Word and Spirit: Renewing Christology and Pneumatology in a Globalizing World 3110304740, 9783110304749, 9783110307313

Table of contents :
Introduction: Renewing Christology and Pneumatology amid the Challenges of the Globalizing World
1 God’s Two Hands: Beyond Fundamentalism and Spiritualism
2 The Incarnation of the Word and the “Concarnation” of the Spirit as Modes of Divine Activity – “Inspired” by Thomas Erskine (1788–1870)
3 The Signs of the Times – a Locus for the Word to meet the Spirit: the Heterotopian Character of Truth in History
4 Theological Truth, Difference and Plurality: Perspectives from a Contextual European Theology of Interruption
5 Holiness and Spirituality: How to Communicate with God in the Age of Globalization
6 The Word Made Flesh: Ryu Young-Mo’s Christo-dao: A Korean Perspective
7 Shaping Humanity with Word and Spirit: Perspectives East, West and Neither-East-Nor-West
8 The Trinity of Aquinas and the Triad of Zhu Xi: Some Comparative Reflections
Notes on Contributors
Index of Names
Index of Subjects

Citation preview

Word and Spirit

Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann

Herausgegeben von Bruce McCormack, Friederike Nüssel und Christoph Schwöbel

Band 158

Word and Spirit

Renewing Christology and Pneumatology in a Globalizing World

Edited by Anselm K. Min and Christoph Schwöbel

DE GRUYTER

ISBN 978-3-11-030474-9 e-ISBN 978-3-11-030731-3 ISSN 0563-4288 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress. Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.dnb.de abrufbar. © 2014 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Druck: Hubert & Co. GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ♾ Gedruckt auf säurefreiem Papier Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com

Table of Contents Anselm Kyongsuk Min Introduction: Renewing Christology and Pneumatology amid the Challenges of 1 the Globalizing World Christoph Schwöbel 1 God’s Two Hands: Beyond Fundamentalism and Spiritualism

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Markus Mühling 2 The Incarnation of the Word and the “Concarnation” of the Spirit as Modes 29 of Divine Activity – “Inspired” by Thomas Erskine (1788 – 1870) Hans-Joachim Sander 3 The Signs of the Times – a Locus for the Word to meet the Spirit: the 47 Heterotopian Character of Truth in History Lieven Boeve 4 Theological Truth, Difference and Plurality: Perspectives from a Contextual 63 European Theology of Interruption Ki-Sang Lee 5 Holiness and Spirituality: How to Communicate with God in the Age of 85 Globalization Kim Heup Young 6 The Word Made Flesh: 113 Perspective

Ryu

Young-Mo’s

Christo-dao:

A

Korean

Pan-chiu Lai 7 Shaping Humanity with Word and Spirit: Perspectives East, West and 131 Neither-East-Nor-West Anselm Kyongsuk Min 8 The Trinity of Aquinas and the Triad of Zhu Xi: Some Comparative 151 Reflections Notes on Contributors

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Index of Names Index of Subjects

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Anselm Kyongsuk Min

Introduction: Renewing Christology and Pneumatology amid the Challenges of the Globalizing World From Gnosticism and Arianism in the early centuries to the rationalism of the eighteenth century, the atheism and nihilism of the nineteenth, and the relativism and secularism of the twentieth, Christian theology has always thrived on challenges. In the early decades of the twenty-first century Christian theology also faces a number of challenges both from within and from without: fundamentalism and spiritualism from within, historical despair, deepening skepticism, relativizing pluralism, and increasingly the intensifying challenge of “other” religions from without. What are the resources with which Christian theology can respond to these challenges? The present volume is a collection of eight papers responding to those challenges. All the papers except one were presented at the first conference of the East-West Theological Forum held in Seoul, South Korea, on 2– 4 April 2009. The Forum was organized by theologians representing both East and West as a venue for theological dialogue to be conducted in biennial conferences. It was financially supported by the generosity of Somang or Hope Church in Kwachun City, Kyonggido, South Korea and the vision of its pastor, The Reverend Hyun-Seung Jang, who believes in the collaboration of churches and academic theologians, of churches open to the work of ongoing theology and of theologians sensitive to the pastoral needs of the churches. The topic of the first conference in April 2009 was “Word and Spirit: Truth and Perspectives.” To speak of the Word and Spirit in Christian theology is, in a real sense, to speak of everything worth talking about. As the two hands of God with which the Father deals with the world, creating, redeeming, and otherwise providing for it, the Word and Spirit are operative in the depth and height, the center and periphery of the world, and all the profound problems and hopes of the created world are connected to the operations of the Word and Spirit. By the same token, the topic of Word and Spirit inescapably evokes many different problems, approaches, and perspectives, and especially so in the case of an EastWest dialogue in the context of a globalizing world as attempted at this conference. We have here papers by four Asian theologians and four European theologians. Two German Protestant theologians respond to the challenges of fundamentalism and spiritualism by retrieving the Reformation tradition of Luther,

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Calvin, and Thomas Erskine. Two Catholic theologians, one Belgian and the other Austrian, deal with the problems of human suffering, human powerlessness, skepticism regarding God, and the diversity of religions on the basis of various postmodern insights. On the other hand, two Korean theologians, one Catholic and another Protestant, explore the original insights of perhaps the most important Korean theologian of the twentieth century, Ryu Young-Mo, who has synthesized the three shaping traditions of Korea, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism, in his very original Korean Christian theology. These insights are proposed as responses to the dualism and technological anthropocentrism of Western capitalism now engulfing the world. Another paper by a Chinese Protestant theologian explores the connection between the Christian doctrine of deification and the Neo-Confucian doctrine of self-cultivation. The last paper by a Korean Catholic theologian explores the trinitarianism of Thomas Aquinas and the triadism of Zhu Xi, draws substantial parallels between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit on the one hand and Taiji, Li, and Qi on the other, and proposes areas in which each can learn from the other in order to further develop itself. In the first essay, “God’s Two Hands: Beyond Fundamentalism and Spiritualism,” Christoph Schwöbel, the Tubingen theologian, selects fundamentalism and spiritualism as the contemporary context for his theological reflection on the Word and the Spirit, applying Tillich’s method of correlation of message and context. The contemporary globalizing world is marked by sheer religious pluralism (in the descriptive, not normative, sense), but fundamentalism and spiritualism (Pentecostal, charismatic movements) require special theological attention. In its strict sense fundamentalism may apply only to a small group in the Abrahamic religions, but as a tendency to absolutize the literal application of Scripture it is present in all denominations. Pentecostal, charismatic movements of spirituality tend to concentrate on empowerment and the transformation and enhancement of life, and define themselves in terms of an experiential style of worship and allegiance to spiritual leaders while doctrinally remaining syncretistic and amorphous. Schwöbel reminds us that both fundamentalism and spirit-oriented spirituality are modern reactions, the first against modern Western criticisms of traditional religious beliefs evident in the higher criticism of the Bible and the scientistic interpretations of evolution but also assuming their individualism and rationalism, and the second in line with the modern Western exaltations of individualism, subjectivism, and emotional intensity. The problem with fundamentalism, for Schwöbel, is that in its emphasis on the submission to the letter of Scripture, it displaces the foundation of faith from Christ to the external word of Scripture. Christians do not believe in the letter of Scripture but in Christ and the triune God he reveals, although the letter does play an instrumental role in leading to faith in Christ. Fundamentalism is a phe-

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nomenon of displaced foundations, foundations of faith and its proper content, which consist in the self-presentation of God through Christ in the Spirit accepted in unconditional personal trust, not in the objective inerrancy of the Bible as such. The problem with spiritualism is that in its emphasis on the intensity of the subjective experience of power and transformation, it is also individualistic and promiscuous with regard to the sources of that intensity and finds itself in tension with the foundation and content of faith, ultimately disconnecting the fruits experienced from their true source, the Holy Spirit. Spiritual experientialism is a phenomenon of disconnected effects. The solution for both fundamentalism and spiritualism, for Schwöbel, is the same, a return to the Trinitarian theology of the Reformers. For Luther the external meaning of Scripture is clear enough for all and needs no magisterium to interpret. To achieve certainty about the truth of that external meaning, however, requires the interior testimony of the Holy Spirit because it involves overcoming the blindness of the human heart and making the truth of the Gospel certain. For Calvin the testimony of the Holy Spirit alone provides a higher source of conviction and certainty about the truth of Scripture than human conjectures and reasons: God alone can bear witness to his own words. Just as the letter of Scripture acquires certainty and truth only through the Spirit, so it is also through the Spirit and his testimony about the Gospel of Christ that the effects of the Spirit can be authenticated. Effects are truly from the Holy Spirit only insofar as they are in accord with the Gospel. Fundamentalism needs to return to the true foundation of the certainty of faith, the interior testimony of the Holy Spirit about Christ, from its misplaced foundation in the external word of Scripture. Spiritualism must reconnect the fruits experienced to their true source, the Holy Spirit, who, as the Spirit of Christ, can only point to Christ, the Word, revealing the heart of the Father. In “The Incarnation of the Word and the ‘Concarnation’ of the Spirit as Modes of Divine Activity – ‘Inspired’ by Thomas Erskine,” Markus Mühling of the Leuphana Universität Lüneberg summarizes the Protestant understanding of the eternal Word and the incarnate Word and interprets atonement as the double sacrifice of the Son on the cross for the sake of love and of the Holy Spirit raising the crucified and identifying himself with Christ in reanimating humanity with love. He then goes on to discuss the pneumatology of Thomas Erskine, the nineteenth century Scottish theologian, in terms of the fruitful distinction between the Holy Spirit acting “with” believers and the Holy Spirit acting “in” the believers. Through his personal presence the Spirit acts with believers by making them aware of truth and certain of their salvation by enlightening human reason in its natural integrity and exciting human emotions through reason. The content of the Spirit’s activity is bound and limited to the incarnation

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and revelation of the Word, which would forbid enthusiasm and utopianism. The purpose of the Spirit is not primarily to overcome guilt but to transform believers and ultimately all humanity into the body of Christ by delivering them from selfishness and recreating them in the image of the crucified. The activity of the Holy Spirit “in” the believers or his “indwelling” is radically different from his activity “with” the believers: it is to empower them to participate in the state of glory and to perform miracles of healing and raising the dead, the signs of the kingdom. In a thoroughly Christological interpretation of the Holy Spirit Mühling argues that the work of the Spirit is authentic only if it is both related to and distinguished from the work of the Incarnation of the Word. Erskine’s pneumatology is positive in that it relates the work of the Spirit “with” believers to promoting the atoning effects of the cross in the hearts and minds of believers. In order to carry out this function in all humanity, however, the Spirit cannot be incarnated because incarnation means limitation to a particular spatio-temporal location; the Spirit must also be distinguished from the Word. Erskine’s understanding of the work of the Spirit “in” the believer runs the danger of identifying it with incarnation and neglecting the distinction between the Spirit and the Word. The work of the Holy Spirit is traditionally called “inspiration,” but this does not highlight its necessary relation to the incarnation. Better than “inspiration” is “concarnation,” which highlights the distinction of the work of the Holy Spirit from the incarnation as well as its relation to the incarnation. In this regard Mühling follows Richard of St. Victor’s suggestion that in the eternal Trinity the Holy Spirit is “condilectus” or loved together with the Son, who is the “dilectus” or loved of the Father. The Word is incarnate, but the Holy Spirit is “concarnate” in the service of the Incarnate One. Mühling applies the standard of incarnation as location at a particular time and place to a critique of many contemporary tendencies. Fundamentalist literalism is wrong because it incarnates the Holy Spirit in letters. An elitist understanding of the gifts of the Spirit is wrong because it contradicts the universal intention of Christ. Enthusiastic Pentecostalism is wrong because it limits the presence of the Spirit to moments of intimacy and joy and ignores the moments of suffering and abandonment of the cross. The interpretation of the work of the Holy Spirit is only authentic when it is thoroughly Christological or in the “concarnate” service of the Incarnation. The problem of human suffering raises questions about the power of God and the powerlessness of human beings. The denial of God may solve the problem of divine power, but it does not solve the problem of human powerlessness, which still cries out for a source empowering us to overcome the fatalism of powerlessness. The problem of suffering has also been raising doubts about our capacity to provide ultimate answers to ultimate questions. Where do we find a

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source of strength and truth that will empower us to overcome both powerlessness and skepticism so rampant today? Where do the Word and the Spirit fit in this empowering process? In “The Signs of the Times, a Locus for the Word to Meet the Spirit: The Heterotopian Character of Truth in History,” Hans-Joachim Sander of the University of Salzburg seeks to provide an answer that combines the modern turn to history as the signs of the times in which God reveals herself and the postmodern turn to the “other” place or heterotopos as the privileged locus for the signs of the presence of God, precisely the place where the Word meets the Spirit. For Sander our experience of suffering and our sense of powerlessness are the classical loci for the question of God in which the power, existence, and relation of God to human suffering must be tested and prove their relevance. Here two strategies are both relevant and irrelevant. Sander takes the Word as the strategy to overcome the burden of powerlessness by submitting to the consoling authority of divine revelation through a sacred text, and the Spirit as the strategy to overcome the same burden by submitting to an ideal power and a transcendent horizon that empowers us no matter how powerless we feel. The problem here, however, is that the two are conceived as mutually exclusive: either the Word or the Spirit, which weakens both strategies. Human suffering in the age of globalization puts an unprecedented burden on the human intellect in coping with the doubts about God or an ultimate religious reality. Submitting to ancient texts of the Word does not help with coping with modern doubts, nor does the appeal to a wider, transcendent horizon provided by the Spirit because it has no immediate relevance to the problems of the present. The problem of suffering is a problem for the present, the here and now, as is the problem of God that responds to that suffering, which means that there are no final answers to these problems for all times and places. Doubts and lack of certainty apply to both theism and atheism. This also sets the twofold task for theology, to both present reasonable arguments for its traditional beliefs and address the modern doubts and ambiguities raised in the public sphere of the present. Relation to time and the historical problems of the present has become constitutive of theology in modern times. The turn to the subject is precisely a turn to the historical problems of the subject. Each in its own way, all modern theologies have been of this sort, from the liberal theology of the nineteenth century to the comparative theology of the most recent decade. It is objective history, however, not just subjective interiority or existence, that poses the problems of power and powerlessness and therefore also the question of God anew for each time. It is here that one must look for the signs of the presence of God, but not in the “utopias” that human beings construct with their autonomy and exclusion of others, but in the “other” place or “heterotopias” (Foucault) where all positive and nor-

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mal assurances about God and life are put into question, where we are compelled to ask again the fundamental questions of God and life in the most radical way in the midst of radical uncertainty, and where we truly face the otherness of God in the very contradictions of human utopias. Such heterotopias include the graveyard, the brothel, theatres, colonies, exile, the desert, and above all the cross where the Roman centurion found the truth about Jesus. We are no longer assured of the power to control history or the normal certainties about God and life. It is here that the Spirit meets the Word, empowering us to find the revealing Word of God in a creative way without the comforting benefit of words to describe the Word. In a world where postmodernism, religious plurality, and globalization seem to have made all absolute truth claims suspect, is it still possible for Christians to make truth claims, and if so, how? In his essay, “Theological Truth, Difference and Plurality: Perspectives from a Contextual European Theology of Interruption,” Lieven Boeve, professor of fundamental theology of the Catholic University of Louvain, expands his “theology of interruption” and argues that the Christian narrative is both interrupted and interrupting. It is culturally interrupted through the process of detraditionalization and pluralization, which also leads Christianity to rediscover its own interruptive nature: it is being continually interrupted by the God it bears witness to so as to interrupt as part of its own mission. Contextually, the encounter with religious difference heightens awareness of the irreducible particularity of one’s own tradition with its own way of life and hermeneutic horizon, interrupts the tendency to complacent universalization and absolutization of Christian truth claims, and forces one to wonder about the relationship of such claims to those of others. The classical paradigm of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism is guilty of absolutism. It assumes a single framework as a meta-discourse, which is bound to be as particular as any other. Exclusivism and inclusivism both universalize Christianity as the one and only truth for all, while pluralism particularizes it as just one version of a greater, universal truth. It is simply not appropriate to conceive of religious truth in universal terms of which concrete religions are considered particular contingent instances. Boeve recognizes that some sort of inclusivism is unavoidable. When Christians dialogue with other religionists, it is natural that they do so with the belief in Jesus as the definitive revelation of the ultimate truth of reality, which is precisely what makes them Christians. It is from this Christian perspective that they will interpret whatever goodness and truth they find in other religions. This inclusivism, however, does not have to be totalizing and universalizing. This inclusivism is a “different” inclusivism: it is aware of its own particularity, and neither holds the illusion that it possesses a universal perspective nor relativizes its own position but only seeks to determine its position in light of the dialogue with the

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other. It is based on the view that one is a “participant” in a religion without being able to attain a detached “observer’s” perspective on all religions. Is this participant inclusivism, then, capable of respecting the other? Boeve deduces a profound theological justification for respecting other religions from the very nature of the Incarnation, which shows that the particular is not only a vessel of the universal but also constitutive of its truth. The human Jesus is constitutive of what we know of Jesus as Christ; it is in the concrete humanity of Jesus that God is revealed. Furthermore, it is only because God shared full humanity with us that we human beings are also saved. That is to say, the truth about God becomes manifest only in the concrete and historical. Every concrete encounter, every particular and contingent event, can be the locus of God’s manifestation. For Boeve, this is what Chalcedon means for us today. We can neither dispense with the particular, which alone can manifest the divine, nor absolutize it because it does not coincide with God. The very truth of Christianity thus requires the full acceptance of the particularity of its own discourse along with the divine judgment under which it always stands. From the theological perspective, then, the encounter with religious others and their truth claims, especially those who are also poor and marginalized, is the place in which God’s interruption can be revealed. Christian discourse must suffer the radical-hermeneutical tension of a narrative that both concerns God and is interrupted by God. Boeve warns against two tendencies in current theologies of religion. One is to pit the Word and the Spirit against each other, confining the Word to the Christian tradition and seeing the Spirit as working in other religions. This simply relativizes Christianity as one particular instance of a broader economy of salvation. It forgets that the Spirit is always the Spirit of Christ and promotes the Christological hermeneutic of events. The other tendency is to identify the narrative with the Word and the interruptive event with the Spirit, the former standing for stability and sameness, the latter for newness and otherness. For Boeve, interruption is not rupture. The Christian narrative is constitutive of the interruptive event as such by introducing a dynamic tension between the words and the Word, which it is the role of the Spirit to help interpret. The Word and the Spirit together constitute the dynamics of God’s involvement in history and our interpretation of that involvement: the event interrupts and opens up the narrative, which in turn bears witness to the event. In an age increasingly suffering the ills of a globalization carried out by capitalism and information technology that seems to intensify the exploitation of nature and the oppression of the third world poor and in the process demonstrates the limitations and bankruptcy of Western reason, is it conceivable that Korea may provide an “other” reason and a theological perspective countering the materialism and anthropocentrism of the contemporary Western forces of

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globalization? In his “Holiness and Spirituality: How to Communicate with God in the Age of Globalization,” Professor Lee Ki-Sang, the philosopher from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, a long-time student of Heidegger, attempts to provide a Korean model for the rethinking of God on the basis of an exegesis of one of the most profound Korean thinkers of the twentieth century, Ryu Young-Mo, especially his notion of nothingness and emptiness. For Ryu Western metaphysics regards as existent only things that can appear in the light of the sun; it does not realize that the sun is a very small part, a mere speck of dust, of the infinitely vast universe and that it also hides the immensity of the universe and its countless stars by keeping them from being seen. We have to appreciate the enormous darkness of the universe and learn to see things in the dim light of night rather than in the bright light of day. Human reason is very much like the sun: it illumines only a very small area of the world while keeping most of it from being seen. We have to seek God in this darkness and emptiness of the universe. For Ryu, Koreans have experienced God as Haneunim, the lord of heaven, where heaven stands for the limitless, empty, formless space, not a being or thing itself but the ground or field that allows beings with particular shapes and forms to appear and interact with one another. Being or existence is equated with shapes and forms, and God and heaven in this sense are formless non-beings. Koreans experience God in the horizon of nonbeing or nothingness rather than being or existence. They have also experienced this God as Hananim, the great oneness, referring to the one unified whole in which all the possibilities of the universe are found united before the appearance of any existent, the pure form and structure of all things in their pre-existing potentiality in God and thus the mind of God so to speak. Koreans have also experienced God as Haneulnim, the absolute being containing all the relative beings that appear, disappear, and change in the infinite space and time, and as Haneolnim, the great Spirit that fills up the infinite space and time and provides for all the individuals and events with its will, the universal life in which relative, contingent beings participate. In the essay that follows, “The Word Made Flesh: Ryu Young-Mo’s Christodao: A Korean Perspective,” Kim Heup Young, the theologian from Kangnam University near Seoul, an expert on Confucianism, also explores Ryu’s thought, focusing on his interpretation of the Incarnation. Kim has long advocated the substitution of Christo-dao for Christo-logy and Christo-praxis on the ground that Dao is a holistic conception that overcomes the dualism of logos and praxis. Moreover, he has found such a Daoist approach to the interpretation of Christ or Christodao most profoundly exemplified in the thought of Ryu Young-Mo. Such a Daoist interpretation is what would result when the Christian Bible is read by Koreans

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in light of the respective scriptures of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism that have long shaped the spirituality of all Koreans. Ryu Young-Mo was a precursor of what we today call contextual theology, multi-faith hermeneutics, and comparative theology, and his Christo-dao is a most original example of the necessary and relevant Koreanization of the Christology of Western Christianity. In a fascinating discussion brimming with provocative images and metaphors typical of East Asian culture, Kim discloses seven facets of Ryu’s Christo-dao: Jesus as filial son, a Confucian Christology, as rice, a sacramental Christology, as flower, an aesthetic Christology, as seed, an anthropological Christology, as spirit, a pneumatological Christology, as Dao, a cosmic life Christology, and as the being in non-being, an apophatic Christology. Jesus is first of all the paradigmatic filial son and “profound person” who has fully accomplished the loving, obedient relationship with the divine Father and realized his ren or co-humanity, even to the point of sacrificing himself on the cross, and thereby also the deepest yearning of human nature. Excessive ancestor veneration is a violation of true filial piety, which is due God the Father alone. Second, to eat a meal is to nourish our bodies, which are God’s temples in which he dwells, and therefore also to make an offering to God. As Jesus sacrificed himself and became our meal, our rice, on the cross, so every meal is a Eucharistic meal at which we eat Christ. Third, identifying red flowers with the blood of nature and seeing human blood as the flower of nature, Ryu considered Jesus’ shedding of blood on the cross as the blossoming of a cosmic flower. Fourth, developing an agricultural metaphor of the Trinity, Ryu envisioned Jesus as the seed of God, God as the tree, and the Spirit as the life of both the seed and the tree. Jesus is the paradigmatic seed of life in which we all share, which constitutes our true nature as human beings, and which we must develop to be our true selves. Fifth, it is through the Holy Spirit, the cosmic Qi, that we develop this inner seed of our true Christological nature in such a way that the union among Christ, the Spirit, and our true selves approaches identity: the Spirit is the Christ, the Word, and our true selves. Sixth, Jesus is the Dao, the Way to the true life in God, both the brightest and safest way on which we can walk to our true destiny, our union with God or the unity of heaven and humanity in Confucian terms, where the Pauline ideal that “it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me” (Galatians 2:20) becomes a reality. Ryu saw Christ as the Dao in which the Neo-Confucian li and the Buddhist dharma are fulfilled. Finally, Ryu’s Christo-dao culminates in the mysticism of the apophatic. Combining Neo-Confucianism and Daoism Ryu regards Jesus as the identity of the Non-Being in Being and the Being in NonBeing, the human and the divine. We are beings who are but who really are not. God is a being who is not but who really is and remains incomprehensible.

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In his “Shaping Humanity with Word and Spirit,” Lai Pan-Chiu, the theologian from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, discusses the role of the Word and the Spirit from a doubly ecumenical perspective, the relation between the Eastern and Western forms of Christianity and the relation between Christianity and Neo-Confucianism. The overriding concern for Lai is the possibility of dialogue between Christianity and Neo-Confucianism on the issue of human nature: Is it good, sinful, or perfectible? The Confucian doctrine of the goodness and perfectibility of human nature through self-cultivation challenges Lai to reexamine the Christian tradition on the positive possibilities of human nature for attaining sagehood or sainthood, which he initially finds in the Orthodox emphasis on the deification of the human being. The Word and the Spirit, for Irenaeus, are the “two hands” of the Father with which God shapes humanity originally created in the image and likeness of the Word and renewed through the activity of the Holy Spirit. The Word reveals the creation of the human being in the image and likeness of God, while the Spirit renews and perfects that image and likeness so as to empower the human being to become divine. For all his emphasis on the sinfulness of human nature, Augustine does not contradict but complements Irenaeus. Augustine too speaks of human beings becoming children of God by grace through the Word who became what we are by nature. Through the work of the Word and the Spirit the human being can become a true image of the Trinity. Augustine’s psychological doctrine of the Trinity “presupposes” rather than “contradicts” Irenaeus’ more historical doctrine, and both accept some version of the doctrine of deification. Surprisingly, Lai finds Augustine’s “psychological” doctrine not only supplementary to Irenaeus’ more “kerygmatic” approach but also more “communicable” to the Confucians than the latter. In the last essay of this collection, “The Trinity of Aquinas and the Triad of Zhu Xi: Some Comparative Reflections,” Anselm Kyongsuk Min, Professor of Philosophy of Religion and Theology at Claremont Graduate University, California, proposes to compare the two representative figures of Western theology and Neo-Confucianism on the ultimate ontological foundations of the universe conceived by both in terms of three, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit by one and Taiji, Li, and Qi by the other. After presenting each position on its own terms, Min proceeds to compare the two by means of a “dynamic” hermeneutics of each, interpreting each not so much in its static, reified conceptuality as in its dynamic implications and trajectories, and to provide reflections on what each can learn from the other so that each can further develop itself. Without denying significant differences, Min discerns a substantial parallel in the root meanings and trajectories of the central concepts of each position, between Father and Taiji, Son and Li, and Holy Spirit and Qi. “Father” in Aquinas

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and the classical Christian position stands for the ultimate, underived, unoriginated source of all reality, including the divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit and the reality of all created things. Taiji, or the Great Ultimate, seeks to say the same thing, the ultimate, primordial, absolute source of all empirical reality than which there is nothing higher, nothing more profound, nothing more primordial or more ultimate. “Son” stands for the perfect image in which the “Father” knows himself and the perfect exemplar of all created things containing their rationes, forms, or essences. Apart from the differences in their respective derivation, Li or Reason fulfills the same function as “Son.” Li stands for the transcendent source of the intelligibility, ratio, essence, intrinsic teleology, or the li’s of all empirical realities. Both are the ordering principles of the universe. With some significant differences, Min also sees a similar ontological function in both the Holy Spirit and Qi: both stand for the transcendent principles of movement and vitality in all created things. Min goes on to ask what each can learn and appropriate from the other. He suggests that Christian theology can judiciously use Neo-Confucian categories in contextualizing and indigenizing itself into the culture of East Asia. Likewise, modern Christian theology, like much modern Western thought, has been anthropocentric, and Neo-Confucianism can inject an appropriate sense of the vastness of the cosmos and the humble place of the human in that cosmos and help Christian theology both recover the cosmological dimension of its own classical tradition and overcome its modern anthropocentrism so inimical to the ecological urgencies of the globalizing world. Min also suggests that a serious encounter with the classical Christian Trinitarian tradition, at least with the questions it had to struggle with if not with its answers, can help Neo-Confucianism develop clearer conceptuality, greater coherence, and more sophisticated historical consciousness. I was quite impressed when I heard these essays at the conference. I am more impressed now that I had to read them many times so as to introduce them here. They naturally contain many controversial claims and many compelling insights that only provoke further issues and discussions and call for a continuing dialogue between tradition and modernity, between traditions, between East and West, and above all between Christianity and its unknown future in a world that seems to be changing too fast for all. Together, the essays constitute a substantial contribution to the constructive task of contemporary Christian theology in facing the all too daunting challenges of the twenty-first century. Conferences do not just happen. They happen only because some people make them happen. I would like to acknowledge the hard work of the two cochairs, Professor Kim Heup Young and Professor Christoph Schwoebel, who between them did the critical work of selecting and inviting presenters and over-

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seeing the conference as a whole. Meriting special mention here is the managerial labor of Dr. Oh Heung myung, then a doctoral candidate under Professor Schwoebel at Tuebingen, who performed all the chores of the conference with tact, humor, enthusiasm, energy, and efficiency. The conference owes its very existence and success to Dr. Oh’s most careful planning and managerial involvement from the very idea of the conference to the securing of its finances and conference facilities to hotel reservations and airport transportations. Dr. Oh’s great labor of love is hereby greatly appreciated and gratefully acknowledged.

Christoph Schwöbel

1 God’s Two Hands: Beyond Fundamentalism and Spiritualism 1.1 Interpreting the Religious Situation of Our Time Interpreting the religious situation of the time is a genuine task of Christian theology. Paul Tillich has expressed this by emphasising the correlation between message and situation. He writes on the first page of his Systematic Theology: A theological system is supposed to satisfy two basic needs: the statement of the truth of the Christian message and the interpretation of this truth for every new generation. Theology moves back and forth between two poles, the eternal truth of its foundation and the temporal situation in which the eternal truth must be received.¹

If one looks a little more closely, it becomes clear that the two poles do not have equal weight. The application to the contemporary situation is an implication of the universal truth claims of the Christian message: If it is claimed to be true universally, at all times and in all places, then it must also be true in our time and in our place. This is the reason why Christian theology is of necessity a hermeneutical discipline, involving the exercise of interpretation in order to show that the universal truth claim is also one that is specifically applicable to our situation. Interpretation always demands special attention to the situation of the recipient of the message. Analysing the religious situation of our time is therefore an intrinsic task of Christian theology. However, this task cannot be fulfilled satisfactorily by borrowing the interpretation of the times from sociology, philosophy or the political sciences. There can be no doubt that Christian theology has to be in conversation with sociology, philosophy, the political sciences or any other intellectual discipline. However, it does so as an independent conversation partner with its own perspective on reality. The reason for this can again be found in the character of the truth claims of the Christian message. They do not apply as universal truth to all times and all places. They also claim to be relevant for all dimensions of reality, since the truth claims of faith have holistic and comprehensive character.

 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 3.

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In conversation with sociology, philosophy or the political sciences theology must therefore make its contributions from a theological view of reality, hoping that this may also shed light on sociological research, philosophical reflection, or the theories and findings of the political sciences. If we look at the contemporary religious situation in a global context and try to interpret it from a theological perspective, the first thing we have to observe is its pluriformity. In contrast to the expectation of a comprehensive, global and irreversible process of secularisation which had been forecast by sociologists in the first half of the twentieth century, a trend that was quickly ‘baptized’ by various theologians from Dietrich Bonhoeffer to Paul van Buren, we experience today an astounding resurgence of religious interest. This is a multifaceted phenomenon, which comprises the revitalisation of the historical religions, the appearance of many forms of a patchwork religiosity, borrowing elements from various religious traditions, the rise of spirituality, sometimes only marginally related to the historical religions and, of course, the emergence of a new ideological atheism. This situation can be described as a situation of global and public religious and ideological pluralism. I employ pluralism here as a descriptive term, not as a normative theological theory. Descriptively pluralism means that we live in a situation of the coexistence and competition of many religious and ideological orientations. The task we are confronted with in the Christian churches and in our societies consists in finding ways of dealing with this situation in a manner that avoids violence and strives for the common good of our societies in the world situation. This is a global scenario. The effect of globalisation means for the religions that they encounter one another on a scale and with an intensity as never before in human history. Global pluralism is also a public phenomenon. Our time has witnessed the widespread return of the religions in public life. The strategy of the Enlightenment of containing religious conflicts by privatizing them, by relegating possibly contentious religious convictions to the private realm, has come to an end. Today religious and antireligious convictions in their bewildering pluriformity are a fact of public life. Global and public religious and ideological pluralism challenges us to deal with difference, challenges us to find ways of peaceful coexistence and of just cooperation between those who have fundamentally different religious and ideological convictions. Christian theology cannot interpret this situation from a perspective above the different religions and ideologies. It does so from the perspective of a participant agent who is also an observer and interpreter of the situation. We are part of the situation we are interpreting. In interpreting this situation theologically, we bring the resources of Christian theology to the task of interpretation. The aim is to achieve critical clarity in interpretation in order to act constructively in our situation. Karl Marx’ famous statement in the eleventh thesis on Feuer-

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bach: “The philosophers only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it” is manifestly wrong. Change that is not informed by a guiding interpretation results in the arbitrary violence of terror; interpretation that does not lead to change is incomplete, since every true interpretation will lead to change – even if it consists only in the fact that I now understand what I did not understand before – and that is the profoundest change imaginable. There are two phenomena of our contemporary religious situation worldwide which demand specific attention: the growing influence of fundamentalist religion and the explosive rise and expansion of spirit-oriented, charismatic forms of religion or spirituality both within and outside Christianity. These two forms of religion I intend to interpret and to subject to a theological critique.

1.2 The Letter Alone: The Attractions of Fundamentalism It is a common habit in Christian theology to see fundamentalism always as a problem of the others, which in no way applies to one’s own faith and theology. It is a useful reminder to note that fundamentalism was first introduced as a programmatic positive term with the Christian churches. The term “fundamentalism” first appears as a self-description of Christians in the United States in connection with the publication of a series of tracts under the title “The Fundamentals” between 1909 and 1920. “Fundamentalists” was a self-description of a group of theologians and lay people who saw themselves as opposed to the modernist and who formulated their anti-modernist creed in the so-called “five fundamentals” which were put together by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States. These fundamental principles are: 1. the inerrancy of Scripture, 2. the virgin birth, 3. the substitutionary atonement of the death of Christ; 4. the bodily resurrection of Christ and 5. the historical reality of the miracles reported of Jesus. The genesis and the interpretation of Christian fundamentalism is a much discussed and controversially debated issue. However, two aspects seem to me to be clear. First of all, Christian fundamentalism is a modern reaction against the modern criticism of traditional tenets of Christianity. The views, which were opposed by fundamentalists, were those associated with the so-called “higher criticism” of the Bible, the historical-critical interpretation of the Biblical sources. The attempt to uncover the “original” meaning of the biblical writings by the rigorous application of historical methods seemed to the Christian groups supporting the fundamentals as a strategy for questioning the truth of the Bible.

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Furthermore, they felt acutely challenged by the scientistic interpretation of evolutionary theory which was, for instance, proposed by Thomas H. Huxley, “Darwin’s Bulldog”, and which seemed to suggest that the Genesis account of creation was untrue and that humans had evolved from monkeys. Against this two-fold challenge the insistence on the inerrancy of the Bible should erect an insurmountable defence. Therefore it became the first of the five fundamentals. What appears to be characteristic for Christian and other forms of fundamentalism is that they respond to the challenges of modern criticisms of religous beliefs by defending them on the ground of their opponents. Since the authority of the Bible was challenged, they defended the inerrancy of the Bible. Because the virgin birth was presented as “unbelievable” and “mere myth”, not compatible with the known facts of biology, they insisted on it as the second most important, fundamental truth about Christianity. Since the Iran hostage crisis and the following religious revolution in Iran the term has been applied first to Islam, later in connection with the Israeli settlers on the West Bank also to Judaism. In the 1990s the “Fundamentalism Project” at the University of Chicago already looked at fundamentalism in connection with the three monotheistic religions. By now the term is also applied to Hindu groups and Buddhist sects. In every case it denotes a modern religious reaction against the secularist criticism of religion in modernity. In the monotheistic faiths it always denotes a religious orientation of the type where “letter alone”, sola littera, provides the basic orientation for fundamentalist believers. All questions of religious belief, practice and morality are answered with reference to the literal authority of Scripture. While the term “fundamentalist” in the strict sense may apply only to relatively small groups in Judaism, Christianity and Islam there are nevertheless fundamentalist tendencies in almost all Christian denominations, seeking orientation from the literal application of Scripture to the basic questions of finding meaning and orientation in life. Why is fundamentalism modern? It displays the fundamental characteristics of religion in modernity. It is a religion of choice and not a religion into which one grows through belonging to a religious group of people. It presupposes the modern individual who masters life by making choices – a feature quite unknown in traditional religions and societies. Fundamentalism also expects of its adherents that they are able to supply reasons for their beliefs by citing the authoritative scriptures – also a modern phenomenon. Its modern character is part of its attraction: The appeal to choice and scriptural reason combine with considerable ease use of modern technologies of sign-based communication. Fundamentalists believe that they can read the divine code that programmes the course of history and the course that structures their individual lives. Knowing the code

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and obeying is the ideal strategy for mastering a complex world through the imposition of clear-cut boundaries.

1.3 The Spirit Alone: the Power of Spiritual Energies There is however also another form of religion, which is definitely on the rise, not only in Christianity but also in forms transcending Christianity as well as any other historical religion. It is the phenomenon of spirit-filled faith, both in the form of the Pentecostal-charismatic movement and the rise of a polymorphous spirituality. The rise of the Pentecostal movement since the Azusa Street Revival in 1906 is a much-discussed phenomenon. There are very few signs that the growth of Pentecostal-charismatic movements is decreasing. It has changed the religious situation in Latin America dramatically and has made an enormous impact in Asia and Africa.² It manifests a form of Christian religion with a strong experiential emphasis and often a minimal institutional form of organisation, but displaying all of the gifts of the Spirit that have an experiential impact: healings, prophecy, speaking in tongues, and an emphasis on blessing in the context of enthusiastic worship. Experiential intensity is the common hallmark of Pentecostal-charismatic movements, both within Pentecostal churches and in the charismatic branches of main-line churches. Very often we also find a focussing on a charismatic leader together with a relatively low-key form organisation and highly personalised structures, compatible with voluntary organisation. Whereas in fundamentalist forms of Christianity the question of doctrine can always be answered by pointing to the letter of Scripture, thus avoiding the need for doctrinal formulation, it is even more difficult with regard to Pentecostal and charismatic movements. While there is strong and self-critical engagement with questions of doctrine by some theologians with that kind of background, the theology that is operative in Pentecostal and charismatic churches, seems to be focussed on the themes of power, transformation and life, often coupled with an emphasis on bodily health and prosperity. Boundaries seem to be defined by conformity with the experiential style of worship and allegiance to the spiritual leaders but not by assent to a doctrinal basis.

 Cf. David Martin, Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1993); Harvey Cox, Fire from Heaven. The Rise of Pentecostal Spirituality and the Reshaping of Religion in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2001).

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Therefore there is a continuous engagement with criticisms from without and from within about the distinctive content of Pentecostal charismatic Christian worship and its relations to other forms of religion outside Christianity, e. g. shamanism or some of the new religious movements which have a non-Christian background. The emphasis on experiential intensity as a true sign of faith and on the outward signs of spiritual power seems to be in an unresolved tension with the foundations of faith and its distinctive content. The fact that boundaries are not doctrinally defined, which often invites the criticism of syncretism not only with other religions but also with quasi-religions like “healthism” and “prosperity religion”, is something that forms of Pentecostal and charismatic Christianity have in common with many enterprises for which spirituality is the key-word of their religious endeavours. In 2004 Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead published a book with the provocative title The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion is Giving Way to Spirituality. ³ Based on their studies in Kendal in Cumbria in the North West of England they claimed that religion as a form of life focussed on a transcendent source and authority would give way to spirituality focussing on the inner sources of significance and authority, tending towards the cultivation or sacralisation of unique subjective lives. Whatever may become of this prognosis, it is certainly true that in the West there is an inflation of “spirituality” which in terms of content may mean almost anything but in terms of the experiential effects means a flourishing of all dimensions of life and a “coating” of everything with spiritual significance. These forms of spiritual religiosity are remarkably promiscuous as far as the origins of the means of achieving heightened significance are concerned, and they are highly individualistic in their forms of practice. When they are institutionalized, these forms of spirituality are organised in voluntary associations, “soft forms” of institutionalization with a low threshold, only individual rules and no penalties for non-attendance so that they can make a highly marketable offer. If one looks at the keywords of this movement of polymorphous individualised spirituality one comes across “power” and “empowerment”, “life” and everything that enhances life, often summarized under different notions of “transformation” and “flourishing”. Spiritually is not content-centred but effect-focussed, and what counts as an effect is only assessed in terms of its experiential quality which may be ecstatic or offer an increased sense of well-being. Both trends, fundamentalism and what for lack of a better term I will call “spiritual experientialism”, can be found within and outside the Christian

 (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004).

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churches. Quite often mainline churches have wings, which tend to be “fundamentalist”, or create niches for “spiritual experientialism”.

1.4 Displaced Foundations and Disconnected Effects When we try to assess both these major trends in the framework of a theological diagnosis of the religious situation of the times, one element seems to be a common feature of both forms of religion. They both seem to introduce misplaced relations and missing connections into the network of Christian doctrine and practice. I want to suggest that “fundamentalism” is a phenomenon of displaced foundations. This becomes immediately clear when we consider the order of priority of the five fundamentals. The first is belief in the inerrancy of Scripture. This would mean that believing that Scripture is inerrant is the gateway for true faith, the eye of the needle we have to go through in order to believe properly. This is exactly how the fundamentals function. Once you subscribe to the inerrancy of Scripture, it is easy to believe in the virgin birth, the substitutionary character of the atonement of Christ or the reality of the bodily resurrection or Christ’s or the historical event of the resurrection. However, you have to subscribe to inerrancy as denoting “being factually true”. To put it very pointedly: Believing in the Bible becomes the key to believing everything else that the creeds state. However, Christians are not Christians because they believe in the Bible but because they believe in Christ. Believing in Christ means that Christ in his person is the Son of God the Father in whom God reveals himself to us, a revelation that comes to completion by being confirmed by God the Spirit as truth for us. Therefore Christians do not confess their faith in the Bible but in the triune God, the Father, the Son and the Spirit. And Christians do not believe in a book, which could only mean assenting to everything that the book says, but Christians believe in the triune God in the sense of trusting God unconditionally in a personal relationship of trust. The content of faith is, in a Christian understanding, precisely which enables and demands trusting in God unconditionally: that God is the creator of everything there is, the redeemer of those who are alienated from God and the one who enables us to believe in him in a personal communion of trust, the sanctifier, the Holy Spirit. What is at stake for Christianity in the debate with fundamentalism is precisely the question of the foundation of faith and of the content of faith. Foundation and content are (that is the conviction of Christian faith) identical be-

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cause Christian faith is based on the self-presentation of God through Christ in the Spirit so that his self-presentation is also the access to who God is and what God is. God’s Trinitarian self-presentation is therefore the dynamic and personal foundation of faith. So far I have simply suggested that “fundamentalism”, treating the inerrancy of the Bible as the fundamental article of faith, is a case of displaced foundations and presented as an alternative, I am persuaded orthodox, account of the foundation and content of faith. But how could this view be argued for? Which kinds of arguments would persuade a Christian fundamentalist? Presumably only such arguments which could rely on the authority of Scripture and which would also be ascertained for Christian fundamentalists in such a way that this new certainty manifests that their former certainty was wrong. Before we turn to such arguments let us first look at the second trend, spiritual experientalism. Here I would suggest that this is a case of disconnected effects. This would imply that the effects of faith, the “fruit of faith”, as Paul says in Galatians 5:22– 23, have become disconnected from their source so that it becomes quite unclear who the Spirit in spirituality is, whose effects love, joy, peace and the other fruits of the Spirit are, and whose gifts are the gifts of grace which give charismatics their name. The diagnosis of disconnected effects would not have to claim that there are no effects that are experienced, but it would raise the question whose effects we are dealing with here. The criticism of much of the experiential religion of Pentecostal charismatics and certainly of the new religiosity of subjective individualized spirituality would direct attention to the content of experience and not to its experiential intensity. In the Bible spiritual effects are tested by asking whose Spirit it is who creates effects. “Beloved, do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits to see whether they are from God.” (1 Jn 4:1) What is presupposed is that there are many spirits which create effects in our experience. However, what distinguishes these spirits is the way they are connected to their source. And the criterion for seeing that the spiritual experiences are experiences of the Spirit of God is to see whether they confess “that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh” (1 Jn 4:2). Again, we have an implicitly Trinitarian argument: The identity of the Spirit in question is discerned by understanding where he comes from, where he has his origin, whether this origin is God or something else. And the criterion for testing the origin is whether the spirit in question “confesses” Christ. Testing the spirits means testing their connection by looking at their source through their content. Conversely, if it is God who is the source of the Spirit, it is God who is the Father of Jesus who has come in the flesh, and it is this specific identity of the giver that allows us to test the gift.

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Again the question is: How can such a view be defended in such a way that it might persuade charismatics? How could this argument about the Trinitarian connectedness of the Spirit serve as a criterion for testing effects by testing their connection to their source and medium? So far we have arrived at a preliminary answer: Testing the “Christ content” of spiritual experiences would be the way in which they could be tested. Displaced foundations and disconnected effects – our diagnosis has already, albeit indirectly, applied as a criterion of the diagnosis what can only be offered as a therapy: the Trinitarian connectedness of the letter and the spirit, of the Word and the Spirit. Let us now look at the way the letter and the spirit and the Word and the Spirit are related in the theology of the Reformation.

1.5 Relocating the Foundations and Reconnecting the Effects: The Lessons of Reformation Theology The relationship between the Word and the Spirit is one of the central topics of the theology of the Reformation. Reformation theology developed its view of the inner connection between the word and Spirit by taking up and developing Paul’s dialectic relationship between the letter and the Spirit. Paul places the old controversy on the question of the priority of either the written word or the spoken word which has exercised Western culture explicitly since Plato in a new context: the relationship between the demands of the law and the new relationship to God in Christ that is appropriated to believers in Christ by the Spirit. This new relationship is established through the death and resurrection of Christ which let those who believe in Christ participate in God’s transforming righteousness, dying to theirs sins with Christ and being raised to new everlasting life with Christ. The resurrection of the crucified Jesus is the only event, which liberates believers from reign of the law, which under the rule of sin has lost its function of providing orientation of those who strive for communion with God, and condemns sinners to death instead. Just as for Paul God is “the one who raised our Lord Jesus from the dead” (Rom 4:24), so the Spirit is the “Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead” (Rom 8:11). There is now a new covenant in Christ, “not of letter but of spirit”, and from this perspective Paul can say: “the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life” (2 Cor 3:6). However, the life-giving power again finds expression in a letter, the letter which the believers become by being transformed through the Spirit so that they become “a letter of Christ, pre-

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pared by us, written not with ink but with the Spirit of the living God not on tablets of stone but on tablets of human hearts” (2 Cor 3:3). We only understand the position of the Reformers correctly when we understand that the transformation through the death and resurrection of Christ which effects the transformation of sinners to believers, from death under the law to life in the Spirit, has for the Reformers again become letter, the message of the Gospel, witness in the letter of the biblical Scriptures. This message, witnessed in the writings of Scripture is oriented to become the oral word of the proclamation of the Gospel, which is authenticated by God the Spirit. It is well known that the Reformers’ views on the relationship of the Word and the Spirit were directed at a two very different fronts: on the one hand against the scholastic view that the truth of the biblical message was encountered in the interpretation of Scripture by the church fathers and the magisterium of the Roman Church, on the other against the view of the enthusiastic wing of the radical Reformation that the truth of the message of the Gospel is communicated to the hearts of believers independent of the external word of Scripture. For Luther it is one and the same Spirit who inspired the word of the biblical authors and who makes the external word of the biblical witness and of the proclamation of the Gospel effective in the hearts of believers, thus creating the certainty of faith by authenticating the truth of the biblical message. Luther consequently distinguishes two aspects of the clarity of Scripture. One is the external clarity of the word of Scripture. With regard to that it must be maintained: the word of Scripture means what it says. There is no opaqueness or obscurity here which would require and authoritative interpretation by the church fathers or the magisterium to make the meaning of Scripture clear. The external clarity of scripture, the clarity of its communication by the signs of the letter of Scripture is the necessary condition of the priesthood of all believers. The internal clarity is a different matter. It is concerned with the certainty concerning the truth communicated by the externally clear word. With regard to that humans have a heart, which obscures the inner meaning of the message of Scripture unless it is enlightened by the witness of Scripture. For understanding the truth of the Gospel as it is witnessed in Scripture both are needed: the inspired external clarity of Scripture and the internal testimony of Scripture as a new action of the Holy Spirit, overcoming the blindness of the human heart and making the truth of the Gospel certain in the constitution of faith. In John Calvin’s Institutes this view, which defines the common ground of the Reformers, is further developed in a systematic fashion. He compares Scripture, the communication of the divine Word, to the glasses which help those with de-

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fective eyesight to read the signs of God in creation which point to the creator properly and so make him known “unto salvation”.⁴ Calvin says: For as the aged, or those whose sight is defective, when any book, however fair, is set before them, though they perceive that there is something written, are scarcely able to make out two consecutive words, but, when aided by glasses, begin to read distinctly, so Scripture, gathering together the impressions of Deity, which, till then, lay confused in their minds, dissipates the darkness and shows us the true God clearly.⁵

Scripture for Calvin is the mode of divine self-communication in which God does not communicate something about God but manifests himself. This, however, excludes the view that Scripture must be approved as a mode of divine self-communication by the church or that the church has the right to define the boundaries of the canon of Scripture. Against this view Calvin offers a very simple argument which is both scriptural and logical. If it is true that the church is built on the foundation of the apostles and prophets, i. e. if the church is the creature of the word, the church which is the consequence of the word and which only has stability if it rests on this foundation, then the church cannot be the judge over Scripture, the authority on which the authority of Scripture depends. Calvin writes: “If the doctrine of the apostles and prophets is the foundation of the church, the former must have its certainty before the latter began to exist.”⁶ He goes on to show that the often quoted remark by Augustine, that he would not believe the Gospel were he not moved by the authority of the church, is not in its original context a statement about the constitution of faith. It is rather a polemical statement against the Manicheans who had appealed to the Gospel in support of the teachings of Mani. Augustine simply states that unbelievers might be convinced to consider the Gospel if they could rely on the authority of the church. In the same book Augustine asserts unequivocally that the certainty of faith cannot rest on human authority but only on “God himself internally strengthening and illuminating our minds”.⁷ What is then the foundation of the authority of Scripture? How can we come to a view that is not merely probable but certain? Calvin argues: If, then, we would consult most effectually our consciences, and save them from being driven about in a whirl of uncertainty, from wavering and even stumbling at the smallest ob-

 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1863), I, IV, 1, p. 64.  Calvin, Institutes, I, IV, 1, p. 64.  Calvin, Institutes, I, VII, 2, p. 69.  Calvin, Institutes, I, VII, 3, p. 70.

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stacle, our conviction of the truth of Scripture must be derived from a higher source than human conjectures, judgments, or reasons; namely the secret testimony of the Spirit.⁸

Calvin operates with a distinction between what human reason can achieve and what only God’s revelation by the Holy Spirit can achieve. For Calvin it is clear that reason cannot produce certainty, certainty can only be constituted by the disclosure of truth, only by the activity of the Holy Spirit. Arguments are certainly useful but they do not constitute certainty. This also applies to arguing for the authority of Scripture. … although we may maintain the sacred Word of God against gainsayers, it does not follow that we shall forthwith implant the certainty which faith requires in their hearts.⁹

What can produce the certainty of faith? Calvin says: I answer, that the testimony of the Spirit is superior to reason. For as God alone can properly bear witness to his own words, so these words will not obtain full credit in the hearts of men, until they are sealed by the inward testimony of the Spirit. The same Spirit, therefore, who spoke by the mouth of the prophets must penetrate our hearts, in order to convince us that they faithfully delivered the message with which they were divinely entrusted.¹⁰

We find here in both Reformers a very strong insistence on the connection between the word and the Spirit, between the letter of Scripture and the authentication of the truth witnessed in Scripture by God the Spirit. The connection the Reformers argue for serves both as a criticism of the displaced foundations we find in fundamentalism and as a criticism of the disconnected effects we find in spiritual experientialism. The authority of Scripture depends on the authority of the self-presentation of God in Christ and through the Spirit as it is witnessed in Scripture and which becomes effective through the instrumentality of the human witness of Scripture. Scripture is not the foundation of faith. Rather, the foundation of faith is the dynamic self-presentation of the triune God who employs the witness of Scripture and of Christian proclamation in order to constitute the certainty of faith. In fundamentalism the instrument through which the foundation of faith is effective has become the foundation. The notion of the “inerrancy of Scripture” is either an abbreviation for the self-presentation of the triune God or it indicates a displacement of the foundations.

 Calvin, Institutes, I, VII, 3, p. 71.  Calvin, Institutes, I, VII, 4, p. 72.  Calvin, Institutes, I, VII, 4, p. 72.

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However, this dynamic relationship between word and Spirit also works the other way around. In order to know which Spirit informs our spirituality we have to connect the effects of the Spirit to the word of God. God the Spirit authenticates the witness that he enables in the first place. The effects of the Spirit remain inextricably linked to the content of the Gospel so that the Gospel serves as the criterion for discerning the spirits.

1.6 God’s Two Hands: the Word and the Spirit in the Trinity This view of the relationship between Word and Spirit, which can be effectively used in criticising a fundamentalism of displaced foundations and an experiential spiritualism, rests on a view of the dynamic self-presentation of the Triune God in the divine economy. This Trinitarian account is not a doctrinal superstructure that is built on the more basic doctrines of the Word and the Spirit. Rather, it explains the interrelationship of Word and Spirit as part of God’s Trinitarian economy and points to the personal identity of the Spirit and the Word in relation to God the Father. The image I have borrowed for the title of this lecture comes, of course, from Irenaeus in Adversus Haereses who insists that God creates everything by his two hands: the Word and the Spirit. In Irenaeus, this insistence has a demythologizing effect. God does not operate through intermediary beings, the kinds of beings which populated the intermediate spheres and heavens of Gnostic cosmologies. God acts as God is and so he acts through his two hands: the Word and the Spirit. No need for spirits, angels, demi-gods, or superhuman powers. God can employ the stuff of creation as an instrument of his activity but he does this through the activity of his two hands. The interrelationship of the three persons of the Trinity in God’s triune action is what constitutes the unity-in-difference of divine agency in the divine economy. I know no better short exposition of this than Luther’s in the Large Catechism. There he writes in the conclusion of the explanation of the three articles of the Creed: … here you have everything in richest measure. For in all three articles God himself has revealed and opened to us the profoundest depths of his fatherly heart and his pure, unutterable love. For this very purpose he created us, so that he might redeem and make us holy, and, moreover, having granted and bestowed upon us everything in heaven and on earth, he has also given us his Son and Holy Spirit, through whom he brings us to himself. For, as explained above, we could never come to recognize the Father’s favor and grace

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were it not for Lord Christ, who is a mirror of the Father’s heart. Apart from him we see nothing but an angry and terrible judge. But neither could we know anything of Christ, had it not been revealed by the Holy Spirit.¹¹

This summary of the threefold self-giving of the Father, the Son and the Spirit, of God’s Trinitarian generosity explains why the Word and the Spirit belong so inextricably together because the way God gives himself is also the way in which God draws us into communion with himself. Calvin echoes this thought by describing the way in which all God’s works are perfected in the Holy Spirit: In fine, he is described to us as a Fountain, whence all heavenly riches flow to us; or as the Hand by which God exerts his power, because by his divine inspiration he so breathes divine life into us, that we are no longer acted upon by ourselves, but ruled by his motion and agency, so that everything good in us is the fruit of his grace, while our own endowments without him are mere darkness of mind and perverseness of heart.¹²

All of God’s Trinitarian action is perfected in the agency of Spirit. This constitutes the unity of divine action. Nevertheless, within this unity there remains a distinction, which consists in what Father, Son and Spirit contribute to the Trinitarian action: This distinction is, that to the Father is attributed the beginning of action, the fountain and source of all things; to the Son, wisdom, counsel and arrangement in action, while the energy and efficacy of action is assigned to the Spirit.¹³

While the Spirit’s domain is the energy and efficacy of action, what the Spirit does is nothing other than perfecting the work of the Father and the Son. Therefore the Spirit does not offer a new content of revelation but makes the truth of the Gospel of Christ certain for us and so establishes the communion of God with believers, which the Father intended from the beginning.

 Martin Luther, “The Large Catechism,” in Robert Kolb and Timothy J. Wengert (eds.),The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, trans. Charles Arand et al (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2000), pp. 439 – 40.  Calvin, Institutes, III, I, 3, p. 465  Calvin, Institutes, I, XIII, 18, p. 126.

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1.7 The Mission of Christian Theology: A Mission to the Mind and a Mission of Freedom The Trinitarian framework of understanding God’s two hands in their interrelationship has important anthropological consequences. The human being is understood in the biblical writings as homo significans, as a sign-using being, as the animal audiens et loquens, the animal which speaks and talks, which is addressed by God the creator and responds to God the creator. The created destiny of humans to be the being with whom God wants to be in conversation receives its ultimate seal in the Incarnation of the divine Word. This is also a central aspect of the Christian mission. It is the mission to be in conversation among believers, with other believers and with non-believers. As such the Christian mission is a mission to the mind. It always has an essential intellectual dimension. Its medium is the external clarity of the Christian message, which engages human understanding and human reason. Fundamentalism distorts this character by replacing insight and understanding with submission to the authority of the letter. On the other hand, the understanding of what it means to be human in Christianity also implies that humans are spiritual beings open to the disclosure and direction of the Spirit of God. Humans live by the action-directing certainties, which are constituted for them, but not constituted by them. The work of Spirit of God does not create a mindless enthusiasm but rather an intelligent enthusiasm, which has a very specific content: the truth of the Gospel of Christ. The work of the Spirit is already described by Paul as a liberating work: Where the Spirit is, there is freedom. The freedom that one does not have to believe what one has not been made certain of, because we can only believe that which has been made certain to us. This is the liberation from all coercion in matters of faith: the hard coercion of subjection to the letter and the soft persuasions of a spirituality that has no specific content and therefore no claim to truth apart from the evidence of individual experiences. The Christian mission is therefore always non-coercive, because it respects the freedom of the Spirit it is obliged to respect the freedom of religion. And so it lives in the expectation that the Spirit will confirm what the word of the Gospel proclaims. One thing, however, should be clear: Paying attention to the Word and the Spirit enables us to move beyond the pitfalls of fundamentalism and spiritualism. In contrast to the Zen Buddhist koan which invites us to reflect on the sound of one hand clapping, paying attention to the Word and the Spirit in their Trinitarian interrelationship should let us expect to hear the sound of two hands clapping in the rhythm of the divine economy.

Markus Mühling

2 The Incarnation of the Word and the “Concarnation” of the Spirit as Modes of Divine Activity – “Inspired” by Thomas Erskine (1788 – 1870)

In this paper I mainly investigate the doctrine of the activity of the Holy Spirit given by the Scottish Theologian Thomas Erskine of Linlathen in order to ask if we will find something fruitful for our contemporary life in the church. I will examine Erskine’s doctrine of the activity of the Holy Spirit (IV), evaluate it (V) and ask about its impact on today’s life (VI). Since it is impossible to conceive of the activity of the Spirit without remembering the state of affairs regarding the doctrines of God, Christ and Atonement, I first speak about the eternal Word (I), His incarnation (II) and His sacrifice on behalf of human beings (III). I have chosen Thomas Erskine of Linlathen because sometimes it seems to be easier to evaluate concepts of former times than problems of our own time. Maybe to some extent Erskine’s situation resembles some of our problems. Living in the first half of the 19th century in Scotland, he faced a church divided into radical parties: First there were the traditional federal Calvinists wishing to hold firmly to the Westminster Confession. Secondly, there was a rationalistic party, wishing to purify the Gospel of all seemingly supernatural elements. And there was thirdly an evangelical party wishing to renew the Scottish church by invoking new experiences of the activity of the Spirit. Erskine – like his friend John McLeod Campbell –belonged to neither party. Inspired by Erskine, McLeod Campbell taught the doctrine of the universality of the intention of God to save humans and the doctrine of the assurance of faith. For a short time, the divergent parties came together in a coalition and they dispensed McLeod Campbell from his chair as minister. Unfortunately for them – but rather fortunately from my perspective – they could not dismiss Erskine, because he was not an official minister of the Scottish church but a creative lay-theologian, a landlord with a huge estate, who took on the vocation to visit dying people in his vicinity, to write theological books and to correspond with European nobles about religious themes. Nearly forgotten today, his thought influenced C.S. Lewis in the 20th century via George McDonald. But now we have to leave Erskine for a while and turn to the first of the systematic topics.

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2.1 The Eternal Word A common description of the basis of theological thinking, both in the Reformed and the Lutheran perspectives, consists of the thesis that we have to argue solo verbo and that this word is not primarily a literal entity, but a personal one. In the very first place, the term verbum is not to be interpreted by the term Scripture, but by the term Christ: The Protestant formula sola scriptura is only a vivid basis for the Christian faith if it is interpreted in the light of the formula solo verbo. And the formula solo verbo has to be interpreted by the formula solus Christus. ¹ Neither the oral proclamation of the church, nor the scriptures are identical with the Word of God. They can become the Word, whereas the revelation itself is the Word of God. In his line of argument Karl Barth makes clear that the term “revelation” means nothing but the second Person of the Trinity, the eternal Son.² “Revelation” does not only and primarily refer to circumstances between God and his creatures; it means primarily a fact in the eternal inner life of God and only in a secondary and derived matter does it mean the communication between God and his creatures. Correspondingly, Word means primarily the second Person of the Trinity and it refers to the fact that the divine being has to be understood not as a substance, but as an eternal event of communication between Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The insights of Karl Barth are on no account an exception in the history of Reformed theology. It may suffice to cite Erskine, who tries to give an understandable metaphor for this state of affairs: When we contemplate God before creation – if we can realise such a state on our imaginations – we are sometimes overwhelmed and lost in the sense of a dreary depressing solitude. From everlasting God had been, and God is love. His life consists in love, yet whom had He to love? The idea of love in action excludes the idea of singleness; oneness is not singleness – oneness is completeness. Then in this completeness there cannot be ab-

 In the Reformed perspective, Karl Barth (KD I/1, pp. 120 f) has expressed this state of affairs in the following manner: “Wir sagten von der kirchlichen Verkündigung: Sie muß Gottes Wort je und je werden. Und wir sagten dasselbe von der Bibel: Sie muß Gottes Wort je und je werden. […] Also gerade im Blick auf die Offenbarung oder von der Offenbarung aus ist von Verkündigung und Bibel zu sagen, daß sie Wort Gottes sind, indem sie je und je Wort werden. Eben darum ist nun aber von der Offenbarung selbst nicht dies, sondern gerade das umgekehrte zu sagen: sie wird Wort Gottes, nämlich in der Bibel und in der Verkündigung, indem sie es in sich selber ist.”  Cf. Barth, KD I/1, p. 435: “Jesus Christus kann uns darum den Vater offenbaren […], weil er sich offenbart als der, der er ist. Er wird nicht erst Gottes Sohn oder Wort im Ereignis der Offenbarung. Sondern das Ereignis der Offenbarung hat darum göttliche Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit, weil in ihm das Eigentliche Gottes offenbar wird.”

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solute equality; order always supposes inequality; – “My Father is greater than I.” There is the order of giving and receiving, governing and obeying, blessing and trusting. This lower hemisphere is the Son, continually receiving and returning the Father’s love, giving a sympathising response to every thought and feeling in the Father’s mind.³

Erskine states explicitly that this eternal inner life of God is not only an event of revelation or communication, but he explicates the complete description of the Christian God according to 1 John 4:8 – 16: God is love. At the very beginning of this paper we said that the state of affairs concerning the proper sense of the Word as grounded in the inner life of God is a common Protestant notion. To underline this it may suffice to cite Luther himself for the Lutheran Tradition: “Like the Father is an eternal speaker and in eternity the Son is spoken, the Holy Spirit is the listener.”⁴ Luther here refers to God as an eternal event of communication. In addition to the role of the second Person of the Trinity explicated by Barth and Erskine, he adds the Holy Spirit to the eternal conversation that is Godself. A medieval theologian, Richard of St. Victor, described the role of the Spirit in the framework of this inner-trinitarian communication exactly as being the condilectus, i. e. the co-loved person of Father and Son.⁵ We will see later that his inner-trinitarian role resembles his economic activity.

2.2 The Incarnation of the Eternal Word We would not know anything about God’s eternal Word if we had not been created. And we would not know anything about God’s eternal Word if it had not become flesh. The incarnation is not the only mode of activity of the eternal Son. Wolfhart Pannenberg points out that John 1:1– 13 refers to both the eternal event of divine being in itself and other modes of activity of the Word, whereas John 1:14 refers to the incarnation and revelation of the Word.⁶ We have now to recall the material core of the fact of incarnation. According to the traditional formula the hypostasis of the Word assumed a human nature, with the effect that in the hypostatic union one person subsists in

 Erskine of Linlathen, Thomas, Letters of Thomas Erskine of Linlathen, ed. by William Hanna (Edinburgh, 1878), pp. 436 f.  Martin Luther, WA 46, 60,4: “Gleich wie der Vater ein ewiger Sprecher ist, der Sohn in Ewigkeit gesprochen wird, ist also der Heilige Geist von Ewigkeit der Zuhörer […]”  Cf. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, ed. by J. Ribaillier (Paris 1958), 3,11; p. 192.  Cf. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematische Theologie (Göttingen 1988), vol. 1, p. 258.

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two natures – a human and a divine nature. If it is true that we have access to an understanding of divine attributes only via the incarnated Son, there is no problem with excluding properties between the divine and the human. The divine nature primarily refers to the framework of the eternal relationship between Father, Son and Holy Spirit.⁷ And I suggest that it is sufficient to describe this framework by the attributes of the divine love like perfect surrender, perfect faithfulness, perfect confidence or faith and perfect truthfulness. These are properties of the inner life of the divine essence, disclosed in the event of Christ. They are essential properties because we must necessarily ascribe them to God in order to speak of God. The traditional properties like omnipotence, omniscience etc. must not be interpreted as attributes of the essence of the divine life.⁸ Rather, omniscience and omnipotence are properties of the relationship between God and his creation. They are primarily located in the doctrine of creation. With respect to the divine nature of Christ we can say that the divinity of the Word consists in his loving relations to Father and Spirit. With the incarnation He changes his perspective to the world, without losing in any sense his divinity.⁹ He enters the creation in a particular and concrete spatio-temporal place, Palestine in the first century, with concrete and particular human relationships. This by no means implies a kenosis of divine attributes (but a kenosis of the traditional metaphysic properties). The assumed framework of human relationships is not accidental. The motivation for the incarnation is salvation and God’s motives are truthful. That means that Christ claims for his own identity not only to be in

 I first encountered the inspiration for this relational reconceptualisation of the doctrine of Christ in Christoph Schwöbel, “Christology and Trinitarian Thought,” in idem (ed.), Trinitarian Theology Today (Edinburgh 1995), pp. 113 – 46.  Cf. Gottfried Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk. Darstellung der evangelisch-lutherischen Dogmatik vom Mittelpunkte der Christologie aus (Erlangen 1856), vol. 1, pp. 52 f.: “Ist dies richtig […], so folgt, da es Eigenschaften, nur gibt, sofern Verhältnisse; […] Und eben darauf beruht das Recht, immanente oder wesentliche Eigenschaften Gottes aufzustellen. […] Andererseits aber müssen von ihnen diejenigen ausgeschieden werden, welche blos Beziehungen Gottes zur Welt ausdrücken; denn außerdem würde man nicht nur in den oben angedeuteten Fehler zurückfallen und Gott von der Welt abhängig machen, sondern man würde auch die Welt als nothwendig setzen.”  Ernst Wilhelm Christian Sartorius, Die Lehre von der Heiligen Liebe oder Grundzüge der evangelisch-kirchlichen Moraltheologie (Stuttgart 1861), pp. 126 f.: “Das Auge, welches Himmel und Erde mit den Strahlen seines Blicks umfaßt, entäußert sich nicht der Sehkraft, wenn es sich ins Dunkel begiebt oder das Augenlied schließt, sondern nur ihrer mitherrschenden Wirksamkeit; so senkt der Sohn Gottes auf Erden sein allumfassendes Auge und begiebt sich ins menschliche Dunkel und öffnet darin als ein Menschenkind sein Auge als das allmählig aufgehende Licht der Menschenwelt, bis er es zur Rechten des Vaters leuchten läßt in völliger Herrlichkeit.”

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love with Father and Son, but also to be in love with the ‘persons’ of humanity. In other words: His claims to identity as God leads to the fact that the world and God become inseparable, not by nature and creation, but by grace and incarnation (theosis): “Theosis is the ascension toward what is better – it is neither a diminution nor an alteration of nature. In other words, by theosis man will not cease being man; he will simply become perfect man.”¹⁰

2.3 The Double Sacrifice of the Word and the Spirit The purpose of the incarnation of the Word is the salvation of human beings. But how can the Word achieve this? Although the Christ-event – including incarnation, cross and resurrection – is the core of Christian faith, the church resisted the temptation to dogmatize one model of understanding the doctrine of atonement. At all times theologians therefore have the task to explicate the atonement in relation to the witnesses of other times. I suggest that the key to an understanding of atonement consists in the notion of love and its attributes as mentioned above. Primarily, love is not an emotion or a feeling, but a relational event of communication, interaction and cooperation. A relational event consists of the relationship and the relata. But if we focus not on the relationship of love itself, but on one of its relata – in our case on the person of the incarnated Word – we can describe this love with the help of the language of attitudes. I suggest that love can be described as a surrendering, i. e. to provide oneself as means for the real aims of another person. ¹¹ If this is correct, the incarnation itself as described above is love in the following sense: The Word identifies Himself with every human being for the sake of their salvation. The problem with this is that fallen humans do not know what their real aims are. Humans imagine a lot of aims. And a lot of things impose themselves as pretended proper aims for the pursuit of human life. If the incarnated Word had provided Himself and his activity as means for these subjective aims of humans, He would have been unfaithful to his mission, unfaithful to the real aims of humanity (consisting of love) and unfaithful to the framework of the inner life of the Trinity constituting the divine being. In other words, he would have lost his divinity, his essence and existence.

 Anastasius Sinaita, Wegweiser, PG 89, 36.  I have discussed this issue in more detail in Markus Mühling, Versöhnendes Handeln – Handeln in Versöhnung: Gottes Opfer an die Menschen (Göttingen 2005), pp. 323 – 34.

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Fortunately, this is impossible. However, to be faithful to the real aims of humanity has its price, the price of conflicting aims between all sinful humans and the Word. These conflicting aims led Christ to the cross and to the death of his person, but not to the death of his aim – not to the death of love. As far as we have described the atonement it would lead only to an understanding of the crucified Christ as a victim, not as a sacrifice. Furthermore, it would lead us to the contradiction that the aim of surrender and love survived the cross but not the person, who is constitutive for this love. For in God, the divine persons constitute their inner divine framework of love and this inner divine framework of love constitutes the persons. I am of the opinion that we can solve these problems by referring to the work of the Spirit as a second part of the double sacrifice constituting the atonement. The death of Christ on Calvary means a serious violation not only of the person of Christ, but also of the inner divine relationship. The consequences of sin become a matter for God. On Holy Saturday the being of God itself is at stake and this wound has to be healed. According to some scriptural evidence and a wide branch of the tradition,¹² this healing is provided by the resurrection of Christ through the work of the Spirit. In the framework of the model of love I conceive the Spirit as the subject of the resurrection by surrendering himself to the dead Son.¹³ The Spirit provides himself as a means for the affairs of the Son. Now we have to remember that being the brother of all human beings belongs irreducibly to the identity claims of the Son. The Spirit cannot raise the Word without His identity-claims, i. e. without His human nature. Therefore the resurrection of Christ by the Spirit precisely means the faithful promise to act in regard to all human beings as he has done in regard to Christ as the Word of God. And this promise is based on the Spirit’s own claim of identity, on the Spirit’s own desire: “The desire of the Spirit is to penetrate, and quicken the whole mass of the human nature, even as the sap of a tree seeks to penetrate and quicken the whole mass of the tree.”¹⁴ Consequently, the person of Christ does not carry the sin of humanity alone, because the Spirit identifies himself with Christ: “It was this spirit in him, which

 Cf. Rom 1:4; 8:11; 1.Tim 3:11 etc. and the discussion in Pannenberg, Systematische Theologie, vol. 1, p. 342.  Thomas Erskine of Linlathen, The Brazen Serpent or Life Coming Through Death (Edinburgh 1831), p. 158: “He was born of the Spirit, and he lived personally by the Spirit, but it was not till his resurrection that the Spirit dwelt in him federally. He was raised by the Spirit, and then the Spirit dwelt in him as the Head of the body.”  Erskine of Linlathen, Brazen Serpent, p. 169.

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bore the burden of every man’s soul, and of every man’s sin, and of every man’s sorrow.”¹⁵ Traditionally, this leads to the Spirit’s sanctifying and inspiring activity in the present time and to his reconstituting activity in restoring humanity’s integrity in the absolute future of the fulfilment of the Kingdom of God.

2.4 The Activity of the Eternal Spirit Now we will turn to Thomas Erskine’s pneumatology in order to examine whether we can find fruitful insights for present-day theology. Erskine divides the activity of the Spirit into two aspects: the Spirit acting with the believers and the Spirit acting in the believers: Before Pentecost, the Spirit was with them – after it, he was in them. […] Before Pentecost, the miracles were performed by the power of God, external to the disciples, to which they appealed by faith. And thus these miracles were like answers to prayer. But after Pentecost, the miracles were performed by the power of God dwelling in the disciples.¹⁶

2.4.1 The Spirit’s Activity with Believers 2.4.1.1 The Manner of the Spirit’s Activity with Believers First of all, it is evident that the Spirit has a personal status like the Father and the Son. Erskine often speaks of him as an “agent,”¹⁷ meaning a subject of action. He is responsible for the new life that is understood as life in God and for the awareness of truth and certainty of salvation: The source of their new life is the Spirit, and every stream from that source, in like manner, will partake of its nature.¹⁸ This is the life, and it is one with the mind of God.¹⁹ He is where the truth is, and he dwells in the hearts where it operates.²⁰

 Erskine of Linlathen, Brazen Serpent, p. 170.  Erskine of Linlathen, Brazen Serpent, p. 178.  Cf., e. g. Thomas Erskine of Linlathen, Remarks on the Internal Evidence for the Truth of Revealed Religion (Edinburgh 1821), p. 152: “To this divine agent we are directed[…].”  Erskine of Linlathen, Brazen Serpent, p. 5  Erskine of Linlathen, Brazen Serpent, p. 24  Erskine of Linlathen, Evidence, p. 151

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This is just personal assurance founded on the general forgiving love – and yet being absolutely necessary to the understanding of that general love.²¹

This effect of the Spirit’s activity is primarily conceived of as an effect on human affectivity: […] but the doctrine of the Spirit is connected in the minds of Christians simply with a belief of his accompanying and giving weight and authority to revealed truth. The truth becomes thus closely associated in their minds with a sense of the presence and the gracious solicitude of God.²²

According to Erskine, it is a fact that the Spirit is responsible for this effect, but it seems to be an open question of how the Spirit achieves this effect: “With regard to the mode of the operation of the Holy Spirit on the human mind, the Bible says nothing; – it simply testifies the fact.”²³ Erskine is convinced he can find conceptualized descriptions of the Spirit’s activity in the scriptures in order to solve this question. However, here is not the place for a detailed examination of Erskine’s exegetical work.²⁴ The result is a theory of an indirect change of humanity’s affects by the Spirit. A direct effect on the affectivity by changing the emotions would not only mean a supernatural²⁵ action (this is not Erskine’s problem), but furthermore it would harm the personal distinction between the person of the Spirit and the person of the believer – it would be a transgression  Erskine of Linlathen, Brazen Serpent, p. 8. Erskine of Linlathen, Evidence, pp. 156 f: “That the belief of the gospel is, in every instance, the work of the Holy Spirit, no one…can doubt.”  Erskine of Linlathen, Evidence, p. 152.  Erskine of Linlathen, Evidence, p. 152,  A biblical example (cf. 2 Sam 6:8 – 17) may suffice at this point, found in Erskine of Linlathen, Evidence, pp. 155 f: “When the prophet Elisha was surrounded in Dothan by the Syrian army, he felt no fear, because he placed full confidence in the protection of God. But his servant was terrified by the appearance of inevitable ruin. It pleased God, however, to deliver him at once from his agitation and perplexity, even before he thought fit to remove the appearance of danger. And how was this effected? God opened the young man’s eyes, and he saw and beheld the mountain was full of horses and chariots of fire round about Elisha. God here interposed miraculously, in order to calm the man’s spirit. But mark the nature of the interposition; God dealt with the man as a reasonable being, – he gave him ocular demonstration of his safety. He did not work in his mind an unaccountable intrepidity in the face of danger which he could not have explained, but discovered to him a fact, which, from the nature of the human mind, could not fail of dispelling his fearful apprehensions.”  Cf. Erskine of Linlathen, Evidence, p. 158: “In the gospel, sinners are called upon, not to be supernaturally influenced, but to believe the Divine testimony” and pp. 153 f: “It is an influence which probably can never be distinguished, in our consciousness, from the innate influence of argument or motif.”

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of human freedom²⁶ and it would mean a contradiction of the natural abilities of human beings given to them by their truthful creator.²⁷ But as an activity with believers such a direct activity has to be excluded. The Holy Spirit is no psychotropic drug! Erskine holds the opinion that affects and emotions will awake by facts²⁸ apprehended by reason. Reason also belongs to man’s fallen abilities. Therefore reason is blind to valuing a fact as true or false and actually it seems to be a matter of contingency whether one person adheres to a fact and another does not. According to Erskine, the circumstances in which a fact is presented are as responsible for its comprehension as the fact itself. Different circumstances cause different addictions and dispositions. There are dispositions beneficial for the acceptance of facts and dispositions hindering evidence.²⁹ In order to provide a fruitful soil for the acceptance of facts it is essential to provide or create appropriate circumstances. He gives two examples: A firm-minded man, unused to the melting mode, may on a particular occasion be moved and excited by a tale far beyond his common state of feeling: His friends may wonder at an agitation so unusual; they may ask how this story has affected him more than other stories of a similar nature; but he will not be able to give any other reason […]. But these circumstances did not make the impression; they only made him more fit to receive the impression from an object which was naturally calculated to make it. […] just as the impression upon wax is entirely made by the seal, although heat may be required to fit it for receiving the impression.³⁰

Applied to the activity of the Spirit regarding human beings this means: I have used this illustration to show that the influence of the Spirit does not necessarily destroy, and is not necessarily independent of, that natural relation of cause and effect […]³¹ This divine agent does not excite feelings or emotions in the mind, independent of reason or an intelligible cause: The whole matter of the Bible is addressed to the reason, and its doctrines are intelligible causes of certain moral effects on the characters of those who be-

 Cf. Erskine of Linlathen, Evidence, p. 158. “In the Bible, this doctrine of Divine influence which we are now considering, is uniformly connected with the most explicit declarations, that man is free to act, and responsible for his actions.”  Cf. Erskine of Linlathen, Evidence, p. 159. “The evidences for the gospel, both external and internal, are suited to the human faculties; and so too is the substance of its contents.”  Cf. Erskine of Linlathen, Evidence, p. 156. “It is then the object believed, from whatever source the belief proceeds, whether from seeing or hearing, which operates on the mind”  Cf. Erskine of Linlathen, Evidence, p. 158. “There is nothing to prevent him from embracing the gospel, and walking in the ways of holiness, but his own opposite inclinations.”  Erskine of Linlathen, Evidence, p. 154  Erskine of Linlathen, Evidence, pp. 154 f.

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lieve them. The Spirit of God brings these causes to act upon the mind with their natural innate power.³²

These passages force us to distinguish between two further questions. What are the facts the Spirit provides? And what are the appropriate circumstances he also provides? First, the facts are nothing but the state of affairs we have called the double sacrifice of the Son and the Spirit in their atoning work: But still it must be remembered, that it is not the supernatural agency itself abstractly, which gives Christian peace and Christian strength to the mind, but the history of the Saviour’s work, which through this medium is spiritually revealed to it.³³ […] and indeed this doctrine is the ground of the Christian’s confidence […]³⁴ As the work of the Spirit is to enlighten the eyes of our understanding with regard to divine truth, and to take of the things of Christ and show them to us, the belief of this doctrine of course includes the conviction, that we stand in need of this light, and that the inclination of our hearts naturally leads us from the things of Christ.³⁵

Materially, the Spirit’s activity is bound to the incarnation and work of Christ and this avoids false enthusiasm and utopianism: We are also told, that the Spirit takes of the things relating to Christ, and presents them to the soul.³⁶ As the gospel confines the influence of the Spirit to the truths contained in the written word, there is nothing to fear from fanaticism. The Holy Spirit does not now reveal any thing new, but impresses what is already revealed.³⁷ We may gather from this, that the Spirit never acts, except through the medium of the doctrines of the Bible.³⁸

Second, what are the appropriate circumstances the Spirit provides? The answer sounds very simple: The appropriate circumstances consist in nothing but his own personal presence. It was his personal presence with Christ in his life, death and resurrection and correspondingly now it is his personal presence

      

Erskine Erskine Erskine Erskine Erskine Erskine Erskine

of of of of of of of

Linlathen, Linlathen, Linlathen, Linlathen, Linlathen, Linlathen, Linlathen,

Evidence, Evidence, Evidence, Evidence, Evidence, Evidence, Evidence,

p. 153. p. 157. p. 157. pp. 160 f. p. 152 p. 162. p. 152.

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with believers making them perceptive for the truth. The point of this very simple statement is not that it is simply the presence of the Spirit, but the presence of the Spirit as a person that causes the appropriate circumstances. This personal presence of the Spirit has to be conceived of as a personal relationship in the model of intimate and loyal friendship: When the arguments of the gospel alarm or confirm or comfort the mind, the Holy Spirit is present; and the belief of this will unspeakably enforce the argument; – just as we often find that the presence and voice of a friend will give weight to reasons which would be disregarded in his absence.³⁹

I think that all of this will suffice to exemplify how Erskine conceives of the activity of the Holy Spirit with believers. Let us take a closer look at the manner how Erskine conceives the effects – truth and love in assurance – of this activity.

2.4.1.2 The Effects of the Spirit’s Activity with Believers If the Spirit does nothing else but put the work of Christ and Christ himself into the presence of believers, his inspiring work is not primarily to overcome the guilt of sin, but sin itself by transforming believers into the body of Christ: “And this standard can be nothing else then the living power of the Head animating and filling the members; it must be Christ evidently living and moving in them by his own spirit.”⁴⁰ Since the aim of the work of the incarnated Word and the aim of the Spirit’s action is directed to the whole human race, believers will be equipped with the same attitude: “And as the sphere of the Spirit’s interest in this world is the whole human race, into whatsoever soul he enters, he carries with him this general interest, and this special charge.”⁴¹ From the view of the subject of the particular believer, this means being delivered from selfishness and being transforming into the image of the crucified. However, to look not primarily at one’s own interest is not a value in itself, but it is a relational value constituted by this interest in redeeming all humans: “[…] be delivered from selfish individuality, it [i.e. the human mind] will cease to seek its own, and will become an intercessor for […] the world with thanksgiving for the unspeakable gift.”⁴² This new attitude of believers causes new feelings:

   

Erskine Erskine Erskine Erskine

of of of of

Linlathen, Linlathen, Linlathen, Linlathen,

Evidence, pp. 161 f. Evidence, p. 167. Evidence, p. 171. Brazen Serpent, p. 172.

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This love in us, which is life, God’s own life, yes God Himself, for God is love, will love, and hate, and suffer in us, just as Christ did, because it was this same love dwelling in him, which loved, and hated, and suffered in him.⁴³ And therefore the Spirit of Holy love, which is the Spirit of God, is continually grieving and grieving over men. […] And this Spirit […] still bears our griefs and carries our sorrows, he still is wounded by our transgressions, and bruised by our iniquities; he still bears the iniquities of us all.⁴⁴

Furthermore, it causes a new communicative action of believers. They become the cross point in the communication between the inner Trinitarian communication and the communication of the human race with the help of their intercession and prayers: […] it is indeed His will that all men should be saved, and that it is His own loving Spirit within it, which is even now inspiring these desires, and drawing forth these prayers.⁴⁵ But it is not the creature, it is the Spirit of God in the creature, which prays. And what is this but a deeper deep – God praying to God?⁴⁶ The Spirit acting this way in the life of the body, and it is this life animating the members of Christ which fits them to be fellow workers with Christ and the Spirit against the serpent. It is this which fits them to be witnesses for Christ, as the head of life, and it is this which fits them to be intercessors for the body and the world.⁴⁷

2.4.2 The Spirit’s Activity in Believers Forced by the biblical speech of “dwelling in” and by his valuation of Pentecost as a historical narrative Erskine distinguishes the Spirit’s activity with believers from his activity in believers. The latter is an addition to the former and he describes it as the seal of the Spirit: “The Holy Ghost had been with them before, but now, he was in them. It was after that they believed, that they received this seal.”⁴⁸ Interestingly, in regard to this kind of action Erskine seems to forget the personal transcendence between the Spirit and humans: “And this it does, by being the actual indwelling of the personal Holy Ghost, exercising the power

     

Erskine Erskine Erskine Erskine Erskine Erskine

of of of of of of

Linlathen, Linlathen, Linlathen, Linlathen, Linlathen, Linlathen,

Brazen Brazen Brazen Brazen Brazen Brazen

Serpent, Serpent, Serpent, Serpent, Serpent, Serpent,

p. 160 p. 170. pp. 172 f. p. 171. p. 173 p. 183

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of God from out of the men.”⁴⁹ The effects of the Spirit’s “activity in” are radically different from the effects of the Spirit’s “activity with.” Whereas the latter means to become transformed into the image of the incarnated Christ and his atoning work described by the classical status exinanitionis, the effects of the former belongs to the realm of the risen Christ described by the classical status gloriae: Even so, if there be kingly power in Christ our root and head, then the mere manifestation of holy love in his members, without power, although it be an evidence of a much diviner kind than mere power, is nevertheless not a full witness for him, because it does not witnesses to the present, glorified condition.⁵⁰ I do not speak of a power separate from a love, but of a love clothed in power. It was no longer a love manifested in weakness, a love which could do no more than weep with them that weep, but it was a love which healed the sick and raised the dead. […] for it was declaring love dominant; and that is the gospel.⁵¹

The effects of the activity of the Spirit’s work in believers are nothing else but their ability to perform miracles of healing and miracles of raising the dead. But in contemporary times, no one observes these abilities in believing people: “These signs shall follow them that believe: and yet here is a church holding this faith, and nevertheless unfollowed by these signs.”⁵² Erskine’s explanation of this lack of abilities places the lack of faith in the church itself: “There was another conclusion to which the argument might have led, and that was the lack of faith in the church.”⁵³ However, Erskine also has to admit, that in all times, past and present, there is real faith in the church: “There has doubtless been a great deal of true life and true living faith in the professing church, since these signs have disappeared; but there must be a great and radical defect somewhere, to account for this absence.”⁵⁴ During the next hundred pages Erskine looks for an answer to this problem by describing the condition of the present church and voting for a millennarist option. However, he does not really find a satisfying answer. Or in other words, the only explanation he can find is very simple: What is responsible for the lack of these miraculous abilities is the fact that the church, like particular believers, has to be understood as simul justa and peccatrix. The church is also a corpus permixtum and as long as we have to distinguish between the visi-

     

Erskine Erskine Erskine Erskine Erskine Erskine

of of of of of of

Linlathen, Linlathen, Linlathen, Linlathen, Linlathen, Linlathen,

Brazen Brazen Brazen Brazen Brazen Brazen

Serpent, Serpent, Serpent, Serpent, Serpent, Serpent,

p. 183 p. 174. p. 175. p. 179. p. 180. p. 180.

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ble church and the hidden church we do not have to expect to find the effects of this “activity in” realized, yet there is, according to Erskine, one exception: the very early days of the church after Pentecost.

2.5 The Incarnation of the Word and the “Concarnation” of the Spirit Our task is now to evaluate Erskine’s pneumatology and I suggest using the notion of incarnation as the essential criterion. First we have to bear in mind what incarnation means and implies: (1) It implies the location of the incarnating entity (i. e. the Son) in a concrete particular spatio-temporal place in history. (2) Located in a concrete spatio-temporal place in history implies being open for receiving effects given by particular creatures. (3) The incarnation does not mean the abandonment of the essential divine attributes of love. (4) 2 and 3 imply that the incarnation indicates the Son’s attitude of surrender by adopting the real aims of creatures. (5) The incarnation implies an abandonment of the non-essential properties of omnipotence, since omnipotence is a property of the relationship of the transcendent to the whole of creation. (6) 4, 5 and the actuality of human sin imply a conflict of aims between the incarnated Son and his human creatures leading to the double-sacrifice of the Son on Calvary and of the Spirit in raising the dead Son and inspiring his human brothers and sisters. The question is, in what sense is the notion of incarnation applicable to the activity of the divine Spirit described by Erskine of Linlathen? I suggest that we can maintain the following statements: ‒ The Spirit’s activity with believers assists the atoning effect of Christ’s incarnation by supporting the attitude of the theology of the cross in the hearts and minds of the believers. We can see this as a positive analogy to the language of incarnation. ‒ In order to provide this aid to the effect of the Son’s atoning incarnation, it is necessary for the Spirit not to be incarnated himself. Because incarnation means being located in a concrete spatio-temporal place, the concept of incarnation excludes being located in other places in history or space. But if the Spirit’s work consists in constituting the communion of believers as

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the body of Christ, he must be able to be active in more than only one spatiotemporal place. Therefore, to be with the believers in a model of friendship is a negative analogy to the concept of incarnation. All in all, we can conclude that the Spirit’s work must be related to the incarnation but cannot be identified with incarnation. Therefore, we can speak of the Spirit’s activity with the believers as his aid for the incarnating activity of the Son. Traditionally the Spirit’s activity in the world is called inspiration. But the term “inspiration” is ambivalent. Whereas it signifies the necessary distinction from the incarnation of the Son, it does not signify its necessary relation to the incarnation. Therefore, I want to suggest using the term “concarnation” for the economic activity of the Spirit – derived from Richard of St. Victor’s description of the inner-trinitarian activity as condilectus and signifying both the necessary relation to and the necessary distinction from the incarnation of the Word. My very simple thesis consists in the assumption that understanding the Spirit’s work becomes problematic where one sets aside either the distinctiveness of incarnation and/or the relation to incarnation as such. If this assumption is valid, we cannot evaluate Erskine’s opinion about the Spirit’s work in the believers in the same positive manner: ‒ Strictly speaking, “to be in a particular believer” would imply being located in a concrete spatio-temporal place. I would say the Spirit would then be incarnate in a strict sense. But this would not be appropriate. At this point Erskine forgets the distinctiveness of the Spirit’s work vis-à-vis of the incarnation. ‒ To be an aid for the atoning effects of the incarnation of Christ implies supporting the attitude of love for the cross in believers, not the attitudes of the risen Christ. At this point Erskine forgets the relation between the Spirit’s work and the concept of incarnation. Nevertheless, I think Erskine is not completely wrong in distinguishing a more direct activity of the Holy Spirit from the indirect activity with believers. I suggest he is wrong in evaluating the narrative of Pentecost merely as a historical narrative. Luke combines in his narrative two aspects: He locates the indirect activity of the Spirit consisting in his constituting the communion of believers for the sake of his temporal scheme fifty days after Easter, whereas the other witnesses of the NT locate this mission of the Spirit immediately at the time of the different experiences of Christ as resurrected.⁵⁵ But this mission of the Spirit also implies

 Cf., e. g., Jürgen Becker, Das Urchristentum als gegliederte Epoche (Stuttgart 1993), pp. 29 – 38.

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his promise to act on believers like he has acted on the dead Christ. Luke has mixed this aspect of eschatological hope with the historic aspect in his narrative of Pentecost by referring to the hope of Joel 3. Nevertheless, I think we still have to wait in hope. But this eschatological activity of the Spirit can be understood as “concarnation” in the sense of being an aid for the incarnation of the Son, because the Spirit will not become incarnate in the world in order to be immediately present to his human creatures. Rather the human creatures will be incorporated into the inner Trinitarian framework in order to be immediately present to the Spirit, the Son and the Father “face to face.”

2.6 Consequences Applying the concept of “concarnation” to other descriptions of the activity of the Holy Spirit – unmentioned by Erskine but prominent in our present time – I think we have to assess some phenomena in contemporary piety as being problematic. I only want to mention some examples: ‒ To assume that the Spirit dictated the scriptures in a literal manner seems to mean a direct spatio-temporal incarnation of the Spirit in letters (or perhaps an “inletteration”). But it seems to lose the necessary distinction between the Spirit’s work and the incarnation. Is it, furthermore, possible to conceive a personal entity becoming incarnate in letters as a non-personal entity? ‒ To assume that the Spirit could act in an inspiring way that limits the gifts of the Spirit to an inner circle (the church as a whole or a particular community in the midst of the church) seems to force the relation to the incarnation, because such an understanding loses sight of Christ’s universal intention for his work. ‒ To assume that the Spirit would only act in creating enthusiasm and other affects, feelings or emotions of joy experienced in intimate communities also seems to be an understanding of the Spirit’s activity that is not closely related enough to the incarnation of Christ. The absence of glory and prosperity is by no means evidence for an absence of the Spirit’s supportive activity. ‒ Phenomena like glossolalia can be hints of the “presence” of the “concarnating” activity of the Spirit – under two conditions: The glossolalia reported by Paul has to be distinguished from the xenolalia reported by Luke in Acts 2. The history of the Pentecost-movement shows that this was a hard lesson to

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learn.⁵⁶ But it was nevertheless a necessary lesson, because speaking and understanding unlearned languages would harm the necessary distinction of the Spirit’s work from incarnation. That is also the reason for my opinion that the phenomenon of glossolalia cannot be a necessary or a sufficient condition (in an epistemological respect) of the presence of the Spirit. The criteria of relatedness to and distinctiveness from incarnation – collected in the term “concarnation” – could perhaps contribute something to exploring the cosmic aspect (i. e. the activity directed to non-personal entities) of the Spirit’s activity in the world as bound to and distinguished from the work of the cosmic Christ as mediator of creation.⁵⁷

 Cf. Anna Quaas and Jörg Haustein, ‘Die Pfingstbewegung,’ in Mark Mühling (ed.), Kirchen und Konfessionen (Göttingen 2009), pp. 169 – 84, esp. pp. 172 f.  A specific doctrine of the cosmic Spirit satisfying these two criteria can be found in Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematische Theologie, vol. 2 (Göttingen 1991), pp. 96 ff.

Hans-Joachim Sander

3 The Signs of the Times – a Locus for the Word to meet the Spirit: the Heterotopian Character of Truth in History In modern European times two precarious questions were raised about God: Does God exist? And: If so, what is his responsibility in human suffering? God’s existence becomes a very complicated matter as soon as the two questions are combined. On the one hand his existence was denied on the basis of the power which is claimed for his existence. If God’s power is so enormous that it is responsible for all and everything in the universe then God may be blamed for human suffering. In consequence human suffering – especially if it is innocent – serves as a strong argument against his existence as a power which is expected to be good for human beings.

3.1 Power, powerlessness and suffering – God as a precarious subject A nineteenth-century German writer, Georg Büchner, put it in famous phrases: “Why do I suffer? That is the rock of atheism.”¹ Here, the power which is found in the concept of God and which can be applied to everything in the universe is used as an argument against God’s existence. The deistic reduction of this power which argues that God once used his power for creation but after that liberated himself and the universe from being involved in all and everything is no longer a convincing argument. The combination of the two questions raised above is attacking its weak point: God’s apathy with a person’s individual suffering. God can never be isolated enough by apathy that he cannot be related to my personal experience of suffering. There has to be some sort of empathy involving

 “Man kann das Böse läugnen, aber nicht den Schmerz, nur der Verstand kann Gott beweisen, das Gefühl empört sich dagegen. – Merke dir, Anaxagoras, warum leide ich? Das ist der Fels des Atheismus. Das leiseste Zucken des Schmerzes, und rege es sich nur in einem Atom, macht einen Riß in der Schöpfung von oben bis unten.” Georg Büchner, Dantons Tod: Dramatische Bilder aus Frankreichs Schreckensherrschaft, ed. Joseph Kiermeier-Debre (Frankfurt 1835, München: dtv, reprint 1997), third act, p. 85.

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him in my personal suffering if existence applies to him as powerfully as claimed. But on the other hand arguments in favour of God can be brought forward as well if the two problems of human suffering and God’s existence are combined. If God really has the power to take responsibility for human suffering as his cause then his existence makes a big difference for this suffering. God and the powerlessness of this suffering come together and personal suffering becomes a sort of locus theologicus, a place to find arguments about God. At this point it should be possible to discover the true nature of God’s power. If there is a God with a caring relationship to everything in the universe then it cannot be impossible to demonstrate his power on the basis of the suffering. In both cases power and powerlessness are combined in different modes and this leads to different concepts of God. In the first answer, the atheist one in the sense of a radical non-theistic position, God’s power is a danger for a human answer to suffering. His existence must be denied in order to get rid of the power involved in the concept of God. Here God serves as a tool to enhance the power of human subjects in existential matters. In the second answer, the theistic alternative of trust in God as a supreme being, the same divine power provides a basis for an answer to human suffering. In order to experience the relevance of the concept of God one has to accept the power of his existence. In the first answer God’s power and human beings’ powerlessness in suffering contradict each other. By opting for human power his existence is denied. In the second answer God’s power cannot be understood without a close relation to human powerlessness. By opting against human powerlessness his existence is believed. Yet for both positions, the concept of God is unavoidable for the arguments raised. If one is decided to believe in God’s non-existence an alternative power is needed to overcome the fatality of powerlessness in human suffering. This alternative may be more humanity, better resistance against violence, improving the rule of law, progress in medical knowledge and so forth, basically more modernity. If one is decided to believe in God’s existence an alternative form of powerlessness is needed to overcome a contradiction between powerlessness in human suffering and God’s power to take responsibility for this. Then this powerlessness is filled up with God’s presence and its violent attack on human existence is turned into a special human experience which is alienating and entrusting at the same time.

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3.2 Spirit and Word – A Binary Code in Danger of Dualism The binary code of Spirit and Word applies at this point. “Word” may stand for a strategy to submit to the authority of a sacred text which empowers believers to overcome the burden of powerlessness unavoidable in human life by reference to a God willing to reveal his affection to the reader of this text. Then the locus of the person involved in suffering becomes the reality-test of the power of the Word. “Spirit” may stand for a strategy to submit to the experience of an ideal power which empowers no matter what kind of powerlessness is felt by transcending one’s own life into a horizon much greater than one’s own small position in the universe. Then the test how convincing this idea may be is the capability of the persons to transcend his or her locus of suffering. In both ways powerlessness is transformed into some sort of power which can be tested no matter how vague a God-term or a religious ultimate reality may be. Both strategies can be raised against the atheist position by the very power they bring into existence. But there is a problem of dualism which weakens both strategies. Within a binary code one has to decide which part to choose. After having chosen one part the other part has to be excluded. But nevertheless each part depends on the difference to the other part in order to be an option for a decision between both. As long as Word and Spirit stand against each other none of them has a chance to break up the atheistic option of more modernity by believing in a Non-God or non-religious ultimate reality. Both cases – believing in God and/or in an ultimate religious reality and non-believing in God in the sense of denying God’s existence or an ultimate religious reality – are intellectual challenges. Yet, in the first one there is more to lose in modern times because of the existential need to relate to the suffering of oneself or others. If there is no strategy to overcome the contradiction between Word and Spirit then powerlessness in human suffering looks like a final fate and this deepens the violent power of this suffering even more. This means that for those who have decided to believe in God and/or an ultimate religious reality it is necessary to bring forward arguments in favour of God or an ultimate religious reality. For the theistic side of the problem one may put that in the formula: the more one believes in God, the more intellectuality is needed. Human suffering puts high pressure on human existence and on societies. In modern times this resulted in a relation between God’s existence and human intellectuality which is unprecedented in religious history. Suddenly human intellectuality is on par with God’s existence. To some extent the power of God’s existence depends on the authority of arguments. This is a result of the pressure

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caused by suffering because this experience is not a simple idea. It is a bitter common reality and at the end of modern times it has even increased. Human beings are presently living in a world full of suffering as a result of endemic violence in the age of globalization. We are in doubt of God here and now because of the power of this suffering. Unfortunately, it cannot be overcome in referring to a divine existence being present since all ancient times and for all future times. And this creates doubts about God’s actual existence. The same argument can more or less be said about an ultimate religious reality. Both strategies of Word and Spirit want to control these doubts by the power of submission. In the strategy of Word God is made present by a sacred text which provides consolation or a way to a better future. This text is a tradition from ancient times and it was not written to meet modern doubts with God’s power. There may be a gift in return for the suffering here and now as this text confirms its readers but this upcoming gift has nothing to do with present doubts. In the strategy of Spirit suffering is put into a much wider horizon than individual experience. And this horizon gives meaning to the suffering even if it remains a harsh personal experience. But here we have basically the same picture: This horizon has no immediate impact on the present. The precarious questions of ‘why?’ and ‘how?’ scales the wider horizon down to modern size. In both strategies God or the wider horizon of being is secured against powerlessness caused by these doubts. This is the core of the problem.

3.3 The Urgency of Present Times – Unavoidable in Terms of God The modern doubts are still there and they have an important consequence: God is not an entity whose existence is in doubt for the past. And he is not an entity whose existence is uncertain for the future. These two places in time are not the really important ones, at least not for solving the problem of modern doubts about his true power. If God has no existence here and now then why should there be any reason to look for his existence in the past or in the future? His possible non-existence here and now is able to make his eternal character more or less unimportant. God may be an eternal entity but without presence in the actual world this eternity has no power. In this sense the pressure to bring forward arguments in favour of God does not come out of the past or the future. God happens here and now, so to speak. He is a powerful agent in the plural, ambiguous and uncertain times we are living in or he is nothing else but an interesting idea without meaning. But exactly this presence is not obvious. Submission in the

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mode of an ancient text or a wider horizon cannot bring it into a common experience shared by others as a matter of course. Submission only reveals the power of the concept of God. Therefore it is much easier not to bring forward ideas about God’s reality. In this sense theology is a never ending intellectual and personal task whereas notbelieving in God may give much more intellectual comfort; as Wittgenstein once put it: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”² It is therefore not surprising that there are no final answers to be found for modern questions about God’s existence and about his meaning within a world of suffering. But at the same time it is not surprising that just because there is no final answer in terms of God or ultimate religious reality the topics ‘God’ and ‘ultimate religious reality’ are still very much alive in societies and for people today. In terms of both topics it is not that easy to pass over in silence what we cannot speak about. Speechlessness doesn’t give comfort, it causes existential concern. And this cannot be met by intellectual certainty.

3.4 Europe’s Religious Turn – A Return to Globalized Public Religions Human beings do not experience final consolation about the fact that people are still suffering even if one is convinced that God doesn’t exist. This suffering brings us no small doubt about our fate in time. Left alone with suffering and uncertainty is much worse than having a powerful entity be blamed for both even if the existence of this entity may be doubtful. Therefore it still makes a lot of sense to deal with God’s existence in personal matters and for public affairs. An interesting example of that occurred recently. On 6 January 2009 an “atheist bus campaign” was launched in London. Two hundred London City Buses presented an advertisement saying “There is probably no God. Now stop worrying and enjoy your life.”³ Similar campaigns were organised in major other European cities. This campaign was invented by an artist to resist a previous religious advertisement on London City Buses which used God’s power to create apocalyptic fears. This ad said that those who do not believe in God will end up in hell. They used suffering to demonstrate God’s existence and at the same time they denied the modern problem with God’s power, his

 Max Black, A Companion to Wittgenstein’s ‘Tractatus’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), p. 377.  Daily Mail from 6 January 2009.

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doubtful existence. In contrast to this attempt the atheist bus campaign is admitting doubts – “probably” – and so its position offers relief from divine power games through not-believing in God. This is only one of a series of examples in the last two decades of a revival of public discourses about religious visions and values in European societies. One may even speak of a religious turn. Europe is no longer the secular exception excluding religious questions and options from public discourse. The North American experience to have both secularity and religiosity on a high scale, once seen as the great exception, is much closer to the global situation of religion of societies in a post industrialised age. Since 11 September 2001 this turn has shown an ambivalent character on a global scale. Religion can be used to resist and to overcome violence in societies but at the same time it may be used to intensify conflicts or to justify violence. But in no case can religion be treated as a topic easily excluded from public discourse. The former thesis that modern societies will be continuously secularised in the sense of privatising religion is under heavy pressure. It is no longer the main stream in current philosophical and sociological thinking. José Casanova has invented the concept of “public religion” to understand this important change.⁴ Religions able to be public power brokers are subjects that public discourses cannot avoid dealing with. This means that religions which are able to understand their own beliefs on the basis of major problems of public interest are no longer condemned to be only a factor in private life. Religion is a public matter independent of one’s own personal convictions and beliefs and it is providing with discourses on public matters which go far beyond claims for singularity by Christian churches. On the contrary, one can observe an emergent global denominationalism.⁵ Charles Taylor speaks of a “third secularity” in a post-Durkheimian mode. He sees religious beliefs about God and ultimate religious reality reformulated by an age of authenticity where they are considered as earnest personal matters. Religion is a very difficult factor in people’s intellectual and spiritual lives and it has almost unavoidably a public impact by not contradicting public religions. We may live in a disenchanted world but this gives no reason to exclude religious answers for that which is bigger than one’s own life.⁶ In sum, within the framework of late modern secularity public life and

 José Casanova, Public religions in the modern world (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).  José Casanova, Europas Angst vor der Religion (Berlin: Berlin University Press, 2009), pp. 113 – 19.  Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Ma.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 423 – 535.

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private self-understanding are no longer easily relieved of a God-factor. They have to be able to develop positions capable of dealing with the subjects God and God’s public power. Here is the chance for the strategies like Word and Spirit, no matter what uneasiness one may feel about their submission projects. This means for theology that its task is not fulfilled if it can present reasonable arguments in favour of the beliefs held by the various religious communities it is specially related to. And its task is not yet fulfilled if it can provide concepts to overcome the division between strategies like Word and Spirit. These two problems remain high on a theological agenda. But at the same time theology has to deal with the public factor religious beliefs may be or may become in relation to powerlessness and power present in the public sphere. Public religion needs a public theology which deals with the actual ambiguity unavoidable in religious beliefs. So in this sense, theology has a twofold character. It is based partly on religious traditions and their ongoing truth-claims and partly on actual history and its unsolved social, political, cultural problems. It has to find ways to combine these two different perspectives in modes which empower both at the same time.

3.5 Subjects’ Confrontation with Precarious History – a Locus to think differently about God This bipolar character urges us to think differently about God. In theology for centuries one was used to getting an idea who this God may be. Then the basis to think about God is God himself. It seems to me that the picture is not different for the ultimate religious reality. But lacking real expertise I will concentrate here on the theistic mode. In this version God was seen as the master of all times and no time is good enough to reveal anything about who this God is. For such a vision, public theology is not needed in the sense of attention to actual powerlessness. Such powerlessness has to be overcome by this theology. An eternal divine power is all that is needed. Yet in front of human powerlessness in personal and public history this is not convincing. If present times are unavoidable for a systematically developed public theology and if these times are times of upheaval⁷ then time in all its am-

 Lieven Boeve, God Interrupts History: Theology in a Time of Upheaval (New York, NY: Continuum, 2007).

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biguity is a constitutive factor for revealing who this God may be. In various different forms this relation to time as the problem of history has been a broad conviction within theology for the last 100 years. One may even say that it represents the grammar of modern theologies. One can find major aspects of this attention to time in almost every new approach to theology: from Liberal Theology to Nouvelle Théologie, from dialectical theology, especially in Bonhoeffer’s mode, to theologies based on existential confrontations like Rahner’s theology, even in Balthasar’s theodramatic trinitarian mode, from theologies referring to a common universal history as Pannenberg’s theology to all forms of political theology, from theologies of liberation to feminist theologies, from process theology to theologies of religious pluralism, from theologies with self-understanding as being part of the cultural sciences to comparative theologies, from theologies of freedom ultimately justified by Christ to post-colonial theologies. Here the human subject as a historically located entity is at the centre of theology. This subject brings in time in its broadest sense as an open question and as a major factor for God-talk. The timeless nature of God has ceased to be of broad interest. Time has become a sort of co-subject to subjectivity which is the very centre to meet God. Here one is referring to God with something every human being can relate to as his or her internal resource of life, her or his subjectivity. In this approach time is an internal personal experience for relating to God. This is the main stream to deal with the problem of God and time and there is no reason to disclaim its meaning and its truths. Yet there is another approach within theology under the conditions of modern times. And this approach is no contradiction to the option for subjectivity but it creates a contrast to it. And in my opinion this contrast can be a major contribution for resolving the problem of contradiction in the binary code Spirit and Word. It brings forward time in an objective way which is an unavoidable factor for subjects. By their historical nature subjects are confronted with power and powerlessness which not only comes from one’s inner life, the existential quest, but a confrontation with the outside world. Subjects are forced by history into precarious lives and history alienates them from the wishes and visions they claim from time. To some extent, history offends their projects. Within catholic theology one can relate this approach to a systematic theology at the early beginnings of modern times, and to doctrines seeking to come to terms with modernity. The first one is Melchior Cano’s De locis theologicis from 1563 and last one Vatican II from 1962 to 1965. To some extent Vatican II is fulfilling the vision of Cano’s idea of history as a locus theologicus alienus. History is not only a factor unavoidable for a God-talk which is related to human suffering but this history is an embarrassing, strange reality. It is a locus which cannot be controlled by God-talk, but for that reason it has an authority over what ought to

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be said in terms of God. The open question history represents as ever ambiguous present times is a place for raising arguments about believing in God. This changes the very grammar to search for God.

3.6 Vatican II’s Topological View of God and History The major subject of Vatican II was the Church. This Council developed two basic perspectives about the Church: ecclesia ad intra and ecclesia ad extra. For that purpose it presents its doctrine about the Church in two constitutions. The first one is taught in the dogmatic constitution of the Church Lumen gentium, the second one in the pastoral constitution of the Church in the world of today Gaudium et spes. The first one teaches what the Church is if she is presented by means she has access to out of herself: her mystery closely related to the unmixed and unseparated natures of Christ, the People of God marching through a history led by God towards salvation, hierarchy and laity, general and special priesthood, the ecclesial meaning of religious vows, Mary as Church in person and so on. In mutuality with these internal topics the second perspective on the Church, the pastoral constitution, looks to the Church from outside. It deals with the ambiguity of present times, with doctrines of faith which are questioned by this situation and with special urgent problems of daily life, of social and economic conditions of life and of international affairs. This double view of the present times and ecclesial beliefs leads to a new and unmatched form to deal with theological issues. One is urged to look for means of faith and religion the Church has access to only from outside – even if most of these means can be found within her own existence.⁸ In my view this new form has a topological character. The Council puts this in the general locus of “in the world of today.” The notion is not simply “the Church and the World,” a well-known duality of modern times. It is not simply a binary code used very often in modern intellectuality like subject-object, gainloss, left-right, man-woman, north-south, east-west, etc. The notion “in the world of today” points to the locus theologicus people of today represent for faith in God. Human beings as they are living here and now, with their griefs and their joys, their hopes and their anxieties, build up a place in history where the

 For a theological overview of the teachings of Vatican II cf. Herders Theologischer Kommentar zum Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil, 5 vols., ed. Peter Hünermann and Bernd Jochen Hilberath (Freiburg: Herder, reprint 2009).

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Church will find the meaning of their beliefs. Here Christians are confronted with God in a sometimes surprising way and they cannot ignore God’s relation to these people whatever the relation of these people with God may be. Here the Church will also find marks of their errors and misreading about that which is really the case. It is not only the subjectivity of people to be respected for Christian faith. It is also the objectivity of their place in history as being subjects of power and subjects of powerlessness. One cannot submit to this place because one is already a subject of it. Submission is no option because confrontation with this place constantly happens. Being different from it is unavoidable. This is much more precarious than every submission to Word and Spirit has in mind because in this confrontation one cannot overcome powerlessness by whatever powerful means faith can provide its believers with. For this topology the Council uses the notion of the pastoral. The pastoral nature of ecclesial doctrines relates ecclesial teachings with mankind as it stands here and now. For presentations of the Gospel one cannot choose the people one would like to get assuming that they are in favour of this message. One has to deal with the people one cannot avoid being related to. These are the human beings living today. These people are a very complicated matter in all kinds of respect – sociologically, culturally, politically, religiously, personally. They are unavoidable factors for referring to the Christian God. In this sense theology cannot look down on people here and now from a higher position which is secured by religiosity and tradition. It stands in front of them and it has to find answers to what they are deeply involved into. This place has an authority over what faith has to bring forward because this place is unavoidable for that which really matters in front of God. It is a locus theologicus, or more precisely: it is a locus theologicus alienus. The Church cannot control this locus but she cannot avoid being related to it with all of her faith. This locus urges theology to overcome binary codes in terms of God which puts God only on one side, preferably her own side. All the doctrines the Church teaches about her faith at Vatican II are presented in a pastoral manner. This is due to the “pastoral magisterium” Pope John XXIII issued in his opening speech of the Council.⁹ So in Gaudium et spes one can find almost all of the classical teachings of Christian faith but they are taught in a new mode. They are brought in by a pastoral formula. This includes the Church’s faith in God. It is not a new position that God can be found in relation to people here and now. This is old tradition. But here in Gaudium et spes

 Ludwig Kaufmann and Nikolaus Klein, Johannes XXIII. Prophetie im Vermächtnis (Fribourg: Exodus, 1990), p. 136.

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the presence of God is taught in a distinctive manner. For this presence one has to look for signs, which are related to the signs of the times. In number 11 this Constitution states: “The People of God believes that it is led by the Lord’s Spirit, Who fills the earth. Motivated by this faith, it labours to decipher authentic signs of God’s presence and purpose in the happenings, needs and desires in which this People has a part along with other men of our age.” Here three major concepts for theology are linked together: human beings as “the people of God” and as “other men of our age,” time in the mode of “happenings, needs, desires” shared by mankind and finally God as “Lord’s Spirit” and “God’s presence and purpose.” They are linked together by the notion of “authentic signs.” The signs for God have to be deciphered in history. The topological approach Gaudium et spes suggested for the Church can be extended to God. I would even say it has to be extended to God. Time in the form of present times is a place to meet God if one is able to decipher his signs. By the question who God is will be transformed into the problem where in history he can be identified at all. His “who-identity” is based on a “where-identification.” God’s places in history – his “where-identity,” so to speak – are linked to signs which have to be read on historical terms. These signs are closely related to the signs of the times Gaudium et spes is combining the Gospel with (GS 4). One cannot gain power by referring to these signs because one simply has to realize that they are there no matter whether one would like to see them or not. One is confronted with powerlessness. Such signs may be powerful but not those who read them. They have to create new signs for that reading.¹⁰ These two forms of signs in GS 11 and GS 4 are not simply identical but they cannot be separated. Both refer to the upheavals of history. They are considered as places one has to expose oneself to in order to find their truth.

3.7 History’s Truth – Transcending Mankind’s Utopias History is an ambiguous reality. It is a reality in time and at the same time it is a result of stories told about it as past time. And these two things do not have to be the same. Sometimes we tell stories about history which never happened and

 I am using here semiotics by Charles S. Peirce. One of its major positions is that to read a sign a new sign is needed, which is called “interpretant” in Peirce’s diction. Cf. Charles S. Peirce, Semiotische Schriften, trans. and ed. Christian J. W. Kloesel and Helmut Pape (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986), vol. 1, p. 375.

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most of what happens and happened will never be told enough to be remembered over time. In this sense history is a vague place for human beings. One cannot be sure about it because we cannot control its reality and we cannot guarantee the truth of our stories. To solve this problem one has searched in modern times for a special place. Thomas More discovered it in 1516. Unlike all the other places Europeans discovered at that time this place does not exist. But this doesn’t mean that it is not there. It lies ahead in the future. This place was “Utopia,” “not-place,” the title which More gave his famous book concerning the highest state of the republic.¹¹ With the help of utopias modern times have searched to control history and the stories about histories. It is an advantage that they are not-places because one can focus on going to these places without being disturbed by realities of past times and/or present times which are there in real places. For utopias it is enough to control the means one has already at hand by oneself. So utopias and self-relying autonomy go together. Two things are required for marching towards utopias: One has to concentrate on one’s own capabilities here and now and one has to exclude all and everybody which may disturb the progress to the non-place, i. e. discipline over oneself and others and mechanisms for exclusion. Concentration on one’s own self and mechanisms of exclusion are very able strategies to create power over one’s own existence and over others. Yet after the cruelties of twentieth century one has to concede that the modern searches for utopias usually lead to force and violence. We are living in a post-utopian era which is a time of upheaval, currently a world-wide financial and economic crisis. Mankind has become a sort of globalized entity and now this entity has to realize that we cannot force history to develop along utopias mankind was eager to implement, not the least at the financial markets. It may be a deep truth of history that human beings have to overcome their utopias in order to become serious about the times they have to live with. Gaudium et spes refers to true signs of God’s presence in history. Can these authentic signs be found in utopias? Of course, one can use the power of God or an ultimate religious reality to intensify progress towards places one has only visions of. In this sense Spirit and Word fit very well into that. The God-term was very often used in this sense in modern times. Most of such enterprises failed in inquisition, persecution and eviction of people with other religious beliefs, religious wars, theocracy, self-delusion of anti-modernism and fundamentalism. Despite all their obvious differences religious utopian enterprises have in common

 Thomas More, Utopia, ed. George M. Logan (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006).

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a will to control history. Such a will is active in the will to believe in the strategies of Word or Spirit. But God is in control of history, not man. So it is for human beings to overcome their anxiousness to lose control of history. In doing so one has a chance to meet God in history. There is a major difference between utopias and authentic signs Gaudium et spes refers to. A progress towards utopia is not satisfied having “only signs”, it is searching for power over history by discipline and exclusions. In the signs for God’s presence powerlessness will be experienced. But this powerlessness is not filled with violence. It is an adventure in history.

3.8 The Person of the Spirit – a Heterotopos for Truth Claims about God’s Presence in Time What locus is left if the place to meet God is not utopia? It must be a place where one finds truth about history. Gaudium et spes refers to the Spirit in this respect: “The People of God believes that it is led by the Lord’s Spirit, Who fills the earth.” (GS 11) In Christian tradition the Spirit is a creative power – “veni creator spiritus” – and a sort of “great communicator” between God and the world.¹² On the basis of the topological framework of Gaudium et spes the Spirit’s creative power and communication skills have a pastoral nature. People led by the Lord’s Spirit are confronted with the earth as it is because the Spirit fills the earth and they are confronted with the world as it should be but not yet is because the Spirit is acting along God’s plan for history. People thus confronted are led to solidarity with mankind as it stands now. They are not allowed to be separated from people because they are “other people” with strange habits or ideas. These are a sort of presuppositions for a theology of the Spirit pastorally developed in the world of today. In this sense one cannot submit to the Spirit because this would mean avoiding confrontation with others for the sake of a divine spiritual power. There is an alternative to utopia which can provide God talk with means to meet these presuppositions. This alternative is a place in history but unlike utopia it is not non-existent and its place doesn’t lie ahead in the future. It is already there, here and now. It is an other-place, so to speak, where one is confronted with subjects or topics one would prefer to pass over in silence because one cannot speak about them along the normal order of things. These topics urge us to

 Cf. The Spirit in the church and the world, ed. Bradford E. Hinze (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 2004).

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overcome positions one holds as matters of course and claiming to be true. Therefore one cannot refer to them without accepting an experience of powerlessness.¹³ At such challenging places utopias are confronted with realities revealing them as illusions or as violent power claims. The other places to utopias are ‘heterotopias’. The term was invented by Michel Foucault for social, political, cultural, personal realities which cannot be treated without changing the order of things.¹⁴ The graveyard is an example of a heterotopos. It is a place which really exists and where the dead are housed. Being confronted with this place one is urged – or even forced – to think about one’s own destiny of being dead. And all utopias one is eager to reach out for are relativized. In the Christian funeral ritual the moment comes when the community of mourners at the grave prays for the one who will be dead next. At that moment the silence becomes usually very intense. Here the grave functions as a heterotopos. Other heterotopias Foucault mentions are the brothel, theatres, a good library, colonies and the ships people use in migration. Auschwitz is a heterotopos still very alive as the case of the holocaust denial by Bishop Williamson just demonstrated. Chernobyl is a heterotopos as well as cities ridden by war-crimes or fallen prey to mass destruction. For China Tibet is a very hot heterotopos. And recently Wall Street has turned into a  Luther already discussed this problem in reference to liberum arbitrium: “Das Gesetz legt dem Menschen vor, was er im Gehorsam gegenüber dem Willen des Schöpfers tun sole, und zeigt ihm gerade auf diese Weise, sein Unvermögen, den Willen Gottes eigenständig (kraft seines liberum arbitrium) zu tun. Während Erasmus alle von ihm angeführten Gebote nach der Regel ‚ought presupposes can’ interpretiert, haben sie für Luther ihren Sinn in der Regel ‚ought discloses cannot’. Das Gesetz führt zu der Selbsterkenntnis, die dem Menschen sein Unvermögen offenbart – eine Einsicht, die der Widersacher Gottes vor dem Menschen unter allen Umständen verbergen will. […] Erst in dieser Situation, der durch das Gesetz aufgedeckten Machtlosigkeit des Menschen, aktiv zum Heil etwas beizutragen, die als Tod aller Eigenständigkeit erfahren wird, kann der Mensch die Worte der Verheißung hören.” (Christoph Schwöbel, “Offenbarung, Glaube und Gewissheit in der reformatorischen Theologie,” in Grund und Gegenstand des Glaubens nach römisch-katholischer und evangelisch-lutherischer Lehre: Theologische Studien, ed. Eilert Herms and Lubomir Žak (Tübingen/Rome: Mohr Siebeck/Lateran University Press, 2008), pp. 214– 234, 225). Here the Word represents an other-place for man’s self-justification which is utopian.  Michel Foucault, Andere Räume, in Schriften in vier Bänden Dits et Ecrits, ed. Daniel Defert and Michael Bischoff (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2005), vol. 4, pp. 931– 942; also as: Die Heterotopien. Der utopische Körper, zweisprachige Ausgabe, transl. Michael Bischoff, postscript Daniel Defert (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2005). English version: ‘Different Spaces’, in Michel Foucault, R. Hurley/J. D. Faubion/P. Rabinow, Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology. Essential Works of Foucault 1954 – 1984 vol. 2, ed. James Faubion (London: Penguin, 2000), pp. 175 – 85. For perspectives of this concept in theology cf. Trygve Wyller, Heterotopic Citizen. New Research on Religious Work for the Disadvantaged (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009).

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heterotopos after having been obsessed for a long time with the most powerful utopias of late modern civilisation. In the Bible God is very often linked to places which can be characterised as heterotopoi: the Exile, Jerusalem attacked by the Assyrians and conquered by the New-Babylonians, the forty years in the desert at the Exodus, Gethsemane and Golgotha, the empty tomb, the Corinthians in Paul’s letters, the heavenly Jerusalem etc. At each of these places people cannot avoid overcoming a God-talk which they were used to take for granted. Here they are urged to rethink the issue “God.” Here topics which are not fit for God and which demonstrate that certain ideas about God are misleading have to be taken more seriously. These places have a revelatory nature in the sense that they demonstrate the otherness of God especially for those who are very sure about who this God should be. This causes powerlessness and speechlessness because it reveals the self-righteousness of those who have tried to possess God. At such places one cannot submit to the Word because the Word is lost. Not every heterotopos of our days is a heterotopos where God reveals himself. But as decisive moments in time heterotopias contradict utopias and this contradiction alone has a theological meaning. The ruling order of things breaks down and at this rupture God cannot be used to control this order. Here references to God must be creative or they are not convincing any more. At this point God will be a precarious power in the midst of powerlessness. This liberates us from a God-talk which is subjected to the power claims of utopias and it opens the door for the otherness of God’s order of things. This new order, of course, has still to be found, but it really has a chance. One needs God himself to find an alternative which can deal with the speechlessness resulting from heterotopias, i. e. a new vision of the Word. This is the place for the Spirit as creative communicative force urging us not to avoid confrontations with such a precarious otherness. At a heterotopos powerlessness rules but here one can start a fresh perspective to the problems with God’s power and existence still unsolved. This creative act is an experience of the Spirit to overcome one’s words for the Word. Such a heterotopos has a special relation to language.

3.9 Word and Spirit – a Proposal for Thirdness in God-talk There is a major difference between a who-mode to identify God and a wheremode to do so. The final goal of a divine “who-identity” is a positive identification of God. One wants to know who God is und what kind of inner life his ex-

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istence may have – be it Word or be it Spirit. This approach has to face a danger towards history. In knowing who God is – or in pretending to know who God is – one is tempted to use the power revealed to dominate others in history. There is a long tradition of a fatal coalition between imperial thinking and religious knowledge of God. Fundamentalism with a clear political agenda is the latest example. Here language is simply a vehicle to get access to God. It is not the place to meet him but a place for transmission of power from God to one’s own plans with history. Utopia fits very well in this setting and it is easy to create a utopian word and a utopian spirit. In the divine “where-identity” there is almost no chance to identify God positively. Places where he reveals what he is all about have a heterotopian quality. The more he reveals about his own existence the more heterotopian these places turn out to be. Only two examples: In Exodus 3 Moses has to go to Egypt after getting to know the name God has revealed to him. Moses got a word which is against his spirit because Egypt is the last place Moses feels comfortable with. He has good reasons to escape from it and not return. All his utopias have fallen apart in Egypt and the upcoming Exodus will provide him with the same experience. The very knowledge who Jesus really is, the Son of God, comes to the mind of the Roman centurion under the cross when Jesus is dying (Mark 15:39). Jesus’ disciples have fled the place. They have a spirit which keeps them away from hearing the Word. A Jesus dying at a Roman Cross doesn’t fit into their ideas about a powerful history with God. At such heterotopian places one has to overcome ideas of God and projects with his presence which give power to those who stick to their truth-claims. This is a negative identification of what one has to pass over in terms of God. At heterotopias with God a creative transformation can take place and that what is overwhelmed by speechlessness comes to terms with identifications of God which never came up before. One is left without words for what God is or who God is. Such a being without words is a heterotopian experience in language itself. At this place one meets the Spirit as the Word for having no words of God. Here, this Word for having no words becomes the very Word of God. This Word is the topos where an experience of the Spirit waits. Between the confrontation of the human subject with God’s Word as the Lord’s Spirit there is a third reality – the heterotopian place of having no words good enough for the experience to transcend oneself. This thirdness is a locus theologicus alienus. It has a historical quality of being turned around in one’s own identity and a linguistic character of speechlessness. It is the very place of theology in God talk. Here theology means to be sure of not having words good enough for God but knowing that this having no words is the Word where God comes to be known.

Lieven Boeve

4 Theological Truth, Difference and Plurality: Perspectives from a Contextual European Theology of Interruption From within a European theological perspective, the way in which theological truth claims are to be dealt with today has changed considerably over the last few decades, and, for the most part, is due to the following developments. Firstly, there is the changed European religious situation, which can be analysed in terms of being both post-Christian and post-secular. This has resulted in the need to reassess the position of the Christian faith, as well as its attempts to deal with the changes. These approaches vary from deploying very defensive and protective strategies up to the uncritical embracing of the new situation as a new era of religion.¹ Secondly, the postmodern criticism of master narratives, first of all criticising modern ideologies but also having an impact upon religious narratives, has heightened sensitivity for plurality, difference, conflict and otherness. Indeed, in Christian theological circles, this criticism, along with its heightened sensibilities, has lead to reflections on theology’s own mechanisms of inclusion or exclusion, turning the Christian narrative into one of the grand or master narratives which victimise otherness in view of its own purposes. Such reflections often have resulted in reintroducing negative theology as a necessary dynamic at work in all theologies.² Thirdly, and closely related to the first and the second developments, the way theology deals with its truth claims is challenged by the awareness of religious plurality and the practices of interreligious communication. In Western contexts religious plurality and interreligious communication have become part of the common consciousness. Migration, tourism, media, world politics, etc., have brought religious plurality and the attempts to cope with religious dif-

 See, e. g., P. Berger (ed.), The Desecularisation of the World. Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999); M. Hoelzl & G. Ward (eds.), The New Visibility of Religion: Studies in Religion and Cultural Hermeneutics (Continuum Resources in Religion and Political Culture) (London: Continuum, 2008).  See, e. g., K. Hart, “On Interruption,” in J.D. Caputo, M. Dooley & M. Scanlon (eds.), Questioning God, (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2001), pp. 186 – 208.

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ference onto our doorstep and into our living rooms. How then is one to think of one’s own religious truth claims in relation to the claims of others? And how is one to assess the classic theological strategies of exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism in this regard?³ At the same time, fourthly, the impact of globalisation on the world, of the economisation of its procedures, and of the mediatisation of its public space seem to foster large-scale tendencies towards uniformity. Plurality, difference, etc., become a function of larger processes and eventually are recuperated by the market, along with the rationalities which accompany it. In the long run this also affects the way Westerners deal with religion, as Vincent Miller has convincingly argued in his Consuming Religion. ⁴ Fifthly, especially but not exclusively, for Roman Catholic theology, the event of Vatican II has foregrounded the internal plurality of the Roman Catholic Church and the legitimate aspirations of theologians worldwide to engage in contextual theologies. Of course, there is also the ongoing debate regarding the reception of Vatican II, which recently has gained more prominence, not only due to the lifting of the excommunication of four Lefebvrist bishops, but also in regard to the scholarly discussion of whether Vatican II should be conceived of in terms of (merely) continuity or as an innovation within the foregoing tradition.⁵ Lastly, in all of these developments, one might see a considerable polarisation at work. On the one hand, religious forces can vehemently oppose these developments, and in so doing posit their religious positions over against the context. On the other hand, the more frequent silent reactions dissolve religion into the context, including the various vague forms of religiosity and, what some would define as, a certain relativism. Indeed, this is a polarisation which then hardly leaves room for more nuanced positions to mediate between religion and context. This short list of developments may indeed support a conclusion that a contemporary theological reflection on religious truth claims – and inasmuch as they have to do with the exercise we in this paper are engaged in, i. e., Christian truth claims – cannot but be related to the way in which the relationship be-

 For a comprehensive, paradigmatic survey see P.F. Knitter, Introducing Theologies of Religions (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2002).  See V. Miller, Consuming Religion: Religious Belief and Practice in a Consumer Culture (New York: Continuum, 2004), and European reactions thereto in Bulletin ET 17 (2006) 1 (Special Issue: Consuming Religion in Europe).  Cf., e. g., J.A. Komonchak, “Benedict XVI and the Interpretation of Vatican II,” in Cr. St. 28 (2007): 323 – 37.

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tween faith and context is conceived. Inasmuch as our context is marked by a growing plurality and different ways of coping with difference and otherness, the question of the truth of the other automatically impacts the question of one’s own truth claims. In view of the current symposium, bringing together theologians from the East and the West, it would seem even more appropriate to address the challenge of plurality, and especially religious plurality, as one of the key points to be addressed. What I want to do in this contribution is to investigate what a Western theological approach, reflecting from its own context on these questions of truth, difference and plurality, would be able to contribute to the dialogue between the East and the West. Therefore, in the first part, I will sketch in a few lines the theological approach, which is the outcome of both my cultural-theological and philosophical-theological engagement with the contemporary Western context. In the second part, then, I will further develop how theological truth claims are both challenged and to be recontextualised by religious plurality and otherness.

4.1 A Contextual European Theology of Interruption Both in my Interrupting Tradition, and in my more recent study God Interrupts History, I have attempted to develop the category of interruption for conceptualising the relationship between Christian faith and its present day context in a dynamic and productive way.⁶ This has resulted in what one could call a “theology of interruption.” I have made use of the category of interruption to elucidate how both on a cultural-contextual and theological level the Christian narrative is, at the same time, interrupted and interrupting, and this both on descriptive and normative accounts. Indeed, it is precisely the fact that our Christian tradition is culturally interrupted in Europe through the processes of detraditionalisation and pluralisation that opportunities become available for a rediscovery of the interruptive nature of Christianity, that is, its being continually interrupted by the

 Cf. L. Boeve, Interrupting Tradition: An Essay on Christian Faith in a Postmodern Context (Louvain Theological and Pastoral Monographs, 30) (Leuven: Peeters / Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003); God Interrupts History: Theology in a Time of Upheaval (New York: Continuum, 2007). The current contribution draws substantially from this second book, esp. chapters 2, 8 and the conclusion.

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God it bears witness to, and its being assigned by this divine interruption to interrupt on behalf of the same God.⁷

4.1.1 Continuity or Discontinuity between Faith and Context? In order to do so I have critically engaged late modern correlation theologies (such as Edward Schillebeeckx’ critical-productive interrelation between the Christian faith and the historical context⁸), because they too often start from the modern presumption that there is a fundamental continuity between Christian faith and the surrounding, European context. Through these developments, Christian theology profiled itself as a joint venture between the best of Christianity and the best of modernity with its critical-consciousness understood in terms of rationality and emancipation. In terms of our own reflections, it has proven to be very fruitful to bear in mind that these theologies were operative, immersed as they were, in a context in which the hermeneutical overlap between Christianity and culture was still functioning as an (often implicit) background presupposition. The theological presumption of continuity indeed rested upon this factual overlap. Detraditionalisation, however, has called the quasi-self-evident givenness of the Christian horizon of interpretation in Europe into question. Moreover, the still growing pluralisation of the European religious landscape leads to a heightened consciousness that the Christian horizon as such is no longer what Europeans have in common. Christianity progressively is to be located in the religious landscape as only one specific horizon (in its own diversity) in the midst of a dynamic manifold world of religions and other fundamental life options. In short, the continuity of the tradition and the overlap between the Christian horizon of meaning and the present day context have been interrupted on account of contextual shifts. At the same time, the postmodern suspicion of master narratives has raised questions concerning the generalization of conceptual patterns too easily starting off from, or resulting in, harmony, continuity and consensus. For, all too often, such patterns obfuscate the suppression of otherness and difference, and make conflicts and their victims invisible. In so far as modern theological methods of correlation live by these presuppositions, and function de facto on

 For another account of this, see also my: “Religion after Detraditionalization: Christian Faith in a Post-Secular Europe,” in Irish Theological Quarterly 70 (2005): 99 – 122.  Cf. e. g. E. Schillebeeckx, Tussentijds verhaal over twee Jezusboeken (Baarn: Nelissen, 1978) (English trans.: Interim Report on the Books “Jesus” and “Christ,” (London: SCM / New York: Crossroad, 1980)); Mensen als verhaal van God (Baarn: Nelissen, 1989) (English trans.: Church: The Human Story of God (New York: Crossroad / London: SCM, 1990)).

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the basis of the aforesaid overlap between the Christian horizon and the context, they often suffer from a lack of distinctness and are ultimately even rendered counterproductive. In a detraditionalised and pluralised context, the search for continuity and consensus indeed often results in very general discourses, on the level of the lowest common denominator, and therefore at a growing distance from the specificity of the Christian tradition and its appeal. At the same time, I have entered into discussion with anti-modern, rather neo-Augustinian contemporary approaches in theology, starting off from the presumption that a growing alienation of the context from Christian faith has occurred. In regard to these approaches, therefore, theology should take the discontinuity between Christian faith and the contemporary context as its point of departure. Some authors in this regard point out the contradictions in European modernity, based on the self-proclaimed autonomy of the human subject and its striving for emancipation, leading to individualism and libertinism. In opposition to today’s developments, they plead for a rediscovery of the Christian roots of Europe in order to remedy the failures of the modern project, and to integrate again human subjectivity, rationality and a striving for freedom within a communal Christian horizon.⁹ Others favour a genuine post-modern theology in the chronological sense of the term: a theology after modernity, a theology that leaves modernity behind, or at the very least its secular presuppositions. Such theologians read the postmodern crisis of modernity as the destruction of modernity, and therefore reject modern secular thinking and its ensuing postmodern nihilism. By way of remedy, they present conceptual schemes that claim a more original relationship with God as the point of departure for all reflection on humanity and the world.¹⁰ From a theological-methodological perspective, these theological approaches are based on a presumption of discontinuity between faith and context, one which posits Christian faith and theology immediately

 Cf. e. g. J. Ratzinger (Benedict XVI), Values in a Time of Upheaval (New York: Crossroad, 2006). See also, in addition: J. Ratzinger, “Europe in the Crisis of Cultures,” in Communio: International Catholic Review 32 (2005): 345 – 56. For a comprehensive presentation of Joseph Ratzinger’s position with respect to dialogue with the contemporary world, see my “Europe in Crisis. A Question of Belief or Unbelief? Perspectives from the Vatican,” in Modern Theology 23 (2007): 205 – 27.  Cf. e. g. the Radical Orthodoxy movement, with as one of its most prominent representatives: J. Milbank, “‘Postmodern Critical Augustinianism’: A Short Summa in Forty-Two Responses to Unasked Questions,” in Modern Theology 7 (1991): 225 – 37; J. Milbank, C. Pickstock & G. Ward (eds.), Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology (London: Routledge, 1999). For a critical theological engagement with these contemporary neo-Augustinianisms: L. Boeve, M. Lamberigts & M. Wisse), Augustine and Postmodern Thought: A New Alliance against Modernity? (BETL, 219) (Leuven: Peeters Press, 2009).

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in opposition to the context. In this fashion, the context is to be overcome, or at least criticised and remedied. It is my contention that neither the presupposition of continuity nor that of discontinuity is appropriate for the construction of a methodological theological reflection on the relationship between theology (or tradition, or faith) and the context. Recontextualising theology today, that is, attempting to reconfigure Christian theology in relation to the contemporary context, is not assisted by such thinking patterns.¹¹

4.1.2 The Category of Interruption It is for this reason that we must search for a fitting theological category that can support the methodological recontextualisation with regard to the precise relationship between Christian faith and present day culture. By way of response I propose the notion of “interruption.” Whereas anti-correlationist (anti-modern) theologies strongly relativise or deny the intrinsic involvement of Christian faith and theology with the context and thus stress the discontinuity between both, and whereas modern correlational theologies presume a fundamental continuity between faith and context, a theological usage of the category of interruption rather holds continuity and discontinuity together in an albeit tense relationship. Interruption is, after all, not to be identified with rupture, because what is interrupted does not cease to exist. On the other hand, it also implies that what is interrupted does not simply continue as though nothing had happened. More specifically, and more technically, interruption signifies an intrusion that does not destroy the narrative but problematises the advance thereof. It disturbs the anticipated sequence of sentences following one after the other, and disarms the security devices that protect narratives against disruption. Interruption refers to that “moment,” that “instance,” that “event,” which cannot occur without the narrative, and yet cannot be captured by the narrative. It involves the intrusion of an otherness that only momentarily but nonetheless intensely halts the narrative sequence.¹² Interruptions cause the narrative to collide with its own borders.

 See − in relation to the reception of Gaudium et spes − also my “Beyond the Modern and Anti-modern Dilemma. Gaudium et Spes and Theological Method in a Postmodern European Context,” in Horizons 34 (2007): 292– 305.  These reflections on the category of interruption are inspired by J.-F. Lyotard’s notion of the differend in, a.o.: Le différend (Paris: Minuit, 1983); Le postmoderne expliqué aux enfants. Correspondance 1982 – 1985 (Paris: Galilée, 1986). For a theological engagement on Lyotard’s thinking of difference; see my “Bearing Witness to the Differend. A Model for Theologizing in the

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They do not annihilate the narrative; rather they draw attention to its narrative character and force an opening towards the other within the narrative.

4.1.3 Interruption: Both Contextual and Theological Moreover, the category of interruption is not only capable of structuring the mediation between tradition and context in a contextually adequate manner, but it is also a theologically legitimate way of doing so. In other words, from the perspective of recontextualisation, the contextual interruption of modern theology leads to a contextual theology of interruption. It is indeed first of all a contextual interruption, which comes forth from the processes of detraditionalisation and pluralisation, both of which require Christian faith and theology to engage in recontextualisation. The moment of discontinuity accompanying interruption, however, does not necessarily lead to conceptual patterns that present the relationship between Christian faith and the contemporary context in oppositional terms or in terms of rupture. Christians may not be of the world, but they are nonetheless in the world. In this regard, the crisis of modern theology should not lead to the end of dialogue with the context, but rather to a revision of the nature of this dialogue, especially considering the altered relationship with the context. In contrast to the secularisation paradigm, detraditionalisation and pluralisation sharpen our awareness that to be Christian implies a more reflexive identity construction rooted in particular narratives and practices, with its own specific truth claim yet within a context of dynamic plurality and often-conflicting truth claims. A postmodern critical consciousness, moreover, warns us not to be too quick to include or exclude the truth of the other, but rather to reflect on our own truth claim in relationship to the truth claims of others. The contextual interruption of theology is not possible without the context; it happens where continuity and discontinuity between theology and context encounter one another. In the midst of the dialogue with the present day context, however, “interruption” can be made productive not only as a contextual category but also as a theological category. As a matter of fact, interruption is capable of pointing to the way in which God reveals Godself in history and the way in which Christians bear witness to this reality in narratives and practices. God’s interruption

Postmodern Context,” in Louvain Studies 20 (1995): 362– 79; “Critical Consciousness in the Postmodern Condition. A New Opportunity for Theology?,” in Philosophy and Theology 10 (1997): 449 – 68.

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constitutes the theological foundation for a continuous and radical hermeneutic of the context and the tradition. Just as (and because) every concrete encounter with the other/Other is a potential location for God to reveal Godself today, a locus theologicus, it is only in concrete narratives and practices that the interrupting God can be testified to in today’s context.¹³ Ultimately, it is the event of Jesus Christ narrated in this tradition that constitutes both the foundation and the hermeneutical key. Just as (and because) the Christian narrative is interrupted, the same narrative succeeds in bearing witness to the interruption without domesticating it. Furthermore, just as (and because) the Christian narrative is interrupted by God, Christians are called to interrupt themselves and others when their own narratives and those of others close themselves off. In this sense, ‘interruption’ is, first of all, not only a formal, methodological notion, but also a substantial theological category, narratively signified by the same tradition it interrupts. It is because interruption is such a thick theological category that it legitimates and motivates its formal and methodological use. Additionally, there are also political-theological considerations to be borne in mind, as wherever closed narratives are operative, victims are made. Whenever a narrative profiles itself as a meta-discourse, other narratives are either suppressed or excluded, invalidated or silenced. Where diversity and otherness are being stealthily reduced to the multiplicity of market goods or eradicated in the name of an inviolable hegemonic truth claim, Christians are obliged to interrupt on behalf of the God of the interrupted Christian narrative.

4.1.4 A Theology of Interruption: J. B. Metz Going Postmodern? It was Johan Baptist Metz who once declared that “the shortest definition of religion is interruption.”¹⁴ By pronouncing this statement Metz wanted to make clear that Christian faith can never slip unpunished into a sort of bourgeois religion, seamlessly woven into the prevailing culture and society, nor withdraw  Among others in his Einführung in die Gotteslehre (Darmstadt: WBG, 2006), Hans-Joachim Sander develops the concept of “heterotopos” as locus theologicus (alienus), which − all things considered − runs remarkably parallel to the line of thought elaborated here. See also his contribution in the present volume.  Taken from: J.B. Metz, Glaube in Geschichte und Gesellschaft. Studien zu einer praktischen Fundamentaltheologie (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald, 1977), p. 150, thesis vi; also mentioned in: Unterbrechungen: Theologisch-politische Perspektiven und Profile (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Taschenbücher Siebenstern, 1981), p. 86. For Metz’s theology, see further the collection of excerpts and articles by Metz that traces the evolution of his ideas: Zum Begriff der neuen Politischen Theologie (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald, 1997).

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itself from or against its context. Such a religion seeks a too facile reconciliation, forgetting the tragic suffering that confronts human existence. For Metz, there can be no Christian faith without tension or turmoil, without danger or menace. After all, Christians are bearers of the subversive, dangerous memory of the suffering, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. That is why they actively seek out the boundaries of life and coexistence, moved as they are by the human histories of suffering that compel them towards a preferential option for the poor, the suffering and the oppressed. By its very nature, the Christian faith disrupts the histories of conqueror and vanquished alike, interrupting both the ideologies of the powerful and the powerlessness of the victims.¹⁵ The context in which we live thus opens a variety of paths towards the dangerous turbulence of interruption. For Metz, it is particularly the confrontation with suffering that forms the impetus behind his search for a “dangerous” theology of interruption. This confrontation compels him – in keeping with his late modern (neo-Marxist) dialogue partners (such as Adorno, Benjamin and Horkheimer) – towards developing a hermeneutics of suspicion that turns itself against those narratives that reconcile and too easily forget. Today, however, a second opportunity presents itself. Along with the cultural interruption of the Christian tradition, Christians also find themselves confronted with (religious) diversity and otherness.¹⁶ In this instance, a theology of interruption tends rather to develop a hermeneutics of contingency, which aims to maintain the radical historical, specific and particular character of the Christian tradition without, however, closing itself in on it. Such a hermeneutics of contingency, when correctly understood, includes a hermeneutics of suspicion. Whoever chooses to engage in the current dialogue with the postmodern context cannot ignore this theological lesson from the recent past. Otherwise, the rediscovery of one’s

 For a detailed sketch and constructive critique of this theological position, see, for example, my “Postmoderne politieke theologie? Johann Baptist Metz in gesprek met het actuele kritische bewustzijn,” in Tijdschrift voor theologie 39 (1999): 244– 64.  Metz also alludes to this intuition in his later articles, after 1985, but does not really develop it further. See, for example, his “Unterwegs zu einer nachidealistischen Theologie,” in J. Bauer (ed.), Entwürfe der Theologie (Graz: Styria, 1985), pp. 203 – 33; “In Aufbruch zu einer kulturell polyzentrischen Weltkirche,” in F.-X. Kaufmann and J.B. Metz, Zukunftsfähigkeit: Suchbewegungen im Christentum (Freiburg: Herder, 1987), pp. 93 – 123; “Die eine Welt als Herausforderung an das westliche Christentum,” in Una Sancta 44 (1989): 314– 22; and his contributions to Concilium collected in: J.-B. Metz and J. Moltmann, Faith and the Future. Essays on Theology, Solidarity, and Modernity (Concilium Series) (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1995), pp. 30 – 7 (Theology in the Modern Age, and before Its End), pp. 57– 65 (Unity and Diversity: Problems and Prospects for Inculturation), and pp. 66 – 71 (1492 – Through the Eyes of a European Theologian); and two contributions in Zum Begriff der neuen Politischen Theologie, pp. 135– 41 and 197– 206.

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own identity, and its boundaries in confrontation with the other, will be likely to fall once again into the facile closure of one’s own narrative. The other then quickly becomes the forgotten one, the one who hastily becomes enclosed by or excluded from our narratives.

4.2 Theological Truth, Difference and Plurality: the Challenge of the Other’s Truth Claim A warning is perhaps necessary here. This short, more systematic account of a theology of interruption is itself an endpoint of a theological recontextualisation due to interruption. As a way to make the transition to the second part of our contribution I now turn to a particular interruptive event that has become paradigmatic for the theological approach I just shortly presented.¹⁷ Some years ago, during a morning radio show, a woman spoke of an encounter she had had the evening before. As part of a Church movement working for a multicultural society, she was invited by a Moroccan community in a suburb of Brussels to celebrate the “breaking of the fast” with them. The community in question had the practice of holding open house every evening of Ramadan at sundown. The woman recounted that the conversation at the table soon took on a profound sense of meaningfulness, certainly when religious themes such as the importance of “fasting” and the relationship between Muslims and Christians were being discussed. During the conversation, the woman was struck by the fact that certain similarities between Islam and Christianity, with respect to fasting for example, tended also to underline the differences between the two faiths. The encounter did not lead to a relativizing sentiment: “it all boils down to the same thing in the end.” Rather, it led to a respectful recognition of difference and self-worth. The woman then went on to describe how the Christians present began to question themselves about the seriousness of their own faith: did they, for example, experience their own fasting as something authentic? Could they explain, for example, what it was about from their own lived experience? Should they not invest more in living up to the particulars of their own faith? And how could this then be done in a relevant and plausible way for today? She concluded that her meeting with the Muslim community was ultimately an unexpected wake-up call. Respect for the irreducible identity of one’s own Christian narrative and for the otherness of different religions and other fundamental life options can thus go together. What is more, the encounter  Taken from Boeve, Interrupting Tradition, pp. 97– 8.

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made this woman reconsider her own identity and its importance precisely through this encounter with another religion. The experience of the woman in the radio interview can rightly be described as an experience of the productive interruption of one’s own Christian narrative by the narrative of the other. It is with such a paradigmatic experience of interruption in mind that we proceed now with the question regarding theological truth, difference and plurality. Both concrete interreligious encounters and theoretical reflections on the effects of the truth claims of the religious other have necessitated a thoroughgoing recontextualisation of the way in which theological truth claims are to be conceived of and dealt with. In the remainder of the essay, and following the approach I presented in the first part, I will now shortly elaborate on the challenge put forward to theological truth claims by truth claims of the religious other: first I will look into the contextual interruptions of theology it may provoke, and afterwards I will investigate its theologically interruptive potential.

4.2.1 The Truth of the Other: Contextual Interruptions The interruption proceeding, in the midst of religious plurality and interreligious communication, from the confrontation with religious difference, critically challenges Christianity’s truth claims on two fronts. First, the Christian narrative is thrown back upon its own narrativity and particularity. Second, it must then also enquire as to how its own truth claims relate to the ones of others. First of all, the confrontation with the truth claim of the religious other alerts the Christian narrative specifically to the very particularity of its own truth claims and the fact that these truth claims are firmly embedded in a way of life: religious truth concerns a truth one lives by, one immersed in orthopraxis. Religious truth is both given shape in, and by appealing to, concrete life forms, rituals, language, narratives, habits, gestures, sayings, and the ways religious individuals and communities deal with these. In this regard, because of the particular setting, what different religions would seem to have in common may well differentiate them fundamentally. For instance, the very elements that bind the three so-called prophetic religions – also referred to as “religions of the book” or “religions of revelation” – serve at the same time to distinguish them from one another. Islam, Christianity and Judaism differ considerably in their perception of the “prophet”: Mohammed, Jesus or Moses respectively; in the role their sacred scriptures (Qur’an, Bible and Torah) play within the respective religious tradition; and the way in which the revelation of God in history is understood. Paying greater attention to the irreducible particularity of the Christian narrative

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is then one of the lessons gleaned from the encounter with the plurality of religions and fundamental life options. The Christian narrative forms its own (albeit dynamic) symbolic space, its own hermeneutical horizon, or its own hermeneutical circle. Becoming acquainted with Christianity is thus something like learning a language, a complex event that presupposes grammar, vocabulary, competence and familiarity, as much as it does empathy. As a side remark, it should be mentioned that this growing consciousness within Christianity (and other religions) interrupts the often post-secular and post-Christian functionalisation of religiosity. Religious practices and narratives in such an instance are conceived of as little more than a filling in of the necessary religious dimension of being human, of the “homo religiosus.” Belief then is often appreciated as a most effective therapy against loss of meaning and depression; its values are considered the driving force behind social integration and solidarity; its rituals deemed useful because answering the human need for ritualisation. From within the religious praxis, however, the truth religious people live by cannot be reduced to its anthropological function. In this regard, and rooted in the awareness of its own particularity, Christianity and other religions can also criticise and counter (i. e. interrupt) other creeping inclinations to uniformity, such as the processes of economic globalisation, in which plurality and otherness are recuperated in terms of market perspectives, rendering diversity marketable, consumable, and exchangeable. At the same time, and in immediate connection to this first point − i. e. the heightened recognition of the very narrativity and particularity of Christianity − the confrontation with the truth claim of the religious other interrupts any easy universalisation of Christian truth claims or pretences towards absoluteness. The postmodern contextual critical consciousness, gained from the confrontation with plurality and difference, informs the Christian narrative of its particular borders and criticises the tendency, inherent in every narrative (thus also in the Christian narrative), to secure one’s own identity above or against other identities. The modern-theological manoeuvre, for example, to link the Christian narrative, and thus its truth claim, with a secular meta-discourse (e. g. a transcendental anthropology), has not only become unreliable but has also proved counter-productive. Both the truth claims of Christianity and of the other are linked to a universalising framework, one which not only undoes religions of their irreducible embeddedness in particularity, but also reduces the interruptive impact of the claims of otherness differentiating these truth claims. At the same time, post-secular forms of Christian neo-traditionalism and fundamentalism tend to harden and absolutise their religious truth claims to such a degree that, also in their case, the very interruption of otherness caused by the confron-

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tation with irreducible religious plurality, is no longer perceived, or is perceived only as a threat. This contextual interruption is obviously of importance for the discussion regarding the variety of Christian theologies of religions, or theological engagements of inter-religious communication. Any attempt to denote religious plurality by way of a meta-discourse and to transcend the conflict of truth claims by way of a universal epistemological framework does not take the radicality of these truth claims seriously. Such an epistemological observer’s perspective is and remains totalising; the confrontation with the other, and with difference, is ultimately done away with. This is why, from a structural point of view, classical exclusivist, inclusivist and pluralist solutions in fact run parallel to each other. They all demarcate a single framework – which is also, in principle, no less particular than any other – as a meta-discourse on the basis of which all other narratives are perceived. In the first instance – with respect to exclusivism and inclusivism – Christianity is universalised: the Christian faith is the one and only truth, for all times and places and peoples. It is thus from the perspective of this truth that Christians perceive other religions as either completely lacking in truth or sharing only in a part thereof. In the second instance – with respect to pluralism – Christianity is particularised: the Christian faith is (only) one perspective on, or part of, a greater truth. It is one specific (particular) truth that is contained in or surpassed by a higher (universal) truth.¹⁸ This also explains the way in which the three strategies in question evaluate “incarnation”: for exclusivism and inclusivism, incarnation is the cornerstone of the truth claim that universalises Christian particularity: the human Jesus becomes the vessel of a universal, all-embracing divine truth. For the same reason, by contrast, incarnation is the stumbling block par excellence for pluralism. Precisely because the dogma of the incarnation universalises the historical-particular Christian truth claim, thus making it totalitarian, and rendering a respectful approach to other religions as an impossibility. It is only when the fullness of truth is not identified with the Christian faith that it becomes possible for other religions to claim the truth (however partial). In sum, the truth in both instances is not to be found in the specific particularity of the Christian faith but rather in either a universalised Christian faith or a universal religion, of which a particular Chris-

 For a philosophical-theological elaboration of this dynamic of universalisation and particularisation, see my “The Particularity of Religious Truth Claims. How to Deal with it in a Socalled Postmodern Context,” in K. De Troyer & C. Helmer (eds.), Truth: Interdisciplinary Dialogues for a Pluralist Age (Studies in Philosophical Theology, 22) (Leuven: Peeters Press, 2003), pp. 181– 95.

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tianity is but one single form. If truth exists, then it does so in spite of particularity. In light of the interruptive event of the truth of the religious other it is no longer appropriate to conceive of religious truth − and definitely including Christian theological truth claims − in general universal terms or universalised religious patterns to which concrete religious traditions are related insofar as they are particular, contingent and historical instances thereof. However, and at this point, the contextual interruption might serve to open up a perspective of theological interruption: is it not possible − especially from a Christian-theological viewpoint of incarnation − to hold to the opposite, namely by insisting that, if truth exists, it is to be found in the concrete, the historical and the particular? Is this not the ultimate meaning of incarnation: that the “all-too-human” speaks for God, without diminishing God in the process and without assimilating humanity into God? In three steps we will now continue our line of thought further, and develop how contextual interruption is also in this case the driving force towards a theological recontextualisation in which interruption may become a theological category.

4.2.2 Engaging the Truth of the Other: a Participant’s Perspective Leads to Another Kind of Inclusivism In view of the double contextual interruption of Christian theological truth claims, holding to an epistemological observer’s perspective in the discussion of religious truth claims seems to be untenable with respect to both the postmodern criticism of difference and the self-consciousness brought about by interreligious communication. A discussion between Christians and Buddhists on the topic of mysticism and contemplation, one suspects, would reveal significant points of agreement. At the same time, however, it also attests to the difference between both. It truly makes a difference if one contemplates the mystery of reality as “love” or as “emptiness.”¹⁹ For the Christian believer, the ultimate truth of reality was definitively revealed in Jesus Christ as the mystery of love. Living one’s life according to this reality makes one a Christian and ultimately serves as the measure of one’s Christianity. It also forms the background and interpretative key of the way in which Christians engage in their contact with others. For Christians, indeed, the recognition of goodness and truth in other religions takes

 See e. g. the biographical reflections of J.-M. Verlinde in L’expérience interdite (Versailles: Editions Saint-Paul, 1998), chapter 9.

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place of necessity in reference to Jesus Christ, precisely because they engage in contact with others as Christians. Inclusivism, in one way or another, thus seems to be inescapable – Christianity will continue to constitute the hermeneutical circle from within which Christians operate. Such a theological-hermeneutical consciousness, however, should not again turn into an inclusivism that falls pray to the totalising and universalising tendencies we noted above. Indeed, interreligious communication teaches us in practice that there is no neutral place or neutral language from which to speak about the multiplicity of religions, and that the Christian discourse also consists of a highly specific grammar and vocabulary rooted in its own background and traditions. There is no such thing as a religious Esperanto into which every religion can be translated. We have no standard religious language, neither philosophical nor anthropological, at our disposal that allows us to make the uniqueness of every religion – as it is sensed by their faithful from within – transparent and understandable to all. We do not possess a conceptual framework in which a sort of unified religion can be designated or constructed and of which the various religions of the world are concrete representations. Christians engage in dialogue with people of other beliefs and other fundamental life options. All are participants who bring their own background and horizon alongside with other participants. As a matter of fact, interreligious dialogue itself confronts inclusivist theologians with their own particular points of departure and makes them aware that they participate in such a communication from a Christian perspective. Christians are already located, that is, have already adopted a position, in the plural domain of interreligious communication, and it is from this position, in the midst of other positions, that they should assess their necessarily inclusivist dealings with others. Christians do not have a bird’s eye view that allows them to survey religious plurality as detached observers and grant it a place in light of its own truth. Indeed, Christianity’s own place in the midst of plurality is part of the picture. Such a “different inclusivism” to which we here refer is conscious of the particularity of the Christian faith and brings it into the larger dialogue, not in order to relativise its own position but rather to determine it in the plural, interreligious world. In the context of interreligious contacts and communications, Christians will ultimately be confronted with their own specific way of speaking about reality. Unable to distance themselves from their particular options, presuppositions, terminology and conceptual schemes, Christians ultimately approach others with their own “baggage.” An example thereof is the universal salvific will of God, which explains why Christians tend to be so highly motivated in their engagement in interreligious dialogue.

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Perhaps here an image could best explain what we mean. Some pluralists present the various religions as a variety of different paths that lead to the same mountaintop engulfed in clouds. Yet, how can we verify such a hypothesis, if we only follow one of the said paths, namely the Christian one? Without a bird’s eye perspective on the religious reality it is impossible to legitimate the image. There’s the rub! Only from a “helicopter” perspective could one be sure that all paths lead to the same top. A further elaboration of this image therefore leads to the opposite conclusion. The experiences of religious plurality and interreligious dialogue reveal that the observer’s position is in fact unsustainable. We are all participants. We all follow our own path. We are only aware that other paths exist that cross our own from time to time or run parallel with our path for a while only to go off in their own direction. Walking on our own path, however, it is impossible for us to confirm that all these paths actually lead to the same mountaintop. Indeed, it is equally possible that one or other paths, which disappears beyond the horizon and into the clouds, might lead to a different mountaintop. It is impossible to confirm this from the perspective of our own path and likewise impossible to deny it. We simply do not know. Nevertheless, we climb the mountain using our own path and from time to time other paths cross our own. It is thus from our own experiences as mountain climbers that we enter into dialogue and that we are able to exchange thoughts and customs, joys and concerns with others, all the while being rooted in our experience of the journey. In this fashion, a particular role is set aside in this endeavour for the imagination. Aware of the fact that we are participants, and because learning about the other informs our contact with the other, we are capable, to a degree, of changing our perspective without however revoking the irreducible otherness of the other in the process. An inclusivist perspective is thus – epistemologically speaking – unavoidable. Nevertheless, the question posed by pluralist theologians with respect to the relationship between Christian truth claims and other religions remains a pressing one: how do we couple an explicit Christian identity to a fundamental respect for other religions? The practice of interreligious dialogue would appear to show that there is room for both, but how can we conceptualise this reality in theological terms? Is a sort of “pluralist” inclusivism conceivable? In contrast to the classical inclusivist position, this would at least imply that Christians approach religious plurality from the perspective of participants. For us as Christians, the mystery of Christ constitutes the perspective from which we speak about religious salvation and truth, because we live in and from this truth. Though the universal salvific will of God, which is revealed to us in Christ, provides the Christian point of cross-reference that inspires us to seek traces of goodness

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and truth in other religions, we can only follow one path at a time – trusting that all humanity is ultimately saved in Christ.

4.2.3 The Theological Interruption of Incarnation In line with a contextual critical consciousness, the confrontation with the truth of the other interrupts the Christian narrative at the point at which it tends to close itself off. Engaged in ongoing processes of recontextualisation, today’s theologies cannot avoid dealing with this interruption. Recontextualisation, however, can never be legitimate on merely contextual grounds; at the same time it also requires a theological legitimisation. Only when interruption becomes a theological category as well can the Christian narrative allow itself to be interrupted and become a narrative of interruption. As a theological category, then, interruption structures the way in which we reflect upon the relationship wherein God is engaged with God’s creation. It is at this point that we must continue our reflection on incarnation. We noted already above that “incarnation” might signify more than the idea that theological truth is revealed in the particular, or, in other words, that the particular is the vessel of the universal. The interruptive event of the incarnation indicates, rather, that the particular is constitutive of the truth, essential and indispensable. Truth is real, concrete, incarnate, and can only be grasped as such. This means that when we speak of Jesus Christ, God’s Son made flesh, we cannot simply make a clear distinction between the divinity and humanity of Jesus. God’s revelation is unthinkable without the human Jesus; the human Jesus is constitutive of what we know of Jesus as Christ, and of Christian faith in him. It is in Jesus, in his concrete humanity, that God is revealed among human beings as the Jew from Nazareth who proclaimed the Kingdom of God in the language and narratives of his own day and put it into practice until he died on the Cross outside Jerusalem. It is this same Jesus whom his disciples confessed after his death that he had risen, that he was the Christ, God’s Son, in his humanity and not in spite of it. Therefore, the one who desires to know God must look at Jesus. The first disciples expressed the results of their faith-inspired recognition of Jesus in the New Testament, in the language and stories of their day – in the same way as the faith communities that followed them have been doing, inspired time after time by these words. It is this interruptive event which has become the locus where God has made, and continues to make, Godself fully “known.” Moreover, Jesus Christ reveals God and God’s desire for human beings thanks to his humanity. Classical theology tends to explain this point in “soter-

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iological” terms, from the perspective of “he descended from heaven for our salvation.” Only if God has really become human, it is proposed, can the human person really become God; it is only because God shared humanity to the full with us that we human beings are saved. At this juncture, we would rather emphasise the epistemological perspective, so that the question runs: what does it say about the truth unfolded in Christ? As we have already stated: the person who desires to know God must look to Jesus Christ who, as a human person, definitively revealed God in history. At the same time, divine truth for Christians is also to be located in concrete events and narratives. It is only in the all-too-historical, the concrete, the accidental, that God can become manifest, that God becomes manifest. This does not mean that God coincides with the concrete and the accidental, but that the concrete and the accidental make the manifestation of God possible, not in spite of but rather thanks to the concrete and the accidental. Every concrete encounter, no matter how accidental, every particular and contingent event, is the potential locus of God’s manifestation. For Christians, God’s revelation in Jesus Christ forms the hermeneutical key in this regard. This is what the Christological dogma of the Council of Chalcedon²⁰ – Jesus Christ is at the same time both God and human – can mean for us today: God is revealed in Jesus Christ, not without Jesus’ humanity but in and through it; as a human person, Jesus reveals God without thereby giving up his humanity. Historically situated in a very specific context, Jesus’ concrete words and deeds reveal God. Also today, every current statement about this God and this revelation must comply with the same rules. Even today, it is only possible to give expression to God’s involvement in history and the world in all-too-human terms. Jesus’ particular humanity, concrete history and events, Christian narratives and interpretative frameworks, do not represent a stumbling block on our journey to God, they represent the very possibility of the journey. What we have just said is in fact true of every human engagement with the Christian faith, and thus informs the very hermeneutical nature of the Christian tradition, the Christian way of life, and Christian truth claims. It is only in the particular word, narrative, ritual and practice that the profound significance of the Christian faith can be revealed. Incarnation thus demands an ongoing ‘radical hermeneutics’ in which the particular as the possibility of divine revelation is taken seriously and, at the same time, relativised, since the particular never coincides with God, just as God and humanity are united in a single person, un-

 See for this paragraph also my “Christus Postmodernus: an Attempt at Apophatic Christology,” in T. Merrigan & J. Haers (eds), The Myriad Christ: Plurality and the Quest for Unity in Contemporary Christology (BETL, 152) (Leuven: Peeters Press, 2000), pp. 577– 93.

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divided and undiluted.²¹ This is the core around which the Christian tradition turns: the latter cannot be substituted nor can it be absolutised. It speaks of God – and without it there can be no talk about God – but it is not God. Where tradition is absolutised, it is precisely Godself who interrupts such selfenclosing rigidity and fosters recontextualisation. It follows, therefore, that there is no such thing as a core of truths that can be distinguished as such from every form of mediation, or that there is an unchangingly given expression in ever changing historical frameworks, as many classical hermeneutic (and less hermeneutic) theologians have argued. On the contrary, theological truth is coconstituted by the all-too-human, that is, by concrete history and its context. This does not do an injustice to such truths, since it is only thus, through time and history, that we can speak about God. Likewise, it is through this tradition that God speaks to Christians today, as embedded in the current historical context and whereby this tradition both perpetuates and renews itself.

4.2.4 The Truth of the Other as a “locus theologicus” It thus follows that a fully accepted particularity of the Christian discourse is not a refutation of its truth, but rather the very precondition thereof, just as it is only through the incarnation that God becomes fully revealed. This implies at the same time that each Christian narrative stands under God’s judgement and can only bear witness to God in a radical-hermeneutical manner. For this reason, a Christian narrative may not close itself on theological grounds. From a theological-epistemological point of view, the encounter with the other, and also the religious other and his or her truth claims, is in fact the place in which God’s interruption can be revealed and where the borders of one’s own Christian narrative in naming this God can become visible. The “peculiarity” of the Chris-

 It is important at this juncture that we resolutely distance ourselves from other forms of socalled radical-hermeneutical theologies, which – à la J. Caputo and others – endeavour to designate the truth moment of Christian faith as beyond all particularity in a deconstructionist, negative theological movement, with the consequent reduction of particularity. It is only in the all too particular that God is revealed and this revelation cannot be dissociated from the said particularity in any way. Apophasis does not imply the reduction to nothing of kataphasis but rather a radical-hermeneutical qualification thereof. See further my “The Rediscovery of Negative Theology Today: The Narrow Gulf between Theology and Philosophy,” in M. Olivetti (ed.), Théologie négative (Biblioteca dell’ “Archivio di Filosofia”, 59) (Rome: CEDAM, 2002), pp. 443 – 59, and especially my “God, Particularity and Hermeneutics. A Critical-Constructive Theological Dialogue with Richard Kearney on Continental Philosophy’s Turn (in)to Religion,” in Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 81 (2005): 305 – 33.

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tian truth claim, therefore, is that Christians cannot claim the truth, and yet they are always already living in relation to it, in respect to the radical-hermeneutical tension of a narrative that both concerns God and is interrupted by God. That is why present day interreligious communication is not only a contextual necessity but also a theological one. Precisely the confrontation with the truth of the other may well be the place where God reveals Godself today. Indeed, would it be going too far to interpret the paradigmatic interruptive event with which I began this reflection in this way? Is the recognition by the Christian woman of both the specificity of fasting practices and the need to take more seriously one’s own fasting practices, not at the same time a revelatory event, manifesting God in the every day concreteness of encounters and praxis? Such hermeneutical-theological acknowledgement also goes here hand in hand with political-theological consequences, and invites a praxis of mutual recognition, for it might well be God who is met in the religiously other − especially where this other is also the poor, the outcast, the hungry, the thirsty, the prisoner, the naked, in short, in the vulnerable and wounded other: “‘Lord, when was it that we saw you hungry and gave you food, or thirsty and gave you something to drink?’ […] ‘Truly I tell you, just as you did it to one of the least of these who are members of my family, you did it to me’” (Mt 25:37b-40b). In the case of the paradigmatic narrative we started this section with, the political-theological aspects illustrated actually bring to the fore the unhealthy connection between Islam, migration, and the rise of the extreme right in Western Europe. Such a connection is burdened with a manifold of cultural, religious, social, economical and political struggles and exclusions, and the inability to come to the construction of identities which are capable of not only respecting otherness, but also of critical-constructively engaging with it.

4.3 By Way of Conclusion So far the Word and the Spirit, the main theme of this encounter between East and West, have not been mentioned. In this contribution it was the status of theological truth, challenged by the truth claim of the other, which was at stake. Of course, the prominence of incarnation to think theological truth both contextually and theologically, and the recourse to Chalcedon to sustain this point, are not without reference to the Word. Apart from this, however, two more remarks can be made. First, from the ideas developed above, it follows that in the discussion regarding the variety of theologies of religions, the Word and the Spirit cannot be pitted against each other. Yet this happens, for example, in pluralist thinking strategies which confine the Word to the Christian tradition

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and see the Spirit at work in the other religions. So doing, they consciously relativise Christian faith to (only) one particular instance of a much broader and varied set of revelations within the economy of salvation. The Word and the Spirit, however, cannot be divorced from each other, but are connected in the way God makes history concrete: the Spirit remains the Spirit of Christ, and as the Spirit of Christ it fosters the Christological reading key within the radical and political-theological hermeneutics that are called for. The latter, then, constitutes the second concluding remark we would like to make. Word and Spirit are indeed mutually active in the process of continuous recontextualisation of the Christian narrative, that is, of the (un)interrupted theological hermeneutics of history. However, it would be too easy to simply identify narrative with Word and the interruptive event as Spirit, with the Word then standing for stability and sameness, and the Spirit, as an experience of newness and otherness, being the sole active agent in the further development of tradition. For inasmuch as interruption is not to be equated with rupture, the Christian narrative is constitutive for the interruptive event, introducing a continuous dynamic tension between the (particular) word and the Word the latter incarnates, preventing the tradition from closing in on itself. It is then in the Spirit, as it assists the faithful to receive and interpret this tension between word and Word, in which both narrative and interruptive event ultimately are kept together: the narrative being opened up by the event, and the event borne witness to by the interrupted narrative. It is here also that Word and Spirit are not to be pitted against one another; rather they constitute together the very dynamics of God’s involvement in history and the way the faithful read this involvement.

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5 Holiness and Spirituality: How to Communicate with God in the Age of Globalization* 5.1 The Necessity of Integrated Theological Discussion through Dialogues between the East and the West The conceptualization of “God” or “gods” varies according to each and every cultural area. We should not depreciate the theological conceptualizations of a particular cultural area through the indiscriminate adoption and application of the theological conceptualizations in another cultural area. The diversity of theological conceptualization according to the peculiarities of cultural areas reflects the diversity of living space and historical background, that is, the diversity of the Lebenswelt (life-world). These differences derive from the difference of Weltanschauung formed in experiencing nature in unique and diverse ways, while they, in turn, reflect the difference of ontological views. Even in the same cultural area, the transition of ages brings forth the change in theological conceptualizations. As human beings become awakened in their consciousness and accumulate vast knowledge and develop various studies, they have different views on nature and God. Thus, we can say the same about the development or evolution or advancement in understanding God. This process is closely related to the development of the people belonging to those cultures or of the whole humanity. The genesis of an individual entity (ontogeny) is repeated after the genesis of species (phylogeny). The development of understanding God in the dimension of the genesis of species greatly prompts the development of understanding God in the dimension of the genesis of an individual entity. We can trace back the process of development in the dimension of species by examining the process of development in the dimension of an individual entity. We should not adhere to our own peculiar understanding of God as the absolute. Living in the age of the global village, we should now try to have a comprehensive perspective in understanding God. That is, we should approach each * This work was supported by a Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Research Fund of 2009.

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other with open-minded rationality in the dialogue about understanding God. Given that there are many elements to learn and appropriate in other people’s understanding of God, we should be ready to learn and appropriate those elements. The age of the global village invites us to open dialogue about understanding God more than any other time in the past. “The age of the global village” suggests that all the human beings on the earth form a community bound together by a common fate, living together on “one” earth. We should cope together, collecting our utmost wisdom, with the crises hanging over modern humanity. One of the biggest crises is the destruction of the ecosystem as the ground of our living, while another is the confrontation between and among civilizations going to extremes with terrorism and counter terrorism. The most fundamental task of the peaceful coexistence of 7.1 billion people on the earth is confronting us as the utmost serious one. In order to solve these crises at their fundamental dimension, we should mobilize all the resources of our wisdom and insight, including science and technology. We have to face up to the fact that these problems cannot be solved only with science and technology. Our understandings of the world, existence, and God should be changed. According to these understandings, our view of humanity also should be changed. We are located on a crucial turning point in the history of humanity, nay in the history of the universe. The contemporary age is also called the age of culture. Culture, after having always been evaluated below political, economical, or societal subjects, is reemerging as an important and essential element of humanity. Humanity as cultural being is becoming the focus of our attention now. Here, tolerance, serenity, care, ingenuity, and originality stand as main key words, while art and religion are prominently illuminated as forming the cultural life of humanity. At the same time, cultural diversity is rising up as one of our main concerns. As the diversity of species is indispensable for the sustenance of the ecosystem on the earth, the diversity of culture is indispensable for the peaceful coexistence of humanity. We should prepare for a better future in solving the problems confronting contemporary humanity by utilizing to the utmost the innumerable cultural resources transmitted in diverse cultural areas. In doing so, an integral perspective is needed in each and every field. The age of culture requires a cultural attitude as a supple and integral approach. In the broad context, there is nothing that goes beyond the boundary of culture. Culture is the style of human life in itself. Politics, economy, science, and technology are all important in such a context. Philosophy, art, and religion are, of course, important. A cultural approach refuses to reduce these various aspects of humanity to any one field in order to solve any problem by a uniform logic. Now

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integral learning is needed in place of the past “first philosophy.” Not only in each and every individual field but also in the all-inclusive general as a whole, an integral perspective and learning are urgently necessary. Of humanity, nature/universe, and God, we need urgently such an integral perspective and learning. Here, in our discussion, we focus on God. For modern people, who are living in a world and age different from any other world and age, the conceptualization of God should befit the modern horizon of understanding. The understanding of God cherished by humanity five or three thousand years ago obviously does not befit people today. What, then, about those conceptualizations of a thousand or a hundred years ago? Each and every cultural area has inherited and developed their own understanding of God in a unique and independent way. They have built a unique understanding of God with their own view of the world, humanity, and existence. Since the 18th century, with different cultural areas associating with others, there have developed visible and invisible wars about understanding the world or God. Entering the 20th century, the Western world view dominates the whole world as the strongest Weltanschauung. From the latter part of 20th century, however, the whole situation changes. The Western worldview with its technology and science in its uniform rationality has slowly lost its dominant position, allowing different cultural areas to propose their own validity and values. In this process, there have arisen acute confrontations between civilizations, causing cultural wars to develop in a new dimension. These cultural wars, in their fundamental dimension, are modern wars of religion caused by the confrontation between and among faiths and values about “God.” We should accept from the beginning the fact that there are diverse understandings, faiths, and values about God according to diverse cultural areas. Hence, we need an integral discussion about God. This discussion requires an open attitude and readiness to learn. Open dialogue cannot begin on the premise that one’s own inherited theological views – as directly transmitted from God – are absolute truths. Even if they are said to have been directly transmitted from God, there has to be admission that no one can avoid error in receiving and transmitting (or transcribing) even the words of God, since every human being is a limited being and not free from error. God reveals his words to anyone according to his or her cultural and historical background in his or her own language, and those words cannot but have a certain limit in their cultural, historical, and linguistic dimensions. With this limit in our mind, we should proceed in our discussion about God. In such a discussion about God, we should be ready to learn something from other cultural areas beyond our own cultural boundaries. Above all, we should

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be always remember that God reveals and transmits his will in and through history. As human consciousness and spirituality have developed through history, the figure of God should also be said to have developed in his relationship with human beings through history. Even in this modern period, we should try to listen to the words of God who always reveals himself to us. In and through the historical background and cultural context of the modern period, we should try to trace the revelations of God. God, who reveals himself to us in the modern period, is not only God of a particular nation but also God of all. Here, I am going to probe the way of communicating with God in an integral perspective that unites the East and the West in the modern period of the global village, information technology, and cultural diversity in which we are living. A clue for the discussion could be found in the problematic of Heidegger who said “only a God can save us” to modern people who have been walking the road to becoming a part of machines in the shackles of modern technology, naming the modern period as a pitch-dark period God left. According to Heidegger, God has been banished from our life-world (Lebenswelt) as the worldview centered upon logos, reason and humanism has gotten rid of the space for the holiness for God. Hence, he asserts that we should, above all, secure a space for holiness in order to bring back God who could not but have left. He says that we need a new horizon (of being) for relationship with nothingness (the non-existent) rather than with existence (the existent) in order to experience the holy. Below, we are going to probe whether there might be yet a way to approach and experience anew the nothingness that had been thrown out of the boundary of discussion in Western philosophy and general learning. And we are going to ascertain that the experience of nothingness or non-existence (voidness) is closely related to the experience of the holy. Then, we are going to examine Korean people’s unique experience and conceptualization of God in perceiving and naming God through an understanding of being different from the West. Here, following Ryu YoungMo’s description, we are going to examine the process of meeting God not on the horizon of existence (being) but on that of non-existence (nothingness, emptiness, and voidness). Finally, we will attempt to read the historical significance suggested by those new ways toward God.

5.2 “Only a God can Save us” We are now living in the age of the global village where “the world is unified as one.” This age of the global village is governed by three axes in its logic of life, that is, science and technology, liberal democracy, and capitalist market econo-

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my. All of these are the products of Western reason. Due to the brilliant flowering of reason, “the modern human beings” live with exuberance beyond necessity, crying that consumption is a virtue. To enable such an exuberant daily life of citizens in modern advanced countries, an invisible sacrifice is required under the shadow of it. Their exuberant and seemingly peaceful daily life is maintained by the exploitation of nature that does not seem to resist and by the tears of sorrow in the eyes of poor people in the third world.¹ As time goes on, the gulf between rich and poor becomes starker according to the tendency of the rich to become richer and the poor to become poorer while the devastation of nature is accelerated. Under the domination of Western reason, the global village suffers from various problems. In such a context, even in the West, many intellectuals make strenuous efforts to define reason anew and more broadly. Beyond technological and instrumental rationality, and goal-oriented rationality, some thinkers talk about aesthetic rationality, while some philosophers even argue that ethical rationality is needed beyond all of them. Early in the 20th century, reason or rationality only meant very narrowly scientific or theoretical rationality. Although Kant classified reason into theoretical, practical, and aesthetic reason in his discussion, empiricism and scientism forced us to limit true rationality to theoretical reason, excluding the other two from rationality. Thus, ethics, morality, religion, and art became pushed into the area of utterly subjective feeling that has no relation with rationality. In the 20th century, several philosophers, including Heidegger and Habermas, began strenuous efforts to reclaim the past status of reason from its narrowed boundary. Habermas suggested a new type of reason broad enough to include or imply the three types of reason by Kant, calling it “communicative reason (rationality).”² He even calls it “life-world rationality” (lebensweltliche Vernunft) in its fundamental significance of becoming the ground of constituting culture, society, and personal characters (humanity) in forming the life-world as the background and womb of our existential, social, and material world.³ Another philosopher, Wolfgang Welsch, in his voluminous major work entitled Vernunft (Reason), suggests the idea of “transversal reason” (transversale Vernunft).

 Cf. Vittorio Hösle, Philosophie der ökologischen Krise (München 1994).  Cf. J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, vol. 1: Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung (Frankfurt a.M. 1981); Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, vol. 2: Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft (Frankfurt a.M. 1981).  Cf. Ki-Sang Lee, Heidegger eui Jonjaesageonhak [Heidegger’s Study on the Event of Being], (Seogwansa, 2003), esp. chapter one, “Constructing a new frame of culture in the age of cultural diversity: hermeneutics, pragmatics, and event theory,” pp. 19 – 77.

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His naming derives from his attention on the role of reason in its transversing across various fields and areas of culture with the resulting transfer of diverse items. His attention is noticeable in illuminating the unique role of reason as the “transversal across diverse boundaries” enabling modern people who live in the age of the global village where diverse historical traditions and cultural areas get intertwined with each other to form a unified world, to understand and receive different cultural worlds.⁴ After all, European intellectuals themselves are asserting the necessity of a new type of “reason” for humanity to live together peacefully on the earth in the 21st century, admitting the unavoidable limitations of Western reason. The new type of reason should obviously be complemented with new dimensions that have been overlooked by Westerners until now. Western intellectuals might call them “new mentality, new spirituality, and new religiousness.” If people on the earth are really going to form and manage together “one world” not by the logic of the ownership of the stronger and exploitation but by a new logic, Westerners should accept the fact that there have been diverse life-worlds very different from theirs, affirming the fact that other types of “life-world rationality” have been formed and maintained in different life-worlds and cultural traditions all over the world, ready to learn from them with a humble attitude. What feature and content, then, can be said to be characteristic of the “life-world rationality” that has been formed and maintained in Korean people’s life-world and culture? Does Korean people’s logic or grammar of life have any potential power to provide an alternative way of life to heal the decadent and pathological symptoms of endless desire and limitless competition in exploiting others and devastating the earth? The 20th century Western civilization’s spread in the devastation of the earth and the crisis of the annihilation of humanity was criticized most poignantly by Martin Heidegger (1889 – 1976). He perceived the evil influence in the logic of global, nay universal domination being proliferated by the way of living and thinking centered upon reason and existence on the basis of anthropocentrism, strongly asserting the necessity of a new beginning through a new way of thinking. According to him, in such a beginning, we should, above all, restore the dimension of the “holy” that has vanished from our own life-world, expressing his wish in saying that “only a god can save us.”⁵ His saying can be interpreted to

 Wolfgang Welsch, Vernunft: Die zeitgenössische Vernunftkritik und das Konzept der transversalen Vernunft (Frankfurt a.M., 1996), p. 761 f.  M. Heidegger, “Spiegel-Gespräch mit M. Heidegger,” in Antwort: Martin Heidegger im Gespräch (Neske: Pfullingen, 1988), pp. 99 – 100. “Only a god can save us. The only possibility available to us is that by thinking and poetizing we prepare a readiness for the appearance of a god, or for

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imply that the hope of salvation for humanity can be opened only by a totally new relationship and experience with various types of nothingness that had been vanished as non-existent by Western reason. Below we are going to probe some cases of describing the experience of nothingness in diverse patterns approaching it in totally new dimensions.

5.3 Emptiness and Holiness: Korean People’s Experience of God 5.3.1 Communication with God not in the Sun but in Darkness In the age of culture, accepting the mutuality of culture seriously in attempting dialogue, intellectuals on the earth should also accept the diversity of culture, avoiding such a tendency to absolutize a certain type of metaphysics, religion, culture, logic, or ethics. Thus, the claim of generality by European philosophy cannot be accepted any more as before. What is important now is to understand European philosophy as what it is, that is, a type of cultural philosophy – yet as such a philosophy to claim that it is uniquely general and comprehensive for itself. In such a context, Mircea Eliade says, “But if the peoples of the West are no longer the only ones to ‘make’ history, their spiritual and cultural values will no longer enjoy the privileged place, to say nothing of the unquestioned authority, that they enjoyed some generations ago.”⁶ Tagore, a philosopher and poet of India, regarding cultural diversity as what God wishes, strongly rejects ideologies which attempt to transform foreign cultures according to their own. He says, “If mankind will ever be befallen by catastrophe, in which one religion deluges everything, god will have to provide for a second Noah’s ark in order to save his creatures from mental destruction.” Between and among diverse cultures, mutual acceptance with open attitude and dialogues for learning from each other was emphasized earlier by Jaspers, one of the great modern Western philosophers. He states, “every human being owns philosophy only as his own historical form, this historical form – in so

the absence of a god in [our] decline, insofar as in view of the absent god we are in a state of decline.”  M. Eliade, The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion (University Of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 2.

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far as it is true – being an expression of the philosophy of salvation that cannot be itself owned by any one.”⁷ With such a problematic, let us trace the propositions of Daseok Ryu YoungMo, a great modern Korean thinker who cries not for “the metaphysics of existence” but “the metaphysics of emptiness.” According to Daseok, Western thought can be summarized as a “metaphysics of light” in that it has regarded as “existent” only the things that can appear under the bright light of the sun, sometimes even going a step further to claim that what is “real” should include only the things that can be illuminated under the light of reason. Hence, he cries for us to “extinguish the light of the sun!”⁸ Daseok says that the light of the sun is just like the light of a candle that subsists just momentarily in comparison to the enormous darkness of the universe. According to him, even though is named in the East as the “great brightness” (太 陽 taeyang), it is not so big. He emphasizes that brightness cannot overcome darkness. “The universe is an enormous darkness. Even though the sun is said to be enormous, and even though there are many bright things in the world, they have never been able to overcome the darkness of the universe.” Most of them subsist just momentarily in the darkness. The sun is not big. Rather, “the enormous is the darkness, while the brightness is shabby. Especially, we even need not emphasize the shabbiness of the phenomena that can appear only in the light of the sun.”⁹ Living in the solar system, which is just a speck of dust in the enormous universe, regarding the sun as if it were the only light, accepting as “existent” only the things that can be seen under the light of it, Western people cannot perceive the limitless emptiness, let alone see God who is without any existence in the emptiness. Daseok advises us not to seek God under the light of the sun but to communicate with God in the darkness. “If God is, He is in the midst of the enormous darkness, brightness not being the right place to find him. Brightness is only a vacant shadow, where we cannot 7

K. Jaspers, Weltgeschichte der Philosophie: Aus dem Nachlaß, ed. by H. Saner (München 1982), p. 20.  Cf. Ki-Sang Lee, “Extinguish the light of the sun! Emancipation from thinking centered upon existence. Daseok’s thought’s significance in the history of philosophy,” Inmunhakyeonku, vol. 4 (1999) (Institute for Humanities Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies): 1– 34.  Ryu Young-Mo, Daseokeorok, Jukeume Saenmyeongeul, Jeolmange Himangeul [Daseok’s Sayings, Life in Death, Hope in Despair] (Hongikjae 1993), pp. 153– 4. “Though people know that there is darkness under a lamp, they do not know there is darkness under the sun. Due to the sun, we cannot see the stars that can be seen in the night when the sun sets. The sun is just a lamp bigger than a lamp in our room. People’s wisdom does not perceive the truth that there is darkness under the sun, even the sun being just a part of the darkness” (p. 154).

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find God. Tasting the darkness of the universe, we can find God. Thus, I, reversing the way of finding God in the brightness, see God in the darkness.”¹⁰ As a universal man who lives not in the solar system but in the spacious emptiness, Daseok confesses that he has been more interested in the sound of the breathing of the universe rather than the sun. “For an astronomer, day has no great worth. For those who seek the mystery of the universe, how to hide the sun is a main concern. They might wish to listen and know more the whispering of the eternal from the stars. Though they always wish to stay with the eternal, the existence of day interrupts and hinders their wish.”¹¹ Knowing as his only mission the task of communicating with God who is without any existence in the darkness, Ryu Young-Mo composes his pen name “Daseok” (“dark night” or “evening”), giving the reason for it as follows: We should be aware of the truth that behind the existence of brightness, there is something important that is forgotten. That is the hidden communication with the soul, which is the most important thing in our life, appearing without the light of the sun, in the dim light of the night. The brightness of the day hinders the whispering of the soul about the mystery of the universe. In Genesis, [at first] “there was evening, and there was morning,” and according to the Revelation, in the new heaven and new earth, there is no need for the sun again. Thus, the beginning is evening, and even the end is evening again. The beginning and the end are all evening. Evening is everlasting. Day is just evanescent like a dayfly even though it may last even for ten thousand days. I yearn for such an evening.¹²

Day is where the candle-like sun flickers, while innumerable lights of stars cannot be seen. This applies not only to nature. The civilizations of humanity are just as candle-like as civilizations of flesh and sin. All of them are just diffused reflections as civilizations of running sores, full of vanity, likely to vanish like flickering candle lights. The universe of night is pitch-dark so that we cannot discern even a very short distance, but there are twinkling stars that are as distant from us as billions of light years. Stars are twinkling in the darkness.

 Ryu Young-Mo, Daseokeorok, p. 156.  Ryu Young-Mo, Daseokeorok, p. 29.  Ryu Young-Mo, Seongseojoseon (Korean Bible), 1940, August, vol. 139, as quoted in Park Yeongho, Daseok Ryu yeongmoeui Saengaewa Sasang, Ha [The Life and Thought of Daseok Ryu Yeongmo], pp. 69 – 71.

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5.3.2 Theological Views in the Korean Word Haneunim Tracing Daseok Ryu Young-Mo’s description, let us examine now how Korean people have connected their experience of non-existence with God. It is interesting that Korean people have thought of God in the model of Haneul (Heaven). They perceived it as the total whole that cannot be split or divided, including limitless time and space. From Korean people’s characterization and conceptualization of God through responding originally to His revelation in diverse relationship with Him, we can read Korean people’s peculiar experience of God. (Korean people have called God with various names. Below, I use Haneunim as a general name of God. I will explain the other various names according to the occurrence.) Daseok says the following: “Haneunim has no name originally. Haneunim cannot be named. If we name Him, He is no more God but just an idol.”¹³ “As we all know God so well, it is rather strange to name Him. God has no name…‘I am who I am’ was God’s answer to Moses’ question. God has no name.”¹⁴ In spite of this, people have called this unnamable God in various ways. In those various callings, there appear the viewpoints of the callers, which should not be dispensed with just as according to arbitrary views. They are humanity’s answers to the revelations, according to what should be seen and named properly. Let us examine these diverse “names” of God, illuminating the “faces” of God revealed from them. Korean people have been reminded of heaven (haneul) above all from Haneunim. Embracing everything, overlooking everything tacitly, accepting everything, heaven, as the unwavering and absolute being, cannot be characterized easily since it has no shape or form. As limitless space, it embraces fifteen billion years of the universe in its totality, its capacity able to contain everything that can occur in the universe for 150 billion years, nay for a time lasting endlessly, in its limitless space. We might call this “emptiness.” Korean people call this bintanghande (a great totally empty space). God, as the end of everything in their occurrence and event that might occur in the universe, cannot but be related with heaven since God is limitless with no beginning and no end. We characterize that heaven as empty bintanghande.

 Ryu Young-Mo, Myeongsangrok, Jinriwa Cham Na (Meditations, the Truth and true Me), explained by Park Yeongho (Dure, 2000), p. 334.  Ryu Young-Mo, Daseok Gangeui [Daseok’s Lectures], edited by the Society for Daseok Studies, (Hyeonahmsa, 2006), pp. 322– 3.

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Thus, not in the dimension of the existent that is the most perfect, of that which nothing more perfect can be conceived, but in the dimension of the ground enabling such an existence, Korean thinkers have thought of God. Not a transcendent being or existence as the first and final cause of moving and becoming existence, but the field where such causes and results occur, such transcendent events developing within there, has been thought of as the ground to be presupposed for the existence of all those things. This is far from any existence in any form or shape. This is rather the background against which such a form or shape can appear. We might call this sai (span) in Korean. This span is itself the ground and field that can be discussed here properly. The Korean word Haneunim is said to have been derived from Haneul(nim) (personification of heaven). Heaven as the whole universe and God perceived and conceived in its model does not exist in the way that all the myriad things in the whole universe exist. Korean people broadly distinguish between two types of being. One is “being with existence” while the other is “being without existence.” Being with existence is an expression that prominently emphasizes the way of being that brings into relief its existence. In contrast, not in the dimension of existence but in the dimension of non-existence, in a way different from the form or shape of the existent things, being without existence can be defined. What can be seen by our eyes or ascertained by our five senses are all beings with existence, while the other beings, including love or familial affection, society, personality, being, or non-being, are “beings without existence.” Korean people have conceived of heaven as being without existence. They have thought that God “is without existence.” Thus, they have not thought that existence is the supreme category. As beyond existence, embracing existence, enabling existence, surrounding existence, they have thought of “emptiness” or “bintanghande.” They have thought that God is closely related with this dimension of emptiness. This is the dimension of non-existence, nothingness, voidness, or hollowness. Korean people have perceived the world and God not in the horizon of existence but in the horizon of non-existence. According to Daseok, there are three ways for us to encounter God as the holy “being without existence.” Firstly, we can encounter God through the infinite space of the universe. Secondly, we can encounter God through the innumerable constellations all over the universe. Thirdly, we can encounter God through the Spirit (Han Eohl, Great Spirit) coming to us within our mind. Here, we can ascertain the fact that he brings forth nothingness (無) as the essential concept in his description of the ways towards God, which has been overlooked until recently. Through this, we might read Korean people’s thought about God as the absolute Han Ah (the great self), Hanah(nim) (the One [God]), embracing everything that exists relatively, together with their encounter with the Spirit or Han

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Eohl in Korean as the holy power embracing and maintaining everything. “Emptiness,” “Han Ah,” “Han Eohl,” or “Hanuhlnim,” “Haneunim,” “Han Ah Nim,” “Hanahnim,” “Haneohlnim,” or “Han Uh Nim” can be enumerated as his name, while the choice might be not so important. After all, we cannot push God, who is without existence, into any name. Below, let us examine more closely the diverse aspects of these three ways of encountering God who is without existence.

5.4 Diverse Ways of Communicating with God 5.4.1 God is the Emptiness of the Universe as the Mind of It: Hanahnim as the One Hanahnim is the name of God as the one whole. Let us conceive of the absolute void before the Great Absolute (太極) or the absolute emptiness before the cosmic egg appears (before the Big Bang). The absolute void is the state of absolute potentiality, embracing all the possibilities as the state or ground of infinite and absolute emptiness where the Great Absolute can be unfolded, no existent thing yet appearing, as bintanghande (the great totally empty space) that is opened up toward any direction without any hindrance. To borrow a term of logic, this is a pure form that has no content as it is. This is the fundamental ground for basic structure. Since it has no splitting or dividing, it is absolutely one as a unified total whole. It is itself non-existence as the holy in itself. This total Hanah (nim), whose ground is the absolute void as the origin of the Great Absolute or emptiness (non-existence) as the origin of existence, signifies the one as the flawless whole embracing every event of existence evolved in it. Hanah(nim) is Hanah (한ㆍ, the One Self) as the absolute source from which every existence is derived. This is the Han nah (大我) as the great Self embracing each and every individual self (제나, Je nah) in itself. Daseok says that “the only being as the total one (whole) is emptiness.” The material world in which the existent beings overflow is the world of form, itself merely an illusion. “I feel clearly the only emptiness as the mind of God. In the only emptiness, the world of form is mixed like a dust in our eyes. If we are satisfied with the world of form, we cannot see God. Then, we cannot even desire to search for God.”¹⁵

 Ryu Young-Mo, Myeongsangrok, Jinriwa Cham Na, p. 20.

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In Daseok’s saying, the absolute emptiness as the immaculate and holy voidness is the source of life and source of everything. The emptiness as the total one is not just emptiness but an infinite emptiness, like a ball which has its center but no boundary. The finite universe is contained in this infinite emptiness (bintanghande). Thus, this emptiness can be called the infinite universe. For the finite universe to consist of heavenly bodies (stars) to expand, there should be the infinite universe to contain it. This emptiness as the infinite universe was called by Laozi as the amorphous absolute (無極) or void absolute (虛極).¹⁶ For Daseok, the emptiness is true, while everything in the world is false. To think deeply, the only true being is only emptiness. All the myriad things in the universe are merely dust flying in the emptiness. The emptiness “creates and sublates the heavenly bodies and the other myriad things.”¹⁷ For Daseok, the infinite emptiness containing the universe is thought of as the mind of God. The emptiness as the mind of God has no boundary, like a ball without boundaries. In the enormous and sublime bintanghande, there are over one hundred billion galaxies containing one hundred billion suns. The infinite emptiness beyond all the stars is the absolute void, while the infinite emptiness containing all the stars is the great absolute. The emptiness as the mind of God is given to us as the infinite eohl (spirit) within our mind, which might be called also the spiritual absolute (靈極). Hanahnim is the total sum of the spiritual absolute as the holy spirit, the absolute void as the emptiness, and the great absolute containing the heavenly bodies.¹⁸

5.4.2 God (Haneunim) is the Event of Being: Haneulnim, Hanuhlnim The emptiness as the mind of God containing the infinite universe, the Han Ah as the source of every existent thing, and the Hanah as the only total and absolute being – we have called it Hanahnim. In another dimension, Korean people have conceived of Haneunim as the God presiding over all the events of appearance and disappearance, and change and evolution in the finite universe. Taking an example from the blue sky full of constellations with its unknown end, they have conceived of God. The Korean word Haneunim (하느님) comes from this. Haneulnim (or Hanneulnim) as the root of this word signifies God as the absolute  Ryu Young-Mo, Myeongsangrok, Jinriwa Cham Na, p. 152. Ryu Yeongmo, Daseok Gangeui, p. 465.  Ryu Young-Mo, Myeongsangrok, Jinriwa Cham Na, p. 239 – 40.  Ryu Young-Mo, Myeongsangrok, Jinriwa Cham Na, pp. 246– 7.

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being containing everything that appears, disappears, and changes in the infinite space and time.¹⁹ Since Han signifies the infinite space, while neul signifies the infinite time, Hanneul, or its variant Haneul, as the compound of the two words, signifies the absolute being, including all events occurring in space and time, as the absolute comprehending the infinite space and time. While the emphasis was put on the non-existence as the source of existence in the above description, the name here signifies the total event of being occurring on the background of the non-existence of the absolute emptiness. The perspective here is to examine the innumerable individual entities as relative beings in their mutual relationship, which are contained by God as the absolute being who cherishes every existent being that has occurred, is occurring, and will occur in the infinite space and time. In the emptiness of non-existence, the horizons (domes) of existence are incessantly being raised and expanded, appearing and disappearing, connecting everything in the infinite space and time. Every existent being is just an end (긋, 점, 첨단; geut, jeom, cheomdan [end, dot, spearhead]) as a speck that is located in the infinite space and time. It will disappear back into the absolute emptiness as its own source. Figuratively speaking, if the emptiness as the absolute void is said to be the ground or field like a vessel, all the events of existence, which shows the process of formation, destruction, and change evolving in the infinite space and time, can be said to the contents filling and disappearing temporarily in the infinite vessel. Haneulnim is holy as the being who presides over all the events occurring in the emptiness. In such a perspective, Hanahnim might be said to consist of nothingness as substance and existence as phenomenon. Hanahnim consists of nothingness and existence, that is, emptiness (空) and form (色). Here, existence changes incessantly while nothingness does not change at all. Therefore, Hanahnim as the whole might be said to change and stay unchanged at the same time. “Since God has the two aspects of changeless nothingness and changing existence, God stays unchanged with change while changing unchanged as the whole.”²⁰ While nothingness does not change, existence changes. We now exist as changing beings so we yearn for the unchanging nothingness. That is, nothingness is the root of existence. While relative existence exists without true being, it receives its worth of being according to the calling or mission given from God as the whole. We should be aware that we ourselves are relative beings. Relative be-

 Such a divine being is sometimes called Hanuhlnim (한울님) in the sense of a great infinite enclosure containing everything that exists.  Ryu Young-Mo, Myeongsangrok, Jinriwa Cham Na, p. 45.

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ings are innumerable small beings that exist just temporarily and disappear. The absolute being as the whole embracing the total individual entities is the one and only absolute being, without existence, that has no beginning or ending. Shortly speaking, individual entities as relative beings have beginning and ending while the whole as the absolute being has no beginning or ending. But we as individual entities have forgotten God as the one and only whole. The task of individual entities is to return to this one whole and restore it. That is, the true life of individual entities lies in the one whole. To restore and come back to the one whole is to enter eternal life and to achieve true life.²¹

5.4.3 God is the Eohl of the Universe: Haneohlnim The events of existence in the finite universe, including creation, formation, transformation, evolution, and extinction, are being unfolded really within the infinite universe of emptiness (bintanghande). Since our mind accepts all sorts of events, those events being unfolded in the bintanghande, Daseok perceived that our mind and the emptiness are one and the same.²² Thus, he thought that the total emptiness is really the mind of God. The events of existence in the universe, which seems to unfold without any law or principle in the chaos and confusion, when seen in their deep dimension, might be perceived to have been working out the will of God invisibly in themselves. Thus, seeing the flow of change in the universe in the dimension of the will of God, and perceiving the providence of the invisible God in it, Korean people called such a God Haneohlnim. Haneohlnim signifies the spiritual power that fills up the infinite space and time. We can also name it the absolute life. Since human beings are beings of eohl (spirit), they can communicate with Haneohl who is the absolute life. Since they had forgotten their identity as beings of eohl, however, craving flesh and clinging to material properties, they themselves obstructed the way towards communicating with the Haneohl who is the eohl of the universe. Haneohl is a holy being that can be seen only through the eyes of eohl. In short, “sacred” and “holy” mean “being without existence.” Since human beings had lost the capacity to come near this “being without existence,” the original

 Ryu Young-Mo, Myeongsangrok, Jinriwa Cham Na, p. 308. “We should be clearly aware that we may recover the forgotten whole, recognizing correctly our past ignorance. We should search for the one [absolute]. The one is flawless. Everything exists in order to obtain the one [absolute]. The one is within us. Therefore, we should ultimately cling to God our father” (p. 309).  Ryu Young-Mo, Myeongsangrok, Jinriwa Cham Na, p. 248.

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“sacredness,” “divineness,” or “divinity” disappeared from humanity. In so far as we do not recover such a perspective to perceive this “being without existence,” we cannot expect the coming back of the God who left. This holiness cannot be seen through our bodily eyes. It cannot be even seen through our mental eyes. It can be seen only through the eyes of eohl. Only when human beings soar to become the beings of eohl (얼나, eohl nah; self as eohl), they can meet the holiness, even uniting with it. Daseok says the following: What if God does not exist? God is without existence. So God is always spirited. God is not body. God is eohl (靈, Spirit). Eohl is without existence. We cannot see the absolutely big. The whole without anything to add more as the big without boundary is called nothingness (無). I believe in non-existence. The ultimate state of our life is to serve God our father who is without existence.²³

Daseok states, “the true God does not seem to exist. The being who does not seem to exist is God. God as eohl fills up the infinite time and space.”²⁴ According to Daseok, our life that subsists with the breathing through our nostrils is not our true life. The life as eohl that breathes the eohl of God is our true life. As we enter the eternal life, there is the breath of eohl that does not terminate even if our nostrils do not breathe in and out. The life that terminates when we stop to breathe in and out is our false life. “If we do not breathe in the Word (말숨, 말씀; Mahlsuhm, Mahlsseum) as the Spirit of God, it is difficult to call us human beings. The spirit given to us is our true self as our self of eohl. Sakyamuni’s Dharma mind and Jesus’s Son of God signify the same eternal life as the self of eohl.”²⁵

5.4.4 God is the Life of the Universe as the Evolution of it: Haneohlnim, Hanuhlnim Due to the Han Eohl that leads every existent being in the universe to be formed, transformed, and extinguished according to the will of God, pervading up evenly the emptiness of the universe with his spiritual power, the universe becomes the live universal life. This universal life as the whole is an absolute life that lives eternally without death in comparison with the individual life forms as relative beings that live temporarily and disappear with death. The East Asian word

 Park Yeongho, Daseok Ryu yeongmoeui Saengaewa Sasang, Ha (Munhwailbo, 1996), p. 321.  Park Yeongho, Daseok Ryu yeongmoeui Saengaewa Sasang, Ha, p. 71.  Park Yeongho, Daseok Ryu yeongmoeui Saengaewa Sasang, Ha, p. 93.

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saengmyeong (생명, 生命), “Burning up of the Body according to the Words from Above,” already implies “heavenly mandate” (天命), or “the words from above.” To conceive of the universe as life is to read the change of the universe as the evolution of it according to the will of God. In this context, Korean people have called God Haneohlnim or Hanuhlnim. Every individual life form, including humankind, has no true life. Individual life-forms have only relative lives, and as relative beings we repeat the process of birth, living, death, and disappearance. The true life encompasses all the relative life forms as the absolute life of eohl enabling their living. The life of eohl as the life of the universe can be said to belong to the heaven, that is, to Han-eohl (한얼; the great Spirit), which is the empty, vacant, and open being. Every individual life-form participates in turning the wheel of the universal life through the burnt offering of their bodily life. Therefore, human beings should become aware that their life has the dimension of eohl in addition to the dimension of body. The eohl nah (얼나; the spiritual self) of humankind as the life of eohl is one with the Han eohl (한얼; the great Spirit) as the life of universe. When we rise to the eohl nah as the true life through awakening and liberating ourselves thoroughly from the bodily self as a sham life, we can practice the will of heaven becoming one with the Hahn eohl. Daseok regards the wind of the Spirit from a panentheistic perspective in that true life movement lies in panentheism.²⁶ We breathe spiritually by the wind of the Spirit. The Spirit is verily the eohl of our mind as the true “I.”²⁷ According to Daseok’s words, anyone who is open to the Spirit can, by reading the maru (마루, will) of God in every life-form, live the life of breathing the words from above (말숨살이) through deeply thinking about them, and establishing (말슴) and utilizing them (말씀) for the proliferation of the news of God. Another term frequently used by Daseok is the word geut (긋, a speck or spearhead], which designates our own selves as individual life-forms living here and now as inheriting the universal life. Even though we are only a speck of dust in the vast stream of universal life history, we can resuscitate ourselves as the self of eohl to write the history of life together with heaven by becoming one with it, when we have been awakened to the calling or mandate of heaven burning up within us. Such a resolution, as bodily self participating in the history of true life in finishing the bodily life completely, is called gaonjjikki (가온찍기, thrusting in the center) by Daseok: “I am a spearhead that has appeared in the modern period as a tail end of this nation. My spirit thrusts its

 Ryu Young-Mo, Daseokeorok, p. 215.  Ryu Young-Mo, Daseokeorok, p. 233.

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spearhead in the center of my mind each moment I am awakened. This is gaonjjikki (가온찍기. I am just a geut (긋, a speck or spearhead). I am an end, a speck, and also a left-over.”²⁸ Hahm Seokheon, a disciple of Daseok, regards the history of the universe as the history of life, even asserting it as the history of evolution. He asserts that history is, after all, the history of life, saying, “Regardless of whether it is the history of a nation or the history of humanity or the history of a culture or the history of nature [in the museum], after all, the history of the great life that flows through this great universe.”²⁹ He even regards evolution as progress. For him, material progresses toward life, life toward consciousness, consciousness toward conscientiousness in the history of evolution. According to him, as the history of the universe has evolved progressing repeatedly, the history of humanity could also be said to have evolved progressing repeatedly toward spiritual life as its more advanced being. In evolution, he perceived “the faith in the new heaven and new earth”³⁰ clearly.³¹ For Hahm Seokheon, history is the evolution of life. “History is a movement climbing on the eternal stairway. It is an unfinished symphony eternally. Even God might be truly said to be an unfinished symphony eternally rather than a dead finished symphony.” History is not just a repeated process. History is alive, its movement being growth. Life proceeds.³² History is a growing life.

5.4.5 God is the Word of the Universe (Mahl, Maru, Mahlsseum): Inner Egg, Seed-Egg, Thought, Word The breath of Han Eohl fills up evenly the whole universe and all the myriad things in it. God perceived in the dimension of the source and inner egg and principle of the universal life is Haneohlnim or Hanuhlnim. Since the universe as the great emptiness is the mind of God, and since this mind contains all the diverse spreading of the finite universe within the infinite universe, this mind works as

 Ryu Young-Mo, Daseokeorok, p. 30.  Hahm Seokheon, Hahmseokheon Jeonjip, vol. 9, Yeoksawa Minjok [The oeuvre of Hahm Seokheon, vol. 9, History and Nation] (Hangilsa, 1993), p. 42. Janghoeik, “On Saengmyeonggwa Hahm Seokheon Saengmyeong Sasang” [The Whole Life and Hahm Seokheon’s Thought on Life], Ssiahleui Sori, vol. 175 (2003.11– 12), pp. 688 – 91.  Hahm Seokheon, Hahmseokheon Jeonjip, vol. 9, Yeoksawa Minjok, p. 42.  Kim Sangbong, “Hahm Seokheon’s ‘The History of Korea and the World according to the Will of God’”, Ssiahleui Sori, vol. 183 (2005.3 – 4), p. 27.  Hahm Seokheon, Hahmseokheon Jeonjip, vol. 9, Yeoksawa Minjok, p. 57.

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the breath of the Haneohl in the transformation and evolution of the universe. Such a will of God (as being without existence) contained invisibly in the universe has been called Marutteut (마루뜻, 宗旨) in Korean.³³ Sog-ahl (속알, inner egg), ssi-ahl (씨알, seed egg), or bat-ahl (바탈, elemental egg) have been the Korean people’s naming of this mind of evolution of the universe that is transmitted from generation to generation, engraved in everything within the universe. Reaching to the life-form that exists not only as body (material) but also as mind, the communication between the mind of the universe and the mind of the life-form began to be developed. Reaching to humanity that exists not only as mind but also as spirit, the efforts to read the will of God began to be made. This is the beginning of thinking. The geut (긋, tip or end or spearhead) of the universal life, which is continuously transmitted without interruption through the sog-ahl or ssi-ahl within us, constituting our being of eohl (얼나 eohl-nah; I as eohl), which makes us to think of the Han Eohl as the source and end of our self. Due to the sparks of thinking awakened by the Han Eohl, human beings began to yearn for God (그리움 geureeum), which has been expressed in their drawings (그림 geureem), which has been, in turn, articulated into writings ( geul).³⁴ Everything in the universe achieves the will of heaven by burning up its own body tacitly. This is the principle of the universal life, which is the meaning of life. Human beings (사람 saram), as beings that should speak out the will of heaven (사뢰다 saroeda), first of all, have to read the will of God hidden within the whole universe and even contained within themselves.³⁵ Thus, coming to think of God and to yearn for God, human beings make drawings, speak out words, and compose writings. Drawings, words, and writings are all derived from thinking of God. Thinking is the problem. Speaking out words is the problem. Alive or dead is no problem. The absolute thinking is the problem. For humanity, thinking of truth is the problem. Thinking to climb up toward above is the problem. Thinking to climb up toward above is true as according to the word of God. The movement of the Holy Spirit through me is expressed into

 According to Daseok’s explanation, the Korean word Mahl (word) comes from this context. “Mahl is the word on the top of the heavenly peak. Accepting and practicing such a word, we come to know God. Mahlsseum (말씀) comes from such a context, sseum signifying acceptance and practice. Mahl should be accepted and practiced according to God.” Ryu Yeongmo, Myeongsangrok, Jinriwa Cham Na, pp. 130 – 1.  Ryu Young-Mo, Myeongsangrok, Jinriwa Cham Na, p. 117.  “There is a reason in God’s making us human beings to think noble thoughts and to speak it out. Therefore, we are called saram [사 (사룀)]. The center of speaking out words is our ‘saram’.” Ryu Young-Mo, Daseok Gangeui, pp. 290 – 1.

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words. The Holy Spirit blows into my mind like a wind. For me, words are loaded with the will of God our father.³⁶

In saying that “there is only the will of God,” Daseok emphasizes that the words to last eternally are not the words by our tongue but the will of God that can be expressed as a response without opening our mouth. “Thinking needs no voice to make. It does not need to receive sounds through hearing by our ears. The word of God cannot be heard by our ears. Prophets have actually heard the word of God, though. Recordings of it are scriptures.”³⁷ According to Daseok, the Korean word mahl (말, word) comes from maru (마 루, will). The maru of God is implied in the basis of the Korean word mahl. Mahl is the maru of God. When the maru of God comes into and out of our eohl, this sparks the flames of thinking within us. The establishment of words (말슴, mahlseum) is the establishment of the maru of God with our words responding to those flames of thinking. The practice of words (말씀, mahlsseum) is the use of our human words for the establishment of the maru of God. Thus, living on the search for the will of God and on the establishment and the practice of our words according to the will of God is called mahlsuhmsari (말숨살이) in Korean, which literally signifies to live on breathing in the word. It is also called mahlsseumari (말씀살이), which literally signifies to live on the practice of the word. To breathe words from above is to yearn for the eternal in thinking the will of God. It is to burn up the flames of truth flowering up within us. Since the breath of words from Above is none other than God, we should breathe not through our body but through our eohl. As long as we breathe through our eohl, the breath of words from above can be said to be “the breath of eohl.” It is a breath united with the Hahn Eohl (한얼, the universal life) in heaven. Thus, the breath of eohl is also the breath of the universe (우숨, wusum). The greatest breath of the universe is smile (웃음, wuseum), that is the breath of the universe that comes from transcending everything within the world into becoming united with the absolute life.³⁸ The breath of eohl comes just from the mode  Ryu Young-Mo, Myeongsangrok, Jinriwa Cham Na, p. 110.  Ryu Young-Mo, Myeongsangrok, Jinriwa Cham Na, p. 122.  “In our life, we do not know when we are going to cease breathing. Our task today is to grow our breath securely before we die so that the eternal breath of life may be established. The way to do so comes from turning from the bodily breath of life to the breath of words from above. The bodily breath of life should be turned into the breath of words from above, and that breath of words from above should be turned into the smile of the universe. Only the breath of words that can become the smile of the universe (the heavenly mandate) can enter the eternal breath of life.” Ryu Young-Mo, Jesori, Daseok Ryu Yeong-Mo Gangeuirok [Our own words, Daseok Ryu Young-Mo’s Lectures], ed. by Heung-Ho Kim, p. 76.

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of life listening to and following the words from being itself, since its task lies in spreading and filling up everything in the universe with the invisible Han Eohl of the universe. Daseok says analogically, “Christ is the spreading and filling up of God.” According to Daseok, we have the breath of life within our heart, while we have the will of eohl within our abdomen. Just as the sun should unite with the seed-egg, our self as eohl should meet and unite with the Hahn Eohl. Just as the seed-egg can meet the sun and grow to become a tree with the bursting out of its endowments in uniting with the sun, we also can become a tree only when our inner egg or endowments meet the Hahn Eohl. Thus Daseok infers by analogy the way of our true living, considering carefully and thoroughly the leaves of life, the flowers of the endowments, and the fruits of the will of eohl in all their aspects. In short, we should receive the breath of life, grow its leaves, bloom our endowments, and bring to fruition the will of eohl. ³⁹

5.4.6 God is the Focal Point (Purpose) of the Universe: Hanahnim, Hanuhnim Daseok perceives the beginning and end of the universe in God as Hanah(nim). The absolute emptiness or absolute nothingness as the bintanghande (a great totally empty space), the emptiness as the total whole in which all the relative existence and relative non-existence are contained, is called Hanah (하나; literally, “One”) in Korean. To pursue this Hanah is the original duty and mission of everything, including all living beings, in their religious and ultimate dimension. Everything, including our life, returns to the Hanah, which is to be united into the one (歸一). “(Everything) begins from the one and returns to the one as a matter of course. What all the great religious thinkers searched for, believed in and talked of is the ‘Hanah.’ What all the Daoist saints and Buddhist monks have obtained in their awakening of the Dao (道) is this ‘Hanah.’”⁴⁰ Identifying God with heaven and the one, Daseok asks us to “be awakened to the one and enter into the one.” Hanah is not only the object of knowing but also the purpose of our life as the focal point of participation and harmony. To be awakened to the one and enter into the one is “to know God and believe in God and live out God.”⁴¹ Hanah is the source and purpose of existence and life as the power leading the evolutionary history of life. For humanity, as the  Heung-Ho Kim, Daseok Ilji Gongbu, Ryu Yeongmo Myeongsangrok Puri 1, pp. 510 ff.  Ryu Young-Mo, “Kkamaknuhn” (“Blinded Eyes”), Daseokilji [Daseok’s Diary] (facsimile) vol. 1, (1982), p. 833.  Ryu Young-Mo, “Yeo-o” (“Leap”), Daseokilji [Daseok’s Diary] (facsimile), vol. 1 (1982), p. 832.

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center of the evolutionary history of life, to search for the one (God in heaven) and return to the one is its original nature. The feature of a person standing upright and holding up his or her head toward heaven signifies the true nature of humanity’s yearning for heaven. “To search for God (窮神) is the true nature of humanity lurking in its deepest part like the heliotropism in plant ecology.”⁴² “God is the great constant (常) in the infinite space as the one and only constant (常) in the eternal universe. Since God should be revered above our head, God is called Hanunim (한우님).”⁴³ God as the focal point to be searched for and revered by us is uniquely called Hanunim or Hanuhnim by Daseok. The human nature of searching for Hanuhnim that is God in heaven is expressed through searching for the object of love. The object of love “is changed into more higher being as the vessel of our mind grows bigger. When the capacity of the vessel has grown big enough, the object of love becomes God as the eternal absolute.”⁴⁴ The more a person climbs up toward God, the more a person’s eohl matures. Since every person yearns for the one (God), progressing toward the one, they must be recognized and evaluated in relation with the Hanah (God). In this context, Daseok says that there is only the process of climbing up toward Hanah(nim), there being neither perfect truth nor perfect life. Our life “travels continuously on the road of trial toward the one from the earliest times.”⁴⁵ For Daseok, to yearn for the lord who is the Hanah and return to God is to return to the element and root of one’s self that can be connected with the lord of Hanah. “In order to enter into the eternal through thinking and reasoning, there is only the way of awakening to one’s own sog-ahl (original nature) and

 Ryu Young-Mo, “Maeimgwa Moeumi ani!” (“Neither Clinging nor Collecting”), Daseokilji [Daseok’s Diary] (facsimile), vol. 1 (1982) p. 743.  Ryu Young-Mo, Myeongsangrok, Jinriwa Cham Na, p. 239. It is ascertained in the recordings of his lectures that Daseok preferred Hanuhnim to Hanunim. Nim, “Nim whom we should always revere above our head,” that is Hanuhnim, “Nim in the heaven.” (Ryu Yeongmo, Daseok Gangeui, p. 896). “In Hanuhnim, the ‘u’ signifies the above in comparison with the below, the ‘h’ indispensable in its signifying holding up the ‘above’ from the relative planes.” Ryu Yeongmo, Daseok Gangeui, p. 897. “In the ‘uh’ of Hanuhnim, the ‘u’ is uttered when we make our throat into a rounded shape. If we utter more deeply, the ‘h’ sound comes naturally. This sound is unavoidable in the sense of revering the above more deeply. The first sound in the ‘Han’ is also unavoidable in ‘Hanuhnim.” Ryu Yeongmo, Daseok Gangeui, p. 912.  Park Yeongho, Jinrieui Saram: Daseok Ryu Yeongmo, (The Man of Truth: Daseok Ryu Yeongmo), vol. 1 (Dure, 2001), p. 33.  Ryu Young-Mo, “Hanah Doege” (“Become United with the One”), Daseokilji (facsimile), vol. 1 (1982) p. 812.

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returning to one’s own root.”⁴⁶ The way toward God lies in entering into one’s own inner self with one’s utmost devotion and sincerity.⁴⁷ Daseok explains this one and only Hanah as the original one reality (元一 物). The original one reality is itself the absolute truth (or the absolute true reality). According to Daseok, the original one reality is what “we originally have.” The original one reality, which does not belong to the relative world of existence and non-existence, which is the absolute Hanah, lies within our self. Therefore, we should make efforts and achieve the absolute truth of Hanah for ourselves.⁴⁸ Daseok says that “the conclusion of my philosophy is ‘let’s go to the Eops (없, 無; nothingness)’.” He says that this Eops lies within each of us. The Eops is not severed from the relative world. The Eops transcends the world of relative existence (有), yet constituting the whole one with the relative existence. God is the Hanah where the material signified by “existence (有)” and the Mahm (맘; spirit) signified by “non-existence (無)” are unified. “Mohn and Mahm are not two separate entities, there being only God (the great Hanah).”⁴⁹ God, who is without existence, is the one as the whole unifying existence and non-existence. “God is in the unity of existence and non-existence, his divine power penetrating heaven and earth without the distinction of existence and non-existence. God is one.” The place of God as the whole transcends all sorts of distinctions as the place where everything “becomes one.” “To distinguish between right and wrong usually comes from the delusion of mine…If we believe in God, satisfied with him, all sorts of problems cease to be problems. The end of disputes can be met only at the state of sage, while knowledge and ignorance are transcended only when we reach the one and only God.”⁵⁰ When we communicate with the God who is without existence, we come to penetrate divinely heaven and earth without the distinction of existence and non-existence, transcending right and wrong or knowledge and ignorance, ultimately becoming united with the one. “All problems are ultimately connected to the one (一). The essential problem always lies in the one [whole], the pivotal point is to live a true life like the one (一) and to return to the one (一).”⁵¹

 Ryu Young-Mo, “Hanah” (“The One”), Daseokilji (facsimile), vol. 1 (1982), pp. 757, 760.  Park Jaesoon, Daseok Ryu Young-Mo (Hyeonahmsa, 2008), pp. 340 – 1.  Ryu Young-Mo, “Kkamaknuhn” (“Blinded Eyes”), Daseokilji [Daseok’s Diary] (facsimile) vol. 1, 1982, pp. 833 – 6.  Ryu Young-Mo, Myeongsangrok, Jinriwa Cham Na, pp. 328, 330, 337.  Ryu Young-Mo, “Yeo-o” (“Leap”), Daseokilji [Daseok’s Diary] (facsimile) vol. 1 (1982), p. 832.  Edited by Park Yeongho, Daseok Ryu Yeongmo Eorok [The Sayings of Daseok Ryu Yeongmo] (Dure, 2002), p. 40.

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5.5 With the Expectation of the Age of Spirituality in the 21st century Today humanity urgently needs a new paradigm of thinking, a new epistemological frame, and a new type of creative hermeneutics. The paradigm of thinking centered upon reason derived from the West has given humanity the hope for infinite progress, probably enabling the existence of humanity to expand to and dominate the infinite space. Now the earth might be too small for over 7.1 billion human beings. So in order to secure the space for their existence, the voyage to the broader cosmos, including migration to different planets, is the necessary task for our future. However, it may be now the time to reflect upon whether such desires and attitudes toward expanding our space infinitely are merely based upon a narrow and wrong understanding of being in a specific way of existence clinging only to material existence. The axis of humanity’s relation with being should not be put merely on our sense data. We should reject such claims by sensualists or empiricists that only material beings that can be touched by our five senses can be said to exist. Expanding more broadly our capacity to experience, we should accept that we cannot include all the beings due to our intellect’s spatial and temporal restraints, even though we say that we make relations with other beings by our intellect. Although our experience based upon our intellect is restrained by time and space, our power to think and imagine without any limit is not restrained by them. With the help of thinking, human beings have the power to encounter every existent being in all its aspects. We call such a power reason. With the power of reason, we can perceive every existent being in all its aspects in any way. Thus, the axis of humanity’s relation with being has always been taken care of by reason. Implicitly, however, reversing this relationship, we came to take for granted that anything that cannot be perceived by reason cannot be said to exist. Thus, in the paradigm of thinking and living centered upon reason, nothingness (無), emptiness (空), or voidness (虛) has been excluded, deleted, forgotten, and even hidden, regarded as beyond existence, even uttering a word about nothingness becoming the object of branding and driving out of the world as unreasonable, irrational, or anti-rational behaviour. Such modern disputes surrounding reason are, after all, disputes about modernity and post-modernity. Habermas, who regards the present age as belonging to the unfinished modern period, suggests expanding the boundary of the conception of reason more broadly. According to him, if we throw away reason, we fall unavoidably into the unreasonable, irrational, or anti-rational state, which only brings forth more serious devastation to humanity without any alter-

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native solution of salvation. In such a context, Habermas found that “life-world rationality” (lebensweltliche Vernunft) as communicative reason, including theoretical, ethical, and aesthetic rationality, could be an alternative. In a sense, we can admit that he is right. That is, we can accept that reason can be interpreted as “life-world rationality.” In other words, reason is the product of our life-world. The communicative reason that Habermas suggests as an alternative reason is, strictly speaking, ascertained merely as the product of a scholar in the Western life-world, who has lived within the Western tradition centered upon logos. Therefore, we can and should ask and ascertain a further question of whether there have been any other forms of “reason” in other life-worlds. We should ask what has taken the role of the axis of humanity’s relation with being in other life-worlds or cultural areas. In Korean people’s life-world, they regarded Iseong (理性, reason) as the power of humanity’s ontological perception. However, this reason should not be said to be the translation of the Western logos, ratio, Vernunft, or reason. Korean people’s Iseong is engraved with their unique “communicative reason” as the product of their life-world. Korean people are, as we can ascertain, well aware of the fact that their life-world reason is, unlike the Western reason, in good relation with nothingness, emptiness, and voidness, these being regarded as more foundational than being or existence. In this context, humanity’s unique power to have relation with nothingness might be called eohl in Korean and “spirituality” in English, which makes it easy to distinguish between this Korean reason and Western reason. When we enhance humanity’s potentiality from reason to spirituality one step further, we might be able to establish the proper status of humanity according to the present age that can be called “the age of cosmos.” In the presently prevalent thoroughly secularized life-world reason where anything divine is inexorably excluded, we cannot find any trace of the holy. We should ask, at least once, whether the crisis of modernity might have been caused by our throwing away and clearing away of the divine and the holy. In such a problematic, we have examined Korean people’s way of communicating with God on the horizon of understanding existence that is different from the one of the West. We could ascertain that Korean people’s horizon of understanding existence is actually founded not upon “existence” but upon “non-existence” (nothingness, emptiness, or voidness). God perceived on such a horizon of non-existence can also be ascertained to be rather the “absolute emptiness” or “great emptiness” or “great totally empty space” (bintanghande) than the “supreme being” or “first cause” or “absolute being.” In examining such diverse conceptualizations of God perceived through Korean people’s unique “lifeworld reason” – or rather “life-world spirituality” – on their horizon of non-ex-

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istence, I have attempted to suggest some unique features of God that have been cherished in them. From the above discussion of God, we might broadly distinguish four characteristics. Firstly, we might think of God as the whole one Hanahnim. Including the infinite absolute (無極), the great absolute (太極), and even the spiritual absolute (靈極), Hanahnim embraces and presides over everything that appears, changes, and disappears in the endless span of space (空間) and time (時間) within the great empty whole. In the midst of change, Hanahnim is maintaining and sustaining the total whole, driving power, heat, breath, and blood endlessly as a mystical power that works out the circulation of becoming, ruminating, and feeding again everything. That is, God is Hanahnim who has the three dimensions of (1) the great empty whole; (2) the whole endless event of appearance, disappearance, and change that has its beginning and end within the beginningless and endless great emptiness; (3) the mystical power itself that operates everything within the absolute one total whole. Secondly, we might think of God as the absolute emptiness when we select the infinite absolute (無極) among the above. In this dimension, God signifies emptiness itself as the vessel containing every existent being. This God is Hanahnim as the root and source of every existence. In the context that every existent being must return to him, this Hanahnim is also called Hanunim or Hanuhnim. Thirdly, we might think of God as Haneulnim who presides over the developmental process of becoming, appearance, disappearance, and transformation occurring within the great absolute (太極) of infinite space and time. In the emphasis of the plane of life, God is called Haneohlnim, while God is called Hanuhlnim in the emphasis of the power of governance. Fourthly, we might think of God as Haneohlnim who is the Eohl (Spirit) of the universe, whose feature is also frequently expressed as the mind of God. Every existent being within the great emptiness can, communicating with each other, be united with each other according to Haneohlnim. Closing this discussion, finally, I hope that Korean people’s unique theological views may be of help to the construction of an integral theological view, which is necessary for humanity on the earth in the age of new mentality, new spirituality, and new religiousness. In conclusion, let us hear a word from Daseok about our spiritual way of life: All teachings are to teach us to go toward the supreme peak (宗 = God). There should be a time of awakening thoroughly. Learning (學) is to go toward awakening (覺). Teaching (敎), as awakening (覺), becomes clean when we achieve our awakening (成佛). The clean (깨끗) is the breaking up to the last (깨끝). When we break up the relative world to the last thoroughly, the Absolute as the truth appears. It is to be awakened to the true self. The breaking up to the last is Amen. We should clear away everything. We should clear away everything so that there may be nothing. If there remains something due to our incomplete clearing

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away, there remains the less non-existence. The less non-existence (덜없음) is soiled (더럽 다). Such non-existence due to our incomplete clearing away is really soiled.⁵²

 Edited by Park Yeong-ho, The East Asian Saint Daseok Ryu Yeongmo (Seongcheonmunhwa Jaedan, 1994), p. 172. Daseok wrote the following poem in his journal from 11 January 1963. “Mind is bright while the space is empty. There is less non-existence. There should be no existence. There should be complete non-existence. Material existence should disappear while even the clean with stirring dusts should disappear. To become holy need to become empty and clean of any material dusts fluttering.” Ryu Yeongmo, Daseok’s Journals, vol. 2 (1990), p. 86. Refer to the following work: Ryu Yeongmo, The Song of Eohl, with commentary by Park Yeong-ho (Dure, 2004), pp. 168 ff.

Kim Heup Young

6 The Word Made Flesh: Ryu Young-Mo’s Christo-dao: A Korean Perspective 6.1 Introduction

Elsewhere, I proposed for “christo-dao” rather than traditional “christo-logy” or modern “christo-praxis” as a more appropriate paradigm for the understanding of Jesus Christ in the new millennium.¹ This christological paradigm shift solicits a radical change of its root-metaphor, from logos (Christ as the incarnate logos) or praxis (Christ as the praxis of God’s reign) to dao (Christ as the embodiment of the Dao, the “theanthropocosmic” Way) with a critical new interpretation.² For, first of all, christo-logy has been taken as the orthodox view but now becomes very problematic, and christo-praxis can serve as a necessary corrective but still within the limit of a dualistic end of the former.³ Christo-dao, utilizing the wholistic metaphor of dao, can overcome this vestige of Greek dualism remaining between christo-logy and christo-praxis. Furthermore, for East Asian Christians, the christological adoption of dao is as inevitable and legitimate as that of logos for the Western church at the fourth century.

An earlier version of this paper was published as “The Word made Flesh: Ryu Young-mo’s Christotao, A Korean Perspective,” in One Gospel and Many Cultures: Case Studies and Reflections on Cross-Cultural Theology, ed. by Mercy AmbaOduyoye and Hendrik M. Vroom (Rodopi, ), -  See my “Jesus Christ as the Tao: Toward a Christotao,” Christ and the Tao (Hong Kong: Christian Conference of Asia, 2003), pp. 155 – 82. As the widely used root-metaphor of all classical East Asian religions including Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism, dao is a very inclusive term with various meanings. For example, Fingarette defined Dao as “a Way, a path, a road, and by common metaphorical extension it becomes in ancient China the right Way of life, the Way of governing, the ideal Way of human existence, the Way of the Cosmos, the generativenormative Way (Pattern, path, course) of existence as such.” Herbert Fingarette, Confucius – The Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 19. Dao is also interpreted as “the logos in praxis” or “a being in becoming,” as its Chinese character consists of two graphs meaning a head and a movement (“to run”); see Wing-tsit Chan, The Way of Lao Tzu: Tao-te ching (Indianapolis & New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), pp. 6 – 10.  As a composite adjective of theos (God), anthropos (humanity), and cosmos (universe), literally, theanthropocosmic refers to the interrelation of God, humanity, and the cosmos.  See Jürgen Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ: Christology in Messianic Dimensions, trans. by Margaret Kohl (San Francisco: Harper, 1990), pp. 38 – 72.

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I argued that, in fact, this adoption has been operative since the beginning of Korean Christianity. As an example, I introduced briefly the thoughts of Dasŏk Ryu Young-Mo (柳永模) (1890 – 1981).⁴Although unpopular, Ryu Young-Mo is a most innovative religious thinker in the history of Korea. He was a guru, a towering teacher of very important Korean Christian leaders of the last generation. His most famous disciple was Ham Sŏk-hŏn 咸錫憲 (1901– 89) who also became a guru of Korean minjung (people’s) theology and movement.⁵ Ryu’s religious insights also deeply influenced significant intellectuals in other religious traditions in Korea such as Neo-Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. Ryu entered into the Christian faith as a Presbyterian at the age of fifteen (1905), though he later declared himself as a Non-Orthodox (DU: 287). Perhaps this Korean religious genius was much ahead of his time like Søren Kierkegaard (1813 – 55) in 19th century Europe. The Korean Calvinists in his time, extremely loyal to their learning from fundamentalist and exclusivist missionaries, could in no way appreciate his provocative foresight that would be more suited for 21st century Christians in a highly global and multi-religious world. Indeed, he was a precursor of intertextual interpretation, multifaith hermeneutics, and comparative theology.⁶ Deeply embedded in East Asian scriptures, he developed an intriguing interpretation of Christian faith in the light of East Asian thoughts. Simply, he read the Christian Bible seriously along with Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist scriptures. He made an interesting suggestion for this multi-scrip-

 Ryu’s literary name is Dasŏk (多夕) that literally means “so many nights.” This name symbolically shows his Daoist inclination (namely, night rather than day, vacuity rather than substance, non-being rather than being, etc.). The most important primary source for the study of Ryu’s thought is the photocopies of his diaries that he wrote from 1956 to 1975, but they are very difficult even for Korean scholars to comprehend due to his recondite writing style and very innovative usage of Korean language: Dasŏk-ilji, 多夕日誌 [The Diaries of Dasŏk], 4 vols. (Seoul: Hongikje, 1990), abbr. DI. Fortunately, his faithful student Kim Heung-ho recently published their complete commentaries which become a crucial aid for the study of Ryu: Dasŏk-ilji Gong-bu [The Study of Dasŏk’s Diaries], 7 vols. (Seoul: Sol, 2001), abbr. KDI. There are two other important resources, collections of his lecture notes that his students had dictated: Park Young-ho, ed., Dasŏk-ŏrok, 多夕語錄 [the Analects of Dasŏk]: Ssial-ŭi-maeari (Seoul: Hongikje, 1993), abbr. DU; and Kim Heung-ho, ed., Jesori [the Genuine Voice from the Self]: The Sayings of the Honorable Ryu Young-Mo (Seoul: Poongman, 1985), abbr. JS.  See Ham Sŏk Hŏn, Queen of Suffering: A Spiritual History of Korea, trans. by E. Sang Yu (London: Friends World Committee for Consultation, 1985).  Ryu said, “After Confucianism, Buddhism, and Christianity illuminate each other, they also know themselves better” (DU: 365). For an example of comparative theology, see Francis X. Clooney, Theology after Vedanta: an Exercise in Comparative Theology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993); for multifaith hermeneutics, see Kwok Pui-lan, Discovering the Bible in the Non-Biblical World (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1995), esp., pp. 57– 70.

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tural reading: “regard all the scriptures of East Asian religions as the Old Testament” (DU: 82).⁷ Whether Ryu was a religious pluralist is an open question, as his followers are divided on this issue. However, it is clear that his interest was not so much in an epistemology of religious pluralism as in a constructive hermeneutics of his faith in and through (not out of!) the plurality of those traditional, indigenous religions. Kim Heung Ho, one of few living disciples of Ryu and probably the most reliable interpreter of Ryu’s thought, argued that Ryu was first and foremost a Christian, a serious follower of Jesus Christ. One way that he differed from other Korean Christians is that he freely employed scriptural resources of our indigenous religions in order to understand the Christian Bible better and more properly in his context. Having been with us for more than one millennium, these East Asian scriptures have profoundly influenced, shaped, and been deeply embedded in our modes of life and thought (just as the Bible has for Westerners). By reading the Bible in and through these indigenous scriptures, he could conceive of his new faith in Jesus Christ more clearly, intelligibly, and practically. In this paper, I will continue to explicate Ryu’s insights into Jesus Christ. They may portray a salient example of Korean contextual Christology, so to speak, the Korean face of Jesus Christ. Christians in the contemporary world, highly global and pluralistic, may need to hear these fascinating Christian thoughts in a new key. I will try to put his thoughts as much as in his own words by literal translations rather than a systematic interpretation, so as to make him speak for himself. His christodao can be categorized in seven “configurations of basic insights” as follows: 1. Jesus is the filial son (孝子): a Confucian Christology 2. Jesus is the Rice (bab): a Sacramental Christology 3. Jesus is the Flower: an Aesthetic Christology 4. Jesus is the Seed: an Anthropological Christology 5. Jesus is the Spirit (靈): a Pneumatological (Qi 氣) Christology 6. Jesus is the Dao (道): a Cosmic Life Christology 7. Jesus is the Being in Non-Being (無極而太極): an Apophatic Christology

 Ryu partially supports the theory of preparation and fulfillment; he regarded Christianity as a New Testament that has completed all the truth revealed in Asian religious thoughts, so to speak, Asian Old Testaments. His cross-cultural Asian hermeneutics would be summarized in the following statement: “Putting the essence of Western culture in the backbone of Asian culture, I tried to explain the former [Christianity] in and through the latter [East Asian religions]” (KDI 2: 176).

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6.2 Jesus is the filial son (孝子): a Confucian Christology Famous with an impeccable tradition of maintaining genealogy, Korea has been and still is the most Confucianized society in the world. Almost every family in Korea keeps a genealogy that records names and the kinship of all their ancestors and relatives since the origin of their clan (for the period of about one and half millennia). From this strong Confucian vantage point, first and foremost, Jesus is a filial son.⁸ Filial piety (孝) is a cardinal, most well-known, Confucian virtue. However, it is a big mistake of popular Confucianism to understand filial piety simply as a blind obedience to parents, but Confucian filial piety ultimately means a faith in God, the true Father. According to Ryu, Jesus could become the Christ as he has accomplished fully the loving relation between father and son (父子有親), one of the five Confucian moral rules (五倫). Our yearning for God the Father is in fact an unavoidable inclination of original human nature: Human yearning for God the Father cannot be prevented. For it is the relationship between father and son…Father and son cannot be two (父子不二). This refers to the loving relationship between father and son (父子有親). The longing for God the Father, the beginning and the truth, is an unavoidable human nature (人間性). That entails the true meaning of what is to be human. (DU: 165)

Therefore, the Christian expression to give the glory to God implies achieving the original nature given to us by the Father. However, Confucianism has gone astray. It has forgotten the true object of filial piety, God the Father, but instead emphasizes ancestor worship excessively: Forgotten filial piety toward God since long time ago, people regard it as treating one’s father as the Heaven…[However,] God the Father should take precedence over one’s parents. Confucianism that relied heavily on the mandate of Heaven (天命) completely forgets Heaven (忘天). This is the reason why Confucianism is so enervated. (DU: 227, 230, 254)

Further, Jesus is the Only Begotten Son (獨生子). Ryu interpreted this Johannine expression in a special way (Jn 3:16). The title “the only son” does not imply so much a royal prerogative as a special mission given to him by God. In fact, the cross-bearing and the crucifixion on the cross of Jesus culminates the filial piety

 See KDI 6: 319. In contrast to Luther’s German theology of Reformation, Ryu called his as a Korean “theology of filial piety” (KDI 2: 223 – 4).

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of the only begotten son: “Jesus did not come from God in order to receive all lavish hospitalities. The one who will ascend into Heaven [on the contrary] ought to bear the cross. His death is nothing but to accomplish the mission given to him as a son” (DU: 216). Since we are also children of God, we also have a similar mission in the world as His children. “Jesus taught people in the world to give. This world is the world to give [rather than to receive]” (DU: 71). Furthermore, Jesus is the Profound Person (君子), the ideal Confucian personhood. The profound person in Chinese literally means a son of a king. Since God is the true king, Jesus, the only begotten son of the king, is none other than the profound person. Religious exclusivism is wrong. For, first of all, you have to know others in order to know yourself better. And all religions, after all, converge at the common quest for full humanity, i. e., the goal of a profound person: “Christians regard Confucianism as heretic and Buddhism as idol worship. Buddhists denounce Jesus and Confucianism…[However] If a person does not know others, one does not truly know oneself either. If one wants to become a profound person, one should also know the other profound persons” (DU: 57). The primary goal of Confucianism lies in attaining full humanity or sagehood through becoming a profound person. Hence, ren 仁 (benevolence or cohumanity), the cardinal virtue of Confucianism, involves an ethico-ontology of “being togetherness.”⁹ The Confucian project of a profound person is consummated in the achievement of this co-humanity through the sacrifice of oneself (殺身成仁). The crucifixion of Jesus on the cross is a perfect example of both the profound person who achieves this sacrificial act (DU: 320) and “the only begotten son” who accomplishes his filial duty (DU: 125). In this sacrificial act of Jesus on the cross to realize co-humanity, Ryu found a true meaning of Christ: “Christ is the one who regards serving God and human race as [the goal of] his life (生命). Christ is the one who lends oneself to serving so as to show people of all races how to live eternal life as Christ. Therefore, isn’t it natural for a person to honor and praise Christ sincerely?” (DU: 39)

6.3 Jesus is Rice (Bab): A Sacramental Christology Ryu was famous for eating one meal a day (一食). For him, this was a serious ritual practice that embodies his Christian piety in everyday life: “The climax

 See my Wang Yang-ming and Karl Barth: A Confucian-Christian Dialogue (Durham: University Press of America, 1996).

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of the worship toward God is eating one meal a day. For it is that which spirit eats body and that which I dedicate my body as a living worship” (DU: 52). Eating has a deeper spiritual meaning than a simple hygienic intake: “A meal signifies a sacrificial offering (祭物).” Since our bodies are “God’s temple,” to eat means to dedicate an offering to God who “lives in” us (1 Cor 3:16). “Therefore, to eat a meal is a worship or a Mass. Regarding that it is I who eats is something like stealing the offering. To eat a meal means to love God” (DU: 186 – 7, JS: 129). Jesus’ sacrifice on the cross consummates this sacrament of eating. At this point, Ryu developed a fascinating insight that, on the cross, Jesus becomes rice¹⁰: “Jesus sacrificed himself on the cross. To sacrifice oneself means to become a meal. To become a meal signifies that a person becomes rice that can be cooked as food. To become rice implies that it has been ripen. It comes to maturity and becomes a ripe fruit” (DU: 187). Hence, every meal should be regarded as the sacrament of Eucharist: “[T]he worship when Jesus was sacrificed by being nailed on the cross and shed blood is really our food to eat and drink. Eating with the acknowledgment of this is the Eucharist. We must have a daily meal as the Eucharist, not as an appetite to eat (食慾)” (DU: 100). “I eat a meal to imagine rice as the flesh of Jesus and water as the blood of Jesus. It is not true that this [kind of imagination] is required only during the Mass or the Lord’s Supper. But whenever I eat rice, I suppose as if I were eating Christ, and then I receive some news” (DU: 223). After all, he suggested, is not the purpose of life to become rice? That is to ripen so as to be used and dedicated as a sacrificial food (DU: 187, JS: 130). Rice as human life is fruit of the Holy Spirit which Ryu identified with four Confucian virtues of full humanity; co-humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom (仁 義禮智). Full humanity as rice is what we ought to attain to be dedicated to God. “Human life is rice, fruit of the Holy Spirit [to be borne] to serve God. This fruit of the Holy Spirit means to become fully human or to attain true humanity (人格). True humanity is what it is to be devoted to God. True humanity signifies benevolence (or co-humanity), righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, i. e., the original nature of human being. We should dedicate this original nature to God” (JS: 133). The purpose of eating, hence, is to attain true humanity. Based on a passage of the Doctrine of the Mean, Ryu defined this process of humanization as the dao (率性之謂道 [DU: 187, JS: 131]). From this vantage point, Ryu conceived of Jesus as true humanity, the perfect embodiment of the Dao, who has accomplished the four Confucian virtues once and for all. In his East Asian Christian thought, fur-

 Cf. Jn 6:48, 51. In Korean, rice (bab) has a multiple connotation such as a grain, a meal, and food.

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thermore, the Word does not mean so much a doctrine as an expression of true humanity: “the Word is nothing other than an expression of true humanity. We are offering true humanity through the Word” (JS: 133). True humanity as universal sacrament, hence, entails the Word of the Holy Spirit, the salvific energy of the cosmos: “What special nourishment can the universe and humanity get from the rice of human life? It is the Word. In the rice of human life, there is the Word. There is the Word of the Holy Sprit and the Father. There is the Word of the Holy Spirit, the cosmic power to save the human race” (DU: 188, JS: 132).

6.4 Jesus is the Flower: An Aesthetic Christology Ryu metaphorically imagined that red flowers are the blood of nature and that human blood is the flower of nature.¹¹ From this image, Ryu surmised that “flower is blood.” Applying this contemplation to the bloodshed of Jesus on the cross, Ryu conceived an intriguing Christology of salvific blood-flower (kkot-pi): Since flower is red like blood, it is called that flower blossoms. Flower is the blood of nature, and human blood is the flower of nature. Flower is blood, and blood is flower. This flower of blood or blood of flower is the blood Jesus shed on the cross. The flower-blood of Jesus shed on the cross is the blood of flower (花血). In a word, it is the spilled blood of the righteous. No matter how evil the world is, the blood of the flower spilled by the righteous can cleanse it. (DU: 165 – 6, cf. JS: 156)

Based on the natural phenomenon that a flower blossoms at the end of its life [of the plant], furthermore, he established another basic insight that “flower is the end.”¹² And he developed an aesthetic Christology of the cross; namely, the crucifixion is the blossoming of cosmic flower: The present is both the end and a flower (kkŭt-kkot). God is alpha and omega as well as the beginning and the end. The first character of the Chinese word the present (現在) connotes “blossoming like a flower,” and the second “the end of God.” The end of life is death, which means both the end and a flower. Seeing the cross where Jesus was crucified is just like observing the blossoming of a flower. Any death is solemn and holy. [Then, how much solemn and holy] the death of a young person [who died] with the bloodshed of flower is! It is the blossoming of a far more sublime flower. (DU: 204, JS: 149)

 In Korean, the two words, being red (pi) and blossoming (pinda), are phonetically related. Ryu employed this relation to establish his suggestion.  Again, Ryu pointed out the phonetic resemblance between two Korean words of “end” (kkŭt) and “flower” (kkot).

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Trees produce fruits after the fall of flowers. Analogically, Ryu applied this natural phenomenon to Christology. If the crucifixion of Jesus is the falling of cosmic flower, then the resurrection is the bearing of a cosmic fruit (花落能成實): Jesus regarded death as the falling of flower. To blossom flower is [to manifest] the truth, and to fall petals of flower is the cross. The cross is a symbol of the truth over death. Believing the cross means believing the truth. This refers to the state where death has been swallowed up by life; in other words, when the spirit has overcome the body. (DU: 166, cf. JS: 157)

Watching the blossoming of the azalea, a popular Korean mountain flower blossoming in the early spring, Ryu contemplated this flower Christology and lamented poetically, “The azalea falling beforehand, taking the burdens of others! The one who was hanged on the cross would have been a blossom of this azalea!” (JS: 64) “The azalea to be crucified on the cross is to bear the burdens of the human race!” (JS: 66)¹³

6.5 Jesus is the Seed (ssi): An Anthropological Christology Ryu envisioned Jesus as the cosmic seed. He propounded an agricultural analogy of the Trinity; namely, Jesus is the seed, God is its tree, and the Spirit is the life that includes both the seed and the tree: The life of Jesus and the life of God are one in terms of the life of the Spirit (ŏl).¹⁴ If the spirit of Jesus is the seed, then that of God is its tree. Where does a seed come from? It [obviously] comes from its tree. A tree is the source of its seeds. Jesus comes from God. And when a seed sprouts, it again becomes a tree. This means the return to God. (DU: 148)

Here, Ryu’s thought is clearly trinitarian, and not so unorthodox as he confessed.¹⁵ The spirit of Jesus is the seed of God, i. e., the spirit of eternal life. Ryu explicated perichoresis in light of this seed Christology: “When Jesus said ‘whoever sees me sees him who sent me’ [Jn 12:45], the ‘me’ here refers to God’s seed (spirit) in him. To believe in God’s seed in me, the Word (logos), or 13

Using this symbolic expression, Ryu would have lamented pains and the suffering of Korean people during the period of Japanese occupation. Also see KDI 5: 536 – 7, 6: 133 – 4, 7: 13 – 4.  The Korean word ŏl connotes both soul and spirit in English. In this paper, however, this term will be translated as spirit, as Ryu stated that “ŏl [靈] is the Holy Spirit” (JS: 125).  Ryu also underscored the meditation of the Trinity (念參): see KDI 7: 558 – 9.

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the one whom God sent is salvation and eternal life (Jn 12:50)” (DU: 351). “To give the only son (Jn 3:16) means to give us the seed of God (1 Jn 3:9)” (DU: 277). With the support of these Johannine passages, Ryu claimed that it is not only Jesus but also all of us who possess the seed of life from God as the only sons. The only difference between Jesus and us lies in the fact that Jesus is the first ripened fruit of the seed, a paradigm we should follow and produce. Jesus is the Christ who once and for all has accomplished the purpose to be God’s seed (DU: 341): Not only the spirit of Jesus but also the spirit of every human being is the seed. To tell this [truth] is [the purpose of] religion. In other words, in terms of the spirit, both Jesus and “I” are the same seeds of God. If Jesus is the first ripened fruit, I also ought to become a ripened fruit. I should believe in Jesus, God, and me. In terms of the life of the spirit, all of them are [the same] one life. To believe in the spirit of [true] “I” is to believe in Jesus and God. Jesus and “I” are the same seeds that have come from God. (DU: 148, cf. JS: 167) Jesus has come in order to make us realize our true selves. To believe in Jesus means to know that I am an immortal life. I must realize that I am a seed from the Heaven. If Jesus is a seed, then I am also a seed. (DU: 149)

The deeper objective of Christology, as we have seen repeatedly, lies in its anthropological implication, that is to say, a realization of our true selves. At this point, Ryu developed an anthropology of inner seed in dialogue with Confucianism. God’s seed in us is the inner seed, the true life, which Ryu identified with the Confucian notions of moral power (de 德) or the innate knowledge of the good (liangzhi 良知): “Jesus taught us that the inner seed in me, God’s seed, is the true life. Therefore, first and foremost, I should follow the inner seed in me. That inner seed is the true life of Jesus as well as my true life” (DU: 308). Our true subjectivity is not so much our physical appearances as this inner seed, the spirit. Ryu made a profound suggestion that our true subjectivity is related to qi (氣), the cosmic spiritual energy. In Confucian terms, my true self, my inner seed, or my real life, is nothing other than the qi of natural greatness (浩然 之氣): The thing that comes from the womb of my mother is not I. But the inner seed is I. The spirit (精神) is I. The inner self is I. The outer self (the body) is only a handful quantity of soil or of ash. However, the inner self can build the kingdom of the Heaven. It is the limitlessly great and limitlessly powerful I. It is I in the qi of the natural greatness. I in the natural greatness of qi is the body of qi (氣體) and the spiritual body (靈體). To live in the real life is to cultivate this spiritual body…A handful soil is not I. But the qi of the natural greatness that covers the earth and the entire universe is I. It is too vigorous and too immense (至剛至 大) to be measured and compared with anything. That is I, my true self. (DU: 192)

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The goal of Christology, after all, lies in this anthropology, the realization of true I: “The I of Jesus is after all your I” (DU: 272). Jesus as the inner seed is not a totally other being, but a personification of true humanity hidden but latent in us: “Jesus is both the budded and the resurrected I” (JS: 93). What Confucianism calls “original nature” (性) has been fully revealed and completely recovered in and through Jesus Christ, which he called the primordial revolution: “Original nature that Confucianism speaks of signifies the one ‘whom He [God] has sent’ (Jn 6:29). . . . By the recovery of this original nature, [Jesus] has accomplished the primordial revolution.”¹⁶

6.6 Jesus is the Spirit (靈): A Pneumatological (Qi 氣) Christology As we already have seen in the previous section, Ryu’s anthropological Christology is profoundly pneumatological: The Holy Spirit is the Christ, the Holy Spirit is the Word, and the Holy Spirit is my true self. It [the Holy Spirit] witnesses none other than Christ and my true self. By receiving the spirit of the truth, I could attain the “I” of the truth being liberated from the physical “I,” even from death. The reason why we should receive the Holy Spirit is to obtain eternal life. Eternal life means to become the Son of God through the Holy Spirit. It would be as if one were returning to the Father like the prodigal son in Luke 15. (DU: 199)

At this juncture, Ryu played with the Korean word breathing (sum). Beyond the ordinary physical breath (mok-sum), he asserted, it has a spiritual dimension, the breathing of the Word (mal-sum) that bears a phonetic resemblance to the Word in Korean (mal-ssŭm). From this line of thought, he formulated an interesting pneumatology of logos, which may overcome the dualism between logos and spirit: The breathing of the Word (mal-ssŭm = mal-sum) is the end of breathing and the life after death.¹⁷ To breathe the Word is to live eternal life. To think about the Word is to think about

 DU: 371. However, this primordial revolution does not only imply an individualistic character formation, but also contains a serious social dimension. From the notion of seed (ssi), Ryu originated the insight of ssi-al (literary seed-egg, i. e., the locus of cosmic spiritual force) that he identified with minjung (the mass of people). In fact, Ham Sŏk-hŏn took over this insight to develop his famous thought of ssi-al that became the foundation for minjung theology. Hence, it is a mistake to view Ryu’s thought merely as a personal approach that lacks liberative aspects.  Mal-sum also connotes the end of breathing.

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eternity, and the Word is none other than God. To breathe the Word is to believe and live in God. The breathing of the Word is to set fire of truth in us. It sets fire on firewood in us…The Word is written in the mind-and-heart of truth…The flame of eternal life is flaring in our mind-and-heart. The Word of God is burning…A human being is a holy brazier where the Word of God is burning…If one cannot breathe the Word of God, the person is not worth being called as a human.” (DU: 205)

Ryu postulated that the Holy Spirit is comparable to the “illustrious virtue” (明 德), a key notion in the Great Leaning (大學), one of the Confucian four books: “the Holy Spirit is the illustrious virtue. The illustrious virtue should be manifested” (DU: 215). Further, he identified the Holy Spirit with the qi 氣, a crucial East Asian notion very similar to pneuma: “The Holy Spirit is nothing other than energizing and circulating the qi” (DU: 365). He explicated, The Chinese word qi portrays clouds in the Heaven. It describes that clouds are moving with the wind…The wind that makes clouds moving or the power that make the wind moving is qi…Qi is the foundation of creating and forming (生成) myriad things…I view the Holy Spirit also as a metaphysical wind. As a wind, it is a movement of qi. It is the Dao that enables me to be connected with the qi flowing down from the Absolute Top. (DU: 369)

Furthermore, Ryu propounded an East Asian version of Jesus’ Prayer¹⁸: For me, to breathe is to take the breath of the Holy Spirit. In this way, I can embody the truth. All of these [after all] are based on prayer. Prayer is an awakening, and the Holy Spirit is the power. In this power of the Holy Spirit, we breathe and gush out. This is an illumination. (DU: 184)

6.7 Jesus is the Dao (道): A Cosmic Life Christology Following John 14:6, Ryu comprehended Jesus as the Dao, the way of the truth toward the life in God.¹⁹ Christ is the brightest way on which we can walk safely (the truth) to attain the unity with God (the life). It coincides with the goal of Confucianism, the unity of Heaven and humanity. Ryu elucidated, Then, what are “the way (道), the truth (眞理), and the life (生命)” Jesus envisioned? He seems to understand them as follows. The way refers to ascending again to Heaven after

 Ryu said, “Our Lord is the Lord Breathing” (KDI 2: 607– 8).  See KDI 1: 508 – 9. Ryu described Christ also as “the high way (hang-gil)” toward Heaven (KDI 7: 534).

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having descended from Heaven to the earth. The truth is to walking brightly along the way, and the life means that the Father and the Son become one as the brightest light.²⁰ The Son of Man came from Heaven and returned to Heaven. There is no brighter way than this. Going straight along this way without error is the truth. And finally meeting with God is life. Compare this to the railroad! The railroad is the way, the train is the truth, and the arrival is life. (DU: 167, JS: 157– 8)

As we already have seen, Jesus is ultimately the true “I.”²¹ The way, the truth, and the life, after all, refer to this true ‘I’: The way is eternally coming and eternally going. However, ‘I’ come and go on the way. If I come and go on the way, I become the way. Just as a silkworm’s cocoon makes thread and as a spider spins a web, I produce the way. The ‘I’ of the Spirit, endowed by God, is the way, the truth, and the life [and Jesus is the enlightened one who realized this fact]. (DU: 43 – 4)

These statements may sound strange. Nevertheless, this is an ingenious East Asian interpretation of Paul’s passage, “it is no longer I who live, but it is the Christ who lives in me” (Gal 2:20). From his East Asian perspective, this passage virtually means that the Christ who lives in me is the true ‘I’ (true humanity). Then, Confucian insights on true humanity such as the mind-and-heart (hsin), original human nature (性), and the principle (li) can be utilized as profound resources to formulate Christology, more precisely, christodao, some examples of which we already have seen. He said, hence, “The way toward God resides only in one’s mind-and-heart [心]” (DU: 52). Moreover, Ryu equated the dao with the Neo-Confucian notion of li (the principle) and the Buddhist notion of dharma: The way is absolutely necessary for us to move forward. Without the way, we cannot move an inch. The entire spaces (空間) exist to provide the way. The space between an atom and a neutron or that between molecules exists for the sake of the way…This way implies precisely the principle (理). The dao refers to the way. The statement that vacuity (虛空) is the truth should be understood from this vantage point. Dharma (法) in Buddhism also refers to the principle, the way. (DU: 170 – 1)

Ryu reminded us that a deeper meaning of dao lies in emptiness or vacuity. “No matter how beautiful flowers are, it is only the emptiness that really reveals the beauty of flowers” (JS: 288). In truth, the non-being (emptiness) is more funda-

 Ryu argued that “being glorified” in the passage of Jn 13:31– 2 means “being brightened.” As they are the same bright light, God the Father and Jesus the Son can be united.  Ryu also described the true I as “the Heavenly I” that has opened the true way of life to us through “the cross Jesus has borne” (KDI 7: 545).

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mental than the being (a flower): “When people watch flowers, they normally focus only on flowers, but they do not pay even a slight glimpse to the emptiness (虛空) in the outside of flowers. In fact, it is the emptiness that enables the existence of those flowers.” (DU: 241) At this point, the East Asian root-metaphor of dao departs from its Western counterpart, logos, as is saliently pictured in medicines and paintings. Whereas Western paintings focus on things, East Asian paintings pay more attention to the empty space, which, we believe, is more profound²²: “Westerners do not seem to know the non-being (無). Although they are efficient, it is only with respect to the being (有), but it is not so well with respect to the remoteness and the greatness (遠大)” (DU: 309). Further, he formulated a fascinating theological insight of the Vacuity (虛空): I long for the Absolute Vacuity (絶對空). What would happen to me after I die? There is nothing. Only the Vacuity without anything can be the truth. What is really fearful is the vacuity. This is the truth. This is God. Without the vacuity, there is neither the truth nor an existence. How can the universe exist without the vacuity? There is nothing to exist without the vacuity. All the spaces between things, qualities, cells, molecules, atoms, and neutrons are part of this vacuity. Since there is vacuity, there is existence. (DU: 161)

Boldly declaring that God is the Absolute Vacuity, furthermore, Ryu suggested an intriguing Daoist-Buddhist-Christian apophatic theology: If our life blossoms and expands limitlessly, it will arrive at the Vacuity (空, the Absolute [絶大]). That is to say, living eternal life. The Vacuity is the foundation of the first beginning of life and everything. It is God. I also believe in the personal God. Although God is personal, it does not refer to such a personality that we have. Being personal denotes the first beginning of everything. God transcends both the being and the non-being (有無). In the search of God, we cannot satisfy with materials. Since we cannot be satisfied with things that exist, we search for God who is not. Therefore, God is the Being in Non-Being. (DU: 285)

6.8 Jesus is the Being-in-Non-Being (無極而太極): An Apophatic Christology Ryu upheld a mysticism of the One (hana): “After all, there is the only (absolute) One.” (DU: 19) “All problems are ultimately related to the (absolute) One. . . . [T]

 See my “Response to Peter Lee, ‘A Christian-Chinese View of Goodness, Beauty, and Holiness,” Christianity and Ecology: Seeking the Well-being of Earth and Humans, ed. by Dieter T. Hessel and Rosemary R. Ruether (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 357– 63.

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hey are how to live authentically as the (absolute) One.” (DU: 40). He identified this Absolute One with God the Lord: “The One is the Lord, and the Lord is the One” (DU: 45). Moreover, God in Korean (Hana-nim) literally means the One (hana) and the Lord (nim). Ryu conceived this absolute oneness of God at the pinnacle of Daoist and Neo-Confucian cosmogony: “God is the one and the absolute. The Non-Ultimate is the Great Ultimate (無極而太極). There is only God.” (DU: 186) “Non-Being (虛無) is the Non-Ultimate (無極), and Being (固有) is the Great Ultimate (太極). The Non-Ultimate and the Great Ultimate are one, and the one is God. The Great Ultimate of Being (有) cannot be conceived without the conception of the Non-Ultimate of Non-Being (無). Hence, they are one” (DU: 240). From this vantage point, finally, as we noticed at the end of the last section, he expressed a novel East Asian definition of God; namely, God is the One who is ‘the Being in Non-Being’ (Ŏpshi-gyeshin-nim)²³: “We should not call in vain the name of God who is the Being in Non-Being” (DU: 269). “Since God is the One who is Being in Non-Being, we cannot see God” (DU: 275). This Being-in-Non-Being has been historically manifested in the crucifixion (the Non-Being) and the resurrection (Being) of Jesus Christ. Hence, He is both the Non-Being (the Non-Ultimate無極, Vacuity空) and Being (太極 the Great Ultimate, 色 Form). “God is the Being in Non-Being. Although God is not, God is: Although human beings are, they are not” (DU: 371). Likewise, Jesus is the Being in Non-Being, the One who “Is” in spite of “Is-Not.” Whereas we are those of non-being-in-being, He is the One of Being-in-Non-Being. Whereas we are the “forms” that are “none other than emptiness” (Heart Sutra), He is the “emptiness” that is “none other than form”²⁴: “I am who is but who is not (色卽是 空): The one is who is not but who is (空卽是色)” (JS: 68). From the vantage point of the supreme cosmogonic paradox of Dao, Ryu “understood the cross as both the Non-Ultimate and the Great Ultimate…Jesus is the One who manifested this ultimate [paradox] in Asian cosmology. Through the sacrifice of himself, He achieved genuine humanity (ren). That is to say, by offering himself as a sacrifice, He saved the human race and opened the kingdom of God for humanity.”²⁵ In Christ, the Non-Ultimate and the Great Ultimate become one. In the historical scene, this is revealed as the affectionate and filial relation between father and son. Seeing the blossom of the flower of Jesus on the cross, Ryu envisioned the glorious blossom of the cosmos, a new cosmogony. For  God is also “the Father who is the Being in the Non-being (Ŏpshi-gyeshi-abba)” (KDI 3: 386).  Kim Heung-ho, Jesori, p. 68.  Kim Heung-ho, “Ryu Young-mo’s View of Christianity from the Asian perspective,” in Tasŏk Ryu Young-mo, ed. by Park Young-ho (Seoul: Muae, 1993), p. 299.

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“the cross implies a rush into the cosmic trajectory [Dao], the resurrection means a participation in the revolution of the cosmic trajectory, and the sitting on the judgment seat in the right-hand side of God entails a lighting up of the world.”²⁶

6.9 Conclusion Ryu was not a systematic theologian and never wrote a theological treatise. Nevertheless, his insights of Jesus Christ present a splendidly innovative Christology in a crude form. In a nutshell, Jesus is the embodiment of the Dao. That is to say, Christ is the filial son (a proto-paradigm for loving human relationship), rice (cosmic sacrificial food), blood-flower (the cosmogonic flower), the seed of life (true humanity), the Spirit (the breathing of life, qi), and the Being-in-NonBeing (the supreme paradox of the Great Ultimate and the Non-Ultimate). Characteristically, his christodao (Christ as the Dao) is Confucian, sacramental, aesthetic, anthropological, pneumatological, cosmic, and apophatic (Daoist). Naturally, Ryu’s formation of christodao reflects the complex history of three great world religions in Korea, namely, Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. If Jesus Christ is the embodiment of the Dao, then, the teachings of all these religions converge at this point. Jesus is the perfect accomplishment of the Confucian project of the profound person, i. e., to attain full humanity. Jesus is the perfect historico-cosmic manifestation of both the Daoist and the Buddhist visions, the dynamic power of the Vacuity and the Absolute Nothingness (in the paradox of weakness and reversal). Ryu’s religious propensity, however, seems to incline more to the Confucian and Daoist side than the Buddhist. For him, Christology is a perfection of Daoist cosmology and Confucian anthropology. From this Confucian-Daoist vantage point, he conceived Christ as the one who has achieved, not merely a historical revolution, but also the cosmogonic revolution, a transformation of the theanthropocosmic trajectory of Dao through the paradoxical change of the Non-Ultimate and the Great Ultimate (i. e., crucifixion and resurrection). Since the goal of Christology is after all anthropology, his christodao is positively anthropological (Confucian). Nevertheless, it also contains a profoundly apophatic dimension in naming God the Ground of Being (Daoist). This apophatic aspect of christodao will bear great fruits in the future. If the Confucian side of christodao refers to the yang dimension of East Asian Christology, the Daoist side will present the yin dimension. As I predicted elsewhere, this yin dimension of

 Kim Heung-ho, “Ryu Young-mo’s View,” p. 301.

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christodao will be particularly important for the Christology in the third millennium, as we are in the time when the yang Christ is going and when the yin Christ is coming.²⁷ After all, Christ is “the one who comes eternally” (DU: 341). Are these insights a product of syncretism? This would be an important question to some, but it misses the point. For we cannot make as clear-cut of a division between Christianity and our indigenous religions as some fundamental Christians mistakenly claim. If the Christian faith is something to do with the totality of our lives, it should be also something to do with our indigenous traditions (according to Hank Bloom, ‘dynamic configurations of practice and belief’) that have shaped and deeply permeated in our modes of life. For Ryu, these insights are not so much the products of speculative synthesis as the results he attained after his serious reading of the Bible along with our indigenous scriptures that have molded our worldviews and pre-understandings of life continuously. Through this intertextual interpretation (or multi-faith hermeneutics), he could make the understanding of Christian faith much more meaningful, relevant, and practical. In fact, all his writings and dairies were written for this purpose, in order to make the biblical texts “reach and arise some feeling to the mind-and-hearts” of the Korean people. Obviously, Ryu was a serious and sincere reader of the Bible. But he also was honest with and took seriously his own cultural-linguistic context. He tried “to hear it, faithfully, as a message, directed to [the Korean] people in the situation in which they are living.” Probably, he would be more a serious and responsible reader of the Bible than so-called orthodox Presbyterian Christians, and so would he be more a Reformed Christian than they are (if not in Orthodox doctrines, but in terms of sola scriptura). Every morning he performed a ritual: As soon as he woke up, he chose the biblical texts of the day. Reading repeatedly, he memorized and meditated on them until he could attain some enlightenment. Then, he wrote a summary in a Chinese poem, in the similar manner as great Buddhist and Confucian scholars in Korea had performed in the past. These poems constituted the most important contents of his famous diaries. He explained this meditative biblical hermeneutics, metaphorically comparing to a chicken’s production of eggs. He read, memorized, and meditated the Word of God as diligently as a chicken eats and digests food. Then, he gave birth of his own enlightenment as a chicken produces eggs every day. Are these insights acceptable to other Korean Christians in the Church? This is another difficult question. Korean Christians are still more willing to accept Western forms of Christology, aculturally imported and mechanically transmit-

 See my “Jesus Christ as the Tao.”

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ted. However, for Ryu, they are too foreign, dogmatic, abstract, irrelevant, and impractical to be the ultimate frame of reference for his whole being. Simply, they bypass the necessary process of self-appropriation in and through the personal particularity and the communal locality. Genuine universality must encompass genuine particularity. Understanding the Gospel universally (the Word) presupposes first and foremost understanding it locally (the flesh). The confession of Christ without one’s own particularities or contextualities is superficial, vague, incomplete, and unsatisfactory. The goal of Christology is rather in discerning the meaning of human life and accountable actions and in response to the command of the Spirit of Christ working here and now among diverse particularities and idiosyncrasies. For Ryu, therefore, existential and ethical concerns are far more important and immediate than a dogmatic speculation about Jesus Christ. At this juncture, it is also worth remembering that Ham Sŏk Hŏn, the guru of the Korean minjung movement was a disciple of Ryu and that Ham’s well-known social thought of minjung (ssi-al) that deeply influenced minjung theology in fact originated from Ryu. Christodao, living in the Dao (Way) of Christ, is not merely a thinking of Christ, but an eating, drinking, and breathing of the Spirit of Christ (the Word) in and through our whole bodies and the whole networks of communities. Living in the Way (Dao) of Christ invokes us to move one step further beyond just conceiving the Word to giving birth to our own “eggs” from the conception of Christian faith. For East Asian Christians, the adoption of East Asian ethico-religious metaphors is as legitimate a theological process of “owning up to one’s own metaphors” in order to produce our own eggs as Euro-American Christians have done with respect to Greek-Western philosophical and secular metaphors for the formation of their theologies.²⁸ For this constructive theology, Ryu YoungMo submitted us a marvelous example. Finally, confessing Jesus as the embodiment of the Dao is none other than an East Asian way of saying “the Word made flesh.”

 See my “Owning Up to One’s Own Metaphors: A Christian Journey in the Neo-Confucian Wilderness,” Christ and the Tao, pp. 123 – 34.

Pan-chiu Lai

7 Shaping Humanity with Word and Spirit: Perspectives East, West and Neither-East-Nor-West 7.1 Introduction “Word and Spirit” is a very appropriate theme for the inaugural conference of the East-West Theological Forum.¹ It reminds us not only of the universal presence of the Word and the Spirit, but also of the important event in the encounter between East and West in the early 1930s, when Karl Ludvig Reichelt (1877– 1952), a famous Scandinavian missionary to China, founded a centre for Buddhist-Christian dialogue on a mountain in Hong Kong.² The mountain is named “Tao Fong Shan” which literally means “Logos-Pneuma-Mountain.”³ The journal published by the Institute of Sino-Christian Studies, situated at Tao Fong Shan, is entitled Logos & Pneuma: Chinese Journal of Theology (1994‐). As the title of my paper indicates, I would like to take this opportunity to reflect on one of the theological issues which has puzzled me as a Chinese Christian for a rather long time – the question of human nature. As a Christian brought up in Hong Kong, a city famous for its being a meeting place of Eastern and Western cultures, I have been told from time to time that Christianity and Chinese culture, particularly Confucianism, have contradictory views on human nature – whereas Confucianism advocates for the goodness of human nature, Christianity emphasizes the sinfulness of human nature. This contrast is highlighted in “A Manifesto for a Reappraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture” issued by a group of Neo-Confucians on the New Year Day of 1958. It reads: Christianity insists that man [sic] is tainted by original sin and that salvation comes from God, from above. Confucians, on the other hand, generally believe that human nature is good and that man [sic] can attain sagehood and harmony in virtue with Heaven by his

 An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the first East-West Theology Forum held in Seoul, April 2009. The author would like to thank the participants for their comments.  Eric E. Sharpe, Karl Ludvig Reichelt: Missionary, Scholar & Pilgrim (Hong Kong: Tao Fong Shan Ecumenical Centre, 1984).  Tao is the Chinese word for logos or “word,” Fong for pneuma or “wind,” and Shan for “mountain” or “hill.”

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own efforts…Furthermore, it (i. e. Christianity) has its doctrines of heaven and hell, so that Christian love really comes with a proviso, namely that “you accept my religion.” The Confucian view, however, is that all men can achieve sagehood. It has no organization, and does not require worship of Confucius since any man [sic] can potentially become like him.⁴

The contrasts articulated by the Neo-Confucians seem to raise several important questions for Christian theologians engaging in dialogue with Confucianism: Is it necessary for Christian theology to define human nature in terms of original sin? In what way(s) it is possible for Christianity to affirm the goodness of human nature? Can Christianity also affirm that all human beings attain sagehood or sainthood? Can human being participate or be united in the virtue of God? What is the role of human effort in this process? Does it play a vital and active role? Is there any absolute difference between the human nature of Jesus Christ and that of other human beings?⁵ It is very obvious that the Neo-Confucian comments on the stark contrasts between Christianity and Confucianism refer mainly to the Augustinian tradition prominent in Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. It is doubtful as to whether the contrasts can also be applied to what we conventionally call Eastern Orthodox Christianity. If this is a legitimate doubt, Christians engaging in dialogue with Confucianism may have to reconsider the possibility of addressing the above issues from an Eastern Orthodox perspective. In order to address the questions mentioned above, I have explored various theological approaches, including those of Karl Barth and John Cobb, Jr., in my previous essays on related topics. I have attempted to argue that the Christian understanding of humanity is far more complicated than the stereotype constructed by the Neo-Confucians, and that there is no absolute or unsolvable contradictions between the Christian and Confucian views of human nature. In these essays, the theological tradition of Orthodox Christianity is briefly referred to from time to time without any systematic exposition.⁶ In an essay recently

 Carsun Chang, Tang Chun-I, Mou Tsung-san and Hsu Fo-kuan, “A Neo-Confucian Manifesto,” in The World Treasury of Modern Religious Thought, ed. by Jaroslav Pelikan (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), pp. 366 – 7.  Prof. Heup Young Kim, co-chair of this forum, has addressed some of these issues in his Wang Yang-ming and Karl Barth: A Confucian-Christian Dialogue (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1996) and Christ & the Tao (Hong Kong: Christian Conference in Asia, 2003).  See Pan-chiu Lai, “Christian Ecological Theology in Dialogue with Confucianism,” Ching Feng 41:3 – 4 (Sept-Dec 1998): 309 – 44; “Process Christology and Christian-Confucian Dialogue in China,” Process Studies 33:1 (2004): 149 – 165; “Christian-Confucian Dialogue on Humanity: An Ecological Perspective,” Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 14:2 (2004): 202– 15; “Barth’s Doctrines

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published in Korea, I attempted to use the theology of Gregory of Nyssa (c. 330 – 95), one of the most respected theologians in the Orthodox tradition, to argue that his theology, particularly his theory concerning the creation of human being and more importantly his doctrine of salvation, vividly illustrates a Christian Humanistic tradition which is compatible with Confucianism and thus provides room for further development in Christian-Confucian dialogue.⁷ I would like to reiterate in this paper that if one takes into consideration the perspective(s) misleadingly stereotyped as “Eastern” Orthodox Christianity, one will find that the contrasts or contradictions between Christianity and Confucianism are not as absolute as the Neo-Confucians have suggested. Perhaps one may add that the so-called “clashes” between East Asian and Western civilizations considered by Samuel Huntington are not as stark as he has imagined.⁸ Furthermore, there will be many possibilities for further dialogue between Christianity and Confucianism. Referring to the main theme of this forum concerning Word and Spirit, this paper will pay particular attention to the theological resources related to the Orthodox Church, a theological tradition which is very rich in its discussion on the relationship between the Word and the Spirit as well as the concept of theosis or deification. This paper will take Irenaeus (c. 115 – 90) and Augustine (354– 430) as representatives of the so-called “Eastern” and “Western” perspectives respectively. Through analyzing their views on the economic activities of the Son and of the Holy Spirit as well as the related concept of theosis or deification, this paper will argue that there are significant commonalities and room for further dialogue not only among different theological traditions within Christianity (the “Greek East” and the “Latin West”), but also between Christianity and Confucianism (the “Confucian East” and the “Christian West”). Given the limited space of this paper, it will neither engage directly in a dialogue with Confucianism nor articulate a particular theological anthropology or a doctrine of the Trinity. The rather modest aim of this paper is simply to point to a direction for further exploration.

of Sin and Humanity in Buddhist Perspective,” Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 16:1 (2006): 41– 58.  Pan-chiu Lai, “Christian Transformation of Greek Humanism and Its Implications for Christian-Confucian Dialogue,” Korean Journal of Systematic Theology 22 (2008 12): 245 – 69.  Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London: Touchstone Books, 1998).

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7.2 Neither East Nor West Before embarking on the topic concerning shaping humanity with Word and Spirit, I would like to add a remark on the sub-title of this paper concerning the concepts of “East” and “West.” In “Western” theological circles, when one talks about the “East,” one may think of neither the “Far East” (which is a rather Eurocentric concept) nor East Asia, but the Eastern Orthodox Church or the division between the “Greek East” and the “Latin West” – a schism closely related to the development of the doctrine of the Trinity. For Christians in Western Europe or North America, Orthodox Christianity may be called “Eastern” without any serious confusion, but for Christians in East Asia, Orthodox Christianity can be called “Western” instead of “Eastern” because of geographical reasons. Both concepts of “East” and “West” are relative, ambiguous and fluid. In the present context of globalization in general and World Christianity in particular, the division between “East” and “West” becomes increasingly obsolete or outdated. For Christians from the Orthodox tradition, they would prefer to identify their own theological tradition as the heritage of the universal church which is “bothEast-and-West” as well as “neither-East-nor-West.” This paper aims to show that if the question of human nature is addressed from the perspective of the Word and the Spirit, one may find that the division between the theological approaches of the Latin West and the Greek East may not be as sharp as expected. Furthermore, the differences between these two approaches may complement each other to form a more adequate theological anthropology which can be very useful for dialogue between Christianity and Confucianism.

7.3 From Trinity to Theosis It is rather well known that Orthodox theology underwent a significant renaissance during the last few decades.⁹ This theological renaissance is not merely some sort of renewed interest in traditional doctrines. The recent publications in the field indicate that Orthodox theology attempts to address a wide range of contemporary issues through retrieving the insights from its traditional resources and engaging in dialogue with other theological traditions. This can be seen in the Orthodox theologians’ attempts to address various contemporary issues, including environmental ethics, bio-ethics, and the dialogue between

 Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1997), pp. 160 – 6.

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theology and natural science.¹⁰ Some Orthodox thinkers even attempt to engage in dialogue with postmodern thought and address the issues concerning religious pluralism.¹¹ The renaissance of Orthodox theology together with the involvement of the Orthodox Church in ecumenical dialogue with Western churches bore many fruits and the most significant one is probably the contemporary renaissance of Trinitarian theology. As Christoph Schwöbel, co-chair of this forum, points out, the contemporary renaissance of Trinitarian theology has benefited from the theologies of Karl Rahner (1904 – 84) from the Catholic tradition, Karl Barth (1886 – 1968) from the Protestant side and Vladimir Lossky as well as John Zizioulas from the Orthodox tradition.¹² Partially due to the renaissance of Trinitarian theology, there are many studies seeking to reconsider theological anthropology in the perspective of the doctrine of the Trinity. Many of the discussions seem to be focused more on the conceptions of person and relation which are derived from the doctrinal understanding of the immanent Trinity and tend to take the immanent Trinity as the perfect model or archetype for our understanding of human person and relation. Discussions on the economic Trinity, especially how the economic activities of the Trinity shape humanity, remain relatively few. However, as Catherine Mowry LaCugna (1952– 97) emphasizes in her award winning book it is important to link up the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity because “The doctrine of the Trinity is ultimately a practical doctrine with radical consequences for Christian life.”¹³ Following this approach, this paper takes as its title “shaping humanity with Word and Spirit” in order to link up the doctrine of the Trinity and the theory of theosis, which has been undergoing a kind of renaissance in recent years.

 For example: Gennadios Limouris (ed.), Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation: Insights from Orthodoxy (Geneva: WCC Publications, 1990); Jon and Lyn Breck, Stages on Life’s Way: Orthodox Thinking on Bioethics (Crestwood, New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2005); Alexei V. Nesteruk, Light from the East: Theology, Science, and the Eastern Orthodox Tradition (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003).  For example: Christos Yannaras, Postmodern Metaphysics, trans. by Normal Russell (Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2004); Michael Oleksa, “All Things New: An Orthodox Theological Reflection on Interfaith Dialogue,” in: Grounds for Understanding: Ecumenical Resources for Responses to Religious Pluralism, ed. by S. Mark Heim (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), pp. 122– 36.  Christoph Schwöbel, “Introduction – The Renaissance of Trinitarian Theology: Reasons, Problems and Tasks,” Trinitarian Theology Today, ed. by Christoph Schwöbel (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995), pp. 1– 30, esp. 3 – 7, 15 – 19.  Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity & Christian Life (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1993), pp. 1 ff.

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7.4 Renaissance of the Doctrine of Theosis In recent years, there have been a lot of studies concerning the concept of theosis within the theological circle of Orthodox Christianity.¹⁴ More importantly, there have been many expositions of the concept of theosis done by theologians from other theological traditions.¹⁵ Nowadays, many Protestant or Catholic theologians take seriously this concept and attempt to have dialogue on this doctrine. Some recent studies of the concept of theosis indicate that this concept is deeply rooted in the Christian tradition and has a long history of development.¹⁶ Furthermore, the doctrine belongs to various traditions, including Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox.¹⁷ It is a “Catholic” doctrine belonging to the ecumenical tradition inherited by the Eastern and the Western churches.¹⁸ There are also some other books attempting to show that there are many commonalities between the Catholic and Orthodox traditions regarding the doctrine.¹⁹ Admittedly, many Protestant theologians might have reservations about the term “deification,” even though they might affirm the participation of human being in God.²⁰ But based on the brief review outlined above, we can see that there is a significant revival of the doctrine of deification. It illustrates not only the renaissance of Orthodox theology and the achievement of ecumenical

 For example, Gregorios I. Mantzaridis, The Deification of Man: St. Gregory Palamas and the Orthodox Tradition, trans. by Liadain Sherrard (Crestwood, New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1984); Panayiotis Nellas, Deification in Christ: Orthodox Perspective on the Nature of the Human Person, trans. by Normal Russell (Crestwood, New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1987).  Gösta Hallonsten, “Theosis in Recent Research: A Renewal of Interest and a Need for Clarify,” Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions, ed. by Michael J. Christensen and Jeffrey A. Wittung (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007), pp. 281– 93.  See Stephen Finlan and Vladimir Kharlamov (eds.), Theosis: Deification in Christian Theology (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2006). The editors’ introduction (pp. 1– 15) to the book provides a brief account of the contemporary development of the academic discussion of the doctrine.  Michael J. Christensen and Jeffrey A. Wittung (ed.), Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007).  Daniel A. Keating, Deification and Grace (Naples, FL: Sapienta Press of Ave Maria University, 2007).  For example, A. N. Williams, The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).  For example, Bruce L. McCormack, “Participation in God, Yes; Deification, No: Two Modern Protestant Responses to an Ancient Question,” in idem, Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), pp. 235 – 60.

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dialogue among different denominations, but also a re-discovery of the Western theological tradition. So, in this sense, the theological concept of deification is neither exclusively of the East nor exclusively of the West. It is rooted in the Biblical notion of participation,²¹ and is quite prominent in the theology of the Greek Fathers,²² which is well recognized by the Eastern and Western Churches. With its recent revival across denominational lines, it can thus be said to be ‘both-eastern-and-western’ or even “Neither-East-Nor-West” because it belongs to neither “East” nor “West” nor both, but to the universal Christian tradition as a whole. Of course, this is not to say that there is no difference between the “Eastern” and “Western” perspectives. As we are going to see, with regard to the main theme of this paper, “shaping humanity with the Word and the Spirit,” there are significant differences between the views of St. Irenaeus and St. Augustine, but they complement rather than contradict each other.

7.5 Irenaeus and the “Eastern” Perspective To begin our tour of the “perspectives of East, West and Neither-East-Nor-West” with Irenaeus seems to be very natural and needs no justification. The title of my paper might be reminiscent of the biblical image of a pot being shaped directly by the potter’s hands as well as the famous metaphor of two hands of the Father employed by Irenaeus. Due to limited space, the following discussion about Irenaeus will be focused on how humanity is shaped by the Word and the Spirit, and this is quite in line with Irenaeus’ thought. When Irenaeus makes reference to the Word and the Spirit as the two hands of the Father, it is usually about the ‘creation’ of humankind in the image and likeness of God, meaning not only the creation of human being in the beginning²³ but also the redemption or re-creation of human being in Christ and the perfection or resurrection of humanity in the eschaton. ²⁴ In fact, how humanity is perfected by the triune God is one of the key motifs in Irenaeus’ writings.

 Daniel G. Powers, Salvation through Participation: An Examination of the Notion of the Believers’ Corporate Unity with Christ in Early Christian Soteriology (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2001).  See Normal Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).  Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses V, 6.1; V, 28, 3 – 4; Demonstratio 11.  Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses V, 1.3; Demonstratio 22.

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The metaphor of two hands of the Father affirms that the Word and the Spirit function differently but not without any coordination. Instead, the two hands of the same Father work for the same purpose – the one salvation planned by the same Father.²⁵ Irenaeus used the term “economy” to refer to the entire divine work from creation to the consummation.²⁶ Without denying the suitability of some other terms, such as anakaphalaiōsis or recapitulation of all things in Christ,²⁷ which may include non-human creatures as well, it is also proper to use the term “theosis” to describe Irenaeus’ understanding of human salvation because he did use a lot of expressions closely associated with the doctrine of theosis. ²⁸ Although Irenaeus did not use the exact word “theosis,” all the basic elements for a doctrine of theosis could be found in his theology.²⁹ Irenaeus’ elaboration on the metaphor of the two hands of the Father clearly relates to the doctrine of the Trinity, especially the economic Trinity rather than the immanent Trinity.³⁰ Sometimes, it is even related to the church liturgy. For example, in his Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching, Irenaeus writes, For this reason the baptism of our regeneration takes place through these three articles, granting us regeneration unto God the Father through his Son by the Holy Spirit: for those who bear the Spirit of God are led to the Word, that is to the Son, while the Son presents [them] to the Father, and the Father furnishes incorruptibility. Thus without the Spirit it is not [possible] to see the Word of God, and without the Son one is not able to approach the Father; for the knowledge of the Father [is] the Son, and knowledge of the Son of God is though the Holy Spirit, while the Spirit, according to the good pleasure of the Father, the Son administers, to whom the Father wills and as He wills.³¹

What Irenaeus attempts to highlight is not only the unity of the activities of the three divine Persons for the one economy, but also their respective distinctiveness. Upon quoting Psalm 33:6, Irenaeus elaborates, “Thus, since the Word ‘establishes,’ that is, works bodily and confers existence, while the Spirit arranges and forms the various ‘powers,’ so rightly is the Son called Word and the Spirit

 Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses V, 6, 6 – 7.  Irenaeus, Demonstratio 47; Denis Minns, Irenaeus (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1994), pp. 48 – 9.  Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses I, 10, 1; 3, 16, 6; 5, 18, 3; 5, 21, 1.  Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses IV, 28, 2; IV, 33, 4; V, 16, 2, particularly IV, 38, 3.  Jeffrey Finch, “Irenaeus on the Christological Basis of Human Divinization,” in Stephen Finlan and Vladimir Kharlamov (eds.), Theosis: Deification in Christian Theology, p. 86.  Minns, Irenaeus, pp. 37– 8.  Irenaeus, Demonstratio 7; English translation cited from St. Irenaeus of Lyons, On the Apostolic Preaching, trans. and introduction by John Behr (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997), p. 44; hereafter ET, p. 44.

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the Wisdom of God.”³² With regard to the work of the Son or the Word, Irenaeus writes, In previous times, it was said that humankind was made in the image of God, but it was not shown to be so. For the Word, in whose image human was made, was as yet invisible. This is why humankind so easily lost the likeness. But when the Word of God became flesh he ratified both, for he truly revealed the image, himself becoming that which was his image, and he securely restored the likeness, making humankind like the invisible Father by means of the visible Word.³³

In order to accomplish this task, the humanity of Christ played a vital role. As Irenaeus explains, The divinity of Christ is not hidden by or under his humanity. On the contrary, it is revealed through it, because the humanity limits and defines the divinity, allows it to be measured and comprehended. To see this human being is to see God made visible, to see what can be seen of the Father.³⁴

Turing to Irenaeus’ understanding of the work of the Spirit, it can be summarized as follows: He (i. e. the Holy Spirit) was active with the Word in creation and providence, as wisdom, one of the two hands of the Father. He spoke through the prophets as they declared the Son to their generation, empowered the Son for his ministry, and was later sent by the Son to empower the disciplines for the evangelization of the nations. It is the work of the Spirit to lead people to the Son, who presents them to the Father. Thus, just as it is impossible to approach the Father apart from the Word, it is likewise impossible to see the Son without the Spirit. The Spirit continues to speak through the New Testament Scriptures, but especially works in and through the Church. Indeed, his saving work is restricted to the Church, so that where the Spirit is the Church is found, and where the Church exists the Spirit is present and active.³⁵

 Irenaeus, Demonstratio 5; ET, p. 43.  Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses V, 16, 2; English translation cited from Alexander Roberts and W. H. Rambaut (trans.), “Irenaeus. Against Heresies,” in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 1, ed. by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1867); http://www.ccel.org/ ccel/schaff/anf01.html, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0103.htm. Last accessed 30 March 2009.  Minns, Irenaeus, p. 40.  Terrance L. Tiessen, Irenaeus on the Salvation of the Unevangelized (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1993), p. 258. Tiessen is quite right in pointing out that Irenaeus did not talk about the secret operations of the Spirit apart from the Word or the church and this makes Irenaeus’ position quite different from that of “anonymous Christianity” (pp. 185 – 7, 210 – 12).

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After all, the most important aspect as well as the goal of the work of the Spirit remains bringing perfection to humanity. Based on his own understanding of the distinction between image and likeness that the likeness was lost in the fall, but not the image, Irenaeus relates the image to the Son and the likeness to the Spirit, suggesting that humankind was created in the image of God, and it is the Holy Spirit who bestows the likeness on human being.³⁶ As Irenaeus puts it: We do now receive a certain portion of his Spirit, tending towards perfection, and preparing for incorruption, being little by little accustomed to receive and bear God, which also the apostle terms “an earnest” – that is, a part of the honour which has been promised us by God…This earnest, therefore, thus dwelling in us, renders us spiritual even now, and the mortal is swallowed up by immortality…If therefore, at the present time, having the earnest, we do cry “Abba Father,” what shall it be, when, on rising again, we behold him face to face; when all the members shall burst out into a continuous hymn of triumph, glorifying him who raised them from the dead, and gave the gift of eternal life?³⁷

In other words, according to Irenaeus, the Spirit is entrusted with the indispensable work of renewing humanity in the image and likeness of God, which was revealed in the Incarnate Son.³⁸ There is thus some sort of complementarity between the works of Spirit and of the Word. As Irenaeus writes, “The Spirit demonstrates the Word, and, because of this, the prophets announced the Son of God, while the Word articulates the Spirit, and therefore it is He Himself who interprets the prophets and brings man [sic] to the Father.”³⁹ There are several important implications for theological anthropology to be derived from Irenaeus’ theory of the economic activities of the Word and the Spirit. The first one is that human body forms an integral part of humanity. As Irenaeus states, God’s glory will be revealed in the works of his hands, as it is moulded after the pattern of his Son. For it is the human being, and not part of the human being, which, by the hands of the Father (that is, by the Son and the Spirit), comes to be in the likeness of God. Soul and Spirit might be part of the human being, but they cannot constitute the whole of the human being. The perfect human being is a mixture and union of the soul which receives the Spirit of the Father, mingled with that flesh which is moulded by hand according to the image of God.⁴⁰

    

Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses V, 6, 1; V, 1, 3, Demonstratio 5. Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses 5, 8, 1. Terrance L. Tiessen, Irenaeus on the Salvation of the Unevangelized, pp. 182– 3. Irenaeus, Demonstratio 5; ET, p. 43. Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses V, 6, 1.

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Secondly, Irenaeus’ use the metaphor of two hands of the Father, which might have been inspired by Theophilus of Antioch’s interpretation that the creation of human being is “the only work worthy of His own hands” whereas other creatures were made simply by the Word of God,⁴¹ implicitly affirms human uniqueness vis-à-vis other creatures. Thirdly, as Irenaeus insists, the flesh of Jesus Christ is no “different from ours” or “from another substance” than our own.⁴² This may be further developed into a more Christocentric approach to theological anthropology that true humanity is to be defined by the humanity of Jesus Christ. The approach may be very significant for dialogue with Confucianism and Mahayana Buddhism.⁴³ Fourthly, an anthropological implication to be further derived from Irenaeus’ understanding of the vital role of Jesus Christ’s humanity in the divine economy is that If Christ’s humanity is not something that sullies or conceals his divinity, but rather makes that divinity available to human perception, then the same is true of the humanity we share with Christ…Precisely in our humanity we can be, and, indeed, are called to be, revealers of divinity, bearers of divine glory, the means by which God is glorified.⁴⁴

In other words, in principle all human beings can become partakers of God’s virtue. Fifthly, Irenaeus’ theory of economic activities of the Word and the Spirit assumes a dynamic view of humanity that when created, human being was not perfect and needed to grow into perfection;⁴⁵ and, it is the divine plan of salvation to help human being attain perfection.⁴⁶ In this process, though the almighty God might have the power to bring perfection at the time of creation, God would prefer to accomplish it patiently in full respect of human freedom and the diversity of ability of individual human beings. As Irenaeus puts it, “As a mother is prudent not to make full use of her power at the beginning to grant perfection to man; but as the latter was only recently created, he could not pos-

 Minns, Irenaeus, p. 51.  Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses V, 14, 3.  See the studies of Karl Barth made respectively by Heup Young Kim and Pan-chiu Lai stated above.  Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses IV, 20, 7.  Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses IV, 11, 2.  Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses IV, 37, 7.

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sibly have received it.”⁴⁷ In this way, human freedom is affirmed in the divine economy. Last but not least, Irenaeus assumes a “teleological” view of human being. The goal of God’s economic activities is the perfection of humankind in the image and likeness of God, which is also the last word of Irenaeus’ Adversus Haereses – “coming to be in the image and likeness of God.”⁴⁸ Viewed from this perspective, it is quite right to say that according to Irenaeus, “it is part of man’s [sic] nature to be divine, and also little by little to become that which he [or she] rightly is, namely, God.”⁴⁹ As Mary Ann Donovan succinctly summaries Irenaeus’ anthropology articulated in Adversus Haereses, In the Irenaean view the human person carries the image of the Son of God in the flesh and bears the similitude to God in the gift of freedom. Being free, the human person is, as it were, normally incomplete but perfectible, and meant to mature into the ability to rest in submission to God, which brings incorruptibility and a participation in the glory of God.⁵⁰

It is rather obvious that Irenaeus’ view of humanity is quite different from the view associated with Augustine. As Denis Minns suggests, For Augustine, the fate of most human beings was sealed when Adam sinned, their history predetermined. Because of Christ and the grace he offers, some human beings, and only some, are able to escape from the main course of human history and become part of the history of salvation. This is in the strongest contrast to Irenaeus’ understanding, because, for him, the history of humankind and the history of salvation are one and the same. This path may twist and wander through many detours, but there is no radical bifurcation.⁵¹

Minns might have slightly overstated the contrast. It is because, though not in terms of predestination, Irenaeus also mentions that those who did not believe would be punished.⁵² Since Irenaeus affirms not only the recapitulation in Christ but also human freedom, it is logical to allow people, out of their free will, to

 Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses IV, 38, 1.  Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses V, 36, 1– 3.  Gustav Wingren Man and the Incarnation: A Study of the Biblical Theology of Irenaeus, trans. by Ross Mackenzie (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1959), p. 209; cf. Jeffrey Finch, “Irenaeus on the Christological Basis of Human Divinization”, p. 89.  Mary Ann Donovan, One Right Reading? A Guide to Irenaeus (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1997), p. 136.  Minns, Irenaeus, pp. 58 – 9.  Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses IV, 39, 4– 40, 1.

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reject divine salvation and to receive judgment accordingly. ⁵³ As Terrance L. Tiessen also points out, although Irenaeus’ doctrine of recapitulation became a basis of salvific universalism in the later development of Christian theology, this was not Irenaeus’ own position, which affirms that there are two destinies people must choose between eternal life and eternal death, which means separation from God.⁵⁴ However, Minns is quite correct in suggesting that Irenaeus “allows us to see that orthodoxy is not monolithic, that before Augustine’s influence exerted itself in the West, there was a fully articulated orthodox theology suffused with an optimism and a confidence which have since largely disappeared from the Western tradition” and “that it is possible to be orthodox and catholic and still range beyond the gloomy shadows cast by St. Augustine.”⁵⁵ It is quite fair to say that with his understanding of how humanity has been shaped by the Word and the Spirit, Irenaeus offers an alternative vision of humanity which is more compatible with Confucianism and deserves to be further studied in details within the context of Christian-Confucian dialogue. However, as we are going to see, this is not to say that the “Western” perspective represented by Augustine is to be abandoned entirely.

7.6 Augustine and the “Western” Perspective Given the main theme of this paper, taking St. Augustine as one of the focal points of study might sound odd. Though he is recognized as the most important representative of the “Western” theological tradition, it is questionable as to whether he had any concept of deification and whether the concept is related to the economic activities of the Word and of the Spirit in his theology. It is widely believed that in contrast to the Greek theologians, Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity was formulated in terms of one single nature subsisting in three Persons rather than starting with the divine Persons playing distinctive roles in the economy of salvation.⁵⁶ From time to time, Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity was criticized for its emphasis on the unity of the divine substance as well as the in-

 Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses V, 27, 2.  Minns, Irenaeus, p. 135.  Terrance L. Tiessen, Irenaeus on the Salvation of the Unevangelized, pp. 161– 2, 170 – 1, 244– 6, 262– 3.  Mary T. Clark, Augustine (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1994), pp. 70 – 1; LaCugna, God for us, pp. 97– 101.

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separability of the divine operations (opera trinitatis ad extra indivisa sunt) at the expense of the distinctiveness of different divine Persons’ economic activities.⁵⁷ With regard to Augustine’s conception of deification, since the publication of Gerald Bonner’s ground-breaking study of Augustine’s conception of deification,⁵⁸ there have been newly found materials, particularly Augustine’s sermons, supporting Bonner’s thesis that Augustine did have some sort of concept of deification, which might be slightly different from that of the Orthodox theologians though.⁵⁹ In fact, Augustine had expounded on the idea of deification in his homilies,⁶⁰ and had used expressions closely related to the concept of theosis in his De Trinitate, where he states, For surely if the Son of God by nature became son of man by mercy for the sake of the sons of men (that is the meaning of the Word became flesh and dwelt amongst us), how much easier it is to believe that the sons of men by nature can become sons of God by grace and dwell in God; for it is in him alone and thanks to him alone that they can be happy, by sharing in his immortality.⁶¹

Augustine even considered the prospect of humanity in terms of bearing perfectly God’s likeness. He writes, “For only when it comes to the perfect vision of God, will this image bear God’s perfect likeness.”⁶² Alternatively, he states, “the image of God will achieve its full likeness of Him when it attains to the full vision of Him.”⁶³ Turning to the economic activities of the Word and of the Spirit, it is important to note that in Augustine’s De Trinitate, he did discuss how the divine image in human being was broken up (in Book VII), repaired (in Book XIII) and perfected (in Book XIV) and how the distinctive work of the Word (Book XV, 3, 14– 4, 26) as well as the distinctive work of the Spirit (Book XV, 5, 27– 39) were involved. Augustine takes seriously the distinction among the three divine persons. In De Trinitate, Augustine clearly states that “in this triad only the Son is called the Word of God, and only the Holy Spirit is called the gift of God, and only the Fa LaCugna, God for Us, pp. 97– 101.  Gerald Bonner, “Augustine’s Conception of Deification,” Journal of Theological Studies n.s. 37 (1986), pp. 369 – 86.  Robert Puchniak, “Augustine’s Concept of Deification, Revisited,” in Theosis: Deification in Christian Theology, pp. 122 – 33.  Mary T. Clark, Augustine, p. 47.  Augustine, De Trinitate, XIII, 3, 12; The English translation is cited from: Saint Augustine, The Trinity, introduction, translation and notes by Edmund Hill (Brooklyn, New York: New City Press, 1991), p. 353. Hereafter, ET, p. 353.  Augustine, De Trinitate, XIV, 5, 23; ET, p. 390.  Augustine, De Trinitate, XIV, 5, 24; ET, p. 390.

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ther is called the one from whom the Word is born and from whom the Holy Spirit principally proceeds.”⁶⁴ He continues, This distinction then within the inseparable Trinity must be diligently looked into and not casually taken for granted. It is this that allows the Word of God also to be called distinctively the wisdom of God, even though both Father and Holy Spirit are also wisdom. If therefore any of these three can be distinctively named charity, which could it be more suitably be than the Holy Spirit? What is meant is that while in that supreme simple nature substance is not one thing and charity another, but substance in charity and charity is substance, whether in the Father or in the Son or in the Holy Spirit, yet all the same the Holy Spirit is distinctively named charity. ⁶⁵

Augustine considered the distinctions among the three divine Persons not only in immanent terms, but also in economic terms. He affirms that whereas the incarnation of the Word (and not of the other two divine Persons) demonstrates that “human being could so be joined to God that one person would be made out of two substances,”⁶⁶ the distinctive work of the Spirit lies in the outpouring of the divine life to human hearts. “So the love which is from God and is God is distinctively the Holy Spirit; through him the charity of God is poured out in our hearts, and through it the whole triad dwells in us.”⁶⁷ To be fair to Augustine, his doctrine of the Trinity is not merely a theoretical explanation on the internal relationship among the three divine persons (the socalled immanent Trinity), but also a doctrine concerning how the economic activities of the triune God repaired and perfected the divine image in human being already broken up in the fall. Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity does not only affirm the distinction between the work of the Word and of the Spirit in the restoration and perfection of the divine image in human being, but also refers to his theological anthropology, which is focused on the concept of imago Dei. In De Trinitate, when approaching the end of his exploration of the doctrine of the Trinity, Augustine exclaims before making his conclusion and final prayer, this is the mind to which has been allotted a kind of power to see invisible things, and to which the senses of the body also bring all things for judgment as it presides, so to say, in the innermost and uppermost place of honor, and which has nothing above it to whose government it is subject except God.⁶⁸

    

Augustine, Augustine, Augustine, Augustine, Augustine,

De De De De De

Trinitate, XV, 5, 29; ET, p. 419. Trinitate, XV, 5, 29; ET, p. 419. Trinitate, 13, 5, 22; ET, p. 361. Trinitate, XV, 5, 32; ET, p. 421. Trinitate, XV, 6, 49; ET, p. 434.

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In other words, Augustine’s psychological doctrine of the Trinity affirms that “a human person is capax Dei.”⁶⁹ Of course, one has to be reminded that, “For Augustine only the first Adam’s sinless nature can properly be called ‘human nature’,” and “it is only through Christ’s redemptive act that man’s [sic] inherent human capacities are re-empowered and made capax Dei once more.”⁷⁰ As Mary T. Clark succinctly summaries the theological anthropology underlying Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity: Such is the dignity of human personhood: a vocation to share divine life, a life of love. The image that a human person is, a mirror for reflecting God, is distorted by disordered love. It is restorable by ordering one’s love according to the scale of values: God first, then images of God (human persons), then traces or vestiges of God (non-human creatures). Since God’s image on human persons was originally distorted by pride, only the humility of Christ and faith in the crucified and risen Christ can cleanse the mirror so that by the Holy Spirit’s gift of himself as love, a human person may become a true image of the Trinity.⁷¹

In short, Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity affirms the human dignity and assumes a doctrine of deification. Catherine Mowry LaCugna is one of the arch-critics of the Trinitarian legacy of Augustine.⁷² She is particularly critical towards Augustine’s psychological approach to the doctrine of Trinity, especially its focusing on searching for the image of the Trinity within the individual soul, which implies that one may simply look within oneself to discover God or God’s oikonomia, and thus fails to take seriously the relationality of the triune God being poured out in the historical economy of creation, redemption and consummation.⁷³ However, LaCugna herself also admits: Augustine retained the strongest possible link between theologia and anthropologia by seeing the soul as a speculum of God. Even if this is the link of the economy of grace, of the sending of Son and Spirit, Augustine nonetheless did not altogether abandon a point of intersection between God and creature.⁷⁴

She further concludes:  Mary T. Clark, Augustine, p. 68.  D. Ogliari, Gratia et Certamen: The Relationship between Grace and Free Will in the Discussion of Augustine with the So-called Semipelagians (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003), p. 406.  Clark, Augustine, p. 72.  Stanley Grenz, Rediscovering the Triune God: The Trinity on Contemporary Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004), p. 147.  LaCugna, God for Us, pp. 101– 3.  LaCugna, God for Us, p. 102.

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In the Augustinian tradition, God’s economy of redemption and sanctification transpires within the soul of each individual, whose unique internal history bears God’s providential plan. In this sense, there is a strong connection, albeit an anthropological rather than a historical one, between oikonomia and theologia. The events of salvation history, particularly incarnation and the sending of the Spirit, no doubt are significant in that they are the indispensable and presupposed basis apart from which the move toward interiority to discover the Trinity within would be meaningless.⁷⁵

LaCugna’s remark may help us to understand that Augustine’s psychological doctrine of the Trinity presupposes rather than contradicts the more historical understanding of the economic activities of the Word and the Spirit. Furthermore, Augustine’s psychological doctrine of the Trinity, without denying the doctrine of original sin, also presupposes some sort of doctrine of deification. In these respects, the contrasts between the “Eastern” and “Western” perspectives are by no means absolute. Admittedly, with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity, Irenaeus places greater emphasis on the distinction among the divine Persons as well as the distinction between the economic activities of the Word and of the Spirit without overlooking their unity, while Augustine stresses more the unity as well as equality of the immanent Trinity and the inseparability of the economic activities of the Triune God without overlooking their distinctiveness. Irenaeus’ recapitulation soteriology highlights the eschatological unity of creation in and under Christ, whereas Augustine tends to take seriously the divergence of human destiny. In spite of these differences, with regard to the concept of theosis or deification, both theologians assume a dynamic view of humanity and the goodness of human nature either in terms of the perfectibility of humanity or the restoration of the divine image in human being without denying the fall and its impact on humankind. Both theologians affirm the divine initiative in the shaping of humanity through the Word and the Spirit, without denying the role of human freedom in the process of deification, as it was exemplified in Jesus Christ. Perhaps it is possible to say that Irenaeus and Augustine represent two perspectives or two different and yet complementary witnesses to the same truth about the relationship between God and human being. With regard to the Christian-Confucian dialogue, one may even argue that Augustine’s psychological doctrine of the Trinity makes a rather distinctive contribution to the dialogue through translating a more historical understanding of the shaping humanity through the Word and the Spirit into a more psychological understanding of the imago Dei in individuals. Admittedly, Confucianism, espe-

 LaCugna, God for Us, pp. 103 – 4.

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cially in The Doctrine of the Mean (Chung Yung / Zhong Yong), accepts the idea of divine mandate or heavenly endowment (tien ming / tian ming), which accounts for the divine origin of the goodness of human nature. However, in its method of self-cultivation, Confucianism, especially in Mencius (Meng Zi), places greater emphasis on discovering the goodness of human nature as individual through introspection or self-reflection. The psychological approach advocated by Augustine can thus be regarded as a supplement to the more “kerygmatic” (if not more “dogmatic” in the negative sense of the word) approach represented by Irenaeus as well as an alternative approach more “communicable” to the Confucians.

7.7 Concluding Remarks Through the review of the “Eastern” and “Western” perspectives on the shaping of humanity with the Word and the Spirit outlined above, we may find that, with the concept of theosis or deification, it is quite possible for Christianity to articulate a dynamic view of humanity which attempts to define human nature in terms of humanity’s being shaped by the economic activities of the Word and the Spirit rather than by original sin or actual sin. The goodness of human nature is not only found in its creation but more importantly in its redemption and perfection. Based on the assumptions that true humanity is defined by human nature revealed in the incarnated Word and that the human nature of Jesus Christ is the same as that of Adam, Christianity can further affirm that in principle all human beings can attain sagehood or sainthood. In other words, by grace, human being can participate or be united in the virtue of God. During this process, human effort plays an active and vital role. The review outlined above also indicates that when viewed in the perspective of how humanity is shaped by the Word and the Holy Spirit, the goodness and perfectibility of human nature can be affirmed. The Christian understanding of humanity should not be restricted to the static structure of human nature, because the Christian understanding of humanity should be related to the dynamic process of theosis or deification, and interpreted in light of the narrative of God’s economy in its totality. A more dynamic approach to defining human nature, not by creation or fall, but by the economy of the triune God aiming at the perfection of humanity, may serve as a bridge for the communication between Christianity and East Asian Culture, especially Confucianism as well as Mahayana Buddhism. The development of this kind of theological anthropology is neither a by-product of the passive accommodation of Christianity to East Asian culture nor an unwarranted compromise with Confucianism. Instead, it is the result of a rediscovery of

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the full gospel in which divine salvation is not merely a negative measure of getting rid of sin and death, but a positive sharing of the richness of the divine life, including particularly the virtue and love of God. Probably due to some historical reasons, Orthodox theology is much less well known, not to say less well developed in East Asia. It will be beneficial for Christian theologians in East Asia to take a more pro-active approach in engaging in dialogue with this theological tradition rather than focusing rather exclusively on the “Western” theological tradition. As there are more and more theological dialogues between the Orthodox and Western Churches, particularly on the concept of theosis, it is expected that the intra-religious dialogue within Christianity will make further contributions to the inter-religious dialogue with Confucianism. Perhaps one day, one may find that in reverse, the Christian-Confucian dialogue may also contribute to the intra-religious dialogue within Christianity and even within Confucianism.⁷⁶

 The divergence between the two classical Confucian texts mentioned above, (namely The Doctrine of the Mean and Mencius) in their approaches to the goodness of human nature reemerged in the subsequent dispute between the two major schools of Neo-Confucianism, namely the Principle school (li xue) represented by Chu Hsi (zhu xi, 1130 – 1200) and the Mind-heart school (xin xue) represented by Wang Yang-ming (1472– 1529) respectively.

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8 The Trinity of Aquinas and the Triad of Zhu Xi: Some Comparative Reflections I am not an expert on Neo-Confucianism, yet whenever I had a chance to read about Zhu Xi and his triad of Taiji (太極) or the Great Ultimate, Li (理) and Qi (氣), the three primordial sources from which all beings emerge, I sensed an intuitive similarity with the classical Christian Trinitarian theology of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The Great Ultimate seems to be the source of all things including Li and Qi, while Li refers to the fundamental structure, form, logos, ratio, or reason of all things, and Qi to the fundamental vitality or dynamic force underlying all things. This immediately reminds the classical Trinitarian theologian of the three persons of the Trinity, of the Father, who is the source of all being including the divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit and the reality of all created things, of the Son, who is the Word or Image of the Father and the eternal exemplar, model, or ratio of all created things, and of the Holy Spirit, who is the Love and Gift of the Father and the vitalizing, ordering, teleological power and movement underlying all created things. Despite the striking similarities between classical Christian Trinitarian thought, especially that of Aquinas (1225 – 74), and the Triadism of Zhu Xi (1130 – 1200), his virtual contemporary, I have found very little material in the way of comparative studies. There are some studies dealing with the question of whether Zhu Xi’s Qi can be equated with Aristotle’s prime matter,¹ and the answer is “no,” while other studies deal with the question of whether Zhu Xi’s Li can be equated with Plato’s Idea of the Good, and the answer is “no” again. Some argue that Zhu Xi cannot be understood on Western terms, either Platonic or Aristotelian.² Many have asked the question of whether the Confucian idea of God is that of a personal God, and the answer seems to be both “yes” and “no.”³ The great Jesuit missionary to China, Matteo Ricci (1552– 1610), noted that Taiji

 For example, Russell Hatton, “A Comparison of Ch’i and Prime Matter,” Philosophy East and West 32:2 (April 1982): 159 – 75.  Wing-Tsit Chan (ed.), A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, NY: Princeton U. Press, 1963), pp. 640 – 1.  Julia Ching, Confucianism and Christianity: A Comparative Study (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1977), pp. 112– 50. Ching deals with the question of the personal God in Christianity and Confucianism but nowhere bothers to compare Christian trinitarianism and Zhu Xi’s triad of Taiji, Li, and Qi.

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and Li are accidents, not substances capable of creating, and that the ancients of China did not worship Taiji although they did worship Heaven.⁴ No one, however, in my knowledge, has attempted to compare the three in Aquinas and the three in Zhu Xi, which is what I propose to do, without, however, in any way claiming that they can be equated. I do not think they are identical by any stretch of the imagination; the differences are obvious and striking, as I will point out, but there are also certain dynamics and trajectories of the three concepts in each system which seem to parallel each other and which can be explored with great profit to both systems, each challenging the other to further develop itself. Through a dynamic, not merely conceptual, hermeneutics I intend to reveal, analyze, and explore their parallel trajectories. The NeoConfucianism of Zhu Xi has exerted such a profound influence on Korean culture that I am willing to claim that Korean Christians, self-consciously or only anonymously, are Neo-Confucians, a fact that surprisingly has not received much attention from the advocates of theological indigenization. I am inclined to think that Zhu Xi’s categories can help Korean theologians indigenize and concretize their Trinitarian tradition, while this Christian tradition can help Neo-Confucians develop Zhu Xi’s thought with greater analytic sophistication. I will proceed in three parts. In the first part I present a very brief summary of the essentials of classical Christian Trinitarian theology, especially that of St. Thomas Aquinas, which is a great synthesis of both Greek and Latin Trinitarian theologies. In the second part I will also summarize the essentials of Zhu Xi’s thoughts on Taiji, Li, and Qi. In the third part I will present comparative reflections, especially with a view to how East Asian Christian theology can take advantage of Neo-Confucian categories in indigenizing Christian Trinitarian theology, and how the sophistications of Christian Trinitarian theology can help in the further development of Neo-Confucian thought today.

8.1 Aquinas on the Trinity⁵ Here I would like to focus on what each of the three divine persons is and does, with a minimum of discussion of the intricacies of classical Trinitarian theology.

 Matteo Ricci, Chunjoosiluy [The True Meaning of the Lord of the Heaven], trans. Yong-bae Song et al. (Seoul, Korea: Seoul National University Press, 1998), pp. 81– 104.  I provide a much more detailed discussion of Aquinas’s Trinitarian theology and Christian Trinitarian theology in general in the following publications: Paths to the Triune God: An Encounter Between Aquinas and Recent Theologies (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005); The Solidarity of Others in a Divided World: A Postmodern Theology After Post-

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My aim is to provide enough characterization of each of the three divine persons with some clarity so as to see if there is room for comparative reflections with their Neo-Confucian counterparts, Taiji, Li, and Qi. There is a sense in which it is true to say that when Christians talk about God simply, without further qualifications, they are referring to the Father, the first person of the holy Trinity. The Father is God in the most primordial sense in contrast to the Son and the Holy Spirit, both of whom proceed, emerge, or derive from the Father. The Father is “the principle of the whole Godhead (principium totius deitatis)”⁶ and thus the source of the divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit as well as the ontological source of the reality of all created entities. All beings, divine or created, are beings only insofar as they participate in the primordial being or esse of the Father, either by essence or by the grace of participation. Unlike the Son, the God begotten, “the God from God and Light from Light” (the Nicene Creed), and the Holy Spirit, the God proceeding, the Father is “the principle not from a principle (principium non de principio),” God unoriginated and unbegotten, and thus God in the most absolute, unqualified sense. As God in the most unqualified sense the Father is the being itself that subsists through itself (ipsum esse per se subsistens) in whom essence and existence coincide. As such, he is simple, not composite like finite creatures, the fullness of being containing all the positive possibilities and perfections of all being, the first cause of all finite beings immanent in all created things as the source of what is most profound and actual in them, their act of existing, but also transcendent of all of them as being above all genera and species. Likewise, he is infinite and thus unknowable in his essence and knowable only in his effects, immutable and eternal, with knowledge, will, love, justice, and mercy proper to an infinite being, with ideas of all things to be created that constitute “the operative principle (principium operativum) of all things.”⁷ The Father is all of these

modernism (New York, NY: T & T Clark International), pp. 91– 155; “God as the Mystery of Shared and Sharing Love: Aquinas on the Trinity,” in Peter Phan (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Trinitarian Theology (Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 87– 107; “The Dialectic of Divine Love: Pannenberg’s Hegelian Trinitarianism,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 6:3 (July 2004): 252– 69; “The Trinity and the Incarnation: Hegel and Classical Approaches,” Journal of Religion 66:2 (April 1986): 173 – 93. In this section readers are referred to these publications, especially Paths to the Triune God, for documentation and further elaboration. I will provide documentation only for cited material.  Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae (ST), Part I, Question 39, Article 5, ad 6. All references to the Summa will be indicated in abbreviated form by the number of the Part, Question, and Article.  ST, I, 15, 1 ad 2.

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precisely as the God unbegotten, as the Son and the Holy Spirit are these, each in its own way as the God begotten and the God proceeding respectively. The Son comes forth from the Father by way of the procession of the intellect; i. e., he is born of the intellectual self-understanding of the Father. As the God begotten, the Son is the Word, Concept, or Image in which the Father knows himself and in that self-knowledge also all other things such as the Holy Spirit and all creatures. As the self-knowledge of the Father through which the Father also creates all things, the Son is the logos or ratio, the expressive and operative wisdom, the productive reason (ratio factiva) by which all things are made, the exemplary likeness (similitudo exemplaris) which contains the reasons (rationes) of all things to be created and in which all things pre-exist as in their model before they exist in their own essences. He is by appropriation the eternal law imprinted in the nature of things as intrinsic principles of their own being by which God governs the world and in which the natural law, the law of created things, participates as a reflection participates in its original. He is the one absolute Truth in which finite truths must participate if they are to be true, the divine Wisdom in which all human wisdom must participate in order to be wise, the divine Light in which all things must participate in order to be knowable. Above all, the Son is the Image to which human beings must conform if they are to be the image of the Father, the natural Son in whose likeness they must participate if they are to become the adopted children of the Father and attain their ultimate end in the saving union with the Father. The Word thus bears an internal relation to all things created, a relation that God gives himself in his eternal self-knowledge through which he creates all things, not a relation derived from the things he creates. The Holy Spirit comes forth from the Father by way of the procession of the will or love or as “the vital impulse and movement (vis impulsiva et motive)”⁸ by which the Father loves himself, the Son, and all created things. As “the love of primordial goodness (amor primae bonitatis) whereby the Father loves himself and every creature,”⁹ the Holy Spirit is that by which the Father impels himself to make a gift of himself in his totality to the Son, this gift of the divine essence itself being the paradigm of all gifts.¹⁰ Love consists in the giving of oneself and constitutes the most primordial of all gifts (primum donum) that makes all other true giving possible. The Holy Spirit is this gift of the Father through which the Father creates the world in the image of the Son and orders and empowers them

 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, bk. 4, ch. 23, 2.  ST, I, 37, 2.  ST, I, 38, 1, ad 2.

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to reach their end, which is participating in the mutual love of the Father and the Son. As the primordial power and movement of love in God, the Holy Spirit is the bond of love (vinculum amoris) that unites the Father and the Son, and endows on all creation the gift of existence, life, ordered relations, and movements to their ends by reconciling them to one another and to the Father in the Son whose image and trace they bear. The Holy Spirit is the Father’s cosmic “prudence” – the recta ratio agibilium – through which he governs and leads all things to their end, liberating them from the constricting power of sin, passion, and the law, renewing them in their hearts, “configuring” them to the Son, empowering them to imitate God and promote fellowship, inclining the will toward the true good, and opening them to the divine motion of grace. Proceeding from the will and love of the Father for himself, the Son, and all creatures, the Holy Spirit likewise implies an internal relation to creatures, again a relation that God gives herself by loving them from all eternity and creating them in time, not a relation derived from them. It is the logic or ratio of the eternal processions of the persons in the immanent Trinity that also governs the relation of the economic trinity to the creation and redemption of the world. As effects of the triune God creatures reflect something of the trace (vestigium) and image (imago) of the trinity. The Father, the underived source of all being, is reflected in the totality of a created entity as a substance capable of acting, while the Son, the perfect image of the Father and exemplar of all created things, is reflected in the form, or essence, or nature of each substance, especially in the intellectuality of rational creatures, and the Holy Spirit, the primordial love of the Father and the Son, is reflected in the vitalizing, relational, teleological movement of substances to one another and to their ultimate end. The same logic is also followed in the logic of appropriation, that is, the ancient theological practice of attributing to a particular divine person what belongs to all three persons in their common divine essence in order to illuminate the distinctive quality of each person in terms of what is better known to us, namely, God’s essential attributes. Thus, “power” is attributed to the Father, the underived source of all being, “from whom” all things come; “wisdom” is attributed to the Son, the Word and Wisdom of the Father, “by whom” all things are made as by the art and form by which an artist makes things; and “goodness” is attributed to the Holy Spirit, the Father’s primordial impulse to love and relate, “in whom” love promotes the goodness of things by guiding and ordering them to their fitting end. The Father is “creator” in the sense of not receiving the power from anyone else, but creates “through” the Son in the sense that the Son derives his power of creation from another, and “in” the Holy Spirit in the sense that the Spirit governs and vivifies things created by the Father through

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the Son by bringing them to their proper end. The Father is the efficient, the Son the exemplary, and the Holy Spirit the final cause of creation and redemption empowering the ordo and motus ad deum of all things.¹¹

8.2 Zhu Xi on the Triad¹² Now to Zhu Xi. Anyone trying to discuss Zhu Xi’s view of the triad of Taiji, Li, and Qi faces an important initial problem. There seems to be a wide-spread view that Zhu Xi failed to fully integrate Taiji and Li, raising the fundamental issue: Is Taiji no more than Li in its ultimacy, leaving only Li and Qi as the two ultimate sources of all reality? Or, is Taiji in some important sense the source of both Li and Qi, constituting the truly “ultimate” or the ne plus ultra, that than which there cannot be anything more ultimate, id quo ulterius nihil cogitari potest, to paraphrase Anselm? There seems to be textual evidence for both interpretations. I will take the second interpretation in this essay for the obvious heuristic reason that it seems to bring Zhu Xi and Aquinas closer to each other and renders their Trinitarian or triadic parallels much clearer, but this is not the most important reason. The most important reason is the systematic one based on the question: Can Li itself be the ultimate or should it be derived from something more ultimate than itself? If Li were the ultimate and yet also irreducibly different from Qi, we would indeed end with two irreducible ultimates, Li and Qi, and a dualism that would render the world totally contingent and unintelligible. I would like to interpret Li and Qi as originating from Taiji that provides some primordial coordination and

 For this brief summary of the relevant aspects of Aquinas’s Trinitarian theology, see my Paths to the Triune God, pp. 26 – 36, 77– 7, 136 – 8, 168 – 238.  My summary of Zhu Xi’s teaching on the triad is based on: Carsun Chang, The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957), pp. 243 – 83 “Chu Hsi, the Great Synthesizer”); Wing-Tsit Chan (ed.), A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 588 – 653 (“The Great Synthesis in Chu Hsi”); Fung Yu-Lan, (ed. Dirk Bodde), A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (Macmillan, 1964), pp. 294– 306 (“NeoConfucianism: The School of Platonic Ideas”); Teng Aimin, “On Chu His’s Theory of the Great Ultimate,” in Wing-tsit Chan (ed.), Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism (University of Hawaii Press, 1986), pp. 93 – 115; Chiu Hansheng, “Zhu Xi’s Doctrine of Principle,” in Chan, pp. 116 – 135; Yu Yamanoi, “The Great Ultimate and Heaven in Chu Hsi’s Philosophy,” in Chan, pp. 79 – 92; Ren Jiyu, “Chu Hsi and Religion,” in Chan, pp. 355 – 376; Wing Tsit Chan, Chu Hsi: New Studies (University of Hawaii Press, 1989); Julia Ching, The Religious Thought of Chu Hsi (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 32– 53 (“The Great Ultimate”); Yung Sik Kim, The Natural Philosophy of Chu Hsi (1130 – 1200) (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 2000); Zhang Li Wen (ed.), Li, trans. Ahn Yoo Kyong (Seoul: Yemoon, 2004) (in Korean).

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unity of the two. Here I am following the interpretations of Julia Ching, Chiu Hansheng, Teng Aimin, and Yu Yamanoi.¹³ For Zhu Xi the most primordial source of all reality is Taiji, translated as the Great Ultimate. I find this name itself strikingly telling and appropriate. Literally, it means the “great peak” or “summit,” meaning there is nothing beyond it, nothing higher than it, perhaps also nothing more profound and nothing more comprehensive than it, quite comparable to Anselm’s reference to God as that than which nothing greater can be thought, id quo maius nihil cogitari potest. It is the ultimate in being and knowledge and value. It is the source of all actualities and potentialities of the world, of all things in heaven and on earth. It contains both the ultimate principle of order called Li and the ultimate principle of movement called Qi. It is sometimes identified with Tien (天), “Heaven,” whose Li, Tien Li (天理) contains both Li and Qi and governs the movement of the world. It is sometimes identified with Tao (道) or “Way,” or Tien Tao (天道) the ultimate source of why things are what they are, also manifested by means of Li and Qi. Not an object among objects, formless in itself, the Great Ultimate is immanent in all things in their totality as well as in them individually, without dividing itself. It is like the same whole moon reflected in many rivers, seas, and oceans. In its infinity, eternity, and self-sufficiency, it is also transcendent of them all. It is very revealing to realize that Zhu Xi published his Commentary on the Diagram of the Great Ultimate only after some twenty-one years of meditation. The Great Ultimate is first and foremost an object of contemplation, not argumentation. This ultimate is called the Great Ultimate in relation to the things of this world, but in itself it is also called Wuji, the Ultimate of Non-being, beyond all human comprehension. The Great Ultimate is the Ultimate of Non-being, taiji er wuji, or 太極而無極. The Great Ultimate is perhaps comparable to God in her manifestation to the created world, the deus revelatus, the Ultimate of Non-being to the deus absconditus, God in her incomprehensible inner hidden essence highlighted both by the moment of negation in analogical attribution and by the tradition of negative theology from Pseudo Dionysius to Derrida today. The Great Ultimate contains both Li and Qi as its two phases. It is the Tao Li (道理), Tien Li (天理), the Tao of Heaven (天道), the source of all the li’s and the highest of the li’s. Through its activity and tranquility it generates yang and yin respectively, the two aspects of qi, and through them the five basic agents of the world, fire, water, wood, metal, and soil, which are ultimately responsible,

 See the preceding footnote.

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through their fusion and interaction, for all the processes and movements of the world. It is the Great Ultimate that distributes li and qi appropriate to each thing and makes each what it is. Human beings receive both his nature as a human being, his li, and his life, his qi, from Tien or Heaven, the Great Ultimate. The Great Ultimate is often identified with Li or at least considered closer to Li than to Qi, but it is also present in Qi as one of its two basic modes of self-manifestation. Li refers to the reason or ratio, form or pattern, or intrinsic nature of things that makes them what they are. There is the primordial ultimate Li of the world as a whole, the Li of Heaven, the cosmic Li, Tao, or Tao Li contained in the Great Ultimate, and its many manifestations in the particular li’s that constitute the nature or hsing (性) of each individual entity. These li’s do not exist by themselves but only by inhering in concrete things as their li. Li provides the possibilities of order, stability, and universality in the world. The same Li is operative in the li of things and in the li of the human being that constitutes his reason, which makes it possible for human reason to investigate the li or ratio of things as well as the ratio of the universe as a whole. It is the presence of the same Li that also makes certain cosmic sympathies possible among different entities. Human nature as originally constituted by li is good, but it becomes evil when it deviates from the mean and thereby from the li of his nature. True human nature deriving from Li contains humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom. The human mind in some way contains the li and tao of all things. The purpose of moral education is precisely to so cultivate the human heart and mind as to embody the cosmic Tao Li as perfectly as possible. The Three Bonds and Five Ethical Relations (三綱五倫) are expressions of this cosmic Tao Li. Qi refers to the cosmic power of movement which is without shape or form in itself but manifested in the many movements of particular entities, giving them their individuality and physical form, their consciousness and movement common to human beings and animals. Individual entities are special configurations of Qi. The kind and amount of Qi one is endowed with determines a person’s life and death, wealth and poverty, and honor and lowliness as well as his moral temperament. While all li’s are good, not all qi’s are good; some of them are bad qi’s. Differences of personality are due to the degree of the purity and clarity of the qi they are endowed with. When their qi is clear, their li is free to express itself, making it easier to know the truth of things, while the purity of their qi promotes their respectfulness, generosity, loyalty, and fidelity. Qi does not exist by itself any more than does Li: these are co-constitutive principles of being, one accounting for the form or essence, the other for the movement, of things.

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8.3 Some Comparative Reflections I hope I have not distorted Zhu Xi’s theory of the triad beyond all recognition. Before I go on to discuss some of the obvious differences between Aquinas and Zhu Xi, let me point to a rather obvious but also very profound and very profoundly significant similarity between the two thinkers and the two systems, classical Christian trinitarianism and Neo-Confucianism. I refer to their common reference to what is conceptually identical, if I may put it so boldly, the concept of Li which almost exactly corresponds to the concept of ratio or logos or reason in the classical West. Both systems assume the existence of a law of nature or the natural law. Things have their own nature as their own internal principles of operation, something that makes each thing what it is and determines the range of its actions, and the role of human reason is precisely to discover that nature. Both systems are opposed to the activist, constructivist conception of human reason so popular since Descartes in the modern West. For the classical tradition, both Western and Confucian, the role of human reason is not to constitute or construct the world but rather conform to, by discovering, the objective nature of things, their li and their ratio. This modest conception of human reason is in turn based on the idea that the nature of things in the world is a reflection or embodiment of the eternal law or the Li of Heaven. It is because the same Li or eternal law is manifested in the li of things that there is a certain pre-established harmony or isomorphism between human reason and the reason of things as well as a certain agreement between Heaven and human beings or tien jen he i (天人合一). If, for the Neo-Confucians, the human heart in some way reflects the Tao of all things, for Aristotle and Aquinas the human soul is in some way all things (quoddammodo omnia). It is not only that human theory must conform to the nature, li, or tao of things; human praxis must also so conform. Human beings are meant to cultivate their nature or hsing so as to conform their desires, their qi, to their li or reason, and their reason to the objective li of things, which in turn reflects the eternal law of God or the Li of Heaven. I think this is a very important correspondence very rarely noticed or remembered if at all. Apart from this very important similarity, however, the differences between Aquinas’s classical Trinitarian theology and Zhu Xi’s Triadism are obvious and forbid any simple identification. Christians worship the Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; Confucians do not worship Taiji, Li, and Qi, as Matteo Ricci already noted. The intricate method and conceptuality whereby Aquinas, along with the classical Christian tradition going back to Origen, Athanasius, the Cappadocians, and Augustine, derives the Son and the Holy Spirit from the monarchy of the Father, namely the whole metaphysics of divine generation and divine procession, and explains the mutual relation between the persons, between the

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divine essence and the persons, and between the immanent and the economic Trinity: all these are, as to be expected, simply not there in Zhu Xi. I do not want to belabor the obvious. In short, in trying to compare the two, I am not claiming that each can be substituted for the other, not at all. It is wholly understandable that no two concepts, each belonging to a different system, will be identical in every respect. Each concept has more than one meaning and also acquires connotations from the context, the system of which it is an integral part and in which it bears references to the rest of the system. There are no two concepts, therefore, each belonging to a different system, that will have exactly the same set of denotations and connotations; each will bear traces of the differences between the two systems from which they come. This is true even of the concepts of ratio and li that I have just compared. The ratio or model attributed to the Son by classical Trinitarian theology or attributed to scientific, technical reason by the modern West today will not share the same set of denotations and connotations as its Neo-Confucian counterpart, Li, although I think it can acquire some of the same denotations and connotations in the process of cultural globalization. This means that comparative philosophy or comparative theology should not be limited to a search for similarities and differences at the level of concepts; this is useful insofar as it keeps us careful about either naively identifying or naively differentiating concepts of different systems, but it does not go far enough. It is quite possible that some concepts may have certain root meanings which can develop into root metaphors and analogies far transcending their immediate denotation or conceptual meaning, with a far-reaching significance for a whole field of ideas. These root meanings, metaphors, and analogies have a certain dynamic of their own which produces a certain trajectory of developments. It is at this level of root meanings, metaphors, analogies, and models contained in certain key concepts that I think comparative philosophy or theology can perform their very significant cultural function. Through a dynamic hermeneutic or hermeneutics of the movements that a concept may contain in terms of root meanings, metaphors, analogies, and models,¹⁴ we can point to certain important similarities between systems that exist despite the obvious conceptual differences, and we can also point to certain important differences between systems that exist despite the obvious conceptual similarities. Shedding light on the dynamic similarities and differences will sensitize us to the deeper possibilities of

 On the use of models and metaphors in theology and science, see Ian G. Barbour, Myths, Models, and Paradigms (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1974) and Sallie McFague, Metaphorical Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982).

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collaboration as well as to the deeper challenges for further dialogue, with all their cultural implications. It is at this level of dynamic hermeneutics that I propose to explore the similarities between the Trinitarianism of Aquinas and the Triadism of Zhu Xi. At the level of root meanings and analogies I see a very fruitful similarity or parallel between the two. For all the sexist connotations we are legitimately concerned with today,¹⁵ the root meaning and ontological dynamic of “Father” in Aquinas, as in classical Christian theology as a whole, far transcends that of the human male progenitor and refers to the ultimate source of all things, including the divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit and the reality of all finite creation, and furthermore to this source understood in a properly analogical way, i. e., in its causality, negation, and eminence.¹⁶ He is the simply underived, unoriginated source, the “principle not from another principle” (principium non de principio), the fons et origo, the fountain and origin, of all things, the sun from which all good comes, the light from which all rays originate, the infinite, incomprehensible, and inexhaustible source of all being and all possibilities of being. For all the differences in the ontology of each, I think Taiji seeks to say the same thing, the ultimate, primordial, absolute source of all empirical reality. As I said, the name itself is strikingly suggestive, more so than “Father,” of this ultimacy, primordiality, and absoluteness. It is really that ultimate source “beyond which” and than which there is no more, nothing higher, nothing more profound, nothing greater, nothing more primordial or more ultimate, indeed id quo altius, profundius, maius, ulterius nihil cogitari potest. The root meaning of “Son” in Aquinas is that of word, image, or concept, the product of the intellectual self-knowledge of the Father in which the Father knows himself and all other things, the perfect image of the Father and therefore also the perfect exemplar and model for all created things, containing their rationes, forms, and essences. It is by means of this analogy of intellectual selfconception that Aquinas unifies the Biblical analogies of Son, Word, and Image, and also relates that Son to the destiny of all creatures, especially human beings. As I said earlier, apart from the intellectual explication of the procession of the Son from the Father, there is an almost perfect parallel and similarity between the Son as Word and Image of the Father and the Li as an expression of the Great Ultimate, Tien Li or Li of Heaven as the transcendent source of the intelligibility, ratio, essence, intrinsic teleology, or li’s of all empirical re I provide a theological discussion of the sexism of the traditional Christian Trinitarian formula in my Paths to the Triune God, pp. 249 – 58.  For a discussion of the analogical predication of divine names, see my Paths to the Triune God, pp. 168 – 74, 245 – 7.

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alities. As the Son is the eternal law governing the world, so the Li is the eternal Li governing the particular li’s of the phenomenal world. As all things bear the traces and images of the eternal Word of God, so all things also bear the vestiges of the Li of Heaven in their empirical structures and essences. Both contain an eternal relation to the things of this world. Of course, the Son personally takes flesh in the humanity of Jesus, while the Tien Li does not, but this is not crucial at this point, although one can point to a profound similarity in that each human person embodies and manifests the image of the Son and the teleological dynamism of Li respectively to different degrees in proportion to the degree of one’s sanctity and virtue. The root meaning of the “Holy Spirit” in Aquinas is that of the primordial impulse and movement of love in God, from which also flows the power of life and movement in all created things. As the power of love, it is the power of relating, uniting, ordering, reconciling things that are different, expressed in material, living things in their vitality as the power of growth, reproduction, sensation, physical movements, and self-preservation against the destructive threats of the environment, expressed in human beings in the vitality of self-assertion tempered by the persuasions of reason, in their desire and will to be united with what they love and with that unknown God for whom we are made and without whom we cannot find rest, according to Augustine. From Plato’s conception of the “spirited” element of the human soul to the Aristotelian Thomist conception of rational and irrational appetites to Hegel’s conception of Spirit, “spirit” has always meant a nexus of such ideas as movement, vitality, and relation to an Other. In Aquinas, “spirit” is always found inseparably united to a moderating principle, such as the form of a thing, reason conscious of its own form, and the eternal Word and the Father from whom the Holy Spirit originates, as in Zhu Xi there exists no qi which is not also combined with li. My impression is that in Zhu Xi qi means primarily the power and energy of movement whereby an entity asserts and preserves itself ontologically in relation to others, according to li when it is clear and pure, against li when it is turbid and impure. Apart from its varying relations to li, and apart from Qi’s relation to Li in the primordial Triad, the basic or root meaning of qi is that of vitality and movement, and in this respect again it bears a profound parallel and similarity to “spirit” in the Holy Spirit in Aquinas. Wing Tsit Chan consistently translates qi as “material force” and “material energy,” stressing its inherent connection to material things and its individuating and vitalizing role in them. In my limited knowledge, on the other hand, Qi also has a transcendent dimension. As a counterpart to the Li of Heaven in the primordial Triad, Qi is not simply identical with any particular qi. Just as the great Li or Tien Li is the primordial source for all empirical li’s, so the Qi in the triad is the primordial and thus transcendent

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source for all empirical qi’s. As such a source, Qi is not itself physical or bodily. To use a Christian theological term, the Qi in the immanent triad transcends its economic function of vitalizing and dynamizing each particular material thing in the world. One may note that the note of relating and reconciling so prominent in the Christian concept of the Holy Spirit is not as prominent in the Neo-Confucian concept of Qi, but what is clear is that there is a profound similarity between the two as far as their root meanings go, that of vitality and movement as modes of ontological self-assertion. Koreans are especially familiar with the meaning of Li and Qi even if they have never read a word of Zhu Xi’s Commentary on the Diagram of the Great Ultimate. Li in the sense of the inner teleology and essence or form of things and Qi in the sense of the power of ontological self-preservation and self-affirmation have both become so much a part of the Korean culture and language, especially through the five centuries of the Lee Dynasty (1392– 1910) during which Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism reigned as the official ideology of the nation, that it is not going too far to say that Koreans are Neo-Confucians, whether they are aware of it or not. Koreans say that they have to learn to solve problems in accordance with li or soonli (順理) (as Westerners speak of “listening to reason”), when parties in power are tempted to resort to force and extralegal measures, and use such cognates of li on many important occasions such as baeli (背理), habli (合理), sahli (事理), nonli (論理), mooli (無理), and goongli (窮理). Politicians are not supposed to serve two leaders each from a different faction or party because it will be against taoli (道理). Likewise, Koreans use cognates of qi in reference to situations when one’s life or will is tested. When politicians insist on having their own ways and show no readiness to negotiate on a bill in the National Assembly, Koreans say they are fighting the battle of qi to see whose qi is stronger. When someone is demoralized, they say his qi has been defeated and killed. When something fails to make sense, they say it closes off our qi, our breath. Similarly, Koreans use various cognates of qi such as gi-se (氣勢), eu-gi (意氣), gi-bag (氣魄), gi-oon (氣運), gi-jil (氣質), and gi-oon (氣運), in reference to our power of self-assertion, vitality, and self-fulfillment. The language of both qi (氣) and li (理) has become thoroughly indigenized into Korean culture and, I believe, into East Asian culture generally.

8.4 Towards a Dialectic of Mutual Incorporation I propose that Christian Trinitarian theology, especially Korean Christian Trinitarian theology, incorporate these root meanings of Taiji, Li, and Qi into its elaboration of the theology of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. It goes without saying that

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we have to do so carefully and therefore creatively so that it does not simply contradict the traditional meaning of the doctrine of the Trinity and transform it into something else. It means a very resourceful use and incorporation of the root meanings of those concepts without necessarily accepting them in all their meanings and ambiguities, some of which are indeed alien to the Christian tradition. It will require all appropriate modifications and refinements according to the internal need of Christian theology, especially the grammar for the predication of divine names acceptable to that theology. We can learn a great deal in this regard from what the Fathers of the Church including Aquinas did in using Greek categories for the systematic elaboration of Christian doctrines while also using them carefully, critically, and transformatively. One immediate stumbling block to the project of incorporating Neo-Confucian categories may be the standard objection that these categories seem impersonal while the divine persons are, of course, quite personal. There are, I think, two misunderstandings here that we should avoid. One misunderstanding is that Taiji, Li, and Qi are impersonal cosmic forces. They are indeed cosmic forces. I think, however, that they also contain all the foundations for being personal. Li means reason and the transcendent source of all phenomenal structures, patterns, and reasons. Qi means the primordial movement of impulse and will and the transcendent source of all phenomenal movements, desires, and wills. If we identity Taiji with Tao and Heaven, the Li and Qi also become the Li and Qi of Heaven, Tien Li and Tien Qi, which certainly make them as personal as the Heaven whose personality many recognize and accept. There is also room to argue that as the transcendent source of reason and will, Zhu Xi’s Triad contains all the elements of personality and is personal in the analogical sense of supereminence, to a degree that infinitely transcends the human mode of personality. The second misunderstanding is that many operate with a purely univocal, anthropomorphic understanding of “person” and dismiss the Neo-Confucian Triad as impersonal because they do not act like human beings with their individual knowledge and will. In contrast, the classical Christian tradition has always recognized that God remains transcendent and incomprehensible in her infinite essence, which means that even while we must use human language, we must purify it of all finite imperfections, and apply it to God to a super-eminent degree. That is, we should predicate names of God not univocally, which would be sheer anthropomorphism and projectionism, but only analogically, which always includes purification and negation without which we reduce theology to anthropology as Feuerbach said Christians did and without which our theology can always become ideology at the service of some human interests. The analogy

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may be the analogy of being or the analogy of faith or, as I prefer, something of both without being able to reduce one to the other. The whole debate on the personality vs. impersonality of God, I think, can learn a great deal from Aquinas’s discussion of the personhood of God. “Person” in the sense of “subsistent individual of a rational nature” signifies what is most perfect in all of creation, and it is only fitting to apply it to God, whose essence contains every perfection, but not as it is applied to creatures but only in a more excellent way. As the self-subsisting being itself God is the supreme self-subsisting being, while, as the most spiritual and most actual being, he is also the most perfectly intelligent being. God is a substance but without accidents, rational in nature but without being discursive, an individual in the sense of incommunicable but without being individuated by matter. In its objective meaning or signified reality (res significata) “person” belongs to God in the most excellent way, infinitely more properly than to creatures, but not in the univocal sense in which it applies to human persons under their hylomorphic conditions. For Aquinas it is not a simple question of either affirming or denying personality of God as though “person” means one simple thing, the human person that we are so familiar with. It is a question of negating it in its human mode (modus significandi) while affirming it in its signified reality but only to the most eminent degree.¹⁷ This means that in speaking of God we have to always preserve an overwhelming sense of reserve and inadequacy, always sensitive to the irreducible infinite gap between our concept of God and God’s transcendent reality. Christians often become too glib and fanatical in speaking about God as though they had immediate access to the mind of God. In this regard Christianity can also learn much from the general reticence, silence, and reserve that Confucianism has always shown when it comes to speaking of things divine. Confucius is known for saying that he could not talk about things divine when he did not know enough about things human. Neo-Confucianism goes as far as laying the ontological bases for the personality of the Triad by characterizing it as primordial Li or reason and primordial Qi or will as two modes of Taiji and stops short at identifying Taiji itself with Heaven, the ultimate symbol of transcendence which we can never reduce to human knowledge and human will. The result of incorporating Neo-Confucian categories, however, will be enriching to Christian Trinitarian theology in more ways than one. First, it will help indigenize Christian theology into the cultural context of Korea and East Asia in general that have indeed been so profoundly shaped by Neo-Confucian-

 ST, I, 29, 3.

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ism. It will bring the three persons of the Trinity closer to home for many Koreans. We do not have to pray to Taiji, Li, or Qi, which may sound strange, but our appreciation of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit will be immensely enriched as the persons are elaborated in terms relatively familiar in our culture. The meaning of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit does include that of Taiji, Li, and Qi. The Father will be the divine Taiji, the ultimate incomprehensible fountain of all reality beyond which we cannot go in being, truth, and value; the Son will be the divine Li after which all things are created and renewed in all their as yet uncomprehended essences; and the Holy Spirit will be the divine Qi in whom all created things have their being, their movement, and their breath of life. Second, the appropriation of Neo-Confucian categories will help Christian Trinitarian theology recover its continuity with its own classical Trinitarian tradition. So much of modern and contemporary Christian theology, especially of the Protestant tradition, has been preoccupied with human salvation, just as modern Western thought has been anthropocentric, to the exclusion or at least neglect of the cosmological dimension of Trinitarian theology, a dimension that was still alive in the classical and medieval periods. Christ is not only the savior of humanity but also the principle according to which the cosmos will be renewed, the eternal law in which the laws of nature participates. Christ and the Holy Spirit are operative in all of creation, giving them life, renewing and transforming them, just as Li and Qi are operative in all things including the movement of the heavens, not just in humanity. Third, this will also help Christian Trinitarian theology become relevant to one of the most compelling issues in our time of globalization, the ecological dimension. I do not think that our ecological disaster is a result of an anthropocentric thinking presumably endemic to the Christian tradition. This way of thinking, rather popular these days, is wrong on many accounts. First of all, ecological disasters are primarily the result of a globalized anthropocentric practice in the way of producing, distributing, and consuming commodities, that is, primarily the result of the capitalist economic system gone mad, not the result of the mere idea of anthropocentrism, which would be idealism pure and simple. Nor has Christian theology always been anthropocentric, not in the classical or Middle Ages. As Aquinas says, God became human not because human beings are the center of the universe or the noblest of all creatures but because they needed the savior the most.¹⁸ Likewise, the biblical injunction of Genesis 1:28 about having “dominion” over nature was more an encouragement to human liberation than an imperative

 ST, I, 20, 4, ad 2.

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to dominate nature. To interpret the passage as justifying domination of nature in our contemporary sense is simply to project our contemporary ideologies into the text of scripture, betrays a woeful lack of a sense of history about the historical context of scripture itself and about the historicity of our own ideological preoccupations and thus totally misreads Scripture. At a time when human beings counted themselves lucky if they lived to the age of forty, when human beings were subjected to the ravages of nature and must have felt so hopeless and powerless in the presence of nature, the message about having dominion over nature must have sounded rather liberating and encouraging. On the other hand, it is also clear that today, when we have the power to destroy nature and destroy ourselves in the process, we cannot read the passage in the same way. We have to be ecologically conscious, and our theology certainly must reflect this compelling imperative of our time. It is here that theology can be helped in part by incorporating the humble sense of the place of humanity in the scale of the cosmos as found in the tradition of Neo-Confucianism, where, as in the classical Western tradition, the role of human reason is not to construct and destroy the world but rather to conform to and respect the nature, li, ratio or logos of the world created by God. Appropriating categories of another system even with all the caution and care, however, does not leave Christian Trinitarian theology simply as it has been; it changes, transforms, and, I think, enriches it, as in the example of the so-called Hellenization of Christianity, which I do not consider a betrayal but rather an enrichment of Christianity. The possibilities of this enrichment have already been indicated, but the full picture will only emerge with the actual appropriation of Neo-Confucianism into a Trinitarian theology actually operating in the liturgy and praxis of the Christian churches. At the same time as it is enriched by Neo-Confucianism, Christian Trinitarian theology, I believe, also has an important contribution to make to the development and enrichment of Neo-Confucianism itself, by challenging the latter to become clearer, more coherent, and also more historically conscious. From the Christian Trinitarian theological perspective, there are innumerable questions Zhu Xi raises but does not answer. Zhu Xi, like many East Asian philosophers, simply states and describes and appeals to certain intuitions, without analyzing, elaborating, and arguing, which makes the reading of much East Asian thought by Westerners and Western-trained scholars like myself rather frustrating and tantalizing. Let me simply transpose some of the questions that were historically raised in the many Trinitarian controversies, especially in the early centuries of Christianity, to the context of Neo-Confucianism. Let me begin with the Triad itself. How are the Taiji, Li, and Qi related to one another in their primordial state in the triad, prior to their embodiment and man-

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ifestation in the phenomenal world? Are they primordially one or unified in some sense, as they must be? If so, what guarantees their unity? What constitutes the Neo-Confucian equivalent of the divine essence that constitutes the unity of the one God despite their tri-personality in the classical Trinitarian tradition? How do Li and Qi emerge from the depth of Taiji? What would be the NeoConfucian equivalent of, say, the intellectual and volitional processions of the Word and the Spirit? How are they different, and how does this difference impact their function? How are Li and Qi related to each other? What would be the equivalent of the thoroughly relational identity of the divine persons who otherwise share the totality of the divine nature? The Cappadocians used to say that it is impious to confuse the persons with the Sabellians and to divide the nature with the Arians. How is the relation between Li and Qi guaranteed in the primordial triad? What is the equivalent of the monarchy of the Father, the self-understanding and self-loving of the Father that issues in the harmonious relation between the Son and the Holy Spirit? Above all, what is the root metaphor or model equivalent to that of the intellectual being with the two processions of intellect and will that dominates Augustine and Aquinas? With regard to the relation of the primordial triad to the phenomenal world, one may ask: How does the phenomenal world emerge from the primordial triad? By making, emanation, creation, or what? What motivates the triad to “make” the world? Love? Blind urge? Need? Or simply “nature”? How does the triad rule or govern the world? Does it make sense here to speak of the equivalent of the relation between the immanent and economic trinity in the West?¹⁹ I am asking what are obviously questions raised by Western Christian Trinitarian theology. I am not asking for or anticipating the kind of answers we already know from that source. I am simply saying that these are the questions that a classical Christian Trinitarian theologian is compelled to ask. Are these nonsensical questions? How will Neo-Confucians respond to these questions? What I do not hope for is a blunt dismissal of these questions on the usual, facile ground that all such questions are misguided because based on dualistic thinking. I can only say that non-dualistic thinking can also mask incoherencies, ideologies, and the simple refusal to think further. I also believe and hope that Neo-Confucianism has a long way to go in developing itself; it need not be frozen at the present state of things because if it were so frozen, then, it would be dead, which many people have been suspecting that it has been because of its refusal to think further. Just as one can err by absolutizing and rei-

 See note 5 above for my publications in which I do discuss precisely these questions.

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fying oppositions, one can also err by absolutizing and reifying non-dualistic harmonies.

Notes on Contributors Lieven Boeve is Professor of Fundamental Theology and dean of the Faculty of Theology at the Katholieke Universitiet Leuven (Belgium). Since 2000 he has also served as the coordinator of the research group Theology in a Postmodern Context, now part of the research platform The Normativity of History. His research concerns theological epistemology, religious experience, truth in faith and theology, tradition development, and hermeneutics. In addition to co-editing numerous volumes, he is the author of Interrupting Tradition: An Essay on Christian Faith in a Postmodern Context (2003) and God Interrupts History: Theology in a Time of Upheaval (2007). He was the international president of the European Society for Catholic Theology (2005 – 2009). Heup Young Kim is Professor of Systematic Theology at Kangman University (South Korea), former dean of the College of Humanities and Liberal Arts, the Graduate School of Theology, and the University Chapel, and one of the founding members of the International Society for Science and Religion. He researches and publishes in the areas of Asian constructive theology, comparative theology, interfaith dialogue, and the relationship between science and religion. His English-language monographs include Wang Yang-ming and Karl Barth: A Confucian-Christian Dialogue (1996) and Christ & the Tao (2010). Pan-chiu Lai is currently Associate Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Professor of the Department of Cultural & Religious Studies at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. His research interests include interreligious dialogue, Christian theology, religion and culture, and religion and science. In addition to his publications in Chinese, his English-language publications include Towards a Trinitarian Theology of Religions: A Study of Paul Tillich’s Thought (1994) and articles in academic journals such as Studies in World Christianity, Studies in Interreligious Dialogue, BuddhistChristian Studies, and Ching Feng. He has co-edited with Jason Lam Sino-Christian Theology: A Theological Qua Cultural Movement in Contemporary China (2010). Ki-Sang Lee is Professor of Philosophy at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul. His major publications (in Korean) include The Reception of Western Philosophy and the Search for Korean Philosophy (2002), Philosophizing Here in Korea (2003), Opening a Korean Philosophy with Dasuk (2003), Contents and Culture:

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Philosophy (2009), and The Era of the Global Village and Cultural Contents (2009). He has published articles in English and German on the problem of life, Ryu Young-Mo, and the Korean understanding of being. He is the translator of many of Heidegger’s works including Sein und Zeit and editor of the five-volume Encyclopedia of Philosophy in Korea (in Korean). Anselm Kyongsuk Min is Maguire Distinguished Professor of Philosophy of Religion and Theology at Claremont Graduate University (USA). He is the author of, among many other publications, Dialectic of Salvation: Issues in Theology of Liberation (1989); The Solidarity of Others in a Divided World: A Postmodern Theology after Postmodernism (2004); and Paths to the Triune God: An Encounter between Aquinas and Recent Theologies (2005). He has published numerous articles on Hegel, postmodernism, religious pluralism, Asian theology, the Trinity, liberation theology, Aquinas, predication of divine names, Christology and Pneumatology. He is currently working on a systematic theology of globalization. Markus Mühling is Professor of Systematic Theology and Interdisciplinary Dialogue at the Leuphana Universität Lüneberg (Germany), and from 2009 – 2010 was Guest Professor at King’s College, University of Aberdeen (Scotland). His research interests range from the doctrines of God, reconciliation, and eschatology, to the history and theory of science, to ethics in pluralistic societies. His major monographs include Gott ist Liebe (2005); Versöhnendes Handeln, Handeln in Versöhnung (2005); Grundinformation Eschatologie (2007); and Einstein und die Religion (2011). Hans-Joachim Sander is currently University Professor for Dogmatic Theology at the University of Salzburg (Austria). He has studied theology, philosophy, and history in Trier, Jerusalem, and Würzburg, where he received his diploma (1985), doctorate (1991), and Habilitation (1997), all in theology. Topics of his research include Vatican II, God and power, topology of loci theologici, human rights and Christian faith, and utopias and heterotopias. His recent publications include Einführung in die Gotteslehre (2005); “God – An Adventure of Power: Topological Enterprises within Process Theology,” in Franz Riffert and Hans-Joachim Sander (eds.), Researching with Whitehead: System and Adventure (2008); and “Europe’s Heterotopias: Pastoral Power within the Signs of the Times” in Trygve Wyller (ed.), Heterotopic Citizen: New Research on Religious Work for the Disadvantaged (2009).

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Christoph Schwöbel is Professor of Systematic Theology and Director of the Institute for Hermeneutics and Cultural Dialogue at the Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen (Germany). He has taught at the Universities of Marburg, Kiel, Heidelberg (Germany), King’s College London, and has been a visiting Professor in Denmark and Japan. In addition to having edited and co-edited numerous volumes in German and English, his major publications include Gott im Gespräch (2011), Christlicher Glaube im Pluralism (2003), Gott in Beziehung (2002), and God: Action and Revelation (1992).

Index of Names Adam 142, 146, 148 Adorno, Theodor W. 71 Anaxagoras 47 Arand, Charles 26 Aristotle 151, 159 Athanasius 159 Augustine 10, 23, 133, 137, 142 – 148, 159, 162, 168 Barbour, Ian G. 160 Barth, Karl 30 f., 117, 132, 135 f., 141 Becker, Jürgen 43 Behr, John 138 Benjamin, Walter 71 Berger, Peter L. 63 Beveridge, Henry 23 Bischoff, Michael 60 Black, Max 51 Bloom, Hank 128 Boeve, Lieven 6 f., 53, 63 – 83 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich 14, 54 Bonner, Gerald 144 Breck, Jon and Lyn 135 Büchner, Georg 47 Calvin, John 2, 3, 22 – 24, 26 Cano, Melchior 54 Caputo, John D. 63, 81 Casanova, José 52 Chan, Wing-tsit 113, 151, 156, 162 Chang, Carsun 132, 156 Ching, Julia 151, 156 f. Chiu, Hansheng 156 f. Christensen, Michael J. 136 Clark, Mary T. 143 f., 146 Clooney, Francis X. 114 Cobb, John 132 Confucius 132, 165 Cox, Harvey 17 Darwin, Charles 16 Defert, Daniel 60 Descartes, René 159

Donaldson, James 139 Donovan, Mary Ann 142 Eliade, Mircea 91 Elisha 36 Erskine (of Linlathen), Thomas 2 – 4, 29 – 45 passim Faubion, James D. 60 Feuerbach, Ludwig 14, 164 Finch, Jeffrey 138, 142 Fingarette, Herbert 113 Finlan, Stephen 136, 138 Foucault, Michel 5, 60 Fung, Yu-Lan 156 Grenz, Stanley 146 Habermas, Jürgen 89, 108 f. Haers, Jaques 80 Hahm, Seokheon/Ham, Sǒk-hǒn 102, 114, 129 Hallonsten, Gösta 136 Hanna, William 31 Hart, Kevin 63 Hatton, Russell 151 Haustein, Jörg 45 Heelas, Paul 18 Hegel, Johann G.W. 153, 162 Heidegger, Martin 8, 88 – 90 Heim, S. Mark 135 Helmer, Christine 75 Herms, Eilert 60 Hessel, Dieter T. 125 Hilberath, Bernd-Jochen 55 Hill, Edmund 144 Hinze, Bradford E. 59 Hoelzl, Michael 63 Horkheimer, Max 71 Hösle, Vittorio 89 Hsu, Fo-kuan 132 Hünermann, Peter 55 Huntington, Samuel P. 133

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Hurley, Robert 60 Huxley, Thomas H. 16

Luther, Martin 1, 3, 22, 25 f., 31, 60, 116 Lyotard, Jean-François 68

Irenaeus 10, 25, 133, 137 – 148

Mackenzie, Ross 142 Mani 23 Mantzaridis, Gregorios I. 136 Martin, David 17 Marx, Karl 14 McCormack, Bruce L. 136 McDonald, George 29 McFague, Sllie 160 McLeod Campbell, John 29 Merrigan, Terrence 80 Metz, Johann B. 70 f. Milbank, John 67 Miller, Vincent 64 Min, Anselm Kyongsuk 1 – 11, 151 – 169 Minns, Denis 138 f., 141 – 143 Mohammed 73 Moltmann, Jürgen 71, 113 More, Thomas 58 Moses 62, 73, 94 Mou, Tsung-san 132 Mühling, Markus 3 f., 29 – 45

Jang, Hyun-Seung 1 Jaspers, Karl 91 f. Jesus Christ 1 – 11 passim, 13 – 27 passim, 29 – 45 passim, 73, 79 f., 100, 114 – 129, 132, 138, 141, 147, 162, 166 Jiyu, Ren 156 Johannes XXIII. 56 Kant, Immanuel 89 Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver 71 Kaufmann, Ludwig 56 Kearney, Richard 81 Keating, Daniel A. 136 Kharlamov, Vladimir 136, 138 Kierkegaard, Søren 114 Kiermeier-Debre, Joseph 47 Kim, Heung-Ho 104 f., 114, 126 f. Kim, Heup Young 8, 11, 113 – 129, 132, 141 Kim, Sangbong 102 Kim, Yung Sik 156 Klein, Nikolaus 56 Kloesel, Christian J. W. 57 Knitter, Paul F. 64 Kohl, Margaret 113 Kolb, Robert 26 Komonchak, Joseph A. 64 Kwok, Pui-lan 114 LaCugna, Catherine Mowry 135, 143 f., 146 f. Lai, Pan-chiu 10, 131 – 149 Lamberigts, Mathijs 67 Lao Tzu (Laotse) 113 Lee, Ki-Sang 8, 85 – 111 Lee, Peter 125 Lewis, C.S. 29 Limouris, Gennadios 135 Logan, George M. 58 Lossky, Vladimir 135 Luke 43 – 44, 122

Nellas, Panayiotis 136 Nesteruk, Alexei V. 135 Nyssa, Gregory v. 133 Ogliari, Donato 146 Oleksa, Michael 135 Origen 159 Palamas, St. Gregory 136 Pannenberg, Wolfhart 31, 34, 45, 54, 153 Pape, Helmut 57 Park, Jaesoon 107 Park, Yeong-ho 93, 94, 100, 106 f., 111, 114, 126 Paul, St. 9, 20 f., 27, 124 Peirce, Charles S. 57 Pelikan, Jaroslav 132 Phan, Peter 153 Pickstock, Catherine 67 Plato 21, 151, 162

Index of Names

Powers, Daniel G. 137 Puchniak, Robert 144 Quaas, Anna 45 Rabinow, Paul 60 Rahner, Karl 54, 135 Rambaut, William H. 139 Ratzinger, Joseph 67 Reichelt, Karl Ludvig 131 Ribaillier, Jean 31 Ricci, Matteo 151 f., 159 Richard of St. Victor 4, 31, 43 Roberts, Alexander 139 Ruether, Rosemary R. 125 Russell, Normal 135 – 137 Ryu, Young-Mo (Daseok) 2, 8 f., 88, 92 – 94, 96 – 107, 111, 113 – 129 Sakyamuni 100 Sander, Hans-Joachim 5, 47 – 62, 70 Saner, Hans 92 Sartorius, Ernst 32 Schillebeeckx, Edward 66 Schwöbel, Christoph 2 f., 13 – 27, 32, 60, 135 Sharpe, Eric E. 131 Sherrard, Liadain 136 Sinaita, Anastasius 33 Song, Young-bae 152 Tagore, Rabindranath 91 Tang, Chun-I. 132 Taylor, Charles 52

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Teng, Aimin 156 f. Theophilus v. Antioch 141 Thomas v. Aquinas 2, 10, 136, 151 – 154, 156 f., 159, 161 f., 164 – 166, 168 Thomasius, Gottfried 32 Tiessen, Terrance L. 139 f., 143 Tillich, Paul 2, 13 Troyer, Kristin De 75 Van Buren, Paul 14 Verlinde, Joseph-Marie

76

Wang, Yang-ming 115, 132, 149 Ward, Graham 63, 67 Ware, Timothy 134 Welsch, Wolfgang 89 f. Wengert, Timothy J. 26 Williams, Anna N. 136 Wingren, Gustav 142 Wisse, Maarten 67 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 51 Wittung, Jeffrey A. 136 Woodhead, Linda 18 Wyller, Trygve 60, 172 Yannaras, Christos 135 Yu, E. Sang 114 Žak, Lubomir 60 Zhang, Li Wen 156 Zhu, Xi/Chu, Hsi 2, 10, 149, 151 f., 156 – 164 passim, 167 Zizioulas, John 135

Index of Subjects Asia 17, 113, 132, 134, 149, 165 Asian culture 9, 11, 115, 148, 163 Atheism 1, 5, 14, 47 Baptism 138 Bible 2 f., 8, 15 f., 19 f., 36 – 38, 61, 73, 93, 114 f., 128 Buddhism/Buddhist 2, 9, 16, 27, 76, 105, 113 f., 117, 124 f., 127 f., 131, 133, 141, 148, 171 Catholicism/Catholic 2, 6, 54, 64, 67, 132, 135 f., 143, 171 Certainty 3, 5 f., 20, 22 – 24, 35, 51 China/Chinese culture 60, 113, 131 f., 151 f., 171 Christian doctrine 2, 19, 164 Christian narrative 6 f., 63, 65, 70, 72 – 74, 79 – 81, 83 Christology 1, 8 f., 32, 80, 113, 115 – 129 passim, 132, 172 Communication 16, 22 f., 30 f., 33, 40, 59, 63 f., 73, 75 – 77, 82, 91, 93, 103, 148 Concarnation 29 – 46 Confucian Doctrine 2, 10 Confucianism 2, 8 – 11, 113 f., 116 f., 121 – 123, 127, 131 – 149 passim, 151 f., 156, 159, 163, 165, 167 f. Conviction 3, 14, 19, 24, 38, 52, 54 Creation 10, 16, 23, 25, 30, 32 f., 42, 45, 47, 79, 99, 133 – 148 passim, 155 f., 161, 165 f., 168 Creature 23, 30, 40, 42, 44, 91, 138, 141, 146, 153 – 155, 161, 165 f. Cross 3 f., 6, 9, 33 f., 40, 42 f., 62, 78 f., 114, 116 – 120, 124, 126 f. Dialectic 21, 54, 153, 163, 172 Divine economy 25, 27, 141 f. Divine essence 32, 154 f., 160, 168 Divine nature 32, 136, 168 Divine persons 34, 138, 143 – 145, 147, 152 f., 164, 168 Divine Self-communication 23

Divine Word 22, 27 Doctrine of the Mean 118, 148 f. East and West/Eastern and Western 1, 10 f., 82, 131 – 149, 151 Emptiness 91 – 93 Epistemological 45, 75 – 81 passim, 108 Eschatology/eschatological 44, 147, 172 Eschaton 137 Eternity 31, 50, 123, 155, 157 Europe/European 1, 6, 29, 47, 51 f., 58, 63 – 83, 90 f., 114, 134, 171 f. Exclusion 5, 58 f., 63, 82, 166 Exclusivism 6, 64, 75, 117 Faith

2 f., 9, 13 – 27 passim, 29 f., 32 – 35, 41, 55 – 57, 64 – 83 passim, 87, 102, 114 – 116, 128 f., 135, 146, 165, 171 f. Freedom 27, 37, 54, 67, 141 f., 147 Fundamentalism 1 – 3, 13 – 27, 58, 62, 74 Globalization 1 f., 5 – 8, 11, 14, 50, 64, 74, 85, 134, 160, 166, 172 God (personal) 125, 151 God, Korean Conceptions of 91 – 107, 110 God, the Father 1 – 11, 19 f., 25 f., 30 – 33, 35, 44, 116, 119, 122, 124, 126, 137 – 145 passim, 151 – 168 passim God, the Son 2 – 4, 10 f., 19, 25 f., 30 – 35, 38, 42 – 44, 62, 79, 100, 116, 122, 124, 133 – 151 passim, 153 – 156, 159 – 168 passim God, the Spirit 1 – 4, 9 – 11, 19 – 26 passim, 29 – 45, 47 – 62, 97, 103 f., 118 – 120, 122 f., 131 – 149, 151 – 168 passim Gospel 3, 22 f., 25 – 27, 29, 36 – 39, 41, 56 f., 129, 149 Grace 10, 20, 25 f., 33, 136, 142, 144, 146, 148, 153, 155 Hermeneutic 6 f., 9 f., 13, 63 – 83 passim, 89, 108, 114 f., 128, 152, 160 f., 171 – 173 Heterotopias 5 f., 60 – 62, 172 f. Hindu 16

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Index of Subjects

Holiness 8, 37, 85 – 111, 125 Humanism 88, 133 Humanity 3 f., 7, 9 f., 33 – 36, 48, 67, 76, 79 f., 85 – 110 passim, 113, 117 – 119, 122 – 124, 126 f., 131 – 149, 158, 162, 166 f. Identity 9, 20, 25, 32 – 34, 57, 61 f., 69, 72 – 74, 78, 99, 164, 168 Incarnation 3 f., 7 f., 27, 29 – 45, 75 f., 79 – 82, 142, 145, 147, 153 Inclusivism 6 f., 64, 75 – 78 Incorporation 163 f. Interreligious communication 63, 73, 75 – 77, 82 Interreligious dialogue 77 f., 132 f., 149, 171 Interruption, Category of 68 – 82 Islam 16, 72 f., 82 Judaism 16, 73 Judgment 7, 24, 127, 143, 145 Kingdom of God 35, 79, 126 Korea 1 f., 7 – 9, 88, 90 – 110 passim, 113 – 129, 133, 152, 156, 163, 165 f., 171 f. Latin America 17 Law 21 f., 48, 99, 154 f., 159, 162, 166 Life-World 85, 88 – 90, 109 Limitlessness 8, 90, 92, 94, 121, 125 Logos 8, 88, 109, 113, 120, 122, 125, 131, 151, 154, 159, 167 Mercy 144, 153 Metaphysics 8, 91 f., 135, 159 Modernity 11, 16, 48 f., 54, 66 f., 71, 108 f. Monotheism 16 New Testament 79, 115, 139 Nothingness 8, 88, 91, 95, 98, 100, 105, 107 – 109, 127 Old Testament 115 Ontology 117, 161 Orthodox Christianity 132 – 134, 136

Orthodox Church 133 – 135 Orthodox doctrines 128 Paradigm 6, 9, 64, 69, 72 f., 82, 108, 113, 121, 127, 154, 160 Particularity 6 f., 73 – 77, 81, 129 Peace 14, 20, 38, 86, 89 f., 135 Pentecostal/Pentecostalism 2, 4, 17 f., 20 Philosophy, Chinese 151, 156 Philosophy, comparative 160 Philosophy, European 91 Philosophy, Korean 171 Philosophy, Western 88, 171 Pluralism 1f., 6, 14, 54, 64, 75, 115, 135, 172f. Plurality 6, 63 – 83, 115 Pneumatology 1 – 11, 35, 42, 115, 122, 127, 172 Postmodern/Postmodernism 2, 5 f., 63, 65 – 71, 74 – 76, 80, 108, 135, 152, 171 f. Power/Powerlessness/Empowerment 2 – 6, 10, 17 f., 21, 25 f., 35, 38 – 41, 47 – 62 passim, 71, 90, 96, 99 f., 105, 107 – 110, 119, 121, 123, 127, 138 f., 141, 145 f., 151, 154 – 156, 158, 162 f., 167, 172 f. Protestantism/Protestant 1 – 3, 17, 30 f., 132, 135 f., 166 Radical Orthodoxy 67 ratio 11, 109, 151, 154, 158 – 161, 167 Rationalism 1 f., 29 Rationality 66 f., 86 f., 89 f., 109 Reconciliation/Reconciling 71, 155, 162 f., 172 Reformation 1, 21 f., 116 Relativism 1, 64 Religion, Public 52 f. Religions 1 f., 6 f., 14, 16, 18, 51 f., 64, 66, 71 – 79, 82 f., 113 – 115, 117, 127 f., 171 Religiousness 90, 110 Renaissance 134 – 136 Resurrection 15, 19, 21 f., 33 f., 38, 71, 120, 126 f., 137 Revelation 4 – 6, 19, 24, 26, 30 f., 73, 79 – 81, 83, 88, 93 f., 173 Sacrifice 3, 9, 29, 33 f., 38, 42, 89, 117 f., 126

Index of Subjects

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Salvation 3, 7, 23, 32 f., 35, 55, 78, 80, 83, 91 f., 109, 121, 131, 133, 137 – 143, 147, 149, 166, 172 Scripture 2 f., 9, 15 – 17, 19 f., 22 – 24, 30, 36, 44, 73, 104, 114 f., 128, 139, 167 Secularisation/Secularism/Secularity 1, 14, 52, 63, 69 Self-presentation (of God) 3, 20, 24 f. Sin 21, 25, 34 f., 39, 42, 81, 93, 131 – 133, 147 – 149, 155 sola scriptura 30, 128 Spirit of Christ 3, 7, 83, 129 Spiritualism 1 – 3, 13 – 27 Spirituality 2, 8 f., 14 f., 17 f., 20, 25, 27, 85 – 111 Supper 118

Theology, Western 10 Theosis 33, 133 – 149 passim Tolerance 86 Tradition, Christian 7, 10, 59, 65, 67, 71, 80 – 82, 136 f., 152, 159, 164, 166 Tradition, orthodox 133 – 136 Tradition, religious 14, 53, 73, 76, 114 Transcendence/Transcendent 5, 11, 18, 40, 42, 74, 95, 153, 157, 161 f., 164 f. Trinity 2, 4, 9 f., 19, 25 f., 30 – 32, 33, 120, 133 – 147 passim, 151 – 169, 172 Trinity, economic 135, 138, 155, 160, 168 Trinity, immanent 135, 138, 145, 147, 155 Truth 1, 5 f., 35, 47 – 83, 94, 106, 154 Truth claims 6 f., 13, 53, 59, 62 – 65, 69, 73 – 76, 78, 80 f.

Testimony 3, 22, 24, 36 Theology, Asian 1, 172 Theology, Christian 1 f., 11, 13 – 15, 27, 66, 68, 132, 136 – 144 passim, 152, 161, 164 – 166, 171 Theology, comparative 5, 9, 114, 160, 171 Theology, contextual 65 – 82 Theology, dialectical 54 Theology, European 6, 63 – 83 Theology, liberal 5, 54 Theology, (post)modern 67, 69, 152, 172 Theology, negative 63, 81, 157 Theology, orthodox 134 – 136, 143, 149 Theology, Trinitarian 3, 32, 135, 151 – 171 passim

Universalism 143 Universality 29, 129, 158 Utopia 4 – 6, 38, 57 – 62, 172 Vatican II 54 – 57, 64, 172 Violence 14 f., 48, 50, 52, 58 f. Virtue 89, 116 – 118, 123, 131 f., 141, 148 f., 162 Western culture 21, 115, 131 Witness 3, 6 f., 14, 22, 24 f., 33, 40 f., 43, 66 – 83 passim, 122, 147 Word of God 6, 24 f., 30, 34, 50, 62, 103 f., 123, 128, 138 f., 141, 144 f., 162