Words Made Flesh : Essays Honoring Kenan B. Osborne, O.F.M. [1 ed.] 9781576592397, 9781576592243

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WordsMadeFles h:

Es s aysHonori ngKenanOs borne

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Essayson ContemporaryFranci scani sm

Words Made Flesh: Essays Honoring Kenan B. Osborne, O.F.M.

Professor Emeritus of Systematic Theology for His Contribution to the Franciscan Intellectual Tradition

Volume 16

2011

Spirit and Life: Essays on Contemporary Franciscanism serves as a vehicle for the publication of papers presented at various conferences, symposia, and/or workshops that seek to bring the Franciscan tradition into creative dialogue with contemporary theology, philosophy, and history. During the fiftieth anniversary year of The Franciscan Institute (1991), the publication of this series was a refounding of an earlier Franciscan Institute Series entitled Spirit and Life, established in 1948 by the Reverend Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., one of the co-founders and first director of The Franciscan Institute. Copyright © 2011 Franciscan Institute Publications Saint Bonaventure University Saint Bonaventure, NY 14778 [email protected] www.franciscanpublications.com Phone: 716-375-2062 Fax: 716-375-2113 ISBN 13: 978-1-57659-224-3 ISBN 10: 1-57659-224-3 Library of Congress Control Number: 2011922193 Cover design by Emily Hurlburt. Image: Le “Quaestiones” di Giovanni Scoto (manoscrito del sec. XIV-XV): iniziale decorata Printed in the United States of America by BookMasters, Inc. Ashland, Ohio

Spirit and Life Essays on Contemporary Franciscanism

Volume 16

2011

Words Made Flesh: Essays Honoring Kenan B. Osborne, O.F.M. Professor Emeritus of Systematic Theology for His Contribution to the Franciscan Intellectual Tradition Volume Editor: Joseph P. Chinnici, O.F.M. Editor: Daria Mitchell, O.S.F.

Contents Contributors to this Volume ............................................................5 Introduction Joseph P. Chinnici, O.F.M. .....................................................9 Remarks at the Retirement Dinner for Kenan B. Osborne, O.F.M. Bishop John S. Cummins . ...................................................15

The Soul’s Short, Straight Path to Truth and Peace (Qualiter anima) William J. Short, O.F.M ...........................................................19 Duns Scotus on What Constitutes Personeity †Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M. . ......................................................29 History, Metaphysics, and Theology in St. Bonaventure Zachary Hayes, O.F.M. .........................................................73 ‘He made a tongue of his whole body’. A Franciscan Theology of the Word of God †Regis A. Duffy, O.F.M. .........................................................85 Where In the World Are We? Old Testament Views of Creation* Michael D. Guinan, O.F.M. ................................................109 Bonaventure’s Anthropology and Ecclesiology as a universal approach towards a vision of a globalized world Johannes B. Freyer, O.F.M. .................................................123 John Duns Scotus: An Anthropology of Dignity and Love Antonie Vos .........................................................................151 The Tradition and The Third Millenium:The Earth Charter Mary Beth Ingham, C.S.J. . ................................................177

Contributors to this Volume Joseph Chinnici, O.F.M., is a Franciscan Friar and a Professor at Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley. An Oxford-educated historian, Joe is a widely-respected scholar, teacher and speaker in the history of American Catholicism and the development of Franciscan theology and spirituality. His ground-breaking work Living Stones: The History and Structure of Catholic Spiritual Life in the United States (second edition 1996) has been followed by numerous articles in U.S. Catholic Historian, the co-edited Prayer and Practice In the American Catholic Community, and significant studies on the history of prayer and on the reception of Vatican II in the United States. He is currently working on Church, Society, and Change, 1965-1996, a history of the postconciliar period in American Catholicism. In addition to his current faculty duties, Joe is Chairman of the Commission for the Retrieval of the Franciscan Intellectual Tradition (CFIT) and editor of the Franciscan Heritage Series. Bishop John S. Cummins was ordained to the priesthood on January 24, 1953 at St. Mary’s Cathedral in San Francisco. In 1962, while serving as chancellor of the newly created Diocese of Oakland, Monsignor Cummins also served as the diocesan liaison to the three Catholic theological schools entering the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley. On May 16, 1974 he was ordained Bishop and Auxiliary to Bishop Alden Bell in Sacramento. Bishop Cummins was appointed the second Bishop of Oakland and installed on June 30, 1977. William J. Short, O.F.M., is a Franciscan Friar of the Province of St. Barbara, and Professor of Spirituality at the Franciscan School of Theology, Berkeley, California. He received his doctorate from the Gregorian University, Rome, and has been involved particularly in the publication of early Franciscan texts for the past decade. He resides at Mission San Miguel in central California, where he is also Guardian of the local friar community.

†Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M., was a member of the Sacred Heart Province of the Order of Friars Minor and an outstanding giant in scholarship on Blessed John Duns Scotus. Fr. Allan taught philosophy on the campus of St. Bonaventure University during the summers in the 1950s and 1960s. He also returned to campus in 1998 as the first Fr. Joseph A. Doino, O.F.M. Visiting Professor of Franciscan Studies. He retired from active academic life in November 2002, moved to the friar’s retirement community in Sherman, Illinois, where he died November 15, 2006. Zachary Hayes, O.F.M., is a noted Franciscan theologian and Bonaventure scholar. A member of the Sacred Heart Province of the Order of Friars Minor, he is a retired professor of systematic theology at the Catholic Theological Union, Chicago. He is the author of many books, including Saint Bonaventure’s Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity, Saint Bonaventure’s Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, The Hidden Center: Spirituality and Speculative Christology in St. Bonaventure and numerous articles. †Regis A. Duffy, O.F.M., S.T.D., earned a bachelor’s degree from St. Bonaventure in 1957, and six additional academic degrees, including two from the Institut Superieure de Liturgie in Paris and a doctorate of sacred theology from the Institut Catholique de Paris. He published five books, including An American Emmaus: Faith and Sacrament in the American Church, which was honored by the Catholic Press Association in 1996, and Liturgy in the Catechism: Celebrating God’s Wisdom and Love. He also wrote numerous scholarly articles and edited books and encyclopedias. Father Regis Duffy died on January 4, 2006 at the Franciscan friary on the campus of St. Bonaventure University. Michael D. Guinan, O.F.M., (Ph.D., Catholic University of America) is a Franciscan priest and a Professor of Old Testament, Semitic Languages and Biblical Spirituality at the Franciscan School of Theology in Berkeley, CA. He has published ten books, several pamphlets and many articles in publications such as The New Jerome Biblical Commentary, The Collegeville Bible Com-

mentary, and The Message of Biblical Spirituality series. He has taught the Old Testament, Hebrew and Aramaic languages, and biblical spirituality at St. Bonaventure University, St. Patrick’s Seminary and the Franciscan Seminary in Manila. Dr. Habil. Johannes B. Freyer, O.F.M., is currently the Rector Magnificus of the Pontifical Antonianum University in Rome. He holds an S.T.D. from the Antonianum University and with his Habilitation at the University of Trier he was Professor for Dogmatik and History of Theology. He is the author of many publications including Homo Viator: Der Mensch im Lichte der Heilsgeschicte (2001). Prof. Dr. Antonie Vos is professor of Systematic Theology and Church History at the newly founded Protestant Theological University (Utrecht) in the Netherlands. He holds a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Utrecht and is the founder of the Research Group John Duns Scotus. This Research Group is a member of the Franciscan Institute which is part of the Catholic Theological University. He has written many books, including Contingency and Freedom: John Duns Scotus, Lectura I 39 (1994), Duns Scotus on Divine Love (2003) and The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus (2006). Mary Beth Ingham, C.S.J., is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Honors Program at Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles. She received her Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Fribourg, Switzerland and has taught philosophy at LMU for the past 18 years. She is the author of seven books which include Scotus for Dunces: An Introduction to the Subtle Doctor (2003) and numerous articles on the thought of Franciscan John Duns Scotus (1265-1308). She has been a member of the summer faculty at the Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure University and a popular speaker with various Franciscan groups.

The Mariner’s Compass A person or a Church does not move easily form Santa Barbara, California, a small provincial town with a Catholic community to match, to Berkeley, the bustling cosmopolitan center of one of the world’s great public universities. Even the most experienced explorer would be challenged to make the journey in August, 1968, just three years after the Second Vatican Council and as the country exploded with the Vietnam riots and the California governor called out the national guard. All of us were embarked on an entirely new venture. The small Franciscan seminary which had been at the Old Mission since 1854 was now turning outwards towards the neighbor and northwards towards membership in the new ecumenical school, the Graduate Theological Union. These types of journeys are rarely made in history; they are never made successfully without leadership and vision. For the faith-questing young believer, they are not made at all without a teacher of courage, commitment, knowledge, and experience. We were and are blessed to have such a leader in our fellow friar, priest, brother, and teacher, Kenan Bernard Osborne. He came to Berkeley in the summer of 1968 as a newly minted, German-trained professor of systematic theology. God-given intellectual depth and curiosity, I think, would be the first characteristic of Kenan’s teaching and writing. He possesses that rare combination that would move a person both to learn Greek on his own and to sneak into the carcer (the locked cabinet where the professors kept the more advanced theologically “censored” works by Congar, Chenu, and de Lubac, before the Council) in search of answers both personal and institutional. Then Providence: a solid collegiate training through his own teacher, Father Geoffrey Bridges, himself a pupil of Philotheus

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Words Made Flesh: Essays Honoring Kenan Osborne

Boehner, in the philosophy of John Duns Scotus, the thirteenth century Franciscan master; exposure to some fine Scripture scholarship at the theologate in Santa Barbara; a licentiate in theology from The Catholic University of America; a trip to the Goethe Institute, and a three year sojourn in the land of Rahner, Ratzinger, Kung, and Metz, in the heady days during and immediately after the Second Vatican Council; lastly, a first generation exposure to the “global Church” in the decrees of the Council and a return to Santa Barbara in Spring 1968, precisely at that moment when the great migration to Berkeley was beginning. And when a new generation of believers would need a true compass. The issues were clearly posed, both to the person, but even more importantly to the Church: Faith seeking understanding in a secular and global world. (Or, was it not also a “sacred and redeemed world, alive with God’s presence?” Kenan would ask us.) It is a mark of a good teacher and a profound thinker to make complex ideas, simple; simple ideas, profound; profound ideas, guiding lights. Osborne’s rich training in classical, scholastic, and modern philosophy and theology had disposed him well for the educational task which history placed before him. But God’s gifts alone endowed him with remarkable skills in the classroom. Imagine in the early years, a diminutive lecturer, standing in front of his first class sticking out his large right hand, palm upwards. He places a book on it and suddenly moves his palm from underneath the tome. It drops, crashing to the floor. What do we mean, he poses, when we say that God is the ground of our being, or the ground of everything that is? Can we find this God in each thing? Or again, imagine him a few years later having returned from a trip to Greece. He narrates the story of his own search for a post card in a local shop as he asks the owner for directions. When the owner obliges, Kenan offers him a tip. The owner’s response: “thank you,” in the same koine Greek that is a form of eucharistein, “to give thanks.” What does it mean, Kenan asks us later in the classroom, when we say that the eucharist should permeate our life? Can we celebrate gratefulness everywhere? Does our life outside match our life in the liturgy?

Introduction

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Or again, imagine the teacher tracing the elaborate history of the sacrament of penance in the classroom. The materials speak for themselves. How do we make room for history, for development, for God’s continuous leading of the Church, he asks? Or, another example, have you ever seen a teacher, chalk in hand, chart on the blackboard Aristotle’s categories of being, and then opining that for all the depth of these categories they lead imperceptibly into many cul-de-sacs of thinking and living. Missing from their centrality is a key value of the Franciscan tradition, relationality! In the terrain of the twenty-first century, in some areas, the teacher notes, the only way to negotiate a passage will be to re-image how we think. And finally, picture the mature teacher, having made over eleven trips to China, probing the experience of his students from multiple cultures: What is the word in your world for “sin”? For “grace”? For “Holy Spirit.” The theologian’s vision is always one of “new horizons,” God’s sea and sun beckoning out from the continental base which is the Church’s living tradition. Kenan’s first book, New Being (1969), a revision of his doctoral dissertation from Ludwig-Maximillans Universität, Munich, reflects a life-long interest in the relationship between good theology and the twentieth-century philosophical reflections of Paul Tillich and Martin Heidegger. Later works incorporate the French linguistic and structural philosophers. Compatible with the Franciscan philosophical and theological inheritance, here are insights which take seriously the issues of symbol-making, temporality, history, individuality, contingency. The synthesizing focus for students is the foundational sacrament, Christ human and divine, the most beautiful of God’s creaturely works (in the words of Scotus, summum opus Dei). Christ is the first born of all creatures, the “real window” into the infinity of God’s gracefilled love. A profound exposition of the scriptural texts, from their original languages (Kenan is a master of both ancient and modern languages), would always form the base of the theological discussions. These foundations and Tradition’s history and Church teaching would then be used to illuminate the fundamental issues facing contemporary faith in the fields of Christology, the sacraments, the ordained and lay priesthood, ecumeni-

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Words Made Flesh: Essays Honoring Kenan Osborne

cal relations, and ecclesiology. At the origin of it all is faith in a Trinitarian God, a relational God who makes all things to be in relationship, one with the other, so that nothing can be thought of in itself, and no-thing can encompass the mystery. Many of these initial ideas find their culmination in Kenan’s 2009 publication of A Theology of the Church for the Third Millennium, A Franciscan Approach (Brill). An academic study incorporating a lifetime of learning, this major ecclesiological reflection combines history, philosophy, and theology, through the lens of the Franciscan masters Bonaventure and Scotus, to offer a way forward in the global Church of tomorrow. The perceptive student ends up, as does the professor, in a humble spirituality of the “wow”! A summary list of some of the achievements indicates in a small way the width and breadth of Kenan’s work: a major architect of the Catholic presence at the Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley; work with the National Conference of Catholic Bishops and the Catholic Theological Society of America for the renewal of the sacrament of penance; President of the Franciscan School of Theology, Berkeley, 1971-1985; President of the Catholic Theological Society of America, 1978-1979; an associate editor for over thirty years of Journal of Ecumenical Studies; participation in the Franciscan Order’s intellectual renewal in Rome and elsewhere; theologian for the National Roman-Catholic Presbyterian Reformed Consultation; recipient of numerous distinguished awards, among them the John Courtney Murray Award of the Catholic Theological Society of America (2002); author of over fifteen books and almost sixty articles; graduate “father” of an entirely new generation of multicultural scholars from the United States, Vietnam, the Philippines, Latin America, China, and India; popular preacher and teacher for clergy, religious, and laity all over the world; Professor of Theology, 1968 to 2009, at the Franciscan School of Theology. For countless people, chief navigator and compass maker, helping to move the Church forward from Junípero Serra’s Scotistic inheritance into the twenty-first century. It is with great affection, gratitude, and admiration that we, the Faculty of the Franciscan School of Theology, dedicate this book of essays to Kenan Osborne. He is our colleague and mentor.

Introduction

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Written by some of the finest scholars in the Franciscan world today, these different approaches to sacraments, ecclesiology, Christology, and anthropology testify to our professor’s academic life, his plumbing of our theological tradition for new insights, and his wide breadth of learning and interests. The preface by Bishop John Cummins, the Bishop of Oakland during most of Kenan’s tenure at our school and himself affiliated to the Order of Friars Minor, indicates the long and distinguished service of our theologian to the life of the Church. May these essays be received by all in the spirit in which they are offered. The book itself has been collected from a series of two symposia, one directly honoring Kenan Osborne on his retirement from the Franciscan School of Theology, and another on an academic occasion sponsored by the Henry Luce Foundation honoring Kenan Osborne by examining The Franciscan Intellectual Tradition in a Global World. It is with gratitude to the Henry Luce Foundation, who has contributed greatly to the Kenan B. Osborne Chair of Systematic Theology at the Franciscan School of Theology, that the essays are here published for the first time. Joseph P. Chinnici, O.F.M. Franciscan School of Theology Graduate Theological Union Berkeley, California 94709 January 31, 2010

Remarks at the Retirement Dinner for Kenan B. Osborne, O.F.M. Bishop John S. Cummins I. The Franciscans came early to Oakland, namely in 1893 at St. Elizabeth’s. Earlier in 1797 they were in Mission San Jose. They were rather late to Berkeley, 1968. That is their history. Henri Daniel-Rops looks into some real perspective. By the 1250s there were 25,000 Franciscans in 1,100 houses in Europe and the Mediterranean. That is, perhaps, why monks did not particularly like them. Neither did bishops who “saw them as agents of the Holy See, their centralized organization exempt from Episcopal control. The archbishop of Sens long refused them admission to his French diocese.”1 I would contrast that with the attitude and activity of Bishop Floyd L. Begin who sent the first permission letter to the Franciscans to move to Berkeley. As I recall his statement, “They never cause trouble.” II. Now to Berkeley. Kenan had to reconcile again what Daniel-Rops notes as “the testament of Francis: he who is not learned must not try to learn.”2 We can compare that statement to a contemporary of Francis, namely, Bonaventure. “Few lives have been so harmonious; 1 Henri Daniel-Rops, Cathedral and Crusade (New York, NY: E.P. Dutton and Co., 1957), 161. 2 Daniel-Rops, Cathedra and Crusade, 159.

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Words Made Flesh: Essays Honoring Kenan Osborne

seldom have such brilliant intellectual gifts accorded so well with the leaning of their owner’s heart.”3 Kenan found the Bonaventure heritage easy. He even did better as president than Bonaventure did as general minister: “So he (Bonaventure) abandoned teaching to devote himself in most awkward circumstances to problems of administration, arbitration and appeasement.”4 That obviously is the thirteenth century version. III. It was the Franciscans along with the Dominicans and some others who marked their history with great strides in effective preaching. St. Francis and St. Anthony of Padua “held enormous congregations spellbound…. They used any and every occasion, Mass, pilgrimages, religious clothing, consecration of churches—civil functions: coronations, burials, peace conferences, tournaments … they were on bridges and street corners, stone pulpits and temporary wooden platforms in public squares.”5 We can leap ahead to the twentieth century to the classroom. That means any classroom, whether first grade or a University of Santa Clara hall, addressing the American bishops, or any retreat house, Catholic, Protestant or otherwise. And not only was Kenan a frequent occupier of those places but he was always and inevitably prepared, with very special treatment for the audience, whether they were parish or graduates or chancery people. The old Franciscans, it is said, influenced the Monks of Cluny, the Benedictines and the Cistercians to go to the universities. Monastic life was at the same time stimulated and “the secular clergy shamed into a more diligent exercise of their sacerdotal function.”6 We would have to except that word shamed and look for a more felicitous and accurate participle for the clergy, as well as the bishop, of the Diocese of Oakland.

Daniel-Rops, 327. Daniel-Rops, 327. 5 Daniel-Rops, 51. 6 Daniel-Rops, 161. 3 4

John Cummins

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IV. I would make one observation. Daniel-Rops remarks about the Franciscans, their “accent on renunciation, absolute poverty, passionate love of Christ, and an exquisite reverence for the created world as an image of God.”7 One could walk through Assisi and along the trail of the California Missions or cruise the Danville hills. It is evident that beautiful places are not the object of renunciation. Kenan Osborne was very instrumental in establishing San Damiano and that particular institution has made our diocesan history something very special. V. I have just two more thoughts. The reputation of the early Franciscans was that they were the arm of the Pope. I would note that Kenan’s life and teaching coincided with the last half of this, the twentieth century. The Franciscans of early days were seen by Daniel-Rops as developing a new concept of the Church and its function in the world – a church in whom the brilliance of feudal power would give place to interior prestige; the Church of the missions, and of the universities wherein human thought was to make a notable advance; a Church in close sympathy with the aims of an enlarged society.8 That centuries of old assessment has such a familiar ring, echoing the teaching career of Father Kenan Osborne, dealing with Vatican documents, analyzing, exposing and understanding them. VI. And one last thought. In 1219 the chapter under Francis sent Brother Giles to Tunis and others to Morocco and to their martyrdom. Francis, no less anxious to shed his blood for Christ, went east. So many wished to accompany him that he had to draw lots for the limit of twelve.

7 8

Daniel-Rops, 43. Daniel-Rops, 166.

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Words Made Flesh: Essays Honoring Kenan Osborne

He spent some months with the Crusading Army. He then crossed through the lines. The Sultan of Egypt, somewhat welcomed him, but set out a carpet marked by crosses so that Francis and his companion would have to tread upon their sacred symbol which St. Francis did without hesitation. ‘Gracious me,’ quotes Daniel-Rops of the Sultan, ‘you trample on the cross of Christ.’ ‘Do you not know,’ replied Francis, ‘that on Calvary there were three crosses, one for Christ and two for thieves? We adore the one; you can have the other two. And if you care to strew them on the ground, why should we hesitate to trample them?9 By 1245 there was a Franciscan as ambassador to the Mongol tribes. Twenty-five years later John of Montecorvino was in Peking, later to Canton. By 1350 the Dominicans held sway in the west of Asia. The Franciscans were in China and steppes of Mongolia and Siberia. The end of the century saw the collapse of the Mongol Empire and the beginning of Asia’s abandoning of Christianity.10 I do not want to get into the exaggeration of saying that nothing happened in Asia between the 1300s and Kenan Osborne’s arrival. I just will make the point that he is deeply in the Franciscan tradition. VII. I would not be bold enough to try a summary of all of this. I think the description of Bonaventure can be an appropriate close. “For him, intellectual pursuits had no sense or value except in so far as they were directed to faith and love.”11 Amen.

Daniel-Rops, 501. Daniel-Rops, 508. 11 Daniel-Rops, 328. 9

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The Soul’s Short, Straight Path to Truth and Peace (Qualiter anima) Riccerio of Muccia, Friar Minor Introduction In 1583 and again in 1911 a little text appeared in English on a “speedy way to perfection.”1 Its Latin original is a very early example of the Franciscan tradition of spirituality, written perhaps within a decade of the death of St. Francis. The author’s identity has been a matter of some discussion: most recent research points to an early companion of Francis himself, Brother Riccerio, from the central Italian town of Muccia, near Camerino, in the Marches of Ancona.2 This early example of Franciscan spiritual literature has recently been published in a modern Italian translation by Cesare Vaiani, O.F.M., who also supplies a valuable Introduction.3 A comThe Speedy Way to Perfection: or, The Words of Brother Ricerius of Marchia, a companion of the Blessed Father, St. Francis, Declaring How a Man May Come to the Knowledge of the Truth in a Short Time, ed. and rev. by Dom Benedict Weld-Blundell (Fort-Augustus, Scotland: The Abbey Press, 1911). The first English version is in a manuscript of Oscott, England; the 1911 edition modernized the manuscript’s sixteenth century language. 2 His name appears in many forms: Rizzerio, Ruggero, Richerio, Rinieri, etc. 3 “Rizzerio di Muccia,” in I Mistici: Scritti dei Mistici Francescani, Secolo XIII:I, Dizionario francescano (Milan, Padua, S. Maria degli Angeli [Perugia]: Editrici francescane, 1995): 43-63. I am grateful to my friend and colleague fr. Cesare for his kind permission to use his Introduction as the basis for these preliminary remarks, and for his indication of the transcription of the Latin original. His translation has also helped me to clarify several difficult points. 1

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Words Made Flesh: Essays Honoring Kenan Osborne

pletely new English version directly from the Latin seemed an appropriate contribution to this Festschrift, honoring my early mentor in the Franciscan tradition, Fr. Kenan Osborne, O.F.M. The Author Riccerio of Muccia (d. 1236) appears in the Life of Saint Francis by Thomas of Celano, the first hagiographical legenda of the saint. There we read the following account of his close relationship to Francis: “There was a certain brother named Riccerio, noble by birth but more noble in character, a lover of God and despiser of himself.” He had the notion that if Francis loved him he would be worthy of God’s love; if Francis did not show kindness toward him, he would risk God’s wrath. Francis assured him in these words: “You are very dear to me and you should know that … you are worthy of my love and intimacy.”4 A slightly later text, in the Assisi Compilation (Legend of Perugia), recounts another story: “Brother Riccerio of the Marches of Ancona, noble by birth and more noble by holiness, was loved by blessed Francis with great affection.” There he identifies himself as one of the “cleric brothers, who have many books” and asks about the saint’s intention regarding observing the Rule on this point. The reply of Francis is that the brothers should have nothing except their habits.5 Brother Riccerio thus takes on the figure of the confidant of Francis, though a well-educated one, a former student of the University of Bologna, and one who knows the intention of Francis in writing the Rule: in this guise he appears in later Franciscan texts.6 Cesare Vaiani provides relevant documentation on his later biography: he served as Minister of the friars in the Province of the Marches of Ancona from 1225 to 1232, then retired to the contemplative life in a hermitage, and died on February 7, 1236. He was buried in Muccia, near the Church of St. James, where the 4 Chap. XVIII, no. 49, in R. Armstrong, J.A. W. Hellmann, W. Short, eds., Francis of Assisi: Early Documents, Vols. I-III (New York: New City Press, 19992001), 226. Hereafter referred to as FA:ED followed by volume and page. 5 Assisi Compilation 101, in FA:ED 2, 204. 6 For example, in “The Little Flowers of St. Francis” (Fioretti) 27, FA:ED, 3, 614-16; and in The Conformities of Bartholomew of Pisa, in Analecta Franciscana IV, 478.

William Short

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body was exhumed in 1663, and transferred to a place of honor in the church in 1709. In 1838, the long-standing popular devotion to this friar was recognized as he was declared “Blessed” by the Holy See; and in 1951 his remains were moved to a new church built in his honor. The Text The treatise itself emphasizes an asceticism solidly based on instructions to be found in the writings of Francis himself, particularly in regard to the need for complete expropriation. Living “without anything of one’s own,” is the basis for the deepest union with God. On this point Riccerio uses the Latin term medium (pl. media), which can be rendered both as “something-in-the-middle” and “a means,” to indicate that which stands between the soul and God. The former usage could connote an obstacle, a barrier, something that blocks the way to union with God (for example, the kinds of idle conversations mentioned in the text). The latter usage can connote something subtler, including any methods or techniques for reaching such union if the person “clings” to them. To preserve this ambiguity of the original I have simply repeated the Latin term, in italics, hoping the reader will not be too distracted by thoughts of modern communications when reading Riccerio’s critique of “the media.” There are also some differences between this disciple and his spiritual master. Riccerio does not express here Francis’s tender, affectionate love for the world of creatures around him, creatures seen as means toward God, and not obstacles. Our author seems to have absorbed a more traditional approach to the world surrounding him, that of the fuga mundi, rejecting and despising the “love of creatures” as an obstacle to union with God. His down-to-earth examples, however, taken from common observations of everyday life (the behavior of flies, the collapse of buildings, the best way to find room at an inn) reveal him as someone very much in touch with reality. And his remarks about accepting anything that honors God, even the office of prelate (in his case, that of Minister of a Province), may be an autobiographical remark from one who knew the difficulties and distractions of “being in charge,” while wishing for the peace and quiet of the hermitage.

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Words Made Flesh: Essays Honoring Kenan Osborne

The Translation I have tried to keep the English version close to the original Latin, trying to avoid an overly literal rendering, on the one hand, while not presuming to make the text “contemporary” in tone. For this reason I have for the most part maintained the masculine gender of pronouns in the text, except in cases where a more inclusive term obviously fit. Following Vaiani, I have chosen the longer text, from the ms. Gadd. XXVIII, Plut. 90 inf., f. 169-172v, from the Biblioteca Laurenziana of Florence, which, as he notes, is nearly identical to ms. 1/85 of the Archive of the Collegio Sant’Isidoro of Rome.7 I have chosen, however, to include a few significant variants from the latter ms. in the footnotes. May the reader find through this text, as it promises, a short, straight way to peace of soul. William J. Short, O.F.M. Old Mission San Miguel CA Feast of Bl. Riccerio of Muccia

7 The extant printed editions (Venice: B. Stagnini da Tridino, 1537, 1538, 1543, and 1553) rely on these two mss.

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Treatise: How a Soul Can Quickly Reach Knowledge of Truth and Possess Perfect Peace8 Whoever wants to reach knowledge of the truth by a short, straight path, and possess perfect peace of soul, must expropriate himself completely of the love of every creature and even love of his very self,9 so that he may cast himself totally into God, holding back nothing for himself, not even time, so that he arrange nothing for himself according to his own notions, but rather remain always available, submissive, and ready for God’s leading and calling. If someone wants to be joined to God he must not keep any medium between himself and God. Now there are as many media as there are things that a person loves. Therefore, in order not to impede being joined to God, every love must be removed. Many people who seem spiritual, and who observe some good practices very strictly, carefully and constantly, are nevertheless always lukewarm, and they do not reach a perfect and stable state; and this is the reason: they still keep something of their own, which serves as a medium between them and God. And because of these media, to which they cling in the soul, they undergo changes. Though they sometimes perceive the sweetness of God, and even persevere in prayers, devotions and other good practices, and have some feeling of God, yet afterwards, when the occasion arises, they waste time, reverting to chatting, complaining, worldly conversation, and other external things they love, as if earlier they had perceived nothing of God. They act like flies, which now alight on honey, then on spit and filth. Why is it then that the passion of Christ, so forceful and powerful as to break even the hardest hearts in a single act of meditation, does not change many people who have meditated on it for five years, or ten, or even more? Here is the reason: even though they are deeply moved in meditating on it and delight in it and feel it, still they do not change Ms. 1/85: Title, “Words of Brother Riccerio of the Marches, companion of our Blessed Father Francis.” 9 Ms. 1/85: “self, that is, not to be esteemed for the power he may have or desire, for example, in the office of prelate or preaching or confessing, so that …” 8

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their lives, and when they leave it they spend their time on trivia as usual. Certainly there is no other reason except that the media, to which they cling, do not allow the soul to reach Christ, nor Christ to reach it. And if at times these media go away, they still return afterward, as if to their own empty house.10 But once the soul expropriates itself totally of every created love and holds true poverty of spirit wholeheartedly, since it does not delight in any creature, it is then drawn to and filled by divine love, into which it casts itself completely. And if those media, which the soul has abandoned, return to it, they cannot enter it, because the house is full and the inn is already occupied by divine love itself, and all the affections are bound. We see this with travelers, who do not turn in at the inns already occupied by others, but at the empty ones that can take them. When the soul is occupied and filled in this way by divine love (this happens immediately when God sees it emptied of every other love, even love of itself) then it begins to be illuminated by the truth itself, which is God; and in this truth it sees the truth of all creatures and it recognizes what is worthless and what is valuable. And in this light it sees the worthlessness of all earthly things and the harm that can result from attachment to them, so that it does not allow itself to be deceived by them even if it sees many people going after those things. It is as if someone recognizes there is poison in the food placed in front of him, and even if many eat it and say to him, “Eat! This food is good!” he would not eat it, but rather would say, “I am sure that there is poison in the food, so I don’t eat it. You who eat it are fools, because you’ll die from it.” Similarly, if someone sees a tower ready to collapse, no matter how often people tell him, “Go inside boldly and stay there, because we do it too,” he would not go inside, but would mock them. Thus anyone guided by this light not only does not love earthly things but actually despises and detests them as deadly: they poison the soul, and are certainly headed for collapse, dragging the soul that clings to them into the same ruin. And if by chance there seems to arise an occasion for some worldly advantage, this light teaches him to let it go, because he is 10

Matt 12:43-45; Luke 11:24-26.

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aiming at greater profits. It is as if someone were to say to the Emperor: “I want to sell you an excellent little piece of land near Assisi11 for sixty pounds, even though it is worth seventy: in this way you can earn ten whole pounds!” Certainly the Emperor would pay no attention and would not even stop to listen, because he is aiming at the purchase of cities and castles and other important affairs. So the soul intent on heavenly profit would disdain concerning itself with temporal and earthly affairs. By this light the soul is given the perfection of all the virtues: for what is humility if not the light of truth? What is charity, patience, obedience? What are all the other virtues, if not the light of truth? The soul is guided by this light to discern and to love the strength and power of these virtues and to embrace their practice and, by this means, to acquire and possess them. And, in the opposite way, in this same light the soul abhors and detests every vice, so much so that if a hundred of the most beautiful women in the world were placed in front of such a man he, illuminated by this light, would be annoyed and not in the least provoked to lust. Not only would he not follow the vice of gluttony but he would actually go to eat with regret and annoyance,12 and in this way he would detest all the vices, having considered and understood their malice by means of this light. And in a general way13 the soul is guided by this light in the varied, individual things that need to be done, because it is illuminated by this light that fills it to consider the honor of God and his will in everything that happens to it. For it chooses only him, loves only him, and so in all things has as its aim his honor and his will. And it does this after the example of Christ who, in the prayer he made during his passion observed these two things: bowing in prayer like any little man he gave honor to the Father; and, by saying, “Not my will, buy your will be done,”14 he sought his will. Thus the soul, by this light, follows the example of Christ; and if it sees that what happens to it is in accord with God’s honor and Ms 1/85: “land and he appraises it for …” Ms 1/85: “would eat soft and delicate things with …” 13 Ms. 1/85: “And in a natural way.” 14 Luke 22:42. 11 12

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his will, it carries it out; but if it sees that it is contrary to them, it despises it, and would never do it, for any reason or any person, even so far as to avoid useless words15 which it knows to be against the honor of God and his will. By this light of truth it becomes more fully instructed, so that when the soul has become strong and familiar with this path, this light will not be obstructed because of good occupations, as for example, when the office of prelate comes its way, or the concerns of preaching, or taking care of something useful for its neighbor. Like someone who is at some distance from a wall in front of him and with one glance sees the wall itself and everything inbetween, so the soul illuminated by this light sees God and everything that is to be done, and does not leave the path he has undertaken because of these things, even if at times his contemplation may be interrupted. Furthermore, in this light the soul knows the truth of its own worthlessness, and the more it is joined to God the more it considers itself worthless, because it sees itself more clearly. And since it holds back nothing for itself and does not appropriate what it receives from God or what it does by his gift, but rather attributes them all to God and recognizes that they are bestowed, unmerited, by his goodness, for this reason it does not become exalted nor is it deprived by ingratitude. Even more, God, on seeing that nothing is being stolen from him but that, rather, it returns everything to him, places all his abundant treasures in such a soul, and grants it much more than it may ask or desire. And the soul gains all of this by means of this expropriation, because, once all evil desires and ambitions and disordered affections are put to flight, and all the created media that shadow the soul are removed, then the divine light comes in, filling and enlightening and instructing it, as was said. From this expropriation the soul gains not only the gift of the light of truth, but also the gift of peace and of stability; and then God really dwells in it, because he stays only in the dwelling-place of peace. For this reason such a soul, in all tribulation, harm, difficulty and injury, maintains tranquility and patience, and is stable and strong. 15

Ms. 1/85: “words and evil thoughts and every vice which ...”

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This happens, first, because the soul entrusted itself totally to God and is conformed to his will, so that, considering that all of this happens to it by the will of God, it agrees with him and bears it all not only patiently but even gladly. Second, this happens also because it has cast itself completely into God and remains there, so hurtful words and worldly harm and other similar things, even the world itself, do not reach it, because they cannot rise up to God, where the soul has placed its inheritance. And even less can they touch it because such a soul is not involved with these things, and they cannot find it where it used to be: it is as if someone who wanted to find me searched in all the places where I used to spend time, even throughout the whole world, except in that place where I am. He certainly would not be able to find me. In the same way, if someone’s house catches fire, and he is present, he would defend it and fight the fire, but if he were absent he would not defend it nor be concerned. So the soul that has cast itself fully into God is absent from all worldly realities and does not care what happens to it, even if that may seem harmful or hurtful according to the world. Third, this happens because the soul is invigorated and strengthened by the example of Christ who dwells in it, and who for its sake bore so many and such great things. For this reason, it is eager to imitate him more intensely in tribulations and rejoices in them and is hardly disturbed by anything. For this reason the soul also reaches stability in the bodily senses, since, once it rejects all created things for love of the Creator, it does not wander after them unlawfully through the senses, but rules them and stabilizes them, entrusting them confidently to God, saying as it comes away from prayer: “Lord, hold16 and rule my senses, and do not allow me to wander outside you.” Through this nakedness,17 the soul usually reaches mastery of its body; and there is such peace and agreement between them that they disagree in nothing. The body gladly submits to the soul and follows it in all the things it wants to carry out: in roughness, severity, abstinence and vigils, and in every labor and discomfort. 16 17

Ms. 1/85: “Hold me bound to you, and rule …” Ms. 1/85: “Through this expropriation …”

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And when the body remembers the burden of difficulties and labor which it used to tolerate because of impatience, anger, envy, ambition, and worldly intrigues, and now sees itself established in such peace, it gladly bears all these labors, just in order to avoid those unfruitful ones that were so harmful and taxing. It is as if someone were sure that for every hundred silver pieces he would be given one thousand: it would not be hard for him to give a hundred, he would even more gladly give two hundred. So the body, as it gains great profit from all these labors, joyfully bears them all, and gladly follows the soul, or even strives to run on ahead and arrive first. Thus it is very useful and beneficial for us to cast out all media, expropriate ourselves and die to all created things; to place no hope in ourselves or in any creature, but to cast ourselves confidently into God, who will accept us kindly, guide us lovingly, and lead us to a blessed ending. For we see that merchants take desperate risks for the sake of worldly gain, committing themselves to the dangers of the highways and the seas; and soldiers do the same for worldly honor, exposing themselves to the sword and wars and death. Yet often the former do not gain the profit nor the latter the honor they wished; and if they do gain it they are sure they will lose it. How much more should we do this for spiritual profit and honor, true and certain and lasting forever, especially since we will not be subjecting ourselves to any danger! What is more, and is certain, is that if someone carries out this expropriation well and faithfully and purely, in a short time – within a few days – he will begin to feel some of those things mentioned above and to taste God’s sweetness. Persevering in that expropriation, he will find out through reliable experience that all those things said earlier are true. As he comes from prayer he will embrace only the things of God with eagerness and loving kindness, looking on this world with some worry and amazement, like someone who is startled or alien or changed, like someone coming from another world. Utterly scorning this world, he will hardly be able to bear with the annoying sight of it because his spirit has been so distanced from it, and has been happily transformed in God.

Duns Scotus on What Constitutes Personeity †Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M. As I looked for a theological topic where I could make use of information I have about Duns Scotus that has not yet been made available to the general public, I chose the topic of Trinitarian personeity, that is to say, what precisely constitutes a person in the Trinity. I know that recently theologians have questioned the aptness of using ‘person’ in the Trinity.1 For it differs so radically from what we ordinarily understand by a person,2 namely, an individual human being. That is the primary definition given by Webster’s Third International Dictionary. Yet we need to recall historically that ‘person’ is a distinctively Christian notion. It is not found, for example, in Aristotle. The idea of an individual subject responsible for its own acts sufficed for the Stagirite.3 1 Lawrence B. Porter, O.P. gives a good summary of the controversy between Karl Barth and Karl Rahner in his article “On Keeping ‘Persons’ in the Trinity; A Linguistic Approach to Trinitarian Thought,” in Theological Studies 41 (1980): 530-48. 2 Porter (531) emphasizes the vagueness of the term and cites various opinions of its origin. He concludes with this observation: “… it now seems that the Latin persona is linked to the Etruscan persu, a word found written beside two masked figures. Whatever may be the true origin, we know that persona was used to translate the Greek prosopon, meaning countenance or face, but originally designated the mask worn by an actor. From this it was applied to the role assumed and finally to any character on ‘the stage of life.’” 3 Aristotle dealt with it under the notion of ousia, which Boethius translated as ‘substance.’ Substance in its primary sense was the individual, something linguistic philosophers stress can only be properly named or pointed to (ostensive definition). In a secondary sense, substance was the basic category (defined properly in terms of genus and specific difference).

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It was Tertullian,4 I believe, who first suggested the Latin term persona as a fitting name for the individual persons in the Trinity. And Webster’s Dictionary admits this theological usage (especially if Person is capitalized) in its third set of definitions, viz.: “One of the three modes of being5 in the Godhead as understood by Trinitarians.” It is the English equivalent, the dictionary goes on to say of the Greek term: “hypostasis.” The other definition given here is: “the unitary personality of Christ that unites the divine and human natures.” The problem Scotus discusses, coming as he does in a university setting where all theologians are Christian trinitarians, is quite different. It is whether what constitutes a person is something purely relative or something absolute. The first alternative he admits is the common view. It was admirably couched by Augustine6 in what became a kind of theological axiom, namely that whatever is said of the Trinitarian persons absolutely is common, what is distinctively trinitarian is the opposition of relationships, namely paternity versus sonship, and passive spiration versus active spiration. Three of the termini or subjects of these relationships of origin represent distinct supposits or persons. The third terminus, active spiration, according to “filioque” tradition to which Scotus belongs, is a shared property of Father and Son. Philosophers have no trouble in understanding the possibility of triadic relationships, involving three distinct persons. What they do have trouble in understanding, however, is that the subjects of these relationships are essentially constituted exclusively by their relationships.7 Relationships require as a logiTertullian, Adversus Praxean Liber, text and translation by Ernest Evans (London: SPCK, 1948). 5 “Modes of being” is considered to be a Barthian term, see K. Barth, The Doctrine of the Word of God, tr. G.W. Bromley (Edinburgh, 1975), 355. James of Viterbo uses the term, however, and Scotus himself is aware of this usage. See Balić, Adnotationes, 21*-22* in vol. 6 of the Vatican edition of Duns Scotus, Opera omnia (hereafter abbreviated as Vat.). 6 Cf. Augustine, De Trinitate, V, c. 9 (PL 42, 916-17); see also De Trinitate, VIII, proemium (947). 7 Though second or higher order relationships can exist between relationships themselves as subjects, philosophically speaking, primary relationships require ultimately subjects which are not relations, and in that sense, abso4

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cal precondition subjects (or relata), and ultimately a ‘relatum,’ though described as a relation or a relative, in as much as it is the substrate or substance in which the relation exists, is something other than the relationship itself, and is in that sense nonrelative or absolute. I suspect it was something of this nature that caused some theologians to question the common opinion that the divine persons are constituted exclusively by the opposition of relationships as Augustine and others seemed to hold. Be that as it may, apparently Scotus himself once favored this view, for according to the English author of the Liber propugnatorius,8 Scotus at Oxford was forced publicly to retract his opinion that it seemed more probable that the divine persons were constituted by something absolute rather than by relations.9 On the other hand, William of Nottingham10 declares that later on at Paris Scotus taught that the divine persons were characterized by relations, changing the opinion he has once held privately, not publicly, that they were distinct absolutes. lutes. Scotus elsewhere makes a point of this, where he introduces a formal distinction between a relation and its foundation in a related subject. 8 This thomistic work has not ineptly been called a Liber contra Ioannem, since it defends those disputed doctrines of Aquinas where these have been attacked by John Duns Scotus. Franz Pelster, S.J., who devoted considerable research to the work, which many manuscripts ascribe simply to Thomas Anglicus, suggests Thomas Sutton as the author (cf. “Thomas von Sutton, ein Oxforder Verteideger der thomistichen Lehre” in Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie [1922]: 225-27). However, the divergence of ideas from some of Sutton’s other authentic works is considerable. The work was formerly attributed to Thomas Jorcz or Gorce by Mandonnet, but this is undoubtedly incorrect. The editors of the Vatican edition of Scotus’s Ordinatio make no attempt to identify the author. 9 Liber propugnatorius [I, d. 26, q. un.] (cod. Vat. lat 872 f. 133rb -133vb) declares that Duns Scotus held the opinion of the persons as distinct absolutes to be tamquam probabilem quam ipse, cum doceret Oxoniae, compulsus est publice revocare. And the author goes on to say that in favor of this opinion Duns Scotus cited the dictum cuiusdam antiqui doctoris, cuius nomen non nominat, quia forsitan doctrina illius erat suspecta vel non authentica. 10 William of Nottingham, Sent. I, d. 26 q. 2 corp. (cod. Catabrigiensis, Gonville Caius 300, f. 70rb): Haec opinio a nullo magistro authentico tenetur iam: ponunt enim omnes magistri moderni quod tam constitutio quam distinctio personarum solum fit formaliter per proprietates relativas; et hanc conclusionem [tenet Duns, scilicet in Ordinatione sua] mutata prima opinione, quam asserendo fatebatur se alias et alibi tenere, scilicet Parisis, – nec secundum rei veritatem umquam publice illam asseruit.

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The critical Vatican edition has edited his Oxford views, both in Lectura I and Ordinatio I (distinction 26). It has yet to begin Book III, where the Paris view predominates. It is found in distinction 1, part II, where Scotus asks but one question. “Is the formal characteristic that terminates11 the union of human nature to the Word a relative property of his?” As Balić indicates, in preparing volume VI of the Vatican edition, the Scotistic Commission made a preliminary edition of the text in Book III,12 numbering distinct sections or paragraphs so that footnote references to the text would correspond to the future Vatican edition of Book III. While I had the main codices on which this preliminary edition was based,13 I did not have the actual numbers Balić was using. Consequently, when I had occasion to participate in the International Scotistic Congress held in Rome March 1993, I took the opportunity to remedy this situation by a personal visit to the Scotistic Commission. Through the courtesy of Father Luke Modric, then its head and the cooperation of Father Barnabas Hechich, (who has recently succeeded him as president), I was able not only to examine this preliminary edition, but was given a xeroxed copy of the question.14 Though it does not represent the Commission’s final edition, it does bear the paragraph numbers this edition will undoubtedly have. For the present, at least, I find it extremely useful for understanding the footnote references in the volumes of the Vatican edition that have so far been published. Also, it contains what appears to have been Scotus’s final opinion about persons in the Trinity. Consequently, I take this opportunity to append a copy of the Latin text to this article. But first let me give a summary account of what has already been made available in the introductory Annotationes to volume

11 ‘Terminate’ has the meaning here of functioning as the ultimate term of a relationship, in this case becoming incarnate. 12 The question is the fifth in distinction 1, of Book III. It is the sole question in part 2 of this distinction. 13 Namely, Codex A (Assisi 137) and Codex S (Vatican Latin 883). 14 The text was transcribed by Martin Bodewig and annotated by Barnabas Hechich.

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VI of the Ordinatio.15 There Balić points out two distinctions in Book I that created problems, namely distinctions 26 and 39. I have touched on the problem concerning distinction 39 elsewhere.16 It is the lengthy discussion Balić devotes to distinction 26 that concerns Scotus’s discussion of what constitutes a person in the Trinity that I wish to summarize here. What Balić first discovered in 192717 was that a distinct literary connection existed between distinction 26 in Book I and in the aforesaid distinction 1 of Book III. Manuscripts presented these interrelated questions roughly in two forms, one short and one longer. It kept the Scotistic Commission busy for many years trying to determine which represented the authentic Ordinatio. The longer forms of distinction 26 apparently resulted from incorporating material found in distinction 1 of Book III; the shorter form in distinction 1 from omitting material that had been inserted in the longer form of distinction 26. As Balić explains there were two problems the Scotistic Commission needed to solve, one literary, the other doctrinal. Under the literary aspect it was necessary to establish whether Duns Scotus in distinction 26 dictated or wrote the shorter or the longer version. Under the doctrinal aspect, they had to determine just who the doctor or doctors were who held the persons were absolute before Scotus and just who this ‘doctor antiquus’ might be that Scotus gives as the authority for the fact that the absolutist view had been held earlier. After much study, the Scotistic Commission decided that the authentic Ordinatio was represented by the shorter version of Book I and by the longer version in Book III. In the first book, Scotus favored the opinion that the divine persons are constitut15 I have discussed this elsewhere, “Reflections about Scotus’s Early Works,” in John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics, ed. Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood and Mechthild Dreyer, see esp. 50-54. 16 Cf. e.g. my articles, “Scotus’ Paris Lectures on God’s Knowledge of Future Events,” in The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus, ed. Marilyn McCord Adams, 285-86; “God’s Knowledge: A Study in Scotistic Methodology,” in Via Scoti, (Roma: Edizioni Antonianum, 1995), I: 165ff; and also my “Reflections about Scotus’s Early Works,” 53-54. 17 Carl Balić, “Les Commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les quatre livres des Sentences,” (Doctoral dissertation, University of Louvain, 1927), 66-82, 154-61.

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ed by something non-relative or absolute, though he hesitated to assert this categorically as his opinion. By the time he came to work on the third book in Paris, he found he could answer the objections he had to the common opinion that the divine persons are constituted by relatives, and gave this as his final position. It was his disciples, knowing that Scotus had changed his opinion on this matter from the time he first taught at Oxford to his later tenure at Paris, who created the two alternate versions (one long, in Book I, and one short in Book III). Understandably, they were concerned to cite Scotus’s latest, rather than his earlier views. Hence they sought to update what Scotus originally wrote in distinction 26, where he left arguments against the common opinion unanswered.18 To do this, much of what Scotus dictated or wrote in distinction 1 of Book III had to be transferred to distinction 26 of Book I, and since it was included there, there was no point in repeating it when transcribing Book III. Thus the original short version in Book I became longer,19 and the original long version of Book III became shorter. Had Scotus himself undertaken to make these changes when he was dictating his Ordinatio, Balić declared, he would have made a far better job of it that did the disciples. Hence, the critical text of distinction 26 in volume VI of the Vatican edition represents the short version. This favors the opinion that the divine persons are constituted not by relations as the common view maintains, but by something non-relative or absolute. The interpolations introduced by disciples and taken from distinction 1 of Book III,20 to create the longer version in Book I are indicated below the critical text as interpolations. Since the variants could not be included there as well, they are relegated to Appendix B in the volume.

18 It is especially the arguments against the common opinion found in paragraphs 45, 51 and 52 that Scotus found difficult to answer (cf. par. 93 in Vat. 6: 49): Illa argumenta de tertia via videntur difficilia, et tamen solubilia si secunda opinio [i.e., the common view] sit vera. Solvat ea qui scit. If one examines par. 174, 175, 203-05 in dist. 1, of Book III (see appendix), these arguments are answered. 19 See the Wadding-Vives text of dist. 26 which adopts the longer version. 20 As Balić indicates, not all of the interpolations stem from the Ordinatio III. Some are found in Reportationes or come from as yet unidentified notebooks of Scotus.

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Having solved the literary problem, the Commission addressed the doctrinal one. Who were the earlier theologians who held the absolutist position, and who in particular is the ‘doctor antiquus’ that Scotus cites to prove that the absolutist opinion was not an innovation of his own. Balić gives ample evidence that William of Alverna,21 Bishop of Paris, and Robert Grosseteste,22 Bishop of Lincoln, held the absolutist position. He declares it is certain this opinion was held long before Scotus, but admits it is difficult to determine who had written about this same opinion first. Was it William of Paris or Robert of Lincoln? Does either depend upon the other?23 The Commission also identified the ‘doctor antiquus’ as being St. Bonaventure, but left in doubt the question of whether Scotus attributed the absolutist position to the Seraphic Doctor himself, or whether he merely adduced his name as providing evidence that this view had been held earlier. And finally in the third section, of the Adnotationes,24 Balić suggests what he believed one could say about Scotus’s own personal opinion, and how his thought developed from the time he first taught at Oxford to when he later lectured in Paris and held the Franciscans’ chair as their regent master of theology. As a young man, Scotus in his Oxford Lectura declared that the absolutist interpretation is consonant with faith, and is more probable than the common opinion of the constitution of the divine persons by exclusively relative properties.25 Although he is Guilelmus Alvernus, episcopus Parisiensis, De Trinitate, notionibus et praedicamentis in divinis. This work is found in William’s Opera omnia II (Parisiis 1674), pars II seu Supplementum in quo continentur quattuor tractatus hactenus non editi …, ex codice manuscripto insignis ecclesiae Carnotensis, cura et studio B. Le Feron:, 1a-64b. Balić cites extensive sections from the work in his Adnotationes to Vat. 6: 14*-20*. 22 Robert of Cowton, Alfonsus of Toledo, and Thomas of Argentina all testify that Robert Grosseteste (cited simply as Lincolniensis) held this opinion, but give different arguments in its favor they attributed to him. 23 What makes it difficult is that Robert Grosseteste’s treatise De personis divinis et imagine Dei, cited by Cowton has not been found. Puzzling also is the fact that some of the arguments Cowton attributes to the Bishop of Lincoln are found cited in Scotus’s Lectura, while others occur in the aforesaid work of William, Bishop of Paris. 24 Vat. 6: 24*-26*. 25 See Adnotationes to Vat. 6:25*; Lectura I, d. 26 n. 54-66, Vat. 17: 332-37. 21

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unwilling to assert this definitively, he admits it appears to him more probable.26 He clarifies this somewhat when he discusses personality with respect to the first divine person in distinction 28, question 3 of the Lectura. Since the Father’s property of “unbegotten” is presupposed by his relationship of paternity to the Son, John Duns admits the opinion that the first person is constituted by some absolute reality seems to be much more probable.27 Despite that, however, he will respond according to the common relativistic position to the question “Is the first person constituted by some positive relationship to the second person?”28 But nowhere in the Ordinatio, says Balić, does Scotus declare definitively that this absolutist position is either ‘more probable’ or even ‘very probable.’ In the short form that represents the authentic Ordinatio I (dist. 26) John Duns does admit there is a difficulty in answering the arguments against the common opinion. During the years Scotus taught in Paris, however, he found ways to answer the objections he was unable to refute at Oxford. Balić cites an incidental question added to the Barcelona Reportatio III, (dist. 8, q. 1-2)29 that is indicative of his growing ability to solve these problems. Consequently, John’s belief in the common opinion grew stronger. Nevertheless he still accepted this traditional view, chiefly because of the authorities in its favor rather than for any rational ground. In the following question of Ordinatio III, distinction 1, q. 5, where he treats of the incarna-

Lectura, n. 66, Vat. 17: 337: Ista autem opinio videtur mihi probabilior, eam tamen non assero. 27 Ibid. n. 63, Vat. 17: 385: Alia est opinio ponens primam personam constituti aliqua realitate absoluta, quia non est intelligibile Patrem esse in divinis nisi praeintelligatur ingenitum … 28 Ibid. n. 70, Vat. 17: 387-88: Ista autem opinio, licet sit multum probabilis et evacuat difficultatem quaestionis, quia tamen non tenetur communiter, ideo aliter respondeo ad quaestionem, sustinendo viam communem quod personae constituuntur per relationes. And in n. 82, Vat. 17: 391, he gives this definitive answer: Et secundam hanc viam, tenendo quod personae constituuntur relationibus, dico quod persona constituitur proprietate relativa secundum quod est in re, et non secundum quod intellectus aliquis negotiatur circa illam proprietatem considerando unam rationem in illa proprietate et non aliam. 29 This is found in Balić’s, Ioannis Duns Scoti, Doctoris Mariani, Theologiae marianae elementa in Bibliotheca mariana medii aevi, II A (Sibenici, 1933): 305-15. 26

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tion, one can see Scotus gives a better and more lengthy defense of the common opinion. Ordinatio III, d. 1 [q. 5]* Pars Secunda De Facto Incarnationis Quaestio unica [Utrum formalis ratio terminandi unionem naturae humanae ad verbum sit proprietas eius relativa] 154 Viso de possibilitate Incarnationis in communi et in speciali quaero de facto scilicet de termino formali incarnationis: utrum formalis ratio terminandi unionem naturae humanae ad Verbum sit proprietas eius relativa. [Argumenta pro et contra] Quod non, ostendo dupliciter: Primo, quia nulla proprietas personalis, sed essentia terminat, quia per illam rationem convenit Verbo terminare unionem per quam convenit sibi continere perfectionem suppositi creati, et per quam natura creata est in perfecta obedientia et potentia obedientiae ad Verbum: (Istae enim assignantur esse rationes possibilitatis incarnationis ex parte assumentis et naturae assumptae); sed ista conveniunt Verbo per essentiam, non per aliquam rationem personalem, quae non est formaliter infinita, quia proprietas personalis nec continet formaliter perfectionem omnis suppositi, nec est potentia obedientiae in creatura ad ipsum, sed respicit omnipotentiam facientis quae non est proprietas personalis, sed essentialis. 155 Praeterea, assumens communicat esse naturae assumptae; sed esse in divinis est essentiale; ergo aliquod essentiale quod praecise est ratio essendi, est ratio communicandi humanae naturae dependentiam ab Verbum.

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156 Secundo, quod non proprietas Verbi relativa, quia eo Verbum terminat unionem (si30 persona est primus terminus unionis), quo Verbum formaliter est persona; sed non proprietate relativa est haec persona persona,31 quia tunc esset per accidens, quia constituitur per aliquod alterius generis; ergo etc. 157 Sed quod proprietas relativa non est haec persona nec terminat, probo per illas rationes quae adductae sunt distinctione 26,32 primi libri, pro opinione; quaere ibi. 158 Contra: Persona una assumit et non alia, ergo per illud quo est haec persona distincta et determinata. Sed hoc tantum est proprietas relativa, secundum Anselmum,33 I De processione Spiritus sancti; volens Spiritum sanctum esse de Filio, arguit per divisionem: aut est de Patre aut de essentia Patris; si primum detur, habetur propositum, quia nihil habetur ibi nisi proprietas suppositi vel communis essentia, si divisio est immediata et destruendo unum membrum, inferat aliud, ergo si non sequitur, facit fallaciam consequentis. [Opinio aliorum] 159 Si dicatur quod sicut per hoc quod est ‘de uno Deo’ intelligit quidquid commune est tribus personis, puta vim spiritivam, quae fuit proprietas absoluta in toto tempore suo (sicut communiter exponunt eum doctores), ita per illud ‘de relatione’ intelligit ipse quidquid est proprium personae Patris, sive sit relativum sive absolutum, – et ita, si ponatur proprietas absoluta,34 intelligitur per illud membrum ‘de essentia Patris’ * The text was originally transcribed by Martin Bodewig from the principal Assisi MS (Codex A 141ra-143rb). The text was annotated with reference to Vatican Codex S 172ra-175ra by Barnabas Hechich. For a description of these manuscripts see the introductory “De Ordinatione I. D. Scoti Disquisitio Historico-Critica” to the Vatican edition, vol. 1, p. 12*-28* (Codex A) and 34*35* (Codex S). MS has ‘sed’ which Hechech changed to ‘si.’ 31 Text leaves out the repetition of ‘persona’ and adds: Sequitur textus interpolatus: quia …; ergo etc. Codex A in the margin has non in libro Duns. 32 Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 26, n. 32-35, 60-64, 66. 33 Anselm’s argument in Ordinatio I, d. 26, n. 20 reads: omnia sunt unum in divinis ‘ubi non oviat relationis oppositio’. (Vat. 6: 5) 34 Codex A has ‘absolute’; Codex S has ‘absoluta.’ 30

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Spiritum sanctum spirare de absoluto proprio Patris, si quid sit, sicut de proprietate Patris, – Contra: 160 Augustinus VII De Trinitate cap. 9: sub essentia continetur quidquid est ad se sive sit essentiale, commune tribus, sive personale. Probat enim ibi, quod eodem modo dicitur aliquis persona et Deus, licet persona accipiatur pro prima substantia; non autem eo est Deus quo Pater, secundum eum, sed alio est Deus et Pater; ergo non intelligitur personale, si sit absolutum, sub relatione personae, sed magis sub ipso communi, quod est ad se. 161 Praeterea, si aliquo absoluto constituatur persona Verbi, ergo ratio Arii erit demonstratio, cum enim arguit, quod ingenitum esse et genitum esse est aliud et aliud, et utrumque dicitur secundum substantiam, ergo persona prima est alia secundum substantiam a secunda. Conclusio necessario sequitur, si ponatur persona esse absoluta; illa enim constituit substantiam, et non relationem, et ita illud quod est aliud secundum istam proprietatem, est aliud secundum substantiam; ingenitum autem est aliud secundum proprietatem; ergo et secundum substantiam. 162 Si dicatur quod ratio Arii est sophisma figurae dictionis dupliciter: tum quia commutatur ‘ad aliquid’ in ‘quid,’ arguendo sic: ‘ingenitum esse est aliud a genito, hoc est, est aliud in quantum ingenitum, igitur est aliud secundum substantiam’: commutatur enim ‘ad aliquid’ in ‘quid’ (quod ostendit Augustinus, quia ingenitum dicit formaliter ‘ad aliquid,’ licet negative); tum quia si non accipiatur ingenitum pro ipsa proprietate quam significat, sed pro illa proprietate absoluta quae substernitur (si ponatur, dicatur a) et arguitur ‘ingenitum est aliud a genito [f. 141rb] personaliter, ergo est aliud ab eo secundum substantiam’ est figura dictionis, commutando ‘hoc aliquid’ in ‘quid.’ In praemissa enim intelligitur alietas in proprietate primae substantiae, in consequente infertur alietas pro substantia secunda sive pro quiditate, quia ita intellexit Arius (dixit autem ipse quod Filius Dei est pura creatura, et habet aliam substantiam et aliam naturam

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a Patre), et ita obviat sibi Augustinus V De Trinitate cap. 6, quod si aliquid sunt tres personae secundum substantiam, quod non intelligitur nisi de substantia secunda, quae est quiditas. Et hoc modo tam Augustinus quam haeretici, contra quos loquitur, accipiunt substantiam. Et ideo ex alietate suppositi, quod est prima substantia, inferre quod est aliud secundum substantia, sicut ipsi loquuntur, et commutare ‘hoc aliquid’ in ‘quid.’ Si altero istorum modorum, respondeatur ad rationem Ariii quod sit sophistica, – contra: prima substantia est maxime substantia; si persona constituatur per absolutum, per illud erit maxime substantia, – et ita si secundum hoc sit aliud, erit maxime aliud secundum substantiam. 163 Praeterea, ad istam conclusionem sunt aliquae rationes, tactae dist. 26 primi libri,35 pro parte ista ‘quod relationes constitunt personas.’ [I. – Ad quaestionem] 164 In ista quaestione sunt duo articuli: primus quid sit proprietas constituens personam; secundus an illa sit ratio terminandi istam unionem. [A. – Quid sit proprietas constituens personam 1. – Rationes pro opinione quae tenet personas constitui per relationes] 165 [Rationes speciales] De primo tactum est in primo libro, quaestio praedicta.36 Sed apponuntur rationes speciales quod non possunt esse proprietates absolutae. Primo sic: illa proprietas, si constitueret, non esset tantum personaliter nec virtualiter in Deo, quia tunc non esset magis huiusmodi persona quam asinus: (includit enim Deus virtualiter perfectionem asini in se); ergo oportet quod sit ibi actualiter: ergo est ibi ut actus absolutus. Ergo in divinis essent tria esse absoluta quod est inconveniens.

35 36

Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 26, n. 24-27. Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 26.

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166 Praeterea secundo sic: illud absolutum vocetur a, ergo a si facit unum cum essentia, alterum est actus, alterum potentia, et alterum perfectio alterius; essentia non perficit illud personale, quia non praesupponit illud, sed magis econverso; ergo absolutum personale erit perfectio essentiae. Et sequuntur tunc duo inconvenientia: unum quod essentia secundum se non sit perfecta omnino, – aliud, quod una persona non sit omnino perfecta, quia non habet absolutum alterius personae (quod est perfectio ex ostensis).37 167 Et si confirmetur hoc secundum, quia ‘secundum Anselmum Monologion 13, praeter relationes, omne aliud aut est simpliciter melius ipsum quam non ipsum, – aut non, sed in aliquo melius non ipsum quam ipsum; quod secundo modo se habet, non est in Deo, secundum ipsum; ergo omne aliud quod est in ipso, circumscripta relatione, est simpliciter melius ipsum quam non ipsum, et perfectio simpliciter,’ – ex hoc sequitur quod nulla persona erit simpliciter perfecta, quia nulla habet absolutum alterius; sequitur etiam quod duae personae sunt aliquid perfectius quam una, quod est contra Augustinum VIII De Trinitate cap. 1. 168 Praeterea tertio sic: multiplicato aliquo absoluto multiplicatur omne aliud absolutum circumstans illud (exemplum: multiplicata quantitate, multiplicatur albedo, et e converso); ergo si sic sint distincta absoluta propria quae circumstant essentiam divinam, distinguerent etiam essentiam divinam. 169 Et confirmatur maior, quia plura eiusdem speciei non possunt esse in eodem; ista, si ponantur, erunt eiusdem speciei, – quia si non, erunt alterius speciei, et ita oportet quaerere per quid alterum illorum sit incommunicabile: sicut enim ponitur paternitatem (quae differet speciei a filiatione) non posse esse de se incommunicabilem, ita sequeretur de a in Patre (si sit absolutum) et b in Filio – si differant specie – quod neutrum erit de se incommunicabile, et oportebit stare ad aliqua propria eiusdem rationis. Confirmatur ista ratio, saltem quia non sunt plura eiusdem rationis in eodem perfecto (sicut in divinis non sunt plura Verba neque plures Patres), quia hoc videtur esse 37

Scilicet, secundum inconveniens; cf. supra.

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imperfectionis quod in aliqua natura possunt esse plura omnino similia; ergo in natura divina simpliciter perfecta non erunt plura absoluta eiusdem rationis, neque alterius; ergo nullo modo. 170 Quarto: si proprietas absoluta a exprimatur ab essentia, et similiter b et ‘expressum’38 est in eodem supposito cum eo a quo exprimitur (secundum istum modum exprimendi qui ponitur), ergo a et b erunt in una persona, et ita nulla persona originabitur ab alia (quia propria earum erunt in eadem persona), immo sequitur quod non erit distinctio personalis. 171 Quinto: sequitur quod non sit ibi origo, quia persona originata per originem accipit esse; sed persona, si est absoluta, praecedit relationem originis; ergo persona secunda praecederet in essendo ipsam originem passivam et ita non haberet esse per eam. 172 [Responsio ad rationes pro opinione opposita]39 Et ideo tenentes conclusionem istarum rationum responderent ad rationes oppositas tactas pro opinione opposita. Ad illud40 Augustini de persona, dicitur quod loquitur ibi de formali significato personae, non de materiali: formaliter autem significat aliquid, in se indistinctum et ab alio distinctum, in natura intellectuali; accidit autem huic signato formali, per quid sit talis distinctio (per absolutum, vel aliquam relationem), – et tamen in aliqua alia absolutum necessario importat aliquam relationem. Sic in proposito. 173 Ad illud41 quod suppositum naturae divinae non est unum per accidens; ergo non constituitur per aliquid alterius generis in natura; dicitur quod relatio constitit ut transit in essentiam et non ut alterius generis; nec propter hoc sequitur quod constitutivum sit absolutum, quia relatio servat illud quod est proprium sibi; bene tamen conceditur illud quod relinquitur ex relatione esse absolutum quia illud est esse.

Codex A has ‘exprimens.’ It should rather read ‘expressum.’ Respondet ad aliquas rationes factas pro opinione quae tenet personas constitui per absoluta, id est, contra opinionem communem seu de relativis; cf. Ordinatio I, d. 26. 40 Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 26 n. 54 (Vat. 6: 21). 41 Cf. Ordinatio n. 52 (Vat. 6: 19). 38 39

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174 Ad aliud42 quod ‘proprietas personae est primo incommunicabilis, relatio non,’ dicitur quod relatio subsistens, qualis est divina relatio, est primo incommunicabilis, licet ex abstracta ratione talis relationis sit communicabilis. 175 Per idem43 quasi dicitur ad illud44 quod ‘personarum vel personalia distinguentia sunt primo diversa, non sic paternitas et filiatio’: negatur minor, quia si paternitas et filiatio in eis communicant in aliquo, non tamen divinae vel in divinis. 176 Ad illud45 quod ‘relatio realis requirit extrema realiter distincta’ dicitur quod hoc est verum de relatione accidentali, qualis non est ista, sed substantialis constituens suppositum substantiae. [2. – Improbatio praedicarum rationum] 177 Quantum ad istum articulum primo videndum est de responsione et obiectionibus, secundo de conclusione in se. [a. – De rationibus specialibus ac responsionibus] 178 De primo arguitur quod rationes non concludant, et quod responsiones non solvant. 179 [Rationes speciales non concludunt] – Probatio per ordinem. Prima enim ratio46 inititur huic propositioni ‘omne absolutum est actus et per consequens dans esse.’ 180 Hoc [f. 141va] improbatur multipliciter: Tum quia in creaturis, ubi maxime videtur habere probabilitatem, non omnis actus dat esse, quia tunc natura humana in Christo dat esse, et idem esse non haberet quod haberet demissa (quod est contra Augustinum, VIII Trinitatis cap. 1), quia demissa haberet propriam personalitatem, quae dicit actum incommunicabilem. Cf. Ordinatio n. 45. Cf. Ordinatio n. 51. 44 Codex S has: Per idem quasi dicitur quod prima distinguentia aut primo distincta non sic paternitas et filiatio; ideo negatur minor … f. 174va. 45 Cf. Ordinatio I, dist. 26, n. 36. 46 Cf. supra n. 165. 42 43

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181 Similiter, actus dans esse dat operationem, – proprietas hypostatica in creaturis non dat operationem. Quod patet per Damascenum I cap. 60:47 “Naturales et non hypostaticas < ... voluntates et operationes: si enim hypostaticas>48 demus ipsas, 49 volentes 50 operantes tres hypostases sanctae Trinitatis dicere cogemur”; ubi ipse, ex hoc quod tres personae divinae non habent tres operationes, concludit quod operatio non est hypostatica, – hoc est, non est per proprietatem hypostaticam, et hoc in communi, sive de proprietate absoluta sive relativa. 182 Praeterea, tertio: in omni eo quod habet esse aliquo modo ab aliquo, praeter illud quod dat sibi esse est aliud ratione cuius51 recipit esse (patet de composito ex materia et forma, et omnibus aliis compositis ex actu et potentia); ergo in habente esse per aliquid dans esse, est aliquid quod non est actus dans esse sed ratio recipiendi esse, – et ita videtur in supposito naturae esse, quod cum suppositum habeat esse naturae et natura dat esse, proprietas hypostatica erit ratio recipiendi esse. 183 Ad argumentum52 tunc potest dici quod cum duplex sit ratio entitatis, quiditativae scilicet et hypostaticae, sicut quiditativae est de se dare esse, quia ipsa est de se communicabilis,53 ita hypostaticae est ut non sit actus dans esse, quia de se est incommunicabilis ut ‘quo.’ Et licet in creaturis proprietas individualis det esse, quia est gradus alicuius entitatis positivae ultra entitatem quiditativam naturae, tamen ultra entitatem singularitatis proprietas suppositi nullam54 entitatem dicit, immo nullum positivum addit55 (ex prima quaestione); et licet adderet aliquod esse, illud tamen non esset ratio dandi esse, sed tantum incommunicabile esse, quia haec natura exsistens – in qua includitur natura et entitas singularis – est totalis ratio Damascene, c. 58 [III c.14] (ed. Buytaert 215, 28-33; PG 94, 1035). Codex A omits . 49 Codex A has ‘aut.’ 50 Codex A has ‘aut.’ 51 Codex S; for ‘cuius.’ Codex A has veram entitatem dicit nullam. 52 Cf. supra n. 165. 53 Codex A has ‘incommunicabilis.’ 54 For ‘nullam entitatem dicit’ Codex A has ‘veram entitatem dicit nullam.’ 55 For ‘addit’ Codex A has ‘dicit.’ 47 48

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dandi esse, et ita quidquid intelligatur advenire, sive56 positive sive privative, vel positivum vel privativum, sive absolutum sive respectivum, 57 esse. Licet ergo in divinis ‘proprietas personalis’ non sit tantum negatio sed aliqua proprietas positiva, tamen quia natura divina est de se haec – per se existens – ipsa habebit totam rationem dandi esse: sicut et in creaturis ‘haec natura existens’ dat totaliter esse, non tantum per hoc quod proprietas adveniens est negatio (immo si adveniret proprietas positiva, nihil tolleretur ab hac natura exsistente, quin totaliter dare esse), ita nec in divinis tolletur ab hac natura – quae est de se exsistens – quin dabit totaliter esse personae, licet in persona intelligatur proprietas personalis positiva. 184 Ad argumentum58 ergo, cum probatur quod sit actus, cum non sit ibi in potentia, vel cum non sit virtualiter in Deo, dico quod est ibi fallacia aequivocationis: uno enim modo actus est differentia opposita potentiae, et hoc modo actus et potentia dividit omne ens etiam et materiam, – alio modo actus cum potentia constituit aliquid totum (sicut loquitur Philosophus VIII Metaphysicae59 de actu et potentia), et hoc non est potentia opposita actui, quia illa non manet cum actu, sicut ‘haec materia’ cum forma simul in composito; ista ergo proprietas non est tantum virtualiter in essentia divina (sicut est asinus, qui est ibi tantum in potentia ante actum), et per consequens haec proprietas est actu ibi prout actus opponitur tali potentiae. Sed non sequitur ‘ergo est actus dans esse’; ad hoc enim requireretur quod esset actus formalis: hoc enim modo materia daret esse, quia est ‘in composito’ in actu, non in potentia ante actum. 185 Secunda etiam ratio60 videtur deficere: tum quia istud non se habet ad essentiam sicut perfectio ad perfectibile, sicut diffuse declaratum est ‘de proprietate relativa personae’ distinctione 5 primi libri,61 ubi dictum est quod persona non componitur ex Balić omits ‘sive positive sive privative’; cf. Vat. 6: 39 line 6. For Codex A has only ‘non dabit.’ 58 Cf. supra n. 165. 59 scilicet in toto libro. – Aristot., Metaphysicae VIII, t. 1-16 (c. 1-6, 1042a 13-1045b 23). 60 Cf. supra n. 166. 61 Ordinatio I, d. 5, n. 113, 118, 129-38 (IV, 67-68, 73-78). 56 57

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essentia et relatione vel proprietate, sicut ex quasi potentiali et actuali. Immo essentia magis habet ratione actus. Etsi ergo ista proprietas intelligatur quasi posterior aliquod modo essentia, non tamen propter hoc est perfectio eius; ibi enim est idem ordo originis et perfectionis, et illud quod est prius origine, est prius perfectione, sicut tunc fuit diffuse declaratum. 186 Secundo: dato quod aliquo modo se haberet ad essentiam ut informans ipsam, non tamen est perfectio simpliciter, quia secundum Anselmum, Monologion 15,62 ‘perfectionis simpliciter in quolibet melius est ipsum quam non ipsum,’ quod est impossibile de proprietate hypostatica, quia illa de ratione sui repugnat cuilibet alii contradictorie ab illo cuius est, et ita non potest ipsam in aliquo alio esse melius ‘quam non ipsum,’ quia cuilibet alii contradictorie repugnat. 187 Sic ergo ad rationem63 patet quod falsum assumitur si accipiatur quod illud absolutum perficiat essentiam; nec probatio eius valet ‘per hoc quod aliquo modo sequitur et non praecedit,’ quia in divinis – sicut potest poni praecessio – actus et forma est primum. Secundo, dato quod haberetur hoc ‘quod informat,’ non sequeretur quod sit perfectio eius simpliciter, nec illa quae inferuntur ulterius, scilicet quod ‘essentia divina non sit simpliciter perfecta’ vel quod ‘persona una non sit simpliciter perfecta in se.’ 188 Praeterea, ista ratio64 melius concluderet contra relationem, quia probabilius videtur quod proprietas absoluta hypostatica non sit perfectio quam quod relatio non sit perfectio, quia nulli proprietati hypostaticae competit esse perfectionem (nec in creaturis, nec in aliis), alicui autem relationi secundum rationem propriam competit esse perfectionem; aliqua enim est perfectior altera, et tamen nulla perfectio simpliciter, quia secundum Augustinum De quantitate animae, cap. 1:65 “Aequalitatem inaequalitati iure praeponimus, nec nullus est omnino humano sensu praeditus,” etc., “quin aequalitatem inaequalitati praeferat.” Hoc autem non est tantum a fundamento, potest enim inaequalitas fundari in fundamentis perfectioribus Anselm, Monologion c. 15 (PL 158, 163; ed. Schmitt I 28, 30-31). Cf. supra n. 166 (in minore rationis). 64 Cf. supra n. 166. 65 Augustine, De quantitate animae, lib. I, cap. 9, n. 155 (PL 32, 1044). 62 63

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quam aliqua aequalitas; patet etiam quod, si tantum esset ex fundamento, Augustinus faceret petitionem principii: intendit enim concludere nobilitatem figurae ad figuram, puta circuli ad figuras rectilineas, et hoc facit ex aequalitate et inaequalitate, – quare si illa excellentia non esset nisi ex fundamentis et ex illa concluderet excellentiam fundamentorum, et tunc faceret circulum. 189 Si dicatur quod dictum Augustinum66 verum est ratione fundamentorum proximorum, non remotorum, proximum autem fundamentum aequalitatis est quantitas, – hoc est falsum et nihil ad [f. 141vb] b. Quaero enim cum dicitur ‘quantum est par vel aequale alii quanto,’ aut dicit relationem aut aliquod absolutum? Si absolutum, tunc potest intelligi aliquid esse par absque hoc quod sit alicui par; et similiter, unde habebitur perfectio paritatis hoc modo respectu imparitatis? et tunc in triangulo oportet esse duas quantitates! Vel fingas aliquem alium modum quo paritas possit esse aliquod absolutum, perfectius aliquo modo imparitate et aliud a quantitate. – Si autem dicat relationem, sicut videtur manifestum, ergo relatio per se fundabitur in relatione; immo videtur dicere eandem relationem cum relatione aequalitatis: quantum enim est par quanto et aequale quanto! 190 Ad illud67 Anselmi, Monologion 15, respondetur quod loquitur de quiditatibus, non autem de proprietatibus hypostaticis. – Quod probatur, primo per exempla eius de sapientia et veritate ex una parte, auro et plumbo ex alia parte. Secundo per rationem, quia illud solum est perfectio simpliciter quod potest esse in aliquo infinitum, sicut illud melius est in aliquo ‘non ipsum quam ipsum’ quod est ex se finitum; haec conveniunt quiditati ‘esse finitum’ vel ‘infinitum,’ non autem proprietati hypostaticae, quia proprietas personalis divina – qualiscumque sit – nec est formaliter finita nec infinita; similiter proprietas hypostatica repugnat cuilibet praeter quam uni cuius est, – ergo non potest cuilibet esse melior ipsa ‘quam non ipsa,’ sed nec alicui. Excludit ergo Anselmus ab universitate quiditatum relationem secundum quiditatem, et tunc omnis quiditas absoluta est vel perfectio

66 67

Cf. supra n. 188. Cf. supra n. 167.

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simpliciter vel limitata; sed non sequitur ex hoc propositum de proprietate hypostatica absoluta.68 191 Tertia ratio69 habet maiorem falsam in omnibus ordinatis essentialiter, licet quandoque gratia materiae sit vera; et similiter, in omnibus non aeque illimitatis. De nullo enim ordine essentiali ex propria ratione prioris et posterioris oportet ipsa commultiplicari, sed potest stare multiplicatio posterioris sine multiplicatione prioris, licet non econverso; similiter quandocumque duo comparantur ad tertium quod est illimitatum, eo modo quo ista duo sunt limitata non oportet condistingui70 eis (exemplum anima intellectiva comparantur ad partes corporis, quae quodammodo est illimitata respectu illarum eo modo quod partes sunt limitatae, non oportet animam distingui in distinctis partibus). Illa ergo maior, ad propositum, est falsa dupliciter: et quia essentia (eo modo quo est ibi prioritas in persona71) prior est aliquo modo ipsis proprietatibus, non e converso, secundum eos, – ergo non oportet essentiam distingui ad istarum proprietatum distinctionem; et quia ista essentia est formaliter infinita, istae proprietates non sunt formaliter infinitae, – et ideo non oportet ‘infinitum formaliter’ distingui ad distinctionem eorum quae non sunt formaliter infinitae. 192 Si etiam maior72 acciperetur generaliter, de quibuscumque absolutis circumstantibus idem, – adhuc habet instantiam manifestam de anima et potentiis, quia potentiae multiplicantur non multiplicata anima. Sed si hoc posset evadi, specificando maiorem de his quae sunt eiusdem speciei (sicut accipit illa prima confirmatio maioris73), nec tunc propositio est vera universaliter in relationibus, ut patebit distinctione 8.74 Plura eiusdem rationis esse in eodem – in absolutis etiam – non est contradictio, si aliquod eorum non sit actus adaequatus illi in quo est. Sequitur adnotatio Duns Scoti mutila; vide in fine huius dictionis. Cf. supra n. 168. 70 Codices A and S have ‘condescendi.’ 71 Cf. supra n. 166: essentia non perficit illud personale, quia non praesupponit illud, sed magis e converso. 72 Cf. supra n. 168. 73 Cf. supra n. 163. 74 Cf. Ordinatio III d. 9, q. unica n. [6-9]. 68 69

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193 Cum ergo declaratur per inductionem75 fit fallacia consequentis, quia accipiuntur singularia aliqua non similia proposito, puta in quibus distinctio priorum constituit76 distinctionem posteriorum, vel in quibus consimilis limitatio utrobique et non illimitatio in uno respectu alterius; ex his non potest inferri universaliter, quia falsa est ubi deficiunt condiciones sicut in proposito. 194 Sed ad illud ultimum, additum ad confirmationem maioris, quod idem,77 etc., posset dici quod sicut simpliciter perfectum – idem numero – est communicabile pluribus suppositis eiusdem rationis (ita quod non repugnat sibi ex perfectione sui simpliciter, sed convenit sibi quod ipsum sit in pluribus suppositis eiusdem rationis), ita ex perfectione naturae eius potest ei competere quod plura eiusdem rationis possunt esse in eodem sicut supposita in natura, et per consequens etiam plures proprietates hypostaticae eiusdem rationis; sed non potest ita78 esse de aliis de quibus exemplificatur (puta de Patre et Verbo), quia perfectio eius requirit quod quaelibet productio habeat terminum adaequatum, non autem ita requirit quod aliqua proprietas hypostatica sit adaequata illi naturae in constituendo suppositum. 195 Per istud79 posset dici ad illam primam confirmationem maioris,80 applicando eam ad propositum, quod est ibi fallacia aequivocationis. Maior enim, si esset vera, debet intelligi de esse ‘in’ sicut actus est in eo quod informatur per ipsam; sed sic minor non est vera: proprietas enim non est in essentia ut informans eam, sed ut constituens suppositum in ea. 196 Posset tamen ad utramque confirmationem81 dici quod istae proprietates non sunt eiusdem rationis formaliter, sicut in creaturis proprietates individuales sunt primo diversae, et non eiusdem rationis. Et [f. 142rb] si ex hoc inferatur quod sunt alterius speciei sive quod utraque earum habeat rationem Cf. supra n. 168 (exemplum). Codex A adds “vel consistit distinctio.” 77 Cf. supra n. 169: Confirmatur ista ratio, saltem quia non sunt plura eiusdem rationis in eodem perfecto. 78 Codex S; A omits. 79 Cf. supra n. 194. 80 Cf. supra n. 169. 81 Cf. supra n. 169. 75 76

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quasi alterius speciei, et per hoc oportet ipsam per aliud determinari ad incommunicabilitatem, – non sequitur, sicut nec in proprietatibus in creaturis in quibus istae sunt ultimae determinationes naturae in creaturis: licet non sint eiusdem rationis in aliquibus, tamen nulla est entitas quiditativa et communis, sed de se est ‘haec.’ 197 Quarta ratio82 procedit ex falsa imaginatione, scilicet quod istae proprietates exprimuntur ab essentia quasi per originem, – quod non fuit dictum. Sed sicut aliqui concedunt quod relationes pullulant in essentia (si tamen hoc proprie dicatur), ita posset dici et concedi contra eos quod istae proprietates – si sint absolutae – pullulant in essentia; et licet quaelibet sit in eadem essentia ex qua pullulat (quia essentia est in tribus personis), tamen aliqua non est in eadem persona cum illa a qua habetur per originem. Nec repugnat vera originatio ‘personae habentis unam’ a persona habente aliam, licet omnes istae non origines, sed aliquo modo pullulant ex essentia, – sicut habent alii dicere per relationem, quod Filius pullulat a Patre per originem et tamen filiatio pullulat aliquo modo in essentia sive ab essentia divina. 198 Quinta ratio83 videtur deficere, quia difficilius videtur sustinere originationem ponendo extrema tantum esse relativa formaliter quam ponendo ea esse absoluta. Nam si tantum sint relativa, nihil erit aliud ‘personam originare personam’ quam relativum habere correlativum; sed relativum, positum, videtur sine omni actione alia habere correlativum. Si autem ponantur absoluta, non videtur tanta difficultas quomodo unum suppositum gignatur ab alio, cum in creaturis – secundum eos – sint supposita absoluta et tamen non ibi negatur originatio unius ab alio. 199 Cum ergo arguit quod absolutum praecedit relationem, et per consequens originationem, respondeo: dictum fuit quod originatio pertinet ad genus causae efficientis, et sicut in creaturis terminus non est originatione formaliter, sed quasi effective (nec ex hoc quod non est formaliter illo, sequitur quod praecedat illud), ita posset dici in proposito, nec videtur maior 82 83

Cf. supra n. 170. Cf. supra n. 171.

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difficultas de prioritate absoluti quam respectivi, nec hic quam in creaturis. 200 [Responsiones non solvunt] Quod rationes assignatae ab eis non solvantur, probatio: Primo ex ratione Augustini:84 aut Augustinus intendit in illo formali signato personae ‘indistinctum in se et distinctum ab alio’ secundum essentiam, et tunc non habet maius concedere quod sunt tres personae quam tres essentiae (sive tria distincta secundum essentiam), quod videtur manifeste contra intentionem suam, ubi vult quod aliter utimur nos nomine substantiae et aliter graeci: graeci ergo ipsi utuntur persona vel substantia pro prima substantia, et concedunt tres substantias eo modo quo nos 85 proprie concedimus secundum eum tres personas. Aut intelligit ‘indistinctum in se’ 86 ab alio’), et tunc illud secundum formalem suum signatum est ad se, et habetur propositum. 201 Contra aliud,87 quaero utrum relatio constituit, ut est formaliter eadem essentiae aut non? Si sic, sequuntur duo absurda: unum, quod relatio non erit relatio, quia secundum Augustinum VII De Trinitate:88 ‘substantia, si ad alterum est, iam non est substantia,’ __ et ita relatio, si est formaliter substantia, ita non est ad aliud; similiter autem89 quidquid constituitur aliquo in quantum absolutum, est absolutum formaliter, et ita suppositum constitutum esset formaliter absolutum. Aut constituitur relatione in quantum transit sive est idem essentiae divinae non formaliter sed realiter, – et cum hoc stat quod constituitur proprie, relatione ut relatio est, quia relatio non potest considerari in divinis quin sit idem realiter ipsi essentiae, sive sit res sive sit relatio. Si ergo secundum aliquem modum considerata, constitueret suppositum per accidens, si sic constitueret – et secundum omnem modum considerata est Cf. supra n. 172. Codex A omits. 86 Codex A omits. 87 Cf. supra n. 173. 88 Augustine, De Trinitate VII, c. 4 (PL 42, 942): Ita iam substantiam non erit substantia, quia relativum erit … 89 Hechich has ‘similiter aliud’ for ‘similter autem’ in both A and S. 84 85

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realiter90 eadem essentiae licet non formaliter – ex hoc quod, ut eadem realiter essentiae, constituit, non prohibetur constitutum esse ens per accidens; non autem potest constituere ut magis idem essentiae quam realiter, quia non ut formaliter idem. 202 Praeterea, quod dicitur ‘relationem derelinquere esse absolutum,’91 hoc videtur repugnari sibi ipsi, quia forma non derelinquitur aliquid esse ad se, sicut albedo non derelinquit aliud esse in albo, quo albo est album, quam semet ipsam; igitur proprietas constituens, si conservet hoc quod est sibi proprium, derelinquit quod est sibi proprium et nihil aliud. – Similiter quomodo posset esse absolutum derelinqui a proprietate relativa, si praecedat eam in persona? 203 Contra illud quod respondetur postea92 de relatione subsistente, quod ipsa est incommunicabilis, quaero cum prius oporteat intelligere aliquid93 quam subsistens, quare propter quid paternitas sit ‘haec’? Non de se, cum non sit formaliter infinita; – ergo multo magis nec est de se subsistens; igitur nec de se incommunicabilis. Contra aliam partem94 quod ‘ipsa in quantum divina est incommunicabilis’ arguo sic: quando duo constituunt aliquod tertium, neutrum habet ab alio quod est secundum propriam rationem sui. Sicut materia non habet a forma potentialitatem quae est eius in causando compositum, nec forma habet aliquam actualitatem 95 quae est eius in componendo cum materia compositum, ita etiam in definitione: genus non habet aliquem conceptum determinabile a differentia, nec differentia habet a genere actum specificum indivisibilem in plura secundum speciem. Ergo si persona constituatur ex essentia et proprietate incommunicabili, neutrum habebit ab altero quod est sibi proprium; ergo ut sic, sicut essentia non habet communicabilitatem a proprietate, quia ipsa de se est communicabilis, circumscribendo per intellectum proprietatem, ita proprietas non habebit ab essentia incommunicabiltatem, Codex A has “‘formaliter eadem essentiae, sed non realiter’ – et hoc etc.” Codex S has “‘essentiae, licet non formaliter’ – ex hoc etc.” 91 Cf. supra n. 173. 92 Cf. supra n. 174. 93 Hechich suggests adding ‘esse hoc’; but it is in neither codices A nor S. 94 Cf. supra n. 174. 95 Codex S; A omits. Hechich substitutes ‘a materia’ for ‘aliquam’ before ‘actualitatem.’ 90

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sed erit ex se primo tale, circumscripta per impossibile ipsa essentia. 204 Praeterea, essentia non dat incommunicabilitatem Patri ut mere essentia est, quia ipsa est communicabilis de se; ergo ut ipsa intelligitur habere in se virtualiter paternitatem, et ita idem, ‘ut virtualiter in essentia’ erit ratio sui ipsius ‘ut formaliter tale.’ 205 Contra aliud,96 scilicet quod ‘relationes divinae sunt primo diversae,’ ut argutum est frequenter, et potest unum membrum iterari: quia tunc sciens unam originationem in divinis, et nesciens utrum illa originatio sit generatio vel spiratio, nullum conceptum haberet nisi de voce. Vana ergo essent illa problemata quae fiunt de generatione in communi, et solvuntur per propria media, antequam quaeratur de productionibus in speciali. 206 Contra aliud, 97 scilicet, quod relationi ‘unde relatio est’ convenit quod sit ad aliud distinctum, quia si non est ad aliud distinctum, non est relatio (alioquin posset dici quod paternitas posset esse relatio realis absque Filio, si non oporteret extrema relationis esse [f. 142vb] distincta, sicut nec identitas).98 Aut ergo paternitas haec est ad aliud distinctum sola filiatione, aut ad aliud distinctione priori quam illa quae esset a Filio. Si secundo modo habetur propositum; si primo modo, ergo arguendo ‘paternitas non est aliud distinctum, ergo non est realis’ est sic arguere: ‘huic relationi non est relatio realis opposita, ergo non est realis’; sed hoc videtur esse manifesta petitio principii, quia antecedens non videtur manifestius consequente. Nullum ergo argumentum habebitur in multis relationibus ad concludendum eas non esse reales per hoc quod non sunt extrema realiter distincta, sed esset communiter petitio principii. [b. – De conclusione in se] 207 Quantum ad aliud,99 scilicet de conclusione, videntur auctoritates sanctorum magis sonare pro relationibus constituentibus quam proprietatibus absoluta. Cf. supra n. 175. Cf. supra n. 176. 98 Codex S has ‘identitas.’ 99 Cf. supra n. 177. 96 97

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208 Adduco etiam ad hoc unam rationem, quia, si prima persona sit absoluta (sit a), et si secunda si est absoluta (sit b), in primo instanti originis a non est Pater, sive hoc habens relationem realem, quia non habet Filium; in 100 instanti naturae gignit, et tunc est Filius, et relatio realis in a; ergo illa prima persona acquiret aliquid sibi formaliter inexistens per actus generationis, sicut secunda persona, – quod videtur inconveniens, quia sicut quidquid habet filius per generationem habet, secundum Hilarium, ita nihil habet Pater generatione, sed innascibiliter omnia habet a se. 209 Posset tamen dici et solvi ista ratio per distinctionem prioritatis et posterioritatis originis, ita quod in primo instanti originis ponatur a esse Pater et in secundo b esse Filius, et tamen simul naturae esset a Pater et b Filius. Et distinctio ista prioritatis et posterioritatis tacta est distinctione 20 primi libri. 210 Inquirantur aliae rationes probantes istam consequentiam ‘tres personae sunt unus Deus, quarum una est ab una per generationem et una a duabus per spirationem, ergo prima constituentia et distinguentia istas personas sunt relationes’; si conclusio asseratur credenda, – quia nihil quod non est expresse articulus fidei,101 tenendum est tamquam simpliciter credendum nisi sequatur ex aliquo simpliciter credendo, rationes multae quae adducuntur ad probandum hanc conseqentiam sunt solubiles, et multae iam solutae. [B. – An proprietas personalis sit ratio formalis terminandi unionem naturae humanae ad Verbum] 211 Quantum ad alium102 articulum principalem quaestionis de ratione scilicet formali terminandi istam unionem quae Codex S; A omits. Cf. Lectura I, d. 2, n. 164 (Vat. 16:166-67): Intelligendum est in principio quod duo sunt de substantia fidei de quibus principaliter tractatur in I libro Sententiarum, scilicet quod sint tantum tres personae et unus Deus, et quod hae personae non sunt a se, sed una persona producit aliam et duae tertiam. Circa hoc autem non est licitum varie opinari. Sed utrum personae constituantur per relationes vel per modos essendi, dummodo tamen salvantur praedicta, non est illicitum varie opinari, sed licitum est circa illa exerceri, quia non teneor ex fide ad quodcumque verum. 102 Cf. supra n. 164. 100 101

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dicerent istam esse propter continentiam perfectionis realitatis suppositi creati in ipso assumente et propter potentiam obedientialem in natura assumpta, haberent dicere quod essentia esset propria ratio terminandi istam unionem, sicut argutum fuit ad quaestionem istam in primo argumento.103 212 Sed istud suppositum videtur esse falsum, quia ista dependentia est alterius rationis a dependentia creati ad causam; continentia autem virtualis quae est in termino et potentia obedientialis quae est in dependente, pertinent ad dependentiam creati ad causans. Unde propter rationes istas non posui in prima quaestione Verbum posse terminare istam dependentiam sed propter subsistentiam independentem. 213 Dico ergo quod essentia non est formaliter ratio terminendi istam unionem, sed proprietas personalis. 214 Quod probo sic: in quocumque supposito est ratio formaliter terminandi istam unionem, ipsam terminat eam; Pater, in quo est essentia divina, non terminat eam; ergo etc. Probatio maioris: suppositum non terminat104 nisi quia habet rationem formalem terminandi, sicut non creat nisi quia convenit ei ratio formaliter creandi; et propter hoc in quocumque est ratio formalis creandi proxima creat; unde necesse est tres personas simul creare. 215 Dicetur quod proprietas est ratio terminandi ut ‘sine quo non.’ 216 Contra hoc: in quocumque est ratio formalis agendi, agit secundum istam rationem vel saltem potest agere secundum illam rationem, et prius natura quam actio eius sit elicita actu, vel terminus productus; et illud est ei ratio et principium agendi, sicut frequenter declaratum est in I libro; quo modo, propter hoc, Pater et Filius spirant Spiritum sanctum quia habent vim spirativam, et uterque est prius origine quam Spiritus Sanctus spiretur. Et propter hoc etiam tres personae creant, ita quod potentia creandi est etiam cuilibet personae ratio creandi et quare possunt creare, quia quaelibet habet eam prius naturaliter quam creatura producatur. Ergo a simili: illud quod est ratio Cf. supra n. 154. Codex S has Probatio maioris: nihil est ratio terminandi nisi quia habet rationem formalem terminandi. 103 104

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terminandi unionem istam, erit habenti prius ratio terminandi quam terminet, si prius naturaliter habeatur quam ipsa unio terminetur; sed certum est quod ipsa105 non habetur a tribus naturaliter prius quam ista unio facta sit; ergo etc. 217 Aliter106 potest respondere ad rationem quod tres personae alio et alio modo habent essentiam, et propter istum alium modum habendi eam una potest terminare, ita quod essentia sibi sit ratio terminandi et non alii. 218 Contra hoc dupliciter potest argui: Primo sic: quia, cum ista unio sit realis, habet terminum realem et sub ratione reali; ergo relatio rationis non est formalis ratio terminandi unionem (iste autem modus habendi eam), et tantum relatio rationis in ipsa essentia, quia aliter essentia realiter referretur ad se vel ad personam; ergo essentia ut sic habita, non est formaliter ratio terminendi eam, ita quod sic haberi sit propria107 ratio terminendi eam. 219 Secundo: quia non est distinctio in modo habendi essentiam nisi pertinens ad originem, sed propter illam non terminat unionem persona una, et non alia, quia illa distinctio esset eadem si Pater fuisset incarnatus et non Filius, et tamen tunc non terminasset Filius sicut modo; ergo propter illam distinctionem quae necessaria est, non est essentia ratio terminandi uni et non alii, quod est contingens. 220 Patet ergo solutio quaestionis ex istis duobus articulis, scilicet quod proprietas Verbi est ratio terminandi, et illa secundum auctoritates videtur esse relativa sive relatio originis, licet rationes adductae hoc non concludunt. [II. – Ad argumenta principalia] 221 Ad argumenta: Ad primum108 patet quod illa maior est falsa, nec illae sunt rationes ad probandum possibilitatem incarnationis. 222 Ad aliud109 dico quod communicare esse non est idem quod Ipsa … prius| S has unio naturaliter prius potest terminari ad aliud. Cf. supra n. 214. 107 Codex S has ‘proxima.’ 108 Cf. supra n. 154. 109 Cf. supra n. 155. 105 106

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esse divinum informaret formaliter naturam humanum, nec etiam effective communicare, quasi scilicet persona assumens effective det aliquod esse naturae assumptae ex hoc quod assumens est; sed istud communicare est terminare dependentiam exsistentiae naturae actualis assumptae, et hoc non quod exsistentia realis naturae assumentis sit ratio terminandi, sed subsistentia, id est, incommunicabilis exsistentia. – Ad formam 110 concedo quod communicat esse, hoc est exsistentia sua incommunicabilis, ut exsistentia incommunicabilis, non exsistentia ut exsistentia est ratio terminandi dependentiam naturae assumptae. 223 Ad aliud:111 concedo maiorem, et minor negatur secundum communem opinionem; tenendo personas esse relativas. [III. – Ad rationes pro opinione quae tenet personas constitui per absoluta] 224 Ad probationes illas quae adducuntur pro illa opinione, quarum aliquae dimittebantur in I libro.112 225 Responsionem ad Augustinum113 quaere.114 226 Ad aliud de supposito per accidens, 115 dico quod aliquo modo loquitur [f. 142vb] de ‘per accidens’ metaphysicus, alio modo Codex S; A omits. Cf. supra n. 156. 112 Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 26, n. 15-27 (Vat. 6: 4-7); see also n. 93 (Vat. 6: 49): Illa argumenta de tertia via videntur difficilia, et tamen solubilia si secunda opinio [i.e., communis] sit vera. Solvat ea qui scit. Reference is to nn. 41, 51, 52. Cf. also Lectura I, d. 26, n. 75 (XVII, 339-340): Alia argumenta quae sunt facta ex parte proprietatis, fateor quod nescio bene solvere secundum istam viam [i.e., communem], quando arguitur: ‘quidquid constituit aliquid in ultima unitate, circumscripto quocumque alio, sibi repugnat communicabilitas opposita, sed paternitati – circumscripto quod non sit eadem essentiae divinae – non repugnat communicabilitas’; et similiter aliud argumentum, quod ‘ab ultimis constitutivis non abstrahitur aliquid commune in quid, sed hoc contingit a paternitate et filiatione’; similiter tertium argumentum, quod ‘esset suppositum per accidens, si ultima unitas – qua constituitur – esset relatio et non proprietas dicta ad se’; unde ‘si natura creata per unitatem eiusdem generis contrahitur ad suppositum, multo fortius natura divina erit hoc et hoc suppositum per unitatem essentialem, et non relativam proprietatem’. 113 Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 26, n. 54 (Vat. 6: 21); cf. supra n. 200. 114 Cf. infra: Adnotatio Duns Scoti mutila.: “Ad illum quarta via: Ad primum de Augustino …” 115 Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 26, n. 52 (Vat. 6:19); cf. supra n. 200. 110 111

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logicus. Metaphysicus enim dicit ens per accidens quod includit in se res duorum116 generum, sicut patet V Metaphysicae, cap. ‘de ente’ et ‘de uno.’117 Logicus vero dicit propositionem esse ‘per accidens’ cuius subiectum non includit rationem inhaerentiae praedicati, et si ex talibus duobus fiat unus conceptus – quorum neuter per se est determinativus alterius – dicit illum conceptum esse ‘unum per accidens.’ Exemplum non est in creaturis de conceptu logico ‘uno per accidens’ nisi cui correspondet118 ‘unum per accidens’ metaphysice, quia etsi haec sit per accidens ‘rationale est animal,’ tamen, iungendo unum conceptum alteri, unus est per se determinativus alterius; ideo totus conceptus non est unus per accidens, sed tantum aliquis aggregans conceptus duorum generum. Ad propositum ergo dico quod haec potest concedi – per accidens logice loquendo – ‘paternitas est deitas,’ quia subiectum ut subicitur 119 includit rationem inhaerentiae praedicati ut praedicati, quia subiectum non est formaliter praedicatum. Iungendo etiam conceptus subiecti conceptui praedicati (dicendo: ‘Deus Pater’), unus non per se determinat alterum, quia secundum Damascenum proprietates determinant hypostases, non naturam120; ergo iste conceptus in se non est ‘per se unus,’ et ita non dicit conceptum ‘per se unus’ respectu alicuius suppositi; quod enim non est ‘per se unum’ in se; non est alicuius ‘per se suppositum,’ – et ita in conceptibus. Sic ergo logice loquendo posset concedi quod Pater non est ‘per se suppositum’ Dei. 227 Sed contra hoc121 arguo, quia prima identitas non potest esse per accidens, et sicut nec in rebus, ita nec in conceptibus; prima autem identitas in praedicatione videtur esse primae naturae ad suum suppositum; ergo illa non est per accidens, sed per se. 228 Respondeo: prima identitas praedicationis est cuiuscumque ad se, ut ‘homo est homo,’ ‘Deus est Deus.’ Sed Cf. supra n. 156. Cf. supra n. 156. 118 Cf. supra n. 156. 119 Cf. supra n. 156. 120 Damascene, De fide orthodoxa c. 50 [III c. 6] (ed. Buytaert 186, 12-187,15; PG 94, 1002) – cf. infra n. 227. 121 Cf. supra n. 226. 116 117

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realiter loquendo secundum metaphysicum – cum hic non sint genera neque aliquid alicuius generis (ex distinctione 8, I libri)122 nihil erit hic ens per accidens; nec sequitur ‘est suppositum per accidens logice, ergo est suppositum per accidens metaphysice,’ quia ‘esse suppositum’ dicit habitudinem alicuius ut subiecti ad 123 praedicatum, et ita potest dici suppositum ‘per accidens’ propter accidentalitatem ex parte inhaerentiae, non extremorum. 229 Et si obiciatur ‘hic conceditur res quasi duorum generum, scilicet substantiae et relationis,’ – respondeo: propria ratio , quantum ad genera vel quasi-genera, non facit ‘totum’ esse ens per accidens, sed habitudo rei ad rem, puta nonidentitas simpliciter; nunc autem licet propria et formalis ratio relationis – quae manet ibi – non includat formaliter rationem essentiae, tamen unum in re est verissime idem alteri, propter quam identitatem non est habitudo realitatis qualis requiritur eorum quae constituunt ‘ens per accidens.’ 230 Si obiciatur contra primum membrum, 126 quod ‘cum in creaturis possit esse suppositum naturae per se unum, quare non ita hic?’ – eodem modo posset dici quod aliquid absolutum imperfectum potest esse incommunicabile, et universaliter aliquid ‘contrahens per se in aliquo genere’ potest esse incommunicabile, sicut aliquid communicabile, – et ita in quocumque creato quod pertinet ad genus aliquod, potest esse aliquid illius generis constituens incommunicabile; simpliciter autem perfectum non potest esse incommunicabile, neque aliquid eiusdem rationis (quale secundum istam opinionem127 est omne absolutum in divinis), et ita nihil ‘quasi eiusdem generis cum essentia’ potest constituere personam vel suppositum ibi, sed tantum aliquid quod sit quasi alterius generis. Exemplum: si quidlibet de genere substantiae, usque ad ultimum quo constituitur ‘haec substantia,’ esset perfectio simpliciter et per consequens communicabile, non Ordinatio I, d. 8, n. 95-115 (Vat. 4: 198-207). Codices A and S omit. 124 Codex S; A omits. 125 Codex S; A omits. 126 Cf. supra n. 228: et ita potest dici suppositum ‘per accidens’ propter accidentalitatem ex parte inhaerentiae, non extremorum. 127 scilicet, quae tenet personas constituti per absolutum 122 123

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posset ‘haec substantia’ ulterius per aliquid contrahi (quia de se ‘hoc’ non est ulterius determinabile in se), sed tantum posset per aliquid de genere qualitatis vel quantitatis constituere aliquid incommunicabile, quia qualitas vel quantitas non esset perfectio simpliciter; tunc illud constitutum ex substantia et accidente esset ens per accidens, et ita esset ens per accidens, si una istarum realitatum non esset perfecte eadem alteri. 231 Ita ponitur in proposito quod essentia est perfectio simpliciter, et quidquid est eiusdem generis vel rationis, quod est ‘ad se’ cum essentia; et ideo quodlibet tale est communicabile, et tamen de se ‘hoc.’ Et ultra: illud quod est esse ‘hoc,’ non potest contrahi illud, sed tantum potest in129 eo quod est ‘hoc’ constitui aliquid incommunicabile per aliquid quod non est perfectio simpliciter, et ideo nec eiusdem generis cum essentia, sed quasi alterius generis. 232 Ad aliud130 dico quod paternitas de se est formaliter incommunicabilis; non quidem iste conceptus, quia – secundum dicta alias – potest univocus abstrahi a paternitate divina et creata, sed ista realitas quae est in divinis, quae non est formaliter essentia ipsa, est formaliter incommunicabilis et non quasi per determinationem extrinsecam, puta ‘quia divina.’ Ratio incommunicabilitatis eius est ista, quia sicut essentia est actus ultimus, et ideo non potest per aliquid determinari respectu cuius sit ipsa quasi potentialis, ita quidquid est in ea, est ultimum, in ultima actualitate sibi possibili, ita quod in illo instanti naturae in quo sapientia pullulat in essentia, ipsa pullulat secundum ultimam determinatonem quam potest habere; unde et illa realitas, quae est sapientia formaliter, est non determinabilis. Similiter, quidquid potest esse incommunicabile in primo instanti naturae in quo pullulat in natura, est incommunicabile et pullulat ut incommunicabile, et non prius ut communicabile, quia tunc esset determinabile per aliquid quo fieret incommunicabile. 233 Et si dicas quod tunc paternitas non est incommunicabilis nisi quia est in essentia divina, haec enim realitas non habet ut ex se sit ultimate determinata nisi quia est in essentia, – dico quod Codex S; A omits. Codex S interlin.; A omits. 130 Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 26, n. 45 (Vat. 6: 15); cf. supra 203. 128 129

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quasi originaliter vel fundamentaliter quidquid est intrinsecum in divinis, est ab essentia, quia secundum Damascenum cap.9 est ‘pelagus quoddam infinitae substantiae’; sed tamen illa alia habent formaliter rationes131 et se ipsis sunt primo talia formaliter, ita quod sapientia licet ab essentia quasi originaliter et fundamentaliter habeat quod sit perfectio simpliciter, est tamen perfectio simpliciter formaliter et in se formaliter infinita, – ita quod in eodem instanti naturae in quo sapientia iam actu est in essentia, circumscripta per impossibile ipsa essentia, remanebit intellectus sapientiae simpliciter et infinitae. Ita in illo ‘nunc’ naturae in quo intelligitur paternitas in essentia, ipsa se ipsa formaliter est incommunicabilis, circumscripta tunc per impossibile ipsa essentia. Nec hic est contradictio quod aliquid quasi originaliter vel causaliter habeat ab alio hoc quod sibi convenit formaliter, sicut calidum ex se formaliter contrariatur frigido, licet hoc causaliter sit ab igne, cui non contrariatur formaliter. Ita est in aliis, quod illa entiitas qua constituitur aliquid in esse specifico, ex se formaliter est indivisibilis in plures species, etiam dato per impossibile quod esset incausata, licet modo istam indivisionem132 habeat causaliter.133 234 Et si obicias ‘quare aliqua entitas oritur in essentia communicabilis et ista incommunicabilis?’ – dico quod huius ratio [f. 143ra] formalis non est nisi quia haec entitas est haec et illa entitas est illa; et haec entitas ‘quia haec’ est communicabilis et illa entitas ‘quia illa’ est incommunicabilis, ita quod ista oriri non posset nisi incommunicabilis formaliter 134 oriretur. Ratio autem istius extrinseca – quasi originalis vel fundamentalis – est, quia essentia est radicaliter infinita, ex qua possunt oriri intrinsece non tantum perfectiones simpliciter et communicabiles, sed etiam proprietates incommunicabiles; quaelibet tamen, quando oritur, oritur determinata, summa determinatione sibi possibili.

Codex S has ‘rationes suas’; A omits. Codex S; A has ‘divisionem.’ 133 Codex S; A has ‘incausaliter.’ 134 Codex S; A omits. 131 132

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235 Per hoc patet ad omnes135 probationes quae ostendunt paternitatem ex se non esse incommunicabilem: 136 Cum enim dicis137 quod ‘non est de se haec,’ dico quod falsum est, intelligendo etiam formaliter de realitate illa quae est paternitas, non est de conceptu communi huic paternitati et illi, quia (sicut expositum est distinctione 8, I138 et dicetur distinctione 23, III139) potest esse conceptus aliquis140 absque ordine realitatum intra, quarum una sit contractiva vel determinativa alterius. Paternitas autem – haec vel illa – non est de se ‘haec,’ id est, fundamentaliter, sed ab essentia, et ab ipsa eadem essentia est paternitas incommunicabilis, quia non prius est ‘haec’ quam incommunicabilis et postea quasi facta incommunicabilis per aliud determinans, sed sine omni ordine singularitatis ad incommunicabilitatem in ista realitate, oritur realitas summe determinata in primo instanti naturae in quo oritur. 236 Nec illa propositio141 est vera quod ‘omnis quiditas est communicabilis,’ sed tantum quiditas quae est perfectio simpliciter aut divisibilis (prima enim communicatur in unitate naturae sine omni divisione; secunda communicatur cum142 sui divisione): haec quiditas non est perfectio simpliciter nec divisibilis, quia est in natura perfecta simpliciter. 237 Nec illa propositio143 est vera quod ‘relationes oppositae sunt aeque communicabiles ex se,’ immo spiratio activa oritur ut communicabilis duobus, nec umquam potest fieri incommunicabilis per aliquid determinans, spiratio autem passiva ex se formaliter, in eodem instanti in divinis, est incommunicabilis. 238 Quod etiam dicitur144 quod ‘quacumque positione – possibili vel impossibili – facta, stante ratione eius, ipsum remanet incommunicabile,’ concedo quod ‘stante ratione eius,’ Codex S has ‘illas.’ Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 26, n. 46-50 (Vat. 6: 16-17). 137 Cf. Ordinatio n. 47. 138 Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 26, n. 46-50 (Vat. 6: 16-17). 139 Cf. Ordinatio III (suppl.), d. 22, q. unica, n. [7-8]. 140 Codex S has ‘communis’ for ‘aliquis.’ 141 Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 26, n. 46 (Vat. 6: 16). 142 Codex S has ‘cum’; A ‘sine.’ 143 Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 26, n. 48-49. 144 Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 26, n. 50. 135 136

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et non ‘posito aliquo repugnante suae rationi.’ Quod si ponatur rationem eius manere et aliquid repugnare, ex oppositis in antecedente sequuntur opposita, scilicet quod ipsum sit incommunicabile formaliter ex se et possit communicari; et ita in proposito: si ponatur spirationem praecedere generationem activam ponitur aliquid incompossibile paternitati Patris et tamen rationem paternitatis manere, et ita sequetur paternitatem esse communicabilem, ex primo et tamen incommunicabilem ex secundo; unde formaliter est contradictio generationem esse productionem secundam in divinis. Paternitas ergo, quia divina, est incommunicabilis, ita quod ly ‘quia’ sit circumstantia principii originalis vel fundamentalis, non autem contrahentis vel determinantis, eo modo quo contrahitur album cum dicitur ‘homo albus’ vel ‘albedo humana’: haec enim albedo praeintelligitur in se exsistens, et ut sic, esset indeterminata et determinabilis ut sit hominis (et ad hoc determinatur cum dicitur ‘albedo humana’), non autem quod albedo oriatur ex natura hominis et in illo instanti in quo oritur, ipsa de se sit indeterminata. Ita – per oppositum – in proposito, quia sicut causa non daret esse effectui nisi daret sibi ‘esse conveniens effectui,’ nec produceret istum effectum nisi produceret aliquid quod natum esset habere talem effectum (puta, nulla causa causaret triangulum formaliter nisi produceret aliquid quod necessario haberet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, et si posset producere aliquid quod non necessario haberet tres, non produceret istum sed alium, – nec est alia ratio huius nisi quia formalis ratio trianguli est talis ut sit triangulus), ita dico quod deitas non esset ratio fundamentalis alicuius realitatis intrinsecae nisi ipsa oriretur talis ut – in primo instanti in quo est – sit determinata ultima determinatione; ergo si produceret aliquid, determinabile per aliquam realitatem quasi sibi advenientem iam producto, non produceret aliquid intrinsecum in divinis, – si etiam produceret aliquid incommunicabile, bene produceret proprietatem personalem, sed aliquid aliquo modo aliud ab illa.

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239 Ad argumentum145 dico quod licet aliquis conceptus communis possit haberi, qui dicatur in ‘quid’ de paternitate146 distinctus a spiratione divina (immo forte qui dicatur in ‘quid’ de paternitate divina et paternitate creata), tamen nulla realitas potest esse distincta in divinis aliquo modo ex parte rei – a qua sumatur iste conceptus determinabilis in ‘quid’ – quae realitas sit determinabilis per aliam realitatem, sicut communis conceptus in intellectu determinabilis per alium conceptum; et possibilitas huius et ratio satis tacta est supra in I libro.147 240 Dico ergo quod paternitas et filiatio non sunt primo diversa quantum ad intellectum, quin possibile sit intellectum abstrahere ab eis aliquem conceptum communem, sed sunt primo diversa quantum ad realitatem et realitatem, ita quod nullum unum gradum realitatis includunt qui sit quasi potentialis et determinibilis per differentias proprias, sicut albedo et nigredo includunt realitatem aliquam eiusdem148 rationis determinabilis per differentias proprias specificas eorum, a quibus sumuntur differentiae specificae eorum. Et tunc illa propositio maior, quae est quod ‘prima distinguentia sunt primo diversa,’ tantum debet intelligi de ipsis realitatibus quae primo constituunt quantum ad non-convenientiam in aliqua realitate una formali, quam formaliter includant. 241 Ad aliud149 dico quod omnis relatio realis est inter extrema distincta, sed quandoque distinctione praecedente relationes, quandoque non, sed tantum formaliter causata per ipsas relationes; et hoc non tantum est in divinis, sed etiam in creaturis, et etiam in relationibus accidentalibus. Voluntas enim movet se et movetur a se, et non tantum est relatio realis voluntatis ad volitionem, sed etiam voluntatis ut activa ad se ipsam ut passiva; sicut pater non tantum dicitur realiter ad filium, sed etiam ad matrem, vel non tantum calefaciens dicitur realiter ad calorem genitum, sed etiam ad illud quod calefacit, – et universaliter effectus dependens a principio activo et passivo necessario requirit relationem realem, qualis est ‘passivi ad activum,’ et Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 26, n. 51; et supra n. 205. Codex S has ‘generatione.’ 147 Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 8, n 135, 136-150 (Vat. 4: 220, 221-227). 148 Codex A adds ‘rei vel.’ 149 Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 26, n. 36. 145 146

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hoc vel solam vel mutuam ad hoc ut sit relatio alterius illorum principiorum ad effectum et e converso. Et tamen voluntas, quae est fundamentum istarum relationum oppositarum ‘moventis et moti,’ et denominatur ab utraque earum, ipsa non distinguitur distinctione aliqua istarum relationum, sed tantum distinctione aliqua facta per ipsas. 242 Cum arguitur contra istud membrum,150 quod tunc nulla erit probatio, probando istam relationem esse realem quia extrema sunt distincta realiter, – dico quod oportet probare, inferendo conclusionem, quod nec extrema sunt distincta distinctione praecedente relationem, nec distinctione causata per relationes. Et ad hoc secundum probandum non sufficit accipere quod istae relationes [f. 143rb] oppositae dicuntur de eodem: non ergo sequitur ‘dicuntur de eodem, ergo non distinguuntur formaliter distinctione pertinente ad genus relationis,’ sicut non sequitur ‘dicuntur de eodem, ergo non sunt reales,’ sicut in proposito movens et motum dicuntur de eodem, et tamen sunt reales; sed oportet probare quod illam distinctionem quam causant, si nullam praesupponant, non faciunt151 ex natura rei sine actu intellectus. Unde bene potest concedi quod argumentum ad destruendum realitatem relationum, propter indistinctionem realem extremorum, frequenter petit, et difficile est probare omnia quae sunt necessaria ad hoc quod argumentum illud concludat. Si tamen illa sint probata, consequentia est bona. Sed oportet ultimo devenire ad hoc quod extrema ista illam distinctionem quam faciunt, non faciunt ex natura rei (sicut identitas et identitas), sed per actum intellectus, et ab illo medio statim posset argui, praetermisso eo quod est de distinctione extremorum; statim enim sequitur ‘si relatio non consequitur ex natura rei, non est realis.’ Et hoc modo Philosophus V Metaphysicae nititur ostendere identitatem non esse realem relationem, quia intellectus bis utitur eodem, non autem quia extrema non distinguuntur distinctione praecedente relationem, nec per relationes distinctione incompossibilium, neque distinctione compossibilium, quae sit ex natura rei; et haec

150 151

Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 26, n. 37. Codices A and S have ‘sit.’

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omnia membra oporteret probare, ad hoc ut istud enthymema probaret conclusionem illatam. 243 Unde argumentum de prima substantia quod non constituatur per relationem, coincidit cum illo argumento de per se supposito, et similiter potest solvi, quia ‘hic essentia habet hoc de relatione primae substantiae quae est de se hoc; sed incommunicabilitatem non potest habere aliquid quod est ad se, sed quaelibet entitas ad se est ibi perfectio simpliciter; potest ergo inveniri in eo quod ponitur in divinis habere rationem substantiae ultimae coordinationis, quantum ad hoc quod non repugnat perfectioni, sed152 quantum ad hoc, scilicet quantum ad esse hoc153, sed non quantum ad incommunicabilitatem quae repugnat perfectioni. 244 154 argumenta155 pro opinione de constitutivis absolutis soluta sunt dist. 26 primi libri. 156 [contra tertiam rationem]157 [Nota quod non oportet prius commultiplicari ad multiplicationem posterioris nec illimitatum universaliter ad multiplicationem limitati, licet aliquando gratia materiae secutus sit, etc.] ADNOTATIO DUNS SCOTI MUTILA158 Item tertio sic: omnis relatio terminatur ad absolutum, primus autem terminus relationis ‘in persona’ est aliqua persona vel aliqua proprietas, non essentia, quia sicut non refertur, ita non terminat relationem (ita enim terminus relationis distinguitur sicut relatum); ergo persona in quantum distinguitur ab aliqua alia et terminat relationem eius ad se, est absoluta. Maior Codex S omits ‘sed quantum ad hoc’ and continues with ‘scilicet quantum ad esse sed’ etc. 153 Codex S omits. 154 Codex S; A omits. 155 scilicet primae et secundae viae. 156 Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 26, n. 84-92. 157 Codex A adds this and the following bracketed note in the margin. 158 Codices A and S insert this text between n. 190 and 191 above; see note 39 supra. Codex A indicates it is taken from Scotus’s notebooks. See folio 141ra: “Ab illo loco usque ad signum o+o est in cedulis in libro Ioanne, et signum discontinuationis.” Codex A adds in the margin the notes we have put in brackets. 152

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declaratur in quaestione ‘De relatione Dei ad creaturam,’ d. 30 primi libri. [Nota quod non omnis actus dat esse, sed sicut entitas quiditativa dat esse ita hypostatica non dat esse]. Ad tertium dici potest quod bene absolutum potest terminare relationem et semper terminat in relationibus modo mensurae159 sicut satis habetur distinctione 30 primi libri, quod relationes creaturarum terminantur ad divinum in quantum absolutum est; [Nota bene][Nota quod absolutum potest terminare relationem et quando ita est et quando non] universaliter autem loquendo non oportet concedere terminum relationis esse absolutum nisi in relationibus dissimilibus, de quibus ibi arguitur, quae160 scilicet sunt in genere qualitatis (cuiusmodi non sunt relationes divinae), vel de termino formali (scilicet ratione cuius primus terminus terminat), non autem de primo termino: quemadmodum enim in161 relato, fundamentum est absolutum, sed non semper illud quod refertur (secundum istam opinionem), ita et illud quod est ratio terminandi relationem semper est absolutum, et prius exigitur a parte termini relativi sicut fundamentum ex parte substantiae causatae. [Nota quomodo verior est identitas naturae divinae ad suppositum suum quam naturae creatae, etc. realiter loquendo, sed logice loquendo natura creata formalius predicatur se suo supposito, quam, etc.] Per istud potest dici ad aliam confirmationem, qua infertur quod ‘verior esset identitatis substantiae creatae ad suum suppositum quam naturae divinae ad suum’: hoc non sequitur, si intelligatur ex parte rei, quia licet entitas individualis in creatura per se determinet naturam et faciat ‘per se unum’ cum ea, tamen illud ‘unum’ est compositum aliqua compositione etiam reali, – relatio autem, licet non per se determinet naturam divinam, tamen ita vere est idem ei; quod tamen nulla fiat illi composito; et ideo realiter sive metaphysice loquendo, multo est verior identitas suppositi divini, et in se et ad suam naturam, Codex S adds ‘et hoc principaliter.’ Codex S; A has ‘quod.’ 161 Codex S; A omits. 159 160

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quam suppositi creati in se et ad suam naturam; – logice autem loquendo, bene potest concedi quod substantia sola162 creata formalius praedicatur de suo supposito (quia ‘per se primo modo’), non sic ‘Deus’ de Patre, quia ‘Pater’ non habet ita unum per se conceptum in intellectu sicut ‘Socrates.’ Si inferas ‘ergo praedicatio haec verior est quam illa,’ potest negari consequentia, quia aliqua minus formalis, vel non ita per se, potest esse verior quam alia formalior et per se. [Nota quod aliqua predicatio minus formaliter est verior realiter loquendo quam alia magis formaliter si verior est ydemptitas, etc.] Sed163 maior est identitas extremorum in re, quorum in conceptu est minor vel minus formalis inclinatio vel inhaerentia. Ad ultimam confirmationem potest concedi logice quod neutrius quiditatis est ‘per se suppositum’; realiter autem est suppositum naturae, non relationis, quia relatio est ibi proprietas incomunicabilis, natura non. Similiter, relatio transit in essentiam et non econverso, propter infinitatem essentiae. [Item nota quomodo essentia divina habet conditiones primae substantiae quae sunt perfectionis.] Ad quartum: Prima substantia in creaturis habet aliquid perfectionis, scilicet ultimam unitatem, et ideo est indivisibilis,164 et haec consequitur ultimam actualitatem propter quam competit sibi ‘per se esse’; duo opposita conveniunt substantiae secundae, quae est divisibilis, et non habet ‘per se esse’ nisi in prima substantia. Istas condiciones primae substantiae habet essentia divina ex se, et non per relationem formaliter: est enim de se ‘haec’ et per se subsistit, vel saltem est totalis ratio subsistendi, secundum Augustinum De Trinitate VII,165 Pater non eo Pater est quo est Deus. Ultra hoc prima substantia creata – quia limitata – habet incommunicabilitatem quia idem numero limitatum non est communicabile et haec proprietas non dicit perfectionem et ideo haec proprietas per se non convenit essentiae divinae. Per hoc patet ad primum ibi tactum, quia concedo quod prima substantia in divinis, quoad hoc quod est ‘maxime esse Codex S omits ‘sola.’ Codex S has ‘si.’ 164 Balić’s reading, Codex S has ‘individualis’; A ‘indi-lis.’ 165 Augustine, De Trinitate VII, c. 6, n. 11 (PL 42, 943): Substantia Patris ipse Pater est, non quo Pater est, sed quo est. 162 163

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substantiam et per se subsistere,’ non constituitur formaliter relatione, sed est deitas, vel hic Deus, quo est maxime substantia et subsistit. Similiter ad secundum dico, quod ‘prima substantia non includit non-substantiam,’ verum est, propter perfectiones convenientes ei, et ideo ubicumque salvantur illae condiciones, non erunt per non-substantiam166 sed in quo non potest esse per substantiam, ista condicio quae est imperfectionis, scilicet, incommunicabilitas (sicut ponitur in Deo, ubi quodlibet ‘ad se’ ponitur perfectio simpliciter, et ita communicabile), ibi necesse est primam substantiam – quantum ad illam conditionem habendam – includere non-substantiam. [Nota quod paternitas in primo instanti in quo pullulat in essentia est incommunicabilis haec deitas non] Ad tertium ibi tactum,respondeo:paternitas et haec paternitas incommunicabilis – quidquid sit de istis in conceptu – in re sunt omnino idem, ita quod nulla est distinctio realis nec formalis; et ideo res illa, in primo instanti in quo pullulat in essentia, est ibi sub ratione ultimae determinationis sibi possibilis. Quia ergo relationi non repugnat determinatio ad incommunicabilitatem, ideo ipsa non tantum est quiditas et ‘haec,’ sed incomunicabilis, et omnino non prius in re ‘haec’ quam incommunicabilis; sed deitas ‘haec’ est communicabilis, ita quod repugnat sibi per aliquod quasi generis sui – secundum istam opinionem – esse incommunicabilem. Nego ergo consequentiam ‘in relatione est quiditas, et haec incomunicabilis in quantum est relatio, ergo haec possunt inveniri in eo quod est ad se,’ quia ultimum repugnat cuilibet quod est ad se; in Deo, secundum istam opinionem, non repugnat relationi, et ideo relatio statim habet eam. [De duplici per se esse] Ad quartum ibi tactum: ‘per se esse’ conceditur ‘huic essentiae’ vel Deo ‘unde Deus,’ sed non ‘per se esse’ quo formaliter aliquid per se sit incommunicabiliter, et hoc convenit personae creatae ex limitatione eius, propter quam est incommunicabilis et ut ‘quod’ et ut ‘quo’ (de qua duplici incommunicabilitate dictum est I libro distinctione 23).167 Verum est ergo quod substantia creata habet ‘per se esse,’ accidens non, 166 167

Codex S; A has ‘substantia.’ Ordinatio I, d. 23, n. 16 (Vat. 5: 357); Codex A has ‘d. 33.’

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et hoc competit se ex perfectione sua, – sed quod non potest illud ‘per se esse’ communicare alicui in quo sit, hoc est limitationis. [f. 142ra] Hic ergo concedo essentiam determinari ad ‘per se esse’ (sive ut ‘quod’ sive ut ‘quo’), sed cum hoc, esse169 communicabile personae relativae, ut quo ipsa persona relativa habeat idem ‘per se esse.’ Ad illud de quarta via: Ad primum de Augustino respondeo: Augustinus ibi in VII (a principio cap. 6 vel 22), inquit quomodo dictum est ‘una essentia,’ et a graecis ‘tres substantiae,’ a latinis autem ‘tres personae,’170 et in littera illa quae adducitur ex cap. 8 vel 31, quod ‘substantia est ad se’ – quod ‘non proprie dicuntur tres substantiae171,’ quia substantia (sicut conceditur in divinis) est ad se, et accipit pro eodem essentiam et substantiam. Ergo, inquit, ‘non est dicendum172 tres substantiae, ut non dicantur tres essentiae.’ Non ergo intendit ipse quod substantia, ut graeci accipiunt eam (scilicet pro persona), sit ad se, sed quod ipse non proprie concedat tres substantias sed tantum propter necessitatem loquendi videtur utitur; unde cap. 33 videtur praeferre modum loquendi latinorum quod sunt ‘tres personae’; et istud probat consequenter non esse proprium, ostendens personam simpliciter dici ‘ad se,’ sicut essentiam. [item nota de diversitate exprimendi trinitatem in divinis.] Finaliter ergo173 conclusionem eius accipit de hac materia, cap 9 sive 35: “Volumus,” inquit, “vel unum aliquod vocabulum servire huic significationi qua intelligitur Trinitas, ne omnino taceremus interoganti174 ‘quid tres’?” Et dicatur sive tres personas a latinis sive a graecis tres substantias, diceret Augustinus improprie dici et tantum propter necessitatem loquendi. Non ergo ex eius intentione habetur quod aliquis terminus, significans subsistens incommunicabile in divinis, sit ad se, sed tantum quod illa nomina – quae ab aliquibus Codex S; A omits. Codex A has ‘tamen hoc est’ instead of ‘cum hoc esse.’ 170 Augustine, VII, c. 4, n. 7 (PL 42, 939): dictum est a nostris graecis una essentia, tres substantiae, – a latinis autem una essentia vel substantia, tres personae. 171 Codex S; A has ‘personae.’ 172 Codex S has ‘non dicendae sunt.’ 173 Codex A rep ‘vel sententialiter.’ 174 Augustine has ‘interogati’; Henry of Ghent ‘interoganti.’ 168 169

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accommodata sunt ad exprimendum tale incommunicabile – sunt per se nomina absoluta, immo mere absoluta, ita quod essentialia. Oporteret autem habere primum ab ipso, ad hoc ut haberetur propositum in ista quaestione pro tertia opinione (quae ponit in re ‘hoc subsistens incommunicabile’ esse ad se), et non tantum175 posse exprimi aliquo nomine essentiali, accommodato sibi ex usu vel ex necessitate loquendi. Per hoc ad omnia quae adducuntur de Augustino pro illa opinione. [Nota quomodo persona definitur a Boethio et Richardo, quia nec per absolutum nec per respectivum et ita quod ab absoluto et respectivo potest abstrahi contentus neuter et indifferens.] Ad tertium, de Richardo et Boethio, respondetur quod sicut 176 ab absoluto et relativo – loquendo quiditative – potest abstrahi aliquid commune quiditative, ita etiam ab incommunicabili tali et tali abstrahitur aliquid commune, quod nec de se est incommunicabile absolutum nec incommunibile relativum, quale177 quid describitur Richardus et Boethius, hoc addito ‘quod illud sunt in natura intellectuali,’ ita quod sicut descriptio superioris non debet includere propriam rationem alicuius inferioris, ut178 descriptio personae – quae dicit incommunicabile in natura intellectuali – non debet includere ad proprie pertinens ad incommunicabile absolutum, nec proprie ad incommunicabile relativum, sed debet esse indifferens ad utrumque; et ita describit uterque personam. Concedo ergo quod nec in definitione personae assignata a Richardo nec assignata a Boethio ponitur aliquod relativum, et ita dico quod nec personae – unde definitur – datur esse absolutum vel relativum, sed indifferens ad utrumque; ita quod sicut in aliqua natura non invenitur ratio ista in speciali nisi in absoluto et ratione absoluti (sicut in creatura), ita in natura divina non invenitur nisi in relativo.

Codex S; A has ‘tantummodo tamen.’ Codex S; A omits. 177 Codex S has ‘tale.’ 178 Codices A and S; Balić reads ‘ita’ for ‘ut’ here (Vat. 6:57, line 30). 175 176

History, Metaphysics, and Theology in St. Bonaventure Zachary Hayes, O.F.M. Aristotle describes the difference between poetry and history in the following words: Poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars.1 Concerning the universal, the same author says that poetry speaks about “what such and such a kind of person will probably or necessarily say or do.” History, on the other hand, with its

1 Aristotle, Poetics, ch. 9, 1451b, 1463-64, as found in Richard McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York, NY: Random House, 1941/1970): “Any other claim to wisdom must be brought into relation with this wisdom. Philosophy, then, which at the level of Aristotle’s understanding of metaphysics is a search for the ultimate principles of reality, is best seen not as a self-sufficient form of human knowledge, but as a stage in the larger pattern of the spiritual journey of humanity to God. But that journey, which in the case of Francis of Assisi was uncomplicated by extensive rational inquiry, takes a different form in the life of the intellectual scholar. In the latter case, rational philosophy is seen as a necessary and important development of the human mind. But it cannot be allowed to rest in itself. The intellectual person is to move through the process of rational inquiry in philosophy, and even in theology, only to culminate in a form of ecstatic, transforming love in which the human soul is drawn beyond the categories of rational discourse ever deeper into a mystery that it never comprehends.”

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“singular statements,” deals with what a particular person “did or had done to him.” This text sets out the elements of an interesting discussion when it suggests a preference for philosophy over history and for the knowledge of universals over that of particulars. If philosophy in its highest form turns out to be what Aristotle offers in the writings that have come to be known as the Metaphysics, then this text from the Poetics suggests what would become an explicit debate during the high Middle Ages when the fuller library of Aristotelian writings entered the intellectual life of the Christian West. This would be the debate between the understanding of Christian theology cast in the form of a history, and the understanding of metaphysical knowledge as the knowledge of universals. Allusions to this problem are present in the opening pages of the Summa of Aquinas.2 How it appeared to St. Bonaventure is the issue we wish to discuss in this paper. The term metaphysics as it relates to Aristotle was originally the result of an historical accident. It was used at first to designate a group of writings that came literally after the physics as the Philosopher’s writings were put together by Andronicus of Rhodes about the year 70 b.c.e. The title probably meant simply “that which comes after physics.” In subsequent editions, the title and the sequence remained. But in the book known as the Metaphysics, the Philosopher does something that is a long way from what he does in the Physics. For here he speaks about that science which seeks to know the first principles of reality, and he treats of the movement of the mind from the experience of particular things to a knowledge of the more universal causes or principles that underlie particular instances of movement or change. He describes this level of knowledge as the first philosophy, as wisdom, or even as theology. And this, he argues, is one of the ways in which human beings work out their desire to know. It is, perhaps, the pre-eminent way in which we do that. Not surprisingly, in the light of this, the Scholastics came to understand the meaning of the title Metaphysics to be not simply 2 Thomas Aquinas, Summa, I, 1a. 1. The opening question of the Summa is clearly shaped by the background problems of Aristotle and Averroes as understood by the philosophers of the thirteenth century.

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“that which comes after physics,” but above all, “that which transcends physics.” The science described by Aristotle in the Metaphysics is, then, the knowledge of first causes. As such, it is that knowledge which underlies and transcends all other sciences, and which leads to a knowledge of the ultimate source of motion and life. It is here that we find his argument for the theory of the four causes which, he argues, is sufficient to support a science of first principles. In Book XII, he takes his readers on the search for the source of all motion, the unmoved mover – “the object of the world’s desire” – which is pure being, pure actuality. In what sense would this Aristotelian understanding of a first philosophy and its object be seen as compatible with or coherent with the Christian understanding of theology and God? This, of course, was a major question for Christian scholars of the thirteenth century. The more familiar style of theology, certainly well into the twelfth century, had been cast in the form of what we today would call salvation history. One thinks here of Rupert of Deutz and Hugh of St. Victor as important examples. Typically, such an approach would follow the line of Scripture from the moment of creation in Genesis to the final consummation in the book of Revelation. One could then distinguish different periods or ages within this larger framework. Various patterns can be discerned in the writings of theologians prior to the thirteenth century. One could follow the pattern of six ages from Augustine. Or, as Bonaventure indicates, both “ancient and modern authors” distinguish three periods: the Law of Nature, the Law of Scripture, and the Law of Grace.3 And one could discuss important persons, places, or events. That is, one could discuss individuals rather than universals. Bernard McGinn speaks of this style as a theology that follows the ordo historiae.4 McGinn also suggests that Aristotle’s approach to philosophy and history could readily raise problems for such a self-understanding of theology. If history deals with particulars, and if particulars are not the locale in which one finds significant Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, Hex. 15, 20 (V, 401). (Unless otherwise indicated, all works of Bonaventure are cited according to the Quarrachi edition of the Opera Omnia.) 4 The Journal of Religion, vol. 58 suppl. (1978): 64ff. 3

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truth, then the style of the ordo historiae seems threatened from the outset. If one takes the Aristotelian ideal of “knowledge of things in terms of their causes,” and if one moves to the more argumentative style involved in Aristotelian logic, it seems inevitable that, whatever theology becomes, eventually it will be significantly removed from its original concern with particular events and persons in history. It is from this base that we would like to sketch the view of Bonaventure concerning this new philosophy that, during his lifetime, was coming to Western Europe especially through the Arab intellectual centers of Spain.

1) History and the philosophy of Aristotle The history of the modern debate concerning Bonaventure’s assessment of Aristotle was opened to a great extent by the classical study of Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure. The first edition of this book goes back to 1924. And the debate has continued to the present. We do not intend to sketch the history of this discussion but merely to highlight some of the key factors that are involved in it.5 Basically, the problem may be seen as that of the relation between two forms of wisdom. The history of Christianity has sought the wisdom of the Christian way from the person of Jesus Christ, and therefore from a particular sector of historical experience. But, now in the thirteenth century, a new library of Aristotelian writings became available to the West. And this represented a new form of wisdom – the wisdom of a philosophical tradition which apparently is open to anyone who has a good mind and the willingness to use it critically. Bonaventure, from the beginning of his career until the end, was a strong defender of the unity of Christian wisdom. Because of the universalism implicit in his theology of the Word, Bonaventure could expect that some genuine wisdom could be The present essay may be viewed as a summary of the current state of the question which takes into account major studies such as those of Cardinal Ratzinger and John Quinn among others; see notes 11 and 12, p. 79 for full references. 5

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found in all the arts and sciences, and particularly in the world of philosophy. But, to the extent that any philosophy bracketed or ignored or simply could not know the historical experience of Jesus Christ because that philosophy came into being before the historical career of Jesus, it would probably not be complete. In fact, it might be distorted. And fundamentally it would have to remain open to further insight and possible correction to be derived from the wisdom of Christ which becomes explicit in a particular sector of history. From this base, it becomes important to distinguish several levels in Bonaventure’s relation to Aristotle. In the first place, we can distinguish the methodological implications of the new philosophy. Not only did this involve grammar and the so-called old logic, which had been familiar to theology for some time prior to this. But it now involved the so-called new logic, and therefore the entire arsenal of syllogistic reasoning. This will amount to a significant shift in methodology for theology. Even a superficial reading of Bonaventure’s early Sentence Commentary and Disputed Questions reveals an extensive knowledge and skill in using the new method which Bonaventure himself describes as a modus perscrutatorius and which he clearly distinguishes from the long familiar method of the lectio divina of the Scriptures.6 If his rational theology were to be assessed from this perspective alone, it would be safe to say that he accepted Aristotle in a positive way. This level of methodological awareness can be distinguished legitimately from the particular philosophical views or theories of Aristotle. Here, in as far as he understood Aristotle’s actual positions, Bonaventure was convinced that – great as the philosopher was, and he called the Stagirite the princeps et dux of the Peripatetics7 – he was simply and seriously wrong on a number of important issues. As a commentator on the Sentences, Bonaventure expressed the fact that many of his contemporaries were convinced that Aristotle held the world to be eternal. While Bonaventure himself was not so sure that this was actually Aristotle’s view, it certainly was the view of some of Bonaventure’s 6 7

Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, I Sent., prooem., q.2 (I, 9ff). Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, II Sent. d.1, p.1, a.1, q.1 (II, 17).

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contemporaries among the philosophers. Bonaventure himself distinguishes different ways in which the idea of an eternal world can be understood. If it is taken to mean that in no sense whatever does the world have an origin, it is simply wrong and is in contradiction with the biblically based tradition reflected in the doctrine of creation. Bonaventure was also concerned with Aristotle’s rejection of the Platonic theory of the Ideas and the related theory of exemplarity. This appears in Aristotle at the end of the first book of the Metaphysics8 and is discussed in the second book of Bonaventure’s Sentence Commentary9 where he states his clear preference for the view of Plato on this matter. Other than these particular issues of content, in his early years Bonaventure reflects great respect for the Philosopher. In terms of the content of Aristotle’s philosophy, the early works of Bonaventure show his willingness to employ the Aristotelian theory of hylomorphism and the epistemological theory of abstraction even while giving each of these the stamp of his personal views. For example, Bonaventure’s understanding of hylomorphism extends even to the conviction that created spiritual beings, in as far as they are subject to change, must be in potency in some sense. And if matter is understood to be the principle of potentiality and hence of change, then it is understandable that the hylomorphic theory of Bonaventure involves the idea of a type of spiritual matter in the case of the angels and the human soul. And while he adopted the Aristotelian epistemological theory of abstraction as at least a partial account of the genesis of human knowledge, Bonaventure never seems to have seen it as the total picture. He was never completely satisfied with the principle Nihil in intellectu nisi prior in sensibus connected with the empiricism involved in the Aristotelian theory. Abstraction, as Bonaventure saw it, could not account for all that seemed to be involved in the phenomenon of human knowledge, and he always extended this theory in a non-Aristotelian direction by appeal8 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 1, c. 9, 706ff.; Bk. 14, 918ff, as found in McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle. 9 Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, II Sent. d. 1, p.1, a.1, q.1 (II, 17).

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ing to the theory of Illumination after the manner of Augustine. It has been argued even further that in his Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, Bonaventure extends even this epistemology by appealing to the Dionysian mystical epistemology of ecstatic knowledge. On the other hand, he never criticizes Aristotle for not appealing to some form of Illumination. In view of facts such as these, it seems appropriate to suggest, with Van Steenberghen, that the young Bonaventure could be described, philosophically, as an “eclectic Aristotelian”10 though John Quinn would later refine this assessment.11 By this we mean that Bonaventure would have known the form of eclectic Aristotelianism taught in the Faculty of the Arts, and he clearly employed it in developing his own form of rational theology. But it must be said that this is not the entire picture. Quinn argues convincingly that, within this context, Bonaventure developed philosophical positions which are best described not in terms of their remote historical sources, but in terms of his own creative deployment of such sources, and therefore should be described directly as “Bonaventurean.” Beyond this, the theological tradition for centuries had employed elements of the neo-Platonic tradition. These also are discernible in the rational theology of Bonaventure. And he was clearly influenced by the so-called “Dionysian renaissance” of the thirteenth century.12 This could be accounted for through his relation with Alexander of Hales and the early Franciscan school at Paris. Beyond that, he may well have known the ideas of Dionysius from a personal reading of at least the Divine Names, and the Mystical Theology of the Areopagite. Bonaventure’s early relation to Aristotelianism must be distinguished from that which we find later and which can be considered a second level of relation to philosophy. This can be traced clearly to some ten years after Bonaventure had left the university circles and had taken up his work as General Minis10 Fernand van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1955), 147ff. 11 John Francis Quinn, The Historical Constitution of St. Bonaventure’s Philosophy (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1973). 12 Joseph Ratzinger, The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure, trans. Zachary Hayes (Chicago: Franciscan Press, 1971), 86ff.

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ter of the Franciscan Order. Obvious symptoms of this level appear in the Collations on the Ten Commandments of 1267, in the Collations on the Gifts of the Holy Spirit of 1268, and then in the final work of his literary career, the Collations on the Six Days of Creation left uncompleted in 1273. The issue here is no longer that of what the historical Aristotle might have taught and how that might be employed in developing a theology. It is, rather, the issue of the movement among the philosophers of Bonaventure’s time with its inclination to take the Aristotelian philosophical system as a self-sufficient vision of reality. It is in this context that Bonaventure develops what has been called a canon of philosophical errors.13 At this point, his language becomes charged with the sense of disaster. It is important to note that what he is reacting to is not Aristotle as an historical figure, but what has been called the movement of “radical Aristotelianism” that has developed in the context of the university during the years since he left there to take up his work as General Minister of the Franciscan Order. While at the time of the Sentence Commentary, Bonaventure was uncertain whether Aristotle had actually taught the idea of an eternal world, he now says that it has become abundantly clear that this was indeed the case. Thus, he writes in the Collations on the Ten Commandments: I heard it said when I was a student that Aristotle taught that the world was eternal. And when I heard the reasons and arguments offered to prove this, my heart began to be disturbed and I began to think: How can this be? But now the issue is so clear that no one can doubt it.14 This position, which seems clearly opposed to the Christian theology of creation and is now espoused by the philosophers of his own time, Bonaventure sees as a sin against the first commandment; for it amounts to making an idol of the creation of the human mind and allowing human theoretical constructs to Ratzinger, The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure, 134. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, De decem praec., 2, 28 (V, 515); English translation: St. Bonaventure’s Collations on the Ten Commandments, trans. Paul J. Spaeth, WSB VI (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1995). 13 14

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replace the divine truth of revelation. And just a year later in the Collations on the Gifts of the Holy Spirit he writes: There are three errors in the sciences which must be avoided, for they destroy the meaning of the Sacred Scriptures, the Christian faith, and every form of wisdom.15 Bonaventure here goes on to line up three major errors without attributing them to a specific source: the thesis of the eternity of the world; the necessity of fate; and the unicity of the soul in all human beings. These he sees as violations of the order of causality, the ground of understanding, and the order of living. By this time, however, he designates these as errors that are symbolized in Scripture by the number that is the name of the Beast: the number 666. The apocalyptic tone of this seems unmistakable. In Bonaventure’s view, these errors evacuate the entire meaning of the Christian faith by undermining the mystery of creation, the mystery of the salvific work of Christ, the reality of human freedom and responsibility, and the gift of eternal life.16 Whether this entire triad of errors can be attributed to Aristotle may well be debated. But it seems clear that the radical Aristotelians of the thirteenth century have drawn, either from Aristotle or from Arab scholars such as Averroes or Avicenna, the theory of the necessity of fate and the unicity of the soul. And, as we have seen, these errors together with that of the eternity of the world, involve the denial of some crucial Christian convictions in the mind of Bonaventure. But the major problem lurking behind all these is the rejection of the theory of exemplarity and the related theory of the Ideas. While this issue does not appear in these Collations, it had already surfaced in the Sentence Commentary, and will ap-

15 De donis Sp. S., 8, 16 (V, 497); English translation: Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, Collations on the Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit, trans. Zachary Hayes, notes Robert J. Karris, WSB XIV (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2008), 176. 16 De donis Sp. S., 8, 15-20 (V, 497-98): Collations on the Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit, WSB XIV, 173-80.

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pear with dramatic urgency in the Collations on the Six Days of Creation. We will return to this below.

2) History and the theology of Joachim of Fiore With this another sort of problem enters the picture. Joachim of Fiore is well-known as a twelfth-century abbot who, in the aftermath of a personal “pentecostal experience,” created a new understanding of the theology of history significantly different from that of Augustine which had long been familiar to the Western Christian world. It was the fate of this new theology of history that it came together in the thirteenth century with the phenomenon of St. Francis of Assisi, at least in the minds of some of Francis’s followers. This conjunction of factors gave birth to a potentially incendiary, apocalyptically-toned theology of history and a problematic understanding of the nature of the Franciscan Order. With this we refer to the phenomenon of the Franciscan Joachites. We do not intend to rehearse the details of the Joachite problem. But it is essential to mention at least the following. As a theology of history, the Joachite view was convinced that history was running quickly to its end. Gerard of Borgo San Donnino, in a text that was condemned by ecclesiastical authorities in 1255, had proclaimed a “new and eternal testament” in an age of the Spirit which would transcend the age of the Son. The age of the Spirit would be one in which the empirical church of the Christian testament would be transcended by a pure church of the Spirit. The nature and mission of the Order of Franciscans is to be understood in this sort of historical context. It is, beginning with Francis of Assisi, an apocalyptic phenomenon. As such, it signals the approaching end of history. Its mission is to prepare the hearts of human beings for the conversion required in such an apocalyptic context. Now, it was the task of Bonaventure to deal with the affairs of the Order and its relation to the Roman Church at a time when this sort of apocalyptic understanding was a divisive reality within the Order itself, to say nothing of the problems it

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raised for the Order’s relation to the church as a whole and to society. Bonaventure never accepted this view in its entirety. But his later works reflect the problems involved in the Joachite movement in some way. This is particularly true of the final, uncompleted series of lectures he gave at Paris in 1273 known as the Collations on the Six Days of Creation. By this time Bonaventure is in Paris addressing scholars at an institution which, in his mind, should be a major center of Christian learning and wisdom. We are taken back to his earlier sense of the unity of Christian wisdom and his problems with Aristotle. But now those philosophical issues are seen with what can best be described as an apocalyptic seriousness. Those philosophers who propose philosophy as an adequate and selfsufficient guide for human life are, in fact, attacking the wisdom of Christ in what should be the very center of Christian wisdom. The issue here, again, is the radical philosophical movement of the thirteenth century, now viewed in terms of other elements of medieval experience which lie outside the confines of the university. It is in this context that the strongest language appears in judgment of the philosophical movement. And it is perhaps precisely this context, in which so many of the elements of Bonaventure’s personal life and experience converge, that we find the strongest statement of his vision of the ideal of the unity of Christian wisdom. At no point in his career do we find a simple, direct condemnation of philosophy. What we find over and over is a highly developed theology of the Word. In the final analysis, God utters but one Word. It is this Word, spoken from the depths and the center of the divine mystery, that finds expression in the world of God’s creation, and in the world of salvation history and revelation. It is this one Word that undergirds the whole of creation and that has become incarnate in the history of Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus Christ is, for Bonaventure, the pre-eminent embodiment of divine Wisdom. He is, in the fullest sense, “the way, and the truth, and the life” (John 14:6).

‘He made a tongue of his whole body,’ A Franciscan Theology of the Word of God †Regis A. Duffy, O.F.M. When the yet unconverted Augustine went to hear Ambrose’s preaching in the cathedral of Milan so as to improve his rhetorical skills by listening to a master preacher, he quickly found something better – the compelling Word of God: I was taking no trouble to learn from what Ambrose was saying but interested only in listening to how he said it.... Nonetheless as his words, which I enjoyed, penetrated my mind, the substance, which I overlooked, seeped in with them.... As I opened my heart to appreciate how skillfully he spoke, the recognition that he was speaking the truth crept in at the same time.1 When Honorius III invited Francis of Assisi to preach before him, Francis promptly forgot the memorized sermon he had been urged to prepare and the pope heard something much better – the compelling Word of God:

St. Augustine of Hippo, The Confessions, trans. M. Boulding (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1977) V, 14 [24]: 130-31. 1

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And such was the fervor of his spirit as he spoke that, unable to contain himself for joy, as he uttered the words with his mouth he moved his feet as if dancing ...2 Although Ambrose, Augustine and Francis could not be more different in the paths of their conversion and their manner of preaching, they shared a quality common to all authentic proclaimers of the gospel – they spoke out of their own conversion experience prompted and enabled by the Word of God. Thus, when we speak of an Augustinian tradition in preaching, the reference is not to a specific exquisite late Latin rhetorical style but to the impassioned conviction with which the Word was and is proclaimed.3 And when we speak of a Franciscan theology of the Word of God, it is necessarily a synthesis of a heritage shaped by the evangelical praxis and preaching of Francis of Assisi and continued in the varied historical and sociocultural expression of his followers. Such a synthesis might appear impossible considering the apparently fruitless comparison of the preaching of Francis of Assisi and Anthony of Padua, or Bonaventure and Berthold of Regensburg. Closer study reveals an amazing continuity in these disparate styles and epochs that is premised on the nature of ongoing conversion in the life of Christians. There has been a renaissance in the study of medieval preaching in general and of individual Franciscan preachers such as Anthony and Bonaventure. A relatively new area in this renaissance is the study of the socioeconomic and political contexts of mendicant preaching and the makeup of their audiences.4 These

2 Legenda 33; see also Vita prima 16, Vita secunda 127, and Legenda maior II:5 – all cited by William Skudlarek, “Assertion Without Knowledge? The Lay Preaching Controversy of the High Middle Ages” [Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1976), 244, n.1.] 3 See Hughes Oliphant Old, The Reading and Preaching of the Scriptures in the Worship of the Christian Church. The Patristic Age (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 1998), 2:344-46. 4 David L. d’Avray, The Preaching of the Friars: Sermons Diffused from Paris before 1300 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985); Daniel R. Lesnick, Preaching in Medieval Florence: The Social World of Franciscan and Dominican Spirituality (Athens/London: University of Georgia, 1989).

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contexts have helped theologians to read otherwise familiar texts of early Franciscan preachers in a more perceptive way. One example, already noted above, of the transforming character of such contexts on familiar texts is the sociopolitical, economic, as well as the doctrinal persuasions, of the friars’ audiences. Another such example is the mixed social groups that Francis and Bernardine spoke to, the heretical persuasion of some of Anthony of Padua’s early audiences, the transnational and often rowdy nature of the Parisian university audiences that Gregory of Naples, John Rochelle, and Bonaventure addressed. One final example must suffice: contemporary communication models employed to assess the range and effectiveness of medieval preaching.5 These contexts have only recently begun to be examined more closely. The results of such study sometimes challenge the accepted wisdom about the style, the content, and the success of Franciscan preaching. In brief, this renaissance in methodologies for studying medieval preaching as well as the ongoing publication of critical editions of early Franciscan sermon texts until now accessible only in manuscript makes the study of this Franciscan heritage all the more challenging and important.6 Before suggesting several major characteristics of a Franciscan theology of the Word, however, it is necessary to assess some of the obstacles to receiving that Word by the thirteenth century audiences of the first Franciscan preachers.

5 Sophia Menache, The Vox Dei Communication in the Middle Ages (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 6 Les Sermons Universitaires Parisiens de 1250-1251 Contribution à l’Histoire de la Prédication Médiévale, ed. M. Davy (Paris: Vrin, 1931). Louis Jacques Bataillon, “Les images dans les sermons du XIIIe siècle,” La Prédication au XIIIe siècle en France et Italie (Aldershot: Variorum, 1993); J.T. Welter, “Un Nouveau Recueil Franciscain d’Exempla de la Fin du XIIIe Siècle,” Etudes Franciscaines 42 (1930): 432-76. Jacques Guy Bougerol, “Sermons inédits de maîtres franciscains du XIIIe siècle,” Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 81 (1988): 17-49.

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The Pastoral Heritage of the Past It would be difficult to underestimate the pastoral damage inflicted by the barbarian invasions at the end of the patristic period with its widespread destruction of civilization and learning. The breakdown of ecclesial communities and the lack of a trained ministry were but two of the long term effects of that destruction. Preaching largely disappeared or was replaced by reading the homilies of the Fathers which most early medieval communities probably found incomprehensible. During this early medieval period the Benedictines and the Irish monks re-evangelized areas of Europe, e.g. England and the German lands. This ministry gave them the right to preach outside their monasteries. Their preaching, to some extent, addressed this neglected or even absent ministry of preaching in large areas of Europe. In the twelfth century Guibert of Nogent and other monks had to defend their monastic right to preach. The general argument to support such rights was that with ordination a monk received the power to preach just as any other priest. In response their opponents argued that ordination is always to a specific community. How did this justify a monk’s ordination, and thus, his right to preach?7 Eventually, the canons regular took over some pastoral preaching from the monks. But this controversy repeated itself in the thirteenth century when the mendicants were forced to defend similar rights to exercise this ministry. In brief, from the early medieval period the ministry of preaching had usually been limited to comparatively small groups of monks or canons regular and to the few diocesan bishops or priests motivated or canonically empowered to preach. The result was congregations who were often barely evangelized and often enough unaccustomed to hear preaching.8 Meanwhile, W. Zemler-Cizewski, “Guibert of Nogent’s ‘How to Preach a Sermon,’” Theological Studies 59 (1998): 406-19; M. Peuchmaurd, “Le prêtre ministre de la parole dans la théologie du XIIe siècle,” Revue Théologique Ancienne et Médiévale 29 (1962): 52-76. 8 One historical example is the Frankish kingdoms which were nominally Christian but, as Charlemagne’s Admonitio generalis of 789 implies, in desperate need of evangelization. The emperor’s insistence on teaching and preaching regularly and in the vernacular was meant to correct this pastoral situation. 7

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heretical groups such as the Waldensians had begun their own preaching and seem to have developed fairly organized channels of communication.9 By the end of the eleventh century this generally deplorable situation had begun to change. Not only had preaching been renewed in the Benedictine and Cistercian monasteries and in the cathedral schools but the promotion of the Crusades and the offensive against heretics had promoted a form of popular preaching that began to spread into some of the dioceses of France and elsewhere.10 Alan of Lille’s (+ 1203) wonderful Ars praedicandi bears eloquent witness to the renewed interest in effective preaching directed to all levels of society.

Conciliar Reforms and the Franciscan Response But even this incipient renewal in preaching was not enough to correct the sacramental void that had deepened in the early medieval period.11 The fact that most Christians were no longer receiving the eucharist was but one symptom of this pastoral problem. The gradual pastoral acceptance of a new form For an excellent discussion of this reform in preaching see Rosamond McKetterick, The Frankish Church and the Carolingian Reforms, 785-895 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1977) 14, 73, 84, 184-204. For a more extended discussion of this example, see Regis Duffy, “‘Lands Rich in Wine and Oil’ – Culture and Conversion,” Jungmann vol. (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1999) 243-62. The fact that untutored priests might have read the homilies of others does not contradict this statement for most of these sermons were either irrelevant or incomprehensible to the majority of medieval people, see Durant W. Robertson, Jr., “Frequency of Preaching in Thirteenth-Century England,” Speculum 24 (1949): 377-88. 9 Menache, The Vox Dei, 213-41. 10 See P.B. Roberts, “Preaching In/And the Medieval City,” Medieval Sermons and Society: Cloister, City, University, J. Hamesse et al., eds. (Louvain-LaNeuve: College Cardinal Mercier, 1998), 151-64. Also Jean Longère, La Prédication Médiévale (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1983), 54-75. 11 I have discussed this question in “Hold Back Nothing for Yourself,” In Solitude and Dialogue: Contemporary Franciscans Theologize (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 2000), 101-23, and in “The Medicus and its Transformation from Its Patristic to Its Medieval and Tridentine Usages,” Rule of Prayer, Rule of Faith Essays in Honor of Aidan Kavanagh, O.S.B. (Collegeville: Pueblo, 1996), 106-22.

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of penance known as Irish Tariff or Tax penance had indirectly contributed to this eucharistic abstention. This new form of penance which the Irish monks brought to Europe as part of their re-evangelization program required confession of serious sins before the reception of the eucharist. But there was a dearth of competent and canonically empowered confessors to hear the confessions of these sinners. Thus, the lack of the opportunity to confess such sins meant abstention from reception of the eucharist, sometimes over a considerable period of one’s life.12 The Lateran IV Council of 1215 convoked by Innocent III sought to correct this situation by addressing the larger question of pastoral reform. Innocent’s encouragement of the Franciscan and Dominican Orders was one aspect of this reform. His own training as a student in Paris also seems to have fostered Innocent’s desire to see important pastoral changes enacted.13 Two particular canons of Lateran IV were designed to correct the preaching and sacramental problems already described. Canon 10 mandated that bishops were to appoint preachers whose word and example would be efficacious in calling people to renewed conversion. The council hoped that this would lead christians back to confession and communion. Canon 21 enacted sacramental reforms that would support this continuing conversion: at the very least, annual confession of serious sins and reception of the eucharist during Eastertide.14 The impact of Lateran IV on Francis is clearly seen by comparing the early Rule and the final Rule that he gave the friars. About five years before Lateran IV, Innocent III allowed Francis and his companions to give exhortations to penance everywhere though other friars would need the permission of the saint (The Legend of the Three Companions, XII, 5). Six years after the council, Francis devoted some important lines to the question of preaching in the rule of 1221. Francis had obviously taken the 12 See my article “Reconciliation,” The New Dictionary of Theology, ed. J. Komonchak, M. Collins, D. Lane (Wilmington, Del.: M. Glazier, 1987): 830-36. 13 See C. Morris, “Christian Civilization (1040-1400),” The Oxford Illustrated History of Christianity, ed. John McManners (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 209-10. 14 See Giuseppe Alberigo et al., eds., Conciliorum oecumenicorum decreta (Freiburg: Herder, 1962): 215-16 (canon 10) and 220-21 (canon 21).

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council’s canon 10 as a mission for himself and the other friars. According to the rule of 1221, those friars who went among the Saracens might quietly preach by their lives or publicly proclaim that Word.15 In chapter seventeen of that same rule, Francis placed certain safeguards around this office of preaching (XVII, 1-2, 4) and then, pointed to the essence of gospel preaching: “All the brothers, however, should preach by their deeds” which is then spelt out quite clearly in the remaining lines of the chapter.16 In the definitive Rule of 1223, the section on preaching has been condensed to the three lines that comprise chapter IX. The first two lines probably reflect some of the negative experience of those first years of preaching: no friar is to preach without the permission of the bishop in whose diocese he works nor is any friar to be given the office of preaching without examination and approval of the general minister. But the final line of the chapter contains the famous admonition that such preaching, brief in length and well chosen and chaste in style, is to focus on the themes of virtues and vices, and punishment and glory.17 John O’Malley reminds us that “the ninth chapter of the Rule must certainly be considered one of the most important statements in the whole tradition of preaching in the Christian West.”18 We will return to that important mandate of Francis below.

A Franciscan Theology of the Word of God A systematic study of the Word of God would usually enunciate and develop a series of theses that were grounded in biblical 15 Early Rule of 1221, XVI, 6-7, Francis and Clare: The Complete Works, ed. R. Armstrong and I. Brady (New York: Paulist, 1982), 121. See also Longère, La Prédication Médiévale, 95-102 for a detailed summary of how this faculty of preaching was historically developed in the Order. 16 Early Rule of 1221, XVII, 3, 5-19 in Francis and Clare, 122-24. 17 Rule of 1223, IX (Francis and Clare, 143). 18 John O’Malley, “Form, Content, and Influence of Works about Preaching before Trent: The Franciscan Contribution,” I Frati Minori Tra ‘400 e ‘500 (Assisi: Universita di Perugia, Centro di studi francescani, 1986): 27-50. On pages 45-47, O’Malley notes that the council of Trent in its decree on preaching paraphrases this line from the rule.

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or theological texts. But if one attempts a Franciscan theology of the Word, it must begin with and ultimately be judged by the praxis of that Word by Francis of Assisi. While it is true that Bonaventure to some extent theologically articulates that praxis, no one system can hope to encapsulate the genius of Francis’s approach. Therefore, this essay has very modest goals: to suggest several trajectories that are at the heart of any Franciscan theology of the Word, independent of (and yet, applicable to) the particular sociocultural and historical contexts in which evangelization takes place. I will offer four such statements and comment briefly on them, acknowledging that they in no way exhaust the subject.19 Here are the four observations about the theology of Franciscan preaching: first, conversion is always modeled before it is preached. Second, the Franciscan call to conversion is always attuned to the cultural language of its hearers. Third, Franciscan love for the Word of God is reinforced by the continual study and disciplined use of the Scriptures. Fourth, the Franciscan encounter with the Word of God is modeled in the Emmaus narrative: “hearts burning within them.”

Modeled Conversion To our first observation, then: Conversion is always modeled before it is preached. This conviction is not unique to the Franciscan tradition but Francis certainly gave his own emphasis to that conviction. As already noted, Francis, in the earlier Rule of 1221, describes modeled conversion: “All the brothers should preach by their deeds.” Francis was well aware of the biting criticisms of worldly preachers by other contemporary evangelical (and sometimes, heretical) movements. The focus of his own conversion continued to be the living of, not the discussion of, the gospel. When Francis approved Anthony of Padua to teach scripture to the future friar preachers, he conditioned his approval by cit19 I first proposed these ideas in giving the annual Franciscan Chair lecture in 1995 at the Washington Theological Union, Washington, D.C.

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ing the later Rule: “... as long as – in the words of the Rule – you ‘do not extinguish the Spirit of prayer and devotion’.”20 This same focus sets the tone of the later Rule in its opening line: “The rule and life of the Friars Minor is this: to observe the Holy Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ ...”21 But to nourish “the Spirit of prayer and devotion” and to “observe the Gospel” are core characteristics of ongoing conversion. In other words, Francis was convinced that if the gospel life was embodied by his followers, then the core of the gospel message would be heard. Expressed differently, the enacted message must be embodied in the messenger. At this point, it is important to note that Francis probably heard the IV Lateran council’s appeal for conversion and reform differently than many of his contemporaries. Francis had been raised in the typical medieval Christianity of his time where conversion was not perceived as an ongoing experience and need of the growing christian but rather as a one time event concurrent with infant baptism. His own adult conversion experience strongly permeates his Rule and Testament and explains his style and aims in preaching the gospel. When Francis received the initial oral approval of the friars’ way of life, Innocent III said: “Go with the Lord, brothers, and as the Lord will see fit to inspire you, preach penance to all.”22 More than a decade after this approval, Francis in the final form of the Rule repeated this warrant: I also admonish and exhort these brothers that, in their preaching, their words be well chosen and chaste for the instruction and edification of the people, speaking to them of vices and virtues, punishment and glory in a discourse 20 “A Letter to Saint Anthony,” Francis and Clare, 79. Francis cites a line from the fifth chapter of the later Rule. 21 “The Later Rule,” Francis and Clare, 137. 22 Ite cum Domino, fratres, et prout Dominus vobis inspirare dignabitur, omnibus paenitentiam praedicare. First Life of Celano, 33. Although Innocent III employed the term ‘praedicare’ it seems to be in the non-canonical sense of ‘exhortare.’ See Leonhard Lehmann, Tiefe und Weite. Der universale Grundzug in den Gebeten des Franziskus von Assisi [Werl/Westfallen: D. Coelde, 1984], 63-64. For a different interpretation, see Skudlarek, “Assertion Without Knowledge?,” 232.

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that is brief, because it was in few words that the Lord preached while on earth.23 In other words, the friars’ popular exhortations were to focus on penitential and moral themes which are at the heart of ongoing conversion. This was in sharp contrast to much of what passed for popular preaching in his time. Even if Latin was not used in preaching to monks, students, and priests, the content of such sermons was not accessible to the vast majority of laypeople. The lay reform movements of the twelfth century had employed paraphrasing of the scriptures and moral exhortations in the vernacular.24 Whereas a dogmatic sermon might conceivably be preached even by an agnostic, penitential and moral exhortations implied at least a modicum of credibility. When Bonaventure describes the preaching of Francis, it is the embodied and lived gospel that we see: Francis, therefore, Christ’s valiant knight went around the cities and fortresses proclaiming the Kingdom of God, preaching peace, teaching salvation and repentance for the remission of sin, not with plausible words of human wisdom, but with the learning and power of the Spirit ... without using flattery or seducing blandishments ... without fear of any reprover he uttered the truth most confidently.25 Bonaventure’s phrase “with the learning and power of the Spirit” furnishes a corrective to understanding the friar’s conversion as the source of his effectiveness as a preacher. Francis, as Kajetan Esser pointed out, believed that the preached Word of God was addressed to the concrete situation of the hearer.26 The friar who listened to that Word in his own life would speak with “The Later Rule,” Francis and Clare, 143. Lehmann, Tiefe und Weite, 62-63. 25 Legenda maior XII as cited in Skudlarek, “Assertion Without Knowledge?,” 234. 26 Kajetan Esser, “Die religiösen Bewegungen...,” 301 as cited in Skudlarek, “Assertion Without Knowledge?,” 239, n.1. 23 24

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the power of that same Word to others. John of Wales, an early friar who wrote on preaching, put it this way: If a preacher wishes his word to be efficacious, he should drink from the rivers of the grace of God. And he should pray to this author of the Word that he should give to this Word the power to penetrate the hearts of his hearers.27 As soon as the holiness of the minister is mentioned, there is always the fear that we are returning to the classic debate between Augustine and the Donatists. What is particularly insidious about the Donatist position is that it misconstrues the biblical notion of conversion. In response to the Donatists’ demand for holiness in the sacramental minister for a true sacrament, Augustine distinguished between what God uniquely does and what we are enabled to do in response. A fruitful sacrament, Augustine taught, is one in which both God’s action and our response are symbolized.28 In a similar way, an expectation that the preacher of God’s Word should witness to God’s action in his life does not detract from what God uniquely does but rather reaffirms it. The source and efficacy of such an ongoing conversion is dramatically imaged in the action-words of Francis. Prophets like Hosea, Ezekiel and Isaiah sometimes employed an action word filled with the power of God, “the prophetic word made visible.”29 While Francis’s action-words may not technically be such prophetic symbols, they are certainly redolent of the source of such

27 John of Wales, Communiloquium, Latin text and translation by M.D.J. Phelan, “The ‘Pastoral Care’ of John of Wales” [M.A. dissertation, Fordham University, 1947], 79. 28 For this discussion, see Regis Duffy, “Sacraments in General,” Systematic Theology. Roman Catholic Perspectives, vol. 2, ed. by Francis Schüssler Fiorenza and John P. Galvin [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991], 183-210, here 19294. 29 Bruce Vawter, “Introduction to Prophetic Literature,” The New Jerome Biblical Commentary, ed. by Roland E. Murphy et al. [Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990], 199.

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symbols.30 Thomas of Celano’s description of Francis preaching before Honorius III provides an example: And such was the fervor of his spirit as he spoke that, unable to contain himself for joy, as he uttered the words with his mouth he moved his feet as if dancing ...31 This same Francis will preach in the cathedral at Assisi by pouring ashes over himself and then leaving the church. When, due to illness, his brothers give him some nourishing food, he will have himself led into town with a halter around his neck and a brother proclaiming that he is a glutton and hypocrite. He will break out into song to proclaim the praises of God. In other words, he imaged the conversion that he joyfully preached to others. Celano, in describing how Francis “preached” in his last illness by his example, insightfully says that “he made a tongue of his whole body.”32 The pastoral corollary to this notion of modeled conversion is caught in the saying, “What you are so thunders at me that I cannot hear what you are saying” (Ralph Waldo Emerson). The very struggle to remain in the way of conversion in each period of one’s life is always embodied and proclaimed in that person. Therefore, the most flawed person who must constantly struggle to live the message he preaches is modeling conversion in a humble but credible way.

30 Some of the legends about Anthony of Padua’s preaching seem to reflect this same kind of action-word. According to one such legend, when heretics refuse to listen to Anthony’s preaching, he preaches to the fish in a nearby river who give him the reverent attention that he did not receive from the townspeople. This legend was so rooted in popular culture that one of the Austrian folksongs that recounts the legend is used by the composer Gustave Mahler in his music as late as the turn of this century. 31 Thomas of Celano, Vita prima, 73 as cited in Skudlarek, “Assertion Without Knowledge?,” 244, my emphasis. 32 Thomas of Celano, Vita prima, 97 as cited in Skudlarek, “Assertion Without Knowledge?,” 244, n.4.

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‘Home Again!’ Cultural Language A second thesis is: the Franciscan call to conversion is always attuned to the cultural language of its hearers. In the late twentieth century we have become accustomed to hearing about the importance of the cultural context of the proclaimed gospel, especially in Paul VI’s powerful letter Evangelii nuntiandi. But I suspect that truly gospel-minded preachers in every age have, as a rule, instinctively known that the Word cannot be heard apart from the culture of its hearers.33 Our culture, after all, provides the initial lens through which we understand reality and appropriate values. Although the gospel message certainly contests some of those values and understanding, it also sees culture as growing out of God’s creation. Thanks to the work of such scholars as David L. d’Avray, Daniel R. Lesnick, Bernadette Paton, Cynthia L. Polecritti, and Eugene F. Policelli and others we have learned how to contextualize the preaching of the friars in its sociocultural as well as its historical situation.34 The Franciscan sensitivity to culture is the logical outcome of Francis’s reverence for the vestigia Dei, the footprints of God in creation. After all, culture is, in part, the human response to that creation.35 Francis in his Canticle of Brother Sun praises what God has created and then, renewed through Christ. Paul 33 An excellent example of this cultural sensitivity may be seen in the work of Alan of Lille, The Art of Preaching [Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1981] in which he systematically suggests how to preach to specific sociocultural groups, e.g. soldiers. 34 David L. d’Avray, The Preaching of the Friars; Daniel R.Lesnick, Preaching in Medieval Florence; Bernadette Paton, Preaching Friars and the Civic Ethos: Siena, 1380-1480 [London: Center for Medieval Studies, 1992]; Cynthia L. Polecritti, “Preaching Peace in Renaissance Italy: San Bernardino of Siena and His Audience” [Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1988]; Eugene F. Policelli, “Humanism in the Life and Vernacular: Sermons of Bernardino of Siena” [Ph.D. dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1973]; David L. d’Avray, “Method in the Study of Medieval Sermons,” Modern Questions about Medieval Sermons Essays on Marriage, Death, History and Sanctity, ed. Nicole Bériou and David L. d’Avray (Spoleto: Centro Italiano di Studi sull’alto Medioevo, 1994), 3-29. 35 Bonaventure, Breviloquium, Part Two, Ch.1, par.2; English translation in WSB IX, 60-61. For a discussion of this point, see Fanny Imle and Julian Kaup, Die Theologie des heiligen Bonaventura: Darstellung seiner dogmatischen Lehren [Werl: Franziskus-D., 1931], 76-84.

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speaks of the Christian as a ‘radically new creation’ and Francis in the Earlier Rule thanks God not only for having redeemed us but for having created us through his Son, a uniquely Franciscan view.36 In short, the Franciscan heritage emphasizes that it is the same God who creates and redeems and that culture will aid in and be transformed by these redemptive actions. One of the most obvious examples of this sensitivity to the acculturated situation of their listeners is the friars’ use of exempla, i.e., stories that would flesh out the gospel message. [Already in the thirteenth century a Franciscan friar from the English-speaking province collected a number of these exempla for the use of preachers.37] Lesnick summarizes Anthony of Padua’s use of exempla: He [Anthony] used comical as well as serious means of fixing the attention of his listeners. He excited laughter and used witticisms to move his audiences from sin toward virtue. Apparently one reason for his great popularity among the humbler social orders was his use of novel illustrations, anecdotes, and stories relating to the trades and crafts. He constantly referred to and used examples from the natural world in order to make his religious discourse more concrete.38 The perennial problem with the use of exempla, of course, is that the preacher may spend more time in finding and narrating the best anecdotes than in preparing the sermon itself. What marked the great Franciscan preachers’ distinctive use of such stories was the conviction that the Word of God always had a relevance in the lives of their hearers. One of the reasons, I suspect, that people have welcomed the Franciscan approach to the

36 See Zachary Hayes, “Bonaventure: Mystery of the Triune God,” The History of Franciscan Theology, ed. by Kenan Osborne [St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1994], 39-125, here, 82-84. 37 Liber exemplorum ad usum praedicantium, Saeculo XIII compositus a quodam fratre minore anglico de provincia hiberniae, ed. Andrew G. Little [London: British Society of Franciscan Studies, 1908]. 38 Lesnick, Preaching in Medieval Florence, 140.

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preaching of God’s Word is because, at its most authentic, it links the experience of God and God’s world so closely. Language is also an important cultural creation. The use of culturally telling language provides a bridge to God’s Word for people of a specific time and place. The early German vernacular sermons of the Franciscan Berthold of Regensburg, for example, are considered pioneering examples of effective communication because they were in a cultural idiom that people immediately understood.39 As early as 1268 Roger Bacon classed his German confrere as the finest preacher in the vernacular at that time.40 But I have selected the sermons of Bernardine of Siena as best exemplifying a complete and effective use of culture to evangelize. Bernardine’s audiences were a cross section of the population, sometimes numbering in the thousands. Before coming to a city, Bernardine learned as much of the local dialect as he could and employed it in effective ways in his sermons. He knew how to use language to open up the meaning of the Gospel message. He tried to discover any special problems and customs of the area in which he was going to preach. He not only kept himself well informed of the current economic and political issues of that area but used them with telling effect to illustrate the practical corollaries of living the gospel. Iris Origo captures the genius of Bernardine in all this: Since he considered every facet of life to have some interest or importance, he ended by painting some pictures as detailed and as brillant as those which illustrated the missals of his brother-monks [!]. It is as if a series of minatures had been turned into a newsreel of the early fifteenth century, a minute faithful documentary.41 39 Berthold of Regensburg, Deutsche Predigten, ed. by Otto Brandt [Jena: L. Diedericks, 1924]. 40 See Denise A. Kaiser, Sin and the Vices in the Sermones de Dominicis by Berthold of Regensburg [Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1983], 61. 41 Iris Origo, The World of San Bernardino [New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1962], 7. See also, Cuthbert Gumbinger, “St. Bernardine of Siena, The Popular Preacher,” Franciscan Studies 2 [1942]: 12-34.

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This genuis for communication resulted in an immediacy of language that still speaks to us today. He compares for example, the mouth of a slanderer to the stench that comes from some wells.42 In commenting on Luke’s parable of the fig-tree, he immediately adds “those good large purple figs from Massa” and then as he develops the parable, he compares the city of Siena to the trunk of the fig tree that for three years has yielded nothing: “God has waited and waited, and you yield no fruit in his praise, but do all things contrary to his will. Siena, beware.”43 Time and again, after he has digressed for a moment, he will gleefully call out his famous “Home, again” to bring his audience back to the main theme.44 When he chides his listeners for coming late and thus, missing an important part of his message, Bernardine tells them to be punctual in these words: If you have meat to cook before you come to the preaching, see that you have bought it and that you’re up with Sovana [the largest bell in Siena] and that you put the meat on the fire and skim off the grease, then clothe yourself and it will be already half cooked ...45 Bernardine was a trained rhetorician and a master of communication. But he was much more than that. Like Francis, Bernardine believed that this was God’s world and spoke of it in such a way that he convinced many of his listeners of that truth. He transformed the way his contemporaries viewed their lives and their times because they began to find the footprints of God where they had not before. Vittorio Coletti, in his important study of language as used in medieval sermons, points to Bernardine of Siena’s intuitvely brillant use of this cultural key. What, at first blush, might seem to be an uncritical but popular use of language to attract his audience’s attention turns out to be a very nuanced use of all the

Saint Bernardine of Siena, Sermons, ed. by Nazareno Orlandi [Siena: Typografica Sociale, 1920], 17. 43 Sermons, 49-50. 44 Sermons, 8. 45 Sermons, 11. 42

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possible registers of a word or phrase.46 Behind this use of language there is always the catechetical and moral concerns that are part of ongoing conversion. Bernardine of Siena is an obvious example but whether looks at stylistically different preachers as Francis, Bonaventure, or Anthony this same sensitivity to cultural language (i.e., not only words but the images that are generated by a culture’s concerns and values) is present in their homilies. In the Franciscan tradition the clarity of the gospel message must be framed and projected by the power of the cultural language of one’s hearers.

The Undiluted Word Third, Franciscan love for the Word of God is reinforced by the continual study and disciplined use of the Scriptures. I love good wine. Therefore, I found it difficult to believe that anyone would put water in their wine until I tasted some of the French vin ordinaire. In 2 Corinthians, Paul uses to great effect a Greek term employed in the wine trade of his time – kapeleuein – to describe some preachers: “For we are not like the majority, watering down the Word of God” [2 Cor 2:17].47 Over the centuries, preachers who have not been faithful to God’s meaning in the scriptures have indeed diluted the Word of God. Putting aside the cases where the Word might be considered too inconvenient or demanding, preachers have always been tempted to read into that Word what best suits the theme they want to preach on. Bonaventure chastens such preachers: “They ought not to preach stories but the divine words.”48 Since this transition from what God means in the scriptures to its implications for our lives remains a problem for contemporary preachVittorio Coletti, L’Eloquence de la chaire, Victoires et défaites du latin entre Moyen Age et Renaissance (Paris: Cerf, 1987), 118-24. 47 I follow Charles K. Barrett’s translation and comments where he notes that the term can mean ‘to adulterate’ as well as its practical corollary ‘to make profit from’ the Word of God. See Charles K. Barrett, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians [New York: Harper & Row, 1973], 103. 48 Bonaventure, Epistola de tribus quaestionibus 6 [Quarrachi ed. 8:33233], as cited in Dominic Monti, “Bonaventure’s Interpretation of Scripture in his Exegetical Works” [Ph. D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1979], 13. 46

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ers, we have something to learn from the great friar preachers’ disciplined use of God’s Word. Since Francis put the living of the gospel at the center of a friar’s life, there is small wonder that he held the scriptures themselves in such reverence.49 Bonaventure gives theological expression to Francis’s love of the scriptures when he speaks of the breadth, the length, the height, and the depth of scripture in his prologue to the Breviloquium. He then advises the student: No one can develop such a facility [in expounding the meanings of scripture] except by long practice in reading the text of the Bible and committing it to memory; otherwise he will never be able to be an expert in the exposition of the scriptures.50 Bonaventure spoke from experience. As a theological student at the University of Paris, he would have spent five years listening to lectures on the scriptures and then, for two years as a baccalaureus biblicus given a literal reading of all the biblical books under the supervision of a regent master before proceeding to a commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard.51 Unlike patristic homilies that usually teased out the implications of a single scriptural reference, medieval preaching tended to be highly structured and analytical. It reflected its university background of lectio, disputatio, praedicatio. In the twelfth century, Abbot Guibertus [+1124] in his treatise on how a sermon ought to be prepared, distinguished several meanings or senses of scripture that the preacher might treat and takes the classi-

49 See his First Letter to the Custodians, Francis and Clare, 53. Thomas of Celano’s description of Francis is also pertinent here: “Francis’s highest intention, his chief desire, his uppermost purpose was to observe the holy gospel in all things and through all things and with perfect vigilance ...” Vita Prima in St. Francis of Assisi. Writings and Early Biographies, ed. Marion Habig [Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1973], 229. 50 Bonaventure, Breviloquium, Prologue, 6, 1, trans. by Erwin E. Nemmers [St. Louis: B. Herder, 1947], 16: see WSB IX, 19. 51 Palemon Glorieux, “L’enseignement au moyen âge. Techniques et méthodes en usage à la faculté de Théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 35[1968]: 65-186.

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cal paradigm of the word “Jerusalem” to illustrate these meanings.52 Bonaventure had a highly refined use of these meanings that gave his preaching much of its depth and insight. Once the literal meaning of a scriptural text was established, the exegete and the preacher had to draw out nourishment for the soul: “Scripture has a multiform meaning. Thus it may capture every intellect and may equally inflame and illumine every intellect striving diligently to understand it by the multiformity of its resplendence.”53 But to discover these meanings Bonaventure and his contemporaries were expected to have a thorough knowledge of the biblical research tools then available. Thanks to the careful scholarly work of Beryl Smalley, we now know at least some of the scholarly resources that Anthony of Padua, Alexander of Hales, John de la Rochelle, Bonaventure, Johm of Pecham, and John of Wales used in commenting on the scriptures.54 They show an impressively wide command of every type of commentary then available. In other words, in their efforts to establish the literal and spiritual meanings of scriptural texts, they were not fantasizing about what they might want the texts to mean but rather, responsibly and critically reviewing previous studies in order to arrive at the true and challenging meaning that they taught and preached. As the attacks on the mendicant orders began to intensify, Bonaventure and his successors found it necessary to defend their gospel way of life from the scriptures themselves. This led to a more radical reading of the scriptures, especially in regard to the poverty and humility of Christ, and its implications for their own time.55 A perennial Franciscan theology of the Word of God always questions us closely as to what kind of student of that Word we 52 Guibertus of Novicento, Quo ordine sermo fieri debeat, PL 156, 19-32. This paradigm has been traced back to John Cassian. See Monti, “Bonaventure’s Interpretation of Scripture in his Exegetical Works,” 27, n.5. 53 Breviloquium, Prologue 4, 3 [Nemmers trans., 13]; Monti, WSB IX, 1415. 54 Beryl Smalley, The Gospels in the Schools c.1100-c.1280 [London: Hambledon Press, 1985], 144-241; Smalley, “The Use of Scripture in St. Anthony’s Sermones,” Greyfriars Review 8[1994]: 239-52. 55 See Smalley’s remarks, “The Use of Scripture in St. Anthony’s Sermones,” 241.

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really are. First, such a theology asks if the praxis of the Word of God has a continual impact on the praxis of our lives. In the Franciscan perspective there is no dichotomy between the living of and the study of the Word of God. One energizes the other. Second, if Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure or Anthony had at their disposal our rich contemporary hermeneutical and linguistic resources for biblical study, they would put us to shame by their command and use of these tools for an interpretation of scripture that would speak to our generation. Third, the disciplined use of God’s Word refers to the professional and rigorous preparation that we submit ourselves to if we have the privilege of teaching and preaching that Word to others. A preacher must be sure of the literal meaning of a scriptural text, with all that implies in current bibilical study, if he is ever to penetrate the spiritual meanings.

The Affective Dimension in Preaching A fourth thesis is: the Franciscan encounter with the Word of God is modeled in the Emmaus narrative: “hearts burning within them.” Joseph Fitzmyer in commenting on the conclusion of Luke’s post-Resurrection narrative where the Emmaus disciples recall how their hearts were on fire as Christ opened the sense of the scriptures to them, says simply “they realize the full import of his catechesis and his actions.”56 But, as the phrase “hearts afire” indicates, this is not simply an intellectual awareness but an ardent response of the whole person. This Lucan phrase, “hearts afire,” captures the characteristic Franciscan response to the Word of God. [The phrase also avoids some of the problems associated with the more familiar description of this response as the “affections” [affectus, affectio].57 Joseph Fitzmyer, The Gospel According to Luke X-XXIV (New York: Doubleday, 1985), 1568. 57 For a discussion of the history of the term and its place in the thought of Bonaventure, see Elizabeth Dreyer, “‘Affectus’ in St. Bonaventure’s Description of The Journey of the Soul to God” [Ph.D. dissertation, Marquette University, 1983]; also, Johann B. Schneyer, Die Unterweisung der Gemeinde über die Predigt bei scholastischen Predigern: Eine Homiletik aus scholastischen Prothemen (München: F. Schöningh, 1968), 52-53. 56

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While the acknowledged influence of the Cistercians [especially St. Bernard of Clairvaux] and the school/abbey of St. Victor is important in the affective dimension of Franciscan preaching, the first and most pervasive influence is that of the founder, Francis of Assisi. Thomas of Celano’s famous description of Francis preaching before Honorius III, already alluded to, makes the point: And such was the fervor of his spirit as he spoke that, unable to contain himself for joy, as he uttered the words with his mouth he moved his feet as if dancing, not as in wantonness, but as glowing with the fire of Divine love; not provoking laughter, but extorting tears of grief.58 This type of affective preaching by an authentic gospel person seemed to elicit an affective response.59 Part of the dynamic of such preaching seems to be the way in which it invites participation from the listener. This participation consists in looking at one’s experience in a more comprehensive way. The listener’s own redemptive experience is questioned by the way in which the meaning of the scriptural text is slowly unfolded. In Bonaventure’s case, the often artificial scholastic method of dividing and subdividing the analyses of the scriptural text being exegeted is transformed into highly imaged language which evokes a response. Here, for example, is the opening of Bonaventure’s Christmas sermon [probably preached at the new basilica of St. Clare in Assisi in 1268].60 Let us go over to Bethlehem and see this word that has come to pass, which the Lord has shown us.” [Luke 2]. 58 Thomas of Celano, Vita prima, 73 as cited by Skudlarek, “Assertion Without Knowledge?,” 244. 59 The eyewitness account of Thomas Spalato who heard Francis preach at Bologna is a good example. Both Skudlarek, “Assertion Without Knowledge?,” 238 and Lesnick, Preaching in Medieval Florence, 137 give the citation. 60 I translate from the critical text, Saint Bonaventure, Sermones de diversis, vol.1, ed. by Jacques G. Bougerol [Paris: Les Editions Franciscaines, 1993], 86-97, here, 87, lines 1-20. For the question of whether the sermons written and transmitted to us in Latin were actually preached in the vernacular, see, Jean Longère, La Prédication Médiévale, 150-64.

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1. These words can be explained in a twofold way, namely literally and allegorically; literally, the words of the shepherds are explained, but allegorically, the words of contemplatives. – As for the literal sense, two points should be noted there: the fervent devotion of the shepherds, when they say “Let us go over” and their pious acknowledgement [confessio] when they say “this word that has come to pass.” As to the first, their devotion is [to be understood] in two ways: in their proposal to go and in their desire to see.... As far as the first proposal to go ... their words are not false or insincere because of what follows, “And hastening, they came” and because they hastened to come, they merited to see. Hence, the additional “and they found Mary and Joseph and the child placed in a manger.” Thus, we are instructed in this so that we might seek Christ with concern and with haste. And the Gloss [says]: “The presence of Christ must not be sought with apathy; thus the shepherds found [Christ] without delay because they did not run with a false faith to see what they heard.” Thus the fervent devotion of the shepherds is shown in their proposal to go and in their desire to see. Bonaventure was considered one of the great preachers of his day and preached quite frequently not only the university sermons in Latin but also vernacular sermons in the rest of France and in Italy.61 No one reason accounts for this popularity. I am convinced that a major factor in his popularity as preacher was his ability to construct an affective dynamic that might be compared to a collage or a mosaic in which vivid individual pieces gradually form part of an affective whole. The listener has been drawn into this cumulative process by the highly imaged language that calls out a personal response.62 61 See Sophronius Clasen, “Der hl. Bonaventura als Prediger,” Wissenschaft und Weisheit 24 [1961]: 85-113. 62 I would not want to claim that all Franciscan preachers have valued this affective dimension as much as Francis or Bonaventure. But after examining the sermons of Franciscan friars given at the University of Paris in the academic year 1250-51, I would say that the best of these are faithful to this

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The Word of God always calls us to conversion. But we are converted and redeemed out of our lived experience. When we look at the classic examples of spiritual autobiography we see how an Augustine or a Francis found the vestigia Dei, the footprints of God in their own lives. The Word of God always implicates us in a similar process by bringing us back not only to the facts of our experience but to the non-verbal components of that experience and the meanings we gave those experiences then and now. In a similar way, the preaching of that Word invites and enables us to deal in a more wholistic fashion with those experiences. The affective dimension of that preached Word reveals the wounds not yet healed and the love not yet given.63

Conclusion Let me close by suggesting that the Franciscan tradition has some relevant pastoral corollaries to teach us. First, in contrast to some of the sloppy and even irresponsible preparation for teaching and preaching the Word of God that is too current today, this tradition calls us to a grateful, prayerful, and enthusiastic study of God’s Word empowered by the rich biblical studies that are now available. Scholars, for example, now seem to agree that Bonaventure wrote his Commentary on Luke, not as an academic commentary, but to train friars who were given the commission to preach.64 In this pastorally rich and insightful approach to Luke, Bonaventure gives us a model of how Franciscans would make themselves a servant to that Word. Second, the Franciscan approaches the religious experience of others with reverence. God’s footprints are already in the lives affective dimension in various degrees. A good example is the Holy Thursday sermon of Gregory of Naples, the second provincial of the French Province. The Latin texts of these sermons can be found in Marie-Marguerite Davy, Les Sermons Universitaires Parisiennes 1250-51: Contribution à l’Histoire de la Prédication Médiévale (Paris: Vrin, 1931). 63 Jean Chatillon in his article “St. Anthony of Padua and the Victorines,” Greyfriars Review 89 [1994]: 347-80 has argued convincingly that Anthony was an early representative of this affective theology. 64 See Thomas Reist, Saint Bonaventure as a Biblical Commentator (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985), 54-78.

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of those we teach and preach to. Therefore, we do not talk at them but rather address their religious experience with direct, not rhetorical, questions. Those listening can easily differentiate the preacher who is ‘doing his own thing’ and the preacher who is there to help the listener see how the Word of God questions the meaning of their religious experience. Franciscan preaching always leads back to spiritual autobiography and to expressions of worship and praise for the footprints of God rediscovered in our lives. Finally, the Franciscan approach to preaching might be best captured in that scene of Francis of Assisi dancing as he preached the Word of God before the papal court, much as David danced before the ark of covenant to welcome the presence of God. When we watch inspired dancers like Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire or Mihail Berishnakov, we are tempted to leave our seats and join them. Using this metaphor of dancing, let me ask readers three questions about their Franciscan experience of the Word of God. First, are you still learning the steps or are you really dancing? What a difference there is between “going through the motions” of living the Word of God and actually allowing that Word to permeate the intent and direction of our lives. Second, do you hear the music as you dance? We need to hear the rhythm and tempo of the music in order to dance. The music for our dance is the Word of God which, as Paul reminds us, is the Word from the Cross [1 Cor 1:18]. When the joy of living the gospel life has somehow disappeared, is it perhaps because the Word is no longer at the center of our lives? We need to keep hearing that music if we are to continue to dance. Third, does the way you dance make others want to dance? Authentic living of the Word of God is infectious. When we see someone living the Word of God it provokes questions in us that disturb the lassitude of our own lives. We rise to dance.

Where In the World Are We? Old Testament Views of Creation* Michael D. Guinan, O.F.M. Whether we like it or not, to be human is to live in relationship to and with the world as a whole. It is a given of our existence. How we think about and view the world, then, becomes important for how we will live in it. For a long time, from a spiritual point of view, we have regarded the world as a source of temptation and sorrow, a “vale of tears,” from which we hope to escape at death as purely as we can. Since the Enlightenment and the rise of modern science, often the world has been seen as a giant machine that we are challenged to figure out, “to solve,” as it were, and use to our advantage. Our contemporary ecological crisis suggests that we have not used it well. Does the Bible provide any insight here? For a long time, for a variety of reasons, within biblical studies, the role and meaning of creation was either ignored or considered (with some hostility) to be a late and pagan borrowing in Israel that was never comfortably integrated into the story of salvation history. Recent revival of interest, however, has shown how inadequate such an approach is.1 Scripture in fact presents a number of positive imFor a discussion of some of these causes, see William P. Brown, The Ethos of the Cosmos: The Genesis of Moral Imagination in the Bible (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999), 4-10, 23-25; Theodore Hiebert, The Yahwist’s Landscape: Nature and Religion in Early Israel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 3-29; and Walter Brueggemann, “The Loss and Recovery of Creation in Old Testament Theology,” Theology Today 53 (1996): 177-90. For an assessment of the current situation, see Leander Keck, “Introduction to the 1

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ages of creation that can be very helpful in approaching creation and our role within it. Before turning to some of these, some preliminary observations are needed.

Preliminary Considerations It is always good methodology to begin by defining terms; so, what is the meaning of “creation” in the Bible? We can begin by mentioning a few things that it is not. Creation does not equal “nature,” in the sense of “I love the beauty of creation.” This derives from nineteenth century Romantic ideas.2 Creation is not a scientific word; “creation vs. evolution” is a totally misleading question.3 Neither is it a philosophical one (e.g., “creatio ex nihilo,” “eternal creation”). Creation, rather, is a thoroughly religious concept. Creation always implies a Creator. To understand everything that exists at its deepest level, it must be seen in relationship to God. And this is a statement not only about beginnings, but is true also of every single moment of time.4 This brings us to the second preliminary consideration, the nature of creation language. If we ask, “What are the two most New Interpreter’s Bible,” The New Interpreter’s Bible, vol. 1 (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1994), 1: “In those days [1950s], biblical theology insisted that whereas the Canaanite deities were nature gods, the God of Israel acts in history; nowadays, there is uncertainty about history, but intense interest in ecology and God’s concern for the earth.” 2 Literary critic Robert B. Alter has noted, “There is no real nature poetry in the Psalms, because there is in the psalmist’s view no independent realm of nature, but there is creation poetry ...”, The Art of Biblical Poetry (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1985), 117. 3 See briefly my “In the Image of God: Creationism vs. Evolution,” St. Anthony Messenger, 102/1 (June 1994): 18-23 (also printed as “The Creation Story of Genesis: Does It Really Contradict Evolution,” Catholic Update CO694 (June 1994). For more detailed discussion, see Langdon Gilkey, Creationism on Trial: Evolution and God at Little Rock (Minneapolis, MN: Winston Press, 1985) especially chapter 8, “The Shape of a Religious Symbol and the Meaning of Creation,” 209-34. 4 Thus we can see, despite popular (mis)understanding, how and why St. Francis of Assisi is not a saint of nature. He is rather a saint of creation who saw in and through all things the hand of the same Creator so that we are all brothers and sisters, members of one family.

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important moments of our lives?” the answer would be: birth and death. If we ask further, “Describe them,” we would not be able to do so. We experience birth but are not able to reflect on it and describe it; we will experience death, but then we are not around to do so. And yet, these are important not only as limit experiences in time, but as recurring moments, experiences throughout our lives. The only way we can talk about these is through “non-literal” language. They are “something-like;” we use metaphoric, symbolic language to talk about them. We do not describe them, we “evoke” them, i.e. try to “call up” the experience. The same thing is true of the birth and death of the universe. When we talk about these, (protology [talk about first things] and eschatology [talk about last/final things]) we also can do so only in indirect ways, symbolic ways. Thus we can see the fatal flaw in trying to read protological (creation) language as scientific description or eschatological language as historical prediction. It is literalizing what is essentially nonliteral language. We can note further that, in fact, protological and eschatological language interconnect. The “beginning-time” and the “end-time” interpenetrate. Thus, one can legitimately ask, “Does the creation account in Genesis 1 refer to something at the beginning of time, or is it a vision of God’s purpose and goal at the end?” As the German saying puts it: Urzeit wird Endzeit.5 This issue will return later in our discussion. It should come as no surprise, then, to find that when the Bible speaks of God as Creator, it draws on a variety of analogies or metaphors rooted in human experiences.6 When God creates, it is like: a) parents giving birth (“Before the mountains were begotten, and the earth and the world were brought forth” [Ps 90:2, interestingly, using both paternal and maternal images]); See Zachary Hayes, Visions of a Future: A Study of Christian Eschatology (Wilmington, DL: Michael Glazier, 1989), 89-94, who builds on Karl Rahner, “The Hermeneutics of Eschatological Assertions,” in Theological Investigations, vol. 4 (Baltimore, MD: Helicon Press, 1966): 323-46. What is said of eschatological language applies equally, mutatis mutandis, to protological language. 6 For convenient summaries, see Claus Westermann, Genesis 1-11 (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Press, 1984) 26-41; Walter Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1997), 145-64. 5

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b) an artisan fashioning or forming an artifact (“For thus says the Lord, the creator of the heavens, who is God, the designer and maker of the earth, who established it, not creating it to be a waste, but designing it to be lived in” [Isa 45:18, using four verbs of making]); c) a powerful commander giving orders (“By the word of the Lord the heavens were made…. For he spoke and it was made, he commanded, and it stood forth” [Ps 33:6, 9; Genesis 1); d) a mighty warrior defeating a powerful enemy (Chaos) (“O God, my king from of old … you smashed the heads of the dragons in the waters … you brought dry land out of the primeval waters” [Ps 74:12-17]). It is obviously not a case of “which one of these is true[r]?”; they are different, complementary, and at times overlapping ways of conceiving of and talking about God’s “creative” activity. What then is the product of God’s activity? How do we “imagine” what it is that God has done? Here too a variety of images appear, some distinct, some overlapping. In what follows we will briefly explore three of these, all of them rooted in the relation of all things to God: 1) the world as God’s sanctuary/tabernacle (the Priestly material in the Pentateuch); 2) the world as God’s kingdom (the Psalms); and 3) the world as God’s playhouse (Proverbs/wisdom).7

The World as God’s Sanctuary/Tabernacle Perhaps the best known creation text in the Bible is Genesis 1 which belongs to the Priestly material in the Pentateuch. When God begins to create, the world is a disordered chaos, dark, watery, formless and void. Then God begins to act, proceeding through two movements or panels, corresponding to days 1-2-3 A very important work in this regard is that cited above (n. 1), William P. Brown, The Ethos of the Cosmos, in which he studies five images of creation and their moral implications: 1) Cosmic Sanctuary (Priestly material of the Pentateuch); 2) Garden (Yahwist material in the Pentateuch); 3) Yahweh’s Victory Garden (in Second Isaiah); 4) Wisdom’s Playhouse (in Proverbs); and 5) Job’s Carnival of Animals in the wilderness (in Job). My own work on creation as God’s sanctuary was well advanced when Brown’s book appeared. He does not treat the psalms (32); I depend on him for the image of playhouse. 7

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(Gen 1:1-13) and days 4-5-6 (Gen 1:14-2:4). On the first days, God, dividing and conquering as it were, subdues the chaos and brings out an ordered universe fit for habitation and life. On the second set of days, God fills this universe with living, moving beings. Appearing on the sixth day, human beings are, on the one hand, part and parcel of the world, fully and deeply integrated into it, and, on the other, the climax of God’s creative activity with a special role to play. They are to act as God’s image and likeness in creation. The living God of Israel can be imaged only by living beings who do what God does. Humans do this, first, by recognizing and accepting their secondary status as images, and second, by continuing God’s twofold activity of subduing the chaos and being instruments of life. This account began with dark, watery, formless chaos. Where does it end? The first full day when all of creation is involved is not the sixth day, but rather the seventh day, the Sabbath. God is presented as bringing about the universe by working for six days and then resting on the Sabbath. Thus the Sabbath marks the end and climax of God’s creative work. From our point of view though, the Sabbath is the first full day on which the universe and all its creatures exist; it is the beginning of our history. But is creation really finished at this point? A certain level has indeed been reached, but there are indications that more remains to be done. Humans sin; the Israelite family, oppressed in Egypt, is delivered by God from this oppression; they come to Sinai and there covenant with the God who led them out safely. Then Moses, on Mt. Sinai, receives instructions for building the tabernacle (Ex 25-31); after a crisis of covenant is survived (Ex 32-34), the tabernacle/sanctuary is built according to those instructions (Ex 35-40). These thirteen chapters (Ex 25-31, 35-40, almost one third of the Book of Exodus) dealing with the construction of the tabernacle/sanctuary and all of its paraphernalia show marked points of contact with the creation account of Genesis 1.8 There is now much material on this topic. Among others, see William P. Brown, Ethos of the Cosmos, 73-89; Samuel E. Ballentine, The Torah’s Vision of Worship, Overtures to Biblical Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1999), 136-42; Nahum Sarna, Exploring Exodus (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), 213-15; Jon D. Levenson, “The Temple and the World,” Journal of Re8

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Four significant points can be noted. (1) God’s instructions to Moses (ch. 25-31) occur in seven speeches (25:1-20:10; 30:11-16; 30:17-21; 30:22-33; 30:34-38; 31:1-11; 31:12-17 [18]). God speaks seven times, and the seventh speech (31:12-17) deals explicitly with observing the Sabbath, and includes clear and unmistakable allusions to Genesis 1 (Ex 31:17). (2) When the tabernacle is built (ch. 35-40), this sequence is not followed. However, a clear stress falls on the fact that they did things “just as the Lord had commanded them.” This phrase occurs, in fact, eighteen times (e.g. 39:1, 7, 21, 26). God speaks, and so it happens. And when the tabernacle is completed, this is described in terms almost verbatim with the end of the Genesis creation account (compare Gen 1:31//Ex 39:43; Gen 2:1//Ex 39:32; Gen 2:2//Ex 40:33; Gen 2:3//Ex 39:43). (3) Some unusual vocabulary occurs in both sections. At the beginning of creation, the ruah elohim (spirit of God) is moving over the waters (Gen 1:2); when Bezalel is chosen to be chief artisan for the building of the tabernacle, God tells Moses, “I have filled him with ruah elohim of skill [hokmah/wisdom] and understanding [tebunah] and knowledge [da’at] …” (Ex 31:3; 35:31). Likewise, on the fourth day of creation, God makes the sun and moon to be “lamps” (me’oroth) to mark the liturgical calendar [the fixed times, the days and the years] (Gen 1:14); part of the material for the tabernacle are the lamps (me’oroth) that stand in the sanctuary (e.g. Ex 25:6; 27:20; 35:8, 14, 28). The majority of the occurrences of the word me’oroth in the Old Testament refer to these sanctuary lamps. (4) When is the tabernacle actually finished? “On the first day of the first month, you shall set up the tabernacle…” (Ex 40:2, 17). The first day of the first month is New Year’s Day, the day for celebrating and renewing creation. In the flood story, “in the first month, on the first day of the month, the waters were ligion, 64 (1984): 275-98; Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil: The Jewish Drama of Divine Omnipotence (San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row, 1988), 78-99; Terence E. Fretheim, Exodus, Interpretation, A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching (Louisville, KY: John Knox Publishing, 1991), 264-78; Eric E. Elnes, “Creation and Tabernacle: The Priestly Writer’s “Environmentalism,” Horizons in Biblical Theology, 16/2 (Dec. 1994): 144-55.

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dried up from the earth” (Gen 8:13). The “uncreation” of the flood was over; the new creation had begun. Throughout the ancient Near East, New Year’s festivals marked the renewal of creation. With this, the purpose of creation and the purpose of the exodus are reached. “And they shall know that I am the Lord their God who brought them out of the land of Egypt that I might dwell [tabernacle] among them” (Ex 29:46). What the Sabbath is to time, the tabernacle is to space. When Israel gathers around the tabernacle to worship, according to the rituals and calendars of the Book of Leviticus which follows, creation is most “in order.” This is when you “really” have creation. Israel’s worship activity serves either to maintain the integrity of creation or to restore and heal it where and when it has been broken.9 The implications of this are clear. World-building and tabernacle/sanctuary-building belong together. These are two poles tightly held together. Think of the “minimize” button on the computer window. When you click on it, the “big picture” is reduced to a “little picture” on the toolbar; when you click on that, the “big picture” reemerges. The tabernacle is the “little picture;” all of creation is the big one. On the one hand, the tabernacle is a microcosm, a small universe; on the other, the cosmos is a macro-tabernacle, a large sanctuary, complete with the presence of God, sanctuary lamps, and a full voiced choir, all creatures, summoned to “Praise the Lord from the heavens … praise the Lord from the earth” (Psalm 148).

The World as God’s Kingdom It is true that the exact phrase “the kingdom of God” occurs only once in the Old Testament (Wis 10:10), but the underlying concept of God as a king who rules a kingdom (“Your kingdom is a kingdom for all ages, and your dominion endures for all gen-

See Samuel E. Balentine, The Torah’s Vision of Worship, (n. 8), especially 155-66. A groundbreaking study in this regard is Frank Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual: Space, Time, and Status in the Priestly Theology (Sheffield, England: JSOT Press, 1990). 9

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erations” [Ps 145:13]) is an important image throughout.10 While it occurs in a number of other books (e.g. Isaiah), here we will focus particularly on the Book of Psalms where it forms perhaps the central metaphor.11 Kingship was well known in the ancient world and a whole mythology was connected with it. A conflict existed in the world of the gods between the god of life, creation, and order (in Canaan, Baal; in Babylon, Marduk) and the god of chaos and destruction, usually represented as a sea monster (in Canaan, Yam = The Sea; in Babylon, Tiamat = The Deeps). In the struggle between the two (repeated regularly, perhaps annually), the god of order and creation is victorious and then is proclaimed king. The earthly king stood in a special relation to the king-god, one often described as “father-son,” and was to be a force for creation and order in the realm. In the thought of the ancient Near East, the concept of kingship is closely tied to the concept of creation. In the Bible there is no doubt or equivocation that Yahweh alone is King and there is none like him among the gods (Ps 95:3; Ps 96:4-5). It is Yahweh who defeats the forces of chaos and establishes creation; thus God has “established the world; it shall never be moved” (Ps 89:12-13; Ps 93:3-4). By such actions, God’s rule is established, a rule of peace and life (Ps 29:10-11; Ps 89:1011; Ps 93:3-4) characterized above all by “justice and judgment” which are “the foundation of his throne” (Ps 89:15; Ps 97:1-2; Ps 99:4). And this same God, who is King of all creation, is also King over a specific people, Israel (Num 23:21b). God’s rule exists before any earthly rule and is the model of what human rulership should be. Thus when God chose David to be a human king, along with his descendents, they were to represent the rule of God in the world. The Davidic king, so For an excellent summary of Old Testament material on the kingdom of God, see John P. Meier, “God’s Kingly Rule in the OT,” in A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus, vol. 2: Mentor, Message, and Miracles (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 243-53. 11 Psalms scholar James Luther Mays has argued that the kingship of God is the central metaphor of the Book of Psalms. See “The Center of the Psalms: ‘The Lord Reigns’ as Root Metaphor,” in The Lord Reigns: A Theological Handbook to the Psalms (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1994), 1222. 10

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chosen, stands in a special relationship with God (Ps 89:26-27; 2 Sam 7:14) and does not have absolute authority. He is under Yahweh and expected to obey the covenant obligations. This is a serious requirement; failure in this regard will have serious consequences (Ps 89:31-33; 2 Sam 7:15) but will not break Yahweh’s promise and commitment (2 Sam 7:15-16; Ps 89:4-5). Psalm 72 is a virtual summary of the king’s duties in this regard (see also Isaiah 9:5-6; 11:9; Jer 23:5-6). As God’s representative, the king was to be, above all, guardian and custodian of peace and justice in the world, i.e. in God’s kingdom. Sharing in God’s kingship, however, does not stop with the human king, David and his descendents. Every human being is created to image God’s royal rule. “What are humans that you are mindful of them … you have crowned them with glory and honor, you have given them dominion over the works of your hands” (Ps 8:5-7). This is clearly connected to the creation of humans in the image of God in Gen 1:26-28. To be human is to be the representative of God’s royal rule in creation, i.e. in God’s kingdom. To phrase it in other terms, to be human is to be called to act as agents of life, peace, and justice in the world. One study of the Hebrew root for justice (sdq) concluded that the basic meaning of “justice” is “cosmic order.”12

The World as God’s Playhouse13 The purpose of the Book of Proverbs is “for learning about wisdom (hokmah) and instruction” (Prov 1:2). Wisdom is a rich concept which includes intelligence and shrewdness, good common sense, sound judgment, and the ability to consider some of the deeper problems of life. It is the ability to live in harmony with the order of the world. Before it becomes this more general virtue, it is quite concrete: it is the ability, the expertise to do a good job, whatever the area. While it certainly has an intellecHans H. Schmidt, Gerechtigkeit als Weltordnung: Hintergrund und Geschichte des atltestamentlichen Gerechtigkeitsbegriffes (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1968). 13 As noted above (n. 7), I depend here especially on William P. Brown, Ethos of the Cosmos, 271-316. 12

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tual element, wisdom is eminently practical. Wisdom is a virtue manifested in action. Wisdom is a key element in building a house. “By wisdom (hokmah) a house is built, and by understanding (tebunah) it is established; by knowledge (da’at) the rooms are filled with all precious and pleasant riches” (Prov 24:3-4). Yahweh’s act of creation is described in almost identical terms. “The Lord by wisdom (hokmah) founded the earth, by understanding (tebunah) he established the heavens; by his knowledge (da’at) the deeps broke open, and the clouds drop down dew” (Prov 3:19-20).14 The psalmist can exclaim, “How manifold are your works, O Lord! In wisdom you have wrought them all” (Ps 104:24). In the great hymn of Proverbs 8, wisdom’s role in creation is developed even further. Wisdom becomes personified as a skilled artisan (and/ or “little child”)15 who is present with God throughout the creative process. In Prov 9:1, we read that “Wisdom has built her house, she has set up her seven columns,” referring on one level at least to creation. Yahweh, through and with wisdom, has built a house, all of creation.16 In this house, Wisdom is at play. “Then I was beside him, like a master worker; and I was daily his delight, rejoicing (playing) before him always, rejoicing (playing) in his inhabited world and delighting in the human race” (Prov 8:30-31). Wisdom begins with God, plays before God, then comes to earth and plays with and before the whole human race. Wisdom is a figure of divine mediation who is present in and through the world, calling to us The three terms, hokmah, tebunah, and da’at, are mentioned together also in the context of the building of the tabernacle (Ex 31:3; 35:31) and of the building of the temple of Solomon (1 Kings 7:14). 15 There is considerable discussion about the meaning of the Hebrew word here (‘amon). The two most common suggestions are “artisan” and “nursling child,” but other suggestions have been made. See Roland E. Murphy, Proverbs, Word Biblical Commentary 22 (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 1998), 48; William P. Brown, Ethos of the Cosmos, 274 n. 14. 16 Various suggestions have been made about the meaning of Wisdom’s house: a regular Palestinian house, a temple, the cosmos [see, e.g., Roland E. Murphy, Proverbs, 58-59; Leo Perdue, Wisdom and Creation: The Theology of the Wisdom Literature (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1994), 94-97]. Obviously, I don’t think these are mutually exclusive choices. 14

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at the highways and byways to come to her and find life (Prov 1:19-33; 8:1-36).17 Humans are called to seek and find wisdom, for with her are the blessings of life, peace, and justice. “Happy are those who find wisdom (hokmah), and those who get understanding (tebunah) … long life is in her right hand … all her paths are peace” (Prov 3:13-17; see also 1:3; 2:9; 8:15). Since the Lord created his house, the universe, with hokmah and tebunah, humans, by seeking and living with hokmah and tebunah put themselves in line with God’s creative power and activity. Wisdom, which begins with “fear of the Lord” (e.g. Prov 1:7), with our relating to God in faith, guides us through life so that we can live as co-creators with God. God’s wisdom, manifested in the world, the “God-built house,” is the model of all human wisdom.

The Shadow Side The world is God’s sanctuary, God’s kingdom, God’s playhouse! Well and good, we might say, but that is hardly an accurate description of the world as we know it. The world is a much more complex and ambiguous reality than that! The Old Testament is well aware of this and acknowledges a shadow side for each of these images, a side intimately connected with our failure as human to live out our role before God. When we forget that we are images and want to play God; when we delude ourselves into thinking that we are ultimately in charge and violate God’s covenant; when we reject the fear of the Lord and live not wisely but foolishly, we become agents of chaos and destruction and not agents of creation with its interrelated dimensions of peace, justice, and life. In the context of creation, humans have a very high calling indeed, but if the limits are violated, the consequences can be very serious indeed. There is extensive literature on the meaning of the figure of the Wisdom Woman. See Kathleen O’Connor, “Wisdom Literature and the Experience of the Divine,” in Biblical Theology: Problems and Perspectives, Steven J. Kraftchick, Charles D. Myers, Jr., Ben C. Ollenburger, eds. (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1995), 183-95; Roland Murphy, The Tree of Life: An Introduction to the Wisdom Literature (2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1996) 133-49, 227-29. 17

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The world may be God’s sanctuary but sinfulness and uncleanness are constant threats. Priestly regulations include rituals of reparation and restoration, such as purification offerings (Lev 4:1-5:13), reparation offerings (Lev 5:14-6:7), and the annual Day of Atonement (Lev 16). “Restoration rituals serve to restore both persons and worlds to the cosmic design of God’s creational intentions.”18 The world may be God’s kingdom, but chaos is not completely eliminated. It continues to be a force to be reckoned with.19 The human kings, and all human beings called to image God’s kingship, fail to live up to their responsibilities and become instead agents of injustice and destruction. Prophets speak up and challenge kings to be true to their basic call. The world may be God’s playhouse, where the Wisdom of God is found calling out to the whole human family (Prov 8:4), but folly and foolishness abound. The Wisdom Woman has a counterpart in Lady Folly (Prov 9:13-18) as well as in foolish and deceitful men who would waylay and seduce the wise (Prov 1:8-18). Their way leads not to life but to death.20 When we experience the world in its brokenness, we are experiencing not “creation” but “uncreation.” The world comes apart. At such times, the world may indeed seem to be fairly described as a “vale of tears,” but from a biblical point of view, this is neither adequate nor ultimate.

Conclusion None of these images of God’s creation, then, are meant to be simply descriptions of the world as we know it. To borrow a phrase from Samuel Balentine, they are visions which shape “another world to live in.”21 We might quibble whether they envision “another” world, or rather penetrate to the deepest reality See Samuel Balentine, The Torah’s Vision of Worship (n. 8), 162. A point stressed by Jon Levenson in his book Creation and the Persistence of Evil (n. 8). 20 See William P. Brown, Ethos of the Cosmos, 286-91. 21 The Torah’s Vision of Worship, 213. This is part of the title of part three of the book. 18 19

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of this world, but they represent this world as “really real.” It is at this point that protology becomes eschatology. Creation language and creation images are not inherently conservative, serving to justify the status quo;22 rather, they present “alternative visions” that describe no concrete situation at any given space or time. In fact, they sit in judgment on every culture and every time. Can we ever say, this side of the parousia, that the world is enough God’s sanctuary, kingdom, or playhouse? As we noted at the beginning, creation and Creator go together. To speak of creation is to speak the language of faith. That the world is indeed God’s sanctuary, kingdom, and playhouse is not immediately obvious, nor is it subject to scientific or philosophical proof or disproof. It is part of the vision of faith, a vision which challenges us at any and every moment. If this is in fact, as the Scriptures present it, “where in the world we are,” then we are left with important questions: how do we worship in God’s sanctuary? how do we co-rule in God’s kingdom? how do we play in God’s house?

* Since creation plays an important part in the Franciscan spiritual and theological tradition, I am happy to offer this essay in honor of Kenan B. Osborne, O.F.M., who has played such an important role in the recovering of that tradition in contemporary theology.

It is especially Walter Brueggemann who has argued that creation texts simply serve to legitimate the status quo of Israel’s royal establishment (e.g., The Prophetic Imagination (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1978), 16-19; Israel’s Praise: Doxology against Idolatry and Ideology (Philadlphia, PA: Fortress, 1988), 101, 106, 108. This has been critiqued by J. Richard Middleton, “Is Creation Theology Inherently Conservative? A Dialogue with Walter Brueggemann,” Harvard Theological Review 87 (1994): 257-77, as well as by William P. Brown, Ethos of the Cosmos, 23-25. Neither makes precisely the argument I am making here. More recently, Brueggemann grants some positive benefits to creation theology in our present context and circumstances, but still expresses unease and distrust (“Loss and Recovery,” n. 1), 187-90. 22

Bonaventure’s Anthropology and Ecclesiology as a universal approach towards a vision of a globalized world

Johannes B. Freyer 1 The Phenomenon of Globalization The fact that we have come together this day – from so many different countries and continents – in order to exchange ideas about what Franciscan tradition is – is itself an expression of globalization. Even in the fields of philosophical, theological and spiritual reflection globalization is leading towards a worldwide integration. Globalization is drawing us towards a world, an international movement, of ideas, people and material goods.1 The essence of globalization consists, therefore, in the free exchange of ideas, people and material goods. Constantly increasing, such an exchange of ideas, people and material goods is leading towards forms of reciprocal bonding and integration; it furthers interactions and networking, but it is also bringing us into structures of mutual dependency. The free flow presupposes liberalization and the eventual disappearance of territorial limits. 1 Cf. Ulrich Beck, Was ist Globalisierung, (Frankfurt aM.: Suhrkamp, 2007); Cf. Bernd Meier, Technischer Fortschritt und Mobilität: neue Herausforderungen durch die Globalisierung (Köln: Dt. Inst.-Verl., 1997).

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National borders, once permanently fixed, are losing their significance. Normally, what we understand by the term globalization is, above all else, the free and untrammeled exchange of goods, the creation of a global free market, and that implies a parallel worldwide standardization. This is leading towards an imposition of cultural norms within a worldwide global system. In addition to the market globalization must be added the contribution made by the high-speed transmission of information and news reports. This has the result that distance and remoteness are, in effect, abolished; time and space will have to be reassessed; a nation’s internal and external affairs are converging. A new internationalism is on the rise. Local events are being played out upon the world stage and are having an impact and influence far beyond current national borders. Whether globalization is showing more negative or more positive aspects is the subject of heated debate at the moment. But it cannot be denied that the current form of globalization is characterized by features that are overwhelmingly economic in their nature, which results in a marked change in the role and image of the individual human being. No longer is the individual as a ‘social being’ at the center, but is regarded only in the function of producer and consumer. This is not to deny that globalization has many positive achievements to its credit. However, the negative effects are apparently gaining the upper hand. The spread of the free market is not an unmixed blessing for everyone, but it heavily favors a limited number of nation states and transnational companies.2 Liberalization of the market has been forced upon many countries and this enforced liberalization often goes hand in hand with military and intellectual dominance. In place of growth and a balanced relationship for all, it seems that globalization is bringing in its train an increase in inequality and an ever more rampant economic speculation.

2 Cf. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work (New York: Norton & Company, 2006).

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The mobility that globalization engenders is becoming more and more a mass migration. Democratic values are being weakened, and the social regulatory influence of the state is being rendered ineffective. It is becoming more and more obvious that globalization cannot be left to market forces alone. Untrammeled economic globalization and liberalization require a counterweight that only an ethical globalization can provide, a globalization that furthers equal rights for all, mutual respect, shared values, recognized codes of conduct, common standards when making value judgments, and a universal willingness to take on responsibility. It is expected that, at this level of an ethical globalization of values, religion will be required to make its contribution. For religion to exercise any sort of effective intervention in this process there will be need for deep intellectual and thoughtful reflection; in effect, there will be a process of theologically-based thinking. I would like to start these considerations underpinned by a theological substratum by casting a look upon our Franciscan tradition: I would like to ask what theological indicators for a humane globalization can be found in this tradition of ours, what are these indicators that will be capable of inspiring and enthusing us. In doing so we must be aware that the term globalization is a relatively new coining, and it is best compared with the traditional concepts of universality, comprehensively allembracing, universal and so on.

2 Universal Fundamentals in The Franciscan Charism Christianity by its very nature implies universality in its modes of thought and indeed it claims and proclaims its universality; it is therefore eminently compatible with globalization for its selfimage is couched and expressed in global terms.3

3 Cf. Johannes B. Freyer, “Globalisierung auf franziskanisch,” in Tauwetter 15/2 (2000): 52-54.

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Francis and his Brothers in the Movement, from the very beginning thought of themselves as oriented towards the whole of the then known world. Francis sends his Brothers out to all four corners of the globe, he writes to All the Faithful and to the Rulers of the People “... to the political leaders all over the world ...” He is strongly conscious that he has a personal mission and so he forms his early brotherhood as a missionising movement, one that goes out to all people and to all nations even unto the uttermost ends of the earth. This missionary vocation is the expression of a universal fundamental in his charisma. However, his charism has nothing at all of the monastic stabilitas loci in it, but its form of life is an itinerarium.4 This universal fundamental in Francis’s life is unmistakable – it penetrates right down to the texts of the prayers he composed, which include all creatures and the whole universe in their embrace. This also explains the rapid spread of the Brotherhood to all the countries of the known world. Wherever there was a new expedition ready to depart and discover the hitherto unknown parts of the world, the friars minor were present. So it is not at all surprising that soon the friars were also thronging the newly burgeoning world of the universities.5 The universities were presenting themselves as places where the comprehensive universal knowledge of the time was being gathered, revised and re-thought, and further developed. The heritage of the world of thought, nurtured in Arabic, Greek, Jewish and Latin minds, was coming together at the universities.

4 Cf. Pietro Maranesi, “Pellegrini e forestieri”: l’itineranza nella proposta di vita di Francesco d’Assisi, in CFr 70 (2000): 345-90; Cf. Luigi Padovese, ed., Pellegrini e Forestieri, in Collana Teologia Spirituale, Vol. 1 (Bologna: EDB, 2004). 5 Cf. Luigi Pellegrini, L’incontro tra due “invenzioni” medievali: Università e Ordini Mendicanti (Napoli: Liguori Editori, 2003).

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Learned scholars and students from many nations flocked there. At that time one could not imagine a more global place than a university. It is from the midst of this universal atmosphere and at the same time from the heart of a long-established religious order that Bonaventure of Bagnoreggio appears, and it is his anthropology and his ecclesiology that we wish to examine in more detail here.

3 Bonaventure’s Concept of the Human Being viewed against the Universal Background At the center of Bonaventure’s anthropology stands the Homo Viator, the itinerant, the pilgrim on the path, traveling from his origin in the act of creation towards the ultimate goal, perfection in God. On this journey, the human being passes through various dimensions of creation, of the world and of life.6 If we focus our attention upon these dimensions of the human pilgrim’s path, we can discern a multilayered, universal background to life. This universal background comprises Bonaventure’s cosmological creation theology, his theology of history, his doctrine of cognition and his doctrine of wisdom as well as his doctrine of Salvation. Bonaventure’s creation theology, into which his anthropology is integrated, casts its gaze upon the whole universe, the cosmos, which, despite the vastness of its spaces, is still, ultimately, limited. The human being, as crown of creation, has of course a prominent place in the universe, but at the same time this human being is integrated within the macrocosmos of the creation. On the one hand, the human being has been created in the image and likeness of God and therefore stands as Capax Dei Cf. Johannes B. Freyer, Homo Viator: Der Mensch im Lichte der Heilsgeschichte. Eine theologische Anthropologie aus franziskanischer Perspektive, Veröffentlichungen der Johannes-Duns-Skotus-Akademie, Mönchengladbach, Vol. 13, (Kevelaer: Butzon & Bercker, 2001). 6

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over and above all of creation; on the other hand, the human being, as microcosmos, is an organic part of it.7 As Minor Mundus, the human being has a material share in creation, and a human being’s physical organs, in the way their functions interrelate, reflect on a small scale the way the cosmos interrelates on an immeasurably larger scale.8 The human being is, as it were, an organic mirror, reflecting the whole universe with its ordered and orderly flow. On account of its nature, the human being is, for Bonaventure, a creature that reaches beyond itself, a created being that possesses a universal character. This universal character that a human being has is not limited to its own physical body, which is wholly a part of the material universe. The universal character is established in particular in the transcendent ability that a human being has in being able to surpass its material nature and rise to the level of the supernatural. For Bonaventure, the human being is that created being which has a share in the nature of the whole material creation as well as a share in the spiritual nature of that other reality, also a creation of God, that is non-material. The human being, as a kind of intermediate being, has both a material and a spiritual side and thus links up the material world with the spiritual reality.9 As a typical scholastic, Bonaventure describes the human being as a creature composed of body and soul. In doing so, he is attempting to avoid that form of strict dualism that sees matter and spirit as irreconcilable opposites by preferring to define a human being as a twofold composite 7 Cf. Breviloquium II, 9-11; English translation WSB IX, 84-96; Cf. Hisako Nagakura, “L’Homme au centre de l’Univers Créé. L’Humanisme de Saint Bonaventure,” in L’Homme et son univers au Moyen Åge I, Christian Wenin, ed., Philosophes Médiévaux Tome XXVI (Louvain-La-Neuve 1986), 389-95. 8 Cf. Libros Sententiarum, II, dist. XXX, art. I, quaest. I (Opera Omnia II, 715 arg. 4): Cum enim homo sit minor mundus, propter quam omnia facta sunt; Cf. Libros Sententiarum II, dist XV, art. II quaest. II, concl. (Opera Omnia II, 385, 5). 9 Cf. Luigi Jammarone, “Antropologia bonaventuriana,” in L’anima (Napoli: Dehoniane, 1979), 199-239.

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of corporeal body and spiritual soul. Each body possesses its spiritual soul, and each soul needs its own physical body. What makes this way of viewing matters significant is that the spiritual component, in which a human being has a share through the possession of a soul, now breaks open the bounds that limit the contingent and the material space associated with it and extends the horizon far out into infinity.10 The universality in the horizon of a human being is therefore no longer restricted to the limited reaches of the material universe. In a human being’s ability to envisage and perceive the transcendental, then limitless horizons and the unbounded possibilities that the spiritual world contains are finally opened up. The universal dimension of the Bonaventurean anthropology is therefore not limited to the material cosmos. From his eschatological perspective, the limits of the human being’s horizon can now be extended out into the infinite Kingdom of God. The human being is now a Viator, an itinerant, who strides through the material bounds of the cosmos in order to penetrate deeper and ever deeper into the spiritual dimension and thus into the eschatological Infiniteness of the Kingdom of God.11 Therefore, Bonaventure’s creation theology identifies and defines the human being on the grounds of both its material as well as its spiritual nature, as a creature that has been created for a universal dimension. The mobility that comes from being on a pilgrim path is the corollary to this universal dimension. In Bonaventure’s theology, the dimensional universalism corresponds to a temporal, a historical universalism present in his theology of history. Proceeding from an allegorical interpretation of the events in the Biblical account of the seven-day-long Creation, 10 Cf. Itinerarium VII, 1; English translation available in Works of St. Bonaventure, vol. 2, ed. Philotheus Boehner and Zachary Hayes (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 2002), 133-34.. 11 Cf. Itinerarium II, 11, 12, 13; English available in WSB II, 77-79; Cf. Johannes B. Freyer, “Essere uomo – essere itinerante: un’ontologia dell’itineranza in prospettiva francescana,” in Pellegrini e Forestieri. Luigi Padovese, 157-65.

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Bonaventure’s exegesis envisages the epochs in the history of the world and of the Church as a reciprocal intertwining – and yet, simultaneously, a historical and theological parallel process.12 Thus, as in the Creation, where spatial, physical, and biological elements are all woven together and are thus interdependent one upon the other, so too a shared identity exists, one that arose and took shape in time and in history, transcending generations and epochs. Proceeding from God (egressus) the whole of creation finds itself under the leadership of humanity on the path back towards God (regressus) through time. The limiting, contingent, transitory dimension of time will thereby be broken up through the Christological event of the Passion, Death and Resurrection of Jesus and through the work of the Holy Spirit: then time will be transmuted into the dimension of timelessness, into the everlasting future: the eternal, the totally fulfilled life on the Eighth Day of Creation, the Day of the New Creation Once again, the human being finds itself to be a Viator and an itinerant, this time on the path towards the eternal Creation, ever renewing itself. Thus it is that the human being is bound up with the course of history. The situation of humanity as history unfolds itself is designated by Bonaventure as, roughly speaking, the so-called status. He makes a distinction here between the status naturae institutae – the time before the Fall, the status naturae lapsae – the time during the Fall and its immediate effects, and the status viae – the current state of humanity, on the path away from sin on its way to God, and finally, the status gloriae – the state of perfection at the end of time. Rooted in the past and characterized by the past, actively engaged in the work of forming the present, humanity is on its way into the eschatological future of a new world, which God will create at the end of time. Time and space, two decisive factors 12 Cf. Joseph Ratzinger, The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1971 [1989]).

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in a human being’s life, are, in Bonaventure’s view, wholly and universally determined. This comprehensive, all-embracing and determined existence that both creation as a whole and humanity itself has, possesses features that reveal an ongoing process of interaction, of interlinkage, of mutual dependency and intertwining. In order to escape the dangers of dualism and fragmentation, Bonaventure repeatedly emphasized his almost holistic view: namely, the organic, functional, spiritual and non-materialistic relationships that exist between the parts and the whole. It is sin alone that leads to dualism between matter/body and spirit/soul; it is sin alone that leads to the breaking-up of that which should, in accord with Creation’s intention, belong together. Here Bonaventure recognizes the all-embracing order, the Ordo given by God under whom all that is exists, and to whom all must be subject. This comprehensively shared identity and this all-embracing, mutual interdependence are for Bonaventure part of his working hypothesis that he more or less applies to all forms of reality. A quite special role in his all-embracing working hypothesis is played by the universal epistemology which, through belief in knowledge, leads to wisdom. All knowledge, experiential as well as theoretical, can be derived, according to Bonaventure, from knowledge originating in Jesus Christ (scientiae Jesu Christi). Therefore, for Bonaventure, theology, as the doctrinal exposition of the Mysteries of Christ, is superior to all other branches of knowledge. We are somewhat averse today to accepting such a view, but it can be traced back to the attempt to explain the connection between all forms of knowledge by referring to an all-penetrating and all-pervading wisdom that has been manifested in Jesus Christ and, from this point on, by casting light upon the most profound meaning that life and existence itself can have. Not alone does everything belong to everything else, not alone is everything mutually interdependent, but everything that is has a profound shared significance, for it has a certain future.

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Thus it is that practical, experiential knowledge, which is focused upon the material and the temporal, will be purified and extended by the Holy Spirit, will be thrown open so that it will have the capability of perceiving that spiritual dimension that belongs to existence, and will expand towards the fullness of knowledge which is found in love. While the natural sciences that rely solely on knowledge gained by experimentation upon material objects, and which make of the human person itself an object subjected to examination, the intrinsic value, the dignity inherent in every single created thing, in every human being, will be revealed by understanding, which need not renounce experimentation but is associated with wise circumspection. For Bonaventure, knowledge gained by experience alone leads to valuing objects and persons only for their perceived usefulness. But if knowledge is elevated through Faith to wisdom, then it will lead to insight into the meaning and the true value of a thing. Pure science, that is knowledge derived from experiment, remains for him nothing but a patchwork that can only convey limited and partial understanding. But if science is raised through Faith to wisdom, then it allows universal understanding and knowledge, in which it illuminates the true basis of things and of existence. The human being, who has already come to recognize that he is a Viator and an itinerant within the spatial and temporal dimensions of his existence, is then required in a special way to set out on the path in order to leave material and sensual knowledge behind and to attain a faith-inspired insight into wisdom and, by doing so, to achieve an understanding of love. The step from scientific knowledge to a wisdom that comprehends the true reason becomes a sort of itinerarium, too, that moves from partial knowledge to a comprehensive and universal understanding. Finally, Bonaventure’s temporal and spatial universalism and his universal epistemology have their basis in a theological, salvific universalism. Here we must be careful to distinguish

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between the doctrine of Salvation and the doctrine of Redemption (soteriology). While soteriology limits itself to the redemption of humanity and the world from sin and guilt, the doctrine of Salvation relates to the attainment of perfection of humanity and the universe, which is to be achieved by the final act in the process of creation, its culmination at the end of time. Bonaventure has a dynamic concept of what the act of creation is, the creation which is still not yet complete. The world and humanity live in the Sixth Day of the Creation in the sure hope of the Perfection that Salvation will bring on the Seventh Day and of what will occur on the Eight Day of Creation when “all things will be made new.” Soteriology is limited to a description of the redemption, which has become necessary because of sin, that is a part of the Perfection of Salvation. This Perfection of Salvation for the whole of the universe is fulfilled in the perfect communio with God, to whom humanity with the whole of creation will return on the Last Day of the work of creation in order to rest eternally in his Love. This Perfection of Salvation has been promised to the whole of creation, but now, through sin, it has been thwarted. Therefore, there is a need for redemption. Creation, which has been disfigured by evil and which, by sin, has been reduced to a state of nothingness (Nihil) and is, consequently, condemned to death, will now be redeemed and in a universal perfectioning will be re-created anew and everlastingly given life. The universal Perfection of Salvation is being sought right from the first moment of Creation. God, who transcends his creation, gives it an Ordo which is to bring to this perfection. This Ordo is to be understood as something that is not static but dynamic. The Ordo progressively leads on to growth and maturity to finish up in a state of perfection and is to be understood by the human person as an ethical and moral duty to fulfill itself and achieve the purpose of the whole of creation in reaching perfection in full Communio with God. It is precisely against this Ordo that humanity acts whenever it fails to orient itself and

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the world towards God, seeking to bend all things to serve its own desires.13 Since perfection, however, is not to be achieved by strictly adhering to prescriptive laws – to an Ordo – but by being in loving community with God, God, who is, as it were, immanent in creation, is leading towards perfection from within, through his Presence and his Epiphany in creation. Therefore, in the union of the Divine Logos with human nature, Bonaventure also sees an aspect of the Incarnation in its contribution towards the perfecting of the creation. But also the Presence of God within creation is under a shadow and its full effectiveness is being hindered by sin. The all-embracing universal completion needs, so to speak, a way of escaping out of the state of sin and guilt. This way out is found in the Cross. Through his Death upon the Cross Jesus Christ restores once again the lost community of humankind with God. In the way Anselm interprets it in his Theology of Satisfaction, the Cross is not regarded, primarily, as the execution of a just punishment and a necessary act of restitution, but in the forefront the Cross stands for a radical expression of the highest form of self-sacrificing love.14 It is precisely this act of radical love that Bonaventure once again interprets in a universal dimension. The reality of the Cross changes the structure of creation that has fallen into sin and is doomed to death. The human person and the universe are affected in the way their history unfolds, for history that is proceeding towards death is turned around and recalled to life. Humanity and the world are no longer inevitably lost but the chance of a new Creation/creation is being offered. This opportunity (= grace) that the Cross is offering has to be seized upon and actively taken up by the human person.

Cf. J.A. Wayne Hellmann, Divine and Created Order in Bonaventure’s Theology, trans. Jay Hammond (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2001). 14 Cf. Libros Sententiarum III, dist. XXV art. 1 quest II; Cf. Breviloquium IV, 10; English available in WSB IX, 164-68. 13

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The Redemption through the Love that is being offered on the Cross affects all people and the whole universe, and in this sense it is universal. No one is being forced, however, to avail himself/herself of this offer of Love. The human being can refuse the grace of Redemption and thus reject Perfection. After God, the human person within the Universe plays the main role before this universal backdrop. According to Bonaventure, everything has been made for the sake of the human person and on his account. God himself is pursuing his Plan, the Plan of Salvation and in the long run, the Plan of Redemption. All creatures and created things are being made perfect and complete and are redeemed with humanity, as it were, for the sake of the human person. But all creatures are being dragged down with humanity to death because of sinfulness. We are able to see that in his theology Bonaventure is maintaining a strong anthropocentricity, which has consequences on the universal stage. There lurks a danger in this theological anthropocentricity of Bonaventure’s, too. The human being stands so far above the whole of the rest of creation, and the latter is so very much dependent upon him, that we may well be able to speak of a complete surrender of creation to humanity. Many a modern critic of Christianity sees in such a strong and all-embracing, comprehensive anthropo-centricity one of the main causes of today’s ecological problems in regard to the destruction of the environment.15 Humanity has, in the truest sense of the word, made the environment subject to him, and thereby contributing to its destruction. This condemnation is not, however, wholly fair when the latter versions of Bonaventure’s anthropology are being considered. Cf. Carl Amery, Das Ende der Vorsehung. Die gnadenlosen Folgen des Christentums (Rheinbeck 1974); Cf. Leonardo Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor (New York: Orbis Books, 1997); Cf. Lynn White, “The Religious Roots of our Ecological Crisis,” in Science 155 (1967): 1203-07. 15

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Even when this portrays a strong anthropocentricity when viewed against the universal backdrop, yet Bonaventure balances this out through the inherent challenge provided by a code of ethics that make of the human creature, as Bonaventure sees him, a fellow-creator acting in responsible freedom and living in a state of Communio with God.16 In spite of the prominent position in creation that the human being takes, yet in Bonaventure’s view, humanity is not above creation, but is a member and a constituent part of it. Through the physical and material body, humanity is so closely bound up with the material universe that he must necessarily maintain a form of communication with it. As Lord of Creation, humanity is intimately, closely woven into its very fabric for in and with humanity, God desires to lead the whole of creation to Perfection. As fellow-creators in the work of creation, the human being has to protect the other fellow-creatures and bring them back to God. As the image and likeness of God, a human being has been commissioned to carry out a task, and he must bear joint responsibility with God in maintaining the never-failing concern that God has for his creatures. With this in view, the human being has received the universal commission creation has imposed, namely in the company of all creatures to take the path that leads to God. This presupposes that humanity has the gift of free will to make of this path a journey of purification, of enlightenment and of union with God.

4 Bonaventure’s comprehensive image of the Church This all-embracing, universal way of looking upon things that is to be found in Bonaventure’s anthropology is tied up almost seamlessly to his image of the Church. In his ecclesiology, the universal dimension, this universal backdrop is not just a permanent presence that accompanies it; 16

Cf. Johannes B. Freyer, Homo Viator, 107-15.

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this universal dimension is one of its characteristic and defining features. The universal character is contained, implicitly, in the use of the term Catholic. In accord with the text of the Creed Bonaventure understands the word Catholic not just in its present, strictly denominational sense, but in the truest sense of the word as that all-embracing and comprehensive dimension of universal Christian belief. The Church is Catholic because she is bringing together all those people who confess to a belief in Jesus Christ in one universal Community – the Communio.17 Now Bonaventure develops in his works a structural image of the Church according to her outward appearance. He describes the Church, so to speak, while looking upon her as an outsider would. In his later works, however, he begins to describe the Church more and more from the inside. In doing so, he looks at the Church from the aspect of her inner dynamism, a view from the inside. At first, just one superficial glance at her external appearance will reveal the way Bonaventure is presenting the Church. It appears to be a rigidly structured pyramid. At the top, at the apex, sits the Pope, and so the Church is being organized in precisely the way medieval society views itself – the idea of separate social classes or estates.18 Here Bonaventure has not only integrated the sociological situation of the estates, in regard to the Church, into his theological thinking, rather he is orienting himself according to a schema based on the pyramidically structured, mystical Theology of Dionysius the Areopagite (also known as the PseudoDionysius).19 This latter’s conception is a pyramidical image of a heaven and an earth at its center. The Wisdom of God flows down through Cf. Breviloquium V, 7; English available in WSB IX, 196-200; Cf. Comment. In Sapientiam I, 7; Cf. Hexaemeron I, 2-5. 18 Cf. Antonio Blasucci, “La costituzione cerarchica della chiesa in S. Bonaventura,” in Incontri Bonaventuriani 4 (1968): 49-68; Cf. Antonellus Elsässer, “Die verschiedenen Stände in der Kirche nach der Lehre des Heiligen Bonaventura,” in Wissenschaft und Weisheit 31 (1968): 13-29. 19 Cf. De Perfectione Evangelica, Q. IV, A. III; English translation WSB XIII. 17

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the hierarchy of angels to that point where heaven and earth meet – which happens to be the Pope.20 He, as the apex of the earthly pyramid, receives the celestial Wisdom and through the channels of the earthly estates, which reflect the celestial pyramid, this Wisdom flows down to the common folk of the Church at the foot of the pyramid. The ascent towards God begins – illuminated from above – but, once again, on a path leading up through the hierarchical structures. As a consequence, those at the higher levels of each particular estate are helping those below to rise in their turn. The Wisdom of God is, as it were, being filtered down through the hierarchical levels. Of course, Bonaventure has in mind, when describing his image of the Church thus, the visual representation of the celestial hierarchy mirrored in its counterpart, the earthly pyramid consisting of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. The universal dimension, which here comprises the celestial as well as the terrestrial pyramid, when observed from outside, is formed on strictly hierarchical lines. Thus the correspondingly lower levels in the hierarchy are dependent upon the higher, and these are then considered to be responsible for the former. The Pope is thought to be almost equal in rank with the angels, and so he is the conduit through which the heavenly Wisdom flows down to the terrestrial pyramid here below on earth. On account of the Pope’s role he is the Head of the Church on earth. The Church on earth is linked to the Church in heaven to such a degree that she ought to be a true image and an exact reflection in time and in history of the celestial Church. The universal background in Bonaventure’s writings is therefore now stretching out across the universe and includes heaven itself. Bonaventure is not so much depicting the social structure of the Church as institution; rather, he wants to contemplate the mystical character of the universality of the Church’s scope, Cf. Lang J., “Vermitteltes Heil. Struckturen und Anliegen des Kirchenverständnisses bei S. Bonaventura,” in S. Bonaventura 1274 – 1974, Vol. IV, Jacques G. Bougerol, ed., (Grottaferrata: Collegio S. Bonaventura, 1974), 387420. 20

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range and reach. Bonaventure justifies the strictly hierarchical view that the universal, all-embracing Church possesses because it is also Christological and because it has been ordained by Jesus Christ as Head of the Church. In his later work, Bonaventure begins to think more about the image the Church projects from within. The point of departure for this is a Trinitarian one. A theological model for the inner life of the Church is the inner flow of love and life within the Communio of the Trinity.21 Now in God, between the Three Divine Persons, there is no hierarchy. The Three Divine Persons rank equally, are of equal dignity in their reciprocal relationships and in this loving Communio they are one. Each of the Three Divine Persons possesses its own Proprium that exists in loving communion with each other, but without any subordination. Bonaventure, of course, speaks of the source of Divine Love as originating from the Father, but this does not imply in any sense a hierarchical supremacy. Just as the Three Divine Persons, each with its own Proprium existing in loving communion with each other, are one and so achieve a Divine Communio, so too those in the Church who hold office, each with his or her own Proprium, are all dependent one upon the other, are of equal value and of equal rank, and so should be one in the loving Communio. Bonaventure classifies the estates of the Church into three great groups.22 The laity, the Holy People, is classified according to its different ranks in the group of the active members and these, with their calling to engage actively towards fulfilling the requirements of the Faith in the world, correspond to the Holy Spirit. The clergy, the Pope, patriarchs, bishops, priests, deacons and others in holy orders in Bonaventure’s epoch are classified under the group designation “mixed forms of life” as they are dedicated

21 Cf. Hanspeter Heinz, “Trinitarische Kirche – Kirche als Communio,” in Der Dreieinige Gott und die Menschheit (Freiberg: Herder, 1989), 139-68. 22 Cf. Hexaemeron XXII.

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not only to an active life in the Faith but also to a life of prayer. This group represents the Son, Jesus Christ. The third group, the contemplatives are classified by Bonaventure to include those under monastic vows and those members of the newly founded mendicant orders and these correspond to the Father. Bonaventure sees contemplation as the source of the active Christian way of life; therefore, the contemplative orders are the fountain of the life in the Church just as the Father is the Source of Divine Life. Each of these groups represents, therefore, within the Church, each with its own Proprium, a Divine Person. Thus just as the Divine Persons relate one to another and are one, so too should the three groups in the Church stand in loving communication with each other and so build up the Communio of the one and universal Church. Bonaventure sees the Church being built up from inside through the equally matched interplay among the many – in love. If we now consider these two visions that Bonventure had of the Church, then we must concede that the external image conceals within it the danger of an ecclesial imperialism and Caesaro-Papism with its rigid hierarchical structure and castelike system of estates. History also confirms again and again that this danger certainly exists. In his later works, Bonaventure himself, however, dismantles this strictly hierarchical way of viewing things. Through the Trinitarian structure the strict hierarchical model is broken up and superseded in favor of a Love-Communio. In this LoveCommunio every estate or class has its own task to fulfill. The class of the active contribute to the cleansing, the purification of the world by living a life imbued by Faith. The next class is the class that consists of those whose lead the mixed form of life, namely those in ecclesiastical office, who minister the sacraments, the Body of Christ, by bringing enlightenment to the Church. The class of the contemplatives, through a life led according to the Evangelical Counsels, take the road to Perfection. Purification,

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Enlightenment, Perfection are, however, the decisive steps in the mystical ascent to God, and each class performs its own service, of equal worth to those of the other classes, by means of its own Proprium. The universality, Catholic in the truest sense of the word, of the Church, grows out of the dynamic, interactive collaboration by all three estates in the Communio. Just as he did in his anthropology, Bonaventure is demonstrating in his ecclesiology the universality that comes into existence through Communio. Actually, it is inconceivable for Bonaventure to postulate any form of universality without Communio in which all three estates are integrated as peers both in value and in ranking.

5 Bonaventure’s theological signposts (indicators) Theological signposts (indicators) can be derived from Bonaventure’s anthropology and ecclesiology. I would like to mention some of these here, as they are significant for our present theme. The image of God that lies at the basis of the anthropology and the doctrine of the Church places God at the center as the Highest Good. Characterizing God as the Highest Good implies that in him there is a self-communicating flow of love and Communio.23 God emanates a stream of Life first within the Trinity, between Father and Son in the Spirit. God maintains this interflow of Life within himself, but not for the sake of himself alone. In the act of Creation, in his plan of Salvation and for the Redemption of a world fallen into sin, God pours out his stream of Life freely and gratuitously beyond himself. The Bonum of the inner-trinitarian loving selfcommuning and Communio is being extended to the whole of creation, but especially to humanity. Thus the human person knows that that he/she is liberated, both in and with creation, through the Redemption that gives him/her Life in Salvation.

23

Cf. Itinerarium VI, 2; English available in WSB II, 123-25.

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This liberation, which is the grace of a new life, is freely and gratuitously (gratis) given to the human person. Thus Bonaventure is here laying particular emphasis upon two theological categories, both in the reflection and in practice, which has a prominence and significance for the whole gamut and range of Franciscan traditions: the Bonum and the magnanimity contained in the concept of Liberalitas. Now the Church is precisely the community of all people, and into this is poured God’s Bonum, and the Church is precisely that community that should enable humanity to draw life from this Bonum. In much the same way, the Church has been chosen, through her ministry, to make in this world a reality of that Liberalitas of God’s in solidarity. The Church should convey to the world this outpouring and interflow of loving communing and Communio in a form that reveals its universality. This she does by her imparting the Life received (because of God’s magnanimity) to and through all her members and her estates, and then, in solidarity, out to all humanity. From this perspective, according to Bonaventure, there results a number of moral qualities that are part and parcel of being a Christian: freedom and responsibility, magnanimity (Liberalitas) and a sense of justice, the will to acknowledge and respect the dignity and worth of all human beings and of all fellow-creatures. In addition to these qualities, being a Christian implies furthering and supporting those relationships of solidarity built upon good will, affection and love. Of course, these theological indicators arise from theoretical pondering and reflection, but they form the point of departure from which they become effective, as God himself puts into practice his revealing of himself in the course of the story of our Salvation. God’s effective salvific practice, if this is reflected upon in the light of theology, then becomes the Church’s concrete and specific assignment, namely to participate in God’s salvific practice in concrete and practical ways.

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6 Bonaventure’s indicators for a humane globalization By examining Bonaventure’s anthropology and ecclesiology, we can establish clearly that the idea of a globalized world – in the sense that there is a universal way of looking at things, and that there are implications that flow from this intertwining, from this mutual dependence, from this integration and interaction are, historically speaking, nothing new. Christendom, by definition, and the Franciscan Charisma in particular, has this universal dimension. Globalization had already begun long before this particular word had ever been used in this sense. At the risk of overstating my case, I venture to say that globalization is nothing more than a restriction placed upon a universal way of thinking and acting, limiting it solely to the field of economics and the market place, to which all else is subordinated. Globalization reduced to the level of a market is, in the truest sense of the word, a real impoverishment, because this sort of globalization excludes fundamental levels of human life and activity, or discounts them or even destroys them. The progressive increase in destitution affecting whole regions of the earth that is accompanying the globalization of the market, is only the material expression of a multi-faceted, human, cultural and spiritual impoverishment. Here is a clear and unavoidable indication that globalization urgently needs a course correction so as to be made more humane. Now we cannot simply apply Bonaventure’s anthropology and ecclesiology, in their original form, to today’s situation. Theological reflections have no immediate relevance for economics. Yet the Franciscan tradition does indicate clearly a way of applying ethical considerations, based on theology, to economics and the money markets.24 Cf. Giacomo Todeschini, Ricchezza Francescana. Dalla povertà volontaria alla società di mercato, (Bologna: il Mulino, 2004); English translation Franciscan Wealth: From Voluntary Poverty to Market Society, trans. Donatella Melucci (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2009). 24

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An example of this is the stance taken by Bonaventure’s disciple, Peter John Olivi, in his writings in regard to the economic issues of his time and age.25 So Bonaventure’s theological indicators can inspire us first to reflect and then to take practical measures that can well be helpful towards achieving a humane globalization process for our time. But it will scarcely contribute anything towards this goal if what is done is merely to wag a warning, moralizing finger, accompanied by theological heckling, in a world characterized by almost exclusively economic globalization. Any such call to order from a moralist high ground will receive scant heed indeed. I see therefore that the task of theology consists in pointing out, from a position of solid expertise, the weaknesses inherent in globalization, and from a theological point of view to contribute in the form of indicators towards finding ways of solving the problems.26 As the crises caused by globalization are ascribable to the way globalization sees itself and understands its own role and thus are universal and all-embracing, then they can only be solved in the same way, namely holistically and comprehensively. Consequently, religion, with the theological thought linked to it, has a justified place in the search for a comprehensive resolution of all issues. I would like here to itemize some examples, as a follow-up from Bonaventure’s views and position. Bearing in mind Bonaventure’s anthropology and ecclesiology as well as the Franciscan vision of God, I select five undoubtedly weak places in the theory and practice of globalization. 1] The threat that globalization poses, namely to mutate towards becoming a form of economic, cultural and militaristic imperialism because of the way it is now being pursued in 25 Cf. Pietro di Giovanni Olivi, Usure, Compere e vendite. La scienza economica del XIII secolo, ed. Amleto Spicciani - PaoloVian - Giancarlo Andenna, (Bergamo: Europia, 1998). 26 Cf. Antonio M. Baggio, Etica ed economia. Verso un paradigma di fraternità, (Roma: Città Nuova, 2005); Cf. G. Daniel and D. Groody, Globalization, Spirituality and Justice (New York: Orbis Books, 2007).

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favorof a Western-oriented idea of the world and a Western form of managing the economy and thus imposing itself by force upon many nations and peoples. The reaction that this causes is fomenting worldwide fundamentalism and terrorism and is the cause of conflicts among cultures. 2] The enforced liberalization in favor of the Western-style economic systems brings about in all countries the formation of narrowly based social classes that amass and control wealth: whole peoples are consequently being made destitute. Even as the value of the markets and the stock exchanges is rising and the gross national product is increasing, fewer and fewer people are benefiting from this. The chasm between rich and poor is growing wider all over the world. The market is therefore killing its own children. New potential markets can be opened only when living standards are rising in all classes in populations all over the world and when all can participate in the free market. Without this improvement in the standard of living and without the growth of new markets from which all can profit, the free market economy will simply collapse because of the worldwide lack of potential customers. A global Black Friday is not a figment of the imagination, a fictional horror scenario, but it is a potential reality well within the realm of possibility. 3] The plundering of nature’s resources that is taking place without providing alternative sources is destroying the environment. The future lack of natural resources and the worldwide climate change are becoming a concrete threat to life. 4] Reducing life to the materialistic level in a globalization that is focused solely upon material things is leading to cultural impoverishment, to an inhumane world. A globalization which lacks a holistic view of life will create a world environment that is a life-denying one, unworthy of humanity. 5] A purely economic globalization can only provide material goods; it has no way of broadening its horizons to consider the .

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mystical-spiritual, nor even to admit that there are the nonmaterial values and experiences. It cannot conceive of any deeper significance to its own ongoing development nor can it give any real meaning to life – even though often enough commercial publicity organs pretend to do so. Without any significance to the way the world develops, without any meaning to life, humanity in the long run will remain without orientation, without values and without any real prospects for its future. This lack of direction, this deficit in true values, will finally lead to a drastic loss of the sense of human solidarity within humanity. Basing my views upon the Bonaventurean tradition, from a theological standpoint, has enabled me to shine a critical light upon the weak places in globalization. It is precisely this sensitivity towards what is happening in the world that is one of the fruits of theological reflection, such as was desired by Bonaventure. Reflecting on these matters sets me not only at a critical distance from globalization’s weak spots, but it also allows me to set up some positive indicators in order to deal and cope with these weaknesses. Providing indicators from a theological standpoint that can deal with the areas of the market economy, politics and culture is, however, well within the Franciscan tradition, which never saw theology as something divorced from questions and issues in the world of the economy, politics and culture.27 The danger that the process of globalization in the final analysis will be subject to a worldwide Western-oriented imperialism has its corresponding danger, so clearly expounded in Bonaventure’s works of his time, of the growing dangers of a religious imperialism in the form of Caesaro-Papism. This danger is averted, in theological terms, by means of the Theology of the Trinitarian Communio. Putting into effect Cf. Ovidio Capitani, “Nuove acquisizioni del pensiero etico-economico francescano del Basso Medioevo,” in Alle origini dei Monti di Pietà. I Francescani fra etica ed economia nella società del Tardo Medioevo, Quaderni del Monte 3 (Bologna o.J), 21-28. 27

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the vision of a Communio will create attitudes and mechanisms of acknowledged mutuality, reciprocal appreciation that will conquer an enforced imperialism. The Communio as a model of a worldwide living-together can overcome the forceful dominance exercised by the tiny majority over a vast minority by replacing this domination with a mutual, humane, cultural, intellectual and spiritual enrichment and cross-fertilization. The Communio model can also make a market economy fruitful. A healthy market presupposes equal partners, a place where risk and profit are distributed proportionately to the share each has contributed in the market. If the market has any chance of surviving, it must bear in mind the Bonum of all those taking part in the market and accordingly support the justly deserved Bonum of each partner in the transaction. A market that favors one partner over the other can only be maintained in the long run by the exercise of force or by criminal actions, which will inevitably set in motion self-destructive mechanisms. Healing the world market in globalization, therefore, requires nothing short than that all those taking part in the market, from the simple worker to the wealthy capital owner, from the peasant farmer to the stockbroker, can enjoy a proportionate share in the whole of the Bonum. Since the individuals taking part in the globalized market are dependent upon each other, necessarily partners, a really liberal market can only be maintained through Liberalitas (magnanimity). This Liberalitas, which is there for all, will create the cultural, technical, scientific and economic conditions that will allow all parties to take part in the market process on an equal footing. This presupposes, first of all, a sense of solidarity with those people who are being excluded from sharing in the goods of this world, those who have been marginalized, and those who because of the unjust market mechanisms of the present day are being deprived of their chances of survival.

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The theological indicator here gives good cause for us to consider carefully and deeply that there are goods which are essential and indispensable to maintain life itself, and these should not be in the possession of some few multinational companies nor should the latter have unfettered rights of disposal over them, since every human person has a claim upon them in virtue of Nature herself. Expressed in theological terms, in accord both with Bonaventure and with the Franciscan tradition, this is so because God has given these goods to all humanity as the basis for sustaining people’s livelihood. There are goods which are in no way to be subjected to the rules that govern the market economy, because these goods have a social and a humane function, they serve and preserve life. It is only through thus recognizing that this Good – this Bonum – belongs to all humanity that the ever-widening gap between the rich and the poor can be closed. A global market can indeed profit from such a just balance between wealth and natural resources. Liberalization of the world market is thus interpreted as a Liberalitas in solidarity, which sees that the dignity of every human person as a fundamental goal, yet to be achieved, of globalization. As globalization goes hand in hand with enormous environmental problems, which are endangering the future, the theological indicator is inviting us to overcome the prevalent exaggerated anthropocentricity, which is the cause of our reckless treatment of nature. This can begin when human beings recognize that the environment and Nature possess their own dignity, when humanity ceases to look upon itself as the conqueror of Nature but reaches an understanding of itself as an integral and integrated part of Nature, and as such can accept its special responsibility for the environment. By recognizing their responsibility to care and to preserve the created world, human beings will change their attitude towards Nature and its resources. Only if they do this can they preserve the created world, as a place capable of sustaining life, for future generations.

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In order to make globalization more humane, more environmentally friendly, and to mould it into a form that can look forward to a life-asserting future, it will need to find its way back to a holistic view and practice in regard to the way life is led and the environment managed. To act against the restriction of globalization to the market, there is need for a renewed opening up to find a new and wider spiritual and cultural meaning and sense, far from materialistic thinking. Spiritual, religious and moral values must be reintegrated into the process of globalization in order to achieve genuine fulfillment in the way life is led. Here Bonaventure’s theology points out that transient goods alone are not sufficient to provide any lasting satisfaction, but there is a higher and a permanent Bonum to be striven for and that will ensure the fullness of life. It is here that religion and faith can make a significant contribution because it belongs to the nature of religion and faith to contribute towards strengthening the holistic approach to life from a theological and spiritual standpoint. From the position that Franciscan tradition maintains, it is clear that theology does not oppose globalization as such, but it wants to contribute towards making the process of globalization more humane and more environmentally friendly. We human beings are not helpless victims in the face of globalization, but we do have a historic responsibility to intervene in the process of globalization to modify it. In the spirit of Bonaventure’s theology and in the spirit of the Franciscan tradition certain values, expressed in words such as Bonum, Liberalitas, in the idea underlying the word Communio, the recognition of the unique nature and the dignity of each and every creature, can provide the stimulus and motivation to change the present form of globalization so that the world can become a place worth living in – for all.

John Duns Scotus: An Anthropology of Dignity and Love Antonie Vos I. Introduction We believe. We celebrate. We remember. It is a privilege for me to introduce John Duns from Scotland (Scotus). John was born in Duns in the South of Scotland in the winter of 1266 into a family of the same name: Duns.1 We meet a mature and rich version of the new Christian mode of thinking in Duns Scotus’s philosophy and theology, which was specifically embodied in his anthropology. First, in §2 we look at the early Scottish life of John Duns (* 1266), whereas §3 deals with his Franciscan context just as it mirrors itself in the Franciscan school system. We also meet John Duns Scotus in his historical academic world (§4). In §5 we look at the ancient mode of thinking so that we can discern the decisive differences and appreciate the point at which it all changed, whereas §6 sketches the nature of Scotus’s decisive contributions to the philosophy of the individual, wedded to other crucial notions: what it means to be human and to have will (§7), and what contingency and freedom (§8), goodness (§9) and love (§10) consist in. Against this background, some reflections on the issue of globalization are launched (§11). Our final remarks concern the pressing process 1 The original version of this contribution was presented on the occasion of the International Franciscan Symposium (Berkeley Franciscan School of Theology, October 6, 2007), focusing on Duns Scotus’s anthropology.

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of globalization where we need the retrieval of John Duns Scotus’s heritage (§12).

2. Duns: a Scottish boy Both Scotland, and Church and mendicancy were John Duns’s cradle.2 He was born in the North of Great Britain: in the South of Scotland, named Duns, baptized John, in the winter of 1266. The old Melrose Chronicle tells us that a first small band of Minors crossed the border along the Tweed in 1231,3 when they established a site in Berwick-on-Tweed before founding a house in Roxburgh about 1234 and pressing on to Haddington (before 1242), Dumfries (about 1262) and Dundee (1284).4 So around 1280 there were four friaries in South Scotland: Berwick, Roxburgh, Haddington and Dumfries. The three first were rather near to each other. In that area John Duns originated. Church and faith, mendicancy and theology were his manger. The young John followed Christ in the footsteps of il poverello. Franciscan renewal was welcomed by both families and inspired individuals. This feature was a continental one, and this attraction also touched the gentry family of Duns in the South of Scotland, which supported the Franciscan movement on both the personal, and the practical and financial levels.5 John was a Duns from Berwickshire, twenty-five miles to the North.6 The village of Duns, in the heart of Berwickshire, lies be2 See David Knowles, The Religious Orders in England I, (Cambridge 1948), part II: ‘The Friars 1216-1340,’ and Jean Leclercq, François Vandenbroucke and Louis Bouyer, A History of Christian Spirituality II, (London and Tunbridge Wells2 1982), 283-314: The Spirituality of the Middle Ages: ‘The Franciscan Spring.’ 3 Quoted by William Moir Bryce, The Scottish Grey Friars I, EdinburghLondon 1909, 5 note 1: Hic primo ingrediuntur fratres minores Scotiam. 4 See Moir Bryce, The Scottish Grey Friars I, 5-6 (20-35), 161-62 (161-67), 168-69 (168-98), 199 (199-217) and 218-19 (218-39), respectively. 5 Cf. Angelus Cardinal Felici in the Decretum of Dun’s Beatification by the Congregatio de Causis Sanctorum, in Opera Omnia XIX, X: Ortus est in Scotiae urbe Dunsio, ad annum 1265. Eius familia liberaliter beneficia conferebat in Sancti Francisci Asisinatis filios, qui primos evangelizatores imitantes, iam ab institutionis exordio ad Scotiae fines perrexerant. 6 “Dun” is Gaelic for hill or fort.

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tween two chains of mountains, to be located south of the Lammermuir Hills. It was an agricultural area. Father Duns was a commoner, a gentleman from the landed gentry in a world which was a mixture of Scottish-Pictish and Anglo-Norman. After some preparatory education at home or in a local school a young friar attended the school of his friary. It was obligatory on all friars – a word derived from the way Englishmen pronounced the French word frères – except the illiterate, to devote part of their time to reading and writing, as the General Chapter of Narbonne (1260) had already confirmed.7

3. The Franciscan school system The orders of the poverty movement contributed immensely to the educational system and the intellectual level of Europe’s culture. The Church was the manger of society. Not only new types of schools and a new type of education were invented, but also innumerable schools were built. The hinterland was huge, and, relatively, the Franciscan hinterland was very huge. I illustrate this qualification with one example only: Soon after 1230 the German province had already been split up into the provinces of Cologne, Saxony, and the Strasbourg Province. Crucial is the school system which shows a remarkable complexity.8 The conventual school The basic unit of the organization of the Franciscan Order was the friary (convent), and the basic unit of the Franciscan School system was the conventual school. The situation in the Umbrian province sheds some additional light on the distribution of convent schools. Aside from the more important studia in Perugia, Assisi, Todi, Gubbio, Città del 7 On the young John Duns, see Antonie Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus (DPhil), (Edinburgh: EUP, 2006), 15-23. 8 See DPhil, 23-27. Cf. Vos, “Scholasticism and Reformation,” in Reformation and Scholasticism, Willem J. van Asselt and Eef Dekker (eds.), An Ecumenical Enterprise, (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2001), 99-119, and Richard W. Southern, The Making of the Middle Ages, (London: Yale University Press, 1961).

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Castello, Spoleto and Borgo Sansepolcro […], the province seems to have had a range of convent schools with only one lector each by the early fourteenth century.9 For the year 1282, when Duns had already started his philosophical studies in his studium, 669 Franciscan friaries can be traced in Italy and there should have been more than 400 Italian conventual schools throughout the fourteenth century: It is in the conventual school context that nearly all adult friars were immersed in straightforward lectures on dogmatic and moral theology, where they would hear countless numbers of sermons, and would receive additional training in forensic skills on a daily basis. Together with the custodial schools, the convent schools provided by far the most important context for the regulated permanent education of the friars, most of whom would never leave their province for higher studies at a studium generale.10 In the English Province there were already thirty-four lectors for the forty-three Franciscan convents in 1254, and all these lectores had been trained academically. So, there was not only a formidable rise of the number of friaries all over Europe, but this growth was accompanied by a formidable rise of the number of friary schools. The custodial school The friaries were organized in custodies, and the custodies had their own preparatory schools. In John Duns’s days, the English Province had higher academic schools of theology in each of its seven custodies: London, Norwich, Stamford, Exeter, Coventry, York and Newcastle.11 Custodial and provincial theological schools (studia particularia theologiae) formed the top of the subprovincial educational system. Contrary to the arts schools, which came into being when the average age of new postulants dropped and the pursuit of Bert Roest, A History of Franciscan Education (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 85 (83-87: on developments in various areas). 10 Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, 86-87 (84-86: on Italy). 11 See Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, 72-73 (65-81: “Custodial and provincial schools”). 9

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university degrees asked for a proper grounding in the profane sciences, these intermediate theology schools sometimes can be traced back to the late 1220s and early 1230s.12 Such theological schools might become prestigious centers of learning. As far as England is concerned, the educational organization was due to Albert of Pisa, the second Provincial Minister (1236-39) and the fourth General Minister (1239-40).13 He appointed lecturers at London, Canterbury, Hereford, Leicester, Bristol, Cambridge and Oxford. The work was continued by William of Nottingham. The studium generale In general, the best theological students of the custodial schools were sent to the studia generalia theologiae of the Order to get qualified for the lectorate, the teaching license for theology within the order. The ‘non degree’ status of these schools derived not so much from their inferior curriculum, but was due to the absence of a public chair of theology attached to a university.14 There might have been various reasons for the absence of a chair of theology: there was no university in the neighborhood, the neighboring university did not have a theological faculty, or the Franciscan school in question was not willing to align itself with such a local institution. In addition to the degree studia of Paris, Oxford and Cambridge, at the end of the thirteenth century, the Franciscan Order had more than ten such non-degree studia generalia; for instance, Bologna, Pisa, Venice, Milan, Lisbon, Toulouse, Magdeburg, and Cologne. Already in the second half of the thirteenth century there was a papal privilege of the mendicant orders that friars who had finished the lectorate courses at such a non-degree studium generale received the licentia do-

Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, 71. See John R.H. Moorman, A History of the Franciscan Order (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1988), 101-07. 14 Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, 30 (28-38: on studia generalia, and 97-107: on the degree program). 12 13

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cendi in all non-degree schools.15 The custodial and provincial schools and the studia generalia, spread over the whole of Europe, were the tip of an iceberg. The astonishing growth of the Franciscan Order in the middle of the thirteen century resulted in a huge number of all kinds of schools. There was excellence in abundance, because this Franciscan world was first rate from the human and spiritual points of view. Dunn was involved in a most promising youth movement. Finishing one’s theological studies was a most exciting affair. The mendicant orders were very popular with the young people. The theological faculty On top of this, the mendicant orders abounded in bright students. The most talented ones got a chance to study in the theological faculties at Paris and at Oxford, but it was Oxford that was extraordinarily popular with the poverty movements and their students. On this international top level the Franciscan masters of theology and their bachelors had to prove themselves among the numerous other theologians, for in the theological faculty they worked together with the professors and bachelors of the other orders where also most of the secular masters shared their point of view on Christian thought.

4. John Duns in his academic world In October 1307 – more than seven centuries ago – at the age of forty-one Duns Scotus had recently moved from Paris, the intellectual capital of Europe, to Cologne (Germany), but died suddenly the following year.16 A great personality of his time – Gonsalvo of Spain, the General Minister of the Franciscan Order and one of the leaders of the world church – was fond of his younger confrère (confriar) John. He appointed him to one of the See Bullarium Franciscanum II 208b, n. 317. At the end of the fifteenth century, there were more than 100 Franciscan studia generalia – see Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, 32-36. 16 See DPhil 86-102. 15

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most prestigious chairs in the universities of Europe: the Franciscan theological chair at Paris University. We find this text worth highlighting in a letter of Gonsalvo of Spain, dating from the autumn of 1304: By this appointment I assign to your love Father John Scotus, beloved in Christ. I am fully acquainted with his praiseworthy life, excellent knowledge and most subtle mind, as well as with his other remarkable qualities, partly through my long personal experience, and partly because his fame has spread everywhere.17 This praise was not social convention. It was only of Duns that Gonsalvo spoke in this way, and not of the other candidates. He was beloved in Christ, and he was beloved. John was excellent and most subtle. Gonsalvo did not just write in his letter Scotus is subtle, as if he were the only subtle mind, but most subtle. At that time theology abounded in subtle minds. Scotus is known to be a notoriously difficult and highly original thinker,18 but Gonsalvo and the students of John Duns did not think that Duns was notoriously difficult, nor does subtilis mean: difficult due to complicated and overtechnical reasoning. Subtilis means efficient by precise and detailed demonstration. Wodeham tells us Scotus was rationalis – he was able to substantiate his point of view by delivering formidable arguments. He was able to make – and to prove – his case and it was precisely this demonstrative efficiency that was very much appreciated in his own time and in 17 The text of Gonsalvo’s letter was reprinted by Little, The Grey Friars in Oxford, 220: Baccalaureus hujusmodi praesentandus ad presens debeat esse de aliqua provincia aliarum a Provincia Francie dilectum in Christo Patrem Joannem Scotum, de cujus vita laudabili, scientia excellenti, ingenioque subtilissimo, aliisque insignibus conditionibus suis, partim experientia longa, partim fama, quae ubique divulgata est, informatus sum ad plenum, dilectioni vestre assigno, post dictum patrem Egidium, principaliter et ordinarie praesentadum. See André Callebaut, ‘La maîtrise du Bx. Jean Duns Scot en 1305,’ Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 21, (1928): 206-39. The source is: Heinrich Denifle and Alain Chatelain (eds.) Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis II 1, (Paris, 1891), 117. 18 See Stephen D. Dumont, “John Duns Scotus,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (eds.), (Oxford 2 2006), 353 (353-76).

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the centuries to come. His was a rich theological world which delighted in quality and cherished high standards. Duns was loved and admired in that world. The dynamics of his personality could also cope with the challenges of his academic milieu. Wodeham mediates a unique observation: “that human person, who was so lively and could really argue.” Wodeham calls him vivax, lively – he was a lively teacher, not a dull one.19 It is true that Duns was a highly original thinker, but the decisive impact of this description lies in the fact that Duns was original in a new and original tradition. The achievements of the thirteenth century were also highly original and many excellent qualities possessed by Aquinas, Scotus and Ockham were not exclusive. They excelled and they were able to excel, because they worked surrounded by excellence. The thirteenth century was the first century of the university, and it was the final third of this highly creative century that was its most original, a time which abounded in brilliant thinkers from Henry of Ghent onwards, especially among the Franciscans. Indeed, although John Duns was highly original, he was sailing on the high seas of creativity and originality that were flowing through his world. These seas had their origins in the tenth century, the iron century, but the iron century was also the century of an established monastic order, a long dynamic spirituality and a new interest in study and scholarship, as we also observe in an awakening interest in Boethius. We discover two impressive educational innovations: the phenomenon of monastic education (the monastery schools) and the phenomenon of ecclesiastical education (the cathedral or church schools). These new stages in the development of institutions for higher education and critical teaching were developed further during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The best schools of 19 This remarkable and eloquent testimony originates from John Duns’s studium at Oxford. When Adam of Wodeham discusses a certain theory put forward by John Duns, he adds this personal impression: “that man, who was so lively and could really argue.” See Rega Wood and Gedeon Gâl (eds.), Adam de Wodeham, Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum III, (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1990), distinction 10 §5 (153): […] ille homo, sicut vivax et rationalis.

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both types shared a unique dynamics of their own and became centers of higher learning, with a unique sociological structure. There team building and specialization were invented. This academic world created theory formation. Numerous new schools were founded. About 1200, the university was born. Being the fruits of the process of Christian mission and message and of the renewal of the Church, they stand out from the viewpoint of the history of culture. The new institutional wineskins also contained new wine – the wine of a new view of reality that stated reality is not necessary and closed, but contingent and open. With the exception of the biblical message, the ancient world views embodied necessitarianism – things cannot be different from what they are. There are no true alternatives available to the agents of this world. Christian thought became emancipated from this ancient model of thinking in a process of liberation which took centuries, but the old approach of necessitarianism again played a substantial role in the thirteenth century when it was revitalized by the introduction of the philosophies of Aristotle, Avicenna and Averroes. The theses of these philosophi were sharply criticized by Bonaventure, and eventually refuted philosophically by Duns Scotus. Let us have a closer look at the ancient views in order to be able to appreciate the new world of John Duns Scotus.

5. The ancient world – before and after Jesus Christ The Old Testament is not counted among the old Seven Wonders of the Old World, nor is it among those of the new; but that is a mistake. Before Christ, the Old Testament is the Wonder of the Old World, but the Old Testament tells more than one story: it tells the story of God’s care of his people over the centuries, and it reveals much about ancient Israelite societies and ancient Semitic culture behind the Old Testament. Their world view is impressively expressed in Ecclesiastes 3: A time to be born and a time to die; a time to plant and a time to uproot;

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a time to kill and a time to heal; a time to tear down and a time to build; a time to weep and a time to laugh; a time to mourn and a time to dance; a time to embrace and a time to refrain; a time to love and a time to hate.20 Everything has its fixed time – time itself is immutable, and life is unbearable. ‘There is nothing new under the sun’ (Ecclesiastes 1:9). There is no bitterness; it is nothing, a breath of air, a sigh, boring and empty. It is all vain, air. All is nothing. The initial conclusion is simple and heartbreaking: ‘Meaningless! Meaningless!’ Says the Teacher. ‘Utterly meaningless! Everything is meaningless.’ The destiny of human existence weighs heavily on human shoulders. The children are punished for the sins of the fathers to the third and fourth generations (Ex 20:5). The ius talionis (the law of a balanced reality which cleanses itself) reigns, for acts and effects are necessarily linked. The Psalms sing that God is mild and merciful, but reality is harsh and cruel. Only God himself is the great exception in a harsh reality (Psalm 91). The dominance of time in Ecclesiastes runs parallel to the superior position held by the god Kronos in the Greek pantheon where it was embedded in the mythology of cosmogony and theogony. Not only things, animals and humans, but also the gods were subject to the Deities of Fate. The same pattern is to be observed in the old-Germanic myths. The past, the present and the future can only be what they are. According to the first Greek philosophers, reality is one and nihil fit ex nihilo are axiomatic and also consequential to Aristotle’s position. Reality is full (principium plenitudinis) – an event is either impossible or necessary.

20

See Ecclesiastes 3: 1-8.

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Let us travel back in time for a second time – now to the tenth century BC – to unravel the consequences for what individuals can be. The text is found in 1 Samuel – in the history of King Saul and the young David. Although the viewpoint is prophetic, I want to focus on an aspect of the ancient Semitic culture where these pioneers of faith lived and loved and hated. We join a passionate dialogue: David has again spared Saul’s life and left the camp taking with him Saul’s spear. David shouts out: “Why is my lord pursuing his servant?” (1 Samuel 26:18). David presents two possible reasons for Saul’s actions. The first possibility is: “The Lord has incited you against me!” The second is: “People have incited you against me.” What is the impact of these questions? If Saul answers that it is the Lord who has incited him against David, then David can come forward with an offering and if that does not help, he has to accept his destiny. If, on the other hand, Saul’s answer points at people, then they can be cursed before the Lord and this curse can help. However, the crucial question is why David does not ask whether this attitude comes directly from Saul himself. The solution is: there is no self, and there is no inner life. People did not see themselves in terms of individual consciousness. The turning point There are light years between the ancient options and the philosophy and anthropology of Duns Scotus. How can that be? Before Jesus Christ everything was thought of in terms of external processes, and a new beginning is impossible. The kèrygma of the Kingdom sings a new song: Everything has become new. The ancient world views are diametrically opposed to the message of the Gospel: He has come who is the Light, the Truth and the Life. In his footsteps, humanity was promoted: transformed from a point of dust into the apple of God’s eye when Jesus took the little girls and boys in his arms and his eyes transformed these instances of nothing, and their mothers, the widows, the poor, the outcasts, the ill and the handicapped, the contaminated and the impure, those in the forbidden crafts and the dead, the foreigners and the slaves, into treasures. In many poleis of the Greek world, eighty percent were slaves and fifty percent wom-

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en. These were not human beings – indeed there were not many humans in antiquity. However, the arrival of a little boy made Christmas in Bethlehem. Jesus Christ revealed new attitudes and created new hearts and new compassion, but such revelation does not produce new theories. These have to be invented and developed. This took place over the centuries – in the Greek and in the Latin Church, on and on. The movements for renewal more and more set the tone: the Cluniac reform movement in the tenth and eleventh centuries, Cistercians and Norbertines in the twelfth century, the Dominicans and Franciscans, the Carmelites and Augustinians (including the Eremites) in the thirteenth century, the Brabantia and Rhineland mystics in the fourteenth century, and the devotio moderna in the fifteenth century. Duns was at home in that world and his work was its intellectual culmination.

6. Individuals De Rijk stressed that in the thirteenth century it was no longer enough to see reality through the old lenses of potentiality: You will ask what they do not accept any longer. Let me try to state it sharply. In the garden of our new Philosophical Institute are two individual maple trees. According to Aristotle, they differ from each other only in terms of their matter; so, not in an essential way. I understand that this assertion is not able to shock you and now I have to become really personal. According to Aristotle, you and I differ from one another and from all other human persons because one and the same essence of the human being is only realized in different chunks of matter.21 21 Lambertus M. de Rijk, Het ongure individu. Uitdager en spelbreker van het denken [The disreputable individual. Challenger and spoilsport of philosophical thought] (Leiden, 1983), 11. Excellent expositions on aspects of the medieval philosophy of individuality are found in Jorge J.E. Gracia, Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages, (Munich2 1984), and Gracia (ed.,), Individuation in Scholasticism. The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation 1150-1650, (Albany, 1994).

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This view of the human being can be characterized as that of the unpleasant, disreputable individual. Once we see how negative ancient views of individuality were, we can begin to imagine what Duns’s rehabilitation of the individual amounts to: it is not awkward, not unpleasant, and no longer “dirty.” An individual is just first-rate and any individual is what they are by virtue of what is essential to them, and not accidental. At the end of the thirteenth century the individual was already honored – existentially and theoretically, but one was still unable to make that claim true. Now the ontological order is turned upside down: reality is not necessary means it does not rest on universals or forms. The basic category is not universality, but individuality – the individual has their own identity, something essential which cannot be shared with anything else. They are unique, not something negative. Eventually, there is an ontological sun which shines on the world of the individual which is proper, good, dignified, and lovable. It enjoys the sun of God’s love which extends itself to everything, standing under the patronage of the cosmic Christ. Scotus’s innovations have an enormous impact. The whole of reality was seen in a new light. Scotus elaborated on more complex theories of matter and individuality.22 A material thing (substance) is individual in virtue of something positive which qualifies its nature in order to be this individual thing.23 Duns calls this essential individuality singularitas and he also uses the term haec (namely, natura) which led to the famous term haecceity.24 What matters is the individual difference. Individuals are different. They belong to a certain kind, but they also differ from each other: one book differs from another book;25 one flower differs from another one of the same kind. It is valuable See DPhil chapters 10 and 11. See Lectura II 3.139 (quaestio 6): Utrum substantia materialis sit individua per entitatem positivam determinantem naturam ad essendum hanc substantiam individualem. Compare §§164-77. 24 Lectura II. 3.164: Respondeo ergo ad quaestionem, quod substantia materialis per aliquid diversas singularitates secundum positivum determinatur ad hanc singularitatem, et ad diversa positiva. In Reportatio Parisiensis II 12, haecceitas is found, derived from hec (= haec). 25 In fact, this example is an implicit extension of the medieval theory; the medieval theory of kinds is mainly related to natural kinds. 22 23

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in itself: it is a positive thing. There is no need of a principle of individuation at all, since individuality is an essential property of everything there is.26 The history of the theory of individuality shows revolutionary changes. In mainstream Christian medieval thought, an individual does not embody the negative aspect of reality, but is something fundamental. The ontological tables have been turned upside down: universals are not the pillars of being, individuals are. And even matter matters. A universal is still a real aspect of individual reality – it is seen as a general property, but on the other hand, Duns also rejects early nominalism which only accepts individuals, and not general properties.27 His is the via media.

7. Human persons and will The general theory of individuality is basic to the anthropology of the human individual: the human person. Human persons act. The human individual participates in the positive radiance of the individual as such, but a human individual also acts in a personal way. Again, a contingency approach differs widely from a necessitarian one. Within a necessitarian context, a human individual is embedded and enclosed in the necessary process of the one possible world. The contingency approach starts with alternative possibilities which are essential to reality. A knowledge-based philosophy of the individual loses the will. True will is withdrawn from what a person can be. According to Duns Scotus, this option is an absurd one. If reality is contingent, both knowledge and will are the personal constituents. What matters is not voluntarism, but the truth that will is essential to personhood. Moreover, will is open will. There is also an intrinsic connection between will and freedom.28

‘Individual’ is a transcendent term. According to Duns Scotus’s ontology, an individual enjoys its own ontological status. 27 In fact, Duns Scotus’s logic does not follow the Aristotelian SP-structure, but the Fregean Fastructure. 28 See DPhil chapter 11. 26

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8. Contingency and Freedom Reality is open. What does this fine metaphor amount to? According to Parmenides the whole of being is fixed, as a sphere is. We think that our eyelashes move, but that is illusion. There happens nothing, nothing moves, nothing changes. The Greeks were scandalized, but the philosophers were also haunted by Parmenides’s arguments. They tried to save change, occurring in the course of time and history, but this diachronic change through time is itself necessary. Duns Scotus discovered the illusion of this solution. It is a Pyrrhic victory. We are still closed in, but now not by immutability, but by time. It is not enough that the present is open for the future, for it must be open in itself. If something happens now, at time t, then it must be possible that it is not the case at that same present time t. There must be an alternative. What is the basic alternative? Answer: that it is not the case. There are two really important words in our language: God and not. They are intrinsically connected. Theology is an extended theory of negation. I have an open hand. What is the basic alternative? That it is not. I present the alternative at a later time, because I am acting in time. For this reason, I call this alternative synchronic, terminology I have taken from the linguist La Saussure. He distinguished between studying a language throughout its history – diachronically – and as it works now in our present – synchronically. The openness of my hand is a structural possibility, for at the same time when it is open it could have been closed: a fist. At this same moment you are a believer. Why is that so wonderful? Because at this same time you could have been someone who is missing all the wonders of the faith. At this same time I enjoy talking here, being with you. Why is that so wonderful for me? I could have missed it. The whole of our life is built on true contingency, but most religious and most philosophies deny this true, synchronic contingency.29

29 See Antonie Vos, Henri Veldhuis, Aline H. Looman-Graaskamp, E. Dekker and Nico W. den Bok, John Duns Scotus. Contingency and Freedom. Lectura I 39, (Dordrecht/Boston 1994), i-viii and 1-206.

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If reality is open, the will must be an open will and a contingently acting will, although the will can close itself. Since there are alternatives, there are alternatives to be willed. The will is essentially free and this freedom is anchored in the nature of reality. It is no arbitrary innovation, but the discovery of what belongs as such to the reality of willing. The doctrine of the free will is also the majority report after Augustine until the end of the eighteenth century, but only the Scotian logic and ontology of synchronic contingency enables us to explain it as coherent truth. The harvest is consistent theology and consistent philosophy. The openness of freedom belongs essentially to the will and this free will’s openness is both beautiful and risky. So, we still need more than contingency, will and freedom.

9. Will and goodness If reality is contingent, there are no ways of arriving at goodness in a necessary way. Reality is also risky; life is dangerous. Values and norms are not embodied in our natural habitat; an ought cannot be derived from an is. Acting and living well ought to be done. What is good, salutary and merciful ought to be looked for, ought to be discovered and ought to be done. We can will everything, but we ought to will what is right and good. In this way willing and goodness are intrinsically linked. The life of goodness rests upon the life and identity of God. Thus the Anselmian type of goodness is decisive; the correct goodness is good, because the objective goodness of the other appeals to us, absorbs us and invites us to be absorbed in it and to love it. Ethics can only be based on moral goodness which focuses on the other who is our neighbor, and the Other, our Creator and Redeemer, in a contingent world. In this ethics there is a shift from the ego to orientation on the other and the neighbor. Being free is also a central notion of Scotian ethics and anthropology. Freedom is not primarily freedom from sin. Even sinning presupposes freedom and so, being free in the sense of alternativity,

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freedom is essential to be a person.30 Being free is primarily being free for, and not being free from. Duns Scotus’s ethics focuses on actual goodness, which delights in love.

10. Love Duns Scotus’s anthropology passes on to an ethics of goodness, but this is still not the end of the story. When we discover that someone else or something else is truly good, we see that this goodness is attractive, enchanting and ravishing. What enchants our hearts, elicits its love. Christian faith is natural. Its logic has the strength of iron, is cast iron, and the heart follows its beat. John Duns is convinced that we ought to love God above all, and he is sure that he can also demonstrate it. However, to love God is not an isolated affair. Love of God implies the love of the neighbor and the love of self, and vice versa. God himself shines his sun on our neighbor, and ourselves who are proper, good, respected, and lovable and enjoyable. It enjoys the sun of divine and human love extending itself to everyone who desires to walk in this light.31

11. Globalization and the classic Western tradition The immense complexities, the breathtaking challenges and the unrestricted confusions of the present process of globalization require a firm grasp of the dynamics of the thought of humanity. Every partner not only ought to discover where other partners are standing, but a critical image of us is also required. It is not enough to see the varieties in the different histories of the main cultures of the world, but we have also to develop comparative philosophy and comparative theology in order to see See Dekker and Veldhuis, “Freedom and Sin. Some Systematic Observations,” European Journal of Theology3 (1994): 153-61. 31 See Antonie Vos, Henri Veldhuis, E. Dekker, Nico W. den Bok and A.J. Beck, Duns Scotus on Divine Love. Texts and Commentary on Goodness and Freedom, God and Humans, (Aldershot, 2003), i-x and 1-235. 30

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how such a comparative philosophy and theology analyze and structure the wealth of cultural, religious and philosophical patterns and proposals. The requirement to be adequate confronts us with the unique rise of Greek philosophy more than twenty-five centuries ago and its development in Hellenistic and Roman philosophy during more than a thousand years. However, do we only see one type of philosophy based on the only one possible world model in the history of the thought of humanity and in the history of religions or can we discern more than one type of philosophy including another type of philosophy based on the model of many possible worlds in the history of religion, philosophy and theology? The Duns Scotus story offers us a decisive alternative: Of realty the rarest-veinèd unraveller; a not Rivalled insight, be rival Italy or Greece. Since globalization is an overwhelmingly complex phenomenon, due attention to conceptual matters has to be appreciated. In general, the importance of the logical and analytical dimensions of the globalization debates, in combination with the ethical and historical dimensions has to be stressed.32 In particular, ethical questions really matter, and without taking history seriously – historical attention in the sense of scientific historiography – we are walking on clouds, but mind also that these three dimensions – analytics, ethics, historical consciousness – are intrinsically linked with the history of Christian thought. Globalization is tantalizingly complex. There are many different kinds which often are no key to each other, coping with different challenges, and we may, for instance, distinguish between political, economic, military and cultural globalization. In particular, political globalization finely illustrates how pervasive modern globalization has become. In a sense, political globalization is the most eloquent version which we easily observe in the list of the general secretaries of the United Nations: Trygve Lie (1946-53), and Dag Hammerskjöld (1953-61), both from Scandinavia, Oe Thant (1961-71), from Asia, Kurt Waldheim (197132

Consult the chapters 14-16 of DPhil.

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81, Europe), Javier Pérez de Cuellar (1981-91, South America), Boutros Boutros Ghali (1991-96) and Koffi Annan (1996-2006), from Africa and Ban Ki-moon (Asia). Three out of the first four were from Europe, and then South America, Africa and Asia have come in. The tendency cannot be clearer. My favorite was Dag Hammerskjöld, the secretary of my youth. Read his wonderful Markings. Do not forget Boutros Boutros Ghali, that genial Coptic Christian from Egypt, who, as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in the Egyptian government in 1978, was the architect of the Camp David Accords. This wonderful story highlights what globalization might mean but also that much globalization is appearance globalization, witness their powerlessness. Economic globalization is most easily to be observed, for it is felt most directly. Because countries which were not interested in milk for centuries, but they got interested, when the European milk lake ran dry and the European butter mountain melted. Chinese economy influences Dutch economy more than the measures of the Dutch government. Economic globalization is important, but unpredictable, for it is full both of perspectives and of dangers. Military – enormous decisions are made, based on ignorance. The tiny Dutch country also got involved both in the Iraq and in the Afghanistan war. The Dutch government numbers excellent Christians who were even brilliant professors before they got into the government, but their decisions were still ignorancebased: no idea of the Semitic world, no idea of Islam, and even no idea of the Old Testament. This field is covered with mines. Compare also tourism and sports – think of the Olympic Games – and globalization as far as it especially touches on the poor, the refugees and the victims. These aspects are still underestimated because of the weakness of the ethical dimension, and in many cases the ethical dimension is not even taken into account. This is also true of the cultural aspects and dimensions in general. Globalization requires much more intellectual and even scientific efforts in order to cope with very complicated issues in adequate ways. This in itself again fans ethical challenges of the first rank.

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As far as Peter Phan’s impressive contribution is concerned, I only focus on three points: world Christianity, Europe and Rome, and the nature of theology. World Christianity For half a century I used the notion of world Christianity in a different way: simply as the whole of the Christian communities all over the world, and after 1977 when I worked at Oxford University and lived in an international community. I was always impressed by the fact that existential communication with fellow Christians all over the world is an affair quite different from communication in general. So, I stick to the old-fashioned, ecumenical meaning of world Christianity. This is not only confirmed by global Christian communication, but also by the phenomenon that as far as Christian faith is concerned the relationship between faith-culture substantially differs from the relationship between religion-culture as far as other religions are concerned. According to the Christian faith, faith and culture do not coincide, nor is faith based on culture. There is an irreducible priority of faith over culture. This irreducible priority of faith over culture is the teaching of the New Testament. It is implied by the kèrygma resounding from the letters of Paul and from the Fourth Gospel. We discern it in the life of Saint Francis starting with the Gospel. We discover it in the breathtaking emancipation of Christian life and thought – from ancient life and thought patterns developing over centuries and centuries and culminating in the life and work of John Duns Scotus – that it is not the status quo that governs us. Only dynamics pointed the way to a new agriculture, social and medical care in hospitals originating from monastic communities and monasteries, and exact sciences. Only here religion gave rise to science.33 Neither the ancient Semites nor the old Greeks, the old Romans nor the old Germanics made all of these inventions, but the Christians – only when they had become Christian did they become innovative. Christianity is not a Western religion, pre33

See DPhil chapter 10: “Physics.”

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cisely not in the West. Neither the West nor Europe existed before the Christian faith came in. We cannot even trace traits of the old Germanic religion in the orthodox theology and philosophy of the Middle Ages. There is an irreducible priority of faith over culture. The agenda of a Christian ought to be derived from Christ’s agenda. We are not, in the first place, Dutch or Saxons or Indians, Japanese or Originals, but we are Christians in the first place. We have our Lord, Jesus Christ the King, the Servant King, and then for a long, long time there is nothing, and eventually, we meet our lovely Queen Beatrix. In sum, the thesis of Christianities is not true.34 I regret many divisions and confusions, and especially the huge loss of theological consensus during the last two centuries – in contradistinction to the massive continuity from the New Testament, and the second half of the second century, onwards until the first half of the nineteenth century in matters systematic. However, the miracle is that all disasters of conflicts did not destroy the patrimonium fidei. Europe and Rome Peter Phan’s plea on behalf of the global South ought to be heard – without any doubt, and it deserves much more undiluted attention. However, I would like to stress the intrinsic difficulties of communication and cooperation –apart from the problem of power. What is impeding the European Community? There are frictions based on power, but much more can be explained in terms of the complexities of many different systems, languages and culture. World Christianity itself is the issue. The issue of world Christianity is whether one has a world center, or not. In fact, there is only one world center in the history of Christianity: Rome. The World Council of Churches tried to build a new one, but they failed, and the explanation to be given is simple: a world center is a gift from history. It cannot be built in an artificial way. It cannot be invented. History makes world centers, not plans and initiatives for people of good intentions. 34

Compare the history of the World Council of Churches.

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However, this is not the whole story and not the only fact to be reckoned with. A world center is part of only one national culture. It is universal and it is particular and the universal can only be offered and distributed in terms of the particular. There is no other way, and there is no other way out. The problem is that its universal activities start from particular conditions. I only stress one condition: speaking Italian. I admire Italy and its culture, but it is still difficult to cooperate with excellent colleagues, if our Italian is not fluent. We lost Latin and have still no successor, whereas we generally overlook the implications of this old brute fact. If we have no idea of Italian culture, we cannot understand how Vatican life is going on. Moreover, in Europe there is no real power flow from the North toward the South; and if so, that would not be the solution either. Power is mostly powerlessness. The problem is how to work together and how to work well and fruitfully on an international scale. The problem is that we are not equipped, and we have to pursue the direction leading to new kinds of equipment. Criticism will not be of any help; what is needed is an instructive and exploratory dialogue. We have to work. The nature of theology My third point concerns the nature of Christian thought and theology. According to Peter Phan, – apparently in the Greek Church and in the Latin Church – Christian beliefs have been articulated in Hellenistic categories. This hypothesis was the bold proposal of the old German Dogmengeschichte, but the question is whether this proposal is an acceptable one and whether Greek philosophy forms part of the Christian heritage. The Greek Church still teaches us that philosophia is not part of her heritage, but for now my point is not that it is not true – although it cannot be true, since non-Christian Greek philosophy simply excludes the possible truth of the Christian faith. The hypothesis under consideration was massively defended by the German history of dogma – a hundred years ago; but let us think of Popper: conjectures and refutations. In terms of Popperian methodology we can consider what Harnack defended as a conjecture. When we start to refute it, we discover a wealth of

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new developments in all fields from the second and third centuries onwards. The speed of this dynamics enormously accelerated in the Middle Ages in an ongoing emancipation over centuries and centuries. When we follow the extremely original developments of theology, we also discover the historical power of the Christian faith. Only when we started doing theology in Europe, did we start to think analytically and critically. There also lies the key for a new appreciation of conciliar Christological dogma according to historical methods. Globalization presupposes a rational attitude, not ignorance based, but familiar with the discoveries of the past. We can only escape from ignorance if we investigate the historical development and that is the only way of rediscovering the classic Christian tradition. This rediscovery simply presupposes the rediscovery of the identity and the enormous significance of the Franciscan academic tradition. We can only know ourselves if we know the classic Christian tradition and its ramifications in the universities between 1200 and 1800. The view which overlooks these centuries blocks investigating the enormous dynamics, creativity and originality of the history of the Christian faith between the New Testament and the modern age, because it also forgets the early modern age. This mistake leads to overlooking the impact of antiquity, and the impact of all cultures which still base themselves upon antiquity. When we overlook the impact of antiquity, on the one hand, and the Middle Ages, on the other, we cannot even begin to understand what we call Western culture – there was no Western culture before Christianity, and there was no Europe before the Christian faith, and we could not understand it, not even our technical agriculture, let alone our education and university life. All this and much, much more was only invented in the Latin Middle Ages, and theology is the queen of the process of emancipation from the thought patterns of antiquity.

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12. The end and a new beginning Scotus fell out of favor in the nineteenth century. Necessitarianism replaced contingency thought. The victor became a loser and losers become marginalized. Duns Scotus’s line of thought – the line of thought of Anselm and the Victorines, John of La Rochelle and Bonaventure, John of Pecham and Henry of Ghent – was relegated to a marginal place for not satisfying the Aristotelian scientific canon. However, historiography ought to be democratic. What’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. When we focus on global issues, we have to determine the place in world history of the phenomena of the world. Duns Scotus reconstructed the whole of the tradition of the philosophia christiana in ways which cannot be overtaken because of their intrinsic value, although they can be overlooked! It is bliss to rediscover this tradition on a large scale. The unity of Duns Scotus’s philosophy and theology unlocks the coherence of the heritage of the medieval university: a new type of academic institution gave rise to a new type of thought – philosophy in a new key and theology in a new key. Duns Scotus’s contributions have to be understood and analyzed within this context – a world of thought which can be translated with the help of modern theories like the theory of infinite sets (Cantor), the theory of logical connectives and the logic of quantifiers (Frege), the logic of relation and identity (Russell), modal logic (Lewis) and the ontology of possible worlds (Platinga). The Old Testament not only has a David-Goliath story, it is itself a David-Goliath story, as we can also say of the New Testament. Victory seems to be impossible; nevertheless, it took place, as is also the case in the history of Christian thought. Hellenistic philosophy was convinced that the Christian view was utterly irrational, prospectless on the path of reason, but it won, although the nineteenth century repeated the ancient verdict. Christian philosophy According to Greek thought, the order and the logical that is not personal is higher than what is personal. Fate is above the

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gods and the tragic reigns. Biblical faith does not know of the phenomenon of fate, rising higher than God, and does not accept the tragic. Creation belief is incompatible with both Greek religion and philosophy, but Christian thought is creation thought. Even the Platonist kosmos noètos is seen as creation. It is just the other way around: God is necessary and creation is contingent. The necessity of God and the Logos (the Gospel of John) absorbs what is necessary and sets the world and human existence free. In this process of Umwertung aller Werte, contingency replaces necessity, freedom replaces fate and determinism, the individual is rehabilitated and universals turn out to be properties and, eventually, matter does matter. Language and thought are de-cosmologized and ethics and anthropology turn around divine presence, for humanity is an image of God created in the Man of Sorrows. David defeats Goliath and this process of conversion and emancipation from old thought patterns ensues into a new way of thinking, uniquely represented by the theology and philosophy of John Duns Scotus, following the footsteps of il poverello. We have again to determine John Duns Scotus’s place in world history: the place of John Duns from the South of Scotland, a minor of major status and impact, marking Christian thought for five centuries. It is time to rediscover that significance, expressed in a unique way by Gerard Manley Hopkins, from the Society of Jesus, in Duns Scotus’s Oxford: He lived on; these weeds and waters, these walls are what he haunted who of all men sways my spirits to peace; Of realty the rarest-veinèd unraveller; a not Rivalled insight, be rival Italy or Greece; Who fired France for Mary without spot.35

35 W.H. Gardner (ed.), Gerard Manley Hopkins. A selection of his Poems and Prose (Harmondsworth 1953), 44.

The Tradition and The Third Millenium: The Earth Charter1 Mary Beth Ingham, C.S.J. I. Introduction All religious traditions, indeed all spiritual traditions are challenged by the contemporary signs of the times. We are challenged to look deep within our own charisms and inspirations to identify what each of us has to bring to this global moment. For philosophers, such reflection calls us to look at assumptions, those unspoken and accepted dimensions to worldviews. It is often our assumptions, rather than our statements, that guide our decisions and actions. To offer a counter-cultural and prophetic approach is to challenge what “everyone knows.” I have been invited to reflect upon the principles set forth at the outset of the Earth Charter. This opening portion of the document is foundational to the rest: it offers an integrated opportunity for reflection upon central values of life and dignity, relationship and justice, beauty and abundance. The document The Earth Charter is a declaration of fundamental ethical principles for building a just, sustainable and peaceful global society in the 21st century. It seeks to inspire in all people a new sense of global interdependence and shared responsibility for the well-being of the whole human family, the greater community of life, and future generations. It is a vision of hope and a call to action. The Earth Charter project began as a United Nations initiative, but it was carried forward and completed by a global civil society initiative. The Earth Charter was finalized and then launched as a people’s charter in 2000 by the Earth Charter Commission, an independent international entity. 1

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assumes that these values are linked, and indeed they are. We find them together within a variety of religious and spiritual traditions. The Charter itself can only affirm them together; it does not explain why they form such an integrated position. This is unfortunate. When seen from a religious or spiritual vantage point, they form a coherent position because they reveal a particular aspect of divine being: love and generosity. The principles of the Charter contain implicitly the elements of a spiritual perspective that focuses on an optimistic anthropology (or vision of the human person and nature), the importance of Biblical justice (or right relationships), and an aesthetic vision of the world, both present and future. Taken as a whole, this viewpoint has particular significance for us today. Reflection upon the principles in the Earth Charter provides us with the occasion to step back for a moment and to consider the overall worldview they represent. Viewed in light of our Christian perspective, this worldview is even more compelling. It offers us a framework from which to view the needs we see in the world at the dawn of this third millennium. A sustained reflection on the framework points out resources within our own spiritual and intellectual traditions that help us see more clearly and act more justly. Most of this paper involves a reflection upon the principles of the Charter and upon how they resonate with the Christian tradition. At the close of this paper, I turn very briefly to contrast two different ways of seeing reality. The first is that suggested by the Earth Charter and informed by a Christian perspective. The second way belongs to contemporary market capitalism, and offers a framework for one version of globalization, perhaps the dominant model. When we see these two worldviews together, we may identify more clearly how precisely our tradition has something to contribute to our own time. It is my contention that the Christian insights I outline can challenge the Earth Charter, both enhancing and integrating its principles and actions. Consequently, the Christian Earth Charter offers an imposing alternative to contemporary models of globalization. Because my area of expertise is medieval philosophy, I first link the principles of the Charter to deeper assumptions that are

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explored in light of the thought of Franciscan John Duns Scotus (1265-1308), a key figure in the Christian Intellectual Tradition. It is in Scotus and in his recovery today that we can find the most coherent framing of the Christian vision for the next millennium.2 This vision reflects that of Vatican II, combining an optimistic anthropology, an affirmation of the value of right relationships, and an aesthetic vision of the whole of nature. Once we have reflected upon his thought and its value for today, we will look briefly at the assumptions that ground the contemporary market worldview, and conclude with the challenges before us.

II. Toward a Christian Earth Charter: A. The assumptions behind the Earth Charter The Charter makes no overt appeal to a transcendent or spiritual dimension. Nevertheless, its principles are entirely consistent with the deepest values held by the major world religions. Indeed, from the perspective of the major world religions, such as Christianity, Judaism and Islam, which recognize a personal, loving Creator, the four principles are different expressions of a single insight: the goodness and beauty of the created order valued by a loving God. The first principle: “Respect Earth and life in all its diversity” affirms the value and interdependence of all forms of life in addition to the inherent dignity of human beings. The second, “Care for the community of life with understanding, compassion and love” expresses the importance of loving stewardship over all that exists. The third, “Build democratic societies that are just, participatory, sustainable and peaceful” notes the human vocation to work toward the promotion of the Reign 2 This is the focus of much of my current work. While I can only briefly present Scotus’s insights in this present paper, a much fuller elaboration of these points can be found in “John Duns Scotus: Retrieving a Medieval Thinker for Contemporary Theology,” The Franciscan Intellectual Tradition, Elise Saggau, O.S.F., ed. (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 2001), 93-104. See also my Scotus for Dunces: An Introduction to the Subtle Doctor (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2003).

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of God, where true justice (right relationships) is the experience of all. Finally, the fourth, “Secure Earth’s bounty and beauty for present and future generations” points beyond the present toward the future. By moving beyond our own time, we enter the transcendent dimension of a world and an age outside of our own. Each of the four principles calls us to a higher viewpoint. We might understand this as the divine viewpoint from which the most important values are best seen. When we see this divine standpoint as not only offering a higher perspective, but as introducing us into a loving and compassionate way of seeing all reality, we understand how religious traditions like our own can actually “fill in” the basic framework offered by the Charter. We can fill in the framework with Christian insights about God’s design from all eternity and how this design informs our reflection and action. 1. Principle 1: Respect for all life Assumption #1: Value and dignity The value of life, its connection and importance, and human dignity are both affirmed and supported in the Christian view of creation and Incarnation. In the Franciscan thought of John Duns Scotus, the affirmations frame his entire view of reality. Both acts belong to divine intentionality, both are the manifestation of divine generosity at different moments of history. Both promote the complete manifestation of divine design: to share divine Trinitarian life with all. Scotus understands salvation history backwards in a way that mirrors the opening hymn in the letter to Ephesians. The divine act of creation was for the purpose of the Incarnation, which is for the purpose of participation in the divine Trinitarian communion. Approaching the question from the perspective of divine intentionality, Scotus affirms that God’s desire was to invite creation into a sharing of divine life. God did this by becoming incarnate. Key to this divine plan from the foundation of the world was to become present as human in the created order.

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For this desire to be realized, there must be beings whose nature is capable of reason and love, humans. In order for humans to exist, there must be a sustainable environment in nature. Thus, when we backtrack from the act of the incarnation, we discover both the need for human persons and the need for an interdependent created order. Both the value of the created order and the value of the person are expressed in the Charter’s first principle. They are affirmed together because they both share life. The Charter affirms life; Scotus affirms something deeper than life. Scotus affirms the loving intention and desire for relationship on the part of God. Thus, even life has a deeper foundation in the divine loving plan. At this point, one might question: “But this approach seems to weaken the Charter’s principle by making the value of creation and the person secondary values to God’s plan. At least the Charter affirms them in an absolute manner.” I would answer that the viewpoint of salvation history, or even of the participatory future that awaits all creation, does not make the value and dignity of creation or of the human person derivative. The longer view simply places that value and dignity within a much larger scheme or plan, and in this way anticipates the fourth principle. It also emphasizes the centrality of relationship as part of an understanding of value, thus placing principles two and three as implications of principle one. Nature and the human person are created in such a way as to be capable of relationship. This capacity for relationship, both with one another and with God is the foundation for their value. Because of this shift toward relationship, the Christian viewpoint of someone like Scotus sees value not in terms of an individual’s private possession, nor is it simply a function of usefulness. Scotus’s medieval world was far more “objective” about value than our own day. Values were not seen to be the subjective result of preference or taste, but were held to be part of the “nature of things” as constituted by the divine creative act. Historically, this drew upon the ancient Stoic perspective dividing the goods of the world into two categories. These were called bonum utile (or useful goods) and bonum honestum (or goods whose val-

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ue is intrinsic and not derived from their use). When the Earth Charter affirms that every form of life has value regardless of its worth to human beings, it claims that all life belongs to this higher category of bonum honestum. This is a very significant claim, since historically this category would be the one having an absolute value, one that could never be disregarded. For modern philosophy, the person alone is seen as having such value. For ancient thinkers, virtues were listed in this category of absolute goodness. The created order and nature By placing all life into this higher category of value, the Charter invites the contemporary world to rediscover the relationship of all life as sacred, even though the term sacred is not used. As believers, we can go even further, and affirm the value of life independently of human perspective because of our understanding of the relationship of creation to the loving Creator. The value of absolute goods is not intrinsic to their nature, it is a gift from the Creator. This value, even though it is the result of a relationship, cannot be disregarded for any reason. The gift of dignity that is the result of divine love is not an instrumental good. It is a good of intrinsic value that is contingent upon divine love. According to this perspective, creation has value in God’s eyes because of the important role it plays in salvation history: this world is the place where God becomes incarnate. But Scotus goes further than to place the Incarnation into the broad frame of salvation history. He also understands it independently of human fallenness and original sin. Scotus rejects the position taken by Anselm in Cur Deus Homo? that, had the fall never occurred, God would never have become incarnate. Rather, according to him, the Incarnation was part of the divine plan to bring all creation to glory, in and through Christ Jesus. This means that God would have become incarnate in our world no matter what. The incarnation is not a divine response to human fallenness. It is divine intentionality from the beginning. This vision is Christocentric, viewing all reality through the lens of Jesus Christ as the fullest expression of divine desire and fullest manifestation of human nature.

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This does not mean for Scotus that sin is not a reality. On the contrary, it is part of the human experience of disordered desire. The position on the Incarnation simply means that God’s decision to become human is not a consequence of human neediness or fallenness. Rather, it is a consequence of and reason to affirm human dignity. The insight from the Book of Proverbs, “And my delight is to be with the children of humanity,” (Prov 8:31) may well express Scotus’s insight about the reason behind the Incarnation. This Christocentric position grounds a far more positive anthropology (or vision of human nature). It also sheds light on the phrase “The Congregation of the Great Love of God.” As we look at our primitive documents, we might discover a hidden and positive anthropology as well. The divine desire to be present within the created order informs our own understanding of our nature and dignity, of the nature and dignity of creation. It is also fruitful for us to consider how such a shift in anthropology may inform our own spirituality of ministry. Human dignity In addition to his position on the Incarnation and its affirmation of an optimistic anthropology, Scotus also defends the value of the person through his principle of individuation, haecceitas. For any individual, the principle of individuation (what makes that particular individual that one and not another) must be intrinsic, unique and proper to the being itself. It must be a positive entity, a this rather than a not-that. It must be incapable of reproduction or cloning: the undivided individual of each being. Your haecceitas makes you what you are and sets you off from other things like you, other human beings. It “contracts the indifference of the specific nature to just one unique individual.”3 This aspect of Scotist thought was particularly attractive to Gerard Manley Hopkins, Jesuit poet.4 3 Allan B. Wolter, “Scotus’s Individuation Theory” in The Philosophical Theology of J. Duns Scotus, M. Adams, ed., (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1990), 90. 4 For example, “What I do is me, for this I came …” from “As Kingfishers Catch Fire.” In Scotus and in Hopkins, personal identity is an act, not a thing to be expressed.

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Haecceitas points to the ineffable within each being. The sacredness of each person, indeed of each being is philosophically expressed in this Latin term. According to Scotus, the created order is not best understood as a transparent medium through which divine light shines (as Aquinas taught), but is itself endowed with an inner light that shines forth from within. The difference between these two great scholastics can be compared to the difference between a window (Aquinas) and a lamp (Scotus). Both give light, but the source of light for Scotus has already been given to the being by the Creator. Each being within the created order already possesses an immanent dignity whose foundation is relational; it is already gifted by the loving Creator with a sanctity beyond our ability to understand. In his alternative approach to divine desire as it relates to the Incarnation and to the principle of individuation, Scotus affirms the dignity of the created order and the enormous value of the human person. We are invited to participate in divine intentionality and desire by our own actions. This means that when we as rational and free persons choose in light of ultimate goodness, we imitate God’s own creativity and are the dynamic image of God. Our contingent acts reveal finite beauty and freedom, in the same way that divine contingent acts reveal infinite divine beauty and freedom. We do not have the same sort of perfect, infinite and creative freedom that God enjoys. Far from it. Divine freedom is creative of value in an ultimate sense; our freedom affirms value yet only in a relative sense. Our choices are never the measure of the good; rather, they are measured by the good as established by God. When we consider some of the insights Scotus offers, we see how our own tradition deepens and challenges the first principle of the Earth Charter. We might imagine the order of created goodness (or the many goods surrounding us) existing as a bridge between the freedom of human moral choice and the freedom of God’s choice. The goods of this world lead us to God by virtue of their existence. They do not need to be loved by us in order to have value. They already possess the value of their existence as loved and created by God. It is up to us to recognize and affirm the value of creation by means of our choices. Our moral educa-

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tion involves learning to love rightly and in an orderly manner. It is not so much a matter of finding objects to love, since all that exists is worthy of love. It is rather a matter of adjusting our loving to conform to the worth of the object. We should not love objects more than persons, for example. We should not love persons as if they were our possessions. We should not love God as if God belonged to us alone. The message here is not about loving some things and not others. That would be easy. It’s about loving all that is, but according to the appropriate measure. Our tradition also challenges and deepens the Charter’s basic affirmation regarding human dignity. Beyond the human participation in the created order (which gives it a dignity comparable to all that exists), the Incarnation affirms more strongly the link between human nature and divine nature. Like Jesus, we are called to incarnate divine desire and action in our own world. Just as the Incarnation is the divine mode of loving presence to this world, so too our own mode of presence can be transformative of situations and relationships. 2. Principle 2: A Compassionate Regard Assumption #2: Justice and right relationships With his teaching on haecceitas and the Incarnation, Scotus shows us how moral living flows from a foundational metaphysical value. The individual is created for relationship. Moral living involves both ordered loving and the promotion of right relationships. This is what justice, particularly Biblical justice, calls for. Actions such as respect for persons and truth-telling are good because the world exists in the way that it does and because human nature is created in such a way as to know the world and to be perfected by means of our interaction with it. Those actions that lack goodness (such as murder and lying) do not affirm the goodness that belongs to the created order and to the beings in it. Indeed, these vicious acts destroy value and attack goodness. At its core, the domain of moral reflection depends upon God because all created reality depends upon divine love. The objectivity of the moral order depends upon divine desire because God is

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the source of the created order that, itself, is a book to be read by human reason and understood by the natural powers of human reflection. Scotus’s position on the Incarnation also informs our understanding of justice and how God relates to our world according to justice as well as mercy. Since the moral universe is Christocentric, and since the purpose of the Incarnation was the realization of divine desire to be present in the created order, reality is viewed as the sphere of generosity, relationship and love, not a domain to be “controlled” or “made right in terms of strict justice.” Justice involves not so much making amends for sin, but establishing and strengthening relationships. John 3:16: “God so loved the world, he gave his only son” can be read in light of Philippians 2 and kenosis. Divine and human mutuality, both in the act of creation and incarnation, grounds our reality and our relationships. To love each other is to love God. To mistreat or manipulate any other person is not just an offense against them but against God. In the act of the Incarnation, God fully expresses the divine desire for mutuality, where relationship is sustained as a free and generous gift to be with those who are the least in any situation. Such a vision is framed within a personalist view of the world, and upon the love and care of a personal God who both feels our suffering and, more importantly, longs to be in relationship with us because of who we are. God also longs that we be in relationship with one another: not relationships that degrade and destroy, but relationships that build up and promote the community of all persons, wherever they may live. To accept this insight is to reject a mechanistic and impersonal view of things. Accordingly, rational action is not understood as a calculation but as ordered loving, loving rightly and appropriately. Our contemporary response might be that love is precisely not rational; we have often been told to keep our emotions out of our rational reflection. Here is where Scotus and the tradition he represents challenges our time. Ordered loving is perhaps the most difficult human activity of all, since we must integrate our desires and our analysis into a single act. This sort of rational behavior requires all our intellectual talent and skill. Ordered loving is not

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unreflective loving; it is the result of thoughtful consideration of the world around us, of our own authentic needs and, more importantly of the needs of others.

Justice and the human heart The Charter’s Principle 2 refers to the attitude of compassion and love with which one should view the world. These are internal attitudes that inform intentions. These are the divine attitudes that framed the values of Principle 1. They are attitudes that belong to the human person, at her most rational, integrated and free. To see this, we need only reflect upon the nature of our desires, seen also from Scotus’s optimistic perspective. He claims that we are naturally created by God with all it takes to love what is good. We do not, however, manage to do this successfully, because of our brokenness. The Franciscan helps us see this when he examines the desires of the human heart. In Ordinatio II, distinction 6, Scotus describes the human heart in terms of two natural and basic dispositions: the concern for self (affection for possession) and the concern for justice (affection for justice). Both dispositions are important, because if I neglect my own basic needs, then I would not act out of a sense of my own dignity. However, my own needs should not be more important that what is required in certain situations. The justice I owe to other persons should not be sacrificed in favor of myself. There are times when I must reflectively consider how my own good stacks up against the needs of a larger group, of the demand of personal dignity. Justice in this context refers to the Augustinian notion of ordered loving. At a personal level, this involves the balance of the two natural dispositions for moral action: the affection for justice and the affection for possession. Metaphysically (not emotionally) human desire has two natural and foundational orientations: one focusing inward, the other outward. The first, toward self-preservation and conservation, affectio commodi, sometimes translates as the affection for possession. The best way to understand this orientation would be as the basic instinct for self-

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preservation that belongs to all living beings. In animals and humans, this natural instinct gives rise to emotional responses, such as fear, anger or the rush of adrenaline when we are in danger. We see this desire through its effects in behavior or internal psychological states. While the natural purpose of the affection is the survival of the being, in humans it does not always appear as positive. In unhealthy human behavior, for instance, it can express itself in obsessive concerns for self. Fear can become paranoia; anger can be sustained in resentment. This naturally good affectio can thus be disordered by our free choice. Scotus accounts for sinfulness in terms of the uncontrolled or disordered affectio commodi. He explains Satan’s fall not in terms of pride, but in terms of disordered self-love. The second, higher metaphysical affection is called the affectio iustitiae or the affection for justice/for the just. This affection has a focus beyond the self and is oriented toward goods around me and seeks to love each in accordance with its worth. The affection for the just looks beyond me, while the affection for possession looks at me. According to Scotus, the affectio iustitiae belongs to human nature insofar as it is rational and free. Here again, he departs from the tradition when he claims that it was not lost through original sin. The affection for justice is a requirement of human, free choice. In every rational choice both affections are present and at work. The key to right loving lies in the appropriate relationship between them. But here is the rub. Even though the higher affection was not lost through sin, it is not as able to maintain its control over the desire for possession. Self mastery is difficult to achieve, and sometimes hard to maintain. In our present state, the two important moral affections are no longer in a close, harmonious working relationship. Concerns for self will always play a moral role, because they are the natural foundation for life. But such concerns should never, alone, dominate choice. They are ordered and moderated by the rational concerns to do what is right. When I am honest with myself and with others, for example, I feel good about myself. If I am morally mature I do not pursue honesty merely because it makes me feel good about myself. I pursue honesty because the truth has a value independent of my own feelings about myself.

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Honesty is the right path for me to follow in life. This path is rational and therefore liberating. It satisfies the affectio iustitiae. The only way I might know for certain that I perform an action because it is right would be to look for examples in my life where being honest cost me something, either the respect of others or some good I desired for myself. In such cases of decision, I have a clearer understanding of my own character and what motivates me. Even though examples of hard decisions do reveal how the affectio iustitiae governs my behavior, it would be an error if I were to understand these two affections according to a more contemporary “selfless vs. selfish” dichotomy. This dichotomy belongs more properly to the last few centuries of moral reflection. It has taken root in religious traditions that embrace a more negative anthropology, viewing human affection as suspect. It was supported in the development of an obligational morality in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Scotus has both a positive anthropology and a moral theory based upon harmony, not obligation. The affectio commodi is not a “selfish” affection. Rather, it expresses the concern for self that is necessary for survival. Nor is the affectio iustitiae a “selfless” affection. I can, for example desire to be a person of integrity. Here, my own moral goodness (my self perfection) is willed in accordance with the affection for the just (an objective moral good). This sort of choice brings both affections into ordered harmony and reveals how moral integrity is, for Scotus, the source of happiness.5 It also shows clearly that natural perfection lies in a harmonious relationship with moral goodness. The affection for happiness is not selfish; it is self-interested, however. But, if we remember the earlier discussion of human dignity, we must have a healthy concern for our own dignity. To ignore our value diminishes God’s creative act. Concerns for self must be governed and moderated by awareness of intrinsic worth and self-knowledge. While I love myself, I should not love myself as if I were God or in place of God. There are times when 5 I develop this more carefully in “Duns Scotus, Morality and Happiness: A Reply to Thomas Williams,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 74, 2 (2000): 183-87.

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I should rightly and justly demand respect. This is not selfish. We know how difficult it is for victims of abuse or persons in codependent relationships to acknowledge and defend their own rights and dignity. Persons troubled by a false sense of guilt are loath to defend themselves from abuse. Scotus’s discussion of choice brings both affections into mutual relationship within the human heart. Internal harmony or justice is itself a goal of moral living. But so are just actions, actions that promote right relationships in the world. My nature as a person defines my behavior insofar as every choice I make has a personal, rational and (to some degree) free dimension. The modern or contemporary moral dichotomy between what I desire and what I must do disappears in Scotus. There is no sharp division nor is there radical conflict between who I am and who I ought to be. This is due to his positive anthropology. Human nature is not suspect. Nor, however, is it perfect and complete from the outset. The affections are not properly balanced and we must learn to bring them into greater harmony with one another. In this way, moral education and living is perfective of natural human goodness. We need others around us to support our moral journey. The moral context is the relational place where we learn right and ordered loving. As we know, this education takes a lifetime to perfect. According to this perspective, the measure of success in any decision is never merely the outcome. Rather it is the harmony of the action with the intention of the agent. Just as divine desire expresses itself in salvation history and in the act of divine presence, so too human moral desire should express itself in acts of justice, acts that are compared to beauty in Scotus’s texts. When he describes the moral agent, he introduces the model of the artist or artisan for moral decision-making. Moral choices seek to promote beauty in the world on the basis of what is currently present to the creative eye of the moral agent.6 This introduces discernment as a model for deliberation and judgment, and presents a spiritually informed perspective on rationality. Together, 6 I develop this in much greater detail in The Harmony of Goodness: Mutuality and Moral Living According to John Duns Scotus (Quincy: Franciscan Press, 1996).

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human reasoning and love reveal that good intellectual activity is spiritual activity, or in other words, the mind does indeed have a road to God. Just as the value of creation and the person is dependent upon a relationship to God the Creator (Charter principle 1), so too moral intentionality has a deep foundation in God’s nature as love (Charter principle 2). Our moral journey is a transformative one: we grow through love into persons who incarnate love in our attitudes and our actions. The foundational moral principle for Scotus is “God is to be loved.” God is loved both as the highest good, and as the most gracious being who rewards us far beyond anything we might do to deserve it. If God has initiated and established such a relationship with us, then the only human response possible is gratitude. By this act of gratitude, the person strengthens the relationship initiated by God but now reaffirmed by human love in return. The circle is complete: from God to us, from us to God, then back to us and back to God. The order of all reality in relationship to God is dynamic movement. There is, consequently, only one first principle for all action, whether human or divine. That principle is both a first and a final principle, Alpha and Omega. It functions as both the beginning of relationship and its culmination in communion of God with all persons, among all persons and then back to God. As it applies to God, this principle defines the life of the Trinity as interpersonal communion. All that God does is inspired by the divine love that is the free and intentional outpouring of the life of the Trinity. As it applies to all reality, this principle expresses the communion of all with and in God. Principles 2 and 3 of the Charter bring together the Biblical insights of justice and right relationships in two ways. Principle 2 expresses the intentionality of compassion and love that inspires Biblical justice as mutuality. It also offers an opening to generosity as the fullest expression of rational justice. In the Incarnation, we see divine generosity establishing relationships based upon love. In Scotist thought such generosity is not mere justice, but in fact the expression of divine mercy that is “God’s justice to the divine nature.” This is divine integrity. For Scotus, the only true justice is love.

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In a beautiful argument in Ordinatio IV, d. 46, Scotus considers how it is that God’s justice is mercy.7 In answer to the question of the coincidence of justice and mercy, especially in forgiveness of sinners, Scotus begins with a presentation of two notions of justice. The first is from Anselm, the second from Aristotle. The first (Anselmian) understanding of justice involves rectitude of the will served for its own sake (or personal integrity). The second (Aristotelian) understanding of the term deals with this rectitude in relationship to another (or giving what is due). In other words, there is a sense of justice that refers to the self, to what character and integrity require. Additionally, there is a sense of justice that involves due proportion to something or someone other than oneself, giving someone what he deserves. An act may be just in either or both senses. I can act justly toward myself as well as toward another.8 So, in the case of divine justice, we can consider the following situation: God could act by virtue of either perspective. God can either respond according to the object (what it deserves) or according to the divine nature (what God owes the divine nature, so to speak). Clearly, God’s integrity far exceeds any demands the external object might make on divine action. God’s deepest justice then, is justice to divine integrity.9 God must always be God, regardless of the circumstance. This is the metaphysical requirement of divine identity. When, however, we remember that the creature is what it is because of the prior act of divine choice, God’s action according to the divine nature is in harmony with the earlier divine creative action that brought this creature into being. So, even when God does act out of Anselm’s sense of justice, the creature is still getting what it deserves because the deepest value of that being has already been given by God. To say that such a being receives what it deserves is not to say it merits on its own. Indeed, what it deserves belongs to the order An English version of this is reproduced in Will and Morality, 238-55. This supports what we said earlier in terms of the affectio iustitiae and how it applies to personal dignity and integrity. 9 “I say that God is no debtor in any unqualified sense save with respect to his own goodness, namely, that he love it. But where creatures are concerned he is debtor rather to his generosity ...” Ordinatio IV, d.46 in Will and Morality, 253. 7 8

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of created goodness chosen by God in love.10 What had appeared as two different perspectives on justice now collapses into one, in light of the divine nature and the original act of divine desire to create this world. There is still more good news: since God’s nature is love and generosity, this means quite simply that God’s justice is mercy, forgiveness, and generosity. For this reason, we cannot know what reward awaits us, for indeed, “eye has not seen, nor has ear heard, what God has stored up for those who love him” (1 Cor 2:9). 3. Principle 3: Building a just society The social order The Charter’s Principle 3 points to the actions that result from the attitude developed and expressed by Principle 2. These involve social and economic justice, the political manifestation of divine desire. Right relationships in society depend upon a commitment to the common good, over and above personal rights and privileges. Here again, Scotus can help us understand these intricate relationships. When he discusses the principle of private property, he claims that it is not a natural right. It is, rather, an accommodation to human desire in its present state (of internal instability). Because the affection for possession (seen earlier) is no longer in a perfectly harmonious relationship with the affection for justice, peace in any society could be threatened if there were no protection for private property, or something like it. Scotus argues that, in the Garden of Eden prior to the Fall, all property was held in common.11 This was reasonable, since it contributed to a decent way of life and provided all that was needed for survival. No one would have taken what another needed, nor monopolized the goods of the garden. After the fall, however, things changed. The original harmonious relationship 10 “In an unqualified sense where a creature is concerned, God is just only in relationship to his first justice, namely, because such a creature has been actually willed by the divine will.” Will and Morality, 255. 11 “In the state of innocence neither divine or natural law provided for distinct ownership of property; on the contrary everything was common.” Ordinatio IV, d. 15, q. 2 in Political and Economic Philosophy, 29.

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of the two internal affections was upset. Concerns for self began to assert themselves as they had not before. Once outside the state of innocence, the human desire to possess became more difficult to control. Peaceful coexistence was threatened; private ownership offered the solution.12 For this reason, private property may be a reasonable right, even though it is not a natural right. If it were defended as a reasonable right, this would be on the basis of political harmony and peace, since political stability may depend upon a respect for property. A society in which private property is defended may be a more peaceful society than one in which all is held in common. The religious community living according to the more communal sharing of goods (the vow of poverty) would then imitate the state of innocence, or the human community as intended by God. As we look at the second and third principles of the Charter, we recognize that our tradition challenges them to go even deeper. There are two specific challenges here. The first flows from reflection upon the Incarnation and divine intentionality. This challenge calls for a shift from a “stewardship” model to one of “companionship.” In other words, divine desire as it relates to creation and the Incarnation opens the way to expanding the moral sphere to a more inclusive companionship with nature, and not simply with other persons. Principle 2 already called us to a compassionate attitude toward all that exists. Principle 1 had raised all life to a level of intrinsic goodness. This shift to a companionship model challenges common, modern philosophical categories of person vs. non-person. Traditionally, persons have value (they must be respected) and non-persons do not (they can be used in an instrumental way). Martin Buber’s “I-Thou” vs. “IIt” dichotomy reflected this distinction. A shift to a companionship model means transcending the Thou vs. It categories, and moving to an attitude of reverence for all life, as if everything 12 “First of all, communality of all property would have militated against the peaceful life. For the evil and covetous person would take more than needed and, to do so, would also use violence against others who wished to use these common goods for their own needs…. Secondly, the original law would also have failed to ensure the necessary sustenance of mankind, for those stronger and more belligerent would have deprived the others of necessities.” Political and Economic Philosophy, 31.

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that lives is a “Thou.” The dignity of persons normally seen as a narrow category is now expanded to include all that lives.13 A second challenge relates to how we understand rationality as instrumental or aesthetic. In other words, the challenge is not simply changing behavior but involves renewing our understanding of rationality, and especially the rationality of love. Implicit here is a call to a more spiritual and artistic model of decision making along the lines of discernment, informed by spiritual intuitions and a rich spiritual tradition. This challenges us and our world to think differently, to look anew at situations to ask a different set of questions. Scotus views the divine design as relational love. In the human response of love to the created order, understood as gift of a loving Creator, we set in motion the return of all to God. The transformation of a mechanistic, impersonal vision of nature into a personal vision, recognizing the small, the importance of presence, of the small step, moving toward dynamic and organic ways of considering situations, using discernment and artistic judgment, rejecting the “ways of the world” to see things through the eyes of God, all these are the challenge for Christians today, indeed for all people of good will. These are the particular legacy of a thinker like Scotus, along with an indefatigable confidence in the love of a personal God who delights in the human efforts to bring goodness into a world torn by strife and division. 4. Principle 4: Secure the beauty and bounty for the future Assumption #3: The aesthetic vision of the present and the future The fourth principle of the Charter calls us to move from a scarcity to an abundance model. To see the earth as bountiful and beautiful, both for the present and the future is to enter the For a more careful development of this theme, see Michael J. Himes and Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M., “The Sacrament of Creation: Toward an Environmental Theology” in Franciscan Theology of the Environment: An Introductory Reader, D. Nothwehr, ed. (Cincinnati, OH: St. Anthony Messenger Press, 2002), 345-60. 13

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realm that Scotus describes as divine generosity and liberality. The affirmation of abundance and beauty is not license to hoard or squander, but a call to gratitude and responsibility. The Charter asks that we transmit to future generations the values, traditions and institutions that support the flourishing of all earth’s communities. The Franciscan vision as articulated by Scotus offers a coherent and rich formulation of these values, all centered on the Incarnation and divine abundance. At the highest level of Scotus’s discussion of divine and human action we find the order of merit. This dimension of reality is framed by the relationship of communion between God and the individual human person, which Scotus calls acceptatio (acceptance). I understand this to be synonymous with divine delight. Acceptatio is the foundation for the order of merit. Merit is constituted by charity (love) and is doubly defined. From the human side merit refers to the act insofar as it is informed by the intention of love for God. Because of this loving intention, the act is itself finalized toward the highest and most perfect good. From the divine side, the meritorious act is also framed in love. Here divine loving acceptance rewards the human act with a divine response. The meritorious act lies between two free and loving wills. It is (as it were) suspended between the loving human freedom that performs it and the loving divine freedom that rewards it. As a focus for two loving regards, the meritorious act is constituted by the reciprocal relationship of love. Indeed, charity is foundation, intention, result and reward. Merit is a reciprocal relationship of loving friendship between the person and God. Thus, a reflection on the order of merit reveals the centrality of love and generosity in Scotus’s vision of the relationship between the human and divine. When Scotus discusses the order of merit, he situates it clearly in the theological domain, because it depends upon the nature of God, precisely as revealed in Scripture. When he speaks of acceptatio, Scotus assumes that the God referred to is one that we know well both from our reflection upon scripture and upon our own personal experiences. This is a God who can be trusted. Acceptatio appears as the culmination of divine intentionality

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from the first moment. There is no distinction between the graciousness of the creator, the redeemer and sanctifier. Nothing, not even human weakness, has interfered with the realization of divine desire. Indeed, history unfolds as single movement of love that informs human experience. Scotus describes human moral actions according to an aesthetic perspective. When love for God informs human moral actions, they become beautiful and worthy of divine acceptance. Human moral reasoning resembles the work of the creative artist, who sees the potential for goodness and beauty in a situation and works to bring it out. The moral agent is the creative artist or musician, who gives the best performance possible, in light of the conditions in a situation that may not be ideal. The divine ear listens to the harmony of goodness in the human heart and the human action. God’s response is sheer delight. This is acceptatio. Acceptatio is nothing less than the bringing to completion of the good work begun by God at the moment when order came forth out of chaos. As ordered and ordering love, it is part of the overall divine intention to reveal and share graciousness and mercy. Like divine action recorded in Scripture, the act of acceptance expresses the divine joy and, in particular, the delight with which God responds to every human action. Acceptatio is the divine applause for human efforts at loving; the divine joy at the sight of human generosity. In acceptatio, God’s freedom meets human freedom; God’s love encounters human love. In acceptatio, God freely and lovingly embraces a human action performed out of love. This action, however great or small, is accepted and rewarded. Indeed, where the order of merit is concerned, Scotus affirms only one certainty: God’s freedom and love are so immense, that we can count on a reward far beyond anything our actions deserve. Divine goodness does not stop there, for our sins will be punished far less than they deserve.14 14 “And so, it is well said that God always rewards beyond our worth, and universally beyond any particular value which an act might merit. This merit is beyond nature and its intrinsic goodness; it is from a gratuitous divine acceptance. What’s more, even beyond that justice which would commonly reward an act, for God rewards by means of pure liberality.” Ordinatio I, d. 17, n. 149 (5:210). Translation mine.

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The principles of the Earth Charter, when informed by deeper Christian reflection and an optimistic perspective, actually reveal themselves as a single dynamic insight: that at the end of the day, we will be judged on love, since all that exists is founded upon a single act of divine love. That act continues throughout time, it was not a moment in history long ago. Creation is still at work, dynamically revealing and unfolding divine desire. The Incarnation is not simply a historical event; it is still taking place in our lives and in our actions. This dynamism is not mechanical, but organic. It is moving into the future, a future of beauty, bounty and abundance.

III. The challenge of this vision to contemporary assumptions

In light of the principles of the Earth Charter and the insights of John Duns Scotus, we can better reflect on the contemporary set of assumptions that undergird the global market. In this way we can see clearly the challenge our vision brings to contemporary assumptions and attitudes about dignity, justice and beauty. Assumption #1: Life and dignity depends on market value The first assumption of the contemporary capitalist model has to do with the market. Whether it is the law of supply and demand or the invisible hand of market forces, there is a type of blind faith in the market that resembles a religious conviction. Such a blind faith results in the devaluation of the person, of life and of dignity, all in favor of productivity. Together, these combine to produce the WalMart strategy: get more for less! The basic quantitative rather than qualitative approach is made more insidious by consequentialist or utilitarian reasoning, where the end justifies the means. Market forces are measured and weighed, value is reduced to productivity and outcomes. Rational reflection focuses on maximizing quantifiable outcome, rather than promoting human lives and human dignity. The best sort

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of reasoning is instrumentalist, getting me where I want to go as quickly as possible. The best course of action is that which has the least amount of cost and the most amount of benefit/profit. All life, but most especially human life and value are never part of the discussion, precisely because these cannot be quantified. Assumption #2: Relationships and Justice are based on power The second assumption has to do with relationships. As we know, the roots of the current international relationships go back to the colonial era. Asymmetrical or uneven relationships between the parties involved in the era of globalization perpetuates the power of rich over poor, of north over south. Colonial and neo-colonial relationships will not change until our ways of thinking change. Human rights and the dignity of the individual are left behind, as corporations seek to maximize profits. So we see outsourcing of companies to countries where there are few (or perhaps no) environmental protection laws, or no minimum wage. While these practices do create jobs for those who have none, they also benefit from societies in which child labor is the order of the day, or sweatshops abound. The flow of resources from the many to the few suggests that the goal of globalization is not globalization, but rather privatization of goods, capital, and access to resources. Whole populations are excluded from the benefits advertised by the advocates of “globalization.” Assumption #3: A mechanistic, impersonal universe; no human action can affect it Finally, the third assumption reinforces the other two. We perceive the situation as beyond our control: the wheels are moving and we are unable to stop them. Our self-perception is one of helplessness. Enormous impersonal forces of the market are driving things. Unrestricted competition is at odds with restricted mobility of labor (immigration policies do not keep pace with the investment strategies). Large multinational conglomerates are driving prices up and down to make quick profits, consumers

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are gouged as are producers. This is just the way it works and basically, you have to learn how to play the game or get out. It is the only game in town. Together the contemporary impersonal, quantifiable and instrumental vision of reality dominates a great deal of public consciousness. Yet there are those responsible corporations and persons who are trying to act out of a sense of responsibility. There are those who attempt to promote the dignity of persons and creation with a renewed sense of social purpose. The Christian Earth Charter can be of enormous support for them and for others who would like to help transform our world for future generations.

IV. Conclusions: A vision for a new millenium The insights represented by Franciscan thinker John Duns Scotus flow from his commitment to a spiritual and personalist Christian vision, where salvation history is seen as the larger frame of intentional divine activity. This connects with the centrality of the human person as “the summit of creation” – not in a domineering or majestic tone, but insofar as God’s purpose was to create beings capable of understanding and love. Our rational capacity to imitate God means that we are imago Dei, images of God and temples of the spirit. Our spiritual vocation grounds our human dignity at a level that is beneath utility, a more foundational level of intrinsic goodness. For this reason, the use of persons, the quantification of human labor, the manipulation of markets to take advantage of certain persons for the luxury of others: all these behaviors are abhorrent to the basic personalist intuitions of Christianity. According to this spiritual vision, each person is called to develop internal attitudes of balance and harmony, of loving regard to the world around her. The fulfillment of such a moral journey is the culmination of ordered loving, where generosity is rendered rational; indeed, it is rationality itself. In the generous act, the person pours forth, not unreflectively nor because of any external constraint or condition that requires action of a par-

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ticular sort, but because this is what it means to be that sort of person. Here generosity meets integrity, as the deepest reality of the divinity is generous and intentional love, mercy and forgiveness. This vision of God, Triune communion and generous Lover, is truly Good News for today. As a philosopher, I am convinced that to change the way people see the world is to change the world. The current dominant materialist worldview, inspired by capitalist assumptions about the market and the way it works, about the importance of power and domination, and about the impersonal forces at work, this current model can be challenged at the deepest levels by the Earth Charter emboldened by an articulate Christian vision. In its affirmation of the value of the person and nature, of the importance of mutuality and right relationships, about the centrality of beauty and abundance, and about the power of ordered loving (even in the small events of our life), Scotist thought offers a way to challenge the profound insights of the Charter toward an even richer integration and deeper foundation. Together, Scotist thought and the Earth Charter offer an alternative model for our time. It is a model that uses the best of the tradition to promote the many benefits of greater global interaction and to avoid the abuses that abound in the current model. It is a spiritual vision of the way we would like the world to be. It is a vision that has resources for our minds and our hearts as we strive to help bring forth the reign of God: where peace, justice and ordered loving will be found.

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COLETTE OF CORBIE (1381-1447) LEARNING AND HOLINESS by Elisabeth Lopez and translated by Joanna Waller. In 1994, Elisabeth Lopez published, in French, a serious study of Colette and her reform movement. With a translation by Joanna Waller, this important work is appearing for the first time in English. 640 pages, Hardcover, Size: 6 x 9, ISBN: 1-57659-217-0, $50.00. FRANCIS OF ASSISI: HERITAGE AND HEIRS EIGHT CENTURIES LATER by Thaddée Matura, O.F.M. Translated by Paul Lachance, O.F.M. A fresh examination of how the Franciscan tradition has adapted and contemporized over 800 years. 112 pages, Tradepaper, Size: 6 x 9, ISBN: 1-57659-214-6, $25.00.

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By Special arrangement The early Franciscan MoveMenT (1205-1239): hisTory, sources and herMeneuTics by Michael F. Cusato, O.F.M. (2009). This volume gathers together and updates previously published essays on topics related to the contested story of early Franciscan history (1205-1239), treating subjects such as the Franciscan approach to power and authority, the attitude of Francis towards Islam and the Crusades, the Privilege of Poverty, the connection between the two versions of the Epistola ad fideles, the relationship between the chartula and stigmata of Francis, the centrality of the Sacrum commercium, and the fall from grace of Elias of Cortona. By special arrangement with the Italian publisher, Centro Italiano di studi sull’Alto Medioevo (Spoleto). $60.00 John Duns scotus, PhilosoPher: ProceeDings of “the QuaDruPle congress” on John Duns scotus (2010) Volume 1, edited by Mary Beth Ingham and Oleg Bychkov. From October 2007 through March 2009, four international conferences were held in honor of the 800th anniversary of the death of John Duns Scotus (d. 1308). This volume represents the papers from the first conference – held at The Franciscan Institute – which explored themes and issues from the Opera Philosophica of Scotus. Appearing in the prestigious series Archa Verbi. Subsidia, and co-published by Aschendorff (Münster) and Franciscan Institute Publications, these four volumes will represent the finest in contemporary scholarship on the Subtle Doctor today. $60.00

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A Franciscan Spiritual Review $30.00 Domestic $35.00 International Published quarterly The Cord, a quarterly review that deals with topics having to do with the Franciscan spiritual tradition, celebrated sixty years of continuous publication in 2010. Its primary purpose is to promote a deeper knowledge and more ardent love of the Franciscan way of life. It solicits articles which help readers appreciate better the Franciscan charism, its relevance in the contemporary Church, as well as some of the ways Franciscans are making a difference in today’s world. It restricts its material to Franciscan spirituality and to such matters as are of particular concern and interest to the English-speaking Franciscan family throughout the world. The Cord periodically reviews books of interest to Franciscans. It also provides a feature called “On the Franciscan Circuit” to share information about Franciscan programs taking place throughout the country and English-speaking world. It publishes short poems and art work that deal with Franciscan themes. The Cord provides advertising services for programs and materials that are of special interest to Franciscans. Cost: full page, $60.00; half page, $30.00. All ads should be sent to the Editor. Subscription period: January/December of the current year. Subscriptions entered late in the year are applied to the following year. Back issues for the current year are provided for subscriptions entered early in the subscription period. To order, send your request in writing, by phone, fax or email to: Franciscan Institute Publications The Franciscan Institute St. Bonaventure University P.O. Box 17 St. Bonaventure, NY 14778 USA Phone: 716-375-2062 Fax: 716-375-2113 Email: [email protected]