriedly gathered some warm clothing, a few apples and an old vermouth bottle filled with moonshine liquor,22 and rushed to the rescue. He sped through Moscow in his Niva at 85 miles per hour. As he put it, he was ready to sacrifice “a hundred engines just to save his boss.” Even though it was the middle of the night, he was stopped by the GAI, the ever-present traffic police, but he only had to tell them: “Someone threw Yeltsin into the river,” and the police officer waved him on. By mentioning this encounter, Korzhakov wanted to show just how popular Yeltsin had become. He wrote, “People felt love toward Yeltsin and looked toward him with hope. He was the symbol of the real perestroika, and not the garrulous originator, Gorbachev.”23 Korzhakov gave a vivid picture of how he found Yeltsin at the police station: He was lying on a cot in still wet underwear, covered with a pea jacket. His body had such an unhealthy bluish coloring, as if someone had spilled ink on him. When he recognized Korzhakov, he “started to cry, ‘Sasha, look at what they have done to me.’ ” Korzhakov lifted Yeltsin’s head and practically poured the moonshine down his throat. Yeltsin was quite frozen; he did not even react to the strong drink. He tasted the apple, but stiffened again. Korzhakov removed the pea jacket covering (Yeltsin also took off his wet underwear) and began to rub Yeltsin’s entire body with the moonshine until his blood circulation appeared more normal. After that, he put a sweater on him. Yeltsin’s wet clothing was hanging on a nail nearby, and Korzhakov noticed some traces of blood and grass stains on it. He had no doubt that Yeltsin had been in the water. Yeltsin’s version of the incident seemed strange to Korzhakov. According to Yeltsin, as he was walking to visit his friend from Sverdlovsk after he had dismissed his official car, a red Zhiguli (Russian-made small sedan) pulled up next to him and four sturdy characters jumped out. They threw a sack over Yeltsin’s head, and he thought that they would take him into the woods to kill him, but they just threw him off the bridge into the stream and drove off. According to Korzhakov, had these people really wanted to kill Yeltsin, they would have whacked him on the head first before dumping him in the water. How did they know that Yeltsin would be walking to the dacha? He asked Yeltsin about the sack that supposedly had been tied over his head. Yeltsin claimed that he managed to untie it as he was sinking. Korzhakov asked the policemen at the station whether they had found the sack or seen a suspicious car. Their responses were negative. In the meantime, after a third glass of the homemade brew, Yeltsin got more animated. From the available evidence, Korzhakov concluded that Yeltsin could not have fallen from the bridge. Finally, when his wife and daughter arrived, a more or less warmed up, still “half-drunk” Yeltsin was helped into his family car. Another police

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car drove up to the station right after the Yeltsin’s Volga (larger Russianmade sedan) arrived to investigate the incident. They concluded in their report that a drunken Boris Yeltsin got lost in the woods.24 That incident, in addition to previous ones, only reinforced the lingering suspicion that Boris Yeltsin drank heavily and often lost control. His incomprehensible speech at the Moscow City Committee’s meeting in November 1987, his alleged uncouth behavior in the United States, and the “bridge incident” seemed to validate the charge of alcoholism. That charge followed Yeltsin throughout his later career, and his enemies tried to exploit his weakness and undermine his ever-growing popularity, reliability and trustworthiness.25 NOTES 1. In this sentence, the word “local” is used because “cosmopolitan” in Soviet terminology was used as a euphemism for anti-Semitism, implying that Soviet Jews’ views were alien to the country’s ideology. 2. New York Times, September 19, 1989. 3. Boris Yeltsin, Against the Grain: An Autobiography, trans. Michael Glenny (New York: Summit Books, 1990), pp. 254–255. 4. The visit with President Bush was arranged at the last minute, and it was played down not to offend Gorbachev; New York Times, September 13, 1989. 5. New York Times, September 12, 1989. 6. Ibid. 7. New York Times, September 13, 1989. 8. Associated Press, September 24, 1989. 9. New York Times, September 11, 1989. 10. Argumenty i fakty, September 1989. 11. New York Times, September 11, 1989. 12. Yeltsin, Against the Grain, p. 256. 13. The Washington Post (September 28, 1989, p. J15) reported that according to reliable witnesses, Yeltsin polished off a quart of Jack Daniel’s whiskey, although the article did not mention that Yeltsin’s party consisted of four more members. 14. Dimitri K. Simes, After the Collapse: Russia Seeks Its Place as a Great Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), pp. 47–48. 15. V. Pribylovsky, “Russian Presidential Candidates—1996: Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich,” available at: http://www.geocities.com/Capitol-Hill/2768/ Yeltsine.html, p. 4. 16. New York Times, September 19, 1989; and Washington Post, September 20, 1989. 17. Pravda, September 21, 1989, p. 7. 18. Yeltsin, Against the Grain, p. 256. 19. Ibid., pp. 258–259.

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20. New York Times, October 17, 1989. 21. Aleksandr Korzhakov, Ot rassveta do zakata [Boris Yeltsin: From Sunrise to Sunset] (Moscow: Interbuk Publisher, 1997), pp. 71–72. 22. Ironically, all this was taking place during Gorbachev’s campaign against drunkenness and alcoholism. People were afraid to buy alcoholic beverages openly, and many, like the Korzhakovs, resorted to making their own homemade brew. 23. Korzhakov, Ot rassveta do zakata, p. 72. 24. Ibid., pp. 72–74. 25. Drinking is a national pastime in Russia, especially among men. Even heavy drinking is acceptable privately, but public drunkenness of officials is distasteful; this is expected only from the less-educated lower classes.

5 Struggle for Power

While Gorbachev was globetrotting and winning all the accolades abroad, Yeltsin was widening his base of support at home. By the late 1980s, Russians were becoming more and more disappointed with Gorbachev’s perestroika (restructuring and overhauling the economy). Gorbachev kept promising economic improvements, but the proposed target dates were getting pushed further back. New ideas and innovative plans for reforms kept popping up momentarily and some were embraced, but most of them dissipated without results. Public sentiment indicated that the economy, which had brought Gorbachev into power, could also bring him down. Thus, Yeltsin continued to criticize the sluggish economy. A poll taken in late 1989 indicated that 20 percent of the people believed that the failure of the economy was basic, and it was caused by the very nature of the Soviet-style socialism,1 implying that only organic changes could resuscitate it. The same poll indicated that 44 percent of the people blamed the government bureaucracy for the failures of Gorbachev’s program. In line with these findings, Yeltsin concluded that as long as the party was the state, only systemic political and economic reforms could save Gorbachev’s perestroika. In his public pronouncements, Yeltsin insisted that unless half of the Politburo and the Central Committee was changed at the forthcoming 28th Congress of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), no real reforms could be effected.

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Gorbachev also realized that the top leadership must be restructured in order to breathe some new life into his perestroika. On September 20, 1989, he announced the ousting of five veteran Politburo members; the dismissal came without much explanation. At the end of the two-day Central Committee meeting, Gorbachev thanked the five former members for their many years of faithful services on behalf of the party. He made no additional mention of the purge itself, but stressed that the party must be revitalized: “We must consolidate the party, the Central Committee and all society, and resolutely move forward without giving in to those who would like to keep us in the past and on the road of retreat, nor to those who propose an adventurous platform.”2 The newly appointed replacements to the Politburo did not inspire much enthusiasm among the reform-minded critics. Vladimir A. Kryuchkov, head of the KGB, was made a voting member of the Politburo. Yuri D. Maslyukov, chairman of the GOSPLAN (State Central Planning Agency), was also promoted to full membership. One of the two new alternate members was Boris K. Pugo, who moved up from the Central Committee watchdog agency. He was also former head of the Latvian Communist Party, and had risen through the ranks of the KGB. Yevgeny M. Primakov, chairman of the Council of the Upper House of the Soviet Parliament, the Union, became the second alternate member.3 Elevating the chairman of the KGB and bringing in another staunch conservative who had made his career through the KGB did not portend well either for Gorbachev or his perestroika. By late 1989, the Soviet Union’s foreign relations and domestic politics were undergoing the most rapid transformation. In foreign affairs, the Gorbachev-initiated changes ranged from withdrawing the troops from Afghanistan to renouncing the “Brezhnev doctrine.”4 The newly liberated former Soviet satellites blessed him for the latter decision, and for reducing the tension between East and West, the Western media sung his praises. In 1990, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. But at home, from the onset, Gorbachev’s support in the Politburo was far from solid. He was keenly aware of Khrushchev’s dismissal in 1964. Making every effort to secure his position, in October 1988, he had himself elected president of the Soviet Union.5 Thus, the Politburo could not automatically remove him from this post. He also tried to shore up his support in the Central Committee by placing more of his own people in key positions. By assuming the office of president, he wanted that position to be less vulnerable from the party. To achieve the separation between party and state, Gorbachev had the Central Committee of the CPSU issue a whole series of revised policies, such as instituting an executive presidency and allowing the formation of

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political parties, which signaled an abandoning of the monopoly of the Communist Party. According to the new arrangements, the president was to be responsible to the Congress of the People’s Deputies, but have sufficient reserve powers to ensure the functioning of the state.6 In fact, Gorbachev was transferring power from the party to the Congress of Deputies; that is, to the government. Inadvertently, he was playing into the hands of his critics, and of course, into the hands of Yeltsin. On March 13, 1990, on Gorbachev’s initiative, the Congress of the People’s Deputies, in line with the previously approved Central Committee’s sanction, amended the constitution. At that session, the new executive presidency was enacted, and the notorious Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, which had enshrined the Communist Party’s supremacy, was removed. The following day, the congress voted to elect Gorbachev as president of the Soviet Union. Of the 2,250 deputies, 1,329 voted in favor of Gorbachev, 495 against; 250 abstained and 54 cast invalid ballots. According to the law, Gorbachev needed 50 percent of the votes cast to get elected; he received 60 percent. Considering that Gorbachev had no challenger for that post, the result of the voting clearly signaled his rapid decline of popularity and a serious loss of support.7 As president of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev had to perform a tough balancing act in trying to cope with the increasingly more independent Congress of Deputies, and as general secretary of the Communist Party dealing with its different factions. To further complicate his situation, some of the fifteen constituent republics of the Soviet Union initiated a process of secession, while others were striving for more autonomy. As Gorbachev’s glasnost (discussing mistakes and criticizing domestic and foreign policies) opened the floodgates of public opinion, long-repressed grievances surfaced and culminated in often-violent nationalist movements toward independence. The Baltic republics were leading the way toward independence, but nationalist popular fronts emerged practically in every Soviet republic. Pro-independence demonstrations were becoming daily occurrences. Violent ethnic clashes began to dominate the news. In Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan, serious fighting broke out. The Azeris, in Baku, Azerbaijan’s capital, rioted and demanded the return of Nagorno-Karabakh to the Azerbaijani administration; ethnic Armenians were attacked and twenty-five of them were killed. In Georgia, rioting and fighting flared up between the Georgians and Ossetians. In Odessa, militant Ukrainian nationalists, the Rukh, demanded political changes. In Dushanbe, the Tadjik capital, rioters stormed the police headquarters and twenty-two people were killed.8

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The Kremlin had only two choices: to crack down on these aspirations by brutal force or yield to the demands. Resorting to massive force would have been contrary to Gorbachev’s overall democratizing policies. Therefore, only limited force was used in an attempt to restore a semblance of order, but in the long run that turned out to be ineffective. Under those circumstances in early 1990, local elections were held in the individual republics. Those elections were contested by a multitude of candidates. In the Russian Republic (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, RSFSR), for example, 6,700 candidates contested 1,068 seats. As stated previously, Yeltsin was one of them. Until the late 1980s, Republic soviets (local parliaments) had only a perfunctory administrative role, and practically no decision-making power. The general secretary of the Communist Party made all significant decisions in Moscow with the concurrence of the Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Membership in the local, regional or republic soviets was only a symbolic Communist Party-approved position in recognition of some achievements or good work performance—members as a rule were also party members. Even republic boundaries were only nominal; all republics regardless of their ethnic makeup were Kremlin-controlled and considered to be organic parts of the Soviet Union. Perhaps one of the most characteristic examples of this was Khrushchev’s generous 300th anniversary present to the Ukrainian Socialist Republic in 1954—the Crimean Peninsula and the traditionally Russian city, Odessa. At that time, the transfer of those territories was a meaningless gesture because the Kremlin’s control was prevalent throughout the Soviet Union.9 By 1990, as a result of Gorbachev’s policies, the subservient nature of the republics had changed. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, which extended through eleven time zones with a population of 146–147 million people and Yeltsin at the head of its parliament, was also energetically pushing for self-determination. On March 11, 1990, Lithuania declared itself independent from the Soviet Union; its parliament voted to change the country’s name by dropping the words “Soviet Socialist.” Using his newly acquired presidential powers, Gorbachev had the Red Army patrol the streets of Vilnius, and imposed an economic blockade on Lithuania. On May 9, the Estonians followed their neighbor’s example, renaming their country the Estonian Republic, and concurrently reinstating the country’s pre–World War II constitution.10 Yeltsin became chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet in May 1990, and moved into the huge, well-appointed office of his predecessor in the building of the Russian Parliament, the White House. When his aide, Lev Y. Sukhanov, bragged about seizing such a magnificent office, Yeltsin realized

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that in fact they had seized “an entire Russia.”11 He claimed that the new and active members of RSFSR government and high officials were entitled to special benefits, which enhanced their prestige.12 On June 12, 1990,13 the First Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic under Yeltsin’s leadership passed legislation on “Declaration of State Sovereignty of Russia.” At this session, the Russian Parliament proclaimed its right to determine its own economic and political future.14 Under those highly volatile domestic circumstances, on June 19, 1990, the 28th Congress of the CPSU began its four-day conference. Gorbachev, wanting to be a global statesman, had been preoccupied with foreign affairs, and paid little attention to his opponents within the Communist Party. At the last minute, he tried to shore up his support to stave off a conservative backlash, but it was too little and too late. The party’s right wing had the upper hand; the delegates, as in the past, were handpicked by the anti-reform party apparat. There were few defenders of Gorbachev. Only 125 of the 2,700 delegates were outright supporters of the proposed “democratic platform.” The prominent reformist leaders—Yeltsin, Popov, Stankevich and Zaslavsky, among others—who had already been elected to local, city or republic offices, stayed away from the congress. Yegor Ligachev orchestrated the attacks on Gorbachev, who was blamed for the collapse of the “socialist commonwealth,” withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe, compromise on German unification, surrendering the party’s constitutional leading role, the growing nationalist aspirations of the Soviet republics, advocating market economy, and also for not helping to improve the workers’ living standards. At the end of the congress, the majority of the conservative delegates elected one of their own, Ivan K. Polozkov, as the new first secretary of the Russian Communist Party.15 The party’s right wing managed to win a Pyrrhic victory, but it was already badly hemorrhaging, as it was breaking up into factions, losing membership, and on the way to losing the war. Boris Yeltsin, the most prominent and popular critic of Gorbachev, announced his resignation in July 1990 from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As the newly elected chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, he believed that he should withdraw from all political organizations. To substantiate this point, he also dropped out from the democratic bloc. By his action, he wanted to give proof that as the chairman of the Parliament he was acting in behalf of all the people and therefore he should be above “party politics.” The elected vice-chairmen of the Russian Supreme Soviet were of conservative leaning, with the exception of Ruslan Khasbulatov. The First Congress of the RSFSR established a Constitutional Commission to chart a

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new constitution in view of the recently approved sovereignty and a series of reform proposals.16 On July 31, 1990, Gorbachev agreed to cooperate with Boris Yeltsin, now the powerful and influential chairman of the RSFSR, in developing a new economic reform program. Consequently, a team of economic experts led by Grigory Yavlinsky and Stanislav Shatalin proposed a far-reaching economic reform program that became known as the “500 Days.” In essence, the “500 Days” program stipulated the rapid introduction of market economy, but the proposed “shock therapy” on the Polish model, elimination of price controls, introduction of private property, selling land, and competition between enterprises frightened the conservatives and provoked bitter attacks on Gorbachev, who began to backpedal. He offered to combine the “most valuable elements” of the “500 Days” program with that of Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov’s program that offered selected price increases. Yeltsin objected. In November 1990, seeing the ineffectiveness of the Ryzhkov government’s program, Gorbachev once again met with Yeltsin and agreed to earnestly pursue the reforms. But Gorbachev did not live up to his commitment. He let Ryzhkov take the fall for the economic difficulties, but did not support the “500 Days” program either. In January 1991, he appointed Valentin Pavlov prime minister and charged him with developing a third economic plan. Under conservative pressure, Gorbachev promoted Gennady Yanayev and Boris Pugo to a newly formed Security Council of the USSR. Also, the Congress of the People’s Deputies of the USSR called for a referendum on March 17, 1991, on the preservation of the Soviet Union.17 In summer 1990, after the declaration of sovereignty of the RSFSR, Yeltsin traveled to several of the Soviet republics, advocating a push for self-government and urging local leaders: “to take as much sovereignty as they could swallow.” In January 1991, the Soviet army attacked demonstrators in Riga and seized the television center in Vilnius. Yeltsin protested the army’s action and to show his support to the Baltic republics in their struggle to preserve their independence, he traveled to Tallinn where he signed agreements with the democratically elected nationalist governments. On February 19, 1991, Yeltsin went on television and sharply criticized Gorbachev’s policies, demanding his resignation, and urging him to hand over the government to a federal council made up of the heads of Soviet republics.18 A day after Yeltsin’s television speech, the conservative Communists in the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR counterattacked. Signatures were collected for a no-confidence vote and the eventual removal of Yeltsin.19 These efforts did not prevail, but on the initiative of democratic deputies, a referendum on the creation of a popularly elected presidency had already been ap-

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proved for March 17, 1991. On that same date, a national referendum on the preservation of the Soviet Union had already been planned. The majority of the electorate voted for the preservation of the Soviet Union and for the creation of the presidency of the Russian Republic. Out of 184 million eligible voters in the Soviet Union, 147 million participated in the referendum; 76 percent supported the preservation of the Soviet Union.20 A closer analysis of the vote revealed that six union republics boycotted the balloting, foreshadowing the secession of those republics. Still, in April 1990, almost a year before the referendum, the Russian Supreme Soviet adopted two laws concerning the presidency: “On Election of the President of the RSFSR” and “On the President of the RSFSR.” Those laws emphasized that the presidency was the highest office of the Russian Federation, and stipulated that the candidates must be at least thirty-five years old and not older than sixty-five. The president was to be elected for a five-year term, for not more than two consecutive terms. The law “On the President” stated that the president may not be a people’s deputy or a member of any political party; neither can he hold other public office. The president had the right to initiate legislation, report to the congress on the state of the Republic, and sign and promulgate laws. Among other responsibilities, he had to appoint the chairman of the Council of Ministers with the consent of the Supreme Soviet.21 On June 12, 1991, a year after declaring its sovereignty, the citizens of the Russian Federation had an opportunity to elect a president from a field of six candidates; 76 percent of 106 million eligible voters cast ballots. Boris Yeltsin, the staunch critic of Gorbachev, won 57 percent of the votes. His opponents, N. Ryzhkov, a nominee of the Communist Party, received 17 percent; V. Zhirinovsky, of the Liberal Democratic Party, 8 percent; A. Tuleyev, also a militant right-wing Communist, 6 percent; A. Makashov, an extreme nationalist and retired general, 4 percent; and V. Bakatin, former interior minister, 3 percent.22 Winning an absolute majority in the first direct and popular election of a president in Russia, Boris Yeltsin earned the legal and moral right to speak and act with authority on behalf of more than 147 million people. Where did the election outcome leave Gorbachev, the president of the Soviet Union? Undeniably, the internationally admired statesman, Nobel Peace Prizewinner, and renowned representative of the “mighty Soviet Union” was dealt a serious domestic setback by the election success of his major critic. Despite his precipitous drop of popularity at home, abroad Gorbachev was still viewed as the only legitimate representative and spokesman of the USSR. But whom did he represent?

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Practically all the republics were distancing themselves from the Kremlin. Gorbachev tried to placate them by negotiating a treaty to preserve the Union. Representatives of the participating republics met in Gorbachev’s presidential dacha in Novo Ogaryovo. The proposed treaty was to supersede the original 1922 Union Treaty, which was incorporated into the 1936 and 1977 constitutions.23 The issues under consideration were: power sharing, taxing powers, division of property and ownership rights. On April 21, 1991, Yeltsin, plus the heads of eight union republics (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia did not participate) signed a “9+1” agreement with Gorbachev, marking the beginning of a new Union Treaty that would render the republics greater autonomy within the USSR. That new treaty was to serve as the basis of a new constitution and it was to be ratified on August 20, 1991. The issues concerning the absentee republics were not addressed; neither was the possible interference with the forthcoming constitution of the RSFSR, nor the status of the sixteen autonomous republics within the Russian Federation, nor the political split between the pro-Union and pro-independence factions in the Ukraine.24 Yeltsin was busy with the internal affairs of his new office, issuing decrees, organizing his administration, appointing officials, and even forming a state council (not envisioned by the constitution) under the president. But as president of a sovereign Russia, he started to think about his own image, and how an independent Russia would be perceived abroad vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. His earlier trip to the United States with the innuendoes of drunkenness certainly did not help his image. His meeting with President Bush was kept very low key—the White House had tried to make it as informal as possible, so as not to alienate Gorbachev. In the midst of domestic political upheavals, Yeltsin also made a short trip to Spain. He was invited to speak at a political seminar, but that trip ended when his plane crash-landed and he suffered a serious back injury. Yeltsin described that accident by saying how lucky he was that an excellent neurosurgeon was at hand in Spain to operate on him, and what fine professional care he received in the hospital. Also, he commented on the cleanliness and modern efficiency of the hospital, and that in a Soviet hospital he would probably have been kept for six months after such a serious injury. In Spain, a day after his three-hour back operation, he was asked to get up and walk. Yeltsin returned to the Soviet Union with another set of good impressions of the West.25 The West, however, was not all that charitable to Yeltsin. After his previously mentioned television speech attacking Gorbachev’s leadership and asking for his resignation, the Western press turned against him. The Berliner Zeitung wrote, “Gorbachev’s resignation will hardly open the way to

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democracy.” According to the Christian Science Monitor, “Yeltsin’s decision to launch an open attack reflects his weakness rather than strength.” The London Times editorialized, “foreign diplomats believe that Gorbachev remains the most suitable candidate, if not from the point of view of progress, then at any rate to prevent chaos there. Yeltsin remains an unknown quantity and could lead to anarchy.”26 Yeltsin’s appeal to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France, on behalf of the emerging Russian democracy within the Soviet Union also ended in a rebuff. La Monde wrote: “Having come to Strasbourg—the gateway to Europe—Yeltsin must note that only one Russian is recognized—Gorbachev.” Yeltsin was called “an irresponsible person and a demagogue” by a group of socialists. The socialist leaders told him that they felt more reassured by Gorbachev. The Berliner Zeitung reported that members of the Europarliament in no uncertain terms had no sympathy for Gorbachev’s opponent. Also, that Yeltsin’s efforts to establish direct relations between Strasbourg and the Russian Parliament would only destabilize the situation in the Soviet Union. The New York Daily News warned that only Gorbachev could prevent the country from plunging into “bloodshed, hunger, cold and anarchy.”27 Such rejections and antagonism were very disappointing to Yeltsin, and could have alienated him from the West, but if he really hoped to turn his country into a democratic political system and market economy, he did not have any other models. He realized that Gorbachev had established a formidable network of support abroad, and that he had to change tactics to endear himself to Western leaders. Less than a week after his June 12, 1991, presidential election, he made his second trip to the United States on the invitation of congressional leaders. But once the election results were in, not like in 1989, President Bush was bound to invite the first democratically elected president of Russia.28 The Bush administration, in spite of the friendly hospitality extended to Yeltsin, was still faced with the dilemma of how to avoid harming the cordial relations with Gorbachev. In Russia, Yeltsin was beginning to do all things that appealed to the Americans: land reforms, cutting back on the political power of the Communist Party, and encouraging private enterprises. Nevertheless, doubts lingered about him. Some of Yeltsin’s pre-election promises were questionable, for example, his pledge of a substantial increase of pensions—from where would he get the money? Although Yeltsin was very successful in getting elected and had some excellent advisors, he lacked an organization to carry out his proposed reforms. He was viewed as a one-man show. Ironically, it was thought that to make progress in Russia, he would be forced to rely on the very same central administration that he

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had been criticizing. Yeltsin, not unlike Gorbachev, hoped to obtain billions of dollars in aid from the West to carry out his reforms.29 Upon Yeltsin’s arrival in the United States, the headlines read: “ Russia’s Yeltsin Charms Congress, but Aid Is Another Question.”30 As if Yeltsin had taken lessons from Gorbachev, after an hour-long meeting with about seventy senators, Ernest F. Hollings, democrat from South Dakota, joked with Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, democrat from Maine, that Yeltsin was such a hit that the democrats should put him at the top of their list for the 1972 presidential ticket.31 When Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole told Yeltsin that lawmakers wished to engage in more direct contact with the Soviet republics rather than with the central government, adding, “I hope to make that point clear to President Bush,” Yeltsin replied, “That’s why I’ve come here.”32 Yeltsin told members of the Congress almost everything they wanted to hear. He stressed that he did not come to ask for money and Western aid, but if given, it should come with specific conditions attached. Among other issues, he encouraged Congress to support the Baltic republics’ quest for independence. He advocated cessation of Soviet aid to Cuba; instead money should be directed to the conversion of the Soviet military industry to nonmilitary uses. In addition to formal meetings, wherever he went, Yeltsin worked the crowds. At the Lincoln Memorial he readily mingled with the people, as well as in New York, on Wall Street and at New York University.33 Yeltsin redeemed himself with his second visit to the United States. NOTES 1. “Gloomy View of Perestroika in Soviet Poll,” New York Times, October 20, 1989, and San Francisco Chronicle, October 20, 1989; also at: http://www. summitlake.com/COMMENTARY/PRAVDA/Pravda%20Chapt% 206/Soviet_Poll_6.23.html. 2. New York Times, September 21, 1989. 3. Pravda, September 20, 1989; and New York Times, September 21, 1989. 4. In 1968, Leonid Brezhnev, upon deciding to intervene in Czechoslovakia, announced that the Soviet Union would have the right to defend the achievements of the socialist countries: “This means that each Communist party is responsible not only to its own people, but also to all the socialist countries, to the entire Communist movement. Whoever forgets this, in stressing only the independence of the Communist party, becomes one-sided. He deviates from his international duty.” Pravda, September 25, 1968. 5. “Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev,” available at: http://www.artnet/~upstart/gorby.html. 6. Robert Sharlet, Soviet Constitutional Crisis: From De-Stalinization to Disintegration (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1992), p. 86.

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7. Ibid., p. 481. Originally, the congress had 2,250 delegates. 8. Warren Shaw and David Pryce, World Almanac of the Soviet Union from 1905 to the Present (New York: World Almanac, 1990), pp. 325–326. 9. The consequences of Khrushchev’s “generosity” became problematic after the Ukraine declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Russian nationals living in the ceded regions of eastern Ukraine would have preferred to live in Russia. Ever since, Crimea has been a trouble spot for the Ukraine. The headquarters of the Soviet Black Sea fleet was located there, and the division of the fleet between Russia and the Ukraine has remained a long-lasting issue of contention. Also, the Tatars, who had been deported by Stalin and returned to Crimea during the Khrushchev era, have been demanding their own autonomy. 10. Shaw and Pryce, World Almanac of the Soviet Union, pp. 326–327. 11. Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: Random House, 1994), p. 18. 12. Ibid., pp. 10–21. 13. This date became the Russian Federation’s “Independence Day.” 14. Shaw and Pryce, World Almanac of the Soviet Union, p. 328. 15. Hedrick Smith, The New Russians (New York: Random House, 1990), pp. 514–515. 16. Vladimir Pribylovsky, “Russian Presidential Candidates—1996,” Federal News Service, April 1996, p. 5. 17. Ibid., pp. 4–5. 18. Ibid., p. 5. 19. Ibid., p. 6. 20. Izvestia, March 22, 1991. 21. Pravda, April 25, 1990. 22. Izvestia, June 14, 1991. 23. The 1922 treaty served as the basis for the formation of the Soviet Union; the 1977 Brezhnev constitution was the rewriting of the 1936 Stalinist constitution. By 1991, the Brezhnev constitution went through a whole series of revisions. 24. Sharlet, Soviet Constitutional Crisis, pp. 111–112. 25. Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, pp. 118–120. 26. Ibid., p. 23. 27. Ibid., p. 25. 28. George J. Church, “Boris Looks Westward,” Time, June 24, 1991, p. 28. 29. Ibid. 30. P. Fessler, “Russia’s Yeltsin Charms Congress, but Aid Is Another Question,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, June 22, 1991, p. 1685. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. New York Times, June 20 and 22, 1991.

6 Yeltsin Takes Control

After his return from abroad, Yeltsin continued negotiating with leaders of Soviet republics. The April 21, 1991, Novo Ogaryovo meeting in Gorbachev’s impressive presidential dacha needed refinements. Originally, at that meeting, the agreement of the new Union Treaty had been hammered out and the date for ratification had been set for August 20, 1991. During those negotiations, Yeltsin found himself in close agreement with Nursultan A. Nazarbayev, the president of Kazakhstan. Their official relationship turned into friendship, and while in Novo Ogaryovo they spent much of their free time together.1 Consequently, on August 18, 1991, Yeltsin accepted an official invitation to Kazakhstan. After the formal meeting was over in Alma Ata (Kazakhstan’s capital, now renamed Almaty), Nazarbayev planned an elaborate reception for his good friend, Boris Yeltsin. The host took Yeltsin and his entourage to a picturesque out-of-town location. Knowing Yeltsin’s weakness for the Russian banya (bathhouse), a small stream was especially rerouted to provide a natural Jacuzzi for the honored guest, and very comfortable yurts (rounded tents) were set up along the stream for the comfort of the visitors. Yeltsin relaxed and enjoyed himself, splashing in the water and sunbathing on the shore. Later, for entertainment, Kazakh and Russian folksongs were sung, followed by a sumptuous meal. By that time, Yeltsin was quite exhausted; nevertheless, the highlight of the evening was when Nazarbayev picked up the domra (a mandolin-like string instrument) and started to sing. Yeltsin

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joined him by keeping rhythm with wooden spoons. As a result of Nazarbayev’s hospitality, Yeltsin’s originally planned departure was delayed by three hours, and he landed at Moscow’s Vnukovo airport at 1:00 A.M. From the airport, he was driven to his country residence in Arkhangelskoye.2 Later, both Yeltsin and his bodyguard, Korzhakov, speculated about the delayed departure from Kazakhstan, and believed that it was somehow connected with the imminent coup. According to reliable sources, Yeltsin’s plane had been targeted by the plotters to be intercepted, and it was missed only because of the long delay.3 Was Nazarbayev tipped off about the attempt, and therefore did not allow Yeltsin to depart on time? Was someone in Moscow trying to save Yeltsin by keeping him out of harm’s way? Or, was it only a lucky coincidence that Yeltsin’s departure was delayed? No concrete evidence has ever surfaced on this issue. As mentioned above, August 20, 1991, was designated as the fateful day when the new Union Treaty was to be signed by the participants of the “9+1” agreement of Novo Ogaryovo. That date was to signal a new beginning for the Soviet Union as a loose federation of autonomous republics. Of course, there was maneuvering among the heads of state, but the framework had already been decided, and further action had to wait until the treaty went into effect. Taking advantage of the apparent political lull, Gorbachev and his family—wife, Raisa, daughter, Irina, and son-in-law, Anatoly— traveled to Foros in Crimea for a short vacation.4 In Gorbachev’s absence, the long-dissatisfied leading conservative members of the Communist Party were ready to “save the Soviet Union.” Ironically, Gorbachev himself had appointed the conspirators to the highest and most sensitive offices. The main organizers of the coup were: Vladimir Kryuchkov, chairman of the KGB; Boris Pugo, interior minister; Valentin Pavlov, prime minister; General Dimitri Yazov, defense minister; Genadi Yanayev, vice president and acting president; Oleg Baklanov, first deputy chairman of the Defense Council; and Oleg Shenin, head of the Communist Party’s Personnel and Organization Affairs. In addition, these top-ranking government and party officials were joined by Aleksandr Tizyakov, president of the Association of State Industries; and Vasily Starodubtsev, chairman of the Farmers Union.5 Apparently, Gorbachev’s accession to the demands of the heads of the union republics during the Novo Ogaryovo negotiations prompted the right-wing Communists to act. On August 6, 1991, Kryuchkov requested an analysis from KGB experts about the possible consequences of imposing a state of emergency in the country. Evidently, the declaration of a state of emergency was carefully planned. Action had to be taken to prevent the new Union Treaty from taking effect, and on August 17, a decisive meeting of

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the conspirators was held. The rationale for seizing power was that Gorbachev had come under the influence of “extremists,” that is, democratic reformers, and was no longer in the position to save the Soviet Union. The facts were that Gorbachev had no direct control of the KGB; the presidency was undermined by Prime Minister Pavlov’s attempts to impose his own independent economic policies. In addition to those, the military was hurting because of the withdrawal from East Germany, and the industrial-military complex resented the sharp cutbacks in spending. Gorbachev lost popular support because the perestroika was not showing results. Under those circumstances, Kryuchkov and his cohorts had no difficulty in recruiting equally disenchanted subordinates. On the eve of the declaration of a state of emergency, the conspirators sent their representatives to the vacationing Gorbachev. The members of the delegation were: Yuri Plekhanov, head of the KGB’s directorate in charge of security for government leaders; Shenin and Baklanov of the Central Committee; and General Valentin Varennikov, commander of the ground forces. In the name of the already established Emergency Council, they demanded that Gorbachev issue a decree of state of emergency; the delegates insisted that it was the only way to alleviate the disastrous conditions of the country. If Gorbachev was not willing to cooperate, he was to hand over his authority to Vice President Yanayev. Gorbachev refused, but by this time, he and his family were under house arrest with communication cut off from the outside world. The conspirators already had their agenda prepared and proceeded without Gorbachev’s blessing.6 On August 19, 1991, at 6:00 A.M., TASS, the official Soviet news agency, reported that Gorbachev “for health reasons” was unable to fulfill the responsibilities of the presidency and had been replaced by Vice President Yanayev. Concurrently, the formation of an Emergency Committee for the State of Emergency was announced.7 The formal documents, the appeal to the people, had been prepared in advance, and to make sure that there was no resistance to the takeover, tanks were ordered into Moscow to secure all strategic points. Like all other Muscovites, Yeltsin was caught unaware of the coup, resting comfortably after his exhausting day in Kazakhstan. It was Yeltsin’s daughter, Tanya, who awakened him with the news of the coup and the declaration of the state of emergency. By eight o’clock, some of Yeltsin’s closest associates arrived at his dacha in Arkhangelskoye. As the most ardent reformer, Yeltsin was keenly aware of being in danger. The head of his security, Korzhakov, immediately began to summon all available bodyguards to the dacha to escort Yeltsin to the Parliament building in Moscow where he would be better protected. Even while planning his ride to Moscow, Yeltsin, with the aid of his wife, Naina, began telephoning all

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possible allies, among them General Pavel S. Grachev, who was then the commander of a paratroop division in the city of Tula. A few months earlier, Yeltsin had met with General Grachev and they had considered various scenarios as the events were developing. Grachev responded to Yeltsin’s call with a somewhat vague promise of support. Despite the takeover, the telephone and the facsimile machines were still working in the dacha. Yeltsin and his associates quickly composed an appeal to the Russian people, condemning the lawlessness of the coup. Thanks to the improved communications, the message was faxed and dictated on the phone to as many sources as possible. Within one hour, the Western wire services picked up the message and rebroadcast it worldwide.8 After making the initial contacts, Yeltsin decided to head for Moscow, and started out in his limousine under a small Russian flag, with his entourage in a few other cars in front and behind. Korzhakov remembered that this was the first time he and a fellow security guard were sitting in the back seat in order to protect Yeltsin with their own bodies if necessary. Although a group of Special Forces “Alpha” had been dispatched to Arkhangelskoye and was lurking in the woods around the dacha with orders to arrest Yeltsin, strangely, they let the small convoy through. Yeltsin’s group did pass by some tanks along the highway, but they managed to reach the White House without any trouble. After Yeltsin’s safe arrival, arrangements were made to smuggle his family out of the dacha. For one night, Yeltsin’s wife, two daughters, sons-in-law and grandchildren holed up in the small apartment of one of the security guards whose family was in the country. Safe but uncomfortable, the next day the family moved to their central city apartment on Tverskaya Street. Yeltsin and his growing number of supporters held fort in the massive building of the Russian Parliament.9 August 19, 1991, was a day of confusion. The conspirators brought the army into Moscow as a show of force. They broadcast their prepared decrees, but were uncertain about their next move. Their ranks were wavering; some were losing their nerve. Around 10:00 A.M., Kryuchkov and the leaders of the putsch met to assess the situation. Valentin Pavlov, the prime minister, was unable to attend, as he succumbed to a heart attack. Those present concluded that there were no major disruptions, no strikes, the stores were open, and people went about their business as usual. Gorbachev was isolated at his Black Sea resort, and their chief opponent, Boris Yeltsin, although he had slipped through their hands, was confined in the White House with tanks and troops blocking all the escape routes. To justify their action, the putschists decided to put some compromising material on television about the leading democrats. Also, to “reassure people,” they announced some price cuts. They believed that it was necessary to quickly

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secure the support of the Supreme Soviet to give the appearance of legitimacy to their action. Apparently, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Anatoly Lukyanov, was obliging. Lukyanov released an announcement in which he claimed that the pending new Union Treaty raised many questions. According to him, the treaty, as it was presented to the Supreme Soviet, was in conflict with the Soviet Constitution. Before revising the current constitution, more detailed study and widespread discussions were necessary. A nationwide debate on such serious issues could take place only if law and order were assured. The essence of Lukyanov’s statement was that the recent turmoil in the country was not conducive to reasoned debate, but the Union Treaty could be soberly reassessed under the aegis of the State Emergency Committee.10 The situation in the White House was also in disarray. Yeltsin and his supporters, who were assembling there, feared an imminent attack and arrests on the order of the conspirators. Yeltsin was able to use a single, recently installed telephone line (overlooked by the conspirators, who had cut off all other phone connections from the White House) to make contact with the outside. The initial plan was to stay in the White House and wait and see what would develop. The prominent people around Yeltsin were Rutskoi, Burbulis, Silayev, Khasbulatov, Shakhrai and many others. They pondered how they could most effectively counter the Emergency Committee’s decrees. Concurrently, under the leadership of Vice President Rutskoi, a former general, a defense committee was formed.11 In the meantime, the realities of the takeover began to concern the Muscovites. Although they were dissatisfied with the results of the perestroika, the people did not want to regress to a pre-Gorbachev type of regime. As word spread that Yeltsin and the reformers were contesting the takeover and were in the White House, the White House became a magnet for supporters of democracy and reforms. Ignoring the tanks and the troop carriers, thousands of Russians began to assemble in front of the White House to show their support for Yeltsin and the policies that he was advocating, and also in defiance of the illegal takeover. Inspired by the growing crowd, Yeltsin felt that he “had to be out there right away, standing with those people,”12 and despite the dangers of leaving the relatively safe White House, Yeltsin did go outside. Amidst the cheering crowd, flashing cameras, and television crews scurrying around, he climbed up on a tank and read his appeal “To the Citizens of Russia,” denouncing the Emergency Committee and declaring all of its actions illegal. That was a defining moment for Yeltsin. The picture of him standing on a tank, defying the Communist putschists, and standing up for democracy was flashed around the world. In Moscow, the mimeographed copies of his

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proclamation denouncing the illegal takeover were spreading like wildfire. A new champion of Russian democracy was born. Yeltsin’s heroic public appearance, however, did not alleviate the danger he and his supporters were facing. The possibilities that the Special Forces would storm the White House were ever present. Korzhakov was busily exploring the hidden escape routes in the building’s basement. He found four emergency doors through which the president could be evacuated in case the building came under attack, but only one of the exits that led to the metro tunnel between two stations (Krasnopresenskaya and Kievskaya) seemed viable. Another alternative was an escape to the American Embassy’s compound, whose entrance was just about two hundred yards behind the White House. The Americans had already made an offer of political asylum to Yeltsin and his entourage. That offer itself had symbolic significance because it represented evidence of American support for Yeltsin’s position and condemnation of the conspirators. During the second night, shooting started around the White House and storming of the White House by the Special Forces “Alpha” appeared so real that Korzhakov actually awakened an exhausted Yeltsin and led him, still groggy, and half-asleep, to his limousine to dash over to the American Embassy. Realizing what was going on, Yeltsin rejected the plan, and went back into the building.13 Yeltsin’s instinct to refuse to leave the White House turned out to be the right decision. Later he mused: “From the perspective of security, the plan to go to the U.S. Embassy was 100 percent correct. But from the point of view of politics, it would have been a 100 percent failure.”14 Yeltsin realized that if he had sought refuge in the American Embassy, it would have given the appearance of abandoning the people, and to some extent, implied foreign interference. As the news of the coup d’état in Russia spread around the world, even though it was completely unexpected, it did not take long for Western decision makers to realize that if they wanted to prevent the erosions of the newly evolving East-West relations, the Communist takeover must be condemned and Yeltsin supported. While the situation in the Russian White House remained precarious, and an attack was expected, Western support for Yeltsin was pouring in. President Bush reached Yeltsin on the telephone and reported at a follow-up press conference: “I assured Yeltsin of continued U.S. support of his goal of restoration of Mr. Gorbachev as the constitutionally chosen leader. And I also shared with him the support that other world leaders voiced in my several conversations yesterday (August 19, 1991), conversations I had with those leaders in Eastern Europe and leaders in Western Europe, as well, and Prime Minister Kaifu (of Japan). And I gave him reassurance.”15 President Bush’s rambling endorsement was a great

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morale booster for Yeltsin and his supporters, but it did not alleviate the danger of an attack on the Russian White House. In defiance of the Emergency Committee and the forbidding presence of the tanks and troops, Russians from all walks of life rushed to defend the White House. People started to arrive in front of the building on August 19, soon after Yeltsin’s proclamations were spread. The crowd swelled and formed a human shield in front of the White House. Notables, writers, actors, musicians (such as the world famous cellist, Mstislav Rostrpovich) and reform politicians (such as Yuri Luzhkov) joined Yeltsin. Among others, Major General Aleksandr Lebed showed up. In his memoir, Lebed recalled those fateful August days from his vantage point.16 In mid-August 1991, Lebed was making “grandiose” vacation plans. He had just received a small plot of land and wanted to grow something, enjoy the sun, fresh air, water and physical labor. At that time, he lived in an apartment in Tula. On August 17, he was about to depart when he was called on the phone to get to the headquarters of the 106 Paratroop Division. He tried to object that he was on leave, but his superior, Lieutenant General Grachev, ordered him to interrupt his vacation and prepare an operational group of the Tula division for readiness. Lebed was not given an explanation where the group would be heading; it seemed that they would be flown to a trouble spot somewhere in Armenia or Azerbaijan. By midnight the group was ready, but Lebed still had no information on where it would be heading. There was an unusual secrecy about the preparations. The night passed, and the next day at eleven o’clock, Lebed was told that he would be receiving orders at 6:00 P.M. The evening passed without any further clarification. At 4:00 A.M. on August 19, Lebed was told that three regiments would have to move to the Tushino airbase (Tushino is located at the outskirts of Moscow). Upon arriving in Tushino, Lebed received instructions that he should set out to Moscow immediately, contact the defenders at the Supreme Soviet of Russia, and organize the defense of the White House with his Second Battalion. He was to proceed there accompanied only by an officer. When Lebed inquired as to whom he should meet there, he was told that he was expected in the White House and that the battalion would be following him. Driving up to the building of the Russian Supreme Soviet, a strange sight greeted Lebed and his fellow officer. People were enthusiastically building barricades from any material they could get hold of—pavement stones, construction materials, trolley buses, et cetera. Lebed had no notion of what was going on; he had not heard of the proclamation of the Emergency Committee. The people on the makeshift barricades appeared good-natured to Lebed, and if the battalion had to defend the building, it would be doing so with these simple Muscovites, but against whom?17

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Lebed’s confusion continued when people surrounded his car and shouted questions: “You would not really shoot at us, would you?” Cursed by some, threatened by others, Lebed eventually entered the White House at a side entrance, and tried to explain to the armed guard that he was sent to organize the defense of the building. He was not allowed to proceed inside the main building, thus failing at his first attempt to contact the defenders. Lebed called Grachev on a regular telephone to report his situation, and was instructed to return to his battalion. He left the White House, but by that time, heavy construction equipment was used to reinforce the barricades, and most approaches were blocked. To find the battalion was easier said than done; roads were torn up, streets barricaded, and thousands of people were milling around the White House. Lebed lost contact with his troops. When it was impossible to get through by car, he walked to an office building and asked the women working there to use the telephone. He called the headquarters about the whereabouts of his battalion, but he was told to call back fifteen minutes later, so he sat down in the corridor and waited. Lebed was ordered to return to the building of the Russian Supreme Soviet and carry out his initial order, which was to meet with the head of the defense and organize the defense. On his way back, in the midst of barricades and crowds, Lebed found his battalion in utter confusion about 300 yards southeast of the White House. The officers and the soldiers were hoping that their general would explain to them what was happening. But to quote Lebed: “I myself did not know what the devil was going on.”18 A huge crowd surrounded the troops. Lebed addressed the people and tried to calm them. He told them that these soldiers were sent to assist the defense of the White House, and they would not fire at the people. Eventually, a delegation of the defenders led by Korzhakov found Lebed and invited him to meet with Yeltsin. While he was waiting to see the Russian president, Yuri Skokov, Yeltsin’s advisor, explained to Lebed what was happening. “This was the first time I heard about the Emergency Committee. And [heard] about the serious illness or arrest of Gorbachev,” wrote Lebed.19 He did not have much time to meditate about the revelations because he was ushered in to meet the president. Yeltsin greeted him in shirtsleeves, with a bulletproof vest hanging on the back of a nearby chair. Yeltsin wanted to know Lebed’s assignment and also on whose order he was sent. Lebed responded tersely; his mission was to organize the defense of the White House with a paratroop battalion, on the order of Lieutenant General Grachev. Yeltsin wanted to know against whom Lebed was defending the White House. The general hesitated momentarily—he himself did not know who the enemy was—but said: “from any person or group of people that threatens the integrity of the post or the safety

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of the personnel of the post.” This response was satisfactory to Yeltsin, who relaxed a bit, and began to inquire about the feelings of the military in connection with the Emergency Committee. Lebed told him, “the soldiers simply, do not know anything about it.” Yeltsin expressed his confidence in Grachev and Lebed, and ordered Lebed to move his battalion up to the White House. Lebed realized that given the reality of the confused situation around the building, this was almost an impossible task. The dedicated crowd that surrounded the White House and kept vigil on the barricades would not allow the military to approach the building without resistance.20 Moving the troops to the White House required the full cooperation of the spontaneously organized civilian defenders. Yeltsin gathered the leaders of the barricades and explained to them that Lebed and the paratroopers under his command were on their side and the battalion should be allowed to pass through. It was still not easy; the slightest misunderstanding could have led to bloodshed. Eventually, Lebed’s battalion did take up position around the White House. By the time he checked in with headquarters the evening of August 20, he was told that he had misunderstood the command, and the chief, that is, the minister of defense was upset, therefore: “the same way he moved his battalion in, he should move it out.” Lebed felt like a marionette. The high command’s confusion was obvious. Removing a battalion through the amassed 100,000 people was much more difficult than bringing it in. Lebed did manage to remove his troops from the White House, despite the clamoring journalists, TV crews and people badgering him with dozens of questions. Eventually, the crowd yielded very unwillingly and let the battalion through. He went to the divisional headquarters where he was expected. Despite rumors, Lebed reported that there was no shooting. All of the sudden, he was asked to report to the assembled generals what was going on around the White House. According to Lebed, about 100,000 people surrounded the building of the Supreme Soviet, the approaches were barricaded, and well-equipped and able defenders guarded the building itself. An attack on the White House would result in an enormous carnage. General of the army, V.I. Varennikov, accused Lebed of being a pessimist and spreading uncertainty. Nevertheless, Lebed was given the task of drawing up a plan to attack the White House. A haphazardly drawn up plan was hastily approved with very little concern about the details, and Lebed was told that he would receive specific instructions for action by telephone.21 In the meantime, the columns of tanks, troop carriers and trucks with soldiers were surrounded by large groups of Muscovites. Children were climbing up on the tanks, young and old, women and men were taking their pictures standing at or on tanks. The soldiers were freely fraternizing with the people. Here and there, clusters of people were debating the situation,

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but Center City Moscow looked like a special holiday with the attraction being the military hardware everywhere. People with children were walking in the middle of usually traffic-clogged main thoroughfares; many of them were enjoying an unexpected day off. Stores in general were open; Pizza Hut and McDonalds were exceptionally busy. The largest crowd, as mentioned before, was in front of the White House, ready to face down any attack. This was the picture Lebed saw as he went on reconnaissance. Lebed claimed that he told his superior he was unwilling to participate in such a senseless activity that would lead to unnecessary bloodshed. He was given an option to warn the defenders of the White House that an attack would take place at 3:00 A.M. It was a curious assignment, considering that the planner of the attack was to warn the “enemy.” To play it safe, Lebed conveyed the message to the White House that the attack would start at 2:00 A.M. That evening, there was total confusion about which troops would be storming the White House. Grachev was told the Alpha was not willing to participate in the attack, the designated Dzerzhinsky division did not leave its barracks, and the Tula division was also standing still in Tushino. With no order to attack, Lebed himself went to sleep. On that fateful night, no attack materialized.22 Three young people died tragically, but the White House stood unharmed with Yeltsin within, protected outside by people of Moscow. The well-conceived but poorly executed coup was rapidly losing momentum, and without generating popular support, it was on the verge of collapse. Blood was spilled, but bloodshed was prevented. An armored vehicle was sent on patrol near the White House. As it entered a tunnel that would have taken it close to the building, the tense crowd, expecting an attack, started to throw stones, bottles and even “Molotov cocktails” at it. One young man jumped on the vehicle’s canvas cover. Shots were fired, the young man fell down, and as the armored vehicle tried to back out from the tunnel, it crushed him. Two others rushed to help the fallen victim; they were hit by bullets. Thus, Dimitry Komar, Ilya Krichevsky and Vladimir Usov became the victims and martyrs of the ill-begotten putsch. By the next morning, August 21, the unity among the conspirators was already faltering. The international community was solidly condemning them and they were threatened with complete isolation. Without the masses behind them, and perhaps sobered up by the death of the young men, they were ready to compromise, but by then Yeltsin and his entourage realized that they already had the upper hand and were unyielding. Yeltsin not only survived unscathed, but went on the offensive. Still on August 21, he addressed the Russian Parliament and reported to the members how he had taken the initiative in the absence of the president of the USSR, Gorbachev, who at that time was still held incommunicado by KGB troops under the

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command from Kryuchkov. Yeltsin reiterated that the coup was unconstitutional, and there was absolutely no evidence that Gorbachev was incapacitated. He issued a decree that in the absence of the commander in chief, he, the president of Russia, was taking charge of the armed forces. He praised Major General Lebed who, instead of attacking the White House, had come to defend it.23 It should be noted that Lebed was hardly a supporter of Yeltsin; he was just carrying out his orders. According to his own writing, he had acted without fully comprehending what was going on. He only complained that as a result of the confusing orders, he was forced to act like a puppet. When he was told to organize the defense of the White House, he attempted to organize it. When he was told to withdraw his troops from the White House, he withdrew them. When he was told to plan an attack on the White House, he planned it. When he was told to warn the defenders about the impending attack, which he had just planned and was to lead, he warned them. The attack did not take place because the high command was also confused; instead of giving specific orders, they were making “suggestions.” Local commanders also did not get direct instructions, and when they received contradictory orders, they tended to ignore them. It was the ineptitude of the Emergency Committee and the confused military command that saved the White House, not the loyalty of the soldiers. Of course, Yeltsin also owed his survival to the near 100,000 Muscovites who kept vigil day and night around the White House and were ready to protect it with their bodies. The people wanted real changes; they were hoping to improve their lives, and believed that Yeltsin might reinvigorate the reforms that Gorbachev initiated and the country would progress toward democracy. People certainly did not want to regress to the Brezhnev era stagnation. In his report to the Parliament, Yeltsin explained that he had made provisions in case he could no longer operate from the White House. He had authorized a group of his cabinet members to head to the interior of the Russian Republic, and act on behalf of the president. Andrei Kozyrev, Russia’s foreign minister, had been dispatched to the United Nations to inform the international community about the illegal and unconstitutional coup d’état in Russia, and to explain the Russian government’s actions. In the worst case, Kozyrev was told to form a government-in-exile. Yeltsin assured Parliament about the international community’s support. He had talked with and was unequivocally encouraged by leaders of the free world and even by some leaders of newly democratic former Soviet satellites to reestablish legal order in the country. Yeltsin was contacted by President Bush; President François Mitterrand; Prime Minister John Major; the presi-

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dent of Czechoslovakia, Havel; the president of Bulgaria, Zhelev; and Mrs. Thatcher, among others. Yeltsin also claimed that most leaders of the union republics were behind him. But to reestablish legality, as a first step, Gorbachev had to be brought back to Moscow.24 Given Yeltsin’s courageous and decisive action in the face of grave danger, the same Russian president who even a few months prior to the coup had been rebuffed by the Council of Europe and ambivalently received by President Bush was now hailed and supported by all of the important Western leaders. Yeltsin became the stalwart defender of the Soviet Union’s fledgling democracy. He prevented the Communists from blocking the country’s path to reforms, and also from taking it back to the era of confrontations with the West. It was surprising that Yeltsin, the product and beneficiary of the Soviet system, so unhesitatingly turned to the West for support.

NOTES 1. Aleksandr Korzhakov, Boris Yeltsin: Ot rassveta do zakata [Boris Yeltsin: From Sunrise to Sunset] (Moscow: Interbuk Publisher, 1997), p. 81. 2. Ibid., pp. 81–82. 3. Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: Random House, 1994), pp. 46–47. 4. “The Gorbachev Account,” New York Times, August 23, 1991. 5. New York Times, August 23, 1991. 6. Ibid. 7. Pravda, August 20, 1991. The Russian name of the committee was formidable: Gosudarstvenniy komitet chrezvychaynogo polozheniya, GKChP (State Committee for State Emergency). 8. Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, pp. 56–57; and Korzhakov, Boris Yeltsin: Ot rassveta do zakata, pp. 82–83. 9. Both Yeltsin’s and Korzhakov’s detailed description of the events agree, even on fine points. 10. Pravda, August 20, 1991. 11. Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, pp. 67–68. 12. Ibid., pp. 68–69. 13. Korzhakov, Boris Yeltsin: Ot rassveta do zakata, pp. 93–94. 14. Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, p. 93. 15. George Bush, “You Don’t Set Back Democracy Very Easily,” Vital Speeches of the Day, September 15, 1991, p. 708. 16. Aleksandr Lebed, Za derzhavu obidno [For a Great Power Painfully] (Moscow: Moskovskaya Pravda, 1995). 17. Ibid., pp. 383–386. 18. Ibid., pp. 388–389. 19. Ibid., p. 390.

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20. Ibid., pp. 390–391. 21. Ibid., pp. 399–402. 22. Ibid., pp. 404–405. 23. Boris Yeltsin, “A Bold-faced and Unprecedented Coup D’Etat,” Vital Speeches of the Day, September 15, 1991, pp. 709–713. 24. Ibid., p. 710.

7 The Demise of the Soviet Union

As the coup collapsed, Yeltsin sent a delegation to free Gorbachev from his house arrest and bring him back to Moscow. After Gorbachev’s inglorious return under Yeltsin’s protection, Yeltsin’s triumphant speech in the Parliament left little doubt as to who really was in charge of the country. While the Western leaders were waiting and even hoping for Gorbachev to reassert himself, domestic political initiative had already shifted in favor of the leaders of the independence-seeking Soviet republics. The Soviet republics, following the example of the Baltic republics, one after the other rapidly moved toward independence. In an almost futile attempt to redeem himself, on August 24, 1991, Gorbachev resigned as head of the Communist Party,1 but that act was too little and too late. On that same date, Yeltsin closed down the offices of Pravda and disbanded the Communist Party on the territory of the Russian Republic.2 Following the failed putsch, the complete collapse of the Soviet Union became inevitable. On September 7, 1991, the independence of the Baltic States was officially recognized. On November 1, the former Soviet-dominated Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)3 was dissolved. In Russia, as a symbolic act of rejection of the Soviet system, the city of Leningrad was renamed to its original pre-Revolutionary name, St. Petersburg. In the meantime, Gorbachev was trying to play catch-up with the fast-moving, independence-seeking republics. In November, in Novo Ogaryovo, at the presidential dacha, he reassembled the heads of state in a desperate final attempt to hold

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the Soviet Union together, but by that time his efforts were futile. On December 1, the Ukraine held a referendum, and more than 90 percent of its citizens voted for independence.4 On December 8, Shushkevich, Yeltsin and Kravchuk—the leaders of Belarus, Russia and the Ukraine—met at the Belovezhsky residence of Shushkevich, and signed a treaty to abolish the USSR, and to form the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).5 In retrospect, Yeltsin claimed that by then Gorbachev’s presidency was untenable. By signing the new treaty, he was ready to lead Russia on a different path than that of the Soviet Union: “Russia had chosen a new global strategy. It was throwing off the traditional image of ‘potentate of the world,’ of armed conflict with the Western civilization, and the role of policeman in the resolution of ethnic conflicts.”6 By dismantling the central government in Moscow, Yeltsin had no qualms about the end of the USSR. He considered the Belovezhsky agreement a revision of the Union Treaty between three major republics of that Union. It was a voluntary association of the Slavic republics, without “dragging” other republics into the newly formed CIS.7 The new treaty also sealed Gorbachev’s fate—he became a president without a country. On December 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned. A day before Gorbachev’s resignation, Russia took over the USSR’s seat in the United Nations. Thus, Russia, shorn from its czarist and Soviet Empire, became an independent country. Although a democratically elected president headed that newly independent country, its Parliament was a remnant of the Communist system. Yeltsin, the former Communist boss of Sverdlovsk, Communist Party secretary of Moscow and Politburo member, had an almost impossible task facing him—to move Russia out of the Communist rut, and put it on the path of democracy and free market- type economy. As party boss, Yeltsin had been able to command with the authority of the police state behind him. As a democratically elected president, in order to bring about real changes, he had to act within the existing laws. He had to engender not only popular but also legislative support. After his successful challenge of the putschists, he had the momentum of popular support, but the Soviet-era Communist-dominated Parliament balked. The legal framework that Yeltsin inherited was still the 1977 Constitution, which was based on the 1936 Stalinist Constitution, which placed the Communist Party above the law and gave the state the right to control the economy.8 During its first ten years, the 1977 Constitution was amended only once, in 1981. By 1988, as Gorbachev was attempting to place his perestroika and glasnost on a legal basis, nearly one-third of the 1977 Constitution was amended. A year later, many of the amended clauses were reamended.9 In 1990, one of the most significant changes was enacted: Article 6 of the constitution10 was amended by depriving the Communist Party of its politi-

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cal monopoly over the Soviet system. With the union republics clamoring for independence, Gorbachev agreed to propose a new Union Treaty offering them unprecedented autonomy. As stated before, the treaty was to be signed on August 20, 1991. Conservative Communists at the highest levels on Gorbachev’s administration conspired to forestall the enactment of the treaty, remove Gorbachev, and retake control of the country. On August 19, 1991, they launched their putsch attempt. After overcoming the coup d’état, Yeltsin, Kravchuk and Shushkevich reasoned that their decision to dissolve the Soviet Union was a natural consequence of the putsch-interrupted adaptation of the proposed Union Treaty. Of course, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the formation of the CIS were not what Gorbachev had in mind, but after the leaders of the three Slavic republics11 concluded their agreement, Gorbachev could no longer influence the formation of independent republics. However, the Gorbachev-initiated pravovoye gosudarstvo (government based on laws) curtailed Yeltsin’s action to implement radical economic and political reforms, as long as he wanted to remain within the boundaries of legality. As president of Russia, he did have the authority to issue presidential decrees, but in the long run, to establish a genuine democracy, the outdated and much-amended Soviet Constitution had to be changed. Yeltsin realized that if Russia intended to emerge from its Communist-imposed isolation and join Western civilization, it had to throw off its traditional image of being an undemocratic country. Concurrently, Yeltsin had to act decisively to affect significant economic reforms to move the country out of economic stagnation. But the Soviet-era legislators objected to a rapid conversion of the system to a market-type economy. No economist himself, Yeltsin appointed a young and energetic economist, Yegor Gaidar (born in 1956), first as vice premier, and on June 12, 1992, as acting prime minister. Gaidar assumed responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the government. He was well versed in economic theory, but without practical experience. He was inclined to listen to the advice of knowledgeable American, Western European and IMF economists, such as Jeffrey Sacks of Harvard University and Anders Aslund of Sweden. Unfortunately, those advisors had little or no real understanding of the Russian conditions. Jeffrey Sacks, before coming to Russia, had successfully advised the Polish government to institute major economic reforms in one sweeping move, which became known as “shock therapy.” The same approach was suggested to Gaidar. On the basis of the Western advice, with the assistance of a group of similarly young Russian economists, Gaidar worked out a series of plans for reforms and presented them to Yeltsin. Gaidar considered himself

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a technocrat and believed that it was Yeltsin’s responsibility to shepherd the plans through the Parliament. The plans advocated the need for competition, which was to be achieved by large-scale privatization of state-owned enterprises and the elimination of price controls. Initially, Yeltsin had some partial success in the Parliament in bringing about reforms, but when the Parliament refused to go along, he began to rely on presidential decrees. On January 1, 1992, the stifling price controls were removed and large-scale privatization began. To give the Russians a stake in the privatization, a voucher system was introduced. Every adult and child received a 10,000–ruble voucher (about $40.00 each); altogether 144 million vouchers were distributed. But these reforms did not live up to the high expectations. Production, especially in the heavy industry, was free-falling, the prices were skyrocketing, and the privatization was benefiting only a small percentage of the population. The Parliament began to raise more and more objections to Yeltsin’s decrees. The Central Bank, which under the constitution was controlled by the Parliament, kept printing money and continued to subsidize even the failing enterprises. The government-introduced economic reforms quickly eliminated certain shortages. The stores were rapidly filling with merchandise. There was an onslaught of foreign goods entering the country, much of which replaced shoddy, often inferior quality, and unattractively packaged domestic goods. Small kiosks sprung up like mushrooms throughout Moscow, St. Petersburg and in other cities. Those businesses were primarily selling imported wines and liquor, cigarettes, snacks, candy, cheap cosmetics, shaving needs, colorful (often pornographic) magazines, plastic toys and music tapes, just to name some of the items that had become available practically overnight. Colorful advertising posters replaced the faded old Communist slogans on buildings and billboards. Television and radio stations were saturated by enticing commercials, previously unseen and unheard of, not to mention the appearance of foreign soap operas on the small screen.12 The movie theaters were showing mostly action-packed foreign films. As a consequence of the inflation, prices were displayed in stable foreign currencies instead of the ruble. The dollar and Deutsche Mark were becoming the preferred means of doing business. More and more currency exchange places opened up in the form of storefront-type small banks. Clearly, there were opportunities for enterprising Russians. Unfortunately, the majority of the population was unable to take advantage of the situation. On busy street corners, near metro stations, and in flea markets, elderly pensioners were trying to sell their prized possessions just to survive. More than a third of the population fell below poverty level. The government-dependent sectors of the economy—education, health care, science, police and

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military industry—were hardest hit by the crisis.13 The newly opened small businesses, kiosks and banks became easy targets of criminal elements. If the merchants were not held up or robbed, members of organized crime, the Mafia, demanded protection money from them. To cope with such disarray, a strong and well-organized state was needed. The president and the Congress of People’s Deputies would have to act in unison to reestablish order without resorting to authoritarian means. Instead of cooperating, the Speaker of the Parliament, Ruslan I. Khasbulatov, skillfully assembled an anti-Yeltsin, anti-reforms majority from diametrically opposing forces in the Parliament. He brought together conservative Communists and right-wing nationalists. Khasbulatov insisted that, according to the constitution, ultimate power was vested in the Congress of People’s Deputies and not in the president. On the surface, the struggle for power appeared to be between the legislative and executive branches. In reality, it was a struggle between the reform-minded president and the adherents of the Communist system and those newly emerging chauvinistic and anti-Western elements who have championed the formation of a fascist state. The democratically elected Yeltsin asserted that the political and economic reforms must be enacted for the good of people. As stated above, Yeltsin initially had popular support, and only small isolated groups objected or raised questions about the legitimacy of his decrees. He himself paid little attention to the old, outdated, patchwork-like constitution. At the same time, in a democratic system, “the rule of law,” which Yeltsin was hoping to establish, could not be ignored. As the reforms faltered, people were facing ever-increasing hardships: inflation, unemployment and loss of status. The voice of anti-reformists grew louder and louder in and outside of the Parliament. Ironically, the anti-reform forces began to take advantage of the constitution-guaranteed rights of free press, speech and assembly. Although those rights had been written in the Soviet constitutions, in reality, people were never given a chance to practice them. Anti-reform demonstrators took to the streets, often resulting in violent confrontations. In June 1992, at the Ostankino television tower, a massive crowd of extreme right-wing elements demanded to broadcast their views and intended to stay there until they succeeded. The demonstrators were blocking the entrances to the studios and harassing the workers. When the police tried to disperse them, a bloody confrontation ensued, resulting in seventy-eight people injured, including twenty-eight policemen.14 The Soviet Constitution that had been dead letter, and had been ignored by the country’s Communist leaders, came to life after the August 1991 coup attempt. The new regime pledged its adherence to the law of the land.

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But strict observance of legality turned out to be a double-edged sword in the hands of a clever manipulator like Khasbulatov. It became a weapon against the president. Yeltsin’s options in his efforts to maintain legality and continue on the road of reforms were limited. One option would have been to resort to extraordinary presidential powers, namely to suspend or dissolve the Congress by force, but such arbitrary action would have alienated Western democracies on whose financial assistance Yeltsin was counting. Another option was to call for a referendum on the question, “who should govern, the President or the Congress?” According to Article 5 of the 1977 Constitution, “the most important questions of state and public life can be resolved with the help of a referendum.” That clause had remained dormant until 1990, when Gorbachev saw a need for it, but since there had been no previous referendums held, there were no laws or mechanism governing them. To make up for that deficiency, the Fourth Session of the Congress of the USSR passed a series of laws on holding referendums. It was decided that a referendum could be a nationwide vote on major issues as stipulated in the constitution, but it could be either “mandatory” or “consultative.” The initiative for referendum may come from citizens, the Congress, the Supreme Soviet (Parliament) and the president.15 Indeed, on March 17, 1991, in desperate search of a popular mandate, Gorbachev had held a referendum on the question of preserving the Soviet Union. Out of 184 million eligible voters, 147 million cast their ballot, and 76 percent voted in favor of preserving the Union. Despite the apparent favorable outcome, a closer examination revealed that six union republics and even some autonomous republics had boycotted the referendum.16 These results foreshadowed the eventual secession of the republics. Yeltsin and the Parliament blamed each other for the economic shortcomings of the country and for the turmoil created by the legislative stalemate. As soon as Yeltsin issued decrees in favor of economic reforms, the Khasbulatov-led Parliament countermanded them. Yeltsin’s young acting prime minister, Yegor Gaidar, and the young reform team were unable to curb the inflation and the overall decline of the economy. The conservative elements in the Congress of People’s Deputies harshly criticized and even ridiculed the young reformers; they were referred to as boys in “pink shorts,” who were ruining the country’s economy. The presence of Western advisors with whom Gaidar consulted and whose advice he had sought did not help. Yeltsin realized that he had to find a more mature and less rash prime minister who would be more acceptable to the Congress of People’s Deputies. In an attempt to appease his political opponents, Yeltsin sacrificed Gaidar, holding him responsible for the failures of the reforms. On De-

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cember 15, 1992, Yeltsin appointed Victor Chernomyrdin as prime minister, a former Soviet minister of the gas and oil industry. However, appointing a more conservative technocrat did not alleviate the conflict between Yeltsin and the anti-reformist forces in the Parliament. By mid-December 1992, the domestic political strife for power between the Parliament and the president reached such a high pitch that Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, during a session of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),17 wanted to give the world a realistic picture of the precariousness of democracy and reforms in Russia. He addressed his fellow foreign ministers as if conservative nationalist forces had taken control of Russia. He wanted to alert the West, and also to send a message to fellow Russians of what could happen if the progressive, pro-democracy forces would not prevail. I feel obliged to point out certain changes in Russian foreign policy concept. . . . We are well aware that our traditions, largely, if not wholly, rooted in Asia, set limits to our rapprochement with Western Europe. . . . The former territory of the Soviet Union cannot be regarded as an area to which CSCE norms are to be applied in full. It is essentially a post-empire area in which Russia will recur to all means at its disposal, military and economical included, defending its interests. We shall firmly insist on former Soviet republics to quickly join a new federation, . . . and we shall be tough about it.18

That statement, although it was quickly clarified as hypothetical, coming from a pro-Western Russian foreign minister, served to momentarily awaken the West from its complacency toward Russia. By then, a curious political situation had developed in Russia. An undemocratically elected Parliament, adhering to an outdated constitution, attempted to use democratic means to unseat a democratically elected president, and to undermine democratization and the evolving free enterprise system. Concurrently, the democratically elected president, resorting to presidential decrees, wanted to save democracy and the economic reforms. In March 1993, to put an end to the obstructionist policies of the Parliament, Yeltsin announced its dissolution. On March 20, 1993, Yeltsin went on television and announced that he had signed a decree on the “Special Procedure for Governing the Country,”19 about the dissolution of the Parliament until a new draft of the constitution was decided by a referendum on April 25. He declared null and void all the decisions of the Supreme Soviet and Congress that sought to cancel or suspend his decrees. The leaders of the Congress, and the chairman of the Constitutional Court, Valery Zorkin, declared Yeltsin’s decree unconstitutional. Speaker Khasbulatov claimed that Yeltsin’s action was an attempted coup, and he convenend the 9th Congress of the People’s Deputies. Despite

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last-minute, behind-the-scenes negotiations between Yeltsin and Khasbulatov, the Congress was not willing to compromise, and it moved to impeach Yeltsin. There were 617 votes for impeachment, just 72 votes short of the required two-thirds majority.20 At that point, Yeltsin saw no other way out of the quagmire than turning to the people for support; he decided to hold a referendum. After numerous political skirmishes, it was agreed that a referendum would be held in April 1993. The following four questions were put on the ballot: 1. Do you trust the President? 2. Do you approve of the socio-economic policies since 1992? 3. Is there a need for a pre-term election of the President? 4. Is there a need for a pre-term election of the Parliament?

Even before the referendum could take place, the Constitutional Court ruled that on the basis of a 1990 amendment to the 1977 Constitution, the first two questions had only “consultative” significance; and the last two questions also would require constitutional amendments before they could become “mandatory.” The ruling clearly favored the anti-Yeltsin forces. Khasbulatov believed that the rapidly falling living standards and financial setbacks suffered by the majority of the population would prompt people to overwhelmingly vote “no” on Question 2. As for the question on the Parliament’s tenure, only a majority of more than 50 percent of the eligible voters would make the preterm elections “mandatory.” On April 25, 1993, the referendum was held: 64.5 percent of the eligible voters cast their ballot. According to the official results, 58.7 percent supported Yeltsin; 53 percent favored the reforms, despite all the deprivations and difficulties; and 49.7 percent voted for a preterm election of the president; but 67.2 percent asked for a preterm election of the Parliament.21 Yeltsin’s gamble paid off: the da, da, nyet, da (yes, yes, no, yes) responses to the questions reassured the president that the people were behind him. At that point, Yeltsin made a very serious political mistake. Instead of taking advantage of his newly affirmed mandate by dissolving the recalcitrant Parliament, he hoped for the legislators’ cooperation. Perhaps, with the whole world watching, Yeltsin did not want to act arbitrarily and jeopardize his image as a democrat. While not making the decisive political move, he did attempt to reinvigorate the economic reforms. NOTES 1. “Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev,” p. 5, http://www.artnet/~upstart/gorby. html.

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2. “Chronology of Russian History: The Post-Soviet Period,” p. 1, http:// www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/history.html. 3. Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, CMEA, formed in January 1949, in order to expedite trade within the Soviet bloc countries. 4. “Chronology of Russian History: The Post-Soviet Period,” p. 1. 5. Ibid. 6. Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: Random House, 1994), p. 113. 7. Ibid., pp. 113–114; it must be stated that the three heads of states made an effort to have the president of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev, join them just before signing the treaty. 8. Robert Sharlet, Soviet Constitutional Crisis: From De-Stalinization to Disintegration (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), p. 8. 9. Ibid., p. 86. 10. Article 6: The leading and guiding force of the Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of all state organizations and public organizations, is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CPSU exists for the people and serves the people. The Communist Party, armed with Marxism-Leninism, determines the general perspectives of the development of society and the course of the home and foreign policy of the USSR, directs the great constructive work of the Soviet people, and imparts a planned, systematic and theoretically substantiated character to their struggle for the victory of communism. All party organizations shall function within the framework of the Constitution of the USSR.

11. Kazakhstan joined the CIS soon after its formation. 12. A Mexican soap opera, The Rich Also Cry, was one of the initial hits. A whole series of such shows followed, such as Dallas and Falcon Crest, which have become steady viewing staples for the Russians. 13. “Boris Yeltsin,” http://www.cs.indiana.edu/hyplan/dmiguse/Russian/ bybio.html. 14. Moscow News, July 5, 1992. 15. Izvestia, December 19, 1990. 16. Izvestia, March 22, 1991. 17. The CSCE was a loosely structured, somewhat fuzzy institution that held occasional meetings to follow up the decisions of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. In 1995, it was upgraded to become the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 18. Andrey Kozyrev, Preobrazhenie [Transformation] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnaya Otnoshenie, 1994), p. 5. 19. In fact, the decree came out on March 25, 1993, and it did not contain the phrase, “special procedure for governing the country,” http://www.geocities.com/ Capital Hill/2768/Yeltsin.html. 20. Ibid. 21. Izvestia, May 25, 1993.

8 Yeltsin Wins a New Constitution

In April 1993, the momentum was still on Yeltsin’s side. He did win on the four referendum questions discussed in chapter 7. Still, the Parliament remained intransigent. Yeltsin realized that the economic reforms must be carried out, if for no other reason but to gain access to the foreign funds. By August 1993, it was clear to Yeltsin that he had miscalculated his dealing with the Parliament. When asked at a televised news conference, “What mistakes have you made as president of the country?” Yeltsin responded without hesitation: “The most serious mistake was that I did not dissolve the Parliament right after the referendum.”1 In September 1993, to assert himself and show both his allies and opponents his resolve in favor of the reforms, he brought Yegor Gaidar back into the government, making him first-vice premier and acting minister of the economy. Finally, it was also time for a showdown with the Congress. On September 21, 1993, the president signed Decree No. 1400 on Planned Constitutional Reforms, which included the dissolution of the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet, and called for a new parliamentary election on December 12, 1993. Under this decree, the Constitution of the Russian Federation was “terminated” and a new constitution was to be ratified by the voters.2 Yeltsin had contemplated decisive action against the recalcitrant Congress long before September. Finally, when it appeared that there was no other way, he wanted to know how Western democracies would react if he

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had to resort to unconstitutional means or even force to unseat the entrenched Soviet-elected Congress. To receive an honest response, he turned to the German chancellor, Helmuth Kohl, for advice. It seems that the two leaders understood each other very well. Yeltsin invited his “friend, Helmuth” hunting and fishing at the shores of Lake Baykal, and to give him a real Russian treat, took him to a banya (bathhouse).3 Clearly, the two big men enjoyed each other’s company. Based on the developing trust, Yeltsin asked his German friend in the strictest confidence, what the West’s reaction would be if he were to restrict the activity of the Parliament. It was clear to Yeltsin that basic democratic values cherished by the West would have been violated, had he acted authoritatively, and he felt that Kohl would not misconstrue his inquiry. The German chancellor reassured him that he and the leaders of the Group-7 countries “would sympathize with harsh but necessary measures for the sake of Russia’s stabilization.”4 But Decree No. 1400 was in violation of the still-valid 1977 Brezhnev constitution. All summer, Yeltsin attempted to have a new democratic constitution drafted in cooperation with the Congress, but despite his efforts, the Parliament remained intransigent. He set an October 4, 1993, deadline for members of the Parliament to vacate their building, the so-called White House.5 The Khasbulatov-led Parliament defied Yeltsin’s decree, and refused to disband. Khasbulatov repeatedly defended his stand by saying that regardless of how the Russian Parliament might have appeared, “even the most conservative parliament in the world would never become a dictatorship, unlike a single leader, who regardless of the manner of his rise to power, could turn his domain into a dictatorship.”6 Thus, acting within the framework of the 1977 constitution, the Parliament impeached Yeltsin and named Vice President Aleksandr V. Rutskoi to be president. It was not easy to dislodge the aggressively anti-Yeltsin forces from the White House. Yeltsin desperately wanted to avoid violence. When the Parliament refused to abandon the building, at first the lines of communication were cut off, and eventually the hot water and electricity. To come to an agreement, Yeltsin accepted an offer from the Russian Orthodox Patriarch Aleksii II to mediate. Representatives of the president and the Parliament were to meet in the Saint Daniel Monastery. Before the parliamentary delegation agreed to participate, it was demanded that the electricity be turned on. Yeltsin reluctantly yielded to that condition just to get the crisis amicably resolved, but even the church’s mediation did not help. Khasbulatov and Rutskoi expected popular support for their resistance to Yeltsin’s “illegal and dictatorial” decrees.

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However, neither the public nor the military responded to the appeals from the Parliament. Fringe elements, extremist right-wing and diehard Communists were the only ones who took to the streets and began to attack law enforcement officers. The police force, which had been instructed to avoid provocation, was not equipped to deal with the rioters. The army was not brought into Moscow until the very last minute, at dawn of October 4, 1993. By then, rioters took over the mayor’s office and started fighting inside the Ostankino Television building, threatening to seize control of the broadcast studios. The minister of defense, Grachev, and the top military brass were slow to respond to Yeltsin’s request to storm the Parliament. When, late at night on October 3–4, Yeltsin confronted the generals, one reported that the troops under his command were not ready because they had been ordered to help with the potato harvest. According to Yeltsin, there was no actual plan to attack the White House until 3:00 A.M., October 4.7 A mere captain, Gennady I. Zakharov, who was familiar with the White House’s layout, proposed the plan of attack. Ten tanks were to be set up, five at the (Kalininsky) Novy Arbat Bridge and five behind the building in the Pavlik Morozov8 playground. The tanks were to fire at the upper floors of the White House to minimize casualties, but to create panic and confusion among the defenders. Concurrently, elite units of Alpha and Vympel were to storm the building. Once the plan was approved, the military set it into motion, and by 7:00 A.M., all the units were in place. The designated elite Alpha units let it be known that they would not storm the White House. They demanded a Constitutional Court ruling about the legality of the order. The president met with the unit’s officers, but they were not responding to the direct order. The units around the White House responded only to snipers, but did not launch an attack. As Alpha troops were patrolling the area, a sniper bullet killed a second lieutenant, which changed the mood of the Alpha. As the word spread about the loss of their comrade, they were ready for action and stormed the White House. By mid-afternoon the battle was over and the security forces arrested the leaders of the parliamentary opposition.9 Yeltsin won, but at a high price. The bloody confrontation before the storming of the White House resulted in twenty-seven deaths and the shelling cost more than one hundred lives. To the very last minute, Muscovites and Russians throughout the country hoped for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. People were horrified by the merciless shelling of the White House in the heart of Moscow. Yeltsin’s popularity plummeted. Regardless of who had started the bloody confrontation, the blackened White House stood there for a long time as a stark reminder of the ever-present threat of resorting to force.10

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Perhaps, a cartoon that appeared captured the situation best. It was imitating a well-known U.S. World War I recruiting poster, “Uncle-Samwants-you,” but it was depicting Yeltsin in a similar manner pointing his finger and saying, “Yeltsin wants you to have democracy.” Indeed, Yeltsin wanted Russia to move toward democracy the best way he knew how. He insisted that parliamentary elections take place, as he had announced before the dissolution of the Parliament on December 12, 1993, and concurrently, a referendum was to be held on a new constitution.11 Immediately after the confrontation, Yeltsin cracked down on the opposition. On October 4, 1993, he issued a decree banning public associations of those who had taken part in illegal disturbances, and prohibiting the publication of Communist and nationalist publications.12 Ten political parties and organizations were barred, and thirteen newspapers were shut down. Chancellor Kohl’s assessment of his Western colleagues’ reaction to Yeltsin’s resorting to brute force was correct. Kohl himself and all Western leaders rallied around Yeltsin; they agreed that under the circumstances there was no other way to get Russia out of its intractable political crisis. They found it reassuring that Decree No. 1400 not only contained the dissolution of the Congress, but it also stipulated nationwide free elections. While Yeltsin’s drastic action against the Parliament was not seriously criticized in the West, his crackdown on, or possibly eliminating the potential opposition, raised serious questions in Western democracies. Yeltsin’s arbitrary decrees were endangering cherished democratic values such as freedom of speech, and freedom of press and assembly. Yeltsin, who was very conscious of preserving his democratic image abroad, refused to extend his “state of emergency” beyond two weeks, even though his more radical pro-reform supporters urged him to ban the Communist and Fascist Parties permanently. Bans on all opponents were lifted, with the exception of five of the most rabidly leftist and anti-Semitic groups. Any political party or organization, regardless of its stance, as long as it was able to obtain 100,000 valid signatures, was declared eligible to participate in the forthcoming elections. Pre-election prognostications gave little chance to the opposition. The Yeltsin-supported reform party under the leadership of Gaidar was greatly favored. Personally, Yeltsin considered himself above party politics; he campaigned only for the approval of the new constitution. The way the constitution was written, he, the president, would have the power to dissolve the Parliament, call for new elections or referendums, name the head of the government and central bank, and also appoint judges. Those and additional powers were designed to prevent endless future confrontations with the Duma (the Lower House of the Parliament).13

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Scheduling the referendum on the new constitution and the parliamentary election on the same date was a risky proposition. If the constitution did not get the required majority, the results of the elections would have been without legal foundation, and therefore invalid. Considering that in past elections the citizens of the Soviet Union had no choice of political parties, in 1993, a whole multitude of parties sprung up to give the electorate ample, and often confusing, choices. Despite the short pre-election period, political campaigning began fervently. To ensure free, unhindered and fair elections, on October 29, 1993, Yeltsin issued a decree on “Informational Guarantees for Participants in the Election Campaign of 1993.” That measure offered to all registered parties equal time on the state-owned television and radio stations for campaign broadcasts. Each party was allotted one hour of free broadcast time on national television. Twenty-two parties, which were able to obtain the required 100,000 signatures to be placed on the ballot, were eligible for the free broadcasts. In addition to the parties, 1,567 registered candidates were to be given airtime on television and radio broadcasts covering their districts.14 The 1993 constitution divided power between the Parliament and the president; it had already been pointed out that it favored the president. Russia’s legislature, the federal assembly, was divided into two chambers—the Federation Council (the Upper House) and the State Duma (as the Lower House of the Parliament was renamed). Accordingly, at the December 12, 1993, elections, the stakes were 450 seats in the Duma and 178 seats in the Federation Council. In the Duma, 225 seats were to be distributed proportionately between the parties which would obtain at least 5 percent of the votes, and 225 seats were to go to winners of individual election districts. The Federation Council, the federal assembly’s upper chamber, was to have 178 deputies, two from each of Russia’s eighty-nine regions. One of the members was to be the locally elected executive head of the region, the other the head of the regional legislature, chosen by the elected regional deputies. Under the 1993 constitution, the Federation Council was the weaker half of the legislature, but it still had been vested with considerable authority.15 The resolution on the electoral procedure, signed by Yeltsin in November, stipulated that the final report on results of the elections was to be published within a month after the election. On December 20, the Central Election Commission (CEC) reported the final tally on the vote on the proposed new Russian constitution: 54 percent of Russia’s 106,170,335 eligible voters took part in the referendum, and 58.4 percent of those voting supported the draft, which was sufficient for the referendum to be valid. Russia’s new constitution came into effect with the publication of its full text by the official ITAR-TASS news agency on December 24.16 It is noteworthy that in com-

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parison with previous balloting, the number of participants was declining. In the April 1993 referendum, 64.5 percent of the eligible voters cast their ballots, and in 1991, when Yeltsin was elected president of the Russian Republic, 74.66 percent of the eligible voters participated.17 According to the Central Election Commission report, of the proportionally assigned 225 of the 450 seats in the Lower House, the Zhirinovsky-led ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party received 22.79 percent of the votes; Gaidar’s Russia’s Choice 15.38 percent; the Communist Party 12.35 percent; Women of Russia (centrist) 8.10 percent; Agrarian Party (rural communists) 7.90 percent; Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc (reformist group) 7.83 percent; Russian Party of Unity and Accord (reformist) 6.76 percent; and Democratic Party (centrist) 5.50 percent.18 On December 25, the final official election results showed that the main reform bloc, Russia’s Choice (RC), won the most number of seats, ninety-six of the 450–seat Duma. The ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Vladimir Zhirinovsky came in second with seventy seats. The Communist Party captured sixty-five seats. The three main anti-reform blocs (the LDP, the CP and the Agrarian Party) won 182 altogether, whereas the four pro-reform blocs (the RC, Yabloko, the Party of Unity and Accord, and the Russian Movement for Democratic Reform) received only 164 seats. The Women of Russia Party won a total of twenty-five seats, while independent candidates took thirty seats altogether.19 Yeltsin hailed the passage of the constitution, but noting the election results, he joined the critics of the reformers for inflicting undue hardship on the people. Strange as it may sound, the passage of the new constitution can be attributed to the archenemy of the reforms, the ultranationalist Zhirinovsky, who urged his supporters just before the elections to vote for the constitution. With future presidential elections in mind, as a potential candidate in 1996, the powerful presidency appealed to him. Before the elections, Zhirinovsky was generally ignored by the Western press and ridiculed by the Russian intellectuals—who would listen to a clown? After having run the best and liveliest campaign, his Liberal Democratic Party won the highest number of votes, almost 23 percent. Zhirinovsky’s success was not entirely unexpected. In 1991, he had run for the Russian Republic’s presidency and came in third after Yeltsin and Ryzhkov, with 6 million votes, 8 percent of the votes cast. Zhirinovsky worked tirelessly to build up a following. In December, his party received 12 million votes. He supported ultranationalist policies, especially toward the former Soviet republics. In foreign affairs, he objected to American and IMF interference into Russian affairs. He advocated that the United States should pay for future Russian support of American foreign policies toward rogue countries such as Iraq or Libya.

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Domestically, Zhirinovsky promised instant economic improvements by reintroducing price controls and tough anti-crime measures. His demagogic message hit the right notes; he said things people wanted to hear. The average Russians, at least those who had bothered to go to the polls, voted for Zhirinovsky to punish the reformers who had made their lives so difficult. The 1993 constitution was patterned to some extent on the German constitution, but the section on the presidency resembled the French constitution.20 As a result of Vice President Rutskoi’s betrayal, the new charter had no provision for vice presidency. The president needed the Duma’s approval for the appointment of a prime minister, but not for the dismissal of the prime minister. In case the Parliament refused the president’s nominee for prime minister three times, the president was given the right to dissolve the Parliament and schedule new elections.21 Perhaps the most significant provision of presidential authority was in Article 90: “The President of the Russian Federation issues edicts. Implementation of the edicts and directives of the President of the Russian Federation is mandatory throughout the territory of the Russian Federation.” The president also possessed a veto power over legislation submitted to him. His veto could be overridden only by a two-thirds majority vote in both houses of the federal assembly. The constitution limited the presidency to two consecutive four-year terms. The mechanism for the removal of the president was made very cumbersome. The constitution named the president supreme commander in chief of the armed forces, and assigned him the right “to approve the military doctrine of the Russian Federation.” Article 86 fixed the president’s role in formulating Russia’s foreign policies: “exercises leadership of foreign policy, conducts talks and signs international treaties, signs instruments of ratification, accepts the credentials and letters of recall of diplomatic representatives accredited to him.” With the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia had to develop its own foreign policy initiatives. From the onset, the greatest challenges were establishing strategic partnership with the United States and integration with Western Europe, in addition to developing relations with former Soviet republics, the so-called “near abroad.” NOTES 1. Heard by the author on Russian Television (RTV), August 12, 1993. 2. V. Pribylovsky, “Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich: President of the Russian Federation,” Russian Presidential Candidates—1996, http://www.geocities/ CapitolHill/2768/yeltsin.html. 3. It’s usually a primitive small wooden bathhouse—the Russian version of the Finnish sauna.

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4. Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: Random House, 1994), pp. 134–135. 5. Izvestia, September 22, 1993. 6. Moscow News, October 4, 1992. 7. Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, pp. 377–378. 8. Pavlik Morozov was a “heroic” Soviet youngster who supposedly betrayed his parents during the Stalinist era of collectivization. His statue is located in the park named for him. 9. Aleksandr Korzhakov, Boris Yeltsin: Ot rassveta do zakata [Boris Yeltsin: From Sunrise to Sunset] (Moscow: Interbuk Publisher, 1997), pp. 174–196; CNN television provided live coverage of the siege. 10. Eventually, no money was spared to erase the “black marks,” and the damaged White House was restored within a year and a half. 11. “Boris Yeltsin,” pp. 4–5, http://www.cs.indiana.edu/hyplan/dmiguse/ Russia/bybio.html. 12. Leon Aron, Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 555, fn. The following leftist organizations were banned: the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Working Russia and Working Moscow (led by Victor Anpilov), the Russian Communist Worker’s Party, the All-Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the All-Russian Youth Union, the United Labor Front, and the National Salvation Front. Also banned were: the extremist Party of the Revival of the Great Power, the Officers’ Union, the Russian Party, the Patriotic Youth Front, the Russian National Unity, Russian National Council, Russian All People’s Union, and the National Patriotic Front “Pamyat.” Major and minor publications’ pro-Communist and extreme right-wing papers were suspended, among them: the Pravda, Glasnost, Sovietskaya Rossia, Rabochaya Tribuna, Den, Rusky Vestnik, and Russkoye Boskresenie. 13. Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Projekt) [The Constitution of the Russian Federation (Draft)] (Moscow: Izdatelstvo “Yuridicheskaya literatura,” 1993). See also the officially approved document in English translation: The Constitution of the Russian Federation of Dec. 12, 1993, http://www.russiatoday. com/constit/constit1.php3. 14. Aron, Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life, p. 557. 15. Chapter 5, The Constitution of the Russian Federation of Dec. 12, 1993, http://www.russiatoday.com/constit/constit1.php3. 16. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/rferl/1993/12/index.html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 17. Izvestia, May 25, 1993. 18. New York Times, December 26, 1993. 19. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/rferl/1993/12/index.html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 20. Section I, Chapter 4, Articles 80–92, The Constitution of the Russian Federation of Dec. 12, 1993. 21. Ibid., Section I, Chapter 6, Article 111/4.

9 Yeltsin and the West— The Early Years

Yeltsin’s foreign policy initiatives began long before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Not trained in diplomatic niceties, his 1989 visit to the United States made the fifty-eight-year-old Siberian appear to be boorish, pushy and a heavy drinker. During the era of “Gorby mania,”1 as Andrei Kozyrev (later Yeltsin’s foreign minister) referred to the West’s infatuation with Gorbachev, Yeltsin did not cut an attractive figure compared to the much smoother Gorbachev. As discussed in chapter 4, on September 10, 1989, Yeltsin arrived in the United States for an eight-day lecture tour, on the invitation of the Esalen Institute’s Soviet-American Exchange Program. By then, Yeltsin was an outspoken critic of Gorbachev’s sluggish reforms. He was not only an elected member of the Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies, but had already become the leader of the first independent parliamentary caucus, the Inter-Regional Group. Yeltsin’s stormy reemergence on the Russian political scene, in spite of his unceremonious removal from the Politburo, intrigued American Kremlin watchers sufficiently to extend him an invitation. As Yeltsin’s political standing and influence grew in Russia, foreign policy began to play a more important role. Initially, his main intention was to obtain recognition from the West for the Russian Republic separate from the Soviet Union, and consequently for his own leadership. Although Yeltsin never quite gave up personal diplomacy, he realized the need for a reliable foreign minister to assist him in formulating Russia’s foreign policies, represent the Russian Republic abroad, negotiate treaties, defend Rus-

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sia’s interest around the world, and concurrently be in charge of the republic’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A young, talented and pro-Western foreign minister candidate was found in the person of Andrei Vladimirovich Kozyrev. In 1990, the thirty-nine-year-old Kozyrev was dispatched from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to become the foreign minister of the Russian Republic. Eventually, he served as foreign minister of the independent Russian Federation until 1996. As far as Kozyrev was concerned, moving from the Soviet Union’s Foreign Ministry to a subordinate republic’s foreign ministry was not necessarily a career- enhancing move, even if it was the foremost and reform-oriented republic. At the time of Kozyrev’s transfer, Gorbachev “began to do everything possible to keep Yeltsin out of foreign affairs, and weaken his authority. . . . For him [Gorbachev] the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] had to become not only the instrument of reforms of an important sphere of Union activities, but also the upholder of Gorbachev’s international prestige.”2 When Kozyrev assumed the post of foreign minister, the Russian Republic’s foreign ministry was only an insignificant bureaucratic office on the periphery of the Soviet Union’s foreign ministry. Even within the Russian Republic, the new foreign minister could hardly get an appointment with I. S. Silayev, the RSFSR’s (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic) premier. Yeltsin, by then chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, was practically impossible to contact. The planned first introductory meeting between Kozyrev and Yeltsin had to be cancelled because of an accident in which Yeltsin’s car was involved.3 The Russian Foreign Ministry’s activities were uncharted. The foreign minister’s authority to sign treaties of friendship and cooperation with foreign governments was not spelled out. That question surfaced when the visiting Polish foreign minister, K. Skubishevski, brought with him to Moscow a declaration of friendship from Lech Walensa’s democratic government. Only upon Kozyrev’s insistence did Silayev and Yeltsin authorize him to sign such documents. The question of who was to organize Yeltsin’s foreign visits had also become an issue. Kozyrev seriously objected when he learned that it was not his Foreign Ministry but the hosting French government that was to arrange Yeltsin’s visit to Strasbourg, France. He insisted that Russia’s own Foreign Ministry take charge of such visits in order to avoid unexpected unpleasantness or embarrassment. Eager to gain recognition, Yeltsin was not willing to delay his trip; thus he traveled to Strasbourg without adequate preparation. The disastrous results of that visit have already been discussed; briefly, Yeltsin was chastised in the European Parliament, accused of undermining Gorbachev’s authority, and in the press, he was called a “demagogue.”4

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After the French debacle, Kozyrev had a meeting with Yeltsin, and it was agreed that from there on, the Russian Foreign Ministry would be in charge of Yeltsin’s foreign travels. As a result, Yeltsin’s foreign visits, even while the Soviet Union still existed, became much better organized. Yeltsin’s visit to Czechoslovakia turned out to be triumphal to the chagrin of Gorbachev; President Vaclav Havel greeted Yeltsin as a head of an independent state. Preparations for Yeltsin’s forthcoming second visit to the United States were not seriously affected by the uncertainty of the outcome of the 1991 presidential elections in Russia. Kozyrev assured Yeltsin that he was expected to go to the United States as a winner.5 Proving himself a capable organizer and effective spokesman of Yeltsin’s pro-Western policies at home and abroad, Kozyrev served loyally as Yeltsin’s foreign minister until 1996. Throughout his tenure, Kozyrev was identified with Yeltsin’s democratic and definitely pro-Western foreign policies. But as a result of domestic political pressures, Yeltsin, from time to time changed course, yielding to anti-Western and nationalistic policies. Consequently, Kozyrev often had to bear the brunt of attacks and criticism not only by the ever more nationalistic Parliament, but also by Yeltsin. Disparagingly, right-wing politicians and the media began to refer to Kozyrev as the “foreign minister of the West.” With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Foreign Ministry replaced the Soviet Foreign Ministry. As expected, there were substantial personnel changes at the highest echelons and in the diplomatic corps, but the middle-level support staff remained in office. The newly evolving Russian Federation had no comprehensive foreign policy. The foreign policy establishment took its cues from Yeltsin, and he was ending many formerly legitimate but most subversive Communist-sponsored foreign relations. Subsidies to pro-Soviet regimes stopped practically overnight. Entirely new relations had to be developed with the emergence of the independent former Soviet republics. The so-called “near abroad” required special attention from the Russian government. In fact, it was the formation of a loosely structured Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on December 21, 1991, between the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus and later Kazakhstan that signaled the end of the Soviet Union. Eventually, all former Soviet republics, with the exception of the three Baltic republics, joined the CIS. In the past, the member republics of the Soviet Union had been dependent politically, economically and militarily on the dominant Russian Republic; as members of the CIS, they all carefully guarded their newly acquired sovereignty. Consequently, the new alliance, for all practical purposes, remained an empty shell. As far as relations with the West, credit goes to Gorbachev for ending the cold war, but as long as the Soviet Union remained a one-party state with a

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centrally controlled command economy, it could not be considered on equal footing with Western democracies. Yeltsin was prepared to change all that. Even before the actual collapse of the Soviet Union, on June 7, 1991, NATO, not wanting to take advantage of the rapid disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and jeopardize the progress of disarmament negotiations with Gorbachev, issued a cautious policy statement: “The long decades of European division are over.” The North Atlantic Alliance welcomed the increased contacts with the Soviet Union and its former satellites and praised the political and economic reforms in those countries: “We seek to build a constructive partnership with them in order to further promote security and stability in a free and undivided Europe.” The alliance emphasized that consistent “with the purely defensive nature of our Alliance, we seek neither unilateral advantage from the changed situation in Europe nor threaten the legitimate interest of any state. We do not wish to isolate any country, nor to see a new division of the Continent.” The policy statement promised to support the reforms undertaken by Central and Eastern European countries and assist them to “establish democratic systems of government based on the rule of law and respect of human rights, as well as the related effort to create modern competitive market-oriented economies.” The Soviet Union was advised to yield to legitimate independence aspirations of the Baltic republics through peaceful negotiations.6 After the demise of the Soviet Union, the above policy statement by the North Atlantic Alliance served as an opening for Yeltsin to establish friendly relations with NATO as a significant step of Russia’s integration into prosperous and democratic Western Europe. In December 1991, to gain acceptance and prove Russia’s pro-Western stance, one of Yeltsin’s first foreign policy moves was to send a letter to NATO requesting membership into that organization, and expressing his country’s willingness to move toward a strategic partnership. That unexpected appeal from NATO’s former adversary did not receive a formal response; the West was clearly unprepared to act positively on Yeltsin’s forthright proposal. His letter did receive some publicity in the media, but suspicion lingered in the West about the permanency and even about the viability of Yeltsin’s democratic reforms in Russia. Even after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the demise of the Soviet Union, NATO could not bring itself to seriously entertain Yeltsin’s offer. By not encouraging Russia to become a member, the West missed an excellent opportunity to strengthen Russia’s nascent democracy. An acceptance, or at least a positive response, would have given an initial boost to Yeltsin’s pro-Western foreign policies, a much-needed new identity to the floundering Russian military, and would have effectively countered Yeltsin’s nationalist and Communist critics.7

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Despite NATO’s reluctance to embrace Yeltsin’s Russia, the YeltsinKozyrev team pushed on toward integrating Russia with the rest of Europe and building a friendly relationship with the United States. Neither the major powers nor the newly formed Commonwealth of Independent States objected to Russia’s taking the Soviet Union’s permanent seat in the United Nation’s Security Council. Yeltsin realized that he had to make his domestic reforms attractive to the American public, decision makers, and especially President Bush. Learning from Gorbachev’s public relations feat, Yeltsin began a massive campaign to develop personal channels of communication with the American president, sending him letters, cables, and making phone calls. As the elected leader of a budding democracy, Yeltsin was succeeding. A White House official was quoted as saying: “George Bush loves anybody who got elected to anything.”8 Even though Yeltsin was unable to reach the level of Gorbachev’s success in “bonding with Reagan and Bush,” he was making himself heard, and was definitely gaining the American president’s respect. Early in 1992, Yeltsin decided to personally accept Russia’s UN seat in the Security Council. En route to New York, he stopped in London for a meeting with the British prime minister, John Major. No longer could Yeltsin be ignored or snubbed either by Europeans or Americans. While the Soviet Union was respected and feared on account of its military prowess, an unstable Russia could potentially have destabilized two continents. A week before Yeltsin’s arrival in the United States, to prevent further political and social unrest in Russia and former Soviet republics, Washington hastily convened a forty-seven-nation conference on aiding the newly independent countries. President Bush pledged $645 million in aid over two years. Concurrently, Secretary of State James Baker announced that the United States would send to Russia and to the republics both medicine and 38.4 million tons of food left over from the Gulf War. But during that conference, it was concluded that the above-mentioned aid was dwarfed by an actual $30 billion of humanitarian and economic aid that would be necessary to stabilize those countries.9 Upon arrival in New York, Yeltsin addressed the extraordinary meeting of the Security Council, which met to assess its role in the post–cold war era. It was the first time that government leaders of all five of the Security Council’s permanent member countries were present, along with the leaders and foreign ministers of the other ten non-permanent member countries. Yeltsin made a pitch for financial aid for the Commonwealth of Independent States. He reasoned that the money saved from nuclear reduction and reduced military spending, with the disappearance of the “evil empire,” could be diverted to pay for the reconstruction of the CIS. He added, “Russia con-

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siders the United States and the West not as mere partners, but rather allies.”10 As an additional goodwill gesture, Yeltsin announced that Russiancontrolled missiles would no longer be targeted on U.S. cities. At a news conference following the Security Council summit, Yeltsin claimed that the West did not contribute enough to ease the economic crisis. He said: “Russia is facing the last opportunity to defend democracy,” implying that if the West would not do more to help, “dictators will rise, once again, there will be mass repressions, and once again you will have the arms race.”11 That warning was a strong reminder to the Western leaders about the fragility of the newly evolving world order. Yeltsin’s speech at the UN served as a proper preface to his meeting with President Bush at Camp David—their first real encounter. It has been already noted that George Bush clearly preferred dealing with the more polished Mikhail Gorbachev, and considered Yeltsin’s post-coup humiliation of the former Soviet leader inappropriate. But Yeltsin’s reforms were ever more substantial than those of Gorbachev. Now that Yeltsin was emerging as the real representative of his people, President Bush was prepared to discuss the newly evolving relationship between the United States and Russia. At Camp David, Yeltsin and Bush signed a declaration recognizing the new “friendship” between the two nations. At that meeting, President Bush proposed a reduction in the number of warheads on long-range nuclear weapons to between 4,500 and 5,000 for each side. That proposed reduction was far less than the previously established level of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), signed by President Bush and then Soviet President Gorbachev in July 1991.12 Not to be outdone, Yeltsin offered even deeper cuts in the strategic nuclear arsenal, to retain no more than 2,500 warheads for each side. It was agreed that Secretary of State Baker would fly to Moscow to explore the possibility of additional reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. Ironically, Yeltsin also raised the issue of developing an anti-missile system; suggesting the building of a so-called Global Peace Shield, which should be developed jointly by the United States and Russia. The idea of an anti-missile shield had originated with President Ronald Reagan, who had proposed the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which was to protect only the United States from incoming intercontinental missiles. The press dismissed Yeltsin’s proposal, and Retired Admiral Eugene Carroll, deputy director of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information was quoted as saying, “it would be a stupid waste of the world’s resources when the need is for development of the world’s economies.” But the admiral gave Yeltsin credit for suggesting cooperation between the nations.13 Actually, the idea of developing the extremely costly and technically very

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problematic anti-missile shield during the Bush administration was quietly laid to rest, only to reappear during the Republican-controlled Congress in the late 1990s and early 2000. After the Camp David meeting, Yeltsin flew to Ottawa for a short stopover, to get acquainted with Canada’s prime minister, Brian Mulroney. Like his counterparts in Britain and Western Europe, Mulroney was not rushing to offer substantial economic aid to Russia. In fact, he was more concerned about future Canadian wheat sales to Russia. On the whole, Yeltsin’s mission to the West was successful. His statesman-like behavior helped to erase the dismal images of his 1989 American visit. At private meetings with the British prime minister, the American president, and the Canadian prime minister, as well as at the United Nations summit in front of fifteen world leaders, Yeltsin gave evidence of his sincerity about developing democracy and market economy in Russia. He made no secret about the fact that his success, to great extent, depended on Western financial aid so he could prove to the Russians that the reforms would revitalize the country’s floundering and inflation-riddled economy. At the same time, he wanted the respect due the democratic leader of a powerful country. Perhaps the greatest achievement of Yeltsin’s whirlwind visit to the West was that it laid foundations for ongoing cooperative relations. The informal February 1992 Camp David meeting between Presidents Bush and Yeltsin was shortly followed by a formal summit meeting in Washington; the two leaders met on June 15, 1992. In his introductory briefing to the press, Secretary of State Baker called that encounter an entirely different type of summit, “presenting opportunities that were, indeed, unimaginable during the Soviet era. . . . President Bush is focused on building a democratic peace with Russia . . . it would be built on our shared democratic values, not on competition or a balance of terror. It would be a true and enduring peace, not a ‘cold peace’such as existed during Cold War, when all we could hope to do was to manage and contain conflict.”14 Secretary Baker signaled that the summit was expected to be more than just exchanging views; it was to chart the future course of Russian-American relations. While welcoming President Yeltsin to the White House, President Bush expressed the hope that the newly developing “partnership” between the United States and Russia would “end forever the old antagonism that kept our people apart, that kept the world in confrontation and conflict.” The U.S. president congratulated the Russian president on the progress Russia had made on the road to freedom and democracy, and he added, “the promise of more to come owes much to the courage and vision of President Boris Yeltsin.” He even compared Yeltsin to Peter the Great, saying, “like Peter the Great, you are redefining Russia’s understanding of itself, redefining Russia’s role in the world. But for the first time in modern Russian history, a

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leader claims his authority not to the dispensation of history but a democratic mandate.”15 In his response, Yeltsin emphasized the end of Communism in Russia and hopes for establishing a new partnership with the United States. He hailed the new beginnings and the fact that the countries were no longer viewing each other as adversaries. He also praised the many similarities between the two countries and added, “The United States’ experience holds a special importance for us. . . . We have good ground for cooperation.”16 The meeting of the presidents resulted in signing an unprecedented strategic arms reduction agreement, substantially below the levels established by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START, later referred to as START I). Instead of the previous agreement of up to 13,000 warheads, by 2003, the United States and Russia would reduce their nuclear arsenal to 3,000–3,500 warheads. With U.S. financial and technical aid to Russia, the reduction of warheads might be reached by the year 2000. The presidents attributed their success of coming to terms in such a short time to shared democratic values and a rapidly developing personal trust and confidence between them. By the time of the formal dinner reception in the White House, Yeltsin, celebrating the agreement, turned to the American president and said, “George, my friend George—we have done it.”17 Establishing rapport with George Bush was one thing, but to win over a highly suspicious and skeptical United States Congress was another. Before Yeltsin’s official state visit, on April 1, 1992, President Bush submitted to Congress an economic aid package, in order to make economic help available to Russia. During his stay in the United States, Yeltsin was given an opportunity to make a case for congressional support of the foreign aid package for his country. On June 17, 1992, Yeltsin went to Capitol Hill to address a joint session of Congress. Upon entering the House chamber, members of the Congress greeted him by chanting “Bo-ris, Bo-ris,” and his speech received numerous standing ovations, winning over many skeptical lawmakers. “The idol of communism which spread everywhere social strife, animosity and unparalleled brutality, which instilled fear in humanity, has collapsed,” declared Yeltsin to a thunderous applause from the chamber. “It has collapsed never to rise again. I am here to assure you we will not let it rise again in our land.”18 Yeltsin intended to prove to the audience and to the U.S. voters that aiding Russia was in their own self-interest. He affirmed his commitment to the already enacted and continued economic and political reforms of his government. “Today I am telling you what I tell my fellow countrymen. I will not go back on the reforms.” Then, he informally added, “And it is practically impossible to topple Yeltsin in Russia. I am in good health, and I will not say ‘Uncle’ before I make the reforms irreversible.” Apparently, Yeltsin

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was aware of the ongoing U.S. political debate; and he stressed that the United States would share his successes and failures. “Today the freedom of America is being upheld in Russia,” he continued, “Should the reforms fail, it will cost hundreds of billions to offset that failure,” implying the cost of a future arms race. As an additional incentive for aid, he said that success would not only promote peace and democracy, but “it will create new jobs, in Russia, as well as in the United States.” Along those lines, he was also encouraging private investments in his country. Throughout his presentation, Yeltsin showed great political skill. At one point, taking advantage of the audience’s enthusiasm, he strayed from his prepared speech and touched upon the issue of the purportedly unaccounted-for Vietnam prisoners of war in Russia. Some congressmen had advocated freezing all aids until the Russian government accounted for all such missing Americans. “I do not understand you ladies and gentlemen. This matter has been investigated and is being investigated. Yeltsin has already opened the archives and is inviting you to join us in investigating the fate of every unaccounted for American. So now you are telling me, first do the job, and then we shall support you by passing that act. I don’t quite understand you.” In spite of that minor exasperated departure from his main theme, Yeltsin’s message was enthusiastically received. He concluded his speech by extending his clasped hands toward his audience and saying, “Today, free and democratic Russia is extending its hand of friendship to the people of America.”19 Although representatives expressed their approval of Yeltsin’s oratory, the question remained, to what extent would he be able to overcome the seemingly intractable and increasingly partisan budget constraint that dominated U.S. domestic policies? Representative John P. Murtha, democrat from Pennsylvania, was quoted as saying, “I like what he said. I appreciate it. But I am anxious, without any plan, to support more aid.” Congressman Stephen L. Neal, democrat from North Carolina, was more blunt: “If the average person back home [asked], they’d say we need the money here.” Democratic leaders made it clear that the conditions for approval of a Russian aid package remained unchanged by Yeltsin’s visit. Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, democrat from Maine, announced that he hoped to bring the foreign assistance measure (S2532) to the Senate floor as early as June 23, 1992. In fact, just before Yeltsin’s appearance in Congress, the Senate Democratic Caucus had been split over the wisdom of bringing the president’s aid proposal to the floor, but apparently Yeltsin made a very persuasive case for expediting the aid package. Although Democratic support was growing for the bill, domestic issues still took precedent. In the House, Majority Leader Richard A Gebhart was in favor of dealing with controversial domestic issues before considering the foreign aid package, House Bill

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(HR4547). He suggested that it might be placed on the agenda “sometime in July.” Nevertheless, Yeltsin’s speech also made an impact on the House. A smaller, less controversial foreign aid appropriation bill for fiscal 1993 was scheduled for consideration on June 24, 1992. That bill included $417 million aid for Russia and the former republics of the Soviet Union.20 Yeltsin’s triumphal visit ended with the signing of tax and investment treaties, which were to benefit U.S. companies seeking to do business in Russia. The treaties would clear the way for the U.S. companies to repatriate profits made in Russia, rather than being forced to reinvest them there, and they would eliminate double taxation. The treaties were reciprocal, and both had to be submitted to the Senate for ratification. Concurrently, President Bush granted Russia lower tariffs on normalized trade, namely, the most-favored-nation (MFN) status. Granting the MFN to Russia had to pass several hurdles. Two years prior, President Bush had signed a trade agreement with then Soviet President Gorbachev, which eventually led to the 1991 congressional approval of the MFN status for Russia. But as a final step, President Bush had to waive the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment, which curtailed normalized trade with the Soviet Union. President Bush’s action relieved Russian goods entering the United States from heavy tariffs.21 Another irritating problem between the two countries had to be resolved—what should be done with an unfinished American embassy building in Moscow? Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Kozyrev were able to come up with an acceptable solution. The United States had a $30 million claim against the Soviet Union for making the still incomplete structure unsuitable for an embassy upon the discovery of numerous implanted listening (bugging) devices. Debate raged in Congress whether the United States should just demolish the building or build additional secure upper floors. Perhaps the building could be used for other purposes. For dropping the claim, the United States was offered a generous long-term lease on the unoccupied building in the center of Moscow, and was given permission to build a new facility near the original site. At the same time, Russians were allowed to occupy a new embassy complex in Washington, D.C., that had remained empty for years because of the ongoing dispute.22 Upon completion of his official visit to the United States, Yeltsin had a genuine feeling of accomplishment. He had established an excellent rapport with President Bush, and he was praised and cheered by the members of Congress as the first-ever Soviet or Russian leader who had been given an opportunity to address a joint session of Congress. He had signed treaties and was promised substantial foreign aid. But in Moscow, instead of a hero’s welcome, he was confronted with severe criticism and outright hos-

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tility in the Parliament. His accomplishments abroad were hardly appreciated at home. He was resolved to make Russia a democracy and change the country’s economy to a market-type economy. Yeltsin’s economic reforms, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and removal of price controls brought about fierce resistance in the Russian Parliament. Meanwhile, in the United States, after a bitter presidential campaign, the democrat, William Clinton, replaced the republican, George Bush. Naturally, Yeltsin, who had established a good rapport with President Bush, was hoping for Bush’s victory. During the campaign, when Yeltsin learned about President Bush’s occasional setbacks and brooding, he “called him to try to cheer him up.” Yeltsin felt sympathetic because, as he put it, he “knew the feeling of acute loneliness all too well. You just need to clench your teeth and take yourself in hand in order not to wilt, quit, retire—whatever.”23 Yeltsin did have another interesting comment on the American system of elections: “I am impressed with the way the Americans do things. During the election campaigns there was rather harsh debate going on between Bush and Clinton, or perhaps it could be stated even more strongly—confrontation. But soon after the elections were over, as soon as it became clear who won, Bush began to help Clinton, and Clinton helped Bush. In our country, they would have remained mortal enemies for the rest of their lives.”24 Yeltsin did not waste much time to establish personal contact with the new president. As discussed previously, the rapidly declining living standards, Russia’s loss of prestige, and ongoing ethnic turmoil within the country gave ammunition to the conservative Parliament to continuously challenge Yeltsin and his government. The Parliament continued its opposition to Yeltsin’s economic reforms and remained highly critical of his pro-Western foreign policies. To counter his critics, Yeltsin counted on the promised Western economic aid and foreign investments, but instead of massive infusion of capital, money was just trickling in from abroad. On the heels of severe congressional battering, in April 1993, Boris Yeltsin traveled to Vancouver, Canada, for a summit meeting with President Clinton. Despite conservative criticism at home, Yeltsin reiterated his firm commitment to a dynamic and effective U.S.-Russian partnership that would strenghten international stability. The two presidents approved a comprehensive strategy of cooperation to promote democracy, security and peace. They also agreed on a new bilateral economic package to address Russia’s immediate humanitarian needs and contribute to its successful transition to a market economy. The economic package announced at the Vancouver summit totaled $1.6 billion, including $690 million in grant assistance, $700 million in con-

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cessional food sales, and $230 million in Export-Import Bank credits. The package also contained a $50 million Russian-American Enterprises Fund to support private sector developments, $95 million to assist privatization efforts, a $6 million initiative for the resettlement of Russian officers, $215 million toward denuclearization, and $48 million to establish a “Democracy Corps” (a coalition of American people and institutions that would be mobilized to support democratization in Russia).25 In terms of economic aid, the Vancouver summit was a resounding success for Yeltsin. It strengthened his resolve to stand firm on his pro-Western foreign policies. On a personal level, Yeltsin had no trouble laying the foundations of a long-lasting friendship with Bill Clinton. Later, Yeltsin reflected upon Clinton becoming the new U.S. president: “So much international politics depends on him that I sincerely empathize with him. Clinton is very unusual. He is young and handsome, looks wonderful for his age, and he impresses women. Perhaps, the figure of Clinton means some kind of a new breakthrough for America.”26 Since the Vancouver meeting, Yeltsin referred to President Clinton as “my friend Bill.” The two presidents envisioned a community of friendship and cooperation stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Still in Vancouver, Yeltsin received a promise of more help to come from the G-7 advanced industrial countries.27 Already at the 1992 Munich meeting of the G-7, it was announced that a $24 billion package was being put together to support Russia’s macroeconomic reforms. That package included $11 billion in bilateral financing, $4.5 billion in International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank loans, $2.5 billion loan deferral, and $6 billion currency stabilization fund. In July 1993, at the Tokyo meeting of the G-7, an additional $1.8 billion bilateral package for Russia and the newly independent states (NIS) was approved: $375 million for private sector, the United States’share contained $125 million in grant assistance, and $250 million in export credits to a new multilateral Special Privatization and Restructuring Program to support the privatization of state enterprises in Russia. The $3 billion in funding was to be drawn half from G-7 countries and half from international financial institutions. In addition, to ease Russia’s financial obligations, Russia’s foreign creditors signed an agreement to reschedule about $15 billion of the country’s debt service payments that were due.28 While the aid packages appeared generous, the actual allocation of the funds depended on Russia’s compliance with the implementation of stringent IMF required economic reforms. With the internal power struggle going on inside Russia, the Yeltsin government was unable to comply. Originally, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were to channel $17 billion to Russia, but delivered only $2 billion.29 The IMF and the

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World Bank’s fact finders, upon witnessing the political infighting, decided that the situation was too chaotic to hand over money to the beleaguered Yeltsin government. Without the inflow of foreign capital, the economy floundered, and the Russians’ faith in democracy was shaken. The average Russian mistakenly equated democracy with economic prosperity. When the introduction of freedom of speech, press, assembly, religion and free elections combined with ill-conceived privatization did not result in economic prosperity, the Russian electorate expressed its disappointment and displeasure. Consequently, at the country’s first free multiparty election, Russians gave a parliamentary plurality to the extreme nationalist demagogic Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky-led Liberal Democratic Party. The Congress of People’s Deputies accused the IMF of interference in Russia’s internal affairs, and Yeltsin was charged with not only ruining the country’s economy, but also selling out to the Western financial interests whose main concern was to weaken and eventually destroy Russia. With the Duma dominated by the combined forces of nationalists and the reorganized Communist Party, Yeltsin’s foreign policy came under attack. The loss of the Soviet empire and the abandonment of Soviet allies were bemoaned, especially by Zhirinovsky and his followers. The Yeltsin government was also blamed for not standing up for those Russians who remained in the former Soviet republics. The country’s overall defense policies and degenerating military forces were bitterly criticized, especially after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact,30 in light of NATO’s growing influence. NOTES 1. Andrey Kozyrev, Preobrazhenie [Transformation] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnaya Otnoshenie, 1994), p. 156. 2. Ibid., pp. 165–166. 3. Ibid., p. 280. 4. See detailed discussion in chapter 5. 5. Kozyrev, Preobrazhenie, pp. 285–286. 6. North Atlantic Council, “Partnership with Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” June 6–7, 1991, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/ed/edc/edc20e.htm. 7. Ira Straus, “NATO and the Identity Crisis of the Russian Military,” Problems of Post-Communism, Fall 1994, pp. 64–68. 8. R. Watson and F. Coleman, “The Year of Yeltsin,” Newsweek, December 30, 1991, pp. 18–21. 9. T. Masland and F. Coleman, “Can Boris Yeltsin Make the Team on the Eve of His U.S. Visit? Strong Doubts Remain,” Newsweek, February 3, 1992, pp. 26–28. 10. M. Nemeth and H. Macenzie, “Boris Yeltsin Takes the World Stage,” Maclean’s, February 10, 1992, pp. 24–26. 11. Ibid.

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12. “Factbox-Missiles Cast a Long Shadow over U.S.-Russian Summits,” Reuters, America Online, June 1, 2000. The aims of the treaty were to reduce the long-range nuclear force of the United States and Russia by 30–40 percent. It was to go into effect in December 1994. 13. M. Nemeth and H. Macenzie, “Boris Yeltsin Takes the World Stage.” In the late 1990s and 2000, when the push for the development of a limited anti-missile system resurfaced, Yeltsin’s successor, Russia’s newly elected president, Vladimir Putin, like his predecessor, proposed joint development of an anti-missile shield. See also “Factbox-Missiles Cast a Long Shadow over U.S.-Russian Summits,” Reuters, America Online, June 1, 2000. 14. U.S. Department of State Dispatch, “US-Russian Summit,” June 22, 1992, pp. 481–482. 15. Ibid., p. 486. 16. Ibid., p. 487. 17. Ibid., p. 490. 18. Pamela Fessler, “Yeltsin Charges onto Capitol Hill, Charms the Life Out of Cold War,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, June 20, 1992, p. 1813. 19. Ibid., p. 1817. 20. Ibid., pp. 1814–1815. 21. Ibid., p. 1820. 22. Ibid., pp. 1820–1821. 23. Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: Random House, 1994), pp. 136–137. 24. Ibid., p. 136. 25. Fact Sheet: “Russia,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, August 16, 1993. 26. Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, p. 136. 27. G-7 is an international organization (established in 1985) of the world’s major industrial powers: the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Japan. It discusses and coordinates economic and commercial matters and works to aid the economies of other nations. The leaders of the G-7 nations meet annually in member countries. 28. Fact Sheet: “Russia,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, August 16, 1993. 29. New York Times, January 4, 1994, p. 17. 30. On February 25, 1995, the thirty-six-year-old Soviet-dominated military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, was formally dissolved (New York Times, February 26, 1991).

10 Backlash of the Imposed Democracy

Despite all the infighting, the Russians voted for a new constitution and held free multiparty elections. It was hoped that with a democratically elected Parliament, the country’s transformation to a market-type economy and democracy would proceed more efficiently. Contrary to Western expectations, the combined strength of the nationalists and Communists in the Duma made the introduction of new pro-reform and pro-market legislation very difficult. The makeup of the new Parliament hardly differed from the disbanded Congress of Soviet Deputies, and the West became concerned with the success of the extremist elements. The results made the emerging Russian democracy appear very precarious. Feeling especially threatened by the possible reemergence of the Soviet colossus, the former Soviet satellites clamored for Western guarantees of their recently obtained independence. To ensure their safety, they wanted to join NATO. Only Yeltsin and his newly acquired constitutional powers held the promise of the continuation of Russia’s democratization. Despite the disappointing election outcomes, Yeltsin pledged to continue Russia’s transformation into a democratic state and repeatedly declared that his pro-Western foreign policies remained intact. But Yeltsin also realized that if he wanted any cooperation with the Duma, he must make additional changes in the government. Chernomyrdin remained prime minister, but First Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, who was responsible for the removal of price controls and was an advocate of eco-

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nomic reforms, had to go. As Prime Minister Chernomyrdin began slowing the reforms, Finance Minister Boris Fyodorov, known for his strict fiscal policies, submitted his resignation. Yeltsin’s post election criticism of the reformers and those governmental changes did not necessarily mean the end of reforms, but signaled a definite slowing of them. Strobe Talbot, President Clinton’s ambassador-at-large for Russia (later, deputy secretary of state) summed up the post-election redirections by saying: “Russia needs more therapy and less shock!”1 The reform party, Russia’s Choice, had clearly lost the people’s confidence, and in the Duma, there was very little cooperation even among the reform parties. Consequently, Yeltsin had very little support in the democratically elected Parliament. That was demonstrated when the Duma voted overwhelmingly for amnesty for all arrested leaders of the armed resistance against Yeltsin in October 1993, and also for the conspirators of August 1991. The amnesty was passed, with 253 members for it and sixty-seven against it. Aleksandr Rutskoi, Ruslan Khasbulatov and other leaders were promptly released from prison, despite Yeltsin’s vehement protests. He watched hopelessly but had no legal means to prevent the Parliament’s decision. Article 103 of the constitution gave the Duma the sole right to declare an amnesty, and presidential veto did not apply.2 The election setbacks and the domestic redirections of the reforms slowed the much-needed foreign aid, credits and private investments in Russia. A few days before President Clinton’s planned arrival in Moscow, on January 5, 1994, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank released a joint memorandum on Russian economy. The five-page document reaffirmed their assessment of the pace of the reforms. Despite announced policy intentions, Russia had pursued an extremely gradual approach to the reduction of inflation. Experience elsewhere suggested that that was not an effective way to minimize economic hardship or maximize political support. Russia was warned that it needed to impose hard budgetary constraints on state enterprises in order to control budget deficits and inflation. The thrust of the memorandum was that the Russian authorities should speed up the pace of reform, not slow it, as had been suggested by certain members of President Clinton’s administration.3 To ameliorate the impact of massive layoffs resulting from the closure of nonviable plants, the memorandum advocated a targeted social safety net rather than global subsidies of food and energy.4 Consequently, high-profile Western advisors to the Russian government Jeffrey Sachs and Anders Asland sent a letter of resignation to President Yeltsin: “We can no longer help the Russian government. The aims and the policies announced by the prime minister are strongly opposed to our own

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concepts.” Government spokesman Valentin Sergeyev suggested that the departure of the two advisors would not have a great effect on the new government because Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin did not use the services of Western advisors. Sergeyev added that Chernomyrdin believed “the mechanistic transfer of methods of Western economies to Russian soil cause much more harm than help.”5 Not only were domestic policies affected by the congressional election, but also Russia’s foreign policy was getting more assertive and in conflict with Western expectations. On January 18, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, while addressing Russian ambassadors to the CIS and the Baltic states, said: “We should not withdraw from those regions which have been within the sphere of Russian interests for centuries; we should not fear the words ‘military presence.’” He also said that it is necessary for Russia to keep its military presence in former Soviet republics to prevent forces hostile to Russia from filling the “security vacuum.” Notably, Kozyrev also referred to the Baltic states as a region of “vital” interest to Russia. Kozyrev had already stated in public on a number of occasions6 that Russia intended to hold on to positions conquered over the centuries by maintaining military bases and/or peacekeeping operations in those areas.7 The statements by the foreign minister were contrary to U.S. expectations; Washington responded quickly. The U.S. State Department’s spokesman, Mike McCurry, noted that the United States had “told the Russian government repeatedly that we expected prompt withdrawal of all Russian troops from Estonia and Latvia. We don’t accept any view that suggests Russia should assert or exercise a special role or prerogative . . . inconsistent with the UN Charter, the principles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and general principles of international law.”8 In response to Russia’s attempts to revive its sphere of interest, its former satellites and the Baltic republics wanted to come under NATO’s protective umbrella. In Western political circles and in the media, the topic of NATO’s possible expansion to the East kept recurring. Yeltsin and the reformers vehemently opposed the possible incorporation of former Warsaw Pact states into NATO, because that provided extra ammunition for Russian nationalists and Communists to attack Yeltsin’s pro-Western policies. To sum it up, all Russians thought that moving NATO closer to Russia’s borders was a threat. Yeltsin, who was prepared to scale back Russia’s military spending and negotiate strategic arms reductions, viewed the expansion of NATO as a betrayal and an act that would seriously undermine his prestige in working with the Duma. The summit meeting with President Clinton on January 13–14, 1994, momentarily boosted Yeltsin’s image. Negotiations with the American

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president began on January 13, with Clinton quoted as saying, “Russia and the United States must work together to build a new future for Europe, on which a new future for our entire world depends.” He also expressed his belief that “together we can work to lead a new security for Europe based on democratic values, free economies, and the respect of nations for one another.” Yeltsin reiterated that the meeting of the two presidents in Vancouver in 1993 laid the foundation for U.S.-Russian relations, and considered the 1994 summit to be more “in-depth, practical, and global in nature.”9 The most significant achievement of the summit was when Leonid Kravchuk, the president of Ukraine, joined Clinton and Yeltsin, and the three presidents signed the trilateral agreement on the elimination of the nuclear weapons located in Ukraine. According to Radio Mayak, the agreement included a joint statement that had the status of a treaty, and it was appended with letters from the presidents, which spelled out the security guarantees to be given to the Ukraine. It was also reported that some two hundred warheads would be transferred to Russia over the next ten months, and during the same time period, Russia would deliver one hundred tons of nuclear fuel to Ukraine. At the joint press conference of presidents, Clinton noted that all the SS-24 ICBMs (Nuclear Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) would be deactivated within ten months. The agreement provided that the missile withdrawals would take place “in the shortest possible time.”10 In a joint statement after their negotiations, Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin heralded the achievement of “a new stage” in relations between Russia and the United States characterized by a “mature strategic partnership based on equality, mutual advantage, and recognition of each other’s national interests.” The declaration also stressed that Moscow and Washington were ready to “move forward on the path of openness and mutual trust” in their relations and pledged to continue efforts to overcome the division of Europe. Among the “urgent tasks” related to those efforts were “preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and protection of human rights and the rights of national and other minorities.”11 The published document addressed the Russians’ concern about the rights of ethnic Russians remaining in the former Soviet republics. It showed that the United States was willing to put pressure on those newly independent states, which were abusing ethnic minorities. The joint declaration also stressed the need for cooperation in peacekeeping, and it implied primarily the need for cooperation in solving the ongoing Bosnian crisis. Since Bosnia-Herzegovina’s declaration of its independence from Yugoslavia in 1992, bloody civil war raged among the Moslems, Serbs and Croats.

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The West was threatening to use NATO airplanes to bomb Serb positions, because the regular Serb army was blatantly assisting local Bosnian Serbs to overwhelm the Moslem Bosnian defenders. The multinational United Nations peacekeeping forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina were unable to keep the factions apart and prevent the Serb forces from atrocities against the Moslem population. But Moscow objected to using NATO against its historical allies, the Orthodox Serbs, Russia’s “little brothers.” Russia’s anxiety on account of NATO’s direct involvement in the Bosnian conflict or the possible expansion of NATO to the East was not at all irrational. Although the original 1949 North Atlantic Treaty did not specifically mention the Soviet Union, it was an agreement among the Western allies, with the inclusion of Turkey, Greece and the Federal Republic of Germany, to prevent any Soviet incursion in the member countries. Signatories pledged to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their people founded on principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They resolved to unite their effort for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.” As far as admitting new members, Article 10 of the treaty stated: “the Parties by unanimous agreement, may invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.” 12 By 1990, NATO membership had risen to sixteen. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO, with its enemies disappearing and its raison d’être becoming questionable, should have been gradually disbanded. In fact, instead of disappearing in the post–cold war era, NATO was gaining new prominence. As long as the protracted internal turmoil was going on in Russia and the possibility of an extreme nationalist takeover was probable, extending NATO’s protective shield to defend the newly independent former Soviet satellites, and even the Baltic republics, was becoming plausible in the early and mid-1990s. The outbreak of civil war in the former Yugoslavia also proved the need for a potent military force that could prevent the spreading of that conflict, and if necessary, not only keep but also make (my italics) peace. Only NATO had the ability to handle serious conflagrations on the continent. Eventually, even the United Nations’ Security Council had to turn to NATO to enforce its resolution of a “No Flight Zone” over Bosnia to thwart the Serbian air force of President Slobodan Milosevic from attacking the Bosnians. Despite Serbian aggression, Russia stood firmly against NATO’s direct involvement in the Bosnian conflict. Russia had made many concessions to the West to give evidence of its cooperation, but it was unwilling to yield on the issues of the expansion of NATO, and NATO’s new peacekeeping role.

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As long as Russia was not a member of that organization, NATO was seen as a military threat. Russians argued that eruptions of armed conflicts should be generally handled by the UN, or by the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Russia had a prominent role in both of those organizations. Acting in the international sphere unilaterally, without Russia’s consent, would have been a risky proposition, considering that country’s nuclear arsenal. At international forums, and also privately, Foreign Minister Kozyrev warned Western decision makers that any arbitrary action would jeopardize future cooperation with the West and weaken the Yeltsin government at home. Both the extreme nationalists and the Communists in the Duma and in the streets were blaming Yeltsin and his pro-Western supporters for the economic shortfalls of the country and the loss of prestige and influence abroad. Not wanting to endanger the friendly relations that had already been secured with Yeltsin, and at the same time, to assure the security of the newly evolving democracies in the face of possible Russian resurgence, President Clinton offered an imaginative solution. On January 10–11, 1994, at the NATO summit in Brussels, on Clinton’s initiative, a close security link with NATO was offered to former Soviet satellites and also to former Soviet republics, including Russia, through participation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and later, the Partnership for Peace (PFP).13 Partnership for Peace provided a framework for enhanced political and military cooperation to prepare for and undertake multilateral crisis management activities such as peacekeeping. Participating states were to assign representatives to NATO headquarters. On the basis of that representation, countries were given the right to participate in PFP exercises and relevant discussions with the allies. Members were required to inform NATO of resources they would contribute to PFP activities, to report their progress toward democratic control of the military and publish their defense budgets. In event of a direct threat against any PFP member country, NATO consultation was offered with the possible extension of security guarantees under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; that is, if any member of NATO was attacked, other members would come to the defense of that country. On January 24, 1994, the PFP was officially opened for membership. By February 28, 1994, all former Warsaw Pact nations and many former Soviet republics, including the Baltic republics and the Ukraine, joined.14 Despite repeated reassurances that NATO was not against any country, the organization carried the undeniable anti-Soviet and anti-Russian symbols of its origins. Thus, the PFP was a delaying tactic to formal enlargement of NATO, while it appeared to serve as a preparatory step toward

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eventual admission to that organization. However, it was stated in the Partnership for Peace Charter that PFP membership was no guarantee for admission into NATO. Initially, the Russian Federation expressed an interest in joining the PFP, but its actual participation was delayed. Russian nationalists claimed that such participation would be demeaning to a “great power,” and charged that it was a ploy to bring NATO dangerously close to Russia. They also complained that Western-controlled financial institutions, like the IMF and the World Bank were “dictating” policies to Russia. The Russian economy was still reeling from the high inflation rates, decreased production and rising crime rate. Russians living in the former Soviet republics were facing severe restrictions. The nationalists blamed Yeltsin for not supporting Russia’s traditional allies, the Serbs. The domestic political pressures and the continued discussion about the expansion of NATO made Russian foreign policy less accommodating to the West. NOTES 1. New York Times, January 25, 1994. 2. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1994/02/940224.html (opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 3. This was probably a reference to Strobe Talbot’s comment about needing more therapy and less shock. 4. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1994/01/. 5. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1994/02/. 6. Including interviews with Izvestia on October 8, and also with Nezavisimaya gazeta on November 24, 1993. 7. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1994/01/. 8. Ibid. 9. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1994/01/940113. 10. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1994/01/940114. 11. Ibid. 12. “The North Atlantic Treaty,” United States Government Documents, April 4, 1949. 13. “What is NATO?” NATO Fact Sheet, March 1996, http://www.nato.int/ docu/facts.htm#AN. 14. “Partnership for Peace,” Fact Sheet, Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, March 2, 1994.

11 Cooling of Pro-Western Policies

Despite the initially expressed interest in the Partnership for Peace, the Russian Federation refrained from joining the newly formed international organization. Russia was disturbed by the dual message of the United States’ foreign policies. While the Clinton administration supported Boris Yeltsin, it also advocated the enlargement of NATO. Apparently, the United States was not convinced of the permanency of Yeltsin’s reforms. Nevertheless, in September 1994, the fifth summit meeting between Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton took place.1 The two presidents’ joint statement of the summit emphasized that with the end of the cold war, major progress had been achieved with regard to strengthening global strategic stability and nuclear security. They agreed to continue their countries’cooperation across a broad range of security issues that had already been negotiated by the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreements in June 1994.2 At a closing news conference, Yeltsin announced: “For peace, for humanity, for mankind, for our whole planet, we have agreed to cooperate on most things.”3 The two leaders agreed to expedite the completion of the START I agreement, and move toward the ratification of START II. They welcomed the implementation of the January 14, 1994, Trilateral Treaty. All three parties—Russia, the Ukraine and the United States—had been fulfilling their obligations. The Ukraine had already transferred 360 warheads to Russia for dismantlement, and Russia had delivered one hundred tons of low-enriched uranium in the form of fuel assemblies to the

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Ukraine in compensation. The United States had provided a $60 million advance payment to Russia to purchase highly enriched uranium under a previously negotiated sales contract. The Ukraine was also to continue its deactivations of the SS-24 and SS-19 nuclear missiles.4 Both countries agreed on “preserving the integrity and viability of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.” They expressed an interest in defining the differences between the anti-missile defenses forbidden by the treaty and the use of effective “theater missile defenses.” The presidents reaffirmed their commitment to concluding a Complete Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and an unconditional extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). They also agreed on the continuation of the moratorium on nuclear weapons testing. There were several concrete agreements signed on assuring nuclear security.5 In responding to a reporter’s question about a possible conflict between the United States and Russia, President Yeltsin emphatically rejected that notion: “We never fought the United States, and I can say as a President that we will never fight the United States in the future. Instead, we will focus on building a world of decency and welfare.”6 That summit was no longer dominated by solicitous discussions on how to help weak, democratic Russia recover economically; instead, geopolitical issues dominated it. Despite the much-heralded strategic cooperation, there remained some controversial problems. The United States’efforts to dissuade Russians from selling weapons to Iran had only limited success. President Yeltsin agreed to limit future sales, but insisted on fulfilling existing contracts—including the delivery of a “kilo-class” submarine.7 The Clinton administration, to avoid a confrontation with Russia on the ongoing Bosnian crisis, decided to suspend the congressional resolution of removal of an arms embargo for Moslem Bosnians. Selling weapons to the Moslems would have balanced the Serbs’ advantage. Commenting on the summit, the National Review accused the Clinton administration of making a behind-the-scenes agreement with Yeltsin. In order to secure Russia’s support in the UN Security Council for U.S. action in Haiti, the Clinton administration assured Moscow of American support for Russian peacekeeping interventions within the borders of the former Soviet Union. Under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, the “Commonwealth of Independent States” was acknowledged as a “regional organization.” That maneuver entitled Russia not only to UN blessing, but also possibly to UN funding for its military operations in that region. According to the article, the United States compromised its own freedom of action in the Western Hemisphere, and simultaneously gave Russia a free hand to act within its old imperial borders.8

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With conflagration raging in neighboring republics and refugees streaming into Russia, the Yeltsin administration could hardly wait for the arrival of international peacekeepers and have them reestablish order. At the same time, internal pressure from the Duma was also growing for Russia to intervene and take control of the region. In addition to the turmoil in the “near abroad,” even more serious problems threatened the stability of the Russian Federation. Some of its own autonomous republics began to defy the central authority of Moscow, and were demanding more autonomy and even independence. Faced with the problems of the “near abroad” and the possible fragmentation of the country, a strongly worded foreign policy report came to light. An analytical report entitled “Russia-CIS: Does the Western Position Need Correction?” dealing with the reintegration of Russia and other CIS states was prepared by Yevgeny Primakov, Yeltsin’s chief of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). According to the report, all the major political forces in Russia, and the other countries belonging to the CIS, were in favor of a reintegration of the post-Soviet “Eurasian space.” Some circles in the West and the Islamic world, however, saw that “natural, historical trend” as a manifestation of Russian neoimperialist ambitions. The SVR’s report argued that the sovereignty of former Soviet states did not guarantee the implementation of reforms or democracy in that region of Eurasia. The lack of integration between Russia and the other former Soviet republics benefited only nationalist and “neoisolationist” forces in Russia and the CIS.9 The tenacious ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia cautioned Western decisionmakers to stay out of the local wars on the borders of Russia. They gave their tacit approval to Russia to adjudicate conflicts within its own sphere of influence. Although there were series of armed conflicts in the former Soviet republics, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, fighting within Georgia, and civil war in Tajikistan and Moldavia, Russia’s attention was distracted by the separationist Chechnya. Chechnya is situated in the eastern part of the North Caucasus. It borders on North Ossetia and Ingushetia in the west, on Stavropol Kray in the north, on Dagestan (of the Russian Federation) in the east, and on Georgia in the south. Its area is 19,421 square-miles, with a population of more than 1.2 million, of which one million are Chechen. The remainder consists mainly of Russians, Ingush and other North Caucasians. More than 100,000 Chechens live in other areas of the Caucasus, Central Asia and part of the Russian Federation. The capital city is Grozny. This small North Caucasian nation has had a long, troubled history.10 In 1722, Peter the Great annexed the Caspian region of Dagestan, which marked the beginning of a 150-year military campaign to absorb the rest of

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the North Caucasus region into the Russian Empire. In the mid-nineteenth century, Imam Shamil, on the basis of Islamic teachings, built a formidable fighting force from the mountain tribes of Dagestan and Chechnya to oppose Russian domination. After long and stubborn resistance, the imperial forces of tzarist Russia overwhelmed the indigenous population.11 The revolution of 1917 brought the Communists to power, but Islam and the traditional clan system remained strong despite persecution by the Kremlin. In 1922, Chechnya became an autonomous district in the Russian Federation. In 1936, the territories of the Chechens and Ingush were combined into an autonomous republic of the Soviet Union. During World War II, the Chechens, who had never given up their hopes for independence, were accused of collaborating with Nazi German troops, and the entire nation and their Ingush neighbors were deported to Central Asia on Stalin’s orders. Tens of thousands perished. In 1957, Nikita Khrushchev allowed the Chechens to return to the Caucasus, and set up a Checheno-Ingush Republic.12 The collapse of the Soviet Union opened a window of opportunity to the Chechens to seek independence. In 1991, Chechnya separated from Ingushetia. The local Communist leader, Doku Zavgayev, was overthrown, and a Soviet air force general, Dzhokar Dudayev, won a disputed election. Upon his victory, Dudayev declared Chechnya’s independence from Russia and decreed that Chechnya would be known as Ichkeria. Yeltsin did dispatch some troops to bring the renegade republic back into the fold, but a well-equipped Chechen army confronted the Russian soldiers, who withdrew without a fight. Although Russia never acknowledged Chechnya’s independence, no action was taken against Dudayev until 1994.13 The Kremlin did manage to come to a compromise agreement with other autonomy-seeking ethnic republics, Tatarstan and Bashkortorstan, but Dudayev insisted on a complete separation from Russia. He expressed readiness to meet with the Russian leadership at any time and “discuss all problems in a normal atmosphere,” but stressed that he would not retreat “one iota from the idea of the independence of the republic.”14 Yeltsin could not tolerate secession. Decisive action had to be taken against the Dudayev. Action was demanded by the Duma, by the people who had associated the growth of organized crime in Moscow and in other major cities to swarthy Caucasians, mostly to Chechens. With the other ethnic republics watching, Chechnya had to be kept within the federation. Had Chechnya been allowed to secede, a Soviet Union-like breakup threatened the Russian Federation. While Yeltsin had to cope with the long-festering problem of the rebellious, his country’s relations with the West were also becoming more troublesome and often confrontational. As “patriotic,” that is, nationalist elements in the former Soviet republics, especially in the Baltic republics,

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were depriving ethnic Russians of their civil rights, Russia was reasserting its right to intervene unilaterally in the CIS countries on behalf of its countrymen. The Russian military journal, Krasnaya Zvezda, likened Russia’s right to intervene in countries within its sphere of influence to the Monroe Doctrine. Following a similar hard line, Kozyrev reiterated: “Russia can use any means, including military, to protect its citizens’rights in the former Soviet republics.”15 In December 1994, at a NATO meeting in Brussels, on the basis of previously held negotiations, Kozyrev was expected to sign the Partnership for Peace Treaty, but instead of signing it, he attacked it. He condemned the Western allies’ decision to initiate discussions on the possibility of former Warsaw Pact countries joining NATO by the end of 1995, and he declared that under the circumstances, Russia would need more “clarifications” before it would join PFP.16 A few days after Kozyrev’s undiplomatic, last-minute refusal to cooperate, President Yeltsin launched an even more powerful attack on the plans to enlarge NATO. The first open clash between Yeltsin and the Western leaders occurred on December 5–6, 1994, in Budapest, at the summit meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).17 Prior to that meeting, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) had been upgraded (as reflected by changing the name from “Conference” to Organization) to become a full-fledged, European-based international organization. Since the origins of the CSCE dated back to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act agreement, the United States and Canada were charter members. During the past few years, Russia had championed the promotion of the CSCE to maintain peace, and to strengthen democracy and stability in Europe. Not being a member of either NATO or the European Union, Russia saw a definite advantage for itself by elevating the importance of that organization. In December 1994, Hungary assumed the rotating chairmanship of the OSCE and offered to host the summit meeting, the purpose of which was to give heads of state an opportunity to approve the recent streamlining of the unwieldy, unstructured and powerless cold war organization.18 Hosts, Hungarian President Arpad Goncz and Prime Minister Gyula Horn, welcomed the arriving dignitaries: President Clinton of the United States, President Yeltsin of Russia, Chancellor Kohl of Germany, Prime Minister Major of Britain, French President Mitterrand, President Kuchma of the Ukraine, and the beleaguered Bosnian President Izetbegovic, among others. As expected, most of the speeches were inconsequential. The shadow of the stubborn Bosnian conflict hung over the conference. President Clinton, in addressing the meeting, expressed the United States’ commitment to the revitalized OSCE, which he hoped would play an important role in facilitating the cessation of fighting in Bosnia. According to White

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House sources, President Clinton’s presence in Budapest was a symbolic gesture of support of the OSCE, and perhaps, to give him an opportunity for an “idle chat with his counterparts.” He did not expect to participate in serious negotiations, and did not anticipate unpleasant surprises from his “friend,” Boris Yeltsin. Kozyrev’s outburst in Brussels against NATO, and his refusal to sign the PFP agreement should have put the State Department and Clinton’s advisers on alert for an impending confrontation. President Yeltsin, already seriously concerned about the planned NATO enlargement, the West’s anti-Serb sentiment, and the imminent crisis in the Caucasus, addressed fellow world leaders without diplomatic restraints. He charged that NATO was trying to divide Europe again, and the United States intended to dominate the world. Yeltsin warned: “History demonstrates that it is a dangerous illusion to suppose that destinies of continents and of the world community in general can somehow be managed from one single capital. Why are you sowing seeds of mistrust? Europe, which has not yet thrown off the legacy of the Cold War, is in danger of plunging into a cold peace.”19 Without mincing words, Yeltsin let it be known that Russia intended to play a vital role in European affairs, and preventing the enlargement of NATO was in Russia’s national interest. He also gave notice to the Western allies that Russia’s cooperation could not be taken for granted. The threat of a “cold peace” carried an ominous warning of a possible return to the era of precarious peace during the cold war. Ironically, in 1992, President Bush hailed the new age of “enduring peace” between the United States and Yeltsin’s Russia as opposed to a “cold peace” during the cold war.20 Regardless of the origins of the phrase, Yeltsin put the blame on the United States for endangering peaceful cooperation with Russia. Yeltsin’s stern warning in Budapest served other purposes: He wanted the world to know that Russia should not be underestimated, provoked and interfered with, because its nuclear arsenal was intact. With the West put on notice, on December 11, 1994, soon after his return from Hungary, Yeltsin launched a major campaign against Chechnya. Despite the massive force of 40,000 troops, the initial attack on the rebellious region floundered. To bring the Chechens into submission, indiscriminate artillery and heavy aerial bombing wiped out entire villages and practically flattened Grozny, the Chechen capital. That marked the beginning of a twenty-month devastating war with heavy casualties on both sides. In addition to the military casualties, civilians perished by the tens of thousands. The rebels were driven to the mountains, but were far from being defeated. The international community watched the carnage with horror, but with Bosnia still in flames, no Western country intimated any possible interven-

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tion into Russia’s “internal affairs.” The only thing the West could do was condemn Russia’s human rights violations against the civilian population and advocate political settlement of the conflict. Despite the war in Chechnya, Yeltsin was well aware of the necessity to maintain a solid, businesslike relation with the West, and was not about to forfeit Russia’s right to fully participate in European and world affairs. To defuse international criticism during the height of the Chechen campaign, Yeltsin allowed three separate fact-finding OSCE missions to enter Chechnya in an effort to resolve the ongoing conflict. In April 1995, a permanent OSCE mission was set up in Grozny. The OSCE was to ensure the protection of human rights, help to develop democratic institutions, facilitate the delivery of aid, assist with the return of the refugees, promote the resolution of the crisis, and support the rule of law.21 By permitting the OSCE to play an important role in Chechnya, the Yeltsin administration attempted to give evidence of its willingness to cooperate only with those international organizations in which Russia had full membership. When the Council of Europe wanted to send fact finders into Chechnya, Yeltsin refused, because Russia’s admission into the council had been suspended until the satisfactory resolution of the Chechen crisis. Kozyrev bluntly told the council that without full membership, his country would not accept fact-finding missions.22 Cooperating with the OSCE observers in Chechnya, the Yeltsin administration wanted to emphasize the importance it attached to that international organization vis-à-vis NATO. Despite those Russian efforts, the West under no circumstances was willing to accept OSCE as an alternative to NATO—the OSCE was not a defensive alliance; it was organized as a vehicle for cooperative security. It could not offer “all-for-one, one-for-all” security guaranties. The West was willing to accept the OSCE only as a complementary organization to NATO, because it was proven in the Chechen conflict that the OSCE was able to go places where NATO could not. The OSCE was viewed only as a useful channel for direct dialogue on security issues with Russia.23 By spring 1995, when the fiftieth anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany was approaching, a definite chill set in the relations between the West and Russia. In the United States, the recently elected combative Republican congressional majority with a leadership still under the influence of cold war reflexes was taking a strong anti-Yeltsin stand. It was condemning Russia for aggression in Chechnya and for its willingness to sell nuclear equipment to Iran. More and more opposition was voiced in the Congress and in the media to President Clinton’s forthcoming visit to Russia for the commemoration of the victory in Europe. In spite of the objections, knowledge-

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able Russian experts in the administration who realized the immense historical significance of that day to Russia, advised President Clinton to go. The symbolic momentousness of the American president’s presence at the Moscow celebration could not be underestimated. May 9, 1995, marked the fiftieth anniversary of Nazi Germany’s signing its unconditional surrender to the victorious Soviet Union in a separate ceremony. The victory came at the end of the devastating World War II, which had inflicted indescribable suffering on the whole nation, and had left more than 20 million victims in the Soviet Union. That event had become one of the most meaningful historical landmarks to the Russian people. Hardly any family had remained unaffected by the war, and the Communist leadership exploited those memories. In Soviet terminology, World War II was referred to as the “Great Patriotic War.” The huge military budgets of the post-war years had been justified on account of the necessity of preparedness to safeguard against any World War II-like foreign aggression against the “motherland.”24 Since then, on national holidays, veterans, both men and women, proudly wear their World War II medals, and some elderly veterans wear their medals every day. The victory in 1945 had given the proven status of a great power to the Soviet Union. Despite its dissolution, no Russian, and certainly not President Yeltsin, was willing to relinquish his country’s great power or even nuclear superpower role in world affairs. For the U.S. president, the Soviet Union’s ally in World War II, to snub Russia’s fiftieth anniversary celebration of VE Day would have been a grave political mistake. Not attending the ceremonies would also have seriously undermined Yeltsin’s already badly sagging prestige. On May 8, 1995, after celebrating the anniversary of the victory in Europe at Arlington National Cemetery, President Clinton flew to Moscow for more celebration, and a summit with President Boris Yeltsin. In the meantime, President Yeltsin had also made some compromises to ease the tension. In Chechnya, a cease-fire was arranged, and as mentioned above, a permanent OSCE mission with a broad range of objectives had been set up in Grozny. On account of the strong Western criticism of the Kremlin’s attack on Chechnya, and especially, of the indiscriminate bombardment of cities and villages without consideration for the civilian population, the Moscow celebration of the anniversary was altered to avoid embarrassing the visiting Western statesmen. The grandiose military parade was separated from the rest of the celebration. Thus, the attending allied leaders were able to commemorate VE Day and concurrently avoid the military parade—they were able to show their contempt of the Russian Army’s brutal actions in Chechnya. Despite the prevailing controversies between Russia and the West, neither wanted a serious break in their relations.

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The leaders of Russia’s major World War II allies and many other foreign dignitaries attended the fiftieth anniversary celebration, among them President Clinton, Prime Minister Major and President Mitterrand, and also as a special guest, German Chancellor Kohl.25 To give even more importance to that anniversary, Russia dedicated a special area in Moscow to the memory of World War II soldiers, named Poklonnaya gora—“Hill of Admiration” (or “Respect”). The area contained a military museum, a small memorial chapel, and an impressive victory column depicting the famous battles and final victory of the Red Army. The Yeltsin administration had spared no effort to prove its patriotism to its own people, and to remind the world of Russia’s military might. After the elaborate celebration, Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton began their seventh summit meeting. Before the summit meeting, there was no lack of speculation about the state of Russian and U.S. relations. According to President Yeltsin, it was depicted in the media as a “crisis in our relations. The results of the Moscow talks once again refuted these speculations. Of course, even after the summit, a number of differences remained.” Yeltsin then added, “The important thing is that we seek to resolve these problems . . . without prejudice.”26 President Clinton concurred: “Today we focused on the future. . . . I think this meeting was a win-win meeting.”27 The list of topics discussed included the question of European security, and in that connection, the proposed roles of OSCE and NATO. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty was addressed, and both countries agreed to advance the ratification of START II, and move forward toward the acceptance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The issue of Russia’s sale of nuclear equipment to Iran was raised, and so was the violence in Chechnya. President Yeltsin remained adamant on the expansion of NATO, but after lengthy negotiations on that issue, he sounded slightly more willing to listen to President Clinton’s reasons. Yeltsin summed up the issue by saying, “we were not able to dot all i’s and cross all t’s. And if it is so difficult, let us not hurry, and let us continue our consultations when we meet in Halifax, Canada. If the problems could not be resolved in Canada, the negotiations could continue at the Fall meeting of the United Nations when that organization would have its 50th anniversary celebration.”28 President Clinton also tried to soften the issue by saying that the question of NATO’s expansion had been under consideration by member countries, but “as far as I know,” said the U.S. president, “there may be significant differences among the NATO partners themselves.” Clinton stressed that there must be a special relationship between NATO and Russia. To show good faith, Yeltsin expressed a willingness to join the Partnership for Peace. That was a significant change from Kozyrev’s blunt refusal in December to sign an agreement, and

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Yeltsin’s threat in Budapest about Russia’s relations with the West moving toward a “cold peace.” On May 31, 1995, without much fanfare, Foreign Minister Kozyrev signed the PFP program.29 Concerning the potentially dangerous nuclear equipment sales to Iran, Yeltsin also made some concessions. The United States was objecting to Russia’s selling Iran a nuclear reactor and a centrifuge, which could be used for developing a nuclear bomb. In the interest of nonproliferation, Yeltsin decided not to sell Iran the objectionable centrifuge and related equipment, even though missing the sale would be a certain financial sacrifice to Russia. Yeltsin pointed out that Russia and Iran had originally concluded a legitimate contract in accordance with international law, “But that contract did contain components for peaceful and military nuclear energy. Now we have agreed to separate those two.”30 Other technical details of the still-pending sale were relegated to the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission to iron out. The situation in Chechnya was another sensitive issue of the summit meeting. Clinton was urging Yeltsin to make the cease-fire permanent, but in order not to alienate Yeltsin, he reiterated that Chechnya was an internal affair of Russia with the proviso that it had an international component, namely terrorism. The U.S. president suggested that the evil of terrorism did not know borders,31 and that this topic should be tackled by the leaders of G-8 countries at their forthcoming meeting in Halifax. At the presidents’ joint news conference with regard to economic aid to Russia, President Clinton pointed out that financial aid to Russia would also be considered at the meeting in Halifax. He said that he had been supporting economic aid to Russia to help the conversion to a market economy and the country’s denuclearization efforts. Specifically, President Clinton confirmed that he was supporting the approval of a $6.8 billion IMF standby loan to Russia to facilitate economic reforms.32 The May summit generated another important joint statement concerning the two countries’ missile systems. “The United States and Russia are each committed to the ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of strategic stability. Both sides must have the option to establish and deploy effective theater missile defense systems. Such activity must not lead to violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty. . . . Theater missile defense systems will not be deployed by the sides for the use against each other.”33 The theater-wide missiles have been identified as air defense or tactical interceptor missiles, as opposed to the strategic anti-ballistic missiles, which were forbidden by the ABM Treaty.34 Yeltsin took advantage of the presence of the visiting leaders and held private talks with all of them. It was noted that Chancellor Kohl was highly

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critical of Russia’s war in Chechnya, and also concerning the pending sales of strategic nuclear equipment to Iran. Conversations with John Major and Francois Mitterrand followed similar patterns. In spite of the criticism, the presence of the world leaders boosted Yeltsin’s image and served as proof that Russia’s relationship with the West would not come to a dead end. Sensitive and inconclusive issues remained unresolved, but it was agreed that they were to be revisited at other international forums. In addition to NATO’s expansion, Chechnya, and nuclear sales to Iran, a large anti-Yeltsin counterdemonstration did cast a dark shadow on the celebrations and clouded Yeltsin’s political hold on the country. On May 9, thousands of demonstrators waving red flags and carrying portraits of Josef Stalin marched through the capital in an alternative Victory Day rally. The march, which was organized by various opposition groups, including the Communist Party, Viktor Anpilov’s Workers’ Russia, and the Officers’Union, had attracted an unusually large turnout. Police estimated that about 30,000 people took part, including many veterans. The participants argued that Yeltsin had no right to lead celebrations marking the victory over Nazi Germany. One veteran said, “1945 marked the victory of the Soviet people and not that of these traitors to the Soviet Union who are running Russia.” In his address, Anpilov said Yeltsin had put too much emphasis on Russia’s (rather than the Soviet Union’s) contribution to the war, while General Valentin Varennikov argued that, “what Hitler had failed to do, the current regime had done through betrayal and lies.” Speakers called for the restoration of a unified state on the territory of the CIS, and for bringing “patriotic forces” to power in Russia.35 Under constant pressure by Congress and other opponents for basing all relations with Russia on Yeltsin, President Clinton arranged to meet with figures from across the Russian political spectrum at the U.S. ambassador’s residence in Moscow. On May 11, President Clinton held talks with Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov, who told the American president that Russia faced “balkanization” or “criminalization” if fair and democratic elections were not held on schedule. Yabloko leader Grigory Yavlinsky criticized Yeltsin’s economic policy and Russia’s “inadequate” democracy. Russia’s Choice leader Yegor Gaidar talked about a growing “tendency of confrontation” that threatened to bring back the cold war. Other prominent politicians invited to meet with Clinton included Agrarian Party Chairman Mikhail Lapshin, Democratic Party of Russia Co-chairman Sergei Glazev, “Forward, Russia!” leader Boris Fyodorov, and Women of Russia leader Yekaterina Lakhova; Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the most prominent opponent of Yeltsin, was excluded from the meeting.36 These encounters provided the U.S. president with

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some insights into Russian politics, and a chance to form a personal opinion of Yeltsin’s challengers. Apparently, Clinton saw no promising alternative to dealing with and supporting Yeltsin. Clinton and his advisers realized that relations with Russia could only worsen if the Communist leader, Zyuganov, or the rabid nationalist, Zhirinovsky, would come into power. Liberals like Yavlinsky or Gaidar, on the basis of the past election, had no sufficient support to rise to the top; the same held true for other moderate leaders. Only Prime Minister Chernomyrdin appeared to be gaining in status and influence. His businesslike meetings with Vice President Albert Gore enhanced his stature as a competent Russian statesman. At the meeting with President Clinton, Zyuganov advocated fair elections because he felt assured that his party would win control of the Duma, and consequently he himself would be elected president. Zyuganov’s insistence on holding elections served as a notice to Yeltsin to formally announce the date of the constitution-stipulated parliamentary elections. Not to repeat the 1993 election setbacks, Yeltsin knew that he needed a broadly based, well-organized political party to gain control of the Duma. His former pro-reform allies—Gaidar, Yavlinsky and Fyodorov—not only did not have popular support; they had become outspoken critics of Yeltsin and his policies. Yeltsin turned to Chernomyrdin, his stolid prime minister, to organize a pro-government, that is, a pro-Yeltsin party. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, with Yeltsin’s encouragement, set out to organize a center-right electoral bloc; its founding congress was held on May 12, 1995. The conference organizing committee told the media that all Russian regions would be represented, along with State Duma deputies from several factions and certain large enterprises, including the ZIL and Moskvich car factories.37 At the founding meeting, Chernomyrdin was unanimously chosen to lead the center-right electoral bloc, “Our Home Russia.” First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets and the Samar Oblast’s governor, Konstantin Titov, joined him as his deputies, and Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Shakhrai and Tatarstan’s prime minister, Farid Mukhamedshin, were elected to be among the bloc’s 125 board members. Chernomyrdin stressed that “stability” would be the movement’s “key word.” Responding to charges that his new electoral ambitions did not befit a prime minister, Chernomyrdin challenged his critics to “name one democratic country where the executive branch is apolitical and non-party related, and its representatives show no interest in parliamentary elections.” Shakhrai promised that budgetary funds of the government would not be used to finance Our Home Russia, which would rely on contributions from large enterprises and firms. It was reported that prominent business leaders, including the direc-

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tor of the Avtovaz Corporation and the president of the Association of Russian Banks, also attended the congress.38 Many politicians continued to denounce Chernomyrdin’s bloc as the “party of power.” Duma Press and Information Committee Chairman Mikhail Poltoranin predicted that the bloc would not have a “happy fate,” saying it was doomed to become the president’s “whipping boy.” Commenting on Chernomyrdin’s nomenclature connections dating back to his days running the Soviet gas industry, “Forward, Russia!” leader Boris Fyodorov suggested that a more fitting name for the new bloc would be “Our Home Gazprom” implying that Chernomyrdin had previously been the head of the state-owned gas industry monopoly. However, St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, a consistent supporter of Yeltsin, called on “all reformist, democratic, healthy forces in society” to support Chernomyrdin’s bloc. Sobchak said that Russia needed strong parties that could draw up intelligent programs and take responsibility for implementing them, but other pro-reform leaders refused to join.39 With the new Our Home Russia Party organized, Yeltsin was getting ready to announce the election date. But before making the date official, he traveled to Halifax, Canada, to participate in the Group-7 (with Russia’s inclusion, Group-8) meeting.

NOTES 1. New York Times, September 29, 1994. 2. At the previous summit meeting, it was agreed that high-level negotiations between the United States and Russia would continue on a regular basis. Vice President Albert Gore and Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin were nominated to conduct negotiations on strategic disarmament, trade, foreign assistance, cultural exchanges and other issues deemed important to both countries. 3. New York Times, September 29, 1994. 4. “U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability and Nuclear Security Initiatives,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, October 10, 1994, p. 676. 5. Ibid. 6. New York Times, September 29, 1994. 7. “Cold War II?” National Review, October 24, 1994, p. 20. 8. Ibid. 9. http://www.friends-partners.org/cgi-bin/friends/rferl/select-rec.pl. 10. http://unpo.org/member/chechnya/chechnya.html. 11. The heroic struggle in the Caucasus was depicted, often romanticized, by great Russian writers: Pushkin, Lermontov, Nekrasov and Tolstoy. 12. “Russia Has Long History of North Caucasus Unrest,” Reuters, September 6, 1999. 13. Ibid.

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14. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1994/03/940302.html (opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 15. Michael Mihalka, “Trawling for Legitimacy,” Transition, June 30, 1995. 16. Ibid. 17. The OSCE evolved from the so-called 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which created the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The CSCE was a loosely structured international organization that met intermittently at host countries to follow up and, to some extent, broadened the decisions of the Helsinki agreement. In the early 1990s, it was beginning to assume a more important role in European affairs, and in December 1994, it was made into a more permanent organization with multiple tasks: to assure compliance with human rights norms, monitor elections, and assist with peacekeeping. The conference (CSCE) changed its name to Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to reflect its new structure. 18. Andrew Felkay, Out of Russian Orbit: Hungary Gravitates to the West, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997), p. 67. 19. New York Times, December 11, 1994. 20. “U.S.-Russian Summit,” Department of State, June 22, 1992. 21. Felkay, Out of Russian Orbit, pp. 74–76. 22. Mihalka, “Restructuring European Security,” Transition, June 30, 1995, p. 8. 23. Piotr Switalski, “An Ally for the Central and Eastern European States,” Transition, June 30, 1995. 24. Russians often use the term rodina—mother country or native country— instead of otechestvo or otchizna, words that are derived from the root ot’ets—father, usually translated as fatherland. 25. It is worth noting Chancellor Kohl’s presence at the celebrations. Perhaps his friendly personal relationship with Yeltsin eased the possible tension of the representative of the former enemy, not to mention recent German economic aid provided to Russia. 26. “The President’s News Conference with President Yeltsin of Russia in Moscow,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, May 15, 1995. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Pavel Baev, “Drifting Away from Europe,” Transition, June 30, 1995. 30. “The President’s News Conference with President Yeltsin of Russia in Moscow,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, May 15, 1995. 31. On April 19, 1995, the Oklahoma City bombing took place. 32. “The President’s News Conference with President Yeltsin of Russia in Moscow,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, May 15, 1995. 33. “Russia-United States Joint Statement on Missile Defense Systems,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, May 15, 1995, p. 799. 34. The republican President Bush proposed that development and deployment of an anti-ballistic strategic missile system, the so-called National Missile

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Defense system, in light of the 1972 ABM Treaty and the 1995 Joint Statement, would clearly be in violation of the original treaty. 35. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1995/05/950510I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 36. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1995/05/950511I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 37. Ibid. 38. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1995/05/950515I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 39. Ibid.

12 Yeltsin Holds On

On June 14, 1995, a few days before Yeltsin’s departure to Halifax, the ominous news came that a large group of Chechen fighters had attacked the southern Russian town of Budennovsk, located in Stavropol Krai, about 75 miles northwest of the Chechen border. The gunmen had launched assaults on the local police headquarters, administrative buildings, and other sites, as well as shooting randomly at the town’s residents. According to Russian news agency reports, the gunmen had identified themselves as Chechen separatist fighters, and were demanding the cessation of Russian military operations in Chechnya in return for the release of hostages. The Chechen separatist commander, Shamil Basayev, led the fighters. Basayev, a well-known field commander in the forces of Dzhokhar Dudaev, and a group of at least fifty pro-Dudaev fighters had barricaded themselves in the local hospital with approximately two thousand hostages.1 In the meantime, at a press conference held in the barricaded hospital, Basayev demanded the withdrawal of all federal troops from Chechnya, negotiations between Yeltsin and Dudaev, and amnesty for all Chechen fighters. He threatened to shoot the hostages, beginning with “servicemen and local officials,” if those conditions were not met. Basayev claimed to have already shot five Russian officers in retaliation for a delay in allowing journalists to enter the hospital and begin the press conference. Sergei Medvedev, a spokesman for President Yeltsin, said in an interview that negotiators will do everything possible to try to convince the terrorists, but it

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seemed unlikely they would succeed. The Izvestia (Moscow’s daily newspaper) reported on June 16 that the elite “Alpha” commando team was preparing an assault on the hospital.2 In spite of the crisis, and in defiance of the Duma’s resolution to go to Budennovsk and personally negotiate with hostage takers, Yeltsin flew to Halifax. He did not want to miss the meeting with the most prestigious world leaders, and planned to turn the crisis to his own advantage; international terrorism was one of the agenda items of the G-8 meeting. The despicable Chechen terrorist attack on the civilian population in Budennovsk had given Yeltsin an unexpected opportunity to justify his decision to wage war against the rebellious province. He told his fellow world leaders that Russia had to deal with, the “kind of horrible criminals with black bands on their foreheads and they [the seven leaders] gained much better understanding that this was really the only way that we could deal with these criminal elements.” He reiterated the same to the journalists covering the meeting: “taking this [Budennovsk] example, you should judge for yourselves that Chechnya today is the center of world terrorism, bribery, corruption and Mafia. We could not do otherwise. We had to destroy those terrorists and bandits.”3 But not wanting to give the appearance that he intended to dominate the conference by focusing on Budennovsk, he hastily added: “Dear journalists, Bill [President Clinton] and I have accumulated a whole host of very important issues—global issues, not internal Russian disputes [my italics].”4 During his exchange with the press, Yeltsin did emphasize that President Clinton had the correct understanding of his position all along. As a sign of their camaraderie, he repeatedly referred to the American president as “Bill.” President Clinton was more careful in assessing the Chechen situation. As far as the latest terrorist attack in Budennovsk was concerned, Clinton condemned it: “Terrorism everywhere is wrong, terrorism in the Middle East is wrong, people blowing up our Federal building in Oklahoma City is wrong, and people taking hostages in your country [in Russia] and killing innocent civilians is wrong, and has to be strongly resisted.” But the president added: “In any democracy, there have to be political solutions to people’s differences. And so that is what we have urged.” Although President Clinton sympathized with Russia’s difficult situation, he restated the United States’ position: “ultimately, in any democracy, all decisions are finally resolved in a political manner in a way that would permit the cycle of violence to be broken.”5 Incidentally, at least in public, President Clinton refrained from informality and referred to the Russian leader only as President Yeltsin.

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While Yeltsin was fraternizing with the world leaders, the situation in Budennovsk worsened. Apparently, the initial negotiations with Shamil Basayev were unsuccessful. On June 17, the elite Russian Alpha commando team stormed the building where the Chechens had barricaded themselves with the hostages. The assault did free some hostages, but it failed to dislodge the Chechens. Later, a second attack also failed. The hostages suffered very heavy casualties—thirty died and seventy were wounded. In Halifax, when questioned about the assault, Yeltsin said that he had authorized it before his departure. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, perhaps to absolve the president from the responsibility for the failed attacks, claimed that they had not been authorized and had been “impulsively” launched by the troops without orders.6 After the costly attacks, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin personally opened negotiations with Basayev about the release of the hostages. In a series of nationally televised phone conversations, Basayev and Chernomyrdin agreed upon the conditions for the release. Chernomyrdin accepted most of Basayev’s demands, including: cessation of federal military actions in Chechnya; the opening of negotiations between the federal government and representatives of the Chechen separatist president, Dzhokhar Dudaev; and safe passage back to Chechnya for Basayev and his fighters. Basayev released about two hundred hostages on the afternoon of June 18, after he and Chernomyrdin had agreed to the terms in principle. In accordance with the agreement, General Anatoly Kulikov, the commander of joint federal forces in Chechnya, ordered all combat activities to cease as of 8:00 P.M., local time. Preparations for the release of the hostages and Basayev’s departure continued early the following morning.7 In accordance with the Chernomyrdin-Basayev agreement, a high-level Russian delegation set out for Grozny to begin negotiations with Usman Imaev, former procurator-general of the Chechen Republic, who was representing President Dzhokhar Dudaev. The talks were to resolve the question “of Chechnya’s status within the Russian Federation.” Negotiations were to begin immediately on arrival. The cessation of military activities and the opening of negotiations, if consistently implemented, represented a major shift in Russian policy toward the Chechen conflict. On the afternoon of June 19, after two days of intense negotiations, Chechen fighters, led by Shamil Basayev, left the Budennovsk hospital and departed for Chechnya in a convoy of buses. The Chechen gunmen simultaneously freed more than 764 hostages. Under the agreement, the gunmen were guaranteed safe passage back to Chechnya. As “insurance,” about 150 volunteers, including eight parliamentary deputies, were accompanying Basayev and his sev-

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enty-three fighters. Basayev had promised that the volunteers would be released upon arrival in Chechnya.8 The daring Chechen incursion into Russia had serious political repercussions. Yeltsin’s departure in the midst of the crisis was highly criticized by the media and in the Duma; his overall popularity rating dropped to single digits. At the same time, for his statesmanlike handling of the crisis and care for the safety of the hostages, Chernomyrdin’s stature improved significantly. A move to impeach Yeltsin was initiated by Duma Deputy Speaker Gennady Seleznev, a member of the Communist faction, but gathered only 150 votes, short of the 226 needed to pass it. The Duma also proposed that Yeltsin should impose a state of emergency in Chechnya. All the political parties and factions had their own ideas on how the crisis should have been handled and who should be blamed for the mistakes. The Democratic Party of Russia blamed the government, and had already collected 102 signatures in favor of a no-confidence vote in the government. The Liberal Democratic Party, Communist Party, and Yabloko also lined up in support of the no-confidence vote. Only the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, and New Regional Policy, Russia, and Stability planned to support the government. Yegor Gaidar called for the dismissal of the power ministers—Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov and Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Yegorov—and the disbanding of the Security Council itself for failure to prevent the attack.9 It was no surprise that the parties were posturing; new parliamentary elections were scheduled for December 1995. In the meantime, negotiations about the peaceful resolution of Chechnya began. An OSCE team, headed by the Hungarian Sandor Meszaros, was accepted by both sides to mediate the cease-fire negotiations, and by mid-July, an armistice was arranged. Western leaders praised the OSCE representatives for their effective and impartial management of the negotiations, and Foreign Minister Kozyrev was also highly complimentary about their role.10 Unfortunately, the OSCE-assisted midsummer cease-fire agreement did not lead to a final solution, and new fighting kept flaring up. While preparing for year-end parliamentary elections, the parties began to organize and seek allies in earnest. Alexander Prokhanov, the editor of the extremist newspaper Zavtra, called on opposition parties to unite their strength to secure victory in the upcoming parliamentary elections. On June 15, in Sovetskaya Rossiya, Prokhanov invited Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov, Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, former Vice President Alexander Rutskoi, Agrarian Party leader Mikhail Lapshin, and Congress of Russian Communities leader Yury Skokov to set aside their differences and form an alliance. He argued, “the people want to be sure that Yeltsin’s ‘temporary occupational regime’ will be eliminated.”

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He believed that the appearance of Viktor Chernomyrdin’s bloc represented the greatest threat to the opposition’s chances in the elections.11 The leaders of several democratically oriented parties and movements also decided to form the United Democratic Electoral Bloc (ODIB). Yegor Gaidar’s Russia’s Democratic Choice (DVR); Alexander Yakovlev’s Russian Party of Social Democracy (RPSD); Yury Chernichenko’s Peasants’ Party (KP); the Movement of Soldiers for Democracy; Women for Solidarity; and the Congress of National Associations of Russia (NOR) were ready to join the alliance, which would back one candidate in each single-member Duma constituency. Yury Skokov, a leading figure in the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO), said that he would also join the united democratic bloc. Gaidar said the bloc was holding talks with the leaders of democratic Russia. Grigory Yavlinsky’s Yabloko group did not take part in the negotiations.12 It is interesting to note that those democratically oriented parties did not plan to ally themselves with Chernomyrdin’s pro-Yeltsin, Our Home Russia group. According to the above alignments, Yeltsin was opposed not only by the extreme nationalists and Communists, but also by many of his former supporters, democratic and pro-reform parties. As for the average Russians, even before Budennovsk, the ever more popular opinion polls rated Yeltsin at 7 percent. The Izvestia declared, “Today, the majority of Russian citizens belong to the opposition.” A member of the Agrarian Party said to an American reporter: “Budennovsk was just the last drop that made the cup overflow. Our patience [with Yeltsin] just snapped.”13 On June 22, 1995, the State Duma passed a vote of no confidence in Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin’s government by a margin of 241 to 70, with twenty members abstaining. Originally, the vote had been scheduled over the government’s economic policies, but the events in southern Russia influenced the outcome. Only 226 votes would have been necessary for the motion to succeed. Additional measures which recommended the dismissal of Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Yegorov, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, Interior Minister Viktor Yerin, and Federal Security Service Director Sergei Stepashin, failed, primarily because Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party did not support them. The vote did not require the president to take action because Article 117, Paragraph 3 of the 1993 constitution stipulated that only after a second vote of “no-confidence in the Government of the Russian Federation . . . within three months, the President of the Russian Federation announces the dismissal of the Government or dissolves the State Duma.” According to presidential spokesman Sergei Medvedev, Yeltsin “will ignore the Duma vote since he has no grounds for not having confidence in the government.”14

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The terrorist attack in Budennovsk reawakened some of the country’s police-state traditions. As a consequence of government intelligence warning that the rebels had planned Budennovsk-like terrorist acts, Moscow Mayor Luzhkov ordered a citywide crackdown on “suspicious characters.” In one week, the police detained nearly twelve thousand people. Many of the detainees were Chechens and other swarthy Caucasians. Likely suspects were stopped and searched randomly. There was a threat of a presidential declaration of a state of emergency, which might have given Yeltsin a pretext for canceling the elections.15 Yeltsin insiders indeed advised the president to declare a state of emergency, and even the Duma had proposed it in connection with the Budennovsk raid, but such an act would have been viewed with great suspicion at home and abroad as an end of democracy. President Yeltsin was not prepared to turn to presidential rule; instead, he disregarded the no-confidence vote and tried to work with the none-too-cooperative Duma. He submitted the START II Treaty to the Duma for ratification. The agreement signed by Yeltsin and President George Bush in January 1993 called for deep reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both the United States and Russia. The treaty had practically no chance of passing in the hostile Duma. Nevertheless, Yeltsin fulfilled his promise to President Clinton that he would try to expedite the ratification of START II. Despite political setbacks and loss of popularity at home, Yeltsin was careful to preserve his image as a decisive president, a champion of reforms, and a defender of Russian democracy. He did not want to disappoint his new friends, “Bill,” “Helmuth” and the others. To some extent Yeltsin fell into a Gorbachevlike predicament, attempting to play the role of the leader of a great power abroad, while losing control at home. In October 1995, once again Yeltsin traveled abroad. His final destination was the United States. As leader of one the founding countries, Yeltsin wanted to address the United Nations on the occasion of its special fiftieth anniversary celebration. On October 20, on his way to New York, he stopped in Paris for talks with his French counterpart, Jacques Chirac. With the Bosnian crisis looming over all of Europe, and direct action by NATO being contemplated, Russia’s role remained doubtful. In Paris, President Yeltsin told journalists that he and President Chirac had agreed on the terms of possible Russian participation in a NATO-led peace implementation force for Bosnia. Yeltsin and Chirac also jointly proposed a meeting of the Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian presidents in Moscow before the end of October in preparation for the scheduled November opening of Yugoslav peace talks in New York. Undoubtedly, Yeltsin wanted his country to play a significant role in bringing peace to war-torn Bosnia.

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On October 22, in his speech at the UN General Assembly in New York, President Boris Yeltsin warned that NATO was overshadowing the UN Security Council in dealing with European security problems. He denounced NATO’s recent use of force in Bosnia as “an obvious and clear-cut” violation of UN principles. He also condemned the proposed expansion of NATO, saying it would prevent the creation of “a unified Europe.” Yeltsin added that Russia would participate in policing a settlement in the former Yugoslavia, but only under “a clear-cut mandate of the UN Security Council.”16 On October 23, after his belligerent speech at the UN, Yeltsin met with President Clinton in Hyde Park, New York, the site of the Roosevelt estate and museum. According to his own admission, Yeltsin had not been optimistic about the outcome of that encounter. Contrary to his initial belief, the meeting did not turn out to be a “disaster,” as the media had predicted it. At a joint news conference, Yeltsin was even joshing with the reporters about those dire forecasts. He emphasized that Russian and U.S. partnership was not temporary but permanent, and the two countries’friendship would solve “not only bilateral issues but issues affecting the whole world.”17 The focus of the conference was on Russia’s participation in peacekeeping in Bosnia. The two presidents agreed that Russia would participate, but the details were left to Secretary of Defense Perry and Defense Minister Grachev to work out. In addition, it was agreed that both presidents would push for the ratification of START II, and work for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. President Yeltsin was enchanted by the “most incredible scenery” of the conference site and expressed his sincere appreciation to President Clinton for inviting him there. He also praised the “wonderful museum,” which captured “the persona and the personality of President Roosevelt.” Throughout the news conference, to underline his closeness and friendship with President Clinton, he repeatedly referred to him as “Bill.” Apparently, Yeltsin expressed his appreciation for the setting and the informality of the conference: “And I must say that this kind of meeting is not an official summit, it is a working meeting, but this most successful working meeting is worthy of meetings that would last hundreds of days, and these are big issues, global issues, that affect the lives of all the people of the planet.”18 On October 21, 1995, in Dayton, Ohio, just in time for Yeltsin’s visit to the United States, an accord was reached on the cessation of fighting in Bosnia. Under the close scrutiny of the United States, the warring parties of Bosnia—Presidents Slobodan Milesovic of rump Yugoslavia, Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, and Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina— were brought together to hammer out a peace agreement. The agreement stipulated that in place of the ineffective United Nations peacekeepers, well-armed NATO forces, spearheaded by the U.S. forces, were to keep the

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antagonists apart. But for the peacekeeping operation to succeed, Russian participation had to be secured. Throughout the ongoing crisis in former Yugoslavia, Russia was resentful that the West had been taking arbitrary action against the Serbs, Russia’s traditional ally.19 Yeltsin strove to be recognized as an equal partner of the United States both in the peacekeeping effort in Bosnia and generally in international issues. In Hyde Park, Clinton prevailed on the Russian president to cooperate in Bosnia, and he offered acceptable terms to the Russian Army. After prolonged negotiations between the Russian and American defense ministers, it was agreed that Russian forces would be participating in the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia under an independent command, which coordinated its action with NATO. Eventually, five thousand Russian soldiers were sent to Bosnia. While Yeltsin was actively pursuing his self-serving foreign policy objectives, he publicly attacked his own foreign minister, Kozyrev, for being too accommodating to the West. Although Kozyrev hardly ever strayed from Yeltsin’s policies, he had been for a long time the target of the Russian nationalists and Communists. In the West, Kozyrev was considered to be a likeable negotiating partner who, at times, due to domestic political pressures, was forced to take a more nationalistic line. With an eye on the forthcoming parliamentary elections, Yeltsin was looking for a scapegoat for Russia’s failure to effectively counter the proposed NATO expansion, and also for NATO’s bombing Serbian positions, and not making a strong enough case abroad for Russia’s intervention in Chechnya. At a news conference, Yeltsin said that he “remained dissatisfied” with Kozyrev, who had “failed to coordinate the work of the Foreign Ministry and other ministries.” Kozyrev would remain in his post, however, until a “suitable successor” could be found. Later, Yeltsin softened his criticism, and suggested that Kozyrev needed a deputy to assume the burden of his administrative duties. However, Yeltsin did not explicitly reverse his previous statement that he intended to dismiss Kozyrev, and his intentions in that regard remained unclear. He might have been using his own foreign minister as a bargaining chip to pressure NATO and the United States into accommodating Russian demands on issues such as Bosnia, NATO expansion, and CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) treaty revision.20 In late October 1995, by the time Yeltsin returned to Russia, the election campaign was proceeding in earnest. The unfettered press and competitive television broadcasts treated the population to an unprecedented coverage of the forthcoming December 17 elections. Practically daily, opinion polls were published, public figures were interviewed, and a new era of political advertisements flooded the TV screens. Billboards in major thoroughfares,

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where in the past Communist slogans had dominated, were saturated with a variety of political posters. An independent Central Election Commission (CEC),21 chaired by Nikolay Ryabov, was formed to oversee all aspects of the December elections. As in 1993, a total of 450 Duma seats were to be filled. By the end of November, Ryabov, chairman of the CEC, reported that forty-three parties had registered for the elections. They were fielding 5,675 candidates for the 225 seats to be determined by party list, three times more than in 1993. There were 2,700 candidates running in the single-mandate districts, of which roughly 1,000 were independents. Seven blocs were the most active in the districts: the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (187 candidates), the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (131), Our Home Is Russia (108), the Congress of Russian Communities (90), the Agrarian Party (90), Russia’s Democratic Choice-United Democrats (75), and Yabloko (71). The number of candidates in each district ranged from three to twenty-seven, with an average of twelve. Women made up 10 percent of all candidates, while residents of Moscow made up 20 percent. Overall, the government had set aside 374 billion rubles ($83 million) for conducting the elections.22 Besides the above named parties, there was a long list of parties, blocs and organizations, which managed to secure the required 200,000 signatures. Often it was difficult to ascertain what the various parties stood for. Some appeared to be representing interest groups, others different religious associations, such as the Moslem Movement, (NUR), or the Christian Democratic Party. Some were recognizable by their names: Women of Russia, the Ecological Party, the Party of Workers’ Self-Government, All Russian Movement of Transportation Workers, Communist Workers of Russia—For the Soviet Union, Bloc of Independents, and the Beer Lovers’ Party, just to name a few.23 All the opinion polls were predicting the victory of the Zyuganov-led Communist Party. Yeltsin attempted to reunite his former supporters by calling for the defeat of the Communist Party. This presidential interference was challenged by the Communists as unconstitutional; they appealed to the Central Election Commission and threatened to sue Yeltsin. Ryabov of the CEC ruled in a somewhat Orwellian language that President Yeltsin did not violate the electoral law when he stressed the need to prevent a Communist victory in the December parliamentary elections. Ryabov said that the article of the law prohibiting “federal bodies of power and their employees” from campaigning for or against political parties did not apply to Yeltsin, because as head of state he was neither a federal body of power nor an employee of one. However, while letting Yeltsin off the hook, Ryabov suggested that Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin should step down from his

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government post for at least a week or two before the elections, when he would be campaigning for Our Home Russia.24 On December 17, 1995, 69.2 million of the eligible 107 million voters (that is, 64 percent of the electorate) cast their ballots. Each voter received two ballots, one for a single candidate, and another for one of the forty-three officially approved parties. The 5-percent party list threshold was determined on the basis of the total number of ballots cast (1.3 million votes were declared invalid). Only four parties with a combined 50.49 percent of the total number of the votes cleared the 5 percent barrier (see Table 1). Despite the devastating election setbacks, Yeltsin hastened to reassure his fellow Russians and the anxiously watching world that he would stay the course. Two days after the elections, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin went so far as to declare that there would be no government reshuffle, and he promised that even Deputy Prime Minister Chubais, who was blamed by most Russians for the mismanaged privatizations, and who was the chief target of the Communists, would remain in the cabinet. Yeltsin had more political savvy than that; he realized that changes must be made if he was hoping for even minimal cooperation from the newly elected Duma.25 Table 1 1995 Parliamentary Election Compared with the 1993 Election Party Communist Party Liberal Democratic Party Our Home Russia Yabloko Parties below five-percent Women of Russia Working Russia Congress of Russian Comm. Party of Fyodorov Russia’s Democratic Choice Agrarian Party Power to the People Other parties Independents

Percent 22.30 11.18 10.13 6.89

List 99 50 45 31

Single 58 1 10 14

Total 157 51 55 45

1993 45 63 — 25

4.61 4.53 4.31 3.98 3.86 3.78 1.67 — —

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

3 1 5 1 9 20 9 17 77

3 1 5 1 9 20 9 17 77

23 0 — — 76 55 — — —

Source: The New York Times December 30, 1995; and http//www.friends-partners.org/ friends/news/omri/1996/01/960192I.html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,new)

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On October 26, Yeltsin was hospitalized for a month with a severe heart problem, and spent another month recuperating in a government rest home. Nevertheless, during his absence from the Kremlin he kept a keen eye on the elections. Emerging from his lengthy confinement, to appease the Duma, he forced the liberal foreign minister, Kozyrev, out of the cabinet,26 and replaced him with Yegeny M. Primakov, director of the Foreign Intelligence Service and an experienced diplomat of the old school. Just as Yeltsin had sacrificed Yegor Gaidar and other reform-oriented members of his cabinet after the 1993 elections, Kozyrev became the first victim of the 1995 elections. As noted earlier, Primakov had already distinguished himself with his strongly worded note under the title “Russia-CIS: Does the Western Position Need Correction?” admonishing the West about Russia’s right to the “Eurasian” space. In his report, he had also advocated the reintegration of the CIS states.27 Primakov was known as an expert on the Middle East with close personal ties to Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein, and who had favored selling nuclear technology to Iran. Soon after his appointment, Primakov did not hesitate to reiterate his foreign policy priorities. He stressed that the NATO expansion must be blocked because it would create a security threat to Russia, and that Russia also must prevent the emergence of global hegemony of any one country. He stated that after the old war, Russian foreign policy became “over corrected” and excessively pro-Western. Primakov wanted “equal partnership” with the West, but Russian foreign policy must focus “on more vigorously and effectively defending the country’s national interests while avoiding confrontation.”28 Contrary to his post-election promise “to hold the line,” namely, to continue the reforms and the country’s democratization, Yeltsin, in his “State of the Nation” address, also began to echo the nationalistic foreign policies of his adversaries in the Duma. He criticized the West for attempting to limit Russian interests in the CIS, marginalizing his country’s role in the Bosnian settlement, and undermining the 1972 ABM Treaty. Among the accomplishments of Russian foreign policy, Yeltsin mentioned accelerated CIS integration, warming ties with China, Russian admission to the Council of Europe, and ongoing nuclear arms reductions. But to add weight to his criticism of the West, on February 23, 1996, Russia unilaterally suspended the UN-approved sanctions against the Bosnians Serbs.29 In domestic policies, Yeltsin also was changing direction by taking a more populist line. Not unlike the Duma, he also criticized his own government for serious economic shortcomings. On January 16, 1996, contrary to Chernomyrdin’s post-election assurances that “no changes would occur in the Government,” Yeltsin fired Deputy Prime Minister Chubais, the last se-

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nior government official of Gaidar’s reform team. Chubais was specifically criticized for the government’s failure to pay wages and pensions on time. It must be noted that after his party’s election victory, Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov called for the removal of Kozyrev, Chubais and Shakrai from the government.30 Yeltsin obliged, and even went a step further, severely criticizing the ineffectiveness of the entire government, singling out the prime minister, and at the same time holding the defense minister responsible for failing to win the war in Chechnya. The significant election gains of the Communists, and the very poor showing of the democrats and reformers was very disconcerting in the West. Apparently, a sickly Yeltsin was losing control of his country. Conservative politicians in the United States had been suspicious all along about the stability of Yeltsin’s Russia; and liberal politicians were perturbed about Yeltsin’s campaign in Chechnya, and the blatant human rights violations that had been taking place there. Russia’s economy was not improving and it was riddled by corruption on all levels. For lack of legal protections, foreign investments in Russia were stifled, and whatever international economic aid was given to Russia dissipated without expected results and was hard to trace. Under those circumstances, the expansion of NATO was becoming more urgent. Especially former Soviet satellites, supported by conservative politicians, implored Western decisionmakers to extend NATO’s protective umbrella, in light of a possible Communist or nationalist takeover in Russia. Under strong republican pressure, the Clinton administration had to move forward with the admission of former Warsaw Pact members into NATO. There were even demands to admit the Baltic republics into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Republican critics of Clinton’s foreign policies also advocated tightening and curtailing foreign aid to Russia until the market reforms proved to be working and corruption was wiped out. Of course, the West did not consider to what extent its policies contributed to the Communists’ electoral success. Doubts about the reforms in Russia began to emerge dating back to the Western-inspired, ill-advised “shock therapy,” the sudden removal of price controls, and the attempts to create a market economy through privatization of state-owned enterprises. Western insistence on privatization benefited only a small group of brazen entrepreneurs and led to the impoverishment of the majority of the population. The stringent conditions that had been attached to the IMF and World Bank loans drastically slowed their actual distribution of caches, and once the money was received, corrupt officials often misappropriated it. Nothing unified Russians more against the West than the proposed NATO expansion to the East. It flew in the face of all Russia’s efforts to join the West, to integrate itself with the “civilized” Western Europe, and to become an equal

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partner of the United States. Despite the claims of President Clinton and other Western heads of state about the non-offensive nature of NATO, the anti-Soviet, cold war military organization, in the mid-1990s, still represented a military threat to most Russians. From the West, Russians had received mostly promises. From IMF and World Bank loans, very little filtered down to the people. Occasionally, food relief reached the stores, but even some of that was tainted. Foreign capital investments were primarily made in the energy sector, in the exploration and development of oil and natural gas fields. At first, the flood of Western films, television programs and advertisements was welcomed, but as those were preempting traditional Russian culture, they became resented. As for advertisements, without effective legislation governing them, the Russian public was often misled. Russians were rapidly losing faith in democracy and capitalism. It must be emphasized that they had very little knowledge and experience with democracy and with the highly competitive market economy, and they had very unrealistic expectations of them. The Communists’ parliamentary plurality did not mean that the average Russians wanted to return to the past, but they desperately wanted to see improvements in their standard of living, and some guarantees as to their future welfare. They felt betrayed by their own corrupt government officials, the loss of job security, delayed or missed paychecks, vastly deteriorating social services, and the rising crime. It was reported that 30 percent of the population lived under poverty level, and more than 50 percent of the people reported a decline in their living standards as compared to 1989. Those few who had enriched themselves, the so-called “new Russians,” shamelessly flaunted their riches. Regardless of how they earned their wealth (and much of it was ill-gotten), the average Russians viewed them suspiciously. The public health system was in shambles, and life expectancy, especially for men, was dropping at an unprecedented rate. In spite of all the deteriorating conditions, on February 15, 1996, in Yekaterinburg, at his former home base, Boris N. Yeltsin officially announced his candidacy for the presidency. Yeltsin blamed the incompetence of his own government for the economic shortcomings, foreign policy setbacks, electoral fiasco, and military failures in Chechnya, without taking responsibility for the failures. Presidential elections were to be held in June 1996. The winner of the presidency must receive an absolute majority of the votes cast. If none of the candidates received more than 50 percent of the votes, a run-off election would have to be held between the two highest vote getters. Yeltsin offered himself as the savior of the country from the Communists. “My duty as a politician who launched the reforms is to consolidate all healthy forces and prevent shocks that could lead to

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civil war,” said Yeltsin at the formal opening of his campaign. Given the results of the parliamentary election and Yeltsin’s single-digit popularity rating, both of his chief opponents—the Communist leader, Zyuganov, and the ultranationalist, Zhirinovsky—had a much better chance than he to win the presidency. Considering the alternatives, the West had to stand by and support Yeltsin’s candidacy. NOTES 1. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1995/06/950616II. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 2. Ibid. 3. “Exchange with Reporters in Halifax,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, June 26, 1995, p. 1081. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1995/06/950619II. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1995/06/950619II. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 10. Andrew Felkay, Out of Russian Orbit: Hungary Gravitates to the West (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997), p. 76. 11. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1995/06/950619II. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 12. Ibid. 13. Katrina Heuvel Vanden, “Yeltsin’s Folly,” Nation, July 10, 1995. 14. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1995/06/950622I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 15. Vanden, “Yeltsin’s Folly.” 16. Ibid. 17. “The President’s News Conference with President Yeltsin of Russia in Hyde Park, New York,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, October 30, 1995. 18. Ibid. 19. Felkay, Out of Russian Orbit, p. 91. 20. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1995/06/950620I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 21. The CEC was formed on February 28, 1995, on the basis of a presidential directive (Ukaz). 22. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1995/11/951129I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 23. Ibid.

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24. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1995/11/951124I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 25. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1995/12/951220I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 26. Supposedly, Kozyrev was given a choice—keeping his cabinet post or assuming a seat in the Duma. Kozyrev had won election to the Duma from an electoral district in Murmansk. Legally, an elected person could not concurrently serve in the government and in the Duma. Considering Yeltsin’s previous denunciation of Kozyrev, it was obvious that he had to leave the government. 27. See chapter 11 for more details. 28. Izvestia, March 8, 1996. 29. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1996/02/960226I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 30. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1996/01/960117I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new).

13 The 1996 Presidential Election

The parliamentary elections gave Yeltsin a clear picture of what must be done to regain the trust of the Russian people. He had to recapture all those voters whose economic conditions had deteriorated as a result of the reforms, that is, the majority of the population. The question was, could that be done within a few months? Yeltsin was determined to prove once again that he would lead his compatriots to a better future and protect them from the evils of Communism. Yeltsin was in a fight for his political life, and the Russian electorate was in for an unprecedented electoral campaign. But long before throwing his hat into the ring, in 1992, Yeltsin was quoted by his confidant and bodyguard, Korzhakov, as saying: “I’ll not endure a second term, I need a successor.”1 By the end of 1995, many were considered, but none selected. Korzhakov, who by then had been promoted to the rank of major general and head of the presidential guard, had also become an informal advisor of the president. According to him, the following candidates were considered as possible successors of Yeltsin: Prime Minister Chernomyrdin was one of the front-runners, but as he was trying to assume more of the presidential prerogatives, Yeltsin had his doubts. Nevertheless, when Yeltsin offered him the role of becoming his heir, Chernomyrdin categorically refused to accept it. Moscow Mayor Luzhkov was another candidate. Despite his leadership abilities and resourcefulness, Luzhkov was accused of being too closely associated with the oligarchs, such as the super-rich Gusinsky and Berezovsky. There was another, rather frivolous,

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reason why Yeltsin frowned on naming Luzhkov as his successor. It was the influence of Lena Luzhkov, the mayor’s wife, on her husband’s political decisions—the memory of Raisa Gorbachev’s unpopularity was still very much alive. Luzhkov also refused a tentative offer to succeed Yeltsin. Perhaps both Chernomyrdin and Luzhkov viewed Yeltsin’s offer with suspicion, knowing his cleverness; the offer could have been a test of their loyalty. First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets was the third candidate, but Chernomyrdin could not stand Soskovets, and had often asked Yeltsin to dismiss him. The internal rivalry cautioned Yeltsin about entrusting Soskovets.2 Yeltsin had been quite impressed by the young, energetic, talented and reform-minded governor of Nizhny Novgorod, Boris Nemtsov, and considered him as a likely successor. But Nemtsov lost favor because of signing a petition against the war in Chechnya. His wife, Naina, who not so long ago had tried to convince her husband “to chuck politics,” by the end of 1995 reversed herself, and urged her husband on, “Only you, Boris, can do it.”3 Not finding or not really wanting to find a suitable replacement, Yeltsin accepted the challenge to run for a second term. No longer a novice in election campaigns, he realized that he needed a strong campaign organization, and Yeltsin named Soskovets to head his reelection committee. Not everybody in Yeltsin’s close circle of associates was happy with the appointment, but the initial moves of Soskovets were in the right direction. The needed signatures for officially registering Yeltsin with the Central Election Commission were so quickly collected that the legality of the dubious efficiency was questioned by Russia’s independent NTV television station. The charge was that government officials had used their high office to obtain the signatures—which, in fact, was true. Among other instances, the minister of transportation had railroad workers sign the petitions when they were receiving their paychecks. Another early decision of Soskovets’ pre-election analytic group was to bring in some American “image-makers” to help with the campaign. The first contact was made with Felix Braynin, a former professional hockey and soccer player, who had emigrated from Belarus to San Francisco in 1979. With $200 in his pocket, he began painting houses. By the mid-1990s, he had become a wealthy management consultant who advised Americans interested in investing in Russia. He told Soskovets that Yeltsin must have professional consultants in order to be reelected. In early February, after long negotiations, Braynin was instructed to “find some Americans,” but to proceed discreetly. “Secrecy was paramount,” said Braynin, “Everyone realized that if the Communists knew about this before the elec-

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tion, they would attack Yeltsin as an American tool. We badly needed the team, but having them was a big risk.”4 Braynin got in touch with Joe Shumate, a Republican Party expert in political data analysis, who had served as deputy chief of staff to California Governor Pete Wilson. Since Wilson’s drive for the 1996 republican presidential nomination had ended almost before it began, it was believed that Shumate and George Gorton, Wilson’s longtime top strategist, might be available to help Yeltsin. They were—and they immediately enlisted Richard Dresner, a New York-based consultant who had worked with them on many of Wilson’s campaigns. Dresner had another connection that might prove useful later on. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, he had joined with Dick Morris to help Bill Clinton get elected governor of Arkansas. As Clinton’s political guru (until his demise for gross indiscretion), Morris became the middleman on those few occasions when the Americans sought the administration’s help in Yeltsin’s reelection drive. So, while Clinton was uninvolved with Yeltsin’s recruitment of the American advisers, the administration was aware of their existence, and although Dresner denied dealing with Morris, three other sources told Time magazine that on at least two occasions, the team’s contacts with Morris were “helpful.”5 Soskovets hired the American team in strict secrecy. To preserve security, a contract was drawn between the International Industrial Bancorp Inc. of San Francisco (a company Braynin managed for its Moscow parent company) and Dresner-Wickers (Dresner’s consulting firm in Bedford Hills, New York). The Americans would work for four months, beginning March 1, 1996. They would be paid $250,000 plus all expenses and have an unlimited budget for polling, focus groups and other research. A week after signing the contract, the Americans started to work full-time, however, their boss was not Soskovets, but Yeltsin’s thirty-six-year-old daughter, Tatiana Dyachenko, a computer engineer with no previous political experience. She emerged as the most important manager of her father’s reelection campaign.6 The campaign management went through several reorganizations within a short time; Yeltsin kept realigning his pre-election staff. A group under Yuri Yarov was responsible for organizational matters; Sergey Filatov’s group had to coordinate contacts with social organizations; Igor Malashenko, the president of the NTV, was in charge of communications; and Anatoly Chubais and Victor Chernomyrdin were responsible for campaign finances. In spite of that high-powered group of professionals, Yeltsin primarily trusted his daughter and a smaller circle of advisors: Viktor Ilyushin, Sergey Filatov, Georgy Satarov and Sergey Shakhrai. Only Tatiana Dyachenko had direct contact with the American consultants, who had worked hidden from the public eye and independently from the rest of the reelection staff.7

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The history of “Tatiana’s emergence is really quite simple,” according to Valentin Yumachev, Yeltsin’s close friend and ghostwriter. “The President decided in February that the campaign Soskovets was running was going nowhere. He needed someone he could trust completely, and she was it.” None of Yeltsin’s other senior campaign officials were “what you would call pleased with Tatiana’s placement,” added Pavel Borodin, Yeltsin’s minister of the presidency, the government’s general-services manager. “But because she had no personal agenda they couldn’t plot against her. Her power obviously derived from that, but also from her native intelligence and the knowledge she gained from the Americans, who brought us a professionalism and dispassion none of us were really used to.”8 By the time the Americans set to work, the Yeltsin campaign was floundering. Five candidates, led by Communist Gennadi Zyuganov, were ahead of Yeltsin in some polls. The president was favored by only 6 percent of the electorate and was “trusted” as a competent leader by an even smaller proportion. “In the U.S.,” said Dresner, “you’d advise a pol with those kinds of numbers to get another occupation.”9 Despite low ratings and his health problems, Yeltsin was not ready to give up, but behind the scenes he did make several maneuvers to preserve his hold on the presidency. In fact, Soskovets told the American consultants right at the onset: “One of your tasks is to advise us a month before the election about whether we ought to cancel it, if you sense that we would lose.”10 Just in case, documents were prepared about calling off the election, dissolution of the Duma, suspension of opposition newspapers, banning the Communist Party, and declaration of presidential rule. Yeltsin also had secret meetings with leaders of opposition parties and presidential candidates. Negotiations were sanctioned even with the Communists about establishing a united front. The American consultants advised that Yeltsin must present himself as the only alternative to the Communists, and insist that the Communists must be stopped from taking control.11 At a news conference in April, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin cautioned about an anti-Communist campaign because, as he put it, “Currently we are negotiating with everyone, among them Communists” about the possibility of forming a national coalition.12 Yeltsin’s liberal opponent and presidential candidate, Grigory Yavlinsky, had two meetings with Yeltsin; he was offered a deputy premiership in charge of economic affairs if he would join Yeltsin. Actually, on May 11, in Astrakhan, Yeltsin announced that a troika of candidates—Yavlinsky; retired General Aleksandr Lebed, who was becoming a rather popular challenger; and centrist candidate Svyatoslav Fyodorov, ophthalmologist turned politician—would side with him. As for Yavlinsky, he refused Yeltsin’s offer, and said that he would withdraw his candidacy only if he would be made

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head of the government.13 Lebed also held onto his law-and-order candidacy. Behind the scenes, Korzhakov was trying to persuade Lebed from seeking the presidency; he even offered him a special command post, and asked him, “Why do you need politics? . . . You don’t know anything about the economy. Why would you want to be president?”14 But Lebed could not be dissuaded. Despite all the intrigues and behind-the-scenes manipulations, the campaign invigorated Yeltsin. Soon after the official announcement of his candidacy, he crisscrossed the country, and made thirty campaign stops from February 15, until the June 16 election. At first, his appearances resembled the former prearranged party meetings; he was surrounded by local officials in gray suits. On the advice of the American image makers as conveyed to him by his daughter, he loosened up; no longer did he speak from a podium, which cut him off from his listeners. His speeches became shorter and he was engaging in banter with the people. Yeltsin easily slipped into his populist mode. At one point, in Atashchev, a small village not far from Moscow, Yeltsin was supposed to lay a wreath on a war memorial and meet with local veterans. After the ceremonies, a six- or seven-year-old little boy caught Yeltsin’s attention. Yeltsin started to talk to him about his grandchildren, then asked the little boy: “Do you help your parents?” When the child said, “Yes, I do help,” Yeltsin wanted to know what the child did in his family’s kitchen garden. “We plant herbs, pull weeds, and water the plants,” said the little boy. Then Yeltsin regaled the little boy and the people around them: “Even now, I myself plant potatoes, and gather them myself. My whole family does this together. Every spring we plant about seven sacks of potatoes, and in the fall we dig out eight sacks. All through winter we eat our own potatoes.”15 That encounter must have impressed the small child, but Yeltsin’s entourage had a very hard time to keep from bursting out laughing. The campaign stop in Tatarstan had a surprise for Yeltsin and his aides. On the eve of his arrival, local newspapers featured the ancient Tatar tradition according to which victory would be assured the warrior (in that case, to the presidential candidate) who could break an earthenware jug with a pole while blindfolded. Everybody realized that this ploy was only a superstition, nevertheless, Yeltsin had to go along with the popular public event, and he could not afford to fail. Korzhakov was rightly concerned. His counterpart, Askhat, the head of security of Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaymiev, reassured him that Yeltsin would not miss. When time came for Yeltsin to prove his “prowess,” he was blindfolded with a dark green cloth, given a long pole, taken to the area where the jug was placed, spun around, and was let loose to try to break the jug. The large group of onlookers froze.

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Without much hesitation, Yeltsin headed toward the jug, carefully got around a small mound, and avoided a small hole in the ground—for a moment it appeared that he was off course, but he did make the correct turn— and with one carefully aimed strike, he broke the jug to pieces. The people were exultant. The blindfold was removed and it was never seen again. Of course, it was transparent. As Korzhakov acidly observed, “Only a blind person would not be able to see the jug.”16 Yeltsin’s appearance in Volgograd (formerly “hero city” Stalingrad) was carefully designed. The elaborate reception in his honor and the meeting with the city’s veterans took place as scheduled. His speech contained the standard attack on the reappearance of fascists against whom the defenders of that city had fought so bravely during World War II. The problem was that one of the factories, which had been converted from military production, now manufactured dildos, among other things. When the company ran short of cash and was unable to pay the workers (many of them veterans), it provided them with a supply of such phallic imitations. Yeltsin’s alert analytical group was aware of that fact, and provided the president with a punch line that would make him overcome a possibly embarrassing situation. So, in his address to the workers, he said: “As President of Russia, I do know that instead of money you have received payment in dildos. But you are such strong fellows that you have no need for such artificial means.”17 The plan worked, and the listeners roared with laughter. Yeltsin was a real muzhik, a regular fellow. In Volgograd and around the country the appearance of the energetic, vigorous, down-to-earth Yeltsin seemed to convince many that he was one of the people and could be trusted. To make himself more genuine and acceptable, Yeltsin confronted the question of his alleged alcoholism. Yeltsin’s campaign committee issued a booklet in which the candidate answered the “voters’ questions.” Some of the more interesting questions and answers were: “Is it true that I abuse alcohol?” Yeltsin’s response was, “To say ‘yes’ would be untrue. To say ‘no’ would not be convincing. People here would not believe it unless they checked it themselves. They would say, ‘What kind of Russian man are you if you can’t drink?’ So, I’ll only say that I drink, but I do not abuse alcohol.” Another question was: “Is it true that my health is not good?” Response: “Last year, because of huge emotional and physical burdens, I ended up in the hospital but the doctors quickly put me back on my feet. Today, I do not think about those ‘weaknesses’—every day I work from five in the morning until late at night. I am used to such a schedule.” Question: “They say that Yeltsin is preparing some kind of ‘armed measures’ in case he is not reelected.” Response: “Yeltsin has no such plans. He is preparing his future work as President. All talk about a coup is a provocation. Yeltsin is a legally

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elected president; he was elected by the people. He will never become a coup maker. Yes, in 1991, he climbed on a tank. Yes, in 1993, he ordered the storming of the White House. But all that was in defense of democracy and authorities legally elected by the people.”18 Yeltsin tried to appeal to all age groups. His youth appeal manifested itself in the advertising campaign “Vote or lose.” In the city of Rostov, Yeltsin was advised to demonstrate his youthful spirit and energy. Although the candidate did not feel well that day, his daughter, Tatiana Dyachenko, insisted that her father go on with the planned program, which was to address a group of young people that had assembled for a concert by the popular Zhenya Osin group. Yeltsin did make a short speech, then he turned to the bandleader and asked him to play something. The band struck up a popular melody, and Yeltsin began to dance with the lead singer of the group. It was not much of a dance, but the television cameras captured it, and pictures of a reenergized Yeltsin were flashed around the world. His image makers were elated, but his campaign staff hoped that he would not collapse. Tatiana was urging her father to project a youthful exuberance to counteract doubts about his health problems.19 The American image makers most likely inspired such advice. The episode in Rostov actually bordered on the edge of good taste—for many, the elderly, supposedly dignified president, awkwardly bouncing around with scantily-dressed young women did not make a good impression. As the campaign was heating up, Boris Yeltsin appeared with popular politicians, actors and intellectuals. He waded in the water with fishermen, went down mineshafts with miners, and wherever he went, he did not go empty-handed. He promised to pay back-wages, raised the minimum pensions, and allocated funds for hospitals, libraries and other local institutions. At industrial centers, he campaigned on a recently signed presidential decree in support of the military-industrial complex. On his campaign trip to the far north, he declared on May 24, “I’ve come with full pockets . . . Today a little money will be coming into Arkhangelsk Oblast.” On his next stop, in Vorkuta, Yeltsin announced a 133 billion ruble ($26.6 million) package of support for the Pechora coal basin. According to the head of the Independent Miners’ Union, 78 billion rubles in back-wages arrived on the eve of Yeltsin’s visit. In an attempt to win back the allegiance of miners, Yeltsin offered a variety of benefits, including subsidized summer holidays for thousands of children, grants for the construction of retirement homes in warmer regions, and a 40–60 percent reduction in railroad tariffs on coal from Vorkuta.20 The exasperated minister of economy, Yevgenii Yasin, wrote a letter to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin warning him that Russia was on the

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brink of a financial crisis. Yasin reportedly wrote that trying to pay all the wage arrears before the election was “absolutely unrealistic,” and the effort could cause currency reserves to slump to $3–4 billion.21 Despite the warning, Yeltsin’s unrealistic promises continued. His election posters were on billboards in Moscow and everywhere around the country. Television ads with his stern warnings about the danger of the return of the Communists were repeated on all channels. Both television and newspaper journalists commented favorably on Yeltsin’s campaign stops. Nevertheless, he was far from favorably received everywhere. Anti-Yeltsin signs were not uncommon at campaign stops. One of the most nagging problems he faced was the disastrous war in Chechnya. Yeltsin was aware that in order to win back his former supporters, in addition to paying back-wages and pensions, the situation in Chechnya had to be resolved. But attempt after attempt to resolve the war in Chechnya failed. As Russian casualties were mounting, Yeltsin decided to act personally. On May 28, he flew to Grozny to meet with the local residents and Russian troops. A day before his trip, Yeltsin initialed an agreement signed by acting Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiev and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on a complete cease-fire beginning at midnight on May 31. The two men also signed an agreement on the release of all hostages and other persons forcibly detained within two weeks. The cease-fire was based on the July 30, 1995, demilitarization agreement. The issue of Chechnya’s future status vis-à-vis the Russian Federation was not raised, but on May 27, ITAR-TASS, the Russian news agency, quoted the head of the Russian Presidential Commission on Federation Power-Sharing, Sergei Shakhrai, as saying that a document had been prepared that gave Chechnya “a series of special powers within the context of the Russian Federation.”22 Yeltsin’s short visit to the Chechen capital, Grozny, received broad news coverage. That was to be only another example of proving the candidate’s courage, and reminding viewers of Yeltsin’s heroic stand in August 1991. In fact, it did not take much courage to make a four-hour stop at a heavily guarded airport, decorate a few soldiers, meet with some Chechen representatives and quickly fly out. Nevertheless, the Chechen question was at least temporarily removed as a contentious issue from the campaign. By the end of May 1996, election polls showed Yeltsin shoulder to shoulder with the Communist Zyuganov and ahead of the other candidates. Both the Russian and the Western media followed the election campaign in detail and with great fascination. After the Communist success at the December 1995 Duma elections, the possibility of Zyuganov’s election appeared very real. As mentioned before, coalition with other candidates and behind the scenes negotiations between Yeltsin and other contenders were

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ongoing, and the possibility of cancellation of the election was also discussed within Yeltsin’s inner circle. In fact, Yeltsin had his staff prepare two documents, one studying the possible effects of the cancellation of the election, and another holding the election as it had been announced. But the chief of the presidential guard, Korzhakov, made a colossal mistake when he told a reporter that in order to avoid the outbreak of a civil war, the election might be cancelled, and concurrently, it might be necessary to declare a national emergency. By then, Yeltsin had already made his choice, and he publicly scolded Korzhakov and reaffirmed that the elections would take place as scheduled.23 Any indication of Yeltsin’s canceling the election would have jeopardized his support for reelection from the West. From the onset of his candidacy, Yeltsin had Western support. In February 1996, Germany’s chancellor, Helmut Kohl, at an official state visit, openly endorsed the candidacy of his “friend,” Boris Yeltsin. Soon after Kohl’s visit, the president of the International Monetary Fund, Michel Camdessus, came to Moscow to arrange for the availability of substantial credits to Russia for the next three years. On March 13, Yeltsin traveled to Egypt to participate in a high-level conference on the problems of peace in the Middle East, and to fight against the spread of terrorism.24 In April, the so-called G-7+1 meeting (leaders of the seven most advanced industrial nations, plus Russia) took place in Moscow with Yeltsin’s active participation. The very fact that the most powerful countries of the world accepted Yeltsin’s invitation to come to Moscow was by itself a coup. Directly following that meeting, which bolstered Yeltsin’s international prestige, he had a five-hour private meeting with President Clinton. In the midst of the election campaign, both the G-7+1 meeting and the follow-up meting with President Clinton were definite pluses for Yeltsin. During a joint news conference, Yeltsin emphasized and kept repeating it for the domestic audience that Russia was recognized as an “equal partner” of the United States, and Russia was a “great power.” Even before the question and answer part of the news conference, Yeltsin stressed that the conference had not been called to assist his election campaign, but had already been agreed upon in Halifax.25 When journalists probed the question of the forthcoming election, they were getting evasive responses. Did President Clinton promise to support Yeltsin’s candidacy during their previous meeting in Egypt with the proviso that Yeltsin would also help his reelection by clearing up some negative aspects of the two countries’ relations? Clinton responded that people were not particularly concerned with foreign affairs, and as long as presidents of democracies were doing their work well for the benefit of their people, they would be rewarded. He added that the presidents made significant progress

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in working toward the reduction of strategic weapons, which would make their compatriots and the world safer, and would be appreciated by the people. When the question was raised what would happen to U.S.-Russian relations if the Communist candidate should be elected, Yeltsin was quick to answer: “That will not happen because I will be reelected.”26 Clinton praised Russia’s successes and the two countries’ cooperation: The political and the security partnership between our nations is strengthened by our growing commercial ties. We’ve worked hard to take down the old barriers to trade and to investment. Thanks to President Yeltsin’s leadership, 60 percent of Russia’s economy is now in the hands of its people, not the state. Inflation has been cut; democracy is taking hold. Since 1993, trade between the United States and Russia is up 65 percent. And the U.S. is now the largest foreign investor in this great nation. That’s helping to create more good jobs and new opportunities in both our countries.27

President Clinton was asked, why didn’t the United States and other Western democracies provide Russia with Marshall Plan-like assistance? The president blamed the Republican Congress for shortsightedness in cutting back on foreign aid in general, but as for Russia, he added: “The United States has strongly supported the multi-billion-dollar aid package coming out of the international financial institutions. Even though our assistance to Russia has dropped in the last couple of years, the Nunn-Lugar funds are still helping the denuclearization movement, and funds that I asked the Congress to adopt in the ’93–94 time frame, those funds have by no means been all used up.”28 But during that election year, even previously delayed money from the West was expedited. In mid-May, the IMF released the latest portion of its $10.1 billion loan, while World Bank President James Wolfensohn was in Moscow negotiating loans worth $1.4 billion, showing confidence in Moscow’s economic course. On May 25, Foreign Economic Relations Minister Oleg Davydov signed a memorandum on a 1 billion DM ($650 million) loan from Germany.29 Some astute observers believe that the Russian presidential election was in fact decided in Davos, Switzerland, where members and invited guests of the World Economic Forum gathered. As a potential victor of the Russian presidential sweepstakes, Genanady Zyuganov, head of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, made his appearance in Davos and addressed the assembled world leading figures in politics, finance and culture. He was forthright and told his esteemed audience that they should accept the fact that Russia would be voting for his ideas, and “when the Communists will come to power in faraway Russia, basically, they [the world leaders] will have nothing to fear.”30

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The representatives of the world’s financial elites were not especially perturbed by the possibility of the Communists’ return to power in faraway Russia. But two of the Russian oligarchs who were present in Davos became quite concerned. Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, who up to that point were in tough competition for increasing their wealth and influence, realized that their common enemy was Zyuganov. The reemergence of the Communists would have threatened their recently acquired financial empire, and they agreed to combine their resources to keep Yeltsin in power. Still in March, at a private meeting, Berezovsky and Gusinsky accompanied by Chubais confronted Yeltsin and warned him that unless he changed his lackadaisical and inapt advisors, he would lose the election.31 In no uncertain terms, Yeltsin was told that he needed an energetic and resourceful manager like Chubais, unlimited funds, and the power of the mass media, especially television. Yeltsin was not used to being told what to do, and at first he resented the interference of those outsiders. Only in January he had fired Chubais from the government, blaming him for the country’s economic problems and for the Communists’ December victory. A few months later, was he to put his fate into Chubais’ hands? But the oligarchs insisted that only Chubais would be able to affect Yeltsin’s victory. After some hesitation, Yeltsin’s better political instincts prevailed, and he listened. For a while, the original Soskovets’analytical group also remained in existence, but it was rapidly losing influence. With Chubais heading the new advisory group, the oligarchs were ready to extend unlimited funds to Yeltsin’s reelection campaign. They also delivered two powerful and influential television stations, the Gusinsky-owned independent NTV, and the Berezovsky-controlled ORT, in support of Yeltsin’s reelection. Up to that time, the NTV was highly critical of Yeltsin, and had been mercilessly criticizing the war in Chechnya. As a result of Gusinsky’s alliance with Yeltsin, NTV suddenly changed direction. Its director, Igor Malashenko, joined Yeltsin’s reelection staff and became responsible for all mass media connections. That new group was also closely connected with Yeltsin’s daughter, Tatiana Dyachenko. As for the rest of the media, they did not have to be bought. Russia’s free press thrived under Yeltsin. Journalists did not have to be told whom to support; they were ready to do everything possible to keep the Communists from coming back into power.32 In contrast with the reenergized, repackaged and flush-with-money Yeltsin campaign, Zyuganov was unable to capture the imagination of the people. He was depicted as a sluggish, worn-out bureaucrat with an undistinguished career. He appeared to be just as bored with his own speeches as were his audiences. He also was unable to generate campaign funds to advertise effectively on television. Zyuganov’s public endorsements paled in

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comparison to Yeltsin’s. Yeltsin was endorsed by all the democratic organizations in Russia; the pro-reform activists; the Russian Orthodox Patriarch Aleksii II; many of the best-known actors and artistic directors, such as Nikita Mikhalov, Igor Moiseyev and Yuri Nikulin; and chess champions Anatoly Karpov and Gary Kasparov. Endorsements from abroad were pouring in, from: Leni Fischer, president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe; Natan Sharansky, former Russian dissident, later minister of labor in Israel; Helmut Kohl, German chancellor; and Alain Juppe, French prime minister (he had endorsed Yeltsin’s reforms, but not formally his candidacy). Yeltsin was also supported by most of the heads of state of the CIS countries.33 Zyuganov had no supporters from abroad. At home, leftist parties and some of the nationalist organizations endorsed his candidacy. Among the other presidential candidates, Zhirinovsky was supported by Jean-Marie Le Pen, the extreme nationalist leader of the French National Front. Yavlinsky had endorsements from some of the most disenchanted former Yeltsin supporters, such as Yelana Bonner, the widow of Andrei Sakharov, and Sergei Kovalyov, human rights advocate. Lebed and Gorbachev had very few notable endorsements.34 Altogether, eleven candidates’ names appeared on the June 16, 1996, presidential ballots. Unless a candidate earned more than 50 percent on the first turn, a runoff election had to take place between the two highest vote getters. Initially, Yeltsin’s strategists wanted Lebed to withdraw, but they realized that Yeltsin could not get the necessary 50 percent vote on the first ballot, and they needed Lebed on the ballot because he would siphon votes from Zyuganov. In fact, Lebed, who was short in campaign funds, was given money to campaign more vigorously.35 On June 16, 1996, Russia went to the polls. Of the 108,495,023 eligible voters, 74,515,019 valid votes were cast, accordingly, the turnout was 69.818 percent. At the last minute, Aman Tuleev, one of the eleven official candidates, withdrew in favor of Zyuganov (see Table 2). The runoff election between Yeltsin and Zyuganov was scheduled for July 3, 1996. The big surprise of the first round was Lebed’s very good showing. The Yeltsin election team apparently had made the right decision by keeping Lebed in the race with the proviso that if he did not get a sufficient number of votes in the second round, he would throw his support to Yeltsin. On June 18, Yeltsin appointed Lebed as Security Council secretary (although he did not make the appointment public right away) in hopes of winning over his supporters. Yeltsin described his alliance with Lebed, who had often been critical of the president, as “the union of two politicians and two programs.” Yeltsin said that Lebed would help to correct his course on

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Table 2 Official Election Results—June 16, 1996 Candidates Boris Yeltsin Gennady Zyuganov Aleksadr Lebed Gregory Yavlinsky Vladimir Zhirinovsky Svyatoslav Fyodorov Mikhail Gorbachev Martin Shakkum Yury Vlasov Vladimir Bryntsalov Aman Tuleev Against all candidates

Percent of Votes 35.28 32.03 14.52 7.34 5.70 0.92 0.51 0.37 0.20 0.16 0.00 1.54

Number of Votes 26,665,495 24,211,686 10,974,736 5,550,752 4,311,479 699,158 386,069 277,068 151,282 123,065 308 1,153,921

Source: Russiyskaya gazeta, June 22, 1996, and OMRI I, June 1996.

military reform, security issues, and the battle against crime and corruption. As for Lebed, he was looking forward to being in a good position for the year 2000 presidential election, perhaps sooner, considering Yeltsin’s poor health.36 The period between the first and second round of the elections was rocked by a financial scandal. On the evening of June 19, two of Yeltsin’s campaign officials, Sergei Lisovsky and Arkadii Yevstafev, were arrested while leaving the government’s White House. They were carrying a Xerox cardboard box containing not copying papers, but $500,000 cash. Lisovsky had served as head of advertising of the Yeltsin campaign, and used his connection with show business figures to organize the “Vote or Lose” concerts in support of Yeltsin. Yevstafev was formerly the deputy managing director of Russian Public TV (ORT). Lisovsky and Yevstafev had been working closely with Anatoly Chubais in preparing Yeltsin’s reelection campaign. Apparently, those two were detained and questioned for eleven hours by Korzhakov’s security service with the knowledge of Mikhail Barsukov, the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB).37 About 11:00 P.M., the chief of Yeltsin’s election campaign team, Chubais, found out about the arrest. He immediately informed Yeltsin, Lebed and Chernomyrdin. As soon as he learned about the incident, the newly appointed secretary of the Security Council, Alexander Lebed, ordered the detainees to be released. Upon his release, Lisovsky claimed that

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FSB officers tried to obtain such information that could tarnish the image of Yeltsin’s election campaign organizers, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and Chubais. Apparently, Korzhakov was well aware of the half-million dollars in cash in the office safe of Deputy Finance Minister German Kuznetsov, who also served as Yeltsin’s campaign treasurer. It was hardly a secret to insiders as a part of the illegal campaign contributions to Yeltsin’s campaign. But Korzhakov tried to make it appear that he was concerned about the money because it could have been stolen from Yeltsin’s funds by the staff, and therefore he vigilantly “kept an eye on it”—a hidden listening device was installed in that office. Actually, at the moment the two campaign workers had picked up the money, Korzhakov was tipped off, and his security officers stopped Lisovsky and Yevstafev and detained them. In the meantime, Korzhakov consulted with his colleague and friend, Barsukov, at the FSB, because (as he claimed later) the possession of undocumented foreign currency was against the law. While the detainees were pressed for incriminating information, Korzhakov went to the Presidential Club to meet with Barsukov. They wanted to discuss the latest development. Alerted by Chubais, Tatiana Dyachenko called Barsukov, who was still at the club, and demanded the immediate release of the two campaign workers. She also contacted Korzhakov, and threatened him that she would wake the president and tell him about the unnecessary interference, and how such an arrest would jeopardize the election. Korzhakov claimed that the “shady businessman,” Berezovsky (with an Israeli passport), made Tatiana call him. He implied that the money must have come from Berezovsky. He rejected Tatiana’s request, saying that nothing could be done until the next day, and then the president would have to decide. Still, late that night, Yeltsin was awakened and called Korzhakov, who promised Yeltsin that the whole affair would be kept quiet, and they agreed to sort things out next morning.38 Chubais and Berezovsky knew better; they did not wait until the morning. The gauntlet was thrown down by Korzhakov, who wanted to regain the upper hand, and perhaps to blackmail Yeltsin to forgo the second round of the elections. With the appointment of Lebed, Korzhakov was losing influence, and the balance within Yeltsin’s inner circle was shifting. Up to that point, Korzhakov had practically unlimited access to Yeltsin; he had risen from a lowly personal bodyguard to the rank of general. He had considered himself as a close friend of the Yeltsin family. He and his friend, Barsukov, had been strong supporters of the war in Chechnya, and both were concerned about what would happen to them if Yeltsin lost the election. As mentioned above, Korzhakov had publicly advocated the cancellation of the presidential election altogether. After winning the first round, Yeltsin’s

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victory in the second round was imminent. In addition to Barsukov, Korzhakov was closely linked with the minister of defense, Grachev, and the original head of Yeltsin’s reelection campaign, Soskovets. Korzhakov was also aware that one of the conditions of Lebed joining Yeltsin was the dismissal of Grachev. The reinstatement of Chubais, and Berezovsky’s growing influence also spelled disaster for Korzhakov. The arrest of the two associates of the Chubais group was intended to be a preemptive first shot, but the shot misfired.39 As stated above, soon after the arrest, Chubais found out about it, and instead of trying to keep it quiet, he went public. After informing Yeltsin, Lebed and Chernomyrdin, he contacted the president of NTV television, Igor Malashenko, who went on the air with a special edition devoted to the arrest of Lisovsky and Yevstafev. A popular anchor, Yevgeny Kiselev, gave detailed information on the detainment, calling the incident “the attempt of the enforcement bodies to sabotage the run-off.”40 Chubais gave the same explanation to Yeltsin. The president was told that the two campaign workers were on their way to make payments to popular musical groups for concerts, which they had performed on behalf of Yeltsin. Knowingly intercepting these people was an act of provocation, clearly to embarrass the president. As stated above, Korzhakov and Barsukov tried to assure Yeltsin that they could keep the whole event from the public. Barsukov, when questioned by the press, kept insisting that “nobody was arrested.” When Yeltsin summoned Korzhakov and Barsukov into his office, they claimed that carrying so much unaccounted-for cash captured the attention of the security people on duty, who were just doing their job. By then, however, Yeltsin was aware of the entrapment, and he asked for a letter of resignation from the two men. They were amused by this request and never believed that Yeltsin would fire them, but then he went on television to make public Lebed’s appointment as the new secretary of the Security Council. Yeltsin then explained that his campaign team needed to be revitalized with new people, thus, he was replacing Soskovets and exempting Korzhakov and Barsukov from their duties. The president said: “All the time I am being criticized on account of Barsukov, Korzhakov and Soskovets. Should the president be obliged to work for them? They have taken too much for themselves and given too little in return.”41 Yeltsin’s explanation was quite vague about the specifics of the dismissal; many people did not quite understand the meaning. According to Korzhakov, even his elderly mother misunderstood Yeltsin’s announcement. She had already been wondering about her son’s good fortune—nice apartment, new furniture, and many other much-desired consumer goods—she scolded him, “You had taken much, you should

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have shared and given [to the president], then he would have not driven you out.”42 Although Yeltsin’s phrasing was poor, the message was clear: the “evil spirits” were banished from the Kremlin. Freeing himself from people who had become a burden, a decisive Yeltsin once again appeared to be ready for the July 3 runoff election, but the facts were quite different. A totally exhausted Yeltsin fell ill with a debilitating heart condition. Still, appearances had to be kept up, and Yeltsin’s staff did their best to keep the president’s condition from the public. Chubais told the press that the president was in excellent condition. When he was asked why Yeltsin cancelled a previously arranged trip to France, Chubais explained that the president had decided against the trip because of possible civil disorder that might occur. Chubais did not spell out what might happen, but hinted, “this is not poker or even chess, it is a much more serious situation—in essence it could be bloody.”43 In the midst of the flurry of activities, the source of the half-million dollars was never revealed. Nothing was mentioned about it in the media, at least not before the second round of the election. Just before the runoff election, Yeltsin suffered a serious heart attack, and he completely disappeared from the public view. His new press secretary, Sergey Yastrzhembsky, kept insisting that the president was much too busy working with documents. But Yeltsin had a long history of heart trouble and a series of other illnesses. In 1987, he was hospitalized for several days with serious chest pains after his ouster as Moscow Communist Party boss. In 1991, heart trouble forced him to stop working, and he spent two weeks by the Black Sea recuperating. In 1994, during his return flight from the United States, Yeltsin became incapacitated and failed to get off the plane to meet with the Irish prime minister at a stopover in Ireland. The official version of the diplomatic faux pas was that the president was exhausted and had overslept. The press accused him of being too drunk to get off, but Korzhakov claimed that Yeltsin was too sick. Korzhakov vividly described the scene inside the plane. In the middle of the night, Naina, Yeltsin’s wife, awakened Korzhakov in a panic, saying that the president had fallen, was not moving, and had possibly suffered a heart attack. Yeltsin’s plane always had several physicians on board. The team of doctors feverishly worked on the president to revive him. Their diagnosis was heart attack. Complete rest was necessary, as even the slightest movement could be dangerous. The officials accompanying the president decided hastily that Deputy Premier Soskovets would have to meet the Irish prime minister, Albert Reynolds. Upon reviving, Yeltsin made a feeble attempt to go himself, trying to stand up but falling back on his bed. He insisted that he must go because it would be a scandal not to, but he didn’t even

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have the strength to button his clothes. The plane was on the tarmac for twenty minutes, and the Irish officials and the military honor guard were already in place, waiting. Despite all his efforts, Yeltsin could not get on his feet, and Soskovets met with the Irish delegation. Yeltsin was given strong sedatives and slept through the rest of the flight to Moscow.44 Still in 1994, during his visit to Kazakhstan, Yeltsin was shown needing help in walking. In December of that year, he dropped out of sight for two weeks for minor nose surgery. In July 1995, he was hospitalized for two weeks with acute heart trouble and he had to stay for another two weeks at a health resort. At that time, his aides released a photo showing him at work, but to the embarrassment of the Yeltsin press office, it was quickly identified as an old picture. In October 1995, he was hospitalized again for a month with heart problems. Aides claimed that it was exhaustion after the strenuous U.S. summit.45 Despite the artful cover-up and Naina Yeltsin’s insistence that her husband was suffering from a bad cold and a sore throat, a week before the decisive runoff election, not too many people believed the official explanations of Yeltsin’s absence. The hard-won first round was in serious jeopardy. Would people entrust the presidency to an ailing man? But the country had already made its choice. On July 3, 1996, Boris Yeltsin was elected president of the Russian Federation. He received 40,202,349 votes, that is, 53.82 percent of the votes cast. His opponent, the Communist Gennady Zyuganov, received 30,104,589 votes, 40.31 percent of the votes; 3,603,760 people, 4.82 percent voted against both candidates.46 How did Yeltsin manage to prevail? As they say, victory always has many parents, and in this case, many also claimed credit for Boris Yeltsin’s victory. In a cover story of Time magazine, “Rescuing Boris,” undue credit was given to the American advisors who had been hired by Soskovets. The subheading of the magazine article proclaimed: “The Secret Story of How Four U.S. Advisors Used Polls, Focus Groups, Negative Ads and All the Other Techniques of American Campaigns to Help Boris Yeltsin Win.”47 It was proudly proclaimed that a small group of American political consultants using unseemly methods of American campaigning was responsible for Yeltsin’s rapid rise in the polls and eventual victory. Indeed, after the quick failure of California Governor Pete Wilson’s attempt to get the presidential nomination in 1996, the temporarily unemployed Republican’s “hired guns” willingly sold their services to the Russians for a good price in addition to unlimited expenses. The Time article detailed their behind-thescenes activities and exaggerated influence. They did not speak Russian, they did not know anything about the country, they worked in isolation, and

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their only link to the election campaign was the president’s daughter. The link was important, but their impact was minimal. When Berezovsky and Gusinsky realized that their financial empire was at risk, they provided unlimited funds for the president’s reelection. But can anybody really believe that more than 40 million Russians could be bought? The media was very helpful by constantly reminding people of the worst aspects of the Soviet era, which certainly aided Yeltsin’s rise at the polls. Yeltsin also helped his own popularity as he warmed up to campaigning. People wanted to believe even his unrealistic promises of paying all the back-wages and pensions, and building new schools, hospitals and recreation centers. His promise to resolve the Chechnya conflict and his short “heroic” trip to Grozny disarmed many of his critics. One must not forget about the prestigious foreign endorsements of Yeltsin. Indeed, all those things contributed to Yeltsin’s victory, but the election was not really between Yeltsin and Zyuganov, it was the choice between the past and future. The Russian people, despite its uncertainties, had chosen the future.

NOTES 1. Aleksandr Korzhakov, Boris Yeltsin: Ot rassveta do zakata [Boris Yeltsin: From Sunrise to Sunset] (Moscow: Interbuk Publisher, 1997), p. 308. 2. Ibid., pp. 311–312. 3. Ibid., p. 317. 4. Michael Kramer, “Rescuing Boris,” Time, July 15, 1996. Time supposedly had the information about the American consultants before the elections, but it agreed to withhold it. Two Russian newspapers covered basically the same story, with many direct quotations from Time; Soversenno sekretno, August 2, 1996, and Zavtra, July 16, 1996. Neither of these papers have a high reputation for objective reporting. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Kommersant-Weekly, July 9, 1996. 8. Michael Kramer, “Rescuing Boris,” Time, July 15, 1996. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid.; also Soversenno sekretno, August 2, 1996, and Zavtra, July 16, 1996. 11. Argumenty i fakty, July 11, 1996. 12. RIA, Novosti, April 25, 1996. 13. http://www.nns.ru/restricted/persons/eltzin51.html. 14. Korzhakov, Boris Yeltsin: Ot rassveta do zakata, p. 363. 15. Ibid., pp. 331–332. 16. Ibid., pp. 335–336. 17. Ibid., p. 335.

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18. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1996/05/960529I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 19. Leonid Mlechin, Formula Vlasti: Ot Yeltsina k Putinu [Formula of Power: from Yeltsin to Putin] (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2000), p. 469; and Korzhakov, Boris Yeltsin: Ot rassveta do zakata, p. 335. 20. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1996/05/960527I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 21. Ibid. 22. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1996/05/960528I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 23. Leonid Mlechin, Formula Vlasti, pp. 471–473. 24. On April 26, in Shanghai, China, Yeltsin signed an agreement with China on military cooperation in Russia’s border regions; the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan also signed that agreement. 25. “The President’s News Conference with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia in Moscow,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, April 21, 1996. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. Leonid Mlechin, Formula Vlasti, p. 462. 29. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1996/05/960527I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 30. Leonid Mlechin, Formula Vlasti, p. 462. 31. Ibid., p. 462. 32. Ibid., p. 466. 33. http://users.aimnet.com/~ksyrah/ekskurs/presend.html. 34. Ibid. 35. Leonid Mlechin, Formula Vlasti, p. 477. 36. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1996/06/960618I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 37. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1996/06/960620I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 38. Korzhakov, Boris Yeltsin: Ot rassveta do zakata, pp. 10–16. 39. Leonid Mlechin, Formula Vlasti, p. 480. 40. http://users.aimnet.com/~ksyrah/ekskurs/presend.html. 41. Leonid Mlechin, Formula Vlasti, p. 483. 42. Korzhakov, Boris Yeltsin: Ot rassveta do zakata, p. 19. 43. Leonid Mlechin, Formula Vlasti, p. 487. 44. Korzhakov, Boris Yeltsin: Ot rassveta do zakata, pp. 206–212. 45. “A Look at Yeltsin’s Health,” Washington Post, December 10, 1997. 46. “Resultaty vyborov Presdidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii” [Election Results of the Russian Federation], July 3, 1996; www.fci.ru. 47. Michael Kramer, “Rescuing Boris,” Time, July 15, 1996.

14 The Struggle against NATO’s Expansion

The hard-won election was over. Despite the shadows cast over Yeltsin’s re-election, Western leaders breathed a sigh of relief upon his victory. Contrary to the suggestions of his closest advisors such as Korzhakov and Barsukov, Yeltsin did not resort to tanks and coercion to stay in power, but took the risk and faced the democratic challenge of his opponents. Under Yeltsin, Russia was moving toward accepted norms of democracy, and his reelection brought the promise of a continuation of economic reforms. With all his faults, Yeltsin was a known quantity to most Western leaders. Considering the alternatives, he was the only Russian leader who was able to keep the country from reversing its course or fall into disarray. The illegal campaign finances, manipulating the media, and taking advantage of incumbency were not unique to Russia. The democratic West has had its share of these manipulations—such abuses were a relatively small price to pay for the preservation of democracy in Russia. After the election, the immediate task was to settle the Chechen conflict. The newly appointed secretary of the Security Council, Lebed, undertook that assignment. Bringing Lebed in the fold before the second round of the election was a real coup for Yeltsin. When asked about Lebed’s future after the election, Yeltsin solemnly stated: “Under the directive appointing Aleksandr Lebed stands not only my signature. I attest that next to my signature are the signatures of millions of voters who voted for him on June 16. Their trust cannot be betrayed. I am certain Aleksandr Ivanovich has come [to us]

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and will be staying for a long time.”1 Despite Yeltsin’s pledge, it did not work out that way. Lebed’s stay in Yeltsin’s service turned out to be short-lived. Nevertheless, Lebed did succeed in ending the war in Chechnya. After a humiliating defeat of the Russian troops in Grozny, on August 10, 1996, Lebed was appointed as Yeltsin’s personal representative for Chechnya. On August 31, Lebed signed a truce agreement with the Chechen leadership with the proviso that the Russian troops would withdraw from Chechnya. The issue of Chechen independence was deferred for five years.2 When accepting the appointment as secretary of the Security Council, Lebed overestimated the importance of that position. When important decisions were at stake, Yeltsin did not rely on the Security Council; he usually consulted with the inner circle of advisors and with the so-called “power ministers.” In fact, the Security Council met only once during Lebed’s tenure. The logical appointment for Lebed should have been minister of defense. As for his negotiations in Chechnya, Lebed overstepped the authority of his position when he signed the official documents—the minister of interior, Anatoly Kulikov, or the minister of defense, Rodionov, should have signed those documents. The military considered the agreement a betrayal. Thus, Lebed was becoming the target of Minister of Interior Kulikov, and the military leadership of the pro-Kremlin Chechens accused Lebed of yielding Grozny to bandits. In Chechnya, Aslan Maskhadov, commander of the Chechen forces (later, president of Chechnya) declared: “As soon as the Russian troops leave, we’ll establish an Islamic government.”3 On September 7, Lebed, who considered himself a “straight shooter,” gave an interview to the German magazine Stern. The journalists asked Lebed about the command structure of the war in Chechnya: Was Moscow in charge, or did the local army commanders make decisions on their own? Lebed said that most of the orders did come from the Kremlin, but he appended his response with an anecdote from the Brezhnev era: “Today, after a long and extended illness, a not fully conscious General Secretary set out to work to fulfill his official obligations. Nowadays, decisions are also made under similar conditions in Moscow.” The journalists, somewhat taken aback by the analogy, probed Lebed’s flippant statement: “This is not very flattering to Yeltsin. Are you calling your boss an old, sickly party functionary, who has already fulfilled his historical task?” “Should I rather not tell the truth?” responded Lebed with a question. “Are you also saying, ‘It’s time for him to leave’?” asked the one of the interviewers. Lebed repeated his previous response: “Should I rather not tell the truth?”4 Yeltsin’s disappearance just before the runoff election signaled the very poor health of the president. The inauguration was an extremely low-key affair. On August 9, 1996, his physicians propped Yeltsin up just long enough

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that the very weak and sickly looking president could take the oath of office. After the abbreviated ceremony, Yeltsin once again disappeared from public view. On September 5, it was officially announced (what practically everybody had already known) that Yeltsin was suffering from a debilitating heart condition and needed triple or quadruple bypass surgery.5 The best international and Russian heart surgeons were summoned for consultations. Still, before the operation, the ailing president decided to see Lebed. After his meeting with Yeltsin, Lebed talked to the press, sounding convinced that the ailing president was “on his last leg.” He said that considerable changes must be made on all levels of the government, the system must change, and the executives must be changed. He said that he was preparing to carry out such changes. When asked when he expected to become president, he did not specify the date, but responded: “It’s in the cards.” After such arrogant and self-serving public statements, Lebed’s fate was sealed. On October 17, Yeltsin dismissed him for noncooperation with other members of the government, and for creating an unhealthy atmosphere, as if the 2000 campaign for the presidency had already been started.6 The previously promised long cooperation ended abruptly, and Lebed was gone from the Kremlin, but he was not gone from politics. Had there been a new presidential election soon after his dismissal, he certainly would have won. According to surveys, at that time, his popularity rating was 60 percent.7 On November 5, Yeltsin underwent open-heart surgery. The operation lasted seven hours, and Yeltsin’s heart was stopped for sixty-seven minutes; he needed a quintuple bypass. Just before the operation, he temporarily signed over the presidential authority to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. But as soon as he regained consciousness the following morning, he reclaimed his authority. Nevertheless, for two months he was under physicians’ care.8 Just as he was recovering and was beginning to work, he suffered a serious setback. On January 8, 1997, he came down with double pneumonia and was forced to stay away from his office for several weeks.9 Although members of Yeltsin’s inner circle, such as Chubais and Satarov, insisted that the president’s mind was absolutely clear and that he was able to give instructions by phone, in fact, for months the country was running without a president. By winning the election, Yeltsin was hoping that he would have another four years to enact decisive economic and political reforms to prove to his countrymen and the world that Russians had made the right choice by reelecting him. But his illness took its toll. He was recuperating slowly and was unable to regain his previous high level of energy. To protect his health, people of the presidential administration and his family and friends tried to spare him from exhaustion by forming a protective shield around him. In-

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formation was carefully filtered before it reached the president. A period of stagnation set in. During Yeltsin’s recuperation, Chubais was in charge of the presidential administration. Only a handful of people were able to meet with the president regularly: the heads of the administration and secretariat, the press secretary, and the head of the protocol department. Others, including the ministers, met only occasionally with Yeltsin. Mountains of documents needed the president’s approval, but they were processed irregularly and often returned with notations that were not clear to the subordinates and didn’t indicate whether those documents had been approved or still needed more work. Numerous high-level appointments were also delayed, and when they were eventually made, the inner circle of the administration screened the candidates haphazardly.10 As Yeltsin slowly began to resume his work, he once again started to look for a successor. He was again considering the young and popular governor of Nizhny Novgorod, Boris Nemtsov.11 Nemtsov had made a name for himself by introducing successful reforms and turning his region into a free-market laboratory. He had enabled collective farmers to acquire land, and he had issued regional bonds to promote development. He had also given tax breaks to struggling enterprises and started to improve the rapidly deteriorating social services in Nizhny Novgorod. He was not anxious to leave his home base, and was well aware of some of his handicaps on the national scene—he was Jewish, and an outspoken opponent of the war against Chechnya. Even a possible presidential succession in 2000 did not tempt him. Finally, Yeltsin’s daughter, Tatiana Dyachenko, personally called on Nemtsov with a message from the president that the country needed him. Not unlike Yeltsin, who had been very reluctant to leave his well-established base in the Urals, Nemtsov reluctantly accepted an appointment to the cabinet as first deputy premier. Yeltsin welcomed him in the Kremlin in front of television cameras, and said that he had a challenging offer for him. Nemtsov was to build a new team of “fresh young men from scratch.”12 Yeltsin did keep his long-faithful collaborator, Chernomyrdin, as prime minister, but surrounded himself with young reformers like Chubais and Nemtsov. While trying to regain the initiative in domestic affairs, Yeltsin was confronted with a serious challenge in foreign affairs. As much as the reappearance of the reformers in top positions in Russia was welcomed in the West, President Clinton and Chancellor Kohl, “good friends” of Yeltsin, disregarded Russian objections and relentlessly proceeded with their plan to expand NATO. As stated earlier, regardless of public disclaimers to the contrary, bringing a Western military alliance close to Russia’s borders was perceived by most Russians to be a serious threat to their country’s security.

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No other issue united Russian politicians of different persuasions more than their opposition to the expansion of NATO. Yeltsin’s minister of defense, Igor Rodionov, also took a belligerent stance against NATO’s expansion to the East. He charged that the military balance in Europe would be unsettled. If NATO went ahead with the expansion, he warned: “We would have to take countermeasures.”13 On another occasion, Rodionov declared that Russia would consider changing its military doctrine, seek new alliances, and withdraw from the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), and possibly abrogate START I and START II agreements.14 The Duma formed an anti-NATO association to respond to the threat of NATO’s expansion. Sergey Glotov, a member of the Duma, and a former Strategic Rocket Forces officer, told the Russian news agency ITAR-TASS that Russia should “put into production a new generation of tactical ballistic missiles to restrain the unprovoked expansion of NATO.”15 On March 12, 1997, the Duma passed a resolution by a vote of three hundred to one, harshly condemning NATO’s planned expansion, which would “detract from efforts to construct a new global security system in Europe.” That resolution backed the government’s attempt to secure an agreement from the Western powers that would be “restrictive and contain effective security guarantees for Russia.” The resolution also insisted on enacting a legally binding international treaty that would have to be subject to parliamentary ratification.16 On February 28, 1997, Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, addressing the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, warned that the planned expansion of NATO would seriously damage Russia’s relations with the West. He stated that Moscow wanted a moratorium on NATO’s expansion. On March 2, 1997, upon his return from an extensive visit to Western Europe, Primakov briefed Yeltsin about the results of his negotiations about the Russian-proposed legally binding NATO charter. The West was balking on concluding such a treaty. Yeltsin decided to confront Clinton personally on that issue at the forthcoming Helsinki summit on March 20–22, 1997.17 With the Duma and public sentiment behind him, Yeltsin arrived in Helsinki in a brand new Russian-built (but with Swiss-furnished interior), $70 million IL-96 airplane.18 He was quick to note that while everybody expected to see a frail Yeltsin, instead a wobbly Clinton arrived in a wheelchair as a result of a recent knee injury. To prove his physical prowess, Yeltsin playfully pushed Clinton around in the wheelchair, but behind the playfulness, he wanted to give evidence that he, that is, Russia, would not be

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pushed around and would firmly oppose the Clinton-supported NATO expansion.19 Shortly before the Helsinki summit, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright reiterated the United States’ firm commitment to the enlargement of NATO. She vowed that the alliance would not be deterred from admitting former Soviet-bloc states. Under those circumstances, the summit promised to be the most difficult since the end of the cold war. Both sides appeared to be intransigent, and there was much at stake. Yeltsin could not appear weak to his domestic critics, the Communists and the nationalists. Clinton also had to prove his country’s determination in the face of Russian opposition. That was the eleventh meeting of the two leaders, who by then had managed to establish a very good working relationship. Despite the unlikely agreement on NATO at the onset of the summit, both parties sounded an optimistic note. Yeltsin’s spokesman, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, said “We express very careful optimism,” that the summit offered the chance to “lay down an outline for Russian-American partnership in the 21st century,” and he even praised NATO for showing signs of understanding Russia’s security concerns about its former cold war antagonist. Clinton said, “We never had a meeting that didn’t result in constructive progress,” and although there was a “tough agenda” awaiting the leaders, he was also optimistic.20 Yeltsin realized that despite his most impassioned objections, he could not prevent the forthcoming expansion of NATO. He, at least, had to receive some concessions to make the inclusion of former Warsaw Pact countries into the Western military alliance more palatable. Clinton and the Western leaders refused to agree to a legally binding treaty with Russia, which would have to be ratified by the NATO members’ parliaments. The treaty demanded by the Russians specified that no nuclear weapons or even any NATO troops would be placed on the territory of the new members. Clinton was keenly aware of the fact that Yeltsin could not go home empty-handed; a compromise had to be reached. Clinton could not risk endangering Russia’s ongoing cooperation in the reduction of nuclear arms, and the American president also needed the continued presence of Russian troops in Bosnia. Another consideration was to keep Russia from selling weapons to Iran and other rogue states.21 At their joint news conference, the two leaders agreed to disagree on NATO, but claimed that U.S. and Russian relations had not been damaged, and a compromise was reached even on future relations between NATO and Russia. In his opening statement, President Clinton stated: “We didn’t come here expecting to change each other’s mind about our disagreement, but we both did come here hoping to find a way of shifting the accent from our dis-

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agreement to the goals, the tasks, and the opportunities we share. And we have succeeded.” The president continued: President Yeltsin and I agree that NATO Secretary General Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov should try to complete negotiations on a NATO-Russian document in the coming weeks. It would include a forum for regular consultations that would allow NATO and Russia to work and to act together as we are doing today in Bosnia. It would demonstrate that a new Russia and a new NATO are partners, not adversaries, in bringing a brighter future to Europe.22

President Yeltsin also claimed that their first summit meeting after their re-election was a success. He listed five areas where agreements had been reached: “on European security, on parameters of future reductions in nuclear forces, concerning the ABM missile treaty, on chemical weapons, and we also signed a U.S.-Russian economic initiative.” He concluded his opening statement: I would say that emotions sometimes get the upper hand in assessing Russian-American partnership. This is not the approach that Bill and I have. . . . We want to overcome that which divided us for decades. . . . I firmly believe that we will be able to resolve all issues which, for the time being, are still outstanding. Today’s meeting with Bill convinced me of this once again. We will be doing this consistently, step by step. We will have enough patience and decisiveness.23

As for the special treaty between NATO and Russia, Yeltsin did get a commitment that no nuclear weapons would be placed on the territory of new members, and the former Warsaw Pact infrastructure would not be utilized, and also that Russia would be consulted in future NATO actions. To give more legal weight to the treaty, it was agreed that all sixteen heads of state of NATO countries, the general secretary of NATO, and the Russian premier would sign the document before the formal invitation of new members. Yeltsin insisted that the agreement should be binding. Clinton explained that state-by-state ratification would be too cumbersome and time-consuming. The signing ceremony between Russia and NATO was to take place before the July 1997 NATO summit in Madrid, when the official invitation to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland would be issued.24 The proposed NATO-Russia agreement was criticized for making too many concessions to Russia. The new members would become only “second-class” members of the organization—with no nuclear weapons on their territory and no NATO troop buildups. When asked about those issues, both presidents objected to those allegations. Clinton emphasized that the security guarantees and the military command structure would be available to all

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the new members. He pointed out: “NATO is a different organization today than it was. We have a different mission. What is the most important thing NATO is doing today? Working in Bosnia. NATO has a major partnership with Russia in Bosnia.”25 Clinton, as in the past, reiterated that his administration was firmly committed to the 1972 ABM Treaty, and claimed that there was no congressional majority that would want to override that agreement. As for the status of the still unratified START II agreement, Yeltsin firmly announced: “As far as Russia is concerned, I expect that the State Duma will make a decision based on my advice, and ratify that treaty.” Clinton only wished that he could give such firm guarantees on behalf of the Congress. Both presidents promised that as soon as START II was ratified, negotiations on guidelines for START III and even more radical reductions of nuclear weapons would begin. Yeltsin objected to an accusation that Russia yielded on NATO’s expansion in return for substantial economic aid. “The statement on economic issues which we just signed,” said Yeltsin, “is assistance to the private sector for making investments in Russia. This is assistance to American citizens, not to Russia.” To support his statement, Yeltsin added: “We’ve held four tours lasting from 45 minutes to an hour and a half each—the order of looking at those issues was as follows: First, we looked at European security and NATO; secondly, the ABM issue; and then we took up chemical weapons. Then we talked about START III, that is, the reduction of further strategic weapons. And only after that, we started talking of economic issues.”26 Despite Yeltsin’s objections, the agreed-upon financial aid package did not eliminate, but helped to tone down Russian criticism of NATO’s eastward expansion. The American assurance given on the ABM Treaty also helped. The signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the promise of advancing the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention were gestures of ongoing cooperation between the two nations, despite their disagreement on NATO. The American side made another concession to placate Yeltsin, by announcing that the United States would support Russia’s full participation in future meetings of the Group of Seven (G-7) of the most economically advanced democracies.27 Contrary to pre-summit predictions of very difficult negotiations and possible confrontations, the meeting ended amiably. The presidents once again gave evidence of their very good personal rapport, and did not hesitate to joke around publicly. Yeltsin consistently referred to his counterpart as “Bill”; Clinton privately also addressed Yeltsin as “Boris,” although he remained more formal in public. Accordingly, the media began to refer to the two presidents’ meetings as the “Bill and Boris” show. The apparent warm personal relations made broaching of difficult issues easier.

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As agreed in Helsinki, on May 27, 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin met at the Elysee Palace in Paris to sign the NATO-Russia Founding Act. In the Founding Act’s preamble, NATO and Russia stated that they no longer considered each other as adversaries. The Founding Act committed NATO and Russia to build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area, based on principles of democracy and cooperative security. A NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council was established in Brussels. In the Founding Act, NATO reaffirmed that it had no plans to deploy nuclear weapons in the new member states.28 On June 20–21, 1997, Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton met again in Denver at the scheduled summit of the advanced industrial democracies. At that time, on President Clinton’s recommendation, Russia was admitted into the Group of Seven as a full member. Originally, Gorbachev had been invited as a special guest to attend the meetings of the G-7 group in appreciation of his easing of tensions between East and West. Consequently, invitations to Yeltsin followed, hence the appellation Seven plus One or G-7+1. Finally, in Denver, the Group-Seven plus One officially became Group-8. Full membership was a long-sought-after recognition to Boris Yeltsin. He believed that as a president of a nuclear superpower and a fledging democracy, he should be an equal partner with the economically advanced countries’heads of state. For him, it was a question of national and also personal prestige. He did not want to be just a “special guest” at annual meetings of world leaders who were discussing momentous political and economic questions with worldwide implications. Once becoming part of that exclusive organization, he fully enjoyed his participation in the “club-like atmosphere.”29 Originally, in 1975, the leaders of six industrially developed nations (United States, France, England, Germany, Italy and Japan) got together to discuss the complexities of world oil pricing mechanisms. The meeting was informal but confidential, like “gathering around the fireplace.” The leaders liked the format and decided to broaden the topics and continue with such meetings. Eventually, Canada joined the group, hence the Group of Seven.30 As discussed above, Russia joined the world’s most exclusive club in 1997. The meetings took place behind closed doors, without foreign ministers or guards; only the heads of state participated, each with one assistant, and the translators. As Yeltsin became a member, his designated assistant was Alaksandr Livshitz. The meetings usually began with a discussion, and the leaders made their points without a specific order. At times, new topics surfaced unexpectedly. It was the assistant’s responsibility to contact the support staff instantly by phone, and advise the president about the implications of the newly raised issue.

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Yeltsin related that, in general, discussions were divided into three parts. The first part consisted of economic and financial issues. Russia’s strategic goal in that connection was the removal of all economic restrictions, and the recognition that its market economy entitled it to eventually enter into World Trade Organization. Yeltsin complained about the paradoxical situation—on one hand, Russia received financial aid and credit, and on the other hand, the same countries raised protective tariffs against Russian imports. The second aspect of the discussions dealt with security issues and current political developments. In that regard, nuclear security and especially the evolving competition for nuclear weapons concerned the world leaders. The third round of discussions dealt with global problems, such as the ecology and demography, but also human rights violations were considered.31 Those summit meetings did not zero in on the problems of any one of the participating countries. Doing so would have denigrated that country’s status as an equal. No one country tried to monopolize the meetings. Those meetings provided the leaders with an opportunity to get to know each other on a personal basis, and develop trust in each other. It must be noted that although Russia was officially admitted into that exclusive club, it was not a part of the financial preparatory committee, and it did not participate when the leaders addressed international finances.32 The camaraderie among the world leaders pleased Yeltsin; he enjoyed hobnobbing with his peers. Such meetings provided him with a short reprieve from domestic political struggles. An example of informality occurred during the 1998 Birmingham Summit in England. In the midst of the discussion, British Prime Minister Tony Blair suddenly closed his folder and said, “It’s 4:00 P.M., of course, I already cannot go to the stadium, but I can still catch the soccer game on television.” It happened to be the final game of the British Cup competition between the teams of Arsenal and New Castle. The leaders took their cue from Blair, and good-naturedly stopped the meeting and headed for the television. Apparently, at that point, football became more important than the topic under consideration.33 In comparison with the G-8 meetings, formal bilateral summits were always carefully scripted, and the press closely scrutinized practically every move of the leaders. Even before becoming a full-fledged member of the Group of Eight, Yeltsin had developed close personal relations with Western leaders. On a personal level, he felt more comfortable with his contemporaries—German Chancellor Helmuth Kohl and French President Jacques Chirac. Yeltsin prided himself on having devised the so-called “meetings without neckties.” Those were informal meetings of heads of state, preferably away from the Kremlin, in scenic country dachas. Such getaways pro-

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vided Yeltsin and his guest a unique opportunity to relax, talk confidentially, and occasionally touch upon politically sensitive topics. In 1997, in Strasbourg, Yeltsin suggested to Kohl and Chirac that the three of them should meet informally, in Russia. Yeltsin hoped that a twoto-three-day meeting would take place in Yekaterinburg, in the “mighty Urals,” where Europe meets Asia. Due to scheduling complications, the encounter lasted only a day and a half, and it was held just outside of Moscow. Yeltsin once again insisted that Kohl and Chirac were more to him than just “colleagues” or “partners.” All three of them were “children of the war [World War II],” they were from the same “mold—open, straight forward and blunt. From the very beginning they felt sincere sympathy toward one another.”34 The Russian press warmly greeted the informal meeting of the three heads of state, but the Western media suspected some intrigue. According to Yeltsin, England sent out feelers and Italy also let it be known that it would have liked to participate in such “meetings without neckties.” But at that time, Yeltsin wanted to meet only with his “friends.” Was Yeltsin attempting to drive a wedge between the United States and some of its European allies, France and Germany? Chancellor Kohl, although a strong advocate and friend of Yeltsin, was an unlikely candidate to do anything to weaken NATO. The French always tried to cut a different path, and Chirac was probably more open to temptation. But according to Yeltsin, generally innocuous topics were discussed—questions of transportation, a possible joint development of a jumbo passenger jet using the Russian-built Antonov 70 as a base, the formation of a tri-country exhibit, establishing a Franco-German-Russian university, and preparing a joint text about the “20th Century of Europe.” Yeltsin did, however, broach the idea of a “greater Europe,” stretching to the Urals, which would enhance Russia’s influence in European affairs. The idea was not new; already Gorbachev had talked about “our common European home,” trying to upgrade Russia’s significance and downplay the United States’ role in European affairs. Yeltsin’s revival of this concept upon meeting with Europe’s most important leaders implied certain anti-Americanism. That idea did not get any support from the visitors, but Chancellor Kohl reassured Yeltsin that he and Chirac, as leading members of the European Union, would do their utmost to make certain that the expansion of NATO would not lead to the isolation of Russia.35 On November 1, 1997, Yeltsin arranged another informal get-together with Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. The meeting took place in Krasnoyarsk, approximately halfway between Moscow and Tokyo. On the surface, it was just another meeting without neckties—the two leaders, Ryu and Boris, were going fishing on the Yenisey River. In fact, away from

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publicity and journalists, one of the most troubling unresolved foreign relations problems was to be discussed—the eventual conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and Russia. Near the end of World War II, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and consequently had seized four small southern Kuril Islands.36 Ever since the end of the war, Japan had been attempting to reclaim those islands, but neither the Soviet Union nor Russia was prepared to yield on that issue. Because of this contentious problem, there was no peace treaty signed between the two countries. Both leaders were under heavy domestic political pressure to stand firm. Having launched his ill-fated campaign in Chechnya to preserve the integrity of the Russian Federation, Yeltsin could hardly hand over Russian possessions to Japan. He had also been under constant attack by his nationalist and Communist opponents in the Duma for betraying his country’s interests. But the Russian economy desperately needed foreign capital, and a substantial increase of Japanese investments would have been very helpful. At the same time, official Japanese trade agreements or credits were kept at bay as long as Russia was holding onto those islands. In Krasnoyarsk, the informal fishing trip was to provide the two leaders with an opportunity to come to some sort of agreement on the islands, and to move toward a peace treaty. Yeltsin and his Japanese guest were housed in a magnificent hunting lodge, and everything was prepared by the local governor to make the leaders’ stay enjoyable. To avoid any mishaps, the fishing took place in a protected section of the river. The Japanese premier lived up to the image of a tourist, taking numerous pictures. To his delight, he even caught a fish (according to Yeltsin, this was prearranged by the hosts). Nevertheless, Yeltsin had nothing against the artificiality of the arrangements, as long as they put his guest in an excellent mood. Despite all their efforts, the two leaders could not bring about a concrete plan for a peace treaty. They announced only a joint commercial fishing agreement and guarantees for additional Japanese investments in Russia. As far as the peace treaty was concerned, both leaders committed themselves to work hard and conclude a treaty no later than the year 2000.37 At bilateral summits, G-8 meetings, and informal get-togethers with President Clinton and other heads of state, Yeltsin did his utmost to uphold Russia’s prestige as a great power, and concurrently, to present himself as one of the most influential world leaders. With its thousands of nuclear weapons, Russia could not be ignored. But after its military debacle in Chechnya, its failing economy, and ongoing political strife between the legislature and the president greatly diminished Russia’s role in world affairs, especially in the rapidly growing globalization of international trade. Rus-

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sia’s loss of influence manifested itself by its inability to prevent NATO’s expansion. NOTES 1. Leonid Mlechin, Formula Vlasti: Ot Yeltsina k Putinu [Formula of Power: From Yeltsin to Putin] (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2000), p. 495. 2. “Chronology of Russian Involvement in North Caucasus,” Reuters, December 25, 1999. 3. Mlechin, Formula Vlasti, p. 499. 4. Ibid., p. 501. 5. New York Times, September 6, 1996. 6. Mlechin, Formula Vlasti, pp. 503–504. 7. Ibid. 8. Leon Aron, Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 651. 9. Timeline, “The Career of Boris Yeltsin,” New York Times, December 31, 1999. 10. Mlechin, Formula Vlasti, pp. 507–509. 11. Before the 1996 election, Yeltsin rejected Nemtsov for his outspoken opposition to the war in Chechnya. 12. Aron, Yeltsin, pp. 657–658. 13. “Russia Opposes NATO Expansion,” The Associated Press, December 18, 1996. 14. Nezavisimaya gazeta, November 28, 1996. 15. “Duma Anti-NATO Association,” ITAR-TASS, January 29, 1997. 16. “Duma Blasts NATO Expansion,” http://www.friends-partners.org/ friends/news/omri/1997/03/970313I.html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 17. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1997/03/9703I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 18. http://www.russiatoday.com/special/summit/summit2.php3. 19. Boris Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon: Pazmyshleniya,Vospominaniya, Pechatleniya [Presidential Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, and Impressions] (Moscow: ACT Publisher, 2000), p. 152. 20. http://www.russiatoday.com/special/summit/summit2.php3. 21. Regarding arms sales to Iran, a secret confidential agreement was in effect between Russia and the United States since 1995. According to this pact, through 1999, Russia could deliver previously contracted arms sales to Iran (avoiding U.S. sanctions), but after that date it would stop selling even conventional arms to that country. The treaty was negotiated and signed by Vice President Albert Gore and Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin on June 30, 1995, within the framework of ongoing meetings of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, which had been established in 1993. See John Broder, “Despite Pact by Gore, Russian Arms Sales to Iran Go On,” New York Times, October 13, 2000.

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22. http://frwebgate2.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/waisgate.cgi?WAISdocID= 7187228397+0+0+0–&WAISaction=retrieve. 23. Ibid. 24. http://search.rferl.org/nca/features/19970324152504.html. 25. http://frwebgate2.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/waisgate.cgi?WAISdocID= 7187228397+0+0+0–&WAISaction=retrieve. 26. Ibid. 27. http://search.rferl.org/nca/features/19970324152504.html. 28. http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nis/chron_summits_russia_us.html. 29. Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon, pp. 150–151. 30. Information on Russia’s participation, first as G-7+1 and later as G-8, has been described by Aleksandr Livshitz (Yeltsin’s special representative to the group) in an interview given to the Moscow radio station, Echo, on July 14, 2000 [http://www.echo.msk.ru/interview/interview/51.html]; and also by Yeltsin in his memoir, Prezidentsky Marafon, pp. 149–165. 31. Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon, pp. 160–161. 32. http://www.echo.msk.ru/interview/interview/51.html. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid., p. 128. 35. Ibid., pp. 129–130. 36. The islands taken by the Soviet Union, but claimed by Japan, are Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu. 37. Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon, pp. 137–138.

15 Government Reshuffle and Economic Crisis

Although unable to prevent NATO’s eastward expansion, Yeltsin did manage to extract some compensation from the West. The signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act alleviated some of Russia’s objections to the expansion, and the act provided Russia with a consultative status in the North Atlantic Organization. Russia’s formal acceptance into the G-7 group gave Yeltsin the symbolic recognition of “great power” status. In addition to the political gains, substantial economic aid was to follow. Russia’s faltering economy badly needed economic aid and infusion of foreign investments to enable the government to pay its obligations and shore up the value of the ruble. As a rule, Yeltsin represented his country’s interests in foreign affairs, and the day-to-day management of the country was in the hands of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. In 1993, Yeltsin entrusted him to pursue ongoing negotiations with the United States primarily to enhance cooperation in the areas of space and energy. Those negotiations became known as the GoreChernomyrdin Commission.1 In addition to his domestic responsibilities, semiannual meetings with the U.S. vice president gave Chernomyrdin international exposure and experience. Always a loyal supporter of Yeltsin, before the 1995 parliamentary election, Chernomyrdin organized a moderately liberal center-right party (Our Home Russia) on behalf of the president, to counter the Communist domination in the Duma. That undertaking did not yield the desired results. When rumors had it that Chernomyrdin

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might run for the presidency in 1996, he hastened to reassure Yeltsin that he would under no circumstances run against him. With Yeltsin’s precarious health, Chernomyrdin’s stature was on the rise. On March 13, 1998, Yeltsin once again came down with a severe respiratory illness, and he was prescribed complete bed rest. Instead of taking his time to recover, Yeltsin stirred up an unexpected political crisis. On March 23, he announced the removal of Chernomyrdin, surprising both friend and foe, and especially his stolid and longtime faithful prime minister. There was a great deal of speculation in the press, both at home and aboard, about Yeltsin’s surprise move. Publicly, Yeltsin claimed that Chernomyrdin was too slow to introduce reforms and that he fell behind in paying wages and pensions. Also, living standards were not improving. Privately, Yeltsin gave Chernomyrdin a lot of credit, praised his loyalty, his readiness to assume responsibility during the president’s illnesses, and his ability to make necessary compromises, but stated that he was just not dynamic enough. Yeltsin searched for Chernomyrdin’s replacement among the new generation of reformers, looking for a technocrat rather than an accomplished politician. Yeltsin denied any jealousy on his part in regard to Chernomyrdin’s growing popularity.2 There were many discussions about the sudden dismissal of the prime minister. Some suggested that Chernomyrdin was let go from the government because he had been selected by Yeltsin to succeed him, and thus was given free hands to prepare for the succession. Other insiders claimed that Chernomyrdin was only temporarily relieved to spare him from blame for a forthcoming financial disaster. The thought was that some less experienced person would take the blame, and then Chernomyrdin would return to deal with the problem. Contrary to the above rumors, it was also heard that since Chernomyrdin and his government had done nothing to stave off a pending budgetary crisis, one of the most influential financial oligarchs, Berezovsky, said: “We (italics added) will replace Chernomyrdin.” The oligarchs must have warned Yeltsin about the ever-worsening financial situation, and the president must have acted on their advice. Despite Yeltsin’s stated reasons for the dismissal of his premier, in the United States and in the West, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission’s meetings were viewed as the meetings of two future presidents.3 While the future presidency of Al Gore was indeed encouraged by Clinton, Chernomyrdin was not Yeltsin’s choice for the high office. In fact, Yeltsin resented even the appearance of any infringement on his presidency and the presumption of his endorsement. Yeltsin selected the thirty-six-year-old, little-known Sergei Kiriyenko, to be his new prime minister. Kiriyenko came to Moscow with the former proreform governor of Nizhni Novgorod, Boris Nemtsov. At first, Kiriyenko

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was made deputy minister of fuel and energy, later minister. Yeltsin described Kiriyenko as a representative of a new generation, a reformer, although not like his first premier, Guidar, who was a scholar and a revolutionary democrat. Kiriyenko was also well educated and free of the influence of any political or financial group. In addition, Yeltsin claimed, “he would not shy away from any confrontation and worry about the consequences of his actions. He would become a real technocratic premier, the type the country needed.”4 The Duma was not ready to affirm Yeltsin’s new liberal nominee, and rejected Kiriyenko twice. Only under the threat of imminent dissolution did the Parliament vote to accept Yeltsin’s choice. The wrangling in the Duma lasted for a month. During that time, under worsening financial conditions, the country was left without a government. Kiriyenko, having just emerged from the bruising confirmation battle, hardly had a chance to act decisively on the imminent economic crisis. The economic crisis had begun in Asia, and investors were fleeing from emerging markets, making it more difficult for Russia to finance its chronic budget deficits by selling treasury securities. Only by offering ever-increasing interest rates of Short-Term Government Bonds (GKO) was the government able to obtain funding. By May 27, 1998, the Central Bank raised its key interest rates to 150 percent. Concurrently, the Kiriyenko government tried to sell a 75 percent stake in its last giant, still state-owned oil company, Rosneft, for $2 billion, but found no takers. To avoid a fiscal disaster, an emergency appeal was made to the IMF for help, but the release of a previously approved IMF disbursement was tangled up in bureaucratic red tape. At that point, Yeltsin decided to go directly to the power behind the Fund: the Clinton administration. He dispatched the controversial Anatoly Chubais to Washington as his chief debt negotiator.5 On the basis of previous negotiations, Chubais had already earned creditability in the West, while he was utterly despised in Russia. As head of Russia’s hasty and haphazard privatization program, he was blamed for much of the resulting sufferings and shortcomings. Ironically, Chubais, after successfully managing Yeltsin’s reelection campaign, running the presidential administration during and following Yeltsin’s heart surgery, and being one of the deputy premiers in the Chernomyrdin cabinet, was just dismissed, together with Chernomyrdin during the latest governmental shakeup. After his dismissal, he was named to head Russia’s electrical monopoly, United Energy System.6 That was not Chubais’ first dismissal, but as the fiscal crisis loomed over Russia, the president once again turned to him for help.

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In Washington, Chubais made a strong case for support. He told the top U.S. treasury officials that the United States would have a “historic opportunity” to come to Russia’s aid because “there used to be a few reformers [in the government]. Then there were a good number of reformers. [Now] they are all reformers.” Strobe Talbott, deputy secretary of state, promised President Clinton’s support of Russia obtaining IMF and World Bank loans, but the president was concerned about Congress’s reaction to another Russian bailout. The Russians were told to obtain additional funds from commercial banks to show that the Clinton administration was not their sole supporter. President Clinton made a carefully worded announcement that the United States would back Russia’s quest for financial assistance from the IMF and the World Bank “if necessary and if Russia agreed to the stiff conditions.”7 No figure was mentioned in the president’s announcement; U.S. officials were considering $5–10 billion, but were leaning toward the lower end. Despite U.S. support, the IMF made very tough demands on Russia before it would approve any new loan. One of the most severe requirements was the reduction of the annual budget deficits from 5.5 to 2.5 percent. While the negotiations in Washington continued, the situation in Moscow worsened. On June 23, 1998, realizing the seriousness of the conditions, at a joint government and Duma meeting, Yeltsin urged the representatives to enact an anticrisis economic plan because “the crisis has become so acute that any delay could result in social and political dangers.”8 On July 8, despite the skyrocketing interest rates, the Russian Treasury could not find enough bidders to raise cash for the government. The Central Bank’s hard currency and gold reserves fell to $12 billion, half the level of the previous year. (By comparison, China’s reserves were about $150 billion.) Realizing the imminent collapse of Russia’s financial system, at the urging of the Clinton administration, the IMF offered Russia $17 billion emergency loans to be issued in eighteen months. The World Bank and Japan added another $5.6 billion with the provision that Russia demonstrated its compliance with the IMF’s conditions. The primary aim of the emergency loan was in order to bolster Russia’s hard currency reserves to avoid the devaluation of the ruble. On July 13, 1998, the Kiriyenko government received the good news that Russia was offered $22.6 billion in loans.9 That loan went far beyond any economic aid that had been promised to Yeltsin in Helsinki for his reluctant acquiescence to NATO’s expansion. It was a desperately needed bailout of the Russian government. The threat of instability, social upheavals, and Yeltsin’s possible loss of control, prompted the Western leaders to come to his aid. Personal relations and the growing trust between “Bill” and “Boris,” special friendships with “Helmuth” (Kohl), and “Jacques” (Chirac), and the friendly fishing trip in

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Siberia with “Ryu” (Ryutaro Hashimoto), could not be ignored in obtaining the generous bailout package. The Russian financial market responded positively to the promised IMF loans. Holders of the short-term Treasury Bonds were ready to convert their bonds to longer terms, but only as long as the government made the conversions in dollars. That meant that in case the ruble was devalued, the government, not the investors, would lose money. Under the circumstances, it was becoming increasingly more difficult to keep the ruble pegged to a fixed rate with the dollar.10 Although the Russian legislature enacted some of the IMF-stipulated austerity measures, they did not go far enough. The IMF decided to send a warning to the Duma by reducing the first installment of the loan to $4.8 billion from $5.6 billion. The next installment of $5.6 billion was due in September. In Moscow, the Yeltsin administration worked feverishly to enact directives to ensure future loan payments. In Washington, Chubais was fighting hard with IMF officials to get their final approval of the entire relief package. The republican-led U.S. Congress criticized the proposed huge Russian bailout. Although the IMF package did not contain direct U.S. funds, Dick Armory, republican majority leader, threatened to lead a floor fight against the administration’s requested $18 billion contribution to the coffers of the IMF. Those U.S. contributions were needed because the Asian financial crisis had already severely depleted the IMF’s reserves.11 Traditionally, August has been vacation time in Moscow; those who are able escape from the city and travel to the countryside. Far from completing the necessary reforms, and in spite of the looming financial crisis, the Duma adjourned, and Yeltsin was headed for a five-week vacation. On his way, while stopping in Novgorod, he firmly assured the people that the ruble would not be devalued, and that he would not disrupt his vacation to return to Moscow. According to him, that would have been a clear sign of a pending disaster. However, less than a week later, on August 17, 1998, disaster struck. The financial market collapsed, the ruble had to be devalued, and Yeltsin had to rush back to Moscow. The Duma was called back for an emergency session.12 Kiriyenko and the president of the Russian Bank, S.K. Dubinin, issued a set of emergency regulations in an attempt to stabilize the country’s financial and budgetary policies: 1. The Bank of Russia allowed the ruble to float within new limits of the “currency corridor” between 6 and 9.5 rubles to the dollar. 2. State securities (treasury bills and federal loans) were to be cancelled until December 31, 1999, and they were to be exchanged for new securities.

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3. A temporary restriction was placed for Russians on large-scale foreign currency operations. A ninety-day moratorium was imposed on repayment of credits received from non-Russians, on payment of insurance on credits insured by the mortgage securities, and on the payments under fixed-term contracts in foreign countries. Non-residents were prohibited to invest funds into ruble assets with the time for repayment of up to one year. 4. The Bank of Russia advocated setting up a payment pool by the strongest Russian banks to maintain the stability of interbank settlements. Concurrently, the Russian Bank began to stabilize the banking system by building up the most viable domestic and foreign banks. 5. The Russian government promised to issue short-term treasury bills on the financial markets. 6. The government requested that the Federal Assembly tighten control over the flow of currency abroad. 7. The government suggested that the Duma hold an extraordinary session before the end of August, and enact legislation to ensure timely payments of wages and pensions, create procedures for bank stabilization, and strengthen the system of currency regulations.13

Despite the attempts to control the fiscal collapse, both the value of the ruble and Yeltsin’s popularity were plummeting precipitously. On August 21, 1998, the Duma was called to a special session. Blaming Yeltsin for the country’s financial plight, the Duma overwhelmingly passed a resolution (245 to 32) asking for Yeltsin’s resignation. Yeltsin was not about to resign, but in response to the Duma’s action, he fired Kiriyenko and his cabinet, including Chubais, the president’s Special Representative to International Agencies. At the same time, he named his former Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, to head the government.14 Recalling Chernomyrdin was admittedly a step backward, and signaled a slowing of reforms; nevertheless, Yeltsin considered his former premier a stabilizing force and acceptable to the Duma.15 On the heels of the Asian financial crises, which devastated stock markets and in some instances, national economies, international reaction to the Russian fiscal fiasco was moderate. Helmuth Kohl, Yeltsin’s good friend, whose country had the largest stake in the Russian economy, expressed concern, but said that Russia could overcome the crisis if it would take additional steps without violating previous agreements. The reaction from Washington was also supportive: “We plan to continue to work with the Russian government,” said Mike McCurry, President Clinton’s press secretary. U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin advised the Russians to enact legislation that would restore investor confidence. International financier, George Soros, who had made substantial investments in Russia and had

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much to lose, praised the August 17 action of the Russian government, “it was necessary, timely and courageous.” The Japanese response was more cautious. First Deputy Finance Minister Koji Tanami said that the G-7 countries were wary of giving additional aid to Moscow.16 The International Monetary Fund was not pleased with the Russian government’s action, but under the circumstances, understood and accepted its necessity. Michel Camdessus, managing director of the IMF, said that in spite of the crisis, the IMF would release a loan tranche as planned in September, but only if the Russian government would take additional steps to put its economic house in order.17 Acting Prime Minister Chernomyrdin was trying to do just that. Upon his reappointment, his first order of business was to achieve political peace with the Duma, so that the government could concentrate on the economy. Before accepting the reappointment, Chernomyrdin made some preconditions. He insisted on full control in choosing his cabinet, and a pledge from Yeltsin that he would not interfere with the daily operation of the government. Having received Yeltsin’s promise, Chernomyrdin offered the legislators a compromise. As long as the Duma would neither initiate a noconfidence vote nor impeachment procedures for the next eighteen months, Yeltsin would agree not to disband the Parliament. Chernomyrdin further promised that he would appoint the cabinet ministers with the Duma’s concurrence, and “there would be no Chubaises, Gaidars and Nemtsovs” in the cabinet. Yeltsin reserved the right to name the ministers of defense, security, and foreign affairs. The Communist Party also wanted increased public control of television and radio broadcasts.18 Yeltsin had no other viable candidate for prime minister, and had to accept the proposed compromise in order to have Chernomyrdin accepted by the Duma. The agreement was prepared and was signed by the president; Gennady Seleznev, speaker of the Duma; Valentin Yumashev, head of the presidential administration; and Chernomyrdin, acting prime minister. Only Zyuganov’s signature was missing. The leader of the Communists announced that his party would not support Chernomyrdin. Exploiting the confusion caused by the fiscal collapse, and seeing that Yeltsin was on the retreat, Zyuganov wanted to create a political crisis. On August 31, 1998, without the Communists’ support, Chernomyrdin received less than one hundred votes out of a possible 450.19 On September 1, 1998, in the midst of the economic and political turmoil, Yeltsin received a boost with the arrival of President Clinton for a Moscow summit meeting. It was difficult to tell whether the seemingly meaningless summit was Clinton’s proof of his confidence in Yeltsin, or the beleaguered U.S. president’s attempt to get a short reprieve from the rapidly

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brewing Monica Lewinsky scandal at home? Not since President Nixon’s visit in 1974 had an American president gone to Moscow in such a weak domestic political situation. The summit meeting in 1974 intended to give the impression that the president was actively engaged in foreign affairs despite his domestic problems. Five weeks after returning to Washington, Nixon resigned in disgrace. Clinton’s prospects did not appear much brighter. Yeltsin’s situation was hardly enviable; his health was ruined. During a short visit to Sweden, he was confused and made notable misstatements. Likewise, at a stopover in Novgorod, he appeared disoriented. His political judgment had also become highly questionable—firing his loyal prime minister of five years, and within six months attempting to reappoint him. Parliamentary opposition hounded both presidents. Samuel Berger, Clinton’s national security advisor, insisted that the visit was necessary because “America has a strong interest in preventing Russia from backsliding and promoting its stability and success.” He added that President Clinton wanted to reassure Yeltsin “particularly in times of difficulty, that the United States and the West would not turn away from cooperation.”20 It was also argued that Clinton would have an opportunity to closely judge Yeltsin’s physical and political health. The two presidents had not had a formal summit meeting since March 1997, in Helsinki, though they had met briefly twice at the Group-8 gathering. In Moscow, Clinton showed his continued support of Yeltsin. He also expressed his sympathy with Russia’s financial plight, but brought no additional money. He warned that further financial aid was not possible until the Russian government would enact painful short-term reforms, raise taxes, combat corruption, and control inflation. While supporting Yeltsin, Clinton let it be known that the United States supported the reforms—not necessarily only the Russian president, but also those who supported the reforms. During his stay, President Clinton was scheduled to address students at the prestigious Moscow Institute of International Relations, and also to meet with influential political and business leaders. During a carefully orchestrated reception at the American Embassy, Clinton once again exchanged opinions with the head of the Communist Party, Zyuganov; Yeltsin’s other former presidential challenger, Lebed, governor of the vast Siberian Krasnoyarsk region; Berezovsky, one of the influential oligarchs; and other critics of Yeltsin, such as Yavlinsky. When President Clinton advised Zyuganov about the need for the continuation of reforms, the Communist leader responded diplomatically that Russian Communists were “in favor of normal reforms that would benefit all the citizens of the country.”21 One of the leaders of the Our Home Russia (NDR) Party, which had been formed by Chernomyrdin, told Clinton that

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there was a strong likelihood that Chernomyrdin might not be approved by the Duma, and the dissolution of the Duma was a real possibility. But it was the outspoken former general, now governor, Lebed, who painted the bleakest picture of Russia. He said: “The situation in Russia is catastrophic. The situation is worse than in 1917. Now we have stockpiles of poorly guarded nuclear weapons.” 22 Expectations of that summit were minimal; nevertheless, the two presidents signed two formal documents. One agreement stated that their countries would exchange information on future missile launchings and provide early warning to each other. That agreement was to greatly reduce the chance of a nuclear accident. According to a second agreement, both countries agreed to remove from their stockpiles fifty metric tons of nuclear grade plutonium, from which thousands of nuclear warheads could have been produced. A joint statement reaffirmed Clinton’s and Yeltsin’s commitment to promote nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Other joint statements dealt with the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, promotion of commerce and investment, promotion of technological cooperation, and cooperation of non-governmental organizations. A memorandum of understanding was signed concerning civil aviation safety and accident investigation. Both presidents expressed hope that the Duma would expeditiously ratify the START II agreement, so that negotiations on START III could start—a reduction of the nuclear arsenals to one-fifth of that of the cold war. They condemned terrorism and called for a peaceful solution of the Kosovo crisis. In addition, Russia offered to host a G-8 conference on transnational crime in 1999.23 At their postsummit joint news conference, the two presidents pronounced their meeting a success. Yeltsin, in response to a question, assured everyone that despite some disagreements, he and President Clinton remained friends: “We had from the beginning, through the end of the discussions a very friendly atmosphere, something I would describe as very attentive and considerate, free of differences during these discussions. . . . We have confidence and thrust in that which we do, and we do everything to loosen tension.” President Clinton fully concurred, and added: “You ask whether Russia and the United States have a partnership. I think the plain answer to that is yes, even though we don’t always agree on every issue.”24 Clinton used the occasion to lecture the Russian legislators indirectly. He said he realized that Russia was going through difficult times, but there was no shortcut to developing a system that would have the confidence of foreign investors. Progress must be made in enacting reforms. “So from my point of view, saying that we support reform and saying we will support those who continue it.” Somewhat awkwardly urged the Duma to cooperate

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with Yeltsin saying, “If the required laws were passed in the Duma, and things the President has asked for already are done and the decisions are made well, I think that is worth something apart from the specific agreements we have made.”25 Yeltsin admitted that many of the problems were a product of their own making: “We have not been able to address properly many issues . . . since we have started the reforms, but we are still obliged to take these reforms to the end. . . . We are not saying that we only count on help from outside, not at all. . . . We need political support from the United States so that the United States is supporting of the reforms in Russia.” He added, “once this is in place, all the investors who are willing to come to the reformed Russia will come with their investments. . . . We have to put together a program of stabilization. . . . Through stabilization . . . this program will work in the next two years.”26 To a question probing the future of Russia, Clinton responded that he firmly believed that Russia “will get back on its feet . . . every time outsiders counted Russia out, they turned out to be wrong. And this is a big challenge, but, I mean, a country that rebuffed Napoleon and Hitler can surely adjust to realities of the global marketplace.” Clinton reiterated that the just-concluded security agreements proved that the United States and Russia would continue their cooperation in foreign policy and security areas. As for the economic cooperation, Clinton once again aimed his answer at the Duma. “Restoring real growth to the Russian economy depends upon President Yeltsin’s ability to persuade the Duma to support his formation of a government, which will pursue a path of reform with a genuine sensitivity to personal dislocation of the people who have been hurt.” For additional emphasis he added, “So I support President Yeltsin’s commitment in that regard.”27 Despite all the joint pronouncements of cooperation, NATO’s expansion had remained a point of contention. Yeltsin emphatically reiterated, “we are against NATO’s expansion farther to the East. We consider this to be a big mistake, a grave mistake, and sometime in the future it will be considered a historic mistake.” Then he alluded to the NATO-Russia Foundation Agreement, saying that Russia had signed it to avoid confrontation, but at the same time, he warned, “we will not allow anyone to step over this agreement or anybody to try and bypass this agreement or generally ignore it.”28 President Clinton attempted to downplay the issue. He explained that NATO was a unifying organization, which had been dealing with regional security challenges, “like in Bosnia and Kosovo, both of which we would never have solved . . . had it not been for the leadership of Russia and the partnership between NATO and Russia.” In view of the brewing crisis, Clinton added: “Similarly, we have got to work together in Kosovo to prevent another Bosnia from occurring.”29

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Outwardly, both presidents behaved as if that summit was just like some of the previous ones, a routine get-together of leaders of two powerful nations, who were in the process of further reducing nuclear arsenals and dangers of a possible accidental nuclear confrontation. But the journalists reminded them of the issues that both presidents would have preferred to avoid. Clinton was asked about his affair with Monica Lewinsky, and how that affair influenced his overall effectiveness. Another issue challenged the American president’s sincerity—he had not really apologized to the American people. Clinton’s responses to those questions were equivocal, but that was the first time he accepted questions on his sordid affair. President Yeltsin was also reminded of his political dilemma when he was asked if he would accept any other candidate for the office of prime minister besides Chernomyrdin, or would he disband the Duma if his nominee was refused the third time. Yeltsin also avoided giving a straight answer.30 The summit provided both presidents with a short relief from the pressing domestic issues. They both gave the appearance that they were fully in charge. In reality, both presidents’ futures were precarious—they both faced impeachment. While Yeltsin was trying to extricate himself from the political quagmire, and Clinton had to deal with the consequences of the Lewinsky affair, the situation in Kosovo was reaching a critical point. The hard-won peace, or at least, the cessation of fighting in the Balkans was about to be shattered in Kosovo. The United States could not ignore the flagrant human rights violation and the ethnic cleansing by Milosevic’s Serbian forces. Kosovar Albanians were killed, their villages burned and pillaged, and thousands were uprooted and fleeing. Historically, Russia sided with the Serbs. It was clear to the Clinton administration that not unlike in Bosnia, the United States could not act unilaterally. The United Nations had no forces that could effectively intervene on behalf of the Kosovar. Only NATO could possibly stop the Serbian ravages, but NATO could not risk moving against Milesovic without securing its flanks, that is, obtaining Russia’s support, or at least, an assurance of Russia’s noninvolvement. Was the “Bill and Boris” friendship strong enough to persuade Yeltsin about the need to confront Milosevic, and would Yeltsin still be in the position to act decisively? Or would the United States and Russia find themselves once again in opposing camps? NOTES 1. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin created the Commission at the Vancouver Summit in April 1993. Officially, it was formed as the “U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation.” Its first meeting was held on September 1–2, 1993, in Washington, D.C. http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nis/gore_chernomyrdin.html.

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2. Boris Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon: Pazmyshleniya,Vospominaniya, Pechatleniya [Presidential Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, and Impressions] (Moscow: ACT Publisher, 2000), pp. 117–118. 3. Leonid Mlechin, Formula Vlasti [Formula of Power] (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2000), p. 516. 4. Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon, pp. 121–122. 5. Michael R. Gordon and David E. Sanger, “The Bailout of the Kremlin: How the U.S. Pressed the I.M.F.,” New York Times, July 17, 1998. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. David E. Sanger, “I.M.F. Backs $17 billion for Russia, but Delays First Payment,” New York Times, July 21, 1998. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Michael Wines, “Yeltsin and Crew Are Sinking Like the Ruble,” New York Times, August 22, 1998. 13. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1998/08/980817I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 14. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1998/08/980824I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 15. Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon, pp. 217–218. 16. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1998/08/980818I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 17. Ibid. 18. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1998/08/980831I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 19. Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon, pp. 224–225. 20. John M. Broder, “Turmoil in Russia: Summit Meeting,” New York Times, August 30, 1998. 21. Natalia Kalashnikova, “Blood, Sweat and Tears,” Segodnya, September 3, 1998. 22. Richard C. Paddock, “Talk of ‘Civil War’ Rages in Russia,” Los Angeles Times, September 3, 1998. 23. “Chronology of U.S.-Russia Summits, 1992–2000,” http://www.state. gov/www/regions/nis/chron_summits_russia.html. 24. “NBC News Special Report” (5:08 A.M. ET), September 2,1998, http:// web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid.

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The September 1998 summit did not improve Yeltsin’s relationship with the Communist-dominated Duma. Yeltsin’s critics were not at all impressed by Clinton’s support. Despite the proposed compromises, the Duma turned down Chernomyrdin’s nomination the second time. Yeltsin’s dilemma was whether he should nominate Chernomyrdin a third time—all signs pointed to another rebuff. If the Lower House rejected the president’s nominee a third time, according to the constitution, the president could dissolve the Parliament, and new elections would have to be held. But while Yeltsin was contemplating his next move, the Duma was gearing up for his impeachment. An unprecedented constitutional crisis was in the making. As soon as an impeachment process started, the president could not dismiss the Parliament. In the meantime, in the midst of the financial crises and bitter political power struggle, the country no longer had an effective government. Yeltsin realized that he had to find another acceptable candidate to head the government; his choices were limited. Naming one of the “young reformers” was out of the question. The influential mayor of Moscow, Y. Luzhkov, was recommended to Yeltsin as a possible candidate, and Luzhkov himself did not hide his interest in getting the nomination, by actively lobbying with the members of the Parliament for support. On September 7, 1998, at a round-table discussion in the Kremlin, Zyuganov and Maslyukov, representing the Communist Party, strongly recommended Luzhkov. Some influential members of the Federation Council (the Upper House of the Par-

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liament) also came out in support of the mayor. In the past, Luzhkov had been a strong supporter of the president, but lately he appeared much too ambitious for Yeltsin. As prime minister, Luzhkov would have become a front-runner for the 2000 presidential election. A strong premier would have been in the position to undermine the president’s authority, and Yeltsin was not ready to risk that. Even in his weakened position, he would not allow the Communists to force a candidate on him.1 While Yeltsin stood behind Chernomyrdin publicly, actually he made another selection, a person with much less ambition than Luzhkov, his foreign minister, Evgeny Primakov. Although his name had already been bandied around in the Duma as a possible candidate for heading the government, Primakov did not campaign for the position, and repeatedly expressed no interest in becoming prime minister. The onetime journalist, director of an academic institute, advisor of Gorbachev, head of counterintelligence, and Yeltsin’s foreign minister, with no expertise in economics, was a very unlikely choice. Primakov himself enjoyed his role as foreign minister, and at one point, when he was considered to be named Chernomyrdin’s first deputy prime minister, he was heard saying to members of the Duma: “I don’t even know what would be better for me, if you support me or if you reject me.”2 Primakov had to be convinced to accept the nomination, but he appeared to be the right choice. Because of his calm demeanor, reassuring “elderstatesman” appearance, and levelheadedness, he was acceptable to the Duma and to the society at large. On September 11, 1998, his nomination sailed through the Duma. The vote was 317 to 16 in his favor, with fifteen abstentions. Primakov immediately set out to form a coalition government. To calm the political turmoil, he named Communist Y. Maslyukov, the former head of Soviet Gosplan (the State Planning Department), as his first deputy prime minister; from the leftist Agrarian Party, G. Kulik, deputy prime minister; the pro-democratic Yabloko representative M. Zadornov, finance minister; from Zhirinovsky’s ultra-right group, S. Kalashnikov was named minister of labor; and the Communist-supported Gerashchenko was appointed to head the Central Bank.3 Western reaction to Primakov’s nomination was mixed. Just the fact that Russia finally had a responsible government was considered a definite plus. It was hoped abroad, as it was hoped in Russia, that the diplomat-turnedprime minister would be able to restore some stability in Russia. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said that Primakov enjoyed the trust of Western countries, while French Premier Hubert Vedrine said Primakov had the very qualities needed to restore the public’s confidence in authority. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott called Primakov an “extremely

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able, skillful advocate of what he sees as Russia’s national interest” and said that he “clearly recognizes the extraordinary importance of U.S.-Russian relations.” Conservatives in the U.S. Congress had serious doubts about the appointment of the former “spy master.” Closer to Russia, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, who had locked horns with Primakov in the past, said: “Yevgeny Primakov is a nominee acceptable to the majority of Russia’s political forces.” He continued, “being an experienced and welleducated politician, Primakov will be able to do much to achieve stability in Russia, in which Georgia is largely interested.”4 According to the Izvestia, by appointing Primakov, Yeltsin made a significant concession to his opponents, and that would have to be followed by other compromises. The newspaper speculated that this was a sign of Yeltsin’s gradual withdrawal from power. The paper also quoted the leader of Yabloko, Gregory Yavlinsky: “It is quite likely that before the year 2000, Yevgeny Primakov will have to carry out the duties of head of state as well as premier.”5 But those who had counted on Yeltsin’s withdrawal were in for a disappointment. The intensifying international crisis in Kosovo played into the hands of Yeltsin and the newly forming Primakov government. The new crisis temporarily distracted politicians and the media from the country’s economic woes. The Western threat of bombing the Serbian forces in order to stop the violence against the Albanian minority in Kosovo served as a unifying force in Russia. The Russians, despite the well-documented atrocities of the Kosovars, lined up behind the Serbs for several reasons. Yeltsin wanted the world to know that Russia, in spite of its economic weakness, would not tolerate unilateral Western military action against Serbia. The West was also warned that any planned action sanctioned by the United Nations would also be blocked by a Russian veto in the Security Council. There had been longstanding historical and emotional ties between the Russians and the Orthodox Serbs, but territorial integrity also played an important role in Yeltsin’s decision to support Milosevic. Russia had fought a disastrous campaign in Chechnya to stave off secession—similarly, the Serbs also wanted to preserve their country’s integrity. On October 5, 1998, Yeltsin contacted major world leaders over Kosovo. He tried to reinforce Russia’s diplomatic position in the Balkans and forestall NATO air strikes. He personally telephoned Yugoslav President Milosevic, German Chancellor-elect Schroeder, U.S. President Clinton and UN Secretary Kofi Annan. Instead of NATO action, Yeltsin wanted the Organization of Security and Cooperation for Europe (OSCE) fact-finding delegation to try to come up with an acceptable arrangement. Concurrently, it was reported that all over the country Russians were volunteering to help

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Serbia fight NATO. Even the Russian patriarch, Aleksii II, spoke up against NATO bombing, saying: “any military interference in the region may have irreversible consequences.”6 Former general and presidential contender Lebed warned that the United States would get its “own Chechnya” if NATO launched an air attack against Yugoslavia. According to the Communist leader Zyuganov, NATO’s readiness to launch an air attack demonstrated a “relapse of trigger-happiness” and a “recurrence of Cold-War thinking.” The Duma Defense Committee Chairman, Roman Popovich of Our Home Russia, accused NATO officials of wanting to test their weaponry in Yugoslavia, saying that the military industrial complex of NATO member nations “is the worst horror in the world” because the mounting tension around Kosovo was engineered in its interest. Yabloko’s Lukin, former ambassador to the United States and chairman of the Duma’s International Affairs Committee, declared, “Russia will resolutely resist NATO’s plans to strike Serbia.” The Speaker of the Duma, Seleznev, advocated breaking Russia’s treaty with NATO if the alliance attacked Yugoslavia.7 While Russians formed a united front against NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, they were pressing for Western aid for the country’s economy. The paradox was not lost on some Russian commentators who questioned the Kremlin’s latest bid to assert itself as a great power vis-à-vis NATO. Retired foreign policy expert Georgy Arbatov put it bluntly, “It is difficult to act as a great power when you constantly beg for aid.” Despite dependence on Western economic aid, and perhaps because of its humiliating economic weakness, a pronounced anti-Western stance was growing stronger in Russia. Anti-Western policies were already apparent in the Primakov-designed hard-line foreign policy, which strongly criticized Western action against the Bosnian Serbs in 1995 and Iraq in 1996. Now that Primakov had become prime minister, anti-Western tendencies received additional momentum. Despite all the protests, Russian Defense Minister Sergeyev was dispatched to Belgrade to warn Milosevic that NATO air strikes were imminent “if decisive measures are not immediately taken for radical improvement of the situation in Kosovo.” In warning the West not to attack Yugoslavia, Russian officials issued vague threats of their own. Foreign Minister Ivanov said that military action could lead to serious consequences, while the word from the Russian general’s staff was that the army was prepared “to carry out any order.”8 In a resolution on October 2, 1998, the Duma denounced the potential use of force by NATO in Kosovo as “an illegal aggressive action,” saying that such an action would cause it to review all existing agreements between Russia and NATO, including the accord to restrict arms trade with Yugoslavia. The Duma also recommended that the foreign minister should recall

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Russian representatives to NATO for consultation. The Defense Ministry warned that NATO air strikes would eliminate any possibility that the Russian legislature would ratify START II.9 At one point, the Duma proposed that Russia send anti-aircraft missiles to Yugoslavia, and it should consider “providing weapons and other military hardware if Yugoslavia asks for them.”10 While the Duma’s threat of delaying the ratification of START II was real, giving weapons to Yugoslavia had little practical meaning, because Russia’s foreign and defense policies were entirely dependent on Yeltsin. Even though Russia’s prestige as a great power appeared to be at stake on its ability to prevent NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo, Yeltsin was not ready to supply military hardware to Milosevic. But the anti-NATO verbal barrage continued. Foreign Minister Ivanov said in a public statement that NATO “by taking one reckless step in Kosovo may destroy irrevocably everything we have been building with great effort for the last few decades.” However, Ivanov ruled out the possibility of a “forcible reply” from Russia. Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, speaking on Russian television, warned that NATO bombing would throw the world back to “the times of the Cold War, when there was a balance of power of two blocs facing each other.” Vladimir Lukin, head of the Duma’s Foreign Affairs Committee, said that a NATO strike would constitute a “very negative blow to Russia’s national interest.” Such a precedent could lead to NATO’s intervention in Russia, “when someone is not happy with how we deal with Dagestan or Tatarstan.”11 Premier Primakov joined into the fray—all along he had supported a tough line against the West, and he continuously condemned American dominance. He repeatedly described the Balkans as an area that had historically been within Russia’s sphere of influence. To signal the possible end of cooperation with the West, he recalled Russia’s representatives from NATO headquarters, even though Russia’s cooperation with NATO was minimal. At the headquarters, the Russians were still fighting against NATO’s expansion. The only exception was the deployment of peacekeeping troops alongside NATO forces in Bosnia. That collaboration was the result of successful Western diplomacy, which gave the appearance of unity, but it was not indispensable.12 On October 13, 1998, Richard Holbrooke, President Clinton’s special representative, and the architect of the Bosnian settlement, managed to hammer out a limited agreement with Milosevic, and a temporary relaxation of the Kosovo crisis appeared to take hold. Yeltsin, who was all along hoping for a political solution, proposed that Russia was prepared to participate in an OSCE mission to Belgrade in monitoring Milosevic’s implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1199, on Kosovo.13 United Nations Resolution 1199 clearly stated the need for immediate cessation of fighting, international verification, and for a political solution

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in Kosovo. Despite the dire situation in Kosovo, Resolution 1199 did not recommend or endorse the use of NATO forces to reestablish peace in that troubled area, perhaps attributable to the vociferous objections of Russia. Despite all efforts of Western diplomacy, the Kosovo crisis and especially the violence against the civilian population did not abate. The UN Security Council passed another resolution hoping to force Milosevic to withdraw his forces from Kosovo and come to terms with the Albanian population of the region. UN Resolution 1203 reiterated the need for political settlement of the conflict, but at that time, it authorized ground and air monitoring of the withdrawal of Yugoslav military forces.14 Once again, Russia objected to the inclusion of any use of force in the Resolution. The Security Council heeded the Russian concerns, nevertheless, Russia abstained, reportedly because the Resolution did not acknowledge that Belgrade had already complied with many of the UN’s previous demands. Primakov gleefully noted that Russia’s position on Kosovo “annoys the Western powers most of all.” Then he added, “Let them get irritated. Russia is a great power.”15 Russia believed that by clever diplomacy it had prevented NATO from carrying out its threat against Yugoslavia, and hoped that OSCE, as a regional organization, might help to bring about a political settlement. Russia’s preference for OSCE’s role in the Balkans was beyond doubt. Criticism of possible NATO action was also criticism of the United States. For a long time, Russian foreign policy had advocated the “creation of a democratic multipolar world, [where] there will be no dictate by any one state or group of states. . . . Where a mechanism will be developed for collaboration and collective response to international events.”16 As stated above, Yeltsin’s other dilemma was that while he strenuously objected to Western intervention in Kosovo, his country’s economy was still reeling. Both he and Prime Minister Primakov realized that Russia still needed Western assistance. Nevertheless, the premier lambasted the socalled “economic reformers,” even though he could offer no way out of the economic morass. He defended his left-leaning government by saying those earlier reformers “duped the West,” and brought on the country’s problems because they “did not pay attention to the social aspects of the economy.” He was also dismissive about the formation of a middle class in Russia. “People waving their arms on the stock market floor are not middle class. Without fundamental development of the economy—instead of just money changers—a real middle class cannot emerge.”17 He also blamed the IMF (International Monetary Fund) for providing loans to incompetents. In spite of the criticism, Primakov urged the IMF not to delay sending Russia the previously approved loan tranche.

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By the end of 1998, Russia’s inflation rate had reached 84 percent. Since the currency devaluation, the already severely depressed economy contracted another 5 percent. An estimated 42 million Russians, nearly onethird of the entire population, were living below the official poverty line. Banks were failing, and the Central Bank reported that its hard currency reserves stood at $12.3 billion.18 Despite the dire conditions, assistance from the IMF or the World Bank was not forthcoming. The chairman of the European Commission, Jacques Santer, also refused to pledge any new loans, so Primakov found himself in the uncomfortable position of having to ask Santer for food aid from the European Union on the basis of humanitarian assistance. The Clinton administration, disregarding Yeltsin’s non-cooperation with the West vis-à-vis Milosevic, and the $50 million unpaid Russian debt, promised the resumption of grain and meat deliveries, and began expanding additional humanitarian assistance to Russia.19 But Russia was warned that unless it curbed its assistance to Iran’s missile program, it was seriously endangering the continuation of U.S. aid.20 The businesslike German chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, replaced Yeltsin’s German friend, Helmuth Kohl. During his first visit to Russia, Chancellor Schroeder reaffirmed the continuation of good relations between the two countries, but he pointed out that Germany could not give Russia any emergency financial aid, saying “The possibilities are exhausted.” To lessen the blow, he announced that he had brought 1.7 tons of medicine for Russia. It was apparent that the “Männerfreundschaft” (male bonding), which had developed between Kohl and Yeltsin, was over. In Germany, Kohl, not unlike Clinton, was accused that he had “based his policy too much on the person of Boris Yeltsin; at times he might have been quite right: Yeltsin was the strong man who could exercise control. But those days had passed.” Economic relations between the two countries were to be based on solid foundations. “There will be none of the so-called ‘agreements between old friends,’ under which Helmuth Kohl sometimes offered Russia thousands of millions [of marks] in credit.” 21 To give evidence of the new type of relationship, in addition to meeting with Yeltsin and Primakov, Chancellor Schroeder also met with other leading Russian politicians, with the Communist Zyuganov, former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, and Krasnoyarsk Governor Lebed. Schroeder pointed out to Yeltsin and other politicians that Germany and other Western countries were placing restrictions on future financial assistance to Russia, until Russia gave evidence of having laid a firm foundation for economic recovery.22 After renewed speculation about the state of Yeltsin’s health, it was reported that during his meeting with the German chancellor, he looked fit and spoke distinctly. A week earlier, Yeltsin had severely curtailed his meet-

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ing with the visiting Japanese prime minister, Keidzo Obuchi. At that meeting, it was announced that the previously promised Japanese loan would also be held up until Russia met the same stringent conditions which had been imposed by the IMF. While withholding the loan, the Japanese also promised humanitarian aid in the form of $10 million worth of medicine.23 As the country was struggling with the economic turmoil, Yeltsin’s health remained precarious. On October 12, 1998, he had to shorten his trip to Kazakhstan because of bronchitis. Later that month, he was forced to cancel a trip to Austria for reasons of “unstable blood pressure and fatigue,” and had to check into a sanatorium. On October 14, a resolution was introduced in the Federal Council of the Parliament requesting Yeltsin’s “voluntary resignation from the Presidency.” In the beginning of November, the Duma voted on legislation “concerning a medical removal of the president of the Russian Federation on account of conditions of his health.” The motion fell only five votes short of passing. Yeltsin attributed that sudden flurry of renewed attacks on his presidency to the fact that he had appointed a leftist-leaning premier. The Communists in key positions in the Primakov government believed that the removal of Yeltsin would give them a chance to seize the presidency. Early in November, an ugly incident of anti-Semitism occurred when former General Albert Makasov not only made blatantly anti-Semitic public statements, but said that the president was surrounded by “too many people of Jewish nationality.” Yeltsin took a firm stand against Makasov, but the Communist majority in the Duma refused to censure him.24 On November 22, Yeltsin was once again rushed to the hospital with pneumonia.25 Yeltsin’s political health also did not improve, and it was not only the hostile Duma that demanded his resignation. A poll taken of 1,500 urban and rural residents found that 75 percent said that they would approve Yeltsin’s impeachment and only 16 percent were opposed. Seventy percent of the people said that Yeltsin should be impeached for his dissolution of the Supreme Soviet in September 1993, and his war against Chechnya. Rural residents were significantly more in favor of impeachment—85 percent for, 8 percent against. In Moscow, 38 percent were against impeachment. Politically, supporters of the reformist Yabloko were the most supportive of Yeltsin; only 56 percent of them were in favor of Yeltsin’s ouster. Communists were 91 percent for impeachment.26 With Primakov at the head of the government, the political storm abated somewhat, but his administration had no detailed plan for the economic crisis. Only the prices of some key medicines were fixed. There was talk about controlling basic food prices and fuel to help people get through the winter. Tax collection was to be boosted, while some taxes were to be lowered to create incentives for industrial growth. It was proposed that exporters

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would have to sell 75 percent of their hard currency earnings for rubles to bolster the government’s hard currency reserves. The government was still hoping to receive the bailout package from the IMF that had been approved in July and frozen in August. Primakov warned that if the money was further delayed, the government would have to print money to pay wages. Primakov hoped that his government would soon come to terms with foreign holders of Russia’s defaulted treasury debt.27 On December 29, 1998, Russia failed to make the $362 million payment on Soviet-era debt it owed to commercial banks around the world. In August, Russia had already defaulted on millions of dollars it owed to foreign governments, but that was the first time it failed pay to private creditors. Yeltsin, who had been in and out of hospitals, said little and did even less to address the country’s economic crisis, and he left the day-to-day management of the economy to Primakov. Nevertheless, he had a letter published in the business daily, Kommersant, “There is no other path for Russia than continuing toward democracy. . . . The outgoing year 1998 wasn’t the easiest for any of us, and many people might think that the nation has reversed on its path. That’s not true. As the president of Russia, I say there is no way back.”28 Primakov had no choice but to reaffirm the president’s statement, although he warned that his administration would tame the “wild capitalism” by strengthening state regulations of the economy. The government’s budget for 1999 reflected the premium Primakov had placed on achieving political consensus by distributing credits, writing off debts, and avoiding unpopular reforms. The budget included military pay increases, and billions of rubles of new subsidies were appropriated for the coal industry and for agriculture. The budget called for spending 573 billion rubles ($29 billion).29 The Defense Department’s share of the budget was $5.1 billion, 2.6 percent of the gross domestic product. “Such a budget will be fatal for the army,” complained the newspaper Krasnaya Zveda, “There will be enough money for food and salaries,” but not enough to buy new weapons or carry out military maneuvers or to provide the military with vital necessities.30 Despite Yeltsin’s assertions to continue with the reforms, the Clinton administration was seriously concerned about the shaky state of the market reforms in Russia. On December 10, 1998, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers, traveled to Moscow for high-level talks on economic and security issues. The American visitors wanted to impress upon Primakov the importance of carrying on with the reforms, and encouraged him to send a top negotiator to the IMF in Washington. The strategic concern was the ratification of the START II agreement, which had been held hostage in the Duma. The Duma repeat-

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edly delayed action on START II because Communist and nationalist deputies were charging that it would weaken Russia and would be too expensive to implement. Deputies were concerned about such issues as NATO’s expansion, and the possibility of deployment of nuclear weapons closer to Russian borders. Nevertheless, the Primakov government promised to make a major effort to have the treaty approved. The government hoped that quick ratification would improve its chances of receiving the much-needed aid from the IMF.31 As a consequence of the drastic devaluation of the ruble, exports had become too expensive, and domestic production began to revive. Primakov was rapidly gaining popularity. He kept his distance from the president and often consulted with the Duma. He was credited with the temporary calm after the economic and political upheavals, and was increasingly viewed as a popular alternative to Yeltsin. On January 17, 1999, Yeltsin was hospitalized again for almost two weeks with a bleeding ulcer. In early February, contrary to his doctors’ advice, Yeltsin decided to travel to Jordan, to King Hussein’s funeral. He believed that as the president of a “great power” he must be there where all the important dignitaries of the world would make an appearance. But during his short trip, his health did not hold out. He needed medical attention and had to cut short his stay. That incident gave the Communists an additional incentive to prepare for Yeltsin’s impeachment. On February 23, while celebrating the Defender of the Fatherland Day, Zyuganov addressed a huge pro-Communist rally, and said that the Duma had already collected enough evidence to confirm “Yeltsin’s criminal activity.” Zyuganov continued, “Now after seven years of democratic mind games, everyone realizes that an incompetent person is in power who is unable to be responsible for his words.”32 The Commission for Impeachment submitted its findings to the Duma, and the legislators could have voted on the motion to impeach as early as March 15. Yeltsin was prepared to face up to the charges and urged his accusers to go ahead with the impeachment. He was well aware of the convoluted constitutional procedures of the impeachment before the president could actually be removed. A two-thirds majority of the Duma was needed to push through each of the impeachment charges. The Constitutional and Supreme Courts and the Federation Council (the Parliament’s Upper House) must then approve the motion.33 Knowing the complication, Yeltsin’s opponents in the Duma were also waiting for the most appropriate moment to introduce their motion. Ignoring Yeltsin’s request to initiate the impeachment process immediately, the Speaker of the Duma, Seleznev, said that it might not be brought to the floor until mid-May 1999.

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NOTES 1. Boris Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon: Pazmyshleniya,Vospominaniya, Pechatleniya [Presidential Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, and Impressions] (Moscow: ACT Publisher, 2000), pp. 224–226. 2. Leonid Mlechin, Formula Vlasti: Ot Yeltsina k Putinu [Formula of Power: From Yeltsin to Putin]. (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2000), p. 522. 3. Ibid., pp. 522–524. 4. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1998/09/980911I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 5. Izvestia, September 11, 1998. 6. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1998/10/981006I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 7. Ibid. 8. Celestine Bohlen, “Russia Vows to Block the U.N. from Backing Attack on Serbs,” New York Times, October 7, 1998. 9. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1998/10/981005I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 10. “Duma Suggest Giving Serbs Weapons,” The Associated Press, October 23, 1998. 11. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1998/10/981009I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 12. Michael R. Gordon, “Russia Sees NATO Raids as Imperiling Ties to West,” New York Times, October 13, 1998. 13. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1998/10/981014I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 14. http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1203.htm. 15. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1998/10/981026I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 16. “Ivanov’s Interview,” Izvestia, October 28, 1998. 17. “Primakov Interview,” Izvestia, November 20, 1998. 18. Greg Myre, “Russia Inflation Hits 84 Percent,” The Associated Press, December 31, 1998. 19. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1998/10/981012I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 20. Carol Giacomo, “Albright Says U.S. May Cut Russia Aid over Iran Missile Crisis,” Reuters, December 9, 1998. 21. Roland Eggleston, “Schroeder’s Visit Marks New Era in Russo-German Relations,” RFL/RL Newsline, endnote, November, 20, 1998. 22. Ibid. 23. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1998/11/981113I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 24. Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon, pp. 248–250. 25. “Some of Yeltsin’s Recent Ailments,” The Associated Press, February 27, 1999.

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26. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1998/10/981030I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 27. “Key points of Russian Economic Plan,” The Associated Press, October 31, 1998. 28. Vladimir Isachenkov, “Yeltsin Vows to Continue Reforms,” The Associated Press, December 29, 1998. 29. The United States 1999 Federal budget, in contrast, was $1.7 trillion. 30. Krasnaya Zvezda, December 4, 1998. 31. Barry Renfrew, “Russia Eyes Nuke Treaty,” The Associated Press, November 12, 1998; and http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/ 1998/12/981208I.html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 32. “Communist Wants Yeltsin Impeached,” The Associated Press, February 22, 1999. 33. Article 93, Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, December 12, 1993.

17 Kosovo

While the Duma was gearing up to Yeltsin’s removal from office, a major international crisis was coming to a head in Kosovo, which severely tested the already precarious cooperation between Russia and the West. The decision to expand NATO had already damaged Russia’s trust in the West. Now, a threatened NATO military action against Milosevic’s Yugoslavia seemed like a direct challenge to Russia’s influence in Europe. Yeltsin, under constant political pressure from the Duma, took a firm stand against the use of force by NATO. On Russian television, he said: “I conveyed Clinton my view, both by phone and by letter, that this (threatened military strikes against Yugoslavia) will not work. We will not let you touch Kosovo.”1 Russia was one of the Contact Group nations of former Yugoslavia, which at negotiations held in France was trying to persuade the Serbs and the ethnic Albanians to come to terms on Kosovo’s future by granting wide autonomy to the Albanians. In addition to Russia, the United States, Britain, France, Germany and Italy were members of the Contact Group, which warned Milosevic that unless he signed on, he would face NATO military action. The Kremlin supported autonomy for Kosovo, but objected to any placement of NATO troops in Kosovo without Belgrade’s full approval. Milosevic ruled out any such intervention. Yeltsin’s stand against NATO was heartily approved by the Duma, especially by the nationalists and Communists. The Duma hastily passed a resolution urging the international

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community to oppose the use of force by NATO without prior permission from the UN Security Council.2 Despite Russian objections, NATO was prepared to move against the recalcitrant Milosevic. In the midst of the tense international situation, there was speculation in Russia that Yeltsin once again was contemplating to reshuffle the government. On March 16, 1999, a political commentator wrote in the Izvestia that if not Primakov, his Communist first deputy prime minister, Maslyukov, might be ejected from the government. The writer figured that Primakov was safe for at least another month because he was scheduled to have an important meeting with U.S. Vice President Al Gore, and possibly with President Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and representatives of the IMF.3 On March 23, in mid-flight en route to the United States, Prime Minister Primakov received a telephone call from Vice President Gore, who advised him that diplomatic efforts had failed, and the United States and NATO were preparing to unleash a major air strike against Yugoslavia. Despite the high expectations of the meeting, Primakov ordered his plane to return to Moscow. The prime minister’s abrupt cancellation of his visit to Washington signaled a significant deterioration of Russian-American relations. The split over Kosovo, which had been festering for some time, was endangering discussions on a variety of strategic and financial matters. Cash-starved Russia needed loans to cover its foreign debts and keep its economy functioning.4 Primakov, like his predecessors, was in a precarious political position. His mission to Washington was intended to boost his standing at home by providing him with high-level meetings with top officials and to negotiate for new commitments of Western aid. The planned session was to be devoted to Russia’s dire economic situation. The agenda also included issues dealing with arms control, the environment, agricultural sales, and efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. All those issues had to wait; no new meetings were scheduled.5 Upon landing in Moscow, Prime Minister Primakov stated that when he received the phone call from Gore, he warned him: “Think it over once more, Mr. Vice President. I have the impression that you are not considering all the consequences,” adding that NATO strikes would not only destabilize the situation in Kosovo, but would adversely “affect relations between Russia and the United States, and would damage stability in Europe.”6 Primakov’s stern warning was followed by a general outcry protesting NATO’s decision to bomb. In a rare show of unanimity, Moscow politicians insisted that the expected NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia would widen the conflict and dangerously undermine the role of the UN. Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev

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repeated an earlier prediction that air strikes would result in “another Vietnam,” and both Foreign Minister Ivanov and the Communist Party leader, Zyuganov, said that Russia would have to reconsider its cooperation agreement with NATO. Duma Speaker Seleznev said that NATO troops in Yugoslavia would trigger a “very difficult and bloody war” for which “Americans will have to prepare zinc coffins.” He added that if troops would be introduced without the approval of the UN Security Council, people “will start to question the need for the UN in the first place.” As late as March 24, 1999, President Yeltsin was still waiting for a response from President Clinton to an earlier message trying to prevent the attack on the Serbs. Duma Speaker Seleznev pledged that if NATO launched air strikes against Yugoslavia, Moscow would immediately provide powerful weapons to Belgrade. Fellow Communist faction member and Duma Security Committee Chairman Viktor Ilyukhin called for an emergency meeting of the Duma and the Security Council to discuss “whether to provide Yugoslavia with a reliable air defense system to reduce their casualties.” On March 24, General Anatoly Kvashnin, chief of staff of the armed forces, held a meeting of top military officials to prepare for a possible Russian response if NATO bombs were dropped. The Liberal Democratic Party leader, Zhirinovsky, announced that he had ordered charter flights to dispatch volunteers to Yugoslavia. Seleznev also suggested that the ratification of START II would be in doubt if air strikes occurred. He explained that although the Duma was unlikely to debate the treaty on April 2, as it had been originally scheduled, it would take up the issue “soon” after the Kosovo situation “developed favorably.”7 As the NATO bombs began to fall, not only political leaders, but also hundreds of Russians demonstrated in front of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and demanded to stop the bombing. Among the first retaliatory actions of the Kremlin was to pull out of the Partnership of Peace military cooperation program. President Yeltsin also recalled Russia’s chief military envoy to NATO, and ordered the closure of Russia’s offices at NATO headquarters. In addition, Russia decided to withdraw its one hundred-member team from the Kosovo Verification Team stationed in Macedonia. Despite the well-documented atrocities of the Serbian regulars and irregulars, Russians lined up solidly behind their traditional allies.8 There was plenty of saber rattling, but Yeltsin realized that in light of its economic conditions, Russia was not in the position to be drawn directly into the conflict and sever its relations with the West. After meeting with his ministers, Yeltsin said: “Russia has a number of extreme measures in store, but we decided not to use them so far. We are above that. On the moral level we are superior to the Americans. The NATO

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aggression against Yugoslavia is a very big mistake by American diplomacy and by Clinton, and they will be held accountable.”9 Russia turned to the UN, and called for an urgent Security Council vote to stop the NATO attack, but the call for the Security Council meeting did not stop the bombing. Yeltsin also appealed to the foreign ministers of the six-nation Contact Group on Yugoslavia to meet in Moscow to continue the search for peace. That request, after Russia’s stinging criticism of the bombing, went unheeded.10 The media was generally sympathetic to Yugoslavia, but it was pointed out that Russia was much too weak to challenge the West. “It is easier to brandish rusty weapons and assail Americans than properly hold talks with the IMF,” wrote the Russian daily, Segodnya.11 The same paper criticized Prime Minister Primakov for aborting his Washington trip; he should have accepted the inevitable facts and kept his appointments with the IMF. The Izvestia wrote that Russians “should grit their teeth and set about finally dragging Russia out of the financial hole, . . . a break with the Americans and NATO would be much more costly for us than it would be for the West.”12 Top Yeltsin officials also began to take a more realistic view. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said that Moscow was not considering giving Yugoslavia any military help. “There is no talk about using force,” he said. Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin also played down the situation, saying that Russia had to maintain good relations with Europe: “We could not find ourselves face to face against all of Europe, which unfortunately happened during the Cold War.”13 Although Yeltsin had initially ordered the recall of Russia’s chief military envoy to NATO and the closure of his country’s office at NATO headquarters in Brussels, he reconsidered it. He decided that Russia would keep its mission in Belgium open, and continue to take part in other alliance programs. As the bombing continued, criticism in the Duma did not subside. At an emergency meeting, the Duma passed a resolution expressing outrage, and demanded the immediate end of the air strikes. Arch nationalist Zhirinovsky, wearing his army colonel’s uniform, told his fellow legislators, “The Third World War started on March 24.” In its resolution, the Duma declared that the air strikes in Yugoslavia represented a “serious threat to Russia’s security.”14 A sixteen-point resolution condemning NATO was passed by the Duma by a vote of 366 to 4, with two abstentions.15 Despite the harsh condemnations, Russia was not in a position to take direct military action to aid the beleaguered Yugoslavia. The Russians were hoping to play a conciliatory role, while assuring Milesovic of their support. Prime Minister Primakov and Defense Minister Sergeyev traveled to Belgrade bringing a letter from Yeltsin with a “whole range of specific proposals for settling the crisis.” In his State of the Nation speech, Yeltsin pro-

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claimed, “I will do everything to put an end to military action in Yugoslavia,” but added, “Russia has made its choice—it will not allow itself to be drawn into the conflict. We are trying to avoid another global split.”16 The Primakov mission to Belgrade did not produce a breakthrough. The protests against the bombing continued at all levels. Demonstrations in front of the U.S. Embassy had become daily events, although the police kept the relatively small groups of demonstrators at a safe distance from the building. Tempers were running high in the Duma. A debate on calling an end to the air strikes ended up in fistfights between the Communist and liberal lawmakers. The fight started when the hard-liners criticized an earlier failed peacekeeping mission to Belgrade by a group of liberal representatives.17 When Milosevic signaled that he was ready for a cease-fire, Yeltsin made a renewed effort to mediate a political settlement. NATO rejected the offer because it insisted on the removal of Yugoslav troops from Kosovo. The incensed Duma adopted a resolution by a vote of 279 to 34 in favor of supplying Yugoslavia with weapons, military hardware, and other much-needed spare parts. Yeltsin rejected the idea, once again resisting the notion of getting Russia directly involved in the conflict. Sending arms to Belgrade would have resulted in an escalation of the conflict “with unpredictable consequences.” Seleznev, the Communist speaker of the Duma, reported upon returning from Yugoslavia that Milosevic wanted to join the proposed union between Russia and Belarus, which had been under consideration. The speaker indicated that Yeltsin supported the idea, and added that the Russian president had told him that he ordered a retargeting of Russian nuclear missiles against NATO countries. None of those claims were confirmed by the Kremlin or by the Strategic Rocket Forces.18 When questioned about the proposed unification, Yeltsin told reporters that Yugoslavia’s possible joining the Russian-Belarusian union was impractical from both a legal and a political point of view. With an impeachment debate scheduled in the Duma for April 15, Yeltsin did not want to reject outright the Seleznev-supported expansion of the union. As for the NATO air strikes and the possible introduction of NATO ground forces in Kosovo, Yeltsin kept up his relentlessly harsh criticism. But the words were not followed with any action, although a Russian intelligence gathering ship, the Liman, was sent to the Adriatic Sea. There was no evidence that it was dispatched to provide intelligence to Milosevic; it was more likely to collect information on Western military activities for the benefit of the Russian army. Despite Yeltsin’s strong, energetic comeback from his sickbed, and in spite of his vociferous criticism of the West, the Duma still insisted on holding the debate on the president’s impeachment. On April 14, 1999, the motion to delay the debate until mid-May fell short of twenty votes. For all

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practical purposes, Yeltsin ignored the threat of impeachment; as a matter of fact, he challenged the Duma not to postpone the impeachment debate. In the meantime, he concentrated on the Kosovo crisis. He named his ex-prime minister, Chernomyrdin, to be special envoy to Yugoslavia. Chernomyrdin was charged with bringing about a diplomatic solution that would be acceptable to both sides. Success was doubtful, because up to that point, Milosevic did not accept any Russian peace initiatives. The West hoped that the ex-premier might serve as an intermediary. His appointment came as Germany proposed a new peace plan. A twenty-four-hour suspension of bombing was to take effect if Yugoslavia would begin to withdraw its forces from Kosovo.19 The initiative of Yugoslavia’s joining the Slavic union still did not disappear; in fact, the pro-Serbian Duma passed a nonbinding resolution 293 to 54 in its favor. Eager to receive military support from Russia, the Yugoslav Parliament also passed similar action. Speaker Seleznev described the Duma’s action as “a political initiative put forward to end the war, and he added, “if the three nations [Russia, Belarus and Yugoslavia] unite, they cannot be pushed aside by the West.”20 Russia and Belarus had already been negotiating for two years before signing a treaty on joining the two countries, but up to that point the agreement had very few practical results. The Russian Orthodox Church also decided to get actively involved on the side of fellow Orthodox Serbs. The Russian patriarch, Aleksii II, led a delegation of thirty to Belgrade to show support for the embattled Serbs. “Our visit here shows that we are together in this difficult time,” said the patriarch upon his arrival. “We share your sorrow. It’s a sorrow of the people who suffer, who have become refugees, who need help and support.”21 When formal governmental protests did not work, Yeltsin tried to use his personal good rapport with the Western leaders to stop the air strikes against Yugoslavia. When he was unable to make headway with President Clinton, he telephoned British Prime Minister Tony Blair and warned him about the impending catastrophe, especially if ground troops were to be introduced in Kosovo. Yeltsin pointed out that the bombing, instead of forcing Milosevic to capitulate, had strengthened him. But Tony Blair responded to Yeltsin’s pleas as Bill Clinton had done a month before. Negotiations had been tried before the bombing in Rambouillet, France, and they had failed; the West had no other alternative but to resort to force. In the midst of the air strikes, on May 13, 1999, French President Jacques Chirac paid a short visit to Moscow. In regard to Kosovo, he said that Yeltsin had two choices—either he was for or against Milosevic. As far as the West was concerned, Milosevic was a man of the past, from the “bad past.” Chirac pointed out that Russia could remain on the sidelines and become a marginal country, or it could en-

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ter into the contemporary world: “Russia must uphold human rights and democratic principles.”22 Yeltsin’s efforts to stop the bombing did not impress his opponents in the Duma, who on May 11, 1999, voted to begin three-day impeachment hearings starting on May 13. On May 12, however, Yeltsin made another one of his unexpected political moves. He removed Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov from office, and named Sergei Stepashin23 as acting premier. Yeltsin’s decision to remove the popular Primakov was not without risk. Had Primakov turned to the Duma and the Federal Council protesting his irrational dismissal, he would have found sufficient support to keep him in office. Zyuganov and his fellow Communists were ready to mobilize the people and bring them out in the streets to demand Yeltsin’s resignation. But the humiliated Primakov left quietly.24 In a short speech, Yeltsin justified his action by saying: “Today I made a difficult decision.” He praised Primakov for restoring political stability, but blamed him for failure in turning the economy around. Yeltsin said that Russia must press ahead with free market reforms, implying that Primakov was not fully supporting that strategy. He added: “We have no right to put off making decisions that are necessary to revive the economy for another six months. Delays and procrastination, I am sure, are the most serious blow today to stability in the economy and social sphere.”25 Most likely, the real reasons for Primakov’s removal were quite different. He was becoming very popular and was often mentioned in the press as the most viable candidate for the presidency. He had shown himself ready to make compromises and was willing to cooperate with the Communists. More and more, he was overshadowing the sickly and often irrational Yeltsin. With Primakov’s dismissal, Yeltsin threw down the gauntlet to the Communists in the Duma. That defiant act of Yeltsin certainly added fuel to the debate on to his pending impeachment. On May 13, 1999, in the Duma, Yeltsin was charged with five impeachable offenses. The first charge against him was the destruction of the Soviet Union. In 1991, Yeltsin and the then leaders of the Ukraine and Belarus declared the Soviet Union null and void. That act had violated a referendum held earlier that year in which the majority voted for keeping the Soviet Union together. Yeltsin was also accused of the economic disarray that had occurred as the result of the breakup. The ill-fated war against Chechnya in 1994–1996 was also blamed on Yeltsin. The use of force against the Parliament in 1993 was deemed to be another impeachable offense. Yeltsin’s fourth offense was the destruction of the effectiveness of the armed forces. The last charge was genocide against the Russian people. That was linked to the severe economic problems of the country.26

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Yeltsin’s opponents in the Duma were hoping to get the necessary twothirds majority on at least one of the five charges. But the Communists and their allies fell short of the three hundred votes needed for impeachment. The closest vote was 283 on Chechnya; the other votes ranged between 238 and 263. The reaction to that outcome was a sense of relief among Yeltsin’s Russian supporters and in the West, but it made his opponents furious. Yeltsin took his victory calmly, and to add to his enemies’ ire, on the day of the final voting, he announced: “Now that the affair with impeachment is over, the Duma can closely address draft laws badly needed today.”27 Indeed, Yeltsin won another battle with the Duma, but the war was not over, he was facing another confrontation—the approval of his newly appointed prime minister. In the midst of the domestic political turmoil, he continued to relentlessly criticize the NATO air strikes in Yugoslavia. He even threatened to quit the peace effort if NATO did not heed his proposals. He said: “Russia will withdraw from cooperation if its mediation efforts for the Kosovo conflict are ignored.”28 Despite the warning, the Chernomyrdin mission to Yugoslavia continued, but without notable results. Chernomyrdin met with Milosevic five times; some of those meetings lasted hours. When the Russian representative confronted Milosevic, asking him whether he really expected to win the conflict, the Serb leader responded, “We would neither win [the conflict] nor lose it.” Milosevic insisted that as soon as NATO would start ground action, the Yugoslav forces would teach them a lesson. In fact, Milosevic urged Chernomyrdin to advise the Western leaders to begin ground action.29 In the domestic political sphere, the Communists had a choice either to approve Stepashin as prime minister or face dismissal of the Duma. With the defeat of the motion for Yeltsin’s impeachment, the potential for a constitutional crisis was no longer an issue (the Parliament cannot be dissolved while the president is being impeached). Had the Communists balked, the president had the constitutional power to dismiss the Duma and name an active prime minister for three months, after which new elections must be held. Regardless of the election outcomes, Yeltsin would still be president. Despite his low popularity rating, Yeltsin out-maneuvered his opponents. On May 19, 1999, the Duma voted with 298 in favor, 55 opposed, and 14 abstained for Sergey Stepashin’s candidacy for prime minister.30 Thus, the former head of the Federal Security Service, an unfailing supporter of Yeltsin’s campaign in Chechnya, minister of justice, and later minister of interior, “the rosy cheeked hawk” as the media referred to him, became Russia’s new prime minister.

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Stepashin pledged to revitalize the domestic economy. He said that he would crack down on crime and corruption. He would take tough measures to regulate the economy, and continue the transition to a free market economy. He announced that he would follow the IMF’s prescriptions for reforms, and push Parliament to pass a series of bills necessary to obtain new loans. In light of NATO’s bombing Yugoslavia, he proposed to increase Russia’s military allocations from the current 2.8 percent of the country’s gross domestic product to equal 3.5 percent.31 Although the Russian media was highly critical of the seemingly irresponsible replacement of Primakov, the West took it in stride. Leaders commented that they did not expect a change in their relations with Russia. There was some concern about the possibility of new political turmoil in Russia and a setback to peace negotiations in Kosovo. Primakov’s stabilizing efforts in Russia were appreciated, but his often-critical stance toward the West did not endear him to Western decision makers. The West did not have to be worried about Russia’s active participation in negotiations with Milosevic. On Yeltsin’s instructions, the president’s special envoy, Chernomyrdin, earnestly tried to convince the Serbian leader about the futility of his resistance to Western demands to withdraw his troops from Kosovo. At one point, bending under the pressure of bombing, Milosevic signaled that he would have his forces draw back, but only if the Russian, Ukrainian and Indian forces would be entering Kosovo. But by that time, Milosevic was hardly in a position to set conditions for his capitulation. On June 2, 1999, after lengthy negotiations with the Western leaders about conditions for the cessation of the NATO air strikes, Chernomyrdin teamed up with the president of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, representing the European Union, and they headed for Belgrade to give the ultimatum to Milosevic. By then, the ongoing heavy bombing had already caused devastation in Yugoslavia, and ten days earlier, the International Criminal Tribunal had indicted Milosevic and four other senior Yugoslav officials for crimes against humanity and violations of laws or customs of war.32 On June 3, 1999, Milosevic and the Serb Parliament accepted the Western dictates. In essence, the conditions required: • An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo. • The verifiable withdrawal of all military, police and paramilitary forces from

Kosovo according to a speedy time schedule. • An international security presence, with fundamental participation by NATO,

must be placed under unified command and control and authorized to maintain safe surroundings for the population in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return of displaced individuals and refugees to their homes.33

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Once the Yugoslav side had agreed to the above conditions, the Russians insisted that their participation in enforcing the agreements must be sanctioned by the Security Council of the United Nations. On June 10, the UN Security Council passed resolution UNSCR 1244 by a vote of fourteen in favor and none against, with one abstention (China). It welcomed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s acceptance of the principles of a political solution to the Kosovo crisis, including an immediate end to violence, and a rapid withdrawal of its military, police, and paramilitary forces. The Security Council’s resolution confirmed the decision to deploy international civil and security presence in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices.34 On the basis of the UN resolution, a NATO-Russia KFOR (Kosovo Security Force) agreement, patterned on the Bosnian IFOR Russian participation, that is, close cooperation of the troops, was agreed upon. U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Russian Federation Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev negotiated the agreement. However, as the Yugoslav forces were getting ready to withdraw from Kosovo, and NATO soldiers were beginning to be deployed to their assigned security zones, on June 11, a detachment of about two hundred Russian paratroopers moved unexpectedly into Kosovo, taking control of Pristina’s airport. Superior British troops eventually surrounded the airfield, but the defiant Russians prevented NATO from setting up a planned base at the airfield and supply planes from landing. The United States’delegation in Helsinki, still working on the details of Russian participation, was trying to resolve the situation quickly and peacefully, while the NATO commanders were contemplating the removal of the Russians by force. At the negotiating table, the Russian minister of defense promised to cooperate, but the paratroopers were holding onto the airfield. Eventually, on June 17, 1999, an agreement was hammered out about Russia’s participation in Kosovo. The total Russian deployment in Kosovo was not to exceed five battalions with a total strength of not more than 2,850 troops, plus up to 750 troops for the airfield and logistics base operation combined, and sixteen liaison officers. The level of Russian participation was to be reduced in proportion to reductions in the overall size of KFOR. As far as the Pristina (Slatina) airfield was concerned, it was to be used by all KFOR participants, under their established procedures. Details were to be determined by the KFOR commander, in consultation with Russian representatives.35 The confrontation at the Pristina airfield raised serious concerns about Russia’s participation in KFOR. There appeared to be confusion in the Kremlin: Did Yeltsin authorize the bravado of the paratroopers? Foreign Minister Ivanov apparently had not been consulted on that action. Was the military acting on their own in an attempt to provoke a confrontation? After

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Yeltsin’s repeated protests of NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia were ignored, did he feel the need to reassert himself? Not only did he condone the quick move of the troops into Kosovo just before the deployment of NATO troops, but also he viewed it as a moral victory. After the incident was resolved in Pristina, Yeltsin praised the action of the troops and decorated the members of the High Command and local commanders. According to Yeltsin, that action was to serve as a reminder that the Russians must be taken seriously. He explained that in order to counter the negative public opinion throughout Europe for his country’s support of Serbia, “Russia was obliged to make a gesture, even if it would not have a serious military significance.” He claimed the gesture demonstrated what Russia could do even in the face of NATO’s military might.36 The arbitrary action of the small Russian contingent did cause a momentary frustration to NATO’s High Command, but it hardly affected the overall deployment of KFOR troops. Still, Yeltsin achieved what he had hoped for, once again becoming the focus of attention. President Clinton, meeting with Jacques Chirac in Paris, was forced to make an appeal to his “friend Boris” to cooperate. U.S. secretaries of state and defense in Helsinki had to use their diplomatic skills to defuse the situation. Only later did it become known that if NATO’s commander, General Wesley Clark, had had his way, British troops would have stormed Pristina airport and threatened to unleash the most frightening crisis with Moscow since the end of the cold war. The commander of the international peacekeeping KFOR, British General Sir Mike Jackson, refused to carry out General Clark’s order to send assault troops to remove the Russians from the airfield. He justified his disobedience by saying: “I am not going to start the third world war.”37 Fortunately, the order was countermanded, and as mentioned above, a diplomatic solution was reached. Had a military confrontation taken place between the Russians and NATO, it could have had horrendous consequences. Yeltsin’s original approval of rushing troops into Kosovo did not become public knowledge until months later when he honored the military for their successful daring maneuver in Pristina. Had there been casualties, the blame would have been placed on NATO—perhaps on lower level Russian commanders for their rash decision. As the dubious adventure wound down more or less favorably, Yeltsin was ready to take credit for it, but carefully protected himself from assuming responsibility had the gamble backfired. In Russia, where anti-NATO sentiments were prevalent, the Pristina incident, beating NATO to the punch, played well in the media. As a result of NATO’s military intervention in Yugoslavia, relations between Russia and the West reached their lowest point. Yeltsin, for his pro-Serbian sympathies, became isolated. Russia had clearly lost its influ-

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ence. Neither threats nor diplomatic pressure or even Yeltsin’s personal appeals made the West relent. Despite the setbacks, Yeltsin realized that in view of Russia’s economic shortcomings only the West and the Western-dominated IMF and World Bank could bail out his country’s economy. After the “new cold war,” as Yeltsin was referring to the tension that had developed on account of NATO’s action, he was prepared to mend his relations with the Western leaders at the forthcoming June meeting of the Group-8.38 On June 19–20, 1999, at the economic summit meeting of the Group-8 in Cologne, Germany, Yeltsin had his chance to reestablish himself among the world leaders. Prime Minister Stepashin represented Russia on the first day of the summit. The mood was forgiving; the Group-8 leaders agreed on a plan to provide Russia with relief from the debt that had plagued its economy. The final communiqué included an arrangement under which Russia was able to reschedule payments of nearly $70 billion in debt that had been run up by the Communist government during the days of the old Soviet Union. Chancellor Schroeder agreed to push the International Monetary Fund to release $4.5 billion in Western aid that had been blocked when Russia’s financial markets collapsed in August 1998.39 Yeltsin spent altogether seven hours in Cologne, most of the time in negotiations with President Clinton. The announced purpose of their meeting was further nuclear arms reduction, and discussions about initiating START III. But START II was still not ratified by the Duma. Before substantial disarmament could be negotiated, “there was an elephant in the room,” noted President Clinton’s security advisor, Samuel Berger, referring to the Kosovo crisis. Even before his departure from Moscow, Yeltsin publicly announced, “We are going to reconcile.”40 As a special gesture of goodwill, President Yeltsin came to the meeting with President Clinton bearing a gift—a report on declassified Russian information relating to the assassination of President John Kennedy.41 As far as Kosovo was concerned, President Clinton commented, “We have turned a new page.” Yeltsin pledged that he would make a new effort to have the Duma ratify START II. He relented to the Americans’ request to open negotiations about the up-to-that-point sacrosanct 1972 ABM Treaty. That issue was pushed by the Republican-dominated United States Congress, whose more radical members considered the ABM Treaty with the Soviet Union no longer valid. Clinton, on his part, reaffirmed his support of economic aid for Russia, and stipulated that Russia was “a full member of the G-8.”42 Content with his short trip abroad, having successfully emerged from the impeachment debate, and with a new prime minister in place at home, Yeltsin appeared to be fully in control. Although his condemnation of NATO air

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strikes was in harmony with public sentiments, his popularity rating hardly increased. The parliamentary election was forthcoming at the end of 1999, and the presidential election was to be held early in 2000. Yeltsin’s term was coming to an end. His health was fragile, his decisions questionable; nevertheless, the possibility of a third term was bandied around. Yeltsin repeatedly declared that he would finish out his term and would not seek reelection. Despite his promises, both at home and abroad, people were waiting to see whether one of the ultimate tests of democracy—a peaceful transition of power—would indeed take place in Russia. Would Yeltsin yield to a legitimately elected successor, or would he come up with a ruse, like declaring a national emergency, to stay in power. The pre-1996 presidential election document to authorize a postponement of the election that had been prepared, although not used, did not bode well for 2000.

NOTES 1. “Hands Off Kosovo, Yeltsin Tells Clinton,” Reuters, February 18, 1999. 2. Ibid. 3. Izvestia, March 16, 1999. 4. John M. Broder, “Primakov, on Way to the U.S., Turns Back Home in Midair,” New York Times, March 24, 1999. 5. Ibid. 6. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1999/03/990324I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 7. Ibid. 8. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1999/03/990325I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 9. Timothy Heritage, “Russia Rules Out ‘Extreme’ Response to NATO,” Reuters, March 25, 1999. 10. Ibid. 11. Segodnya, March 25, 1999. 12. Izvestia, March 25, 1999. 13. Barry Renfrew, “Russia Won’t Use Force Against NATO,” The Associated Press, March 25, 1999. 14. Nick Wadhams, “Russia Denounces NATO Air Strikes,” The Associated Press, March 27, 1999. 15. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1999/03/9903229I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 16. Greg Myre, “Yeltsin Denounces NATO’s Strikes,” The Associated Press, March 30, 1999. 17. Barry Renfrew, “Report: Russia to Escalate Protest,” The Associated Press, March 31, 1999.

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18. Adam Tanner, “Yeltsin Talks Tough on Yugoslav, Seeks Survival,” Reuters, April 9, 1999. 19. Barry Renfrew, “Chernomyrdin to Head Kosovo Mission,” The Associated Press, April 14, 1999. 20. Greg Myre, “Russians Back Yugoslavia Link-Up,” The Associated Press, April 16, 1999. 21. “Russian Patriarch Visits Belgrade,” The Associated Press, April 20, 1999. 22. Boris Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon: Pazmyshleniya,Vospominaniya, Pechatleniya [Presidential Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, and Impressions] (Moscow: ACT Publisher, 2000), pp. 289–290. 23. The forty-seven-year-old Sergey Stepashin had been a loyal Yeltsin supporter all along. He was the head of the Federal Security during the first Chechen war. Later, he was made minister of justice, then minister of interior, and by the time of his appointment to premier, he also served as deputy prime minister. 24. Leonid Mlechin, Formula Vlasti: Ot Yeltsina k Putinu [Formula of Power: From Yeltsin to Putin] (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2000), pp. 529–530. 25. Barry Renfrew, “Yeltsin Fires Prime Minister,” The Associated Press, May 12, 1999. 26. “List of Impeachment Charges against Yeltsin,” Reuters, May 16, 1999. 27. Martin Nesirky, “Yeltsin Survives Duma Vote, Checks Health,” Reuters, May 15, 1999. 28. Colin McIntyre, “Yeltsin Warns on Kosovo, Bombing Intensifies,” Reuters, May 12, 1999. 29. Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon, p. 290. 30. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1999/05/990519I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 31. “Priorities of Russia’s Prime Minister,” The Associated Press, May 19, 1999. 32. http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199899/cm select/ cmfaff/188/9071302.html. 33. http://www.bobharris.com/scoop/kosovo/kosovodocs/chernomyrdin.html. 34. http://www.kforonline.com/resources/documents/default.html. 35. Ibid. 36. Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon, pp. 292–293. 37. Joseph Fitchet, “Disobeying Orders: NATO Veil Lifted,” International Herald Tribune, September 11, 1999; and The Guardian, August 3, 1999. 38. Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon, p. 376. 39. http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9906/20/g8.summit.02/. 40. Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon, p. 378. 41. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/daily/june99/ jfk20.html. 42. “Chronology of U.S.-Russia Summits, 1992–2000,” http://www.state. gov/www.regions/nis/chron_summits_russia.

18 The Search for a Successor

Unsuccessful in influencing foreign affairs and playing only an intermediary role in Kosovo, Yeltsin began to concentrate on the forthcoming election. His own health was still very fragile, and he realized that he needed to find a suitable successor. Since the onset of his presidency, he had been advocating Russia’s transformation to a genuine democracy. The main ingredients of democracy—multiparty elections, freedom of the press, and freedom to travel, among others—were indeed promulgated under Yeltsin’s leadership. Nevertheless, the 1993 constitution had given the president powers to defy the elected Parliament and to govern by decrees. Whenever the president disagreed with the decisions of the Duma, he issued his decrees to countermand legislation, or he took the initiative on actions that he felt were necessary for the good of the country. Often, presidential decrees were issued in defense of the nascent democracy to keep Russia from sliding back to an authoritarian Communist-dominated system, or in defense of developing a free-market economy. Accordingly, an ongoing conflict between the Parliament and the president characterized Russia’s transition to democracy. Up to that point, Yeltsin had prevailed, but how could he assure the election of a person of his choice as president in view of the democratic constraint? Yeltsin had been looking for successors even before the 1996 presidential election; according to his own assessment, he was unable to find anyone he could trust. Therefore, despite his poor health and very low popularity, he decided to run for reelection in 1996. During his second term, his health

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worsened and he was often incapacitated. Yeltsin’s inner circle of advisors and heads of the government were running Russia’s day-to-day operation during his prolonged illnesses. As the succession of prime ministers’ popularity increased, and their names appeared in the press as potential presidential candidates, Yeltsin’s antipathy toward them grew. Chernomyrdin, a Yeltsin loyalist, held onto the premiership the longest. Not a very colorful personality, a former director of the Soviet gas and oil monopoly, he distinguished himself in defusing the July 1995 Chechen terrorist attack by Shamil Basayev in Budennovsk.1 During ongoing negotiations between Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, the Russian premier gained international recognition. Yeltsin could not accept the fact that Chernomyrdin began to overshadow him, and replaced him with a young and inexperienced politician, Kiriyenko, who was removed after the 1998 fiscal debacle. Primakov was appointed to head the government as a compromise candidate, but as soon as he had stabilized the political situation, and his political stature was showing signs of promise as a potential presidential candidate, Yeltsin fired him. Primakov’s compromises with the Communists in the Duma did not endear him to Yeltsin, who figured that the prime minister would have an advantage during the upcoming election. Ironically, by ousting Primakov, Yeltsin, at least for a short time, propelled him to be the leading candidate for the presidency. Stepashin, also not Yeltsin’s choice for the presidency, followed Primakov. By midsummer 1999, the candidates for the presidency were beginning to line up: the mayor of Moscow, Luzhkov; the Communist, Zyuganov; the former general, now governor, Lebed; and Primakov were among the front-runners. In the midst of the search for the right successor, Yeltsin’s family and inner circle of advisors came under close public scrutiny and were accused of taking foreign bribes. In the domestic and foreign media, it was claimed that Yeltsin had lost control of the Kremlin, and a corrupt group of actual family members and close associates, among them oligarchs, had been unduly influencing the president. In the media, this group was referred to as the “Family.” A poll taken in July listed the following “Family” members as the “gray cardinals”: Tatiana Dyachenko, Yeltsin’s younger daughter and one of her father’s main boosters and confidants, especially since the 1996 elections; Boris Berezovsky, one of the most influential oligarchs; Roman Abramovich, another of the oligarchs; Anatoly Chubais, who had been in charge of the privatizations, had been blamed for “giving away” the country’s wealth to cronies, and had held several high government posts; Valentin Yumashev, former head of the presidential administration, confidant, and editor of Yeltsin’s books; and Aleksander Voloshin, who followed Yumashev as head of the presidential administration. All those people near

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Yeltsin and others, including his older daughter, Yelena, and her husband Valery Okulov, head of AEROFLOT (Russia’s state-owned international airline), were linked to bribe-taking scandals.2 Yeltsin claimed that the allegations were politically motivated, and he dismissed them. In light of the often wild accusations, Yeltsin declared that he had “no stocks and bonds, no real estate abroad (no villas, castles, palaces, farms, or haciendas), foreign bank accounts, precious stones, gold bars, oil wells, diamond mines, land holdings abroad, yacht, airplanes, helicopters or that sort of things.” He added, “Neither my wife nor my daughters, Lena and Tanya, have Swiss or English bank accounts.”3 The allegation of corruption linking Yeltsin, his family, and high-level Kremlin officials reached such wide circulation that Yeltsin felt obliged to deny them during a telephone conversation with President Clinton.4 Yeltsin had to confront another political rumor, which accused him of using his political wiles to hold onto the presidency. On July 6, 1999, in an interview with the editors of the Izvestia newspaper, he unequivocally said that he intended to leave his office when his term ended in 2000, and hand over the power to a duly elected president. He said: “For the first time in the history of Russia, power will be transferred not in a revolutionary way but in a constitutional and civilized manner.”5 In the course of the interview, Yeltsin told the editors that he had a successor in mind, but not so much “as an heir of the throne.” He claimed that his personal likes or dislikes had nothing to do with a successor: “This will be a new head of state who comes to power in a legal way.” He continued, “Of course I have my own idea who might become the next president. But as soon as I utter his name, he won’t be allowed to live in peace. He will be smothered.”6 As far as the forthcoming Duma elections were concerned, Yeltsin commented that the Kremlin would help to consolidate “a broad coalition of progressive politicians—both federal and regional. He praised Prime Minister Stepashin, saying that he had been growing in authority, and Yeltsin even had a few good words for Moscow’s Mayor Luzhkov and his supporters. In the interview, he also commented about the possible unification between Russia and Belarus. He said that he had instructed Stepashin to meet with President Lukashenko to expedite the unification process. Ironically, Lukashenko was critical of the slow progress of the talks, and made no secret of his ambition to one day head the union.7 As Yeltsin was giving assurances that he would not seek a third term, Mayor Luzhkov was organizing his own campaign for the presidency. He was forming a coalition under the name of “Fatherland–All Russia” (OVR). The initial purpose of the new political alliance was to gain strong representation in the Duma, and from there launch a viable presidential campaign. Luzhkov courted former Premier Primakov to join the new alliance.

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Despite his attempts, Yeltsin was unable to block the emergence of the new political party. He could hardly count on Chernomyrdin’s Our Home Russia (NDR) Party, which had proven to be ineffective during the 1996 election, and whose members in 1999 leaned toward merging with Luzhkov’s party. Stepashin also was not in the position to lead an effective campaign against either Yeltsin’s longtime political opponents or the new challengers. “With each passing day, power is slipping from the Kremlin,” said Vladimir Ryzhkov, one of the leaders of Our Home Russia. With the weakening of the center, the regional governors, many of whom ruled their domains not unlike previous Communist Party bosses, were cast in the role of kingmakers.8 Yeltsin was not about to give up the initiative. On August 9, he fired his prime minister of four months. The news of Yeltsin’s latest decision, not unlike in the past, shocked his supporters and confused his opponents. Washington was just about to take Stepashin seriously when the news of his dismissal became public. Less then two weeks earlier, Stepashin had traveled to the United States and succeeded in establishing a fine rapport with Vice President Gore. They had even decided to proceed on a first-name basis, and declared their meeting to be very satisfactory, which was viewed by some as the meeting of two future presidents. When Stepashin was asked whether he would declare himself a presidential candidate, he answered, “I have no plans to occupy the office of the president.” Considering that before reaching Washington he had stopped in Yekaterinburg, Barnaul, Spotski, Vladivostok and Seattle, his trip showed no lack of ambition.9 For Yeltsin, who was desperately searching for a viable successor, the nomination of Stepashin as prime minister was only a temporary solution. Admittedly, he never looked upon his loyal supporter as the future president of Russia. Stepashin served the purpose of replacing Primakov who had already been irritating Yeltsin, and was becoming popular. Even though Stepashin did not engender much enthusiasm, the fact that in seventeen months, Yeltsin had fired the government four times showed that he himself was unfit to govern. Even his reform-minded former deputy prime minister, Boris Nemtsov, condemned the president: “It is hard to explain madness. The people have grown tired watching an ill leader who is not capable of doing his job.”10 On August 5, 1999, Yeltsin offered the premiership to Vladimir Putin, telling him that he must help to bring the forthcoming parliamentary elections to a successful conclusion. Putin was ready to accept the assignment, but questioned, “whom should we support?” At that point, Yeltsin himself did not know the answer, but improvised: “We shall build a new party.” Then he added: “I am a person who has been tortured by the Parliament more than anyone in history, I know that it will be necessary for you to establish a solid

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base in the Duma. It is important to have your own political resources.” When Putin expressed a dislike of pre-election fights, Yeltsin assured him that as long as he showed self-assuredness, he would succeed. As an extra incentive, Yeltsin hinted that Putin might eventually move up to the country’s “highest office.”11 On August 9, Yeltsin officially nominated the forty-six-year-old Vladimir Putin, the head of the Federal Security Service, as prime minister. Putin had spent most of his career in the country’s security service (KGB), and had little experience in politics and economics. Nevertheless, Yeltsin firmly believed that he had found the right person not only to become the next premier, but also his chosen successor for the office of the presidency. Originally, his association with St. Petersburg’s reform-minded mayor, Anatoly Sobchak, had called the Kremlin’s attention to him. In 1997, Putin was invited to work in the presidential administration in Moscow. Yeltsin took notice of him early on when Putin was working in the administration, first as Yumashev’s deputy, later as head of the office. Yeltsin had many opportunities to meet with Putin and was impressed by his brief and concise reports. Unlike his predecessors in a similar position, Putin did not seek Yeltsin’s attention beyond official business, and he avoided giving personal opinions or trying to establish personal relations with the president. Putin gave concise and thoughtful responses to Yeltsin’s most provocative questions and also gave the impression that he was able to face up to life’s challenges.12 In 1998, Yeltsin was looking for a replacement for the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Nikolay Kovalev. Putin must have hit the right note, as the president offered him that job. When Yeltsin suggested that Putin reenter the service with the rank of general, Putin respectfully responded that he had left the service in 1991, and would prefer to remain a civilian, adding that it was important that the FSB be headed by a civilian—with the president’s permission, he would just as well remain a colonel in the reserves. While in charge of the FSB, Putin reorganized that agency to Yeltsin’s liking. Yeltsin also gave him credit for dealing firmly with political extremists, especially the Makashov-fueled provocative anti-Semitic outbursts.13 Up to the last minute of naming a new prime minister, some of Yeltsin’s closest advisors (among them, Chubais) opposed the removal of the Stepashin government. Chubais warned Yeltsin about the possibility of mass demonstrations and the potential of a new political crisis. Yeltsin was aware of the risks; nevertheless, he went on television and announced: Today I have made the decision to remove the government of Sergey Vladimirovich Stepashin. In accordance with the Constitution I turn to the State Duma with the request to confirm Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin as Chairman of the Government of

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the Russian Federation. I am convinced that assuming this office, he would be of great use to the country, and Russians would have the opportunity to appreciate Putin’s business acumen and human qualities. I am certain in this. But I wish that everybody should have the same certainty in June 2000 when they would go to the polls. . . . I know Vladimir Vladimirovich well, I have been observing him for a long time, when he worked as deputy mayor in St. Petersburg, and in the last years, we have been working side by side.14

On the same date, in the evening, Putin was interviewed on television. His answers were cool and collected; he responded to questions as if he would be willing to give only his name, rank and serial number. As for his family, he replied that he had a wife and two daughters, age thirteen and fourteen; as for hobbies, he named sports, literature, music, boxing and judo. Regarding his political experience, he said, “I haven’t been involved in politics.” To the question of running for the presidency, he simply said, “A proposal was made to me and I accepted it.” To the follow-up question on the presidency, he said that he would run on the record in office in the coming months: “If there are results—and for the government that means in the economic sphere above all—then we can count on the support of a wide segment of the population.”15 Concurrently with naming the new premier, Yeltsin signed a decree setting the date for parliamentary elections; the voting was to take place on December 19, 1999. That marked the official beginning of the election season. Setting the date, Yeltsin shrewdly assured the confirmation of Putin. If the Lower House rejected his nominee three times, he would dissolve the Parliament, and a new election date would have to be selected. Not wanting to create additional complications, on August 16, the Duma approved Putin as prime minister with a majority of 233 votes to 84 against and 17 abstentions.16 Yeltsin congratulated Putin, and told him: “We shall work together, respecting each other and having counsel on serious issues, and I’m allowing independence.” But the president also warned him not to stray too far from the Kremlin’s policies.17 Besides the upcoming elections and the faltering economy, Putin was faced with a different problem. New disturbances flared up in the mountains of the North Caucasus region where Islamic militants clashed with Russian security forces. Chechen raiders crossed over to the neighboring Dagestan region, capturing several mountain villages. From there they issued a statement declaring Dagestan’s independence as an Islamic state, and vowing to drive away “infidels,” that is, Russians, from its territory. Dagestani authorities rejected the rebels’ statement and called for the Russian army’s help to uproot the Islamic militants. Dealing decisively with the renewed militancy

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of the Chechens was to become Putin’s first major challenge. He had already been involved with the restless region in the North Caucasus as head of the FSB and also while chairing Yeltsin’s Security Council. As the newly named premier, he promised that the government would use its toughest measures to restore order in that troubled area.18 At first glance, a skirmish in Dagestan might have seemed like a relatively unimportant clash with bandits, but a closer look revealed that the fiercest Chechen field commander, Shamil Basayev (who was responsible for the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk, in which 150 people died), was the leader of the “bandits.” Basayev wanted to rouse Dagestan and bring it in line with Chechnya. In an interview, he said: “The aim is the union of Dagestan and Chechnya.” He hoped that Dagestan would fight for its independence from Russia. By his incursion into Dagestan, he wanted to kindle the flames of independence in that country, but the Dagestanis were not ready to secede from Russia.19 In Russia, the formation of a new government was taken in stride. It was just another example of a sickly president’s attempt to hold onto power, which was rapidly slipping out of his hands. Not much success was predicted for Putin; few believed that he would be able to succeed Yeltsin as president. He was a man who had no political experience, and no political party to back him up. The combined forces of Mayor Luzhkov and former Prime Minister Primakov appeared to be making inroads in the Duma against the entrenched Communists. After securing a firm base in the Duma, either of the two politicians could be in the position to mount an effective campaign for the presidency. How did Yeltsin expect the novice premier to overcome the odds? Cynical observers pointed to Yeltsin’s electoral victory in 1996. With sufficient funds and an all-out media blitz, anyone could win in Russia. Other pundits speculated that there might not be another election. Apparently, Yeltsin had fired Stepashin because he was unable to break up the Luzhkov-Primakov political alliance. Putin was given the formidable task not only to head the government and deal with the problems of the economy, foreign affairs and internal rebellion, but also to build a new political party by recruiting three of his predecessors—Chernomyrdin, Kiriyenko and Stepashin—to counter the left-of-center Fatherland-All Russia (OVR) group. Putin’s future depended on how well he could mobilize the pro-Yeltsin supporters before the December election. In the meantime, Primakov’s popularity was rising. It was speculated that he would lend the Luzhkov-led group his popularity to storm the Duma, and in exchange Luzhkov would agree to support Primakov for the presidency. If the sixty-nine-year-old Primakov were to be elected president, he would yield more power to a Luzhkov-led government.

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Russia’s economic conditions were in worse shape than at the beginning of Yeltsin’s 1996 presidential campaign. Wage arrears were 59 million rubles—48 percent more than in 1996. Unemployment was rising. Real income for the entire population was 23 percent below what it was just a year earlier. Yeltsin’s popularity rating was ranging between 2 percent and 7 percent. With such odds, in no country could an incumbent or his designee win a legitimate election. The outgoing premier, Stepashin, predicted that Putin would not last longer than three months. It appeared more likely that the democrats would be frustrated in Russia. Following a popular trend, the regional governors began to line up with the Luzhkov-Primakov group. Even if elections were to be rigged, without the governors’ support, such a move could deliver less than 10 percent of the votes.20 As the political parties began to align themselves for the elections in Russia, the crisis in the Caucasus went on unabated. Additional Chechen Islamic militants crossed over into Dagestan. The rebels were confronted by Russian Interior Ministry troops. A terrorist bomb exploded in the town of Bainaksk, killing some thirty-six people and injuring 110. The bomb explosion in Dagestan suggested that a previous bomb explosion in Moscow’s prime underground shopping center, the Manezh Square, had also been committed by Chechen terrorists. Yeltsin was outraged and called the bombing a barbaric act. Mayor Luzhkov said that the criminals who were responsible should be shot. Rebel groups in the Caucasus claimed credit for the bombing. In Dagestan, the Interior Ministry’s forces did not have the sufficient strength to repel the militants; consequently, the Defense Ministry took control of the military operation.21 At a Security Council meeting, Yeltsin criticized the army for its slow reaction, and then demanded tougher action against the rebels. In other comments, Yeltsin said that he had drawn three conclusions about the Dagestani events: “First, the defeat of the bandits has led them to resort to especially cruel actions. . . . Second, we have not been able to destroy the roots of the virus of terrorism. . . . And third, up to now federal forces have been acting in a favorable information environment, but the longer the confrontation takes place and the more victims there are, the less trust there will be.”22 Prime Minister Putin added: “We must brush away the syndrome of guilt developed in previous years,” an apparent reference to the reluctance to use sufficient force after the 1994–1996 Chechen war. “We have been attacked,” Putin said, arguing that Russia should move quickly to eliminate “the bandits in Dagestan.” He said that “much time” will be needed to resolve the socioeconomic problems in the North Caucasus, but “we cannot afford to spend too much time on eliminating the bandits.”23

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On September 9, 1999, an explosion occurred at an apartment house in southeastern Moscow. The nine-story building was destroyed, and windows in neighboring apartment houses were blown out. More than ninety people died in the explosion, while dozens were hospitalized. Putin declared September 13 to be a national day of mourning for the victims of the apartment blast, as well as for those killed in the explosions at the Manezh shopping mall in the Russian capital and in the town of Buinaksk, in Dagestan. Initially, Putin did not outright label the Moscow explosions as terrorist acts, but by combining the day of mourning with that of the victims of the Dagestani bombing, he did not leave much doubt as to the culprits.24 On the designated day of mourning, another explosion destroyed an apartment building, in the southern part of the capital. At least 110 people were killed and dozens of others injured. Speaking on national television on September 13, President Yeltsin said, “terrorism has declared war on the Russian people, and therefore it was necessary to unite all forces of society and the state to rebuff the internal enemy.”25 Once again, foreign affairs intruded on the multilayered domestic issues. At a meeting held on September 10, in Auckland, New Zealand, with U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov underlined Moscow’s continued opposition to the United States’deploying a limited ABM system. He argued that the 1972 treaty was the “cornerstone of strategic stability” and should not be changed. Dr. Albright attempted to convince her Russian counterpart that the new system was not anti-Moscow, but Ivanov was unmoved. He noted that the matter was an “issue of intense debate in the Duma,” where it was decided that START II, even after ratification, would become void if the 1972 ABM Treaty would be abrogated.26 On September 12, Putin traveled to Auckland, to participate in a meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. On the sidelines of the APEC summit, U.S. President Clinton and Russian Premier Putin met for the first time. Clinton expressed his concerns about recent allegations of Russian corruption and money laundering. He said that Russia should deal with those allegations “because it could eat the heart out of Russian society if the problem of corruption is not dealt with.” Putin acknowledged that corruption was a “matter of concern” for Moscow, but added that there were some political dimensions to it. The Russian premier suggested that Moscow and Washington should develop a “cooperative approach” toward dealing with the problem of money laundering. Clinton and Putin also tackled the issue of arms control, with Putin stressing that Moscow was committed to persuading the State Duma to ratify START II, but that achieving that goal would be “difficult,” especially in

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light of the U.S. efforts to change the ABM Treaty. Clinton, on his part, repeated that the sole purpose of amending the 1972 ABM Treaty was to protect the United States against possible attacks by such “rogue states” as North Korea and Iraq. Putin responded that he understood Clinton’s concerns, but that they must be addressed in such a way as to take into account the security concerns of other countries.27 Returning from Auckland, Putin reported to the Duma about his meeting with Clinton and spelled out his policies. Contrary to his initial doubts, he said that he was absolutely convinced of a Chechen connection in the Moscow bombings. Putin emphasized that Chechen complicity did not justify calls for “annihilating the Chechen people.” He proposed the following measures to exert pressure on Chechnya: an “objective” reassessment of the 1996 Khasavyurt agreement; the imposition of a strict cordon sanitaire along Chechnya’s borders (he did not specify whether it would extend to Chechnya’s border with Georgia); the “destruction” of all Chechen guerrilla bands; and the creation of a Chechen government in exile.28 During the fall, Chechnya came under intensive Russian air strikes. At first, the Russian government insisted that only suspected guerilla strongholds were targeted. Then the Chechen infrastructure was hit. In Grozny, the Chechen capital, oil depots and the airport came under attack. Civilian casualties were mounting, and thousands of refugees were flooding neighboring states. The massive and often indiscriminate bombing began to draw protest from abroad. It appeared that the Putin government was taking a page from NATO tactics in Kosovo, and it was trying to subdue the Chechens without the introduction of ground forces, but at the same time it was amassing troops at Chechnya’s borders. In the United States, the Clinton administration came under severe criticism by the Republican Congress for not taking tougher measures against Yeltsin’s Russia. The Bank of New York’s involvement with large-scale Russian money laundering schemes was making headlines, and it prompted FBI investigations and congressional hearings. Misspent IMF loans also came under congressional scrutiny. Accusations of bribery against the Yeltsin insiders, the so-called “Family,” and corruption gave fodder to attacks on Clinton’s foreign policy.29 Republicans blamed Russia for delays in the implementation of a national missile defense system because of its vehement opposition to amending the 1972 ABM Treaty. When the Russians took forceful action against the Chechen incursion into Dagestan and began heavy bombing of Chechnya, the Clinton administration joined republican critics of Yeltsin. On November 1, 1999, Prime Minister Putin and members of the official Russian delegation for the Middle East talks, arrived in Oslo. They were

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supposed to take part in the Middle East summit, which had been organized by the Norwegian authorities to commemorate the late Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and to give a new boost to the Middle East peace process. Prime Minister Putin and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivanov took part in the official arrangements and had a series of meetings with both the Norwegian hosts and other delegations. During the talks with Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs K.Vollebaek, who also headed OSCE in 1999, the Russians agreed to send an OSCE monitoring team to Chechnya, Ingushetiya and Dagestan. The main task of the team would be to assess the scope of the refugee problem in North Caucasus, cooperate with Russian authorities in solving that problem, and also to improve the situation of the approximately 200,000 refugees from Chechnya. During his stay in Oslo, Prime Minister Putin told reporters: “Local bandit groups are to blame for developments in Chechnya not Russian authorities or Russia.” He added that “terrorists” there were armed and trained by other countries and “our task is to free the Chechen people of those unwanted guests.”30 On November 2, Putin met with President Clinton. Their meeting was dominated by the problems linked to Russian military operation in Chechnya. Clinton urged Putin in tough terms to seek a political settlement of the Chechen conflict and to avoid civilian casualties. He warned Putin that Russia’s offensive in Chechnya could “entail major loss of life of innocent people,” a development, he said, which could “affect Russia’s international reputation, which it had been working very hard to try to restore.” But Clinton reportedly did not threaten any political or diplomatic retaliation against Moscow, even if it continued its assault on Chechnya. Putin brushed aside Clinton’s objections over Russian policy in Chechnya, characterizing the Chechen conflict as a domestic matter for the Russian government to handle, and called anew for the international community to help Moscow in its battle against the Chechen “terrorists.”31 The atmosphere during the Clinton-Putin meeting was apparently made cooler by Putin’s delivery of a message from Russian President Yeltsin. Yeltsin warned the United States against violating the ABM Treaty by proceeding with plans to build a national ballistic missile defense system. Aside from simply restating Moscow’s opposition to U.S. efforts to renegotiate the terms of the 1972 accord, the timing of Yeltsin’s message (it was faxed to media outlets while Clinton was meeting with Putin) was presumably intended to deflect the criticism leveled at Moscow over its crackdown in Chechnya. The Yeltsin message was also in line with recent Russian attempts to internationalize the Russian-U.S. negotiations over the ABM Treaty. That strategy was based on an understanding of how unpopular recent U.S. moves in the arms control arena—including the rejection of the

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Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—were in many foreign capitals. Yeltsin’s message was reportedly also sent to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the Group of Seven countries, and to China, India, South Africa and Sweden. Among other things, the message warned that any collapse of the ABM Treaty due to U.S. missile defense plans “would have extremely dangerous consequences for the entire arms control process.”32 Soon after the encounter with President Clinton, Prime Minister Putin wrote an “op ed” article in the New York Times in defense of the Russian action in Chechnya. He appealed to the American public by recounting terrorist attacks against the United States and similar acts of terror in Russia. “Terrorism today knows no boundaries,” wrote Putin, pointing out that Shamil Basayev, the Chechen warlord, was getting assistance from Osama bin Laden, who had also been held responsible for blowing up two American embassies in Africa. Putin claimed that Russian troops aimed only to get rid of the terrorists from Chechnya and selected their targets very carefully, not unlike the United States in Desert Storm and in Yugoslavia. “Yet in the midst of war, even the most carefully planned military operations cause civilian casualties. . . . An anti-terrorist campaign was forced upon us. Sadly, decisive armed intervention was the only way to prevent further casualties. . . . But when society’s core interests are besieged by violent elements, responsible leaders must respond.”33 When President Clinton was saying good-bye to Putin in Oslo, he told him that they would continue their dialogue in Istanbul at the forthcoming OSCE meeting. Putin responded that not he but President Yeltsin would attend that conference. Clinton was quoted as saying, “Oh my God that’s all I’ve needed!” According to Yeltsin, “Bill did not feel like meeting with me in Istanbul. Western countries were preparing to make rather harsh statements about Chechnya. And they were all aware of that. As a matter of fact, it was the beginning of a new phase of Russia’s isolation. This had to be prevented so it should not happen.”34 Although he saw the necessity to go, Yeltsin had his own concerns about the trip to Turkey. In spite of his health problems, he knew that he would have to make a powerful case for his country’s policies in Chechnya and to refute an onslaught of criticism. He claimed that Russia’s position was clear: “We save the world from international terrorism, and we save Russia from falling apart.”35 On November 18, 1999, in Istanbul, Yeltsin made one of his most defiant appearances at the fifty-four-nation Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. He told the assembled world leaders: “You have no right to criticize Russia for Chechnya. As a bloody wave of terrorist acts that have swept over Moscow and other cities and towns of our country, 1,580 peaceful inhabitants of our country suffered. . . . We cannot accept recipes from

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so-called objective critics of Russia, those who fail to understand that we are simply obliged to put an end to the cancer of terrorism to prevent it from metastasizing far beyond the Caucasus.” He condemned interference in other countries’ internal affairs for “humanitarian” reasons. He warned about the disproportionate consequences of such interventions. “Suffice to recall the aggression of NATO, headed by the United States, that was mounted against Yugoslavia.”36 President Clinton, in his public address, rebutted Yeltsin’s assertion about aggression in Yugoslavia. But he criticized Russia’s indiscriminate war in Chechnya, in which civilian casualties were mounting and which uprooted hundreds of thousands of people from their homes. He did not challenge Russia’s right to “to overcome the scourge of terrorism and lawlessness. We believe Russia has not only the right, but the obligation to defend its territorial integrity.” Clinton warned, “if attacks on the civilian population would continue, the extremism Russia was to combat would only intensify.” During the first Chechnya war in 1994–1996, in defending Yeltsin’s military operation in Chechnya, Clinton called it a justifiable civil war comparable to that of Abraham Lincoln’s during the Civil War. But in Istanbul, Clinton was firm in his criticism; nevertheless, he finished his speech with a personal appeal to Yeltsin: President Yeltsin, one of the most thrilling experiences of my life, as a citizen of the world, before I became a president, was when you stood up on that tank in Moscow when they tried to take freedom of the Russian people away. And your standing there on that tank said to those people, “You can do this, but you’ll have to kill me first.” If they had put you in jail instead of electing you president, I would hope that every leader of every country around this table would have stood up for you and for freedom in Russia and not said, “Well that is an internal Russian affair that we cannot be a part of.”37

Yeltsin listened attentively to his “friend Bill,” and after the public session gave him a friendly bear hug. The two leaders met privately for fortyfive minutes. In spite of the “very good personal chemistry,” as Clinton put it, “it didn’t stop us from our clear disagreement here.” Aides reported that the Yeltsin-Clinton meeting was contentious, but lacked the fireworks over Chechnya. “It had a constructive tone as opposed to diatribes or shoe-pounding and it proved that we can disagree without damaging the overall relationship.”38 Clinton’s criticism of Yeltsin was relatively mild compared to the words of French President Chirac, who called the consequences of the onslaught on civilians unacceptable, saying: “The current offensive is a tragic error for the whole region.” German Chancellor Schroeder said: “War is the wrong means to combat terrorism. . . . The massive use of

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force, above all harms the civilian population, therefore it has to stop.”39 Because of the harsh European criticism and a delay in signing a landmark European Security Charter, Yeltsin, after spending only eight hours in Istanbul, decided to leave early without waiting for the ceremonial signing, snubbing both the French and German heads of state who had originally been scheduled to meet with him privately.40 Despite the outright rejection of criticism, Yeltsin did make a concession to his critics. He agreed to allow the chairman of the OSCE to visit Chechnya and help to seek a political resolution to the conflict. But the fighting in Chechnya, instead of winding down, was escalating. As the criticism of human rights violations mounted abroad, domestic support for cracking down on the Chechens grew. The attacks on Dagestan and especially the terrorist bombings in Moscow turned Russians against the Chechens. Not only the nationalists and extremists, but also the democrats and liberals lined up behind the government’s firm retaliation. Prime Minister Putin, by acting decisively and speaking crudely about the Chechens, “We will find the bandits even if we have to get them from the outhouse,” the previously little-known ex-KGB officer had the majority of the country’s approval of his military operation in Chechnya. Putin’s popularity was growing just as the political campaigning for the Parliament was heating up. NOTES 1. Shamil Basaev, Chechen field commander, raided a hospital in Budennovsk. Chernomyrdin promised peace talks in return for hostages. The ensuing talks and cease-fire lasted three months. 2. “Reyting ‘serych kardinalov,’ ” Novaya gazeta, June 22, 1999. 3. Boris Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon: Pazmyshleniya,Vospominaniya, Pechatleniya [Presidential Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, and Impressions] (Moscow: ACT Publisher, 2000), pp. 340–341. 4. New York Times, September 9, 1999. 5. Matt Bivens, “Yeltsin Promises to Exit in 2000,” St. Petersburg Times, July 6, 1999. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Celestine Bohlen, “Formation of Rivals’ Alliance Exposes Yeltsin’s Decline,” New York Times, August 7, 1999. 9. Vremya MN and Kommersant, July 29, 1999. 10. Echo Moskva, Radio Interview, August 9, 1999. 11. Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon, pp. 357–358. 12. Ibid., p. 357. 13. Ibid., pp. 358–360. 14. Ibid., pp. 363–364.

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15. Adam Tanner, “Putin Shows Somber Reserve in Russian TV Interview,” Reuters, August 9, 1999. 16. “Yeltsin’s Latest PM Choice Gets Duma Approval,” Reuters, August 16, 1999. 17. Vladimir Isachenkov, “Yeltsin Warns New Prime Minister,” The Associated Press, August 17, 1999. 18. Celestine Bohlen, “New Russian Premier Has Plan to Quell Rebellion,” New York Times, August 11, 1999. 19. Carlotta Gall, “Dagestan Skirmish Is Big Russian Risk,” New York Times, August 13, 1999. 20. John Helmer, “The Kremlin’s Last Call,” Moscow Tribune, August 31, 1999. 21. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1999/09/990902I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1999/09/990910I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 25. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1999/09/990913I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 26. “U.S. and Russia Still at Odds over Amendments to ABM Treaty,” Agence France Presse, September 11, 1999. 27. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1999/09/990913I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 28. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1999/09/990915I. html(opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). 29. Raymond Bonner, “Bank Affair and Yeltsin’s Son-in-Law,” and Eroc Schmitt, “Hearings on Russian Money Moves Are Likely to Be Partisan,” New York Times, September 21, 1999. 30. http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe?4439, “V. Putin in Oslo for Talks on the Middle East and Chechnya, Meets Clinton, Others,” NPI Center for Russian Studies, November 2, 1999. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Vladimir Putin, “Why We Must Act,” New York Times, November 14, 1999. 34. Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon, p. 378. 35. Ibid., pp. 378–379. 36. “In Words of Yeltsin and Clinton: Examining Terrorism and Human Rights,” New York Times, November 19, 1999. 37. Ibid. 38. Randall Mikkelsen, “Clinton, Yeltsin Hug, Feud over Chechnya,” Reuters, November 18, 1999. 39. Paul Holmes, “Yeltsin Leaves OSCE Session over Chechnya Row,” Reuters, November 18, 1999. 40. Ibid.

19 Yeltsin Had the Last Word

Apparently, Yeltsin was satisfied with Putin as his choice for Russia’s next president. But Yeltsin’s credibility was at low ebb. His circle of close advisors, his immediate family, and even he himself were being continuously accused with alleged corruption and bribe taking. That battering was too much for Yeltsin’s reticent wife, Naina, who spoke out publicly in defense of her husband and daughters. As a rule, Russia’s first lady remained in the background all throughout Yeltsin’s turbulent political career. But finally, in the fall of 1999, she had become so indignant by the “unsubstantiated attacks” on her family that she went on television. She portrayed her family as people of modest means who were victims of a sensationalist and politically biased press and jealous rivals. Speaking more in sorrow than anger, she said that the president “and his family have been dragged through the mud.” She denied that her husband was incapacitated, and claimed that the press had maligned their daughters, Tatiana Dyachenko and Yelena Okulova. When Yeltsin’s former supporters had turned against him, she responded that it was not the result of her husband’s “mistaken policies but self-interested machinations of ambitious politicians.” She also used the interview to reassure the nation that Boris Yeltsin would turn over the reigns of power to a legitimately elected successor on schedule.1 Despite Naina Yeltsin’s assertions that the president was fit to carry on with his duties, Yeltsin’s health remained precarious. On October 9, 1999, he spent two days in the hospital with the flu, and again on November 29, he

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was hospitalized with pneumonia.2 The conflict with Chechnya continued unabated, and Western criticism of Russia was getting more pronounced. After NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, which was bitterly criticized by Yeltsin, Russia became more and more isolated. The Russians needed some positive news in foreign affairs. Hardly up from his sickbed, contrary to his doctors’ advise, Yeltsin announced that he would travel to China. The trip served a dual purpose: to be a moral booster—Yeltsin wanted to put the West on notice about the possibility of strategic alignment with China, and also to give evidence of his mastery of keeping Russia in the forefront of nations. The announcement of the two-day informal visit, with Chinese President Jiang Zemin on December 9–10, 1999, coincided with the indefinite postponement of a previously planned December 21 meeting with French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. Officially, the reason for the cancellation was blamed on conflicting schedules. The more likely reason was the two Western leaders’ firm criticism of Russia’s unrestrained attack on the civilian population in Chechnya. Yeltsin decided to snub his critics. President Clinton, who so far had been more restrained in his criticism of Russia’s Chechen campaign, also weighed in condemning the new offensive. Only the Chinese foreign minister, Zhang Qiyue, said that Beijing supported Russia’s military action in the North Caucasus “as an effort to maintain national unity and territorial integrity.”3 On December 9, 1999, a pale and drawn Yeltsin arrived in Beijing. He was greeted with a bear hug from Jiang, who asked him: “How are you old friend?” During the course of their meeting, the Chinese leader let it be known that he and the Chinese government were giving their unequivocal support of Russian military action in Chechnya. Bolstered by the support, Yeltsin lashed out at Clinton. In front of the scores of television cameras, Yeltsin thundered that Chechnya was an integral part of Russia and “no one has the right to interfere into our internal affairs. [Clinton] for a minute, for a second, for half a minute has forgotten that Russia has a full arsenal of nuclear weapons. He has forgotten about that. Therefore he decided to play his muscles, as they say.” Yeltsin continued his tirade, “It has not happened in the past and it won’t happen that he [Clinton] will dictate to people how to live. A multipolar world is the basis of everything.”4 The personal attack on him by “his good friend, Boris,” bothered Clinton enough to respond: “I haven’t forgotten that. I didn’t think he’d forgotten America was a great power when he disagreed with what I did in Kosovo.”5 In joint communiqué, Yeltsin and Jiang stressed their shared Western criticism. China and Russia were brought together by their strong opposition to NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia. China objected to the air strikes on grounds that they were not authorized by the United Nations Security

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Council. Chinese support of Russia’s actions in Chechnya was based on its own vulnerability in the remote Xinjiang region and Tibet, where separationist sentiments were alive; also China was concerned with possible Western interference in its dealing with Taiwan. The two leaders expressed their objection to altering the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Although the two heads of state discussed a growing need for a Russo-Chinese “strategic partnership,” they were quick to point out that they were not attempting to build an anti-U.S. front.6 Yeltsin’s criticism of Clinton found an echo in Moscow, where the political campaign was proceeding in earnest. Former Prime Minister Primakov, who appeared to be Putin’s arch challenger for the presidency, said that Clinton’s criticism of Russia’s action in Chechnya was the American president’s “revenge” for Russia’s opposition to events in Kosovo. Then he added that it was “an attempt to put pressure on Russia.” The Communist Party’s leader, Zyuganov, called the statement by Clinton and other Western leaders immoral: “Reasonable and civilized people cannot make such statements.” The newspaper Segodnya interpreted the latest U.S.-Russian conflict in terms of the upcoming Duma elections: “Russia and the U.S. are ready to break off relations for the sake of the two presidential successors: Vladimir Putin and Al Gore. To save Gore’s presidential chances, Clinton decided to ‘get concerned’ about Chechen civilians.”7 There was no real intent to sever the Russian-American relations, and Prime Minister Putin hastened to soften Yeltsin’s verbal attack on Clinton. He emphatically told a group of journalists: “I want to draw your attention to the fact that we have very good relations with the United States.”8 It was clear that the December 19, 1999, election was to be a dress rehearsal for the forthcoming June 2000 presidential election. By the October 24 deadline, thirty-one parties submitted applications. To qualify, 230,000 valid signatures were needed, or in order to be listed, the applicants had to pay a substantial sum of money as collateral. Eventually, twenty-eight parties qualified (two parties were dropped before the final balloting). As in 1995, 450 Lower House seats were at stake; half of the seats were to be distributed proportionately among those parties that received at least 5 percent of the total number of votes cast. The other half of the seats were to be allocated to the winners of individual constituencies. The Chechen electoral district, where fighting was going on, was not allowed to participate.9 After fierce campaigning, on December 19, Russians went to the polls to cast their ballots for the members of the Duma. Eligible voters received two paper ballots nationally (Muscovites received four, as they had to elect a mayor and regional council members)—one ballot for a party list and another for individual candidates. That was Russia’s third multiparty parlia-

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mentary election. According to the press release of the International Commission of Election Observers: “The election for the State Duma demonstrated significant progress toward the strengthening of democracy in the Russian Federation.” It added: “The high level of awareness of voters gave evidence of their trust in the democratic process.”10 The election had some surprising results. The two-month-old Unity (Yedinstvo) Party, without any specific program other than its support of Prime Minister Putin, came in as the second highest vote getter, just barely 1 percent less than the Communist Party. Sergei Shoigu, a loyal Yeltsin and Putin supporter, led the Unity Party. He had for a long time been serving as emergencies minister, and a week before the election, Putin named him deputy prime minister. The Luzhkov and Primakov-led, Fatherland-All Russia (Otchestvo-Vsya Rossiya) Party came in third. Despite the name recognition of its leaders, that combined party did worse than expected. The party of “young reformers,” Sergei Kiriyenko and Anatoly Chubais, the Union of Right-Wing Forces (Soyuz Pravyx Sil) did better then expected. The Yavlinsky-led Yabloko attracted only as many voters as it had during the previous election. Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party was disqualified, but at the last minute, the party’s leader assembled a so-called Zhirinovsky bloc, which barely managed to qualify as a parliamentary party. In addition to the six parties that received more than the required 5 percent, numerous independent candidates won seats in the Duma. It appeared that the Communists’ hold on the Duma was broken, and with the independent votes, the government could count on at least 227 seats. A total of 61.77 percent of eligible voters participated in the election.11 For official election results, see Table 3. Table 3 Russia Parliamentary Election—December 19, 1999 Party List Communist Party Unity Fatherland-All Russia Union of Right-Wing Forces Zhirinovsky Bloc Yabloko Independents TOTAL

Percent 24.29 23.32 13.33 8.52 5.98 5.93

Seats 67 64 36 24 17 17

81.37

225

Seats 46 8 30 5 0 4 122 215

Total 113 72 66 29 17 21 122 44012

Source: Vybory 1999 [Elections 1999], http://www.nns.ru/Elect-2000; Reuters, December 23, 1999.

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Yeltsin was elated with the election results. The fact that the leftist bloc no longer had a majority in the Parliament was a clear-cut “victory” for him. At last, the pro-government forces combined with independents were in the position to enact pro-reform legislation without being continuously countermanded by Communist and ultra-nationalist forces. The Russian president was especially pleased with the Unity Party’s success, which fully supported Putin. The election outcome apparently paved the road for Putin’s election to the presidency. After the election, Yeltsin was hoping for more constructive working relations between the president and the Duma, but the days of his presidency were already limited. It would be the new president who would benefit from the parliamentary victory.13 Yeltsin did not consider himself a political “prognosticator or political scientist but a politician,” a realist. He realized that the election did give an advantage to Prime Minister Putin for the forthcoming June 2000 presidential elections, but during the next six months, many unexpected things could happen. The fighting in Chechnya was still intensifying, and Russian casualties were increasing. The public might come to support a peace candidate. The economy was far from recovering from the 1998 collapse, and additional IMF loans were needed to stabilize the situation. Putin did gain popularity for his determined action against the Chechens, but he did not offer any economic remedies. There was another issue that seriously concerned Yeltsin: What fate awaited him and his immediate family upon retirement in view of the widespread public allegations of corruption? He needed assurances that after leaving office he and his family would be immune to prosecution. Yeltsin gave plenty of thought to the fate of his predecessors after their removal or resignation from office. In 1964, Khrushchev was unceremoniously removed from office. He remained alive, but was placed under house arrest and was forbidden to meet with people or travel anywhere. To the public, he became a non-person. Upon his death, the Pravda noted the passing of the once all-powerful leader of the Soviet Union only with a few lines on a back page. Gorbachev fared much better, thanks to Yeltsin. Contrary to Gorbachev’s complaints about his mistreatment by Yeltsin’s entourage upon his resignation as president of the Soviet Union, he received a pension and full medical benefits. He was allowed to keep his presidential dacha (Moskva-reka-5), he was provided with security protection, and cars were at his and his family’s disposal. Gorbachev also was given a sizable building in the center of Moscow for the so-called Gorbachev Fund, where he was able to reestablish his sociopolitical activities. His travels were not curtailed. While abroad, but also in Russia, Gorbachev often publicly criticized Yeltsin and his policies; although that was highly irritating to Yeltsin, there were no repercussions. Gorbachev also participated unhindered in the 1996

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presidential elections.14 Upon leaving office, Yeltsin expected even more favorable treatment than his discredited predecessor, but he had no illusions about how people would feel about him upon his retirement. “They will not love or admire me. According to old Russian tradition, soon after leaving [office], the person departing is blamed for all misfortunes and sins.”15 Yeltsin categorically denied ever asking anyone about immunity after leaving office. He did say that from time to time members of the Parliament, even Communists, met with him to consult about enacting legislation concerning the immunity of a departing president. Yeltsin claimed that he had never encouraged such activity. In view of the ever-present allegations of wrongdoing, Yeltsin’s legal staff advised him that there ought to be a law concerning the status of the outgoing president, and since the constitution did not address that issue, Yeltsin should act to fill the legal gap. Yeltsin was a better politician than that. Had he written a decree about immunity after leaving office, it would have been self-serving and practically an admission of guilt.16 The safest way from that predicament was to select a successor whom Yeltsin could fully trust, and one who under no circumstances would turn against him. Yeltsin believed that Vladimir Putin was such a person. Ex-KGB officer Putin from St. Petersburg, who had risen to the country’s second highest office, was entirely dependent on Yeltsin. Putin had no constituency and was not part of the emerging political elite. He was not allied with any of the existing political parties, and his political experience was very limited. He owed special favors to no one. His original patron, the former reform-minded mayor of St. Petersburg, Anatoly Sobchak, had already been sidetracked. Putin wasn’t even the head of the hastily formed but surprisingly successful Unity Party. His loyalty to Yeltsin was without doubt. Yeltsin had to find a way to assure Putin’s election to the high office. By mid-December, Putin’s popularity ratings were running high. He had acquitted himself well abroad while meeting with U.S. and Western heads of state. Despite international criticism, he relentlessly pursued the war against the Chechen rebels. Yeltsin’s political instincts had rarely failed him; he knew that it was time to act. Speculations were ongoing that Yeltsin would not give up his power, that he would declare a national emergency and postpone presidential elections or find a legal loophole and run for a third term. Yeltsin, ever the politician, liked to get his opponents off-balance. He knew that in order to give Putin an unbeatable advantage for the high office, dramatic action was necessary, but at the same time, legality had to be observed. Still, on December 14, five days before the election, Yeltsin summoned Prime Minister Putin to his office and told him that he would resign before the end of his official term. When asked about assuming the responsibility

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of the presidency, Putin was hesitant, but Yeltsin encouraged him to accept. At that meeting, no date for the resignation was set.17 Yeltsin’s earlier decision was confirmed on December 22, when Putin came to give him a routine report. Instead of paying attention to Putin’s report, Yeltsin began to pace in his office, looked out the window and said, “It will be difficult to leave the Kremlin because so much is connected with these walls and people who have worked here.” Then he added, “I have thought it over and made the difficult decision. I will go through with the resignation.” After that, the two men discussed the legal formalities concerning the president’s voluntary departure. The necessary documents were prepared in utmost secrecy by two of the most trusted persons of the head of the presidential administration—Aleksandr Voloshin, a trusted friend and the former head of the administration, Valentin Yumashin.18 As late as December 27, Yeltsin sent warm holiday wishes to President Clinton and other heads of state without any hint about his impending retirement. In reference to the U.S.-Russian relations, the Russian president wrote, “1999 was not an easy year for Russian-American relations, and required no small effort to support and strengthen the positive start of cooperation between Russia and the United States.” Reminding his “friend Bill” of the meetings in Cologne and Istanbul, noting that these meetings proved “that even during stressful times in our relations and international situations, we have no trouble jointly finding mutually beneficial solutions to the most complicated problems.” From the onset, Yeltsin believed that good personal relations with fellow heads of state would help to resolve intricate bilateral and international problems. In addition to present decision makers, two former leaders, German Chancellor Kohl and U.S. President Bush, who during their tenure had developed close personal ties with Yeltsin, were also on the Russian president’s Christmas card list.19 The date of the actual resignation was kept in secret. On December 28, a television crew came to the Kremlin to record the usual presidential New Year’s greeting. Yeltsin went through the motions, but declared that he was dissatisfied with the text and wanted a retake on December 31. The producer of the program was concerned about the postponement and was worried about editing and preparing the tape, but Yeltsin dismissed his objections. No one suspected the real reasons for the delay. People around Yeltsin were used to his arbitrary decisions, his twists and turns. On December 29, he advised Putin about the actual date of his resignation. For the greatest dramatic effect, the secrecy was complete. In addition to the above- named three persons, only Tatiana Dyachenko, Yeltsin’s younger daughter (his most intimate advisor since the 1996 election), was told of the plan in advance—no one else, not even Yeltsin’s wife, Naina, was forewarned.20

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On December 31, 1999, at 9:00 in the morning, Yeltsin signed his last presidential decree, Decree No. 1761: 1. In accordance to Part 2, Article 92 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation as of 12:00 noon, December 31, 1999, I will cease to fulfill the obligations of the President of the Russian Federation. 2. In accordance to Part 3, Article 92 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation the obligations of the President of the Russian Federation will be temporarily fulfilled by the Chairman [Prime Minister] of the Government of the Russian Federation as of 12:00 noon, December 31, 1999. 3. The present Decree will take effect as soon as it is signed.21

At 9:30 A.M., Vladimir Putin signed his first presidential decree, Decree No. 1762, which, in effect, guaranteed the retiring president and his immediate family immunity from any kind of future prosecution.22 After the documents were formally signed, Yeltsin advised his shocked staff about his decision, and the television cameras recorded his farewell address. The tape was rushed to the studio. Before the midday broadcast, a few other formalities had to take place. A meeting with the Orthodox patriarch, Alekii II, was arranged. The former Communist boss and ex-KGB officer asked for the blessing and support of the church. The patriarch praised Yeltsin for his “courageous decision,” and then blessed the two men. Yeltsin was pleased to note that Putin already had a good relationship with “His Holiness” because in “the future he would need the help of this wise man.”23 The next step was the transfer of the so-called “nuclear suitcase.” A responsible duty officer had been following Yeltsin twenty-four hours every day with a system that would put the president in touch immediately with the minister of defense and chief of general staff in case a decision about the use of nuclear weapons would be necessary. As of noon, Putin’s finger would be on the nuclear button—an awesome responsibility. The transfer itself was quite uneventful—from that moment on, the officer had to follow Putin everywhere. Still before noon, the power ministers were invited for a ceremonial farewell dinner. Just before twelve o’clock, Yeltsin and all the invited guests crowded into Tatiana’s office in the Kremlin to witness the historical announcement on television.24 At noon, on December 31, 1999, Yeltsin’s speech was televised, but instead of the expected routine presidential New Year’s greeting, Yeltsin gave his dramatic farewell address. On the threshold of the new millennium, Yeltsin addressed his fellow Russians: “Today I am turning to you for the last time as president of Russia. I have made a decision. I thought long and hard over it. Today, on the last day of the departing century, I am resigning.” In his speech, he countered the argument that he “would hang onto power by any means, he won’t give it to

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anyone.” He stressed that it was important to him to uphold the constitution. He insisted that a democratic transfer of power was very important for Russia. Although he decided to leave before the end of his term, he reasoned that Russia must “enter the new millennium with new politicians, new faces, and with new, smart, strong, and energetic people.” He pointed out that he felt confident that he was leaving Russia in good hands. In accordance with the constitution, for three months, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin would assume the office of the presidency. Then, he said, the Russian people would know for whom to vote at the March election.25 Before completing his speech, Yeltsin added a few personal notes. “I want to ask your forgiveness for the fact that many of the dreams we shared did not come true, and for the fact that what seemed simple to us turned out to be tormentingly difficult.” He apologized for the false hopes that Russians could with “one leap from the totalitarian past enter into the light, rich, civilized future.” He admitted to his own naiveté. He said that he was aware of the hardships people had suffered, and was tormented by their pain. Then he emphasized that despite the mistakes, throughout his tenure, his main concern was “what needed to be done so that people could live more easily and better.” He wished his fellow citizens well: “Be happy. You deserve happiness. You deserve happiness and tranquility. Happy New Year! Happy new century, my dear ones!”26 On that note, the Yeltsin era ended, but it has left a permanent imprint on Russian history, and its effects will certainly be felt throughout the country’s future. NOTES 1. Michael Gordon, “Under Fire, Yeltsin Is Defended by His Wife,” New York Times, September 27, 1999. 2. “The Career of Boris Yeltsin,” New York Times, December 31, 1999. 3. Mike Collett-White, “Yeltsin China Trip Seen as a ‘Snub’ to Hostile West,” Reuters, December 7, 1999. 4. “Yeltsin Blasts Clinton over Chechnya,” Reuters, December 9, 1999. 5. Paul Eckert, “Yeltsin Flies Home, Lifted by China’s Support,” Reuters, December 11, 1999. 6. Ibid. 7. Segodnya, December 9, 1999. 8. Eckert, “Yeltsin Flies Home.” 9. “Russian State Duma Election Rules,” Reuters, December 19, 1999. 10. “Vybory v Rossii,” http://www3.rusline.ru. 11. “FACTBOX—Balance of Power in Russia’s New Duma,” The Associated Press, January 18, 2000. 12. The number of seats does not add up to 450 because in nine districts the voters selected “against all candidates”; in those districts, new elections must be

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held. Chechnya did not participate—that was the last missing single district seat. On the party list, the missing 18.63 percent went to parties that did not reach the minimum 5 percent limit. 13. Boris Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon: Pazmyshleniya,Vospominaniya, Pechatleniya [Presidential Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, and Impressions] (Moscow: ACT Publisher, 2000), pp. 382–390. 14. Ibid., pp. 394–395. 15. Ibid., p. 297. 16. Ibid., pp. 397–398. 17. Ibid., pp. 30–31. 18. Leonid Mlechin, Formula Vlasti Ot Yeltsina k Putinu [Formula of Power: From Yeltsin to Putin] (Moscow; Tsentrpoligraf, 2000), pp. 566–567. 19. “Boris Wishes Bill Warm New Year Despite Chilly 1999,” Reuters, December 28, 1999. 20. Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon, pp. 31–32. 21. Mlechin, Formula Vlasti, p. 566. 22. Ibid., p. 567. 23. Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon, p. 19. 24. Ibid., p. 20. 25. “In Boris Yeltsin’s Words: ‘I Have Made a Decision,’” New York Times, January 1, 2000. 26. Ibid.

Conclusion

After his unexpected and dramatic resignation, Boris Yeltsin removed himself from the center stage of Russian and world politics. He had given his chosen successor, Vladimir Putin, an unprecedented advantage, the advantage of the incumbent. On March 26, 2000, Putin was elected on the first round of balloting with an absolute majority of 52.94 percent of the votes cast.1 Still, in November 1999, Yeltsin had committed himself to travel to the Middle East to visit the holy sites in Bethlehem, and to participate in the Orthodox celebrations of the two thousandth anniversary of the birth of Christ. In addition to the religious aspects, the originally planned presidential trip had political underpinnings—Yeltsin wanted to show his support for the creation of a Palestinian state. Despite his resignation, the visit was still on. Yeltsin landed at Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport on January 5, 2000, with an entourage of 150 Russians, including his family, the Russian foreign minister, and many other senior officials. Although Yeltsin was to be the guest of the Orthodox Church and was invited by Yasser Arafat to attend Christmas services in Bethlehem, Israel extended him all the courtesies due a visiting head of state. He had lunch with Israeli President Ezer Weizman, and stayed in the newest luxury hotel in Jerusalem, where the Clintons had stayed before him. Ironically, the Russians forwarded 1,100 pounds of delicacies to the hotel for the Yeltsin party, but it had to be turned away because the Jerusalem Hilton was under rabbinical supervision and served only strictly ko-

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sher meals. The Orthodox Church ended up donating the Russian delicacies to the poor in Jerusalem.2 On the second day of his visit, Yeltsin was awarded one of the highest honors of the Orthodox Church. He and six fellow Orthodox heads of state3 were named “Knights of the Holy Sepulcher.” Yeltsin was visibly moved by the honor. “In the year 2000 of Christianity, I find myself in the Holy Land for the first time,” he said. “I am glad to see that we have made our influence felt. Of course, we have been constantly troubled by the question of division of countries and churches.” On January 7, former President Yeltsin and the leaders of Orthodox states joined Yasser Arafat in celebrating Christmas in the Church of Nativity, Christ’s birthplace.4 As a result of his resignation, the political significance of his trip to the Holy Land was diminished, but the religious aspects remained. Was Yeltsin a true believer? People doubted Yeltsin’s sincerity in Russia when he was seen attending Orthodox services carrying a candle. Father Georgy, the Yeltsin family’s priest, vouched for him, and claimed that the Russian president became a committed Christian in 1993, after the death of his mother, Klavdia. “Naturally, as former party worker it was not easy for him even to cross himself. But he managed to overcome that within himself,” said the priest.5 After his return from the Holy Land, Yeltsin practically disappeared from public view. It was reported that Putin occasionally visited him and consulted with him. On October 8, Yeltsin emerged from his quiet retirement to publicize the publication of his just-completed third memoir, Midnight Diaries [Prezidentsky Marafon].6 The book did not contain any new or sensational revelations. It was informative on Yeltsin’s justifications of his decision making, international meetings, and other significant events during the second term of his presidency. After a lavish reception and a few interviews in connection with the publication of his book, Yeltsin again faded out of public view. Visiting heads of state, “friends” during his presidency, like French President Jacques Chirac or Chinese President Jiang Zemin, called on him when visiting Russia. He also received private invitations from former leaders, George Bush, Helmuth Kohl and others. Russians always marked important birthdays such as the fiftieth, sixtieth, or seventieth with special celebrations. When notable public figures such as actors, scientists, statesmen, officers and the like reached those significant birthdays, they were given special awards, titles, promotions and medals. As Yeltsin was approaching his seventieth birthday, according to his daughter, Tatiana Dyachenko, he was anticipating only a low-key family celebration. Nevertheless, on January 30, 2001, two days before his birthday, he was rushed to the hospital with an “acute viral infection.” That sudden illness was very depressing to Yeltsin, who despite his proclaimed low-key

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239

plans, was keenly aware that his birthday would hardly go unnoticed, and was looking forward to the event. As it turned out, his seventieth birthday on February 1 was celebrated at the Central Clinical Hospital.7 Yeltsin’s family and close friends held the birthday party at the hospital, and many high-level officials were streaming in to congratulate Russia’s first president. The most distinguished visitor was Yeltsin’s successor, President Putin, who came with a huge bouquet of flowers. Putin, together with Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, raised their glasses with champagne to congratulate Yeltsin. Telegrams were also pouring in, from both houses of the Parliament; the Orthodox patriarch, Aleksii II; Gorbachev; former German Chancellor Kohl; and former Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto, just to name a few. The media, of course, also noted the birthday. Yeltsin’s friends hailed him and praised his achievements. His foes condemned him. Opinions were sharply divided.8 Yeltsin was aware of the fact that upon his departure from office, his contemporaries would not love him or even appreciate what he had done for Russia. He put his faith in history. The commemoration of his seventieth birthday in the media provided a sample of public views on Yeltsin and the Yeltsin era. Commentators saw the contradictions between the fighter for democracy of the early 1990s, the man who sent tanks to blast the rebel parliamentarians in 1993, and the one who unleashed the war in Chechnya in 1994. Boris Nemtsov, was quoted as saying, “Boris Nikolayevich [Yeltsin] firmly knew that freedom was better than communism, that private initiative was better than bureaucracy.” The headline in the Izvestia, in reference to the Yeltsin era, read, “Ten years which shook Russia and the world.” The Moskovsky Komsomolets called him “The ‘Last Tsar.’” The daily Novoye Izvestia wrote, “Whether the friends and enemies of Yeltsin want it or not, and whether it is a plus sign or a minus sign, the last decade will go down in Russian history as the ‘Yeltsin era.’” The extreme left-wing and ultranationalist press used the former president’s birthday to harshly denounce him: “Yeltsin is 70. It would have been better if he had never been born,” wrote the Zavtra. The publication blamed Yeltsin for the demise of the Soviet Union, for falling population growth, rising poverty, and the loss of Russia’s prestige.9 The New York Times’ editorial was not especially flattering in its appraisal of Yeltsin’s accomplishments, but it did give him some credit: “Russians ought not to forget the singular achievement of Boris Yeltsin. For all his maddening weaknesses, he led the nation toward democracy after 1,000 years of tyranny.”10 The radio station Echo noted that on Yeltsin’s birthday their open-line express poll, in the course of five minutes received 5,554 telephone calls in response to the question: “Was Yeltsin a positive or a negative figure in Rus-

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Yeltsin’s Russia and the West

sia’s history?” The responses were evenly divided.11 Other polls showed that 80 percent of the people rated the “Yeltsin era negatively, and 25–30 percent tended to blame Yeltsin personally for the shortcomings.12 A more comprehensive Russian survey showed that the public’s attitude toward Yeltsin was less than favorable. On January 6–8, 2000, the respectable Russian public research firm, the Nationwide VCIOM,13 asked a scientifically selected cross section of 1,600 people about their opinions on former President Yeltsin. The survey yielded the following results:14 Question: What good things did the years of Yeltsin’s rule bring? All replies % Democracy, political rights and freedom 23 Getting rid of shortages, coupons and queues 16 Restoring private property and the possibility to start own business 13 Freedom of action for energetic, capable people Ending Communist rule

12 10

Improved relations with the West Destroying the totalitarian system and state interference in personal life Hope for the renewal of Russia

7 7 5

Improved quality of goods and services Removing the threat of new world war Other

4 3 1

Can’t name anything good Don’t know

46 8

Question: What bad things did the years of Yeltsin’s rule bring? Economic crisis, fall in production Closures of enterprises, mass unemployment Chechen war 1994–96 Worsening living conditions and loss of buying power for the masses Inflation wiping out savings Collapse of the USSR Rising crime and penetration of state organized crime Looting of state property and riches of Russia Non-payment of wages, pensions, etc. Collapse of system of education, health and social security Political instability, conflicts in the leadership

40 36 34 34 32 31 28 28 26 19 16

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Lack of confidence and hope in the future

15

Freedom of action for swindlers and bank robbers Loss of Russia’s great power status

15 11

Dominance of foreigners and Russia’s dependence on the West

7

Other Can’t name anything bad

3 2

Don’t know

4

Question: What marks on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) do you give to the performance of a) Boris Yeltzin b) the State Duma c) Vladimir Putin? Boris Yeltsin 2.5

The State Duma 3.1

Vladimir Putin 5.7

Question: Do you think it was necessary to start radical reforms of the political and economic system in 1991? All replies % Definitely necessary Probably necessary Probably not necessary

12 29 25

Definitely not necessary Don’t know

17 17

Question: What were your feelings about the news of Boris Yeltsin’s resignation from the post of president of the Russian Federation? Satisfaction Surprise Delight Incomprehension Alarm Regret Indignation No particular feeling Don’t know

51 27 11 6 4 4 1 12 1

Question: Who do you think won/lost from the resignation of Boris Yeltsin?

Vladimir Putin Ordinary citizens

All replies % Won Lost 40 1 17 3

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Yeltsin’s Russia and the West

Boris Yeltsin himself

12

13

Political opponents of Yeltsin, Fatherland/All Russia, Communists, etc.

8 14

The circle around Yeltsin, the “Family” Political allies of Yeltsin, Unity, Right Forces, etc.

6 6

28 5

Bankers, financiers, the oligarchs (Berezovsky and others)

2

8

The “middle class” The military and security forces

2 1

1 1

Everyone No one Others Don’t know

16

1

4 2

17 1

14

26

As the above survey indicated, the Russians did not keep Yeltsin in high esteem, and blamed him practically for all of the country’s shortcomings. In the United States, President Clinton and his administration were severely criticized for their support of Yeltsin, especially as the U.S. presidential elections of 2000 were approaching. The Republican-dominated Congress commissioned a report on the failure of the Clinton administration’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia. On September 20, 1999, a group of Republican congressmen made public a 209-page, sharply critical study, “Who Lost Russia?” The authors of the report were scholars of the conservative Heritage Fund and retired members of previous Republican administrations. The main thrust of the report was that President Clinton’s foreign policy toward Russia failed because it unfailingly supported Boris Yeltsin. The study listed all of Russia’s difficulties as of 1991 and put the onus on Yeltsin. According to the study, Clinton and his advisors equated democracy and free market with Yeltsin. The Democratic presidential candidate, Vice President Al Gore, was also a target of the criticism. The Gore-Chernomyrdin commission was faulted for making too many concessions to the Russians. On the basis of the report, congressional hearings were held, and a self-appointed Russian expert, Curt Weldon, Republican Congressman from Pennsylvania, led the charge against Clinton and his policies. He claimed that Clinton and his administration ignored the Duma, which should have been supported instead of the Russian president. The congressman asserted that he had established an excellent rapport with factions (never specifying which factions) of the Duma, and the Lower House of the Russian Parliament was most receptive to his proposals of “really” democratizing Russia.15

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The Republicans insisted that because the Clinton administration was too forgiving to Yeltsin, the Russians turned against the United States. At the same time, they accused Russia—contrary to U.S. policies and despite U.S.-sponsored aid—of selling weapons to Iran and advocating the removal of the Iraq embargo. Russia consistently opposed NATO’s expansion, and it objected to the bombing of Yugoslavia. Yeltsin’s Chechen incursions were condemned. Clinton was ridiculed for comparing Yeltsin to Abraham Lincoln, implying that the Chechen campaign was a civil war. The Republican attacks implied that the United States should have been tougher on Yeltsin, but the critics did not offer any alternatives, and those who advocated that the Duma was a democratic institution perhaps should have noticed that although it was elected, it was dominated by Communists and nationalist forces, which by their nature were anti-American and anti-economic reforms. It was Yeltsin who had sought strategic partnership with the United States, even though his efforts were continuously rebuffed. It was Yeltsin who negotiated for the reduction of nuclear weapons. It was Yeltsin who begrudgingly accepted NATO’s expansion to the East. Despite great domestic pressure, he did not sever relations with the West. In spite of Yeltsin’s efforts, the Duma retaliated by refusing to ratify the START II agreement. It was Yeltsin who during the Kosovo crisis restrained the Duma from sending weapons to Yugoslavia. In the final analysis, it was Yeltsin who consistently foiled the Communists’ onslaught to take control and try to revert back to a one-party political system and a state-controlled economy. He managed to keep Russia from chaos, did not restrain the often-critical media, and oversaw three multiparty parliamentary and two presidential elections. What price did the Russians pay for the Yeltsin-led breakup of the Soviet Union and transition from a one-party political system and state-controlled economy to a multiparty democratic parliamentary system and a markettype economy? The costs were enormous. Initially, Russians believed that by ridding themselves of the Communist rule, their lives would instantly improve, but those were unrealistic expectations, and soon enough those expectations were frustrated. The economy practically collapsed. The government fell behind in paying wages and pensions. A large portion of the population became impoverished, and social services hit rock bottom. Creating a market-type economy proved to be immensely difficult. Removal of price controls led to inflation, and people’s savings melted away. Privatization of state-owned enterprises was done haphazardly, and it was fraught with corruption. The transition enriched only a few. Crime surged. In government offices, state agencies and institutions, bribery was ever present. The country was led into an internal war against the secessionist Chechens.

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Russia’s international prestige was diminished. Was Yeltsin to blame for all of this?It has been demonstrated that since his early childhood, Yeltsin was a leader. He was the type of person who got his way, and who did not shy away from confrontation. He used any venue open to him to gain recognition. When sports provided an opportunity, he excelled in volleyball. When the road to move ahead led through the ranks of the Communist Party, he took advantage of that option. He became the Communist Party secretary of the Sverdlovsk region—the “boss” of one of the Soviet Union’s most important heavy industrial centers. When Moscow called, at first he hesitated to give up his powerful position in the Urals, but he realized that real power was in the capital, in the Kremlin. In Moscow, to some extent, he had to reinvent himself. As party secretary of the city, he followed a populist approach, insisting on changes. Consequently, he came up against a calcified party bureaucracy, making enemies in the establishment. When Gorbachev came into power and began to advocate reforms, Yeltsin was already a nonvoting member of the Politburo, the highest organ of the Communist Party. He tried to outdo Gorbachev by criticizing the slow pace of political and economic reforms. Yeltsin also attacked the encroaching “personality cult” centering on Gorbachev. That brazen criticism appeared to signal the end of Yeltsin’s political career. At that time, “going against the grain,” was a serious misjudgment. Gorbachev and the conservative Communists booted Yeltsin from his high-party posts. Ironically, thanks to Gorbachev’s attempts to open up the political system, Yeltsin reappeared on the scene as his ardent challenger. As glasnost bloomed, perestroika wilted. By the end of 1980s, while Gorbachev was celebrated abroad for bringing the cold war to an end, in Russia he was rapidly losing credibility. Yeltsin successfully exploited Gorbachev’s faltering economic policies and in rapid succession was elected into the People Deputies of the USSR and into the Supreme Soviet. He allied himself with the most outspoken reform politicians. His prestige and influence as a reformer was growing. As an upcoming politician, he was invited to the United States. Eventually, he was elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, the Soviet Union’s largest and most influential republic. From that position, he challenged Gorbachev and the primacy of the Communist Party. On June 12, 1990, Yeltsin presided over the declaration of sovereignty and independence of Russia. A year later, he was elected president of Russia. He resigned from the Communist Party and banned it from the Russian government. When, on August 19, 1991, Gorbachev fell victim to a Communist-led coup attempt, Yeltsin defied the conspirators and reached his highest peak of national and international popularity. Within a few months, the Soviet

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Union fell apart. Yeltsin prevailed as president of Russia, and Gorbachev remained without a country to head. Upon the demise of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin promised his compatriots democracy, rule of law, human rights and economic reforms. He turned to the West for political and economic support. The responses were positive, but while Yeltsin received unlimited moral support, economic aid was much slower in coming. Yeltsin fought his way to political power and created the opportunity for major political and economic reforms, but he had neither specific economic plans nor the know-how on implementing reforms. If the capitalist free market-type economy was able to create the wealth and the high living standards in the United States and in the West, he believed that Russia should follow that example. He named young, democratically minded reformers to form a government and to promulgate the necessary reforms. At first, the recalcitrant, still Soviet-elected Parliament resisted effective changes. Yeltsin realized that if he did not want to regress to an authoritarian mode, his powers must be spelled out by a new constitution. When the Parliament absolutely refused to cooperate, Yeltsin had to resort to the most drastic methods to dissolve the Parliament and call for new elections. The adoption of a new constitution and parliamentary elections did not ease Yeltsin’s dealing with the Duma, but the 1993 constitution did give the president almost dictatorial powers. To some extent, he could govern by decrees to expedite reforms. Nevertheless, the Duma remained dominated by anti-reformist forces. Yeltsin tried to gain some cooperation with the Duma by sacrificing his pro-reform premier, but that did not alleviate the domestic power struggle. Consequently, economic improvements were lagging. In foreign affairs, Yeltsin wanted Russia to join the ranks of civilized Western democracies and be accepted as a great power. He was seeking strategic partnership with the West, but neither its economy nor its conventional military forces qualified Yeltsin’s Russia to be considered as a great power. Only its nuclear arsenal demanded respect. For that reason, pretenses were kept, and Yeltsin was given all the accolades of the head of a great power. Despite establishing excellent personal rapport with Western heads of state, as long as Russia desperately needed Western financial aid for its faltering economy, he could not prevent the eventual expansion of NATO toward the Russian borders. Although personal good relations among the leaders apparently remained intact, pro-Western feelings in Russia cooled significantly. The promise of improved standards of living by the introduction of Western market-type economy also did not materialize, which contributed to rising anti-Western sentiments. The Yugoslav crises, first in Bosnia later in Kosovo, brought relations between Russia and the West close to a breaking point. Yeltsin blustered, condemned NATO’s air

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Yeltsin’s Russia and the West

strikes in Yugoslavia, but he refrained from a direct confrontation. As stated above, the United States also had complaints against Russia for selling arms and even nuclear components to Iran, opposing the embargo against Iraq, and entering into negotiations with countries like Libya. It was overlooked by the critics that those countries had substantial foreign debts to the Soviet Union, which Russia hoped to collect. Yeltsin was a product of his society—not what is known as a democratic personality. He was a “mover and shaker.” He changed the course of Russian history, leading the country out of almost three-quarters of a century of Communist rule and a thousand years of tyranny. Yeltsin did democratize Russia—far from perfect, and struggling, but well on its way toward real democracy and free market economy. One of his “young reformers,” Boris Nemtsov, characterized him as “a real Russian tsar with recklessness, drinking bouts, decisiveness, courage, and at times, although rarely, timidity. But in contrast with evil Russian tsars, Yeltsin has been a good tsar.”16 History will definitely be kinder to him than his contemporaries. NOTES 1. http://www.fci.ru/prez2000/default.htm. 2. Sergei Shargorodsky, “Orthodox Church Honors Yeltsin,” The Associated Press, January 6, 2000. 3. In addition to Yeltsin, the leaders of Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Romania and Ukraine were honored. 4. Gareth Jones, “Yeltsin Celebrates Christmas in Bethlehem,” Reuters, January 7, 2000. 5. “Priest Says Mother’s Death Made Yeltsin a Believer,” Reuters, January 5, 2001. 6. Boris Yeltsin, Prezidentsky Marafon: Pazmyshleniya,Vospominaniya, Pechatleniya [Presidential Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, and Impressions] (Moscow: ACT Publisher, 2000); the book’s English title is Midnight Diaries, translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: Public Affairs, October 12, 2000). 7. http://strana.ru/state/kremlin/2001/02/01/980976741.html. 8. Patrick Lannin, “Yeltsin, in Hospital, Sips Champagne at 70,” Reuters, February 2, 2001. 9. Ibid. 10. “Russia’s Flawed Reformer,” Editorial, New York Times, January 2, 2000. 11. http://www.echo.msk.ru/7news/index.html. 12. http://gazeta.ru/31012001. 13. The All-Russia (before 1992, All-Union) Centre for Public Opinion Research (VCIOM). 14. http://www.russiavotes.org/Yeltsin.htm.

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15. Curt Weldon, “A New Vision for Russia,” House Floor Speech, October 18, 1999. 16. Boris Nemtsov, “Provincial v Moskve [Provincial in Moscow],” Argumenty i fakty, No. 44, 1999.

Selected Bibliography

BOOKS, PAMPHLETS, ARTICLES AND OFFICIAL PRESS RELEASES Aron, Leon. Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. Bush, George W. “You Don’t Set Back Democracy Very Easily,” Vital Speeches of the Day. September 15, 1991. The Chechen Crisis and Its Implications for Russian Democracy. Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. One Hundred and Sixth Congress, First Session. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000. Church, George J. “Boris Looks Westward,” Time, June 24, 1991. Cohen, Stephen. Failed Crusade: American Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000. Dobrynin, Anatoly. In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents. New York: Random House, 1995. Eggleston, Roland. “Schroeder’s Visit Marks New Era in Russo-German Relations.” RFL/RL Newsline, Endnote, November, 20, 1998. Felkay, Andrew. Out of Russian Orbit: Hungary Gravitates to the West. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997. Fessler, Pamela. “Russia’s Yeltsin Charms Congress, but Aid Is Another Question,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, June 22, 1991. ———. “Yeltsin Charges onto Capitol Hill, Charms the Life Out of the Cold War.” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, June 20, 1992.

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Selected Bibliography

Filatov, Sergey. Sovershenno neskretno [Not at All Secret]. Moscow: Vargius, 2000. Gorbachev, Mikhail. Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1987. Gordon, Michael R., and David E. Sanger. “The Bailout of the Kremlin: How the U.S. Pressed the I.M.F.” New York Times, July 17, 1998. Hough, Jerry. Russia and the West: Gorbachev and the Politics of Reform. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988. Kanet, Roger E., ed. Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s. New York: Praeger, 1982. Kennan, George F. Russia and the West: Under Lenin and Stalin. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960. Klebnikov, Paul. Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of the Kremlin. New York: Harcourt, 2000. Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Projekt) [The Constitution of the Russian Federation (Draft)]. Moscow: Izdatelstvo “Yuridicheskaya literatura,” 1993. Korzhakov, Aleksandr. Boris Yeltsin: Ot rassveta do zakata [Boris Yeltsin: From Sunrise to Sunset]. Moscow: Interbuk Publisher, 1997. Kozyrev, Andrey. Preobrazhenie [Transformation]. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnaya Otnoshenie, 1994. Kramer, Michael. “Rescuing Boris.” Time, July 15, 1996. Kto est kto v russiyskoy diplomaticheskoy sluzhbe [Who is Who in the Russian Diplomatic Service]. Moscow: Department of Information and Press Service of the Russian Foreign Ministry, 1993. Layard, Richard, and John Parker. The Coming Russian Boom: A Guide to New Market and Politics. New York: The Free Press, 1996. Lebed, Aleksandr. Za derzhavu obidno [For a Great Power Painfully]. Moscow: Moskovskaya Pravda, 1995. Masland, Tom, and Fred Coleman. “Can Boris Yeltsin Make the Team, On the Eve of His U.S. Visit? Strong Doubts Remain.” Newsweek, February 3, 1992. Mihalka, Michael. “Trawling for Legitimacy.” Transition, June 30, 1995. Mlechin, Leonid. Formula Vlasti: Ot Yeltsina k Putinu [Formula of Power: From Yeltsin to Putin]. Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2000. Nemeth, Mary, and Hilary Macenzie. “Boris Yeltsin Takes the World Stage.” Maclean’s, February 10, 1992. Nemtsov, Boris. “Provincial v Moskve [Provincial in Moscow].” Argumenty i fakty, No. 44, 1999. Office of the Press Secretary. “Partnership for Peace.” Fact Sheet. The White House, March 2, 1994. Pier, Andrew G., and DimitryV. Trenin, ed. Rossia v mirovoy torgovle oruzheniem: Strategia, politika, ekonomika [Russia in the World’s Arms Trade: Strategy, Politics, and Economy]. Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 1996.

Selected Bibliography

251

Pribylovsky, Vladimir. “Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich: President of the Russian Federation.” Russian Presidential Candidates-1996. http://www.geocities/ CapitolHill/2768/yeltsin.html. Putin, Vladimir. “Why We Must Act.” New York Times. November 14, 1999. Remnick, David. Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia. New York: Random House, 1997. Sharlet, Robert. Soviet Constitutional Crisis: From De-Stalinization to Disintegration. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992. Shaw, Warren, and David Pryce. World Almanac of the Soviet Union from 1905 to the Present. New York: World Almanac, 1990. Shevstova, Lilia. Yeltsin’s Russia: Challenges and Constraints. Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 1997. Simes, Dimitri K. After the Collapse: Russia Seeks Its Place as a Great Power. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999. Smith, Hedrick. The New Russians. New York: Random House, 1990. Straus, Ira. “NATO and the Identity Crisis of the Russian Military.” Problems of Post-Communism. Fall 1994. Switalski, Piotr. “An Ally for the Central and Eastern European States.” Transition, June 30, 1995. U.S. Department of State Dispatch. “U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability and Nuclear Security Initiatives.” October 10, 1994. ———. “U.S.-Russian Summit.” June 22, 1992. Vanden, Katrina Heuvel. “Yeltsin’s Folly.” Nation, July 10, 1995. Watson, Russel, and Fred Coleman. “The Year of Yeltsin.” Newsweek, December 30, 1991. Wines, Michael. “Yeltsin and Crew Are Sinking Like the Ruble.” New York Times, August 22, 1998. Yeltsin, Boris. Against the Grain: An Autobiography, trans. Michael Glenny. New York: Summit Books, 1990. ———.“A Bold-faced and Unprecedented Coup D’Etat.” Vital Speeches of the Day. September 15, 1991. ———. Midnight Diaries, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. New York: Public Affairs, 2000. ———. Prezidentsky Marafon: Pazmyshleniya,Vospominaniya, Pechatleniya [Presidential Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, and Impressions]. Moscow: ACT Publisher, 2000. ———. The Struggle for Russia, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. New York: Random House, 1994. Yergin, Daniel, and Thane Gustafson. Russia 2010: And What It Means for the World. New York: Random House, 1993.

JOURNALS, NEWSPAPERS, AND INTERNET SOURCES (Specific issues are fully cited in the chapter notes.)

252

Selected Bibliography

Argumenty i fakty. Weekly news magazine, Moscow. The Associated Press. The world’s largest news gathering organization. Internet. Chronology of Russian History. http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/chrono.html. Bucknell University, Lewisburg, PA. European Internet Network (EIN). “Russia Today.” Daily news summaries from Russia. http://www.europeaninternet.com/russia/. Friends and Partners. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Archives from 1991. http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/rferl/index.html (opt,mozilla,pc,english,,new). Gazeta.ru. Daily Internet news summaries and interviews, Moscow. http://www.gazeta.ru/. Interfax News Agency. Leading source of political, economic, and financial news from Russia. http://www.interfax.ru/. Izvestia. Daily newspaper, Moscow. Kommersant. Daily newspaper, Moscow. Moscow News. English language Russian daily newspaper, Moscow. Moskovsky Komsomolets. Daily newspaper, Moscow. New York Times. Daily newspaper, New York. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. Daily newspaper, Moscow. OMRI (Open Media Research Institute) Daily News Digest I and II. News summaries from Russia. Internet, Prague. Radio Ekho Moskvy [Radio Ekho Moscow]. Daily news summaries and interviews, Moscow. http://www.echo.msk.ru/. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline. Five times weekly news reports, Prague. http://www.rferl.org/newsline/. Reuters. International news agency. Internet. Segodna. Daily newspaper, Moscow. Transition. Weekly journal of the Open Media Research Institute, Prague. Tsentralnaya Izbiratelnaya Kommissiya Russiyskoy Fedratsii [Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation]. http://www.fci.ru/. U.S. Russian Summits, 1992–2000. U.S. Department of State. http://www.state. gov/www/regions/nis/chron_summits_russia_us.html. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. http://www.access.gpo.gov/ nara/nara003.html.

Index

ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty, 108, 115, 116, 133, 166, 208, 219–220, 221 Albright, Madeleine, 164, 219 Aleksii II, Russian Orthodox Patriarch, 150, 188, 202, 239 Alpha. See Special Forces “Alpha” Andropov, Yuri, 16 Annan, Kofi, 187, 222 Anpilov, Viktor, 117 APEC (Asia-Pacific Cooperation), 219 Arafat, Yasser, 237 Aslund, Anders, 69, 100–101

Berger, Samuel, 180, 208 Blair, Tony, 168, 202 Borodin, Pavel, 142 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 102–103, 129–130 Bradley, Bill, 33 Braynin, Felix, 140 Brezhnev, Leonid I., 4, 14–15, 16 Brezhnev doctrine, 42 Budennovsk, 124–125, 212. See also Chechnya Burbulis, Gennady, 28, 57 Bush, George, 32, 49–50, 57–58, 63, 89, 91–92

Bakatin, Vadim V., 36 Baker III, James A., 32–33, 94 Barsukov, Mikhail, 151, 152–153 Basayev, Shamil, 123, 124–125, 212, 222 Belarus-Russia reunification negotiations, 201 Berezovsky, Boris, 139, 149, 152, 156, 180

Castro, Fidel, 23 CEC (Central Election Commission), 81–82, 131, 140 Chechnya, 109–110, 112–113; Budennovsk incident, 124–125; ongoing conflict, 146; OSCE team, 221; renewed conflict, 216–217, 218, 220; truce agreement, 159–160

254

Index

Chemical Weapons Convention, 166 Chernenko, Konstantin, 16 Chernomyrdin, Victor: failed attempt for reinstatement, 179; forming “Our Home Russia,” 118; meeting with Vice President Albert Gore, 118; negotiating with Shamil Basayev, 125; as Prime Minister, 73, 99–100, 101, 161, 212; removal from office, 173–74; special envoy to Serbia, 202, 205–206; vote of no confidence, 127, 131–132; and Yeltsin’s reelection committee, 141, 152, 153 Chirac, Jaques, 128, 168, 202, 223 Chubais, Anatoly: as Deputy Prime Minister, 132; as head of presidential administration, 161–162; negotiating for financial support in Washington, 175–176; opposing Stepashin’s removal, 215; political alliance with Sergei Kiriyenko, 230; removal from the government, 133–134; as Yeltsin’s campaign manager, 141, 149, 151–153, 154 CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) 68, 87, 89, 109, 133 Clark, Wesley, 207 Clinton, William J., 95; defense of NATO action in Yugoslavia, 223; G-7+1 meeting, 147–148; G-8 summit in Cologne, 208; meeting with Vladimir Putin, 221–222; OSCE meeting in Budapest, 111, 113–114, 117–118; summit in Hyde Park, New York, 129; summit in Moscow, 100, 101–102; summit in Vancouver, 96. See also Summit meetings; Yeltsin, Boris N. CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance), 67 CNN (Cable News Network), 2 Cohen, William, 206

Communist Party of the Russian Federation. See Zyuganov, Gennady Communist Party of the USSR: Central Committee, 3; Politburo, 23 Congress of People’s Deputies, 45, 71–72 Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993, 80–83 Constitutions of the USSR: 1924 and 1936, 1, 43, 71; Constitution of 1977, 48, 68, 72, 74, 78 Coup attempt (August 19, 1991), 1–4, 54, 56 CSCE (Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe). See OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) CTBT (Complete Test Ban Treaty), 108, 166 Dagestan, 109–110, 216–217 Davos, Switzerland, 148–149 Decree No. 1400, 77–78 Dresner, Richard, 141, 142 Dudayev, Dzhokar, 110, 123 Duma (Lower House of the Parliament), 81, 97, 99–100, 131–132, 178; condemning NATO’s bombing of Kosovo, 200; demanding Yeltsin’s resignation, 192, 194; protesting NATO’s bombing of Serbia, 188; Putin’s approval, 216; Yeltsin’s impeachment, 201, 203–204 Dyachenko, Tatiana (Yeltsin’s younger daughter), 36, 141–142, 152, 162, 212, 227 Elections: parliamentary 1993, 80–82; parliamentary 1995, 131–132; parliamentary 1999, 229–230; presidential 1996, 150–151 European Parliament, 86–87

Index Fatherland–All Russia, 213, 230. See also Luzhkov, Yuri; Primakov, Yevgeny Federal Council (Upper House of the Parliament), 81 Filatov, Sergey, 141 FSB (Federal Security Service), 215 Fyodorov, Boris, 100, 118 Fyodorov, Svyatoslav, 142 G-7 (Group-7) countries, 78, 97, 147; G-8 (Group-8), 167–168, 208 Gaidar, Yegor, 69, 72, 77, 80, 82, 117, 127, 133 GKO (Short-Term Government Bonds), 175 Glasnost, 3, 25, 31, 43, 244. See also Perestroika Gorbachev, Mikhail S.: after the fall of the Soviet Union, 87–88; compensations, 231–232; confinement during the coup attempt, 1–4, 54–55; confrontation with Yeltsin, 22–28; early cooperation with Yeltsin, 16–17; high standing in Washington, 32; reconstruction of the Politburo, 41–42; resignation, 67–69. See also Yeltsin, Boris N. Gore, Albert, 118, 174, 198, 214. See also Chernomyrdin, Victor Gorton, George, 141 Grachev, Pavel S., 56, 60, 79, 127, 153 Gusinsky, Vladimir, 139, 149, 156 Hashimoto, Ryutaro, 169–170 Havel, Vaclav, 87 Holbrooke, Richard, 189 Ilyushin, Viktor, 141 IMF (International Monetary Fund), 96, 100, 134–135, 148, 176–177, 193 Ipatyev house, 16

255

IRGD (Inter-Regional Group of Deputies), 28, 85 Ivanov, Igor, 200, 219 Jackson, Sir Mike, 207 Jaruzelski, Wojciech, 23 Kazannik, Aleksey, 28 KFOR (Kosovo Security Force), 206–207 Khasbulatov, Ruslan, 45, 57, 71, 73, 75, 78, 100 Khrushchev, Nikita S., 110, 231 Kinkel, Klaus, 186 Kiriyenko, Sergei: financial crisis, 177–178; political alliance with Chubais, 230; as Prime Minister, 174–175; removal from office, 212 Kohl, Helmuth, 78, 80, 111, 115, 116, 147, 168, 178, 191 Korzhakov, Aleksandr, 18, 23, 36–38, 54–55, 58, 139, 143, 147, 152 Kosovo, 182, 187 Kozyrev, Andrei, 63, 73, 86–87, 94, 101, 104, 111, 112, 130, 133 Kravchuk, Leonid, 68–69, 102 Kryuchkov, Vladimir, 42, 54–55, 56 Kulikov, Anatoly, 160 Kuril Islands controversy, 170 La Repubblika, 35 LDP (Liberal Democratic Party), 82. See also Zhirinovsky, Vladimir Lebed, Aleksandr: armistice negotiations in Chechnya, 159–161; Governor of Krasnoyarsk region, 180, 188, 212; head of Security Council, 152; major general, 59–63; presidential candidate, 142–143, 150; removal from Security Council, 160–161 Ligachev, Yegor K., 21–22, 27, 45 Lisovsky, Sergei, 151, 152 Lukyanov, Anatoly, 57

256

Index

Luzhkov, Yuri, 59, 139–140, 212, 230 Major, John, 63, 111, 115, 117 Makashov, Albert, 192, 215 Malashenko, Igor, 141, 153 Maslyukov, Yuri D., 42, 186 Milesovic, Slobodan, 129, 187, 201, 205 Mitterrand, François, 63, 111, 115, 117 Mulroney, Brian, 91 Nagorno-Karabakh, 43 NATO, 88–89, 99, 101, 102–103, 113, 134; NATO-Russia Founding Act, 167; Russian opposition to expansion, 162–166, 182 Nazarbayev, Nursultan A., 53 Nemtsov, Boris, 140, 162, 174; assessing Yeltsin, 239 Nikolas II, Tsar, 16 NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty), 108 NTV (Gusinsky-owned independent television station), 140, 149 Okulov, Valery, 213 Okulova, Yelena (Yeltsin’s older daughter), 213, 227 ORT (Russian Public TV), 151 OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), 111–112, 113; Hungarian-led monitoring team in Chechnya, 126; new monitoring team in Chechnya, 190, 221 “Our Home Russia,” 118, 214. See also Chernomyrdin, Victor Parliament, 69. See also Congress of People’s Deputies; Duma Pavlov, Valentin, 54–56 Perestroika, 3, 22–23, 25–26, 31, 41–42, 244. See also Glasnost PFP (Partnership for Peace), 104–105, 111, 114–115

Polozkov, Ivan K., 45 Pravda, 35, 67 Primakov, Yevgeny: Foreign Intelligence Service, 109; Foreign Minister, 42, 133, 163; interrupted trip to New York, 198; negotiations with the IMF, 190; party leader, 212, 230; peace making effort in Belgrade, 201; Prime Minister, 186; removal from office, 203 Pugo, Boris K., 42 Putin, Vladimir V.: as acting president, 234–235; at APEC summit, 219–220; meeting with Clinton, 221–222; offer of presidency, 232–233; as Prime Minister, 214, 215–216 Referendum: March 1991, 72; April 1993, 74 Rubin, Robert, 178 Russian-Belarusian reunification negotiations, 201 Russia’s Choice, 82, 100. See also Gaidar, Yegor Rutskoi, Aleksandr V., 57, 78, 100 Ryzhkov, Nikolai, 46, 47 Ryzhkov, Vladimir, 214 Sacks, Jeffrey, 69, 100–101 Sakharov, Andrei, 28 Schroeder, Gerhard, 187, 191, 223 Scowcroft, Brent, 32–33 SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative), 90 Seleznev, Gennady, 194, 198–199 Sergeyev, Igor, 188, 206 Sharansky, Natan, 150 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 187 Shoigu, Sergei, 230 Short-Term Government Bonds (GKO), 175 Shumate, Joe, 141 Shushkevich, Stanislav, 68–69 Simes, Dimitri K., 32, 34–35

Index Sobchak, Anatoly, 119 Soros, George, 178 Soskovets, Oleg, 118, 140, 149, 152 Special Forces “Alpha,” 56, 58, 79–80 State Emergency Committee, 1, 57 Stepashin, Sergei: as Prime Minister, 200, 203–205, 208, 212, 214 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty: START I, 92; START II, 107, 128, 166, 181, 189, 193–194, 199, 208; START III, 166, 181, 208 Summers, Lawrence, 193 Summit meetings: Birmingham (1998), 168; Cologne (1999), 208; Denver (1997), 167–168; Halifax (1995), 123–125; Helsinki (1997), 164–166; Moscow (1995), 115–116; Moscow (1998), 179–180; Vancouver (1993), 95–96; Washington (1992), 91–92. See also Yeltsin, Boris N. Suslov, Mikhail, 14 Talbott, Strobe, 176, 186, 193 Terror acts in Moscow, 219 Thatcher, Margaret, 64 Union of Right-Wing Forces, 230 Union Treaty, 48, 54 United Nations: charter, 108; fiftieth anniversary, 129; Resolutions 1199 and, 189–190; Security Council, 89; UNSCR 1244 concerning Kosovo, 206 Unity Party (Yedinstvo), 230 VCIOM (survey of public attitude toward Yeltsin), 240–242 Vedrine, Hubert, 186 Voloshin, Aleksander, 212 Walensa, Lech, 86

257

White House (seat of the Russian Federation’s Parliament), 2, 57–58, 79 “Who Lost Russia?” (Republican critique of Clinton’s foreign policy), 242–243 World Bank, 96–97, 100, 134–135, 148, 176 World Economic Forum, 148–149 Yabloko, 82. See also Yavlinsky, Grigory Yanayev, Gennady Ivanovich, 1 Yasin, Yevgenii, 145 Yavlinsky, Grigory, 46, 82, 117, 127, 142, 180, 187 Yedinstvo (Unity) Party, 230 Yeltsin, Boris N.: accusations of corruption, 212–213; addressing the U.S. Congress, 92–93; attempts to mitigate the Kosovo crisis, 187–188, 197, 203; Birmingham summit (1998), 168; on the campaign trail, 143–146; candidate for presidency, 135; chairman of Russian Supreme Soviet, 44–45; confrontation with Gorbachev, 22–28; criticized by the Western media, 48–49; Denver summit and admission into G-7 (1997), 167–168; dubious incident, 36–38; election victory and falling ill, 152–155; engineer, 13–15; family origins, parents and early childhood, 7–9; first trip to the United States, 31–35; foreign and domestic endorsements, 150; Halifax summit (1995), 123–125; Helsinki summit 1997, 164–166; institute, 10; meeting with Bush, 90–91; meeting with Jiang Zemin in China, 228–229; “meetings without neckties,” 168–169; Moscow summit (1995), 101–102; Moscow summit

258

Index

(1998), 179–180; NATO-Russia Founding Agreement, 167; offering the presidency to Putin, 232–233; open-heart surgery, 161–162; Orthodox Christmas in Bethlehem, 237–238; OSCE meeting in Istanbul (1999), 222–223; party activist in Sverdlovsk, 14–17; resignation, 233–235; RSFSR presidential election, 47; second trip to the United States, 49–50; seventieth birthday in the hospital, 238–239; short trip to Spain, 48; siege of the White House (1993), 78–79; speech in the UN (1992), 89–90; speech in the UN (1995), 128–129; sports, 9–10; struggle with the Parliament, 69–70; survives impeachment, 203–204; taking charge during the coup, 2–4, 54; transfer to Moscow, 17–18, 21; travel to King Hussein funeral, 194; VCIOM (survey of public attitude toward Yeltsin), 240–242; warning of a “cold

peace,” 112; Washington summit (1992), 91–92 Yeltsin, Naina, 140, 155, 227 Yevstafev, Arkadii, 151, 152 Yumashev, Valentin, 212 Zadorov, Mikhail, 186 Zakharov, Gennady I., 79 Zemin, Jiang, 228 Zhirinovsky, Vladimir, 47, 82–83, 97, 117, 126, 127, 135, 199 Zhirinovsky Bloc, 230 Zorkin, Valery, 73 Zyuganov, Gennady: candidate for presidency in 1996, 134, 135, 142, 146, 147, 150–152; candidate for presidency in 2000, 212; head of Communist Party of the Russian Federation, 117, 126; initiating Yeltsin’s impeachment, 194; meeting with Clinton, 180; opposing Chernomyrdin’s renomination, 179; opposing NATO’s action in Kosovo, 199; speech at the World Economic Forum, 149–150, 151

About the Author ANDREW FELKAY is Professor of Russian Studies at Kutztown University. Among his earlier publications are Out of Russian Orbit (Greenwood, 1997) and Hungary and the USSR, 1956–1988 (Greenwood, 1989).