Worship and Ethics: Lutherans and Anglicans in Dialogue [Reprint 2012 ed.] 3110143771, 9783110143775, 9783110889666

Table of contents :
Acknowledgements
Introduction by the Editors
Part I: Traditions
The Anglican Tradition of Moral Theology
A Modern Understanding of Christian Ethics in the Perspective of its own Tradition
Hastings Rashdall as Social Theologian: Critical Methodology and the Rhetoric of Brotherhood
Ernst Troeltsch’s Ethics of Compromise and its Significance for Contemporary Theological Ethics
Part II: Foundations
The Foundation of Cognition and Ethics in Worship
Worship and Theology
Part III: Mediations
In Search of a Eucharistic Social Ethic
Social Ethics as an Ethics of Responsibility
Fundamentals of the Economic Ethics of Arthur Rich
Integrity in Business: A Christian Approach to Business Ethics
Part IV: Integrity
Worship and True or False Narrative
Justification and Responsibility for the World: their Place in Life, Worship and Pastoral Ministry
Retrospect and Prospect
Contributors

Citation preview

Worship and Ethics

W G DE

Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann Herausgegeben von O. Bayer · W. Härle · H.-P. Müller

Band 70

Walter de Gruyter · Berlin · New York 1996

Edited by Oswald Bayer and Alan Suggate

Worship and Ethics Lutherans and Anglicans in Dialogue

Walter de Gruyter · Berlin · New York 1996

® Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Worship and ethics : Lutherans and Anglicans in dialogue / edited by Oswald Bayer and Alan Suggate. p. cm. - (Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann; Bd. 70) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 3-11-014377-1 1. Christian ethics — Anglican authors. 2. Christian ethics — Lutheran authors. 3. Public worship — Anglican Communion. 4. Public worship — Lutheran Church. 5. Anglican Communion — Doctrines. 6. Lutheran Church — Doctrines. 7. Anglican Communion - Liturgy. 8. Lutheran Church — Liturgy. I. Bayer, Oswald. II. Suggate Alan M. III. Series: Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann; 70. Bd. BJ1275.W67 1995 241'.043-dc20 95-42323 CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek — Cataloging-in-Publication Data Worship and ethics : Lutherans and Anglicans in dialogue / ed. by Oswald Bayer and Alan Suggate. — Berlin ; New York : de Gruyter, 1996 (Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann ; Bd. 70) ISBN 3-11-014377-1 NE: Bayer, Oswald [Hrsg]; GT

© Copyright 1996 by Walter de Gruyter & Co., D-10785 Berlin All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Printed in Germany Disk conversion with TEX: Lewis & Leins GmbH, Berlin Printing: Werner Hildebrand, Berlin Binding: Lüderitz & Bauer-GmbH, Berlin

Eva Bayer 1941-1993

Acknowledgements

The contributors to this volume are glad to acknowledge with gratitude the generous financial support of the British Council and the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst towards this project, latterly through the newly established British German Academic Research Collaboration Programme, and of their own several institutions. They are also very grateful to the Lutherisches Kirchenamt in Hannover for its generous financial support of the publication of this book. They also acknowledge with gratitude the assistance of Ms Christine Helmer and Dr Douglas Hedley in translating the essay of Thomas Reinhuber and the first essay of Hans Ulrich respectively.

Contents

Acknowledgements

vii

Introduction by the Editors

xi

Part I: Traditions

1

The Anglican Tradition of Moral Theology Alan M. Suggate

2

A Modern Understanding of Christian Ethics in the Perspective of its own Tradition Hans G. Ulrich

26

Hastings Rashdall as Social Theologian: Critical Methodology and the Rhetoric of Brotherhood Anthony Dyson

59

Ernst Troeltsch's Ethics of Compromise and its Significance for Contemporary Theological Ethics Thomas Reinhuber

88

Part II: Foundations

117

The Foundation of Cognition and Ethics in Worship Daniel W. Hardy

118

Worship and Theology Oswald Bayer

148

X

Contents

Part III: Mediations

163

In Search of a Eucharistie Social Ethic Alan M. Suggate

164

Social Ethics as an Ethics of Responsibility Oswald Bayer

187

Fundamentals of the Economic Ethics of Arthur Rich Theodor Dieter

202

Integrity in Business: A Christian Approach to Business Ethics Richard A. Higginson

232

Part IV: Integrity

257

Worship and True or False Narrative Peter H. Sedgwick

258

Justification and Responsibility for the World: their Place in Life, Worship and Pastoral Ministry Klaus Sturm

278

Retrospect and Prospect Hans G. Ulrich . . .

285

Contributors

295

Introduction

This book belongs to a wider process, but in itself it is a unique venture in the field of Christian ethics. It presents the results of a series of consultations where English Anglicans and German Lutherans have jointly explored the theological traditions in which their Christian ethics is rooted and discussed issues in modern theology common to them both. In recent years there have been many official and semi-official contacts between Anglicans and Lutherans as part of the world-wide ecumenical search for greater understanding between the churches. The Meissen Agreement was a significant step forward in AnglicanLutheran understanding of doctrine. It is now recognised across the churches that the time has come for deeper ecumenical reflection on the subject of Christian ethics. The contributors to this volume are not official delegates of their churches, but a self-constituted group of theologians who belong to the Anglican and Lutheran communions. In 1984 Alan Suggate visited Germany to make contact with both Catholic and Protestant scholars in Christian ethics. At Tübingen he met Oswald Bayer, and the two of them hit on the idea of a consultation. They each gathered a small group of scholars who met at Durham in 1987, Tübingen in 1989, and Cambridge in 1991. All had made substantial studies of their own tradition and in varying degrees were conversant with the other tradition and committed to deeper engagement with it. The pattern of the consultations was for each member to offer a study from within his own tradition (in the broad sense of the English- or German- speaking tradition), and for each study to be discussed by the other members. The object was to enter more fully into each other's traditions, to perceive common strands and tensions between them, and to identify and discuss a number of issues which go to the heart of the two theological traditions and merit further intensive exploration.

Xll

Introduction

The members of the consultations all see themselves as living out of their tradition, but no attempt has been made to achieve a balanced representation of the different strands of those traditions. The essays in this volume are held together by a particular focus and a set of convictions. The focus is the interrelationship of Christian worship, thought and practice. The convictions are (i) that Christian ethics is sustained in the life of the Christian community which must continually remain in dialogue with its tradition; (ii) that Christian ethics has its roots in worship and doctrine, and can be properly pursued only in that context; (iii) that therefore one needs to clarify the processes of mediation between those roots and practice; (iv) that Christian ethics must be constantly pursued not only ecumenically but also in dialogue with the world, and in contemporary terms this means that it must neither insulate itself from nor capitulate to the assumptions, ideas and practices of modernity, but address itself to them critically and constructively. The book therefore moves though four phases. First there are essays which focus on the two traditions. Alan Suggate and Hans Ulrich present a historical conspectus of their respective traditions of Christian ethics. In both essays it is clear that modernity, shaped by the Enlightenment, has made a profound impact. It has strained the Anglican tradition with its concepts of the via media and the triple cord of scripture, reason and tradition, and created such a breach in the Lutheran tradition that it is difficult to write a continuous history of it. The next two essays focus specifically on two outstanding liberal theologians, near contemporaries, who are paradigmatic of theological attempts to meet the challenge of modernity. The first is the remarkably wide-ranging Hastings Rashdall (18581924), whom Anthony Dyson critically appreciates as a social theologian. The other is the theologian and philosopher Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923), whose significance for today's theological ethics Thomas Reinhuber considers through an examination of his ethic of compromise. In the second part Daniel Hardy and Oswald Bayer both concentrate on the foundations of Christian ethics. Daniel Hardy traces those roots through the question of cognition back to the worship of the Church. Oswald Bayer develops an understanding of theology and theological ethics which both derives from and is directed towards worship.

Introduction

Xlll

The third part focusses on forms of mediation between the roots of Christian ethics and its practice. The common assumption of the writers is that mediation is essential, but there is a diversity of approach, not only between the two traditions but also among those in the same tradition. Alan Suggate builds on the Anglican tradition represented by William Temple to propose a social ethic where mediation functions though an interplay between ideas anchored in eucharistie practice and the experience of Christian living in the world. Oswald Bayer presents a Lutheran social ethic whose roots yield the key concept of responsibility. Theodor Dieter and Richard Higginson concentrate on forms of mediation appropriate to the economic and business sphere. Theodor Dieter explores the nature and value of the model developed by the Swiss theologian Arthur Rich for relating the Christian faith to the institutional side of economic life, whereas Richard Higginson starts out much more from the question of the practice of individuals in business and enquires about the best model to support the Christian in the search for integrity in business. In the fourth part Peter Sedgwick and Klaus Sturm offer essays which open up questions about a new kind of awareness of the Church in relation to society. Both address the question of how the Christian can maintain (or forfeit) integrity in Christian ethical practice. Assuming that a true theology of the Church includes a judgment about the visible relationships within and without the Church, and that a Christian ethic is related to the nature of the Church, then, Peter Sedgwick argues, if the Church in its life tells a false story or narrative, its ethic is compromised. Klaus Sturm explores the implications of the concepts of justification and responsibility for the world from several related angles: life, worship and pastoral ministry. These essays formed the basis for our dialogue together, which enabled us to achieve a far greater depth of understanding, not only of the other tradition but also of our own. Furthermore, several issues rapidly came to the surface and confronted us again and again. We decided not to revise the essays themselves in order to exhibit the dialogue and issues, but to let them stand as examples of attempts to engage with and develop our own traditions. Nor do we record the discussion of particular papers or groups of papers, mainly because the issues are not confined to one part but run right through the book. The substance and tenor of our dialogues is rather gathered together at the end.

XIV

Introduction

Here Hans Ulrich looks back on our discussions and offers a summary of the discoveries which we made, in such a way as to draw out the central points of common ground and tension between the two traditions, and to exhibit sharply the issues which we believe urgently require sustained investigation. We are all agreed that Christian ethics is rooted in the practice of worship, where G o d ' s presence is communicated and celebrated, and this implies that questions of ethical theory are best handled not through general concepts but through common practice and its history. We recognised that the traditions of Christian ethics are bound up with diverse histories, social contexts, habits of the heart and forms of thought, which have various theological roots, the Anglican being more eirenic, the German more conflictual. We all realised that we had many points of contact which at the same time revealed points of difference. This was most evident in our understanding of freedom, responsibility, the relation of Christianity and culture, and of teleology and history, and indeed the very meaning of the term social ethics and the relation of ethics to worship. We have therefore attempted to identify a number of questions arising from our awareness of common ground and yet of tensions between the two traditions. It seemed best for each contributor to write in his own language. For this English edition the essay of Thomas Reinhuber was translated by Ms Christine Helmer, and the first essay of Hans Ulrich by Dr Douglas Hedley. Alan Suggate gave advice over these two translations, and translated the remaining five German essays. The various members of the group will certainly be exploring these issues in the coming years. But the time seemed ripe, both in our deliberations and in the wider context of developments in ecumenical discussion, to share our findings so far with a wider audience. We hope very much that our report will not only be illuminating but also stimulate many others to undertake similar exploration. In political and economic terms our two countries are being drawn ever closer together within the context of the European Union and the amazing changes which have swept across Germany and Eastern Europe. The situation is far more encouraging than even a short time ago, but clearly new problems are emerging all the time. The churches face an immense challenge to clarify in the light of faith their own position and role within Europe and in Europe's relations with the rest of the world. They already have official instruments in place, such as the

Introduction

XV

Council of European Churches, and each communion has its own evolving institutions. It is to be hoped that greater co-operation and mutual understanding can develop at all levels of the Church. This book, as a report of unofficial dialogue between English Anglican and German Lutheran theologians on substantive issues of Christian ethics, is the first of its kind, and is offered as a small step within that process. Tübingen and Durham, November 1994

Oswald Bayer and Alan M. Suggate

The contributors to this volume are very glad to have the agreement of Oswald Bayer to dedicate it to Eva Bayer, who gave so much of herself to our consultations and whose quiet strength was an inspiration and encouragement to us all. Alan M. Suggate

Parti Traditions

The Anglican Tradition of Moral Theology Alan M. Suggate

Hooker and the via media For the English who experienced the impact of the Reformation on the continent of Europe there was one fundamental question: what were to be the distinctive characteristics of the English Reformation? The reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary and Elizabeth I were a period of great upheaval as that question was thrashed out. In the framing of a comprehensive answer no one was more influential than Richard Hooker (cl554-1600). Hooker was an eirenic man who sought a middle way between Rome and Geneva which would enable as many as possible to be included within the Church and state of England. Rejecting the Genevan tendency to derive all from Scripture, he appealed to reason, Scripture and tradition as complementary authoritative guides in worship, belief and morals.1 In his concept of reason and law Hooker drew extensively on St. Thomas Aquinas. The universe has an orderly structure. Its laws are grounded in the eternal law of God's own being. Human beings are unique; for not only do they have their own structure, they also have the gift of reason implanted in them by the wisdom of the Creator. By reason they participate in the eternal law and are able to apprehend the structure of the universe. This structure reflects also a moral law, These notes concentrate on ethical writings by several authors. The place of publication is London, unless otherwise indicated. 1

Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (2 vols) Dent, 1907. See J.S. Marshall, Hooker and the Anglican Tradition Adam and Charles Black, 1963; and for Anglican Moral Theology starting from Hooker see Thomas Wood, 'Anglican Moral Theology/Ethics' in J. Macquarrie and J. Childress (eds), A New Dictionary of Christian Ethics SCM Press, 1986.

The Anglican Tradition of Moral Theology

3

which guides human beings concerning their chief moral duties. This is the natural law. Hooker thus retained the Catholic emphasis on the capacity of reason to grasp the rational order of the universe, an order which embraces both fact and value. But he insisted that it had to be a right use of reason, and that in turn required faith. In this Hooker was very close to Calvin. Scripture does not quench the light of reason but perfects it, as grace perfects nature. The natural law is confirmed, interpreted and amplified by those divine laws which are revealed in Scripture. The essential function of Scripture is to reveal all those things which are necessary for salvation. It thus guides people to their supernatural end, which is the beatific vision and eternal union with God. The natural and the supernatural spheres are thus complementary. Hooker correspondingly thought of Church and state as two aspects of one and the same Christian society. This model was standard in Anglican thought until in the nineteenth century its disjunction from the realities of English society became too glaring. But even to this day it remains powerful as a distant ideal. In Hooker's Christian society all human laws (civil and ecclesiastical, national and international, public and private) are to be deduced from or at least compatible with natural law and revealed divine laws. The English Reformers did not preserve only the tradition of natural law. Whilst critical of the Roman Church they strove to preserve all that was valuable in the Church's past. They did not remotely consider themselves to be creating a new church. An Anglican would be mortally offended to be told that his church was founded by Henry VIII! Rather it finds its roots in Scripture and in the tradition of the Church. It looks especially to the period of the Early Church Fathers, when the Church was undivided and the credal affirmations were hammered out. Scripture certainly has priority over tradition in that it is the criterion of all doctrine. As William Beveridge (1637-1708) bluntly put it, "What is here written [in Scripture] we are bound to believe because it is written; and what is not here written we are not bound to believe because it is not written." 2 Yet Scripture always requires interpretation, and here tradition and reason can be guides to its sense. Moreover, the Anglican Church maintained many traditional rituals for which no specific warrant could be found in

2

Quoted by H.R. McAdoo, The Spirit of Anglicanism: a Survey of Anglican Theological Method in the Seventeenth Century, p. 310 Adam and Charles Black, 1965.

4

Alan M. Suggate

Scripture. The English Reformers, as P.E. More explains, here "stood with Rome in so far as they would admit the immense value of tradition in much that was vital to religious observance, though it might not be necessary to salvation." They held that one should allow "due weight in the practical sphere of religion to the wisdom of accumulated human experience."3 Connoisseurs of Anglicanism are in the habit of singing the praises of this via media. A doyen of Anglican theology, H.R. McAdoo, assures us that the via media is not "compromise or an intellectual expedient but a quality of thinking, an approach in which elements usually regarded as mutually exclusive were seen to be in fact complementary. These things were held in a living tension, not in order to walk the tight-rope of compromise, but because they were seen to be mutually illuminating and fertilise each another." 4 P.E. More similarly claims that the via media points in a positive direction, "aiming to introduce into religion, and to base upon the 'light of reason', that love of balance, restraint, moderation, measure, which from sources beyond our reckoning appears to be innate in the English temper." More quotes Thomas Fuller (1608-61): "Moderation is not an halting betwixt two opinions, when the thorough-believing of one of them is necessary to salvation", nor is it mere lukewarmness, but a law and an ideal whereupon all a man's soul may be set, even to martyrdom.5 Disputes within the Church of England usually involve mutual recriminations that the other is upsetting the balance. Yet the via media does not aim at a mid-point between two alternatives on the same logical level. Rather it aspires to transcend them, promoting an ideal unity which is focussed in the concrete self-reforming form of the Church, and especially in its worship. Non-Anglicans may well suspect that the much vaunted aurea mediocritas of the via media is in reality a decidedly Laodicean mediocrity, dictated more by the instinct for institutional self-preservation than by truth. Before the reader can make a judgment, certain strands of the via media need further elaboration.

3

Quoted by P.E. More, 'The Spirit of Anglicanism' in P.E. More and F.L. Cross (eds), Anglicanism. The Thought and Practice of the Church of England, illustrated from the Religious Literature of the Seventeenth Century, p. xxvii SPCK, 1962.

4

H.R. McAdoo, The Spirit of Anglicanism, p. 312.

5

P.E. More and F.L. Cross, Anglicanism, pp. xxiif.

T h e Anglican Tradition of Moral Theology

5

Living the via media: the Caroline Divines The seventeenth century was no more tranquil than the sixteenth. The death of Elizabeth in 1603 brought the Scottish James VI to the throne of England. Though the son of the Catholic Mary Queen of Scots, he was brought up a Protestant, and so was acceptable to England. His son Charles I was overthrown and executed by the Puritan Oliver Cromwell. Cromwell's Commonwealth did not survive his death in 1658, and the English restored the Stuart house in the person of Charles II (1660). In this turbulent period Anglican moral theology was developed in line with Hooker by the so-called Caroline divines.6 A unifying thread of Anglican Christianity is its down-to-earth character. William Chillingworth (1602-44) expressed the spirit when he remarked, "I am fully assured that God does not and therefore men ought not to require any more of any man than this, to believe Scripture to be God's Word, to endeavour to find the true sense of it, and to live according to it." For the English Reformers Scripture is not a complicated manual of theological propositions or a playground for philosophers. It is the earthy presentation of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who was born, lived and died for the salvation of the world. Ralph Cudworth (1617-88) stated quite simply, "The Gospel is nothing else but God descending into the world in our form and conversing with us in our likeness." 7 Here we see the well-known Anglican affection for the down-to-earth doctrine of the Incarnation. However, Anglicans have never professed to hang their faith on the peg of a single doctrine. They have aimed to grasp the sense of Scripture as a whole and, in so far as it yields doctrines, to set those doctrines in a proper relationship to each other. Only in this way, it is held, can the story of God's saving actions be rightly grasped. This way of reading Scripture cannot be divorced from the living reality of the Church. The appeals to the Early Church Fathers and the rest of the tradition were made not in some intellectual way but out of the consciousness that there was a living continuity between the Church's past and present. H.R. McAdoo writes that "The theologi6

For this period see especially P.E. More and F.L. Cross, Anglicanism·, H.R. McAdoo, The Spirit of Anglicanism; The Structure of Caroline Moral Theology Longmans Green, 1949; Thomas Wood, English Casuistical Divinity during the Seventeenth Century, with Special Reference to Jeremy Taylor SPCK, 1952.

7

Both quotations in P.E. More and F.L. Cross, Anglicanism, p. xxv.

6

Alan M. Suggate

cal method of the period took the fact of the Church into account, its continuity, its givenness, and its visible corporateness . . . The effect of this was more or less undesignedly to hold together Scripture, law and reason, within the life of the Church which for many was a living embodiment of that primitive antiquity which was sought in the writings of the first five centuries." 8 It is characteristic of the Anglican approach generally to exhibit a strong historical awareness. Indeed, justifications in Anglican theology are usually shot through with appeals to historical origins and development. The Anglican Church may be said to live by the history of its worship, doctrine and practice. The reference to worship is of great importance. When McAdoo alludes to the linking of the Church's past with its present, he stresses "the cumulative effect on theological method of the unceasing use of a liturgy and of the recitation of the creeds . . . The effect can hardly be overestimated . . . " 9 At the heart of the worship of the Church is the sacraments. Many Anglicans have understood the sacraments as the fruit of the Incarnation. Both Incarnation and sacraments speak of God giving himself in and through the material order which he created. This kind of thinking attains its fullest scope in the endorsement of natural theology and natural morality: the natural order is capable of being taken up into the supernatural. As the parson-poet George Herbert (1593-1632) wrote A man that looks on glass, O n it may stay his eye, O r if he pleaseth through it pass, And then the heaven espy. 1 0

In that case the sacraments of the Church are the focus of what is true of the whole universe, as well as being grounded in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. When Cudworth spoke of God descending and conversing with us in our likeness, he added the words, "that He might deify us, that is (as St. Peter expresseth it), make us partakers of the divine nature." Cudworth well knew that he was taking up a doctrine of Irenaeus and Athanasius: God became 8

H . R . M c A d o o , The Spirit of Anglicanism,

pp. 313f.

9

H . R . M c A d o o , The Spirit of Anglicanism,

p. 313.

10 F.E. Hutchinson (ed), The Works of George p. 184 Oxford: Clarendon, 1941.

Herbert,

The Anglican Tradition of Moral Theology

7

incarnate in order that we should be made as God. For Anglicans generally the sacraments are an indispensable means of the attainment of this end. Advance in holiness is impossible without grace, and the sacraments are the principal channels of grace. In the second half of the 17th century there grew up a view of ecclesiology and priesthood which was sharply different from that of the Puritans and Protestants of a hundred years before. The priest was expected to intercede with God for his parishioners and to act as their teacher. This was in part a response to a demand from all classes for a sound moral theology. The Reformation had encouraged ordinary people to accept responsibility for their spiritual and moral development. Certainly they needed Scripture and the sacraments. But if, following Chiliingworth, they needed to find the true sense of Scripture and live according to it, then they needed guidance. A remarkable number of divines (for example Joseph Hall, Jeremy Taylor, Robert Sanderson and Richard Baxter), some of whom stood in the Puritan tradition, produced a stream of books, treatises, monographs, sermons, letters, lectures and other devotional works to satisfy this popular need. The overriding aim of this Caroline moral theology, as it is called, was to provide a body of teaching which would help people in all the circumstances of life to grow in grace and (as Baxter put it) "guide them safely in their walk with God, to life eternal." These divines stood basically in the Thomist tradition, and made use of the mediaeval moralists. But it was always a critical use. Nor was their work geared to the confessional. The laity had the freedom and the responsibility to work out their own "walk with God". The task of the moral theologian was to foster the growth of character and to give broad principles, with particular help over the problems in life which most taxed the conscience. From William Perkins' The Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience (1606) to John Sharp's The Case of a Doubting Conscience (1684) a succession of works focussed on the guidance of conscience. But the actual decision of what to do in specific cases was left to the individual Christian. It is important to observe that in Anglican moral theology no area of life lay outside the sphere of Christian moral principles. In the one Christian society life was not divided into a public and a private arena. This is hardly surprising in a tradition which derived so much from Thomism. The natural moral law had always applied to the whole of human life, and the exercise of practical reason was traditionally

8

Alan M. Suggate

recommended in order to determine how at any point the response of faith was to be made. Moral theology was to be comprehensive enough to lead society in the ways of justice as well as the individual in the ways of holiness.

Joseph Butler The 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688 removed the Stuarts and ushered in an age of toleration under the House of Orange and later the Hanoverians. Proportion, moderation, and practical reasonableness were its hallmarks. The greatest English moral theologian of the 18th century was undoubtedly Joseph Butler (1692-1752), who for the last two years of his life was Bishop of Durham. His moral philosophy is contained in his volume of Sermons and in the 'Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue' appended to The Analogy of Religion.n Butler shows and develops many of the hallmarks of the Anglican method. Moral excellence for him consists in fulfilling the demand made upon us by our whole nature in the concrete situations in which we find ourselves. He was deeply aware of the complexities and perplexities of pursuing this excellence. On the one hand, he recognised the complexity of human nature. In the view of Donald MacKinnon he is superior to Kant in presenting the detail of his moral psychology. In particular he criticises those who argued simplistically that virtue can be identified with a generalised concern for human welfare, thus ignoring the special claims of family and friends. Butler is also well aware that natural law is not a wholly objective set of rules, but rather an inner demand upon us that we pursue what is in accord with our being. He is also very sensitive to the sheer complexity of the situations with which we have to deal morally. He commends a strongly empirical approach to our decision-making. Butler thus presents us with a natural law which is flexibly interpreted, combining attention to general principles and the particularities of human existence. So far from operating a highly deductive approach 11 Joseph Butler, The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature. To which are added Two Brief Dissertations: 1 of personal identity; 2 of the nature of virtue. Oxford University Press, 1833; Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel SPCK, 1970; D.M. MacKinnon, 'Joseph Butler' in J. Macquarrie (ed), A Dictionary of Christian Ethics SCM Press, 1967.

The Anglican Tradition of Moral Theology

9

to natural law, he recognises that to acknowledge a natural order of human conduct may issue in an insoluble and even tragic conflict of obligations. He was, for example, deeply aware of the conflict between the demands for compassion and forgiveness, and those for a proper resentment against injury done to others or to ourselves. Butler well illustrates a particular feature of Anglican moral theology and indeed Anglican theology in general: a sensitivity to the currents of thought in his own culture. In many respects he is a man of his century, especially in his readiness to commend moral virtue on prudential grounds. It is typical of Anglican thought to be sensitive to developments in various secular disciplines and to the questions posed to the theologian by contemporary society. It attempts to make intellectual contact with the age in a constructive yet critical manner. It is hardly surprising that there are perpetual tensions within the Anglican communion as its members pursue the via media. The Evangelical wing of the Church of England has emphasised the primacy of Scripture; the Catholic wing continuity and tradition; whilst what is often called the Broad Church has been particularly responsive to the challenges put to the Church by contemporary currents of thought. Individual Anglicans cannot be neatly assigned to one or another of these three categories. They exhibit a bewildering variety of embodiments of them. We can illustrate the different emphases from the nineteenth century, an age of intense religious passion and controversy.

F.D. Maurice The most eminent Anglican theologian of the 19th century was F.D. Maurice (1805-72). Maurice exhibited to the full the propensity for comprehensiveness evident not only in Hooker but also in the highly influential poet, philosopher and theologian, Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834). Maurice deplored the division of English Christianity into sects. Not only were there numerous dissenting churches which rejected the Anglican attempt to include /all Englishmen with the Anglican settlement. The Church of England itself was racked by warring sects. As a consequence the Church of Christ was not only marred by disunity, but also deaf to its obligations to society as a whole. Maurice's most important work, The Kingdom of Christ (1838) offered a critique of the narrowness of the sects and explored the possibility

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Alan M. Suggate

of drawing together their partial truths into a more comprehensive theology. He complained that they founded their theology on the doctrine of original sin. Christians should rather start out from the love of God. In Christ God out of love had created a divine order. This was a living reality which at all times surrounded every human being. It was identical with the Kingdom of Christ, which had always existed and included everyone. Christ was the Head of every person, according to Maurice. No one could therefore ever be without God. Nor by implication could one ever be without one's fellow human beings. For Christ's Kingdom is a universal fellowship. All share in the common humanity of Christ, and since Christ sacrificed himself in obedience to God's perfect will of love, then all must regard each other as brothers and sisters of Christ for whom they must sacrifice their whole lives.12 Maurice retained the triple strand of the via media. He was in intention thoroughly scriptural, and lectured frequently on biblical subjects. He had a lively sense of tradition, believing that its riches offered a sound defence against sectarian attenuations. He also emphasised the critical use of reason. His rejection of a literalistic view of endless punishment in hell cost him his chair at King's College, London. He revived the tradition of moral theology, particularly in his last years when he held the Knightbridge Chair of Casuistry and Moral Theology at Cambridge, and he drew extensively on Jeremy Taylor in his lectures on The Conscience (1868).13 Maurice's especial contribution within moral theology was a reemphasis on the public nature of Christianity. His theology did not simply require the unity of the Church, but also the education of the Church into the social character of the Kingdom of Christ. Unfortunately the sectarianism of the churches had encouraged a false individualism. Maurice objected to the idea that individuals were redeemed one by one out of the world. Rather the universal Church existed only for the sake of the world. The world had to be educated into the realisation that true reform was not attainable by refashioning society according to man-made schemes, but only by the recognition 12 F.D. Maurice, The Kingdom of Christ James Clarke, 1959. For Maurice's theology see T. Christensen, The Divine Order: a Study in F.D. Maurice's Theology Leiden: Brill, 1973. 13 F.D. Maurice, The Conscience Macmillan, 1868.

The Anglican Tradition of Moral Theology

11

of the already existing Kingdom of Christ. Maurice himself became involved in the setting up of a number of producers' co-operatives in London in the name of Christian socialism. However, he soon decided that more direct teaching of his theology was necessary, and he abandoned the co-operatives in favour of a Working Men's College, of which he was the Principal, and where theology was the central subject.14 Maurice was enormously influential, not least on the Liberal Catholics like Charles Gore (1853-1932) and B.F. Westcott (18251901) who produced with others a volume of essays called Lux Mundi. Subtitled Ά Series of Studies in the Religion of the Incarnation', it was described by its editor Gore as an attempt "to put the Catholic faith into its right relation to modern intellectual and moral problems." The word 'Catholic' reflects the fact that these Liberal Catholics were deeply marked by the Oxford Movement. They tried to combine the deep hold of that movement on the givenness of the faith with a profound determination to face the challenges of the contemporary world and live with intellectual integrity within it. Lux Mundi was a remarkable success, deeply impressing large numbers of Christians who were struggling with challenges such as biblical criticism and the theory of evolution. One such Christian was the distinguished theologian Hastings Rashdall (1858-1924), who is the subject of a special study by Anthony Dyson later in this volume.15

Anglo-Catbolic and Evangelical The more direct descendants of the Oxford Movement tended to be less interested in intellectual movements of the age, and more concerned with sacrament and doctrine on the one hand and the integrity of the Church in relation to English society. The first generation of 14 See T. Christensen, Origin and History of Christian Socialism 1848-1854

Aarhus:

Universitetsforlaget, 1962. 15 C. Gore (ed), Lux Mundi Murray, 1889. C. Gore, The Reconstruction of Belief (3 vols in one) Murray, 1921; Christian Moral Principles 1921; Christ and Society Allen and Unwin, 1928; Philosophy of the Good Life Murray, 1930. B.F. Westcott, Social Aspects of Christianity Mowbray, 1887; Christian Aspects of Life Macmillan, 1897; Lessons from Work Macmillan, 1901; The Incarnation and the Common Life Macmillan, 2nd ed. 1908.

12

Alan M. Suggate

the Oxford Movement had emphasised the recovery of the doctrine of the Church as the creation of God, Christ's Body, and rescued the Church of England from incipient erastianism. The second generation saved the movement from academicism by living out its insights, particularly in the slum areas of the sprawling cities, developing a strong emphasis on mission and social reform, and exposing the class reference of the Established Church. Some of these Anglo-Catholics (as they are usually called) militantly proclaimed a Christian socialism which was highly sacramental and potentially revolutionary, both in Church and state, thus going well beyond the Maurice from whom they drew. 16 Both the Liberal Catholics and the Anglo-Catholics were prone to believe that they alone were restoring to the Church an awareness of its social responsibilities. Yet in their own quite different way the Evangelicals made a huge impact on society. It is true that many were very individualistic in their understanding of the faith, stressing individual conversion and discipline. Often they lacked a well developed sense of the Church as a corporate body. Yet their manner of life and their achievements were very impressive. For example, the Clapham Sect, which included William Wilberforce, lived lives of intense prayer and holiness, and showed amazing generosity in their donations to charity. They also aimed for a "reformation of manners" throughout society, and used their own high position to shape the course of legislation in Parliament. Wilberforce is renowned for his successful campaign to abolish slavery in the British Empire. 17 Another towering figure is the Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury (180185). An "evangelical of evangelicals", as he described himself, he harnessed his faith to a revival of noblesse oblige. Like the Clapham Sect he set standards of prayer and integrity among the upper orders of society, and whilst he laid enormous stress on individual conversion and responsibility, he recognised the need for education and legislation to combat the appalling conditions of the poor. By the skilful presentation to Parliament of masses of detail on their plight he was able to secure laws to reduce the hours of work in certain industries and protect children who worked in mines and as chimney sweeps. 16 See Desmond Bowen, The Idea of the Victorian Church, pp. 285-311 Montreal: McGill University Press, 1968. 17 O n Wilberforce see R. Furneaux, Wilberforce Hamilton, 1974.

13

The Anglican Tradition of Moral Theology

H e promoted better working-class housing, better conditions for the mentally ill, and better schools and public health. Shaftesbury's theology was of a very simple biblical kind. H e abominated liberal theology, suspected catholic theology, and found social reform such as co-operatives, socialism or democracy alien to his aristocratic outlook. But his approach had most impressive results in one area of public life after another. His trenchancy cost him high political office, and he extracted the admiration of even his strongest detractors. 18

Twentieth-century

Anglicanism

In the 20th century the scene in Anglican ethics has become even more complex. The Anglican tradition has always contained multiple strands, but until this century it remained rather self-contained. Nowadays however it is impossible to pursue ethics except in a thoroughly ecumenical and international context. The vicissitudes of 20th century history - the growth of a common scientific and technological culture, the vast increase in communications, and two world wars in particular - and the struggle of the churches for greater mutual understanding and unity have opened the Anglican tradition to all manner of currents of thought in an unprecedented way. It is now more difficult than ever to classify Anglican theologians; they must each be understood as they are, and not rigidly categorised. However, it is still possible to identify differing emphases within the triple cord of Scripture, reason and tradition. These differences flow in large measure from differing evaluations of the Enlightenment and the growth of secularity. The Enlightenment laid great stress on the individual, on his freedom and autonomy, and on his capacity for generalisation through his reason. The combined effect has been to dissolve people's ties with their particular historical contexts and traditions. Religion has been a special casualty of this process, sometimes because of its oppressiveness and obscurantism, but often simply because of its particularity. Gradually, and with 18 O n Shaftesbury see Georgina Battiscombe, Shaftesbury: Earl of Shaftesbury

and B. Hammond, Lord Shaftesbury Earl of Shaftesbury Cassell, 1886.

a Biography

Constable 1974; G . F . A . Best, Shaftesbury

of the

Seventh

Batsford, 1964; J . L .

2nd ed. 1923; G . B . A . M . Finlayson, The

Methuen, 1981; E . Hodder, The Life of Lord Shaftesbury,

Seventh 3 vols

14

Alan M. Suggate

growing speed in the twentieth century, more and more areas of life have withdrawn from the tutelage of the Church, and if they have not necessarily become atheistic, at least they have been neutral on matters of religion. It is typical of the English tradition that these developments have been discussed not primarily through high-level abstract debates about freedom and rationality, but in relation to more concrete issues. There has been the long-running debate about science and religion, for example, and debates at various specific points (divorce, abortion, censorship, the age of consent) about the scope of the law in a liberal society, and especially the justification of Christians in trying to enshrine their norms in the law. Let us start with a number of positions which are in varying degrees of a liberal kind.

Varieties of liberal thought The tradition of moral theology has been developed further this century through leading exponents such as Kenneth Kirk, Bishop of Oxford, R.C. Mortimer, Bishop of Exeter, and more recently Herbert Waddams and Gordon Dunstan, Professor of Social and Moral Theology at King's College, London, a chair established in honour of F.D. Maurice, thus atoning for his expulsion in 1853. Their work exhibits the hallmarks of moral theology: concern for the human end in the vision of God and the means to its attainment; the nature of the moral act; objective and subjective aspects of morality; the virtues; moral principles and their application; the morality of actions; assistance with difficult cases; the location of moral theology in worship and the sacraments. In varying degrees they have updated the tradition. They drew encouragement from the Second Vatican Council, which promoted a fuller engagement with the contemporary world and loosened natural morality from its tight Thomist bonds to assume a more flexible character. 19 19 K.E. Kirk, Some Principles of Moral Theology Longmans Green, 1920; Conscience and its Problems Longmans Green, 1927; The Vision of God Longmans Green, 1931. R.C. Mortimer, The Elements of Moral Theology Adam and Charles Black, 1947. H. Waddams, A New Introduction to Moral Theology SCM Press, 3rd ed 1972. G.R. Dunstan, The Artifice of Ethics SCM Press, 1974; G.R. Dunstan and M.J. Seller (eds), Consent in Medicine King Edward's Hospital Fund for London, 1983;

The Anglican Tradition of Moral Theology

15

The use of the tradition of moral theology is evident in many Anglican reports, for example Putting Asunder (1966 under the chairmanship of R.C. Mortimer), which played an important role in the revision of the divorce law in England and Wales, and The Church and the Bomb (1982), which used natural morality arguments, including just war theory. Some of these reports have been criticised, especially by Anglo-Catholics and Evangelicals, for lacking theological content, either because they have offered much rational discussion without any obvious anchorage in the Christian faith, or even because their discussion is held to be a capitulation to the secular mind-set. Thus the authors of Putting Asunder have been taken to task for accommodating themselves to secular perspectives in order to ensure a hearing. 20 The Liberal Catholic position has been substantially developed, and at least in the sphere of social ethics it has been by far the most influential for most of this century. Its leading exponent was William Temple (1881-1944), successively Bishop of Manchester and Archbishop of York and Canterbury. 21 Temple was brought up in the heyday of British Hegelianism and elaborated a constructive philosophy on the assumption that the universe was fundamentally rational and that the human mind could in principle grasp it. His leading ideas were taken from the Christian faith - especially Incarnation and sacrament. It was Temple's claim that these ideas enabled one to make sense of the universe as no other ideas did. The horrors of the First World War made little impression on this optimistic philosophy. Indeed, Anglican theology generally looked on the war as an unfortunate interlude with no lasting implications for theology. The non-conformist P.T.

G.R. Dunstan and E.A. Shinebourne (eds), Doctors' Decisions: Ethical Conflicts in Medical Practice Oxford University Press, 1989. 20 Putting Asunder SPCK, 1966; The Church and the Bomb CIO, 1982. The criticism of Putting Asunder is made by Oliver O'Donovan in Resurrection and Moral Order, p. 20f. (see n.34). 21 For Temple's Christian philosophy see Mens Creatrix Macmillan, 1917; Christus Veritas Macmillan, 1924; Nature, Man and God Macmillan, 1932-4. For his Christian social ethics see Christianity and Social Order Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1942; also 'What Christians stand for in the secular world' in Religious Experience James Clarke, 1958. The main biography of Temple is F.A. Iremonger's William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury Oxford University Press, 1948. For a study of his Christian social ethics see Alan M. Suggate, William Temple and Christian Social Ethics Today Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1987.

16

Alan M. Suggate

Forsyth was almost alone among theologians in articulating a theology of the cross as a response to the war. 22 Anglicans only intensified their incarnational idealism. The dangers of Hegelianism were partially offset by the fact that Temple's philosophy was never divorced from the worship and practice of the Christian Church. Moreover, in his closing years he opened himself more and more to the thought of continental theologians (especially Emil Brunner) and of the American Protestant Reinhold Niebuhr, both directly and indirectly through the criticisms of the younger generation of Anglican theologians. Temple was an instinctive synthesiser, but he came to question the rationality of the world and the possibility of smooth continuities between faith and culture. He spoke of the need to tilt the balance away from a metaphysics of the Incarnation towards a more biblical emphasis on Redemption. Temple devoted much energy to insisting on the public role of Christianity and to refining the method of relating the faith to social order. The centrepiece was a set of social principles affirming the freedom and dignity of the individual, the social nature of human personality, and the need to pursue the common good through mutual service. These social principles were grounded not only in reason, but also in certain doctrines of the Christian faith (Creation, Incarnation, and the nature of the Church as the Body of Christ). They were used to make critiques of contemporary society and then to suggest directions in which society might be guided so that it approximated more fully to the requirements of a Christian society. Here Temple recognised the role of reason in analysing social forces and weighing the consequences of various possible forms of action. In presenting his method Temple attempted to be sensitive to ecumenical thought. He developed a stronger interest in natural law, seeking common ground with Rome, whilst feeling obliged to reject the Thomist straitjacket in which Roman moral theology was then imprisoned. He also tried hard to accommodate the insights of Reinhold Niebuhr into the nature of human beings and their political communities, which were grounded in a theology of a Lutheran type which gave much greater emphasis to the Cross. The most notable exponent of a modified Temple tradition is Ronald H. Preston, who for many years was Professor of Social and 22 P.T. Forsyth, The Justification

of God Duckworth, 1916.

The Anglican Tradition of Moral Theology

17

Pastoral Theology at Manchester University. 23 Preston trained as an economist before turning to theology, and much of his work has been concerned with how the resources of the Christian faith can be brought to bear on economic life. Whilst thoroughly conversant with the tradition of moral theology, he has been continually open to currents of thought in contemporary secular and theological worlds. His study of economics took place at the London School of Economics in the 1930s - a turbulent era and a radical place. He has critically imbibed the thought of Temple and Niebuhr, the Christian social concern of the economic historian R . H . Tawney, the social theology of the growing ecumenical movement and the World Council of Churches, and the aggiornamento of the Second Vatican Council. His work has always been firmly set within the worship and sacraments of the Christian Church, and his theology grounded in the concept of the Kingdom of God. In his engagement with a pluralistic and secular world he has sought for basic continuities between reason and revelation, whilst recognising the distinctive shape of the Christian faith. H e has always acknowledged the basic autonomy of economics (and the other first-order disciplines), whilst being well aware that economists can overstep their bounds and elevate economic theories into metaphysical dogmas. He has for instance recently tried to disentangle truth from falsehood in the debate on capitalism. H e distinguishes between two senses of the term: an economic system and an ideology. He rejects the ideology, but is willing to accept the economic system for its benefits, whilst seeking to free its practice from the cruelties which it inflicts on those who are powerless in the market place. More liberal still are a number of writers who achieved distinction in recent decades, and particularly in the 1960s, which was a period noted for its liberalism and its interest in the phenomenon of secularity. John Macquarrie, now retired from the Lady Margaret Chair of Divinity in the University of Oxford, in a succession of books has considered the challenges of current philosophical and ethical thought

23 R.H. Preston, Religion and the Persistence of Capitalism SCM Press, 1979; Explorations in Theology 9 SCM Press, 1981; Church and Society in the Late Twentieth Century SCM Press, 1983; The Future of Christian Ethics SCM Press, 1987; Religion and the Ambiguities of Capitalism SCM Press, 1991.

18

Alan M. Suggate

and tried to relate the Christian faith constructively to them. 24 John Habgood, Archbishop of York, has explored the contentious questions of the relation of science to the Christian faith and the relation of the church to the nation in a secular age.25 Peter Baelz, as a Professor of Moral and Pastoral Theology at Oxford and later Dean of Durham, sought to relate the Christian faith and ethics to the insights of various forms of art. 26 Ian T. Ramsey, as Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion at Oxford and later as Bishop of Durham until his untimely death in 1972, tried to give an account of Christian insight in terms which were responsive to logical positivism and linguistic analysis. He also sought to show how Christianity might in a modest way contribute to the discussion of contemporary ethical issues, by constituting interdisciplinary groups in which the theologian could offer a Christian perspective. This posed the question of the relation of Christian and secular morality, and Ramsey interestingly attempted a rehabilitation of the natural law tradition in a modern form. 27 Basil Mitchell, Ramsey's successor at Oxford, concerned himself especially with the role of the law in a secular society, and the relation of religious to secular morality. 28 Starting out from a famous debate between H.L.A. Hart and Lord Devlin, Mitchell explored whether the law should be concerned only with actions which harm individuals, or whether it should also be used to protect the morality and essential institutions of a society. Mitchell sought both to analyse the strands of argumentation and trace the disagreements to their origin in fundamental differences about the scope and nature of morality. Noting 24 J. Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology SCM Press, revised ed. 1977; God and Secularity Lutterworth, 1968; 3 Issues in Ethics SCM Press, 1970; In Search of Humanity SCM Press, 1982; In Search of Deity SCM Press, 1984. 25 J.S. Habgood, A Working Faith: Essays and Addresses on Science, Medicine and Ethics Darton, Longman and Todd, 1980; Church and Nation in a Secular Age Darton, Longman and Todd, 1983. Confessions of a Conservative Liberal SPCK, 1988. 26 P.R. Baelz, The Forgotten Dream Mowbray, 1975; Ethics and Belief Sheldon, 1977. 27 I.T. Ramsey, Religious Language SCM Press, 1957; Models and Mystery Oxford University Press, 1964; Christian Discourse: Some Logical Explorations Oxford University Press, 1965; Editor of Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy SCM Press, 1966; Models for Divine Activity SCM Press, 1973. 28 B.G. Mitchell, Law, Morality and Religion in a Secular Age Oxford University Press, 1967; The Justification of Religious Belief Macmillan, 1973; Morality: Religious and Secular (Gifford Lectures) Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.

The Anglican Tradition of Moral Theology

19

that both Hart and Devlin were liberals, Mitchell went on to ask what light specifically Christian conceptions might shed upon the debate, and to discuss how far they should be allowed to influence the process of law-making in a secular society. In the Gifford Lectures in the University of Glasgow in 1974-5 Mitchell, noting the moral confusion of modernity, analysed three types of secular theory: scientific humanism, which claims to discover an objective ethic in the study of humankind; romantic humanism, which identifies morality with the individual's sincere policy for living; and liberal humanism, which attempts an accommodation between the two by distinguishing basic social morality and individual ideals. Mitchell observes that secular thinkers have themselves criticised these three types on the grounds that they do not do justice to the Western ethical tradition at its best, including the demands of the conscience. Mitchell explores the concept of human needs, noting that though some are obvious, others are not and are open to divergent interpretations. They ultimately go back to varying conceptions of what people need and who they are. Christian conceptions are therefore considered, and Mitchell maintains that it is doubtful whether the intuitions of the traditional conscience can be defended in terms of an entirely secular world view. Perhaps the most drastic response to the Enlightenment is that of Don Cupitt, Dean of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, who has been so impressed with its assumptions that he has radically recast traditional Christian beliefs to meet its requirements. 29 For example, he has embraced a thoroughgoing voluntarist approach to ethics, holding that we do not discern moral values but create them for ourselves. Cupitt's position has been attacked and ruled out of court by many Christian theologians. But many of these writers of a liberal hue are also taken to task, especially by Anglo-Catholics and Evangelicals, for accommodating themselves to liberal fashions and offering only an attenuated Christian theology.

29 Don Cupitt, The Crisis of Moral Authority Lutterworth, 1972; Only Human SCM Press, 1985; The Long-legged Fly SCM Press, 1987; The New Christian Ethics SCM Press, 1988.

20

Alan M. Suggate

Anglo-Catholicism

and

Evangelicalism

The Anglo-Catholic tradition is well represented by Kenneth Leech, who finds much liberal writing insufficiently theological or radical. He has spent much of his ministry in inner London, both in Soho, where he gave pastoral and material support to hundreds of young people who had migrated from other parts of Britain and were at risk; and also in the East End, where his ministry has reached out to all kinds of disadvantaged people, including ethnic minorities subject to racial discrimination and attack. In his writings he has drawn out the essential unity of doctrine and action, prayer and politics.30 He is a noted exponent of the significance of the Christian tradition of spiritual direction and guidance for the contemporary context. In stressing the importance of personal spiritual disciplines in Christian growth, he has related these both to the Christian tradition of worship and the Eucharist, and also to the need for prophecy in the social arena, where he has been highly critical of supporters of liberal, free-market capitalism and remains committed to a form of Christian socialism. In the last 25 years there has been a remarkable flowering of evangelical ethics within the Church of England. A landmark was the National Evangelical Anglican Congress of almost 1000 delegates held at Keele in 1967.31 They robustly declared their belief in the historic faith of the Church, emphasising the trinitarian nature of the God they worshipped, the authority of the Bible, and the scriptural themes of man, sin and grace. A lengthy section of the Congress Statement dealt with the Church and the world. It opened with the words, "We believe that our evangelical doctrines have important ethical implications. But we confess to our shame that we have not thought sufficiently deeply or radically about the problems of society. We are therefore resolved to give ourselves to more study of these crucial issues in future." Christian involvement in the world entailed not only the redemption of individuals but also the reformation of society. 30 Kenneth Leech, Soul Friend Sheldon, 1977; True Prayer Sheldon, 1980; The Social God Sheldon, 1981; True God: An Exploration in Spiritual Theology Sheldon, 1985; Spirituality and Pastoral Care Sheldon, 1986: The Eye of the Storm: Spiritual Resources for the Pursuit of Justice Darton, Longman and Todd, 1992. 31 National Evangelical Anglican Congress Keele 1967, Keele '67: the Ν EAC Statement Falcon, 1967; see also N E A C Obeying Christ in a Changing World, The Nottingham Statement Falcon, 1977.

The Anglican Tradition of Moral Theology

21

Evangelical Anglicans have amply carried out that resolution. They set up a publishing house, Grove Books, which has produced a stream of pamphlets of a high standard to inform and stimulate study in the fields of ethics, doctrine, ministry and worship. They run a monthly magazine, Third Way, which has been a lively forum on Christian perspectives on society. They have set up various projects to promote informed engagement with society, such as the London Institute for Contemporary Christianity and the Shaftesbury Project. A major inspiration for this renewal has been John Stott, who was joint organiser of the Keele Congress and later Director of the London Institute. He has written books on Christian mission in the modern world and issues facing Christians today.32 Another is David Sheppard, who for many years as Bishop of Liverpool has shown an especial concern for the mission and service of the Church in an area of immense social difficulty.33 Evangelicals consistently show their determination to lay and build upon scriptural foundations for their work. On this basis they often make severe critiques of secular thought, and especially its rationalistic assumptions. Oliver O'Donovan, Regius Professor of Moral and Pastoral Theology at Oxford, has been severe with modern theologians for capitulating to the liberal mind-set, particularly to a historicist perspective which dissolves the order God has established as Creator and the uniqueness of God's action in Jesus Christ. He has offered the most thoroughgoing attempt to articulate an evangelical ethics. His Resurrection and Moral Order is subtitled 'An Outline for Evangelical Ethics'. Christian ethics for O'Donovan is evangelical not in a narrow sense, but because it arises from the gospel itself. In particular it stems from the resurrection of Jesus Christ. O'Donovan's ethics is therefore a thoroughly theological ethics, rooted in revelation. Yet the resurrection both affirms and vindicates the created order, and in renewing it, carries it forward to its ultimate goal in the redeemed universe. We do not therefore have to choose between a revealed ethic which has no connection with the created order, and an ethic simply derived from nature. O'Donovan also points to the complementarity of the objective order of reality and the subjective response of human beings to God through the Holy Spirit. This 32 J. Stott, Christian Mission in the Modern World Falcon, 1975; Issues Facing Today Basingstoke: Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 1984. 33 D. Sheppard, Bias to the Poor Hodder and Stoughton, 1983.

Christians

22

Alan M. Suggate

response entails not only specific deeds of obedience to God's will, but also an ultimate act of surrender represented by the sign of Baptism. 34

Donald MacKinnon One of the most distinguished Anglican philosophical theologians of the twentieth century was Donald MacKinnon, who held professorships at Aberdeen and Cambridge. He made it his special concern to tread the borderlands of theology and philosophy, insisting that we feel on our pulses the challenges to theology posed by the agonies and dilemmas of the world before we attempt to reply from within the faith, lest we reveal the inadequacy of our conception of the faith to meet contemporary questionings. 35 As a student at Oxford in the 1930s he had to face a double challenge: from logical positivism, then in its heyday, and from Karl Barth's theology of crisis. At the same time he maintained a lively interest in the Thomist tradition, and especially the work of Jacques Maritain. MacKinnon became convinced that logical positivism had a shallow concept of the truth: to understand the reality of the world we rather had to press against the limits of language. At the same time he recognised the dangers of metaphysics, especially of a Hegelian variety, and he had sharp criticisms to make of British Hegelians, including William Temple, on the grounds that their philosophising was far too airy and benign to match the tragic course of historical events in the 1930s. He insisted that the search for metaphysics and for inviolable human norms, desperately needed in the face of fascism, had to be pursued by a process of questioning, in and through the current crisis of morality and an ever changing social order. One must always start out from concrete individuals and communities, in a mood of warmheartedness and empathy. MacKinnon found warrant for this in Paul's anguish for the fate of his people Israel, and above all in the Cross of Christ - 'a deed of flesh and 34 Oliver O'Donovan, Principles in the Public Realm Oxford: Clarendon, 1984; Begotten or Made?

Oxford: Clarendon, 1984; Resurrection

Inter-Varsity Press, 1986; Peace and Certainty 35 Donald MacKinnon, A Study in Ethical Borderlands

Theory

in Theology

Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1987.

Leicester:

Adam and Charles Black, 1957;

in Theology Lutterworth, 1968; The Problem

University Press, 1974; Explorations Theology

and Moral Order

Oxford University Press, 1989. of Metaphysics

Cambridge

5 S C M Press, 1979; Themes

in

The Anglican Tradition of Moral Theology

23

blood' - of which the Eucharist is in turn the concrete symbol and witness. MacKinnon refused to give glib all-embracing explanations of the problem of evil, and repeatedly came back to the tragic loss of the one apostle Judas Iscariot and to the impending destruction of Jerusalem as outcomes of the ministry of Jesus. MacKinnon's own style of writing matched these preoccupations - passionate meditations rather than sequential argumentation, and he himself, in discussing T.S. Eliot, saw the poet conveying a deeper metaphysical insight than the philosopher.

Feminist ethics An important recent development in Anglican ethics is the rise of feminist perspectives. Women point out that ethics has largely been the preserve of men, and they insist that the perceptions of women must be heard. One example is over the question of work, where women generally occupy weaker positions in the labour market and are often expected to subordinate themselves to the careers of their husbands. Men have used Christian ideas of sacrifice to manipulate women into self-denying acquiescence in these roles. Women now counter by insisting on a Christian ethic which will give prominence to the flourishing of women and men. Women also complain that Enlightenment assumptions reveal a mentality which is alien to women. For example, the Enlightenment takes its stand on the rational, free, autonomous individual. A corollary is a sense of isolation from others and an adversarial, competitive attitude towards them. People warily choose to enter into contractual relationships, jealously protecting their rights and freedoms. By contrast many women wish to affirm that they become themselves only in the context of other people. Human life is centrally about the growth of relationships. Many relationships are simply not chosen we do not choose our parents or choose to have this particular child. Furthermore, relationships involve not only the intellect but also the emotions, not simply rational argument but also the warmth of love. Women therefore plead for an ethic of human relationships based on connectedness and caring. 36 36 See for example Grace M. Jantzen,'Connection or Competition: Identity and Personhood in Christian Ethics', in Feminism and Christian Ethics: Studies in Christian

24

Alan M. Suggate

Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair Maclntyre In the Anglican world the debate about the Enlightenment and liberalism has been greatly strengthened by the impact of two writers of distinction, neither of whom is Anglican. The first is Stanley Hauerwas, an American Methodist. He has drawn attention to the Christian Church as composed of communities of character who are faithfully to live by the story of God's gracious dealings with his world. This is to challenge fundamental Enlightenment assumptions. For Hauerwas denies that there is a universal religious experience independent of particular communities, or universal norms which can be formulated in some neutral language independent of a particular framework. Rationality is more a skill to be cultivated within such communities and frameworks than a universal principle. Hauerwas looks to the Church to free itself from subservience to liberal culture, and to be a distinctive community which socialises its members into coherent and comprehensive religious outlooks and forms of life, a place where the imagination of Christians can flourish, and where the character of persons and groups is transformed as they live true to their convictions. 37 The other writer is Alasdair Maclntyre, a Scotsman by birth but long resident in North America, and after much pilgrimage a Roman Catholic. In his book After Virtue he charted the fortunes of the Enlightenment, from its heady optimism about pioneering a new civilisation based on universal rational principles and liberated from the shackles of the particular traditions of the past, to its nadir in noncognitivism. In Maclntyre's view the project was never viable from the start, and the worst aspect of our predicament is that we fail to recognise this. He looks for the revival of our civilisation through a reappropriation and reconstruction of modes of thought which anteEthics, Vol. 5.1, pp. 1-20. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1992; Anne Borrowdale, A Woman's Work: Changing Christian Attitudes SPCK, 1989. 37 S. Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethics Notre Dame: Fides, 1974; Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological Ethics San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 1975; A Community of Character: Towards a Constructive Christian Social Ethic Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981; The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics SCM Press, 1984; Against the Nations: War and Survival in a Liberal Society Minneapolis, Minn.: Winston Press, 1985.

The Anglican Tradition of Moral Theology

25

date the ravages of the Enlightenment. In subsequent books Maclntyre has begun to explore this task. The influence of Hauerwas and Maclntyre is evident, for example, in the stimulating work of John Milbank, who stands within the Anglo-Catholic social tradition, and it seems certain that the issues which they raise will stimulate Anglicans for many years to come and sharpen the tensions between the different strands in the Church of England. 38

38 A. Maclntyre, After Virtue Duckworth, 1981, 2nd ed. 1985; Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Duckworth, 1988; Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry Duckworth, 1990. J o h n Milbank, Theology and Social Theory Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.

A Modern Understanding of Christian Ethics in the Perspective of its own Tradition Hans G. Ulrich

I. History and tradition of Christian ethics How should we see Christian ethics in the German-speaking context? How can we describe it for those who want to gain a real insight and not just a few thought categories, tendencies or positions or even limited problems? A presentation of Christian ethics which does not wish to be dependent upon a concept which is limited to a particular issue (e.g. an ethic related to a unified picture of reality) will have to reflect upon its own tradition. Engagement with ethical tradition becomes really urgent when it is no longer clear what the language of ethics means: what is the meaning of 'conscience' ? what is the meaning of 'commandment' ? what is the meaning of 'good works', 'responsibility', 'virtue'? It has been quite correctly said (cf. Alasdair Maclntyre 1 ) that the language of morality has become unintelligible because what it speaks of no longer has any place within a living, linguistic context. It is a matter, as Jeffrey Stout puts it, of an ethic 'after Babel' 2 . In this situation it is important that one learns the 'grammar' and distinctions of the moral language of one's own tradition. In order to learn this, we have to work through and thereby remember Christian ethics. It is not sufficient to reconstruct a history of ideas, conceptions and manuals in their context. It is necessary to look for the constructive elements of a tradition and their theological 1

Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, London: Duckworth, 1981.

2

Jeffrey Stout, Ethics after Babel: The Languages Boston, and Cambridge, James Clarke, 1988.

of Morals and Their

Disorder,

A Modern Understanding of Christian Ethics

27

logic. Tradition is never simply given: rather it is always present as remembered tradition. Some presentations of the history of Christian ethics have attempted this. One might mention Chr. Ernst Luthardt's history of ethics.3 The second volume describes the history of Christian ethics from the Reformation to Albrecht Ritschl. The presentation pursues the question of how Christian life and action, which are rooted in the renewal of humanity through God's salvific acts, might be perceived. Luthardt notes: "The powers of healing must come into this world from eternity." He continues: "Christianity has maintained itself despite all the obfuscations, sins and weaknesses of its adherents. That is the witness of history in the whole as well as in part. Here alone is the power of conversion from sin and the inner victory over the suffering of death, nowhere else . . . Justification on the basis of faith is the presupposition of morality, and justifying faith the power of morality." 4 The dangers of such an attempt are clear, i.e. the narrowing down of all aspects to a single systematic point, instead of showing the traditions in their resistance to conceptual limitations. Hence for Luthardt, the question of the justification of the sinner is prominent, whereas the incorporation of Christian ethics into the work of the Holy Spirit is barely present, and with it that aspect of the Christian ethic which does not only speak of the human capacity for the good but also of the good which is intended for human beings. Histories of ethics are in danger of remaining histories of particular problems. Influential and programmatical is Ernst Troeltsch in his book on Basic Problems of Ethics (1902) 5 . Troeltsch tries critically to appropriate the tradition when he makes evident the connection between ethics and the message of the kingdom of God, ethics and eschatology. This is however made integral to his general diagnosis that Christian ethics since the Reformation has developed no 'objective' ethic which shows how reality can be good. In opposition to this, Troeltsch presents a teleological theory of reality. Christian eschato3

Chr. Ernst Luthardt, Geschichte der christlichen Ethik, Bd. II. Geschichte der christlichen Ethik seit der Reformation [History of Christian Ethics, Vol.II: History of Christian Ethics since the Reformation], Leipzig 1893.

4

Ch. Ernst Luthardt, op.cit., 689f.

5

In: Ernst Troeltsch, Gesammelte Schriften II [Collected "Writings II], Tübingen 1913, 552-672.

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logy is interpreted correspondingly and thus subordinated to a specific problem.6 Christian eschatology as remembered and recovered by Johannes Weiß and Karl Barth cannot be fitted in with this teleological interpretation of reality. Indeed the history of ethics has repeatedly been recounted from the perspective of specific problems - a striking example is Max Weber in his book The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904/1920). Here the writing of history shares various, general ideas of the modern view of reality: e.g. by taking as themes 'the world' and 'the shaping of the world'. This is true for Luthardt just as much as for Troeltsch or Weber. For a theological treatment of the history of ethics it is important to show where the Christian tradition does not fit in with such ideas, and further, where is the point from which the history of ethics has to be perceived anew. The difference between a general history of ethics and the story to which the Christian community and its ethic belong is constitutive for Christian ethics (cf. Dietrich Ritschl7).

1. The tradition of Protestant theology in ethics We shall consider certain lines of tradition in Christian ethics as they have been pushed into prominence by Protestant theology. From here one can go further and ask how the tradition of Protestant ethics relates to the broader history of Christian ethics. Protestant ethics is not so limited as it appears in some theological conceptions, where it is perhaps reduced to the Lutheran theory of vocation or a theory of rational self-restraint. The doctrine of the Two Kingdoms, Protestant ethics as an ethic of freedom, Protestant ethics as an ethic of institutions, the ethic of the orders are further theoretical elements which 6

Cf. Hans G. Ulrich, Eschatologie und Ethik. Die theologische Theorie der Ethik in ihrer Beziehung auf die Rede von Gott seit Friedrich Schleiermacher [Eschatology and Ethics. The Theological Theory of Ethics in its Relation to Talk of God since Friedrich Schleiermacher], München 1988.

7

First of all Dietrich Ritschl developed this concept and introduced story-theology into German ethical discourse: Dietrich Ritschl, Zur Logik der Theologie. Kurze Darstellung der Zusammenhänge theologischer Grundgedanken, München 1984 (Engl.: The Logic of Theology. A brief account of the relationship between basic concepts in theology, Philadelphia 1986.)

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are developed but which also remain debated. At the same time it is apparent that particular parts of ethical theory have barely been taken up, as for example the theory of the virtues. Ethics in the tradition of Protestant theology cannot be merely a historical note in the general orientation of culture. Seeing ethics in the tradition of Protestant theology means testing ethics by the logic of this theology. Thus it will become apparent how this logic has changed in the history of ethics. Let us take one recent example. "Martin Luther, by the thoroughgoing radicality of his concept of faith, gave to modernity the sense of the subject-relatedness of all living reality, and thus unleashed in history the infinite and richly varied motif of a scrutiny of all such relationships, which enquires into the traditions of the ethical experience of reality and aims at a subjectively mediated basis for them." 8 The idea of such subject-relatedness remains one-sided as long as we neglect the fact that Protestant theology speaks of human beings as living on the basis of an alien (i.e. imputed) righteousness. Protestant theology sees people in a living and lived relationship to God which does not dissolve in human subject-relatedness and which cannot be sublimated in it. Therefore the worshipping community, the communion of the saints, as the place where the Word is heard, is inalterably bound up with the foundations of ethics. This is also true for ethics directed to the world insofar as it does not presuppose a thoroughly autonomous subject. This subject is orientated towards that which comes as gift, even when the distinction between receiving and acting is not expressly used.

2. T h e diversity of the Protestant traditions and the ecumenical profile o f ethics The Protestant tradition is transmitted in a multitude of forms. The ethics of the Lutheran and of the Reformed tradition each have their own shape. This perception entails opposing an abstract view of Christianity which all too readily shows the Christian life as a general way 8

Trutz Rendtorff, Art. 'Ethik VII. Ethik in der Neuzeit' ['Ethics VII: Ethics in Modernity'], in: Theologische Realenzyklopädie [Theological Encyclopaedia] Vol. X (481-517), 482.

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Hans G . Ulrich

of life, but not in its form as a conflict about truth. The conflict of traditions is sometimes visible in recent cases e.g. in the discussion about the foundations of a social ethic.9 The profile of Protestant ethics is bound up with this conflict. An ecumenical ethic can show the inner consistency of a Christian ethic only in the necessary coexistence of a tradition with others. The sublimation of the traditions in a general theory of Christianity tends to reduce the different issues to a supposedly common problem. An example of this tendency is the Handbook of Christian Ethics10. The systematic place of an ecumenical ethic can be sought where the theological logic of this ethic reveals itself as ecumenical. Insofar as the relationship of God to human beings determines this logic and insofar as this relation is remembered in worship, worship itself is the point of reference for an ecumenical ethic.

3. The history of Christian ethics The history of Christian ethics cannot be thought of as a literary history or the history of ideas. The history of ethics should be described as the history of an ethical practice which is bound up with the history of the Christian community. The history of the Christian community is in its turn interwoven with the various forms of life in social and political reality. A history of ethics with this totality in mind was undertaken in the major studies of Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch. Troeltsch focuses his presentation upon the question of the relationship between the Christian religion and culture. Culture is interpreted in a teleological way. The idea is directed towards the unity of culture and its permeation by the Christian religion. Here the writing of the history of ethics is confronted with new tasks. It has to elucidate the tension between tradition and the history of problems. This includes what Alasdair Maclntyre means by the remembering narrative of the moral tradition and what Dietrich Ritschl 9

Cf. the discussion in Germany: Evangelische Ethik. Diskussionsbeiträge zu ihrer Grundlegung und ihren Aufgaben [Protestant Ethics: Essays on its Foundations and Tasks], introduced and edited by Hans G . Ulrich, München 1990, 146-244.

10 Handbuch der christlichen Ethik [Handbook of Christian Ethics], ed. Anselm Hertz, Wilhelm Korff, Trutz Rendtorff, Hermann Ringeling, Vols. 1-3, Freiburg, Basel, Wien 1978-1982.

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said about the story in which believers stand. 11 That which should be remembered is the tradition of an ethical practice, even if no history of Christianity can be developed from this. It is a history of the Christian communities and a history of Christians who demonstrate their witness to the gospel in all its brokenness. This involves the history of ethics showing how Christian life and action are related to preaching. H o w has Christianity been preached ethically?

II. Main issues in the task and understanding of ethics in its history 1. T h e place of P r o t e s t a n t ethics Protestant ethics has to be described as the practice of those who live from the Word of God and stand within the story of that living. Ethics as a manifold praxis within the Christian community must not be limited in what it is responsible for and in what it says to the community. But the Christian community as the place where God's word is heard and borne witness to, this is the central point of reference for Christian ethics. This has been demonstrated in recent history by Dietrich Bonhoeffer in a remarkable way. "The church is the place where people attest and take seriously the fact that God has reconciled the world to himself in Christ." 1 2 In this way ethics remains related to the community. The community is not simply one of common convictions but a community of those who live from God and can be recognised as such. They are those whose life is visibly a life with God. It is the communio sanctorum. Thus ethics does not assume a given moral subject, but the subjects of ethical action are seen as those who are daily 11 Dietrich Ritschl, 'From the Story to Action', in: The Logic of Theology, 239-251. 12 Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Ethik, München 1975, 215. Cf. on Bonhoeffer: Wolfgang Huber, 'Wahrheit und Existenzform. Anregungen zu einer Theorie der Kirche bei Dietrich Bonhoeffer' ['Truth and the Form of Existence: Suggestions for a Theory of the Church in Dietrich Bonhoeffer'], in: Folgen christlicher Freiheit. Ethik und Theorie der Kirche im Horizont der Barmer theologischen Erklärung [Consequences of Christian Freedom: Ethics and the Theory of the Church in the Light of the Barmen Theological Declaration], Neukirchen-Vluyn 1983, 169-204. cf. Oswald Bayer, Aus Glauben leben. Uber Rechtfertigung und Heiligung [Living by Faith. On Justification and Sanctification].

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dependent upon God's action. These are the saints. Christian ethics has in this sense spoken of sanctification. It preserves the criticism of the idea of an original moral state of which humanity could assure itself. (1) In accordance with this, Christian ethics has its place in the sermon as paraenesis - as remembering exhortation. The relation of Christian ethics to the paraenesis preserves it from the temptation to produce morality by rhetorical means. Thus it remains clear that ethics is not just concerned with the justification of action and conduct but includes remembering the nature of life with God. (2) Ethics stands also in relation to the practice of confession and repentance. Ethical responsibility cannot remove guilt because it can only live on the basis of God's forgiveness and rely on his promised forgiveness. Forgiveness can only come from God's assurance; that is the point of confession. The necessary criticism of the practice of confession and repentance in Protestant theology did not in any way imply its repression or rejection. Nonetheless, with the loss of the true meaning of confession it became difficult for Protestant ethics to retain the connection between guilt, forgiveness and freedom in its system of thought. How is release from guilt linked with the justification of action? What is the distinction between 'justification by faith' and ethical justification? (3) The insight of Protestant theology was that the Christian performs his service of God in every daily activity. It is there that he fulfils his vocation. But this did not carry with it replacing the connection with the worship of God by other institutions for the teaching and exercise of Christian morality. Given this relationship to the worship of God it is clear why Christian morality does not live off its own resources. The question 'Why be moral?' does not relate to the human constitution and moral learning alone, but also to the disposition of this learning, which is connected to worship and to the history of God's dealings with human beings which is remembered there. (4) The remembering of the place of Christian ethics involves a conflict with a secular ethic. This issue and the associated change in theological reflection upon it (the doctrine of the Two Kingdoms) arises only when 'Christian' freedom has changed its meaning. The freedom of a Christian is in the tradition of Protestant theology the freedom of a person who lives out of the daily grace of God - out of God's righteousness.

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Worship is the place where God's Word can be heard. It is the place where God as the Creator is working and where God rules the hearts of believers. This identification of the place of ethics relieves the Christian from having to define its place somewhere else. From this vantage point the Christian is free to turn to the world. The Christian does not live on the world's terms, but stands over against it and considers the world from a practical point of view. This presupposes freedom from works. The Christian is the free lord of all things, said Luther. This means that he knows the basis of his life is dependent upon nothing in the world. In it he is free and stands freely over against the world. The 'world' is seen from the perspective of redemption: God has reconciled the world to himself in Christ and that means the whole sphere of creation. That means also that human beings are not responsible for the whole world nor are they required to shape it in its totality. The question of the relationship of the Christian ethos to the world remains a central question of Christian ethics. From the perspective of the tradition of Protestant theology we can firmly say that this question cannot be answered without reference to the Christian community. To this community it is said of the world: "Adapt yourselves no longer to the pattern of this present world" (Rom. 12,2). The worldly side of the Christian community is distinguished from the spiritual by the fact that God rules in different ways in the world and in the Christian community. The world too is ruled by God, but it is not yet a world which has been transformed to its core by God. In the community however God rules people's hearts. The modern treatment of the issue differs in the sense that it refers to humanity or a general subject, from which it then tries to maintain that it is in communion with God. It is then unclear how human beings exercising their far reaching responsibilities live from God's gracious action. The doctrine of the Two Kingdoms has reflected upon and handed on the task of ethical praxis in relation to the world and the Christian community. The history of Christian ethics in its dramatic sweep can be read off from the changes in the doctrine of the Two Kingdoms. A decisive change occurs where there is a slackening of the distinction within the action of God which is reflected in the Two Kingdoms doctrine. Other tendencies take its place and change the task of ethics radically, e.g. the question of a Christendom which forms and em-

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braces the whole world, where the eschatological distinction between the Christian community and the world is no longer constitutive.

2. G o d ' s W o r d and ethics - Scripture and ethics Christian ethics sees itself not just as an ethic which reflects the level of consciousness in the Christian way of life. Ethics in the tradition of Protestant theology has always thought of itself as bound to listen again and again to the Word of God in Law and Gospel. This reference to the Word of God not merely serves particular goals of ethical justification but reflects the need for renewal in the relation of human beings to God. (1) The faith which comes from the hearing of the Word is prior to works and is distinguished from works. This faith which comes from hearing is the source of good works. Faith must always be awakened afresh. It lives from the Word. In this way God's word remains in its 'otherness' vis-à-vis the Christian life. The unity of Person and works does not remove the salutary otherness of the Word. This could imply, let us say, that the Christian has so to speak to internalise the command of God. However, Protestant ethics derives its form and its logic from the fact that it reckons with the creative action of God through his Word. This points to worship as the constitutive place where the Christian learns to live ethically and grows in Christian character 13 . Here the 'second use' of the Law has its place (usus elenchticus, usus paedagogicus): the preaching of the Word of God which as Law conveys the knowledge of sin. Through this, ethics is preserved from relying upon humanity which must not and cannot be renewed unaided but must be perfect or must perfect itself. (2) Christian ethics does not limit itself to the problems of the justification of action but unfolds the Christian life as a whole. The Christian life is a life in correspondence with Christian faith and in the form and shape of what is required by God. Hence it can be remembered in the form of admonition. In this respect too Christian ethics remains an explication of the Divine Word. Thus the 'third use' 13 Cf. Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic, Notre Dame, 1981.

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of the Law {usus in renatis) is controversial. It must remain clear that in the commandment the healing will of God encounters us, transcending anything which human beings can do. 14 God's command in this way also performs the function of consolation, because it meets the human being as the particular, saving will of God and not in an overwhelming demand, 15 and because the human being does not need to produce it from his own consciousness. (3) Whether the explication of the divine Word actually determines the practice of Christian ethics or whether it simply functions as occasion requires within various ethical approaches depends upon the general task of ethics. The boundary is marked where Christian ethics relates to a Christian consciousness which no longer stands in need of consolation from the Word of God. O f course, the expression of this hermeneutical relation to the Word of God can go in different directions. The history of ethics as biblical ethics shows that it all depends on how ethics relates to God's action. Otherwise we have the problem of ethical guidance which merely uses biblical statements to justify human action. In the recent history of theological ethics this problem has obviously come to the fore without adequate discussion of its presuppositions. For example in the Church Dogmatics of Karl Barth ethics as the explication of the Divine command is only possible on the presupposition that Scripture is a witness to the presence and reality of God which includes human life and action. Here the paraenetic form of biblical ethics must remain clear, and the paraenetic and the descriptive forms of ethics work together.

3. Dogmatics and ethics The understanding of ethics is always determined by the distinction between dogmatics and ethics. This goes back to the practical division 14 It has to be observed that God himself is the subject of 'usus'. 15 Cf. Michael Welker's interpretations of the law: 'Erwartungssicherheit und Freiheit. Zur Neuformulierung der Lehre von Gesetz und Evangelium', ['Sure Expectation and Freedom: Towards a N e w Formulation of the Doctrine of Law and Gospel'] in: Evangelische

Kommentare

[Protestant Commentaries]

18 (1985), 6 8 0 - 6 8 3 ; 19 (1986),

39-42; 'Gesetz und Geist' ['Law and Spirit'], in: Jahrbuch [Yearbook

of Biblical Theology],

für Biblische

Neukirchen 1989, 215-230.

Theologie

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of labour between ethics and dogmatics in Protestant theology. With this problem however is also connected the definition of the task of theology itself. (1) The ethics of Protestant theology moves within the framework of the knowledge of God's reality and presence, which dogmatic theology unfolds. The subject of theology is the economy of God, and this includes ethics, the unfolding of Christian life and action. The theology of universal salvation - 'economic' theology (oikonomia) is articulated in an explication of the divine Word. It reflects on the history of God's dealings with human beings as it is witnessed to in Scripture. In this respect it follows God's economy. Other conceptions of dogmatic theology, for example those which link it to a particular doctrine which is not evidently an explication of the divine Word, should be distinguished from this. In Protestant theology ethics is just as fundamental as dogmatic theology (economic theology). Ethics follows in its articulation God's creative and saving action and unfolds its story in its logic. It considers human action, which is seen in relation to the action of God. It does not refer back to dogmatic statements as if it were secondary and had to justify human behaviour. If in ethics 'good works' are spoken of, that is at the same time to speak of God who created these good works. It is in this way that ethics is related to God's salvific action to his economy and not to this or that dogmatic content. The distinction between dogmatics and ethics within their unity is not based upon the fact that dogmatic theology has divine action and ethics has human action as its subject. That would be to deny the equally fundamental task of both. Rather the distinction is based upon the fact that dogmatics unfolds the reality and presence of God which reaches further than ethical perception and knowledge. Ethics unfold what is right and good for human beings in response to their recognition of obligation. Dogmatic theology speaks of the reality of God - of the economy of God - which is not simply present as a vague and open horizon but as the reality from which the human being lives. Thus the distinction between dogmatics and ethics has to reckon with the necessity of demonstrating a well thought out modern ethics in its dialectic. How far this does not just recognise the conditions of modernity but also changes them, has still to be shown. (2) In relation to this problem - and in relation to other problems which are partly of secondary significance - the relationship between

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dogmatics and ethics has been perceived very diversely in the course of history and remains much disputed. Here one needs a presentation of the history of the issues. Furthermore, one must see the whole spectrum of what makes up 'modern identity', even in its brokenness. In the perspective of cultural history this is much more evident than is the case in many historical discussions by theologians. In Troeltsch's description we have the issue of an autonomous ethic, which does not move in the shadow of a dogmatics, which like metaphysics presents a reality which is not in every respect mediated along with historical reality. Ethics is to replace metaphysics. This attitude however belongs to the history of the problems of metaphysics and its replacement by practical philosophy. The problem with this criticism is that it fails to distinguish between the dogmatic form of doctrine and the theological task with which economic theology is connected. (3) Two models of theology? The presentation of the problem by Troeltsch has been seized upon in contemporary discussion. Even the interpretation of Schleiermacher and Barth has been fitted into this mould. Trutz Rendtorff has made the claim that an essential change in the understanding of theology has taken place - one form of theology, the dogmatic form, has been replaced by an other: the ethical. Thus it is no longer possible to speak of two tasks of theology; rather according Trutz Rendtorff we should speak of two models of theology. "In systematic theology 'ethics' then is the title for the orientation of theology to the conditions of modernity, dogmatics is the title for the adherence or return to a premodern model of theology." 16 Ethics is "theology which is particularly interested in present-day Christianity". 17 This 'ethical theology' has the task of understanding the reality of life theologically in so far as Christian faith 'realises' itself in its own freedom as it accepts reality and lives responsibly. Ethics is thus the enhanced form of theology. This programme is based upon the presupposition that God and humankind are connected in one ethical subject 16 Trutz Rendtorff, Ethik: Grundelemente, Methodologie und Konkretionen einer ethischen Theologie [Ethics: Foundations, Methodology and Substance of an Ethical Theology], Vol.1, Stuttgart 1990, 2nd ed. 43f. 17 Op.cit., 44.

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and that reality, through which this subject is mediated (its world), can be understood in its ethical and theological sense. Corresponding to this Christian consciousness, in which God and humankind are united, there is a particular view of a meaningful world and in this sense a teleological world-view. This is profoundly linked to Schleiermacher's definition of Christianity. The real change however is not properly characterised as the supersession of dogmatics by ethics. In fact it is the supersession of economic theology by a theological teleology. In the two models of theology the relation of God and world, God and humankind are discussed differently. In the ethical theology one is concerned with an integrating vision of an all encompassing reality. This would have to be discussed as a thoroughly problematic element of the modern consciousness. The programme of an ethical theology is guided by a limited issue. It is a matter of the recovery of a teleological world-view. This was stipulated by Troeltsch as the task of ethics: "Once again ethics is the principal and superior science: no longer as subjective morality in the narrow sense but as the doctrine of the final and determining goals of action." 18 One has to ask why ethics has to be linked to the history of this issue. Clearly it promises to validate a living reality which copes with pluralities and safeguards the social life of human beings. In the conduct of one's life it is important to live in accordance with this reality. Ethics is the theory of the conduct of life which corresponds to this. A confrontation with this part of the history of an issue will have to take us beyond a criticism of the teleological world-view. It is linked with the equally broken history of Christian eschatology and its Utopian elements. It is at this point that the problem of contemporary ethics today has arisen. 19

18 Ernst Troeltsch, 'Grundprobleme der Ethik' ['Basic Problems of Ethics'], in: Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II. Zur religiösen Lage, Religionsphilosophie und Ethik [Collected Writings, Vol. II On the Religious Siutation, Religious Philosophy and Ethics], Tübingen 1913 (552-672), 566. 19 For further discussion cf.: Hans G. Ulrich, Eschatologie und Ethik. Die theologische Theorie der Ethik in ihrer Beziehung auf die Rede von Gott seit Friedrich Schleiermacher, München 1988.

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(4) Final remarks about the relationship between dogmatics and ethics The discussion up to this point about the relationship between dogmatics and ethics leads back to the question what the task of theology is and whether this task can really be safeguarded by using the distinction of dogmatics and ethics or not. That means that dogmatics cannot be used for particular elements of ethical theory (e.g. for reflection about moral certainty or about confidence in action). In dogmatics it is rather the general conception of life which is unfolded, which is the context of human action and inaction. The decisive question is how far this is usable for a 'material' ethic. This is the very reason for seeing worship and ethics in an immediate relation to each other: 'worship' as the place where the totality of divine action encounters human life. As an example one might take the ethics of human work. Human work is tied up with the gift of the Sabbath and the Word, through which human beings participate in God's creative activity.

4. Ethical accountability: the task of ethics That there is an explicit ethical responsibility within Christian faith has been justified in many different ways in the tradition. Is ethical accountability a form of Christian freedom, is it the exposition of its responsibility, or is it justified in some other way? Is not ethical responsibility rather an illuminating witness to the Christian life?

(1) Ethical accountability as the place of humankind in God's rule Protestant theology described the ethical existence of the Christian in a new way. The decisive feature now was that a particular way of life was seen as the proper mode and test of the Christian. It is not that the subject of ethics is a form distinguished from everyday life, rather Christian ethics is related to the Christian form of life which has its own characteristics. Ethics gives a witness to this Christian way of life, just as this form of life is itself a communication with the world.

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Christian ethics encompasses the form of life which carries God's promise and in which a Christian can lead a life which serves his neighbour and serves God in his glory. The form of life is the very place where God's spiritual rule is effective in a way which influences the world. The characteristics of the Christian way of life are contained in God's command. This command carries with it the promise that the form of life which corresponds to the command preserves human life in its coexistence with God. These basic principles of Protestant ethics are developed further in the ethic of the 'institutions', albeit with different emphasis (consider for example the different interpretations of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ernst Wolf and recently Wolfgang Huber 2 0 ). Ernst Wolf defines it thus: "Institutions are social structures of the created world which are God's invitations to orderly and constructive action in the freedom of faithful obedience to his command." 2 1

(2) Accountability for good deeds Reformation ethics was an ethics of the Christian form of life. It was not a universal ethic of behaviour and action on a Christian basis. Nevertheless the Christian life takes place in the 'everyday'. With the freedom from works which is bestowed in faith, life and action is in the service of the neighbour. Christian freedom consists in this particular form of action. In order that the Christian can be claimed in this way by God, he must be free of other claims. Hence it is a freedom from works which is at the same time a freedom for good works. "Freedom from works" means freedom from a claim which holds one in thrall and makes one unavailable for God and neighbour. Conversely the Christian in his availability for the neighbour is free from being used or misused for other purposes.

20 Wolfgang Huber, 'Freiheit und Institution. Sozialethik als Ethik kommunikativer Freiheit' ['Freedom and Institutions: Social Ethics as an Ethics of Communicative Freedom'], in: Evangelische Ethik [Protestant Ethics], introduced and edited by Hans G. Ulrich, München 1990, 230-244. 21 Ernst Wolf, Sozialethik. Theologische Grundfragen Issues], Göttingen 1975, 173.

[Social Ethics: Basic Theological

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41

(3) Ethical accountability and responsibility for the world The task of ethics changes where the question concerning a general 'forming of the world' or 'responsibility for the world' is prominent. One does not just have to think about good works within the world; one has to be responsible to a 'world'. At this point the conceptual lines of traditional Protestant ethics diverge. For Christian ethics to take the 'world' as a subject of discussion creates a problem. It cannot reduce itself to the presentation of the 'vita Christiana . But this remains controversial. The task was to see ethics in relation to the Christian life and yet at the same time not exclude a responsibility for the life of the world in all dimensions. The theme of 'life-world' {Lebenswelt) in its totality has been further developed. It has raised the question concerning a 'Christian world' and the question concerning a positive progressive development of the human 'world'. The doctrine of the 'Two Kingdoms' has set limits to the exploration of this theme. We repeatedly find attempts in ethical theory to consider the relationship between a particular ethic of the Christian life and the whole life-world. It is crucial here that Christian ethics does not just provide justifications or advice for Christian life but is orientated toward a particular form of life. In this respect too we should speak of a 'world'. This was part of the intention of the doctrine of the Two Kingdoms. Where this task is neglected, ethics loses its objective accountability. It might then be tempted to relate itself to other realities e.g. a historically given Christian morality or a particular Christian consciousness.

(4) The issue of the ethical task Ethical accountability in a specific form is demanded by the idea of a Christian form of life and good works. The question 'What should I do?' does not mean 'What should I do in general?'. The ethical question is rather: 'What should be done in the living context of the divine command with respect to the needs of the neighbour?' The command is not the definitive answer to the ethical question but is the broad remembering of life with G o d . Protestant theology has located the systematic place of ethics in freedom from works. This means that ethical accountability is not just a sign of the autonomy of humankind

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but the practice of attention to the needs of the neighbour. This ethical accountability is thus also the practice of attention to God's will. The definition of the ethical task is first and foremost to be derived from the concept of freedom, which has undergone dramatic changes.

III. The history of ethics as a history of problems The history of Christian ethics is an integral part of cultural history, the history of piety and the history of theology and many other contexts. The history of Christian ethics has repeatedly had to tackle an issue from a quite new starting point which has changed the prevalent way in which the questions are put. A perception of the history of ethics as a history of problems has to be aware of these points which have determined the profile of Christian ethics. This history of problems however should not just be seen as the history of a continual transformation of Christian traditions but also as the rejection of such lines of tradition. The history of problems in ethics is also marked not least by modernity. The modern development of ethics has been greatly stimulated by dominant modern ways of posing problems. With the construction of the 'modern identity'22 the basic and the concrete themes of 'ethics' have changed. This includes the programmatic question about the nature and definition of human existence (the conditio humana in this sense23) and the theme of accountability for the world.

1. Conditio humana (1) A characteristic of a 'modern' ethic is its acknowledgement that human beings are responsible for their own existence. The question 22 See Charles Taylor, The Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Cambridge, Mass. 1989.

Identity,

23 See for the distinction between 'nature of man' and 'conditio humana': Hannah Arendt, Vita activa oder Vom tätigen Leben [Vita Activa or the Active Life], München 1960, 14-18. See also: Hans G. Ulrich, Anthropologie und Ethik hei Friedrich Nietzsche. Interpretationen zu Grundproblemen theologischer Ethik [Anthropology and Ethics in Friedrich Nietzsche: Interpretations in the Basic Problems of Theological Ethics], München 1975.

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43

'What shall we do?' is oriented not just to action but also to the definition of human beings. Gerhard Ebeling says about the history of ethics, "Even a neutral analysis of ethical problems would confirm that at its heart it contains the question 'What is man?' and thus one way or another is founded upon a particular worldview and shares in its controversial nature." 24 For the more recent history of ethics it is crucial how far it is inferred from the fact human beings are fully accountable for their existence, that it depends upon them alone to what extent their humanity can be realised. This distinction between criteria of humanity which guide the ethical judgements, and the realisation of humanity is a problem which to this day requires clarification. 25 (2) A further characteristic of modern ethics is that it allots to humanity a responsibility which it has to carry alone. The person, it is said, is called to autonomy. This can also be interpreted in the sense that the 'autonomous' person is left alone, so that he is thrown back on himself. The question of how humanity can be on its own, even when there is also talk of a responsibility before God as the supreme judge, remains unresolved. The self-enclosed nature of humanity and the responsibility of humanity lie in an unclear relationship. With regard to these issues Christian ethics has to consider how it has come to contradict its own tradition. In this way it has become aware of the contradiction between self-realisation and 'freedom from works', and can begin the attempt to solve this contradiction.

2. Everyday life - affirmation o f ordinary life Protestant theology gave up the distinction between everyday life and a particular ascetical 'holy' way of life. Everyday life becomes the place 24 Gerhard Ebeling, 'Die Evidenz des Ethischen und die Theologie' ['The Evidence of the Ethical and Theology'], in Wort und Glaube [Word and Faith] Vol. II, Tübingen 1969 (1-41), 9f. 25 See Gerhard Sauter, 'Mensch sein - Mensch bleiben. Anthropologie als theologische Aufgabe' ['To be Human, to Remain Human: Anthropology as a Theological Task'], in: Anthropologie als Thema der Theologie [Anthropology as a Theme in Theology] (ed. Hermann Fischer), Göttingen 1977, 71-118; Hans G. Ulrich, Anthropologie und Ethik bei Friedrich Nietzsche. Interpretationen zu Grundproblemen theologischer Ethik, München 1975.

44

Hans G. Ulrich

of worship and sanctification. This implies that the Christian form of life has a claim on the whole of life. What to do in the world is the genuine task of Christians. They are called to it. The very concept 'vocation' confirms it (Beruf). In connection with this characteristic there are different problems which ethics has to consider. One of them is the question how far the demand of the divine commands is equated with the requirements of everyday life, and the good simply merged into the everyday. Furthermore the problem arose whether the world must become a Christian world. The theological conceptions of the ethics of the 20th century are mainly concerned with the place and task of ethics in relation to a world which is not Christian. For this non-Christian world, moreover, the good life is entirely mediated with everyday life.

3. Christian world and the 'responsibility for the w o r l d ' (1) The questions concerning the secularity of the Christian form of living in Reformation theology are different from those of later theology. The ethic of the Christian life appears not to be adequate where 'world' is considered as a coherent total living web of relations. This perspective gains new meaning in the modern world. It is conditioned by the question of what holds the world together and how - through ethics - integration can be found. A solution can be found in a teleological world view in which 'world' is seen from the perspective not of the other coming world but of its immanent all-embracing character. The fact that Schleiermacher conceives of ethics as the representation of 'Christian morality' is tied up to presuppositions which previous ages did not share.26 We similarly find a synoptic vision of the world in an intellectual system in which alongside 'Christian morality' there is located a philosophical ethic which mirrors the whole of reality. This is a specific presupposition which determines the history 26 Cf. Martin Honecker, 'Nachwort' ['Postscript'] zu: Schleiermacher: Christliche Sittenlehre. Einleitung [Schleiermacher's Christian Morality. An Introduction], ed. Hermann Peiter, Stuttgart et al. 1983, 125-149. Ellert Herms, 'Reich Gottes und menschliches Handeln' ['The Kingdom of God and Human Action'], in: Friedrich Schleiermacher 1768-1834. Theologe - Philosoph - Pädagoge [Friedrich Schleiermacher 1768-1834, Theologian, Philosopher, Teacher], ed. D. Lange, Göttingen 1985, 163-192.

A Modern Understanding of Christian Ethics

45

of ethics and its issues. In this it is claimed that ethics, and thus also Christian ethics, has the task of mirroring a whole world, a life-world, and not just the task of presenting the good life of Christians and their political task for the whole community. The conviction that 'ethics' should reflect a 'world' and is not simply related to the political context leads to the question of a 'Christian world' and the connection between ethics and the history of Christendom. In his historical survey Trutz Rendtorff has characterised as the sole task of ethics its development "as the preservation and renewal of a supra-individual structure of responsibility". 27 Melanchthon renewed this line of tradition, which is close to the Aristotelian ethic, for Christian ethics. The crucial question here is what this 'objective ethic' presents and from which perspective it will be seen. This can only be clarified if one is not wedded to the presupposition that ethics should mirror a 'world' or has to construct it. (2) Another path is that taken by the tradition of 'objective ethics' which tries to grasp the reality which God has given to humankind in terms of 'orders', 'institutions' or 'mandates'. This path of Christian ethics has become important in the 20th century as an approach to an ethics of human reality which is not to be identified with the states of affairs which have arisen historically or with a world which is achievable through progressive development. O f course, the ethic of the orders has in this respect been ambivalent and its place in the history of problems has been often distorted. (3) Bonhoeffer considers an ethic of the Christian life from another perspective. Here the character of the Christian ethic as witness is particularly important and hence changes ethics. Here ethics is determined by the problem of the relationship of the Christian to the world. It remains crucial that this problem is not solved theoretically (e.g. by means of a theory of secularisation) but persists in the task of witnessing. It remains a mark of the Christian in the world.

27 Trutz Rendtorff, Art. 'Ethik VII: Ethik der Neuzeit', in: Theologische klopädie X (481-517), 482.

Realenzy-

46

Hans G . Ulrich

4. N a t u r a l l a w - ethic of (natural) evidence and verification The history of Christian ethics has been shaped by extremely varied and partly conflicting ways of dealing with the theme of natural law. Linked to this are various notions of certitude in ethical judgements. (1) One way is the certitude that there are no persons who fall outside the scope of God's will. Discussion of natural law tries to articulate the universality of the divine command. For Protestant ethics it was crucial that natural law is contained within the command of God's word in revelation. (2) We find another meaning for natural law when it is supposed to convey ethical instruction independent of God's command. That presupposes the distinction between the transmitted command and natural law. Natural law serves the universal understanding of reality. One must further distinguish this use of natural law from orientation according to the nature of humankind (secundum naturarti hominis). Bound up with this orientation according to the nature of humankind we find the identification of natural law and the law of human reason. Ethical certitude is thus the task of an autonomous human reason. 28 This way of thinking points to a number of issues which gain their peculiar shape in modern identity. As a medium of understanding reality natural law is dependent upon cultural and intellectual developments. Natural law is then moved into the ambit of the natural sciences. Ethical certitude is associated with the theoretical scientific knowledge of nature. The different treatments of natural law have so far received barely any critical attention. 29 Such an attempt would have to show that the relation of ethical accountability to natural law has the aim of doing justice to the relationship of 'ought' to 'is'. From this perspective theological ethics faces further questions of how far it can be guided by the difference between 'ought' and 'is' at all. (3) James M. Gustafson has recently attempted a general revision of ethics in that he believes that there has been a one-sided concentration in ethics upon human utility and human needs and wants. He thinks 28 C f . Ludger Honnefelder, 'Die ethische Rationalität der Neuzeit' ['Ethical Rationality in Modernity'], in: Handbuch der christlichen Ethik, Vol.1, 19-45. 2 9 C f . f o r Ernst Troeltsch's conception of natural law: Klaus Tanner, Der lange Schatten des Naturrechts. Eine fundamentalethische Untersuchung [The Long Shadow of Natural Law. A Fundamental Ethical Investigation], Stuttgart 1993.

A Modern Understanding of Christian Ethics

47

that a theocentric ethic is necessary as a corrective. 30 It has the task of showing how the life and action of human beings fits into a divinely created world. The understanding of this world is also the function of the modern disciplines. Ethics has the specific task of harmonising anew scientific knowledge of the world and ethical foundations. It is important to observe that ethics cannot remain limited to the foundations of human action and its goals. Admittedly the point where theological reflection is to engage remains open. Is it a new approach to a theology of nature? Or is it a universal theological theory of reality? Is it the rediscovery of a Christian wisdom? The difficulties in orientation lie in the fact that dogmatic theology is not expected to employ its own critical power. The foundations are developed independently.

5. The foundations of ethical accountability (moral sources) (1) The faith from which works spring comes from hearing the Word of God. This belongs to the basis of a theological ethic. In faith the individual breaks out of his solipsistic isolation. Further, faith is always mediated along with the Christian life. Faith does not have its impact upon our way of life merely at a secondary level. Thus we may say that Christian ethics cannot base itself either upon existing Christian morality or upon a transmoral conscience which could stand on its own. Christian ethics cannot be grounded either in convention or transcendentally. It cannot articulate the problem of 'foundation' in this foundationalist manner. (2) For Christian ethics there are various problems concerning its foundations, in view of the changes in the relationship between dogmatic theology and ethics, given the recognition of the historical mediation of Christianity (Schleiermacher, Hegel), and given the radicalisation of the criticism of the theory of knowledge (Kant, Nietzsche). Ethics must develop and justify itself as a critique of personal and social morality. It cannot retreat to a radical standpoint of (personal) morality; at the same time it cannot avoid the question of the basis of social morality, the issue of 'Why be moral?' The changes 30 James M. Gustafson, Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective, Vol. I: Theology and Ethics, Chicago 1981; Vol. II: Ethics and Theology, Chicago 1984.

48

Hans G. Ulrich

in ethical theory include the question of the source of morality. This is true of the discussion of 'religion' as a source, and generally it is also true of the question of the constitution of the moral subject. It is repeatedly a question which arises from Kant's philosophy, e.g. in the ethical theory of Wilhelm Herrmann. (3) Along with the question of the constitution of morality there arises explicitly the question of what ethical accountability is and how ethical judgement is possible. Work upon a theory of ethical accountability develops in a fundamental as well as in a methodological aspect. On the one (the fundamental) side, ethics reflects upon the problem of its legitimation and lets its conceptions be determined by it. On the other side ethics begins to reflect upon its own methodological problems and to discuss theories about ethical judgment. In this way ethics reveals itself not merely in its connection with the contexts of its tradition but presents itself in the openness of the intellectual community to the construction of theories.

(4) Crisis of morality For Christian ethics, furthermore, there has arisen the central problem of how far there still exists a morality at all to which ethical accountability can be related. Nevertheless Hegel's idea of the development of a homogeneous moral world has not been abandoned. Blueprints for a 'Christian world' continue this tradition. (This is true e.g. for Albrecht Ritschl, Ernst Troeltsch or Trutz Rendtorff and many others.) In contrast to these blueprints the claim that there is a 'crisis of morality' has shaped ethics since the end of the 19th century. The discussion of this crisis has led to various attempts at renewal, which partly include the blueprints above.

(5) The 'evidence of the ethical' and the 'crisis of morality' For theological ethics (in its Protestant form) it seems tempting to see morality as mediated along with the given reality of everyday life. In this way one can speak of 'the evidence of the ethical' without giving too much weight to any particular moral consciousness. The treatment of the 'evidence' of the ethical starts from various issues. For the most

49

A Modern Understanding of Christian Ethics

part at least it is tied up with (as with the work of Hans Jonas 3 1 ) not allowing assent to ethical demands to be dependent upon particular intellectual or cultural conditions. Gerhard Ebeling's reference to the 'evidence of the ethical' 32 starts from the claim that ethics cannot be justified from a context of religious conviction but rather that faith can be understood from ethical reflection on everyday experience. 'Ethics' has thus a hermeneutic function for the mediation of faith.

(6) Minima moralia The perception of ethics in the 20th century has been largely governed by the attempt to see actual morality in a critical light. Thus it is said that morality has to be rediscovered as 'minima moralia'33 and that means morality in all its contradictions and defects. The recourse to the minima moralia means avoiding abstract enquiry in moral consciousness and understanding it rather in its particular given expression. Correspondingly, ethical justification is understood as the best possible account of what guides life and behaviour. This account cannot rest upon anything which lies beyond the articulated justification. It is not the abstract certainty of a moral insight but the clear articulation which provides this accountability. With this articulation ethics reveals its capability as well as its need of justification.

31 Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip

Verantwortung.

Versuch einer Ethik für die

Zivilisation [The Principle of Responsibility: Civilization],

technologische

a Proposal for an Ethics for

Technological

Frankfurt 1979.

32 Gerhard Ebeling, 'Die Evidenz des Ethischen und die Theologie', in: Wort Glaube

II, Tübingen 1969, 42-55. See the critique of Oswald Bayer,

(Handbuch Theology,

Systematischer

Theologie

Bd.l)

[Theology

(Handbook

of

und

Theologie Systematic

Vol. / ] , Gütersloh 1994, 4 5 6 - 4 5 8 ; and: Bayer, 'Die Gegenwart der Güte

Gottes. Zum Verhältnis von Gotteslehre und Ethik' ['The Presence of the G o o d ness of God. The Relation of the Doctrine of God and Ethics'], in: Oswald Bayer, Leibliches

Wort [Bodily Word], Tübingen 1992 (314-333), 324-327.

33 Theodor W . Adorno, Minima [Minima

Moralia.

Reflexionen

Moralia. Reflections from Damaged

aus dem beschädigten

Life] (1951), Frankfurt 1964.

Leben

50

Hans G. Ulrich

6. The discussion of 'social ethics' Ethics in the tradition of Protestant theology has always understood itself as social ethics.34 It has adduced the fact that the Christian lives in binding relationships and that his life and everything he does serves his neighbour. Insofar as Protestant ethics sees action and work as linked in a vocation, this is related to the community. In this vocation the Christian serves the community. Many changes in the economy and its associated society (for example the drifting apart of work and vocation) have made these connections seem questionable. So it has become necessary to reflect explicitly upon social action. There are conceptual issues standing in the way of this, like the connection of ethics to the idea of a Christian 'world'. The critique of this, and also the perception of cultural conflicts, as in the work of Ernst Troeltsch, has thrown up the question about an ethic of society as a web of life, as culture. It was in this perspective that Ernst Troeltsch wrote his study of Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen [The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches and Groups'] (1922). In contrast to this, 'the social question' of the 19th century and further critical elements in Protestant ethics (e.g. the rediscovery of eschatology) help to raise the issue of the explicit form of social action. On these lines we also find the development of social ethics as an ethic of social responsibility and as an ethic of institutions (e.g. Ernst Wolf). Both these tendencies, an ethical (perhaps also theological) theory of society and an ethic of (programmatic) social action (including institutions), have determined the models of social ethics. Also the second tendency, including the model of Arthur Rich35 which treats economic ethics as social ethics, has been developed further.

34 Cf. Ernst Wolf, Sozialethik, Göttingen 1975. Wolfgang Huber, 'Freiheit und Institution. Sozialethik als Ethik kommunikativer Freiheit', in: Evangelische Ethik. Diskussionsbeiträge zu ihrer Grundlegung und ihren Aufgaben, introduced and edited by Hans G. Ulrich, München 1990, 230-244. 35 Arthur Rich, Wirtschaftsethik Bd. I: Grundlagen in theologischer Perspektive [£conomic Ethics: Vol. I: Foundations in Theological Perspective], Gütersloh 1990 3rd edition; Bd. II: Marktwirtschaft, Planwirtschaft, Weltwirtschaft aus sozialethischer Sicht [Market Economy, Planned Economy, World Economy from the Standpoint of Social Ethics], Gütersloh 1990.

A Modern Understanding of Christian Ethics

51

For a further development of social ethics there has to be a new start from this point. One must demonstrate what social action means in relation to the Christian way of life in its totality. Thus it should be critically observed that here social ethics is limited to an ethic of social action. Instead the Christian life must be described in its own full social extent. We can connect this to new attempts which try to see the Christian community itself as a social ethic (cf. Stanley Hauerwas 36 ).

7. Ethics as science (theory) With the development of theology and its disciplines as a 'science' ethics too seeks its scientific form. This is particularly true of the relationship between the social sciences and ethics. The development of ethics as a science depends upon the conception that ethics does not just formulate or interpret moral directives but can justify them theoretically. The major idea here is the theoretical development of the relationship between theory and practice. However, engagement with the history of science has not really been achieved, although some work has been done e.g. in relation to 'critical theory' (cf. Martin Honecker 3 7 ).

8. Ethical existence and modern identity The history of ethics has been marked by the general view of human ethical existence. Existence is not just seen as free for independent responsibility - just as important is the question of the 'world' in which we have our existence. The tradition of Protestant theology has been profoundly transformed in relation to these issues. Hence the question remains how far the Christian form of living is mediated 36 Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethics, Notre Dame/London 1981. Cf. Dietrich Ritschl, The Logic of Theology, 239-251. 37 Martin Honecker, Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie. Grundfragen evangelischer Sozialethik [The Concept of a Social-ethical Theory. Basic Issues in Lutheran Social Ethics], Tubingen 1971.

52

Hans G. Ulrich

with particular characteristics of modern identity and how its logic has become changed in the process of its confrontation. This is also the case with respect to further elements of the Christian form of life apart from freedom and relationship to the world: - the stamp given to the capitalist world by the conception of 'vocation' ( B e r u f ) and asceticism which was analysed by Max Weber; - the self control on which the autonomy of humanity rests, which is seen as the transformation of Christian asceticism; - the affirmation of everyday life, which at the same time includes in itself the 'good'. The history of Christian morality and its modern issues pose the task of critically remembering the tradition of Christian ethics in the face of such characteristics.

IV. Ethical-theological maxims: Freedom and responsibility - God's goodness and good works How does the logic of the Christian tradition relate to the history of ethics in the modern age? Is the connection as genuine as is often maintained in the histories of Christian ethics ? What are the points of connection and what are the differences? In particular this has been discussed in relation to the understanding of Christian freedom. 38 Equally significant is the question of how talk of 'the good' is understood. Here we should emphasise that we cannot abstractly set the Christian traditions over against modern identity. Rather, we must point to their proper yet questionable co-existence. This means a critical inquiry into the received interpretations of modernity.

1. F r e e d o m and Responsibility (1) The issue of 'freedom' uniquely links modern identity with that of Christianity. True, what this linkage looks like has remained contro-

38 See: Freiheit im Leben mit Gott. Texte zur Tradition christlicher Ethik [Freedom in Life with God. Texts on the Tradition of Christian Ethics], ed. Hans G. Ulrich, Gütersloh 1994.

53

A Modern Understanding of Christian Ethics

versial.39 Trutz Rendtorff, for example, has posited a continuous development of Christian tradition in Reformation and modern thought. "Thus the appearance of the individual subject, his freedom and his autonomy, is the direct result of the first epoch of post-Reformation ethical theorising and at the same time the most important consequence of the transposition of the Protestant idea of freedom from its specific theological form into a universal claim." 40 Correspondingly the concept of freedom is described as a universal concept of orientation in Christian ethics.41 This means that in the understanding of freedom we can see that the lines of problems of theological ethics converge and can be united by a binding theological concept. The goal attained is an enlightened understanding of Christian freedom which can guide the present and the future. According to this view, in the modern understanding of freedom is encapsulated a learning process of Christian doctrine, which has come to a strong and durable conclusion in the present age. The modern understanding of freedom finds its climax in the radical responsibility of humankind for itself and the world and finds its realisation in the 'ethical sense' of all areas of life which are constituted themselves in freedom. Trutz Rendtorff tries to show that this ethics of freedom, which is characterised as modern, can also be found in Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics.42 In opposition to this one should say that Barth's ethics preserves the Protestant presupposition of the necessary otherness of 3 9 Cf. Oswald Bayer, Umstrittene [Contested

Freedom.

wald Bayer, Leihliches Reformation

Freiheit.

Theologisch-Philosophische

Theological-Philosophical Wort. Reformation

and Modernity

in Conflict],

Controversies],

und Neuzeit

Kontroversen

Tübingen 1981; O s -

im Konflikt

[Bodily

Word.

Tübingen 1992; Gerhard Ebeling, 'Der

kontroverse Grund der Freiheit. Z u m Gegensatz von Lutherenthusiasmus und Lutherfremdheit in der Neuzeit' ['The Controversial Ground of Freedom: O n the Opposition between Enthusiasm and Alienation Towards Luther in Modernity'] , in: Freiheit

im Leben

mit Gott. Texte zur Tradition evangelischer

Ethik,

introduced

and edited by Hans G. Ulrich, 213-226. 40 Trutz Rendtorff, Ethik. Grundelemente, schen Theologie,

Methodologie

und Konkretionen

einer

ethi-

Vol. I, Stuttgart 1990, 2nd edition.

41 Trutz Rendtorff, 'Die christliche Freiheit als Orientierungsbegriff der gegenwärtigen christlichen Ethik' ['Christian Freedom as a Guiding Concept in Christian Ethics Today', in: Evangelische Aufgaben,

Ethik. Diskussionsbeiträge

zu ihrer Grundlegung

und

ihren

introduced and edited by Hans G. Ulrich, München 1990, 113-123.

42 Cf. Trutz Rendtorff, 'Der Freiheitsbegriff als Ortsbestimmung neuzeitlicher Theologie am Beispiel der Kirchlichen Dogmatik Karl Barths' ['The Concept of Freedom as a Characteristic of Modern Theology as Exemplified by The* Church Dogmatics

54

Hans G. Ulrich

God and humankind, in the salutary otherness of God's command, which ethics has to explicate, over against human action. Barth's ethics assumes a dialectical form in its practice. In contrast to such a combination of modern and Christian freedom Oswald Bayer has presented Christian freedom in Protestant understanding as 'promised freedom' 43 . This freedom remains tied to the primacy of the promised Word of God. As such it must remain controversial and cannot be absorbed into a history of the development of human autonomy: "Human freedom cannot be understood from its own resources. Promised freedom is always controversial; it cannot keep itself away from disputes. It is always confronted with them precisely because it has always provoked them. This is especially true since the Christian understanding of freedom is not external to the history of modernity. The course of that history is marked by the understanding and misunderstanding of the 'libertas Christiana and cannot be understood apart from the issue of its 'secularisation'." 44 This remembering of the Reformation concept of freedom is inseparable from a criticism of the perception of modernity and a criticism of the interpretation of Descartes. It is emphasised that freedom is thought of as independence from the world and not as independence from God. God appears only as the 'silent' implication. "Descartes cannot speak of God's coming in his promise 'through the creature' in worldly mediation." 45 That constitutes the difference in the understanding of freedom - the question whether freedom stems from encounter with God and how this is developed.

of Karl Barth'] in: Freiheit

im Leben

mit Gott. Texte zur Tradition

evangelischer

Ethik, introduced and edited by Hans G. Ulrich, Gütersloh 1994, 363-381. 43 Oswald Bayer, 'Zum Ansatz theologischer Ethik als Freiheitsethik' ['Towards the Assessment of Theological Ethics as an Ethics of Freedom], in: Zugesagte Zur Grundlegung logical Freedom],

theologischer

Ethik [Promised Freedom:

the Foundations

Freiheit. of

Theo-

Gütersloh 1980, 37-59. Cf. Bayer's critique of Rendtorff's concep-

tion: 'Ethik als Kontroverswissenschaft am Beispiel des Freiheitsbegriffs' ['Ethics as a Controversial Discipline: the Example of the Concept of Freedom'], in: im Lehen

mit Gott. Texte zur Tradition evangelischer

Freiheit

Ethik, introduced and edited

by Hans G. Ulrich, Gütersloh 1994 (257-275), 272. 44 Oswald

Bayer,

Umstrittene

Freiheit.

Theologisch-philosophische

Kontroversen,

Tübingen 1981, Foreword, vii. 45 Oswald Bayer, 'Descartes und die Freiheit' [Descartes and Freedom], in: Wort, Tübingen 1992 (176-204), 201.

Leibliches

A Modern Understanding of Christian Ethics

55

(2) Responsibility The concept of freedom has been linked in recent history to the concept of responsibility. 46 This concept has partly replaced the concept of 'vocation' as it was formed by Reformation theology. The meaning of 'vocation' has thereby been changed. Max Weber, who uses Protestant theology as his starting point, has decisively influenced the idea of an ethics of responsibility. Characteristic here is the connection with political ethics: responsibility is linked to conferred power and whosoever bears responsibility can forfeit it. Hence it is possible to make a person accountable. In Christian ethics the connection between responsibility and power has remained fallow. 47 Where ethics is seen as an ethics of responsibility it is presupposed that responsible action is possible: it is barely discussed who has this power to act. Who the ethical subject can be is a question which remains undefined. A theologically clear concept of responsibility is frankly lacking. The question here is how far Christian ethics can define its task as an ethics of responsibility. How may it define the relationship of responsibility to power or action, or the relationship of responsibility to guilt? Christian ethics is seen at present, albeit from different perspectives, as an ethics of responsibility. The question remains unanswered: how is responsibility conferred on human beings? what is the basis of the power through which humanity is responsible? If ethics is defined as the 'theory of the conduct of human life' (Rendtorff) we must ask what it means for a Christian to conduct a responsible life. Is not the subject of ethics at the same time 'life' 46 Cf. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethik, collated and edited by by E. Bethge, München 1949 (1984, 10th edition), 238-269 ('Die Struktur verantwortlichen Lebens' ['The Structure of Responsible Living'). Cf. Oswald Bayer, 'Freiheit im Konflikt. Evangelische Sozialethik als Verantwortungsethik' ['Freedom in Conflict: Lutheran Social ethics as an Ethics of Responsibility'], in: Evangelische Kommentare 24 (1991), 522-526; now in: Bayer, Freiheit als Antwort. Zur theologischen Ethik [Freedom as Response: Theological Ethics], Tübingen 1995, 183-196; Wolfgang Huber, 'Sozialethik als Verantwortungsethik' ['Social ethics as an Ethics of Responsibility'], in: Huber, Konflikt und Konsens. Studien zur Ethik der Verantwortung [Conflict and Consensus: Studies in the Ethics of Responsibility], München 1990, 135-157. 47 Cf. Oswald Bayer, 'Macht, Recht, Gerechtigkeit' [Power, Right and Justice], in: Kerygma und Dogma 30 (1994) 200-212; now in: Bayer, Freiheit als Antwort. Zur theologischen Ethik, Tübingen 1995, 283-296.

56

Hans G. Ulrich

as it is experienced, continually achieved and received? This subject of Christian ethics could be called a 'living from God's justice'. 48 In contrast to the concept of the 'conduct of life' would be that of the 'form of life'. The subject of Christian ethics could be the form of life of which responsible behaviour is simply a part.

2. T h e G o o d n e s s of G o d and good w o r k s 4 9 (1) The tradition of Protestant ethics has not just developed 'freedom from works' as the basis of ethics but has also changed the question of the good. Protestant ethics is an ethics of good works insofar as it has criticised the deeply questionable sublimation of good works into religious works. Thus ethics is not a theory of a 'good world' or a 'good life' and it is not a teleological theory about a world which is orientated towards 'the good'. As an ethics of good works it relies upon the merciful acts and good gifts of God which stand for the good. In this respect it is a doctrine of goodness, the goodness of God, but expressly not a doctrine of the good world. It deals with the economy of God. Only God - as the God of good action - is good. The good works develop from the communication of God's goodness. (2) Obviously this 'logic' of an ethic of good works has been exposed to difficulties and changes. The history of ethics has shown that it has barely been able to preserve its credibility. The development of ethical conceptions is determined by alternatives in ethical theory which do not go with this logic. One might consider the distinction between the doctrines of virtue, duties, and goods or the distinction between subjective and objective ethics. In these distinctions lie attempts to find the 'good' in that which makes demands upon humanity. That is also the case in the attempt to ex48 Cf. Eberhard Jüngel, 'Leben aus Gerechtigkeit. Gottes Handeln und menschliches Tun' ['Living from Righteousness: God's Action and H u m a n Activity'], in: gelische Kommentare

Evan-

21 (1988), 6 9 6 - 7 0 1 ; und: Jüngel, 'Empfangene Gerechtigkeit.

Gottes Handeln und menschliches Tun' ['Received Righteousness: God's Action and Human Activity'], in: Evangelische 4 9 Cf.

Oswald

Bayer,

'Die

Kommentare

Gegenwart

Gotteslehre und Ethik', in: Leihliches Tübingen 1992, 314-333.

der

22 (1989), 36-38.

Güte

Gottes.

Wort. Reformation

Zum

Verhältnis

und Neuzeit

im

von

Konflikt,

A Modern Understanding of Christian Ethics

57

pound the 'is' of social reality in relation to its immanent 'ought'. The ethical agent is bound by this 'ought'. The ethics of good works, by way of contrast, first attends to the basis on which a person lives. It has to show the 'good tree' which can then produce good fruits. The history of ethics has been determined by the attempt to talk about the goodness of God and not just the good which is given to or makes demands on people. The description of paraenesis as 'indicative and imperative' has mistakenly given this currency. It must remain clear that the 'imperative' does not aim to incapsulate the good gifts of God in mere human action. The conceptual alternatives of Christian ethics are determined by highly questionable interpretations of the relationship between 'is' and 'ought'. In opposition to this distinction Christian ethics has to speak of how God communicates his goodness and how humanity participates in it. The logic of this communication can be expressed neither in a given 'is' nor in an 'ought'. In this way the question of Christian ethics becomes relativised: how do we evaluate the reality of life: is it determined by the basic absence or presence of the good? 50 This controversy about reality, which is also a dispute about eschatology, has to be faced critically by Christian ethics.

V. The focus of critical 'remembering ' of the tradition: Worship and Ethics Is it possible for the remembering of the tradition, if it is not to become a repristination, to hold together its tensions so as to reveal the perspectives for contemporary ethics? One can only speak of the development of a tradition if the tradition can lead to a critical and constructive debate with the history of Christian ethics. We have pointed to a number of significant issues. We should emphasise the ethics which sees freedom as a freedom from works. Bound up with this is the knowledge that Christian ethics gains its structure from the fact that it remains dependent upon the gifts of God, upon life with God. That makes it an ethics of the Christian community and gives it its focus in worship. This means in its fullest sense that 50 Cf. Oswald Bayer's discussion of the issue: Theologie Theologie

Bd. 1) Gütersloh 1994, 413-417.

(Handbuch

Systematischer

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Hans G. Ulrich

the Christian ethos develops in the relation of God's merciful action to human activity. Thus baptism and communion are places of ethical reflection insofar as this relation is there remembered and grounded. Worship is the constitutive reality for Christian ethics. There have been many attempts in the German-speaking context to re-open the history of Christian ethics and from there to move to a general discussion of the theological bases of ethics. This discussion has concentrated upon certain broad theoretical questions and themes: the doctrine of the Two Kingdoms 51 , political theology 52 and - in particular - the relationship between Christian ethics and modernity. These discussions have been the subject matter of Protestant theology and ethics. The logic of this theology however needs renewed validation for ethics. The relationship between freedom and responsibility has become too opaque. The fact that Christian freedom is rooted in the good gifts of God requires renewed reflection. 53 In this context belong the attempts to rediscover the locus of sanctification and pneumatology as the theological approach to the foundation of ethics. 54 The very core of this rediscovery has to be the coherence of worship and ethics.

51 Cf. Zur Zwei-Reichelehre Luthers [Luther's Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms], Gerhard Sauter, München 1973.

ed.

52 Cf. Evangelische Kirche und freiheitliche Demokratie. Der Staat des Grundgesetzes als Angehot und Aufgabe [The Lutheran Church and Liberal Democracy. The Constitutional State as a Gift and a Task] Eine Denkschrift der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland [A Memorandum of the Lutheran Church of Germany], Gütersloh 1985. 53 Cf. Hans G. Ulrich (ed.), Freiheit im Leben mit Gott. Texte zur Tradition evangelischer Ethik, Gütersloh 1994. 54 Cf. Johannes Fischer, Leben aus Gottes Geist [Living in God's Spirit], Zürich 1994.

Hastings Rashdall as Social Theologian: Critical Methodology and the Rhetoric of Brotherhood Anthony

Dyson

'The rise of industrial capitalism in the last half of the eighteenth century was to have a profound revolutionary impact on the social, economic and political life of nineteenth-century England. A period of unparalleled prosperity and progress for the few, it was an era of hardship, starvation and economic depression for the many. Although the technology that might liberate humankind from scarcity and deprivation had at last been developed, the contradictions and inequities of the market system were becoming more and more manifest... The royal commission reports of this period recount the human suffering in minute detail. The dangerous and debilitating working conditions in the factories, the overcrowded and unhealthy living conditions of the slums of great cities, the child labour, the starvation, and the misery, are all duly and faithfully recorded. At the same time, the poverty and security of the working class were aggravated by the periodic economic crises of the century: the crisis of the thirties and early forties, the commercial collapse of the fifties, and the Great Depression of 1873-96. . . . The spreading industrialisation and the continued development of the market economy were creating a more and more restive, more and more dangerous working class, without at the same time providing any institutionalised means of insulating its members from the system's inevitable shocks and inequities. . . . Reforms were introduced primarily to meet the threat to the whole edifice of capitalism posed by the rising tide of discontent.' 1

1

I.M. Greengarten, Thomas Hill Green and the Development of Liberal-Democratic Thought, University of Toronto, 1981, pp. 3f. There is an acute problem for this essay about inclusive and non- inclusive language. Nearly all the authors quoted use exclusive language. I have not felt warranted

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'Paul Renouard (1845-1924), La crise industrielle à Lyon: Sans Travail, 1884, wood engraving, the original drawing is executed in pencil heightened with touches of black ink wash and accents of black chalk or crayon. The formal language, like the mood of the drawing, is hushed, tensely meditative, still. Indeed Sans Travail is remarkable for its intensity and concentration of vision. A scene of enforced idleness in one of the domestic workshops. The chef d'atelier and his family with one of the hired labourers. We are in a poor room where a whole family of old weavers lives. No more resources; soon no more bread. . . . It is an image replete with painful contradictions; the family together but each member isolated, the space of work transformed into an arena of enforced idleness; the protective paternal figure the most overtly helpless of all, as peripheral as the literally peripheral child and more hopelessly outmoded. Renouard's old weaver . . . more selfcontrolled . . . less overtly despairing . . . long suffering self-respect... a self-respect bordering on secular sanctity. An everyday icon of the modern man of sorrows, a man of sorrows distanced from his fellowsufferers by greater age and loss, seated in helpless, puffy dignity. Here and there some furniture and looms, abandoned and covered with paper to preserve the working parts from dust.'2

Introduction Hastings Rashdall (1853-1924) has recently received comparatively little attention as a scholar and as a church figure. Rashdall was educated at Harrow and New College, Oxford. After leaving Oxford he taught briefly at St David's College, Lampeter. He then went to a post at University College, Durham, where he was ordained. In 1888 he was elected to a fellowship at Hertford College, Oxford. In in employing inclusive language for quoted material. 'Brotherhood' despite all its problems must be also retained. This essay is almost entirely about method; it barely deals with ethical topics. O n e of my research students, Margaret Marsh, has been working on topics in Rashdall's social ethics, namely: school life, university education, clergy training, religious education, church organisation, divided Christindem, overseas missions, family life, employment, housing, medical care, commerce, war, after-war. 2

Linda Nochling, The Politics of Vision: Essays on Nineteenth-Century ciety, Thames and Hudson, London, 1991, ch 6, passim.

Art and So-

Hastings Rashdall as Social Theologian

61

1889 he became a founder-member of the Christian Social Union, and an editor of its Oxford branch's Economic Review for a number of years. In 1895 Rashdall was elected to a fellowship and tutorship in philosophy at N e w College, Oxford. In 1909 he was appointed to a canonry at Hereford Cathedral and divided his time between Oxford and Hereford. O n Lloyd George's nomination, Rashdall became Dean of Carlisle in 1917, where he remained until his death in 1924. In my judgment, he was the most outstanding British liberal theologian of his generation and may legitimately be placed on the same level as some of the leading German theologians of the same generation. H o w far and in what respect he should be associated with the circle of Anglican Modernists is another question. 3 Two exceptions to the comparative silence about Rashdall are Charles Raven's placing of Rashdall in the broader context: 'There were very many, and in all lands, who insisted upon maintaining a reasonable faith and in challenging both the omnicompetence of scientific materialism and the inerrancy of religious authorities. Their influence was an invaluable encouragement, and in many cases their work has still an unappreciated worth and deserves fresh attention from those who are now in a position to carry it forward. We in England owe a debt to F.J.A. Hort, and William Sanday, to James Ward, Hastings Rashdall and J.F. Bethune-Baker which has never yet been properly acknowledged'. 4 The second exception is John Macquarrie who de3

B. G. Worrall, clained him 'as near as anybody to being the acknowleged leader of Anglican Modernists'. Worrall adds that, maybe 'his gifts and temperament fitted him for academic life, and perhaps made him less suitable as a leader of a popular movement within the Church, The Making of Modern Church: Christianity in England since 1900, London, SPCK, pp. 123: Hensley Henson, however, though he liked R a s h d a l l . . . and allowed him to be a learned man, he [Henson] condemned the lesser fry as shallow, dogmatic, provocative, and almost as incredibly foolish. They belittled the scale and complexity of the reconstruction to which they addressed themselves', O w e n Chadwick, Hensley Henson: A Study in the Friction between Church and State, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983, p. 298. Alan Stephenson, The Rise and Decline of English Modernism, SPCK, Londong, 1980, included Rashdall among his 'giants of modernism'. For biography of Rashdall see P.E. Matheson, The Life of Hastings Rashdall DD, Oxford University Press, Londong, 1928; Dictionary of National Biography, 1928-30, pp. 706-709; Anthony Dyson,'Hastings Rashdall', Hastings Rashdall: Bibliography of the Published Writings, Chirbury, Powys, PP· 1-15·

4

Charles Raven, Natural Religion Press, Cambridge, 1953, p. 189.

and Christian

Theology,

Cambridge University

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Anthony Dyson

scribes Rashdall as 'an exceptionally able theologian who wrote with distinction on a wide range of subjects'.5 Of course others have recognised Rashdall as a philosopher, a moral philosopher, a Christian ethicist, an historian, and an historian of doctrine in such writings as Theory of Good and Evil, Conscience and Christ, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, and The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology. He has not, however, to my knowledge been seriously received as a social theologian. Nor have the significant unity and reciprocity of Rashdall's many-sided intellectual commitment been much noted. Although I shall devote most of this essay to these two last-mentioned themes, it is clear that this can only be done impressionistically, and that much more has to be left out than can be included. Nor do my necessary references to Christian Socialism, in its first two generations, in any sense signal a claim on my part to offer fresh interpretation in this well-trodden territory. Be that as it may, I am convinced that it is impossible to arrive at a just estimate of Rashdall as a social theologian without paying attention to his dealings with Christian Socialism both in positive and negative judgement. This, of course, is as it should have been for a social theologian of Rashdall's era. For Anglican Christian Socialism represented one of the first serious attempts to come to ethical, theological, ecclesiological and spiritual terms with the world produced by the Industrial Revolution.

Salvation

and the Overcoming

of Secular

Power

This essay is not first and foremost an historical study. It is rather a case of seeking to understand the past so as better to understand the present. In particular, it is the social theology of the present that I am eager to enable Rashdall to serve. To give one example from the recent past, I imagine that no-one could have felt satisfied by the quality of the overall social-theological response which followed the publication of Faith in the City, whose own theological content was also uncertain and miscellaneous. In trying to make progress in this respect, it is first of all necessary to be clear about basic theological foundations and directions. So, in a 5

John Macquarrie, Twentieth-Century

Religions Thought, SCM, London, 1963, p. 53.

Hastings Rashdall as Social Theologian

63

volume dedicated to Anglo-German theological dialogue, it is apposite to begin by taking account of the longstanding and widely-influential doctrine which appears to stand in stark contrast with the particular social-theological, liberal tradition in which Rashdall stands. The doctrine of the Two Kingdoms is regarded as one of the principal theological bequests of the Reformation and, in particular, of Lutheranism, to subsequent thinking. Yet, so influential a doctrine has encountered a good deal of opposition, not least in recent times. For it is alleged, taking one aspect of a multi-sided critique, that the Two Kingdoms doctrine has only negative things to say about the church's involvement in the socio-political-economic order. Notably some Liberation theologians have accused the Lutheran understanding of so individualising and spiritualising the message of salvation as to render it useless as a tool for engaging in the problems of contemporary society. So separate are the Two Kingdoms (it is alleged), that the kingdom of redemption can never bring about 'an overcoming of secular power' 6 , can never constitute 'an ecclesiastical counter-history which continually overcomes this power'. 7 But 'if we are to say "salvation is a fact", "salvation has appeared on the historical stage", then we have to enunciate, not just an ecclesiology, but also an ecclesiology which recounts and resumes the Church's actual, concrete intervention in the human social order . . . '. 8 Thus it is argued that a doctrine of Two Kingdoms, or a doctrine of One Kingdom seen as a secular realm served by a secular gospel, are poor alternatives. Instead, the theological task is to clarify what is involved in the Church's actual, concrete intervention in the human social order in a way that preserves the transcendent dimension of the gospel and indwells, subversively but not destructively, as a history, that social order, with the capacity to 'bring about reconciliation in the face of secular alienation.'9

6

John Milbank, 'An Essay against Secular Order', Journal of Religions Ethics, 15, 1987, pp. 199-224.

7

Milbank, 'An Essay', p. 199.

8

Milbank, 'An Essay', p. 207.

9

Milbank, 'An Essay', p. 210.

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Anthony Dyson

An Approach to Understanding Rashdall as a Social Theologian My approach to Rashdall in this essay consists in an albeit brief analysis of some of Rashdall's own theological precursors and contemporaries, and of the way in which he sets out to correct and develop these ideas. The sources in question are well-known. They are some common themes from Maurice, Kingsley, Lux Mundi, Westcott and the Christian Social Union. I shall then explore Rashdall's notion of 'Brotherhood', and the resultant shape of his social theology. I shall refer to the place and function of worship in his scheme of things. .. I feel I owe much to the Teaching of Maurice

...510

Rashdall was indebted to Maurice in three directions. First Maurice .. was almost, one may say, the first to suggest that Christian principles should be applied to social relations . . . '. n Second, ' . . . nobody did more than Maurice to diffuse that interpretation of Christianity which lays the most stress upon these watchwords [of the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man] which makes them the very essence of Christian faith, so much so that everything else in Christianity must be regarded as subordinate to, or illustrative of, these two great truths'.12 Third, 'though sin has its consequences in this world and the next . . . those punishments must always be thought of as the punishments of a loving Father who seeks only the good of all His Children'.13 I am only concerned with the first two of these points. Maurice's general tendency has been well expressed by Vance: 'a high and hopeful doctrine of man, partly derived from Coleridge, a view of human society as the kingdom of Christ upon earth, and an urgent sense of social and moral purpose deriving from this insight'.14 Thus, Vance continues, 'Christ as the light of the world 10 Rashdall, Principles and Precepts, Blackwell, Oxford, 1927, p. 162. 11 Rashdall, Principles and Precepts, p. 157. 12 Rashdall, Principles and Precepts, p. 160. 13 Rashdall, Principles and Precepts, pp. 161f. 14 N . Vance, The Sinews of the Spirit: The Ideal of Christian Manliness in Victorian Literature and Religious Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, p. 54.

Hastings Rashdall as Social Theologian

65

was already present in man waiting to reveal the world and the self in their completeness'. So, 'if the new Jerusalem was to come about in the present world it must be through the complete self-realisation of the universal fellowship among men already provided for in the fact of their brotherhood in the incarnate Christ'. This process of realisation would involve 'more and more cooperation between man and man of an increasingly fraternal kind.' 15 In Maurice's own words: Ί have endeavoured in my tracts to prove that if Christ be really the head of every man, and if he really have taken human flesh, there is ground for a universal fellowship among men . . . That it ought to make men understand and feel how possible it is for men as men to fraternise in Christ'. 16 So, 'society is not to be made anew by arrangements of ours, but is to be regenerated by finding the law and ground of its order and harmony, the only secret of its existence, in God'. 17 So 'Christian Socialism, for Maurice, was educative and ethical; it was hardly in any sense political'. 18 This law of brotherhood did not imply egalitarianism or democracy, but theocracy expressed through a monarchy with divine right. The political expression of this point of view was what Ramsey describes as 'a sort of Toryism'. 'The gift of a spirit, to dwell with men, to lift the beggar out of his dunghill, that he may be an heir with princes, is in some sort the peculiarly Christian truth, and this is as I conceived the ground of the Socialism of the modern world, that Socialism which was proclaimed by St Paul when he spoke of a body with many members, each having distinct functions and offices'. 19 Hence, Maurice's ideas, especially in his use of the term socialism, 'were not those which we now commonly associate with the word 'Socialism'. In those days anyone was called a socialist who thought that the existing order of human society was capable of serious improvement'. 20 In an important passage, Rashdall identifies one of the significant factors in Maurice's approach. 'The tendency of "liberal" thought un15 N. Vance, The Sinews of the Spirit, p. 56. 16 F. Maurice, The Life of Frederick Denison Maurice chiefly told in his own Macmillan, London, 2nd edn, 1884, i, p. 239. 17 F. Maurice, The Life, ii, pp. 136f.

Letters,

18 E.R. Norman, The Victorian Christian Socialists, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 21. 19 Quoted in F.M. McClain, Maurice: Man and Moralist, SPCK, London, 1972, p. 129. 20 Rashdall, Principles and Precepts, p. 157.

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til recently has been towards a more complete spiritualisation of this eschatological teaching [of Christ in the Gospels]. Theologians like Frederick Denison Maurice and his followers were inclined to explain in a spiritual sense the whole idea of "coming" and "the Kingdom". The Kingdom meant for them a gradual remoulding of human society in accordance with the ideas of Christ'. 21 Anticipating a feature of Rashdall's correlation which I shall set out below, it is possible to see here that Rashdall's personalism gives far more autonomy, initiative and activity to human beings who are, in the long run, participants alongside the being of God as the Absolute. Notwithstanding, it will become apparent that Rashdall has his own account of Maurice's 'gradual remoulding of human society'.

Kingsley: Maurice's 'much more Fiery and Militant Disciple'22 I quote first, from Thomas Hughes' memoir, the well known event in which in 1848 'some of those who felt with C. Kingsley that the "People's Charter" had not had fair play or courteous treatment, and that those who signed it had real wrongs to complain of, put themselves into communication with the leaders, and met and talked with them. At last it seemed that the time had come for some more public meeting, and one was called at the Cranbourn Tavern over which Mr. [F.D.] Maurice presided. After the president's address, several very bitter speeches followed, and a vehement attack was specially directed against the church and the clergy. The meeting waxed warm, and seemed likely to come to no good, when Kingsley arose, folded his arms against his chest, and began - with the stammer which always came at first when much moved but which fixed everyone's attention at once - "I am a Church of England parson" - a long pause - "and a Chartist"; and then he went on to explain how far he thought them right in their claim for a reform of Parliament . . . \ 2 3 I take Kingsley's exclamation to mean that he felt full personal and emotional sympathy for the Chartists, wanting to identify himself with them, even though, 21 Rashdall, Conscience and Christ, Duckworth, London, 1916, pp. 40f. 22 Rashdall, Principles and Precepts, p. 162. 23 Thomas Hughes, prefatory memoir in Chaarles Kingsley, Alton Locke: Tailor and Poet, new edn, Macmillan, London, 1885, p. xix.

Hastings Rashdall as Social Theologian

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in many aspects of policy, he did not agree with them at all. The second mode of expression which occurs in very similar forms in several of his writings is rather more complex. In 1851, the time of the opening of the Great Exhibition, Kingsley accepted an invitation to preach in a London parish. H e took as the title of his sermon 'Message of the Church to the Labouring Men'. In that sermon Kingsley argued that 'the business for which God sends a Christian priest in a Christian nation is, to preach freedom, equality, and brotherhood in the fullest, deepest, widest meaning of those three great words'. 2 4 Kingsley went on to observe that ' . . . these words express the very pith and marrow; I say they preach freedom, equality and brotherhood to rich and poor for ever and ever'. Kingsley then offers an interpretation: 'there are two freedoms - the false, where a man is free to do what he likes; the true, where a man is free to do what he ought'. 'Two equalities - the false which reduces all intellects and all characters to a dead level . . . the true, wherein each man has equal power to educate and use whatever faculties or talents God has given him, be they less or more'. 'This is the divine equality which the church proclaims'. Finally, there are two brotherhoods - 'the false, where a man chooses who shall be his brothers, and whom he will treat as such; the true, in which a man believes that all are his brothers, not by the will of the flesh, or the will of man, but by the will of God, whose children they all are alike'. 25 It would be wrong to suppose that brotherhood of this kind was, for Kingsley, superficially based; on the contrary, it is grounded in the fact that God's Spirit is actively abroad in the world and that Christ is in everyone. Here Kingsley is using a phrase which of course relates to the French Revolution and which is associated with socialism. H e first cites the phrase in its mundane meaning and then goes on to show how the phrase is transcended by the Christian meaning which is attributed to it. What Kingsley appears to be saying is that freedom, equality and brotherhood in their most valued form are not goals which can be achieved through human action, but in some sense endowments by God. It is therefore hard to say whether freedom, equality and brotherhood are, for Kingsley, social states at all. Norman remarks 24 Hughes, prefatory memoir, p. xxxiii. 25 Hughes, p. xxxiii.

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that Kingsley's social reformism may perhaps be best described as a liberal progressivism; freedom, equality and brotherhood were not to be, and could not be, attained through political action. 26 It comes, therefore, as no surprise that for Kingsley the primary reference of progress was to the soul. N o r m a n observes that Kingsley's 'enthusiasm for improving the conditions of the working classes was held in balance with a profound belief in the general unsuitability of these classes for government or for social influence'. Indeed for Kingsley, the term 'democracy' did not mean a 'political arrangement to secure the representation of people's voice'. Instead 'democracy' suggested 'a kind of comradeship and "fellowship" between the social classes. . . . It was a quality of paternalistic relationships'. 2 7

'Lux Mundi' and Theological

Method

The prefaces to Lux Mundi, a volume significantly sub-titled Ά Series of Studies in the Religion of the Incarnation' contain the following statement of justification. 'The writers found themselves at O x f o r d together between the years 1875-1885 engaged in the common work of University education; and compelled for their own sake, no less

than that of others, to attempt to put the Catholic faith into its right relation to modern intellectual and moral problems',28 In a subsequent

new preface, Gore responded to those opponents who took theological exception especially to the words underlined above. H e explained that, 'by the phrase " t o attempt to put the Catholic faith into its right relation to modern intellectual and moral problems" . . . it was not by any means intended to suggest that the modern problems or the modern sciences were the things of first importance and the faith only secondary. What was intended was that, as holding the Faith, we needed, as the Church has so often needed, to bring that with which we ourselves are identified, into relation with the claims, intellectual and practical, made upon us from outside'. 2 9 G o r e emphasised that he and his colleagues were writing 'to succour a distressed faith', writing 26 Norman, The Victorian Christian Socialists, p. 38. 27 Norman, The Victorian Christian Socialists, p. 37. 28 Charles Gore (ed), Lux Mundi, John Murray, London, 10th edn. 1904, p. vii (my italics). 29

Gore, p. x, note 1.

Hastings Rashdall as Social Theologian

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'as for Christians perplexed by new knowledge which they are required to assimilate and new problems with which they are required to deal'. But 'what is needed to help men in such perplexity is not compromise, for compromise generally means tampering with principle, but readjustment, or fresh correlation, of the things of faith and the things of knowledge'.30 Rashdall's response to the position outlined by Gore is in part worked out through his concept of 'development'. He has two requirements: that the ethical teaching of Jesus is understood as 'laying down general principles and not detailed regulations of eternal obligation' and 'that the necessity for development is admitted in the amplest manner ?x Development is necessary because we need to know the means by which the human good, revealed by Jesus, is to be promoted and we must also know what in detail constitutes this good which we are to promote for all mankind. For 'it is obvious from the nature of the case that there can be no finality in either of these directions'. 32 It is correct, moreover, that 'the actual development of the Christian ideal has been towards an increasing recognition of the value of many things in life from which Christ's own followers turned aside'.33 As a matter of fact, the history of the first four Christian centuries was to a large extent a history of the gradual absorption into Christian life 'of what was best in pagan Literature, Art, Philosophy, even Ethics and Theology'. 34 It is, none the less, obvious that not all current ideals are in harmony with the legitimate development of Christ's own ideal. Further, not only does Christianity promote new ideals; it sometimes 'actually cancels old rules'. 35 In this last respect, therefore, 'theology and ethics are not altogether different from science'. Development in ethics is the key to other forms and loci of development including theology. 'More and more theological differences themselves will be such as directly flow from the ethical differences'.36 So development is based upon what he takes to be the core ideal(s) of 30 Gore, p. χ (my italics). 31 Rashdall, Conscience and Christ, p. 195. 32 Rashdall, p. 197. 33 Rashdall, p. 208. 34 Rashdall, p. 209. 35 Rashdall, p. 197. 36 Rashdall, p. 223.

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Jesus, in a very broad sense, later correlated with developments in human history, experience and knowledge. The 'rules' of the correlation are not set out in detail. A fuller statement says that 'the Christian Revelation was final, just because it contained in itself the germ of all future development; just because it possessed, and still possesses, the capacity of taking up into itself, and transforming and harmonising, all that is permanent and essential in other revelations'. 37

Bishop

Westcott

Brooke Foss Westcott, Regius Professor at Cambridge and Bishop of Durham, was the first president of the Christian Social Union (1889— 1901). In his book Social Aspects of Christianity, Westcott explores the theme of the Kingdom of G o d . The Kingdom of G o d is 'at once spiritual and historical: eternal and temporal: outward and inward: visible and invisible: a system and an energy'. O n one hand 'it is an order of things in which heavenly laws are recognised and obeyed. It depends both for its origin and for its support upon forces which are not of earth. It is inspired by the principles and powers of a higher sphere'. O n the other hand 'at the same time, though it is not limited by the conditions of our present existence, it is manifested under them. It is in the world though it is not of the world'. 3 8 '[Christ] did not come to found a school . . . he did not come to mould a sect . . . H e came to deal with the whole of life, with thought, action, feeling, with life in its largest and noblest forms, with life in every phase of its progressive activity'. 39 The 'three characteristics' which mark the society which answers the 'promise of creation' are 'righteousness, peace, joy'. 4 0 Westcott claims that in these three characteristics we can recognise 'equality, liberty, fraternity' interpreted, purified, extended. Again, he claims that righteousness, peace and joy are 'the Christian translation of Equality, Liberty, Fraternity, in which nothing of the old truth is lost, and all is transfigured'. The three Christian terms 'tell us that the community 37 Rashdall, Doctrine

and Development,

Methuen, London, 1898, p. 25.

38 B.F. Westcott, Social Aspects of Christianity, 39 Westcott, Social Aspects, p. 89. 40 Westcott, Social Aspects, p. 90.

2nd edn, Macmillan, London, pp. 88f.

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and not the individual is the central thought in the life of men', that 'the fulfilment of duties and not the assertion of rights is the foundation of the social structure'; that the end of labour is not material well-being, 'but that larger, deeper, more abiding delight which comes from successfully ministering to the good of others'. Each of these characteristics is then explored positively and negatively. First, for example, righteousness/equality: equality may be so presented as to destroy the richness and the beauty of life; an equality of units in an aggregate carries with it sterile monotony. 41 But, 'every inequality of earth is lost in the equality of souls'. Second, peace/liberty: liberty again may rapidly degenerate into license; but when we say Our Father, 'there is opened a vision of that true liberty, the obedience of his perfect law, which is the spring of peace'. 42 Third, joy/fraternity: fraternity may be made the pretext for imposing upon the weaker, the younger, the less mature in the family of men, practices and opinions for which they are not prepared, or even for arresting the growth of the more advanced; but when we say Our Father 'there is opened a vision of that true fraternity, the fact of a common spiritual parentage which brings to all the children the earnest of eternal joy'. 43 Westcott then explains that 'on all of us' is laid the duty of showing that righteousness, peace and joy, are indeed the notes of the Kingdom to which we belong, 'the Kingdom which satisfies the social instincts of men'. But he then significantly advances his argument by observing that 'the social embodiment of the Faith answers to the peculiar temper of the age'. The 'social gospel' - Westcott's use of this phrase correlates with 'the direction which the current of present thought is setting'. 44 However, all this is not a human work. It is the work of God. 'He is pleased to work through us, but He himself works'. 'We are not called to found, but to receive a Kingdom, a Kingdom that cannot be shaken. Our part is only to offer ourselves to the Divine influence by which we are surrounded: to listen to the still Voice which speaks in ourselves with whisperings which if they cannot be uttered yet cannot be misunderstood: to use the powers of the new age'. 45 41 Westcott, Social Aspects, p. 91. 42 Westcott, Social Aspeas,

p. 92.

43 Westcott, Social Aspects, p. 93. 44 Westcott, Social Aspeas,

p. 96.

45 Westcott, Social Aspects, pp. 97f.

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This treatment of 'righteousness, peace, joy' is stylistically and theologically incoherent to a dangerous degree. The three comparisons with equality, liberty, and fraternity are frequently unclear because they lack analogous features. Instead of the triad being transformed, as Westcott claims, it is frequently replaced. It is clearly perilous spiritualisation to contrast material well-being with successfully ministering to others. The proposition that 'every inequality of earth is lost in the equality of souls' undermines the cause of human democracy. Yet this and other passages are presented as the 'Gospel of the Kingdom, the social Gospel'. 46 This treatment, so characteristic of Westcott, is a partial adaptation of some traditional theological concepts to existing humanistic concepts; it is not an interpretation and transformation of theological concepts from within. There are a number of factors which make it difficult to arrive at a just and clear estimate of Westcott as a social theologian and public figure. A judgment must in the first place rest upon his words. In the Church Congress lecture of 1890 Westcott gives notice that he will not discuss 'any of the representative types of Socialism - the paternal Socialism of Owen, or the State Socialism of Bismarck, the international Socialism of Marx, or the Christian Socialism of Maurice or the evolutionary Socialism of the Fabian Essays'."'7 The term 'Christian Socialism' is, for Westcott 'a most vague phrase'. 48 The notion of Socialism has been discredited by its use in relation to evolutionary enterprises. 'Socialism' ought to be 'claimed for nobler uses' as 'a theory of life'. But there are a number of reservations expressed. First, Westcott held the view that the task of the Church is not to propose any social program, 'but to enforce eternal principles'. Second, though many Christians believe that 'Christians, as Christians, have a witness to give on social questions', Westcott did not think that one could go further than to 'discuss social questions'. 49 Third, Westcott held no brief for

46 Westcott, Social Aspects, p. 96. 47 Westcott, The Incarnation and the Common Life, Macmillan, London, pp. 223-247. 48 A. Westcott, Life and Letters of Brooke Foss Westcott, Macmillan, London, 1903, ii, p. 261. 49 A. Westcott, Life and Letters, ii, pp. 17, 67.

Hastings Rashdall as Social Theologian

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revolutionary politics, but agreed that Socialism as he conceived it sometimes needed to be implemented by government action. The major question which must be answered is the seriousness of Westcott's commitment to Christian Socialism from a theological perspective. Vidier discounts the argument that Westcott's latish conversion to Christian Socialism was a fashionable response to a 'social gospel' which was becoming fashionable in a variety of Christian circles, in England and in mainland Europe in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. 50 I disagree with Vidier on this score. Rashdall has summarised Westcott's overall position as follows: 'The Bishop's whole being was penetrated with the idea that the Gospel of brotherhood was meant to be applied to actual social life, that not competition but cooperation was the true basis of trade and commerce as well as of private and family life'. 51 There is certainly no doubt, therefore, that Westcott held to some theological convictions, and to the need for the application of those convictions to human life in some not precisely formulated way. Indeed as far as the theological convictions are concerned, Westcott was at one with Maurice in that both, radically, 'adjusted the relationship of the sacred and secular in order to see the world as a single unity in the providential design of God'. 5 2 Rashdall carried this tendency further. But this partial defence of Westcott the theologian does not do full justice to his dependence upon his wider religious and secular environment. To take adequate account of this dimension, it is useful to discuss Norman's hypothesis. Norman argues that 'radical attitudes adopted by churchmen derived from an area of debate largely restricted to the educated classes; theirs was a partisan gesture, a taking of sides in a division of opinion over ideas currently appealing to groups within their own class. Social radicalism within the Church was as much the result of class moralism as was the more prevalent conservatism'. 53 'Some, often a majority [of the leadership of the Church] have readily adopted the progressive idealism common to liberal opinion within

50 A.R. Vidier, F.D. Maurice and Company: Nineteenth Century Studies, SCM, London, p. 265. 51 Rashdall, Principles and Precepts, p. 168. 52 E.R. Norman, Church and Society in England: 1770- 1970, Clarendon, Oxford, 1976, p. 168. 53 Norman, p. 8f.

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the intelligentsia, of which they were a part'. 54 . . The social attitudes of the Church have derived from the surrounding intellectual and political culture and not, as churchmen themselves seem to assume, from theological learning'. Thus, according to Norman, Westcott's . . was a standard criticism of laisser-faire practice of the sort that had been spreading among sections of the intelligentsia for some years'. 55 All this has to be seen against the background, after the prosperity of the 1850s and 1860s, of the trade depression, beginning about 1873, which not only had 'grave social consequences but also aroused a social conscience and even, according to Beatrice Webb, "a new consciousness of sin among men of intellect and property". There was a revival of various forms of socialism and an outburst of philanthropic activity. All this was in full flood in the 1880s . . . Talk about social problems and about socialism became common and even fashionable'. 56 I should contend that this background was influential in the formation of the Christian Social Union, and of the contributions of individual figures such as Westcott.

The Christian Social Union The year of establishment of the Christian Social Union (CSU), 1889, was also the year of the publication of Fabian Essays and Lux Mundi, and of the great Dock Strike. The C S U was founded by Gore, Scott Holland and others. In the present context, I want mainly to investigate its socio-theological impulse. A starting-point can be identified in its three aims. 1. 'To claim for the Christian Law the ultimate authority to rule social practice. 2. To study in common how to apply the moral truths and principles of Christianity to the social and economic difficulties of the present time. 3. To present Christ in practical life as the Living Master and King, the enemy of wrong and selfishness, the power of righteousness and love'. 57 Taking these aims in reverse, the third is a perfectly proper statement of piety, though it assumes that 54 Norman, p. 10. 55 Norman, p. 132. 56 Vidier, F.D. Maurice and Company, 57 P.d'A Jones, The Christian cial, and Social Conscience Princeton, 1968, p. 177.

p. 257.

Socialist Revival,

1877-1914:

in Late- Victorian England,

Religion,

Class, and

So-

Princeton University Press,

Hastings Rashdall as Social Theologian

75

the members knew how to so present Christ. The second aim is the most specific of the three and was, for example, used by Westcott to justify his view that study was all that the Union had to do. In fact, the Union did not actually undertake much study of the Christian social tradition. The first aim is almost perversely obscure. Woodworth, in his very early study of Christian Socialism, may be correct when he suggests that the principle of 'Christian Law' refers to the 'fundamental notion that the road to right thinking lies through right acting'. 58 If this is the case, then Wagner may be right in saying that the Union 'theorised without evolving a theory or producing, as yet, tangible results in keeping with its possibilities'. 59 The CSU rapidly became for some, but not for all, a highly distinguished and respectable institution. Early in the CSU's life there was something of a split between the more 'radical' Headlamite London branch and the more intellectual branch to which Rashdall belonged. The leadership of the CSU was insistent that the Union was not tied to any particular form of churchmanship, partly ' . . . on the principle of Christian Socialism being something larger and broader than mere "Socialism"'. 60 In Gore's case, for example, Christian Socialism was 'a divinely revealed ideal' of which secular political and economic constructions were but temporary and partial embodiments. Accordingly they refused to narrow and limit their conceptions by tying themselves down to any particular theory or political party'. 61 The CSU quickly became an expert in the study of practical social questions, the promotion of commercial morality and of consumer conscience. The most convincing explanation of the phenomenon of the CSU is found, in my opinion, in Norman's Church and Society already mentioned above. Norman argues that 'the most obvious [general conclusion] is the class basis of the social ethics the Church has adopted'. 62 'Radical attitudes adopted by churchmen derived from an area of debate largely restricted to the educated classes'. The social attitudes of the Church have derived from the surrounding intellectual and 58 A.V. Woodworth, Christian Socialism in England, Swan Sonnenschein, London, 1903, p. 142. 59 D . O . Wagner, The Church of England and Social Reform since 1854, Columbia University Press, N e w York, 1930, p. 233. 60 Jones, The Christian Socialist Revival, p. 160. 61 Jones, The Christian Socialist Revival, p. 178. 62 Norman, Church and Society, p. 8.

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political culture, and not, as churchmen themselves always seem to assume, from theological learning. Thus the leadership of the CSU was 'not really socialist at all'. Norman claims that the senior body of the CSU represented the synthesis of Victorian intellectual liberalism with Chamberlain's 'constructionism' or Collectivism. 'They differed only in the scale of their moralising from those of their class and profession whose criticisms of Political Economy, and partial acceptance of collectivist functions for the State, were marked features of the last three decades of the century'. 63 Norman labels most of what passed for Christian Socialism in the later nineteenth century as 'Liberalism, with all its moralistic qualities, but with Gladstonian economic ideas hacked out'. What remained from all this for the CSU was in fact 'social service idealism of the upper-class clergy who organised and sustained it'. 64 Thus understood, the CSU was in a fairly explicit way not 'political'. 'It is clear that Christian Socialists of the CSU tradition did not regard their ideas as requiring political expression. They saw "socialism" as a moral dimension to be added to existing political parties' .65

Rasbdall

and

'Brotherhood'

In order to locate the main principle(s) of Rashdall's social theology, I shall render, impressionistically, a selection of expressions by Rashdall on the theme of 'Brotherhood'. The list is by no means exhaustive. This method is applied since nowhere, with the partial exception of the essay 'The Social Mission of the Church' in Christus in Ecclesia does Rashdall set out a systematic account of his social theology. ' . . . Any higher conception of God than is implied in Christ's revelation of God's Fatherhood, or any higher conception of human life than is implied in His ideal of Sonship to God and Brotherhood to all men'. 66 ' . . . But then the essence of His teaching is our brotherhood one of another in that Society which He founded'. 67 ' . . . the nature of 63 64 65 66 67

Norman, Norman, Norman, Rashdall, Rashdall,

Church and Society, p. 176. Church and Society, p. 181. Church and Society, p. 185 (my italics). Doctrine and Development, p. 59. Christus in Ecclesia, T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1904, p. 49.

Hastings Rashdall as Social Theologian

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the Brotherhood formed by His followers'. 6 8 ' . . . the life of Christian Brotherhood may be realised in the work of a profession done heartily and honestly as a service to one's fellow-men, in the charities of private and family life, in the active and energetic discharge of citizen duties'. 6 9 . . the principle of human brotherhood - the principle that there is an essential value in every human soul and every human life'. 7 0 ' . . . a society knowing and recognising one another as brethren . . . '. 7 1 'The idea of a society of brethren acting and working together for the great moral and spiritual and social ends which Jesus called the Kingdom of Heaven . . . \ 7 2 ' . . . the Christian ideal of brotherhood'. 7 3 'The essence of Christ's teaching was that men should treat G o d as their Father and one another as brothers'. 7 4 'The idea of a Church . . . is the idea of an organised community . . . for turning society at large into a brotherhood of men serving one another in the way that Christ enjoined upon his disciples'. 75 'The true idea of the Church is that it should be the most conspicuous realisation and embodiment, the most powerful witness and promoter, of that principle of brotherhood in human society'. 7 6 ' . . . the value of Christ's great principle of Brotherhood'. 7 7 Ά man who believes what Christ taught about God's Fatherhood, about human brotherhood and human duty'. 7 8 \ . . in laying down the principle of human Brotherhood, in its fullest possible extent and with a complete absence of inconsistent additions and qualifications, our Lord has laid down the fundamental principle of all true Morality as it is recognised by the moral consciousness of the present day at its highest'. 7 9 ' . . . the very principle of Love or universal Brotherhood'. 8 0 'The law of Brotherhood requires that we should love every 68 Rashdall, Christus in Ecclesia, p. 59. 69 Rashdall, Christus in Ecclesia, p. 106. 70 Rashdall, Christus in Ecclesia, p. 129. 71 Rashdall, Christus in Ecclesia, p. 317. 72 Rashdall, Christus in Ecclesia, p. 321. 73 Rashdall, Christus in Ecclesia, p. 360. 74 Rashdall, Christus in Ecclesia, p. 26. 75 Rashdall, Christus in Ecclesia, p. 29. 76 Rashdall, Christus in Ecclesia, p. 29. 77 Rashdall, Philosophy

and Religion, Duckworth, London, 1931, p. 164.

78 Rashdall, Philosophy

and Religion, p. 173.

79 Rashdall, Conscience and Christ, p. 113. 80 Rashdall, Conscience and Christ, p. 136.

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human being, even the man who has done us an injury'. 8 1 . . The Christian ideal of universal Brotherhood'. 8 2 . . the Christian doctrine of Brotherhood'. 8 3 ' . . . the belief that God is the common Father of men and that Christ taught the Brotherhood of man . . . \ 84 ' . . . those whose bond of union is a common acceptance of the principles of Christian brotherhood and a common purpose of applying that principle to questions of social policy . . . , 8 5 'Is the Christian necessarily a Socialist?'. 86 . . the Gospel of Brotherhood'. 8 7 It has become plain from this culling of references to 'brotherhood', that, for Rashdall, the Christian Church is an organised society whose ultimate aim is to bring about that ideal state of human life which Jesus called the 'Kingdom of Heaven'. So the duty of Christians is clear, as members of an ideal Society which is as it were ever struggling to find a more and more perfect expression in an actual visible Church - to strive towards the mark of social salvation. It is therefore appropriate to introduce at this point references to worship and brotherhood within the society of the church.

Worship 'In all worship the realisation of Christian Brotherhood is an important element'. 88 F o r Rashdall, 'the H o l y Communion is worship at its highest'. 89 It is 'the great symbol of Christian brotherhood'. 9 0 Specifically, 'more than any other service, the H o l y Communion helps us, compels us to realise the idea of the Church or Christian Society. In all worship the realisation of Christian brotherhood is an imporsi Rashdall, Conscience

and Christ, p. 144.

82 Rashdall, Conscience

and Christ, p. 258.

83 Rashdall, Conscience

and Christ, p. 263.

84 Rashdall, Conscience and Christ, p. 283. 85 Rashdall, 'Is the Christian necessarily a Socialist?', Economic p. 333. 86 Rashdall, 'Is the Christian necessarily a Socialist?', Economic p. 333. 87 Rashdall, Principles and Precepts, p. 168. 88 Rashdall, Christus in Ecclesia, p. 46. 89 Rashdall, Christus in Ecclesia, p. 47. 90 Rashdall, Christus in Ecclesia, p. 46.

Review,

July, 1908,

Review,

July, 1908,

Hastings Rashdall as Social Theologian

79

tant element: in the Holy Communion it is of vital importance'.91 The Eucharist is, moreover, profoundly related to Christian morality (not only to Christian doctrine, as some have supposed and still suppose). 'Communion with the brethren is a vital part of that Sacrament. The Sacrament in which we symbolically eat the body and drink the blood of Christ does, indeed, primarily mean an effort to appropriate, to conform our wills to His teaching . 92 Thus the Eucharist is not merely an human construction; on the contrary 'the essence of His teaching is our brotherhood one of another in that Society which He founded - the Society pledged to live out that teaching of His in social life'.93 Rashdall radically overturns the priorities of conventional piety. The 'high-church' teaching 'tends at times almost to treat the whole spiritual life of man as a preparation for the worthy reception of the sacrament, instead of treating the sacrament as a preparation for a Christ-like life'. 94 Thus, 'the thinking, which should be the basis of prayer, should not be limited to private matters, to personal failings, and personal habits. If we are to say sincerely "Thy Kingdom come", we must be thinking in our own minds of some definite steps or phases in the coming of that kingdom of God, of the work of our calling, of the works of charity, the good causes, the social institutions, the scraps and bits of social reform or social progress which we might do something to promote'. 95 But alongside this social orientation to worship and prayer, 'in ecclesiastical matters Rashdall was, although not Anglo-catholic in his theory of sacraments or ministry, a thorough churchman caring greatly for the historical institutions of religion, and for continuity and tradition even in the smallest details; in his own practice he set great store by frequent communion and regular attendance at public worship'.96 Rashdall derived his appreciation of beautiful ceremonial from his father, John Rashdall, who had an intense love of church order and worship.

91 Rashdall, Christus in Ecclesia, p. 48. 92 Rashdall, Christus in Ecclesia, p. 48. 93 Rashdall, Christus in Ecclesia, p. 49. 94 Rashdall, Christus in Ecclesia, p. 39. 95 Rashdall, Christus in Ecclesia, pp. 160f. 96 C.C. Webb, D.N.B.,

1922-1930, p. 708.

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For Rashdall the philosopher of religion, 'both God and the souls are included in the Absolute, which cannot therefore be itself a Person but is rather a society of persons'. 97 So, in a sense, the church is, by analogy also a society of persons as the corporate worship of the church is that of a community of persons. Likewise the social task of the church is to realise the human community at large, and human communities, in particular, as societies of persons. So the Kingdom, not an otherworldly reality in Rashdall, is the ideal community to which humankind moves. All this is affirmed and confirmed, Rashdall would say, by what we can safely believe, after critical study, to have been the nature and content of Jesus' person and moral teaching in the New Testament. The study of moral philosophy and Christian ethics, in turn, takes this search for moral understanding further in ever changing circumstances. All this, then, relates to the leitmotif of 'Brotherhood', to its nature and realisation.

Rashdall and the Scope of Social

Theology

Rashdall went up to New College, Oxford, in 1877. His time in Oxford coincided almost exactly with that 'turning point, that "new emphasis" in British government which, Barker argues, came after 1880'. 'After that date government did more of what it had done previously in the w a y of regulation and control . . . in the w a y of direct intervention and the provision of services'. 98 Alarm about the condition of the people with respect to the quality of social life, public behaviour, industrial competitiveness, and military competence, seemed to require a much enlarged 'direct public responsibility for the mental and physical conditions of the people'. ' . . . The new conception was of government as the instigator of movement. . . . Government was not merely to regulate society, it was to improve it'. 99 An important figure for Rashdall, and for many others in this transitional period, was Thomas Hill Green referred to above. It has been said of Green that he contributed to this climate of political argument by providing a distinctive tone of earnestness, 97 Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, p. 53. 98 R. Barker, Political Ideas in Modern Britain, Methuen, London, 1973, p. 7. 99 Barker, p. 99.

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social concern and addiction to high principle. H e held that freedom is valuable only as a means to an end. To secure the conditions of such freedom, public action was necessary to raise the condition of people who would otherwise be prevented in practice from acting freely. Green himself appears to have preferred a voluntary individual effort to coercive state action and so, in talking of state action, he thought in terms of the removal of obstacles to freedom which was not coercive. N o w sometimes Rashdall writes in a conservative way and sometimes much more adventurously in this respect. I shall illustrate this diversity of approach with mention of three topics. First, Rashdall's chapter 'The Social Mission of the Church', which I have earlier recognised as a key document for Rashdall's social theology, begins by accepting the largely societal and collective character of that mission, but, in the later parts of the chapter, he notes three applications of his general principles. O n e is personal almsgiving; another is personal service; another, more pertinently, is taking 'an interest in those wider social questions which the Christian spirit has somehow got to solve'. 100 Second, Rashdall writes forcefully, even passionately, in his essay 'Social Reform and the Education of the Clergy'. 101 Speaking of the clergy, he insists that 'people whose duty is . . . to act on society, should at least, it will surely be admitted, know something as to what society is, what are its aims, what are the laws by which it is governed, how far it is capable of improvement, what are the criteria of good and bad social effort, what are the particular problems which are at present occupying the attention of social philosophers and of experienced practical men in these connections'. This can counteract the 'mistakes and crudities . . . which tend to bring discredit upon the whole idea of Christian socialism, or even of social Christianity'. 102 Third, Rashdall faces the critical question about intervention by the Church in matters of state and secular government. ' . . . I come to a question which specially concerns us as members of the CSU. This is the question of the interference of the Church and the clergy in political and economic struggles'. 'All that is moral lies within the province of the church, and therefore of its official organs; and morality covers the whole 100 Rashdall, Christus in Ecclesia, p. 137. 101 Rashdall, 'Social Reform and the Education of the Clergy', Economic Review, 1898, pp. 44-57. 102 Rashdall, p. 57.

8,

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Anthony D y s o n

of life. O n the other hand, when we come to the practical question whether an interference, rhetoric or partisanship, of a particular kind, under particular circumstances, is always not conducive to that good life which it is the church's mission to promote - that is a question about which it is always possible to say a good deal on both sides.

But remember that the question is always one of expedience, not of principle But in more usual circumstances how far do the Bible and Christian tradition affect the scope of social theology and what policy is the Church permitted to pursue in respect of political liaisons? An informative treatment of Rashdall's response to these two questions come from reading together William Temple's article on 'The Church and the Labour Party' and Rashdall's response 'Is the Christian necessarily a Socialist?'. 1 0 4 Temple envisages a member 'of our Church' i.e., the Church of England, who hears voices and cries from political theories and parties. 'But he hears yet another cry . . . this cry is of Brotherhood, of mutual dependence binding all men to each other and to the body politic, of hope and faith that society can be regenerated and a kingdom of Humanity set up'. The member 'of our Church', furthermore, knows that this is 'his own doctrine' and that 'in his B o o k ' i.e., the Bible, 'he has a definition of the ideal which is trying, there outside, to articulate itself. Temple then quotes from St Paul on the Body, referring to 'this Socialism of St Paul's'. Also, commenting on the Epistle to the Ephesians, Temple speaks of the 'fullest scheme of evolutionary socialism, so far as all fundamental points are concerned . . . '. O n e of the objections put by Christians to this interpretation is that the Church, unlike the Labour Movement, is not concerned 'with the material side of life'. Temple replies that 'the Philosophy of the Incarnation certainly involves the principle that spirit needs bodily expression if it is to be operative; and the actual conduct of the Incarnate gives no support to this concentration upon the purely spiritual side of life'. 'There is no warrant in the Gospel narrative for the view that the Church is concerned only with men's characters, and not with their physical conditions'. Temple continues: 'the sug103 Rashdall, 'The Rights of the Church', Economic Review, 6, 1896, pp. 178f. 104 W. Temple, 'The Church and the Labour Party', Economic Review, 18, 1908, pp. 190-202; and Rashdall, 'Is the Christian necessarily a Socialist?', pp. 315-336.

Hastings Rashdall as Social Theologian

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gestion, that is, that the aims and object of the Labour Movement lie outside the sphere of Christianity as such - cannot be supported by the authority of the Gospels'. 'The Church is bound to recognise the justice, the essential Christianity, of the Labour Movement; the alternative is internal decay and ultimately dissolution'. The great sins of the modern Churchman are sins of the citizen, not of the individual. 'Everywhere it is the system which grips us . . . which is . . . when contrasted with the Christian ideal, a vast organisation of wickedness for which no individual is altogether responsible'. Furthermore, the Church can supply the chief need of the Labour Movement, namely the need for an appropriate ritual, through its central rite the Holy Communion, which is 'essentially and primarily social'. 105 What follows if the Labour Movement and the Church were to come together? The Church would surely reserve her right 'to criticise the method of the movement from time to time'. If that right is not appreciated, then people say that the Church is trying to attach herself to a political party. 'That is not our aim; but to those who raise the objection it may be fitting to point out that, if the Church ought not to be attached to any political party, it is incumbent upon us to detach her from that political party to which she has been united for at least three centuries'. What the Church may do is to 'guide thought' and apply the principles of Christianity with regard to economics. Now competition is at base a principle of selfishness and even hatred. 'Brotherhood and competition are not only distinct; they are contradictory. If the doctrine of the Brotherhood of Man is to be worked out in the economic sphere, we must substitute a co-operative basis for the existing competitive basis of society'. 'Socialism . . . is the economic realisation of the Christian Gospel. There is no middle path between the acceptance of Socialism and the declaration that the Gospel cannot be applied to economics'. 'We may believe in Individualism, or we may believe in Christ; we cannot consistently believe in both'. Rashdall replies to Temple in the article cited above. He contrasts the term 'Socialism' as used by Maurice and Kingsley to mean the subordination of economics to ethical principles, with the later sense of Socialism as the reorganisation of economic arrangements where the State is the sole owner of land and capital. So Socialism is either an ethical principle or Christianity is identified with a particular pro105 W . Temple, 'The Church and the Labour Party', pp. 190f.

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gramme of social or economic reform. Rashdall sees Socialism as, in the first place, an economic theory and not an ethical creed. Socialism does presuppose certain ethical values, but these are not special to Socialism and may be shared by all sorts of people who are not Socialists. So a Christian may share a Socialist's ideals without approving of Socialism as an economic theory. 106 In the second place Rashdall disagrees with Temple's disposition to 'identify Christianity with a particular plan of social reform'. This is especially the case if by 'Christianity' is meant the teaching of Jesus Christ. For long-term questions of social and political arrangements are incompatible with Jesus' expectation of an imminent parousia. Almost as unhistorical is it, as it seems to me, to discover a 'full scheme of evolutionary Socialism' in St Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians. But Rashdall, in any case, does not require that a justification of Socialism need be based on the New Testament. His theory of 'development', already noted, permits him to say that the Christian ideal includes many elements from later Christian developments. So the basic test question is: Is economic Socialism the best means of applying the Christian principle of Brotherhood to the conditions of modern life? The question 'between Socialism and Non-Socialism is a question of means and not of ends'. 107 Therefore, practically speaking, it is, on Rashdall's view, very important that 'Socialists and advanced Social Reformers who are not Socialists should practically co-operate upon the attainment of the ends upon which they are agreed'. Likewise, 'those whose bond of union is a common acceptance of the principles of Christian Brotherhood and a common purpose of applying that principle to questions of social policy should be willing to recognise that the difference between the Socialist and the Non-Socialist is a difference of machinery only, and not of ethical principle. It is unfair, misleading, and practically injurious to the cause of social reform to insist that every Christian must join the Labour Party, or that the Church should use its corporate strength on its behalf'. 108

106

Rashdall, 'Is the Christian necessarily a Socialist?', pp. 315f.

107

Rashdall, 'Is the Christian necessarily a Socialist?', pp. 330f.

108

Rashdall, 'Is the Christian necessarily a Socialist?', p. 333.

Hastings Rashdall as Social Theologian

85

Dr Garnett's Wisdom The cause of re-focusing the achievement of Rashdall has been greatly advanced by the recent publication of Garnett's essay on 'Hastings Rashdall and the renewal of Christian Social Ethics c. 1890-1920'. 1 0 9 Rashdall's friend Inge 'deplored what he saw as an over-obsession with social ethics, and especially what he saw as the tainting of Christianity with secular politics. For him the Gospel was emphatically not a gospel of social reform, but of spiritual regeneration'. Rashdall, too, accepted that religious revival would not be sustained through jumping onto political bandwagons. But Rashdall passionately affirmed 'the church's direct intellectual role in shaping moral and social renewal in the world'. Inge's polemical position on social questions 'unhelpfully bypassed real religious dilemmas'. Rashdall's aim was to develop a scientific theology and moral philosophy which would prevent the world-affirming from becoming a secularised humanitarianism. Rashdall admired Seely's Ecce Homo who stressed that to carry out Christ's precepts about the brotherhood of man in modern times, much more is needed than habits of devotion, personal correctness or austerity, charity to individuals among the sick and the poor. Rashdall always paid attention to 'the context of ideas' and gave weight to 'mixtures of motive' and to the 'practical difficulties of making moral decisions'. Rashdall judged that if Christian theology were to disappear as an effective force, 'Christian morality would not remain beyond the reach of criticism'. This was the setting for Rashdall's, Gore's and others' efforts for the development of a new Christian casuistry. Christian critics of the Church's involvement in the debate on social ethics were particularly prone to use biblical or historical references without attention to context or to the principle of development. Rashdall saw the fallacies of this approach. Henson argued that moral laws and economic laws operated in separate spheres; Rashdall drew attention to the extent to which modern economic theory 'itself incorporated consideration of ethical factors'. He argued for the absolute impossibility of separating 109

In Revival

and Religion

since 1700, eds., Jane Garnett and Colin Matthew, The

Hambledon Press, London and Rio Grande, 1993.

86

Anthony Dyson

Church from State by dividing life into mutually exclusive spheres. 'Study was for Rashdall the prerequisite of action'. 'This was a recognition of the creative power of doubt, allied to a belief in the force of rational questioning'. 'The moral philosopher still had a role in helping to tease out developments of Christian ethics in increasingly complex human circumstances'. The importance of D r Garnett's essay lies in the care that she takes to locate Rashdall in his own situation. She draws attention, for example, to recent studies of political and social philosophy in Rashdall's period. She also emphasises that Rashdall's primary role was as a critic and a teacher. It was through his teaching, preaching and writing that his influence was felt. H e was not a systématiser. D r Garnett is of the opinion that the 'broader working out of his social theology and his commitment to its practical application and apologetic significance have been almost entirely neglected by historians'. I have reached the same conclusion by my own route. There is, therefore, still much to be examined; but the outcome promises great reward.

Conclusion M y treatment of Rashdall's account of worship occupies a central place in this essay - more central in fact than those who think of Rashdall as only philosopher and theologian might suppose. Moreover, his treatment of worship is fully 'of a piece' with the other axioms of his thought. Using his category of 'brotherhood' to reconstitute traditional worship and spirituality, Rashdall overcomes crude contrasts between sacred and secular, time and eternity, and so on. But, if this far-ranging intellectual restatement of worship carries weight, Rashdall is clearly hesitant about what may become of the liberal intellectual Christian at the levels of piety and religious feeling. O n e of Rashdall's most moving and profound essays is 'Liberalism and Practical Piety'. 1 1 0 'We should not allow the unjust taunts and imputations of ribald ecclesiastical journals to prevent our recognising that theological emancipation (as we may call it) - emancipation from crude and narrow theories, imaginary terrors, baseless superstitions 110 Rashdall, Christus in Ecclesia, pp. 355-364.

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does bring with it some moral and religious dangers'. On the other hand, 'those who, if we took them at their word, believe in a God who is capable of the most arbitrary injustice, who is pictured either as a sort of Moloch . . . or else as a sort of ecclesiastical martinet... so often . . . exhibit far more grasp on the Christian ideal of brotherhood in their hearts and in their lives, than those who intellectually base their theology on the fatherhood and universal love of God'. A liberal theology is not of necessity a vague theology: but it is more difficult for it to be an 'efficacious influence over conduct'. So Rashdall's understanding of worship is pre-eminently ethical. He does not concentrate upon Transubstantiation, Consubstantiation, or the Real Presence, though equally he is not prepared to have a battle about them. Instead his new symbolic world, based on the ethical criterion of 'brotherhood', means an ethical relationship with Christ. 'Loyalty to Christ means primarily believing Christ's words, attending to them, doing them. Feeding on Christ's body and His blood means living upon his words'. 111 This is a principal element in the process of the realisation of ethics to which philosophy, moral philosophy, theology, social philosophy, history, Christian ethics, and other disciplines contribute.

111 Rashdall, Christus in Ecclesia, p. 35.

Ernst Troeltsch's Ethics of Compromise and its Significance for Contemporary Theological Ethics Thomas Reinhuber The significance of the concept of compromise in the work of Ernst Troeltsch has already been pointed out in various interpretations.1 The considerations of this paper assume that compromise is a key concept for the thought of Troeltsch. This concept is, as no other, suited to shed light on his works, especially his ethical writings, in their achievements but also in their problems. The first two sections of this paper will outline two texts from the beginning and the end phases of the theologian's life-work with the intention of featuring compromise as the theme of Troeltsch's entire research project. A third section will examine more closely the function of the concept of compromise with respect to both the ethical questions and the context in which the concept appears. The closing fourth section will outline the possibility of a critical appropriation of the significance of the concept of compromise as it informs Troeltsch's thought for contemporary ethical reflection within theology.

I. Compromise as Necessity In Troeltsch's renowned article published in 1902, "The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religions", the essential problems and questions motivating the liberal theologian throughout his entire life are concentrated in an exemplary manner. The early works of the young scholar are pulled together in this article which the author states 1

The following are only examples: W. Bodenstein, Neige des Historismus. Ernst Troeltschs Entwicklungsgang, 1959, 119 and 179; R. J. Rubanowice, Crisis in Consciousness. The Thought of Emst Troeltsch, 1982, 133-136; H. Steubing, Der Kompromiß als ethisches Problem, 1955, 7.

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is, for him too, "the seed of what is to come" 2 , the starting-point for diverse research projects in theology, philosophy, the history of the humanities and social history. Troeltsch does not only move on theological terrain with the question of the absoluteness of the Christian religion. For Troeltsch, this question is an example of the overarching problem of all philosophy of history. This problem is a motif constantly preoccupying his work and it has made him the proponent of historicism. This problem has to do with the "main question of all philosophy of history", the "conflict between historical relativism and the Absolute". 3 H o w is the metaphysics of the 'Absolute' related to the history of the relative? H o w can absolute norms and values be established in the relative development of human cultures and ideas? This question of historicism was also the theme of Ernst Troeltsch's entire life's work. In the article on the absoluteness of Christianity, this theme makes its first appearance in a comprehensive manner. The starting-point of this work is the ascertainment that an important characteristic of the modern world is given with the movement of the Enlightenment in the 18th century: the "development of a totally historical view of human affairs". 4 Christianity can not immunize itself against this fact. As is the case with all other religions, Christianity must locate itself in the stream of the contingent determinations of historical development and must itself be subject to historical-critical observation. The concepts of historicity and relativism are, for Troeltsch, synonymous concepts. Hence, there can be no 'Absolute' given in history. For Troeltsch, however, the recognition of total relativism in the stream of historical development does not lead inevitably to a sceptical or nihilistic indifference with respect to the origin, the becoming and the passing away of historical movement and intellectual ideas. The human being is not tossed about in the waves of history without orientation or without points of reference. N o r m s are won by weighing 2

E. Troeltsch, Meine Bücher. Gesammelte Schriften ( = G S ) IV, 1925, 9.

3

Ibid.

4

E. Troeltsch, Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte und zwei Schriften zur Theologie (Siebenstern-Taschenbuch 138), 1969, 29. The references to this work in this essay are translated by Christine Helmer. For the meaning of history (Geschichte) in Troeltsch's work, see: A. O . Dyson, History in the Philosophy and Theology of Ernst Troeltsch (Diss. Oxford), 1968.

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and comparing alternatives conflicting with each other in history and by becoming personally convinced of the relevance of certain values in one's life. The 'Absolute' can never be found in history because it transcends history; the truth removed from all relativity provides the final goal and ideal for the human activity of comparing and evaluating· If this hypothesis is accurate for all appearances in the history of ideas, it is also accurate for religions. N o religion can claim absoluteness for itself. Nevertheless, when the great religions are compared with one another, Christianity, according to Troeltsch, achieves the "supremacy" 5 and it appears "not only as the high-point, but also as the point of convergence between all recognizable directions of religious development". 6 Troeltsch does not wish to exclude the possibility that this religion may be surpassed and developed as it is oriented to the future goal of absolute divine truth, but he is convinced that these developments can only arise from the ground of the Christian religion. At the end of his deliberations, Troeltsch inquires after the possible consequences of the case he has described. H e forecasts most difficult future developments for both liberal dogmatics and church praxis. H e closes the article with the sentence: "The unavoidable concessions and compromises will emerge by themselves, but they should not be the proper goal of theology". 7 The term compromise appears in Troeltsch's writings here for the first time. The final phrase of this important article is given a distinctly important status. However, the term compromise is not precisely defined and its meaning remains ambiguous. Is Troeltsch referring to compromise in theory or in praxis? With respect to whom or what are concessions to be discussed? Between what points of view and extremes are compromises to be concluded? The context does not permit an unambiguous answer. Nevertheless, it is established that Troeltsch does not appeal to compromise as something that could be or should be avoided. O n the contrary, his concluding verdict assigns to compromise the mode of the self-evident and the necessary. Although compromise should

5

Ibid., 102.

6

Ibid., 90.

7

Ibid., 131.

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not be the proper goal of theology, compromises, for Troeltsch, are obviously inevitable and emerge naturally from situations.

II. Compromise

as the universal

principle

The significance of the concept of compromise is only hinted at in Troeltsch's early work by way of the absoluteness of Christianity. However, some of Troeltsch's later works give the concept greater importance along with a more specific content. Five lectures are collected in the small volume, Christian Thought: Its History and Application^, that Troeltsch intended to give from March 14 to 19,1923 at the Universities of London, Oxford and Edinburgh and at the London Society for the Study of Religion. The lecture-tour was planned on the initiative of Friedrich von Hügel, a Roman Catholic theologian living in England and a good friend of Troeltsch. The invitation extended to Troeltsch provided the opportunity for an outstanding representative of German liberal theology to speak in England. The lecture tour was also intended to contribute to the mutual understanding between nations during the tense postwar situation. Troeltsch's sudden death on February 1, 1923 unfortunately frustrated the project. Nevertheless, the completed manuscript of Troeltsch's intended lectures can be read as a testament of the scholar, a summary of the essential conclusions of his work, but also leaving further questions. The lectures represent Troeltsch's theological perspective on the threshold of his last great work, Der Historismus und seine Probleme [Historicism and its Problems], a work remaining unfinished with only its first section completed. The following section will more closely examine the first three articles of the volume, Christian Thought: Its History and Application that are collected under the heading, "Ethics and the Philosophy of History". In the essay entitled, "The Place of Christianity among the World-Religions", Troeltsch reports on the conclusions of his Absoluteness article, clarifying it by adding some modifications. This text 8

E. Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Überwindung, published with an introduction by Friedrich von Hügel in 1924 . The second edition, a reprint of the 1924 edition, was published in 1979. The English edition appeared in 1923 with the title: Christian Thought: Its History and Application. Westport, Connecticut: Hyperion Press, Reprint edition, 1979. This latter English edition is cited in this paper.

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will not be considered in this essay. Rather, the lecture on "Politics, Patriotism and Religion" 9 is important for elucidating the meaning of Troeltsch's concept of compromise. In this lecture, Troeltsch begins by inquiring into the mutual influence of religion and politics. Once the medieval system of unity in which religion exerted an all-encompassing influence on politics had crumbled, an antagonism between diverse sovereign states with their respective interests dominated historical development. It was Machiavelli who, above all, reflected on the new state of affairs. He observed a rupture between politics and Christian morality and analyzed the mechanisms of Realpolitik. In contrast to Machiavelli, the connection of politics with religious or humanistic ideals has been advanced in diverse Utopian proposals, from Thomas More's Utopia to Kant's tractate On Eternal Peace. According to Troeltsch, actual politics has constantly aligned itself with the laws of obtaining and preserving power that Machiavelli had researched. The dreams of utopias have been abandoned to enthusiastic spirits. Troeltsch observes two extremes arising from this development: naturalism in which politics is solely a conflict of power determining the victory of the stronger or the luckier, and idealism, that is, the standpoint of religiously or spiritually disposed believers who can only suffer in the world of real politics and hope for the coming reign of God. However, the attempts to actualize each extreme is always doomed to failure. On the one hand, bare Machiavellianism leads to the self-destruction of nations through endless conflicts of power and wars. On the other hand, pure idealism means the complete renunciation of any actual effect on the world by shaping and ordering it. Troeltsch outlines a possible third alternative between both extremes. He sketches the possible solutions to the problems associated with the two extremes, the world-government of a single world-empire and the idea of a League of Nations, and finally shows that the difficulties point to "the true path . . . of practical compromise". 10 Politics is and remains for Troeltsch a human activity inseparable from power and violence. Nevertheless, politics must be humanized up to a point and must be open to ethical goals. Troeltsch considers both sides, power and spirit, rule and humanity, in his aim to join them by 9

Ibid., 131-167.

10 Ibid., 159.

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his way of compromise. Troeltsch hopes to find assistance and support for this way by distinguishing between politics, or the technical forms of power-interests, and patriotism, the commitment and love a nation feels for its own existence. However, patriotism does eventually reach beyond its borders; the commitments of other nations are respected, self-sovereignty is waived in favor of contributing to greater international organizations. The extension of the definition of patriotism touches upon practical problems that the thinker is unable to solve. In Troeltsch's words, the theoretical solution to these questions can be "only in a compromise between naturalism and idealism, between the practical necessities of human life upon earth and the purposes and ideals of the life of the spirit." 11 Troeltsch's concept of compromise stands in sharp contrast to widespread opinion. For Troeltsch, compromise plays a prominent role in both theoretical reflection and practical actualization. On the contrary, common opinion concedes a justification for compromise in practical conflicts but keeps it at arms length from theoretical discussions. Troeltsch deplores the opinion prevalent in Germany of compromise "as the lowest and most despicable means to which a thinker can have resort." 12 Troeltsch argues that the "radical disjunction . . . to choose either for or against"Xi demanded by many, finally and inevitably leads to ruin or makes itself impossible. An instructive example of this statement is, for Troeltsch, the history of Christianity, which was always "in the long run, a tremendous, continuous compromise between the Utopian demands of the Kingdom of God and the permanent conditions of our actual human life." 14 Troeltsch reflects more closely on the essentials when he identifies the constant shaping of compromise as the totality of life, all its powers, movements and ideas. The last sentence of the German edition of the lecture concludes with the thesis: "if the whole course of history is thus characterized by compromise, it is not likely that the thinker can escape it. He, too, must confess to a compromise even in these days when this presence and need of compromise in all earthly things

11 Ibid., 164. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid., 165.

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is weighing particularly heavily upon all our souls." 15 The significance Troeltsch attaches to the idea of compromise is insurpassably exhibited in this quotation. However, three smaller paragraphs are added to the English version of the lecture that do not appear in the German text. Troeltsch intended to use these paragraphs in a direct address to his English audience. A few sentences quoted from the English version further clarify Troeltsch's understanding of compromise: "Amongst yourselves, in England, the principle of compromise is less undervalued. Political experience and the influence of empirical systems of thought have given you a different outlook, though you have not lacked your uncompromising thinkers, from the Puritan fathers to the disciples of Rousseau, Tom Paine, and Bentham. . . . It is thus easier for me to confess my adhesion to the principle of compromise here than in my own country. I know of no other principle and I am unaware of any practical thinker who does." 16 The central motif of compromise appears more clearly in this statement than in the German text. Compromise is the focus towards which everything points. It can even be termed the principle that no theorist can avoid, not even when the theorist intends, as Troeltsch does, to deal also with practical problems. It is understandable that Troeltsch's declaration of compromise as the principle of his research and work might be more welcome in England, "the classical country of compromise, where it has played a dominant role for centuries in internal and external affairs" 17 , than in his own home country. This case also casts a characteristic light on Troeltsch's view of his own, rather isolated, position in the cultural and intellectual life of Germany.

15 Ibid., 166. 16 Ibid. 17 H . Steubing, Der Kompromiß

als ethisches Problem, 7.

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III. Compromise in Ethics

1. Universal ethics In the three lectures entitled "Ethics and the Philosophy of H i s t o r y " 1 8 , Troeltsch focuses again on his lifelong theme: the "relation between the endless movement of the stream of historical life and the need of the human mind to limit and to shape it by means of fixed standards." 1 9 Troeltsch searches for a system of ethics that is adequate to this task of limiting and ordering history. H o w can firm conclusions be drawn in the face of an all-embracing historical relativism where all traditional values threaten to disappear in the whirlpool of nihilism? H o w can unambiguous norms be formulated in the face of the complexity of an ethical system nourished from very different sources? Troeltsch begins to answer his question by considering a basis in the so-called morality of conscience. This type of morals, initially worked out in Greek philosophy, is founded on the doctrines of virtue and natural law. It was appropriated by the tradition of morality and was remodeled and further developed, especially in Christian culture. Kant led the way for the whole of modernity when he formulated a morality of conscience as a rationally determined ethics of duty. F o r Troeltsch, particular moral demands on the individual as well as on the social level can be deduced from the goal that must direct all human acts: the idea of a free, autonomous personality. Troeltsch gives examples of this idea: the demand to be truthful over and against oneself, justice in life together with others, the universal ideals of humankind, the ideas of humanity and the ideas of human rights. But, Troeltsch's reception of Kant's rational optimism is broken. The eternal, timeless and universal demands of reason stand against the temporal stream of history and the development of nature. Thus, for Troeltsch, the question of the relativism of the demands of reason becomes the quintessential problem. Morality is not from the outset ordered to nature and history. Morality must first establish itself, it must fight, because the tension between nature and spirit, between necessary self-preservation and the shaping of the moral personality is never completely resolved. "Man is, and always will be, at once a 18 E. Troeltsch, Christian 19 Ibid., 39.

Thought: Its History and Application,

36-129.

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natural and a rational being. Reconciliation can only be attained by a compromise which has always to be made afresh". 2 0 Troeltsch immediately raises the objection that there could be situations in which a compromise might be irresponsible or rejected as immoral. For Troeltsch, however, such possibilities are rare; if they appear, then they mostly refer to private and personal life. O n the other hand, there can be no refusal to compromise in the complex contexts of public life. Thus, at the end of his lecture on "The Morality of the Personality and of the Conscience", Troeltsch can only answer his initial question concerning the possibilities of damming up the stream of historical relativism by keeping this damming up a "relative act, which only realizes absolute standards as far as possible, and bears in its bosom its own absolute quality only in the form of decision by the personal conscience and resolution." 2 1 For Troeltsch, this decision always "remains an act of compromise". 2 2 Troeltsch further clarifies his understanding of the concept of ethics in the second lecture entitled " T h e Ethics of Cultural Values". In this lecture, he points out the two main themes of occidental ethics. H e has already pointed out the leading thread, the morality of personality and conscience. This strand is shaped by formal, subjective and rational principles of morality. The second essential line consists of the ethics of goods or the ethics of cultural values, that in contradiction to the morals of conscience is determined by material, objective and lived forms of morality. The former thread of ethics has its roots, above all, in Stoicism and attains its zenith in Kant's philosophy. The latter line can be traced back to Neo-Platonism and is brought to completion in the ethical systems of Schleiermacher and Hegel. Since antiquity, combinations and mixtures between both lines have always recurred. Nevertheless, for Troeltsch, a fundamental difference between the morals of conscience and ethics of culture can be clearly described. " A s the former by virtue of its formality leads us out of History into the sphere of the timelessly valid, so conversely the latter conducts us back into History and Development, and more particularly into the realm of the Individual." 2 3 Ethics of cultural values 20 Ibid., 64. 21 Ibid., 66. 22 Ibid., 67. 23 Ibid., 82.

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emerge out of respective historical circles of culture. They are embodied in specific concrete forms of life, such as marriage, family or state. Troeltsch anticipates a simpler solution for his fundamental problem of the historical shaping from an ethics of cultural values. For him, the solution can not emerge from the more universal, abstract morals of conscience. Universal ethical principles for the totality of humanity can be established on the basis of a morality of conscience, but the problem always remains as to how universal demands can be joined to particular shapes of diverse human cultures. Nevertheless, the necessity of relating the diverse shapes of cultural values to a unified whole remains, if the last word is not to be spoken by a pluralistic chaos of values. For Troeltsch, the task of synthesizing all essential and proven cultural values is necessary. This synthesis is, for him, the goal of all philosophy of history and ethics. The process of synthesis is the conscious reconstruction of the unconscious. 24 In Troeltsch's view, the task of compromise arises repeatedly anew with the conscious ordering of values that are grounded in the personality of the human being and its morality of conscience. Compromise now consists of the "union of the Morality of Conscience with the Ethic of the Goods or Values." 25 For Troeltsch, the great churches were once the forum in which such a creative synthesis could be prepared and executed. Troeltsch now assigns this task to a "Public Spirit" 26 , a term he leaves ambiguous. This "Common Spirit" is a specific situation in which humans can order and combine cultural values transmitted to them from the standpoint of conscientious convictions and feelings of responsibility. For Troeltsch, the task of ethically mastering history remains incomplete because ethics is always something "complex" and "diversified". 27 Troeltsch's lecture, "The Common Spirit", concludes the whole series on "Ethics and the Philosophy of History", and it ends appropriately with the statement that there can be no absolute and radical solution in ethics, but solutions are always and only to be determined by the way of compromise.

24 Cf. ibid., 95-99. 25 Ibid., 105. Cf. ibid., 111. 26 Ibid., 123. 27 Ibid., 128.

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2. Christian Ethics Compromise as a leading concept also plays a significant role in Troeltsch's principal ethical work The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches.1* The first edition of this book appeared in 1912. The occasion for its composition arose from Troeltsch's review of a work by Martin von Nathusius entitled, Die Mitarbeit der Kirche an der Lösung der sozialen Frage [The Contribution of the Church to the Solution of the Social Question], a book deemed by Troeltsch to be entirely unsatisfactory. Troeltsch begins his great work by inquiring into the importance of religiously determined social ideas for the treatment of the social problems of his day. What does Christianity, and more specifically, what do the churches have to contribute to the solution of social problems that have become more and more pressing since the age of industrialization? Churches are determined by their past histories, as are all historical phenomena. Troeltsch first undertakes to analyze the historical developments out of which various social theories of Christianity have emerged. A comprehensive history of Christian social ethics from its beginnings in Jesus' preaching to the eighteenth century, more broadly, of Christian ethics and culture in general resulted from this analysis. Troeltsch's main theme is the mutual conditioning of religious ideas and social reality rather than the one-sided dogmatic positions offered on both church and Marxist sides. Troeltsch was influenced by the sociological approach of his friend Max Weber. Troeltsch uses the following thesis to guide his investigation of the history of Christianity: a particular Christian idea corresponds to a specific sociological form of community and this form of community, in turn, corresponds to an independent social ethic. The intention of the project is to determine the mutual influence of Christian social form or social ethics and the world of the social in general: family, economic society and state. The message of Jesus was "a free personal piety . . . without any tendency towards the organization of a cult, or towards the creation 28 E. Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, Volumes I and II, with an introduction by H. Richard Niebuhr, tr. by Olive Wyon. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, reprint 1981. This translation will be quoted in this essay. The German text, "Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen" is found in GS I, 1977: 3rd reprint in the edition from 1922.

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of a religious community." 29 Nevertheless, diverse communities with particular shapes arose from faith in Jesus Christ and his elevation to the centre of the cult in worship. Troeltsch appropriates Max Weber's typology 30 and distinguishes between the "three main types of the sociological development of Christian thought: the Church, the sect and mysticism". 31 Troeltsch understands these basic concepts in Weber's sense of ideal types. They do not occur as types in reality but are always concretized in mixtures and combinations. However, as abstractions, these types are helpful for analysis. Troeltsch evaluates the dogmatic component as secondary to the worship of Christ and the unconscious religious foundational idea embedded in it. "The worship of Christ constitutes the centre of the Christian organization, and it creates Christian dogma." 32 On the basis of these categories, Troeltsch outlines the following typology 33 : The Church is defined as the institution of salvation and grace. As a Volkskirche [popular Church], it can admit the masses from all classes of society born into it. Its christology sees the redeemer and saviour in Christ. Soteriology is focused on the past event of the atoning death on the cross. The "administration" and mediation of salvation and grace occur through the distribution of the sacraments. In ecclesiological terms, the Church tends to identify itself with the kingdom of God. Theology, on the whole, has a sharp dogmatic coloration. The sect, on the contrary, is seen as the association of reborn Christians who have consciously decided to join the sect. It is a confessing and voluntary congregation that admits only few members - from the middle class and especially from the lower class. Christ is the Lord of the sect, its example and lawgiver. The concept of redemption is oriented to the future advent of Jesus Christ the Judge, and the sacraments are the confirmation of sanctification. The sect hopes for the coming kingdom of God. Its ethically determined theology is formed by a simple lay and Bible-based piety. 29 Ibid., 993. 30 See: M. Weber, Kirchen und Sekten in Nordamerika, in: CW 20, 1906, 558-562 and 577-582; in expanded form under the title Die protestantischen Sekten und der Geist des Kapitalismus also found in: M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie I, 1947, 207-236. 31 E. Troeltsch, The Social Teaching, 993. 32 Ibid., 994. 33 Cf. ibid., 993-999.

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Mysticism as a type is difficult to summarize. It consists of a free religiosity and it lacks any organization. Its members are found especially among the educated and the upper classes. The Christ of mysticism is conceived as spirit, principle or symbol. Redemption is understood as a spiritualized, inner uniting of the human soul with the divine. Consequently, sacraments as external elements do not play a significant role in mystic piety. The kingdom of God is located in the inner self, according to a mystical interpretation of Lk 17: 21. The theology of mysticism has a tendency to align itself with the science and culture of its time. In this rather schematic typology, Troeltsch has concretized and differentiated the types by using examples from the history of Christianity. It follows naturally that the ethics of the various churches and groups have differing shapes. The starting-point for the question concerning Christian ethics and its development is the preaching of Jesus of Nazareth. Troeltsch clearly appropriates Kantian concepts when he states that the announcement of the kingdom of God will shed light on the "true spiritual values" 34 of disposition and of pure will. A foundational moral demand for the preparation of the kingdom of God arises from this announcement. The moral demand consists of radical self-sanctification before God and of the dispositional ethical fulfillment of the commandment to love. According to Troeltsch, however, the moral demand as the foundation of Christian ethics is portrayed as "an ideal which cannot be realized within this world apart from compromise." 35 The problem appears as early in history as the origins of Christianity itself and "austere radicalism has already given way to compromise, with the necessity for being on terms of understanding with the general life of the world." 3 6 The tension between the 'ought' and the 'is', between ideal demand and the real world are continuously preserved in the history of Christianity. Therefore, "the history of the Christian Ethos becomes the story of a constantly renewed search for this compromise, and of fresh opposition to this spirit of compromise." 37

34 35 36 37

Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid.,

51. 999. 80. 999f.

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In this history, the churches search for the compromise between the preached ideal of the transcendent idea of the kingdom of God and the immanent worldly exigencies and conditions of life. They conduct the search on the basis of their universal outlook and lateral effects in society. The means by which compromise as a balance could be achieved was the reception of certain ideas of natural right, primarily those ideas of Stoic origin. The idea of relative natural right was also applied after the original, ideal demands of absolute natural right, such as freedom or justice, became part of the actual orders, such as right or property. This shift occurred under the conditions of the decline from the ideal society, in sociological terms, or after the fall, in Christian terms. Troeltsch points to medieval Thomistic social philosophy as the classical example of a church ethics of compromise. Thomistic social philosophy is an all-encompassing harmonious architecture of nature and grace from which a two-tiered moral structure develops. The first level consists of the praecepta of the Ten Commandments that are valid for all human beings and their ordinary level of worldly morality. The Consilia evangelica are raised above the Ten Commandments. These evangelical counsels based on the Sermon on the Mount are intended for those who desire to leave the world by following the strict morals of sanctification and travel to God on the perfect ascetic path. This "Catholic compromise of a natural and a supernatural ethic" 38 was broken by Protestant theology with its emphasis on a uniform moral code valid for all Christians. Nevertheless, another kind of compromise took the place of the double-level ethics. The Protestant version of ethics consisted of the morals of vocation. Its claim upheld the validity of Christian life and Christian piety in the world together with their forms, or common "vocations". Troeltsch determines the structure of Lutheranism to be conservative and quietist. Existing social conditions are passively endured rather than challenged. On the other hand, Calvinism actively and progressively engages in the political, social and economic orders. For Troeltsch, the form of Neo-Calvinism as "ascetic Protestantism" constitutes "along with mediaeval Catholicism . . . the second great main type of Christian social doctrine". 39 38 Ibid., 496. 39 Ibid., 690.

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These church shapes with their respective ethics of compromise were challenged from the beginning by the sects. The sects advocated a radical, uncompromising ethics oriented on the Sermon on the Mount. They lived, from the Donatists to the Waldensians, from the Anabaptist groups to the English Puritans and the American Q u a k ers, moving between the two poles of passivity and activity. At the one pole, they suffered and endured political and social conditions in their retreat from the world and the quiet waiting for the kingdom of God. At the other pole, they fought aggressively and reformingly against the world in their attempt actively to actualize the kingdom of G o d as its strict ethical ideal on earth. For Troeltsch, the sects are exclusively "the sole supporters of a Christian social ethic which was radical, allowed no compromise, and did not accept the existing social order" 4 0 throughout the entire history of Christianity. Finally, mysticism emerges as the third type of Christian selfshaping. It strives for freedom of conscience against legal coercion and seeks solidarity with others. However, it is not concerned with finding or not finding a compromise because it is not founded on an institution and an organization. 4 1 After a vast traverse through the history of Christian ethics, the conclusions of Troeltsch's social theory seem rather inconclusive and resigned. His initial question had been concerned with the role of Christianity in determining the solution of social problems of his time. The only answer he offers is the insight "that all Christian-Social Work [social endeavour] is in a problematic condition." 4 2 The forms representing Christian social theories of the past do not suffice to cope with actual problems. Church programs do exist, but they are hardly noticed and they have little connection to reality. The social and reforming ideals of the sects can be considered to be honourable, but they ultimately remain mere Utopian child's play in the face of pressing problems. Troeltsch has in mind the goal of the transcendent kingdom of G o d both as the actualization of the 'Absolute' and as the strength it gives to work in this world. Nevertheless, according to Troeltsch, an ethical system can only be developed in the light of

40 Ibid., 804. 41 Cf. ibid., lOOOf. 42 Ibid., 1012.

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compromise constantly accommodating to the respective situation and "will only desire to achieve that which is practically possible."43 A further question concerning the function of a new ethical system in society is addressed. For Troetsch, the way ethics is sociologically shaped within a particular organization must inevitably lead to a compromise. Although, for Troeltsch, the type "Church" has lost its dominating role in society, the Church remains necessary as it provides the greatest possible framework for organization. Troeltsch's hope lies with the Church as an all-encompassing Volkskirche. Room to develop is found within this house for both the groups of the sects with their impulses for consistent ethics and for the mystics with their commitment to individuality and freedom. The goal here is also a compromise, a balance and a common uniting of the forces of the Church, the sects and mysticism in favour of a unified whole.

IV. Critical

appreciation

The three sections above have shown that the concept of compromise, a concept so decisively determinative of Troeltsch's thinking, is not unambiguously conceived. Troeltsch himself gives no definition for this word which is so important to him. He evidently uses the term according to its common language use. The concept is coloured differently with respect to its use in various texts and problem contexts. Three aspects of the concept of compromise are distinguished from each other in this fourth section.

1. The avoidance of extremes This task of compromise is encountered mainly in texts discussing practical and political questions. As a theologian, Troeltsch was frequently concerned with the relation between theoretical analysis and practical work in state, economics and society. In his personal life, he was also politically active in several part-time and honorary posts. His experiences on both ter43 Ibid., 1013.

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rains of the vita activa and the vita contemplativa increasingly urged him to recognize the necessity of compromise. F o r him, compromise is the best means to balance diverse and often opposing interests. C o m promise opens up the perspective for the possible and the actualizable, and helps to traverse the reasonable path of the middle between two extremes. Troeltsch states that all radicalisms inevitably end in destruction. This statement, formulated during the Weimar Republic, proved to be a clear-sighted warning concerning the dictatorship of National Socialism. Troeltsch specifically advocated the necessity of compromise in the political sphere. His claim, relevant to contemporary socio-political action, has its plausibility and justification. In almost every daily newspaper or news broadcast one encounters compromise as the best possible solution to conflict, whether it be in political disputes between parties, or in wage-bargaining between unions and management establishing a wage agreement. There is no question that compromise is an essential element in politics and society, primarily the politics of a democratic and constitutional state. Compromise cannot be avoided in thinking about political issues. Furthermore, theological ethics must perceive this state of affairs and reflect on it. But Troeltsch's deliberations on the contribution of compromise to theological ethics are too general to be helpful in concrete situations. H e outlines a comprehensive, universal conception of a theological ethical goal, but he hardly considers the specific spheres of its applications, the limits and possible deformations of compromise. T h e proposals of Wolfgang Trillhaas can be considered here to fill in the gaps of Troeltsch's outline. In his work on ethics, Trillhaas discusses the concept of compromise in the chapter appropriately headed, " E t h i k der Demokratie". 4 4 H e deals with the origins of the concept of compromise in the history of right and then the possible and necessary - and the questionable - applications of the concept. His considerations are more precise and helpful than Troeltsch's suggestions. Troeltsch can suggest that a contemporary ethics be concerned with compromise, but his reflections do not suffice for a more detailed and differentiated analysis.

44 W. Trillhaas, Ethik. Third Edition 1970, 466-470.

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2. T h e r e d u c t i o n of the ideal In spite of the complexity Troeltsch discovers in ethics, he tends to think and to analyze moral problems in simple dualisms and polar oppositions after all. Troeltsch reduces the entire historical development of ethics, including Christian ethics, to the question of how the ethical ideal, or the kingdom of G o d in Christian terms, can hold its own ground or can even be asserted in the real world. For Troeltsch, the actualization of the kingdom of G o d in the real world is not thinkable without compromises. However, the ethical ideal inevitably experiences a devaluation and a reduction of its original content in the situation of compromise. There can exist an absolute willing, but never an absolute accomplishment, under the conditions of this world. Consequently, for Troeltsch, the "art of the possible" (Bismarck) applies not only to politics, but also to ethics. At this point, it is appropriate critically to ask the following question with respect to Christian ethics. Is Troeltsch too much shaped by a metaphysical dualism which he simply imports into Christian preaching and theology? Troeltsch interprets N e w Testament texts in idealist concepts. In becoming a mouthpiece for the Kantian ethics of reason, Jesus of Nazareth's own proclamation moves into the background. Troeltsch evidently has as his starting-point a pure Christianity, an original idea of the kingdom of G o d that cannot be lived without compromising with the world. This idea fades, in Troeltsch's thought, to a future ideal, to absolute divinity serving as the transcendent guiding star of ethical efforts in this world. Following from this startingpoint, connections to the doctrines-of creation and christology are entirely left out of the picture. Troeltsch's talk about the compromise between an ideal Christianity and the real world is not adequate to the conceptions of G o d as Creator, Redeemer and Sanctifier. G o d posits Godself as Creator in relation to the created world. G o d as Redeemer and Sanctifier condescends to the fallen world, always and again engaging in the world. Therefore, Christianity's engaging in the world is nothing alien or detrimental to its nature, but is already constituted by G o d ' s act of incarnation. Consequently, the decisive question must be: how is this engaging in the world executed, with means that are

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irreconcilable with the Christian message or with means compatible with it? 45 There is another problem with Troeltsch's conception of the kingdom of God. Troeltsch moves Jesus' preaching of the eschatological kingdom of God into the centre, but almost entirely obscures the presence of the kingdom of God in this world, as it is manifested in the N e w Testament healing stories or in the parables of Jesus. Troeltsch has little understanding for the unique intermeshing between the present and future eschatology characteristic of the entire N e w Testament. A dualistic tearing asunder of what inseparably belongs together occurs by Troeltsch's leaving such connections out of consideration. Troeltsch's view of an original Christianity shows itself to be abstract and idealistic, entirely in opposition to the sober realism usually dominating his thinking. This idealism is even evident against the backdrop of tensions (or should one say, of compromises?) that are already present in the message and activity of Jesus. Troeltsch sees Jesus as the preacher of the radical, uncompromising ideal of the kingdom of God. Troeltsch fails to see that there are not only people in the circle of Jesus' followers who are torn by Jesus' call from their places of origin and vocations (Mk 1:14-20; Lk 9:57-62), but also others who remain in their worldly ties, holding onto Jesus and being accepted by Jesus as they are (Lk 8:1-3). Troeltsch's conception of an originally pure and ideal Christianity appears to be a philosophical-idealist construct. Troeltsch alleges that a pure Christianity dirties its hands when it engages in the world by a decision of compromise. Troeltsch neither sees that the closest circle of Jesus' disciples provides room for such opposing persons as a taxcollector (Mk 2:13-17) and a Zealot (Lk 6:15), nor does he see that Paul's letters always report tensions, conflicts and quarrels. Finally, it is striking that Troeltsch's dualistic thinking hardly notices a dualism indispensable for ethics, namely the dualism between good and evil. This fact corresponds to the more theological side of his works in which the phenomenon of sin is not sufficiently considered. Connections and compromise can be thought out between reason and nature, spirit and life. Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether a compromise between good and evil can be claimed on 45 Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Die Begründung der Ethik bei Ernst Troeltsch", in: Pannenberg, Ethik und Ekklesiologie, 1977, 93.

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ethical grounds, or whether this dualism could be the necessary place for the "either-or" often rejected by Troeltsch.

3. The mediation of principles The increasing extent and significance of compromise in Troeltsch's thought is revealed by Troeltsch's use of this concept. In the widest sense of the term, Troeltsch not only relates compromise to a political or ethical context, but extends the range of the term. Compromise becomes the fundamental concept from which everything emerges, or the guiding concept to which everything points. It is not only a theoretical possibility in exceptional situations that must be justified. It is the necessary principle of life and of all history. Finally, it is also the essential principle of thought reflecting on history. Troeltsch can also use compromise as a synonym for a term he moves to the centre of his later texts: "culture synthesis". 46 The aim of culture synthesis is to summarize the great ideas and authorities from antiquity to the middle ages, from the mediation of Christianity to a modern Euro-American culture. A unity would emerge from the "crucible of historicism" 47 that would be passed on to future generations. Troeltsch, who in 1915 moved from the Heidelberg Theological Faculty to the Berlin Philosophical Faculty, displays the breadth and the universal horizon of his thought in his work on the culture synthesis. This aspect of Troeltsch's work demands one's deepest respect. In this work, Troeltsch requires that nothing be left unreflected, nothing be left undigested. H e wants to verify everything and to hold onto the best. The great ideas and values that have arisen f r o m the entire development of history should not be lost, but they should be harvested as the ripe fruits of history, to be ordered and to be passed onto a new epoch. Troeltsch remains, however, in the realm of the approximate with the goal of culture-synthesis because he can only give vague recommendations for the attaining of this goal. Troeltsch writes at the end 46 E. Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, GS III (1922), Reprint 1961, 772. Cf. 164-199. 47 Ibid., 771.

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of his great book on historicism48 that the most successful syntheses are significant, epochal works of art, such as Dante's Divine Comedy or Goethe's Faust. Nevertheless, these works are always composed at the end of a development and their production cannot be coerced. The only remaining task is to strive for a synthesis of the contents of "Ancient-Christian-European civilization". 49 All intellectual forces must take part in this endeavor. Troeltsch obviously knows that the intended synthesis is easier to achieve through hyphens in a text than in reality. The only thinkable and traversable path for Troeltsch is the path of compromise. Compromise is the historical method of comparing and weighing. Compromise means summarizing the "both-and", a category opposing what Troeltsch flatly rejects as the dogmatic method of the "either-or". 50 Troeltsch always regarded the "either-or" with suspicion, and similarly the intellectual proponent of the "either-or": Sören Kierkegaard. 51 Troeltsch saw in Kierkegaard a modern representative of a radical Christianity who could summon up just enough strength to negate the world, but could not gather up any more energy in an effort to change it. Consistent with his criticism of Kierkegaard, Troeltsch could understand and classify the so-called "dialectical theology" proclaiming itself as the new theological movement at the beginning of the nineteen-twenties as only "An apple from Kierkegaard's tree". 52 In spite of all the criticism Troeltsch occasionally brought against the great opposite to Kierkegaard, Hegel, the Hegelian spirit manifests itself in Troeltsch's thoughts on compromise. Hegel speaks about mediation or reconciliation as the binding-force of his great system. Similarly, Troeltsch speaks about compromise as the one fundamental principle encompassing everything. In Troeltsch's system, compromise becomes the universal historical-philosophical category compre48 Ibid., 772. 49 E. Troeltsch, Die Absolutheit

des Christentums,

91.

50 Ibid., 20. 51 Cf. E. Troeltsch, Die Kirche im Lehen der Gegenwart, of the second edition of 1922, 105.

G S II (1913), 1962: Reprint

52 This is the title of one of Troeltsch's smaller works, which argued against Friedrich Gogarten, a proponent of dialectical theology and a student of Troeltsch. The article first appeared in: CW 35, 1921, 186-189; published again in: J. Moltmann (ed.), Anfänge der dialektischen Theologie II, 1963, 134-140.

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hending, mediating and combining things. The concept of compromise probably gains in fascination, but loses in precision. Helmut Thielicke's version of an ethics of compromise contrasts with Troeltsch's version. Thielicke attempts to legitimate an ethics of compromise 53 with his understanding of law and gospel as God's compromise with the world. On the one hand, Thielicke defines compromise on exclusively theological grounds and he tends to overestimate the concept of compromise by theological means. On the other hand, Troeltsch universalizes the concept of compromise in historicalphilosophical terms. The concept of compromise has to achieve and comprehend too much to be helpful for concrete ethical problems and their reflection. This section of the essay has primarily raised critical objections to Troeltsch's conception of an ethics of compromise. In the following section, the challenges Troeltsch's thought offers for contemporary reflection in theological ethics will be pointed out. The following four points relate mainly to Troeltsch's main work, his Social Teaching.

4. Historical foundation Troeltsch's Social Teaching of the Christian Churches is the incomparable and unsurpassed history of Christian social ethics. Certainly, there are distortions of the historical or the theological state of affairs and a one-sided perspective in judgement. The criticism that Troeltsch consulted too few original sources is correct. However, is it at all possible to work closely with many sources in a work encompassing the development of entire centuries? Troeltsch was quite conscious of the shortcomings of his work. The work lacks, to use the example Troeltsch himself admits54, a detailed treatment of the ethics of Anglicanism and of Orthodox churches. Recent developments that Troeltsch could not have encountered, for example, the movements of liberation theology in the Third World, would have to be considered in this work if it were written today. Particular estimations could be supplemented by more precise research. For example, Troeltsch's picture of Lutheran ethics sketched with little understanding could be 53 See: H . Thielicke, Theologische Ethik II/l, 1955, 190-201. 54 Cf. Troeltschs Zusätze und handschrifliche[n] Erweiterungen,

GS IV, 1925, 823.

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supplemented by Werner Elert's descriptions of the social effects of Lutheranism. 5 5 The deficiencies mentioned above cannot detract from the achievement and the significance of the entire project. Troeltsch's social theories are the historical prolegomena to every contemporary social ethics. Even a social ethics can not begin with itself. It has a history and, in certain situations, can be traced back to traditions conveying prejudices that can obstruct the view for possible solutions to problems arising later on. Whoever seeks to make specific Lutheran distinctions fruitful in contemporary ethical reflection must be aware that a mere catchword, such as the so-called "two-kingdoms-doctrine", is sufficient to make further meaningful discussion impossible. T h e history of the effects of this doctrine is hardly conducive to an impartial, objective discussion. Troeltsch's social theory can help to bring such histories of effects to consciousness. It is precisely in the field of social ethics that theological thoughts have many referents to social phenomena. In this field, a huge gap can emerge between the intention and the attained social effect. What did a social ethics hope to achieve? What has become of it? H o w was it used, or rather misused, by alien interests? Every social ethics must consider such questions before it delves into the problems of the present and future. Troeltsch's magnum opus remains a rich source of true and false paths for both the positive and the disastrous effects of Christian social theories, or, where his judgements are obsolete, a permanent challenge to do better.

5. M o d e l s and T y p e s Troeltsch gives no satisfactory answer to the classic ethical question: What shall I or what shall we do? T h e strengths of his ethical deliberations rest less on the prescriptive, normative side and more on the descriptive, analyzing side. Troeltsch's work still has a guiding function in the task of perceiving reality and in the ascertaining of the nature of this reality. Troeltsch's ideal-typical conceptuality helps to clear a path through the thicket of ethical problems. H e creates a typology of social phe55 Cf. T. Rendtorff, Ethik I, 1980, 58.

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nomena and develops models of Christian ethics. These types and models should not copy reality, but should serve as heuristic concepts to survey, to structure and thus better to understand the complexity of the often intertwined connections in social ethics. Every social ethics is dependent on the competence and the results of other sciences, especially the social sciences. In this regard, Troeltsch serves as a model. H e did not write Christian theology and use its terminology in a ghetto, but he continuously sought out dialogue with other sciences and eventually appropriated those concepts and methods so far as they appeared to him to be useful. T h e objection that Troeltsch's appropriation of social scientific concepts often results in the primacy of sociological language in theological-ethical work is quite correct. But the alternative cannot be the simple dismissal of his unique contribution. T h e three-fold typology of Church, sect and mysticism is possibly a net whose mesh is too large really to capture reality. Nevertheless, Troeltsch's typology has not yet been superseded. It can be modified and differentiated. It could be further supported by exegetical work and dogmatic, ecclesiological reflection that is more thorough than Troeltsch's work. 5 6 All this must not happen as a reaction to Troeltsch. The sketches of his proposal can be modified. Thus, his work can be fruitful for future writing.

6. M e d i a t i o n s O n e must, on the one hand, regard Troeltsch's concern for a universal compromise, for the mediation, the mixing and the reconciliation of intellectual forces and ideas with some scepticism. O n the other hand, there are areas within a restricted sphere where Troeltsch's concern is justified. The restrictions will be briefly outlined in two points. a) Every modern ethical reflection had and has to come to terms with Kant's moral philosophy. Kant's ethics, based on reason, freedom 56 An example of this is offered by Gerd Theissen, who appeals to Troeltsch in his three-folded typology of "Wanderradikalismus", "Liebespatriarchalismus", and "gnostischem Radikalismus" in: G. Theissen, "Wanderradikalismus. Literatursoziologische Aspekte der Uberlieferung von Worten Jesu im Urchristentum", in: G. Theissen, Studien zur Soziologie des Urchristentums, 1979, 104f.

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and autonomy, has set standards for philosophy as well as for theology from the eighteenth century until today. These standards must be accepted in all ethical endeavors, even if they cannot eventually follow Kant's lead. There have recently been intensified objections to Kant's hegemony. Alasdair Maclntyre's attempt to portray the failure of ethical proposals determined by the Enlightenment and his recourse to Aristotle's doctrine of virtue is a special example of these objections. There are other ethical conceptions, besides Maclntyre's confrontation, endeavouring to unite Aristotle with Kant, or Kant's moral philosophy with the ethics of utilitarianism. The scientific climate of these objections is marked by an interest in the mediation of classic ethical systems. In his day, Troeltsch strove to mediate between the morals of conscience and the ethics of culture, from Kant to Hegel, with his ethics of compromise. In the climate of contemporary objections to Kant's moral philosophy, Troeltsch would be a dialogue-partner to discover. b) One issue in the dialogue between Protestant and Catholic theology is the significance of natural law. This topic is still very controversial with respect to the problem of justifying norms within a system of ethics. The tradition of natural law belongs to the permanent stock of every Catholic moral theology. In the realm of Protestant theology and ethics, however, considerations resting on natural law are regarded with sceptical reservation. This reservation is due primarily to the powerful influence of Karl Barth's theology. Protestant ethics has every reason to seek conversation with Catholic social theory because the latter has unquestionably at its disposal a greater treasure of experience in the realm of social ethics. The strict rejection of natural law argumentation should not be used by Protestant ethics to obstruct from the outset the possibilities of dialogue with Catholic ethics and to deny its own capacity for communication. Besides, Protestant ethics finds starting-points in its own tradition for a theology of natural law, for example, the Reformers. A more recent example for an ethics based on the natural law argument is Troeltsch's Social Teaching. Troeltsch's history of social ethics features the decisive significance of the idea of natural law as the motor for the development of Christian ethics in both Catholic and Protestant circles. Thus, the critical appropriation of Troeltsch's Social Teach-

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ing could lead to necessary corrections and it could stimulate further ecumenical Christian dialogue.

7. T h e sociological e m b o d i m e n t of ethics Observation of current ethical discussion in the philosophical or the theological realm could give the impression that ethics has to do with what academics formulate only at the desk or deliver in conference lectures. Troeltsch took a decisive contrasting view. H e was convinced that ethical, and generally, all human ideas can not exist in a vacuum. Ethical ideas require an institutional form in order to be actualized in social reality. Ethical goals need to be organized in the life of a society. For Troeltsch, the important moment in the actualization of ethical ideas is the embodiment of an ethics. Ethics has to take a certain shape in the real world. H e inquires into the "sociological embodiment" 5 7 in which ethics engages with reality. Human conceptions and convictions do not assert themselves single-handedly; they need humans who mediate them and apply them in action. These humans, in turn, must meet in communities; they must organize themselves. If organization does not occur, the conceptions and ideas are in danger of being dissipated. Troeltsch admitted that his theology tended towards the mystical type. 58 But he is convinced that no ethical formative power can be attributed to mysticism because of its emphasis on individuality and freedom. Troeltsch claims the unambiguous superiority of the type "Church" above the sect, and especially over mysticism, with respect to the organization of religious and ethical life. Troeltsch prophesied an increasing expansion of mysticism in Western religious culture. This prophecy has been confirmed when one observes the current movements of the esoteric and of N e w Age reaching into society and even into churches. In spite of the expansion of mysticism, Troeltsch saw compromise as the only and best possible solution for the future of Christianity and the connection between all three sociological basic forms of Christian life. Troeltsch's Social Teaching claims the Church to be the all-encompassing sociological

57 E. Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, 771 together with 768-772. 58 E. Troeltsch, The Social Teaching, 985.

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embodiment that alone is capable of admitting elements of sects and mysticism as its members. Troeltsch sees "future tasks, tasks of a sociological and organizing kind, which are more pressing than all doctrinal questions" 59 in the unification of all three classes under the roof of a Volkskirche. For Troeltsch, all efforts to reach a unity through church dogmatics have failed. Nevertheless, the call to organize entirely pushes to the side an essential point Troeltsch himself featured in earlier discussions.60 A Christian community cannot organize itself, but needs the Christcult, the worship of Christ, as its centre and basis. The sociological embodiment has a theological centre! Only on the foundation of the cult do the sociological forms of Church, sect and mysticism take their distinctive shapes. Only on the basis of the cult does the development of their respective and unique dogmas and moral conceptions which shape a society occur. For Troeltsch, the relations between worship, Church (including the sect and mysticism) and society constitute Christian ethics! Nevertheless, Troeltsch himself tore these relations apart. Troeltsch analyzes contemporary problems and searches for solutions. It becomes evident that the foundation, the Christ-cult, the embeddedness of the religious community in worship, no longer plays a role. Troeltsch attempts to shape future unity in the compromise between Church, sect and mysticism and to organize this unity in sociological terms, but he does not consider the unity's origin in the proclamation of Christ in worship. A contemporary social ethics must be formulated both with and against Troeltsch. Social ethics can see, with Troeltsch, the unity of worship, Christian form of life and the society in which such forms of life take shape. Theological and ethical reflection, against Troeltsch, must actually hold together this unity. Troeltsch's alternative between a sociological-organizational and a dogmatic mode of posing questions in theology is not conclusive. Can Bonhoeffer not be used to meaningfully supplement Troeltsch's talk 59 Ibid., 1009. 60 Cf. ibid., 994. Troeltsch expands the idea of the dependence of all religions on the cult in the work "Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu für den Glauben" (1911). The English translation is entitled "The Significance of the Historical Existence of Jesus for Faith", in: E . Troeltsch, Writings

on Theology

and Religion,

R. Morgan and M. Pye. London: Duckworth, 1977, 194-198.

tr. and ed. by

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about the necessity of a sociological embodiment of ethics? Bonhoeffer formulates an "ethics of formation" by taking as his model the N e w Testament image of the b o d y of Christ (Rom 12:3-8; 1 C o r 12:12-31). This image is the "starting-point of Christian ethics . . . the body of Christ, the form of Christ in the f o r m of the Church". 6 1 It is not clear w h y no mediation can occur, specifically at this point, between a more sociological ethics and an ethics more strongly focused on dogmatics and ecclesiology. O r are Luther's distinctions between diverse forms of worship, and thereby, diverse forms of Christian existence in his Preface to the German Mass62 of 1526 either only dogmatic reflections or only organizational reflections? Are they not, rather, both? Troeltsch was a thinker of mediations. H e was a theologian of compromise even though he posed an "either-or" between a sociological and a dogmatic-ecclesiological ethics. H e remained for his entire life "a seeker and not a full possessor of the truth" 6 3 , as he once wrote in a letter about himself. Contemporary theology and ethics might not be able to follow every step of Troeltsch's explorations. It might only be able critically to walk on his path of inquiry. Nevertheless, Troeltsch remains a highly stimulating and challenging conversation partner.

61 D. Bonhoeffer, Ethik, ed. by E. Bethge, 1975, 89. 62 WA 19, 73, 32-75, 30. 63 E. Troeltsch, Briefe an Friedrich von Hügel 1901-1923, ed. by K.-E. Apfelbacher and P. Neuner, 1974, 96.

Part II Foundations

The Foundation of Cognition and Ethics in Worship Daniel W. Hardy

1. Introduction With few exceptions, the worship of the churches today is seen as a conventional and undemanding activity whereby Christians continue the beliefs and practices of the past. In practice, it seems that worship has become 'routinized charisma'. 1 The 'conventional' position which worship occupies is symptomatic of the limitations now generally placed on its importance. Yet there is little question that worship, when fully understood, serves as the indispensable foundation for cognition and ethics. Unfortunately, modern defenses of the importance of worship do not substantially improve the situation. One such defense takes the form of establishing worship as a separate theological discipline which has to do with the texts and history of worship, liturgy, and these are thought most aptly to be approached through textual and historical methods. The practices of equating worship with liturgical history and then separating liturgy from other disciplines in theology go unquestioned; and the exclusive use of historical-textual study is not questioned either. 2 Rarely, therefore, is the nature of worship discussed. Neither is consideration given to the consequences of liturgical study for other theological disciplines, or for more general concerns with

1

The early history of church ministry is frequently described by sociologists as the 'routinisation of charisma', but the phrase is also applicable to what has n o w occurred for and in worship.

2

Often - though not always - it also presupposes the validity of directly transferring historical practices to the present.

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right belief and right action, whether in times contemporaneous with the liturgies studied or for today. 3 Another more directly theological defence of the position of worship in theology brings other difficulties. Worship is seen as complementary with doctrine and life, the three 'conjoined in a common "upwards" and "forwards" direction towards God and the achievement of his purpose, which includes human salvation'. 4 Worship is the place where this vision comes into sharp focus for the Church, and 'the theologian's thinking therefore properly draws on the worship of the Christian community and is in duty bound to contribute to it, . . . aiming at a coherent intellectual expression of the Christian vision, . . . to propose to the worshipping community any corrections or improvements which he judges necessary'. 5 Because liturgies for worship shape human experience and behaviour, and theology has a reflexive and critical function, the expressions of such experience and behaviour in theology can be gathered as in a 'liturgical way of doing theology' which organizes theology around worship. Notwithstanding the seriousness with which this position takes worship, it prejudges what occurs there and also separates worship not from doctrine but from theology. In a fashion typical of post-Kantian theology, the main mediations in which the impact of worship is found are human experience and behaviour, upon which theology reflects. 6 Three consequences follow: (1) The issue of what truth is found in worship is set aside, and varieties of experience and behaviour are presented as of equal worth. (2) Closely allied to this is the problem that the dynamics of God's presence and work (and hence of his nature) in the processes of cognition and ethics as such are not con3

4

Unfortunately, at least in English universities, provision for liturgy even as a separate and developed academic discipline is rare. Where it does exist, there is little opportunity for the consideration of ho it may be constitutive for right belief and practice.

Geoffrey Wainwright, Doxology: The Praise of God in Worship, Doctrine and Life. A Systematic Theology, N e w York: Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 10. 5 ibid., p.3. 6 Here, following a pattern of thought very similar to that of Schleiermacher, itself a reaction to that of Kant, worship is seen as the avenue by which the absolute draws human experience and behaviour beyond its usual confinement to knowledge and ethics, which are consequently regarded as reflections on the original 'drawing up', cf. F.D.E. Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, trans. John Oman, N e w York: Harper and Row, 1958, Second Speech.

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sidered; such ontological and epistemological matters are eschewed in favour of the discussion of religious experience theologically expressed. Correspondingly, the more demanding requirements which might follow for cognition and ethics from the presence and work of God in worship are muted. As we will see, worship is a risk which makes radical demands on cognition and ethics, because of the active presence of God manifest there; this differs from the more relative demand made by the shapes of liturgy on human experience. (3) Since it dwells on worship-focussed experience, and confines the discussion to Christian expressions of that, the consideration is - though in the broadest terms - confessional, 'from faith to faith', and does not consider God's presence and activity in the public domain within which cognition and ethics operate. With these limitations, such a defense of the importance of worship for cognition and ethics is far too limited as a discussion both of the dynamics of God's presence and of its impact on the people and world for which it occurs. 7 This brings us to what will be our central concerns here. What is it that occurs in worship? And how is that related to truth, as well as to those disciplines - cognition and ethics - which are occupied with ascertaining truth? How, furthermore, are these given their fullest direction in Christian worship of God? The methods by which truth is sought nowadays have little apparent connection with worship. The main alternatives for the pursuit of truth are variants of the positivistic notion of scientific knowledge, the experience of art or the model of rhetoric. 8 By contrast, worship is seen as the most intensive expression of a faith already arrived-at, in which the issue of truth is suspended; worship is therefore regarded as the most 'confessional' aspect of Christian faith. N o t surprisingly therefore, where the study of faith is assimilated to the notions of truth implicit in secular academic study, worship is the first casualty. If it receives attention at all, it is only as an interesting phenomenon, one activity alongside others in a special domain called 'religion' where questions of truth can only be raised with great difficulty. Amongst 7 8

For further discussion of this position, see D.W. Hardy and D.F. Ford, Jubilate: Theology in Praise, London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1984, p.l69f. 'The post-modern - in Heideggerian terms, post-metaphysical - experience of truth is an aesthetic and rhetorical experience.' Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Post-modern Culture, London: Polity Press, 1988, p. 12.

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'religious' activities, its relation to others is largely overlooked; and if the constitutive features of religion are identified as knowledge (right belief) and ethics (right action), the two comprising 'true religion', the importance of worship for these is ignored. Furthermore, its significance beyond 'religion' is forgotten. The result is fragmentation: not only the fragmentation of truth from worship, but of worship from knowledge and ethics. This situation needs to be appreciated if we are to find the kind of connection which there is between worship, truth, knowledge, and ethics, and how that connection is formed in the Christian understanding of worship. For we shall be presenting a quite different view of their relation than this situation normally allows. Instead of seeing worship either as the most intensive expression of a faith already arrived-at, in which the issue of truth is suspended, or as a free approach to mystery, we shall see worship as that special and primary activity which incorporates truth in its activity, and thereby defines and effects a reality which exemplifies this truth. Cognition, as we will see, finds its proper placing and methods within worship as it participates in the movement of truth and exemplifies it in the understanding of reality. Ethics likewise participates in the movement of truth, but does so through bringing about the proper form of reality as such, particularly in the realms of nature and society. Thus, worship is the central means whereby human beings are called to their proper fullness in society and the world.

2. Notions of Truth and the Restriction and Liberation of Worship The beginning of the fragmentation of worship and truth - as traditionally conceived - occurs when worship is seen as the intensive expression of a faith whose truth can no longer be accepted as unproblematic. And the usual result is transition to a free approach to an undefined mystery. Such a transition is described in a poem by the Irish poet Micheal O'Siadhail:

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Enough was enough. We flew nets of old certainties, all that crabbed grammar of the predictable. Unentangled, we'd soar to a language of our own. Freedom. We sang of freedom (travel lightly, anything goes) and somehow became strangers to each other, like gabblers at cross purposes, builders of Babel. Slowly I relearn a lingua, shared overlays of rule, lattice of memory and meaning, our latent images, a tongue at large in an endlessness of sentences unsaid. 9

Here - in the first two stanzas, are two familiar views of truth. One confines truth, not only in the metaphysical but in its correspondence to reality, a correspondence which is predeterminative and therefore allows prediction. There are fixed beliefs and norms: 'nets of old certainties, all that crabbed grammar of the predictable' - a view of truth which entangles one in convoluted fixities which include and predict all. The other idealizes freedom from such truth and the predictability which it imposes: 'unentangled we'd soar to a language of our own' a view of truth which suggests that it lies in subscription to a minimum, which even then divides. Of course, the two views incline in opposite directions, the one toward fixed metaphysics in correspondence with reality, the self-repeating reality which such a metaphysics requires and a commonness based on standard expectations, the other toward fluidity, minimal belief, difference of expectation and change, leading to the estrangement of people (and their purposes) from each other. But both are relativized as they are made dependent on human agency: 'we flew nets of old certainties'; 'we sang of freedom'. The poem, however, contrasts these views, with a much less restrictive possibility for truth, that of relearning a lingua which is not simply based on human assertion, which has its roots in the past and 9

'Freedom' from Micheal O'Siadhail, The Chosen Garden, Dublin: The Dedalus Press, 1990, p.57.

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its applicability in the present, and which allows people to join together in the depths of what may yet be said. At first glance, this appears to be the aesthetic and rhetorical notion of truth which is said to be characteristic of post-modernism. But it is not, simply because it is the result of a 'slow relearning', a deep sharing, of latent images, seeking a lingua through which an infinity of meaning can be brought to speech. These are not simply poetic visions of truth. The same three possibilities for truth appear - in different order - in more concrete historical terms in the story of St. Thomas following the Resurrection, and the ways in which that is conventionally interpreted. 10 (1) In the first place, we see in Thomas what appears to be a spirit of free inquiry, seeking to validate belief by empirical investigation unencumbered by claims from others elsewhere. When he is confronted by the fixed certainty of other disciples that Jesus has been raised from the dead, he is too fully embedded in such habits simply to accept it. It follows that he is therefore isolated, both from other disciples and from the one the risen Jesus - around whom their community is gathered. Thomas' behaviour is commonly admired by modern people who idealize free inquiry and observational evidence, and with them the normalcy of individualism. In accordance with the ideals of modern thought, Thomas doubts what he does not find for himself, and does not accept general impressions or the beliefs of others; he must believe for himself and do so on the basis of hard, specific evidence. So he will not accept what he seems to think is the unconfirmed truth about Jesus rising from the dead until he himself sees the risen Jesus, and sees the specific things which show that it is Jesus that he is seeing. And even seeing is not enough for him; he must touch: 'Unless I see the nail marks in his hands, and put my finger into his side, I will not have faith in it.' And, according to the Gospel accounts, the resurrected Jesus does in fact come amongst the disciples and invite Thomas to see and touch the things which show that it is the same Jesus who was crucified that now stands in front of him: 'Put your finger here; see my hands. Reach out your hand and put it into my side. Do not be faithless but faithful.' (John 20.27)

10 John 22.24-29.

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(2) But there is another side to the story, which appears to advocate the unconditional

acceptance of fixed truths. Jesus corrects T h o m a s :

'Because you have seen me, have you accepted? Blessed are those who have faith even when they do not see.' This seems to suggest that it is better simply to accept given truth in faith than to raise questions about it, or to demand observational evidence. The truly faithful person simply accepts on trust what has been given him/her to accept, and lives in and from that truth. Like the other view, this notion of truth is also widespread amongst Christians. There is a 'truth given in the beginning' through revelation. This truth is theoretical in form, in the sense that it is a simple and comprehensive statement of Christian faith. And accepting it confers blessing and full community; it is the basis of full life in the Church. Correspondingly, it cannot be doubted without the withdrawal of that blessing, or without removing oneself from the Church. For those who understand Christian faith in this way, the statements of assent made by Christians are statements of simple acceptance of the truth which is 'contained in the Scriptures, set forth in the creeds, and witnessed to in the historical formularies of the Church'. 11 And they cannot subsequently question that to which they have assented without undermining their faith and its grace. The two views just mentioned are frequently seen as unalterably opposed, as those which emphasize 'unentangled freedom' are opposed to 'nets of old certainties'. A modernity which idealizes the restless free inquiry of the isolated individual, pursued through a consistent search for hard evidence, is often set against a traditionality which idealizes the strategy of trusting acceptance of a transmitted truth, manifest in a life in that faith. The result is that the two are hardened into positions which exclude the other. On the one hand, it is said (by those committed to the fixity of truth) that free inquiry and an ongoing search for evidence, together with all the attention to reflection and empirical detail which they require, will disarm the possibility of recognizing truth; and the activity of questioning all truth can carry questioners beyond the possibility of settled or shared conviction of any kind. 12 On the other hand, it is claimed (by those committed to an adventurous freedom) that strict adherence to traditional theories 11 This is the affirmation required of those to be ordained in the Church of England. 12 When seen in this way, post-modernism appears as the extreme of modernism.

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disallows the acknowledgment that any statement of faith is to some extent fluid, and therefore subject to alteration and interpretation in the light of historical understanding.13 Proponents of each of the two views fail to understand the other, and frequently exclude the other from any kind of legitimacy. Consideration of any major issue polarizes the two and revives this misunderstanding, bringing both common understanding and common action to a standstill. Interestingly enough, the very disagreement between adherents of the two views brings constructive discussion of cognitive and ethical matters to a stop. 14 But is either of these opposing views of truth sufficient? And is the story of St. Thomas to be understood primarily in these terms, as a trial of two views of truth - one which justifies a view of truth which is minimalist, conditional and contingent upon free inquiry, and the other which presents truth in the form of fixed 'givens' to be received from authoritative sources and unconditionally accepted? And is human agency so pivotal? Or are these restricted forms of a more fundamental view of truth? There is a third possibility to be considered, however, similar to what Micheal O'Siadhail called 'the relearning of a lingua . This suggests that truth is reached and held by other means. And this option brings us closer to seeing truth as moving and - through worship incorporating the believer's cognition and ethical awareness. How this happens in an historical situation can be seen in the story of Thomas. On the one hand, as so often happens in the Gospels, Thomas' expectations are transformed and surpassed. Contrary to the common supposition that it is Thomas' free inquiry which brings belief, it is the movement of Jesus toward Thomas which elicits Thomas' response. Jesus presents himself to Thomas and is receptive to the kind of ques13 This is the problem with many statements of the 'realist' position today. 14 A n interesting example of this opposition is found in the story of Martha and Mary (Luke 10.38-42), in which Martha, 'distracted by much serving', appeals to Jesus to send her sister Mary, who was sitting at his feet listening to his teaching, to help. But Jesus says to her, 'Martha, Martha, you are anxious about many things . . . Mary has chosen the good portion, which shall not be taken from her.' Martha's concern for many things brings her the same distractedness and isolation which characterize the free inquirer obsessed with hard evidence, Mary's quiet listening to Jesus seems similar to simple acceptance of given truth, and there is the same misunderstanding between them.

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tions which he asks; and it is Jesus who offers the possibility for exact evidence. The result is that Thomas is called to attend to Jesus, and no longer persists with his desire for inquiry; in the presence of Jesus, there is no record that he does touch Jesus. H o w then does he respond? H e does not arrive at anything so sterile as an acceptance of the 'fact' of the resurrection, but instead finds the possibility of a deep engagement with the very person whose life he had doubted. This response carries him out of his isolation and into the 'relearning of a lingua in a full affirmation of Jesus: ' M y Lord and my G o d ! ' It is this old-new language (a 'lattice of memory and meaning') employed in this affirmation which reconstitutes his belief and his action, not a successful inquiry. O n the other hand, Jesus' words to Thomas ('Blessed are those who have faith even when they do not see.') cannot be taken as a straightforward defense for the necessity of accepting fixed beliefs and norms - statements of 'old certainties . . . that crabbed grammar of the predictable'. First, Jesus' words present a different way of faith. The inability to see does not force the sightless into accepting statements of truth from others. Rather, the inability to see confers a different way of encountering truth. For a blind person, the encounter with the world rests on its self-presentation through sound, and this means an intermittency of encounter which is not the case for a sighted person. The acoustic world is one in which things pass in and out of existence. This happens with surprising rapidity. There seems to be no intermediate zone of approach. There is a sudden cry from the lake, 'Hello Daddy!'; my children are there in their paddle boat. Previously, a moment ago, they were not there . . . The intermittent nature of the acoustic world is one of its most striking features. In contrast, the perceived world is stable and continuous . . . Acoustic space is a world of revelation. 15

Secondly, it needs to be recognized that for the blind person, having faith is the process of orienting oneself in the presence of a truth which is otherwise present only through sound. Statements, whether from truth or from those who have witnessed it, serve as aids to its memory - and hence to self-orientation - not as substitutes for it, as if

15 John M. Hull, Touching the Rock: A n Experience of Blindness, London: S P C K , 1990, p.63f.

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it were no longer present.16 These are the 'memory' to which Micheal O'Siadhail refers, whose 'meaning' must be found anew by reference to the continued presence of the reality to which they refer: Slowly I relearn a lingua shared overlays of rule, lattice of memory and meaning, our latent images, a tongue at large in an endlessness of sentences unsaid. 1 7

And this 'lattice of memory and meaning' gives us a tongue in which to speak, in an ongoing process of understanding never fully achieved. In effect, then, the two views of truth which we have seen - the one emphasizing free individual inquiry and the other emphasizing trusting acceptance - are not quite what they seem. Each finds its proper placing within a dynamic of movement and response which is the heart of that activity we know as worship. Without reference to this dynamic, they become self-important and self-destructive.

3. The Movement

of Truth and Human

Response

How is it that the movement of truth - and hence the relearning of a lingua - occurs? We must now undertake a preliminary survey of the ontology and epistemology of worship. As we have now seen, the proper interaction between free inquiry and accepting belief occurs within the movement of truth, in the movement of God toward human beings into which human understanding and action are incorporated. What are the circumstances in which this happens? It does not simply happen when people are 'open'; much as it is idealized today, the notion of openness is too restricted, for many of the same reasons as is free inquiry. Nor does it happen when people simply adhere to accepted statements of truth; as the old saying goes, 'I've made up my mind - don't confuse me with facts.' That is 16 It is sometimes said that 'When the Bible is open, G o d speaks; when it is shut, he stops.' This can be taken to mean that Biblical statements substitute for the constant reality of G o d ' s presence. 17 'Freedom' from Micheal O'Siadhail, The Chosen Garden, Dublin: The Dedalus Press, 1990, p.57.

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equally restricted, as we saw when we considered this notion of truth. Christian faith is neither a generalized openness to the divine nor an obedient acceptance of what is given, though both are important. Instead, it is a directed openness (or attentiveness) within the movement of truth toward human beings. The proper interaction occurs where people move in the same direction as that of the movement of truth. When we reach this point, we find that there are three issues inextricably linked: (1) What is the movement of truth toward human beings? (2) H o w are people to follow this movement? (3) What are the implications for human knowledge and behaviour? We can attempt preliminary answers to the questions. (2) If God is the primary source of all that is, the most suitable way of following the movement of truth occurs in worship, where full attention is given to God, moving for and in human beings in the world. Worship itself is the recognition of ontological position and movement of that which is worshipped, and it entails the proportioning of human knowledge and behavior to the being and activity of that which is recognized. 18 (1) Such worship is based on the actual movement of the truth of God toward human beings, whose fundamental pattern or logic can be discerned. This movement is one which energizes (enlivens) human beings and lifts them to their proper being and activity in truth - the peace which is their truest character. And the movement is traceable to the character of God, in which the energy of God fulfills relationality according to the conditions of God's own being. 19 So it is that in worship, cognition and ethics find their dynamic order. Where the dynamic order of a Trinitarian God is recognized in worship, therefore, what is occurring is more than the acknowledgment of a static state of affairs, however ultimate, in which principles of knowledge or morality are established and then treated as a foundation from which other insights may be derived. Where God is worshipped, knowledge is directed to the ontological recognition of a dynamic order of indefinite depth ('God') which is directed toward us in a particular - though comprehensive - kind of movement, a dynamic order: it moves 'for 18 Cf. Matthew 22.21: 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's.' 'Honour to whom honour is due.' 19 By thus focusing on ultimate dynamic order, I am implicitly criticizing the tradition of monarchialism which dominates Western theology, and substituting a more dynamic form of Trinitarianism.

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us' and our world, exciting and sustaining the dynamic order in which our existence and well-being consist. (3) In directed openness to this divine dynamic order, there also occurs an ontological movement in those who recognize it, whose existence is totally orientated to that which is recognized, in a total alteration of affection which brings about a habit of life. 20 In its purified form, this ontological recognition is praise, which incorporates a purified reorientation, in which the dynamics of human life - both individual and social - are focused in correspondence with that which is recognized in praise. Whatever is the dynamic order recognized in the divine is therefore realized in the arrangement of human relationships in and with the world. And insofar as the truth of God is discovered in praise, human recognition and reorientation brings truth for them; the primary marks of that divine order - such as freedom in relationship, justice and love - are realized in the human. 21 Recapitulating these three points, we may say that it is in the movement of worship (focused in praise), together with the movement of reorientation which accompanies it, that the dynamics of divine order in human life in the world are found in most concentrated form. It is here that the dynamics of the human subject in his/her search for truth and goodness are focused. Hence, the movement of worship 'sets the direction' for cognition and ethics. 22 20 A homely analogy for this is the physical or bodily adaptation which occurs for a vegetarian, when the body adapts itself to eating vegetables to such a point that it cannot tolerate eating meat. But the notion of a total reorientation is central to the view of faith taken, for example, by John Calvin and Jonathan Edwards. 21 It is very important to recognize that these primary marks of divine order are realized together in the human. Freedom and responsibility, justice and love, are achieved together, not in isolation from each other; and the purification of one always involves the purification of the other. It is a matter of some debate how this combination is to be achieved in human life, and each party in the debate tends to idealize its own position. The following statement idealizes one alternative: 'The model toward which the Protestant Reformation initially began to move, and which the so-called 'free churches' sought to incarnate more thoroughly than official Protestantism, is the voluntary community which has about it neither the coercive givenness of establishment nor the atomistic isolation of individualism.' (J.H. Yoder, The Priestly Kingdom, Notre Dame, 1984, p.25) And even if a satisfactory combination can be achieved in the Church, it is usually a sectarian success, and there is frequently a correlative failure to bring this to the world beyond. 22 Cf. Ν. Maxwell, From Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution in the Aims and Methods of Science, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984.

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It is instructive to compare this account of the appearance in worship of the dynamics of divine order in human life in the world, with the tradition of Wisdom in Judaism and Christianity. There, a wisdom purified in praise shows the dynamic order of G o d present for humankind, thereby illuminating and grounding all the complexities of life and knowledge. The wisdom found in praise was not limited to those who 'worshipped' in formal ways; it was closely connected with much wider human concerns, those centred on finding the 'nature of things' and thereby finding the ways to live in the world. But finding and refining wisdom through praise was the means by which human beings focussed the order and the energy of G o d as it appeared in the world in which they lived.

4. The Dynamics of Divine and Human

Order

The problem, however, is that current notions of G o d , and hence the worship of G o d , are too limited for such a correlation with truth or the disciplines concerned with it. There seems to be a clear correlation between the aridity of current views of G o d , equally arid conceptions of worship, and the sterility of much current discussion of truth, human cognition and ethics. 23 N o w that we have seen that worship mediates (through dynamic concentration) the dynamic order of G o d in the reorientation of human cognition and ethics, it is time to discuss more fully the dynamic order of God. We must now outline a view of the dynamics of G o d which is more adequate to the complexities of man's life in the world as we know it. Basic to this understanding of G o d is the actuality of full differentiation in G o d , and between G o d and the world, while still retaining full relationality in G o d and between G o d and the world. This allows us to discern 'relativities', how there are particularities in fully dynamic exchange with each other, within G o d and the world, and between G o d and the world. If we see this full differentiation in G o d - the threefoldness of G o d - in radically relational terms, we may see G o d as relationality (Father), order in relationality (Son) and energy in relationality (Spirit). 23 It m a y be the case that the p o s t - m o d e r n i s t e m p h a s i s o n truth as rhetoric or art derives f r o m the substitution of h u m a n creativity f o r the d y n a m i c s of divine - or even natural - creativity.

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If we then see this threefoldness from the vantage-point of the Spirit, the Spirit may be seen as the energy which occurs in the relational dynamics implicit in the Father and which there brings about full order in the Son, doing so through what can be called 'blessing'. This 'blessing' is a concentration of energy which 'moves' the relational dynamics (Father) and hence its order (Son). Thus, from the implicit relationality of the Father, the Spirit can be seen to generate the fullness of the Father through the Son. The Spirit can then be seen to 'unite in holiness', though doing so in the relationality of the Father and in the order of the Son, as the active agent of their unity. This uniting is the blessing of the energy of the Spirit whereby dynamic relationality is redoubled and thus fully ordered. Though this suggests a way in which the self-structuring of G o d is to be seen, it is a self-structuring which occurs in an ongoing 'relation' with human life in the world. In this relation all the characteristics of the divine (as just seen) interact ongoingly with those of human life in the world. This 'interaction' is constituted by the relational dynamics of the Father and the dynamic order in this relationality is that of the Son, but the energy in the relationality is that of the Spirit. And it suffuses human participation in the interaction. The 'blessing' of the Spirit in the interaction opens and reopens human beings to the full relationality of the Father in the dynamic order of the Son, and moreover energizes them to structure themselves accordingly, within their initial conditions as finite and historical. This can and does occur for human beings without their awareness, preconsciously so to speak, but it occurs to best effect when, in various ways appropriate to them, human beings interact with the Spirit through their own powers. And we have already seen that this happens most importantly in the directed openness of worship - where there is a 'focusing' which both excites and directs cognition and ethics. Just as it is in the dynamics of his order - the energizing of his relationality - that G o d reaches his fullness, and in this dynamic order interacts energetically with human beings to enable them to develop their own dynamic order, it is in their 'relativities', the energizing and ordering of their relationality, that human beings exist. This is not simply a 'fixity' about them which they can acknowledge and forget, but the condition of their existence as human beings; their self-relationality and their relationality to others and to the world are the matrix of their life, and their dynamic self-structuring (e.g., the ontological reorienta-

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tion which occurs in worship) always occurs within this matrix. There is, in fact, no 'self which they can be which is not also a relativity to others and the world. This is what is seen, for example, in Jesus' summary of the law, 'love thy neighbour as thyself. But, again, this cannot be treated as an achievement, as if it could be a 'fact' of their previous being which sets limits on their relationality. The quality of their life resides in the development of the dynamic order in this relationality; the goal is beyond permanent achievement, and rests on concentration and reconcentration of the energy by which they are self-structured in interaction. Such a 'wisdom' of the intersection of truth and human order in worship is fundamental to the 'moving' and 'directing' of cognition and ethics.

5. Misdirected Ontological Recognition and The Problem of Power Ontological recognition and reorientation may be seriously misdirected, however, and at the least the result can be distortion or trivialization, the more so where such misdirection is 'refined' through a misdirected praise. Most often, the misdirection occurs through assigning excessive importance to what is finite and controllable. And the result is a double displacement, as the position of the divine dynamic order and the corresponding positioning of the human subject (both individual and social) are misdirected. 24 In one way, such misdirection is understandable enough. The world as we find it is a rich array of fascinating events and patterns, and humanity itself interesting enough to be its own fascination (narcissism). The very fascination of such things can easily lead us to focus upon them and their inherent richness, to such a point that they are seen to be the source from which all richness is projected. 25 And there is the further attraction that concentrating on them can serve to focus the

24 It will be remembered that such misdirection is the root meaning of the w o r d 'sin', and its refinement through misdirected praise is idolatry. 25 There is a negative counterpart to this fascination, when the perversities of human beings produce damage, whether in themselves or for others, and these bring a horrible fascination which perpetuates and magnifies the damage.

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order and energy of the world in such a way as to yield benefits. 26 The fault underlying such moves is a theological one, in which the depth of the dynamic order of G o d is lost to such a degree that human beings confuse the fascination of the world for that of G o d , and confine the richness of ontological recognition to the pragmatics of knowledge or technical principles. The richness of wisdom is thereby transferred to human hands; wisdom is transferred to those capable of manipulating wisdom for what is presumed to be the benefit of humankind. Furthermore, these displacements occur not once only, but growingly; the world in which we live is increasingly interlaced with the effects of human science, technology and manipulation. What could once have been described as 'natural' is largely a human artifact. Perhaps unwittingly, those whose persistent searching for evidence disallows the recognition of truth, as well as those who insist on the necessity of simply accepting given beliefs, misdirect ontological recognition. For both direct attention to processes of knowledge which are under human control. The result is not simply a mistake; it is a distortion of ontological recognition and human orientation. Furthermore, the 'correct' form of ontological recognition which is offered by each to the other simply repeats the misdirection. The 'searcher' offers worship of a mysterious G o d , one so mysterious that his participation in the world is limited (thereby 'underdetermining' the world), while the 'accepter' offers worship of a G o d whose will is clear, who 'determines' (actually overdetermines) the world. 2 7

26 T h e e x p a n s i o n of such fascination leads naturally t o an anthropological reduction of religion, as with L u d w i g F e u e r b a c h . Karl M a r x p r o v i d e s a 'scientific' f o r m of this fascination, b y which the order and energy of the w o r l d are f o c u s e d f o r h u m a n benefit. 27 T h e r e are m a n y t o d a y w h o are c o m m i t t e d t o the necessity of ignorance in ontological and ethical matters, and the chief alternative seems t o be a willingness to prescribe c o u r s e s of action f o r every situation. Strangely, b o t h lead to trivialized notions of the w o r l d and h u m a n life. R e g r e t t a b l y , this is very m u c h the case with m o d e r n religious practice. It is not o n l y Anglicans of w h o m it can be said, as did o n e p r o f e s s o r of religion, ' G i v e Anglicans t w o things to talk a b o u t , and they will always be f o u n d talking a b o u t the m o r e trivial of the t w o . ' Triviality has replaced b l a s p h e m y as the main h a z a r d of religious life.

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6. The Bright Mystery of Faith It is a very serious question how such misdirection is overcome. There is much to be learned from J o b , a classic instance of misdirection. J o b seems to have claimed a knowledge of the secrets of creation, and also to have supposed that by his knowledge and power he could affect creation in its most fundamental constitution. H e had in fact taken control of the richness or creativity of wisdom itself. But, in the end, he was forced to admit: 'Surely I spoke of things I did not understand, things too wonderful for me to know.' (Job 42.3) In his way, as we have already seen, Thomas was very similar. He would not accept what he was told about the risen Jesus until he knew, and he could only know by seeing and touching. H e too was overwhelmed by the presence of Jesus, and he forgot about wanting to know by seeing and touching. Both situations make it clear that the fundamental possibility of worship - true ontological recognition and human orientation - remains even where there is misdirection, and that the dynamic between this recognition and its correlative orientation may be restored even where there have been disruptions. It is simply that the dynamic order which G o d has introduced into the human relation with him remains itself even where the eyes of human beings are diverted to lesser (and more controllable) substitutes; and, remaining itself, it brings the possibility of ontological recognition and reorientation. 28 If, therefore, the G o d who is recognized in worship is a mystery, this is not the mystery of a dark and remote being; it is what we might call a 'bright' mystery. Veiled though it may be to human beings who have concentrated on mediations of it, this 'veiled wisdom' is also a shining mystery, and one which is nearby. Here again, J o b ' s words give an important clue: ' M y ears had heard of you but now my eyes have seen you. Therefore I despise myself and repent in dust and ashes.' (Job 42.5-6)

28 'At some point along the way I turned my back on God. I challenged and dared God to prove that I was/am loved. A stubborn refusal set in to accept for myself what I preach for others, that God is love - outgoing, searching love - that moves always towards us - only we need to be facing in the right direction, to know and appreciate that. So I'm in the early stages of turning, i.e. a real repentance, but it is hard and painful and won't happen overnight.'

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There are important lessons hidden here also for both the groups we discussed earlier. (1) For those so committed to the persistent search for evidence that they are carried beyond the possibility of recognizing truth, whose key phrase is often 'the mystery of God' (a mystery which is to be appreciated through questioning, and which always defeats the possibility of saying anything positive), the mystery of God will now be seen as a glory or richness whose recognition makes it irradiate human understanding and practice. (2) For those whose rigid adherence to traditional theories disallows fluidity, the continued nearness and brightness of God manifests a creativity which always draws human beings beyond any fixed formula. There is a creativity hidden in wisdom itself which gives it that order and energy which brings human beings to transcend their own understanding, and does so both suddenly and gradually. 29

7. The Formation

of Worship in Christ

What is the basis for the ontological recognition and reorientation we have found in worship? It is that the mystery of God is a 'bright mystery': as mystery, it is not inert but active, creative and redemptive. And to be seen fully, this ordered dynamic must be seen in Trinitarian terms, as the stirring of God by the Holy Spirit to be himself by being with humankind in Jesus Christ. This is what comes into focus in worship, as it is ontologically recognized and as human beings reorientate themselves accordingly. It is as Archbishop Michael Ramsey once said, 'The gospel of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ is both strange to mankind and yet nearer to mankind than the breath which they breathe. For the truth in Him is also the truth in them.' 30 29 Such recognition may be sudden or gradual; one need not accept the view that it must be either the one (the overdeterminist view) or the other (the underdeterminist view), for the dynamic order of God's relation to human beings includes both. 30 'Where then does wisdom come from? Where does understanding dwell? It is hidden from the eyes of every living thing, concealed even from the birds of the air. Destruction and Death say, "Only a rumour of it has reached our ears." God understands the way to it

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The ordered movement of God - the dynamic order of God to humankind which occurs by the Spirit-stirred presence of Jesus becomes formative for those who recognize it in worship, the more so where this is refined in praise. The active truth which is there in him occurs for them where they recognize him (ontological recognition) and follow him (positioning their life). The truth that is in him is highly dynamic and energetic, and is so also for them. If one speaks of this in terms of wisdom, wisdom is seen to have a creativity set within it, which is ordered there by God's command and confirmation; the full shape of it is found in Jesus Christ. And this needs to be recognized through an appropriate response, what can be called creative fearfulness. The movement of God toward humankind, so near to them in love, requires that they recognize him - fear the very one who is nearest to them in love. And this fear is itself an excitement whereby they may be drawn to him. Correspondingly, the hope for God which is found in fear provides a creative spark for all human understanding and life. 31 The way to wisdom is through a proper relation (fear) to God, from which there springs a creative hope for life on earth.

8. The Ethical Content of Worship We have seen that worship - as ontological recognition with its correlative orientation of life -is central to the human relation to God, and that such recognition takes its dynamism from the dynamic order of God which appears in worship. Now we must look more closely at the implications of what we have found for the nature of goodness and how human beings may realize it. and he alone knows where it dwells, . . . When he established the force of the wind and measured out the waters, . . . then he looked at wisdom and appraised it; he confirmed it and tested it. And he said to man, The fear of the Lord - that is wisdom, and to shun evil is understanding.' (Job 28.20-28) 31 In that way, David Hume's explanation of religion f r o m the human psychological experiences of fear and hope proves right, though not in the way he intended.

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Corresponding to the ontological recognition which we have seen to be characteristic of worship, human beings show an instinctive yearning for fullness of life. This may take the form, for those who contemplate it, of a 'vision of life in its fullness', such as that to which Mother Julian of Norwich, the great medieval English mystic, came: All shall be well, and all shall be well, and all manner of thing shall be well.

Her words speak of the goal of life as a condition of well-being for all of us and everything, where everyone and everything is in order, and all is in harmony. Such well-being is akin to glory, but only for those who partake of it (that is, are orientated to it), even if only in anticipation. As thus seen, glory denotes not splendour or magnificence but an undistorted order and harmony which pervades all.32 And the characteristic feature of such glory is that it is 'benign' or 'right', a feature which is recognized by those who are themselves 'right'. 33 This 'rightness' is not simply the absence of disruption; it suggests more than relief that the worst will not happen - the word is most frequently used when a tumour which threatened to be cancerous is diagnosed as 'benign'. It is closer to what is suggested by the words, 'It's all right after all!' - that something is entirely 'all right', and is known as such by one for whom it is 'all right'. 34 The indefinable quality of glory or 32 I was much struck by this when, during the year of the anniversary of St. Cuthbert's death, the Queen Mother visited Durham Cathedral, where Cuthbert is buried. It was not she herself who was a magnificent figure, but the grace and harmony she brought with her which was so remarkable. And, as each person was introduced to her, she surrounded him/her with her own peace and tranquillity, drawing each person into her own well-being. That was her glory, an uninterrupted order and harmony which surrounded those with whom she came in touch. She needed none of the techniques which these days are used to make people appear splendid; the wellbeing with which she surrounded people was her glory. And it brought amongst those who were with' her that day a sense of well-being and harmony. 33 Hence the close association of the glory of God with his righteousness, of the human anticipation of it with hope and steadfastness in hope with faith. We 'desire a better country' by hoping for it and remaining steadfast in that hope. (cf. Hebrews 11.1-16) 34 This was shown in the film 'Close Encounters of the Third Kind' which made such an impression a few years ago. In it, the first encounters with the visitors from other planets seem frightening, and we are inclined to regard them with suspicion

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well-being, of order and harmony, the 'allrightness' which is in the universe, whose vestiges are within the reach of human beings, is that to which everyone reaches out whenever he/she seeks for well-being which is the most characteristic human activity. We shall need to look at this more carefully in a moment. First, it is important to recognize that the contemplation of such well-being is a twofold activity. There is an ontological recognition of this well-being correlated to a reorientation of life by which we recognize it. Hence well-being is recognized through a correlative wellbeing. T h e same occurs where there is neither time nor inclination for contemplation, and human beings seek for fullness of life, even in the fragmented form of pragmatic behaviour. So far as the ontological recognition of well-being is concerned, for human beings whose lives are constantly changing, 'well-being' is necessarily elusive; the achievement of what is thought to be well-being stimulates the vision of what might be a greater well-being. 3 5 And, again by the nature of the case, for human beings who are particular individuals and societies, the nature and means of well-being are matters of disagreement and competition. But the ontological recognition of well-being remains: even when they cannot envisage or achieve this well-being, or at least not as much as they would like, human beings still search for it, live for it and are relatively happy when they are more or less well. Here is the reorientation which is correlative to ontological recognition. T h e searching for well-being, together with the adaptation which is required to achieve it, are a constant and pervasive reorientation to anticipate well-being in the form of their lives. The undistorted order and harmony of the well-being for which they seek

as the visits of alien intruders, particularly when they seem to frighten all those with whom the space ship comes in contact, and when a young boy is taken away. But, despite the typical responses of the Americans - a huge build-up of American armed forces to deal with them, and trying to keep the whole affair hidden from the public - it becomes more and more clear that the visitors come with entirely benign intentions. All the A r m y takeover, and the secrecy, are shown simply to be the product of fear. But those who have been contacted by these benign beings are, quite simply, fascinated, completely preoccupied by what has happened; they are drawn into the well-being these beings create. The only problem is communication, and that is overcome by the use of musical tones. 35 In this way, progress is linked to utopianism.

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are anticipated even in activities which seem very different - such as struggle, for example. It is also important to recognize that the well-being thus recognized, as well as the reorientation of life which is intrinsic to this recognition, are not abstractions. They appear in all the means by which human beings live. They are mediated in social life, as well as through human life in the world. And the supposition that one can somehow realize this well-being apart from doing so in life, with others, and in the world, provides an important and very common obstacle to full recognition of the nature of well-being. On the contrary, the glory which is sought is that which will appear in an undistorted order of life, society and world for all. That is certainly the meaning of the kingdom of God as preached by Jesus. The ontological recognition of well-being, and the reorientation which accompanies it, are the characteristic activities which occur in worship, where well-being is ascribed to God as his perfection and human beings thereby find the possibility of well-being for themselves. As we saw earlier, the means by which such recognition is purified, and matched by a purified reorientation, is praise. Serious problems arise, however, where there are deficiencies in the understanding of God and the nature of his well-being, for then worship also legitimates forms of life which are much less than they should be. Such deficiencies appear in a view which is found very widely today, one which is closely connected with basic features of modernity, particularly deism, analyticity and individualism. The most fundamental feature of the view is its use of closure, whether full or 'punctuated', in relationships. 36 In the complete form of the view, the world is closed off from God, as are items and people in the world from each other. So, in each case, existence requires distinctness, a 'being away from' others, and identity is established through differentiation: people are naturally different, 'these' different from 'those' at every point, this nation different from that nation, this class different from that class, workers different from managers, 36 'There are not many differences in mental habit more significant than that between the habit of thinking in discrete, well-defined class concepts, and that of thinking in terms of continuity, of infinitely delicate shadings-off of everything into everything else . . . the, so to say, universal overlapingness of the real world.' (A.O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, N e w York: Harper, 1936) Punctuated relationships are those which depend on the decision of those related.

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this political party different from that, this religious group distinguished from that. And as the world grows steadily more complex, particularity becomes more important. 3 7 Such distinctions and differences, which have a legitimate place, become problematic when they are refined and become self-important. 38 Thus reinforced, differences are translated into sharp divisions. Thereafter, difference is shown by enhancing division by whatever means are available. Such divisions are frequently rationalized in religious terms, where the world as a whole is presented as a place divided against itself, and the universe as a place where there is a great conflict - a warfare of good and evil. G o d is said to have made things this way, or perhaps to have allowed them to slip into such conflict, and now gives victory to those whom he has chosen, while defeating the evil ones. Whether seen in such religious terms or not, the view undermines all relationality. Well-being is seen as the result of standing alone and self-sufficient, impervious to the threat posed by others. The power to stand alone is supposed to derive from the intrinsic position of the strong individual, which others naturally wish to usurp in order to become strong themselves. 39 Except perhaps through (irrational) choice, it is not incumbent on such a person to engage in relationships with others, for the world is a place where everyone must struggle to improve his/her position by maximizing assets in every way. 37 T h i s is a preeminent feature of ' p o s t - m o d e r n i s m ' , which confines all relationality to the p o s i t i o n of f o r m s of language b y which p e o p l e are constructed: 'I've been in love with y o u for w e e k s . ' ' T h e r e ' s n o such thing,' she says. 'It's a rhetorical device. It's a b o u r g e o i s fallacy.' ' H a v e n ' t y o u ever been in love, then?' ' W h e n I w a s y o u n g e r , ' she says, Ί allowed myself to be c o n s t r u c t e d b y the d i s c o u r s e of romantic love f o r a while, yes.' ' W h a t the hell d o e s that m e a n ? ' 'We aren't essences, Vic. We aren't u n i q u e individual essences existing prior t o language. T h e r e is o n l y language.' ( D a v i d L o d g e , N i c e W o r k , L o n d o n : Penguin, 1989, p. 293) 38 T h e p r o c e s s by which they are refined is similar to praise. Where in Christian w o r s h i p praise refines relationality, in this alternative view praise is reflexive and refines separation. 39 T h e p e r s o n w h o lives in a w o r l d which is only a place of conflict, and in which he is constantly struggling, will eventually b e u n a b l e t o see the w o r l d as anything else. T h e r e is a particularly striking case of this in s o m e of the A m e r i c a n soldiers w h o served f o r years in the Vietnam War; a g o o d n u m b e r of them have been able only to live in the wild areas of the northwestern states in a state of constant struggle with themselves. T h e y have internalized the struggle of which they w e r e a part f o r so long, and are never at peace. H o s t i l i t y is a w a y of life f o r them.

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The main issue posed for theology and ethics by such views is the true character of well-being. The most serious problems which beset the human race today arise from the distorted visions of 'well-being', and the practices accompanying them, by which people live.40 (a) The Nature of God's Well-Being As recognized in worship, God is one whose being is directed, directed toward human life in the world. His well-being, therefore, is that which occurs in the direction of his being. It is, so to speak, achieved in the direction of his being. Correspondingly, human well-being in the world arises through the direction of his being toward us and our world, and as our lives are conformed to that. 41 We shall presently need to look further at the implications of these matters for the dynamics of God's well-being. Recognizing God as one whose being is directed has important implications for the question of the nature of God. The God who is thus recognized is one who has the highest importance for explanation and valuation, for he will be that which is simultaneously the highest form of explanation and of the highest axiological importance. 42 The two are found to be interrelated in worship: where God is recognized for himself, in worship, the highest explanation is valued as such, while it also derives its explanatory importance from the value accorded it. The first priority in worship is to recognize this, but it is also important that the explanation which is thus valued should be correlated to other less wide-ranging explanations and values, and that they should 40 The fact that it is found through the ontological recognition and orientation which occur in worship does not prevent human beings from posing false ideals of wellbeing to which they conform themselves. 41 There are two senses in which this is so. It is the case that his being is 'toward' human beings in the world; he is 'for them'. But this is also an active movement toward them, refined in a concentration of movement. The consequence is that human beings are not only to respond to his being for them, but also to the concentration of his movement. 42 The issue of explanation is akin to the question of being, and that of valuation allied to that of direction, for it is the nature of being which explains, and the direction which things have which constitutes their value. The claim that, at the highest level, the two are profoundly interrelated conflicts with the modern notion that factual explanation and values must be kept separate.

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be seen as proportional to it. The implication is that ontological recognition is not primarily a utilitarian matter, is not finding the highest explanation in order to translate it into useful practice, but that other forms of explanation and valuation follow naturally from the proper ontological recognition. The risk of talking in these terms, of that which is highest in explanation and valuation, is that worship seems to be directed to the highest 'that which is', a static ideal of perfection to which human beings and the world need simply to conform by repeating it under the conditions of finitude. But this is a mistake, certainly as far as Christian worship is concerned. When it is recognized in worship that God's well-being occurs in the direction of his being, it will be seen that this is not a changeless well-being, secure against the difficulties of contingency and complexity. The possibility of a changeless well-being is then seen to be an abstractive notion of well-being, abstractive because it is always distant from G o d ' s own life and the life which he confers on humankind in the world. 4 3 For G o d and humankind, harmony arises in difference (and therefore complexity), and order occurs in and through movement (where there is contingent order). This means that talking of order and harmony as 'uninterrupted' or 'static', as if order and harmony always displace movement and complexity, is untrue to G o d ' s well-being and the well-being conferred by G o d . Nowhere is this better seen than in worship itself, whose nature is the finding of G o d ' s own dynamic order in the dynamics of life in the world. 4 4 (b) The Dynamics of G o d ' s Well-Being As we have seen, G o d ' s well-being occurs in the direction of his being. True well-being as such is seen in the whole being and work of G o d , not only in himself but with us. But it is doubtful whether we can grasp this fully enough with our usual view of G o d ' s activity. We tend usually to see G o d as active in such a way as to have consequences 43 T h i s is seen in m a n y views of the k i n g d o m of G o d , wherein it is a state of affairs which is reached at s o m e point. T h e possibility that it always continues to b e attained is thereby excluded. 44 C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , the notion of w o r s h i p as an u n c h a n g i n g repetition of

God's

changelessness, in which h u m a n beings find stillness, is to be regarded as suspect. Instead, it is p r o p e r l y seen as the realization of the f r e e d o m and responsibility, the justice and love, which together are the d y n a m i c o r d e r of G o d , in the particular circumstances of t h o s e w h o w o r s h i p .

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for the well-being of human beings in the world rather than actively enacting his own well-being in the world. So we see God as an individual agency making a commitment for the good of his people (e.g., the covenant with the Jews), and being active in various ways to fulfill the commitment. This is similar to the way in which we see a human being, who retains his/her independence while making a commitment to another and acting to fulfill the commitment; the relation begins with the commitment and ends with its withdrawal. The relationship to the other always rests on the commitment and the actions by which it is fulfilled: the 'other' is the sphere of operation for the 'one'. 45 This rather limited notion of relationship can be carried into the understanding of God's activity in the world. God's activity in the world is then seen to rest on the ways by which God is fully himself. He is himself by means of such activities as seeing, knowing, loving and judging, and these are realized in their mediation through speech, hearing, attention and discernment; the two sets - ways and their mediations - are inextricably bound to each other. The sheer effecting of God, the empowering of God to do as and what he does, occurs as the active mode (see-ing, know-ing, etc.) operative in the ways and means by which God is himself.46 But this understanding of the trinitarian activity of God is a complex form of individual action and commitment, and therefore fundamentally monotheistic. As with the view of individual personality which it follows, this understanding of God can be coupled with - and perhaps even leads to - a counterposed view of the freedom of human individuals.47 When measured against another and more dynamic view, this view appears compressed and abstractive.

45 A more complex view can be produced dialectically, where the 'other' develops an independence which corrects the 'one'; but this is based on bilateral individualism. 46 Bruce J. Malina, In The N e w Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology (London, 1983), drawing on the work of Bernard de Geradon, suggests that such a 'three-zone' understanding of G o d mirrors the first-century view of man as comprised of zones of 'emotion-fused thought', 'self-expressive speech' and 'purposeful action', pp. 60-7. F o r him, this is derived from a 'dyadic' view of personality, in which the 'individual... perceives himself and forms his self-image in terms of what others perceive and feed back to him.' (p. 55). F o r both man and God, therefore, the role of the other is limited to feedback. 47 This, of course, is a plausible view of the genesis of the autonomous freedom of individuals which characterized to European Enlightenment.

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(c) God's Well-Being as Occurring Within Dynamic Relationality What occurs in Christian worship, however, is an ontological recognition of a God whose well-being occurs within relationality; and this recognition confers the same relationality on those who recognize it. The point here is a simple but extremely fundamental one, that God's being includes relationality; God's relationality does not begin and end with a choice made in his independence. Hence the relationality which God confers on human beings is one which is from his own relationality; and it is this relationality which is conferred through the ontological recognition and human reorientation which we know as worship. But the relationality of God is not an inert relationality, whose character is established once for all. It is always a dynamic relationality, comprised of a social dynamic. And the highest possibilities for relationality are fulfilled there, moving from the love which is its character (not self-love but love in nucé) to the fullest expression of that love in relationality. Hence God's well-being is a fulfillment which occurs in the movement of love in his own relationality.48 Furthermore, God expresses his own well-being by forming the wellbeing of his people, and by acting to maintain that where the social practices of his people are orientated to him. It is because God confers well-being in this way, that there is the possibility of well-being for his people. So it is the dynamic order in God - together with the wellbeing which is achieved there - which is enacted in the relationality of his people. When, for example, two people are joined in marriage, they do not simply engage in a bilateral commitment witnessed by the community, the consequence of which is mutual well-being. It is the movement of the divine relationality in them by which they receive the possibility of their sociality and the well-being in which it is fulfilled. This is the basis for a different and fuller understanding of the activity of the trinitarian God. In this case, every aspect of God is seen as intrinsically relational and practical. Hence it becomes impossible to posit 'seeing', 'knowing', 'loving' and 'judging' as the fundamental aspects of God 4 9 , for these notions are inseparably connected to their corresponding dialogical relationships, 'speaking', 'hearing', 'at48 See note 27. 49 Malina translates them into m o d e r n terms as the 'core p e r s o n a l i t y ' of G o d in ibid., p. 61.

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tending', 'discerning'; and both are inseparable from those forms of energetic activity which generate and effect them. This has very farreaching implications; it means that God's 'nature' is not comprised of 'pure' activities, but of such activities practiced with at least one particular other, with the expectation that a fullness of the activities requires the contribution of this other. Each activity is therefore immediately a communicative activity 50 : seeing to seeing, knowing to knowing, loving to loving, speaking to speaking, etc. Even beyond that, each activity is also a responsibility which includes both receptiveness and conferral: seeing to speak, hearing to know, attending to love, discerning to judge. And it is always with this particular other. (d) The Energy of Weil-Being What runs through all this relationality is a stirring ('the Spirit') which presses the activities not to some abstract perfection (perfect knowledge, love, etc.), but to the fullness of relationship with this one (seeing, knowing, loving, judging with this one). So the relationality of God is one of energetic involvement and participation, moving toward fuller and fuller relationship. And this would not be complete until all the fullness of each had enlarged the other. Even then it could not be complete, because the stirring would still continue in the vibrancy of the relationship.51 Incidentally, such an understanding of God would not stimulate an opposing freedom; the only opposition would come through antisociality, from one who wishes to remove himself from such involvement, who would then lose the vibrancy of relationship. Seen in such a way, it becomes clear that God is what - from the human point of view - can be called an 'energy event'52 constituted by 50 This is what is sometimes called 'face-to-face' activity. See Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969. 51 The 'richness' of the biblical accounts of heaven is probably due to this. See Isa. 11.1-11 and Rev. 21.1-27. 52 'Awareness of an all-pervading mysterious energy articulated in the infinite variety of natural phenomena seems to be the primordial experience of human consciousness, awakening to an awesome universe filled with mysterious power. N o t only is energy our primary experience; energy, and its multiple modes of expression, is also the primary concern of modern physics, its ultimate term of reference in describing the most fundamental reality of the universe. Physics is establishing contact with energy events rather than with substances of atomic or subatomic dimensions. These energy events extend in size all the way from subatomic particles to galactic systems. The universe can be seen as a single, if multiform, energy event, just as a particle such

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a concentration of well-being in relationship which is inseparable from the extending of this relationship with his people in the world, and from the expression of his well-being in that relationship. The world he has brought into being and maintained is therefore a relational one, for which he has provided the possibility of well-being. His purpose is to move toward fuller and fuller relationship with it and all that comprises it, bringing it to its fullness by sharing his own fullness with it. One way of expressing this is to say that G o d does not remain social within a boundedness which is himself, but is himself by enacting with us what can be called an 'ideal social community' in which it is possible for human beings to come to a full life with each other. 53 Hence his sociality is enacted with theirs; it finds its fullness where human beings are most fully social in their practice of life. 54 As G o d extends his sociality into relationship with a universe which is social, that sociality is ramified in an increasingly complex sociality. 55 (Hence, to talk about a substance-like 'relationality' or 'sociality' of the universe is to talk of an abstraction.) This increasing complexity is itself the manifestation of the ongoingly energetic involvement and participation of G o d , whereby he intends to move toward fuller and fuller relationship with his people and their societies, though it can also be driven by the human revolt from the responsibility which this involves. (e) The Form of Human Well-Being We have concentrated on the true character of well-being as that appears in worship. And we have found that Christian worship brings recognition of the dynamics of G o d ' s well-being - that G o d ' s wellbeing occurs in the direction of his being toward us, through the en-

as the p h o t o n is itself perceived in historical reality as an energy event.' ( T h o m a s B e r r y , T h e D r e a m of the Earth, San F r a n c i s c o : Sierra B o o k s , 1988, p. 24) 53 C o m p a r e J ü r g e n H a b e r m a s , T h e T h e o r y of C o m m u n i c a t i v e A c t i o n , Vol. 2: L i f e w o r l d and S y s t e m : A C r i t i q u e of Functionalist R e a s o n , B o s t o n : B e a c o n Press, 1987, p. 2 and p a s s i m . 54 A n d this is not to be seen in s i m p l y h u m a n terms. A s w e have seen previously, the ecological is n o t s i m p l y an e n v i r o n m e n t or 'context' within which h u m a n beings are social; the ecological is necessarily implicated in their sociality and its fulfillment. 55 A n d all the means b y which h u m a n beings deal with their sociality politically, e c o n o m i c a l l y and religiously, t h r o u g h institutions and personally, serve further to r a m i f y their sociality.

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ergy by which he is involved with human life in the world. It is these dynamics, and the characteristics which appear in them, which confer a proper form and energy on human relationality. In God, there is positive openness to the other by which God is with the other, identified with the other in whatever is his situation or need, and affirming the other there. This is what constitutes the actuality of positive openness and affirmation in our relationships, and thus breaks down the closures by which we cut ourselves off from relationship and the distortions by which we misconstrue relationships. The result is that we are opened to divine relationality in our human relationality, and thereby energized for full relationship with each other in the world. The privilege which the ontological recognition and human reorientation of worship brings - of being thus opened and energized permits no one to stand above the world of today, which is largely driven by the 'modern' view mentioned earlier. Instead, it confers freedom and responsibility to show the movement of God's well-being to all human-beings, and only thus to partake of God's glory. This is exactly the way followed by the movement of God toward humankind in Jesus Christ, who brought benignity and well-being by undermining the hostility of the world in his death.

Worship and Theology Oswald Bayer

Theology reflects on knowledge and action. It considers dogma and morality. Knowledge and action, dogma and morality are however grounded in worship. In this essay I therefore put forward a concept of theology which has worship as both its source and goal. This claim, that theology should be worked out with worship as both its source and goal, seems to be almost self-evident in Anglican thought. But in the tradition of German-speaking theology and its ethics it is very far from self-evident. So it is an unusual departure for a German Protestant theologian to begin with worship and not with theology - to treat it as the very starting-point, and only then go on from the concept of worship to develop what can count as theology. The second shift concerns the concept of worship in itself. I should like to focus first not on specific Christian worship but on general worship, which is identical with religion in general. In distinguishing and relating general and specific worship it is right not to let general worship become too vague in its scope, nor to let the latter become too narrow in its definition. We are not dealing here with two different areas of study, but with a single area.

I. Worship 1.1 General Worship: the Church as an Order of Creation According to the Yahwist's story of creation the first word of God to human beings is the promise of life (Gen. 2.16): 'You may eat . . . !'. This promise of life is protected by a threat of death (Gen. 2.17): 'But

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from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you may not eat; for on the day on which you eat from it, you will surely die.' On this passage Martin Luther pithily remarks in his lecture on Genesis of 1535: 'Haec est institutio Ecclesiae, antequam esset Oeconomia et Politia',1 that is, the Church was instituted before the economy or politics, not a specific church, but a general church 'sine muris'2 without walls. It exists in word and faith, in that God calls human beings into life, 'preaches' to them, 'sets forth his word to them', 3 and so 'wills only that they praise God and thank him, in order to delight in the Lord.' 4 There are three basic forms of life (orders, estates) which are to be distinguished and related, in which the creative word of God has ordered, provided and constituted humanity: Church, Economy (including matrimony and the family), and Politics. Of these Church is the first; it is the basic order. The basic order is that of the human being whom God addresses, who is made for thankful and free response. The humanity of human beings consists in the fact that they are called into life by God, are addressed by him, and so can hear and themselves speak in response - and must be responsible.5 In God's address and the expected human response there lies the basic process of worship, the basic process of religion, cult and Church, understood as an order of creation; all people and all religions belong to it. Every person, simply by being a person, belongs to Church as an order of creation, it defines him as a person, though it is corrupted by the ingratitude of human beings, by their sin, and so in fact it is no longer Church. It may seem at first sight an astonishing claim that worship, Church, is an order of creation. The advantage of doing so will be shown in what follows. From the promise of life which is valid for all people from the very beginning (Gen. 2.16), and from God's self-presentation: Ί am the Lord, your God' (Ex. 20.2) and the first commandment 'You shall have no other gods but me' (Ex. 20.2), as from the threat 1

Martin Luther, Lectures on Genesis (1535-1545), WA 42, 79, 3.

2

ibid., 79, 4.

3

ibid., 80, 2 ('proponit ei

4

ibid., 81, 3f. ('Hoc tantum vult, ut laudet Deum, ut grattas ei agat, ut laetetur in Domino ...' Cf. the continuation: 'et ei in hoc obediat, ne ex vetita arbore comedat', ibid., 81, 4.)

verbum').

5

v.i. 'Social Ethics as an Ethics of Responsibility'.

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of death which protects the promise of life (Gen. 2.17), there arises a peculiar 'natural' theology and at the same time a phenomenology of religion. In line with Rom. 1.18-3.20 it reckons with a relationship to God within which everyone lives, though factually and practically it is always a failure; it is a false, perverted relationship. Reason - not primarily theoretical reason but practical reason guided by the power of imagination - always reaches after God, but at the same time misses him, as Luther pointedly puts it (on Jonah, 1.5, 'Then the people were afraid and each cried to his god'), 'these people in the ship all know of God', 'but have no certain God.' 6 To make God certain is the office of Jesus Christ. The community which arises from the self-presentation of God in his creation is always faulty, thus Church as an order of creation is corrupted; the whole creation is dragged into this corruption and 'groans' (Rom. 8.18-23). The God who speaks to the creature through the creature is therefore present and active only in law and gospel; yet also beyond law and gospel, in God's terrible hiddenness, in which I can no longer hear him, at any rate no longer 'understand', but only 'hear' him as terrifying, experience him as crushing, dreadful, sinister, and flee from him - to the gracious and merciful God, to the Father, who allows himself to be seen to his heart through his Son, and who is love, entirely love. By deciding to consider first not specific but general worship and its basic corruption, we have been brought to questions in the field of religious studies. Certainly we can not assume some general study of religion which provides a 'framework' 'in which Christian theology with all its disciplines must find its place.' 7 Rather the inevitable 'perspective of a world history of religions' 8 arises only from that 'middle' (Gen. 2.9) which is established in primeval times with that promise of life which is valid for all people and for all creatures. And nowhere can it be heard more critically and more comfortingly than in the preamble to the decalogue and the first commandment, Ί am the Lord your God, You shall have no other gods but me.' (Ex. 20.2) Martin Luther, Commentary on the Prophet Jonah (1526) WA 19, 208, 2If. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie [The Theory of Knowledge and Theology], 364. Frankfurt, 1973; cf. however the important relativising, ibid., 42 If. 8 ibid., 364.

6 7

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Luther's explanation of the first commandment in the Large Catechism reveals strikingly how vast a concept of religion one can attain by interpreting the first commandment. With this concept of religion we can grasp the dimension of a theology of creation, and - as is shown in the doctrine of the three orders or estates as forms of life also the way our social and individual existence is bound up with our elemental experience of the world, coping with basic needs. But if so, then necessarily we are in the realms of cultural anthropology and sociology. Religious studies is also concerned with institutions. We have now sketched the basic features of a doctrine of a general worship. The challenge of such a doctrine to theology is inescapable and not only in respect of its relation to the world religions; it arises from its own sources, from the biblical texts. It needed to be addressed lest specific worship, to which we now turn our attention, appears isolated, positivistic and arbitrary.

1.2 Specific Worship In Christian worship the restoration of the corrupted order of the Church, which is brought about by Jesus Christ, is bestowed and distributed. 'Distribution' 9 is something more and other than, say, 'representation'. 10 For it is not a representation as an expression, not declaration, but bestowing promise. With the promise of the forgiveness of sins, and so the healing of our basic ingratitude to the Creator, everything hangs on the effective word of God, which precedes our faith, so that faith and prayer, human response, can never lead to an

9

Cf. Martin Luther, Against

the Divine

Prophets

of Pictures and Sacrament

(1526)

WA 18, 204, 3f.; 205, 13f. Accordingly salvation is 'acquired' on the Cross (sub Pondo Pilato), but it is 'distributed' in the Word (from the beginning of the world to its end). 10 Friedrich Schleiermacher understands worship as an act of 'presentation' (not an 'efficacious' act), in Die christliche

Sitte [Christian

Morality],

ed. Ludwig Jonas,

SW 1/12, 5 0 2 - 7 0 6 (esp. 599-620). Berlin, 2nd ed. 1884; id., Die praktische [Practical Theology],

Theologie

ed. Jacob Frerichs, SW 1/13, 68-82. Berlin, 1850. A (not uncrit-

ical) appropriation of Schleiermacher's category of 'presentation' is undertaken by Peter Cornehl in 'Theorie des Gottesdienstes - ein Prospekt' ['Theory of Worship: the Prospects'], in ThQ

15 9, 178-195. Tübingen, 1979.

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understanding of worship simply as a 'self-realisation of the church'. 1 1 Even as the response of the Church faith remains the w o r k of God. Given the widespread ecclesiological and sacramental theological arguments - evident in the use of the category of 'representation', and talk of the 'self-realisation of the Church', of the Church as an original sacrament 12 - the criterion of specific worship which Luther urged f r o m the beginning of his Reformation theology is not at all selfevident. It lies in the event of w o r d and faith, promissio and fides classically formulated in the work, The Babylonian Captivity of the Church (1520): ' G o d has never had, nor does he ever have, any dealing with humanity except by the word of promise. Conversely, we can never have anything to do with G o d except by faith in the w o r d of promise.' 1 3 This correlation of w o r d and faith, in which first comes the word, only then faith - prevenient word and following faith - remains for Luther the criterion of true worship. In 1544, at the end of his life, at the consecration of the church at Torgau Castle, his concern was that 'this new house should be directed so that nothing else takes place in it, but that our dear Lord himself speaks with us through his holy word, and we in turn speak with him in prayer and songs of '14

praise. Public word and inner prayer as 'the converse of the heart with G o d in supplication and intercession, thanks and adoration', 1 5 are inseparably linked with each other. For that reason 'religion as a private affair' 1 6 is unthinkable. The word which creates faith is a 'bodily word', 11 Cf. Karl Rahner, Grundkurs des Glaubens [Fundamentals of Faith], 403f. Munich, 1976. 12 On the understanding of the Church as an original sacrament cf. Otto Semmelroth, The Church as Original Sacrament. Frankfurt, 3rd ed. 1963; cf. his article 'Original Sacrament' in LThK, Vol. X, 568f. Freiburg, 1965. Karl Rahner, Kirche und Sacramente, Quaestiones disputatae [Church and Sacraments: Disputed Questions] 10, 17, Freiburg, 1960. 13 M. Luther, De Captivitate, WA 6, 516, 30-32; cf. ibid., 517, 8f; 514, 14f. 14 WA 49, 588, 15-18. 15 Konfirmationsbuch der Evangelischen Landeskirchen in Würrtemberg, Stuttgart, 33, 10th ed. 1962 (Answer to the question: What is prayer?). Cf. Ps. 19.15 ('The words of my mouth and the thoughts of my heart before you, Lord'). 16 Cf. Oswald Bayer, 'Leibliches Wort. Öffentlichkeit des Glaubens und Freiheit des Lebens' ['Bodily Word. The Public Nature of Faith and the Freedom of Life'], in Leibliches Wort. Reformation und Neuzeit im Konflikt [Bodily Word. Reformation and Modernity in Conflict], 57-72, esp. 66-68. Tübingen, 1992.

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as the Augsburg Confession in its fifth article emphasises against the enthusiasts. The elements of externality in this word can be read off the Lord's Supper. Here there is an interplay of four elements: first of all the social and at the same time natural and cultural element of common eating and drinking is constitutive. This process, which is a real, bodily and present experience, is inseparable from the gift-word of Jesus Christ, as the cited speaker. It is therefore inseparable from the New Covenant17, the creation brought home to God, the final communion between God and humanity, together with all creatures. This eschatological community gathers together bodily. Yet it is first and foremost as sinners that they gather, who are on their way to becoming the eschatological community, through the performative word which addresses them by means of wine and bread, which has its competence, power and authority only from the raising of the crucified Jesus. 18 If one reads off the constitutive elements of the 'bodily word' in the event of the Lord's Supper, then we do not become aware of the authority of the word of God and the Holy Scriptures in some rigid revelatory positivism, nor does it drown in the inexhaustible ocean of explanation and appropriation. There is no need to lay claim to the totality of the historical world of modernity as an institutional counterweight to subjectivity, which is a totality that says nothing, because it says everything. 19 Rather one is referred to an event which has a clear shape and can be experienced in the present, where Word as Body and Body as Word come into their own christologically, ecclesiologically, anthropologically and eschatologically. We have now given the major aspects for the development of a concept of specific worship. It would not be difficult to go on to reflect on the discrete elements and their relationships. I have spelled out elsewhere what could be inferred by taking the example of 'the

17 H o w far the N e w Covenant is a distinctive mark of externality is shown in Leibliches Wort (see n. 16), 309. 18 C f . Oswald Bayer, 'Tod Gottes und Herrenmahl' ['The Death of G o d and the Lord's Supper'] in Leibliches Wort (see n. 16), 289-305; id., 'Kurzer Begriff des ganzen Evangeliums. D a s Herrenmahl als Mitte des Glaubens' [A Summary of the Whole Gospel: The Lord's Supper as the Centre of Faith'], ibid., 306-313. 19 Cf. Leibliches Wort (see η. 16), 61-63.

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complaint God hears', which touches on the liturgy: concretely in the Kyrie and the prayers of intercession.20 There are just two more vantage points left to mention, which are decisive for specific worship and thereby for restored general worship: sacrifice and gift, and celebration.

1.2.1. Sacrifice and Gift Worship is first and last God's service to us, his sacrifice which took place for us, which he bestows in specific worship - 'Take and eat! I am here for you' (cf. I Cor. 11.24 with Gen. 2.16). This feature of worship is lost if we want to do as a work what we may receive as a gift.21 'We do not present a good work, we do not actively communicate' perhaps in a self-realisation of the Church; through the priest as the servant of the divine Word 'we rather receive the promise and the sign and communicate passively.'22 We may not ascribe to the sacramental gift-word the character of prayer; and the good deed which we should take and receive may not be presented to God as a sacrifice.23 The Lord's Supper is not a 'sacrifice which could be brought to God', 2 4 in it rather the condescension and self-sacrifice of God encounters us, which he communicates to us. We receive his sacrifice. 'The mystery of Christian holiness consists not in services, sacrifices and vows, which God demands of humans, but rather in promises, fulfillments and sacrifices, which God has done and achieved for the benefit of humans; not in the great and huge commandment which God imposed, but in the highest good, which God gave as a gift; not in legislation and moral doctrines, which concern merely human sentiments and human actions, but in execution of divine decrees by means of divine deeds, works and institutions for the salvation of the whole world.' 25 20 Cf. Oswald Bayer, 'Erhörte Klage' ['The Complaint God Hears'], in Leibliches "Wort (see n. 16), 334-348. 21 Cf. M. Luther, De Captivitate, WA 6, 520, 33-36. 22 ibid., 521, 29f. 23 Cf. ibid., 522, 27-29. 24 ibid., 523, 9f. 25 Johann Georg Hamann, Golgatha und Scheblimini, ed. Josef Nadler, 6 vols., 194957, III, 312, lines 6-17 (emphases removed).

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In specific worship one is to hear, taste and - through the word see, that what holds the world together at its heart is not, say, the Categorical Imperative, but the categorical gift. Specific worship does not cultivate a religious province, but discloses the world as creation. From his Reformation realisation that the words of institution of the Lord's Supper are at their heart a gift-word, Luther went on to discover his understanding of creation as gracious gift, which was so significant for him. The gift-word of the Lord's Supper is what he has in ear, sight and heart when he perceives and acknowledges that every action of the trinitarian God is a bestowing promise and promising bestowal. 26 Corresponding to the universal character of the categorical gift is the universality of the response, for which we are empowered through the gift and the promise: Ί owe God thanks and praise for everything, and so serve and obey him.' An attitude of giving and loving is included in the response - included, but not identical with it. So it might be mistakenly inferred from Romans 12.If that 'the doctrine of worship is identical with the Christian ethic.' 27 In no way can this magna charta of our new obedience (Rom.12.lf) be understood along with Roman Catholic thought as a joint sacrifice of the believer which is shown forth in the eucharist. 28 This claim fails just as much as the twin claim of worship being 'identical with the Christian ethic.' 29 Both claims lead to the removal of the necessary distinction between faith as the service of God to human beings and love as the service of believers to other creatures. This distinction is necessary for salvation; it cannot be removed. The sacrifice and worship of which Rom. 12.If speaks characterises the significance of baptism within the whole of the letter to the Romans. The two verses endorse the significance of baptism not only at the ethical level but beyond the ethical by touching our whole bod26 Cf. On the Supper of Christ. Confession. Large

Catechism

(1528) WA 26, 505, 38-506, 7, and in the

(1529) WA 30/1, 191, 28-192, 2 9 ( B S L K 660 18-661, 42).

27 Ernst Käsemann, 'Gottesdienst im Alltag der Welt' ['Worship in the Everyday World'], in Exegetische flections],

Versuche und Besinnungen

[Exegetical

Explorations

buch Systematischer

Theologie,

(Hand-

Vol. 1), 401, n.39. Gütersloh, 1994.

28 Against Ulrich Wilkens, Der Brief an die Römer

[The Letter to the Romans]

VI/3). 8f. Zürich/Einsiedeln/Köln und Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1982. 29 Cf. η. 27.

and Re-

II, 198-204 (201). Göttingen, 1964. See Oswald Bayer, Theologie

(EKK

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ily perception of the world. The significance of baptism - walking in newness of life (Rom. 6.4) - has to be worked out in comprehensive aesthetics. Creation can be perceived only through God's judgment, otherwise to speak of creation is idle talk. And so we have come to the second major aspect - celebration.

1.2.2. Celebration as dying First of all, 'festival' [Fest] and 'celebration' [Feier = both 'celebration' and 'rest from work'] mean hard and unpalatable facts. 'For nature dies and suffers very unpleasantly, and it is a bitter feast day for it to have to rest from its works.' 30 This is certainly unpalatable for modern humanity, since - and this even affects the theology of Barth 31 and Bultmann 32 - the human being can only understand himself as a worker and a doer (in Barth by analogy with God). This human being is revealed most clearly in Karl Marx, for whom the world only exists insofar as it is self-produced through human work. 33 Here that powerful basis of life, the sabbath, Sunday, is forgotten. If this power is granted to us as a categorical gift, then the compulsion to realise oneself - not only in works but also in deeds, even the deed of faith - must die. That is the hard and unpalatable side of worship as celebration. This side finds its validity if the sermon is perceived as a memoria baptismi - a memorial of baptism 34 - and worship is

30 Martin Luther, On Good

Works (1520), WA 6, 248, 26f. (Exposition of the third

commandment). In order to understand this whole section it is to be observed that in German the verb feiern

means both 'to celebrate' and 'to rest from work' or 'to

have a holiday from work'. 31 Cf. Karl Barth, KD I I / 2 , 594: 'To be a human being is to act. And acting means choosing, means deciding.' Cf. Theologie 32 ibid. (Theologie),

(see η. 27), 402, η. 43.

402, η. 44.

33 Karl Marx, Ökonomisch-philosophische

Manuskripte,

Marx/Engels Gesamtausgabe,

Pt I, Vol.I/2, 292. Berlin, 1982. Cf. ibid., 274, 22-26: 'Given that for socialist man the whole so-called history of the world is nothing other than the creation of man through human work, than nature becoming subject to man's needs, he has the vivid irresistible proof that he gives birth to himself . . . ' Cf. Hegel: The true being of man is . . . his action; in action his individuality is real . . . ' Phänomenologie [.Phenomenology

of Mind],

34 M. Luther, De Captivitate,

des Geistes

ed. J. Hoffmeister, 236. Hamburg, 6th ed., 1952. W A , 6, 528, 8-17.

Worship and T h e o l o g y

157

understood intrinsically on the basis of baptism. Then this dying of which Romans 6 speaks cannot be ignored. Such a dying makes way for life. 'You shall rest f r o m your work, so that G o d may w o r k in you.' 3 5 That is the quite delightful effect of celebration - it removes our burdens and spasms. Faith is nothing other than this: 'a divine w o r k in us that changes us and gives us new birth f r o m G o d (Jn. 1.13; cf. Jn. 3) whereby G o d kills the old Adam, and makes of us totally different persons in heart, spirit, mind and all our powers.' 3 6 If this is true, if it is right to celebrate and to endure G o d ' s w o r k in us, then faith is primarily neither theory nor praxis, neither vita contemplativa nor vita activa but - and Luther found a special phrase for it - vita passiva?7 What this means for the concept of theology must now be shown.

II

Theology

If worship has the universal dimensions which we have made evident, then theology, understood in the narrower sense as an intellectual endeavour, cannot go beyond it. It can never outstrip it, not even catch up with it. It flows f r o m worship and moves towards it. It is as a special and specific intellectual endeavour - part of the faith which hears, which loves G o d not only with the whole heart but with every power and vitality, including one's mind and intellect (Mk.12.30). In a broad sense theology is identical with faith. Luther certainly supported such a concept of theology - one which has been made strange for us today in the wake of Semler and Schleiermacher. If you want to fit it into 'rules', then there are three, which Luther called oratio, meditado, tentatioÌS - these are not three separate ways of proceeding, but a single way.

35 EKG, 240, 4 (Martin Luther). 36 Martin Luther, Foreword

to the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans (1522);

WADB,

7,10, 6-8. 37 Martin Luther, Operationes in Psalmos (1519-1521), o n Ps. 5.12; WA, 5, 165, 33-166, 16. 38 Foreword to the first v o l u m e of the Wittenberg Edition of the Scriptures in German (1539); WA, 50, 658, 29-611, 8, interpreted in Theologie (see n. 27), 55-106.

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On this way sapientia and scientia, life and doctrine do not part company. The modern forms of theology are essentially characterised by such a rupture - which is bound up with dissolving the object of theology. 39 Theology was changed from a doctrine of the word to a doctrine of faith - as in the case of Schleiermacher - or transformed into a philosophy of mind and identified with thought - as with Hegel, for whom 'religion and philosophy are identical', and 'philosophy . . . itself is worship . . . itself is religion'.40 The real human being, one who not only thinks but also has passions, is thereby forgotten. The passionate complaint yields to 'the passionless calm of purely intellectual knowledge'.41 Considering Hegel's theorising, Schleiermacher's psychologising, and the moralising of Christianity in the tradition of Kant, I can see only one way to reach a concept of theology which is responsible in systematic theology: to pursue theology as a linguistic discipline - or to be more precise, a doctrine of linguistic forms. Mindful of general worship and the corrupted order of the Church, it is directed to the forms of specific worship; it aligns itself with these forms, which are at once a linguistic game and forms of life: above all with praise and complaint, the cry of Kyrie, the prayers of intercession, the promised and bestowed blessing. I have tried to grasp this orientation for the doctrine of creation in Schöpfung als Anrede [Creation as Address], in order to develop a doctrine of creation on the basis of the morning praise of a Paul Gerhardt 42 or a clause of the catechism.43 To align theology with the forms of worship - that is the project. In general the envisaged doctrine of linguistic forms must be worked out considering the multiple forms and their relationships. As a criterion we must keep in view the correlation of promissio and fides, and (for the

39 Cf. Theologie

(see η. 27), esp. 276-280.

40 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen tures on the Philosophy

of Religion],

über die Philosophie der Religion

[Lec-

I I / 2 . Glöckner Edition. Vol. X V I , 315; G W

(Suhrkamp), Vol. 16, 28. 41 id., Preface to the second edition of the Wissenschaft der Logik

[Science

of

Logic]

(1831) Glockner Edition, Vol. IV 35; GW (Suhrkamp), Vol. 5, 34. 42 Oswald Bayer, 'The Morning of Creation', in Schöpfung Hermeneutik

der Schöpfung

[Creation

as Address:

als Anrede.

Zu

Towards a Hermeneutics

ation], 109-127. Tübingen, 2nd ed., 1990. 43 ibid., 80-108 ( Ί believe that God has created me, along with all creatures').

einer

of Cre-

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159

more precise understanding of the promissio) the distinction between law and gospel. 44 As systematic theology, this theology, aligned with a doctrine of linguistic forms, will not take its cue - as is usually the case - only from the outline of the creed, moving from creation to eschatology. To avoid the danger of abstraction and speculation as far as possible, it makes much more sense to see the organising principle of a systematic theology in the distinction and relating of the clauses in the Small Catechism. 45 Calvin attempted to move in this direction in the first edition of his Institutes (1536), but then in practice he abandoned it. As a doctrine of forms theology is, so to speak, a grammar of the language of the Bible, of the living and life-giving voice of the gospel, which relates to the death-dealing law. Therefore theology does not primarily seek the 'concept' (like Hegel), nor the 'motive' (with Schleiermacher and Feuerbach); it does not resolve the form into the concept, nor absorb the form back into the motive. As a doctrine of forms it preserves the work of form criticism within it and endorses Franz Overbeck's insight that speech form and life form are indissolubly interwoven. 46 In the 'form' social and individual lives are bound up with the elemental experience of the world, coping with basic needs, as already emphasised, and this does not only imply but continually presupposes theory and practice. Therefore theology and its ethic cannot be stretched on the Procrustean bed of a schema of theory and praxis, nor can they primarily be a theory of action. For as an agent the human being lives on the basis of freedom. This is not the outcome but the presupposition of his action - a presupposition which is certainly not a kind of postulate or implicate, but the promise as bodily word. As a doctrine of forms theology entails at the same time a science of history. It is so on the basis of the promise which entails knowledge of sin and waiting for the gift of justification. If theology were to understand history differently, then if it were not to take it as by nature circular, or sink into scepticism or melancholy, it would have to form 44 Cf. Theologie (see η. 27), Chapter 2: 'The Object of Theology', where a fourfold definition of the object of theology is made evident. 45 O n the systematics of the Catechism cf. Theologie (see η. 27), 106-114. 46 ibid., 462, η. 265.

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the idea of a unity of history, a unity of reality, and speak of God as the unity of reality, as a totality of meaning, which one would have to grasp after by hypotheses - but then everything eschatological would be formalised and subordinated to the modern concept of projection and hypothesis. But if theology entails knowledge of sin and waiting for the gift of justification, it renounces the concept of a unity and refuses to conjure up a meaning of history. It does not give meaning to the meaningless. The painful difference between the promise of life, the unconditioned, unconditional promise of life to everyone and everything, and what daily contradicts it, cannot be disguised by theology; on the contrary theology corresponds to the passion of complaint, which perceives this difference. So theology necessarily entails temptation, contestation and controversy. In renouncing the concept of a unity of history theology also renounces theodicy - that is, justifying God and his goodness in the face of evil. Against the God who is inaccessibly distant yet at the same time insistently close, he who 'does not give you a definition of himself in his word', but rather 'is hidden in majesty and does not lament or remove death, but brings about life, death and all things', 47 theology can only speak of the God who promises himself definitely through the history of Christ. It refuses to reconcile (and so at least intellectually to comprehend) the inconceivable hiddenness of God and his tangible promise, which does lament death and brings about life through death. That dread hiddenness of God, which does not brighten whilst we are on our way, cannot also be identified with his wrath and judgment, insofar as these are forms of his love. Therefore it cannot be understood on the basis of the distinction and correlation of law and gospel, the promise of life and the related threat of death (Gen. 2.16f), and so resolved intellectually. N o r by contrast is theology grounded in action, where it would be a matter not so much of contemplating the unity of history but rather of creating it, of making history, guided by freedom as the regulative idea. Theology pursues no such contemplation or action, it is neither speculative nor moralistic. It is rather practical, in the sense of an experience, as occurs in meditation - that is the listening and learning

47 Martin Luther, De Servo Arbitrio (1525), WA 18, 685, 21-23.

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encounter with the biblical texts - in temptation and in prayer: it is vita passivai

48 The theological concept briefly formulated here is developed in Theologie (see n. 27). O n its significance specifically for ethics see Oswald Bayer, Freiheit als Antwort. Zur theologischen Ethik [Freedom as Response: Theological Ethics] Tübingen 1995, esp. 1.10: ' "I am the Lord your God . . . " The first commandment in its significance for grounding ethics.'

Part III Mediations

In Search of a Eucharistie Social Ethic Alan M. Suggate

Again and again, by the grace of God, Christians have known and experienced this koinonia [of the Church] as a reality. When they do so, their shared dedication to a life of worship, prayer and service becomes a powerful testimony to their faith, and can make a significant contribution to the life of those around them . . . . The Christian doctrine of humanity presupposes that we exist in a network of personal and social relationships in which the God-given potential of each one of us is developed, and that we have a deep-rooted solidarity with all other human beings which finds expression in mutual service, sacrificial self-giving and love.'

In places like these the Report of the Archbishop of Canterbury's Commission on Urban Priority Areas, Faith in the City, instantly reveals its pedigree. It belongs to a long tradition which reaches back through William Temple (1881-1944) to those in the nineteenth century, like F.D. Maurice, who saw themselves recovering social thought common up to the Reformation but eroded thereafter. It is a quite different style of thinking from that of Christians generally supportive of the present Conservative Government, which has roots more in the Puritan tradition. Let us first look more closely at the pedigree of Faith in the City. In 1942 Temple published a popular tract called Christianity and Social Order.2 He first vindicated at length the right of the Church to intervene in the social order: the supposition of completely separate spheres of religion, politics, economics and so on was a modern The place of publication is London, unless otherwise indicated.

1

Faith in the City, The Report of the Archbishop

2

Urban Priority Areas, pp. 58f. Church House Publishing, 1985. W. Temple, Christianity and Social Order, quotations on pp. 35,12,73,90. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1942.

of Canterbury's

Commission

on

In Search of a Eucharistie Social Ethic

165

aberration. He sketched the scope and the limits of the Church's competence: The Church must announce Christian principles and point out where the existing order at any time is in conflict with them. It must then pass on to Christian citizens, acting in their civic capacity, the task of reshaping the existing social order in closer conformity to the principles. For at this point technical knowledge may be required and judgments of practical expediency are always required.

Temple starts out from what he calls Primary Christian Social Principles, which are really summary Christian doctrine: God and His purpose; Man, his dignity, tragedy and destiny. From these he infers three derivative social principles: freedom (or respect for personality), social fellowship and service. Temple then uses these social principles to make critiques of contemporary British society. The severest domestic problem of the 1930s had been long-term unemployment. The worst aspect of it, writes Temple, is that the unemployed feel they have fallen out of the common life. Worse than physical need is the fact that they are not wanted. They have no opportunity for service and are turned in upon themselves. The only answer to moral isolation is for the unemployed to do something needed by the community. "For it is part of the principle of personality that we should live for one another." Having offered critiques of this kind on the basis of the social principles, Temple goes on to sketch "the task before us". Here he sets out six broad objectives which Christians should urge upon the government. For example: "Every child should find itself a member of a family housed with decency and dignity"; or "Every citizen should have a voice in the conduct of the business or industry which is carried on by means of his labour and the satisfaction of knowing that his labour is directed to the well-being of the community." He also writes that the only long-term answer to the futility and frustration of the unemployed is that we find a social order which provides employment steadily and generally. Temple hopes every Christian will endorse the substance of what he has said so far. In his view we have now reached the limits of the Church's competence. Beyond this point Christian citizens must work out programmes of action for themselves, each in their field. He decided to add some further reflections in order to stimulate Christians in their task. He called his final chapter an Appendix, and issued

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the caveat, "Let no one quote this as my conception of the political programme which Christians ought to support. There neither is nor can be any such programme." Here Temple floats the idea, for example, that the state should maintain a certain number of works beneficial to the community (afforestation, new roads and the like) from which private enterprise would be excluded and which the state would expand or contract according to the demand for labour. Three comments are in order here on Temple's approach to social questions: 1. The approach is not only one which Temple used throughout his adult life; it was characteristic of much thinking in reports produced both for the Lambeth Conferences of the world-wide Anglican Communion and by the Anglican commissions on English social questions. There is nothing very original in Temple's thought. What he succeeded in doing was clarifying and popularizing the approach. In 1924 he chaired a large ecumenical gathering in Birmingham called the Conference on Christian Politics, Economics and Citizenship (COPEC). This conference and Temple's Christianity and Social Order ensured that a whole generation of clergy and thousands of laity were familiar with the approach and ready to consider questions about the direction of a reconstructed British society. 2. In the 1920s Temple and COPEC operated with four derivative social principles. In addition to the three in Christianity and Social Order there was the principle of sacrifice. This was basically an extension of the principle of service. It was an attempt to mark the fact that the Cross lay at the centre of the Christian faith, and that service could be extremely costly. Between 1924 and 1942 Temple came to realise that groups were far less amenable to love than individuals nations especially so - and that it was futile to expect them to be animated by self-sacrifice. Self-sacrifice can and must be freely practised by individuals, but it cannot be forced on others as a national policy.3 This was an important development in Temple's thought which I shall pick up presently. 3. Temple's approach starts from a broad doctrinal understanding of the Christian faith and works towards concrete decisions on specific issues. He seems to believe there is nothing controversial about the more specifically Christian part of this process. The chief problems 3

W . Temple, Christianity and Social Order, p. 53.

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arise over the aspects of technical knowledge and practical expediency. Hence the way in which he distinguished between the competence of the Church as such and the role of the Christian citizen. The Church can apparently move from its principles via a critique of society to broad objectives for society to which every Christian might be expected to subscribe. These broad objectives are commonly called middle axioms. They came into their own at the ecumenical Oxford Conference of 1937 on Church, Community and State, and were sponsored by leading figures like Joseph H. Oldham, the chief organiser of the conference, and the German H.-D. Wendland, the American Reinhold Niebuhr, and the Canadian John C. Bennett. 4 They are not axioms in the mathematical sense, and the phrase is to that extent unfortunate. They are basically an attempt to mark out a middle ground between social principles (which are too vague to give clear guidance) and programmes (which contain disputable elements of calculation). Middle axioms are inseparable from the question of authority. Temple believes clearly that they can carry the authority of the Church in a way that programmes can not. They can also carry another authority; for middle axioms are often understood to be guidelines on which Christian and non-Christian should be able to agree. This is based on the assumption that what can be inferred from Christian doctrine should also be commendable on grounds of reason.5 Let us now turn our attention to the theological foundations of Temple's Christian social principles. Enquiry reveals that there is an integral connection between his social principles, theology, philosophy, and worship, especially the sacraments. Temple was brought up in the period when British philosophy was dominated by the British Hegelians. T.H. Green (1837-1882) was particularly influential up to 1914. 6 Many people were losing their Christian faith in an age of critical questioning. Their highly moral parents had instilled in them impulses to altruism and sacrifice for social causes, and they now looked for secular outlets. Green adopted the Hegelian view that the real is the rational, and reconciled religion and philosophy in a way 4

J . H . Oldham in W . A . Visser't Hooft and J . H . Oldham, The Church and its Function in Society, pp. 209ff. Allen and Unwin, 1937; cf. C . - H . Grenholm, Christian Ethics in a Revolutionary

Social

Age, esp. Chapters 2 and 3. Uppsala: Verbum, 1973.

5

Grenholm, pp. 88ff., 184ff.

6

M. Richter, The Politics of Conscience.

Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964.

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which would appeal to highly moral English gentlemen. H e attacked the utilitarians, believing that they were all involved in a conflict between the logic of their various theories of utility and their impulses to philanthropy. In practical terms it was vain to suppose that the selfish pursuit of pleasure could somehow become altruistic. Green substituted a doctrine of self-sacrifice. " H e gave us back the language of self-sacrifice," said one of his disciples, "and taught us how we belonged to one another in the one life of organic humanity. H e filled us again with the breath of high idealism." Green believed his philosophy could articulate Christianity without loss of content and show that there was no inherent conflict between religion and science. This was partly achieved by stressing God's immanence. In society God is immanent in human institutions, aspirations and customs. In individuals he is immanent in the sense of being the principle of reason and morality. God is thus made identical with conscience. God, maintained Green, realises Himself progressively in man and society. This takes place through the development of character to perfection by a process of asceticism, self-sacrifice and devotion to a noble cause. N o t surprisingly Green had great difficulty with the notion of sin, and was highly optimistic about the possibility of individual and social progress. After all, reality is rational. There can therefore be no ultimate conflict, no paradoxes. The purpose of philosophy is to synthesise and reconcile all aspects of human life by showing its ultimate purpose and goal. The glory of Christianity "is not that it excludes but that it comprehends . . . It is the expression of a common spirit, which is gathering together all things in one." The main division among British Hegelians was between absolute idealists, in whose thinking God became an impersonal principle, and personal idealists (such as T.H. Green and Edward Caird), who maintained that value was located principally in self-conscious personality and the organism of society, and who correspondingly held on to a personal understanding of God. All were constructive metaphysicians, seeking to work out a coherent intellectual map of the world. William Temple also held that philosophy was "a determined effort to think clearly and comprehensively about the problems of life and existence." 7 In his three major works, Mens Creatrix (1917), Christus 7

For what follows see A.M. Suggate, William Temple and Christian Today, Chapter 5. Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark, 1987.

Social

Ethics

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Veritas (1924) and Nature, Man and God (1932-4), he was engaged in the search for a coherent account of the universe. Like Caird (who was his tutor at Oxford) he believed the world had a spiritual and not a materialistic interpretation, and he stressed the category of personality. The world's principle of unity had to be not a purely intellectual one, such as logical coherence, but one which embraced imagination and conscience too. The sciences, aesthetics, morality and religion itself - indeed every facet of experience - had to be included in the search. Temple makes the assumption that the universe is basically rational and that the human mind can in principle grasp it. "Philosophy assumes the competence of reason to grasp the world as a whole." Temple was not in fact entirely unambiguous about the relation of revelation and reason, as Emil Brunner pointed out in a letter which was found in Temple's own copy of Nature, Man and God after his death. Was Temple writing Christian philosophy regulated from the start by the Christian faith? or was he offering thought which rested on rational argument? or was he striving towards a synthesis of Christian faith and reason? It is clear that Temple's own pattern of worship and practice made him proof against the most dangerous effects of Hegelianism. H e is best thought of as a Christian philosopher whose leading ideas are culled from the Christian faith. These leading ideas are Incarnation and Sacrament. Temple tries to show that if we work from the world we can see that its different facets converge but do not meet in an all-inclusive system of truth. The missing unity is supplied by the Incarnation. "It is the historic Incarnation of God in a human life of perfect love, issuing in a society bound together by the power of that love." Reason cannot supply the deficiency, but it can welcome the Incarnation as making the universe intelligible as no other metaphysics can. But Christianity cannot offer theoretical certainty; for the basis of assurance is always faith. Certainty lies more at the level of the practical. Temple argues that, if we follow the findings of the sciences, it is clear that matter preceded mind. There has taken place the emergence of a succession of levels of reality - matter, organic life, mind, and spirit. The emergence of each is dependent on the lower levels, but is not predictable on the basis of the knowledge of the lower. In fact the higher controls the lower. It is indeed only when the higher indwells the lower that the lower reveals its full potentialities. The lower, then,

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exists to embody or symbolize what is more than itself. At the highest level spirit, the unique element in personality, directs the organism through the power of mind to a future goal which appears to be good. We need not be concerned with the details of Temple's thought here, which is partly dated. Suffice it to say that the universe has a fundamentally sacramental character. In this sacramental universe persons, since they are in the image of God, can most fully express the divine nature. A person is a psychophysical organism. Body and mind are not two separate entities. They are organically one; mind is the principle of control, the body the medium through which it carries out its purposes. Temple detects three basic dimensions of personality. First, there is individuality, which is marked by freedom. Temple distinguishes two kinds of freedom. The first is a basic form of freedom which is the foundation of legal and moral responsibility. True freedom, however, entails a person acting as a unified self, directed freely towards a chosen goal. "True spiritual freedom would be the state of a man who, knowing an ideal which completely satisfied all aspects of his nature, always in fact perfectly conformed to it and could perfectly trust himself so to do." Temple grounds freedom ultimately in the fact that God is the loving Father of every person and desires the love of His children. Each person is thereby sacred. Secondly, personality is at the same time inherently social. The self cannot of itself attain to unity. It can only do so in the reciprocal relationships of society. But a person is not to be concerned with others just for the sake of the self's attainment of unity. God has created persons supremely for love and fellowship with Him and with each other. Persons therefore need a purpose common to the interests and welfare of all. Only so can the individual be satisfied and all persons united in universal fellowship. Thirdly, this means that the fulfilment of the self in only possible through service to others. A person is ultimately one whose unity resides in the purpose he has to promote universal love. "Love alone has absolute moral value. N o w loving others and helping them to realize their good means forgetting self. To realize myself therefore means in fact to sacrifice myself in the service of others." The human predicament consists in the fact that people persistently follow an apparent good which is not the real good.

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T h e centre of the trouble is the personality as a w h o l e , which is self-centred and can o n l y b e w h o l e s o m e and healthy if it is G o d - c e n t r e d . T h i s w h o l e personality in action is the will; and it is the will which is perverted. O u r p r i m a r y need is not to control our p a s s i o n s b y o u r p u r p o s e , but to direct o u r p u r p o s e itself to the right end. It is the f o r m taken b y our k n o w l e d g e of g o o d and evil that perverts our nature. We k n o w g o o d and evil, b u t w e k n o w t h e m amiss. We take them into our lives but w e mis-take them. T h e c o r r u p t i o n is at the centre of o u r rational and p u r p o s i v e life . . . R e a s o n itself as it exists in u s is vitiated. We w r o n g l y estimate the ends of life, and give preference to those w h i c h s h o u l d be subordinate, because they have a stronger appeal t o o u r actual, empirical selves. T h a t is w h y the very virtues of o n e generation lead to the miseries of the next; f o r they are contaminated with the evil principle, and it is truly said that ' o u r righteousnesses are filthy rags'. We totally misconceive alike the p h i l o s o p h i c and the practical p r o b l e m of evil if w e picture it as the winning of control over lawless and therefore evil p a s s i o n s b y a righteous but insufficiently p o w e r f u l reason or spirit. It is the spirit which is evil; it is r e a s o n which is perverted; it is aspiration itself w h i c h is c o r r u p t .

The remedy for this predicament cannot come from the self; it can only flow from a redemptive act of God. That act must not override man's freedom. There is only one power that can effect a reconstruction of the self about G o d as centre. That is the power of love expressed in sacrifice. The one hope of bringing human selves into a right relationship with G o d is that G o d should declare His love in an act, or acts, of sheer self-sacrifice, thereby winning the freely offered love of finite selves which H e has created. In Temple the Incarnation is absolutely central. It arises both as the culmination of a sacramental universe and as the decisive act of G o d which begins His declaration of loving purpose to redeem the world. If the universe in its whole extent is sacramental, it can only become this perfectly "because within it and determining its course is the Incarnation, which is the perfect sacrament intensively . . . " Temple spent a lifetime meditating on St. John's Gospel, in which he saw the fusion of the historical and the spiritual which is "in the completest possible way sacramental." Central is the Word. St. John "is intensely and profoundly sacramental; he sees the spiritual in the material, and the divine in the human nature, which it uses as its vehicle. The central declaration 'The Word became flesh' is the affirmation of this sacramental principle." As Temple was fond of saying, Christianity is the most materialist of all the world's great religions. The root of Temple's view of the relation between the Christian faith and the social order is in this sacramental view of the relation of spirit to matter.

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The Cross and the Resurrection reveal God's conquest of sin and death. Through the Cross man learns what sin costs God and knows that his sins are forgiven. We see the true nature of God Himself, the full meaning of the words, 'God so loved the world'. The Church consists of men and women brought together by the will of God in response to that divine act. The dynamic of this society is the Holy Spirit: the Church is the fellowship of the Spirit. It is the Body of Christ, His personality which continues the principle of the Incarnation by gathering into itself all people and nations. Salvation involves "inner and outer unity - the inner unity of complete personality and the outer unity of a perfected fellowship as wide as humanity. For ideally the Church is the community where men and women are set free from self-centredness." Worship is the distinctive activity of the Church. It too is sacramental; man only reveals what it is in him to be when God indwells him. And the Eucharist is at the heart of Christian worship. Full self-giving is precisely that of which we are least capable. The fundamental problem of the spiritual life is to accomplish the transformation from self-centredness to love. O n l y by self-surrender is love to be reached, and only by love is self-surrender possible. We are enclosed in a vicious circle. 'Who shall deliver me from the body of this death? I thank my G o d through Jesus Christ our Lord.' What I cannot do in and for myself, Christ has done for me and will do in me. H e offers His life the life of perfect love, expressed in the uttermost self-sacrifice - that I may receive it as my own; and in its power I become able to give myself more completely to God.

The implication of this is that we also give ourselves more completely in love to others. William Temple's Christian philosophy is peculiarly his own, but it also the product of a long stream of thought - or rather of several streams - and many of his ideas are still in essence widely held within the Church in England. His instinct for synthesis and his positive attitude to history and culture are evident in the thought of his great predecessor F.D. Maurice (1805-1872). His interest in the Incarnation and sacraments is typical of Anglican moral theology, but their prominence reflects the Catholic influence of the Oxford Movement and its heirs, the Ritual Slum Priests and the second wave of Christian Socialism. The liberality of his Catholicism is again a typically Anglican trait, with its endorsement of the faculty of reason and freedom of interpretation within the givenness of the faith and the corporate

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life of the Church. Nor is the evangelical dimension lacking in Temple. His teaching invites a response in faith to what God has done in Christ, and an important part of his work was his missionary activity among the holiday-makers on Blackpool sands and among students at Oxford. There was however another strand in his thinking which is especially important if we are attempting to relate the eucharist and social ethics: the Liturgical Movement. In England this stream became a flood chiefly through the work of two men, both monks. One was Father Gabriel Hebert of the Society of the Sacred Mission. His translation of the Swedish Lutheran Archbishop Ingve Brilioth's Eucharistie Faith and Practice, Evangelical and Catholic, brought to the English an ecumenical perspective on the history of the Eucharist and taught them to contemplate a "polished jewel, each of whose facets shows some different and beautiful refraction of one and the same light." 8 Brilioth presented five such facets: thanksgiving, communion, commemoration, sacrifice and mystery. Hebert himself, writing in the 1930s against a background of growing secularism in British society and the rise of fascism abroad, deplored the fragmentation of life and the easy-going materialism depicted satirically in Aldous Huxley's Brave New World. He exposed the widespread assumption that religion is a matter of mere individual opinion, an option for those who feel the need for it. Such private beliefs could not of course influence social life. Hebert looked for deeper foundations and found them in the Eucharist. The Eucharist, he wrote, is fundamentally something done. The commemoration of Christ's saving work is an objective remembrance by means of ritual, which binds together past, present and future. It is moreover an action which is social. Hebert demonstrated the truth of this for the early Church, especially Augustine. To worship God in the Church is not a substitute for the service of God in daily life; rather it is that which makes the service of God possible by bringing the things of daily life into the light of eternity. And as the Chistian redemption is not merely individual but social, so the normal type of Christian worship is not the individual's meditation, but the common worship of the body, when the members are met together to learn the meaning of the common life which is in Him. 9 8

I. Brilioth, Eucharistie Faith and Practice, Evangelical and Catholic, quotation p. 276. SPCK, 1930.

9

G. Hebert, Liturgy and Society, Chapters I and III and p. 160. Faber and Faber, 1935.

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D o m Gregory Dix was a monk of the Anglican Nashdom Abbey, who made a profound study of the history of the liturgy. His great work, The Shape of the Liturgy, published in 1945, is a masterpiece both of scholarship and of English prose, which has excited and deeply influenced a whole generation of Christians. He, like Hebert, rescued the study of liturgy from its antiquarian image and made it fruitful both in ordinary parish life and in social life in the face of the threats of totalitarian regimes and the subtler totalitarian threat from the mystique of technical and scientific mastery of the environment. His chief aim was to show that the liturgy is constructed not round a pattern of words but round the four-fold action of Jesus at the Last Supper: H e took, H e blessed, H e broke, H e gave. 10 I want to draw out the strengths of this multiple stream of tradition, particularly the implications of this eucharistie approach to ethics. 1. It preserves the priority of God's action. The eucharistie prayer recites the great acts of God, culminating in the fact that Christ gave the sacrament to his followers, and gave His life on the Cross. The sheer historical objectivity of the Christian faith is thus underlined. Furthermore, it is Christ Himself, whom God raised up, who is present as the celebrant at every Eucharist. This view should be an effective defence against two temptations. First, against an excessively subjectivist or existentialist understanding of the Christian faith and ethics it must be said that we do not posit or create our own values, but respond to what God has done in Christ. N o r should we be afflicted with preoccupation with our feelings or moods. Secondly, we have a defence against a Pelagian approach, as if by our own action, either in worship or in society, we could earn our salvation. 2. Liturgy is action. It is etymologically the work of the people. The dramatic work of G o d in Christ is entered into and represented in the liturgy. This point is very well expressed by J o h n A.T. Robinson's

Liturgy Coming to Life (1960). The Eucharist is the Christian action, the heart of all Christian action in the world, because it mediates and makes present, in all its efficacy and power, the great saving act of God in Christ once and for all wrought out on Calvary. For all Christian action in this world is nothing else than the finished work of Christ becoming 10 G. Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, Chapter IV. Dacre Press/Adam and Charles Black, 1945.

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operative through His Body the Church. And the Eucharist is the point where that finished work is continually renewed in the Church, as those who have been buried and raised with Christ in baptism come to share in the broken body and outpoured blood of Him whose crucified and life-giving body they are called to be. This is the point where all Christian action begins, where we are united with His act, and where what He has done for us is renewed within us for transmission to the world. This is the crucible of the new creation, in which God's new world is continually being fashioned out of the old, as ordinary men and women are renewed and sent out as the carriers of Christ's risen life."

This view should be a sure defence against several defects of English Christianity: (a) against the passive pietism which looks for private spiritual uplift; (b) against the predominance of the liturgy of the Word - especially viewed as words, words, words, over the liturgy of the Eucharist; (c) against the thin moralism of those who connect Christianity and ethics by focussing on the explicitly moral teaching of the Bible and distilling it into abstract ethical maxims. 3. The Eucharist is corporate action. It is a drama in which each has a role to play, corporately and publicly. Gregory Dix tells how Christians risked death to celebrate corporately in the early centuries of the Church. And John Robinson wittily remarks that it should be as unthinkable for any full member of the Church simply to cut this corporate act as for someone in a theatre company to decide one evening to take the night off. More sombrely, at the Last Supper "there was only one who could think of leaving that evening, and when he went out it was night indeed." 12 The corporate nature of the Eucharist is evident in the 'we' of the Confession and the Creed, and in the common cup and loaf. "Though many, we are one Body, because we all partake of the one loaf." St. Paul censured the Corinthians for their indifference to their neighbours in the Eucharist itself, and warned them of their failure to discern the Body. The common meal must surely be a pattern of how we treat each other both in the Eucharist and in our daily lives. A firm hold on this aspect should be a defence against an individualism where each makes his or her communion and enjoys a private religious experience with God, or which allows a clericalization (and Protestants can be just as bad as Catholics) concentrating all the activity in one person and leaving the rest passive. If the primary reason 11 J.A.T. Robinson, Liturgy Coming to Life, p. 16. Mowbray, 1960. 12 Dix, p. 152; Robinson, p. 55.

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for attendance at the Eucharist is to receive personal help and strength to live the Christian life, then we are, as John Robinson points out, treating the minister as a garage proprietor whose job it is to open up for any of his customers who require a fill-up. Who comes and how often depends quite naturally on what the individual thinks he needs and how much he feels he gets from it. Such a view ignores the force of the plural 'Do this', and almost certainly reflects and reinforces an individualistic approach to daily life. Many parish priests have had to wrestle with the problem of ministering to huge housing estates on the outskirts of cities, often populated by those who have been moved from the inner city. The chief problem has been the breakdown of any sense of community. Such priests have found a profound meaning and source of hope in the corporate dimension of the Eucharist. 4. For this corporate action matter is indispensable, the matter of bread and wine, symbols of the world in which the laity live and work. O n the one hand the bread and wine are the gifts of God. O n the other they are the work of human hands. "To the Eucharist we bring not raw materials, nor even the cultivated wheat and grape, but bread and wine, manufactures, bearing upon them all the processes, and the sin, or commercial production." It is this matter, subject of thankful joy yet symbols of the old order, which is brought up at the offertory to be set by God in a right relation to Himself and made vehicles of His life. 13 Such an approach contains a very positive view of nature, but it also a defence against a romantic view of it - and how the English love harvest festivals! It is also a defence against an individualistic moralizing which would leave whole areas of life (including the economic) exempt from moral scrutiny. 5. The Eucharist encapsulates the meaning of history. For it looks back to the acts of God in the past, culminating in the Cross and the Resurrection; it points to the presence and work of Christ in the contemporary; and it points forward to the consummation. At its institution Jesus related it to the coming Kingdom of God. In the Eucharist we have a foretaste of the realized Kingdom, the completed Communion of Saints. This Kingdom is to embrace not only human beings, but the whole creation which now groans and travails, or as John Robinson puts it, a transformation has to take place "till the 13 Robinson, p. 35.

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whole body of this old world becomes conformed to the likeness of Christ's glorious Body." So the post-communion prayer of the Methodist Sunday Service says, "Almighty God, we thank you that you have fed us in this sacrament, united us with Christ, and given us a foretaste of the heavenly banquet prepared for all mankind." A n d Charles Wesley could write in his hymn 'Love divine, all loves excelling', a stanza which reads: Finish then thy new creation, Pure and spotless let us be; Let us see thy great salvation, Perfectly restored in thee; Changed from glory into glory, Till in heaven we take our place; Till we cast our crowns before thee, Lost in wonder, love and praise. 14

O n c e again, such a view can save us f r o m a trite situational morality which is divorced f r o m the processes of history. It is this eschatological sense of the Eucharist which has, as I shall try to show, been rather underplayed in English Christian social ethics. 6. Most of the above points inescapably entail a close connection of the Eucharist and witness in society. This was firmly grasped by the Anglican Catholic priests who devoted their lives to the service of the slums in our great cities. Robert Dolling (1851-1902), a priest in London and Portsmouth, took a positive view of the ordinary pleasures of ordinary people, and refused to separate the sacred and the secular. H e called friendship sacramental, and wherever he was vicar he physically linked the area of worship with amenities for dancing and sports. H e crusaded against the atrocious conditions of his parishioners: "I speak out and fight about drains because I believe in the Incarnation," he said. 15 Frank Weston, Bishop of Zanzibar, told a congress that they could not worship Christ in the Eucharist if they were allowing H i m to be sweated in the bodies of his children w h o were employed at below-subsistence wages. Several writers, moreover, have emphasized on the basis of the Eucharist the need for us to respect nature, and have 14 Robinson, p. 65; Methodist H y m n Book, 431; See also G. Wainwright, Eucharist and Eschatology. Epworth, 1971. 15 C.E. Osborne, Life of Father Dolling; E. Arnold, 1903.

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deplored, as Dix did, the prevalence of an intoxication with technology and science which is destructive of the environment and of human dignity. There is of course no guarantee that the Eucharist will turn worshippers outward. Unfortunately a man may worship and yet be turned inward upon himself, a parish may become parochial, a church a sect. [This can stem from] the subjective view of Christianity in which the emphasis is largely upon personal piety and individual personal morality, and where a sharp line of distinction is drawn between the natural and the supernatural, the secular and the sacred.

It is John Robinson's plea that Our task is so to integrate our lives that the whole action of the liturgy becomes part of the very pattern and rhythm of our living. With this as the focus of our week and the centre of our community, everything we do is seen as preparation for Communion, of which the setting apart of the loaf on Sunday is but the climax. And equally everything we do becomes the outworking of Communion, of which the consecration of our bread on Sunday is but the sample and first-fruits of the rest.'6

There are thus embedded within the contemporary Church of England many important insights about the nature of the Eucharist and its relation to the world. However, the suspicion arises that admirable sentiments often remain at the level of rhetoric, and that the radical implications are yet to be drawn out. The heart of the problem seems to lie in the moral idealism of the tradition. The Anglican tradition has generally taken a very positive view of nature and culture. It is no accident that when H. Richard Niebuhr in his Christ and Culture identified the position of Christ as transformer of culture, he presented the thought of F.D. Maurice as an example.17 Such an approach is liable to overlook the barriers to transformation endemic in cultures. The problem became particularly acute in the heyday of British Hegelianism. Though Temple and his colleagues did not capitulate to T.H. Green, or subscribe to a doctrine of inevitable social progress, they nonetheless tended to view the world as rational, waiting to be synthesised by rational minds. There seemed to be 16 Robinson, p. 76. 17 H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, 1951.

pp. 220ff. New York: Harper and Row,

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no room for paradoxes, no problem in reconciling the Christian faith and the natural. The Incarnation could readily be viewed as the climax of the natural process. Moral ideals could easily be inferred f r o m Christian doctrine. The only problem was h o w the will of the nation could be stirred up in order to approximate more to the ideals. The high point of this idealism among churchpeople was the C O P E C Conference of 1924. In spite of the qualifications introduced by Temple into his Christianity and Social Order, the centrepiece of the book is still a set of moral principles which are intended to galvanize churchpeople to undertake the task of social reconstruction after the Second World War. The book was immensely influential in the period of the Labour Government of 1945-51. Industrial mission tackled the powers and principalities of industry with an excessive optimism about their capacity for transformation. As economic conditions improved and the cold war relaxed, Christians viewed the rapid development of a secular society not only with favour, but as the perfect fruit of Christianity itself. In spite of his insights into liturgy, John Robinson produced his Honest to God in 1962 which (at least in its more indiscreet passages) endorsed a situation ethics which was too existentialist and individualistic, and too optimistic about the rationality and goodness of human beings. 18 Even in the tougher era of the 1980s a good deal of Church writing, if it was not wildly idealistic, at any rate sought a comfortable balance between poles of human existence, for example between the individual and the corporate, as in the report Changing Britain,19 However, in the same period, insights have been developed which seem to offer a way of taking us on to deeper levels. Some of the clues are offered by Temple himself during his last years. After the C O P E C Conference, the domestic and international scene rapidly deteriorated. There were major strikes, economic crises, and mounting long-term unemployment, together with the rise of fascism. Temple became much more conscious of the factor of power in human life, and particularly the self-interested use of power. H e repudiated the Hegelian notion that the world was rational, and confessed that much in our evil world was highly irrational. 20 18 J.A.T. Robinson, Honest to God, Chapter 6. SCM Press, 1963. 19 Changing Britain Church House Publishing, 1986. 20 Temple's Introduction to Doctrine in the Church of England, p. 17. SPCK, 1938.

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This deeper engagement with the world was interwoven with a deeper understanding of the Christian faith. We had to move away, Temple wrote, from the idea that a whole world view could be built up around the Incarnation. "We have been learning again how impotent man is to save himself, how deep and pervasive is that corruption which theologians call original sin. Man needs above all to be saved from himself. This must be the work of divine grace." There needed to be a renewed emphasis upon judgment and upon redemption. 2 1 If John Robinson was correct to plead for an integration of liturgy and life, then the quality of our engagement in either will be profoundly affected by the quality of our engagement in the other. It is this relationship which I want to explore further. The quality of our engagement with the world patently depends on our analysis of it. Temple was once criticized by one of his closest colleagues, C.E. Raven, for talking about industrial problems as if all one had to do was to speak of vocation and the whole spirit in which they were undertaken was changed. Those at C O P E C seemed to believe that the Christian faith offered the power to find the solution to social problems. All that was required was to exercise the will and the intelligence in order to find the solutions. However, in the last year of his life Temple declared that the Church was mistaken in insisting on ideals and concentrating its efforts to intensify the will to pursue them. H e diagnosed a crisis in British society which was not primarily moral but cultural. The aims of its citizens might remain to a large extent Christian, but their souls were moulded by alien influences, by new dogmas and assumptions about the nature of reality, which were quite different from Christian assumptions. The cure for the crisis must therefore be to re-establish a unity between men's ultimate beliefs and habits and their conscious aims. Furthermore, Christian social witness had to be radically dissociated from an idealism that assumed men to be so free spiritually that aims alone were decisive. There was need of a much clearer recognition of the part played in human behaviour by subconscious egoisms, interests, deceptions and determinisms imposed by man's place in nature and history and by his cultural patterns, as well as his sinfulness. It had to be recognized that society was made up of competing centres of power. These contending vitalities could not be eliminated, and their problem was compounded 21 See also his article 'Theology Today' in Theology,

November 1939.

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by human sinfulness. What had to be aimed at therefore was a distribution and balance of power, so that a measure of justice could be achieved even among those who were actuated in the main by egoistic and sinful impulses.22 These important words have implications which carry us beyond the point which Temple himself reached. They demand a rigorous examination of the assumptions and forces which drive and shape society at the most fundamental level. There is, alas, no simple way of doing this, for the Church and Christians are part of society, and there must be an unremitting struggle to discriminate between the true and the false in those assumptions and forces from a Christian perspective. For example, in so far as society is a scene of contending vitalities, where the powerful will press home their advantage at the expense of the powerless, one must view with ideological suspicion policies which purport to uplift the powerless without any real cost to the powerful. Behind such policies may well be an assumption that the preferred economic system is benign, or a self-perception of the powerful as benefactors, or a negative and cynical view of other groups. Thomas Arnold remarked 160 years ago that the Church had never dared to speak boldly to the great, but had contented itself with lecturing the poor. Gratefully accepting the role of moral guardian of society, the Church has indeed often reproduced the moralism of the powerful without inspecting their ideological assumptions. One of the strengths of Liberation Theology is its strong ideological suspicion. Aloysius Pieris, in An Asian Theology of Liberation, fears that though the Vatican II document Gaudium et Spes contained precious new perspectives, and initiated a far-reaching dialogue with the modern world, this modern world turned out to be primarily the first world, the Western technocratic world spreading its tentacles over the entire globe and driven by the motive of profit accumulation or mammon. What, he asks, about the unjust world created in the very process of building that modern world?23

22 W . Temple, 'What Christians Stand F o r in the Secular World' in Religious

Experi-

ence, pp. 2 4 3 - 2 5 5 . Clarke, 1958. 23 A. Pieris, S.J., An Asian Theology of Liberation, 1988.

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It therefore becomes imperative for a proper analysis of the world to listen to the experience of the powerless. It was one of the great merits of Faith in the City that the committee toured the country listening to the views especially of those who lived in Urban Priority Areas. The book urged that the Church listen to the voices in its midst.24 One project which arose out of Faith in the City is a project in Sunderland, a town which, whilst retaining a great pride, is nevertheless greatly depressed by the collapse of so many of its industries, and the attendant pressure on communities, largely as a result of decisions taken at the centres of power in London. A worker was appointed to live in inner Sunderland, to get alongside the local inhabitants, to encourage them to tell their stories and share their experience not only with each other but also with more affluent areas in Sunderland, and with the Diocese of Oxford, which had sought just such a link with an inner city area. It is only by such work (fraught with difficulty as it is), in continuity with the Ritual Slum Priests of the 19th century, that the image of the Church as a middle and upper class affair can be dispelled, and the Gospel really seen to be good news for the poor. These reflections do not necessarily imply the elimination of moral ideals or moral principles from Christian social ethics. The point is rather that they will be doomed to be rendered impotent or suborned by an ideology, unless they are discerned and practised in and through a careful analysis of society which pays close attention to the flesh and blood struggles of human life. This perspective on our engagement with the world must stand in a reciprocal relationship with our perspective on the Eucharist. As Professor Bayer has pointed out, an outstanding feature of the Eucharist is its concreteness. Generalisations in the form of doctrine and ethics can undercut the immediacy of God's address in and through the Lord's Supper. One of the severe critics of Temple's generation was Donald MacKinnon. Trained at Oxford in the British empirical tradition, at a time when antimetaphysical logical positivism was at its most powerful, and deeply affected too by Karl Barth, MacKinnon criticized the addiction of the previous generation to smooth syntheses. The Incarnation, he insisted, was not the disclosure of universal cosmic principles, but the manifestation of the divine Word in the

24 Faith in the City, p. 62.

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harsh particularities of human existence. 25 MacKinnon enables us to identify an important disability of English social ethics: a tendency to extract general ideas from Christian doctrines, which can have the effect of veiling from us the dramatic character of the encounter of the human Incarnate Christ with the world. We can easily forget that Christ came to his own and was not received by them, that he had no place to be born, no place to lay his head, and no place to be buried. As Pieris reminds us, he was a threat to Herod the Great's security and therefore hunted down. He was calumniated before the court of law, tortured, classed as a criminal among criminals, and made the victim of priestly fanaticism and political opportunism. 26 MacKinnon also rightly insists upon the centrality and concreteness of the Cross. It is fundamental to Christianity, he writes, to find at the heart of the universe a moral deed of infinite cost. Apart from the obedience of Christ to the point of death on a Cross, the world had no centre, no history, and no direction. The Passion of Christ did not disclose, as in a Platonic myth, the order of events. If the world had a wholeness at all, it was because its pieces and fragments were brought together there. 27 It is a commonplace of ecumenical discussions that Christians in the Eucharist enter into the movement of Christ's own self-offering. It is all too easy, however, to think of the Son presenting himself as High Priest and as Head of the Body, His Church, in the heavenly places, whilst overlooking the pain endured and the print of the nails. The place of the Church in that movement is highly problematical. The death of Christ is not only a judgment upon the world. It is also bound to be a judgment upon the Church and every Christian within it. As MacKinnon correctly observed, the Church is an eschatological society. It bears witness to the triumphant Passion of the Son of God. Death and resurrection are the rhythm of its life, as the sacrament of Baptism bears witness. But that means that the conflict once played out between Pilate, Caiaphas, Iscariot and Christ is bound to be continued within the Church. The Church can be no refuge from insecurities

25 D.M. MacKinnon, 'Revelation and Social Justice' in Malvern

1941, pp. 8Iff. Long-

mans Green, 1941. 26 Pieris, pp. 13f. 27 D.M. MacKinnon's essay in D.M. MacKinnon (ed), Christian Faith and Faith Macmillan, 1953.

Communist

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and questionings, and yet we strive to make it just such a refuge. 28 MacKinnon believes that the insight into the meaning of the Passion of Christ has been preserved by the liturgy, which is a thing done rather than a thing said. "It is by the action of the Eucharist that the life of the individual is, in its daily movement, rooted in and held to the source of its redemption, the action of Calvary and the empty tomb." 29 Wolfhart Pannenberg gives expression to a similar point by stressing that the Church is a symbolic community. It is not only that the Church uses symbols that unite all Christians, like the Cross. The Christian community symbolizes another community, the community of all human beings in a society of perfect justice and peace, the global village, the Kingdom of God. The Church has no raison d'être except to symbolize the future of the divine Kingdom that Jesus came to proclaim. "This explains in what specific sense worship is in the centre of life of the Church: the worship of the Christian community anticipates and symbolically celebrates the praise of God's glory that will be consummated in the eschatological renewal of all creation in the New Jerusalem." The Church bears that which is ultimate, but only symbolically. Therefore its doctrines, its institutions and its liturgy are all provisional. If the Church forgets its essential symbolic character, then its doctrines are perverted into coercive uniformity, and its ministry is likely to arrogate to itself tyrannical powers. Christians can even forget the symbolic character of the liturgy and perform it as a dead ritual or a cheerless duty. 30 This reflection serves as a reminder that the Eucharist has no automatic efficacy. It can only be by divine grace that the Church is held to the action of Calvary. It is most encouraging to find across the denominations a growing recognition of the reciprocal relationship of world and Eucharist, of liturgy and life. Pieris, following Schillebeeckx, notes that Jesus did not give his life in a liturgical context (he might have noted that this is true also of the Suffering Servant in Isaiah 53). Christ died in an obvious secular conflict, coloured though it was by religion, wrote Schillebeeckx, and he remained faithful to God and to human beings, 28 MacKinnon in Malvern 1941, pp. 99-102. 29 MacKinnon in Christian Faith and Communist Faith, p. 246. 30 W. Pannenberg, Christian Spirituality and Sacramental Community, ton, Longman and Todd, 1984.

pp. 35-7. Dar-

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and gave his life for his own in a secular combination of circumstances. Therefore, "Calvary was not a Church liturgy but an hour of human life which Jesus experienced as worship. In it our redemption is to be found." Pieris believes that one of the weaknesses of Vatican II is that it has treated the Church's liturgy as the origin and culmination of the liturgy of life. There seems then to be a Church liturgy which pre-exists in a hierarchically constituted Church, in which the secular liturgy of life has to participate. It also looks as if the Church as G o d ' s people, continuing the mystery of Jesus' humanity by being the locus and subject of Christian worship, is made subordinate to the symbolic presence of Christ in the institutional Church and the institutional liturgy. Pieris, building on the intuitions of liberation theologians, insists that the authentic Church is to be found where Christ is, the Incarnate Christ of history continuing his presence sacramentally in the flesh and blood of human beings, his least brethren, who cry and strive for the dawn of the Kingdom of justice. It may be truer, therefore, to say that the liturgy of the official Chruch should originate and culminate in the liturgy of life. This would fit with Jesus' style of building the Church through Calvary. 3 1 Pieris's contention seems correct. It does, however, open up the danger that the liturgy might be reduced to no more than a psychological support for the political struggle. The answer to this problem is certainly not to depoliticize the liturgy of the Church. As Pannenberg points out, the liturgy of the Church is intimately related with the social and political struggle. In that liturgy there is symbolically present all that the social and political struggle is about. However, it also celebrates and anticipates a Kingdom which is not ultimately realised in the present political order of society, but is rather celebrated in the worship of the Church. Such a view can head off the danger of the naked politicization of liturgy, whilst at the same time fending off a self-contained ecclesiocentric ritual or a privatized participation in salvation. 32 Nicholas Wolterstorff also shows in a profound way how in the Eucharist the Christian enters into a rhythm which embraces both the political struggle and what he calls the 'rest-of-delight'. H e very helpfully reminds us of Nietzsche's devastating indictment that Christians 31 Pieris, pp. l l f . 32 Pannenberg, pp. 36, 46f.

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have no joy. In a chapter entitled 'Justice and Worship: the Tragedy of Liturgy in Protestantism', he notes the one-plus-six day rhythm of Christian existence. Like so many Anglicans and Orthodox, this true Calvinist sees the world and history as a sacrament of God. Worship is the response to one's apprehension of this world as the epiphany of God. It consists therefore in joyfully blessing God and praising him. In creation God works for six days and then takes rest, delighting in his works. Human beings, in the image of God, are to follow that rhythm, alternating between the mastery of the natural and social world and thankful enjoyment of the world. The seventh day is also the feast of liberation from servitude, the celebration of freedom from enforced toil in Egypt. For the Christian work and rest are locked together in a one-plus-six rhythm, which is a celebration in memorial of God's new Creation and our liberation. On the day of rest Christians celebrate in memorial the remembered and expected acts of God, at the centre of which are Christ's resurrection and the arrival of the Kingdom of shalom. These acts are the abiding context within which we do our daily work. In worship we celebrate in memorial the very actions remembered and expected. Liturgy then is set within the rest-of-delight, which implies that the struggle for the embodiment of justice and shalom in the world does not exhaust the true life.33 It is along lines such as these that we are likely to find the closest integration of liturgy and life. In the Third World the greatest hope appears to lie in the base communities. In Britain the Faith in the City Commission found first-hand evidence of a vitality and generosity of Church life in deprived areas which was a challenge to more affluent congregations. They suspected that the failure of the Church was particularly a failure to attend to the experience and the spiritual riches in its midst, and they wanted every encouragement to be given to the growth of theologies which were authentic expressions of local cultures.34 This would imply the development of base communities of a type appropriate to Britain. It may well be from such communities that we shall learn to a much deeper level than hitherto the nature and practice of a Eucharistie social ethic.

33 N. Wolterstorff, Until Justice and Peace Embrace, Chapter VII. Grand Rapids, Mich., 1983. 34 Faith in the City, pp. 62-5.

Social Ethics as an Ethics of Responsibility Oswald

Bayer

As a Protestant systematic theologian and social ethicist I accept the challenge of engaging with the weighty hundred-year-old tradition of papal social encyclicals, that is, with a particular expression of natural law thought, and with the question of its authoritative stipulation and interpretation, in other words, the question of an infallible teaching office. This double question still requires an answer even if we consider a modern historical version of the problem, such as in the influential Gaudium et Spes, rather than a neo-scholastic form of natural law.1 In tackling this double question about natural law and its authoritative interpretation we are concerned not with a problem peculiar to Roman Catholicism but structurally with a common Christian, even a common human problem. I shall try to substantiate this claim [These] by trying to present the Protestant equivalent in what follows. As for the content of the topic, two distinct emphases are possible, one focussing on the problems of economic ethics, the other of political ethics. I choose the second. In general I should like to present Protestant social ethics as an ethics of responsibility. That is my second claim [These]: Protestant social ethics can best be understood as an ethics of responsibility. The word 'responsibility' is uniquely suited to represent the complexity of the situation we need to consider. In the perspective opened up by this word and its meaning the topics and problems can be related to each other quite freely. Otherwise in the discipline of ethics, that is, formal reflection on morals, they could be related only with difficulty. 1

Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et Spes), esp. paras 11-39.

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Above all, in this perspective the basic theological problem of relating theological and philosophical ethics can be tackled without difficulty. This problem does not touch simply on the outer forms of theology, as if theology could first be conscious of its subject matter in some inner realm of pure belief and pure knowledge. Theology cannot function at all in some inner realm. It is a discipline constituted by conflict and controversy. That is my third claim [These]: theology, including theological ethics, is inherently a conflictual discipline. This captures the character of the biblical texts, before which theology is formed. 2 They are in themselves the treatment of conflicts, for instance in the primeval history or the letters to the Corinthians. Every topic of theology is caught up in the controversy, at least in the tension, between a general philosophical framework and a theological framework. Classically this is clear in Luther's Disputatio de homine (1536).3 In the N e w Testament one can point to the insoluble tension between a discipleship-ethic and a Haustafel [household rules] ethic 4 , between the command to love one's enemy and the golden rule. If one wanted to find the quintessence of the purely Christian, and in this sense the essence of Chrisianity, it would be like peeling an onion to find its kernel - one would find nothing. Theology is not a selfcontained understanding of faith in some inner realm. It is rather a discipline of conflict. It becomes what it is only by letting itself in for arguments and controversies. In the realm of understanding and thought one cannot by-pass the challenges to the life of faith. Faith is bound to be in the thick of strife, if its charter document declares, Ί am the Lord your God; you shall have no other gods but me.' The unity of God cannot be construed as an idea, it is contested as a matter of fact. Thought cannot evade this situation of conflict and struggle. N o r can it retire to some transcendental retreat. This is very important for the communicability of Protestant ethics. It claims to

2

Cf. O s w a l d Bayer, Autorität und Kritik. Zu Hermeneutik und Wissenschaftstheorie [Authority and Criticism. Hermeneutics and the Theory of Knowledge], (11-18) 17f. (theology - 'before' the text). Tubingen, 1991.

3

WA [D. Martin Luthers 175-80; 1536.

4

Cf. m y essay o n discipleship-ethic and an ethic of house rules: 'Luther's Ethics as Pastoral Care', in Lutheran Quarterly, IV, 1990, 125-142.

Werke. Kritische

Gesamtausgabe.

Weimar, 1883ff], 39/1,

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speak the truth - without being able to demonstrate its universality abstractly or guarantee its general validity in advance. M y third claim, which I have briefly explained (that theology and theological ethics is a discipline of conflict), I link with the second thesis and so come to the fourth: that responsibility is a 'concept of

critical

mediation'}

In the common use of the term 'responsibility' and also in academic philosophical use, theology and the church encounter a secularisation of their very own tradition (cf. 2 Cor. 5.10). This is certainly bound up with the general history of religion, which knows of a final accountability of human beings in a last judgment even beyond Judaism and Christianity. True, in this secularisation the eschatological dimensions are attenuated or confined to history. At present they are ill-defined and blurred, for example, when talking about responsibility for myself (in my own conscience), for others, for coming generations, for world history. It is however important that this way of speaking always carries with it knowledge of an authority before whom I am responsible, before whom I must give a reckoning, by whom I am questioned. And at the same time it is clear that I must give an account of what I do and permit, that I am to be answerable not only before someone but for something. So actual usage constantly discloses an interplay between two factors. This task of developing the word 'responsibility' as a concept of critical mediation - a task in which fundamental theological dogmatic and ethical questions interlock from the outset - I acknowledge in the first section below, by developing basic concepts of a theological political ethics from the fundamental anthropological definition of the human being as a being who listens and speaks. I then tackle the problem of the teaching office of the church and point to the significance of worship for Protestant social ethics (II), in order finally in the third and last part (III) at least to hint at the necessary eschatological framework.

5

The expression 'concept of critical mediation' is introduced and elucidated in Oswald Bayer, Zugesagte Freiheit. Zur Grundlegung theologischer Ethik [Promised Freedom. The Foundations of Theological Ethics], 16-18. (GTB 379) Gütersloh, 1980.

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/ I begin with the question of the heart of our humanity. As humans we are beings who listen and speak - and in this sense we are rational creatures. We are the kind of creatures who are addressed by G o d in and through the world and so can hear and respond - more than that, we must hear and respond and must be responsible. This is evident from the theological doctrines of creation and eschatology. H e who has called me into life and made me capable of response is also the one who calls me to responsibility before himself. The Creator is at the same time the Judge. This is shown by the biblical primeval history. The human being has to be responsible before the one who stands over against him, who confronts him and asks, 'Where are you?' (Gen. 3.9) and 'Where is your brother?' (Gen. 4.9). These questions cannot be evaded. For as creatures called into life by G o d , we are addressed in an absolutely irrevocable way. We are 'creatures with whom G o d wills to speak eternally and immortally', 'be it in wrath or be it in grace.' 6 As people who hear, respond and are made responsible, we are ipso facto always social beings. For when I hear, I can only hear another. It is only another whom I can address - I can address myself only in a derivative sense. As social creatures we live by the reliable word of G o d , which is given and heard, which does the truth and requires our attention. Such a reliable word is the spirit behind every authority and every constitutional state order which deserves the name. Any constitutional state order is an order of sovereignty. H o w does the constitutional state as an order of sovereignty relate to the basic condition of the human being as a rational and social creature? To clarify this relationship we have to go into the use of the terms power, force and sovereignty. H o w are they to be distinguished? H o w are they to be related, and what guidelines emerge from them? We can recognise two quite distinct approaches - they ought to be addressed first. B y critically relating these two, a third approach can be presented which will shape our handling of the topic. The first approach arises from the Lutheran grounding of a political ethics, linked influentially in modern times with the conception of 6

WA 43, 481, 34f. and 33 (on Genesis 26.24: " 'Ego sum Deus tuus, Sum Dii Abrahae" '!). Cf. the linking of Gen. 26.24 with Mt. 22.32: WA 43, 479, 17-30; 1541.

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the state of nature and the social contract, as represented by Thomas Hobbes. This grounding is principally designed to cope with sin and its consequences. According to Luther's exposition of the primeval history, in the beginning in paradise there is the Church and the oikonomia, that is, the household as marriage, the family and the economy; but there is no politia.7 Politia - in modern parlance the state is an institution rendered necessary by the fall. It is not an order of creation but an order of necessity. Correspondingly the prime feature of the state is its coercive power. It alone restrains arbitrariness; it alone checks our predatory cravings, where one preys upon another; it alone can cope with Cain, the one who murders his brother. In such a theological and political approach every infringement of the law is a breach of the dam through which the waters of chaos rush in and threaten total devastation. Quite different is that approach of natural law which in the Aristotelian and Stoic tradition posits an original sociality of human beings - that human beings by virtue of reason aspire to a consensus, right up to a cosmopolitan consensus, a consensus of all peoples, and generally keep it. The breaking of rules is an abnormality. The first thought is not to avert chaos, rather one presupposes a cosmos, and credits human beings with the capacity for peace and the rational and social use of their freedom. Within such an approach one can attain a utopia where human beings communicate freely without the need for sovereignty, where one can anticipate a common life and a common understanding - quite contrary to the real world - which one can and may at the same time take for granted. Within theology and the Church this approach fits well, at any rate factually and practically, with those who convert the redemption in Jesus Christ to an abstract universalisation and indulge in fanaticism. They think of relationships in the state - as the community of citizens - on the analogy of the community of Christians, and correspondingly make inflated demands. 7

WA 42, 79, 3-9 (on Gen. 2.16f); 1535. Even if Luther here refuses to treat politics as an order of creation (ibid., lines 7-9: 'Politia autem ante peccatum nulla fuit, ñeque enim ea opus fuit. Est enim Politia remedium necessarium naturae corruptae.'), he knows nevertheless that politics is rooted in the economy. This is shown also by his exposition of the fourth commandment in the Große Katechismus (WA 30/1, 152,20ff = BSLK 596, 20ff: 'from parental authority there flows every other authority')

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The position in the Church and theology, at any rate in Protestantism, can be understood as a contest between these two approaches which I have set out in an ideal-typical summary fashion. One would have to go on to show in detail that particular political options are bound up and correspond with them. By contrast, theological realism, which I should like to support, envisages a third way, which avoids both the defective theological understanding of sin in the second orientation, and the defective theology of creation in the first. If the state has to do only with sin, and not with the original condition of humanity, then this has fateful consequences for our understanding of the state. As a constitutional state, it veers towards being purely coercive. The concept of the few representing the many becomes strengthened and stiffened. Popular expressions in the formation of the political will - like plebiscites - are fundamentally suspect. They raise the spectre of mob rule. But if the state has to do with the original condition of human beings - without in any way denying their perversion - then one's judgment is different. First of all, the phenomenon of power will be perceived differently: not as something which unfortunately has to be deployed and exercised because of sin to prevent greater evil; nor in contrast as something which is evil in itself; but as something which belongs constitutively to being human, something that is entailed in our very humanity. The human being is a creature who hears, and so can speak in response, and has to be responsible. The one who listens gives himself into the power of the one to whom he listens, into the power of the one who speaks. The one who speaks, who addresses another, challenges him, demands his attention, exercises power towards him, yes, over him. A s human beings we are marked not by a symmetry, a pure and equal capacity for speech, but by an asymmetry, the asymmetry between hearing and speaking, speaking and hearing. It is unnecessary to say that these do not just divide into two separate groups, as if some only speak and the others have no option but to obey. It is a matter of asymmetry in one and the same person. There is no one in whom the two elements are not found side by side - admittedly in varying proportions according to circumstance. As one who hears and speaks I, like every other person, am one over whom others have power, and one who has power over others. Only within this combination of

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power and responsibility, and not outside it, do human beings have their dignity and freedom. Freedom and dignity are not an individual possession which I could think of, let alone have, in detachment from others. The dignity of human beings and their freedom lie much more in a social interplay between hearing and speaking, gift and appropriation, reception and transmission, authority and criticism. 8 As a social interplay freedom exists right from the beginning, according to God's creative will, not in a realm which is free of sovereignty, but in relationships of power which benefit the life of others, and from the start form it and thoroughly create it. This is above all the value of physical and spiritual parenthood. However, this power no longer operates in life in an unbroken way. Human beings have in fact fundamentally perverted and corrupted their original capacity for hearing and speaking and therein their power, freedom and dignity. They live in statu corruptionis. That is ignored by the second orientation, or at any rate underestimated. The power which creates and promotes life is perverted into violence which threatens and damages life. Perverted power is violence, and violence is the misuse of power. The biblical primeval history sees this misuse of power in the setting of the man over the woman (Gen. 3.16), and above all in fratricide (Gen. 4). Correspondingly the fifth commandment (You shall not kill) is directed against the misuse of power. Indeed all the commandments are directed against the misuse of power, and thereby serve freedom. In respect of law, consider particularly the eighth commandment ('You shall not bear false witness against your neighbour'). It serves the power of the reliable Word, and so law and freedom. In the situation where power is misused and perverted into violence, life cannot be preserved and promoted without sovereignty. That which serves beneficent power in the face of violence and against it is legitimate and responsible sovereignty, which calls for matching responsibility. Political sovereignty opposes naked violence, averts fratricide, and controls club-law and feud-law. The curbing of violence and its unpredictability and arbitrariness is a huge cultural achievement. As for the totalitarianism of state power, which it is true has only become possible in the modern age, one should not forget what an advance it represents over against feud-law and club-law and the 8

Cf. the w o r k cited in n. 2.

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ever-present threat of the war of all against all, if the modern state monopolises physical force and uses it only to intervene lawfully so as to serve the constitutional order. However, 'legitimate physical force' 9 (not violence) is certainly not an adequate definition of the sovereignty of the state. It does contain (and this must not be misunderstood nor unreasonably suspected), the final option, which really does exist and is not simply a threat but is actually exercised. This does not mean that the use of force is the norm; it is rather an ultima ratio}0 It would be politically disastrous if the ultimate scenario, if emergency orders and emergency laws were to be the model for lawmaking and a state order. For within the sinful, fallen world that original power, that asymmetry of hearing and speaking which really does promote life, in spite of all the perversion and distortion, is fortunately not entirely lost or extinguished. Therefore the political order is not simply counterforce. As a form of 'sovereignty', it is something different from pure counterforce, so far as it does and can assume an order which is positively desired and affirmed. The sovereignty of the constitutional state rests not only on the threat and necessary exercise of (legitimate) force, but at the same time on its recognition by the citizens. The sovereignty of the constitutional state could not survive if it could not rest on a large measure of consent by the citizens, on a moral consensus. Given the scope of this essay it is enough to have introduced power, violence and sovereignty in their right relationship as the basic concepts of a theological political ethics. To develop these relations further one would have to trace the concepts of law and justice11 in order to complete a doctrine of institutions which has as its counterpart a doctrine of conscience. We will omit a detailed presentation in this whole area in order to leave room for the second main section, which is devoted to the problem of the Church's teaching office and the significance of worship for Protestant social ethics. 9

Max Weber, Staatssoziologie [Sociology of the State], 28, ed. Johannes Winckelmann. 2nd revised edition. Berlin, 1966.

10 Max Weber, Soziologische Grundbegriffe vised edition. Tübingen, 1978.

[Basic Concepts of Sociology], 81 f. 4th re-

11 Expounded in my essay "Macht, Recht, Gerechtigkeit' ['Power, Law and Justice'], in Kerygma und Dogma, 30, 1984, 200-12.

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II How does the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church address the social world, as it was presented in the first section? It is an axiom of the Protestant understanding of the Church that 'Where the Word is, there is the Church' ('Ubi est verbum, ibi est ecclesia'n). But then one must immediately ask about the precise form of such a Word which founds and supports the Church. It can only be that Word which is Jesus Christ himself in his presence, who is promised and communicated in the bodily word of baptism, and in the word of the Lord's Supper ('This is my body given for you'), and also in the unconditional word of absolution: Ί totally absolve you from all your sins. You are free.' or 'Do not be afraid'. Where such sentences are promised, there is the Church. In such sentences with which it is commissioned and entrusted the Church is infallible. 13 The infallible Word creates a faith which is certain - more certain than any experience in life which it contradicts. The question then is: Can an ethical command, say: 'Do not join the army', be made with the same authority with which the infallible Word of God through human agency forgives and absolves sin? Dietrich Bonhoeffer raised this question with exemplary acuteness in the first half of the 1930s when he proposed an ecumenical council which would make a binding declaration for peace 14 , a proposal which has recently been revived by Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker. 12 WA 39/II, 176, 8f (Martin Luther on the occasion of the disputation [of John Macchabaeus Scotus] on the Church, 1542) 13 In the first Reformation text in the history of Luther's theology, the set of theses Pro veritate inquirenda 'Potestas Clavium

et timoratis conscientiis consolandis (1518), the 24th thesis reads: operatur verbo et mandato

1, 631, 35f.) Cf. Oswald Bayer, Promissio. in Luthers during

Theologie

Dei firmum et infallibile opus...'

Geschichte

der reformatorischen

[Promissio. History of the Turning Point in Luther's

the Reformation]

(WA Wende

Theology

(1971). Darmstadt, 2nd edition 1989, 186-90.

14 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 'Kirche und Völkerwelt' ['The Church and the World of N a tions'] (an address at morning prayer on 28 August 1934 at the Conference of the World Alliance for Promoting Friendship among the Churches, held at Fanö), in id., Gesammelte

Schriften

(GS) [Collected Writings], ed. by Eberhard Bethge, Vol.

I, Munich 1958, 216-9, English ibid., 447-9. Cf. ibid., 212-5, English 444-6. Cf. Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich hoeffer. 448-50.

Theologian,

Bonhoeffer.

Theologe.

Christian, and Contemporary].

Christ. Zeitgenosse

[Dietrich

Bon-

Munich, (1967) 5th edition 1983,

196

Oswald Bayer

Bonhoeffer enquired about the certainty with which not only the individual Christian in his calling and station, but the Church as Church could recognise the will of God and proclaim it with authority in the here and now: 'Can the Church proclaim the command of God with the same certainty with which it proclaims the gospel? Can the Church say with the same certainty: "We require a socialist economic order" or "Don't go to war", as it can say "Your sins are forgiven"? Clearly both gospel and command can only be proclaimed with full authority where they are spoken quite concretely.' 15 However, for such an authoritative proclamation of God's command, according to Bonhoeffer one would need 'detailed empirical knowledge', 'full knowledge of the facts'. 16 If the church does not possess this knowledge then she should 'be silent in a qualified way'. 17 But if the Church with expert knowledge, with full knowledge of the situation, dares for example to say 'Do not go to war' or 'You must be socialists', then she dares to present 'this law as God's law in the clear knowledge that she could be blaspheming the name of God, that she could be wrong and sinning, but she may speak it in faith in the word of the forgiveness of sins, which covers her too. So the proclamation of the commandment is rooted in the proclamation of the forgiveness of sins.' 18 Bonhoeffer's question can be meaningfully compared with the Roman Catholic posing of the question, whether it involves infallibility not only in matters of faith but also in matters of morality though for Bonhoeffer the basis for decision was not the papal teaching office, but the community of all the baptised, represented by an ecumenical council. On the other hand Bonhoeffer reckons with the possibility of error and emphasises the necessity of the forgiveness of sins, not only for the individual but also for the whole Church, which 15 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 'Zur theologischen Begründung der Weltbundarbeit' ['The Theological Basis of the Work of the World Alliance' sc. for Promoting Friendship among the Churches], a lecture given at the Youth Peace Conference, Cernohorske Kupele, Czechoslovakia, 26 July, 1932, GS I, 145 (see above n.14). 16 ibid., 146. 17 ibid., 147. Cf. GS V 339 and his 'Nichtwissen um das Gebot' ['On not knowing the command'] (GS III, 159. Cf. his Exaudi-sermon of 8 May, 1932 (GS I, 133-9). On 'qualified silence' see GS V, 339f (1933). See further Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 226 (see above n.14). 18 GS I, 147.

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after all according to the word of Luther is the greatest sinner and remains permanently in need of forgiveness.19 I cannot simply agree with Bonhoeffer. One has to ask, Can the pastoral situation, where the servant of God's Word holds the keys of binding and loosing and speaks God's command concretely, be broadened to a binding and loosing of society? Is a pastoral care of society possible? At this point it is obviously essential to distinguish and relate different forms of speech and reflection as clearly as possible. If the Church assumes responsibility for society, that cannot take place in just any kind of speech form. But which speech forms are suitable? Should its speech - and the Church has no other means to fulfil its task be one of rational discourse - with appeal to wisdom and argumentation, with exact and acute observation of empirical detail? Or in a prophetic apodictic way: 'Thus says the Lord?' Is this engagement to be in argumentative or apodictic speech, or a combination of both? This is the question about the 'tasks and limits of church pronouncements on social questions' 20 - in the German Protestant church, for example, the problem of its official reports [Denkschriften]. The Roman Catholic teaching office lays claim to infallibility both in matters of faith and in matters of ethics, morality. 21 The Protestant office of teaching and service (magisterium as ministerium) takes its stand on the fundamental distinction between faith and action. 22 Infallibility is claimed only for the Word which creates faith and so for God himself. For faith is the work of God alone. Our action, however, has the Last Judgment before it, not behind it. Therefore all our 19 W A 34/1 276, 7f: 'Non est tarn magna peccatrix

ut Christiana

Mt. 28 on 9 April, 1531). Cf. W A 40/1, 197, 23f: 'Est quidem simul peccatrix

ecclesia' (Sermon on ecclesia sancta,

tamen

est' (on Gal. 2.11; 1535).

20 Cf. 'Aufgaben und Grenzen kirchlicher Äußerungen zu gesellschaftlichen Fragen. Eine Denkschrift der Kammer für soziale Ordnung der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland' ['Tasks and Limits of Church Pronouncements on Social Questions. A Report of the Committee for Social Order of the Lutheran Church of Germany'] (1970) in Die Denkschriften ports of the Lutheran

Church

der Evangelischen in Germany],

Kirche in Deutschland

[Official

Re-

Vol. 1/1, 43-76. ( G T B 413). Gütersloh,

1978. 21 Vat. I (Denzinger 3074). 22 It rests too on the distinction between knowledge of the Gospel as the Word which creates faith, and knowledge of the concrete command, which is to be fulfilled by action.

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actions and decisions are ambiguous in our own eyes and in the eyes of other human beings. The ambiguity of the attitudes and actions even of Christians is not removed in this world. Even what we call good or evil must pass through the fire of judgment. Even where we act with a good conscience, our wishes, aims and plans are not yet thereby justified. Therefore our action does not confer the certainty of the Word which creates faith. It is not a sacrament - even in the most earnest and conscientious obedience to God's commands. This distinction between faith and action is confirmed in worship, in fact it is first established there. The heart of worship, God's service to us, lies in the claim of the law 'You ought', and in the promise of the gospel ('You may. You may live because God himself takes your side'). That this service of God to us is the cornerstone of Protestant social ethics cannot be expounded here in detail, but must at least be addressed. This takes place in critical reference to the kind of moral theology which rests on Transcendental Philosophy, Fundamental Moral Theology.23 The problem expressed earlier in the pattern of nature and grace becomes here the question of the relationship between human and divine freedom; the freedom of God is declared to be the condition for the possibility of human freedom.24 In this transcendental grounding of theological ethics Roman Catholic theology (as is evident in the Handbuch der Christlichen Ethik25 [Handbook of Christian Ethics]) links up with modern attempts by neoprotestant Lutherans26 to validate the Reformation understanding of justification in modern life, so 23 Cf. above all Franz Böckle, Fundamentalmoral. Munich, 1977, 2nd edition 1978 [ET Fundamental Moral Theology, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1980], 24 ibid., esp. 78-92, on the basis of Hermann Krings' article 'Gott' ['God'], in Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe [Handbook of Basic Philosophical Concepts], ed. Hermann Krings, Hans Michael Baumgartner and Christoph Wild, Vol. Ill, 614-41, esp. 632-41. Munich, 1973. 25 Handbuch der Christlichen Ethik, ed. Anselm Hertz et al., 2 vols, Freiburg-Gütersloh, 1978, 2nd edition 1979, Vol. 3 1982. 26 Cf. esp. Rechtfertigung im neuzeitlichen Lebenszusammenhang. Studien zur Neuinterpretation der Rechtfertigungslehre, im Auftrag der Theologischen Ausschusses der vereinigten Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche Deutschlands [Justification in Modern Life. Studies in Recent Interpretation of the Doctrine of Justification, under the aegis of the Theological Committee of the United Protestant-Lutheran Church of Germany], edited by Wenzel Lohff and Christian Walther. Gütersloh, 1974.

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that reformed and modern understandings of freedom are viewed together and do not call each other into question but only support each other. 27 The God who promises freedom to human beings in a bodily way and requires responsibility from them fades into the condition of the possibility of human freedom. The forum of responsibility before God is largely converted into conscience. The forum externum Dei becomes the forum internum, as Kant, citing Rom. 2.15, terms conscience. In this way Christianity is absorbed into modernity. The world is deprived of the salt of criticism, which without talk of the Last Judgment becomes insipid and loses its cutting edge; Christians are no longer aliens. Freedom and responsibility are no longer concepts of critical mediation. 29

Ill

For freedom and responsibility to remain concepts of critical mediation we need the doctrines of creation, sin and eschatology. Their connection and relationship emerges revealingly from the formula at which Luther arrives in his exposition of Genesis 8.21 and 6.35 ('All the thoughts and desires of the human heart are evil from one's youth up'), as he makes a critical attack on the traditional definition of the human being as an animal rationale. According to Luther's formula 27 Cf. for example Trutz Rendtorff, 'Menschenrechte und Rechtfertigung. Eine theologische Konspective' ['Human Rights and Justification. A Theological Conspectus'], in Der Wirklichkeitsanspruch forderung. Church

Ernst Steinbach to Realism.

entieth Birthday],

von Theologie zum

und Kirche. Die sozialethische

70. Geburtstag

The Socio-ethical

Challenge.

[The

Claim of Theology

For Ernst Steinbach

Herausand

the

on his Sev-

edited by Dieter Henke, Günther Kehrer and Gunda Schneider-

Flume, 161-74. Tübingen, 1976. 28 Immanuel Kant, 'Die Metaphysik der Sitten. Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre' ['The Metaphysics of Morals. Metaphysical Bases for a Theory of the Virtues'], in id., Werke in 10 Bänden

[Works in 10 Volumes], ed. Wilhelm Weischedel,

Vol. 7, 572-7. Darmstadt, 1968: 'The consciousness of an inner court in men (before which their thoughts either accuse or excuse them [cf. R o m . 2.15]) is the conscience' (573). Cf. ibid., 53If. 29 O n 'freedom' as a concept of critical mediation, cf. apart from the work cited in n.5, my book, Umstrittene Freedom.

Freiheit.

Theologische-philosophische

Theological-philosophical

Controversies]

Kontoversen

[Contested

( U T B 1092). Tübingen, 1981.

Oswald Bayer

200

the human being is an animal rationale habens cor fingens.30 There are two basic forces which move human beings, their rationality and their utopianism.31 To make the topic manageable I considered only one of the two basic forces in human beings in the first section: the human being as an animal rationale et sociale. But now we must stress the second basic anthropological force, that the human being is a cor fingens, not only that he has a cor fingens. With this in view we must at least hint at what emerges from the heart of worship - the claim of the law, and the promise of the gospel - for Protestant social ethics as an ethics of responsibility. The insight emerges which has largely been forgotten or at least suppressed by modern theology and the Church: that faith encourages Christians to show a good deal of scepticism. The situation today world-wide is that people swear by the principle of a pure future, or rather pure futurity, together with a preference for the modality of possibility, linked with an almost complete silence about the Last Judgment, in spite of, or perhaps because of a noticeable cultivation of negative utopias. In such a situation we have to learn afresh this scepticism of faith, above all in the Protestant Church and theology. It involves a more modest estimation of our capacities and options, and of the range of our action, the limits of our responsibility. An eschatology 32 has to elucidate how our ultimate Judge, on whom our hope is founded, limits and defines our responsibility. On the one hand, on this basis we cannot be ethically indifferent or take decisions blindly or resort to cynicism, just because we are unable to fit our action into a perspicuous structure of the world and history, or even to produce that structure. On the other hand we must not fall into a moralistic fanaticism in which we think we can undertake responsibility for everything and anything in the madness of omnipotence and ubiquity. It is precisely those who in the light of the ultimate Judge know that human responsibility is finite and limited, who will appreciate 30 WA 42, 348, 38 (on Gen. 8.21; 1536). 31 Expounded further in Autorität

und Kritik, 99-107 (v.s., n.2).

32 Cf. my summary of an eschatology, 'Die Zukunft Jesu Christi zum Letzten Gericht' ['The Future of Jesus Christ to the Last Judgment'], in Eschatologie Gericht [Eschatology

and Last Judgment]

hard Rittner, 68-99. Hannover, 1991.

und

Jüngstes

(Bekenntnis. Fuldaer Hefte 32), ed. Rein-

Social Ethics as an Ethics of Responsibility

201

that responsibility in a modest, down-to-earth and confident way, because they are relieved and absolved from absolute claims, and they will keep in view the possible consequences of their ethical decisions and actions, thus agreeing with Max Weber's ideal type of an ethic of responsibility. 33 The scepticism of faith is content with today, in line with the Sermon on the Mount (Mt. 6.34). True, the coming generations and their life chances also belong to this today, and we are responsible for them. But even so we cannot guarantee success, nor do we have to want to do so. As long as I know of the awesomeness of the Last Judgement, I cannot speak the last word on human action.

33 The ideal-typical opposition of an ethic of responsibility and an attitudinal ethic is to be found in Max Weber, Politik als Beruf [Politics as a Calling], 55-67. Berlin, 7th edition 1982.

Fundamentals of the Economic Ethics of Arthur Rich Theodor

Dieter

Arthur Rich's two-volume work on economic ethics1 is the first to appear on the subject in German-speaking Protestant theology for more than half a century (it was 1927 when Georg Wünsch published his Evangelische Wirtschaftsethik [Protestant Economic Ethics]). In it the author has drawn together the results of his engagement over many decades with questions of economics and ethics.2 Rich's two volumes will therefore well repay careful study. 1

2

A. Rich, Wirtschaftsethik. Grundlagen in theologischer Perspektive [Economic Ethics: Fundamentals in Theological Perspective]. Gütersloh, 1984, 3rd edition 1987 (henceforth cited with Τ and the page number); id., Wirtschaftsethik II: Marktwirtschaft, Planwirtschaft, Weltwirtschaft aus sozialethischer Sicht [Economic Ethics II. Market Economy, Planned Economy, World Economy from a socio-ethical viewpoint]. Gütersloh, 1990 (henceforth cited with Ί Γ and the page number). A. Rich was born in 1910 in Neuhausen am Rheinfall (Switzerland). He was an apprentice and worker in a machine factory. His encounter with religious socialism persuaded him to study theology (in Zürich and Paris). From 1938 to 1947 he was a parish minister. In 1947 he took a doctorate for his work on the social ethics of Zwingli. From 1947 to 1954 he was Director of the State Teacher Training College of the Canton of Schaffhausen. In 1951 he qualified as a university lecturer with a work on the theological anthropology of Pascal. From 1954 to 1976 he was Lecturer in Systematic Theology in the University of Zürich specialising in social ethics. From 1971 to 1975 he served as President of the Societas Ethica. Rich died in 1992. Cf. S. Karg, 'Arthur Rich ("1910). Wegweisend für den Dialog zwischen Ethik und Wirtschaft' ['Signposts for the Dialogue between Ethics and Economics'], in S. Leimgruber and M. Schoch (eds), Gegen die Gottvergessenheit. Schweizer Theologen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert [Against Forgetfulness of God: Swiss Theology in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century]. Basel, 1990, 369-387. Cf. id., 'Arthur Richs Sozialethik im Spiegel seiner Publikationen' ['Arthur Rich's Social Ethics as Reflected in his Publications'], in Th. Strohm (ed), Christliche Wirtschaftsethik vor neuen Aufgaben. Festgabe für Arthur Rich [New Tasks for Christian Economic Ethics. Essays in Honour of Arthur Rieh]. Zürich, 1980, 471-507. Cf. also the special volume of 'Zeitschrift' (Reformatio, 42, 1993) to mark the death of Arthur Rich, with contributions by Rich and about him.

Fundamentals of the Economic Ethics of Arthur Rich

203

Rich is a Reformed and not a Lutheran theologian. At present there is no economic ethics in German which could be identified as Lutheran. 3 Rich's w o r k is representative of Protestant economic ethics especially in the 1970s and 1980s, though for some years in Germany there have been notable reflections on economic ethics f r o m a theological perspective which have a different orientation. 4 In what follows Rich's thought on economic ethics will be presented in its fundamentals. The emphasis goes on the foundations of social ethics - economic ethics is a 'special instance of social ethics' (1,67) - and so on the first volume of his Wirtschaftsethik [Economic Ethics]. I can offer only an outline here of Rich's careful engagement with economic problems and theories. That is regrettable, since Rich's strength lies in his interrelating of economic expertise and ethical insight. However, a thorough presentation of his economic thought would go beyond the confines of this essay. The following exposition is therefore limited to an introduction to A r t h u r Rich's basic concepts and his fundamental distinctions and groundwork on social and economic ethics, and to their deployment in a comparative evaluation of the market economy and the central command economy, together with various ways of ordering the market economy. At strategic points in the presentation of Rich's train of thought, I shall introduce reflections of a critical and analytical kind, testing the soundness of his ideas.

3

H.-J. Prien has investigated Luther's ideas on the economy and ethics in a monograph, Luthers Wirtschaftsethik [Luther's Economic Ethics], Göttingen, 1992. The results of this study show clearly h o w hard it is systematically to develop an economic ethics which deserves to be called Lutheran, in the conditions of the modern economy and given present day economic theories and recent theories of economic ethics. The ideas of Ulrich Duchrow (see for example Weltwirtschaft Heute: Ein Feld für Bekennende Kirche? München, 2nd edition 1987 [E.T. Global Economy: A Confessional Issue for the Churchesare not convincing in this and other respects. Even the Denkschrift der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland: Gemeinwohl und Eigennutz [Report of the Lutheran Church in Germany: Common Good and Self-interest] is not specifically Lutheran.

4

Best exemplified in the seven colloquia of the Evangelical Academy of Loccum on questions of economic ethics which took place between 1986 and 1989. The papers of these conferences are published in Theologische Aspekte der Wirtschaftsethik [Theological Aspects of Economic Ethics], Vols I-VII, ed. E. Herms et al., Loccum 1986-1991. Cf. also E. Herms, Gesellschaft gestalten [Shaping Society], Tübingen 1991, see esp. 44-94, 146-271.

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I. The Problem of Ethics or Social Ethics Rich divides the 'problem' of ethics (1,41) into three main areas, which are constituted by the three basic relationships of human life. These fundamental relationships, which are 'objectively given' (1,42), are the relationships of I to myself, I to You, and I/We to It. 'They are all equally original, and functionally present an indivisible unity'. (1,42) Ύ is the human being in self-conscious distinction from all others. To that extent he knows himself as something given. At the same time, because of his latent or visible potential, he knows that he is in himself a task, a goal. This Rich calls the 'self'. (1,42) Τ and the 'self can fall apart into contradiction and so endanger human identity. The human being as an I-self stands face to face with the You, so much so that he needs the You in order to exist at all. Rich speaks here of 'personality': Ί am never a person . . . for myself alone but always in a relationship where I find myself as an I-self in relation to the You of the other and acknowledge him as a You, and where the other finds himself as a You to me and acknowledges me as an Iself. (1,45) 'Individuality', in the terminology of Rich, comes through oneself, but 'personality' only in relation to the You. The human being stands not only in a relation of I or We to You, but also in a relation to the world as the 'physical basis of life'. (1,46) In this relation the human being is on the one hand inescapably dependent on the environment (for instance, we need air to breathe), on the other hand he can raise himself above nature and shape it as an object. There is here a 'reciprocal interweaving of subject and object'. (1,48) In the area of the three basic relationships, according to Rich, relations are either mediated or unmediated. Examples of the latter are those of 'sentiment, friendship and love. Such relationships arise quite spontaneously, especially if they are genuine, and can exist without any external regulation'. (1,52) By contrast in marriage, for example, the I-You relationship is mediated institutionally. Rich wants to use the concept of 'institution' 'in a very broad sense. It covers all orderings and arrangements which depend upon human organisation'. (1,49) It is true that for individuals institutions are usually facts of life; however, they are not natural entities but rather created by human beings and thus changeable 'arrangements'. The I/We-It relationship to nature has long been a relationship to a nature transformed by human beings. The decisive mediating

Fundamentals of the Economic Ethics of Arthur Rich

205

agency here is the institution of the economy. The individual shares in this agency, including exploiting the environment through economic activity. That is the case even when he acts quite differently as a private person (for example as a consumer, gardener and so forth). Included in the I-You relationships are those, as already mentioned, which bear a 'directly personal character', insofar as they 'move in the intimate sphere of love, friendship and sentiment, and also of the neighbourhood, small-scale cooperation and so on'. (1,53) O n the other hand there is the legal or quasi-legal structuring of such relationships. We do not necessarily have to choose between direct personal and institutionally mediated relationships. In the relationship of worker and foreman, for instance, the directly personal and the indirectly institutional can come together. In the I-self relationship it appears there can only be a direct relationship in Rich's terminology. Nevertheless Rich also speaks of the 'institutionalising effect in the I-self relationship'. (1,55) By this he means the effects which other relationships, mediated by institutions, have upon the I-self relationship. This is particularly clear, for example, in the effect which the division of labour in production has upon the I-self relationship of the worker. The 'three basic relationships in their direct and indirect form highlight the main features of ethical responsibility in the concrete existence of human beings.' (1,57) Here Rich is speaking of individual, personal and environmental ethics, which is different from the terminology normally used in ethics. In the individual ethic the issue is the responsibility of the I for the self in the direct relationship; 'in the personal ethic it is the concern of the I for the You, what can be called an obligation to interpersonal humanity' (1,60) or a dialogical existence which does not only lay claim to the other as a means, but respects him as an end. The environmental ethic concerns 'our direct dealing with the natural environment as the elemental basis of existence for all creatures.' (1,61) Human beings have a responsibility for these relationships, not only for them in their direct form but also for their institutional mediations. 'This responsibility, which is directed to social structures and their consequences for the qualitative shaping of basic human relationships, forms the specific content of what is here called social ethics. It is only when social ethics is understood this way that the responsibility of human beings is integrated into a whole'. (1,58) 'Social ethics inquires in a universal sense about the

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structural ordering of institutionally mediated existence which can encourage rather than hinder those individuals, groups, and societies and so on who wish to live responsibly in all the structures of human life. And to that extent it is directed precisely to enabling ethical behaviour individually, personally and environmentally in the area of institutionally mediated relationships.' (1,66) The direct object of social ethics is therefore the institutional arrangements in which human beings realise their three basic relationships. The criterion for the assessment of institutional contexts is whether they further or hinder life in the basic relationships. To that extent life in the institutions is the indirect object of social ethics. Economic ethics is 'concerned with nothing other than the application of socio-ethical questions, criteria and principles to the basic problems of the economy.' (1,67)

II. Rich's epistemological

reflections

1. As we have seen, according to Rich, the basic question of social ethics is as follows. ' H o w are the institutions of society which mediate our common life to be structured, so that by their mediation in all the basic relationships of human existence they encourage rather than hinder what is due to human beings and the environment?' (1,71) To be able to answer this question social ethics uses the knowledge of the social sciences. To that extent it is 'a discipline which is related to and conscious of the empirical.' (1,72) In order to be able to define the relationship between ethical and social scientific judgements in social ethics, Rich distinguishes between 'what measures up to empirical reality' [Sachgemäß, henceforth 'the empirical'] and 'what is due to human beings' [Menschengerecht, henceforth 'the humane']. The way he distinguishes and relates the humane and the empirical is very significant for his ethical theory. This is important for the further reason that Max Weber strongly advocated the case he developed for a value-free science, whereas Gerhard Weisser, with whom Rich agrees epistemologically, elaborated the conception of a 'normative sociology.' For Weisser the social scientist has the task not only of acquiring theoretical knowledge about a subject area but also of issuing

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207

'warnings, recommendations and evaluations.' (1,75) In order to do so he must not allow the problem of norms to disappear from view. 5 Rich distinguishes the empirical and the humane in the following way. The empirical customarily deals with what is objective. 'In this sense a bridge, for example, is constructed in an empirically correct manner if in its construction the objective laws of statics are strictly followed.' (1,76) Here it is not a matter of 'good' and 'bad' but of 'correct' or 'incorrect'. What is objective are natural laws. But are there laws in economics whose objectivity is comparable with those of nature? That is not so. 'The economy is surely . . . not a fixed product of nature but a historical and cultural product.' (1,77) It 'arises from the activity of human beings' (1,81), so it has no inherent laws in the strict sense. Even where there are constraints in the economy these are quite different from natural laws. There are objective states which are created by human beings and to which they submit. In relation to the economy Rich distinguishes 'between real and supposed objective laws'. (1,80) In the first category he includes efficiency (an inefficient economy cannot properly meet needs), planning (which is necessarily bound up with economic activity, including in market economies, though not in the form of central planning), and competition, which makes efficiency visible, (cf. 1,77-80) Real laws are distinguished therefore by the fact that 'they are grounded in the rational' (1,81), or 'are rooted in the natural tendency of the rational life of human beings.' (177) Efficiency, planning and competition can, however, be realised in very different ways, depending on which basic interests are dominant in the economy. If the profit motive becomes 'the dominant structural principle in economic activity, then constraints arise which have no connection with the rational structure of economic activity itself, but with an ordering of the economy which is dominated by acquisitiveness.' (1,79) Competition, for Rich a necessary feature of the economy, takes on here the form of 'an aggressive, uninhibited contest to oust one's opponents, where what is decisive for market share is not the competitiveness of the enterprise but primarily the position of eco-

5

For the ideas of Gerhard Weisser see his essay 'Glaubensgewißheit und heutige Wertens- und Erkennenskritik' ['The certitude of faith and the modern critical approach to values and knowledge'] in the essays in honour of Arthur Rich (v.s. note 2), 111-124.

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nomic power.' (1,79) The network of constraints which arises in this way can easily be misunderstood as an objective law, but in fact these constraints rest on value decisions which become manifest in the ordering and the politics of the economy, 'and by their modification they can be, if not removed, at any rate mitigated.' (1,80) Rich summarises his reflections in the claim 'that what is not empirically adequate cannot really be humane, and what conflicts with the h u m a n e cannot really be empirical. Here is a guideline of great relevance for social or economic ethics.' (1,81) However, Rich's distinction of the humane and the empirical appears to be unclear and contradictory. O n the one hand he declares: 'The concept of the empirical belongs to the domain of description and explication. Descriptive and explicative statements state how something is, how it behaves, how it occurs or functions, for instance, What are the empirical laws of a competitive economy?' (1,82) O n the other hand he observes: 'In contrast the concept of the humane is a prescriptive and normative category. It aims to express how something ought to be, to behave, to occur and to function, so that it is not only empirical and practicable but in its systemic structures it can at the same time satisfy the requirements of the humane.' (I,82f) This definition supports the first part of Rich's above claim, that what is not empirically adequate cannot really be humane. For human beings who pursue the humane in their economic dealings but are ignorant of empirical reality or exclude it from their practical decisions are going to produce results and side-effects which contradict the humane. However, the second part of the claim (that what is not humane cannot be empirical) is not plausible. If the empirical belongs to the descriptive and the humane to the normative, then one can envisage someone following a descriptive account of an empirical situation and yet failing to act normatively. Anyone who wishes to take a different view must adopt a normative concept of 'the empirical'. 6 In that case, however, the distinction between the empirical and the humane becomes unclear. 6

This is of course clear from the very word. 'Sachgemäß' indicates a standard and so a norm. The extent to which Rich's 'Sachgemäß' can acquire an ethical normative value is shown by the following quotation: 'Can an economic order which is functioning well in purely technical terms really be 'Sachgemäß' if it is bound on structural grounds to violate the 'Menschengerecht', or more concretely, if it produces horrendous social inequalities, precipitates mass unemployment, and in production and consumption is interested in human beings only or predominantly

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It is, moreover, not quite clear how the empirical laws which Rich mentions (efficiency, competition and planning) - and they are basic structures of economic activity and at the same time 'necessities' how they relate to the empirical knowledge of economics which is to be observed in concrete economic activity. What counts as 'empirical reality' and so as 'measuring up to empirical reality' ? This is not really clear. Moreover, we must make the following observation. It is evident that economics 'arises from the activity of human beings' (1,81) and is therefore changeable. However, one can criticise Rich here for speaking of the human being, for the human being cannot be an economic subject. There are only individual economic subjects with varying and limited power of action (workers, managers, entrepreneurs, unions, multi-national concerns, the state). Any single concrete economic (or political) activity can change only a limited number of economic facts. There are always others that are entirely produced by human beings, yet in relation to the particular act must be assumed to be unalterable. Some other action can set about changing them, but then for its part it must treat other facts as unalterable by this action. This is the only way in which action, and particularly economic action, is possible. Taking account of this one can say that an economic activity is empirical if it takes account of the economic data which are relevant to attaining its end, and the contexts investigated by the discipline of economics, in such a way that it can reach the intended goal.7 Nothing is thereby said about the quality of the goal.8 The empirical is concerned with the instrumental character of action in relation to predetermined goal. This proposal is designed to clarify the meaning of the term 'empirical' and thereby avoid the obscurities in Rich. But Rich would not accept this modification. 2. After Rich has distinguished between the empirical and the humane, there is the question how the content of the humane is to be for their labour or their spending, so that the sense of alienation gains ground and many of the victims want to break out of it?' (1,82) 7

In this connection it is all the same in principle whether one is dealing with an action within the economic order or whether the action is aimed at changing the framework of the economic order itself. The circumstances which cannot be changed by the particular action must always be taken into account so that the action reaches its goal and to that extent is 'Sachgemäß'.

8

F o r Rich's thought on this question under the term 'Menschengerecht', see further below, III and V.

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defined. In agreement with critical rationalism (Karl Popper and Hans Albert) Rich rejects any train of thought which, on the principle of absolute foundation, claims to provide an ultimate foundation for empirical and ethical judgments demonstrable by reason. 9 The critical rationalist Hans Albert is aware that in everyday consciousness many value convictions are bound up with empirical insights. For him this is quite acceptable as long as these value convictions are falsifiable, since for him the principle of critical testing is the criterion of rationality. A falsification of value convictions cannot stem directly from new empirical insights. However, it does arise if it can be shown that they are incompatible with this knowledge. Value convictions are therefore valid until they have been falsified, and they can lay claim to validity only in so far as they are understood to be falsifiable. Otherwise critical rationalism would see 'dogmatism' here, which is tantamount to pronouncing 'anathema'. Rich does not accept this understanding of value convictions. What is humane ought to be an unconditional standard. H e accuses Albert of confusing 'certainty' and 'certitude'. Following Pascal he says there are 'certitudes of the heart . . . which have their own reasons, inaccessible to rationality.' (1,94, note 53) If one wanted to ground them in rationality, then it would be a matter of certainty. But this can only be reached in a misleading way, by dogmatism. Rich's own conception comes nearest to the normative sociology of Gerhard Weisser. Since social scientists need to advise and admonish, then they too have to concern themselves with value judgements. These judgements cannot be justified scientifically and in this sense lay claim to general acceptance. According to Weisser there are 'axiomatic, basic concerns . . . which have their place in subjective experiences of conviction, which include "direct knowledge" and for which therefore no justification is possible or required.' (1,97) Such 'basic concerns' are not 'dogmatic', for they are to be interpreted and clarified, and are susceptible of certain corrections. They are not arbitrary or random just because their general validity cannot be rationally demonstrated. They are rather certitudes which are entertained as a matter of confession 9

Cf. also H. Albert, Traktat über kritische Vernunft [Treatise on Critical Reason], Tübingen, 2nd edition 1969, 55-79; id., 'Kritizimus und Naturalismus' ['Criticism and Naturalism'], in id. Kritische Vernunft und menschliche Praxis [Critical Reason and Human Praxis], Stuttgart, 1977, 34-64.

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and to which 'testimony is borne' (1,99) in the expectation that they can also be made clear to others. Rich is therefore in line with critical rationalism in contesting the idea that 'the normative can be universally validated as a material norm in the sense of scientifically objective rationality.' (1,100) H o w ever, he affirms against critical rationalism and with G. Weisser, that there are basic concerns which are normative certitudes, and which are communicated by 'argumentation and testimony' and tend 'to general evidence and thereby to universal obligation.' (1,101; v.i. Ill) 3. Social ethics aims to demonstrate the humane with reference to the 'structures and processes of society'. (1,102) It is not enough to develop the norms; they must rather take up 'the claims of the empirical' and 'therefore be operative and practicable'. (1,102) This results in the following levels of theory: (1) The first level is that of 'the fundamental certitude of the experience of the humane.' (1,170) It has a confessional character. (2) 'The starting point of socio-ethical judgements and decisions are constitutive criteria which are able to articulate the basic concerns of the humane in a principled and obligatory sense.' (1,102) They are not dogmatic, since (a) a distinction is made between the inner substance of their experiential certitude and their verbal expression; (b) their experiential certitude must be reinterpreted afresh in new historical contexts; (c) the communication of experiential certitude has to occur not in an authoritarian manner but 'in a non-authoritarian way through rational argumentation.' (1,103) 'Although oriented to the absolute in experiential certitude', the criteria ought 'to articulate the humane in such a way . . . that it can be understood, discussed and deployed even without the fundamental premises.' (1,170) (3) The 'question about the humane within the empirical' is not answered by moving from the criteria of the normative to guidelines for action in a deductive manner. (1,103) We require particular steps to move between the humane (the normative and prescriptive) and the empirical (the descriptive/explicative) so that guidelines for action (called maxims) can be reached. It is important to distinguish between criteria and maxims. 'Criteria have to be established as norms of a purely prescriptive kind. Within experiential certitude they express what in principle is valid ethically. Maxims on the other hand present norms in a form which is at once prescriptive and explicative. They are prescriptive insofar as they can let themselves be guided by the criteria. And they are explicative so far as they are

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oriented to the knowledge of the social sciences in the interest of the empirical.' (1,103) Their degree of certainty is less than that of the criteria.

III. Experiential certitude: humanity based on faith, hope and love Rich is concerned with Christian experiential certitude. At the same time it needs to be communicable. Its explication in the form of criteria ought to possess plausibility even for those who do not share it. So Rich enquires both about the specifically Christian in a humanity based on faith, hope and love, and also about the 'general horizon of human experience of faith, hope and love.' (1,105) 'Faith', 'hope' and 'love' denote phenomena of general human experience. This includes the fact that without trust human life is not possible, that it collapses where faithfulness and faith cease. Without hope as trust in the future, life seems an 'absurd and dead existence' (1,106). Love is the unity of trust and hope and at the same time the ground from which trust and hope can spring. Faith, hope and love are basic forms of human life - existential, whose absence robs human life of its humanity. Nevertheless, it is a daily experience that we human beings 'in our actions notoriously deny faith, hope and love and shape our human lives by quite other motivations: underhand mistrust, fatalistic resignation, and self affirmation which is reckless of humanity.' (1,111) This is for Rich a preliminary definition of 'evil'. It characterises the 'contradiction between the essence of humanity and the existence of human beings.' (1,111) It is important to see that evil is found on the level both of the person and of social structures and institutions. 'Since human beings in their total existence can never be detached from institutions and their structural forms, the evil which they do must also be found in the structures.' (1,114) Conversely structural evil has its repercussions on the person; for the relationships in which human beings live are never just direct but also always institutionally mediated. If persons or groups of persons change, there is no necessary change in structural evil. And conversely as structures change for the better, it does not follow that persons change. In view of the persistence of evil in the

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personal and institutional, the question is raised about a radical good which is a match for radical evil. Rich elucidates the Christian faith, which knows of a radical good, in the following way: in Jesus human beings have experienced the inbreaking of the Kingdom of God, in such a way 'that in his speech and action God's promise and claim became transparent, and what was to come became a present event.' (1,120) In his death on the cross, however, his contemporaries found proof of his failure; for according to the law the curse of God rests on anyone who dies on a cross. Without the experience of the resurrection of Jesus which the disciples had 'it would remain completely incomprehensible that the cause of the crucified one continued, that there should be any such thing as Christianity at all - Christianity as the conviction that God acted precisely in the Jesus of Nazareth who historically failed, and that therefore there is a future - the coming of his Kingdom - which cannot be refuted by any historical human failure, even in such an absolute and final form as death.' (1,121) It is therefore true to say that 'faith as the experience of the resurrection is faith which arises from the resurrection and not simply belief in the resurrection.' (1,121) That means 'a faith that human beings and the world have a future in God's coming, even if they founder on the reality of personal and structural evil.' (I,121f) Christian hope is thereby directed not to a future which develops out of the possibilities of the present and to a certain degree lies in the power of human beings, but to a future in the sense of an advent. 'Therefore there is a future not because time, which lies in the hands of human beings, marches on, but because God breaks into this time, comes to the world in order to make way for the unfeasible, the totally other,' (1,124) even against all the odds. The faith of Christians is 'a trust which is primarily rooted in the faithfulness of God and not simply in human faithfulness.' (1,123) Finally in love 'faith becomes real and what is hoped for becomes present. In it God's will attains its goal, "for God is love" . . . Agape-love is not at his [sc. man's] disposal. It is an unexpected event, a gift of God, which becomes a motivating command to the one who believes and hopes.' (I,124)10 'As 10 To say that faith is 'real' in love appears to be a version of idea 'fides caritate formata', which is not acceptable for Reformation theology. Rather faith is 'real' in trust on God's Word, and as such is active in love (Gal. 5,6).

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the presence of the one who comes, this love is here and now, wherever it grasps and moves human beings, an anticipation of the future, the whole within the fragmentary, the ultimate in the penultimate, that which remains . . . In agape-love the humane reaches its most radical and incomparable form.' (1,126) The specifically Christian aspect of humanity as based on faith, hope and love is 'rooted in the totally other of the Christ event, which awakens trust where mistrust gains ground, encourages hope where all the signs contradict hope, and frees people for love where one can expect no matching love but must reckon even with hate and hostility.' (1,127) However, when it comes to 'making the normative concrete', 'there is no specifically Christian humanity but only the human.' (1,127) Therefore the Christian faith has to test everything in society which claims to be genuinely human, and it has to make itself intelligible as regards the 'normative content of its humanity' (1,128) to those who do not share its experiential certitude.

IV. Rich's

existential-eschatologicalapproach

Before we deal with the criteria for humanity in detail, we need to focus on Rich's theological approach. Rich develops his 'existentialeschatological approach' (1,162) in a sustained discussion with representative forms of theological ethics. According to Rich, the crux is the 'mediation . . . between the absolute and the relative, the ultimate and the penultimate, the claim contained in the promise of the Kingdom of God and the reality of our world, which is always troubled by structural and personal evil, yet already experiences the power of the one who comes. The difficulty of such a mediation lies in the fact that between the relative and absolute so defined there is a relation of both difference and correspondence, and the mediation is bound to fail in its complexity if one pole is underestimated or neglected over against the other.' (1,163) The relative, because it is non-absolute over and against the absolute, can be reduced to nothing. Rich sees this danger in the early Barth, (cf. 1,134-142) A different approach is to look for the absolute in the relative, whether as the order of creation, (E. Brunner; cf.I,142150) or - in a critique of the whole status quo - as the ultimate goal of a revolutionary transformation of society (a theology of revolution; cf.

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1,157-162). The Christological approach of the later Karl Barth with its analogical relating of the Christian community and the civil community contains elements of distance and correspondence between the relative and the absolute. However Rich thinks that Barth expects more of the state than its relativity permits, (cf. 1,150-157) Rich formulates the main outcome of his survey of these forms of theological ethics in the following way. At this point we encounter an impasse which is unavoidable if one tries to derive relative historical orders directly from the absolute, and so direct standards for the ordering of the world, whether the absolute be orders of creation, or the Lordship of Christ, or the Kingdom of G o d , or whatever. Either one does not really take up the relative, because it can never hold its own before the claim of the absolute, and the whole thing ends in socio-political indifference, if not something worse. O r one does succeed in taking up the relative and projecting the absolute into socio-political processes (the will of G o d as Creator for the basic orders of society, his liberative power in the social and political upheavals of the age, and the Lordship of Christ in analogy with social institutions and those of the state) and the consequence will be an exaggeration of these powers which is ideologically suspect, with the inescapable tendency to a conservative or revolutionary conformism. However, both are highly questionable from a socio-ethical point of view. (1,164)

In contrast Rich aims to regard and take up politico-social structures 'in their historical relativity and secularity.' (1,165) They need 'no theological grounding either for or against.' (ibid.) They may not, however, be accepted uncritically, but ought always to be viewed in the light of how they can be organised to 'favour the highest possible degree of social justice.' (ibid.) Rich's summary is highly significant: 'The setting of socio-political goals in the concrete formation of society and the world is not primarily to be founded on the promise and claim of the ultimate, which became transparent in the eschatological event of Jesus of Nazareth; rather this is the case with the Christian life in the specific exercise of socio-ethical responsibility, and so in relation to social institutions and their structurally caused effects.' (I,165f.) Humanity based on faith, hope and love is not, therefore, as it might appear at first sight, a supreme norm from which the subordinate norms for shaping society could be directly deduced. This humanity is rather life-defining, but at the same time constitutes the subject of ethical judgement and socio-ethical responsibility. The believer enters in his hope and love into a relationship with the norms and ethical

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claims present in society. This relationship is one of critical acceptance. It takes its cue f r o m the criteria which are to be derived f r o m humanity based on faith, hope and love. It lets the relative be relative and incomplete, whilst concerning itself, 'in the light of the claim of absolute love' (1,167), for an ever more just society. L o v e {agape) is not itself a criterion but a power of judgement which, in the sense of Philippians 1,9 takes reason into service in order to recognise in the concrete what corresponds to justice. Rich's approach is called 'existential-eschatological' since he derives the socio-ethical responsibility of the Christian f r o m his eschatological existence. The structure of this derivation has been sketched above. (v.s.II.3)

V. The

Criteria

The criteria explicate the humane in the sense of being 'normative reference points for the humane, which is to be concretised in social justice.' (1,172) Rich gives seven criteria but it is not a question of a 'fixed number'. (1,172) 'These criteria are not the product of the historical situation but only of love in its hope and faith. However, they d o manifest themselves in time, and not beyond the historical situation.' (1,172) To that extent the historical situation is an indirect basis for their recognition - in other contexts other criteria can appear 1 1 whereas the witness to Christ in the N e w Testament is the primary source of the humanity which t o o k f o r m in Jesus. To this extent the criteria of this humanity have a Christian character. 'However, insofar as Christian existence seeks to be nothing more than truly human existence, they have to validate themselves as purely humane criteria, as criteria for true humanity.' (1,172)

(1) The criterion of creatureliness Faith means that 'existence is grounded in that which lies outside its e l f (1,174, following Ebeling 1 2 ), and expresses the truth that human 11 Cf. also 1,173, n.l. 12 Cf. G. Ebeling, 'Was heißt Glauben?' ['What is meant by Faith?'], in id., Wort und Glaube [Word and Faith], Vol.3, 232. Tübingen, 1975.

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beings do not owe their existence to themselves, but are creatures and not the Creator. Herein we see the ontological difference between God and the human being. Alongside this difference however (which human beings share with all other creatures) there is also the 'personal correspondence' ( 1 , 1 7 5 ) which is specific to human beings and which marks them off from all other creatures. 'The human being . . . is the only creature to whom God reveals himself, to whom he speaks as a Father, whom he incorporates into his promise and claim and in all this calls to a response, or more precisely to responsibility as the embodiment of God's image.' ( 1 , 1 7 5 ) An understanding of human beings which makes them creators and lords of themselves (as for instance in Marx or Sartre) is incompatible with the criterion of creatureliness. (2) The criterion of critical distance In contradiction to his creatureliness, historical man refuses to understand himself as a creature. Instead he founds his existence on his own possibilities and pursues 'total power in a life emancipated from faith . . . In the final instance he allows himself to do and commit everything he can do and commit, restrained neither by the claim of the divine You nor of a human You.' ( 1 , 1 7 9 ) Since in the historical world 'personal and structural evil is at work down to the deepest foundations' ( 1 , 1 8 0 ) , critical distance is required to evaluate past, present and future structural forms (Rich appeals to I Corinthians 7 , 3 1 ) . The claims of historical systems of order to 'ultimate validity' ( 1 , 1 8 0 ) or 'ultimate significance' ( 1 , 1 8 1 ) must be opposed. If one were to take something historical as of ultimate validity then 'something creaturely would be absolutised in its historicity.' ( 1 , 1 8 1 ) (3) The criterion of relative acceptance If the criterion of critical distance were the sole criterion to regulate the relationship with the world, and in particular the relationship to its structural forms, that would lead to a 'sheer negativity which . . . sees evil in the status quo.' ( 1 , 1 8 2 ) But this would be a 'betrayal of the human', the betrayal of the present to a Utopian future.' ( 1 , 1 8 2 ) In the face of that negativity there would be little sense in changing the status

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quo in the direction of greater humanity and social justice. However, an absolutising of the relative would of course deserve downright negation, (cf. Rev. 13,11-18) Rich exemplifies the basis for the criterion of relative acceptance with a reference to Paul, who in the Letter to the Romans 'requires them not to be conformed to the structures of the world' (cf. R o m . 12,2), but at the same time advises the R o m a n Christians 'to subject themselves to the political power in the state.' (1,182; cf. R o m . 13,1) This acceptance is relative in that it 'always takes place within a critical movement for a justice which better corresponds to the criterion of the humane.' (1,184)

(4) The criterion of relationality Here it is a matter of 'the way the humane deals with ethical values and virtues as they are found within general human experience.' (1,184) Christ did not bring any new morality but he brings every morality into a state of crisis (cf. R o m . 10,4). N o moral value reaches so deep as the imperative of agape-love (critical distance from the values). At the same time Paul (cf. Phil. 4,8) takes up values which he finds in his environment, making them visibly relational. A n example is the values of 'freedom' and 'service'. 'Christian freedom as freedom in humanity based on faith, hope and love can . . . never be understood as absolute but only in relation to its complement of service. It is self-determined freedom in service of our fellows, and service of our fellows in selfdetermined freedom.' (1,187) Here arises a 'polarity of values' (1,188), which is a better expression than 'relationality'. O f course service in the environment of Paul was not rated a value at all. The novelty lies precisely in the fact that in the perspective of love 'freedom and service become relational values. F o r both-are always present in love.' (1,187f) The criterion of relationality aims to prevent the absolutising of one value where there is a polarity of values. Particular values are only 'aspects of the human.' 'The whole in which they find their unity is humanity based on faith, hope and love. They can never be this whole in themselves but they can point to it, though of course only when they are understood as relational and d o not aim to make themselves into the whole, claiming thereby to bring healing and salvation.' (1,189) To opt for this whole - agape-love, which integrates the polarities of

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value - is 'radical'. In contrast, to isolate one value and simultaneously negate the polar value is 'extremist'.

(5) The criterion of fellowship The human being is not created a solitary being but in and for togetherness (Gen. 1,27). Humanity always therefore has a dialogical character. This fundamental structure is contravened when in the relation of the Τ and the 'You', the Τ interest or the 'You' interest dominates.

(6) The criterion of fellow-creatureliness As a creature it is the lot of human beings 'to stand in communion with the rest of creation.' (1,194; cf. Eccl. 3,18f) On the other hand human beings also have a special status in relation to the rest of creation, as homo faber and homo conservator. (1,195) 'Fellow creatureliness as a criterion of the human therefore means two things: human beings are bound up with the totality of creation, and they have the task of using the created order responsibly before God in a way which furthers human life, and of preserving it with reverence.' {ibid.) (7) The criterion of participation Fellowship and fellow creatureliness primarily touch the personal direct relationship of individuals and groups. But they are also to be verified in the domain of institutionally mediated relationships. Fellowship implies that one allows others to share in what one has, is and does. For institutions 'this means that the social structures of power, law, administration, direction and property can meet the claim of the humane only to the extent that they are designed to give all interested and affected parties their share in the powers, rights, competences and goods which are established through these structures, and so structurally counteract the formation of one-sided privileges.' (1,197) Rich sees that the criterion of participation cannot without more ado be validated from the New Testament, this 'Magna Charta

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of humanity based on faith, hope and love'. (1,197) For at that time the factor of social structures was scarcely in view. However it is clear 'that social structures which oppose the spirit of participation are experienced as inhumane and so as intolerable. Humanity based on faith, hope and love has to take this very seriously according to its own guiding criteria.' (1,199) If we review Rich's development of the concept of criteria, one can make the following critical remarks. 1) According to Rich the criteria are 'norms of a purely prescriptive form . . . They express in the horizon of a certain experiential certitude what is to count as ethically valid on principle.' (1,222) However, on this understanding a criterion like creatureliness is not properly handled. The claim that the human being is a creature of God is not a prescriptive judgement but states a fact, even if it is not accessible to all. This claim contains a normative aspect if one derives from it the prescription 'Take care in your life to be a creature of God'. Strictly speaking this is not an ethical norm, but a call to faith, since the very meaning of 'faith' is to live trusting in God's creative word and so as a creatura verbi. A meta-norm arises out of the original claim if one extrapolates from it the rule: 'Every ethical judgement that contradicts the fact of human creatureliness is to be rejected'. By analogy the same goes for the criterion of the fellowship and fellow-creatureliness. The criterion of the critical distance is exclusively a meta-norm insofar as it contests the claims of institutions for ultimate significance, by offering a rule for dealing with social claims to authority. The same correspondingly goes for the criterion of relationality. Here indeed Rich himself says that it is about 'the way the humane deals with ethical values and virtues as they are found within general human experience.' (1,184) The criterion of participation is the only one which is of a 'purely prescriptive type.' The seven criteria of Rich therefore have a very varied character. First there are the descriptive-normative13 or meta-normative crite13 Theologically the alternative 'descriptive-prescriptive' does not present a complete disjunction in the matter of judgments. The word of G o d lies beyond this alternative, for it has a promissory character: a word of promise, a performative word of God. Cf. also O. Bayer, Was ist das: Theologie?

Eine Skizze

A sketch], Stuttgart, 1973, 24-39; id., Aus Glauben Heiligung

[Living

from

Faith.

On Justification

leben.

[What is

'Theology'?

Über Rechtfertigung

and Sanctification].

und

Stuttgart, 2nd

edition 1990, 29-64. The alternative 'descriptive-prescriptive' is adopted here be-

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ria (creatureliness, fellowship and fellow-creatureliness); secondly the purely normative (participation); and thirdly the purely metanormative (critical distance, relative acceptance and relationality). Rich does not unfortunately make this heterogeneity clear, and as a consequence does not discuss the problems they pose. 2) According to Rich humanity based on faith, hope and love has certain peculiar criteria which are the 'principles of Christian existence.' (1,172) It is 'love in its hope and faith which produces these criteria.' (ibid.) One therefore expects that Rich will deduce these criteria from that humanity or develop them as their explication. In fact when he develops and grounds the criteria he scarcely refers to the chapter on humanity based on faith, hope and love. This is especially the case with the criterion of creatureliness. (1,173-179) The other criteria are grounded by reference to various biblical passages without their relationship to that humanity being made explicit. That is unsatisfactory from a systematic point of view. The criterion of relationality is only justified by biblical examples. (1,184-192) 3) As regards the criterion of relationality, its scope is not clear. Is there a polar opposite value to every value, or is this the case only with some values? One surely cannot claim a polar value to justice, only equity as a higher form of justice. Mercy as the opposite of justice is not an ethical value. Even so in Rich justice has a special status among the 'values'; it is the social realisation of the humane as defined by the criteria. 14 Health, for example, does not have illness as its polar value, but it is surely perverse if someone takes health as a value in such a way that the reality of illness is suppressed. It is important to integrate illness into life, but it cannot be integrated as a value even if it is valuable to reach a proper relationship to illness. With relationality, therefore, the extent and validity of the criterion is not clear. These remarks show that Rich's reflections on the criteria betray a succession of obscurities and leave many questions unanswered.

cause R i c h includes o n l y this alternativein his presentation at the level of criteria, in contrast to his d i s c u s s i o n at the level of h u m a n i t y b a s e d o n faith, h o p e and love. 14 R i c h ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of this term agrees in large m e a s u r e with R a w l s ' t h e o r y of justice; cf. 1,201-221.

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VI. Maxims from a formal perspective Criteria 'emphasise b y their comprehensiveness the absolute reference point of all socio-ethical judgements and decisions.' (1,222) In order to come to decisions on empirical matters, and particularly over questions about orders, there needs however to be insight into the empirical. T h e relating of the humane and the empirical is to be carried out in the maxims. T h e y are therefore, in contrast to the criteria, 'not only prescriptive statements of ethical obligation but at the same time cognitive statements about reality.' (1,223) 'Maxims therefore have not only to stand the test of the super-rational claim of the humane, they have also to prove themselves in the face of the rational claim of the empirical.' (1,223) Rich proposes the following steps in forming maxims: a) Since maxims are essentially related to reality, their formation begins with the analysis of the problems in a given economic or social situation. b) T h e possible options for the solution of these problems are examined, their structure illuminated and the probable consequences investigated. c) Each option contains within itself value preferences. T h e y must be made conscious and tested. d) O u t of these three steps a maxim can be formed as a guideline. It takes its cue f r o m the criteria of the humane and to that extent is normative; insofar as it meets the requirements of the empirical, it is cognitive. e) A n y maxim so formed must be repeatedly tested. 'If it turns out to be impracticable because it is at variance with the basic economic data, or if it turns out that its factual consequences in the given situation and in the light of the goal are counterproductive in human, social or ecological terms, then it must be abandoned (or if possible modified) as empirically inadequate and ethically irresponsible. Conversely the economic practicability of a maxim o r its sheer social or ecopolitical efficiency is not sufficient to justify it ethically. O n e still needs to further, so far as one can foresee, a form of humanity which can be reconciled with the understanding of humanity based on faith, hope and love.' (I,227f.) T h e claim to validity of the maxims, unlike the criteria, is limited. It does not have the same obligatoriness and certitude; for empirical

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insight and reality itself are continually changing. The nearer a maxim stands to the criteria, the more general is its 'claim to validity' (1,231); the nearer a maxim stands to a problem area, the more limited is its claim. Here one should once again recollect what is specific to Christian ethics. 'What is specific lies not in the maxims, which non-Christians can also have as the ius humanum. Its very essence does not lie in the criteria, which as proper basic ethical principles guide a humanity grounded in the Christian faith. Ultimately it lies in the fact that the humanity of faith with its ethic is never a mere ethic derived by reflection which here and now lays claim to us, but is a gift stemming f r o m the one who comes, in short not simply an imperative which demands but an indicative which gives and already transposes us into the future of the Kingdom of G o d which is still to come.' (I,242f)

VII. Maxims for economic systems Economic activity is activity mediated in various ways. The institutions of this mediation are the proper subject for socio-ethical reflection. Rich conducts this reflection in two stages. The first deals with economic systems and the second with economic orders. These should be understood in the following way. Economic activity always involves planning. The various basic forms of the social organisation of the economy differ, therefore, not by whether they involve planning or no planning, but over who has the authority to plan. Either planning of the diverse economic processes is undertaken centrally, so that in the strict sense there is a single economic subject, the central planning authorities, or it is conducted in a decentralised way through the many entrepreneurs who focus on the purchasing behaviour of consumers. The first is the co-ordination system of the central command economy, the second that of the market economy. This is, of course, an ideal-typical contrasting of the basic economic systems. Each of these two systems, particularly the market economy, appears in various orders which make the systems concrete. Rich wants the concepts of 'system' and 'order' to be understood in the following way. 'In what follows an economic system means the basic system, the basic foundation of an economic order; and the economic order means the actual or possible concrete expression of a particular economic sys-

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tern.' (11,177) Rich poses the question both at the level of system and at the level of order which system and which order is ethically 'admissible' or acceptable. His judgement, or the guidelines for a judgement, are formulated by Rich in 'maxims for judging and deciding about an economic system' (11,226; cf. 255-258), and in 'maxims for judging and deciding about an economic order.' (II,259;cf.338-344) For the maxims to satisfy the claim to be empirical, Rich presents the foundations and basic structures of economic systems as well as their problems and limits. The maxims gather together his previous reflections. Many contain only economic judgments, but others have both economic and ethical elements. Rich comes to the conclusion that the central command economy is not acceptable for a humanity based on faith, hope and love. He bases this principally on the criteria (in conjunction with economic reflections), i.e. ethically, and not primarily through economic considerations, although the theoretical considerations and empirical observations which Rich adduces (cf. 11,213-225) clearly expose the ineffectiveness of central planning for developed, industrial economies. 15 Rich argues rather in the following steps. (1) He asks which values are realised in each of the two basic economic systems. Behind each of them 'stand specific human values. The market economy relates to freedom, to responsibility for oneself and to the private interests of the economic subject. The central command economy, on the other hand, relates to social obligation, solidarity and 15 Rich wrote the relevant passages before the well-known collapse of the economies of actual socialist countries. The problems he specifies are principally these: the central command economy has no appropriate procedure for determining the needs and requirements for goods in a society. In order to undertake planning satisfactorily a plan must be drawn up for every type of goods, but that is impossible given the huge number of goods. Rich cites O t a Sik: 'Drawing up a plan in which the quantity of each product was concretely contained would take longer, even with the help of the most modern computer systems, than the time for which the plan is formed.' (Wirtschaftssysteme [Economic

Systems].

Berlin-Heidelberg-New York,

1987, 23; quotation from 11,215) The effectiveness of production is less than in the market economy, partly because increases in income for the workers are correlated with the fulfilment of the plan, but, as is evident, plans can be 'fulfilled' even without higher and better productivity. Also in the distribution of the product problems arise because special interests (party bureaucracy, economic bureaucracy, the consumers) collide with one another, and there is no authority to regulate the conflicts, since officially special interests are not supposed to exist, (cf. 11,213-221) See also the basic reflections on the 'limits of the central command economy': 11,221-224.

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the collective interests of those active in the economy.' (11,256; 2nd maxim) (2) O n the basis of the criterion of relationality it is clear, for instance, that the value 'private interest' may not be realised without the polar twin value 'collective interest'. If it is made 'extreme' or absolutised, then in this form it is not ethically acceptable. N o w the systems rest respectively on one polar value. Therefore if they are to be acceptable, they must be open to movements to realise the polar opposite value. This is the condition for the acceptability of the systems. (3) So the question arises, Does the market economy leave room for its supplementation by elements of central planning? Does the central command economy leave room for supplementation by elements of the market economy? Rich is not here thinking of a mixture. Rather it is clear that the principles of each system are constitutive and the principles of the other system are only regulative. In spite of this we need a guarantee that not only would the values underlying each system be realised, but to a certain degree also the polar values of the other system. The question raised here is an economic question. The answer is that the central command economy is not open to elements of the market economy. Either these are only of a cosmetic kind, whereupon one cannot speak of them being regulative, or the market elements are far-reaching, whereupon the claim of central planning must be given up. The market economy, on the other hand, is open to elements of overall planning, as is already the case in various ways and degrees in the practice of Western states. Naturally this does not imply central planning of a command type. (4) Therefore the following conclusion emerges. The market economy is acceptable in the light of the criteria of the humane, but the central command economy is not. When we review Rich's ethical evaluation of the market economic system in comparison with the central command system, certain difficulties in his approach are evident. Rich draws above all on the criterion of relationality. H e has to investigate the 'basic value principles' (II,239)of the two systems. In the case of the market economy that is relatively easy. There are values like self-interest and individual freedom. 'In terms of motivation, the market economy is therefore based on the individual and not the communal interest of the particular economic subject. More precisely the common good becomes a function

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of the individual or private maximisation of interest.' (11,182) This can be established from the writings of the theorists about the market economy (cf. 11,227-233) as well as from its operation. There are much more difficult problems in the case of the central command economy, though Rich does not make this clear. Here the 'state as collective' is the 'single economic subject.' (11,212) The value which underlies its actions is the general or collective interest. However, one has to ask, Is this value in fact realised according to Rich in the central command economy, or is it only a claim in the realm of theory? Rich does not pose this question expressly. Just because in the central command economy there is strictly speaking only one economic subject and not many individual economic subjects pursuing their own interest as in the market economy, it does not necessarily follow that the planning authorities, as representatives of the 'collective state', realise the common good. They can also pursue the negation of the collective good. Rich is far from seeing a realisation of the common good in the reality of the (former) central command economies. (11,213-224) But what does it mean for him then to see the collective interest as a basic principle of this form of economy? It can only be a claim in the realm of theory. If this claim were to be met at least theoretically, then a concept of the common good or collective interest would have to be developed, as well as an idea of the political institution or action in which the economic elements of the collective interest would be established and made concrete. Such a procedure would, to follow Rich's criterion of participation, have to contain opportunities for all citizens to have their say in decision making. To determine a plan centrally without democratic participation contradicts an essential criterion of humanity and cannot therefore even at the theoretical level uphold the claim to be representing the common good. 16 On this basis Rich's judgement is not plausible when he writes: 'Like the market economy, the central command economy, as typically practised in the Soviet Union, rests on a basic principle which has relevance to social ethics' (11,208) - he means the collective interest. If against Rich one has to contest the idea that the central command economy 16 Here one has to ask whether individual interests and general interests (as the common good) really confront each other as polar values. It is true that one can pursue one's own interest without respecting the general interest, but the general interest cannot be pursued without considering individual interests. H e r e therefore the adoption of a value polarity must be modified.

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genuinely relates to one value, then Rich's question whether this economic system is open to values which realise the polar opposite value (the private interest of the individual), is basically superfluous. O u r reflections on this example reveal a difficulty in the use of Rich's criterion of relationality. What exactly does it mean to say that institutions 'have' 'value principles'? Is this referring to the practical realisation of values or to theoretical claims? H o w is this 'having' of value principles to be determined? O n l y if these questions can be answered in the concrete does the criterion of relationality help one to an ethically based decision between options in the matter of institutions.

VIII. Maxims for economic orders The market economy operates in very different forms of order, and other forms are conceivable and appear to be realisable. To judge that the market economy is ethically acceptable is not to decide for any one of its forms of order. This difficult question must now be investigated. Rich states the chief forms of order of the market economy and carefully analyses their particularities and their problems: the capitalistic market economy 1 7 (cf. 11,260-268), the social market economy (the German model; cf. 11,269-277), the democratic market economy (the Swedish concept; cf. 11,277-285), and the socialist market economy (at an experimental stage in Eastern Europe; cf. 11,285-296), the humane economic democracy of O t a Sik (cf. 11,296-308), and the ecologically regulated market economy of H . Chr. Binswanger (cf. 11,308-318). The maxims to be developed over the orders combine elements of the empirical and the humane to establish guidelines for deciding between these various possibilities. Rich prepares the way for them by (a) analysing the performance and the problems of the market economy, and (b) explicating some of the criteria of the humane in dealing with the problems of the economy. (a) The market economy is in many cases excellent in solving the problem of the co-ordination of supply and demand and the effective allocation of resources. Nevertheless there remain problems which 17 Rich does not identify the market economy with capitalism but understands capitalism as one of the forms of the market economy.

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it cannot surmount because of its very dynamic. The provision of public goods (for instance public security and overall education), is impossible or difficult to organise through a market economy. External costs of production (such as air pollution) are passed on to the public and do not appear in a firm's balance sheet and in the calculation of its effectiveness. Prices, it is true, are an indication of scarcity, but they reveal only current shortages and not future ones. So in a pure market economy, for example, no attention is paid to the likely future scarcity of energy sources. This is true even on the assumption of perfect competition. Furthermore without a framework provided by the state the market economy is not in the position to defend itself against erosion of competition. In this situation what is decisive is not simply performance but also perhaps the control of an enterprise over its outlets. Left to itself a market economy can only with difficulty and over a long time cope with booms and slumps, to the great detriment of many, for example the unemployed. The division of those active in the economy into the possessors of labour and possessors of capital is often sensed to be unjust, so that conflicts and instabilities result. Since these problems cannot be solved in principle in a pure market economy, then in the nature of the case, if a society is not prepared to put up with such problems, it is pushed towards regulation. That means the state will provide a framework for the economy, produce general plans and take other measures. The co-ordination of the market is not thereby abolished, rather its conditions are to be determined so that the overall results of individual economic activity lead in the desired direction. (b) The more precise definition of the criteria with reference to the economy leads to the following insights. If one relates the criterion of fellowship to the economy, then it follows that the work of human beings is to be organised in such a way that they are never only a means but also always an end, and so that at work they are still 'responsible subjects' with 'their own space for self-determination'. (11,323) Only so will the worker be respected as a fellow human being. The criterion of participation defines the form of fellowship in the context of the institutions. It means 'that living and working together in social institutions can satisfy the claim of the humane insofar as its structures are directed to the participation of all interested and affected parties in the institutionally conditioned powers, rights and

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goods and entitlements.' (11,144) The criterion of participation has considerable ramifications because it needs to be related to many areas of the economy. Economic activity is possible only in cooperation (for example in the cooperative labour of workers and possessors of capital, suppliers and producers). If mutual dependence becomes one-sided dependence, 'where one partner imposes conditions of work on another' (11,144), where, that is, the 'interests of one party dominategli, 145), then it offends against the criterion of participation, which requires that 'those who cooperate determine together the conditions of their common work, that is, strive for a consensus.' (11,144) Equally the criterion is to be deployed in the question of distribution. Here it is a matter on the one hand of the 'just distribution of available work so that everyone who is willing and able to work can share in this cooperation.' (11,146) When a large number of people are permanently excluded from work, then the criterion is violated. On the other hand it concerns the 'humane division of the social product among those who share in its production as well as the others who for whatever reasons have no share.' (11,149) The cause of the confrontation of labour and capital lies in the fact 'that the workers have no share in the productive capital, or so little a share that it is practically negligible. Productive capital is for all that a means of production which has been produced by industrial cooperation, that is, together with the factor of labour. If then those who jointly produce such capital have no share in the dividend which accrues to the side of capital through the market mechanism of distribution, then the means of distribution is confrontational, since the system favours the one side and disadvantages the other.' (11,150) Forms of order of the market economy are to be tested to see how far they overcome confrontational relationships in favour of a participative distribution. A performance orientated economy properly has a social state, for in society there are always people who cannot contribute fully (children, the old, invalids and so on). Therefore a society cannot be organised simply according to performance principles but must always take care of the needs of those who are weak. Moreover an orientation towards performance leads to great differences in incomes without a necessary correspondence between income and performance. Hence the necessity for a redistribution policy in a social state in favour of

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those sectors of the population which are weaker and poorer, so that a 'participative solidarity' (11,155) can be achieved. Moreover, for assessing the alternative orders of the market economy the criterion of creatureliness is important. 'Human beings ought to observe the will of the Creator and stand by their fellow-creatures.' (11,162) The consequent obligation to stabilise the environment includes the idea of stabilising populations and stabilising claims (the section of the human race who are already well provided for cannot legitimately aim to increase their standard of living disproportionately as hitherto), and qualitative instead of quantitative growth. 18 In maxim 12 Rich gathers together the aims which state regulation must set in modifying the market economy in the interests of the humane. a) Minimising cyclical and structural instabilities, particularly to avert unemployment. b) Accommodating economic growth and economic practices to what is ecologically tolerable. c) Keeping inflation down to an optimal minimum to maintain the purchasing power of money. d) The most efficient production and distribution of necessary goods and services in a humane shaping of the conditions of work and an environmentally friendly use of nature. e) The creation of a social net to safeguard the livelihood of all social groups. f) The participation of workers in matters of income and in the decisions of firms on issues which concern them. g) The sharing of profit and loss by the whole workforce, on the one hand to let them share in the successes of the business and on the other hand to find a just relationship between the interests of capital and wage earners. (11,340)

It is clear in these reflections 'that the uncompromising capitalist form of the market economy is unacceptable for a humanity based on faith, hope and love.' (11,342) Since individual interests (the interests of capital) dominate one-sidedly, then the realisation of the polar value of the common good required by the criterion of relationality is neglected. Equally the distribution of property will offend against the criterion of participation.

18 'Qualitative growth means the continuation of a process of investment decoupled from an increase in the social product and growth in the consumption of energy and raw materials.' (11,66)

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It is different with the social market economy. As a market economy it gives considerable space to individual interests, yet has a string of regulations which are designed to further the general good and participation in industry and also provide social security nets. To that extent it is acceptable, though only if it is developed further, particularly through the reform of property and a more thorough regard for environmental matters. 'The maxims I have adduced contain no precise model of an order of the market economy. They stake out only a framework within which the options could be pursued in the light of the humane and the empirical. Many different options are possible.' (II,343f) Rich has persuasively presented his conception of a existentialeschatological social ethic as the outcome of his investigation of various socio-ethical proposals and their difficulties, and he has worked it out convincingly and considered it from an epistemological point of view. In the second volume of his economic ethics he gives a presentation of what it means to say that judgements in economic ethics must satisfy the claims of the empirical. H e shows what it means for the empirical and the humane to enter into a dialogue with each other. In the present discussion of economic ethics opinions are often held at such a high level of principle that one cannot see how they can be related to concrete problems. O r they are so concrete that they only reflect practices which are already prevalent, without providing any orientation. In contrast Rich undertakes a many-layered, well thought out interrelating of experiential certitudes, ethical normative criteria and empirical insight, right through to the maxims. So there emerges a complex theory. Even if one believes it contains serious unresolved problems (e.g. lack of clarity over the distinction between the empirical and the humane, problems over the justification of the criteria, and problems of detail in the execution of the interrelating), nonetheless this economic ethics, through its awareness of the problems, its proposed solutions and its complex structure, surely deserves attention in further discussion in economic ethics.

Integrity in Business: A Christian Approach to Business Ethics Richard A.

Higginson

This essay attempts to break new ground in business ethics. To explain how this is so, it is necessary to make a number of preliminary observations about the subject. First, I believe I am following common practice in regarding business ethics as a subject-area different from, though obviously related to, economic ethics. Economic ethics is principally concerned with the description, analysis and evaluation of different systems. For instance, it investigates the different value-systems which are implicit and explicit in capitalist and socialist economies. In contrast, business ethics tends to assume a particular economic system as its context and then asks, given that system, how a company or its leading figures should act within it. Business ethics has developed primarily within the Western market economy and so it presupposes that system as the context within which moral decisions have to be made. Second, it is clear that in the West, business ethics is a subject which is attracting plenty of interest at present. It became a fashionable subject in the United States during the 1970s and early 1980s, and where America leads, Britain usually follows several years later. The number of books on the subject is growing fast. British business schools are starting to incorporate an ethical dimension into their courses. There has been a growth of other institutions concerned with business ethics, many of them Christian in foundation, e.g., the Institute of Business Ethics, which developed out of the work of the Christian Association of Business Ethics. There is a European Business Ethics Network which runs an annual conference, and has member groups within several European countries. Although there is a tendency for academics to predominate at such conferences, it is a mistake to think that business ethics is only of interest to academics. Follow-

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ing the example set by American companies, an increasing number of British companies have developed mission statements and codes of ethical practice. These are usually statements of policy in such areas as: responsibilities to different groups (shareholders, customers, employees, etc.), gifts, favours and hospitality, conflicts of interest and dealings in shares. Companies have also found themselves under pressure from consumers to demonstrate a high ethical profile with regard to the environment. This is the age of lead-free petrol, ozonefriendly aerosols, cruelty-free cosmetics, and (in Germany more than Britain) sulphur-free power stations. The 'greening of business' may be a case of too little, too late, but it is surely a process that is here to stay. Third, I find it striking how in all of this, very little has yet been developed by way of an identifiably Christian perspective. Business ethics is an overwhelmingly secular phenomenon. Even where Christians have been involved in it, they have been reticent about doing so on anything other than a largely secular society's own terms. A substantial and significant Christian contribution to the subject is now overdue. While one should not necessarily expect Christians to have a different answer on every or indeed most questions of business ethics, there should be some coherence between the approach they adopt and their overall theological perspective on life. But on the whole the institutional churches give them little help in making such links. It was partly in response to this gap that in 1989 Ridley Hall, an Anglican theological college in Cambridge, launched a Foundation which seeks to integrate the areas of business leadership, faith and values, and to offer a unique resource in management development. The original name given to this project was 'God on Monday', though it was changed in 1992 to 'Faith in Business'. The Foundation offers a programme of residential seminars for people in positions of responsibility in business, commerce and industry. Based on the conviction that Christian faith is relevant to the world of business, these seminars bring together small groups of business leaders in dialogue with theological staff and students to explore themes such as 'Values in Business Today', 'Issues of Leadership' and 'Managing the Dynamics of Change'. The intent and indeed the experience of the seminars is that through this combination of business and theological/ethical expertise a realistic and authentic Christian perspective on business is being forged.

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Part of my job is to direct the Ridley Hall Foundation. The approach to business ethics which I sketch in what follows is something which has developed through its work. It is unashamedly practical in character. Through involvement in discussion with men and women engaged in very down-to-earth concerns my overriding motive has become one of saying something that is helpful to the business person, rather than attractive to the academic. At the same time, I remain committed to the endeavour to root business activity in an intellectually coherent Christian theology - and this may sometimes have the force of challenging such activity, in ways great and small. Fourth, it is appropriate to identify ways in which this approach to business is different from that which has been characteristic of Industrial Mission, a phenomenon which represents a major immersion of the churches in industrial life in post-war Britain. Generalisations about Industrial Mission are dangerous, and I do not wish to give the impression of standing over against industrial chaplains in criticism, since there is much common ground in what we are doing. But in the concept of industrial mission championed by Bishop Ted Wickham, and followed by many of its practitioners, there have been pervasive - and, I believe questionable - tendencies. One is a tendency so to emphasise G o d in the secular, and to see his Spirit as active in everyone, that the idea of Christians being a distinctive group pursuing a particular vocation in business has either been denied or lost to view. A second is a tendency (sometimes allied with a liberation theology with its 'bias to the poor') to side with employees and regard management with suspicion. Where this happens, Christians in management positions are unlikely to look to their local industrial chaplain as an obvious source of support. A third is a tendency to emphasise the corporate dimension with its focus on structures and groups in such a way that it downplays the feelings of isolation which can be experienced by those on whom the burden of momentous decisions actually falls. However, there are certainly industrial chaplains who provide notable exceptions to these three trends. In my work and writing, I regard managers with a conscious Christian commitment as the main target of concern. This is not to deny the appropriateness of other people being primarily concerned with other groups in industry, such as workers on the shop floor. But it proceeds from a conviction that in recent decades Christian busi-

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ness leaders have actually received short shrift from the church. The church has failed to show an intelligent, informed understanding concern about the type of work they do and the type of decisions they have to make. Furthermore, it is people in executive positions (and that of course includes trade union executives) who are most likely to have to make weighty decisions of an ethical nature. It is therefore apt that an article on business ethics should have management primarily in mind. At the same time, management is a very broad term, covering many different levels of responsibility, and in the examples used I try to convey the impact which questions of an ethical nature have upon business at a whole variety of levels. Fifth, my approach to Christian ethics reflects the particular tradition from which I come, the Anglican evangelical tradition. Anglican evangelicalism these days covers a wide spectrum, so I should at once explain that I stand near the broad or 'open' end of the evangelical spectrum. Ridley Hall, both as a college and a Foundation, welcomes the contribution of Christians from all types of tradition, but its nucleus and its heart is evangelical. This is expressed in commitment to the central Gospel reality of G o d ' s redemption in Jesus Christ, the Church's task of mission, and the authority of the Bible. Evangelical presuppositions are evident in my approach at three main points. The first is that I do believe meaningful distinctions can be made between Christians and non-Christians. Whatever label may or may not be used to preface the word 'Christian', the latter suggests personal acceptance of Jesus Christ as a Lord to whom one owes primary allegiance. This ought to make a difference to the way one conducts one's business life. To say this is not inconsistent with recognising that many who are not Christians follow high moral standards and sometimes set an example which puts Christians to shame. The second evangelical presupposition is the positive attitude with which I approach the Bible. This is not to commend a simplistic use of the Bible, where a moral case is constructed simply by stringing together a collection of biblical verses with no attention to their context, or its dissimilarity from our own. Rather it is a conviction that where the Bible is studied carefully, with close attention to detail, and applied thoughtfully, with sensitivity and imagination, it repeatedly proves its relevance to moral issues - even those of which it makes no direct mention. It is a resource which we neglect to our detriment.

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A third evangelical trait (though not an exclusive one) is that I have been prepared not just to discuss ethical issues, but also the spiritual context in which the Christian engages with these issues. I have talked about personal faith and one's relationship with God, not just as a backcloth to business decision-making, but as a crucial contributor to the process.

A Semblance of Method " H o w would I know an issue in business ethics if I came across it?" That was the reaction of an old college fried who now works in the City of London for a big insurance company when I told him of my interest in the subject. For a moment I was stumped for an answer. Yet as my friend and I sat and talked over lunch, it emerged that even while I had been waiting to eat with him, he had been arguing with a senior about the manner of presenting an insurance policy. M y friend had been arguing that the way his boss was proposing to do it was potentially misleading to the customer and therefore dishonest. In short, he had been deep into a question of business ethics without realising it. Ethics concerns questions of ought, of obligation: to put it bluntly, it's about what we ought to do and why we ought to do it. Such questions occur in every area of life, and business is no exception. It's not difficult to think of examples: fiddling the expenses, handling the manager with a drink problem, delayed invoice payment, or creative accounting. When we are confronted with an ethical problem many of us respond in a highly ad hoc manner. Under pressure, we make a hurried decision: 'thinking on our feet' is the polite way to describe it. M y conviction is that we often need to reflect more thoroughly upon a critical choice than is the typical human response. Certainly, decisions - especially in business — have to be made at speed, but that makes it all the more important that we learn to practise mature and well-informed habits of judgment which will stand us in good stead when the pressure is on. Moreover, in relation to many key issues which confront us, e.g., whether it is right to take up a morally questionable job, or what our position is on a controversial issue which lies at the very heart of our job, we do have scope for reflection.

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As an ethicist, I feel a particular concern to promote some semblance of method as far as moral decision-making is concerned. There are different methodologies espoused by different Christian ethicists, but there are certain elements which tend to be common to them all. Building upon these elements, I shall here commend a methodology which is essentially very simple. Stage One: Consider all the relevant facts. It is important to survey an issue in all its many different dimensions, with reference to all the participants involved. Indeed, to have as full as possible a picture of what is going on, we need to bring together the facts as perceived by those of different views, because all of us are notoriously partial in our selection of certain facts to the exclusion of others. But we should not be blind to the possibility that the facts presented by some individuals or groups may actually be incorrect - and to ascertain this will require careful investigation. In the world of business, there are clearly areas of information which are highly technical, where one is heavily dependent upon the expert. There are areas where I confess readily that I have limited knowledge or understanding and for that reason am unwilling to venture an ethical judgment. We are all dependent upon the experts at some point, but even then we need to beware: experts disagree! To have a mastery of the facts is important, but that by itself will not solve the ethical problems. We need to know what value to give to certain facts; we need to know how to assess and weigh them aright. So we come to Stage Two: Consult the important sources of guidance. For the Christian this will mean, high upon the list of sources, the Bible, though it is important to recognise that the particular tradition with which we are familiar influences and to some extent filters the way in which we read the Bible.

Uses of the

Bible

The Bible is an astonishingly rich and varied collection of literature, with a wealth of ethical material on which to draw. I shall spell out the moral guidance it has to offer in terms of a series of words beginning with 'p': portraits, parables, prescriptions, paradigms, perspectives and principles.

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First, portraits. The Bible contains portraits of what a good, Godfearing person looks like. The righteous man of Psalm 1; Job's protestation of his integrity in Job 31; snapshots which appear in the book of Proverbs; Paul's personification of love in 1 Corinthians 13. Above all, the person of Jesus. Here one can speak of a two fold relevance for Christians. On one level, Jesus provides an example to follow, a model for imitation. To ask the question 'What would Jesus do?' does not guarantee a simple answer, but it can be a helpful question to ask. Jesus called on his disciples to imitate his actions: 'If I, then, your Lord and Teacher, have washed your feet, you also ought to wash one another's feet. For I have given you an example, that you also should do as I have done unto you' (John 13:14-15). We look for guidance from the Jesus of history. But on another, arguably more profound level, we look for guidance from the Christ of faith. Christians believe that they have a living relationship with Christ who will guide them, through his Spirit. As Professor C.F.D. Moule has helpfully put it: 'the Bible is not so much a compass or a chart, as directions for finding the Pilot; and he it is who will be to us both compass and chart and will steer us through the shoals' 1 . Sometimes we are so preoccupied with using the Bible to make a better case that we neglect the role it has to play in making us better people. It is concerned with our moral growth and development, as individuals and in community. We are meant to cultivate the fruit of the Spirit, to grow 'to the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ' (Eph. 4:13). Deepened moral understanding should be a natural result of the cultivation of Christian character. There is another type of biblical material which can be included under this heading of portraits: stories about historical persons in the Bible which have a moral character, portraying men and women making critical moral choices. Here it is striking how God's people actually behave in a great variety of ways. One example is the very different responses of Elijah and Obadiah to Ahab's idolatrous rule (see 1 Kings 17 and 18). Elijah's bold defiance of Ahab is well known. His response was one of outspoken criticism and direct confrontation. But another, intriguing character in the story is Obadiah. He is described as a devout God-fearer, but one who still held authority under Ahab 'over the household'. He was then able to use the advantage of 1

C.F.D. Moule, 'The Holy Spirit and Scripture', Epworth Review, 8.2., 1981, p. 73.

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his position to conceal and feed 100 loyal prophets when Jezebel tried to root them out. We can see in this saga two distinctive models of resistance in the face of an evil regime - models which might be applied today to the situation of someone working in a rotten government, company or other organisation. There is the implacable opposition implied by 'coming apart'; there is the more subversive working to mitigate the worst features of a situation from within. Both types of strategy have their justification. How then do we decide which is the model we in particular should be following? I have two brief observations to make on this point. The first is that here questions of ethics shade into questions of vocation. God calls us to different courses of action. Moreover, I suspect what God calls us to is connected with the type of person we are - such as what our strengths and weaknesses are. For instance, some people are able to live with situations of moral ambiguity much better than others. Second, ethical questions do not collapse into questions of vocation. There are limits about what it is legitimate to do in following a particular model. Obadiahs may be commanded to carry out actions which compel them to declare their true colours. What if Ahab had commanded him personally to execute some prophets of the Lord? Obadiah-like discretion has its place, but there are moments when the conflict of loyalties becomes such that it ought to give way to the valour of an Elijah. Second, moral teaching is conveyed through parables. I have in mind principally the parables of Jesus though there are others in the Bible as well. Of course, the main point of a parable is not necessarily a moral one. The parables are often saying something primarily about God, or about the kingdom of God, but implications for our behaviour are usually present. The parables of the Good Samaritan (extending the idea of love of neighbour to include the person traditionally thought of as the enemy) or the unmerciful servant (with its message that we should forgive as our heavenly Father forgives) are obvious examples. Jesus' teaching technique is essentially one of providing us with pictures of how a disciple does and does not behave. These are memorable but also intriguing. In the parable of the talents, is Jesus indicating implicit approval of the practice of financial investment, or is he simply using that as an illustration to make a point about using talents in the non-financial sense in which we have now come to understand the word? What if any moral implications

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should we draw from the parable of the labourers in the vineyard (Matt. 20:1-16)? The main point is undeniably theological, that God makes the same offer of salvation to us all at whatever stage in life we repent. But I have heard different people attempt to draw lessons for industrial practice in three quite different ways: (i) the employer has the right to pay employees what he or she likes; (ii) all employees should be paid the same, whatever they do or however hard they work; (iii) as long as an employer sticks by an agreement with an employee no one else has the right to complain. All of these, in my view, are dubious lines of interpretation, and yet they have value because they stimulate the mind and make one think again about accepted practice in the area of wage differentials. The picture of Jesus the presenter of parables is of a topsy-turvy kind of teacher, not afraid to stand conventional wisdom on its head or give it an unexpected twist. Christians should not simply be in the business of repeating moral commonplaces. There should be a distinctive, which may sometimes mean unusual, flavour to what they have to say. Third, there is the type of material which people most readily associate with the ethical teaching of the Bible: prescriptions. The Bible contains many highly specific commands, instructions, rules, laws, i.e., moral statements taking the imperative form, summed up in the word 'prescriptions'. Take e.g., the Ten Commandments, the heart of the Bible's ethical material as far as many people are concerned. What as Christians are we to make of such material? If we live under grace and have been freed from bondage to the law, are such prescriptions still binding on us? The answer would seem to be that yes, some of them are. The New Testament has its share of solemn prescriptions as well as the Old, and where an Old Testament prescription is reinforced or reaffirmed in the New, its continuing relevance and application seem clear. This is true in general terms of the Ten Commandments. Jesus tested the moral seriousness of the rich young ruler by asking him if he had kept the second half of the Decalogue. There is one of the Ten Commandments, that to keep the Sabbath, which does not seem to be reinforced in the New Testament. Here Jesus displayed a radical liberalism of practice which devout Jews of his day found deeply shocking. His example should free Christians from

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a zealous Sabbatarianism which inhibits them from helping other people and using the day for re-creation, which may very well include recreation! There seems no reason to doubt that keeping one day a week clear from work is good for human beings (in that sense the creation order still holds) but what day it is is not especially important - though obviously the more collective a weekly day of rest is, the greater the chance of it actually bringing refreshment to people. That is a weighty consideration to take into account when it comes to the issue of Sunday trading, which has been a controversial issue in Britain in recent years. Fourth, paradigms. I use this heading as a way of taking seriously those biblical prescriptions which are not reinforced in the New Testament. There are many prescriptions which are found only in one particular part of the Bible (e.g. the Mosaic law), are closely connected with the customs and circumstances of a particular culture, and it is much more problematic whether we should still consider them binding. The Reformers made a distinction between different categories of command in the O T law: ceremonial (laws concerned with ceremonial which clearly apply no longer - e.g., the sacrificial system is now redundant because Jesus's death came to be understood as the one perfect sacrifice for sin), moral (basic moral truths of permanent relevance and validity - e.g., the Decalogue) and civil (laws concerned with the detailed regulation of Israelite society - these are not binding but can still provide a valuable model). I follow Christopher Wright, in his helpful exposition of Old Testament ethics 2 , in thinking that the latter prescriptions are best understood as paradigms, i.e., particular cases which provide a model in the way they illustrate a general principle. Rigid application of the form in which the principle is found may no longer be appropriate, but there is usually scope for reapplication of the principle in a careful and imaginative way. Let us consider briefly the prohibition on charging interest, found in Leviticus 25:3537 but reaffirmed several times in the Old Testament. How should we interpret this in an age when the institutionalisation of interest (and high levels of interest at that) has become a bedrock of our economic system? For the first millennium of its existence the Christian Church roundly condemned the taking of interest, but from medieval times 2

Christopher J . H . Wright, Living as the People of God. The Relevance of Old Testament Ethics, IVP, 1983.

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it came to regard a modest level of interest as acceptable. This was justified initially in terms of compensation to the lender for the risk of damage and the loss of gain which his loan incurred; more recently it has been in terms of maintaining the value of capital in an age of inflation. There is logic in these justifications, and I do not think it either desirable or practicable for Christians to try to turn the clock back 1000 years. However, we must be wary lest we lose sight of what is fundamental to the biblical condemnation of interest, namely, a concern that the poor should not be exploited. This is not a criticism which is valid of all forms of credit in the modern world, but it is one which may well be true of some - the banking practices both of highinterest loans to poor Third World countries and heavily marketed credit cards coming under the ethical microscope at this point.

A Series of Perspectives There is a fifth way in which the Bible helps us in our ethics and that is in terms of a series of perspectives, which I shall treat at rather greater length. How does the area of business fit into the overall scheme of things revealed in the Bible? How does our understanding of the revealed character of God affect the way we look at it? And how does it appear in the light of the great themes of salvation history: creation, fall, redemption and our future hope? First, our doctrine of God. God the Trinity is a God who relates well within himself. Father, Son and Holy Spirit operate together as an immaculate unit, working together for our human good. The idea of persons in community is there right at the heart of the godhead. Is there a similar unity acting in love at the head of our organisations? The different roles played by the three members of the Trinity actually reveal a basic pattern common to most human activity. Every business operation needs planning - careful, imaginative, creative planning. God the Father shows this par excellence. Every business operation needs executing - someone prepared to roll up his sleeves and go out to do what needs to be done, effecting transformation of the situation - Jesus the Son. Every business operation needs good communication - someone who will coordinate the efforts of planner and executive, explain what is going on in the maelstrom of the

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market-place, and help evaluate what has been achieved. This is a more diversified brief but the Holy Spirit is certainly equal to it. Analogies of this sort can become strained. We should not push this one too far. But it is potentially a very exciting thought that in our normal sphere of business operations we are in some sense mirroring the life of God. As we partake in the regular cycle of planning, executing and evaluating, we reveal ourselves to be creatures made in the image of God - not just any God, but a Trinitarian one. There is a pattern present in the world because it was there in God first. And for work to be truly satisfying, it needs to partake to some degree of all three elements. Individuals and groups should never be treated as mere functionaries, but should be given scope for applying creative and critical thought to their activities3. Let us now look at business from the perspective of some of the key events described in the Bible. We start by going back to creation. God's act of creating the world was the first great act of initiative. In it he demonstrated his power and his love. He made a world full of ready-made beauty for human beings with whom he wanted to relate to enjoy. He also gave these human beings both a share in his creativity and an important job to do in 'subduing the earth' which he had made. As Psalm 8:6 says, God made man ruler over the works of his hands. For the world is one which is full of resources that need tapping (extracting, refining, developing) if they are to be used to their full potential. Human beings have a highly creative and responsible role to play in putting these resources to full use. There is a right and proper theology of wealth creation which corresponds to the dignity and honour which God has given to the human race: to our task as stewards of his creation. It is in adding value to God-given resources that the fundamental rationale and justification for business activity lies. In saying this I believe it is still valid to regard manufacturing activity (whether this be the use of old or new technologies) as embodying the quintessential form of business, though clearly service industries such as financial services have an essential supporting role to play.

3

A management consultant who has developed the implications of this in terms of 'Whole Work' is Christian Schumacher. See his To Live and Work: A Theological Interpretation, MARC Europe, 1987.

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At the same time, we need to remember that 'the earth is the Lord's, and all that therein is' (Psalm 24:1). The dominion which God has given men and women over the non-human creation should mean responsible care, not domination and exploitation (though sadly it has often been misinterpreted as the latter). So not every exploit in tapping the world's resources by manufacturing industry is justified. It is appropriate to ask questions such as: Does this pose a threat to the environment? Does this make use of resources which are easily renewable or ones which are in danger of being exhausted? Does its manufacture pose a threat to the health and safety of human beings? It is of course increasingly fashionable to be Green, and Christians certainly don't hold a monopoly of these concerns, but their sense of the world being on trust from God ought to make them especially sensitive to environmental considerations. We move on from creation to the second great stage in salvation history, the episode known as the fall. When I use the word 'fall' this does not mean I am committing myself to the literal nature of the Genesis story about Adam and Eve taking the forbidden fruit. I am using it as a piece of theological shorthand to refer to the fact that human beings have fallen far short of their high calling and deviate from God's purposes for them and his world in a great variety of ways. They do this of course in every area of life, in the most intimate of relationships as well as the more impersonal. But since the area of life under scrutiny is business, it is important to face up honestly to some of the less attractive ('fallen') aspects of business: * The fact that increased profit - rapidly and incessantly increasing profit - can become an idol that threatens to subvert all else; * The fact that asset strippers can become so blind to the human cost involved in their buying and selling of companies; * The fact that pockets of the business world can develop where people become constitutionally dishonest, hiding true thoughts and feelings in the interest of "getting on" - where you manipulate the situation to try to ensure you get the credit when things go well, and to avoid the blame when they don't 4 ;

4

F o r a vivid, well documented description of this in action, see Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers, O U P , 1988.

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The fact that managers can sometimes bury themselves behind a desk or a secretary and make themselves thoroughly insensitive to the needs of those around them; * The fact that people can develop a highly schizophrenic attitude to life, where they participate in patterns of behaviour at work which they would never tolerate outside it, like the accountant who teaches his children impeccable standards of honesty at home, but may be routinely involved in massaging company's accounts. But the fall isn't just reflected in human deviousness and deliberate perversity. It is evident in the imbalances and distortions seen in the world of work, in what is sometimes called structural sin, where it is more difficult to pinpoint individual blame. It is a mark of the world's fallenness that societies struggle to get a good balance between the numbers of people able and willing to work and the number of jobs available; or the fact that most people are either over-worked or underworked, with few enjoying that happy balance between the two. A sad irony of the present situation, where there is heavy pressure on companies to cut costs by carrying out large-scale redundancies, is that those left in work (especially in management positions) are often working shockingly long hours to compensate for colleagues who have departed. There again, the Bible depicts the fall as affecting work in its very essence. And so the earth does not only produce corn and vines, it bears thorns and thistles. Work involves painful toil. Despite the advances made by modern technology, it seems impossible to avoid some element of hard, grinding work, of tedious monotonous routine, in most types of job. Perhaps it is because of some of the more objectionable features of work that many Christians both outside and within the business world feel uncomfortable. Those who are outside carp and criticise (often, in my view, hypocritically); those who are inside feel guilty and powerless. They gloomily acknowledge that business practice manifests the marks of the fallen world all too easily but feel that there is little which can be done about it. But I have also come across Christians who go to the opposite extreme. Taking their stand on a theology of wealth creation, they end up with a bland affirmation of nearly everything industry gets up to. I have rather had that feeling at some very prestigious meetings about business ethics which I have attended in London: the captains of industry reassuring each other that everything they do is thoroughly honourable. Where both groups go astray, in my view,

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is this: neither actually operates f r o m a Christian (as distinct f r o m an O l d Testament) understanding. They have an imbalanced theological perspective. Whether one's theology is dominated by creation or fall and even if it contains elements of both, it also needs the N e w Testament perspectives of redemption and future hope in order to display a truly Christian understanding. So I move on, thirdly, to the Christian doctrine of salvation or redemption. It may well be asked what on earth this has to do with the world of business. The answer is, if we think carefully, a great deal. First, it sets before us fairly and squarely the ideal of service. Jesus Christ is one w h o was in the form of G o d but 'emptied himself, taking the f o r m of a servant' and 'humbled himself, even to death on a cross' (Philippians 2:7-8). Christians are called to be emulators of a Master w h o said Ί am among you as one w h o serves' (Luke 22:27). We are here to serve G o d and to serve our fellow-humans - and that includes the men and women we meet in the sphere of work. This should not, indeed, be a totally alien concept: the phrase 'serving the customer' is one which passes a businessman's lips often enough. Indeed, many management theories go further n o w and talk about delighting the customer, so perhaps we are all in for a good time in the future! However, the question which such language raises is: what is the relationship between service and profit? D o we serve others only because it serves our o w n or the company's self-interest? Certainly, profit is a very necessary means for the running of a successful enterprise. Because it is so necessary, it is very easy for it to become the predominant matter of concern - both for large companies worried about the response of shareholders, and for small firms struggling to survive. Nevertheless, the Christian view is that profit should have secondary status as a means rather than being an end in itself. Service is at the heart of our calling, and we should not forget it. Second, taking the life and ministry of Christ seriously sets before us the possibilities of a new start. Redemption means deliverance f r o m the power of evil, passing f r o m darkness into light, a new beginning: all the metaphors used in the N e w Testament about the salvation G o d has wrought in Christ have a stark, radical quality. Life on earth will always partake of the character of the fall, but that does not mean

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nothing can be done to change all the unsatisfactory things about business. So the effects of change within a Christian should be felt on the place where he or she works. Christians are not meant to hide their lights under a bushel; they are meant to be salt and light, enhancing their surroundings and pointing the way towards something better. They have a crucial role to play in influencing companies and organisations for good. But there is no room for being naively triumphalistic about this. Such influence is not automatically welcomed or accepted. Third, and following on from this, for the world to be saved, Christ had to die. Radical improvement is not possible without cost. Individuals have to be willing to change, including self-sacrificial change, if business is to be run in the way God desires. And radical change is likely to be resisted by all who stand to gain from maintenance of the status quo, the way things are run at present. What this points to is that there are actions in business which have quasi-redemptive character. They show the marks of costly Christlikeness. Here are some possible examples of such action. 1. It could be the person who takes the blame on behalf of others in the organisation, e.g., the technical service engineer who says 'I'm sorry' in the face of a customer complaining of faulty goods or a late delivery. H e could say 'it wasn't me, it was them back at the works' but he reconciles the customer (and so redeems the situation) by taking the blame vicariously. This can involve very real suffering, especially if he finds himself doing it repeatedly. If the person involved has a living relationship with Christ and can look to his example, he is more likely to find the resources to be sustained in this uncomfortable scapegoat role. 2. But taking responsibility for the mistakes of others should not be something anyone has to put up with indefinitely. Radical change might mean a lower tolerance level of mistakes, because one is genuinely concerned to serve the customer better. And so a managing director may have a quasi-redemptive role in sweeping the evil represented by complacency with low standards and indifference to customer needs out of the system - a policy which is almost certainly to the company's benefit, but may still provoke considerable resistance, and bring considerable flak upon himself. Here the biblical image which springs to mind may be something more like Jesus sweeping the money-changers out of the temple.

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3. It might mean a willingness to go it alone, as Jesus did, in taking the stand for something in which you believe. It might mean a refusal to pay bribes when trying to win contracts in certain Third World countries. It might mean owning up to the fact that a product is faulty when all one's colleagues are denying or covering it up. It might mean resisting a trend towards taking short cuts with matters affecting employee and public safety. It might mean working for a more just structure in the company. Going against the stream in these and other ways will not be easy. It could lead to resignation or being asked to resign. It will often appear to have little effect in the short term but it may sow the seeds for a change in policy in the long term. Christians are sometimes surprised to discover that, when they stand up for their convictions, others actually respect them for it. Their courage earns them respect and provides an opportunity for Christian witness. Others may even be grateful for someone willing to take a moral lead (act as the company's conscience?) and then be prepared to follow. The redemptive character of Christian vocation in the world is superbly expressed by Paul in Romans 12:2: ' D o not be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewal of your mind, that you may prove the will of G o d , what is good and acceptable and perfect'. Finally, there is the doctrine of our future hope. Ultimately our hope of salvation, of the full coming of the Kingdom of G o d , lies beyond this world. Only in a 'new heaven and new earth' will the effects of the fall be fully reversed. The Bible contains some vivid pictures of what this will be like: Isaiah 65, where everyone lives to a good old age, the animals get on peacefully together and there is an end to the expropriation of people's property; or Romans 8, with the creation being liberated from bondage to decay and being brought into the glorious freedom of the children of God. We are still a long way off that at the moment. We live in the 'in between' period, praying that G o d ' s kingdom will come, that his will should be done on earth as perfectly as it already is in heaven. We are called to bring the present world more into conformity with that glorious future age. And in the world of business we may get glimpses of it. The glow of satisfaction over a finished product, one which has taken a lot of time and effort to achieve; the unravelling of manipulative accounting practice, so that the true state of financial affairs is clearly revealed; the clicking together of individuals in a close-knit

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team; the breakdown of hierarchical structures which have impeded progress and the establishment of genuine respect between blue and white collar workers. All these and other things are worth striving for, and it is exciting when substantial progress is made in the direction of any one of them. But though this future element to our faith inspires hope, it should also serve as a warning not to expect conditions approaching Utopia in the present world. There is a twofold thrust to eschatology. In the first volume of his vast Theological Ethics, the Lutheran theologian Helmut Thielicke pointed out that as Christians we stand in a field of tension between two overlapping ages, the present world which is one day to pass away and the coming world which will replace it and already makes inroads upon it5. Christians are called out of their old lives into a new existence, but still have to live in a far from perfect world with all the circumscriptions upon action which that brings. There are times when we have to accept things which are not satisfactory, which we would like to change but it is outside our power to do so. And so there may be times when it is right to compromise, to make some concession to the fallen realities of this world - at the same time looking for a compromise which is creative and holds out hope for something better in the future. 'Be as wise as serpents and as innocent as doves', said Jesus as he sent out his disciples on a missionary journey (Matthew 10:16). They seem to me very appropriate words for a Christian business person also, combining that mixture of idealism tempered by realism, high principle laced with shrewdness, which are just the attitudes he needs. Christians help neither their firm nor their witness by being naive, but they need to be prepared to stand up and be counted on matters of principle. The quality of wisdom is required to know what those crucial matters are, because not every dubious issue is a resignation issue.

Love, Justice and

Integrity

There is a fifth type of moral guidance which the Bible provides, one which the Bible itself sometimes highlights but which also emerges as 5

See Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics Vol. I: Foundations, A & C Black, 1966, ch. 4.

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one takes seriously the other ways I have mentioned, namely, principles. A principle is a norm which asserts a moral quality which ought to be present, not just in one particular act, but across a whole range of acts. It is, I think, near synonymous with the word 'value' which is becoming increasingly popular in the business world. In my book Dilemmas'3 I have suggested that there are two primary values which are the foundation for all others, and which are not often mentioned in a business context: love and justice. Jesus picked out the two Old Testament commands 'love of God' and 'love of neighbour' and said 'on these depend all the law and the prophets'. Justice is another theme which shines powerfully through the prophets' teaching, and is identified by Jesus in Matt. 23:23 as one of 'the weightier matters of the law'. I define love as a disposition which delights in other people and wills the best for them. Something of love is expressed in the care and respect for others which is increasingly finding its way into business language. The important Christian contributions are to check that these are not empty words, and to stress that love is universal: Jesus reinterpreted love of neighbour to mean even love of the enemy, a fact which suggests even competitors should be included among the various groups (shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, and the community at large) to whom companies are increasingly acknowledging responsibility. A universal understanding of love supports the breadth of approach this represents, while accepting that it can make moral decisions harder rather than easier, because sometimes these different groups will have clashing interests. The right approach then is surely to hang in and try to balance different interests rather than completely abandon one group in favour of another. Justice too is a far from simple concept to apply to business. Its importance in a business context is to keep in view some of the wider issues within an organisation, notably pay and structure. To keep questions of justice on the agenda is to take seriously issues concerning the comparative treatment of individuals, the balance of power between different groups within a corporate body (not least who owns the company), the relationship between different institutions within a

6

Richard Higginson, Dilemmas: A Christian Approach to Moral Hodder & Stoughton, 1988.

Decision-Making,

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society, and - yet more broadly - between different countries in one world. Love and justice, then, are primary, but there are also many other values (each of which can be related to these primary principles) which are of relevance in the business world. I once did an exercise with some businessmen on one of our seminars and we came up with 50. Several may be relevant to any one particular situation. I would highlight the importance of principles to the point of making Identify the vital

principles Stage Three in my proposed ethical method. Important though it is for Christians to approach questions of business ethics from a theological perspective, they need to be able to talk about such questions in a language understandable to all. In communicating with and seeking to persuade non-Christians, they are obliged most of the time - to talk the same moral language. This brings me to discussion of a word which is widely used in business parlance today:

integrity. During the seminars run on Issues of Leadership I have carried out an exercise borrowed from J o h n Adair's book Effective Leadership7. Adair invites readers to rank 25 attributes in order of 'most valuable at the top level of management'. H e tried this on some top executives and they ranked integrity third, behind only 'Ability to take decisions' and 'Capacity to lead people'. O n both the occasions I carried out the exercise, participants' aggregate score was to put integrity first. Whether managers are Christian or non-Christian, there is increasing recognition that integrity is a crucial quality in what their job is all about; but our findings - limited statistical sample though they represent - suggest that it is likely to be prized particularly highly by Christians. What does integrity mean? Clearly it implies high moral standards. I think it carries connotations of honesty, consistency and public defensibility. B y the latter phrase I mean that the person with integrity is willing and able to defend an action taken without embarrassment in public. It does not mean that one always does what is 'nice' or what is popular; but the leader with integrity usually carries respect, because others recognise the worthiness of his or her motives. An example given by one leading businessman, formerly a senior manager with a major international chemicals company, poses inter7

John Adair, Effective Leadership, Pan Books, 1983, pp. 12-13 and 201.

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esting questions about integrity. Multi-national companies are often criticised for selling things to the Third World which they would not sell in the West (indeed, might not be allowed to). To the outsider this looks like a case of unscrupulous exploitation, and indeed, in some cases, I have no doubt that it is. But this businessman argued that a cheap pesticide which has been banned in Europe, partly because it degrades very slowly in our climate, may actually be just the thing needed when a locust invasion hits an African country where it degrades more quickly. For those Africans in that situation starvation, not pesticide poisoning, is the greater threat. Where a convincing defence can be made of such an action a manager or leader may still be said to be acting with integrity. The position which surely lacks integrity is where a company's professed stance is at odds with the actual practice of what people do out in the field: to quote a phrase used by J.K. Galbraith, this is 'institutional truth which ignores reality'. Company mission statements which give pride of place to integrity set managers an excellent ideal; where organisations are not always so helpful is in fleshing out what this means in specific situations. Stage Four is this: Evaluate priorities. I wrote earlier that a typical Christian response should be to try to balance the valid claims exercised by different groups. But clearly there is no way one is going to be able to please everybody all of the time. Business people have to make hard decisions. And often the decision will involve putting different principles or values in an order of priority. What if any useful advice has the Christian ethicist got to offer on this score? Four brief comments follow. 1. Prioritisation can never be divorced from specific context. I do not think it possible to construct a systematic, timeless hierarchy of duties: nobody to my knowledge has drawn up a plausible league table of moral obligations. There are too many circumstantial variables. For instance, a chemicals company forced to cut costs might have to choose between saving jobs and reducing its pollution of rivers. It has to place two worthy objects, keeping people employed and contributing to a cleaner environment, in an order of priority. In a period of rocketing unemployment it might be more important to save the jobs; in an era of escalating pollution it might be more important to clean the rivers. The context in which the decision is made rightly affects the evaluation of priorities.

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2. When faced by a dilemma, we too readily assume that there are only two possible courses of action. We need to recognise that there may be possibilities other than those which spring instantly to mind. In the above instance, the chemicals company might be able to make significant cuts in areas which do not infringe an important value. We need to exercise creativity and imagination, and not allow ourselves to be impaled on the sharp horns of a dilemma too easily. 3. Nevertheless, there will be times when action we find painful is necessary. It seems right to make someone redundant. O r in order to pull a company round a managing director finds there is no alternative but to work 70 hours a week, bad though that is for our marriage and family life. In such situations, it is vital that we do not act in such a way that we seem to have turned our back on the individuals who will suffer. We may be able to help redundant employees to find another job, or arrange for their retraining. We need to keep the lines of communication with family alive, and maybe compensate by spending additional time with them once the intense period of pressure is over. Christians must work at being positive even when they feel they're being negative. 4. Many ethical problems in business revolve around questions of honesty. Deals, mistakes, or unpleasant truths are covered up because of the fear of how the other party will react. It is often assumed that telling a customer or colleague something that is unpalatable will lead to rejection, with all the dire consequences that may follow. O f course it may, but I would still like to offer a challenge: are we inclined to overestimate the necessity of being devious? Openness is a trait which is generally appreciated; openness breeds trust.

Having the Mind of Christ Stage Five, which is of course much more difficult to do than to say, is to Think an issue through to a judgement. Apply the principles to the facts in the light of the guidance received, evaluate one's priorities, and think the matter through. Here I would like to say more about the spiritual context in which the Christian business person makes his or her ethical choices: namely, a relationship with God. At the end of a business ethics seminar which I ran at a flourishing commuter church in the south of England, one

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participant made a very shrewd observation: that a lot of the decisions which are taken in business involve matters of very fine judgment, a highly delicate balance of responsibilities, and we may often have to act not completely sure of whether what we are doing is the right thing. N o w one might think that being a Christian actually makes the situation more difficult: our ethical sensitivity may well be greater and we may be uncomfortably conscious of the fact that we are ultimately accountable to G o d for the many actions, good and bad, which have followed from our many choices, good and bad. Against this, we need to remember the following: 1. Paul says that the person who is indwelt by the H o l y Spirit has 'the mind of Christ' (1 Corinthians 2). This is tremendously heartening. It may be that in looking to the H o l y Spirit for guidance a clear message which radically simplifies decision-making will come. There is no guarantee of this, but let us not shut ourselves off immediately from the possibility! 2. Even when we do not seem to get clear guidance, we need to remember that at the end of the day we are justified, not by works, but by G o d ' s grace. O u r relationship with G o d and our standing before him do not depend on the rightness or wrongness of our moral decisions. G o d looks upon the heart, and because we know his heart is merciful, we need not fear him as judge. 3. It may be that when confronted by a difficult moral dilemma, the Christian feels that whatever decision he takes contains an element of sin. N o w it could be that in feeling this he is suffering from an oversensitive conscience, that he is actually taking the best possible course to extract himself or others from a messy situation which is not of his making, but no matter: if sin is felt, the wise thing to do is to confess it. 'Sin boldly, but believe even more boldly and rejoice in Christ!' is a memorable quote from Luther which may be highly relevant to certain business dilemma situations 8 . The important thing is not to be paralysed by guilt, but to have courage to go forward, to do whatever one conscientiously believes is the least evil (or most good) thing to do, secure in the promise of G o d ' s forgiveness. 4. Too often when making difficult decisions we isolate ourselves from the companionship, support and potentially good advice of other 8

This was a phrase used by Luther in a letter to Philip Melanchthon of August 1, 1521.

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people. A revealing aspect about the seminar mentioned above was how many individuals there were in similar types of work (notably the insurance field) but how little they had hitherto talked to each other about their work. They were grappling with similar problems, but had failed to use their collective resources in discussing these problems. One of the most important lessons that the Japanese have to teach us is a readiness to be interdependent, something we stubborn independent Westerners find very difficult to put into practice. But interdependence is surely as relevant to wrestling with complex moral decisions as it is to other areas of work. It is taking seriously the corporate dimension to our humanity implicit in the New Testament doctrine of the church as the body of Christ. And it is at this point that the worship of the church may have a very important role to play. Is it worship which encourages that sort of interdependence, through the relevance of its preaching, the inclusiveness of its prayer, the world-affirming nature of its celebration and the warmth of its fellowship? 9

9

The themes of this essay are developed in greater detail in Richard Higginson, to Account, Eagle and Highland, 1993.

Called

Part IV Integrity

Worship and True or False Narrative Peter H. Sedgwick

Introduction In this article I wish to explore the implications of a quotation from Isidore of Pelusium given by Charles Gore in Church and Ministry seventy years ago in 1919. "There is this difference betwixt the ecclesiastical ministers or magistrates, and the ministers or magistrates of state; if these offend, the whole world can distinguish betwixt their persons and their functions; no disparagement falleth upon any but the offenders. But if ecclesiastical persons become obnoxious, then they confound their persons and their functions, and transfer the shame of the faults of some even upon all, yea upon the whole order itself." 1 N o w it is true that the authority of the modern state is more questioned than when Gore wrote in 1919. Habermas's exploration of the legitimation crisis of government in modern capitalist societies has been all too little studied by theologians. Yet Gore is, I feel, correct. We can distinguish between the corrupt politician or civil servant, and the State which they serve. A corrupt minister, or still worse a corrupt group of clergy, transfers shame "upon the whole order itself." The Renaissance Popes live long in the memory as a discrediting of the medieval Church which they ruled. They were magnificent patrons of the arts, but they were corrupt, venial and proud. Perhaps this does not apply to them all, but the popular image does not distinguish this quite so carefully.

1

Isidore of Pelusium. Epist it Í 2 (paraphrased by G. Hickes. Dignity of Episcopal Order in Treatises ii 288, Oxford 1847) cited C. Gore. Church and Ministry, p. 82, 1919.

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I wish to proceed in this essay in four theses. First, the Anglican understanding of ecclesiology will be spelt out from the beginning of this century. Unlike the Confessio Augustana Article 7, it has always included for many Anglican theologians a stress on the visible nature of the Church, comprising word and sacrament; order and internal relationships; and external relationship to society. Secondly, I will allude briefly to the eschatological and narrative understandings of some recent Christian ethics, which relate ethics closely to the nature of the Church. Such writers as Hauerwas, Ogletree, Braaten and Pannenberg are important here. Thirdly, and in the fourth section, I wish to explore the pathology of the Church in worship and in internal relationships. If it is granted that a true theology of the Church includes a judgement about the visible relationships within and without the Church; and if a Christian ethic is in any way related to the nature of the Church, then, if as well the Church's functions are discredited by the persons who serve them, shame falls upon the ethical witness. The Church, as I will seek to show, tells a false story or narrative, and its ethic is compromised. What the implications are for a Christian witness in society by a Church with false worship, broken internal relationships and a compromised attitude to society, can be seen in many examples of Church history. Schism, declining membership and opposition to the Church are one outcome; but so too is a Church apparently successful in terms of membership and prestige, yet attacked by the prophet, such as S. Kierkegaard or R. Niebuhr. This is a theoretical essay, not an historical one, but the implications can be seen in many forms. Donald MacKinnon used to ask his students what they thought of those Roman Catholics who would not receive communion in Spain during the Civil War as a protest against the Church's support of the terror of General Franco. Thus an alternative title for this paper could be 'Guernica and Catholic Worship in Spain, 1938.'

Anglican Ecclesiology and the Visible

Church

Charles Gore, noted Michael Ramsey, was one of the dominant Anglican theologians at the beginning of the twentieth century. 2 His doctrine of the Church was, said Ramsey, built on "broad foundations. 2

A. M. Ramsey. From Gore to Temple, 1960.

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The essential role of apostolic succession was in his mind bound up with other questions: the nature of Christianity as the religion of an institutional church, the role of all the members within that society, and the means of their unity with Christ and with one another." 3 Already we can see the corporate nature of Anglican ecclesiology. Catholicism for Gore meant the way of seeing Christianity as "the establishment of a visible society as the one divinely constituted home of the great salvation." The Church was the new Israel: a new covenant established a universal society. H e appealed to Aristotle for a justification of this view of the Church as a social fellowship, speaking of the "social sacraments of regeneration." 4 At its best the N e w Testament revealed a "strong corporate discipline exercised by each local church" with a "high level of spiritual, moral and social life." 5 This meant that Gore was deeply aware of how the Church could become corrupt. Ramsey describes Gore's attacks on the Church's "worldliness, arrogance, moral distortion; neglect of the living word of God in the Scriptures." 6 Gore both judged the Church and defended its true nature as the revelation of human society as it was meant to be. Thus Gore also developed a pathology of the Church. The English Anglican Church was worldly and morally compromised, with much unthinking affluence and little corporate sense; the Roman Catholic Church perverted the inner relationships of the Church by its elevation of the Pope to a semi-divine position and by an authority which crushed the intellect; the Reformation Churches repudiated divine authority altogether and tended to be fissiparous, although they had once defended Scripture against a corrupt tradition and vindicated spiritual liberty against ecclesiastical tyranny. Gore never denied that the Spirit could use the Churches, but argued that they were deeply corrupt. 7 Gore, of course, was an Anglican Bishop himself for many years. H e called for the ending of the establishment of the Anglican Church in England, much as MacKinnon and others were to do sev-

3

ibid p. 117.

4 C. Gore. Church and Ministry, p. 43, 1919. 5 Gore. Christ and Society, p. 91, 1928 and Catholicism 1923. 6

Ramsey, p. 113.

7 C. Gore. Orders and Unity, p. 184, 1980.

and Roman Catholicism,

p. 1,

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enty years later.8 Above all he wished for ecclesiology to be related to the theme of judgement, and for ordinary Church life to be aware that the Churches did not minister as they should. Yet Gore resisted the idea that the link between the inward and the outward, the spiritual and the material, the "principle of the Incarnation" could be questioned by the failure of the outward and the material. Although he quoted Isidore, he would not accept the conclusions. He offered the traditional defences against doubting the ministry of the Church: the validity of orders depends on the authority of the Church, not the other way round, thus citing Augustine against Cyprian; secondly, Christ obeyed the Jewish law despite the failure of Scribes and Pharisees, and in Matthew 23,2-3 specifically distinguished between obedience and imitation of the Pharisees; and the inevitability of moral failure in any visible community, which should be met by discipline and reform. 9 But others were not so sure. T.A. Lacey in Unity and Schism (1917) explored the question of how valid any church's ministry was once it was in schism with another. So too O. Quick argued that a divided church meant that the validity of orders was only a matter of degree. He wrote that once it is admitted that orders are at all impaired there was injury to the "healthy activity of the whole body." The representation of the whole Church is no longer a reality in each congregation, the will of Christ is hindered, and something essential to ordination is no longer fully present. Quick went no further than this, for he realised quite well that the concept of sacramental validity implied an outward sign, gave a "pledge, guarantee or means of assurance." Once that was questioned, "everything is made uncertain and indefinite, and the whole point and meaning of the term vanishes in a mist of doubt and confusion. Such a situation would be intolerable." 10 Quick had argued himself into a paradox. He insisted that this was the situation and it was intolerable; and yet there were still "fully real or valid" Sacraments in the Church. His argument began from division in the Church, but it could also have moved in the same direction by 8

T.A. Langford. In Search

of Foundations

English

Theology,

1900-1920.

p.

150,

1969. A . O . Dyson 'Reflections on F o u r Church and State Reports' in ed G. Moyser Church 9

and Politics Today, 1985.

Orders and Ministry, p. 81.

10 O . Quick. The Christian

Sacraments,

pp. 144-5, 1944.

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considering the faults Gore complained of. Quick ultimately fell back on the theology of representation in the Sacraments. They represent a universal grace which is there in the person receiving them already. 11 Other Anglican theologians could be cited as well as Gore, Lacey and Quick. R. C. Moberly's Ministerial Priesthood (1897), related the pastoral office of the minister to the Sacraments. Once again the implication of relating a doctrine of the Church to a broader definition than 'word and sacrament' is that this definition of the Church in pastoral and liturgical terms can fail. "Eucharistie leadership, truly understood, involves many corollaries of spirit and life - the bearing of the people on the heart before God; the earnest effort of intercessory entreating; the practical translation of intercession into pastoral life, and anxiety, and pain." 12 These actions are "necessary elements" in the inward, spiritual reality of sacramental worship and ministerial leadership in the Eucharist. Without them the highest point of mystical reality in the executive role of the minister is "as the shell or the shadow." It is only a "technical enacting" of priesthood on behalf of the congregation. Elsewhere Moberly explored the difference between the assumption of, inchoate capacity of, witness to, the reality of free will in human personality, and a true Christian definition of free will, which is "the capacity in me of a perfect response, of personal will and personal character, to God . . . Free will is . . . his self-realisation in perfect dependence . . . is his self-identity with goodness." 13 Obedience, even in worship, is never an end in itself. Goodness is expressed in the internal relations of the Church, in its external witness and in worship. But in itself it is the nature of God which is expressed in human life. The perfection of God is related to the identity of the self, and of the Church. The relationship to Professor Hardy's argument is clear. The goodness of God in creation is ontological, not temporal, and expresses the continuity of blessing, mediated through the social symbols of baptism and Eucharist, which are communitycreating actions. As Moberly put it, moving by imagery in a sermon given in an Oxford hospital from the beauty of the flower at a sick bed to the health of a person; to the inner health of a person even when outwardly dying; to the nourishment of the inner health by

11 ibid p. 112. 12 R.C. Moberly. Ministerial Priesthood, p. 260, 1913. 13 R.C. Moberly. Atonement and Personality, pp. 220-6, 1907.

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the Communion service, "(the Communion service) was at once the most practical and the most inclusive, and profound, and constraining of realities. It swept in, and summed up, and symbolised, the whole reality of the transfigured life." And the existence of the beauty of creation gives witness to that complete realisation of blessing which the Communion service is the earnest of. 1 4 Therefore this section has demonstrated that Gore, Q u i c k and Moberly were all aware of the relationship of ecclesiology to the quality of the Christian life. All of them wrote on the necessity of a high internal life of the Church, and all equally described the failure of the Church. Moberly gave a subtle account of the consequences of moral failure, and Q u i c k in the ecumenical sphere could write on the validity of sacraments being a matter of degree. This landed him in a mire of paradoxes which he attempted to extricate himself from. N o n e of them however moved on to consider what could constitute a falsification of Christianity itself. In the last two sections of this essay I will attempt to do this in the spheres of internal relationships and worship. Before this, however, the nature of ecclesiology must be juxtaposed with that of Christian ethics.

Ethics as an Ecclesial Function In his volume Christian Existence Today15 Professor Hauerwas speaks of the Church as G o d ' s new language. The Church is constituted by word and sacrament, and in it the story of G o d ' s new creation is not only told but enacted. H e makes the point that the Church cannot tell the story without becoming part of the tale. Indeed, he suggests that the teller and the tale are one. The Church is created by G o d as the healing of our separation, and thus the narrative on which theological reflection may proceed both includes texts qua texts and the ecclesial context in which those texts are set. The ecclesial context is made up of concrete people who are formed by the authority of Scripture. Without this recognition, it is possible that hermeneutical theory will so develop that theories of textual interpretation replace ecclesiological theory altogether. In the erection of sophisticated explanations of the 14 R . C . Moberly. 'The Flower' in Christ Our Life, 1902. 15 S. Hauerwas. Christian Existence Today, 1990.

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structural and semiotic significance of the text for its readers, a world of meaning is created in which the erection itself becomes a tour de force, and the experience of the pilgrim people of God is forgotten. Professor Hauerwas makes the claim that narrative works within a community. So it is a false dichotomy to see narrative either as a transcendental quality of experience or as a literary form for interpreting texts. He correctly notes that the mistake in this division is to ignore the nature of the Church. The Church is the presence of the Spirit, the carrier of the tradition which interprets the Scriptural text and makes it accessible here and now. The Church thus is created by the presence of the Spirit (it is clearly not the case that the two can be equated directly) and is that community receptive to the preaching of the Word. The sermon proclaims the nature of the Christian story to a community, and it presupposes the existence of that receptive community as it creates it in the act of preaching. As Hauerwas notes, the story is not self-referential back to the world of meaning of the text, as it were a language game private to a small group of participants who appreciate the rules, but is about the redemption of all creation, and creates a community capable of witnessing to that fact. So narrative is neither a transcendental quality of human experience nor a literary form, but refers to the existence of a community from where the story is told; to the story itself in textual form; and to the community as a character within the wider story which goes beyond the text: the story of the redemption of humanity, and of creation which includes humanity. But if the Church mediates between theories of narrative as literary form and theories of narrative as transcendental categories by being itself the narrator of literary texts and yet also being an embodiment of transcendental categories, it also plays its part in making that narrative intelligible. Here I turn to the central theme of this essay. If a narrative is related, it is possible to tell the story in a true or false way. Newman's theory of real and notional assent showed how it was possible for a belief to be held in a way which expressed no real commitment to that belief. Narrative can be falsified in a different way. If the narrative functions as part of a discourse which denies the free response of the audience, it loses its authenticity. What is crucial is whether the narrative is part of authoritative communication, between Church and society. If a Church presents its views as one plausible reading of what it means to be human, it may be interesting but it

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will lose any claim to give an account of h o w things ultimately are. But if it forces its audience to accept its views because it does not respect that audience, it becomes a Church which seeks power and not authority. Thus the telling of the tale is falsified by the way the story coerces its audience. Thus m y central concern is h o w a proper understanding of the Church can mediate between a general account of narrative as giving transcendental significance to human self-understanding, in which Christian narrative is but one plausible account of reality, and a particular account of narrative whereby the Christian texts are the sole concern of the theologian, and Christian truth is equated with (one might say reduced to) interpretative theory. But if a proper ecclesiology can mediate between these two positions, in ways suggested by Hauerwas, so too the Church can destroy the narrative altogether. It is self-deception, or false discourse. It has been a perennial theme of Anglican moralists, most notably Bishop Butler of D u r h a m (16921752), several of whose sermons are on the deceitfulness of David (with Bathsheba) and Balaam. "If people will be wicked, they had better of the two be so f r o m the common vicious passions . . . than f r o m this deep and calm source of delusion which undermines the whole principle of good" (Sermon 10, para 16). Many recent writers on ethics have also written on the relationship of ecclesiology and eschatological ethics, such as Pannenberg, Braaten, and Ogletree. 1 6 Pannenberg's debate with Ebeling drove Pannenberg to derive the ethical and political requirements of the Gospel f r o m the liturgy. Pannenberg echoes the W C C document Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry, especially the well-known para. 25 of the Eucharist statement. ("The Eucharistie celebration . . . is a constant challenge in the search for appropriate relationships in social, economic and political life.") Pannenberg's view of the Eucharist is that it symbolises the coming Kingdom not only in communion with Jesus but also in anticipating a restored social harmony. This then must be cashed out via notions of distributive justice into a critique of the existing social order, and so into social action. 17

16 See my article, 'Recent Christian Ethics', Scottish Journal of Theology, vol. 41-3, p. 397, 1988. 17 W. Pannenberg. Christian spirituality and Sacramental Community, pp. 46-47, 1983.

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Likewise, T.W. Ogletree sees liturgy as transformed by eschatology, with a concrete vision of a community taking shape in the world. This community is not only oriented to the future, but also is concerned to survive in the present age. He writes, "If Christian ethics is to incorporate the eschatological impulses of the New Testament it must give far more attention than is presently customary to the life of the Church and its ministry . . . the Church is a fellowship in which the fundamental equality of all people is clearly acknowledged. The equality is rooted in the solidarity of people in both sin and grace. The poor, the disabled, the outcast are not only wholly welcome to share in this solidarity; they represent its essential meaning." 18 Some might question the rigorous note of "essential", but the general point is clear. We have seen that there is a close relationship between the integrity of the Church, explored in the first section, and the validity of the Christian ethical claim. Both Stanley Hauerwas in his narrative theology, Wolfhart Pannenberg and T.W. Ogletree all relate ethics and liturgy together. Therefore, the question must be pressed further, returning to the concerns of Gore, Moberly and Quick in the first section: what is the implication of the corruption of the Church for Christian ethics? I turn to the third section, on internal relationships within the Church.

Relations Within the Church

Community

In a recent Anglican document on training for ordained ministry, the working party (chaired by Professor Hardy) listed the issues which such a project would require. They write, The central issue is how a new social order is re-established by G o d ' s activity within the damaged order of existence and in the world, and how this is to be made possible in the present circumstances of the world. A number of questions would require careful consideration: how is this new social order formed through the redemptive activity of G o d , how is it structured in its life, how is it realised through the relationships which constitute the Church, how are these maintained and spread through corporate and ordained ministry? 18 T. W. Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, p. 185, 1983. See also Carl E. Braaten. Eschatology and Ethics, 1974.

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The document points out that the disciplines of Church history, worship, ethics, sociology and psychology all matter in this approach, but that coordination of these disciplines must be balanced by "concern for - and practice in - the positive practical task of forming and animating a new social order." 19 But it is possible for the enterprise to fail. Donald MacKinnon has written of the bigotry, arrogance and evil temper of much AngloCatholic treatment of non-Anglicans in their relationships with them this century, in a lecture commemorating Charles Gore. H e described "The deadly evils which characterised the Anglo-Catholicism of the early 'forties which I have mentioned (and they were deadly evils and are such still where they remain)." "The temper of exclusion encourages men to think of membership of Christ's Body after the manner of the claim Civis Romanus sum. In Anglo-Catholicism it was a claim that by such membership men stood at the heart and centre of history and thus, after the likeness of a sharply exclusive citizenship, were the superiors of all lesser breeds without the law." The irony of this lecture is profound. Gore, Moberly and others were deeply aware of how the Church can fail. MacKinnon demonstrates how their successors brought about such a corruption, in a lecture in honour of Gore himself. 20 What MacKinnon is describing is a power relationship. It may work across Churches, in ecumenical dialogue and relationships (or the perversion of them), or inside Churches. But it remains the "cultivation of the status of invulnerability" in MacKinnon's words - and that is a power relationship. What is a power statement and how does it differ from one which attempts to convey an authoritative account of an event, relationship or concept? Authoritative accounts are statements which create an inner feeling of certainty within the listener so that truth is revealed in and through what is communicated. The value of the Church is that it is where learned obedience to authoritative truth can be worked out. It is not the case that what is authoritative can only be told within the Church, but rather that the Church is where such a response is 19 Report of the Working Party on Assessment, October 1985. ACCM Occasional Paper No. 22, 1986. 20 Kenosis and Establishment - The Gore Memorial Lecture, 5 November 1968, reprinted in D.M. MacKinnon. The Stripping of the Altars, Collins 1969.

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made. But the learning of that response and the telling of the tale are two sides of one coin. Where the response is forced, the tale may as well not be told at all. The learning of the response is one which takes time: it is like the nurturing of the human family from the birth of a child to its adulthood. To speak of the Church as the family of G o d draws attention to the slow, and laborious, creation of common trust and relationships within a family. A family is not a contractual set of relationships, but one informed by trust, which can be destroyed. So too can the Church destroy its credibility and integrity by breaking relationships. Christian membership of a local congregation is not contractual, for all the inevitable emphasis on financial giving, membership forms, and the existence of legal or rational systems. Christian membership is created by participation in the learning of obedience to the preaching of the Word, the celebration of the sacraments, and the formation of true sociality. Rational criteria merely permit the existence of such a response to each other and to Christ through the presence of the Spirit. A helpful analysis of power and authority is given in a recent work of linguistic philosophy by David Bell. 21 Power statements have a syntactical structure. "If you do x, I will do y . " B y making it clear that reward or punishment will follow the performance of an action by the listener, the Church (or any other person or corporate body) seeks to manipulate the response. There may be a place for this at the most basic level of relationships, but such actions all too quickly turn into the exercise of control. Speaker and listener cease to be on an equal footing. This is not the same as the spontaneous expression of emotion at an action. What distinguishes it is the planned exercise of a future reaction. Thus the action ceases to have value in its own right. It is instead a means of winning or averting a desired response from the one in control. The controlling agent makes it clear that they intend to affect the recipient's status or value. So the whole set of future actions by the controlling agent becomes contingent on the performance of a desired set of actions by the recipient of the threat or promise. This is a power relationship. It is not constrained by the legal, rational or value criteria, for the important point is the maintenance of that relationship. Reasons may be given for why the controlling agent views the other person or group in that light, but at its heart 21 D . Bell. Power, Influence and Authority. O U P , 1975.

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what matters is sustaining that relationship. It may be easier to sustain that relationship by making promises, whereby you pledge yourself to do something for someone, or by making threats, wherein you intend action to someone. Such a statement, in either form, does not mean that the person "has" power. Power is not a possession but a resource. To say " Ά ' possesses power" can be re-phrased " Ά ' has the potential for exercising power effectively." Thus power is a relational term which exists over long periods of time. The existence of repetitive acts over a lengthy period accounts for the frequent propensity to see power as a state or thing. Equally "power" as a noun lacks a verb: you cannot power something, although it is possible to speak of empowering someone. Again the lack of a verb for the term means it is frequently seen as a mysterious entity. It is possible also to speak of controlling or influencing, and this is where authentic Christian discourse can begin. As influence statement is sanction free. It can be phrased, "If you do χ, then y will happen", or "If you do x, then you will do y." This prediction is still a reinforcement, but is only contingent. A perception of contingency implies a view of what could happen, but will not unless certain prior actions occur. The contingency is only a prediction, and in no way does the desired situation lie within the control of the person (or group, or office-holder) making the statement. The basis of influence is the ability to change someone else's perception, either because of the prestige of the person, the office, or the message. Professor Hardy has argued in an unpublished paper entitled "Created and Redeemed Sociality" that Christian faith must not be set apart from common sociality, lest the Christian contribution to sociality be privatised. 22 If this happens, then the Church will be seen as outside the society to which it speaks. So Professor Hardy argues that created sociality present in the human condition must be preserved with its own integrity. The social transcendental present in human society is an element of nature. Such a reality must be brought to correspondence with truth, but too great an emphasis on the Church as witness to the work of God in Christ can destroy the common human task which we all share in virtue of the fact that we are human. This observation is acute, and Pro22 D.W. Hardy. 'Created and Redeemed Sociality' Presidential Address; Society for the Study of Theology, 1987.

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fessor Hardy's criticism of Bonhoeffer is precisely that Bonhoeffer makes this mistake. It is true that Bonhoeffer recognised the need for a proper appreciation of the sociality present in human nature, but he confined his attention to the relationship of Church and world. What my argument has sought to bring out is that the Church is a concrete context for the narrative of divine redemption, and the place where Christians can learn to fashion their response. It is the place where they learn what obedience means, and how it can be destroyed. The Church thus becomes a moral instrument for learning faithfulness to God's work of sociality. But such faithfulness is only achieved slowly, and may be perverted. How does one learn obedience within the Church to the telling of the tale, and the creation and redemption of sociality by God? Those who hold authority within a Church have symbols of their authority, which are recognised by others. Authority exists because influence is accepted within the community, although it can of course also exist because of power. Authority supported by power is destructive of humanity's free choice: it becomes manipulative, and the existence of sanctions is crucial. Modern theories of authority which promote sociality are ascending: that is, they begin from the 'lowest' or most basic level of the organisation to the highest. Thus the Vatican II document on the Church, Lumen Gentium (Christ the Light of the Peoples), begins with the people of God gathered together in the Spirit, and works up to the nature of ordained ministry and episcopacy. So too does the W C C document Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry. Secondly, authority is won by individual achievement and not by social ascription. Although ordained ministry is given authority by ordination, nonetheless it is important that there is no dichotomy between the personal expression of authority in a parish, and the authority given to the minister by the Church hierarchy or congregation. This, thirdly, is because authority is specific to a particular sphere of competence. What the Church can have authority about is the nature of divine action, and its role in creating human sociality. The person who abuses this authority to pronounce on wider spheres of human society can only do so if he or she is trained to be competent in this area. Otherwise it is an abuse of authority which will result. Finally, modern theories of authority see it as part of learned behaviour. Authority will be accepted because people have taken the time to accept it.

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People learn legitimacy in behaviour. Legitimacy is a shorthand expression for the acceptance of authority because a reasoned elaboration in accordance with accepted credenda can be given if requested. Thus the crucial point is whether the credenda are accepted or not. Challenges to authority occur because of a failure of socialisation, or because changes render the old credenda irrelevant or incredible. Hence totalitarian regimes exercise power most carefully over the creation of new ideas. It is at this point that sanctions will be brought most powerfully against the reformer. Roman Catholic theologians today will present the documents of Vatican II as a belated response to the "new ideas" of the Reformation: the authority of Scripture, the importance of Baptism and the role of the laity, the involvement with the world as "vocation" for every Christian. Yet the Reformation was met at the time with a response best described by Hobbes in his Leviathan, chapter 18 : "It is annexed to the sovereignty, to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are averse, and what conducing to peace; and consequently on what occasions, how far, and what men are to be trusted withal, in speaking to multitudes of people; and who shall examine the doctrines of all books before they be published. For the actions of men proceed from their opinions; and in the well-governing of opinions, consisteth the well-governing of men's actions, in order to their peace and concord." Yet this is a complete falsification of the notion of the Church as narrative, described in Part I. It is not that there is no tradition of doctrine to be handed on from generation to generation: Schillebeeckx in his recent The Church with a Human Face has argued that it is this need to preserve the original Gospel which underlies Paul's acceptance of the need for ordained ministry in Philippians. But Hobbes' view is one of the maintenance of authority for its own sake, suppressing all opposing views so that power is maintained. Authority seen as evil will be spoken of as power, and will lead to its resistance. There will be a slow disintegration of authority, where first it will be questioned as a coherent vehicle for the expression of narrative, and the integrity of the authority judged as unfit to be a character in the narrative. Since the Church possesses a transcendental quality of sociality over time (an essential temporality), a great deal of time will be spent by those questioning authority in demonstrating the wrong nature of the past history of that authority. Thus theological scholarship will demonstrate that the existence of authority in a power relationship renders

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it incapable of embodying the narrative of the Gospel. As the power relationship begins to use more and more sanctions to maintain its position, a corruption develops of embodied transcendental sociality. In the present day, "We find ourselves in a technologically dominated political and social situation wherein systematically distorted communication on a mass scale seems to hold sway. The persuasive power of classical rhetoric seems well-nigh powerless in that all too easily manipulated situation. We need, therefore, some form of a critique of ideologies that can perform a critical emancipatory function on a societal level by unmasking those ideological distortions in the same way psychoanalysis unmasks the distortions and illusions of any individual." 2 3 Sociality breaks down into the pressures and powers of this world, abandoning the liberation of Christ. After the questioning of authority as lacking integrity to maintain human sociality, there can follow protest and finally resistance against authority as evil. Resistance can take many forms, from passive noncooperation to active organised resistance. What is central to them all is that resistance is seen as necessary to preserve the intelligibility of the Gospel, once it has been corrupted by the wrong use of authority as power. The response by a corrupt authority will be to manipulate the set of beliefs which undergird authority, so that those protesting can either participate in such a way that they are won over, or their support can be gained. Hence the study of language becomes crucial in modern examinations of the corruption of authority in power as evil: one might instance Orwell's awareness of language in his novel 1984, or the way in which ecumenical documents move constantly between agreement on an ideal state while carefully avoiding a discussion of the real. Equally behaviourist psychology contends that all human behaviour is absolutely determined, given the correct use of language containing sanctions or 'reinforcing consequences'. But it is not merely B.F. Skinner and his followers who only use the language of power. Hannah Arendt also argues that in the modern world influence and authority has disappeared from our vocabulary: there is only power, defined as the group's activity in concert for a particular aim. Against this Christianity will want to argue for the necessity of narrative conveyed by influence, and the learning of obedience to the narrative, even if that may result in a judgement to protest against 23 D. Tracy. The Analogical

Imagination,

p. 74, 1981.

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authority perceived as power. So the pronouncement of authority as evil involves the use of a judgement as to whether authority works through sanctions (threats or promises or both) and is therefore involved in power, or whether it is still only seeking to win obedience through influence. There seem to be two examples by which a Church can, then, destroy itself. One is the vexed and important subject of race. Where a Church practices apartheid, other members of that denomination may exclude it from Christian fellowship. At this point the concerns of Gore, Moberly and Quick are pushed to their logical conclusion. As far as the members of that denomination are concerned, the offending Church is outside their fellowship. Thus in 1984 the Lutheran South African Church was excluded from the Lutheran World Federation. 24 Secondly, there is the imposition on congregations of practices not essential to the truth of the gospel by an authority which will admit no challenge. Clearly much could be written about Paul's objection to circumcision. But what unites both division within a Church on racial terms, and imposition on a congregation of practices which are adiaphora (things indifferent to salvation) is that they are illustrations of a power relationship. As such, they show that the freedom of the Christian to follow Christ in the Christian fellowship is compromised; so too is the Church; and so too is the Christian witness, or ethic, of that Church. We have, then, illustrated Isidore's point in the area of internal Church relationships. We turn to the area of worship.

Worship within the Church Baptism is the sacramental rite which sets us within the Christian community. As I Corinthians 12.13 puts it, by one Spirit we are all baptised into the one body: setting a person within the Body of Christ, a putting on of Christ, a being baptised (Gal. 3.27, Acts 2.41). Here the Church enacts the significance of the Gospel as a narrative for the individual. Baptism has this significance because in it we accept the judgement passed on sin as evil, and accept that sentence. The true filial obedience of Christ is focused in Matt. 3.15 at the baptism by 24 See the essays in The Church of Sweden's document on LWF Budapest 1984 entitled, 'Status Confessions - Church Unity.' 1984.

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John: a completion of God's just requirements. Equally Luke 12.50 describes the coming death of Christ as a baptism. Running throughout the epistles is a constant concern with the moral requirements embodied in Christianity and expressed in the sacraments: Colossians 2.14 speaks of the bond standing against us, now negated by Christ's action on the Cross. Romans 8.3 likewise speaks of the Cross as vindicating the just requirements of the law. But it is through baptism that humanity is united with the obedience of Christ worked out on the Cross. Baptism expresses our acceptance of the necessity of Christ's victory, or accepting the truthfulness of divine grace (John 3.33). The Eucharist is described by Paul in terms of judgement in I Corinthians 11. "Let a person examine himself, and so eat the bread and drink of the cup." Paul here is castigating the Corinthians for greed, which is blasphemous because the sacrament was instituted by Christ. Yet it is only a small step to envisage a situation where the Eucharist is betrayed not by selfishness and greed, but by the corruption of power. Participation in the Lord's Supper means becoming part of the Lord's Body, as Dr Suggate has well brought out in his treatment of the Eucharist in his essay. Thus the corruption of power spreads further, from the betrayal of sociality and trust into the manipulation of relationships; from the betrayal of language into the expression of self-deceit and false intention; from the abuse of the sacraments into the delivery of judgement upon oneself (I Cor. 11.29). I have mentioned already the story told by Professor D.M. MacKinnon of the importance of the refusal of some Roman Catholics to participate in the Eucharist during the Spanish Civil War because of the full support which their Church gave to the Fascism of General Franco. [But it was only the protest of the American R.C. Bishops which prevented a nuclear submarine armed with nuclear missiles being named Corpus Christi, after a city in Texas, by the American government: the blasphemy would have been too great.] Professor C.F.D. Moule points out that the blindness of I Cor. 11.29 is parallel to Hebrews 6.6, where deliberate apostasy involves a failure to recognise Christ and implies that the story of his crucifixion continues in their own actions. 25 Hence the failure to discern the Body 25 C.F.D. Moule. 'The Judgement Theme in the Sacraments' in W.D. Davies and D. Daube (ed). The Background of the New Testament and its Eschatology. CUP, 1956.

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in I Cor. 11.29 includes both the Lord's B o d y present in some way with the elements, and the Lord's Body as the Church. As Moule says, the betrayal of authority is seen in "the authorities of the world, whether in ecclesiastical guise as the high priest, or in the robes of civic office like Pilate." At Baptism and Eucharist, the Spirit is concerned with the decision which must be made on false authority. Yet this presentation of the sacraments as judgement on the community's practices is only an introduction to the presence of the Kingdom as judgement. The judgement theme is linked with new life in the messianic community. In the Eucharist the Kingdom is anticipated and this hope celebrated in remembrance of his passion. It is by the forgiveness of sins that the Kingdom first penetrates into our world. As the W C C document puts it, " I n accordance with Christ's promise, each baptised member of the B o d y of Christ receives in the Eucharist the assurance of the forgiveness of sins (Matt. 26.28) and the pledge of eternal life (John 6.51-58)" (Eucharist II.2). As J . Tillard puts it in his commentary, the celebration of the Eucharist nourishes us with hope, as well as a meeting with the Lord. It is the hope which the Eucharist presents which enables those resisting the corruption of authority to continue in their protest, often recognising the cost which this will bring. 26 To quote the W C C document again, which summarises the point well: The meals which Jesus is recorded as sharing during his earthly ministry proclaim and enact the nearness of the Kingdom, of which the feeding of the multitude is a sign. In his last meal the fellowship of the Kingdom was connected with the prospect of Jesus' sufferings. After his resurrection, the Lord made his presence known to his disciples in the breaking of the bread. Thus the Eucharist continues these meals of Jesus during his earthly life and after his resurrection, always as signs of the Kingdom. Christians see the Eucharist prefigured in the Passover memorial of Israel's deliverance from the land of bondage and in the meal of the Covenant on Mount Sinai (Ex. 24). Eucharist 1.1

The sacraments enact the nature of the Church as carrier of the story of Christianity, and as a central character within that story. The fundamental forms of the Christian interpretation of Scripture are the ideals of the Christian community. The life of that community per26 J. Tillard. 'The Eucharist, gift of G o d ' in M. Thurian (ed). Ecumenical on Baptism, Eucharist

and Ministry, pp. 109-110. W C C , 1983.

Perspectives

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forms actions which bear witness to that faith, and that is a corporate action. Some texts only deliver meaning when they are performed by interpretative actions. Such are the Scriptural texts, and the interpretative action which performs them is focused on the Eucharist. Here the Christian Church focuses its actions and makes the understanding explicit. It goes beyond the expression of certain fundamental features of human sociality. As Professor Lash writes in his article 'Performing the Scriptures': T h e N e w Testament texts d o not simply give symbolic, narrative expression to certain fundamental and pervasive features of the human drama . . . T h e y also express their author's confidence in one man in w h o m the mystery of divine action is seen to have been embodied and focused . . . The fundamental f o r m of the Christian interpretation of Scripture is the life, activity and organisation of the Christian c o m m u n i t y , construed as performance of the biblical text. T h e best illustration of what this might mean is, of course, the celebration of the Eucharist. In this context the principal f o r m s of discourse are practical: in praise, confession, petition, they seek to enact the meanings which they e m b o d y . A n d if, in the liturgy of the Word, the story is told, it is told not so that it may merely be relished or remembered, but that it m a y be performed, in the following of C h r i s t . 2 7

Conclusion H o w then might the Church fail in its worship and betray itself to that judgement which the sacraments portray? Questions of false prophecy, idolatry and heresy all arise here. So too might the corruption of worship by power relationships, greed or division in a congregation. They are perennial questions in the life of a congregation. Thus Paul faced the question of false prophecy, and idolatry was a constant feature of the N e w Testament witness. There will be no agreement in the Church as to what false worship is. Yet beyond the inevitable disagreements in a pluralist church, there is the falsification of worship itself. Luther stressed that the communion service indicates the spiritual unity of Christ and the Church. H e does not begin with the individual and her or his relationship to Christ, only then moving on to the unity 27 N . Lash. 'Performing the Scriptures' in Theology 1986.

on the way to Emmaus,

p. 45-6,

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this brings. Rather in the communion service the Christian enters the community in which Christ is present as the Lord. "For Christ with all his saints constitutes a spiritual body, just as the inhabitants of a city constitute a community and a body, each individual citizen being a limb of every other and of the whole city." 28 Equally, neglect of the unity of the Church brings the Christian participation into disrepute. Luther saw the Eucharist as a continual strengthening of the Christian life, much as Bonhoeffer did. Christian awareness will be marked both without security and yet with security: this is the dialectic of God's grace in the sacrament alongside existence in the world. Nevertheless, existence in the Church in no way escapes from this paradox. The question of integrity is raised again and again in the very being of the Church. It may well be argued that our lives are entirely falsifications: we cannot even retell the story of our own existence to ourselves, still less to others, without error, false memory and self-indulgence. Every transition from experienced life to reflective narrative passes through this deception. If we have truth at all, it is through our continually ambivalent desire to be truthful, and through the merciful reception of our speech by those who know and love us: those who make allowances for our lack of integrity. That knowledge of ourselves is a theme of Psalm 139. Ultimately this search for integrity brings the Christian back to the security of her or his justification by Christ, and to their enfolding within the unity of the church, of which Luther spoke. What then of the integrity of the visible Church itself? One of the most prominent theologians this century in the Church of England to appreciate Luther was Michael Ramsey, later Archbishop of Canterbury. Let him have the final word, on the perennial struggle for the integrity of the Church: "Catholicism always stands before the Church door at Wittenberg to read the truth by which she is created, and by which also she is judged." 29

28 Martin Luther. A Sermon on the Blessed Sacrament, 1519. 29 Michael Ramsey. The Gospel and the Catholic Church, p. 180, 1936.

Justification and Responsibility for the World: their Place in Life, Worship and Pastoral Ministry. Klaus

Sturm

Living by faith If we look for key words and phrases to capture the m o o d of our time then we can readily think of 'confusion' or 'insecurity' or 'profound isolation'. Late twentieth century people have lost their bearings. Spiritual and religious guidelines, which in the past two hundred years were often questioned but never written off, have at last been shaken or even vanished. T h e demand for ethical bearings, for example at the management level of big firms, is only a reflection of this sense of crisis. Parts of Protestantism, and that includes the German Protestant churches, have not been able to stop this trend; indeed they share the blame for it. Religious forms of life, liturgy and worship, preaching, sacrament and pastoral ministry have lagged behind through their intellectual concentration on socio-ethical requirements. A majority of baptised and nominal church members w h o are pretty ignorant about religion are having demands thrust u p o n them in church documents and by action groups, which catch this silent majority unprepared. It is right that ethical demands, such as the trio of justice, peace and the integrity of creation, are made, but the trouble is that they are simply beyond the capacities of people because of their distance and lack of Christian practice. It is only the believer with a daily spiritual practice who will be able to understand the force of those demands. We are paying the penalty for the fact that in a supposedly enlightened Western industrial and performance society ora et labora has been shortened simply to labora. All t o o readily under the banner of love of neighbour we have endorsed a society which justifies itself through vocational activity. Prayer and worship have been confined first to Sundays and finally to the sporadic celebration of high feast days.

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However it is quite basic that faith is meant to shape our everyday life, if it is not to evaporate. This is true even for an era when the process of secularisation is seen not only as inevitable but also in a certain sense as a sign of hope. To offer and press for a visible form of spiritual or religious practice is not clericalism. It can bring help for living in a world which has lost its bearings and is fragmented. In Germany at present there is clearly no threat from this angle. It is rather that there already exists an ethical clericalism which wants to demand from an almost completely post-Christian society attitudes and actions which are only to be expected from Christians. Those ethical demands must recover their place in life, worship and pastoral ministry. Justification and responsibility for the world have their roots in the proclaimed Word of God. Without ora there is no labora. Proclamation in worship is and remains the central place for the experience of justification. There the word of acquittal and assurance becomes clear, the basic declaration that we are accepted by the merciful and loving God, through his Son Jesus Christ. Therefore declining numbers of those taking part in worship not only pose questions about externals or the assortment of forms of social activity. Rather we reach the heart of what it is to be a Church. The communion of saints, the gathering and sending out of committed Christians is the foundation and touchstone of Christian life even in the post-modern world. Common worship certainly aims at growth through individual witness and study of the Scriptures. It is going to be increasingly important to rediscover the ordering of the day through prayer and the reading of Scripture. Oases of quiet and prayer enable faith to take shape in daily practice. Personal assurance and the experience of acceptance in the name of Christ are the roots of Christian existence. So worship and pastoral ministry are places where we learn to perceive sin as separation from God. The assurance of my existence in a Christian sense is impossible without the crisis of recognising our sin. Knowledge of sin is vital for responsibility for the world. The truth of the gospel - my unconditional acceptance by God - is the key to repentance (Rom. 2,4). The experience of God's love reveals the woeful deficiency of our actual life in the sight of God. At the same time we experience conversion, stemming not from anxiety but from an experience of that love - otherwise there is the great danger of a faith which is driven by neurosis.

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Living by justification means then living by God's pure word of assurance - the holy place where his 'yes' has the power to open up paradise, his claim on us is quietly fulfilled by G o d himself, and the separation is overcome. Protestant ethics therefore flows from the freedom of faith and frankly acknowledges the worldliness of its activity and the use of reason which avoids religious excess. It can accept the limited and fragmentary nature of us creatures. For the act of justification is on a different plane from the realm of action. Only the one who is loved is converted, and only the one who is converted loves. So it is not a matter of a unique act, but of a becoming. Change and the need to act ethically calls Christians back again and again to the sources of their faith. N e w certitude through the justifying word of assurance repeatedly frees them for thankful action.

The Church as an integral living community The Christian life is always transmitted personally and locally. Therefore the parish, the outer visible form of the community, will become more and more important. Institutional fragmentation into 'service activities' will only increasingly dissipate the reality of the Christian community. Cold and formal relationships kill the Church in the eyes of the locality. As a symptom of this, the closer community in many districts of large cities is dying out. This is because of the vast range of competing cultural attractions, and the parcelling out of responsibilities among the various leaders of the Church which prevents personal links. It is precisely because we live in a world where individuals are for ever having to deal with quite separate branches of officialdom that they look for personal dealings within the Christian community and not for a Church which functions like a perfect 'service machine'. Even though people are willing to accept service from the churches when it is only a short-term commitment, it can be fatal in the long run if local roots and the small-scale parish disappears more and more. It is absurd if, given the inevitable demands of pastoral care and the complexity of the world, it is seriously believed, for instance, that a vicar can responsibly undertake the direction, administration and organisation of a Christian community and at the same time give intensive pastoral care to one, two, three or even more thousand parishioners, and on top of that fulfil a teaching post. The obvious question is: Will

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the Church of the future be an institution which administers services to a mass of people who are otherwise uninterested, or is it to say yes to small neighbourly communities where the life of the Body of Christ can be lived on the small scale? Such an integral living community combines worship, proclamation, festival, celebration and mutual help and the sharing of time, money and concerns, a genuine love and a readiness to forgive. Having, giving and taking a share are the hallmarks of the Church as an integral living community just as much as the trio of witness, fellowship and service. It is the small scale, the personal relationship and the local grounding which make such a spiritual home possible.

Protestant theology as a Church discipline Protestant theology as an academic undertaking in state universities will have to stress its orientation towards the life of the Church. The very position of theology in the university is going to depend on achieving a living exchange and a fruitful interrelationship between Church practice and theology. Academic theology cannot secure a place in a university by deduction from modernity's prevailing concept of a science. Its warrant grows out of practical goals, responsible both to reality and Christian sources, and that necessarily means reflecting on church life. Its character as a 'Church discipline' stems from its confessional character. If it lacks reference to the reality of the Church, then the ground is cut from underneath its practical goals. For it would then be justified as a discipline not in its present form but only within comparative religion. Academic theology as confessional stands or falls with the public acceptance of the Church. And by the same token Protestant theology as a general enterprise will always be understood as an eminently practical discipline.

Justice, peace and the integrity of creation These catchwords denote in fact the greatest challenges of our time. But their ethical character must be kept in view. A n y exaggerated religious demands in this area must be avoided, since we require here modest, rational human insight alone. Christian and philosoph-

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ical ethics move on the same plane in the material order. C o n flict flares up over the definition of the human and therefore in all questions about fundamental anthropological assertions, in particular the possibilities and limits of the proper use of reason. Christian anthropology avoids a naive trust in the goodness of humanity and in the realisation of God's kingdom here on earth, without thereby neglecting to show the most intense concern for justice, peace and the integrity of creation. But salvation must already be a gift, if human beings are to be free for ethical discourse, for the right use of a reason which is not inflated by religion. Without the gift of freedom in the word of assurance of the living God, the 'must' of the ethical demand leads either to despair, or at least to excessive demands, or to overestimating the possibilities of human action.

Individual ethics and social ethics In Germany in recent years there has clearly been a rupture to an alarming degree between individual ethics and social ethics, for instance over the question of armaments or abortion. More conservative circles concentrate on questions of individual ethics, whereas groups which rate themselves progressive have concentrated attention on socio-ethical issues. We need a thorough overview of the whole field of ethical problems, free from ideology and prejudice, in order to work out credible guidelines for action. In addition we need to devote particular attention to the question of the relationship between personal decisions of conscience and public state responsibility within the body politic. Reason delivered from ideology by the Gospel word of acquittal will aim for a minimal use of force and the wide ranging realisation of the commandment to love in the unredeemed world which still stands under the law. Politics will be conscious of the need for amelioration, but also of the imperfectibility of human existence in this world of time. Ethical discourse in our day needs a sense of reality, specialist competence, persistence and the knowledge that absolute demands only carry within them the seeds of dictatorship and catastrophe. Well intentioned but unrealisable schemes which for instance presuppose that the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount is

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going to be strictly kept by all people on earth bring only paralysis and expose very quickly the hypocritical or starry-eyed character of their ambitions. Knowledge of the limitations of action where the law of the jungle reigns in the tangled relationships of human beings must not restrict intense engagement in any way, but it does make it modest and prevents claims to superior knowledge and moral arrogance.

Motivation and assurance as the distinctively Christian in ethical discourse As already indicated, Christian ethics stands materially on the same ground as a purely philosophical or even pragmatic ethics. The command to love and the dignity of the human being, respect for the individual and ordering of the common life are general basic insights which (and this alas happens often) are simply relativised or obscured by ideological blindness or egoistic partisanship or lust for power. B y contrast the specifically Christian contribution to ethical discourse is motivation and assurance, the promise of liberation from the burden of the law in the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Since I must not constitute myself but am accepted 'without the works of the law', that is, am loved by God in my limitations and for the sake of the dignity of my person as a created being, I do not have to cope with the wearing need to work out my own identity, which otherwise all too easily ends in my being tossed into the void of a cold meaningless universe. Freedom for others, freedom to help grows from the assurance we receive from worship and pastoral care, from the celebration of reconciliation with the G o d who came near in Jesus Christ. Here preaching and the sacraments have a vital and fundamental function. We can go from the stillness and from the joyful celebration of the good news that we are accepted and liberated to our concrete tasks without the act of justification being inevitably functionalised. The life of justification is a life-long turning to the living G o d (compare the first of Luther's ninety-five theses). We are taught that a good tree is known by its fruits. So it is with responsibility for the world, which grows from the Protestant belief in justification.

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Shaping our lives If we are to practise piety, to live and give shape to our faith, we need training. Since the family as the smallest social grouping is in large measure no longer the norm, then the basic spiritual education must be taken up again directly by the Church community. In fact when in the companionship of the Christian community personal belief takes shape and is lived out, when genuineness and wholeness are evident in the life of spiritual parents, then even our alienated contemporaries are stirred. They find assurance in the promise of Christ who goes with us, they find delight in the forgiving acceptance of their limitations, and they trust their reason will be protected from arrogance by the God who relativises all human action and alone graciously brings all things to their completion. A renewal of spiritual life will be possible only through the strengthening of the parish. To live by faith needs practical training. Worship, common liturgical prayer, the celebration of the Lord's Supper and quite practical training in spiritual lifestyle through retreats and leisure time - these old places of renewal must be rediscovered. At the same time in a multi-cultural, leisure society the circle which meets regularly, the closed group will certainly not disappear but will decline in importance. Opportunities at separate times for strengthening and guidance in one's own life and faith will be gladly taken up. Here there is a place for initiatives beyond the parish, for instance organising holidays or free time, but ideally these should still be anchored in the community so they have a lasting and continuing effect. Only the small neighbourly parish will in the future be able to offer the warmth and show the flexibility which modern people look for and expect. Over against the big institution it can more easily combine local roots and a flexible radiating power. The window-dressing of church politics, large-scale service projects without spiritual backing, and an institutional preoccupation with safety are dead ends. The truth is that what is exemplary and true and helps faith to find shape knows the way to the human heart.

Retrospect and Prospect Hans G. Ulrich

A conversation on ethics between different theological traditions necessarily contains many aspects and insights which need first of all to be documented in their particularity and diversity. This task is performed in the preceding essays. At the same time we were very surprised to recognise that we held important insights and perspectives in common. This will be recorded in what follows. It is not intended thereby to give a comprehensive summary, but rather to identify the common lines of understanding. With this aim in mind, references will be made to the various essays, and some indication given of the inner connections of the whole work. At the same time our conversation showed - and this is even more important - that there are common future tasks. These too will be recorded here. They are linked with leading themes and catchwords ("ethics and learning", "ethics and ethos", etc.), which were originally formulated in our conversations and invite us to further work.

I The Search for Consensus 1. Traditions of Christian ethics and their meeting point The aim of our common deliberations was to incorporate ethics into the theological discussion between Anglicans and Lutherans. That had to mean not only looking to share our respective histories of ethics, but also presenting our different traditions to each other. This process revealed that there is a range of significant points where the traditions touch on each other and meet. The chief outcome, however, was the fact that the main lines of the traditions do not only lend themselves to being linked under a

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common concept of Christian ethics, but actually converge in a consensus which is to be found in the various traditions. This is evident in the presentation of ethics in historical (Alan Suggate / Hans Ulrich) and systematic (Daniel Hardy / Oswald Bayer) perspective: in both traditions Christian ethics is not only to be conceived as a stock of pronouncements about Christian life and action; rather one can see that Christian ethics is rooted in the praxis of worship. Ethical thought and ethically based action (theory and praxis) are bound together by worship in their relation both to the Church and to social reality: by the knowledge which is communicated in worship, and by praxis, which attains its form in worship. The essays of Daniel Hardy and Oswald Bayer share the farreaching insight that Christian ethics is grounded in the presence of the goodness of God which is communicated and celebrated in worship. Therefore Christian ethics cannot be reduced to the question of the religious grounding of morality, nor to the question about the grounding of action in Christian morality. Our work together came to focus on the need to change the current way of posing questions in ethical theory (e.g. the question of the ethical subject). Understanding between the traditions should not be fixed on general questions and outlooks, but rather focussed on common praxis and its history.

2. Forms of thought The traditions of Christian ethics are bound up with various histories, social contexts, various 'habits of the heart' and forms of thought, which for their part have a variety of theological roots. The Anglican tradition is markedly eirenic in its modes of thought. Its preference is for mediation and transformation, rather than demarcation and conflict. Prominence is given to the search for compromise as a form of ethics. By contrast on the Lutheran side there is a clear emphasis on ethics as a conflictual discipline. This points to the way God in his word unmistakably contradicts human ambition. God's word contradicts any kind of human life which seeks only its own justification and not the needs of the neighbour. It is worth paying particular attention to the question of which dialectical forms of ethics, combining conflict

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and mediation, are to be found in the traditions (cf. Alan M. Suggate,

William Temple and Christian Social Ethics Today).

3. Points o f contact and tension When traditions encounter each other, it is particularly worth noting the places and ideas which reveal both points of contact and points of difference. A number of such places and ideas of critical mediation have surfaced which merit particular attention. Freedom: In the Anglican context 'freedom' as a leading idea is less often made the topic of discussion than in the (German-speaking) Lutheran context. In the latter the 'freedom of a Christian' is cardinal for the understanding of ethics and Christian forms of life, admittedly worked out in very different ways. The prime reason for this is that the concept of Christian freedom has been bound up with the discussion of the legacy of the Enlightenment and modernity. The concept of freedom has remained contentious, insofar as the 'freedom of the Christian', which the Reformation affirmed, has been interpreted as the freedom which is bestowed by God in his promise in history (for example, Descartes, Hamann, cf. Oswald Bayer, Umstrittene Freiheit

[Contested Freedom], Leibliches Wort [Bodily Word]), thus repeatedly

coming into conflict with other discussions of human freedom. Responsibility: The concept of responsibility lets us follow a path of critical mediation over the understanding of Christian ethics in present-day discussion about ethics and morality. In this concept freedom and guilt meet, responsibility and (political) accountability (Max Weber). For the Lutheran tradition one can say that it stresses the limits of human accountability. It distinguishes sharply between ethical accountability and justification. Christianity and Culture: A point of contact and tension is the theological handling of the relationship of Christianity, Church and culture. The Anglican tradition is able - in contrast to Lutheran ethics to reckon with the Christian transformation of culture in a limited and pragmatic way. Lutheran ethics does stress that Christian forms of life unfold in the everyday world, but the fundamental distance between the Christian faith and the world remains ever present. In both traditions the focus is less on an ethic with a grand design for changing the world as on an ethic of everyday life in the

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world, which engages with this world. The dynamics and form of this engagement vary. Here there are many different emphases in the traditions. The Anglican ethic largely follows a 'middle way' of linking and relating Christian forms of life and culture. On the Lutheran side stress goes on the inevitability of conflict and argument, which is grounded in the fact that God's righteousness must be repeatedly imparted afresh. In the recent history of ethics Ernst Troeltsch has given a strong impetus to both traditions to focus on the topic of Christianity and culture. Troeltsch can therefore serve as a bond between the traditions (cf. Thomas Reinhuber). True, his ethico-political concept of an ethics of compromise cannot be equated with the ethic of the 'middle way', which is directed at the everyday world of compromise, and not at the programmatic construction of a synthesis of culture. Nevertheless Troeltsch's presentation of the social teaching of the Christian churches and groups proves to be a helpful means of clarifying the traditions (even the Anglican) which have shaped Christian ethics in their history. There is much work to be done in dialogue with Troeltsch. Social ethics: The traditions are agreed that Christian ethics seeks to discern and define forms of social life. Christian ethics is social ethics. This is true if only because Christian ethics is related to the community of those who come together in worship. One does not have in mind simply the sociological insight that in a pluralistic society there are many moral communities, and ethics relates to them in a realistic way, but that worship gives the Christian life a communitarian form. This form lets us participate in the relationships in which God's goodness presents itself. God bestows his goodness on the community, and the social nature of Christian forms of living is not some obvious datum of human life but is bound up with God's living reality (cf. Daniel Hardy). Worship in this perspective cannot be something eternal, exempt from the real, geschichtlich world (cf. Anthony Dyson). On the contrary, worship has to be the place of actual engagement with the social world, because worship is the visible place of the actual performance of Christian forms of life. The description and analysis of this connection remains a necessary task. In the recent history of ethics both traditions share a concern with a detailed grasp of social reality to accompany everyday social action and also change social reality. On the Anglican side the social ethics of William Temple provides a good ex-

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ample (cf. Alan Suggate). On the German-speaking side there are today various theories, which are related to a variety of leading problems, for example the development of a social ethics of reasoned (empirical) judgment (e.g. Martin Honecker), or a situation where the logic of the Christian religion (e.g. its understanding of freedom) is realised ethically (e.g. Trutz Rendtorff). The project of Arthur Rich (cf. Theodor Dieter) is associated with the concern for a social ethic on the level of the everyday action which gradually changes social conditions. He too travels the middle way of the concrete pursuit of social justice, guided by maxims (similar to middle axioms). The social ethics of Arthur Rich can therefore serve as a project which mediates between the traditions. He shows the viability of a well-developed social ethic which seeks to grasp present-day social reality and at the same time helps us towards explicit social action which is communicable by means of criteria. Given the necessity of social action, we must be sensitive to those who bear responsibility in their professions, (cf. Theodor Dieter / Richard Higginson). The tension between a social ethic as a professional ethics and an ethic of social and political action is an insoluble tension in Christian social ethics. What the term 'social ethics' means is determined by the dialectics of Christian freedom: it frees one both from abstract negation and from uncritical accommodation (Oswald Bayer, Zugesagte Freiheit [Promised Freedom]). On these terms one must consider what 'Vermittlung' (mediation) means. At this point we were able to discover a consensus between the traditions. Teleology and History: In the Anglican tradition there is a clear emphasis on the need of Christian ethics properly to reflect on the goals and aims of the Christian life, and so see the rationality of ethics. The teleological orientation of the Christian life does not in any way conflict with an eschatology which affirms God's contradiction of human ambition. A teleology which can ally itself with utilitarian forms of ethical argument (typical of Anglo-Saxon thought) is less fragmented than in the Lutheran ethic. This certainly underscores the fact that God has provided well for the world and that we must live in accordance with his order, but at the same time it sees this good world as standing in contrast to God's work of salvation, which brings the necessary deliverance and redemption. For ethics in both traditions there remains the constant need to test how the human need for deliverance can properly be expressed in ethics.

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Ethics and Worship: The central point of contact and tension is finally that of the relationship of worship and ethics. In both traditions worship is visibly the concrete place where human beings receive the good gifts of God. O n this receptivity depends the way their lives are formed. We need to consider how the reception of word and sacrament, as the Lutheran tradition sees it, relates to participation in the good gifts of God in the Eucharist according to the Anglican tradition. This throws up the question how spirituality and ethics relate to one another in the two traditions.

II Prospects for further work Insights which come to light in the meeting of traditions do not lend themselves simply to being recorded and reckoned up as a tally of differences and similarities. Rather common perspectives materialise through the appearance of themes and topics where the emerging consensus can be tested. These include the general question of the possibility of a Christian ethic, which is to be answered by focussing not so much on the content of a Christian morality as on the way the Christian ethic can be learned and transmitted.

1. Ethics and learning Insofar as Christian ethics is rooted in worship, ethics cannot be transmitted without training and entering into the spirit of the practice of worship. This can be described as the 'learning of a language', in distinction from other ways of learning (cf. Daniel Hardy). Here further valuable work could be done on the question of how Christians acquire knowledge, how this learning takes place, and how learning and training in the practice of worship belong together.

2. Ethics and Ethos / Ethics and Story In this connection it is also worth considering the relation between ethics and the lived ethos of the Christian ethic. How is this ethos given to us, and how can it be presented and communicated? One

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needs to clarify to what extent there can be not only a Christian basis for morality or action, but also an actual Christian morality, within which the Christian ethic is transmitted. So one must define the task of paraenesis. Also at the same time the general question is posed about the formation of tradition in the Christian ethic. Here one should consider those proposals for a Christian ethic which see Christian morality shaped by the Christian story, which is connected with the practice of the Christian community (cf. Stanley Hauerwas).

3. Ethics and historical change H o w is Christian ethics also bound up with historical reality, which includes the history of worship and proclamation and its effects? Christian ethics must not be presented as if it were a system for living the Christian life, but as the portrayal of the form of Christian living bound up with worship, and the historical reality which it encounters. O n e has to portray the Christian form of living in its continual conflict with social and historical reality (cf. Anthony Dyson). Ethics must visibly be pursued dialectically. Therefore in ethics we must clarify the relation between true knowledge and historical change. H o w do eternal truths connect with historical, temporal events and relations? This is not one of those common questions about historical change and the relation of change to permanence, since in Christian ethics we have to clarify how G o d ' s living presence (and not a set of ideals or utopias laid up in eternity) touches and changes present-day human reality. The crucial point is that this cannot be encompassed in a general theory about the relation of G o d and history, but must be worked out with reference to the forms and mediations through which G o d ' s coming in the human world can become the subject of knowledge.

4. Forms of mediation and communication The mediation between the roots of Christian ethics in praxis and in the living tradition present in worship, in the action and life of Christians, must be explicitly explored and portrayed. Forms of mediation of this kind have been sought in Christian ethics in various ways and

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degrees, e.g. middle axioms (or maxims), which do not simply offer rules for the application of Christian principles but distinct forms for Christian living and action. In this connection the definition of the theological task as a doctrine of forms (v.s. Oswald Bayer's 'Theology and Worship') needs to be worked out for ethics too. One has to show how the Christian form of living is schooled in the form of the praxis of worship. This will include considering the relation of liturgy and ethics.

5. Ethics and Truth / Ethics and K n o w l e d g e Ethical judgment also lays claim to knowledge, insofar as it guides action not only by abstract moral requirements but by the demands of objective reality. Certainly ethics must not be tied to questionable concepts of knowledge. Here the reflections of Daniel Hardy on the connection of theological knowledge and worship should be taken up and pursued further for their ethical implications.

6. Ethics and Apologetics Christian ethics, particularly when it is rooted in worship, cannot remain outward-looking unless we buckle down to critical mediation. If both God's promise and his contradiction should be equally heard, then Christian ethics must not simply defend its patch but engage with the non-Christian world in discussion which builds up knowledge. Exploration is needed on the task of an apologetic ethic and the connection of apologetics and ethics. Here the chief issue will not be the distinction between the Christian and non-Christian world but the distinction and connection between the practice of worship and action in the world.

7. Contested freedom In both traditions we can see the need and the prospect of learning to understand afresh the 'freedom of the Christian'. Here we can reach a critical understanding of the strategy of liberalism in its various ex-

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pressions, which are discussed particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world. We shall need to ask whether a dialectical relation can be detected between a liberal, individualistic and rather amorphous mediation of the Christian faith and other (e.g. contemplative) forms of transmission (cf. Daniel Hardy in The Weight of Glory).

Ill Worship and Ethics / Church and Ethics All these topics, tasks and questions meet in the prospect of thinking out the Christian ethic afresh from its roots in worship. This anchorage of the Christian ethic in reality keeps it from being restricted to specific theories of subjectivity, of society or of ethical decision-making, which grow out of questions reflecting various cultural ties. The topic 'Worship and Ethics' has stood the test as the leading thread in the conversation between our traditions. It liberates us from fixed ideas about moral reality and its ethical reflection and reminds us of the reality of Christian praxis. Further work on these prospective tasks will show how the traditions can be understood and portrayed afresh. The prospective tasks we have identified are connected to each other by three basic lines which are inseparable: we have shown (1) how the Christian life shares in the goodness of God and continually needs renewal and recollection (foundations); (2) how the Christian ethic clearly does not only guide or judge action, but includes a corresponding form of living (cf. Klaus Sturm / Peter Sedgwick), and (3) how this ethic can be communicated (mediations).

Contributors Professor Dr Oswald Bayer is Professor of Systematic Theology and Director of the Institut für Christliche Gesellschaftslehre in the Evangelisch-Theologische Fakultät of the Eberhard-Karls University of Tübingen. Professor Dr Theodor Dieter is Research Professor at the Institute for Ecumenical Research of the Lutheran World Federation in Strasbourg, and formerly Assistent in the Evangelisch-Theologische Fakultät of the Eberhard-Karls University of Tübingen. Professor Anthony O. Dyson is Professor of Social and Pastoral Theology in the Department of Religions and Theology, University of Manchester. Professor Daniel W. Hardy is Director of the Center of Theological Inquiry, Princeton, New Jersey, and formerly Van Mildert Professor of Divinity, University of Durham. Dr Richard A. Higginson is Lecturer in Christian Ethics and Director of the Ridley Hall Foundation at Ridley Hall, Cambridge, and formerly Tutor in Ethics at Cranmer Hall, St. John's College, Durham. Thomas Reinhuber is Assistent in the Evangelisch-Theologische Fakultät of the Eberhard-Karls University of Tübingen. Dr Peter H. Sedgwick is Vice-Principal of Westcott House, Cambridge, and formerly Lecturer in Theology in the University of Hull. He has also been Theological Consultant to the North-East Churches, based in Durham. Pfarrer Klaus Sturm is Weltanschauungsbeauftragter der Evangelischen Landeskirche in Württemberg, Stuttgart. He was formerly Pfarrer in Nagold and also Assistent in the Evangelisch-Theologische Fakultät of the Eberhard-Karls University of Tübingen. Dr Alan M. Suggate is Senior Lecturer in Theology in the University of Durham. Professor Dr Hans G. Ulrich is Professor of Systematic Theology and Director of the Institut für Systematische Theologie, Abteilung Sozialethik, in the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg.

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The Theological Paradox / Das theologische Paradox Interdisciplinary Reflections on the Centre of Paul Tillich's Thought Proceedings of the V.International Paul Tillich Symposium held in Frankfurt/Main 1994 Edited by Gert Hummel 1995. 23,0 χ 15,5 cm. XVII, 264 pages. Cloth. ISBN 3-11-014995-8 (Theologische Bibliothek Tópelmann, Volume 74) The contributions are grouped according to three chapters: Paradox as a category of theological thought - Paradox as a method of dogmatic understanding - Paradox as a function of religious speech and practice. The editor is professor of systematic theology at the University of the Saarland and chairman of the German Paul Tillich Society.

Paul Tillich's Theological Legacy: Spirit and Community International Paul Tillich Conference, New Harmony, 17-20 June 1993 Edited by Frederick J. Parrella 1995. 23,0 χ 15,5 cm. XXIII, 185 pages. With 2 plates. Cloth. ISBN 3-11-014667-3 (Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann, Volume 73) From the contents: The hidden community of the Kairos and the spiritual community. The concept of the breakthrough of revelation in Tillich's Dogmatik of 1925. Kairos and the hope for a new world community. Tillich's anthropology versus his christology. A vision of Protestantism for today. (All in English) The editor is current president of the Paul Tillich Society of North America, and professor of religious studies at Santa Clara University in Santa Clara, California.

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