Working-Class Organization and the Return to Democracy in Spain 9781501745775

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Working-Class Organization and the Return to Democracy in Spain

WORKING-CLASS ORGANIZATION AND THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN Robert M. Fishman

Cornell University Press Ithaca and London

Cornell University Press gratefully acknowledges a grant from the Program for Cultural Cooperation between Spain's Ministry of Culture and United States Universities that aided in bringing this book to publication.

Copyright© 1990 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, 124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 1990 by Cornell University Press.

International Standard Book Number 0-8014-2061-X Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 89-42887

Librarians: Library of Congress cataloging information appears on the last page of the book. @ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum

requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

To the memory of my parents

Contents

Acknowledgments Abbreviations

1 Introduction

ix xiii

1

2 Workplace Leaders and Union Organization

19

3 Who Are the Workplace Leaders?

65

4 The Opposition Labor Movement in Franco Spain

87

5 Labor and Political Transition

138

6 The Difficulty of Union-Building

187

7 Conflict or Accommodation

214

8 Conclusion

247

VII

Afterword

256

Appendix

259

Bibliography

263

Index

273

Acknowledgments

My interest in Spain and in the themes of this book extends back many years. Through friends and teachers in Barcelona while I was in the School Year Abroad Program in 1973, I learned about the democratic aspirations and the critical sensibilities of a people living under dictatorship. The courage of numerous Spaniards and the comprehensive social vision of many in the opposition gave me a reference point that greatly expanded my sense of politics and its potentialincluding the potential for disasters such as the four decades of repression experienced by Spain. Throughout my work on this study, that sense of politics has been as important to me as the tools of social science analysis. I finished several drafts of this manuscript while teaching in the Department of Government and the Committee on Degrees in Social Studies at Harvard University. I am grateful to my colleagues and students there for providing a stimulating environment for scholarship. The Center for European Studies at Harvard has offered an especially congenial setting for my work, and I am indebted to many colleagues and staff members there, above all, Abby Collins. In drafting the final version, I have also received vital suggestions and encouragement from Peter Agree, Edward Malefakis, and Gail Ullman. My greatest debt, as should be clear, is to the unionists of Madrid and Barcelona who agreed to be interviewed and who patiently answered hundreds of questions, many of them sensitive or difficult. Their generous cooperation was essential to the study. My research in Spain from September 1980 through May 1982 was made possible by funding from the Social Science Research CountX

x

Acknowledgments

cil and the Fulbright Commission, support that I gratefully acknowledge. Among the helpful staff of both funding sources, I especially thank Patricia Zahniser of the Fulbright Commission, Madrid, for assistance and encouragement well beyond the call of official duty. The size of the study was expanded in late 1980 by the generous offer of Rafael Lopez Pintor, then director of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociol6gicas (CIS; the principal government-funded institute for social and public opinion research in Spain), to make available the services of the CIS's interviewers for my survey. My research activities found a home in the office provided by DATA, the experienced Madrid social research organization. The assistance and support of the DATA team extended well beyond the essential physical amenities of an office. The entire staff, including directors Manuel G6mez-Reino, Francisco Andres Orizo, and Dado Vila and field coordinator Antonio Pons, found time in busy schedules to advise me on an almost daily basis about the problems associated with successfully designing, carrying out, and coding a sample survey. Their critical reading of several drafts of my questionnaire was especially important. In Barcelona, Manuel Ludevid, professor of industrial relations at ESADE and veteran of the union movement-turned academic, generously arranged for office space and secretarial assistance at ESADE. He also placed his great knowledge of labor at my disposal, offering encouragement, useful advice, and introductions to acquaintances and friends in the union movement. For reasons of space I cannot acknowledge individually the advice and cooperation of many Spanish academics as well as political and union figures whose help was essential. However, I must mention some of those who were especially helpful. I was fortunate to receive the cooperation of individuals with widely different points of view. Jose Marfa Maravall lent advice and made important introductions at several crucial points despite his own hectic schedule of academic and political responsibilities. Amando de Miguel offered valuable advice and encouragement and introduced me to colleagues in the Department of Sociology, University of Barcelona, and in Madrid. Likewise, Jose Juan Toharia offered helpful suggestions and introduced me to colleagues in the Department of Sociology·, Autonomous University of Madrid. Victor Perez Dfaz was a colleague throughout, sharing with me his insights on the Spanish working class and his experience in survey research. Others who were extremely helpful include Ramiro Cibrian, Jordi Estivill, Antonio Izquierdo Escribano, Jesus De Miguel, Carlota Sole, and Antonio Vazquez-Barquero. I also

Acknowledgments

x1

thank sociology student Daniel Capella for his help at several key points. My debts to leaders and officials in the union movement include many above the level of the workplace inside the confederal headquarters. In Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) in Madrid I thank especially Hector Maravall and, at an earlier point, Adolfo Pastor, for taking time to answer my questions and arrange necessary help. For the Union General de Trabajadores (UGT) I thank especially the associated Fundacion Largo Caballero and its staff members for their interest in my work and their cooperation. Inside the UGT itself, Juan Mazarrasa offered help essential for me to draw the sample for Madrid. In the Socialist 'family' I also wish to thank Dieter Koniecki of the Madrid office of the Friederich Ebert Foundation for his interest in my work and for making available foundation studies and publications. The relatively closer ties between the unions and intellectual or academic life in Barcelona made my work a great pleasure there and provided me with debts too numerous to acknowledge. However, I am especially grateful to Jaime Aznar, a member of the secretariat of CCOO of Catalonia at the time of the study, for his exceptional initiative and intellectual interest in facilitating my research. Jose Luis Lopez Bulla, secretary general of CCOO of Catalonia, wrote an emphatic letter for my use and that of other interviewers, asking for collaboration with the study. Robert Martinez, with whom I shared offices in Madrid and Barcelona, offered colleagueship, advice, and support at all stages of the research and writing. The collegiality of Carol Mershon, author of a study of plant-level leaders and industrial conflict in Italy, has also been important; she shared her insights on Italian workplace unionism and offered detailed commentaries on my own work. My intellectual debt to Juan Linz is so great that no words of thanks are adequate. His influence on my understanding of politics and society and on my work has been much too pervasive to note in detail. He stimulated my interest in social science when I was an undergraduate at Yale and later during my graduate work showed me how to define a researchable topic and investigate it fully. In Madrid and in New Haven and in long-distance calls, he has generously offered advice, insights, and support at all stages of the research. The methodology of this study-the use of a sample survey of a specific social group to understand a larger political-historical process-! owe to Linz, and in the execution of the project no problem has been too

xii

Acknowledgments

large or small to attract his attention. The human concern and hospitality Linz and his wife Rocfo de Teran extend to his students as well as his great dedication to social science have created a strong sense of fellowship among those of us privileged to work with him. Also considerable has been my intellectual debt to J. Samuel Valenzuela. He has decisively shaped my understanding of both the labor movement and its role in the process of redemocratization. In his graduate course at Yale I first analyzed the problem that would occupy my efforts for several years. His encouragement and direction complemented Linz's. When I completed my research in Spain, I was fortunate to return to a stimulating environment in the graduate program in sociology encouraged by Director of Graduate Studies Scott Boorman. Through his insights and enthusiasm Boorman pushed me to develop a number of aspects of my work that would otherwise have received much more limited attention, the most important being the significance of the workplace leadership role. He also gave the manuscript a very close reading, for which I am indebted. David Cameron read the entire manuscript and helped introduce me to the study of labor and politics in Western Europe. Others who have provided helpful advice and useful comments on one chapter of the manuscript or more include Michael Barzelay, Peter Bearman, H. E. Chehabi, Julie Feinsilver, Nards Gubianas, Akiko Hashimoto, Peter Lange, Jonathan Reider, Josep Rodriguez, Frank Romo, and Michael Wallace. The efficient word processing and typing of Roger Hecht have been indispensable throughout my work on this manuscript. At Cornell University Press I am particularly indebted to Peter Agree and Kay Scheuer for expert editorial suggestions and-when necessarypatience. The encouragement and advice of friends and family members have been essential. My greatest debt in all respects is to my parents, Betty and Leo, to whose memory I dedicate this book. RoBERT

Cambridge, Massachusetts

M. FrsHMAN

Abbreviations

Acuerdo Marco lnterconfederal Acuerdo Nacional de Empleo Alianza Popular ccoo Comisiones Obreras Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas CIS Confederacion Nacional del Trabajo CNT CONC Comisio Obrera Nacional de Catalunya CSUT Confederacion de Sindicatos Unitarios de Trabajadores Organizacion Sindical Espanola OSE Partido Comunista de Espana PCE Partido Socialista Obrero Espafiol PSOE Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya PSUC Sindicato Unitario su Union del Centro Democratico UCD Union General de Trabajadores UGT uso Union Sindical Obrera AMI ANE AP

Xttt

Working-Class Organization and the Return to Democracy in Spain

1

Introduction

When Francisco Franco died in November 1975, the attention of most observers focused on the political elite in Madrid. After nearly four decades of authoritarian rule, the prospects for a return to democracy would indeed rest, in no small measure, on the actions and strategies of prominent political leaders-some inside the remnants of the Francoist system and others in the growing opposition. Yet the challenges and possibilities of that moment would be keenly felt in many arenas of collective life far removed from the center of political attention. Among the social forces committed to a comprehensive political transformation was the labor movement, an object of repression throughout the authoritarian period. This book examines labor organization and its place in the return to democratic rule. The analysis focuses on the role of labor in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, a phenomenon that has attracted growing interest in recent years. 1 It also examines both 1. The most important contribution to the growing literature on redemocratization is the large collective volume edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore, Md., 1986). Published in paperback as four separate volumes, this work includes a number of country studies as well as several comparative chapters. Especially important is the concluding theoretical statement of O'Donnell and Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Earlier studies include John Herz, ed., From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism (Westport, Conn, 1982); Julian Santamaria, Transici6n a Ia democracia en el sur de Europa y America Latina (Madrid, 1981 ). For an especially insightful paper covering many important problems of such transitions, see Juan Linz, "The Transition from Authoritarian Regimes to Democratic Political Systems and the Problems of Consolidation of Political Democracy" (paper presented at the IPSA Round Table, Tokyo, March 29-Aprill, 1982). For stimu-

1

2

Working-Class Organization

the development of union organization after decades of authoritarian repression and the constraints on the growth of unions in that context. Although the general concerns of the investigation are macropolitical, the research has focused on plant-level labor leaders, crucial and insufficiently studied actors in such macropolitical processes. The casual observer of Spain, aware of its history of revolution, civil war, and repression and cognizant of the historical role of anarcho-syndicalism and maximalist socialism in the labor movement, might have expected a great outpouring of working-class radicalism if not outright revolutionary attempts in the postauthoritarian period. The Portuguese events of 1974-1975, just before the death of Franco, seemed to encourage such expectations. But the labor movement that emerged would prove weak, broadly committed to the survival of political democracy, and in many respects moderate and selfrestrained. It is this historical experience that we must examine and explain.

The Dual Task of Labor With the death of Franco the labor movement faced the challenge of contributing to the establishment and consolidation of a democratic regime while using the developing freedoms to organize workers and secure a position of strength in Spanish society. These two broad goals-political transition and organizational growth and strengthwere both difficult to attain and, at least at times, appeared to stand in mutual tension. The central problem of this book is how the labor movement discharged these dual tasks. From the standpoint of a small radicalized minority, the political objective of democratization itself might appear questionable. But the maximalist goal of a rapid revolutionary transformation of state and society played virtually no role in the discourse of labor despite a widely shared ultimate commitment to socialist transformation. Sectors within labor differed greatly over the appropriate strategy to secure a political transition. But the objective of democratization stood virtually unchallenged. The Spanish model of redemocratization, as it took shape, emphasized sociopolitical consensus and the inclusion within the new regime lating studies on conditions leading to the collapse of democratic regimes, see Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore, Md., 1978).

Introduction

3

of all sectors willing to accept the democratic rules of the game, regardless of their political background. This emphasis raised several questions concerning labor's pursuit of its own objectives: Would the mobilization of workers by (apparently) ideologically radical organizations prove compatible with the broad social and political consensus necessary for a peaceful transition to democracy by negotiated reform? How would the great expectations of profound change fostered by the initial return of freedoms be reconciled with the limited achievements possible in the context of a regime transition by reform and a severe economic crisis? To what degree would broad political considerations help shape or limit the formulation of worker demands in the firms, and what mechanisms would account for any such influence? And, to what extent would the constraints imposed by the macropolitical goals of labor impinge upon the organizational objectives of the union movement, those of attracting the support of workers and defending their interests? By the late 1980s the two broad goals of labor have met with varying degrees of success. In a remarkable achievement, the first and most essential challenge-the return to and consolidation of democratic rule-has been surmounted with greater success and rapidity than many had assumed possible. The ability of the left to pressure and negotiate with the post-Franco (and more or less reformist) successor governments contributed crucially to the rapid move in the second half of 1976 toward a full political opening culminating in the free legislative elections of June 1977, the first since February 1936. 2 The new Cortes (the Spanish parliament) drafted a broadly 2. For a good historical treatment of the Franco period and the transition, see Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi, Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy (London, 1979). For an excellent treatment of the transition, stressing the conjunction of pressure from below with reform and negotiation from above, see Jose Maria Maravall, La politica de Ia transici6n (Madrid, 1981 ). An excellent study that includes the presentation of findings from numerous sample surveys during the transition years is Juan Linz, Manuel G6mez-Reino, Francisco Andres Orizo, and Darfo Vila, Informe sociol6gico sabre el cambia politico en Espana 1975-1981 (Madrid, 1981). On the party system that emerged from the 1977 elections, see Juan Linz, "The New Spanish Party System," in Electoral Participation, ed. Richard Rose (London/Beverly Hills, Calif., 1980), and Jorge de Esteban and Luis Lopez Guerra, Los partidos politicos en Ia Espana actual (Barcelona, 1982). On Spanish politics after Franco, see the excellent work of Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad, Spain after Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System (Berkeley, 1986). The Gunther et al. study presents a broad perspective on the emergence of a new party system based on qualitative elite-level interviewing and mass-level survey work. For a sociological essay on the party system of the Second Republic, see Juan Linz, "The Party Systems of Spain: Past and Future," in Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives, ed. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York, 1967). A standard work

4

Working-Class Organization

acceptable democratic constitution, approved in referendum in December 1978. The resulting democracy survived a serious and chilling coup attempt on February 23-24, 1981, and within two years it witnessed the smooth transfer of power from the Union del Centro Democratico (UCD) to the opposition Socialist Party (PSOE) after the latter's commanding electoral victory in October 1982. 3 Although the Spanish democracy, without question, remains more precarious than the most established representative systems of Northern Europe and North America, it has already survived longer than the previous Spanish experience in democracy, the Second Republic of the 1930s,4 and has successfully resolved most initial difficulties (although neither the lingering high unemployment nor the terrorist problem centered in the Basque Country). Democracy stands, not as the banner of hope for a bare majority or a large minority, but as the shared preference of most Spaniards of both left and right. 5 The organizational task of labor, however, has proved more troublesome. The unions did establish a fairly broad presence in workplaces throughout the economy, and by 1978 they had signed up several million members and had carried out numerous strikes and organized large demonstrations. But this initial apparent strength would soon abate, with a rapid decline in membership, a drop in worker participation in strikes and demonstrations, and a decrease in real wages. By 1982, when I completed my field work, the Spanish labor movement, almost without question, was the weakest of any Western democracy with an industrial economy. 6 This reversal in fortunes was all the more disconcerting given labor's strength in late Franco Spain. The high strike rate of the 1960s and early 1970s, when such activity was still illegal, had given many the hope that, once in English on the history of the Republic remains Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War: 1931-1939 (Princeton, N.J., 1965). 3. On the PSOE, see Jose Felix Tezanos, Sociologia del socialismo espaiiol (Madrid, 1983), and Maravall. 4. On the breakdown of democracy in Spain in the 1930s, see Juan Linz, "From Great Hopes to Civil War: The Breakdown of Democracy in Spain," in Linz and Stepan. 5. For public opinion data on the broad support for democracy, see Linz, Gomez-Reino, Andres Orizo, and Vila, pp. 613-630. For a recent valuable contribution on this question, see Peter McDonough, Samuel Barnes, and Antonio Lopez Pina, "The Growth of Democratic Legitimacy in Spain," American Political Science Review 80 (September 1986). 6. Comparative figures on the strength of unions in different national contexts are available in a number of sources including major theoretical works such as Hugh Clegg, Trade Unionism under Collective Bargaining: A Theory Based on Comparisons of Six Countries (Oxford, 1976), and John Stephens, The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism (London, 1979).

Introduction

5

democracy returned, the organized working class would be a powerful force for change and for improvement in workers' lives. Thus, paradoxically, the organizational challenge, initially appearing the less awesome of the two major tasks facing labor upon Franco's death, ultimately proved the more difficult. This crude sketch may suggest that the organizational (and therefore in some sense particular) interests of labor were sacrificed to promote the political agenda of securing a broad consensus in support of the new democracy. Such an outcome would be just the reverse of that outlined in the scenario of various theorists who envision workingclass mobilization as a major threat to the consolidation of democracies and, at times, an important causal factor in the collapse of democratic rule. In both lines of interpretation, the two main items on labor's agenda would stand in stark conflict with one another. Precisely this potential problem and the question of how labor would handle it led to my interest in the Spanish union movement during the transition. I was especially interested in the capacity of labor, to the extent necessary, to limit demands in order to advance a broad and long-term political agenda, in this case the consolidation of democracy in a country with a history of repeated authoritarian experiences. Yet in the end neither the crude sketch nor the theorists' scenario proved an accurate representation of labor's role in the political transition. Instead, the relationship between the two tasks faced by labor proved more complex and in many respects more historically contingent than suggested by such stimulating but deceptively simple formulations. In this book I have attempted to acknowledge and examine the complexity and historical contingency of these processes, while retaining the analytical approach of the broader formulations with their usefulness for posing comparative questions. I have attempted to outline the nature and dimensions of the organizational task along with the goals and activity that respond to the political task. I have analyzed the mutual influences between the two challenges and presented a rationale and procedure for examining the problem from the standpoint of the plant-level labor leaders. Yet in the end I have been led to emphasize historically contingent factors in preventing the two tasks from coming into major conflict with one another. Such tension between broad analytical questions and (in part) historically specific conclusions might prove disappointing to some investigators, but perhaps it is inevitable in a style of social science that attempts to make

6

Working-Class Organization

sense out of the choices and difficulties encountered by major sociopolitical actors. 7

Working-Class Mobilization and Political Change The organizational and political challenges workers face when they attempt to act collectively form recurrent themes in the writings of strategists and students of the labor movement. Illustrative of the fundamental importance of these two dimensions of collective worker action is the fact that the two most central works of Lenin, for better or worse the most practically important leader of the workers' movement in this century, are concerned with organization and political transition. 8 Among the formative influences on modern social science, Robert Michels stands out for his emphasis on the organizational problems and dynamics inherent in collective worker action, even if he somewhat overinterprets the macropolitical consequences of these processes. 9 More contemporary works by social scientists have stressed the difficulty any large group has in organizing to pursue its interests in political and civil society. 10 The political orientation and impact of 7. This is, of course, the Weberian tradition in social science. Weber placed the attempt to make sense out of the choices and constraints faced by social and political actors at the center of the need for a social science: his work dearly involved the posing of broad analytical problems and their complex empirical examination. However, this tension between broad problems and partially historically specific conclusions has been more or less disappointing or even unacceptable to large schools of contemporary social science. One area of current work that systematically addresses this problem is the growing corpus of mathematical and computer models whose conclusions are in fact historically specific. Historical contingencies affect the output of these models for reasons connected with the presence of certain key nonlinearities in the assumed dynamics. Many mathematical developments are quite recent and in the future may contribute to studies, such as this one, which cover broad historical processes more qualitatively. One of this new generation of strongly nonlinear dynamic models is the "cascade principle," demonstrating the feasibility of certain quite non intuitive threshold crossings in systems of weakly coupled components or "islands." For expositions of the cascade mathematics and references to other relevant literature in nonlinear phenomena, see Scott A. Boorman and Paul R. Levitt, "The Cascade Effect: An Essay in Disequilibrium Theory," in Research Methods in Social Networks Analysis, ed. L. Freeman, A. K. Romney, and D. R. White (Chicago, 1985). 8. These two works of V.I. Lenin are, of course, What Is to Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement (American ed., New York, 1969), and The State and Revolution (American ed., New York, 1971). 9. Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (American ed., New York, 1962). 10. The most influential formulation of this problem remains that of Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass., 1965). For an excellent theoretical treatment of social movements built, in part, on the work of Olson, see Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1973). This is not the place

Introduction

7

labor have, of course, received considerable attention, 11 although several influential recent interpretations have deemphasized the role of labor organization and activity in accounting for macropolitical outcomes that might conventionally be described as particularly favorable or unfavorable to labor. 12 Although there are provocative studies proposing the theses that the advance of labor organization can either contribute to the acceptance of the political status quo 13 or, under other circumstances, lead to progressive sociopolitical change, 14 from my perspective the relationship between political and organizational objectives has received entirely too little systematic treatment. However, if we focus more broadly on working-class mobilization, rather than on the organizational problem in its narrower sense, then the links between the specific aims of labor and the broad political outcomes emerge as a more prominent theme among social scientists. Analysts of the breakdown of democratic regimes in Europe in the interwar years and in Latin American in the 1960s and 1970s have placed considerable stress on the role of labor mobilization. The influential work of Guillermo O'Donnell underlines the importance of working-class mobilization (or the 'activation of the popular sectors') and the economic exhaustion of the import-substitution phase of industrialization as the major factors accounting for the 'bureaucraticauthoritarian' military coups of the Southern Cone countries, the most for a discussion of the extensive literature which has addressed the problems identified by Olson. 11. For a recent stimulating essay broadly treating the cross-national differences in working-class politics, see Seymour Martin Lipset, "Radicalism or Reformism: The Sources of Working-Class Politics," American Political Science Review 77 (March 1983). For major treatments of the role of the working class in the political cleavages and party systems of democratic nations, see the introductory chapter by Lipset and Rokkan in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York, 1967), and Richard Rose, ed., Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook (New York, 1974). A major recent contribution to the literature on crossnational differences in working-class politics is the work of J. Samuel Valenzuela, referred to extensively in the text. 12. The major comparative work of Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston, 1966), stresses, as the title suggests, the importance of agrarian structures rather than industrial ones or workers' organizations in determining the broad political outcomes attained by different countries. In a similar vein, the recent influential study of Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge, 1979), argues that the actions of workers' organizations are relatively unimportant in accounting for successful social revolutions. 13. For an argument along these lines, see Guenther Roth, The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany (Totowa, N.J., 1963), a study that centers on what Roth refers to as the "negative integration" of the labor movement and the Social Democratic party in Imperial Germany. 14. For an excellent recent example of such an argument see Stephens.

8

Working-Class Organization

economically advanced of Latin America (with the exception of oilrich Venezuela). 15 Although the thrust of much of the growing literature on 'bureaucratic authoritarianism' has been to argue that the working-class threat to the capitalist system led to reactionarytechnocratic coups, in fact most of the evidence advanced concerns purely economic demands and their impact on macroeconomic performance. 16 In contrast to the dynamic of economic mobilization and military response outlined by the 'bureaucratic authoritarianism' theorists, in interwar Europe several actual revolutionary attempts posed a more comprehensive (even if short-lived) threat to the capitalist system. To some extent in Italy, somewhat less in Germany, and more in Spain, such unsuccessful revolutions contributed indirectly to the demise of democratic regimes, forming part of the complex process of the breakdown of democracy. 17 Some analysts have overstated the degree to which the nondemocratic regimes in these countries formed a 'reaction' to the earlier revolutionary episodes. 18 Still, these cases underline the importance of working-class mobilizations, and remind us that such mobilizations for regime change can, on occasion, pose a much clearer threat to the existing order than is ever the case for purely economic demands. In our consideration of the Spanish case, then, we shall distinguish between revolutionary challenges to the state or the economic order and economic demands with their impact on macroeconomic performance. In my view this distinction is fundamental to the examination of labor mobilization and political transitions. Large strike waves and massive demonstrations by workers, as long as they center on economic demands and do not challenge the legitimacy of the existing 15. Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley, 1973). 16. For a series of essays elaborating, discussing, and challenging the O'Donnell model, see David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton, N.J., 1979). 17. For discussions of the breakdown of democracy in these countries, including consideration of the role of unsuccessful revolutions in the events leading to the end of democratic rule, see the essays on the European breakdowns in Linz and Stepan. For an insightful historical essay arguing that the Ruhr Rebellion (Germany, 1920) presented the government with difficult dilemmas contributing to the defeat of the regime-founding coalition of the Weimar Republic, see Werner T. Angress, "Weimar Coalition and Ruhr Insurrection, March-April 1920: A Study of Government Policy," journal of Modern History 29 (March 1957).

18. As a point of contrast with those who overstress the counterrevolutionary dimension of fascism, see the richly multicausal analysis of Juan Linz, "Some Notes toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective," in Fascism: A Reader's Guide, ed. Walter Laqueur (Berkeley, 1976).

Introduction

9

state, should not be confused with revolutionary actions. Lest this distinction seem unnecessary one should remember that revolutionary efforts have, in fact, played a central role in working-class mobilizations as recently as the Portuguese political transition following the coup of April 25, 1974. 19

Elements of the Problem The issue of labor and redemocratization has begun to attract considerable attention as a number of formerly authoritarian countries-Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and earlier Portugal, Greece, and Spain-return to democratic rule. With scholars working on a number of particular countries, the promise of systematic comparisons begins to emerge, although the early attempts at formulating a broadly comparative and theoretical framework for studying the problem have proved stimulating but incomplete. 2 ° Following Valenzuela (whose theoretical framework is discussed in Chapter 2), I understand the development of a labor movement to consist, essentially, of "the selection of a leadership to fill the organizational space of the labor movement. " 21 The organizational task faced by labor, then, involves the emergence of new leadership groups or the consolidation of preexisting ones. These competing leaderships must, in Valenzuela's framework, contend for both worker support and recognition from employers and 19. For a good account of the Portuguese experience with extensive bibliographic references, see Kenneth Maxwell, "The Emergence of Portuguese Democracy," in Herz. An excellent study of the agrarian revolution and the broader dynamics of the Portuguese case is Nancy Gina Bermeo, The Revolution within the Revolution: Workers' Control in Rural Portugal (Princeton, N.J., 1986). 20. For an early effort that suggests many lines for further work, see Alessandro Pizzorno and J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Labor under Redemocratization" (paper presented at the Wilson Center Conference on "Transitions from Authoritarianism and Prospects for Democracy in Latin American and Latin Europe: Cross National Themes," Washington, D.C.: June 4-7, 1981). As this book goes to press, the comparative work of Valenzuela on labor and transitions has progressed significantly, promising soon to lead to the publication of stimulating conclusions. A conference organized by Valenzuela at the Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame, in April 1988 permitted the drawing of many rich comparisons. Papers presented at the conference are to be published in a volume edited by Valenzuela. 21. See J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Labor Movement Formation and Politics: The Chilean and French Case in Comparative Perspective, 1850-1950" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1979). See also J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Uno schema teorico per l'analisi della formazione del movimiento opcraio," Stato e Mercato 1 (December 1981), and J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Movimientos obreros y sistemas politicos: Un analisis conceptual y tipol6gico," Desarrollo Econ6mico 23 (October 1983).

10

Working-Class Organization

the state. This understanding of labor movement formation suggests the importance of examining the unions' organizational development from the standpoint of the labor leaders, as I have done in this study. However, my interest in analyzing the possible tensions between the two tasks of labor requires a more lengthy and careful consideration of the nature of the organizational challenge. As I argue in Chapter 2, the plant-level labor leaders on whom I have focused my research are central actors in the process of organizational development; yet their very existence, far from assured, instead constitutes a yardstick of the advance of that process. This understanding of the organizational problem of unionism and the role of the workplace leaders underlies my use of the data from my survey of plant-level leaders, informing the discussion of the organizational task. For this reason we shall consider at length the role of the workplace leaders in the problem of union organization. This treatment might seem excessive to those interested exclusively in the macrohistorical problem of the transition, but it allows us to analyze the issues of concern with greater rigor than would otherwise be possible; additionally, this approach may increase the study's relevance for those either interested in unionism under democracy or more broadly concerned with general theoretical issues of the aggregation of individual characteristics and collective outcomes. Thus, in this book the challenge of labor organization is more than an element of the larger historical problem we attempt to analyze. It is, in itself, a problem requiring substantial attention. My emphasis on the plant-level leaders leads me to examine, in Chapter 3, their social background characteristics. The analysis in that chapter attempts to underline those factors that encourage the development of workplace leadership. In order to delineate the dimensions of the organizational task presented by the return of democratic freedoms, as well as to locate the investigation historically, I return in Chapter 4 to the Franco period and the type of labor opposition that then existed. The intention is to examine the forms of union-type activity possible under repression, so as to appreciate the legacy of authoritarian rule for labor and its subsequent impact on the union movement during the transition. But in posing these questions, Chapter 4 also complements and extends the consideration in Chapter 2 of the organizational problem of unions and shows how (within limits) collective worker action and the representation of interests may be possible even without the formal presence of union organization (or opposition activists)

Introduction

11

inside the workplace. The two chapters, taken together, represent an analysis of activism, union organization, and collective worker action under democratic and nondemocratic conditions. If I had chosen to construct a strictly chronological narrative, Chapter 4 would clearly have gone first. The actual ordering of the two reflects the analytical goal to first establish the ordinary character of the organizational problem faced by unions and the crucial role, in this regard, of workplace leaders such as those I surveyed. Only on this basis can one appreciate both the extraordinary character of the forms of collective worker action possible under repression and their legacy for the tasks of democratic unionism in the transition. Parallel to our examination of the organizational task is the consideration of the political challenge faced by labor in the context of the transition. This is the main topic of Chapter 5 and a key theme in several other chapters as well. However, the specifically macropolitical issues posed by the transition receive, perhaps, less sustained attention than the political-organizational ones. This decision not to undertake a more extensive conceptual treatment of the macrolevel problem of transition reflects, in part, the great complexity of a tranc sition from authoritarianism to democracy and the more or less decisive importance of numerous factors-the role of the king, the character of the institutions of the Franco regime, the multinational makeup of Spain, to name only a few-that cannot be adequately addressed in a study focusing on labor and its political role. Thus, this book should not be confused with a general history or a comprehensive political analysis of the transition, two broader objectives toward which it contributes partially. Instead, I examine how the development of a union movement and a system of industrial relations reinforces or detracts from the consolidation of a new democracy. 22 My understanding of the political problem of the transition obviously follows the theoretical works of Linz on authoritarian regimes and regime transitions, as well as his specific studies of Spain. 23 Crucially, 22. For an important theoretical and empirical study that analyzes the interplay between the installation of a regime and the attempt to institutionalize a system of interest intermediation, see Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton, N.J., 1978). 23. For his typological and comparative treatment of nondemocratic regimes, see Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Handbook of Political Science, vol. 3: Macropolitical Theory, ed. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, Mass., 1975). For his influential early formulation of the authoritarian regime type, see Juan Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain," in Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems, ed. Erik Allard and Yrjo Littunen (Helsinki, 1964). Linz's comparative analysis of the breakdown of democracy, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown,

12

Working-Class Organization

I assume that the way in which key problems are handled during the installation of the new democracy is' potentially decisive for the regime's long-run stability. Chapter 6 returns to the organizational theme, examining more concretely the difficulty of building a strong union movement during the transition years. Among more or less political phenomena, it is the legacy of Francoism and the obligatory "vertical union" that proves most crucial in accounting for the current weakness of the unions. The fact that the legacy of Francoism for workers cannot be understood as exclusively political or organizational underlines how the two dimensions of labor's agenda on which we focus are strongly intertwined. In Chapter 7, I search for any possible tensions between the political and organizational tasks in formulating labor demands. The apparent restraint of the unions, both inside the plant and in nationwide negotiations, is the focus of the discussion. In this context I attempt to assess the meaning of the peak-level pacts or accords negotiated by nationwide leaders of business, labor, and political parties. I account for labor's limitations by considering a wide array of factors, including conceptions of the legitimacy of the state and the impact of the economic cns1s. Thus, as the work progresses our consideration of the two tasks of labor becomes increasingly intermeshed. I close by reconsidering why these two central challenges did not enter into greater conflict in Spain, and by asking what lessons for other countries can be drawn from the Spanish case and our approach to it. The keystone of the research, a survey of 324 plant-level leaders in Madrid and Barcelona, the two largest provinces, is described in a methodological appendix. The less quantifiable aspects of the investigation-attendance at numerous union and party congresses, assemblies, and demonstrations; interviews with higher-level union officials and informed observers; observation of union election campaignsare alluded to in the text but not discussed in detail. However, without this qualitative sense of the labor movement it would have been far more difficult to interpret the results of the survey meaningfully. and Reequilibration (Baltimore, Md., 1978), actually includes many crucial theoretical insights on transitions to democracy and conditions for consolidating democratic regimes. For his analysis of interest groups under differing political regimes in Spain, see Juan Linz, "A Century of Politics and Interests in Spain," in Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism and the Transformation of Politics, ed. Suzanne Berger (Cambridge, 1981).

Introduction

13

The reader will, doubtless, note that the use of survey data here differs, in some respects, from what has become routine in the social sciences. The analysis of individual-level differences in attitudes and characteristics, which would have fully absorbed many investigators, 'occupies relatively little of our energies. Instead, in this book use of the survey data is more oriented toward historical and macrolevel problems. In my view there is a need for an increasing convergence between survey research methodology and the broad formulations and objects of inquiry of historical and macrolevel social scientists. The questionnaire study, attempting to stand outside history and focusing only on individual attitudes and characteristics, is all the more deeply limited by its historical context and conditioned by broad structural factors. However, the problems examined by historical and macrolevel analysts in many cases cannot be adequately resolved without the empirical data provided by sample surveys of key social groups such as workplace union leaders, employers, party activists, municipal councilors, church leaders, and so on. Historical Background

Prior to the repressive decades launched by the military-led uprising of July 18, 1936, the Spanish labor movement was divided in two ideologically distinct wings: the anarcho-syndicalist Confederaci6n Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) and the socialist Union General de Trabajadores (UGT). 24 The CNT was, by most standards, the more ideologically radical of the two, but during the course of the Second Republic (1931-1936) the UGT underwent a massive radicalization parallel to the leftward evolution of the closely allied Socialist party (PS0£). 25 The Spanish Communists of the Partido Comunista de Espana (PCE), by contrast, were relatively weak until the outbreak of civil war in the summer of 1936. The radicalization of the Socialists 24. For an excellent work that includes extensive treatment of the left under the Republic and before, see Edward Malefakis, Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: Origins of the Civil War (New Haven, Conn., 1970). A good history of the Spanish left is Stanley Payne, The Spanish Revolution (New York, 1970). 25. For a recent stimulating interpretation of the conditions surrounding the radicalization of the Socialists and the collapse of the Republic, see Paul Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and Revolution in the Second Republic (London, 1978). Much more than Malefakis or Payne, Preston sees the leftward move of the Socialists and the demise of the Republic as the result of the unwillingness of the right and the dominant classes to accept the social reforms placed on the political agenda in the first years of the Republic.

14

Working-Class Organization

found ideological expression in the move toward Leninism and in praise for the Soviet Union on the part of the sector under the leadership of Francisco Largo Caballero; in practical politics the most dramatic confirmation of the Socialists' move to the left came in October 1934 with a major, if ultimately unsuccessful, revolutionary attempt. The uprising was most successful in the northern mining region of Asturias, reconquered by government troops only after several weeks' fighting. 26 To be sure, there were also more or less 'corporatist' strains in Spanish unionism, best exemplified by the Socialists' partial implication in the labor policy of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship of the 1920s. 27 Catholic unionists were relatively insignificant except for the Basque Country where the regional nationalist Solidarity of Basque Workers (ELA-STV) competed with the UGT for workers' support. The pre-Franco labor movement, then, was characterized by divisions largely political in nature. With the military uprising of July 1936 the political role of the workers' movement increased dramatically. Armed workers joined the loyal minority in the armed forces to defend the Republic from the right-wing rebellion. The arming of the workers combined with the abandonment of the Republic by much of its security forces led to a classic revolutionary situation of dual sovereignty in the Republican zone. 28 Labor organizations took control of many factories, especially in Catalonia where the CNT was dominant, and established revolutionary committees that shared power with the remnants of the legitimate state. 29 Thus the civil war would leave Spain with a legacy more complicated than suggested by the triumph of a right-wing coalition under the leadership of Franco. The struggles between sectors of the left in the Republican zone and the history of a defeated social revolution would leave their imprint 26. An account of the events in Asturias can be found in all major histories of the period. For a consideration of the Spanish October and numerous documents dealing with it, see Marta Bizcarrondo, Octubre de/34: Reflexiones sabre una revolucion (Madrid, 1977). 27. On interest groups under Primo de Rivera, see Linz, "A Century." 28. For a recent interpretation of revolutions stressing (following Trotsky) the central importance of dual sovereignty, see Charles Tilly, "Revolutions and Collective Violence," in Handbook of Political Science, voi. 3: Macropolitical Theory, ed. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, Mass., 1975). For an excellent empirical analysis, see James Rule and Charles Tilly, "Political Process in Revolutionary France, 1830-1832," in 1830 in France, ed. John Merriman (New York, 1975). 29. For an outstanding account by a sociological observer of dual sovereignty in the Republican zone, see Franz Borkenau, The Spanish Cockpit: An Eye-Witness Account of the Political and Social Conflicts of the Spanish Civil War (Ann Arbor, 1963). The existence of this recent historical experience of revolutionary dual sovereignty makes all the more noteworthy the current legitimacy of the democratic state.

Introduction

15

on the collective political memory of Spaniards. It is this record of deep divisions within the left itself and of the revolutionary challenge it posed to the existing order that makes the subsequent political history seem all the more remarkable. The four decades of authoritarian rule opened with a severe repression of the left and the regional nationalists as well as with the onset of serious economic difficulties. The first years of Francoist rule witnessed the regime's only partial approximation to the fascist model of ideological mass mobilization. However, the fascist elements of the regime-founding coalition were never dominant and became increasingly less important. 30 The divisions within the regime and its inability or unwillingness to organize civil society left important spaces for opposition activity of varying political shades. During the last two decades of Francoist rule, when a new opposition labor movement would develop, the level of repression was well below that of the earlier authoritarian period. Still, the activists of the illegal unions and the left parties risked arrest and in unusual cases even execution. As we shall discuss in depth in Chapter 4, during this period a new union movement, Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) emerged, at first largely spontaneously. Both the UGT and CNT had been nearly destroyed by the severe repression following the civil war, and their ideological opposition to using the official "vertical unions" of the regime prevented them from matching the growing capacity of CCOO to mobilize workers. In the course of the 1960s Comisiones came to be led increasingly by Communist labor militants. This largely Communist-led labor movement scored considerable successes in elections to plant-level committees within the official regime unions and managed to mobilize a high level of strikes despite their illegality. A smaller opposition union that emerged at roughly the same time was the Union Sindical Obrera (USO) formed by Catholic worker activists and independent self-management socialists. Thus, the political division of the labor movement multiplied during the Franco period and was to increase still further at the time of the regime transition. Two new union confederations-the Confederaci6n de Sindicatos Unitarios de Trabajadores (CSUT) and the Sindicato Unitario (SU)-split 30. For an analysis of the Spanish single party and its incapacity to penetrate and mobilize society in the fashion of a totalitarian party, see Juan Linz, "From Falange to MovimientoOrganizaci6n: The Spanish Single Party and the Franco Regime, 1936-1968," in Authoritarian Politics in Modern Societies: The Dynamics of Established One Party Systems, ed. S. Huntington and C. Moore (New York, 1970). The standard history of the Falange in English remains Stanley Payne, Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism (Stanford, Calif., 1961).

16

Working-Class Organization

off from CCOO in 1977, just as unions were again legalized. These two small confederations were linked to more or less Maoist parties to the left of the PCE. Although I shall not dwell on regional nationalist unionism in this study with its research focus on Madrid and Barcelona, in the Basque Country, and to a lesser extent in Galicia, unions linked to regional nationalist parties play a central role in the labor movement. In the Basque Country the historic nationalist union, ELA-STV, has had to compete with more radical unionists linked to the independentist terrorists. This politically divided labor movement would form one of the principal forces pushing to end authoritarian rule and return to democracy. Yet it would not be strong enough to bring about a transition by ruptura, that is, a rapid and clear break with the past. Instead, after Franco's death in November 1975, the more or less reformist forces within the regime would come to play a decisive role. King Juan Carlos himself served as a symbol of continuity in legal forms blended with the determination to accomplish a full and authentic democratization. His appointment of Adolfo Suarez as prime minister in summer 1976 led to concern and skepticism on the part of prodemocratic forces regarding the possibilities for change, sentiments perhaps most concisely expressed at the time in the famous judgment of the conservative historian Ricardo de Ia Cierva: "Que error, que inmenso error." But the choice of Suarez would prove to be no error. His commitment to change, it became clear, was more thoroughgoing than that of the previously more well-known regime politicians publicly identified with the desire for democratic reform. Furthermore, his great abilities in persuasion, compromise, and public appeals on television were well suited for the challenges of the transition. Suarez was to remain as prime minister through various phases of the political transformation until his resignation under still enigmatic circumstances in winter 1981, several weeks before the coup attempt of February 23, 1981. Suarez and the Union del Centro Democratico (UCD), the party he joined and subsequently led to victory in the first parliamentary elections of June 1977, formed the keystone of the Spanish model of redemocratization by negotiated reform. With a political and historical sensibility similar to that of many major social scientific discussions of transitions, Suarez and the UCD attempted to avoid useless conflict over issues from the past in order to create a legitimate space within the new democratic regime for all political forces-those pre-

Introduction

17

viously identified with Francoism as well as the various degrees and shades of opposition-prepared to accept democracy. Along these lines they attempted to establish the broadest possible regimefounding coalition and to formulate an initial agenda that would defuse potential sources of conflict rather than provoke them. One crucial area of such potential conflict and of policy-making designed to avoid it concerned the challenge to the central state posed by peripheral nationalisms, and the state's regionalization. This problem, vital though it was to the chances for consolidating democracy, will not form part of our analysis. Instead we concentrate on another arena of potential conflict-the relations between labor and employers and the state-and its handling during the transition period. The politics of consensus designed by Suarez to carry out the regime transformation by negotiated reform found its expression in the sphere of industrial relations in a number of agreements discussed and signed at the peak level, the first of which was the Moncloa Pact signed in October 1977. We shall focus on the interplay between the political process of redemocratization and the organizational efforts and initial mobilizational effervescence of labor. The Spanish path to democracy, as I have emphasized, was premised on the goal of defusing possible sources of conflict. The feasibility and implications of such a style of redemocratization can be assessed only by examining closely one of the potential sources of conflict-a sector with grievances to be voiced and its own organizational agenda to pursue in the context of the return of democratic freedoms. It is for this reason that I have focused on unionism at the plant level where most conflict and organizational activity take place. Thus the emphasis on what might be termed the 'microorganizational' activity of labor flows from a broader interest in the viability and implications of transition by negotiated reform. Yet this book's stress on plant-level unionism should not obscure the overriding importance of the macropolitical challenge of establishing and consolidating a stable democracy. The coup attempt of February 23, 1981, reminded all Spaniards how valuable and potentially fragile their democracy was. That afternoon and evening, the country briefly listened to recordings of martial music over the radio and observed the suspension of regular programming on television, the parliament fell under military occupation, the government was held hostage, the citizens of Valencia experienced the declaration of martial law, and rumors of troop movements swept other cities; it then seemed that all the efforts and hopes of the previous five years

18

Working-Class Organization

might collapse in one night. That democracy survived the crisis and subsequently attained a greater degree of consolidation must be attributed, in part, to the actions in key moments of great leaders, most especially the king, as well as to the cumulative impact of the political choices made by Suarez and other national figures. But, as the more structural theorists of regime transformations emphasize, the broad patterns of socioeconomic and political cleavages help shape the choices available to historical actors. Yet such an intellectual opposition of leadership and action with structure and constraint would be a misleading point of departure for our analysis. As I shall argue in Chapter 2, questions that at one level appear structural or macrohistorical-for example, the role of labor in the transition, the implication of the working class in the social order, the interactions among employers, unions, and the state-rest on human action and leadership that are themselves problematic, that cannot be taken for granted. The leaders and significant actors, on whose efforts the success of the transition rested, included those to be found at many points in the social structure far removed from the great centers of power.

2

Workplace Leaders and Union Organization

As we set out to analyze the development of unionism with the return to democratic rule and the role of labor organization in the larger political transformation, we face the choice of where to direct our intellectual efforts and what type of research to conduct. Much thinking on the working class, its support for collective labor action, and its place in or against the existing social order is based on the analysis of the attitudes of individual workers as reflected in surveys. 1 This study instead addresses research activities and centers interpretations around the workplace-level leadership of the labor movement and its role in the processes which concern us. This decision is suggested in part by the existence of much excellent research on the attitudes of individual workers 2 and public opinion in general' during 1. An excellent critical review of this literature, distinguishing among different types of theorizing on individual-level worker attitudes, is the article by John Low-Beer, "Cultural Determinism, Technological Determinism, and the Action Approach: Competing Explanations of New Working Class Militancy," Research in the Sociology of Work 1 (1981). Low-Beer is a major contributor to the literature on worker attitudes and class consciousness or militancy as seen from the individual level, with his Protest and Participation: The New Working Class in Italy (New York, 1978). 2. The large survey research project on working-class attitudes carried out by Victor Perez Diaz in 1978 and again in 1980 has, justifiably, made a great impact on the understanding of all observers of Spanish labor. The study, begun at a time when the Spanish working class was still thought of by many as quite radicalized, demonstrated the complexity of worker attitudes and their underlying moderation. Perez Diaz's study has led to rwo books: Clase obrera, partidos y sindicatos (Madrid, 1979), and Clase obrera, orden social y conciencia de clase (Madrid, 1980). For his discussion of the findings of the 1980 replication of the original survey, see "Los obreros espaiioles ante el sindicato y Ia acci6n colectiva en 1980," Papeles de Economia Espanola, no. 6 (Madrid, 1980). Another major contribution to the understanding of the attitudes of industrial workers in Spain is Jose Felix Tezanos, Crisis de Ia conciencia obrera? (Madrid, 1982). Tezanos's study, based on

19

20

Working-Class Organization

the period of political transition and the consolidation of the new democratic regime. The findings of this research will, or at least should, form part of our understanding of labor in the transition to democracy. Nevertheless, the labor movement and collective action by workers are not the simple or automatic result of the summation of the attitudes and characteristics of all individual workers in a society. Among other factors of crucial importance are the plant-level union leaders themselves who form a more significant and independent influence than is normally appreciated, especially in a context such as newly democratic Spain where organization building and political transition represent the historical agenda of labor. However, it is not sufficient simply to assert the significance of the workplacelevel leadership; the relevance of this point for the way we conceive of and study labor movements and for this investigation warrants a more careful development of the argument. Not all social-science thinking stresses individual-level attitudes and characteristics. Perhaps the most influential alternative approach to the study of labor conflict is that of Charles Tilly, who sees various forms of social conflict, including strikes, as organizational and political phenomena rather than as the consequences of individual "frustrations," be they psychological or economic. 4 In Tilly's view conflict is one form taken by collective action on the part of groups contending a survey of industrial workers in the province of Madrid, deals with the theoretical issues of class consciousness and embourgeoisement. In addition to the theoretical and empirical discussion, the methodological introduction-noting the impossibility of gaining access to many of the sampled factories-should be read by researchers involved in designing a study of working class attitudes. (The obvious advantages of sampling through the workplace rather than residence should be weighed against the refusal of many industrial establishments to grant access, thus introducing a possible bias in survey findings.) For a good example of the use of such individual-level survey data for a strategic analysis of workingclass mobilizational options, from a leftist point of view, see Antonio Izquierdo Escribano, "Juicios y actitudes de los trabajadores en paro y de los ocupados segun encuestas recientes," Mientras Tanto, no. 12 (Barcelona, 1982). 3. The most comprehensive work on public opinion and the political party system during the transition period is Juan Linz, Manuel G6mez-Reino, Francisco Andres Orizo, and Dario Vila, Informe socio/6gico sobre el cambio politico en Espana 1975-1981 (Madrid, 1981). This lengthy volume includes data from numerous surveys conducted at different moments in the transition process. It also includes extensive bibliographic references. Another important analysis of the political transition with much public opinion data is Jose Maria Maravall, La politica de Ia transici6n 1975-1980 (Madrid, 1981). See also the Revista Espanola de Investigaciones Sociol6gicas, for the periodic "barometers of public opinion" and numerous articles. 4. Charles Tilly's most comprehensive exposition of his theoretical approach to varying types of collective action including strikes is From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass., 1978). The book includes an extensive critical review of the literature dealing with the topic. For his empirical treatment of strikes in France within this theoretical framework, see Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly, Strikes in France, 1830-1968 (Cambridge, 1974).

Workplace Leaders and Union Organization

21

for power. For conflict to occur, individuals must be mobilized into groups prepared to defend their interests in relation to other collectivities or the state. Because many of the demands and much of the resistance characterizing collective action are directed toward the state, political variables together with organizational variables-specifically the degree to which individuals are mobilized into groupsdetermine the level of conflict. Strikes, Tilly argues, are to a large degree the result of the organization of workers into unions and the relation of the labor movement to the state. Collective action by workers, then, does not automatically follow their individual complaints but requires their mobilization into organizations such as unions. The Tilly school of analysis indicates the importance of studying labor organization and its relationship to politics rather than focusing exclusively on individual worker attitudes. However, subsequent developments in this sociological school have been principally in the area of strikes,' with little to say about the problem immediately at hand: the role of plant-level leaders in unionism and labor conflict. Other theorists of the labor movement are more directly relevant. Valenzuela, in a formulation enormously helpful in the design of this study, has argued that the formation of labor movements should be thought of as a process which 'selects' one or more groups of leaders to "fill the organizational space of the labor movement." 6 The leaderships, Valenzuela argues, fill this space-that is, they consolidate the position of the movements they head-as the result of a complex process that can in no sense be reduced to the automatic aggregation of individual worker attitudes. Instead, success requires "the obtaining of a) the allegiance of a significant number of workers, b) organizational linking, that is, the building of a network with national reach, c) recognition from employers, and d) recognition from the state." 7 The two requirements extrinsic to the working class, recognition by employers and by the state, are important in order to permit unions to operate without repression as well as to provide labor with ne5. An especially influential formulation by a student of Tilly has been that of David Snyder in his article, "Institutional Setting and Industrial Conflict: Comparative Analyses of France, Italy and the United States," American Sociological Review 40 (June 1975). Snyder argues that the makeup of the determinants of strike action-whether organizational and political as in Tilly's model or economic as suggested by others--depends on the institutional setting of the particular country involved. This interpretation has stimulated much additional work on strikes by other researchers. 6. See J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Labor Movement Formation and Politics: The Chilean and French Cases in Comparative Perspective, 1850-1950" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1979). 7. Ibid., 323-324.

22

Working-Class Organization

gotiating partners, thus allowing the leadership the possibility of winning concrete gains for the workers. The fact that worker allegiance is only one of the four factors necessary for success explains how it is possible that nations with working classes quite similar sociologically or at least economically may nevertheless produce labor movements that are very different ideologically. The great variation that exists from society to society in the pattern of repression or recognition by the employers and the state is, in Valenzuela's model, especially significant in the determination of the shape the labor movement is to take. Valenzuela's framework highlights the need to study leaders and rank-and-file workers as distinct levels of the labor movement with different roles and experiences. Their views on large political and ideological matters may be quite different, since neither level 'mechanically' mirrors the other. The implications of this interpretation should be clear: Research should not be limited to individual worker attitudes but should be directed as well to the leadership, its attitudes and its relationship to rank-and-file workers, labor organizations, employers, and the state. Nevertheless, Valenzuela seldom distinguishes between the national and workplace leaders of labor and therefore does not develop the specific importance and problematic nature of the plant-level leadership. Hugh Clegg, in perhaps the major theoretical statement to emerge from the industrial relations tradition, also stresses the importance of structural factors, rather than individual worker attitudes, in explaining country to country variations in union activity, strength, and forms of organization. 8 Trade Unionism under Collective Bargaining: A Theory Based on Comparisons of Six Countries, Clegg's broad interpretive work, explores, as the title suggests, the ways in which variations in the pattern of collective bargaining can account for national differences in unionism. The central argument holds that, "where collective bargaining is the predominant method of regulation, its dimensions account for union behavior more adequately than any other set of explanatory variables can do." 9 Clegg has been criticized for being excessively "institutionalist," 10 and he does employ, to ad8. See Hugh Clegg, Trade Unionism under Collective Bargaining: A Theory Based on Comparisons of Six Countries (Oxford, 1976). Clegg himself does not emphasize the fact that his theory stresses structural rather than individual-level causal factors. 9. Ibid., 11. 10. See Walter Korpi and Michael Shalev, "Strikes, Industrial Relations, and Class Conflict in Capitalist Societies," The British Journal of Sociology 30 (June 1979). Korpi and Shalev's criticism of Clegg is one of the weakest points in an otherwise very strong

Workplace Leaders and Union Organization

23

vantage, his considerable knowledge of national variations in the pattern of collective bargaining. However, Clegg does not view collective bargaining as an institution set in stone and autonomous of social influence, but rather as the result of the relationship between the unions and employers and the state. Although Clegg is concerned with bargaining and the nuts and bolts of established unionism, whereas Valenzuela analyzes the historical formation of labor movements, there are significant parallels in the conclusions (though perhaps not in the line of argument) of these two comparative theorists of labor. Notwithstanding the major differences in emphasis and object of inquiry of the two analysts, both see the structure of the relationship between union organization on the one hand and employers and the state on the other as the key to understanding the varying forms of unionism we can observe today in different national contexts. However, neither Valenzuela nor Clegg develops sufficiently the specific importance and the problematic nature of the plant-levelleadership in the development and performance of unionism. Despite the power of interpretations such as those just outlined, it is important to remember the frequency with which analysts of labor look to the attitudes and characteristics of individual workers to explain phenomena that can be better understood as the result of broader processes. Even those who may include some reference to the state, employers, and leadership in their explanations tend to return too quickly to the assumption of the determinacy of individual worker views. This point is well illustrated by an argument, admittedly minor, to be found in Labor Organizations, a major work on unionism by Mark van de Vall. Van de Vall reasons that a relative decline in the status of civil servants in the United States probably accounts for an observed increase in the level of unionization among these employees in the 1960s, while other white-collar workers remained largely outside of unions. 11 The line of reasoning is clear: individual worker dissatisfactions add up to unionization. Clegg presents a much more compelling explanation for the same phenomenon: In 1962 President Kennedy issued an executive order extending collective bargaining argument. They reason that politics cannot be excluded from the study of unionism since it plays a key role in class relations, and they attempt to show that the political power of workers as manifested by leftist participation in government is a major factor in determining the level of strikes. 11. See Mark van de Vall, Labor Organizations: A Macro- and Micro-Sociological Analysis on a Comparative Basis (Cambridge, 1970), 26.

24

Working-Class Organization

rights to public employment where the Wagner Act had not applied. As a result of this recognition of the right of labor organizations to represent federal employees in bargaining, "union density rose rapidly to a figure approaching 50 percent." 12 This example underscores the importance of developing interpretive models that highlight the key variables, even if they are not found at the individual level. Before considering the plant-level leadership and its role in unionism, it will be useful to first briefly discuss another style of theorizing that criticizes the assumptions of the simple adding up of individual attitudes and dispositions. In "Threshold Models of Collective Behavior,"13 Mark Granovetter argues that a number of phenomenafor example, riots, strikes, and leaving social occasions-cannot be predicted or understood by adding up the number of people who favor or oppose such actions. The individual decision to participate in such 'collective behavior,' Granovetter reasons, is based on a calculus of costs and benefits, both of which will be affected by the number of people involved in the activity. Thus, some potential rioters with a threshold of thirty require the participation of that many persons before they will join in; others may have a threshold of, say, sixty; and the occasional 'instigator' with a threshold of zero is willing to initiate the activity. The payoff for Granovetter is the finding that small changes in the distribution of thresholds in a group-for instance the switch from thresholds of one and two to three and four on the part of two individuals-may change the outcome in favor or against the actual occurrence of a riot or other examples of 'collective behavior.' Such minor changes by a few individuals, Granovetter rightly notes, would seem insignificant to the conventional researcher. Granovetter's scheme suggests the possibility that we might choose to view the plant-level leaders as workers with a zero threshold, those willing to engage in strikes or other union activity even when nobody else does so. In fact, such a conception of the workplace labor leaders would be seriously mistaken, and the contrast between it and their actual role helps clarify the nature of the activity of these key unionists. The factory-level leaders do not simply engage in the same activity as other unionists, differing only in a willingness to begin the activitya strike, a demonstration, carrying a union card, and so on-before other workers; instead, the leaders must actively encourage and coordinate activity, employing both formal political skills such as pre12. Clegg, 26. 13. Mark Granovetter, "Threshold Models of Collective Behavior," American Journal of Sociology 83 (May 1978).

Workplace Leaders and Union Organization

25

siding or speaking in meetings and informal skills of association and discussion with other workers. 14 The role also involves dealings with others besides the workers themselves: employers, supervisors, the confederal union hierarchy, and sometimes political parties or representatives of the state. Far from always being the first to strike, the leader may actually restrain some of the most eager would-be strikers from acting until it is clear that support among the workers is sufficient to make a successful outcome likely. JS Furthermore, the risk of repression is significantly greater for the workplace leader than for Granovetter's strike 'instigator' with a zero threshold. The lone 'striker' risks the loss of a day's pay or at worse dismissal from his job, but in many historical contexts (and still today in many repressive systems) the factory-level leader is in danger of jailing as well as blacklisting, excluding him from employment anywhere. The point to be underlined is that in unionism and collective worker action workers are by no means all doing the same thing with variations limited to the intensity of their daring, conviction, or anger. Granovetter thus weakens his argument by suggesting that it may be equally applicable to such divergent phenomena as leaving a social occasion and strikes. In the former case the threshold models are very helpful for understanding observed behavior. However, in the latter case the threshold paradigm is of a very limited usefulness, since collective action by workers normally requires conscious coordination and mobilization rather than the contagion of individual acts. Even where formal union organization is totally absent, successful collective action by workers may require informal leadership that actively forges alliances among the employees much as a formal union leadership might do, thereby making it possible to prevail in a confrontation with the employer. 16 This fact that the activity of workplace-level leaders is different in content from that of rank-and-file union members is of central importance for this study. For this reason we will now explore in greater detail the role of the plant-level leaders in union organization. 14. An outstanding examination of the activities of the plant-level leadership in a company with a strong union presence is Eric Batstone, Ian Boraston, and Stephen Frenkel,

Shop Stewards in Action: The Organization of Workplace Conflict and Accommodation

(Oxford, 1977). This work, which stresses both the formal and informal dimensions of leadership activity, will be discussed more thoroughly below. 15. Of course, not all labor leaders act in this fashion, discouraging the most militant workers from striking when the odds are that the strike will fail and lead to demoralization. 16. This is one of the findings of Frank Romo in "Moral Dynamics: A Block Modelling Study of Conflict and Coalition Formation in a Mental Institution" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1986). This sociological study analyzes, in part, employer/employee relations.

26

Working-Class Organization The Basic Argument

Before developing the argument let us first examine its principal points: 1. The workplace labor leaders are essential if there is to be formal activity, an "organizational presence," in the plant. Even with no leadership a few isolated members may be present in some workplaces; but they add up to little in the society as a whole, and their impact within the firm is minimal. 2. Such leaders are generally, though not absolutely always, necessary for collective worker action to take place within the firm. 3. There is, however, an inadequate supply of plant leaders at the level of the society as a whole and sometimes even within firms with an established tradition of unionism. Numerous workplaces have no leader to mobilize and coordinate activity; many others have only a leader of one or another union or faction. Union confederations with a great visibility in the nationwide media may nevertheless be unable to establish a leadership presence in most firms, thus making it impossible for them to gain dominance within the labor movement even if their program may be, in principle, attractive to most workers. 4. The views of the workplace leaders may be significantly different from the majority of rank-and-file workers. 5. These leaders are subject to problems and pressures not always shared by other workers, including the risk of repression by employers or the state. 6. The plant-level leaders may attempt to mobilize (or demobilize) the workers in their firm and may try (with more or less success) to influence their views on political or labor matters. Any coordinated attempt to mobilize or demobilize labor conflict throughout the society must include the participation of workplace leaders. 7. These leaders link the different levels of the labor movement: the workers in the plants with frequently limited and immediate concerns, and the national union leadership with its broad strategies and aims in political and labor matters. 8. The workplace leaders form a heterogeneous group, and they may differ considerably from the national leadership of labor on matters of opinion as well as experience.

The Need for Leadership in the Firm For the unions to have a formal structure, an organizational presence within the firm, they must have leaders within the workplace

Workplace Leaders and Union Organization

27

willing to undertake the tasks and the risks of labor organization. In one way or another, depending on the institutional forms of worker representation and organization in the countries involved, 17 these leaders establish and maintain the presence of their union among the workers in the firm. Thus, they are essential if the union is to undertake activity inside the firm. The workplace leaders are important as well, though not essential, for the existence of union structures and strength at the national level, for without them few workers join the unions, and the labor organizations suffer from very low membership. In Spain the major form of worker representation within the factories has been the works committee (comite de empresa) established by statute and elected by all workers in the firms regardless of union affiliation. Most candidates for posts on these committees represent one or another of the competing union confederations, and the elected delegates normally become the key union leaders within the firm. 18 Participation in both collective bargaining and official bodies dealing with labor matters is based on the results of the elections (normally referred to as union elections) to the works committees. Thus, the plant-level leaders must be able to win election to the committees if their unions are to be legally empowered to represent workers. The plant-level leaders play a role of obvious importance in persuading workers to join unions and, in fact, in providing them with something to join. However, it should be noted that in many countries a worker may still choose to become a union member, even without leaders or union presence in his or her workplace. In Spain, for instance, a few workers in such work situations may enroll as members through territorial offices either for political motives or to secure legal assistance from the unions. 19 Hamilton makes the point clearly in 17. For a comparative treatment of the terms of representation of workers and unions within the firm in Western Europe, see Anthony Carew, Democracy and Government in European Trade Unions (London, 1976); and Manuel Ludevid Anglada, El sindicato dentro de Ia empresa: La experiencia Europea. el caso espaiiol (Barcelona, 1979). Ludevid's book is especially valuable for understanding the similarities and differences between the type of union representation in the firm in Spain and the forms to be found in other European countries. 18. Independents are also free to run in the elections, and in some firms the majority of the elected delegates are not union members. In a few cases the principal leader of a union within the firm prefers to remain off the committee, heading instead the secci6n sindical; however, this is very unusual. 19. Socialist party members are actually required by party statute to join UGT. Other workers may join a confederation through its local headquarters in their town or city in order to qualify for the legal assistance provided by the unions. This is an important function of unions in Spain because public statutes provide workers with broad rights and entitlements that are not always honored, thus creating the need for legal action.

28

Working-Class Organization

his excellent analysis of French working-class attitudes (based on individual-level survey data): Basically, where unions are present, workers join in great numbers; where they are absent, individual membership, though possible, is a rarity. The fact of the matter is that workers with grievances in the non-union shops do little more than live with them. The implicit assumption of spontaneous organizational response is not justified. 2 "

Additionally, the union's strength or weakness, as perceived in the workplace, is one of the factors influencing workers' attitudes toward the union and their decisions about participation. 21 Obviously, a labor organization without leaders or activists cannot demonstrate such strength. The presence of a formal union leadership within the workplace is, however, not an absolute necessity for collective worker action to take place, and two qualifications ought to be made to the above argument. They concern the existence of informal leadership and activity, and the attempts sometimes carried out by rank-and-file workers to persuade one of their peers to accept the responsibility of leadership. A recurrent finding of the labor leadership studies is that not infrequently, although certainly in a minority of cases workers suggest that a coworker 'step forward' to become a leader. 22 That is to say, in some working environments, when conditions seem to demand concerted action, the workers will persuade one among their rank to lead their action as well as to represent them before other groups. In a sense, in these cases the leadership does not contribute to the creation of conditions for collective worker action, but rather preliminary conditions for collective action cause leaders to emerge. This phenomenon represents, however, only a minor qualification. This process seems to occur, for the most part, in contexts where unionism already exists and simply needs additional or replacement leaders. Furthermore, the fact that rank-and-file workers attempt to encourage 20. Richard Hamilton, Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic (Princeton, 1967), 234. 21. This observation seems to hold in a wide range of settings. See, for example, the findings of Joel Seidman, Jack London, Bernard Karsh, and Daisy L. Tagliacozzo, The Worker Views His Union (Chicago, 1958) and the discussion by van de Vall of the reasons why workers join unions. 22. Among the numerous sources for this observation, see Batstone et al.; Seidman et al. (esp. chapter 8); and Sidney M. Peck, The Rank-and-File Leader (New Haven, 1963).

Workplace Leaders and Union Organization

29

the emergence of leadership serves to underscore the importance of leaders if preliminary forms of collective action are to be sustained and extended. Where no willing leader can be found, unionism will not develop. In some instances, militant forms of worker struggle take place, challenging the existing patterns of unionism and on occasion the official union leaders as well. The events of May 1968 in France mark perhaps the most significant example of this in recent labor history. Yet in this case the militant forms of worker action were usually to be found precisely in those factories where the existing majority union confederation, the CGT, was already strong. 23 Thus, even when new informal leaders emerged contesting the official union leadership, they were usually a product of unionism and its experiences of organized activity and conflict. Although informal leaders and collective worker action can and do appear even where no union has previously existed, such cases are unusual rather than the norm and account for only a small minority of joint worker activity and conflict. Informal leadership may be common, usually supplementing the official leaders, where unionism is well established/4 but it cannot be counted on in workplaces with no union presence. Plant-levelleaders, then, are essential if the union is to have a formal presence and play a role within the firm. Some forms of collective worker action may be possible without such a formal union presence, but without union organization (or some functional equivalent) they cannot be sustained and coordinated at the level of the society as a whole as required in order to have an impact on macrolevel processes of political or social change. 25 The Inadequate Supply of Workplace Leaders One of the central problems seriously limiting and shaping the possibilities for union activity is the major shortage of plant-level leaders. Despite the strong evidence for this shortage, many analysts 23. Michael Mann, Consciousness and Action among the Western Working Class (London, 1973), 52, cites P. Dubois et al., Gri!ves revendicatives ou gri!ves politiques? (Paris, 1971 ), 273, 345, 392. 24. Informal opinion leaders play an important role in the strongly union British factory studied by Batstone et al. However, many of those leaders with no elective position such as shop steward are, in fact, former stewards. 25. In some historical contexts--especially revolutionary or semirevolutionary situations-the political action of the working class has been based on workers' councils at the factory level and political parties as the mechanism coordinating activiry in different workplaces, and unions have been relatively less important.

30

Working-Class Organization

do not recognize its existence, and even those who do so fail to build it into a larger interpretive scheme, affording to the problem the weight it actually holds. In fact, in many firms no one is willing to undertake the responsibilities of union leadership, thereby making it very difficult for any collective worker action to take place and preventing the labor movement from penetrating the plant. In many other workplaces only one leader or coherent group of leaders exists, and, as a result, no matter how many ideological alternatives for labor may appear present at the national level, for the workers in such plants only one choice for organized activity is available. The problem exists to one degree or another for all unions, but is much more serious for some than for others, thereby greatly limiting their capacity to reach the workers. It is worth mentioning that a considerable literature does exist on the low levels of participation within unions in otherwise very different national contexts. 26 The issues of low attendance at meetings and disinterest by most members in active participation in union affairs deserve the attention they receive; frequently they are of major concern to the local leadership itself. 27 And yet, despite similarities between activism and leadership, the two roles-active participant and plant-level leader-are quite distinct from one another. The costs and benefits of leadership are considerably greater. Moreover, while unions do manage to survive with low participation, they cannot exist within the firms in the absence of workplace leadership. The literature on participation in unions is, therefore, not particularly helpful for the issue of leadership shortage. When analysts of labor leadership actually present data or observations concerning the supply of workplace-level leaders, they do note cases where no one is willing to serve as leader; even in a strongly unionized plant in England many departments have no shop steward for precisely this reason. 2 s In nonunion firms, or those in the process of unionization, the problem is obviously more serious. 29 Nevertheless, such isolated observations as are to be 26. See van de Vall for a comparative treatment with data from a number of countries; see also Patricia Fosh, The Active Trade Unionist (Cambridge, 1981), for a recent empirical study dealing with participation in union affairs in a British factory. Fosh reviews the theories and findings of the Anglo-American literature on union participation. 27. On this point see Robert W. Miller, Frederick Zeller, and Glen Miller, The Practice of Local Union Leadership (Columbus, Ohio, 1965), 97-98. 28. This was the case in the factory studied by Batstone et al. 29. In the unionization effort recounted by Seidman et al. initially, no worker in the plant was willing to take an activist role even though many workers had individual grievances, and a majority eventually voted in favor of the union.

Workplace Leaders and Union Organization

31

found in several studies are no substitute for recognizing that leadership shortage is a general problem facing unionism, one likely to be far more serious in the backwaters and the frontiers of union development than in contexts with a long tradition of workplace unionism such as the large British factories where many studies have been conducted. Thus although the observation of the shortage of workplace leadership might appear at first glance to be a commonplace, in fact it has not been incorporated into the systematic thinking on labor. The shortage of leaders within the firm plays an even greater role in shaping outcomes when the object of discussion shifts from the simple existence of any form of unionism to the competition among different unions or internal union factions. Any cleavage within the labor movement, whether it involves political conflict within unions or competition between union confederations, cannot reach the rankand-file workers allowing them to choose among the alternatives unless those alternatives are simultaneously represented in their workplaces by plant-level leaders. In the absence of competition between different leaders tied to the various tendencies and present in the same plants, those alternatives that seem to exist when the labor movement is viewed from the nationwide level have no real existence for ordinary workers in their workplaces. In fact, academics writing on internal political conflict within the union movement tend not to recognize the extent to which the leadership shortage limits the development of competition or political conflict within the labor movement. 30 If one 30. Even so intelligent and persuasive an analyst of labor as Charles Sabel makes this oversight in his analysis of political conflict inside unions. See his article, "The Internal Politics of Trade Unions," in Organizing Interests in Western Europe, ed. Suzanne Berger (Cambridge, 1981 ). Sabel argues that strategic dilemmas lead inevitably to internal political conflict in unions and that such conflict may politicize the rank and file as the issues are presented to them. In fact, many internal union political conflicts-even those in which one or more factions stand under the banner of internal democratization-fail to penetrate the workplace and reach the rank and file with the issues, precisely because of the shortage of leadership. Valenzuela also fails to build this factor into his model. The major exception to this failure of the literature to accord significant weight to the shortage of workplace leadership is the outstanding work on internal union politics by S.M. Lipset, M. Trow, and]. Coleman, Union Democracy (New York, 1956). Nevertheless, even Lipset et al. place much less stress on the problem than it deserves. For instance, in analyzing the impact of size differences in the shops on the possibilities for internal political conflict, they note the need for activists to mobilize opinion in the shop and recognize that the available pool will differ with size, but this is almost an afterthought. It would be possible to reformulate and simplify the basic task of their analysis as an examination of the factors that allow for (1) the creation of two alternative pools of leaders and activists, each extensive enough to largely cover the national union; and (2) the capacity of both sets of leadership to actually reach the membership with their message and alternative, even when not occupying the union administration. Although some readers of Union

32

Working-Class Organization

union confederation (or internal union faction) wins 40 percent of the delegates in nationwide elections, this does not necessarily mean that 40 percent of the workers have chosen it over the competition. Such competition, of course, may reach the plant level in many cases where the opposed tendencies are all represented by a local leadership; the point is that it cannot be assumed that such cleavages will penetrate all (or even most) work settings. The extent to which the shortage of factory-level leaders prevents internal competition within the labor movement from being presented to rank-and-file workers is an empirical question to be settled only by the appropriate data for each case. Data on the union elections (held to fill positions on the works committees which exist at the firm level) and responses from the survey I conducted of plant-level labor leaders in 1981 make it possible, in the Spanish case, to assess the extent to which the labor movement in general, and more particularly the competing union federations, Democracy may already see this line of reasoning, most clearly do not, as is apparent from the way subsequent analysts use (or ignore) the book in developing their own formulations. Lipset, in his own restatement of the major points of the argument in chapter 12 of Political Man, does not refer to the shortage of leadership at the workplace level (where it is most severe, greatly limiting the development of labor organizations and internal cleavages) but does place some stress on the general shortage of political and organizational leadership in the working class (at least implicitly referring to leadership positions higher up than those of current concern to us). The point is not to argue that Lipset is mistaken in his interpretation but rather that he has failed to develop sufficiently a crucial line of reasoning. Despite the evidence on the importance of workplace leaders in Union Democracy, the reader who is not looking for it is unlikely to retain it as a major finding of the book. Other researchers with data demonstrating the leadership supply problem shy away from making the point clearly and fail to build it into their interpretive schemes. See, for example, H. A. Clegg, A.]. Killick, and Rex Adams, Trade Union Officers (Cambridge, Mass., 1961). Clegg et al. argue optimistically that the supply of shop stewards is nearly adequate to meet existing needs. In fact, their data show that 46 percent of the stewards were opposed at their first election and only 23 percent were opposed at subsequent elections (p. 163). In other words, in a majority of the British workplaces with a steward there is no competition for the leadership position, and alternative strategies may not be articulated (even though they may be presented by informal leaders). Thus, even where the leadership supply problem is overcome sufficiently to allow union activity to take place, it may still prevent cleavages from penetrating the workplace insofar as only as one leadership is available in the immediate work context. Batstone et al. note that some departments in their strongly union British factory have no steward because no worker will accept the job. Nevertheless, they do not develop the significance of this observation. Similarly, Seidman et al. note the difficulties of leadership recruitment both in contexts of institutionalized unionism and in those where union organization is underway, but they fail to stress the point or to underscore its recurrent nature in otherwise different contexts. Finally, I should note that the leadership supply problem is actually significantly more serious than suggested by the findings of empirical studies of unionism. The total lack of any leadership in a plant produces a total absence of unionism and therefore escapes the notice of the researcher who examines union activity.

Workplace Leaders and Union Organization

33

are able to reach the workers in their places of employment. Unions in Spain establish their presence within the firm in two ways: by setting up union sections (secciones sindicales) and by running candidates in the competitive elections to fill spaces on the works committees (comites de empresa) which represent all employees in a company (regardless of their union membership) in their dealings with management, including collective bargaining. Of these two types of presence, the works committees are of much wider importance because the union sections frequently do not exist at all in the smaller firms, and even in the larger firms sometimes the sections have little real life or activity. The elections to the works committees assume a significance beyond their role in shaping industrial relations at the company level because they are the main arena for competition among the politically distinct union confederations. 31 The results, which are added up and made public for the fifty provinces and the country as a whole, have an impact on political and interest group relations at the macrolevel. The confederations, therefore, exert considerable efforts and expense in the attempt to secure the best possible results. The elections are not automatically held in each particular workplace, but rather they must be organized by workers in their own firms according to the legal basis established in the Estatuto del Trabajador. 32 Above all, for the elections to take place, there must be workers present interested in serving on the works committee and willing to run for the position of delegate. In other words, a plant-level leadership must be present. Moreover, even if one group of workers initiates the electoral process and is willing to stand for election representing one union (or as independents), if the other labor confederations are to compete within the firm, they too must be able to field a list of candidates. The ability of the competing confederations to present candidates at the individual firm level is, therefore, the best indicator of the degree to which they have a plant-level leadership present. 33 31. For an analysis of the union elections of 1978 and the results from 1980, see Robert M. Fishman, "The Labor Movement in Spain: From Authoritarianism to Democracy," Comparative Politics 14 (April 1982). A shorter version, directed to the Spanish reader, has been published as chapter 9 in In forme sociol6gico sabre el cambia politico en Espana 1975-1981, ed. Linz, Gomez-Reino, Andres Orizo, and Vila. 32. The Estatuto del Trabajador, the central piece of labor legislation of the new democratic regime, was printed in full in the Boletin Oficial del Estado (March 14, 1980). Numerous reprints arc available. On the works committees and the union elections, see articles 63-76. 33. The simple question, included in the survey, of which unions presented candidates in the firm, is an objective and reliable indicator of the presence of a leadership of the

34

Working-Class Organization

Democratic union elections have been held in 1978, 1980, 1982, and 1986. In the 1980 elections it has been estimated that the number of workers in firms where voting was actually held represents between 52 percent and 57 percent of the eligible total.H In the remainder of the firms, with more than 40 percent of the eligible labor force, there is, as a general rule, no leadership and no union present at all. 35 This absence, most common in the smallest firms, is not limited to them. The shortage of leadership is, however, far more serious than this figure suggests. The responses of the workplace leaders interviewed in 1981 suggest the magnitude of the problem faced by the competing confederations (see Table 2.1). Even CCOO, the union with the broadest presence, was able to present candidates in 86.4 percent of the firms, thus leaving workers in the remaining companies with no opportunity to respond positively to their alternative. The UGT, despite its great weight in the diffuse public perception of the labor movement and its links to the electorally powerful Socialist Party (PSOE), reached just 72.8 percent of the workplaces, leaving more than 25 percent without its presence. The other union confederations were simply not an option for most workers given the highly limited scope of their workplace presence. Thus, USO offered its alternative to workers in only 11.4 percent of the firms and could not hope to succeed electorally despite both its links to the UCD (then the govrespective unions. In fact, a small leadership nucleus for a union may be present even in some firms where it is unable to present a list of candidates, since in firms with more than 250 workers, any list, in order to be included on the ballot, must include 50 percent more names than the number of delegate positions to be filled. However, in such rare cases the small leadership nucleus, unable to find enough candidates to form an official list, is also likely to be isolated from the other workers in the firm and therefore ineffective in labor matters. Such isolated and weak leaderships probably cannot sustain their activity for long and are not a major factor in the larger scene of labor relations. In some firms the list of candidates of the unions includes some nonmembers. However, even in such cases the initiator and organizer of the list is almost always a leader of the union in question who manages to incorporate into their electoral effort sympathetic independent workers. 34. This is one of the conclusions of the official study of the 1980 elections conducted by the UGT. See Elecciones sindicales de 1980: Un primer ami/isis (Madrid, 1981), 64. 35. Normally, any union leadership that exists within the firm will wish to institutionalize its presence by holding elections for the works committee. Thus, where no group of workers has organized elections within the plant, this indicates, with rare exceptions, that no labor leadership exists. The principal exception to this general rule is the anarcho-syndicalist CNT, which (in most firms) opposed participation in the elections. A few firms where elections were not held may have a CNT leadership presence, but this is highly exceptional. The inability of the major confederations to carry the union elections beyond 57 percent (or 52 percent) of the eligible labor force underlines their great difficulty in penetrating the plant level.

35

Workplace Leaders and Union Organization Table 2.1. Presence of plant level leadership: percentage of workplaces in which the union presented candidates for the works committee By province

ccoo UGT uso CSUT

su

(N)

By size*

Barcelona

Madrid

Smaller

Medium

Large

85.7 68.2 12.3 9.1 1.9

87.1 77.1 10.6 4.1 12.9

75.7 58.6 9.0 2.7 3.6

87.9 72.9 6.4 6.4 7.1

100 94.4 25.0 12.5 15.3

(154)

(170)

(111)

(140)

(72)

Total 86.4* * 72.8** 11.4 6.5 7.7 (324)

*Size categories are as follows: smaller = 51-250 workers; medium = 251-1000 workers; large = 1001 + workers. One firm remained unclassified as to size. Small firms with fewer than fifty workers were excluded from the sample. **In one firm unclassified by size CCOO and UGT were both present. Note: Unless otherwise noted, the data reported in all the tables are in percentages. The numbers in parentheses indicate the absolute number of cases in each column.

erning party) and its generous financing during the 1980 elections. 36 The two 'Maoist' labor confederations, CSUT and SU, which had earlier posed a vigorous public challenge to the relative moderation of CCOO and UGT, reached an even smaller percentage of workplaces than USO. Clearly, then, the complicated multiple cleavage that might seem to exist in the labor movement on the basis of media and broad public perceptions did not fully penetrate most workplaces; the competition was limited, at best, to CCOO and UGT in most firms where elections took place. Even though both CCOO and UGT enjoyed a far greater presence in the plants than the smaller confederations, the shortage of workplace leadership remained a serious problem for them, limiting greatly their ability to deal directly with workers. This inability to gain a foothold in many plants clearly reduced their ability to gain new members and strength as well as their capacity to compete in the elections. For UGT this was almost certainly the greatest problem. Their moderation relative to CCOO may have been quite successful (at! east in the 1980-1982 period) in appealing to the mass of workers, but apparently this political profile proved less capable than the union36. Despite its small membership, USO was the only union to spend considerable sums on public advertisements in the 1980 union election campaign. The newspaper and radio announcements stressed the theme of the union's independence, although ironically they were clearly not paid for by membership dues. My data on the leadership supply problem help explain why this media presence could not be converted into a successful electoral outcome for USO.

36

Working-Class Organization

ism of Comisiones in motivating workers to undertake the extra effort involved in leadership tasks. The capacity of the unions to penetrate the plants-in other words their ability to attract, recruit, or develop a workplace-level leadership-varies considerably by size of firm and regional context. The variation by size of firm, with all confederations encountering greater difficulties in the smaller firms than in the larger ones as the data in Table 2.1 demonstrate, is quite predictable, given the general shortage ·of leadership. The larger the number of workers in a firm, the greater will be the probability that someone (or some group) can be found for leadership tasks. Although this observation may seem intuitively obvious, it becomes so only when we recognize that the leadership supply problem is serious. The especially acute nature of the leadership shortage in the smaller plants has two major consequences: (1) Those unions with severe leadership recruitment difficulties will be closed out of numerous smaller firms. Not only will they be disadvantaged in the competition with relatively leadership-rich unions, but additionally their strength (holding other factors constant) will tend to be centered disproportionately in the large firms, limiting their ability to deal with and represent the great number of workers divided among the smaller firms. (2) In many cases, if any leadership at all exists in the smaller firms, it is without any competition for the support of the workers, thus producing a dynamic of labor representation and conflict significantly different from the one which exists at the nationwide level. This poses the question of whether much of the variation analysts have found in the behavior and attitudes of workers in different size firms might not be best explained by reference to the leader(s) present in the workplace. 37 Just as the leadership supply problem may help explain differences in worker or labor movement behavior by size of firm, so too it may help account for the disparities in the shape taken by labor affairs in distinct regional contexts. Thus, the great success of CCOO in Barcelona in its competition with UGT is probably largely a result of the organizational weakness of the Socialist confederation in Catalonia-its inability to attract enough plant-level leaders there-rather than the consequence of any generalized difference between the working classes of Madrid and Barcelona as measured in individual level characteristics and attitudes. 38 The 37. For a good discussion of firm size as an explanatory variable, see Hamilton, 205 ff. 38. In both 1978 and 1980 the CCOO margin of victory over UGT was greater in Barcelona than in Madrid and considerably higher than in the country as a whole.

Workplace Leaders and Union Organization

37

problem is particularly severe for UGT in the smaller firms in Barcelona where its presence is actually just below 50 percent. This organizational weakness of the Socialist labor confederation in Barcelona not only places it at a competitive disadvantage in the elections but additionally makes a fundamental impact on the workplace situations encountered by other unions in Catalonia: nearly one third of CCOO leaders in Barcelona (compared with just 21 percent in Madrid) face no competition whatsoever from UGT within their plants. 19 These data strongly suggest that explanations for the radicalized tendencies so significant in working class politics in Catalonia should be centered more around the leadership level than the mass level of individual attitudes. Even if the interpretations of scholars and researchers have insufficiently acknowledged the leadership supply problem and its impact on the labor movement, to what extent do the unions themselves appreciate its significance? In fact, many figures within the union movement recognize the problem and consider it serious. Nevertheless, even if some include this problem, to a degree, in their strategic thinking, they still fail to accord it the weight it deserves in their understanding of the situations and tasks they face. Two examples will illustrate this point. During the 1980 elections the CONC (CCOO of Catalonia) carried out a public campaign to recruit new workplace leaders for the electoral effort. Posters with the union's emblem, placed in the Barcelona subway system and other well-traveled points, suggested to workers: "Run for delegate. Your fellow-workers trust you." 40 Paradoxically, this rare public display of the need for plant-level leaders was produced not by a small minority confederation but rather by the union with the least severe leadership shortage in the Catalan context. However, this attempt to increase the leadership pool by means of an extraordinary public appeal most certainly did not signal a full appreciation of the extent to which the electoral outcome would be shaped by the presence or absence of such leaders. The Catalan regional-national41 leadership of CCOO was understandably proud 39. An examination of the differences between leaders who face competition inside their firm and those who do not would be useful. 40. The message in Spanish was: "Presentate a delegado(a). Tus compaiieros confian en ti." 41. Comisiones Obreras in Catalonia supports Catalan nationalism (within the framework of the Spanish state) and therefore refers to its own structure as "national." Thus, the central body of CCOO for all of Catalonia is the Comisi6 Obrera Nacional de Catalunya (CONC), and the council with the ultimate authority between the (roughly) triennial con-

38

Working-Class Organization

of its large victory and its superior showing in comparison with Comisiones in the rest of Spain, and chose to interpret this success as a result of its own abilities to connect with the working class and its concerns rather than as a consequence of the severe workplace leadership shortage suffered by UGT. Needless to say, these two possible interpretations of the electoral outcome-the one common among CONC officials and the other suggested in this chapter-lead to sharply different expectations about the possibilities for carrying out successful mobilizations of the working class. 42 In the case of UGT, the great expense and effort of a program of leadership training seminars might suggest full appreciation of the problem, at least by those designing this massive training effort. Nevertheless, even leaders of the Socialist confederation have failed to attach sufficient weight to the recruitment of new leaders. This became clear to me when a key figure in their leadership training program suggested with conviction that UGT must gear its appeal toward politically independent workers to the right of the Socialists in order to gain a competitive advantage. He had not realized that such a move to the right could promise no amelioration of the union's number-one problem of leadership supply and might even further aggravate it by disillusioning the core group of strongly committed Socialists who contribute heavily to the limited pool of workplace leaders enjoyed by the UGT. 43 Thus, top-level union leaders and officials may be more likely than academics to recognize the shortage of workplace leadership, but this recognition, even when it

gresses is the Consell Nacional. The term "regional-national" is preferable for academic analysis because it reflects the ambivalent identity of the area in question. 42. The Catalan leadership of CCOO has repeatedly stressed the need for working-class mobilizations more than the nationwide Spanish leadership. Nevertheless, the mass demonstrations of the labor movement have generally attracted a considerably lower attendance in Barcelona than in Madrid. In Barcelona even well-publicized demonstrations frequently draw only a few thousand workers, as in the December 1981 march demanding the fulfillment of the pro-employment promises made to labor in the Acuerdo Nacional de Empleo (ANE). The failures of working-class mobilization in Catalonia have not been limited to would-be mass demonstrations, but have also included prominent strikes such as the one at Estampaciones Sabadell in 1981. That strike, at a factory in the industrial Valles Occidental (heartland of the pro-Soviet working-class rebellion against Eurocommunism) area outside Barcelona, received considerable attention in the press as an example of workingclass resistance to cutbacks, but in the end the strike fizzled (after company threats of dosing the plant and a settlement imposed by the Catalan regional-national government) as the workers returned to their jobs with the union leaders the last to reenter the factory. 43. The individual who made this remark was one of a number of figures in the UGT training program with whom I spoke in the course of my research.

Workplace Leaders and Union Organization

39

exists, certainly does not lead to a full analytical development of its consequences. Differences in Attitude between Leaders and Rank-and-File Workers A number of analysts of the labor movement have advanced propositions dealing implicitly or explicitly with the relationship between the attitudes of the leadership and the views of ordinary rankand-file workers. Some formulations concentrate on top level leaders and full-time union officials while others refer to the workplace leaders of greatest interest to us here, but all conceivable interpretations have been advanced: labor leaders have been seen as more conservative than the rank-and-file workers, 44 more radical, 45 representative, 46 or likely to differ in outlook with the precise nature of such differences depending on the situation. 47 Few studies have actually dealt with this question empirically, and the limited findings seem to support the 44. The classical statement of the view that the organizational position of labor leaders moves them in a conservative direction remains Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of Oligarchical Tendencies in Modern Democracy (English trans., New York, 1962). 45. Two analysts who suggest that the labor leadership is often more radical than the working class as a whole are S. M. Lipsct in "The Political Process in Trade-Unions," chapter 12 in Political Man (Garden City, N.Y., 1960), and John D. Stephens, The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism (London, 1979), 86. 46. Many writers on labor tend to (or would like to) assume that plant-level leaders such as shop stewards are closely representative of the views of the workers, although this assumption is tempered in the more careful passages of some of the same writers by the recognition that leadership and rank-and-file views may diverge from one another. Good examples are Peck, Rank-and-File Leader (esp. foreword by Eugene V. Schneider; it states, with respect to the shop stewards studied in this work, that "there is reason to believe that they arc in close touch with rank-and-file and that they reflect its thought"), and Joseph A. Raffaele, Labor Leadership in Italy and Denmark (Madison, Wis., 1962). Another good example of this assumption of representativeness of workplace leaders is Anthony Carew's comparative treatment of the structure of European unions and worker representation, Democracy and Government in European Trade Unions (London, 1976). Carew devotes his attention to the relative power and participation of union members and full-time paid union officials. He thus overlooks completely the possible (attitudinal) distinctiveness of the nonpaid workplace leaders-the only members below the rank of fulltime officials with any significant chance of participation in union congresses and policy formulation-and their impact on the question of internal union democracy. 47. The main theoretical formulation of this point of view is the work of Valenzuela. An empirical study that counterposes different theories of the relationship between leadership and rank-and-file views, and presents data from two Mexican unions, is Howard Handelman, "Oligarchy and Democracy in Two Mexican Labor Unions: A Test of Representation Theory," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 30 (January 1977). Handelman's findings support the view that leadership and rank-and-file attitudes may diverge significantly, with the direction of the difference varying from case to case.

40

Working-Class Organization

latter position, that the relationship between leadership and mass attitudes will vary from one context to another. In the Spanish case data now exists for two distinct levels of the labor movement: the plant-level leaders surveyed in 1981 and industrial workers interviewed in the Perez Diaz investigations of 1978 and 1980. The workplace leaders turn out to be more radical, on the whole, than the workers they represent. With respect to the firms where the respondents work, and the question of whether they choose to see them as a team, or rather, as a point of conflict between workers and employers, the leaders hold clearly more radical views stressing the importance of conflict (see Table 2.2). Among the leaders, 64.2 percent prefer the conflictual view of the firm, while among the workers 44.2 percent chose that position in 1978 and 38.9 percent did so in 1980. The conflict interpretation of the firm is most common among CCOO leaders of whom 70.9 percent hold this view. However, the difference with UGT is quite small; in the Socialist union confederation 67.1 percent support the same interpretation. Despite the competition between these two unions to represent workers and to delineate the general strategy to be followed in labor conflict, in fact, at the level of the workplace leadership they resemble one another while both diverge somewhat from the rank-and-file workers they represent and lead. 48 It is most noteworthy that even among the independent, nonunion delegates on the works committees, 47.1 percent, a greater proportion than in the industrial working class as a whole, regard the firm as a point of conflict. Thus, the tendency for the leaders to be more radical than the workers in their plants holds, to one degree or another, across all of the alternatives for labor representation. Nevertheless, two qualifications should be introduced to the general picture of a workplace leadership to the left of the workers it represents. Although a majority of the leaders prefer the conflictual view of the firm whereas a majority of the workers instead regard their company more as a team, the opinions are by no means unanimous in either case; at both of these distinct levels of the labor movement significant minorities hold the view of the majority in the other group. In other words, there is a large overlap in attitudes at the leadership and mass levels. Some workers will actually be more radical than the leader(s) present in their workplace, and many workers will share the 48. The excellent doctoral dissertation research of Lynne Wozniak, Department of Political Science, Cornell University, also finds striking similarities at the workplace level between the leadership groups of the two leading confederations.

3.7

Doesn't know; doesn't answer; other answer. (2126)

4.7

38.9

56.4

1980

(141)

7.0

70.9

22.0

ccoo

(82)

4.8

67.1

28.0

UGT

(31)

0

64.5

35.5

(70)

2.9

(154)

3.9

62.3

33.8

Percentage agree 50.0

47.1

Barcelona

Independents

---

Workplace-level leaders, 1981 Other unions

(170)

5.9

65.9

28.2

Madrid

(324)

4.9

64.2

30.9

Total

*The data on industrial workers are from Victor Perez Diaz, "Los obreros espafwles ante el sindicato y !a acci6n colectiva en 1980," Papeles de Economia, 6, Madrid 1980.

(3443)

44.2

My firm is not like a team, because there is fundamental opposition between the interests of the employers and the employees.

(N)

52.1

1978

My firm is like a team where there is a principal common interest in producing more and better in the benefit of everyone.

Statement

Industrial workers Perez Diaz survey*

Table 2.2. Comparison of attitudes of industrial workers and workplace-level leaders on employer-employee cooperation

42

Working-Class Organization

general orientation of their leaders. The existence of this overlap suggests that within the firm the actual relationship is likely to vary from case to case. Thus, these findings support the argument that the leaders and the rank and file frequently hold different views and that the precise nature and direction of this difference vary across cases. In Spain the leadership is normally more radical than the workers, but this general tendency does not hold for all firms and provides no evidence about other countries where the relationship may be quite different. In her study of the differences between active and inactive members of a British union, Fosh found that although the actives (a category much broader than the leaders) are generally somewhat to the left of the nonactives, on the question of the view held of the firm, the actives are actually more likely to regard it as a team. 49 In his study of two Mexican unions, Handelman found the leaders generally more radical than the members in one case and more moderate in the other. 5 ° Clearly then, the leadership is not always more radical than the mass level. The other qualification concerns the moderation in individual worker attitudes strongly suggested by the data from the Perez Dfaz study. His findings indicate that rank-and-file Spanish workers are by no means unambiguous radicals, but this in no sense means that they are either fully satisfied with the status quo or opposed to collective worker action. 5 1 The complexity of worker attitudes at the mass level is confirmed by a number of studies (for different countries), and the favorable views many workers voice about their own firms do not prevent the same individuals from criticizing their firms or their supervisors and from supporting militant forms of collective worker action. 52 Thus, the real differences in Spain between the attitudes of rank-and-file workers and their workplace leaders, and the generally more radical position of the latter group, in no sense signify that a universally revolutionary leadership has imposed itself on a unanimously moderate working class. The data and interpretation presented here might seem, at first 49. Fosh, 50-53. 50. In the more oligarchical union the leaders tended to be more conservative, whereas in the democratic union the leaders were more radical than the members. 51. Perez Diaz demonstrates the existence of hroad but shallow support for the unions. He also finds working class criticism of existing inequalities that stops well short of a revolutionary determination to eliminate private ownership of the means of production. 52. An excellent essay on the complexity of working-class views is Mann, Consciousness and Action. A rich description of the ambivalence of workers with respect to the companies where they work and their supervisers can be found in Seidman et al.

Workplace Leaders and Union Organization

43

glance, to challenge the democratic legitimacy of union leaders within the plants. However, the role of the leaders is not to mechanically reflect the views of the workers but rather to help coordinate the defense of their interests. The workers have, after all, chosen these union leaders to represent them, and if they have done so despite the presence of attitudinal differences it is either because there are no more moderate leaders willing to offer themselves as representatives or because the workers feel that the more radical leaders will be most effective in defending their interests (or for some combination of these two reasons). Furthermore, no matter what its own views may be, the leadership cannot successfully carry out a conflictuallabor strategy without the support of the rank-and-file workers. The democratic legitimacy of workplace union representatives and their importance to the workers are not diminished by the differences between the leadership and mass levels. Now let us consider how the plant-level leaders themselves see this issue. In fact, they are, for the most part, aware of the differences between the two levels, tending to regard the workers as more moderate (see Table 2.3 ). With respect to the workers in their own firm, 59.5 percent of the leaders believe the rank and file to be more moderate. Most significantly, this percentage is fairly consistent among leaders belonging to the politically divergent confederations. Apparently, the political orientation of the leaders does not significantly filter their perceptions of the workers, at least within their own firms. The perception of the workplace leaders thus confirms the existence of attitudinal differences between the leadership and rank-and-file levels, and, more significantly, demonstrates that most workplace leaders are aware of this phenomenon (at least within their own firms). In fact, many of those leaders who believe that the workers hold essentially the same position, 35.5 percent of the total, may actually be located in firms where the differences between workers and leaders on labor and political issues are smaller than normal. However, when the point of reference shifts from the firm to Spain as a whole, the consensus begins to break down, and ideology plays a greater role in shaping leader perceptions. A clear majority, 58.6 percent, still recognizes the fact that workers tend to be more moderate than the union leadership in the country as a whole, but 13.9 percent (as compared to only 4.3 percent when the question refers exclusively to the respondent's firm) prefer to believe that the rank and file are more radical than the leadership. This small but still significant minority is dreaming of the existence of a radical proletariat supposedly sold out

(N)

Within the firm workers seen as: More radical More moderate Same position No answer; no opimon In all Spain workers seen as: More radical More moderate Same position No answer; no opinion

(75)

(66)

1.5

12.0 58.7 22.7 6.7

()

2.7 65.3 32.0

(141)

14.2 59.6 22.0 4.3

5.7 61.7 32.6 0

Madrid Total

ccoo

16.7 60.6 21.2

9.1 57.6 33.3 0

Barcelona

(35)

8.6 65.7 20.0 5.7

()

2.9 54.3 42.9

Bare

(47)

8.5 61.7 27.7 2.1

2.1 63.8 34.0 0

Madr

UGT

(82)

8.5 63.4 24.4 3.7

2.4 59.8 37.8 0

Total

(14)

21.4 57.1 21.4 0

7.1 64.3 28.6 0

Bare

(17)

11.8 58.8 29.4 0

0 58.8 41.2 0

Madr

Other unions

(31)

16.1 58.1 25.8 0

()

3.2 61.3 35.5

Total

Table 2.3. Leadership view of workers' attitudes compared with those of union representatives (the leadership)

(39)

17.9 59.0 20.5 2.6

5.1 51.3 41.0 2.6

(31)

19.4 41.9 25.8 12.9

3.2 58.1 35.5 3.2

Madr

Independents Bare

(70)

18.6 51.4 22.9 7.1

4.3 54.3 38.6 2.9

Total

(324)

13.9 58.6 23.1 4.3

4.3 59.6 35.5 0.6

All

Workplace Leaders and Union Organization

45

by the national labor movement. The highest percentage holding such a view is among the independents and those belonging to other unions. Actually, these two categories are difficult to interpret because of their great internal heterogeneity; although both groupings are generally to the right of CCOO and UGT, each has a left fringe holding quite radical views. More interesting is the finding that, among CCOO and UGT leaders, the highest percentage choosing to believe that the workers are more radical is the 16.7 percent found in Comisiones in Barcelona. It is in Catalonia that the left wing of CCOO has been strongest, and its ideological position leads a small but visible minority to hold an unrealistic view of the working class as a whole. In these findings, just as in the case of the Batstone et al. study of British shop stewards, the radicalism of some workplace leaders becomes increasingly operative as the issue moves further away from the workers they actually represent. 53 The Costs of the Leadership Role

The leadership shortage is a problem of fundamental importance for the labor movement, limiting the dimensions of its existence and growth and helping to determine its makeup. As a result of this constraint the supply of alternative leaderships is severely limited; workers are frequently not offered the opportunity to determine who will best qualify as a leader in a choice among various alternatives, as some analysts have assumed to be normaV 4 Instead, self-selection often plays a part in filling the leadership role. The simple fact of selfselection, along with the factors that help discourage others from offering themselves for leadership tasks, may contribute to the emergence of the differences observed in attitudes at distinct levels of the labor movement. What, then, accounts for this shortage of leaders 53. Batstone et al. found that the most radical stewards acted relatively pragmatically when dealing with issues directly affecting their own work area whose workers they represent. The political radicalism of these stewards influenced their activity much more in issues dealing with the factory as a whole and in plantwide deliberations among all the stewards. 54. For example, Landsberger, in his excellent study of Chilean local union leaders, states that "the job requirements for being a union official are, objectively speaking, sufficiently similar from country to country (and are likely to be recognized as being similar by those responsible for filling them, i.e., the membership) that there will be a strong tendency for persons of similar characteristics to be elected to them." Henry A. Landsberger, Manuel Barrera, and Abel Toro, "The Chilean Labor Union Leader: A Preliminary Report on His Background and Attitudes," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 17 (April 1964).

46

Working-Class Organization

and the consequent prominence of self-selection? Unlike political parties, unions generally cannot draw their leadership from those social strata most likely to develop political skills and self-confidence. As Lipset has emphasized, the political skills necessary for union leadership are rarely developed among industrial workers and are not likely to be evenly distributed in the working class. Leftist political activists are among the workers most likely to develop such skills. 55 The infrequency of political skills in the working class, however, does not by itself explain the shortage of leadership; in fact, it is not only a cause but also, in part, a consequence of the insufficient supply of leaders. If more workers were willing to serve as leaders, the proportion developing political skills would obviously rise. The explanation of the problem may lie largely in the costs and risks of the leadership role. A basic cost of leadership is the time involved in carrying out the associated responsibilities, including the official duties as well as the less formal activity crucial to sustaining support for unionism. 56 All told, meetings with workers, supervisors, top management officials, union officers from outside the plant, and public authorities, may well consume a great amount of time. For these efforts, workplace leaders such as the works committee delegates interviewed in Spain or the British shop stewards receive no monetary compensation beyond their regular wage, although they may be excused from their normal work obligations to attend to union matters during much of the working day. 57 Thus, the worker who becomes a union leader in his or her plant faces the possibility of changed relationships not only with workers and company officials inside the factory but also with family and friends outside who may not appreciate the reduction in time available to them. 58 Nevertheless, time itself is certainly not the only factor involved; it is likely to be more of a constant than a variable, 55. Lipset stresses this point in chapter 12 of Political Man. 56. The principal cost of labor leadership in Chinoy's discussion is time. Eli Chinoy, "Local Union Leadership," in Studies in Leadership: Leadership and Democratic Action, ed. Alvin W. Gouldner (New York, 1950). 57. Even where the national labor legislation establishes clear provisions for the amount of time during which labor representatives may be excused from regular work duties in order to attend to union responsibilities, in fact, practices may vary considerably from factory to factory on the basis of the behavior and attitudes of employer and union. The legal provision for "union hours" for works committee delegates is established in Spain by article 68 of the Estatuto del Trabajador. Nevertheless, whereas in some factories delegates manage to receive more than the legally allotted time for union affairs, in others they are unable to secure release from work duties for all the time provided by law. 58. For interesting data on this question, sec Landsberger et at., 414.

Workplace Leaders and Union Organization

47

thereby accounting for little plant-to-plant or country-to-country variation in the pattern of labor unionism. The more dramatic costs of union leadership, however, do appear to vary considerably from one context to another. Thus, it is essential to consider the major risks involved in unionism-repression at the hands of the employers or the state-that have played a fundamental role in the history of the labor movement. Repression has been stressed by a number of analysts for its impact on the development of the labor movement, although others have minimized its importance in contemporary union affairs.' 9 The most interesting and directly relevant discussion of the issue is provided by Valenzuela who argues that the pattern of repression or recognition by the employers on the one hand and the state on the other decisively influences the process of selection of a labor leadership to "fill the organizational space of the labor movement." That is, the configuration of these two variables-recognition or repression on the part of the employers and the state-largely accounts for the form taken by the labor movement, at least in terms of its political-ideological orientation. Valenzuela argues that repression (especially by employers) discourages moderates from running the risks of leadership, while providing those who become leaders with the need to find explanations for the sanctions they may encounter-a need perhaps most easily met by leftist ideologies. Large structural variables-such as the treatment afforded to labor by the state and by the employers-so successfully used by comparative-historical and macrolevel analysts, can be studied empirically at the individual level appropriate for survey analysis, provided that we identify the right population and ask the appropriate questions. The impact of repression on the Spanish union movement and on the shortage of leadership can be partially60 59. Valenzuela and Mann are among the comparative analysts of labor who stress the importance of repression as an explanatory variable in the determination of the ideological orientation of labor; in the case of Valenzuela's theoretical framework repression plays an especially important role. Numerous analysts of labor movement development in particular national contexts emphasize the significance of repression. For data on Chile in the 1960s that suggest repression was a reality for only a minority of local labor leaders, see Landsberger et a!., 404, 414. 60. These data do not capture those cases of "successful" employer repression that have totally eliminated union activity in the plants in question-or prevented it from emerging in the first place-thus removing such workplaces from any sample of unionists. With respect to repression by the state (during the Franco period), it should be noted that my sample does not include union activists who suffered arrest in the Franco period but are not currently in positions of workplace leadership. Some veterans of the period of illegal opposition to Francoism have, in fact, dropped out of union activity. Additionally, these

48

Working-Class Organization

ascertained by reference to the experiences suffered by the workplace leaders. The data indicate that repression by the state and the employers has, in fact, directly touched many plant-level leaders, although those affected remain clearly a minority (see Table 2.4). The systematic repression of the labor movement by the Franco regime is reflected in the arrest experienced by 16 percent of the leaders (almost all these arrests having taken place during the Franco years). Despite the great number of actual arrests suggested by this percentage and the more diffusely suffered risk of such repression, it is perhaps surprising that the figure is not actually higher, particularly in the case of CCOO which played such a crucial role in the antiregime opposition. However, it is noteworthy that 12.2 percent of UGT leaders, fully half the figure for CCOO, have suffered arrest even though the Socialist confederation, as an organization, did not play a major effective role in the opposition. Despite the crucial differences between the histories of the two labor organizations, at the level of the individual leaders who carry the presence of the unions into the workplace the differences are not as great. In fact, the variation in the level of state repression between the provinces of Madrid and Barcelona is greater than that distinguishing CCOO and UGT. This great disparity in the level of repression characteristic of the two regional contexts, as manifested in the individual experiences of the workplace leaders of the two provinces, is a significant factor to keep in mind while analyzing the differences between union politics in Barcelona and Madrid. In any case, the central point should be clear: the threat of arrest has played a major role in the world of labor activists and leaders. Although those actually arrested are a minority, certainly all of today's workplace leaders are aware that, if Spain's democracy should collapse, they could easily be subject to arrest. Repression of union activity by employers remains a reality in some Spanish firms even under democracy. The workplace leaders themselves, as long as they are delegates on the works committees (as is the case for all respondents), are legally protected from dismissal, but some cases occur anyway, and the employers can rely on the broadly worded section of the Estatuto de los Trabajadores on firings for indiscipline. 61 A small but not insignificant 8.6 percent of the redata concentrate on especially severe manifestations of repression-arrest and dismissalwithout capturing less extreme but perhaps more prevalent sanctions. 61. Article 54 of the Statute allows for the disciplinary dismissal of workers on the basis of several motives including, "b) indiscipline or disobedience in work, c) verbal or physical

(82)

12.2

9.8

UGT

(31)

22.6

9.7

Others

By union

(70)

1.4

4.3

Independents

(154)

9.1

7.1

(170)

22.4

10.0

Madrid

By province Barcelona

(324)

16.0

8.6

Entire sample

*This item refers to dismissal of any worker within the firm as long as the respondent considers that the motivation for the firing was activity associated with the labor movement. **The large majority, but not quite all of these arrests took place during the Franco period.

(N)

24.1

Percentage arrested for union activity or political activity.** (141)

9.9

ccoo

Percentage reporting one or more dismissals by the firm in last three years for union activities. •

Workplace leaders

Table 2.4. Repression of labor activity by employers and the state

50

Working-Class Organization

spondents report at least one case of dismissal for union activity in the firm in the last three years. This clearly demonstrates that employer repression of union activity is a factor in labor relations in contemporary Spain, but it is difficult to specify the precise impact of this level of repression. It is, for example (at least on the basis of these data), not possible to determine the weight of repression or the fear of it in preventing the emergence of a labor leadership in the many firms where none exists. These data appear to suggest that repression or its absence does not determine which confederation will emerge as the dominant force in each particular firm (assuming that the majority union in each case is normally the one to which the respondent belongs). 62 The level of employer repression reported by the workplace leaders is for all practical purposes identical for the different unions, varying only from 9.7 percent to 9.9 percent. Even the independents report some cases of dismissal, although for them the figure is clearly lower: only 4.3 percent. This finding might encourage one to conclude that repression by employers varies independently of the type of unionism they face (with the exception of independent representatives), but such an interpretation would be mistaken. For our immediate purposes the key question is not so much the determination of which union will achieve majority status in the firm but rather the delineation of the relationship between employer repression and the presence or absence of a workplace leadership belonging to the different confederations. Even those leaders who represent only a minority of the workers in a firm still play some role in labormanagement relations there. The emergence (or absence) of a leadership representing different tendencies may, in part, be explained by the behavior of the employer toward labor, and once the labor leadership has developed it, in turn, may influence the behavior of management. The data present a complex pattern of employer repression in relation to the presence or absence of workplace leaders representing offenses against the employer or persons who work in the firm or family members who live with them." Thus, there is some legal basis for dismissing a labor activist who makes insulting remarks against the employer in the course of a strike. 62. The respondent was normally a member of the firm's dominant union, although there are exceptions to this general principle. The chairman (presidente) and secretary generally belong to the union with most delegates on the works committee; in some cases these officers are split between the two leading unions, and in rare cases a representative of a minority union may be chosen as chairman or secretary. Among the respondents, 58 percent serve as chairman of their committee, 25.6 percent hold the position of secretary, and the remainder are simply elected delegates on the committee. See Appendix for a description of the sampling procedure.

Workplace Leaders and Union Organization

51

Table 2.5. Workplaces where leaders reported one or more dismissals for union activity, 1978-1981, controlling for union presentation of candidates in workplace elections Percentage of workplaces where dismissals occurred Union

ccoo

UGT

uso

CSUT

su

Other Left Unions• Coalition of Left Unions• • Company Unions** •

presented candidates 10.0 8.5 2.7 4.8 4.0 66.7

9.1 20.0

(280) (236) (37) (21) (25) (3)

(11) (20)

presented no candidates 0 9.1 9.4 8.9 9.0 8.1

(287) (303) (299) (321)

8.6

(313)

7.9

(44) (88)

(304)

Note: The percentages are based on the number of firms falling into each category, as indicated in the parentheses: i.e., 10 percent of 280 firms. "Other Left Unions includes Plataformas de Lucha Obrera but excludes Asociacion Obrera Asamblearia, which was coded separately. Note that N is only 3. **Coalition of Left Unions indicates a unity slate of candidates including representatives from two or more of CCOO, UGT, CSUT, SU, and Other Left Unions. • • *Company unions refers here to any union that limits all activities to one single company; normally, but not always, this indicates a promanagement orientation.

the different labor options (see Tables 2.5 and 2.6). CCOO stands in marked contrast to UGT and the three smaller confederations with a limited nationwide presence, USO, CSUT, and SU. The prevalence of dismissals for union activity is higher in those firms with some Comisiones leadership presence (10 percent) than is the case for any other confederation. (The very small far leftist unions that are more strongly associated with repressive contexts are not confederations and have absolutely no nationwide presence.) Much more significant is the total absence of employer repression (as measured by actual dismissals) in those firms where no Comisiones leader exists. In those work settings where employers have resorted to repression in dealing with the labor movement (as measured by actual dismissals for union activity), a CCOO presence has invariably developed, except in some firms where all union activity may have been effectively eliminated, thereby escaping our attention. To put the matter another way, if any union activity is to persist in the face of repression by management, CCOO will have a place in it, although other unions may also be present. The causal relationship between employer repression and differing styles of unionism undoubtedly works in both directions as suggested above: some types of union behavior are more likely than others to lead to stern measures by management, and such harsh treatment of labor movement activity helps determine which form(s) of unionism will emerge within the firm. The existence of an association between

52

Working-Class Organization

Table 2.6. Presentation of union candidates in works committee elections (controlling for the occurrence of dismissals for union activity) Unions presenting candidates

ccoo UGT uso CSUT su

Firms with one or more dismissals

Other Left Unions* Coalition of Left Unions** Company Unions***

100.0 71.4 3.6 3.6 3.6 7.1 3.6 14.3

(N)

(28)

Firms with no dismissals 85.0 72.8 12.2 12.2 8.2 0.3 3.4 5.1 (294)

No answer 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 50 (2)

Total 86.4 72.8 11.4 6.5 7.7 0.9 3.4 6.2 (324)

Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because many firms have more than one union present. Several small unions are not reported in this table. *Other Left Unions includes Plataformas de Lucha Obrera but excludes Asociaci6n Obrera Asamblearia, which was coded separately. Note that N is only 3. **Coalition of Left Unions indicates a unity slate of candidates including representatives from two or more of CCOO, UGT, CSUT, SU, other left unions, and independents. ***Company unions include any union that limits all activities to one single company; normally, but not always, this indicates a promanagement position.

employer repression and any particular union, by itself, does not suggest which causal arrow is most significant for the union in question, but a familiarity with the unions makes it possible to interpret these findings. Table 2.5 treats dismissals by management as the dependent variable, examining its variation on the basis of the presence (first column of percentages) or absence (second column of percentages) of the different unions. Table 2.6, on the other hand, makes the presence of the unions the dependent variable, with employer repression the independent variable. Let us consider first the causal arrow that runs from union presence to the employer response of firing labor activists. The three union options that seem to have "produced" the highest level of employer repression are (in descending order) Other Left Unions, including mainly the extremist grupuscle Plataformas de Lucha Obrera, Company Unions, and CCOO. The high percentage of dismissals found in firms with Other Left Unions present underscores the way in which particularly militant unionism may indeed increase the likelihood that management will respond with harsh measures such as firings. This same phenomenon probably explains part of the association between CCOO and repression because a minority far-left sector exists within

Workplace Leaders and Union Organization

53

Comisiones. Nevertheless, the low level of repression in firms where the 'Maoist' confederations CSUT and SU were present (4.8 percent and 4.0 percent, respectively) clearly demonstrates that ideological positions to the left of the mainstream of labor need not always lead to a higher than normal incidence of firings, particularly when the ideological orientation is not accompanied by especially militant tactics. The high degree of repression in firms where Company Unions are present, however, should not be interpreted as an employer response to this brand of unionism because such "unions" are generally promanagement. Thus, even though employer repression may be viewed, to a degree, as a dependent variable, most of the empirical associations which exist cannot be understood by following such a line of reasoning. The direct effect of management firings on the probability of the emergence or absence of the different union options can be seen by comparing the first two columns of Table 2.6. Limiting ourselves to those firms where dismissals were unable to eliminate all union activity (therefore still present in th~ sample), it is clear that repression has made some unions more likely to develop and other less likely to establish a leadership within the firm. CCOO, with candidates running in the elections of 100 percent of the repressive firms and 85 percent of those where no dismissals were reported, is actually more likely to appear where employers resort to firings of union activists. Perhaps such workplace contexts encourage labor activists to affiliate with a strong and ideologically leftist union perceived adequate for dealing with hostile employers. Company unions are much more likely to emerge in repressive than in nonrepressive environments: 14.3 percent as compared to 5.1 percent. This type of "unionism" does not develop in the attempt to overcome repressive measures; but rather it forms part of some employers' strategy to reduce the strength of labor within their firms. That is, the firing of labor activists and the appearance of company unions are associated with one another because they both represent part of the antiunion effort of some employers. 63 USO, the most moderate of the confederations, finds its chances for the recruitment of a workplace leadership most seriously damaged by em63. For an analysis of different types of anti-union activity by employers, including company unions and their dfect on labor organization in the United States, see Beth Rubin, Michael Wallace, and Larry Griffin, "The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove: Dealing with the Labor Problem, 1902-1932" (paper presented at the meeting of the Social Science History Association, November 4-7, 1982).

54

Working-Class Organization

ployer repression. The relative accommodation toward management it has come to represent64 apparently has little space in strongly antiunion firms, and yet it is not promanagement enough (except perhaps in some exceptional firms) to play the role of company union. CSUT and SU were also less likely to be present in repressive firms. This finding is more difficult to interpret, but perhaps those left unionists who encounter repression (with the exception of the genuine extremists of a few miniscule far-left organizations) find it necessary to join a larger confederation such as Comisiones with organizational resources capable of defending them. In the case of the Other Left Unions, their presence is such an exception that it is probably not the result of any systematic factors, and their behavior is so extreme (one might say intentionally provocative) that it does undoubtedly increase the possibility of employer repression. Thus, for those small far-left unions, dismissals by management should be seen only as a dependent variable. The ability of UGT to establish a workplace leadership is, it seems, not directly affected by dismissals for union activity: the difference in the level of UGT presence is only 1.4 percent, comparing repressive and nonrepressive settings. In both cases, the presence of the Socialist confederation is more limited than that of CCOO. Thus, employer repression, at least in the narrow sense of the direct effect of dismissals on the development of workplace leadership, does not appear to explain UGT's shortage of plant-level leaders in its competition with CCOO. If this discussion does not lead to conclusions as precise as one might desire, that is because the problem--employer repression and its impact on the emergence or absence of workplace leaders representing the different unions-requires a more monographic treatment than possible here and perhaps even a more narrowly focused research design. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw some relevant conclusions. Employer repression, even in the restricted sense employed in the above analysis, has some direct though limited impact on the development of a workplace presence by the unions, that is on the problem of leadership shortage. The full impact of employer repression on the recruitment of workplace leaders is, however, larger and more diffuse. Management may enact or threaten various sanctions short of dis64. Between the union elections of 1978 and 1980 USO moved considerably to the right and dropped its commitment to self-management socialism while establishing close relations with the then governing party UCD. A good background source on the unions under democracy is ]. A. Sagardoy Bengoechea and David Leon Blanco, El poder sindical en Espana (Barcelona, 1982).

Workplace Leaders and Union Organization

55

missal against activists and leaders. Furthermore, the knowledge that employers sometimes resort to such measures undoubtedly spreads to firms where workers have not personally experienced repression. In fact, some evidence suggests that workers with grievances in nonunion plants may even have a pre-experiential sense that union activity, by breaking with the discipline of the firm, is likely to lead to repression. 65 Repression, then, is a cost or risk that limits the pool of available leaders and may help shape the outlook (and affiliation) of those who fill that pool. Even those leaders who have experienced neither repression nor its risk in their firm may still derive meaning for their union work from the knowledge that many fellow unionists have suffered loss of job and arrest for carrying out similar activities. These data confirm the existence of special risks and costs for the plant-level leaders, suggesting how crucial 'structural' factors such as employer and state repression are experienced at the individual level by a significant minority. Plant-Level Leaders and the Link between Workplace Unionism and Macropolitical Processes The plant-level leaders represent the crucial link between unionism in the workplace, with its immediate concerns and limited grievances, and the larger structures of the labor movement, with their broader political and economic goals and strategies. Nevertheless, the way this link actually performs in different national and historical contexts is not a constant but rather an empirical question. If unionism is to be a force in the larger society, it normally must penetrate the workplace with a capability to help solve workers' problems, that is, with leaders who can be relied on by their fellow employees.66 Only then will large numbers of workers participate in and 65. In the union organizing effort described by Seidman et al. workers with grievances were initially afraid to become involved in the organization drive despite the fact that (at least in their own plant) they had seen no actual evidence of employer repression of union activity. 66. In his analysis of the determinants of support for collective worker action among recently unionized public employees in Illinois, Schutt found that for two of the three dependent variables (the remaining one being an index of potential support for strikes called for different reasons, an indicator of dubious validity because individual workers need have only one motive to support a strike even though at the collective level many motives may be present) the independent variable with, by far, the most predictive power was the reliance of the respondents on shop stewards to resolve their individual grievances.

56

Working-Class Organization

support union activities. For any strategy to be carried out it is not sufficient for the national leadership of labor to formulate and articulate it; the workplace leaders must bring such goals and considerations to their firms and do so in such a way as to link union activity to the concrete (and diverse) concerns of workers. This essential intermediate and coordinating role of the plant-level leaders offers them, as a(n informal) collectivity, the capacity to shape the possibilities for mobilizing or demobilizing labor in the pursuit of any broad systemwide goal. The attitudes, abilities, and perceptions of the workplace leaders will help determine how they discharge this crucial role. Although the plant-level union leaders must address the problems experienced by their fellow workers, this in no sense means that their union activity automatically and simply reflects worker concerns. In fact, the leaders influence (to varying degrees) the conduct and strategy of collective worker action in their firms. 67 Furthermore, the leaders may attempt to extend their influence over the orientation of the workers beyond the strictly defined question of industrial relations in the firm to encompass broad political views and specific political issues. It is, however, important to note that even a well-respected plant-levelleader may fail dismally in attempts to channel the political activity of the membership in his or her firm. 68 Nevertheless, persistent attitudinal differences between the leadership and mass levels by no means eliminate the role of the leaders in shaping the place of labor in macropolitical processes. Even in the extreme case of working-class revolutionary attempts, the political challenge posed by the working class may well reflect the ability of the leadership to define both situation and collective goals in revolutionary terms while mobilizing Although Schutt's purpose was to test the relative success of four different strategies for explaining worker militancy-termed the economic, incongruity, social background, and political models-his empirical findings lend strong support to our emphasis on the role of workplace leaders. See Russell K. Schutt, "Models of Militancy: Support for Strikes and Work Actions among Public Employees," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 35 (April 1982). 67. See Batstone et al. for an excellent treatment of the role of shop stewards in collective worker action. 68. Hamilton interprets the continued radicalism of French workers as, in large measure, a result of the influence of the ideological unions in place in factories. For a criticism of Hamilton's argument, see Duncan Gallic, "Trade Union Ideology and Workers' Conceptions of Class Inequality in France," West European l'olitics 3 Oanuary 1980): 10-32. For an excellent qualitative description of a radical American plant-levelleader who won the support of his fellow workers on union matters but failed to influence their larger political orientation, at least in the electoral arena, see John W. Alexander and Monroe Berger, "Grass Roots Labor Leader," in Studies in Leadership and Democratic Action, ed. Alvin Gouldner.

Workplace Leaders and Union Organization

57

rank-and-file workers on the basis of more limited and immediate (as well as frequently defensive) objectives. 69 The impact of the plant-level leaders on the participation of the working class in the larger political and economic systems does not flow automatically from the attitudes of the workplace leaders on macrolevel issues. Rather, the significance of the plant-level leaders rests on (1) their position as a key link in the organizational and communications chains of labor, and (2) their use of political, ideological, or broadly strategic criteria in decisions guiding their activity in the workplace as coordinators and leaders of collective worker action (or inaction). This broad political and strategic orientation, as the argument developed here should have made dear, need not be shared by many of the workers whom the leaders attempt to mobilize (or demobilize). Unlike those above and below them, the workplace leaders must deal with and talk to both national-level leaders and shop-floor workers, simply in order to carry out their responsibilities. Although these contacts include informal conversations, they also encompass the formal activity of labor organizations such as meetings and official consultations; 70 the workplace leaders form the organizational link between the national and plant levels. The plant-level leaders, therefore, tend to be more or less sensitive to the concerns of both the top level and the rank and file. The workplace leadership role-and thus the individuals who fill it-provides the necessary mechanism allowing the national labor 69. Barrington Moore argues that the participation of rank-and-file workers in the major unsuccessful revolution of 1920 in the Ruhr was based on defensive and limited concerns rather than on some deeply held aspiration for profound change. The revolutionary character of the movement, in his interpretation, results from the interplay between the radical ideology of some working-class leaders in the Ruhr and the development of the political crisis surrounding the failed Kapp Putsch of March 1920. For Barrington Moore's account and analysis of the Ruhr revolt, see Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt (White Plains, N.Y., 1978), 328-353. A semi revolutionary situation that demonstrated the capacity of elites (to at least attempt) to define a movement as revolutionary or nonrevolutionary was the occupation of the factories in Italy in September 1920. With the workers holding a large portion of the industrial plant of Italy in an action that had arisen out of a labor-management conflict, some leaders drew up a revolutionary manifesto and attempted to convert the occupation into a revolutionary bid for power, while other leaders (dominant in the Socialist union confederation) eventually managed to redefine the factory take-overs as an industrial conflict, thus establishing the basis for a negotiated settlement. On these events, see Martin Clark, Antonio Gramsci and the Revolution That Failed (New Haven, Conn., 1977), and Paolo Spriano, The Occupation of the Factories (London, 1975). 70. One of the important conclusions of Batstone et al.'s excellent study is how successful workplace leadership is based on a combination of formal and informal contacts on the part of the shop stewards.

58

Working-Class Organization

movement, with its broad goals, to (attempt to) mobilize or demobilize the working class. 71 If there is to be a more or less successful nationwide coordinated strategy of conflict or restraint, it requires the active participation of plant-level leaders. Moreover, given the role of leaders in forging coalitions of workers with (somewhat) diverse interests and views if successful collective action is to take place, it is not necessary that all or even most rank-and-file workers share the interpretation and strategic outlook underlying nationwide campaigns. The workplace leaders may try to politicize the rank and file; however, even if they do not succeed at this, as long as their own activity is informed by political and strategic criteria, such macropolitical factors maintain considerable importance in shaping workplace-level conflict. Although it should now be clear that the plant-level leaders are a key link making possible the politically oriented mobilization or demobilization of the working class, it remains for us to consider the way in which they carry out this linking role. To what extent do the workplace leaders actually think politically and strategically while dealing with issues of conflict or restraint? Do they actively make fine political distinctions, or do they, rather, respond passively, whether to the political positions of national leaders or to their own underlying preference for conflict (or accommodation)? The research findings indicate that the plant-level leaders do, in fact, stress the importance of political considerations in the formulation of labor demands. Among the respondents, 46.3 percent agreed with the strong statement that when making demands unions should above all take into account their consequences for the stability and consolidation of democracy. A smaller proportion, 38.9 percent, chose an intermediate response, considering the political consequences when making demands while simultaneously insisting that "the needs and interests of the workers have a greater importance." Only 13.6 percent denied any role for the consolidation of democracy as a criterion in the formulation of demands, and the rest did not respond. These findings, however, do not fully resolve the issue. Workplace leaders' acceptance of including political problems among considerations to be taken into account in drawing up demands confirms that 71. This point, of central importance to the argument developed here, suggests how the problems of concern to macrolevel theorists of labor-researchers on 'neocorporatism,' students of comparative political economy, etc.-should be addressed by data collected in empirical studies of unionism at the plant level. The development of this link between the issues and methods of researchers dealing with the macro and the plant levels has generally been absent from the agenda of both sets of scholars.

59

Workplace Leaders and Union Organization Table 2.7. Support for a general strike by labor under differing political conditions

In the hypothetical case: To topple government To pressure legal institutions In the actual coup attempt: (N)

In the hypothetical case of totally antilabor legislation approved in parliament

In the actual case of the coup attempt of Total February 23, 1981

With aim of toppling the government

Believe that the unions should have called a general strike at the time

With aim of pressuring legal institutions

31.3 37.9 48.4 (124)

44.1

38.4

55.1

46.3

50.0 (150)

42.0 (136)

(324)

Note: Percentages do not sum to 100 in this table because the negative response categories are not shown; instead, this table examines the association of a positive response to different but unrelated questions.

they can serve as a link between macropolitical processes and workplace conflict or accommodation. But this does not establish whether they are an active and independent factor or a mere passive relay of decisions taken at a higher level. Let us directly address this issue by examining the attitude of the plant-level leaders toward the use of the ultimate weapon of labor conflict, the general strike, under differing political circumstances (see Table 2.7). A large minority, ranging from 38.4 percent to 46.3 percent, indicated its support for the use of the general strike in one or another of three sharply different political settings. In the hypothetical case of the approval by parliament of totally antilabor legislation, 38.4 percent would support the extreme step of calling a general strike aimed at toppling the government, and a larger minority, 46.3 percent, would favor the more moderate step of launching a general strike designed to pressure the legal institutions. Shortly before the survey was carried out an extreme crisis took place actually raising the possibility of a general strike: at the time of the February 23, 1981, coup attempt against Spanish democracy, the leading labor confederations briefly contemplated calling such a nationwide strike. Nearly half the respondents, 42.0 percent believe that the unions should have called a general strike to oppose the coup. Most significant about the position of the workplace leaders concerning the use of this ultimate weapon of labor is not the precise percentage answering one way or another

60

Working-Class Organization

but rather the relationship between different instances of support for a general strike. The advocacy of a general strike in any one of the three different situations is largely independent of the other two. In other words, those who favor the use of the strike in any one of the cases are not much more or less likely than the sample as a whole to support such a tactic in the other two cases. This finding speaks directly to the issue under consideration: The advocacy of the general strike is not a constant across all political situations, with the same group supporting (or opposing) such action in all cases, on the basis of a generalized predisposition towards such militant tactics; rather it is in great measure contingent on the individual leaders' assessments of the macropolitical justifications, dangers, or ramifications of such a nationwide strike. The workplace leaders make political judgments when evaluating the use of an extreme form of labor conflict. Apparently, not only intellectuals and national leaders, but the plant-level leaders as well, distinguish between pressuring, challenging, or defending the existing political system when they are considering worker action with a potential or desired impact on the political order. This in no sense means that politics is always the primary criterion in formulating union strategy. We can conclude more cautiously that macropolitical considerations may influence the pattern of conflict or accommodations even at the plant level by virtue of the concern of the workplace leadership for such factors and their ability to think politically on their own. For our purpose-an examination of the working-class role in the political transition and the organization of workers into unions in this context-these plant-level leaders form a key agent and object of study. Not only do they link the limited and diverse concerns of plant unionism with the broad (and frequently political) objectives of the national labor movement, but they do so in an active manner, employing (at times) their own ability to think politically. The extent to which labor conflict and mobilization have been adjusted to the perceived challenges and requirements of the political transition depends, in large measure, on the activity of the workplace leaders (with all the constraints to which they are subject). Distinctiveness and Heterogeneity of the Plant-Level Leaders The significance of the workplace leadership role, standing alone, does not illuminate the full importance of the individual leaders for

Workplace Leaders and Union Organization

61

the problems of union organization and worker mobilization. Several factors-the shortage of leadership, the aspiration of the union movement to gain a presence in workplaces throughout the economy, and the material and ideological diversity of the working class-lead the unions to rely on a heterogeneous pool of individuals to serve as plant-level leaders. Even with respect to issues on which the labor confederations adopt clear policies, large numbers of workplace leaders disagree with the position of their union. Paradoxically, in order to reach the workers, the national labor movement must rely on a diverse group of local leaders including many at odds with official union policies. 72 It is for this reason that the plant-level leaders must be studied empirically; their opinions and experiences cannot be easily predicted by offical union policy or mass-level attitudes. The diverse and (largely) independent views of the Spanish workplace leaders can be seen on an issue of considerable importance to the union confederations at the time of the survey: the form(s) of worker representation to be used in the negotiation of company-level contracts (see Table 2.8). The confederal policy of CCOO had been to stress the role of the works committees-the only representatives of all the workers in a plant-in such collective bargaining. UGT, on the other hand, had argued that even company-level bargaining should be carried out by the unions rather than the committees. At the level of the workplace leaders, as well, CCOO preferred the works committees and UGT favored the unions over the committees, although in the latter cases the plurality was quite small: only 2.5 percent. However, in each union a large proportion also mentioned the alternative officially favored by the other confederation: 43.3 percent of CCOO advocated some role for the unions in plant bargaining, and a full 63.4 percent of UGT believed the committees should participate as representatives of the workers. Since multiple responses to this question were permitted (in order to parallel the reality of industrial relations in Spain in which both unions and the works committees may participate in plant bargaining) one cannot determine from these data exactly how the two alternatives were ranked among those choosing both forms of representation. Nevertheless, it is clear that a substantial proportion of the workplace leaders of both major con72. Two empirical studies with findings in support of this generalization are those of Seidman et al. and Lipset et al. Seidman et al. found that a union with a policy strongly in favor of the rights of racial minorities nevertheless took a contrary position in a few work settings with shop stewards opposed to racial integration. Lipset et al. found that, although the two union parties inside the ITU held generally divergent ideological positions, a minority of the leadership/activist group in each case held views on nationwide political issues more like the majority in the other union party.

(141)

85.1 43.3 16.3

ccoo

(82)

63.4 65.9 14.6

UGT

(31)

61.2 48.4 16.1

Others

By union

Note: Percentages do not sum to 100 because multiple responses were permitted.

(N)

Works committee Union confederations Strike committee elected in assembly

Preferred representative

(70)

90.0 21.4 12.9

Independents

Table 2.8. Preference for form(s) of worker representation in negotiating firm-level contracts

(154)

79.9 51.3 20.1 (170)

77.1 38.8 10.7

Madrid

By province Barcelona

(324)

78.4 44.8 15.2

Entire sample

Workplace Leaders and Union Organization

63

federations prefers to conduct plant bargaining in a manner more or less at odds with confederal policy. Additionally, a small but not insignificant minority of both major unions advocates a continued role for the apparently more ideologically leftist mechanism of worker representation common during an earlier, less institutionalized phase of the political transition: the election of a strike committee in an assembly of the workers in the plant. 73 These findings confirm the (partial) independence with which the plant-level leaders carry out their union activity and underscore the internal diversity of the workplace leadership group. Neither confederation is a monolithic whole. Furthermore, the difference in policy between the unions is not the only major variable accounting for the variation in the responses of the leaders. Even at this initial examination of leadership views, another crucial factor is apparent: regional context. Support for bargaining by the union confederations is higher in Barcelona (51.3 percent) than in Madrid (38.8 percent), reflecting the independence of the Catalan representatives of CCOO from the policies established at the con federal headquarters in Madrid. 74 The advocacy of a less institutionalized form of worker representation for plant bargaining-the election of a strike committee to be chosen in an assembly-is also more prevalent in Barcelona: 20.1 percent as opposed to 10.7 percent in Madrid. On some key issues to be analyzed in subsequent chapters the distance between the two provinces is even greater. The emphasis of this discussion on the significance of workplace leaders for creating, sustaining, and shaping labor movement activity should not obscure the importance of the other major factors. The plant-level leaders are essential if unionism is to emerge, and they play a partially independent role in shaping its development. Nevertheless, they are in no sense voluntaristic actors with complete freedom to bring into existence any labor movement, mobilization, and conflict of their choosing. The major constraints they face include the views and experiences of the workers themselves, the attitudes and actions of employers and the state, and the positions and resources of the 73. The selection of a strike committee by an assembly of the workers in the factory was more common in the period of the political transition preceding the first generalized election of works committees in 1978. 74. The regional difference within CCOO is quite dramatic on this point: 60.6 percent in Barcelona, as opposed to only 28 percent in Madrid, supports plant bargaining by the union confederations. In general, CCOO of Barcelona (and Catalonia) tends to be quite independent of confederation policy as formulated in Madrid.

64

Working-Class Organization

union confederations and allied political parties. Thus, the stress placed on the workplace leaders in the above analysis has been necessary only to remedy the lack of attention normally paid to them and does not mean to suggest that they alone form the principal factor in the development of the labor movement. Still, their key role in organizational expansion and the political mobilization of labor does make them a particularly apt object for the investigation of these processes, so long as we keep in mind the other major actors and the system of relations among them. If unions are to be established as a major force and if society is to undergo any significant change involving the mobilization or demobilization of the working class, then plant-level leaders have a key part to play. By concentrating most research efforts on the workplace leaders, this study of the historical agenda of labor--organization building and political transition-can be methodologically individualist and structuralist simultaneously, in the tradition of Weberian social science.

3

Who Are the Workplace Leaders?

Who are the individuals filling this key role of workplace leadership, and what are their social backgrounds? I address these questions with two purposes in mind: to identify the principal social characteristics of the respondents surveyed and to locate key differences among the competing unions. This sociological profile, however, is of more than descriptive interest. The way in which social experience influences the development of leadership is especially important given the severity of the leadership supply problem.

Regional Origins The rapid economic expansion and growth of industry experienced by Spain in the 1960s sparked an enormous influx to the great urban centers and industrial suburbs of Barcelona and Madrid from the agricultural regions. 1 These migrations helped establish the social 1. On the transformation of the Spanish social structure during the Franco period (especially during the second half of the authoritarian experience) see Amando de Miguel, Cuarenta mil/ones de espanoles cuarenta afios despues (Barcelona, 1976), and his Recursos humanos, clases y regiones en Espana (Madrid, 1977). For an earlier work see Juan Linz and Amando de Miguel, "Within-Nation Differences and Comparisons: The Eight Spains," in Comparing Nations, ed. R. Merritt and S. Rokkan. On the growth of urban centers and the accompanying migrations, see Jaime Martin Moreno, "Proceso de urbanizaci6n y estructura demografica de las grandes ciudades espaiiolas: Referencia al fen6meno emigratorio," in Emigraci6n y retorno: Una perspectiva europea, ed. Jose Cazorla Perez (Madrid, 1981), and jaime Martin Moreno and Amando de Miguel, La estructura social de las ciudades espaiiolas (Madrid, 1978). On the problem of the cultural integration into Catalonia of the massive immigration

65

66

Working-Class Organization

bases for the labor movement that was to develop in opposition to the Franco regime. 2 Yet clearly, not all migrants to the cities would contribute equally to the growth of labor resistance. Region of birth is among the variables most helpful in accounting for the patterns of political behavior and beliefs of workers and others in a number of national contexts. 3 In Spain, the political characteristics and social relations of the agrarian regions have varied considerably from the conservatism of Old Castile to the revolutionary traditions and leftist voting of the landless day laborers of Andalucia, thus raising several interesting questions. 4 To what extent does this diversity of regional political experiences help account for the division of the labor movement into two large unions-one Socialist the other (mostly) Communist-and a number of smaller ones? To what degree have the unions been able to rely on leaders born in the province of Madrid or the region of Catalonia and, therefore, the product of their indigenous political traditions? Finally, do Barcelona and Madrid, with their fairly significant differences in union politics, differ as well in the regional origin of their plant-level leaders? The data (see Table 3.1) demonstrate a basic similarity in the pattern of recruitment for the two major confederations, CCOO and UGT. Each draws about half of its workplace leadership from the local traditions of Madrid and Barcelona, although the figure is slightly higher for UGT than CCOO. The region that discriminates most clearly in its contribution to the two major unions is Castilla/La Mancha (New Castile and La Mancha) accounting for 17.7 percent of CCOO leaders and only 8.5 percent for UGT. This large wheat, wine, and olive producing region lies between Madrid to the north of Spaniards from other parts of the country, see the study of Carlota Sole, La integraci6n sociocultural de los inmigrantes en Cataluiia (Madrid, 1981 ). 2. In his study of the determinants of working-class militancy in the authoritarian period, based on a survey conducted in Barcelona province in 1972, John R. Logan found that immigrants to Catalonia, especially voluntary immigrants, were more supportive of worker militancy than others. See John R. Logan, Industrialization, Repression, and Working Class Militancy in Spain (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1974). 3. See, for example, the findings of Richard Hamilton, who has stressed the importance of region of birth for political attitudes in his studies of both France and the United States. In the American case, Hamilton found that some of the more right-wing attitudes of workers are largely explained by the overrepresentation of individuals of Southern origin in the working class. See Richard Hamilton, Class and Politics in the United States (New York, 1972). 4. On the differences in patterns of land tenure among the Spanish regions see Malefakis, Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution. The much earlier work of Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Civil War (Cambridge, 1943), remains a useful and colorful introduction to the problem if read in conjunction with Malefakis.

(141)

20.6 29.1 7.1 17.7 0.7 4.3 15.6 4.3 0.7

ccoo

(70)

-

(31)

(82)

-

32.9 28.6 5.7 10.0 2.9 2.9 11.4 1.4 4.3

19.4 12.9 9.7 12.9 9.7 9.7 19.4 6.5

24.4 30.5 6.1 8.5 2.4 7.3 12.2 8.5

Independents

Others

UGT

By union

(154)

5.8 5.8 1.9 8.4 20.8 6.5 0.6

-

50.0

Barcelona

(170)

0.6 52.9 7.6 20.0 2.9 2.4 8.2 3.5 1.8

Madrid

By province

(324)

24.1 27.8 6.8 13.3 2.5 5.2 14.2 4.9 1.2

Entire sample

Note: The regions have been coded as follows: Catalonia includes the four Catalan provinces (Barcelona, Girona, Lleida, and Tarragona) plus the Balearic Islands. Madrid includes only Madrid province. Castilla/Leon includes Castilla Ia Vieja and Leon. Castilla/La Mancha includes Castilla Ia Nueva and La Mancha. Northern regions includes the provinces of the north from Galicia to Navarra. Eastern regions includes the provinces of Aragon, the Valencian region (three provinces), and Murcia. Andalucia includes the eight Andalusian provinces. Other southern regions includes the provinces of Extremadura and the Canary Islands in addition to Ceuta and Melilla.

(N)

Catalonia Madrid Castilla/Leon Castilla/La Mancha Northern regions Eastern regions Andalucia Other southern regions Other countries

Region

Table 3.1. Regional origin of leaders

68

Working-Class Organization

and the poorer, more leftist region of Andalucia in the far south. How is it that the vital working-class and leftist traditions of Andalucia have contributed fairly equally to the two confederations, while the less significant labor movement heritage of Castilla/La Mancha has strongly favored the Communist over the Socialist union? And why does Castilla/La Mancha provide almost as many leaders (13.3 percent of the total) as Andalucia (14.2 percent)? Sociologically, Castilla/ La Mancha is a region of transition between the small holding peasantry dominant in agriculture to the north and the mass of landless day laborers working on large estates in Andalucia to the south. Although landless farm laborers are a minority of the agricultural population in Castilla/ La Mancha, outnumbered by selfemployed farmers, they form a fairly sizeable minority with the proportion varying from province to province. Thus, the social basis for the left is more restricted in this transitional region than in Andalucia or in the urban industrial areas further north. In its agricultural social structure Castilla/La Mancha is a region of (at least) latent confrontation, but this cleavage does not oppose an impoverished majority to a small group with great wealth but rather a large agricultural working-class minority and a small-holding majority. In contemporary electoral politics this region has been fairly evenly divided between left and right, although the left is somewhat weaker than in the country as a whole. 5 Thus, politically as well as sociologically, Castilla/ La Mancha is a transitional or confrontational region. Perhaps as a result, the distribution of forces within the right, when compared to the rest of Spain, has relatively favored the more extreme elements. This is the region where the neofascist parties won their highest levels of support, reaching the figure of 7.3 percent in Toledo Province in 1979. In contrast, other regions such as Galicia and Castilla Ia Vieja, dominated by small peasant agriculture, are much more homogeneously conservative, producing large votes for the establishment rightist Alianza Popular rather than the neofascist far right. On the left, the Communists have done fairly well in Castilla/ La Mancha, but they have not attained the same level of support as in the most leftist regions. At the municipal level the distinctive character of this region is even clearer: in many small towns the Communists are the party of the left. Moreover, this occurs even in so conservative a province as Guadalajara. 5. A valuable source on the electoral geography of democratic Spain is Jorge de Esteban and Luis Lopez Guerra, eds., Las elecciones legislativas dell de marzo de 1979 (Madrid, 1979).

Who Are the Workplace Leaders?

69

Castilla/ La Mancha is an area with a moderately weak workingclass tradition. The fundamental cleavage created by the local agrarian relations establishes the probability that the left will be a large minority; politically, the region has been more polarized than the rest of the country. Although political violence during the conflict-ridden Second Republic of the 1930s has not yet been fully analyzed by region, it appears that a significant share of the violent incidents did occur here rather than in the more dominantly leftist regions. 6 A high proportion of the immigrants to the large industrial centers, especially Madrid, come from Castilla/ La Mancha, and these veterans of sociological and political confrontation, without a hegemonic leftist tradition, have contributed much to developing the new (mostly) Communist union and relatively little to reestablishing the old and more moderate Socialist union. Of course, the immigrants from this confrontational context do not, by themselves, explain the emergence of a large Communist wing of the labor movement; they account for only 17.7 percent of the plant-level leaders of CCOO. Nevertheless, they form a major piece of the large puzzle that lies behind the development of any strong nationwide organization in so diverse and complex a society as Spain. Major differences between Barcelona and Madrid in the region of birth of their workplace leaders reflect in part the variation between the two provinces in point of origin of the large immigration of the 1960s and early 1970s. One fifth of the Madrid leaders, 20 percent, as opposed to only 5.8 percent for Barcelona, migrated from Castilla/ La Mancha. The region of equivalent importance to Barcelona is Andalucia which produced 20.8 percent of its leaders, compared to 8.2 percent for Madrid. This suggests the hypothesis that some of the divergence in the pattern of contemporary union politics between Barcelona and Madrid may be explained by the differences between the heritage of class relations and politics of Andalucia and Castilla/ La Mancha. Both Madrid and Barcelona have produced from within about half of their current supply of leaders: 52.9 percent of the workplace leaders in Madrid were born in that province, whereas for Barcelona 50 percent were born in Catalonia. Thus, the greatest variation between the two provinces in the collective experiences represented by their plant-level leaders is the most obvious: the difference between the historical working-class traditions of the two cities. In the case of 6. See the unpublished data of Juan Linz on political violence during the Second Republic.

70

Working-Class Organization

Barcelona the even split between those born in Catalonia and in other regions of Spain underlines a (potential) cleavage of considerable significance for the Catalan labor movement. Internal union divisions over the issues surrounding Catalan nationalism and language politics have been especially severe in UGT. CCOO, with its policy of strong official support for Catalanism while conducting most union business in Spanish, has been more successful in avoiding serious internal conflict over this issue.

Demographic Profiles The age distribution of the leaders sharply differentiates the two leading confederations. Furthermore, an analysis of this variable contributes much to an understanding of the leadership selection process: the characteristics of the leaders do not reflect some unambiguous technical "qualifications" for the position; rather, they point to the interplay of macropolitical events and shared generational experiences as key factors behind the emergence of a workplace leadership. 7 Comisiones has based its considerable workplace presence on the participation of markedly younger leaders than those available to UGT (see Table 3.2). More than one quarter of the CCOO leaders, 26.3 percent, were under thirty years of age, whereas the figure for the Socialist confederation was 9.8 percent. Conversely, 20.7 percent of the UGT leaders, as opposed to 9.9 percent for CCOO, were fifty years or older. This differentiation in the age structure of the leadership group of the two unions is considerably sharper than what exists at the membership level, although even there CCOO is somewhat younger. 8 These data confirm my interpretation of the empirical finding-in an ecological analysis of the 1978 union elections-that UGT tended to do poorly in provinces with a relatively high percentage of young workers (measured as those nineteen years and younger in that analysis) in the labor force. In an article written well 7. The role of generational factors and collective experiences in the formation of workplace leaderships is among the important findings of Carol Mershon's excellent research on Italian unionism at the factory level. See Carol Mershon, "Generations of Change: Partisanship and Ideology among Italian Unionists," paper presented at the Sixth International Conference of Europeanists, Washington, D.C., October 30-November 1, 1987; and chap. 4 in Mershon, "The Micropolitics of Union Action: Industrial Conflict in Italian Factories" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1986). 8. For data on union membership by age, see Perez Diaz, Clase obrera, partidos y sindicatos, 4.

(70)

(82)

(31)

(141)

22.9 12.9 7.1 11.4 18.6 20.0 5.7

9.7 25.8 12.9 12.9 19.4 6.5 12.9

3.7 6.1 12.2 15.9 28.0 13.4 20.7

13.5 12.8 17.7 14.9 18.4 12.1 9.9

Independents

Others

By union

UGT

ccoo

(154)

14.9 9.7 15.6 14.9 15.6 15.6 13.0 (170)

10.6 14.7 11.8 13.5 25.9 11.8 11.2

Madrid

By province Barcelona

(324)

12.7 12.3 13.6 14.2 21.0 13.6 12.0

Entire sample

Note: Some columns do not sum to 100 because the two cases of refusal to answer this question are not reported, although they have been included in the N used as the basis for percentaging.

(N)

26 and younger 27-29 30-32 33-35 36-41 42-49 50 and older

Age

Table 3.2. Age of leaders (in 1981)

72

Working-Class Organization

before conducting the survey, I speculated that the influence of this variable on the election outcome was not the direct result of the presence of young workers in the (union) electorate, arguing instead that, "The effect of young workers in diminishing the possibilities for the UGT may be the result of a much greater ability of rival labor organizations to tap these young workers for key roles as activists and leaders, thus leaving the Socialist union at a competitive disadvantage in provinces with a high score on this variable." 9 The confirmation of that earlier finding in subsequent survey research underscores the validity of emphasizing the role of the workplace leaders--even for many phenomena (such as voting in union elections) that some observers prefer to interpret as the unambiguous result of individual-level worker actions. The relatively young workplace leadership of CCOO is clearly the product of a distinctive set of generational experiences. Those survey respondents who were under age thirty (in 1981) entered the labor force and initiated political activity in the late 1960s and early 1970s, precisely the time that Comisiones was the dominant presence in the growing movement of working class opposition to the Franco regime. As we shall see shortly, this movement did not generate the entire pool of leaders enjoyed by CCOO later under democracy; many of today's leaders became active for the first time after the demise of the authoritarian regime. Nevertheless, for those who entered the labor force in the late Franco period, independently of their own level of involvement in the opposition movement, CCOO was the union, and the style and expectations it represented were the norm. The hopes and excitement of those difficult years of labor protest under repression have passed, but they have left an enduring mark on union life under democracy: the large percentage of young workers in the pool of workplace leadership demonstrates how their generation's experience-specifically, their entry into the labor force at a time of growing opposition to dictatorship-motivated many to undertake the special risks and costs of activism and leadership. The relatively old leadership of UGT is, in part, the result of the weakness of the Socialist confederation during the opposition years when the younger generations entered the labor force. However, for those fifty years and older who represented 20.7 percent of UGT workplace leadership, the explanation is more positive. The unionists of this age group are the only ones whose personal political memory 9. Robert Fishman, "Labor Movement in Spain," 300-301.

Who Are the Workplace Leaders?

73

includes the years of the Second Republic when UGT was one of the two major labor confederations and CCOO did not even exist. The ensuing years of civil war and the harsh repression of the early Franco period dissuaded all but a small proportion of workers of this age group from undertaking the risks of labor leadership: they form only 12 percent of the overall pool of leaders for all unions. But when they choose to become involved they tend to support UGT, playing a major role in the Socialist confederation. This analysis may appear to present the competition between the two leading confederations as, in part, a contest opposing two distinct generations. Such an argument would be mistaken, primarily because the majority of the leaders in both unions actually falls in the intermediate age range from thirty through forty-nine. Additionally, however, one must remember that in many workplaces the question is not which leadership will win the support of workers but rather whether any leadership will emerge at all. Neither major confederation enjoys a reserve of plant-level leaders fully sufficient for achieving a presence throughout the economy. The contrasting experiences of different generations help determine the extent of their contribution to the overall pool of leaders. All the unions have an overwhelmingly male workplace leadership (see Table 3.3 ), and the distribution of the total sample is 92.3 percent men and only 7.7 percent women. UGT has the most exclusively male group of leaders: 98.8 percent men. CCOO has been much more successful in enlisting the active support of a (small) group of women who made up 11.3 percent of its pool of leaders. Significantly, this distinction between the two unions occurs exclusively at the leadership level. At the mass membership level women are just as likely to join UGT as Comisiones. 1° For whatever reason, the women in CCOO are more likely than their female counterparts in UGT to serve as leaders in their plants. It is conceivable that the membership and/or bureaucracy of UGT is more 'sexist' than in the other unions, therefore discouraging women from undertaking responsibility, yet there is no real evidence of this. Alternatively, one could argue that those women who undertake to lead union activity in their workplaces are breaking so fundamentally with the patterns of domination in the larger society that they are likely to be drawn to a confederation determined to overturn that order of domination. A (mostly) Communist union such 10. For data on union membership by gender, see Perez Diaz, Clase obrera, partidos y sindicatos, 94.

(141)

22.0 73.8 2.1 0.7

88.7 11.3

-

1.2

(82) (31)

-

16.1 83.9

9.8 89.0

-

93.5 6.5

Others

By union

1.2

98.8

UGT

(70)

-

24.3 70.0 1.4

91.4 8.6

Independents

(154)

-

22.1 74.0 2.6

91.6 8.4

1.2 (170)

-

15.9 81.2

92.9 7.1

Madrid

By province Barcelona

(324)

0.2

1.2

18.8 77.8

92.3 7.7

Entire sample

Note: Some columns do not sum to 100 because those who did not respond to the question are not reported in the table but are included in the N used as the base for percentaging.

(N)

By sex Men Women Marital status Single Married Divorced/ separated Widowed

ccoo

Table 3.3. Gender and marital status of leaders

Who Are the Workplace Leaders?

75

as CCOO clearly offers that promise more than UGT with its ties to the moderate PSOE. However, much of the explanation for this phenomenon may lie in the age distribution of the leadership group in the two unions. The young leaders are more likely to be single than their older counterparts, and in contemporary Spain they are undoubtedly more likely to have 'liberal' views about the role of women in social and political life. Both factors should tend to free women from the restrictive aspects of the traditional female roles, thus allowing significant numbers of younger women to serve as leaders. In fact, among the youngest age group, those twenty-six years and younger, 31.7 percent of the respondents were women, and for CCOO leaders of this age group the figure rises to 4 2.1 percent. 11 Thus, the tendency of young activists to choose CCOO as the union for their leadership efforts helps to produce the considerable presence of women among the Comisiones leaders. CCOO has more single leaders than UGT: 22 percent, as opposed to 9.8 percent. This phenomenon does not indicate some generalized rejection of orthodox roles and behavior by the unionists of Comisiones, but rather, just like the presence of more women among the CCOO leaders, it follows naturally from the age structure of the confederations' leadership. Among the youngest leaders, 51.2 percent are single, and in the next youngest group 30 percent are unmarried. 12 Of course, the large majority in all unions is married. Nevertheless, the single minority, with more time to attend meetings and pursue the informal dimension of political and associational activity (discussing union strategy with friends or acquaintances outside the official, organizational context) may have a special role to play in internal union politics. It is interesting to note that Barcelona, with its recent experience of sharp internal conflict in the labor movement and left parties, has a somewhat larger group of single leaders than Madrid.

Leaders in Occupational and Class Structures How do these intermediate-level leaders of the working class fit into the class and occupational structure? Are they more or less char11. Given space limitations, the full table has not been reported in the text. 12. Ibid.

76

Working-Class Organization

acteristic of the classic working class than the employees they represent? How similar are the competing unions and the two provinces in terms of the class and occupational composition of their leaderships? The leaders come from various class backgrounds, if we use the principal occupation of their fathers as the indicator. The most common parental background for respondents from all unions and both provinces is the manual working class (see Table 3.4). Yet, although this is the modal reply, the percentage making this response never reaches an absolute majority and attains the maximum figure of 45.5 percent for Barcelona. Those whose fathers worked in agriculture comprise just about one quarter of the respondents. And, although only 7. 7 percent come from families that owned a business, it is interesting to note that this group is represented in all the unions, even CCOO. In fact, the most noteworthy aspect of the data on class background is the similarity of the different unions. The leaderships of the competing unions are not clearly differentiated from one another on the basis of their fathers' occupations. Furthermore, the leaders strongly resemble the rank-and-file workers on this indicator. 13 Despite the importance (even in Spain) of second-and third-generation working-class families for the transmission of political organizational traditions, many industrial workers and plant-level leaders are firstgeneration occupants of their class position. This is a direct result of the migration to the cities from the agricultural regions. However, the similarity of the unions disappears when we turn from the question of class background to the current occupation of the leaders themselves (see Table 3.5). Comisiones is, by far, the most 'blue-collar' of the unions, with 60.3 percent of its leaders either unskilled, semiskilled, or skilled 'blue-collar' workers. The figure for UGT is 30.5 percent, just about half the level of CCOO. This striking contrast between the two principal confederations is of special interest because it does not mirror an equivalent difference among the rankand-file members of the two organizations; the unions are relatively similar in terms of the occupational characteristics of their members. 14 Furthermore, this disparity in the occupational characteristics of the two leadership groups has not generated an equally large distance between them on most political issues; their attitudinal profiles are much more similar and on some key issues nearly identical. Thus, 13. Data on rank-and-file workers is to be found in the studies of Perez Diaz and Tezanos. 14. Ibid.

(N)

Manual work Agriculture Nonmanual work Owner of business Unclassified; did not respond; other

Occupational field

(141)

43.3 28.4 15.6 5.7 7.1

ccoo

Table 3.4. Principal occupation of leaders' fathers

(82)

41.5 24.4 20.7 8.5 4.9

UGT

(31)

6.5

-

45.2 29.0 19.4

By union Others

(70)

38.6 14.3 24.3 14.3 8.6

Independents

(154)

45.5 25.3 14.9 7.8 6.5 (170)

38.8 23.5 22.9 7.6 7.1

By province Madrid

Barcelona

(324)

42.0 24.4 19.1 7.7 6.8

Entire sample

(82)

-

3.7 28.0 18.3 6.1 4.9

3.5 19.9 8.5 3.5 0.7 0.7

(141)

11.0 19.5 8.5

UGT

27.0 33.3 2.8

ccoo

(31)

16.1 22.6 12.9 3.2 6.5 3.2

-

9.7 25.8

Others

By union

(70)

-

44.3 27.1 1.4 11.4

-

5.7 8.6 1.4

Independents

(154)

3.9 29.9 13.0 3.2 3.2 0.6

18.8 24.0 3.2

(170)

4.1 25.3 17.6 4.1 5.9 0.6

14.7 23.5 4.1

Madrid

By province Barcelona

*All blue-collar workers whose job title includes the Spanish term "oficial" have been coded as skilled. **"Capataces," "encargados," etc. (in English, "foreman") have been coded as blue-collar supervisory.

(N)

Blue collar Unskilled and semiskilled Skilled* Supervisory* • White collar and service Lower Middle Technicians and highly skilled Organization technician Management Unclassified

Status

Table 3.5. Occupational status of leaders

(324)

4.0 27.5 15.4 3.7 4.6 0.6

16.7 23.8 3.7

Entire sample

Who Are the Workplace Leaders?

79

this large difference between CCOO and UGT is specific to the problem of leadership recruitment and supply. From which groups does UGT draw its plant-level leaders, if not from the core of the industrial working class? Foremen and other 'blue-collar' supervisory personnel form one small but not insignificant part of the answer. This category accounts for 8.5 percent of UGT workplace leaders, more than for any other union. A majority of UGT leaders are actually located in the middle or upper levels of 'white-collar' or service employment. A small number, 4.9 percent, actually hold management positions; a slightly larger group, 6.1 percent, is employed in the sociologically interesting role of 'organizational technician.' Thus many of these workplace leaders hold occupations that could be characterized as 'contradictory class positions,' following the formulation of some theorists 15 and a few (with management appointments) are clearly not part of the working class at all, unless one accepts the loosest definition, which would include all those who receive a paycheck regardless of their work responsibilities. Nevertheless, this same UGT leadership has, for the most part, chosen to identify with the working class and to contribute to the development of unionism. What implications can we draw from the class composition of the UGT leadership and its contrast with CCOO? At one level, we can simply note that the organizational presence of the Socialist confederation in the industrial working class is more tenuous than the election results or even membership data would suggest. The pool of leaders that UGT must rely on for organizing workers is not only smaller than that of CCOO, but it also is less clearly anchored in the 'blue-collar' world characteristic of most unions. This difficulty of UGT is congruent with a broader problem it has encountered: whereas the Socialist confederation is frequently able to reduce greatly the participation in CCOO sponsored mobilizations simply by making its opposition clear, except on rare occasions it has not been able to launch its own, autonomous worker mobilizations without the support of Comisiones. This suggests that the success or failure of the UGT attempt to establish a solid Socialist organizational presence in the working class after its relative insignificance in the 1960s and early 1970s rests, to a considerable degree, on its capacity to make progress on the leadership supply problem. Otherwise, successes for 15. On the concept of contradictory class locations see Erik Olin Wright, Class, Crisis and the State (London, 1978).

80

Working-Class Organization

UGT in economywide bargaining and in gearing its program to the attitudinal orientations of the workers will not necessarily result in any significant and lasting improvement in the union's standing. To pose the problem from the point of view of the would-be leaders rather than from the perspective of the confederations, one can argue that those workers willing to take the large step of breaking with the subordinate nature of their position in the authority structure of work are also likely to be attracted to a union with a style and ideology offering a strong alternative to the existing order. Despite the many similarities in the ideology and orientations of the two confederations, CCOO clearly has the more radical image. In the Spanish contextwithout any material inducements to encourage relatively moderate or satisfied workers to assume the responsibilities of workplace leadership, and with the risk of negative sanctions or even repression for those who undertake such tasks-apparently most 'blue-collar' workers who assume the position of plant-level leader are strongly motivated ideologically and tend to be drawn to a union of the same cast. However, for employees with positions higher in the occupational structure, the assumption of leadership tasks does not represent a break with a position of great subordination. Such individuals, with 'contradictory' or intermediate class positions, if they identify with the working class and its problems, tend to be drawn to UGT. Evidently, the Socialist confederation, with its representation of worker interests within a reformist framework and its relatively pragmatic style, is more appealing to this group of leaders than to the strictly 'blue-collar' leaders. Let us briefly consider one additional possible explanation for this difference between the two leading unions. Rather than attempting to locate the principal cause in the area of the supply of leadership, as developed in the above discussion, we could instead examine the way the competing confederations choose to select their workplace leaders. Do the unions differ in their preference for the type of individuals to serve as leaders, with CCOO favoring 'blue-collar' workers as the most 'genuine' or effective representatives of the proletariat and UGT preferring intermediate-level employees as somehow more qualified for the duties involved? Although this could be a minor factor contributing slightly to the observed distribution, in fact, there is no real evidence that this is the case except for the presence of some 'workerist' tendencies in CCOO. However, even such 'workerism' that seeks to minimize the role of middle-class elements in the labor

Who Are the Workplace Leaders?

81

movement is really directed primarily toward the staffing of bureaucratic or top-level leadership positions rather than the plant-level leaders of prime concern here. Moreover, the survey data provide evidence tending to refute this argument or at least diminishing the weight one can attach to it. The total absence of UGT from many firms (see table 2.1) suggests strongly that the standard problem for the union is one of insufficient leadership supply rather than competition between leaders of different class positions. The leadership supply problem has helped produce the strong occupational differentiation in the leadership pool enjoyed by the two confederations. To what extent have the leaders known harsh or unusual labor market experiences helping to provide the motivation for their activism? Unemployment and the experience of work outside Spain both deserve consideration: the former as a possible determinant of radicalism and the latter as a potential conduit for diffusing European models of unionism within Spain during the period of Francoist repression. In the 1960s and early 1970s millions of Spaniards worked abroad in Western Europe, but unemployment had not yet reached the enormous proportions attained in Spain during the economic crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In fact, only a small minority of the leaders had personally encountered unemployment or work outside Spain (see Table 3.6). Thus, these facets of working-class life cannot account for the decision of (most of) these individuals to participate actively in the labor movement, nor can they distinguish among the leaderships of the competing unions. Unemployment has been most common for the CCOO leaders (16.3 percent), and the smaller labor organizations grouped together as Other Unions have the highest level of work outside Spain (16.1 percent). Neither figure is substantial enough to provide much explanation for the attraction of would-be leaders to the union option in question, and in the case of Other Unions the category is so heterogeneous that it is difficult to analyze. 16 Thus, it seems that the chief elements of working-class experience accounting for the emergence of the labor leadership are the everyday problems of work along with the conflictual and solidaristic aspects of collective worker action itself, rather than the individualized encounters with harsh labor market events such as unemployment. 16. The category Other Unions is made up of a diverse group of smaller unions that I have grouped together for the analysis simply hecause they are too few in number to he analyzed separately. The category in no sense represents a coherent or cohesive group.

(N)

Have been unemployed Have worked outside Spain

Experience

Independents 4.3 8.6 (70)

Others 12.9 16.1 (31)

UGT

11.0 9.8 (82)

ccoo

16.3 8.5 (141)

By union

Table 3.6. Exceptional labor market experience of leaders

(154)

8.4 7.8

Barcelona 15.3 11.2 (170)

Madrid

By province

12.0 9.6 (324)

Entire sample

Who Are the Workplace Leaders?

83

Education and Religion The level of education of the leaders varies considerably, extending from none at all for a few (1.2 percent), and only primary education for a large minority (29.7 percent), to some higher education for a substantial group (17.3 percent), and a higher education degree for a smaller minority (6.8 percent) (see Table 3.7). However, the distribution within the two large confederations is strikingly similar, in fact, almost identical. The main differences are the presence of more higher education degrees in UGT and more vocational education in CCOO, but even on these points the disparity between the two unions is never more than 7 percent. This similarity is the result, in part, of two counteracting influences: the relatively higher occupational status of UGT leaders tends to be correlated with a higher educational attainment, but the young leaders of Comisiones have experienced somewhat greater educational opportunities than their older counterparts in UGT as a result of improvements in the school system over time. The greater educational attainment of the Independents is clearly to be explained by their higher position in the class/ occupational structure. The presence of some individuals with a higher education among the workplace leaders demonstrates the erroneous nature of the frequently held view of labor leaders as an unschooled lot. Nevertheless, many plant-level leaders do have relatively little education, and there is no evidence that this impairs their effectiveness. The lack of any clear association between educational attainment and the assumption of leadership tasks underscores the fact that the selection of workplace leaders is not based on technocratic credentials but rather emerges from the dynamic of union life within the firm with its interplay of workers, activists, employers, union confederations, and the larger political society. Formal education, then, is not a major influence on staffing the workplace leadership role. Religious belief and practice are among the most powerful variables for explaining political behavior in a number of countries. 17 In the Catholic societies of southwestern Europe, with their ideologically oriented party systems and their history of conflict over relations between Church and state, religion remains a strong predictor of political preference. 18 In Spain, the workplace leaders (see Table 3.8) 17. For data on the relative weight of religion, occupation, and region in shaping partisanship in fifteen democracies, see Rose, ed., Electoral Behavior, 17. 18. The seminal works on party systems remain Lipset and Rokkan; and Giovanni

(140)

2.9 35.0 18.6 12.9 9.3 14.3 2.9 4.3

ccoo -

(82)

(31)

(70)

12.9 20.0 10.0 17.1 24.3 12.9 2.9

-

29.0 19.4 3.2 12.9 25.8 6.5 3.2

-

35.4 19.5 6.1 12.2 13.4 8.5 4.9

Independents

Others

UGT

By union

(N)

Very good Catholic Practicing Catholic Not very practicing Nonpracticing Catholic Believer in other religion Indifferent Atheist Other response; no response

Religious practice

(141)

(82)

(31)

-

22.6 16.1 3.2

-

45.1 11.0 2.4

34.0 34.0 1.4

-

9.7 12.9 35.5

-

-

1.2 7.3 32.9

Others

By union

UGT

1.4 2.8 4.3 22.0

ccoo

Table 3.8. Religious practice and beliefs of leaders

(70)

2.9 14.3 17.1 30.0 1.4 15.7 14.3 4.3

Independents

"The other answers referred, mostly, to some form of nonuniversiry technical education.

(N)

None Primary Intermediate Vocational Secondary Some higher education Higher education degree Other answers*

Educational level

Table 3.7. Educational attainment of leaders

(154)

29.2 21.4 0.6

1.9 5.8 6.5 34.4

Barcelona

-

(169)

1.2 29.0 19.5 7.7 10.7 19.5 8.9 3.6

Madrid

(170)

0.6 5.3 10.6 21.8 0.6 34.1 22.9 4.1

Madrid

By province

(154)

1.3

30.5 18.8 11.7 13.6 14.9 4.5 4.5

Barcelona

By province

(324)

1.2 5.6 8.6 27.8 0.3 31.8 22.2 2.5

Entire sample

(323)

1.2 29.7 19.2 9.6 12.1 17.3 6.8 4.1

Entire sample

Who Are the Workplace Leaders?

85

are significantly less religious than the population as a whole, with a majority claiming to be either atheists or indifferent toward religion. The Independents are easily the most religious of the leaders, with those belonging to Other Unions following them. Comisiones Obreras is the most secularized union option with 34 percent atheists and 34 percent indifferent. The Socialist UGT has the lowest presence of atheists, only 11 percent. The slightly higher level of atheism among Other Unions and Independents, with 16.1 percent and 14.3 percent respectively, reflects the presence of a small leftist fringe within both union options. The difference between CCOO and UGT suggests that the intensity of many workers' rejection of the Church is one of the underlying factors sustaining the political cleavage within the labor movement and distinguishing between the constituencies of the Socialist and Communist movements. Nevertheless, we must remember that the distributions of religious practice and belief in the two unions overlap considerably. Both confederations contain large minorities professing one degree or another of adherence to Catholicism (including the "nonpracticing Catholics"). Thus, despite the importance of religion for understanding politics, standing alone it cannot explain the divisions within the union movement. Above all, we should note that the rejection of the Church by a majority of the leaders underscores and sustains their opposition to the existing social order. It may seem difficult to draw any simple and brief conclusions since these data underline the diversity of the leadership group. Perhaps the most important point to make is that the leaders are not an exact social reflection of the working class. Similarly they are neither a precise ideological mirror image of the workers nor a narrow technocratic elite with unique credentials to represent their fellow employees. In fact, the leaderships of the competing unions differ from one another considerably along several dimensions. This suggests that the factors we have examined affect not only the selection of the leaders but also the production of the leaders. As the data on age demonstrated, the historical context in which some generations entered the workplace created leaders tending to opt for one union; different historical contexts (for the introduction to the workplace) tended to produce leaders opting for different unions. Distinctive generational Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge, 1976). For recent comparative work on party systems, see Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, eds., Western European Party Systems: Continuity & Change (London/Beverly Hills, Calif., 1983). On religion and party preference in Spain, see Linz et al., chapter 10.

86

Working-Class Organization

experiences and other broadly shared aspects of social life help motivate some individuals to serve as leaders, thus attenuating the leadership supply problem but never eliminating it entirely. Now that our analysis of the workplace leadership role and its significance has been complemented by a consideration of the individuals who fill that role, we are prepared to investigate the larger issues of the study with the data collected from the leaders.

4

The Opposition Labor Movement in Franco Spain

When the government of Adolfo Suarez reinstituted the legal right of unions to establish themselves and operate freely in April 1977, some two months before the first parliamentary elections of the new democratic period, several competing labor confederations had already begun the work of opening headquarters and distributing membership cards. As the Francoist ban on union activity crumbled and was ultimately eliminated during the transition period, the organizational challenge assumed central importance for the labor movement. In order to emerge as a more or less powerful social force in democratic Spain, the unions would have to win the allegiance, membership, and dues payments of large numbers of workers with no previous union experience. To achieve this goal required labor to offer at least the promise, if not always the demonstrated ability, to win concrete concessions on matters of importance to the diverse group of workers whose support it sought. Yet even more fundamental was the need for the labor movement--or more precisely the competing union confederations-to gain a presence in workplaces throughout the country by relying on or recruiting a plant-level leadership to coordinate or even initiate union activity. What were the dimensions of this organizational challenge faced by labor in the context of a regime transition and an accelerating economic crisis? To what extent could the unions rely on organizational forms or at least leadership and activist groups in place in their workplace and with experience in collective worker action? To answer these questions we must direct our attention backward in history to analyze the opposition labor movement in Franco Spain. 87

88

Working-Class Organization The Opposition Labor Movement: Challenge to Authoritarian Rule and Organizational Basis for Democratic Unionism

The victory of the Franco-led forces in the Civil War initiated a period of severe repression of the labor movement and other supporters of the defeated Republic. 1 Thousands were executed and more imprisoned while others fled the country. The legal ban on union activity virtually destroyed the large labor organizations of the preFranco years and eliminated their leaders from political activity inside Spain. Thus, the Franco system can clearly be classed with those "exclusionary" authoritarian regimes that attempt to dismantle a previously strong labor movement by repressing a mobilized working class (along with others). 2 Nevertheless, a few activists did manage to evade the harsh repression of the postwar years, thereby maintaining some opposition activity and organization. 3 And yet by the end of the Franco period, the opposition labor movement was a major force challenging the regime and capable of sustaining a level of strikes that fell well within the broad Western European pattern even though such industrial conflict was illegal (or at best semilegal after the pseudolegalization of strikes in early 1975) in Spain. The apparent strength of the illegal opposition labor movement and its ability to sustain a high level of strikes (after the mid-1960s) suggest (1) that conflict between the regime and civil society was of enormous significance for the demise of authoritarian rule in Spain4 1. A recent well-researched monograph on the repression of the first years of the Franco regime is Ramon Salas Larrazabal, Perdidas de Ia guerra (Barcelona, 1977). See also the criticism by Alberto Reig Tapia, "La represi6n franquista en Ia guerra civil," Sistema 33 (November 1979). 2. For the concept of "exclusionary" authoritarian regimes and its distinction from the "inclusionary" model of some state corporatist regimes, see Stepan, The State and Society, chap. 3. In this conceptual distinction Stepan builds on the work of O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism. 3. The biographical accounts of how activists and leaders spent these years and the experiences-flight, hiding, arrest, and exile-they suffered, are most instructive. Short useful accounts of how a number of currently prominent leaders spent this period can be found in the biographies published in a series during the recent political transition. Especially interesting, for its treatment of a leader who spent the most difficult years inside Spain rather than in exile, is the biography of the Madrid Communists' leader Simon Sanchez Montero. See Pedro Calvo Hernando, Simon Sanchez Montero: Perfil humano y politico (Madrid, 1977.) For a compelling account, in English, of how the Francoist repression would lead a local leader of much less prominence to spend half a lifetime hiding in his own home, see Ronald Fraser, In Hiding: The Life of Manuel Cortes (New York, 1973). Of course, thousands of the less fortunate victims of the repression did not live to tell their stories. 4. For a stimulating argument, based on the recent Portuguese experience, that the collapse of authoritarian rule owes more to the internal tensions within such regimes than

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and (2) that the emergence of democratic unionism would stand on the solid foundation of an extensive organizational presence of labor, thus permitting significant continuity for the union movement itself in the transition period. The obvious relevance of such conclusions for the larger issues addressed by this study requires us to explore in considerable detail the opposition labor movement, the circumstances that allowed it to emerge, the extent of the political challenge it posed to the regime, and the weight of its own organizational presence.

Legal and Illegal Forms of Unionism Like other authoritarian systems that attempt to eliminate the political challenge posed by labor, the Franco regime could not restrict itself to repressing preexisting unions, but felt the need to develop a labor policy to (partially and unsuccessfully) take their place.' The regime's initial strategy was to establish an official "vertical union" with obligatory membership for all workers and employers but with few real functions. 6 The Sindicato structure (the official regime union, also referred to as the Organizacion Sindical Espanola, OSE) was not empowered to conduct bargaining or formulate wage policy; wages and guidelines on working conditions were established by decree of the Ministry of Labor. Nevertheless, the Falangist sector of the regime took the OSE seriously as a framework within which to create the harmony of the "productive forces," with the aim of incorporating the working class into an antiliberal state. The first elections inside the "vertical union" took place in 1944, but they were of little significance, doing nothing to challenge the organization's falangist domination. As a relatively weak single party, especially within the working class where its presence was minimal, the Falange could staff the bureaucracy and top-level leadership positions of the Sindicatos to the conflict between regime and civil society, see Philippe Schmitter, "Liberation by Golpe: Retrospective Thoughts on the Demise of Authoritarian Rule in Portugal," Armed Forces and Society (November 1975). 5. For a comparative and theoretical discussion of labor under authoritarian regimes, reporting and building on the papers presented in a conference on this problem, see J. Samuel Valenzuela and Jeffrey Goodwin, Labor Movements under Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge, Mass., 1981). 6. For a history of the regime's "vertical union" written by an opposition activist and labor relations specialist, and directed to a broad audience in the context of the transition period, see Manuel Ludevid, Cuarenta aiios de sindicato vertical: Aproximacion a Ia organizaci6n sindical espanola (Barcelona, 1976).

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but could not hope, on the basis of its own members, to create a lively union organization in workplaces throughout the economy. 7 The regime's decision to introduce the election of worker representatives at the factory level was to substantially alter the form of union activity. The jurados de empresa, committees of worker representatives elected within the framework of the Sindicatos, provided the OSE with genuine life and relevance for workers and also established a space available to opposition activists. The initial official step creating the jurados was taken in 1947, but many years passed before the bodies were actually functioning in most firms. Electoral guidelines were laid down in the early 1950s, and some factories actually chose jurados, although the institution still did not become generalized throughout the economy. The enactment of a law on collective bargaining in 1958, as part of a broader economic liberalization, actually provided the jurados with a significant function. 8 The elected worker representatives were to negotiate collective contracts with the employers or their representatives within the framework of the OSE. In this fashion collective bargaining replaced the decrees of the Ministry of Labor as the legal mechanism for establishing wages and working conditions, but strikes remained illegal. Given the inability of the OSE hierarchy to fill the positions on the jurados with falangists or other strong supporters of the regime, these elective bodies opened up new possibilities: the elective posts allowed opposition activists to reach the workers and initiate (limited) collective action within a legal framework; even where no self-conscious opposition activists were present, the jurados encouraged authentic worker representatives to emerge and gain experience in the organized conflict of interests between workers and employers. Maravall, in his important analysis of the opposition labor movement, argues that the regime's important decision to institute collective bargaining through the jurados reflected exigencies of capitalist development: the need for increased productivity and rationalization at the firm level, along with the setting of wage rates by individual 7. For an analysis of the Spanish single party and its incapacity to penetrate and mobilize society in the fashion of a totalitarian party, see Juan Linz, "From Falange to MovimientoOrganizacion," in Authoritarian Politics in Modern Societies, ed. Huntington and Moore. The standard history of the Falange in English remains Payne, Falange. 8. An excellent source on the labor relations system that emerged in the wake of the 1958 reform is Jon Amsden, Collective Bargaining and Class Conflict in Spain (London, 1972). A Spanish translation of this book has also been published. For an earlier treatment, see Fred Whitney, Labor Policy and Practices in Spain (New York, 1965).

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enterprises rather than the Labor Ministry. 9 This issue is of considerable importance for our understanding of the tendencies leading to the demise of authoritarian rule; the attempt to institute collective bargaining without the right to strike helped shape the development of political and economic life during the remaining Franco period. Maravall's interpretation seems attractive, providing, as it does, a coherent theoretical scheme for making sense out of the apparently unlikely spectacle of a procapitalist, exclusionary authoritarian regime that creates a space for the (limited) representation of workers' interests, thereby allowing opposition activists to mobilize workers. In fact, the initiation of collective bargaining does coincide roughly with the beginning of rapid economic growth and the adoption of government policies aimed at encouraging capitalist development. Nevertheless, several points suggest the inadequacy of this interpretation as the sole explanation for the jurado system of labor negotiations. Linz and de Miguel's 1961 study of employer attitudes found that a plurality of Spanish business leaders actually opposed adopting collective bargaining. 1° Furthermore, the period of rapid economic growth actually began before the practice of collective bargaining became widespread. Apparently, the system of bargaining was neither essential to capitalist development nor vital to the functioning of particular enterprises, at least in the view of the business executives themselves. It would, however, be a mistake to dismiss totally Maravall's explanation. The collective bargaining legislation was, in fact, instituted by the same government (named by Franco in 1957) that enacted other measures designed to encourage rapid economic growth. The autonomy for individual firms provided by the new labor relations system replaced the rigidities of regulation by the Ministry of Labor, and the negotiation of a collective agreement between workers and management reduced the need for individualized forms of worker protest, such as absenteeism or slow work habits, 11 while also pro9. This excellent sociological work is Jose Mara vall, Dictatorship and Political Dissent: Workers and Students in Franco's Spain (London, 1978). This work has also appeared in Spanish. I 0. Juan Linz and Amando de Miguel, Los empresarios ante el poder publico (Madrid, 1966), 195. 11. A now classic treatment of industrial conflict includes the argument that in the absence of strikes worker grievances find more individualized forms of expression such as absenteeism; seeK. G.]. C. Knowles, " 'Strike-Proneness' and Its Determinants," in Labor and Trade Unionism: An Interdisciplinary Reader, ed. Walter Galenson and S.M. Lipset (New York, 1960).

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viding employers with new incentives for productivity increases to pay for wage increases. 12 If the "exigencies of capitalist development" can help explain the form taken by labor relations in the second half of the Franco period, but by no means fully account for the phenomenon, what other factors help us understand the policies adopted by the regime? The two principal considerations were the desire of the regime to legitimate and institutionalize itself, and its international position. From the regime's point of view, developing the OSE provided the Franco system with the opportunity to legitimize itself in the eyes of the working class while institutionalizing the relationship between workers, employers, and the state. The fascist and semifascist components of the regime, although not strongly committed to rapid economic growth, did take the Sindicatos' structure seriously as a framework for forging the unity of the "productive forces" and/or as a vehicle for integrating workers into the regime by providing a legal outlet for their grievances. This element of the regime's labor policy is exemplified by Jose Solis; named national delegate of the Sindicatos in 1951 and secretary general of the Movimiento (the official party) and the OSE in 1957, Solfs defended the more or less fascist, political, incorporating mission of the Sindicatos: We profess and practice with full sincerity the principle of the political nature of our unions, in a double sense. In one sense, because they represent or are a basic part of the constitution of the State, being a form of political representation. In another sense, our Organization is filled with political substance by its end, by its program, when it contemplates the economic and social problems which occupy it. The concept of association is subordinated here to the transcendental ends of an organization, that is to say, of the people, by the people, and for the people. Let us understand: we are not dealing with a democracy of parties, but rather with the most perfect expression of a modern society: syndical democracy. Whom does the Sindicato represent? All of the producers. 11

12. The relationship between productivity and union action is somewhat polemical. For an argument, from a perspective sympathetic to unionism, that labor organization and collective worker action tend to restrain productivity increases (rather than encouraging them as others would argue) see Rubin, Wallace, and Griffin, "The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove." 13. Quoted in Ludevid, 44, 45.

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This political conception of the Sindicatos led Solis and others like him to undertake inconsistent and inadequate, but nevertheless real, attempts to encourage the authentic democratic representation of worker interests within the OSE. Thus, the elections to the jurados were free, but the labor opposition was not permitted to wage a coordinated national campaign, and many opposition activists elected as delegates were eventually dismissed. Comisiones Obreras was first tolerated and then declared illegal in February 1967 after it became clear that the workers' movement intended more than simply to enliven the official structures. Yet in November 1967, Solis wrote, "If Comisiones Obreras wishes to act, let them use the channel of sindicalismo, and let them act within legality." 14 The desire of Solis to incorporate worker militancy within the regime is noted by Ludevid, labor relations specialist and former opposition activist, in his popularizing book on the OSE: Solis represents ... the development of a certain populist attitude with respect to some worker conflicts. Many still remember the famous anecdote of the "Solis bonus" from the time of the great miners strikes in Asturias at the beginning of the 1960s. Solis travelled in person to the mining valleys, holding public meetings and speaking "directly" with the people. And the bonus which the miners were demanding was granted. 15 Another element helping to push the regime toward reforming the Sindicatos was the position of Spain in the international system. After breaking its post-World War II isolation, Spain developed extensive economic, cultural, and even military dealings with many Western democracies. The need to justify the regime's policies within international organizations such as the ILO (or potentially the EEC), as well as the desire to reduce the popular animosity toward Franco Spain which existed in much of Western Europe, encouraged reformist tendencies within the system. Additionally, as Spaniards began to study law and the social sciences abroad, democratic notions and formulations about interest politics were increasingly likely to gain the attention of policy makers in Madrid, as in the case of the drafter of the 1958 law on collective bargaining who had previously studied at Columbia University. Nevertheless, the links between Spain and the democratic West did not guarantee reforms such as collective 14. Ibid., 46. 15. Ibid., 45-46.

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bargaining and opening up the Sindicatos; and in no sense did the connections determine the shape the reforms would take. Spain stands out among essentially exclusionary, repressive authoritarian regimes for the extent of democratic worker participation and representation allowed (and even encouraged at times) within the official "union" structure. 16 Other cases, such as Portugal and Greece, demonstrate how equally strong, or even greater, links to democratic countries need not open up such key regime institutions to the same extent. Thus, the contradictory tendencies within the regime which led it to repress labor with one hand while opening up possibilities for its organization with the other, were the result not simply of the tensions of capitalist development but also, in important respects, of the particular political makeup of the regime and its (largely unsuccessful) attempts at legitimation. An authoritarian regime's difficulty confronting the political problems of legitimation and institutionalization is of central importance for the development of a democratic opposition.17 As the Spanish case suggests, conflict between the state and civil society and the tensions within the authoritarian regime itself are not fully separate spheres of contention, despite the analytical usefulness of distinguishing the two. Each arena of conflict influences the other. Illegal Forms of Unionism The two large unions of the pre-Franco years, UGT and CNT, were not only formally illegal but also severely repressed in authoritarian Spain. Yet, despite the thousands of arrests and executions, 16. For a discussion of the range of policies developed by authoritarian regimes for dealing with labor, see Valenzuela and Goodwin, Labor Movements. The Spanish case does not fit into either the "free market" or the "corporatist" mode of control, as they are formulated in this work. If we accept these types, then Spain appears to be an intermediate case. 17. The difficulty posed for an authoritarian regime by the attempt at legitimation and institutionalization is a well-developed theme in the works of Linz. For an article of Linz that illustrates just how serious this problem has been for the Brazilian regime, leading him to characterize it as an authoritarian situation rather than a regime, see Juan Linz, "The Future of an Authoritarian Situation or the Institutionalization of an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Brazil," in Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven, Conn., 1973). This article is extremely suggestive for the understanding of any authoritarian regime or "situation." On the many types and degrees of opposition that existed under the Franco regime and their treatment (in some cases toleration) by the regime, see Juan Linz, "Opposition in and under an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain," in Regimes and Oppositions, ed. Robert Dahl (New Haven, Conn., 1973).

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these workers' organizations managed to maintain their existence, albeit in greatly weakened form. In the immediate post-Civil War years, much opposition activity centered on actual military resistance, especially in mountain valleys of northern Spain. After the end of World War II, this guerrilla struggle faded until it was eventually abandoned entirely by the opposition. In 1946 the first major strike wave of the Franco period began with a general strike in Manresa, a middle-sized industrial city in the hinterland of Barcelona Province. 18 The general strike of Manresa ended with a compromise settlement, signaling the willingness of some regime elements to negotiate with mobilized workers rather than simply coercing them. The willingness of many workers to strike in the early Franco years is quite impressive given the displays they had witnessed of the considerable coercive capabilities of the authoritarian state. Nevertheless, these early strikes were more episodic than sustained, in contrast to the pattern that was to emerge in the last ten years of the regime. The organizational presence of the opposition union movement, in the early period, was neither extensive nor strong enough to maintain a consistently high level of strikes. The serious economic hardship of the period provided workers with motives to strike that could, on occasion, be activated (by a politicized minority) but did not afford them the resources necessary to sustain a high level of industrial conflict. 19 Nevertheless, even in this early period, the labor movement already used some of the same methods that were to prove so useful in late Franco Spain. For example, in the famous Barcelona streetcar strike of 1951, elected worker delegates inside the workplace structure of the OSE, many of them members of the PSUC, used their position to help extend the work stoppage throughout the city, building it into a general strike. 20 Thus, opposition activists (along with some worker representatives who would not have considered themselves part of an organized opposition), facing the inadequate strength of their own autonomous organizations, made use of the official Sindicato structure 18. An account of the Manresa strike can be found in the very useful treatment of the labor movement in the first half of the Franco period by Llibert Ferri, Jordi Muixi, and Eduardo Sanjuan, Las hue/gas contra Franco (1939-1956): Aproximaci6n a una historia del movimiento obrero espana/ de posguerra (Barcelona, 1978), 78-83. 19. Ferri et al. make clear how the severe economic hardship experienced by most workers during the postwar years, along with the activism of a highly politicized minority, lay behind the episodic outbreaks of strikes in that period. For a strong argument on the importance of prosperity in providing workers with the resources necessary to sustain a high level of strikes, see Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution. 20. On the Barcelona streetcar strike of 1951 see Ferri et al., 148-174.

96

Working-Class Organization

of the regime to help mobilize collective worker action. The first presence of opposition activists in elective positions at the workplace level dates from the 1947 OSE elections and the 1948 decision of the PCE to attempt to infiltrate the Sindicatos structure. Nevertheless, this early penetration of the regime's "vertical union" did not approach the great presence attained by the labor opposition in late Franco Spain. One additional element of the 1951 streetcar/general strike foreshadows the workers' mobilizations that were to occur twenty years later. Public demonstrations by worker militants accompanied the spread of the strike beyond the tramways and throughout the city. Such uses of public space by the labor movement, as I will develop later in this chapter, are not a useless outpouring of enthusiasm and daring; rather they contribute significantly to mobilizing workers in a setting where the union movement cannot penetrate all workplaces with its organization. The character of the opposition workers' movement was to change markedly, beginning in the late 1950s and coinciding roughly with the initiation of rapid economic growth and the adoption of collective bargaining. In the course of strikes and other industrial disputes, workers began, apparently spontaneously,21 to meet in assemblies outside the official framework of the Sindicatos to discuss strategy, formulate demands, and elect committees to coordinate action. These committees, known as comisiones obreras (workers' commissions), formed in conjunction with specific conflicts or demands; once the issues had been resolved the commission would simply cease to meet, in effect dissolving itself. The Asturian mine of La Camocha is often cited as the location of the first workers' commission, but, given the spontaneous character of the movement and the ephemeral quality of the commissions, it is impossible to determine definitively where or when the comisiones obreras first emerged. A permanent, formal structure was established in the mid-1960s, but the leadership of Comisiones Obreras sought to prevent it from becoming just one more clandestine labor organization. Instead, Comisiones stressed the need to maintain its participatory, movementlike quality and to operate in 21. The spontaneous nature of the first workers' commissions is widely accepted and is stressed by CCOO leaders in their writings on the movement. For two books by top-level leaders see Julian Ariza, Comisiones obreras (Barcelona, 1976), and Nicolas Sartorius, El sindicalismo de nuevo tipo (Barcelona, 1977). The work by Sartorius, by far the more important of these two, includes several very stimulating essays of a historical and interpretive nature.

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the open as much as possible by making use of all available legal or (illegal) opportunities. 22 In the course of the 1960s CCOO became the predominant force in the labor movement; its strength increased while UGT and CNT continued to decline to the point of relative insignificance (except for some highly localized, exceptional settings where they maintained some importance as Maravall stresses). The initial founding nucleus of Comisiones included left-falangists, Catholic worker activists, independent socialists, and Communists. CCOO attempted to combine legal and illegal tactics: the infiltration of the Sindicatos and the mobilization of workers in illegal forms of protest such as strikes. Despite the desire of some falangists and "verticalists" (proponents of the Francoist model of vertical unionism) to work with Comisiones, the essentially antiregime character of the new organization and the presence in its ranks of many Communists led the regime to declare it illegal in February 1967. The resulting repression made it difficult for CCOO to sustain its semiopen style of worker mobilization--combining assemblies and other open meetings with smaller clandestine encounters of the most dedicated activists. Nevertheless, Comisiones recovered from the arrests it suffered and continued to grow by following its own particular brand of unionism, so well suited to the authoritarian setting. As Comisiones developed and led workers in an increasing number of strikes, its political character also changed somewhat. The Communists of the PCE emerged as the dominant group inside the labor organization, but they insisted on the independence of the movement from party control, and non-Communists remained active not only at the mass level but in positions of leadership as well. The extent of the growing Communist dominance was broadly shared knowledge within the labor movement and the left but was not made fully public and was not acknowledged by some sectors of opinion prior to the return of democratic rights. In the course of the accompanying internal struggles, some factions made up of far-leftists or Catholic activists decided to withdraw from Comisiones temporarily or permanently. 23 For example, USO participated in Comisiones as a sort of a union 22. Sartorius stresses this point in El sindicalismo de nuevo tipo. For a discussion of these issues in the Catalan context, contrasting the Comisiones style with the more clandestine approach of the other oppositional unions, see Manuel Ludevid, El movimiento obrero en Catalufia baio el Franquismo (Barcelona, 1977). 23. For an examination of the internal conflicts in Comisiones stressing the activities of the non-Communists within the movement, see Jose Antonio Diaz, Luchas internas en comisiones obreras 1964-1970 (Barcelona, 1977).

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within a union before it eventually withdrew to establish its own autonomy. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to view Comisiones in this period as an exclusively Communist vehicle, or worse, as an instrument for the Communist domination of the working class. Independent socialists and political Catholics continued to figure significantly in the movement. At the mass level, many workers who supported Comisiones and participated in its actions had no particular political affiliation. The dominant position of the PCE in CCOO was due largely to its organizational abilities, effective strategies, and willingness to undertake the difficult work of unionism under conditions of frequently severe repression. In any event, the internal political struggles did leave real scars and antagonisms inside the union movement. It is impossible to ignore the significance of the Catholic workers movement and organizations in the development of a powerful labor opposition. The Hermandad Obrera de Acci6n Cat6lica (HOAC), a legal Catholic workers organization, was a major participant in labor struggles during much of the Franco period, and numerous activists who eventually found their way into other labor organizations gained their first experience in its ranks. Furthermore, on many occasions churches and monasteries served as sanctuaries (normally safe from police intervention) for meetings of the workers' movement, even when the organizations involved (such as CCOO) were not specifically Catholic and many of the individual activists were, in fact, atheists. This in no sense means that the Church was a monolithic antiregime force. Most of the Church hierarchy supported the regime strongly in the early Franco years, and, although this support diminished significantly in the 1960s and 1970s, at the time of the regime transition a minority faction of the hierarchy still supported the Francoist "bunker" opposing the dismantling of the authoritarian system. But notwithstanding the proauthoritarian sentiments of a sector of the hierarchy, the relatively protected and autonomous status of the Church under an authoritarian regime and the presence in its ranks of proworker elements greatly facilitated the organization of a powerful labor opposition. Thus, during the nearly four decades of authoritarian rule the working class recovered, to a significant degree, the capacity to act collectively and to move beyond the strictures of the official system of labor relations. Worker activists managed to accomplish this rebuilding of a movement despite the overwhelming repression of the first years of the Franco period and the continuing, although weaker and incon-

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sistent, repression of the remaining authoritarian years. Although labor managed to reorganize itself in this radically altered context, the task was carried out, for the most part, by new organizations that emerged for the first time in the authoritarian period and were especially well suited to the task of mobilizing workers under conditions of (inconsistent but frequently severe) repression. The historic unions of the pre-Franco years declined to a position of relative insignificance, not only because of the enormous impact of the massive executions and jailings of the immediate post-Civil War period, but also because of their continuing inability to master the challenge of mobilizing workers in an authoritarian setting. The Franco period, then, witnessed a change in the labor movement's cast of characters with a new organization, CCOO, emerging as the predominant force. USO and several smaller unions also were formed during the Franco years. Yet the union movement as a whole, new as well as old, did not fully organize and encapsulate the totality of collective worker action during the authoritarian period. The apparent great strength of the opposition labor movement-the high strike rate of the late Franco years, the mass participation in assemblies, the aggressive formulation of economic and political demands, the election of militant worker representatives to sit on the jurados de empresa, and so on--did not reflect the presence of equally strong organizations prepared to begin the work of democratic unionism. As we shall see, the marked successes of collective worker action were based in no small measure on the participation of individual workers, and even representatives and activists, with no direct organizational link to the opposition. The key role of labor organizations in leading or coordinating worker mobilizations must not obscure the fact that many totally unaffiliated workers took part in such mobilizations and on occasion even initiated them. The Opposition as the Organizational Basis for Democratic Unionism The model of organization successfully developed by Comisiones for opposition labor activity stressed the fusion of a loosely structured participatory movement in which all workers would be encouraged to take part, with a more tightly knit clandestine organization capable of leading and coordinating mass actions. This model resolved the apparent dilemma between a small clandestine organization relatively

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safe from repression but incapable of reaching most workers and a large open movement able to take advantage of all opportunities for legal and illegal collective worker action but subject to rapid and easy destruction by the forces of repression. Yet this flexible notion of an "organized movement" created much confusion about just who could be considered to form part of Comisiones. Thus, a 1968 meeting of the formal (clandestine) structure of CCOO would approve a statement arguing, It will be necessary to fight the idea that CCOO is a closed group only made up of those of us who attend its meetings. The Comisiones were born in the companies and all workers belong even if only the most combative vanguard attends the periodic meetings. It is necessary to find new and flexible forms to link all workers to the tasks of Comisiones, that is to say, the workers' struggle. 24

In other words, Comisiones did not have, nor did it wish to form, a structure of mass membership encompassing all those workers who might support mass actions and attend open assemblies in which all present were entitled to discuss and vote on the tactics and demands of the day. It follows that the actions (assumed to be) led by CCOO do not always signal the presence of a strong workers' organization. The consequences of this relative dissociation between organization and collective action will require our consideration, but first we must examine the pattern more closely. The ambiguity between movement and organization was not viewed by CCOO leaders as an unfortunate exigency of the authoritarian context but rather as a new and creative form of unionism that would eliminate the distinction between members and nonmembers by including all workers. This enthusiasm for the style of Comisiones is expressed well by Nicolas Sartorius, the movement's leading intellectual: Open platforms are necessary, in which the largest possible number of workers participate in the discussion and reach decisions and agreements. Sometimes it will be an assembly of representatives ... in the local or central Sindicatos' headquarters; sometimes in open spaces between factories or construction sites on strike; in an industrial park, in the soccer field of a locality; in a religious center or a church, or other tens of examples we could suggest thinking about the struggles 24. Sartorius, 104.

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which are taking place. Without forgetting that most times combinations of several forms present themselves and in a question of hours a change takes place from one form to another, thanks to (a/ calor de) the inexhaustible creativity and originality of the masses in movement. The great task of the stable structures of Comisiones, of the vanguard ... is precisely to find (saber) how to encourage all of these forms ... combine them, make them cohesive, and direct them toward the established objective, ;ust as the orchestra director attempts to assure that each instrument emits the appropriate sound and that the whole orchestra produces a melody rather than unconnected noises. 25 (emphasis added) Clearly, then, at the rank-and-file level we should expect to encounter individuals who participated in mass actions such as strikes without perceiving themselves to form part of CCOO or even the opposition movement in a looser sense. Such individuals would never have attended clandestine (i.e., organizational) meetings and probably were never encouraged to do so. This style of unionism-a two-tier system of involvement providing rank-and-file workers with no direct link to the permanent clandestine structures-makes it impossible to delineate the organizational basis for democratic unionism by reference to the individual-level experiences of rank-and-file workers during the opposition period. Instead, we must direct our attention to the experiences of the most active elements, and especially the plant-level leaders whose importance I have already heavily stressed. Not only do they establish the organizational presence of the unions inside the workplace-precisely the issue of greatest concern-but, within the framework of the CCOO model of an organized opposition movement, one might also expect them to form the only link between the permanent clandestine structures and the larger more diffuse movement in the workplaces by participating in both. Concretely, then, we must ask if the welldocumented activities of the opposition labor movement are, in fact, an indication of the presence in workplaces throughout the economy of plant-level leaders experienced in labor conflict and well situated to initiate the construction of democratic unionism with the eventual return of the full freedom to organize. In fact, as we shall see, the relative dissociation between oppositional activity and organization is to be found even within the leadership stratum, although to a lesser degree than among the rank and 25. Ibid., 111-112.

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file. Some of the leaders engaged in the aggressive representation of workers' interests within the OSE, as well as other forms of collective worker action, including strikes, had no organizational involvement with the opposition. As late as autumn 1974, Sartorius acknowledged that the transition from ephemeral to permanent forms of organization was still taking place in some locales. 2 " Despite the eagerness of the theorists and leaders of Comisiones to interpret all signs of collective worker resistance as evidence of the extensive strength of their diffuse movement, this alleged link to the "organized movement" was not always perceived by the principals involved in such activity. Leaders during the Authoritarian Period A large minority of the current pool of workplace leaders gained its first experience in union affairs by participating in the opposition labor movement of the Franco years. The 39.3 percent of the survey respondents who indicate that they took part in the opposition labor movement (see Table 4.1) represent, in the most simple and obvious terms, a significant but inadequate foundation for developing union organization under democracy. Had our survey covered the entire country instead of the two largest industrial centers, the figure would undoubtedly have been even lower. Only in Asturias and the Basque Country might we find a higher level of opposition experience. All the currently competing union confederations have been able to count on some experienced plant-level leaders, already in place, for the challenge of building democratic unionism. CCOO, the predominant element in the opposition labor movement, as one would expect enjoyed the most sizeable base for organizational expansion under democracy; 59.6 percent of its current pool of leaders participated in the opposition. Yet it is noteworthy that this figure is not even higher. The network of workplace leaders provided to Comisiones by the opposition movement was not, standing alone, sufficiently extensive for the challenges and the opportunities of democracy. New leaders had to be recruited. The UGT was to begin democratic life in a considerably weaker position: only 28.4 percent of its pool of workplace leaders could be drawn from those with a history of involvement in the opposition movement, roughly half the 26. Ibid., 100. At the end of each essay in El sindicalismo de nuevo tipo appears the date of its writing, a valuable piece of information given the major historical changes during the period in which the book was written.

(N)

Participated in labor opposition Held elective post within the vertical union Participated in one or more strikes Participated in negotiations with employers

Activity

(82)

32.9 22.0

59.6 34.8 (141)

28.4 19.8

UGT

59.6 32.6

ccoo

Table 4.1. Participation in union activities under Francoism

(31)

32.2 32.2

35.5 22.6

Others

By union

(70)

28.6 18.6

12.9 15.7

Independents

(154)

(170)

38.8 30.6

40.6 28.2

37.9 20.9 48.7 24.7

Madrid

By province Barcelona

(324)

43.5 27.8

39.3 24.8

Entire sample

104

Working-Class Organization

figure for Comisiones. Still, this level of opposition labor experience among the leaders of the Socialist confederation is quite impressive, given the relative insignificance of UGT during the Franco period. The history of the two organizations under authoritarianism is vastly different, but the pattern of past activities by the individuals who make them up is much more similar. The relatively small dimensions of this difference between the plantlevelleaders of the two principal confederations-relatively small in comparison to the great disparity between the two organizations, judging by their official histories-allow several interesting conclusions. The remarkable reemergence of UGT as a major force after its insignificance in late Franco Spain owes much to individual leaders whose pattern of activities under Francoism resembled the profile of CCOO activists. UGT's ability to attract some such individuals during the return to democracy helped fuel its organizational expansion. Conversely, even CCOO would have to rely on some workplace leaders with the typical UGT profile of no past experience. The relatively small distance between the leaders of the two unions is particularly noteworthy with respect to an issue on which the two organizations maintained fully opposite positions during the Franco period: participation in the elective bodies assigned to represent workers' interests inside the OSE. CCOO had advocated the infiltration and "democratic occupation" of the Sindicatos, urging its militants to stand for election to the jurados, while UGT (encouraged by the trade union leadership of democratic countries) insisted on abstention from the elections, arguing that they only legitimated a major institution of the dictatorial regime. Yet 19.8 percent of UGT leaders have held an elective post inside the OSE, not so much smaller a proportion than the 32.6 percent for CCOO. Whether one chooses to see the UGT glass as half full or half empty, it remains remarkable, given the history of UGT as an organization, that it is not completely empty. This finding again underlines the importance of understanding the organization-building process and the resulting organizations as, in large measure, consisting of a heterogeneous pool of workplace leaders and their networks of supporters rather than merely as a reflection of the official histories written largely by or about top-level leaders. In many respects the workplace leaderships of the two confederations are more similar than we would expect without the benefit of the detailed knowledge of them provided only by survey research. More important, this relative similarity of the two leadership groups underscores the great complexity of the working-class experience during

Opposition Labor Movement in Franco Spain

105

the authoritarian period, a complexity not adequately developed in the available historical accounts. Participation in the opposition labor movement, an ambiguous notion given its vague self-definition, is not the only indicator of meaningful collective worker action carried out by the leaders. A slightly larger minority, 43.5 percent, participated in at least one strike during the Franco period, perhaps the most significant and least ambiguous form of worker mobilization. Despite the high strike rate of the late authoritarian years, a majority of the current leadership pool had absolutely no strike experience under Francoism. Thus, in spite of the ambiguous nature of the line distinguishing the opposition movement from the working class as a whole, actual involvement in mass actions such as strikes was not a much more broadly shared experience than the self-perception of participation in the opposition movement, at least for those who would become workplace leaders. The comparison between Barcelona and Madrid on this question raises the issue of the relationship between workplace organization and strike activity under authoritarianism. The workplace leaders of Madrid are slightly more likely than their counterparts in Barcelona (40.6 percent and 37.9 percent, respectively) to have participated in the opposition labor movement. Yet government data indicate that the strike rate was higher in Barcelona than in Madrid, and the survey shows that Catalan leaders are roughly 10 percent more likely than those of Madrid (48.7 percent and 38.8 percent, respectively) to have participated in strikes under authoritarianism. These data clearly suggest that the opposition was somewhat more tightly organized inside the firm in Madrid but nevertheless more capable of mobilizing workers in Barcelona. How can we account for this apparent paradox? At one level I can suggest that the opposition in Madrid was fairly wellorganized but encountered much repression at the hands of the state and inadequate support from the larger community. In contrast the labor movement in Barcelona was slightly less well organized, but it could take advantage of a broadly shared culture of opposition and (perhaps as a result) a considerably lower level of repression by the Francoist state. (On the question of state repression by province, refer again to Table 2.4.) Such a descriptive amplification of the differences between Barcelona and Madrid is a good point of departure, but it still does not provide an interpretive scheme to make sense of these observations. For the moment let us simply note that workplace organization is clearly not the only determinant of labor's ability to mobilize strikes in an authoritarian setting.

106

Working-Class Organization

Smaller minorities of the leaders gained actual experience representing worker interests under authoritarianism, whether by sitting on the jurado or by unofficially negotiating or both. Participating in negotiations with employers was a slightly more common experience than holding an elective post within the official regime union (the only legal basis for taking part in negotiations), confirmation of the view that in some instances the labor movement managed to supersede the legal bargaining structures rather than simply to use them. Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that only in very exceptional circumstances was the opposition able to impose upon employers negotiations fully bypassing the legal collective bargaining procedures:27 most leaders had neither type of representative experience, and participation in negotiations was only slightly more prevalent than the holding of the elective posts legally empowered to engage in such negotiations (27.8 percent and 24.8 percent, respectively). Thus, the large minority of today's leaders who were already active in the labor movement during the oppositional period are, on the one hand a smaller group than those who took part in worker mobilizations but on the other hand a larger group than those with actual experience in the representation of workers' interests. A solid organizational basis for the growth of democratic unionism would require more than a collection of individual activists, distributed extensively throughout the economy, and self-identified as part of the opposition movement. Such a solid and extensive foundation would require a large pool of leaders tied to the opposition movement and additionally with concrete experience mobilizing workers and representing their interests. In other words, a small self-contained opposition movement without links to the mobilization and representation of workers could provide the emergent democratic unions with a pool of activists willing to begin the task of organization development but not with established patterns of group action adequate for labor relations under democracy. Our analysis, then, must focus not only on the physical presence in the workplaces of activists whose initiation into the labor movement dates from the opposition period but furthermore on the association between that movement and actual collective activity by workers in pursuit of their interests. 27. The fact that many contemporary observers and subsequent analysts overestimated the extent to which this practice took place underlines the difficulty of forming accurate judgments in a repressive context where political and interest organizations cannot establish regular lines of communication and contact throughout a society.

Opposition Labor Movement in Franco Spain

107

Collective Worker Action under Authoritarianism What, then, was the relationship between the opposition labor movement and those forms of collective worker action-mobilizations and negotiations-that the working class was able to undertake despite the risks of repression? More concretely, to what extent did those activists and leaders who sustained the oppositional organization, filling its ranks, also play a key role in the strikes and collective bargaining of the period, thereby anchoring themselves in the representation of worker interests? Or, alternatively, did much authentic collective worker action, strikes and bargaining, take place under the leadership of workers with no organizational link to the opposition? To reverse the formulation, we might ask if the opposition was incapable of drawing within itself, leading or coordinating, much genuine collective worker action. Together these questions point out the complexity of the issue of whether an existing workplace leadership would consolidate itself or a new one would have to emerge in the transition period. 28 I encountered the complexity of this issue even before beginning the survey; in an ecological analysis of the first union elections under democracy, I found counterintuitively that the electoral success of CCOO was not correlated with a history of high strike activity during the Franco period. Comisiones, the predominant force in the opposition labor movement, presumably had helped initiate and lead most strikes during the late Franco years, but nevertheless this union did not perform electorally better, under democracy, in provinces characterized by a high strike rate in the early 1970s. I attempted to explain this apparent paradox and concretize the issue of the continuity or discontinuity of the labor leadership and organization in the transition period by advancing the following four hypotheses: 1. The opposition labor movement may have succeeded in developing an

extensive organizational presence in areas where it never resorted to strikes but acted within the collective bargaining process of the official regime umon. 2. Authentic labor leaders, part of informal organizational networks within the workplace, representing workers somewhat effectively in- the legal collective bargaining without resorting to strikes but not involved in the 28. This issue-the selection of a leadership to "fill the organizational space of the working class"-is, as we have pointed out, formulated by Valenzuela as the central problem in the formation of labor movements. However, he focuses much more on the national leadership of labor than on the workplace leadership of special interest to us.

108

Working-Class Organization

opposition labor movement, may have joined union federations since the death of Franco. 3. Labor representatives in the union structure of the Franco regime, not involved in the opposition labor movement, and not serving or responding to the interests of workers in their firms but with power based (during the Franco years) on prestige, repression of opponents, or other factors, may, since the death of Franco, have joined union federations. 4. The union federations may have, since the death of Franco, engaged in a tremendous expansion of their organizational presence, successful independently of their previous strength or weakness in the areas involved, thus mobilizing previously inactive workers and recruiting previously inactive workers to be activists and local labor leaders. 29 Having redirected our attention forward historically toward the initiation of the democratic period by referring to these four hypotheses, let us now return to the authoritarian/opposition period and confront those speculations with the survey data on the leaders' experiences. Among today's leaders, those who considered themselves to form part of the opposition labor movement were, in fact, more likely to participate in concrete forms of collective worker action or representation than their counterparts in today's leadership pool who did not share their involvement in the opposition (see Table 4.2). Whether we focus our attention on election to a post in the regime's "vertical union," participation in strikes, or involvement in negotiations with employers, the opposition group was much more likely than the nonopposition group to have taken part in activities in defense of the collective interests of workers. Nevertheless, this association is far from perfect: a minority of the opposition group, judging by these three indicators, never actually undertook any unionlike activity that would have anchored it in the defense and representation of worker interests within the firm. Conversely, a minority of the nonopposition group, despite the lack of any organizational link to the opposition movement, was in fact engaged in some unionlike activity. The actual pattern of activity revealed by the survey datathe imperfect association of the opposition organization with the mobilization and representation of worker interests-is, in fact, more complex than the possibilities suggested by the four hypotheses formulated prior to the survey. Authentic labor leaders without any involvement in the opposition movement did exist during the authoritarian period, roughly along the lines indicated by hypothesis 2. However, in contrast to that 29. See Fishman, "The Labor Movement in Spain," 296.

27.1

39.1 56.5 34.8 (23)

41.7

76.2 48.8

(84) (11)

54.5 54.5

Other unions

UGT

(9)

77.8 55.6

33.1

Independents

(127)

70.9 47.2

39.4

Total

Participated in the opposition labor movement

ccoo

(56)

33.9 14.3

19.6

(57)

22.8 17.5

12.3

UGT

(20)

20.0 20.0

20.0

Other unions

(61)

21.3 13.1

13.1

Independents

(194)

25.3 15.5

15.5

Total

Did not participate in the opposition labor movement

ccoo

Note: Those who did not answer the question on participation in the opposition labor movement (3 cases) have been excluded from this table.

(N)

Held elective post within the vertical umon Participated in one or more strikes Participated in negotiations with employers

Activity

Table 4.2. Participation in union activities under Francoism (controlling for participation in the opposition labor movement)

110

Working-Class Organization

hypothetical profile of nonmovement labor leaders, some of the nonopposition labor activists actually participated in strikes, thus engaging in illegal (as well as legal) forms of collective worker action. In fact, among today's leaders, those without any opposition experience were more likely to participate in strikes under Francoism (25 .3 percent) than to hold an elective post in the OSE or negotiate with employers (15.5 percent in each case). Clearly, Comisiones Obreras and in a broader sense the opposition movement were unable to organize or coordinate much of the collective action by workers in defense of their interests or even to attract the allegiance of those leading such activity. One obvious conclusion we must draw is that the non-opposition elected worker representatives on the jurados de empresa were not simply a disreputable collection of falangists, OSE bureaucrats, and servants of management, as some analysts of the period have argued. 30 Rather, the Sindicato structure offered real (but limited) possibilities for the representation of worker interests and, on occasion, for the mobilization of labor conflict, even in workplaces where the opposition never managed to establish an organizational presence. The incapacity of Comisiones Obreras, the "organized movement" so enthusiastically described by its theorists, to lead or channel a good deal of the collective worker action taking place under authoritarianism indicates that it was neither as well organized nor as strong as suggested by a review of the strike activity. In the first place, as the leaders of Comisiones themselves point out in their accounts of the period, the lines between the opposition movement and the illegal permanent organization were diffuse rather than sharply drawn. Additionally, however, not even the movement, let alone the organization, encompassed all joint worker action. The clandestine organization may have fashioned itself, in the metaphor of Sartorius, as the director of a large orchestra made up of many instruments, each free to make its own sound but together representing the opposition movement. Yet many of the "instruments"-workers and leaders engaged in strikes and bargaining-did not, in fact, perceive themselves to form part of a larger "orchestra." Furthermore, as the survey data indicate, some of the opposition organization was actually quite self-contained, uninvolved in any form of broadly shared collective worker action. The labor movement, then, would enter the 30. For example, Carr and Fusi Aizpurua in Spain, a generally excellent history of the Franco years and the transition period, refer to the nonoppositionist delegates as "unrepresentative bureaucrats," 90.

Opposition Labor Movement in Franco Spain

111

transition period less deeply rooted in the world of the workplace than the level of industrial conflict would have suggested, and CCOO leaders and activists could easily overestimate their strength within the working class. The labor movement, facing the dual task of pressing for a return to democracy and extending its own organizational presence throughout the economy, was weaker than many at the time hoped or feared. The relative dissociation between the labor movement and collective worker action documented here for the authoritarian period-the existence of many opposition activists with no experience in strikes or bargaining, and others involved in mobilizing and representing workers but not linked to the opposition-explains why many workers would fail to learn the lessons of democratic unionism despite their contribution to the high level of conflict characterizing late Franco Spain. Industrial conflict and labor relations under authoritarianism did not encourage most workers to view organization as essential for mobilizing and defending worker interests, a lesson normally taught by union activity under democracy. Instead, the genius of the Comisiones model of "organized movement," was to produce a high level of worker mobilization even though the clandestine organization was much weaker and less extensive than what would be required by the union movement under democracy. And at worst, the opposition was, in some work settings, a small self-contained group or totally absent from other contexts where collective worker action was nevertheless taking place. This qualified interpretation of the opposition workers' movement must not obscure the fact that the Franco regime did fail spectacularly in its policy of repression and its attempted dismantling of the labor movement. The executions, jailings, and firings of the authoritarian period could not prevent the opposition, especially Comisiones Obreras, from gaining considerable strength in the late 1960s and 1970s. The high strike rate of the late authoritarian years, to a considerable degree (but not exclusively) linked to the organizational presence of the opposition, represented a massive challenge to the legal and repressive structures of the regime and a failure for the Francoist goal of eliminating class conflict. Still, the Franco period actually did disorganize the working class and the labor movement with enduring consequences for the union movement. Even massive and sustained opposition activity differs radically from the consolidated organizational life required for successful unionism under democracy. Having considered the complexity of oppositional activity and the

112

Working-Class Organization

basis it would provide for labor's efforts in the transition period, we must now examine more carefully two elements of this complexity: the relationship between the official Sindicatos' structure and the emergence of the opposition, and the imperfect association between labor organization and mobilization (more specifically strikes) under repressiOn.

The Regime's Union Structure and Its Role in the Development of the Labor Movement The opening of some possibilities for defending worker interests within the official Sindicatos presented workers and opposition with the choice of using or refusing to participate in a key institution of the authoritarian state. This option produced a split between the new labor movement of the 1960s, with its Communist, Catholic, and independent socialist participants, and the historic organizations of Spanish labor, UGT and CNT. Both "historic" confederations opposed participation in the elective representative bodies of the Sindicatos, arguing that such participation only strengthened or legitimated the regime, deflecting workers from concerted opposition. This abstentionist posture of UGT and CNT accompanied-and in part caused-their decline into relative insignificance and their replacement by CCOO (and to a lesser extent USO) as the predominant organization of workers' opposition. Even Maravall, a leading figure in the PSOE and minister of education in the Socialist government that came to power in the 1982 elections, recognizes the relative failure of the UGT strategy. In his excellent monograph on the opposition, Maravall notes that the Comisiones strategy of infiltrating the official Sindicatos and utilizing their legal possibilities was instrumental in the growth of opposition strength and the development of the capacity to mobilize workers and wage effective strikes. 31 Independently of CCOO strategy many ordinary workers, unaffiliated with the opposition, made use of the Sindicatos and even served as representatives. Some of these representatives, after experiencing the frustrations of the limited possibilities for representation within the legal structures, turned to active involvement in the opposition. Others joined the organized labor movement only with the return of democratic freedoms when they became involved in emerg31. Maravall, Dictatorship and Political Dissent.

Opposition Labor Movement in Franco Spain

113

ing union confederations. The OSE, its possibilities and its limits, clearly helped shape the labor movement and the collective experience of the working class. Yet, if the fact that the regime's labor structure influenced the development of the workers' movement is clear, we must still develop a more precise understanding of this impact of the legal structures.

The Jurados de Empresa and the Conditions for Opposition Most analysts agree that the growth of Comisiones into a powerful opposition movement under conditions of continued (albeit somewhat diminished) repression was possible, in large part, because of its successful infiltration or "democratic occupation" of the OSE, especially at the factory level. This effect of the jurados is an obvious paradox since they were established in an attempt to institutionalize the OSE and to displace normal union activity and political opposition. There are several ways in which the jurados, and more broadly, the OSE facilitated the development of opposition strength: 1. By providing existing opposition activists and leaders with a forum for legal activity, reaching workers, and anchoring themselves and their attempts at mobilization within the regulated representation of worker interests. 2. By producing a leadership-worker representatives-where the opposition did not exist or could not succeed in gaining the confidence (in this case, the votes) of the workers. In many cases these new leaders would get involved in the opposition after experiencing the limits of the strictly legal pursuit of worker interests. 3. By providing a physical space for meetings and assemblies of workers. The Sindicato's buildings were open to workers who were encouraged to use them. Even when the official meeting rooms were not made available for assemblies and discussions, the bar and hallways of the building still offered the opportunity for workers to meet with one another to discuss labor issues. 4. By providing a focus, an object, for individual grievances and complaints. Even when the jurado was not made up of opposition activists or others in favor of militant collective worker action, it might still inadvertently facilitate such action by providing a focal point for complaints-in both the physical and discursive sense-thereby increasing the possibilities that workers would coalesce into a group capable of joint action. 12 32. For a wealth of details on the questions covered in points #3 and #4, see the excellent account of the opposition labor movement in the Baix Llobregat comarca (the industrial suburbs to the West and Northwest of the city of Barcelona), lgnasi Riera and Jose Borella, El Baix Llobregat: 15 aniios de luchas obreras (Barcelona, 1976).

114

Working-Class Organization

Thus, the ways in which the OSE/jurado structure aided the cause of collective worker action extend beyond the most obvious. Characteristics of Elected Worker Representatives

Even before CCOO could wage a coordinated effort to place opposition activists on the jurados, previous elections had already produced a substantial minority of representatives in favor of militant collective worker action. The L6pez-Cepero study, conducted in 1961, establishes this point clearly with its survey of jurado members and enlaces sindicales in the province of Madrid. 33 For example, L6pezCepero found that 21 percent of the jurados and 11 percent of the enlaces were willing to express support for the right to strike, 34 this at a time when strikes were illegal and much less common than in later years. Some sentiment in favor of legalizing strikes undoubtedly reflects the presence of Communist cadres on the jurados. The PCE had advocated the infiltration of the OSE for many years prior to the emergence of Comisiones, and a number of Communist cadres did succeed in winning representational elections (obviously without publicly indicating their allegiance to the PCE), on occasion contributing to mobilizing strikes. Nevertheless, it seems highly unlikely that as early as 1961, 21 percent of the jurados in Madrid could be Communists, and thus we must conclude that these elected representatives included some unaffiliated workers in favor of militant labor actions. A slightly larger proportion of the representatives, 26.3 percent of the jurados and 18.8 percent of the enlaces supported the view that unions should be "an instrument which achieves the betterment of the working class by whatever means necessary" ( por los medias que sea).l 5 The representational elections, even prior to CCOO's, emergence, produced a sizeable group of leaders in favor of full democratic unionism, whether they held that view before seeking election or developed it only in the context of their attempts to represent workers on the jurados. In this way the impact of the OSE reforms on the workingclass and labor relations began to take shape before the opposition labor movement could elaborate a coherent and coordinated strategy 33. jose Mariano L6pez-Cepero Jurado, "La representaci6n sindical en Madrid: Estudiopiloto" (Ph.D. diss., University of Madrid, 1962). The jurados were elected only in firms with fifty or more workers, while the enlaces sindicales could he elected in firms of all sizes . .H. Ibid., 79. 35. Ibid., 82.

Opposition Labor Movement in Franco Spain

115

for fully taking advantage of those reforms. Still, this leaves a majority of the representatives, in the early period of the L6pez-Cepero study, who did not take such a strong stand in favor of unfettered union activity. To what extent were these representatives, nevertheless, seriously engaged in representing worker interests (within limits) as opposed to unambiguously defending employer interests or the political goals of the Francoist system (or some faction within the regime)? The Lopez-Cepero survey data suggest that a large minority of the representatives did maintain a conciliationist view of unionism quite compatible with the Francoist vision of the Sindicatos and the interests of the employers. One of the most interesting items in the questionnaire posed the issue of the types of action the representative would undertake in the event of a labor dispute. Each respondent was asked to choose four alternatives, ordering them in importance. Nearly half of the representatives, 42 percent of the jurados, indicated that they would "look for a conciliation of interests," and 10.5 percent chose this as their most preferred alternative. An even larger group, 60.3 percent of the jurados, stated that they would "attempt to calm spirits to lead to a more satisfactory solution," and 15.7 percent opted for this as their first choice. However, 34 percent indicated they would consult with their fellow workers, and for 15.7 percent this option represented the first choice. Even those with a fairly conciliationist view of unionism could, of course, still attempt to represent worker interests within that limited framework. The most common response to this question was "to speak with the personnel director," indicating some desire to achieve concessions from the firm to resolve the dispute. This alternative was chosen by a sizeable majority-65 .6 percent of the jurados, with 27.6 percent ranking it first. 36 The representatives can be placed into three broad categories, none of which alone represented a majority. The first group was favorably inclined toward worker mobilizations, beyond what was legally permitted. The second group fit more comfortably into the legal structures and the Francoist model of a conciliationist "vertical union," but still made genuine attempts to represent the interests of workers within these limits. The third group was more concern~d with the conciliationist model than with any attempt to serve the interests of workers. Additionally, there were, undoubtedly, some representatives neither particularly concerned with nor favorable to any model of 36. Ibid., 73.

116

Working-Class Organization

Table 4.3. Comparison of plant-level representatives under authoritarianism and democracy: the representatives' image of firm management 1961 Study View of management Very competent Fairly competent Fairly incompetent; not very competent* Very incompetent Other; D.K.; D.A. (N)

Enlaces

Jurados

35.0 50.0 7.7 3.2 3.9

19.7 67.1 6.5 5.2

(154)

1.3

(76)

1981 Study 9.3 39.2 36.4 13.0 2.1 (324)

*The 1981 wording was, "Not very competent," a milder form of criticism than the 1961 wording, "fairly incompetent."

unionism. Such nominal representatives, virtually uninvolved in any unionlike activity, can be found even under democratic unionism in plants where the leadership supply problem is particularly severe and the local context leads to elections but does not generate any significant collective worker action. How does this pool of representatives compare with the one that would emerge from fully democratic union activity and elections twenty years later? Only one question from the L6pez-Cepero study was repeated in almost identical form in our 1981 survey, and, although it does not directly pose the most central issues of unionism, it does provide a rough yardstick for assessing the respondents' view of the management in their firm, a basic dimension of labor attitudes. The representatives chosen in 1980 in fully democratic union elections tend to be more critical of management than those elected twenty years earlier in the Francoist Sindicatos (see Table 4.3). The jurados, unlike the enlaces, were almost exclusively located in firms with more than fifty workers; therefore, they form the best comparison with the 1981 respondents who, by virtue of the sampling strategy, were all situated in firms of fifty or more workers. The 1961 jurados are roughly twice as likely as the 1981 leaders (19.7 percent and 9.3 percent, respectively) to regard management as "very competent." The single most common response for both groups is "fairly competent," but the jurados were much more likely that the 1981 representatives to choose this alternative (67.1 percent and 39.2 percent, respectively). A large segment of the 1981 respondents, 36.4 percent, chose "not very competent," as opposed to only 6.5 percent of the jurados who opted for the response of "fairly incompetent." Although this difference must reflect the greater willingness of the 1981 representatives to criticize management, clearly it is amplified by the

Opposition Labor Movement in Franco Spain

117

disparity in the wording of this response category. Finally, a minority of the representatives-13 percent in 1981 and 5.2 percent of the jurados in 1961-is willing to characterize management as "very incompetent." What broad judgments can we draw on the basis of these survey data from the Franco period and their comparison with findings from the democratic period? The plant-level representatives elected inside the OSE were clearly, on the whole, more conservative, proemployer, and conciliationist in orientation than their counterparts chosen twenty years later in fully democratic union elections. Nevertheless, these two historically· distinct groups overlap considerably: the body of all plant-level representatives was quite heterogeneous in both periods with attitudes ranging from the militant support of collective worker action to the preference for a conciliationist proemployer style of unionism. In conclusion, the elections for worker delegates inside the Sindicatos provided for the extensive emergence of more or less authentic representatives even prior to the development of an effective opposition. Yet these representatives-their views, their opportunities for action, their links to labor organizations-were quite different from the plant-level leaders characteristic of democratic unionism. In other words, despite the several ways in which the Francoist Sindicatos facilitated the development of the opposition and the emergence of leaders to represent workers, the authoritarian character of the regime deeply affected and limited the collective life of workers, not only at the level of the nationwide elite but inside the workplace as well.

Intensifying Political Opposition or Increasing Economism? For the regime, the participation of workers in elections inside the OSE and the negotiation of contracts by the elected representatives held the hope, if not the promise, of the institutionalization of interest representation. Such an institutionalization would not only provide for nonconflictual labor relations but also help solidify the regime's political future. For the opposition, participation in the Sindicatos elections held the promise of reaching the mass of workers. Yet it also posed the danger of cooptation, the legitimation of the regime, and the diversion of energies away from political opposition and toward purely economic demands. In a real sense, the behavior of the plant-level representatives and the evolution of their thinking, even

118

Working-Class Organization

more than the elections themselves, represented a crucial battleground between regime and opposition. The issues the jurados de empresa posed for regime and opposition cut to the heart of a number of questions of concern to social science analysts of authoritarian regimes. Would the regime be able to successfully implement a limited democratization without liberalization, that is, without lifting its exclusion of the opposition? 37 Could an essentially exclusionary authoritarian regime institutionalize worker participation, thus solidifying its future? 38 Would a slow but steady opening of the regime prove a viable option, perhaps leading eventually to a complete return to democracy? 39 Would the legal framework for representation strengthen the economistic tendencies of unionism, or, rather, would the severe limits on legal action by the representatives instead intensify political opposition within the working class? We can assess the extent to which the opposition activists on the jurados concentrated on economic demands or instead intensified their political opposition by examining the responses to an openended question dealing with the opposition labor movement's activities. The question read, "Apart from strikes, what did the activities of the labor opposition (oposici6n sindical) consist of during Francoism?" The replies to this question, totally unprompted because it was open-ended, afford us the opportunity to weigh the relative importance of different meanings, goals, and activities in the eyes of the participants themselves. By dividing the respondents first into opposition and nonopposition groups and then into those who did and did not serve as elected representatives in the Sindicatos, we can approach an understanding of how the tension between 37. In "Opposition in and under an Authoritarian Regime" Linz insists on the importance of distinguishing between liberalization and democratization in authoritarian regimes, arguing that progress on one dimension does not necessarily lead to progress on the other. However, in this article Linz stresses more the phenomenon of liberalization (for the relatively more tolerated sectors of the opposition) without genuine democratization. Robert Dahl in Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, Conn., 1971), distinguishes two distinct dimensions of the democratization of a nondemocratic regime: "liberalization" (the growth of public contestation) and "inclusiveness" (the expansion of participation). 38. Samuel Huntington, in his highly influential work Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn., 1968), of course argues that building political institutions is the key to the stability of regimes. 39. Dahl places some hope (with qualifications) on such relatively slow processes of evolution toward democracy as a path of political transition likely to lead to stable democracy. See Polyarchy, chap. 3. Carr and Fusi place great stress on the "opening" tendency within the regime.

119

Opposition Labor Movement in Franco Spain Table 4.4. Leader views on nature of labor opposition apart from strikes: economic or political

Activity

Participated in the opposition Did not Held post in hold post vertical union

Did not participate in the opposition Held post in vertical union

Did not hold post

Political opposition; to overthrow regime Labor demands; socioeconomic demands

22.0

9.1

3.3

3.7

12.0

14.3

3.3

3.0

(N}

(50}

(77}

(30}

(164}

Note: The question reported in this table was open-ended with no limitation on the number of responses possible. The table includes only those responses directly relevant to the issue under discussion.

institutionalization and opposttton worked itself out among the plant-level representatives. Those who participated in the opposition are, not surprisingly, more likely than their nonopposition counterparts to point to political opposition and the attempt to overthrow the regime as an activity of the labor opposition (see Table 4.4). (This suggests that the political overtones of many strikes were more apparent to the relatively small group of leaders and activists in the organized opposition movement than was the case for the mass of participants in those mobilizations.) However, among the opposition activists precisely those who served as representatives inside the OSE, rather than those who never held such elective positions, are most inclined to stress the political nature of the labor opposition (22 percent and 9.1 percent, respectively). Furthermore, the elected OSE representatives are more inclined to mention political opposition than socioeconomic or labor demands (22 percent and 12 percent, respectively), whereas their fellow oppositionists who never served as Sindicatos representatives stress socioeconomic/labor demands more than political opposition ( 14.3 percent and 9.1 percent, respectively). Apparently, then, the experience of serving on the jurados and holding the responsibility for representing worker interests within that limited structure actually magnified these labor activists' commitment to political opposition. Although they attempted to represent the socioeconomic interests of the workers in their plants, this effort did not greatly alter their understanding of their larger enter-

120

Working-Class Organization

prise. Thus, the OSE reforms not only provided the oppositiOn with the opportunity to anchor itself in the workplace but simultaneously reinforced its commitment to overthrow the regime, thanks largely to the frustrations inherent in attempting to represent worker interests within such limited bounds. The efforts of the regime to institutionalize itself in the labor arena failed dismally, simultaneously increasing economic conflict and intensifying political opposition. The regime's failed attempt to institutionalize a representative labor structure while maintaining the exclusion of autonomous organizations of workers helped set the pattern for its larger failure to elaborate a political future without a full democratic opening. In the absence of acceptance by workers or stable patterns of interest intermediation, the system was maintained at the cost of the continuing repression of labor activists and the frequent shifting of legal regulations on labor matters. This complex and contradictory record of the regime on labor relations, to recapitulate the argument, was not exclusively the result of economic considerations or the goal of reducing working-class power. The changing form taken by the Francoist Sindicatos was, in large measure, the consequence of political factors that played a contradictory role, simultaneously opening and closing possibilities for the collective efforts of workers. This doomed attempt at institutionalization without allowing workers full freedoms would influence the way workers organized, and, in a loose sense, would set the tone for the type of transition following Franco's death: The regime retained the capacity to enact (and within limits, to enforce) a legal framework that shaped the possibilities for the collective defense of workers' interests. Yet the regime could not secure the loyal participation and the allegiance of workers (or even the political indifference of their elected representatives) without negotiating a full and rapid transition to democracy, an end to the exclusion of the left and organized workers. Neither a full institutionalization of authoritarianism nor a slow step-by-step transition toward democracy was possible. Thus, the regime's attempt to institutionalize labor relations and secure the workers' participation in the Sindicatos was of great significance, but equally important was its failure. This institutional impasse facilitated the mobilization of workers by the opposition. But, to return to our central concern with the organizational basis for democratic unionism, what does this mobilizational capacity-the high strike rate of the late Franco period-say about the organizational strength of the opposition, its presence inside factories?

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Table 4.5. Opposition organization and worker mobilizations: An imperfect association with many deviant cases Strikes during Franco period: Took place in plant

Did not take place in plant

Opposition organization Present in plant

Not present in plant

Strikes organized by the opposition

Strikes with no apparent link to the opposition

(Normal pattern)

(Deviant cases)

Opposition activists incapable of mobilizing strikes

Unorganized workplaces uninvolved in labor mobilizations

(Deviant cases)

(Normal pattern)

Labor Organization, Strikes, and Public Protest under Repression I have already noted the significant yet imperfect association between the opposition organization and collective worker action such as strikes. Most strikes occurred in plants where the opposition was present, and the existence of opposition activists inside a factory, in most cases, led to strikes. However, many exceptions to this general rule exist: instances of organization without conflict, and conflict without organization. The survey data provide direct information only on plant-level leaders, but given the crucial role of these leaders in establishing the organizational presence of labor inside the workplace, in rough terms these data permit us to address the issue at the level of factories and their collective experiences. 40 In order to understand the opposition's considerable mobilizational capacity and assess its meaning for the dimensions of the organizational task, we must make sense of the "deviant cases"-strikes with no direct organizational link to the opposition and oppositional organization uninvolved in strikes (see Table 4.5). An explanation of the "deviant cases" should prove of broader interest than its immediate relevance to understanding the shape of the historical challenge faced by Spanish labor. A whole tradition of 40. Obviously, in some cases even if the respondent (today, under democracy, a workplace leader) was not involved in the opposition someone else in his (or her) factory might have been. However, frequently this was not the case, and, in fact, nobody was involved in the opposition. The lists of factories with opposition activists present and those which participated in strike waves, to be found in the Riera and Borella book, confirm the existence of an imperfect association between oppositional organization and strikes at the workplace level. Informal discussions with respondents after the end of the structured interview also reinforced this conclusion.

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Working-Class Organization

social scientific work on strikes has developed and subsequently qualified the view that strikes are associated with the organization of workers into unions. The large project of Shorter and Tilly examining the incidence of strikes in France over a period of more than a century, reached the conclusion that industrial conflict could be best explained by the growth of workers' organizations and their changing relationships with political power rather than by reference to individual psychological frustrations, economic hardship, the "breakdown" of social norms, or even, industrialization. 41 The perspective of Shorter and Tilly has been significantly amended by researchers who have emphasized the role of institutional42 and historical-contextual 43 factors in shaping the determinants of strike activity. Thus, strikes and union organization tend to be associated with one another, but the precise nature of this association and the importance of other factors continue to require empirical and conceptual work. The role of political factors in determining strike rates has also received considerable attention. Korpi and Shalev have argued that labor organization increases the "power resources" of workers, allowing them to engage in conflict aimed at securing material improvements. This conflict may emerge in the form of strikes, but, in the interpretation of Korpi and Shalev where the labor movement has the opportunity for real participation in political power, it will prefer to limit strikes and redirect its energy toward political conflicts and negotiations offering greater rewards. Therefore, in the absence of leftist participation in government, increasing levels of union organization are associated with high strike rates, but where the left participates in government powerful labor organizations produce extremely low strike rates (considerably below the level for late Franco Spain). 44 In this way Korpi and Shalev suggest how politics intervenes decisively in the relationship between organization and strikes, and they place the whole scheme in the framework of a broader argument about the power resources of the working class. The power and achievements of the working class in democracies are also of central interest to comparative researchers such as Stephens 41. Shorter and Tilly, Strikes in France. 42. Snyder, "Institutional Setting and Industrial Conflict." 43. Beth A. Rubin, Larry J. Griffin, and Michael Wallace," 'Provided Only That Their Voice Was Strong': Insurgency and Organization of American Labor from NRA to TaftHartley," Sociology of Work and Occupations 10 (August 1983). 44. Walter Korpi and Michael Shalev, "Strikes, Power and Politics in the Western Nations, 1900-1976," in Political Power and Social Theory, vol. 1, ed. Maurice Zeitlin (Greenwich, Conn., 1980).

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and Cameron, who rely heavily on the percentage of the labor force organized into unions as a key variable measuring the organizational strength of labor. 45 Stephens actually argues that high levels of unionization produce a hegemony of labor in civil society leading to political economic changes toward socialism. In his view the Gramscian concern with hegemony in civil society46 is crucial for understanding political economic change, and this concept can be operationalized by the empirical study of the organizational strength of labor, more concretely the percentage of the workforce affiliated to unions. Given this great interest in labor organization-its relationship to broadly significant concepts such as the power of the working class as well as empirically observable phenomena such as strikes-this analysis of the "deviant cases" under Spanish authoritarianism assumes added significance and poses several interesting questions. What activities did the opposition labor organization undertake in those settings where it did not engage in strikes? And, how (if at all) did this increase the "power resources" of the working class? How was industrial conflict possible at all, in settings with no presence of the oppositional movement?

A First Approach to the "Deviant Cases" To make sense of the "deviant cases" on the basis of the survey data, we must break down the respondents into four categories: distinguishing first between participants and nonparticipants in the opposition, and then dividing each group into strikers and nonstrikers on the basis of their participation or nonparticipation in strikes under Francoism. First, we must consider whether the nonstrikers in the opposition were really involved in any meaningful form of oppositional activity or if they, rather, simply thought of themselves as part of the opposition without really adding anything to it. Our measure of involvement in the opposition is simply the affirmative response to the question, "Did you participate in any opposition union activity 45. See David R. Cameron, "Social Democracy, Corporatism, and Labor Quiescence: The Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society" (paper presented at the Conference on Representation and the State: Problems of Governability and Legitimacy in Western European Democracies, Stanford University, October 1982); and John Stephens, The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism (London, 1979). 46. The concept of hegemony-the exercise of dominance in civil society by a social group without the direct use of state coercion-plays a central role in the highly suggestive work of the Italian Communist intellectual Antonio Gramsci. See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (English trans.: New York, 1971), for extensive discussions of this concept.

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Table 4.6. Frequency of two key experiences under Francoism (controlling for strike participation and opposition involvement) Participated in the opposition Experience Arrested Participated in negotiations with employers (N)

Did not participate in the opposition

Strikers

Nonstrikers

Strikers

31.1 51.1

37.1

34.3

6.1 24.5

(90)

(35)

(49)

Nonstrikers 5.5 12.4 (145)

under Francoism?" (Tenia Vd. alguna actividad de oposici6n sindical bajo el franquismo?) From the data reported in Table 4.2 we know that just under one-half the self-declared opposition activists were involved in representing worker interests through negotiations. Does this mean that the nonstrikers in the opposition were uninvolved in any significant form of collective worker action? What evidence would permit us to judge the authenticity of their claim to oppositional activity? The experience of repression at the hands of the Francoist state is, perhaps, the best hard indicator of the extent to which the respondents were actually involved in meaningful oppositional activity considered dangerous by the regime. Of course, many individual activists succeeded in avoiding arrest despite their opposition activities. Nevertheless, for broad categories of respondents the arrest rate should indicate, roughly, the degree to which the regime considered their style of activity threatening. Limiting our attention for the moment to participants in the opposition, the arrest rate for the nonstrikers is, surprisingly, actually slightly higher than for the strikers (34.3 percent and 31.1 percent, respectively) (see Table 4.6). In other words, opposition labor activists stood roughly one chance in three of being arrested regardless of their strike participation. Apparently, then, the nonstrikers in the opposition were involved in significant activity, of some form, which the regime considered threatening. What was the activity, and in what way(s} did it contribute to the broader mobilization or organization of the working class?

Workplace Organization and the Use of Public Space in Working-Class Mobilization The open-ended question reported on in Table 4.4, on activities other than strikes identified by respondents as constituting the work

125

Opposition Labor Movement in Franco Spain Table 4.7. Reported activities of the opposition labor movement (controlling for respondent participation in opposition and strikes) Participated in the opposition Activity Clandestine organizational tasks Mass action outside the firm: demonstrations, etc. (N)

Did not participate in the opposition

Strikers

Nonstrikers

Strikers

54.4 30.0

20.0 42.9

18.4 8.2

(90)

(35)

(49)

Nonstrikers 8.3 11.7 (145)

Note: The question reported in this table was open-ended, and multiple responses were permitted. The table includes only those responses directly relevant to the issue under discussion.

of the opposition labor movement, allows us to explore the differences among the four categories of immediate interest (see Table 4.7). If the opposition activists are considered alone, one sees that the activities associated with the opposition were remarkably different for strikers and nonstrikers. More than half the strikers, 54.4 percent, as opposed to only 20 percent of the nonstrikers, mention clandestine organizational tasks. Apparently, the strikers were significantly more likely to attend clandestine meetings (any strictly organizational meeting had to be clandestine, given the illegality of establishing autonomous working class organizations) and to sense the importance of the organizational work required of the labor movement. It seems fair to conclude that in those workplaces where the opposition was able to mobilize strikes, the web of organizational life was much more dense than in those work settings where the opposition was never able to stage strikes. This finding-the rough association of strikes with higher levels of labor organization-helps extend the interpretations of comparative researchers on strikes to an authoritarian context such as Franco Spain. Nevertheless, it only deepens the puzzle facing us, the question of the activity of the non-strikers and their contribution to the opposition. One considerably risky form of activity is mentioned significantly more frequently by the nonstrikers than by the strikers. Demonstrations and other types of mass action outside the firm are listed by 42.9 percent of the nonstrikers as opposed to just 30 percent of the strikers. Clearly, this explains why the arrest rate was just as high for the nonstrikers as for the strikers. Yet, this still leaves us the problem of how to interpret this empirical finding and relate it to our understanding of workers' mobilizations under repression.

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Working-Class Organization The Use of Public Space by Labor Activists: An Explanation for the "Deviant Cases"

These public protests, and in a broader sense the use of public space, help explain both types of deviation from the expected association of strikes and labor organization. Those opposition activists unable to initiate strikes in their workplaces managed to sustain their sense of involvement in the labor movement by participating, frequently at great risk, in public protests. The enduring sense of involvement in the opposition by these activists enabled the labor movement to maintain a much more extensive presence than would have been possible had it limited itself to those workplaces where it was able to wage strikes. Yet these public protests were in no sense a visually compelling but hollow outlet for otherwise failed activists. Their impact would be felt throughout the working class, even by many workers who never participated and in workplaces with no organizational link to the opposition. The public presence-through demonstrations, graffiti, political murals, leaflets, and so on-achieved by the opposition at the cost of great repression, allowed the labor movement to mobilize workers even in workplaces with no opposition activists present, that is, with no organizational link to the movement. In this way, the movement's use of public space increased its mobilizational capacity and, in a sense, the power of the working class beyond the level produced by labor organization itself. This pattern of mobilization was repeated in numerous strike waves and areawide general strikes during the Franco period. Workers in the first factory or factories to shut down would take to the streets (at times in the company of workers from other firms), shouting slogans, demonstrating, and making their cause known. This public presence permitted the strikers to bring other workplaces into their struggle even absent any direct and stable (that is, organizational) channel of communication. Accounts of labor conflict under Franco are full of examples of strikes that spread in this fashion. A typical case is a strike that spread from the firms of K. D. and Hispano Suiza, located in Sant Feliti de Llobregat, a town in the highly conflictual Baix Llobregat area (comarca) outside Barcelona. Drawing on the reporting of a newspaper, Riera and Botella relate the incident in their excellent history of the labor movement in the Baix Llobregat: The workers of those firms [K. D. and Hispano Suiza], first thing in the morning went out to the street and, taking the National Highway II,

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127

they headed for Molins de Rei, provoking stoppages and the abandonment of the factory in many companies. A number of incidents with the police took place. 47

The significance of labor demonstrations, then, was not so much that they presented an immediate threat to the state or even "public order" as suggested by some analysts48 but rather that they increased the ability of the opposition to mobilize workers, to cause strikes to spread. Although academic analysts tend to undervalue the importance of workers' public protests, many labor activists and leaders are well aware of the significance of this factor and display considerable creativity in their search for ways to gain a public presence for their movement. A brilliant example of this is provided by Carlos Navales, an outstanding labor leader who gained prominence in the course of a strike he helped lead in 1974 at Elsa, the factory where he then worked in Cornelia, outside Barcelona. The book of Riera and Botella includes an account by Navales of how the Elsa workers extended their own conflict into a general strike in Cornelia and throughout the comarca of the Baix Llobregat: From the beginning we drew from the experiences of previous struggles with respect to their popularization. We understood how crucial it was to make the strike a subject of discussion throughout the comarca. For that reason we reached the agreement to at all times wear our work clothes in order to provoke conversations about our conflict wherever we walked. Our fellow workers of Clausor and Fama [two other factories in Cornelia] had already done so with positive results. We also considered it fundamental to find massive forms of participation which make our positions known, explain somewhat our problem, and permit the participation of those not from our factory. That was translated into the agreement to carry out many peaceful marches and to spend the whole day in visible places and in groups. In this way, we were creating in Cornelia and in the comarca an esthetic constantly producing commentaries about the struggle of Elsa. It became common to see in Cornelia and in neighboring towns workers from Elsa in their classic blue work clothing explaining the conflict. We consider that, by itself, to be of more value than even the distribution of thousands of information sheets. 49 4 7. Riera and Botella, 121. 48. See the treatment of public demonstrations in labor disputes by Shorter and Tilly. 49. Riera and Botella, 109-111.

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Working-Class Organization

Implications By no means do all labor activists enjoy the resourcefulness and creativity in the use of public space reflected in Navales's account. In fact, just as the organizational strength of labor and the strike rate are variables useful for the study of both unionism and the working class, so too is public protest, or more broadly the use of public space. The public activities of labor are perfectly tangible-perhaps quantifiable-and they play a major role in the larger successes or failures of labor. In the Spanish authoritarian case I have shown how the public protests of workers must be introduced into the analysis both empirically and conceptually if we are to understand the relationship between union organization and strikes. Without this concept, we are left with too many otherwise unexplainable "deviant cases." The extent to which the labor movement carries out protests in public space (and the nature of that activity) is, moreover, an independent variable; it is not the simple product of the strength or weakness of labor organization inside the workplace. For example, the Italian labor movement is considerably stronger inside the firm than the Spanish (under democracy) and also more adept in using public space. However, the United States labor movement makes much less use of public space than the contemporary (democratic) Spanish one, but it is much better organized inside the workplace. In Franco Spain, as I pointed out earlier, the labor movement was better organized inside the firm in Madrid but was able to sustain a higher strike rate in Barcelona. It is precisely the ability of the Catalan labor movement to act publicly that accounts for the relatively high strike rate of Barcelona during the authoritarian period in spite of its relative organizational weakness. The labor movement's use of public space, then, absorbs great energy expended by the movement's activists and contributes to labor's overall mobilizational capacity. It follows that the "power of the working class" or the "hegemony of labor in civil society" does not rest exclusively on the organizational strength of unions but relies as well on the public activities of unionists. The Italian case-with its tradition of large labor demonstrations, colorful public posters, and so on-perhaps best demonstrates how the analysts of labor devote a disproportionately small fraction of their systematic efforts to this area of union life which absorbs so much energy and creativity on the part of the activists. Clearly then, it

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would be useful to systematically incorporate this variable into the comparative analysis of labor. Perhaps public protest is more significant in the overall pattern of labor mobilization under authoritarianism (with its severe limits on labor organization) than under democracy, but only a comparative empirical treatment of the issue could resolve this point. What factors might account for the greater success, or at least efforts, of some national labor movements in this particular area of union life? I will briefly suggest four types of explanation that might prove useful, although it will not be possible to evaluate here their relative importance: 1. The social (and opinion) structure of the larger community. The perceived strength of the working class; the receptiveness of the larger community; links to intellectuals. The working class may be more likely to use public space in its mobilizational activities in those areas where it perceives itself occupying a central role in the social structure, where it is the predominant element of the labor force. A strongly related factor is the workers' perception of the larger public's receptiveness to their efforts and point of view. Links between workers and intellectuals are much more prevalent in some contexts than others, and these are likely to help persuade workers of the general importance of their movement, increase their visibility to nonworkers, and involve them in the articulation of the larger community. 2. State repression or tolerance of such public activity. The "space" left open by the state for such activity varies not only from country to country but also from region to region (or city to city) within the same country. Most obvious and important, the probability of arrest or fines for demonstrations or other public displays of labor issues makes such activity more difficult. Additionally, however,the speed with which municipalities remove posters and clean walls of graffiti and murals varies tremendously from city to city even within the same country. In some cities, posters or murals are removed almost immediately, while in others they become a virtually permanent part of the public landscape of working-class neighborhoods. 3. The political orientation of the labor movement. Politically radical labor movements, and more specifically those with strong links to Communist parties, are more inclined to attempt to mobilize the working class as a whole rather than just actual members for the defense of their immediate interests. Additionally, the stress of Communist parties on massive public events, such as demonstrations and annual popular festivals (in most cases sponsored officially by the party newspaper), must have an impact on the allied labor movement. 4. Cultural factors. Without either adopting a position of cultural deter-

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minism or attempting to explain political differences by reference to "national character," one can still recognize the variation in the repertoire of public activities made available (or emphasized) for members of different cultures. Workers who have participated in large public gatherings and observed public esthetic displays are, presumably, more likely to engage in public activity for the labor movement. These factors all seem to encourage a greater degree of public labor movement activity in Barcelona than in Madrid. The industrial working class is a much larger proportion of the labor force in Barcelona province than in Madrid province (50 percent and 38 percent, respectively). At least during the authoritarian period, the broad community sentiment was more favorable to labor protest in Barcelona because of the widely shared culture of opposition. And throughout the first years of democracy, if not afterward, many more links existed between intellectuals and labor activists in Barcelona than in Madrid.so State repression was much more severe in Madrid during the authoritarian period (refer again to Table 2.4), and even under democracy political posters and murals are allowed to remain on public walls considerably longer in Barcelona. At the time of the regime transition (and before the serious internal crisis of the PSUC) Barcelona had the strongest Communist movement in all Spain. Cultural factors seem to point in the same direction-toward a more publicly active labor movement in Catalonia-but it is more difficult to make solid empirical statements about them. In fact, the Catalan labor movement has made a more extensive and imaginative use of public space than its counterpart in Madrid. This explains the higher strike rate of Barcelona under authoritarianism despite the weaker organization of labor inside the workplace. Today, under democracy, labor posters and murals are a more visible presence in Barcelona than in Madrid. The disparity between the two cities is particularly great on the question of labor/political murals: In Madrid they have been virtually absent, but in Barcelona their colorful messages helped set the tone for public life in a number of working-class neighborhoods, dramatizing workers' conflicts and perhaps contributing to a climate of opinion more favorable to militant struggles. 50. A recent study has found much evidence of substantial erosion in the ties between intellectuals and workers during the 1980s. See Paolo Di Rosa, "The Disenchantment of Spanish Intellectuals: Reflections on the Relations between Intellectuals and Workers in Contemporary Spain" (Honors Thesis, Social Studies, Harvard University, November 1986).

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The labor movement's protests and other activities in public places, along with the factors that help encourage this style of unionism, can contribute significantly to the mobilizational capacity and influence of the workers' movement. Nevertheless, I emphasize this factor principally as a corrective to the general failure of social scientists to consider it at all. Workplace organization remains, without question, a more fundamental requirement for the union movement if it is to be capable of sustained (and coordinated) mobilizations. Furthermore, labor demonstrations and other public forms of activity frequently fail to engender authentic mass enthusiasm, even in contexts such as Barcelona, and may actually be counterproductive on occasion. The point, simply, is that the movement's activity in public space and the structure of working-class communities both affect the ability of workers to act collectively even on matters such as industrial conflict, which many observers have assumed to be a purely organizational phenomenon. To return to the central concern of this chapter from which I have digressed intentionally, let us consider the implications of this discussion for our understanding of the organizational task faced by labor in the transition period. We can now appreciate why the high strike rate did not signal the existence of an organization so strong or extensive as some had assumed. We should note, as well, that the style of mobilization that produced this high level of strikes would be somewhat less appropriate under democracy when organization would be more essential. Before continuing, I will briefly mention how two other factors contribute in to the existence of the "deviant cases." Clearly, the level of state repression-higher, as it was, in Madrid than Barcelona during the authoritarian period-not only affects the probability of public protest by labor but also directly influences the opposition's ability to use workplace organization to initiate strikes. The regime's inconsistent pattern of repression was a major determinant of the course taken by collective worker action. Additionally, the elected worker representatives on the jurados were, in some respects, an imperfect functional alternative for the autonomous organization of labor. These elected representatives, in place throughout most of the economy, in some instances participated in initiating or spreading worker mobilizations even if they themselves did not belong to the organized opposition. Thus, two dimensions of the authoritarian system-the pattern of repression by

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Working-Class Organization

the state and the nature of the Francoist Sindicatos-join the phenomenon of public forms of labor mobilization in accounting for the "deviant cases." Qualifications

The reader has undoubtedly taken note of the fluidity of my use of the concept of the public activity of the labor movement. The survey data refer, essentially, to public demonstrations. The quotes used for illustration mention a somewhat broader array of activities, and in the end I have discussed posters and labor/political murals while shifting the terminology from public protest, to public activity, to the use of public space, and so on. This fluidity reflects my preference for suggesting possible implications of the findings by moving speculatively beyond the simple explanation of the "deviant cases." Although I have attempted to extend the discussion from public demonstrations to include labor/political murals in working-class neighborhoods and so forth, the survey data actually do not support this extension. While the nonstrikers in the opposition were more likely than the strikers to mention demonstrations as an important activity of the opposition labor movement, they were not more likely to mention painting graffiti, distributing pamphlets, and other activities coded together as "relations with a broader public" (see Table 4.8). Virtually the same proportion of opposition strikers and opposition nonstrikers mention this type of activity-34.4 percent and 34.3 percent, respectively. These figures should serve as a note of caution, yet all they really show is that public propaganda was a less important outlet for the energy and activism of the nonstrikers than the physical presence of these activists in public demonstrations. Posters, pamphlets, and murals, just like public demonstrations, escape the attention of the researcher who focuses exclusively on workplace organization or union membership data. However, the extent to which these and other public activities tend to be associated with one another or, rather, vary independently, is an empirical question to be resolved by research. An important question that must be addressed is whether the public activity of labor is only a physical expression of the political efforts of the union movement. In fact, there is some association between the political and public activity of labor, but the two phenomena remain distinct from one another. Some public efforts of unionists deal unambiguously with labor struggles, attempting to mo-

133

Opposition Labor Movement in Franco Spain Table 4.8. Participation in activities other than strikes identified by respondents as constituting the work of the opposition labor movement (controlling for strike participation [under Franco] and opposition involvement) Participated in the opposition Activity Political opposition/to overthrow regime Opposition to the vertical union Raising consciousness of the workers Organization/ clandestine tasks Relations with a broader public: graffiti, pamphlets, etc. Mass action outside the firm: demonstrations, etc. Other means of labor pressure Labor demands/socioeconomic demands Assemblies Use of vertical union structure Concrete mentions of legal actions for limited ends (N)

Did not participate in the opposition

Strikers

Nonstrikers

Strikers

16.7

8.6

4.1

3.4

7.8 29.8

17.1 34.3

4.1 20.4

1.4 11.7

54.4 34.4

20.0 34.3

18.4 10.2

8.3 11.0

30.0

42.9

8.2

11.7

3.3 12.2

11.4 17.1

4.1 4.1

4.1 2.8

6.7 4.4 3.3

2.9 11.4 0

4.1 0 8.2

1.4 3.4 2.8

(90)

(35)

(49)

Nonstrikers

(145)

Note: The question reported on in this table was open-ended, and multiple responses were permitted. A few responses that did not fit into the above categories as well as the "Doesn't know's" and "Doesn't answer's" have been excluded. Those respondents who did not answer the questions about participation in the opposition and in strikes under Franco have been excluded from this table.

bilize community support or simply provide information about a specific conflict. And clearly, some political activities of unions do not take place "in public" but rather in more restricted organizational or institutional environments. Thus, despite the frequent association of political unionism with public mobilizations by labor, one cannot collapse the two phenomena into one concept. Thus, my use of the terms "public space" and "public protest" is intentionally rather broad and somewhat vague. The purpose is to think somewhat speculatively about implications to be drawn from solid empirical findings. The survey findings concern public protests and their role in labor conflict under authoritarianism. The account by Navales of the Elsa strike, however, clearly raises the issue of other creative uses of public space by workers, as in their strategy of wearing blue work clothes in public while on strike in order to provoke discussion of their conflict. Between these two examples there is a wide variety of more or less routine and observable uses of public space by the union movement: posters, murals, and so on. All of these public

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Working-Class Organization

displays of labor activism allow the movement to reach workers untouched by organizational ties and to help shape a climate of opinion. Finally, I should underscore that the public dimensions of labor movement activity are perfectly tangible and that they play an important role in establishing labor's mobilizational potential. Conclusions The Franco period, then, left a deeply contradictory legacy for the working class, far more complex than suggested by a simple historical narrative of repression and resistance or an elementary quantitative description of the collective experience of workers. The opposition's success in forging a (relatively) powerful workers' movement, after recovering from the enormous impact of the repression of the early Franco years, posed a major challenge to the regime in the 1960s and 1970s and provided workers with increased possibilities for the collective defense of their interests. Yet the opposition was not the only source for the representation of workers' interests during the authoritarian years. The official Sindicatos, especially after the reforms carried out in the late 19 5Os, provided for the extensive emergence of worker representatives at the plant level, but these representatives would only imperfectly carry out the functions fulfilled by workplace union leaders under democracy. Both organizational contexts for collective worker action-the opposition movement and the official Sindicatos-produced worker leaders, thus contributing significantly to the workplace leadership pool that would become available to the competing union confederations under democracy. In the context of the reopening of democratic freedoms to organize throughout the economy, the unions would rely on individual leaders from both backgrounds--opposition and regime "union"-as well as many who shared both types of experience and others with no experience whatsoever. The collective worker life of the Franco years produced a heterogeneous and sizable group of workplace leaders, but this pool was insufficiently large for the challenge of building democratic unionism; many totally new leaders would have to be recruited to advance the cause of union organization and extend its presence. Thus, the Franco period was characterized by a fundamental duality of the organizational structures or forms available for the mobilization and representation of worker interests. Although in theory (and in

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135

law) the official regime union and the opposition movement were diametrically opposed to one another, in reality they influenced one another deeply, and at the workplace level (largely as a result of the CCOO effort to infiltrate the Sindicatos) the same individuals frequently staffed both sets of roles. However, neither opposition nor the OSE represented the kind of stable mass-membership organization that characterizes democratic unionism. The OSE would make an enduring impact on the collective life of workers, not only because of the severe repression accompanying the attempt to supplant the pre-Franco labor movement but also as a result of the opportunities provided for the limited but real representation of worker interests. A clearly unintended consequence of the regime's efforts to institutionalize the Sindicatos was to contribute to the emergence and strengthening of the opposition inside the workplace. Thus, the OSE, and above all the elective plant-level negotiating committees that served the opposition so well represented a major failure for Francoist goals. Yet we must not forget that the Sindicatos created a highly distorted form of collective worker life. The representation they allowed was limited (without the possibility for effective coordination above the level of the workplace, without the crucial right to strike, and with no possibility for any open protagonism in political life), and the OSE structure encouraged all-workers, activists, and leaders-to believe that the representation of workers would be possible without the efforts required to established an autonomous,

permanent, mass-membership organization. The opposition, as well, would offer less of a foundation for democratic unionism than appeared to be the case. It was neither so strong nor so broadly present as the (top-level) opposition leaders wished to believe. The diffuse lines separating clandestine organization, opposition movement, and supportive workers made it impossible for anyone to clearly draw the outlines of the oppositional organization. The organized opposition's ability to mobilize workers with whom it maintained no permanent organizational link made it possible to sustain a high strike rate. Yet this quality of collective worker life made it impossible for the opposition to assess objectively its own strength and additionally discouraged workers and activists from viewing permanent organization as essential for mobilizing and representing worker interests. Let us distinguish two related facets of this argument: First the opposition movement neither represented nor aspired to achieve the permanent mass membership model of organization. Second, the opposition's ability to lead broadly successful

136

Working-Class Organization

worker mobilization despite this organizational weakness discouraged workers from conceiving of organization as an essential element of mobilizations. The successful strategy of forging a broad but diffuse opposition movement that could initiate large strikes was based on numerous factors of which two deserve our special attention. The opposition's use of the OSE provided not only physical facilities and a legal status for those activists who secured election to the jurados, but it also targeted key individuals-namely the elected worker representatives on the jurados-for incorporation into mobilizational efforts through the calling of assemblies of worker delegates. Demonstrations and other activities which provided the opposition with a public presence were crucial in permitting the labor movement to extend its mobilizational capacity beyond its organizational reach. Both of these facilitating factors for large mobilizations-the use of the OSE and the reliance on public protests-were successful adaptations to the difficult context of a repressive authoritarian regime. Yet neither factor would directly contribute to the organizational basis for the emergence of mass-membership unions, and the legacy of the OSE would clearly detract from the agenda of the union movement under democracy. Thus, the high strike rate of the authoritarian period did not signify the existence of such a solid foundation for the growth of unions under democracy. Some may object to the parallel treatment in this analysis of the OSE, created by an exclusionary authoritarian regime, and the opposition, created autonomously by those who resisted dictatorship. And, of course, in most ways they cannot be equated. Yet they both influenced collective worker life during the Franco period as well as afterward. And together, or rather separately as well as in their interaction, they manifest the regime's failure to achieve its ends but its success in disorganizing the working class. The challenge of organizing a strong labor movement under democracy would be greater than suggested by the powerful mobilizations of the Franco period. This exclusionary authoritarian regime could not eliminate the collective life of the working class and failed in its attempt to build stable institutions for the nonconflictual representation of interests. Yet this failure did not provide an especially strong foundation for the emergent worker organizations under democracy. If autonomous massmembership organizations of workers are normally necessary for mobilizing and representing workers, the Spanish authoritarian experience demonstrates that under conditions of repression (and at great

Opposition Labor Movement in Franco Spain

137

personal cost) it is possible for labor activists to improvise alternatives to that model of organization. One improvisation-the creative use

of public space-would still be of some (although diminished) use under democracy, but in order to gain some protagonism in the new democratic Spain, labor would have to pursue the goal of a massmembership organization.

5

Labor and Political Transition

All sectors of the ideologically divided labor movement-with the sole and obvious exception of the few falangist worker activistscounted themselves among the forces pushing for an end to authoritarian rule and a return to democracy. Yet the strength of their desire to contribute to the rebirth of democratic freedoms in no sense eliminated or reduced the difficulty of the political choices confronting them in this period. In fact, the analysis of regime transitions by social scientists-for processes of redemocratization, such as the recent Spanish experiences or the breakdown of democratic regimes as in the case of Spain 1936-1939 or Chile 1973-places considerable stress on the actions of the labor movement and the mobilization of the working class as one of the principal factors helping to account for the success or failure of democracy. 1 During the Franco years worker mobilizations, by their very nature, contributed to the cause of democracy since they broke with the repressive and exclusionary character of the authoritarian system. 2 However, once the reestablishment of democracy became a real possibility, it was no longer sufficient to oppose Francoism and mobilize workers. Instead, labor faced the challenge of gaining as much protagonism as possible over the process of political change and then of acting to advance and consolidate that process even as the political transition took a very different path from that envisaged by labor. During the transition period, labor adjusted its views about the type 1. See the works cited in Chapter 1, note 1. 2. This, of course, does not mean that all those who took part did so primarily to oppose the regime.

138

Labor and Political Transition

139

of transition that could be carried out, and, simultaneously, labor began to weigh the relative political utility of mobilization and restraint. Would the great hopes of the labor movement for hegemony over the transition process (in conjunction with the associated leftist parties) and for organizational expansion based on defending workers' interests prevent labor from exercising restraint when the process came to follow the path of (negotiated) reform rather than the complete collapse of the old system? To what extent would political considerations guide the conduct of union activity in this period? How compatible were leftist unions-their political and economic mobilizations-with the broad social and political consensus characterizing the Spanish model of transition? Clearly, within the framework of this study it will also be necessary to examine how the constraints of the transition process affected the development of the labor movement, but for the moment we must direct our attention to the impact of labor on the political transition. The Path to Democracy: Reforma or Ruptura? The words reforma and ruptura came to represent the great historical choice apparently faced by Spanish political actors after the death of Franco: either a process of democratization enacted by the legal institutions of the Franco regime and preserving some elements of the old system, or the dislodging of authoritarian rule, and its replacement by a provisional government of democratic forces. The labor movement and the parties of the left insisted on the need for a ruptura, a clear break with the past. This objective reflected their hope to gain protagonism over the establishment of a new democratic system as well as, in some cases, a misplaced sense of confidence in their own mobilizational capacities. The form eventually taken by the redemocratization process under the guidance of Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez (and the pressure of the opposition) was closer to the reforma than the ruptura model, leading many to refer to it as Ia reforma. 3 Nevertheless, a number of factors-the pressure exerted by the opposition on the government, the negotiations between Suarez and the 3. Leading government politicians normally referred to the process as Ia reforma as did many sectors of the left. For example, CCOO of Catalonia, in criticizing some elements of the behavior of opposition and the left during the transition period, referred to the process as Ia reforma. See the documents of the II Congress of the CONC published in Lluita Obrera, no. 33 (January 1981 ). The PCC, the pro-Soviet splinter of the PSUC, has suggested more strongly the need to reevaluate the reforma.

140

Working-Class Organization

opposition, the concessions (such as the legalization of the PCE prior to the first legislative elections of June 1977) won by the opposition, and the eventual decision of the opposition to accept the process and contribute to a consensual drafting of the new constitutiondistinguish the Spanish case from the strict reforma model, leading to the formulation of labels such as reforma pactada (negotiated reform), ruptura pactada (negotiated ruptura), reforma/ruptura pactada, and "transition by transaction" to describe what went on. 4 In late 1976 and early 1977 the national leadership of the parties of the left and the labor movement, the main forces of opposition, moved away from insisting on a ruptura and toward accepting a negotiated reform, the reforma pactada. This change in strategy followed the relatively weak popular response to the call for a general strike in November 1976. 5 This strategic reappraisal by the opposition leadership appears to reflect an acknowledgment of their evident incapacity to engineer successfully (or take advantage of 6 ) the collapse of the regime as well as their recognition of Suarez's desire to negotiate a full democratization. Yet this adaptability of the top leadership represented the abandonment of their commitment to a ruptura, a belief central to the aspirations of thousands of dedicated opposition activists. The change in opposition strategy and the form ultimately taken by the transition pose three major questions: Would a ruptura have been possible if the national leadership of the left had simply acted with greater resolve, maintaining its commitment to a clear political break with the past despite the government's project for a negotiated reform? Would the disappointment of many labor activists over the path taken by redemocratization translate into a lack of support for the new democratic regime or, at least, a style of mobilizations counterproductive for consolidating the new regime? And, would the consensual transition process hamper labor's style or weaken its commitment to systematic economic changes? 4. Ruptura pactada has been the preferred term for most political figures from the opposition. In his paper on transitions, Linz refers to the process as reforma/ruptura pactada. Donald Share has labeled this style of redemocratization "transition by transaction." See Donald Share, "Two Transitions: Democratization and the Evolution of the Spanish Socialist Left" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., September 1-4, 1983). 5. See Carr and Fusi, Spain, 244. 6. Transitions by ruptura may occur not so much because the opposition has the strength to topple the regime but rather as a result of the internal crisis and collapse of the regime itself.

Labor and Political Transition

141

Labor's Abandonment of the Ruptura Model

The image (or mirage) of the 'missed historical opportunity' hangs diffusely over numerous regimes and movements, prompting endless debates among historians, social scientists, and political activists.7 It is always possible (if not inevitable) to ask if events could have followed a radically different path if only key actors had behaved differently in certain crucial respects. Such questioning and reexamining of the past may seem particularly appropriate for great tragedies on the order of the Chilean coup against Allende in September 1973 which quickly led to thousands of executions. Yet even so relatively successful, if unexciting, an outcome as the establishment of a fragile parliamentary democracy based on a broad and moderate consensus can also motivate academics and activists to ask if a more socially progressive, and perhaps a more solid, democracy might not have been possible if key political actors had pursued such a goal. The national leadership of the main parties of the left continues to defend its change of strategy, arguing that for various reasons a ruptura would not have been possible. 8 Nevertheless, some top-level leaders privately voice doubts on the matter, and the issue remains a subject for debate and potential reinterpretation at the activist level. 9 On the other hand, at the level of mass public opinion the question is of no current interest. In the future, historians and social scientists will undoubtedly direct some attention to this issue regardless of the interest among real political actors. How can we assess the validity of the argument that a historical opportunity for a significantly different path to democracy was 7. Historically minded social scientists such as Moore, Skocpol, and Roth (The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany) have joined the debate over the transition from Imperial Germany to the Weimar Republic and the issue of whether a real historical opportunity for a more revolutionary, or at least socially reformist republic, was missed as a result of errors or the conservative orientations of some Social Democrats. Among the other ex· periences that have prompted much debate over the possibility of missed htstorical op· portunities are the social revolution in the Republican zone during the Spanish Civil War and the occupation of the factories in Italy. In fact, almost every transition period and every failed or near revolution prompts such debate among the principals and intellectuals or academics regarding the possibility that events could have taken a radically different course. 8. Mundo Obrero, February 2-8, 1978, special section on the IX Party Congress of the PCE. 9. I have heard some such doubts in my conversations with top-level leaders. Only the far left openly discusses such a possibility. However, as our data show, at the activist level much disagreement remains.

142

Working-Class Organization

missed? At one level we could elaborate a longer or shorter list of considerations underlying the shift in strategy such as that offered retrospectively by the PCE (which had still been the most powerful force of opposition at the time of the abandonment of the commitment to ruptura in late 1976) in 1978: A radical political ruptura effected at one time, with the installation of a provisional government, as the Communist Party and the Junta Democratica had advocated, was not possible for several factors, among which it is worth emphasizing the reformist orientation taken by some forces in the opposition and those which emerged from the Francoist regime itself, as well as the international pressure, fundamentally European and American, fearful of the hegemony of the working class and the forces of the left. Under the influence of these factors the mass movement, despite its breadth and importance, could not achieve the force necessary to determine a radical political ruptura. This situation forced the PCE to modify its rupturista thesis into the solution of the ruptura pactada. 10 However, if we wish to proceed in the more analytically rigorous fashion formulated by Weber for judging the objective possibility that history could have taken a different course, 11 then we must first pinpoint those factors or causes which, if modified, could have led to a different outcome. Four factors seem especially important: 1. The effective unity of the State's forces of coercion; 2. The genuinely reformist tendency within the regime which enjoyed the support of the king; 3. The inability of the opposition to carry out mass mobilizations weighty enough to force the government (or other elements of the regime or the state) to stray from its resolve to maintain charge of the transition process; and 4. The ultimate willingness of the opposition, given the above considerations, to modify its strategy.

In the context of a study of labor in the transition period, I cannot offer anything to the understanding of the first two factors, but it is possible to address the third factor, the inability of the opposition to wage more successful mass mobilizations. The historical record offers 10. Mundo Obrero. 11. Max Weber, On the Methodology of the Social Sciences (English trans., New York, 1949), 180-184.

Labor and Political Transition

143

somewhat contradictory bits of evidence: the very high strike rate of the key transition year 1976 and the apparent failure of the opposition's attempt at a political general strike in November 1976. 11 In fact, given the relative durability of the regime and its forces of repression, a high strike rate, by itself, would be insufficient to accomplish a ruptura. Thus, we must pose the question of whether the relative failure of the November 1976 general strike reflected a basic inability of the opposition to stage such an action effectively, or if this failure was simply the result of poor planning or other factors specific to that particular strike call. The answer we provide--our assessment of the opposition's capacity for waging coordinated mass mobilizations in 1976---obviously, must influence our judgment about the issue of missed historical opportunities. A nationally coordinated mass mobilization of workers would, as I have argued, require the active participation of plant-level labor leaders responsive to national political strategies and able to initiate protest activity among the workers in their firms. My examination of the labor movement under Francoism and the organizational basis for the emergence of democratic unions has already suggested that the union movement during the transition period was actually not as strong as the high strike rate seemed to suggest. An extensive organization is, of course, necessary for nationally coordinated mobilizations. 11 Still, our data on the organizational scope of the union movement at that time is, at best, quite indirect evidence. The views of the workplace leaders themselves on the reforma versus ruptura option are more directly useful because these individuals were clearly privileged witnesses to the mobilizational capacities of the opposition. In the survey I asked the respondents to choose between two sentences evaluating the path taken by the political transition. The first sentence indicated agreement with the strategic change by the opposition allowing it to cooperate in the reform process; the second choice presented the argument of the missed historical opportunity, pinpointing the "lack of decisiveness and the errors of many opposition leaders" as responsible for the failure to establish a more progressive democracy based on mass mobilizations (see Table 5.1). A 12. On the high strike rate in 1976, see Maravall, La politica de Ia transici6n. 13. Of course, such organization is less crucial for strike waves or movements that spread by informal process of contagion. In rare historical moments, even against the counsel of the official organizations of workers, such movements may arise unexpectedly and exert an (unintended) impact on macropolitical developments. This was not to happen to Spain in the 1970s.

(82)

(47)

(35)

(141)

(75)

(66)

(N)

4 4

3

4

5

2

27

Other answers; no answer; no opinion

23

31

53

40

68

(14)

0

43

(17)

0

35

65

4 (324)

7 (70) (31) (39) (31)

39 26 23

10

57 67

68

5

28

67

Total

0

39

61

Independents Barcelona Madrid Total

Other unions Barcelona Madrid T oral

Percentage agree 57 70

Because of the indecision and the errors of many leaders of the opposition, a historic opportunity was lost to create a more advanced democracy on the basis of popular mobilizations and a political ruptura.

72

43

55

30

66

UGT Barcelona Madrid Total

ccoo

Barcelona Madrid Total

The balance of forces at the time of the political transition did not permit the step to democracy by ruptura, and the leaders of the left did well in changing strategy to facilitate the reforma which led to democracy.

Statement

Table 5.1. Attitude toward the political transition: reforma or ruptura

Labor and Political Transition

145

clear majority of the workplace leaders, 57 percent, chose the first option, accepting the justification for the reforma pactada. A sizeable minority, 39 percent, however, preferred to believe that, "a historical opportunity was lost to create a more advanced democracy on the basis of popular mobilizations and a political ruptura." Thus, the plant-level leadership is considerably divided in its interpretation of the process that led to the current democratic system. This retrospective vision of the workplace leaders obviously cannot, by itself, 'prove' what was or was not possible at the time of the transition. Yet dearly the (significant) pockets of radicalism which express their disappointment with the course taken by the transition could not have successfully achieved a ruptura acting by themselves. A nationally coordinated and broadly supported mass mobilization capable of exerting strong pressure for a ruptura would have required the workplace leaders' extensive support and resolve. Our data demonstrate that, instead, most plant-level leaders share the sense of the opposition's national leadership, that labor was incapable of such a coordinated mobilization. In other words, the very division of the respondents on this issue suggests that the reforma pactada was the only real possibility for establishing democracy. Only if a strong majority of the workplace leaders had rejected the justification for the reforma could we argue that the opposition movement might have been able to successfully mobilize support for a ruptura if the national leadership had simply acted with greater determination. Nevertheless, in certain areas and in one of the two major confederations the majority of the workplace leaders do reject the reforma model. Sentiment on the reforma versus ruptura question is rather unevenly distributed by region and union. A clear majority, 63 percent, does accept the reforma in Madrid, the central testing ground for the uninstitutionalized politics of the early transition period, given the location of the government and the ministries in a city surrounded by a large industrial working class. However, in Barcelona, with its greater concentration of workers and industry, only 50 percent of the respondents approved the (modified) reforma model. A majority of the CCOO leaders, 53 percent, preferred to believe that a historical opportunity for a ruptura had been missed. The rupturista sentiment is especially pronounced in CCOO of Barcelona where just over two thirds, 68 percent held this view. But what are the causes of these differences, and what is their meaning for the issues of concern to us? The Barcelona leaders' greater willingness to question the strategic choices made by the national political elite of the opposition fits within

146

Working-Class Organization

a broadly shared characteristic of the Catalan political culture: a certain tendency to criticize actions taken in the political center, Madrid. This critical tendency, with its obvious historical roots and causes, in no sense represents a total rejection of 'Madrid.' Yet it is a widely felt and salient feature of political activity in Catalonia. If this phenomenon is most obvious, in our data, for CCOO, it nevertheless appears, to some degree, in all major political groups in Catalonia. Other factors also contribute to the strongly rupturista perspective of CCOO in Barcelona. Opposition sentiment was much more widely shared in Barcelona than in Madrid as a result of the Catalan nationalism especially strong among the middle classes. On the other hand, the level of repression of labor was relatively lower in Barcelona than Madrid. These two factors must have provided labor activists in Catalonia with a perception of the balance of forces at the time of the transition, more optimistic than justified by the reality of the rest of Spain. Furthermore, the broad alliance of the opposition in Catalonia led labor to temper its efforts to carry out worker mobilizations such as the November 1976 attempt at a general strike. Thus, labor activists in Barcelona did not have as much of an opportunity as their counterparts in Madrid to learn from experiences that mass mobilizations could not be counted on to topple the remnants of the Franco regime. Whatever explanation we prefer, the transition clearly left a great concentration of disappointed activists in Barcelona and especially in CCOO in that province. The fact that the rupturista sentiment is so much weaker in Madrid confirms my analysis that at the plant level conditions did not exist for a nationally coordinated and effective mass mobilization of workers. The disappointment of so many Barcelona labor activists with the form taken by the transition would appear to provide considerable raw material for the emergence of movements and tendencies in Catalonia critical of the policies elaborated by the confederations and political parties in Madrid. In fact, the pattern of labor politics has been rather different in Madrid and Barcelona with the radical tendencies normally better represented inside the unions in Catalonia. Still, this does not mean that the Catalan labor movement has been in open and continuous rebellion. The rupturista perspective common in the labor movement in Catalonia has been a resource available to those union radicals who wish to mobilize opposition to the more recent conciliatory policies of the confederations. However, not all workplace leaders disappointed with the reforma also take a radical position on more contemporary and

Labor and Political Transition

147

practical issues, and the difference between Madrid and Barcelona (especially within CCOO) on the issue of the transition is not reproduced to the same extent on more practical questions concerning demands and negotiations under democracy. Consequences of the Leaders' Assessment of the Transition The acceptance of the reforma pactada model of transition by a majority of the plant-level leaders suggests that a substantial portion of the labor movement would likely be inclined to gear its strategies and actions to the goal of consolidating the new democratic regime. But what of the large minority (in some places and unions a majority) disappointed with the transition, and preferring to believe that a more insistent policy of labor mobilizations could have led to a ruptura and a more progressive democracy? Would they pursue a policy of 'irresponsible' (from the point of view of regime consolidation) mobilizations or even still attempt to push for a ruptura? All too frequently the social science discussion of these issues as well as the commentaries of activists refer to "mobilizations" and their impact on regime consolidation without distinguishing between sharply different forms of mobilization. However, the language and concepts of social science and some speeches by labor leaders do contain distinctions worth noting. Labor mobilizations can consist of economic or political demands on employer and/or the state, or, alternatively, they can directly challenge the existing order by breaking clearly with the acceptance of the legitimacy of the (democratic) state. This difference between types of labor mobilizations parallels the distinction I drew in the first chapter between the impact of union mobilizations on macroeconomic performance and the consequences of revolutionary or semirevolutionary attempts by labor. Labor mobilizations intended to directly challenge the existing order were extremely rare in Spain after the initial installation of democratic freedoms; such instances manifested isolated pockets of radicalized workers uncharacteristic of the larger working class. Even the frequent factory shut-ins (encierros), as a general rule, were intended more as a gesture of worker determination in economic or political disputes rather than as a thoroughgoing defiance of the economic and political orders. The campaign of encierros and other activities in opposition to the Ley de Acci6n Sindical, a proposal for labor legislation presented by the Suarez government in 1978, illustrates well this limited

148

Working-Class Organization

scope of seemingly radical labor actions. Speaking at the first nationwide Congress of Comisiones Obreras in Madrid in June 1978, CCOO (and PCE) leader Adolfo Pinedo warned in clear and insistent terms that the opposition to the proposed labor legislation should never be carried to such extremes that it might seem to question the position of the Cortes (the Spanish parliament) as the institution responsible for passing legislation. Although Pinedo's warning did not receive an overwhelmingly enthusiastic reception from the delegates (using applause as an indicator of enthusiasm), it was neither challenged nor rejected. Apparently, the acceptance of the legitimacy of the democratic state's existing institutions was real even if, at times, unenthusiastic. 14 Labor mobilizations, then (at least for the short run) would be aimed at improving the negotiation position of the union movement rather than eliminating its institutional adversaries. Within this framework, to what extent would labor demands be measured against the perceived needs of the process of regime transition and consolidation? This question must be addressed, for even strictly economic demands may 'destabilize' a regime through their aggregate impact on macroeconomic performance. Synchronizing Labor Demands to the Consolidation of Democracy A large majority of the workplace leaders, 85 percent, believes that to one degree or another, "at the time of making demands the unions ought to take into account their consequence for the stability and consolidation of democracy" (see Table 5 .2). The largest segment, 46 percent, answers unequivocally in the affirmative, placing a high priority on political considerations at the time of making demands. A slightly smaller segment, 39 percent grants a more limited role to political considerations in formulating demands, preferring to believe that, "the needs and interests of the workers have a greater importance." Only a small minority, 14 percent, chooses the view that "the workers must be defended independently of the supposed political consequences and the problems of the political system." Thus, most 14. I was fortunate to have the opportunity to attend the I Confederal Congress of CCOO in Madrid in June 1978 along with several other union and party congresses of both the Socialist and Communist wings of the labor movement during my research trips to Spain.

Labor and Political Transition

149

labor demands, even if they appear solely economic, have been formulated and advanced at the plant level with one, if not always both, eye(s) on the fragility of the democratic system and the goal of regime consolidation. This willingness to at least consider the possibility of making sacrifices in the formulation of demands out of recognition for the difficulty of the consolidation process (the sum of the first two responses to the question reported in Table 5.2) represents the majority opinion for all unions and regions. However, some unions and areas place a higher priority on political considerations than others. These differences in the weight attributed to the goal of regime consolidation, to some extent, reproduce the pattern of variation apparent in the response of the leaders to the reforma versus ruptura issue. Madrid is somewhat more inclined than Barcelona (53 percent and 39 percent, respectively) to grant the highest priority to the possible political consequences of labor demands. The difference between the two provinces is especially pronounced in Comisiones Obreras. However, in this case Barcelona's radicalism is reflected in a reluctance to place the highest priority on political considerations, not in a total rejection of the need to defend the existing political system. That is, the Catalan workplace leaders are most likely to choose the intermediate response to this question. In other words, their tendency to criticize 'Madrid' and their disappointment over the path taken by the regime transition lead them to restrict the extent to which they adjust demands to the problems of the democratic system but not to totally eliminate this consideration. Even in CCOO of Barcelona, where a large majority believes that a historical opportunity for a ruptura was missed, only 18 percent see no need to measure labor demands against their possible consequences for the stability and consolidation of democracy. Apparently, then, the great disappointment of many labor activists with the reforma (pactada) was not to lead to a pattern of labor mobilizations destabilizing the fragile democracy. Most of the labor movement ruled out any direct challenge to the exiting system, and even economic demands would be more or less adjusted to the perceived requirements of regime consolidation. The form taken by this restraint in labor demands must be left for a later chapter (Chap. 7) where it can be more fully developed. However, this still leaves us with the more immediate need to make sense of the leaders' apparent political restraint and their desire to defend a political system that has represented a great disappointment to a substantial minority of them. What factors account for labor's willingness to contribute to

ccoo

43

-

(75)

47

18

5

(66)

Up to a certain point, yes, but the needs and interests of the workers have a greater importance.

No, because the workers must be defended independently of the supposed political consequences and the problems of the political system.

Other answers; no answer

7

51

30

(N)

UGT

Other unions Independents

Total

(141) (35)

-

6

12

2

37

57

45

41

(82)

(47)

7

34

59

-

9

32

60

(14)

-

36

43

21

(17)

(31)

-

29

24

-

45

26

47

29

(39)

-

21

36

44

(31)

3

13

23

61

(70)

1

17

30

51

(154)

2

18

42

39

(170)

10

36

53

(324)

14

39

46

Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total

Yes, above all, those consequences must be taken into account and the demands measured against them.

Attitude

Table 5.2. Attitudes of workplace leaders on the importance of unions' demands taking into account the stability and consolidation of democracy

Labor and Political Transition

151

consolidating a democratic regime established in a manner radically different from the one envisaged by the opposition? Evaluation of the Political and Economic Systems The pattern of labor movement activity, the formulation of demands, and the style of mobilization or restraint are likely to be affected not only by retrospective historical judgments and strategic considerations but also by the activists' evaluation of the existing political and economic systems, the possible targets of their efforts. In fact, much writing on the legitimacy of the political system tends to assume that it is strongly linked to the legitimacy, or perceived justice, of the economic system, whether in a transition period or during more normal times. 15 Let us begin, then, by examining the workplace leaders' evaluation of the economic system. A large majority of the respondents reject the current economic system with greater or lesser intensity, describing it as unjust (see Table 5.3 ). The largest segment, 44 percent, describes the economy as "fairly unjust," while 38 percent go so far as to label it "very unjust" Furthermore, this strongly negative judgment is more common in Barcelona (42 percent) than in Madrid (35 percent). Curiously, the difference between the two provinces is greatest in UGT where 51 percent in Barcelona versus 21 percent in Madrid viewed the economic system as "very unjust"; other questions reveal the largest interprovincial difference within CCOO. In fact, the rejection of the economic system is stronger among UGT leaders of industrial Barcelona than among CCOO leaders of Madrid. This finding suggests that the view of the economy held by these unionists may be largely independent of their political conceptions. The broadly shared rejection of the economic system is not reproduced when the unionists turn their attention to the political system (see Table 5.4). Only a minority of the workplace leaders, 39 percent, see the political system as "very" or "fairly unjust," and of these only 9 percent actually view the political system as "very unjust." Just under one quarter of the leaders, 24 percent, see the political system 15. Among the authors who argue along these lines from a wide variety of different perspectives, see Weber and Poulantzas. For example, in Political Power and Social Classes (London, 1975), Poulantzas reasons that the democratic organization of the capitalist state tends to legitimate the capitalist order as a whole. In Economy and Society (American ed. Berkeley, 1978), Weber argues clearly that the legitimacy of political authority is linked to the legitimation of economic relations.

(75)

(66)

1 7

-

-

45 47

5

2

12 61 2

-

(141)

39 53 1

1 1 6

(N)

Very just Fairly just Neither just nor unjust Fairly unjust Very unjust No answer; no opinion

Assessment

(35)

UGT

(47)

-

60 21

2 17

-

(82)

-

51 34

2 12

-

(17)

-

35

35

6 24

-

Other unions

(14)

-

64 14

14 7

-

(31)

-

48 26

10 16

-

(31)

-

39 26

10 26

-

Independents

(39)

49 13 3

3 8 26

(154)

I

I

(70)

41 42

1 4 11

44 19

1 9 26

Total

(170)

-

47 35

4 15

(324)

44 38 1

I

4 12

1

(75)

(66)

33 13

1 25 25

29 18 2

20 32

-

34 6 3

31 16 1 (35)

-

(141)

20 37

1 23 28

(47)

30 -

2 34 34

(82)

32 2 1

1 28 35

(14)

7

29

-

-

21 43

(17)

-

41 12

24 24

-

(31)

35 6 3

-

23 32

(39)

26 10 5

3 21 36

(70)

3 (31)

(154)

29 12 3

24 6 4

-

23

1 20 35

3 23 39 3 29 42

30 9 2

31 7 1

(170) (324)

1 24 33 2 28 31

Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total

ccoo

3 6

40 51

-

-

ccoo UGT Other unions Independents Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total

Table 5.4. Evaluations of the political system

(N)

Very just Fairly just Neither just nor unjust Fairly unjust Very unjust No answer; no opinion

Assessment

Table 5.3. Evaluations of the economic system

Labor and Political Transition

153

as "fairly just" while one third, 33 percent, choose the intermediate response, "neither just nor unjust." There is much variation within each union option and both provinces. In all cases, the workplace leaders are split between those who deny (to one degree or another) the justice of the political system and those who give it more credit, regarding it as either "fairly just" or "neither just nor unjust." CCOO and the province of Barcelona continue to be most critical of the status quo, but in each case only a fairly small minority (16 percent of CCOO and 12 percent in Barcelona) goes so far as to label the political system "very unjust." The difference between the unions and the provinces, then, is smaller than for many apparently related issues that produce more ideologically colored responses. It is especially noteworthy that the difference within CCOO between the two provinces is quite small: only 5 percent more of the Comisiones leaders in Barcelona view the political system as "very unjust" than is the case for their counterparts in Madrid. Thus, the workplace leaders tend to dampen their critical energies when they evaluate the existing political system. Many workplace leaders differentiate radically between the political and economic systems, accepting the former while strongly rejecting the latter (see Table 5.5). Even among those respondents who condemn the economic order as "very unjust," over one quarter, 27.4 percent, regard the political system as "fairly just." These Eurocommunists and democratic socialists are equally committed to eliminating the capitalist system and preserving democracy. There is a weak association, among these unionists, of their evaluations, respectively, of the political and economic systems: those who consider the economy "very unjust" are slightly more likely than other respondents to view the political system as well as "very unjust." Nevertheless, in general, the respondents' judgments of the two systems are rather independent of one another. Despite the assumption of theorists that accepting (or rejecting) the justice of one order will lead to the acceptance (or rejection) of the other, these data demonstrate clearly that this need not be the case. Not only at the level of the nationwide strategists and theorists of labor but also further down in the movement, inside the plants among the workplace leaders, many individuals evaluate the political and economic systems in sharply different terms. Thus, neither disappointment with the historical process that led to reestablishing democracy nor thorough opposition to the existing economic system must necessarily lead to rejecting the current political system. This ability of the workplace leaders to distinguish between

2.4 31.7 43.9 22.0

-

(41)

8.3 50.0 16.7 16.7 8.3 (12)

50.0 50.0

(2)

Very just Fairly just Neither just nor unjust fairly unjust Very unjust No answer; no opinion

(N)

Evaluation of the political system

(143)

(124)

0.9 27.4 20.2 30.6 17.7 3.2

-

17.5 42.7 34.3 4.2 1.4

Very unjust

Fairly unjust

Evaluation of the economic system Neither just nor unjust

Fairly just

Very just

Table 5.5. Relation between evaluations of political and economic systems

(2)

50.0 50.0

No answer; no opinion

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155

a historical process, the economic system and the political system allows them to maintain broad criticism of contemporary Spanish society while also supporting strongly the current democratic regime. This discussion of the respondents' evaluations of the political and economic orders obviously raises the issue of the legitimacy of the (democratic) state. However, the concept of legitimacy should retain a more precise meaning than the perceived justice or injustice of the existing order, related as such perceptions are to the question of legitimization. Let us, then, turn to a more careful consideration of the legitimacy of the democratic state in the eyes of labor and its relation to the formulation of demands and the attempt at mobilization. Labor and the Legitimacy of the Democratic State In the strict sense developed in Weber's brilliant work, legitimacy refers to the belief on the part of the subjects and staff of the ruler that the authority of the ruler (and therefore the larger political order) is binding, that obedience is owed to authority as long as it rules in accordance with the principle on which it bases the claim to legitimacy. In the argument of Weber, legitimacy is a crucial factor increasing the stability of orders of domination (principally the state) beyond what would be assured by other key factors (also extensively analyzed by Weber) such as economic interest and coercion. The legitimacy of a structure of domination, thus, simultaneously constrains the ruler and his staff-forcing them to adhere more or less closely to the form of conduct stipulated by their legitimation formula-and increases the probabilities for the acceptance of authority by the larger population. 16 The concept of legitimacy is, in its complexity, a social scientist's delight, drawing together ideal, material, and organizational factors; specifying probable types of activity or belief on the part of key actors; and offering insights into the prospects for the stability or change of the larger political and social orders. Nevertheless, the very complexity of the concept and the difficulty of operationalizing it have limited the extent to which it is employed (as opposed to mentioned) in macrosociological and macropolitical investigations. Some social scientists use the word without really tapping 16. Weber's elaboration of his complex and fundamental concept of legitimacy can he found in many parts of Economy and Society, not only in the most widely read sections on the types of legitimate domination.

15 6

Working-Class Organization

the Weberian concept, and others look elsewhere for the understanding of macropolitical change. 17 Of course, many social scientists do use the concept of legitimacy heavily in their work, but even then their actual operationalization tends to be somewhat distinct from the strict Weberian notion, and instead lies closer to our previous discussion of the perceived justice of the political or economic order, or a more diffuse idea of support for a regime (or other institutions). For our purpose--examining the possible tensions inherent in the historical agenda of labor during the transition years-the concept of legitimacy is an especially intriguing one, for it suggests an intellectually elaborate explanation for instances where the behavior by key groups runs counter to their apparent economic or organizational interests. That is, if the democratic state is legitimate in the eyes of (most of) the plant-level leaders, this should increase the chances that they will contribute to the consolidation of democracy, ruling out revolutionary style mobilizations and synchronizing labor demands to the goal of building a stable democracy. Furthermore, one might argue that to the extent that the acceptance of legitimacy underlies the actions of major socioeconomic adversaries, such as employers and the labor movement, this makes it more feasible for sharply divisive projects of social transformation to be posed without endangering the survival of democracy. The concept of legitimacy, as it interests us, refers then not to some diffuse notion of support for the regime but to the belief that the political order is binding, that the democratic state is entitled (unlike private citizens and groups) to enforce its decisions even when they run counter to the goals or interests of individuals or key groups. In practice this does not mean that accepting the legitimacy of the state leads individuals to feel constrained to obey the law and legal authorities; as Weber recognizes in his formulation, the belief in legitimacy can be, and often is, associated with the breaking of some laws. All that is required is that even in breaking the law such individuals or groups at some level accept the binding character of the orderthat the state is justified in enforcing it. In the case of a labor movement that is challenging the otherwise dominant position of employers in the workplace, forcing it to rely on the pressure exerted by the organization and enthusiasm of activists, some law breaking is normal and perhaps inevitable. From my point of view, the crucial question 17. An outstanding comparative social scientist who relies heavily on Weberian ideas but does not employ the concept of legitimacy is Theda Skocpol in States and Social Revolutions.

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is whether infractions of the law by the labor movement are intended to challenge directly the structure of legitimacy, to ignore its existence, or, rather within the framework of acceptance of the legal (democratic) structure to simply pressure employers and political authorities through strong actions. In the survey I operationalized this conception of legitimacy by asking the following question concerning the respondents' acceptance in principle of the enforcement of the law by the authorities when labor activists have broken it: Many times in the labor movement-just as in other social sectors, such as the employers for example-actions which to some extent are illegal are considered and carried out. These actions can include unauthorized demonstrations, the non-observance of legislation on labor matters, encierros (shut-ins), etc., and may at times include holding a boss hostage. I would like to ask you about your opinions on what the state can do to respond to illegal actions of the labor movement. If the state arrests those involved and places them on trial, does this seem reasonable to you?

The answers offered to the respondents included the following alternatives intended to represent the way opinion leaders for differing viewpoints inside the labor movement would formulate their response: Yes it is reasonable because the state has the right and the duty to do so; if not, the laws make no sense. As long as we are talking about a democracy it is reasonable. In theory it is reasonable, but in reality many times the state enforces the law when it runs against our interests and does not enforce it when it runs against the interests of capital. So we have the right to insist that the law is enforced in a just manner. It is reasonable only if we are talking about something very serious, such as holding a boss hostage, for example. It may be that the state has the right to do so, but I am not interested in the rights of the state but rather in the interests of the workers. It is not reasonable. What the state ought to do is respond to the needs and interests of the workers and not arrest them.

158

Working-Class Organization

This question poses the difficult dilemma of the situation in which the apparent interests of the labor movement run counter to its recognition of the state's authority, precisely the type of tension of concern to us and the sort of problematic choice suggested by Weber's formulation of the concept. In this case the first two responses-the absolute acceptance of the principle of the legitimacy of the stateare so legalistic that they are probably not compatible with the normal exercise of unionism given its great stress on organized pressure. The next two responses are the 'normal' choices for dedicated unionists who accept the legitimacy of the democratic state. These two alternatives reflect a recognition of the principle of the authority of the state combined with a reluctance to see that authority utilized against the labor movement. The final two responses, in different ways, reject that authority: The fifth response suggests a belief in one segment of civil society, the organized working class, and a disinterest in or antagonism toward the state. Such a semianarchosyndicalist position is unlikely to encourage organized revolutionary action to overthrow the state, but it clearly does not imply the need to adjust labor movement activity to the perceived requirements of the transition and consolidation processes. The final response signifies a denial of the legitimacy of the current state; for those who hold this view only a workers' state can be legitimate. The largest segment, 50 percent, chooses the middle two responses, indicating a tempered acceptance of the democratic state's legitimacy compatible with the spirited defense of workers' interests (see Table 5.6). A relatively small group, 14.2 percent of the total sample, chooses one of the first two responses, reflecting a respect for authority possibly great enough to interfere with the determined defense of the interests of workers. On the other hand, a fairly sizeable minority, 29 percent, apparently rejects the legitimacy of the state, choosing one of the last two alternatives. Among these unionists the larger group, 21 percent, prefers the "workers' state" response, and just 7.1 percent choose the semianarchosyndicalist option. Relatively few respondents, just 6.8 percent, were unable to choose among these closed-ended responses, insisted on combining alternatives, offered another answer, or refused to respond. Most workplace leaders, then, accept the principle of the legitimacy of the democratic state to one degree or another. This holds for all the unions and both the provinces, although the minority rejecting the state's legitimacy is larger in Barcelona than in Madrid and more sizeable among the Comisiones leaders and those of the small unions

(N)

Other response; no answer

Re;ection of legitimacy of the state: The state may have the right, but only the workers are of interest The state should not arrest workers

"Normal" reluctant acceptance of legitimacy of arrest of unionists: In theory it is reasonable, but ... Only if the infraction is especially severe ...

9.8

7.1 (82)

12.2

27.7 (141)

4.9

46.3 14.6

9.2

37.6 9.2

4.9 7.3

4.3 5.0

UGT

As long as it is a democracy, yes ...

ccoo

Legalistic responses The state has the right and duty to do so ...

Opinion

(31)

6.5

29.0

9.7

25.8 12.9

3.2

12.9

Other unions

By union

(70)

2.9

18.6

4.3

37.1 11.4

18.6

7.1

Independents

(154)

2.9

24.7

5.8

44.2 9.1

9.7

2.6

Barcelona

(170)

9.4

19.4

8.2

13.5

33.5

7.1

8.8

Madrid

By province

(324)

6.8

21.9

7.1

11.4

38.6

8.3

5.9

Entire sample

Table 5.6. Acceptance of the legitimacy of the democratic state: the leaders' views on the state's right to arrest and try labor activists for illegal actions

160

Working-Class Organization

grouped together as Other Unions than among the UGT or the Independent respondents. Thus, labor activists disappointed with the reforma pactada, with strong criticisms of the economic system, and with only a partially positive evaluation of the political system's justice may still accept the legitimacy of the democratic state, its right to enforce a universally binding legal order. This belief in the subordination, in principle, of the action of groups and individuals in civil society to (predictable and legal) regulation by the representatives of the political system as a whole helps explain the apparent restraint of labor during the transition period. Despite the desire of labor activists to do away with the capitalist system and their lack of great enthusiasm for the current democratic regime, most still believe that their mobilizations and activity fit within a larger structure of legitimate 'domination' by the democratically chosen political authorities and thus do not represent the only source for the justification of collective action. These beliefs in the legitimacy of the political order sharply constrain the possibilities for any revolutionary style mobilization by labor designed to eradicate the existing political system or directly confront its authority. Their impact on the formulation of labor demands and the conduct of normal mobilizations is less clear. However, even with regard to 'normal' labor movement activity, a widely shared belief in the state's legitimacy ought to make more likely the synchronization of demands with the perceived requirements of the transition and consolidation processes. Nevertheless, this belief in the legitimacy of the democratic state is not likely to be the only factor explaining the apparent restraint of labor. The minority that rejects this belief is fairly sizeable, especially in certain contexts, and obviously if conditions were favorable it might not exercise such restraint. We will focus on the impact of this and other factors on the mobilization or demobilization of labor in Chapter 7. However, we must not delay in introducing the other major political factor encouraging restraint: political parties with their great presence inside the Spanish labor movement. Political parties obviously played a more central role than the unions in the transition to democracy and the consolidation of the new regime, although their direct capacity to mobilize civil society is more limited than that of the union movement. The political parties were not only key participants in the processes of transition and consolidation, but also had an enormous stake in the survival of the new system which allowed them to pursue their political projects

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freely and which elevated numerous party loyalists to positions in parliament from their former location as provincial lawyers, professors, clandestine operatives, or even jailed activists. For this reason, some observers may be tempted to interpret any labor restraint as a sign of union subordination to political parties. In a moment we will examine the close relationship between political parties and the union movement, but first we must address the possibility that the belief of the workplace leaders in the legitimacy of the democratic state is simply an indication of their adherence to party discipline rather than an attitudinal factor independent of the parties' influence on this matter. If key political beliefs affirming the legitimacy of the state were simply an indication of the acceptance of party discipline by the plantlevel leaders, then we should expect them to be associated with unquestioning loyalty to the party leadership. The survey included a question measuring the respondents' judgment of the main party leaders' performance. The predominant political party in the labor movement during the transition years was the PCE, and its leader during this period, Santiago Carrillo, combined a strongly Eurocommunist public position in favor of democracy with a stern disciplinary hand in internal party politics. What, then, is the relationship between the workplace leaders' evaluation of Carrillo's performance as a political leader and their position on the legitimacy of the state? Again, if these two items are strongly correlated with one another, if it is the unquestioning loyalists of Carrillo who most accept the legitimacy of the state, then we would have to conclude that the parties (or even more precisely the PCE) are the key institution accounting for the loyalty of the labor movement to democracy. However, the unquestioning loyalists of Carrillo, those who indicated total approval for his performance, are the most likely to reject the legitimacy of the state. Nearly half of these party-line Communists, 41.3 percent, rejected the legitimacy of the state as opposed to 29 percent for the sample as a whole (see Table 5.7). On the other hand, they were also among those most likely to give the overly legalistic responses. Only a little over a quarter of these well-disciplined Communists, 27.6 percent, chose the intermediate 'normal' responses to the legitimacy question. This group of unconditional Carrillo loyalists is, however, a relatively small group, only 9.0 percent of the total sample. A much more sizeable segment of the workplace leaders, 34 percent of the sample, is made up of those who offer qualified approval to Carrillo's performance, choosing the response, "In general he has

16.4

31.0 10.3 (29)

Other response; no answer; no opinion

(N)

(110)

7.3

0.9

10.3

17.3

47.3

5.5 5.5

In general, has acted fairly well

Rejection of legitimacy of the state: The state may have the right, but only the workers are of interest The state should not arrest workers

6.9

20.7

"Normal" reluctant acceptance of legitimacy of arrest of unionists: In theory it is reasonable, but ...

Only if the infraction is especially severe ...

3.4 17.2

Total approval

Legalistic responses: The state has the right and duty to do so ... As long as it is a democracy, yes ...

Views on arrests of labor activists who have acted illegally

(67)

9.0

20.9

9.0

10.4

43.3

3.0 4.5

Mediocre but without major errors

(63)

4.8

27.0

11.1

7.9

38.1

4.8 6.3

Many avoidable errors

View of Carrillo

(48)

2.1

25.0

12.5

8.3

22.9

14.6 14.6

Total disapproval

Table 5.7. Leaders' acceptance of legitimacy of democratic state (controlling for their evaluation of Carrillo's political performance)

(7)

14.3 (1)

14.3 (1)

42.9 (3)

28.6 (2)

No answer

Labor and Political Transition

163

acted fairly well." Many of these unionists are members or supporters of the PCE who maintain their independent criteria for judging political matters rather than always accepting the party's position. It is these conditional or independent-minded supporters of Carrillo who most consistently believe in the legitimacy of the state. Nearly two thirds of this segment of the leaders, 64.6 percent, choose one of the intermediate or 'normal' responses to the legitimacy question, more than twice the figure for the unconditional Carrillo loyalists. Furthermore, only 17.3 percent of these independent-minded Carrillo supporters choose one of the last two responses rejecting the legitimacy of the state. Clearly, then, party discipline in the strict sense is not responsible for the fairly broad acceptance of the legitimacy of the political order on the part of the plant-level leaders. In fact, these findings suggest that the legitimacy of the democratic state and the disciplinary muscle of the parties could be independent but complementary factors encouraging different segments of the workplace leadership to accept a policy of restraint. With the independent role of political beliefs established, let us now turn to the crucial organizational question of the relationship between political parties and the union movement. Political Parties and the Union Movement The more or less close links between unions and political parties throughout the world form the subject for lengthy descriptive and analytic treatments by political and social scientists. 18 Even in the United States, absent a major working-class party of one or another ideological tendency, the union movement is deeply involved in politics, acting as a key force inside the Democratic party. 19 In fact, the very term labor movement is frequently used to refer to the complex of unions and associated parties of the working class, in distinction 18. Among the numerous discussions of union/party relations, see Rainer Deppe, Richard Herding, and Dietrich Hoss, "The Relationship between Trade Union Action and Political Parties," in The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968, ed. Colin Crouch and Alessandro Pizzorno, 2 vols. (New York, 1978); George Ross, "Party and Mass Organization: The Changing Relationship of the PCF and CGT," in Communism in Italy and France, ed. Donald L. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow (Princeton, N.J., 1975); Peter Weitz, "The CGIL and the PCI: From Subordination to Independent Political Force," in Communism, ed. Blackmer and Tarrow; Daniel Horowitz, The Italian Labor Movement (Cambridge, Mass., 1963). 19. On the American labor movement and political parties, see J. David Greenstone, Labor in American Politics (Chicago, 1969).

164

Working-Class Organization

to the term union movement which always refers exclusively to union organizations and their followers. The ways in which parties and unions influence one another differ considerably from country to country and union to union. The Spanish pattern of union/party relations fits clearly within the type formulated by Valenzuela as "contestatory," with ideological divisions and a large Communist presence inside the labor movement. 20 However, in certain key respects Spain differs markedly from the other principal cases-France, Italy (with some qualifications due to the unification efforts of the unions there), Portugal, and precoup Chile-that make up this type. In Spain the close ties between one labor confederation, CCOO, and the Communist party are mirrored by the equally strong, if not stronger links between another confederation, UGT, and the Socialist party. Among the other "contestatory" cases, only in Portugal are Socialist labor militants concentrated in one union confederation in competition with the largely Communist confederation, and in the smaller Iberian country the Socialists coexist with activists from another party, the Social Democratic PSD, in a weak confederation. However, in Spain the Socialists are the clearly dominant (and virtually uncontested) force in a confederation roughly equal in strength to the largely Communist labor organization. Thus, union/party relations are an element of immense significance for contemporary political developments in Spain, crucially linked to the emergence of the party system and the pattern of competition between the Socialist and Communist parties for the votes of workers and other potential leftist voters. 21 However, for our own agenda the two most important facets of the union/party relations are the extent to which the parties may have shaped the unions' interpretations of the political requirements (for mobilization and/or restraint) of the period and the impact of the parties on the organizational reemergence of the unions. The close links between the two large confederations, UGT and CCOO, and the two principal (if very unequal in electoral support) parties of the Spanish left, the PSOE and the PCE, are clearly manifested in the overlapping composition of the top leadership positions in the unions and the associated parties as well as in the party statutes. 20. Valenzuela's work provides conceptual and typological order to the examination of union/party relations. A recent publication in which he sets out his typology is J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Movimientos obreros." 21. On the relationship of the unions to the emerging party system, see Maravall, La politica de Ia transici6n, and Fishman, "Labor Movement."

Labor and Political Transition

165

The secretaries general of the two labor confederations for the transition years, Marcelino Camacho and Nicolas Redondo, were elected deputies to parliament in 1977 and again in 1979 representing the PCE and the PSOE, respectively; however, during the second legislature, Camacho would resign from parliament, citing the need to devote more time to union affairs but perhaps also reflecting his desire to protect the union from the serious internal party divisions emerging over the performance of Carrillo as leader. The executive committees of both confederations have been overwhelmingly (but not exclusively) composed of members of the associated parties. The official statutes of the PSOE actually require party members to join UGT, a sister organization established by the same founding nucleus as the party. The official PCE position only recommends that party militants carry out their union work inside CCOO, and a few older party members have actually preferred to remain in UGT, the historic (preFranco) union of the Marxist left. In the Socialist and Communist cases alike, both union and party insist that, despite their close relations and shared goals, each organization is autonomous of the other, free to elaborate its own strategy and to differ when necessary. Thus, UGT leader Redondo has insisted repeatedly on the freedom of UGT to disagree with the PSOE and has on occasion publicly criticized party actions. 22 CCOO ideologists and leaders not only affirm their independence from the PCE but also have elaborated careful arguments about the need to move beyond the traditional forms of party/union relations in order to assure the autonomy of their movement, its 'unitary' or inclusive character, and its freedom to act in areas the parties had previously reserved for themselves. 23 This insistence on the 'unitary' character of Comisiones is manifested in the policy of making room for non-Communists inside the organization. Thus, even at the level of the national executive committee (and at times the secretariat, as well), some supporters of 22. For Redondo's address to the 1978 lJGT Congress, in which he insisted on the freedom of UGT to differ with PSOE if it so wished, see UGT, Boletin de Ia Union General de Trabajadores, no. 399 (June 1978). In the PSOE Congress of October 1981 Redondo not only underlined the freedom of UGT to dissent even from a Socialist government, but he also criticized the PSOE for not rewarding the union work of party militants active in the labor movement. 23. The most influential Comisiones theorist of the independence of the union movement from parties is Nicolas Sartorius (also a leading member of the PCE) whose many contributions can be found in E/ sindicalismo de nuevo tipo. For the thoughts on party/union relations and the autonomy of the labor movement of an especially thoughtful CCOO leader who briefly served as secretary for Union Affairs of the PSUC in 1982 before resigning the post, see Jaime Aznar, "Las relaciones partido/sindicato," Zona Abierta, no. 17 (1978).

166

Working-Class Organization

other parties have been present, without, however, ever approaching the point where they might pose a real challenge to the dominance of PCE members and supporters. 24 The internal divisions and conflicts in both confederations have been more serious and persistent than suggested by the image of the partydominated union. As for the parties, both the PSOE and the PCE experienced serious internal conflicts during the transition years, and in the case of the Communist party these divisions had developed into a major crisis for the party by 1981. Particularly in the Communist case, questions of union strategy were not absent from the conflict within the party, but broad ideological choices, international questions, the issue dealing with Spain's regional nationalities, and tensions between organizationally or historically distinct wings of the party were more important. Dissension within the parties has quickly found expression in internal union disagreements, and the most persistently troublesome conflicts in both confederations have concerned differences among members of the dominant party rather than between them and union members of contrasting political loyalties. Thus, in 1980 the Madrid provincial leadership of the PCE attempted unsuccessfully to oust Fidel Alonso, a (moderately) hard-line pro-Soviet Communist, from the general secretariat of the provincial Madrid organization in CCOO. On that occasion Camacho, sensing the need to maintain the participation within the union of a politically heterogeneous group of labor activists, refused to lend his weight to the party leadership effort to oust a hardline dissident. Several months later, in early 1981, the national executive committee of UGT suspended the Madrid provincial leadership of their confederation because it had jointly sponsored with CCOO a poorly attended demonstration that the national Socialist leadership saw as a threat to the UGT policy of that moment, consisting of negotiating contracts with the employers without first formulating a common position with CCOO. Thus, both Socialist and Communist confederations have faced serious internal problems within their Madrid provincial organizations. Nowhere has the crisis of the PCE been more severe than in Catalonia, where the rebellion against Eurocommunism inside the PSUC (the more or less independent Catalan affiliate of the PCE) would 24. Five individuals among the forty-two elected to the executive committee of the confederation at the June 1978 CCOO Congress did not belong to the PCE or the PSUC. Two of these five were independents, two were members of the Movimiento Comunista de Espaiia (MCE, a semi-Maoist group), and one was a member of the Trotskyist Liga Comunista Revolucionaria (LCR).

Labor and Political Transition

167

produce a hard-line majority at the famous V Congress of January 1981. The deepening divisions inside the PSUC between pro-Soviets, "Leninists" (left-Eurocommunists would be a more accurate term for this tendency which was critical of the Soviet Union), and various shades of Eurocommunism, led eventually to the founding in early 1982 of a pro-Soviet splinter party, the Partit dels Comunistes Catalans (PCC). The PCC has been strong among labor activists in the ranks of CCOO; the leader of CCOO in the city of Barcelona, Alfredo Clemente, has played a prominent role in the emergence of the PCC and in the development of a left-wing opposition inside CCOO, where he headed an insurgent slate of candidates for the executive committee during the II Confederal Congress in Barcelona in June 1981. Clemente's hard-line slate of candidates received 25 percent of the votes, much to the surprise of Sartorius and other "officialist" union leaders, and won an equivalent number of seats on the executive body thanks to the union's proportional representation system. With the spread of the pro-Soviet schism to the rest of Spain in 1983 and the conflict between followers of Carrillo and Gerardo Iglesias, the new secretary general, the divisions within the Spanish Communist movement grew dramatically. Thus, by 1983 it was clear that despite the continuing predominance of Communists (of one stripe or another) within CCOO, no political organization could easily dominate the labor confederation. Instead, competing political tendencies would have to make an effort to maintain cooperation on union matters despite their political differences. The appearance of close ties between unions and parties, then, in no sense signifies the subordination of unions to the dominant tendency in the parties. However, the presence of party activists in leadership positions in the unions does indeed allow the parties to play a role in the formulation of union policies and strategy. In this way, political considerations dearly enter into the establishment of official union positions. Thus, in spring 1980 Santiago Carrillo could call a meeting of Communist labor militants to discuss the difficulties being encountered by CCOO and to attempt to reorient their union activity (in a more moderate direction). 25 One major difference between the Socialist and Communist camps deserves brief parenthetical treatment. The Communist activists in CCOO not only constitute a potential vehicle for party 'domination' 25. Large excerpts from the discussion among the participants in this meeting of Communist labor activists were published by the PCE propaganda secretariat.

168

Working-Class Organization

of the union but also form an identifiable and enormously important group inside the PCE in internal party affairs. It would be impossible to imagine a PCE congress without the participation of numerous well-known Comisiones leaders along with many less well-known plant-level union activists. But Socialist labor activists have played a much less central role in the PSOE, and even prominent members of the UGT executive committee normally attend party congresses only as invited guests (rather than voting delegates) unless they are deputies in parliament, as in the case of Redondo himself and Manuel Chaves. Thus, labor activists as individuals (or a collectivity), if not the union as an institution, appear to have a much greater influence in party affairs in the Communist camp than among the Socialists. This phenomenon may provide the impression to many that party/union ties are closer for the Communists than the Socialists, but in no sense does it signify that party control over the union is greater among the Communists than the Socialists. In fact, the Socialist party's reluctance to recognize the contribution of its activists inside the union movement led UGT leader Nicolas Redondo to complain, during his public address at the PSOE Congress of October 1981, that the Socialist union activists were being slighted. Party/union ties at the central organizational level, then, are very important, but at second glance they are less clear cut than they first appear. At this level the parties are able to influence (but not control) the formulation of official union policy and strategy. Also at this level, the unions can call on the parties for support in their own organizational efforts, and this avenue of assistance has been especially significant for UGT, given the strength of the PSOE (at least electorally) and the weakness of UGT at the end of the Franco period. However, ft..r the parties to encourage directly a policy of coordinated mobilization or restraint they must be present, themselves, at the plant level. Otherwise, they would have to rely on the (inadequate) capacity of the nationwide leadership of the unions to control the actions of labor throughout the economy. What, then, is the position of the parties in the unions at the plant level, and how do workplace unionists respond to the ties between the union movement and political parties? Political Parties and the Workplace Leaders A large minority of the workplace leaders of both major confederations were actual party members at the time of the survey (see

Labor and Political Transition

169

Table 5.8). Among the CCOO leaders 38.3 percent were PCE members, and among the UGT leaders nearly as many, 33.3 percent, belonged to the PSOE. Of course, since more respondents were in CCOO than in UGT, this translates into a considerably greater presence for the Communist party than for the Socialists. A small but still significant minority of the CCOO leaders, 5. 7 percent, belonged to far-left parties. As a rule, these far-leftists (mostly Maoists or Trotskyists) represent a consistent source of opposition to any plans of the unions' confederal leadership for restraint. If we add members of all parties together, we find a greater presence of political parties in CCOO (44 percent of the leaders) than in UGT (34.5 percent). Following this observation, political considerations, such as the best strategy for contributing to the regime transition, might seem somewhat more likely to make their appearance in the conduct of union affairs within CCOO than in UGT. However, given the serious internal division in the PCE and the presence of a number of far-leftists in the union, this in no sense means that Comisiones activity at the workplace level is subordinated to the official policy of the Communist party. If we shift our focus from actual party members to party sympathizers, we perceive the position of the Socialist party in UGT to be much more dominant than that of the Communist party in Comisiones. Over half of the UGT leaders, 54.3 percent, consider themselves sympathetic to the PSOE, while just 28.4 percent of CCOO leaders sympathize with the PCE. By adding together members and sympathizers we can see that pro-Socialists are overwhelmingly dominant (87.6 percent) among UGT leaders; in contrast, the pro-Communists are somewhat less dominant (66.7 percent) among CCOO leaders. Furthermore, even among the workplace leaders, 5. 7 percent of CCOO sympathize with the Socialist party; only an insignificant 1.2 percent of the UGT respondents consider themselves sympathetic to the PCE. These findings reflect the greater strength of the Communist party as an organization and its considerable presence within the working class and the workplace, at least for the transition years prior to the onset of a severe internal crisis. The findings also suggest the sizeable diffuse appeal of the PSOE, a party that has enjoyed considerably broader (and less deep) support than the PCE. This broad support for the PSOE has clearly been crucial for the reemergence of the UGT as a major force, just as the organizational strength of the PCE and the extensive presence of CCOO are related phenomena. CCOO, then, is likely to be a battleground between strong supporters of (politically motivated) mobilization and restraint. At the workplace

(141)

28.4 5.7 3.5 0.7 5.0

Party sympathizers PCE PSOE Far left Other Left in general; combination of leftist parties

(N)

38.3 5.7 -

Party members: PCE PSOE Far left Other

ccoo

(81)

-

1.2 54.3 2.5 2.5

1.2

-

-

33.3

UGT

(31)

-

3.2 19.4 9.7 22.6

6.5 3.2

-

Other unions

By union

Table 5.8. Party membership and sympathy among the workplace leaders

-

(70)

12.9 1.4

4.3 41.4

2.9

-

Independents

(154)

12.3 24.7 1.3 9.1 3.2

18.2 8.4 3.2 2.6

Barcelona

(170)

15.4 29.0 4.7 3.0 1.8

-

15.4 8.3 3.0

Madrid

By province

(324)

13.9 26.9 3.1 5.9 2.5

16.7 8.4 3.1 1.2

Entire sample

Labor and Political Transition

171

Table 5.9. Party membership of the (interviewed) leaders (by size of firm) Party

Smaller

Medium

Large

PCE

13.6

18.6

18.1

PSOE

1.8

9.3

16.7

Far left

2.7

1.4

6.9

Others

0.9

2.1

(N)

(110)

(140)

(72)

Note: Unlike Table 2.1, which provides information on the presence of all unions in the firm, this item only reports on the party membership of the respondent.

level UGT is somewhat less likely to see its activity as crucially related to the political projects of the working class, whether such projects be radical mobilizations or strategic restraint. The distribution of the party affiliation of the leaders by size of firm further distinguishes the type of presence of the two parties in the labor movement (see Table 5.9). The probability that the interviewed workplace leaders will belong to the PSOE increases dramatically with firm size. Almost no leaders in the smaller firms (just 1.8 percent) belong to the PSOE; in the medium-sized firms the figure increases to 9.3 percent, still just half the level attained by the PCE in that size category; in the large firms of more than a thousand workers, 16.7 percent of the leaders belong to the PSOE, nearly as high a figure as that attained by the PCE. In contrast, the success of the Communists in gaining the affiliation of the workplace leaders remains fairly constant for the three firm sizes. These differences are only partially explained by the greater strength of UGT in large firms where more of the respondents belong to the Socialist labor confederation. Above all, these findings reflect the great organizational weakness of Spanish Socialism within the working class. Only in the large firms, with their enormous concentration of workers and technicians, does the PSOE have much chance of achieving an organizational presence. In the smaller firms, if UGT is to exist at all it is forced to rely on sympathizers of the PSOE rather than party members for leadership positions, and the resulting workplace organization is likely to remain at the periphery of the major projects of the labor movement. The far left, as well, is considerably stronger in the large firms. Thus, the PCE stood, despite all its internal problems and its weak electoral support, as the only political organization with a fairly extensive presence throughout the working class during the transition years.

172

Working-Class Organization

Before proceeding we must qualify our interpretation of these data on the party affiliation of the leaders. Unlike Table 2.1, which reported the presence or absence of all unions in the firms of the respondents, in this case our data refer exclusively to the party membership or sympathies of the respondent him-or herself. Since the survey design involved only one respondent per firm, many party members were undoubtedly missed, even in the firms where interviews took place. For instance, if the respondent is the chairman of the works committee in a large factory and (s) he is a Socialist party sympathizer while several other committee delegates are actually party members, their membership would totally escape our attention. Likewise, if the respondent is a PCE member, this still tells us nothing about whether the UGT leaders, if they exist at all in that particular firm, belong to the PSOE. Thus, the overall presence of the parties in the workplaces is undoubtedly somewhat greater than the impression created by Table 5.9. Nevertheless, the differences by size of firm and the differing patterns of the two confederations are real, even if the absolute level of party penetration of the workplace is greater than these data might suggest.

Workplace Leaders' Impressions of Party/Union Relations Regardless of the personal involvement in a political party of the sampled workplace leaders, they can be expected to perceive the activity of political parties in their firm insofar as it affects union affairs. Furthermore, their reaction to the presence of parties within the union movement is more than an indicator of their own subjective preferences and dislikes; if the workplace leaders are hostile to the activity of the parties inside the unions (whether at the plant level or higher up inside the confederal structures), such hostility is likely to limit the parties' ability to mold union behavior inside the firm. We tested the leaders' perceptions and preferences regarding party/ union relations by asking them to choose the most accurate among a series of sentences characterizing those relations. First, we asked them to assess those relations for the union movement as a whole. Then we asked them to respond with reference to each specific union, and finally we asked them to indicate their preference for the ideal state of union/party relations. The alternatives we offered to the respondents were the following straightforward phrases:

Labor and Political Transition

173

• Control by the parties over the unions; • Influence by the parties over the unions without reaching total control; • Mutual influence between parties and union but with autonomy for each of them; • No relation between parties and unions; • Influence by the unions over the parties without reaching total control; • Control by the unions over the parties.

By first asking the respondents to assess the situation for the union movement as a whole, we made it easier for them to subsequently speak critically about their own union, and we were able to offer a wording for the responses that avoided the sensitive issue of explicitly stating which party might be in control of the union in question. Just over one quarter of the respondents, 26.2 percent affirmed that the union movement as a whole is controlled by political parties, and many of the remaining leaders, 44.4 percent stated that the parties influence the unions (see Table 5.1 0). Only about one-fifth of the leaders, 20.1 percent, believed that parties and unions are fully autonomous of one another, each influencing the other without controlling it. Not surprisingly, the Independents and those leaders belonging to the small labor organizations grouped together as Other Unions were the most likely to believe that the union movement is controlled by political parties, and, in the case of Other Unions, this critical view actually represented a large majority of the respondents, 71 percent. It is striking that the Independents are somewhat less critical of the labor movement as a whole on this score than are the members of Other Unions. This underlines the identification of many Independents, although certainly not all, with the union movement despite their preference not to join any labor organization. Perhaps most noteworthy is the finding that the largest segment of both major confederations (almost the same percentage in both cases: 49.6 percent in CCOO and 50 percent in UGT) shares the view that the political parties influence the unions. Thus, there is some consensus among the workplace leaders to the effect that, to one degree or another, the parties help establish the course of labor union action. The image the leaders hold of CCOO, if we focus on the aggregate figures for the sample as a whole, is quite similar to their impressions of the union movement in general; in this case, however, the percentage believing that the union is actually controlled rather than simply influenced by political parties rises somewhat (see Table 5 .11). But once grouped by their union affiliation, the (relative) consensus

(141)

5.7 (82)

3.7

1.2

17.1 50.0 22.0 1.2 4.9

14.2 49.6 27.0 2.1 1.4

-

UGT

ccoo

(31)

(70)

1.4 5.7

-

-

-

41.4 37.1 11.4 2.9

Independents

71.0 22.6 3.2 3.2

Other unions

By union

(N)

Control of the parties Influence by the parties Mutual influence with autonomy for each No relation between parties and unions Influence by the unions Control by the unions No answer

View of relationship

(141)

3.7

(82)

-

4.3

-

1.2

45.1 42.7 4.9 2.4

UGT

7.8 42.6 39.7 5.0 0.7

ccoo

Table 5.11. Image of union/party relations in CCOO

(31)

-

77.4 12.9 9.7

Other unions

By union

(70)

5.7

2.9

-

57.1 2L9 10.0 1.4

Independents

*For the full wording of the phrases offered to the respondents as alternatives, seep. 173.

(N)

Control by the parties • Influence by the parties Mutual influence with autonomy for each No relation between parties and unions Influence by the unions Control by the unions No answer

View of relationship

Table 5.10. Image of union/party relations in the union movement as a whole

3.2

(154)

40.9 31.8 19.5 3.2 0.6 0.6 3.2

Barcelona

1.2

(170)

5.9

22.4 42.4 22.4 2.9 2.9

(170)

28.8 38.8 23.5 2.9 0.6 0.6 4.7

Madrid

By province

(154)

-

30.5 46.8 17.5 1.3 0.6

By province Madrid

Barcelona

(324)

34.6 35.5 21.6 3.1 0.6 0.6 4.0

Entire sample

(324)

26.2 44.4 20.1 1.9 1.9 0.6 4.6

Entire sample

Labor and Political Transition

175

of the respondents, which appeared earlier disappears entirely. The leaders belonging to Other Unions and the Independents are not markedly more inclined to accuse CCOO of being under the control of political parties than they were with respect to the union movement as a whole. However, the UGT leaders are overwhelmingly inclined to regard the rival confederation as heavily influenced by political parties. The largest segment, 45.1 percent, actually sees CCOO as controlled by parties, and most remaining UGT respondents, 42.7 percent, prefer to believe that Comisiones is influenced but not controlled by political parties. The CCOO leaders, not surprisingly, are the most likely to accept the official position of their own confederation that it is fully autonomous of political parties. Yet only a minority of the Comisiones respondents, 39.7 percent, holds this view, and slightly more, 42.6 percent, believe that political parties do influence their union. A small minority, 7.8 percent, actually believes that their confederation is under the control of political parties. Thus, CCOO leaders are the least critical of their own confederation, but many share the impression that political parties exert a major influence over the direction of their union. The Barcelona leaders were considerably more likely than their counterparts in Madrid to view CCOO as under the control of the parties, with 40.9 percent and 28.8 percent, respectively, choosing this response. It is by no means clear that this difference in the image held by the respondents in the two provinces reflects a real disparity in the pattern of union/party relations in these two regional contexts. The decision of the Madrid provincial CCOO to resist the attempt of the PCE leadership to oust Fidel Alonso as secretary general might seem to justify the differing perceptions held in the two provinces, but in reality the underlying pattern is quite similar in both cases: Communists are the predominant presence in Comisiones, but they are divided internally and certainly incapable of enforcing one undisputed line on the union. Rather, the critical image of CCOO in Barcelona is an indication of the frequently bitter relations between the confederations there and the sectarian attitudes they hold of one another. Additionally, this image of CCOO in Barcelona may be a result of the public airing of internal political disputes in the Catalan Comisiones where sharply different political tendencies are in frequent conflict with one another. Such internal conflicts do, in fact, lend an overtly political note to much internal union discussion, but they clearly do not constitute control of the confederation by one tendency or another. The presence of several distinct tendencies makes it dif-

176

Working-Class Organization

ficult for any one of them to be in a stable position of control even if it wished to make the attempt. Thus, the impression of political 'control' of union affairs may, at times, be more an indication of the political character of internal union affairs and disputes than a reflection of actual control. The image of UGT held by the sample as a whole is quite similar to its impression of CCOO (see Table 5.12). As one should expect, the union affiliation of the respondents strongly influences their perception of the role of political parties inside UGT. UGT leaders were the most inclined to see their union as autonomous of political parties, although again, as in the case of CCOO, only a minority, 40.2 percent, held this official union view. The largest segment, 45.1 percent, believed their union to be influenced but not controlled by political parties. In fact, the two leading confederations hold almost identical self-images. However, CCOO leaders are somewhat more generous in their appraisal of UGT than vice versa. Among the Comisiones respondents, 16.3 percent were willing to state that UGT is autonomous of political parties; only 4.9 percent of UGT leaders held the same view of CCOO. It is not possible to interpret definitively this difference, but the explanation may lie largely in the greater concern of many Comisiones activists with the labor movement as a whole, rather than exclusively with their own union, reflecting the 'unitary' ideology and origin of their movement. Leaders' Ideal of Union/Party Relations When we shift our attention to the workplace leaders' ideal preference for the state of union/party relations, it becomes clear that their responses to the previous questions did, in fact, represent their perception of reality rather than an ideological acceptance of party dominance over labor (see Table 5.13). A strong majority of the leaders, 56.8 percent, would prefer there to be "mutual influence between parties and unions but with autonomy for each of them." Furthermore, this view is especially common among CCOO and UGT respondents (60.3 percent and 64.6 percent, respectively), groups inclined to see their own unions as influenced by political parties. In marked contrast to the ideology of the labor movement and the reality of union/party relations, a significant minority in both major confederations (21.3 percent in CCOO and 15.9 percent in UGT) would actually prefer for there to be no relations between unions and parties.

(N)

Control by the parties Influence by the parties Mutual influence with autonomy for each No relation between parties and unions Influence by the unions Control bv the unions No answe.r

View of relationship

-

(31)

(82)

7.8 (141)

77.4 22.6

Other unions

By union 9.8 45.1 40.2 3.7 1.2

UGT

34.8 39.7 16.3 0.7 0.7

ccoo

Table 5.12. Image of union/party relations in UGT

(70)

5.7

-

1.4

48.6 34.3 10.0

Independents

(154)

4.5

38.3 38.3 17.5 0.6 0.6

(170)

4.7

32.9 38.2 21.2 2.4 0.6

Madrid

By province Barcelona

(324)

4.6

35.5 38.3 19.4 1.5 0.6

Entire sample

178

Working-Class Organization

And finally, a smaller minority of the leaders, especially numerous in UGT, would like to see the unions exercising influence or control over the parties. Almost no respondent favored party influence or control over the union movement, although this is (for a majority) their image of the current situation. It is worth noting the striking similarity of the two provinces and the two leading confederations in their response to this question. The preference for real autonomy from parties, if not the absence of any relations with them, is broadly shared throughout the labor movement. Political Parties and the Union Role in the Regime Transition In light of this evidence, how should we interpret the capacity of the parties to shape the contribution of the unions to the political transition and to guide their organizational development? Clearly, the presence of many party activists inside the union movement, from the top of the confederations down to the workplace level, provides these political organizations with some influence over the conduct of labor affairs. Nevertheless, this influence is quite insufficient to account, by itself, for the restraint practiced by the unions or for their (limited) successes in expanding their presence. Most workplace leaders are not official party members subject to party discipline, and even among those who are there is no consensus on political matters or on the option of mobilization or restraint; the most politically involved minority is itself strongly divided on these questions. Furthermore, most plant-level leaders would prefer the unions to be fully autonomous of political parties in spite of (or perhaps because of) the evidence they see of party influence over labor organizations. Thus, any attempt of a party to impose a politically inspired strategy on one of the confederations could easily encounter great resistance. The sheer organizational muscle of the parties cannot be counted on, by itself, to lead one or another course of action to prevail inside the labor movement. Still, it is not enough to say that the parties exerted influence but not control. We can distinguish between the significance of the two parties in their impact on the union movement. The strong commitment of the PCE-a party with reasonably strong internal discipline at least until 1980-to a policy of political, social, and economic moderation for the transition years contributed a great deal to the elements of restraint in the activity of CCOO. After all, Comisiones

(N)

Control by the parties Influence by the parties Mutual influence with autonomy for each No relation between parties and unions Influence by the unions Control by the unions No answer

Preferred relation

(141)

2.8 5.7 60.3 21.3 6.4 2.8

ccoo

Table 5.13. Views of ideal state of union/party relations

45.7 45.7 2.9

(70)

45.2 48.4 6.5

-

(31)

(82)

-

-

-

3.7 64.3 15.9 9.8 6.1

Independents

Other unions

By union UGT

(154)

3.2 57.8 27.3 8.4 2.6

-

(170)

28.2 4.7 2.9

3.5 55.9

2.4

Madrid

By province Barcelona

(324)

2.8

6.5

1.2 3.4 56.8 27.8

Entire sample

180

Working-Class Organization

contained a highly radicalized minority and included many activists with a history of involvement in the almost melodramatic struggle against Francoism. The willingness of this labor organization (with significant internal opposition) to adhere to a policy of wage restraint beginning with the Pactos de Ia Moncloa signed in fall 1977 by the political parties clearly owes much to the role of PCE members in its ranks and, above all, in leadership positions. The capacity of the PSOE to influence the union movement directly through its members was somewhat more limited, but the PSOE's need to do so was also lesser because UGT was by inclination somewhat more moderate than CCOO and in any case was incapable of launching, by itself, a campaign of mobilizations broad enough to make a major political impact. However, the broad and weak support enjoyed by the PSOE clearly helped UGT to compete with CCOO; the political sympathy for the PSOE served, for the Socialist labor confederation, as something of a counterweight to the organizational strength of the PCE and CCOO itself. Weberian social science (along with the neo-Marxist formulations that attempt to incorporate the insights of Weber within a Marxist theoretical framework) 26 teaches us that stable macropolitical developments or patterns of actions result from a multiplicity of causes, each contributing to the probability that events would take the course leading to the eventual outcome. Our interpretation of the parties' role in the labor movement during the transition reflects the basic validity of this approach. The parties did tend to push the unions in the direction of restraint and the synchronization of their demands and strategy with the perceived requirements of the transition and consolidation processes. However, if other factors-the beliefs of the workplace leaders and activists, the attitudes of the working class as a whole, the economic situation with its considerable impact on mobilizational strategies and possibilities, the orientation of the state and employers toward the union movement-had pushed toward a policy of determined labor confrontation during the transition years, the efforts of the parties would have failed. The predisposition of many workplace leaders to resist party control of union behavior represented a potential source of opposition to party initiatives; the parties alone would not have been able to carry the day for restraint had other factors heavily pushed labor toward confrontation. 26. Leading attempts to incorporate the multicausality of Weberian analysis within a Marxist theoretical framework include Nicos l'oulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, and the essay on overdetermination in Louis Althusser, For Marx (London, 1977).

Labor and Political Transition

181

The Perceived Threat to Democracy Other factors as well must help account for labor's desire to contribute to consolidating the new regime despite the disappointment felt by many activists and leaders with the path taken by the political transition and their continuing strong opposition to the economic system. It has not been our intention to draw up an exhaustive inventory of possibly influential factors. Instead we have concentrated on two central considerations: the attitudes of the respondents toward the current political system and the impact of political parties on the labor movement. Additionally, we must introduce the specter of authoritarian rule: the recent experience of repression and the fear of a return to dictatorship. If the fear of a return to dictatorship has actually served to restrain the mobilization of the labor movement or at least acted to deepen the unions' commitment to the current democratic regime, then the leaders must perceive the threat to democracy to be real. We attempted to gauge their assessment of the danger to democracy by asking the respondents to rate that threat on a 1-to-1 0 scale, with 1 representing no danger of a return to dictatorship and 10 representing a maximum risk to democracy (see Table 5.14). The mean score for the group as a whole was 5. 72, indicating a considerable but not overwhelming concern about the possible demise of democracy. For a small minority of the leaders, the prospect of the return to dictatorship assumed the dimensions of a near certainty; 9.3 percent chose 9 or 10 as responses. For these leaders, even if for no others, the perceived danger of a successful coup against democracy must have exerted an impact on their strategic and tactical thinking. The concern over the dangers faced by democracy is somewhat unevenly distributed among the workplace leaders: in some contexts the fear of a return to dictatorship is much stronger than in others. Of the four union options we have distinguished for our analysis, CCOO is the most concerned about the risks faced by democracy, with a mean score of 6.12. Furthermore, 14.3 percent of the CCOO respondents chose 9 or 10. Significantly, this fear of a return to dictatorship occurs precisely in the union with the greatest mobilizational potential, with the most formidable capacity to oppose restraint if it so chose. This concern on the part of CCOO activists helps explain why the radical tendencies within Comisiones have not led the labor organization to attempt a consistent campaign of mobilizations aimed at pressuring the political authorities.

UGT

=

no risk of return to dictatorship, 10 = maximum risk)

6.40 16.00

(75)

5.82 12.30

(66)

Mean score Percentage choosing 9 or 10

(N)

(141)

6.12 14.30 (35)

5.63 2.90 (47)

5.96 8.60 (82)

5.82 6.10

-

(17)

5.00 14.20 (14)

5.41

(31)

5.23 6.40 (39)

5.31 7.70 (31)

4.71

(70)

5.04 4.30

(154)

5.57 9.10

(170)

5.86 9.40

(.124)

5.72 9.30

Total Independents Other unions Madrid Total Barcelona Total Madrid Barcelona Total Madrid Barcelona Total Madrid Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona

ccoo

Table 5.14. Perceptions of threat to democracy in mid-1981 (1

Labor and Political Transition

183

The Madrid leaders are somewhat more concerned than their Barcelona counterparts over the dangers faced by democracy. The difference between the two provinces is especially noteworthy within CCOO: for the Madrid Comisiones leaders the mean score is 6.40, whereas it is 5.82 for their counterparts in Barcelona. This disparity undoubtedly reflects the differences in the experiences encountered by labor activists in the two contexts. The level of repression during the Franco period, as we have pointed out, was higher in Madrid than in Barcelona. Under democracy the Madrid working class has lived in close proximity to a large and occasionally violent extremeright movement, a phenomenon largely absent from Catalonia. Additionally, the serious coup attempt of February 23-24, 1981 (several months prior to the beginning of the survey) was centered in Madrid and Valencia, providing the populace of those two cities with a much greater scare than that experienced by other Spaniards who saw only the events on television. 27 In fact, given the variation in the experiences of the labor leaders between our two research settings, it is perhaps surprising that the difference in their appraisal of the risk to democracy is not even greater. In any case, the willingness of (most) Madrid workplace leaders to accommodate themselves to the reforma pactada and to synchronize (at least to a degree) labor demands with its tempo is clearly linked to their perception that the current experiment in redemocratization is fragile.

Labor's Role in Consolidating Democracy: Participant or Guarantor? The role available to labor in the transition process and in the subsequent consolidation of the new regime was far less intoxicating than the one envisaged by many leaders of the opposition in the waning years of Francoism. Yet labor would adjust to this lowering of expectations, to the disappointment over the course taken by history, and would incorporate into its decisions over labor mobilizations and strategy a consideration of the political problems faced by the redemocratization process. A number of factors-principally the po27. Demonstrations were called for Friday, February 27, in all major Spanish cities in support of democracy. The participation in Madrid (in excess of one million, according to the press, but probably half that number) and in Valencia (several hundred thousand) was much larger, in proportion to the population of those cities, than for other locations in Spain where the coup attempt was less directly experienced.

184

Working-Class Organization

litical beliefs and concerns of the workplace leaders and activists as well as the presence inside the labor movement of parties strongly committed to redemocratization-account for the willingness of labor to accommodate itself to the reforma pactada and to reinforce the new regime even while maintaining strong criticisms of the economic system. Yet it is neither fair nor accurate to concentrate all our energies on the question of whether labor would represent an obstacle to consolidating the new democracy given its disappointed expectations. Labor clearly wanted to do more than simply avoid hindering the redemocratization process; additionally the labor movement hoped to participate actively in the process and to offer, as a last resort, the promise of determined resistance to any attempt to overthrow democracy by force. The major participants in redemocratization were, by necessity, the political parties, leaders, and institutions. However labors' willingness to negotiate matters of economic and political policy (including wage restraints) with employers, political parties, and the state demonstrated the ability of Spanish civil society to resolve peacefully its problems and differences within a democratic legal framework. This institutionalization of social conflict had been impossible to attain under authoritarianism, and now it was at least partially achieved under democracy. In this way labor was an essential participant in one important facet of the consolidation process. A number of leaders of labor and the left had affirmed that any serious coup attempt would meet the immediate response of a general strike. The crisis of February 23-24, 1981, provided labor and the democratic system in general with just such an immediate and grave threat. In the early evening hours, while the situation remained quite unclear and the danger that the coup might succeed seemed very real, CCOO and UGT jointly called for a nationwide general strike to begin the next morning. However, the national leadership of the two leading confederations within hours reversed itself, reflecting the prevailing judgment of the moment that any attempts at mobilization would only encourage the coup to spread by offering the military the specter of a semirevolutionary situation or rather the pretext of a pseudorevolutionary situation. Only in Catalonia did CCOO maintain the call for a general strike, and even there the strike took effect almost exclusively in the Baix Llobregat area of the industrial suburbs of Barcelona. 28 Thus, in the crunch of a great crisis moment, labor 28. On the actions of the Catalan labor movement in response to the coup attempt, see the weekly of the PSUC, Treba/1.

Labor and Political Transition

185

could not (or chose not to even attempt to) assume the role of guarantor of democracy. Labor's reluctance to assume this role suggests how difficult or unreasonable it would be to expect labor to singlehandedly save democracy from its enemies. Yet the political commitments of labor and its fairly extensive presence in workplaces around the country did represent a dissuasion to the plotters against democracy. The difficulty of dismantling the democratic labor movement would have been one of the central problems facing any military regime. The costs of repressing a movement with a broad presence in civil society, and with some capacity to evaporate into the fabric of daily life when the authorities show up, are greater than those presented by marginalizing the top political elite who can be placed under house arrest or quietly sent into exile. The events of February 1981 clearly represented the most dramatic single threat encountered by Spain's new democracy. However, the open disloyalty of the far-right military plotters was not the only potential source of difficulty for a stable democracy. In his comparative examination of the breakdown of democratic regimes Juan Linz has argued that 'semiloyal' behavior on the part of major political forces ambivalent toward democracy contributes crucially to the collapse of democracies. 29 The labor movement has largely avoided such 'semiloyalty,' instead making its commitment to the survival of democracy unambiguously clear and thereby encouraging conservative social sectors to do likewise. This unswerving loyalty to the democratic system, along with the (at least implicit) invitation to the right to act similarly, has represented labor's greatest contribution to the redemocratization process. Clearly, then, labor was not an obstacle to the consolidation of democracy; only for a few brief moments or in a few exceptional factories did labor pursue radical mobilizations without regard to their possible consequences for redemocratization. Instead, labor itself was a participant in the regime transition and the consolidation of the new democracy, albeit in a less central role than that reserved for the political parties. To a much more limited extent, labor has even helped to serve as a guarantor of the democratic system, but this in no sense means that the unions, acting alone, can protect democracy from its enemies. Only a broadly shared democratic consensus among the Spanish people and the major political forces along with the loyalty of the key institutional actors has been able to save Spanish democracy 29. Sec Juan Linz, The Crisis of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration (Baltimore, Md., 1978).

186

Working-Class Organization

from the military plotters and their de facto allies in the campaign against democracy, the terrorist movement. In order to participate in the redemocratization process labor has had to redefine its expectations and strategies. This flexibility in the service of democracy has not been limited to the top-level leaders and strategies; it has penetrated the workplace where union organization and the heterogeneous working class meet. This adaptability of labor helps explain the success of the Spanish path to democracy.

6

The Difficulty of Union-Building

The organizational task of labor in the transition period-the challenge of expanding the presence of the unions-was more clear cut than labor's political agenda during the period. However, the unambiguous character of the organizational goal of the labor movement would not serve to guarantee unqualified success in the undertaking. The burst of popular enthusiasm and (relative) mass political activity that accompanied the first return of democratic freedoms filled the ranks of the unions with large numbers of nominal members along with many genuine activists. The confederations distributed union cards freely in 1977 and 1978; this policy combined with the authentic popular enthusiasm of the moment led to a spectacular surge of membership. By the time of the first union elections in 1978 both major confederations listed over two million members, and several smaller ones claimed membership totals in the hundreds of thousands. If we were to believe these undoubtedly exaggerated figures they would place union membership at over 70 percent of the employed labor force, the highest for any country other than Sweden. 1 By 1982 one authoritative estimate suggested a membership level of 20 percent of the employed labor force, but most sources inside the labor movement spoke unofficially of a figure of 13 percent or even lower. 2 The Spain 1. A good account of the unions during the early transition period with figures on the rapidly growing membership claims is Fernando Almendros Morcillo, Enrique JimenezAsenjo, Francisco Perez Amor6s, and Eduardo Rojo Torrecilla, El sindicalismo de clase en Espana (1939-1977) (Barcelona, 1978). 2. For the estimate that 20 percent of the lahor force belonged to unions in 1982, see Sagardoy Bcngoechea and Leon Blanco, El poder sindical en Espana, 130-131.

187

188

Working-Class Organization

of the October Revolution of 1934, of the sweeping social revolution in the Republican zone during the Civil War, and of the great membership surge of 1977-1978 had become the country with the weakest labor movement in Western Europe, at least by most conventional measures. In fact, the decline in the strength of labor between 1978 and 1982 was somewhat less dramatic than suggested by the above figures. The membership totals claimed by the confederations in 1978 were clearly exaggerated-in part as a result of the competition among the confederations to establish their preeminence in the union movement but additionally as a consequence of the free and extensive distribution of membership cards greatly surpassing the ability of the unions to collect dues or carry out any real organizational activity. In 1978, at the height of union membership, Spanish sociologist VIctor Perez Dfaz surveyed industrial workers on labor matters and found a membership level of 5 6.3 percent in the industrial working class. Two years later, while the decline in membership was still in progress, Perez Diaz repeated his survey and found only 33.8 percent of the industrial workers to be union members. 3 Clearly, the union movement was never really as strong as suggested by the confederations' claims in 1978. And later, even as many workers chose to drop their formal membership, Perez Diaz found that many nonmembers held a largely favorable view of the unions and were open to influence by labor organizations. Thus, the loss of strength was not as overwhelming as suggested by the membership figures. Still, other indicators confirm the view of a weakening labor movement. Participation in union demonstrations-a key element of labor movement activity in Spain-declined considerably after 1979, and by late 1981 even in the large industrial cities of Madrid and Barcelona, only a few thousand workers would join in well-publicized demonstrations called to demand the fulfillment of the prolabor aspects of the Acuerdo Nacional de Empleo (ANE), a peak-level pact negotiated after the momentous events of February 1981. 4 Additionally, beginning in 1979 the failure of strikes reached an alarming level. In that year the union movement was unable to break the government's wage guidelines despite a high strike rate, and in 1980 the · attempts of CCOO to break the Acuerdo Marco Interconfederal 3. For the results of his 1980 survey, see Perez Diaz, "Los obreros espaiioles." 4. For an excellent source that draws together all the major documents for the labor transition including the ANE, see Fundaci6n Friedrich Ebert, Documentos y legislacion !aboral de Ia transici6n (Madrid, 1982).

The Difficulty of Union-Building

189

(AMI), a peak-level pact signed by UGT and the nationwide employers' association, would lead only to defeats for Comisiones. Thus, the decline in membership actually highlighted the union movement's growing incapacity to wage successful worker mobilizations. In Spain, just as in all other democratic countries, a diffuse sense of support for the labor movement by many non-members would not prove an adequate substitute for the more formal and predictable tie to the confederations provided by actual membership. The decline in union membership after the initial surge of 19771978 parallels the experience of several other countries in their moments of the return to democratic rule. In both France and Italy the membership booms of the first years of freedom after World War II were followed by rapid drops in membership. But this rough similarity of the Spanish experience to other cases in no way reduces the need to explain these phenomena in Spain. Let us, then, turn to an examination of the way the unions confronted the organizational challenge in the transition period, the elements of their success and failure.

The Growth of a Union Presence in the Firms The growth of unions involves, as I have insisted repeatedly, not only the affiliation of masses of individual workers, but also the recruitment of a workplace leadership and the establishment of an authentic union presence inside the firm. It is from the perspective of these leaders that we can best measure and analyze the advance (or retreat) of union organization. We must, from the outset, keep in mind that those workplaces without leadership, where the unions are totally absent, have escaped this study entirely. Our examination of the opposition labor movement in Chapter 4 suggested how the Franco years would bequeath to the union movement a leadership pool of considerable size but still quite inadequate for the challenge of establishing a union presence throughout the economy under democracy. Thus, the arrival of democratic freedoms would lead to an expansion of the leadership pool of the union movement and a broadening of the union presence in the economy. How would this broadening of the union presence look from the viewpoint of the leaders, and how quickly would it proceed? The union elections of 1978, one year after the return of democratic freedoms, represented the first clear test of the unions' appeal to workers as the labor organizations competed with one another to place rep-

(N)

lt was already well established for some time It had just become well established It was on the way to establishing itself well There was little presence of the union No answer; docs not know

Assessment

(141)

54.6 22.7 10.6 8.5 3.5

ccoo

(82)

37.8 15.9 15.9 28.0 2.4

UGT

By union

(30)

23.3 30.0 26.7 16.7 3.3

Other unions

(115)

41.7 24.3 17.4 12.2 4.3 (138)

48.6 18.8 11.6 18.8 2.2

Madrid

By province Barcelona

Table 6.1. Workplace leaders' view of their union's presence in the firm during union elections, 1978

(253)

45.5 21.3 14.2 15.8 3.2

Total

The Difficulty of Union-Building

191

resentatives on the works councils (comites de empresa) elected at the factory level. In the survey we asked the plant-level leaders how well their union was established inside their firm at the time of the 1978 elections, offering the following four statements as alternative answers: • • • •

It had already been well established for some time. It had just become well established. It was on the way to establishing itself well. There was little presence of the union.

Slightly fewer than half of the leaders, 45.5 percent, reported that their union had already been well established inside the firm for some time before the 1978 elections (see Table 6.1). The next largest group, 21.3 percent, stated that their union had just become well established inside the firm at the time of the elections, and the remainder made less optimistic assertions about the achievements of their union inside the workplace. Thus, the burst of enthusiasm and the public excitement accompanying the first return of freedoms in 1977 would not, by themselves, provide the union movement with a position of great strength. Instead, unionists would have to work diligently to expand the scope of their organizations, work which continued throughout 1977 and 1978. The high-water mark of union strength was probably reached in summer 1978, more than one full year after the return of freedom for labor organizations and many months after the apogee of public enthusiasm over participation in democratic political life. Clearly, then, we cannot focus exclusively on the excitement and disappointments of the transition period, but must examine as well the facilitating and restraining conditions for the development of union organization under Spanish democracy.

Competition among the Politically Defined Unions The union elections, held every two years since 1978, remain the most tangible evidence of the support achieved by the competing labor confederations. Yet the elections are not a direct test of the organizational vitality of the unions. All workers, members and nonmembers, can vote to place their preferred representatives on the works councils, and the results demonstrate the diffuse support for the confederations (or even for individual delegates) more than strong

192

Working-Class Organization

support of the unions in question. Thus, the votes attained by the unions in the elections do not necessarily reflect their respective membership levels and need not translate directly into the ability to actually mobilize workers collectively in defense of their interests. Furthermore, the official (or for 1978, semiofficial) results of the elections actually report the percentages of the elected delegates belonging to the different confederations rather than the proportion of votes received by the respective unions. With these provisos in mind, it remains useful to examine briefly the elections as an indicator of the competing unions' development and in recognition of the elections' pivotal role in that process. The 1978 elections established the clearly predominant position of CCOO, with 34.7 percent of the delegates while the second-ranking UGT won 21.7 percent of the elective positions. No information was available on the affiliation of 18.13 percent of the delegates as a result of poor reporting procedures, and the remainder were divided among smaller unions and independents. 5 The success of these two unions in the first democratic selection of labor representatives was clearly linked to the prior success of the two major parties of the left, the PSOE and the PCE, in the 1977 parliamentary elections. An analysis of the provincial variation in the support attained by the unions in the elections demonstrated that the electoral appeal of the PCE was strongly associated with the success of CCOO while the PSOE support was a significant but less important variable in explaining the UGT vote. 6 Surveys of working-class attitudes confirmed this link between the union and party options of Spanish workers, showing the Communist electorate solidly behind CCOO while the Socialist electorate (as opposed to actual party members) divided its support between UGT and CC00. 7 This division within the Socialist electorate, along with the greater organizational strength of the PCE, explains why the Socialist union stood second to its Communist counterpart even though the Socialist party had received roughly three times as many votes as the Communist party in the first legislative elections. In the second union elections of 1980 the difference between CCOO and UGT was virtually eliminated, with Comisiones winning 30.87 5. On the 1978 union elections, see Perez Dfaz, Clase obrera partidos y sindicatos, and Fishman, "Labor Movement." 6. Fishman, "Labor Movement." 7. In addition to the surveys of Perez Dfaz, see Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas, "Estudio prospectivo sobre las elecciones sindicales en Espana," Revista Espanola de Investigaciones Sociol6gicas, no. 1 (January-March 1978).

The Difficulty of Union- Building

19 3

percent and UGT winning 29.28 percent of the delegates. Third place was claimed by the Union Sindical Obrera (USO) with 8.68 percent of the delegates. Although USO insisted on its independence from all political parties and remained, like the larger confederations, internally heterogeneous, its increase in support from the 1978 elections was based in large measure on its unofficial alliance with the then governing party, the UCD. USO had abandoned its previous commitment to self-management socialism, preferring instead to attempt to appeal to center-right workers. The official electoral results were met by (frequently substantiated) claims of fraud on the part of USO and, to a lesser extent, UGT. The upward trend for UGT was to continue even after these elections, while USO would enter a period of crisis and decline. The second union elections of 1980 left UGT and CCOO in a position of fairly even-handed competition for leadership over a weak and divided labor movement. Together these two unions claimed just over 60 percent of the delegates elected in 1980. Thus, their penetration of the workplace remained inadequate. However, no other union-neither the centrist USO nor the smaller unions of the farleft-could mount an effective nationwide challenge. Regional nationalist unions were quite significant in the Basque Country and, to a lesser extent, Galicia, but with this one major exception we can state that the highly divided opposition to the two large confederations was relevant only within individual firms and not above that level. Thus, the weakness of UGT and CCOO did not provide the basis for the emergence of an alternative to their predominance. The elections, then, provide us with a rough indication of the very partial organizational success of the union movement in the transition period. To understand the reasons why that success was not greater we must turn to an examination of the experiences and observations of the plant-level leaders. The Intergenerational Transmission of Union Loyalties One of the most interesting questions posed by all cases of redemocratization concerns the extent to which political and associational life under the new democracy manifest continuity with the experience of the previous democratic period, before the antidemocratic interlude. The question can be addressed both at the macro level, in terms of the identity of the principal political and social actors,

194

Working-Class Organization

and at the individual level where the attitudes and loyalties of the mass public are the issue. Researchers on redemocratization in Spain have addressed the issue of historical continuities in works dealing with political parties, electoral behavior, 8 and employers. 9 For the union movement as well, the questions involved are clearly significant: How strong are the historical continuities underlying the development of a democratic union movement? To what extent have such continuities aided the unions (or some of them) in their organizational efforts? And, to what extent have such influences actually shaped today's union movement? If we first direct our attention to labor organizations themselves rather than actual worker behavior, we find a limited continuity with the pre-Franco years. One of the two large unions of today's democracy, UGT, is a survivor of pre-Franco Spain; however, the other major confederation, CCOO, emerged in opposition to Francoism and would not hold its first formal congress until 1978, after the return of freedom. The third-ranking union today, USO, is also a product of the opposition experience. The anarcho-syndicalist CNT, which had shared predominance in the pre-Franco labor movement with the Socialist UGT, was reduced to insignificance during the authoritarian period, and, unlike its Socialist counterpart, never managed to recover. For whatever reasons-serious internal divisions, the lack of any international support, the absence of any examples of a powerful anarcho-syndicalist movement in another country, and the inadequacy of anarcho-syndicalist abstentionist principles for a moment in which both state and employers were willing to recognize and deal with more moderate unions-CNT could not take effective advantage of the initial enthusiasm in 1977-1978 of old veterans and young idealists. The CNT would quickly decline from a weak third place to even greater insignificance. Thus, the cast of characters in the labor movement was only partially the same as it had been prior to the authoritarian years. After the long period of repression and in a new historical context, the baggage an organization carried from an earlier period was of only limited usefulness in the late 1970s. Thus, the experience of Francoism did alter the organizational makeup of the labor movement, although not in the way intended by the 8. On parties and electoral behavior, see tbe works of Linz, Gunther eta!., and Mara vall. 9. On employers and employers' associations, see Robert Martinez, "Employers Associations in Democratic Spain: The Individual Employer View" (paper presented at the World Congress of Sociology, Mexico City, 1982); Robert Martinez, "Business Elites in Democratic Spain" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1984).

The Difficulty of Union-Building

195

regime itself. A (largely) Communist confederation had replaced an anarcho-syndicalist union as the partner (or alternative) to a Socialist confederation in the union movement. As we turn our attention to the individual-level behavior of workers, the major question concerns the intergenerational transmission of loyalties. To what extent are today's unionists following the pattern of activity or affiliation established by their parents before the Franco years? Does continuity of organizational loyalty within families help explain the reemergence of UGT and other aspects of the current configuration of the union movement? We asked the respondents to identify the labor union orientation of their fathers, preferring to phrase the question somewhat loosely rather than raising the issue of formal membership. Presumably, if the workplace leaders first learned of the importance of unionism from the stories of their parents, and if such collective reminiscence aided (or hindered) certain confederations in the transition period, then those influences should be dear in the respondents' identification of their fathers' union preferences. In fact, we found that most respondents, 60.8 percent, indicated that their fathers had no union orientation, and an additional 9.9 percent did not know or refused to answer (see Table 6.2). Only 11.7 percent of the leaders indicated that their fathers preferred UGT, and a smaller group, 7.4 percent, specified CNT. The indication of a parental preference for UGT is, not surprisingly, strongest among current members of the Socialist confederation of whom 18.3 percent answered in this way. Thus, a family history of involvement with UGT made it slightly more likely that the leader in question would opt for UGT rather than another alternative as the outlet for his or her union activities. However, such family-loyalists represent less than one-fifth of the total leadership pool of UGT and clearly cannot account by themselves for the reemergence of UGT as a major confederation. Comisiones, as well, has drawn a number of leaders from UGT families: 11.3 percent of its total supply of leaders. To what extent does CCOO, as the more radical component of the union movement, represent a (historically transformed) inheritor of the 1930s CNT tradition? On the basis of these data the links between the CNT past and the current CCOO seem minimal despite the attempt of some Comisiones leaders to stress such ties. 10 Only 9.2 percent of the Comisiones workplace leaders identify the CNT as the union of their parents, as opposed to 10. See, for example, the welcoming remarks of Jose Luis Lopez Bulla, secretary general of CCOO of Catalonia, at the II Confederal Congress of CCOO, Barcelona, June 1981.

(N)

Vertical union No union Other answers Does not know; no answer

ccoo

UGT CNT CNT and UGT

Preference

(141)

11.3 9.2 0.7 5.0 1.4 53.9 6.4 12.1

ccoo

(82)

62.2 4.9 3.7

1.2

-

18.3 9.8

UGT

Table 6.2. Union orientation of the respondents' fathers

1.4 64.3 7.1 14.3

3.2 80.6 3.2 6.5 (31)

(70)

-

8.6 2.9 1.4

3.2 3.2

-

Independents

Other unions

By union

(154)

1.9 0.6 63.6 1.9 11.7

-

7.8 12.3

(170)

2.4 2.4 58.2 9.4 8.2

1.2

15.3 2.9

Madrid

By province Barcelona

(324)

1.5

60.8 5.9 9.9

11.7 7.4 0.6 2.2

Entire sample

The Difficulty of Union-Building

197

9.8 percent for the UGT respondents. In the case of CCOO, it seems clear that the historical loyalties of workers neither aided nor hindered its development. For the current UGT, historical loyalties seem to have been a minor help, yet insufficient in their scope to explain the organization's reemergence as a major force. If this study could have included all of Spain rather than just the two largest provinces, undoubtedly greater historical continuities would have emerged in some regional contexts. However, the exceptional nature of such localized examples of continuity underlines the fact that they cannot account for the broad and extensive reemergence of the labor movement. If the union movement had been forced to limit its activity to those contexts in which it enjoyed continuity with the historical patterns and loyalties of the pre-Franco days, it would have been much weaker than it is today, and the goal of an extensive presence in firms throughout the economy would have been impossible to contemplate. Why have intergenerational influences been such a weak factor in forming the loyalties of today's workplace leaders? The four decades of repression were long enough to prevent much passing on of union loyalties from parents to children. Additionally, the massive immigration to Madrid and Barcelona in the 1960s and 1970s substantially altered the makeup of the working class in these two great metropolitan centers. Yet no matter what explanation we prefer, the consequences remain the same. The labor movement would not be able to pick up where it had left off forty years earlier by simply activating a reservoir of latent support passed on from generation to generation. Instead, even at the level of the dedicated workplace leaders, the union movement would have to forge new loyalties during the transition period. Political Transition and the Legitimacy of the Employers The transition clearly represented much more for workers and the labor movement than the crucial return of the freedom to organize. From their point of view the return of democracy represented, in a symbolic sense, a historical vindication of the working class, and inspired the brief hope in substantial protagonism by labor over the course of political developments. In this context how would the specifically political hopes and disappointments of the transition affect the organizational efforts of the unions? And, how would the workers'

198

Working-Class Organization

perceptions of the employers' political stance on the regime issue affect their own determination to organize a countervailing presence in the firms? As these questions suggest, we must consider the ways in which the political-historical context of the transition influenced the union movement's development. The disappointment of many labor activists with the reforma pactada, in fact the belief of a large minority of the workplace leaders that a ruptura could have been achieved, would appear to be one of the major parameters of the effort and dedication of unionists in this period. Such disappointment over the path taken by the transition probably is among the major factors accounting for the crisis of the PCE after 1980 and the collapse of the parties to their left. However, the moderate cast of the reforma pactada cannot, effectively, be blamed for the crisis in union development; at worst, the form taken by the transition deprived the union movement of a continuing political effervescence to fuel its organizational development, forcing the unions instead to rely largely on their own concrete efforts and achievements (with the assistance of the allied political parties). This leaves the more easily focused question of the unionists' perceptions of the political role of the employers and their place in the transition process. If the union activists viewed the employers and management as thoroughly tied to the Francoist past, as enemies of democracy, such a politically inspired delegitimation of business might well fuel their determination to organize in opposition to the employers. As a hypothesis we might suggest that such a delegitimation of employers (for workers and labor activists) may occur in exclusionary authoritarian or right-wing totalitarian regimes, encouraging the rapid growth of unionism with the return to democracy. The absence of comparative data on this point makes it difficult to speak about other cases, but this factor may help explain the rapid growth of unionism in several European democracies after World War II. We asked the workplace leaders, "In your opinion, what was the position of the managers and owners of this firm with respect to the political change which took place after the death of Franco?" The alternatives offered to the respondents ranged from "They have been in favor of the political change" to "They have been totally opposed to the political change" with several intermediate options. A clear majority of the leaders, 56.2 percent, believes that business has simply accepted the change without having favored it as a matter of principle (see Table 6.3). A small but not insignificant minority, 11.4 percent, actually believes that the owners or managers of their firms favored

(N)

In favor of the political change Have simply accepted it Appear to accept it but actually try to complicate the consolidation of democracy There have been many divisions among them over the political transition They have opposed the political change but in a discrete manner They have opposed the change totally Other; no answer; no opinion

Employers/manager seen as:

-

1.2 2.4

2.8 4.3 (82)

6.5

8.5

7.8

(141)

9.7

1.2

4.3

(31)

-

12.9 48.4 22.6

Other unions

By union 4.9 68.3 13.4

UGT

12.1 51.8 17.0

ccoo

(70)

1.4 10.0

1.4

2.9

17.1 54.3 12.9

Independents

5.8

(154)

-

5.8

5.2

14.3 55.2 13.6

Barcelona

(170)

3.5 3.5

7.1

2.4

8.8 57.1 17.6

Madrid

By province

(324)

1.9 4.6

6.5

3.7

11.4 56.2 15.7

Entire sample

Table 6.3. Workplace leaders' impressions of the position of the employers and managers of their firm toward the political transition

200

Working-Class Organization

the political transition. If we add the first two responses together, we find that (in the view of the labor leaders) 67.6 percent of the employers and managers fully accepted or actually actively favored the political transition, a figure strikingly similar to the finding of Robert Martinez in his survey of employers and employers associations in 1981. Martinez found that 70.4 percent of the industrial employers believed that no alternative to the reforma pactada had existed in 1976. 11 Thus, the perceptions of the workplace leaders seem essentially accurate. The political behavior of the employers during this period led to their delegitimation only in exceptional cases. Merely 1.9 percent of the leaders state that the employer in their firm totally opposed the redemocratization, and even those who believe that their employers or management discreetly opposed the change are a small minority, just 6.5 percent. The antidemocratic attitudes or actions of employer and management in a small minority of firms have contributed to the dynamic of radicalized conflict in such exceptional cases. However, no generalized political delegitimation of employers existed in 1977-1978, and the reconstruction of the union movement would have to rely on other sources for activating workers, activists, and leaders.

Difficulties in the Development of Unionism The organizational challenge faced by the unions can best be understood by dividing it, along the lines of our analysis, into leadership and mass levels. The unions could not establish a presence in the workplace and appeal to workers without recruiting a plant-level leadership. However, such a leadership, by itself, would clearly be unable to undertake successful union activity. The support and, wherever possible, the actual membership of the mass of individual workers would be essential for the development of unionism. Yet the usefulness of this distinction does not signify a separateness of the two levels, which interact with one another, each being necessary for the other. The interaction between leadership and mass levels occurs in any political or socioeconomic association, but in the Spanish labor movement it would take place within the context of a fluid political situation and unfulfilled expectations for the development of the union movement. The leaders' assessment of the workers' willingness to support 11. See Martinez, "Business Elites," 224.

The Difficulty of Union-Building

201

union activity and their measurement of that willingness against the benchmark of their own prior expectations provide a good way to open the topic of leadership-mass interactions in the (partially frustrated) development of unionism. The large majority of the workplace leaders have found the willingness of workers to support union activity lower, to one degree or another, than they had expected (see Table 6.4). The largest single group, 59 percent, sees the workers' support of unionism as somewhat lower than expected, and 15.1 percent view the workers' support as much lower than expected. Only a tiny group, 4.3 percent, sees the workers' support as higher, to one degree or another, than they had expected. The remainder (except for the "don't knows") claims to have expected just the level of worker support that has evidenced itself. This relatively weak response to unionism by rank-and-file workers poses several interesting questions: What factors can account for the lower-than-expected support for union activity, and how do the leaders interpret the problem? To what extent are the leaders able to maintain their own dedication and activity in the face of the (relative) lack of interest of workers? And, how do the problems experienced by these two levels of unionism, as well as the interactions between them, contribute to the current organizational weakness of labor?

Why the Workers Do Not Support Union Activity More: The Judgment of the Workplace Leaders In discussing the efforts of the workplace leaders I have stressed, above all, their essential contribution to union activity. In their absence no formal union activity can take place, and in order for labor organization to take root inside the plant they must effectively link the act of joining the union to either the resolution of problems of concern to the workers or the development of workers' collective identity, or both, as a way of overcoming the Olsonian "free-rider" problem. 12 Yet our interest in the plant-level leaders is not restricted to their role as key participants but also encompasses their perspective 12. On Olson, see chap. 1, n. 10. For the argument that the Olsonian free-rider problem is suspended in the context of the formation of new collective identities, see Alessandro Pizzorno, "Political Exchange and Collective Identity in Industrial Conflict," in The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe Since 1968, Vol. 2, Comparative Analysis, ed. Colin Crouch and Alessandro Pizzorno, (New York, 1978).

(N)

Much higher than expected Somewhat higher than expected The same as expected Somewhat lower than expected Much lower than expected Does not know; no answer

Worker support rated as:

(141)

0.7 5.0 14.9 60.3 18.4 0.7

ccoo

Table 6.4. Leaders" views of worker willingness

(82)

28.0 62.2 8.5 1.2

-

-

(31)

3.2 3.2 16.1 54.8 22.6

Other unions

By union

support union activity

UGT

to

(70)

1.4 4.3 21.4 54.3 12.9 5.7

Independents

(154)

0.6 3.9 19.5 57.8 16.2 1.9 (170)

1.2 2.9 20.0 60.0 14.1 1.8

Madrid

By province Barcelona

(324)

0.9 3.4 19.8 59.0 15.1 1.9

Entire sample

The Difficulty of Union-Building

203

as witnesses of the broader processes of labor relations and union building. Their judgments concerning the reasons why workers do not support unions in greater numbers may provide insights into their own contributions as well as the problems behind the lack of greater worker support for the union movement. In the survey, I and the interviewers who assisted presented the leaders with a list of twelve possible motives to "explain why the workers do not support union activity more." First, we asked the respondents to indicate for each one of the twelve possibilities if it was, in his or her view, an important explanation. Then we asked the respondents to choose the most important factor, if, in their view, one explanation was in fact much more important than the rest. Restricting one's attention at first to the initial form of the question, which theoretically permitted the respondents to respond affirmatively to all twelve alternatives, one finds the leaders most inclined to attribute the economic crisis with responsibility for the workers' reluctance to support union activity (see Table 6.5). An overwhelming majority, 83 percent, agreed that "the economic crisis which causes fear of unemployment and limits the possibilities for labor demands" was a major factor. The next most widely chosen explanation was the legacy of the Franco years or, more precisely, "the consequences of long years of depoliticization and obligatory membership to the Sindicato Vertical," an alternative selected by 72.2 percent of the respondents. The leaders' two most widely chosen factors, despite their apparent lack of similarity, share one basic trait: both are key elements of the specific historical context of the transition-problems encountered by the labor movement in the period of interest-rather than relatively timeless obstacles encountered by unionism everywhere or the (potentially avoidable) result of decisions and actions of the union movement itself. In other words, both the political-cultural legacy of Francoism and the economic crisis represented, for the labor movement, unavoidable and serious constraints of the transition years-problems not shared by the union movement in many other national settings. The one consideration likely to impinge on the process of union building in the widest range of national and historic settings-"the opposition of the employers to the union presence"-is mentioned by just under one half of the leaders, 47.5 percent, although the figure is considerably higher for both CCOO and the UGT than for the other union options. Another difficulty encountered by many union movements in their formative periods, if not subsequently as well-

(N)

The opposition of the employers to the union presence The hostility of the government to union activity and rights The ineffectiveness of some union leaders The general disinterest in political and social matters The need to offer more services to the workers The political parties and the role they have played in the internal life of the unions The economic crisis that causes fear of unemployment and limits the possibilities for labor demands The need to compete with other unions, which takes energy from union work The positions of other unions that in their errors have weakened the labor movement The consequences of long years of depoliticization and obligatory membership to the vertical union The ideological debates The internal conflicts in the unions

Reason

50.0 68.3 43.9 46.3 76.8 24.4

57.3 82.9 26.8 35.4

48.9 61.7 29.1 39.0 90.1 54.0 68.1 78.7 21.3 41.8 (82)

41.5

58.9

(141)

59.8

UGT

57.4

ccoo

(31)

29.0 51.6

48.4

71.0

25.8

74.2

22.6 80.6

80.6 67.7

25.8

35.5

Other unions

By union

Table 6.5. Leaders' opinions as to why workers do not support union activity more

(70)

32.9 52.9

57.1

52.9

42.9

80.0

27.1 50.0

60.0 61.4

12.9

18.6

Independents

(154)

24.0 51.3

68.2

61.7

33.8

83.8

28.6 48.7

59.7 60.4

37.0

44.8

(170)

27.6 36.S

75.9

62.9

31.8

82.4

34.7 45.9

67.1 67.1

45.3

50.0

Madrid

By province Barcelona

(324)

25.9 43.5

72.2

62.3

32.7

83.0

31.8 47.2

63.9 63.9

41.4

47.5

Entire sample

The Difficulty of Union-Building

205

"the hostility of the government to union activity and rights"-is mentioned by a somewhat smaller percentage of the respondents, 41.4 percent. However, the CCOO leaders are especially inclined to regard this factor as important: 58.9 percent of them, as opposed to 41.5 percent of the UGT leaders, chose this response. One form of union activity of great potential usefulness in the effort to attract the loyalty of workers to labor organization-the provision of services to the rank and file-was not highly stressed by the respondents. Only 31.8 percent of the leaders indicated their belief that "the need to offer more services to the workers" was a significant factor. The importance accorded to this factor varied considerably between the two major confederations, with 29.1 percent of CCOO and 43.9 percent of the UGT choosing this alternative. Apparently, the unionists of UGT are somewhat more receptive than their (more ideological) counterparts in CCOO to the argument that union organization can advance, in part, on the basis of providing individualized services to workers rather than exclusively on the foundation of collective mobilizations. A number of alternatives that refer to the actual performance or behavior of the unions and the associated parties were chosen by many respondents without, however, reaching the level of emphasis accorded to the economic crisis and the legacy of Francoism. Nearly half of the leaders, 47.2 percent pointed to "the political parties and the role they have played in the internal life of the unions," suggesting, perhaps, disappointment with the strategic options adopted by the left in the transition period. Even more respondents, 62.3 percent, attributed some importance to "the positions of other unions which in their errors have weakened the labor movement," an indication of the real divisions that have sometimes plagued the union movement on important questions and decisions. A fair amount of blame is even cast on the style or substance of internal union activity: 54.6 percent complain of "the ineffectiveness of some union leaders," and 43.5 percent point to "the internal conflicts in the unions." The Barcelona unionists are considerably more inclined than their Madrid counterparts to direct their critical judgments toward the behavior of the union movement itself. Among the Barcelona leaders, 59.7 percent (as opposed to 50 percent in Madrid) list the "ineffectiveness of some union leaders" as one of the factors accounting for weak worker support for union activity. Even more impressive is the disparity in the importance attributed to "internal conflict in the unions": 51.3 percent of the Barcelona respondents and only 36.5 percent of those from Madrid include this consideration as a signif-

206

Working-Class Organization

icant explanation. Thus, the Catalan workplace leaders believe that the high level of internal conflict in their organizations and the associated behavior of labor leaders have decreased their ability to appeal successfully to workers. It is difficult for us to determine the extent to which this judgment of the Barcelona leaders actually reflects a weakening of unionism in Catalonia as a result of its internal conflicts or, rather, if it merely represents an indication of their self-critical tendencies. These are the only two items that the Barcelona respondents are markedly more inclined to stress than their Madrid counterparts. Variations in the respondents' predispositions toward political explanations point to the greater sensitivity of the Madrid respondents to the state as an actor impinging on labor's ability to organize. The Madrid leaders are more likely than those of Barcelona to stress "the hostility of the government to union activity and rights" (45.3 percent and 37 percent respectively), just as they are also more inclined to affirm the importance of "the consequences of long years of depoliticization and obligatory membership to the Sindicato Vertical" (75.9 percent for Madrid and 68.2 percent for Barcelona). Thus, just as the Madrid unionists are more receptive than their Catalan colleagues to the argument for politically motivated restraint, so too are they more likely to cite political factors as the cause of labor's difficulties. Apparently, the Madrid leaders are more willing to make political sacrifices, but they also expect more from the political realm. They are more sensitive to the state and its crucial role as an actor in the issues and struggles of concern to labor. This difference between the two provinces clearly suggests underlying historical continuities from the pre-Franco days and the anarcho-syndicalist predominance in Catalonia during that period. However, the survey data indicate that the direct historical link to the pre-Franco CNT is weak, even in Barcelona (refer again to Table 6.2). Rather, it seems that we are encountering the resiliency of a distinct Catalan working-class tradition of which the organizational strength of CNT before Franco was but one manifestation. The relative similarities of CCOO and UGT leaders in their judgments on this question confirm the common nature of the difficulties they encounter as they attempt to build plant-level unionism. Employer opposition, perhaps the most timeless obstacle to unionism (together with the internal heterogeneity of the working class), is mentioned by 57.4 percent of Comisiones respondents and 59.8 percent of those belonging to UGT. A central internal problem of labor organization, "the ineffectiveness of some union leaders," is noted by

The Difficulty of Union-Building

207

48.9 percent in CCOO and 50 percent in UGT. The legacy of Francoism is included among the significant factors by 78.7 percent and 82.9 percent of the leaders in the two large confederations. However, some differences are apparent in comparing the two unions. UGT has stressed negotiations and providing services to workers somewhat more than CCOO, and it is more inclined to affirm "the need to offer more services to the workers," a factor mentioned by 43.9 percent of UGT respondents as opposed to only 29.1 percent for CCOO. But the Comisiones style of unionism stresses somewhat more the need for a comprehensive political approach to the problems of workers, an approach centered on opposition to the existing order. CCOO leaders point to "the hostility of the government to union activity and rights" more than those in UGT (58.9 percent and 41.5 percent respectively). Comisiones respondents are nearly unanimous in their emphasis on the contemporary economic context as a constraint on their activity: 90.1 percent of them, as opposed to 76.8 percent in UGT, mention "the economic crisis which causes fear of unemployment and limits the possibilities for labor demands." Thus, several differences in style or emphasis between the two unions limit the otherwise extraordinary similarities in their understanding of the obstacles to the expansion of unionism. When we shift our attention to the single most important factor in the leaders' eyes, the saliency of both the economic crisis and the legacy of Francoism becomes even clearer (see Table 6.6). Just over one fifth of the respondents, 20.1 percent, considered "the consequences of long years of depoliticization and obligatory membership in the Sindicato Vertical" to be the most important explanation, and almost as many, 19.8 percent, mentioned the economic crisis while 19.1 percent declined to single out one factor as most significant. It is especially noteworthy that no respondent chose "the need to offer more services to the workers"; apparently a heavily service-oriented style of unionism is not a viable solution to the challenge of labor organization in Spain. The relative disinterest of the workplace leaders in this approach limits the extent to which it might be implemented. The absence of consensus among the leaders on the causes for the weakness of worker support reflects the complexity and multiplicity of factors responsible for the relative debility of union organization. Nevertheless, the plant-level leaders do place their greatest emphasis on the specific historic constraints of the transition years: the economic crisis and the political-cultural legacy of authoritarian rule.

(N)

The opposition of the employers to the union presence The hostility of the government to union activity and rights The ineffectiveness of some union leaders The general disinterest in political and social matters The need to offer more services to the workers The political parties and the role they have played in the internal life of the unions The economic crisis that causes fear of unemployment and limits the possibilities for labor demands The need to compete with other unions which takes energy from union work The positions of other unions that in their errors have weakened the labor movement The consequences of long years of depoliticization and obligatory membership to the vertical union The ideological debates The internal conflicts in the unions No answer; no one reason placed above the others

Reason

6.5

13.4

1.2 2.4 35.4 1.2 3.7 18.3

22.7 2.8

5.0 19.9

-

(141)

(82)

3.2

2.4

2.1

1.4 19.9

16.1

2.4 8.5

3.5 5.7

(31)

6.5 6.5 9.7

6.5

12.9

16.1 12.9

(70)

2.9 5.7 22.9

(154)

0.6 3.9 22.1

15.6

3.2

8.6

3.9

21.4

5.2

5.8 7.1

5.7

22.9

5.7

7.1 14.3

3.9

-

3.2

4.9

9.2

7.1

4.3

-

(170)

2.4 2.9 16.5

24.1

3.5

2.4

18.2

2.9

4.7 10.6

7.1

4.7

Madrid

By province Barcelona

Independents

Other unions

By union 6.1

UGT

7.8

ccoo

Table 6.6. The single most important reason why workers do not support union activity more (leaders' opinions)

(324)

1.5 3.4 19.1

20.1

3.4

3.1

19.8

4.0

5.2 9.0

5.6

5.9

Entire sample

The Difficulty of Union-Building

209

Activism and Disenchantment among Workplace Leaders However great one's interest in the reasons why rank-and-file workers have not offered more support to the unions, our most intensive focus must remain on the plant-level leaders, given their pivotal role in the growth of unionism and our ability to analyze more directly their behavior and attitudes. Several questions deserve attention: What factors have impeded them from achieving greater success in their efforts? How are they affected by the reluctance of most workers to join in the union movement? What elements of their experience have proved most discouraging to them? The term desencanto, roughly equivalent to disenchantment, came into wide usage in the late 1970s, denoting the decline of popular enthusiasm for politics after the burst of excitement and participation in 1976-1977. For most Spaniards desencanto referred to lost enthusiasm for politics and political parties without encompassing the union movement. However, the decline in the strength of the union movement after the initial membership surge clearly paralleled the growing difficulty of the parties in attracting active (as opposed to simply electoral) support. The political orientations and loyalties of many labor activists suggested a strong linkage between the difficulties of the union movement and the loss of enthusiasm for the parties, although the precise nature of this link is not at all obvious. The survey addressed the issue of the disenchantment with unionism by asking respondents to identify the most important explanations for the desencanto sindical among some cadres and activists. In this way the respondents were asked to specify the elements of union life most discouraging to people like themselves, those who sustain the life of labor organization. Whereas in the previous discussion we were concerned with the relative lack of (even passive) support by many rank-and-file workers, at this point we turn to an examination of the loss of enthusiasm and active support in and near the leadership group. For the leaders, clearly, passive support of the unions is not sufficient; their energetic activity is necessary if the cause of union organization is to be advanced. By far the greatest cause of disenchantment for the leaders has been "the lack of interest and support of the workers," a response chosen by 45.4 percent (see Table 6. 7). Not surprisingly, the leaders have been disappointed with the relative lack of support among their fellow workers for their efforts. This suggests the possibility of a vicious circle of declining interest at both the leadership and the rank-and-

22.0 15.9 14.6 22.0 17.1

16.3 17.7 23.4 22.9 14.3 (82)

22.0 9.8

23.4 14.9

(141)

18.3 52.4 12.2

UGT

20.6 41.1 14.2

ccoo

(31)

16.1 16.1 6.5

9.7

51.6

19.4 22.6

3.2 51.6 19.4

Other unions

By union

(70)

10.0 7.1 11.4

14.3

27.1

31.4 17.1

5.7 49.9 28.6

Independents

(154)

14.3 19.0 13.7

18.8

24.7

24.7 15.6

14.3 42.2 19.5

(170)

20.6 18.2 13.5

12.9

22.4

24.1 14.1

15.9 48.2 15.3

Madrid

By province Barcelona

Note: In this question respondents were asked to limit themselves to two reasons, but a few insisted on choosing more than two.

(N)

The opposition of the employers The lack of worker interest and support The lack of interest by the upper-level leaders in the cadres and activists The competition between unions The incapacity of unions to protect cadres and activists from employer reprisals for union activity The political parties and their role in the internal life of unions Conflicts and ideological debates inside the unions The impossibility of really revolutionary actions The time required by union work The lack of support of the government

Reason

Table 6.7. Most important reasons for disenchantment with union life among some cadres and activists (leaders' opinions)

(324)

17.6 18.6 13.6

15.7

23.5

24.4 14.8

15.1 45.4 17.3

Entire sample

The Difficulty of Union-Building

211

file levels, each fueling the other. Nevertheless, most workplace leaders have not responded to the relative disinterest of the rank and file by withdrawing from activity, even if this lack of support does make it more difficult to maintain their enthusiasm. The net effect is a widening of the gap between the leadership and rank-and-file levels. The model of unionism that has emerged-competition among politically defined confederations-has been a source of discouragement to many activists who had hoped for a unified and/or less partyoriented union movement. Just under one quarter of the respondents, 24.4 percent, cite "the competition between unions" as a major cause of the desencanto sindical, and 23.5 percent point to "the political parties and their role in the internal life of the unions." For some unionists the latter consideration represented disappointment with the moderate line of the major leftist parties in the labor movement rather than an unconditional opposition to any presence of parties inside the union movement. Only 17.6 percent of the leaders mention "the impossibility of really revolutionary actions," although the figure is somewhat higher, 23.4 percent, for CCOO. In fact, more of the respondents, 18.6 percent, consider "the time required by union work" a major cause of disenchantment among labor cadres and activists. Thus, the political restraint of the transition years and its principal agent, the political parties, do not appear to be the greatest cause for such a loss of enthusiasm as has occurred among the activists and leaders. Instead, the difficulties inherent in constructing a new union movement in bad economic times and the relative disinterest of many workers have been more fundamental. The most timeless obstacle to the development of union organization-the opposition of employers to the union presence-has not been absent from contemporary Spain. Yet it has not been the predominant cause of the current weakness of labor. Only 15.1 percent of the leaders mention "the opposition of the employers" as one of the most important reasons for the desencanto sindical, and fewer still, 14.8 percent, point to "the incapacity of the unions to protect the activists and cadres from employer reprisals for union activity." Thus, these more or less universal impediments to the growth of unionism do not stand alone as the key to the difficulty with which Spanish labor has confronted the organizational challenge. Nor do any of the other factors I have mentioned-the political restraint of the confederations, internal union tensions, and the performance of union leaders. All these factors contribute something to the current weak state of the labor movement, as does the preference of the

212

Working-Class Organization

Table 6.8. Leaders' characterizations of their experience in union affairs Firm size

A valuable experience Satisfactory Difficult but despite everything worthwhile Really not worthwhile and is considering the possibility of leaving it Other answer; no answer (N)

Smaller

Medium

Large

Total*

17.1 18.0 54.1 10.8

30.7 11.4 52.9

29.2 13.9 54.2 1.4

25.6 14.5 53.4

3.6

1.4 (111)

(140)

1.4 (72)

5.6

0.9 (324)

*One firm was unclassified by size.

workplace leaders to deemphasize services. A more pragmatic style of plant-level leadership could conceivably have been more successful, although such pragmatism would have made it even more difficult to motivate workers to undertake those leadership responsibilities necessary to establish the union presence in the Grm. The predominant factors, instead, seem to be those constraints on union development specific to the historical context of the political transition. These considerations-the legacy of the Franco years (especially with respect to the pattern of labor relations and official 'union' activity), the severe economic crisis, the discontinuities with pre-Franco unionism, and the relative legitimacy of the employerswere all unavoidable and serious impediments to the development of strong unions. No change in union strategy, whether on the political issues and agenda of the transition or on more specifically laborrelated matters, could have eliminated these constraints. What are the dangers that these obstacles to the union movement and the associated lack of support from rank-and-file workers will discourage the workplace leaders to the point of provoking a massive abandonment of their leadership responsibilities, thereby weakening labor organization still further? In fact, some leaders have withdrawn from activity, deciding that the costs of leadership outweigh its benefits. In a few cases, organized unionism has totally vanished from the factory following the decision of the entire works council to resign. 13 However, such a collapse of unionism at the workplace level has not become a generalized phenomenon. In the survey we found only 5.6 percent of the respondents considering giving up union activity in the belief that "really it is not worthwhile" (see Table 6.8). 13. I encountered this phenomenon on two occasions in my own interviewing, both times in the Baix Llobregat outside Barcelona.

The Difficulty of Union-Building

213

However, this percentage is highest in the smaller firms where 10.8 percent of the leaders was considering leaving their union activity. It is precisely in these smaller firms where it would be most difficult to replace the current leaders, given the gravity of the leadership supply problem. Thus, there is some danger of a further decline of the union presence in smaller firms, but elsewhere, even if membership falls further, the presence of the union inside the firm is likely to persist. We have now examined the major impediments to the development of unionism, but still have not considered the possibility that changes in union strategies may have contributed to the drop in membership after the initial surge of 1977-1978. To address this question we must turn to an analysis of mobilization and demobilization, conflict and accommodation, as well as negotiation at the factory and economywide levels in the context of the political and economic constraints of the transition years.

7

Conflict or Accommodation

To the extent that the political and organizational tasks of labor did, in fact, tend to conflict with one another, that tension should manifest itself not only in an academic or theoretical interpretation of labor's actions but also in the actual behavior and decisions of unionists. Union leaders, both inside the factory and higher up at the confederallevel, faced numerous decisions throughout the transition years about when to mobilize conflict or initiate demands and when to limit demands and encourage restraint or even do nothing at all. These decisions and the way they were carried out represented much of the day-to-day work of unionists, but they would also help determine the success of labor in pursuing its larger agenda of organizationbuilding and consolidating democracy. To what extent would political criteria actually affect labor's formulation of demands and strategy of mobilization? What factors other than political considerations would help influence the course of labor conflict and the acceptance of restraint? Have the political considerations of the labor leadership impaired their capacity to defend the interests of rank-and-file workers and to pursue their organizational goals? And, what has been the interplay between plant-level union activity and economywide activity with respect to the question of conflict and restraint? One interpretation, in several variations, addresses itself to most of these questions and provides us with a provocative point of departure for examining this facet of union activity. This "demobilization" thesis holds that the leadership of labor deactivated the movement in 1977 (or even earlier in 1976), once the reforma pactada had been solidly launched and the political imperative shifted from 214

Conflict or Accommodation

215

conflict and pressure to moderation and consensus. The most distinguished analyst to present this thesis is Maravall who writes that "after the 1977 elections, the dynamic of 'directed' mobilization lost impetus. The lower capacity for pressure 'from below' on the part of the Left organizations beginning in July 1977 seems clear." 1 Maravall elaborates further that this demobilization may be attributed to a conscious decision of the major political parties of the left or to the political cultural legacy of Francoism. And he argues that these two explanations for the phenomenon are not necessarily incompatible with one another. Such an emphasis on the political cultural legacy of Francoism clearly resembles much of what I have stressed in earlier chapters. However, such a focus--centering on the consequences of four decades of authoritarian rule for collective worker actionspeaks directly to the current weakness of labor but much less to the alleged drop in mobilization after the initial moment of the transition. It is the former argument-that the left political leadership consciously demobilized the labor movement-which we must consider. Did a moderate or pragmatic national leadership deactivate an enthusiastic movement, forcing a policy of restraint on a rank-andfile base that in principle would have preferred to continue militant struggles? If so, such a demobilization from above might help explain the current weakness of the union movement by discouraging activists and preventing them from energetically defending the interests of workers. If the labor leadership in fact wounded its own organizational potential in pursuit of a political strategy of moderation, we still must ask why this was the case and what mechanisms were used to implement the strategy to deactivate the rank and file.

The Peak-Level Pacts of the Transition Years The style of labor negotiation for the transition years suggests some basis for the demobilization-from-above thesis. Collective bargaining has not been limited to the level of individual firms or industries; it has also been carried out intermittently at the nationwide level for the economy as a whole. Three peak-level pacts or accordsthe Moncloa Pact of autumn 1977, the Acuerdo Marco lnterconfederal (AMI) of January 1980, and the Acuerdo Nacional de Empleo (ANE) of spring 1981-established wage guidelines and a 1. Maravall, La politica de Ia transici6n, 30.

216

Working-Class Organization

Table 7.1. Evolution of strike activity during the transition years, according to two studies Mara vall* Year 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980

Sagardoy and Leon Blanco• •

Workers on strike

Strike-hours

2,956,000 3,265,000 4,183,000

156,000,000 110,000,000 68,000,000

Workers on strike

Strike-hours

556,371 3,638,957 2,317,026 3,633,004 5,752,304 2,461,061

10,355,120 110,016,240 92,572,050 128,738,478 171,067,049 108,625,662

Note: The discrepancy between these two sources is symptomatic of the general confusion and inconsistency in the strike data for the crucial transition years. Even in the Ministry of Labor different offices list widely varying totals for the same years. *Data are from Jose Maria Maravall, La politica de Ia transici6n 1975-1980 (Madrid, 1981 ), p. 28. Mara vall's figures are rounded to the closest thousand in the case of "Workers on strike" and the closest million for "Strike-hours." **Data are from J. A. Sagardoy Bengoechea and David Leon Blanco, El poder sindical en Espana (Barcelona, 1982).

negotiating framework. The first agreement, the Moncloa Pact, was actually signed by the major political parties rather than the unions or employers associations. The Moncloa Pact, which gained the force of law after approval by the Cortes, placed a limit of 22 percent on wage increases (several points below the then prevailing rate of inflation) and included concessions to the left on other political and economic matters. The accord was a most concrete manifestation of the 'politics of consensus' carried out by the Suarez government and the other democratic forces in their attempt to consolidate the new regime. Thus, if there was a politically inspired demobilization from above, the Moncloa pact represented its keystone: its most concrete manifestation, its central element and the symbolic crystallization of its spirit. The other two pacts, also critical for the development of democratic Spain's political economy, were less clearly political than the Moncloa accord. The AMI and the ANE were negotiated after the end of the consensus politics of the first democratic Cortes (19771979) and were signed by the unions and the leading employers association (as well as the government, in the case of the ANE) rather than the political parties as such. Did the broad accord signed by the nation's political leadership in October 1977 mark the beginning of an orchestrated demobilization? And, if so, did this bring to an end the popular enthusiasm of 1976 and early 1977, gutting the labor movement of its capacity to mobilize workers? The most basic evidence we must examine is the evolution of strike activity during the transition years. Unfortunately, the basic

Conflict or Accommodation

217

strike data for the years of greatest interest are quite unreliable, and different sources list widely divergent totals for the same years. 2 Nevertheless, a pattern emerges from a comparison of several sources. According to Maravall's data, 1978, the year in which the Moncloa Pact was in force, did in fact see a somewhat lower level of industrial conflict than at the high water mark of labor unrest (see Table 7.1). Nevertheless, the peak of strike activity was actually attained in 1979, after the alleged demobilization had already taken place. The explanation for the high strike rate of 1979 is clearly the joint effort of CCOO and UGT to challenge the government's wage guidelines for that year. However, in this case, the explanation is only of secondary interest. The crucial point is that, after the first pact expired on January 1, 1979, the unions were actually able to surpass the level of conflict they had attained earlier. This datum confirms the argument in Chapter 6 that the initial burst of enthusiasm of 1976-1977 did not provide the unions with the relatively broad penetration of the workplace they would subsequently attain. If the first pact represented a break on labor's efforts to mobilize workers, the effect was only temporary and would not diminish the union movement's ability to return to a policy of heightened conflict in the appropriate moment. A brief qualification of this conclusion is in order. It is always possible to point to specific instances of-or attempts at-'demobilization-from-above,' deactivating particular local struggles. Despite such localized occurrences, union organization continued to expand after the signing of the Moncloa Pact and the peak of labor conflict would be attained after the accord expired. Specific instances of deactivation in the early period do not constitute a comprehensive and enduring demobilization from above. The Peak-Level Pacts and Neocorporatism Despite the empirical evidence against the most extreme version of the demobilization thesis, we cannot easily discount the pacts' importance for the development of political and economic life as well as for all aspects of union activity. The changing formula for peak2. The difficulty over the strike data from the transition years is so serious that different offices within the Ministry of Labor have on file figures that disagree considerably. Only a small part of the confusion may be attributed to the transfer of statistical functions on labor matters to autonomous regional national governments that followed procedures slightly different from those employed in Madrid. Paradoxically, strike data were more carefully collected and published in late Franco Spain than in the first years of the transition.

218

Working-Class Organization

level negotiations, the tendency to alternate between the failure in several years to come to any agreement and the subsequent return to the policy of nationwide agreements, and the debates over the matter within the union movement, all created the expectation that issues of contention between labor, employers, and the state might be addressed and resolved at the peak associationallevel. Yet this expectation could not be a certainty, and even when economywide agreements could be successfully negotiated they were assured of opposition from some unionists and would not fully channel all labor conflict. In this context the pacts made a significant impact on the possibilities for conflict or restraint, but they would not stand as the sole determinant of the course of labor conflict. The repeated attempts to resolve major economic and political issues within the framework of economywide bargaining clearly suggest a more or less close fit of the recent Spanish experience with similar phenomena in other countries that have been widely researched and interpreted in the large body of literature on 'neocorporatism. ' 3 However, if we strictly apply Schmitter's well-formulated definition of corporatist intermediation, 4 it is clear that Spain cannot be classified as a societal corporatist system. The competition among labor confederations for representing workers and the low level of union membership distinguish Spain from the neocorporatist systems with their (de facto) compulsory membership and noncompetitive associations. However, the pacts obviously do represent the corporatist style of the joint formulation of policy and distributional decisions by labor, business, and the state. Schmitter himself has pointed out that the literature on neocorporatism actually treats two related but somewhat independent dimensions: the structuring of interest group associations and the formulation of policy. 5 The Spanish case underscores the necessity of maintaining that distinction. Whether we wish to classify Spain as a 'weak and unstable neocorporatist system' or in some other way is, for the moment, not crucial. At the conceptual level it is essential only 3. See the essays in Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch, Trends toward Corporatist Intermediation (London/Beverly Hills, Calif., 1979); in Suzanne Berger, Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics (Cambridge, 1981); and in Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe Schmitter, eds., Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making (London/Beverly Hills, Calif., 1982). 4. Schmitter's extremely useful definition of corporatism is found in his influential essay, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" in Schmitter and Lehmbruch. 5. Sec Philippe C. Schmitter, "Reflections on Where the Theory of Nco-Corporatism Has Gone and Where the Praxis of Nco-Corporatism May Be Going," in Lehmbruch and Schmitter.

Conflict or Accommodation

219

to recognize the significance of the pacts, coupled with their clear failure to determine fully the conduct of industrial relations. For our purposes what is needed is not a precise labeling of the Spanish experience with peak-level pacts, but rather an empirical consideration of the impact of the pacts and other factors on the mobilization or demobilization of workers. As I have argued at length, it is the middle levels, the plant-level leaders, who are essential for any coordinated policy of confrontation or restraint, and who must understand the strategies and concerns of both the national leadership and the rank and file in the workplace. It is from their point of view that we must empirically pose the issue of the role played by the pacts and other factors, in the evolution of labor conflict. What was the basis of support for the pacts, and what were the size and source of the opposition to them? How did the pacts actually influence labor conflict at the plant level, how crucial was their role in the policy of restraint? Did the impetus for the pacts flow exclusively from the national leadership; was the policy of restraint forced on a workingclass base that would have preferred to pursue more militant struggles? Only by addressing these questions empirically can we resolve the larger issue of the possible conflict between labor's political and organizational goals. The Pacts and the Plant-Level Leaders How, then, did the workplace leaders respond to the pacts signed by the national leadership of their confederations? The Moncloa Pact, the first and most interesting from our point of view, was actually never signed by the unions themselves but only by the associated political parties. Alone among the confederations, CCOO officially endorsed the pact despite opposition from some quarters within the union. UGT followed a policy of de facto acceptance, refusing to officially endorse it but doing nothing to challenge it systematically. This difference between the two leading confederations underlines how UGT seemed at least as radical as CCOO in the first phase of democratic union politics extending through mid-1979. In contrast, the smaller unions-USO, CSUT, and SU-rejected the Moncloa accord, and the two "Maoist" unions-CSUT and SU-based much of their appeal on their determined opposition to any sort of social pact. Among the workplace leaders, the Moncloa Pact divided both major confederations fairly evenly. (see Table 7.2). In both UGT and Com-

(N)

The unions did well in limiting their demands out of respect for the wage ceilings The unions ought to have attempted to break the wage ceilings In fact, they did hreak them No answer; no opinion

Percentage stating that:

(39)

(31) (17)

(14)

(82)

(47)

(35)

(141)

(75)

(66)

5

10

6

14

I

2

5

6 3 (154)

6 4 (70)

3 (31)

6

4

(324) (170)

8

45

43

5

9

39

51 39 33

44

61

6

46

39 51

58

46

23

-

5

8

2

12

-

10

11

9

8

8

8

53

71

46

45

49

44

53

36

29

14

43

43

48

38

43

43

Total lndependen ts Other unions UGT ccoo Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total

Table 7.2. Attitudes toward the Moncloa Pact

Conflict or Accommodation

221

isiones 43 percent of the respondents agreed that "the unions did well limiting their demands out of respect for the wage ceilings." A marginally larger minority in both confederations argued that "the unions ought to have attempted to break the wage ceilings," and the remainder offered other responses, including the argument that the unions did break the wage ceilings. In contrast to the remarkable similarity of CCOO and UGT on this question, the two provinces of Madrid and Barcelona emerge as clearly different. In all four union options we have distinguished for analysis, Barcelona is more critical of Moncloa than Madrid, although the difference is quite small in the case of UGT. For the sample as a whole the difference between the two provinces is twelve percentage points, with 51 percent of Barcelona and 39 percent of Madrid arguing that the unions should have broken the wage ceilings. The distance between the two provinces is particularly great in CCOO (17 percent) and the small labor organizations grouped together as Other Unions (18 percent). It should not be surprising that Barcelona, with its critical inclination toward the national political elite, was more reluctant than Madrid to accept the wage restraints negotiated in the Moncloa Palace. What is the larger significance of the clear (even if frequently passive) rejection of the Moncloa Pact by nearly half the workplace leaders? This finding might appear to support the demobilization thesis, which argues that the top-level leadership deactivated a movement otherwise capable of continuing militant struggles. However, much of the respondents' criticism may be specific to the Moncloa Pact, the terms it included, the way it was negotiated, and the way it was implemented (or not implemented). The absence of any role for the unions in the discussions leading to the agreement, coupled with the government's failure to carry out the more politically progressive elements of the pact that had been included as concessions to the left, probably account for much opposition to the Moncloa accord. Each pact represented a particular mix of political and economic elements, and in the case of Moncloa this mix was received unfavorably by a large sector of the union movement. For many unionists their passive rejection of the Moncloa agreement represented neither a principled opposition to all pacts nor a preference to avoid any restraint, any limitation on demands; rather, the rejection was specific to Moncloa, at least for many unionists. Still, the lack of enthusiasm toward this first pact demonstrated that such agreements negotiated at the top could not automatically count on the active support of the workplace leaders.

(N)

In favor of limiting demands independently of any pact In favor of asking for something in exchange for limiting demands but willing to limit them even without a pact Willing to limit demands only if there is a pact Against any pact or limitations on labor demands Other answer; no answer

Position

2 (141)

29

39

24

1

(75)

20

42

32

3

(66)

28

40

25

7

3 5

(35)

-

17

43

37

3

(47)

13

28

55

4

(82)

15

34

48

4

(14)

29

29

21

21

(17)

-

53

18

18

12

(31)

-

42

23

19

16

(39)

-

31

15

31

23

(31)

3

16

23

52

6

(70)

24

19

40

16

(154)

28

34

27

10

(170)

22

31

39

6

(324)

25

32

33

8

UGT ccoo Other unions Independents Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total

Table 7.3. Attitudes on the importance of a pact to justify limitations in labor demands

Conflict or Accommodation

223

Those leaders who totally oppose any pact as part of a policy of limitations on demands form a smaller minority than those who opposed the wage ceilings of the Moncloa Accord (see Table 7.3). Just 25 percent of the respondents oppose all pacts, choosing the response, "There should be neither pacts nor limitations on demands but rather the working class should get what it can." Apparently, then, either the specific content of the first accord or the way it was negotiated increased the basis for opposition above the 25 percent of workplace leaders opposed to all pacts. The unconditional opposition to all pacts and restraint is slightly more prevalent in Barcelona than in Madrid, yet the distance between the two provinces on this question of principle (just 6 percent) is smaller than the disparity in their views of the Moncloa Pact. Additionally, this unconditional opposition to all pacts is somewhat higher in CCOO (28 percent) than in UGT (15 percent), but in both cases it could be described as a fairly small minority, sizeable enough to make its presence noted in internal debates but incapable of altering union policy. These data suggest that in the frequently heated internal discussions over the policy of restraint and the specific pacts, 6 the radical critics of accommodation were themselves divided between unconditional opponents of any conciliation at the nationwide level and the less intransigent critics of the particular pact in question. Thus, even though a clear majority of workplace leaders accepted the possibility of peak-level negotiations, their support would have to be won on each particular pact. The plant-level leaders, the key intermediate actors for any policy of mobilization or demobilization, were potential defectors from the policy of negotiated restraint. Do these data indicate that at the workplace level the labor leadership was deeply divided with a large minority unwilling to compromise or make any sacrifices? In fact, this is not the case, and, when the frame of reference of the leaders is limited to their own firms rather than the economy as a whole, their responses are much more uniform (see Table 7.4). A reduction in the level of real wages, the 6. Unfortunately, the official proceedings of most union and party congresses where these debates have taken place have never been published. In such a context there is no substitute for attendance at all the major congresses by the researcher studying the problems faced by the labor movement. The standard newspaper accounts available in El Pais and other Spanish dailies are useful but obviously limited given space and time constraints of journalism. A surprisingly candid document on the internal debate within the Communist wing of the labor movement is Partido Comunista de Espana, Los comunistas en el movimiento obrero: Reunion de militantes obreros comunistas. Madrid, 17-18 mayo 1980. Resumen de las intervenciones (Madrid, 1980).

(82)

(47)

(35)

(141)

(75)

(66)

(N)

5

4

6

2

3

2

14

9

11

6

9

5

14

CriSIS

Not willing to negotiate a loss in real wages Other answers; no answer

76

79

87

85

89

89

92

85

Willing to negotiate a loss of real wages to defend jobs in firms in

3

(39)

(31)

(324) (170) (154) (70) (31)

(17) (14)

13 2 4 3

7

3

13 9 17 21 6 33 19 24

5

84 89 79 76

94 62

77

2 1 3 4 3

12 12

12 23 19

86 86 85

73

77

5

7

-

1

-

1

2

26

19

24

14

12

11

14

6

8

3

-

69

77

76

79

87

87

86

94

92

95

Total Independents Other unions UGT ccoo Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total

2

In favor of demanding the democratization of the firm In favor of limiting demands to economic matters Other answers; no answer

Position

Table 7.4. Two questions of almost unanimous opinions

Conflict or Accommodation

225

main concession negotiated by labor in the pacts, is potentially acceptable to an overwhelming 84 percent of the leaders in order to save jobs at companies in financial crisis. In other words, almost all leaders believe that workers in financially troubled enterprises should at times make wage sacrifices, but the more radical unionists oppose the extension of such moderation to more profitable enterprises through the economywide pacts. It is highly significant that this willingness to limit demands in companies experiencing financial crisis is actually most prevalent in CCOO, the most radical of the major union options. Paradoxically, then, the most radical unionists in effect favor a widening of economic disparities within the working class, allowing its most prosperous elements employed in profitable firms to advance economically while disadvantaged workers make sacrifices, rather than using the restraint of the most privileged workers to win concessions for those less privileged. The debate within the labor movement did not really pose the issue of whether restraint would be exercised; rather it addressed the question of who would restrict demands and the level of the economy at which the limits would be agreed upon. Indeed the economic crisis was a serious problem all unionists would have to deal with in one way or another. Another question that elicits a nearly unanimous response from the workplace leaders concerns the importance of seeking the democratization of the firm rather than concentrating on strictly economic demands. The support for this proposition is 86 percent, and among the CCOO leaders it reaches 94 percent. This suggests an area in which the labor movement could seek concessions from employers or the state in return for wage restraint. Thus, the overwhelming willingness to limit wage demands under some circumstances is matched by a consensus favoring the concentration of some efforts on the pursuit of noneconomic goals. Yet the near unanimity of the plantlevel leaders on these two questions concerning their own workplaces has clearly not provided the basis for a consensus on either the pacts or the broader issue of how to balance strategies of restraint and mobilization at the national level. The workplace leaders were, almost without exception, willing to acknowledge the need for wage restraint under some circumstances, and they saw noneconomic demands such as the democratization of the firm as part of the agenda they face. Yet a substantial minority of them opposed all pacts as a matter of principle, and on specific pacts opinion among the workplace leadership has been fairly evenly divided, at least in the case of the

226

Working-Class Organization

Moncloa Pact. This underscores the complexity of the exercise of restraint by labor, particularly in a context of political change and economic crisis. The phenomenon of wage restraint is manifested in different ways at the level of plant bargaining and economywide negotiations. The factors helping shape the attitude and behavior of the workplace leaders include not only the goal of regime consolidation and other concerns of the political parties but also the perspective of the rank-and-file workers and the constraints imposed by the economic crisis. Workplace Leaders and Labor Conflict: Attitudes toward Strikes The workplace leaders obviously influence the course of labor mobilizations or demobilizations in ways more direct than expressing their opinions regarding demands and pacts. Most directly, they play a crucial role in actual labor conflict, helping to activate or deactivate it. The leaders cannot avoid the issue of whether to encourage or discourage conflict within their firm. In the survey we asked the workplace leaders to evaluate the number of strikes which have taken place in their own firm and in the country as a whole, offering them the options "too many," "not as many as there should have been," and "the necessary ones." When the question dealt with their own firm, only a tiny minority, 6 percent, believed there had been too many strikes, and among CCOO the figure was a minuscule 1 percent (see Table 7.5). Almost half the respondents, 48 percent, would have preferred to see more strikes in their plant, and the percentage holding this view was virtually the same in the two leading confederations: 53 percent in CCOO and 50 percent in UGT. Somewhat fewer, 40 percent of the leaders, believed that the level of strikes in their firm had been just right, and the remaining 7 percent provided other responses or did not answer. The leaders' perspective on strike activity in their own firms clearly suggests that they have been more of a force for conflict than restraint. If the workplace leaders had actually deactivated the workers in their firms, if they had forced a policy of demobilization on a working-class base disposed to continue a high level of conflict, then we could expect the leaders to say that there had been too many strikes in their firm. Instead, it seems that

Conflict or Accommodation

22 7

the leaders were unable to carry out as many as they would have liked. The clear implication of such an interpretation is that much of the impetus for restraint came from below, from the rank-andfile workers, with the workplace leaders participating reluctantly in the limitation of conflict rather than serving as the lieutenants of a politically orchestrated demobilization from above. However, it would be possible to offer another interpretation of these data: perhaps, we could argue, the workplace leaders personally would have liked to see a higher level of conflict but nevertheless acted to restrain strike activity in their firms out of a sense of discipline with the confederal policy of their unions. In other words, we might attempt to cast the plant-level leaders as reluctant but nevertheless effective lieutenants in a policy of demobilization from above. However, no evidence favors such an interpretation, and a strong case can be made that much of the pressure for moderation came from rank-and-file workers themselves, or more precisely, from their unwillingness to support a policy of militant and persistent mobilizations. When the point of reference was shifted to the economy as a whole rather than the firm of the respondent, a substantial segment of the leaders, 34 percent, affirmed that the number of strikes had been excessive. The similarity between the two leading confederations breaks down on this question with 44 percent of UGT and only 18 percent of CCOO arguing that there have been too many strikes in the country as a whole. As on other matters, the ideological orientation of the respondents influences their view of nationwide problems and processes but plays a much more limited role in shaping their perception of labor relations in their own company. But, most significant for our purposes is the fact that even those who believe there have been too many strikes in the country as a whole are not inclined to hold the same view with regard to their own firm. In the only context where the workplace leaders are crucial actors-their own plant or office-they are either satisfied with the level of conflict or disappointed that more was not possible. The pressure for restraint, then, may have come simultaneously from above and below, with the middle-level workplace leaders representing the most reluctant participants in the process. Yet even if this is the case, the pacts negotiated by the national leadership of labor still provided some coherence, coordination, and predictability to that restraint.

(N)

In respondent's firm Too many The necessary ones Not as many as there should have been Other answers; no answer In all of Spain Too many The necessary ones Not as many as there should have been Other answers; no answer

Opinion

UGT

Other unions

Independents

Total

53

8

(75)

53

6

(66)

(141)

53

(35)

3

12 27

24 17

7

5

7

3

49 26 23

53

57

9 43 49

18 22

1 41

36

2 47 48

(82)

1

(47)

44 29 26

5

9 40 32 28

50

9 32 51

9 37

6 (17)

(14)

53

21

-

29 12

24

43 36

29 47

14 43 43

-

(31)

3

23 39

35

13

6 35 45

(39)

3

64 8 26

5

18 46 31

(31)

10

42 19 29

16

10 35 39

(70)

6

54 13 27

10

14 41 34

(154)

4

42 18 36

3

8 45 44

(170)

6

27 25 42

11

4 34 51

(324)

5

34 22 39

7

6 40 48

Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total

ccoo

Table 7.5. Workplace leaders" evaluations of the number of strikes in their firms and in all Spain

Conflict or Accommodation

229

Alternative Explanations of Workplace Leaders' Acceptance of the Pacts

If the pressures leading toward restraint can come from above, from below, or both, the factors persuading the workplace leaders to accept nationally negotiated restraints may be principally political or economic. In our analysis we shall attempt to weigh the relative impact of both the economic crisis and the leaders' political beliefs. Subsequently, we will examine the effect of these same factors on the leaders' views of conflict in their own firms. The economic crisis confronted the labor movement and all other political actors with a critical national problem. Its most direct impact on the union movement can be traced to the threat of rising unemployment and plant closings, a concern that ran deepest in those firms losing money. The economic difficulties of many firms could push the unions toward restraint in several different ways: by increasing concern over the profitability of the enterprise; by raising the importance of noneconomic demands such as job security; by lowering the workers expectations; and by decreasing the resources available to the workers themselves to sustain a protracted conflict. But despite the expectation that the economic crisis should help push the union movement toward restraint, the survey findings indicate that leaders in firms losing money are not that much more likely to support the pacts than their counterparts in profitable enterprises (see Table 7.6). The uncompromising rejection of all pacts is 19.2 percent, among leaders in firms losing money, compared with 26.6 percent in profitable companies. Apparently, the direct threat of plant closings or job loss makes the pacts only slightly more acceptable. If we focus instead on the second response to this question, the willingness to limit demands even if a pact should prove impossible to negotiate, the leaders from money-losing enterprises do emerge as significantly more moderate than their counterparts. Nearly half the leaders from unprofitable companies, 48.1 percent, would limit demands even without a pact, whereas fewer than one third, 30.3 percent of the leaders in profitable companies would do the same. Apparently the economic reality of money-losing enterprises forces many labor leaders in such contexts to limit their demands irrespective of the provisions of the nationwide pacts. However, the cleavage within the labor movement over the principle of nationally negotiated pacts is not, for the most part, a function of the differing economic contexts faced by the workplace leaders. The economic concerns experienced in individual workplaces

230

Working-Class Organization

have a direct influence on the conduct of labor relations inside the firm, but they exert a much weaker influence on attitudes toward broad political or macroeconomic issues. We must turn to political considerations for an explanation of the leaders' attitudes toward nationally negotiated pacts. Without any doubt, the most historically significant political issue dividing the labor movement was the debate over reforma versus ruptura as the path to democracy. Unlike more diffuse attitudinal differences one attempts to uncover with survey research, the reforma/ ruptura question was an actual topic for heated internal debates within the labor movement; even after the transition had been largely accomplished it remained a subject for dispute as radical sectors argued that labor should have pressed harder for a ruptura. Moreover, the earliest pact was, in a sense, an artifact of the reforma pactada model for transition: the Moncloa Pact represented an attempt to consolidate the regime change by extending the political consensus to the economic arena. On this basis, we might expect to find that those unionists who opposed the reforma (pactada) were also inclined to reject the pacts. In fact, the leaders' attitude toward the transition does help account for their opinions regarding the pacts (see Table 7. 7). Among those leaders who believe that a historical opportunity for a ruptura was missed, the largest segment, 40.5 percent, is opposed to any pact or limitation on labor demands. In contrast, among those leaders who accept the transition by reforma, just 14.8 percent reject all pacts on principle. The leaders' view of the regime transition, then, is a much more important factor than the economic situation of their firms in predicting their attitudes toward nationally negotiated restraint. Nevertheless, we must be careful not to overstate the importance of the reforma versus ruptura debate. This political-historical question was clearly associated with the labor leaders' view of the pacts but would not, by itself, determine that view. Even among the pro-ruptura unionists, those totally opposed to the pacts remained a (large) minority, and among the pro-reforma leaders a reasonably sized minority (14.8 percent) rejected all pacts. Thus, in the Spanish case a recent and crucial political debate appears to have helped shape the leaders' orientation toward nationally negotiated restraints on wage demands. However, the controversy over the political transition was a specifically Spanish phenomenon not to be repeated in many other societies where labor also engages in peak-level negotiations. This raises the question of whether the role of political considerations in the reception of the pacts in Spain was

(71)

29.6 25.4

35.6 25.6 0.5 (188)

14.1 31.0

6.9 30.3

-

(52)

26.9 19.2

5.8 48.1

Losing money

(11)

27.3 27.3 9.1

36.4

-

Other answers; no answer

Economic condition of firm Just holding its own

(322)

32.6 25.2 0.6

8.1 33.5

Total

(N)

In favor of limiting labor demands independently of any pact In favor of asking for something in exchange for limiting demands but willing to limit them even without a pact Willing to limit demands only if there is a pact Against any pact or limitation on labor demands Other answers; no answer

Position on pacts and labor demands

32.5 40.5 0.8

32.2 14.8

(126)

3.2 23.0

11.5 41.5

(183)

Believe that a historical opportunity for a ruptura was missed

Accept the rcforma

(13)

38.5 23.1 7.7

7.7 23.1

Other answer; no answer

Attitudes toward the political transition

(322)

32.6 25.2 0.6

8.1 33.5

Total

Table 7.7. Relation between attitudes on the importance of a pact to justify limitations in labor demands and degree of acceptance of political transition by reforma (pactada)

(N)

In favor of limiting labor demands independently of any pact In favor of asking for something in exchange for limiting demands but willing to limit them even without a pact Willing to limit demands only if there is a pact Against any pact or limitation on labor demands Other answers; no answer

Position on pacts and labor demands

Earning money

Table 7.6. Relation between attitudes on the importance of a pact to justify limitations on labor demands and firm's economic condition

232

Working-Class Organization

limited to the reforma versus ruptura issue or if broader, less historically specific political attitudes would also influence the unionists' view of negotiated restraint. Legitimacy of the State and Acceptance of the Pacts In discussing the political transition we focused somewhat on operationalizing the concept of the legitimacy of the democratic state. We found a majority of the leaders acknowledge the legitimacy of the state, accepting in principle (more or less reluctantly) its right to use repressive powers to enforce the law, even if that should involve the arrest of workers or unionists who have acted illegally. This issue-the legitimacy of the democratic state and more specifically our operationalization of it-poses the question of the labor movement's willingness to subordinate the unrestrained pursuit of its own interests to the broader principle of the democratic self-regulation of the society as a whole. Unlike the reforma versus ruptura controversy, the legitimacy problem has not been the subject of a recent well-defined political debate, but it does represent an enduring concern encountered by the labor movement (and other interest groups) in all democracies. In fact, the leaders' attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the state do exert a powerful influence on their view of the pacts, an impact even more clear cut than that of the reforma versus ruptura debate (see Table 7.8). Among those unionists who unambiguously reject the legitimacy of the democratic state (response #6) nearly half, 49.3 percent unconditionally oppose all pacts, and among those who profess indifference to the state's claim to legitimacy (response #5) the unconditional opposition to all pacts is almost as high, 47.8 percent. These levels of rejection of the principle of nationwide negotiation of restraint are even higher than those observed among the rupturistas, of whom just 40.5 percent expressed an unconditional opposition to all pacts (refer again to Table 7.7). For those leaders who expressed a "normal" or reluctant acceptance of the legitimacy of the democratic state (even when it may conflict with the activity of the labor movement), the principled rejection of all pacts is quite low: just 14.6 percent and 8.1 percent, respectively, for the two responses #3 and #4) I have categorized in this fashion. This small percentage of unconditional opposition to nationwide restraint is actually slightly lower than what we observed among those who indicated support for the transition by reforma, of whom 14.8 percent opposed all pacts.

14.6 0.8

18.5 14.8

(27)

10.5 15.8

(19) (123)

41.5

39.0

48.1

52.6

4.1

18.5

21.1

As long as it is a democracy ...

*For the exact wording of the question and responses on legitimacy, see Chapter 5.

(N)

In favor of limiting labor demands independently of any pact In favor of asking for something in exchange for limiting demands but willing to limit them even without a pact Willing to limit demands only if there is a pact Against any pact or limitation on labor demands Other answers; no answer

Attitudes on pacts and labor demands

The state has the right ...

In theory it is reasonable but. ..

(37)

-

8.1

40.5

43.2

8.1

Only if infraction is severe ...

(23)

-

47.8

34.8

13.0

4.3

Only the workers are of interest

Attitude toward state legitimacy*

(71)

1.4

49.3

23.9

16.9

8.5

The state should not arrest workers

Table 7.8. Relation of attitudes toward pacts to justify limitations on labor demands and toward legitimacy of the democratic state

(22)

-

31.8

31.8

27.3

9.1

Other responses; no answer

(322)

0.6

25.2

32.6

33.5

8.1

Total

234

Working-Class Organization

These findings underscore the importance of political beliefs among the plant-level leadership as a supporting condition for the negotiation of nationwide restraint. However, it was apparently not the controversy over the return to democracy by reforma pactada that led to most workplace leaders' acceptance of the principle of restraint by negotiated pacts. Rather, the leaders' belief in the legitimacy of the democratic state and its ultimate right to regulate society-a point of view that exists independent of any specific contemporary debate or partisan attempt to engender it-seems to have been more instrumental in producing their predisposition toward the pacts. Thus, the policy of restraint would rest not just on strategic political considerations that could be counterposed to organizational objectives but also on broadly shared attitudes concerning the democratic state and the self-regulation of society. We can only speculate that such attitudes may be just as important as internal discipline or the line of command within unions and parties in accounting for the acceptance of peaklevel pacts by the labor movement in a number of other national settings. 7 Thus, political considerations are more influential than economic factors in predisposing the leaders toward acceptance of the pacts. Yet for all the significance of the pacts in providing a nationwide framework for negotiations, as previously insisted, the principal real impact of the plant-level leaders on the mobilization or demobilization of the workers occurs not through their support or opposition to the pacts but rather through their conduct of labor relations in their own firms. How strong would the link prove to be between the leaders' attitudes toward conflict in their own firms (where they would help determine its course) and their reception of the national policy of negotiated restraint through peak-level pacts? In fact, the link between the leaders' assessment of conflict in their own firm and their opinion regarding the pacts is rather weak. The indicator we have used to examine the respondents' attitudes toward conflict in their firm is their evaluation of the number of strikes that have occurred. Those leaders who are disappointed with the level of strikes in their firm, responding "not as many as there should have been," are slightly more likely than the remainder of the respondents to reject all pacts as a matter of principle (see Table 7.9). However, the level of unconditional opposition to all pacts is not extremely high 7. The logic of much work within the neocorporatist framework rests on the assumed link between internal discipline and hierarchy in the labor movement and the peak-level pacts.

(N)

In favor of limiting labor demands independently of any pact In favor of asking for something in exchange for limiting demands but willing to limit them even without a pact Willing to limit demands only if there is a pact Against any pact or limitation on labor demands Other answers; no answer

Attitudes toward pacts and labor demands

33.1 18.1

5.0

(20)

(127)

-

39.4

55.0

25.0

9.4

(153)

37.3 30.1 1.3

26.1

5.2

-

(21)

23.8 28.6

33.3

14.3

There have been ... strikes in the firm Not as many as there Other answers; should have been no answer

The necessary ones

15.0

Too many

(321)

32.7 24.9 0.6

33.6

8.1

Total

Table 7.9. Relation of attitudes toward pacts to justify limitations on labor demands and leaders' evaluations of strike frequency in their firms

236

Working-Class Organization

among these disappointed leaders, reaching a figure of just 30.1 percent compared to 25 percent among those respondents who believe there have been too many strikes in their firm and 18.1 percent among those who believe the number of strikes to have been what was necessary. In comparison to the political attitudes we nave examined, the leaders' view of conflict in their own firms is a relatively poor predictor of their judgment on the pacts. Again, our attention is drawn to the gap which on so many issues separates the labor activists' activities in their own workplaces from their ideological orientation toward the system as a whole. Despite the significance of political beliefs for the predisposition of the majority of the leaders to accept the policy of the pacts-an acceptance crucial to prevent the more radical tendencies from triumphing in internal debates or union congresses-the link between this predisposition on matters of national policy and the actual process of conflict and accommodation inside the workplace appears tenuous rather than automatic. Explaining Leaders' Views of Conflict in Their Own Workplace

If the leaders' view of conflict in the immediate context of their own workplace is only weakly associated with their attitudes toward mobilization at the national level, how then can we account for their stance toward labor relations in their own firm? The two broad influences we have been examining--economic conditions and political attitudes-both affect the unionists' perspective on conflict in their firm. The economic condition of the firm, or more specifically, its profitability, exerts a clear impact on the leaders' assessment of conflict. (see Table 7.10). The respondents located in profitable enterprises are the most likely to express disappointment with the level of strikes in their firm, with 53.2 percent choosing this alternative. Among the respondents from companies that are losing money the extent of disappointment with the level of strike activity is notably lower: only 30.8 percent. Thus, the economic crisis does tend to decrease the predisposition of the leaders toward conflict, particularly in those firms where its impact is most severely felt, thereby increasing the chances for de facto restraint regardless of the unionists' ideological preferences. However, this impact of economic conditions on attitudes toward labor conflict is far from absolute. At all three levels of eco

Conflict or Accommodation

237

Table 7.10. Relation of leaders' evaluation of strike frequency in their own firm and economic condition of firm Economic condition of firm Number of strikes Too many

Earning money 4.2

Just holding its own

Losing money

Other answers; no answer

4.3

15.6

9.1

6.2

Total

The necessary ones

36.8

40.0

51.9

27.3

39.6

Not as many as there should have been

53.2

45.7

30.8

45.5

47.7

5.8

10.0

1.9

18.2

6.5

Other answers; no answer (N)

(190)

(70)

(52)

(11)

(323)

nomic performance for the firm, opinion among the leaders is divided, with many respondents disagreeing with the majority sentiment. Clearly, other factors as well are at work in the formation of leadership attitudes toward conflict and in the process leading to a limitation of labor demands. On the basis of our argument concerning the gap between ideological/systemic issues and the reality of labor relations in the firm, we would expect to see a much weaker impact of political attitudes on the leadership view of conflict in their firm. However, the influence exerted by the unionists' perspective on the legitimacy of the state is surprisingly strong (see Table 7.11). Disappointment with the level of strikes is especially high, at 65.2 percent, for those who chose the fifth response to the legitimacy question, one of the two groupings that rejects the legitimacy claims of the democratic state. These are the unionists who believe ultimately in one aspect of civil society, the self-organization of the working class, answering that "only the workers are of interest." This exceptionally strong belief in the selforganization of workers as the ultimate source of right leads this relatively small sector of the labor movement to their hope for a high level of industrial conflict regardless of economic or political conditions. Among the remaining leaders, their attitude toward the legitimacy of the state exerts some influence on their evaluation of the strike-level, but the impact is somewhat weaker than was the case for the economic condition of the firm. Even among the radical advocates of a workers' state (the sixth response to the legitimacy question) the disappointment with strike activity inside the firm reaches just 50 percent, slightly lower than the 53.2 percent found among respondents in profitable firms. Furthermore, no response category to the legiti-

238

Working-Class Organization

macy question produces quite as low a level of disappointment as the 30.8 percent encountered among money-losing firms. The leaders' evaluation of conflict in their own firms follows a logic in large measure different from that guiding their perspective on nationally negotiated restraint. The economic condition of the firm is relatively more important and the political beliefs of the leaders relatively less so in their attitude toward conflict in the firm where they actually influence its course. This duality in the views of many leaders toward conflict and restraint-their ability to distinguish between the strategies appropriate to their own company and those fitting for the country as a whole, as well as to employ different criteria for evaluating the two situations-permits both political and organizational considerations to influence the labor movement even when they appear to lead in different directions. Yet these findings do not demonstrate the existence of such tensions; they merely suggest that insofar as they do exist they may simply lead to contrasting strategies in different contexts. But, in fact, all major considerations have tended to push the labor movement in the same direction. Motives for the Limitation of Demands We have been concentrating on an analysis of the unionists' view of the pacts and their evaluation of strikes, but at least as crucial for the dynamic of labor conflict is their role in formulating demands. By the time of the survey in 1981 a clear consensus existed that in practice demands were being held well below the maximalist aspirations of the most militant unionists. Even those unionists who opposed the pacts were, in many cases, demanding less in their own firms than the maximum limits established in the accords. In the survey I approached the problem of the limitation on demands in a number of ways, but the most direct question asked the leaders to indicate which (if any) of a long list of alternatives justified limiting demands. More specifically, the interviewer asked, "For each one of the motives I will read you, tell me, please, if you think that in the current context it is or is not a justified reason to limit demands." The list offered the respondents included political, economic, and organizational considerations (see Table 7.12). The factor most widely cited as a reason justifying limitations in demands was "the lack of willingness of the workers to support strikes with the determination which would be necessary," chosen by 72 percent. (Multiple affirmative responses

3.7

15.8 (19)

(N)

(125)

4.8

8.0 39.2 48.0

In theory it is reasonable but ...

(37)

8.1

5.4 51.4 35.1

Only if infraction is severe ...

*For the complete text of the question and response alternatives on legitimacy, see Chapter 5.

(27)

7.4 48.1 40.7

5.3 47.4 31.6

Too many The necessary ones Not as many as there should have been Other answers; no answer

Number of strikes

As long as it is a democracy ...

The state has the right ...

13.0 (23)

(70)

5.7

7.1 37.1 50.0

-

21.7 65.2

The state should not arrest workers

Only the workers are of interest

Attitude toward the legitimacy of the state*

(22)

4.5

31.8 63.6

-

Other responses; no answer

Table 7.11. Relation of leaders' evaluation of strike frequency in their own firm and acceptance of the legitimacy of the democratic state

(323)

6.5

6.2 39.6 47.7

Total

240

Working-Class Organization

were permitted). Thus, the moderation or caution of the rank-andfile base, far from being forced on them by the labor leadership, instead emerges as the most broadly shared motivation for the leaders' restraint. This consideration is especially crucial for CCOO respondents, among whom 80 percent answer affirmatively. The reluctance of workers to support strikes is central to the willingness of the more radical of the leading confederations to accept a policy of restraint. The next most commonly cited factor was "the danger of plant closings," with an affirmative response of 70 percent. This figure is only marginally lower than the 72 percent who mentioned the workers' moderation. However, among CCOO leaders the difference is significant, with 15 percent fewer mentioning "the danger of plant closings." The main political rationale for moderation, "the importance of creating a situation favorable to the consolidation and stability of democracy," draws a slightly lower affirmative response of 65 percent, and other considerations are somewhat less important. The motivation for restraint reflects a complex set of factors rather than one simple consideration, such as the desire to consolidate the new democratic regime. The policy of nationally negotiated pacts was based to a considerable (but not exclusive) degree on the strategic goal of regime consolidation. The acceptance of this policy among the plant-level leaders rested on the parties' strength within the labor movement and, even more, on the diffuse acceptance of the democratic state's legitimacy among a majority of the leaders. Yet the support for the pacts among the workplace leaders was always vulnerable to attack from the left. A significant minority maintained a consistent and principled opposition to all pacts on political grounds. In internal union debates this maximalist sector could always hope to add to its numbers the less radical critics of particular pacts who objected to their specific content or the procedure for negotiating them. Thus, the majority in favor of the pacts was unstable, particularly in Barcelona where the Catalan political culture to some extent encourages criticism of decisions reached by the national political elite in Madrid. 8 This highlights the great importance of the moderation of the rankand-file base. The workplace leaders were, as a group, relatively undependable supporters of the pacts and might well (at least in numerous local contexts) have led a movement in opposition to them 8. I have stressed such differences between Barcelona and Madrid and the importance of the Catalan context in Robert Fishman, "El movimiento obrero en Ia transici6n: Objetivos politicos y organizativos," Revista Espanola de Investigaciones Sociol6gicas, no. 26 (April-June 1984).

(N)

The need to fight inflation The danger of plant closings The need to maintain the competitiveness of the Spanish economy in the international market The importance of creating a situation favorable to the consolidation and stability of democracy The need to develop and strengthen the workers' organizations before attempting sharper struggles The lack of support of other unions The lack of a willingness of the workers to support strikes with the determination which would be necessary

Reason

UGT

Other unions

Independents Total

80

(35)

45 80

(141)

65

51

83

(75)

48

39

77

(66)

57

63

76

48

77

81

72

43

71

69

49 74

(82)

70

(47)

45

71

46

76

46

53

37

33

43

21

77

74

65

72

53

37

58

35

43

26

(14)

36

21

36

57

43

86

50

(17)

71

24

41

53

35

59

41

(31)

55

23

39

55

39

71

45

(39)

56

44

44

44

49

72

46

(170)

(154) (70) (31)

75

69

(324)

72

41

42 60

56

61

65

41

65

41

70

42

75

47

72

48

37

51

53

34

68

36

29

43

57

74

42

51

71

50

55

71

55

Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total Barcelona Madrid Total

ccoo

Table 7.12. Leader opinions on justified reasons to limit labor demands in the current context

242

Working-Class Organization

if the workers had really been inclined to support such militant struggles. Instead, the policy of pacts negotiated 'above' at the national level, with their political (as well as economic and organizational) rationale 9 was congruent with the reality of 'below,' the moderation of the workers and the economic crisis felt in workplaces throughout the country. Economic, political, and organizational factors all pushed in the direction of restraint, and, except for a few isolated contexts, even those workplace leaders preferring a more conflictual strategy had to accept limitations. Even the maximalist critics of the nationwide pacts tended to accept the need to restrict demands within their own firm. The importance of the economic crisis in helping create a constituency for restraint suggests that serious economic difficulties, frequently viewed as a destabilizing threat to democracy, may in some contexts have the reverse effect. When the economic downturn is moderately severe, as in contemporary Spain, it may lead to caution and moderation on the part of many workers rather than encourage widespread acts of desperation. The current Latin American,attempts at redemocratization are taking place under even more severe economic conditions than those experienced in the earlier Spanish transition; it may soon be possible to advance comparative generalizations on the impact of economic downturns on the prospects for success in transitions to democracy. The factors we have been discussing are not just social science abstractions, but in fact helped chart the course of the internal union debates on these questions. The political elements of the internal discussions are, perhaps, clearest in the case of the Moncloa Pacts. 10 But the other considerations have also been clearly presented in decision-making settings. Thus, when Fidel Alonso, the pro-Soviet CCOO leader from Madrid, argued in favor of the recently signed ANE at the II Congress of CCOO in June 1981, he explained his discord with the maximalist critics of the pact by referring to organizational questions and the moderation of the workers. Alonso noted that despite its best efforts Comisiones had been unable to break the AMI in 1980, and that the conflict with UGT over that pact had only weakened the Communist labor organization. In this case and for this leader organizational considerations and the recognition of the work9. for an analysis that emphasizes political determinants, see Georges Couffignal, "Les syndicats espagnols: Priorite au politique," in Les syndicats europiens et Ia crise, ed. Klaus Armington et al. (Grenoble, 1981). 10. See the discussions reported on in Los comunistas en el movimiento obrero.

Conflict or Accommodation

243

ers' moderation overruled the case against restraint. 11 In a sense, then, 'demobilization' was not so much a product of an elite political decision as it was the result of the economic crisis and the moderation of the workers. This de facto demobilization, in turn, helped persuade activists and leaders of the need to support a policy of peak-level pacts even when they had lost political enthusiasm for the strategy. The unwillingness of the workers to support militant struggles outside a few highly localized settings made it virtually impossible to pursue any policy other than restraint of one form or another. No effective opposition to the pacts was possible (despite the widespread lack of enthusiasm for them) and in many firms workers achieved gains well below the ceilings established in the peak-level accords. Restraint triumphed, albeit with moments of tension and discord, both as official nationwide strategy and as the de facto reality of labor relations within individual plants. Yet how can we square our argument about the moderation of the workers with the high level of strikes in the transition period and, above all, with the peak of labor conflict attained in 1979 after the onset of the pacts? Numerous short strikes will produce a high strike rate regardless of their outcome and irrespective of the workers' willingness to persevere until they win many of their objectives. In fact, the moderation of Spanish workers during this period appears to have emerged, in part, from the widely shared experience of failed strikes. In his excellent survey research that demonstrated the essential moderation of Spanish industrial workers, Perez Dfaz included questions about strike experience. In his 1980 survey he found that among those workers who had participated in strikes, only 23.2 percent characterized the results as "good," and just 39.9 percent "would do so again or would advise that it be done again in the same circumstances."12 Largely as a consequence of the economic crisis, the widespread strikes produced more disappointment than concrete gains, and as a result the willingness of workers to strike began to decline after 1979. The workplace leaders encountered increasingly difficult constraints within their own firms. Economics, the associated moderation of the workers, and the weakness of the unions restrained mobilization more extensively and decisively than politics. In this context which was more important for our concerns: the 11. Notes from my attendance at the II Confederal Congress of CCOO, Barcelona, June 1981. 12. Perez Dfaz, "Los obreros Espanoles ante el sindicato y Ia acci6n colectiva en 1980," 256-257.

244

Working-Class Organization

informal but real limits on demands encountered at the level of the firm or the official policy of pacts negotiated at the nationwide level? Clearly, the company-level restraint was more vital for the particular firms in question and additionally helped solidify the acceptance of the official pacts. Yet, the nationwide pacts, with their links to political considerations, were highly significant for the system as a whole.

Why the Pacts? Now that we have established the multiplicity of the factors reinforcing the policy of restraint, the reader may be left with the troubling doubt of whether the pacts themselves were in any way significant in lessening the danger of irresponsible mobilization and radicalized class conflict. We can identify several positive functions associated with the pacts. Perhaps most obviously, the agreements added an element of predictability and coordination to the practice of restraint which, in one form or another, was more or less inevitable. Employers could be relatively confident that, regardless of their firm's economic performance, wage increases would not exceed the amount established for the year in question. (In a few exceptional firms wage increases actually did surpass the official limits, but this occurred only where it was acceptable to business as well as labor.) Moreover, the coordination provided by the pacts facilitated the process of plantlevel negotiations by frequently inexperienced representatives and won for labor some (very limited) concessions in exchange for wage restraint, small victories that could be pointed out as accomplishments of labor at a time when unions could achieve very little. 13 Despite the lack of worker enthusiasm for the pacts, they still provided unions with an obvious and public function. Perhaps more important, given the need to consolidate the new system, the pacts provided the clear impression that socioeconomic conflict was being placed 'under control'; independent of their specific content, the agreements showed that the institutional actors of a democratic society could meet and resolve their differences. The image of labor conflict presented in the press was largely based on exceptional 13. A good example of this was the joint rally of CCOO and UGT of the Baix Llobregat in Comella (Barcelona province) on April 30, 1982, in preparation for the celebration of May 1. The stirring speeches of the local labor leaders, and especially that of the secretary general of CCOO for the comarca, told a crowd in need of encouragement of the importance of claiming credit for the small accomplishments won in the ANE and other agreements.

Conflict or Accommodation

245

and therefore newsworthy events such as factory shut-ins, bitter strikes, and the holding of hostages by militant workers. In a society with a memory of revolutionary class conflict and with a large Communist presence in the labor movement, the pacts provided the opportunity to show that such militant struggles were the exception rather than the rule. The pacts, then, served to consolidate the new democracy by emphasizing the collective moderation of labor and underlining the usefulness of democratic procedures for conflict resolution. By conceptually linking all the pacts together for our discussion we have done some injustice to the differences among them and to the fact that they were not continuously in effect during the period of interest. We should note that the AMI, the second pact, was signed by UGT and the CEOE with CCOO opposition and served to provide the Socialist confederation with heightened employer recognition, thus increasing its strength relative to CCOO. 14 Beyond this recognition of the complexity of the phenomenon, we can only note the need for further monographic research on the pacts. 15 The possible tensions we can draw analytically between political and organizational motives did not, in fact, present themselves as a difficulty for the unions in the formulation of their strategies. Both types of consideration pushed the unions toward restraint-political goals and beliefs led a majority (with strong opposition from a politically defined minority) to support the nationwide pacts while organizational (and the related economic) factors led virtually all to exercise restraint at the plant level. The acceptance of restraint would rest not on the primacy of one criterion over another but rather on a historical constellation of factors--economic, organizational, and political. The pacts represented the formal and visible product of this constellation of factors, and, although they may not have actually contributed decisively to the forces limiting demands and reducing conflict at the factory level, they almost certainly did lessen the perception of conflict. In a country where the labor movement relied heavily on public demonstrations, where crowd estimates were routinely inflated in the press, 16 with a history of revolutionary class 14. For data on the impact of the AMI on collective bargaining see Carlos Atienza Garda, La negociaci6n colectiva en Espana: Estudio comparativo. 1979-1980 (Madrid, 1980). The importance of employer recognition is stressed by Valenzuela. 15. Among those currently working on Spanish 'ncocorporatism' arc Salvador Giner, Victor Perez Diaz, Carlota Sole, and Lynne Wozniak. 16. In my own experience observing numerous demonstrations, I found the estimates in the press to be routinely inflated and the claims of the organizers to be exaggerated by

246

Working-Class Organization

conflict, with an ideological tone to the public declarations of labor leaders, and with isolated instances of highly radicalized conflict, this public formalization of restraint contributed to consolidating democracy. Through the pacts, politically motivated labor leaders and activists helped achieve their goal of a stable democracy and did so without the need to override organizational goals. a factor approaching ten. Only when rallies took place in closed arenas could the crowd estimates in the press and the claims of the organizers be treated as reliable.

8

Conclusion

I opened this volume on labor and redemocratization by highlighting the two central tasks of the union movement in this historical context, as well as the possible tensions between them. Although the larger questions framing the investigation have been macropolitical in scope, the more micro-organizational difficulties and processes associated with the attempt to build a strong union movement have received, perhaps, as large a share of our analytical efforts as the more strictly political dimensions of the transition. This choice of emphasis has been premised on the effort to link the two items on labor's historical agenda and the resulting need to flesh out the organizational dimensions of the problem more than is standard in the macroscopic analysis of workers and political change. The organizational challenge-initially appearing relatively straightforward after the evident successes of the opposition labor movement during the Franco period-has, to date, proved far more difficult to surmount than the political tasks of the transition. In the consensus of leading participants and observers of Spanish politics, the new democracy had achieved considerable stability in less than one full decade after Franco's death. At the center of our analysis lies the role of labor in this apparent success and the unions' greater difficulty in surmounting the organization-building goals of the same period. The possible tensions between these two broad goals-above all the potential incongruity between the wide sociopolitical consensus necessary for the Spanish model of redemocratization and the more specific desire of labor to mobilize workers, defend their interests, and expand organizationally-helped guide my research and discus247

248

Working-Class Organization

sian, but ultimately they proved relatively unimportant. The labor movement at the national level and most leaders inside the plants did adjust their demands and activity to the perceived requirements of the political transition. The unions' latent challenge to the capitalist order proved compatible with a strong commitment on the part of most plant-level leaders to political democracy. Revolutionary actions defying the legitimacy of the democratic state played no role in the organized, coordinated efforts of labor. Furthermore, even standard union demands, especially on economic matters, were held in check below the level many activists would have ideally preferred. This restraint was evident in both plant bargaining and nationwide negotiations culminating in peak-level accords. Labor's moderation contributed to the process of regime consolidation by preventing an accelerating dynamic of sociopolitical polarization and avoiding the danger of an even deeper economic crisis resulting from militant demands. A constellation of numerous factors-most prominently the links between the political parties and the union movement, the commitment to democracy and acceptance of the legitimacy of the state by the plant-level leaders themselves, and the economic crisis along with the associated moderation or caution of rank-and-file workersled the labor movement to conduct its efforts in a fashion that probably helped consolidate the new democracy and certainly did not appreciably destabilize it. The organizational activities of the unions-more specifically, formulating demands and waging strikes in conjunction with the attempt at union building-