Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years 3031285638, 9783031285639

Table of contents :
Series Foreword
Contents
Chapter 1 Beyond the Western Male Canon: A New Dawn for Philosophy?
Abstract
1.1 The Murky Western/Non-western Miasma
1.2 Methodology
1.3 Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions
1.4 Further Research
1.5 Conclusions
Chapter 2 En Hedu’Anna of Mesopotamia Circa 2300 BCE
Abstract
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Mesopotamian Civilization at the Time of En Hedu’Anna
2.1.2 The Temple Cities and the En
2.2 Biography
2.3 Surviving Works
2.3.1 In Nin-me-hus-a
2.3.2 In-Nin-Sa-gur-Ra
2.3.3 Nin-ME-Sar-ra
2.3.4 The Temple Hymns (TH)
2.4 Philosophy of Religion
2.4.1 Indigenous Religious Philosophy
2.4.2 En Hedu’Anna and the Idea of a Supreme Being
2.5 Cosmology
2.5.1 Cosmology Before En Hedu’Anna
2.5.2 En Hedu’Anna’s Contribution to Cosmology
2.5.2.1 “Planet”
2.5.2.2 The Concept “Constellation”
2.6 Epistemology
2.7 Ontology: The ME
2.7.1 Being and Becoming
2.7.2 Ontological Status of the ‘Ground Plan’ and Amulets
2.7.3 Greater versus Lesser ME?
2.7.4 The ME, The Real of the Ideal
2.7.4.1 The ME in Indigenous Mesopotamian Thought
2.7.4.2 En Hedu’Anna’s Adaptation of the ME
2.8 Moral and Social Philosophy
2.8.1 Mesopotamian View of Human Nature
2.8.1.1 Gender
2.8.1.2 Gender Fluidity
2.8.2 En Hedu’Anna’s Compassionate View of Humanity
2.8.3 Female Sexuality
2.8.4 The Woman Philosopher
2.9 Socio-political Philosophy
2.9.1 Government Use of Force
2.9.2 Government Corruption
2.9.3 Positive Law as the Foundation of Procedural Justice
2.10 Influence
2.10.1 Scribal Academies
2.10.2 Influence on Judaism
2.10.3 Conceptualizing Astronomy
2.10.4 Influence on Tamil Language
2.10.5 Goddess Worship
2.11 Conclusions
References
Chapter 3 Gārgī Vācaknavī of India गार्गी वाचक्नवी fl. Eighth Century BCE
Abstract
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Biography
3.3 Philosophical Achievements
3.4 Social-Political Background
3.4.1 Vedas and Upaniṣads
3.4.2 Caste, Gender, Sex
3.5 Philosophic Significance of the Dialogue
3.6 Conclusion
References
Chapter 4 Maitreyī of India मैत्रेयी Circa 1100–500 BCE
Abstract
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Biography
4.3 Philosophical Achievement:
4.3.1 Understanding Maitreyī’s Contribution
4.3.2 Vedānta
4.3.3 Social-Political Background: Four Stations of Life
4.4 Philosophical Discourse
4.5 Conclusion
References
Chapter 5 Mahapajapati Gotami महाप्रजापती गौतमी Circa Sixth–Seventh Centuries BCE
Abstract
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Biography
5.2.1 Aspiration and Past Lives
5.2.2 Final Life
5.3 Ordination
5.3.1 Argument for Ordination
5.3.2 Primacy of Universal Buddhist Truth over Social Conventions
5.3.3 Widowhood and the Spiritual Path
5.3.4 Mahapajapati Gotami Crossing Boundaries
5.4 Conclusion
References
Chapter 6 Khema of Great Wisdom from India खेमा Circa 563 BCE–483 BCE
Abstract
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Biography
6.2.1 Aspiration and Past Lives
6.2.2 Final Life and Enlightenment
6.3 Philosophical Teachings
6.4 Conclusion: Khema as Philosopher
References
Chapter 7 Meng Mu of China 孟母 Circa 4th Century BCE
Abstract
7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 Meng Mu the Person
7.1.2 Confucian Philosophy of Education: A Background
7.2 Learning from Meng Mu
7.2.1 Meng Mu San Qian 孟母三遷
7.2.2 Meng Mu Duan Zhi 孟母斷織
7.2.3 Mengzi Qu Qi 孟子去妻
7.2.4 Meng Mu Chu Qi 孟母處齊
7.2.5 Han Ying on Meng Mu
7.3 Conclusions
References
Chapter 8 Ban Zhao of China 班昭 45–116 CE
Abstract
8.1 Introduction
8.1.1 Biography
8.1.1.1 Family
8.1.1.2 Achievements
8.1.2 Philosophy
8.2 Social-Political Background
8.2.1 Han Dynasty History
8.2.2 The Philosophical Heritage: Philosophy and Philosophers in the Han Court
8.3 Philosophical Works: “Needle and Thread,” “a Journey to the East,” and Lessons for Women
8.3.1 The Poem “The Needle and Thread”
8.3.2 The Poem: Rhapsody on Traveling Eastward/A Journey to the East
8.3.3 The Prose Treatise: Lessons for Women/ Nüjie
8.3.3.1 Overview of the Lessons
8.3.3.2 Philosophy In Seven Chapters
8.3.3.3 The Nature of Relationship within Family
8.3.3.4 The Nature of Relationship within the Generational Family
8.3.3.5 Womanly Virtue
8.3.3.6 Propriety and Rhetoric
8.3.3.7 Husband and Wife Relation
8.3.3.8 The Argument for Education
8.4 Conclusion
References
Chapter 9 Sulabha of Indiaसुलभ
Abstract
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Biography
9.3 Textual Context
9.4 Sulabha’s Philosophy
9.5 Conclusion
Appendix
Translation of Sulabha-Janaka Dialogue
References
Chapter 10 Rābi‘a al-‘Adawiyya of Basra 712–801/185–95رابعة ا عدوية ا بصرية
Abstract
10.1 Introduction
10.1.1 Sources of Rābi‘a’s Biography
10.1.2 Biography
10.1.3 Teacher, Mystic, Pedagogical Innovator
10.1.4 Rābi‘a as “Honorary Man”: Teacher, Mentor, or Educator?
10.2 Teaching Methods: Moral Parables and Multi-sensory Pedagogy
10.3 Rhetoric, Philosophy of Language, Poetics and Ineffable Love
10.3.1 Selection Criteria
10.3.2 Names and Letters
10.3.3 Language and Poetics
10.4 Taxonomy of Love
10.4.1 Reinterpretation of Hawā
10.4.2 The Spiraling Power of ‘Ishq: Creating a “Semantically-Based” Etymology
10.5 Feminism
10.5.1 Feminists and Feminisms
10.5.2 Rābi‘a’s Feminism
10.6 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 11 Yeshe Tsogyal of Tibet 777–876 CE
Abstract
11.1 Biography
11.1.1 Preliminary Comments Regarding Sources
11.1.2 Life
11.2 Philosophical Foundations of Vajrayāna Buddhism
11.2.1 Bön Before Buddhism
11.2.1.1 Bön Ways to Enlightenment
11.2.1.2 Bön Deities
11.2.2 Tibetan Buddhism
11.2.2.1 Theravedic Influence
11.2.2.2 Mahāyāna Influence
11.3 Vajrayana Buddhism
11.3.1 Nyingma
11.3.2 Nyingma Tantrism
11.4 Teaching
11.5 Works
11.5.1 Questions and Answers of the Lady
11.5.2 Prayer
11.5.3 Aspiration
11.5.4 Book of the Dead
11.6 Philosophy
11.7 Conclusions
Appendix I. Prayer
Appendix II. Aspiration
Appendix III: Autobiography (Excerpt)
References
Chapter 12 Murasaki Shikibu of Japan 紫式部 Circa 978–Circa 1000
Abstract
12.1 Introduction
12.2 Biography
12.3 Philosophical Background
12.4 Works
12.4.1 Poetic Memoirs (Murasaki Shikibu shū) Circa 1014
12.4.2 Diary (Murasaki Shikibu Nikki) Circa. 1008–1010
12.4.3 The Tale of Genji (Genji Monogatari) Circa 1002–1022
12.5 Philosophical Methodology
12.5.1 The Epistemology of Buddhist Upāya
12.5.2 Heian-Kyō as the Lotus Sutra’s “Burning House”
12.5.3 From Wisdom to Wisdom Gone Beyond (Compassion)
12.6 Conclusions
References
Chapter 13 Cao Wenyi of China 曹文逸 1039–1119
Abstract
13.1 Introduction
13.2 Philosophical Heritage
13.2.1 Dao as Cosmic Mother and Female Body
13.3 Cao’s Daoism
13.3.1 Taiji
13.3.2 Bumiao
13.3.3 A Lived Body Experience
13.3.4 Life’s Journey of Transcending
13.3.4.1 The Idea of ‘Transcendence’
13.4 Legacy of Cao Wenyi
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
References
Chapter 14 Sun Bu’er of China 孫不二 1119–1183
Abstract
14.1 Introduction
14.1.1 Daodejing
14.1.2 Zhuangzi
14.1.3 Sunujing
14.1.4 Cao Wenyi
14.2 Biography
14.3 Works
14.3.1 Bu Suanzi
14.3.2 Yao Baomei
14.3.3 Wu Ye’er
14.3.4 Manting Fang
14.4 Conclusions
14.4.1 Why Sun Is a Philosopher
14.4.2 Sun’s Daoism
References
Chapter 15 Akka Mahadevi of India Circa 1130–Circa 1160
Abstract
15.1 Introduction
15.1.1 Virasaivism in Twelfth Century Karnataka
15.1.2 Akka Mahadevi—Radical Woman Philosopher of Virasaivism
15.1.3 Life of Akka Mahadevi
15.1.4 Locating Akka Mahadevi among Medieval Philosophers—The Anubhava Mantapa
15.1.5 Situating Mysticism in Akka Mahadevi
15.1.6 Erotic Mysticism in Akka Mahdevi’s Vachanas
15.1.7 The ‘Domestic Household’ as Allegory and Metaphor
15.1.8 Transgression and Transcendence
15.1.9 Akka Mahadevi in the Eyes of Other Shivasharane
15.1.10 Relevance of Akka Mahadevi for Women Today
References
Chapter 16 Empress Xu/Renxiaowen of China 仁孝文皇后 1361–1407
Abstract
16.1 The Author and the Work
16.2 Cultural and Historical Background
16.3 Purpose of Writing, Contents, Strengths and Weaknesses of the Book
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
References
Chapter 17 Im Yunjidang of Korea 任允摯堂 1721–1793
Abstract
17.1 Biography and Writings
17.2 Philosophical Views
17.3 Translations from The Extant Writings of Im Yunjidang
17.3.1 Biographies
17.3.1.1 Biography of the Wife of Mr. Song (Neungsang)
17.3.1.2 The Biography of Two Women: Choe and Hong
17.3.2 Discourses
17.3.2.1 Discourse on Misaeng Go Begging Vinegar
17.3.2.2 Discourse of On Gyo Tearing the Hem of His Garment
17.3.3 Expositions
17.3.3.1 Exposition on the Human Heart-Mind, Heart-Mind of the Way, Four Sprouts, and Seven Emotions
17.3.3.2 Exposition on Overcoming the Self and Returning to the Rites is Humaneness
17.3.4 Inscriptions
17.4 Conclusions
Bibliography
Chapter 18 姜靜一堂 Gang Jeongildang of Korea 1772–1832
Abstract
18.1 Biography and Writings
18.2 Philosophical Views
18.3 Translations from The Extant Writings of Gang Jeongildang
18.3.1 Eighteen Poems
18.3.2 Two Letters
18.3.3 Twenty-Six Personal Missives
18.3.4 Two Commemorations
18.3.5 Funeral Epitaphs
Bibliography
Chapter 19 Nana Asma’u of Nigeria 1793–1864
Abstract
19.1 Introduction
19.1.1 Family Origins, Scholarly Values
19.1.2 Qadiriyya Sufism
19.2 The Prevailing Philosophy of Nana Asma’u’s Place and Time
19.3 Sufi Philosophy as Reflected in Asma’u’s Literary Works
Appendix
References
Chapter 20 Oodgeroo of the Noonuccal (Kath Walker) of Australia 1920–1993
Abstract
20.1 Introduction
20.2 Biography
20.3 Philosophy
20.4 Conclusion
Appendix
References
Chapter 21 Emérita Quito of the Philippines 1929–2017
Abstract
21.1 Introduction
21.2 Biography
21.3 Philosophy
21.3.1 Public Philosophy
21.3.2 Phenomenology and Existentialism
21.3.3 Ethics/Moral/Political Philosophy
21.3.4 Filipino Philosophy?
21.3.5 The Future of Philosophy in the Philippines
21.4 Conclusions
References
Chapter 22 Sophie Olúwolé of Nigeria 1935–2018
Abstract
22.1 Biography
22.2 Methodology of Classical African Philosophy
22.2.1 Critiquing the Oral Tradition
22.2.2 The Ifá Tradition
22.3 Critical Traditionalists
22.4 Olúwolé’s Philosophy of Gender
22.5 Olúwolé’s African Political Philosophy
22.5.1 Intercultural Philosophy
22.5.2 Belief in Witchcraft
22.6 Conclusion: Olúwolé and the Future of an Oral Tradition and Gender Conscious African Philosophy
References
Chapter 23 Viola Cordova Jicarilla Tribe, Apache Native American 1936–2002
Abstract
23.1 Biography
23.2 Influences: Traditional Native American Women’s Public Philosophy
23.2.1 Nanye’hi
23.2.2 Catherine Brown
23.2.3 Sarah Winnemucca (d. 1891)
23.3 Philosophy
23.3.1 Ontology and Epistemology
23.3.2 Ethics and Aesthetics
23.3.3 The Nature of Human
23.4 Conclusion
References
Appendix

Citation preview

Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19

Mary Ellen Waithe Therese Boos Dykeman   Editors

Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years

Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences Volume 19

Series Editors Ruth Edith Hagengruber, Department of Humanities, Center for the History of Women Philosophers, Paderborn University, Paderborn, Germany Mary Ellen Waithe, Professor Emerita, Department of Philosophy and Comparative Religion, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, OH, USA Gianni Paganini, Department of Humanities, University of Piedmont, Vercelli, Italy Editorial Board Luka Borsic, Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia Antonio Calcagno, Philosophy Department, King's University College, London, ON, Canada Sabrina Ebbersmeyer, Department of Communication, University of Copenhagen, København S, Denmark John Conley, Loyola University Maryland, Baltimore, MD, USA Karen Green, University of Melbourne, St Kilda, VIC, Australia Sarah Hutton, University of York, London, UK Katerina Karpenko, Philosophy, Kharkiv National Medical University, Kharkiv, Ukraine Klaus Mainzer, Technical University Munich, München, Germany Ronny Miron, Bar-Ilan University, Ganey Tikva, Israel Marie-Frederique Pellegrin, Université Jean Molin Lyon III, Lyon, France Sandra Plastina, Department of Culture Education, Università della Calabria, Arcavacata di Rende, Italy Dorothy Rogers, Montclair State University, Montclair, NJ, USA Sigridur Thorgeirsdottir, Department of Philosophy, University of Iceland, Reykjavik, Iceland George N. Vlahakis, Open Hellenic University, Athens, Greece Elizabeth Minnich, Association of American Colleges & Universities, Charlotte, NC, USA

Paola Rumore, Department of Di Filosofia, Universita degli Studi di Torino, Torino, Italy Mariafranca Spallanzani, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy Tamara Albertini, Department of Philosophy, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, HI, USA Dorota Dutsch, Santa Barbara, USA Romana Bassi, Padova, Italy Massimo Mazzotti, Berkeley, CA, USA As the historical records prove, women have long been creating original contributions to philosophy. We have valuable writings from female philosophers from Antiquity and the Middle Ages, and a continuous tradition from the Renaissance to today. The history of women philosophers thus stretches back as far as the history of philosophy itself. The presence as well as the absence of women philosophers throughout the course of history parallels the history of philosophy as a whole. Edith Stein, Hannah Arendt and Simone de Beauvoir, the most famous represen­ tatives of this tradition in the twentieth century, did not appear from nowhere. They stand, so to speak, on the shoulders of the female titans who came before them. The series Women Philosophers and Scientists published by Springer is of interest not only to the international philosophy community, but also for scholars in history of science and mathematics, the history of ideas, and in women’s studies.

Mary Ellen Waithe · Therese Boos Dykeman Editors

Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years

13

Editors Mary Ellen Waithe Cleveland State University Cleveland, OH, USA

Therese Boos Dykeman Fairfield, CT, USA

ISSN 2523-8760 ISSN 2523-8779  (electronic) Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences ISBN 978-3-031-28562-2 ISBN 978-3-031-28563-9  (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

Series Foreword

Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences The history of women’s contributions to philosophy and the sciences dates back to the very beginnings of these disciplines. Theano, Hypatia, Du Châtelet, Agnesi, Germain, Lovelace, Stebbing, Curie, and Stein are only a small selection of prominent women philosophers and scientists throughout history. The Springer Series Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences provides a platform for publishing cutting-edge scholarship on women’s contributions to the sciences, to philosophy, and to interdisciplinary academic areas. We, therefore, include in our scope women’s contributions to biology, physics, chemistry, and related sciences. The series also encompasses the entire discipline of the history of philosophy since antiquity (including metaphysics, aesthetics, and philosophy of religion). We welcome also work about women’s contributions to mathematics and to interdisciplinary areas such as philosophy of biology, philosophy of medicine, and sociology. The research presented in this series serves to recover women’s contributions and to revise our knowledge of the development of philosophical and scientific disciplines, so as to present the full scope of their theoretical and methodological traditions. Supported by an advisory board of internationally esteemed scholars, the volumes offer a comprehensive, up-to-date source of reference for this field of growing relevance. See the listing of planned volumes. The Springer Series Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences will publish monographs, handbooks, collections, anthologies, and dissertations.

Paderborn, Germany Cleveland, USA Vercelli, Italy

Editors-in-Chief Ruth Hagengruber Mary Ellen Waithe Gianni Paganini

v

Contents

1

Beyond the Western Male Canon: A New Dawn for Philosophy?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Mary Ellen Waithe and Therese Boos Dykeman

2

En Hedu’Anna of Mesopotamia Circa 2300 BCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Mary Ellen Waithe

3 Gārgī Vācaknavī of India fl. Eighth Century BCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Shyam Ranganathan 4 Maitreyī of India Circa 1100–500 BCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Shyam Ranganathan 5

Mahapajapati Gotami Circa Sixth–Seventh Centuries BCE . . . . . . 89 Supakwadee Amatayakul and Suwanna Satha-Anand

6

Khema of Great Wisdom from India Circa 563 BCE–483 BCE. . . . 103 Supakwadee Amatayakul

7

Meng Mu of China Circa 4th Century BCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Ann A. Pang-White

8

Ban Zhao of China 45–116 CE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Therese Boos Dykeman

9

Sulabha of India Floruit Circa 800 BCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 Ruth Vanita

10 Rābi‘a al-‘Adawiyya of Basra 712–801/185–95. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Tamara Albertini 11 Yeshe Tsogyal of Tibet 777–876 CE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 Mary Ellen Waithe 12 Murasaki Shikibu of Japan Circa 978–Circa 1000. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 Sandra A. Wawrytko vii

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Contents

13 Cao Wenyi of China 1039–1119. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 Robin R. Wang 14 Sun Bu’er of China 1119–1183 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291 Sandra A. Wawrytko 15 Akka Mahadevi of India Circa 1130–Circa 1160. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 Vijaya Ramaswamy 16 Empress Xu/Renxiaowen of China 1361–1407. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339 Ann A. Pang-White 17 Im Yunjidang of Korea 1721–1793 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351 Philip J. Ivanhoe and Hwa Yeong Wang 18 Gang Jeongildang of Korea 1772–1832. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383 Philip J. Ivanhoe and Hwa Yeong Wang 19 Nana Asma’u of Nigeria 1793–1864 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419 Beverly Mack 20 Oodgeroo of the Noonuccal (Kath Walker) of Australia 1920–1993. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433 Therese Boos Dykeman 21 Emérita Quito of the Philippines 1929–2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445 Mary Ellen Waithe 22 Sophie Olúwolé of Nigeria 1935–2018. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455 Louise Müller 23 Viola Cordova Jicarilla Tribe, Apache Native American 1936–2002. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469 Therese Boos Dykeman Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489

About the Authors

Tamara Albertini  Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of Hawa’ii at Manoa., Honolulu, HI, US. Author: “Meanings, Words, and Names: Rābi’a’s Mystical Dance of the Letters,” in Ineffability: An Exercise in Comparative Philosophy of Religion, edited by Timothy D. Knepper and Leah E. Kalmanson, Springer: International Publishing, 2017; “Ibn Khaldūn: A Philosopher for Times of Crisis,” in: Politics, Nature, and Society–The Actuality of North African Philosopher Ibn Khaldūn, ed. by Tamara Albertini, Special Issue, Philosophy East and West 69, 3 (2019) and other works. Supakwadee Amatayakul  Tenured Teacher, Department of Humanities, IULM, Milan, Italy. Author (with Ileria de Bernardis): Lost in History: Women in Literature and Philosophy, Mimesis International (2022); editor: The Emergence and Heritage of Asian Women Intellectuals. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press (2013); author (with N. G. Albert): “Overcoming Emotions, Conquering Fate: Reflections on Descartes’s Ethics,” Diogenes 237:1 (2012) and other works. Therese Boos Dykeman  Retired Adjunct Professor of Philosophy, Fairfield University, Fairfield CT, USA. Introduction to Field-Being Philosophy (with Laura Weed & David White) Cambridge Scholars Publishing (2022); Rhetoric at the Non-Substantialistic Turn: The East-West Coin, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books (2018); The Neglected Canon: Nine Women Philosophers, First to Twentieth Century Kluwer Academic Publishers (1997); American Women Philosophers, 1650-1930: Six Exemplary Women Thinkers, Edward Mellen Press (1993) and other works. Philip J. Ivanhoe  Professor of East Asian Languages and Cultures, Georgetown University, Washington DC, USA. Author (with Hwa Yeong Wang): Korean Women Philosophers and the Ideal of a Female Sage, Oxford University Press (2023); Zhu Xi: Selected Writings, Oxford University Press (2019); Oneness: East Asian Conceptions of Virtue, Happiness, and How We Are All Connected, Oxford University Press (2017) and other works.

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About the Authors

Beverly Mack  Professor Emerita of African Studies, Department of African and African American Studies, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, USA. Author: Equals in Learning and Piety: Muslim Women Scholars in Nigeria and North America, University of Wisconsin Press, (2023); Muslim Women Sing: Hausa Popular Song (Indiana University Press, 2004), co-author (with Jean Boyd): Educating Muslim Women: The West African Legacy of Nana Asma’u, Interface Press (2013); author: One Woman’s Jihad: Nana Asma’u, Scholar and Scribe, Indiana University Press, (2000) and other works. Louise Müller  University Lecturer in African Literature and Media, Department of African Languages and Cultures, Leiden University, Netherlands and Senior Researcher, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa. Author (with K. Dorvlo) Caught in the Cosmic Web: Ghanaian Folk Tales in the Twenty-First Century. Weesp, Quest for Wisdom Foundation (2023); (with K. Dorvlo, A. Muijen and J. Gomes) Gevangen in het Cosmisch Web: Ghanese Volksverhalen in de Twintigste Eeuw. Weesp, Quest for Wisdom Foundation (2022); (with L. F, Dorvlo, K, Muijen, H. S. C. A.) The Adinkra Game: An Intercultural Communicative and Philosophical Praxis. Culture and Tradition at School and at Home. (2021) and other works. Ann A. Pang-White  Professor of Philosophy and Director of Asian Studies, University of Scranton, Scranton PA, USA. Author: Readings in Chinese Women’s Philosophical and Feminist Thought: From the Late 13th to Early 21st Century. Bloomsbury Press (2022); The Confucian Four Books for Women: A New Translation of the Nü Sishu and the Commentary of Wang Xiang Oxford University Press, (2018); editor: Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Chinese Philosophy and Gender, Bloomsbury Press (2017) and other works. Vijaya Ramaswamy  Retired Professor of Ancient Indian History, Centre for Historical Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University and Tagore Fellow at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, India. Author: Divinity and Deviance: Women in Virasaivism (1996), Walking Naked: Women, Society, Spirituality in South India (1997, 2007), Researching Indian Women (2003), A Historical Dictionary of the Tamils (2007) and other works. Professor Ramaswamy died in 2020, just after submitting her chapter “Akka Mahadevi” for this volume. Shyam Ranganathan  Professor of Philosophy and a faculty member at the Centre for Asian Research, York University, Toronto, Canada. Author of Hinduism: A Contemporary Philosophical Investigation, Routledge (2019); “Context and Pragmatics” in the Routledge Handbook of Translation and Philosophy (2018); several articles in The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Ethics (2017); Patañjali's Yoga Sūtra: Translation, Commentary and Introduction, Penguin Black Classics (2008); Ethics and the History of Indian Philosophy (2007, 2nd edition 2017) and other works. Suwanna Satha-Anand Professor of Philosophy, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand, Secretary-General, Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie. Author: (with Wongsurawat, Wasana & Albert, Nicole G.) “Émotions

About the Authors

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et vie morale en Asie,” Diogène (2018); “Buddhist ‘Genesis’ as a Narrative of Conflict Transformation: A Re-reading of the Aggañña-sutta,” Diogenes (2013); “Silencing Metaphysics,” Journal of Philosophical Research 40 Supplement (2015) and other works. Ruth Vanita  Professor Emerita, Director, South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Montana, Missoula, MT, USA. Author of The Dharma of Justice in the Sanskrit Epics: Debates on Gender, Varna and Species, Oxford University Press (2022), Dancing with the Nation: Courtesans in Bombay Cinema Bloomsbury, New York; Speaking Tiger, New Delhi (2018); Gender, Sex and the City: Urdu Rekhti Poetry in India, 1780–1870 New York: Palgrave-Macmillan; New Delhi: Orient Blackswan (2012). Editor: India and the World: Postcolonialism, Translation and Indian Literature New Delhi: Pencraft (2014) and other works. Mary Ellen Waithe  Professor Emerita, Department of Philosophy and Comparative Religion, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, OH, USA. Editor: A History of Women Philosophers (4 volumes), Editor and translator (with MEC Vintro and CA Zorita) of Oliva Sabuco (1587) New Philosophy of Human Nature, and other works. Hwa Yeong Wang  Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Duke Kunshan University, China. Her research interests include Asian and comparative philosophy, feminist philosophy, and Confucian philosophy with a special focus on women, gender, and ritual. Her recent publications include “Chastity as a Virtue: Song Siyeol and Hume” (Religions, 2020) and “Women Who Know Ritual” (Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 2022). Her first translation of and commentary on the writings of two Korean women philosophers is Korean Women Philosophers and the Ideal of a Female Sage: The Essential Writings of Im Yunjidang and Gang Jeongildang (Oxford University Press, 2023). Robin R. Wang  Professor of Philosophy and Director of Asian Pacific Studies, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, CA, USA. Author: Yinyang: The Way of Heaven and Earth in Chinese Thought and Culture, Cambridge University Press (2012); editor: Chinese Philosophy in an Era of Globalization, SUNY Press (2004); Images of Women in Chinese Thought and Culture: Writings from the Pre-Qin Period to the Song Dynasty, Hackett (2003) and other works. Sandra A. Wawrytko  Professor of Philosophy, San Diego State University, San Diego, CA, USA. Author: “Women on Love —Idealization in the Philosophies of Diotima (Symposium) and Murasaki Shikibu (The Tale of Genji),” Philosophy East & West (2018); “The Sinification of Buddhist Philosophy: The Cases of Zhi Dun 支遁 and The Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna (Da sheng qi xin lun大乘起信論 ),” and “The Epistemology and Process of Buddhist Nondualism: The Philosophical Challenge of Egalitarianism in Chinese Buddhism,” both in Dao Companion to Chinese Buddhist Philosophy, ed. Youru Wang and Sandra A. Wawrytko, Springer (2019).

Chapter 1

Beyond the Western Male Canon: A New Dawn for Philosophy? Mary Ellen Waithe and Therese Boos Dykeman

Abstract In this volume we provide rich examples of non-western philosophy written by women over the last four thousand years. We begin by defining the scope of our non-western terrain: philosophy created outside the Greco-Roman, Judeo-Christian traditions. The philosophers who are the subjects of inquiry here hail from places as distant as pre-colonial Africa, the Americas, Asia and Australia. Together with our expert contributing authors we demonstrate through inquiry and analysis how these women philosophers advanced human thought about profound issues, some to include the nature and treatment of women themselves.

1.1 The Murky Western/Non-western Miasma Philosophical inquiry and analysis differ in Western and Non-Western traditions. Western philosophy asks the right questions and urges you to try to find and understand the answers. Non-western traditions disclose answers and defend them through personal action, exemplification of virtue, vilification of vice, use of symbols and fables, the exercise of concentration, meditation, mindful prayer and communication of memorable poetry. They challenge you to formulate thoughtful questions. Non-western philosophies are no less philosophical than western philosophies. For example, the Ch’an (Zen) classical koan “What is the sound of one hand clapping?” requires and invites rigorous conceptual analysis. One must think about

M. E. Waithe (*)  Cleveland State University, Cleveland, OH, USA e-mail: [email protected] T. B. Dykeman  Fairfield University, Fairfield, CT, USA © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_1

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the nature of sound, and of the nature of the sound of clapping as well as question whether it is possible for one hand to clap. One must decide whether to take the sentence literally or imagine its metaphorical meaning. Such an exercise is an activity that is every bit as philosophical as the Socratic query “Is something good because the gods love it, or do the gods love it because it is good?” Socrates’ question requires and invites conceptual analysis. One must think about what kind of “thing” a “something” can be? An emotion such as love? An action? An object? How might one gain knowledge of the gods’ motivations for considering something to be “good”? Again, one must decide whether to take the matter of the gods’ attitudes literally, or as a metaphor for some other type of entity? We editors are not experts in the broad field of non-western philosophy. Readers from non-western traditions—African, Indian, Chinese etc., probably are more knowledgeable than are we. Nevertheless, we assembled a list of prospective candidates as the subjects of these chapters, seeking repeated references to a woman as a philosopher, or references to her writings as philosophical. Some left behind very little that has been saved; others left multiple, lengthy works. Therefore, there is variety in the length as well as the contents of chapters. Some will have a translated reading appended and some will present material that varies from a brief quotation imbedded into the body of the chapter, to multiple pages, appended at the end of the chapter. Thus, we offer for our readers’ consideration, the works of women known to have written and/or taught philosophy in their day. But by “teaching” we do not necessarily imply lectures, debates or discussions at formal gatherings on the front porches and public places as characterized by Greek philosophies. Some served as advisors to religious or political leaders, as mentors to cadres of students, as supervisors of scribes and translators of traditional works that were in dire need of preservation for transmission to future generations of scholars. They worked in monasteries, convents, royal courts, or were peripatetic teachers of inherited indigenous doctrines and disciplines. There is one further clarification to the reader, and it concerns historicity and personhood. The reason that the word “history” does not appear in the title of this volume is related to the issue of whether a purported author is identical with the person named as author of a writing. In the west, the matter is considered to be a no-brainer: events begin and end within certain, definable temporal periods, even when, as indicated by terms such as fluorit or circa, those periods are a bit flexible and indefinite. In western traditions most writings and teachings are documented to have been the product of a particular named individual or by groups of individuals working in concert. There are a few exceptions to this, including the Old Testament Bible. With regard to it and to other early texts often deemed “sacred,” it is accepted that some portions were written by authors unknown, some were written with the intention of being accepted as authentic, and yet are deemed “spurious.” But this is not the case with the bulk of written thought, nor with the bulk of written philosophy from western—Greco-Roman, Judeo-Christian—traditions whose authorship and place of origin are “no-brainers”. Outside this “no-brainer” tradition there also exist works attributed to named individuals. Some works by individuals represent more than their personal insights

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and arguments, they represent the considered views of a group—a philosophic tradition—and the named author is an adherent or a representative of that non-western group’s indigenous tradition. Within non-western traditions are some in which terms like “author” and “history” make no sense. Instead, “history” is timeless, cyclical, eternal. There are no beginning and ending dates, and there is a lot of repetition. In the west we have a saying that “history repeats itself.” By it we mean that there are certain political systems, approaches, that seem to go in and out of fashion multiple times, and with them, so do certain types of political events: wars, poverty, literacy, scientific and artistic advances. We don’t mean that the same events recur, only that similar types of events seem to be packaged as a suite. In some non-Western traditions, “history repeats itself” is a self-evident truth, one reflected in the knowledge that a named writer, teacher, philosopher, guru or yogini, etc. is the reincarnation of a previous sage or deity. Although in the west such a truth-statement might be met with an agnostic “pshaw,” or even “B.S.”, the editors of this volume are unaware that any school of philosophy has proven the impossibility of reincarnation. We therefore take our non-western predecessors at their word regarding reincarnation and leave it for our readers to discern the philosophic content and import of those writings. In western academic philosophy, books like this one are composed by individual people (and are called monographs), or by a free association of individuals acting in concert (and are called anthologies). In some non-western thought there is no “self,” only those illusory beings whom we might call “persons” but who are the incarnations of, the avatars of, certain qualities that for the sake of convenience are treated as inhering in some person or deity, etc. Analogously, within some non-western traditions, it is simply a “juvenile error” of immature, unsophisticated misunderstanding either to affirm or deny that, for example, Sulabha was a historical person who entered into the conversation with Janaka discussed in this volume. Likewise, alternative explanations of her historicity are irrelevant: there is no “self” to whom the name Sulabha refers. “Sulabha” is merely a label affixed to the recorded text of the debate with King Janaka, representing the female voice. This does not mean that a male wrote the text of the female voice; “Sulabha”, may well have lived—in the western sense of the word— at a certain place during a certain historical period as an enunciator of the views proffered in that written work. But from her perspective, she is not a “self”, she is an incarnation of, an avatar of, an aspect of some deity or is some expression of a quality, virtue or power of a divinity. Imposing upon Sulhaba western constraints of personhood and selfhood disrespects Sulabha herself as well as a rich, ancient philosophical tradition that denies the existence of “self.” We can say with respect to Debate with King Janaka that there may be some reason to believe that Sulhaba is not its author. “Sulhaba” may be a pseudonym or pen name of some other woman, but there is no evidence to support this conclusion. We can speculate whether “Sulabha” could possibly be a pen name of some man who intended to represent the voice of many women through Debate, but there is no evidence of that. Occam’s razor teaches us that the simplest explanation—in this case, that the named author is the real author—is likely the true

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explanation. It remains the fact that Debate was written by someone. There is no reason to attribute Debate to anyone other than the named speakers who may be referred to as the voices of, avatars of, aspects of, some deity, or, may be referred to as a manifestation of a quality, virtue or power of a divinity. That is why, rather than disrespecting the great traditions within philosophy by imposing western criteria of self and personhood, we include Sulhaba, treat her as author, and present her work. We do not claim that it presents only her original concepts, ideas and arguments. Rather, we acknowledge that the chapter presents the concepts, ideas and arguments about women’s nature and intellectual standing characteristic of the form of Hinduism prevalent during her time, where she was believed to have lived and which she is believed to have advocated. All this, without daring to make non-Hinduistic claims to her personhood, her time-encapsulated existence as a “self.” All this, without treating the issue of historicity as anything other than a red herring. How could we respectfully offer accounts of non-western philosophies by judging them according to western philosophical criteria, only to come to the conclusion that they fail those criteria? Similar understandings infuse a western attempt to identify the authors of views presented by other non-western traditions, particularly indigenous cultures of pre-colonial Africa, the Americas, and Australia. This involves another important point to be made, which is that the named writer may be expressing more the philosophy of her culture than her own views. In some cases, the named woman did write the materials attributed to her, sometimes writing her own personal views, and expressing concepts that she personally originated, such as those in Viola Cordova’s Apache “Euroman.” Sometimes the writer is a learned transmitter of the views of the culture and civilization to which she belongs and writes on behalf of the group of which she is a part. Respectful representation of others’ philosophical traditions extends to the matter of including portraiture of our philosophers. Many of the women portrayed in this volume were depicted in large public monuments, in frescos on temple walls, on postage stamps, currency and other representations. Those likenesses may have been composed decades, if not centuries after the death of the philosopher. As such, they must certainly be nothing more than artistically imagined reconstructions of what those philosophers looked like. Within some philosophic traditions, however, the representation of a person’s face is considered disrespectful. This is particularly so with women in some Islamic traditions, such as in the case of Nana Asma’u. Rather than include a portrait of some Fulani woman who may have borne a physical resemblance to her, we offer instead a reproduction from her hand-written text.1 A closely-related issue arises with the case of Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders: common (but no longer universal) to those cultures is the fact that representation of a recently-deceased person’s face or first name is disrespectful of the dead.

1 We

thank Dr. Beverly Mack for this insight, and for her suggestion.

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One must wait until grieving “sorry business” is over. How many days, weeks or months that may be depends upon the family and upon the social status of the deceased. Western ways of doing history and philosophy, such as this westerner-edited account of women philosophers from non-western traditions, tend to focus on written documents as the only legitimate source of the knowledge we share. But what is the written word? It a set of drawings of letters that each have particular sounds attributed to them. One can’t hear the sounds without reading the writing aloud. Writing is a visual, artistic artifact whose components are organized systematically according to rules that are agreed-upon by those who engage it. Like writing, other visual art forms can easily tell history. Does Pablo Picasso’s 25 ft-long, 11-ft-high Guernica tell the pain and anguish of the Spanish Civil War better than Ernest Hemmingway’s 500-page historical novel For Whom the Bell Tolls? Does the beaded necklace of a Maasai woman, or the patterned hair braiding of a Yoruba woman more accurately relate the story of their respective ancestry and their personal social status? There are other analogous questions. The materials and patterns in wampum belts of many Native American tribes provide visual memory of oral history, communicating values, beliefs, covenants, laws, petitions, and particular events. As editors and architects of this volume we take as the definition of philosophy one that celebrates its fluidity. That means that we acknowledge that the discipline “philosophy” was defined differently at various historical periods, in different geographic places, among sometimes competing “schools.” We do not mean by this merely the obvious that there existed different philosophical perspectives. Rather, we advance the further suggestion that what counts as the activity of doing philosophy means many different things to practitioners of the discipline. In this volume, we wish to explore and navigate through varied non-western conceptions of philosophy, not impose upon them some arbitrary western definition. After all, it is very un-philosophical to cling unquestionably to what one knows and to what one’s society knows to be the standard against which to judge all others. We reject such hubris and try not to act on it. In the following chapters what we offer as philosophical may initially strike you as devotional activity, or anthropology, or medicine, which in the west, are no longer considered to be philosophy. When western philosophers consider certain topics and questions to be philosophical, we often label them in religious terms, “Islamic Philosophy,” etc. Most of what we consider to be Early Modern Philosophy is inexorably and unquestioningly rooted in Catholicism, or in early Christianity, or at the very least, in Judeo-Christianity. But, generally and maybe generically-speaking, philosophy is what its Greek lexicology tells us: the love of wisdom. It certainly includes love of wisdom of exploring the basic questions: what is the universe? How did it come into being? What is human nature? It also includes love of wisdom of exploring questions that are universally basic or universally important to all cultures: what is mathematics? Are numbers real? Is anything real? Does a deity exist? Does evil? What is the nature of truth, justice, love, and other fundamental concepts? Is the mind separate from the body, and is it a different kind of thing than the body?

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Does the mind think and does the body feel? If mind and body are not different kinds of things, does the embodied mind or the minded body think or feel? Or, is there no essential difference between thinking and feeling? What is the right thing to do? We include in this volume such questions investigated by women from non-western traditions. When women philosophers from non-western traditions mentor their students on the intellectual, emotional, and physical practices through which to achieve wisdom, we include them here. When achievement of wisdom is expressed as unification with the divine, or as oneness with the universe, or as salvation, we include those accounts here. Among these chapters you will find descriptions of behavioral practices, including diet, exercise, prayer, sexual activity, story-telling, ecstatic, meditative and other activities or “fields of being.” These descriptions allude to philosophical concepts that are at the very core of non-western traditions. Often, they constitute the difference between experiencing the discipline of philosophy as a sterile, impersonal academic subject and therefore experience “being a philosopher” as being a learned person whose viscerally-internalized belief system implies a way of life and a way of looking at and understanding life. We venture near to those other academic disciplines but only insofar as they remain philosophically informative. We draw a very dotted line—one containing many gaps and overlaps–between philosophy and religion. We exclude works that primarily contain devotional material, ritual performances, rites, etc. although we do include materials that explain how to perform actions that are intended to enhance perception, clarify thoughts, increase mental focus and otherwise assist in reasoning. We do not exclude works that rely upon a particular conception of a divinity, or of the nature and origin of the universe: any more than we would omit from the western canon John Locke’s Essay for its Christian foundations. We do not exclude works that assume certain statements to be religious truths, any more than we would omit from philosophy’s canon the Apology for its assumptions that the gods are displeased with Socrates’ impiety. For each of the philosophers introduced in this volume, chapter authors provide basic background information about the historical period during which a philosopher lived, the society in which she lived, and the then-prevailing philosophical perspectives of the people of that civilization or society, etc. When it seems to us to be relevant and informative, we sketch the basic details of these systems of thought: Daoism, Shinto, Hinduism, and more. We then explain how the philosopher who is our subject was an original thinker and contributed either to the development of some version of that theory, or amplified it, simplified it, interpreted it, or contributed towards the understanding of some of its basic concepts, etc.

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1.2 Methodology A. Inclusionary Criteria: With respect to most professional philosophers today, the strongest claim we can make that they are indeed philosophers, is to demonstrate that they are expert proponents of some school or another and are viewed by their contemporaries or successors to have been such. This, plus the criterion of female gender, are our primary inclusionary criteria. With respect to most philosophers from non-western traditions, we can also show that they were expert proponents of some school or another and were viewed as such by their contemporaries and/or their successors. They may have earned honorifics such as “professor,” “yogini,” “enlightened one” or “wise woman” and such recognition, although not a necessary condition for inclusion here, is a sufficient condition to demonstrate that they merit consideration. We have not striven to be complete, fair, democratic or egalitarian in our selection of philosophers. We have not eliminated a philosopher of one tradition in order to have the space to include one of another tradition. We have not attempted to have an equal number of philosophers from each of the historical periods we’ve described. Nor have we determined which original philosophic writings to include by the length of the available translations—the selected readings vary widely in length. What we do urge and applaud are the efforts of future scholars to broaden this selection. B. Feminist Methodological Concerns: It is irrelevant to the editors of this volume whether a philosopher who is the subject of a chapter was herself a feminist. Some were, some were not, and for many of our subject philosophers, whether they ought to be referred to as feminists depends upon some contemporary definition of feminism or of feminist philosophy. We duck that debate entirely. Yet, our feminist concerns determined our methodology for presenting these thinkers. As part of the methodology for presenting these women philosophers, as distinct from our methodology to identify those who are philosophers, we strive to avoid certain value-evoking terminology which philosophers steeped in the western tradition have used to ignore or deny the existence of those who are not in that tradition. Therefore, where predecessor westerner-authored histories of non-western philosophies may have referred to “cults,” we employ the less pejorative “community,” “branch,” “division,” etc. We use language that to the twenty-first century reader carries no negatively-biased connotations. Even seemingly value-neutral words are by some contemporary philosophers interpreted as connoting less than astute rationality, viz. “devotee,” “followers.” We prefer to describe a thinker as a “student of x” or “member of x” or “critic of x” and allow readers to determine whether the philosopher was a victim of mind-numbing indoctrination, or was a willing, intelligent advocate or thinker in her own right. We have not admitted suppressed premises which claim that women philosophers were brain-washed and indoctrinated and so lacked the independence of will or the freedom to make logical self-regarding decisions.

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To this end, we have assembled many of the world’s experts: scholars who are experts in the schools of philosophy in which women philosophers are found, and who, while having expertise in translating from the source languages, write expertly in English. Many of our philosophers have long been appreciated in and identified as practitioners of other fields; therefore, some of our chapter authors hail from those related disciplines: Religion, History, Women’s Studies, Political Theory, Anthropology, Humanities, and area studies. We have charged these authors with bringing forward the philosophical nature and implications of the texts they present.

1.3 Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions We present these non-western women philosophers chronologically, in order of the year of birth or fluorit customarily attributed to them. The introductory remarks contextualize their works and so we invite you to envision them meeting one another in a Diotimic/Judy Chicago-esque Symposium/Dinner party, sharing hugs, shaking hands across the millennia, across the miles, through a virtual archival collection of their works. There are the magical e-books, the rice paper scrolls with their blackberry ink, the clay tablets of cuneiform, the foxed and wormed books in Arabic, the hand-sewn leather-bound quartos, the once-soft goatskin rolls. In the background we hear Aboriginal, Yoruba and Native American oral traditions, transmitted by stories that have been carefully handed down for generations. Neither philosopher Diotima nor artist Chicago, westerners both, are present of course, but their mis en scène is our inspiration, our imagination for what it might be like had these historical philosophers met in person at some non-discrete point in time, just as they meet here in this volume. Now, to imagine this symposium of women philosophers from non-western traditions, coming together across distances of space and time! And so, we begin 2300 years before the common era, in Mesopotamian Sumeria with Chap. 2, the writings of En Hedu’Anna. We conclude more than 4000 years later, in the present century, in Chap. 23 with the writings of Viola Cordova, an Apache Native American professor of philosophy. Chapter 2, En Hedu’Anna of Mesopotamian Iraq, 2300 BCE is by one of this volume’s editors, Mary Ellen Waithe. The world’s first known author, writing at the dawn of civilization, En Hedu’Anna of Sumerian Mesopotamia (now known as Iraq) was a Sumerian Princess and high priestess of the Temple/City of Ur. She wrote in cuneiform, in poetic style. The objective of her poems was primarily to pay homage to the gods and goddesses of the lesser temple-cities in the Empire that had been founded, expanded and ruled by her father Sargon. An analysis of her poems reveals her views (and perhaps those of other Mesopotamians) of the nature and origin of the universe, the nature and powers of deities, the nature of human nature, mind–body monism, woman’s nature, gender fluidity, as well as the practices and authority of the “exceedingly wise woman” philosopher. She offers a

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limited catalogue of the moral emotions, virtue and vice, an account of the duties of those who govern, a view of the nature of social justice and more. Her writing, both animated and virulent, joyful and despairing, is also explicit regarding female sexuality. In-text excerpts from her work are included. Gargi Vachanavi of India, 700 BCE, is the subject of Chap. 3 by Shyam Ranganathan. Gargi Vachanavi has been renown since antiquity for several contributions to Hindu philosophy. First, she was an outspoken supporter of the by then, ancient Vedas and is credited by some with advancing the significance of the Rig Veda. The history of her teachings presents us with her views on several philosophic topics within the context of the Purva Mimasa school of Vedantic Hinduism. Second, she addresses the nature and order of Being, brahma vidya or knowledge of the nature of divinity (which resulted in her being titled Brahmavadini). Third, she discusses, the nature of atman or self/soul, and fourth, she argues in favor of the capacity of women for intellectual pursuits. Her famous debate on metaphysics with the philosopher/sage Vajnavalkia is recorded in the Yoga Vajnavalkia. Insights into Gargi’s two philosophical interrogations of him are derived from an explanation of how that exchange is meaningful in view of its historical background and a reading from a proper perspective. Thus the interrogation, made in two stages, centers on Vedic philosophy as natural to procedural metaphysics. The interrogator Gargi demonstrates her astuteness when she takes control of the second debate. This chapter includes an historical overview, an analysis of her arguments interspersed with short quotes from Gargi’s work and an appended reading of the longer debate with Vajnavalkia. Chapter 4 Maitreyi of India, circa eighth century BCE, is also by Shyam Ranganathan. The path taken by Maitreyi closely parallels that of Gargi Vachanavi. Like Gargi, Maitreyi has been renown since antiquity for her contributions to Hindu philosophy. In this chapter, her views as a proponent of Advaita Hinduism are explained. She was a defender of that monistic school of philosophical argument that the true self, Atman, is the same as the highest metaphysical reality (Brahman) and that knowledge of one’s true identity as Atman, can be followed by acquiring knowledge of the identity of Atman and Brahman. That deep philosophical understanding, not merely intellectual comprehension, is the path to spiritual liberation. A dialogue with the sage Yainavalkya is preserved in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad in which she analyzes the concept of Atman, and its unity with the concept of Brahman, and discusses the nature of love and its role in the self who is seeking liberation. Their dialogue is reproduced and discussed in this chapter. Chapter 5 offers a brief discussion of the views of Mahapajapati Gotami of India, 6th/fifth centuries BCE by Supakwadee Amatayakul and Suwanna SathaAnand. Mahapajapati was the biological aunt and foster mother of Siddartha Gotama, known as “the Buddha.” Living the ascetic life of a renunciant was widely accepted as part of the path to enlightenment and therefore to finding one’s self, atman, and seeking the understanding needed to realize oneness with Brahma—all of Being. But only men could become Buddhist monks. When Siddartha was grown and well-revered as the “father of Buddhism” Mahapajapati

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entered into dialogue and demonstration with her foster son regarding the equality of the souls of men and women, sending a deputy to present her argument. After multiple entreaties, Mahapajapati succeeded in convincing the Buddha of the righteousness and justice of women’s request to become monks. A code of conduct was drawn up to which the nuns, called Bhikkunis, were required to adhere. But it was the argument proffered by Mahapajapati Gotami that demonstrated the moral equality of Buddhist male and female adherents. Khema of Great Wisdom, also is from India and lived 563–483 BCE. In Chap. 6, by Supakwadee Amatayakul, we learn of the emergence of Buddhism as it developed out of the major elements of Hindu philosophy. Her contemporary, Siddhartha Gautama, “the Buddha” praised her as being exceptionally wise and of giving evidence of having been reincarnated from a previous life during which she had selflessly performed numerous good deeds. The Samyutta Nikaya, part of the Pali Canon, records some of her contributions to philosophical Buddhism prior to its development as a religion. In this chapter, Khema’s life and contributions to Theravedic Buddhism are discussed. Scholar Anne Pang-White brings us Chap. 7, Meng Mu of China, who lived circa fourth century BCE. Meng is the Confucian philosopher whose son, Mengzi (later known as Mencius) became one of the world’s most renown Confucian philosophers. Meng Mu’s views on education and on ethics within marriage and the family were first taught by her to her son. Her views are captured in brief surviving quotations concerning several topics. First is the duty to maximize the benefits of one’s own education. Second is the duty to develop one’s own character. Third, we have her argument about the duties of married men to their spouses. Ban Zhao 45–116/120 CE was also from China and lived during the later Han years. In Chap. 8 co-editor of this volume, Therese Boos Dykeman gives us a close textual analysis immediately following a scholarly history of the period and life of Ban Zhao. A Chinese Confucian feminist, she is most famous for her Lessons for Women/Nuji. Formulating her ideas in both prose and poetry, especially on ethics, Ban Zhao was a noted scholar, historian, and philosopher, who, as a teacher and advisor to Empress Deng Sui, was involved with politics and rule. While Ban Zhao and Meng Mu lived thousands of miles and years apart, they share the honor of being two ancient Chinese women who made an intellectual impact. The philosopher discussed in Chap. 9, Sulabha Mahabharata of India, lived sometime between 400 BCE and 400 CE. She was a peripatetic Indian ascetic yogini engaged in philosophical debate with King Janaka, who also was a philosopher. That discussion is chronicled in the Hindu epic Mahabharata, a factor that both reflects its significance and assured the preservation for posterity of her text. In it we find her arguing that “My body is different from your body. But my soul is not different from your soul…” Leading expert in Hindu philosophy, Professor Ruth Vanita described the encounter and analyzed it in the context of Hindu thought for this volume. Rabi’a al-Adawiyyah of Basra, Iraq, 714–801(?), the subject of Chap. 10, is introduced by Tamara Albertini. Rabiya was a Muslim saint and Sufi mystic.

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There are strong elements of a Philosophy of Religion in her recorded teachings. She addresses the nature and qualities of divinity, the epistemological questions regarding whether a person can come to have certain knowledge of the divine, the role and function of mystical practices in gaining such knowledge, the nature of salvation, the nature of marriage, and other significant philosophical topics. Chapter 11 takes us to Tibet and to the contributions of the Buddhist Yeshe Tsogyal which are described by co-editor of this volume, Mary Ellen Waithe. This philosopher lived from 777 until 876. Yeshe Tsogyal is recognized as a Buddha by the Ningma (“Old Scriptures School”), as well as by a division of Mayahana Buddhism, Karma Kagyu. Through ascetic living, tantric practice and years of meditative practice Yeshe Tsogyal reached enlightenment: unification with all that is. Her-autobiographical notes and two other brief writings are appended to this chapter. She contributed to the Tibetan Book of the Dead but we cannot distinguish her original contributions from those of her guru, Padma. She discusses ascetic and tantric practices, intended to free the mind of its preconceptions and distractions. Today Yeshe Tsogyal is known as “the mother of Tibetan Buddhism.” Our Chap. 12, about Murasaki Shikibu of Japan, is by Sandra Wawyrtko. This philosopher lived circa 978-circa 1000. She was from the Fujiwara clan of poets, lawyers and courtiers. Her thought is grounded in a combination of Japanese animist Shinto with its intense spiritedness that characterized every living thing, including landforms. Japanese versions of Mahayana Buddhism (Tendai and Shigon), as well as Confucianism and its Daoist foundations inform various aspects of her writing. Murasaki’s great philosophical novel, Genji Monagatori (Tale of Genji) as well as her diary, Murasaki Shikibu Nikki discuss metaphysical issues such as the nature of being, women’s souls, women’s rights, the morality of suicide, and the nature of love. She is an existentialist and is Japan’s first-known female philosopher. Her serially-published epic novel has been translated into nearly 40 languages and has been in print for more than a millennium. Robin Wang brings to our readers Chap. 13 about the philosopher Cao Wenyi (Cao Xiyun) of China, who lived from 1039 to 1119. This Daoist Master’s Song of Ultimate Source of the Great Dao appears in this volume in English translation for the first time. This didactic poem is a philosophy lecture in verse format. Both technical terms and allegorical references, as well as the relevant parts of Daoist philosophy are explained. Cao discusses the emerging Daoist concept of inner harmony as a methodology for controlling one’s interaction with the external world as well as control over one’s own intellect so that one can reach enlightenment. Chapter 14 discusses Sun Bu’Er of China, who was commemorated as one of Seven Buddhist Masters. She lived from 1119 until 1183. Scholar Sandra Wawyrtko explains Sun’s teachings and writings which explore the methodology of “inner alchemy” as a set of personal practices that is not exclusively for women. In Sun’s account, cultivation of both yin (female) and yang (male) principles is needed in order for any person to reach enlightenment. Such cultivation of seemingly opposite principles reveals that neither force should rule a person, rather that it is discovering how to balance the two harmoniously that supports the achievement of enlightenment.

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Mere weeks prior to her death in 2020 Professor Vijaya Ramaswamy created for this volume an analysis of the philosophy of Akkha Mahadevi of India. It appears here as Chap. 15. A representative of the Kanada language and Hindu thought who lived from 1130 until 1160, this young Indian philosopher argued for female equality. Mahadevi strongly opposed all that divides humans from one another including caste, sex, language, and dress. After an argument with her husband, King Kaushika, she walked into a meeting of Prabhu’s philosophic circle, as a “nude peripatetic” with only her hair as cover. She wrote in poetic form. In this chapter her views on the ungendered nature of the soul are examined along with other topics. In Chap. 16, we explore the thought of China’s Empress Xu, also known as Renxiaowen. Living from 1361 to 1407, Renxiaowen was a proponent of Mahayana Buddhism as well as Confucianism. Excerpts from her work, The Inner Chambers are reproduced in translation here and given expert analysis by scholar Ann Pang-White. Renxiaowen argues that traditional Confucian virtues apply also to women; therefore, women ought to influence the decisions of imperial courts’ politics. Women can achieve the epitome of wisdom just as men can; women can reach sagehood in the present lifetime. Im Yunjidang of Korea, who lived from 1721 to 1793 is introduced to us by Philip Ivanhoe and Hwa Yeong Wang in Chap. 17. Im was a well-known neo-Confucian philosopher. She promoted interpretations of Confucian values of moral self cultivation and human nature. Im defended a woman's right to become a Confucian sage and argued that men and women did not differ in their human nature according to her analysis of the Analects. Gang Jeongildang of Korea, (1772–1832) the subject of Chap. 18, is also brought to our attention by the research and translation team of Philip Ivanhoe and Hwa Yeong Wang. This neo-Confucian philosopher was strongly influenced by the teachings of Mengzi. Portions of her posthumously published writings are analyzed and reproduced in translation here. Chapter 19 brings us the thought of Nana Asma’u of Nigeria who was born in 1793. The exact year of her death is uncertain and is variously reported as 1832 or 1864. Nana Asma’u was a Fulani who wrote about Sufism from the perspectives of feminism and philosophy. She wrote a book on Islamic Sunni ethics, The Way of the Pious. This chapter by Africanist Beverly Mack focuses on Nana Asma’u’s philosophy of education. In Chap. 20, co-editor of this volume, Therese Boos Dykeman, introduces the philosophic views of Oodgeroo of the Noonuccal/Kath Walker (1920–1993). She was the first Australian Aborigine woman to have become a published author. Oodgeroo, by retelling Aborigine legends, brings understanding of Aborigine metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, religion, and socio-politics. As Oodgeroo explains it, Aborigine philosophy rests on the principle that humanity is one with the universe. According to Aborigine thinking, humanity’s task has been to preserve the earth, a task which in view of global climate change, is of current interest. Aborigine philosophy also means developing habits of sharing and tolerance and of acquiring

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the skill of “deep listening and quiet still awareness.” Her contributions to philosophy, however, have not been acknowledged until now. Emérita Quito of the Philippines is the focus of Chap. 21 by co-editor Mary Ellen Waithe. Trained in western philosophy, Quito held a particular disdain for Scholasticism, particularly Thomism and was impressed by existentialist phenomenology. She was a prolific author of philosophy, publishing most works in English, but some also in Tagalog. Emerita Quito spent most of her professional life developing a methodology for uncovering indigenous Filipino philosophy in part through linguistic analysis. This, despite the fact that more than 300 languages and dialects are spoken across this island nation. Chapter 22 by Louise Mueller presents the work of Sophie Bosede Oluwole (1935–2018) Nigerian professor of metaphysics and ethics at the University of Lagos, she engaged in the controversy of the existence of African philosophy and the role of women in philosophy and their lack of representation. Oluwole was the first women to earn a Ph.D. in philosophy in Nigeria. In her 1994 Socrates and Orunmila she argued that Orunmila, an ancient Yoruban philosopher, predated Socrates. Orunmila’s philosophy captured Yoruban conceptions of the universe, of deities, of personhood and of social justice especially as these were represented by well-known aphorisms and proverbs. Oluwole explained the wisdom in Orunmila’s Yoruba proverbs and aphorisms which made such claims as these: No matter if the task be accomplished by man or woman; both children and adults are wise; reason stretched to its limits invites folly. Oluwole taught and wrote philosophy during a unique time in African history. She levelled the criticism that African philosophical traditions were not only being replaced by western philosophical traditions but were being denigrated and their significance ignored. Viola Cordova (1936–2002) of the Native American Jicarilla tribe of the Apache nation is the subject of Chap. 23 by Therese Boos Dykeman. Influenced by the work of several Native American women of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Cordova taught elements of Native American ontology and epistemology, ethics and aesthetics, coining the expression “Euroman” to refer to colonial views of human nature that disregarded duties of humans to the natural world.

1.4 Further Research We haven’t the slightest reason to think that this volume exhausts the resources for learning of non-western women who made contributions to philosophy. We urge readers to pursue these and other “leads” further and to bring to light the fullness of contributions by women to non-western philosophical thought. It is far from certain that each of the following candidates are philosophers. Yet, from a brief sketch of their lives and works, it seems to us reasonable to delve deeper into their writing and teaching and assess their relevance to the discipline of philosophy.

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1. Liu Moran (773–840) This writer of philosophy was royal princess of the Tang dynasty at a time when Daoism was becoming formally practiced as a religion in addition to being a philosophy. She was appointed a Daoist priestess. In that role, she guided ordinary people through the steps necessary to reach freedom of mind and spirit from physical as well as mental distractions. This, she argued, prepares the way for accepting the unification of mind and body as self/soul and prepared that person for enlightenment. She held the highest rank: Great Cavern and Three Radiances. She composed the Zuowang lun (Treatise on Sitting in Oblivion), a Daoist text of meditation and inner cultivation, as well as a eulogy praising the female Daoist Xue Yuanjun (Primal Mistress Xue). In these works she described the methods for the inner cultivation of a woman’s mind and body, thus advocating a uniquely Daoist philosophy of medicine implicit in her treatise.2 2. Hu Yin (fl. 848), sobriquet Jiansunü (Woman of Knowing the Plain), was an outstanding Daoist priestess-physician and Daoist-medical theorist active in the first half of the ninth century. She is noted especially for composing a work on Daoist longevity techniques and philosophy of medicine, Chart of the Tonification and Purgation of the Five Viscera and Six Receptacles according to the Scripture of the Inner Refulgences of the Yellow Court preserved in the Daoist Canon. Among its many topics Hu discusses qi (or chi) and flow of energy to various bodily organs. Again, a good source for an English translation is Jinhua Jia’s work referred to above. 3. Mirabai (Mira) (circa 1498-circa 1547) analyzed the nature and moral/ intellectual status of Hindu women, immortality, personhood, and freedom of conscience, presenting her views through public singing and dancing. With respect to the latter, every pose, every step, every facial expression communicated to illiterate people Hindu principles in a way that was readily understood by uneducated commoners. She used performance as a pedagogical tool for teaching Hinduism to illiterate, ordinary people. As a member of the philosophical movement, bhakti,( a yoga professing love for all creatures), Mirabai opposed the caste system. Through her association with members of lower castes, she influenced feudal relations of her time.3 4. A’Ishah Al Ba’aniyyah of Damascus (1517 CE). This Syrian native, a prolific writer, was well versed in rhetoric and poetry, as well as in jurisprudence and Sufism. She studied and then practiced jurisprudence in Cairo. As a Sufi Master, she was authorized to issue fatwahs or legal opinions. Her philosophical orientation was Islamic, and her Principles of Sufism4 is a work of religious epistemology. In it she argues that the fullest human knowledge of the divine entails the present, immediate, profound unification with Allah requires

2 See

translation by Jinhua Jia in Gender, Power and Talent…Columbia University Press,2018). especially MisirHiralall, S.D (2017). Confronting Orientalism: A Self-Study of Educating through Hindu Dance. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. 4 A’Ishah Al Ba’aniyyah Principles of Sufism, T.E. Holderin (tr). 3 See

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that the person seeking the truth first exemplify four virtues that she refers to as principles: repentance, sincerity, remembrance, and love. 5. Zeb un Nissa (1638–1702): This Islamic Sufi writer was born of a Persian princess and an Indian Emperor and spent most of her life in India. Zeb un Nissa was a Mughal princess, who had gathered a great library, staffed by scholars and scribes who transcribed books for her. She was learned in science, philosophy, math, astronomy, literature, knew Persian, Arabic and Urdu languages and argued for the unification of religions in the tradition of religious tolerance advocated by Mughal Emporer Akbar the Great (1542–1605). 6. Nanye’hi/Nancy Ward: (1738–1824). Nanye’hi’s May 1817 speech, “Cherokee Women Address Their Nation,” concisely explained Cherokee philosophy. This philosophy centered on the relationship between Creator, land, and family, and on the need for peace and balance—a philosophy that differed from that of the Christian colonists. Her aim was to argue why the Cherokee way of life, grounded in their philosophy, should be honored by the whites. Born in Tennessee, Nanye’hi contributed to her people by introducing dairy and weaving, occupations that changed men’s and women’s roles. More importantly, in an ambassadorial role, she was instrumental in keeping peace between the Cherokee and the whites by promoting alliances and thus preventing wars. For this she was referenced in documents of Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson. Wise and talented as she was courageous, Nanye’hi became leader of the powerful Women’s Council of Clan Representatives and the only voting woman on the Cherokee General Council. She questioned why there were no white women negotiator counterparts. For her bravery in battle, Nanye’hi achieved status of War Woman. Honored also with the title of “Beloved Woman,” Nanye’hi first spoke publicly in 1781. In the Cherokee tradition, a speech by a woman and mother was listened to and respected. Theodore Roosevelt’s 1905 The Winning of the West notes that the reason she was not listened to by white males was not because she was Cherokee but because she was a woman.5 7. Kishida Toshiko (1863–1901). This Japanese feminist (pseudonym Nakajima Shoen), against great opposition, engaged in developing feminist consciousness during the Meiji Period 1868–1926. She was also one of the first women to attack the family system in place. That system rested on Confucian rules which ensured women act in deference and submissiveness to men and remain uneducated. Toshiko, who served as tutor to Empress Haruko, consort of Emperor Meiji in the imperial court, was unusually well educated in the Chinese and Japanese classics. After Toshiko left the court to accompany her mother on lecture tours, she made public speeches beginning at age 16. She delivered her most famous speech in 1883, “Daughters in Boxes” arguing

5 See: Nancy Cott, et al. eds. Root of Bitterness: Document of the Social History of American Women, Harold W. Felton, Nancy Ward, Cherokee, Joy Ritchie and Kate Ronald, “Cherokee Women,” Available Means: An Anthology of Women’s Rhetoric(s).

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that “the first requirement of marriage is education.” From her speech “To My Brothers and Sisters,” she wrote: “Heaven has given freedom to daughters” and so women in this age must “develop a thorough knowledge of the world around them.” Her speechmaking came to an end in 1887 with The Peace Preservation Law that prohibited women engaging publicly in political activity. This was followed by the 1889 law which denied voting rights to women. She won honors for her essay on Wen Xuan, Selections of Refined Literature. In a nation that officially despised women and submitted them to isolation, Toshiko attacked the Confucian idea that a virtuous woman embraces “three obediences:” to father, husband, and son. She argued against the view of male superiority by nature, the concubine system, and the lack of education for girls. She provided evidence that women were not intellectually deficient with examples that included Murasaki Shikibu. She founded schools for girls, taught, and wrote diaries and published essays, fiction, and poetry. When she was in prison, she taught her fellow prisoners to read.6 8. Fukuda Hideko (1865–1927). Hanged for her political views, earning her the nickname “Joan of Arc,” Hideko argued that economic independence was the key to women’s freedom in Japan. In analyzing women’s conditions, she concluded that women were oppressed politically and economically by men, by wealthy owners of textile mills and copper mines, and by traffickers of prostitutes. This led to her establishing a women’s technology school. She admired socialism and the anarchism of Kropotkin. She believed women should choose their own roles in life. After hearing Kishida speak in 1882, she joined the women’s rights movement and organized the first women’s discussion and lecture groups ever held in Japan. One of her speeches was entitled “The Theory of the Equality of Human Beings.” She founded the magazine Women of the World in order to cover international feminism, to inform women about other women such as Mme. Roland, and inspire them. One of her articles in Bluestockings/Seito was entitled, “The Solution to the Women Question.” Her 1904 autobiography Half My Life referenced Benjamin Franklin, Joan of Arc, and Russian Nihilists. Her My Reminiscences was published a year later. Fukuda wanted women to see themselves as Raicho did when she said: “I am the sun.” One hundred years later in a celebration of her life, a memorial to her was erected in Okayama.7 9. Zitkála-Šá (Gertrude Simmons Bonnin) 1876–1938. A Yankton Sioux, Gertrude Bonnin was born in South Dakota, was educated by Quakers,

6 Rebecca Copeland and Melek Ortabasi, The Modern Murasaki: Writing by Women in Meiji Japan, Sharon Seivers, Flowers in Salt: The Beginnings of Feminist Consciousness in Modern Japan, Mamiko C. Suzuki, “From Kishida Toshiko to Nakajima Shoen,” Gendered Power: Educated Women of the Meiji Empire’s Court. 7 Jan Bardsley, The Bluestockings of Japan, Mikiso Hane, ed., tr., Reflections on the Way to the Gallows: Women in Prewar Japan, Sharlie C. Ushioda, “Fukda Hideko and the Women’s World of Meiji Japan,” Japan in Transition.

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graduated from Earlham College, and attended the Boston Conservatory of Music. She wrote under the name Zitkala-Sa (Red Bird). Working in the Office of Indian Affairs in Utah, she witnessed official disregard for the human and civil rights of Native Americans and then lobbied for those rights in Washington, D.C. She believed that rights are rooted in cultural identity. She founded the National Council of American Indians in 1926 and wrote about such troubling moral issues as genocide and forced family separation. Her autobiography was serialized in the Atlantic Monthly, and in 1902 it published her “Why I Am a Pagan” essay. In her articles for American Indian Magazine, she attempted to merge cultural and social criticism with aesthetic form, stories and narratives. She turned the discussion upside down when she demonstrated the superstitions of Christians and their disregard for nature and disrespect for other cultures. What she learned from tribal traditions is now of current interest in light of global warming and global living. A violinist, she co-composed with William F. Hanson the first American Indian Opera “The Sun Dance” which appeared in 1913. Zitkala Sa is buried in Arlington National Cemetery next to her husband, US Army Captain Raymond T. Bonnin.8 10. Hiratsuka Raicho: (1886–1971). Japanese feminist and pacifist Hiratsuka Raicho is considered to have fostered a “stronger feminist consciousness” in Japan and to have “…pushed the feminist movement in Japan to a new level.” She graduated from Japan’s Women’s University in 1906. Having studied English and German philosophy with Ikuta Choko, she was encouraged to study Nietzschean philosophy. She founded the New Women’s Association, a woman’s rights organization. As the first editor of Bluestockings/Seito, she published works by Emma Goldman and Olive Schreiner. In her manifesto, “In the beginning, Woman was the Sun,” she wrote that women having once been the sun, were now the moon reflecting light given by others. She also studied and was influenced by Zen Buddhism.9 1 1. Kim Iryop of Korea (1896–1971), a prolific Zen Master, addressed the nature of being, the concept of human nature, feminist principles of Buddhism, the nature of good and evil, and the morality of civil disobedience towards religious and political authorities.

8 P. Jane Hafen, ed. Zitkala-Sa –Dreams and Thunder: Stories, Poems, and the Sun Dance Opera, Doreen Rappaport, The Flight of Red Bird: The Life of Zitkala-Sa. 9 F. Horimoto, “Pioneers of the Women’s Movement in Japan: Hiratsuka Richo and Fukuda Hideko Seen Through their Journals,” Seito and Sekai Fujin. Dissertation, 1999. Hiroko Tomida, Hiratsuka Raicho and Early Japanese Feminism.

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1.5 Conclusions For what reasons do we suggest that this volume may introduce a “New Dawn” for the discipline of philosophy? The “dawn” of philosophy has traditionally been designated as occurring with Pythagoras and other pre-Socratics. Their earliest dates go back to 524 BCE (Thales’ birth), two millennia after En Hedu’Anna, two centuries after Gargi Vachanavi and Maitreyi. As the historical record shows, and as this volume amply demonstrates, there is, indeed, a “New Dawn” for philosophy in the sense that is purely temporal. The earliest now-known writing of philosophy has been pushed back from the time of the Greek and Italian pre-Socratics to the time and place that writing was invented: Mesopotamia. But there is another sense in which this volume rings in a new dawn: we see for the first time in recorded history women philosophers from non-western traditions discussing the nature of divinity, the nature of the universe, the nature of morality and law, and the content of moral and metaphysical principles. We can look at this “new dawn” in temporal terms of the antiquity of the earliest women philosophers. Or we can think of a “new dawn” in the metaphorical sense that it is now dawning on us that our discipline is far older than we imagined it to be. We dare to suggest that it is “a new dawn for philosophy” in both the temporal and metaphorical senses. One thing is clear: among the earliest known writings of philosophy were those by non-western women, at least three of whom (En Hedu’Anna, Gargi Vachanavi, and Maitreyi) preceded the pre-Socratics. Of those, En Hedu’Anna of Mesopotamia, writing in cuneiform, is the earliest. Perhaps future research will find philosophical writing that predates her work, but as of this writing, it appears that the temporal dawn of philosophy dates to a philosopher who is both non-western and a woman. The metaphorical “dawning” is dependent upon whether or not readers of this volume experience a Zen-like “aha!” moment of recognition (as Catherine Villanueva Gardner10 so powerfully showed) that there are many genres in which philosophy can and has been written: the “Platonic Dialogue” and the monograph are not exhaustive of the ways in which philosophical thought can be presented. Now in the noonlight of philosophy, women philosophers continue to contribute toward understanding in profound ways the universe and the human condition. Whether in cyber conferences or in person at Diotima-like Symposia, whether in classrooms or at professional society meetings, whether through print or media yet to be invented, women philosophers will explore possibilities not yet conceived of. It is our profound hope that this and other histories of women philosophers will serve to motivate, sustain, and invite that continued scholarly investigation. Therese Boos Dykeman and Mary Ellen Waithe

10 Gardner,

Catherine Villanueva. (2003) Women Philosophers: Genre and the Boundaries of Philosophy. Boulder CO: Westview Press.

Chapter 2

Courtesy Penn Museum of archeology object B16228

En Hedu’Anna of Mesopotamia Circa 2300 BCE Mary Ellen Waithe

Abstract  In this Chapter I present early Mesopotamian philosophical views and contrast them to En Hedu’Anna’s account of metaphysics, epistemology, ontology, philosophy of religion and her views on several socio-political issues. Through her writings we see her views of the cosmos, of deities, of women’s nature, gender fluidity, justifications for violence, and other significant concepts. Lastly, I summarize her influence and suggest that her work marks a new dawn, a first, for Philosophy.

M. E. Waithe (*)  Cleveland State University, Cleveland, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_2

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2.1 Introduction In this chapter I summarize the philosophical views of ancient Mesopotamians as learned through the works of En Hedu’Anna. Her writings reveal important aspects of traditional Mesopotamian thought. She introduces significant advances to the philosophy that informs that tradition, expressed in hundreds of lines of free-verse poetry. Her forty-five poems address questions and concepts later to be attended to by philosophers everywhere: what is the nature of the universe? Of deities? Of humans? En Hedu’Anna did not write and teach in an institutional vacuum. The intellect-shaping institutions that sharpened her mind could only have been the scribal schools and, for royalty such as En Hedu’Anna, private tutors. She is a faithful reporter of indigenous Mesopotamian views about the nature of the cosmos, of divinity and of humans. Through analogies, metaphors, and other linguistic devices, she contributes conceptual analyses of these, introducing her own innovative insights. As with the Presocratics, in En Hedu’Anna’s writings there are no large expanses of text that constitute philosophical argumentation, but what there is turns out to be important to philosophers. Division of philosophy into its often overlapping and interrelated subjects (such as metaphysics and philosophy of religion) would first appear thousands of years after En Hedu’Anna’s lifetime. It is precisely because she wrote prior to any other known philosopher, without any model of philosophical teaching, writing, analysis, or argumentation to emulate, that we cannot judge her by the informal criteria for “what counts as philosophy” that would become customary only thousands of years later. With a little background information, we come to understand the reasons she gives for the conclusions that she reaches. Readers can thereby reconstruct her arguments. We can recognize the all-too familiar philosophical topics that have grabbed her imagination. Like pornography, philosophy is difficult to define. But you do recognize it when you see it, don’t you? En Hedu’Anna’s institution was the temple. It was the site of daily, public ceremonies to welcome the Morning Star and the Evening Star. These, and celebrations at New Moon and Full Moon offered her large, public audiences several times each month as the population gathered during successive phases of the moon for rites and celebrations that were both religious and civic. We know that her cycle of Temple Hymns was presented live to the assembled populace of each temple/city and repeated at later events by the temple’s gala singers. Unlike instructors from the scribal schools, En Hedu’Anna is not known to have had official students. Yet, to the extent that verbally disseminating her own ideas before huge public audiences at nearly forty different temple/cities constitutes “lecturing,” we must acknowledge that En Hedu’Anna engaged in a teaching activity that is recognizable to contemporary academicians. Her position accorded a large staff, including a hairdresser, professional scribes and their assistants, priests, priestesses, gala singers, and others. En Hedu’Anna wrote long before “publish or perish” became a prophetic mantra in academia. She did publish. Her writings consist of hundreds of lines, in four

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works. Three of the works appear to have been written within a six-year period. Such an output of creative academic writing certainly would have earned her tenure today. That those writings were reproduced verbatim (excepting scribal errors/ erasures, and lacunae,) for at least five centuries following their original inscription, and were printed and translated four thousand years later, speaks to what today would be called “their impact factor.” Having made such an enduring impact with her work, she would today merit promotion to the highest professorial rank in our own institutions.1 Although En Hedu’Anna has written the earliest known example of philosophy, I leave it to the global philosophical community to analyze whether this marks a “new dawn” for the discipline of philosophy. I think that in some important respects it does.

2.1.1 Mesopotamian Civilization at the Time of En Hedu’Anna In the “cradle of civilization” throughout the Mesopotamian kingdoms of Akkadia and Sumer lived an ethnically diverse society. The Sumerian temple-city of Urkuk is where the earliest-known system of writing, cuneiform, developed. The Sumerian temple-city Ur appears to be the location of the dawn of written philosophy. Mesopotamia had a vast system of record-keeping, and a highly developed mathematics that included celestial geometry and climatology. This civilization embraced specific ideas about the nature of the universe, the existence and role of divinity in the control of that universe, and the nature and role of humans in relation to each other and to the divine. Moreover, this civilization was grounded in a complex understanding that wisdom, coupled with selfless devotion to the deities

1 (Suter (2007) argues that clothing and hairdo depicted on this statuette (dated to 2350 BCE) are of a head-priestess. She reminds us (personal communication September 2020) that “the ancient Near East did not know portraiture in our sense.” Although the statuette dates to En Hedu’Anna’s place and time, depicts a woman garbed and coiffed as an En, and is composed of precious marble and lapis lazuli as befitted her status, it is possible that this bust represents (without necessarily resembling) a different En). The cuneiform tablets containing her work date to at least five hundred years after En Hedu’Anna’s death. This means for that period of time, copies of her works survived as exemplars from which the ensuing generation of tablets was copied. Dozens of copies of each writing were found in Nippur and at her temple at Ur. All are of approximately the same antiquity, with remarkably little variation amongst them. This suggests that (a) the venues might have served as a kind of “finishing school” for a group of highly advanced scribes and (b) her work either had been copied repeatedly and accurately during that 5-century lapsus, OR that the scribes responsible for producing the copies that have survived were consulting a single, rare exemplar. Either way, it follows that her work was well-known, well-received (because duplicated—not an easy task for cuneiform carved into clay and baked!) and was considered to epitomize the excellence of Sumerian literature, much as the work of philosopher Murasaki Shikibu (see Chap. 12, below) is considered to epitomize great Japanese philosophical literature.

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could bring about the metaphysical union of a human high priestess with a divinity: a mystical, ceremonial union that could be fortuitous for the urban as well as agrarian population that lived under the protection of that city-state. Its cosmology and its philosophy of religion were closely aligned (Meador, 2000, p. 18).

2.1.2 The Temple Cities and the En Various temple-cities dotted Akkadia and Sumer. Each honored a specific deity. Each temple was a venue of religious offerings to the deity who inhabited the temple in the embodiment of its high priest/priestess or En. The En and her large staff lived in the gipar on the temple grounds. Each temple/city was the center of civil justice, the marketplace of exchange, the warehouse of harvested crops, the hall of records civil, religious, and commercial. And although there existed high-ranking civilian municipal offices, each temple/city was presided over by an En who determined its rules of commerce, the management of vast system of irrigation and navigation canals and ports. The En could establish the boundaries of farms that were under the protection of the temple-city. The En could order the raising of armies and the waging of wars. Whatever the temple/city, its En wielded a great amount of authority not only over religious matters, but over major aspects of civilian legal policy. Sargon the Great founded the (now-vanished) temple-city of Akkad (Agade) in the north. He had a large temple to the goddess Inanna built there. He also conquered the southern region, Sumer. There, in its southern-most port on the Persian Gulf, the temple/city of Ur controlled all Sumerian commerce arriving by sea.2 Sargon installed his daughter, a princess, as High Priestess of Ur’s Temple of the Moon God Nanna and Nanna’s wife Ningal. Scholars Hallo and van Dijk (1968) and following them, Meador (2000), believe that En Hedu’Anna may also have served as a priestess in a temple-city with a similar name, Uruk. Situated approximately fifty miles from Ur, Uruk was home to the temple of the god An, and also a temple to the goddess Inanna. As part of En Hedu’Anna’s priestly duties, she presided over the public worship of the Moon God couple. Her duties included an (at least) annual performance of a symbolic marriage. The “marriage” was intended to promote fecundity of people, animals, and crops. During this elaborate ceremony, En Hedu’Anna is spiritually transformed into the earthly manifestation of Nanna’s wife, the moon goddess Ningal. Acting as Ningal, En Hedu’Anna ritually “marries and copulates” with that goddesses’ husband, the moon god Nanna, obtaining the title “lady who is a god.” (Meador, 2000, p. 44). The ceremony was part of En Hedu’Anna’s 2 Sethanne

Howard, Historian of Astronomy at the U.S. Naval Observatory notes: “In its heyday Ur was a coastal city on the rim of the Euphrates and the Persian Gulf. As the most important port on the Persian Gulf, it was the gateway to Mesopotamia. All imports via the sea with their accompanying wealth had to pass through Ur.” (Howard, 2017).

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public clerical role. It was her job. The political clout of the temple-city of Ur within Sargon’s expanded empire was undoubtedly improved by the installation of a princess as its High Priestess. But the temple-city’s primary power came from the fact that it was the home to the high-ranking Moon God couple: Nanna and Ningal.3 Whether male or female, the En was well-educated. Howard explains that “who we call a scientist today was earlier known as an astronomer/mathematician, philosopher, or priestess. Those who were ‘scientists’ were also part of the religious structure” (Howard, 2017). Howard specifically includes En Hedu’Anna as fitting this description.

2.2 Biography En Hedu’Anna was born in Akkad, the new capital of her father Sargon’s empire. She was literate, and was fluent in Akkadian, Sumerian and in the Sumerian women’s dialect, Enmesal. She signed her writings “En Hedu’Anna,” the title conferred upon her by her father. En Hedu’Anna’s clerical career began in the temple-city Ur, probably shortly after its conquest by Sargon. She continued to serve at Ur, and possibly also in Uruk throughout the last six years of her father’s life. At some point during her residency in Ur while she was travelling elsewhere, Lugalanne of Sumer raided Ur and awaited her return. He ousted En Hedu’Anna from her temple, expelling her to the wilderness. Benjamin believes that this attack was motivated in part by the status of women as landowners and to specific regulations governing their right to land use, etc. He states: “...her deportation by Lugalane during the civil war after Sargon’s death all evidence practical connections between Enheduanna and land use rights” (p. 26). Inanna restored her to En-ship of Ur. Her thirty-five year career as En ended four years into the reign of her nephew Naram-Sin.4 Her education, although probably provided by royal tutors rather than by scribal school instructors, likely included the same preparatory subjects then taught at advanced levels in the scribal academies: arithmetic, celestial geometry, stellar, solar and lunar astronomy, facts of plant and animal biology, religious and cultural views held by various conquered populations, military 3 According

to Ira Spar: “Each community worshipped its city’s patron deity in the main temple. . . . This association of city with deity was celebrated in both ritual and myth. A city’s political strength could be measured by the prominence of its deity in the hierarchy of the gods.” (Spar, 2009). 4 Sargon’s reign is believed to have begun in 2334 BCE. En Hedu ’Anna’s priesthood is dated to 2285–2250 BCE. En Hedu’Anna served at Ur for thirty-five years during which time Sargon died (2279 BCE) and En Hedu’Anna’s brother Rimush assumed the throne (r. circa 2279–2270 BCE). According to archeologist Paul Collins, upon En Hedu’Anna’s death she was succeeded by “Sargon’s great granddaughter, Enmenanna,” (Collins, 1994), likely a granddaughter to either Rimush or his supposed twin, Manishutu. Rimush’s eight to nine year reign was followed by the ascension to the throne of En Hedu’Anna’s brother, Manishutu (r.circa 2270–2255 BCE). His 15-year reign was followed by the succession of En Hedu ’Anna’s nephew Naram-Sin (circa 2254–2218 BCE).

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history, laws of commerce and of royal proclamations. It was a career for which she must have had training, both in indigenous Mesopotamian metaphysics, cosmology, astronomy, ethics, arithmetic, geometry, and religion including liturgical rites. She would know the personalities and powers of the many deities and both their Akkadian and Sumerian names. Like the “incantation priest” referred to in Temple Hymn 11, lines 147–156, she may have been expected to be fluent in different languages (Oxford ETCSL). As En, she also had authority over many of the temple/city’s civil functions. The Semitic language Akkadian would have been En Hedu’Anna’s native tongue. But she writes primarily in an “orphan” language, Sumerian, (Kramer, 1963, p. 306) which she may well have learned from her Sumerian mother, Taslultum. The final poem in the Temple Hymns cycle is written in Emesal, “... a dialect... of the Sumerian language that is restricted to direct speech of goddesses and women in certain types of literary texts, in particular lamentations, divine love songs, a dialogue [sic.], proverbs, a “lullaby,” and a few more” (Michalowski, 2013).

2.3 Surviving Works En Hedu’Anna’s literary corpus in which her philosophical ideas are presented consists of four separate works: the Nin-me-hus-a, (NMH), In-nin-sa-gur-ra, (INS), Nin-me-sar-ra, (NMS) and “Temple Hymns” (TH). They are written in Sumerian. The inscription of the poems in cuneiform would likely have been undertaken by one of En Hedu’Anna’s two scribes supervising the work of staff. In this section, I offer a brief description of each work but reserve discussion of their philosophical import for later.

2.3.1 In Nin-me-hus-a5 In Nin Me Hu sa is En Hedu’Anna’s fictionalized account of Inanna’s ascent to power. It is a myth built by En Hedu’Anna upon the then-existing Mesopotamian philosophy of religion and its familiar cast of deities. In this second work, En Hedu’Anna does not tell the story as though it were a myth. She tells it as though she were offering an historical, quasi-journalistic account of actions that truly occurred. Clearly, she intends her subjects, future lectors and auditors, to believe that Inanna is a far greater power than Mount Ebih. En Hedu’ Anna’s childhood affiliation (as a member of Sargon’s family) with Akkad’s temple of Inanna is likely what originally inspired En Hedu’Anna’s devotion to that goddess. Her additional appointment as priestess in the Temple of Inanna at Urkuk established her unquestionable authority as Inanna’s earthly representative. The poem displays Inanna’s 5 Oxford

ETCSL: t.1.3.2, as “Inanna and Ebih,” Meador (2000), 91.

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vicious side. She is aggressive towards the stubborn, primordial, anthropomorphized Mount Ebih who refuses to acknowledge Inanna’s superiority and the righteousness of her command. Ebih at first refuses to engage with Inanna whose powers it considers to be the lesser. But its powers are no match for hers and Inanna keeps upping the ante by inflicting increasingly painful conditions on Mount Ebih, transforming it from a paradise to a wasteland. Mount Ebih eventually capitulates and acknowledges Inanna, but only after she has laid waste its unnaturally perfect beauty. Mount Ebih has worked hard to exclude the bad that occurs in nature—the storms, droughts, pestilence, etc. That, plus its haughty assumption that it is greater than the goddess and need not bow down to her, are both impossible under the presumed cosmic law that nature is neither all-good nor all-bad for Mesopotamians but is both good and bad. Perfection, Mount Ebih’s paradise, is unnatural. Inanna’s powers, increased by her dominion over Mt. Ebih, further embolden her to acquire more. But it is not simply greater powers that Inanna seeks: En Hedu’Anna depicts her character as wanting them all. Inanna turns to the members of the Anunna, beginning with her adoring great grandfather An who heads it. He gladly “retires”, placing Inanna in his role. She then demonstrates her potential for devastation, she frightens its members, the Anunnaki, to give her control of their own powers. Inanna thereby acquires the authority to permit or to thwart the actions of each deity, all of whom therewith have duties of carrying out Inanna’s commands. This is the plot En Hedu’Anna invents.

2.3.2 In-Nin-Sa-gur-Ra6 In this writing, En Hedu’Anna clues us into the details of Inanna’s divine powers and her personality. Having given us an account of Inanna’s acquisition of other deities’ powers, En Hedu’Anna provides further detail about the powers that she has ascribed to Inanna. Inanna’s powers now surpass those of the god An, her great-grandfather.7 In this writing En Hedu’Anna discloses her views of women’s sexuality, gender identity, gender fluidity, and other topics of philosophic interest.8

6 As “in-nin sa-gur-ra: A Hymn to the Goddess Inanna by the en-Priestess Enheduanna” (Sjoberg, 1975); “Lady of Largest Heart” (Meador, 2000), “Stout-Hearted Lady,” (Hallo in Lipson & Binkley, 2004, 34). 7 It is in In-Nin-Sa-gur-Ra that En Hedu’ Anna authorially confers upon Inanna what Meador refers to as “the carved-out ground plan of heaven and earth” (Meador, 2000, 122). Meador is alone in this reading. No other published translations read that there is a “carved-out ground plan” (map) of heaven and earth that is of Inanna’s creation, nor do any other than Meador claim that En Hedu’Anna depicts Inanna as inheriting this “ground plan” from her ancestral deities. Sjoberg’s translation is unhelpful due to frequent lapsus in his established text of the cuneiform. The Oxford translation also does not support Meador, nor does that of Hallo and Van Dyck. I mention this anomaly only because Meador’s is popular in non-academic goddess-worship literature. 8 Mesopotamians considered the human heart to be the locus of thought and memory. A contemporary translation might be “Lady of the Greatest Mind,” “Great-Minded Lady,” etc.

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2.3.3 Nin-ME-Sar-ra9 This work by En Hedu’Anna recounts her expulsion from the temple by Lugalanne and her banishment to the wilderness. Nin-ME-Sar-ra (NMS) criticizes Inanna for not protecting En Hedu’Anna from such treatment. In NMS, En Hedu’Anna acknowledges that somehow, she must have acted to displease Inanna. She apologizes for her lapse in judgment, although does not disclose what that lapse entailed. En Hedu’Anna reports, as though factual, appeals made to various deities for their protection and assistance in resisting her expulsion and in reclaiming her en-ship. En Hedu’Anna reminds Inanna of her unending love and devotion for the goddess. En Hedu’Anna reminds her readers of the “events” described in NMH and INS. One of her invented “facts” in NMS is that Inanna wrested unlimited powers from the other deities. En Hedu’Anna identifies the powers that indigenous belief held to have been distributed among the major deities and through them, to the lower deities that they supervised. She consolidates the powers and makes them exclusively Inanna’s. An additional fiction by our philosopher is that Inanna permitted the deities of the Anunna to retain a few of their original powers that posed no threat to Inanna’s control of that divine council (Robson, 2005).

2.3.4 The Temple Hymns (TH) Claudia E. Suter confirms the underlying reason for a king to appoint a daughter as head priestess of a temple: The temples in these major centers controlled large parts of the local economy. By putting them in the hands of high priestesses who were royal children, their production came de facto under the control of the crown. The dissemination of high priestesses would then have formed part of other well-known endeavors of Akk[adian] and Ur III kings to attain power by controlling the economy in their realm. Such an agenda would explain not only the dependence of high priestesses’ estates on the royal household, but also the harsh treatment Enheduana experienced when the local ruler liberated himself from Akk[adian] rule (ETCSL14 4.07.2), as well as the abduction of other en by conquering enemies. (Suter, 2007, pp. 322, emphasis in original, material in square brackets mine.)

The collection Temple Hymns10 consists of 42 poems, each dedicated to a temple in Sumer or Akkadia. Each of the Mesopotamian temple/cities is a major shrine to a deity, and each temple is presided over by an En who could be male

9 Pritchard

(1969) titles this “Hymnal Prayer of Enheduanna: The Adoration of Inanna at Ur,” The Exaltation of Inanna is the title given by Hallo and van Dijk (1968) and adopted by Meador (2000). 10 Meador (2009); University of Oxford, Oriental Institute Studies.

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or female.11 En Hedu’Anna made personal visits to each of the temple-cities (Meador, 2009, 206). The occasions would have been highly ceremonial, with En Hedu’Anna being ritually welcomed by the presiding En and dozens of priests, priestesses, musicians, singers and other staff of each temple/city. The welcome would have been in public ceremonies that may have lasted for days filled with religious rituals, banquets, exchanges of gifts and more. En Hedu’Anna’s poems contain her detailed description of the location, architectural details about temple buildings, and the populace served by the temple-city. Each hymn describes the unique features of a single temple. The considerable details presented in each poem make it probable that she composed the poem to each temple while visiting there. These homages were paens to the temples, the earthly abodes of the deities, but they were not primarily addressed to gods. Perhaps each “hymn” was part of her speech, in effect thanking her hosts for their hospitality by praising the temple they have built and lavishly appointed. Her “hymn” would be repeated at that temple’s ceremonies by its gala singers. There is no reason to believe that En Hedu’Anna did not also present to each temple’s assembled throngs the works listed above. The colophon to the Temple Hymns addresses that poem cycle to Sargon in the first person. Kramer and Sjoberg conclude that TH is the equivalent of an ambassadorial report by En Hedu’Anna to Sargon. Through TH she spoke in her sacerdotal capacity as En, also in her royal capacity as Princess acting on behalf of her father’s government. She was, in effect, both a religious leader and a government minister. She functioned as a good-will ambassador to the conquered populations that were scattered across Sumer.12 The poem cycle constitutes a “state of the temple-cities” report to Sargon. That the entire poem cycle was addressed to him further evidences this. The cycle invokes the protection of Nisaba, the goddess who is credited with fostering the development of cuneiform. She is the goddess of writing and thinking who “presided over intellectual pursuits” (Meador, 2009, p. 239). En Hedu’Anna tells us that cuneiform is the pride of “the black-haired people” of

11 If

the assumption is correct that she visited these temples, then it follows that there was a sixyear period between her investiture as high priestess and Sargon’s death, during which En Hedu ’Anna made visits to forty-one temples in addition to serving her own at Ur. Some of the larger cities she visited had more than one temple, therefore her six-years in office prior to Sargon’s death included tours of (only!) thirty-eight different cities. If she was also priestess at the temples of An and of Inanna at Urkuk, then she would also have travelled there several times a year. This means that in addition to the Temple Hymns tour, she commuted 100 miles round-trip from Ur to Urkuk several times each year. This is a travel itinerary of immense duration and complexity insofar as her personal servants, priestesses and priests, dignitaries and their staffs, liturgical garments, instruments and gifts would travel by river barges and donkey-drawn or cattle-drawn carts throughout the Sumerian region. This would have left some subordinates behind. An insurrectionist with his armed contingent availed himself of En Hedu’Anna’s absences to invade Ur, occupy the temple and its many buildings and grounds, and await her return, only to forcibly expel her from her temple/city, banishing her to the wilderness (Hallo, 1968).

12 Babylon

is not included in this group; it was not at that time under Sargon’s control.

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Sumer. It is undoubtedly the greatest contribution to human civilization by the Sumerian people. It was an invention that forever revolutionized the exchange and preservation of information. En Hedu’Anna’s use of cuneiform preserved her civilization’s ideas about human and divine nature, as well as ideas about the nature of the universe. TH is the earliest known attribution to any author of a written description of a culture’s philosophical foundations. I now turn to descriptions of various aspects of En Hedu’Anna’s philosophical views: of religion, of cosmology, ontology, epistemology, law and justice, and several positions that she advocates or condemns on moral grounds.

2.4 Philosophy of Religion In this section I will attempt to deduce En Hedu’Anna’s contributions to philosophy in part by distinguishing her views from the culturally-held views of philosophy of religion.

2.4.1 Indigenous Religious Philosophy At the time of En Hedu’Anna the Mesopotamian panoply of anthropomorphic gods included the Annuna, akin to a Board of Directors. It was led by a deity whose responsibility was to authorize the collective decisions of the other gods (Kramer, 1963, 134ff.) Gods had human physical features and included males as well as females. The “humanity” of these “divinities” included having problems such as jealousy, alcoholism, or rage, and having needs for food, clothing and libation. They could mate and produce offspring deities. The Anunna decided how each of their member deities ought to act, and how any member’s subordinate gods and goddesses ought to act. The Anunna was the supreme moral and metaphysical authority: it determined what ought to exist, when and how something ought to exist, what its characteristics would be and how it would function. The Anunna incorporated all supreme powers of all lesser deities and functioned as a unified, supreme corporate power. An headed the Anunna, but his role appears to have been largely administrative.13 Centuries before En Hedu’Anna’s birth, Inanna was worshipped as a minor goddess. The earliest mention of her is at the Inanna temple in Urkuk. That “mention” indicates that she is a lesser divinity, but it did not identify her with any heavenly body. By the time of En Hedu’Anna’s appointment as an en at that

13 Traditional

Mesopotamian theogony is embedded in its cosmogony. The divinities in this were An and Ki. They gave birth to son Enlil, god of earth, air, wind, storms. En Hedu’Anna’s TH reports that in Nibru, a temple had been erected to Enlil, who had taken “his seat” on its dais and

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Urkuk temple, Inanna had become identified in the minds of the public with two astral bodies, as the Morning Star and as the Evening Star (Kramer, line 80), but this identification is insufficient to support a conclusion that the goddess Inanna was at that time identified with the planet Venus.

2.4.2 En Hedu’Anna and the Idea of a Supreme Being Mesopotamian traditional philosophy of religion was polytheistic, and, to the extent to which each temple represented the dwelling place of a single god (or divine couple), it also was henotheistic. In this context, En Hedu’Anna introduces a novel, radically important philosophical concept, an enduring idea that subsequently spread far beyond Mesopotamia itself: that of a Supreme Being. Insofar as this concept is not mentioned by any author as derived from the unwritten indigenous philosophy of religion that existed prior to En Hedu’Anna, and absenting evidence to the contrary, we may, at least tentatively, attribute to her innovation this important concept. Either she is author/creator of this idea, or she is reporting the ideas of another thinker about whom nothing further is known, and who, by signing her work, plagiaristically presents it as her own. The logic of Occam’s razor supports the former. En Hedu’Anna attributes to Inanna the ability to amalgamate the powers of the Anunna (and with each divinity, obtaining control over the actions of lesser divinities), consolidating all to herself. She depicts Inanna as... … queen (performing) great deeds, who gathers (for herself) the me’s [sic] of heaven and earth, she rivals the great An, she is the august leader among the great gods, she makes their verdicts final… (INS in Sjoberg, 1969, A. l. 3-4).

Hallo and Van Dyck translate En Hedu’Anna’s comment to Inanna: “How supreme you are over the great gods, the Anunna! The Anunna kiss the ground with their lips (in obeisance) to you.” (Hallo & Van Dyck, 1968, p. 29, l. 115, 116.) The picture that En Hedu’Anna has painted is of the Anunna whose seven deities are well-known to the indigenous population. Those Anunnaki seek consensus on various orders each wishes to give. No longer is it An’s role to formally authorize, to “rubber stamp” those decisions. That is where—between tradition and En Hedu’Anna’s innovation—the similarities end. The deities have each retained some power, but not their most important power: power over one of the mysterious

thus resided there. (Oxford ETCSL, Section 4, l. 34–37). Enlil’s spouse Ninlil gave birth to their son, the moon god Nanna, who became the spouse of the goddess Ningal. Their offspring were the sun god Utu, daughters Erishkegal, the goddess of the Underworld and Inanna, the goddess of rain, of love (including human, vegetative and animal fecundity) and of war (Meador, 2000, 15–16). The primary “residence” of Inanna’s parents Nanna and Ningal, the “moon god couple” was in the temple/city led by En Hedu’Anna.

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“seven great ME.” En Hedu’Anna’s reorganization of the Anunna has those deities, in fear, cede their great ME to Inanna: “She is the august leader among the great gods, she makes their verdicts final” (Sjoberg, 1969, INS l.4). By subtly altering the description of the structure of the Anunna, En Hedu’Anna transforms it from a Board of Directors headed by An as its chairperson. She converts its function into that of an Advisory Board that is ceremonially chaired by An, but that reports to Inanna, who may or may not permit the collective will of the Anunna to be carried out. En Hedu’Anna has each deity follow An’s example. Each capitulates, permitting Inanna to take possession of their powers: The Anunna-gods crawl before her lofty word. . . The gods of the land are panic-stricken by her heavy roar, At her uproar the Anunna-gods tremble like a solitary reed, At her shrieking they hide all together, Without Inanna the great An has not made a decision, Enlil has not determined the destiny. . . (Sjoberg, 1969, INS line 5.)

Similar information is translated as prose by Oxford’s ETCSL: Inana, [sic] your victory is terrifying . . . The Anuna [sic] gods bow down in prostration, they abase themselves. You ride on seven great beasts as you come forth from heaven. Great An feared your precinct and was frightened of your dwelling-place. He let you take a seat in the dwelling-place of great An and then feared you no more, saying: "I will hand over to you the august royal rites and the great divine rites. . . . Lady, pre-eminent through the power of An and Enlil … Without you no destiny at all is determined, no clever counsel is granted favour.” (ETCSL, INS, l. 100–108, 113–114)

Pritchard renders an alternative translation of En Hedu’Anna’s writing, one that states that Inanna was from birth, greater than the other Anunnaki. You who in accordance with the life giving me, Great Queen of Queens, Have become greater than Your mother who gave birth to you, (as soon as) you came forth from the Holy Womb, Knowing, Wise, Queen of All the Lands, Who multiplies (all) living creatures (and) peoples-I have uttered Your Holy song. Life-Giving Goddess, fit for the ME

Through a program of consolidation by peaceful adulation enforced by reminders of Inanna’s trickery, intimidation, and terrorizing violence (against Mt. Ebih), En Hedu’Anna, in In nin me husa, has re-invented the indigenous goddess and has transformed her into something still recognizably paradoxical, but something

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previously unmentioned. En Hedu’Anna records for posterity an ideal. It is an ideal that is more awesome and more powerful than any ideal previously known: an omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, immortal Supreme Being. In INS (ETCSL inter alia) En Hedu’Anna has Inanna remind An that it is due to his influence over the other members of the Anunna that she has risen to command. He has acceded to her demand for sovereignty over all that exists outside of “heaven” i.e., beyond the visible universe. Inanna had to cajole and flatter her divine forefathers into relegating their powers to her. She added their powers to her own power as member of the Anunna. She then played upon the all-too-human weaknesses of the four other Annuka deities to gain control of the remaining four of the seven major powers.14 The violence that Inanna exhibited against the arrogant Mount Ebih frightened every deity into relinquishing their greatest power to her. Here, from En Hedu’ Anna we have the first written work in history that describes the important concept of a Supreme Being, a divinity more powerful than any other known entity. Stopping short of overtly challenging the familiar Mesopotamian concept of a corporate pantheon headed by the Anunna chaired by An, En Hedu’Anna simply reshuffles the deck of deity cards so to speak, dealing to Inanna the best hand. Inanna plays that hand adroitly, bluffing, playing to the gods’ human foibles and fears, convincing each to part with their strongest suit. Our philosopher thereby claims for Inanna a newly-invented rank, a supremacy heretofore never mentioned, that of reigning supremely over all other gods, reigning over the known universe. EnHedu’Anna does not give us a Supreme Being who is self-creating but who is the offspring of deities Nanna and Ningal, so she also is hereditarily divine, born with certain supreme powers. En Hedu’Anna depicts her character An as acquiescing to Inanna’s demand to replace him as Chair of the Anunna. Once that was granted, Inanna turned violent leaving An appalled. En Hedu’Anna claims that An cannot condone Inanna’s violent destruction of the Eden-like paradise of Mount Ebih. Our author has An warn: “’Its fearsomeness is terrible—you cannot pass through. The mountain range’s radiance is terrible—maiden Inana, you cannot oppose it.’ Thus he spoke.” (In Nin Me Husa Oxford ETCSL t.1.3.2, lines 127–130). The next plot twist is for EnHedu’Anna to have Inanna embark upon a program to take control of the great powers from all the other Anunna deities and appropriate them to herself. Under the imaginative cuts of En Hedu’Anna’s stylus reed, An qualifies his support of Inanna with his warning, but he does not attempt to reclaim control of his powers from her. En Hedu’Anna, our author, instigates a civilization-shaping change in the hierarchical structure of Mesopotamian polytheism. Inanna’s great

14 The

Annukai include deities (1) An who rules Heaven; (2) Enlil, the God of the air between heaven and earth, (3) Enki, the God of Wisdom, Magic and “sweet waters”, (4) Ninhursag/Nintu the Goddess of Birthing, (5) Nanna/Sin, the Moon God who ruled the tides, menstrual cycles, cows and dairy production, (6) Utu, the Sun God (Sumerian Myths and Epic Tales, 1966, p. 37), “and… (7) Inanna herself” (Pritchard J., p. 579 n.5), the paradoxical goddess of love and war.

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grandparents, grandparents, and parents—deities all—were mere inheritors to the enforcement of cosmic rule. Inanna comes to embody it (Pritchard, 1975, lines 60–65). From In-Nin-Sagura (ETCSL INS, lines 100–108) it is clear also that Inanna’s control of the Anunna includes dominion over her great-grandfather’s decision-making authority and over her grandfather Enlil’s power as a divine judge to determine human’s individual destinies. Indigenous religious philosophy had considered Inanna to be the goddess of rain (controlling plant reproduction), and of human and animal fecundity as well as the goddess of love and war. The additional permanent powers that En Hedu’Anna has assigned to Inanna include being: • Omniscient, all-knowing: Inanna alone has knowledge of the nature and structure of the earth, its sun, moon and the visible planets. • All wise, sagacious, of perfect judgment, perfectly just: she alone controls Enlil’s ability to render judgment on people’s destinies. • Omnipotent: she alone exercised the seven great powers—seven ME—She alone has complete dominion over the known universe (“all the Lands,”) and over the Anunna and its deities’ greatest powers. She alone executes the great ME; she alone authorizes the minor deities’ exercise of their remaining lesser powers. • Omnipresent: She extends from “horizon to zenith to horizon,” i.e., through the entire known universe.15 Writing philosophical fiction in the guise of religious fact, En Hedu’Anna gives convincing detail to her description of Inanna’s assumption of divine powers. En Hedu’Anna minimized the importance of the Annukai by consolidating the greatest powers of each deity into Inanna. Through En Hedu’Anna’s authorial creation Inanna, a goddess known throughout Sumer and Akkadia, came to embody the totality of the forces of nature and morality as female supreme deity. En Hedu’Anna has transformed the indigenous goddess Inanna into the world’s firstknown “God Almighty.” En Hedu’Anna does not abandon traditional polytheism or “invent” the concept of monotheism. She remains polytheistic, retaining all the traditional gods and goddesses, but allotting to Inanna, supremacy over all of them. Her introduction of the idea of a single divinity who exceeds all others in knowledge, wisdom, power, etc., marks an important conceptual development in philosophy of religion, a conceptual and theoretical development that has permeated organized religions ever since. Inanna’s personality as developed by En Hedu’Anna included contradictory forces. As such, she is a paradox, a mystery. Like a cosmic Venn diagram, Inanna depicts and includes all that is: the good as well as the evil. In Temple Hymns En Hedu’Anna had depicted each temple’s god/goddess as an important

15 Inanna

worship, then and now, is directed toward the planet Venus in its aspects as Morning Star and Evening Star.

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member of the pantheon. Over the course of the poems summarized above, she introduced a philosophically significant twist that marks a development from traditional Mesopotamian religious philosophy: the entire Anunna, (and therefore every deity) is depicted by En Hedu’Anna as being under the dominion of the goddess Inanna. In a not-so-subtle way, En Hedu’Anna has changed the status of all the other deities of the Anunna. No longer are they peers serving on a divine council chaired by An, they serve as managers under Inanna’s command, with Inanna’s great-grandfather An serving her, the Anunna’s Chief Executive Officer. The consolidation of the powers of the universe into the hands of a single omnipotent deity was the instantiation of a concept Mesopotamians had not previously known: En Hedu’Anna’s conception is of single, supreme, omnipotent deity whose intercession the priestess could petition on behalf of the inhabitants of the temple-cities. However. En Hedu’Anna does not describe Inanna as the creator of the universe as later traditions would impute to their Supreme Being. Contemporary philosophers may be tempted to read En Hedu’Anna’s writings as presenting nothing more than an entertaining historical account of the activities of Mesopotamian deities. That can be a valid conclusion to reach only if we (and her ancient lectors and auditors) believe in the existence and powers of those deities. Her intended audience not only shared her belief in the traditional deities, but they also viewed their En as the authoritative connection between humans and the divine. Her sacerdotal role as High Priestess and her appointment to it by Sargon assured the subject populations that what I am identifying as her philosophy of religion and aspects of her metaphysics were divinely inspired. But 21st-century readers may be less reluctant than were ancient Akkadians and Sumerians to accept an argument from (divine) authority. In that case we must view En Hedu’Anna’s description of those gods, their powers and their behaviors as of her own invention. En Hedu’Anna has Inanna create a role for the minor deities that is not functionally distinct from what, more than a thousand years later would become the role of sants in Hinduism, and saints in Christian and Islamic traditions. En Hedu’Anna’s minor deities grant intercessions, perform miracles, provide petitioned-for goods or events, etc.

2.5 Cosmology 2.5.1 Cosmology Before En Hedu’Anna Long before the birth of En Hedu’Anna, Mesopotamians of Sumer and Akkad held their own indigenous theories about the nature of reality and the nature of the cosmos. In the beginning, there was a multi-layered dome. Its edge met the edge of the primordial cosmic ocean called Nammu. The highest region of the dome is Heaven, the abode of the “old gods” and the astral bodies. Out of Namuu and floating on it, emerged a mountain, Mount Ebih and the floating disc that it was situated on, Earth. Mount Ebih, where Heaven and Earth met, housed two gods,

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the male An whose domain was heaven, and the female Ki whose domain was earth. Below earth was the underworld, home to decedents. It had seven gates, at least one of which was deep inside the mountain at Gishbanda (Oxford ETCSL, TH lines 187–196). For those mortals whom Inanna’s sister, Ereskigal, Goddess of the Underworld permitted entry, there was no possibility of return (Lambert, 2018). Beneath the underworld was a freshwater ocean.

2.5.2 En Hedu’Anna’s Contribution to Cosmology The foregoing traditional account is often referred to in En Hedu’Anna’s works. She transmits this tradition and neither questions nor challenges it. But it does appear that she contributes to its advancement. I argue that if we understand the relationship in Mesopotamian history of the goddess Inanna to the Morning Star and Evening Star, we can reasonably attribute to En Hedu’Anna two distinctions that will be vital to the advancement of astronomy: the distinction between the concepts “planet” and “constellation.” 2.5.2.1 “Planet” Prior to En Hedu’Anna’s investiture as a priestess at Uruk, the goddess Inanna was worshipped there as an anthropomorphic deity. The earliest representations of Inanna are from Uruk but these do not identify Inanna with any astral body. According to GE Kurtik at Moscow’s Institute for History of Science and Technology: As far as we know, in the second-first millennia BC all deities identified in Mesopotamia with constellations or seperate [sic] stars (planets) originally had an ‘earthly’ prehistory. . . in the course of Inanna astralization the merging in the single image of two deities, the non-astral (Inanna) and the astral, took place. (Kurtik, 1999, p. 502 n.3)

At about the time of En Hedu’Anna’s appointment to the temple at Ur, Uruk’s temple of Inanna began to be identified in public records of that temple’s celebrations as a deity whose embodiment was as the Morning Star and also as the Evening Star. Just as the goddess “lived” in more than one temple, so, too, she could appear as more than one star. Or so Mesopotamian astronomers like En Hedu’Anna believed. Kurtik claims: “Originally, Inanna was adored in Mesopotamia only as a local goddess of the city of Uruk... the identification of Inanna with Venus [took] place at a later time” (Kurtik, 1999, pp. 501–502). That “later time” was, I suggest, the time of En Hedu’Anna’s residency at Ur. Such an identification would require that the public (or, at the very least, En Hedu’Anna as chief astronomer) accept what no Mesopotamians could empirically confirm: the course of Venus across Earth’s sky during daytime. Lacking the ability to empirically confirm that the two sightings (Morning Star, Evening

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Star) were of the same object, En Hedu’Anna—perhaps extrapolating from the “fact” that a deity could inhabit more than one temple simultaneously—concludes that the two sightings of Venus were invisibly connected when the sun was at its zenith.16 She comes to the conclusion that Inanna is the “Great Queen of the Horizon and Zenith” (Pritchard, 1969, Nin Me Sara). This comment tells us that En Hedu’Anna understood there to be not one but two distinct types of celestial object17: The separate sightings, morning and evening, were of one, non-stellar astral body, now called a planet (Brown & Zólyomi, 2001). 2.5.2.2 The Concept “Constellation” While there is no written record that the concept “constellation” originated with En Hedu’Anna, it was at that time a relatively new idea through which she organized astronomical observations and supervised the temple’s record-keeping of celestial events. The first step toward framing this concept “constellation” would have been recognition that certain stars appeared to move in unison with other stars, and over the course of the year would change their placement, but not their arrangement vis-à-vis other stars of the constellation. Arriving at this conclusion was the result of years of gathering and recording empirical evidence and speculating, inquiring into what all that astronomical evidence means, then, fitting it all under entirely new and unnamed concepts, “planet,” and “constellation.” These are major advancements with respect to the development of metaphysical categories and for the science of astronomy itself. Reaching this conclusion means that there occurred at the very least, a sequence of several steps. First, there needs to have occurred a broadening of understanding that began with the idea of individual major astral bodies such as Venus. Second, a distinction must have been made between the perceived movement of that planet and the perceived movements of other astral bodies. Those movements were not at all similar. The third step in this deductive process involved generalizing to the concept of constellation. Overseeing the recording of astral movements would have been part of En Hedu’Anna’s responsibilities: as stated in Temple Hymns, she “applies the measure to heaven.” Her identification of Inanna as both Morning and Evening stars/Venus marks the first deductive step towards framing the concept “constellation” according to historians at Moscow’s Institute of Astronomy:

16 A

fascinating possibility is that En Hedu’Anna observed day become night and then day, e.g., a solar eclipse. Venus would be visible during totality of the eclipse, but it would not appear simultaneously at either the eastern or western horizons. Such an event may have provided exactly the empirical evidence needed to confirm that the three sightings (morning, eclipse, evening) are of a single astral body that we now refer to as a planet, not a star. 17 This discussion assumes that the Earth’s moon was understood to be non-stellar.

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Inanna’s relation to the planet Venus is proved by seal pictures of the middle of the third millennium BC. This period witnesses a global changes [sic.] in her status: the symbolism connected to Inanna’s role as the goddess of fertility gradually fades away and instead the astral symbolism appears. Though the religious and literary image of Inanna (Ishtar) was not restricted by her role as the heavenly goddess, nevertheless, it was her astral symbolism that became widespread from the last third of the third millennium BC on. If Inanna came to be identified with Venus in the middle of the third millennium BC (which is indicated by some seal pictures), and our initial assumption is correct, we can come to the conclusion that the process of constellation recognition in Mesopotamia started no earlier than the middle of the third millennium BC. (Kurtik, 1999, p. 12)

A conclusion to be drawn from Kurtik’s analysis is that the identification of Inanna with both Morning Star and Evening Star, followed by the deduction that both sightings were of the same (planetary) object, and drawing the further inference that a constellation was a different kind of astral object than a planet all occurred during En Hedu’Anna’s years as Chief Astronomer at Ur. From the perspective of the discipline of philosophy, it marks a significant new development. We now distinguish between the concepts “constellation” and “planet.” There is no evidence that those concepts existed before En Hedu’Anna.

2.6 Epistemology Carol Lipson and Roberta Binkley, quoting from Julia M. Asher-Greve, note that in ancient Mesopotamia... ... the mind was still in the body, mind and body were inseparable, meaning and understanding were ‘embodied’” (432). Heart, body, and mind were a holistic concept, and the mind was not separate from the body as in the Western philosophical tradition (432–34). Mesopotamians conceptualized the body as the agent of thinking, ‘feeling,’ experiencing and knowing…. In the absence of a specific concept of mind the corporeal body was representative of the totality of the individual” (447). (Binkley, 56)

Aspects of such monism survive even in rhetorical structure of late-emerging languages like English. Expressions such as “I love you with all my heart” ascribe to the heart the moral emotion of love. It confirms that we perceive the heart poetically, metaphorically, as the center of the person. Yet, we would chuckle (perhaps) at a suitor saying “I love you with all my liver.” We know, we assume to be true, factual, that the liver is not the organ that is the source and locus of love. In some sense we purport to “know” that our heart produces and experiences the moral emotion of love. “I love you with all my heart” betrays our naive, primitive monistic conviction that mind and body are one. In Mesopotamian epistemology the human body thinks. En Hedu’Anna concurs.

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2.7 Ontology: The ME18 2.7.1 Being and Becoming From En Hedu’Anna’s works as well as from the findings of Assyriologist archeologists and cuneiform scholars we can offer a sketch of ontology prior to En Hedu’Anna. At least two divisions are possible: that “which participates in Being”19 and that “which participates in Becoming.” In the former are included all physical objects in the known universe, deities and humans as well. In the latter is included those skills and arts that are foundational to Sumerian culture. Each of the seven divinities of the Anunna also “possesses” (in a sense intentionally left vague) a ME, but traditional ontology leaves unanalyzed the question “what is a ME?” It is for En Hedu’Anna to explain via plot, metaphor and analogy the ontological status of the ME. Pritchard claims that there exist, in addition to the seven ME (one per Anunna deity), ninety others (op. cit.). Meador embellishes Pritchard’s account to depict the ME as a ground plan of heaven and earth that is carved inside Inanna’s cloak and that inheres in amulets that a deity can wear as a necklace or can transfer to another deity by handing over the amulets or necklace to another god. Once we fix (by ignoring) Pritchard’s mistaken assumption that the ME inhere in physical amulets, etc., we can make sense of mention of Inanna’s “cloak” or “robe” as well as make sense of her amulet necklace. Meador wrongly assumes there to be two basic types of Being: the first includes the “ground plan of heaven and earth” and other physical objects such as Inanna’s amulet necklace. The second type of Being is ME.

2.7.2 Ontological Status of the ‘Ground Plan’ and Amulets From INS En Hedu’Anna’s audience learns that Inanna has a plan in mind, also, that An is ignorant of Inanna’s plan, and that “even if he wanted/An could not do a thing [about it].” (Meador, 2000, p. 120.) But what is the plan? The only “plan” mentioned in En Hedu’ Anna’s writings is “the carved-out groundplan of heaven and earth” (INS Sjoberg, I. 67–68.). Meador instead describes a cloak embroidered with such a “plan” of which Inanna is both author and steward (Meador, 2000, 114–115, 147). It is vague whether, as Meador claims, said plan is something of Inanna’s authorship (i.e., En Hedu’Anna’s), or whether it is something

18 “ME”

(singular and plural) pronounced: “may.” thank Dr. Therese Boos Dykeman who suggested I frame this discussion in terms of Being and Becoming. 19 I

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under Inanna’s control, but that that she is merely steward of. In any event, no other translations mention such a “cloak.”

2.7.3 Greater versus Lesser ME? In addition to the question of the nature of the “ground plan” is the question “what might such a plan depict?” ME are non-physical ideals. Confusingly, some ME are ideals of that which is real, while other things called (by translators) “ME” appear to be various deeds, skills and moral values that are implied by those ideals and are sometimes represented by physical objects. Each such ME inheres in some physical object, just as we might say that magnetism is a property inhering in ferrous metal. Is this what En Hedu’Anna intends to depict when she mentions the “groundplan”? En Hedu’Anna takes to a new level of discretion the ideal as real independent of its manifestations in persons, places, objects. This is tied to epistemological issues such as the infallibility of reported messages from the divinities, especially in light of the fact that throughout her poems En Hedu’Anna adds information about divine events: “facts” that are of her fictitious invention, but which she presents as though they came from a god.

2.7.4 The ME, The Real of the Ideal 2.7.4.1 The ME in Indigenous Mesopotamian Thought According to the traditional Mesopotamian concept of the universe and its pantheon of deities, Mount Ebih was first to emerge above the submerged disc that was then the Earth and prided itself on that fact. Pride became arrogance and Mount Ebih somehow made itself increasingly perfect: a paradise. For reasons to be explained below, the role of Mount Ebih in tradition did not accord well with En Hedu’Anna’s own philosophy of religion and metaphysics. So she created a new tradition. She does not claim this novel view as her own. She represents it as the outcome of actions of various divinities. In Sumerian philosophy, the ME is the essence of divinity, the nature of being, the powers of the universe that include what we later will think of as the forces of physics. The ME also embodies the moral forces: love and hate, truth and false, in sum, the nature of all that is, the virtues and vices, the power of thought, and more. The ME include the ideal, or spiritual qualities perceived as forces of nature: human nature as well as mother nature and her greater cosmos (Kramer & Maier, 1989). According to Pritchard, “ME” is to be translated as “ordinance” (Pritchard, 1975, p. 53 n. 11), and that En Hedu’Anna’s expression “the seven ME” is likely a reference to the specific ME of each of the major deities (Pritchard, 1969, p. 579 n.5).

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2.7.4.2 En Hedu’Anna’s Adaptation of the ME Building upon the indigenous conception of the ME, EnHedu’Anna’s INM describes a series of battles initiated by the goddess Inanna, first against Mount Ebih and then against the various gods for control of the ME that each deity embodied. Through INM our philosopher raises closely related metaphysical and religious questions. As mentioned above over time Mount Ebih in its quest for beauty and perfection became an earthly natural paradise. En Hedu’Anna presents this in INM in detail, as though offering a factual account. The laws of nature are cyclical. They govern the life cycles of humans and animals, of fishes and tides, of the predictable phases of the moon and the rising and setting of the sun. It is by reference to such laws that the High Priestess would order the planting and harvesting of barley and other crops. The still-unfathomable laws of nature, laws of physics, govern the position of astral bodies. En Hedu’ Anna writes in NMS that Inanna is “mistress of the scheme of order,” is “all knowing,” and of “wise vision” (Meador, 2000, p. 174). She says of Inanna: your hands seize the seven fixed powers my queen of fundamental forces Guardian of essential cosmic sources (Meador, 2000, p. 171)

En Hedu’Anna was chief astronomer whose responsibility was to supervise the keeping of records of solar, lunar, stellar and planetary movement across the firmament. En Hedu ‘Anna knows that the natural law is that there exist predator/prey relationships. The lion does not lie down with the lamb as Mount Ebih’s paradise depicted. To claim otherwise is to challenge the authority of the natural law. Birth, growth, decline, death, decay: all are part of the natural cycle prescribed by natural law. No matter that En Hedu’Anna shows us Inanna in all her arrogance, ferocity and rage, she also presents Inanna as wrathfully insisting that the laws of nature are inviolable, even for a deity. En Hedu’Anna shows that Mount Ebih’s attempts to create a paradise in an imperfect world is nothing less than the mountain’s impossible attempt to subjugate natural law to the anthropomorphic mountain’s own “ego.” En Hedu’Anna has Inanna quickly punish what she calls “the upstart” who neither submits to Inanna’s authority, nor abides by the natural law. The introduction by En Hedu’Anna of the idea that there is a supreme law of nature to which the gods themselves are subject is, I would argue, an extremely significant development in the history of philosophy. It is one that fits into what may be characterized as a sketch of the first-ever outline of a system of philosophy, one in which metaphysics, philosophy of religion, law and ethics all fit together in mutual, reasoned support. Kramer and Maier offer this account: The me were universal decrees of divine authority. They are the invocations that spread arts, crafts, and civilization. The me were assembled by [the deity] Enlil in [the town of Ekur] and given to [the god] Enki to guard and impart to the world, beginning with [the temple at] Eridu, his center of worship. From there, he guards the me and imparts them on

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the people. . . . Later, Inanna comes to Enki and complains at having been given too little power from his decrees. In a different text, she gets Enki drunk and he grants her more powers, arts, crafts, and attributes - a total of ninety-four me. (Kramer & Maier, 1989)

The preceding is entirely consistent with the account of the ME that En Hedu’Anna had reported, but it is partly drawn from sources composed long after her lifetime. En Hedu’Anna’s known surviving writings omit details of the origin and distribution of the ME prior to Inanna’s assumption of them from the other members of the Anunna. Several times she mentions “seven ME,”—a far cry from the ninety-four that Kramer reports. The Sumerian word ME (plural) denotes a key concept of Mesopotamian religion. It is often translated as “divine ordinances” or “divine powers” or the like. In some texts (such as Inana’s [sic] Descent to the Netherworld (ETCSL 1.4.1) the ME are imagined as concrete objects, which the goddess Inana [sic] wears and takes off so she can be admitted into the Netherworld. Taking off the objects makes her powerless and vulnerable, so she dies in the Netherworld and has to be revived. (Ancient Mesopotamian Gods & Goddesses program, 2019)

En Hedu’Anna’s account of the ME refers only to what may be called the “Seven Divine ME,” the primary powers of each of the seven divinities who make up the Anunna. Our philosopher does mention other powers that Inanna eventually comes to control, but those are not part of the Seven Divine ME. Nor is it clear that minor powers are ME at all. Although En Hedu’Anna identifies many actions “that are yours, Inanna” these include many quotidian things such as kissing a baby, so it is not at all clear why these acts/powers of Inanna should be considered by Kramer to be ME. Kramer and Maier’s list of lesser ME is attributed to Inanna by an anonymous later writer. En Hedu’Anna’s own writings are silent regarding the ontological status of what Kramer mistakenly labels “the lesser ME.” We are not offered any analysis of what the ME are, nor any explanation of the basis upon which the lesser ME are to be distinguished from the “greater ME.” I would argue that there is a reason for the silence: in our philosopher’s ontology there exist only the “greater ME”: the idea of “lesser ME” is an oxymoron. To recap an earlier distinction: the Seven Divine ME can be thought of as “that which participates in Being.” The ninety or so skills, arts and crafts that have been mistakenly referred to as the lesser ME— followed by the chorus line “these things are yours Inanna” –are never discussed by En Hedu’Anna. They participate in Becoming. The honorific appended to each, viz., “are yours, Inanna,” means nothing particularly philosophical. It is merely a recitation of the rights, privileges and courtesies extended to the goddess; an enumeration of the skills needed by the society in order that it thrive. Inanna inspires basketmaking, weaving, leather-working, pottery and sculpting, the metallurgic arts, writing,20 fishing, farming, trading, and more. She inspires humans to excel at whatever it is they do to contribute to the social welfare of the empire.

20 Not

to be confused with Nisaba, the goddess accredited with inspiring the development of cuneiform.

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2.8 Moral and Social Philosophy 2.8.1 Mesopotamian View of Human Nature The indigenous Mesopotamian account of human nature considers the gods to have human as well as non-human qualities. They were born of parental deities, had human problems such as jealousy, rage, drunkenness, etc. Humans were like these gods, only powerless and dependent upon them. 2.8.1.1 Gender Gender is a secondary characteristic of human beings, and does not play a role as an essential component of personhood: . . .the Sumerian language has no grammatical gender. Certainly Sumerians must have looked at the world in a way different from the Greeks, outside the system of binary gender oppositions that dominates the rhetoric of Aristotle and continues through the western philosophical and intellectual tradition. For Mesopotamians, according to Asher-Greve: “The human body was a divine genderless creation. All humans were created in one process and that process was prior to sex and gender. This concept is corroborated by the archaic sign for person which is a genderless body.” Later, in the Atrahasis myth, the two genders were created with a complementary anatomy for procreation. But gender categories extended beyond the binary concept to multiple gender and social status of persons of ambiguous, or no, sex and castrated men” (453). Within these multiple, fluid gender categories as represented in the sculpture, relief, and seals, spiritual and emotional qualities are equally and evenly present in all genders. (Lipson & Binkley, 2004, p. 58) citing (Asher-Greve, 1997).

This was the traditional Mesopotamian view, and clearly was one shared by En Hedu’Anna. With En Hedu’Anna’s promotion of Inanna’s supremacy, Inanna acquires the powers of the other deities. She also acquires aspects of their personalities and at will, can take on their appearance. 2.8.1.2 Gender Fluidity Some degree of gender fluidity was recognized in Mesopotamian culture. Myth had it that Inanna once switched roles with her lesser god husband, Dumuzi (Jacobsen 43). As needed, at will, Inanna transgenders fluidly from female to male and back again. En Hedu’Anna describes members of the priesthood, some of whom as castrati, bisexuals, homosexuals, and the androgynously-gendered, any of whom may cross-dress. There appear to be two ways in which gender is fluid: first, through what En Hedu’Anna refers to as the “...ritual head-overturning / priest to become woman / priestess to become man...” (Meador, 2000, p. 102). The explicit mention that there existed a ritual, a divinely-sanctioned practice through which one’s birth gender officially, sacramentally can be altered, makes it clear

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that such transformational practices were widely honored, although they may have been limited to members of the clergy.

2.8.2 En Hedu’Anna’s Compassionate View of Humanity In INS En Heduanna tells the story of a young woman who may have somewhat of a masculine, or somewhat unpleasant appearance. She has been treated cruelly by others. She is homeless and wanders the market place. She is not ashamed: she has a handsome bearing and maintains her dignity. En Hedu’Anna’s depiction suggests that Mesopotamian society, or at the very least, some residents of Ur, acted upon extremely negative attitudes towards non-heterosexuals. Inanna dressing a maiden within the women’s rooms embraces with full heart the young girl’s handsome bearing the maid a woman evilly spurned taunted to her face sways beneath the wrath thrown on her everywhere her only path a wanderer in dim and lonely streets her only rest a narrow spot in the jostling market place where from a nearby window a mother holds a child and stares this dreadful state the Lady would undo take this scourge from her burdened flesh over the maiden’s head she makes a sign of prayer hands then folded at her nose she declares her manly/woman in sacred rite

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she takes the broach which pins a woman’s robe breaks the needle, silver thin consecrates the maiden’s heart as male gives to her a mace (Meador, 2000, pp. 123–124)

Extending to non-clergy the right to dress according to the gender with which a person identifies, En Hedu’Anna has Inanna sanctify what she depicts as gender transformation.21 The moral imperative, the ME of compassionate, respectful treatment of others, including gender minorities, and their inclusion as valued members of the temple community appears to originate with En Hedu’Anna. She does not quite have Inanna articulate this as a principle, but she exalts Inanna’s open-mindedness, inclusiveness and compassion. En Hedu’Anna has Inanna turn the table, so to speak, on gender bigotry by transforming the woman into the gender with which the woman identifies. Our philosopher tells us that this principle of gender fluidity describes one of Inanna’s great powers “to turn man into woman / woman into man / are yours Inanna...” (Meador, 2000, p. 127).

2.8.3 Female Sexuality En Hedu’Anna offers her readers an account of femininity. She praises Inanna’s vulva, and her own. They are the locus and focus of creation. She exuberantly celebrates its nature. Her writings are replete with examples of Inanna speaking in overtly sexual metaphors about males who would “plow her field.” She mentions seductive techniques such as wearing the breastplate referred to as “come, man, come,” wearing makeup, etc. En Hedu’Anna identifies the locus of her expected sexual joy that will result when she, En Hedu’Anna becomes one with the goddess Ningal while retaining her own identity. She is the priestess who ceremonially, tantrically, “copulates” with Nanna, to bring about the conditions under Nanna’s control, namely, the movement and phases of the Moon (Meador, 2000, p. 53).

21 Strictly

speaking in twenty-first century terms, what I have styled as “transgender” is (in the case of clergy) “cross dressing,” and (in the case of the “maiden”) establishes “manly woman” as either a third gender, or as “butch” lesbian.

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2.8.4 The Woman Philosopher To the true woman who possesses exceeding wisdom, soothing ….and opening the mouth, always consulting a tablet of lapis lazuli, giving advice to all lands, the true woman, the holy potash plant, born of the stylus reed, applies the measure to heaven and places the measuring rope upon the earth – to Nisaba be praise! (TH c.4.80.1 line c 4801.539 – Oxford ETCSL project)

These lines may refer to the goddess of writing, Nisaba, who is credited with inspiring the creation of cuneiform. But they also read like En Hedu’Anna’s own job description. She considers herself to epitomize the intellectual, educated woman. As leader of part of the government/religious establishment, En Hedu’Anna was sent to Ur by Sargon to quiet down occasional insurrections by the subdued population and foster the assimilation of Akkadian, Sumerian and other peoples under his Empire. She must have been a charismatic personality, an articulate orator who demonstrated empathy during periods of public hardship. She did this by personally speaking to the crowds. She did not delegate to lesser clergy the responsibility for calming the public’s war-frayed nerves and for helping the public look ahead to a brighter future. She herself is always “soothing… and opening the mouth.” She is “...always consulting a tablet of lapis lazuli, / giving advice to all lands...” But why should she give advice? She is the Princess, daughter of the Emperor Sargon. Why can she not give orders?? Her power and authority is not En Hedu’Anna’s point. Rather it is that when a woman is exceedingly wise—a philosopher—she understands that better relationships must be retained with leaders of other lands, including those Sargon controls. Peace, calm, order—all needed for bountiful harvests and for vital trade—result from the public’s feelings of security created by the advice of the woman philosopher. “The woman who is exceedingly wise” is “always consulting a tablet of lapis lazuli.” What is the significance of using a tablet of lapis lazuli rather than leather, or clay or slate tablets? Lapis lazuli was not locally sourced. It came from the distant regions of what is now Afghanistan. It was rare, expensive, a coveted trade item connoting wealth and authority (Winter, 1999). As a substrate for record-keeping, it was what only the most important inscriptions were carved into: royal edicts and promulgations, laws and regulations, treaties. Among En Hedu’ Anna’s responsibilities was overseeing the demarcation of new territories, the expanded boundaries of the original temple-city, its surrounding farms, its system

2  En Hedu’Anna of Mesopotamia Circa 2300 BCE

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of canals that connected to the Tigris, the Euphrates, and the Persian Gulf.22 The seemingly-incidental mention of lapis lazuli by En Hedu’Anna is a clear reminder that her official proclamations have the status of permanent law. Establishing social policies was within the purview of “an exceedingly wise” woman.

2.9 Socio-political Philosophy 2.9.1 Government Use of Force En Hedu’Anna often depicts Inanna as a wild, violent, vicious force. But she does have her character Inanna suggest that the use of force or violence ought to be proportionate to the threat to society that might be posed by insurrectionists or other “upstarts.” Inanna states: I grab the upstarts in my hands Shake them Make them fear me Set a great ox Against its great strength A calf against its small strength (Meador, 2000, p. 93)

Here, it is clear that the initial step towards controlling lawbreakers ought to be to instill fear of the law in them. Give them a “good shaking” and scare them into being law-abiding. But when that fails, then, the authorities will use only the amount of force needed to subdue and control the miscreants: those who pose big threats require the frightening force of “an ox,” those who pose lesser threats will respond to the gentler kicks, the “small strength” of a calf. Use of force proportionate to the risk is a legal principle that En Hedu’Anna advocates. There are at least two ways to characterize that statement. First is that in the occasion of warfare, there is a limit to the amount of force you can use against the opponent. You must not kill, harm, or impede your enemy any more than is needed for them to capitulate and surrender. The frequent wars and border skirmishes yielded many captured enemy opponents who were then enslaved as prisoners of war. The military presence governed activities in urban populations and members of the conquered civilian population frequently were taken captive.

22 During

her lifetime En Hedu’Anna’s temple/city, Ur was on the Persian Gulf. Over the millennia the gulf has receded many miles south from Ur.

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With the foregoing as a status quo for her entire lifetime En Hedu’Anna analyzed the situation of prisoners—civil as well as military—and reached the conclusion that the sentencing system was unjust if it was corrupt. Her principle, that the use of force—in this case, constraint and forced labor—must be proportionate to the threat, implies quite clearly that not only must the punishment fit the crime, but that the punishment must also take into account whether the offender is likely to be recidivist. The situation is somewhat different with prisoners of war. The enemy army’s surviving combatants would be handed over to the victors. Tied together and nude, these young male soldiers would be on public display during the victory celebrations. The losing side... . . .hands over captives Armies disband Strong young men Come before you [Innana] willingly A wind storm breaks up dancing in the city Drives the prime youth before you Rope-tied captives To the city which does not profess “the land is yours” Which does not say “it is your father’s” You speak one holy word Turn that city from your path. (Meador, 2000)

2.9.2 Government Corruption En’Hedu’Anna has little to say about civil government. However, we do find occasional hints of the moral principles that En Hedu’Anna believes are essential to Mesopotamian civilization. One such principle is intolerance of government corruption, particularly, judicial corruption. She writes: Nothing can be compared to your purposes (?); who can oppose your great deeds? You are the lady of heaven and earth! Inana, in the palace [you are] the unbribable judge, among the numerous people [it is you who makes the final] decisions. (INS lines 78–81, ETCSL)

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2.9.3 Positive Law as the Foundation of Procedural Justice As discussed above, the depiction of a woman philosopher as consulting a tablet of lapis lazuli confirms that the legal system overseen by En Hedu’Anna was one of positive law. The most important civil and criminal laws were recorded on a substrate that would outlast any other. Due to the stone’s rarity and expense the written law could not easily be forged. The practical implication is that clergy, civilian administrators and judges enjoyed limited leeway to interpret the purpose and application of any law. En Hedu’Anna agreed with and supported this positive law system. But that does not mean that she was unaware that officials sometimes were corrupt or unjust.

2.10 Influence En Hedu’Anna had no prior model of written philosophy to refer to, so we cannot fault her for not leaving us with a systematic philosophy that meets contemporary expectations. However, we can attribute to her certain philosophical views as described in the previous pages. For widely different reasons her work was valued for centuries after her death.

2.10.1 Scribal Academies Half a century after her death, scribal schools—possibly the same institutions that preserved her writings—produced at least two lengthy balbales that refer to En Hedu’Anna. The preservation and replication of these anonymous balbales reflects the enduring scholarly respect for En Hedu’Anna’s writings as a unifying tool of Mesopotamian culture. “Balbale to Nanna” names En Hedu’Anna several times and mentions a wish for her restoration.23 From En Hedu’ Anna’s known works we learn that it was she who invented the story of Inanna controlling the Annuna partly by outwitting An. Thus, it is the author En Hedu’ Anna herself who fictively outwitted An. The balbale author’s wish was fulfilled although its authorship remains obscure. Similarly, “Descent of Inanna to the Netherworld” relates events

23 Curiously

it states: “May my En-ḫedu-ana excel even An”. Who could wish that our philosopher excel the god An? Nothing in her known biography implies that she desired to be divine, or desired to be more powerful, wiser, than An. En Hedu’Anna may have described her character Inanna as more powerful than An, but she never describes herself as such. The narrator also discloses an intimacy with our philosopher, by referring to her as “my” En Hedu’Anna. Who could possibly refer to her as “my” En Hedu Anna? Perhaps the narrator is one of her brothers, twins Rimush or Manishutu who respectively served as Sargon’s first and second successors.

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that supposedly occurred later than those recounted by En Hedu’Anna (Wolkstein & Kramer, 1983), all are consistent with En Hedu’Anna’s characterization of the goddess. This is the writing from which Pritchard derives both the “necklace/amulet” account and that of the so-called “lesser ME,” and because it was not written by our philosopher, nothing from it can be reliably attributed to her. Nevertheless, the survival of multiple exemplars in multiple cities’ scribal academies evidence the sustained interest in teaching and preserving her views.

2.10.2 Influence on Judaism As discussed earlier in this chapter, evidence of En Hedu’Anna’s influence on Judaism first appears about 2000 BCE with Abraham’s YHWH. It was made explicit generations later with Moses’ receipt of the Ten Commandments which begin with a first-person statement by a divinity describing itself as supreme above all other gods. Yahweh’s fearsome, angry, and frequently destructive personality greatly resembles that of En Hedu’Anna’s goddess Inanna. Like Inanna, Yahweh embodies a paradoxical set of qualities. He can embody the idea of moral perfection. Yahweh can bring good to a population and he can wreak havoc, terror, misery upon entire civilizations. It is through En Hedu’Anna, not Abraham and Moses, that the literate world was introduced to its first concept of a Supreme Being. Although it is entirely possible that the idea of a Supreme Being arose independently with other thinkers, there are none, other than En Hedu’Anna, to whom it is attributable from such an early date.24

2.10.3 Conceptualizing Astronomy Guided by her astronomical observations, but going beyond mere empirical evidence, En Hedu’Anna entertained a hypothesis that brought her to conclude that Inanna is the “Great Queen of the Horizon and Zenith.” En Hedu’Anna recognizes two astral bodies to be one, articulating a distinction that will become fundamental to astronomy: that between a planet and a constellation of stars.

24 Wenham

1985 and Benjamin op.cit. note that Sargonic-era law (which En Hedu’Anna enforced at Ur) guaranteed women’s property rights and status as fiduciaries for their children, but this is not an innovation by our philosopher. Those rights were incorporated into the Bible’s Book of Deuteronomy, composed seventh century BCE.

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2.10.4 Influence on Tamil Language Nearly two millennia after her death, En Hedu’Anna’s works had spread from Mesopotamia to India. Creating verbatim transliterations of her writings became a major project for scholars in the Sangam academies of the Indus Valley during the third century BCE. Referring to the Temple Hymns by En Hedu’Anna, Leitz advises: If we look on the language and the versions in Sumerian and Tamil we see a close relation between both languages. The Sumerian words we can find in Tamil very often without many changes and often it matches nicely with the grammatical rules found in the grammar Tolkappiyam. We have shown in short the remarkable similarity between the Sumerian temple hymns and the classical Tamil Sangam poems in regard to their construction. That is why we take the temple hymns as the ancestors of the Sangam poems. While the temple hymns are composed 2300 – 2200 b. C. we find the first Sangam poems dated ~ 200 b. C. We can have no doubt on a Dravidian nature of the Sumerian language, which appears to be an earlier version of the Tamil we find in the Sangam poems. But of course the temple hymns didn’t match all the time with the rules given in Tolkappiyam. We find sometime the suffix in the later classical Tamil appear in the Sumerian word as a prefix or the words appear in a different position. The first part in classical Tamil words appears as the second part in Sumerian words. (Leitz, 2019, Vol. 6, p. 66.)

Leitz documents the translation of En Hedu’Anna’s Temple Hymns into written Tamil. He describes the later adoption of dozens of terms from the hymns into the Tamil language itself, their influence on /reflection in various rules of grammar established by the Tamil grammar, Tolkappiyam, as well as their inclusion in that work’s volumes on literature.

2.10.5 Goddess Worship Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the reproduction in antiquity of En Hedu’Anna’s works contributed to the spread of Inanna-worship in locations far from Sumer. As Inanna-worship spread, she became known as Ishtar, and as Aphrodite, all “Venuses,” all goddesses of love.25

2.11 Conclusions In this chapter I have argued that En Hedu’Anna’s poems raise and address concepts and questions that are recognizably philosophical and that predate the earliest recorded pre-Socratic works. In this sense, there is a new dawn for our

25 For

more on Inanna-worship and goddess-worship see Meador (2000).

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profession, and its earliest known philosopher is a young Mesopotamian princess. Referring to En Hedu’Anna, rhetorician Roberta Binkley recently remarked: “Certainly, her existence, and her work, will force a reinterpretation and re-framing of Western culture and canon in terms of human psychology, sexuality, theology, and philosophy” (Binkley, 2019). This essay is an attempt to begin that process regarding the discipline of philosophy.

References Ancient Mesopotamian Gods and Goddesses Program. (2019, December 17). Ancient Mesopotamian Gods and Goddesses Program. Retrieved from United Kingdom Higher Education Academy: http://oracc.museum.upenn.edu/amgg/creditscopyright/index.html Anonymous. (2020, February). Balbale to Nanna. Retrieved from Electronic Text Corpus of Sumerian Literature ETCSL translation: t.4.13.03: https://etcsl.orinst.ox.ac.uk Asher-Greve, J. (1997). The essential body: Mesopotamian conceptions of the gendered body. Gender and History, 432–461. Benjamin, D. C. (2019). Impact of Sargon and Enheduanna on land rights in Deuteronomy. Biblical Theology Bulletin, 49(1), 22–31. Binkley, R. (1998). Enheduanna. Retrieved from Feminist Theory: https://www.cddc.vt.edu/feminism/Enheduanna.html Binkley, R. (2004). The rhetoric of origins and the other: Reading the ancient figure of Enheduanna. In C. S. Lipson (Ed.), Rhetoric before and beyond the Greeks (pp. 48–63). State University of New York Press. Binkley, R. (2019). “Ornament of heaven”: The book of Enheduanna. Retrieved from Arizona State University: http://www.public.asu.edu/~rbinkle/ornament.htm Brown, D., & Zólyomi, G. (2001) “Daylight Converts to Darkness…”. Iraq 53: 149–154. Collins, P. (1994). Sumerian Goddess Inanna (Vol. 5, pp. 103–118). Institute of Archeology. De Lafayette, M. (2014). Comparative encyclopedic dictionary of mesopotamian vocabulary, dead and ancient languages 18 volumes (Vol. 7). Times Square Press. Hallo, W. & van Dijk, J. J. A. (1968). The exaltation of Inanna. Yale University Press. Howard, S. (2017, July). En Hedu’Anna. Retrieved from ResearchGate: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322209120 Kramer, S. (1966). Sumerian myths and epic tales. In J. Pritchard (Ed.), Ancient near eastern texts relating to the old testament (S. Kramer, Trans., p. 37). Princeton University Press. Kramer, S. N., & Maier, J. (1989). Myths of Enki, the crafty god. Oxford University Press. Kramer, S. N. (1963). The Sumerians: Their history, culture, and character. University of Chicago Press. Kurtik, G. (1999). The identification of Inanna with the planet Venus: A criterion for the time determination of the recognition of constellations in ancient Mesopotamia. Astronomical & Astrophysical Transactions: Journal of the Eurasian Astronomical Society, 501–513. Lambert, W. G. (2018). A new Babylonian descent to the netherworld. In H. J. Abush & J. Huehnergard (Eds.), Lingering over Words (p. 293). Steinkeller, P., & Huehnergard, J. (2018). Lingering over words: Studies in ancient near eastern literature in honor of William L. Moran. Brill. Law, S. (1986). The regulation of menstrual cycle and its relationship to the moon. Acta Obstetrica Gynecologica Scandinavia, 65(1), 45–48. Retrieved January 7, 2017, from https:// www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/3716780 Leitz, A. (2018). Exaltation of in—Anna & the hymns from the temple of Kes. Interpretation in philosophical view of these ancient Sumerian poems. A Vedicreligion Institute for Vedic Research and Publications.

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Leitz, A. (2019). Sumerian temple hymns—The ancestor of the Tamil Sangam poems. Vedicreligion Institute for Vedic Research and Publications. Lipson, C., & Binkley, R. (2004). Rhetoric before and beyond the Greeks. SUNY Press. Meador, B. D. S. (2000). Inanna lady of largest heart. University of Texas Press. Meador, B. D. S. (2009). Princess, priestess, poet: The Sumerian temple hymns of Enheduanna. University of Texas. Michalowski, P. (2013). Emesal (Sumerian dialect). https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444338386. wbeah24071 Oxford University Antiquities. (n.d.). Pritchard, J. (1969). Ancient near eastern texts relating to the old testament (3rd with Supplement ed.). Princeton University Press. Pritchard, J. D. (1975). The ancient near east (Vol. II). Princeton University Press. Robson, E. (2005). A new manuscript of Ninmešara (ETCSL 4.07.02), lines 109–139. Orientalia, 74(4), nova series, 382–388. Retrieved September 30, 2020, from http://www. jstor.org/stable/43076974. Retrieved September 30, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/43076974. Retrieved September 20, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/43076974 Sjöberg, Å. (1969). The collection of the sumerian temple hymns (pp. 3–154). Locust Valley NY: J.J. Augustin. Spar, I. (2009, April). Mesopotamian deities. In Heilbrunn timeline of art history. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2000–. http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/deit/hd_deit.htm (April 2009). Retrieved February 12, 2020, from The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2000–: http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/deit/hd_deit.htm Suter, C. E. (2007). Between human and divine: High priestesses in images from the Akkad to the Isin-Larsa period. In M. F. Chang (Ed.), Ancient near eastern art in context: Studies in honor of Irene J. Winter (pp. 315–359). Brill. University of Oxford, Oriental Institute Studies. (n.d.). Electronic text corpus of Sumerian literature. Retrieved August 11, 2020, from http://etcsl.orinst.ox.ac.uk Winter, I. J. (1999). The aesthetic value of Lapis Lazuli in mesopotamia. In A. Caubet (Ed.), Cornaline et pierres précieuses: La Méditerranée de l’ Antiquité à l’ Islam. (pp. 43–58). Musée du Louvre. Wolkstein, D., & Kramer, N. (1983). Inanna: Queen of heaven and earth. Harper. Zgoll, A. (n.d.). Nin Me Sara translation. (M. ---, Trans.). Retrieved July 16, 2020, from http:// www.angelfire.com/mi/enheduanna/Ninmesara.html

Chapter 3

Unknown artist, painting is in public domain due to its antiquity

Gārgī Vācaknavī of India गार्गी वाचक्नवी fl. Eighth Century BCE Shyam Ranganathan Abstract Gārgī Vācaknavī is known for her challenging interrogation of the sage Yājñavalkya, in what was by then a male dominated activity: philosophical debate. Gārgī distinguishes herself for challenging Yājñavalkya, being rebuked and challenging him a second time. Gārgī demonstrates her mastery over the concept at dispute (Growth, Expansion, Development) by being able to revise her approach to the question. Gārgī philosophically demonstrates the very idea she is investigating. Her salvos at Yājñavalkya display the two contrasting modes of philosophical investigation of the early Vedas, characterized by naturalism, and the latter philosophy of the Upaniṣads, characterized as a procedural nonnaturalism. Gārgī engages in this dispute, challenging gender norms of her day. Over a millennia later, Gārgī and Yājñavalkya’s personas are reprised in a post-Vedic dialogue, the Yogayājñavalkya, on the technological application of Yoga philosophy. Here Gārgī is cast as the unassuming interlocutor—in stark contrast to her earlier firebrand,

S. Ranganathan (*)  York University, Toronto, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_3

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gender-norm-breaking performance in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (BU). As this latter depiction is not historically accurate, we will focus on Gārgī’s contribution to the BU.

3.1 Introduction Gārgī (eighth century BCE), the philosopher who is the subject of this chapter, is known for her challenging interrogation of the sage Yājñavalkya, in what was by then a male dominated activity of philosophical debate. Gārgī distinguishes herself for not only pushing Yājñavalkya to clarify his position, but for having the sole distinction of challenging Yājñavalkya a second time—but this time she has learned from her mistakes and emerges unscathed and in charge of the discourse. Gārgī and Yājñavalkya’s debate is a central contribution to the shifting philosophical tradition that begins with the teleological naturalism of the early Vedas that radically pivots to the procedural nonnaturalism of the Upaniṣads—an ethical shift that is also a metaphysical shift. The exercise that Gārgī engages in not only summarizes the dialectical development of this tradition: she herself personifies this development. Moreover, Gārgī’s participation and contribution to this debate challenges gender roles of her day as part of the theme of self-determination that characterizes this procedural shift. Over a millennia later, Gārgī and Yājñavalkya’s personas are reprised in a new post-Vedic dialogue, the Yogayājñavalkya, on the technological application of post-Yoga Sūtra (2nd CE) philosophy. Here Gārgī is cast as the unassuming interlocutor, and wife of Yājñavalkya, conforming to gender roles—in stark contrast to her earlier firebrand, gender-norm-challenging performance in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. As the Yogayājñavalkya is not historically accurate, and as it depicts Gārgī as nothing more than someone who keeps Yājñavalkya company as he delivers his discourse, this article will focus on the historical Gārgī from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (BU).1

3.2 Biography The name Gārgī Vācaknavī shows up first and most prominently in a canonical discussion in the latter part of the Vedas, known as the Upaniṣads (dialogues). W. J. Johnson’s entry for Gārgī Vācaknavī in the Dictionary of Hinduism simply defines her as “Female teacher in the Bṛhadāraṅyaka Upaniṣad (3.6; 3.8) who challenges Yājñavalkya twice in a debate concerning the ultimate nature of reality” (Johnson, 2009).

1 Translations

of the BU here are mine but in many cases they coincide with Patrick Olivelle’s. See Olivelle (1996).

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The evidence that Gārgī Vācaknavī was a historical figure is her appearance in the BU. What is remarkable about her is that she defies stock depictions of women and perhaps, if nothing else, this is evidence towards Gārgī being a unique historical figure, as opposed to a mere fiction. She is depicted as a feisty, gender-norm breaking philosophical interrogator, who challenges the hero of the dialogue, Yājñavalkya, not once, but twice (a distinction held by her alone in the dialogue)! As Steven Lindquist notes, “The cast of characters in Bṛhadāraṇyaka that are defeated in debate by Yajñavalkya consists of many well-known figures from other textual traditions (the Ṛgveda, in particular, perhaps because of its long established authority)” (Lindquist, 2008, 408). Gārgī loses her first round of debate with Yājñavalkya. In this respect she is like the others. The first interaction is less of a debate and more of an interrogation, where Gārgī issues a series of questions to Yājñavalkya who ends the exercise with a rebuke of Gārgī’s strategy. However, her second interaction is much different. In the first exercise, Gārgī apparently does not have any idea where the series of questions will take her, though she is intent on demonstrating a foundational problem with Yājñavalkya’s position: her strategy assumes that if she pushes Yājñavalkya far enough to explain the basis of any particular postulate, she will demonstrate that either Yājñavalkya’s postulate is not foundational, or that it plays no role in philosophical explanation. She is like the first-year philosophy student every professor has encountered, who questions every answer provided by the professor, in the hopes that the exercise will prove the student the more clever. Of course, this does not end well. After Gārgī explores Yājñavalkya’s responses that lead him to offer Brahman (Growth, Expansion, Development) as the basic explanation, and continues on in her search for a more basic explanation, Yājñavalkya warns Gārgī that continuing on in this manner with respect to the basic concept at play, Brahman, will cause her own head to explode (meaning that her strategy will turn up nothing but anxiety and disappointment for her). Brahman is a value, deity or ideal (deva) that you cannot go past (BU 3.6.1). This constitutes a criticism of Gārgī’s strategy, but also a criticism of Gārgī’s expectation that she herself could transcend the procedural constraints of Brahman. Gārgī takes a break and we hear from another interlocutor of Yājñavalkya who tells a story about a cis-gendered woman possessed by a male-sexed celestial being (a Gandharva), who quizzes the woman’s supposedly learned husband about the Self (BI 3.7.1). The husband responds deferentially to the possessing spirit with the admission that he does not have the answers to the questions. This interlude is philosophically absurd. It depicts someone who has lost herself (the male-possessed wife), interrogating her (failure of a) husband who allowed this to happen—and the questioning is about the autonomy of the Self, which he ostensibly cannot speak to. It is also emblematic of misogyny and patriarchy. Here we find a context where the autonomy of the woman is trampled on, while deference is given to men. Yet, the questions put by the occupying spirit to the failing husband cut to the very heart of the debate that Yājñavalkya is engaging in: a debate about the Self as the inner controller or primary explanation of an individual, and Brahman, its procedural foundation. After this interlude, Gārgī returns

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with a renewed bravado, gender-bending means of self address. In contradistinction to the cis-gendered woman possessed by a male spirit, Gārgī chooses to speak about herself as a warrior (which she is not) and in the male gender (which contrasts with her sex) (BU 3.8.1). In many ways, she exemplifies the very concept of Brahman, namely, Development, Growth, Expansion, in her second address to Yājñavalkya. Now Gārgī steers the conversation to elicit the responses from Yājñavalkya that demonstrate she is in charge of the interaction. If the first interaction was a loss, the second is a win for Gārgī and this sets her apart from the many others who only take one shot at interacting with Yājñavalkya and all fail. This dialogue occurs in the late part of the Vedic period (which spans from 1500 to 500 BCE), perhaps around the eighth century BCE. The second text in which Gārgī (or someone with her name) figures prominently is in a text that dates over a millennia later2 the Yogayājñavalkya. Here Gārgī is depicted as the dutiful wife of Yājñavalkya whose deferential, non-challenging, questioning elicits a series of lectures from Yājñavalkya. And whereas the topic of the Upaniṣad is Brahman (Growth, Development, Expansion), the topic of the Yogayājñavalkya is The Eight Limbs of Yoga, made famous by the Yoga Sūtra (circa 200 BCE to 200 CE)—a work of systematic philosophy that comprises one of the early and central contributions of the post Vedic sūtra age—when philosophers composed philosophical texts in aphorisms (Patañjali, 2008). If Gārgī Vācaknavī and Yājñavalkya of the Upaniṣads were historical figures, and if those dialogues represent their philosophical interests in keeping with those times, then the Gārgī of the Upaniṣad and of the much later Yogayājñavalkya are either wholly different people or (more likely) the latter is the fictional recasting of the earlier Gārgī in new philosophical literature. The latter seems correct as the Yogayājñavalkya explicitly describes Yājñavalkya as the esteemed classical figure of the Upaniṣads. Therefore, the Yogayājñavalkya does not continue to fill in details about the philosophical life of Gārgī but rather appropriates her likeness but to quite divergent philosophical ends. Whereas Gārgī is very much the hero of her interaction with Yājñavalkya in the BU, she is reduced to being a sidekick in the Yogayājñavalkya. Whereas the Gārgī of the BU is self-assured and outgoing, the Gārgī of the Yogayājñavalkya is timid and subdued in contrast. Moreover, if we were to take the early BU as the accurate depiction of Yājñavalkya and Gārgī, then we would note that Yājñavalkya is described as having two wives, neither of them is Gārgī. Rather, one of his wives (the topic of a separate entry) is Maitreyī, who is a challenging philosopher in her own right (see Chap. 4 in this volume). Hence, it would seem that the later Yogayājñavalkya renames Maitreyī as “Gārgī,” when Maitreyī and Gārgī are two separate people in the BU. This renaming of Yājñavalkya’s wife is no doubt intentional, for to the extent that the authors of the Yogayājñavalkya knew about Gārgī and Yājñavalkya from their storied role in the Upaniṣads, they would

2 For

more on this, see Bouy (1994).

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know that Gārgī was not one of Yājñavalkya’s wives. One possible reason for this renaming is that in the Upaniṣad, we find Maitreyī at the point in time when Yājñavalkya resolves to depart his home in order to enter into a retirement and renunciation stage of life, lived in solitude. It is during their parting moments that Maitreyī and Yājñavalkya have their philosophical conversation about the Self and love. But with the advent of the Yoga Sūtra, and other works of Yoga philosophy (such as the Bhagavad Gītā) Yoga is recast as a social philosophy of radical transformation: a paradoxical state of social interaction and a constant withdrawal, autonomy and isolation of contemplation. Adding to texts such as the Yoga Sūtra, Yogayājñavalkya carries on this later conception of Yoga as both domestic and transformative. Maitreyī’s story does not fit with this motif. Rather, re-describing the earlier combative Gārgī as a loving wife and philosophical interlocutor of Yājñavalkya does fit with this motif of social interaction and isolated reflection. And hence if this social connection was an important part of the message of the Yogayājñavalkya then this may be why the authors decided to cast Gārgī in the supportive role, jettisoning Maitreyī who was effectively widowed by Yājñavalkya’s departure. It is also possible that it was a literary device aimed at taming the indomitable philosophical spirit of Gārgī—a move that would entail a certain misogyny of the authors of the Yogayājñavalkya in two ways: overwriting Yājñavalkya’s actual loyal wife Maitreyī (who was a challenging philosopher in her own right), with an unusually demure Gārgī.

3.3 Philosophical Achievements One of Gārgī’s main achievements as depicted in the BU is to challenge Yājñavalkya twice. This distinction is hers alone while everyone else folds in the face of Yājñavalkya’s response. These interactions are conventionally described as debates, but in Gārgī’s case they are more a form of interrogation. What is moreover unique about Gārgī’s approach to this challenge is that she revises her approach, learning and growing from her mistakes. Gārgī interrogates Yājñavalkya first on cosmological and metaphysical questions, and then on questions with methodological significance. This switch in strategy also distinguishes Gārgī from Yājñavalkya’s other interlocutors. But it also mirrors the two stages of Vedic philosophy: the earlier naturalistic phase, or natural explanation dependent upon further natural explanation, and the latter non-natural phase that emphasizes the procedural foundations of personal growth and expansion of the Self, responsible for its life. Gārgī’s earlier interrogation depends upon naturalistic ideas of causal dependency of postulates that illuminate these relationships. Gārgī’s second questioning exemplifies her own growth, expansion and development as a thinker. In returning to debate with Yājñavalkya, she poses questions again but ones that lead Yājñavalkya to respond in a manner in keeping with the procedural metaphysics of the latter Vedas. She concludes the

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interaction by stating that Yājñavalkya is unbeatable, but in the process Gārgī has triumphed where others have failed: she has kept control of the conversation. Moreover, she demonstrates a sense of humour in the process. When she returns, she asks the same question twice, and in response to the first answer jokingly claims: “All honor to you, Yajnavalkya. You really cleared that up for me!” (BU 3.8.5) She then proceeds to ask the same question again (as though nothing was cleared up). Gārgī is not a philosopher in the sense of having articulated a philosophy: she does not defend a position, nor argue for one in the BU or in the later Yogayājñavalkya for that matter. But she is a philosopher in so far as she engages in philosophical questioning and also demonstrates a keen appreciation for the issues at play. Her own transformation in the dialogue is in keeping with a literary theme in South Asian philosophical dialogues: she is a dramatic exploration of the very ideas that she is grappling with. In keeping with the philosophical direction of the dialect she enacts, Gārgī exemplifies an individualism at the heart of the latter philosophy of the Upaniṣads, and its central motif of Brahman: growth, expansion and development.

3.4 Social-Political Background Living in a world structured by a history of Western imperialism brings with it a certain amount of anachronistic expectations—expectations, which are often colonial innovations, that are backwards projections on to colonized traditions. Our assessment of the historical social and political background of Gārgī depends upon whether we treat this colonial-era baggage as illustrative or whether we put it aside and examine the philosophical texts with philosophical rigour. For instance, it is a natural colonial-era position to assume that Gārgī is giving voice to Hindu philosophy. But how are we to make sense of this? The term “Hinduism” is a colonial innovation that can obfuscate our understanding of the history of philosophy and Gārgī’s contribution to it if we do not put it aside and attend to her contributions with rigour. The term “Hindu” itself is Persian—not South Asian—used to talk about South Asia and was used by British colonial administrators to name the entire indigenous South Asian tradition, in contradistinction to Islam. If we bring a Kripkean analysis of names and their necessity to bear (Kripke, 1980), the category Hindu means, given its baptismal occasion, something like, “South Asian, no common founder.” The full range of philosophical positions swept up in this baptism is nothing short of the disagreements of philosophy. Anything South Asian could be Hindu: and before the British, no South Asian thought of themselves as Hindu. After this event, many South Asians were raised to believe they were Hindu. Given ordinary assumptions about categories (that they specify necessary and sufficient conditions for

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their application) Hindus and others confabulate about Hinduism and treat it as though there is some type of definitive content to the term, and that contemporary contrasts (for example, the contrast between Hinduism and other South Asian religions, like Buddhism, and the derivative contrast between Hindu and Buddhist philosophy) are historically unperspicuous. The reality rather is that “Hindu” is a racial projection on to the tradition that defines South Asian intellectuals in terms of their geography, not their contributions to philosophy. Hinduism is a class term, and not a kind term: a class is a category whose criterion of inclusion is not necessarily instantiated in its members.3 All together, the full disagreements of philosophy from South Asia are Hindu: they are united by being South Asian with no common founder. But on their own, in isolation, none is Hindu.4 One observation worth repeating is that there is no such thing as a Hindu philosophy except in the vacuous sense of the indigenous philosophy of South Asia, which is continuous with the disagreements of philosophy. Instead, if we want to identify emblematic Hindu positions, we ought to identify what South Asians have to converge on as they philosophically disagree about everything, and this tells us something interesting about philosophy. Without this insight it is tempting to engage in a-historical questions about the contrast between, say, Hindu and Buddhist philosophy—or to expect that there is some type of salient Hindu position to be discovered by examining Hindu philosophers such as Gārgī. But if “Hindu” is a term that only has logical implications at the class level, it would be a mistake to expect anything very Hindu from Gārgī. What keeps these colonial-era myths in place? If we adopt the acclaimed approach to thought in the western tradition, where thought is the meaning of what one says (what the ancient Greeks called logos), the linguistic account of thought, then any explanation of thought is an explanation by way of what I would say. So this model of thought gives rise to interpretation: explanation in terms of what one takes to be true or what one would say, which is the default model for understanding as articulated by leading Analytic and Continental philosophers of the twentieth century.5 Given the ancient provenance of this model of thought, as this tradition spreads (a tradition I call the West) it interprets. But as interpretation is an explanation in terms of what one takes to be true, it can only successfully explain what it agrees with and has difficulty making sense of dissent. The first innovation this tradition sprouts is religion, as a category into which all originally

3 By analogy, Fruit Salad is a class category. Fruit Salad’s criterion of inclusion is a diversity of different pieces of fruit. It doesn’t follow from this that a piece of fruit salad is a diversity of different pieces of fruit. Put the pieces of fruit together: fruit salad. On its own, no piece of fruit is itself fruit salad. 4 . In Hinduism: A Contemporary Philosophical Investigation (Ranganathan, 2018) I explore the historical conditions of this colonial innovation, and its philosophical implications—too numerous to catalogue here. 5 For a review of the Western literature and its commitment to interpretation, see Ranganathan (2022).

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non-Western traditions are placed. These traditions are alternatingly explained in terms of positions that are familiar to the West (via interpretation), and then when this is not possible, in terms of being non-rational, mystical, faith-based and beyond the scope of reason as they depart from familiar positions of the Western intellectual tradition (Ranganathan, 2022). It is easy not to appreciate that religion is a colonial innovation by merely focusing on familiar options to the West that are similar in many ways (the theistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam). That makes it seem as though there is some essential content that distinguishes the religious from the nonreligious. But even here we see that when the same positions advanced by Plato are treated as the topic of secular philosophical exploration in secular philosophy courses (such as a belief in God or the afterlife) those positions are labelled “religious” when their sources are non-European. Likewise, atheistic naturalism (such as Sāṅkhya, Jainism, or even many versions of early Buddhism) or atheistic non-naturalisms (Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, Yoga, standard Vedānta) are treated as religious when their origins are non-Western. When we expand our attention further and study the historical creation of religious identity beyond the geography of Europe, it is manifestly an artefact of the colonialism of this tradition. Traditions without religious identity come to acquire that identity overnight, and the salient historical event that precipitates this is Western colonialism (cf. Masuzawa, 2005; Ranganathan, 2018, 2022). People growing up in such colonized traditions, such as Hindus, gaining their understanding of their tradition via the colonial experience, learn to understand their own tradition this way. Hindu positions are thereby understood on the model of ideas familiar to the Western tradition. Yet the historical truth is that the tradition is coextensive with the full range of philosophical disagreements.6 The alternative to interpretation is unfortunately not defended by famous philosophers of the Western tradition or other scholars of South Asia. This alternative I call explication. To explicate is to employ logical validity to derive (from what is said by a perspective) a theory that entails its controversial claims, and to understand the topic of conversation as what the controversy is about. The standard of logical validity is the idea that if the premises of an argument are true, the conclusion must be true. This model of inference (like all standards of inference) bypasses what we take to be true or are willing to say and allows us to understand the contributions in traditions by way of how they elucidate a topic of controversy. The distinction is of first importance as it is instrumental in recent developments in post-colonial research on South Asian philosophy (Ranganathan, 2022). The idea that South Asia lacks any extensive history of moral and political philosophy, and that it is basically a tradition of religions, arises from the employment of Eurocentric interpretation which cannot understand the unique and divergent moral and political options of South Asia, and projects this confusion back onto South Asia as its mysticism.7 Of the two methodologies of

6 See

Chaps. 2 through 9 (Ranganathan, 2018). Ranganathan (2017b) for a survey of these positions.

7 Compare

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understanding—interpretation versus explication—only explication is rational as it is the application of logical validity while explanations in terms of what one takes to be true (interpretation) violates every standard of logical inference. Logically valid arguments may be comprised of false claims, and arguments that are based entirely on the truth (or what one takes to be true) may be invalid. If we were to interpret Gārgī, her arguments and her philosophical context by way of the West, Gārgī and her tradition would be depicted as a sustained inquiry into gods, beginning with a polytheism of the many gods of the early Vedic world view, to a monotheism that settles on a single god, Brahman. Indeed, Patrick Olivelle, the recent translator of the Upaniṣads (1996), depicts Gārgī and Yājñavalkya as engaging in “theological debate” (see his translation of brahmodya, such as at 3.8.1). More to this point, in the very Upaniṣad where we find Gārgī’s discussion, we find a reduction of the various devas. There we find the question raised, “how many devas are there?” and much turns on how we treat “deva”—conventionally translated as “god.” There, Yājñavalkya entertains this question repeatedly and reduces the number from “Three and three hundred, and three and three thousand” to just one. And as we review the dwindling list of devas, it includes the forces of nature, which eventually reduced to the one deva. Question: “Who is the one deva?” Answer: “Breath. It is called ‘Brahman' and ‘Tyad’ [that]” (BU 3.9.6). A Western interpretation makes use of familiar models in the Western tradition to make sense of South Asia, without attending to the reasons and arguments of South Asian philosophers. It leads to easy comparisons of Vedic devas to the gods of Homer, and between later Vedic philosophy of Brahman with Neoplatonism, absolute idealism (cf. Paulos, 2002) or an ultimate God (Olivelle, 1996). Explication focuses on reasons first, and conclusions last. If we explicate, we see that the primary concern of Gārgī and philosophers investigating Brahman was not primarily ontological but practical (its more explicitly ethical implications being discussed ubiquitously in the tradition); that it was primarily a concern for moral philosophy that supplants a naturalistic metaphysics. And what it replaces it with was a philosophical non-naturalism that treats the self (ātman) as defined by the traits of its substance, which is Brahman—growth, expansion, development—as central to all practical endeavours, including inquiry. These are the literal meanings of “Brahman” obscured by interpretations.8 To fully appreciate this, a brief explication of the development of the Vedic tradition from the early Vedas to the later Upaniṣads is called for. This will allow a closer look at the socio-political factors of Gārgī’s context—without having to project our colonial era myths about South Asia on to the text.

8 The Monier Monier-Williams Sanskrit English Dictionary gives many accounts of the meaning of “Brahman”. The primary meanings are: “growth”, “expansion”, “evolution”, and “development.“ (Monier-Williams, 1995, 737–8).

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3.4.1 Vedas and Upaniṣads The Vedas are a body of literature of the ancient South Asian, Indo-European peoples. The corpus itself was written over a long stretch of time: 1500 BCE to 500 BCE. It has conventionally been divided into four Vedas (Ṛg, Yajur, Sāman and Arthavan) and each Veda is often divided into four portions: Formulas (Mantras), Ritual Manuals (Brāhmaṇas), Forest Books (Āraṇyaka) and Dialogues (Upaniṣads). “Veda” when not employed as a term for the whole, denotes the first three, to the exclusion of the Dialogues. The four Vedas themselves overlap, though there are some differences in theme. The mantra portions of the Ṛg, Yajur and Sāman consist of hymns to and accounts of the various Nature deities, many of which are to be employed in sacrifices, while the Arthavan is a collection of spells and cures. Whereas the Brāhmaṇas specify the practical aim and procedures of the sacrifice, the Āraṇyakas treat the sacrifice as a model for something else– often self-reflection. The school of thought founded on these earlier portions is known as Pūrva Mīmāṃsā (literally, “the interpretation of the former”). The Dialogues (Upaniṣads) record the transition (cf. Santucci, 1976). Whereas the previous portions of the Vedas focus on the various gods and fortuitous relations to them, the focus in the Upaniṣads is on the self (Ātmā) and Development or Growth (Brahman). The school of thought founded exclusively on the latter part of the Vedas comes to be known as Vedānta (literally the “end of the Vedas”). This is a school, or more properly a family of schools, that typically elaborates a position on the basis of a summary of the Vedas known as the Vedānta Sūtra or Brahma Sūtra. Our investigation into Gārgī is pre-Vedānta. What we find in the Upaniṣads themselves is something different from what is nominally labelled as Vedānta later: it is itself an exploration of the discontent and disagreement this tradition has with its earlier teleological naturalism, which it criticizes by way of a radical proceduralism. This philosophy (formalized in later texts such as Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtra) comes to be known as Yoga. The earlier teleological approach to life that characterizes the early part of the Vedas understands right action as justified in so far as it brings about certain material ends, such as health, prosperity, victory over enemies, and riches. The ethical theory at the heart of this earlier approach is consequentialism. The cosmology against which this consequentialism operates is a naturalism, where not only are the goods of life defined naturalistically, but the means of bringing about such goods involves propitiating the forces of nature, each described as a deva—a term conventionally translated as “deity” or “god,” but which has the philosophical import of ideal or high excellences-to-be-reckoned with. Vedic sacrifices consist in the recitations of the mantras while following procedures set out in the Brāhmaṇas. These were meant to secure for the sacrificers the goods of nature. The Vedic reflection on the pressure and necessity of such sacrifices was not magical. It was based on naturalistic observations. According to the Aitareya Āraṇyaka, it is Agni (fire) that is the consumer of food (I.1.2.ii). The sacrificial offering just is food (I.1.4,vii). If it is ultimately fire that is hungry, and the sacrificial offering

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of food is how we feed our debt to fire, then the sacrifice is the ritualisation of metabolism: the burning of calories. The sacrifice hence functions as a model for our animal biology. These same philosophers were aware that the system they were operating with was one of what Nietzsche would later label as ressentiment (Genealogy of Morals 84). “Resentment” in this philosophical sense is the identification of goods of life in terms of evils that one wishes to avoid. One can hence never fully appreciate the goods without some appreciation of the evils they avoid. But as a teleological system, it is riddled with the problem of moral luck: the sacrifices and attempts to appease the forces of nature are not guaranteed to work. The bounty of life is dependent upon the whims of external forces, namely the devas of nature. And evil forces that one wishes to avoid must also be propitiated in the sacrifice because the entire psychology of the teleological endeavour is to avoid bad results and gain the good (Aitaraya Brāhmaṇa 2.1.7, pp. 59–60). It is against this history that the radical proceduralism of the later Vedas asserts itself. Brahman is the concept of this radical proceduralism which identifies the procedure of personal growth and transformation as metaphysically foundational, providing a substrate for the activity and safety of the self (ātman). The goods of life are hence a matter of a devotion to this procedure of growth and expansion, and this devotion allows for the perfection of the procedure itself, namely the good. There is on this account no need to understand the goods of life in terms of the evils one wishes to avoid for it has a non-teleological, procedural definition. The ideas of right and wrong hence replace good and bad as the foci. The later philosophy of Yoga presents these two options (a teleological naturalism versus a radical proceduralism of the self) as a disjunctive syllogism, and motivates the rejection of teleological naturalism in favour of proceduralism.9 Keeping in mind the two stages of Vedic philosophical development made possible by an explicatory attention to argumentative detail (as opposed to the usual interpretation by way of familiar commitments), Gārgī’s two stabs at a debate with Yājñavalkya come to life. Her first attempt at interacting with Yājñavalkya assumes a teleological naturalism, where all considerations are explained by some further causal condition. This motivates Gārgī treating every answer provided by Yājñavalkya as itself in need of some further justification. This summarizes the early Vedic approach to philosophy. When her questions lead her to Brahman, the procedural foundation of inquiry and the self, she attempts to apply the same naturalistic mode of explanation and is cautioned by Yājñavalkya that this will not work. Her second round of questions is concerned to explicate the procedural foundation of the exercise of inquiry, which Yājñavalkya has articulated in response to other interlocutors. This latter approach demonstrates Brahman in respect to both Gārgī’s mode of inquiry and what she elicits from Yājñavalkya by way of her

9 For a study of this historical development spanning the earlier and later Vedas, see Ranganathan (2017a).

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pointed and guiding questions. Gārgī hence personifies the dialectical development of this philosophical tradition. As one who learns from her own mistakes to come back fighting and with renewed vigour demonstrates that she is herself rooted in Brahman—Growth, Expansion, Development.

3.4.2 Caste, Gender, Sex The social and political topics that Gārgī brings to fore is not only gender but also caste. Ancient South Asian literature generally recognizes two genders and two sexes, though there is often some allusion to the divergence between sex and gender in so far as notable figures can at times undergo gender transformation without losing an underlying sex identity. A famous example of this is the deva Viṣṇu, who is paradigmatically male sexed, undergoing a gender transformation to present as the beautiful woman, Mohinī, in the famous Churning of the Milk Ocean myth. Gārgī herself engages in a performance of male gender while not doing anything explicitly to deny her female sex. As for caste, the ancient Ṛg Vedic mantra Hymn to Puruṣa, describes the sacrifice of a cosmic person that results in four castes: the priestly or intellectual caste (Brahmins), the marshal caste (Kṣatriya), the merchant caste (Vaiśya) and the labour caste (Śūdra). By the time that Gārgī participates in her debate these caste identities were known and practiced. If we adopt an interpretive approach to the study of South Asia informed by the Western tradition we try to understand South Asian commitments to caste and gender on models that are Eurocentric. The most salient source on the topic is Plato’s Republic. In the Republic, Plato, via Socrates, defines an individual as belonging to one of three castes on the basis of their virtues (or lack thereof) and their corresponding place within the functioning of the state, which is the soul writ large. To get people to buy their appropriate place in community, people must understand themselves as being comprised by differing materials (an essential part of the Noble Lie, 414b–c). Women are to be treated as equal to men on the grounds that merit is individual and not determined by sex (451c–457b). However, Socrates claims that, as a group, the talents and natures of women and men are different: women are less capable as a group than men as a group (455d–e). If we adopt an interpretive approach on the basis of the West, and given the historical importance of Plato to this tradition, we would treat Plato’s model as a way to think about South Asia. South Asian castes would be understood in a communitarian manner, but also via Plato’s arguments in the Republic and elsewhere (such as the Phaedrus) that different castes and classes of individuals (such as the humans and the gods) are constitutionally different, and that this difference is intrinsic to the identity of the individual. Brahman would similarly be interpreted on analogy to Plato’s account of the Good, as the source of light for all things (509d–511e). With explication we see, especially against the backdrop of the later Vedic philosophy of procedural metaphysics (Brahman) that one’s caste, sex, gender, and even species are inessential traits of the self, whose primary essence consists in

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Brahman (Growth, Expansion, Development). Social markers such as caste, sex, or species constitute contingent social modes of social interaction but are not necessary or intrinsic features of the self, or ātman. This has implications for the fluidity of personal identity. Personal identity can remain the same while undergoing marked social transformations. Gārgī’s own performance in the BU exemplifies this fluidity with respect to caste and gender. Gārgī’s return after her first attempt at debate with Yājñavalkya is hyperbolic as she announces herself as an “ugraputra”—warrior son (BU 3.8.1). Steven Lindquist is correct for drawing attention to this: Gārgī’s language, however, also does much more than other scholars have suggested: it masculinizes Gārgī. Gārgī is metaphorically transformed from a woman into a male (“son,” m. putra). The composer of the text could have employed a gender-appropriate form, such as ugraputrī (“daughter of a warrior”), but chose not to. It is most likely that the author is attempting to make a point by choosing the masculine form: Gārgī's gender is being manipulated by the metaphor. Further, in the context of this all-male debate, Gārgī, is made more male than her counterparts—she is not a passive male Brahmin asking questions. Up until this point in the debate, the rhetoric has been rather mild, even if a bit prickly. Here, however, it is Gārgī who is a “warrior-son” (ugraputra) of the famed Videha or Kāsī wielding “two enemy-piercing arrows” (dvaubānavantau sapatnativyadhinau). Though apparently a Brahmin by birth, Gārgī employs the martial imagery of a male Ksatriya, positioning her above the others present, at least in boldness. (Lindquist, 2008, 419)

What is not addressed in this gloss is the manner in which Gārgī masculinizes herself. She does not change her sex. Nor is her actual caste flipped because of engaging in philosophical debate: if anything, it performatively affirms her role as a Brahmin because she is doing Brahmin-like things (debating philosophy). The shift to self-description as a warrior and man is purely performative. Some have commented that such a shift in gender represents a kind of misogyny: the authors of the text (or perhaps Gārgī herself if these are her own words) seem to take it that it is preferable to be male over female and that Gārgī’s victory lap as a male in tone suggests a rejection of the possibilities of women participating in full philosophical debate (cf. Adamson & Ganeri, 2016). This reading would be stronger if the text in question impugned or renounced the female sex in favour of the male sex, and if it were the case that adopting male-gendered descriptions were not, on occasion, the feminist move. With respect to gender and language, cis-women, and women more generally, might choose a male-gendered description in cases that the female gender description is pragmatically diminutive or implies a second-rate standard. There are a host of such terms in English that women (regardless of their sex) often shun for this reason, including: actress, authoress, comedienne, manageress, 'lady doctor' (Pritchard, 2011). Women earn bachelor degrees not bachelorette degrees, and a major in the army is not a majorette, though she may be a woman. Call these uses, anti-double standard usages of male-gendered terms. These are not metaphors. They are re-purposings of gendered and often sexist language to egalitarian ends. Using the male gendered designation is a way for women to push back against a double standard and to banish expectations that there is some type of particularly female means of discharging the activity that is nonstandard or lesser,

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or, that the primary standard is solely the purview of men. Hence, the mere fact that Gārgī chooses a male-gendered description of herself cannot in and of itself be taken to be a denial of her being a woman in any sense. Moreover, in this particular case, where Gārgī is depicting herself as a fighter, the female gender will not do. Even though women were members of the marshal caste, their daily lives and professional expectations would not have consisted in waging war. To be a warrior’s daughter, for instance, is not necessarily (and most unlikely) to be a warrior oneself, and hence the pragmatics of such a description applied to Gārgī would not imply that Gārgī is a fighter. To evoke the notion that Gārgī is herself a fighter, she would have to make use of the male gender, for it was only the men of the marshal caste who engaged in battle. Of particular importance to note is that the authors of the BU acknowledged that women could be philosophers. Maitreyī, who is the subject of Chap. 4 in this volume, was the wife of Yājñavalkya. She is described with a female-gendered designation (brahmavādhinī) for those who engage in philosophical inquiry and discussion (BU 3.5.1). It was not as though Gārgī could not have been described appropriately with a female gender term: it was that female gender descriptions of herself as a fighter were not pragmatically available to her. With respect to gender, what is often ignored is the intervening dialogue between Gārgī’s two attempts at challenging Yājñavalkya. After Gārgī’s initial attempt at interrogating Yājñavalkya and failing, we hear about the case of Patañcala Kāpya, a teacher of Vedic rights, whose wife was possessed by a Gandharva by the name of Kabandha Ātharvaṇa. Gandharvas are male spirits, without an entirely good reputation, who pose a “potentially harmful… relationship [to] mortal women” (Norelius, 2015, 30). The passage depicting this possession is especially vivid in its depiction of this relationship as deleterious (tasyāsīdhbhāryā gandharvagṛhītā) evoking images of an attacked wife, taken by the Gandharva. It is worth reviewing this text: Once we were living in the land of the Madras learning about the sacrifice in the house of Patañcala Kāpya. His wife was attacked and possessed by a Gandharva. We asked him who he was, and the Gandharva said that his name is “Kabandha Ātharvaṇa.” This Gandharva then asked Patañcala Kāpya and his students: ‘Tell me, Kapya, do you know the connection on which this and the next world, as well as all beings, are connected? 'That, my lord, I do not know,' said Patañcala Kāpya. The Gandareva then asked Patañcala Kāpya and his students: “Tell me, Kapya, do you know the inner controller of this world and the next, as well as of all beings, who controls them from within?” “I do not know that, my Lord,” replied Patañcala Kāpya. The Gandharva then told Patañcala Kāpya and his students “For certain, Kapya, if one knows what that connection is and who that inner controller is, he knows Brahman; he knows all the worlds; he knows the devas; he knows the Vedas; he knows the spirits; he knows the self; he knows everything.” (BU 3.7.1)

In this case a man has allowed his wife to be possessed by a male-sexed spirit, speaks deferentially to this possessing spirit, and shows himself to be ignorant about the self and Brahman. Brahman, the substance of growth, development of the self, is antithetical to external manipulation, possession, and influence. Indeed, someone who is allowing their own self to participate in its rightful substance of Brahman, Growth, and Development, would be self-governing and self transformative. Possession by some other personality is an impediment to such self

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development. It is also quite absurd that the possessing entity should decide to ask and lecture about Brahman, the self, and the inner-controller, having overridden the self and inner control of the unnamed wife in this case. The entire scenario is absurd. This vignette serves to illustrate what a failure to be devoted to Brahman is like but in a political dimension: it is male dominated, and misogynistic, with a lack of self-determination. It is constituted by ignorance by way of external manipulation. This is then the stark contrast against which Gārgī declares herself to be one who engages in battle herself (a warrior son) and completes her salvo with victory. Given that the preceding dialogue references a Brahmin’s wife who had been possessed by a male spirit, Gārgī’s self designation as a male warrior is significant: it not only shows that she is bolder than the Brahmins she is debating, but that she is a fighter, in sharp contrast to the unnamed Brahmin wife who allowed herself to be possessed by an alien male spirit. What I have been detailing is an explication of the BU, which renders the reasons for the various claims and contributions to the discourse explicit. An interpretive approach would look to what is familiar to our world view as the explanation. Given that we (those of us working in the English language) do not have many occasions to distinguish between sex and gender, given the political history of bi[-] genderism (cf. Gilbert, 2009), it is easy for us to not draw a distinction between sex and gender (treating gender as though it is reducible to sex), but also thereby read plays on gender as comments about sex. An interpretive approach, uninterested in reasons for claims being made (concerned instead for the truth of what the interpreter believes) ignores the relevance of the intervening discourse on the unnamed woman’s possession by the absurd male spirit. This intervening discourse serves to highlight the very philosophical worries about a natural world view that characterizes the early Vedas, where explanations were based on external forces. It was this worry that informed the dialectical switch to a radical non-natural proceduralism of Brahman and the self. Gārgī’s recalibration of her own presentation by not giving up on her own indomitable spirit is an expression of this philosophical development.

3.5 Philosophic Significance of the Dialogue We do not have any works written by Gārgī. We know about her philosophical work via the canonical BU. The dialogue described in the BU begins with Gārgī asking the question: “tell me-since this whole world is resting on water, on what, then, is water resting?” Yājñavalkya responds: “Gārgī, on air.” And this sets up a pattern. For every explanation to the question ‘what does this rest on,” Gārgī wishes to know what the explanation rests on. The question has two expectations. First, Gārgī wants to literally know what stands under something, and having identified this substance, she wishes to know what substance it rests on. But it is also a question about causality, in the sense of explanation and condition. To ask what something rests on is to understand the condition of the thing in question. So

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Gārgī next wants to know “On what, then, is air resting?” to which Yājñavalkya responds: “Gārgī, on the worlds of the intermediate region.” Gārgī next asks: “On what, then, are the worlds of the intermediate region resting?” Yājñavalkya responds: “Gārgī, on the worlds of the Gandharvas.” Gārgī asks, “On what, then, are the worlds of the Gandharvas resting?” To which Yājñavalkya responds “Gārgī, On the worlds of the sun.” Gārgī’s initial question pertains to transparent substances, like air, and water. This leads to astronomical explanations of various regions. But this brings us to questions of opaque substances, like the sun. Gārgī continues the pattern of questioning: “On what, then, are the worlds of the sun resting?” Yājñavalkya responds “Gārgī, on the worlds of the moon.” To which Gārgī asks “On what, then, are the worlds of the moon resting?” Yājñavalkya responds “Gārgī, on the worlds of the stars.” Now that we have entered the realm of non-opaque explanations, Gārgī’s questions lead to collections of such explanations. She asks, “On what, then, are the worlds of the stars resting?” Yājñavalkya responds, “Gārgī, on the worlds of the devas.” Gārgī asks, “On what, then, are the worlds of the devas resting?” Yājñavalkya responds, “Gārgī, on the worlds of Indra.” Indra is fashioned as the king of the devas. As the devas are the forces of nature, to ask about the worlds of Indra is to ask about the natural world at a very high level. Gārgī asks, “On what, then, are the worlds of Indra resting?” Yājñavalkya responds, “Gārgī, on the worlds of Prajāpati.” Prajāpati is the Lord of living things and is often fashioned as the creator deva. But to take the question to this level of analysis is to transcend the natural realm. For now we are no longer investigating natural causes for phenomena, but something far more personal. Now the question has led to the question of who decided to create living things. Prajāpati decided to make them. Gārgī asks, “On what, then, are the worlds of Prajāpati resting?” Yājñavalkya “Gārgī, on the worlds of Brahman.” Brahman, interpreted, is just another god. But explicated, we find that its literal meaning in Vedic and Sanskrit of growth, expansion, is illustrative. To bring the explanation to Brahman is to change the topic from what is natural to what is procedural (Brahman is the procedure of growth, expansion, development). Predictably, Gārgī asks, “On what, then, are the worlds of Brahman resting?” And this is a limit to Gārgī’s line of inquiry. Gārgī could ply her recursive inquiry of substances, until she transitioned out of the realm of natural explanation into the realm of personal explanation. Personal explanation, grounded in normative concepts of responsibility and choice, do not permit buck-passing explanations. In so far as a person chooses and is responsible for their choice, they are the explanations for their choice, not what they are standing or resting on. In the later tradition of Yoga based on these Upaniṣad explorations, the realm of natural explanation is identified as prakṛti or nature and is distinguished from puruṣa or the personal. The two metaphysical principles constitute a dichotomy between causal explanations that refer to external input, and normative explanations that have the opposite direction: from the individual out. Brahman, procedural metaphysics, is this explanatory expansion that takes the self as its center point.

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Yājñavalkya’s response is forbidding: “Gārgī, don't ask too many questions, or your head will explode! You are asking too many questions about a deva about whom one should not ask too many questions. So, Gārgī, don't ask too many questions.” The text goes on to claim that “Gārgī Vācaknavī then fell silent.” (3.6.1). Ethan Mills brings attention to the socio-political and philosophical complexities of this moment: What is going on here? Is Gārgī’s silence representing the fact that brahman is that which one cannot ask beyond (Lindquist, 2008)? Is it that her questions are the wrong way to know about brahman, as Śaṅkara and others have argued (Raveh, 2018)? Is this a violent terror tactic on the part of Yājñavalkya to keep her in her place (Vanita, 2003)? (Mills, 2020)

Mills proceeds by stating: I don’t in any way want to eliminate the possibility that Gārgī is being silenced in the way that women and other marginalized people have often been silenced as a tool of their marginalization, being told to shut up and know their place. (Mills, 2020)

While Mills is to be commended for his sensitivity, this worry does not fit with the explicatory significance of the text. We see that in the intervening dialogue between Gārgī’s unparalleled two challenges to Yājñavalkya, the authors of the Upaniṣad review the case of a male dominated home where a woman’s entire persona is taken over by a man, as emblematic of a lack of appreciation for Brahman and self. She does not speak because of self-restraint but because she has been imprisoned by an occupying male force that is treated with reverence. It is misogyny on display. When we put this into context, Gārgī’s decision to heed Yājñavalkya’s warning is depicted in a different light. Here, Gārgī is apparently exerting a self-restraint against lobbing questions at Yājñavalkya that she did not entertain before. But Mills gives plenty of other references to the text to put this worry to rest. He observes that “falling silent is a common trope in the Upaniṣads.” He further observes that “...[al]most every man Yājñavalkya speaks to in the chapter three of the [BU] also falls silent, and the head of the man Śākalya actually does shatter apart ([BU] 3.9)” (Mills, 2020). The case of Śākalya is interesting and important. Śākalya attempts a very similar substantial reduction as Gārgī. Śākalya is the one who asks Yājñavalkya how many devas there are, and every answer is then treated as an occasion for a new question. Each time, the number of devas Yājñavalkya declares diminishes until he reduces them all to Brahman. Śākalya continues, attempting the kind of substantial reduction Gārgī attempts, but topics raised and the answers given by Yājñavalkya are much less naturalistic, and rely upon concepts of choice and responsibility. Śākalya asks “On what are you and your self (ātman) founded?” to which Yājñavalkya responds, “On the out-breath.” To which Śākalya asks “On what is the out-breath founded?” Yājñavalkya responds to a few more iterations of this line of questioning until the answer is “About this self (ātman), one can only say ‘not-, not-”—which is to say that no positive account of the self is possible when what counts as a positive answer is something empirical. Yājñavalkya continues: “I ask you about that person providing the hidden connection—the one

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who carries off these other persons, brings them back, and rises above them? If you will not tell me that, your head will explode.” It turns out that Śākalya didn’t know the answer and “his head did, indeed, explode. Robbers, moreover, stole his bones, mistaking them for something else” (3.9.1-26). The ending of this passage is humorous, and it mocks Śākalya. Gārgī in contrast is not mocked but given a warning. What then could the head exploding really be? Assuming that philosophical perplexity doesn’t actually cause one’s head to explode, it is a metaphor for philosophical perplexity that knows no solution. In asking the question of what substance Brahman is grounded in, one fails to appreciate that Brahman is the ultimate procedural substance of all inquiry—the source of one’s own responsibility to engage in inquiry. It is by virtue of one’s own growth and expansion that one can entertain philosophical questions. And while natural explanations might be susceptible to an endless chain of substantial reduction, when we enter into the personal realm, the buck stops with ourselves as people responsible for what we are doing. Brahman is the substance of the self, our center of responsibility. And so Yājñavalkya teaches in the intervening dialogue between Gārgī’s two interactions, “Your self that is present within but is different from the mind, whom the mind does not know, whose body is the mind, and who controls the mind from within, that is the inner controller, the immortal.” Moreover, “The self sees, but it can't be seen; it hears, but can't be heard; it thinks, but it can't be thought of; it perceives, but it can't be perceived. Besides the self, there is no seeing, hearing, thinking, and perceiving. It is this self of yours who is the inner controller, the immortal. Everything else is misfortune” (BU 3.7.20, 23). One’s head explodes when one attempts to look for a further substantial explanation to inquiry as such—an explanation beyond the self-responsibility of Brahman. For while what we inquire into may be something external to us and is amenable to further substantial reduction, our responsibility in engaging in such inquiry is not. Gārgī’s return to the debate is remarkable for its bravado, and for the fact that she alone, having been rebuked, attempts a second interaction with Yājñavalkya. She begins by announcing “Distinguished Brahmins!” she said, “I am going to ask this man two questions. If he can give me the answers to them, none of you will be able to defeat him in a debate on procedural basics (Brahman).” Yājñavalkya invites Gārgī to ask the question. She continues: “I rise to challenge you, Yājñavalkya, with two questions, much as a fierce warrior son…, stringing his unstrung bow and taking two deadly arrows in his hand, would rise to challenge a rival. Give me the answers to them!” Yājñavalkya invites Gārgī to ask her question again. She then asks: “The things above the sky, the things below the Earth, and the things between the Earth and the sky, as well as all those things people here refer to as past, present, and future, on what, Yājñavalkya, are all these resting?” This is both similar and different from her previous salvos at Yājñavalkya. She is back to asking about substantial reductions, but in this case she is asking about an entire class of things, past, future and present—and she asks if they are mutually interdependent—do they function as substances for each other? Yājñavalkya responds that “these things are all resting.” Gārgī on the face

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of it approves of this answer: “All honor to you, Yajnavalkya. You really cleared that up for me! Get ready for the second.” Perhaps as a joke, she re-asks the same question and receives the same answer, having declared that the first response really cleared things up. But having re-asked the question and having re-received the same response, she continues: “On what, then, is space resting?” (BU 3.81-7) Yājñavalkya replies: That, Gargi, is the imperishable, and Brahmins refer to it like this: it is neither coarse nor fine; it is. neither short nor long; it has neither blood nor fat; it is without shadow or darkness; it is without air or space; it is without contact; it has no taste or smell; it is without sight or hearing; it is without speech or mind; it is without energy, breath, or mouth; it is beyond measure; it has nothing within it or outside of it; it does not eat anything; and no one eats it. (BU 3.8.8)

This response is what we would expect given the distinction between Brahman as a procedural substance of the self, and natural phenomena: the former is not observable although the latter are. But Yājñavalkya continues: Gārgī, this is the indestructible who commands the sun and the moon to stand apart. Gārgī, this is the indestructible who commands the Earth and the sky to stand apart. Gārgī, this is the indestructible who commands seconds and hours, days and nights, fortnights and months, seasons and years to stand apart. (BU 3.8.9)

This is easy to misread as a natural explanation about observable phenomena. But as it’s based on Brahman, the procedural basis of the self, it is rather an epistemic account of how developing and expanding oneself leads to interacting with the world in a manner that enforces distinctions—on the basis of the normative foundations of the self. He continues: Gārgī, without understanding this indestructible, even if one were to make offerings, to offer sacrifices, and to perform penance in this world for many thousands of years, all that would come to naught. Gārgī, pitiful is the one who departs from this world without knowing the indestructible. (3.8.10).

With this Yājñavalkya summarizes the dialectic of this tradition of philosophy: one that begins with the instrumental naturalism of the early Vedas and concludes with the procedural non-naturalism of the latter Vedas. This leads him to conclude: “Gārgī, on this indestructible space is resting” (BU 3.8.11). Gārgī ends her directed questioning of Yājñavalkya with the following: “Distinguished Brahmins!.. You should consider yourself lucky if you escape from this man by merely paying him your respects. None of you will ever defeat him in a philosophical debate” (3.8.12). The text concludes “Then, Vācaknavī fell silent.”

3.6 Conclusion What could it mean that Yājñavalkya cannot be beaten? If Yājñavalkya’s point is to elucidate the procedural priority of Brahman in inquiry and hence in philosophical debate, one could not reject Yājñavalkya’s position without undermining one’s

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own claim to participating in the discussion. And with this observation and appreciation of Yājñavalkya’s position, not to mention Gārgī’s own self-assured self transformation in light of Yājñavalkya’s criticism and the intervening dialogue that depicts the vignette of misogyny and patriarchy, Gārgī has also shown herself to be unbeatable.

References Adamson, P., & Ganeri, J. (2016). Better half: Women in ancient India. In History of philosophy without any gaps. https://historyofphilosophy.net/women-india Bouy, C. (1994). Les Natha-yogin et les Upanisads: étuded’histoire de la littérature Hindoue (Vol. 62). Publications de l’Institut de civilisation indienne, Collège de France, Série in-8o. Boccard. Gilbert, M. A. (2009). Defeating bigenderism: changing gender assumptions in the twenty-first century. Hypatia, 24(3), 93–112. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20618166. Accessed 2021/01/23/. Johnson, W. J. (2009). Gārgī Vācaknavī. In A dictionary of Hinduism. Oxford University Press. Kripke, S. A. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press. Lindquist, S. E. (2008). Gender at Janaka’s court: Women in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad reconsidered. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 36(3), 405–426. Masuzawa, T. (2005). The invention of world religions: Or, how European universalism was preserved in the language of pluralism. University of Chicago Press. Mills, E. (2020). Learning from Gārgī’s silence. Indian Philosophy Blog. https://indianphilosophyblog.org/2020/02/05/learning-from-gargis-silence/ Monier-Williams, M. (1995). In Greatly enlarged and improved (Ed.), A Sanskrit-English dictionary: Etymologically and philologically arranged, with special reference to cognate IndoEuropean languages. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers (Originally published Oxford University Press 1872, enlarged 1899). Norelius, P.-J. (2015). Strīkāmā vai gandharvāḥ. Spirit-possession, women, and initiation in Vedic India. Acta Orientalia, 76, 13–87. Olivelle, P. (1996). Upaniṣads. Oxford University Press. Patañjali. (2008). Patañjali's Yoga Sūtra: Translation, Commentary and Introduction by Shyam Ranganathan. Penguin Black Classics. Paulos, G. (2002). Neoplatonism and Indian philosophy (Vol. 9). Studies in Neoplatonism. State University of New York Press. Pritchard, S. (2011). The readers' editor on… Actor or actress? The Gaurdian. Sun 25 September. https://www.theguardian.com/theobserver/2011/sep/25/readers-editor-actor-or-actress Ranganathan, S. (2017a). Three Vedāntas: Three accounts of character, freedom and responsibility. In S. Ranganathan (Ed.), The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Ethics (pp. 249– 274). Bloomsbury Academic. Ranganathan, S. (2017b). The west, the primacy of linguistics, and indology. In S. Ranganathan (Ed.), The Bloomsbury research handbook of Indian ethics (pp. 59–84). Bloomsbury Academic. Ranganathan, S. (2018). Hinduism: A contemporary philosophical investigation (p. 2018). Routledge. Ranganathan, S. (2022). Modes of interpretation. In W. Schweiker, D. A. Clairmont, & E. Bucar (Eds.), Encyclopedia of religious ethics. Wiley Blackwell. Raveh, D. (2018). Silence or silencing? Revisiting the Gārgī-Yājñavalkya debate in chapter 3 of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 35, 159–147.

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Santucci, J. A. (1976). An outline of Vedic literature. Aids for the Study of Religion Series No. 5. Scholars Press for the American Academy of Religion. The Aitareya Brahmanam of the Rigveda (1922). The Sacred Books of the Hindus (Ed.) (Vol. 2, M. Haug, Trans.). Sudhindra Nath Vas, M.B. Vanita, R. (2003). The self is not gendered: Sulabha’s debate with King Janaka. NWSA Journal, 15(2), 76–93.

Chapter 4

Section of painting by unknown artist, in public domain due to antiquity of the original

Maitreyī of India मैत्रेयी Circa 1100–500 BCE Shyam Ranganathan Abstract Maitreyī has been renown since antiquity for her contributions to philosophy. In this chapter, her views as a proponent of Advaita (Monism) are explained. She was an explicator of a monistic approach to value that argues that the true Self, Ātman, is the basis of the highest values we hold and that knowledge of one’s true identity as Ātman, can be followed by acquiring a first person appreciation of one’s identity as Ātman. That deep axiological understanding, not merely intellectual comprehension, is liberation. Maitreyī (or someone by that name) is reported by the ancient epic Mahābhārata to have remained unmarried, but in one of the earliest of Upaniṣads, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Maitreyī is described as a philosopher (brahmavādhinī) married to the sage Yājñavalkya. Regardless of her marital status, a dialogue with Yājñavalkya is preserved in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad in which she explicates the function of Ātman, its unity with Brahman (Growth, Expansion, Development), and discusses the nature of love and its role in the self who is seeking liberation. That dialogue is explored and discussed in this chapter.

S. Ranganathan (*)  York University, Toronto, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_4

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4.1 Introduction Maitreyī as described in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (BU)1 (perhaps eighth century BCE) was a person known for her skill in philosophical discussion and research. Her contribution to the philosophical dialogue that we have preserved in the Upaniṣad is modest but important and telling. Like others praised and celebrated in this tradition, Maitreyī is credited for having both the right motivation with respect to philosophy (to value it over monetary concerns) and to correlatively ask the right questions that lead to dispositive answers. Maitreyī hence engages in the essential philosophical task of explication: rendering reasons for conclusions explicit. The question that Maitreyī asks pertains to the self (Ātman) as the procedural ground of existence. And the answer she receives from her departing philosopher husband emphasizes the role that the self plays as first principle in philosophical questions, but also social relations. Ironically, as her husband is departing for retirement from the homemaker’s life and towards a life of renunciation (which practically renders Maitreyī a widow). Yājñavalkya’s departure triggers a discussion on love. Accordingly, love is made possible and for the sake of the Self. But this is no argument of ethical egoism. The Self of this tradition is a procedural abstraction and foundation of all personal and philosophical relevance. The very possibilities of love for others rests upon an appreciation of our common interest in such a procedurally sovereign Self. Love, the dialogue teaches us, is not the same as attachment. Maitreyī demonstrates this love in pursuing the philosophical question of the Self in the first place. Also, perhaps the implication of Maitreyī’s example is that love is not selfish, and to love is to let go.

4.2 Biography We learn about Maitreyī in the fifth section of the fourth book of the BU. We meet her as Yājñavalkya announces to her that he has decided to depart married and settled life. What is implied is that he will be taking up a fourth stage of life practiced by Brahmins: renunciation. There we are introduced to Maitreyī as the wife of Yājñavalkya, and sister wife of Kātyāyanī. Maitreyī is introduced as a brahmavādhinī. This appears to be a term of appraisal that describes the person in question as skilled and practiced in philosophical discussion. It is notably formed in the female gender, providing no grounds for juxtaposing Maitreyī’s sex with her role as a philosopher. In other words, her philosophical skill is affirmed as feminine (in gender). Yet, Kātyāyanī is described, in contrast, as a strīprajñaiva—someone with a woman’s knowledge, which pragmatically (not semantically) amounted to the

1 Translations

of the BU here are mine but in many cases they coincide with Patrick Olivelle’s. See Olivelle (1996).

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knowledge of the homemaker. It appears that the authors are contrasting Maitreyī as a woman philosopher with Kātyāyanī as someone who has knowledge of a woman’s role as per conventions of the day. The role that Kātyāyanī is expert on requires material support: in so far as someone is a homemaker, according to convention, they are not earning an income to support homemaking. Yet, being a woman philosopher and having knowledge of womanly matters as per convention, is not mutually exclusive: one could have both capacities and knowledge. But the authors of the dialogue describe Maitreyī as someone who is uninterested with a material settlement necessary to maintain the life of the homemaker, and Kātyāyanī for her part is described as uninterested in philosophical knowledge. This might suggest that Maitreyī was professionally successful on her own terms as a philosopher.

4.3 Philosophical Achievement: To understand Maitreyī’s philosophical importance we need to take a step back to consider methodological options for understanding philosophy. This leads us to an appreciation of the basic options of moral philosophy explored in the South Asian tradition, which shows that Maitreyī falls within an important tradition of Yoga/ Bhakti philosophy. This illuminates the importance of the kind of philosophical activity Maitreyī engages in: asking the right question on the basis of an appropriate motivation. After having investigated these issues, we will be in a position to examine Maitreyī’s influence on the tradition.

4.3.1 Understanding Maitreyī’s Contribution In an intellectual world dominated by the West’s tradition (a tradition linking contemporary intellectual activity to ancient roots in Greek culture and philosophy) certain assumptions structure conventional research into non-western traditions, and these are the same assumptions that animate contemporary philosophy in its Analytic and Continental forms. The kernel of this tradition is what we might call the linguistic model of thought. It is the notion that thought is primarily sentential or linguistic meaning—a model with roots in the ancient Greek idea of logos: one word for thought, reason and words. If we adopt this model of thought, then to understand a thought is to understand it in terms of what one would say. This gives rise to the explanatory model commonly called interpretation: the notion that understanding is always explanation in terms of one’s beliefs, which is what one would say. I call this intellectual tradition the West, to distinguish its intellectual and colonial legacy from the accidental geographic matter of being western. Given the historical roots of this model (cf. Derrida, 1998), it is unsurprising that eminent figures of Continental and Analytic philosophy tacitly or explicitly endorse interpretation, as an account of how to understand aliens at the margins of familiarity.

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This model (and it’s more foundational linguistic model of thought) creates inordinate amounts of problems for accounting for translation given the reality of linguistic differences.2 What is ignored in this tradition is that this model of thought violates every basic criterion of reasoning taught to beginning students in critical thinking and logic classes: understanding an argument is not an explanation in terms of what one takes to be true or would say, as logical inference is not reducible to what one takes to be true, or what one would say, or even truth! Logical inference is about inferential support that evidence or premises provide for a conclusion. In the case of deduction, we say that an argument is valid, just in case if the premises are true, the conclusion has to be true. Valid arguments can be comprised of false premises and conclusion, and a jumble of true claims can constitute an invalid argument. Nevertheless, given the Western cultural underpinnings of interpretation, its problems have not been pointed out until recently, and it has constituted the default approach to the study of South Asian philosophy (Ranganathan, 2017a, 2022). Hence, when I entered graduate school, in the 1990s, the common view was that South Asian philosophers spoke about every issue, except moral and political issues. Here is the influential Bimal Matilal, former Spalding Professor of Eastern Religion and Ethics at Oxford, giving voice to this dogma: Professional philosophers of India over the last two thousand years have been consistently concerned with the problems of logic and epistemology, metaphysics and soteriology, and sometimes they have made very important contributions to the global heritage of philosophy. But, except some cursory comments and some insightful observations, the professional philosophers of India have very seldom discussed what we call “moral philosophy” today. (Matilal, 1989, p. 5, my emphasis)

Matilal’s views are representative of what I call Orthodox Indology and continue to this day in so far as scholars depict South Asian philosophy as primarily religious or spiritual and correspondingly not concerned with moral and political philosophy.3 What is notable about Matilal’s explanation here is his explicit argument by way of interpretation: South Asian philosophers (like Maitreyī) didn’t do moral philosophy because they don’t do what we call moral philosophy today in a Westernized world. If that’s the standard of assessment, then South Asian philosophers’ philosophical independence from the Western tradition will be counted as evidence that they didn’t think about moral and political issues. And this is an overwhelmingly convenient piece of colonial propaganda that renders South Asian thinkers as uninterested in practical questions and requiring enrichment by Western thinkers who do what we call moral philosophy today. Given the cultural roots of interpretation in a global imperial tradition of the West, the solution to the challenge of understanding philosophy non-interpretively seems obscure—that is, unless we return to the basics of logic and critical

2  For

a review of the literature and these problems, as well as a solution, see Ranganathan (2018a). 3 Cf. Ranganathan (2017d) for a review of the literature.

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thinking. What I have shown is that in contrast to interpretation, we can engage in what might be called explication. There are two steps to explication. First, we employ logical validity to derive, from what is said by a perspective, a theory (set of propositions) that logically entails its controversial conclusions about a term t. Second, we compare contradictory and contrary theories of t in a tradition and identify the concept T as what the competing theories converge on as they disagree. Both steps can be explained in terms of logical validity. An important implication of explication is that there is no possibility of understanding philosophy, and the contribution of a modest person like Maitreyī, without appreciating how a philosopher’s activity contributes to our understanding of contrasting and competing philosophical options. In effect, to understand something relatively small, like Maitreyī’s very few lines in the BU, we need to understand the possibilities of the disagreements of philosophy as such. And logic, not our beliefs, is what gets us there. Applying this to South Asian philosophy, we see that there was one term, “dharma”, that philosophers had conflicting theories about (theories that may have been under-articulated but were entailed by what they said and entailed their controversial claims about “dharma”) and the concept that they converged on as they disagree was  THE RIGHT OR THE GOOD—the basic concept of moral philosophy. Applied across traditions (to “ethics,” or “morality” in the European tradition, or “tao” in the Chinese tradition) you would discern the same concept at play. What this shows us is that disagreements about dharma are continuous with moral philosophical disagreements across cultures. What renders this explicit is the methodology of explication. We couldn’t come to this insight if we employed interpretation: rather, we would deny the moral philosophical significance of alien philosophy in proportion to its divergence from what “we” call ethics. This insight structured the editing of the Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Ethics, which provided the first, systematic and broad survey of classical South Asian moral philosophy by a group of scholars in print.4 If we explicate the South Asian tradition, we find that there are four basic ethical theories—three are found outside of South Asia, and one is unique to South Asia. With respect to Hinduism, a label for the entirety of indigenous South Asian philosophical disagreements with no common originator, we find all four options internal to this designation as well (Ranganathan, 2019). All in all, contrary to the conclusion we derive from interpretation, explication shows that moral philosophy was the primary preoccupation of South Asian Philosophy, having explored four basic ethical theories, not entirely explored in all traditions. These four ethical theories are further divisible into two groups: teleological theories and procedural theories.

4 There were previous attempts at scholarship on the matter, but these were collections of interpretations and thereby unsystematic. See for instance Bilimoria et al. (2007, Ranganathan, 2017b).

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Teleological Theories • Virtue Ethics: The Good (often character) conditions or produces the Right (often choice). • Consequentialism: The Good (outcome) justifies the Right (choice or action). Procedural Theories • Deontology: The Right (choice, or decision procedure) justifies the Good (commission or omission of action). • Yoga/Bhakti: (Devotion to the ideal of) The Right (Īśvara, or Brahman) conditions or produces the Good (which is the perfection of the practice). The last option, Yoga/Bhakti, is peculiar to the South Asian tradition. It is perhaps older than the Vedas, and not derivable from the shared Indo-European roots of the Vedas. The Vedas (1500 BCE–500 BCE) are divided into an earlier and later portion. The earlier portion of this South Asian literature shares with other IndoEuropean cultures a view of the world as dominated by gods that are often natural forces and objects. In South Asia, this worldview gave rise to a largely teleological approach to reasoning, where actions that are performed are meant to propitiate gods in the hopes of good outcomes. Yoga/Bhakti emerges on the scene in the latter part of the Vedas.5 At this point, authors begin entertaining an alternate set of explanations: it is not the external forces that account for our lives, but ourself (Ātman) founded on the more basic procedural substance of Growth, Expansion and Development (Brahman). This latter part of the tradition is where we find expressed, for the first time, the philosophy of Yoga. As this tradition explicates its own reasons, we find that a central commitment of this paradigm is the notion that our essence is sovereignty (Īśvara, but also Brahman), and that living in keeping with this procedural essence brings about the good of our life. Key to an argument for the Yoga paradigm is a contrast between a teleological and naturalistic paradigm, on the one hand, where things seem desirable for instrumental and external reasons, and the internal, procedural option of Yoga. To opt for the procedural option is to self-consciously and actively choose a life devoted to self-sovereignty. In fact, we could formulate a basic argument in this tradition as a kind of disjunctive syllogism: • Either we should opt for instrumental-naturalism, or we should adopt a radically procedural approach to organizing our life or the data (devoted to Īśvara, or based on Brahman). • We should reject instrumental naturalism as being second rate. • Therefore, we ought to adopt a life that is radically procedural (devoted to Īśvara, or based on Brahman).

5 Cf.

Ranganathan (2017c), for an overview of the history and development; (2018b).

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This argument shows up in different forms. Later in the tradition, in the Yoga Sūtra (I.2–4), for instance, the two options are rephrased as a contrast between interpretation (an account based on how we think the way things are) which is elucidated as nature (prakṛti) in contrast to explication, which reduces understanding to personal responsibility (puruṣa) to organize mental content (as we do when we formulate a valid deductive argument). A key feature of the earlier formulations of this argument is that it arises within the context of dialogue and at the prompting of the noble questioner. Questioning is an important part of the Yogic tradition for it allows us to put aside our assumptions and consider the options. Questioning is not interminable. When we appreciate what is involved in the very act of posing the question, an activity not externally determined, but internally motivated by our own concern for our own sovereignty—at least over the issue at hand—we find that the procedural option of Yoga is indispensable (what we are already involved in), and the alternatives are thereby second rate. Asking the question serves to bootstrap the case for Yoga, the radically procedural option. The result is an explication of the considerations, including the dissenting option of instrumental naturalism. One classic exploration in the Upaniṣads that exemplifies the noble questioner and this Disjunctive Syllogism is found in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad between the boy Nāciketa who meets the god of Death ahead of time and puts the question to him of whether there is anything like life after death. Death tries to discourage the boy by offering him trinkets that would be attractive to those who opt for the instrumental naturalism of the early Vedas. Nāciketa declines by depicting that option as second rate. Death is thereby pleased with Nāciketa’s penetrating insight into the more basic problems of life and thereby provides Nāciketa with one of the very earliest lessons in Yoga, by way of the model of the chariot.6 According to Yama, the body is like a Chariot in which the Self sits. The intellect (buddhi) is like the charioteer. The senses (indriya) are like horses, and the mind (mānasa) is the reins. The Enjoyer is the union of the self, senses, mind and intellect. The objects of the senses are like the roads that the chariot travels. People of poor understanding do not take control of their horses (the senses) with their mind (the reins). Rather, they let their senses draw them to objects of desire, leading them to ruin. According to Yama, the person with understanding reins in the senses with the mind and intellect (Kaṭha Upaniṣad I.2). This is (explicitly called) Yoga (Kaṭha Upaniṣad II.6). Those who practise yoga reach their Self in a final place

6 Philosophy is filled with interesting allegories of the chariot: all proving something different. Whereas Death employs the allegory to show that there is a self-distinct from the mind, body, senses and intellect, the Buddhist Questions of King Malinda (Milindapañha) argues the opposite: no such self is to be found, if we take the chariot as the allegory for the self. Plato uses the model to explicate the nature of the soul. All souls are comprised of a charioteer and winged horses. The charioteer (the person) is the intellect, but the characters of the horses differ. Gods have noble horses, while humans are stuck with one good horse, and one troublesome horse (Phaedrus 246a–54e).

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of security (Viṣnu's abode—Viṣnu is the deity of preservation).7 This is the place of the Great Self and immortality (Kaṭha Upaniṣad I.3). There is no evil here. Death’s answer in effect is that Death, the loss of control, is something we must contend with. But if we lose control to ourselves, we self-control and the result is our own success as people. If we instead strive after objects of desire, we will steer ourselves in an unhealthy manner and lose control: but this time to the external environment, not to oneself. Implicitly this is a criticism of value as something subject to moral luck.8 In the case of being drawn to objects of desire by one’s senses, the ability to enjoy those objects are undermined by factors outside of one’s control, specifically those brought on by a lack of self-control. But, in contrast, the benefits of a life of Yoga yields outcomes that are not substantially distinct from the self (such as one’s safe arrival at a place of preservation), and yet are not subject to moral luck as they are indistinguishable from one’s own choices and actions. This move to treat value as something that is not subject to moral luck is brought about by a devotion to the self’s interest in being sovereign. Later in the tradition, Arjuna in the Bhagavad Gītā (in the famous Sixth Book of the Mahābhārata) will not only be a self-driven in a chariot, with Kṛṣṇa (Īśvara or sovereignty, an incarnation of Viṣṇu) as his charioteer: he will also be forced to reckon with mortality but also the options of life. Kṛṣṇa persuades him to reject teleological modes of thinking in favour of a more basic proceduralism of Yoga. In the BU, we find Maitreyī occupying the position of the enlightened inquirer, much like the boy Nāciketa who faces Death ahead of time. Like Nāciketa, Maitreyī does not need to be persuaded of the importance of understanding and devotion to the self. However, unlike Nāciketa, she does not assume the value of knowledge of the self but rather inquires into the value of the alternative grounded in instrumental naturalism. Upon departing, Yājñavalkya says, “Maitreyī, I am about to go away from this place. So come, let me make a settlement between you and Katyayani.” In response, Maitreyī asks: “If I were to possess the entire world filled with wealth, blessed one, would it, or would it not, make me immortal?” —echoing a concern shared with Nāciketa. “No,” says Yājñavalkya, “it will only permit you to live the life of a wealthy person. Through wealth one cannot expect immortality.” Maitreyī’s further response is very much like that of Nāciketa: “What is the point in getting something that will not make me immortal?” retorted Maitreyī. “Blessed one: tell me instead everything that you know.” What ensues is a discussion about the self, but one that depicts the self as the substance of value on the whole. Yājñavalkya argues that all things, including loved ones, are valuable by virtue of the self. Moreover, in yogic fashion, the goods of life are not depicted as external to the self, but rather as a function of the self. The argument is quite easily and superficially construed as a form of ethical

7 Viṣṇu

is the deity of preservation. In Hindu lore, his consort is depicted as Bhūmi Devī: Mother Earth. To go to the realm of Viṣṇu is to be never far from Earth. 8 For an exploration of the notion of moral luck, see Nagel 2007.

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egoism, where anything worth taking seriously is something good by way of the preferences of the self. But this isn’t the argument. Rather, the argument has to do with the metaphysics of value: that the genuine goods of life are good by virtue of the self. And that is because in the Yogic paradigm, the goods that are desirable are those that are not subject to moral luck and are hence not substantially distinct from the perfected practice of the self. Given the importance of the enlightened inquirer to the unfolding of Yoga’s main argument, Maitreyī deserves full credit (as does Nāciketa) for initiating an explication of the arguments in favour of Yoga. Interpretively, in contrast, we would have to downgrade our assessment of Maitreyī’s role as a philosopher as she does not assert very much that one could agree to by way of one’s own beliefs—in part because she is recorded as saying so little. To interpret would be to adopt an approach to understanding the argument that is contra-logical. By explicating, and sticking close to the requirements of logic, especially deductive validity, we see that Maitreyī is a philosophical participant in the full disclosure of philosophical considerations, showing herself to be a brahmavādhinī.

4.3.2 Vedānta It is not uncommon to interpret this section of the BU and Maitreyī’s discussion as a defence of a position later known as Advaita Vedānta—this is a position that is generated as a commentary on the Upaniṣads, and the summary of the Upaniṣads, known as the Vedānta Sūtra. The most famous proponent of Advaita Vedānta is Ādi Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara’s position is that there is one universal Self (and no—a— second—dvaita) and that common ideas of individuality are a function of a superimposition of the pure subjectivity of this universal Self on the phenomena—also somehow generated by the Self (see his commentary on the Vedānta Sutra, especially the preamble). This interpretation is triggered by Yājñavalkya’s cautionary comments about the opposite of advaita, namely dvaita (secondness). Yājñavalkya in articulating the position on value criticizes secondness: For when there is a second (dvaita) of some kind, then the one can see the other, the one can smell the other, the one can taste the other, the one can greet the other, the one can hear the other, the one can think of the other, the one can touch the other, and the one can perceive the other. When, however, the Whole has become one's own self (ātman), who is there for one to see and by what means? … By what means can one perceive him by means of whom one perceives this whole world? (BU 4.5.15)

Explicated, we see that the argument here is not an argument for the Advaita Vedānta position as it does not deny there being secondary objects of note, after the self. It is rather an explication of how the world transforms experientially when we give the self its procedural priority—as when the self is given the procedural priority in the well-driven chariot. In the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, there is no longer a substantial difference between the content of experience and action of the self.

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The later Vedānta philosopher who draws faithfully on many of these elements of Yoga, but also the emphasis of value and love as a function of the devotion to the self is Rāmānuja, and Maitreyī’s explication contributes many of the reasons and considerations that make its way into Rāmānuja’s model, which on some accounts is the most influential philosophical position in South Asia in modern times (Potter, 1963, pp. 252–253). Accordingly, individual selves and objects are expressions or modes of Brahman (Development, Expansion, Growth) which is the body of an ultimate self (Īśvara). By devotion to that ideal, which is our normative essence, we bring about the goods of our life. Rāmānuja claims that Bhakti (love, devotion) is itself a kind of knowledge that reveals all that is superlative and of value. Two passages from Rāmānuja are worth mentioning here: The means of attainment of Development (Brahman) is ultimate love (parabhakti), which is of the nature of meditation that has become an object of supreme attachment (to the meditator) and has acquired the vividness of clearest perception.... This ultimate love is to be attained through the path of devotion, which in its turn is aided by responsible action… Love is a particular kind of knowledge (jñāna). (Rāmānuja, Vedārthasaṅgraha §238.)

This echoes themes of this discussion between Maitreyī and Yājñavalkya: responsible action allows for an appreciation of what is loved. But more to the point of the metaphysics of value as tied to the self, when given procedural priority: But love is the same thing as joy. . . Entities other than Development (Brahman) can be objects of joy only to a certain extent and for some time. But Development is such that cognizing of It is an infinite and abiding joy. Since the form of cognition as joy is determined by its object, Development itself is joy. . . (Rāmānuja, Vedārthasaṅgraha §239–241.)

The substantial basis or essence of the self, Brahman, is to be credited for things of value on Rāmānuja’s account. Here, he echoes commitments of Yājñavalkya’s and Maitreyī’s conversation: One holds a husband dear, you see, not out of love for the husband; rather, it is out of love for oneself (ātman) that one holds a husband dear. One holds a wife dear not out of love for the wife; rather, it is out of love for oneself that one holds a wife dear. One holds children dear not out of love for the children; rather, it is out of love for oneself that one holds children dear. One holds wealth dear not out of love for wealth; rather, it is out of love for oneself that one holds wealth dear. (BU 2.4.5)

An important entailment of this position of Yoga is that devotion to the self reveals objects of value. It is hence also, in addition to being a basic ethical theory, a theory of love (Ranganathan 2018a).

4.3.3 Social-Political Background: Four Stations of Life The BU like other Upaniṣads celebrate the Brahmin, characterized by intellectual leadership. Brahmins are one of the four classical castes of South Asia, trusted with the job of conserving the traditions knowledge (literally, veda) and also at

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this time in its history, innovating and pursuing a philosophical project that is quite out of step with its earlier stages. The word “Brahmana” was also used in ancient times as a term of praise for philosophers of great insight. Yājñavalkya is depicted as such an individual in the Upaniṣad, but explicitly so too is Maitreyī, as a brahmavādhinī, speaker or inquirer of matters related to Brahman or philosophy. The earlier stages of the Vedas, encoded in the Mantra (chant) and Brāhmaṇas (ritual manual) depict a nomadic lifestyle. The dominant thrust of philosophy in this context is naturalistic, concerned with the propitiation of natural forces (the gods of nature) by sacrifice.9 The philosophical shift consisted in an abandonment of a teleological approach to value, to a radical procedural account. But this was no doubt correlated with a background economic shift of this tradition from hunting and gathering to agriculture. This shift leads to the abandonment of nomadism and the institutionalization of the settled life. The tradition came to conceptualize this shift to the settled life as an abandonment of śrama, a word that was used to mean ‘fatigue’ or ‘weariness,’ or ‘to labour, toil or exert oneself.’ (Olivelle, 1993, p. 9). It is from here that we get the idea of being a śramaṇa—a term used for philosophers who leave conventional, settled life to solve philosophical problems, such as the Buddha, or Mahāvīra, the last Ford Maker (Virtue Exemplar) of the Jain tradition. Āśrama (not śrama) is the Brahminical rejection of this mode of life. The word itself, āśrama, came to mean ‘station,’ or place or residence. In time, the Brahmanical tradition came to recognize four settled states: “student, householder, hermit, and renouncer” (Olivelle, 1993, p. 74). When we meet Maitreyī in the Upaniṣad, Yājñavalkya appears to be embracing the fourth āśrama, of renunciation, in so far as he is leaving home. But this fourth station is in a way an incorporation of the śramaṇa mode of existence, in so far as renunciation is not an easy mode of existence and involves struggle. Maitreyī’s questions about the value of material wealth and her stated preference for abandoning material wealth in favour of philosophy allows Maitreyī to participate in this fourth station of life with Yājñavalkya. Kātyāyanī in contrast opts for a different existence, with little changed from her former mode of life, save for the absence of her husband. But Maitreyī’s abandonment of material concerns is paradoxical. As noted, she may have been independently successful as a philosopher and teacher, given that she is described as a brahmavādhinī, and so she may not have been in the same need of wealth as Kātyāyanī. She does note that without the well-being of immortality, wealth is not useful. But the conversation quickly turns into a discussion of the metaphysics of all value, as something substantially connected with the self. Understanding that promises all wealth—or at least, the condition of all wealth. Hence, this variety of renunciation that she engages in actually is a long-term gain in support of all things of value.

9 For more detail on the Vedas and this, its dialectical switch from the earlier to later periods, see Chap. 3 on Gārgī in this volume.

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4.4 Philosophical Discourse As noted, our knowledge of Maitreyī’s philosophical activity is what is described in the BU, where she is described as a brahmavādhinī. The dialogue begins with Yājñavalkya announcing his departure and his invitation to arrive at a settlement with Maitreyī. Maitreyī asks about the value of material wealth, to which Yājñavalkya notes that it allows for the life of the wealthy person, but not immortality. Maitreyī responds with “What is the point in getting something that will not make me immortal?" She follows this with "Tell me instead all that you know." Yājñavalkya exclaims that Maitreyī had always been very dear to him, but in her response she made herself more dear to him. (BU 4.5.1–5). What follows is a two-part delivery by Yājñavalkya that is purportedly the summation of his philosophical insight. In the first delivery, Yājñavalkya explains that various objects of value are enjoyed or loved (kāma) not by virtue of the object but by virtue of the self. Hence, contrary to our ordinary means of crediting intentional objects for the value we ascribe to them, it is the priority of the self that renders value as such possible (BU 4.5.6). Summarizing, he claims: Maitreyī it is one's self (ātman) that should be seen and heard, and that one should reflect and concentrate on. When one has seen and heard one's self, when one has reflected and concentrated on one's self, therefore one knows everything. . . (BU 4.5.6)

The reason for the priority of the self as the source of value is that it is the self which renders possible what is valued. By analogy he claims: It is like this. When a drum is being beaten, you cannot grasp the sound external to you; you only grasp the sound by getting hold of the drum or someone beating it. Or when a conch is being blown, you cannot grasp the sound external to you; you grasp the sound only by getting hold of the conch or someone else blowing it… (BU 4.5.8)

In this last passage, Yājñavalkya elucidates that the argument is not one for subjectivism or solipsism. The point is that there is no possibility of understanding what you are hearing unless you can relate it to your action as something that allows both prediction and control. But then, the phenomena is not substantially distinct from your activity. Maitreyī herself is to this point unimpressed: "Now, blessed one, you have utterly confused me! I cannot discover this at all." (BU 4.5.14). It is important that Maitreyī explains why she does not understand. She is expecting the evidence to be external to the self. To which Yājñavalkya denies that there is anything confusing about what is said. Rather, the self is not something liable to demise as external objects are. Moreover, when one entertains any variety of second-ness, then one understands objects of inspection as secondary in relationship to oneself. But when one gives explanatory priority to the self, then what is valuable is substantially dependent on the self. When, however, the Whole has become one's own self (ātman), who is there for one to see and by what means? By what means can one perceive him by means of whom one perceives this whole world? (BU 4.5.15). Rather, one can only speak about the self negatively:

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About this self (Ātman), one can only say ‘not-, not-.' It is ungraspable, for it cannot be grasped. It is undecaying, for it is not subject to decay. It has nothing sticking to him, for it does not stick to anything. It is not bound; yet it neither trembles in fear nor suffers injury. (BU 4.5.15).

And with this, Yājñavalkya concludes: “You see, how can one perceive the perceiver? There, I have given you my knowledge, Maitreyī. There is nothing more to immortality." (BU 4.5.15). And this concludes the dialogue.

4.5 Conclusion While Maitreyī says very little in her discussion with Yājñavalkya, Maitreyī steps into the role of the perspicuous questioner. Perspicuous questioning is an important condition of the pursuit of philosophy in the Yogic mode, for it sets the grounds for rendering explicit the reasons in favour of a conclusion (in general). Perspicuous questioning also invites an insight into the boot strapping argument for Yoga: that in engaging in questioning, we are already relying upon the essential traits of the self, which is explanatorily prior to any answer we could arrive at. Maitreyī serves to trigger an explication of these considerations by Yājñavalkya, but the reasons that are forthcoming are a function of Maitreyī having both the appropriate motivation and asking the right questions. Moreover, the BU begins its introduction of Maitreyī by describing her as a brahmavādhinī, someone conversant in discussions about philosophy. Given her disinterest in short term material gain, she may have been independently successful as a philosopher. Given the inquiry she prompts, she arrives at an account of the basis of all value. Interpretive approaches to estimating Maitreyī’s importance will turn up short because Maitreyī says little that could be appraised by what one believes. Explicated, we find that Maitreyī is indeed a skillful philosopher, who triggers an explication of Yoga, but also basic procedural considerations that make inquiry possible at all.

References Bilimoria, P., Prabhu, J., & Sharma, R. M. (2007). Indian Ethics: Classical traditions and contemporary challenges. Ashgate. Derrida, J. (1998). Of Grammatology (Corrected). Johns Hopkins University Press. Matilal, B. K. (1989). Moral dilemmas: Insights from the Indian epics. In B. K. Matilal (Ed.), Moral Dilemmas in the Mahābhārata (pp. 1–19). Indian Institute of Advanced Study in association with Motilal Banarsidass Olivelle, P. (1993). The āśrama system the history and hermeneutics of a religious institution. Oxford University Press. Olivelle, P. (1996). Upaniṣads. Oxford University Press. Potter, K. H. (1963). Presuppositions of India‘s philosophies: Prentice-Hall Philosophy Series. Prentice-Hall

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Rāmānuja. (1968). Vedārthasaṅgraha (edition and translation). Translated by S.S. Ragavachar. Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama Ranganathan, S. (2017a). The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Ethics. Bloomsbury Academic Ranganathan, S. (2017b). Ethics and the history of Indian philosophy (2nd ed.). Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Ranganathan, S. (2017c). Three Vedāntas: Three accounts of character, freedom and responsibility. In S. Ranganathan (Ed.), The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Ethics (pp. 249– 274). Bloomsbury Academic Ranganathan, S. (2017d). ‘Philosophy, Religion and Scholarship’. In The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Ethics edited by Shyam Ranganathan, (pp. 35–58). Bloomsbury Academic Ranganathan, S. (2018a). Love: India’s distinctive moral theory. In A. Martin (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy (pp. 371–381). Routledge Ranganathan, S. (2018b). Vedas and Upaniṣads. In T. Angier (Ed.), The History of Evil in Antiquity 2000 B.C.E.–450 C.E. (pp. 239–255). Routledge Ranganathan, S. (2019). Bhakti: The fourth moral theory. In Hinduism: A contemporary philosophical investigation (pp. 58–78). Routledge Ranganathan, S. (2022). Modes of interpretation. In W. Schweiker, D. A. Clairmont, & E. Bucar (Eds.), Encyclopedia of religious ethics. Wiley Blackwell Śaṅkara (Ādi). (1994). The Vedānta Sūtras with the commentary by Śaṅkara (Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya). Translated by George Thibaut. Sacred books of the East 34 and 382 vols: url=http:// www.sacred-texts.com/hin/sbe34/sbe34007.htm.

Chapter 5

Rust on leather: Portrait by unknown artist, in public domain due to the antiquity of the original

Mahapajapati Gotami महाप्रजापती गौतमी Circa Sixth–Seventh Centuries BCE Supakwadee Amatayakul and Suwanna Satha-Anand Abstract  This philosopher was the biological aunt and foster mother of Siddartha Gotama, known as “the Buddha.” Living the ascetic life of a renunciant was widely accepted as a most direct path to enlightenment. Being historically and customarily tied to the domestic sphere implied that women were precluded from the ascetic life, and therefore from attaining nibbana. When Siddartha was grown and became enlightened as the Buddha, Mahapajapati entered into dialogue and demonstration with her foster son regarding the equal spiritual potential of men and women, both through direct interaction and through a deputy. Her love of and search for wisdom—specifically, the Buddhist path to nibbana—seemed thwarted S. Amatayakul (*) · S. Satha-Anand  IULM University, Milan, Italy e-mail: [email protected] S. Satha-Anand e-mail: [email protected] S. Satha-Anand  Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_5

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by the conventions surrounding her gender. Yet, she led and taught hundreds of female aspirants. In this chapter we focus on the philosophical arguments implicit in her actions as they must be understood in the context of Buddhist philosophy.

5.1 Introduction Mahapajapati Gotami, the Buddha’s aunt and foster mother, was the first woman to request full ordination for women directly from the Buddha. Once granted, she became the first bhikkhuni or fully ordained Buddhist nun during the time of the Buddha Gotama. It was in response to a series of repeated requests for ordination both by Mahapajapati Gotami herself and on her behalf that the Buddha expressed a great Buddhist truth about the spiritual potential of women to become fully enlightened, and by extension about the universal nature of female and male humans. Through Mahapajapati Gotami’s determination and careful negotiations with the Buddha in the existing order of the ancient Hindu society, we learn how the bhikkhuni sangha or the female monk order came into being during the dispensation of the Buddha Gotama, as we also learn how institutional restrictions necessary for establishing the bhikkhuni order were managed and navigated. In the Pali Canon, details surrounding Mahapajapati Gotami’s request for full ordination are found in the Anguttara Nikaya (A VIII 51) and mirrored in the Vinaya Pitaka (Vin X 253–256). Immediately following the story of her ordination, the tenth chapter of the Cullavagga, a part of the Vinaya Pitaka also known as the Bhikkhuni Khandhaka, is entirely devoted to the rules of conduct for female monks.1 Mahapajapati Gotami’s life stories are also found in brief in the Therigatha (Thi 6.55 157–162) or the Verses of the Elder Nuns,2 and in much greater detail in the Theri-apadana (Thi-ap 17 226–415), a more elaborated extension of the female monks’ autobiographies contained in the Therigatha. In the Etadaggavagga of the Anguttara Nikaya (A I 235), the Buddha named her as his foremost bhikkhuni disciple in seniority. Stories of her past lives are also found in the Jataka and the commentaries.

5.2 Biography While the notion of “past lives” may sound somewhat unfamiliar to contemporary scholarship in philosophy, it has consistently played a significant role in influential philosophical works in both the Eastern and Western traditions. It may be interpreted as an analytic or a formal concept, or as an actual option. The importance 1 The

terms “female monk” is used to refer to bhikkhuni, and “male monk” to bhikkhu. Therigatha comprises 494 verses in which the elder bhikkhunis recount their long paths towards a life of renunciation and enlightenment as a result of their insight into the dhamma.

2 The

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of this concept for the contents of this chapter is twofold: firstly, it reminds us that in Buddhism, enlightenment is never achieved in a single lifetime, but is the result of continuous practice over countless cycles of rebirths. Secondly, together with the notion of “karma”, it explains how actions taken in one lifetime may have repercussions in other lifetimes in the countless cycles of rebirth.

5.2.1 Aspiration and Past Lives The Theri-apadana chapter on Mahapajapati Gotami, set on the day of her passing, recounts her youth and numerous past lives in flashbacks. It was said that she embarked on the path of the dhamma during the time of the Buddha Padumuttara,3 one hundred thousand aeons ago, when she was born in a wealthy minister’s family in Hamsavati. One day, having rejoiced over the Buddha’s teaching, she saw him place his aunt, a female monk, as being foremost in seniority. After performing great deeds through offerings for the Buddha and his followers for seven days, she aspired to the same position under a future Buddha. The Buddha Padhumuttara foretold that her aspiration will be fulfilled under the future Buddha Gotama. She continued to make merits through donations throughout her life, was reborn among the gods in Tavatimsa heaven before transmigrating back to the human realm where she became the chief amongst five hundred female slaves. She encountered a group of five hundred4 paccekabuddhas5 or Individual Buddhas who were refused help in building huts to prepare for the rainy season retreat by the rich people in the city. According to the commentary, having made sure that the Individual Buddhas would also accept donations from slaves and not only from masters, Mahapajapati Gotami, in that incarnation, then solicited help from the group of the five hundred female slaves to provide food offerings to the Individual Buddhas for the duration of the rainy season retreat, and to convince their husbands to donate their manual labor needed to build the huts. When three months had passed and the rainy season came to an end, she had each of the female slaves prepare a coarse cloth, which they turned into robes for the Individual Buddhas. Throughout their lives they continued their good deeds and were again reborn in Tavatimsa heaven. Their meritorious acts bound them together for their remaining life cycles, and they will eventually go forth with Mahapajapati Gotami and attain liberation during the time of the Buddha Gotama. The commentary also records that in another lifetime, Mahapajapati Gotami was born in a village of weavers near Varanasi, where she again gave food alms to five hundred Individual Buddhas. It should be noted that because Individual 3 The

13th of the 28 most recent Buddhas culminating in Buddha Gotama. five paccekabuddhas, according to the commentary. 5 A paccekabuddha is one who attains enlightenment without the aid of a teacher, but does not establish a dispensation, i.e., is not a teaching Buddha. It is said that paccekabuddhas usually appear in the world during the times when the teaching of a supreme Buddha is not known. 4 Or

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Buddhas seemed to have no problem accepting offerings from the lower classes of society, the donations gave people who were previously marginalized from religious life the opportunity to rise in the scale of existence. These few recorded lives are, of course, notable examples of Mahapajapati Gotami’s practice and accumulation of merits in her countless cycles of rebirth in the different realms. Her repeated donations to the Individual Buddhas and her conscious choice to practice good deeds throughout different lifetimes, individually or collectively with her companions, earned her not only rebirths in higher realms, but also the comradery with a group of like-minded followers whose course she would continue to positively influence in successive lives.

5.2.2 Final Life Prior to the birth of the Buddha Gotama, the former slave woman/weaver was reborn as Mahapajapati Gotami, the daughter of Anjana Sakya of the Sakya Clan in the town of Devadaha.6 She was the younger sister of Mahamaya, who would become the mother of the Buddha Gotama. Experts predicted that children born from these two wombs would be wheel-turning monarchs.7 When they came of age, the Great King Suddhodana married both of them and took them to his kingdom in Kapilavatthu. The future Buddha Gotama took conception in the womb of Queen Mahamaya, who died seven days after having given birth to him. King Suddhodana then made Mahapajapati Gotami his chief queen. Since this was also the time that her son Nanda was born,8 she had him be taken care of by a wetnurse and tended the future Buddha instead. She was apparently involved in all aspects of his upbringing, including his education and early marriage. The Buddha, having attained liberation after his great renunciation, was one day teaching his dhamma in Magadha when his father, King Suddhodana, dispatched ambassadors to invite him to Kapilavatthu. The next morning, King Suddhodana was angered seeing the Buddha making his rounds for alms in the city, as he was still unfamiliar with the Buddhist tradition. Upon hearing the Buddha’s teaching, however, King Suddhodana was established in the fruition

6 The

commentary had her reborn in the home of Mahasuppabuddha in the lineage called Gotami. wheel-turning monarch is an ideal ruler in ancient Indian mythology who governs with justice rather than force and brings tranquility and comfort to the people. The chakravarti—the wheel-turning king—is supposed to uphold dhamma, as “he who turns the wheel (of dhamma)”. The prediction is rather curious as neither of them gave birth to a wheel-turning monarch. Mahamaya gave birth to Siddhartha who became the Buddha, while Mahapajapati Gotami gave birth to Nanda and Nandā, a son and a daughter, both of whom were ordained and attained liberation. 8 It was said in the commentary that Nanda was 2–3 days younger than the Buddha. 7 A

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state of non-returner (Dhp-a I 115).9 On this same occasion, Mahapajapati Gotami was established in the fruition state of stream-entry (ibid.). The Buddha had his brother Nanda go forth on the second day, and his son, young Rahula, on the seventh day of his visit. About five years after the Buddha attained liberation, when he was living in the Kutagara Hall near Vesali, King Suddhodana, while still reigning, attained final liberation and realized arhatship under the royal white parasol, and passed away. It was said that with her family members either enlightened, ordained, or dead, Mahapajapati Gotami decided to dedicate her remaining time to the spiritual path and made a direct request to the Buddha to be ordained so as to establish the bhikkhuni sangha or the female monks’ order. She was joined in this request by the five hundred slave women who had been her companions in a former life. Now born into the Sakya clan, their husbands had gone forth after the Buddha had resolved a conflict between them and expounded the dhamma to them on the bank of the Rohini river. Three times Mahapajapati Gotami asked to be ordained, and three times the Buddha refused. Determined, she did not let herself be easily discouraged by the Buddha’s initial refusals. She thus led the five hundred Sakyan women in cutting off their hair, dressing themselves in monks’ robes, and following the traveling Buddha on foot from Kapilavatthu to Vesali. When Ananda interceded on her behalf, she eventually became the first woman to receive full ordination with the condition that she accepts the Eight Heavy Rules (Garudhamma) specifically for female monks. After being ordained, Mahapajapati Gotami approached the Buddha and diligently learned the dhamma from him. She attained full liberation upon listening to a sermon on meditation, while her five hundred female monk followers became liberated10 after listening to the sermon on Nandaka’s exhortation. At one hundred and twenty years old, Mahapajapati Gotami asked the Buddha for permission to end her cycle of existence, reflecting that she had already learned what had to be learned: The three knowledges are attained; I have done what the Buddha taught! The four analytical modes, and these eight deliverances, six special knowledges mastered, I have done what the Buddha taught! (Thi-ap 17 303–304)

9 In Buddhism, there are four different levels of spiritual attainment: a stream-enterer is one in whom the first vision of the dhamma has arisen; a once-returner is one who will be born only one more time in the human realm before reaching the ultimate goal; a non-returner is one who will not return to the human realm but will be spontaneously reborn in the heavenly realm called the Pure Abodes; an arhat is one who has attained full liberation. 10 To different extents, depending on the source.

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Having sought his forgiveness for any transgressions she committed, and having performed a series of miracles, she was accompanied in death by her five hundred faithful female monk followers amidst the lamentation of gods, humans, and the natural world.

5.3 Ordination 5.3.1 Argument for Ordination The part of Mahapajapati Gotami’s story that attracts the most philosophical attention from Buddhist scholars is not so much her teaching or sermon as the unfolding of events as a result of her request for full ordination and the Buddha’s response to it, as it has immense impact on the religious life of Buddhist women and posterity. In order to fully comprehend the significance of her ordination, as well as the Buddha’s reluctance to allow it, a careful consideration of the progression of events that led up to the ordination is necessary. The key events began in Kapilavatthu, when Mahapajapati Gotami and the five hundred Sakyan women who had chosen her as their leader approached the Buddha and suggested that it would be good if women were allowed to become nuns, taking up the homeless life as full-time disciples rather than as lay followers: Blessed One, the appearance of Buddhas in the world is rare; instruction in the True Dharma is difficult to obtain. But now the Blessed One…has appeared, and the Dharma whose preaching is conducive to tranquility and parinirvana is being expounded by him and is causing the realization of ambrosial nirvana. It would be good if the Blessed One were to allow women to be initiated into his order and ordained as nuns. (cfr. Roth, 1970, pp. 4–18; Strong, 1995, p. 52)

The Buddha told her to not entertain this idea: “Gotami, do not long for the initiation of women into the order, or for their ordination as nuns” (Strong, 1995, p. 53). It is interesting to observe in the Buddha’s reply the assumption that Mahapajapati Gotami did not request ordination only for herself, but that it was instead a collective request, done on behalf of many other women as well (SathaAnand, 2013, p. 33). She repeated her request three times, without any success, and left distraught. Mahapajati Gotami then approached her Sakyan women companions and said: The Blessed One will not allow honorable women to be initiated and ordained as nuns. However, let us honorable women cut our own hair, acquire our own monastic robes, and attach ourselves to the Blessed One’s party and follow after him, ... wandering where he wanders throughout the land of Kosala. And if the Blessed One allows it, we will be initiated, and if he does not allow it, we will lead a chaste life in the presence of the Holy Buddha. … (Strong, 1995, p. 53)

Having shaved their heads and put on monastic robes, Mahapajapati Gotami and the five hundred Sakyan women followed the Buddha, who was traveling through Kosala in the company of a large group of monks. Upon arrival in Vesali, he dwelt in the Jetavana. At the gateway of Jetavana residence, Mahapajapati

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Gotami stood crying, her feet swollen from the long trip. The Buddha’s personal attendant, Ananda, inquired about her distress and agreed to intercede with the Buddha on her behalf. Indeed, I am crying, Noble Ananda, because truly the appearance of Buddhas in the world is rare, …The Blessed One will not give women a chance to be initiated and ordained into his order and to become nuns. It would be good, Ananda, if you were to go to the Blessed One so as to obtain permission for women to be initiated and ordained. “That would be good, Gautami [sic],” agreed the Venerable Ananda. (Strong, 1995, pp. 53–54)

Ananda made the request to the Buddha on Mahapajapati Gotami’s behalf and received the same response. Upon further urging from Mahapajapati Gotami, he repeated the request for the second time, and on the third time decided to try a different approach. He asked the Buddha two very important questions: Blessed One, how many assemblies of disciples did enlightened Buddhas of the past have? The Blessed One replied: Previous Buddhas, Ananda, had four assemblies of disciples, to wit, monks, nuns, laymen, and laywomen. Then the Venerable Ananda said to the Blessed One: “Blessed One, the four fruits of monastic life—namely, the fruit of a stream-winner, the fruit of a once-returner, the fruit of a non-returner, and the highest fruit of arhatship—can a woman who is earnest and zealous and who dwells in seclusion realize any of these?” The Buddha replied: “Yes, Ananda, a woman who is earnest and zealous and who dwells in seclusion can realize in any of these four fruits of the monastic life.” (Strong, 1995, pp. 54–55)

It is important to note here that some main arguments in the above passage are absent from the narration of Mahapajapati Gotami’s story in both the Anguttara Nikaya (A 8 51) and in the Cullavagga of the Vinaya Pitaka (Vin X 253–56). Most notably, the reference to the fact that all Buddhas in the past had instituted the Four Assemblies—bhikkhus, bhikkhunis, laymen, and laywomen—is not found in these versions. Had it been included, it would have helped to strengthen the arguments in support of full ordination for women based on established precedence. Also noteworthy is the fact that this argument is absent from several translations of the Buddhist scripture into languages of countries that have never had historical precedence of a female monks’ order.11 Granted that its inclusion in the editing process may not have made much sense in light of the lack of historical precedence, it is still curious to observe that the significance of such absence has still not been systematically raised by Buddhist scholars in those countries. Having established a precedence of a female monks’ order and having received the Buddha’s confirmation of the truth regarding women’s spiritual potential, Ananda proceeds to point out that women should be granted full ordination not only for these reasons, but also because the Buddha owed a great debt to 11 An

example of such country is Thailand, where both the absence of this argument in the Thai translation of the Tripitaka and the lack of historical precedence of a bhikkhuni order have been used to justify the continued exclusion of women from full ordination; see Ptp (The Siamese Tripitaka), v. 23: 312–318.

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Mahapajapati Gotami, his foster mother, giver of milk, the person who suckled him and cared for him as a child. “Well, then,” the Venerable Ananda said to the Blessed One, “since, Blessed One, enlightened Buddhas of the past had four assemblies—namely, monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen—and since women who are earnest and zealous, and who dwell in seclusion are able to realize the four fruits of the monastic life—namely, the fruit of stream-winner up to the highest fruit of arhatship—it would be good if the Blessed One were to allow women to be initiated into this order and be ordained as nuns. Moreover, Mahaprajapati Gautami [sic] performed some difficult tasks for the Blessed One; she nourished, fed and suckled him after his mother had passed away. And for this the Blessed One is grateful and recognizant.” (Strong, 1995, p. 55)

Conceding Ananda’s arguments, the Buddha agreed to Mahapajapati Gotami’s ordination on the condition that she accepted the Eight Heavy Rules or the Gurudhamma in addition to the existing monastic rules. They include: (1) Female monks, no matter how senior, must always defer to male monks, no matter how junior. (2) Female monks must not spend the rainy season retreat in a residence where there is no male monk. (3) Female monks must observe the fortnightly monastic observances under the direction of male monks. (4) After the rainy season retreat, female monks must formally report to a convocation of male monks as well as to the other female monks. (5) A female monk who has broken a monastic rule must be disciplined by both the order of male monks and by that of the female monks. (6) Both male monks and female monks are necessary for the ordination of new female monks. (7) Male monks must never be abused or reviled in any way by a female monk. (8) Female monks may be formally admonished by male monks, but not male monks by female monks (Sponberg, 1992, pp. 14–15). Ananda then relayed the Buddha’s decision regarding her request for full ordination to Mahapajapati Gotami, who was honored and delighted to accept the Eight Heavy Rules, vowing that she would never transgress them. On hearing her response, the Buddha prophesized that this compromise of granting women full ordination under certain conditions would result in the dhamma enduring for only five hundred years rather than a millennium, before comparing it to robbers attacking households, mildew attacking rice, and rust attacking sugar cane. Finally, he likened the establishment of the Eight Heavy Rules to building a dam so that floodwater would not overflow. As demonstrated above, it was in response to Mahapajapati Gotami’s insistence and determination to be granted full ordination that the Buddha confirmed his truth regarding women’s spiritual potential. Her repeated coaxing and skillful negotiations first with the Buddha directly and then through Ananda on her behalf left the Buddha with no other choice than to allow Mahapajapati Gotami, and later

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her five hundred Sakyan women followers, to be fully ordained despite his initial reluctance. The near immediacy between the Buddha’s initial reluctance and his subsequent admission of women’s full ordination attests to Mahapajapati Gotami’s ingenuity in prompting the relevant questions at the right time, and her wisdom in discerning which boundaries to cross and which to respect.

5.3.2 Primacy of Universal Buddhist Truth over Social Conventions12 Keeping in mind the fact that Buddhism has already survived for over two and a half millennia, the prophecy that admitting women into the monks’ order would halve the religion’s lifespan no longer holds. A more interesting issue to explore is rather the philosophical implications of the Buddha’s confirmation of women’s spiritual potential. In other words, having already confirmed that women are capable of attaining the highest fruit of monastic life, i.e., arhatship, to not allow them full ordination would have rendered the Buddha logically inconsistent, as it would imply that his truth was irrelevant to half of humanity and therefore not universal. This would clearly conflict with the declaration of universality of the Buddhist truth. Alternatively, if the reason for denying women full ordination is that women can become enlightened without being ordained, then it would have undermined the universal applicability of the most direct path for attaining ultimate truth, i.e., leaving the household life. The universality of the Buddhist truth also applies to the Four Noble Truths, considered one of the Buddha’s most important teachings. There is no sexual distinction in the Four Noble Truths of suffering, of the source of suffering, of the cessation of suffering, and of the path to the cessation of suffering. Likewise, the Eightfold Noble Paths, the Buddha’s prescriptions for liberation, are meant to be universally applicable. In light of the claim to universality of the Buddhist truth, it becomes apparent that in order to remain logically consistent the Buddha would hold no other option than to allow female ordination. The Buddha’s confirmation of women’s ability to become enlightened also identifies obstacles that keep women from realizing their spiritual potential as being the result of human convention rather than something naturally inherent. The issue of women’s full ordination shed light on the tension between the universality of the Buddhist truth and the restrictions posed by social conventions. It is evident that “when convention came into conflict with Buddhist truth, the Buddha chose to uphold Buddhist truth. This principle of truth over convention explains the decision of the Buddha to allow ordination for women” (Satha-Anand, 1999, p. 285).

12 For

an in-depth treatment of the primacy of the Buddhist truth over social conventions, see Satha-Anand (1999).

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To follow the logical implications of the Buddha’s confirmation of the truth regarding women’s spiritual potential even further, the case also needs to be made that the universality of the Buddhist truth would require the Buddha to support the human rights of women in relation to religious practice. As the full enlightenment of male monks necessarily required the religious institution of the male monks’ order, so also, the full enlightenment of female monks whose potential the Buddha had already affirmed would logically require that an institution for women to learn and practice Buddhism be established—the female monks’ order. “If the Buddha’s initial reluctance indicates the force of convention, then his final decision to allow female ordination indicates his choice to respect women’s rights over the force of that convention” (Satha-Anand, 1999, p. 286).

5.3.3 Widowhood and the Spiritual Path It is not uncommon to find in different renditions of Mahapajapati Gotami’s story the insinuation that her motivation for seeking full ordination was to escape the undesirability of widowhood. The beginning of the “Gotami sutta” in the Thai translation of the Anguttara Nikaya,13 for example, narrates the story of the death of Mahapajapati Gotami’s royal husband, King Suddhodana, the ordination of Nanda, her own son, and of Rahula, the Buddha’s son, as well as the ordination of many male members of the royal household of the Buddha when he visited them soon after his enlightenment. It seems that this narration seeks to provide a background psychological explanation for Mahapajapati Gotami’s desire to be ordained: she did not wish to face widowhood which had been greatly stigmatized in ancient Hindu society. However, it needs to also be pointed out that such focus on Mahapajapati Gotami’s personalized motivation to become ordained instead of on the possibility of a genuine spiritual aspiration reduces the significance of her spiritual quest to the need to escape the unendurability of royal widowhood. It diminishes her commitment to leading a religious life and to achieving the ultimate Buddhist goal of enlightenment. Absent from the Thai translation of the Tripitaka, interestingly, is the fact that Mahapajapati Gotami refers to the rarity of the appearance of Buddhas in the world, as well as to the difficulty in obtaining instruction in the true dhamma, as among the reasons for her wish to be ordained and attain enlightenment, as indicated in the English translated version used here. It is certainly fascinating to observe the correlation between what a translated version of the Tripitaka overtly or covertly identifies as Mahapajapati Gotami’s motivation in seeking full ordination and the position its larger social environment takes with regard to women’s ordination or its possible revival.

13 See

the full Thai narration of this episode in Ptp (The Siamese Tripitaka), v. 23: 312–318.

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5.3.4 Mahapajapati Gotami Crossing Boundaries Even if Mahapajapati Gotami’s motivation for seeking ordination from the Buddha is fear or avoidance of widowhood, her bold requests and daring actions in negotiating with the Buddha can still be appreciated as instances of wise navigations through different demarcations of social boundaries. In the first place, she crossed an important boundary by expressing and demonstrating her wish not to continue the life of a householder, and repeatedly requested a full ordination from the Buddha. After being refused three times, she changed her strategy and decided to shave her head and put on a yellow robe, inviting the Sakyan women to do the same. By initiating a process of “symbolic self-ordination” with the Sakyan women, she symbolically crossed the boundary of ordination, which can be seen as a radical move. She showed her respect for the Buddha and his denial of a full ordination by paying obeisance and by taking leave instead of by confronting him and insisting for a fourth time on being admitted to the monks’ order. But then she persuaded the Sakyan women to self-ordain by shaving their head and wearing yellow robes like the male members of the monks’ order. Her actions indicate both an expression of respect for the Buddha’s decisions, and at the same time her insistence on fulfilling her wish to be ordained. The steps she initiates are bold and progressive moves for women. Next, in the company of other royal women—her Sakyan followers—Mahapajapati Gotami walked barefoot to a different city to seek an audience with the Buddha. Once she reached the entrance of the Jetavana residence, however, she stopped and did not proceed any further. Again, another boundary is crossed—the boundary of proper behavior for a court lady who decided to walk barefoot to another city. Yet at the same time, she understood when and where to stop and to respect existing boundaries. She showed proper judgment by not entering the residence of the male monks’ order but chose to remain outside and to ask Ananda to mediate with the Buddha on her behalf instead. Her wisdom allowed her to see that crossing certain socially rigid boundaries may be self-defeating for her purpose (Satha-Anand, 2007, p. 143). Much more controversy seems to surround the Buddha’s requirement of the Gurudhammas or the Eight Heavy Rules for female monks, as it has often been criticized for indicating the patriarchal inclination of the Buddha rather than simply being rules for regulating the relationship between the two monks’ orders. Is it not reasonable to regard Mahapajapati Gotami’s acceptance of such institutional subordination14 in exchange for the opportunity to become fully ordained as a wise move? When Mahapajapati Gotami requested full ordination from the Buddha, believed to be around five years after the Buddha attained enlightenment, the male monks’ order itself was still rather new and unstable. In its early days, it seemed necessary for the Buddha to tread carefully in his negotiations with the lay society to maintain legitimacy of the male monks’ order and to prevent any appearance 14 See

Sponberg (1992) for an extended discussion on Buddhist attitudes towards women.

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of transgressing their monastic requirements. The Gurudhammas which institutionally subordinate the female monks’ order under the male monks’ order could then be understood as a “precautionary measure taken by the Buddha to secure the acceptance and the respect of the lay society for the nun [female monk] order, and to maintain the lay world’s respect for the male order, which was crucial for the survival of the religion at that time” (Satha-Anand, 1999, p. 286). Sometime after her ordination, for example, Mahapajapati Gotami appealed to Ananda to amend the first Heavy Rule so that male monks and female monks would treat and pay respects to each other solely on the basis of seniority. The Buddha refused on the grounds that it strayed too far from what was considered appropriate between the two sexes to win social acceptance in the lay world (Vin X 256–257). Furthermore, without the proper regulations between the two monks’ orders, the female monks’ and the male monks’ orders may have evoked an image of a “family” to the lay eyes. As the Buddha allowed male monks to receive confession of a fault of female monks, for instance, public confessions of female monks to male monks often invited the laypeople’s indignation and complaint, interpreting the encounter as scenes of reconciliation between husbands and wives (Vin X 259). Since Buddhism encourages the renunciation of household life, such semblance of a “family” among monastics would be counterproductive and disadvantageous to the institutional existence of both orders. Mahapajapati Gotami’s acceptance of the Gurudhammas may therefore be read as part of her wisdom in recognizing the necessity of an institutional subordination of the female monks’ order under the male monks’ order within the social context of that time, and in truly understanding the momentous nature of the Buddha’s decision to grant full ordination to women despite his initial reluctance for which he had more than ample reasons.

5.4 Conclusion Mahapajapati Gotami serves as a powerful role model for women in contemporary Buddhist world, especially in the Theravada tradition in South-East Asia where the female monks’ order has historically been non-existent. Her story has become a source of inspiration and self-understanding for an increasing number of Buddhist women today who are seeking spiritual life amidst changing social, economic, political, and educational circumstances.

References Bode, M. (1893). Women Leaders of Buddhist Reformation. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 25(3), 517–566. Bodhi, B. (2012). The numerical discourses of the Buddha. A Translation of the Anguttara Nikaya. Wisdom Publications

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Buddhaghosa. (1969). Buddhist legends (E. W. Burlingame, Trans. Original Pali text of the Dhammapada commentary). Published for the Pali Text Society by Luzac & Co Horner, I. B. (1930). Women under primitive Buddhism; Laywomen and Almswomen. Routledge & Sons. Horner, I. B. (1952). The book of the discipline (Vinaya-pitaka), v. 5: Cullavagga. Published for the Pali Text Society by Luzac & Co Kajiyama, Y. (1982). Women in Buddhism. The Eastern Buddhist, 15(2), 53–70. Nyanaponika, T., & Hecker, H. (2003). Great disciples of the Buddha: Their lives, their works, their legacy. In B. Bodhi (Ed.), Introduction. Wisdom Publications in Collaboration with the Buddhist Publication Society of Kandy, Sri Lanka Pruitt, W. (Ed.). (2017). The commentary on the verses of the Theris: Therigatha-Atthakatha, Paramatthadipani VI, by Acariya Dhammapala. The Pali Text Society Roth, G. (Ed.). (1970). Bhiksuni-vinaya: Manual of discipline for Buddhist nuns. K. P. Jayaswal research Institute Rhys Davis, C. (1909). Psalms of the Sisters [kindle edition]. Jazzybee Satha-Anand, S. (1999). Truth over convention: Feminist interpretations of Buddhism. In C. W. Howland (Ed.), Religious fundamentalisms and the human rights of women (pp. 281–291). Palgrave Macmillan. Satha-Anand, S. (2007). Fluid boundaries, institutional segregation and sexual tolerance in Thai Buddhism. In G. Ter Haar, & Y. Tsuruoka (Eds.), Religion and society: An agenda for the 21st century (pp. 127–146). Brill Satha-Anand, S. (2013). Madsi and Mahapajapati as great women in the Buddhist tradition. In S. Amatayakul (Ed.), The emergence and heritage of Asian women intellectuals (pp. 27–42). Institute of Thai Studies, Chulalongkorn University Sponberg, A. (1992). Attitudes toward women and the feminine in early Buddhism. In J. I. Cabezón (Ed.), Buddhism, sexuality and gender (pp. 3–36). SUNY Press. Strong, J. S. (1995). The experience of Buddhism: Sources and interpretations. Wadsworth. The Siamese Tripitaka. (1987). พระไตรปิฎกภาษาไทย. Department of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Education Walters, J. (Ed.). (2018). Legends of the Buddhist Saints. Apadanapali 4. The legends of the Theris [Theri-apadana]. Whitman College. www.apadanatranslation.org Walters, J. S. (1995). Gotami’s Story. In D. S. Lopez (Ed.), Buddhism in practice (Abridged, pp. 107–132). Princeton.

Chapter 6

Unknown artist. In public domain due to its antiquity.

Khema of Great Wisdom from India खेमा Circa 563 BCE–483 BCE Supakwadee Amatayakul

Abstract Khema was a contemporary of the Buddha and was one of his foremost disciples. In this chapter, her life and contributions to Theravada Buddhism are discussed. The Buddha praised this thinker as being exceptionally wise. She attained enlightenment upon contemplating an image created by the Buddha depicting the impermanence of life and listening to one of his sermons. Khema later joined the order of Bhikkuni or female monks and became known, especially through a story in the Samyutta Nikaya, part of the Pali Canon, for her deep insight, great learning, and perspicacity in philosophical discussion. Today, Khema continues to be esteemed as an expert in the Abidhamma which focuses on the Buddha’s teachings on the self, the mind, mental states, corporeality, and nibbana—the ultimate truth in Theravada Buddhism.

S. Amatayakul (*)  IULM University, Milan, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_6

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6.1 Introduction Bhikkhuni1 Khema, or Khema Theri, was one of the two foremost female disciples of the Buddha, and was widely known for her wisdom. Although a disciple, Khema was not only a follower of the Buddha’s teachings, but also a teacher of his dhamma.2 In fact, Khema’s dialogue with King Pasenadi of Kosala is a rare example of the Buddha’s words being articulated by a female disciple. Her story is an important demonstration that in early Buddhism, women’s spiritual growth was by no means considered as more limited than men’s, and that their wisdom was acknowledged and appreciated by other female disciples, by noble men, and even by the Buddha himself, as he has held up Khema and Uppalavanna, his other foremost female disciple, as models for all the bhikkhunis to emulate (A II 131; S 17 236). Khema was one of the thirteen eminent bhikkhunis named by the Buddha in the Etadaggavagga of the Anguttara Nikaya (A I 236). This is the so-called “ThisOne-Is-Chief” chapter where the Buddha designated his foremost disciples, and Khema was here distinguished for her great wisdom. She was also one of the 73 bhikkhunis to each of whom a set of verses that make up the Therigatha is attributed. The Therigatha, or the Verses of the Elder Nuns, one of the earliest religious literatures of the world with female authorship (Krey, 2010, p. 20), comprises 494 verses in which the elder bhikkhunis recount their long paths towards a life of renunciation and enlightenment as a result of their insight into the dhamma. Moreover, Khema was one of the forty bhikkhunis who related the meritorious acts in their past lives and sometimes also the attainment of enlightenment in their last existence in the Theri-apadana collection, a kind of appendix to the Therigatha. Stories of her previous lives are also mentioned in the Jataka collection and, in greater detail, in the different Pali commentaries.

6.2 Biography 6.2.1 Aspiration and Past Lives3 As the Etadaggavagga chapter in the Pali Canon mentions only the name of the disciple and the category in which that disciple is appointed as foremost, it 1 A

bhikkhuni is a fully ordained female monastic in Buddhism. term “dhamma” generally refers to the teachings of the Buddha, which Buddhists are encouraged to follow. 3 While the notion of “past lives” may sound somewhat unfamiliar to contemporary scholarship in philosophy, it has consistently played a significant role in influential philosophical works in both the Eastern and Western traditions. It may be interpreted as an analytic or a formal concept, or as an actual option. The importance of this concept for the Buddhist thought we are studying here lies in the fact that in Buddhism, enlightenment is never achieved in a single lifetime, but is the result of continuous practice over countless cycles of rebirths. 2  The

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is rather from the Theri-apadana and the commentaries that we learn about the particularities of Khema’s lives. Due to her inborn inclination towards the highest truth, whenever a Buddha, an enlightened being, appeared in the world, Khema would also appear near him, thereby having opportunities to perfect her virtues and purify her heart, preparing her spiritual maturity to realize the ultimate truth. It is said that during the time of the Buddha Padumuttara,4 a hundred thousand aeons ago, Khema was born in an affluent family in Hamsavati. Upon listening to the Buddha, she took refuge in his teaching and sought permission from her parents to provide food alms to him and his bhikkhu followers for seven days. At the end of this period, she witnessed the Buddha appointing a bhikkhuni to the foremost position among those with great wisdom and formed an aspiration to attain the same position of preeminence under a future Buddha. The Buddha Padhumuttara then predicts that her aspiration will succeed under the future Buddha Gotama.5 Thanks to the merits made to the Buddha Padhumuttara and his Sangha, for aeons, Khema was reborn in different heavens in the Buddhist cosmology, such as Tavatimsa, Yama, Tusita, Nimmanarati, and Vasavatti, where she was made chief queen of the gods, and, when reborn in the human realm, as chief queen of wheel-turning kings.6 Then, ninety-one aeons ago, during the time of the Buddha Vipassi, she had been a bhikkhuni and a teacher of the dhamma for ten thousand years, …skillful in the heaps of causes, expert in the Four Noble Truths, clever, varied speaker, I was one who’s done what the Teacher taught. (Thi-ap 18 433)

Then again reborn in Tusita heaven,7 Khema continued to devote successive lives to the accretion of meritorious deeds and knowledge essential for the fulfillment of her aspiration made long ago. As a result of her good deeds, she was prosperous, beautiful, and well-treated in all of her lives. During the dispensation of the Buddha Konagamana, she and her two sisters, daughters of a rich family in

4 The

13th of the 28 most recent Buddhas culminating in Buddha Gotama. Commentaries, however, had Khema born as a slave girl who saw one of Buddha Padumuttara’s chief disciples, Sujata. She offered him food and made a donation to him with the money for which she had sold her hair, before forming an aspiration to be a foremost disciple of great wisdom of a future Buddha. See Thi-a IV 3 127. 6  An ideal ruler in ancient Indian mythology who governs with justice rather than force and brings tranquility and comfort to the people. The chakravarti—the wheel-turning king—is supposed to uphold dhamma, as “he who turns the wheel (of dhamma)”. 7 The Tusita heaven is considered the most beautiful of the celestial worlds, and the pious love to be born there because of the presence of the Bodhisatta who will become Buddhas in their next lifetimes. 5  The

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Benares, donated a monastery to the Buddha and his sangha—an act that again led them back to Tavatimsa. During the time of the Buddha Kassapa, the Buddha immediately preceding the Buddha Gotama, Khema was born as “Samani”, the eldest of seven daughters of Kiki, the King of Kasi. Together with her sisters, Samani sought to be ordained upon hearing the dhamma, yet was opposed by their father. The sisters therefore opted for practicing virginal celibacy for twenty thousand years instead. It was also during this era that Khema had learned the Mahanidana-suttanta,8 a key teaching of the Buddha, by heart. In their final lives, all seven sisters became foremost disciples of the Buddha Gotama—Khema, Uppalavanna, Patacara, Kundala, Kisagotami, Dhammadinna, and Visakha. Khema used her past lives as opportunities to practice the different virtues, to accumulate the required merits, and to purify her heart so that she would finally meet the conditions for fulfilling her aspiration. Stories of her rebirth in the different realms, accounts of her dedication to the different Buddhas and the sangha, as well as her perseverance in learning, practicing, and teaching the dhamma, illustrate to us that the attainment of full liberation does not happen by chance but through firm resolve and a gradual maturation of one’s virtues and wisdom that had taken root in a distant past, under many former Buddhas.

6.2.2 Final Life and Enlightenment Khema’s efforts and devotion came to fruition in her final lifetime, a hundred thousand aeons and innumerable rounds of rebirths after having made her aspiration under the Buddha Padumuttara. She was born the daughter of King Madda of Sagala during the era of the Buddha Gotama and was admired by all. As the chief consort of King Bimbisara, she was known for her beauty and grace to which she was said to be attached. Believing that the Buddha would find fault with her beauty or would criticize her adoration of it, Khema avoided meeting him. The king, who was a benefactor of the Buddha and had donated his bamboo grove to the sangha, therefore had poets and singers praise the beauty and harmony of the monastery in the grove to her. Since Khema loved all kinds of beauty and the sensual pleasures associated with it, she was persuaded to visit the grove and witness its splendor. When the Buddha exited the grove to beg for alms, she entered and admired its peacefulness. Observing a young monk and his youthful body, Khema wondered:

8 The

fifteenth sutta of the Digha Nikaya, which contains a detailed analysis of the chain of causation.

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…bald-headed, wrapped in saffron robes, seated at the foot of a tree he meditates, a Buddhist monk, discarding sensual delight. Shouldn’t this auspicious Teaching be practiced by old folks, after they have lived the domestic life, enjoying pleasure as they like? (Thi-ap 18 467–469)

Believing that the Buddha was not in his abode in the grove, she entered only to find him there, in his full glory, not unlike the rising sun. Next to him, the Buddha created an image of a woman with heavenly beauty fanning him for Khema to see. The woman though, shining like gold, eyes and face like pink lotuses, with red lips, looking like jasmine, pleasing to the mind and the eyes, with ears that are like golden swings, firm breasts that look like water-jugs, thin-waisted, a shapely behind, fine thighs with charming ornaments, dressed in clothing of fine blue silk, furnished with a border of red, with unsatisfiable looks, she has a smiling demeanor. (Thi-ap 18 472–474)

No sooner had Khema begun to feel a spark of inadequacy in comparison to the celestial beauty, than the Buddha, through his power, caused the illusory image to pass beyond her youth to middle-age and old-age, culminating in death—all in an instant in front of Khema’s eyes. The juxtaposition is remarkable: Then she was ravished by old age, discolored, her face disfigured. Her teeth fell out, her hair turned white, her mouth was fouled with saliva, ears shriveled up, eyes formed cataracts, breasts sagged and became repulsive;

S. Amatayakul

108 wrinkles spread on all of her parts, and veins popped out on that body, crooked-limbed, leaning on a cane, jutting-ribbed, emaciated, trembling, fallen onto the ground, gasping for every breath she took. (Thi-ap 18 476–478)

Only then did Khema realize the fleeting nature of external beauty and life. She gained insight into the transient nature of things, including her own body. The Buddha, sensing that she had relinquished the earthly attachments, said: Khema, see this complex heap as diseased, disgusting and putrid. It is oozing and it’s dripping, the delight of foolish people. With one-pointed focus, steadfast, fix your mind on impurity. Remain mindful of the body; be intent on disenchantment. Just as is this, so too is that; just as is that, so too is this: on the inside and the outside, be detached from body-delight. (Thi-ap 18 481–483)

The Buddha concluded his teaching with the following verse, found in the Dhammapada: Those following the stream, excited with lust, are making webs for themselves, like a spider; others, cutting that away, are going forth, indifferent, giving up the pleasures of lust. (Dhp 347, cit. in Thi-ap 18 485)

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At the end of this verse, the Buddha preached the Mahanidanasuttanta, which Khema recalled having learned in a previous lifetime.9 Having thoroughly penetrated his teaching, although still dressed in her royal attire, Khema “purified her Dhamma eye” and was established in the fruition state of Stream-Entry, a state that is reached with the first arising of one’s vision of the dhamma. She then sought permission from King Bimbisara to go forth, i.e., to be ordained, and attained Arhatship or full liberation from suffering seven months later.10 It must be noted again that although Khema seemed to have attained enlightenment rather easily and swiftly in her final lifetime, her achievement was in no way a product of mere chance or luck but the culmination of her great effort in learning and practicing the virtues, in accumulating merits done over countless cycles of rebirth, so that when the final condition is present—when she is exposed to the teachings of the Buddha in her final life—she was able to fully comprehend it with a purified mind. As Khema’s last hindrance to enlightenment was her attachment to beauty of the physical form and the related sensual pleasures, an anecdote in the Therigatha is worth mentioning as it sheds some light on the transformation of her view towards beauty and physicality after enlightenment. In this verse, Mara, the tempter, approached Khema with the intention to seduce and distract her from her path of the dhamma, saying: “You are young and beautiful./I am also young and in my prime./Come, Khema,/let us delight ourselves with the fivefold music.” (Thi-a VI 3 135). Revealing herself to be detached from sensual pleasures as she had already attained Arhatship, Khema’s response was a stark contrast to her previous stance: I am afflicted by and ashamed of this foul body, diseased, perishable. Craving for sensual pleasures has been rooted out. Sensual pleasures are like swords and stakes. The aggregates are a chopping block for them. What you call ‘delight in sensual pleasures’ is now ‘non-delight’ for me. Everywhere, enjoyment of pleasure is defeated. The mass of darkness is torn asunder. In this way, know, evil one, You are defeated, death. (Thi-a VI 3 136)

9 The

preaching of the Mahanidanasuttanta appears only in the Theri-apadana (Thi-ap) but not in the Commentaries (Thi-a).

10 According

to the Commentaries, however, Khema attained Arhatship together with the analytical knowledges immediately after the Buddha had concluded his sermon.

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6.3 Philosophical Teachings The philosophical impact of Khema’s story has less to do with her perseverance than with her actual teachings of the dhamma. Being known for her profound learning and sagacious discussion skills, she often taught the dhamma to other bhikkhunis and laypeople. Her intelligence and authority in the teachings of the Buddha were widely admired. Khema declared: In the Buddha’s dispensation, I have purified my knowledge of meaning and of the Teaching, etymology and preaching. Skilled in the purifications, confident in Kathāvatthu, and in the dispensation I’ve mastered Abhidhammic method. (Thi-ap 18 503–504)

Yet one dialogue in the Samyutta Nikaya (S 44) stands out from the rest as it was the one that earned her the fulfillment of her aspiration—to be appointed as a bhikkhuni foremost in great wisdom. According to the Khemasutta, on one occasion as the Buddha was staying in Jeta’s Grove near Savatthi, King Pasenadi of Kosala, who was traveling through the countryside between Saketa and Savatthi, arrived at Toranavatthu, where the bhikkhuni Khema had taken up residence. Desiring to discuss spiritual matters, he sent a man to find out if there was an ascetic or brahmin in the town whom he can visit. Having asked around but not finding one, the man saw Khema staying in the town and thus reported to the king about the bhikkhuni who was known for being “wise, competent, intelligent, learned, a splendid speaker, ingenious” (S 44 375). King Pasenadi went to bhikkuni Khema, paid homage to her, and questioned her about the status of the Tathagata, an enlightened sage, after death. “How is it, revered lady, does the Tathagata exist after death?” “Great king, the Blessed One has not declared this: ‘The Tathagata exists after death.’” “Then, revered lady, does the Tathagata not exist after death?” “ Great king, the Blessed One has not declared this either: ‘The Tathagata does not exist after death.’” “How is it then, revered lady, does the Tathagata both exist and not exist after death?” “ Great king, the Blessed One has not declared this: ‘The Tathagata both exists and does not exist after death.’” “ Then, revered lady, does the Tathagata neither exist nor not exist after death?” “Great king, the Blessed One has not declared this either: ‘The Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death.’” (S 44 375)

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The Khemasutta is the first of eleven suttas included in the Abyakatasamyutta (Connected Discourses on the Undeclared) of the Samyutta Nikaya. It deals with the issue of the status of the Tathagata after death—the subject of the last of four sets of metaphysical questions, all of which the Buddha left unanswered or undeclared.11 The questions raised by King Pasenadi—whether the Tathagata exists after death, or not, or both, or neither—exhaust all standard logical possibilities on the issue. Khema’s answers to these questions affirmed that the Buddha did not accept any of the four logical possibilities. To understand why the Buddha did not accept them, we must direct our attention to the notion of selfhood that is implied in these questions: in all four cases, a substantial self of the Tathagata is assumed by King Pasenadi, and each question speculates on the status of that self after death. The first view postulates a form of eternalism according to which the substantial self of an enlightened being continues to exist after death in some metaphysical dimension. The second view, on the contrary, suggests annihilation according to which the substantial self of the Tathagata is completely dissolved after death. The third and fourth views are compromise positions: the third draws a distinction between the permanent and impermanent aspects of the self, the former of which remains while the latter is annihilated after death; the fourth posits a form of skepticism that still relies on the notion of a substantial self to neither exist nor not exist after death. The Buddha, however, teaches that a substantial self or a real “I” that is presupposed in the four views above does not exist. The “self” is nothing more than a composite of the five aggregates—form (corporeality), feeling (sensation, including the mind), perception (ideation), mental formations (predispositions or volitional activities), and consciousness (awareness of sensations)—that are constantly arising and passing away. The aggregates are dependent on causes or conditions for their existence, they are therefore impermanent, subject to dissolution. As a composite reality, the “self” is merely a constantly changing process of experience, an illusion of a real, substantial “I” that we tend to become so firmly attached to. As such, the futility of speculating about its existence or non-existence after death becomes apparent. The path to liberation requires that we instead mindfully observe the arising and perishing of the aggregates whose composite we mistake as the substantial self. To further clarify this point, consider the well-worn example of a chariot, frequently used to illustrate the nature of the self and personal identity in Buddhism. How are we to define a chariot? A chariot is composed of many parts: the wheels, the frame, the axles, the reigns, the seat, the draught pole, to name but a few. Yet none of these parts can be independently used to define a chariot. It is only under the proper conditions, when all of the constituent parts are present and duly

11 In

the Pali Canon, the first two sets of the unanswered questions are about the world with regard to the dimensions of time (Is the world eternal or not?) and space (Is the world infinite or not?); the third set concerns the relation between the self and the body (Is the self-identical with or different from the body?); the fourth about the existence of the Tathagata after death.

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combined, that we designate it a “chariot”—a mere name, a concept. As the “chariot” depends not only on the constituent parts but also on the conditions or causes, themselves constantly changing, that would render the parts to be combined, it is subject to dissolution and is therefore impermanent. When the constituent parts are no longer present, we no longer call it a “chariot”. Just as “chariot” is a concept that we project onto the constituent parts, the “self” is nothing more than a name that we project onto the composite of the five aggregates that constitute a being. There is no essence that somehow dwells within each aggregate or their combination. In response to King Pasenadi’s question as to why the Buddha left the four questions about the after-death status of the Tathagata undeclared, Khema used two similes to illustrate her point. She asked whether the king knew any accountant or calculator or mathematician who could count the grains of sand in the river Ganges or the gallons of water in the great ocean. The king admitted that it is impossible to count either of these. Why? “Because the great ocean is deep, immeasurable, hard to fathom.” Khema then used the same terms to describe the Tathagata in her explanation: So too, great king, that form by which one describing the Tathagata might describe him has been abandoned by the Tathagata, cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated so that it is no more subject to future arising. The Tathagata, great king, is liberated from reckoning in terms of form; he is deep, immeasurable, hard to fathom like the great ocean.12 (S 44 376)

Whoever seeks to describe or define the Tathagata can only do so through the five aggregates, yet the Tathagata, an enlightened being, no longer holds to any of these aggregates as the basis for his identity. As he is immeasurable and indescribable due to the absence of any definition through the five aggregates, none of the four positions in King Pasenadi’s questions applies. It is highly noteworthy that the explanation given by Khema as to why the Buddha chose to suspend his assent to any of the four views was the limitation of rationality and conceptual thought on the part of the interlocuter rather than pragmatic reasons, such as the irrelevance of metaphysical issues for the liberation from suffering (e.g., suttas M 63, M 72). The Buddha himself remarked in the Majjhima Nikaya concerning the status of the Tathagata after death: “For this Dhamma…is profound, hard to see and hard to understand, peaceful and sublime, unattainable by mere reasoning, subtle, to be experienced by the wise” (M 72.18 487). Khema, as an enlightened being who has fully penetrated the Buddha’s teachings, was able to impart his wisdom to King Pasenadi because her learning has allowed her to see things as they are in their impermanent nature. Noticing the difference between Khema’s insight and the king’s questioning enables us to draw a distinction between liberated minds who see all views of the self as mental

12 The same explanation that is here provided for form is successively repeated for feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness—the five aggregates of being.

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constructions and those that are still bound to speculative thoughts who have yet to realize the illusory nature of any attempt at conceptual certainty. Only by renouncing such attempts and by trying to observe the impermanence of the aggregates that constitute what they take to be the self can they begin to fathom the unfathomableness of the Tathagata. King Pasenadi rejoiced in bhikkhuni Khema’s profound explication, paid homage to her, and departed. On a later occasion, he approached the Buddha and asked him the same four questions. The Buddha replied exactly, word by word, as Khema had done. The king twice expressed his amazement that Khema’s explanation was identical with that of the Buddha. The two-part structure of the Khemasutta consisting first of Khema’s teaching and second of the Buddha’s affirmation of it follows the custom of authenticating the teachings of several notable disciples of the Buddha, both bhikkhunis and bhikkus (Krey, 2010, pp. 26–27). In this case, it serves to point out that there is no difference between the Buddha’s wisdom and that of Khema on the issue under discussion, and therefore that she is endorsed as a fully qualified teacher of the Buddha’s dhamma by none other than the Buddha himself. It was said that the Buddha, who was seated in the great monastery in Jeta Grove in the midst of a group of noble disciples, was so pleased with Khema’s teaching on this particular set of undeclared questions that he placed her as foremost among the bhikkhunis, saying “Bhikkus, the foremost of my bhikkhuni disciples among those with great wisdom is Khema” (A I 236).

6.4 Conclusion: Khema as Philosopher The Khemasutta provides a rare glimpse into instances in early Buddhism where the teaching role is not only not assumed by the Buddha, but instead by a woman disciple. It was through Khema that the words of the Buddha were conveyed. More exceptional was the fact that her teaching was directed not at other bhikkhunis or laypeople, as was customary for the time, but, by request, at a man of highest social status—a king. Her teaching demonstrated her high intelligence and her competence in the dhamma; the Khemasutta gave us clear evidence of the Buddha’s acknowledgment of her wisdom. Through her teaching, Khema can be said to have directly followed the example of the Buddha. It is therefore not surprising that the Buddha declared her as a role model for his other female followers: if they were to go forth from the household life into homelessness, said the Buddha, they should become like the bhikkhuni Khema (and also Uppalavanna, his other great female disciple), “for this is the standard and criterion for my female disciples who are bhikkhunis” (S 17 236, repeated in A II 131[2]). Khema held the same position among the thirteen great bhikkhuni disciples as Sariputta among the forty-one great bhikkhu disciples in terms of being foremost in great wisdom (A I 189).

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The philosophical questions dealt with in the Khemasutta were of a profound nature, and a thorough understanding of them is a necessary requirement for liberation. As such, Khema’s explication aimed at the attainment of the ultimate goal of Buddhism itself—enlightenment—here to be accessed through proper insight into the nature of the “self” and its five aggregates by a careful consideration of the after-death nature of the Tathagata. Although the questions were left unanswered by the Buddha, it was Khema who pointed her interlocutor in the Khemasutta to the reason of the Buddha’s withholding of assent on any of the possible logical answers. Most importantly, Khema’s discourse demonstrates that there is no predetermined nature that would limit women’s spiritual development to a level inferior to men’s, despite the androcentrism that is found in some traditional sources of early Buddhism. Khema’s deep understanding of the subtle issues in her teaching was illustrative of her great wisdom and this was, at least in the Khemasutta, acknowledged not only by her male interlocutor but also by the Buddha himself. Today Khema continues to be esteemed in the Theravada Buddhist tradition as a bhikkhuni of great wisdom. She is considered an expert in the Abidhamma which focuses on the Buddha’s teachings on the mind, mental states, corporeality, and Nibbana—the ultimate truth in Theravada Buddhism.

References Bodhi, B. (2000). The connected discourses of the Buddha. A new translation of the Samyutta Nikaya. Wisdom Publications Bodhi, B. (2012). The numerical discourses of the Buddha. A translation of the Anguttara Nikaya. Wisdom Publications Buddhaghosa. (1969). Buddhist legends, (E. W. Burlingame, Trans. Original Pali text of the Dhammapada commentary). Published for the Pali Text Society by Luzac Krey, G. (2010). On Women as teachers in early Buddhism: Dhammadinna and Khema. Buddhist Studies Review, 27(1), 17–40. Nanamoli, B., & Bodhi, B. (2005). The middle length discourses of the Buddha. A translation of the Majjhima Nikaya. Wisdom Publications Nyanaponika, T., & Hecker, H. (2003). Great disciples of the Buddha: Their lives, their works, their legacy. In B. Bodhi (Ed.), Introduction. Wisdom Publications in collaboration with the Buddhist Publication Society of Kandy, Sri Lanka Payutto, P. P. (1995). Buddhadhamma: Natural laws and values for life (Trans. G. A. Olson). SUNY Press Pruitt, W. (Ed.). (2017). The commentary on the verses of the theris: Therigatha-Atthakatha, Paramatthadipani VI, by Acariya Dhammapala. The Pali Text Society Rhys Davis, C. (1909). Psalms of the sisters (Kindle ed.). Jazzybee Verlag Ross Carter, J., & Palihawadana, M. (Eds.). (2000). The Dhammapada. OUP Walshe, M. (Ed.). (1995). Digha Nikaya: The long discourses of the Buddha. Wisdom Publications. Walters, J. (Ed.). (2018). Legends of the Buddhist Saints. Apadanapali 4. The legends of the Theris [Theri-apadana]. Whitman college. www.apadanatranslation.org

Chapter 7

Meng Mu Monument Taigu, PRC. This photograph by unknown photographer is in the public domain

Meng Mu of China 孟母 Circa 4th Century BCE Ann A. Pang-White

Abstract  Meng Mu of China is arguably the first well-known Confucian woman philosopher whose views on education and on ethics within marriage and the family were first taught by her to her son, Mengzi (Mencius). Her views are captured in brief surviving quotations concerning the duty to develop one’s own character, duties of married men to their spouses, and the duty to maximize the benefits of one’s own education.

7.1 Introduction 7.1.1 Meng Mu the Person Meng Mu 孟母 (c. 4th century BCE), literally “Mother Meng,” is the mother of Meng Ke 孟軻 (372–289 BCE). Meng Ke is best known by his honorific title A. A. Pang-White (*)  The University of Scranton, Scranton, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_7

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Mengzi 孟子 (“Master Meng”) or by his Latinized name Mencius. He is often referred to as the “second sage” (yasheng 亞聖) of the Confucian tradition. Many people attribute Mencius’s accomplishments to Meng Mu’s untiring teaching and wise counsel. Regarded as an exemplary mother and a skillful teacher, Meng Mu is a legendary figure in Chinese society and cultural regions. Her philosophy of education and her advice on familial ethics and personal responsibility still ring true today and are applicable to the contemporary world. Meng Mu and Mencius lived during the Warring States Period (475–221 BCE), the later part of the Eastern Zhou Dynasty (770–256 BCE) in ancient China. This was a turbulent time during which China was in perpetual wars among competing feudal states while the ruling Zhou Dynasty was on the verge of collapse. The turmoil of society turned out to be a fertile ground for germinating ideas and thoughts. Hundreds of schools competed for their audience with their proposals on timely subjects ranging from how best to rid the society of all ills, how to govern, how to win a war, to how to cultivate the self and how to survive in the line of fire. Confucianism, a school of scholar-official literati (Ru Jia 儒家), generally tracing its origin to Kongzi (Latinized as “Confucius,” 551–479 BCE), often referred to as the “ultimate sage and the first teacher” (zhisheng xianshi 至聖先師) by the Confucians, is one among the many schools that began to coalesce and took form during this historical period. Meng Mu did not compose any known written works. There is also no formal official record of her available today. Hence, our knowledge of her is limited and indirect, acquired by means of oral tradition or informal written works by later Confucian scholars. Liu Xiang’s Biographies of Women (Lienü zhuan 《列女 傳》), dated around the 1st century BCE, and the Taiping Imperial Compendium of Books and Illustrations (Taiping yulan 《太平御覽》), dated around 984, for example, addressed her as mother of Meng Ke from the State of Zou 鄒 (in what is now Shandong Province). She was held in high regard in numerous other philosophical and literary works including: Han Ying’s Han’s Outer Compendium to the Classic of Poetry (Hanshi waizhuan 《韓詩外傳》, c. 180–120 BCE), Ban Zhao’s “Odes to Meng Mu” (Mengmu song 《孟母頌》, c. the 1st century CE),1 Wang Chong’s Critical Essays (Lunheng 《論衡》, c. 80 CE ), Zhu Xi’s Further Reflection on Things at Hand (Xu jinsilu 《續近思錄》, c. 12th century CE) compiled by Zhang Boxing (c. 1710 CE), Three-Word-Rhyme Classic (Sanzijing 《三 字經》, c. 13th century CE), and Chaste Widow Wang’s Short Records of Models for Women (Nüfan jielu 《女範捷錄》, c. 16th century CE).2 Some nineteenth century literary work claim that her last name is Zhǎng 仉—this claim however is inconclusive.3

1 Ban

Zhao is the first woman historian in China. She lived during the first century CE. For her philosophy, see Chap. 8 Ban Zhao by Therese Boos Dykeman in this volume. 2 See Ann A. Pang-White (2018), 231, 233, n. 6. 3 See, for example, Record of Mengzi’s Genealogy (Mengzi Shijia Pu 《孟子世家譜》), ed. Meng Guangjun 孟廣均, published in 1824.

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7.1.2 Confucian Philosophy of Education: A Background Meng Mu may be regarded as a transmitter of Confucian values. She was Mencius’ first teacher who taught Mencius important Confucian lessons on learning and self-cultivation. To understand the meaning and sagacity of her judgment and legacy, a brief explanation of Confucian philosophy is in order. Premised on the ideas that endowed human nature is fundamentally equal in all human beings but this innate nature could become perfected or corrupted over time owing to the influence of environment and habit, Confucianism is known for its advocacy for the transformative effect of education. Analects 17: 2 succinctly points out, “Human beings are similar to one another by nature. They become far apart due to habit/practice.” Mencius 6A: 7 further elucidates, In years of good harvest, most young people become lazy. In years of poor harvest, many become prone to violence. This is not due to difference in their heavenly endowed nature; it is owing to them allowing their heart-and-mind to become corrupted. Take the example of the wheat. If you sow the seeds and cover them with soil, and the seeds are planted in the same land and at the same time, they will grow luxuriantly in due time. … Therefore, things of the same kind are similar to one another. Why should this principle be doubted when it comes to human beings? Sages and I are the same in kind.4

In tandem, the “Record on Learning (Xueji)” chapter from the Book of Rites (Liji 《禮記》) adds, “A piece of jade, if not chiseled and polished, will never become a useful ritual vessel. A person, if not pursuing learning, will never understand the Way. Therefore, ancient kings in founding their countries and governing their people set teaching and learning as their first and foremost priority.”5 Learning and education are essential to the perfecting of one’s virtue and character. Without education, humanity will descend into the state of animals. This is not to say that animal nature is intrinsically evil. It is part of human nature. However, these physical desires, needs, and emotions should be moderated so that they do not get out of hand. Therefore, after discussing how a humane government must take care of the material welfare of its people by implementing fair land policy, taxing regulation, and a community-aid system (Mencius 1A: 5, 2A: 5, 3A: 3), Mencius 3A: 4 stresses a government’s moral responsibility to educate its people.6 This is in concert with Mencius 3A: 3 where it remarks that governments should “Establish academies and schools to educate the people. … These community schools and national academies are all designed to teach and make known human moral relations.” The Book of Rites, therefore, meticulously proposes a Confucian pedagogy and philosophy of education in several of its chapters. The “Regulations of the Family (Neize)” chapter, for example, delineates a curriculum and developmental plan 4 All

English translations of the Chinese texts in this chapter are by Ann A. Pang-White. an alternative translation, see Di and McEwan (2016), 10. 6 For an excellent discussion on the Confucian view on material welfare and the government’s moral responsibility to its people, see Bell (2003), 218–235. 5 For

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from childhood to adulthood together with the implementation of the ritual distinction between male and female, regarded as an essential means in protecting marital integrity and preventing incest or social disorder:7 At the age of six, boys and girls should be taught numbers and the names of directions. At age seven, boys and girls should not sit on the same mat or eat together. When they turn eight, in going out or coming in at a door, and in going to their mats to drink and eat, they must proceed after their elders—this is the beginning of teaching them how to yield to others. At age nine, boys and girls should be taught how to count the days. At age ten, boys should seek lessons from a teacher outside the home and stay with the teacher overnight [if possible]. He should learn written characters and arithmetic … At age twenty, he will be capped and begin to learn the rituals. … When he reaches the age of thirty, it is time for him to be married and begin to manage affairs proper to a man. … At age forty, he will begin to serve as an official [in lower rank]. … If his plan and his superior’s plan agree and match the Way, he will obey his superior’s command. If not, he will leave. At the age of fifty, he will be appointed as a great official. … At age seventy, he will retire from his post. … All girls, at the age of ten, should cease going out. Her female tutors should teach her congenial speech and appearance, way of obedience, how to handle hemp, raise cocoons, weave silk and make belts of different widths, how to make and mend clothes, how to observe ritual ceremonies, prepare wine and liquid, put beans, picked vegetables, and minced meat in ritual vessels, and how to assist in performing ritual. At the age of fifteen, she will pin her hair up. When she turns twenty, it is the proper age for her to be married.8

Accordingly, boys and girls before age ten are home-schooled by their parents and/or selected female teachers based on their virtue and talents. At age seven, ritual distinction between boys and girls is taught and upheld to adulthood. The curriculum for boys and girls begins to diverge at age ten. Girls’ education focuses mainly on home economics, mannerism, speech, appearance, cooking, sewing, and religious rites, whereas boys’ education emphasizes development and becoming a scholar-official and responsibility to the public.9 This curriculum plan first proposed in the 1st century BC was followed well into the late 19th and the early 20th century until the import of western education paradigm was introduced to China. If gendered education curriculum strikes a conservative tone, the “Record on Learning (Xueji)” and the “Great Learning (Daxue)” chapters of the Book of Rites outline the principle and purpose of education in a language and spirit that is strikingly modern. For example, the “Record on Learning” chapter stresses the symbiosis of learning and teaching, stating, “Teaching and learning enrich each other,” and the importance of timing, “Timing is the most important thing in the great learning.” 7 The

Quli Shang chapter mentions unethical consequences of incest, “For only beasts are without rules of ritual propriety, therefore father- and son- bucks having intercourse with the same doe.” The Jiaote Sheng chapter explains the importance of ritual distinction between male and female as the foundation for family integrity: “When this distinction between man and woman is exhibited, affection will prevail between father and son. When there is this affection between father and son, the idea of righteousness will arise in the mind. … The absence of such distinction and righteousness is characteristic of the way of beasts.” 8 See the last section of the Neize chapter in the Liji. 9 For an emphasis on women’s education and proper methods, see Pang-White (2018), 132, 134, n.9.

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“If students try to learn after the right moment has already passed, regardless how diligently they study, it will be difficult for them to succeed.” The “Great Learning” chapter opens with a clear statement on the purpose of education: “The Way of the great learning rests on manifesting illuminating virtue, loving the people, and abiding in the highest good.” It then outlines eights steps, starting from cultivating the self to the becoming of a public intellectual and a virtuous civil servant: In antiquity, those who wished to manifest illuminating virtue in the world first governed their own states well. Wishing to govern their own states well, they first brought order to their own families. Wishing to bring order to their own families, they first cultivated their own persons. Wishing to cultivate their own persons, they first rectified their own minds. Wishing to rectify their own minds, they first made their own will sincere. Wishing to make their own will sincere, they first extended their knowledge. Wishing to extend their knowledge, they first investigated the principles of things.

The eight steps clearly spell out the continuity and inseparability of the personal, the social, and the political spheres, in eight concentric circles—radiating out and referring back in mutual dependence—constantly reinforcing one another. Personal cultivation and moral relationships within a family are particularly important, as they are the root and the foundation of the social and the political.10 These Confucian values are clearly present in Meng Mu’s philosophy, as we shall see in the next section.

7.2 Learning from Meng Mu Among the surviving written works available today, Liu Xiang’s Biographies of Women presents us with the fullest description of Meng Mu and her philosophy of education and ethics. Liu Xiang’s account completed during the first century BCE, about two hundred years after Mencius died, was among the earliest written records of Meng Mu. The only other known written work mentioning the story of Meng Mu and Mencius, composed earlier than Liu Xiang’s account, is Han Ying’s Outer Compendium to the Classic of Poetry. For these reasons, this section and its analysis will mostly rely on Liu Xiang’s biographic account of Meng Mu. The following is a complete translation verbatim in exact order of Liu Xiang’s chapter on Meng Mu in Volume 1 of his Biographies of Women interspersed with brief analyses.11 There are four well-known anecdotes in total.12

10 For

more on the inseparability of the personal, the social, and the political, see Ames (2010), 30–50; Lee (2000), 113–132; and Pang-White (2009), 210–227. 11 See Liu Xiang, Biographies of Women, Volume 1 (Model Motherhood), chapter eleven (Mother of Meng Ke of the State of Zou). For Chinese text, see https://ctext.org/lie-nv-zhuan or Huang Qingquan 黃清泉, Xinyi leinü zhuan 《新譯列女傳》, 2nd ed. (2008), 54–62. For alternative translation, see Kinney (2014), 18–20. 12 See also Pang-White (2023), “Mencius and Augustine: A Feminine Face in the Personal, the Social, and the Political” in Dao Companion to the philosophy of Mencius, ed. Yang Xiao & Kim-Chong Chong (pp. 615–634).

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7.2.1 Meng Mu San Qian 孟母三遷 The first narrative known as Meng Mu san qian 孟母三遷 (Mencius’ mother relocated three times) describes and praises Meng Mu’s perceptiveness on the importance of learning environment and early childhood education. Meng Mu is the mother of Meng Ke [i.e., Mencius] from the State of Zou. [At first,] their residence was next to a cemetery. When Mencius was young, he liked to play around the burial sites and was eager to learn how to build tombs and bury the dead. Meng Mu [saw this and] said, “This is not the place to stay and raise my son.” Therefore, they left and moved to a place nearby a market. [In the new place,] Mencius loved to imitate showy businesspersons and their business transactions. Meng Mu again said, “This is not the place to stay and raise my son.” They therefore moved again. This time they stayed next to a local school. Here the young Mencius played roles and learned how to set up ritual vessels for religious ceremony and the proper ways of bowing, yielding, advancing, and withdrawing. [Seeing this,] Meng Mu said, “This is where my son should reside.” They then stayed. When Mencius grew up, he studied six arts and eventually became a renowned great Confucian scholar-teacher. Morally exemplary men praise Meng Mu for being good at gradual transformation (jian hu 漸化). The Classic of Poetry says, “That worthy person, /What shall I offer [her]?” This is what is meant! 鄒孟軻之母也。號孟母。其舍近墓。孟子之少也, 嬉遊為墓間之事, 踴躍築埋。孟母 曰: 「此非吾所以居處子也。」乃去, 舍市傍。其嬉戲為賈人衒賣之事。孟母又曰: 「此非吾所以居處子也。」復徙, 舍學宮之傍。其嬉遊乃設俎豆揖讓進退。孟母曰: 「真可以居吾子矣。」遂居及。孟子長, 學六藝, 卒成大儒之名。君子謂孟母善以漸 化。《詩》云: 「彼姝者子, 何以予之?」此之謂也。

Since environment and habits are crucial in the formation of a person, in this anecdote we see that Meng Mu took an active role in selecting the best learning environment for Mencius. She saw that even children’s role-play has a formative effect on a person’s character. The story is even more significant when one takes into account the fact that Mencius’s father supposedly died when Mencius was very young.13 Living in hardship, however, did not thwart Meng Mu’s determination (as a single parent) in finding the best environment that would afford Mencius the opportunity to develop his full potential. In the previous section, we learned that timing is the most important things in learning. If students miss the right moments in learning, it will be difficult for them to accomplish their goals. Meng Mu teaches us that the right timing begins in childhood.

7.2.2 Meng Mu Duan Zhi 孟母斷織 The second anecdote known as Meng Mu duan zhi 孟母斷織 (Mencius’ mother cut her weaving) elaborates on how Meng Mu cut her weaving to teach Mencius a lesson: 13 See, Zhao Qi趙岐, Mengzi tici《孟子题辭》 (Inscriptions of Mencius), cited in Mengzi 《 孟子》, ed. with commentary by Yan Xinglin 顏興林 (2019), 2, also Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mencius/ (accessed June 17, 2020).

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When Mencius was young, one day he returned home after school. Mencius’ mother was weaving threads of linen into cloth. “Have you done your best in your studies today?” she asked. Mencius replied, “It is similar to when it started before.” Upon hearing it, Mencius’ mother picked up a knife and cut up her weaved cloth. Mencius was terrified and inquired the reasons. Mencius’ mother said: “Your neglecting of learning is like my cutting of this weaving. A morally exemplary man pursues learning to establish his reputation. He inquires to expand his knowledge. Accordingly, when he is in residence, he is peaceful and tranquil; when he acts, he distances himself from harm. If you neglect your learning today, you will be bound to a life of servitude with no means to keep yourself from disasters. How is this any different from my work of weaving linen in order to provide food [for the family]? If a woman abandons her work midway, how can she clothe her husband and children and not constantly be worried about shortage of food? When a woman abandons the work she depends on for food and when a man degenerates from cultivating his virtue, if they don’t become thieves or robbers, they will surely turn out to be slaves or servants.” Alarmed by what he heard, Mencius thereupon studied diligently day and night without interruption. He became a student of Zisi [Confucius’ grandson] and turned into a Confucian-scholar who was renowned worldwide. Morally exemplary men praise Meng Mu for knowing the Way of being a mother (ren mu zhi dao 人母之道). The Classic of Poetry says, “That worthy person, / What shall I offer [her]?” This is what is meant! 孟子之少也, 既學而歸, 孟母方績, 問曰: 「學何所至矣?」孟子曰: 「自若也。」孟母 以刀斷其織。孟子懼而問其故, 孟母曰: 「子之廢學, 若吾斷斯織也。夫君子學以立 名, 問則廣知, 是以居則安寧, 動則遠害。今而廢之, 是不免於廝役, 而無以離於禍患 也。何以異於織績而食, 中道廢而不為, 寧能衣其夫子, 而長不乏糧食哉!女則廢其所 食, 男則墮於脩德, 不為竊盜, 則為虜役矣。」孟子懼, 旦夕勤學不息, 師事子思, 遂成 天下之名儒。君子謂孟母知為人母之道矣。《詩》云: 「彼姝者子, 何以告之?」此 之謂也。

In this vivid imagery of cutting her weaving, Meng Mu acted as the sagacious teacher, inspiring Mencius by her personal example and powerful words about the virtues and benefits of diligence, perseverance, and concentration. Drawing on the analogy of a woman’s work, she taught Mencius the dire consequences of prematurely abandoning his learning. In both cases, indolence, irresoluteness, and lack of concentration make a person unfree or even endanger others, whether in providing for one’s family or in maintaining one’s integrity. Confucian emphasis on the principle and purpose of learning are clearly seen in her argument. It is owing to her perceptive parenting and practical wisdom that Mencius eventually became the “second sage” of Confucianism.

7.2.3 Mengzi Qu Qi 孟子去妻 The third narrative known as Mengzi qu qi 孟子去妻 (Mencius intending to divorce his wife) delineates the occasion in which Mencius wanted to divorce his wife for ritual impropriety. After Mencius was married, one day when he was about to enter their private bedroom, he saw his wife dressed only in inner garments. Displeased with what he saw, he left immediately without entering the room. Thereupon, his wife bid farewell to Mencius’ mother and requested to leave their home, stating, “I have heard that the Way [of ritual etiquettes]

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between a husband and a wife does not apply to their private bedroom. Today I did not dress appropriately [i.e., not in full attire] in our private bedroom. When my husband saw me, he became extremely displeased, which is to treat me as a guest. Righteous integrity of a married woman does not allow her to stay overnight at someone else’s house as a guest. I would like to request permission to return to my parents’ home.” Henceforth, Mencius’ mother called for Mencius and admonished him: “According to ritual propriety (li 禮), when one is about to enter the main gate, one asks first if anyone is home in order to exhibit proper respect for others. When one is about to ascend to the main hall, one called out loudly in order to warn others about one’s presence. When one is about to enter a room, one keeps one’s eyes down to avoid seeing other’s mistakes. Today you did not examine yourself to see whether you have acted according to ritual propriety [in making sound to warn others of your arrival]. Instead, you accused others of not following proper rituals. Is it not the case that your own behavior is far from propriety?” [Upon hearing this,] Mencius thanked his mother and asked his wife to stay. Morally exemplary men praised her, saying, “Mencius’ mother understands ritual propriety. She has penetrating understanding of the Way of the mother-in-law (gu mu zhi dao 姑母之道).” 孟子既娶, 將入私室, 其婦袒而在內, 孟子不悅, 遂去不入。婦辭孟母而求去, 曰: 「妾 聞夫婦之道, 私室不與焉。今者妾竊墮在室, 而夫子見妾, 勃然不悅, 是客妾也。婦人 之義, 蓋不客宿。請歸父母。」於是孟母召孟子而謂之曰: 「夫禮, 將入門, 問孰存, 所 以致敬也。將上堂, 聲必揚, 所以戒人也。將入戶, 視必下, 恐見人過也。今子不察於 禮, 而責禮於人, 不亦遠乎!」 孟子謝, 遂留其婦。君子謂孟母知禮, 而明於姑母之道。

This anecdote demonstrates how adeptly Meng Mu handles the conflict between her son and her daughter-in-law. It was never an easy task in being a motherin-law without being partial toward one’s own son. Yet again, she acted as a perceptive teacher who impartially assessed the situation and reasoned with Mencius why he is the one acting inappropriately by ritual standards rather than his wife, for ritual propriety is to place others before oneself out of respect, not a means to shame others for self-righteousness. Consequently, Mencius was able to acknowledge his fault and realized that lacking in self-examination had caused him unfairly accusing his wife. A marriage crisis is thus resolved. It demonstrates a very mature and healthy relationship between adult children and their parents as well as that of mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law, self and other.

7.2.4 Meng Mu Chu Qi 孟母處齊 The fourth narrative known as Meng Mu chu qi 孟母處齊 (Mencius’ mother resided in the State of Qi) explains Meng Mu’s solution to Mencius’ dilemma, helping him fulfil his filial responsibility and maximize his talents at the same time. When Mencius was residing in the State of Qi, he looked worried. Mencius’ mother saw this and asked, “You seem worried. What is bothering you?” “Nothing really,” Mencius replied. On another day when Mencius was home at leisure, he leaned against a pillar and sighed. Mencius’ mother saw this and said, “The other day I saw you looked worried. You said that it was nothing. Today you leaned against a pillar and sighed. What is troubling you?” Mencius replied, “I have heard that a morally exemplary man estimates

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his ability and then takes a fitting official position [that matches his ability]. He will not accept rewards through illicit means nor does he covet glory or official salary. If the feudal lord does not listen to his advice, he would not try to reach his superior. If he listens but does not put it into practice, he would not serve in his court. Now the Way is not practiced in the State of Qi. I would like to leave but am concerned with mother’s old age. This is why I look worried.” Mencius’ mother replied: “Ritual rules for a woman prescribe that she should prepare five meals, ferment the wine, care for her parents-in-law, and mend the clothes—that is all. Therefore, a woman cultivates the self in the inner chambers but has no ambitions in affairs in the external world. The Book of Changes says, “A woman should center her attention on preparing meals and not err from it.” The Classic of Poetry says, “Do not transgress. Do not argue. Preparing wine and food is her only duty.” These sayings elucidate that it is not rightful for a woman to claim authority over others; rather, she should abide by the Way of the Three Obediences (sancong zhidao 三從之道). Therefore, when she is young, she should follow her father and mother. When she is married, she should follow her husband. When her husband dies, she should follow her son. This is what ritual propriety stipulates. Now you are a grown man and I am in my old age. What about you act according to what is right for you and I do what is ritually appropriate for me?” Morally exemplary men said that Mencius’ mother understands the Way of women (fu dao 婦道). The Book of Poetry says, “Always pleasant, / Always joyful, / Never angry in his/ her teaching.” This is what is meant. The salutary ode says, “Mencius’ mother taught and transformed [her son] in proper order. She selected the right place to raise her son and helped him choose the right talents to develop. She thus enabled him to follow great morals. When her son did not make progress in his learning, she cut her weaving to demonstrate her lesson. Her son thereupon perfected his virtue and rightfully became the crowning jewel of his time.” 孟子處齊, 而有憂色。孟母見之曰: 「子若有憂色, 何也?」孟子曰: 「不敏。」異日 閒居, 擁楹而歎。孟母見之曰: 「鄉見子有憂色, 曰不也, 今擁楹而歎, 何也?」孟子 對曰: 「軻聞之: 君子稱身而就位, 不為苟得而受賞, 不貪榮祿。諸侯不聽, 則不達其 上。聽而不用, 則不踐其朝。」今道不用於齊, 願行而母老, 是以憂也。」 孟母曰: 「夫婦人之禮, 精五飯, 审酒漿, 養舅姑, 縫衣裳而已矣。故有閨內之脩, 而無境外之志。《易》曰: 『在中饋, 無攸遂。』《詩》曰: 『無非無儀, 惟酒食是 議。』以言婦人無擅制之義, 而有三從之道也。故年少則從乎父母, 出嫁則從乎夫, 夫死則從乎子, 禮也。今子成人也, 而我老矣。子行乎子義, 吾行乎吾禮。」君子謂 孟母知婦道。《詩》云: 「載色載笑, 匪怒匪教。」此之謂也。 頌曰: 孟子之母, 教化列分, 處子擇藝, 使從大倫, 子學不進, 斷機示焉, 子遂成德, 為當世冠。

In this anecdote, Mencius is caught in a dilemma. He must choose between care for his aging mother whose physical conditions may not allow her to travel extensively and his career goal as a virtuous public intellectual who should uphold his moral integrity in whom he serves as his superior. The Way of the great learning, after all, rests on manifesting one’s illuminating virtue, loving/renovating the people, and abiding by the highest good, which is a personal, moral, and existential goal that he has worked toward for his entire life. As discussed earlier, in the Confucian view all cultivation of virtues starts within the family, the first social environment that an individual is exposed to. Filial piety and sibling affection are regarded as the root of humaneness (Analects 1: 2). Care for one’s aging parents is particularly perceived as the greatest responsibility of all because of the existential, historical, and moral relationships between parents and children. In Mencius’s

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case, his widowed mother raised him in adversity since childhood—his dilemma is especially acute. Here too we see how Meng Mu resourcefully solved Mencius’ dilemma. She adeptly appealed to a strict Confucian code for women, known as the “Three Obediences and Four Womanly Virtues (San Cong Si De 三從四德).” The Three Obediences defines “deference and obedience” as the Way of a woman throughout her lifetime: “when she is young, she should obey her father and older brother; when she is married, she should obey her husband; and when her husband dies, she should obey her son.”14 The Four Womanly Virtues advises women to excel in women’s virtue, women’s speech, women’s appearance, and women’s work.15 In advising Mencius, she contextualized what righteousness means according to each person’s respective circumstance and turned the conservative ritual code for women into a useful means that allows both to fulfill their respective moral ends. In doing so, she solved Mencius’s seemingly unresolvable dilemma. The salutary ode concludes Liu Xiang’s chapter on Meng Mu.

7.2.5 Han Ying on Meng Mu As mentioned earlier, the only other written record that contains stories about Meng Mu is Han Ying’s Han’s Outer Compendium to the Classic of Poetry (Hanshi Waizhuan). It contains three anecdotes but all are much briefer than the ones in Liu Xiang’s Biographies of Women.16 Han Ying’s description of “Mencius’ mother cutting her weaving” and “Mencius intending to divorce his wife” are similar to Liu Xiang’s account with only minor variances.17 Han Ying’s record, however, did not include “Mencius’ mother relocating three times” or “Mencius’

14 See

the Jiao Te Sheng chapter in the Liji. the Hun Yi chapter in the Liji. 16  For Han Ying’s account, see https://ctext.org/han-shi-wai-zhuan/juan-jiu/zh, Volume 9 (accessed June 6, 2020). 17 In Han Ying’s account, Meng Mu cutting her weaving to teach Mencius about the importance of diligence and concentration in learning because Mencius forgot lines when reciting an important text, whereas Liu Xiang’s account described Mencius as not making progress in learning at school. Similarly, both Han Ying and Liu Xiang mentioned that once Mencius intended to divorce his wife because he perceived her behavior to be contrary to ritual propriety. While Han Ying described that Mencius’ wife was squatting on the floor (ju 踞) in their bedroom, Liu Xiang described that she was not dressed in full attire (tan 袒). The Hanshi Weizhuan was also more direct in depicting how Mencius did not abide in ritual propriety when he entered the private bedroom without giving his wife advanced warning. See https://ctext.org/han-shi-wai-zhuan/juan-jiu/ zh (accessed June 6, 2020): “孟子妻獨居, 踞, 孟子入戶視之。白其母曰: 「婦無禮, 請去之。 」母曰: 「何也?」曰: 「踞。」其母曰: 「何知之?」孟子曰: 「我親見之。」母曰: 「乃汝 無禮也, 非婦無禮。禮不云乎: 『將入門, 〔問孰存; 〕將上堂, 聲必揚; 將入戶, 視必下。』 不掩人不備也。今汝往燕私之處, 入戶不有聲, 令人踞而視之, 是汝之無禮也, 非婦無禮也。 」於是孟子自責, 不敢出婦。” 15 See

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mother residing in the State of Qi.” It does nonetheless contain one additional anecdote about Mencius’ childhood, not found in Liu Xiang’s Biographies of Women. This additional story is worth noting because it provides added materials for our understanding of Meng Mu’s philosophy of education. It is translated here in its full length: When Mencius was young, the neighbor in the east side of their home was killing a pig. “Why is our neighbor in the east side killing a pig?” Mencius asked his mother. “They want to give you pork to eat,” Mencius’ mother replied [jokingly]. She later regretted her words and said to herself, “When I was pregnant with this child, if the mat was not set straight, I would not sit on it. If meat was not cut correctly, I would not eat it. I did all these for the sake of prenatal fetal education. Now he just begins to develop his knowledge about things and affairs. If I deceive him today [by not carrying out my words], it is to teach him untrustworthiness.” She thereupon [took money out of their meager budget and] bought pork from their east-side neighbor and prepared the meat for Mencius to eat in order to teach Mencius that one should not deceive others [by taking one’s words lightly]. The Classic of Poetry says, “May you have abundant offspring!” This speaks of how a virtuous mother enables her son to become virtuous.18 孟子少時, 東家殺豚, 孟子問其母曰: 「東家殺豚, 何為?」母曰: 「欲啖汝。」其母自 悔而言曰: 「吾懷妊是子, 席不止, 不坐; 割不正, 不食; 胎教之也。今適有知而欺之, 是教之不信也。」乃買東家豚肉以食之, 明不欺也。《詩》曰: 「宜爾子孫繩繩兮。 」言賢母使子賢也。

In Han Ying’s additional anecdote about Meng Mu, one sees how prudently Meng Mu conducted her action. She took her own behavior as teaching material of what trustworthiness is. One ought not to take one’s words lightly. When one’s actions do not match one’s words, it is to betray another’s trust.

7.3 Conclusions The above anecdotes about Meng Mu illustrate that pioneering practices in education dated two millennia ago are still relevant today. Recent scientific research and developmental psychology have proven that prenatal fetal education,19 childhood learning, and environment are important elements in child development and character formation. Virtues such as persistence, concentration, diligence, and

18 English

translation is based on Chinese text from the Chinese Text Project, https://ctext.org/ han-shi-wai-zhuan/juan-jiu/zh (accessed June 6, 2020), paragraph one. 19  See, e.g., Cheng (2016): 49–53. Prenatal education has been an important element in Confucian philosophy of education since antiquity. Liu Xiang’s Biographies of Women (c. 1st century BCE), Volume 1, mentions numerous maternal models. Most notably, Tairen, the mother of King Wen of Zhou (c. 1112–1050 BCE), was praised for her prenatal fetal education, which was credited for the birth of a sage king (King Wen). Henceforth, Tairen became a legendary figure for prenatal education and was cited in numerous later works, including Madame Zheng’s Classic of Filial Piety for Women, Empress Renxiaowen’s Teachings for the Inner Court, (see my Chap. 16 in this volume), and Madame Liu’s Short Records of Models for Women, among others.

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self-examination as well as familial harmony ensure individual success and lay the foundation for a person’s capacity to serve the larger community. So too, the best teaching method among all pedagogical tools is teaching by modeling the right behavior, especially by parental examples. Meng Mu’s stories teach us all of these valuable lessons. In a patriarchal society, narratives about women exemplars are often neglected. Owing to Liu Xiang’s Biographies of Women and Han Ying’s Han’s Outer Compendium to the Classic of Poetry, thankfully, narratives about Meng Mu are preserved. One sees that without Meng Mu, the “second sage” of Confucianism would not have developed the philosophical foundation that she provided. She not only taught her son basic Confucian moral principles, but taught him to critically assess his own behavior. Her story is a reversal of paradigm in that traditionally males (not females) are the ones in the role of a teacher or spokesperson of a philosophical school or ideology. As audiences, we are drawn to the male figures in the foreground, be it Confucius or Mencius. The accounts about Meng Mu reorient us that Mencius’ accomplishment is indebted to his mother, the hidden female figure in the background. Another interesting angle of “Mencius’ mother cutting her weaving,” in addition to what has been pointed out earlier, is how it accentuates the contribution of a woman’s work to a family’s economic capacity. This recognition cuts through a rigid reading of the Confucian inner-outer distinction, which often acts in concert with the female-male ritual distinction in downplaying women’s contribution to the economic-social life in a society. Meng Mu further demonstrated a woman’s ability in independent reasoning and that adept argumentative skill in philosophical discourse is important in achieving one’s end. Legends about her also presage, foretell, and inspire further advocacy for women’s intellectual and moral autonomy by later authors. Women’s unique contribution to family and society, stemming from their experience of caring relation with their children and others, opened the door for the development of Confucian care ethics that regards family as a fertile ground for moral relations.

References Ames, R. (2010). The Confucian worldview: Uncommon assumptions, common misconceptions. In D. Jones & E. R. Klein (Eds.), Asian texts, Asian contexts (pp. 30–50). State University of New York Press. Bell, D. A. (2003). Confucian constraints on property rights. In Daniel A. Bell & Hahm Chaibong (Eds.), Confucianism for the modern world (pp. 218–235). Cambridge University Press. Cheng, F.-K. (2016). Taijiao: A traditional Chinese approach to enhancing fetal growth through maternal physical and mental health. Chinese Nursing Research, 3(2), 49–53. Di, X., & McEwan, H. (Eds.). (2016). Chinese philosophy on teaching and learning: Xueji in the twenty-first century. State University of New York Press.

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Han, Y. (2020). Hanshi Waizhuan 《韓詩外傳》 (Han’s outer compendium to the classic of poetry) (Vol. 9, c. 180–120 BCE). https://ctext.org/han-shi-wai-zhuan/juan-jiu/zh. Accessed August 30, 2020. Huang, Q. (2008). Xinyi leinü zhuan 《新譯列女傳》(New commentaries on biographies of Women) (2nd edn., pp. 54–62) Sanmin shuji 三民書局. Jiang, Y., & Junlang, H. (2012). Xinyi lijiduban 《新譯禮記讀本》(New commentaries on the book of rites), Two volumes (2nd edn). Sanmin shuju 三民書局. Kinney, A. B. (Trans.). (2014). Exemplary Women of early China: The Lienü Zhuan of Liu Xiang. Columbia University Press. Lee, P. (2000). Lee Zhi and John Stuart Mill: A Confucian feminist critique of liberal feminism. In C. Li (Ed.), The Sage and the second sex (pp. 113–132). Open Court. Legge, J. (2020). The Li ki in sacred books of the East. F. Max Müller (Ed.). Clarendon Press, 1879–1910. https://ctext.org/liji. Accessed August 30, 2020. Liji 《禮記》(The Book of Rites/Rituals), also known as Xiaodai liji 《小戴禮記》. 5th–3rd century BCE. https://ctext.org/liji. Accessed August 30, 2020. Liu, X. (2010). Lienüzhuan《列女傳》(Biographies of Women). c. 1st century BCE. https:// ctext.org/lie-nv-zhuan. Accessed August 30, 2020. Meng, G. (Ed.). (1824). Mengzi Shijia Pu《孟子世家譜》(Mengzi’s Genealogy). Pang-White, A. A. (2009). Reconstructing modern ethics: Confucian care ethics. Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 36(2), 210–227. Pang-White, A. A. (Trans.). (2018). The Confucian four books for Women: A new translation of the Nü Sishu and the commentary of Wang Xiang. Oxford University Press. Pang-White, A. A. (2023). Mencius and Augustine: A feminine face in the personal, the social, and the political. In Y. Xiao & K.-C. Chong (Eds.), Dao companion to the philosophy of Mencius (pp. 615–634). Springer International Publishing. Van Norden, B. (2020). Mencius. In Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. https://plato.stanford. edu/entries/mencius/. Accessed August 31, 2020. Zhao, Q. (2019). Mengzi tici《孟子题辭》 (Inscriptions of Mencius). In Mengzi 《孟子》, ed. with commentary by Yan Xinglin 顏興林. Bulage Wenchuangshe.

Chapter 8

Ban Zhao, in public domain in USA and PRC due to antiquity of the original

Ban Zhao of China 班昭 45–116 CE Therese Boos Dykeman

Abstract  Ban Zhao’s life and achievements are set here in an historical context and her philosophy in a context of Chinese philosophy. To understand her philosophy is to be acquainted not only with her prose such as Lessons for Woman but with her poetry such as “The Needle and Thread” and “Rhapsody on Traveling Eastward.” Her ethics, for example, is formulated in her advice in poetry to her son as well as in her advice to her daughter in prose. Thus, in order to inquire into her philosophy both her prose and poetry are analyzed. A Confucian, Ban Zhao yet pointed out that Confucianism failed itself when it did not recognize that unless women were educated as well as men, there could be no true balance and harmony in either the family or the state. This is a color version of the portrait of Ban Zhao published in the Wu Shuang Pu (無雙譜, preface, (1690) by Jin Guliang. Published online with no assertion of copyright by Chinoy TV Manilla. www.chinoy.tv. T. B. Dykeman (*)  Fairfield University, Fairfield, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_8

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8.1 Introduction 8.1.1 Biography 8.1.1.1 Family Ban Zhao (45–116 CE), known for being “wisest and best in her sex” (Swann 51),1 lived in the first century of the Imperial period of China during the Later or Eastern Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE). Ban Zhao’s biography was sketched in her family authored official history of the Early Han, the Han Shü and preserved more completely in Fan Ye’s (398–445) official Books of the Later Han/Hou Han Shü. The first Chinese historian of historiography, Liu Chih-chi (661–721), wrote a critique of Ban Zhao in his Shitong recording her as scholar as well as moralist (Swann 51, 56). Wang Xiang’s 1624 Four Books for Women/Nü Sishu included comments on her life and work (Pang-White 31–2). By including an epigraph by Ban Zhao’s daughter-in-law, Ting Shih, the 1778 Memoires concernant les Chinois, offered more information about Ban Zhao than did the Hou Han Shü (Swann 43–45). In his 1880 “Education of Women in China,” S. Wells Williams excerpted from the Memoirs.2 Nancy Lee Swann, who was the first to present Ban Zhao’s life and works in a scholarly English translation, included a translation of Fan Yeh’s biography (40– 41) and the memoir by Ting Shih. Swann pointed out that biographical material had also been collected from Ban Zhao’s works themselves, and from comments by, for example, Ban Zhao’s former student Ma Rong (79–166 CE), the renowned commentator on the five Classics. Because the life of Ban Zhao was included in biographies consecrated to celebrated women from the Han dynasty and before, she has been known throughout Chinese history (Tchen-ying 1931). Further, the writings by Ban Zhao were kept in the public arena when they were offered to students as subjects for essay in the examination system (Swann 51). This does not mean that she has been generally well known. Often she was and is today neglected even for her part in the writing of the Han Shü.3 Yet, Ban Zhao was a most exceptional Chinese woman. A poet, historian, and philosopher, Ban Zhao (Pan Chao in old spelling) taught astronomy, mathematics, history, and the Confucian Classics to women at the imperial court and was advisor to the beautiful and intelligent Empress Deng when

1 The

texts of Ban Zhao’s works presented in this chapter rely on translations by Nancy Lee Swann in her Pan Chao: Foremost Woman Scholar of China, American Historical Association, 1932. 2 Nancy Swann observed that Wells did so without acknowledgement (47). 3 In many discussions of the Han Shü, Ban Gu is given sole credit; Ban Zhao is not mentioned, such as in Burton Watson’s 1974 text, which omits reference to her.

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she was ruler.4 Ban Zhao’s distinguished family included her great aunt, Ban Jieyu (33–7 BCE), a well-known poet and concubine of Emperor Cheng and Ban Jieyu’s brother, Ban You. Ban You was a collator of ancient texts in the imperial library, who enriched his own library with discarded duplicates (Idema, Grant 19). His library of “rare and precious” books was then inherited by Ban Zhao’s father Ban Biao/ Pan Piao (3–45 CE). Ban Biao wrote enough to fill nine books, and began the Han Shü or Han Annals, which were then compiled by his son, Ban Gu/ Pan Ku (32–92 CE) and completed by Ban Zhao. A court historian, Ban Gu studied for more than twenty years and wrote nearly ten volumes (Swann 65). His twin brother, Ban Ch’ao, distinguished himself as a General. Sent to Turkestan in 73 CE, Ban Ch’ao became a leader who extended both the Silk Road trading route and the territory of China as he put fifty states along the Silk Road under Eastern Han Rule. The first emperor, Gaozu, in 221 BCE had divided China into 36 “commanderies” with imperial chancellors of mostly military men (Ku 15). As protector general of the Western Territories, Ban Ch’ao eventually gained command of the Tarim Basin bordering the Kushan empire to the west, which gave China control over central Asia. When the ambassador reached the Persian Gulf, Ban Ch’ao “dispatched an embassy to what he imagined was the Roman Empire” (Wollmer 27). Ban Zhao’s son, Cao Cheng, had the honor of being appointed a county magistrate in 113 CE. Thus did Ban Zhao live within an illustrious family. Ban Zhao was educated by her father, older brothers, her literate mother, but probably mostly by tutors. At about age fourteen she composed commentary on Lives of Admirable Women by Liu Xiang/Liu Hsiang (80–8 BCE).5 Fourteen was also the age at which she married Cao Shishu. She had one son and possibly more children whom she raised mostly as a single mother. She lived out her retirement at a son’s post in Chengliu (Peterson 102). Her husband died young, and rather than remarry, which was discouraged by Confucian tradition, Ban Zhao pursued literary work, earning a reputation in the court for scholarship. In China’s long history of literature, the “place occupied by women has been small” (Swann, xi). Yet, Ban Zhao wrote rhapsodies (fu), eulogies (song), inscriptions (ming), dirges (lei), questions (wen), annotations (zhu), laments (aiei), letters (shu) treatises (lun) memorials (shangshu) and exhortations (yiling) –-so much did she write and so little has remained. (Swann 41, Wong 103, Wang, 2003, 177).

4 There were three ruling Empresses: 1. Empress Lu (d.180 BCE) wife of Liu Bang or Gaozu, the founder of the Han Dynasty ruled 188–187 BCE. 2. Tang Empress Wu Zetian (624–705) who ruled for fifteen years, sought to equalize women and for a brief time they were allowed to sit the Imperial Examination, 3. Late Qing Dowager Empress Cixi (1835–1903) sought to modernize China and so urged journals be published about and by women, schools for women be opened, and women to travel. 5 In Lan Dingyuan (1712) Women’s Learning the story is told that Lady Lin encouraged her daughter Zhanyuan to study and later to write a commentary on the Biographies of Exemplary Women because Ban Zhao’s commentaries had been lost. (Beverly Bossler, 2015: 43, 96).

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Often referred to as “Venerable Madam Cao,” or Cao Daijia, “Great Master,” Ban Zhao was highly regarded in the Han court. In teaching the Empress Deng the classics and assisting her in making decisions for governing the Han Empire, Ban Zhao displayed her skill in ethics and politics, which meant that she probably brought to bear both Kung Fu-Tzu’s (551–479 BCE) idea of ruler as father and instructor and Han Fei’s (280–233 BCE) idea of ruler as promoter of law. As Court Poet, she displayed her skill in literature and writing. Yet, talented, accomplished, and as important to China as Ban Zhao was, she and her achievements have barely survived in the history of China. 8.1.1.2 Achievements Just how remarkable Ban Zhao was, is evident, first, from history, and second, from a close reading of her writings. Both Ban Zhao’s sister-in-law and her daughter-in-law, Ting Shih, “were highly literate” and attempted to preserve her work. Her sister-in-law née Ding gathered her works in a three volume Collected Works of Ban Zhao, meaning, perhaps, gathered in sixteen scrolls. The younger sister of Ban Zhao’s husband, Cao Fengsheng, wrote a critical piece on the Lessons, pronouncing it to be “well worth reading” (Idema, Grant 42). Despite their efforts, the scrolls or volumes were little preserved. In a climate which questioned whether women should write at all, and considered their works controversial, little of Chinese women’s writings or the comments on them was deemed important enough to be preserved.6 Important here is that with both her poems and prose Ban Zhao demonstrated her philosophical ability. Her most celebrated prose, Lessons for Women, presents a system of ethics dedicated to her “daughters.” The Lessons set a precedent for the tradition of women writing moral tracts for women. Ban Zhao asked her 6 Until

the twentieth century “women’s writing/nüshu was considered nothing but marginal,” so few wrote and fewer had their work preserved. Not until the two last decades of the Manchu under the rule of Cixi “did women write to use writing to improve their position,” and then not until the feminist martyr Qui Jin (1875–1907) did women write in numbers. (Idema and Grant, 8) The Republic of China during the May 4th Movement in 1919 pushed for equality of men and women. In 1953 Chairman Mao declared that “Women hold up half the Sky” and he removed many old rules. Since 1975 A National Woman’s Day is celebrated on March 8. Discussion about the capability and the propriety of women writers continued in China for centuries by male writers, poets, historians and scholars, one example being Yuan Mei (1716–89) who taught women and urged them to become poets, writing that literature was appropriate for women. He gave evidence from the Book of Changes which called sections “daughters,” and the Book of Odes which included poems by women. Yuan Mei’s disciple Wang Gu agreed that women should write poetry. Xhang Xuecheng 1738–1801, a philosopher of history argued that daughters had not only taught learning in families, but that they preserved “bodies of knowledge” at times of crises and destruction, but he protested Yuan Mei’s opinions. (Kang-I Sun Chang and Haun Saussey, Women Writers of Traditional China.) “The truth remains…that throughout the more than two millennia of imperial China, writing was largely regarded as man’s work, since to write implied participation in the public and therefore the male domain, especially that of officialdom.” (Idema & Grant, 2004, p. 4).

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“daughters” to write out for themselves a personal copy of the Lessons she had written for them. Whether for posterity or simply that they would have a copy, the actual copying of it would have been a teaching tool. The rules of behavior for the upper class were codified based on interpretations of the Rites and Ceremonies, Records of the Rites, and the Rites of the Zou in the century preceding Ban Zhao’s (Idema, Grant 12). But these rules were less about ethical behavior than manners. If these rules were to be adhered to, Ban Zhao reasoned in the Lessons, they should also be ethical. To know and understand ethics, means that one must be educated. Therefore, education must be obtained not only by men but also by women, for they perform and teach the Rites. Secondly, rules were established to insure order be implemented both in the family and in the state, but without educating all members of a family, Ban Zhao reasoned, there could be no harmonious and balanced order in either the family or the state. Being herself educated, Ban Zhao had the ability to give advice to other women, and to advise Empress Deng to ensure that her reign was an orderly one, an ethical one, and a balanced and harmonious one.7 A mother as well as a teacher, Ban Zhao wrote moral messages to both her son and “daughters” in which her own moral character as being attentive and caring is revealed. Controversies persist about Ban Zhao’s role in the Han Shü. Some assert that Ma Xu, brother of Ma Rong, wrote the “astronomical tables alone,” but that seems unlikely (Wong 105). Rather he may have assisted her in writing the treatises on astronomy and the Eight Tables, but she deserves the credit, for she was the more experienced scholar of astronomy and math as well as of history. What is important about the Eight Tables is not so much that their dates are accurate, but that they “contain genealogical charts spanning two hundred years” which include women (101). This is important “because records relating to women in Chinese history were not traditionally well kept” (101). Much of Ban Zhao’s life was spent at court. In addition to writing poems, teaching philosophy and astronomy, and advising Empress Dowager Deng when she was ruler of the Han Dynasty, Ban Zhao was also called upon to teach at court the Han Shü. Her expertise was needed since as a new text it had no tradition. Neither did

7 At the time that Ban Zhao was living in Confucian Han China, Musonius Rufus 30-62 CE was engaged in writing 32 apothegms and 22 longer discourses in which he advised: Learn philosophy to think well in order to act well. Although Martha C. Nussbaum called him “the incomplete feminist,” Rufus believed that women ought to receive the same education as men, for 1—the gods gave women the same power of reasoning as men, 2—the gods gave women the same senses, 3—the sexes share the same parts of body, and 4-women have equal desire for virtue and natural affinity for it. So therefore, women should study philosophy to consider how to live as honorably as men—a parallel argument to Ban Zhao’s. He continued: If a woman studied philosophy, she would be just, a blameless partner, good co-worker, careful guardian of husband and children, free from love of gain, and greed. From studying philosophy one would be more courageous and think nobly. Therefore he concludes, sons and daughters should receive the same education and endure toil, not fear death, nor become dejected in face of misfortune. They will learn mutual care and companionship in marriage (Nussbaum, 2002: 283–326.).

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it have punctuation. So as both teacher and historian, she had the task of parsing it as well as explicating it, which is what she did for her student Ma Rong who later became the first scholar to produce commentaries on all five Classics. Ban Zhao’s memorial to the throne in support of her brother’s request to be relieved of his position and allowed to return to China’s heartland is considered to be one of her finest prose pieces. Her most noted work, Lessons for Women, was translated and introduced by Nancy Lee Swann in 1932 and thus made available to the West for the first time in a scholarly edition. Swann introduced this text with biographical background and concluded it with commentary on Ban Zhao as a moralist, a philosopher of life, and a “woman of letters.” In a review of Swann’s text in 1933, A. W. Hummel, called the book an “outstanding study” and “a definitive study of a gifted Chinese woman of antiquity” (Hummel 562). Hummel also noted that at the time of his writing, a shrine to Pan Chao stood on the East Street of Fu-Fêng (Shensi), the Pan family’s ancestral home. He added that in 1815 a new one was erected “adjoining the temple to the God of Literature.” The members of the Pan family who were still there, he judged to be very poor (Hummel 562–63). Swann’s text was not reprinted until 2001. The Preface of the reprint by Susan Mann includes additional information about the history of the Lessons. A 2018 translation of the Lessons is included in Ann A. Pang-White’s The Confucian Four Books for Women. Throughout the centuries, the importance of Ban Zhao’s works has been critiqued. In their Women Writers of Traditional China: An Anthology of Poetry and Criticism, Kang-I Sun Chang and Haun Saussy provide a history of criticism of and references to Ban Zhao, which is supplemented by Susan Mann also in her Preface.8 8  A

List with page numbers in parenthesis from Women Writers of Traditional China: An Anthology of Poetry and Criticism by Kang-I Sun Chang and Haun Saussy: –9th c Song Ruozhah compared herself to Ban Zhao (671). –13th to 14th c Yang Weizhen – in her Preface to Cao Miaoging, Xiangeli, “Of women who read and were able to write, the best known to history is Ban Zhao of the Eastern Han dynasty.” In recent time such as Li Qiugzhao and Zhu Shuzen “are in no way comparable to Ban Zhao.” (732) Finding Cao Xaezhai “Isn’t there a successor to Ban Zhao after all?” “a second woman who can stand beside Ban Zhao” (733). –14th c Wu Shinu quotes Ban Zhao’s Lessons in a poem (141); Shang Jinfar references (315). –16th c Wang Xian [man] compiled Ban Zhao’s Lessons, as well as Empress Xu’s Precepts for the Ladies of the Palace and Lady Liu’s Brief Notes for Female Guidance (671). –17th c Wang Duansha (366); Zhao Huanguang [male] Ban Zhao laughs at short-lived scholars “summer insects and Morning mushrooms” in a poem. (744). –18th–19th c. Wu Zao (610). In the Preface to the 2001 reprint of the Lessons. Susan Mann also lists reactions to Ban Zhao and her work: –12th c Sung Dynasty philosopher Chu Hsi made an effort to reprint Lessons and praised women who used it to instruct their daughters. –16th c. Lessons was” republished in1580 by imperial command in a joint volume with a similar set of instructions titled Nei hsü attributed to Empress Jen-hsiao” It became half of the “Four Books for Women,” a counterpoint to “Four Books” studied by men for the civil service examination. (ix). –14th to 20th c Lessons was embraced by Korean Yi dynasty with a strict Confucian interpretation to reshape gender relations, curtailing women’s movement. (ix).

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As a subject of imaginative art portraiture Ban Zhao has been brought to mind over the centuries in paintings.9 The initiation of education of women in China began in 1897 with the Chinese Girl’s School.10 Based on Confucianism, this school chose as their model, for her virtue and scholarship, Ban Zhao. Founded in 1906 the Sichuan Girl’s School in Beijing also chose Ban Zhao. In that same year Xu Ding Yi’s Biographies of Great Women of the Motherland in Japan noted Ban Zhao as “a sage of the highest order” and because of her teaching, can be considered a pioneer in women’s education (Jie 9). However, one scholar in 2004, Sherry J. Mou, considered Ban Zhao’s life to be “a direct contradiction” to what she preached in Lessons for Women. (86). That Ban Zhao was an historian, there is no doubt. That she was a poet, no doubt either. That she was a philosopher has been admitted by but few scholars. Her father Ban Biao had theorized that for philosophers and historians, the moral and political are two faces of the same activity. It has been asserted that in this his daughter Ban Zhao followed his thinking (Tchen-ying 43, 50). Ban Zhao’s thinking as evinced in her works will be addressed further on in the examination of her works.

–18th c. China Chang Hsueh-ch’eng mentions Ban Zhao four times in his “essay on the history of women’s learning in China” and praised her but lamented her later imitators and advised going back to her original work. (x). –At China’s first government-sponsored schools for girls, Hsueh Shao-wei argued to install a shrine to Ban Zhao rather than one to Kung Fu-Tzu, for “she speaks directly to their own experience and aspirations.” The female scholar Ch’iu Min-fang published an annotated edition of the Lessons, praising Ban Zhao for arguing, “To be a woman you must have an education!” (xi). –20th c. Ban Zhao metamorphosed as the patron saint of women’s modern education, but her Lessons were vilified during the Maoist period as “feudal-patriarchal ideology.” Still other mentions are referenced by Wilt Idema and Beata Grant’s, The Red Brush, 2004. –14th c. poet Yang Weizhen (1296–1370) dismisses women poets who don’t measure up to Ban Zhao who was also teacher and model. (202). –17th c. Ye Shaoyuan said of his daughter Xiaoluan, “if heaven had allowed her some more years, she would have surpassed Ban Zhao and Cai Yan.” (394). –18th c. Said of Wen Pu/Chuleng when her father wanted her to sit for the exams dressed as a boy, “Wouldn’t it be better for her to become a Ban Zhao rather than a Huang Chonggu?” (570). –19th c. Zhang Yin (1832–1892) from “Thoughts upon Reading the ‘Biography of Ban Zhao’: “You must have heard of the Venerable Madam Ban. Her ‘Treatises’ surpassed the history of Sima Qian. Her careful choice of words followed the Annals. The ladies of the palace took her as their teacher…” (657). Martina Deucher has noted that among the four books King Yongjo (1728–76) ordered to be translated into Korean was Ban Zhao’s “Instructions for the Inner Quarters.” (Ko et al., 2003). 9 Nancy Lee Swann suggests the most famous portraits are found in the T’ang and Sung periods and17th c. collections (Swann, 51, 57). 10 Zheng Wang claims that the first Chinese run girl’s school was in Shanghai in 1898 at a time of anti foot-binding sentiment and educational reforms, and 1920 is the date for the first co-ed to attend Beijing University. (Women in the Chinese Enlightenment, 1999).

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8.1.2 Philosophy Admired as a Confucian historian and poet, Ban Zhao has been less accepted for being a Confucian philosopher; nevertheless, after the dissolution of the Han Dynasty, she was chiefly remembered in China as a moralist (Swann 51). A moral philosopher, yes, but how Confucian was she? Certainly to some she was more conservative than Confucius (Pang-White 10, 17). To others she did not follow the conservative trend of Confucianism as it was beginning to be interpreted: first, by being a writer and teacher, Ban Zhao was not following Confucianism; second, by not accepting the view that yin-yang meant solely hierarchical difference when it came to men and women in regard to family issues; third, by not holding with educating only men, educated to be Gentlemen (Swann 90). As Kung Fu-Tzu admonished, education is necessary to assist talent: “talent requires study, and study values intelligence,” for, “talent undisciplined by study is mere cleverness” (Chang, Saussy 798). Ban Zhao reasoned that women’s talent also had need of the assistance of study. Ban Zhao’s philosophy is evident in what is preserved of both her poetry and prose. In addition to her extant prose—the history Han Shü, her Lessons/ Nu Jie, and a brilliantly argued request in the form of a memorial to bring her aged and ill brother home from a lifetime of service in the field—she wrote poetry, some of which is also philosophy. The only known extant poems have been preserved in Swann’s translations and the subsequent translations of Idema and Grant: “The Bird from the Far West,” “The Cicada,” “The Needle and Thread,” and an essay in rhyme “Travelling Eastward” or “Rhapsody on a Journey to the East.” These writings are like gems in a sparsely furnished crown of Chinese women’s writings. Ban Zhao was the “first woman to write a significant body of work in all the genres of literature of her time” (Idema, Grant 18). Three of Ban Zhao’s works to be examined here not as literature but as philosophy are addressed in this order: first explained as philosophy are the poems “The Needle and Thread” and “Rhapsody on a Journey to the East,” and then analyzed is the divisive prose tract, Lessons for Women. My view here is that to understand the philosophy of the Lessons more fully, is to have examined as well the philosophy inherent in these poems mentioned.

8.2 Social-Political Background 8.2.1 Han Dynasty History Ban Zhao (c 45/51–114/120 CE) and her distinguished family of scholars and leaders were fully involved in the Han Dynasty’s golden age of Chinese culture. Founded by Emperor Liu Bangs/Gaozu (256–195 BCE), the Han Dynasty, (206

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BCE–220 CE) second of the Chinese dynasties, achieved prosperity and rare political stability. Divided into two periods, the Former Han or Western Han (206 BCE–24CE) with its capital at the large city of Changan and the Later Han or Eastern Han (25–220 CE) with its capital at Luoyang, the Han periods formed a rising and falling arc of power and significance. Emperor Gaozu, as described in Ban Biao’s Discussion on the Destiny of Kings, conceived of imperial authority as limited (Ku 23). His was a Confucian “conception of imperial rule by consultation and moral consideration” (Ku 18). This “conception” was described by the Confucian Meng-Tzu in the language of a metaphor: the prince being a boat and the people the water. The water either supports or capsizes the boat (Ku 18). Beginning with Gaozu, “The Han dynasty became the first great patrons of Confucianism” (Ku 18). The full instatement of Confucian ideology was accomplished by the Han Emperor Wu (141–87 BCE) who emphasized harmony in relationships, filial piety, ritual, and righteousness. Confucian philosophy, like Aristotle’s political philosophy, held that family was the foundation of government. If families maintained order, it followed that order would also be maintained in the state. In Han Confucianism, order in family meant order in relationships, e.g., ideologically a man’s subservient relation with his parents was more important than his relation with his wife. Custom may have proved stronger than the law; law, however, for example, forbade men from abusing their wives. So it was that, “During the Western Han Dynasty, the transformation of the Confucian philosophical system into state ideology took place” (Guo 4). Han Confucianism, in fact, became “crystallized in Han statecraft” under the reign of emperor Yüan (48–33 BCE) (Swann, 1950, 30). The arc of Confucian progress and political harmony inclined in the earlier Han dynasty, and progressively declined in the later Han dynasty, although the great prosperity was beginning to vanish in late first century BCE. The Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), was preceded by the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), and was followed by the disunited period of the Three Kingdoms (220–280 CE). When the Han dynasty collapsed, Confucianism regressed, Daoism rose, and Buddhism entered the philosophical environment more fully. Confucian philosophy was expressed not only in family and state governing but in lacquered boxes celebrating filial piety, lead-based ceramics of homes and horses, and carvings of, for example, women musicians.11 The Han period came to be known for fine arts—visual art, literature, and music, as much as for its invention of paper, sundials, water clocks, water powered mills, arch bridges, iron foundries.12 It encouraged mining, astronomy, and medicine.

11  While

artifacts have been discovered of women warriors, “women’s participation remains obscure in the Confucian canon,” according to Sufen Sophia Lai. (Mou, 1999, 80–81).

12 In

addition, the physician Hua Duo discovered a drug that when combined with wine rendered patients about to undergo surgery unconscious. An early seismograph was invented, and Chang Heng held in his Han world that the world was round. A merchant class was developing. (Patricia Buckley Ebrey, 2003: 43).

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During Ban Zhao’s lifetime, political power in the government was held partly by ceremonialism as a method for keeping order. For various court ceremonies, Ban Zhao was often called upon to write poems. Because she understood the Confucian philosophy of government under which laws were made and followed, she was requested, after Emperor He’s death in 106, to aid the Emperor’s second wife and mother to his infant son, now ruler, Empress Deng. (81–121 CE)13 Deng ran an economically efficient government that also reformed criminal laws and patronized the arts. Empress Deng organized disaster relief for the drought and flood victims of 107–109 CE, and she is also credited with adopting paper, a commodity that had recently been invented. With the guidance of Ban Zhao, for fifteen years Deng ruled competently, particularly noted because she was the last of the Han rulers to do so. A memorial by Ban Zhao advising Deng on a “crucial matter” was preserved in the Hou Han Shü (Idema, Grant 33). At Ban Zhao’s death, the Empress took the unusual step of wearing mourning. By 126, a decade after Ban Zhao’s death, it was reported that the government had become oppressive and overly rigorous as it gradually becoming more and more incompetent. The standard history of the Former or Western Han, History of the Former Han / Han Shü was commissioned by Emperor Ming (57–75 CE). Often the Han Shü has been attributed solely to Ban Zhao’s brother, Ban Gu (Gardner 20). Although it was written mostly by Ban Gu, it was also planned and researched by Ban Gu’s father, Ban Biao, and its last chapters written and the whole work edited by his sister, Ban Zhao. “Ever since its compilation,” this work has been “widely read and respected” (Gardner 54). Ban Gu “brought forth the first of China’s dynastic histories” (Swann 65) and from thence forward, it became the basis for the mandate that each dynasty had the responsibility for compiling an “official account”. For reasons of its innovations and its excellence, this history became “one of the most renowned and influential of all Chinese historical works” (Watson 1). At his father’s death at fifty-four, twenty-eight year old scholar Ban Gu decided to continue his father’s work. When he commenced the Han Shü, he was called upon to write it as the official history (Tchen-ying 27). Ban Gu spent twenty years researching and adding innovations: essays on law, geography, literature, pseudo-science of the elements, and forming a bibliographical essay on previous works. Before Ban Gu died in prison at age 61, Emperor He had “issued an edict summoning his younger sister Ban Zhao to come in person to the Dongguan Library in the Han Palace to carry the Han Shü to completion” (Chang, Saussy 788), which she did by 111 CE.14 In doing this, like her brother, she gained

13 Empress

Deng had come to the court at the age of fifteen. She became Empress Dowager when her son was only one hundred days old. Ban Zhao was much older than was she. (Barbara Bennett Peterson, 2000: 102).

14 Idema

and Grant (26) argue that Ban Zhao must not have completed the Han Shü because Ma Xu, Ma Rong’s older brother, was asked to complete it, but that could have many interpretations.

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access to the Imperial archives. With her writing and editing of the Han Shü, Ban Zhao became the first Chinese woman historian.15 Three histories in China preceded the Han Shü: the Classics of History from the Confucian Canon, the Records of the Grand Historian/Shiji by Sima Qian (145–86 BCE),16 and the Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals by Dong Zhongshu (179–104 BCE). Parts of these histories are included in the Han Shü. Appearing centuries after the Han Shü came The Book of Later Han by Fan Ye (398–445 CE). Homer H. Dubs recounted that Ban Gu described the Han Shü as an “encyclopedia of scholarship: dealing with the Chinese world of the first two centuries” of Han rule (Ku 1). The Han Shü, begins with the rule of Emperor Gaozu (141–87 BCE) and is composed of 120 volumes divided into 4 main parts: 12 devoted to the basic annals, 8 to chronological tables, 10 to treatises, and 70 to biography, one of which is of Ban Zhao. Ban Gu “conceived of history as the record of the deeds of individuals” (Ku 2). It emphasized that “Confucian ethics of virtue should reign”. The format for the Han Shü was provided by Sima Qian’s Shi Ji or Historical Records.. Within the Han Shü, “most authoritatively recorded by Ban Gu,” is a “Compilation of the first imperial inventory of literature” (Gardner 32). Ban Gu’s “Essay on Literature” is based on “Seven Summaries” written by Liu Hsin. The Han Shü’s “nearly complete inventory of books in circulation at about the opening of the Christian Era” has been of great importance, for it also “established a precedent for later writers of standard history to follow” (Gardner 37–38). It is the “first dynastic history to include among its ‘Biographies’ a chapter on ‘Exemplary Women’” (Idema, Grant 34). Ban Zhao’s contributions, completed in her style of writing, were the Eight Chronologies Tables and the Treatise on Astronomy (Swann 40, Tchen-ying 51, Idema 26). Chang and Saussy comment: “Truly this was an extraordinary event without precedent....Had it not been for Ban Zhao, there would have been no way to transmit that learning,” (789) for, they add, Ban Zhao taught the Han Shü to among others, “the great Confucian scholar Ma Yong,” line by line (789). In

15 Composed in the women’s apartments during the Han dynasty, the imperial Diary of Work and Rest or Fu xue gave evidence of upper-class women’s literary skills (784). However, “women’s behavior originally had no separate or special documentation; women simply appeared in the historical annals wherever they figured in specific events. If these women had appeared in later times, when histories required specialized treatises with a separate category for women’s biographies, Liu Xiang’s and Fan Ye’s collections would include ten times as many women who were as brilliant and distinguished as Ban Zhao and Cai Yan. This is how we know that women’s learning has been steadily lost with the passing of time. When the Three Dynasties flourished, women studied letters together with men. Such was the ancient precedent; no one saw cause to boast of it or consider it unusual” (Chang and Saussy, 1999, p. 785). 16 Chad Hansen states that in The Records of the Grand Historian/Shiji ca. 100, the father Sima Tan created the classification of “Daoism” and the son Sima Qian “cobbled together the biography of Laozi, crediting him as the founder of Daoism (Laozi, 2011, 9).

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addition to these contributions to the history, Nancy Swann surmised that Ban Zhao might have been the one to include the only woman listed with wealthy merchants, the Widow of Pa, who owned quick-silver mines (Swann, 1950, 408). Although she partly wrote and taught the Han Shü, Ban Zhao was never given the title “historian to the Imperial Court of China” (Swann, xi).

8.2.2 The Philosophical Heritage: Philosophy and Philosophers in the Han Court Confucian philosophy dominated the Han Dynasty. In 124 BCE Emperor Wu established the Imperial University and in 136 BCE he abolished all non-Confucian academics and restored Confucian classics. Out of Former Han evolved a “Confucian idealism based on the crucial Confucian concept of man…human beings are the central focus of the world” (Ch’en 771). Humanity is conceived of as “creative ‘actualization’” of its variable potentials, rather than a fixed “essence” (Ch’en 771). The ontological nature of human beings in Confucianism as in all Chinese thinking can be defined as either annihilation of the individual or the individual as relational, meaning not a Western thing, but an Eastern becoming, becoming actualized and always in relation to. The philosophy of Kung Fu-Tzu (551–479) like that of Socrates, was written by his followers. They wrote down the pithy sayings of the Analects. Confucian philosophy holds a natural, humanistic outlook that teaches ethics/yi from ritual/li, music/le, and discourse in terms of “guiding behavior” (Hansen 11–13). Believing in the intrinsic worth of each human being, the ideal of Confucian thinkers was an ultimate equality to be realized when popular education and potential were developed, the education process affecting morality and political and social elevation of individual human beings. Education was cosmic; justice it was believed was the Will of Heaven, human justice, therefore, should follow the Justice of Heaven. In its prime, Confucian orthodoxy absorbed a “grand synthesis” of other schools of thought, allowing Han thinkers to adopt different positions and critique Confucianism (Ch’en 766). Not by suppression of other philosophies such as Daoism did Confucianism flourish but by learning and education with discriminating spirit. Thus, “The Confucianism in the middle of the first century BCE probably had good reason to believe their doctrine had prevailed,” but with the “fall of Later Han, official Confucian orthodoxy perished” (Ch’en 772). Two problems developed. The first was consequent to the reign of Wang Mang (9–23) a Confucian sage somewhat like a Platonic philosopher king, which “marked the climax of Han Confucian idealism” (Ch’en 773), the pinnacle in the arc and the split between Former and Later Han. The reign of Wang Mang compromised the principle of dynastic rule, which was that the worthiest should rule. The rule of this wise and upstanding Wang Mang, however, proved to be a disaster. So came distrust of Confucianism, and so the second problem, the breakdown of

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the synthesis of the philosophies, making manifest the “disunity and complexity of Han Confucianism” (Ch’en 766). Ban Zhao’s father, Ban Biao was twenty when the Wang Mang rule ended in chaos (Swann 27). Still, Han first century China remained an ordered state with a learned class, (Swann 15) an Eastern equivalent to Rome (Swann xii). Like Aristotle, Kung Fu-Tzu argued that human beings are by nature political, all humans are born political, i.e., born as members of family, of state, of the human race. Confucianism complicates this with the principles of Yin-Yang, to which humans are subject.17 Yin-Yang expresses relationship as structure and function. Logically, one side cannot exist without the other. Thus Yin side ever influences and shapes the other, Yang, and vice-versa. In some ways Yin and Yang have particular definition, e.g., Yin is shady side, right hand, down, and cold, while Yang is sunny side, left hand, up, and hot. As opposing forces, Yin is female and Yang is male with each side ideally being mutually supportive. In the Han court, an understanding of the nature of the universe meant an understanding of the Cosmos as a dynamic whole, governed by complementary opposites, one of these opposites being the principle of Yin-Yang. Related to Qi, the vital force of the universe, the Yin-Yang principle was believed to govern heaven, earth, man, and the seasons (Hinch 82). Originally, as mentioned in the classics, the principle Yin-Yang meant sunshine-shade. The books that introduced Yin-Yang were among those Ban Zhao had studied. In the Book of History, Yin and Yang refer mainly to sunny and shady sides of mountains; in the Book of Odes they are mentioned more frequently and for the first time refer not to geography but to phenomena. Ontologically Yin and Yang are not defined as things with certainty and universality as they would have been in classical Greek or Western thinking, but as relationships, oppositions that ever wax and wane, defined, perhaps, as a circular flowing. So in this way in an unpredictable world, “Yin-Yang may ease a sense of loss of control” (Wang, 2012, 15). It is left to humans to figure out how Yin and Yang are distributed, i.e., as they can be altered more or less in human endeavors, farming to rituals. Over its history, Yin-Yang became less a way of naming than a way of philosophical thinking; philosophical thinking that has affected custom.18

17 Rosenlee

(2006) has argued that the separation of nei-family and wai-state as private and public spheres “marks the beginning of “gender disparity,” “woman’s personhood” being outside the realm of wai” p. 10. 18 The Han court conformed to established customs and to the developing Confucian philosophy and religion. One custom was that government officials wore clothes to conform to the seasons according to the five elements theory [air, earth, fire, water, and metal]. Ceremonies for seasonal changes were held in different directions from the centre of Luoyang and clothes corresponded with colors associated with the seasons: spring, east, gray-green or blue; summer, south, red; autumn, yellow; winter, black. Red became the most respected color of the Han, symbolizing “fire virtue.” Women are depicted in Han art as wearing long pants, long jackets, and elaborate long belts.

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Philosophers in the Han Dynasty, Former and Later, were mainly Confucian, but they held a wide range of philosophical views. One of the most influential Confucian philosophers on the Later Han period was the Early Han Dong Zhongshu (179–104 BCE). Dong Zhongshu’s Luxuriant Dew from the Spring and Autumn Annals became an important and influential source for 2000 years. Dong was instrumental in making Confucianism dominant and for giving prominence to Yin-Yang interpreted as a hierarchical relation: heaven over sovereign, sovereign over people (Wang, 2012 ,15). In the Early Han period, Yin-Yang schools searched into the methods of Yin-Yang. The Han Shü supplied a further understanding of the conceptual nature of Yin-Yang, especially as it resisted the ancient notions of divination and the trends to attach superstitions, such as ghosts (Wang, 2012, 27). While Confucius wrote almost nothing about women, he praised women for their “wisdom and virtue” (Pang-White 5–8). However, Dong Zhongshu argued that the relationship between men and women is based on a hierarchical/patriarchal rather than on a notion of Yin-Yang as balanced and harmonious. In his 123 chapters, Dong argued as a radical Confucian how heaven and human beings resonate with one another, “Honoring yang and debasing yin” and so “all husbands, though lowly, are all yang, and all wives, though noble, are all yin” (Wang, 1999, 205). The philosopher Liu Xian/Hsiang (80 BCE–8 CE) devoted his Biography of Women, solely to the subject of women, the first extant book in China to do so. Its 125 biographies in seven categories provide 104 tales of virtuous and distinguished women over a long history asserting their intelligence. Despite the intense interest in and necessity for education in Confucian philosophy, the fact was only men and some highest-ranking women were educated. Yang Hsiung’s (53 BCE–18 CE) influential philosophical poem, The Canon of Supreme Mystery or Classic of Great Mystery, involved dialectic regarding permanence and change, unity and diversity, simplicity and multiplicity (Ch’en 774). Hsiung claimed that what permeates all presence is formless mystery. Only mystery comprehends both Yin and Yang, for Yin cannot understand Yang and Yang cannot understand Yin. Without man, heaven could not realize itself as cause; without heaven, man could not complete himself (Ch’en 775). The concept of fate is determined by heaven. Human intelligence is implied as being coefficient with the Absolute and as such determines spiritual intelligence. So, Hsiung believed in the concept of fate but did not deny human effort. He also believed that human nature is a mixture of good and bad in contrast to Legalist philosophy, dominant in the previous Qin Dynasty, and especially articulated in the Hanfeizi which held that human nature was inherently bad as opposed to Meng-Tzu philosophy which held it to be innately good (Ch’en 776). In his Exemplary Sayings modeled on the Analects, Hsiung argued that current writing should concentrate on morality over display. So long as they didn’t overwhelm Confucian values, Hsiung thought that Legalism in respect to laws and Taoism in respect to the Way, were valuable. In all, Hsiung demonstrated his own critical version of Confucianism. Hsiung’s friend, the philosopher Huan T’an (43 BCE–28 CE),” in his New Discussions/ Xiniun dismissed “formless mystery” to focus on the pragmatic and realistic.

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After the reign of Wang Mang (9–23 CE) the Later Han philosophers were involved in Confucianism in new ways. One new theory was that it was heaven that proclaimed the founding of a dynasty. Ban Biao (3–54) elaborated that theory in his essay On the Destiny of Kings, which was reaffirmed by Ban Gu (32–92) in the Han Shü. Another change was the exalting of filial piety and ancestor worship which were less common in Former Han. Ban Gu saw the Confucianism dominating the Han court as being “the route to profit and fortune” (Chang, Saussy 786). The foundational philosophy of the Han Shü, was based on Wang Ch’ung’s (27–100 CE) concept of fate or mandate. Wang Ch’ung, compared, perhaps, to Lucretius (1st c BCE), derided Daoist “superstitution,” the Confucian “ghosts” and fenshui mandates, and disentangled them from morality. While Confucian values emphasized the moral spirit of man, Wang Ch’ung seems to have valued moral autonomy regarding the inner spiritual world of a human being (Ch’en 781–788). A rationalist, Wang Ch’ung argued in Balanced Discourse that human life had three interacting planes: the biological-mental-physical, the socio-political, and the moral. These interacted with each other and also with random fate. A person can function differently on different planes, e.g., one can be physically healthy but immoral, etc. Ban Zhao (c 45/51–114/120), an unofficial Confucian philosopher in the Imperial Court, pointed out a large flaw either in Confucian philosophy or in its interpretation. Although the aims of Ban Zhao’s Lessons were different from Kung Fu-Tzu’s Analects, his aim being to “exhibit the duties of political government as those of perfecting self” (Legge 27), and her aim being how to navigate within the family to preserve self, both aims demanded education, virtue, and companionship. While Dong Zhongshu, viewed Yin-Yang as a hierarchical concept, Ban Zhao viewed it rather as a balanced one. She agreed with Liu Xiang and Yang Hsiung in her views of human nature in relation to virtue as being both good and bad. Finally, her approach to the issues of politics, metaphysics, and customs was as a rationalist. A fuller explication of Ban Zhao’s works as philosophy must bear in mind these many deliberations about which she must have known that took place in the Classics and within the later Han years. One subsequent Han philosopher and friend of Ma Rong, Wang Fu (78–163 CE) should be noted. In criticizing society in his political and metaphysical ten volume Comments of a Recluse/ Qian fu lun, Wang Fu argued for good government by taking into account both Legalist philosophy, which emphasized practical government measures, and Daoist philosophy, which defied the outside world. Interestingly, he pointed out that evil conditions created by man are accumulated over generations, and so the need is for such evil to be continually rectified by rational and effective human effort (Ch’en 790). He also insightfully questioned how obedience to the ruler for the good of the state could be reconciled with superior men’s desire for freedom. Twenty chapters were devoted to the Confucian traditions or customs in the Eastern or Later Han society in Ying Shao’s (140–206 CE) encyclopedic A General Discussion of Customs/ Fengsu Tongyi. But in Later Han, Confucianism declined as Buddhism and Daoism rose. Buddhist philosophy, which probably

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entered China via the Silk Road, was first mentioned in 65 CE, perhaps in relation to the Buddhist community in Luoyang. Emperor Ming established the first Buddhist temple in Luoyang in 68 CE, the White Horse Temple, a temple that over the centuries has been rebuilt time and again. Buddhism made slow progress; it “mingled with and grafted on to Daoism” (Demiéville 808). Daoism with its focus on immortality by the influential Daoist Huang-Lao (109–91 BCE) nearly disappeared in first century Later Han. After Huang-Lao, one resource for Daoist beliefs was The Classic of Great Peace (31–7 BCE). It applied Yin-Yang resonance, e.g., in its opposing the imbalance of female infanticide (Wang, 2012, 10). When the Han dynasty collapsed and the rebellions of 184 arose, so did Daoism.19

8.3 Philosophical Works: “Needle and Thread,” “a Journey to the East,” and Lessons for Women 8.3.1 The Poem “The Needle and Thread” One of the few [partially] extant poems composed by Ban Zhao is called “Needle and Thread.” The title word “needle” carries a meaning of “admonition,” meaning “lesson” or “criticism,” i.e., those who “dare criticize, in speech or writing, the faulty actions of their superiors” (Idema, Grant 30). Both a physical object, which “pricks” someone or sews something and a metaphysical object, which “pricks” or “needles” someone as “oral criticism,” a needle also means sewing activity or metaphorically, womanly occupation. The title word “thread” as a physical object means a strand of fibers carried through a material substance. Its purpose is to bind together. Metaphorically thread, therefore, means relationship. Kung Fu-Tzu’s many teachings contain that meaning, “connected by a single thread or principle,” i.e., “loyalty and reciprocity” (31). “The Needle and Thread” is on the surface about sewing but beneath, on one level it is about rhetoric, and on another about the philosophical nature of man and the universe and the meaning of life’s work. Sewing has been a common theme in women’s writings over centuries, often lamenting it as woman’s work, sometimes angrily as a task in lieu of education,

19 Chad

Hansen holds that the Tao Te Ching, translated as “Classic of Ways and Virtues,” “mysteriously emerged at the apex of classical Chinese thought in the third century BCE” and “turned people to a more inclusive harmony with nature”(7). The name Laozi, associated with this short book of “poetic wisdom” means “Old Philosopher” or “Old Master.” This book in the fourth century BCE was elaborated by Zhuangzi (365–285 BCE) in the form of a dialogue between Kung Fu-Tzu and Laozi (8). These two were joined in the Book of Changes/I Ching (10). The first evidence of the Tao or Laozi comes after 250 BCE discovered in two silk scrolls. The first commentary on it is in the Hanfeizi (10). Laozi wrestles with social versus natural process, and in his Theory of Opposites, names come in opposing pairs such as beautiful-ugly, wu-you, exist, thingnot exist, no thing. (Laozi, 2011).

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and sometimes symbolizing female as “distaff side” and male as “spear.”20 So, Ban Zhao’s three stanza poem is an apt example of her thought on many levels of meaning. “The Needle and Thread,” interpreted as philosophy, asks: what is the purpose of human activity or human conduct as political and teleological? The first stanza addresses the nature of the “needle” as a metaphor for human nature, both as “distaff” and “spear,” the second stanza, the work of the needle as metaphor for life’s activities or the work of critiquing what is not just or ethical, and the third stanza, the result or meaning of life’s work, the end of one’s becoming. The first stanza as translated by Swann: Strong Spirit of Pure (Steel), from autumn’s metal cast, (Incarnate) body (of Power), slight and subtle, straight and sharp! To pierce, then to enter gradually in, that is your nature.

The needle represents both a Yin and a Yang principle of the universe, a needle/ sword. A “steel” rather than bamboo needle would sew silk not hemp.21 Steel,22 a metal, is one of the 5 forces or elements: water, earth, fire, wood, and metal which are “the perpetually active principles of nature” (Swann 110). The nature of metal is one of coolness, corresponding to one of the five grains, hemp. Metal overcome by earth, represents one of the five planets, Venus, the metal planet. Under the metal element is one of four seasons, autumn, autumn being an ebbing season.

20 A

few examples of the sewing/needle and thread themes throughout philosophy’s history: • 4th c. BCE Hipparchia, Stoic and Cynic, pursues philosophy, rather than “the loom” (housework). • 14/15th c CE Christine de Pisan’s Lady Reason opines that both sewing and speaking are necessary arts of civilization. • 17th c. Anna van Schurman repeats Helisenne de Crenne’s 16th c. complaint that the needle is all women need. • 18th c. Anne Bradstreet asked “who says my hand a needle better fits?’. • 18th c. Mary Astell comments that some men would remit to her the “needle” and learning to themselves. • 18th c. Maria Gaetana Agnesi “Pen and paper, not needle and spindle.” • 19th c. Judith Sargent Murray asks if the needle is “sufficient to employ the operation of the soul…”. • 19th c. Charlotte Perkins Gilman in The Man-Made World informs that Harriet Martineau hid her writing under her sewing should visitors appear. • At the Jiaotong University in Xian, China, a sculpture of an emerging woman with a book appears to stand in front of a tall needle. • Two writings about the needle from Peter H. Lee’s 1981 Anthology of Korean Literature: “Lament for a Needle” [Choch’im mun] Anonymous. The needle to a widow has been figuratively a responsive friend to her, a gift, a help, an aesthetic elevation, a loving attachment. The conclusion: if this needle has feeling, she and the needle will meet in the afterlife. “The Dispute of a Woman’s Seven Companions” [Kyujung ch’iru chaengnon ki]. Merits are argued between the needle, scissors, thimble etc., but the woman answers, it is herself who attains merits and rewards. 21 Swann explains that garments would have been court garments which were sewn with white silk thread alluding to The Book of Poetry, I, II, 7. (Swann 111). 22 Steel

was used perhaps, since 496–65 BCE.

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In the ideal Confucian political and physical world, all is order, and all order is interrelated. The “needle” is a part of an ordered universe and a part of Yin-Yang relation and interchange as well. The nature of the “needle” is as “strong spirit,” a metaphor for strong character of women, of human society, that submits to and constructs order. As rhetoric it disrupts dis-order to gain order. It sustains both rigid and “subtle” or bendable power. The function of human power is to “pierce” or to ever begin and in sewing, to ever connect so to construct relational unity of mankind. The male function of Yang is to be rigid; the female function of Yin to be soft, but the two must work together mutually, like needle and thread, and like the Analects’/Lungyu notion of knowledge meaning mutual accomplishment. Confucian, this poem also initiates feminist philosophy. It presents the feminine work of “sewing” or functioning as necessary to human achievement. Thus, only in the mutuality of men and women “sewing” together are human achievements accomplished. The second stanza continues literally, metaphorically, and philosophically. The nature of human activity is that it universally leaves many and various “footprints.” Humans progress despite obstacles and errors to accomplish “things.” Yang is giving over to Yin, a universally predictable movement within which sustains uncertainty and error: Only your ordered footprints, Needle and Thread Attest the quantity, the variety, the universality (of your work). You retrace, twist (in your path) to mend flaws / Until the results resemble the pure wool of the lamb.

“Needle and Thread” physically stitch making “ordered footprints,” rhetorically “mend flaws,” and philosophically gain virtue. When we come to understand something like the best of our past, we appreciate the legacy we have received, i.e., all the various and many sewed and mended things of universal quality and benefit. We do so by exercising the virtue of filial piety, expressed metaphorically, like a kneeling lamb before a standing ewe to gain milk, sustenance from ancestry needed to live. Current human achievement, “results,” is meant to equal the best achievements of what came before from our ancestors. The third stanza addresses the point of life’s work. How can one account the myriad nature of it? Accomplished humbly, the legacy of human activity involves the Yang male forcefulness of the sword giving over to the Yin female, a yielding shield or thread-work—a male to female accomplishment. The question is, then, does the point or objective of life’s work and striving, considered teleologically, rise to earthly accomplishment or to a spiritual, metaphysical, and morally transcendental one? Ban Zhao writes: What measure or basket suffices to count (the pieces of your work)? All, all together these are your memorials/…(found in the village home,) They ascend into the stately hall.

“What measure or basket suffices to count…” is an acknowledgment that no matter what size, no matter how big the basket, it is insufficiently large enough

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to contain (or, perhaps, to represent) a person’s myriad accomplishments (“pieces of work”). So we, the readers, are given the image of an enormously-large basket, overflowing with important achievements. This is an acknowledgement that the person is physically productive, but also of moral character, consistently, and persistently so throughout a lifetime. However large the sum of the contents of the basket is, the sum provides a memorial to that person—the person’s biography, history, epitaph, legacy to the world. Idema and Grant explain that the phrase “people like bucket and basket” held the meaning of “unenlightened officials to whom only minor tasks might be entrusted” (31). “Baskets” could not be trusted to carry work of such stature, nor could any person be trusted to carry someone else’s legacy or measure of work. Sewing means many kinds of stitching activities such as: mending, which refers to improving on past stitching provided by ancestors and thus is related to filial piety, and embroidering, which refers to decorating or improving the clothes and so the social status of those of the court, and thus related to aesthetics and political value. It is not right to entrust sewing to unreliable people, for the “source”(s) are not only needle and thread but the physical person sewing and that person’s skills which craft together in order to produce beauty of aesthetical value and human value. Such human activity occurs in the home, the earthly home or village home, yet exists not only for the earthly state but for the good of the political state and the transcendent “state” of Dao. So “memorials” has the triple meaning of clothes, a plaque of stone honoring achievement, and virtues attained of transcendent value. In Swann’s translation of “Needle and Thread,” the poem is divided into three stanzas: the first addresses needle and thread; the second stanza addresses the activity of needle and thread; and the third stanza addresses the results or “memorials” of them and their activity. The poem in Idema and Grant’s translation is divided into two rather than three, the first about the character and work of the needle, the second about its moral purpose.23 Needle and Thread Strong Spirit of Pure (Steel), from autumn’s metal cast, (Incarnate) body (of Power, slight and subtle, straight and sharp! To pierce, then to enter gradually in, that is your nature; Only your ordered footprints, (you wonderful) Needle and Thread Attest the quantity, the variety, the universality (of your work). You retrace, you sway, you twist (in your path to mend flaws Until the results resemble the pure wool of the lamb. What measure of basket suffices to count (the pieces of your work)?

23 “Needle

and Thread” as translated by Wilt Idema and Beata Grant: 30–31. Here, the needle is a “single connection” between “all things” like all of Confucius’ teachings but not like corrupt or ignorant dictums by small-minded officials.

T. B. Dykeman

148 All, all together these are your memorials (They are found in the village home;) They ascend into the stately hall. (Swann 104–5)

Through the images and activity of needle and thread, Ban Zhao explains the cosmic principle of Yin-Yang. As in the Tao te Ching, the two together work in harmony. In addressing the profound questions about the meaning of life, Ban Zhao metaphorically reveals that, incarnate by fate, the needle must work, put forth effort, for the length of its life to earn earthly and heavenly fulfillment. As a female more so than male symbol, the needle offers permission to criticize and to achieve a wealth of female attainment. Ban Zhao looks at the earthly interests of Kung Fu-Tzu and beyond to the universal Daoist Way and heavenly interests. But also, as Idema and Grant make clear, Ban Zhao explains the cosmos as a “single connection linking all manner of things.” (Note Swann’s comment on the “unity of knowledge” 110–11.) This is indeed a philosophical poem about the meaning of life that takes on the issues that Yang Hsiung and other Han philosophers found to be of importance. Clearly, with this poem, Ban Zhao demonstrates how her ideas fit within the established philosophical traditions of her time and place.

8.3.2 The Poem: Rhapsody on Traveling Eastward/A Journey to the East Rhapsody or fu was a new literary genre in the Han Court. Ban Zhao’s rhapsody was included in the early sixth century Selections of Refined Literature.24 A rhapsody by Ban Zhao’s brother Ban Gu compared Chang’an and Luoyang as capital cities of the Han and argued that Luyang was the better (Hanson 210). Her father, Ban Biao’s “Rhapsody on a Northward Journey” is alluded to in Ban Zhao’s rhapsody, entitled “Traveling Eastward” as translated by Swann, “Rhapsody on a Journey to the East,” as translated by Idema and Grant, or “Rhapsody on an Eastern Journey” as translated by David Knetches. The aim of Ban Zhao’s Rhapsody is not to record a scenic journey so much as to offer heartfelt advice from a parent to a son (Idema, Grant 26), for Ban Zhao was the single parent for most of her son’s life.25 Scenic homage to local persons and exploits, too, however, become lessons, as she recounts the models of virtue associated with them.

24 Compiled

by Xiao Tong (501–31) the Selections of Refined Literature/Wen Xuan contained 761 pieces. The oldest surviving anthology of Chinese literature, it has been a valuable primary source, now translated by David R. Knechtges in three volumes (1982–1996) NJ: Princeton UP. 25  A long tradition exists for parents giving moral advice to their children: Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, Dhuoda’s Liber Manuelis, Anne Bradstreet’s Meditations Divine and Moral to mention a few.

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In the context of this journey, or perhaps under the subterfuge of advising her son, Ban Zhao sets forth her ethics at least in part. She considers ethical issues by assimilating Confucian and Daoist philosophies, perhaps the confluence she sees of the rivers He and Luo. She as well develops further the ontological issues addressed in “Needle and Thread.” A “poetic record of an actual trip,” this rhapsody tells of Ban Zhao accompanying her son on a journey to his new posting as chief of Changyan in the year 95 CE.26 The journey means leaving the familiar but following tradition, accepting fate as assigned by Heaven and following the great Way—the road, the Dao, which in turn means listening for “Heaven’s command” so to “go its way” a way that has no “shortcuts.” Ban Zhao reminds herself of Kung Fu-Tzu’s advice: to refrain from being a small person who seeks the comfort of home in the face of traveling. So accompanying her son on his journey is also an opportunity to perform a virtuous deed. Like most trips, this one involves seeing sights, stopping for meals and rest, reminiscing, and taking note of places along the way that honor those people whose fame endures in earthly ways. Mostly it is an opportunity for Ban Zhao as a mother to give her son ethical advice based on her own wisdom.27 In her Lessons, she admits that in being permitted to wear the “purple and gold,” a seal that symbolizes government authority, her son has exceeded her hopes. In this poem Ban Zhao reflects that fame may endure for a time, but “genuine virtue cannot die; though the body decay” (Swann 114). She then implies that one learns virtue by study: “The Classics praise and honor…truth and virtue” (114) or as translated by Idema and Grant, “The Classics and Canons teach only one thing: The Way and its virtue, humanity and wisdom” (25). Yet, despite the facts that men have received education and truth has been supported by evidence, Ban Zhao notes that misfortune and decadence have ensued (Swann 114). How can that be? she asks rhetorically. Ban Zhao answers her own question. Education is necessary but not enough, and with that, Ban Zhao begins to advise her son on ethics. The reader will recall that in Daoist philosophy, Heaven means that the universe is working according to the inter-relational principles of Yin and Yang. In this most simplistic sense, this means that insofar as humans are part of the universe, the outcome of all human action is pre-ordained to be in balance with the balance of the universe. Our individual “destiny” therefore is heavenly-ordained. But within this Will of Heaven is room for moral growth and improvement in the Confucian virtues of ren (humanity–compassion and helpfulness towards others), of xiao (filial piety—the proper respect for one’s family members including ancestors and for one’s superiors including teachers and rulers), and of zheng yi (justice).

26 David

Knetches in his translation of Xian Tong’s Wen Xuan or Selections of Refined Literature. vol. II, Princeton: Princeton UP, 2014: 173. He also lists other translations of the poem. 27 Luo

Rufang (1515–88) in his Selected Writings formed the opinion, after observing motherlove, that women with their “inborn goodness of heart, “shaped Confucian values, especially in regard to social ethics. (Mann and Cheng, 103–4), Gu Ruopu (1592–1681) “Letters to My Sons” also gave ethical advice. (Mann and Cheng, 152).

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Swann observed Ban Zhao’s reasoning that even when “destiny” rests with “heaven,” by “effort” we progress and learn “love” (116). This was noted as well by Idema and Grant: “Know that both your nature and fate rest with Heaven” yet you “must rely on your own great efforts to achieve humanity” (25). Achieving or exemplifying the virtue of ren is the ability and responsibility of the individual, but it requires persistent effort. This advice may have been influenced from her reading of first century BCE Han philosopher Yang Hsiung. She also counsels: keep a “lofty vision” and be led by wisdom (25). Be loyal and reciprocal. If you are virtuous in these respects, i.e., industrious yet aware of the predestining heavenly mandate that is your fate, your wise, enlightened spirit will communicate with heavenly spirits, meaning the active principles that are the eternally-stable, law-abiding forces of the universe. This is an eclectic philosophy, an assimilated Han Confucianism with Daoist “heaven” and Mohist “effort” (Swann 143). In addition, Ban Zhao argues that the interrelation of fate and individual responsibility is not enough. Necessary also is to know that educated thought must be accompanied with feeling, in particular the nurturing of love. If that comes to pass, the communication between heaven and earth will follow. She next argues that while one should “admire the ancients, one should write one’s own thoughts and opinions as well” (Swann 116). In that she must follow her father whose “every action” “meant a literary creation,” she gives herself not only permission to write her own thoughts and actions but the duty to do so (116). Lastly, she argues that rather than seek position and wealth, we must “walk the Way” (116). No matter what fate sends us, wealth or no wealth, we should be respectful, careful or modest, industrious, humble, and temperate. When she ends by declaring that Master Kung Ch’o should be your model, she is referring to Kung Fu-Tzu’s Analects, but makes clear it is not enough to become a Confucian gentleman, i.e., educated and virtuous; although that is required, one must also actively create and love to live virtuously.28 In this poem is “a perfect counterpoint to her later” Lessons/NüJie (Idema, Grant 26). Thus Ban Zhao advises her son to know himself in relation to the divine or absolute, which means realizing his place in the universe and being cognizant of the impermanence of the earthly; to act in relation to others respectfully and considerately; to act in relation to himself by loving to do the right thing. In all, he is to be industrious and modest in order to live his life morally. The virtues she stresses here are less about Confucian filial piety and personal conduct in view of political duties but, perhaps, more about moral autonomy, as conceived by first century Wang Ch’ung’s philosophy.29

28 David

Knetches notes that Ban Zhao refers to Musho Bao who claimed that most important is to establish virtue, then merit, and then good speech—all imperishable (176). Ban Zhao adds to that list feeling, love, creativity. 29 Wang Ch’ung (27–100 CE) argued that destiny of a person is not mandated by heaven but by ming and xing, physical features and actions that are due in part to agency.

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Added to the above, a brief summary of the extant fragment of Ban Zhao’s poem “The Bird from the Far West” or “Rhapsody on the Ostriches,” written on the occasion of her brother’s presentation of a pair of ostriches to the court. Referring to two sections of the Book of Odes, she praises the birds, for they had submitted to duty or acted with virtue as they longed for achieving “Harmony.” Now they repose in harmony, harmony in “high and low” opposing ranks, in the music they hear, and in their “dwell[ing] in love.” In this, Ban Zhao writes mainly from the viewpoint of a Confucian philosopher. With the “birds” as with her son, she sees relationships as complementary more than as hierarchical, evenly balanced in oneness. The paramount virtues: acting with knowing and loving and living in harmony.

8.3.3 The Prose Treatise: Lessons for Women/ Nüjie Ban Zhao composed Lessons for Women/ Nüjie, sometime between 89 and 105 C.E. and so its history from the first to the twenty-first century is a long one. The Lessons and other works collected and compiled in the Hou Han Shü by Fan Yeh in the early fifth century have been found to be “the most considerable as well as the most reliable source” of the “life and writings” of Ban Zhao (Swann 40). Most of Ban Zhao’s other works disappeared in the “turmoil” that occurred in the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries (Swann 51), but as late as the seventh century Lessons was preserved as a separate work (41). While the collection of her works survived only four hundred years, Lessons remained extant in the copy made by Wen Hstian in 530 C.E. and re-emerged in the T’ang 618–907 and in the Sung 960–1279 when it was recommended for teaching. It circulated widely in the Ming 1368–1644, as it was republished by imperial command in 1580. It appeared again in Wang Xiang’s 1624 Four Books of the Inner Chamber / Guige nü sishu, which contained Ban Zhao’s Lessons, Song’s Female Analects, Xu’s Precepts, and Lady Liu’s Nüfan jeilei. While Liu Hsiang’s Biographies of Women was the first book in China devoted solely to the subject of women, Nancy Swann believed that the epitaph of Ban Zhao by her daughter-in-law Ting Shih corroborated the tradition that Ban Zhao had, in fact, in the Han Shü “rearranged, edited and supplemented the Biography of Eminent Women,” (46) this being the book she had commented upon at age fourteen. The Lessons here “takes up three times more space” than the account of her life (Jie 4). Ever since it was written, Lessons for Women/ Nüjie has been a topic of debate. Over the centuries, it has been judged to be feminist, anti-feminist, nothing but a restatement of Confucian philosophy, and rather than philosophy, a book of manners. The Lessons has been alternately considered as a contribution both to the centuries-long disparagement of women in China and to the revolutionary raising of women’s stature. During Ban Zhao’s lifetime, Ma Rong, when Ban Zhao was tutoring him in how to read and understand the Han Shü, read for himself

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the Lessons/Nüjie, and then had his wife and children memorize it (Idema, Grant 42). Some time after Ma Rong’s praise, its audience widened, in fact, it eventually came to be “one of the basic readers for women’s education” (Mou, 1999, 205). Later it was criticized when others translated it into a Dong Zhongshu (Han philosopher, 179–104 BCE) “concrete manner of behavior” (Mou, 1999, 123). You Tong (1618–1704) thought women like Ban Zhao should not write treatises at all (Liu, 2019). Swann deduced that the first “Westerner to get it,” that is, the only one to understand “the full importance of Pan Chao’s plea for education of girls,” was H.A. Giles in 1914 (48). In 1880 S. Wells Williams claimed that Lessons was the only treatise on the education of women to come down to modern times in any language from so early an era, East or West (Swann, xi). In 1898 Qui Yufang praised the Lessons claiming they promoted the concept of equality between men and women.30 Mrs. S.L. Baldwin in 1900 published her translation of the Lessons as a twelve-chapter book of etiquette, with which she took liberties in embellishment (cf. Baldwin). In 1907 He Zhen considered the Lessons to be an “accomplice of evil teachings of Confucius.”31 In 1956 Simone de Beauvoir writing on China mentioned the Lessons succinctly: Ban Zhao, “in 92 AD at the time of the Hans wrote a Lessons for Women—there were four in number: Be truly a woman; be of seemly speech; be of proper bearing; be earnest in endeavor” (de Beauvoir, 1956, 131). Sherry J. Mou in 2004 declared that “far from inventing something new,” the Lessons is “a menu for behavior” (86). Paul Golden in 2005 finds that while R. H. van Gulik claimed the Lessons to be the “most bigoted book in Chinese literature, he finds it to be a “rigid” and an “inhibiting” set of protocols (After Confucius 116). In 2001 Lessons translated by Swann was reissued with Susan Mann’s introduction, and in 2018 it was re-translated by Ann A. Pang-White. Questions have been asked as to whether Lessons is simply warmed-over conservative Confucianism, or whether it redefines and makes additions. The Book of Filial Piety for Women, attributed to a woman named Zheng (ca 730), who borrowed from Lessons, cast “Ban Zhao as the female equivalent to Kung Fu-Tzu” (Mann and Cheng 49). The Human Record: Sources of Global History (1994) argued that a gap existed in the Confucian Classics because they provided little about women and emphasized men’s education as the only avenue to obtain social and political power in Han China. Ban Zhao filled that gap by first explaining women’s honor and power within the family, and second, by advocating education for women (145–53). Sun-Ming Wong concurred, saying that Ban Zhao’s work “comprises…a necessary complement to the Confucian canons which had failed

30 May

1898 in the Wuxi Vernacular Gazette, Qiu Yufang published her annotations on Lessons centering on women’s right to education, claiming “education is obviously the root of virtue” “to be a woman… one must first study and be educated” (6). But the authors of Holding Up Half the Sky: Chinese Women Past, Present and Future, believe Qiu distorted the text (Tao Jie, 9). 31  Angry with Ban Zhao, He Zhen called her “absurd” and a “traitor” in his “Argument for Women’s Revenge,” Natural Justice (July 1907), (Tao Jie, 12).

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to give adequate and systematic instructions concerning feminine ethics” (Mou, 1999, 122–23). Robin Wang agrees with S. Wells Williams that the Lessons had been “the earliest text intended for the education of Chinese women” (Wang, 2003, 177).32 In 2004 Idema and Grant make the point that “Whereas Ban Zhao advocated a literary education for girls,” later texts, Classic of Filiality for Women and Analects for Women, “remain silent on the subject” and in addition, “place greater emphasis on subordination of women” (13). No matter how the Lessons has been judged, had the Chinese leaders listened to Ban Zhao’s argument, China would have been spared eighteen centuries of women’s “illiteracy” and at times such practices as “foot binding” (Swann 136). As Confucianism came to be interpreted ever more as a system of hierarchical relations, the result was that women were deemed further and further inferior. Sherry J. Mou has made a comparison between Ban Zhao’s Lessons and Liu Xiang/ Hsiang’s (79/80–8 BCE/CE) Biographies of Women (Biography of Eminent Women) from a century earlier. She notes that both texts “hold up virtuous paragons for womanhood and impose social constraints on women’s role in society” (Mou, 1999, 205), the emphasis being on virtue more than on women (110). Mou points out that, “In a way, both works are concerned with a larger picture of the entire family, and, as such, women’s roles are appropriated in terms of the welfare of the clan, not just of husbands” (123). In contrasting the two, Ann A. Pang-White claims that what Liu Xiang’s Biographies affirms of women, “virtuous intelligence,” “humaneness and wisdom,” and “penetrating rhetorical skills” Ban Zhao drops (17). Pang-White finds the Lessons to be “a big step backward in the advance for women’s causes” except for its advocating for education, arguing against domestic violence, and defining beauty as inner beauty (17). However, she also observes that generally, scholars claim that the Lessons “should be ranked as the first among all Chinese women’s writings” regarding both “its chronology and its influence” (31). Scholarly translations of the Lessons from Chinese to English have been made by Swann in 1932, by Idema and Grant in 2004, and by Pang-White in 2018. Swann relied on the Hou Han Shu and Ken K’o-chün’s 1879 Complete Collection of Ancient Literature and others; Pang-White relied on the 1885 Zhuangyuange edition of The Four Books for Women with commentary from Wang Xiang. Swann determined that the Lessons offered “a system of theoretical moral principles” with rules for “practical application of these principles” (133). Swann also believed that Ban Zhao was “the first thinker to formulate a single complete statement of feminine ethics” (133). Idema and Grant agreed that the Lessons was “the earliest extant woman-authored moral tract for women” (13). Pang-White considered none of the sources adequate because most of Ban Zhao’s work was missing.

32  Swann

pointed out that S. Wells Williams’ article “Education of Woman in China” and the Mémoires concernant les Chinois, made the claim that Ban Zhao wrote Lessons “for the improvement of her sex at large,” but Swann could find no source for this statement (133).

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Susan Mann, in her 2001 Preface notes that with the reissue of Swann’s text, the Lessons “have once again returned to historical visibility” (Swann, xii). She holds that “Nancy Lee Swann was and her work remains, far ahead of the times” (xiii). 8.3.3.1 Overview of the Lessons Variations on the title of this treatise are many: Admonitions, Precepts, Instructions, and Lessons for Women. Since Nancy Swann was the first to present a scholarly translation of this text into English, I use her title Lessons for Women throughout.33 Written for her “daughters,” Ban Zhao seems to have meant all daughters, given their worries and need for instructions on how to manage a marriage that entails balancing a husband and a husband’s family requirements with their own need to grow in virtue. Nancy Swann argued that the Lessons prove Ban Zhao’s “originality as a moralist in the field of feminine ethics” (140), for while the moral precepts and ethical principles are “traced back to Classics,” they can also be traced to “her own experience of life” (142). Ban Zhao tells of her own errors from lack of knowledge in attempting to do the right thing for the family of which she had become a part. And so, she comes to this task of instruction now as one who has learned from that experience. She does not mention that she also comes from experience outside family as one chosen over male scholars to research, write, and teach in the Imperial Library and to advise and perform in the court. But such superiority must be obvious to her daughters. The ethical system Ban Zhao advises, Swann claims, relied on MengTzu’s “distinction of right and wrong” as being “the root of knowledge” (142). To know is to be moral and to be moral is to know. As she argued in the travel rhapsody, to live a moral life, one should live by human effort in accordance with the Dao. The most important virtues a woman needs to know and perfect, especially “unmarried women,” are humility and modesty. Lessons is about how to be a wise and worthy woman. In this context the word “woman” does not mean an individual as it does in Western thought. It means an Eastern relational unit, as daughter, wife, daughter-in-law, sister-in-law. In fact personal identities were tied less to gender than to family, and more to yin-yang than to gender in order to maintain the internal harmonious balance within the family (Bossler 4).34 One is born as a member of family and thus as community. For Kung Fu-Tzu, there is no smaller relational unit. A state depends on families;

33 The

basis for this text is Nancy Lee Swann’s (1881–1966) doctoral thesis. Swann was hired in 1928 and presided for many years as curator of the Gest Chinese Research Library in Montreal, which then relocated to Princeton. Arthur W. Hummel, Sr., who highly praised this text on Ban Zhao, was a graduate of the University of Chicago and the first president of the Association of Asian Studies, 1948. Jane Donawerth (2002) included Swann’s translation, “Pan Chao c 48–117”, as an example of rhetoric. 34 Robin Wang claims that in the Daodejing, everything embodies yin and embraces yang, and so “through blending these vital energies they attain harmony” (Images, 41).

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the head of state rules like a father. But, there is also an Eastern ontological meaning. “Woman” as with all “things,” cannot exist as an entity, nor as being but exists rather as a relational coming-into-being. In a Chinese ontological sense, neither woman nor man can exist except as a relational becoming. Composed of an introduction and seven chapters, the first chapter of this treatise addresses the virtue of humility, the proper stance for any beginning; the fourth chapter addresses womanly virtues; the sixth chapter addresses a woman in relation to the parents-in-law; the last chapter addresses family harmony, and three of the chapters (2, 3, and 5), which make up the majority of chapters in number and importance, address the relation of husband and wife. So, Ban Zhao shifts emphasis from in-laws to husbands, a shift that was begun in Liu Hsiang’s (80 BCE–8 CE) Biography (Mou, 1999, 123). One of Ban Zhao’s references, an ancient text, “A Pattern for Women,” or “Decree for Women” which Pang-White deems “extremely conservative,” (17) has been lost (Swann 134, 97). The Introduction to the Lessons begins like a speech that briefly claims, “unworthy as I am,” and goes on to claim that she, the author, is “unsophisticated, unenlightened…and by nature unintelligent.” This stated unfitness was at that time a required courtesy for all forms of writing, not unlike the “humility formulas” prevalent in Western writing in some periods (Swann 153). Now at age 54 and ill, Ban Zhao is determined to ease the lives of young girls by providing them with a “system” that will provide training in “proper customs” to their benefit, to ease for them the terrors she felt when she was first married, when she had no confidence in her training in the customs she needed to know in her new set of family relations (134). Young girls here mean aristocratic young girls, for Ban Zhao appears to accept the Confucian view that the aristocracy would be ideally made up of those who were wise and had adopted the pursuit of the Dao or Way. Other notions she appeared to accept: age valued over youth, men over women, and the fortunate over the unfortunate (Swann 143). Her advice, however, would suit all “daughters.” 8.3.3.2 Philosophy In Seven Chapters What Ban Zhao offers in her Lessons/Nüjie are not so much practical how-to succeed lessons but a philosophical basis for womanly activity within a marriage and a family. The Lessons is focused on “family,” for it is within family that one must live and develop and meet obligations, family being the moral and political basis of the Confucian state.35 The philosophical issues concern the nature of

35 Lee in 2009 explains that what Ban Zhao meant by the concept of “familial” is the powerlessness of the individual woman. Women trained in “Three Obediences and Four Virtues” understand their situation as familial, communal, indirect, and conferred by others. However, the daughter-in-law of Chiang Kai-shek, First Lady Chiang-Fang-liang Chiang interpreted the Lessons for herself, and is said to have lived by Ban Zhao’s precepts. (Lin-Lee Lee, 47–66).

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relationships, and thus the nature of family, the nature of marriage, and the issues of virtue, propriety, rhetoric, and education. The Confucian social system deemed woman’s innate inferiority as a custom, and women’s exclusion from public affairs was a key principle that distinguished men and women (Guo 5–6). Ban Zhao does not directly refute this custom, for traditionally Chinese rhetoric allows only indirect refutation. Ban Zhao engages rather in indirect refutation in two ways: First, by demonstrating her own woman-power as a writer, as a moral authority, and as a political consultant. Ban Zhao in this way seeks to empower women within the Confucian system. Ban Zhao knew from her experience with Empress Wu that educated women could rule. The Empress, with Ban Zhao as advisor, did in fact rule China well. Second, by presenting in Lessons a philosophy of relationships and ethics that makes it possible to live in a customary family, Ban Zhao offers a second indirect form of refuting customary applications of Confucian philosophy. Kung Fu-Tzu placed emphasis on ritual as it promotes ethics and etiquette, the moral and the aesthetic in human activity. The family provides not only a place for performing rites, but a place for teaching values and manners or civility. If ritual is not followed, the family becomes dis-ordered. Order is an important aim of Confucianism.36 Although hierarchical order is needed for a smooth-running household, order of a kind of equality is needed to insure balance and harmony. These opposing needs are not to the Chinese way of thinking, illogical. But it happened that the emphasis on hierarchical order to the detriment of balance was a factor in the decline of the Han Dynasty, i.e., when Confucianism became more conservative and women were more confined to an inferior position. Perhaps aware of this beginning trend, Ban Zhao insisted on balance. 8.3.3.3 The Nature of Relationship within Family The Confucian concept of family must be not only political and moral but in harmony and at one with the universe. The nature of family as it is both political and ethical, concerns “duties” and “love.” “Duty” involves members being industrious and virtuous, the goal being to achieve harmony. Harmony in turn requires “love” in all relationships within the family and without. Conjugal love is addressed in Chaps. 2, 3, 5 and 6; family of in-laws in Chap. 7; love as virtue in Chap. 4. Thus, a loving family relies on the morality and astuteness of each family member in relationship. If one knows the rules and rituals, one can work to eliminate stress and embarrassment within the family experience. Knowledge of political and ethical

36 Western

activities among people are rarely called “rituals,” but they exist. In public we hold doors open for people, we say “please” and “thank-you” and “good morning” and “hello” and in private we converse as we eat together and bid each other good night when we go to bed. We experience rituals in religion, in pledging allegiance to the flag, in honoring our dead, and in ceremonies of all kinds.

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“duties,” and the relation between duties and love necessary for women as members of a family, is best gained systematically. Ban Zhao’s intention is to offer that knowledge in a written treatise. She teaches not only by precept but by example. In the Introduction she admits that when married at age fourteen, she worried that she might disgrace her parents and make difficulties for her in-laws. That fear was so distressing, she worked too hard. Having learned from her experience; however, she now seeks to pass on what she has learned in a “systematic” way to those she had “taught and trained,” particularly her “daughters” of marriageable age who need to know the “proper customs for married women.” For without knowing good ways to proceed, they might humiliate both their ancestors and their clan. Her advice from experience: know the meaning of duty and love, but don’t expect too much from yourself in putting them into action. She has to admit, however, that although she raised her son Ku without this systematic knowledge, he turned out well. She first instructs her “daughters” to copy this treatise—wise pedagogical advice. From her educational background and from her experience as daughter-in-law and mother, Ban Zhao acquired knowledge about duty toward family and gained authority to teach moral behavior. Women, she believed, must know the nature of family and their place in it. They must know the meaning of humility and how to practice it. And, importantly, they must know their duties. Such are epitomized in the first chapter, “Humility,”37 which lists the “customs of the ancients” that originated in the Book of Poetry: to place girl babies below the bed, give them pieces of domestic things38 to play with, and announce their birth with an offering before the ancestors. Ban Zhao explains that this does not mean that women should accept lack of respect. This means women should “modestly yield to others,” “respect others,” “put others first.”39 Acknowledging these customs is to know the importance of their earthly and heavenly duties and accept the fact that old customs have influenced society and as well woman’s ordinary way of life within a family. As the poems analyzed here suggest, a man as well as a woman is to be humble, virtuous, and industrious, but it is mainly women whose duty it is to teach within the family virtue and the observance of worship. A child first plays with household items, then as a woman performs household duties which demand keeping the house clean, her person clean, and her spirit pure and quiet. Ban Zhao argues that (like men) to succeed, women must also have

37 Interestingly,

the title of Chap. 2 is “Lowly and Weak” rather than “Humility” in both the Idema/Grant translation and in the Pang-White translation. Wang Xiang’s commentary: To control to moderate” means to “respectfully serve” (Pang-White, 48). 38 These domestic playthings are called “tiles” which are weights for spindles, symbolized later in life by the domestic “needle.” (Cf. Mou, 2004, 83.). 39 Putting others first means putting your family before yourself e.g., by leaving work early to attend your child’s performance, or attend to a husband’s illness, or protect your child with your body in a dangerous circumstance. By these actions you serve them as you are controlled by them.

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knowledge about these expectations and learn strategies, for she must also deal with individual family members, customs, and situations. Perhaps it is like this for us as well: imagine being new to current custom and dressing your baby girl in blue and your baby boy in pink, and by these actions upsetting the household!—custom being what it is! Or while conforming, acknowledging that customarily pink has embodied the meanings of less privilege such as in pay for comparable work. 8.3.3.4 The Nature of Relationship within the Generational Family The definition of family includes deceased ancestors as well as generations of parents and children. Not until the seventeenth century did Gu Ruopu write a letter to her sons suggesting that they and their families live in separate houses instead of under one roof, for “Propriety and righteousness” are easier to reach that way (Mann and Cheng 152). The custom was for generations to live under one roof. This presented a problem—how to gain unity while acknowledging all the customs pertaining to differences of age and sex, and another problem—how to give each other space. In Chap. 6 “Implicit Obedience” of Lessons,40 Ban Zhao advises a woman to be obedient to parents-in-law even when she thinks they are wrong. Confronted with the conflict between “duty” and “love,” regarding in-laws with whom she must live, Ban Zhao offers a way forward. Until the family comes to agreement, what must mitigate actions is love or affection for the whole family. Honoring elders is part of family life, part of the philosophy of family. Ban Zhao reasons in Chap. 7 that in maneuvering well relationships with the elders, the daughter-in-law will “secure for herself the good will of younger brothers-and sisters-in law.” This is achieved by acquiring closeness and “respect” for each other, gained by sincere affection and magnified love. In this way duty and love come together. What then occurs, is that the daughter-in-law will be recognized positively, her faults minimized, and she will be an example that will radiate beyond the family to the neighborhood, district, and on to her own mother and father. Thus, for political expediency the woman is to reduce conflict by accommodation and diplomacy, ideally with the virtuous aim being love.41 To earn praise for being morally responsible for family well-being, a woman must be dutiful and loving. For, a loving unity relies upon a daughter-in-law’s virtue, beauty, modesty, and respect or “excellence.” But if the daughter-in-law, rather than being modest and humble and so esteemed, is instead arrogant and perverted in love, she will be blamed, and the family will be dishonored and disgraced. If the daughter-in-law is virtuous the family consequently will be virtuous, in unity, and thus esteemed. Great importance, therefore, is placed upon a daughter-in-law’s moral behavior. 40 Chapter 6, “Conceding Docility” and “Compliant Docility” are the titles given by Pang-White and by Idema and Grant. 41 Yu Shih Chen argues that the Lessons is a case for survival in “The Historical Template of Pan Chao’s Nü Chieh,” T’oung Pao 82, 4–5 (1996): 229–57, 247. That is part of it.

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Such is Ban Zhao’s Confucian advice to her “daughters” about their duties toward their elders and in-laws. The root of all family relationship is thus morality and wisdom, its aim being to accomplish all duties with love. Ban Zhao’s thinking must be understood as Eastern. This means all is in relationship not just in the Western sense, children to elders, elders to children, duty to love, but that there are no individuals per se, e. g. each thing, such as book exists only as it is related to desk, to mind, to other objects around—in this sense book is no “thing” only relationship. It is incumbent that the attitude and activity of women living within a family of various generations should be seeking unifying oneness or love. Women’s activity within the family, both political and ethical, is meant to nurture sincere love. The importance of harmony and balance in family is that not only each member relies upon it, but the community and the state or government relies upon it, and ultimately the relationship of heaven and earth relies upon it. 8.3.3.5 Womanly Virtue In Lessons for Women, Ban Zhao’s ethics begins with extolling the virtue of humility and concludes in the seventh chapter with “modesty is virtue’s handle.” She asserts that in possessing modesty and acquiescence, women will “have sufficient for harmony with others.” In the first chapter, titled “Humility,” she advises: “let a woman modestly yield to others,” respect others, and put others first. Modesty means not bragging when you act for good and admitting if you act for bad. It means also that in the face of evil being said or done to you, that you bear the disgrace and endure it. Modesty is intimately related to humility. Humility is given importance as both virtue and duty. Ban Zhao adopts the humility stance ritual to introduce the Lessons for Women: “I the unworthy…,” I...“a humble subject,” mainly from the rules of writing etiquette that are demanded of both men and women at the time. But it is also a stance she is taught to take from infancy, symbolized by the custom of being placed “below the bed” with her “primary duty” in her life being “to humble herself before others.” A modest, humble woman attends to domestic duties, tidily, orderly, and with completeness. She continues rites of worship, and she maintains an upright character, meaning that she keeps her own counsel and quietness of spirit. That may be what is expected, but it may not be what occurs. For Ban Zhao humility is not a woman’s virtue only. In her “Rhapsody on a Journey to the East,” she advised her son, “Let us think of being humble and temperate” (Swann 11642) Israel Smith Clare in his 1899 Universal History without evidence claimed that Kung Fu-Tzu “revised” the saying, “Humility is the solid foundation of all virtues,” from the Book of Kings (539). James Legge’s translation of the Analects quoted Kung Fu-Tzu as saying the “Superior” man “brings

42 The

words “humility” and “humble” are not used in Idema’s translation.

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forth” righteousness “in humility.” (Bk. 16:17, p. 299). Legge commented that Kung Fu-Tzu shows himself to be humble when he did not see himself as more virtuous than others (Analects, Bk. 5:27, p. 183). Ban Zhao saw men’s modesty as complementary to women’s, when in the “Rhapsody,” she advised her son, “embarking on a public career,” to “always be respectful/full of simple modesty” (Idema, Grant 26). Swann’s translation of that same passage does not use the word “modesty,” but uses “respect,” “temperate,” “pure,” and “want little” (116). Kung Fu-Tzu advised men to be “modest in speech” meaning to be careful in controlling their tongue (XIV: 29, XIX: 25). In the Lessons, Ban Zhao’s particular “womanly virtue” means controlling behavior by exhibiting “modesty” and also to guard “chastity,” a virtue which was heightened in the Ming dynasty (Li-Hsiang 101). In Chap. 4 womanly virtue is one of four qualifications.43 The other three are words, bearing, and work. “Work” means sewing, weaving, and food preparation. “Bearing” means to assume a clean body and clothes. Lastly, “words” means using appropriate language and rhetoric. To desire these qualifications, virtue, work, bearing, and words is to have the “greatest of virtue as a woman.” Ban Zhao compares virtue to love—to desire it is to have it at hand. 8.3.3.6 Propriety and Rhetoric As much as unity, space is a problem in close living. Space is a physical and ethical issue as much in speech as in action. Ban Zhao explained how appropriate space is achieved. Propriety is often mentioned in the Analects and is a main subject matter of the Lessons for Women, in particular, propriety of women’s words and actions in regard to human relations and situations. In Chap. 3 propriety in all relationships is said to be based on “harmony and intimacy” and in the case of married relationship “grounded in proper union.” To live a life of propriety, women need follow “proper customs,” rules, “correct manners,” rites, and duties of worship. In marriage, propriety means that husbands and wives allow each other proper space, and in this way avoid disrespecting each other with “improper language.” Respect for others is also most important for self-culture. Because language is related to actions, the propriety of women’s rhetoric is as important as her actions. While womanly words “need be neither clever in debate nor keen in conversation,” in Chap. 4 it is said her words should be chosen “with care” to avoid “vulgar language,” speaking at the inappropriate “time,” and wearying others with too many words. To speak with propriety is to refrain from gossip and improper language. Chapter 3 claims that “Crookedness” in affairs “will lead to accusation and thus to anger,” and “straightforwardness,” 43 In

Ann A. Pang’s translation of Chap. 4 “dusty and soiled” clothes should be washed, and it is clear that “beauty” means inner beauty and that the skills demanded of women need not be “unsurpassable skills” (54) so “every woman can reach this goal” (16). Swann translates similarly that a woman doesn’t have to strive to be perfect either in conduct or looks. One additional reason besides the moral and practical might be that Ban Zhao had to assure that because she, herself, became this accomplished person, they didn’t need to expect that for themselves.

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(praised in western thinking) will “lead to quarreling.” This, the reason for indirectness. So to speak with propriety is to speak honestly but not directly. Sharp words spoken make living a loving life difficult. Rebuking or scolding of husbands will lead to wife-beating. Yet in Chap. 5 the “beseeching wife” should not use “flattery” or “coaxing words,” in other words, dishonest words to gain a relationship of “intimacy.” “Personal opinion,” however, must be suppressed if it negatively affects a woman’s honor or the harmony of relationships (this, the reason for omitting an opinion on religion or politics in some climates today) even though, “love may lead to differences of opinion” and ‘”duty” to “disagreement.”44 It is clear from the above examples, that both propriety and rhetoric are bound to morality as much as to culture or convention. Most importantly for Ban Zhao is to learn what propriety means, and for that to occur, both men and women need to be educated about the propriety of words and actions. In brief, for her own upright character, a woman should not be involved with gossip, improper language, “crooked” or “sharp words.” Her use of language is directly involved with husband and wife relationship and issues of space. When husband and wife do not allow each other enough space, “improper language” arises. Lack of space and proper language are responsible for not esteeming the other, possible violence, and most of all for destroying love. 8.3.3.7 Husband and Wife Relation Ban Zhao refers marital relations directly to the Rites, the Book of Poetry and the First Ode which together give credence to the importance of marriage. Marriage as the beginning of family sustains importance as the primary relationship. This does not mean that “all conduct is for the husband” (Mou, 2004, 79) or vice-versa, but that marital relationship has specialness. Marriage is attached to the principles of the universe, for Ban Zhao claims in Chap. 2 that “The Way of husband and wife is intimately connected with Yin and Yang and relates the individual to gods and ancestors.” In Chap. 3 the wife as Yin is honored for gentleness, the husband as Yang for strength or firmness. In the Way, the wife acts on the principles of respect, which means she is to hold on to essence and at the same time to acquiescence, i.e., to hold on to her selfness while being open and generous. The ideal in husband-wife relationship is “based upon harmony and intimacy,” for conjugal love is grounded in that proper union.45 It proceeds with “Respect and Caution.” Thus like Yin and Yang, man and woman have different “characteristics” but in proper relationship are balanced and in harmony. The author (née Zheng) of The Book of Filial Piety for Women (ca 730) “cast Ban Zhao as the female equivalent

44 The

quotation from Chap. 3. As in “Needle and Thread,” Ban Zhao argues for the value of honest, even loving verbal criticism and disagreement by women as well as by men. 45 In

Chap. 3 Ban Zhao argues against violence and physical and verbal abuse for then harmony cannot exist and without that, the marriage cannot be sustained.

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to Kung Fu-Tzu” when she defined Yin and Yang as interdependent, deducing its importance, so defined, in human relations. (Mann, Cheng 49–50). Ban Zhao argued in Chap. 2 that in the “natural order of things” the “purpose is the same.” The natural order is that the husband must be able to “control his wife” and the wife to “serve her husband.” The purpose is to retain reciprocity in order to preserve harmony and balance. That aim cannot be achieved if either wife or husband cannot perform his or her duties. The problem is, she points out, that as in some cases over history, men only know that “wives must be controlled,” thus, in other words, making reciprocity impossible. Nor is there proper teaching, for men are taught to study books but not how to live in proper relationship. Proper relationship is not necessary only for the marriage, but also to carry out the rites. The problem comes down to education. 8.3.3.8 The Argument for Education The issue of education actually relates to two situations, the woman as wife and as daughter-in-law, both situations initiated by marriage. A daughter-in law to manage proper relationships needs virtue and wisdom. How is she to acquire “wisdom”? The proper relationship between a wife and a husband cannot succeed without education for both. The reason is that this important relationship needs balance and harmony, but to attain and retain balance and harmony, Ban Zhao argues, education is crucial. She approaches this problem in Chap. 2 entitled “Husband and Wife.” To live interdependently is to live in love. But if the balance is not established, love will not follow. Balance can be achieved only if both men and women are educated, so they can know what they each must do to attain it. Writing to “benefit” her daughters, Ban Zhao, teaches women how to live an honorable life and how to live interdependently as husband and wife. This relationship being the basis of family, and family the basis of the state, a relationship without love and harmony will destroy family and family the state. The problem is that education being the avenue for social and political power in Han China was little dealt with regarding women in the Confucian Classics, which dealt mainly with their honor and power within the family. Ban Zhao’s intention was to fill the gap, which she did in her argument in Chap. 2 of the Lessons (The Human Record 143). That women should be educated as well as men, is the most revolutionary argument in Lessons for Women. Her argument is that when education is not allowed to both, men and women, the fundamental balance and harmony of all relationships is set awry—husband and wife, family, and state. Ban Zhao taught not only that education is necessary to women as well as men, but what was wrong with the education men obtained. And, too, she taught what it means to be educated, as Susan Mann and Yuyin Cheng have noted: for Ban Zhao, “study involves gathering information, questioning and evaluating it, and discarding the doubtful” (50). Thus, although she did not delineate women’s education, it would seem that in the aim for harmony and balance, it would mirror that of men’s. That part of education lacking in men’s, she is supplying for women’s.

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If women are ignored or given less respect than men, which becomes the case when they are not both practicing the “natural order of things,” and not receiving education, Ban Zhao argues, that the “principle” of the Rites is also ignored. For the rule of the Rites is that “children” be taught to read at age eight and by the age of fifteen be ready for cultural training, “children” she interprets to mean boys and girls. As it is, women are not educated and men’s education lacks training in cultural duties. Thus the Rites cannot be fulfilled. Unequal education produces an unbalanced society and ignores both the “essential relation between” men and women and the rules from classical writings. Because the Confucian Analects argued that education is needed exclusively to become a gentleman or Superior man, the imbalance ensures that ignorance prevails for both men and women. To attain balance and harmony requires knowing how to maneuver all human relations and family life and so necessitates education for both men and women. Swann had said that Ban Zhao’s “whole ethical system was based on this belief” in education (142), but the politics of survival in the home, which then translates to the state, is also for Ban Zhao dependent on education. The tree of knowledge grows from moral ground (“a Mencian teaching,” 142) and its metaphorical gifts of “apples” nourish with wisdom and virtue, these, the “gifts” necessary to live in balance and harmony, but thus far only men have had access to them. Despite Ban Zhao’s argument that points to a logical flaw in Kung Fu-Tzu’s Analects, and/or to a flaw in interpretation, eighteen centuries pass before ordinary women in China receive education, despite her Lessons and her incisive argument being always available for instruction.

8.4 Conclusion The “natural order of things” means that there is an “essential relation” between men and women. The purpose of the actions of men to control and of women to serve, this “essential relation,” however, “is the same” and should be properly maintained. Ban Zhao claims that to maintain this natural order means that men must be educated better than they have been, and women simply must be educated, which the Rites mandate as well as the natural order. The “correct relationship” that results from a woman being respectful, respected, and careful in word and deed is one of harmony, intimacy, and love. The nature of family is revealed through the relationship of husband and wife, the relationship being based on virtue and propriety. Women’s character, particularly, in regards to a harmonious relationship, is cultivated through virtues of humility by putting others before herself, of modesty when arrogance is a temptation, of obedience and acquiescence when harmony is at issue, and of industriousness with propriety in words and actions. She, a Superior Gentlewoman, is then in harmony and balance with a Superior Gentleman. That Ban Zhao was a humanist is evident in her caring arguments delivered to her son and her “daughters” and the importance she gave to the concept of love,

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evident as well in her philosophy of relationships. She was a philosopher of ethics as evident in the system she advanced in her admonitions on the meaning of virtuous living written to her son and “daughters.” In all, she argued that the politic thing to do must be as well the moral thing to do. Her ontological stance on the relationship between heaven and humanity demanded responsibility on the part of man in terms of both his own effort on behalf of himself and his listening to heaven to discover its mandate. In her poem “Needle and Thread” Ban Zhao explained the consequences of human effort. In her own effort to raise the plight of women, both by example and by written treatise, she was a feminist, these lessons being of “value to modern womanhood” (Swann 90). She espoused Confucianism but not entirely, and incorporated ideas from a variety of philosophies. As a philosopher, Ban Zhao’s insight into the most fundamental argument of the Confucian Analects, was precise. It struck at the heart of a flawed philosophy of otherwise brilliant thought.

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Laozi. (2011). Tao Te Ching on the art of harmony: The new illustrated edition of the Chinese philosophical masterpiece (C. Hansen, Trans.). Metro Books. Lee, L.-L. (2009). Inventing familial agency from powerlessness: Ban Zhao’s Lessons for Women. Western Journal of Communication, 73(1), 47–66. Li, C. (Ed.). (2000). The Sage and the second sex: Confucianism, ethics, and gender. Open Court. Liu, H. (1955). The position of Women in Early China: According to Lieh Nü Chuan. In A. R. O’Hara (Ed.), The biographies of Chinese Women. Hong Kong University Press. Mann, S. (2001). ‘Pan Chao: Foremost Woman Scholar of China’: New Introduction. In Gender studies, Asian Studies-China (Vol. 5). University of Michigan Press. Mann, S., & Cheng, Y. (Eds.). (2001). Under confucian eyes: Writings on gender in Chinese history. University of California Press. Mou, S. J. (2004). Gentlemen’s prescriptions for Women’s lives: A thousand years of biographies of Chinese Women. M.E. Sharpe. Mou, S. J. (1999). Presence and presentation: Women in the Chinese Literati tradition. St. Martin’s Press. Nussbaum, M. C. (2002). The incomplete Feminism of Musonius Rufus, Platonist, Stoic, and Roman. In M.C. Nussbaum, & J. Shivola (Eds.), The sleep of reason, erotic experience and sexual ethics in Ancient Greece and Rome (pp. 283–326). University of Chicago Press. Pang-White, A. A. (Trans.). (2018). The confucian four books for Women: A new translation of the Nü Sishu and the commentary of Wang Xiang. Oxford University Press. Rosenlee, L. H. L. (2006). Confucianism and Women: A philosophical interpretation. SUNY. Swann, N. L. (1932). Pan Chao: Foremost Woman Scholar of China, First Century AD: Background, ancestry, life, and writings of the most celebrated Chinese Women of Letters. Century. Swann, N. L. (Trans., Annotator). (1950). Food & money in Ancient China: Han Shu, The earliest economic history of China to AD 25 with related Texts, Han Shu and Shih-Chi. Princeton University Press. Tchen-ying. M. L. (1931). Les forms: et les methods historiques en Chine; Une Famille D’Historiens et Son Oeuvre. BOSC Freres, M. et I. Riou. Doctoral Thesis. Wang, Z. (1982). Han civilization (K.C. Chang and Collaborators, Trans.). Yale University Press. Wang, R. R. (2003). Images of Women in Chinese theory and culture: Writings from the Pre-Qin period through the Song Dynasty. Hackett Publishing Co. Wang, R. R. (2012). Yinyang: The way of Heaven and Earth in Chinese thought and culture: New approaches to Asian history. Cambridge University Press. Wang, Z. (1999). Women in the Chinese enlightenment. University of California Press. Watson, B. (Trans.). (1974). Courtier and Commoner in Ancient China: Selections from the history of the Former Han by Pan Ku. Columbia University Press. Wollmer, J. E., Keal, E. J., & Nagaie-Berthrong, E. (1983). Silk Roads: China Ships, Toronto. Royal Ontario Museum.

Chapter 9

Sulabha of India सुलभ

Floruit Circa 800 BCE Ruth Vanita

Abstract Sulabha was a peripatetic Indian ascetic yogini who engaged in lengthy philosophical debate with philosopher King Janaka. We do not know precisely when she lived. The account of their discussion is reported in the epic Mahabharata. Their debate covers many philosophical issues including the nature of being, of personhood, of certainty, and of women’s capacity for enlightenment. In that regard we find Suhabha arguing that “My body is different from your body. But my soul is not different from your soul…” A complete translation of the debate between philosopher-King Janaka and ascetic yogini Sulabha is included.

R. Vanita (*)  Emerita, University of Montana, Missoula, Montana, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_9

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9.1 Introduction Sulabha is an ascetic philosopher who appears in the Mokshadharma Parva section of the Shānti Parva, which is the twelfth book of the Mahābhārata.1 The Mahābhārata terms itself itihāsa (literally, “thus it was”), the word now used to mean “history”.2 It has been called “the longest poem ever written”,3 and is about seven times the length of the Iliad and the Odyssey combined. Its date is disputed as are the details of its composition. It was probably composed between 500 BC and 200 AD. It purports to recount narratives and dialogues from a number of much earlier periods. Its authorship is traditionally ascribed to sage Vyasa, who also appears in it as an important character and as one of many narrators. By this time, the religion that later came to be called Hindu had developed several schools of philosophy, subscribing to dualist, non-dualist and dualistic non-dualist perspectives.4 All of these schools of thought interpret the Vedic texts, and share certain basic doctrines, such as the doctrine of the reality of consciousness (termed ātman, brahmaṇ or puruṣa) manifested in all living beings, and the doctrine of the numerous rebirths of each living being (jīvātman), which are caused by its attachments to physical and mental experience. The second of these doctrines is shared by Buddhism and Jainism, which grew out of Vedic and Upaniṣadic traditions, and diverged from them, but either retained or later reincorporated many Hindu deities and practices. Philosophy and practice are not separate enterprises in Hindu tradition.5 The wide variety of Hindu religious practices found at the time were grounded in basic philosophical doctrines, such as those cited above. Hinduism is not a “faith” because the doctrines of its various philosophical schools are based on efforts to understand and interpret reality, not on subscribing to a creed. Thus, in the

1 See

discussion in Vanita (2021). Despite its remarkable brilliance, the Sulabha-Janaka dialogue has been little studied. Piantelli (2022) and Vanita (2003) were the earliest studies of its gender politics. Fitzgerald (2002) focuses on karma yoga versus saṃnyasa, noting also Sulabha’s unconventionality. Shah (1995) dismisses Sulabha as a “maverick” (72), and in 2017 discusses her in one paragraph. Dhand (2008)) covers no new ground. 2 Itihāsa is the modern word for “history” in Sanskrit-derived languages, such as Hindi. The word refers to a story considered to be true but differs from the Western concept of history in not emphasizing exact dates and extra-textual evidence. 3 Sharma (2000), Ancient Indian Literature, 137. 4 The word “Hindu,” derived from the name of the Sindhu (Indus) river, was coined by West Asian Muslims around the beginning of the second millennium AD to refer to all non-Muslim inhabitants of Hind (India). With the advent of Islam and Christianity and the development of Buddhism, Jainism, and later, Sikhism, into separate religions, followers of Vedic, Upaniṣadic, epic and Puranic traditions began to identify as Hindus, though some even today prefer the ancient term sanātana dharma (the dharma without beginning or end). 5 There is no exact equivalent for the word “religion” in Sanskrit. Dharma, often translated as “religion,” is a much more complex concept, referring both to the law of existence and to different types of right action.

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Bhagavad-Gītā, which is part of the Mahābhārata, the answer to Arjuna’s question about right action is not that he must believe what Krishna says. The answer is that he must first understand what action is, what the self is, and how action is related or not related to the self. He is not asked to simply believe that he should not be attached to the rewards of action. Instead, once he understands that no one individual is in fact the only cause of or the owner of any action, he understands that no one can control or possess action, therefore becoming attached to the rewards of action is futile, and action without attachment is logically the right way to act. Hindu religious practices could be (and even today can be) broadly divided into the renunciant and the householder paths. Individuals of any community or gender could and did give up family, community and property, in order to become fulltime ascetics seeking knowledge of reality, with the aim of gaining liberation from the cycle of rebirth. Householders fed and supported ascetics, and also learnt from them. In the last stage of life, householders could become full-time ascetics. The Mahābhārata depicts a range of paths to liberation. The tendency in Hinduism to accept the validity of a variety of paths, doctrines and practices has been termed ‘henocritical”, on the model of henotheism, whereby Hindu individuals and communities may choose their own preferred God or Goddess for special worship while acknowledging the divinity of all. The Mahābhārata, primarily but not only through the Bhagavad-Gītā, opens up the path to liberation for all persons, stating that anyone, including a woman, who offers a flower, a leaf or water with devotion (bhakti-yoga, BG 9.26), and anyone who performs all their actions without attachment to the rewards (karma-yoga), attains liberation. This precludes the need to be reborn as a wealthy man able to practice the Vedic duties of charity, ritual sacrifice, and scriptural study. It also shows that jñana-yoga, or the obtaining of right knowledge, is not the only path to liberation. The Mahābhārata is divided into 18 parvas or books, each containing many sub-sections and chapters. The Shānti Parva, as its name indicates, focuses on attaining peace by practicing dharma. The section in which Sulabha appears is focused on the dharma of achieving liberation (moksha) from rebirth and is therefore titled Mokshadharma Parva. After the epic battle, Bhishma, a great teacher and warrior, teaches his five grand-nephews, the Pāndavas (especially the oldest of them, Yudhishthira, who is to become king), the many dimensions of dharma, both for rulers and for everyone. Sulabha appears in this portion of the epic.

9.2 Biography Many ancient Indian philosophers, both women and men, appear only in philosophical and literary texts. The dates of most of these texts are disputed, with traditional scholars and nineteenth-century western scholars generally ascribing much earlier dates than western scholars currently do. There is no biographical information available about these philosophers outside of the texts. This is true

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of the famed philosophers, Yajnavalkya, Gargi and Maitreyi, who appear in the Upaniṣads. It is true also of Sulabha, who in this respect is not unlike Diotima in Plato’s Symposium. The possibly once extant but now lost Saulabha Shākhā recension of the Rig Veda Samhita is attributed to her. She appears in the Kaushitaki Brāhmaṇa, in a list of revered teachers to whom salutations must be offered. The name Sulabha means “she who is easily attained”; it is one of the 1008 names of both Goddess Lalita (a form of Parvati-Durga), and Goddess Lakshmi.6 Ancient and medieval Indian philosophers cited the epics (the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyana) to prove their arguments. They did not make an artificial distinction between narrative and philosophical texts; this continues to be true of Hindu teachers today.7 Debate is perhaps the single most important organizing principle in ancient Hindu texts. It may take the form of structured question and answer, friendly discussion and dialogue, or formal debate between representatives of rival schools of thought. The Mahābhārata is structured as a series of conversations encased one within the other. Interlocutors, human and non-human, from all sectors of society, discuss a wide spectrum of issues, such as vegetarianism, violence, non-violence, varṇa,8 and the means of attaining liberation from rebirth. Sulabha’s public debate with a king is thus one of many debates. The narrator, Bhishma, terms the narrative an ancient historical account (itihāsaṃ purātanaṃ) of a debate (saṃvāda, 12.308.3).9 The debate is said to have taken place in the

6 Lalitā

Sahasranāmaṃ, a Goddess text embedded in the Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa (circa fourth century AD), describes the Goddess as shobhanā sulabhā gatiḥ (the bright one, easily attained, verse 683). Lakshmi Sahasranāmaṃ, a Goddess text embedded in the circa 8th century Skanda Purāṇa terms the Goddess prapatti mārga sulabhā (attained or followed by an easy road, verse 1004). However, Goddess Parvati-Durga is also termed asulabhā (hard to attain), as in the Saundarya Lahari (circa eighth century AD, verses 95–96), and as indicated by her name Durga (hard to reach). 7  As Nicholson (2010) points out, some scholars consider the epics and Puranas non-philosophical narratives, but premodern Hindu philosophers quoted them to support their arguments (74–75;148). Ganeri (2012) shows how the Hindu philosophical tradition of reasoning about scriptural laws proceeds from case to case, citing precedents from a variety of texts and recognizing local norms. 8 Varṇa refers to the four communities into which ancient Indian societies were supposed to be divided. Varṇa in practice may have been mostly based on birth. Several philosophers throughout the Mahābhārata and other ancient texts argue that it should be based on actions, not birth. Many narratives confirm this opinion. When the Portuguese came to India, they invented the term “caste” (from Latin castas), which causes considerable confusion since it is now applied both to 9  Citations

(book, chapter, verse) are to Sukthankar’s edition of the Mahābhārata (1933). Ganguli’s translation includes other manuscripts, so is numbered differently. In the critical edition, the Sulabha chapter in Book 12 is 308; in Ganguli’s translation it is 321. Ganguli does not provide verse numbers.

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satya yuga.10 Bhishma is himself a celibate warrior who, though he lives in a family, is in many ways an ascetic. He is famous for his knowledge both of martial and ruling skills as well as of dharma. Towards the end of the dialogue, Sulabha states that she belongs to the kshatriya or warrior varṇa and is the descendant of a royal sage named Pradhana. A husband who was her equal could not be found so she did not marry but became a celibate ascetic. She is a wandering sage, who roams freely and widely. The Janaka king Dharmadhwaja (henceforth Janaka), whom Sulabha debates, belongs to the lineage of the Janaka kings of Mithila, renowned in ancient texts as philosopher-kings.11 Mithila, the capital of the Videha kingdom in eastern India, was a major political and cultural center in antiquity. The chapters that precede the one about Sulabha recount philosophical dialogues between other Janaka kings and male sages.

9.3 Textual Context Bhishma recounts the Sulabha-Janaka debate as part of a response to Yudhishthira’s desire to learn about sāṅkhya philosophy.12 Sāṅkhya was an immensely influential school of philosophy, from which many Hindu scriptures, especially the Gita, derive concepts. Bhishma answers Yudhishthira’s question by telling him about dialogues between four kings in the Janaka lineage and five sages. Four of the five sages are men. The final and most important dialogue is between Dharmadhwaja Janaka and female sage Sulabha. Yudhishthira asks a second question that triggers the account of this final debate. The question is whether liberation from the cycle of rebirth can be

varṇa, which is now largely theoretical, and to the innumerable jāti or birth communities, many of which do not fit neatly into varṇa categories. Ganguli (1893–1896) translates varṇa literally as color (which has many symbolic meanings in addition to its literal one); its much more common meaning, pertinent here, is that of birth community. 10 The satya yuga is the first and best era in a cycle of four eras that repeats itself eternally. 11 The best-known Janaka is Siradhwaja Janaka, who is Sita’s father in the Rāmāyana. Piantelli (2022) mistakenly conflates all the Janaka kings, including Dharmadhwaja, with Sita’s father. 12 Sāṅkhya is a dualistic school that originated in Upaniṣadic thought around 800 BC. It posits the existence of two completely separate principles, prakriti (often translated “nature”), the principle of matter in motion, and puruṣa, the witnessing consciousness. Sāṅkhya does not posit a God, but every living being is composed of both principles, and there are as many puruṣas as there are beings. When a being realizes its identity with puruṣa and its separateness from prakriti (the body, including the mind), it becomes liberated into a state of isolated bliss (kaivalyaṃ). Sāṅkhya philosophers tend to consider renunciation of the world necessary to attainment of liberation. The Gītā combines Sāṅkhya categories with the idea of a supreme consciousness that becomes incarnate. After this, Sāṅkhya, though influencing other schools of Hindu philosophy, especially Yoga, and Vedanta, disappears as an independent school of thought. See Burley (2012).

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attained while leading a domestic life, or whether renunciation is necessary for liberation. The conventional answer was that renunciation is necessary but in the Mahābhārata this answer is modified. Though there have been women renunciants since ancient times, there are more men than women renunciants.13 A man would typically be seen as representing asceticism and a woman domesticity. Bhishma’s account of a woman representing asceticism and a man representing domesticity is unusual. It draws attention to the fact that neither asceticism nor domesticity is gendered. The story addresses the questions of whether women can match men in asceticism and whether asceticism conflicts with the specific dharma of women, which, elsewhere in the epic, is repeatedly defined as service to their husbands. Sulabha hears that Janaka has attained liberation and decides to find out if this is true. She takes the form of a young and beautiful woman and appears at his court, dressed as a renunciant. An advanced yogi was considered to have special abilities (siddhi). Sulabha demonstrates two of these abilities. The first is that of assuming a form. We are not told what form she had before. But we do know that her youth and beauty is an assumed appearance. This draws attention to the fact that in Hindu philosophy, all forms are appearances; as the Gītā says, bodies are like clothes that are taken off at death and put on at birth. She may also intend to test Janaka’s ability to see through appearances or to disregard them. The second ability Sulabha demonstrates is that of entering and taking possession of another person. Sulabha wants to examine Janaka, and to do so, she enters his consciousness with hers and binds him in yogic bonds.14 Janaka is aware of this and resists her control. As a result, they enter a state of equilibrium, and see each other without their respective ascetic and royal attributes. Despite this, Janaka is not able to see through Sulabha’s youthful beauty (saukumāryaṃ, 12.308.13), and he is wonderstruck by it. He offers her hospitality, and then begins the conversation by asking her who she is, to whom she belongs, where she has come from, and where she will go next (12.308.20). Without pausing for her to answer, Janaka proceeds to praise himself and castigate her. He states that he is free from all attachments and has renounced the world even though he continues to rule. Although Sulabha has not so far criticized him for being a king, he defensively states that kingship and domesticity do not prevent him from being liberated because he has no attachments or aversions. He claims that he has overcome dualities, such as love and hate, pleasure and aversion. Using a common idiom, he states that a lump of earth, a stone, and a piece of gold are the same (samaloṣṭāshmakāñchanaḥ 12.308.37. See also Bhagavad-Gītā 14.24). A king may be a

13 The

epics and other ancient texts state that women can attain liberation by faithfully serving their husbands. However, these texts also depict several women achieving liberation by renouncing the world rather than serving husbands; the tradition of female ascetics continues into the modern world. See Denton (2004). 14 Piantelli (2022) reads Sulabha’s possession of Janaka as “a quasi-coitus.” I disagree, since Sulabha explains why Janaka’s reading of yogic possession as sexual is incorrect.

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renouncer, he says, and an ascetic who appears to have renounced may not have actually done so. Janaka then says that Sulabha is too young and beautiful to have disciplined her senses. Viewing himself as a man and Sulabha as a woman, Janaka misunderstands their yogic union as sexual union. He strongly objects to her having grasped his being and entered his heart (12.308.57–58). He orders her to stop touching him (12.308.70). Stating that a yogi who experiences sexual desire (kāma) is not a true renouncer, and that Sulabha is not maintaining the norms of renunciation (12.308.56), he indirectly accuses her of desiring him. A union between the two of them would be wrong, he alleges, on several counts. First, he is a king and she an ascetic, so they belong to different orders of life (āshramas).15 Second, she is a brāhmaṇa and he belongs to the kshatriya (warrior) community, therefore this is a forbidden cross-varṇa union. Third, if her husband is alive, it is wrong for him to unite with another man’s wife. Janaka wrongly assumes that Sulabha is a brāhmaṇa. This is faulty logic. Since many ascetics are brāhmaṇas, he assumes that all of them are, which is not true. He also assumes that all adult women must be married, and that she must therefore have either a living or a dead husband. This, in his view, makes their union adulterous (not because he is married but because she is). He accuses her of having acted either from ignorance (ajñānena) or else from incorrect knowledge (mithyājñānena, 12.308.63), and adds that if she has become independent (svatantra) due to her own fault (svadoṣa), even a little knowledge of scriptures should tell her that all her actions are anartha, a powerful term indicating uselessness and destructiveness (12: 308: 64). He accuses her of trying to demonstrate her own superiority over him and his counsellors, which shows that she is a wicked woman (12.308.65). Janaka indirectly refers to the conventional dictum that a woman must always be protected by a man; he implies that it is against the scriptures for a woman to be independent.16 He states that a king’s strength is majesty, a brāhmaṇa’s strength is Vedic knowledge, and a woman’s (or wife’s) strength is beauty, youth and good fortune (rūpayauvanasaubhāgyaṃ, 12.308.73). One should not deceive a king, a brāhmaṇa or a good wife (12.308.72). His usage of the word strī conflates its two meanings of “woman” and “wife”. He accuses Sulabha of pride and deceit and concludes by insisting that she tell him about her nature, her varṇa and her intentions (12.308.75).

classical division of a 100-year life span into four equal āshramas or stages—student, householder, hermit and renunciant. Some ascetics become renunciants without passing through the three earlier stages. 16 Law books, such as the Mānavadharmashāstra, also known as the Manusmriti, state that a woman should be protected by her father in youth, her husband in adulthood and her son in old age. This idea and its corollary—that a woman should not be independent, are repeated elsewhere in the Mahābhārata. 15 The

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9.4 Sulabha’s Philosophy Sulabha’s response addresses first, the philosophy of language and communication, and second, the ontology and epistemology of existents, in particular, the self, the body, the mind, consciousness, and personhood. She explains the means by which we perceive and understand these existents as well as relationships between existents and between an existent and its attributes (in particular, the relationship between a living being and its attributes, such as gender, varṇa, āshrama, and appearance). Based on this exposition, she considers the ethics of yogic union, especially between two liberated persons. Sulabha also undertakes an analysis of power, based on her understanding of the self, of action, and of relationships. Sulabha uses terms drawn from non-theistic sāṅkhya philosophy.17 In the Mahābhārata, these terms are incorporated into and combined with the discourse of other philosophical schools, especially the school of theistic yoga, and many philosophers (including Krishna in the Gītā) undertake a similar amalgamation. Janaka bases his claim to be liberated primarily on the yoga of knowledge (jñana-yoga). Instead of achieving knowledge through ascetic practices, he claims to have achieved knowledge by the study of scripture under his guru, the sage Panchashikha. From this knowledge, he says, he has achieved the ability to perform action without attachment. His claim is not primarily based on karma-yoga, that is, he does not claim that his practice of action without attachment has led to his achievement of knowledge. Sulabha proves that Janaka does not have accurate knowledge of reality. His accusations against her demonstrate that he does not understand the reality of the self, of personhood, of action, and of consciousness. Her attack is, therefore, not on karma-yoga itself, but on Janaka’s failure in both jñana-yoga and karma-yoga.18 If Sulabha thought that no householder could ever achieve liberation, she would not bother to examine Janaka. That she undertakes the examination shows that she considers it possible. First, she analyses the nature of words, sentences, speech (vāk), and argumentation (12.309.79–95).19 She does not directly criticize Janaka’s claims. Instead, she states that an argument should be clear and

17 I

use the terms “theistic” and “non-theistic” with the proviso that there are no exact equivalents for these concepts in Sanskrit. Hindu philosophers may or may not posit a personal God but all posit the existence of a non-material principle (consciousness). This is different from Western atheism, which generally denies both the existence of God and also the existence of a non-material principle. 18 I differ with Fitzgerald (2002) who argues that Sulabha disproves the validity of karma-yoga itself. 19 Vāk (speech) appears in the famous Devī Sūktaṃ (Rig Veda 10.25), as the Goddess of speech and knowledge, later conflated with Goddess Saraswati. For analysis of the flaws in Janaka’s speech and the excellence of Sulabha’s argument see Chakrabarti (2014). I disagree with Chakrabarti’s view of Sulabha’s metaphysics of identity as “proto-Buddhist non-Brahmanical” (266–68). Sulabha’s philosophy unfolds in answer to a question about sāṅkhya.

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should make sense to the listener, not just to the speaker. A convincing argument must be logical, pleasant, and based on evidence. Each sentence should build on earlier ones, leading to an unambiguous conclusion. As her argument proceeds, it becomes clear that Janaka’s speech lacks these qualities and is unconvincing, while Sulabha’s speech is logical and convincing. The narrator, Bhishma, comments that although Janaka speaks in a harsh, illogical and inappropriate manner (12:308:76), Sulabha is not upset, and responds with words more beautiful than her physical beauty (12:308:77). Sulabha first examines the faulty ontological grounding of Janaka’s questions. Janaka claimed to see a lump of clay and a piece of gold as the same, meaning that he sees not appearance but reality (both clay and gold are forms of matter) but his criticism of Sulabha is based on his treating gender (and other social categories) as real. At the most superficial level, that of social institutions and categories, he is unable to see reality beyond its conventional packaging. He bases his claims on conventional generalizations about groups, such as ascetics and women. He views temporary attributes, such as youth, beauty, and good fortune, as real. At a more profound level, when he asks Sulabha who she is, whose she is, where she comes from and where she is going, he mistakenly assumes that she (or any self) consists of a body and mind that is capable of belonging, possessing, coming, and going. This, of course, is incorrect, as all schools of Hindu thought agree that a self is not the body or the mind but is the consciousness. It is important to remember that in Hindu philosophy, the mind is a bodily organ or faculty, and is not separate from the body. Sulabha begins by analyzing bodies and minds as constituents of living beings. All bodies (and minds) consist of different, ever-changing, combinations of physical elements. As an accumulation of tiny particles, no one body is essentially different from any other body. The constituent particles of a body (or mind) do not know what they are, and no one asks them who they are. Neither do the senses and faculties know what they are. The eye, she says, cannot see itself. The implication is that the eye sees because of the mind. But the mind cannot know itself on its own. The mind knows itself because of consciousness. This is where Hindu philosophy differs from Cartesian philosophy. A living being (an animal or insect) that does not think in the way that humans think nevertheless has consciousness, which is the unchanging reality. Using sāṅkhya categories that are referenced in the Gītā and also elsewhere in the Mahābhārata, Sulabha states that the five senses that produce knowledge (sight, sound, smell, taste, touch), the five organs of action (tongue, hands, feet, genitals, anus), and the mind are the eleven faculties. All eleven faculties are capable of misapprehension and thus of producing faulty knowledge. Sulabha’s first point, then, is that Janaka’s question “Who are you?” is not meaningful when addressed to anyone as a body and mind, because body and mind are not unitary entities. Her second critique of Janaka’s questions is based on the ontology of change. Constant change is the primary reality of body and mind. Sulabha cites the somewhat unusual example of a foetus. This may have something to do with her being a woman. She may have thought more about foetuses than Janaka has, and she

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relates her analysis directly to the category of gender. A foetus, Sulabha says, is formed from a mixture of blood and semen (12.308.116). She traces its growth through various stages, from a bubble-like being to one with limbs, nails and hair. Each stage has a name in Sanskrit. Only when the baby is born after nine months do its sexual organs (liṅga) appear, and then it is given a name. Now that it has a name and a form it is called female or male (strī pumān, 12.308.118). Thus, she demonstrates that gender (also termed liṅga) and sex are social categories based upon name and form. Name and form (nāma-rūpa), as every Hindu thinker knows, and as Janaka too would know, are changing manifestations. In each lifetime, one has a different name and form. The Gods and Goddesses take many forms and have many names.20 Sulabha relates the widely accepted fact that name and form change to the less-examined fact that sex and gender are unstable and temporary realities. She goes on to say that the baby grows and becomes a youth and then an old person. At each stage its earlier form and appearance disappear. This process of change is continuous but so subtle as to be invisible. Since all the particles in a body and mind are continuously coming into being and going away, what is the point of asking who one is, where one comes from and where one is going? Sulabha analyzes Janaka’s commonplace questions as questions about the self’s existence. She does this because she and Janaka are supposed to engage in philosophical debate; instead, he, viewing her as a woman rather than a sage, reduced the discussion to an insultingly personal one. Such questions are normally asked by philosophers as rhetorical questions, to underline the futility of clinging to any one phase of existence. For example, in the Gita chapter before this one, the sage Panchashikha (guru of Janaka as well as of his predecessor), consoled a king who was grieving about ageing and death, by asking him a series of questions that are intended to demonstrate their own pointlessness: “kuto'hamāgataḥ ko'smi kva gamiṣyāmi kasya vā / kasminsthitaḥ kva bhavitā kasmāt kimanushochasi” (12.307.13) “Where have I come from? Who am I? Where will I go? To whom do I belong? Where am I established? Where will I be? Therefore, why are you grieving?”21 Sulabha also considers the question of personhood (which is distinct from that of selfhood). She states that prakriti, the unmanifested (avyakta) force becomes manifested (vyakta) in the senses, organs, and perceptions that make up a body and mind. This manifestation is a person, a vyakti. An under-discussed aspect of the difference between Western and Hindu ideas of personhood hinges, in my view, on vyakti, the word generally translated as “person” and “individual”.22 However, vyakti means something different from “person” or “individual” in

20 Traditionally,

each deity has 1008 names. Deities take on the forms of men, women, animals, birds, plants, mountains, rivers, stones, and many other existents. 21 Translation Debroy 12.308 (Volume 9, pp. 326–27). 22 Smith (2006) (The Self-Possessed) discusses the difference between concepts of personhood and selfhood in English and Sanskrit, but refers only to puruṣa and ātman, not to vyakti.

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English.23 Vyakti means an expression or a manifestation (and it is still used to mean that as well, as in the word, abhivyakti). A person or an individual is thus understood as an expression. An expression is temporary, not permanent. In each lifetime, a self as consciousness ((jīvātman) is the same, but expresses itself as a completely different vyakti (person). Sulabha uses the term vyakta-avyakta (expressed and unexpressed) three times in six verses (12.113–115) to indicate that identities and categories of personhood, in which Janaka is interested, are merely ever-changing manifestations. Ordinary knowers do not realize this. They see the person as a stable unit and identical with the self. But one who truly knows reality is aware that a person is a temporary expression and is not the self. Sulabha’s conclusion is that because of the constantly changing nature of persons, they cannot be possessed, “Who then has come from where or where not, whose is it or whose is it not, where is it and where is it not?” (12.308.123–24). It follows that no one can possess another. The requirement for a woman to be under a father, husband or son’s control is based on an ontological impossibility. Only change controls the body and mind. Noteworthy in this analysis is the claim that while no particular body belongs to anyone, yet simultaneously each body is also everyone’s (“whose is it not?”). This indicates Sulabha’s third and most important critique of Janaka’s questions, a critique based on the non-difference of consciousnesses. All bodies are the same and all consciousnesses are the same. Sameness of vision (samatva) is a characteristic of a knower of reality. In the Gita, a knowledgeable person is defined as one who sees a brāhmaṇa, an elephant, a cow, a dog and a dog-eater as the same (BG 5.18) because s/he knows that they are all really the ātman or self/consciousness. A knower of reality does not think in dualities, and the most basic duality is I/you, mine/yours. If Janaka, as he claims, has overcome dualities, then why, Sulabha asks, does he see himself as different from her, and why does he want to know who she is and whose she is: Ātmanyevātmanātmānaṃ yathā tvam anupashyasi Evam evātmanātmānaṃ anyasmin kiṃ na pashyasi Yadyātmani parasmiṃshcha samatāmadhyavasyasi Atha māṃ kāsi kasyeti kimarthaṃ anupṛcchhasi Idaṃ me syād idaṃ neti dvaṇdvairmuktasya maithila Kāsi kasya kuto veti vachane kiṃ prayojanam. (12. 308.126–127)

23 The

English “individual” derives from a Latin word meaning “indivisible.” It suggests a stable and unchanging entity. The English word “person” derives from a Latin word meaning an actor’s mask or a character in a play. It suggests that personhood is put on for a lifetime’s performance and then cast aside. However, a mask does not change its expression. Vyakti is more fluid than “person.”

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You see your atman in your own self. In that fashion, why don’t you see your atman in other people? But perhaps you do regard yourself and others as identical. In that event, why did you ask me who I am and whom I belong to? O lord of Mithila! If it is true that you have been freed from opposite sentiments [dualities], what was the need for expressions like, ‘Who are you?’ and ‘Whom do you belong to?’ (Debroy, 2010: 9:36)24

Janaka’s other accusations fall apart once this analysis of selfhood, personhood, body, mind and consciousness is understood. Sulabha dismantles the category of varṇa (now called “caste”) and āshrama (stages of life), just as she did the category of gender. This type of dismantling of varṇa is found elsewhere in the Mahābhārata too. Janaka assumed from her ascetic appearance that she was a brāhmaṇa and objected to her entering into yogic union with himself, because he is a kshatriya (12.308.59). This shows that he thinks only brāhmaṇas can be renouncers, which is incorrect. Sulabha explains that different varṇas and āshramas are not really different; they only appear to be different. They are attributes of an individual being in one lifetime, but they change from one lifetime to the next. They do not attach to the real self, the consciousness. To view varṇas as actually different from one another and to view the body-mind continuum as the self is to make a basic mistake in understanding what difference is and what non-difference is. Those who misperceive reality think that the body and the consciousness are identical, and also think that the varṇas and āshramas are different from one another (12.308.177). Janaka’s anxieties about intermingling show that he does not understand reality and therefore is not liberated. Sulabha uses an ancient image favored by philosophers to explain relationships between existents. One may hold a pot containing milk, and a fly may sit on the milk, but the milk, the pot and the fly all remain separate. They do not depend on each other for the reality of their existence. They have only a temporary connection with one another; this connection does not alter the reality of each one. So also, attributes like varṇa and āshrama may exist along with a person in society but they remain separate from the person’s self (12.308.78–80). A liberated person may be seen in society as having a certain varṇa or being in a certain stage of life but a wise person knows that these are not really part of the self. Sulabha informs Janaka that she too is a kshatriya. It is a mistake to judge people’s varṇa by their occupations or appearance. There are many examples in the epics of persons who permanently or temporarily pursue occupations different from those of their varṇa. Janaka inaccurately attaches certain attributes to groups of people, as if the groups and attributes are static, for example, he sees beauty, youth and good fortune as the strength of women or wives. Without directly alluding to his claims, Sulabha proceeds to analyze power, on the basis of her analysis of the self. Power, whether social or political, does not adhere to the self; it adheres to the body and

24 I

cite Debroy 12:3 308 here because Ganguli uses the term “soul,” which has Christian connotations of uniqueness. The word ātman, since it is used both for many individual selves and for the universal self (in schools of thought that posit a universal self), emphasizes non-difference.

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mind. Just as the body and mind are unstable (Sulabha compares them to the flickering of a flame, 12.308.122), so too is power. However powerful a king is, he can live in only one place at a time, occupy only one house at a time, and sleep in only one bed at night, which he must share with his wife (12.308.135–36). He can use and consume only a limited number of goods. Janaka had said that if Sulabha is independent due to her own fault, all her actions are worthless. This statement immediately followed his speculation about her husband, and he thus implied that a woman should be dependent. Sulabha turns the tables on him by pointing out that rulers (and the powerful in general) may imagine that they own a lot of property and are independent, but in fact they are dependent on advisors, and are frequently disturbed by petitioners. A king’s decisions are open to criticism by everyone, and his actions inevitably create discontent, therefore he lives in constant fear of his subordinates. Sulabha demonstrates that physical, social, and political power are inseparable from dependence and attachment, both of which rob one of freedom. One who is subject to the demands of others and to fear and anxiety is not free. Such a one cannot be liberated from attachments and cannot attain peace, which is the essence of liberation. Our philosopher then makes a new move by connecting the power of kings to the power of fathers and husbands. Using the word janaka, which means “father” but also “king,” she says that every man is king in his own family (12.308.147). Men think that they control their family members but complete control of anyone’s body and mind is inherently impossible, and in fact, patriarchs, like kings, are dependent on those whom they try to control. Sulabha asks Janaka his own questions, now cast in a different light; she says that he thinks the kingdom, city, treasury, and counsellors are his, but whose really are they and whose are they not? (12.308.153). No one belongs to anyone and nothing belongs to anyone. Kings, like other men, have wives, children, friends, and wealth (12.308.148), and, like all humans, they too suffer illness, desire, envy, anxiety about loss, and grief when loss occurs (12.308.150–151). Sulabha contests Janaka’s misunderstanding of yogic union. She says that she has not touched him physically (12.308.169). A yogic union between two liberated persons (muktasya muktena) does not cause physical mixing (12.308.176) because liberated persons know themselves as consciousness, not as body and mind. A non-liberated person may experience yogic union as physical. If Janaka felt as if she touched him even though she did not touch him, this shows that he is not liberated (12.308.174). Sulabha does not use insulting language the way Janaka does. She dispassionately analyzes his condition. There is a subtle put-down in her final statement that a renunciant (one who intentionally is houseless), will spend no more than one night in an empty house, therefore she will stay one night in his body and leave the next day (12.308.189). This suggests that he lacks knowledge and is thus hollow. She also subtly rephrases Janaka’s gendered formulations. He addressed her as a brāhmaṇī (12.308.59), a female brāhmaṇ. Speaking of ascetics as a category to which she belongs, she uses the ungendered term bhikshuḥ (12.308.189). She does not call herself a bhikshukī or female mendicant, as Bhishma does earlier (12.308.7).

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9.5 Conclusion Sulabha’s foundational arguments are not invented by her, but her application of them with specific and detailed reference to gender and gendered power is creative and unprecedented in its time. Although she demonstrates that Janaka is not liberated, she does not categorically state that karma-yoga does not work and that no householder can be liberated without becoming an ascetic. She does suggest that it is harder for those in positions of power to attain liberation.

Appendix Translation of Sulabha-Janaka Dialogue25 Yudhishthira said, ‘Without abandoning the domestic mode of life, O royal sage of Kuru’s race, who ever attained to Emancipation which is the annihilation of the Understanding (and the other faculties)? Do tell me this! How may the gross and the subtile form be cast off? Do thou also, O grandsire, tell me what the supreme excellence of Emancipation is.’ Bhishma said, ‘In this connection is cited the old narrative of the discourse between Janaka and Sulabha, O Bharata! In days of yore there was a king of Mithila, of the name of Dharmadhyaja, of Janaka’s race. He was devoted to the practices of the religion of Renunciation. He was well conversant with the Vedas, with the scriptures on Emancipation, and with the scriptures bearing on his own duty as a king. Subjugating his senses, he ruled his Earth. Hearing of his good behaviour in the world, many men of wisdom, well-conversant with wisdom, O foremost of men, desired to imitate him.’ In the same Satya Yuga, a woman of the name of Sulabha, belonging to the mendicant order, practised the duties of Yoga and wandered over the whole Earth. In course of her wanderings over the Earth, Sulabha heard from many Dandis of different places that the ruler of Mithila was devoted to the religion of Emancipation. Hearing this report about king Janaka and desirous of ascertaining whether it was true or not, Sulabha became desirous of having a personal interview with Janaka. Abandoning, by her Yoga powers, her former form and features, Sulabha assumed the most faultless features and unrivalled beauty. In the twinkling of an eye and with the speed of the quickest shaft, the fair-browed lady of eyes like lotus-petals repaired to the capital of the Videhas. Arrived at the chief city of Mithila teeming with a large population, she adopted the guise of a

25 Sulabhājanakasaṃvādaḥ,(Ganguli

harata_12c020.php.

tr.) https://www.mahabharataonline.com/translation/mahab-

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mendicant and presented herself before the king. The monarch, beholding, her delicate form, became filled with wonder and enquired who she was, whose she was, and whence she came. Welcoming her, he assigned her an excellent seat, honoured her by offering water to wash her feet, and gratified her with excellent refreshments. Refreshed duly and gratified with the rites of hospitality offered unto her, Sulabha, the female mendicant, urged the king, who was surrounded by his ministers and seated in the midst of learned scholars, (to declare himself in respect of his adherence to the religion of Emancipation). Doubting whether Janaka had succeeded in attaining to Emancipation by following the religion of Nivritti, Sulabha, endued with Yoga-power, entered the understanding of the king by her own understanding. Restraining, by means of the rays of light that emanated from her own eyes, the rays issuing from the eyes of the king, the lady, desirous of ascertaining the truth, bound up king Janaka with Yoga bonds.’ That best of monarchs, priding himself upon his own invincibleness and defeating the intentions of Sulabha seized her resolution with his own resolution. The king, in his subtile form, was without the royal umbrella and sceptre. The lady Sulabha, in hers, was without the triple stick. Both staying then in the same (gross) form, thus conversed with each other. Listen to that conversation as it happened between the monarch and Sulabha: Janaka said, ‘O holy lady, to what course of conduct art thou devoted? Whose art thou? Whence hast thou come? After finishing thy business here, whither wilt thou go? No one can, without questioning, ascertain another’s acquaintance with the scriptures, or age, or order of birth. Thou shouldst, therefore, answer these questions of mine, when thou hast come to me. Know that I am truly freed from all vanity in respect of my royal umbrella and sceptre. I wish to know thee thoroughly. Thou art deserving I hold, of my respect. Do thou listen to me as I speak to thee on Emancipation for there is none else (in this world) that can discourse to thee on that topic. Hear me also I tell thee who that person is from whom in days of old I acquired this distinguishing knowledge. I am the beloved disciple of the high-souled and venerable Panchasikha, belonging to the mendicant order, of Parasara’s race. My doubts have been dispelled and am fully conversant with the Sankhya and the Yoga systems, and the ordinances as in respect of sacrifices and other rites, which constitutes the three well-known paths of Emancipation. Wandering over the earth and pursuing the while the path that is pointed out by the scriptures, the learned Panchasikha formerly dwelt in happiness in my abode for a period of four months in the rainy season. That foremost of Sankhyas discoursed to me, agreeably to the truth, and in an intelligible manner suited to my comprehension, on the several kinds of means for attaining to Emancipation. He did not, however, command me to give up my kingdom. Freed from attachments, and fixing my Soul on supreme Brahma, and unmoved by companionship, I lived, practising in its entirety that triple conduct which is laid down in treatises on Emancipation. Renunciation (of all kinds of attachments) is the highest means prescribed for Emancipation. It is from Knowledge that Renunciation, by which one becomes freed is said to flow. From Knowledge arises the endeavour after Yoga, and through that endeavour one attains to knowledge of Self or Soul. Through knowledge of Self one transcends joy and grief. That enables one to transcend death and attain to high success. That high intelligence (knowledge of Self) has been acquired by me, and accordingly I have transcended all pairs of opposites. Even in this life have I been freed from stupefaction and have transcended all attachments. As a soil, saturated with water and softened thereby, causes the (sown) seed to sprout forth, after the same manner, the acts of men cause rebirth. As a seed, fried on a pan or otherwise, becomes unable to sprout forth although

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the capacity for sprouting was there, after the same manner my understanding having been freed from the productive principle constituted by desire, by the instruction of the holy Panchasikha of the mendicant order, it no longer produces its fruit in the form of attachment to the object of the senses. I never experience love for my spouse or hate for my foes. Indeed, I keep aloof from both, beholding the fruitlessness of attachment and wrath. I regard both persons equally, viz., him that smears my right hand with sandal-paste and him that wounds my left. Having attained my (true) object, I am happy, and look equally upon a clod of earth, a piece of stone, and a lump of gold. I am freed from attachments of every kind, though am engaged in ruling a kingdom. In consequence of all this I am distinguished over all bearers of triple sticks. Some foremost of men that are conversant with the topic of Emancipation say that Emancipation has a triple path, (these are knowledge, Yoga, and sacrifices and rites). Some regard knowledge having all things of the world for its object as the means of emancipation. Some hold that the total renunciation of acts (both external and internal) is the means thereof. Another class of persons conversant with the scriptures of Emancipation say that Knowledge is the single means. Other, viz. Yatis, endued with subtile vision, hold that acts constitute the means. The high-souled Panchasikha, discarding both the opinion about knowledge and acts, regarded the third as the only means of Emancipation. If men leading the domestic mode of life be endued with Yama and Niyama, they become the equals of Sannyasins. If, on the other hand, Sannyasins be endued with desire and aversion and spouses and honour and pride and affection, they become the equals of men leading domestic modes of life. If one can attain to Emancipation by means of knowledge, then may Emancipation exist in triple sticks (for there is nothing to prevent the bearers of such stick from acquiring the needful knowledge). Why then may Emancipation not exist in the umbrella and the sceptre as well, especially when there is equal reason in taking up the triple stick and the sceptre? One becomes attached to all those things and acts with which one has need for the sake of one’s own self for particular reasons. If a person, beholding the faults of the domestic mode of life, casts it off for adopting another mode (which he considers to be fraught with great merit), be cannot, for such rejection and adoption be regarded as one that is once freed from all attachments, (for all that he has done has been to attach himself to a new mode after having freed himself from a previous one). Sovereignty is fraught with the rewarding and the chastising of others. The life of a mendicant is equally fraught with the same (for mendicants also reward and chastise those they can). When, therefore, mendicants are similar to kings in this respect, why would mendicants only attain to Emancipation, and not kings? Notwithstanding the possession of sovereignty, therefore, one becomes cleansed of all sins by means of knowledge alone, living the while in Supreme Brahma. The wearing of brown cloths, shaving of the head, bearing of the triple stick, and the Kamandalu—these are the outward signs of one’s mode of life. These have no value in aiding one to the attainment of Emancipation. When, notwithstanding the adoption of these emblems of a particular mode of life, knowledge alone becomes the cause of one’s Emancipation from sorrow, it would appear that the adoption of mere emblems is perfectly useless. Or, if, beholding the mitigation of sorrow in it, thou hast betaken thyself to these emblems of Sannyasi, why then should not the mitigation of sorrow be beheld in the umbrella and the sceptre to which I have betaken myself? Emancipation does not exist in poverty; nor is bondage to be found in affluence. One attains to Emancipation through Knowledge alone, whether one is indigent or affluent. For these reasons, know that I am living in a condition of freedom, though ostensibly engaged in the enjoyments of religion, wealth, and pleasure, in the form of kingdom and spouses, which constitute a field of bondage (for the generality of men). The bonds constituted by kingdom and affluence, and the bondage to attachments, I have cut off with the sword of Renunciation whetted on the stone of the scriptures bearing upon Emancipation. As regards myself then, I tell thee that I have become freed in this way. O lady of the mendicant order, I cherish an affection for thee. But that should not prevent me from telling thee

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that thy behaviour does not correspond with the practices of the mode of life to which thou hast betaken thyself! Thou hast great delicacy of formation. Thou hast an exceedingly shapely form. The age is young. Thou hast all these, and thou hast Niyama (subjugation of the senses). I doubt it verily. Thou hast stopped up my body (by entering into me with the aid of the Yoga power) for ascertaining as to whether I am really emancipated or not. This act of thine ill corresponds with that mode of life whose emblems thou bearest. For Yogin that is endued with desire, the triple stick is unfit. As regards thyself, thou dost not adhere to thy stick. As regards those that are freed, it behoves even them to protect themselves from fall. Listen now to me as to what thy transgression has been in consequence of thy contact with me and thy having entered into my gross body with the aid of thy understanding. To what reason is thy entrance to be ascribed into my kingdom or my palace? At whose sign hast thou entered into my heart? Thou belongest to the foremost of all the orders, being, as thou art, a Brahmana woman. As regards myself, however, I am a Kshatriya. There is no union for us two. Do not help to cause an intermixture of colours. Thou livest in the practice of those duties that lead to Emancipation. I live in the domestic mode of life. This act of thine, therefore, is another evil thou hast done, for it produces an unnatural union of two opposite modes of life. I do not know whether thou belongest to my own gotra or dost not belong to it. As regards thyself also, thou dost not know who I am (viz., to what gotra I belong). If thou art of my own gotra, thou hast, by entering into my person, produced another evil—the evil, viz., of unnatural union. If, again, thy husband be alive and dwelling in a distant place, thy union with me has produced the fourth evil of sinfulness, for thou art not one with whom I may be lawfully united. Dost thou perpetrate all these sinful acts, impelled by the motive of accomplishing a particular object? Dost thou do these from ignorance or from perverted intelligence? If, again, in consequence of thy evil nature thou hast thus become thoroughly independent or unrestrained in thy behaviour, I tell thee that if thou hast any knowledge of the scriptures, thou wilt understand that everything thou hast done has been productive of evil. A third fault attaches to thee in consequence of these acts of thine, a fault that is destructive of peace of mind. By endeavouring to display thy superiority, the indication of a wicked woman is seen in thee. Desirous of asserting thy victory as thou art, it is not myself alone whom thou wishest to defeat, for it is plain that thou wishest to obtain a victory over even the whole of my court (consisting of these learned and very superior Brahmanas), by casting thy eyes in this way towards all these meritorious Brahmanas, it is evident that thou desirest to humiliate them all and glorify thyself (at their expense). Stupefied by thy pride of Yoga-puissance that has been born of thy jealousy (at sight of my power,) thou hast caused a union of thy understanding with mine and thereby hast really mingled together nectar with poison. That union, again, of man and woman, when each covets the other, is sweet as nectar. That association, however, of man and woman when the latter, herself coveting, fails to obtain an individual of the opposite sex that does not covet her, is, instead of being a merit, only a fault that is as noxious as poison. Do not continue to touch me. Know that I am righteous. Do thou act according to thy own scriptures. The enquiry thou hadst wished to make, viz., whether I am or I am not emancipated, has been finished. It behoves thee not to conceal from me all thy secret motives. It behoves thee not, that thus disguisest thyself, to conceal from me what thy object is, that is whether this call of thine has been prompted by the desire of accomplishing some object of thy own or whether thou hast come for accomplishing the object of some other king (that is hostile to me). One should never appear deceitfully before a king; nor before a Brahmana; nor before one’s wife when that wife is possessed of every wifely virtue. Those who appear in deceitful guise before these three very soon meet with destruction. The power of kings consists in their sovereignty. The power of Brahmanas conversant with the Vedas is in the Vedas. Women wield a high power in consequence of their beauty and youth and blessedness. These then are powerful in the possession of these powers. He, therefore, that is desirous of accomplishing his own object should always approach these three with sincerity and candour, insincerity and

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deceit fail to produce success (in these three quarters). It behoveth thee, therefore, to apprise me of the order to which thou belongest by birth, of thy learning and conduct and disposition and nature, as also of the object thou hast in view in coming to this place!’ Bhishma continued, ‘Though rebuked by the king in these unpleasant, improper, and ill-applied words, the lady Sulabha was not at all abashed. After the king had said these words, the beautiful Sulabha then addressed herself for saying the following words in reply that were more handsome than her person.’ Sulabha said, ‘O king, speech ought always to be free from the nine verbal faults and the nine faults of judgment. It should also, while setting forth the meaning with perspicuity, be possessed of the eighteen well-known merits. Ambiguity, ascertainment of the faults and merits of premises and conclusions, weighing the relative strength or weakness of those faults and merits, establishment of the conclusion, and the element of persuasiveness or otherwise that attaches to the conclusion thus arrived at—these five characteristics appertaining to the sense—constitute the authoritativeness of what is said. Listen now to the characteristics of these requirements beginning with ambiguity, one after another, as I expound them according to the combinations. When knowledge rests on distinction in consequence of the object to be known being different from one another, and when (as regards the comprehension of the subject) the understanding rests upon many points one after another, the combination of words (in whose case this occurs) is said to be vitiated by ambiguity. By ascertainment (of faults and merits), called Sankhya, is meant the establishment, by elimination, of faults or merits (in premises and conclusions), adopting tentative meanings. Kamra or weighing the relative strength or weakness of the faults or merits (ascertained by the above process), consists in settling the propriety of the priority or subsequence of the words employed in a sentence. This is the meaning attached to the word Karma by persons conversant with the interpretation of sentences or texts. By Conclusion is meant the final determination, after this examination of what has been said on the subjects of religion, pleasure, wealth, and Emancipation, in respect of what is particularly is that has been said in the text. The sorrow born of wish or aversion increases to a great measure. The conduct, O king, that one pursues in such a matter (for dispelling the sorrow experienced) is called Prayojanam. Take it for certain, O king, at my word, that these characteristics of Ambiguity and the other (numbering five in all), when occurring together, constitute a complete and intelligible sentence. The words I shall utter will be fraught with sense, free from ambiguity (in consequence of each of them not being symbols of many things), logical, free from pleonasm or tautology, smooth, certain, free from bombast, agreeable or sweet, truthful, not inconsistent with the aggregate of three, (viz., Righteousness, Wealth and Pleasure), refined (i.e., free from Prakriti), not elliptical or imperfect, destitute of harshness or difficulty of comprehension, characterised by due order, not far-fetched in respect of sense, corrected with one another as cause and effect and each having a specific object. I shall not tell thee anything, prompted by desire or wrath or fear or cupidity or abjectness or deceit or shame or compassion or pride. (I answer thee because it is proper for me to answer what thou hast said). When the speaker, the hearer, and the words said, thoroughly agree with one another in course of a speech, then does the sense or meaning come out very clearly. When, in the matter of what is to be said, the speaker shows disregard for the understanding of the hearer by uttering words whose meaning is understood by himself, then, however good those words may be, they become incapable of being seized by the hearer. That speaker, again, who, abandoning all regard for his own meaning uses words that are of excellent sound and sense, awakens only erroneous, impressions in the mind of the hearer. Such words in such connection become certainly faulty. That speaker, however, who employs words that are, while expressing his own meaning, intelligible to the hearer, as well, truly deserves to be called a speaker. No other man deserves the name. It behoveth thee, therefore, O king, to hear with concentrated attention these words of mine, fraught with meaning and endued with wealth of vocables. Thou hast asked me who I am, whose I am, whence I am coming, etc.

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Listen to me, O king, with undivided mind, as I answer these questions of thine. As lac and wood, as grains of dust and drops of water, exist commingled when brought together, even so are the existences of all creatures. Sound, touch, taste, form, and scent, these and the senses, though diverse in respect of their essences, exist yet in a state of commingling like lac and wood. It is again well known that nobody asks any of these, saying, who art thou? Each of them also has no knowledge either of itself or of the others. The eye cannot see itself. The ear cannot hear itself. The eye, again, cannot discharge the functions of any of the other senses, nor can any of the senses discharge the functions of any sense save its own. If all of them even combine together, even they fail to know their own selves as dust and water mingled together cannot know each other though existing in a state of union. In order to discharge their respective functions, they await the contact of objects that are external to them. The eye, form, and light, constitute the three requisites of the operation called seeing. The same, as in this case, happens in respect of the operations of the other senses and the ideas which is their result. Then, again, between the functions of the senses (called vision, hearing, etc.,) and the ideas which are their result (viz., form, sound, etc.), the mind is an entity other than the senses and is regarded to have an action of its own. With its help one distinguishes what is existent from what is non-existent for arriving at certainty (in the matter of all ideas derived from the senses). With the five senses of knowledge and five senses of action, the mind makes a total of eleven. The twelfth is the Understanding. When doubt arises in respect of what is to be known, the Understanding comes forward and settles all doubts (for aiding correct apprehension). After the twelfth, Sattwa is another principle numbering the thirteenth. With its help creatures are distinguished as possessing more of it or less of it in their constitutions. After this, Consciousness (of self) is another principle (numbering the fourteenth). It helps one to an apprehension of self as distinguished from what is not self. Desire is the fifteenth principle, O king. Unto it inhere the whole universe. The sixteenth principle is Avidya. Unto it inhere the seventeenth and the eighteenth principles called Prakriti and Vyakti (i.e., Maya and Prakasa). Happiness and sorrow, decrepitude and death, acquisition and loss, the agreeable end the disagreeable—these constitute the nineteenth principle and are called couples of opposites. Beyond the nineteenth principle is another, viz., Time called the twentieth. Know that the births and death of all creatures are due to the action of this twentieth principle. These twenty exist together. Besides these, the five Great primal elements, and existence and non-existence, bring up the tale to seven and twenty. Beyond these, are three others, named Vidhi, Sukra, and Vala, that make the tale reach thirty. That in which these ten and twenty principles occur is said to be body. Some persons regard unmanifest Prakriti to be the source or cause of these thirty principles. (This is the view of the atheistic Sankhya school). The Kanadas of gross vision regard the Manifest (or atoms) to be their cause. Whether the Unmanifest or the Manifest be their cause, or whether the two (viz., the Supreme or Purusha and the Manifest or atoms) be regarded as their cause, or fourthly, whether the four together (viz., the Supreme or Purusha and his Maya and Jiva and Avidya or Ignorance) be the cause, they that are conversant with Adhyatma behold Prakriti as the cause of all creatures. That Prakriti which is Unmanifest, becomes manifest in the form of these principles. Myself, thyself, O monarch, and all others that are endued with body are the result of that Prakriti (so far as our bodies are concerned). Insemination and other (embryonic) conditions are due to the mixture of the vital seed and blood. In consequence of insemination the result which first appears is called by the name of ‘Kalala.’ From ‘Kalala’ arises what is called Vudvuda (bubble). From the stage called ‘Vudvuda’ springs what is called ‘Pesi.’ From the condition called ‘Pesi’ that stage arises in which the various limbs become manifested. From this last condition appear nails and hair. Upon the expiration of the ninth month, O king of Mithila, the creature takes its birth so that, its sex being known, it comes to be called a boy or girl. When the creature issues out of the womb, the form it presents is such that its nails and fingers seem to be of the hue of burnished copper. The next stage is said to be infancy, when the form that was seen

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at the time of birth becomes changed. From infancy youth is reached, and from youth, old age. As the creature advances from one stage into another, the form presented in the previous stage becomes changed. The constituent elements of the body, which serve diverse functions in the general economy, undergo change every moment in every creature. Those changes, however, are so minute that they cannot be noticed. The birth of particles, and their death, in each successive condition, cannot be marked, O king, even as one cannot mark the changes in the flame of a burning lamp. When such is the state of the bodies of all creatures—that is when that which is called the body is changing incessantly even like the rapid locomotion of a steed of good mettle—who then has come whence or not whence, or whose is it or whose is it not, or whence does it not arise? What connection does there exist between creatures and their own bodies? As from the contact of flint with iron, or from two sticks of wood when rubbed against each other, fire is generated, even so are creatures generated from the combination of the (thirty) principles already named. Indeed, as thou thyself seest thy own body in thy body and as thou thyself seest thy soul in thy own soul, why is it that thou dost not see thy own body and thy own soul in the bodies and souls of others? If it is true that thou seest an identity with thyself and others, why then didst thou ask me who I am and whose? If it is true that hast, O king been freed from the knowledge of duality that (erroneously) says—this is mine and this other is not mine—then what use is there with such questions as Who art thou, whose art thou and whence dost thou come? What indications of Emancipation can be said to occur in that king who acts as others act towards enemies and allies and neutrals and in victory and truce and war? What indications of Emancipation occur in him who does not know the true nature of the aggregate of three as manifested in seven ways in all acts and who, on that account, is attached to that aggregate of three? What indications of Emancipation exist in him who fails to cast an equal eye on the agreeable, on the weak, and the strong? Unworthy as thou art of it, thy pretence of Emancipation should be put down by thy counselors! This thy endeavour to attain to Emancipation (when thou hast so many faults) is like the use of medicine by a patient who indulges in all kinds of forbidden food and practices. O chastiser of foes, reflecting upon spouses and other sources of attachment, one should behold these in one’s own soul. What else can be looked upon as the indication of Emancipation? Listen now to me as I speak in detail of these and certain other minute sources of attachment appertaining to the four well known acts (of lying down for slumber, enjoyment, eating, and dressing) to which thou art still bound though thou professest thyself to have adopted the religion of Emancipation. That man who has to rule the whole world must, indeed, be a single king without a second. He is obliged to live in only a single palace. In that palace he has again only one sleeping chamber. In that chamber he has, again, only one bed on which at night he is to lie down. Half that bed again he is obliged to give to his Queen-consort. This may serve as an example of how little the king’s share is of all he is said to own. This is the case with his objects of enjoyment, with the food he eats, and with the robes he wears. He is thus attached to a very limited share of all things. He is, again, attached to the duties of rewarding and punishing. The king is always dependent on others. He enjoys a very small share of all he is supposed to own, and to that small share he is forced to be attached (as well as others are attached to their respective possessions). In the matter also of peace and war, the king cannot be said to be independent. In the matter of women, of sports and other kinds of enjoyment, the king’s inclinations are exceedingly circumscribed. In the matter of taking counsel and in the assembly of his councilors what independence can the king be said to have? When, indeed, he sets his orders on other men, he is said to be thoroughly independent. But then the moment after, in the several matters of his orders, his independence is barred by the very men whom he has ordered. If the king desires to sleep, he cannot gratify his desire, resisted by those who have business to transact with him. He must sleep when permitted, and while sleeping he is obliged to wake up for attending to those that have urgent business with him—bathe, touch, drink, eat, pour libations on the fire, perform sacrifices, speak,

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hear—these are the words which kings have to hear from others and hearing them have to slave to those that utter them. Men come in batches to the king and solicit him for gifts. Being, how-ever, the protector of the general treasury, he cannot make gifts unto even the most deserving. If he makes gifts, the treasury becomes exhausted. If he does not, disappointed solicitors look upon him with hostile eyes. He becomes vexed and as the result of this, misanthropical feelings soon invade his mind. If many wise and heroic and wealthy men reside together, the king’s mind begins to be filled with distrust in consequence. Even when there is no cause of fear, the king entertains fear of those that always wait upon and worship him. Those I have mentioned O king, also find fault with him. Behold, in what way the king’s fears may arise from even them! Then again all men are kings in their own houses. All men, again, in their own houses are householders. Like kings, O Janaka, all men in their own houses chastise and reward. Like kings others also have sons and spouses and their own selves and treasuries and friends and stores. In these respects the king is not different from other men—the country is ruined—the city is consumed by fire—the foremost of elephants is dead—at all this the king yields to grief like others, little regarding that these impressions are all due to ignorance and error. The king is seldom freed from mental griefs caused by desire and aversion and fear. He is generally afflicted also by headaches and diverse diseases of the kind. The king is afflicted (like others) by all couples of opposites (as pleasure and pain, etc). He is alarmed at everything. Indeed, full of foes and impediments as kingdom is, the king, while he enjoys it, passes nights of sleeplessness. Sovereignty, therefore, is blessed with an exceedingly small share of happiness. The misery with which it is endued is very great. It is as unsubstantial as burning flames fed by straw or the bubbles of froth seen on the surface of water. Who is there that would like to obtain sovereignty, or having acquired sovereignty can hope to win tranquility? Thou regardest this kingdom and this palace to be thine. Thou thinkest also this army, this treasury, and these counselors to belong to thee. Whose, however, in reality are they, and whose are they not? Allies, ministers, capital, provinces, punishment, treasury, and the king, these seven which constitute the limbs of a kingdom exist, depending upon one another, like three sticks standing with one another’s support. The merits of each are set off by the merits of the others. Which of them can be said to be superior to the rest? At those times those particular ones are regarded as distinguished above the rest when some important end is served through their agency. Superiority, for the time being, is said to attach to that one whose efficacy is thus seen. The seven limbs already mentioned, O best of kings, and the three others, forming an aggregate of ten, supporting one another, are said to enjoy the kingdom like the king himself. That king who is endued with great energy and who is firmly attached to Kshatriya practices, should be satisfied with only a tenth part of the produce of the subject’s field. Other kings are seen to be satisfied with less than a tenth part of such produce. There is no one who owns the kingly office without some one else owning it in the world, and there is no kingdom without a king. If there be no kingdom, there can be no righteousness, and if there be no righteousness, whence can Emancipation arise? Whatever merit is most sacred and the highest, belongs to kings and kingdoms. By ruling a kingdom well, a king earns the merit that attaches to a Horsesacrifice with the whole Earth given away as Dakshina. But how many kings are there that rule their kingdoms well? O ruler of Mithila, I can mention hundreds and thousands of faults like these that attach to kings and kingdoms. Then, again, when I have no real connection with even my body, how then can I be said to have any contact with the bodies of others? Thou canst not charge me with having endeavoured to bring about an intermixture of castes. Hast thou heard the religion of Emancipation in its entirety from the lips of Panchasikha together with its means, its methods, its practices, and its conclusion? If thou hast prevailed over all thy bonds and freed thyself from all attachments, may I ask thee, O king, who thou preservest thy connections still with this umbrella and these other appendages of royalty? I think that thou hast not listened to the scriptures, or, thou hast listened to them without any advantage, or, perhaps, thou hast listened to some other treatises

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looking like the scriptures. It seems that thou art possessed only of worldly knowledge, and that like an ordinary man of the world thou art bound by the bonds of touch and spouses and mansions and the like. If it be true that thou Met been emancipated from all bonds, what harm have I done thee by entering thy person with only my Intellect? With Yatis, among all orders of men, the custom is to dwell in uninhabited or deserted abodes. What harm then have I done to whom by entering thy understanding which is truly of real knowledge? I have not touched thee, O king, with my hands, of arms, or feet, or thighs, O sinless one, or with any other part of the body. Thou art born in a high race. Thou hast modesty. Thou hast foresight. Whether the act has been good or bad, my entrance into thy body has been a private one, concerning us two only. Was it not improper for thee to publish that private act before all thy court? These Brahmanas are all worthy of respect. They are foremost of preceptors. Thou also art entitled to their respect, being their king. Doing them reverence, thou art entitled to receive reverence from them. Reflecting on all this, it was not proper for thee to proclaim before these foremost of men the fact of this congress between two persons of opposite sexes, if, indeed, thou art really acquainted with the rules of propriety in respect of speech. O king of Mithila, I am staying in thee without touching thee at all even like a drop of water on a lotus leaf that stays on it without drenching it in the least. If, notwithstanding instructions of Panchasikha of the mendicant order, thy knowledge has become abstracted from the sensual objects to which it relates? Thou hast, it is plain, fallen off from the domestic mode of life but thou hast not yet attained to Emancipation that is so difficult to arrive at. Thou stayest between the two, pretending that thou hast reached the goal of Emancipation. The contact of one that is emancipated with another that has been so, or Purusha with Prakriti, cannot lead to an intermingling of the kind thou dreariest. Only those that regard the soul to be identical with the body, and that think the several orders and modes of life to be really different from one another, are open to the error of supposing an intermingling to be possible. My body is different from thine. But my soul is not different from thy soul. When I am able to realise this, I have not the slightest doubt that my understanding is really not staying in thine though I have entered into thee by Yoga. A pot is borne in the hand. In the pot is milk. On the milk is a fly. Though the hand and pot, the pot and milk, and the milk and the fly, exist together, yet are they all distinct from each other. The pot does not partake the nature of the milk. Nor does the milk partake the nature of the fly. The condition of each is dependent on itself, and can never be altered by the condition of that other with which it may temporarily exist. After this manner, colour and practices, though they may exist together with and in a person that is emancipate, do not really attach to him. How then can an intermingling of orders be possible in consequence of this union of myself with thee? Then, again, I am not superior to thee in colour. Nor am I a Vaisya, nor a Sudra. I am, O king, of the same order with the, borne of a pure race. There was a royal sage of the name of Pradhana. It is evident that thou hast heard of him. I am born in his race, and my name is Sulabha. In the sacrifices performed by my ancestors, the foremost of the gods, viz., Indra, used to come, accompanied by Drona and Satasringa, and Chakradwara (and other presiding geniuses of the great mountains). Born in such a race, it was found that no husband could be obtained for me that would be fit for me. Instructed then in the religion of Emancipation, I wander over the Earth alone, observant of the practices of asceticism. I practise no hypocrisy in the matter of the life of Renunciation. I am not a thief that appropriates what belongs to others. I am not a confuser of the practices belonging to the different orders. I am firm in the practices that belong to that mode of life to which I properly belong. I am firm and steady in my vows. I never utter any word without reflecting on its propriety. I did not come to thee, without having deliberated properly, O monarch! Having heard that thy understanding has been purified by the religion of Emancipation, I came here from desire of some benefit. Indeed, it was for enquiring of thee about Emancipation that I had come. I do not say it for glorifying myself and humiliating my opponents. But I say it, impelled by sincerity only. What I say is, he that is emancipated never indulges in that intellectual

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gladiatorship which is implied by a dialectical disputation for the sake of victory. He, on the other hand, is really emancipate who devotes himself to Brahma, that sole seat of tranquility. As a person of the mendicant order resides for only one night in an empty house (and leaves it the next morning), even after the same manner I shall reside for this one night in thy person (which, as I have already said, is like an empty chamber, being destitute of knowledge). Thou hast honoured me with both speech and other offers that are due from a host to a guest. Having slept this one night in thy person, O ruler of Mithila, which is as it were my own chamber now, tomorrow I shall depart.’ Bhishma continued, ‘Hearing these words fraught with excellent sense and with reason, king Janaka failed to return any answer thereto.’

References Burley, M. (2012). Classical Samkhya and Yoga—An Indian metaphysics of experience. Routledge. Chakrabarti, A. (2014). Just words: An ethic of conversation in the Mahabharata. In A. Chakrabarti & S. Bandyopadhyay (Eds.), Mahabharata now: Narration, aesthetics, ethics (pp. 244–283). Routledge. Debroy, B. 2010. The Mahabharata. 10 volumes. Penguin. Denton, L. T. (2004). Female ascetics in Hinduism. SUNY Press. Dhand, A. (2008). Woman as fire, woman as Sage: Sexual ideology in the Mahābhārata. State University of New York Press. Fitzgerald, J. L. (2002). Nun befuddles king, shows karmayoga does not work: Sulabha’s refutation of King Janaka at MBh 12.308. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 30(6), 641–77. Ganeri, J. (2012). Identity as reasoned choice: A South Asian perspective on the reach and resources of public and practical reason in shaping individual identities. Continuum. Ganguli, K. M. (1883–1896). The Mahabharata of Krishna-Dvaipayana Vyasa. Nicholson, A. (2010). Unifying Hinduism: Philosophy and identity in Indian intellectual history. Columbia University Press. Piantelli, M. (2022). King Janaka a Male Chauvinistic Pig in the Mahābhārata. In A. Monti (Ed.), Hindu masculinities across the ages: Updating the past (pp. 35–55). L’Harmattan Italia. Schweig, G. (2007). Bhagavad Gītā (trans). HarperCollins. Shah, S. (1995). The making of womanhood: Gender relations in the Mahābhārata. Manohar Publications. Shah, S. (2017). Articulation, dissent and subversion: Voices of Women’s emancipation in Sanskrit literature. Social Scientist, 45(9/10), 79–86. Sharma, T. R. S. (Ed.). (2000). Ancient Indian literature: An anthology. Sahitya Akademi. Smith, F. (2006). The self-possessed: Deity and spirit possession in South Asian literature and civilization. Columbia University Press. Sukthankar, V. S. (Ed.). (1933). The Mahābhārata: For the first time critically edited. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. Vanita, R. (2003). The self is not gendered: Sulabha’s debate with King Janaka. NWSA Journal, 15(2), 76–93. Vanita, R. (2019). Male-female dialogues on gender, sexuality and dharma in the Hindu epics. In V. Howard (Ed.), The Bloomsbury research handbook of Indian philosophy and gender (pp. 299–323). Bloomsbury Academic. Vanita, R. (2021). The Dharma of Justice: Debates on gender, varna and species in the Hindu epics. Oxford University Press.

Chapter 10

Portrait by unknown artist is in public domain due to its antiquity

Rābi‘a al-‘Adawiyya of Basra 712–801/185–95 ‫رابعة ا عدوية ا بصرية‬ Tamara Albertini Abstract Rābi‘a was a Muslim saint and Sufi mystic. Her contemporaries also considered her a teacher of character. There are strong elements of a Philosophy of Religion in her collection of poems which is one of the earliest to set forth a doctrine of Divine Love. The concepts that she propounds include a daring taxonomy of love and the notion that self-effacement does not erase one’s gender. She thus emphasized that women’s piety is superior to men’s (which suggests a feminist consciousness). Her poems reveal a refined mastery of Arab meters and an intricate reflection on Arabic letters and language. Her writing is part of early Sufi philosophy and has inspired Muslim mystics for centuries, among them luminaries al-Ghazzālī (d. 1111) and Farīd al-Dīn al-‘Aṭṭār (d. 1221). Some of her verses are present in all genres of Arab songs to this day. This chapter is an updated and expanded version of my earlier chapter: T. D. Knepper, L. E. Kalmanson (eds.), Ineffability: An Exercise in Comparative Philosophy of Religion, Comparative Philosophy of Religion 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64165-2_13. Select portions reprinted with permission. T. Albertini (*)  University of Hawai’i at Mānoa, Honolulu, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_10

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10.1 Introduction 10.1.1 Sources of Rābi‘a’s Biography The first to mention Rābi‘a is famous ‘Abbasid littérateur al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 254– 255/868–9). Since he also lived in Basra and was in his 20s when Rābi‘a died, the information he provides, however scarce, is valuable, since it clearly establishes the historicity of the saint of Basra (Badawī, 1962, 108). A prime source for biographical details is Abū ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī’s (d. 412/1021) much respected Dhikr al-Niswa al-Muta‘abbidāt al-Ṣūfiyyāt (officially translated as A Memorial of Female Sufi Devotees); it is the earliest known work focusing exclusively on Sufi women. A full copy of al-Sulamī’s long-lost text, written only 60 years after his death, was discovered in Ryadh in 1991 but only became available in a critical edition in 1999. Al-Sulamī is considered a reliable author whose information found entry in later biographical works. What is particularly impressive about his procedure is that he provides a full chain of transmission (isnād) patterned after the methodology applied in the Ḥadīth, Islam’s second scriptural text. In doubt, the following will therefore rely on his narrative.

10.1.2 Biography Despite her fame as one of Islam’s greatest Sufi saints, the life of Rābi‘a al ‘Adawiyya al-Qaysiyya al-Baṣriyya (A. H. 95–185/C. E. 712–801), as she came to be known, “remains mostly elusive.”1 A number of Islamic sources state that she was born in Basra, a city founded by Muslims in 16/637 and known for its many ascetics. A more recent study suggests her native city may have been Damascus.2 Many Islamic biographical dictionaries record 185/801 as the year of her death,3 while one source indicates the year 135/752.4 The latter date seems highly unlikely, since Rābi‘a would then have been too young to meet some of the luminaries she is reported to have talked to, and she also would have died too early to have had exchanges with other distinguished visitors whose names have been associated with hers. On occasion, her first name is given as Rāyi‘a, although

1 See

(Lewisohn, 2014; Derin, 2008; Lumbard, 2007; Helm, 1994; Smith, 1994; Ernst, 1993; Sakkakini, 1982).

2 In

her recent doctoral dissertation Khedija Kchouk mentions Basra and Damascus as Rābi‘a’s possible birth places (Kchouk, 2012, 49). 3  For instance, Ibn Khallikān (d. 681/1282), Ibn Shākir (d. 764/1363), and Ibn al-‘Imād (d. 1089/1679). See El Sakkakini (1982), 82. 4 Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201). See Kchouk (2012), 49. In her later separate exposé on Rābi‘a, which mostly overlaps with the Rābi‘a dissertation chapter, Kchouk (2013) opts for the earlier date of 752.

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this is no great concern since it may be safely imputed to the accidental addition of a diacritical point.5 The greater biographical question concerns her full name and whether it indicates that Rābi‘a (or her father) became a client to an Arab tribe upon conversion to Islam. And there is also the matter of her having been married or a singing slave-girl before she converted to mysticism.6 Part of the confusion is due to the conflation of the biographies of several female saints by the same first name or with a similar story. Also, it is more than likely that the transmitted stories and sayings of Rābi‘a have been altered for greater effect, which is why they will be referred to as “Rābi‘an” stories (usually called “ḥikāyāt,” plural of “ḥikāya,” in Arabic sources) in the present paper.7 Nevertheless, the position taken in what follows is that they convey enough overlap and consistent features to allow for an appreciation of the saint’s original character and achievements, and also for how she was perceived by her contemporaries. The working assumption is that authors are inseparable from the place accorded them by later tradition; for better or worse, they are more than what they wrote and taught.

10.1.3 Teacher, Mystic, Pedagogical Innovator Without any question, Rābi‘a left an indelible mark on Islamic mysticism like no other Sufi before her, man or woman. Many of the encounters she is reputed to have had with fellow ascetics (zāhidūn, plural of zāhid) and mystics (ṣūfiyyūn, plural of ṣūfiyy)8 such as Mālik ibn Dīnār (d. 123/648), Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d.110/728), 5 The

Arabic ‘yā’’ has two underdots, the ‘bā’’ only one. See, Smith (1994), 170; Kchouk (2012), 48. 6 In a variant added to Farīd al-Dīn al-‘Aṭṭār’s Tadhkirat al-Awliyā’ (Memorial of the Friends of God), it is said that Rābi‘a “fell into minstrelsy,” which suggests that she might have been a courtesan (Baldick, 1990, 234), a detail also used in the Egyptian movie “Rābi‘a al-‘Adawiyya” directed by Niyāzī Muṣṭafā in 1963. Rābi‘a’s mastery of sophisticated meters in her poems (she uses at least 8 of the 16 existing Arabic meters; see Kchouk, 2012, 71) could be read as a clue to underline her past as a singing slave-girl (qayna, pl. qiyān), since that profession required great artistic refinement. However, al-Jāḥiẓ, who wrote about slave-girls (al-Jāḥiẓ, 1980) and mentions Rābi‘a in some of his other work, does not report that the saint of Basra had been one. Kchouk relies on some more sources relating that Rābi‘a was a musician (Kchouk, 2012, 72 and 74) and also orders her poems according to different life stages, from dissipated and hopelessly enamored young woman to repentant Sufi. Courtesan or not, there is strong evidence that Rābi‘a was a freed slave. For the story of her emancipation see Sells (1996), 156. It would explain how she was able to live most of her adult life without a male guardian, since emancipated female slaves indeed enjoyed greater freedom than free women in Islam. 7 Generally speaking, for the reliability of sources on early Sufis, see Silvers (2015), 26. 8 There is general consensus among scholars that asceticism (zuhd = renunciation) preceded mysticism in Islam and that there is overlap between the two movements in that a Sufi is also a zāhid but an ascetic need not also be a ṣūfiyy. Rābi‘a played a major role in the transition from mere zuhd to ascetic Sufism. About the question whether she may be called a Sufi in the historical sense, see Silvers ibid.

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Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/777–8), Ibrahīm ibn Adham (d. 165/782) ‘Abd al-Wāḥid al-Zayd (d. 177/793), and Rabāḥ al-Qaysī (d. 180/796) are obviously anecdotal, if only because a look at their respective dates clarifies that Rābi‘a could not possibly have been a contemporary to all of them. And yet, it is conceivable that the exchanges said to have taken place with some of these very distinguished figures in Islamic tradition belonged to conversations conducted with interlocutors whose names were either lost or less prominent, in order to grant Rābi‘a a higher status. An exception is Ḥadīth-scholar Sufyān al-Thawrī, whose dates confirm him as a contemporary of the saint of Basra and whose name also appears in al-Sulamī’s Memorial. Moreover, as the following will show, the stories involving him strongly suggest that he shared an intimate spiritual bond with her. Whoever Rābi‘a’s pious visitors were, they all bowed down before her extreme asceticism and the purity of her mystical experience. But this did not prevent them from sometimes provoking her and even testing the sincerity (ṣidq) of her religious sentiments. Agile of mind and never at loss for the right words, Rābi‘a always had the upper hand. One gets the impression that she welcomed the opportunity for verbal jousts.9 For instance, knowing her love of God, someone hoped to trick her by asking: “How is your love for the Prophet (may God bless and preserve him)?” She replied: “Verily, I love him. But love for the Creator has turned me away from love for created things” (ās-Sulamī, 1999, 78). Another visitor inquired about her take on Satan to which she answered: “My love for God leaves no room for hating Satan” (Smith, 1994, 123). On occasion, tradition recorded Rābia’s own questions to a number of individuals, making one wonder whether some of her interlocutors were not actually students of hers rather than frequent visitors. For instance, she asked them about “truthfulness” and “generosity,” clearly expecting them to give lacking answers that she would have to—and did—straighten out (El Sakkakini, 1982, 65). Her style is reminiscent of the “What is”-question used among the “acusmatici” in the Pythagorean school.10 This is not to suggest that Rābi‘a was following the teaching model of this ancient Greek school, only that the parallel questioning style supports the assumption that Rābi‘a was teaching and not just receiving guests. Some reactions to statements made in her presence, show how annoyed she could be at what she perceived to be pseudo-pious utterances. Sāliḥ al-Murrī (d. 176/792–93), who enjoyed reiterating, “When someone keeps knocking at

9  According

to Baldick, who assumes that Christian precedents were used to model Rābi‘a’s story, wittiness and repartees are typical elements used in stories of repenting female Christian saints who had been courtesans in pre-Islamic Iraq (whereas asceticism was the mark of ancient Syrian Christian women); see Baldick (1990), 237. While Baldick takes the earlier Christian hagiographical elements as a foil used to recount the life of a fictional Rābi‘a, I interpret the parallels to reflect the survival of a sophisticated Iraqi intellectual culture into the Islamic period. 10 For references to the “acusmatici” see Kirk et al. (1983), 232–233.

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the door, it will in time open for him,” was admonished by Rābi‘a: “How long will you keep saying that? When was the door ever closed, that it might have to open?” (El Sakkakini, 1982, 66).11 This sharp riposte clearly suggests that she was in a position of authority when al-Murrī repeated his remark. If incensed deliberately, Rābi‘a could be punishingly cruel. Thus when Ḥasan al-Baṣrī is said to have invited her to pray with him on the bare surface of a lake, Rābi‘a scolded him for being boastful. She then threw her prayer rug in the air and asked him to join her above the ground, which shamed him endlessly, since he was unable to comply (Sells, 1996, 160–161). Naturally, neither of the two saints could have achieved the physical exploits they are credited with (apart from the fact that they couldn’t even have met at a stage in their lives when they were both spiritually mature),12 but the story nevertheless conveys how strongly Rābi‘a felt the need to correct her fellows, including well-established ones like al-Baṣrī, when she found them lacking in humility. If nothing else, this “ḥikāya” tells us about how she was perceived.13 While the details of the sayings and deeds attributed to Rābi‘a may never be validated, nor falsified for that matter, what does come across is that Islam’s mystical tradition considers her a paragon in terms of her austerity, piety, and mystical teaching. Moreover, one senses the respect she was granted is not the expression of mere veneration for a person more advanced on the religious path. Rather, it is coupled with deference to an authoritative figure whose character and teaching were deemed exemplary. The saint from Basra is not known to have left behind a theoretical text in which she elaborated on her teaching. This does not preclude, however, that elements of her theory, both technical and conceptual, may be reflected in the “Rābi‘an” stories as well as in her poetry. However, before addressing techniques and concepts developed by Rābi‘a in support of her mystical teaching, one should examine whether she was given the status of a teacher by contemporaries or posterity, since this will allow for a more reliable assessment of her place in Islamic tradition. Further, if she was considered a teacher either in the sense of an authority conveying theoretical knowledge or a practitioner offering training, one needs to know the term(s) applied, since a number of teaching titles exist in Arabic with meanings ranging from ustādh (highest) to mu’addib (lowest rank).

11 The

English translation mistakenly transliterates the name as Salih al-Marri. In the version recorded by al-Sulamī, Rābi‘a answers: “The door is already open… But the question is: Who wishes to enter it?” (ās-Sulamī, 1999, 80). Al-‘Aṭṭār also uses the story in The Conference of the Birds (Attar, 1984, 171). 12 Rābi‘a was about 16 years old when Ḥasan al-Baṣrī died at the age of 86 in 110/728. 13 It may also reflect rivalry between ascetics and mystics from a Sufi point of view (see Upton, 1988, 8).

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10.1.4 Rābi‘a as “Honorary Man”: Teacher, Mentor, or Educator? Rābi‘a was depicted lovingly and with great reverence by some of Islam’s major theologians and fellow Sufis, chief among them Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111) and Farīd al-Dīn al-‘Aṭṭār (d. 618/1221). The latter included her among Islam’s most celebrated saints and mystics, albeit with a justificatory note saying, “If it is right to derive two-thirds of religion from ‘A’isha… then it is also right to derive benefit from one of his maidservants” (Sells, 1996, 155). ‘Ā’isha was the Prophet’s youngest wife and, indeed, appreciated for her extraordinary memory, which helped preserve so many of the Prophet’s sayings and deeds. The meaning is that if ‘Ā’isha’s recollections found entry into the Ḥadīth and thus became canonical, then one may accept religious teaching from later women as well. It is only sad that al-‘Aṭṭār felt the need to declare Rābi‘a an honorary man of sort by adding: “When a woman is a man on the path of lord Most High, she cannot be called a woman” (Sells, 1996, 155).14 Despite his great admiration for female saints like Rābi‘a, al-Ghazzālī too thought it necessary to point out that “a man is contemptible if he comes short of a woman, in respect of her religion, and (her relation) to this world” (Smith, 1994, 167), implying that men are ordinarily superior to women in terms of piety and religious accomplishments. Nevertheless, he viewed Rābi‘a among the leading authorities of Sufism, quoted her poems, and even commented extensively on some of her verses, elevating them thereby to foundational texts essential to the teaching of mystical love in Islam. Al-Sulamī’s collection of the lives of female Sufi saints also suggests honorary promotion to male rank when, for example, using the masculine title ustādh in reference to female Sufis such as Fāṭima of Nishapur and Ḥukayma of Damascus. Rkia E. Cornell comments: “Just as the term rijāl (men) might be used in hadith studies to denote authoritative transmitters of tradition, regardless of whether they were male or female. So the term ustādh might be used to denote authoritative teachers of Sufism” (Cornell, in ās-Sulamī, 1999, 59).15

14 In

fairness, al-‘Aṭṭār also reports the following story: “It is related that a group came to Rabi‘a to put her to the test. They said, ‘All the virtues have been dispersed upon men. The crown of nobility has been placed upon the heads of men, and the belt of magnanimity has been tied around their waists. Prophecy has never descended upon any woman. What can you boast of?’ Rabi‘a said, ‘Everything you said is true. But egoism, egotism, self-worship, and (79:24) ‘I am your highest lord’ have not welled up in any woman. And no woman has ever been a pederast” (Sells, 1996, 166). 15 However, ās-Sulamī (1999) does coin terms for female Sufis by, for instance, calling them endearingly ‘niswa’ and ‘niswān’ (the regular plural for women is ‘nisā’’), creating thereby parallel terms to the masculine ‘fitya’ and ‘fityān’ to suggest that women, too, embody the ideal of spiritual chivalry (futuwwa); see 66–68. Also, he considers ‘ta‘abbud’ (= servitude) a form of spiritual submission in which women excel (54). Both the feminine chivalric term and the ideal of servitude are expressed in the title of his work: Dhikr al-Niswa al-Muta‘abbidāt al-Ṣūfiyyāt, meaning literally: The Remembrance of Submitting and Sufi Women.

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However, in the entry reserved to Rābi‘a, al-Sulamī quotes a contemporary of the saint of Basra who said, “Sufyān ath-Thawrī took me by the hand and said about Rābi‘a: ‘Take me to the mentor. For when I am apart from her, I can find no solace’” (ās-Sulamī, 1999, 76; my emphasis). The English translation ‘mentor’ renders the term mu’addiba (feminine form for mu’addib) in the original Arabic. It makes one wonder how to interpret the feminine form. Does it mean that al-Thawrī did not deem it necessary to declare Rābi‘a an honorary man (because he found it entirely unproblematic that women may be authoritative), or did he use the feminine ending because the mu’addib ranks low in the teaching hierarchy of the time (and there would therefore be no outrage in referring to a woman as mu’addiba)? But what exactly is a mu’addib? Unlike for mu‘allim, mudarris, ustādh, and ‘ālim, the title does not imply an institutional affiliation or the issuing of a license (ijāza). Also, it is not the title given to Sufis in later tradition for whom the Arabic term murshid or Persian pīr (spiritual guide) was reserved.16 And it is distinct from murabbī, the moral exemplar, especially as embodied by the Prophet. The basic meaning of mu’addib is educator or teacher of character. Cornell points out that he was a mu’addib who “specialized in personal training, and thus transmitted a form of knowledge that was practical in nature” (Cornell, in ās-Sulamī, 1999, 59),17 as opposed to the ustādh who was in charge of theoretical formation. One should also mention that the term is related to the notion of adab, which has connotations of culture, self-cultivation, and etiquette. A possibly more tangible meaning may be extracted from an explanation provided in Islamic dream interpretation. A number of Muslim oneirocritics explain the meaning of dreaming a carpenter by stating that he stands for a mu’addib. For instance, famous dream interpreter Naṣr ibn Ya‘qūb al-Dīnawarī (fl. 397/1006) elaborates: A carpenter is a man who corrects (mu’addib) others, for a carpenter sets straight the wood and straightens it out and carves it; also, the man who corrects will vanquish (yaqhar) men in whose religion there is corruption (fasād), for he educates them and corrects (yu’addib) them and teaches them what is right and proper, even as the tutor (mu’addib) of young people. (Lamoreaux, 2002, 101–102).18

Al-Dīnawarī’s description fits the image one has of Rābi‘a, who, indeed, relentlessly corrected the flaws in her interlocutors’ answers and dispositions. In this

16 As

Sells points out, it is not clear whether the female ‘pīr-zāne’ used by al-‘Aṭṭār is to be read as a teaching title, especially since the latter combines it with the epithet ‘weak’ (Sells, 1996, 152). 17  A few pages later Cornell cites an intriguing passage quoted by al-Hujwīrī (465/1073 or 469/1077), according to which: “All of Sufism consists of appropriate actions (ādāb): for every time there is an appropriate action; for every station there is an appropriate action; and for every state there is an appropriate action” (ās-Sulamī, 1999, 67). This would suggest that what makes one a mu’addib is the ability to teach the right action (adab) for the right stage in life, the right mystical development, and the right mystical state. 18 The image of the crooked wood used to describe the student reminds one of a similar metaphor in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 1109 b 5.

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respect, she was then the mu’addiba in the sense of a tutor molding her pupils’ characters. While the meaning of the title mu’addib could be clarified, the question about the feminine ending used in Sufyān al-Thawrī’s statement remains. In order to attempt an answer, one needs to examine more exchanges between Rābi‘a and her interlocutors. When asked about the nature of generosity in the presence of other visitors, the same al-Thawrī gave the most advanced opinion: “For the people of the world, it is generosity with their money; but among the people of the coming world, it is generosity with themselves.” Rābi‘a, however, remained unimpressed and said: “You menfolk are all wrong!” Al-Thawrī then asked back: “What is generosity among womenfolk?” to which our protagonist replied: “It is worshipping him out of love for him: not in expectation of a recompense or reward” (El Sakkakini, 1982, 65–66). What stands out in this double riposte is Rābi‘a’s distinction between male and female piety and, moreover, that she deemed the latter superior. A similar sentiment is expressed in a retort she gave to a group of unnamed men who had claimed, “All the virtues have been dispersed upon men,”19 i.e., no merits were left for women. It may therefore well be that al-Thawrī called Rābi‘a his mu’addiba in recognition of the fact that she was self-aware of her uniquely female spirituality. Indeed, as the analysis of the verses referring to her name will show, the one and only trait Rābi‘a never considered shedding off (despite her genuine desire for self-effacement) was her female identity. Usually, the scholarly literature dedicated to Rābi‘a’s teaching focuses on her mystical doctrine. No one seems to wonder if she may have had a pedagogy, which is quite understandable since no one assumed that she may have actively been teaching. The following sheds light on two “Rābi‘an” stories out of which one can distil two highly effective means: (a) teaching through parables, and (b) teaching through parables in which a multi-sensory approach is integrated.

10.2 Teaching Methods: Moral Parables and Multisensory Pedagogy Although Rābi‘a could be very harsh on her fellow Sufis, when she suspected them of laxness or vanity, she is not known to have mandated pious behavior. Instead, her preferred teaching method consisted in parables she invented to model good behavior. Here is her most famous parable in the translation of Margaret Smith: One day a number of saints saw that Rābi‘a had taken fire in one hand and water in the other and was running with speed. “O lady of the next world, where are you going and what is the measure of this?” “I am going to light fire in Paradise and to pour water on to

19 There

is another story conveying the rivalry between male and female Sufis. Al-‘Aṭṭār thus writes that Ibrahīm ibn Adham had spent 14 years to reach Mecca and that he “roared with jealousy” when he found out the Ka‘ba had left her customary place to greet Rābi‘a (Sells, 1996, 158).

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Hell so that both veils may completely disappear… What if the hope of Paradise and the fear of hell did not exist? Not one would worship his Lord or obey Him.” (Smith, 1994, 123)20

In this parable Rābi‘a is concerned with the true motivation for people’s obedience towards God and, as a result, the value of their ethical actions. In response to al-Thawrī who asked her about the authenticity of her faith, she articulates: I have not served God from fear of Hell, for I should be like a wretched hireling, if I did it from fear; nor from love [ḥubban] of Paradise, for I should be a bad servant if I served for the sake of what was given, but I have served Him only for the Love [ḥubban] of Him and desire [shawqan] for Him. (Smith, 1994, 125)

Rābi‘a is fairly clear: there should be only one incentive for one’s good acts: not hope for reward, not fear of punishment, but love of God, which she, as the earlier quoted reply to her faithful pupil al-Thawrī demonstrated, took to be the characteristic mark of female spirituality. According to twentieth-century Syrian writer Widad El Sakkakini, the parable reflects the days in which Rābi‘a herself had acted out of fear and hope. She thus comments: “These two eternal elements, fire and water, haunted her—in a sense that was beyond magic or alchemy” (El Sakkakini, 1982, 60). How extraordinary Rābi‘a’s stance against the focus on paradise and hell as motivators for one’s actions was, may be gleaned from the words of contemporary Tunisian scholar Kchouk who notes: “The contempt for paradise and hell’s fires preached by Rābi‘a is a purely subjective attitude on her part, bordering on ‘bid‘a,’ i.e., ‘condemnable innovation’ in Islam, since the Qur’ānic text itself never ceases to incite all beings to fear Gehenna and do all things in hope of acceding to paradise… (Kchouk, 2013, 34; my translation) Rābi‘a’s parable coupled with the “exhibits” of fire and water has exerted a strong pull on readers’ imagination ever since it was recorded. It even found a continuation in the Christian tradition. Thus over 400 years after Rābi‘a’s passing the parable made an appearance in the chronicle of the Seventh Crusade led by French King Louis IX (1214–1270), which presents us with a testimony to the Saint’s undying fame even beyond the boundaries of her own culture. Jean de Joinville, Louis IX’s biographer, writes of an (alleged) encounter between a Dominican friar called Brother Yves and “an old woman”: On the way from their dwelling to the Sultan’s palace, Brother Yves saw an old woman crossing the street, who carried in her right hand a pannikin full of fire, and in the left a flask of water. “What are you going to do with this?” Brother Yves asked her. She answered: That, with the fire she was going to burn up Heaven; and with the water she was going to quench Hell, that there might be no such thing any more. And he asked her: “Why do you want to do that?” “Because I want no one ever to do right for the sake of Heaven, nor for fear of Hell, but simply to win the love of God…” (Joinville, 1906, 229; my emphasis)21

20 For

the original Arabic see Badawī (1962), 90. the original French text the exhibits are called “une escuellée pleinne de feu” and “une phiole pleinne d’yaue” (Joinville, 1874, 242–243, §445). 21 In

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Clearly, the encounter was fictitious, since Rābi‘a had long been dead by the time Louis IX launched his crusade, which is why Joinville introduces the Dominican friar in order to create a credible source for the parable he collected during his stay in Syria. Centuries later, the parable reappeared in Jean-Pierre Camus’s La Caritee, ou Le pourtraict de la vraye Charite (1641), where it became the inspiration for the work’s main theme: selfless and disinterested love. As in Joinville’s chronicle, a nameless woman (unless one would like to accept the allegorized ‘La Caritee’ as a name) is described carrying fire in one hand and water in the other. The containers, however, are different: Camus opts for a torch rather than a pannikin and a jug instead of a flask.22 Symptomatically, in the Christian source Rābi‘a not only has no name but also no religious affiliation. Proposing a Muslim as a model of piety might have jeopardized the scope of their didactic texts (since they were so obviously written for a Christian audience). Instead, Rābi‘a is described as a personage with a timeless message comparable to an allegorical biblical figure. However, Camus’s portrait does emphasize features that are characteristic of his own culture by stating: “…a Lady of an advanced age appeared, dressed modestly but respectably, whose solemn pace and venerable poise testified that she had some important and serious purpose. She placed herself in the middle of the path and abruptly stopped Brother Yves…”23 (my translation). Rābi‘a’s dignified walk in Camus’s description stands in stark contrast with her rushed pace in Islamic sources. It is clearly reflecting French Baroque culture, in which a composed appearance underlines one’s status. Also, she is said to have stopped Brother Yves, while in the Islamic sources it is fellow saints who inquire about her eccentric behavior. In other words, Rābi‘a is a celebrity in her own cultural context but just an unnamed “Lady of an advanced age,” however venerable, in the Christian source. Also, an illustration is added in Camus’s printed work showing a much younger woman holding up a torch in her right hand and pouring water from a jug in her left hand, made to look like an allegorical figure. In the upper right corner of the illustration the Hebrew letters of the Ineffable Name are inserted within a luminous circle. It is hard to imagine a more alienating representation of historic Rābi‘a, the eighth-century Sufi woman from Basra. However, the original message remained preserved in the Christian texts, in that both Joinville and Camus emphasized the importance of not being distracted by the desire for reward or the fear of punishment in one’s religious life. The mystical theme of ineffability is alluded to in the Hebrew letters, and the extravagant use of paraphernalia also carried over to the Christian sources. Camus takes these as

22 “Elle

portoit en une de ses mains un flambeau allumé, d’autres disent un reschaut, ou un vaisseau d’une braize ardante, & en l’autre une cruche pleine d’eau, …” (Camus, 1641, 82). 23 “…parut une Dame avancee en âge, modestement, mais honnestement vestüe, dont le pas grave, & le maintien venerable, tesmoignoit qu’elle avoit quelque dessein d’importance & serieux. Elle se mit au milieu du chemin, & arresta tout court le Frere Yves, …” (Camus, 1641, 78).

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belonging to the Lady’s “equipage” (Camus, 1641, 81), a French term combining the whole of one’s outward appearance, not only clothes but also accessories. Educating by combining oral teaching with “exhibits” may be seen in another, similarly poignant parable, in which Rābi‘a conveys to fellow Sufi Ḥasan al-Baṣrī the essence of her ascetic ideal by sending him three things: a piece of wax, a needle, and a hair. “Like the wax,” she said, “give light to the world as you yourself burn. Like the needle, be naked and work continually. When you have achieved these two things, be like the hair, so your work will not be in vain.” (Sells, 1996, 161; my emphasis). At the heart of her teaching is an understanding that the intimate of God ought not to fear being consumed—like wax by a burning flame. A juxtaposition with an explanation al-Ghazzālī provides at the end of his book on Love, Longing, Intimacy, and Contentment sheds light upon the origin of the mystic’s inner burning: “Longing [shawq], it has been said, is the fire which God ignites in the hearts of His saints so that they may burn up stray thoughts, willful deeds, hindrances and needs, by that fire in their hearts” (al-Ghazālī, 2011, 193).24 The longing alluded to here is the yearning for divine love that consumes the mystic. Whereas the burning longing is induced by God, the mystic engages with the needle, i.e., with incessant physical work, to complete inner self-depletion. What about the hair? A variant quotation says: “Upon acquisition of these virtues, then become a hair (do not see yourself) so that your work will not be wasted” (Nurbakhsh, 1990, 33–34; my emphasis), indicating that the lover should strive to become as little visible to himself or herself as a hair. As with the fire and water parable, Rābi‘a is not content with using images solely conveyed through language. She also embodies them by becoming a living parable as in her carrying fire and water, which prompted Camus to speak of her as a “Hierogliphe” (Camus, 1641, 82)—an image requiring skillful decoding. Moreover, she proves to be a pedagogic innovator by including accessories as vehicles of her teaching. Images in one’s mind may be powerful, but visible, or, even better, palpable items such as a lump of wax, a needle, and a hair, carry greater persuasive potential. We may become oblivious to what we hear but it is unlikely that we’ll forget what we also saw and touched. Rābi‘a is implicitly operating with the notion of the “retention” (as opposed to the memorization) of a lesson.25 But there is more to the inclusion of exhibits in Rābi‘a’s innovative teaching: she, who had to perform hard physical work on a daily basis, envisioned with great ease that learning could only be further enhanced through the use of

24 The

insertion of the original Arabic ‘shawq’ is mine. Gattagno pointed out the difference between the two terms by emphasizing how “costly” memorizing is, since it requires a deliberate mental effort. Retention, however, is perception-based and easy to recall as needed (Gattagno, 1976, especially 50, 58, and 116). Gattagno who also taught mathematics became famous for his successful teaching in silence and use of colored rods. He introduced the “ogden” as a unit to measure the effort used to learn. Retention is effortless and—unlike memorization—permanent. 25 Caleb

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one’s hands. Not only are all senses to be involved in one’s self-emptying, but the body itself is to be invested in the process through physical activity; as in ritual prayer, it is to participate in the refinement of the soul.

10.3 Rhetoric, Philosophy of Language, Poetics and Ineffable Love Below, the focus is on elements of Rābi‘a’s theoretical teaching as found woven into her poetry. There too one discovers her highly ingenious and innovative streak operating all the way down to the coining of technical terms. In what follows, the analysis involves 26 hemistichs by Rābi‘a, carefully selected from a body of poems comprising about 100 (possibly even 153) verses (Kchouk, 2012, 71), and a sample of her rhythmic and rhymed prose. No effort will be made to render these lines in as poetical form as possible, since it would create an obstacle to an inquiry that needs to remain close to the original Arabic, both because of Rābi‘a’s technical terms and the linguistic structures that she sought to support her teaching.

10.3.1 Selection Criteria To avoid unnecessary disputes about the authenticity of the lines chosen, selection criteria had to be established. For instance, autobiographical references such as in the poem in which Rābi‘a alludes to her name or identifies herself with single letters from the Arabic alphabet are taken to be original. A further criterion is the reliability of the transmitting source as validated by later Sufis who also quoted or elaborated on the verses. Thus the poem about the two loves was originally recorded by Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī (d. 386/996) but then also commented upon by al-Ghazzālī in his Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn (The Revival of Religious Sciences) and many more authorities. Finally, it was essential that the teaching expressed in the selected poetic verses be compatible in terminology and content with other sayings attributed to the saint of Basra. For example, it would be problematic to accept Rābi‘a’s authorship for a poem on “‘ishq” without a tradition that has long linked this term for passionate love with her name. She has thus been and still is being called “Imāmat al-‘Āshiqīn” (the leader of the lovers; Kchouk, 2012, 96) and “Shahīdat al-‘Ishq al-Ilāhī” (the martyr of divine love), as in the title of Badawī’s book that references the saying: “Who loves (‘ashiqa), is restrained and conceals his love, then dies, is a martyr.”26

26 About

this (weak) ḥadīth see Lumbard (2007), 347.

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10.3.2 Names and Letters Technically speaking, Rābi‘a is not a name. It is but an ordinal number meaning ‘the fourth.’27 Nor are al-‘Adawiyya and al-Qaysiyya actual names, since they only identify our protagonist as a client in the early Islamic Mawālī–system signaling that her family had become client to an Arab tribe upon converting to Islam. The tribe and clan affiliations are identity building but they do not reflect the protagonist’s genealogy as they would for an ethnic Arab.28 Al-Baṣriyya, at least, connects Rābi‘a to the city of Basra in which she spent her long life; she lived to the age of 89. The only personal trait in what has become her name is the feminine ending (the ‘a-vocalization followed by a silent ‘t’ in the original Arabic spelling): Rābi‘a al-‘Adawiyya alQaysiyya al-Baṣriyya. It seems befitting that she who desired no earthly possessions was accorded no personal name, just a number to record her place as the last-born among four siblings. Indeed, nothing suggests that Rābi‘a in any way suffered from the lack of an actual birth name. Quite to the contrary, in one of her poems, consisting all together of six verses, she even makes a playful reference to it in the first line: Ka’sī wa khamrī wa al-nadīmu: thalāthatun Wa anā al-mashūqatu fī al-maḥabbati: rābi‘a.29 My cup, my wine, my companion are three And I, the one longing for love, am the fourth. (My translation)

The ‘I’ is reduced to mere longing (shawq),30 waiting to be filled with love (maḥabba); unlike the cup it is empty. Rābi‘a emphasizes her no-name by carefully selecting words to rhyme with it in the rest of the poem. Not only does she efface herself in real life by creating an inner void but she also dissolves what little semantic content her no-name holds—merely the numeric value—by reducing it further to its metric value: one long syllable followed by two short (– - -), as in rā (long), bi (short), ‘a (short). The (partial) meter upon which the no-name rests thus acts itself as a semantic void that only receives meaning from the terms that rhyme with the poet’s name. Rābi‘a becomes, then, in the following verses “the one who

27 More

recently, the palm of the right hand with four raised fingers, indicating the number four, has become the symbol of Egyptian protesters who used to assemble on the square called after the adjacent mosque dedicated to Rābi‘a. 28 Regarding Rābi‘a’s full name, I follow al-Sulamī: “Rābi‘a was from Basra and was a client (mawlāt) of the clan Āl ‘Atīq” (ās-Sulamī, 1999, 74), which gives the most plausible background for her name. As Cornell clarifies in a footnote on the above quoted page, Āl ‘Atīq was a sub-clan of ‘Adī ibn Qays, which is reflected in al-‘Adawiyya and al-Qaysiyya. 29 Badawī (1962), 173 ff. 30 Al-mashūqatu and shawq are derived from the same triliteral (or triconsonantal) Arabic root ‘sh-w-q.’ Henceforth, al-mashūqatu will be referred to as “the one afflicted with shawq.”

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follows” ([muta]tābi‘a), is “only with” ([il]lā ma‘a), is “listening” (sāmi‘a), is “tearful” (dāmi‘a), and, finally, not “at rest” ([lā…]hāji‘a). One cannot help notice the emotional crescendo in the order chosen for the monorhymes of the poem; the rhymes tell their own story.

10.3.3 Language and Poetics Rābi‘a’s technical mastery of poetry is clearly coupled with a reflection upon Arabic linguistic structures, which she exploits to both express and ground her mystical doctrine of love consisting in the self-annihilation of the lover—except for her female gender, which is grammatically expressed at the end of every verse. Considering her skillful play with letters, one wonders if the preservation of the ‘a’ throughout the poem (underlined above in the sequence of rhyming terms for easier identification) is a mere coincidence. In the Arabic syllabic alphabet, letters have names. The ‘a’ is thus called ‘ayn (= eye) which couldn’t have escaped Rābi‘a’s attention. She may well have intended to connect the last pronounced letter of her no-name with the first letter of the word for passionate love—‘ishq— which, as the following will show, is a key-term in her taxonomy of love. The movement that begins with the first sound in ‘ishq would then find its end in the last sound of Rābi‘a—eventually joining two eyes. That Rābi‘a did make explicit use of single letters from the Arabic alphabet to project meaning may be gleaned from a poem that Kchouk attributes to an earlier phase in the poet’s life when she was presumably still a slave-girl lamenting the rejection of her love by a fellow poet-musician: Yuhīnūnanī ka al-qāfī ḥīna tanazzalat wa kuntu ka al-bā’i al-muraffa‘i fī al-ḥafri.31 They lower me like the qāf [q] when it descends and I was like the furrowing elevated bā’ [b]. (My translation)

31 Kchouk

(2012), 77. ‘Ḥafr’ in “fī al-ḥafri” could be a noun, like the etymologically related ḥufra (= hole), and possibly mean well, which is one of the meanings gleaned from E. W. Lane’s Arabic-English Lexicon (1863). But, as my colleague Adly Mirza reminded me, it could also be a gerund and then refer to the action of the verb ḥa-fa-ra (to dig, hollow out, burrow, or furrow). Since Rābi‘a is exploiting the shape of the letters to express her state of mind, she may well be alluding to the outline of bā’ (‫ )ب‬in the isolated position that looks, indeed, furrowing. Considering that bā’ is also the middle consonant in Rābi‘a’s name, it is tempting to relate her “letter-image” with a saying attributed to ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Islam’s fourth Caliph, stating that the opening chapter of the Qur’ān is the heart of Islamic scripture, the opening verse the heart of that chapter, the opening word ‘Bismallāh’ the heart of that verse, the opening letter bā’ the heart of that word, the (subscript) dot the heart of that letter, and, finally, ‘Alī the dot itself (Knight, 2016, 67). This is not to suggest a Shī'a affiliation but that more authors have been inspired by the shape of the Arabic bā’ and projected onto it steadfastness, centeredness, and/or holiness.

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In the above verse Rābi‘a identifies her sorrow with the letter qāf (‫)ق‬, the ending curvature of which takes it below the line (when written in the isolated or the final positions) and then contrasts it with the letter bā’ (‫)ب‬, which always remains on the line (whether written in the isolated, initial, medial, or final positions) and therefore offers a fit image for steadfastness. What Rābi‘a employs in this verse is merely the shape of two letters to express opposite states of mind. If the verse is, indeed, representative of an early stage of her poetical production, a case can be made below for there being a more mature phase in which Rābi‘a became even more creative in her use of single letters as semantic carriers. Below, I will show how she ended up separating the three letters of a key-term in her doctrine of love to turn them into the initial letters of three other words to elicit new meaning— developing in the process a semantically-based etymology.

10.4 Taxonomy of Love 10.4.1 Reinterpretation of Hawā Arabic language has a great number of terms relating to love, chief among them ḥubb/maḥabba, wudd/widād (pure, firm love, God’s love), and ‘ishq (ardent, passionate, excessive love). In addition, many words are available to express various types of desire such as hawā (sudden inclination), shawq (longing, yearning), and shahwa (lasciviousness). For all listed words one needs to include terms of the same root, for instance, ‘ishq-derivatives ‘āshiq (male)/‘āshiqa (female) for the lover and ma‘shūq (male)/ma‘shūqa (female) for the beloved. In her poetry, Rābi‘a often resorts to ḥubb and maḥabba, two terms which share the same root ‘ḥ-b-b’ and are both part of the Qur’ānic vocabulary.32 Sometimes, the saint of Basra combines a “love”-term with a “desire”-term. For instance, in the verses in which she alludes to her name, she invokes maḥabba and calls herself mashūqa, “the one afflicted with shawq.” She also speaks of ḥubb and shawq in her reply to al-Thawrī, when elaborating on the foundation of her faith. Another two terms that she couples are ‘ḥubb’ and ‘hawā.’ Thus in a poem transmitted by Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī and further elaborated upon by al-Ghazzālī in his Iḥyā’, Rābi‘a introduces hawā in order to differentiate between two types of ḥubb:

32 See

http://corpus.quran.com/qurandictionary.jsp?q=Hbb. This online Qur’ānic concordance also connects to Lane’s Arabic-English Lexicon. Ibn al- ‘Arabī correlates ḥubb with ḥabba (= grain or seed), making love both the creator and the creation of the seed; see Gloton (2000), 42. A similar rapprochement between love and seed is already alluded to by Aḥmad al-Ghazzālī when he speaks of the diacritical dot in the letter ‘bā” of “yuḥibbuhum” (‘He loves them’) “that was cast on hum (them) till yuḥibbūnahu (they love Him) grew out” (Ghazzālī, 1986, 68). See also footnote 21.

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1. Uḥibbuka ḥubbayni ḥubba al-hawā Wa ḥubban li annaka ahlun lidhākā

1. I love You with two loves, a love that is desire And a love because You are worthy of it

2. Fa-ammā al-ladhī huwa ḥubbu al-hawā Fa-shughlī bi-dhikrika ‘amman siwākā

2. As for the love that is desire I occupied myself in remembrance of no other than You

3. Wa ammā al-ladhī anta ahlun lahu  Fa-kashfuka lī al-ḥujba ḥattā arākā

3. And as for the love because You are worthy of it It is [due] to Your uncovering of the veil to me so that I see You

4. Fa-lā al-ḥamdu fī dhā wa lā dhāka lī Wa lakin laka al-ḥamdu fī dhā wa dhākā33

4. No praise is due to me for neither this nor that [love] But the praise for this and that [love] is due to You. (My translation)

Terms based on the root ‘h-w-y’ appear 38 times in the Qur’ān and connote in almost all occurrences a notion of vain or misguided desire.34 Al-Ghazzālī translator Eric Ormsby renders ḥubb al-hawā as “love of passion,” which is a viable English equivalent. But one should be careful not to confuse it with the passion of ‘ishq, the term Sufis use to express the mystic’s overflowing love for the Creator. Remarkably, Rābi‘a’s notion of hawā is not negatively colored as in Qur’ānic usage. Ḥubb al-hawā may be the lesser love but it is nevertheless credited to God, which is why it is preferable to render it in a more neutral fashion as ‘love that is desire.’ Here is how al-Ghazzālī responds to Rābi‘a’s distinction between the two notions of love: Perhaps by “love of passion” she means love of God because of His goodness to her, as well as for His bestowal upon her of the bounties of this life; while by the “love because he merits it”, she means love for His beauty and majesty which have been revealed to her. This is the superior, and the mightier, of the two loves. (al-Ghazālī, 2011, 52)

Al-Ghazzālī’s explanation is introduced by the adverb “Perhaps” suggesting a cautious hermeneutic approach. A scrutiny of the Iḥyā’ page in which this explanation appears, however, shows that he bracketed the poem and his interpretation thereof with two quotations each emphasizing the value of “occupying oneself” with God, creating thereby a larger context to underline the relevance of Rābi‘a’s 33 Al-Ghazzālī

(1968), 386. For variants, see Badawī (1962), 64, 73, 110, 119, 123, and 162. Kchouk (2012) only mentions vv. 1 and 4 (89). For Ormsby’s English translation see al-Ghazālī (2011), 52. According to Geert Jan van Gelder this poem was originally about profane love but was then “recycled” either by Rābi‘a or some other mystic (Van Gelder, 1993, 66–76, at 45). While van Gelder may be right about the poem having been reused, what he fails to recognize is that the two presumably older versions he invokes do not mention any Sufi terms: neither hawā nor shughl nor dhikr nor kashf nor ḥujb. The adaptation, assuming it is one, is rather dramatic. I am not aware of any literature discussing ‘shughl’ as a technical Sufi term. To mention but two classical works, neither Louis Massignon (1922) nor Anawati and Gardet (1961) list it. However, my analysis of al-Ghazzālī’s interpretation of Rābi‘a’s verses clearly indicates that it is one (see below). 34 See http://corpus.quran.com/qurandictionary.jsp?q=hwy.

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fourth hemistich in the above poem: “I occupied myself in remembrance of no other than You.” The first one is by Abū Suleymān al-Dārānī (d. ca. 215/830): “He who is occupied with himself [mashghūl bi-nafsihi] today will be occupied with himself tomorrow as well, whereas he who is occupied with his Lord [mashghūl bi-rabbihi] today will be occupied with his Lord tomorrow” (al-Ghazālī, 2011, 51).35 The other citation, a poem, possibly by Ḥallāj (d. 309/922), appears after al-Ghazzālī’s comments: My heart had scattered affections [ahwā’, plural of hawā] but I have fused my passions [ahwā’] into one since my eye has beheld You. He whom I used to envy now envies me and I have become master of men since I mastered myself. To others I abandon both world and belief for I am rapt in remembrance of You [shughlan bi-dhikrika], my only world and my belief (al-Ghazālī, 2011, 53).36

The terms common to Rābi‘a, al-Dārānī, and Ḥallāj are derivatives of sh-gh-l with the basic meaning of to occupy, work, or busy oneself. In addition, Ḥallāj (assuming he is the author) and Rābi‘a also share the word hawā, which they both connote favorably. If one were to highlight each technical term in a different color on the page in question from the Iḥyā’, a resplendent love tapestry would emerge, including shahwa, the Arabic term for lasciviousness, as the kind of appetite that true felicity wipes away. Without any doubt, the Persian philosopher wove into the fabric of his text additional interpretive threads by inserting common technical terms relied upon by the three mystics. This can be no coincidence: while appearing to be merely quoting, al-Ghazzālī is actually commenting, tacitly giving thereby a more secure foundation to his explicit interpretation immediately following Rābi‘a’s verses. The ‘love that is desire’ is sustained by the mystical practice of remembrance (dhikr). It is lesser because the Sufi is still aware of his/her longing, which makes it self-serving. Pure love is only possible once the Beloved Himself lifts the veil (of the Self) obstructing access to the divine, which Rābi‘a alludes to with the Sufi term of kashf (literally ‘uncovering’) in the sixth hemistich. While it may appear that the mystic loves “because” the Beloved merits it, i.e., “because” of some exceptional or unique trait pertaining to the Beloved, it is actually the Beloved who enables the lover to love unconditionally. Therefore, the Beloved is to be praised for the lover’s love.37

35 The

insertion of the Arabic terms is mine. They were gleaned from al-Ghazzālī (1968), 386. insertion of the Arabic terms is mine. They were gleaned from al-Ghazzālī (1968), 387. 37 This is an aspect neglected in the current debate about love conducted among analytic philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt, David Velleman, Niko Kolodny, and Simon Keller. (I am much indebted to my colleague George Tsai for pointing out this debate to me.) 36 The

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This lesson has been repeated time and again down the centuries, and the poem “I love You with two loves” has been an essential component in preserving it. Some of the greatest artist-singers of the Arab world, men and women, have interpreted the poem. The Egyptian grand diva Umm Kulthūm (d. 1975) lent her voice to the leading actress in the movie “Rābi‘a al-‘Adawiyya.” Moroccan Sufi singer Aïcha Redouane and contemporary Arab performers like Aḥmad Ḥawīlī from Lebanon and Rim Banna from Palestine gave their own musical interpretations of the song.38 Considering how much Sufism is under threat nowadays, these singers are making a powerful statement: Sufism is to remain in the fabric of Islamic culture.

10.4.2 The Spiraling Power of ‘Ishq: Creating a “Semantically-Based” Etymology Rābi‘a took a risk by putting a positive spin on an unfavorable Qur’ānic term for desire. This is also indicated by the existence of a variant poem in which hawā is replaced by the more conform and scriptural widād.39 With “‘ishq,” the next love-term to be examined, Rābi‘a went one step further by incorporating a nonQur’ānic term—one with erotic inklings—into her Sufi vocabulary. El Sakkakini assumes that the word was already familiar to the inner circle of Sufis in Basra but that it was our protagonist who first used it openly: “If we give due honour to all the contributors in this [Sufi] language, we find that Rābi‘a established publicly many of the first words in this dictionary. She was also the first to explain the Higher Love in Islamic Sufism” (El Sakkakini, 1982, 71). According to Binyamin Abrahamov the first Sufi to mention ‘ishq may have been ‘Abd al-Wāḥid al-Zayd whose name coincidentally appears in “Rābi‘an” stories and who was a fellow resident of Basra (Abrahamov, 2008, 332). Presumably, he derived it from a ḥadīth qudsī (a saying in which God is the speaker) transmitted by Ḥasan al-Baṣrī saying: “When I caused him to find his happiness and his joy in remembering Me, I passionately loved him and he passionately loved Me (‘ashiqanī wa ‘ashiqtuhu)” (Harvey, 1997, 183).40 Regardless whether Rābi‘a took the lead in divulging the term, how extraordinary her decision was to openly articulate ‘ishq (or one of

38 Here

are the URL links. Umm Kulthūm: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qFZ_HhedXME, Aïcha Redouane: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lplduylUulY, Aḥmad Ḥawīlī: https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=uPRdjNfYrNk, Rim Banna: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=3bFiWWEgIv0 39 Cf. Badawī (1962), 73, 123. Remarkably, none of the modern Arab artists associated with Rābi‘a’s poem about the two loves opted for that substitution. 40 Ormsby quotes Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Nūrī (d. 295/907) as a source for the controversial use of ‘ishq in respect to God (see al-Ghazālī, 2011, XVI).

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its derivatives) may be seen from the many fatāwā (plural of fatwa = legal pronouncement) that have been and are still being issued against its use in relation to God, claiming that it should only be applied to express profane love.41 At the least, Rābi‘a was part of the trailblazing avant-garde that paved the road for a long line of Sufis and philosophers after her, among them the Brethren of Purity (10th c.), Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī as well as his younger brother Aḥmad (520/1126), Ibn al-‘Arabī (d. 638/1240), and al-Rūmī (672/1273). Ibn al-‘Arabī dedicated an entire chapter of his Futūḥāṭ al-Makkiyya (The Meccan Revelations) to love focusing on ḥubb, wadd, ‘ishq, and hawā. About ‘ishq he wrote that it came from the same root as ‘ashaqa (convolvulus), a climbing vine with strong roots that wraps itself around other plants or objects, which he took as a justification to correlate the two terms to consolidate their meanings into one. The appeal of the correlation is obvious to a Sufi, since the vine rotates upward in a circular pattern and ends up annihilating its living host (Gloton, 2000, 42).42 By the same token, ‘ishq plants itself in the mystic’s heart and annihilates the Self by following an upward spiral trajectory. The elder al-Ghazzālī is known for his critique of both the Brethren of Purity and Ibn Sīnā, but he did give serious consideration to their respective views on ‘ishq (al-Ghazālī, 2011, XVII–XVIII). He himself avoided the term in reference to God, preferring maḥabba instead, as is indicated in the title of his Book on Love (Book XXXVI of his Iḥyā’), but did not dismiss the term when citing authors who do mention it. He did not think it important to fight over words if there was agreement over meanings (Albertini, 2014, 227–230). Aḥmad al-Ghazzālī, however, not only used the term ‘ishq but also commented on it in his Sawāniḥ, a work credited with being the first Sufi text to express a full metaphysics of love (Lumbard, 2007, 348). But let’s first cite the poetic lines in which Rābi‘a applies the expression for passionate love:

41 For

classical references against the use of ‘ishq see contemporary Fatwa No 267511 on the following site: http://www.islamweb.net/emainpage/index.php?page=showfatwa&Option=FatwaId&Id=267511 (retrieved August 12, 2016). Knowing the use of the term in profane love literature, one can understand conservative scholars who warn against it in a religious context. For instance, al-Jāḥiẓ who wrote about the ravaging effect of seductive slave-girls, states that ‘ishq is: “a malady which smites the spirit, and affects the body as well by contagion” (al-Jāḥiẓ, 1980, 28), and “we have seen and heard of many a one who has been utterly destroyed, and suffered long torment and wasting away, because of the malady of passion” (29). For more on the classical controversy, see Griffen (1972). 42 Abū al-Qāsim Junayd (297/910) related ‘ishq to ‘ashaq (mountain peak) in a similar effort to intensify the meaning of passionate love; see Lewisohn (2014), 160.

T. Albertini

210 Wā raḥmatan li al-‘āshiqīna! qulūbuhum Fī tayhi maydāni al-maḥabbati hā’ima

Mercy on the passionate lovers! Their hearts Are wandering in the desert spaces of love

Qāmat qiyāmatu ‘ishqihim fa nufūsuhum Abadan ‘alā qadami al-tadhalluli qā’ima.43

[Once] the resurrection of their passion rises, their selves Will ever stand in the position of subjection. (My translation)

The first hemistich speaks of doomed passionate lovers and the third describes passion (redundantly) as a rising resurrection, making one think indeed of an upward spiraling movement, as described by the later Ibn al-‘Arabī. A closer look at Rābi‘a’s wording shows that among the twenty words making up the two verses, five exhibit an initial qāf: qulūb (pl. of qalb, ‘heart’), qāmat (‘she rose’), qiyāma (‘resurrection’), qadam (‘position’), and qā’ima (‘standing’), with the second, third, and fifth terms being etymologically related to each other. This can be no coincidence: qulūb appears right after ‘āshiq (passionate lover) creating a “letter-bridge” between the two terms. The link from the qāf in the last letter of ‘ishq to the qāf in the first letter of qalb reveals a more profound dynamics between letters and words in Rābi‘a’s reflection on language, since it isn’t just the qāf that refers to other terms.44 For El Sakkakini, it took the Sufi Saint from Basra “to explain how these three Arabic letters (‘ayn, shīn, qāf) give meaning to the word: Its penetrating eye (‘ayn), its burning desire (shawq), and its big heart (qalb)” (El Sakkakini, 1982, 71).45 What El Sakkakini means is that if one unchains the three letters that make up ‘‘ishq,’ the letters are free to become the initials of new words (the ones added in parentheses), or, in reverse process, having been separated from those words, they come to form the word for the strongest possible love. Generally, when Arabic letters are detached, they revert, orthographically speaking, to the isolated position and are then called by their names. As they take leave from each other and then again greet each other in the process of writing, they move and change shape—they dance. ‘ishq

q-sh-‘ ‫ع ش ق‬

‫عشق‬

What Rābi‘a invented (or adapted to Sufi needs) is a “semantically-based etymology” inspired by the standard Arabic formation of words from their roots 43 I follow Kchouk who reads “‘alā qadami al-tadhalluli” (Kchouk, 2012, 95) against Badawi’s “‘alā qadami al-tadallulili” (Badawī, 1962, 173). ‘Nafs’ (self) is a negative term in Sufism, since the Self is to be overcome or, as this verse expresses it, “subjected.” 44 Rābi‘a’s fascination with letters was possibly inspired by the loose letters that precede some Qur’ānic chapters. Officially, letter mysticism appears later, especially in the works of the Andalusians Ibn Masarra (319/931) and Ibn al-‘Arabī. A similar play with letter shapes and names is indicated in the title of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Daylamī’s eleventh-century ‘Aṭf al-Alif al-Ma’lūf ‘alā al-Lām al-Ma‘ṭūf (The Inclination of the Intimate Alif to the Lām Towards Which It Inclines); see Lumbard (2007), 350. 45 The English translator puts the names of Arabic letters instead of the terms within brackets, which does not help the reader unfamiliar with Arabic language to understand the use of Rābi‘a’s device.

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called ishtiqāq. Her etymological technique, however, does not reduce words to triliteral bases but to single letters that are the initials of words, the meanings of which relate (or are made to relate) to the term under scrutiny. With her semantic ishtiqāq, Rābi‘a conveys a justification as to why ‘ishq is more powerful than, for instance, ḥubb. It is born of the desire uniting the knowledge of the heart and the seeing of the eye. One could say, it is desire heightened by knowing and seeing. Heart

desire

eye

qalb

shawq

‘ayn

‘ishq knows

unites

sees

It is unlikely that one will ever be able to ascertain whether this semantically-based etymology was entirely Rābi‘a’s own discovery. It may be a further development of a technique that was generally employed in the Sufi circles of Basra, or it may have been invented by earlier poets. Whichever way, as with the public use of ‘ishq, the saint of Basra was, if nothing else, part of the avant-garde of her age. As one would expect, neither Sufis nor Arab poets were eager to commit the details of their techniques (conceptual, interpretive, or otherwise) to writing. The importance of oral transmission may be inferred from the following passage in Aḥmad al-Ghazzālī’s Sawāniḥ in which he makes an unmistakable reference to semantic ishtiqāq: The secrets of love are hidden in the letters of the word ‘ishq (love). ‘Aīn and shīn are love (‘ishq) and qāf symbolizes the heart (qalb)… Love begins with the eye and seeing. This is intimated by the letter ‘ain at the beginning of the word ‘ishq. Then the lover begins to drink the wine (sharāb) saturated with longing (shawq). This is intimated by (the letter) shīn. Then he dies to his self and is born through her; (the letter) qāf suggests (his) subsistence (qiyām) through her. Aside from this, in (different) combinations of these letters (i.e. ‘aīn, shīn, and qāf) there are many secrets, but this much is enough for awakening. The opening of a door (to a new field of ideas [ma‘ānī = meanings]) is sufficient for a man of intelligence. (Ghazzālī, 1986, 62)46

The younger al-Ghazzālī does reveal some of the secrets but also clarifies that more is entailed in the conjoining and disjoining of the letters forming ‘ishq. Also, his phrasing suggests that he is not the inventor of semantically-based etymology and other techniques designed to add meaning to terms but that he is summarizing pre-existing knowledge. As a matter of fact, it can be easily shown how these devices are present in Rābi‘a’s poetry. For instance, in the verses that relate to her no-name, she speaks of the “cup,” the “wine” and the “companion,” and of herself as “the one afflicted with shawq.” The quoted passage from the Sawāniḥ indicates that a semantic substitution need take place in order to fully elucidate 46 The

insertion of the original term within brackets is mine. It was gleaned from the Persian on-line edition: http://www.sufism.ir/books/download/farsi/ayat-hosn-v-eshgh-vo1-2.pdf.

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said verses. Thus while the saint of Basra chooses the word ‘khamr’ for wine, al-Ghazzālī lists sharāb to clarify the analogy between the inebriating beverage and intoxicating shawq—by playing on the common initial letter of the two words. Was it a requirement of the meter that determined Rābi‘a’s preference for khamr over sharāb? Or, did she opt for a less obvious rapprochement expecting more refined recipients of the poem to discover it on their own? The fact of the matter is that she identified with the cup waiting to be filled, not with wine but with the intoxicating desire conducive to the companion (God). But it can be shown that al-Ghazzālī’s explanations are even more closely related to her poetry. He thus indicates that the qāf in ‘ishq may also stand for qiyām (= subsistence) thereby clearly showing that he is open for a substitution on the basis of initial letter sharing. Does that mean that all terms with an initial qāf in Rābi‘a’s poem about the doomed lovers may be inserted in exchange for qalb/qulūb: qāmat (‘she rose’), qiyāma (‘resurrection’), qadam (position), and qā’ima (‘standing’)? Perhaps all, perhaps only the ones derived from the same root. Another comparison between her poem and the comments from the Sawāniḥ reveals more overlap. The saint of Basra writes about the resurrection of the lovers’ passion, while al-Ghazzālī mentions the death and rebirth of the self. He then speaks of “qiyām” (as if echoing Rābi‘a’s “qiyāma”), which Pourjavady renders as ‘subsistence,’ although it is also one of the Persian terms for ‘resurrection.’47 Even if “qiyām” and “qiyāma” are not taken as synonyms, they still share the same Arabic root q-w-m, which makes their respective meanings mutually reinforce each other (as with Ibn al- ‘Arabī‘s semantic consolidation of ‘ishq and ‘ashaqa). Al-Ghazzālī may not necessarily have thought of Rābi‘a’s verses when he wrote his comments pertaining to the letters that make up ‘ishq, but he was definitely referring to an already established mystical tradition invested in consolidating meanings, a tradition to which the saint of Basra not only belonged but had also contributed to create. In addition to confirming the practice of semantically-based etymology, the juxtaposition of texts by Rābi‘a and the younger al-Ghazzālī shows that other “meaning-enriching” devices consist in various term substitutions: (a) on a synonymous basis, (b) on the basis of initial letter-sharing, and (c) on the basis of a shared etymological root. The difference between the two Sufis is that while the author of the Sawāniḥ commented on these techniques, Rābi‘a made actual use of them.

10.5 Feminism The Rābi‘an stories that have come down to us portray the saint of Basra consistently as a strong and self-confident character. At times, she frankly emerges as a defying woman. Despite the recognition of her profound piety, one can sense 47 In

Arabic, ‘qiyām’ is a male noun, while ‘qiyāma’ is female. Since Persian language is genderless, ‘qiyām’ may cover both meanings.

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that the patriarchal society in which she lived, considered her an oddity. It is hard to find a story, in which she is not being challenged or at least teased, whether she is addressed by authoritative fellow Sufis, casual visitors, or disciples. We do not know of contemporary women being irritated or to the contrary inspired by her teaching and unconventional way of life. If there were any, history did not record their reactions. So, in the stories, her challengers were all men, and Rābi ‘a never tired of rebutting their verbal attacks, however mildly they were expressed. Obviously, that in and of itself does not make her a feminist.

10.5.1 Feminists and Feminisms Before attempting an answer, one would first need to acquire an understanding of who a feminist is. Considering that a variety of “feminisms” populate twentieth and twenty-first century debates, it is easy to recognize that the question may be further complicated if the author examined lived in a period that preceded the rise of historic feminism and possibly more so if she (or he) lived in a non-Western tradition. In what follows, different possible answers shall be examined. Thus one could propose that only women may be feminists. Although it seems to be intuitively the right answer, one would have to wonder why any male author should have supported women’s causes, however imperfectly, past or present, unless they had observed first-hand the social injustices suffered by women. After all, Plato advocated co-education and equal political eligibility for male and female guardians in his dialogue Republic.48 Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa of Nettesheim (d. 1535) even declared the superiority of women over men by, for instance, stating that Christ had further humbled himself by being born a male (1996, 63). To feminists and historians of feminism who refuse to acknowledge any feminist quality to authors, men or women, who lived prior to the nineteenth century, one may propose John Stuart Mill. In The Subjection of Women (1869), he denounced in no uncertain terms women’s legal subordination to men and how this injustice was also an impediment to society’s enrichment. It appears that if feminism may be understood as a voice aiming at the empowerment of women, whether legally, culturally, or otherwise, men could be feminists too.49 Another possible response might be that all women are feminists, since surely every woman would have her best interest in mind. But that is not necessarily the case either since what is being perceived as one’s best interest might not be conducive to greater autonomy, which may be the one feature feminists of all colors agree, is essential to feminism. I would add that it should be essential regardless

48 For

a wonderful collection of essays exploring to what extent one may speak of feminism in respect to Plato’s philosophical work, see Nancy Tuana (1994). 49 There is support among feminists and scholars of feminism that men too could be advocates of women’s causes. See Offen (1988), 151, n 72.

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of historic period and culture (more on this subject in the following paragraphs). Suffice it to mention the women who were supportive of the Victorian “feminine ideal” that trapped women within the domestic sphere. While this ideal was a product of British patriarchal society, it was nevertheless internalized by many women in nineteenth century England.50 Even if one were to argue that the women who defended the ideal of femininity did not think of it as an imposed role and thus embraced it freely, one would have to wonder why they denied other women the right to choose differently. An ideal that limits women’s opportunities cannot possibly be compatible with the goals of feminism, even if advocated by women. So, what are we left with? Maybe only women and men born in the nineteenth century and later may be feminists. But how do we then explain the periodic resurgence of women in earlier centuries who found themselves at odd with patriarchal societies, and fought (or if nothing else, discovered tacit ways) to live by what they believed was right: to be educated, write, excel in sciences and the arts, marry or not marry, have or not have children, live in seclusion, teach, remain independent, control their wealth, etc. While it would make no sense to invoke the rights women demanded in any of the feminist waves since the nineteenth century (legal and political equalities as in the first wave or the social and cultural equalities characteristic of the second wave) as the measure of the “feminism” exhibited by individuals in preceding centuries, there remains a core in what women like Hildegard of Bingen (d. 1179), Christine de Pizan (d. 1430), Moderata Fonte (born Modesta Pozzo, d. 1592) and many more wrote and lived by that resonates with modern-day feminists. It comes to no surprise that Simone de Beauvoir dedicated several pages to Christine de Pizan in The Second Sex and recognized her for having triggered the “Querelle des Femmes,”51 a debate that shook Europe for many centuries, inspired both female and male authors to defend the “dignity,” “nobility,” or the “merit” of women, and is yet to be acknowledged as a philosophically relevant inquiry by contemporary philosophers.52 So, may we call Christine a feminist even though no direct line leads from her critical writings to the demands of modern feminism, or should we think of her and other pre-modern women as “proto-feminists,” “forerunners,” “precursors,” “early feminists,” or “first feminists” as has been advanced by various feminists and historians of feminism? The problem with the proposed terms is that they suggest that someone who lived earlier in some ways anticipated or laid ground for a later development. In the present context, this would imply that there is only one feminism—the modern one—and that it defines any earlier expression of it. From this perspective, unless individuals advanced sex equality or fought in some ways for same legal, political, and/or social rights as men, they could not be called feminists. As Gerda

50 See

Hughes (2014), Sanders (1996), Pykett (1992), Auerbach (1982). Beauvoir (1949), II, 4, 147–149, 186 and 191. Unfortunately, de Beauvoir reduces the “Querelle” to a debate about marriage, an institution attacked by clerics who saw it as a trap but defended by women and their male supporters. 52 See Albertini (2000): 126–149. 51 De

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Lerner pointed out, making the women’s rights movement the defining feature of feminism is problematic; it deprives today’s feminist debates of the voices of the past. In addition, Karen Offen and more historians of feminism were able to show that sex equality is not even characteristic of modern continental feminism. Thus French feminists were more interested in sex complementarity.53 Why would we use the understanding of only one brand of contemporary feminism—the AngloAmerican—and take it as the measure of any earlier or non-Western manifestation of a feminist consciousness? Just to “prove” that feminism did not exist anywhere else? My position is that what qualifies as feminism has to be disentangled from the women’s rights movement in order to be detectable in many more places than in Western brands of nineteenth and twentieth century feminism. This is not to say that today’s feminists should not aim for social and political change to make themselves heard, only that the lack of this dimension should not be used to disregard the voices from the past. Maybe one should begin by asking whether feminism avant la lettre is even possible? Feminism in the sense of advocacy of women’s rights has long been credited to French philosopher and utopian socialist Charles Fourier (1772–1837). It appears, however, that the origin of the term (that started to being widely used in France from the 1890s), cannot be traced back to any particular author. Nevertheless, in the same way as individuals could be environmentalists or cli-fi (climate fiction) authors long before the term was coined, a philosopher, writer, major intellectual, social, or cultural player may well have been a feminist in the centuries preceding the rise of historic feminism as a social and political movement. The possible use of the term is not the issue but the meaning we assign to it is. A restrictive meaning reduces it to whatever feminism means to the assessing contemporary author, a broader one allows one to capture diverse feminist expressions, including those from non-Western cultures. Without getting into the feminist debate on whether “defining” feminism might introduce a type of male rationality that uses definitions as tools of domination and suppression into a field that is to be shaped by an inclusive type of rationality (the present essay would not be the place for it anyway), some criteria seem in order. Here are four that I find useful when trying to determine whether women who lived in periods that preceded historic feminism may be called feminists: 1. The awareness of there being social, legal, cultural and/or religious conditions affecting all women—but not men; 2. Realizing that these conditions may be obstacles standing in the way of women’s opportunities and the free development of their talents; 3. Understanding that these conditions are socially construed and may thus be removed or transformed in order to enhance women’s talents and role in society; and 4. The explicit call to change conditions in the way of women’s flourishing.

53 Offen

(1994), especially 122–134.

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In my analysis of older records asking for the improvement of female lives, it is rare to find an express call to claim justice or some form of equity for all women. And there is the matter of how this call is culturally clothed, which is something to be mindful of in a Western setting as well. In her all-female dialogue Il Merito delle Donne Ove Chiaramente Si Scuopre Quante Elle Siano Degne e Perfette Venetian humanist Moderata Fonte (1997) has one of the interlocutors say: “Non taceremo più!” (We shall not remain silent!). Another participant in the dialogue exclaims: “…they [men] don’t look after us, as they should, but rather set out to injure us and deprive us of all those good things we could be enjoying if it weren’t for them—wealth, freedom, reputation, and the favor and respect of all the creatures.” And finally, one finds a passage proclaiming: Come on, let’s wake up, and claim back our freedom, and the honor and dignity they have usurped from us for so long. Do you think that if we really put our minds to it, we would be lacking the courage to defend ourselves, the strength to fend for ourselves, or the talents to earn our own living? Let’s take our courage into our own hands and do it, and then we can leave it up to them to mend their ways as much as they can: we shan’t really care what the outcome is, just as long as we are no longer subjugated to them. (Fonte, 37)

These are not exactly timid expressions of women complaining about the deprivations imposed on them by men. Most importantly, the statements reveal a “They/Them” (men) and “We/Us” (women) divide, which is characteristic of a feminist consciousness. However, because Fonte’s dialogue ends on a reconciliatory note, modern readers who are not acquainted with the writing style of the Renaissance may think the author retracted her sharp protest. Instead, one needs to recognize that the uncommented presentation of opposing views during that period is a device to aid readers find their own voice in the wide spectrum of opinions defended in the dialogue. Again, an actual call to change is rare, and, in addition, one needs to see through the language typical of the culture of an earlier historic period to detect feminist voices. However, the first three above listed criteria can be found more frequently. One or more of these criteria are usually an indication of a feminist consciousness in correlation with texts denouncing limitations affecting women. Even though women may not have been fighting as a group, some of them did express views on behalf of all women. The criteria also help to distinguish women who were merely astute in preserving or augmenting their individual spheres of influence from those whose critical reactions were designed to benefit all women and not just themselves in their respective societies. A great number of powerful ruling queens fall into the first category, for instance, Elizabeth I (England), Maria Theresa (Habsburg Empire), and Catherine the Great (Russia). These authoritative figures are to be applauded for the power they wielded and the ways in which they advanced their kingdoms, but they did not seek to enhance the status of their female subjects, let alone that they changed laws and customs to protect the women in their realms from abuse and oppression. On occasion, one discovers women like philosopher Hildegard of Bingen who were both able to gain greater control over their lives (for instance by gaining independence from the male monastery to which her nunnery was originally attached) and work on

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corrective measures to enhance the condition of all women. The latter, Hildegard attempted by redefining the relationship between men and women through a novel interpretation of the story of Adam and Eve as narrated in the Book of Genesis, in which she argues that Eve’s “weakness” was salvific since, if Adam had erred first, his “strength” would have prevented humankind’s redemption through Christ. Hildegard understood that the conceptional frame given to that biblical story set the tone for how the religious culture in which she lived viewed the sexes. Without challenging heads-on the patriarchal society in which she lived, she also developed a theory of sex complementarity within the cosmology she created to ground her medical theory. Hildegard may not have advocated for equality or rights, but her work suggests that she was keenly aware of how different women’s social conditions were from men’s and that these conditions could be questioned and even changed to benefit the growth of women. Is that not the mark of a feminist consciousness? Once the label of feminism does not presuppose an explicit social-political dimension, which would be unthinkable in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, women like Hildegard emerge not as proto-feminists or “maybe-feminists” but as feminists.

10.5.2 Rābi‘a’s Feminism How does this finding affect the assessment of Rābi‘a regarding a possible feminist consciousness? That she lived earlier than Hildegard should not be construed as an obstacle, since the same could be applied to the latter in relation to the rise of historic feminism. But how about the matter of belonging to a different culture? It is hard to see why the voices of women who question the conditions imposed on them by their respective cultures and seek to have a greater say in family and society should be excluded from the feminist discourse by contemporary authors and activists. I concur with Offen’s plea for the inclusion of feminist voices from more cultures: …[the term feminism] should reflect the cumulative knowledge we have acquired about the historical development of the critique of and program for sociopolitical change in the status of women in a variety of cultures. In other words, it must be not only historically sound but comparatively grounded in order to be conceptually illuminating. (Offen, 1988)

Offen wrote the above lines in 1988. Today, over thirty years later, we are still far from acknowledging feminist expressions articulated in different cultural terms. To give an example, in a Western setting the principle of freedom is invoked to effect social-political change. This is quite different from Islamic societies where the oppressed, male or female, appeal to the principle of justice to make themselves heard. It is a different but not a lesser principle. Considering that Hildegard and Rābi‘a were both women who lived in cultures heavily defined by religion and that both found ways to convince their respective societies that the articulation of their personal religious experience added to the

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body of pre-existing spirituality, they are well suited for a comparison. According to Lerner “Hildegard was privileged in her ability to free herself from traditional gender roles by living as part of a female community, enjoying what Sara Evans has listed as a precondition for feminist consciousness, ‘free space.’” While Rābi‘a did not live in a monastic community, she was nevertheless like Hildegard and her nuns free of domestic tasks and child-rearing responsibilities. She could lead a life that was not determined by multiple cycles of pregnancy, high-risk child delivery, and breastfeeding that affected the health and daily routines of other women. In that respect, she too enjoyed “free space,” a space she was able to structure and shape in accordance with her spiritual needs. She may have been inspired by the memory of earlier female Christian anchorites, in her own culture, however, she had no established role models to emulate; there were no statutes regulating individual or communal lives solely dedicated to devotion (Sufi confraternities were founded much later). In addition, unlike Hildegard who needed to respond to the Bishop of her region, Rābi‘a enjoyed greater independence. She had no superior to monitor her spiritual progress or control her comings and goings, not even a male guardian as it would be customary in Islamic culture. The fact that the mystic from Baṣra spent her adult life with no male legal supervision gives credence to the story of her emancipation from slavery. Indeed, women who were liberated from bondage ended up gaining greater independence than free women. Rābi‘a is likely to have recognized this legal niche, which is how she was able to remain unwed and live by herself; except for a female companion mentioned in some stories who may have joined her household when she grew older. Her rejection of marriage was a violation of her patriarchal society that also frowned on unmarried men; Islam discourages celibacy. This is how Rābi‘a, the emancipated slave, created herself a new role which eventually permitted her to teach and chastise men if she found them lacking in piety and humility. However, the question remains whether she also thought of other women and their need of “free space.” Yes, she was eccentric and fierce when approached by male provocateurs, but that is still not the same as possessing an awareness of social, legal, and/or cultural conditions impacting women’s lives negatively and in need of change. Umm Salama, one of Prophet Muḥammad’s wives, is a much better example for a Muslim woman with a feminist consciousness. The early Islamic records clearly show her as the spokesperson of women. She is the one who asks Muḥammad why the Qur’ān does not mention women, why women cannot inherit and go to war, and why women do not have a say in the sexual practices within their marriages (Mernissi, 1991, 115–119.) God himself answers her questions— in the form of Qur’ānic verses. However, Umm Salama does not always receive favorable responses. What makes you a feminist is not winning a battle but that you are engaged in a battle that demands change and equity for women. Compared to Umm Salama, Rābi‘a does not claim to speak in the name of all women, and the stories do not indicate that she thought of women being oppressed or disadvantaged as a group. Moreover, we do not know whether she had hoped to become a role model for other women. When asked about her love for the Prophet and whether she hated Satan, her response was clear. Her love of God made any other

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attachment or concern obsolete. This suggests that Rābi‘a would have considered social engagements of any type a distraction from her devotion. And yet, it is intriguing to find out that when a group of men questioned the spiritual merits of women, she reacted with unusual outrage and even inflicted on them a blow below the belt: It is related that a group came to Rabi ‘a to put her to the test. They said: All the virtues have been dispersed upon men. The crown of nobility has been placed upon the heads of men, and the belt of magnanimity has been tied around their waists. Prophecy has never descended upon any woman. What can you boast of?” Rabi‘a said, “Everything you said is true. But egoism, egotism, self-worship, and (79:24) ‘I am your highest lord’ have not welled up in any woman. And no woman has ever been a pederast.”54

Rābi‘a does not discuss the misogynistic allegations made by these unnamed male visitors. Instead, she mounts a counter-offensive stating that the worst deviations are also not encountered among women. Significantly, in this one story where women are attacked as a group, Rābi‘a does exhibit a feminist consciousness indicating that she identified herself with other women. Her female self-awareness is expressed here in even stronger terms that in her statement that female piety is superior to men’s. Her strong self-identification and possibly pride of being a woman articulated also in the poetic verses that referred to her name, are unusual for a mystic otherwise intent on shedding her entire being. Indeed, Rābi‘a gave up everything, possessions, attachments, physical and emotional comfort, even the desire to be in paradise for fear of contaminating her love for the creator. She renounced everything, except her female identity. This may not make her a feminist, but it is the sign of a woman who was most at ease with her sex; she could not think of herself not being a woman.

10.6 Conclusion So far, one can safely affirm that Rābi‘a and the later Sufi tradition developed sophisticated techniques to create and convey meanings by using and building upon the morphological features specific to Arabic language. Is that a sufficient basis to claim that Sufis and in particular the saint of Basra had a philosophy of language? What sticks out in her however implicit reflection on language is the primacy given to writing, which, to mention a major authority on philosophy of language, stands in stark contrast with Aristotle’s approach that takes language primarily as a spoken medium of communication and only secondarily considers its written expression. When Rābi‘a composed her poetry, she must have paid attention to sound and rhythm, if for no other reason than to abide by the constraints of the meter. And yet, it does not appear that the auditory aspect of her poetry played a pivotal role in supporting the message of her mystical teaching. Instead,

54 Quoted

in section on Rābi ‘a as “Honorary Man”, n. 15.

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there is strong evidence that while creating her poems she visualized the words’ letters. She thus makes their shapes semantically relevant such as in comparing her sadness to the downward pointing curvature of the letter qāf. When she separates the letters that make up the word ‘ishq and turns them into the initials of three new words, the non-Arab speaker could assume that Rābi‘a operates by matching the sounds of those letters. While that may be a theoretical option, one needs to consider that the Arabic writing system consists of syllables in which the vowels are inherent; the vocalization only comes into effect once the syllables are joined to form words. Therefore, Rābi‘a could not have proceeded from the unvocalized ‘sh’-phonem in ‘ishq to the vocalized ‘sha’-phonem in shawq but by connecting the graphems ‘sh’ and ‘sh.’ In English the same sound is expressed by writing either ‘sh’ (as in shawl), ‘ch’ (as in machine), ‘ss’ (as in pressure), ‘cio’ (as in precious), or ‘tio’ (as in action). To give an equivalent example, if the saint of Basra had written her poetry in English, she would only have considered correlating the graphems (‘sh’ and ‘sh,’ or ‘ch’ and ‘ch,’ etc.). The question that arises now is how one arrives at meanings from letters and words. It is again the author of the Sawāniḥ who furnishes the starting point for the enquiry. He thus writes on the first page: …love [‘ishq] cannot be expressed in words nor contained in sentences; for the ideas [ma‘ānī = meanings] of love are like virgins and the hand of words cannot reach the edge of the curtain of those virgins. Even though our task here is to marry the virgin ideas to the men of words in the private chambers of speech, yet outward expressions (‘ibārat) in this discourse cannot but be allusions to different ideas. Moreover, this indefiniteness (of words) exists only for those who have no “immediate tasting” (dhawq). (Ghazzālī, 1986, 15)55

The imagery is culturally determined, since with the gendering of meanings (female) and words (male) a separation is necessitated, which the younger al-Ghazzālī indicates by introducing the metaphor of the curtain. One can relate the separation alluded to, to the very structure of the Arab verse called ‘bayt,’ meaning ‘house’ or ‘tent,’ and its division into two hemistichs (miṣrā‘āni, dual of miṣrā ‘, literally ‘one half of a folding door’). The other Arabic term for hemistich is shaṭr, meaning ‘half,’ but miṣrā‘ has a greater appeal in this context, since the image it conveys allows for the verse itself to be the curtain between words and meanings—its hemistichs acting as doors. The words are mere allusions, and “their hands” don’t even reach the “ma‘ānī.” How then, can they be “wedded” to meanings? Although al-Ghazzālī concedes later that “in the innermost heart of words is concealed the sharp edges of a sword” (presumably the separation of letters conducive to new meanings), virgin brides and grooms only come together in the mystical experience of dhawq (Ghazzālī, 1986, 15).56 Here is where the author

55 The

insertion of the original term within brackets is mine. It was gleaned from the Persian on-line edition: http://www.sufism.ir/books/download/farsi/ayat-hosn-v-eshgh-vo1-2.pdf. 56 The insertion of the original term within brackets is mine. It was gleaned from the Persian on-line edition: http://www.sufism.ir/books/download/farsi/ayat-hosn-v-eshgh-vo1-2.pdf.

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of the Sawāniḥ and Rābi‘a are again on the same page, for the saint of Basra writes, using most appealing rhythmic and rhymed prose:57 “Laysa li-al-muḥibbi wa ḥabībihi bayna, wa innamā huwa naṭaqa ‘an shawqin, wa waṣafa ‘an dhawqin. Fa-man dhāqa ‘arafa, wa man waṣafa fa-mā ittaṣafa”.58 There is no “between” for the lover and his beloved, indeed, who speaks out of longing, and who describes from taste. Then, the one who tastes knows, and the one who describes does not characterize. (My translation)

Words both lead and block access to meanings, and the dance of the letters is indicative of the transitory formation of utterances, which are considered at best allusions. What opens the doors of meaning is shawq and what allows one to understand is dhawq. Walter Upton captured this superbly in his poetical rendition of Rābi‘a’s 2nd and 3rd lines: “Speech is born out of longing,/True description from the real taste” (Upton, 1988, 36). In other words, only the one who does not comprehend (yet), speaks. In this mystical teaching, the existence of language owes itself to our inability to fully express ourselves. Ultimately, Rābi‘a’s take on language is that words alone fail to convey the full force of meanings. To cite another example from the Sawāniḥ, while grammarians take both ‘āshiq (lover) and ma‘shūq (beloved) as equally relating to ‘ishq, the mystic considers the word ‘ma‘shūq’ solely a metaphorical derivative, since the beloved is merely the recipient of love. Only the ‘āshiq is the real derivative, since “he is the locus of love’s dominion and he is its steed” (Ghazzālī, 1986, 73). In Sufism, common language is metaphorical and therefore (despite the enriching semantic devices) unable to fully express meanings. True ‘ishq is ultimately ineffable—the real beyond the curtain may only be experienced. Such is the understanding of the one who remained nameless herself.

57 It

appears to me that Rabi‘a is making use of saj‘ in these lines, which is an ancient form of prose that predates Islam and is rhythmic as well as rhymed (with some irregularities) but does not employ a meter. Her lines also exhibit some beautiful assonances. I have separated the sentences to allow the reader less familiar with Arabic to quickly recognize the original terms and their translations. For more on saj‘, see Adonis (2003, 17–18) and Stewart (2008). 58 Badawī (1962), 172 ff.

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The reflection on language in Rābi‘a’s poetry would have been most arduous to uncover without the support of Aḥmad al-Ghazzālī’s comments. But the opposite holds true as well, since it would have been a challenge to trace that same reflection in the Sawāniḥ in the absence of Rābi‘a’s verses. The seeker from later centuries gathers the gems scattered in Sufi poetry and strings a necklace—precious stones are for the light of knowledge and pearls for good actions (see al-Ghazālī, 1983, 87).

Bibliography Abrahamov, B. (2008). ‘Ishq. In Y. K. Greenberg (Ed.), Encyclopedia of love in world religions (Vol. 1 pp. 331–333). ABC-CLIO. Adonis. (2003). An introduction to Arab poetics. Trans. Catherine Cobham. Saqi Books. Agrippa von Nettesheim, H. C. (1996). Declamation on the nobility and preeminence of the female sex, translated by Albert Rabil, Jr. The University of Chicago Press. Albertini, T. (2014). Ibn Ḥazm’s and al-Ghazzālī’s most divergent responses to Christianity: A question of epistemology and hermeneutics. In I. Christopher Levy, R. George-Tvrtković, D. F. Duclow (Eds.), Nicholas of Cusa and Islam: Polemic and dialogue in the late Middle Ages (218–234). Brill. Albertini, T. (2000). Actio und Passio in der Renaissance. Das Weibliche und das Männliche bei Agrippa, Postel und Bovelles. Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie, 47(2000), 126–149. Al-Ghazzālī, A. H. (1983). The jewels of the Qur’ān: Al-Ghazālī’s theory. Trans. Muhammad Abul Quasem. Kegan Paul International. Al-Ghazālī, A. H. (2011). Love, longing, intimacy, and contentment = Kitāb al-maḥabba wa’lshawq wa’l-uns wa’l-riḍā: Book XXXVI of the revival of the religious sciences, Iḥyā’ ‘ulūm al-dīn. Trans. Eric Ormsby. The Islamic Texts Society. Al-Ghazzālī, A. H. (1968). Iḥyā’ ‘ulum al-dīn (Vol. 4). Cairo. al-Jāḥiẓ. (1980). The Epistle on the singing girls of Jāḥiẓ. Trans. A.F.L. Beeston. Warminster: Aris & Phillips, Ltd. Anawati, G.-C., Gardet, L. (1961). Mystique musulmane. Aspects et tendances–expériences et techniques. J. Vrin. ās-Sulamī, Abū ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān. (1999). Early Sufi women: Dhikr al-niswa al-muta‘abbidāt al-ṣūfiyyāt. Trans. Rkia E. Cornell. Fons Vitae. Attar, F. U. D. (1984). The conference of the birds. Trans. Afkham Darbandi and Dick Davis. Penguin Books. Auerbach, N. (1982). Woman and the Demon: The Life of a Victorian Myth. Harvard University Press. Badawī, A. R. (1962). Shahīdat al-‘ishq al-ilāhī. Maktaba al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya. Baldick, J. (1990). The legend of Rābi‘a of Baṣra: Christian antecedents, Muslim counterparts. Religion, 19, 233–247. Camus, J.-P. (1641). La Caritee, ou le pourtraict de la vraye Charite. R. Bertault. Beauvoir, S. de (1949). Le Deuxième Sexe. Gallimard. Derin, S. (2008). Love in Sufism: From Rabia to Ibn al-Farid. Insan Publications. Elias, J. (1988). The female and the feminine in Islamic feminism. Muslim World, 78(3–4), 209–224. Ernst, C. (1993). The stages of love in early Persian Sufism, from Rābi‘a to Ruzbihān. In L. Lewisohn (Ed.), Classical Persian Sufism: From its origins to Rūmī (435–455). Khaniqahi Nimatullahi Publications.

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Fonte, M. (1997). The Worth [sic!] of Women Wherein Is Clearly Revealed Their Nobility [sic!] and Their Superiority [sic!] to Men, translated by Virginia Cox. The University of Chicago Press. Gattagno, C. (1976). The common sense of teaching foreign languages. Educational Solutions Worldwide. Van Gelder, G. (1993). Rābi‘a’s poem on the two kinds of love: A mystification? In F. de Jong (Ed.), Verse and the fair sex: Studies in Arabic poetry and the representation of women in Arabic literature (66–76). M. Th. Houtsma Stichting. Ghazzālī, A. (1986). Sawānih: Inspirations from the world of pure spirits, the oldest Persian Sufi treatise on love. Trans. Nasrollah Pourjavady. KPI. Gloton, M. (2000). The Quranic inspiration of Ibn ‘Arabi’s vocabulary of love: Etymological links and doctrinal development. Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi Society, 27, 37–52. Griffen, L. A. (1972). Theory of profane love among the Arabs: The development of the genre. New York University Press. Harvey, S. (1997). The meaning of terms designating love in Judaeo-Arabic thought and some remarks on the Judaeo-Arabic interpretation of Maimonides. In N. Golb (Ed.), Judaeo-Arabic studies: Proceedings of the founding conference of the society of Judaeo-Arabic studies (175–196). Harwood Academic Publishers. Helm, B. L. (1994). Rabi‘ah as mystic, Muslim, and woman. Annual Review of Women in World Religions, 3, 1–87. Hughes, K. (2014). Gender roles in the 19th century https://www.bl.uk/romantics-and-victorians/ articles/gender-roles-in-the-19th-century. Retrieved April 17, 2020. Joinville, J. sire de. (1874). Histoire de Saint Louis: Credo et lettre à Louis X. Trans. M. Natalis de Wailly. Librairie de Firmin Didot. Joinville, J. sire de. (1906). The memoirs of the lord of Joinville. Trans. Ethel Wedgwood. E.P. Dutton. Kchouk, K. (2012). L’héritage du soufisme dans la poétique arabe contemporaine. PhD dissertation, University of Strasbourg. Retrieved from https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/ tel-00762584/document. Kchouk, K. (2013). Poésie et féminité dans l’expérience spirituelle de Rābi’a al-‘Adawiyya, m. 135H/752. Le courrier du GERI, recherches d’Islamologie 2, NS. Retrieved from http:// www.lecourrierdugeri.org/k-kchouk-po%C3%A9sie-et-f%C3%A9minit%C3%A9-danslexp%C3%A9rience-spirituelle-de-rab%C3%AE-a-al-adawiyya/. Kirk, G. S., Raven, J. E., & Schofield, M. (1983). The Presocratic philosophers: A critical history with a selection of texts (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. Knight, M. M. (2016). Magic in Islam. Tarcher Perigee. Lamoreaux, J. C. (2002). The early Muslim tradition of dream interpretation. State University of New York Press. Lane, E. W. (1863). Arabic-English Lexicon. Williams and Norgate. Lewisohn, L. (2014). Sufism’s religion of love, from Rābi‘a to Ibn ‘Arabī. In L. Ridgeon (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Sufism (150–180). Cambridge University Press. Lumbard, J. E. B. (2007). From Ḥubb to ‘Ishq: The development of love in early Sufism. Journal of Islamic Studies, 18(3), 345–385. Massignon, L. (1922). Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane. Paul Geuthner. Mernissi, F. (1991). The Veil and the Male Elite. A Feminist Interpretation of Women’s Rights in Islam, translated by Mary Jo Lakeland. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. Nurbakhsh, J. (1990). Sufi women (revised). Khaniqahi Nimatullahi Publications. Offen, K. (1987). Sur les origines des mots ‘féminisme’ et ‘féministe.’ Revue D’histoire Moderne Et Contemporaine, 34(3), 492–496. Offen, K. (1988). Defining feminism: A comparative historical approach. Signs, 14(4), 119–157. Offen, K. (1994). Defining feminism: A comparative historical approach. Australian Feminist Studies, 9, 20.

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Pykett, L. (1992). The “Improper” feminine: The women’s sensation novel and the new woman writing. Routledge. El Sakkakini, W. (1982). First among Sufis: The life and thought of Rabia al-Adawiyya, the woman saint of Basra. Trans. Nabil Safwat. The Octagon Press. Sanders, V. (1996). Eve’s renegades: Victorian anti-feminist women novelists. St. Martin’s Press. Sells, M. (1996). Rabi’a: Her words and life in ‘Attar’s Memorial of the Friends of God. Trans. Paul Losensky and Michael Sells. In M. Sells (Ed.) Early Islamic mysticism: Sufi, Qur’an, mi‘raj, poetic and theological writings (151–170). Paulist Press. Silvers, L. (2015). Early pious, mystic Sufi women. In L. Ridgeon (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Sufism (24–52). Cambridge University Press. Smith, M. (1994). Rābi‘a: The life & work of Rābi‘a and other women mystics in Islam. Oneworld. Stewart, D. J. (2008). Rhymed prose. In Encyclopaedia of the Qur’an. General Editor. Jane Dammen McAuliffe. Brill Online. Thompson, D. (1994). Defining feminism. Australian Feminist Studies, 9(20), 171–192. Tuana, N. (Ed.). (1994). Feminist interpretations of Plato. The Pennsylvania State University Press. Upton, C. (1988). Doorkeeper of the heart: Versions of Rabi‘a. Threshold Books.

Chapter 11

Lhakha U of Texas El Paso*

Yeshe Tsogyal of Tibet 777–876 CE Mary Ellen Waithe

Abstract Known as the “Mother of Tibetan Buddhism” and the “Mother of Knowledge,” Yeshe Tsogyal built upon indigenous Bön philosophy and Mahāyāna Buddhism to bring about a Buddhism that is identifiably Tibetan. I report on her life, her works and teaching. Then summarize her significance as a philosopher of Tibetan Buddhist metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. Lastly, I append portions of several writings attributed to her.

Portion of mural photographed by “Ignutius” at the Lhakhang, University of Texas El Paso. Photograph in public domain under Creative Commons. Downloaded from Wikipedia 8 March 2022, cropped and sharpened by author. M. E. Waithe (*)  Cleveland State University, Ohio, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_11

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11.1 Biography 11.1.1 Preliminary Comments Regarding Sources Much of what we know of the life and teachings of Yeshe Tsogyal1 has been handed down by her “in secret,” that is, in works that were stashed away in caves, to be studied by persons who were the emanations of her guru, herself, her students and her colleagues. There were two basic systems for preserving early Tibetan teachings, both Bön and Buddhist. First, there is the oral tradition that is passed on, not only from guru to student, but from guru to a person (who is not yet existing as a human) who will become a future emanation of the guru. The second system is the terma tradition of writings concealed in caves or received as inspired for discovery by a future, fully-enlightened person. It is primarily from this tradition that Yeshe’s writings and teachings derived, but in fact, both traditions are considered to be terma.

11.1.2 Life Nam-mkhai sNying-po (8th/ninth century CE) was a scholar who accompanied Emperor Trisong Detsen on travels to India to collect early Buddhist writings. sNying-po is identified as one of Yeshe Tsogyal’s 25 top students. He identifies himself as the scribe for his guru, Yeshe Tsogyal. He preserved Yeshe’s autobiography as a terma. It is from her autobiography we learn that her parents named her Mkhar chen bza’. This is her clan title (Gyatso p. 2). In her autobiography Yeshe Tsogyal reports that locals were astounded that a nearby lake doubled its size at the moment of her birth, signaling that she was destined to develop further “magical” powers. By the time she was twelve she had multiple suitors. Her parents insisted that she marry one of them. Forced into a lay marriage against her will, she fled. Captured (presumably by her legal spouse), she was forced into painful submission: rape or some other violence. Yeshe was rescued at the command of Emperor Trisong Detsen who made her his Queen before “gifting” her to Padmasambhava2 as a student of Buddhism (Dowman, 1996, p. 26). She reports experiencing “magic” such as shape-shifting and being transported bodily to distant locations at an instant. She also refers to powers of precious stones,

1 The

reader will recognize the various ways in which her name has been romanized. Yeshe Tsogyal appears to be the name most used in English translations of works that mention or are by her. 2 Also known as “Padma,” “Perna Junge” and “Guru Orgyan” (his Pakistani headquarters and birthplace).

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etc. It might seem difficult to understand how such events and powers are possible. But these acts and powers may well be metaphors for much more complex concepts.3

11.2 Philosophical Foundations of Vajrayāna Buddhism The reader who is unfamiliar with the transmission of early Buddhist philosophy to Tibet will need to enter a Buddhist world, understand the basic principles of Buddhism and its terminology and suspend philosophic judgment as to whether the events and actions described by Yeshe (or attributed to her) accord with Buddhist theory. Readers who are familiar with Tibetan Vajrayāna Buddhism will see that the reported details of Yeshe’s philosophic development follow the traditional pattern of tantric education: she studied with an eminent guru until she became as adept as he. By that point they learned from each other. Those who are less familiar with Buddhism may reject as fabulous Vajrayāna reports of raising the dead, reincarnation, emanation, shape-shifting, magical or miraculous transformations and other tantric experiences reported by Yeshe.4 To understand such claims, it is necessary to explore first, indigenous Tibetan philosophy, Bön, then, Hindu-influenced Buddhist philosophy, Mahāyāna, and lastly, the Mahāyāna tantric school known as Vajrayāna.

11.2.1 Bön Before Buddhism Yeshe Tsogyal lived in Tibet at a time when the populace were adherents to Bön’s religious philosophy. This indigenous religion coincided with many of the same views as did Buddhism. Bön held that the creation of the world resulted from a

3 For example, the lotus is a symbol of purity and insight. Mention of the lotus is more than a botanical reference. It entails the idea that purity, enlightenment, insight, can arise from the dregs of human existence just as the lotus cannot grow except in mud. Absenting an understanding of the acts and properties that are represented metaphorically by gems, flowers, and other objects, we can suspend judgment about the philosophical significance of such claims. An analogous issue is whether a distinction can be firmly made between philosophy and religion, especially regarding what constitutes worship. For an insightful discussion see Renee Ford 2020. 4 I urge readers to be agnostic about claims that Yeshe Tsogyal and practitioners of other philosophies might make. My reasoning here is that it would be very unphilosophical of us to uncritically dismiss as historically false, reports of mystical experiences that have been described in detail by many philosophers from both western and non-western traditions. To foster inquiry we ought to accept as possibly true, philosophical views that are to the western mind, difficult to embrace.

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cosmic struggle between light and darkness, between coexisting principles of good and evil (Rossi, 2000). Bön philosophy aimed to protect individual households from evil spirits. It was transmitted orally, depicted in mandalas, paintings and other non-literary arts. Bön was reflected in the daily activities of the people: their modus vivendi, as well as their family and clan relations. 11.2.1.1 Bön Ways to Enlightenment Bön holds that there are nine “ways” or “paths” to enlightenment, most of which require performance of physical and intellectual practices that increasingly free the mind in its pursuit of clarity. (1) Way of a Lay Follower outlines ten principles for moral development. (2) Rituals for chasing away the forces of evil are the topic of the Way of Illusion. (3) Funeral and death rituals are described in the Path of Existence. The physical universe and human perception of it is discussed in (4) the Way of the Visual World. Other “Ways” or paths are relevant to the process that individuals go through—their training—to become tantric practitioners. There is (5) the Way of Prediction—incorporating astrology and prognostication techniques. (6) There are rules and regulations for monks given as “Way of a Monk” and the relationship between tantric masters and disciples in (7) the Way of Primordial Shen. But it is via (8) the Path of Primordial Sound that a perfected practitioner–one who has attained (9) the Way of Supreme Doctrine of Great Perfection–becomes integrated into the mandala of highest enlightenment (Rossi, 2000). 11.2.1.2 Bön Deities Bön includes worship, iconography, and meditation on peaceful and wrathful deities. It distinguishes between “enlightened” deities and those who are still “of this world,” or not fully enlightened. Bön’s vengeful deities are depicted with vicious expressions, their many arms brandishing weapons, their many legs trampling enemies underfoot. As would become the case with the development of Vajrayāna (see below), meditation on the wrathful deities is a means of understanding reality and attaining enlightenment. These wrathful deities turn out to be helpful because they embody the negative emotions that must be overcome in order to make progress towards enlightenment. Wrathful deities help people confront and control the emotional obstacles to their enlightenment (Rossi, 2000).

11.2.2 Tibetan Buddhism Buddhism originated in India. During the late 8th or early ninth centuries Tibetan Emperor Trisong Detsen travelled there, purchasing scholarly texts and recruiting

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scholars to establish Buddhism in Tibet. He built many major temple/schools throughout his empire. Prior to the introduction of Buddhism there was no written system of the Tibetan language. Tibetan script was developed at this time by a coalition of invited Indian, Chinese, Tibetan, Nepalese and Bhutani scholars explicitly to translate into Tibetan, the multitude of Buddhist texts that Detsen had imported. Buddhist masters met with their international counterparts to create a written version of the Tibetan language and to translate and transcribe important works so they could be read in the vernacular. 11.2.2.1 Theravedic Influence Some elements of Hinduism, including the doctrine of reincarnation, had been retained by Buddhism’s founder Siddartha Gotama (circa fifth century BCE). Two central doctrines of traditional Theraveda Buddhism, that of unity or oneness, and that of emptiness or no-thing-ness feature strongly in what would come to be Yeshe Tsogyal’s philosophical framework. The doctrine of oneness or unity entails that “all is one” and that distinctions that our mind imposes are artificial. But merely knowing that all is one falls far short of truly comprehending and experiencing one’s own Buddha-nature, i.e., experiencing one’s unity with all that is. The doctrine of emptiness or no-thing-ness holds that the process for achieving unity begins with a person developing the ability to empty their mind of all attachments (whether attachments to objects, to relationships, to desires, etc.). These distract, obscure and disrupt the person in their quest to achieve unity with all that is. Both doctrines figure prominently in Yeshe’s works and teachings. Traditional Theraveda had emphasized the development of the Bodhisattva. A bodhisattva is one who has achieved wisdom by studying the sutras and performing dharmas. In addition, she or he is compassionate, unselfish, and serves others. According to the doctrine of emptiness, the world is only what we make it out to be. It lacks any true reality, any true existence. A person who understands this understands that they can visualize themselves as deity. The comprehension of oneself as Buddha is as certain as any other “fact” we might think we know. 11.2.2.2 Mahāyāna Influence By the time Detsen began the project of establishing Buddhism in Tibet, Buddhism had multiplied into many schools. The most unorthdox of these schools was Mahāyāna. Mahāyāna Buddhism held that it was possible for a person to reach enlightenment in their present life without needing to await reincarnation. Mahāyāna’s sobriquet, “Ox Cart,” symbolized the idea that, with the aid of an enlightened guru, much dedication, and persistent practice, even an otherwise uneducated person could reach enlightenment. The truly enlightened resist entering nibbana until every person seeking enlightenment has reached enlightenment.

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11.3 Vajrayana Buddhism Vajrayana, as it was heavily influenced by indigenous Bön, became Tibetan Buddhism, Nyingma or “order of the ancient translations.” Vajrayana emphasizes the doctrines of emptiness and oneness.

11.3.1 Nyingma The doctrine of emptiness implies that no ontological account of the world is possible because there is no way for the ordinary person to escape the deceptive nature of their own misperceptions that the world exists. The quest is to envision oneself as Bodhisattva: an almost-fully-enlightened person who delays achieving their own enlightenment in order to assist others toward that goal. This quest in part entails the mental practices that help to empty one’s mind. By emptying the mind, both internal and external impediments to visualizing one’s Buddha nature disappear. With the impediments removed the person can visualize their Buddha mind. If we approach the doctrine of emptiness/no-thing-ness as a metaphysical topic, it entails that no physical objects exist outside our minds. If we approach the doctrine of oneness or unity as an epistemological topic it can be said that the experience of unity with our Buddha-nature is no less real, no less true, no less knowable to us than any other experience we might have. We mistake for knowledge, the opinion that so-called “objects” exist when in truth what we believe we have experienced is no more than appearances. We further confuse ourselves when we jump to unsupported conclusions that “real things” underly those appearances. Various esoteric techniques can help us to realize these distinctions and fully comprehend them. These techniques are complicated, require training and supervision of a guru or dakini. To learn them requires patience, deep commitment and endurance on the part of the student of Vajrayana. The present Dalai Lama explains that: Vajrayana [is] the vehicle of the secret mantras, which sets out the extraordinary means for realizing profound concentration through the union of mental calm and clear insight (shamatha and vipashyana) and for progression through the four tantra classes: kriya, upa, yoga, and anuttara.5 (Dalai Lama XIV)

5 Upa

refers to practices for maintaining both inner and outer control through speech and action through having a clear knowledge of the sutras. http://tibetanbuddhistencyclopedia.com/en/ index.php/ Charya_tantra. Kriya refers to a set of practices, mainly breath control techniques and exercises, that are practiced to achieve a specific outcome. https://www.yogapedia.com/definition/5022/kriya. Yoga refers to practices for controlling the internal workings of the body and its energies. Anuttara is the stage of unsurpassibility of the present stage of enlightenment while still retaining human form.

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In order to learn from our experiences in the world of appearances, tantric tools such as meditating, chanting, and magic were used, and other esoteric activities were engaged in.

11.3.2 Nyingma Tantrism Nyingma Tantrism was a school of Vajrayana that also emphasized the individual’s capacity to reach enlightenment in this world, rather than suffering through a series of rebirths that would culminate in enlightenment in the next world. The Nyingma Bodhisattva lives in service to others’ pursuit of enlightenment. The Bodhisattva vows to defer their own entry to nibbana until the very last person has reached enlightenment. Guru Rimpoche, responding to the King who asked to study tantrism, reminded him (and us) that “…the tantric mysteries are said to be secret not because the Tantra is immoral but because it is closed: closed to the narrow-minded adherents of lesser paths.” (Dowman, 1996, p. 24) Padma’s reply stresses the importance to a tantric practitioner of enlisting the aid of an Awareness Dakini (such as Yeshe) who serves as teacher or guru to others. “Without her, the factors of maturity and release are incomplete and the goal of tantric practice is lost from sight”. (Dowman, 1996, p. 24.) Since most practitioners of tantrism fail in their quest to enable another to reach enlightenment, Padma adds a warning about hiring a self-professed but unenlightened tantric teacher. Although an unenlightened tantric teacher may have studied to a certain extent, students of an unenlightened teacher cannot reach enlightenment solely by interacting tantrically with a teacher who themself does not “know the way.” Instead, a qualified Dakini is needed, someone like Yeshe Tsogyal. Nyingma adopted the Bön principle of the nine yanas (paths, ways or vehicles), which climax in the meditation of “the great perfection”. It shared with Bön belief in the afterlife, particularly its belief in the in-between state, the bardo or period of dying.6 At about the time of Yeshe’s life, Tibetan Buddhism adopted this emphasis on the in-between state. The bardo rituals involved in the in-between state explained in the Tibetan Book of the Dead (Rinpoche, 2010) are attributed to Yeshe’ mtsho rgyal and her guru Padmasambhava (Padma). Described in this book are the procedures for advancing through that intermediate, bardo state. Most sources refer to its contents as “rituals.” But that is quite misleading as the work consists mostly of suggested conversations to be initiated by a friend, guru or other person (psychologist?) who is trusted by the one who is dying. Alternative conversations are suggested in the book, depending upon the physical and psychological condition of the dying person, as well as the individual’s own degree of

6 At the time of our philosopher’s life, Buddhism’s principles and those of Bön were barely distinct, but Buddhism also differed in some respects from the indigenous Bön view, e.g., views of the creation of the universe.

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tantric training. In seeking her own enlightenment in this lifetime, Yeshe learned and practiced tantric techniques and taught them to others. Some techniques were, like the contents of the Kama Sutra, sexual, most, like the contents of the Book of the Dead, were not. The tantric version of Mahāyāna in Tibet is what is referred to as “Nyingma.” (snying-po, 1983). In its aim to teach oneness, Nyingma drew on Buddhism’s historic assimilation of Hindu metaphysical principles, particularly the tantric insights of the Kama Sutra. This classic work of illustrated sexual positions was meant as a guide for ordinary people to finding pleasure in (hetero) sexual practices, particularly regarding their teachings of unity and oneness, selflessness, escape from ‘reality’ in bliss. The Nyingma philosopher who has expert knowledge of the sutras and practice of the dharmas can create such pleasure in the sexual partner. In conjunction both partners can achieve the unifying experience of “oneness.” Such experiences prepare a person to be able to recognize and achieve oneness with “all sentient beings.” The philosopher who attains “oneness” is rightfully called a guru: a teacher who has advanced to the stage of leading other sentient beings to nibbana.7 A path of self-discipline would lead Yeshe through many lifetimes to a nibbana of permanence with no further rebirths needed. This last stage is existence in the perfectly blissful enlightenment of gods and goddesses. The personal path to Buddhahood is not paved by chastity but by the union of sexual duality. By two becoming one. The way or path to true knowledge or enlightenment requires study. It also requires meditation. But attaining knowledge—in this case, complete awareness and comprehension that all things are one—does not require ascetic denial of the body. Rather, the acquisition of such knowledge is aided by the proper use of the body in the physical, emotional, and intellectual union of two persons as one.

11.4 Teaching Yeshe Tsogyal drew students from afar. From her autobiography we have her list of eleven “root” or highly advanced students. She gives us no information about the birthplaces of five of these senior students, leaving the impression that these students were locals. Others came to study with her, traversing inhospitable terrain for long distances. One “root” student came from central Tibet and another from Shelkar in southern Tibet. But it was not only local and regional areas that attracted serious students to Yeshe Tsogyal. Another “root” student had travelled from the kingdom of Khotan. This ancient kingdom, centered around the city of the same name, was located in China, along the Silk Road. Perhaps unsurprisingly, one of her senior students came from Yeshe’s home principality of Karchen.

7 More

is required before one becomes fully enlightened: adherence to the Dharmas or teachings, unbridled generosity towards all others, etc.

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Others had travelled from Nepal and from Bhutan. Accompanied by nearly one hundred students, she retreated to the spectacular Zapu valley, close to Tibet’s eastern frontier with China. There, she spent a decade of her life patiently helping each of her students to develop the insight and rigorous discipline that could lead to their enlightenment. Apparently towards the end of her teaching career Yeshe contemplated reaching enlightenment herself, escaping this world of saṃsāra. But she was dedicated to helping her students achieve enlightenment and decided to postpone her own escape from this world. She gives us a list of her top students, and refers to seventy-nine others who still have much to learn: I, Tsogyel, with Be Yeshe Nyingpo, Ma Rinchen Chok, Odren Pelgyi Zhonnu, Langlab Gyelwa Jangchub Dorje, Darcha Dorje Pawo, Surya Tepa of Central Tibet, the Bhutanese girl Tashi Chidren, the Nepali Kalasiddhi, Jangchub Drolma of Khotan, Dorje Tsomo of Shelkar, Zhonnu Drolma of Kharchen, these eleven root disciples together with seventy-nine acolytes, went to the Zapu Valley in Shang. After I had been there for ten years in all, serving my disciples, I composed myself in the samiidhi that brings all things to extinction. But six of my karmically favoured spiritual sons led by Be Yeshe Nyingpo, with the faithful 'Khon and others, implored me to stay to turn the wheel of the teaching rather than to pass into nirvana. (Dowman, 1996, p. 50).

Rather than die a biologically natural death, rather than “retiring” from teaching activities, Yeshe Tsogyal presents herself as the guru who is so devoted to her students that she accedes to their request that she not abandon them during what for many students, is the most formative part of their education. They require their guru for her insight, for her example, for her guidance, for her leadership and for her inspiration. Her student roster tells us about Yeshe Tsogyal as a professor (in both the literal and academic sense) of Buddhist philosophy. First of all, it tells us that she had a solid reputation as a qualified guru. Second, we can see that even during her lifetime, her reputation was widespread. One of two (with Padma) lead tantric gurus in Padma’s school of Nyingma, Yeshe Tsogyal reached the level of Rig dzin,8 the status of a teacher who had become a holder of knowledge or awareness. Apparently because she was the first dakini to reach such perfection, she became known as “the Mother of Tibetan Buddhism.” (Gyatso, 2006) .

11.5 Works Yeshe’ Tsogyal wrote in “dakini script,” an allegedly secret form of writing that also was quite artistic. Written works referred to as “termas” or “treasures” are created specifically for future audiences. Termas specify a list of (not yet existing)

8 One might think of this as roughly equivalent to being a contemporary full Professor with an endowed Chair. It is was a designation by one’s peers that a person has reached the very highest levels of the profession.

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future scholars, one of whom through meditation, revelation, visions, etc. will discover the terma. In some cases, it is a thousand years until its discovery in the cave that was identified in that terma. It is then the responsibility of that successor scholar, the terton or “treasure discoverer” to protect the treasure: by creating accurate reproductions of it, approving translations of it and naming as future successor tertons, persons who, in a strictly biological sense, do not yet exist, but whose “spirit” is that of the (long deceased) terma author. Yeshe Tsogyal’s writings and teachings have been transmitted through a series of scholars who are recognized successors either to her or to Padma. The four works attributed to Yeshe are: (A) Questions and Answers of the Lady; (B) Prayer of Yeshe Tsogyal; (C) Aspiration; and, in collaboration with her guru Padma, (D) Tibetan Book of the Dead.

11.5.1 Questions and Answers of the Lady In this work our philosopher functions much like a Socratic gadfly: she posing questions to Padma, he offering answers. She then replies with insightful follow-up questions, seeking greater precision of detail and greater clarity of understanding. Many of her questions are simple matter-of-fact inquiries. But others reveal a colleague respectfully suggesting/inquiring about alternative or unclear explanation of core concepts, e.g., her inquiries into the Buddhist concept “taking refuge.” “Lady Tsogyal asked: What is the essential meaning of taking refuge? What is its definition? When divided, how many types are there?” The entire work follows this format. Yeshe poses additional questions related to her search to achieve Buddhahood. Questions and Answers reads as a didactic tool that can provide future students with rationales for practicing the Dharma (acts that are morally good because they help others towards enlightenment), invoking helpful deities, etc. It is mostly a practical guide that is worth reading, in part because it offers us a glimpse of what Yeshe’s own training would have been like under guru Padma.

11.5.2 Prayer This work9 records one of Yeshe Tsogyal’s supplications to Padma. Yeshe knows that like everyone else, she will live sequential lives following her “this-life

9 The

title “Prayer” ought not be misunderstood to be an appeal to a divinity. Rather, the sense of “prayer” that is intended is closer to “appeal, supplication, etc.” It comes to us through a scholar who has been confirmed by Buddhist masters to be an emanation of Padma, and whose wife was confirmed to be the emanation of Yeshe.

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deaths” until, when she reaches full Buddhahood, rebirths can cease and she can experience the bliss of total annihilation of self in being at one with all that is. In each subsequent life she will improve her comprehension of the written sutras and the transmitted dharmas through study, meditation and the insights developed by serving all sentient beings. But she has every intention of speeding up the process so that she reaches enlightenment more quickly: in her present lifetime. This goal is in seeming opposition to the goal of bringing others to enlightenment first, putting herself last. She asks that only when “all sentient beings in the six realms10 are freed from saṃsāra’s great ocean of suffering, [may I] quickly attain complete and perfect Buddhahood”.11

11.5.3 Aspiration In this12 brief terma Yeshe Tsoygal acknowledges that her present life will end, and that her death will be a severance of her mind from her body. Her death is an escape from pain and suffering that she otherwise would experience. But those causes of suffering in this life are mere appearances, mere phenomena. She asks that they be replaced with other phenomena: experiences of rainbows, showers of flowers, joyous instrumental music and singing, and the welcome of great spirits. Such blissfully pleasurable experiences are the culmination of a tantric desire to achieve union with all that is.

11.5.4 Book of the Dead Its common English short-title, Tibetan Book of the Dead is misleading. The fuller title Book of Natural Liberation Through Understanding in the Between is more descriptive of its contents. The various versions of this work mention Padma as the “composer” of the work and Yeshe Tsogyal as having written down her mentor’s words. If we take into account the reports that she had the equivalent of a photographic memory, it becomes even more unclear how much and which of its ideas are to be attributed to Padma alone, and which to Yeshe individually. Perhaps the most that can be said regarding her contribution is that they collaborated on work.

10 There

are six realms of samsara from which rebirth is needed. The three lowest are the realms of (1) hell beings, (2) hungry spirits, and (3) animals. The three highest realms are (4) human beings, (5) demi-gods, and (6) gods. 11 Rigpa Translations, 2014. Creative Commons Attribution License. Downloaded 02/03/21. 12 This work’s title, “Prayer for Rebirth in the Copper-Colored Mountain of Glory: An Aspiration composed by Khandro Yeshé Tsogyal” is referred to herein as “Aspiration” to avoid confusion with the work “Prayer.”

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Questions of attribution aside, we can unequivocally state that the complex teachings about the bardo were those with which Yeshe’ agreed and which reflected her views. Robert Thurman, in his translation of Book of the Dead explains the complexity of the bardo, the “between”: …“between” refers to the whole process between death and rebirth. More technically, Tibetans discern six betweens, the intervals between birth and death (“life between”), sleep and waking (“dream between”), waking and trance (“trance between”), and three betweens during the death-rebirth process (“death-point,” “reality,” and “existence” betweens.) (Tibetan Book of the Dead, 1994, pp. xx–xxi).

Chögyam Trungpa, Rinpoche notes the complexity of the concept bardo as it happens in the present life situation as well: The bardo experience is part of our basic psychological make-up. There are all kinds of bardo experiences happening to us all the time, experiences of paranoia and uncertainty in everyday life; it is like not being sure of our ground, not knowing quite what we have asked for or what we are getting into. (Rinpoche, 2010)

The instructions in the Book of the Dead are for those who are declining towards the demise of their present body. The instructions give reasons for those still-living in this world of saṃsāra to quell any fear of death, and to ease and secure their transition out of their this-worldly body. Yeshe Tsogyal’s contribution to this classic work has not been reliably identified. But neither should it go unmentioned because she is reliably identified as having taken on the responsibility of committing to writing these specific teachings of her guru and having them preserved. Interested readers will find various English translations of the Tibetan Book of the Dead, each with its strengths, weaknesses, and alleged improvement over its predecessors. Centuries later, a terton who had been confirmed to be an emanation of Padma, received an apparition sent by the (now divine) guru to retrieve termas written by Yeshe from the caves in which they were concealed. The extent of her contribution (as well as Padma’s) to The Tibetan Book of the Dead has not been elucidated, but this collaborative work, was rediscovered (by a terton) in the fourteenth century. Hand-copied recensions were made by a succession of students until the work was first printed during the nineteenth century. It has been translated into many languages.

11.6 Philosophy We cannot understand the philosophy of Yeshe Tsogyal without acknowledging that Buddhist philosophy entails more than mere academic theory: it entails also living life in a way that was consistent with theory. In this respect, virtue theory underlies Yeshe’s philosophical commitments. One moral virtue, that of developing moral excellence, concerns Yeshe herself: she will live her life in dedication

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to perfecting her own moral character and to perfecting her own understanding of unity with all that is. A second moral virtue that evidently is of great importance to her is that of generosity: she acts for the benefit of others, even when that is to her personal detriment because by helping others, she delays her own enlightenment. Aspects of her view are reminiscent of what is now known as “an ethic of care.” She is unselfish but not selfless. She is unselfish in incurring this delay in order to assist others in transcending the saṃsāra of worldly phenomena. But the teacher also learns by teaching. Her unselfish generosity brings her to more profound levels of understanding the oneness and unity of all beings, thereby benefitting her as well as her students. Thirdly, Yeshe Tsogyal embodies the virtue of equality. She treats all sentient creatures as of equal moral value. All who desire to reach nibbana deserve assistance, training and guidance in reaching their own personal goals. Yeshe Tsogyal commits herself to assisting them, each according to need. What is she likely to have taught? Surely her teaching partly entailed explaining Buddhist moral philosophy in its context of myriad metaphysical and epistemological complexities. Yeshe Tsogyal’s epistemological perspective is phenomenological. For her, all knowledge reduces to phenomena. What may be referred to as “knowledge” is nothing other than our awareness of appearances. From our awareness of appearances, we arrive at the deceptive belief that multiple objects exist, when, in Buddhist thought, “all is one.” Deeper levels of understanding can be achieved by study, by meditation, as well as through insight, inspiration, revelation, divination and similar means. But each of these experiences come to a person merely as phenomena, as appearances, which are deceptive. How then, can someone overcome the limitations of learning and trust that they are on the path to nibbana? If nothing can be learned with certainty, how can a person transition to the next lifetime and become closer to realizing complete enlightenment? In answer to these questions Yeshe Tsogyal introduces the concept of taking refuge. In Yeshe Tsogyal’s work Questions and Answers… she initiates a discussion with Padma concerning the concept of taking refuge. We learn that we ought to “take refuge” in the wisdom of our gurus and dakinis, the sutras, dharmas, mandalas and tikkas.13 Placing unlimited trust in these can protect us from the terrifying three lower realms of saṃsāra. In addition, these sources offer refuge from the inferior view of believing in a self that is distinct from other things. (Padmasambhava, 1999). Padmakara14 was asked by Lady Tsogyal, the princess of Kharchen: To which inner objects does one take refuge? What kind of person takes refuge? Through which manner or method does one take refuge? Which particular attitude and what duration of time does it entail? What particular circumstance is required? What is the purpose and what are the qualities? (Padmasambhava, 1999)

13 Tikkas

are the commentaries on writings or teachings off earlier Buddhists. reference to Padmasambhava.

14 Another

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Above, we see her suggesting (by requesting) a number of clarifications to the philosophy that she has learned in part also by practicing. She pressures her guru, Padma, into explaining the nature and purposes of “taking refuge in” or placing absolute trust in one’s guru, dakini, the sutras and the Dharmas, the mandalas and tikkas of Vajrayna Buddhism. Yeshe Tsoygal knows that tantric activities can induce spiritual entities to aid her meditative practices. This assistance will lead her to even greater accomplishment: that of effortlessly having a perfect memory and complete understanding of all the dharmas and scriptures. She explains that her goal is to attain complete and clear knowledge of Buddhist teachings while in her present incarnation, her present lifetime. She recognizes as threats to her advancement the temptations that are “alien demons.” She writes: My mind is white, whiter than the white snow mountains; it will turn dark, darker than rust, contaminated by the minds of these alien demons. Please look upon me with a little compassion! My mind is good, its quality like gold; it will turn bad, worse than the worst bronze, contaminated by the minds of these alien demons. You who have the Eye of Wisdom, look to me with understanding! My intention is good, like a precious jewel; it will become bad, worthless as stone, contaminated by the intentions of these alien demons. You who have power, please bring it forth now! In one lifetime, in one body, I can realize the highest Dharma. But these alien demons will envelop me in the mire of saṃsāra. You who have compassion, return me quickly to the Path! (snying-po, 1983, p. 23).

She states: And as the result of this practice, may I …be able to protect the teachings of Buddha. May all the sublime teachings taught by Buddha appear, with no effort, within my mind. And, through mastering supreme knowledge such as this, may I attain supreme realization. …[May] I possess the power to spread and expand the Buddha’s precious teachings, realize ultimate wisdom, love and capacity, and so become perfectly enlightened” (Yeshe Tsogyal, Prayer).

11.7 Conclusions The impact of Buddhism on the entire world warrants further examination of the contributions to that philosophy by women. The “Mother of Tibetan Buddhism”, Yeshe Tsogyal, played a critical role in the development of tantric Buddhism. She was both student and teacher to her tantric consort and guru, Padmasambhava, collaborating with him on the production of the most famous work of Tibetan Buddhism: The Tibetan Book of the Dead. In addition, she left her Autobiography, a work entitled Prayer, and another, referred to as Aspiration. She is said to have written in “Dakini script” (which apparently was created in conjunction with the development of written Tibetan).

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In twenty-first century academia Yeshe Tsogyal, the Princess Karchen of Tibet would have met the requirements for tenure and promotion to professorial rank as a philosopher for three reasons. First, she contributed to the theoretical development of an important (and still-active) school of philosophy. Second, she had many students, most of whom studied with her for many years. Third, she published (such as it was during the eighth century in Tibet) by entrusting her termas to the most advanced of her eleven “root” students and they in turn concealing the writings for posterity. The fact that these writings generate philosophical discussions so many centuries later does more than speak to what we might call her “impact factor.” It also indicates that the honorifics bestowed upon Yeshe Tsogyal, “Mother of Tibetan Buddhism” and “Mother of Knowledge” are well deserved.

Appendix I. Prayer Yeshé Tsogyal's Prayer15 Namo Guru: homage to the Guru! Mahā Guru, bless me That in all my lives to come, In the palace in your pure land, Inseparable from you, master, I will always be. And with zeal and devotion, I will serve you and please you, And receive the transmission of your nectar-like blessing Your profound realization, the very essence of your wisdom mind. Let the blessing of your enlightened body, speech and mind, Ripen my own body, speech and mind, So that I gain mastery over the profound Generation and completion stages. May I eliminate completely the demons of wrong views, Along with illness, harmful influence and obstacles, And may good companions and resources multiply, So that my wishes are all fulfilled, just as I desire.

15  Reproduced

under Creative Commons. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License, generated Feb 6 2019 GMT from https://www.lotsawahouse.org/ tibetan-masters/pema-lingpa/yeshe-tsogyals-prayer.

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240 In charnel grounds, hermitages, retreats amid the snows, And other secluded places with all perfect qualities, Let the quintessence of deep samādhi meditation Be my constant practice. And as the result of this practice, May I accomplish the four activities, Turn even gods and rākṣasas into my servants, And so be able to protect the teachings of Buddha. May all the sublime teachings taught by Buddha Appear, with no effort, within my mind; And, through mastering supreme knowledge such as this May I attain supreme realization. Through bodhicitta’s causes and conditions, May I reach and magnetize every single living being,

And through the power of my actions, unbounded like a wish-granting gem, May any connection we have be of deepest benefit and meaning. May I cause the teachings of Buddha to spread, So that lineage holders and teachers of Dharma increase, All beings are brought to bliss, And all realms are purified into buddha fields. From my body, speech and mind, Let infinite emanations appear, To benefit each of those to be trained, Every one according to their needs. May I realize the entirety of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa Is your manifestation, Guru, inseparable from you, And by understanding the three kāyas to be forever indivisible May I swiftly attain the omniscience of buddhahood. May sentient beings offer their prayers, May the masters grant their blessings, May yidam deities grant attainments, May ḍākinīs grant predictions, May Dharma protectors dispel obstacles,

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May the Buddha’s teaching spread and grow, May all beings enjoy happiness and well-being, May they live out the Dharma day and night, May our own and others’ aims be spontaneously accomplished Through this merit, pure by its very nature, Let saṃsāra’s depths, the lower realms, be emptied, So no longer we remain in this ocean of existence, But actualize the three kāyas, together—all as one. Great secret treasure of all the buddhas, Supreme, unsurpassed teaching of Dzogpachenpo, Like a sun rising in the sky, Shine and spread through the entire world! May this merit and my other roots of virtue grow, So that I embody all the precious qualities that fulfil the wishes of the perfect master, possess the power to spread and expand the Buddha’s precious teachings, I realize ultimate wisdom, love and capacity, and so become perfectly enlightened, And all sentient beings in the six realms are freed from saṃsāra’s great ocean of suffering, and quickly attain complete and perfect buddhahood.

Appendix II. Aspiration Prayer for Rebirth in the Copper-Colored Mountain of Glory An Aspiration composed by Khandro Yeshé Tsogyal16 Emaho! Gurus who show me the path pure and profound, yidam deities who grant me all I can desire for practice, and dākinīs who dispel each and every obstacle: I pray to you, please embrace me with your love! When my time of death arrives, let me not cling onto this life, but, intent on traveling to another realm, may I be free of pain as mind and body part! As the appearances of this life fade away, let there be rainbows, flower rains, and relics, and, with voices and instruments melodiously resounding, may the vīras and ākinīs come forth to greet me! With steady mindfulness may my generation stage become clear, and may I actualize the completion stage’s unwavering samadhi! From their union, may I arise in the form of Vajradhara, and travel upon the unmistaken path! Yet, if my karma leads me to wander in

16 Tsogyal

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saṃsāra, may the lands of hell appear as fine celestial palaces, hell’s guardians as deities’ empty yet apparent forms, and may unbearable suffering be perceived as bliss! With vidyādhara gurus closing the ranks, and yidam deity hosts backing me up, may Dharma protectors and guardians escort me and ākinīs come forth to greet me. In U iyāna’s western Copper-Colored Mountain of Glory, in the Lotus Light Net celestial palace, the pure land where vidyādhara gurus reside, may I miraculously take birth within a lotus flower! As soon as I am born, may I meet face to face with Padma, heir of victors, and recognize it is him! Then, with genuine, fierce devotion, may I follow and rely upon him without fail! Thus, becoming an heir to Vidyādhara Padmasambhava, to the buddhas, bodhisattvas, all vidyādharas, the hosts of ākinīs and all victors, may I uphold the teachings’ unfaltering banner! Swiftly liberating all beings of the three realms from the vast ocean of saṃsāra, may I become an omniscient guide to beings, capable of leading them all to the land of liberation! By the blessings of the utmost Three Jewels,17 the power of hosts of yidam deities, and the force of my pure altruistic wish, may my prayers be fulfilled in this very way!

Colophon: Here ends the prayer composed by Khandro Yeshé Tsogyel in the forest charnel ground of Chimpu. Translated at the request of Kyapgön Phakchok Rinpoche by his faithful disciple, Oriane Sherap Lhamo, for the benefit of the sangha and of all beings. Lhasey Lotsawa Translations, Jan. 2021.

Appendix III: Autobiography (Excerpt) The following is excerpted from the autobiography of Yeshe Tsogyal as she dictated it to her student sNying-po, from a rediscovered terma text (Gyatso, 2006). Listen, faithful Tibetans! I am the great Ye-shes mTsho-rgyal-ma! My destructible parts have united with the indestructible expanse; they have become one with the Buddhas in the realm of Padma-'od, the expanse of the Dharma. Do not suffer needlessly. Be happy! The sentient beings of Tibet suffer endlessly, harmed by many and varied karmic actions. But your suffering is self-produced-can't you see that? The Three Jewels are the refuge place of sufferers: pray to each one pointedly with your whole being. I, the great Ye-shes mTsho-rgyal-ma, have gone from the impure, the defiled, into space, but I can still magically manifest to help beings. Do not suffer needlessly. Rejoice! This world is so heavy, weighted down by the ripening of impure karmic actions. Don't you see how relying on emotionality leads to misfortune? The holy Dharma is the way to gain maturity. Take to heart its teachings on the ten virtues, such as effort and the others. I, the great Ye-shes mTsho-rgyal-ma, because of spiritual maturation, have gone to the realm of total purity. (snying-po, 1983)

17 Siddhartha

Gautama the Buddha, dharma (teachings of the buddha), and sangya (the community of enlightened monks and nuns).

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References Dalai Lama XIV. “Mahāyāna/Vajrayana Practice, Tricycle: The Buddhist Review. https://tricycle. org/magazine/mahayana-vajrayana-practice. Accessed March 18, 2022. Dowman, K. (1996). Sky dancer: The secret life and songs of the lady Yeshe Tsoygel. Snow Lion. Encyclopedia of Buddhism. (2021, January 17). Retrieved from Encyclopedia of Buddhism: https://encyclopediaofbuddhism.org/wiki/terma Gyatso, J. (n.d.). A partial genealogy of the life story of Ye shes mtsho rgyal. 1–27. Gyatso, J. (2006, August). A Partial Genealogy of the Lifestory of Ye shes mtsho rgyal. Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies, 2, 1–27. Retrieved June 10, 2019, from Himalayan Art: http: //www .thlib.org?tid=T2719 Lama, D. (n.d.). Mahāyāna/Vajrayana Practice. Tricycle: The Buddhist review. Retrieved January 2, 2022, from https://tricycle.org/magazine/mahayana-vajrayana-practice Padmasambhava. (1999). Dakini teachings. Rangjung Yeshe. ReligionFacts.com. (2016, October 28). Religionfacts.com/bon “Bon.”. Retrieved March 6, 2020, from “Bon.” ReligionFacts.com.: http://www.religionfacts.com/bon Rinpoche, G. A. (2010). The Tibetan book of the dead: The great liberation through hearing in the Bardo. (F. Fremantle, Trans.). Shambhala. Rossi, D. (2000). The philosophical view of the great perfection in the Tibetan Bon Religion. Shambhala Publications. snying-po, N.-m. (1983). Mother of knowledge: The enlightenment of Ye-shes mTsho-rgyal (J. Wilhelms, Ed., & M. o.-s.-r.-m.-p. Wilhelms, Trans.). Dharma Publishing. snying-po, N.-m. (1983). Mother of knowledge: The enlightenment of Ye-shes mTsho-rgyal. 1983. Translation by Jane Wilhelms, ed. Dharma Publishing (pp. 23–24). (J. Wilhelms, Ed., & T. Tulku., Trans.) Dharma. Thondup, T. (1997). Hidden teachings of Tibet: An explanation of the Terma Tradition of the Nyingma School of Buddhism. Wisdom Publications. Tibetan Book of the Dead. (1994). (R. Thurman, Trans.) Bantam Press. Tsogyal, Y. (n.d.). Autobiography p.11. Tsogyal, Y. (n.d.) Zangdok Palri Aspiration. Translated by Oriane Sherap Lhamo. Lhasey Lotsawa Translations and Publications.

Chapter 12

Murasaki Shikibu portrait by Tosa Mitsuoki in public domain due to the antiquity of the artist. Downloaded from Wikimedia Commons, cropped and color-enhanced by editors of this volume.

Murasaki Shikibu of Japan 紫式部 Circa 978–Circa 1000 Sandra A. Wawrytko

Abstract  Murasaki Shikibu is from the Fujiwara clan of poets, lawyers and government officials. Her thought is grounded in a combination of Japanese animist Shinto, Japanese versions of Mayahana Buddhism (Tendai and Shigon), as well as Confucianism and its Daoist foundations. Murasaki’s great philosophical epic novel, Genji Monagatori (Tale of Genji), her diary, (Murasaki Shikibu Nikki) and her Poetic Memoirs (Murasaki Shikibu shū) discuss metaphysical issues such as the nature of being, women’s souls, women’s rights, the nature of love, and other topics too detailed to present here. Murasaki is Japan’s first-known female philosopher. Her serially-published epic has been translated into many languages and has never been out of print.

S. A. Wawrytko (*)  San Diego State University, San Diego, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_12

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12.1 Introduction The woman we know as Murasaki Shikibu has been hailed as “Japan’s most accomplished exponent of the art of prose fiction and an author of world stature.” (Murasaki, 1982, p. vii) Her work has spawned a vast field of scholarship, almost exclusively focused on literary commentaries and critiques in Japan and beyond. However, in standard biographical accounts Murasaki is usually categorized as a novelist, in fact author of the world’s first novel to delve the depths of the human mind. A noteworthy exception to Murasaki’s relegation to literature is found in Mary Ellen Waithe’s chapter on Murasaki in A History of Women Philosophers. Waithe readily admits that those steeped in the traditions of Amero-eurocentric philosophy are not likely to recognize Murasaki’s philosophical contributions given the novel format. Elements in the The Tale of Genji (Genji Monogatari) related to aesthetics, moral philosophy, philosophy of religion (Shintō), cosmology and metaphysics are examined. Waithe also suggests that Murasaki be read as a “literary existentialist philosopher” in the mode of Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky, de Beauvoir, or Sartre, who address “existential questions” such as intentionality, human relationships, and the meaning of life (Waithe, 1989). While this approach allows contemporary readers to engage with Murasaki’s explorations of the human condition beyond cultural contexts, there is much more to be gleaned from her philosophy of life and death. The Japanese recognize Murasaki’s groundbreaking novel for redirecting the evolution of their civilization. Her work both chronicled and decisively shaped the aesthetic of imperial court culture in the period of Middle Antiquity (794–1156), a time when a distinct Japanese identity was being defined against the backdrop of China’s cultural exports. Yasunari Kawabata considers Genji “the highest pinnacle of Japanese literature” that has never been matched, something both modern and miraculous (Kawabata, 1969, pp. 46–47). Themes derived from Genji permeated Noh drama in the Muromachi period (1336–1573), and continue to inspire readers today.1 The abiding respect and awe generations of Japanese have for this work is succinctly expressed by Hagiwara Hiromachi (1815–1863): “The more one reads Genji the more difficult it becomes to express how exceptional it is.” (Caddeau, 2006, p. 1). Within the field of philosophy, the book’s author, Murasaki, is generally relegated to the field of aesthetics, if she is recognized at all. Yet her novel remains relevant for exploring and addressing the universal human condition. She subtly

1 See Jeremy Ingalls’ Preface to her translation of the contemporary novel Tenno Yūgao by Yoichi Nakagawa (1897–1944): “Tenno Yūgao never explicitly mentions Genji but through a series of signals repeatedly points to it.... pointing not solely to the situation in Murasaki’s ‘Yūgao’ chapter but to the import of the fictional career of Prince Genji, inclusive of his state of mind in his middle years and just prior to his death. The ingenuities of Nakagawa’s design also accommodate allusions to the life-history of Murasaki herself.” Nakagawa’s Tenno Yūgao (Boston: Twayne, 1975), 25–26.

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exposes the same delusions that plague human relationships and fuel the socio-political conflicts we continue to experience today (Lucas-Hall, 2020). However, Murasaki is more than a mere spinner of fiction. Beneath the surface of her narrative we can discern her mastery of skillful means (upāya) through which her labyrinthian tale imparts Buddhism’s philosophy of awakening. Her carefully crafted characters demonstrate the possibility of an epistemological shift from a poisonous quest for power and fame to joyous engagement with Suchness (Sanskrit Tathātā; Chinese 真如 zhen ru), reality as it is. Murasaki’s philosophical works—in both poetry and prose—reflect modes of discourse common in many Asian philosophies, seamlessly integrating profound insights with powerful parables and salient images. I contend that Murasaki was a brilliant novelist because she was a philosopher. She was a philosopher because she dared to flout the limitations imposed on the education of women by surreptitiously learning to read Chinese. Through her father (a serious student of Chinese and Japanese classics) and her husband (whose extensive library of Chinese texts she inherited), she had access to and knowledge of scholarly texts. Most importantly, through her study of Buddhist sūtras she gained a penetrating insight into the mind. This is attested to by the innovative introspections of her characters as well as her own ruminations concerning impermanence (anitya), psychological suffering (duḥkha), and liberation. She brazenly displays her forbidden erudition in the opening chapter of her novel. The entire plot is set in motion by the incendiary love of Genji’s father echoing the “reckless infatuation” of a Chinese emperor chronicled in Bai Juyi’s (白居易772-846) beloved poem, “The Song of Unending Sorrow” (Chang Hen Ge 長恨歌). Recognizing the Buddhist influence on her work demonstrates that it much more than a feminist critique of Heian society. The Genji text is often framed as a tale of two worlds—the public political sphere of men and the sequestered private sphere of women. The situation is much more complicated and ultimately not defined by gender. Instead, we have those enthralled by the deluded game of court politics (mainly men) and those who are viewed as mere pawns (mainly women). Among the marginalized are many who find refuge in Buddhism, having realized the superficiality of court gamesmanship. Chapter by chapter Murasaki reveals the hidden lives of women characters, who maintain the life necessities that allow the players to construct their “The Floating Bridge of Dreams.”2 Their dedication to beauty in the arts and Nature, grounded in primal emotional relationships, is the true expression of Heian culture that has been preserved to the present day. Success, self-gratification, and competition are the momentary delusions that entrap most of the men and some of the women (for example, the politically motivated empress implicated in the death of her rival, Genji’s mother) in the court. Correspondingly, key male characters, whether protective fathers or retired officials, prove to be allies of women. Genji “shines” because he rejects the toxic

2 The

title of the closing chapter of Genji, 54.

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masculinity that dismisses women as “bits of driftwood.” (Murasaki, 1980, p. 41) Nonetheless, having been excluded from the imperial succession, he is driven to create an alternative imperial court. As a deft player in the game of marriage politics Genji deploys a cohort of women to become the power behind the throne, only to fade away into oblivion, his death only noted in passing. Hence, within the context of Buddhist philosophy, Murasaki’s message need not be read as a complaint of victimization, but rather a path to empowerment.

12.2 Biography The author’s original name was Tō no shikibu; tō (fuji) which means wisteria, and which indicates her membership in the politically powerful Fujiwara clan. Due to the success of the novel, people in the court referred to the author as Murasaki, her central female character. Murasaki is an herb, whose root was used to make a purple dye associated with the highest nobility in the Heian period. The color also was associated with “relationship and lasting passion,” clearly evident in the character Murasaki. (Murasaki, 2001, p. 1157). The author places her character in the Ministry of Rites (Shikibu no Daijō) branch of the clan, a position her father occupied early in his court career (Murasaki, 1982, p. 7). The author may have intended her readers to identify her with the character, since both are part of the Fujiwara clan and rely on Buddhism during times of personal crisis. However, the lives of these two Murasakis were significantly different. The author’s social status was much more secure and privileged than her character’s. Her father encouraged her literary studies and allowed her to postpone marriage until her twenties (at a time when teenage marriage was the norm). She enjoyed a brief but loving relationship with her much older husband and gave birth to a daughter. As a widow she was invited to assume a high position in the imperial court, as companion and mentor to the young empress. She also acquired a level of education far beyond what was expected or allowed for women. She was relatively free to travel and experience the world beyond the confines of her home. And yet her Diary reveals her unease among the ladies at court. Her very accomplishments made her self-conscious about their negative assessments of her as “pretentious, awkward, difficult to approach, prickly, too fond of her tales, haughty, prone to versifying, disdainful, cantankerous and scornful.” (Murasaki, 1982, p. 135). The character Murasaki was burdened by a precarious social status. Her mother, a concubine, died when Murasaki was a child; her father’s wife then drove her away. Kidnapped at age ten by Genji, she is forced into a pseudo-marriage while still a young teen. As a live-in companion/concubine she evolves into a glorified housekeeper, sidelined by Genji’s two strategic marriages to high status women. Her only education comes from Genji’s tutoring, a Pygmalion-esque project aimed at creating his notion of the ideal woman. Her life is one of strict confinement, presaged by an episode when she first appears in the novel at age

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ten. Angry upon learning that her baby sparrows have escaped, her grandmother, a nun, reminds her that it is a sin to hold them captive (a violation of Buddhist non-injury, ahiṁsā). Like those sparrows she soon becomes caged herself. While this protects her against predatory crows (prowling males), it also deprives her of the level of freedom the author enjoyed.3 Over the course of the novel, however, Genji’s Murasaki grows into the womanly ideal of the author: “The key is to be pleasant, gentle, properly relaxed, and self-possessed; that is what makes for charm and composure in a woman.”4 Unlike the author, her character becomes a beloved figure, known to be compassionate and caring to all. Contemporary author and Buddhist nun, Setouchi Jakucho who translated Genji into modern Japanese, notes the prominence of Buddhist practice for both the author and her characters. Setouchi interprets the novel as a feminist critique of Heian society rather than homage to the character Genji. Setouchi argues that the author is most closely related to the character Ukifune (Drifting Boat), who liberates herself from cultural constraints imposed on women by taking refuge in the Sangha: Almost three-quarters of the women characters become nuns. The last one is Ukifune. The scene of her shaving her head is so detailed and real. Before Ukifune, whenever a woman character renounced the world, it was simply described with the words, ‘she renounced the world’ and ‘Genji wept’ and that’s all. With Ukifune, there are descriptions such as, ‘the lead priest told her to bow to the Buddha,’ ‘face this direction’ and ‘express your thanks to your mother and father.’ The words, the sutras, and the order of the process are exactly the same as those I used! Then I understood: aha! Lady Murasaki herself had renounced the world when she wrote these final chapters. (Jakucho, 2011)

Murasaki was born into a family grounded in literary studies, especially poetry. Her great grandfather Kanesuke (877–933), her grandfather Masatada (910?–962), and her father Tametoki wrote and collected poetry, as did her husband Fujiwara no Nobutaka (950?–1001).5 She obviously was quite intelligent, having learned Chinese by listening to her brother’s lessons. She was well-read in Chinese and Buddhist texts along with Japanese literature. (Morris, 1969, pp. 264–268). In her diary she mentions her resolve to “put my trust in Amitābha and immerse myself in reading sutras.” (Murasaki, 1982, p. 139). Largely because of these educational opportunities Murasaki felt estranged from her own cultural context. Her diary mentions numerous incidents of harassment she suffered from women in the court. They attributed her melancholy to her being overeducated, shy, and dull, and one

3 For a detailed discussion of the Murasaki-Genji relationship, including the erotic symbolism of the sparrows, see Bargen, Chap. 7, “Murasaki: Kaimami through a Woman’s Eyes,” Mapping Courtship, 146–95. 4 Bowring in Murasaki (1982), pp. 135–37. The passage continues with some insights into the author’s avoidance of moral judgements in her novel: “No matter how amorous or capricious one may be, as long as you are well-meaning at heart and refrain from anything that might cause embarrassment to others, you will be forgiven”. 5 Murasaki’s daughter Kenshi or Katako (999- ~ 1080), later known as Daini no Sanmi, continued the family’s literary tradition, distinguishing herself as a poet.

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viewed her as an aberration among court women, who resented her unique literary accomplishments. They even saddled her with the nickname “Our Lady of the Chronicles,” which Murasaki found “utterly ridiculous.” (Murasaki, 1982, pp. 133–137) This drew her even closer to the solace of Buddhism. Defiant, Murasaki tells us her secret retort—“I’ve never seen anyone who lived longer just because they obeyed a prohibition.” She avoids saying this out loud because “that would be inconsiderate of me, for what they say is not unreasonable.” (Murasaki, 1982, pp. 133–135). Nonetheless she seems to express her feelings about her alienation in Genji with a parody of “a remarkably wise woman,” daughter of “a learned scholar,” adept at giving advice about both “public affairs” and “private life.” The man who encounters her admits “Her erudition would have put any ordinary sage to shame. In a word, I was awed into silence.” Finding her wisdom beneficial for his own career advancement, including her mastery of written Chinese, he is tempted to marry her. He is finally saved from this fate of perpetual inferiority to such a “formidable” wife by a “noisome odor” she acquires due to medicine required to treat an illness. This gives him an excuse to end the relationship. Interestedly the men he tells the story to refuse to believe it. One of them declares it “A complete fabrication, from start to finish. Where could you find such a woman? Better to have a quiet evening with a witch.” (Murasaki, 1980, pp. 35–36).6

12.3 Philosophical Background Buddhism was the prevailing religion/philosophy in the Heian court. The Tendai sect, described as ‘the Heian state religion,” had become dominant due to the support of the powerful Fujiwara clan. (Morris, 1969, p. 114). Tendai’s core text was the Lotus Sūtra, which set forth a sweeping doctrine of universal Buddhahood and Buddha wisdom “embracing all species.” (Lotus Sutra, 1993, p. 31) Despite the tendency to read the text selectively to protect the presumed male privilege of awakening, the sūtra includes multiple instances where women’s access to awakening is confirmed.7 Those seeking help from a higher power invoked Amida Buddha to insure rebirth in the Western Paradise. The Buddhist Shingon sect also flourished among the aristocracy, who embraced its elaborate rituals and artistic expressions, tinged with Tantric elements.

6 The

conversation then turns to general types of annoying women—those who flaunt literary accomplishments they lack and those who misuse and abuse poetry. Both types also are criticized by Murasaki in her diary, with special mention of Sei Shōnagon; (Murasaki 1982, p. 131). 7 In this chapter contains a decisive rejection of the Five Obstacles that prevent women from becoming Buddha, accompanied by a clear case of an awakened female—the dragon king’s daughter. The next chapter, “Encouraging Devotion,” includes Buddha’s prophecy for the future Buddhahood of the 6,000 nuns in attendance, led by Buddha’s aunt Mahāprajāpatī; Watson, pp. 190–95. (See also Chap. 5 of this volume, Mahāprajāpatī Gotama).

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Morris cites evidence in Murasaki’s writings “that she knew a great deal about the intricate Buddhist ceremonial, its hierarchy, and its monastic orders” as well as Tendai texts and sūtras available at the time (Morris, 1969, p. 269). More specifically, one could argue that Murasaki “leans” or relies on8 a philosophical classic esteemed for both its wisdom and literary value—The Sūtra of the White Lotus Flower of the Wonderful Law (Saddharma-pundarīka-sūtra). As a core text revered by the Heian court, references to this sūtra, both direct and indirect, are interwoven throughout the novel’s intricate plotlines. More commonly known as the Lotus Sūtra, this vastly influential text has been described by Nikkyō Niwano as “the teaching of human respect, self-perfection, and peace. In short, it is the teaching of humanism.” (Niwano, 1990, p. xxii). Nonetheless, many Heian beliefs misinterpreted Buddha’s philosophy to accommodate Japanese culture. Buddhism was infused with Shintō beliefs and practices grounded in deep-rooted superstitions. Murasaki’s novel includes numerous incidents of malevolent spirits responsible for illness or even death. Exorcism ceremonies include sūtra chanting by priests. The dualistic notion of spirits that could act independent of a physical body obviously is inconsistent with the Buddhist doctrine of an-ātman, the denial of an ātman or soul. Murasaki’s diary includes passages that indicate her skepticism about such beliefs. She provides a detailed description of exorcism rituals performed when the empress experiences problems giving birth. A horde of priests descends on the palace to ward off evil spirits “with the ceaseless chanting of loud spells,” while teams of female mediums and exorcists attempted to capture them. The fierce Shingon guardian deity Fudō is summoned to help. Simultaneously some of the male courtiers disgracefully seize this opportunity to peek at the ladies behind their curtains. Bowring comments “Murasaki is not in the habit of bestowing many honorifics upon the clergy,” (Murasaki, 1982, p. 54) which may well reflect her cynicism regarding the entire spectacle. Bargen concurs: “Murasaki describes pandemonium. The high drama of possession, exorcism, and childbirth degenerates into farce.” (Bargen, 1997, pp. 16–17). A more direct expression of her views on spirit-possession is found in her Poetic Memoirs. A scroll depicting “the grotesque form of a woman who was possessed,” as a young priest wrestles with “a former wife who had become a devil” as the husband chants sūtras, provokes a poetic response (44): “Although his dead wife / Becomes the pretext, / Is he not in fact / Wracked by devils / That lie within?” (Murasaki, 1982, p. 231)9 Jealous women were portrayed as horned demons, reflected in the “horn-hider” (tsunokakushi 角隠し) head

8 Near the end of the Heart Sūtra the bodhisattva of Compassion, Avalokiteśvara, states: “In the three worlds (past, present, future)/every Buddha depends/leans on wisdom gone beyond (prajñā-pāramitā),/then realizes the supreme ultimate awakening (Anuttara Samyak Sambodhi).” (My translation.) Wisdom Gone Beyond is in fact all-encompassing Compassion in Mahāyāna Buddhism. 9 See also Bargen, A Woman’s Weapon, for a discussion of this poem and Murasaki’s unorthodox psychological perspective regarding spirit possession; 23–25.

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cloth traditionally worn by a bride to signal her promise to forswear jealousy.10 Passionate Heian ladies presumably had the power to avenge themselves against unfaithful lovers by attacking their rivals through a malevolent spiritual force while either alive (as a “living ghost,” ikiryō) or dead. (Morris, 1969, p. 132). Several such cases are mentioned in Genji, some of which proved fatal to the intended target (including Genji’s first wife Aoi). However, unaware of having initiated such attacks, the women are not held responsible for them. This poem seems to indicate that Murasaki rejects these shamanistic relics. However a reply to this unorthodox reassessment of spirit possession also is recorded: “Of course! / Because your heart / Is wrapped in darkness, / The shape of devils / Must be clear to you.” (45) The identity of the poet is not clear. It may be Murasaki’s rebuttal for presuming to judge the husband.11 This is consistent with the non-discriminating mind’s “view of no view” in the Avataṁsaka Sūtra: “No view is seeing / Which can see all things; / If one has any views about things, / This is not seeing anything.”(Cleary, 1993, p. 14). Buddhist philosophy attributes our suffering to deluded perceptions of reality, which prevent us from seeing reality as it is, Suchness. Hence the absence of moral judgements about the often-blameworthy behavior of characters in the novel, which enraged Confucian critics. A shift from cultural consensus regarding spirit possession to realistic doubts about that “view” allows Murasaki to plumb the depths of her own mind as well as the minds of her characters. Speaking about the empress she serves Murasaki marvels at “how she can cause a change of heart in someone so disenchanted with life as myself” by her emotional restraint. (Murasaki, Murasaki Shikibu: Her Diary and Poetic Memoirs, 1982, p. 43). Later she muses on the enigma of memory: “Strange how a little incident like this [seeing a young man who reminds her of “the hero in a romance”] suddenly comes back to one, whereas something that moved one deeply at the time can be forgotten with the passage of the years.” (Murasaki, Murasaki Shikibu: Her Diary and Poetic Memoirs, 1982, p. 47). The disassociation of superstitions from authentic Buddhist philosophy is voiced in the novel by a bishop instrumental in the rescue of a young woman who attempts suicide. When she is found under a tree his disciples fear they have encountered a fox, who has assumed a human form to trick them. The bishop is skeptical because he has no previous experience of such a being. While the others remain wary, the bishop expresses the compassion appropriate in a Buddhist practitioner: “It is sad when the fish that swim in the lake or the stag that bays in the hills must die for want of help. Life is fleeting. We must cherish what we have of it, even so little as a day or two.” (Murasaki, 1980, p. 1046). Another indicator

10 Cf.

Morris, 250, note 3. Murasaki did author the response, Bargen argues that she “doubly endorses her own unorthodox view by demonstrating the clever readiness with which one projects the inner demons outside oneself.... There is a suggestion that the audience’s degree of involvement to some extent determines the perception of phenomenon”; A Woman’s Weapon, 25. 11 If

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of the author’s disdain for shamanistic practices is seen in her use of Bai Juyi’s poem of tragic lovers. She completely ignores part of the story that may have been appreciated by her readers—the emperor’s use of a Daoist priest to seek his dead lover, who is known in the afterlife as “The Ever True.” (Birch, 1989, p. 208).

12.4 Works In addition to Murasaki’s massive novel (over one thousand pages in English translation), two other primary texts widen our access to her philosophy—her personal diary and poetic memoirs. In addition, her novel relies heavily on poetic communications between its characters, which reflects customary forms of social interaction in Heian court culture. Goff notes “the [795] waka and countless poetic allusions scattered through the text help to establish setting and tone and delineate character as well as furthering the plot.” (Goff, 1991, pp. 15–16).

12.4.1 Poetic Memoirs (Murasaki Shikibu shū) Circa 1014 Composed throughout Murasaki’s life, this text consists of poems by Murasaki, often accompanied by poetic responses from recipients of the poems. Although this work by Murasaki has only recently attracted scholarly scrutiny (Murasaki, 1982, p. 209), it may be the most important source for understanding her as a philosopher. With no fictitious characters filtering her message, and no focus on events, her personal poems, presented with minimal comments, provide insight into her introspective process. Although we rarely associate poetry with philosophy in European traditions, the power of poetry in Asian cultures is immense. It has been interwoven into philosophical discourse for thousands of years, from Hindus and Buddhists to Confucians, Daoists, and even Neo-Confucians. Recall that Plato planned to exclude poets from his utopian Republic precisely because of their persuasiveness, perceived as a threat to his dualistic model of rationality.12 It is essential that we clarify the poetic standards and practices adhered to in Murasaki’s time. It is impossible to savor the original meaning of poems in translation, since that process removes the intricate rhyming protocols. An additional barrier are the literary allusions required to demonstrate poetic prowess. The poetic process requires much more than merely adhering to traditional conventions. The successful poem depends as much, if not more, on what it does not rather than what it does reveal. Hiromichi considers Murasaki’s “use of the

12 Plato, Republic, 607b5‒6. We easily forget that the Pre-socratic philosophy Parmenides emulated Homeric poetry in his metaphysical treatise On Nature (Peri Physeos). See Wawrytko (2014), “Interpenetration of Art and Philosophy”.

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principle of composition known as ‘ellipsis’ (fude o habuku nori)” to be uniquely pervasive in the novel: “the author consciously avoided writing any more than was necessary.”13 The interaction between the poet and her intended audience represents a form of co-creativity. Similarly in Murasaki’s Genji “the art of descriptive understatement was a sign of her creativity, reserve, and aesthetic sensibility…. The reader’s imagination thus becomes engaged in filling in the gaps planted by the author.”14 Not only must the writer embed her message aesthetically—the one receiving the message must be willing and able to decode it. In most cases multiple meanings are possible. This is a key element in the process, giving the poet what we today might call “plausible deniability” if the intended message conceals a critique. This liberates the poet to speak her mind in a way that otherwise would be socially unacceptable or even hazardous when speaking truth to power. This poetic structure can be traced back to one of China’s oldest texts, the Shijing 詩經or Book of Odes, consisting of poems meant to be sung. The “Great Preface” to this text sets forth “Six Principles” of poetic composition, that were embraced in the Japanese Kokinshū, an anthology of poems compiled early in the tenth century that was well known to Murasaki. Two of these principles are of special significance in Murasaki’s poetic compositions: bi 比 (comparison), and xing 興 (association). Together they offer a dynamic juxtapositioning of inner thoughts or feelings with one’s physical environment, whether natural or social. The primal philosophy of the Yijing 易經 assumes such a cosmic resonance or correspondence exists between humans and their environment.15

12.4.2 Diary (Murasaki Shikibu Nikki) Circa. 1008–1010 Documenting roughly a two-year period when Murasaki first joined the imperial court, this text does not follow the usual format of a dairy as a day by day accounting of experiences. Instead it shifts from reports on daily life with Empress Shōshei right before she gives birth at the mansion of her father, Michinaga (966–1027), to Murasaki’s self-reflections. It is interspersed with poems layered with deep meanings and complicated literary allusions. Bowring has provided a detailed analysis of four distinct sections of the text. (Murasaki, 1982, pp. 25–40) He also examines evidence for the theory that some parts of the text are

13 Quoted

by Caddeau, 109. refers to this as “an aesthetics of ambiguity”; 109. 15 Richard Rutt (The Book of Changes (Zhouyi), 1996) explains this how process unfolds in the Shijing: “the poem moves directly from this visual image to a reflection on the matter in the poet’s mind or heart, bearing a relation to the image that is by no means obvious.... Lack of connecting words, too, is typical of Zhouyi [Yijing]. When read beside the Odes [Shijing], this construction, half rational, half emotional, clearly appears as part of the budding of literature, the discovery of images and experimentation with figures of speech”; 141–142. 14 Caddeau

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missing, based on a lack of narrative continuity. The first 54 sections constitute 65% of the extant text, mostly a report on events and ceremonies surrounding the birth of the imperial prince. There seems to be a transition toward analysis of the court environment starting with Sections 52 through 54 (A), including often critical assessments of the ladies serving the empress. Sections 55 to 72 (B 20%) are framed, and referred to, as a letter to a close acquaintance, possibly her daughter. Sections 73–75 (C 5%), include three distinct scenes, two of which contain love poems. Sections 76–80 (D 10%) provide no clear sense of a closure, perhaps indicating missing sections or an abrupt end to the writing process. Bowring discerns a carefully crafted sequence of the sections, reflective of the author’s literary skill. For example, in the opening sections there is a subtle shift “from visual to aural images… all reinforced by onomatopoeia” as night falls. (Murasaki, 1982, p. 44) Similarly slight changes in word choice and verb tense indicate a change from a record of direct observation to reliance on memory. (Murasaki, 1982, p. 46). When Murasaki makes a seemingly abrupt transition from a discussion of a literary contest to fans Bowring states “Murasaki shows us just how erudite she can be…. What might appear at first to be a section with little justification or relevance to the surrounding prose turns out to be a carefully integrated piece of writing. (Murasaki, 1982, p. 48)” Her novel must be read with the same awareness of and sensitivity to the elaborate nuances even a single word can harbor.

12.4.3 The Tale of Genji (Genji Monogatari) Circa 1002–102216 Murasaki’s magnum opus is an impressive feat unique in world literature. Its fifty-four chapters feature more than 430 characters floating through political schemes and emotional entanglements in the court over a seventy-five-year period. Genji is the most prominent member of the imperial line while the character Murasaki becomes the key figure within the rival Fujiwara line. A most notable aspect of the novel is its permissive attitude toward sexual relationships. While formal marriages are usually arranged alliances between families, both men and women in the novel exercise an incredible amount of freedom in their clandestine affairs. Genji himself has two official marriages and maintains extended ties with ten “significant others.” It is generally believed that Murasaki began work on the novel shortly after the death of her husband, prior to joining the imperial court in 1005 or 1006. Her motivation in writing it remains open to speculation. The composition process, which possibly took place over twenty years, has been described as a refuge from

16 See

Morris for a more detailed analysis of possible timelines suggested by scholars, 274.

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her loneliness and sense of alienation. Bowring asserts that the novel is, like all fiction, “subversive,” given its “taboo-breaker” hero. (Murasaki, 1982, p. 34) He further suggests that its groundbreaking format is the product of “an introverted consciousness that fed on itself.” (Murasaki, 1982, p. 36). Such theories invite us to assume that Murasaki was an overly sensitive artist sunk in a sea of subjectivity. However, a case can be made for a deeper motivation derived from Buddhist philosophy, the intent being not merely to disparage the deluded status quo but seek to transform it. Significantly, the intricate plot is set in motion by the death of a lover and the intense mourning that ensues. In this case it is the emperor who has lost the love of his life, a woman undervalued by others solely on the basis of the court hierarchy—she was “a lady not of the first rank.” Perceived as “a reckless infatuation” that had endangered the stability of the state, the emperor finds little sympathy from the other palace ladies for his “dew-drenched autumn” grief (Murasaki, 1980, pp. 3, 7). The empress, hoping to move on after the demise of her rival, finds his behavior “ridiculous” and violates protocol by playing music in her apartments “deep into the night.” (Murasaki, 1980, p. 12). So even the ostensibly most powerful person in the country is not permitted the time and space needed to work through his emotional crisis. It is a classic clash between the demands of giri (義理social obligations) and ninjo (人情human feelings) suffusing the human condition.17 Murasaki’s Poetic Memoirs reveal a similar lack of support and empathy when her beloved husband died. None of the extant poems directly mentions his death. Instead there are veiled references to a wild goose that has flown away (39), a sky “dark, dyed black” (40), and “a world where all/Wear the garb of sadness” (41). (Murasaki, 1982, pp. 9–30) While still in mourning she recounts unwelcomed advances. Someone asked “whether my door was now open,” to which she responded: “From whose village / Does he come in spring? / The warbler / Asking at this house / Enfolded in the haze.” (Murasaki, 1982, pp. 51, 233). Murasaki also reports being berated at court for her melancholy mood, attributed to her unorthodox insistence on reading Chinese texts. (Murasaki, 1982, p. 113) Yet when she receives a poem implying that, as a widow, she is past her prime she retorts: “I know full well / The morning glory fades / As does the dew,/ Yet still I mourn / This evanescence.” (Murasaki, 1982, pp. 53, 233–234). Near the end of the novel a Buddhist bishop reflects on the inevitable fact of impermanence: “for me, for you, for most of us, bonds with this transient world are not easy to break so long as we remain preoccupied with its illusory triumphs and glories.” (Murasaki, 1980, p. 1072). Buddhist Dharma offers an effective response to these superficial attachments that is grounded in Buddha wisdom, which Murasaki seems to realize but is

17 Observing

low ranking workers struggling under the weight of a palanquin, Murasaki muses: “Are we really that different? Even those of us who mix with nobility are bound by our rank. How difficult life is!” Bowring in Murasaki 1982, 77.

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struggling to implement: “Is there a fate / That could at the very least / Bring satisfaction? / The truth I realize / But cannot yet accept.” (Murasaki, 1982, pp. 56, 234–235) This poem (56) belongs to a series believed to express Murasaki’s grief at the loss of her husband. (Murasaki, 1982, pp. 234–235). The Poetic Memoirs (57) reveals her trepidation about entering the palace—would this new environment cure her melancholy or increase it? In the Diary she admits to a conflict between her realization of Buddhist truth and her ability to accept or implement it: “Those who go out of their way to hurt others deserve to be ridiculed, as do those who act thoughtlessly even though they may not mean to. Some people are so good-natured that they can still care for those who hate them, but I myself find it very difficult.” She wonders if “Buddha himself in all his compassion” could put up with all insults. (Murasaki, 1982, p. 137) She hesitates to seek refuge in the Sangha as a nun, a common choice made by widows (including Genji’s stepmother), confessing “a strong sense of attachment for this world.” (Murasaki, 1982, p. 141). Did the novel allow her to work through these intellectual and emotional struggles?

12.5 Philosophical Methodology Multiple perceptions of Genji have arisen over the centuries. Some argue it is “a Buddhist parable” intent on warning readers of the retribution awaiting sinners. (Shirane, 1987, pp. 174–175). Andō Tameakira attempted to avoid an imposition of “foreign values” on the text, whether Buddhist or Confucian, to reveal the uniquely Japanese aesthetic of profound emotional sensitivity, mono no aware. (Shirane, 1987, p. 175). Literally translated this key term is “Ah-ness!,” an emotional response to things (mono 物) we become aware of (no aware哀れ).18 In cognitive science terminology, it as a form of stimulus-driven ventral attention lateralized in the right hemisphere of the brain that processes emotions but is devoid of language (hence the exclamatory “Ah!”). While the emotional component is indeed crucial to the text, there is much more to be discovered here. Murasaki’s literary style has been described as a melding of “sociological realism, social comedy, psychological subtleties, historical perspective, and metaphysical seriousness.” (Ingalls, 1975, p. 27). Little attention has been given to the author’s philosophical analysis of reality, beginning with the Fourfold Noble Truth expounded by Śākyamuni Buddha concerning thirst or craving (tṛṣṇā), aroused by the Three Poisons, as the cause of suffering (duḥkha). The antidotes to these poisons are the recognition of Impermanence (anitya), Interconnectedness (pratitya-samutpada),

18 The

term aware evolved from “a mere exclamation, devoid of aesthetic connotations” to “an emotion containing an element of balance.... deep impressions produced by small things,” “elegance rather than... grandeur or magnificence”; Hisamatsu Sen’ichi, The Vocabulary of Japanese Literary Aesthetics (Tokyo: Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1963), 14–15.

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and non-self (an-ātman). Following the unfolding message of the Lotus Sūtra, Murasaki’s narrative moves from gradual realization of Buddha Wisdom regarding the superficiality of court culture (LS 1–14) to the character Murasaki’s cultivation of Compassion toward those acting on deluded perceptions (15–27). Ultimately the fullness of Practice becomes possible for Ukifune at the end of the novel, who liberates herself from Heian gamesmanship by becoming a nun (28). Assuming there is philosophical content in the novel, we first need to consider why our philosopher has chosen this particular literary form to convey her thoughts. Years after the novel was written and widely circulated it was condemned; critics claimed the author “was cast into hell for the sin of writing fiction.” (Goff, 1991, p. 199). Yet the popular Noh play, Praying for Genji (Genji kuyō) presents a very different view. In the play the author’s ghost seeks the assistance of a priest to conduct a service for Genji (possibly referring either to the character or the novel itself) to secure her salvation. As the lead actor dances during the service the chorus sings a song consisting of chapter titles that constitute “a Buddhist ‘sermon’ to absolve her from “the sin of writing ‘wild words and fancy phrases.’” (Goff, 1991, p. 198) As the play closes there is an abrupt reversal in the message. The chorus proclaims the hidden identity of author and the true significance of her novel: How interesting indeed. In the dancer’s / wake a cock cries out; /with a wave of the sleeve dream returns to reality. /…./ after careful reflection, it seems clear / that the person known as Murasaki Shikibu / is the Ishiyama Kannon, / who briefly appeared in this world / to write the Tale of Genji. / This, then, is a means to tell mankind / That the world is but a dream. / Precious is the vow revealed. / Even “the floating bridge of dreams” / is expressed inside a dream, / is expressed inside a dream. (Goff, 1991, pp. 208–209)

To awaken us to that fact of this “floating bridge of dreams” the author constructed the Genji dream world, a dream within a dream, to provoke a shift in attention to actual reality, Suchness.19 The bodhisattva Kannon is the Japanese version of Indian Buddhism’s Avalokiteśvara, whose name means “the Hearer of the Word’s Sounds,” specifically the sounds of suffering. As an astute observer of her fellow human beings, the author is acutely aware of the psychological thirsts of those in the court. The character of Murasaki also evolves into a bodhisattva figure as she learns to compassionately cope with the Genji’s infidelities as well as his ever-expanding cohort of women. Buddhist Compassion is also referred to as Wisdom Gone Beyond. The Lotus Sūtra was similarly misunderstood and undervalued by novice Buddhist practitioners. William LaFleur notes that it is “so colorful and picturesque that modern readers have occasionally wondered if it is not mostly froth, with really no substantial or philosophical dimension,” when in fact it is “both a literary tour de force and expressive of a fundamental philosophical perspective in Mahayana Buddhism.” (LaFleur, 1983, p. 84). This initial tendency to devalue

19 The

view of Genji “as a source of enlightenment” also is found in other Genji-related Noh plays, such as Ukifune; Goff, 184.

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the Lotus is not a recent phenomenon. In his spiritual autobiography Zen Master Hakuin (1684–1786) recounts his deep disappointment upon reading the sutra as a sixteen year old monk, having heard it was “the king of all sutras”: “the text was concerned with parables relating to cause and effect…. Why should this particular sutra be so highly esteemed? My hopes were completely dashed. (Hakuin, 1971, pp. 116–117). Years later, when he read it again, his response was vastly different: “Suddenly I penetrated to the perfect, true, ultimate meaning of the Lotus. The doubts I had held initially were destroyed and I became aware that the understanding I had obtained up to then was greatly in error. Unconsciously I uttered a great cry and burst into tears.” He then proclaimed “the Buddha Way is deep and far…. the farther you enter the sea the deeper it becomes and the higher you climb a mountain the taller it gets.” (Hakuin, 1971, pp. 121–122). While Genji and the Lotus may appear shallow that is only because the reader has not taken up Hakuin’s challenge to dive deeper and reach higher. Ultimately Hakuin realized “Outside the mind there is no Lotus Sūtra and outside the Lotus Sūtra there is no mind.” (Hakuin, 1971, p. 87). Buddhism’s philosophy of nondualism allows both the sūtra and the novel to be imbued with multi-layered meanings. The stories told in each text harbor profound messages for those able to fathom their philosophical depths and heights. Hence the author can be perceived as both a “sinner” and a bodhisattva, a purveyor of fiction that leads us astray and a source of wisdom. The sūtra recognizes that many require words that are “soft and gentle and delight the hearts of the assembly.” (Lotus Sutra, 1993, p. 24). Although easily misjudged as superficial, Buddha insists that such words “are not empty or false.” (Lotus Sutra, 1993, p. 30) Rather they are used to evoke or provoke understanding of a deeper reality aimed at “those of dull capacities who delight in a little Law [Dharma].” (Lotus Sutra, 1993, p. 34). Buddha explains and justifies this approach in the second chapter of the Lotus Sūtra, entitled “Expedient Means” (upāya): “The wisdom of the Buddhas is infinitely profound and immeasurable. The door to this wisdom is difficult to understand and difficult to enter. (Lotus Sutra, 1993, p. 23)” Hence Buddha uses “various causes and various similes” in his teaching, employing “countless expedient means to guide living beings and cause them to renounce attachments.” (Lotus Sutra, 1993, p. 24). This strategy was necessary to fulfill his vow grounded in universal access to Buddha wisdom, the “wisdom embracing all species” (Lotus Sutra, 1993, p. 32): “…at the start I took a vow, / hoping to make all persons / equal to me, without any distinctions between us (Lotus Sutra, 1993, p. 36). However, Buddha realizes that many “stray into the dense forest of mistaken views” (Lotus Sutra, 1993, p. 37): I see the living beings in the six paths, how poor and distressed they are, without merit or wisdom, how they enter the perilous road of birth and death, their sufferings continuing with never a break,

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260 how deeply they are attached to the five desires, like a yak enamored of its tail, blinding themselves with greed and infatuation, their vision so impaired they can see nothing. (Lotus Sutra, 1993, p. 42).

To ease their way Buddha cites multiple ways to realize the One Buddha vehicle, including offerings of flowers, jewels, and song (as practiced in Esoteric Buddhism practice, Shingon, brought from China by Kūkai 774–835). Even a Buddha tower built by children using sand can qualify. Japanese literature, and poetry in particular, was often considered a manifestation of this Buddhist nondualism as the seamlessness of inner experience and outer environment. Fujiwara no Shunzei (1114–1204) defended what others denounced as ‘floating phrases and fictive utterances,’ arguing that in poetry “the profundity of things is demonstrated. This is because there exists a reciprocal flow of meaning between such things [as poetry] and the way of Buddhism, a way that maintains the interdependence of all things.” (LaFleur, 1983, p. 90). Shunzei is known for writing poems interwoven with allusions to the Lotus Sūtra, to a reveal the reciprocity between sūtra and poem—“the theme of both the poem and the sutra is the fundamental absence of discrimination (wakezu) or hierarchy in the dharma.” (LaFleur, 1983, p. 95). Since the phenomenal world IS reality, Saṁsāra IS Nirvāṇa, both human emotions and the aesthetics of Nature can be points of entry into awakening. Zen poet Shinkei (d. 1544) observes “The beginner enters from the shallow to the deep; and once he has attained the depths, he emerges again into the shallow: this is the essential rule of all disciplines. Cause produces effect; effect in turn leads to cause.” (LaFleur, 1983, pp. 93–94). Viktor E. Frankl describes the liberating power of art and Nature even within a concentration camp: “As the inner life of the prisoner tended to become more intense, he also experienced the beauty of art and nature as never before.” (Frankl, 1963, p. 62) These comments help to explain the role of aesthetics in Genji in prompting an epistemological shift.

12.5.1 The Epistemology of Buddhist Upāya This analysis of Buddhist philosophical elements in Genji focuses on epistemology in terms of our superficial perceptions of reality. In Buddhism these perceptions (Sanskrit lakṣaṇa) are much more than mere sensory perceptions (phenomena). They are deemed “the building blocks of delusion.” (Hsing, 2001, p. 47). Perceptions are the products of internal mentation, the marks, signs, or characteristics associated with things, that are given linguistic designations (names, labels). In the novel two different kinds of perceptions are evident—the “real world” of the court constructed by the political machinations of those in power and what

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Buddhism regards as the “really, real world” of Suchness, largely sustained by women. The much-vaunted Heian aesthetics is similarly bifurcated—many men were satisfied with superficial appearances, as accessed through transactional task-driven attention. Demonstrating refined taste allowed men to access desirable women through the requisite exchange of poetry and other aesthetic experiences. It also bolstered their career prospects. For example, Genji’s rise to the position of regent to the emperor occurs, not coincidentally, after his team wins a picture contest (eawase) in Chap. 17.20 As a mere means to an end, there was little serious engagement with aesthetics. As one aspiring lover complains—“if I visited a woman of sensibility I would be kept freezing while she admired the snow.” (Murasaki, 1980, p. 29). However, for women like Murasaki (both the author and the character), beauty was deeply moving and potentially transformational. The emotions associated with mono no aware arose in response to natural or aesthetic stimuli, often intertwined. These ranged from complex human relationships to an appreciation of the moon, snowfall, or a garden, resonating with the animism of Japanese Shintō (神 道). Such experiences also are involved in Buddhist practice: Learning to transcend your mental constructions of reality is an art….Learning to look deeply to see into the true nature of things, having direct contact with reality and not just describing reality in terms of notions and concepts, is the practice (Nhat_Hanh, 1996).

Śākyamuni Buddha realized a method to remove deluded awareness and experience clear awareness. Rather than painting a picture of reality, as a metaphysician does, the Buddha functioned as an ophthalmologist who helps us to see reality more clearly. Nirvāṇa, literally “blowing out,” eliminates the poisons of afflictive emotions and deluded perceptions. The destructive, all-consuming flames of desire or thirst (tṛṣṇā) naturally die down once the fuel provided by the Three Poisons (greed/lust, fear/anger, ignorance) is removed. At a cognitive level, Buddhist awakening signals a shift from the egocentric attention of task-driven life to a stimulus-driven expansion of awareness. Similarly, the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra speaks of those able to “transform their existence” (paravrtti-bhava), which literally means “to overturn” (parāvṛtti) one’s existence (bhāva). The Lord of Laṅkā, the demon king Rāvaṇa, experiences this shift as “an awakening and transformation of his consciousness, as he realized what appeared was nothing but the perceptions of his own mind, and he found himself in a realm free from such projections.” (Lankavatara Sutra, 2012, pp. 28–31).

20 Genji

competes with his nemesis Tō no Chūjō to focus the attention of the young emperor on the women they seek to pair him with, demonstrating the ladies’ aesthetic taste through rival collections of paintings. Thomas LaMarre (2000) notes “there was an element of potlatch to these large-sale competitions, in which each team strove to outdo the other in lavishness of expenditure and which resulted in a redistribution of wealth and status,” 71.

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12.5.2 Heian-Kyō as the Lotus Sutra’s “Burning House” Having explained the methodology of expedient means in the second chapter of the Lotus Sūtra, the Buddha provides a compelling example in the third chapter, “Simile and Parable.” Here we find the template for Murasaki’s complex melding of riveting narrative and Buddhist philosophy as a version of Buddha’s “Burning House” in Heian Japan. The setting for the Genji saga is the imperial capital, Heian-Kyō, the proclaimed “City of Peace and Tranquility.” While on the surface this luxurious locale seems to promise an ideal life for all, a closer look reveals the dark underpinnings of the deluded mind. As Genji enthusiast Kawabata observes: Japanese culture was court culture, and court culture was feminine. The day of the Genji and the Pillow Book [of Sei Shōnagon] was its finest, when ripeness was moving into decay. One feels the sadness at the end of the glory, the high tide of Japanese court culture,” which gradually was replaced by military rule. (Kawabata, 1969, p. 45)

In the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra, which validates lay practice, Buddha states that the Pure Land is here, now. Hence, one “whose mind is pure sees this world in its majestic purity.” (Luk, 1990, p. 14). However even the most pristine environment harbors the potential for the all-consuming duḥkha most experience due to the incendiary disposition of deluded minds: The mind is burning, ideas are burning, mind-consciousness is burning, mind-contact is burning, also whatever is felt as pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant that arises with mind-contact for its indispensable condition, that too is burning. Burning with what? Burning with the fire of lust, with the fire of hate, with the fire of delusion. I say it is burning with birth, aging and death, with sorrows, with lamentations, with pains, with griefs, with despairs. (“Adittapariyaya Sutta: The Fire Sermon” (SN 35.28), 2010)

The Burning House parable conveys this truth in the story of …a very rich man….His own house was big and rambling….The halls and rooms were old and decaying, the walls crumbling, the pillars rotten at their base, and the beams and rafters crooked and aslant. … a fire suddenly broke out on all sides, spreading through the rooms of the house.” (Lotus Sutra, 1993, p. 56).

His sons are inside the house engrossed in their games, oblivious to their danger. Like the Buddha, the rich man is unable to save his sons, they must save themselves. The same is true for the characters in Genji, most of whom are unaware of their peril. Like the children playing in the house “they are deeply attached to worldly pleasures / and lacking in minds of wisdom.” (Lotus Sutra, 1993, p. 69). The men in the court assume they have power and agency, while the women are considered relatively powerless, passive pawns. Both groups are confined by and attached to the cultural constructs of gender and family status. This becomes an

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advantage for some women whose awareness of these confining causes and conditions motivates them to seek refuge in Buddhism. The same is true for men on the fringes of power. But those who are winning rarely question the rules of the game. The sūtra makes clear that more is required than simply putting out the flames (“blowing out” or nirvana)—one must reject attachments by exiting the burning building, “Separating oneself from falsehood and delusion… emancipation…. from everything.” (Lotus Sutra, 1993, p. 70). An important distinction between the Burning House described in the Lotus Sūtra and the novel is that the latter involves smoldering fires rather than roaring flames. Such fires are both less apparent and more insidious. Like the elegant Heian court, they thrive in “peatlands, beautiful ecosystems with very diverse fauna and flora.” These ecosystems are essential for sustaining water, climate and storing carbon, just as the court determines and can negatively impact living conditions throughout the realm. In both cases the hidden fires can burn for days or months, creating a toxic haze that hinders vision (creating deluded perceptions). The long-term consequences are deadly: “A fire in California is a disaster, but if we regrow that same forest within 10 years then that fire was carbon neutral. That means what was emitted has been recaptured with this forest regrowth, but with peat—you do not have that option.” (Rein, 2019). As the novel ends, decades after the story began, the author leaves us with the final warning concerning “The Floating Bridge of Dreams” (Chapter 54). Ukifune’s spurned lover, Genji’s assumed son Kaoru, is left to consider how his own actions may have thwarted his pursuit of the lady—“a suspicion crossed his mind: the memory of how he himself had behaved in earlier days made him ask whether someone might be hiding her from the world.” (Murasaki, 1980, p. 1000). Still immersed in his egocentric ignorance, Kaoru can’t fathom the fact that the lady had exited the Burning House of her own accord. Like those in Buddha’s Burning House, “wrapped up in their amusements,” he assumes he simply has been outplayed in the game of erotic conquest he mistakes for reality (Lotus Sutra, 1993, p. 66). A poem attributed to the author, ostensibly about a sumo wrestling match, succinctly exposes the delusion of competition: “Many men fight / At the Palace games / They say, / But can you not feel / The pointlessness?” (Murasaki, 1982, p. 253).

12.5.3 From Wisdom to Wisdom Gone Beyond (Compassion) The “pointlessness” of life in the Burning House is encountered by many characters. Here we will briefly discuss Genji, his faithful companion Murasaki, and Ukifune (central figure in the ten closing chapters set in Uji, “desolate/miserable”). Each of these characters becomes aware of deluded dimensions of

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their environment.21 They experience varying degrees of a shift from the afflictive emotions of the Three Poisons to the uplifting emotions of the Four Exalted Dwellings.22 Genji empathizes with women who have been marginalized due to their less than high ranking mothers.23 Murasaki combines empathy with compassion toward even Genji’s other women, taking joy in their offspring. Ukifune seems to have arrived at equanimity after she avoids the captive state of women like Genji’s mother and Murasaki. Genji inhabits a liminal space between the well-defined social and political culture of the male-dominated court and the cloistered world of women, who sustain the “real world” of public appearances from clothing, furnishings, and childcare to garden design and artistic entertainment (poetry, music, painting). Teenage Genji muses on the impressive skills of his first wife Aoi: “The mansion itself, his wife—every detail was admirable and in the best taste. Nowhere did he find a trace of disorder. Here was a lady whom his friends must count among the truly dependable ones.” (Murasaki, 1980, p. 38). At the age of 17 Genji is already aware of an inner tension between the privileges of toxic masculinity and his social responsibilities. He seeks to avoid “frivolity” while desiring “interesting and amusing little affairs”: “Though in fact he had an instinctive dislike for the promiscuity he saw all around him, he had a way of sometimes turning against his own better inclinations and causing unhappiness.” (Murasaki, 1980, p. 20). The poisonous fires of aversion and attraction are part of Genji’s parental inheritance. Aversion comes in the form of competition among different factions in the court, while attraction involves the desire for aesthetic perfection. Ruthless ambition prioritizes public social obligations to secure political power. Relationships with others and with Nature are guided by the stimulus-driven attention of private human feelings. Genji’s father, the emperor, serves as a model as well as a warning. In Heian Japan monogamy was neither expected nor valued—it was an aberration. In the case of an emperor it posed a serious threat to the game of marriage politics, whereby powerful families could align themselves with imperial power by supplying empresses, consorts, and “intimates.” The emperor violated that code through his disruptive emotional entanglement with Genji’s mother.

21 Awareness

or mindfulness in Buddhist philosophy, Pāli appamāda, indicates the antithesis of carelessness or inattention- a (not) pamāda (careless) (不放逸). In the Appamāda Sutta Buddha describes it as the foundation of meritorious conduct (X, 15). Richard F. Gombrich hails it as “the most distinctive contribution of Buddhism in India’s (or the world’s) soteriological practice,” 80. 22 The Four Exalted Dwellings (brahmavihāras 四住)—empathy, compassion, joy, and equanimity—arise once the Three Poisons are eliminated. They are promoted by the Buddha in multiple suttas, including the Tevijja Sutta and the Kalama Sutta. 23  A contemporary analysis of empathy reveals its deep significance: “the ability to feel, for example, their fear over a threat; or thrill over a newly found food source; or sorrow over a loss, which has as much to do with the fabric of a community as any other. Empathy, in this sense, can be thought of as the source of all emotion, the one without which the others would have no register.” (Terrell, 2014).

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From birth Genji was unique—due to the conditions of his birth and his “shining” demeanor. Normally three-year-old Genji would be raised by his maternal grandmother after his mother died. However the emperor considers his son as “a momento” of the beloved lady that he must have near him. (Murasaki, 1980, p. 9) After years of mourning the emperor is introduced to Fujitsubo, a niece of Genji’s mother, who bears a striking resemblance to her. Unlike Genji’s mother, however, as the daughter of an emperor her pedigree is unassailable. Both father and son become deeply attached to her. This leads to Genji’s brief affair with his stepmother and the birth of their son, assumed to be Genji’s brother, who later becomes emperor. This along with the ascent of Genji’s daughter to empress status vindicates an early prediction that Genji would become “father to the nation.” (Murasaki, 1980, p. 14). Years later Genji suffers the same fate as his father when he marries a much younger wife who has a son (Kaoru) with a much younger man. A Heian gentleman’s life script is exposed in Chap. 2, “The Broom Tree” It opens with a rainy night conversation among three young men who share their experiences with and evaluations of a wide range of women, with Genji as their audience. They demonstrate the poison of aversion grounded in a competitive erotic game that pits men against men and women against women. As Genji’s friend and rival Tō no Chūjō succinctly states “It is with women as it is with everything else: the flawless ones are very few indeed.” (Murasaki, 1980, p. 21). Significantly, Genji does not participate in the exchange of theories and love stories. He does not even give the conversation his total attention, at one point dozing off. Moreover, he had little interest in the imperfect specimens being discussed since his thought were fixed on the ideal woman he had already discovered—his stepmother: “She answered every requirement, he thought. She had none of the defects, was guilty of none of the excesses, that had emerged from the discussions.” (Murasaki, 1980, p. 38). More importantly, Genji rejects the sexist stereotypes set forth by the others. His subsequent interactions with a variety of women defies the ranking system men impose on them. Given Genji’s socially aberrant behavior, he seems open to the Lotus Sūtra’s declaration that “all things are equal.” (Lotus Sutra, 1993, p. 35). Embracing diversity, he actively seeks out each of the flawed feminine types mentioned. But he also challenges the male ranking system, thus championing inclusion. He disregards the advice to “find someone who does not require shaping and training, someone who has most of the qualifications from the start.” (Murasaki, 1980, p. 24). He decides to sculpt Murasaki into the ideal, replacing her “unattainable” aunt Fujitsubo, when he discovers her as a child. By assuming the unlimited potential in all women through proper cultivation Genji demonstrates a level of commitment to the equitable treatment that his mother was denied. Genji goes on to create an alternative world of his own at his Rokujō mansion, a pseudo “Pure Land” insulated from the contentious life of the imperial court. There he reigns as emperor, the role denied due to his mother’s social rank. He is the shining sun surrounded by the ladies who orbit around him. (Shirane, 1987, p. 164). Eventually his refuge outshines the imperial court itself. He cultivates women carefully selected to captivate high ranking men in the court through their

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beauty, aesthetics taste, and exemplary behavior, thereby securing his role as their sponsor. Three women acquire alliances within the imperial family, including his own daughter, born from a chance meeting while he was in exile. Another woman entrusted to him by her dying mother (one of Genji’s former lovers) marries an Emperor, Genji’s illegitimate son and assumed brother. Murasaki’s death reveals that she was the actual power behind Genji’s success. Like Genji, she lost her mother at an early age, a woman who was not an official wife. Unlike Genji, her family was steeped in Buddhism, and she was raised by her grandmother, a nun, and her grand uncle, an abbot. As mistress of Rokujō, the childless Murasaki creates an environment in which Buddhist Compassion flourishes. She learns to accept Genji’s “harem” and their children rather than seeing them as threats. Thus she fits the description of those receptive to the message of the Lotus Sūtra as being “…without anger, / upright and gentle in nature, / constantly pitying all beings” (Lotus Sutra, 1993, p. 78) and  is able to advance to “Peaceful Practices.”24 After her death the light fades for all who knew her: “For Muraski’s women, it was as if they were wandering in a nightmare.” (Murasaki, 1980, p. 720). Even the light of the Shining Genji dims. She is fondly remembered, and deeply mourned, as someone who “always seemed to be thinking of others,” (Murasaki, 1980, p. 721), befitting the Bodhisattva of Compassion. Before her death, Murasaki became aware that the Heian house was burning and had identified the exit but was blocked by Genji from finding solace in monastic practice. In the next generation Ukifune does make it to the exit, despite the barriers set by two amorous males pursuing and competing for her (such that she “had hidden herself away like a fugitive from some terrible enemy”) (Murasaki, 1980, p. 1072). Buddhism, in the guise of a Buddhist bishop, literally rescues her after an unsuccessful suicide attempt. First, by nursing her back to health and then by yielding to her insistent requests to become a nun, despite her young age. The bishop fully understands her dire situation: “for me, for you, for most of us, bonds with this transient world are not easy to break so long as we remain preoccupied with its illusory triumphs and glories.” (Murasaki, 1980, p. 1072). Some critics have bemoaned the lack of a happy ending to the novel, presumably one in which love conquers all. I believe this is a deluded perception of the author’s intent—although no one can live happily ever after in a Burning House, awareness of that fact does allow for one to plan an escape. Once Ukifune has become a nun we are told:

24 Chapter

14, “Peaceful Practices,” is the final chapter in the Wisdom section of the sūtra, which then transitions to the theme of Compassion (Chaps. 15–27). It has been cited as refutation of Chap. 3, because it warns against associating with “those who compose works of secular literature”; Watson in Lotus Sutra,1993, p. 197. The chapter offers a parable about a wheel-turning Buddhist king and his troops. He “presents them with the city of nirvana,” intent on seeing them “wiping out the three poisons, emerging from the threefold world” (the Burning House). Significantly Buddha notes the sūtra (like the Genji?) “is capable of causing living beings to attain comprehensive wisdom. It will face much hostility in the world and be difficult to believe”; Watson in (Lotus Sutra, 1993, p. 207).

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She was happy now. They had all advised deliberation and she had had her way. She could claim this one sign of the Buddha’s favor, her single reward for having lived in this dark world. …the girl was serene. ‘Life as most people know it’—she need no longer think about that. Waves of peace flowed over her. (Murasaki, 1980, p. 1069)

Having arrived at the Exalted Dwellings of joy and perhaps equanimity, Ukifune seems assured of liberation as described in the Lotus: “If there is someone who hears it [Dharma], / Responds with joy and gratefully accepts it, / You should know that the person / Is an avivartika [stage of no regression]. (Lotus Sutra, 1993, p. 73). Defending his decision to admit Ukifune to the Sangha, the bishop cites the case of the dragon king’s daughter’s awakening in the Lotus Sūtra, which confirms the message of universal Buddhahood: “Ours is a world in which even the ogre maiden finds salvation.” (Murasaki, 1980, p. 1072). It seems the boat is no longer adrift, contradicting the view of men in the court that women “are like bits of driftwood.” (Murasaki, 1980, p. 41). Inspired by Ukifune’s story, Fujiwara Teika (1162–1241) composed a poem alluding to the final chapter’s title: “The bridge of dreams / floating on the brief spring night / entirely breaks up; / as from the mountain top takes leaves / a cloudbank into empty sky.” (Pekarik, 1982, p. 79). In addition to the erotic implications of a “brief spring night,” the poet may be invoking Buddhist symbolism in the cloud’s movement. Chinese Buddhism compares a non-attached practitioner to a cloud moving freely over water (yunshui 雲水), driven only by the Dharma winds. This reading is further bolstered by the emptiness of the sky, as well as the mountain top launch site, where Ukifune lives as a nun. She likens her past to “a strange, frightening dream.” (Murasaki, 1980, p. 1090). Has she then awakened? Earl Miner speculates on that possibility: “Teika’s poem conveys something of human destiny revealed in this great work by its late heroine, something also of the indescribably beautiful anguish we feel with the fearful hope we irresistibly invest in Ukifune.” (Pekarik, 1982, p. 80). Thus, Buddhist philosophy may serve as guiding thread that can help us navigate the resplendent labyrinth of Murasaki’s life and her work, which continues to captivate readers more than a thousand years after she first put her brush to paper! What can vie with a misty moon of spring, Shining dimly, yet not clouded over? (Murasaki, 1980, p. 152)

12.6 Conclusions Murasaki’s great philosophical epic novel, Genji Monagatori (Tale of Genji), her Diary, (Murasaki Shikibu Nikki) and her Poetic Memoirs (Murasaki Shikibu shū) discuss metaphysical and moral issues such as the nature of being, women’s souls, women’s rights, the nature of love, and other topics. Japan’s first-known female

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philosopher Murasaki Shikibu, as the verse quoted above notes has in the West, shone only “dimly” as a philosopher. It is hoped that with this chapter some of the clouds obscuring her reputation as a philosopher have been removed.

References “Adittapariyaya Sutta: The Fire Sermon” (SN 35.28). (2010, June 13). (Legacy Edition). (T. Ñanamoli, Trans.) Access to Insight. Retrieved from http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/ sn/sn35/sn35.028.nymo.html Bargen, D. G. (1997). A woman’s weapon: Spirit possession in the Tale of Genji. University of Hawai’i Press. Bargen, D. G. (2015). Mapping Courtship and Kinship in classical Japan: The Tale of Genji and its predecessors. University of Hawai’i Press. Birch, C. (1989). Anthology of Chinese literature: From early times to the fourteenth century. Grove Press. Caddeau, P. W. (2006). Appraising Genji: Literary criticism and cultural anxiety in the age of the last Samurai. State University of New York Press. Cleary, T. (1993). The flower ornament scripture: A translation of the Avatamsaka Sutra. Shambhala. Frankl, V. E. (1963). Man’s search for meaning: An introduction to logotherapy. Simon & Schuster. Goff, J. (1991). Noh Drama and the Tale of Genji: The art of allusion in fifteen classical plays. Princeton University Press. Gombrich, R. F. (2006). Theravada Buddhism: A social history. Routledge. Hakuin. (1971). The Zen Master Hakuin: Selected writings. (P. B. Yampolsky, Trans.). Columbia University Press. Hisamatsu, S. (1963). The vocabulary of Japanese literary aesthetics. Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies. Hsing, Y. (2001). Describing the indescribable: A commentary on the Diamond Sutra. (T. Graham, Trans.). Wisdom Publications. Ingalls, J. (1975). Nakagawa’s Tenno Yūgao. Twayne. Jakucho, S. (2011, April 16). “On Genji Monogatari: A Conversation with Setouchi Jakucho,”. (M. Toyoshima, Interviewer) Retrieved from https://kyotojournal.org/kyoto-interview/ on-genji-monogatari/. Kawabata, Y. (1969). Japan the beautiful and myself. Kodansaha International. LaFleur, W. R. (1983). The karma of words: Buddhism and the literary arts in Medieval Japan. University of California Press. LaMarre, T. (2000). Uncovering Heian Japan: An archaeology of sensation and inscription. Duke University Press. Lankavatara Sutra. (2012). (Red_Pine, Trans.) Berkeley: Counterpoint. Lotus Sutra. (1993). (B. Watson, Trans.). Columbia University Press. Lucas-Hall, R. (2020, May 11). “The Tale Of Genji: A Very Modern 1,000 Years Old Novel, The First World’s Novel Is Japanese—And Still A Gem”. Savvy Tokyo. Luk, C. (1990). Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra. Shambala Dragon Editions. Morris, I. (1969). The world of the shining prince: Court life ancient Japan. Penguin Books. Murasaki. (1980). The Tale of Genji, (E. G. Seidensticker, Trans.). Alfred A. Knopf. Murasaki. (1982). Murasaki Shikibu: Her Diary and Poetic Memoirs. (R. Bowring, Trans.). Princeton University Press. Murasaki. (2001). The Tale of Genji. (R. Tyler, Trans.). Viking. Nhat_Hanh, T. (1996). Cultivating the mind of love—The practice of looking deeply in the Mahayana Buddhist tradition. Parallax Press. Retrieved from http://www.abuddhistlibrary.

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com/Buddhism/G%20-20TNH/TNH/The%20Three%20Dharma%20Seals/The%20Three%20 Dharma Nikaya, S. (n.d.). Samyutta Nikaya. (S. Amatayakul, Trans.) Retrieved 2020, 2021 Niwano, N. (1990). Buddhism for today: A modern interpretation of the threefold Lotus Sutra. Kosei Publishing. Pekarik, A. (1982). Ukifune: Love in the Tale of Genji. Columbia University Press. Rein, G. (2019, November 7). “The dangers of smouldering fires.” . Horizon Magazine. Retrieved from https://www.thenakedscientists.com/articles/science-features/ dangers-smouldering-fires Shirane, H. (1987). The bridge of dreams: A poetics of the Genji. Stanford University Press. Terrell, J. E. (2014, November 30). “Evolution and the American Myth of the Individual”. Retrieved from https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/30/ evolution-and-the-american-myth-of-the-individual/. The book of changes (Zhouyi). (1996). (R. Rutt, Trans.). Curzon. Waithe, M. E. (1989). “Murasaki Shikibu”. In M. E. Waithe (Ed.), A history of women philosophers volume 2. Kluwer. Wawrytko, S. A. (2014). The interpenetration of art and philosophy in East Asian poetry: The metaphysical threat to the platonic hierarchy. The Polish Journal of Aesthetics, 32(1), 31–50.

Chapter 13

Figure 1: Unknown artist’s rendering of Cao Wenyi

Cao Wenyi of China 曹文逸 1039–1119 Robin R. Wang

Abstract  Eleventh-century Daoist Master Cao Wenyi’s Song of Ultimate Source of the Great Dao is presented for the first time in English translation. It is a philosophy lecture in verse format. Both technical terms and allegorical references, as well as the relevant parts of Daoist philosophy are explained. Cao, who is sometimes referred to as Cao Xiwen, discusses the emerging Daoist concept of inner harmony as a methodology for controlling one’s interaction with the external world as well as for controlling one’s own intellect so that one can transition towards reunification with the Dao.

13.1 Introduction The female Daoist Cao Wenyi 曹文逸 or Cao Xiwen 曹希蘊 (1039–1119) (Daoist name Daochong, nickname Cao Xiangu) was seen as the “master of tranquility and human virtue and the perfection of the Dao” (Despeux & Kohn, 2004, 135).

R. R. Wang (*)  Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_13

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She has been a popular female figure throughout Daoist history and was exalted by several Qing-dynasty lineages of women’s inner alchemy. Cao was born into a wealthy family in the county of Ningjing 宁晋 in today’s Hebei Province. According to the historical records, she could read and cite poetry at the age of five and by the age of fifteen was capable of remembering texts after a mere glance. At the age of twenty-one she defied the conventional path of entering into an arranged marriage, which she saw as a form of imprisonment in worldly life. She fled to Yu Hua 玉华 Mountain, where she led an extremely harsh and impoverished life. In the midst of these challenges, she still composed commentaries on the Daoist classic texts, the Daodejing 道德经 and the Zhuangzi 庄子. After gaining an established reputation as a Daoist practitioner, Cao was summoned to the capital of Kaifeng 开封 (in today’s Henan Province) by the Emperor Weizhong, who was fond of Daoism and the literati. The emperor awarded her the title of “Great Master of Literary Withdrawal into Clear Emptiness” (Wenyi zhenren 文逸真人). Many of Cao Wenyi’s writings have been lost. A text called The Song of Ultimate Source of Great Dao 灵源大道歌 (Lingyuan Dadaoge or Dadaoge) has survived to date. This text, the very first undisputable and the oldest authentic female Daoist work,1 is intended for beginners to learn about and practice Daoism, more importantly, to inspire women and men to return to the great source of life. It “acts as a guiding light to women throughout the ages” (Despeux & Kohn, 2004, 120). The text consists of 128 sentences written in poetic stanzas that were easy to remember. Chen Yingning (1880–1969), the most influential contemporary Daoist commentary and practitioner, comments on her work: All Daoist texts from ancient to present contain three things: 1) lavish discussion of mysterious efficacy玄妙 (xuanmiao); 2) lively sayings 口诀 (koujue); 3) convincing and encouraging cultivation.” (Chen, 1988, 2)

Cao’s text is translated below in its entirety as Appendix 1 to this chapter. This will be the first full English translation of Cao’s work. I have also included the text of the original Chinese, which I have established and which is presented as Appendix 2.

13.2 Philosophical Heritage Daoism, a Dao based and inspired teaching and practice, has been considered to be the philosophy of yielding in Chinese intellectual history. One important aspect of yielding is being rou 柔—soft, gentle, supple—which the Daodejing couples

1 This

is the earliest creditable text written by a female Daoist. Huangting jing 黃庭經 (The Scripture of the Yellow Court) was credited to a woman Wèi Huácún 魏華存 (251–334). But it is debatable whether she is the true author, whether this is written by a woman. There are female immortals such as Xie Ziran or He Xiangu in Tang dynasty but none of them left any writings.

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with the feminine, infant and water. Not surprisingly, then, the female and femininity have enormous significance for Laozi and Daoism (Wang, 2017, 37). This female consciousness of Dao, or a Daoist female consciousness, expanding or supporting the feminist assumptions, has shaped the Daoist philosophical landscape and tradition up to today. In a general sense, throughout much of human history and across many cultures, the masculine has been associated with power, control, and dominance, whereas the feminine has been associated with yielding, flexibility, and submissiveness. Cao’s Daodejing inverts the values of these aspects, pointing out the power of the feminine. Traditionally, however, that inversion went against mainstream views, particularly those of the Confucians who dominated social and political institutions. The Daodejing started a full-fledged campaign to put greater pressure on the sages’ leadership ability, moral character, and political actions. This calling rippled through the fabric of Chinese culture. Sages—who were traditionally men—must have a capacity for fostering femininity. The overarching focal point of this Daoist heritage lies in a depiction of Dao as a cosmic force 生 (sheng), a lived body experience 性命(xingming) and the journey of transcending 修身 (xiuzhen).

13.2.1 Dao as Cosmic Mother and Female Body All phenomena in nature or, in classical Chinese terminology, “all things under heaven” (tianxia 天下) can be distinguished according to their characteristics as either yin or yang, and man/male/masculinity and woman/female/femininity are naturally identified with this yin/yang matrix (Wang, 2012, 25). Unlike other interpretations of the yin/yang complementarity in Chinese thought, the Daodejing suggests the primordiality, indeed the superior power, of yin in general and the female and femininity in particular. Dao, the spontaneous potency and ultimate source of all things, is identified as a mother and the female body, a common metaphor for Dao in the Daodejing. This is the Daodejing’s description: As to a Dao— If It can be specified as a Dao, It is not a permanent Dao. As to a name— If It can be specified as a name, It is not a permanent name. Having no name Is the beginning of the ten thousand things. Having a name, Is the mother of the ten thousand things.

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274 (Moeller, 2007, 3)

Here “mother” is designated as the beginning of all things or the name of all things. In Chap. 52, we encounter this “mother” again: The world has a beginning: It is considered the Mother of the world. (Moeller, 2007, 123)

In Chap. 25, Daodejing Cao explains aspects of Dao: There is a thing— It came to be in the undifferentiated, It came alive before heaven and earth. What stillness! What emptiness! Alone It stands fast and does not change. It can be mother to heaven and earth. (Moeller, 2007, 123)

Dao is 母 (mu, “mother” which has a broader range of meanings than merely “biological mother.” It is expanded to mean the source of heaven and earth and the myriad things in them. Dao/mother is responsible for the origin of all things, is with all things, and provides the patterns that one should follow. This basic philosophical commitment reflects a view that the cosmos and world are generated, not created, through a transformative process. The terms used in classical Chinese texts for the origin of the myriad things incorporate a sense of “life” and “birth,” both of which are encompassed in the Chinese term sheng 生 (generation). This link between generation and the mother naturally leads to the priority of female energy, yin. It is generation or transformation, not a substance or Being, which shores up the Chinese philosophical horizon.

13.3 Cao’s Daoism Cao Wenyi maintains the critical philosophical outlook on the Dao as cosmic mother and female body, and further materializes it into a philosophy of body. Her Daodege starts with two traditional philosophical notions: taiji 太极 (Great Ultimate), or Dao and bumiao 布 (mysterious movement) (see Appendix 1 infra for translation of stanza 1–3).

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13.3.1 Taiji The concept taiji had gained popularity during Cao’s time. This notion entails a few presuppositions2: 1. Taiji is the ultimate origin of universe; 2. Taiji intrinsically contains two interrelated forces, namely yin and yang, which have generative efficacy for the myriad of all things. 3. All the myriad things are connected in oneness. The term taiji offers a consistent and conceptually coherent explanation of how the world comes into being.

13.3.2 Bumiao The term bumiao in Cao’s Dadaoge is also derived from the Daodejing, “mysterious and the gate of all marvelous beings.” In this sense, the movement of taiji is mysterious and independent from the human will. Yet this taiji encompasses self-generating, self-forming, and self-transforming forces so it has no need for an external cause or force to originate and sustain its own existence. Cao Wenyi’s Dadaoge tackled structural questions about the universe through the concepts of taiji and bumiao, highlighting the oneness of the myriad things and its self-generative force. This is quite different from the Greek analysis of the universe through the tools of geometrical logic and mathematical order (Wang, 2020b, 98).

13.3.3 A Lived Body Experience Dadaoge’s world centered on generation that turns one’s focus toward internal forces and gives rise to self-powering and self-cultivation. One way we see this is in the focus on the importance of life. As the Lu shichunqiu claims “The sages, having deeply contemplated the nature of the world, found nothing more worthy of esteem than life.” (Knoblock, 2000, 80). Valuing life is the root of living, death, survival and destruction (Knoblock, 2000, 84). Thus body as a storehouse of one’s life elements of jing 精 (essence), qi 氣 (energy) and shen 神 (spirit) is the most available resource and reliable basis for one’s own existence. The Daodejing advises us to “extend your utmost emptiness as far as you can, and do your best

2 Cao lived during the same period as Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017–1073) who wrote a short piece with diagram called Taiji Tushuo (The Great Ultimate Explained). The term “ taiji” is a popular concept for understanding of the Dao and the world.

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to preserve your equilibrium” (Moeller, 2007, 16). This is the way to return to the human original nature and be united with the Dao. These classical Daoist visions of human life were pursued and actualized by Cao Wenyi in Dadaoge stanza 25–28 where she says: Shen (spirit) is xing (inner nature), qi is ming 命 (destiny, one’s lot in life) The spirit does not gallop away, Qi will be firmly solidified. Originally they are intimated linked, If they ever be dispersed—what will be the primordial handle of life? Integrated to become one yet forget one, It can change with the primordial transformation. (Dadaoge stanza 25–28)

Dadaoge confers two important notions for Daoist self-cultivation. Unlike some of the western distinctions of spiritual soul and material body or lofty rational mind and lowly emotion, Dadaoge perceives human beings as a unity of xing and ming. For Cao Wenyi, the ‘primordial handle’ is a unity of xing and ming. Some thinkers began with a division of soul (animus) and material, or rational mind and emotion leading to a hierarchy where materiality and emotion are subordinate. Cao takes the unity to be a generative source. The concept of xing refers roughly to natural endowment and disposition. However the word xing developed from the word for life, 生 (sheng), so it has an intrinsic connection with life and living. Xing thus has two parts: sheng (life, generation) and xin 心 (heart/mind). Xing in Daoist texts such as the Taipingjing was divided into two kinds: 先天 xiantian (prenatal heaven, as endowed by life itself) and 后天 houtian (postnatal heaven, as formed through one’s lifetime).3 This distinction is a fundamental Daoist ontological presupposition. The other vital aspect of human being is ming. Ming is a complex term with multilayers of meanings, such as one’s destiny, fate, vitality and allotment connects one’s physical aspects, such as physical conditions, life expectancy, unexpected events that happened to us. Ming is given by heaven.4 Ming is more

3 In

Confucian tradition, xiantian xing is given by heaven, for Confucius states, “The xing is the same but its cultivation makes the difference.” In Mengzi, heaven’s xing animating every human being is manifest in four xin (heart/mind). Human beings thus are advised to “preserve the xin to cultivate the xing.” The Zhongyong (one of the Confucian classics) claims that “leading by the xing is called dao.” 率性之謂道. The Yijing states, “One yin and one yang is called dao. Led by it is goodness (shan); completed by it is the xing.” (成之謂性). In this sense the xing is the result of yin and yang interaction. In Buddhist teaching xing is also something with paramount importance. Those who are able to grasp the xing will become Buddha (Jianxing chen fu見性成彿). 4 Confucius thinks that “life and death depend on the ming.” He also perceives the importance of knowing the ming. It took him 50 years to know the ming of heaven (知天命 zhi tianming, Analects 2:4).

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connected with one’s physical form, while xing is related with the one’s xin 心 (heart/mind). Determining the connection of xing and ming has become the test ground for different Daoist schools.5 To live a flourishing life one must be able to know ming and cultivate xing 知命 修性 (zhiming xiuxing). These are shared presuppositions common to Confucians, Buddhists and Daoists. However the course and road to fulfilling these two goals are quite different.6 Daoists take a different path from Buddhists and Confucians. They pride themselves on their teaching of xingming 性命學 (xing ming xue). This xingming teaching unites xing and ming by concentrating on the person’s own body, seeing it as a microcosm, a miniature of the universe, and as an unlimited resource for cultivation. In her Dadaoge Cao aims at the dual cultivation of xing and ming, signifying that one should cultivate xing and ming at the same time. Dadaoge also makes an important identification of shen with xing and qi with ming. In other words, it distinctly defines xing as shen (spirit) and ming as qi, (energy flow or life force). These links bring one’s mind, body and spirit into a stage of “clarity and tranquility’ 清靜 (qingjing). This is the “handle of life,” “the fundamental way of being the world, i.e., a state where the mind has been freed from desires and completely absorbed in the Dao.” (Despeux, 2004, 137). This is also the most valuable and unique contribution that Cao Wenyi’s Dadaoge made to Daoist philosophy. Cao’s uniting of shen and qi or xing and ming as “the handle of life” reveals the central role of body cultivation. This handle of life can only be present through body-mind cultivation. Dadaoge, stanza 4 takes mind as lingjie, 靈鏡 (numinous mirror), which contains and reflects all the myriad things7 and body as lingfu, in stanza 8靈府 (numinous residence) which is full of chambers and palaces for universal spirit and various gods to reside. The body, numinous residence and lodging place, must be clean and proper to allow all spirits to come and stay. This function relies also on the person’s cultivation. Cao’s teaching challenges the gender asymmetry that has been pervasive in the history of western philosophy, in which the masculine poses as a disembodied universality while the feminine gets constructed as a disavowed corporeality. But Daoism is not based on an exclusion of the masculine; nor is the masculine taken

5 The core issue is the relationship between xing and ming in the context of cultivation. Should one cultivate xing first then ming? Or should one cultivate ming first then xing? Or, should one cultivate both at the same time? 6 For Confucians this is a social project. Human realization and knowing the xingming depend on the ritual practice. This ritual practice is to achieve a social and communal harmony (Analects, 1.12). A person’s seven 情 qing emotional states, xi 喜 (happy), nu 怒 (angry), ai 哀 (sad), lu (pleasure), ai 愛 (love), e 惡 (evil) and yu 欲 (desire) are embedded in his or her xing. Thus one should cultivate a proper relation between qing and xing through ritual. The ten yi (righteousness) are also contained in ming. Confucians, accordingly, promote a human being’s social and mental cultivation. 7 Mind as mirror metaphor is a common trend in Daoist teaching since the late fourth century BCE with Zhuangzi’s ‘fasting of the mind’ 心齋 (xinzhai) theory.

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to be a rejection of the feminine. There is no feminine outside of the masculine, and there is no masculine outside of the feminine. This prescribes a developmental and dynamic process that defines an original fullness of the ultimate reality and of human being. Basically, this female Daoist thinking is grounded in the value of the body. There is no dualistic dichotomy that separates reason from emotion and excludes femininity, the body, and engagement from rationality and knowing. Dadaoge advises us that the cultivation of the body is an imperative way of living, including knowing and doing. Body includes a constructive cosmic, spiritual and epistemological dimension, a wide range of human emotions, the problems of the human world and the event of death. All can be explained and addressed without pursuing, appealing to, or inserting something external into it. The worries at different life cycles and the troubles in life can be handled through focusing on one’s heart/mind body cultivation.

13.3.4 Life’s Journey of Transcending There have been many misunderstandings of Daoism throughout western intellectual history. For example, Weber (1951, 196) claims that Daoism becomes “absolutely irrational” and involves “inferior macrobiotics, therapy, [and] apotropaia.” One of the key concepts Weber uses to describe Daoism (Taoism) is “magic.” According to Weber, Daoist cultivation is a “magical therapy”; Daoist macrobiotics is a “magical stereotyping of technology”; Daoist thought is a “systematic rationalization of magic” (Weber, 1951, 197); “Taoism knew no ‘ethos’ of its own; magic, not conduct, was decisive for man’s fate” (Weber, 1951, 200); and Daoist philosophy and cosmogony “transformed the world into a magical garden” (Weber, 1951, 200). These assumptions come as no surprise, as Weber’s biased views on Daoism were due to the epistemological, social, historical, and cultural limitations of his time (Wang, 2020a, 180). It exposes a few deep-seated philosophical orientations toward rationality and transcendence. Roger Ames has asked the question why is “the transcendence” absent in Chinese tradition? (Hall & Ames, 1998, 190) He has also argued that “China has a tradition that is at once non-transcendent and profoundly religious” (Hall & Ames, 1998, 233). Spirituality is understood in terms of extension, influence and inclusion (Hall & Ames, 1998, 242). Evidently, the absence of transcendence cannot be taken within a dichotomy between transcendence and immanence. That is, to say that Chinese thought lacks transcendence does not necessarily place Chinese philosophy as secular, naturalistic, or anti-religious. These issues have set the stage to foster a deeper understanding of Chinese and Daoist philosophy.

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13.3.4.1 The Idea of ‘Transcendence’ For western classical theism, transcendence functions as a metaphysical category, meaning eternally beyond, always elsewhere. Before the seventeenth century the word transcendence was related to the divine mystery, the radical otherness of God and the inadequacy of any human categories as applied to God. But after the seventeenth century transcendence becomes a technical term, referring to God’s distance from and independence of the created world, in contrast to immanence (Placher, 1996, 6). This functioned to subject the divine to the structures of human reason. William C. Placher called it the attempt to “domesticate the transcendent.” (Placher, 1996, 7). The discussion of transcendence is a unique way to explore differences between philosophical traditions. For Daoism, life or enlightenment is not a “reward” at the end but rather the realization of being part of the great oneness. This Daoist approach with a coherent comprehensive view does not make a distinction that disembodies reason. This integrated view of the human person enables the discovery of one’s inner divinity, and holds that transcending can occur at a personal level. Everyone has an equal opportunity to achieve this stage at this life without the aid of a deity. Thus the lack of deity is ultimately empowering and optimistic for the individual. Human beings have a chance to be one with the ultimate by living a life attuned to nature and the Dao. The body harnesses the balanced qi, so that one will subsequently move closer to the hub of the universe that is the Dao. Mind and body are harmonized with the vibrations and rhythms of the Dao. This perhaps is the Daoist zeal for transcending. In the Zhuangzi there is a special type of human being called zhenren 真人 (perfect human being).8 Zhenren are capable of lifting heaven and earth, grasping yinyang, breathing true qi 氣, depending on shen 神 (spirit), enjoying longevity and mastering time.9 Thus the absence of transcendence does not drive Daoist thinkers into the camp of a pure naturalism or materialism. A strong commitment to the theory and practice of transcending current human conditions permeates Cao’s Dadaoge. She writes: Knowing a great Dao is not easy to put into practice, Fame, achievement and body are hard to escape. Finding a quiet place to practice,

8 In Chap. 6, Zhuangzi has a comprehensive description of zhenren. Zhenren is a state or condition of a person whose acquisition of true knowledge, ability, emotional state and mind renders them a deified human. It is ultimate unity with nature. 9 Another type of people are Zhiren (a superlative person, ultimate, perfected humans). They are unaffected by external forces. They don’t feel heat in a fire, don’t feel cold in an icy river, don’t fear thunder and mountain landslides, and are not frightened by winds and rough seas. These are external powers as contrasted with the powers of the zhenren, which are more internal. In addition, some people become Shengren 神人 (a sage) and Xianren 仙人 (an immortal person).

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If physical form cannot be first complete one must complete Spiritual form. Do not seek fame or compete for profits, Ending worldly human emotions to attain the stage of no-events. (Dadaoge Stanza 95–102)

Cao’s Dadaoge calls for practices that move beyond mundane existence toward a greater spiritual realm, reaching out—or in—for the divinity and Dao. It intends to prepare the body for the higher stages. The Daoist attainment is “an energetic transfiguration that leads to ultimate transcendence and inner spiritization” (Kohn, 2008, 16). This is a great quest for transcending the limited human condition. It can be perhaps seen as a transcending 超越 (chaoyue), a process of going beyond. It differs from transcendence as a metaphysical entity or framework. Transcending is an embodied practical development and process. It entails a strong conceptual commitment and dedicated practice to go beyond current human physical, mental and social conditions. It is a course of action from a state of becoming to a journey of lifetime. This approach to life leads to several specific goals. First, how do we achieve the goal of making the body a lodging place for a spirit or the transcendent to reside in as Cao’s Dadaoge suggests? To make this possible one’s heart/mind (xin) has to be in a fit condition and qi has to be sufficient. This life-giving qi comes from heaven or responds to heaven. One needs to maintain a communication and deep relationship with the heavenly qi. This communication is the foundation of life, a way of life ruled by physico-mental hygienic principles, a systematic process of negating, forgetting or emptying out the contents of consciousness (perception, emotions, desires, thoughts, even linguistic distinctions). Second, acquiring a life form entails a separation from the great Dao. Transformation is a life-long journey of return to oneness with the Dao. Transformation demonstrates where the body comes from and where the body is going. Third, transformation is an enjoyable and imaginative journey; not a restrained and restricted bodily discipline. By the end of this life-long process one can “penetrate gold” (i.e., be beyond the obsession with wealth) and can pass through rocks (i.e., effortlessly move through obstacles.) This means that one is no longer limited or restricted by bodily forms and one’s spirit wanders freely. At the end one gains spirit penetration 神通 (shentong), a supernatural power. This Daoist practice focusses on inner energy flowing and outer vibration patterns. The manipulation of bodily energies in the end leads to significant spiritual achievement. Cao Wenji’s Dadaoge ends with solid confidence in the power of transformation: A persistent and unified heart/mind moves towards the future, The Great Dao will never disappoint a human being. (Dadaoge 127–128).

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13.4 Legacy of Cao Wenyi Many scholars in the past have been totally ignorant or dismissive of the role of female Daoists’ theory and practice in Chinese intellectual history. For example, Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986) once remarked that there was no need to study women in China because they had met with nothing but “long and unchanging slavery” (de Beauvoir, 1952, 92). Historically, the binding of feet, female infanticide, loveless marriages, and concubinage were sources of women’s misery in China. This led scholars in the past to be dismissive of the role of female Daoist works. In recent years scholars have challenged westerners’ treatment and inadequate understanding of Daoism (Barbalet, 2014). A careful investigation of a wider range of women’s texts and of women’s lived practices demonstrates that the female Daoists have much to offer. The Daoist voices can lead us to rethink the very notions of man/male/masculinity and woman/female/femininity constructed through gender terminology. The Daodejing’s original articulation of the superiority of the female was intended to better capture the dynamic rhythm of nature, the world, and human life. Women and men very often have internalized gender-biased social expectations and standards and so surrender to a social system. Furthermore, as is widely recognized nowadays, gender as a system of social categorization is performative: it is culturally taught, cognitively framed, and implemented by the individual. Our understanding of women in Chinese thought, particularly Daoist philosophy deserves to be far more complex than either Weber or Beauvoir thought. It is a common assumption in Daoist teaching that physical and mental health can be degenerated and damaged by emotions. The way to avoid these conditions is to be with Dao through mind and body cultivation. This embraces and celebrates the living and sentient body as the organizing core of intellectual, spiritual and practical experience. Body is not only a crucial space where one’s ethos and values can be displayed but also where one’s cognitive capacities are enhanced. As Cao explains: …expanding and melting vessels to transform nerves and bones, brightness is reflecting everywhere with a complete penetration. Three bugs to be expelled from the body, So ten thousand spirits will come to the red palace.10 (Dadaoge, Stanza 47–50)

Dadaoge has indicated that three harmful bugs (sanchong) or ghosts reside in three central body parts. The upper bug is in the head and blocks one’s wisdom and makes one stupid. The middle bug is located in one’s chest. It makes one emotionally disturbed with no peace. The lower bug hides in one’s stomach. It causes

10 In

this context “Red Palace” is a metaphor for the human heart.

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one’s desires for food and lust for sex. A perfect natural body gets eaten away by these three dangerous bugs so one must follow Daoist teachings and practices to get rid of them. If the body goes through a transformation then these bugs have no place to reside. Once these dirty and harmful bugs are cleaned out the good and healthy jing, qi, shen will come to reside. This is the one of imperative reasons to cultivate the body. The process of cultivation is also a generative process. The generative process is not simply a function of the cosmos but also appears in one’s knowing and thinking. Cao Wenyi’s Dadaoge illustrates that Daoist body cultivation is not simply entering a quiet physical space and being centered. In solitude one finds delight in one’s own body and mind: enlarge the mind and let it go, relax the qi and expand; the body is a calm and unmoving guide to oneness, so discard the myriad disturbances, do not seek profit and be enticed by it. Ultimately one wants to attain the fittingness of the body for the Dao. Evidently Dadaoge’s attention is directed not outwardly but inwardly. It turns human energy toward the refinement of one’s own body such it will enhance human cognitive ability. The awareness is on the state of the mind and body, an inward horizon 境界 (jingjie). This will stabilize the mind and enable us to attain ming (illumination). This conceptual formulation has been developed into the teaching of Purity and Stillness 清靜 (Qingjing). Advocates of Cao Wenyi’s philosophy of Dadaoge consider the doctrine of Purity and Stillness to be her most cherished and unique contribution to Daoist philosophy in particular and to philosophy as a whole.

Appendix 1 The Song of Ultimate Source of Great Dao 灵源大道歌·曹文逸 by Cao Wenyi Translated by Robin R. Wang I will tell you the entire process from beginning to end, [but] the root of life comes from the True Breath. The brilliant spiritual body has the longevity of emptiness that is not empty; it is a numinous mirror that contains Heaven and myriad things. The Supreme Polarity (taiji) spreads the subtle mystery (miao) and therefore human beings obtain the Oneness; Having obtained the Oneness, guard it carefully so it won’t be lost. If palaces [of the body] are empty and unoccupied,

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the spirit (shen) will spontaneously dwell in there; [Yet] if these numinous residences (lingfu) are agitated and stressed, the blood and fluids will dry out. Sorrows, joys, thoughts, and worries, indulgences and labors all consume and decay the body. Morning and evening we unconsciously collect injury after injury, destroying and corrupting the essence and spirit until there is no foundation. Little by little, one is worn down and declines in health, When there is nothing left, the primordial harmonious spirit departs. It is said that the meditative mind can be cultivated while walking and sitting; Yet only the sage can achieve this level. The original spouts are tender and delicate; The root of knowledge is easily bewildered and misdirected. Laziness and indolence cannot remove weeds, And a harvest has never come from barren ground. Nine years it takes to complete cultivation and generate a sufficient fire, Responding to things with no-mind the spirit transforms rapidly. The mind of no-mind is the True Mind; Distinctions of stillness and action are forgotten and desires are abandoned. Spirit (shen) is 性 inner nature (xing), qi (energy) is lifespan (ming 命); If the spirit does not rush off, the qi will naturally be stable. Originally these two (inner nature and lifespan) are intimately linked and equally precious, If either is ever lost—what foundation of life could there be? They merge to become one and yet forget their own discrete identities; Therefore they can expand and contract with the rhythmic primordial transformations (yuanhua). Piercing metal and penetrating stone is not hard, As compared to preventing their rash failure during sitting and standing practices. This Dao of cultivation is easy to learn yet hard to practice, The definitive stage is where one practices this Dao of cultivation to the point of forgetting it. Do not mistake holding the breath for a genuine practice, neither merely counting breaths, nor following diagrams. Though one may cease all worldly labors,

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284 if the mind is still entangled, what is the difference? Just look at an infant in its embryonic stage.

How could this being have a discriminating mind full of hidden calculations? Focus the qi to ultimate softness, and the spirit (shen) will stay forever; Then the true inhalation and exhalation comes and goes freely; the genuine breath is centered naturally. If the [breath] is fine, unbroken, and gentle, it will return one to the primordial source of life (yuanming), It is like a stream that spontaneously and eternally flows from a numinous spring. The practice of the thirty-six thousand is considered a great accomplishment, The proper yin-yang firing is embodied within it. Expanding and melting vessels to transform nerves and bones, The brilliant light penetrates everywhere without exception. The three corpse worms are expelled from the body, and the ten thousand spirits hold court in the palace of the Red Monarch. Where does True Being (zhenren) come from? True Being (zhenren) is within our own numinous field (lingtai) [heart/mind]. from the beginning. In the past, it was complete covered by cloud and fog, Now, it is seen with the open eye of Dao. Dao is not the work of one day or one night, It is not a technique, but the True Self (zhenwo). The solidity and strength of metal and stone is only known. through long exertion and time-tested determination; Fighting back the dark demons results in the power of wisdom. Relying on emptiness and humility, and concentrating the essence, One is able to enter the paradise of quiescence. Everything must begin with solidifying the foundation, until one reaches the state where there is nothing that non-doing leaves undone. Gradually eradicating distracting desires and thoughts, Firmly retain the essence and spirit, even in dreams. The core practice is neither activity nor stillness, The ultimate Dao is neither square nor round. Cultivating inner primordial harmonious qi, one can achieve True Being,

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But seeking simply the external, using with inhaling and exhaling practice, will never lead to success. If primordial qi does not reside within, the spirit cannot come to rest, The worm-eaten tree has no roots, and its branches and leaves are withered. Body fluids, such as tears, saliva, semen [male] and blood [female]. come from the same source, but with different manifestations. These bodily fluids have no fixed position, They change according to one’s will and intention. In the body, when one feels hot, the fluids become sweat and perspiration, In the eyes, when one feels sad, they become tears. In the kidneys, when a man feels stimulated, the fluid becomes sperm, In the nose, when one feels wind, it becomes nasal mucus. All of these fluids flowing horizontally and vertically nourish the body from head to toe, When they arrive in the head without dissipating, they distill into spiritual elixir. It is difficult to explain this spiritual elixir and those who understand it are rare; All of the elixir is generated from cultivated qi. Only aspire to tranquility without thoughts or worries, Abstain, tame the mind, and limit words. Refine all fluids into the nectar of sweet dew. The dew eliminates hunger and thirst to reveal genuine purity. The end goal is to be free and unfettered, Yet the first stage is the intense and punishing work of refinement. Still, this intense and punishing work also requires a lack of intensity, And to just be carefree while nourishing the primordial spirit. What are barriers stand in the way of the fettered heart/mind? This [perfection] of tension and release completely depends upon the efforts of individual My current bitter existence is hardship piled on hardship, Trees are my food and grass my garment. But I’m alone and at peace. If the heart/mind that knows the Great Dao, but cannot put it into practice, It is because fame, achievement, and ego are major illnesses. Finding a quiet place to practice, Strive for self-composure, sitting with great focus.

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Although it is hard to complete both physical form (xing) and spirit (shen) in tandem, Without cultivation of the predestined materialized body (ming) the inner nature (xing) will wither. Do not seek fame or compete for profit, Sever human emotions and be altogether apart from worldly affairs. With an intense determination, how could others become impediments? With the supreme teachings, who could restrain me? What is the value of sound that reaches the heavens? Horsemanship and literary essays are unimportant. Splendorous garments and sumptuous meals are all mindless What value is accumulated jade or piled gold? Clever crafts, essays, and poems, These numerous achievements impede the path of cultivation. They are just like thin fog and light smoke Purposeless like falling flowers and willow fluff. Fluttering between Heaven and Earth, they are incapable of becoming rain or dew. Fame or body, which is more dear? For half our life we just mindlessly follow along. One should cultivate shen and qi, but it will be a wasted effort if shen and qi are not peacefully comingled. It would be such a pity to have this wonderful body be like a golden palace without a master residing in it. One should use different methods to call back the master, Let the master stay in sealed emptiness without being made to work Within nothing there is something wonderful, but grasping it is hard; Nourishment for the child must come from the mother. Put aside brilliant arguments and expel intelligence, Retract the essence and spirit and just be a fool. A persistent and unified heart/mind moves towards the future, The Great Dao will never disappoint a human being.

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Appendix 2 The Song of Ultimate Source of Great Dao (Dadaoge) 灵源大道歌·曹文逸 by Cao Wenyi Text established by Robin R. Wang 我为诸君说端的。命蒂从来在真息。 照体长生空不空。灵鉴涵天容万物。 太极布妙人得一, 得一善持谨勿失。 宫室虚闲神自居, 灵府煎熬枯血液。 一悲一喜一思虑, 一纵一劳形蠹弊, 朝傷暮損迷不知, 喪亂精神無所據。 細細消磨漸漸衰, 耗竭元和神乃去。 只道行禅坐亦禅, 圣可如斯凡不然。 萌芽脆嫩须含蓄, 根识昏迷易变迁。 磋跎不解去荆棘, 未闻美稼出荒田. 九年功满火候足, 应物无心神化速。 无心心即是真心。动静两忘为离欲。 神是性兮气是命, 神不外驰气自定。 本来两物更谁亲, 失却将何为本柄. 混合为一复忘一, 可与元化同出没。 透金贯石不为难, 坐脱立亡犹倏忽. 此道易知不易行, 行忘所行道乃毕。 莫将闭息为真务, 数息按图俱未是。 比来放下外尘劳, 内有萦心两何异。 但看婴儿处胎时, 岂解有心潜算计。 专气致柔神久留, 往来真息自悠悠。 绵绵迤逦归元命, 不汲灵泉常自流。 三万六千为大功, 阴阳节候在其中。 蒸融关脉变筋骨, 处处光明无不通。 三彭走出阴尸宅, 万国来朝赤帝宫。 借问真人何处来, 从前元只在灵台。 昔年云雾深遮蔽, 今日相逢道眼开。

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288 此非一朝与一夕, 是我本真不是术。 岁寒坚确知金石, 战退阴魔加慧力。 皆由虚淡复精专。便是华胥情静国。 初将何事立根基, 到无为处无不为。 念中境象须除拔, 梦里精神牢执持。 不动不静为大要, 不方不圆为至道。 元和内炼即成真, 呼吸外求终未了。 元气不住神不安, 蠹木无根枝叶干。 休论涕唾与精血, 达本穷源总一般。 此物何曾有定位, 随时变化因心意。 在体感热即为汗, 在眼感悲即为泪。 在肾感念即为精, 在鼻感风即为涕。 纵横流转润一身, 到头不出于神水。 神水难言识者稀, 资生一切由真气。 但知恬淡无思虑, 斋戒宁心节言语。 一味醍醐甘露浆, 饥渴消除见真素。 他时功满自逍遥, 初日炼烹实勤苦。 勤苦之中又不勤, 闲闲只要养元神。 奈何心使闲不得, 到此纵擒全在人。 心知大道不能行, 名迹与身为大病。 我今苦中苦更苦, 木食草衣孤又静。 比如闲处用功夫, 争似泰然坐大定。 形神虽曰两难全, 了命未能先了性。 不去奔名与逐利, 绝了人情总无事。 决烈在人何住滞, 在我更教谁制御。 掀天聲價又何如?倚馬文章非足貴。 榮華衣食總無心, 積玉堆金得何濟? 工巧文章與詞賦, 多能礙卻修行路。 恰如薄霧與輕煙, 閑傍落花隨柳絮。 飄渺浮游天地間, 到了不能成雨露。 名與身兮竟孰親?半生歲月大因循。 比来修炼赖神气, 神气不安空苦辛。 可怜一个好基址, 金殿玉堂无主人。 劝得主人长久住, 置在虚闭无用处。

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289 无中妙有执持难, 解养婴儿须藉母。 缄藏俊辩黜聪明, 收卷精神作愚鲁。 坚心一志任前程, 大道于人终不负。

References Barbalet, J. (2014). Weber’s Daoism: A failure of orthodoxy. Journal of Classical Sociology, 14(3), 284–301. Chen, Y. (1988). Interpretations and commentary on the song of Great Dao of Lingyuang. Chinese Daoist Association Publishing. de Beauvoir, S. (1952). The second sex (H. M. Parshley, Trans.). Columbia University Press. Despeux, C., & Kohn, L. (2004). Women in Daoism. Three Pines. Favraud, G. (2016). Immortals’ medicine: Daoist healers and social change. Journal of Daoist Studies, 9, 101–120. Hall, D. L., & Ames, R. T. (1998). Thinking from the Han: Self, truth, and transcendence in Chinese and Western culture. State University of New York Press. Knoblock, J., & Riegel, J. (2000). The Annals of Lü Buwei: A complete translation and study. Stanford University Press. Kohn, L. (2008). Daoist body cultivation. Three Pines. Moeller, G.-H. (Trans.). (2007). Daodejing: The new, highly readable translation of the life-changing ancient scripture formerly known as the Tao Te Ching. Open Court. Placher, W. C. (1996). The domestication of transcendence: How modern thinking about god went wrong. Westminster John Knox Press. Wang, R. R. (2020a). From female Daoist rationality to Kundao practice: Daoism beyond Weber’s understanding. In Review of Religion and Chinese Society (pp. 179–198). Brill. Wang, R. R. (2020b) A journey of transformative living: A female Daoist reflection. In S. Thorgeirsdottir & R. E. Hagengruber (Eds.), Methodological reflections on women’s contribution and influence in the history of philosophy (pp. 97–109). Springer. Wang, R. R. (2012). Yinyang: The Way of heaven and earth in Chinese thought and culture. Cambridge University Press. Wang, R. R. (2017). Dao becomes female: A gendered reality, knowledge, and strategy for living. In A. Garry, S. J. Khader, & A. Stone (Eds.), The Routledge companion to feminist philosophy (pp. 35–48). Bloomsbury. Weber, M. (1951). The religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism (H. H. Gerth, Trans.). Macmillan.

Chapter 14

Photograph by unknown artist with no copyright asserted is of a statue that is in public domain due to its antiquity

Sun Bu’er of China 孫不二 1119–1183 Sandra A. Wawrytko Abstract Commemorated as one of Seven Perfected Ones (or Seven Perfected Daoist Masters), Sun Bu’Er’s teachings and writings explore the methodology of “inner alchemy” as a set of personal practices that is not exclusively for women. In her account, cultivation of both yin (female) and yang (male) principles are needed for any person to reach enlightenment. Such cultivation of seemingly opposite principles reveals that neither force should rule a person, rather that it is discovering how to balance the two harmoniously that supports the achievement of enlightenment. In this chapter the influences upon Sun of Confucianism and Buddhism are examined, together with an examination of the Daoist sources that inform her philosophy of “inner alchemy.”

S. A. Wawrytko (*)  San Diego State University, San Diego, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_14

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14.1 Introduction The philosophy of the Tang Dynasty (618–906) was dominated by Buddhism and Daoism to such an extent that “not even one first-rate mind appeared among the Confucianists who could dispute the pre-eminence of the Buddhist philosophers or slow the progress of the Taoist church” (deBary, 411). The Song Dynasty (960–1279) witnessed a pendulum swing back toward Confucian philosophy. To insure a successful comeback, supporters of Confucianism needed to incorporate aspects of Buddhist philosophy that had proven so attractive, specifically from the Huayan 華嚴, Tiantai 天台 and Chan 禪 schools. The result was the NeoConfucian hybrid, melding Buddhist and Daoist influences into an interpretation of Confucianism grounded in Yijing 易經 metaphysics (Chan, 1967, xviii). Attacks were launched against “the heterodoxical doctrines,” that included Mohism and Legalism, which “may not be allowed to go without clear sifting. If the slightest amount is not clearly sifted, it will do the human mind very much harm.” Special venom was reserved for Daoists and Buddhists: “The words of the Buddha and Lao Tzu are somewhat reasonable. In this they cannot be matched by Yang [Chu] and Mo [Tzu]. This is why they are much more harmful” (Chan, 1967, 280). Thus, in Sun’s day the Daoist path was not considered a mainstream choice. Nonetheless she flourished within the Complete Perfection (全眞 Quanzhen) school, one of the two principal Daoist schools that arose in this period. Sun distinguished herself as one of the Seven Perfected Ones (七真 qizhen) or Immortals, the only woman in the group. This attainment is the thread that links her to previous manifestations of Daoist philosophy, which recognized life-affirming Yin energy as the source of survival, life extension, and even immortality. However over time the understanding of immortality changed substantially. A brief review of early Daoist texts that served as precursors to Sun’s philosophy—the Daodejing 道德經, the Zhuangzi 莊子, and Sunu jing 素女經 (The Classic of Su Nu)—is necessary to reveal Sun’s sources.

14.1.1 Daodejing Laozi 老子 does not claim to be the originator of the philosophy set forth in the Daodejing. Rather he makes numerous references to past sources, ranging from old sayings to “those of old who partook of One [Dao]” (Chap. 39, Fu and Wawrytko 121). Following the primal theme of survival, there are multiple references to Dao’s alignment with life, such that its yin 陰energy should be emulated through Reversion (反 fan). Chapter 16 outlines the process—“returning [复 fu] to the root” is ‘returning to [natural] destiny,’ “the enduring,” and “enlightenment”; while to be ignorant of “the enduring is to blindly invite disaster.” Being “all-encompassing,” “impartial,” “complete,” “heavenly,” is to be “none other than Dao” and “none other than everlasting—/Free from danger throughout one’s

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life” (Fu and Wawyrtko, 108). Those “adept at preserving life” have “no place for death to enter” (op. cit., 126). “The supple and soft emerge on top” (Fu and Wawrytko, 142). Conversely, yang 陽 energy is associated with death and conflict, the “hard and stiff” (like corpses and dead trees) (op cit, 141). Moreover, “Being audaciously braves invites death” (op. cit., 140). Therefore survival depends on the suppleness of yin energy: Whoever knows the male, Yet holds fast to the female, Becomes the ravine of the world. Whoever becomes the ravine of the world, Without departing from enduring De (德), Returns to infancy. (Fu and Wawrytko, 142)

The most explicit mention of immortality occurs in Chap. 33, which ends with these lines: Whoever does not lose the [primal] place [Dao] will endure; Whoever dies yet does not perish—immortality! (Fu and Wawrytko 119).1

The juxtapositioning of three words—“to die” (死 si), “to perish” (亡 wang), and “long life/immortality” (壽 shou)—seems to pose a paradox. How can one endure yet die, without perishing? One possible interpretation is that, despite physical death, ultimate enlightenment (“profound oneness with Dao”) or spiritual immortality is realized through one’s connection to enduring Dao. Wing-tsit Chan contends that Laozi “showed no tendency to believe in earthly immortals (hsien, a fairy) [ 仙 xian], although his exaltation of everlasting life undoubtedly contributed to the development of the belief” (Chan, 1963, 156). Today we can discern the natural process embraced by Laozi in the “startling secrets” of trees: …they are a web of interdependence, linked by a system of underground channels, where they perceive and connect and relate with an ancient intimacy and wisdom. … the biggest and oldest timbers are the sources of fungal connections to regenerate seedlings.

Dao as Mother nurtures the Ten Thousand Things just as the “Mother Trees… pass their wisdom on to their kin, generation after generation, sharing the knowledge of what helps and what harms, who is friend or foe, and how to adapt and survive in an ever-changing landscape” (Simard 4–5).2

1 Fu

and Wawrytko, 119. Chapter 50 claims that inside those who are “adept at preserving life” there is “no place for death to enter,” 127. 2 Simard, a professor of forest ecology who has an extensive record of publications on this topic in scientific journals, declares “the forest is wired for wisdom, sentience, and healing”; 6.

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14.1.2 Zhuangzi The Daoist philosophy of Zhuang Zi continues the critique of cunning intellect’s (知 zhi) yang approach, while pointing at yin’s 自然 ziran that returns us Dao. Immortality also makes an appearance in a number of characters, both historical and fictional, intent on achieving this goal. This has led some to conclude that unlike Lao Zi, Zhuang Zi did accept the notion of “earthly immortals” (Chan, 1963, 156). It seems more precise to say that he made use of that deep-seated cultural construct to clarify his advocacy of “the usefulness of the useless.” For example, Chap. 1 draws distinctions between two possible perspectives and the corresponding ways of being in the world: Small Knowledge and Great Knowledge. At the end of the chapter these are embodied, respectively, in the Small Person (Logician Huizi 惠子, 370–310 BCE.) and the Great Person (Zhuangzi); the cunning weasel who dies in a net while hunting and the placid ox lounging wu-wei 無為 beneath a tree. Zhuangzi exposes the myopic “self-pride” of those who adhere to the status quo imposed by humans. Their mastery of wei assertiveness and yang energy, deemed “useful” by task-driven humans (such as Confucians), is a thin veneer. “Successful” scholar-officials—akin to little birds who deride the capabilities of the high-flying, massive Peng Bird—conform to narrow anthropocentric standards and values. Hence, their knowledge is “limited to one office” and their “talent” earns the approval of their insular community. Their “virtue” satisfies their sovereign, and their presumed abilities are trusted by people of one State (Watson, 1968, 31). Delving deeper, Zhuangzi signals a transition to increasingly thick layers of acting without artificial action (為無為 wei-wu-wei), by remaining responsive to one’s natural environment. First introduced is an example of the selfless Perfect Person, Song Rong Zi (Glorious Son of the State of Song), who sought nothing from the world. Unaffected by praise or belittlement, he “drew a clear line between the internal and the external” while recognizing “the boundaries of true glory and disgrace.” An improvement over the self-pride of the typical scholar, and yet “there was still ground he left unturned.” The meritless Spiritual Person, Liezi 列子, practitioner of Daoist cultivation, exerted no effort to attain happiness. He was able to “ride the wind,” which exposes his limitation: “he still had to depend on something to get around.” It would be better if he were able to mount “on the truth of Heaven and Earth” and thus wander “through the boundless, then what would he have had to depend on?” What is lacking in Liezi is found in the nameless Sage, who remains anonymous, oblivious to fame (Watson, 32). Zhuangzi’s critique of Liezi seems to indicate he that does not consider practices intent on cultivating transcendent powers as a way to harmonize with Dao. Further evidence of this is found in Chap. 6, where Liezi is described as “completely intoxicated” by a shaman’s alleged powers to “tell whether men would live or die, survive or perish, be fortunate or unfortunate, live a long time or die young.” Liezi exclaims to his teacher, Huzi “I used to think, Master, that your

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Way was perfect. But now I see there is something even higher!’ Huizi sees this as a sign of his student’s deficient understanding of Dao. Huzi has multiple meetings with the shaman, each time eliciting a different prediction of his fate due to his ability to appear in different forms. Finally, the defeated shaman flees in terror, after encountering Huzi as “Not Yet Emerged from My Source.” Liezi then “concluded that he had never really begun to learn anything… he got rid of his carving and polishing [cultivation?] and returned to plainness” (Watson, 94–97). Furthermore, the final chapter (named for Liezi) records Zhuangzi’s parting words to his disciples. He clearly is not expecting to transcend the world by ascending into the heavens. Rather he speaks of heaven and earth as providing all that is required for his burial: “the fool trusts to what he can see and immerses himself in the human. All his accomplishments are beside the point—pitiful, isn’t it!” (Watson, 361).

14.1.3 Sunujing Some of the earliest texts associated with Daoism are medical manuals aimed at increasing health and longevity. External alchemy sought to turn worthless elements such as lead into gold; internal alchemy is intent on transforming the leaden effects of illness and aging into a gold standard of health and possibly immortality. Of special note are early texts in which mysterious females serve as sex consultants to authoritative males.3 The Classic of Su Nu (Sunujing) is named for the goddess Su Nu who functioned as “sex initiatress” for the legendary Yellow Emperor, Huang Di 黃帝.4 Although great antiquity is claimed for such texts, the extant version dates from the Sui dynasty (589–618). The contents are thus not necessarily faithful to the original and may have been subjected to revisionist tampering.5 These manuals recognize the inherent power of yin energy as an essential for male survival and even the secret to longevity. Yang energy also was recognized, however unlike the unlimited, renewable supply of women’s yin, a man’s yang was distinctly limited and thus had to be carefully guarded. One method of nourishing both yin and yang, and maintaining health, was the proper performance of

3 Similarly,

Socrates credits the priestess Diotima from Mantinea for teaching him about Eros; see Plato’s Symposium. An account of Diotima’s philosophy is found in Waithe (1987, 83–116). 4 The name Su Nu has been variously as “Immaculate Lady,” “Immaculate Maiden,” the “Pure Girl, or the “White Madam.” Her phoenix-riding sister, Xuan Nu (玄女)—“Dark Lady” “Dark Girl,” or “Mysterious Madam”—also tutored Huang Di in the sexual arts. Daoist “arts of the bedchamber” are known as xuansu zhidao (玄素之道), based on a combination of their names, literally the Dao or Way of Xuan and Su. 5 Some early Daoist texts on this subject have survived in Japan in the Ishimpō 醫心方, a collection of ancient Chinese medical texts.

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sexual intercourse.6 A mutual exchange of energies could occur, with men contributing yang to women while women shared their yin with men. Men were exhorted to monitor and restrict their seminal emissions, but there was no such prohibition for women.7 However, a man could derive no benefit from his partner unless she shared her yin through an orgasm. Later texts, such as Secrets of the Jade Chamber (Yufang bi-xue), reek of gynophobia, framing intercourse as the battle of the sexes, even referring to the female partner as “the enemy” (Wile, 103). Women are banished from the discussion and serve merely as a means to male ends: Those who would cultivate their yang must not allow women to steal glimpses of this art. …When having intercourse with women, as soon as you feel yourself aroused, change partners. By changing partners, you can lengthen your life.” (Wile, 102)

The message of Laozi was substantially reframed, if not entirely ignored, by Daoists intent on attaining immortality: The glorification of yin in early Taoist philosophy, and the emphasis on the balance of yin and yang in traditional Chinese medicine. gives way to the search for pure yang in alchemy, meditation, and sexual yoga. In early Taoism, yang in its aspect of hardness was to be avoided and yin softness to be cultivated; in later Taoism, yang in its aspect of spirit was to be cultivated and yin materiality to be avoided. (Wile, 29)8

Theories on the health aspects of yin and yang energies are integrated into the Inner Alchemy (neidan 內丹) practiced by Sun. However, it involved training both mind and body while requiring adherence to celibacy. These “pure practices” (qing xiu) “totally rejected carnal techniques in favor of the mystical marriage of male and female principles within the body of the meditator” (Wile, 15). In neidan texts there is no mention of a woman’s advantage in having unlimited yin. Instead, she is burdened with a need to limit and ultimately eliminate the natural flow of menstruation (essential for life), mirroring the need for male practitioners to avoid ejaculation to protect their yang. The preeminent power of yin, as set forth by Laozi, obviously has been devalued.

14.1.4 Cao Wenyi Sun Bu’er’s poetic presentation of her philosophy is said to be inspired and influenced by a Daoist predecessor, the nun Cao Xiyun 曹希蘊 (1040–1115, aka Cao

6 Peng

Zu (籛鏗) was considered the most successful practitioner of these arts, and hence lived more than eight hundred years, allegedly due to his nineteen wives and nine hundred concubines. 7 This assumption accounts for a considerably tolerant view of lesbianism in Chinese culture, if practiced discreetly. See Wawrytko (1993, 203). 8 A case can be made for the continuity of Daoist philosophy today, including texts adhering to the original message, as an esoteric teaching transmitted only to initiates.

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Wenyi9 曹文逸), who appears to be “the first woman to have set forth in verse both the theory and practice of internal alchemy” (Liu, 176). The loss of her poems and texts has deprived us of important philosophical resources, including her commentary on the Daodejing and Scripture of Western Ascension (Xisheng jing 西昇經). We do have her 128-line poem, “A Song of the Great Dao” (Dadao ge 大道歌), which both encourages and guides the reader toward practice: Today as we meet, the eyes of Dao are open. It doesn’t happen in one morning and one night, It’s the product of my true self, not magic arts. (Liu, 190)

Cao’s poem echoes not only the themes in the Daodejing, but in many cases the actual wording of that text. Her disavowal of “magic arts” is noteworthy. Sun’s compositions also contain references to Laozi’s text, along with Buddhist and Confucian terminology.

14.2 Biography Sun Fuchun (富春), the woman we now know as Sun Bu’er (孫不二; 1119–83), was born into a wealthy landowning family in Shandong province. Her life was roughly contemporaneous with the most famous Song Neo-Confucian Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130– 1200). Her father Sun Zhongjing, a literati, provided her with an excellent education. She excelled at the intricacies of poetic composition as well as calligraphy. Sun’s Daoist name, Bu’er, “not two,” was associated with the Buddhist philosophy of nondualism.10 The Quanzhen school she joined drew upon the Three Teachings (sanjiao 三教), a convergence of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism, represented by three key texts respectively, The Classic of Filial Piety (Xiaojing 孝經), the Daodejing (道德經) and the Heart Sūtra (Xinjing 心經) (Pas and Leung, 97). Sun’s path to Daoist practice was quite convoluted. Fulfilling the traditional Confucian roles expected of women, she spent decades married to husband Ma Yu 馬鈺 (1123–1184, aka Ma Danyang), raising three precious sons required to insure family continuity. Things changed radically when Ma became a student of Wang Zhe 王喆 (1113–1170, aka Zhongfu 中孚), one of the founding members of the Quanzhen school. Wang insisted that Ma abandon the life of a householder and devote himself to ascetic practice, which he did in 1168. Stories abound

9 See

Chap. 13 “Cao Wenji” by Robin Wang, in this volume. term “bu er” occurs in Trust in Mind (信心銘 xin xin ming), the philosophical poem of the third Chan Patriarch, Sengcan (僧璨 d. 606): “To abide in this world/just say ‘Not two.’/‘Not two’ includes everything,/Excludes nothing” (Addiss et al., 17). It also may refer to Sun’s mergence with Dao (Komjathy, 2014, 178). 10 The

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concerning Sun’s attempts to dissuade him from this life, even an alleged attempt to starve Wang to death while he was on a 100-day retreat.11 Quanzhen has been proclaimed “the main official branch of Taoism in continental China,” due to its being “the first Taoist monastic order, whose members could more easily be registered and wore distinctive garments, [which] apparently fit the state’s religious policy of segregation between the lay and religious” (Goosert, v. 2, 814). This included a communal lifestyle and celibacy, mirroring practices of the Buddhist Sangha. Wang Zhe is recognized as the fifth Patriarch of a Daoist lineage traced back to Han Dynasty Daoist Master Wang Xuanpu 王玄 浦. His teaching, said to derive from Laozi, was recorded in The Classic of Purity and Tranquility (清靜經 Qingjing Jing). Another alleged link with Laozi is established through The Secret of the Golden Flower (吕祖先天一气太乙金华宗旨 Lu Zu Xiantian Yiqi Taiyi Jinhua Zongzhi), a manual of meditation techniques said to used by Laozi.12 The school distinguished itself for its outreach to the lay community, and the large number of women practitioners it was able to attract. After repeated urgings from Wang Zhe, Sun Bu’er finally embraced Quanzhen practice in 1169.13 As a direct student of Wang she was taught advanced meditation techniques and received multiple transmissions (Komjathy 2014, 180). She went on to develop own teachings and acquired disciples. In 1179 she led a community of female Quanzhen practitioners, the Purity and Tranquility or Clarity and Stillness (清靜 Qingjing) sect, in Luoyang. In addition to her teaching and meditation practices Sun engaged in community activities. After her death apocryphal stories emerged about her auspicious birth and magical arts as the Sun Bu’er legend grew, culminating in her divine ascent as a recognized Immortal. Following the model of many a Chan Master, in death Sun demonstrated extraordinary equanimity: “she groomed herself, put on clean clothes, and presented herself to her disciples, sealing her life’s work by reciting a poem. Sitting erect in lotus posture, she became an immortal” (Komjathy, 182). Her role in the Quanzhen school has been succinctly summarized as follows: “she was included, excluded, marginalized, elevated, and finally deified as one of the so-called Seven Perfected” (Komjathy 2014, 214). Quanzhen flourished across China in her lifetime, establishing 4000 sacred sites and attracting 20,000 monastics (Komjathy 2014, 182).

11 Komjathy (2014, 193) concludes that the account of Sun’s murderous intent toward Wang should be rejected, and that it may indicate misogynous tendencies on the part of those who disseminated the story. 12 See Cleary (1991b). This is a core text for the Dragon Gate lineage of Quanzhen that has survived to the present (Fischer-Schreiber, 25). 13 Wang’s poem attests to her reluctance: “Over these years, I made ten attempts to convert you through divided pears [her husband’s departure];/I matched auspicious times with the heavens in their original suchness./At that time you were unwilling to separate from your family; You simply waited patiently for the right time to coalesce the Golden Lotus [Quanzhen]. (Komjathy, 2014, 178).

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14.3 Works Poems attributed to Sun are contained in a late medieval collection of Daoist verse, Minghe yuyin, edited by Peng Zhizhong (fl. 1340 s) in 1347 with a preface by Yuji (1272–1348). The volume, featuring some five hundred poems, was compiled nearly 200 years after her death. Most of the poets are Quanzhen Masters. Komjathy argues for the veracity of the poems attributed to Sun since some of them appear in earlier texts. Furthermore, he notes a consistency in the “internal elements” of poems associated with Sun (Komjathy 2014, 198). Less credible are two other works: Yuqing taiyuan neiyang zhenjing (Perfect scripture on internally nourishing the embryonic origin of jade clarity) and Yuqing wushang neijing zhenjing (Perfect scripture on the unsurpassed inner landscape of jade clarity), which are included in Sun Buer yuanjun chuanshu dandao mishu (Secret writings on the way of the elixir transmitted by primordial goddess Sun Buer). Since texts of the Quanzhen school were almost always anonymous, the fact that the secret writings name her as the author is cause for skepticism (Komjathy 2014, 200). Moreover, it was a longstanding practice for Chinese authors to credit their works to famous predecessors. A number of other texts have been identified as works by Sun. In some cases, she is given exalted titles, such as Sun yuanjun (Primordial goddess Sun) and Qingjing yuanjun (Primordial goddess Clear Stillness), promoting her to a status beyond even Daoist immortals (Komjathy 2014, 201). These titles are likely to be later attributions, reflecting her growing reputation. Komjathy questions the authenticity of several texts linked to Sun: Sun Buer nüdan shi zhu (Commentary on Sun Buer’s Poetry on Female Alchemy), Nüdan hebian (Collected Works on Female Alchemy), Nü jindan fayao (Essential Methods of the Gold Elixir for Women) and Sun Buer yuanjun gongfu cidi (Practices and Stages of Sun Buer),14 concluding “none of these works actually were composed by Sun Buer. The most that can be said is that some of the works claim to be inspired or revealed by Sun” (Komjathy, 2013, 320 n. 246). Turning to the philosophical content of her work, Sun advises, “Separate from husband and children in the Burning House” (Komanthy 2014, 221). Given the syncretic nature of the Quanzhen sect, this reference to the Burning House Parable of the Lotus Sūtra is insightful.15 The parable describes young children (deluded beings) mindlessly playing in a burning mansion while their father (the Buddha) tries to entice them to escape. The fire symbolize the Three Poisons (greed/lust, fear/anger, and ignorance) that cause our suffering (duhkha) in the Samsaric experience of life. Sun’s separation, first from her husband and later her children, allowed her to exit the Burning House, leaving behind mundane tribulations. After Sun joined the Quanzhen community Wang, now her teacher, wrote “In your

14 Thomas

Cleary (1991a) makes these fourteen poems the core of his text, Immortal Sisters, accompanied by the twentieth century commentaries of Chen Yingming. 15 Komjathy (2013, 391) confirms the connection to the Buddhist Burning House.

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family, your name was ‘Second’ -/Leave it so that your karmic fire may come to an end” (Komjathy, 2014, 178). The following poems trace Sun’s progress toward transcendence through the neidan practice of Inner Alchemy. This requires control over the dynamic movements of qi 氣 energy and bodily fluids through bodily channels to unleash the elixir of immortality believed to reside within. Three stages are involved: “the transformation of vital essence to qi, qi   to spirit [神 shen], and spirit to emptiness” (Komjathy, 2013, 363). Her images and terminology are derived from Daoist as well as Buddhist sources, requiring extensive commentary to reveal the underlying messages. The exact meanings of some passages remain elusive, befitting the most sublime examples of Chinese poetry characterized by “limited words but unlimited meanings.”16  Here is an attempted explication of the philosophical aspects of Sun’s Minghe yuyin poems.17

14.3.1 Bu Suanzi To the Tune “Casting Lots” (one stanza) When you seal the fists [embrace Dao] and loosen your robes, The Water and Fire will immediately commingle and merge. The misty vapors of the myriad districts manifest below the ocean; With a single strike, the Three Passes [points along the spine] become penetrated. Immortal bliss continually expands As you constantly drink the delicious wine [clear fluids]. The wondrous medicine [elixir of immortality] is completely beyond time limits; The nine-times reverted cinnabar sand becomes complete.

The opening line describes how the practitioner situates herself in meditation to realize “psychosomatic integration” of water (kidneys/emotions/vital essence, jing) and fire (heart/consciousness/spirit, shen). Water is a yin element and fire yang. The aligning of body and mind is believed to give rise to the elixir of immortality, “complete energetic presence and the formation of a transcendent spirit” (Komjathy, 2014, 220 n. 142). An alchemical transformation begins within the microcosm of one’s own body. Cinnabar, a highly valued ingredient, is used in Daoist elixirs. The “immortal bliss” seems to refer to the “internal joy, contentment and carefree ease” that arises from the state of “clarity and stillness” attained

16 Yen Yu

嚴羽 (1191–1241), quoted by Fung (1948, 12). For more detailed elucidations of these poems see Komjathy (2014). 17 These poems are included in an Appendix to Komjathy (2014, 219–238), along with other poems he considers to be authentic works.

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by engaging in this entry level practice (Komjathy, 2014, 207). The “nine-times” refers to yang, which is given the value of three in Yijing divination (yin is two), maximized when squared.

14.3.2 Yao Baomei To the Tune “Accentuating Slender Eyebrows”(thirteen stanzas) Admonish people to awaken. In cultivation and practice, renounce the suffering of the Three Roads. Attain enlightened liberation, And leap through the doorway. [Remember] Tan, Ma, Qiu, Liu, Sun, Wang, and Hao Taigu. The ocean of divine law is a raft of compassion; Inside the kingdom, there is universal salvation.

The opening reference to awakening suggests a Buddhist influence, an exhortation to experience an epistemological shift from deluded mind to seeing reality as it is, Suchness (Sanskrit Tathātā; Chinese 真如 zhen ru). The Three Roads also are associated with Buddhism, namely three of the Six Realms— Hell, Hungry Ghosts, and Animals. Rebirth in such realms can be avoided through her practice. The doorway we should leap through is reminiscent of the door to Buddha Wisdom mentioned in the second chapter of the Lotus Sūtra. The text describes the role of Buddhas as facilitators, not saviors, who …open the door of Buddha wisdom to all living beings, to allow them to attain purity. … show the Buddha wisdom to living beings … cause living beings to awaken to the Buddha wisdom … induce living beings to enter the path of Buddha wisdom. (Watson, 1993, 31)

Hence, we ourselves must take the initiative to “leap through the doorway.” Those named here, including Sun herself, have made the leap—the Seven Immortals of her Quanzhen generation. Although the “divine law” usually refers to Buddhist Dharma, in this context Komjathy interprets it as Quanzhen. The “raft of compassion” would seem to indicate Buddhism, especially due to the mention of a raft. However the Daodejing lists compassion (慈 ci) as one of the Three Treasures of a Sage Ruler in Chap. 67.18 Buddhist references continue in the second stanza: the transformation of “ignorance and delusion” into “wisdom and discernment.” To do so one must exit the Burning House of Samsara by adopting the celibate life of a home-leaver, avoiding

18 The

other treasures are frugality (儉 jian) and reticence (不敢 bu gan).

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the aforementioned “Three Roads,” and abandoning the error of a separate self. These are all factors in “personal decay,” along with “old karma.” Karma literally means “doing,” past behavior that determines future outcomes. When we no longer engage in misdeeds, misfortune will no longer arise, opening the way in stanza three to “the immortal offering,” that is to tread “the path to longevity” as an immortal. The Chinese character depicts a person alongside a mountain, someone who has transcended the mundane world, such as a shaman communing with spirits in a natural setting. Progress is promised through “mercury and lead, the black and white,” that is drawing on mercury “the original qi (yuanqi 元氣) and life-destiny (ming 命)” and lead (qian 鉛) “original spirit (yuanshen 元神) and innate nature (xing 性)” (Komjathy, 2014, 222 n. 149). This requires “bitter determination” to adhere to an ascetic lifestyle. The anticipated result of this practice is seen in stanza four, where the recluse is compared to a “solitary cloud and wild crane” who has left “grief and anxiety” behind. In a “thatched hut” one peruses “the golden books,” becoming a worthy companion of Nature—forests, streams, moon, and wind. Note the dynamism of the scene being set here, the forest grows and the stream flows. The moon is described as “luminous,” implying enlightenment, while the wind is “clear,” unimpeded. Stanza five warns of agitated “monkey-mind” and the confusion of conditioned “horse-thought” that must be “corralled and tied up.” This will exhaust the “Six Thieves” (六賊 liu zei)—that is, the distractions of the five senses plus mind as the sixth sense.19 Then purposeless like the Sage described in Chap. 20 of the Daodejing who draws nourishment from Mother Dao,20 mind becomes “vague and indistinct,” having returned to “the place of darkness and silence” that our original nature (Fu and Wawrytko, 111). Stanza six declares the “path to pervasiveness mysteriousness”21 lies “between Wood and Metal.” They represent the vernal and autumnal equinoxes respectively, that is the points in the seasonal cycle when yin and yang energies are equal prior to reversion to their opposite. The practitioner’s body is a microcosm of that cosmic dynamic. Qi is coalescing and spirit congealing as “yin and yang naturally revert” by initiating the internal alchemy of the Celestial Cycle or Waterwheel. A breakthrough on “the dark road” opens stanza seven. The practice now unleashes earth shaking thunder and rain able to generate “Yellow Sprouts” and “White Snow”—symbolizing bodily fluids associated with the elixir of immortality. The internal transformation is conveyed through imagery of “dew,” “precious nectar,”

19 Chan

Master Miaozong (妙總 1095–1170) mentions six “bandits” in her awakening poem who are defeated after she suddenly “came across my nose.” Addiss et al., 129. 20 “I alone remain detached,/Like an infant who has yet to smile,/…/The worldlings all have a purpose,/While I alone appear stubborn and uncouth;/I alone differ from the others,/And value the suckling mother.” Fu and Wawrytko, 110–111. 21 The “profoundly dark” (玄xuan) introduced in the opening chapter of the Daodejing is applied to both Being (有 you) as Named Dao and No-thingness (無wu) as Nameless Dao as “Gateway to all wonders”; Fu and Wawrytko, 97. Fang (1981) (方東美 Fang Dongmei, 1899–1977) offers an intriguing translation for this character—“the mysteriously mysterious mystery”.

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and “fragrant grasses.” The closing lines seem to reflect the stirring of yang and yin energies constituting the elixir of immortality: “The Jade Stamen unfurls and diffuses;/The Gold Flower opens and reveals itself.” Continuing on the path of practice, stanza eight speaks of the terrain we must traverse as a map unfolding before us. Dynamic images from Nature abound—soaring clouds, rippling water, birds in flight and rabbits on the run. The “subtle breath” of qi is represented by the Tiger that “encircles” while the Dragon as spirit “coils.” The Yijing trigrams of water (Kan) and fire (Li) are said to join,22 causing downward movement from the Celestial Pass (the head) to the Terrestrial Axle (the vulva or scrotum).  Stanza nine opens with the Dharma Wheel, a possible Daodejing reference (Chap. 11) as the second line mentions “thirty spokes.” In any case, previous movement continues through dual sources by shifting “sun and moon” (left and right eyes). This allows entrance into the “gold furnace” and warming of the “jade cauldron” (lower portions of the body), thus releasing “misty vapors.” By stanza ten the practitioner is able to “collect the luminous pearl” that has been sought. An “immortal embryo” may now dance—a reference to the self-birthing process of internal alchemy.23 The perfection of yang energy at this point is represented by the appearance of the “Maiden” (奼女chanü). “Precious nectar” is available to drink. The dancing of the immortal embryo is seemingly accompanied by a soothing “jade zither” that produces “immortal sound.” More auditory assistance comes from pounding gold and striking jade. Seminal elements of Daoist philosophy—Being and Nonbeing/No-Thingness—are the focus of stanza eleven. In the first chapter of the Daodejing they are identified as the two ways we encounter reality, both of which “spring forth” from the same source. There we are instructed to “contemplate” (觀 guan) No-thingness in terms of ‘[hidden] wonders’ (妙 miao) and Being in terms of ‘[manifested] forms.’ (Fu and Wawrytko, 96–97). This intertwining relationship is mirrored in meditational practice that returns us to the source: Inside Nonbeing, store perfection; Inside Being, maintain resemblance to Nonbeing. When Being and Nonbeing are both forgotten, One returns to merge with the great Void.

Stanza twelve transports us to the isles of immortals once “practice and accomplishment become sufficient.” Those in residence are “beyond number.” The poem encourages us to join them by focusing on “the elevated Perfected” pre-Daoist goddess the Queen Mother of the West, 西王母 Xiwangmu.

22 When

Kan (a yang line between two yin lines) is above and Li (a yin line between two yang lines) below—water over fire—we have hexagram 63 Already Across (既濟jiji). If the positions are reversed—fire over water—hexagram 64 results, Not Yet Across (未濟 weiji). 23 Strikingly similar imagery is deployed by Zen Master Satomi Myōdō following her awakening experience: “Ah! I gave birth to Buddha and Christ!…The unborn, first parent… that’s me! I gave birth to me! I am what I am before my parents were born!” (King, 1987, 76).

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This curated glimpse into Quanzhen practice concludes with stanza thirteen, which expands on the theme of immortality: Present offerings to the celestial offices. When immortal robes are bestowed, you become transcendent. Mount the ascending phoenix, And be carefree and enjoy the pure metropolis. Among the treasure hall and precious tower, Gold spikes fill the vermillion portals. Perpetual spring without nightfall, There is no longer coming or going.

Through transcendence and ascendence we have the promise of a blissful existence in “perpetual spring without nightfall.” Mere mortals can realize the dream of eternal life, suffused with luxury and joy, by following this practice. This reveling in delayed gratification stands in stark contrast to the austere ascetic lifestyle mandated in stanza three. Also noteworthy is the closing line—literally “without coming and without going”—compared to the Buddhist title of the Tathāgata as “thus come and thus gone” (如來 rulai). The latter reflects the nonduality of coming and going rather than the obliteration of both.

14.3.3 Wu Ye’er To the Tune “Tree Leaves Rustling” (eleven stanzas) Komjathy (2014, 210) characterizes this poem as “more obscure and idiosyncratic in terms of neidan technical terms.” The following discussion will attempt to maintain a focus on the philosophical aspects of the contents. The opening stanza may be read as a survey of her cognitive landscape, although not all of the symbolism is clear: Observing the white phoenix, Watching the black raven, I grope for fish and shrimp beneath the water. Orioles thread the willow trees; Butterflies seek out the flowers. Shadowed in secluded retirement, If not a disciple of clouds, no one can brag.

The mention of black and white suggests yin and yang energies. Groping in the water implies the depth of her practice. The movement of the birds and the butterflies matches previous poems that highlight a dynamic flow within one’s practice. The notion of “secluded retirement” is at the core of Quanzhen, while clouds

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serve as a role model for the free and easy wandering of practitioners who have left behind the rigors of human society. Stanza two contrasts “the forest of thought” to be reined in24 with the uplifting emotion of compassion that needs to be broadened, so one “establishes a foundation.” This becomes a kind of launch pad to rise above “the splayed covering” of our conventional sense of identity. The shift to “simple idiocy” banishes “painful discomfort” (such as the psychological suffering of Buddhist duhkha). Stanza three contains a list of absurdities—a tortoise with scales, a rabbit with a horn, a flying toad, a roaring ox made of mud and a neighing wooden horse. Such deluded perceptions undermine one’s practice, although “few people know this.” Mistaken identity also seems to be the theme of stanza four, which offers revelations such as “Mountains contain stones,/While oceans contain water.” In other words, we are oblivious to the obvious, “the perfectly real.” The cognitive obstacles mentioned in poem 1—monkey-mind and horsethought—reappear in stanza five; they must be captured and locked up. Artifice must be left behind so we may return to ziran, our true identity prior to the impositions of humanity’s cunning intellect, “the silent mystery.” The Five Eyes (五 眼 wuyan) of Buddhism are invoked, with specific mention of “Dharma-vision” of bodhisattvas that enables them to share the teachings with others.25 Stanza six opens with a veiled reference to Dao through mysterious xuan 玄 and profoundly dark miao. The leadership role of the teacher in converting others seems to allude to a chapter in the Lotus Sūtra that contains the Parable of the Phantom City. It shows how Buddha helps minds that are “timid, weak and lowly” navigate a rough road (practice) by urging them forward with the promise of “a great city” ahead where they can rest.26 Given this strategy “each footprint is a step towards return [to Dao].” It is significant that Sun rejects an elitist stance, proclaiming the “countenances of immortals and buddhas are everywhere,” which echoes the “wisdom embracing all species” proclaimed in the Lotus Sūtra (Watson, 1993, 3). This is consistent with the “social engagement” that constituted an important part of Quanzhen practice, especially for laywomen. (Komjathy, 2014, 211). Stanzas seven through eleven use imagery related to phases of the moon, a symbol of yin energy, to track the process of realization. The significance of the moon in Quanzhen practice is clarified in a poem by one of Sun Bu’er’s fellow “immortals,” Qiu Changchun (丘長春 1148–1227): Serene and dissolved in the space of no-mind, Radiant luminosity illuminates the great Void. The dim opaqueness contains a precious moon;

24 Cf.

“the dense forest of mistaken views” in the Lotus Sūtra, representing futile debates and views one becomes fixated on (Watson, 1993, 37). 25 The Five Eyes are (1) Physical (ordinary humans), (2) Heavenly (superhuman), (3). Wisdom (voice-hearers, pratekya-buddhas), (4) Dharma (bodhisattvas), (5) Buddha. 26 More specifically, Buddha “preaches two nirvanas in order to provide a resting place along the road,” the first being close to but not yet fully Buddha Wisdom (Watson, 1993, 136).

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306 The woven network is threaded by a celestial pearl. (Komjathy, 2013, 40)

All of the poems share the same opening line—“The moon in the sky,” implying an elevated state of mind. Each phase is characterized in terms of Dao, the imagery of internal alchemy, and the appropriate level of practice. The movement goes beyond personal practice, encompassing in the later phases advice on teaching others. Note the cycle of reversion from full moon back to full moon. Stanza 7 moon?27

Full “aligned and whole”

Stanza 8

Stanza 9

Stanza 10

Stanza 11

New moon “high and thin”

Waxing crescent “resonant and crescent”

Full moon “aligned in the south” (heart-mind)

Full moon “resonant and blazing”

“Wondrousness of the perfect Dao

“Wondrous and mysterious”

An inordinately large gourd (the usefulness of uselessness, emptiness; Zhuangzi)

Being and Nonbeing “a twofold mystery”

“Inversion involves turning over”

Transmissions of mao (heart, spirit) and you (kidneys, vital essence)

Meeting of dragon (spirit) and tiger (qi)

“Three times three” (perfect yang), yin within yang, yang within yin

“Lead (perfect yang) and mercury (perfect yin) reside in the cauldron”

“Seek oral transmission”

“Enlightened break-through”

“They coalesce into a Gold Flower (elixir of immortality) playing in the wind”

“Do not speak about breakthrough, but teach people about what to consider”

“Refinement completes the pearl”

The sequence ends with the prospect of attaining the internal elixir through refinement. As another Quanzhen text notes, “It is like a dragon with a pearl— when a dragon has a pearl, it can take flight. When people have the internal elixir, they naturally have perpetual life and do not die” Komjathy (2013, 130).28 27 Komjathy

(2014, 212) mentions that discussions of a lunar sequence usually start with the new moon. 28 The pearl image in Daoism is further explained in Commentary on the Yinfu jing: “Considering human beings who awoke to the Dao in ancient times, their inner natures were virtuous and ingenious. They employed skillful means out of compassion for human beings. Externally, they seemed perverse and dull. In this way, they could be subdued and concealed. Internally, their radiance was hidden and unmanifest. As Heshang gong (Master Dwelling-by-the-River) said, ‘It is like beautiful jade contained in stone, and like a luminous pearl held in an oyster.’ … Thus, heaven does not speak, and it is naturally transformative and pervasive. Heaven is without feelings, and it naturally does not age. If humans want to understand the Way of Heaven, they should forget language and then thoroughly investigate the subtlety of the transformative process.” (Komjathy 2013, 194–195).

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14.3.4 Manting Fang To the Tune “Fragrance Filling the Courtyard” (one stanza) The radiance of the mineral fire is hidden; The human body does not last long; When reckoning comes, one realizes that life and death are difficult to guard against. Whether suddenly born or suddenly perishing. It is just like the brilliance of a lightning strike. Recognize and break-through the provisional joining of physical form; Endeavor to obtain this And abandon the world for the immortal regions.

The poem opens with a blunt depiction of the human condition, in which our hidden energy is wrapped in ephemeral physicality. The motivation behind one’s practice could not be more clear—we need to recognize the fact of material impermanence and then “break-through” by transcending the mundane world. “Immortal regions” beckon! The following lines identify the causal facts responsible for our stagnation as well as their reversal: “After thinking reaches its limits,/Turn the heart-mind back to Dao/And seek to know the ruler within these phenomena.” The human mind estranged from Dao is self-limiting. Reversion reconnects us with the enduring (常 chang) Dao, the origin of life. Chapter 16 of the Daodejing provides a detailed description of the reversion process, and the consequences of its absence: Returning to the root is called “tranquility”; This is called “returning to [natural] destiny”; “Returning to destiny” is called “enduring” [Dao]. To know the enduring is called “enlightenment”; Not to know the enduring is to blindly invite disaster. To know the enduring is to be all-encompassing; To be all-encompassing is to be none other than impartial; To be impartial is to be none other than complete; To be complete is to be none other than heavenly [natural]; To be heavenly [natural] is to be none other than Dao; To be Dao is to be none other than everlasting— Free from danger throughout one’s life.29

29  Fu

and Wawrytko, 108. See also Chap. 52: “Apply one’s light,/Return to enlightenment;/ Without inviting disaster—/This is called “cultivating enduring [Dao]”; 128–29.

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Sun’s poem ends with a list of behaviors that demonstrate being “unified” or one with Dao. The character 同 tong depicts a cover which fits the mouth of a vase, hence the same, together, in agreement, or unified. Komjathy characterizes these behaviors as “informing views, foundational principles, as well as existential experiences related to alchemical training and transformation” (Komjathy, 2014, 213). Moment by moment constantly maintain these meetings Be unified in walking and in sitting; Be unified in drinking the nectar of mists. Be unified as a companion of the clear wind and luminous moon; Be unified in a single aspiration; Be unified in perceiving celestial radiance. Be unified in mutually beneficial associations; Be unified with your master in seeking the Dao; Be unified in your singing as fragrance fills the courtyard.

14.4 Conclusions In closing, we must inquire into whether Sun Bu’er is correctly identified as a Daoist philosopher. There are two questions we need to address. First, based on the contents of the poems we can reasonably verify as Sun’s own work, was she engaged in a philosophical enterprise? This determination should not be limited to parochial definitions imposed by Eurocentric traditions. Rather we must establish an understanding of philosophy—the love of wisdom—with global and globalizing scope. Second, if she is a philosopher, does she present and represent Daoist thought?

14.4.1 Why Sun Is a Philosopher Chinese history witnessed a shift from philosophies grounded in close observation of Nature (set forth in the Daodejing and Zhuangzi) to a quasi-religious soteriology bent on transcending the physical world (the cult of immortality). Does Sun’s focus on immortality disqualify her from being designated a philosopher? To make such a determination, we need to consider the cultural context of Chinese philosophy, which is at least partially grounded in survival priorities. The primal link between health and salvation is revealed in the etymology of the word “soteriology.” It has been traced to the Greek soteria “preservation, salvation,” derived

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from soizein “save, preserve,” hence sōs “safe, healthy.”30 Who is to be preserved or saved? Whose health is involved here? The presumed audience for the Daodejing consists of potential Sage Rulers, rather than sequestered individuals. The health of the state is at stake, which depends on the ruler’s ability to provide a healthy environment for the people and promote their return to the life force of Dao (viability). Political reform is sought through Reversion, which depends on the virtuosity (德 de) of the Sage. It seems that an original focus on basic survival morphed into a concern with life extension. Within different manifestations of what has been identified as Daoism, the most contentious element seems to be immortality. In Laozi and Zhuangzi we have seen an attempt to move beyond the emphasis on individual immortality, inherited from past medical/spiritual practices, to a philosophical understanding of immortality in relationship to Dao (the cosmic Mother Tree as source and sustainer). According to the historian Sima Qian 司馬遷 (c. 145–c. 86 b.c.e.), this cult was instigated in the Warring States Period by those unable to comprehend the intricacies of yin and yang energies.31 The same divide reemerges in the Han Dynasty around “the immortality cult” of that time. A group of skeptics “uncompromisingly denounced the so-called Taoist arts of immortality” as pseudo-Daoism contradicted by the original texts.32 These same philosophers, however, also have been seen as precursors of the Xuanxue 玄學 movement that blossomed among the literati in the Period of Disunity, also known as Neo-Daoism. In one sense the signature Xuanxue practice of “Pure Conversation” (清談 qing-tan) was a survival strategy for living in a volatile political environment. By aligning themselves with Daoist notions of ziran and wu they hoped to convince the “Confucian” conformists that they posed no risk to their power base. They went to great lengths to demonstrate their contempt for “Confucian” social mores, especially through the performance art of incessant inebriation. Where should Sun Bu’er be located in this Daoist landscape? What is required to maintain one’s health? Early Chinese medicine assumed sexual intercourse was essential, based on the need for an exchange between a woman’s yin energy and a man’s yang energy. This maintained an essential balance within one’s body paralleling the balance of a harmonious cosmos, as set forth in the primal philosophy of the Yijing. Yin and yang continued to play a role in the evolution of practices designed to insure spiritual balance, without sexual intercourse, as in the

30 https://www.etymonline.com/word/soteriology.

There are varying definitions of the term soteriology consistent with the Chinese coalescing of physical health and spiritual transformation. Webster’s Dictionary 1847 defines it as “the science of promoting and preserving health” while a theological definition related to salvation is found in William G. T. Shedd’s A History of Christian Doctrine 1864. The Oxford English Dictionary 457. 31 Shiji 28.1369; Holcombe, 91. 32 Holcombe, 90. Among these “rational humanists” Holcombe includes Wang Chong 王充 (27c. 97), Huan Tan 桓譚 (c. 4 b.c.e.-28 c.e.), and Yang Xiong 揚雄 (53 b.c.e-18 c.e.).

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Quanzhen school. Modifications were made in the Daoist philosophies inherited from Laozi and Zhuangzi. Yin was no longer considered the default energy to be embraced for harmony with Dao, while yang was warned against as human artifice, the erroneous path taken by cunning intellect. Immortality was sought as a way to escape the limitations of physicality, an individual aspiration that disrupts the natural flow of ziran.

14.4.2 Sun’s Daoism The ascetic aspect of Quanzhen practice, which initially repulsed Sun Bu’er, is absent from both primal Daoist philosophy and primal Buddhist philosophy. In the Daodejing’s utopian vision (Chap. 80) a community in harmony with Dao allows people to relish their food, clothing, and dwellings. Their lives are not devoid of technological advancements, including military hardware: they merely have no desire to use them. They also take death seriously (重死 zhong si), cherishing life while avoiding fixation on an escapist cult of immortality. Although Buddhism is often assumed to require an ascetic lifestyle, the historical Buddha’s Middle Way clearly rejects that extremist stance as “unworthy and unprofitable,” as is the extreme of hedonism. (Piyadassi, 1999). Celibacy was required for monks and nuns, however their lifestyle was minimalist rather than the ruthless self-denial expected of ascetics.33 The Daodejing does not reject sense data outright, merely the human tendency toward sensory overload. Cunning intellect (wei, yang) follows the superficial desires stimulated by our eyes—the flower. True self (wei-wu-wei, yin) is centered in the stomach, recognizing the flower is merely the means to the end of the nourishing fruit.34 This points to Quanzhen’s significant  divergence from the philosophical Daoism of the Daodejing—the emphasis on balancing yin and yang reflected in Sun’s poetry. While this is consistent with the Yijing perspective, whereby harmony is maintained through a constant rebalancing of these energies, Sun’s male colleagues flaunted their yang connections, adopting names such as Aligned Yang, Purified Yang, Redoubled Yang, Cavernous Yang, and Jade Yang. Sun’s ex-husband became known as Elixir Yang (Komjathy 2013, 2–3). Yet Chap. 38 of the Daodejing clearly states the preeminence of yin (the thick and the fruit) over yang (the thin and the flower), especially with regard to one’s survival:

33 “The

formation of the Buddhist order and monastic life have fired the spirit of asceticism in time to nearly limitless bounds as, for example, in the cases of rigidly and blindly promoting celibacy and vegetarianism. But asceticism is not the goal of Buddhism, however hard one might try to justify it. In all the sūtras, it is recommended only as a means (upāya) and not as the end of life” (Inada, 118). 34 See Daodejing, Chaps. 12 and 38.

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Those who have foresight are [merely] the flower of Dao, And the beginning of human folly. Accordingly, the accomplished person holds to what is thick, And does not reside in what is thin; Holds to the fruit and does not reside in the flower. Therefore, prefers the one and avoids the other. (Fu and Wawrytko, 121).

What Sun does inherit from both Daoism and Buddhism is a focus on the need for an epistemological shift from the superficial perceptions of a worldling to the Sage’s profound engagement with Dao; from deluded mind to awakened mind. Sun’s practice includes seeing that the Six Thieves are “completely exhausted,” as well as corralling “monkey-mind” and tying up “horse-thought” (Komanthy, 2014, 223, Poem 2 Stanza 5). These include deluded perceptions derived from the five senses (vision, hearing, taste, touch, sound). However, the most insidious of all is the sixth thief, mind. As the Daodejing’s cunning intellect, the deludedly purposeful, task-driven mind is corrupted by artifice and wei assertiveness. The concluding stanzas of Sun’s third poem are said to describe “the culmination of Quanzhen training and its experiential verification (證 驗 zhengyan) or the ontological and existential states attained.” Hence the poem may be describing the cognitive landscape of a mental shift as a paradise of “vermilion portals” rather than a “post-mortem entrance into the Daoist sacred realms” (Komjathy, 2013, 10). Thus the literal sense of personal immortality may serve as a skillful means (upāya) like those employed by the historical Buddha.35 It can be a point of entry into Quanzhen practice by relying on what is called Great Faith in Buddhism, the initial motivation to engage with the teachings based on personal interest in or attraction to a doctrine. This also accounts for stories of the magical powers attributed to high level practitioners such as Wang Zhe and Sun Bu’er. The deeper philosophical meaning is much more profound—a harmonization with, and immersion in enduring Dao devoid of any independent or estranged self, hence devoid of personal self-interest. As Sun herself warns “Distinctions between self and other are landslides” (Komjathy, 2014, 221, poem 2, stanza 2). We have textual evidence of Sun’s knowledge of and influence from the Lotus Sūtra, in which examples of skillful means abound. In the Parable of the Burning House (Chap. 3) the children must save themselves rather than be rescued by their concerned father. He lures them out by promising “rare playthings”—goat carts,

35 The

Chinese term for upāya is 方便fang bian, meaning to “do a favor” or in modern parlance make something user friendly. This technique allows Buddha and Buddhist texts to convey the Dharma teaching according to the capacity of the audience, modifying the delivery but not the substance of the message. Some have erroneously criticized this approach as a “white lie.” In fact it represents a transitional stage that prepares the audience to expand their level of comprehension as their practice deepens. See Sun Bu’er poem 3, stanza 6.

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deer carts and ox carts. The children make a mad dash for the exit “because such things were just what they had wanted” (Watson, 1993, 57). In the sūtra these represent the Three Vehicles of Buddhist practice—voicehearer, pratyekabuddha, and bodhisattva—that practitioners felt comfortable following. Is personal immortality such a desirable prize. Sun Bu’er dangles in front of her students? In the parable the children are surprised to find something much grander than what they were promised—large carriages, each drawn by a magnificent white ox, symbolizing the One Buddha Vehicle. Does Sun Bu’er provide something much grander than personal immortality as well in the reversion to Dao itself? Another use of upāya appears in Chap. 12, “Devadatta,” where an audience incapable of accepting true enlightenment must be won over by a dramatic performance of the awakening process reflecting their preconceptions. Mañjuśrī reports to the assembly the awakening of the dragon king’s daughter “in the space of an instant.” Bodhisattva Wisdom Accumulated rejects this claim. In response she appears before them and asks Buddha to bear witness to her realization. Śāriputra also refuses to accept her awakening experience, citing the extreme brevity of her practice as well as the obstacle posed by her “soiled and defiled” female body. When she presents “a precious jewel” (her awakened mind) to the Buddha, he unhesitatingly accepts it (thereby confirming her claim). Aware of the crowd’s skepticism, she “does them a favor” by reenacting the awakening process—but first assumes a male body. Watching her/him “preach the Law to all human and heavenly beings” the assembly experiences “great joy,” accompanied by quaking and trembling in the Spotless World. Having seen for themselves the fulfillment of their superficial expectations of what constitutes awakening, Bodhisattva Wisdom Accumulated as well as Śāriputra and the entire assembly “silently believed and accepted these things” (Watson, 1993, 187–189). Of course, this was all a performance, because the dragon king’s daughter was already awakened, as Buddha acknowledged. Using skillful means, she accommodated the narrow capacity of her doubters, employing the “supernatural powers” needed to stimulate Great Faith. She thereby established a foundation on which they could build through their own meditational experiences. Given the paucity of access to Sun Bu’er’s texts we have insufficient evidence to determine her actual philosophy. Perhaps, however, Sun Bu’er followed the model of upāya she saw in Buddhist texts, such that the nondualistic teaching of the nondual (buer), Sun both is and is not Daoist philosophy.

References Addiss, S., Lombardo, S., & Roitman, J. (Eds.). (2008). Zen sourcebook. Hackett Publishing Company Inc. Chan, W. (Trans.). (1963). A source book in Chinese philosophy. Princeton University Press. Chan, W. (Trans.). (1967). Reflections on things at hand: The neo-confucian anthology compiled by Chu Hsi and Lü Tsu-Ch’ien. Columbia University Press. Cleary, T. (Trans., Ed.). (1991a). Immortal sisters: Secrets of Taoist women. Shambhala.

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Cleary, T. (Trans., Ed.). (1991b). The secret of the golden flower: The classic Chinese book of life. HarperCollins. de Bary, W. T., Chan, W., & Watson, B. (1960). Sources of Chinese tradition. Columbia University Press. Fang, T. H. (1981). Chinese philosophy: Its spirit and its development. Linking Publishing Co. Fischer-Schreiber, I. (1996). The Shambhala dictionary of Taoism (W. Wünsche, Trans.). Shambhala. Fu, C. W., & Wawrytko, S. A. (2009). Viability and virtuosity classic. In S. A. Wawrytko (Ed.), Chinese philosophy in cultural context. Montezuma Publishing. Fung, Y. (1948). A short history of Chinese philosophy. Free Press. Goossaert, V. (2008). Quanzhen. In F. Pregadio (Ed.), The encyclopedia of Taoism (Vol. 2, pp. 814–820). Routledge. Holcombe, C. (1994). In the Shadow of the Han: Literati thought and society at the beginning of the Southern Dynasties. University of Hawaii Press. Inada, K. K. (1969). Some basic misconceptions of Buddhism. International Philosophical Quarterly, 9(1), 101–119. King, S. B. (Trans.). (1987). Passionate journey: The spiritual autobiography of Satomi Myōdō. Shambhala. Komjathy, L. (Trans.). (2013). The way of complete perfection: A Quanzhen Daoist anthology. SUNY Press. Komjathy, L. (Trans.). (2014). Sun Buer: Early Quanzhen Matriarch and the beginnings of female alchemy. Nan Nü, 16(2), 171–238. Liu, J. Y. (2014). Songs of her spirit: Poetic musings of a Song Daoist Nun. Journal of Song-Yuan Studies, 44, 175–201. Pas, J. F., & Leung, M. K. (Eds.). (1998). Historical dictionary of Daoism. Scarecrow Press. Piyadassi, T. (Trans.). (1999). Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta: Setting in motion the wheel of truth. Samyutta Nikaya, 56, 11. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn56/sn56.011.piya. html Shedd, W. G. T. (1864). A history of Christian doctrine (p. 1971). Oxford University Press. Simard, S. (2021). Finding the mother tree: Discovering wisdom in the forest. Alfred A. Knopf. The Oxford English Dictionary. (1971). Oxford University Press. Waithe, M. E. (1987). Diotima of Mantinea. In M. E. Waithe (Ed.), A history of women philosophers (Vol. 1, pp. 83–116). Martinus Nihjoff. Watson, B. (Trans.). (1968). The complete works of Chuang Tzu. Columbia University Press. Watson, B. (Trans.). (1993). The Lotus Sutra. Columbia University Press. Wawrytko, S. A. (1993). Homosexuality and Chinese and Japanese religions. In Homosexuality and world religions. Trinity Press International. Wawrytko, S. A. (1995). The ‘Feminine’ mode of mysticism. In D. H. Bishop (Ed.), Mysticism and the mystical experience: East and west. Susquehanna University Press. Wile, D. (1992). Art of the Bedchamber: The Chinese sexual yoga classics, including women’s solo meditation texts. State University of New York Press.

Chapter 15

Unknown artist’s representation. In public domain due to the antiquity of the original

Akka Mahadevi of India Circa 1130–Circa 1160 Vijaya Ramaswamy Abstract  Akka Mahadevi, 1130–1160, was one of the leaders of Virasaivism (literally ‘Heroic-Saivism’), a major philosophical and socio-religious movement of medieval India. In this chapter I describe her contributions to Hindu philosophy against the background of the emergence of the Lingayot movement. A radical, she was a philosopher of Virasaivism and became known as “the naked saint”. Her writings are today considered to be less radical than relevant in their denial of caste and gender as morally, spiritually or intellectually significant.

V. Ramaswamy (*)  Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_15

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15.1 Introduction 15.1.1 Virasaivism in Twelfth Century Karnataka Virasaivism, the history of which can be traced back to more than 800 years, emerged as a major religious force during twelfth century CE in the Southern part of India. Virasaivism is also known as the Lingayat Movement since the visible face of the new philosophy was the wearing of Linga (a cone shaped stone being the signifier of Siva) on one’s body. Therefore, in detailing the life of Akka Mahadevi both the terms—Lingayat and Virasaivism—will be used synonymously. The Virasaivite or Lingayat movement which originated in Karnataka was the pre-dominant factor in overturning Brahmanical superiority and patriarchal values although for a short period. The living force behind the movement was Basava who belonged to a Brahmin family, Brahmanism being the quintessential representation of orthodoxy. However, at the age of sixteen, Basava discarded the sacred thread, renounced his Brahmin identity and in course of time emerged as the leader of the radical heterodox Virasaivite movement. In this movement traditional paradigms got inverted. The female with her powers of creation and nurturing, became more important than the male, the lower castes devoid of the trappings of wealth, status and power, were deemed to be nearer God than Brahmins and other upper castes. Work was celebrated as worship and not as a hindrance to self-realization. Political chaos, religious schisms and an oppressive social structure foregrounds the Virasaivite movement in Karnataka.1 Kalyan, which witnessed the resurgence of this movement, was controlled by the Western Chalukya and the Kalachuri dynasty in turn. Myriad religions like Saivism, Vaishnavism, and Shakta besides Jainism and Buddhism found patronage among the rulers depending on the politico-social compulsions and the personal predilections of the monarchs. There was a strong nexus between the ruling class and the Brahmins. The Chalukyas as well as the Kalachuris who in turn occupied the region of Kalyana which was the seat of Virasaivism, believed in the construction of temples which would sanctify their royal power and provide them with a support base. Brahmin priests were the greatest beneficiaries of the huge endowments in land and money made to these temples. The Chalukyas of Badami built no less than 72 temples in their capital, Ayyavole, between the fifth and the seventh centuries (Ishwaran, 1983: 23). It has been estimated that within a span of the two centuries preceding the emergence of Virasaivism, Saivites constructed 450 temples and the Vaishnavites some 100 temples in Karnataka. While the ruling class lent its patronage to the temples and priests, the priests and Brahmin beneficiaries of the Brahmadeyas endowed the kings with legitimacy and ritual authority. 1 For

an overall view of the Virasaivite movment see Tipperudraswami (1968). Equally useful in situating this movement politically, is Rao (1990).

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The domination of Brahmins in society logically implied the dominance of the patriarchal structure, a situation where canonical texts determined the ascriptive and prescriptive roles of women and the lower castes. As a result, the lower castes and women, who were so crucial to the successful working of the economy, became marginalized so far as their status within society was concerned. Whether the societal structure of medieval South India can be characterized as feudalism or not is a widely debated question which lies beyond the purview of the present study.2 However, it would be more or less valid to look upon it as quasi-feudal. Even in a quasi-feudal social formation, the arguments regarding Brahmin dominance and Shudra subordination as also the in-built gender inequality within a patriarchal structure would hold good. Thus pressures from above were gradually building up, which resulted in the eventual breakdown of the social order. It has been rightly pointed out that: “The Lingayat religious movement also known as Virasaivite movement, was born in the context of a divided and exploitative society in order to challenge it in the name of equality, individual freedom and communitarian commitment” (Ishwaran, 1983: 32). Basavanna was the Prime Minister of King Bijjala of the Kalachuri dynasty, ruling at Kalyana in the now Bidar district of Kannada-speaking State of Karnataka. He revolted against the inhuman and irrational rituals and orthodoxy cherished and practiced by Brahmins and upper castes. Though born in a privileged class which enjoyed all the advantages and benefits of high birth, he cared for the social upliftment of those who were unprivileged or underprivileged. The message of his socio-religious movement in Kalyana against the evil discriminations of caste, creed and sex, spread across the country and attracted hundreds and thousands of like-minded people including women. Kalyana was thronged by people from all parts of the country and from all walks of life who believed in the oneness of mankind. Farmers, untouchable communities such as pariahs (menials and agricultural laborers), tanners, leather workers, hunters and occupational groups like potters, weavers, washermen, fishermen, barbers, merchants, and even some Brahmins flocked together in the firm bond of humanity heralding a new ray of hope to a caste-ridden and oppressive society. By the middle of the twelfth century Virasaivism had begun to gain currency in Karnataka as an alternative to Brahmanism. It had a notably large Shudra following. Many of these began to challenge Brahmanical authority and the caste order even in their individual capacity. Madivala Machchyya, a washerman and Sivanagimayya, an untouchable, refused to observe caste pollution and exulted at the liberating influence of Virasaivism. Caste opposition took a tragic turn when two of the Lingayat followers—Madhavayya, a Brahmin and Haralayya a Harijan—decided to perform an inter-caste marriage between their son and daughter. The orthodox lobby brought pressure to bear on Bijjala who failed to balance the contending faiths of the Kalamukhas, orthodox Brahmanism and heterodox

2 The historical connections between the socio-economic structure characterized as feudalism and the emergence of Virasaivism in the twelfth century is dealt with by Nandi (1986).

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Virasaivism. Succumbing to pressure from the orthodoxy, he ordered the blinding and execution of the two men who had dared to break caste-taboos. This event in CE 1167 led to grim reprisals and three Virasaivite followers—Molla, Bomma and Jagadeva—murdered Bijjala. Kalyana was in a state of political and religious turmoil. Thousands of Lingayats were butchered and the survivors scattered in all directions. Many of their vachanas were burnt. The thoughts contained in the writings in Kannada language called Vachanas— free lyrics of high literary and spiritual value, amazingly appear to be relevant even to this day. The vast Vachana literature of these Shivasharanas as the devotees of Siva were called, constitute the main source for our understanding of the radical, heterodox and even iconoclastic elements within the Lingayat movement. Basava’s socio-religious ideology primarily evolved through his Vachanas and this is also true of Allamma Prabhu, Akka Mahadevi as well as many other Virasaivite saints. This corpus of vachana literature, was a contribution of both men and women of great spiritual experience and has become a canon of Virasaivism. It has not only enriched Kannada literature but also the spiritual heritage of India. This was the prevailing political climate in twelfth century Karnataka, characterized by social unrest and clash of religious ideologies when Akka Mahadevi, a leading Virasaivite saint, lived and wrote her powerfully evocative and passionate vachanas on her Siva—Chenna Mallikarjuna.

15.1.2 Akka Mahadevi—Radical Woman Philosopher of Virasaivism This historical and philosophical overview of Virasaivism foregrounds the life and times of Akka Mahadevi, probably the most radical of the Virasaivite saints, called Shivasharane. She was also known as the naked saint because according to some of the oral and literary traditions of Karnataka, she gave up the wearing of clothes, as a signifier of total liberation and freedom from patriarchal shackles. Her contribution to Kannada culture, philosophy and literature were manifold. Her 430 extant vachana poems (a form of spontaneous mystical poems), and the two short writings called Mantrogopya and the Yogangatrividhi are considered great literary and spiritual contributions to the corpus of Virasaiva literature. Her vachanas, lyrical in quality and both mystical and erotic in content, are still sung in Karnataka and are a part of the rich body of Kannada religious folklore. They reflected the primary features of Virasaivite philosophy called Shakti Visishta Advaita. This can be understood as ‘qualified feminine monism’ in which the primordial principle behind creation is not male but female. Her philosophy also reflects the dual principles of ‘mysticism’ and ‘shunyata’ which means ‘nothingness’. Akka Mahadevi’s life and writings are recorded in medieval religious texts. Virasaivite vachanas as well as the life of saints is preserved in the Shunya

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Sampadane. Multiple versions of this work came out in the medieval period, from the fourteenth to the beginning of the seventeenth century and contains the corpus of Virasaivite vachanas. The Shunya Sampadane is a narrative anthology of vachanas, where the life of Allama Prabhu and his meeting with the other Sharanas are recounted. The vachanas are embedded in the narrative as dialogues between the saints. There are four versions of the Shunya Sampadane. The first of these is by Sivaganaprasadi Mahadevayya who belonged to the fifteenth century. The second version by Halage Arya and the third one by Gummalapurada Siddhalinga Yati are from the sixteenth century and the last version, compiled by Guluru Siddha Viranna Odeya is from ca. 1600 CE. The first version is more inclusive in its outlook, while the later versions become more and more dogmatic in their views, with the last version by Guluru Siddha Viranna Odeya being almost militant.3 The following sections will briefly outline the life of Akka Mahadevi as known from medieval texts like the Shunya Sampadane, medieval hagiographies as well as popular Kannada folklore. These sources reflect the various concepts such as bridal mysticism which are central to her lyrical outpourings as well as the reaction to her radical acts (such as walking naked) or her subversive verses which seem to have upset the applecart of the patriarchal and feudal order in medieval Karnataka.

15.1.3 Life of Akka Mahadevi The life of Akka Mahadevi is shrouded in mystery and secrecy for two reasons— much of the literature by and on the Virasaivite saints was burnt during the time of the blood bath in twelfth century Karnataka. The earliest evidence of the life of the Virasaivite saints—both Shivasharanas (male followers) and Shivasharane (female followers) comes mostly from the writings of fifteenth century hagiographers with some striking exceptions. Harihara, the author of Basava Raja Deva Ragale, written just fifty years after Basava’s death, in mid twelfth century, was one of the few hagiographers to describe the life of Akka Mahadevi. Equally significant is the work of Somanatha, a follower of Basava, titled Basava Purana which describes the life and times of Basava or Basavanna as he came to be known. This Basavapurana was later re-created by Vemulavada Bhimakavi in 1369 under the same title. While the focus of these texts is Basava or Basavanna, the leading light of the Lingayat movement, these texts also refer to the life of other important Virasaivite saints such as Allamma Prabhu and Akka Mahadevi. One of the

3  Harbouring under the trying situation of the pandemic lock-down, I am grateful to Manu V. Devadavan for providing information regarding the various incarnations of the Shunya Sampandane in his email communication to me dated 10th April 2020. His response to me has been produced here.

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most important sources for Akka Mahadevi’s life and writings is the medieval text Shunya Sampadane4 which was written somewhere between the fifteenth and sixteenth century. In modern times, the life of Akka Mahadevi has inspired scholars of religion5 and feminists6 alike. According to the hagiographical texts, Mahadevi was born in 1130 CE at Udathadi located in Shivamogga (modern Shimoga), the Malnad region of Karnataka (South Canara). Her parents—Nimala Shetty and Sumatiamma— belonged to the merchant caste and were pious Saivites. An imaginative reconstruction of Mahadevi’s early years, beginning from her initiation into the Lingayat rituals to her marriage and ultimate renunciation is to be found in Tipperudrasvami’s fictional biography of her. Her deep devotion was instilled in her when she was just eight at the time of her spiritual initiation known as deeksha by her spiritual mentor Gurulinga Deva. She pays tribute to her Guru in many of her vachanas. She writes that to drink the water with which her Guru’s feet have been washed termed ritually as ‘Padodaka’ is more sacred to her than any holy water. To cite a few lines: Seeing the Guru’s feet I am fulfilled. The water from washing the Guru’s feet is a holy bath for me …7

The question whether Mahadevi married King Kaushika is again a much debated one. According to the medieval hagiographer Harihara, King Kaushika was attracted by her great beauty and married her. Even though he was a Jaina and therefore represented a different religion, she was forced to accept his offer because of her fear of retaliation by the king in case of her refusal and its likely effect on her hapless parents. It is said that she, however, placed three conditions before the king8: A. He will not disturb her while she is at her prayers; B. He will let her meet with Jangamas or mendicant Virasaivites and offer them hospitality; and C. He will allow her to have spiritual interactions with other Sharanas or Virasaivite saints. It is believed that she scorned King Kaushika’s sexual advances towards her and left him when he violated her conditions. According to traditional lore as recorded in the Shunya Sampadane, she walked out naked from the king’s palace with her long hair as her only covering. Before the Lingayat spiritual council, the Anubhava Mantapa, she declared her mystical union with Siva thereby nullifying any earthly marriage. A vachana of Akka Mahadevi expresses this idea of her marriage to Chenna Mallikarjuna, her Siva:

4 The

Shunya Sampadane was a medieval text which outlined the life and vachanas of the twelfth century Virasaivite Sharana and Sharane, i.e., both male and female saints. 5 Tipperudraswami (1982). 6 Dabbe and Zydenbos (1989). 7 Vinaya (2017) at vachana 94, and vachana 97. 8 Mudaliar (1991).

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321 Listen, sister, listen. I had a dream

I saw rice, betel, palm leaf and coconut. I saw an ascetic come to beg White teeth and small matted curls I followed on his heels and held his hand He who goes breaks all bounds and beyond, I saw the lord, white as jasmine, And woke with eyes wide open. (Ramanujan, 1973, Vachana 87: 124)

The awakening spoken of here is being alerted to the dangers of succumbing to worldly bondage. Popular Kannada lore supports the theory that she married King Kaushika but walked out of his home discarding her clothes, in search of her true bridegroom Chenna Mallikarjuna. Mahadevi’s physical and spiritual journey took her to the Anubhava Mantapa, literally a space for (sharing) Spiritual Experience in Kalyana, called by modern scholars ‘The Academy of Shivasharana’. It is important to point out here that Harihara, one of the earliest biographers to write about Akka Mahadevi, does not mention her journey to Kalyana and her participation in the philosophical debates in the Anubhava Mantapa. Instead, he narrates her journey to Sri Sailam and her merging with the Siva Linga in the sanctum sanctorum of the Sri Sailam temple.

15.1.4 Locating Akka Mahadevi among Medieval Philosophers—The Anubhava Mantapa Vedantic monism reflected in the high tradition texts like the Vedas and Upanishads which overflows all social contradictions and thus subsumes them, is another philosophical strain present in some of the Virasaivites. Shivasharanas (male) like Siddharamayya and Prabhu Deva and women Shivasharanes, like Akka Nagamma, Satyakka and Molige Mahadevi, deeply influenced by the Sanskritic/ Agamic traditions, reflect this ‘high tradition’ in their vachanas. It is precisely the strong presence of Vedantic monism which made them perceive the unity of all beings in the physical world, that resulted in the obscuring of caste/gender inequalities prevalent in contemporary society. The tension between these two polarities of Vedantic monism and social radicalism is naturally present in the fragmented discourse of Virasaivism. One could go so far as to say that philosophical tensions exist not merely between the votaries of the greater Sanskritic philosophical traditions such as Bonta Devi and Molige Mahadevi and the ‘popular’ or ‘little’ traditions represented by Kadire Remmavve (spinner), Gangamma

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(prostitute) and Kottadada Somamma (grain pounder) but sometimes even within a particular Virasaivite vachana writer. There is in fact a confluence of the two traditions in women like Akka Mahadevi and Satyakka. This conflation of philosophical traditions has resulted in fragmented discourses which belie the existence of a monolithic structure of Virasaivite philosophy. An acknowledgement of this fragmentation is crucial to the location of women Virasaivites within the broad spectrum of Lingayat philosophy. One of the most comprehensive accounts of the philosophical debates in the form of exchange of vachanas in the Anubhava Mantapa, is to be found in the medieval text Shunya Sampadane. Some of the more metaphysical aspects of Virasaivite philosophy which gets reflected in the debates in the Anubhava Mantapa and in the writings of the male Shivasharanas and women Shivasharanes such as the concept of ‘shunyata’ goes back to the pre-Basava philosophical traditions. It was the Panchacharyas or Virasaivite Gurus who stressed the philosophy of ‘shunyata’ or ‘emptiness’ which was probably influenced by ‘Madhyamika’ Buddhism. Among the Shivasharane, vachanas which reflect the philosophical concept of ‘shunyata’ are to be found in the writings of women like Bonta Devi and Molige Mahadevi. Bonta Devi is in fact said to be a migrant from Kashmir and hence strongly influenced by ‘trika’ or Kashmir Saivism. Bonta Devi gives the example of the artificial breaking of space within the pot (ghatakasha) and the ultimate unity of space within and without: Inside the pot, emptiness Inside the body, emptiness Emptiness, emptiness, emptiness. I am empty and Empty is my boundless Siva! (Ramaswamy, 1996a, 48)

The concept of Shunyata is central to the philosophy of Allamma Prabhu, the head of the Anubhava Mantapa. It was by the leading Sharanas of the Anubhava Mantapa—Basavanna, Allamma Prabhu, Siddharamaiyya and Prabhu Linga Deva—that Mahadevi was conferred the honorific ‘Akka’ as a tribute to her wisdom and blazing spirituality shown in her philosophical debates in the Anubhava Mantapa. One of the most famous debates in the Anubhava Mandapa was centered on the issue of Akka Mahadevi’s discarding of clothes and her journeying forth naked in her quest for her Siva. In one vachana, she writes: To the shameless girl Wearing Mallikarjuna’s light, you fool Where is the need for cover and jewel. (Ramanujan, 1973: vachana 124, p. 129)

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As Akka Mahadevi puts it: People, male and female, blush when a cloth covering their shame comes loose When the lord of lives lives drowned without a face in the world, how can you be modest? When all the world is the eye of the lord, looking everywhere, what can you cover and conceal? (Ramanujan, 1973: vachana 184: p. 131)

In the assembly of Sharanas, Allamma Prabhu asked her: Is it true that you laid the blame And left him (Kaushika) by shedding your dress And laying the body bare? The error of your mind cannot be stilled The garment of your hair yet screens your form How is it your shame is shed? (Ramaswamy, 1996a, 41)

Allamma Prabhu’s argument is strongly supported by others in the Mantapa. Mahadevi’s response was a telling one. She claims that she covers her body with hair not so much for herself as to save others from temptation: Unless the fruit is ripe within The outer peel will never lose Its gloss… I covered myself With this intent Lest sight of seals of love Should do you hurt Is there any harm in this? (Ramaswamy, 1996a, 41)

Akka Mahadevi’s logic implied that it was men who needed to be protected from their own lust rather than women like her who had transcended societal liminalities.

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The best defense of Akka Mahadevi’s nakedness in the Anubhava Mantapa came from Basavanna who declared: Does the one who has loved The one without form Have need of body? Does one who has loved The one without mind Have need of shame? Does one who has loved ‘the sky clad one’ (Digambhara) Have need of a girdle cloth? A devotee like Mahadevi Akka Needs no encumbrances at all. (Bhoosnurmath & Menezes, 1969: 271)

In one of his vachanas, Allamma acknowledges his debt to Akka Mahadevi and her transcendental wisdom: She became a companion to the Linga when the ways of the body ceased to be. She became a companion to the knowledge when the ways of the mind ceased to be She became a great radiance when the ways of the acts of the mind ceased to be. I submit to the stand of Mahadeviakka who turned into a linga herself, In our Goggeshvara-linga after the self-other dualism Was wiped out.9

The debates in the Anubhava Mantapa and the eventual endorsement of Akka Mahadevi’s greatness by the most powerful Virasaivite leaders of the twelfth century, marks her as the signifier of a new radical spirituality which transgressed patriarchal frames and transcended social norms.

9 VAV

1303. Devadevan (2019: 152).

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15.1.5 Situating Mysticism in Akka Mahadevi It is noteworthy that the language of mystics cuts across all boundaries, including gender boundaries. As Kristeva points out in her analysis of subjectivity in poetics, (Kristeva, 1984, 1987) the language of ‘madness and mysticism’ transcends gender and the symbolic language structure. The mystical experience (in the case of both men and women) is beyond the experiential field of physical existence and thus becomes a transcendental/metaphysical moment which no language can unlock. However the mystics in their urge to communicate this incommunicable experience, are compelled to use the existent language structure although their vocabulary is dominated by the semiotic, pre-Oedipal language of signs rather than by the ‘symbolic’ language system emerging out of the socially acceptable language grounded in patriarchy. In this whole process of communication of mystical experiences, both male and female mystics sound mad, unintelligible and yet strangely enough, repetitive in their use of metaphors. This logic holds equally for Virasaivite mysticism where the vachanas of Akka Mahadevi, matches in tone and metaphor, the mystical verses of Muktayakka. Many of these mystics use the metaphor of camphor and fire to describe the state of divine union. Muktayakka uses the ‘camphor and fire metaphor with great effect: He has a watery doll, And about her feet He has tied anklets Made all of space And he has given her To a doll of space, For her to fondle… He has raised a throne Made all of fire, For a camphor doll, How strange, the fire Has melted away, The camphor remains! … (Sunyasampadane: I: V: 15: 164)

The metaphor of the ‘watery doll’, ‘doll of space’ and ‘camphor doll’ are very significant in that water, space and camphor possess no form or identity just as the individual soul, after merging in the universe, ceases to be.

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One of the recurrent mystical metaphors in Virasaivism is that of the tiger and the deer in the sense of the merger of irreconcilable opposites. Gangambike however brings the mother image even into this metaphor: In the vast expanse One tiger swallowed a calf But the tiger did not go back to the forest Seeing the calf, the tiger became a mother What does this mean? (Gangambika 4 in Hiremath, 1968: 175: 84).

Mysticism in Akka Mahadevi’s writings was not involved with abstruse metaphors like camphor and fire but was anchored in her passionate love for Siva. The following vachana illustrates this point. Mahadevi writes: Like a silkworm weaving her house with love, From her marrow, and dying in her body’s threads, Winding tight, round and round, I burn, desiring What the heart desires, O Mallikarjuna! (Ramanujan, 1973: vachana 17: 116)

15.1.6 Erotic Mysticism in Akka Mahdevi’s Vachanas Her mystic utterances can therefore be situated within the spiritual paradigm of bridal mysticism. Many of Akka Mahadevi’s vachanas drive home the point that she was no ‘dry’ renunciate but a woman passionately in love with Lord Siva. Many vachanas express this passionate longing for union with Siva: My restless mind has been turned upside down, The whirling wind has become scorching, The moonlight has become the heat of the sun, my friend, I have been roaming like a tax collector in the city! Tell him the way things are, bring him here; The lord who is as white as jasmine is angry. (Dabbe and Zydenbos: 1989: 44)

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The eroticism in her compositions is mystical and uses violent imagery which sets it apart from ‘worldly love’. On a frame of water, raising a roof of fire, Spreading the hailstones for the bridal floor-bed, A husband without head, Married a wife without legs, My parents gave me to an inseparable life, They married me to Lord Chenna Mallikarjuna. (Tipperudrasvami, 1982: 222–3)

In one of her vachanas, Akka Mahadevi says: In our embrace, the bones should rattle, In our welding, the welding mark even should disappear. The knife should enter totally When the arrow enters, even the feathers should not be seen. (Chennaiah, 1974: 39 vide Ramaswamy, 1996a, 1996b: 31)

Akka Mahadevi’s bridal mysticism is at one and the same time mystical, violent and at times quotidian. I quote below a vachana which uses the metaphor of the kitchen fire: I Love the Handsome One: He has no death decay nor form No place or side No end or birthmarks. I Love Him, O Mother, Listen. … So my Lord, white as Jasmine, is my husband. Take these husbands who die, decay, and feed them to your kitchen fires! (Ramanujan, 1973: vachana: 284: p. 134)

It is important to situate the concept of bridal mysticism and its centrality to the entire corpus of devotional literature written by saint-philosophers—both men and women—of the middle ages of any religious denomination. One of the

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most celebrated instances of bridal mysticism is that of St. John of the Cross (Hardy, 2000: 6). Many of the Virasaivite women were bridal mystics. I would like to quote here the expression of unashamed passion towards Lord Siva in the vachanas of these Shivasharanes. Goggavve writes: The fragrance mingling in the breeze Like pleasure in intercourse given freely where there is love; This is the path of bhakti, Is it not, Nastinatha? (Goggavve vide Ramaswamy, 1996a, 1996b: 97)

Bridal mysticism cut across gender lines not only within Virasavism but also sectarian movements like Vaishnavism of the Azhwar saints and Saivism of the Nayanar saints. This was true of male saints from other devotional streams—such as Nammazhwar among the Vaishnavite Azhwar saints, Manikkavachagar the renowned Saivite saint and Kabir, the fifteenth century saint from northern India. I would like to give just one example of male bridal mysticism from the vachanas of Basava as a point of comparison to show that the male bride sounded no different from the female one. Basava often refers to himself as a woman whether as a loving bride or a cuckolding wife: Let the whole world know: I have got a mate. I’m a married woman. Married to one am I. The lord of the Meeting Rivers is my man I’ve got a mate. (Zvelebil, 1984: V: 503: 74).

In another vachana Basava writes: When like a hailstone crystal. Like a waxwork image, The flesh melts in pleasure How can I tell you? The waters of joy Broke the banks And ran out of my eyes. I touched and joined my Lord of the Meeting Rivers,10 10 Koodala

Sangam Deva or Lord of the Meeting Rivers was the name given by Basava to his favourite of Siva, his ‘ishtalinga’.

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329 How can I talk to anyone of that?

(Ramanujan, 1973: vachana: 847: 89)

Even more sexually explicit is this verse by Urilinga Pedda, a male ‘bride’: In my great rapture Of making love with my darling I can’t tell myself from the world. While making love with my love I can’t tell myself from my darling After making love with Urilingadeva The god of the burning member I can’t tell whether it is me, him or something else. (Shivaprakash, 2010: vachana: 393 p. 168)

Akka Mahadevi explains male bridal mysticism by stating that Lord Siva being the only male, all others, irrespective of their gender are ‘female’: I saw the haughty master for whom men, all men, are but women, wives. (Ramanujan, 1973: vachana: 68: 120)

It logically follows from the above verse that all saints perceived themselves as ‘wives’ of the immortal Siva. A striking feature of Virasaivism is the oft repeated aphorism ‘Sharane Sati, Linga Pati’ meaning the Sharane or spiritual aspirant is the eternal bride and Siva the eternal bridegroom. Exemplifying this Akka Mahadevi writes: You are my husband and I, your wife, I have none else, O Lord. Falling in love with you, I came I Followed You. When every passerby is grabbing my hands, Tell me, O husband How can you stand it? O master Chennamallikarjuna, When strangers are dragging away The woman leaning on your arms, O king of compassionate ones,

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330 Is it proper to stand aside and look on? (Shivaprakash, 2010: vachana: 20: p. 110)

Social dissent was a logical precipitate of the passionate love that women saints like Akka Mahadevi had for Siva. Social transgression invariably went hand in hand with their quest for mystical union. In bridal mysticism thresholds were crossed and patriarchal norms violated, while social and moral codes were spurned.

15.1.7 The ‘Domestic Household’ as Allegory and Metaphor The ideal household in ‘everyday’ terms was a patriarchal model where the husband commanded and the wife obeyed. Cheerful acceptance of her lot combined with silent self-sacrifice made the wife the ideal wife, a true ‘pativrata’. Such an iconization invited social adulation with miraculous powers attributed to the chaste wife. Within patriarchal structures inhering in the overall framework of the medieval world, which may be feudal, quasi-feudal or capitalistic, it has been a tightrope walk for women between the realms of patriarchy and spirituality. The practical tensions of following a spiritual path within a patriarchal set-up are most apparent in the case of the householder women saints. Women saints like Lallesvari of Kashmir who was a saint of the Rishi movement. or Akka Mahadevi within the Lingayat movement, walked out of an oppressive marriage and opted for an ascetic path. Spiritual women like Bahina Bai of the Maharashtra Warkari movement, however spent their whole life in reconciling their familial commitments with their spiritual calling. The gendering of spirituality within the patriarchic mode can be read in two ways. In one sense, the woman uses the male epistemological construct to her advantage by sublimating her weakest points and turning them into her strength. The qualities of ‘desire’ and ‘lack’, the notion of woman being ‘body-centered’ is turned by the saint into passion, very often erotic, for the divine. This notion comes to occupy a certain degree of centrality in the Lacanian theory of psycho-analysis and more particularly in Julia Kristeva’s feminism (Kristeva, 1976: 64). The perception of a patriarchal household by women saints and their poetic, mystical outpourings about cruel in-laws and an oppressive domestic situation should be seen in this socio-spiritual context. In situating Akka Mahadevi’s vachanas relating to ‘the domestic’, especially the household, it is important to look at the perceptions of the ‘household’ in the context of medieval Indian devotional traditions. The household, in the imagination of saintly ‘wives’, who could be both male and female, existed both within and without. There was a metaphorical inner world which these wives inhabited where the household featured prominently. God, whether envisaged as male or female, was very much a part of this metaphysical household. The saint related to this divine household usually as a bride or wife but also as mother, lover/paramour

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etc. This household was clearly not a seamless one with well-defined parameters. This imagined household with fuzzy boundaries and changing relationships is therefore quite unlike the physical household with its liminalities marked by patriarchal borders of codes and conduct. The imagery of oppressive households and harsh in-laws is a recurrent theme among both male and female saints. It is equally necessary to locate the ‘threshold’ which marks the ‘households within’ from the ‘households without’. It is incumbent to point out that the saintly wives may neither be wives or even women for that matter. In the spiritual world gender crossings are not unusual and we will encounter the male wife as often as we encounter the female wife. Male saints like Basava or the Warkari saint Eknath situate themselves within an imagined household as ‘wife’ and not as ‘husband’. In expressing the frustration experienced in a profane household, the male saint/wife uses language that is as vituperative and sometimes more violent than women saints. Eknath from the Warkari tradition exemplifies these sentiments in the abhang (the term given to devotional compositions in the Marathi language) beginning ‘Amba satvar pav ge mala’. Save me now mother, I’ll offer you bread, Bhavani, Father-in-law is out of town, Let him die there. I’ll offer you bread, Mother Bhavani. Mother-in-Law torments me Kill her off. I’ll offer you bread, Mother Bhavani (Eknath vide Zelliot, 1998: 28–32).

Allamma Prabhu, the mystic Shivasharana from the Virasaivite tradition used very similar language some centuries earlier. To quote this strikingly similar vachana: O Lord, my Lord, protect me. O Lord, my Lord, Let my mother-in-law’s eyes be pierced Let death break my brother-in-law’s legs Let the wall in the backyard give way And dense darkness come and engulf it Let the he-man of the house disappear And the useless brother-in-law go mad Let the sister-in-law here die And go to the world of the sun

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332 Let the baby’s eyes be shut. Let the moon be bitten by a snake Today let Lord Goggesvaralinga Come and be one with me.11

The sexual relationship is not the only mode in which the household gets expressed in bhakti poetry. Another conspicuous imagery is that of the nurturing woman, the mother, and this is often in contrast to the image of the barren women which, in the mystic terminology implies spiritual barrenness and not necessarily physical barrenness. Basava’s wife Gangambike’s verses are notable for the image of herself as the spiritual mother and Siva as her child: That formless which is constant in the mind and speech of Basava That which even in the process of perception disappears into the void. This has been the success of Allamma’s love! This being determined, my heart craves at the loss. My child (Siva) has not gone anywhere My Chenna Basava! come to the breast of Gangambike. (Gangambika: 2 in Hiremath, 1968: V: 173: 83).

Fragmented images of what love, marriage and home meant to saintly women is balanced by the more commonplace perception of the tormented wife seeking the path of transcendental fulfillment to overcome the ‘lack’ (in the Lacanian sense), caused by an oppressive household. What is perceived more often in their writings, is the abused, ill-treated housewife distancing herself from her physical household and crossing the threshold of the social order in quest of a ‘better home’. In Tamil the term used for this transcendental household is ‘perum illam’ or ‘peru veedu’, literarily, the ‘greater home’. Marital ill-treatment, in the perception of saintly women, could be both real and imagined and both definitive in terms of relationships and allegorical. Women saints Meerabai and Lallesvari (Lal Ded), speak of the actual physical suffering they had to endure at the hands of their husband and/or in-laws. In contrast, Akka Mahadevi’s allegations of ill-treatment are allegorical and imagined rather than real and couched in a mystical language, situating the marital tension not in the context of real relationships but metaphorical ones. Let’s now look at Akka Mahadevi’s vachana of her household and its mystical underpinnings:

11 Basavaraju

(1990).

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333 I have Maya for Mother-in-law; the world for Father-in-law; Three brothers-in-law, like tigers; and the husband’s thoughts are full of laughing women: No God, this man. and I cannot cross the Sister-in-law. but I will give this wench the slip and go cuckold my husband with Hara, my Lord. My mind is my maid: by her kindness I join my Lord, my utterly beautiful Lord from the mountain peaks, my Lord, white as jasmine and I will make him my good husband.

(Ramanujan, 1973: vachana: 328: p. 141)

15.1.8 Transgression and Transcendence Completely demolishing the correspondence that has been established between woman = temptation = Maya, Akka Mahadevi states: To an ascetic, Maya takes the shape of a female ascetic; to a monk she is a nun, a man to a woman, a woman to a man O Chenna Mallikarjuna, I am not one to fear this Maya of thine. (Menezes & Angadi, 1973, 145, cited in Mullatti, 1989: 34)

Akka Mahadevi claims that although she has a female form, she is in fact male: A Woman Though in Name, I Am, if You Consider Well,

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334 The Male Principle.

(Bhoosnoormath & Menezes, 1970: 120; vide Ramaswamy: 14)

According to Virasaivism, man and woman differ from each other only at the psychological level. But at the metaphysical level, they are one and the same principle i.e., Atman, the pure Consciousness. This completely overturns the Brahmanical and patriarchal notions of caste pollution and gender inequality since nothing which emanates from the pure can be impure. Expressing this radical worldview of Virasaivism, Akka Mahadevi states: As long as woman is woman, then a man defiles her; As long as a man is man, a woman defiles him. When the mind’s taint is gone, is there, room for the body’s taint? The entire world is mad because of this adventitious taint. Look you, good sir, For the great spouse called Chenna Mallikarjuna, my lord, The whole world is a wife. (Menezes & Angadi, 1970: 151, in Mullatti, 1989: 34, emphasis mine)

A vachana by Akka Mahadevi exemplifies the transition from bridal mysticism and social transgression to spiritual transcendence. This vachana, in fact, sums up her spiritual journey: I cannot say, It is God or the Union with God. I cannot say, It is meeting or separation I cannot say, It has happened or not happened, I cannot say, It is me or you On getting merged In the Supreme Being of Chennamalikarjuna There’s nothing that I can say! (Akka Mahadevi: vachana 278, vide Shivacharya, 1990: 64)

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15.1.9 Akka Mahadevi in the Eyes of Other Shivasharane The absence of the name of Akka Mahadevi in the vachanas of her contemporary Shivasharane is striking and revealing in terms of her social ostracism. While women vachanakaras (composers of vachanas) like Ayadakki Lakkamma, Satyakka and Punyasthree (wife of Gajesha Masanayya) give a long list of Shivasharanas whom they revere, including a few women saints, not one of them acknowledges the spirituality of Akka Mahadevi or pays homage to her. It is clear that Akka Mahadevi’s quest for transcendence which led to her social transgressions—spurning her husband, crossing the threshold of the palace and finally walking out naked, covered only by her long hair—made her a rebel in their eyes. She was both socially and spiritually unacceptable. The entire issue of her discarding of clothes (it is moot point whether she actually became a naked saint) whether in fact or symbolically, invited censure from her contemporary vachana writers. Guddavve, the wife of Bhattalesvara, says: What use is it if the body is without covering? It is the mind which should be without covering. One who appears to be vrati (devout) but is really a vrata heena (devoid of devotion) Let me not mix with such (Guddavve in Hiremath, 1968: vachana: 230: 112 vide Ramaswamy, 1996a, 1996b: 42)

Another saint, Akkamma, is much more vociferous in her criticism of nudity. She says: Those who discard clothes Are children of donkeys. Those who shave their heads are children of widows12 Those who have matted locks

12 Head

shaving is necessary for the performance of the last rites of one’s parents or any family member. Akkamma’s verse is hence, almost a curse on those who in the name of religion, shave their heads.

V. Ramaswamy

336 Are children of Holeya13 What is important Is knowledge and right conduct.

(Akkamma in Hiremath, 1968: vachana: 231: 113 vide Ramaswamy, 1996a, 1996b: 43)

I shall conclude this section with Akka Mahadevi’s response to all criticisms regarding her perceived social transgressions including the shedding of clothes: Having built a house on Mountain top Can you be scared of wild beasts? Having made one’s home in the market place, how can one afford to shrink from its noise? Listen, Being born in this world When praise and blame follow Shunning Anger One must keep one’s calm.14

15.1.10 Relevance of Akka Mahadevi for Women Today Women within Virasaivism had almost all the rights to a spiritual life with one notable exception. They were not conceded the Jangama status which meant that women could neither conduct priestly ceremonies nor become head of a Virasaiva mutt or religious organization. Perhaps even this right was accorded to them in principle although it seems to have been historically inoperative. At the end of the twentieth century, Mahajagadguru Maate Mahadevi broke this unwritten convention by qualifying as a Jangama and becoming head of a women’s monastic centre in Dharwar, Karnataka. She also succeeded to the Basava Dharmada Jagadguru Peetha, the pontifical centre established at Koodala Sangama (the focal site of Virasaivism) in 1992 by Sriman Mahajagadguru Langananda Swamiji. The female pontiff shared with me her travails and achievements as

13 Holeya

are historically an untouchable caste of Karnataka. The community traces its origin to warrior groups. It is also believed that in ancient Deccan they were well-to-do landlords. From the medieval period onwards, this community was associated with land (“Hola” means agricultural land in Kannada) and were classified as low-caste/out-caste agricultural labour. 14 Akka Mahadevi vide Shuti Rao’s review of Sky-Clad: The Extraordinary Life and Times of Akka Mahadevi, Kannada Woman Saint Poet, www.womensweb.in, Accessed 20.4.2020.

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monastic head in the course of a long interview conducted at her mutt in Delhi.15 She referred to the hostility she had to face from the male Lingayat mutt leaders who believed that she was not acceptable to the Virasaivite orthodoxy because there was no sanction within the religion for a female monastic head. This notable exception of a female mutt intended to establish the ideas of Akka Mahadevi, therefore, merely substantiates the prevalent convention of monasticism being a male preserve. Akka Mahadevi herself sought no social or religious credibility which came to her willy-nilly in recognition of her spirituality and deeply mystical vachanas. Akka Mahadevi’s true greatness lay in the fact that she chose to walk naked, whether one sees this act as an actual/physical one or a purely symbolic one of shattering worldly liminalities.

References Basavaraju, L. (Ed.). (1990). Shivadasa Gitanjali (2nd ed., p. 251) as cited and translated by H. S. Shivaprakash, I keep vigil of Rudra: The vachanas. Penguin Classics, 2010, Introduction: lii–liii. Bhoosnurmath, S. S., Menezes, A., & Adke, A. S. (1969). Śūnyasaṁpādane (Vol. 3). Karnatak University. Dabbe, V., & Zydenbos, R. (1989). Akka Mahadevi. Manushi, 50–52. Hardy, R. P. (2000). Embodied love in John of the cross—C, 27, 6. Institute of Carmelite Studies, ©2000. http://blesslife.org/ourgarden/johnembodied.html. Accessed October 26, 2010 Hiremath, R. C. (1968). Ippattelu Shivasharaneyara Vachanagalu. Karnataka University. Ishwaran, K. (1983). Religion and society among the Lingayat of South India. Vikas. Kristeva, J. (1984). The revolution in poetic language. Columbia University Press. Kristeva, J. (l987). Tales of love. Columbia University Press. Kumaraswami, M. H. H. (His Holiness) Prophets of Virashaivism, Navakalyana Math, Dharwar. Menezes, A., & Angadi, S. M. (1973). Vachanas of Akka Mahadevi. Shri Manohar Apasahib Adke. Michael, B. R. (1983). Women of the Sunyasampadane: Housewives and saints in Virasaivism. Journal of the American Oriental Society, 103(2). Mudaliar, C. Y. (1991). Religious experiences of Hindu women: a study of Akka Mahadevi. The Journal of Medieval Religious Cultures, 17(3), 137–146. Mullatti, L. (1989). The Bhakti movement and the status of women. Abhinav Publications. Nandi, R. N. (1973). Religious institutions and cults in the Deccan. Motilal Banarsidas. Nandi, R. N. (1984). Feudalization of the State in Medieval South India. Social Science Probings, 1(1). Nandi, R. N. (1986). Social roots of religion in ancient India. K.P. Bagchi and Company. Nandimath, S. C., Menezes, L. M. A., & Hiremath, R. C. (1965). Sunyasampadane (Vol. I). Karnataka University. Prabhu, A. (2019). Vachanas. In M. V. Devadevan (Trans.), God is dead, there is no god: The vachanas of Allamma Prabhu. Speaking Tiger Classics. Ramanujan, A. K. (1973). Speaking of Siva. Penguin. Ramaswamy, V. (1996a). Divinity and deviance: Women in Virasaivism. Oxford University Press.

15 See

Ramaswamy (1997b).

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Ramaswamy, V. (1996b). Madness, holiness, poetry: The vachanas of Virasaivite women. Indian Literature, 39(3(173)), 147–155. Ramaswamy, V. (1997a). Rebels, mystics or housewives: Women in Virasaivism. India International Centre Quarterly, 23(3/4), 190–203. Second Nature: Women and the Family. Ramaswamy, V. (1997b). A space of one’s own: Women in Virasaivism. The India Magazine, 17(10), 26–31. Ramaswamy, V. (2007). Walking naked: Women, society, spirituality in South India (2nd rev.). Indian Institute of Advanced Study (1st ed., 1997). Rao, M. (2018). Sky-Clad: The extraordinary life and times of Akka Mahadevi. Westland Publishers. Rao, K. R. (1990). Ideology, organization and mobilization: A historical-comparative study of the Lingayat movement. In Y. Malik (Ed.), Boeings and bullock carts: Studies in change and continuity in Indian civilization—Essays in honour of K. Ishwaran (pp. 187–203). Chanakya Publications. Shivacharya, S. (1990). Religion and society at cross roads. Sri Taralabalu Jagadguru Brihanmath, Sirigere. Tharu, S., & Lalita, K. (1991). Women writing in India, 600 B.C. to the present (Vol. I). Oxford University Press. Thipperudraswami, H. (1968). The Virasaiva Saints—A study. Rao and Raghavan. Thipperudraswami, H. (1982). Soul unto the Sublime, Sri Jagadguru Gangadhara Dharma Pracharaka Mandala. Vinaya, C. (2017). Songs for Siva: Vacanas of Akka Mahadevi. Harper Collins. Zelliot, E. (1998). Roots of Dalit consciousness. Seminar, 471, 28–32. Zvelabil, K. V. (1984). The Lord of the meeting rivers—Devotional poems of Basavanna. Motilal Banarsidas Delhi.

Chapter 16

Portrait in public domain due to its antiquity

Empress Xu/Renxiaowen of China 仁孝文皇后 1361–1407 Ann A. Pang-White Abstract This Ming dynasty philosopher Empress Xu (also known as Empress  Renxiaowen), was an erudite Confucian scholar and also a learned Buddhist. Her surviving works include a Buddhist-influenced Confucian treatise the Teachings for the Inner Court (Neixun). She authored several other Confucian and Buddhist texts, as well as a number of poems.

This chapter is a partial reprint of pp. 121–129, 168–171, 179–184 from Ann A. Pang-White, The Confucian Four Books for Women—A New Translation of the Nü Sishu and the Commentary of Wang Xiang (Oxford University Press, 2018). With the permission of Oxford University Press. A. A. Pang-White (*)  The University of Scranton, Scranton, PA, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_16

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16.1 The Author and the Work Empress Renxiaowen 仁孝文皇后 (1361–1407) of the Ming dynasty 明 (1368–1644) authored the Teachings for the Inner Court (Neixun 《內訓》) (Zhang, 1739). This work, completed in 1405, is both the longest and the most conceptually sophisticated of the Four Books for Women (Nü shishu 《女四 書》) (Pang-White, 2018). It not only stresses women’s learning but also commends their contributions to the well-being of the state. In terms of subject matter and the impact on women’s social standing, this work surpasses both Ban Zhao’s Lessons for Women1 and Song Ruoxin’s and Song Ruozhao’s Analects for Women. Even though originally intended mainly for teaching imperial women, this work was promulgated among the common people as a consequence of several emperors’ decrees.2 In addition to Wang Xiang’s 王相 Four Books for Women (Nü sishu jizhu 《女四書集註》) (Wang, 1885), this work is included in Chen Menglei’s 陳夢 雷 Collection of Illustrations and Books from Antiquity to the Present (Gujin tushu jicheng 《古今圖書集成》) and is the only work of the Four Books for Women included in the “masters section” (zibu 子部) of Ji Yun’s 紀昀 Complete Library in Four Sections (Siku quanshu 《四庫全書》) (Ji, 1986), the largest Chinese imperial collection of literary works compiled during the Qing dynasty 清 (1644–1911). The Teachings for the Inner Court is also well known in Japan and Korea and was often used to teach empresses (Yamazaki, 1986, 155; Kim, 2016, 89–107). Empress Renxiaowen (maiden name, Xu) was the oldest daughter of Xu Da 徐 達 (1322–1385), a famous Ming general. She loved learning and was known for her virtues. People called her Nü Zhusheng 女諸生 (“woman scholar”). Emperor Taizu of Ming 明太祖 (the founding emperor) heard her good name, thereupon asking her father to betroth her to the Prince of Yan 燕王 (Zhu Di 朱棣), Taizu’s fourth son. In 1376, she became Consort Yan and was known for her exemplary filialness to her mother-in-law and benevolence to others (Zhang, 1739). In 1399, Emperor Huidi 惠帝 (b. 1377–?; r. 1399–1402), a grandson of Emperor Taizu and a nephew of Prince of Yan, attempted to drastically abolish the princes’ and vassal kings’ power and territory. The Prince of Yan thereupon initiated the Jingnan Rebellion 靖難之變, a civil war against Emperor Huidi. When he and most of the troops were away to raid the city of Daning, Emperor Huidi’s general Li Jinglong seized the opportunity to attack Beijing, Yan’s headquarters. When the city was besieged, Consort Yan, the future Empress, urged women in the city to defend the capital; she took the lead, gave the women armor, climbed up the city walls, and fought the enemy. The city was thus preserved. In 1402, the Prince of Yan ascended the throne as Emperor Chengzu 成祖 and installed Consort Yan as his empress. She encouraged her husband to practice

1 See

Chap.  8 in this volume, “Ban Zhao” by Therese Boos Dykeman. example, in 1407 by Emperor Chengzu 成祖, and in 1580 by Emperor Shenzong 神宗, of Ming. See Ji (1986) et al., Hu (1985) and Wang (1885, 1–2).

2 For

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humane government: “[I venture to plead with the Emperor:] cherish the people, seek virtuous worthy talents widely, show mercy to family clans, and do not indulge my maternal family.” She also summoned wives of high-ranking officials of the imperial court and academy, and advised them: A wife, in serving her husband, should not stop at only taking care of his food and clothes. There must be something else that a wife can assist with. One may follow or disobey a friend’s advice. Nonetheless, words between a husband and a wife are congenial and easier to keep in mind. Day and night, I serve the Emperor and only think about the people. I urge you too to endeavor to do this. (Pang-White, 2018, 122; Zhang, 1739)

Empress Renxiaowen, a dedicated Confucian, was also a devout Buddhist and a copious writer. In addition to the Teachings for the Inner Court (Neixun), she authored several other Confucian and Buddhist texts, as well as a number of poems.3 In various places in the Neixun, albeit a Confucian treatise, she infused Buddhist karmic law to explain Heaven’s distribution of happiness in proportion to a person’s deeds. She passed away in 1407, at the age of forty-six. Emperor Chengzu mourned her death and bestowed on her the honorary title of “humaneness” (ren 仁) and “filialness” (xiao 孝), in addition to her literary achievements (wen 文), thus the name Renxiaowen Empress. Later that year, he issued an imperial edict to print and widely circulate two of her works, Teachings for the Inner Court and Exhorting Good (Quanshanshu 《勸善書》) (Ji, 1986; Huang, 2008, 69). For the rest of his life, he did not install another empress.

16.2 Cultural and Historical Background Emperor Taizu (r. 1368–1398) of Ming, after defeating the Mongol Yuan Empire 元 (1271–1368), immediately implemented several important policies to restore society from the turmoil caused by famine, corruption, and war at the end of the Yuan regime. These measures included: (1) encouraging agriculture and economic development, (2) lowering taxes (particularly, books and farming instruments were exempt from taxes) (Long, 1865), (3) promoting education (including women’s learning), (4) establishing local schools, (5) observing the ritual distinction between male and female, and (6) promulgating a culture of frugality (Zhang, 1739). Ming emperors and empresses embodied these lessons by example. Ming empresses, far more than any previous dynasties, authored books to teach women of the imperial court (Lu, 2007, 45–48). During the Ming period, the printing system also underwent significant development, partly due to the incentives provided by the government’s tax-free policy on books. By the thirteenth century, wooden, ceramic, clay, and metal movable type was invented. By 1600, printing with bronze movable type was nearly

3 Hu,

1985, 138–140; Lu, 2007, 45–47; Huang, 2008, 67–68; Lee, 1999, 678–681.

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perfected, significantly improving the printing process (Tsien, 1985, 201–217). As a result, in addition to imperial printing facilities, many private print shops also sprung up. The convergence of these factors—the encouragement of learning from above, tax-exempt policy for books, and printing efficiency—greatly contributed to the efficacy of women’s education. Furthermore, to restore moral order and to differentiate Chinese culture from Mongol culture, Ming emperors relied on Confucian teachings, especially Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism (Zhang, 1739; cf. Huang, 2003, 37–40). Zhu Xi (1130–1200), a noted scholar of the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279), is best known for his classification and commentary on the Four Books (Sishu 《四書》), comprising the Analects, the Mencius, the Great Learning, and the Doctrine of the Mean— the standard textbooks in preparation for imperial civil service examinations from 1313 to 1905. Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism focuses particularly on moral cultivation. He regards the three principles (manifesting illuminating virtue, loving/renovating the people, and abiding by the highest good) and the eight steps (investigating things, extending knowledge, making the will sincere, rectifying the mind, cultivating the person, regulating the family, governing the state, and bringing world peace), laid out in the Great Learning, as an excellent guide for any person who wishes to establish the self and contribute to the well-being of the family, the state, and the world. Following Confucius and especially Mencius, Zhu Xi affirms the goodness in innate human nature and the effect of habits. He writes, “[T]he [inborn] nature should necessarily attain the Mean … But the Mean is sometimes not attained because [the person] loses his original nature and beclouds it by habits engendered by [psycho-physical] force [qi 氣]” (Chan, 1973, 619). He thus distinguishes “original nature” (endowed good nature) from “physical nature” (nature affected by external conditions): [O]riginal nature is perfectly good. This is the nature described by Mencius as “good.” … However, it will be obstructed if [our] physical nature contains impurity. … When we speak of the physical nature, we refer to principle [li 理] and [psycho-physical] force [qi 氣] combined. (op. cit., 624)

To elucidate the transition between original nature and physical nature, a fourfold distinction of “mind,” “nature,” “feeling,” and “desire” is made: [Original] [n]ature is the state before activity begins, the feelings are the state when activity has started, and the mind includes [both] states. For nature is the mind before it is aroused, while feelings are the mind after it is aroused. … Desire emanates from feelings. The mind is comparable to water, [original] nature … the tranquility of still water, feeling … the flow of water, and desire … its waves. Just like there are good and bad waves, so there are good desires, such as when “I want humanity,” and bad desires which rush out like wild and violent waves. (op. cit., 631)

Thus, the purpose of “learning is to transform this material endowment” (op. cit., 625). For this reason, Zhu Xi also encourages women’s learning so that they can become virtuous models for their children, relatives, and villagers. He upholds women’s ability to achieve the paramount Confucian virtue of humaneness (Zhu, 1986, 57; cf. Chan, 1988, 784).

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The subjects for women’s learning, however, were more limited than men’s, as Zhu Xi still sees the gendered inner-outer distinction as a ritual mandate and obedience as women’s primary virtue.4 Influenced by earlier Han Confucians’ yinyang hierarchy, Zhu Xi’s teaching on the yin-yang relation was one of inconsistency. On the one hand, following Zhou Dunyi’s Explanations of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate (Taijitu shuo 《太極圖說》), he upholds the complementarity of yang/activity/male and yin/tranquility/female. On the other hand, women are construed unfairly as the inferior sex because of their yin nature. In his Reflections on Things at Hand (Jin silu 《近思錄》), the inferiority and subordination of yin/ female/wife to yang/male/husband is emphasized: “Between man and woman, there is an order of superiority and inferiority, and between husband and wife, there is the principle of who leads and who follows. This is a constant principle” (Chan, 1967, 272). Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism certainly influenced Empress Renxiaowen’s Teachings for the Inner Court, but not without her own creative invention and female sensibility.

16.3 Purpose of Writing, Contents, Strengths and Weaknesses of the Book In her preface to the Teachings for the Inner Court (Neixun), Empress Renxiaowen explains that her reason for writing this treatise is that no suitable teaching material for educating women is available. In her view, Ban Zhao’s Lessons for Women is too simple and Zhu Xi’s Elementary Learning is not written for women. Popular anthologies in the late Yuan dynasty and the early Ming dynasty are too fragmented and superficial—they are simply collections of excerpts from the Record of Rituals, a few poems from the Classic of Poetry, and a handful of women’s biographies, with no explanations. In contrast, the teachings of her mother-in-law (Empress Xiaocigao 孝慈高皇后) are both profound and immediately applicable to women. For these reasons, she wrote the Neixun, incorporating her motherin-law’s insights. The twenty chapters of the Neixun proceed in a logical order: starting from a discussion of the relation between endowed human nature and its potential for virtue to advice on inner cultivation and external manifestation of these virtues in the web of personal, social, and political relations (Renxiaowen, 1885). The book has several strengths. First, in making the argument that (a) regardless of their gender or sex, all human beings are endowed with virtuous nature (Chap. 1), (b) self-cultivation leads to virtue (Chap. 2), and (c) being able to

4 This, however, does not mean women cannot influence or reprimand their husbands. The Song sisters, Empress Renxiaowen, and Madame Liu (several women authors of the Confucian Four Books for Women) certainly reappropriated this virtue.

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correct one’s mistake after knowing it enables sageliness (Chap. 9),5 Empress Renxiaowen opens the door for women’s sagehood. In fact, in Chap. 10, she explicitly calls her mother-in-law Empress Xiaocigao’s teaching “sagely teachings”; and in Chap. 11 she firmly states that a woman can become a sage if her deeds equal those of exemplary sage queens. Relatedly, in her Preface she stresses that women’s education should not be delayed: “none [of the exemplary women] could have been so accomplished without being taught first.”6 No previous writers, male or female, ever made this claim as clearly as she does, a remarkable step that has inspired a multitude of later women writers. For instance, Madame Liu (Liu Shi) unapologetically praises exemplary women as “woman sages” in her Short Records of Models for Women,7 the fourth book of the Four Books for Women. Second, she is fully aware of the power of example, as well as the temptations that aristocratic upper-class women face. She therefore especially stresses the timeless beauty of virtue and, by contrast, the fleeting nature of luxuries and physical attractiveness: “fine clothing with five-color embroidery cannot beautify a person. Only … [in] following the Way can one advance in women’s virtue” (Chap. 2); “a woman should not be haughty about her physical beauty; what matters in her is her virtue” (Chap. 3); “Pearls and jades are not treasures; virtue and sageliness are” (Chap. 11). In the same vein, she exhorts her readers to diligence and frugality, and warns against wastefulness: “It is easy for one who lives in poverty and in an inferior position not to become lazy; it is difficult for one who is affluent to not be lazy” (Chap. 5). Furthermore, in considering the labor going into economic production, she adds: A single thread of cloth is a result of women’s diligent work; a grain of food is a consequence of farmers’ hard labor. These things do not come by easily. If all use these materials intemperately and waste these materials from Heaven without care—those above lead while those below follow and all walk the same path, who will be able to overturn these corrupt practices? … For what is above leads what is below and what is inside manifests in the outside; empresses must observe frugality to lead the six imperial inner quarters. Consorts of marquises and wives of minor officials and the common people all should uphold frugality to lead their households. Accordingly, no citizens will suffer from cold and hunger. (Chap. 7)

Third, considering the immense impact of words and actions—especially when they are uttered and carried out by members of royalty, she emphasizes the importance of prudent speech and benevolent conduct (Chaps. 3 and 4). To prevent cruel treatment and abuse of power that often result from political power struggles, she advises mercy in treating family clans and impartiality in interacting with kings’ and consorts’ maternal relatives (Chaps. 17–20). Fourth, the significance of women’s work as inner helpmate—not only to the well-being of a family but also to the flourishing of a society and the stability of

5 See

Renxiaowen (1885), Neixun, chapter 9, “知而能改可以跂聖。” Renxiaowen (1885), Neixun, preface, “亦未有不由於教而成者。” 7 Liu Shi, Nüfan jielu, Chap. 2, “可謂女中之堯舜”. 6 See

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a nation—is well articulated in this book. Formerly, neither Ban Zhao’s Lessons for Women nor the Song sisters’ Analects for Women made such connections and no other prior authors ever articulated this point with such eloquence. One reads: “Women assist their countries and families from within” (Chap. 8); “Since ancient times, the founding of a country has always relied on the virtue of inner helpmates” (Chap. 10); “Looking back at ancient times, it had never been the case that the rise and the fall of a nation did not depend on whether women were virtuous” (Chap. 13). Moreover, a wife’s moral duty requires her to admonish her husband (even if he is an emperor): If she cannot mutually rectify her ruler by means of the Way, it must be the case that she has abandoned her own virtue. It is as if a net does not have its principal binding threads; it is difficult for the eyes of the net to open. If a ruler has no one to rely on [for his virtue], those below him will have no one to emulate. Gradually both parties will descend into immorality. (Chap. 13)

Fifth, the method of citing former exemplary women as a form of argument begins to emerge in this work. Neither Ban Zhao nor the Song sisters cited any former exemplary women to bolster their arguments. Empress Renxiaowen, to the contrary, presented fourteen examples of virtuous women from history, and four counterexamples, as evidence that reinforces her reasoning. This approach will become a primary form of argument deployed by Madame Liu in her Short Records of Models for Women. This method has the benefit of establishing women’s tradition enlivened by women—providing a sense of sisterhood with shared purposes—a method that contemporary feminists find so powerful! This work does have some limitations. Since the intended audience is empresses and imperial consorts, its narrative is quite formal and the selected examples of women are confined to royal women. Although the text mentions the common people several times, its formality and class distinctions make the book less relatable to non-elite women. Moreover, the rules and policies passed down by the founding emperor of Ming propelled Empress Renxiaowen’s strict observance of orthodox norms of “three obediences” and “the inner-outer distinction,” barring any direct involvement in politics by empresses and imperial consorts. These restrictions significantly limited women’s full political participation.

Appendix 1 Selection from Empress Renxiaowen’s Teachings for the Inner Court 【崇聖訓章第十】

自古國家肇基, 皆有內助之德, 垂範後世。夏商之初, 塗山有莘, 皆明教訓 之功。成周之興, 文王后妃, 克廣關雎之化。我太祖高皇帝, 受命而興, 孝慈高 皇后, 內助之功, 至隆至盛。蓋以明聖之資, 秉貞仁之德, 博古今之務。艱難之 初, 則同勤開創。平治之際, 則弘基風化。表壼範於六宮, 著母儀於天下。驗

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之往哲, 莫之與京。譬之日月, 天下仰其高明。譬之滄海, 江河趍其浩溥。然 史傳所載, 什裁一二。而微言奧義, 若南金焉, 銖兩可寶也。若穀粟焉, 一日不 可無也。貫徹上下, 包括鉅細。誠道德之至要, 而福慶之大本也。后妃遵之, 則可以配至尊, 奉宗廟, 化天下, 衍慶源。諸侯大夫之夫人, 與士庶人之妻遵 之, 則可以內佐君子, 長保富貴, 利安家室, 而垂慶後人矣。詩曰: 「姒嗣徽音, 則百斯男。」敬之哉。敬之哉。 [Chapter] 10 Revering Sagely Teachings (Chongshengxun zhang dishi 崇聖訓章第十) Since ancient times, the founding of a country has always relied on the virtue of inner helpmates. They set exemplary norms for later generations to follow. At the inception of the Xia 夏 and the Shang 商 dynasties, there were Tu Shan 塗山 and You Shen 有莘; both had the merits of teaching essential lessons to the inner courts. The rise of Chengzhou 成 周 was due to the Guanju 關雎 cultural transformation promulgated by the royal consorts of King Wen 文王 [of Zhou 周]. Our founding Emperor Taizugao 太祖高皇帝 inherited the mandate of Heaven and rose [from the peasant class]. Empress Xiaocigao’s 孝慈高 皇后 work as his inner helpmate was immense. She used her inborn illuminating sagely nature to uphold chastity and humaneness and to acquire broad knowledge in ancient and contemporary affairs. At the beginning, in adversity she toiled diligently with the emperor to found this nation. During times of peace, she strengthened the foundation to transform culture. She is an exemplar to the six imperial inner courts and a remarkable maternal model to the world. I have inspected the records of intelligent (zhe 哲) royal consorts from former times and found that none of them is comparable (jing 京) to Empress Gao. Her virtue is like the Sun and the Moon; all under Heaven admire their loftiness and brightness. Her virtue is like an immense ocean; all rivers converge (qu 趍) to its vastness (hao pu 浩溥). Yet what is recorded in books of history only gets (cai 裁) one-to-two-tenths of her teachings. The subtlety of her words and the depth of their meanings are like precious gold produced in the south—only a miniature amount is regarded as treasure, and like grain—one cannot survive a day without them. Her teachings penetrate matters both above and below, comprise both grand ideas and minute details, and elucidate the essentials of morality and the important foundation for happiness and prosperity. If empresses and royal consorts can follow Empress Gao’s teachings, they will be able to match their emperors, serve ancestral temples, transform the world, and extend the source of prosperity. If consorts of marquises and high-ranking officials and wives of minor officials and the common people can follow her teachings, they will be able to assist their husband from within, enjoy long-lasting wealth and nobility, bring benefits and peace to their families, and create prosperity for their offspring. The Shijing (Classic of Poetry) says, “[Tai]si [太] 姒 continued [her mother-in-law’s] fine (hui 徽) reputation. She thus had one hundred sons.” Revere it! Revere it!

Appendix 2 Selection from Empress Renxiaowen’s Teachings for the Inner Court 【事君章第十三】

婦人之事君, 比昵左右, 難制而易惑, 難抑而易驕。然則有道乎? 曰: 「有。 」忠誠以為本, 禮義以為防, 勤儉以率下, 慈和以處眾。誦詩讀書, 不忘規諫。

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寢興夙夜, 惟職愛君。居處有常, 服食有節。言語有章, 戒謹讒慝。中饋是專, 外事不涉, 教令不出。遠離邪僻, 威儀是力。毋擅寵而怙恩, 毋干政而撓法。 擅寵則驕, 怙恩則妬, 干政則乖, 撓法則亂。諺云: 「汨水淖泥, 破家妬妻。」 不驕不妬, 身之福也。詩曰: 「樂只君子, 福履綏之。」夫受命守分, 僭黷不 生。詩曰: 「夙夜在公, 寔命不同。」是故姜后脫簪, 載籍攸賢。班姬辭輦, 古 今稱譽。我國家隆盛, 孝慈高皇后, 事我太祖高皇帝, 輔成鴻業。居富貴而不 驕, 職內道而益謹。兢兢業業, 不忘夙夜。德蓋前古, 垂訓萬世, 化行天下。 詩曰: 「思齊太任, 文王之母。思媚周姜, 京室之婦。」此之謂也。縱觀往古, 國家廢興, 未有不由於婦之賢否。事君者不可以不慎。詩曰: 「夙夜匪懈, 以 事一人。」苟不能胥匡以道, 則必自荒厥德。若網之無綱, 眾目難舉。上無所 毗, 下無所法, 則胥淪之漸矣。夫木瘁者, 內蠹攻之。政荒者, 內嬖蠱之。女寵 之戒, 甚於防敵。詩曰: 「赫赫宗周, 褒姒滅之。」可不鑒哉。夫上下之分, 尊 卑之等也。夫婦之道, 陰陽之義也。諸侯大夫士庶人之妻, 能推是道, 以事其 君子, 則家道鮮有不盛矣。 [Chapter] 13 Serving One’s Ruler (Shijun zhang dishisan 事君章第十三) For women who serve their ruler, because they are intimate (ni 昵) with him and constantly at his side, it is difficult for them to control themselves, but easy for them to bewilder their ruler. It is also difficult for them to humble themselves, but easy for them to become arrogant. If someone asks, “Are there methods to correct this?” “Yes, there is.” One should regard loyalty and sincerity as the roots, use ritual propriety and righteousness to prevent wrongdoing, cultivate diligence and frugality to lead those below, and be kind and harmonious in interacting with the multitude. Read the Shijing (Classic of Poetry) and study the classics. Do not forget the corrections and admonitions offered by others. Rising early in the morning and resting late at night, one’s only vocation is to love one’s ruler. Keep to a constant living place. Be temperate in one’s clothing and food. Be proper in one’s speech. Be cautious about slander and wickedness. Concentrate one’s attention on preparing drinks and food. Do not meddle with external affairs. Do not let one’s teachings and orders go outside the inner court. Steer away from evil. Endeavor in dignified deportment. Do not monopolize the ruler’s love, thus relying on (hu 怙) his special favor. Do not interfere with governmental affairs, therefore bending (nao 撓) the law. Monopolizing the ruler’s love makes one haughty; relying on his special favor makes one jealous. Interfering with governmental affairs creates perverseness and bending the law generates chaos. The proverb says, “Turbid (mi 汨) water, deep mud (nao 淖), a jealous wife destroys the household.” Thus, being able to refrain from arrogance and jealousy is a woman’s happiness. The Shijing says, “Joyful (luozhi 樂只) is the gentleman! May happiness and prosperity (lu 履) keep you safe (sui 綏).” Accept [the ruler’s] commands (shouming 受命) and abide by one’s duties (shoufen 守分). Then, transgression and adulteration will not occur. The Shijing says, “From early in the morning till late at night I am busy with official business; truly (shi 寔) my fate (ming 命) is different from others.” Thus, Queen Jiang 姜后 took off her hairpin [to wait for her punishment]; her virtue was recorded in numerous books. Royal Consort Ban 班姬 declined to ride the carriage [with the emperor]; many from antiquity to the present time praised her example. Our nation is prosperous and great. This is due to Empress Xiaocigao, who served our Emperor Taizugao and assisted him in accomplishing kingly affairs. She occupied a position of wealth and high social rank and yet she was not arrogant. She upheld the proper way of the inner realm and was extremely prudent. Careful and hard-working, neither during the day nor at night did she ever neglect it. Her virtue surpassed her predecessors, her teachings will be passed down to hundreds of thousands of future generations, and her work has transformed all

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under Heaven. The Shijing says, “How dignified and respectful (zhai 齊) is Tairen 太任, the mother of King Wen. She loved (mei 媚) [her mother-in-law] Zhou Jiang 周姜. She is a daughter-in-law of the royal household (jingshi 京室).” This is what it means. Looking back at ancient times, it had never been the case that the rise and the fall of a nation did not depend on whether women were virtuous. Those who serve their rulers must be prudent about this. The Shijing says, “Day and night do not be lax in serving one person.” If she cannot mutually (xu 胥) rectify (kuang 匡) her ruler by means of the Way, it must be the case that she has abandoned her own virtue. It is as if a net does not have principal binding threads (gang 綱); it is difficult for the eyes of the net to open. If a ruler has no one to rely on (pi 毗) [for his virtue], those below him will have no one to emulate. Gradually both parties will descend (lun 淪) into immorality. For if a tree is withering and sick (cui 瘁), it is because insects (du 蠹) are attacking it from within. If government is neglected, it is due to a king’s favorite women (bi 嬖) in the inner court confusing (gu 蠱) him. Caution against spoiled women is even more critical than guarding against enemies. The Shijing says, “The great glorious Zhou dynasty is destroyed by Baosi 褒姒.” How can one not take a lesson from it? The distinction between the above and the below indicates the differentiation between the venerable and the lowly. The way between a husband and a wife is the righteousness of yin and yang: If wives of marquises, high-ranking officials, low-ranking officials, and the common folk can infer its meaning in serving their rulers and husbands, rarely (xian 鮮) would their families not become prosperous.

References Chan, W. (trans.). (1967). Reflections on things at hand: The Neo-Confucian anthology (Compiled by H. Chu & T.-C. Lu). Columbia University Press. Chan, W. (1973). A source book in Chinese philosophy. Princeton University Press. Chan, W. 陳榮捷. (1988). Zhuzi xintansuo 《朱子新探索》(New Research on Zhu Xi). Xuesheng Shuju. Hu, W. 胡文楷. (1985). Lidai funü zhuzuokao 《歷代婦女著作考》(Verified Records of Women’s Writings Through the Ages). Shanghai Guji. Huang, L. 黃麗玲. (2003). Nü sishu yanjiu 《女四書》研究 (“Research on the Four Books for Women”). M.A. thesis. Taiwan Nanhua University, Taiwan. Huang, Y. 黃嫣梨. (2008). Nü sishu jizhu yizheng 《女四書集注義證》(Four Books for Women with Selections from Traditional Commentaries). Shangwu Shuju. Ji, Y. 紀昀, et al. (eds.). (1986, reprint). Siku quanshu 《四庫全書》(Complete Library in Four Sections). Qing Dynasty Imperial Library. Vols. 709 & 722. Originally published in 1782. Reprint by Shangwu Shuju. Kim, H.-K. (2016). The dream of sagehood: A re-examination of Queen Sohae’s Naehoon and feminism. In A. A. Pang-White (Ed.), The Bloomsbury research handbook of Chinese philosophy and gender (pp. 89–107). Bloomsbury. Lee, H. (1999). “Empress Xu” women writers of traditional China: An anthology of poetry and criticism (K. S. Chang & H. Saussy, eds.) (pp. 678–681). Stanford University Press. Long, W. 龍文彬. (1865). Ming huiyao 《明會要》(Essential Ming Laws and Regulations) (Vol. 26). https://ctext.org/library.pl?if=en%26file=26765%26byauthor=龍文彬%26page=7. Accessed March 2017. Lu, J. 盧嘉琪. (2007). Siku quanshu gengxuzhubian suoshou nüxing zhushu 《四庫全書》賡續 諸編所收女性著述 (“Women’s Writings Included in Follow-up Volumes and Editions of the Complete Library in Four Sections”). Chengda lishi xuebao 《成大歷史學報》, 32, 35–80. Pang-White, A. A. (trans. & ed.). (2018). The Confucian four books for women: A new translation of the Nü Sishu and the commentary of Wang Xiang. Oxford University Press.

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Renxiaowen, H. 仁孝文皇后. (1885, reprint). Neixun 《內訓》(Teachings for the inner court). c. 15th century. In X. Wang (Ed.), Zhuangyuange nü sishu jizhu 《狀元閣女四書集註》 (Zhuangyuange Edition of the Four Books for Women with Commentary). Wenchengtang. Tsien, T.-H. (1985). Paper and printing. In J. Needham (ed.), Science and civilization in China (Vol. 5, part I, pp. 201–217). Cambridge University Press. Wang, X. 王相. (1885, reprint). Zhuangyuange nü sishu jizhu 《狀元閣女四書集註》 (Zhuangyuange Edition of the Four Books for Women with Commentary). Wang’s Four Books for Women was first published c. 17th century. Wenchengtang. Yamazaki, J. (1986). Kyōiku kara mita Chūgoku joseishi shiryo no kenkyu: “Onna shisho” to “Shinpufu” sanbusho. 《敎育からみた中國女性史資の硏究:「女四書」と「新婦譜」三 部書》(A View of Education from a Study of Documents on the History of Chinese Women: from “Four Books for Women” to “Instructions for New Brides”, Three Books). Meiji Shoin. Zhang, T. 張廷玉. (1739). Mingshi 《明史》(History of Ming) (Vols. 1, 2, 3 & 113). https:// ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&res=410835&remap=gb. Accessed June 16, 2022. Zhu, X. (1986). Zhuzi yulei 《朱子語類》. Zhonghua Shuju.I accidentally deleted this entry for Zhu, X. (1986). Zhuzi yulei 《朱子語類》 (Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi). Zhonghua Shuju.

Chapter 17

Yunjidang by Mun-seong Ok (玉文星), 2017 Photo Courtesy of History Museum of Wonju, Republic of Korea This composite portrait is based on facial characteristics of modern descendants of the Pungcheon Im family.

Im Yunjidang of Korea 任允摯堂 1721–1793 Philip J. Ivanhoe and Hwa Yeong Wang

Abstract Im is known for arguing, on the basis of core neo-Confucian beliefs concerning a shared human nature, that women are equally capable of mastering the Confucian classics, cultivating themselves, and thereby becoming “female sages.” Throughout her varied writings, she defends this idea, offering highly

P.J. Ivanhoe (*)  Ivanhoe Professor, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] H.Y. Wang  Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Duke Kunshan University, Kunshan, Jiangsu, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_17

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original, powerful interpretations of a range of philosophical issues and historical cases that bring out neglected aspects of Confucian moral life. In most of her writings, she makes clear that the Confucian moral ideal requires not only acting in certain ways but also with a particular sensitivity and style. Her insights deepen our understanding of the Confucian tradition but also contribute in original and important ways to contemporary moral philosophy.

17.1 Biography and  Writings1 Im Yunjidang’s2 ancestral home was Pungcheon 豊川. She is known by her pen name (ho; C. hao 號), Yunjidang 允摯堂, which was given to her by her brother, the famous Confucian scholar Nokmun 鹿門 Im Seongju 任聖周 (1711–88 CE). The general meaning of her pen name is “devoted, sincere, and responsible” and its core sense is taken from a line written by Ju Hui (C. Zhu Xi 朱熹, 1130–1200 CE): “completely devoted to Tae Sa (C. Tai Si) 太姒 and Tae Im (C. Tai Ren) 太 任.”3 She was born in the city of Wonju 原州 in Gangwon Province 江原道. She was the daughter of Noeun 老隱 Im Jeok 任適 (1685–1728 CE), who served as an Assistant Prefect (Pan-gwan 判官) in the city of Hamheung 咸興; her mother was the daughter of Mr. Yun Bu 尹扶, whose family’s ancestral home was Papyeong 坡平 and who attained the rank of Section Chief (jeongnang正郞) in the Ministry of Taxation (Hojo 戶曹). In all, she had five brothers: Im Myeongju 任命周 (1705–57 CE), courtesy name Baeksin 伯新; Nokmun Im Seongju, mentioned above; Im Gyeongju 任敬周 (1718–45 CE), courtesy name Jikjung 直中, pen name Cheongcheonja 青川子; Im Byeongju 任秉周 (1724–56 CE), courtesy name

1 The authors thank Ms. Melanie Dorson for very helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this entry and Mr. Seo Jae Hyun for reading through a number of the translations with us and offering valuable criticisms and suggestions. Thanks also to Mr. Sim Juhyun and Ms. Nikolett Koroesi who read, commented on, and discussed parts of the work in a graduate student seminar focused on the writings of Im and Gang that was held in the Spring semester of 2020 at Sungkyunkwan University. Our special thanks to Professors Youngmin Kim and Robin R. Wang for insightful comments and suggestions on the entire entry. This work was supported by English Translation of 100 Korean Classics program through the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and Korean Studies Promotion Service of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2019-KCL-1230002). 2  A complete translation and study of the life and philosophy of Im Yunjidang can be found in Ivanhoe and Wang (2023, Oxford University Press). For short introductions to the life and thought of Yunjidang, which offer alternative interpretations of their sense and significance, see Hyeon Gim (2004), Kim (2011), and Kim (2014, 2017). 3 Tae Sa was the exemplary wife of King Mun (C. Wen) 文. Tae Im was the wife of Gye Ryeok (C. Ji li) 季歷 and mother of King Mun of Ju (C. Zhou) 周. See personal missive #25 on Gang Jeongildang 姜靜一堂 1772–1832) in this volume.

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Sukmun 叔文4; Im Jeongju 任靖周 (1727–96 CE), courtesy name Chigong 穉恭, pen name Unho 雲湖, and an older sister, who we know only as a wife of Won Gyeongyeo 元景輿 (n.d.). In 1725, her father, at the age of 41, was appointed Assistant Prefect of Hamheung and moved his entire family to this city, located in what is now North Korea. However, he was accused of misconduct5 in the requisition and management of slaves within his bureau, which led to him being impeached. Although the king dismissed the impeachment proceedings against him, Im abandoned his post in 1727 and returned to Seoul. He planned to try his hand at farming but died during an epidemic the following year. In 1729, when Yunjidang was nine years old, her family moved to a mountain village called Okhwadae 玉華臺 in Cheongju 淸 州, in accordance with her father’s will. Her intellectual talents were recognized early on by her second brother, Im Seongju, a highly respected scholar and the most distinguished intellectual among her siblings, who, as a result, taught her the Classic of Filial Piety,6 the Biographies of Eminent Women,7 the Elementary Learning,8 and the Four Books9 as well as other works of philosophy and history.

4 Byeongju was adopted out to his younger uncle, Im Hyeong 任逈 (1698–1742 CE), the fourth son of his grandfather. Im Seongju wrote an epitaph for him. See Nokmun jip (Collected works of Nokmun 鹿門集) 24.6a-7b. 5 Her father’s accusation may well have been a result of the factional politics of the time. Im Yunjidang’s father belonged to the Old Doctrine (Noron 老論) faction, which, along with the Young Doctrine (Soron 少論) faction represented a schism among the earlier Westerners (Seoin 西人), a faction that dominated Korea in the seventeenth century. Largely as a result of a rift between Song Siyeol 宋時烈 (1607–89 CE) (see footnote 13), one of the most powerful and influential Westerners, and his student Yun Jeung 尹拯 (1629–1714 CE), the Westerners divided into the Young Doctrine faction, which opposed Song Siyeol, and the Old Doctrine faction, which supported him. In 1727, the Young Doctrine faction wrested power from the Old Doctrine. The accusation against Yunjidang’s father occurred in the same year as this power change. Details of this event can be found in the Daily Record of the Grand Secretariat (Seungjeongwon ilgi 承政院日記) and the Veritable Records of Joseon Dynasty (Joseon Wangjo Sillok 朝鮮王朝 實錄). Cf. Gim (2019, 58–9). 6 The Classic of Filial Piety (Hyogyeong; C. Xiaojing 孝經) is a text espousing the virtue of filial piety that is cast as a conversation between Confucius and his disciple, Master Jeung (Jeungja; C. Zengzi 曾子). It may date from the fourth century BCE though is more likely a product of the early Han dynasty. For a translation, see Makra (1961). 7 The Biographies of Eminent Women (Yeollyeojeon; C. Lienüzhuan 列女傳) is a work by the Han dynasty scholar Yu Hyang (C. Liu Xiang) 劉向 (77–6 BCE) that contains 125 biographical accounts of exemplary women taken from early Chinese histories. For a translation, see Kinney (2014). 8 The Elementary Learning (Sohak; C. Xiaoxue 小學) was compiled in 1187 by Yu Jajing (C. Liu Zicheng) 劉子澄, a disciple of Ju Hui, at his master's command. It outlines the process of moving from the cultivation of the self to bringing peace to all-under-Heaven described in the Great Learning (Daehak; C. Daxue 大學). It was adopted as a centerpiece of official scholarship by the Joseon dynasty. 9 The Four Books (Saseo; C. Sishu 四書) are a collection of classic texts that Ju Hui promoted as the basic curriculum of Confucianism and adopted in the Ming and Qing dynasties as the basis for the civil service examination. They are the Great Learning, Doctrine of the Mean (Jungyong; C. Zhongyong 中庸), Analects (Noneo; C. Lunyü 論語), and Mencius (Maengja; C. Mengzi 孟子).

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She discussed such works often with her brothers, and regularly received their recognition and praise for her careful and rigorous readings and trenchant insights. In 1737, her family moved to Yeoju 驪州, a city in Gyeonggi Province 京畿道, in which the ancestral mountain [seonsan 先山] of her father’s lineage is located. In 1739, when she was nineteen, she married Sin Gwang’yu 申光裕 (1722–47 CE) of Wonju; his ancestral home was Pyeongsan 平山. They had a daughter together, but she died in early childhood in 1747. In the same year, when Yunjidang was twenty-seven years old, she also lost her husband, after only eight years of marriage. After being widowed, she remained with her in-laws and won renown for the exemplary way she served her two mothers-in-law (her husband’s biological mother and foster mother). She lived in this home into old age, along with two of her husband’s younger brothers, who esteemed her and treated her as if she were their mother. Her younger brother-in-law, Sin Gwang’u 申光祐 (1726–98 CE), was a highly successful official in Office of the Censor General (Saganwon司諫院). When she was more than forty years old, in order to insure that a male descendent would continue her husband’s family sacrifices, Yunjidang adopted his son, Sin Jaejun申 在竣 (1760–87 CE). In 1757, her eldest brother, Im Myeongju passed away; she composed a eulogy in Classical Chinese for him that greatly impressed all who read it. In April of 1759, she completed colophons on two extant works—one on the Book of Poetry (Sigyeong; C. Shijing 詩經) and another on the Songs of Chu (Cho Sa; C. Chu Ci 楚辭)—that had been left behind by her husband. In the spring of 1782, when she was sixty-two years old, her brother Im Seongju moved the family to Mountain Lake (Sanho 山湖) in Wonju. There is good evidence that in 1785, at the age of 65, she organized her various writings into the form they later would take in her posthumously published collection and gave a copy of this manuscript to her son. Unfortunately, Sin Jaejun died unexpectedly in 1787 at the age of twenty-eight, six years earlier than Yunjidang. In 1788, the death of her second brother, Im Seongju, who had served as her mentor and close friend, caused her great sorrow and pain. Only her fifth brother, Im Jeongju, outlived her and it fell to him to write a remembrance of his sister that appears in the Extant Writings of Im Yunjidang.10 She died in 1793, at the age of seventy-three, on the 14th day of May, in the family home in Wonju. Her grave is in Flourishing Fungus Valley (Mujigok 茂芝谷) Village in the Jeongjian 正之安 District of Wonju.11 Three years after her death, her younger brother Im Jeongju and brother-in-law Sin Gwang’u arranged for the publication of Yunjidang’s literary works. While in many respects Im Yunjidang led the regular life of a Joseon dynasty (1392–1910 CE) gentry (yangban 兩班) woman, the early passing of her husband

10 See the Postscript (bal; C. ba 跋) by Im Jeongju in the Extant Writings of Im Yunjidang (Yunjidang yugo 允摯堂遺稿) Appendix (burok; C. fulu 附錄), 7b-8a. 11 The current name of the place of her tomb is Mujang 茂長 Village, in the Hojeo 好楮 District of Wonju.

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and children—both natural and adopted—along with her close relationship to her brothers afforded her considerably more freedom, leisure, and opportunities than many. This should not be taken as implying that pursuing these opportunities and in particular her passion for learning was easy; the society of her times offered implacable resistance to any woman who sought to further her education, and a number of sources testify to how she worked diligently to fulfill her familial duties by day while assiduously pursuing her studies by night. Long before the notion came into prominence among modern Western Feminists, she was shouldering a version of the double-duty or the second-shift.12 As her younger brotherin-law wrote, “Sometimes, when I saw the flickering light of her lamp through my window I knew that the scholar was secretly engaged in the purposeful activity (gongbu; C. gongfu 功夫) of inquiry and study.”13 As noted above, early in her life, under the direction of her brother Im Seongju, she learned the Confucian classics, along with history and neo-Confucian philosophy. She was good at poetry and her extant works include a number of poems, scholarly expositions, and discourses, as well as other genres of writing, in total, amounting to thirty-five separate titles. As noted above, these were published posthumously under the title The Extant Writings of Yunjidang. She was one of only a few women to be published during the Joseon dynasty, along with Gang Jeongildang, and other remarkable women such as Seo Yeongsuhap 徐令壽閤 (1753–1823 CE)14 and Yi Bingheogak 李憑虛閣 (1759–1824 CE).15

17.2 Philosophical Views This brief introduction to Im Yunjidang’s philosophical views relies upon the selected translations that follow: two biographies (jeon; C. chuan 傳), two discourses (non; C. lun 論), two expositions (seol; C. shuo 説), and one inscription

12 The

double burden, double shift, or double duty most often refers to the workload of people who both earn money, but who are also responsible for significant amounts of unpaid domestic labor. For this idea see Hochschild (1989). In Im’s case, it refers to her work at learning and self-cultivation while shouldering extensive responsibilities and work in the domestic realm. In the case of Gang Jeongildang, these senses are combined; she supported her family through her needlework, fulfilled the formidable duties of a married woman, and pursued her education, largely on her own initiative. See Chap. 18 Gang Jeongildang in this volume. 13 See the postscript by Sin Gwang’u in the Extant Writings of Im Yunjidang, Appendix, 6b. 14 Seo Yeongsuhap was a mathematician and a poet. Hundreds of her poems are preserved in an anthology, included as an appendix to her husband’s memoir. 15  Yi Bingheogak, a gentry woman, wrote An Encyclopedia for the Inner Quarters (Gyuhap chongseo 閨閤叢書), which is both a compendium of homemaking tasks in general and in particular, an important cookbook of the period. It includes detailed descriptions of essential items for late Joseon dynasty homemakers and is priceless resource for research into food culture going back more than 200 years.

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(myeong; C. ming 銘). These offer only a small sample of the content and genres that can be found in her complete oeuvre but go some way toward representing her thought and style. Both biographies presented below concern the lives, character, and moral achievements of women, which immediately bring into focus two of the most distinctive features of Yunjidang’s philosophy: her concern with the ethical and spiritual status of women and her role as a woman philosopher. The first biography focuses on the life of Lady Han, a contemporary with whom Yunjidang clearly identified and sympathized. They shared a deep intellectual connection in that Lady Han’s husband, Song Neungsang 宋能相 (1709–58 CE), was a direct descendent and follower of Song Siyeol,16 who led the lineage of learning that Yunjidang and her brothers claimed as their own. Yunjidang describes a revealing, insightful, and philosophically interesting event in Lady Han’s life by “reporting” a conversation between Lady Han and her husband that purportedly took place after an informal gathering at their home. During their visit, her husband’s cousins had expressed great admiration for Yulgok’s17 virtue, fame, and high status and their aspiration to emulate his achievements. After they left, Lady Han asked her husband what he thought of their remarks and he immediately and enthusiastically endorsed them. When she smiled, he asked the reason why and she explained that what made Yulgok great was his moral virtue. Had his cousins focused on this it would have shown that they understood and sincerely admired virtue. Instead, they talked about his great fame and high status as well as his virtue and this showed they were not primarily interested in nor did they most highly value morality. Her husband accepted her analysis and admonition and thereafter, we are told, he made even greater efforts to improve himself. In this part of our first biography, we see a marvelous example of a Joseon dynasty wife serving as moral teacher and guide for her husband; a theme found throughout the writings of Yunjidang and even more prevalent in the works of Gang Jeongildang. The biography goes on to describe the challenges Lady Han faced in developing her own impressive intellectual talents in the face of the inhospitable, patriarchal atmosphere of Joseon society and how she succeeded in doing so while also patiently, masterfully, and cheerfully fulfilling her many roles as a married woman in a large and influential family. Yunjidang brings the biography to a close by embellishing it with a poem of praise in honor of Lady Han, thereby demonstrating her own remarkable skill as a poet.

16 Song Siyeol 宋時烈 (1607–89 CE), also known by his penname Uam 尤庵 was a prominent Joseon stateman, scholar, and philosopher. He played a central role in what is known as the Rites Controversy (Yesong 禮訟), which concerned the proper period of time the Queen Consort had to wear mourning attire after the death of her stepson King Hyojong 孝宗 (r. 1649–59 CE). Song was executed by the royal court for writing an inflammatory letter to the King Sukjong 肅宗 (r. 1674–1720 CE). 17 Yulgok 栗谷 is the pen name of Yi I 李珥 (1536–84 CE), one of the two most prominent Confucian scholars of the Joseon dynasty, the other being his older contemporary Yi Hwang 李 滉 (1501–70 CE), whose pen name was Toegye 退溪.

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The second biography is not of someone familiar or contemporary but concerns two women whose exploits were often discussed in Yunjidang’s time: [mother] Choe 崔 and [daughter] Hong 洪, the wife and daughter respectively of a soldier who had been killed. The central theme is how these two women fulfilled their respective obligations of chastity and filial piety by plotting and carrying out revenge against the man who murdered their husband and father. As is true in the other biography she wrote, discussed above, Yunjidang employs the literary device of having these women speak for themselves; they describe their intentions and motivations in their own voices (Gim 2019, 96). They appear in their own biography as full moral agents who assess, judge, sentence, and punish a man they regard as having murdered their husband and father. Moreover, they further demonstrate their exceptional moral character by turning themselves in after completing their revenge and are pardoned on the basis of their remarkable virtue, sincerity, and honesty. Yunjidang makes a point of saying that their achievement was something “most men would prove incapable of doing.” The first discourse included here shows clearly how Yunjidang’s position as a woman in late Joseon dynasty Korea led her to explore and reveal new and interesting aspects of Confucian philosophy. In her “Discourse On Misaeng Go (C. Weisheng Gao) Begging Vinegar,” (Non Misaeng Go geolhae 論微生高乞醢) she takes up a passage from the Analects18 that is not often the focus of sustained philosophical analysis and shows that in fact it is a rich resource for explicating the ways in which people can come to compromise their character in the day to day activities of everyday life—the realm where she spent almost all of her time.19 Borrowing or “begging” vinegar is not something an average male philosopher did in Gongja’s (C. Kongzi) 孔子 time or in Joseon dynasty Korea, nor is it something most male philosophers do in contemporary America or Korea. The philosophical focus of Yunjidang’s attention is how Misaeng Go compromised moral principle in an effort to curry favor with another: begging vinegar from his neighbor with the sole aim of giving it to another person in order to bolster his own status and reputation. She relates this to core orthodox Confucian themes such as the need to be watchful over oneself—to avoid such compromises of character—and the need to be flexible in one’s deliberations—to “weigh” (gwon; C. quan 權) alternatives in order to know when it might be appropriate to suspend, bend, or emend norms and policies in order to realize more important moral aims. At one point, a questioner

18 Analects

5.24. passage from the Analects is commented upon in interesting ways by a wide range of Confucians, including Ju Hui in China and disciples of Song Siyeol in Korea who touch on some of the same points, though none treats the passage with the care and comprehensiveness of Yunjidang. Cf. Classified Sayings of Master Ju (Juja eoryu; C. Zhuzi yulei 朱子語類) 29.29a– 32a and Gwon Shangha’s 權尙夏 (1641–1721 CE) “Response to Min Seong’yu” (Dap Min Seong’yu 答閔聖猷) in The Collected Works of Hansujae (Hansujae jip 寒水齋集) 7.32b–33a. Thanks to Hanna Kim for pointing out and discussing some of these earlier precedents. 19 This

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presses her by asking, “if someone’s father or brother20 is ill and they come and report their distress and beg for medicine that one lacks but one’s neighbor has, then should one still not ask one’s neighbor to give them the medicine out of concern that it would harm one’s uprightness?” Many contemporary philosophers and psychologists will immediately think of Kohlberg’s (1973) famous hypothetical case about whether a man named Heinz should steal an expensive drug that he cannot afford to buy in order to treat his desperately ill wife and the different styles of moral reasoning he describes—contrasting the approaches of “Jake” and “Amy,” who are taken to represent male and female “types” of moral reasoning respectively. Of course, for many, this recollection will also bring to mind the trenchant criticism of his analysis advanced by Carol Gilligan (2016) and the contribution this has made to the development of care ethics, which at least began as a distinctively feminine approach to morality (Noddings, 2003). The second discourse offers an excellent example of how Yunjidang often objects as much to the style of someone’s behavior as to the particular action that they take. In her “Discourse on On Gyo21 Tearing the Hem of His Garment” (Non On Gyo jeolgeo 論溫嶠絶裾), she discusses the well-known case of On Gyo, who is renowned for the loyalty and dedication he showed to his ruler. When appointed to undertake a dangerous mission as the king’s envoy to a distant and hostile state, On Gyo did not hesitate. When his aged mother beseeched him to stay, he did not falter or delay but tore the hem of his garment, which she had grabbed on to hoping to make him stay, in his haste to depart. Yunjidang questions his behavior and character, which shows her tremendous intellectual independence and courage. She argues that On Gyo actually behaved rather badly. First, she asks whether the mission really was as pressing and critical as he claimed. Next, she questions if it was really the case that he alone was capable of undertaking this duty. If there were others whose family situation was not as precarious as his and whose mother did not need her son to stay with her, why could they not go instead? Finally, Yunjidang asks if the mission really was so critical to the wellbeing of the ruler and state and her son really was the only man or the best qualified to undertake this responsibility, why On Gyo did not take the time to explain all of this to his mother but instead brusquely tore himself from her arms without deigning to address her concerns. Had he really needed to go and taken the time to explain the situation to his mother, Yunjidang contends, she would likely have seen the need and urged her son to do himself, his family, and his state proud. Reading this case and the questions Yunjidang raises, one cannot but recall Sartre’s (1991) famous hypothetical scenario of a young man torn between staying to help his aged mother or leaving to fight with the Free French Forces opposing the Nazis during World War II. Yunjidang describes this kind of conflict of duties with much greater nuance and subtlety than Sartre demonstrated, showing that often there is a

20 The

translation follows the original text, though the implied reference is broader: “parents and siblings.” 21 On Gyo (C. Wen Jiao) 溫嶠 (288–329 CE). See footnote #44.

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great deal of hidden complexity in such basic “existential” choices. Moreover, her analysis shows that one can approach such conflicts in ways that, while not avoiding hard choices, recognize and honor all the moral demands involved. Her analysis is nothing short of brilliant, but it is again clear that her concerns and approach are things that women and particularly mothers would be more likely to think of, focus upon, explore, and highlight and thus things that fall outside the standard ambit not only of Confucian but also often modern philosophical discourse. Her writings open up and develop new and profound dimensions of familiar cases and problems in orthodox Confucian philosophy, and they do this in part because she comes to these cases and problems as a woman, living in a particular cultural and historical perspective. The first of the two expositions included here explores the meaning and significance of four key terms of art, consisting of two sets of paired concepts, that were central to neo-Confucian moral philosophy: the Heart-mind of the Way (dosim; C. daoxin 道心) and Human Heart-mind (insim; C. renxin 人心) and the Four Sprouts and Seven Emotions (sadan chiljeong; C. siduan qiqing 四端七情). Both sets present modes, forms, or aspects of underlying unities that connect a pure and original moral realm with the morally mixed and more ambiguous everyday world. Yunjidang presents the exposition as a dialogue between herself and an unnamed interlocutor and interweaves her explanations with numerous quotes from the classics. The Heart-mind of the Way is the reservoir of Heavenly pattern-principle (i; C. li 理) within each human being that serves as a pure and perfect source of moral norms. This mode of the heart-mind lacks corporeal existence and comes into the world by being embedded in gi-material (C. qi) 氣.22 In this latter form, the Human Heart-mind is the phenomenal seat of human thought, feeling, and volition, but because it is embedded in the realm of gi, it inevitably is, to varying degrees, obscured and prone to error. Such obscuration, in part, is simply a function of being located in a particular physical form; this establishes a personal perspective, which inclines the heart-mind to be biased. Moreover, the gi-material which serves as host for the originally pure heart-mind is naturally mixed in quality and displays different degrees of balance, which makes it hard for the heartmind to perceive its true nature and proper relationship to the rest of the world. Instead of recognizing, being moved by, and acting for the sake of the grand underlying unity that is the Heavenly pattern-principle of its original nature, it tends to act on and for itself, which only deepens its alienation and sense of separation from the whole. This tendency toward self-centeredness, reinforced by the feelings, thoughts, and actions that such a self regularly undertakes, presents the central moral challenge that moral self-cultivation aims to overcome. 22 Gi-material

is commonly translated “psycho-physical matter,” “vital energy,” “vital matter”; in neo-Confucian philosophy, it is one of fundamental constituents of the phenomenal world. We leave it Romanized in its Korean pronunciation since there really is no adequate English translation. We provide the Chinese Romanization of chi to be consistent with other entries in this volume. The Pinyin Romanization for this character is qi.

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This general tension between a pure and perfect original moral state and a mixed, more ambiguous self that is inclined to pursue its own self-centered desires against the underlying harmonious unity of the world and at the expense of the common good, is replayed in the contrast between the Four Sprouts and Seven Emotions. The Four Sprouts find their locus classics in the Mencius, where they describe the nascent, immature expressions of reactive attitudes that underlie and incline us to develop the four core Confucian virtues of humaneness (in; C. ren 仁), righteousness (ui; C. yi 義), rites (ye; C. li 禮), and wisdom (ji; C. zhi 智). Among orthodox neo-Confucians such as Yunjidang, the Four Sprouts were conceived not so much as sprouts but as clues or indications of and pointers toward the original and underlying purity of Heavenly pattern-principle. The Seven Emotions, enumerated in a number of contemporary texts, describe the everyday human repertoire of affective responses, and one of Yunjidang’s central tasks in this exposition is explaining the relationship between the Four Sprouts and Seven Emotions. This was a perennial challenge and served as the focus of one of the most intense, long-running, and sophisticated debates within Korean Confucianism: The Four-Seven Debate.23 At the core of this debate was a set of related questions concerning how a pure and perfect moral realm can provide normative grounds and motivation for people living and acting in the world we know and share, how this underlying moral nature or heart-mind can be reconciled with and find expression in the everyday needs, feelings, and desires of human beings, how we can cultivate ourselves to fully instantiate this original, authentic nature, and how doing so properly locates and orients us to the people, creatures, and things around us. The second exposition takes as its theme a famous line found in the opening section of Book Twelve of the Analects. In response to a question about the nature of humaneness put to him by An Yeon (C. Yan Yuan) 顔淵, his most talented and advanced student, Gongja (C. Kongzi) 孔子 replied, “Overcoming the self and returning to the rites is humaneness”(Analects 12.1). In one important sense, the challenge of how to interpret this line, which has a remarkable and varied history in the commentarial tradition, is connected with the set of issues discussed in regard to the previous exposition. For in saying we must overcome or conquer the self in order to attain the highest and primary virtue of humaneness, Gongja’s teaching appears to be calling on us, at least to some extent, to reject and turn away from the adulterated everyday world—the realm of the Human Heart-mind and the Seven Emotions—and retreat into a pure, more ascetic form of life—described by the Heart-mind of the Way and the Four Sprouts. In general terms, it poses the problem of how to relate neo-Confucian ideas about a pure and perfect original nature with a description of what it is like to be a human being pursuing the kinds of quotidian life that most find appealing. As in the previous exposition, Yunjidang

23 For

more on the Four-Seven Debate, see footnote #72 below.

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presents her explanation in the form of a dialogue between herself and an anonymous interlocutor and regularly invokes ideas and examples from the classics. She crafts her explanation by returning to and drawing upon other parts of the Analects that discuss An Yeon’s character and his efforts at moral self-cultivation and augmenting these with ideas, references, and examples from other classics as well. In particular, she focuses on An Yeon’s unwavering commitment to learn and practice the Way in an ongoing effort to purge himself of self-centered desires and return to his original nature, which is humaneness. In doing so, she connects the interpretation of this line with An Yeon’s well-known love of learning, a theme that was philosophically and personally salient and poignant for her. This, in turn, provided her with an opportunity to explore, in response to a “question” posed by her imaginary interlocutor, the issue of whether everyone is capable of successfully cultivating the self and attaining the ideal of sagehood. Yunjidang begins by noting that while An Yeon was fortunate in having been born with a particularly refined and balanced physical nature, he manifested remarkable perseverance and persistence in his quest for moral self-improvement. Tragically, he died young and, as many others have claimed, this was the only thing that held him back from becoming a sage; one of greatest lessons to learn from his example is the need to work incessantly and assiduously without regard to hardships or impediments to achieve the goal of becoming a sage. Like other great moral exemplars of the past, An Yeon serves as an effective and poignant reminder that we all share the same pure nature and are capable of achieving moral perfection. In the conclusion of her exposition, she brings these related points together and to bear on her own case and through her own case the case of all women: “Though I am a woman, still, the nature I originally received contained no distinction between male and female. Though I have not been able to learn what An Yeon learned, I earnestly share his commitment to becoming a sage.” Our final translation is a brief inscription that Yunjidang wrote on the theme of a short sword. Among her extant works are three inscriptions. In each, she takes as her theme some physical object: a mirror, a short sword, and a ruler and scale, which she then describes as embodying and symbolizing some moral virtue, attribute, or activity. In the inscription presented here, she explains how she and we all must wield a keen-edged spiritual sword to cut down the obstacles that stand in the way of making moral progress. She makes clear that self-centered desires pose the most pervasive and persistent impediments to spiritual progress and urges us to eradicate them whenever and wherever they arise by launching a relentless, uncompromising, decisive, and thoroughgoing assault upon them. We must emulate earlier moral paragons, such as An Yeon, who wielded their spiritual swords with unwavering moral courage, cleared-away every trace of self-centeredness, and established, through an awesome and vigilant campaign of moral improvement, a character that dissuaded any contrary inclination from ever daring to show itself. She concludes the inscription with a lovely piece of poetry extolling the virtues, efficacy, and results of the spiritual weapon she wields.

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17.3 Translations from  The Extant Writings of Im Yunjidang 17.3.1 Biographies This section contains two biographies written by Im Yunjidang; both concern women who distinguished themselves as morally outstanding. 17.3.1.1 Biography of the Wife of Mr. Song (Neungsang) The first biography is about Lady Han, whose husband was in the scholarly lineage of Song Siyeol, one of the most distinguished philosophers of the late Joseon Dynasty; Yunjidang and her brothers regarded him as their intellectual progenitor. Yunjidang makes clear that Lady Han scrupulously fulfilled her familial duties but also developed her intellectual abilities, overcoming the formidable challenges impeding such an education in her time. The biography contains a memorable account of Lady Han gently but decisively instructing her husband about the true aim of learning—moral self-cultivation—and warning him to avoid being tempted to pursue fame and high social status. Biography of the Wife of Mr. Song (Neungsang)24 The daughter of Han Gyejin 韓啟震,25 who was Fourth Inspector (Jipyeong 持 平) [in the Office of the Inspector-General (Saheonbu 司憲府)],26 married Mr. Song (Neungsang). She lost her mother when she was young and showed absolute sincerity in her grief and suffering. When she married [and was preparing to leave for her new home], she happened to be looking through some of her cases and trunks, and came upon a piece of calligraphy written by her mother; she was immediately overcome with sorrow and cried until the tears soaked the clothes she was wearing.

24 Song Neungsang 宋能相 (1709–58 CE) was a late Joseon dynasty philosopher and a direct descendent of Song Siyeol. His ancestral home was Eunjin 恩津; his given name (ja; C. zi 字) was Saryong 士龍, and his pen names were Unpyeong 雲坪 and Donghaeja 東海子. Song Neungsang knew and exchanged views with Yunjidang’s brother Im Seongju 任聖周; both were members of the Old Doctrine faction. 25  Han Gyejin (1689 CE–?). His ancestral home was Cheongju 清州; his given name was Gyemyeong 季明. He was a younger brother of Han Wonjin 韓元震 (1682–1751 CE), pen name Namdang 南塘, and studied under Gwon Sangha 權尙夏 (1641–1721 CE), pen name Suam 遂 菴 and Hansujae 寒水齋, who is known as the foremost disciple of Song Siyeol. Han attained the rank of Third Minister (chamui 參議) in the Ministry of Taxation. Han Gyejin was also a friend of Im Seongju. 26 In translating traditional Korean institutional titles, we follow the Korean History Thesaurus and the Glossary of Korean Studies maintained by the National Institute of Korean History and the Academy of Korean Studies respectively. When a variety of translations are given, we follow the one used in the English version of the Veritable Records of Joseon Dynasty.

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Once, when her husband’s cousins were describing their highest aspiration to him, they said, “We admire Yulgok’s moral virtue as well as his great fame and high status.” Her husband agreed with what they said, but once all of them had left Han asked her husband, “What did you think of what your cousins said?” Her husband replied, “It was good.” Han quietly smiled and her husband asked, “Why are you smiling?” She replied, “I think about it in the following way. Moral virtue is what made Yulgok the man he was. Had he been poor and lowly and lived in a mean and narrow lane27 deep in the mountains, would that have diminished his virtue in any way? Though he enjoyed great fame and high status what did this add to his virtue? Now, had your cousins only talked about his moral virtue then they would sincerely admire virtue. But they talked about his great fame and high status together with his virtue; this is not to admire virtue. The true state of their heart-minds is that they admire high status. You think this good, but isn’t this impermissible?” After listening to her comments, her husband deferred to her view. Subsequently, he committed himself to his own moral cultivation with the aim of becoming a true Confucian. Han served her parents-in-law, and completely fulfilled the duties of being a good wife. Her mother-in-law often would personally reel silk from cocoons; her sons’ wives asked her to let them do this for her, but she declined. Thereupon, the wives left; each returning to her own room; only Han did not presume to do so, but instead kept the fire going and continued to serve her mother-in-law; agile and alert, reverential and respectful, she was never remiss or negligent. She covered up the difficulty of her labors and wanted to help her mother-in-law with the cooking in order to make things easier. Han not only understood and carried out her duties, she also had great literary talent. Her father believed in the popular practices and ideas of his day and so did not provide her with a formal education. Nevertheless, she often devoted herself to the study of the classics and histories and so was able to comprehend their main points. Unfortunately, her life was destined to be short and she died. Is this not lamentable!

The Encomium says: [Lady] Han was the wife of Mr. Song; She was a woman of great virtue and achievement. She was filial to her parents; And greatly advanced in understanding. She led her husband to follow the Way; And encouraged him in his studies. The ancients called such a woman a ‘heroic wife;’28

27 Gongja’s

favorites disciple An Yeon was admired for his ability to live under such conditions as well. See Analects 6.11 and Mencius 4B29. 28 A heroic wife is literally a “female knight or scholar” (yeosa 女士). See the Book of Poetry, Mao #247. In the corpus of Korean neo-Confucian funeral orations and tomb inscriptions (myojimyeong 墓誌銘), yeosa often was used to praise a woman’s intelligence and virtuous deeds, describing them as comparable to what the best male Confucian scholars (sa 士) might achieve. Jeong Hyun (C. Zheng Xuan) 鄭玄 and Gong Yeongdal (C. Kong Yingda) 孔穎達, in their commentaries on this passage, explain a yeosa as a woman with scholarly deeds (士行), who therefore is able to produce a worthy and wise (賢智) son.

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364 Does this not refer to her?

She was not granted a full span of life; But I never saw her stop short.29 Why is one given life? Why is it taken away? It is difficult to have faith in30 pattern-principle.

17.3.1.2 The Biography of Two Women: Choe and Hong The second biography is about two women whose exploits were often discussed during Yunjidang’s time.31 The central theme is how this mother and daughter fulfilled their respective obligations of chastity and filial piety by plotting and carrying out revenge against the man who murdered their husband and father. They further demonstrated their exceptional moral character by turning themselves in after completing their revenge but were pardoned on the basis of their moral excellence. Yunjidang makes a point of saying that their achievement was something “most men would prove incapable of doing.” The Biography of Two Women: Choe and Hong [Mother] Choe 崔 and [daughter] Hong 洪 refer to the wife and daughter of a soldier named Hong 洪 from the Samga District (Samga-hyeon 三嘉縣 in Gyeongsang Province 慶尙道). This soldier was killed and these two women wanted to take revenge against the man responsible for killing him. They said to one another, “The only way in which human beings differ from birds and beasts is in having the virtues of chastity and filial piety. That a wife takes revenge for [the killing of] her husband is [part of] chastity. That a child takes revenge for [the killing of] her father is [part of] filial piety. Now, unfortunately, my husband and your father suffered harm at the hands of another. If we do not take revenge simply because we covet our own lives, then how could we bear to face him in the world below? Moreover, [if we fail to act] how can we take our stand in this world?”

29 Cf.

Analects 9.21, “The Master said of Anja (C. Yanzi) 顔子, ‘Alas! I saw his constant progress; I never saw him stop short.’” Like Lady Han, Anja, who is also known as An Yeon, died young; he was the favorite disciple of Gongja. 30 Cf. the “Common Possession of Pure Virtue” (Ham yu il deok; C. Xian you yi de 咸有一德), section of the Book of History (Sangseo C. Shangshu 尚書), which says in part, “Oh! It is difficult to have faith in Heaven; its mandate is not constant!” (嗚呼! 天難諶, 命靡常). 31 Gim (2019, 95–6) points out that the story of Choe and Hong was well known and discussed in several other Korean works and speculates that Yunjidang may have heard of it from her brothers. Gim further notes that Yunjidang elaborated the tale by including the conversation between the two women in which they decided to take revenge, offering the important insight that by letting the two women speak for themselves, Yunjidang presents them as full moral agents who were perfectly at ease not only to criticize but punish a man they regarded as morally reprehensible.

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From that moment onward, they held their daggers at their sides and kept their eyes on the family [of the man] against whom they sought to take revenge. After several years had passed, they saw an opportunity [to act] and stabbed him to death. They then entered the district [court] and reported what they had done. The Provincial Governor (Taesu 太 守) listened to their account and the royal court decided the case, pardoning them of the crime of murder and exempting their family from corvée labor. Noble people say that what these two women did was resolute, filial, and, moreover, courageous. Most men would prove incapable of doing what they achieved. The Book of Poetry says, “Members of our family accept their fate and never alter their course.”32 Does this not apply to the case of these two women?

17.3.2 Discourses This section contains two discourses written by Im Yunjidang. The discourse 論 is a genre found among the writings of many orthodox neo-Confucians. It usually takes up and discusses some well-known historical figure, often rendering an assessment of the person’s character and actions. Many discourses employ the literary technique of dialogue to advance the author’s analysis, and this is the case with several of Yunjidang’s discourses. 17.3.2.1 Discourse on Misaeng Go Begging Vinegar The first discourse concerns a well-known figure, Misaeng Go,33 mentioned in the Analects, who is criticized by Gongja for begging vinegar from a neighbor. Gongja’s original complaint focuses on Misaeng Go’s aim, which turned out to be not helping the person in need but surreptitiously securing the vinegar in order to curry favor with the one who had come to him for help. Yunjidang extends and develops the analysis of this case, considering several additional aspects and hypothetical variations. In the process, she brings to light a number of important moral concerns that while general in nature and related to the problem of moral signaling are particularly salient for relational theories of morality, such as Confucianism. Discourse on Misaeng Go Begging Vinegar [Yunjidang said] “The pattern-principle underlying the creation and transformation of Heaven and Earth is exceptionally upright.34 Human beings receive this upright pattern-principle at birth and it is without anything crooked or corrupt. Any slight corruption

32 See

the Book of Poetry, Mao #68. theme of this discourse concerns Analects 5.24. 34  Literally, the character translated here as “upright” means “straight” (jik; C. zhi) 直. Cf. Analects 13.18. 33 The

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they might incur results in the destruction of the pattern-principle received at birth. And so, noble people must be watchful [over their endowment of pattern-principle]!35 They are reverent in order to straighten the inner life and righteous in order to square the outer life36—all in order to preserve this upright pattern-principle. “Although the corruption Misaeng Go incurred in begging vinegar from his neighbor in order to curry favor with another is slight, the injury done to [his] uprightness was great.”37 It is fitting that he did not escape the censure of the sage [i.e. Gongja]. As for those who are upright, they have or lack certain things and take or give certain things; in all respects, though, they remain attentive to what is righteous. If they pretend to lack something that they have, if they pretend to have something that they lack, if they should not take something but take it, or if they should not give something but give it—in all such cases they fail to be upright. How could Go be considered upright!” Someone asked, “There are situations that are difficult to handle. Consider, for example, if those close to you have a compelling need of something, rely on you to give it them, and are sincerely reporting their situation. Since they already know I do not have it and still their entreaties grow increasingly strong, what is one to do? From what I infer, Go must have had compelling reasons like this. I doubt whether [giving them what they lack in such circumstances] would injure the genuine and generous Way of the noble person. Isn’t what you say excessive?” [I] replied, “Be that as it may, noble people are absolutely straightforward and trustworthy in preserving their heart-minds and managing affairs and do not allow the slightest compromise. And so, Gongja would not grant the request of An Ro (C. Yan Lu) 顏路 to sell his carriage in order to buy an outer shell for his son’s coffin.38 In general, one goes against a sincere heart-mind and the upright Way when it is not appropriate to give something and one compromises and gives it [anyway]—how could this be so only in the case of An Ro’s self-centered [request]? If one “twists one’s intentions in order to follow along with things”39 one falls into the category of compromise and a lack of uprightness. Though the noble person is genuine and generous, I have never heard of one following such a way.” Someone said, “Be that as it may, if someone’s father or brother is ill and they come and report the hardship they are suffering and beg for medicine that one lacks but one’s neighbor has, then should one still not ask their neighbor to give them the medicine out of concern that it would harm one’s uprightness?” [I] replied, “No, it would not. Human life is a weighty matter, weightier than the repugnance one feels toward begging from one’s neighbor. When there is a weighty matter in play, in response, the repugnance becomes lighter. When Maengja (C. Mengzi 孟子) said one should reach out to save one’s drowning sister-in-law and that this is a matter

35 Cf.

Chapter one of the Doctrine of the Mean, which cautions, “The noble person is watchful over himself when alone.” 36 See section eleven under the hexagram Gon (C. Kun) 坤 in the Book of Changes. 37 This is quote from Jeong I (C. Cheng Yi) 程頤 cited by Ju Hui in his commentary on Analects 5.23. See Ju Hui, Collected Commentaries on the Analects, 5.36a. 38 See Analects 11.8, “When An Yeon died, An Ro begged [for] the carriage of the Master to sell and get an outer shell for his son’s coffin.” 39 This is part of Ju Hui’s commentary on Analects 5.23. See Ju Hui, Collected Commentaries on the Analects 5.36a.

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of weighing the alternatives,40 he offered a good example of this kind of case. On the other hand, vinegar is a trivial thing of no consequence while begging is an action that by nature we are not inclined to do. How can Go alone not feel this way? Nevertheless, Go forced himself to perform an action most do not want to do in order to secure something of no consequence on behalf of another. The heart-mind that motivated his action surely lies in a desire “to poach the merit of others in order to curry favor.”41 This is like stealing something from a person’s home in order to give it to another. What could entail a greater violation of uprightness than this! If you simply consider this one act, you can understand what kind of man he was. And so, this is why the master repudiated him in such a harsh manner. When considering whether to beg something from one’s neighbor, a noble person must decide the matter by weighing what is heavy and light. If one begs [from one’s neighbor] in order to give [to another] and the need involves something substantial—then uprightness is found in doing just this.42 One cannot simply stick to a single, inflexible rule. Nevertheless, to call Go upright, would this not be odd and perverse! On another day, the Master said, ‘Human beings are born to be upright. If they lose their uprightness, they will be lucky to escape with their lives.43 Those like Misaeng Go would indeed be lucky if they escape with their lives—wouldn’t they?

17.3.2.2 Discourse of On Gyo Tearing the Hem of His Garment The second discourse is about On Gyo,44 a minister widely renowned for his loyalty and filial piety. Yunjidang argues he was in fact neither filial nor loyal but rather self-centered and covetous of fame. On Gyo has been praised for being so devoted to his lord that when assigned a dangerous mission he immediately broke free from his mother’s desperate attempt to hold him back, “tearing the hem of his garment.” Yunjidang argues that On Gyo acted on orders from someone who was not at the time his lord, and so he could have declined without violating duty. She also argues that it is implausible to believe that On Gyo was the only person qualified to complete this mission. Furthermore, even granting that the mission was essential to the survival of the state and On Gyo was the only one qualified to complete the task, he still should have explained all of this to his mother and sought her blessing instead of brusquely tearing himself from her arms. Had he done so, she likely would have sent him to do his duty, but had she told him to

40 In

Mencius 4A17, Maengja argues that one clearly should override the general standing prohibition against men and women touching one another in exceptional cases such as one presented to him, in which one’s sister-in-law is at risk of drowning right in front of one. 41 This is part of Ju Hui’s commentary on Analects 5.23. See Ju Hui Collected Commentaries on the Analects, 5.36a. 42 Cf. Analects 13.18 in which Gongja describes a son who conceals his father’s wrongdoing and claims “uprightness is found in doing just this.” 43 Analects 6.19. 44 On Gyo, whose courtesy name was Taejin (C. Taizhen) 太真, known formally as Honorable Chungmu (C. Zhongwu) of Sian (C. Shi’an) (Sian Chungmu gong; C. Shian Zhongwu gong 始安 忠武公), was a renowned general and governor who lived during the Jin dynasty (265–420 CE).

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remain, he should have turned down the assignment, for filial piety is the most basic of human relationships and essential for other virtues, such as loyalty. Discourse of On Gyo Tearing the Hem of His Garment The Analects says, “Master Yu45 said, ‘Filial piety and brotherly respect—are they not the roots of humaneness!’”46 An ancient text also proclaims, “If you seek for loyal ministers, look at the gate of filial sons.”47 There has never been anyone who proved loyal as a minister who was not filial as a son.48 On Gyo of the Jin dynasty originally had a reputation for being earnestly filial throughout his county and village. When the Western Jin dynasty collapsed [317 CE], the world was thrown into chaos and confusion, barbarians gathered like clouds on the horizon, and people like Yu Gon (C. Liu Kun) 劉琨,49 Dan Pilje (C. Duan Pidi) 段匹磾,50 and others swore blood oaths with one another and dispatched representatives and submitted petitions in an attempt to influence the Prince of Nang Ya (C. Lang Ya) 琅琊 [to assume the throne].51 Yu Gon said to Taejin [i.e., On Gyo], ‘I am accomplishing great things in the area north of the Yellow River; you should spread word of this south of the Yellow River and urge him [Sama Ye] [to claim the throne].52 Taejin accepted this mission and made preparations to depart. As he was about to leave, his mother, Madame Choi (C. Cui) 崔, took hold of his lapel, but Taejin pulled away abruptly, tearing the hem of his garment, and departed. His mother’s taking hold of his lapel was the highest expression of a mother’s love for her child. Not considering the moral imperative to save the world in her time, she thought only that he might fall into danger and perish. Her son tore the hem of his garment because he worried that his mother would not let go and he would be unable to successfully complete his work and gain renown in his age. Alas! The relationship between parent and child is the first of the Five Relationships,

45 Yu Yak (C. You Ruo) 有若 was a disciple of Gongja. He was a native of No (C. Lu). His courtesy name was Jayak (C. Ziruo) 子若. 46 Analects 1.2. 47 This line appears in the sixteenth biography Yeoljeon je sibyuk (C. Liezhuan di shiliu) 列傳第 十六 of the History of the Later Han (Hu Han Seo; C. Hou Han Shu) 後漢書, chapter 26 (gwon isib yuk; C. juan ershi liu) 卷二十六. 48 Cf. Analects 1.2. 49 Yu Gon (271–318 CE) was a Jin general who for years fought but ultimately lost Byeong (C. Bing) Province 并州 (what is now modern central and northern Shanxi Province) to the Han Jo (C. Han Zhao) 漢趙 (304–29 CE), a Southern Hyungno (C. Xiongnu) 匈奴 state and adversary of the Jin. 50 Dan Pilje (?-321 CE) was the governor of Yu (C. You) Province 幽州 (what is now modern Beijing, Tianjin, and northern Hebei). 51 When Sama Eop (C. Sima Ye) 司馬鄴 or 司馬業, who became Emperor Min of Jin 晉愍帝 (300–18 CE), the last Western Jin monarch, was captured by the Han Jo former officials like Yu Gon, Dan Pilje and others plotted together to re-establish the Jin dynasty to their own advantage. Dan killed Yu in 318 when he came to believe Yu posed a threat to his own designs on power. The Prince of Nang Ya is Sama Ye (C. Sima Rui) 司馬睿 (276–322 CE; r. 317–22 CE) who became Emperor Won (C. Yuan) of Jin 晉元帝. When the Hyungno (C. Xiongnu) 匈奴 captured Jang An (C. Chang An) 長安 (in 316 CE), the capital of Jin, the Emperor, Sama Ye was forced to abdicate the throne. Sama Ye, had escaped from Jang An to Geon'gang (C. Jiankang) 建康 (present day Nanjing) and declared himself the new Emperor of Jin. 52 In other words, Yu Gon commissioned On Gyo to make his way to Geon’gang to present Sama Ye, the Prince of Nang Ya, with his petition to assume the imperial title, which subsequently he did.

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and mutual love between them is Heavenly pattern-principle. Completing one’s work is the basis for gaining fame and benefit, but the desire for success is self-centered.53 To allow the self-centered [desire] to complete one’s work to harm the greatest affection to be found among the Five Relationships, even someone lacking in humaneness would be unlikely to do such a thing—how much less someone like Taejin, who enjoyed the reputation of being filial? How could he bear to do this? Oh! For those who serve as ministers, on occasions when they must carry out their lord’s commands in circumstances of danger and chaos, it is right that they are not swayed by personal affection. Nevertheless, they should keep in mind their parents’ hardship and suffering, remember that they are in their parents’ thoughts, and should find it difficult whenever they must bow and take leave of them. [Moreover] what Taejin did was not a case of carrying out his lord’s commands; rather, this was the command of Yu Gon. So why didn’t Taejin decline the command on account of his mother and arrange for someone else to carry out [this mission]?” Someone said, “Yu Gon had to send Taejin; isn’t this clearly the case? If he had sent someone else and that person had miscarried the affair, then the revival of the Jin could not be assured. This is also the reason Taejin could not refuse the mission.” Yunjidang replied, “That is not so. There has never been an age with as much overflowing talent as was available in their time. How could there be no one other than Taejin to take up this assignment? Moreover, at the time, Taejin and Emperor Won were not yet established in the relationship of ruler and minister, and so had Taejin declined the command on account of his mother and not gone, what harm would that have done to his loyalty? Oh! When he tore the hem of his garment and left, what did this do to his mother’s heart? The Book of Poetry says, ‘Oh father!—you gave me life; Oh mother!—you nourished me…The kindness I wish to repay is as limitless as the heavens.54 If Taejin was as earnestly filial as was said of him in his time, how could he have endured behaving as he did? This is why I say, when we consider this affair, we know that he was not really sincerely filial; we also know that he was not really loyal to his lord.” Someone said, “Originally Taejin had the reputation of being fervently loyal and magnanimous because when his state had been destroyed and his lord disgraced and he was overcome with sincere sadness and indignation, he worked together with Yu Gon and others of like mind to establish Emperor Won and plan for the revival of the state. The survival or destruction of the Jin depended on their actions. Though you say that, at the time, Taejin and Emperor Won were not yet established in the relationship of ruler and minister, how, on that day, could any minister of Jin bear to sit idly by and watch as the ancestral temples and altars for the god of land and grain [of the Jin] were cut off and the territory of the central realm was lost [to barbarians] without thinking of some way to revive the state? It is true that Taejin was unable to realize both perfect loyalty and filial piety; why though do you criticize him so severely?” Yunjidang replied, “That too is not so. Had his mother been fortunate enough to enjoy a thorough understanding of the situation, as Jin Yeong’s mother55 was, she would have

53 On

the concept of self-centeredness, see footnote #67 below. of Poetry, Mao #202. 55 Jin Yeong (C. Chen Ying) 陳嬰 (?–183 BCE) lived at the very end of the Jin (C. Qin) 秦 dynasty (221–206 BCE) and the beginning of the Han 漢 dynasty (202 BCE–9 CE; 25–220 CE). As the Jin collapsed, a group of people who were leading the revolt came to him and urged him to declare himself king. His mother though advised him against this arguing that since the overthrow of the Jin was not complete, to accept such a sudden rise in status would pose great peril. He followed his mother’s advice and refused to accept the title of king.

54 Book

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urged him to be careful but still sent him on his mission. Then, from the very start, he would have been able to realize both loyalty and filial piety. Now, since this was not the case, as a son, he should have assumed a pleasing countenance and pleasant expression, explained [to his mother] in detail the extreme situation the state was in and what duty demanded of him as a minister. He should have waited until he was able to resolve any remaining doubts she might have and ensure that she was at ease; then, he should have calmly bowed and taken his leave. In this way, within [i.e. toward his family] he would have realized filial piety to his parents and without [i.e. to his lord] he would have fulfilled his duty to be loyal to the state. What, in the end, are his renowned achievement and outstanding reputation worth, given that he earned them by tearing the hem of his garment, stabbing [the heart of his mother’s] affection, and being able to endure forsaking his obligation to be a filial son? Maengja said, ‘If the Blind Man [i.e. Emperor Sun’s (C. Shun) 舜 father] had killed someone, Sun would have fled secretly carrying his father on his back and settled by the shore of the sea, delighting in his life and forgetting all about the empire.56 If even the empire can be regarded [so lightly] how much more is this the case when it is merely self-centered achievement and advantage? Regarding abandoning his parents and stabbing [the heart of his mother’s] affection as nothing out of the ordinary— is this really the way a filial son behaves? Can one who behaves this way avoid offending against the great [Emperor] Sun? If, as someone said, there was no one else who could have been sent on this mission, Taejin was the one person needed to ensure the revival of the Jin dynasty, he had no prospect of resolving his mother’s doubts, he felt the difficulty of fulfilling both the duties of loyalty and filial piety, and [under these circumstances] he acted as he did, then Taejin’s behavior might be forgiven. Now, since this was not the case, and still he behaved as he did, we must wonder how a son could bear to do such a thing and how it could be motivated by anything other than a self-centered desire for gain. Oh! The supreme tender feelings of a loving mother will always focus on her son’s safety in times of chaos; it is only fitting that such feelings will go to any extreme. If her son, after tearing the hem of his garment and departing, should die amidst the chaos and she is unable to see him again, what pain shall this loving mother feel to the end of her days! Even if he does not die while abroad, if when he returns his aged mother, ill with anxiety and worry, has already passed away, even if Taejin then were to weep till he is old and toothless, what good would it do? Though he mourns until he is withered and wasted, how could this be enough to atone for his behavior? Filial piety means being accommodating and compliant. Can one really call Taejin’s tearing the hem of his garment and departing accommodating and compliant? Alas! Someone like Taejin is indeed lucky that he has not been condemned as someone who has violated Confucian teachings. I cannot believe he really had the reputation for being earnestly filial in his time. Alas! Filial piety is the source of the hundred good types of behavior. Since he lost the original source, even if he fully developed all the worthy capabilities under heaven, he still would not be worth talking about. Even if one completely exhausts oneself in working ardently for the imperial family, still, if one is not filial to one’s parents, one cannot really be loyal to one’s lord. What would such efforts amount to? If, when his mother took hold of his lapel, Taejin had immediately acceded to her will, politely declined Yu Gon’s request, and to the end of his life taken care of her in a simple thatched hut, thereby being the perfection of a filial son, then, though he might not have been famous in his own time, how could he not have enjoyed glory for ten thousand generations thereafter?57 In

56 Mencius

7A35. idea being both that the only reputation worth having is to be a moral person and that good people do in fact often attain a kind of immortality for their good deeds.

57 The

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the past, Jegal Congmyeong (C. Zhuge Kongming)58 lived at the end of the Han dynasty. He ploughed his own fields and did not seek to become famous. Later on, in response to three personal visits by Emperor Soyeol (C. Zhaolie),59 he subsequently served him and succeeded in implementing his “three-legged tripod” strategy,60 which led to his immortal reputation. And so, if one cultivates virtue in oneself, then one’s reputation naturally will become outstanding. If one lacks virtue and first thinks about establishing a name for oneself, though one might achieve some renown in a given age, one will not avoid being held up as the subject of critical discussions for ten thousand generations. Dong Jungseo (C. Dong Zhongshu)61 said, ‘Humane people correct their principles and do not plot to achieve gain; they make clear the Way and do not calculate their personal achievement.62 We can say that people like Taejin turn their back on the proper standard of the Way and put working for gain as their highest priority. They themselves ruin the source of the hundred good types of behavior; is this not why they cannot avoid the censure of noble people?”

17.3.3 Expositions This section contains two expositions by Im Yunjidang. The exposition (seol 說) is a genre found among the writings of many orthodox neo-Confucians. It usually presents a focused interpretation and analysis of a term or terms of art, a phrase, or a line from a classic text. This is why Im Yunjidang’s expositions tend to offer some of the most complete and systematic accounts of her core philosophical beliefs. 17.3.3.1 Exposition on the Human Heart-Mind, Heart-Mind of the Way, Four Sprouts, and Seven Emotions The first exposition explores the meaning and significance of four key terms of art, consisting of two sets of paired concepts, that were central to neo-Confucian moral philosophy. The Human Heart-mind refers to the phenomenal seat of human 58 Better

known as Jegal Ryang (C. Zhuge Liang) 諸葛亮 (181–234 CE), his courtesy name was Gongmyeong (C. Kongming) 孔明. He was a politician, military strategist, writer, engineer and inventor who lived during the Three Kingdoms 三國時代 (220–80 CE) period in China. Recognized as the most accomplished strategist of his era, his reputation as an intelligent and learned scholar grew even while he lived in relative seclusion. 59 Emperor Soyeol (C. Zhaolie) 昭烈皇帝 is the posthumous name of Yu Bi (C. Liu Bei) 劉備 (161–223 CE), whose courtesy name was Hyundeok (C. Xuande) 玄德. He founded the state of Chok Han (C. Shu Han) 蜀漢 (221–263 CE) during the Three Kingdoms Period. 60 This strategy pitted different states against one another in ways that all contributed to the victory of the lord he served. 61  Dong Jungseo (C. Dong Zhongshu) 董仲舒 (179–104 BCE) was a Han dynasty Chinese scholar. He is traditionally associated with the promotion of Confucianism as the official ideology of the Chinese imperial state. 62  These lines appear in Dong Jungseo’s Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunchu beollo; C. Chunqiu fanlu 春秋繁露) 17.14a.

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thought, feeling, and volition. Because it exists within the realm of gi-material it inevitably is prone to error. The Heart-mind of the Way is the Heavenly pattern-principle within each human being that serves as a pure and perfect moral norm. The Four Sprouts find their locus classics in the Mencius, where they describe the nascent manifestations of four core Confucian virtues. The Seven Emotions, enumerated in a number of contemporary texts, describe the everyday human repertoire of affective responses. Describing the relationship between the Four Sprouts and Seven Emotions was a perennial challenge and served as the focus of one of the most intense, long-running and sophisticated debates within Korean Confucianism. Exposition on the Human Heart-Mind, Heart-Mind of the Way, Four Sprouts, and Seven Emotions Someone asked, “Emperor Sun told U (C. Yu 禹), ‘The Human Heart-mind is precarious; the Heart-mind of the Way is subtle. Always be discriminating [in regard to the former] and always be unified [with the latter]. Hold fast to the mean [between the two].63 How is it that while there is only one heart-mind the text talks about the Human Heart-mind (insim; C. renxin 人心) and the Heart-mind of the Way (daosim; C. daoxin 道心)?” [I] replied, “It does not say that in the mind-in-itself there are two heart-minds, only that in what emerges from the mind-in-itself there are two modes or forms [of heartmind]. Human beings are born with the most refined gi-material of the Five Phases (ohaeng; C. wuxing 五行) and their natures are the most noble. Nevertheless, were it not for the heart-mind, the nature would have nothing to latch on to and pattern-principle would have no way to be what it is. And so, it is said, ‘Human beings can enlarge the Way; the Way cannot enlarge human beings (Analects 15.29) ‘Way’ refers to the nature; ‘human beings’ refers to the heart-mind. Nevertheless, what do we mean by the heartmind? It is none other than the heart-mind of Heaven and earth that gives birth to things and the spiritual luminosity of the primordial unity.64 This spiritual luminosity of the primordial unity descends into human beings and becomes the essence of their amorphous intelligence. It carries the nature and serves as the governor of the person and the root of the myriad affairs. This is what is referred to as the Heart-mind of the Way. Nevertheless, human beings all have a physical form, and so they cannot avoid having a Human Heart-mind. The Human Heart-mind is born of the self-centeredness65 of the gi-material of the physical form. The Heart-mind of the Way originates in the correctness of the nature and the mandate. Even sages, since they have a body composed of blood and flesh, cannot avoid having a Human Heart-mind. Even a bad person equally receives the pattern-principle of the Great Ultimate, and so cannot but have the Heart-mind of the Way. Nevertheless, when we talk about bad people having the Heart-mind of the Way, this

63 See

the “Counsels of the Great Yu” (Dae U Mo; C. Da Yu Mo 大禹謨) section of the Book of History. 64 The term “primordial unity” or “calm unity” (dam il; C. zhan yi 湛一) is first found in the Western Inscription by Jang Jae (C. Zhang Zai) 張載 (1020–1077 CE) and refers to the original source or state of gi. 65 “Self-centeredness” is a translation of sa (C. si) 私. It refers to the tendency to give preference to oneself and one’s needs and desires in ways that violate what is morally “correct,” which is how one would act if one were perfectly in accord with one’s nature and the mandate of Heaven. Those who are able to overcome self-centeredness realize their nature and the mandate and form “one body” (ilche; C. yiti 一體) with Heaven, earth, and all things.

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does not refer to anything beyond the occasional manifestations of the unvarying standard (byeongyi; C. bingyi 秉彝) and Four Sprouts (sadan; C. siduan 四端).66 When we talk about sages having the Human Heart-mind, though it depends on the gi-material of the physical form in order to be manifested, ‘they can follow what their heart-mind desires without ever overstepping what is proper’ (Analects 2.4); their Human Heart-mind is the Heart-mind of the Way. As for the heart-minds of most people, the majority are born of the gi-material of the physical form and only a few originate in the nature and the mandate. Their Heart-minds of the Way are profoundly beclouded and have difficulty shining through, while their Human Heart-minds easily run wild and are difficult to control. This is what is referred to by saying, ‘The Human Heart-mind is precarious; the Heart-mind of the Way is subtle.’ When the heart-mind is manifested it becomes emotion. If people are able to examine what their heart-minds are manifesting and investigate the subtle springs of good and bad, select what is good and firmly hold fast to it, know what is bad and resolutely eliminate it, ‘constantly ensure that the Heart-mind of the Way governs and the Human Heart-mind obeys its commands, then what is precarious will be settled, what is subtle will be manifest, and in action and stillness, speech and deed one naturally will avoid the errors of overstepping or falling short [of the proper standard].’67 This is what is meant by saying ‘Always be discriminating [in regard to the former] and always be unified [with the latter], Hold fast to the mean [between the two].’” Someone said, “If what are called the Four Sprouts are manifestations of this heart-mind then they likewise are emotions; so why are they separately referred to as the Four Sprouts?” [I] replied, “The Four Sprouts refer to the four aspects of the nature—humaneness, righteousness, rites, and wisdom—when these are stimulated into movement and directly come forth. The Seven Emotions is simply a collective name for what is manifested when the nature and the mandate are combined with physical form and gi. It is not saying that outside of the Seven Emotions the Four Sprouts exist separately. If you don’t distort the meaning by being overly literal,68 you will get it.” Someone asked, “In that case, what does it mean when people talk about the nature manifesting or the heart-mind manifesting?” [I] replied, “That is not how it is.69 The nature is the pattern-principle with which the heart-mind is endowed, while the heart-mind is a vessel in which the nature is lodged.

66 The

“unvarying standard” refers to the inherent moral disposition of the heart-mind. It is first found in the Book of Poetry (Mao #260). This verse is quoted in Mencius 6A6, which employs the variant 秉夷. The Four Sprouts are the nascent moral dispositions first described by Maengja in Mencius 2A6. 67 The quoted section is a close paraphrase of Ju Hui’s Preface to his Doctrine of the Mean in Sections and Sentences (Jungyong janggu; C. Zhongyong zhangju 中庸章句). 68 This is a reference to Mencius 5A4, which teaches that one “must not insist on a term so as to distort the meaning of a sentence” if one wants to understand the meaning of the Book of Poetry. 69 As Yunjidang makes clear in what follows, she rejects any interpretation that strongly separates the nature and heart-mind. It becomes clear that she attributes such a view to the school associated with Yi Toegye, the rival of the school of Yi Yulguk to which she and her brothers belonged. Yunjidang was critical of Toegye’s view that pattern-principle and gi-material are separable. For more details of the Four Seven Debate in English, see Michael C. Kalton et al., trans., The Four-Seven Debate: An Annotated Translation of the Most Famous Controversy in Korean NeoConfucian Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994) and Hyoungchan Kim, “The Li-Qi 理氣 Structure of the Four Beginnings,” in Youngsun Back and Philip J. Ivanhoe eds., Traditional Korean Philosophy: Problems and Debates (London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).

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They are two and yet one. And so, the unfathomable changes and transformations of the spiritual luminosity of one’s amorphous intelligence is the heart-mind, but what enables the unfathomable changes and transformations of the spiritual luminosity of one’s amorphous intelligence is pattern-principle. Pattern-principle is without action; the heart-mind engages in action. Pattern-principle leaves no trace behind; the heart-mind leaves traces behind. If there were no pattern-principle there would be nothing to manifest; if there were no heart-mind there would be no way to manifest. How could a blended mixture of pattern-principle and gi-material manifest only nature or only the heart-mind? Although earlier worthies have put forth such theories,70 I have never dared to believe them. I offer my tentative thoughts on this matter, awaiting someone with understanding.

17.3.3.2 Exposition on Overcoming the Self and Returning to the Rites is Humaneness Our second exposition is focused on a famous line from the Analects 12.1, which has been interpreted in a variety of ways throughout the course of the Confucian tradition. The core issue concerns to what degree the self and, in particular, our everyday emotions need to be overcome—and in what sense—in order to accord with the rites and realize the moral way. On the one hand, one can incline toward a kind of ascetic ideal that jeopardizes the widely held belief in the goodness of human nature; on the other, one can allow greater accommodation of human emotions, which risks moral slackness and indulgence. Exposition on Overcoming the Self and Returning to the Rites is Humaneness The accumulated refined essence of Heaven and earth gives birth to the myriad creatures; those that receive the most correct and penetrating part of this endowment become human beings. Fundamentally, their endowment is pure and without corruption; it is radiant and the highest good. Its purity is the pattern-principle of care and the complete virtue of my heart-mind. Its radiance is the pattern-principle of yielding and the ritual norm (uichik; C. yize 儀則) for human affairs. [Originally] all human beings have this uncorrupted [endowment] and all possess the highest good. Nevertheless, once their physical form has taken shape, outside things unavoidably make contact with it. Once outside things make contact with their physical form, people cannot avoid being moved within. When they are moved within, the seven emotions issue forth; these are called, pleasure, anger, grief, joy, love, hate, and desire. Once the emotions are moved and gallop forth, if one does not know how to restrain them, they flow into chaos and one forgets the way back. If one carries out affairs guided by the gi-material of one’s physical form, one loses the essence that [originally] is the highest good, devoid of corruption. The gi-material of one’s physical form refers to the self. The highest good refers to the rites. The difference between not being humane and being humane is nothing more than the distinction between the self and the rites. And so, for this reason, one who has awakened [morally]71 understands this and certainly will investigate critically, choose meticulously, and hold firmly to the distinction between them [i.e., self and the rites] with the aim of reaching the radiant highest good

70 Here 71 Cf.

the reference is to the views of Toegye and his school. See prior note. Mencius 5A7.

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and returning to one’s original essence. One’s “original” [essence] refers to humaneness. I have heard that among the ancients, there was An Yeon (C. Yan Yuan) 顔淵 who was the kind of man who loved to learn. He once asked the master about humaneness and the master said, “To overcome the self and return to the rites is humaneness.”72 Anja followed his teacher’s instructions and fully exerted his talents to make clear and distinguish the line between Heavenly pattern-principle and human desire and to single-mindedly preserve this distinction. If he understood something to be human desire, he would restrain and extinguish it, overcome and eliminate it. His only fear in this regard was that he would neglect this effort even momentarily. If he understood something to be Heavenly principle, he would reverence, cherish, and “clasp it tightly to his breast.”73 His only fear in this regard was that he would be remiss in performing some minute aspect of the rites. Once he reached the point where he had accumulated a reservoir of authenticity and prolonged effort, he was completely cleansed of human desires and fully immersed and permeated by Heavenly principle.74 [Even when he] wanted to abandon [his learning], he was unable to do so.75 Once his heart-mind no longer was contrary to humaneness, he was ninety-nine percent of the way toward being a sage. The only respect in which he fell short was that he still had to “make an effort to hit to mark.”76 Had he been granted more years of life,77 his humaneness and sageliness would have been beyond measure! In general, ever since Geon (C. Qian) 乾 and Gon (C. Kun) 坤78 gave rise to the universe, from the ancients Bok Hui (C. Fu Xi) 伏羲79 and Sin Nong (C. Shen Nong) 神 農80 down to Emperors Geol (C. Jie) 桀81 and Ju (C. Zhou 紂)82 and Robber Cheok (C. Zhi 盜跖),83 all have the same Heaven-mandated nature, but then what do sages do that makes them sages? What do I do that makes me a common person? It is because I am constrained by gi-material, beclouded by desires for things, and thereby lose my originally [endowed] humaneness. If one were to say that the nature originally contains what is bad, that would be the end of it. But now, since that is not the case, the nature possessed by Yo

72 Analects

12.1. eight of the Doctrine of the Mean. 74 The expression “accumulated a reservoir of authenticity and prolonged effort,” first appears in the “Encouraging Learning” (Gwon hak; C. Quan xue 勸學) chapter of the Xunzi. It is quoted in a number of later sources, including the Reflections on Things at Hand (Geunsarok; C. Jinsilu 近 思錄). 75 Analects 9.11, where An Yeon says this of himself, “[The master has] broadened me with culture and restrained me with the rites. Even when I feel a desire to abandon his learning, I cannot.” 76 Chapter twenty-two of the Doctrine of the Mean, says that “One who is perfectly sincere hits the mark without making effort and grasps it without having to reflect.” 77 When only 29 years old An Yeon’s hair turned white; he died a few years later, leading Gongja to exclaim, “Heaven has forsaken me! Heaven has forsaken me!” (Analects 11.9). 78 The two fundamental forces in the universe, associated with Heaven and earth respectively. 79 Bok Hui is a mythological cultural hero who (along with his sister Yeowa C. Nüwa 女娲) is credited with creating humanity and inventing hunting, fishing and cooking. 80 The “Divine Farmer” Sin Nong is a mythological Chinese deity in Chinese folk religion; more generally, he is venerated as a mythical sage ruler of prehistoric times. 81 Emperor Geol was the last wicked ruler of the Ha (C. Xia) 夏 dynasty. 82 Emperor Ju was the last wicked ruler of the Sang (C. Shang) 商 dynasty. 83 Robber Cheok, of the Spring and Autumn Period, was commonly used as a stock figure of an amoral brigand. 73 Chapter

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(C. Yao) 堯, Sun (C. Shun) 舜, [the Duke of] Ju (C. Zhou) 周, Gongja (C. Kongzi) 孔子, Anja (C. Yanzi) 顔子, and Maengja (C. Mengzi) 孟子 is something I inherently have84 and so, how could I alone be incapable of learning what Anja learned? Someone asked, “Do you not overstate the case? In native capacity, Anja was close to those who are born knowing,85 and so for him it was easy to overcome the self and easy for him to return to the rites. It was easy for him to be humane, because his gi-material was extremely clean and pure. Most people, who have turgid and adulterated gi-material, seek to change and become fine, but though they make one hundred times the effort he put forth, how could they succeed in transforming themselves? This is why there is none in later times who is able to return, as Anja did, to a state where their [heart-minds are] not contrary to humaneness and why they are unable, even with study, to reach such a state.” [I] replied, “That is not so. Though people’s endowments of gi-material are not equal, if we trace back to the original essence of the primordial unity86 that they received, then the sages and common people are the same. It is only that as the flowing gi-material congeals and collects, the turgid, adulterated, dregs thoroughly mix together and form common people. If such people really are able to exert one thousand times the effort of others in eliminating the admixture of dregs, then how could the original essence of the primordial unity ever leave?—it will return and remain comfortably within them and they can return to their original humaneness. Nevertheless, what is the first step one must take in making this effort? [I] say nothing is more important than to establish a commitment and earnestly practice.87 If one is just able to establish a commitment and earnestly practice, one can adopt what Anja described as the heart-mind that thinks, ‘What kind of man was Sun? What kind of man am I?,’ (Mencius 3A1) fully comprehend the pattern-principle of the myriad things, investigate into the subtle springs of good and bad, understand what is bad and overcome and eliminate it, understand what is good and firmly guard it, make earnest and unremitting effort, be cautious and fearful and not burdened by the slightest vestige of self-centered desire or ever be separated, even for a moment, from Heavenly principle—whether in motion or at rest, in speech or in silence—and always follow the norm of Heavenly principle—this is what is known as ‘overcoming the self and returning to the rites is humaneness’; this is what is known as ‘making bright one’s bright virtue.’88 Bright virtue is what one gets from Heaven and is ‘the great root of Heaven and earth.’89 Once the great root is established and the all-pervading Way is implemented Heaven and earth will take their proper places, the myriad things will be nourished, and one will ‘flow in the same stream as Heaven and earth.’ (Mencius 7A13). One who is like this is a sage, and this is also what made Anja a subsidiary sage. The reason there are no great worthies in later ages is only because people have not firmly established a commitment. Since the time of Jeong I (C. Cheng Yi) 程頤 and Jang Jae (C. Zhang Zai) 張載, we have had the theory of the gi-material nature. If people really are able to apply themselves to transform the partiality [of the gi-material nature], those who are weak can change and

84 For

the idea that we inherently have an innate good nature, see Mencius 6A6. as those who come into the world with the greatest natural talent. See Analects 16.9. 86 The term “primordial unity” or “calm unity” (dam il; C. zhan yi 湛一) is first found in the Western Inscription (Seomyeong; C. Ximing 西銘) by Jang Jae (C. Zhang Zai) 張載 and refers to the original source or state of gi. 87 To establish a commitment (ipji; C. lizhi 立志) and earnestly practice (dokhaeng; C. duxing 篤 行) are regular themes in classical Confucian texts. See for example Mencius 5B1 and Chap. 20 of the Doctrine of the Mean respectively. 88 See the opening chapter of the Great Learning. 89 See the opening chapter of the Doctrine of the Mean. 85 Identified

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become strong, those who are foolish can change and become enlightened. Those who are turgid and adulterated can change and become clean and pure. If they are not able to change [the gi-material nature] then to the end, they remain as they are. Whether one becomes humane or does not become humane depends only on oneself. (Mencius 7A3). And so I say, nothing is more important than establishing a commitment and making genuine effort. This is why noble people do not refer to the gi-material nature as the nature.90 Oh! When has Heaven ever created human beings who are not humane? It is only because their heart-minds become enslaved by their physical form, they are satisfied doing violence to and throwing themselves away,91 and then say, ‘My gi-material is not fine! How can I dare to learn to become a sage or a worthy!’ Fearful and foolish, they only follow along in this way and only act in ways contrary to the rites. They happily descend to the lowest level and never realize how pathetic it is that they rot away along with the weeds and wood or how shameful it is that they are not far removed from the birds and beasts! Oh—is this not lamentable! Those who are like this are already so chronically beclouded that one cannot even talk with them about humaneness. Truly, as the master said, ‘In the end, what can one do for them?’92 Eeee! Though I am a woman, still, the nature I originally received contains no distinction between male and female. Though I have not been able to learn what An Yeon learned, I earnestly share his commitment to become a sage. And so, I have made a summary of what I have observed and written it down here to collect my thoughts.”

17.3.4 Inscriptions Our last selection is from another genre found among Yunjidang’s writings: inscriptions. Yunjidang left three inscriptions taking as her theme different physical objects: a mirror, a short sword, and a ruler and scale, which she then describes as embodying and symbolizing some moral virtue, attribute, or activity. Her second inscription is presented here and in it she explains how she and we all must courageously wield a spiritual sword to cut down any and all self-centered desires, which block and impede the way of moral progress. Inscription on [the Theme of] a Short Sword The nature of all human beings is good; why then are so many unable to become like Emperor Yo, Emperor Sun, the Duke of Ju, or Gongja? It is because their nature is injured by human desires. If one is able to control human desires, then the Heavenly pattern-principle naturally shall be preserved, and one too can become like Emperor Yo, Emperor Sun, the Duke of Ju, or Gongja. And so, Anja said, “What kind of person was Sun” What kind of person am I?” (Mencius 3A1) Those who make an effort can also be like this. What does it mean to make an effort? It means that one clearly distinguishes and earnestly practices the distinction between Heavenly pattern-principle and human desire. As soon as one understands that something is a human desire, one must decisively eliminate

90 The

idea is that noble people do not regard the lower parts of their nature as their true or destined nature. See, Mencius 7B24. 91 See Mencius 4A10 for people who do violence to and throw themselves away. 92 See Analects 9.24.

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it, with the ferocity of a peal of thunder! As soon as one understands that something is a Heavenly pattern-principle, one must resolutely practice it, like a mighty river bursting through its banks!93 Be like the keen edge of a sharp knife slicing something in half— do not allow the slightest hesitation to enter your thoughts! Now, the “keen edge of a sharp knife” refers to a short sword. The reason Anja could return [from an error] of no great extent and avoid transferring his anger [unto others]94 is because he had such a sword. The reason Duke Gwak [C. Guo] 郭95 regarded the good as good but was unable to advance it and regarded the bad as bad but was unable to eliminate it is because he lacked such a sword. Lacking or having this sword depends only on whether one has or lacks courage; why is this? What is called courage is really of two types.96 There is “blood and gi-material courage” (hyeolgi ji yong; C. xueqi zhi yong 血氣之勇),97 which is something one must never have; there is moral courage, which is something one must never be without. When blood and gi-material courage retreats, moral courage advances. If one is able to nurture moral courage, then the short sword will naturally arise, and human desires will not dare to stand before it. If all of the operations and applications of one’s heart-mind and every moment of movement and rest of every part of one’s body are the flowing implementation of Heavenly pattern-principle, then Emperor Yo, Emperor Sun, the Duke of Ju, and Gongja are here within me. Is it not amazing and spirit-like this short sword! The inscription is a warning to myself. It Shimmers like a Cold Frost, Its Edge like the Blazing Sun. Its Blade is Insubstantial,98 Yet Its Keenness Cuts Through Iron. Wherever Its Sharp Edge Turns, Every Malady is Eliminated. The Awesome Extent of Your Power!

93 Cf.

Mencius 7A16. 6.3 The first part of this sentence combines a line from the Book of Changes and one from the Analects. See the Image Commentary (Sang jeon; C. Xiang zhuan 象傳) on the hexagram Bok (C. Fu) 復 in the Book of Changes and Analects 6.3. 95 Duke Gwak (C. Guo) 郭公, whose name was Jang Bo (C. Zhang Fu) 長父, was minister to King Ryeo (C. Li) 厲 (r. 877–841 BCE or 857–842 BCE) of the Ju Dynasty. King Ryeo brought disaster on his state and himself; while the details are unknown, Duke Gwak is blamed for failing to control the king’s bad behavior and settle competition among his ministers. 96 The following analysis of courage owes much to Mencius 1B3 and 2A2. 97 “Blood and gi-material courage” is a kind of courage uninformed by pattern-principle and so morally blind and impetuous. This type of courage is described and criticized in the Mencius; roughly, it is what today we would “macho” courage. Yunjidang is not suggesting that a noble person lacks the ability to stand up to physical threats; rather, she thinks this is something only moral courage enables one to do, in the right way, for the right reason, to the right extent, etc. 98  This invokes the story of Cook Jeong (C. Ding) 丁 in Chapter Three of the Jangja (C. Zhuangzi) 莊子, whose knife is said to be “without thickness” (muhu; C.wuhou 無厚) and so can easily move through the openings in the ox carcass he is carving. 94 Analects

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The Spiritual Nature of Your Achievements! Onward! Short Sword! Ignore that I Am a Woman. Urge on Your Keen Blade, As if Fresh from the Whetstone. Destroy the Swarm that Opposes Me, Cut Down the Thicket that Blocks Me. When the Four Evil Spirits99 Are Eliminated, The Sun of Emperor Sun Shall Appear in the Heavens, Great Peace Will Continue for Ten Thousand Generations, And [one’s] Heavenly ruler will be calm.100

17.4 Conclusions Eighteenth century philosopher Im Yunidang argued, on the basis of core neo-Confucian beliefs concerning a shared human nature, that women are equally capable of mastering the Confucian classics, cultivating themselves, and thereby becoming “female sages.” Her writings defend this idea and also present highly original and powerful interpretations of a range of other philosophical issues using historical cases to illustrate her arguments. She brings out neglected aspects of Confucian moral life to show that the Confucian moral ideal requires not only acting in certain ways but also with a particular sensitivity and style. Her insights not only extend and deepen our understanding of the Confucian tradition but, as we have seen, they also contribute in original and important ways to contemporary moral philosophy.

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99 The

demons of the four directions that Emperor Sun traditionally is said to have driven off. See the Canon of Sun chapter of Book of History (Sangseo; C. Shangshu 尚書) and the Chronicle of Zou (Jwajeon; C. Zouzhuan 左傳), Eighteenth Year of Duke Mun (C. Wen) 文. 100  The last lines of Ju Hui’s comment on Mencius 6A15 say, “The Heavenly ruler will be calm, and every part of one’s body will heed its commands.” See Collected Commentaries on the Mencius (Maengja jipju; C. Mengzi jizhu 孟子集注). The “Heavenly ruler” refers to the heart-mind.

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Siku quanshu 四庫全書 [Library of the Four Treasuries]. Wenyange edition. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong & Digital Heritage Publishing Ltd. CD-ROMs. Songs of Chu (Cho Sa; C. Chu Ci 楚辭). https://ctext.org/chu-ci Sunja 荀子. Sunja (C. Xunzi) 荀子. https://ctext.org/xunzi Tiwald, J., & Van Norden, B. W. (Eds.). (2014). Readings in Later Chinese Philosophy: Han to the 20th Century. Hackett Publishing Company. Yi, Y. 이영춘. (Trans.). (1998) Im Yunjidang: Gukyeok Yunjidang yugo (임윤지당: 국역 윤지당 유고 Im Yunjidang: A Korean Translation of The Extant Works of Yunjidang). Hyean.

Chapter 18

The text above is from The Extant Writings of Jeongildang (Jeongildang yugo 靜一堂遺稿), 1836 edition at Seoul National University

姜靜一堂 Gang Jeongildang of Korea 1772–1832 Philip J. Ivanhoe and Hwa Yeong Wang Abstract  Gang Jeongildang acknowledged that she was inspired by and sought to continue the work of Im Yunjidang. Gang established herself as an original and important philosopher in her own right and as part of what is the first and only example of a tradition of Korean female Confucian philosophers. Her extant writings consist mostly of philosophical poetry and short personal missives to her husband and these present—in both content and style—a rich and profound resource not only for how she struggled to pursue the Confucian ideal of becoming a female sage in the face of the poverty and hardship of her daily life but also for how anyone might take the challenges of everyday life as the primary arena for moral cultivation. Her letters to her husband are especially valuable as an example of how this most basic familial relationship did, can, and should figure more P. J. Ivanhoe (*)  Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] H. Y. Wang  Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Duke Kunshan University, Kunshan, Jiangsu, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_18

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centrally in Confucian reflection on self-cultivation and more generally in our account of the moral life.

18.1 Biography and  Writings1 Gang Jeongildang 姜靜一堂2 was a member of a clan whose ancestral home was Jinju 晉州; her childhood name was Jideok 至德; her pen name was Jeongildang 靜一堂.3 The Jinju Gang clan was a gentry lineage, but before she was born, the family had fallen on hard times, as none of its members had passed the civil service examination and secured a position in the coveted bureaucracy for several generations. As a child, Jeongildang learned needlework from her mother, a skill that she and her future husband would come to rely upon as their primary source of income. At the age of twenty, she was married to Tanjae 坦齋 Yun Gwangyeon 尹光演 (1778–1838 CE), whose ancestral home is Papyeong 坡平, but she was not able to move in with her husband for three years because his family was too poor to support her. After moving in, she began to learn the Confucian classics alongside her husband ostensibly, at first, in order to help him study for the first level of the civil service examinations (gwageo; C. keju 科擧). As attested in one of the poems included in the set of translations below, she began her own study of the Confucian tradition in earnest only about ten years later, around the age of thirty. As noted above, in order to enable her husband to concentrate on his preparation for the examinations, Jeongildang supported the family through her needlework and succeeded in maintaining the family’s precarious existence, displaying

1 The authors thank Ms. Melanie Dorson for very helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this entry and Mr. Seo Jae Hyun for reading through a number of the translations with us and offering valuable criticisms and suggestions. Thanks also to Mr. Sim Juhyun and Ms. Nikolett Koroesi who read, commented on, and discussed parts of the work in a graduate student seminar focused on the writings of Im and Gang that was held in the Spring semester of 2020 at Sungkyunkwan University. Our special thanks to Professor Sook-in Lee for insightful comments and suggestions on the entire entry. This work was supported by English Translation of 100 Korean Classics program through the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and Korean Studies Promotion Service of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2019-KCL-1230002). 2 A complete translation and study of the life and philosophy of Gang Jeongildang can be found in: Ivanhoe and Wang, 2023, Oxford University Press. For short introductions to the life and thought of Jeongildang, which offer alternative interpretations of their sense and significance, see Gim (2004), Kim (2011, 2014, 2017). 3 Jideok 至德 means “highest virtue” and is a term found throughout early Confucian writings, for example in both the Analects and Doctrine of the Mean. Jeongildang 靜一堂 means “hall of stillness and unity,” two qualities essential for moral and spiritual attainment in a number of East Asian traditions. Her pen name was given to her by her husband, who thought it reflected core qualities of her moral character.

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great frugality and proving herself a highly skilled, creative, and strictly disciplined family manager.4 Despite his best efforts, Yun Gwangyeon failed, repeatedly, to pass the civil service examination, which were notoriously difficult in his age. Throughout his successive attempts, Jeongildang supported him, materially, emotionally, and intellectually. As is clear from many of her works and in particular from the personal missives (cheokdok; C. chidu 尺牘)5 she exchanged with her husband, a number of which are translated below, she offered her husband regular practical advice about his own moral self-cultivation, chiding him for and correcting his shortcomings while advising, guiding, and encouraging him in the development of virtue. She also supported and offered advice to him about the classics and the examinations, at times studying alongside him, at times working on her own and reporting to him about her progress, and at times expressing her frustration with not being able to follow him by devoting herself completely to the demanding challenges of moral and intellectual development. Her practical moral advice and theoretical reflections always arose from and were expressed in terms of the challenges she faced in the course of her everyday life. In the face of their grinding poverty, she was scrupulous about not compromising herself or her husband morally when inappropriate material gain or reputational advantage was offered to them; examples of her struggling with how best to navigate through such practical moral challenges can be found throughout her writings. Despite the numerous difficulties she faced, she maintained an irrepressible optimism that through frugality, temperance, diligence, and dedicated study they would succeed, if not in the examinations and the competition for an official position then in the higher calling of moral self-cultivation. Eventually, following the advice of his wife, her husband abandoned his aspiration to pass the civil service examination and secure an official post and instead opened a local academy (seodang; C. shutang 書堂) to teach the Chinese classics to young men in their local area. As seen in some of the translations included here, Jeongildang regularly advised her husband not only about general policies concerning how to manage this enterprise but also on the relative quality and worthiness of individual students and how he should behave as master. Gang Jeongildang gave birth to five sons and four daughters; tragically, every one of them died before she or he could learn to speak. There is no explicit account within her extant corpus describing the accumulated effects this had on

4 Thus, she shouldered what modern feminists refer to as the double burden, double shift, or double duty not only by serving as her family’s main breadwinner, but also as the one responsible for significant amounts of unpaid domestic labor. For this idea see Hochschild (1989). Moreover, she voluntarily bore the third, additional burden of pursuing Confucian learning and self-cultivation, which for men of her time, such as her own husband, was considered a full-time and highly demanding task. 5 “In contrast to the seo (C. shu) 書 genre of formal letters, which were expected to be passed around within the scholarly community, these letters served primarily as personal communication” (Haboush 2009, 186).

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her,6 but these wrenching experiences offer further evidence not only of the profound difficulties she faced in the course of her life but also of her indominable spirit and resolute will to meet and overcome every challenge and by so doing strengthen and improve both herself and her family. In 1836, several years after her death in 1832 at the age of sixty-one, her husband arranged for the publication of a collection of her writings under the name The Extant Writings of Jeongildang (Jeongildang yugo 靜一堂遺稿). This collection consists of thirty-seven Poems (si; C. shi 詩), seven Letters (seo; C. shu 書), fifty-eight brief Personal Missives to her husband (cheokdok 尺牘),7 three Commemorations (gi; C. ji 記), two Prefaces and Postscripts (jebal; C. tiba 題跋), three Epitaphs (myojimyeong; C. muzhiming 墓誌銘), three personal Biographies (haengjang; C. xingzhuang 行 狀), three Funeral Orations (jemun; C. jiwen 祭文), five Inscriptions (myeong; C. ming 銘), two Miscellaneous Writings (japjeo; C. zazhu 雜著)—“Reflections on the Predilections of [My Ancestors]” (Sagirok; C. Sishilu 思嗜錄) and “Exposition on an Inkstone” (Yeonseol; C. Yanshuo 硯說)—and a final section, called Lost Works (seubyu; C. shiyi 拾遺), which includes one poem and seventeen Personal Missives. The total is roughly one hundred and fifty pieces of writing.8

18.2 Philosophical Views Gang Jeongildang was directly inspired by the life and work of Im Yunjidang; she explicitly acknowledged the extent to which her predecessor motivated and informed her own study, thinking, and self-cultivation; it is clear that she adopted and developed several of Yunjidang’s philosophical insights in crafting her philosophical views, while also evolving unique and powerful ideas and forms of expression of her own. It is important to understand and appreciate the extent to which both her personal life and intellectual development gave rise to a distinct and valuable expression even of shared ideas and values. Nevertheless, the relationship between Im and Gang adds an additional, unique dimension to their work and lives. Not only are these two the first Confucian women9 to explicitly argue for the natural moral equality of women and men on the basis of core neo-Confucian principles, 6 She

does reveal her feelings about the loss of her last child, a daughter named Gyesuk 季淑, in the epitaph she wrote for her, which is discussed and included among the translations below. 7 Different sources and translators divide the Personal Missives in various ways. Our policy is to break the text where and when it makes best sense to us, provided there is at least one original source that warrants such a decision. 8 While the precise textual history of her work is not clear, we do know that some of her writings have been lost. For example, after recovering from a serious illness in 1832, she discovered that two of her most substantial writings, “Answers to the Questions” (Dapmunpyeon 答問篇) and “A Record of Words and Actions” (Eonhaengnok 言行錄) had been lost. See the Supplement to the Extant Writings of Jeongildang (Jeongildang yugo burok 靜一堂遺稿附錄), 7b. 9 There are important representative women throughout the tradition, many of whom produced exquisite writings of their own, but none presented developed philosophical arguments grounded in core neo-Confucian teachings in support of natural moral equality. Important figures such as

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when taken together, they and their work constitute the first and only explicit lineage of Confucian women philosophers, what can accurately be described as a female transmission of the Way (yeo dotong; C. nü daotong 女道統).10 Like Yunjidang, Gang Jeongildang pursued her education and self-cultivation as a kind of guerrilla activity, carried out behind the scenes and almost always in the face of formidable challenges and resistance. In addition to the barriers that severely inhibited her education, movement, and expression—obstacles that all women faced in the highly patriarchal environment of late Joseon society—in her case, economic hardship added an additional burden that shaped both the form her writings took and the themes that dominated her reflections. For one thing, as noted above, she did not begin her formal study of the Confucian tradition until rather late in life and did not have the benefit of a dedicated teacher or mentor. Her husband did of course help her, but their relationship was clearly more a partnership and one in which she provided the economic support for both. In these and other ways, her situation differs importantly and in interesting ways from that of her contemporary and inspiration, Im Yunjidang. We have no extant Discourses (non; C. lun 論) or Explanations (seol; C. shuo 說) by Jeongildang11; her most extensive and interesting writings are her poems and the personal missives she wrote to her husband. In this entry, we provide translations of eighteen of her Poems, two Letters, twenty-five Personal Missives, two Commemorations, and one Funeral Epitaph. Our introduction to her philosophy is based primarily on these sources, which offer an incomplete but representative sample of her larger oeuvre. Jeongildang’s writings reflect how deeply she was embedded in and attentive to the everyday challenges of practical social life. Her work reveals, often in poignant and incisive ways, the practical dimension not only of her life but of her philosophy as well. She forged her insights in a crucible of difficulty that regularly bordered on desperation and most often expressed them in short and highly focused writings produced in the brief and irregular periods of time she could carve out to think and write. Jeongildang constantly toiled to support her family and in particular her husband’s ultimately unsuccessful attempts to pass the civil service examination, through her needlework and scrupulous family management. These aspects of her life come through clearly in her poetry in which, at times, we can clearly hear the plaintive undertone of her own frustrated aspirations. Yi Ji (C. Li Zhi) 李贄 (1527–1602 CE) in China made such arguments, but he was a man arguing on behalf of women and nothing he wrote portrays the day-to-day struggles, achievements, and aspirations of women, much less from their perspective and in their own voice. For women in the Confucian tradition, see Li (2000) and Ko et al. (2003). For Yi Ji see Lee (2011). 10 The notion of the transmission of the Way (Tillman 2004) became particularly important to later Confucians who traced the idea back to Maengja (C. Mengzi) 孟子; while neither Im nor Gang used this term, it is not implausible to see them in this light and perhaps even to believe they entertained something like this idea. As we shall show, both explicitly looked back to exemplary women of the golden age of the Ju (C. Zhou) 周 dynasty as their models and invoked them not only as personal guides but also as exemplars in their philosophical arguments. 11 As noted earlier, we do know that certain specific works of hers, which were more traditional in genre, were lost, but we do not have a clear idea of the full extent of these losses. See Footnote 8.

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Some of her poetry is focused primarily on her own pursuit of learning and self-cultivation. For example, in the poem “Beginning to Study,” we learn of the relatively late start she had in setting out along the Confucian Way and that she set out upon and travelled this long and difficult journey without a dedicated teacher or mentor. At thirty, I began my studies, Not knowing which direction to turn.

We further learn from this short poem how she scrupulously maintained her focus, shunning even the slightest complacency, and remained steadfastly dedicated to her ultimate ideal: “aspiring to be like the ancients.” Throughout her years of study, she was keenly aware of her late start and the quick passage of time, as is evident in her poem, “Moved to Chant on New Year’s Eve,” which opens with the lines. I have wasted precious time doing nothing, Tomorrow, I shall be fifty-one years old!

But, as always, she refuses to give in to frustration or despair and concludes the verse, instead, with an expression of dedication and resolve: What good to sigh with sadness halfway through the night? Better to cultivate oneself throughout the remaining days.

Her awareness of the need to make every minute count appears in the advice she offers to others as well and especially to the young. In another verse, “Encouraging the Youth,” she counsels, Do not squander the vitality of youth… You should aspire to be a sage or worthy!

In works such as “Three Stanzas Written in Tanwon,”12 we glimpse moments of genuine joy and a sense of achievement in the pursuit of learning: Living in the forest, drinking in the valley, Holding my books, enjoying myself. Reflecting on my prior efforts at self-cultivation. I come close to discerning something profound.

12 Tanwon

is the name of Jeongildang’s family residence. For a discussion of the meaning of its name, see Footnote 33.

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But even in such moments, she seems slightly daunted by the challenges she faced and returns to the theme of her advancing age. I am weak and find it difficult to drive on, Pausing my ascent, I sigh. Encountering these late years of life, What can I do about my sadness and distress?

Other of her poems take up and elaborate upon more traditional philosophical themes, elegantly working in quotes or allusions to classical texts. For example, “Human Nature is Good” expresses not only the orthodox neo-Confucian belief in the innate goodness of human beings but also the need to work hard to bring out and manifest its full form and thereby become a sage, Human nature originally is wholly good, Developing it fully, one becomes a sage.

“Reading the Doctrine of the Mean” urges readers to maintain the meditative attitudes of awareness and vigilance in order to attain the ideals of inner peace and balance, If in the beginning one can be watchful and cautious, In the end one can achieve equilibrium and harmony.

Her “Hymn to Sincerity and Reverence” highlights the central importance of these two virtuous dispositions and makes clear the critical role they play in fully realizing the Confucian Way. If not sincere, how can you have it? If not reverent, how can you preserve it? Only with both of these, Can you enter the gate of the way.

Finally, some of her poetic works offer direct admonitions and encouragement to her husband. We have included two such poems. “For my Husband (1)” begins with a humble description of how she learned needlework as a young girl: the declaration of her “lack of talent and Virtue,” which opens the poem, is neither a description of poor natural ability or effort but stark testimony to the lack of opportunity women faced and the social resistance they endured to educate and cultivate themselves as Confucian scholars. Unforeseen and unanticipated, her skill in needlework, which in some sense became part of her own spiritual practice, enabled not only her own but her husband’s study and cultivation. The verse closes with the ironic reminder that her labor frees her husband to concentrate on these loftier endeavors; of course, at the same time, it adds to her own already heavy domestic burdens, serving as a further impediment to her own pursuit of the Way.

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390 Ashamed of my lack of talent and virtue, When young, I studied needlework.

Authentic work requires exerting oneself, Do not be concerned about clothes and food.

“For My Husband (2)” acknowledges and celebrates her husband’s ongoing and persistent effort to attain the Way, while at the same time bluntly posing the question of how much progress he has made. It clearly is urging him to exert greater effort but also seems to imply a sense of disappointment or growing skepticism about the results. Since the day you began to follow Ganjae,13 You have sought the Way and nothing else! Now it has been thirty years, How have you progressed in your studies?

The first letter included here is a message of condolence addressed to Jeongildang’s uncle Jungsil 中實, written soon after his wife passed away. Through it we get a sense of how difficult it was to stay in touch with relatives and how important letters were as a means of personal communication. Jeongildang expresses, in vivid and moving ways, her shock at the passing of her aunt and her heartfelt sympathy for her uncle and his son, both stricken with grief. In the course of the letter, we learn of the death of her second maternal cousin as well, and the financial strain this placed on the family. She also mentions her own poor health, the persistent malady that plagued her husband (which from other writings we know concerned a problem with his eyes), and the loss of one of her children. These revelations convey the immense challenges she and her family faced; at the same time, that she could find and take the time and make the effort to compose such a warm, sensitive, and moving letter is profound testimony to the depth and sincerity of her feelings and the strength of her character. The second letter presented here was written to her husband in the winter of 1830. It was composed soon after his return from a visit to his teacher and describes how her ill health and the demands of entertaining guests has prevented her from sitting down and hearing more about his trip. She then turns to a discussion of some lines from Analects 12.1, which her husband had mentioned discussing with his teacher, that concern Gongja’s advice to An Yeon (C. Yan Yuan) 顔淵, also known as Anja (C. Yanzi) 顔子, about how to achieve humaneness. Gongja told his young disciple not to look at, listen to, speak, or act in any way that is not in accord with the rites. Jeongildang celebrates this teaching and relates how her husband’s late grandfather often wrote these lines out as an exercise to focus his own heart-mind and motivate his efforts to cultivate himself morally. She suggests they carve these lines into a plaque and hang it above their library, which she

13 See

Footnote 41.

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exclaims “would be very auspicious and delightful.” Jeongildang goes on to offer a concise and trenchant analysis of what this teaching means, seeing it as a call to root out self-centered desires by regulating all one’s conduct by the norms and standards manifested in the rites. One can, thereby, ensure that one’s heart-mind is fully in accord with the Heavenly pattern-principle that is our original nature. She concludes by urging her husband to put forth every effort to practice this teaching. Jeongildang’s personal missives to her husband are of immense interest and value; they cover a wide range of topics and circumstances that we cannot analyze thoroughly or comprehensively here. In this brief and partial presentation, we focus on four types of problems that represent some of the characteristic philosophical issues and themes covered by this genre of her writings: the management of domestic affairs, administrative and pedagogical issues related to their academy, direct personal advice about her husband’s moral behavior and character, and the question of women’s capacity to engage in moral cultivation as well as the added challenges they faced as a result of the patriarchal nature of late Joseon society. Several of the personal missives concern moral challenges that Jeongildang reported to her husband about how she managed different problems encountered in the carrying out of domestic affairs. For example, in the first selection presented below, we see Jeongildang explaining to her husband how an old woman had come to their door and offered him “a peck of rice and a catty of meat” in gratitude for assistance he had offered her earlier, when she was accosted by vagabonds while travelling outside the town. After a brief conversation, Gang concluded that given the optics of the proposed donation she could not accept the gift without appearing to compromise moral principle. As she explained, “Though she offered her gift with the sincere intention [of expressing her gratitude], had I accepted it, I would have been suspected of selling your favor, and so I handled it in this way. I don’t know what you think about this.”14 In selection five, Jeongildang notes that her husband allowed a guest to leave prematurely because of their poverty and her ill health. She reassures him that they still have “a few measures of rice in our storage jars, and my illness is slightly better than it was yesterday” and admonishes him for letting such concerns move him to violate the “rites governing the reception of a guest,” cautioning him that “you must not be the slightest remiss in this regard” in the future. A final example of this type of theme or issue is found in selection fourteen, in which Jeongildang describes her deliberations about a gift of firewood offered by one of her husband’s students. Though both families were desperately poor she refused the gift not because it was beneath her but because “it was not his parent’s idea…but something he came up with on his own.” She makes clear that the value of the gift did not enter into her deliberations about the appropriateness of accepting it; had he offered a much more valuable gift approved by his parents and given in friendship “it would have been inappropriate for me to refuse.”

14 See

the first personal missive to her husband below.

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Like many of her works, these missives reveal how Joseon dynasty women such as Jeongildang wrestled with the application of Confucian values in the complex, subtle, and often ambiguous situations of everyday life and show the extent to which she shared and discussed such challenges with her husband. They make clear that both she and her husband took such matters very seriously, not only as practical problems that needed to be solved but also as opportunities to develop moral understanding and character. Such discussions, and especially those between husband and wife, reveal a hidden, highly significant but largely unexplored dimension of the practice of Confucian self-cultivation. A second type of theme or issue found in Jeongildang’s personal missives concerns administrative and pedagogical matters related to their private academy. In selection seven, she singles out for discussion several students, highlights their different strong points, suggests how her husband could successfully develop their talents, and urges him to accept them as students. In her concluding remark, she suggests that two of the examples she discusses offer precedents for deciding what to do in regard to other aspiring students. She does something similar in selection eight, urging her husband to make every effort to meet with and counsel two young men who have repeatedly but thus far unsuccessfully sought to meet and learn from him. In selection ten, she describes an earnest and resolute student who lives in an isolated rural village and “has no teachers or friends living nearby.” Nevertheless, Jeongildang sees in him someone who is devoted to and truly loves the path of learning. After looking at his letters to her husband, she says “a sense of real learning permeates all that he has written.” She urges her husband to make a special effort to connect with this young man and enable him to advance his education and development. Section eleven finds Jeongildang urging her husband to be more “kind and loving” to their adopted son, for “father and son are one body.” She uses his particular case to make the general point that “a teacher should regard his disciple as if he were his son.” In selection seventeen, she mildly criticizes her husband for not going to pay his respects to his teacher, out of concern over her poor health. She again uses the occasion to draw a larger lesson, this time about proper conduct toward one’s teacher, saying, “To inquire about the welfare of one’s teacher is no different from asking about the welfare of one’s parents.” Gang insists that her husband not allow her ill health to interfere with the proper expression of filial reverence for his teacher. She resolutely declares, “though my illness is severe it is not necessarily fatal,” and even if she were to die while he was off paying his respects, she would, like Gongja upon hearing that the Way was being practiced, die contented and happy. The third type of problem discussed in her personal missives concerns personal advice to her husband about his moral behavior and character. In several of these communications, she offers direct, focused, and at times quite pointed criticisms of her husband. For example, in selection two, she notes that she once heard him angrily reprimand someone and criticizes him saying, “This not the middle way. If you seek to correct this person in this way—without first being correct yourself—how can this be regarded as acceptable?” She offers a similar criticism, but

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in a more general way, in selections four and twenty, which seems to imply that her husband tended to be quick-tempered and harsh in his reprimand of others; she advises him that, in fact, such traits harm him and not the person who is the unfortunate object of his irritation and impatience. In selection three, she urges him be moderate in drinking wine, another unsavory inclination her husband seems to have nurtured. Selection six presents an elegant appeal to focus on being virtuous for its own sake and not be concerned with whether one’s virtue is recognized by others, “I want you, my husband, to work at real Virtue. Do not be ashamed beneath heaven; do not be mortified upon the earth; do not be distressed whether people know or do not know.” In our final example of this type of theme or issue, selection eighteen, we find Jeongildang cautioning her husband about his tendency to favor her at the expense of virtue. She insists that one must not show partiality to one’s wife if it interferes with the service one owes to one’s parents, lord, or teacher and proclaims that even if such improper partiality were to result in her “being rich, noble, peaceful, and at ease” she would “rather die from poverty and hunger.” The fourth and final type of problem we consider concerns the question of women’s capacity to engage in moral cultivation and the particular challenges they faced as a result of the patriarchal nature of late Joseon society. Jeongildang was inspired by Yunjidang’s declaration that women were equally endowed as men with all that is needed to become a sage. In selection twenty-five, she quotes Yunjidang, who said, “Though I am a woman, still, the nature I originally received contained no distinction between male and female.” This was a dramatic claim to make at the time, but it was also clearly and fully consistent with the fundamental neo-Confucian view that each and every person, creature, and thing in the world is endowed with the Great Ultimate, which is the sum of all the Heavenly pattern-principles of the universe. Equally clear and fully consistent with fundamental neo-Confucian views is the implication that all one needed to do was to put forth enough right effort in order to fully realize one’s nature and become a sage; this is precisely what Jeongildang makes clear in her missive, “if one is able to apply oneself then one can reach the level of a sage.”15 She concludes this selection by directly asking her husband what he thinks about these claims. In the following selection, Jeongildang expresses her frustration at being restricted to traditional women’s roles and having to carry the added burdens— as we have argued above, a triple burden—of providing for her family and being responsible for all domestic work, while at the same time doggedly pursuing her intellectual and moral pursuits. Her remarks make clear that she is poignantly aware of the injustice of suffering such restrictions and having to carry these additional burdens, while silently “longing to join those who have cultivated themselves in earlier times.” She contrasts her own disadvantaged position with that

15 Neither

Yunjidang nor Jeongildang ever explicitly challenged the idea that women and men have different social roles that require from each different and unequal “right effort,” but, as we shall see, they did criticize some of the ways in which women’s efforts at moral self-improvement were severely restricted and hamstrung.

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of her husband, who “as a man…[is] free to establish a commitment and seek the Way, follow teachers and choose friends, and diligently improve yourself.” Drawing upon their contrasting positions, she urges him not to waste the opportunity he has and to “make becoming a sage or worthy your highest imperative!” For the most part, the types of discussions and advice we see in Jeongildang’s personal missives are not in themselves surprising, one finds examples of teachers engaging in such conversations and offering their disciples such advice throughout the Confucian tradition, but many will find it surprising and revealing to see such extensive, straightforward, honest, and at times pointed exchanges between a Joseon dynasty wife and her husband. This shows first and foremost the extent to which Jeongildang and her spouse not only thought of one another as equal partners in life and in pursuit of the moral Way but also how regularly they served as ethical and spiritual critics, advisors, and coaches to one another.16 One of the most revealing and important aspects of such exchanges is the recognition that two spouses know each other in ways few people do or can, both because of the challenges and intimacy they share—and in the case of Jeongildang the challenges often were quite formidable, pressing, and enduring—and the extended period of time they spend together. Not only does this offer a spouse a remarkable epistemological privilege, it also offers them the opportunity to hone their ability to give advice and ensures that the recipient of such advice will be inclined to trust that it is given with loving intent and often with a desire to facilitate a shared goal, in this case the quest for moral improvement. While all will acknowledge that the Confucian tradition sees the family as central to the good life and the site of much of the most important work of moral improvement, research on Confucian self-cultivation has rarely focused attention on the ways in which husbands and wives work together, often in the pursuit of shared projects, to promote their mutual moral improvement. These personal missives between Jeongildang and her husband open a rarely encountered window into a neglected yet vital corner of the Confucian ethical world, one that holds deep and powerful lessons for those interested in how to move themselves and others toward the good. It offers yet another example of the distinctive and original ways in which her writings are of profound and critical value while, at the same time, perhaps also helping us understand why her work is so poorly understood or appreciated by contemporary scholars of the Confucian tradition. Next, we introduce translations of two commemorations written by Jeongildang: one about the studio of a retired senior scholar she knew and one about her own home. Her commemoration of Late to Awaken Studio takes as its theme the name of the studio of the retired scholar Hong Jongseon 洪宗善. The name of his studio, Late to Awaken, is taken from a passage in the Mencius that describes those who are destined to awaken early, i.e. attain moral enlightenment before others, and their obligation to and role in then awakening others: i.e.

16 Readers

of Jeongildang’s other writings will know that she regularly offered encouragement as well as criticism and correction to other family members as well.

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those who are “late to awaken.” Hong Jongseon humbly named his studio late to awaken, and thereby offers Jeongildang a golden opportunity not only to discuss neo-Confucian views about self-cultivation, which she does by focusing on the role of reverence, but also to extol the many virtues of the master of this studio. In the course of her commemoration, she also manifests an admirable humility herself by repeatedly questioning whether she is really qualified to discuss such lofty and sublime ideas. The second commemoration is of her home, Tanwon,17 which appears in a number of her poems, either as topic or simply the site of composition, and is mentioned in other of her writings as well. It obviously offered her a cherished sanctuary from the many pressing problems that circumscribed and constrained her life; at the same time, it served to symbolize a number of moral and aesthetic ideals that she held dear. In the course of her commemoration, she presents a history and description of the home and its surrounding garden and comments on how it both reflects and encourages several virtuous traits that were characteristic of its owner—her husband—who himself is easy going. She supports the account and claims she makes by drawing from the classics and embellishing her commemoration with a well-crafted verse. This short and charming composition takes shape around and concludes with a central theme: “What can compare to wandering in a garden and always having an even and easy place?” Our final sample translation is one of two funeral epitaphs found among the extant writings of Jeongildang. We have chosen the epitaph she wrote for one of her daughters, whose name was Gyesuk 季淑. This is an especially interesting piece. Most works of this kind are written by a father, who speaks for himself and his wife. But this epitaph is written by a wife (Jeongildang) on behalf of her husband; on the one hand, it speaks for both of them, but, on the other hand, the actual author’s emotions and experiences are vividly on display. As mentioned in this work and noted in the opening section of our entry, Jeongildang gave birth to nine children all of whom perished before they were able to speak; Gyesuk was the last to be born. This epitaph is one of the few sources that offer us a glimpse into how these wrenching losses affected her and her husband, and as one might expect it overflows with tenderness, love, anguish, regret, and sorrow. With palpable joy, it describes a good natured and highly intelligent child who, “at the age of three to four months…was able to recognize her mother and father’s faces,” but laments that she passed away so early that her father and mother “never heard you call them ‘mother’ or ‘father.’” It also describes in excruciating detail Jeongildang’s inability to produce enough milk to suckle her daughter, how difficult it was to find wet nurses to augment her meagre supply of milk, and how they tried desperately to supplement this with rice gruel when milk was unavailable. The epitaph continues telling the story of their daughter’s short life, describing her downward spiral into illness that so soon led to her premature death. When Gyesuk died,

17 See

Footnote 12.

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her bereaved father was so weak that he could not travel all the way to their family graveyard, and so Gyesuk was put to rest in a grave beneath a hill near their village, which her parents hoped people in later times “will not plough over and ruin.” While the epitaph stoically attempts to proclaim that all life “must come to an end” and, citing the Mencius, that “there is nothing that is not according to fate,” its authors admit they cannot set aside their grief or let go of their emotions.

18.3 Translations from  The Extant Writings of Gang Jeongildang 18.3.1 Eighteen Poems Our first set of translations present a representative selection of Jeongildang’s philosophical poems. This is roughly half of her extant poetry. (1) Rhyme in Honor of My Mother-in-law Ji’ildang18 (1797) In elementary learning, the need is for sincere human relations, Be kind to the young and give rest to the elderly.19 Driving straight ahead20 following such behavior, Leads along the even and easy way.21

[Original rhyme, which provided the model for the poem above]: Spring comes; flowers bloom in abundance, Years go by; people gradually grow old. I sigh, what good would it do? I only want the one good way.

18 Ji’ildang

is a pen name of her mother-in-law, Lady Jeon. It was rare for a woman to have a pen name, which indicates her exceptional talent. It is said that she read the Confucian Classics and historical texts extensively and grasped their overarching principles. See the Collected Works of Gangjae (Gangjae jip 剛齋集) 20.12b. 19 Cf. Analects 5.26. 20 The image and sentiment are similar to what is found in “Eulogy to the Steeds of No” (No Song Gyeong; C. Lu Song Jiong 魯頌駉) Mao #297, quoted in Analects 2.4, which praises the Marquis of Lu for driving his chariot without swerving from the path. 21 This is a reference to a line in section three under the hexagram “To Tread” (i; C. lu 履) in the Book of Changes, that says, “treading the way that is even and easy” (i do tan tan; C. lu dao tan tan 履道坦坦).

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(2) Beginning to Study (1798) At thirty,22 I began my studies, Not knowing which direction to turn. From this day on, I must be diligent, Aspiring to be like the ancients.

(3) Seeing a Boy Attendant Punished at School If you are able to be cautious and careful, How could you go wrong? If now, you have regrets, Sincerely return to being solemn and serious!

(4) Self-Encouragement How fine and good it would be to enjoy life, Wandering around carefree and unconstrained! Take a lesson from those who failed to study, Sinking into old age, sighing in their hovels.

(5) Human Nature is Good Human nature originally is wholly good, Developing it fully,23 one becomes a sage. To desire humaneness, humaneness lies therein,24 Make pattern-principle clear to make oneself sincere.

(6) For My Husband (1) Ashamed of my lack of talent and virtue, When young, I studied needlework.

22 Since

she was born in 1772, we should understand this as a poetic way of saying that she began her studies as she was approaching thirty years of age. 23 Cf. Mencius 7A1 which discusses fully developing one’s heart-mind and knowing one’s nature. 24 Cf. Analects 7.30: The Master said, “Is humaneness far off? I desire humaneness, and lo and behold, humaneness arrives.”

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Authentic work requires exerting oneself, Do not be concerned about clothes and food.25

(7) Moved to Chant on New Year’s Eve I have wasted precious time doing nothing, Tomorrow, I shall be fifty-one years old! What good to sigh with sadness halfway through the night? Better to cultivate oneself throughout the remaining days.

(8) After Illness (1882) A dangerous illness, now fortunately has grown less severe, A clear autumn day, the open door makes me feel refreshed. How could my recovery be only the result of ginseng and herbs? Now, I truly understand the bright realm of sincerity.

(9) Reading the “Doctrine of the Mean” A work transmitted by the sage Jasa,26 Across the ages, continuing to open up [so much understanding].27 Substance stands upright, impartial and unbiased, Function operates freely, without error or defect.28 If in the beginning one can be watchful and cautious,29

25 In

this poem Jeongildang is urging her husband to focus on his studies and not worry about supporting the family, which she does through her needlework. This is a theme we also see in some of her personal missives. Nevertheless, it is her “authentic work” that enables his. 26 Jasa (C: Zisi) 子思 (c. 481–402 BCE), born Gong Geup (C: Kong Ji) 孔伋, was the only grandson of Gongja. He is credited with transmitting the Confucian Way to Maengja and writing four chapters of the Book of Rites (Yegi; C. Liji 禮記), including the Doctrine of the Mean. 27 Cf. Section 11 of Part one (sang; C. shang上) of the “Great Appendix” (Gyesa; C. Xici 繫辭) to the Book of Changes. 28 This and the prior line juxtapose substance (che; C: ti 體) and function (yong; C: yong 用), two terms of art among Neo-Confucian philosophers. Roughly, the former refers to the essential nature of a thing and the latter to the unhindered operation or functioning of that nature. A lighted lamp (substance) emits lamp light (function); the basic nature of human beings (substance) is humaneness (function). 29 The

opening chapter of the Doctrine of the Mean teaches that cultivated people are cautious from the very beginning and watchful over themselves when alone.

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In the end one can achieve equilibrium and harmony.30 The universal way unites the three virtues,31 Sincere! what can be added to pattern-principle?

(10) Sitting in the Night (1823) Deep in the night, all movement ceases, In the empty courtyard, the bright moon shines. My heart-mind is pure, as if washed clean, Suddenly, I comprehensively grasp the nature and feelings.32

(11) Three Stanzas Written in Tanwon (坦園)33 (Written on behalf of my husband).34 Living in the forest, drinking in the valley, Holding my books, taking care for myself.35 Reflecting on my prior efforts at self-cultivation.

30 The

opening chapter of the text concludes with the lines, “When the states of equilibrium and harmony exist in perfection, a happy order will prevail throughout heaven and earth, and all things will be nourished and flourish.”. 31 Chapter 20 of the Doctrine of the Mean includes the line, “Ruler and minister, father and son, husband and wife, elder and younger brothers, the relationship between friends—these five are the Universal Way under Heaven. Wisdom, humaneness, and courage are the Universal Virtues under Heaven.” 32 The idea that after prolonged study one experiences a “sudden and unifying” (hwaryeon; C huoran 豁然) enlightenment is found in the commentary of Ju Hui (C. Zhu Xi) 朱熹 (1130–1200 CE) to chapter five of the Great Learning. The idea finds it origin in a famous four-line stanza attributed to Bodhidharma. See, Heinrich Dumoulin, Zen Buddhism: A History. Volume 1: India and China. (World Wisdom Book, 2005): 85. 33 Tanwon is the name of Jeongildang’s family residence. Literally, it means “Tan’s Garden” and Tan is part of the pen name of her husband, Tanjae Yun Gwangyeon. But the word tan also means even, easy, and easy-going (see footnote #21 above) and Jeongildang associated all of these meanings with the place. She discusses the name and the place in the second Commemoration below, “Commemoration of Tanwon (坦園).” 34  The expression “written on behalf of my husband” appears numerous times throughout Gang Jeongildang’s corpus. Though presented “on behalf of” her husband, these works primarily express her own thoughts and illustrate the degree to which she and her husband, Yun Gwangyeon, were partners in pursuit of Confucian sagehood. “Written on behalf of [my] husband” (dae buja jak; C. dai fuzi zuo 代夫子作) gave Gang Jeongildang a voice that passed over (i.e. beyond) the walls of the inner quarters and afforded her a chance to participate in scholarly exchanges with male scholars of her time, even if only indirectly. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Gim (2005), especially p. 54. 35 Cf. Mencius 5A9. Thanks to Professor Youngmin Kim for pointing out this reference.

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I come close to discerning something profound. A knot of doubts obscures and blocks [the way], To whom can I turn for help? Following what is balanced and correct, Easy and even is this Way. The sun slants into the Dark Abyss,36 Ice and snow polish the mountains. I fodder the horses and grease the axles, On the road ahead, clouds stretch into the distance. I am weak and find it difficult to drive on, Pausing my ascent, I sigh. Encountering these late years of life, What can I do about my sadness and distress? Birds cry out, seeking their flocks, Fish dive, pursuing their schools. The season unfurls the warmth of spring, Their delight is free and easy. Why do I live in isolation? In the end, I rarely see old friends. I wish to discuss the three beneficial things [with them],37 And have them diligently admonish my mistakes.

(12) Encouraging the Youth You must be diligent when reading books, Do not squander the vitality of youth. How can you be satisfied with just memorization and recitation?38 You should aspire to be a sage or worthy!

36 The

“dark abyss” roughly translates Uyeon (C. Yuyuan) 虞淵 (the “Yu Abyss”) a legendary, deep body of water into which the sun “sinks” at the end of each day. See the “Patterns of Heaven” (Cheonmun; C. Tianwen 天文) chapter of the Hoenamja (C. Huainanzi 淮南子). 37 Analects 16.5 describes these as: taking joy in the careful study of ritual and music, speaking well of others, and having many worthy friends. 38 “Learning by memorization and recitation” (gisong ji hak; C. jisong zhi xue 記誦之學) was a common target of neo-Confucian criticism. It referred to a sterile type of learning and was opposed to “learning for oneself” (wigi ji hak; C. weiji zhi xue 爲己之學), which meant learning to improve oneself morally.

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(13) Written on the Occasion of the New Year’s Eve The ancient sages transmitted this way, Each and every person can act in accord with it. The enlightened heart-mind is reflected in icy water Its radiant light shines for a thousand autumns. Passing to one another the one word “reverence,”39 Who is able to unlock this bolt? Flying wildly into the distance is only wasted labor, If you want to make progress, you must seek what is near at hand.40 To the end of your life, continue to strengthen yourself, If you aspire to attain the way, can you dare to be tardy or lax?

(14) For My Husband (2) Since the day you began to follow Ganjae艮齋,41 You have sought the way and nothing else! Now it has been thirty years, How have you progressed in your studies?

(15) Governed by Reverence42 The myriad pattern-principles are the origin of heaven and earth, A single heart-mind unites the nature and the feelings.43 If you are not governed by reverence, How can you reach the distant goal?

39 Reverence

was one of main virtues in Confucianism, but it attained a special status for Ju Hui as the guiding principle of the Sages. See his Classified Sayings of Master Ju (Juja eoryu; C. Zhuzi yulei 朱子語類), 5.9a. Korean Confucianism, especially the school of Toegye 退溪 Yi Hwang李滉 (1501–1570) emphasizes it as the core teaching of the Sages–‘the entrance to the Way and the foundation for accumulating virtue’ (入道之門, 積德之基). See “Presentation Address” (jin Seonghak sipdo jam 進聖學十圖箚) of his Ten Diagrams for Sagely Learning (Seonghak sipdo 聖學十圖). 40  What is “near at hand” is one’s own self or heart-mind. This is a common theme among Confucians. For its locus classicus, see Analects 6.30. 41 It is not clear who this is. 42 From this point onwards, the year of composition is unclear. 43 This idea first appears in Jang Jae’s (Zhang Zai 張載) Completed Writings of Master Jang (Jangja jeonseo; C. Zhangzai quanshu 張子全書), 14.3b. Later, Ju Hui cites this idea in his commentary to Mencius 6A6. See Ju Hui, Collected Commentaries on the Mencius, 5.36a.

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(16) Gazing up at Master Gong Great indeed is the Master’s Virtue! Like the azure sea, vast and boundless. Oh! You who seek to measure [the ocean] with a ladle,44 How could you comprehend so many streams [of wisdom]?45

(17) A Guest Arrives A distant traveller who admires my husband, Says he came from the northern pass.46 Our family is poor, what is there to drink or eat? All I can offer is three cups of wine.

(18) Hymn to Sincerity and Reverence If not sincere, how can you have it?47 If not reverent, how can you preserve it?48 Only with both of these, Can you enter the gate of the way.49

18.3.2 Two Letters Our second set of selections are two letters by Jeongildang. The first is a letter of condolence to her uncle; the second a letter to her husband. As is clear from these

44 Trying

to measure the ocean with a ladle made from a gourd is a trope for someone of limited capacity attempting something beyond their ability. The biography of Dong Bangsak (C. Dong Fangshuo) 東方朔 in the History of the Han Dynasty (Hanseo; C. Hanshu 漢書) contains the line, “To peer at the heavens through a tube, measure the ocean with a ladle, or sound a great bell with a twig…” The earliest example of this kind of expression is the “Autumn Floods” chapter of the Jangja (C. Zhuangzi) 莊子, which has the line, “peeping at the heavens through a tube, or measuring the earth with an awl.” 45 The idea is that Gongja is like the ocean, drawing into himself all streams [of wisdom]. 46 Referring to the Northern Pass implies that the visitor came from Hamgyeong Province 咸鏡 道. 47 See chapter 26 of the Doctrine of the Mean. 48  We find this line the “Words” (Muneon; C. Wenyan 文言) commentary on the hexagram “Heaven” (geon; C. qian 乾) in the Book of Changes. 49 Cf. Analects 15.33.

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examples, letters often were occasions not only for personal communication but also for philosophical discussion and exploration. (1) Letter of Condolence to My Uncle Jungsil 中實 Gwon Ojae 權烏齋 50 Couriers are few and the distance between us great. Receiving no word from you left me in an anxious mood. Last winter, [my brother] Chwiyeo 就如 returned with your reply [to my last letter]. It was only then that I heard the news that my aunt (your wife) was dwelling in the lands below. I was shocked and full of remorse; what can I possibly say? She had not reached old age and always showed such energy; anyone would have said she was very healthy. I personally thought and certainly expected her to join the ranks of the truly venerable. How could I ever have imagined what now has occurred? When I suddenly received this terrible news, I dared to think about you, uncle, trying to manage your crushing grief and pain; it must be so difficult to cope with and control. When I think of seeing before me the image of your child wailing in grief at the loss of his mother,51 I feel the tragic cruelty in an especially poignant way; I cannot stop thinking about it even while eating or resting. Though I want to dispatch a special messenger to offer my condolences to you and my nephew and thereby share my most intimate feelings with you, because I have recently become incapacitated by illness, I am afraid I will not be able to arrange this. I am constrained by circumstances from fulfilling my duties. If this makes me appear cold and indifferent,52 I hold only myself to blame and so cannot overcome my sadness and grief. At the start of summer, I heard through Chiheung 致興 (n.d.) that my second maternal cousin had passed away. How miserable; how miserable—that someone of such great strength and integrity will not be able to enjoy the caring and generous virtue of your profound humaneness—that so many cataclysms, truly beyond anything one could dream of, have piled up one after another in a short period of time! [Whether one will enjoy] long life is something that cannot be known; [this] is pattern-principle.53 But, how could anyone suffer so many repeated disasters? In successive years, we have borne such upheavals. [Under such circumstances] even a well-to-do family wouldn’t have everything they need, how much more so one that is struggling and poor? Over the entire course of carrying out and overseeing the ritual, there must have been times when [you] were hard-pressed for

50 The

date of composition is unclear but probably written in the spring of 1804. the “Minor Odes” chapter of the Book of Poetry, Mao #202. 52 Literally: “Like [the people of Jin (C. Qin) 秦] looking at [the people] of Wol (C. Yue) 越.” During the Spring and Autumn Period (5th century BCE) the state of Wol was in the extreme Southeast of China and the state of Jin was in the extreme Northwest. And so, the two states became a trope for expressing extreme difference, distance, or in this case indifference. 53 Noble people do not concern themselves with longevity but with living morally upright lives. The span of their lives is simply a matter of destiny or fate and up to Heaven. Mencius 7A1 teaches that one who seeks to establish his true moral destiny must not be concerned with premature death or long life. To say that not knowing whether one will enjoy long life “is pattern-principle” is to say that this is what is proper. 51 See

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cash, and so there must have been some aspects of the funerary rite that you were unable to attend to properly. Moreover, you have suffered this unbearable experience repeatedly. Whenever I start thinking that all of this might lead you to not take proper care of yourself, my grief mounts and tears well up. My illness has gradually become long and lingering. My husband has also been distressed for some time about his persistent malady. [As a consequence] the other difficulties that life presents are simply growing worse over time. Last month I suffered the loss of my child, but as I am serving my parents-in-law, how could I express my emotions fully? All my feelings are piled up and go well beyond this, but I cannot bear to write about all of them here. I wish you good health and peace. This letter is incomplete, but please receive it. (2) Letter to My Husband (Written in the winter of 1830): May I ask how you were last night compared to the prior day? After your return from Hoedeok 懷德,54 I had hoped to celebrate with you and pass along some recent news, but I experienced a recurrence of my dreaded illness, which left me unsettled and disoriented, I was worried that moving around too much at this time would make my condition worse. Moreover, throughout the day, our guests monopolized all of my attention, and so I have not been able to talk with you. This morning, however, my health was slightly improved and our guests have dispersed. Fortunately, there was some food and wine left over, so I thought I would wait, out of respect, until after the time for morning greetings and then would prepare and present these as an offering. By then it was already noontime, and I still had not received orders to prepare your wash basin. I dare to think that your health has lost its inner harmony and you have not yet fully recovered. I am very concerned about you. I heard that when you were with your teacher, you received instruction concerning the lines about “not looking at, listening to, speaking, or acting in any way that is not in accord with the rites”55 and want to carve these [onto a plaque] and display them above our library. I think this would be very auspicious and delightful! These four lines are Gongja’s response to Anja [when he asked about the process leading to humaneness], and Anja took these as his guide until the end of his days, so that he could make progress toward the goal of becoming a sage. Moreover, your late grandfather often wrote these lines out in order to spur himself onward and teach those that followed. I dare to hope that you look up to this important lesson that Gongja handed down to Anja, keep in mind this supreme admonition and warning [bequeathed] by your ancestor, and carry on your teacher’s thought to exert yourself earnestly—never lagging day or night and

54  Hoedeok

is a township located in Daejeon, South Chungcheong 忠淸 Province (Chungcheongnam-do), in which Yun’s teacher Gangjae 剛齋 Song Chigyu 宋穉圭 (1759–1838 CE), the 6th descendant of Song Siyeol, resided. 55 Analects 12.1.

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keeping it always before your eyes. The word “self” (gi; C. ji 己)56 means that the desires of one’s heart-mind are not fully in accord with the dictates of Heavenly pattern-principle. The rites are the regulation and embellishment of pattern-principle.57 One must first be clear about what is according to the rites and what is not; then, one must courageously cut off self-centeredness. When one completely accords with Heavenly pattern-principle, one can attain the Way. I dare to urge you to look up to and exert yourself in this manner. I have more to say when we meet. [Please overlook the fact that] this letter is incomplete.

18.3.3 Twenty-Six Personal Missives The third group of translations are twenty-six examples of Jeongildang’s personal missives to her husband. We have a substantial number of her personal missives and the selection here is less than half the total in The Extant Writings of Jeongildang. (1) This morning, an old woman arrived offering a peck of rice and a catty of meat. I asked her the reason and she replied, “When I was travelling outside the town, I was accosted by vagabonds. Your husband happened to be passing by and in tears I appealed58 for his help [standing] at the foot of his horse. He harshly upbraided the vagabonds and, subsequently, I was able to avoid them. I was profoundly moved by his kindness, and so, I offer this to show my sincerity.” When [the old woman came to our house,] I heard you entertaining visitors in the men’s quarters and so did not dare to disturb you; on my own, I decided to return what she had offered. The old woman firmly and resolutely would not accept this, and so I told her, “Once, even after my husband had not eaten for seven days, he still declined a gift of one thousand gold coins. How can I possibly accept what you bring?” The old woman then sighed, picked up her rice and meat, and left. Though she offered her gift with the sincere intention [of expressing her gratitude], had I accepted it, I would have been suspected of selling your favor, and so I handled it in this way. I don’t know what you think about this.

56 .

Reading the character 未 as 夫. Members of the orthodox Cheng-Zhu School of NeoConfucianism tend to take “self” (gi; C. ji 己) as indicating “self-centered desires.” See for example Ju Hui’s commentary on Analects 12.1, where he says, “‘Self’ refers to the self-centered desires of the physical self.” 57  This is a line that appears throughout Ju Hui’s writings. For example, see his comments on Analects 1.12 and 12.1 in his Collected Commentaries on the Four Books in Sections and Sentences (Saseo janggu jipju; C. Sishu zhangzhu jizhu 四書章句集注). 58 Reading 訢 as 訴 in the original.

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(2) Suddenly, I heard you reprimand someone; your tone was overly harsh. This is not the middle way. If you seek to correct this person in this way—without first being correct yourself—how can this be regarded as acceptable? I hope that you will think about this further. (3) The Book of Changes says, “Be moderate in eating and drinking.”59 Wine is an important60 aspect of eating and drinking. I hope you will be moderate in your drinking and careful in regard to your virtue. (4) Suddenly, for some reason, you reprimanded someone harshly; might you have come close to overstepping the mean in your reprimand? Noble people must take special care to apply themselves in regard to their voice, expression, and speech. The Book of Poetry says, “The mild and respectful person. Such a one possesses the foundation of Virtue.”61 I dare respectfully to counsel you that you were a bit lacking in mild and harmonious temperament when you reprimanded that person. (5) This morning our guest (the Licentiate [Sangsa 上舍]62 Yi Wonjung 李遠重) departed; why did you not implore him to remain? It is not proper to treat even common people this way, how much less so a worthy! I think you must have done this because, with me being ill, you worried about how much work this would require [of me]. Nevertheless, there are still a few measures of rice in our storage jars, and my illness is slightly better than it was yesterday. How can you allow your concern for one woman’s labor to come before the proper regulation of your family? The [importance of the] rites governing the reception of a guest comes right after that governing offerings to one’s ancestors. This is a great affair for one’s family; you must not be the slightest remiss in this regard. (6) If I have real Virtue, even if people do not know this, how does it harm [my Virtue]? If I lack real Virtue, even if people offer empty praise, how does this add to [my Virtue]? If I have a piece of jade and people say it is just an ordinary stone, this does no harm to the jade. If I have a stone and people say it is a piece of jade, this does not add to the stone. I want you, my husband, to work at real Virtue. Do not be ashamed beneath heaven; do not be mortified upon the earth63; do not be distressed whether people know or do not know.64

59 See

the Sang (C. Xiang) 象 commentary on the hexagram I (C. Yi) 頤 in the Book of Changes. 犬 as 大. 61 These lines are from the “Greater Odes” chapter of the Book of Poetry, Mao #256. 62 “Licentiate” (Sangsa 上舍) indicates those who have passed the lower licentiate examination (Sogwa 小科). 63 Cf. Mencius 7A20. 64 The idea that a person of genuine virtue is not concerned whether or not he is recognized is found in Analects 1.1. The metaphor of stone and jade recalls the well-known story of Mr. He’s jade (Hwassibyeok; C. Heshibi 和氏璧) in chapter thirteen of the Hanbija (C. Hanfeizi) 韓非子. 60 Reading

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(7) The Gwon child (Yongseok 用錫), the older cousin of ([Gwon] Yongjik 用 稷), came to [study with] you. He received a careful and thorough education. You surely should not turn down anyone who comes [to study with you], how much more so one whose father and elder brother eagerly beseech you and who comes with a genuine heart-mind (silsim 實心). Furthermore, you should teach him in light of the kind of person he is. For example, Hong Sameung 洪 三隱 ([Samueng is] a pen name of [Hong] Uiseop 義燮) and Jo Jaan 趙子 安 (Inseok 仁錫) have sincerely filial heart-minds, and so, it is easy to teach them the Way to serve their parents. Jang Jungsim 張仲深 (Yeon 淵) has a natural aptitude for humaneness and integrity and so it is easy to help him advance to being a good person. From these two examples, you can infer what to do with the rest. (8) Song Mokcheon 宋木川 (Heumseong 欽成) is an heir of [Song] Gangjae 剛 齋. The Licentiate Gim (Byeong’un 炳雲) is the grandson of [Gim] Miho 渼 湖.65 They have called upon you repeatedly. Very sensibly, you were deeply interested in receiving them, but each time, because of our poverty and hardship, you were unable to do as you desired. How regrettable! I have heard that these two worthies are upright, honest, easy going, and agreeable.66 I hope you will get together and have an earnest and urgent face to face discussion with them in order to encourage one another [to greater achievement]. What do you think? (9) You offered some rich person three cups of wine [when he visited our home], isn’t this excessive? [On the other hand] Yeongwon 鈴原 (Second Minister [Champan 參判] Yun Haengjik 尹行直) (1760 CE-?),67 who is an old man, was not even offered [a bowl of] soup or stew [when he visited]. Isn’t that regrettable? Though it is a small thing, still, how can it not be taken into account? (10) Yi Myeongbu 李明夫 (Byeongdeok 炳悳) lives in a valley in the countryside. Although he has no teachers or friends living nearby, still, on his own, he earnestly pursues learning. Whenever I look at the letters he sends you, a sense of real learning permeates all that he has written, and I sigh in deep admiration. Please do your best to convey [these ideas]68 when you reply, so that he will increase his effort and achieve further advancement. (11) Father and son are one; a father should be kind [to his son] and a son should be filial [to his father]. I ask that you be more kind and loving to

65 A

pen name of Gim Wonhaeng 金元行 (1702–72 CE). The twelfth year of Duke Hui (C. Xi) 僖 in the Chronicle of Zou (Jwajeon; C. Zouzhuan 左

66 Cf.

傳). 67 Yeongwon 鈴原 seems to be the fief title of Yun Haengjik 尹行直, who held the official rank of Second Minister (Champan 參判). See the Veritable Records of King Sunjo (Sunjo sillok 純祖實 錄) 23.30a. 68 This line invokes a line from Sect. 12 of the first book of the “Great Commentary” (繫辭傳) of the Book of Changes, which describes how difficult it can be to fully express what one intends. It says, “Writing does not fully convey speech; speech does not fully convey ideas.”

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Heumgyu 欽圭.69 A disciple should love his teacher as if he were a father. A teacher should regard his disciple as if he were his son. This is the Way of the ancients. I ask that, though you extend your love out broadly, you show greater love and sincerely teach those who make a wholehearted effort to improve themselves and see whether this proves successful. (12) I humbly ask how your illness was last night? The wind driven snow has been overpoweringly strong and the room is as cold as ice. I fear this will only add to your difficulties. Last month, Geunjin 謹鎭70 gathered up the chestnuts in the courtyard; he selected out more than a liter of the largest ones and along with several pieces of meat brought them as a gift, and so I stored them away. I just took them out to look at them and discovered that half the chestnuts had been eaten by rats and the meat had turned bad. I pared away the bad parts, washed what remained, and then roasted it over the fire. I still had a little money [that I had set aside] for buying paper and used it to purchase some wine, which I have warmed up and sent to you [along with this food]. Though it is a small thing, do not forget the difficulty [people had to undergo] to bring these to you. Once your hunger has abated a bit turn back to your studies; do not waste any time. I pray for your success at all costs. (13) “The clothes of Munjungja (C. Wenzhongzi) 文中子 (583–616 CE)71 were simple but clean.”72 Now your clothes are simple enough but not clean. To be simple is your Virtue, my husband. If your clothes are dirty and filthy and are not washed clean or if they have rips and holes that are not patched, this is my fault. I am solemnly waiting with lye, needle, and thread for you to call upon me. (14) I heard that one boy’s family had not had firewood to burn for four days, while we had not lit a fire for three days. I could not accept the gift that he offered us, even more so because it was not his parent’s idea to offer the gift but something he came up with on his own. Even had it been something as minor as a liter of rice or a single copper coin, it would not have been in accord with righteousness. In cases like the gift the Gim child offered, even if had been as much as a stone’s73 weight of rice, since it was given and received in friendship and his parents told him to offer it, it would have been inappropriate for me to refuse. (15) Righteousness is the source of good order; profit is the pivot of chaos. I have heard that lately some people who talk at length about profit have come and

69 Heumgyu

was their adopted son. heir of the mainline of a lineage (jongson; C. zongsun 宗孫) of Gang Jeongildang’s husband. 71 . Munjungja is a posthumous title of Wang Tong (C. Wang Tong) 王通 (583–616 CE) in the Su (C. Sui 隋) Dynasty. 72 See the Collected Commentaries on the Elementary Learning (Sohak jipju; C. Xiaoxue jizhu 小 學集註) 6.39a. 73 A “stone” is a unit of dry measure for grain equal to 120 L. 70  An

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reside outside our school. I fear that the students of our school will grow accustomed to hearing such talk and that it will slowly seep into them. Why didn’t you keep such people at a distance early on? The way to keep them at a distance lies not in hating them but in being strict. Straighten your clothes and cap, respectfully fix your gaze upon them, and be completely devoid of any speech or action that is contrary to ritual; then they will distance themselves from you on their own. (16) People have humaneness and righteousness just as the four seasons have spring and fall. When one talks of humaneness, the rites are there within it; when one talks of righteousness, wisdom is there within it. There is no need for doubt. (17) Teachers are where the Way lies; they are one with lords and fathers. Visiting one’s teacher to inquire about his welfare is no different from going to ask about the welfare of one’s parents. So, how can you allow my current distress to stop you from going to see him [i.e. your teacher]? Though my illness is severe, it is not necessarily fatal. Like the master when he heard the Way, though I die I would be honored to do so.74 I want you to drive on at full speed down this path! (18) To serve one’s parents but be partial to one’s wife is to be less than earnest in filial piety. To serve one’s lord but be partial to one’s wife is to be less than conscientious. To serve one’s teacher but be partial to one’s wife is to be less than sincere in one’s learning. You can extend this to each and every affair. Though I am not clever, I do not want you to be partial to me. If you ever were to be partial and have it harm your Virtuous achievements, though it would lead to me being rich, noble, peaceful, and at ease I would rather die from poverty and hunger. Please make a greater effort in this regard! In all that I write and send to you, I am direct and blunt and thereby stray far from the proper Way for a wife to behave. Nevertheless, the elder Sim Guheon 沈 愳軒 (Sadong 師東) once said that you have some capacity for being open and receptive.75 Moreover, I try to take up and follow the teaching of speaking directly in accordance with how things are. And so, I dare not but say everything that is called for. If when you have made a mistake you show even a slight reluctance to amend your ways or you repeat your mistake after having corrected it earlier, then in the end you will have no way to advance in Virtue. I ask you to put forth more effort, put forth more effort! (19) Poverty is the fate of scholars; simplicity is the root of things. To rest in fate, protect the root, and “pursue that which one loves”76—there is no greater joy

74 Analects

4.8 says, “If one hears the Way in the morning one may die that evening without regret.” 75 See the Sang (C. Xiang) 象 commentary on the hexagram Ham (C. Xian) 咸 in the Book of Changes. 76 Analects 7.12.

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than this!77 Whether it is the nobility of Three Ducal Ministers78 or wealth from a vast salary, if it is not the way, I do not want your thoughts to linger upon it. Do we not have the teachings of master Gong, “Wealth and honor gained in ways contrary to righteousness are to me like floating clouds.”79 (20) I want you to be good but forget about the good, to be without transgressions but think about transgression, to see good as if it were your own, to see bad as if it were a pox upon you. A noble person cannot be without the courage to be moral and must not be angry. Now, I heard that when you upbraided someone you were excessive in both expression and tone. If this is true, then it has done harm to your moral self-cultivation. Please be on guard against this. (21) It was the third morning I had not cooked anything, when one of the boy attendants [from the school] came back with a rolled up pumpkin vine. Looking through it, I found it concealed several fist-sized pieces of fruit. I cut them up and made soup but had no wine to serve with it. Since I only have this soup to offer, I cannot help sighing with anxiety. Virtue must be cultivated each and every day. Learning too must be discussed each and every day. In discussing learning, nothing comes before reading books. I have heard that you have just started reading the Book of Changes and that Yi Eunha's 李銀 河 son (Manyeong 晩英) will come to spend the winter. He is a Confucian who has studied the classics since he was a youth; it is great that the two of you will mutually be able to discuss and debate together. I hope that you will write down what you discuss each day on a piece of paper and show it to me. That would be most fortunate! That would be most fortunate! (22) I am deeply distraught because it has been several days and you have not recovered from the disease afflicting your eyes. I would like you to close your eyes and sit up straight, relax and refrain from thought, ease your heart-mind and let your gi-material settle, preserve and nurture your heart-mind. This not only is a method to address your malady, it will also assist in the work of honoring the virtuous nature.80 (23) To act without ulterior motive is how noble people accord with the pattern-principle of Heaven. To act for some ulterior motive is the way of petty people who have given in to human desires. If one can sincerely turn within oneself and look for it [i.e., the original heart-mind], clearly [understand] it, and act out of it, then calmly and easily, you will be in command and unopposed.

77 Cf.

Mencius 7A4 where the same expression appears, “To examine oneself and find one is sincere, there is no greater joy than this!” 78 The collective name of the three most eminent official positions in ancient China. 79 Analects 7.16. 80 “Honoring the virtuous nature” (jondeokseong; C. cundexing 尊德性) was the internal complement of “pursuing inquiry and study” (domunhak; C. daowenxue 道問學); together these comprised the orthodox neo-Confucian approach to self-cultivation.

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(24) Whether human beings live long or die young, whether they succeed or fail— these are matters of fate.81 But if one is a father or mother and listens to the common talk of the age, which says that teaching your daughters to read is a great calamity, and as a result most women and girls don’t know anything about morality—this is laughable! (25) Im Yunjidang said, “Though I am a woman, still, the nature I originally received contained no distinction between male and female.”82 She also said, “Women who do not aspire to be a Tae Im (C. Tai Ren) 太任83 and Tae Sa (C. Tai Si) 太姒84 all are “throwing themselves away.”85 And so, though one is a woman, if one is able to apply oneself then one can reach the level of a sage. I have not yet inquired about what you, my husband, think about this. (26) I am a housewife, sequestered in the inner quarters, not hearing or knowing about anything [outside]. Still, when I have a break from my needlework and cleaning, I study the classical writings, plumbing their moral principles and emulating the conduct they describe, longing to join those who have cultivated themselves in earlier times. As a man, you are free to establish a commitment and seek the Way,86 follow teachers and choose friends, and diligently improve yourself. What is there that through study you are unable to do? What is there that through discussion you are not able to understand clearly? What is there that through implementation you cannot fully carry out? By acting out of humaneness and righteousness87 you can establish what is balanced and correct.88 Who can stop you from becoming a sage or a worthy? [You think to yourself] the sages and worthies were men; I too am a man—so what have I to fear! I entreat you myriad times to renew your

81 Cf.

Mencius 7A1. “Exposition on Overcoming the self and returning to the rites is humaneness,” in Chap. 17 of this volume. 83 Tae Im was the wife of King Gye (C. Ji) 王季, a leader of the state of Ju (Zhou) 周 during the Sang (C. Shang) 商 dynasty. His son King Mun (C. Wen) 文 and grandson King Mu (C. Wu) 武 defeated the Sang to establish the Ju dynasty. Tae Im, along with the mythical Gang Won (C. Jiang Yuan) 姜嫄, were credited with being responsible for the rise and success of the Ju. 84 Tae Sa (c. twelfth-eleventh century BCE) was the wife of King Mun. Among her esteemed ancestors was U (C. Yu) the Great 大禹, founder of the Ha (C. Xia) 夏 dynasty. She gave birth to ten sons, including King Mu, founder of the Ju dynasty and his younger brother, the Duke of Ju 周公. 85 Quoting Mencius 4B57. See also the Supplement to the Extant Writings of Yunjidang (Jeongildang yugo burok 允摯堂遺稿附錄), 6a. 86 Compare Analects 2.4, which begins with Confucius declaring, “At fifteen, I set my heart on learning.”. 87 See Mencius 4B19 for the idea of acting out of humaneness and righteousness. 88 The idea of attaining what is “balanced and correct” (jungjeong; C. hongzheng 中正) is found in works such as the “Record of Music” and “Doctrine of the Mean,” both chapters in the Book of Rites. 82 See Yunjidang’s

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Virtue with each day89 and to make becoming a sage or worthy your highest imperative!

18.3.4 Two Commemorations Next we present two short Commemorations Jeongildang wrote: one about the studio of a retired senior scholar and one about her own home. These represent the genre and her own work well. Her home was a theme that appeared in a number of her poems, either as topic or simply the site of composition, and is mentioned in other of her writings as well. It obviously offered her a sanctuary from the many pressing problems that constrained and circumscribed her life; at the same time, it served to symbolize a number of moral and aesthetic ideals that she held dear. (1) Commemoration of Late to Awaken Studio ([Residence and] pen name of the Retired Scholar Hong Jongseon 洪宗善90 (Written on behalf of my husband).

In the learning of we Confucians, reverence is the guiding principle, but in order to be reverent it is essential that the heart-mind be awakened. One must constantly cleanse and uplift it, as if waking it from sleep or rousing it from drunkenness. When water is still, the waves upon it grow still; when a mirror is clean, the dust upon it dissipates. Is this not simply the purposeful activity (gongbu; C. gongfu 功夫) of taking oneness as one’s guiding principle?91 When human beings are born, there certainly are differences in the clarity and turbidity and the purity and impurity of their gi-material. It is easy for those who are clear and pure to become good; it is difficult for those who are turbid and impure to return to their nature. And so, there are the most wise whose brilliance penetrates throughout the universe and the most stupid whose ignorance and confusion remain until the end of their days.92 This is why the sages and worthies of ancient times singled out the one word “reverence” as the key

89 Cf.

Chapter 6 of the Great Learning. Jongseon 洪宗善 (1768–1840 CE) seems to be the great-grandson of Hong Juhwa 洪胄 華 (1660–1718 CE), pen name Maneun 晩隱, a student of Song Siyeol. 91 “Taking oneness as one’s guiding principle” (ju il; C. zhu yi 主一) is a signature teaching of the Jeong-Ju (C. Cheng-Zhu) 程朱 School. It was first brought to prominence by Jeong I who linked it with the idea of maintaining an attitude of reverential attention (gyeong; C. jing 敬). See, for example, chapters 15 and 24 of Extant Works of the Two Jeong’s (I Jeong yuseo; C. Er Cheng yishu 二程遺書) and was often invoked by Ju Hui. See, for example, Chap. 1 of the Classified Sayings of Master Ju or his commentary on Analects 1.5 in Collected Commentaries on the Analects (Lunyu jizhu 論語集註). 92 Analects 17.3 says, “The Master said, ‘Only the most wise and the most stupid cannot be changed.’” 90 Hong

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to the gate of Virtue. The essential point is nothing more than to awaken the self and awaken others. Now, Master Hong of Namyang 南陽93 is peaceful and calm by nature and filial and friendly in his conduct; he proceeds through the [correct] gate and follows the [proper] path of learning and is earnest in pursuing self-cultivation. The studio in which he resides is called “Late to Awaken,” and he asked me to write a commemoration of it. I am ignorant, benighted, and lost; how can I dare to analyze and explain the principle of awakening the heart-mind? I have, though, heard from my teachers and elders that reverence corrects a single thought and thereby conquers a hundred depravities; threads together activity and stillness and thereby penetrates both the beginning and the end. When it attains its highest form, one’s spirit is clear and luminous and one’s heart-mind is constantly awake. Next year, I will be fifty years old; when I think about how Baegok (C. Boyu)94 understood his faults, I know I have no hope of equalling him! Master Hong is of venerable age and outstanding in Virtue; he can surely be called “one of Heaven’s people who is first to awaken”95—how could he possibly be said to be “late to awaken?” I found it difficult to turn down his earnest request, so as an expedient, I drew upon an explanation of maintaining reverence. I offer this [as my commemoration] and will try to [use it to] improve myself.

(2) Commemoration of Tanwon (坦園)96

What is Tanwon? It is the garden (won 園) of Tanjae 坦齋.97 Why is it called Tanwon? The old name for the garden was Seowon (C. Xuwon 徐園), since the surname of the original owner was Seo (C. Xu 徐). It was also called Seowon (C. Xiwon 西園) since it is located in the western (seo; C. xi 西) part of Hansa 漢師.98 Now, though, Master Tanjae resides there, so why should it not be called Tanwon? The Home of Venerable Jeong [Hyun] (Jeong Gong Hyang; C. Zheng Xuan Xiang 鄭公鄕),99 the Village of Go Yang (Go Yang Li; C. Gao

93 Township

in Gyeonggi Province, which is an ancestral home of the Hong Clan. Baegok (C. Qu Boyu) 蘧伯玉 or Geo Won (C. Qu Yuan) 蘧瑗 was a worthy minister of the Spring and Autumn Period renowned for reflecting on his own faults. The “On the Dao” (Won Do; C. Yuan Dao 原道) chapter of the Hoenamja (C. Huainanzi) 淮南子 says, “When he reached the age of fifty, he understood all that he had done wrong in the previous forty-nine years.” He appears and is praised in several passages in the Analects (e.g. 14.25 and 15.7). 95 See Mencius 5A7. 96 See Footnote 33. 97 Tanjae is a pen name of Yun Gwangyeon 尹光演 (1778–1838 CE), Jeongildang’s husband. 98 Hansa 漢師 is another name of Hanyang 漢陽, an old name of Seoul. See the Veritable Records of King Sukjong (Sukjong sillok 肅宗實錄) 15A.3b. 99 When Jeong Hyun (C. Zheng Xuan) 鄭玄 (127–200 CE) came back to his hometown, Gomil (C. Gaomi) 高密, Bukye (C. Beihai) 北海 Commandery (modern Weifang 潍坊, Shandong 山 東), Gong Ryung (C. Kong Rong) 孔融 (153–208 CE), then the chancellor of Bukye, established the village of Zheng gong xiang (The Venerable Zheng’s Village) in Jeong Hyun’s honor. See History of the Later Han (Hu Han Seo; C. Hou Han Shu 後漢書) 65.16a–b. See also Knechtges and Chang, Vol.1 (2010, 460). 94 Geo

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Yang Li 高陽里),100 the Embankment of So [Sik] (So Je; C. Su Di 蘇堤),101 the Pavilion of Gu[yang Su] (Gu Jeong; C. Ou Ting 歐亭),102 all are [places] that were named after people, so is it not fitting to call [this] garden Tanwon, [the Garden of Tanjae]? Who gave [Yun Gwangyeon] the pen name Tan[jae]? Mr. Song Gangjae 宋剛齋 gave it to him. What does it mean to call one’s residence Tan? [The Analects says,] “The noble person is easy-going (tan 坦) and composed.”103 If you were to look at Tanwon you would find its soil rocky and poor, its trees crooked and drooping, and its buildings narrow and cramped. Parts of it soar on high, such as Looking Down and Looking Up Terrace and Central Harmony Altar104; others rise up precipitously, such as the Ascending Knoll and Culture Mound. Herb and Jade Path is hidden and meanders away; Little Gon105 Creek slants off and then makes a bend. One cannot really say that the garden is “easy-going” (tan). Nevertheless, its master has an easy-going heart-mind and follows an easy-going way.106 [For him] the wild stream in the valley no longer drops precipitously, the household living in the jade cave with a wicker door no longer is in distress.107 Safeguard your treasure! Take the reins of the horses in your hands, and drive straight to the realm of humaneness and righteousness. Look at the rocky and poor, the crooked and drooping, the narrow and cramped, the soaring on high and the rising up precipitously, the hidden and slanting off—wherever one turns there is no even and easy path. [But] if one piles up [its] rocks, one can make a mountain; if one draws from [its] spring one can make a pond. One can plant flowers and cultivate fruits, grow vegetables, and raise medicinal herbs. You can support

100 The village is named after Go Yang (C. Gao Yang) 高陽, one of five mythical rulers in ancient China. See the Book of the Later Han (Hu Han Seo; C. Hou Han Shu 後漢書) 92.2a. 101 It is a mound of earth found on the shores of West Lake constructed by Dongpa So Sik (C. Dongpo Su Shi) 東坡 蘇軾 (1036–1101 CE) when he was prefect of Hangju (C. Hangzhou) 杭州 out of mud dredged up from the lake. See the Unofficial History of the Scholars (Yurim oesa; C. Rulin waishi 儒林外史) 6.9a. 102  It refers the Pavilion of Drunken Old Man (Chwiong Jeong; C. Zuiweng Ting 醉翁亭). Chwiong is a penname of Guyang Su (C. Ouyang Xiu) 歐陽脩 (1017–1072 CE). He left the “Record of Drunken Old Man Pavilion” (Chwiong jeonggi; Zuiweng tingji 醉翁亭記). See A Later Collection on the True Treasure Great Compendium of Detailed Explanations of Ancient Writings (Sangseol Gomun jinbo hujip; C. Guwen zhenbao houji 詳說古文眞寶大全後集). 103 Analects 7.37. 104 The names Looking Up and Looking Down and Central Harmony come from the Record of Music chapter of the Book of Rites. 105 The Gonryun (C. Kunlun) 崑崙 Mountains are one of the longest mountain ranges in Asia and form the northern edge of the Tibetan Plateau. “Little Gon” thus has the sense of a microcosm within the garden. 106 See note #21 above about “treading the way that is even and easy” (履道坦坦). 107 This is a rhymed couplet. “Living in the jade cave with a wicker door” indicates a household that is financially distressed. In this context it seems to refer to Yun Gwangyeon’s household and indicates that the garden was a refuge for him and his wife.

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yourself in a leisurely way. While playing the lute, drinking, and reading books, you can spend days with friends from the mountains and guests from the wilds, wandering free and easy, doing as you please.108 Make light of rank and salary with high and mighty officials. This is the true joy of the master of Tanwon! “Those with fat [horses for their carriages] and [wearing] light furs,”109 enjoying pleasant journeys along broad and even roads, will be knocked down and grow despondent when they encounter a reversal in fortune. How can this compare to wandering in a garden and always having an even and easy place? The Book of Changes refers to “[treading] the way that is even and easy.”110 It also mentions, “Adorned by (the denizens of) hills and gardens.”111 This describes the master of Tanwon.

18.3.5 Funeral Epitaphs Our final translation represents the genre of funeral epitaph. The example below is Jeongildang’s epitaph for one of her daughters; it is one of two epitaphs that are among her extant writings. Funeral Epitaph for My Deceased Daughter112 (Written on behalf of my husband) Alas! This is the resting place of Papyeong 坡平 Yun Gwangyeon’s 尹光演 (17781838 CE)113 deceased daughter who died in childhood. Her name was Gyesuk 季 淑; her mother was Madam Gang.114 Our child was born on the 29th day of the eighth month in 1814, in our residence Tanwon 坦園 in Yakyeon 藥峴.115 On the outside, she was upright and correct; on the inside, she was bright and intelligent. At the age of three to four months, she was able to recognize her mother and

108 The language here is drawn from the Jangja—free and easy wandering (so yo yu; C. xiao yao you 逍遙遊) is the name of the first chapter of this work—and implies spending leisure time with Buddhists, Daoists, and other recluses or refugees from normal society. 109 Analects 6.4 talks about those with too much wealth having “fat horses for their carriages and wearing light furs.”. 110 See Footnotes 106 and 21. 111 We find this line under the hexagram “To Adorn” (bi; C. bi 賁) in the Book of Changes. 112 This was written on the occasion of the death of Gang Jeongildang’s fourth daughter and ninth child, the last child she gave birth to. 113 This is Gang Jeongildang’s husband; Papyeong is the name of his ancestral home (bongwan; C. benguan 本貫), which is the seat of his family lineage. The seat does not always refer to the regional origin of the lineage founder, but often the place where one of the lineage men rose to a high government post or became a prominent Confucian scholar. 114 I.e. Gang Jeongildang. 115 The current name of the place is Jungnim 中林 district in Seoul.

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father’s faces. Even when she was crying, she would immediately stop as soon as she saw her mother or father. When we drew close to her, she would smile; when we drew away from her, she would look after us. Isn’t it as Ju Hui said, “Even a child lacking understanding will smile if it sees its father.”116 Earlier, five sons and three daughters had been born to us, all of whom passed away before they could speak. Their mother and father never heard any of these children call them “mother” or “father.” This child was the last to be born. We had hoped she would grow up and we would love her as if she was a son. Unfortunately, from the moment she was born, her mother did not produce enough milk to feed her. When she was just seven days old, we wrapped her in a baby blanket and brought her to be nursed by others. She struggled to live on this weak trickle of milk, and so we paid no heed to the weather or distance and fed her rice gruel in between [such visits]. Outside she was assaulted by gi-material, so inside her stomach suffered damage; it was no surprise that she became ill. Her family was poor and it was a year of famine. Family and friends who knew of our situation wanted to help and provide for our needs, but it was difficult for them to continue supplying us. When she became ill, she suffered from severe diarrhea. Medicine fortunately enabled her to last out the month, but in the end it could not save her. She died on the fourth day of the first month of 1815; her life did not last a full year. Our family graveyard is located in Gwangneung 廣陵,117 but my strength was not sufficient to travel all the way to it. And so, we dug a shallow grave at the foot of the right hand hill of Split Peak (Takbong 坼峯), south of our village, and, on the fourteenth day of the month we laid her to rest there. Alas! All things with blood and gi-material, when they are given life it must come to an end. “There is nothing that is not according to fate.”118 Those that do not get what is needed to nourish them and are not able to complete their nature—can’t this too be regarded as fate? The short life of this child is surely the result of fate, but is it not also the fault of human failure? I cannot set aside my grief! And so, I have written down a record of it. Is this not letting my emotions go too far? If only those in later times will forgive me and not plough over [her grave] and ruin it. Her father is Papyeong Yun Gwangyeon, [courtesy name] Myeongjik. Memorialized by her father.

Bibliography Ban, G. 班固. History of the Han Dynasty (Han Seo; C. Han shu 漢書). https://ctext.org/han-shu. Beom, Y. 范曄. History of the Later Han (Hu Han Seo; C. Hou Han Shu 後漢書). SKQS ed. Book of Changes (Yeokgyeong; C. Yijing 周易). https://ctext.org/book-of-changes Book of Poetry (Sigyeong; C. Shijing 詩經). https://ctext.org/book-of-poetry

116 Ju

Hui’s Collected Works of Hoeam (Hoeamjip; C. Huianji 晦庵集) 12.17b. name of Gwangju 廣州, Gyeonggi Province. 118 Mencius 7A2. 117 Another

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Book of Rites (Yegi; C. Liji 禮記). https://ctext.org/liji Chinese Text Project 中國哲學書電子化計劃. http://ctext.org Doctrine of the Mean (Jungyong; C. Zhongyong 中庸). https://ctext.org/liji/zhong-yong Gang, J. 姜靜一堂. Extant Writings of Jeongildang (Jeongildang yugo 靜一堂遺稿). http:// db.itkc.or.kr Gang, J. Supplement to the Extant Writings of Jeongildang (Jeongildang yugo burok 靜一堂遺稿 附錄). http://db.itkc.or.kr Gim, D., et al. 김동주 등 (Trans.). (2002). Gukyeok Jeongildang yugo 국역 정일당유고 (A Korean Translation of the Extant Works of Jeongildang). Seongnam: Seongnam City Cultural Center. Gim, H. 김현. (2004). “Seongnihak jeok gachigwan ui hwaksan gwa yeoseong” (성리학적가치 관의 확산과 여성, The Expansion of Neo-Confucian Values and Women). Minjok Munhwa Yeon’gu, 41, 455–488 Gim, N. 김남이. (2005). “Gang Jeongildang ui dabujajack e daehan gochal” (강정일당의 ‘대 부자작’에 대한 고찰, Consideration of the literary works created by Gang Jeongildang on behalf of her husband). Hanguk gojeon yeoseong munhak yeongu, 11, 51–89. Guyang, S. 歐陽脩. Record of Drunken Old Man Pavilion (Chwiong jeonggi; Zuiweng tingji 醉 翁亭記) Haboush, J. K. (Ed.). (2009). Epistolary Korea: Letters from the Communicative Space of the Chosŏn, 1392–1910. Columbia University Press. Hochschild, A. R. (1989). The Second Shift: Working Families and the Revolution at Home. Viking Press. Hoenamja (C. Huainanzi) 淮南子. https://ctext.org/huainanzi Hwang, G. 黃堅. (1796). Another Detailed Explanation of the Reliable Treasures of Archaic Prose: A Later Collection on the True Treasure Great Compendium of Detailed Explanations of Ancient Writings (Sangseol Gomun jinbo hujip; C. Xiangshuo Guwen zhenbao houji 詳說古 文眞寶大全 後集). Version held at the National Library of Korea. http://lod.nl.go.kr/resource/ CNTS-00077507063 Im, Y. 任允摯堂. Supplement to the Extant Writings of Yunjidang (Jeongildang yugo burok 允摯 堂遺稿附錄). http http://db.itkc.or.kr Ivanhoe, P. J., & Wang, H. Y. (Trans.). (2023). Korean Women Philosophers and the Ideal of a Female Sage: The Extant Writings of Im Yunjidang and Gang Jeongildang. In C. Mercer & M. Rogers (Eds.), Oxford New Histories of Philosophy. Jangja 莊子. Jangja (C. Zhuangzi) 莊子. https://ctext.org/zhuangzi Jeong, H. 程顥, & Jeong, I. 程頤. Extant Works of the Two Jeong’s (I Jeong yuseo; C. Er Cheng Yishu 二程遺書). https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&res=185164 Ju, H. 朱熹. Classified Sayings of Master Ju (Juja eoryu; C. Zhuzi yulei 朱子語類). https://ctext. org/wiki.pl?if=en&res=413318 Ju, H. Collected Commentaries on the Analects (Noneo jipju; C. Lunyu Jizhu 論語集註). https:// ctext.org/si-shu-zhang-ju-ji-zhu/meng-zi-ji-zhu/zhs Ju, H. Collected Commentaries on the Mengzi (Maengja jipju; C. Mengzi Jizhu 孟子集註). https://ctext.org/si-shu-zhang-ju-ji-zhu/meng-zi-ji-zhu/zhs Ju, H. Collected Works of Hoeam (Hoeamjip; C. Huianji 晦庵集). SKQS ed. Ju, H. Doctrine of the mean in sections and sentences (Jungyong janggu; C. Zhongyong zhangju 中庸章句). https://ctext.org/si-shu-zhang-ju-ji-zhu/zhong-yong-zhang-ju Kim, S. 김성문. (2014). “From wife to moral teacher: Gang Jeongildang on neo-confucian self-cultivation.” Asian Philosophy, 24(1), 28–47. Kim, S. (2017). “The way to become a female sage: Im Yunjidang’s confucian feminism.” In Y. Back & P. J. Ivanhoe (Eds.), Traditional Korean philosophy: Problems and debates (CEACOP East Asian Comparative Ethics, Politics and Philosophy of Law) (pp. 177–196). Roman and Littlefield International. Kim, Y. 김영민 (2005). “Hyeongyong mosun eul neomeoseo” (형용모순을 넘어서, Beyond Oxymoron). Cheolhak, 33, 7–33.

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Kinney, A. B. (Trans.). (2014). Exemplary Women of Early China: The Lienü Zhuan of Liu Xiang Columbia University Press. Knechtges, D. R, & Chang, T. (Eds.) (2010). Ancient and Early Medieval Chinese Literature (Vol. I): A Reference Guide, Part One. Brill. Ko, D., Haboush, J. K., & Piggott, J. R. (Eds.). (2003). Women and Confucian Cultures in Premodern China, Korea, and Japan. University of California Press. Lee, P. C. (2011). Li Zhi, Confucianism, and the Virtue of Desire. State University of New York Press. Li, C. (Ed.). (2000). The Sage and the Second Sex. Open Court. O, G. 吳敬梓. Unofficial History of the Scholars (Yurim oesa; C. Rulin waishi 儒林外史). https://ctext.org/rulin-waishi Siku quanshu 四庫全書 [Library of the Four Treasuries]. Wenyange edition. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong & Digital Heritage Publishing Ltd. CD-ROMs. Song, C. 宋穉圭. Collected Works of Gangjae (Gangjae jip 剛齋集). http://db.itkc.or.kr Tillman, H. C. (2004). “Zhu Xi’s Prayers to the Spirit of Confucius and Claims to the Transmission of the Way.” Philosophy East and West, 54(4), 489–513. Veritable Records of King Sukjong (Sukjong sillok 肅宗實錄). In the Veritable Records of Joseon Dynasty (Joseon Wangjo Sillok 朝鮮王朝實錄). http://sillok.history.go.kr Yu, J. 劉子澄, & Seon, J. 陳選. Collected Commentaries on the Elementary Learning (Sohak jiapju; C. Xiaoxue jizhu 小學集註. https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=en&res795164 Yun, B. (1975). Jeungju Samjagyeong jago (「增註三字經」字考). Gukhoe Doseogkwanbo 國 會圖書館報, 107, 27–34.

Chapter 19

Nana Asma’u of Nigeria 1793–1864 Beverly Mack

Abstract  Nana Asma’u was a member of the Sunni Muslim West African Fodiyo family, ethnic Fulanis who were known for their erudition and prolific production of treatises in the context of Qadiriyya Sufi philosophy. Asma’u founded a network ‘Yan Taru’ (the Associates) of women who taught other women. It was in large part responsible for the reintegration into reformed Islamic society of those who were defeated in the Jihad. Her poetic works focus on Islam’s egalitarian principles: girls and boys were expected to engage their intellects and live productively. Asma’u wrote about Sufi ethics in The Way of the Pious. Her other works are underpinned

B. Mack (*)  Emerita, University of Kansas, Lawrence, US e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_19

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by Sufi egalitarian principles: it is said that in Sufism “the soul has no gender”. This chapter focusses on her works as they reflect this view and constitute an educational guide to Islam. Out of respect for her Islamic values, a copy of her work “Fa’inna”, “So, Verily...” (rather than a portrait) is reproduced here to represent Nana Asma’u to readers. It is translated in the Appendix to this chapter.

19.1 Introduction 19.1.1 Family Origins, Scholarly Values Nana Asma’u (1793–1864) was an ethnic Fulani Muslim who spent her life in what is now the northwestern corner of Nigeria. Asma’u came to be known by the honorific “Nana” (Hausa, “Lady”) in acknowledgement of her scholarship and activism. She was born in the settlement of Degel, which no longer exists, twenty-five miles northwest of present-day city of Sokoto, which city rose only in the aftermath of the Sokoto Jihad. Her clan hailed from the Futa Toro region (now Senegal) of West Africa and had migrated eastward over several generations as Muslim preachers/teachers. Asma’u was born into an intellectual family. She was a daughter of Shehu (Hausa; Arabic, “Shaikh”) Usman ‘Dan Fodiyo and his wife Maimuna. The Shehu’s name, Usman ‘dan Fodiyo, or son of Fodiyo, is from his own father, who acquired the sobriquet “Fodiyo” for his reputation as a scholar: “Fodiyo” means “learned” in the Fulfulde language. Usman’s mother Hauwa and grandmother Rukkaya were community teachers, and Usman’s first instructors. According to tradition, Asma’u’s first teachers also were her mother, Maimuna, and her grandmother, Hauwa. Asma’u was raised in this clan of erudite scholars whose insistence on educating all children, regardless of gender, was well-established by Asma’u’s birth in 1793. Although Asma’u lived a life of itinerancy in the region as her family fled opposition forces in a long series of jihad battles, she never traveled beyond the region in her lifetime. Her communiques and reputation, however, extended as far as the Maghreb: her collected works include a letter welcoming a Mauritanian scholar, and one from another scholar praising her literary skills (Boyd & Mack, 1997, 282–289). In Asma’u’s community everyone was encouraged to study classical Islamic texts, which together comprised a rigorous curriculum including grammar, sciences of theology, philosophy, and the history of Islam. The Islamic education system, which includes an extended, complex curriculum that can span a lifetime, dates to the early years of Islam, and has spread through the world. By the time Asma’u was born, the Fodiyo family was well immersed in literacy skills in the context of religious learning. Religious education classes began at the age of about five—just as they do in contemporary Nigeria—with the memorization of basic prayers. At each level, children were taught by their elders, engaging in a system of age-appropriate memorization and exegesis. Islamic education begins with the memorization

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of the Fatiha, the opening chapter of the Qur’an,1 which is central to the successful recitation of the five required daily prayers. This and other memorized prayers are then used as the basis for writing, and a child’s education proceeds from this foundation. Other topics are added to the curriculum according to the abilities and interests of the student; the duration of a child’s education depends on family values and circumstances, as well the interests and abilities of the student.2 Education and the production of literary compositions were integral to life in Asma’u’s family. Asma’u, her siblings and age-mates, all received rigorous educations in their early years, much of which involved studying copies of classical Islamic literary works in the Fodiyo family library that dated as far back at the twelfth century (Boyd & Mack, 1997, 68–82).3 The Shehu took an interest in the educational progress of all his children; he soon recognized Asma’u’s keen intellect and encouraged her in her studies. The Shehu wrote more than three hundred prose works on topics as diverse as battle strategy, the obligations of rulers to the ruled, and Sufi metaphysics. Asma’u’s surviving known works—mostly poems— number about five dozen (Boyd & Mack, 1997). Asma’u’s brother Muhammad, who became Caliph later, wrote poetry, as Asma’u did, and collaborated with her on several important works. Among her many siblings, Asma’u had five sisters who also wrote poetry, as well as a female cousin and a niece who wrote. The family’s extensive library of hundreds of volumes of classical works were packed up and moved whenever they had to flee the enemy; these were considered their most precious possessions. The volumes remain in the family library in Sokoto. But beyond the confines of the Fodiyo community, the majority Hausa population was not devoted to Islam. By the time she was seven, Asma’u’s father had been preaching for more than a decade in the region and had been increasingly persecuted for his activities. His aim was to rectify syncretic religious practices, in which pre-Islamic traditions (for example the Hausa bori or spirit possession rites) were integrated with Islamic practices. The local Hausa king had been tolerant of the Fulani Shehu’s preaching, but with the king’s death, his firebrand son imposed severe restrictions on Islamic prayer, attire, preaching, and gathering for sermons. An unsuccessful attempt was made on the Shehu’s life, followed by several years of increasing persecution that led the Shehu to consolidate his followers and launch in 1804 what came to be known as the Sokoto Jihad for the reformation of Islam and the right to worship. At the time, Asma’u was ten, and for the rest of her youth she would be witness to bloodshed and battles. As she

1 The Fatiha, the opening chapter of the Qur’an, is not the first transmission from God to Muhammad; the Qur’an is not compiled chronologically. 2 Although the atmosphere was intellectually rigorous, not every individual was highly educated. Nevertheless, the Fodiyo community was unusually focused on the deeply thoughtful considerations of spirituality and how to live in the world. 3 Asma’u’s poetic work “Sufi Women” demonstrated direct links to the classic twelfth century ‘Sufi Woman” poem by Bagdadi scholar al-Jawzi, who based his own work on the Damascene jurist as-Sulami’s tenth century work of the same name.

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matured into young womanhood, she advised her father, brother, and husband— the three men who orchestrated Jihad strategies—on tactics. She also actively assisted in caring for the wounded, preparing foods, and helping in the building of forts and the development of new settlements as the clan retreated from the enemy. During these times several of her siblings were becoming immersed in Sufi mystical retreats and prayer, but Asma’u remained actively involved with the welfare of the community, and increasingly was acknowledged as the woman in charge of it. By her late teens, as the battles ceased with the Fulani defeat of the Hausa, Asma’u and her extended family settled in the place that was to become Sokoto, and she began to add teaching (of both boys and girls) and composing to the many tasks that filled her days. Asma’u’s first known literary work, at age 27, is a poem that reflects her literary training and the Sufi philosophy that had sustained her throughout the battle years (Boyd & Mack, 1997, 28–31). Asma’u wrote it in response to her brother Muhammad Bello’s poem of the same title, which he had his wife deliver to Asma’u to quell her anxiety, as he rode off to battle. The poem is an acrostic, in which a line is written vertically, and then the letter on each line becomes the first letter of the horizontal line of verse. In this poem Bello had quoted “So verily with every difficulty there is relief” (fa’inna ma’a al-usrin Yusra Qur’an 94: 5). The sentiment of the quoted line hangs over the atmosphere of her poem. Bello wrote this to remind Asma’u of the Sufi perspective that God surely attends to the devout: trust in God, who will always answer the prayer of the faithful. Asma’u’s skillful acrostic response echoes his deep belief.

19.1.2 Qadiriyya Sufism Asma’u’s family’s Qadiriyya Sufi philosophy followed the devotional practices of Iranian Abdul Qadir Gilani (1077–1166) as they have been disseminated around the world by his adherents. Qadiriyya Islam is said to be the most widely spread and most populous of the world’s many Sufi fellowships. By the eighteenth century it was practiced in the Guinea/Senegal region of West Africa, and spread inland toward northern Nigeria by Nana Asma’u’s antecedents, among others. Islam began (622 CE) with an “unambiguous commitment to literacy” (Hiskett, 1993, 8).4 Muslims acknowledge that God’s first proclamation, transmitted by the Prophet Muhammad, directed humans to inquire and develop their intellects as a means of moving closer to knowing God, who had created the universe. Thus, the pursuit of knowledge—more specifically the pursuit of Divine Truth—and the Qur’an’s unassailable message of equality among all the devout, were the philosophical foundations of Asma’u’s scholarly family. Among them, both women and men were literate in several languages: their mother tongue Fulfulde, and Arabic, 4 Hiskett

cites here the first recitation of the word of God to Muhammad: “Read, in the name of thy Lord who creates, / Creates man from a clot of blood,/Read, and thy Lord is most generous, Who taught the use of the pen, Taught man what he knew not” [96: 1–5, Hiskett’s translation].

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the word of God. Most also spoke the local majority’s language, Hausa. The Fodiyo clan’s immersion in literate Islamic studies reflects a Sufi belief in both the development of the intellect for the purposes of deepening spirituality and the gender equity that is at the heart of most Sufi adherents, among whom it is said “the soul has no gender”. Asma’u’s father had begun to practice mystical retreats just prior to her birth. She was born a twin, and it had long been an Islamic tradition to name twins after the Prophet Muhammad’s two sons, Hassan and Hussein. Asma’u’s twin brother was duly named Hassan, but her father said the name he chose for her had come to him in a dream, in which he saw her assisting in the coming jihad struggle just as the historic Asma, daughter of the Prophet Muhammad’s close friend Abu Bakar had assisted them in the early stages of the first jihad, more than a millennium earlier. Asma’u was born immediately following her family’s return from a nearby region where her father had been preaching for five years, and he had just completed writing a book which would become important in the place and time—Ihya al-Sunna—Revival of the Way of the Prophet Muhammad. The early history of Islam and the Prophet’s struggles were very much on the Shehu’s mind.

19.2 The Prevailing Philosophy of Nana Asma’u’s Place and Time The Fodiyos were Sunni Muslims, as was the case for most of the Islamic world by the eighteenth century, except for Shia concentrations in Iran and Iraq. But their religiosity contrasted sharply with the spiritual practices of the Hausa majority among whom they lived in northwestern Nigeria. The Hausa elite— mostly the royal court leaders—claimed to be practicing Islam, but they incorporated non-Islamic traditions, like those of the bori spirit possession cult, which involved trances and possession by potentially malevolent spirits. These syncretic approaches to Islam are what the Shehu sought to eliminate through preaching. Being prevented from preaching and eventually suffering threats to his person and community led to his launching the Sokoto Jihad. The Sunni-Shia split had occurred early, within the first century (622–722 CE) of the history of Islam, over disagreement about succession. Shiat Ali (Ar., lit. “partisans of Ali”) felt that a successor to the Prophet Muhammad must be of Muhammad’s bloodline; these became known as the Shi’a. The only candidate was his cousin, Ali. Those in opposition felt that any man who knew the “way” (Ar., sunna) of the Prophet was qualified to lead; they became known as Sunnis. When Muhammad died he left no designated successor. The committee in charge selected three successive Caliphs as leaders following the Prophet before finally appointing Ali as the fourth. Ali ruled briefly (656–661 CE), before being summarily slaughtered along with his family by Sunnis with political interests in leading Islam. Thus, in well under a century, the Sunni-Shia split had divided Islam into two major factions.

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Sufism has a somewhat more complex history. Sufism (Ar., tasawwuf) often described as “Islamic mysticism”, is one of several Islamic sciences, such as Prophetic sayings (Ar., hadith), theology, logic, and grammar, among others.5 Within the ambit of “Islamic sciences” Sufism and philosophy are considered to be separate classifications, but for the purposes of this study, a particular type of Sufism—Qadiriyya—constituted the socio-religious philosophy in which Nana Asma’u was raised and which constitutes the foundation of her life’s works. The unfolding of the phenomenon known as Sufism is complex, but appears to have begun at the origins of Islam (622 CE) with the development of a movement of ascetics. Indeed, the name itself derives from the scratchy, smelly, tattered wool (Ar., tasawwuf) garments they wore as part of their denial of worldly pleasures. It is said that early Muslims—not yet known as Sufis—concentrated on Qur’anic recitation and the prayerful behavior practiced by the Prophet Muhammad, to the exclusion of engagement with the distractions of daily life. Throughout Sufism’s unfolding between the seventh and tenth centuries it was shaped by the tension between Sunnis and Shia, debates about asceticism and mysticism, and the eventual rise of preacher-leaders whose practices and writings further determined the ways in which Sufism was defined. Islam had spread rapidly, and wherever there was Islam, there were Sufis (Ohlander, 2015, 55). Sufi practices reflected the diversity of cultures where they occurred, so it is nearly impossible to define Sufi practices in a monolithic framework (Ohlander, 2015, 53–54). Nevertheless, as early as the eighth century, literature on the ethics of good conduct (adab) began to flourish, and by the eleventh century numerous works were being produced on morally upright behavior and ethics in the framework of Sufism to the extent that it was said, “The whole of tasawwuf is etiquette” (Yazaki, 2015, 74). Indeed, Asma’u was raised with the belief that “the path of Sufism is better regarded as expressing the path to being a good believer…someone who leads a moral life” (Yazaki, 2015, 97). This code of ethics is reflected in her life and writings. While Sunni and Shia comprise the major factions in Islam, there are Sufis in both camps, and in most historical periods, upholders of the status quo among both Sunnis and Shia objected to Sufi activity, considering it a threat to social order. Sufism was unfolding contemporaneously with the establishment of Islam’s major schools of law, which were developed to guard against dogmatic and nonSunni influence, so one can understand how Sufism might have threatened the status quo. Sufism’s focus on mysticism was particularly objectionable to those in charge of organizing a predictable society: majority Sunnis tolerated the practice of asceticism, which involves obedience to a transcendent deity, but were critical of mysticism, which allows for communion with God through direct prayerful experience. This dichotomy is evident in the difference between Arabic concepts 5  This

short description of both Sufism itself and the collectivity of Islamic sciences cannot be comprehensive and derives from a multiplicity of sources on the topic, some of which are included in the recommended readings. Christopher Mechert’s discussion “Origins and Early Sufism” (in The Cambridge Companion to Sufism Ed. Lloyd Ridgeon, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 3–23) illuminates the intricacies of this history.

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of ‘ilm (discursive knowledge transmitted by humans) and ma’rifa (experiential, heartfelt knowledge of God) (Ohlander, 2015, 58).6 Thus, as the first stages of ascetic Sufism evolved into the next wave of mystic Sufis, they moved farther outside mainstream society. The master-disciple relationship increasingly defined Sufi groups, and by the tenth century Sufi brotherhoods (Ar., tarikh, s.; turuq, pl.) coalesced around preacher/teachers, whose names eventually defined the groups, even as the teachings spread far afield from their origins. Some brotherhoods believed that personal spiritual practice could lead to an individual’s union with God, even before death. The Sufi admonition to “Die before you die” advises that one shed worldly attachments even as one fulfills worldly obligations. This perspective is akin to the Christian philosophy of being “in the world but not of it.” Other brotherhoods engaged in overt expressions of ecstatic activity like trance-inducing dance, and self-flagellation, flagrant violations of what mainstream Muslims considered pious expression. While Sufis saw themselves as preservers of the original message of Islam, non-Sufis saw all these practices as threats to their control of an Islamic social structure. Each side saw the other as heretical, but the law was on the side of conservative Muslims, so Sufis hid their practices for survival’s sake. By the second century after the establishment of Islam (eighth century), Muslim leaders were persecuting Sufis, whose allegiance they demanded. Sufism moved underground in many parts of the world, where its practitioners remained until as recently as the mid-twentieth century. Sufi communities worshipped in secret brotherhoods which had coalesced around specific teachers, from whom they took their brotherhood names. The English translation of tarikh as “brotherhood” should not be taken literally, as every Sufi group has both women and men. In fact, the Sufi belief that “the soul has no gender” was as dangerous to the status quo as individual autonomy in religious practice. But this belief derives directly from the Qur’an, in which numerous passages specify women as well as men in describing characteristics of humans. The Qur’an further specifies that “The best among you is the most devout” (Qur’an 49:13), specifically without regard to gender. At its inception, Islam had commanded humans to engage in intellectual inquiry (“Read, recite!” 96:1) and had been focused on unifying a lethally divisive tribalist seventh-century Arabia through its message of equity, replacing family loyalties with universal allegiance to God. Then the Sunni-Shia split divided those who had been newly (albeit briefly) unified in their spirituality. In institutionalizing Islam, many leaders had little concern for intellectual inquiry, even though scholarship did flourish, often in the framework of Sufi brotherhoods.7 Despite their differences on leadership qualifications, however, both Sunni and Shia

6 For

fuller discussion of these concepts see Rosenthal 2007, Knysh 2000, and Baldick 1989. is not to ignore the flourishing of libraries and intellectual inquiry that did indeed occur in the first millennium of Islam, which far outshines scholarship anywhere else in the world at that period, and is well documented. With the exception of some shining examples of patrons of the arts, many leaders were more concerned with politics than books. 7 This

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leaders agreed on one other perspective that Islam had sought to change through its message of equality: they renewed the tradition of patriarchy. Thus, Islam, the spiritual philosophy that had been meant to unify a diverse populace in an equitable spiritual practice, reverted to old traditions, reinstating divisions between peoples and genders. In Asma’u’s community, Qadiriyya Sufism sought to adhere to Islam’s original messages of both the pursuit of knowledge and universal equality.

19.3 Sufi Philosophy as Reflected in Asma’u’s Literary Works Asma’u understood Islam through a Qadiriyya Sufi philosophy, in which activism and feminism—though not known by those descriptors—were essential pillars of its compassionate and egalitarian Sufi philosophy. The atmosphere in Asma’u’s lifetime involved reliance on the Qur’an for guidance in right behavior, whether for her as a teacher or for those who ruled the Sokoto Caliphate after the jihad. This Sufi community’s interpretation of the Qur’an included two particularly important viewpoints: a common-sense view of gender parity with regard to spiritual pursuits, and the necessity of seeking knowledge of God through education. These values are inherent in the content of Asma’u’s works and in her teaching techniques. The initial decade of the long jihad, which corresponded to Asma’u’s formative life, ages 10–20, shaped her perspective on spirituality, alerted her to social needs, and led directly to her establishment of a system of education by women and for women. This organization came to be known as the ‘Yan Taru, or “the Associates” (Hausa). The aim of the ‘Yan Taru was to provide rural Hausa non-Muslim women, whose people had been defeated by the Fulani forces, a grounding in Islam. As one who had received her early education from women, it was logical to Asma’u to educate young mothers as a means of training the next generation. In this way, she and the itinerant women teachers whom she trained, reshaped society with Qadiriyya Sufi Islam as its philosophical foundation. The notion of a gender-equitable society, and the presumption that the pursuit of knowledge was a necessary component of spirituality—and therefore incumbent on every soul— reflected the egalitarian atmosphere of her family, and their opposition to the patriarchal bias that was part of the reason for the Jihad. The Shehu had written critically about local men who: “revile their wives…beat them…do not educate them…never joke happily with them nor do they share their sexual attentions… [they] confine their wives…[and] neither educate them themselves nor allow them to benefit by being educated by others” (Boyd, 1989, 5). He stated clearly in his writings and preaching that such oppression of women was un-Islamic. In the aftermath of the jihad, the Fulani took over as rulers, replacing Hausa kings with Islamic Fulani Emirs, but the successful transition to an ethnically blended society depended on creating a common social contract. Nana Asma’u’s

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‘Yan Taru teachers were instrumental in orchestrating this by educating rural women, who then instilled the values of the status quo in their children. The ‘Yan Taru spread spiritual literacy, if not actual writing skills. Poor women immersed in labor intensive daily tasks had neither time nor resources for learning to write but learning the basics of Islam and understanding the victors’ views on the jihad—as conveyed in Asma’u’s historical works—aided in the smooth transition of society. Since the founding of the Sokoto Caliphate in the nineteenth century, a blended Hausa/Fulani society has evolved in northern Nigeria, retaining the defeated Hausa majority’s language (Hausa) in an Islamic culture whose basis was Fulani Qadiriyya Sufism. In the years during and following Nigeria’s British colonial period (1903–1961), other Islamic groups established themselves in the North, principally Tijaniyya Sufis and, in the late twentieth century, conservative non-Sufi Muslims, but during Asma’u’s lifetime, Qadiriyya Sufism predominated as the culture’s world view. Asma’u’s ‘Yan Taru cadre are principally responsible for disseminating it. Asma’u did not have time to teach rural women directly: she had to attend to her own teaching and oversee the household of her extended family. Therefore, to minister to the needs of students in the hinterland, the ‘Yan Taru system depended on the teaching skills of older women, without childcare obligations, acting as extension teachers in rural villages. ‘Yan Taru teachers would sit with Asma’u to memorize and discuss the poems she wrote that were to be taught to rural students. These poems were the lesson plans that formed the basis of the ‘Yan Taru curriculum. Asma’u’s compositions were in three languages, depending on her audience: Arabic for fully literate Islamic scholars, both at home and abroad; Fulfulde for topics of most interest to her family members (elegies, commentaries on mystical qualities); and Hausa, for the wider, public audience of those defeated in jihad battles. It was this last group that was served by the ‘Yan Taru, so her extension teachers memorized Asma’u’s Hausa language poems in order to use them in their teaching. In some cases, Asma’u wrote her poems in each of the three languages, to make them widely accessible. An example of this technique is her compact thirty-couplet poem “The Qur’an” in which she mentions the names of each of the 114 chapters of the Qur’an (Boyd & Mack, 1997, 38–43). She wrote it first in Fulfulde (1829)—perhaps because Fulfulde was her first language, perhaps to test it out on her extended family. She wrote it second in Hausa (1838), in which form it would be accessible to rural Hausa women in need of learning the basics about Islam, and the third in Arabic (1850) for scholars. All the Qur’anic chapters are named or alluded to, in order, in the sixty-line poem. It is easily memorized and served as a perfect framework for teachers (who would have had intimate knowledge about the Qur’an) who could then unpack the work, teaching about each chapter. For example, the poem opens with an exhortation common to the beginnings of all Islamic prayer, “Bismillahi rahamani a rahim” (“In the name of God the Most Gracious, Most Merciful”) and includes in line two the term “alhamdu”, a shortened form of “Alhamdulillahi”, “Praise be to God”. The name of the first chapter, “fatiha”

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(“opener’), is not mentioned directly, but the inclusion of the opening phrase— which is the same as the opening phrase of the fatiha—Bismillahi rahamani a rahim, Alhamdulillahi rabbi l-alamin—is sufficient to allow a teacher to draw parallels with the fatiha. A teacher would also explain that the word “fatiha” is Arabic for “opener”, and as such designates this chapter as the opening of the entire Qur’an, which praises God, and the beginning point of a wider range of prayer and spiritual exploration. She would likely add that the short fatiha chapter is known as the essence, the “mother” of the entire Qur’an: it is said that if one can memorize only one chapter, it should be this chapter. Further, a teacher would explain that this chapter—about the length and import of the Christian Lord’s Prayer—is the prayer central to each of the five daily prayers in Islam. For these rural non-Muslim women, a basic introduction to Islam needed to include a description of the Qur’an, and an introduction to the most important parts of it, as they would be relevant to their daily lives. Asma’u’s poem provided this introduction. Another poetic teaching device is Asma’u’s thirty-five couplet Hausa poem “Reasons for Seeking God” (1861) (Boyd & Mack, 1997, 264–267), which implies the unspoken question “Why should we seek God?” and provides implicit answers in a list of features of Creation that inspire us to contemplate God: the heavens, earth, and creatures on it. The next implied question, “how do we seek God?” is addressed by advice to engage in upright behavior, eschew slander, gossip, theft and all forbidden things. This work discusses faith and recommended behavior, but the poem also has political aims, including a prayer of support for the current Caliph, who was Asma’u’s nephew and a successor to her father as leader. The leaders of the Caliphate were pledged to behave as upright Sufi Muslims, so Asma’u’s advising support of them is an appeal for the good of the state. Asma’u’s poem provides both instruction in Islamic creed and offers a personification of the behavior she recommends. “Caliph Aliyu’s Victory II” (1844) is a more blatant appeal to the political views of the jihad victors. It is a brief, 25-couplet poem that affirms the jihadists’ cause. Their victory, Asma’u explains, was one of righteousness over worldliness. The Gobir people, whose habit was to attack villages, raid grain stores, steal animals, and carry off young women, were too fixed on worldly goods. The jihadists’ piety won the day. This work constitutes a news item that informs provincial audiences of an event that she has framed to affirm the spiritual views she seeks to instill. Asma’u’s poem “A Warning II” (1856) (Boyd & Mack, 1997, 190–195) is brief enough for students to memorize (27 couplets) and provides clear instruction on the ways in which to be an upright Muslim: “do not innovate”, “repent and behave like respectable married women… obey your husbands’ lawful demands”, “say your prayer beads”. It is noteworthy that Asma’u allows implicit autonomy to women whose husbands are not obedient Muslims. If husbands make unlawful demands, then the law of Islam outranks them. She is also explicit about the importance of education, saying “In Islam, it is a religious duty to seek knowledge/Women may leave their homes freely for this.” In a time and place where women had been subject to the whims of their men, such autonomy for women was a radical notion, just as gender equity had been a radical notion at the origin of Islam.

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In an arid climate, rain truly can be appreciated as a divine gift. Asma’u’s 24-couplet Hausa “A Prayer for Rain” (1857) was written after a prolonged drought, of the type common to the region. In it she reminds women to appeal to God in seeking relief from the drought, rather than to engage in traditional spirit possession and gambling tactics to try to lure rain. This poem is an example of Asma’u’s perpetually practical nature; she recognizes that there is a concern to the majority and addresses it in a way that underlines her message of faithful reliance on an Islamic worldview. Not all ‘Yan Taru poems were short enough for rural women to memorize, but the ‘Yan Taru teachers were able to master extremely long passages, which they recited on their long treks to villages. Asma’u wrote a long Hausa poem “Be Sure of God’s Truth” (1831) based on her father’s 1812 Fulfulde work created at the establishment of his new administrative capital, Sokoto (Boyd & Mack, 1997, 453– 57). Asma’u’s work is in 48 quintains, likely recited for rural students without the intention of their memorizing it, but only to convey a message. It describes peoples’ duties and responsibilities in a government based on Islamic principles. By writing this poem in Hausa, Asma’u made the contents widely accessible to the public. Its Hausa title, “Tabbat Hakika” can be understood on both exoteric and esoteric levels. First, “hakika” conveys the concept of “in truth”, that is, she is explaining is the truth of the situation: every individual must obey Islamic law, especially those judges who dispense the law. She calls for ethical behavior at every level in worldly circumstances, and punishment for those who transgress. Second, for those able to understand Sufi philosophy, “hakika” as Divine Truth is the ultimate goal of the devout Sufi: first, one must follow the shariah (the highway of the law); second, one treads the tariqah (the narrow path of the mystic); and finally, one reaches hakika, God’s Divine Truth. The poem is informative on whatever level of understanding for which one is qualified. For new citizens, it lays out the ground rules of a new, Islamic government in which the ruled and the rulers are all expected to benefit society through ethical behavior. For the Sufi understanding the work metaphysically, it explains a spiritual structure that leads to union with God. Asma’u’s didacticism included accounts of the joys of heaven and pains of hell that rewarded people according to their deeds on earth. She wrote “Fear of the Hereafter” (1860) (Boyd & Mack, 1997, 254–259) in both Fulfulde and Hausa in the same year, aiming to remind both family and very public audiences that they should yearn for heaven and fear hell.8 Many of her images reflect her intimate knowledge of the Qur’an, in which suitable rewards for both the unjust and the just are clearly described: “The damned will be forced by demons to drink/

8 It

is worth mentioning that the woman who is often described as the “first Sufi”, Basran Rabi’a Al-Adawiyya (circa 718–801). Rabiy’a (see Chap. 10 in this volume) famously ran through town with a pail of water in one hand and a torch in the other, declaring that she wanted to douse the flames of hell and set fire to heaven, because her aim was to love God for God’s sake alone, and not out of fear of hell’s tortures or yearning for heavenly reward. But this was too sophisticated an interpretation of Sufi philosophy for the initiate, and Asma’u stuck with the whip and carrot approach of this poem’s message.

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disgusting things like blood and pus./Stinking and filthy things will cause/their veins to burst open.” Asma’u did not make up these images; they are clearly described in the Qur’an, as are the rewards of heaven: “Those who go to Heaven/ will enter into marvelous light./And there they will enjoy the wonders of/Paradise where milk and honey flow.” Toward the end of the poem she includes an appeal to be united in heaven with Sheikh Jelani,9 affirming her Qadiriyya Sufi affiliation, appeals to the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions. She says, finally “This poem [is]…finished…Sing it and remember.” Anyone who has heard these descriptions of hell will not soon forget them. Two other long, informative works are based on classics in the canon of Islamic literature. Asma’u’s “Sufi Women” (1836) (Boyd & Mack, 1997, 68–82) is her version of a poem that dates to the eleventh century, when Abu ‘Abd ar-Rahman asSulami (976–1021) (as-Sulami, 1999) composed a memorial list of noteworthy Sufi women, and the reasons for their renown (piety, generosity, compassion, right teaching, right behavior). He noted that Sufi men knew the concept, but the Sufi women put it into action. In the twelfth century, scholar Ibn Jawzi (d. 1200) composed his own version of this poem (Sifat al-Safwa), containing the names of 126 women.10 Asma’u’s brother, Caliph Muhammad Bello, also wrote a poem on Sufi women (Kitab al-Nasihah), very likely having studied one of the earlier works, which must have been among his family’s library holdings. Each of these works describes first the wives of the Prophet Muhammad, followed by relevant hadiths and examples of other pious women through various historical ages. What marks Asma’u’s version as unique is that she appends to this long list—in which the same women appear in the same order as in the classical works but described in her own words—a list and description of her contemporaries, whose behavior exemplifies the qualities she wants her students to emulate. By adding the names of women of the Sokoto Caliphate to a work of classic Islamic literary status, she elevates both the personalities and the Sokoto Caliphate itself to the level of revered Islamic history. Asma’u’s “In Praise of Ahmada” (1839) (Boyd & Mack, 1997, 123–130) is in the classic Islamic panegyric mode known as madih, a long praise poem about the Prophet Muhammad (Ahmada). There is a multiplicity of such works in the Islamic world. By the thirteenth century they had become common, and scholar Mervyn Hiskett asserts that they are indices of Sufism; Asma’u’s poem, he notes, is especially similar to the madih genre of the Mamluk period, reflecting her likely literary sources.11 The madih genre, which includes standard opening and 9 Also

spelled Gilani, as above. in turn, was the inspiration for Dr. Javad Nurbaksh’s Sufi Women (1st ed. 1989; 2nd ed. 1997). 11 “…the appearance of the literary cult of Prophetic panegyric in a Muslim community probably indicates that it has received sufism.” (Hiskett 1975, 43). Asma’u’s sources probably included the thirteenth century works Burda by al-Busiri, al-Ishriniyyat by al Fazazi, al-Qasa’id al-wirtriyya of al-Lakhmi, and simt al-Huda by al-Tawzari, all of which are commonly known in West Africa. Hiskett notes that Asma’u’s imagery and phraseology indicate her familiarity with these works. (Hiskett 1975, 43–44, 48–50). 10 This,

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closing doxologies, tells the Prophet’s story by recounting his life’s struggles and successes, his character and miracles, and closes with prayers for union with the Prophet and other elevated Islamic personalities. That Asma’u’s poem is written in Hausa, rather than in Arabic, indicates that a standard in the classic Islamic literary tradition is by this time “no longer the preserve of an intellectual elite but has made a significant impact upon the common culture” (Hiskett, 1975: 51). In having her extension teachers memorize this long poem, Asma’u was drawing them into the heart of Islamic historical traditions (a good Muslim knows the story of the Prophet Muhammad) and sharing it with the new converts they encountered in rural areas (anticipating that they too would become good Muslims). The works that Asma’u wrote for use in the ‘Yan Taru program reflected her Qadiriyya Sufi values and aimed to disseminate them among newly converted Muslim women in rural areas. Prior to receiving the ‘Yan Taru lessons, these women had little idea what Islam involved. The purpose of the Sokoto Jihad had been to eliminate non-Muslim practices in the region, and Asma’u realized that old practices had to be replaced by new ones. She outfitted her ‘Yan Taru leaders with the straw beehive hat that had been the signal attire of the woman leader of the bori spirit possession cult. Visually, the new “head woman” was a Muslim teacher, replacing the leader of occult practices. The chanted poems the ‘Yan Taru teachers brought to rural women replaced the old bori songs. And eventually Islam replaced old practices. By exposing rural women to a wide range of Islamic images—from the practicalities of memorizing a simple prayer, to the news of what happened in jihad battles, to the metaphysical concept of spiritual union with God, Asma’u and her extension teachers sowed the seeds of Islam and began to create a new society based on its values.

Appendix “So Verily”12 Lord God Almighty, all Powerful, he who asserts there is more than one god will perish. One God, Almighty, nothing is perfect except it comes from Him. Come to God, receive His generosity: all good things are derived from Him. Anyone who says he requires nothing of God is either ignorant or an unbeliever. Everyone who seeks God’s help will receive it, for God allows people to make requests. I pray God will show me the Way of religion and that I will keep to it until I die.

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Amas’u, “Fa’inna,” text established and translated by Boyd and Mack (1997, 28ff). Reprinted with permission of the authors.

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432 God is Pure, and forgets nothing: those who He forgives find peace

May He bless us and show us the Path, and may He help us to remain one people. We pray for victory and that the rebellion of Ibra may be overcome. We pray too, for forgiveness in this world and the next. Call upon God always, so that things which are too difficult may be made easy. Pray to God, do your meditations, praying for forgiveness and giving thanks. Look at His generosity! It is unbounded; His munificence is infinite. We give thanks to God and pray for our Lord of the Universe.

References As-Sulami, A., & Abd ar-Rahman. (1999). Early Sufi Women (Dhikr an-niswa al-muta ‘abbidat as sufiyyat) Tran. Rkia Cornell. Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae. Baldick, J. (1989). Mystical Islam: An Introduction to Sufism. London: I.B Tauris. Boyd, J. (1989). The Caliph’s Sister. London: Frank Cass. Boyd, J., & Mack, B. (1997). The Collected Works of Nana Asma’u, daughter of Usman ‘dan Fodiyo 1793–1864. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press. Hiskett, M. (1993). Some to Mecca Turn to Pray. St Albans: The Claridge Press. Hiskett, M. (1975). A History of Hausa Islamic Verse. London: SOAS. Knysh, A. (2000). Islamic Mysticism: A Short History. Brill. Mechert, C. (2015). Origins and early Sufism. In L. Ridgeon (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Sufism (pp. 3–23).Cambridge University Press Ohlander, E. S. (2015). Early sufi rituals, beliefs, and hermeneutics. In L. Ridgeon (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Sufism (pp. 53–73). Cambridge University Press Rosenthal, F. (2007). Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam Boston: Brill. Yazaki, S. (2015). Morality in early sufi literature. In L. Ridgeon (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Sufism (pp. 74–97). Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 20

Oodgeroo of the Noonuccal postal stamp Australia

Oodgeroo of the Noonuccal (Kath Walker) of Australia 1920–1993 Therese Boos Dykeman

Abstract Australian Aborigine Oodgeroo Noonuccal/Kath Walker (1920–1993), having had only a primary school education, came to be awarded four honorary doctorates. An acknowledged poet, she was the first Australian Aborigine woman to have become a published author. Aiming to improve the status of the Aborigine, she became a political leader, and in her writings, made important distinctions between racial integration and assimilation and between just laws and equal rights. She retells Aborigine legends for the purpose of bringing understanding to Aborigine metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, religion, and socio-politics. Aboriginal philosophy rests on the principle that humanity is one with the universe. Humanity’s task is to

T. B. Dykeman (*)  Fairfield University, Fairfield, US e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_20

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preserve the earth, a task which, in view of current climate change, is in need of attention. Aborigine philosophy for her also meant developing habits of sharing, of tolerance, and of acquiring the skill of “deep listening and quiet still awareness.” Among many honors, the United States awarded her a Fulbright Scholarship and the United Kingdom awarded her Member of the Order of the British Empire. Her poetry has been acclaimed and set to music; she herself has been the subject of dramatic performances, but only here is she being acknowledged as philosopher.

20.1 Introduction Australian Aborigine Oodgeroo of the Noonuccal/Kath Walker, acknowledged poet and activist, is introduced here as a philosopher. Art, science, and politics often merge in her works, but the focus is ultimately on ethics and justice. Obtaining her works is a problem for Western scholars; while some of Oodgeroo’s published works are available for research in American university libraries, most of her work, her speeches, documents, and unpublished manuscripts are archived in Queensland, Australia. The following introduces her life and her work as they are related to the Aborigine philosophy she presented and to the philosophy she formulated. With an awareness of her philosophy, scholars hopefully will be encouraged to study Oodgeroo’s works of poetry and prose that articulate her thought. In view of the current climate crisis, such a project would be timely, for at present, Aborigine wisdom is being sought, however belatedly, to gain insight into the underlying principles of the Aborigine worldview of humans and nature.1

20.2 Biography “Direct, charismatic, quick-witted, and dignified,” Oodgeroo taught the “spirituality of her ancestors, responsibility for the earth, and the connection of all people” (Abbey, 2019). A member of the oldest living culture on earth—60,000 years— Oodgeroo Noonccal/Kath Walker, was the first Australian Aborigine woman to become a published author. Oodgeroo [meaning paperbark tree] Noonuccal [the name of her tribe] was the name Kath Walker (nee Kathleen Ruska) adopted in 1988. Born the youngest of seven children to Ted and Lucy McCullough Ruska in Minjerriba on North Stradbroke Island, Queensland, Kath married and then divorced Bruce Walker after twelve years of marriage, and as a single mother raised their son Denis (1947–2017) and another son Vivian/Kabul (1953–91). She became known as an orator, poet, storyteller, politician, but rarely recognized as

1 Not

only is Aborigine philosophical knowledge being sought after for understanding ecology but for their practical knowledge of e.g., medicine and psychology (Grime 2019).

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a philosopher (Brewster, 1994), Oodgeroo’s life was greatly connected with her work (Beier, 1985; Encyclopedia, 2007; Shoemaker, 1995; Taylor, 1999). Her obituaries praised her for a life well lived with laudable accomplishments (Collins, 1994, 1995; Sorensen, 2009). Her life as matriarch and poet were also celebrated in numerous publications (Cochran & Wright, 1994; Mitchell, 1987; Miller, 2015). How did it happen that Oodgeroo, having completed her formal learning at age thirteen with only a primary school education, came to be awarded four honorary doctorates? One answer is the accomplishments she realized, and another is the efforts she made toward achieving better equality for her people based on her political philosophy and concept of justice. She learned from every activity in which she was engaged. She learned typing and bookkeeping skills, and from working as a domestic servant in the book-lined home of the Cilentos, medical practitioners, she learned a new world view. In 1942, having joined the Australian Women’s Army Service, she become a lance corporal. Meeting black American soldiers and European Australians was the enlightening experience that led her to advocate for Aboriginal rights. She then emerged as a political and cultural leader, eventually becoming state secretary of the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders (FCAATS) and a key figure in a campaign to reform the Australian Constitution. During the 1940s Oodgeroo had her first poems published in Realist Writer.2 In 1964 as Kath Walker, she wrote the first book of poetry published by an Aborigine, We Are Going, which became very popular. This was an important achievement both as an Aborigine and as an Australian. Although sacred rituals provided Aborigines’ aesthetic expression in song, dance, story and art, poetry was not among their achievements. Furthermore, Australians provided little space for Aborigine achievement. So, it was extraordinary that Oodgeroo came to be alongside C.J. Dennis, Australia’s highest-selling poet. What Oodgeroo conveyed through her poetry and her prose was ancient Aborigine philosophy as well as her own formulations. She recognized that the orally transmitted philosophy needed to be written down not only for the benefit of Aborigine people but for Australia. She believed that if Australians knew and understood this philosophy, they would more highly respect Aborigine people. Early on, she reasoned that to be acquainted with this philosophy was important for all humanity. Before the public recognized the coming of the current climate change crisis, she understood that Aborigine wisdom offered help in implementing needed changes in healing and maintaining the earth. Oodgeroo’s contribution of poetry that incorporated Aborigine philosophy is another one of the reasons why Oodergoo was awarded honorary doctorates.

2 Oodgeroo’s poetry has been set to music by many including Paul Stanhope’s “Songs for the Shadowland” featuring three mourning poems that concern the Aboriginal philosophy of ancestry and respect for the dead, with woodwinds and soprano, and another “Dawn Wail for the Dead” with French Horn. Her poetry has been translated into other languages e.g. Zandotti, 2012.

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Oodgeroo argued that along with attempts to destroy her people, Australians from their non-Aborigine behaviors and ignorance caused their land to suffer. In her arguments, she articulated the benefits of Aborigine ethics. She made the political distinction between racial integration and assimilation and explained the meaning of just laws and equal rights in that regard. While Oodergoo sought to improve Aborigine and Australian life, her words and deeds proved to be of global significance (Mukherjee, 2014). When in 1962 Oodgeroo was elected Queensland State Secretary of Federal Council for Aborgine and Torres Strait Islander Advancement, she made it her responsibility to travel extensively in Australia, campaigning for equal rights for Aborigines and all citizens. Then in 1967 she succeeded in a landmark referendum to empower the Federal government to legislate Aboriginal affairs; however, in 1969 she lost her election to the Australian Labor Party. Oodgeroo began international lecture tours to Russia and the United States, and other places in 1970, and was appointed a Member of the Order of the British Empire (she declined it later in 1987). Now with these credentials, in 1972, she established an educational and cultural center where she taught children, particularly about the balance of nature. The center, which she called Moongalba, meaning “sitting down place,” was built on the property she bought on North Stradbroke Island. Also, in collaboration with universities, she created programs to be taught in Australian schools. Earlier, in 1970, she won the Dame Mary Gilmore Medal, in 1975 the Jessie Litchfield Award, and the Fellowship of Australian Writers Award. In 1977 she was the subject of the documentary Shadow Sister, which won the Black Film Makers Award in San Francisco, and in 1979 she was awarded the Sixth Annual Oscar at the Michaux Awards Ceremony. The film Shadow Sister, shows Oodgeroo and her very close friend, poet Judith Wright, meeting at Moongalba on North Stradbroke Island, where they discussed philosophy and poetry (Shadow Sister, 1977; Minter, 2015). Additional attention was brought to Oodgeroo from an incident in 1974 when she was a passenger on a British Airways flight hijacked by PLO terrorists. After having been an Australian delegate to the World Council of Churches Consultation on Racism in London in 1986, she became a delegate to the international Forum for a Nuclear Free World for the Survival of Humanity in Moscow. In that same year, a volume of her paintings was published. Having toured China in 1984, she published Kath Walker in China in 1988 (Walker, 1988). She then won a Fulbright to the United States in 1989–9, and in 1991 was awarded a commemorative plaque on Sydney Writers Walk. Announced as one of the Queensland 150 icons in 2009, that same year she became subject of a play written by Sam Watson (Oodgeroo: Bloodline to Country, 2009).  She was honored in 2016 when the Queensland Poetry Fest established the Oodgeroo Noonuccal Indigenous Poetry Prize, and in 2017 she had an electoral district named after her.3

3 Cf.

Dr. Neville Buch’s assessment, History and Philosophy in Queensland.

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Throughout her life, Oodgeroo made known the deep meaning in Aborigine history and belief systems for Australia and in so doing raised the status of her Aborigine people. Australians having been forced to acknowledge the truths Oodgeroo and others presented to them, are now in what will be a long process of making necessary both political-justice change and political–ecological change. She has been and is continuing to inspire Australians (McIlroy & Wynter, 2009; University of Queensland Fryer Library Events, 2020). Her influence in the thought and culture of Australia is one other reason she was awarded honorary doctorates: 1988 Macquerie University, 1989 Griffith University, 1991 Monash University, and 1992 Queensland University of Technology. In her last public speech, “Writers of Australia, ‘I dips me lid’,” delivered at the Sydney Opera House in the year she died, 1993, Oodgeroo explained her motivation for writing her poem “The Dawn…”: “to tell everyone in the world who I am, what I am and why I am what I am.” In her own words, her life had been a “long road and a lonely road” (Abbey). Such a road is the road of a pioneer, a road of one who sustained personal suffering, and the road of a philosopher.

20.3 Philosophy Through her civil activities and through the living of her own life, Oodgeroo made known and practiced Aborigine philosophy. In a 1989 speech, Oodgeroo contrasted the Aborigine’s “strict code of moral behavior” with the “sadistic whips” of the white man’s culture, their “insane traditions of racial and class discrimination” (Noonuccal, 1989a). Such differences in ethics created a “fundamental clash...of diametrically opposed philosophies which continue to clash now.” She argued further in that speech that it cannot be logical to continue “mid-Victorian education departments” in which “rational” means assimilation. For in this system there can be no race equality only race hierarchy. Much is to be learned from listening to “grass-roots cultures,” so it is “logical and imperative that this elitism be hastily dissolved.” As much as in speeches, Oodgeroo wrote philosophy in poetry.  Her poetry addressed abstract issues such as time,  and human issues such as hope, justice, and equality, but it was not always noted for its philosophy (Hodge, 1995; Moodrooroo, 1995; Page, 1993). While the nature of hope is often a theme in Oodgeroo’s works and the subject of several poems, her concept of hope is apropos to her argument here. Hope is the light that arises from Past, and functions as a guide to future. From an Aborigine perspective the future arises from a change within Past that is without racism. She defines Past in her poem “The Past”: Let no one say the past is dead, the past is all about us and within.

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Hope replaces Past with a “juster justice” (“A Song of Hope,” 1960). Such justice and equality are possible, she argued, when the Aborigine methods of learning are taken seriously; this entails acquiring the skill of “deep listening and quiet still awareness” (Grime, 2019). Often repeated in her writings, Oodgeroo’s argument is that listening to the earth and listening to each other are parts of Aborigine philosophy necessary for all future existence. In poetry Oodgeroo looks at the facts and feelings of injustice: “White Man, Dark Man” (1964, 19) Abo man To you… We have taught our democracy White man We had… Long before you came, …democracy, too. “The Teacher (for Mother who was never taught to read or write)” (1964, 17) Holy men… If you have to teach the light Teach us first to read and write. “We Are Going” (1964) We are as strangers here now, but the white tribe are the strangers and we are going. “The Rainbow Spirit” (1988). Perhaps she will come again When the spirits of men And the spirit of the land Are once more together as one.

In these poems Oodgeroo addresses the moral and political injustice of treating people unequally and withholding knowledge and education. In so doing, she brings past Aborigine philosophy into the present and projects a more enlightened future. In articulating and arguing the merits of the philosophy of the Aborigine people of Australia, Oodgeroo Noonccal raised its importance. Aborigine philosophy, formulated mainly through narration in an oral tradition, focused on the relationship between humanity and the universe, one human being to another, the spiritual to

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the material. Oodgeroo re-tells the legends and infuses them with her understanding of their metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, religion, and as important, socio-politics. She believed that knowledge of this philosophy provides opportunity to make fundamental changes in living a better way of life and with that more possibility for the future. One problem for the Aborigine is to sustain both their identity and land, for in losing them, Anuparna Mukherjee pointed out, they lose their “ontological moorings,” and they lose Oodgeroo’s vision of globalization based on true community (1). Another problem is the relation of one human being to another in community. In community one should retain “identity and individuality” within the togetherness. However, Bharna Sharma noted that for Oodgeroo such community cannot exist for women who cannot have “identity” under patriarchy (Sharma, 2020). For in reality, relations between men and women often lead to pain and slavery, as when girls are forced to marry older men. Oodgeroo expresses the feeling of women in her poem “The Child Wife” which says, “love I longed for” yet “old laws” “tether me” and she encourages women to dare to challenge “slavery” (541, 542). Oodgeroo praised women for being the moral leaders of the family and society, but she also challenged women to acquire the moral courage to voice their suffering, take a stand against the “suppression and oppression” sustained under patriarchy, and in so doing acquire education (“The Teacher” 540). If the Aborigine is to have ontological moorings, they must as well have moral moorings. The philosophy of the Aborigine, as Oodgeroo explains, rests on the principle that humanity is one with the universe. While the earth was created by the Earth Mother/Rainbow Serpent, humanity is tasked with preserving it. Being in touch with this basic principle means living ethically. Treating the world ethically is the same as treating each other ethically. Ethical behavior regarding the earth means awareness of the moral mandate of Earth Mother. It mandates gratitude for the earth and appreciation of the earth, its goodness and beauty. Living Aborigine philosophy thus means developing habits of moral behavior: being one with nature, aspiring to true humility, being one with others, practicing sharing and tolerance, and having been granted life, being protector of earth and appreciative of earth’s beauty and abundance. The ethical way to live taught to her by her Aborigine father required that, “No killing for the sake of killing,” which is rather universal, but “what you find, you keep,” which is not (Walker 10). Oodgeroo gave the example of a dog finding a shark. Although the woman who cooks it is hungry, she must give it to the dog. One of the strictest moral laws in Aborigine philosophy is that weapons can be used only for fishing and hunting food. Through her writings Oodgeroo reminds her Aborigine people of their own philosophical history and heritage. Just as important, she shares it with others, especially with white Australians, in hope of influencing the actions of people toward each other without prejudice as well as the actions of people toward their world of land, sea, and sky—this, in her twentieth century concern for global ecology. This crisis, she claimed, came about as a result of not listening to and

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learning from Aborigine philosophy which warns that if you ruin nature, you will be ruined (Walker 7). She explained the legends within legends as having foundational meanings (Noonuccal 1990a). For the Aborigine to gain equality and regain balance, the old truths of Aborigine philosophy are called for. For the world to have the possibility of a future, these truths must be learned. The Aborigine, as custodians of the land of Australia for 49,800 years, has had a vision of it that demands reverence and cooperation. In the beginning was “Dreamtime.” Earth Mother/Rainbow serpent lay asleep under the ground with all the animal tribes in her belly waiting to be born. When it was her time, she pushed up. The world was empty—she made mountains and valleys, water, and threw the good spirit Biani high in the sky—to give light and color and make flowers and fruit.  Oodgeroo retells the story of the land spirit, “All rocks are alive with the Earth Mother’s spirit. They watch over us all—they are our living temples” (Noonuccal, 1989b, 49). Communication occurs when “The Rock Temple listens as the Moon Spirit retells a legend told to her by the Rainbow Serpent” (54). Mankind lives with land spirit, and animal and tree spirit, and so, “Earth Mother sends message sticks to remind us to care for her things, protect land, and put back what we take out.” Now.... “although the spirit of man and the spirit of land have parted, they must come together again.” (13). Life began when Rainbow Serpent woke up and water ran into her tracks. She is the mother of life and maker of laws for how to live and find happiness. Legends teach morals, or what to hold as important in living a good life, what should be rewards and punishments, the importance of helping fellow creatures, other human beings, helping the land by being its keeper, and how to die. Legends urge us to hold in memory—to remember the past and present. For Oodgeroo this means to write it. And so “the time of learning” which means observing, drawing in the sand, recognizing, imitating “in the Aboriginal world never stops” (50).

20.4 Conclusion Oodgeroo Noonuccal brought Aborigine philosophy to light and formulated philosophical arguments through her books in both prose and poetry, and through her speeches. Poetry, being close to the oral and memorable performance of the Aborigine, to the roots of the Aborigine, brings individuals into community and links the individual to the beauty and purpose of land. In so doing, Aboriginal philosophy retains difference in oneness, while demonstrating the originality or distinctiveness of the Aborigine within the oneness of all humanity, Aborigine and non-Aborigine (Maori, 2015). The Aborigine family habit of teaching and remembering orally and of conducting family councils with the father as arbiter judge involved rhetoric as much as philosophy. Aware of rhetoric and its impact, Oodgeroo often deliberately used the simplest language and sentence structure so to have as inclusive an audience

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as possible. So too did Oodgeroo often write in story form, for that was what she remembered from childhood, and stories in particular are often the way of communication for the Aborigine. Paper and charcoal are the means for getting stories of old Dreamtime back (45). Oodgeroo understood that if legends and stories are not preserved in writing, much of Aborigine philosophy and experience will be lost, for, the Aborigine difference in the nation of Australia and the new global internationalism, will eventually be assimilated. Oneness does not mean assimilation, for that obliterates difference. In Oodgeroo’s understanding of the Aborigine philosophy of oneness, oneness means oneness of living people and living things with living land. It is the Aborigine philosophy of oneness and responsibility for the care of nature that leads to natural balance and peace. Oodgeroo’s concepts of equality, multiculturalism, and education provide a beginning for a new Australian philosophy arising from or together with the principles of Aborigine philosophy. Oodgeroo of the Noonuccal articulated Aborigine philosophy in its ontological nature—its philosophy of the relation of the world and the transcendent, its metaphysical nature—its philosophy of relationship of living reality, its political nature—its philosophy of equality and peace, and its ethics—its philosophy of caring for one another, fellow creatures, and the land, and how such a philosophy led to Aborigine traditions. She as well commented upon political philosophy and tradition which sustains inequality and neglects care of the land, and why it is viewed in Aborigine philosophy as unethical. She also advanced her thinking on how in reality Aborigines fail to live up to their own philosophy when they perpetrate patriarchy that thwarts the lives of women, thereby inhibiting equality among their own families and communities. While it may be said that much of Oodgeroo’s diverse writings would not be considered professional philosophy, they do articulate Aborigine philosophy and they do initiate a new philosophy that argues the importance of reinstating Aborigine philosophy not only for itself but for a better understanding of the nature of what “living” means as both a noun and verb. Thus, a new generation of philosophers is invited to inquire into Oodgeroo’s published and unpublished works to discover the full extent of her philosophical legacy.

Appendix Children’s Books by Oodgeroo Noonuccal: • Stradbroke Dreamtime. Angus Robertson, Harper Collins, 1972. • Father Sky and Mother Earth. Jacaranda Press, 1981. (Oodgeroo author and illustrator) • Little Fella, 1986. • The Rainbow Serpent. Australian Government Publishing Service, 1988. (With son Vivian)

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• Australian’s Unwritten History: More Legends of Our Land. Sydney: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992. Poetry by Oodgeroo Noonuccal: • “Municipal Gum” 1960 • “A Song of Hope” 1960 • We Are Going 1964 • The Dawn is at Hand: Poems, Ballad of the Totems 1966 • The Past, White Australia, All One Race, Freedom, Then and Now, Last of His Tribe 1970 • My People: A Kath Walker Collection 1970 • There and Now 1985 • Kath Walker in China 1988 • The Unhappy Race 1989 • The Colour Bar 1990 • Let Us Not Be Bitter 1990 • Oodgeroo 1994

References Abbey, S. (2019). “Noonuccal, Oodgeroo (1920–1993). Australian National University. Beier, U. (1985). Quandamooka, The Art of Kath Walker. Robert Brown & Associates. Brewster, A. (1994). Oodgeroo: Orator, Poet, Storyteller. In A. Shoemaker (Ed.) A Special Issue of Australian Literary Studies: Oodgeroo, A Tribute. (Vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 92–103). University of Queensland Press. Cochran, K., & Wright, J. (1994). Oodgeroo. University of Queensland Press. Collins, J. (1994). Obituary: Oodgeroo of the tribe Noonuccal. Aboriginal History, 18(1–2), 1–4. Collins, J. (1995). A mate in publishing. In A. Shoemaker (Ed.), Special Issue: Oodgeroo: A Tribute (Vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 9–23). Australian Literary Studies Encyclopedia of World Biography Supplement. (2007), vol. 27, Gale. Grime, B. (2019). A 60,000-year-old cure for depression. BBC aired 30 September. Hodge, B. (1995). Poetry and politics in oodgeroo: transcending the difference. In A. Shoemaker (Ed.) Oodgeroo: A Tribute. Special Issue (Vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 63–76) Australian Literary Studies. Maori and Aboriginal Women in the Public Eye: Representing Difference, 1950–2000. 28 Feb 2015 ANOE Press. McIlroy, J., & Coral, W. (2009). Oodgeroo: a keeper of the law, a teller of stories. Green Left Weekly (26 July). Miller, J. (2015). Australia’s Writers and Poets: The Story of Our Rich Literary Heritage. Exisle Publishers Minter, P. (2015). Kath Walker (Oodgeroo Noonuccal), Judith Wright and Decolonised Transcultural Ecopoetics in Frank Heiman’s Shadow Sister. Sydney Studies in English 41 Mitchell, S. (1987). The Matriarchs: 12 Australian Women Talk about Their Lives. Penguin Australia. Moodrooroo. (1995). The Poetetimics of Oodgeroo of the tribe of Noonuccal. In A. Shoemaker (Ed.), Oodgeroo: A Tribute. Special Issue (vol. 16 no. 4, pp. 57–62). Australian Literary Studies.

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Mukherjee, A. (2014). Between the Global and the Local: Oodgeroo Noonuccal and the Poetics of New Internationalism. SubalternSpeak, 2(3), 1–10. Noonuccal, O. (1989a). Towards a Global Village in the Southern Hemisphere. Division of Humanities, Griffith University, Nathan, Queensland. Noonuccal, O. (1989b). The Spirit of Australia. Silverwater, N.S.W.: Golden Press. Noonuccal, O. (1990a). Australian Legends and Landscapes. Random House Australia, 1990. Oodgeroo: Bloodline to Country. (2009). A play by Sam Watson based on her life. Playlab. Page, G. (1993). The Poetry of Oodgeroo. Island. (Sandy Bay, Tasmania): 57, 3–5. Sharma, B. (2020). Womanist expressions in the poetry of Judith Wright and Oodgeroo Noonucal. International Journal of English Literature and Social Science 5(2) (March-April), 540–543. Shoemaker, A. (1995). Performance for the people. In A. Shoemaker (Ed.), Oodgeroo: A Tribute. Special Issue (vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 164–177). Australian Literary Studies. Shadow Sister. (1977). Documentary film, Frank Heimans, director, with photos by Geoff Burton. Sorensen, R. (2009). Ode to Oodgeroo. The Australian (8 June) Taylor, G. (1999). Livewire Real Lives: Oodgeroo Noonuccal. Cambridge University Press. University of Queensland Fryer Library Events. (2020). In times like these what would Oodgeroo do?” Audio https://web.library.uq.edu.au/about-us/events retrieved 5 July 2022. Walker, K. (1988). Kath Walker in China. GuZixin, tr. Brisbane: Jacaranda Press and the International Culture Publishing Corporation. Zandotti, M. (2012). Oodgeroo Noonuccal’s ‘Stadbroke Dreamtime’ (1972). Journal of Italian Translation VII:2 (Fall), 80–95

Chapter 21

Emérita Quito of the Philippines 1929–2017 Mary Ellen Waithe Abstract  Emérita Quito was the first woman from the Philippines to complete a Ph.D. in Philosophy. Her early Scholastic training as an undergraduate was at the University of Santo Tomas expanded to include phenomenology and existentialism during her graduate studies at major European universities. Upon returning home she began to focus on the idea of developing a methodology for investigating indigenous Filipino philosophy. How does one reveal the concepts and principles underlying the belief systems within a country that has suffered a thousand years of occupation by foreign forces, that speaks with hundreds of different dialects across more than seven thousand islands spread across more than one hundred thousand square miles? This amazing philosopher published extensively not only in western philosophy, but on that indigenous to this island nation, prior to the incursions of western nations and the introduction to the Philippines of western philosophical views.

M. E. Waithe (*)  Professor Emerita, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, OH, US e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_21

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21.1 Introduction This chapter introduces an important philosopher, Emérita Quito of the Philippines. Although her philosophical training was in western traditions, her scholarly focus was twofold. First, she had a strong interest in phenomenology and existentialism. She published discussions on the views of Heidegger, Lavelle, Sartre, Husserl, Stein, Bergson, Marcuse, Camus and other contemporaries. Her second major professional undertaking was what convinced the editors of this volume to include a chapter about her: Emérita Quito addressed the question whether there can be a distinct Filipino philosophy that either is devoid of or can be stripped of western religious and colonialist foundations. Spanish rule since the 1500 s had brought with it Catholicism and Scholasticism. During war in the Pacific, the United States was followed by Japan in occupation of the country. This long history of colonization had a chilling effect on political dissidence as those in power suppressed academic freedom when its exercise threatened their interests as colonizers. The values, habits, languages and world views of the colonizers had become ingrained, but unevenly so, across different segments of the Philippine population. Emérita Quito sought to develop a methodology that could explore two interrelated questions. The first question is “is Filipino philosophy possible?” This question can be deconstructed in part by attending to a second question: “Are there authentic non-western foundations of Philippine thought that can account for known Filipino ideals, concepts, values, and so forth, that are consistent with one another, and that meet other desiderata?” This chapter focuses on Quito’s contributions towards the development of an account of Filipino philosophy and relates those contributions to her publications in phenomenology and existentialism, as well as to her political activism.

21.2 Biography Emérita Quito was born on September 11, 1929, in San Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, the youngest of five children. She studied law and philosophy at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) earning her undergraduate degree in 1949, followed by a master’s degree in 1956. In 1961 she entered the doctoral program at the Université de Friborg, Switzerland. During that period she studied also at the Universität Wien, Austria and at the Universidad de Zaragoza, Spain. A decade later, she attended the Sorbonne. Quito’s doctoral dissertation was completed in 1965, written in French. At that time, Ferdinand Marcos was elected President of the Philippines. Quite relevant to the situation in her homeland, Quito’s dissertation discussed the idea of participatory freedom in the philosophy of Louis Lavelle. She was awarded the Ph.D. in Philosophy cum laude. In 1967 she returned to the Philippines to teach at her alma mater, University of Santo Tomas.

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Quito’s graduate studies in Europe had brought her into contact with the philosophy of Herbert Marcuse. His socio-political philosophy influenced her growing dissatisfaction with the developing political situation in the Philippines under the election of Ferdinand Marcos to the Presidency. At the same time, Quito became disaffected with the Scholastic philosophy that informed the overwhelmingly Catholic populace and most Filipino institutions of higher education. The Scholastic tradition seemed to Quito to be irrelevant for addressing the practical needs of the people. It could not illuminate the moral question whether the extravagant lifestyles of the Marcos family and their political appointees could be justified at a time when most of the population lived in poverty. For Quito, the Scholastic tradition did not foster independent, new philosophical research. The tradition looked backwards, historically, not to the history of the Philippines, but to Greco-Roman/Judeo-Christian history in Europe. Furthermore, it was a tradition that did not concern itself with contemporary social and political issues. Among the best universities in the Philippines were Catholic institutions, and the majority of them were in the Scholastic tradition. Quito, in The State of Philosophy in the Philippines notes: The hold of the Catholic faith on the minds of the Filipino people has been so tenacious that most people no longer draw a line between religion and faith on the one hand, and philosophy and reason, on the other. As a result, the most prominent philosophical trend among the majority of professors until the 1960’s has been Catholic philosophy, or to be more specific, the philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas.” (Quito, 1983a, 1983b, 10)

Quito had studied Catholic philosophy, Greek and other European philosophies. Was there such a thing as Filipino philosophy? Philosophy departments of the major Filipino universities did not provide a research infrastructure for laypersons who were philosophy professors. Nor did they at that time share Quito’s interest in the possibility of a Filipino philosophy. The situation was better at De La Salle University, which, although a Catholic institution, agreed to support Quito’s research, so in 1971 she became a full-time faculty member there. Quito’s interest in the relationship between Philippine language and (its seeming lack of) philosophy had by this time expanded to an interest in making analogous inquiries of other languages. In time she became a polyglot: fluent not only in English but also Tagalog, French, German, Urdu/Sanskrit and Malay/Indonesian. She also had a working knowledge of Spanish. The Philippines had been a colony of Spain for three centuries, so Spanish survived at least in written form, even if spoken Spanish was less commonly encountered. It is most likely that Quito’s fluency in Spanish was sharpened during her residency at the Universidad de Zaragoza. Her fluency in multiple languages meant that she would have been a strong candidate when she entered a program to study Oriental and Sanskrit philosophy at the Université de Paris-Sorbonne, France in 1974. While in Paris, she entered the Catholic convent of Assumption Sisters taking the name Sister Mary Paul, but discovering that she had no religious vocation, soon left. Espousing Herbert Marcuse’s concept “the Great Refusal,” Quito embraced the concept of civil disobedience. She was a founding member of the Philippine

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National Association of College and University Professors that championed the faculty’s role as “a third force in directing the country’s social and political transformation.” During the 1970s, Quito publicly called for civil disobedience, for reasons and in ways exemplified by Herbert Marcuse. She understood the formative and liberating role that university faculty could have in the transformation from post-colonial Philippines under the cloud of Marcos’ tyrannical rule into a truly democratic nation. In 1978, at the invitation of the Asian Women’s Institute in India she presented her paper “The Role of the University in Changing Women’s Consciousness.” She also travelled to Seoul to consult with colleagues at Korea’s Ewha Woman’s University. These and other invitations formed the nexus of Quito’s relationship with women’s groups and inspired her to publish a short monograph about philosophers Ayn Rand, Hannah Arendt and Simone de Beauvoir (1986). Emérita Quito received one of France’s highest honors for academic work when she was awarded the title of Chevalier (Knight) de l’Ordre des Palmes Academiques in 1984. In 1985 Quito was honored as the Philippines’s most outstanding educator. At De La Salle University she rose to the rank of full Professor and became Chair of the Philosophy Department, then Dean of the Graduate School of Education, and lastly, Vice President for Academics. Emérita Quito retired and became Professor Emerita in 1993. After retirement, she remained at her home until dying of respiratory failure in Manila in 2017.

21.3 Philosophy Quito’s published work covers the intersection of four broad topics: (a) Public Philosophy, (b) Phenomenology and Existentialism, (c) Ethics and Moral Philosophy, and (d) Filipino Philosophy. Several of her writings address more than one of these topics.

21.3.1 Public Philosophy Emérita Quito’s pursuit of Filipino Philosophy included a series of articles written for a non-academic audience and published in the Manila Chronicle in 1971. The topics included “philosophy of life,” (1971a) “the Oriental mind,” (1971d) and “chance or necessity (1971b).” These guest articles were motivated in part by Quito’s desire to introduce the public to certain philosophical concepts and problems. In part the articles were also intended to gently correct (by engaging with non-academics) the negative public view of the profession of philosophy as bickering and of philosophers as annoying bickerers.

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21.3.2 Phenomenology and Existentialism Emérita Quito published articles on the philosophies of Henri Bergson (1966), Jean-Paul Sartre (1962), Edmund Husserl (1967c), and Albert Camus (1968), as well as an article on the principles of existentialism (1967b), an article introducing Existentialism and Phenomenology (1969), and another on the meaning of existentialism (1967d). Existentialism pervaded her professional writing throughout her career. Quito’s monograph Homage to Jean-Paul Sartre (1981a) reflected his influence on her own philosophical perspective, as did her analyses of Husserl’s and Edith Stein’s phenomenology (2001).

21.3.3 Ethics/Moral/Political Philosophy A short monograph, Regeneration of moral and social values (1974) as well as an article of the same title appeared in (1975c). In 1982, she published “An Existentialist approach to Ecumenism (1982a).” Responding to Simone de Beauvoir’s Pour une morale de l'ambiguïté (The Ethics of Ambiguity), in which she criticized Sartrean ethics, Quito in 1985 published an article. “A morality of ambiguity or the ambiguity of morality?” (1985a). That same year, continuing to narrow her focus to the possibility of a Filipino philosophy, she published “Philosophical conception of value” (1985b). Within a few years she completed two additional monographs, A structural approach to Philippine ethics (Quito, 1989a) and Fundamentals of ethics (1989c). As is evident from the titles of these works, Quito’s interests in the traditional European divisions of philosophy, for example, metaphysics and ethics, was enhanced by her recognition of their relevance to her own desire to address the question whether or not there is a possibility of Filipino philosophy.

21.3.4 Filipino Philosophy? Emérita Quito sought to articulate the methodological problems to discerning whether or not there is such a thing as “Filipino Philosophy.” One major obstacle, she held, was the paucity of Filipino, the official language grounded in Tagalog. She points out that in the latter, not only was there no direct way to express certain philosophical concepts, but in which the term pilosopo had unfortunately negative, comical connotations. In State of Philosophy in the Philippines,” Quito notes: On the popular or grassroots level, the term ‘pilosopo’ (Pilipino word for ‘philosopher’) is a pejorative name for anyone who argues lengthily, whether rightly or wrongly. The term alludes to a character called “Pilosopo Tasyo” (Tasyo, the Philosopher) who perorates endlessly in one of the novels of the Philippines’ national hero, Jose Rizal . . . . the term

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‘pilosopo’ has seeped into the academic consciousness with a damaging effect. (1983c, p.10–11)

The language obstacle is complicated by the fact that Tagalog, the basis of Filipino, the official national language of the Philippines, is not the natal tongue of more than three quarters of the Philippine population. Tagalog is a minority language: one of more than two hundred languages and dialects spoken by residents of this 7000+ island nation that is scattered over more than 1500 square miles. Quito’s published works rarely distinguished between two questions that are central to her inquiry into the existence of a Filipino philosophy. The first question, “is there an indigenous Filipino philosophy that is free of colonizing influences?” requires philosophical archeology—the uncovering of historically indigenous Filipino philosophy that is devoid of the colonizing influences. The second question is grounded in the present, rather than in the historical past: “given that contemporary professors of philosophy in the Philippines have been schooled in the philosophies of the colonizers, what is the future state of professional philosophy in post-colonial Philippines?”. Quito’s perspective on indigenous Filipino philosophy distinguished between academic formal philosophy, on the one hand, and grassroots folk philosophy on the other. Formal academic philosophical publishing in the Philippines was at that time almost exclusively of non-Filipino thought. Filipino grassroots philosophy or folk philosophy was completely alien to westernized Filipino academics. Quito called indigenous philosophy “loose philosophy.” It is “diwang Pilipino” (Filipino spirit), a particular kind of “Volksgeist” (Folk spirit) and “Weltanschauung” (worldview). In Quito’s view, indigenous concepts, languages, and systems of thought result from and contribute to meaningful discourse. But to get to the point of meaningful discourse, philosophers need a deep, complex yet clear understanding of national and cultural identity. Quito remarks: This collective mind, this general attitude toward life, this concerted effort to acquire wisdom which is manifest on the popular or grassroots level constitutes the folk spirit (Volksgeist) of the Filipino and it should (or will) eventually emerge as the formalized philosophy on the academic level. This philosophy however, is still in the process of formalization. (Quito 1983c, p.10)

She illustrates her argument with explanations of concepts that are foundational to Filipino philosophy. First is bahala na or being resigned to leaving everything to Divine Providence, entailing acceptance in advance of whatever occurs. This resignation is not fatalist but contextualized by a second concept Gulong ng Palad–the “Wheel of Fortune” an optimistic reminder that life is a series of ups and downs, sorrows will be replaced by joy. The present is only transitory, time is cyclical, not linear. A third philosophical concept that is indigenous to Filipinos according to Quito, is pakikisama. This concept expresses the value of living well with others and is the foundation of social harmony. There is moral significance to valuing tranquility in relationships with others as part of the cost as well as one of the benefits of living in a community. The value to the individual of living peacefully in

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society is so great that individuals should resist temptation to oppose the general will. One ought not “rock the boat.“ Each person ought to be willing to go along with the rest to preserve peace within the society and assure smooth, interpersonal relationships (11). A fourth related concept is “bayanihan” or helpfulness. While “bayanihan” may be thought of as manifesting in being helpful, “helpfulness” might not capture the nuance of the term. The term bayanihan is rooted in “bayan” or community where one identifies as part of. Some may view bayanihan as akin to camaraderie among people from the same community or ‘imagined community’.1 Quito states that “... a Filipino will come to the aid of anyone who is in need of help, whether he be a native or foreigner.” (p. 11). Although bayanihan is an other-regarding virtue it is reinforced by bahala na or Divine Providence. Whatever good one has done will rebound, karma-like, to one’s benefit. A Supreme Judge will administer just compensation in this life or in the next. A fifth moral concept that is indigenous to Filipino moral philosophy is utang na loob, or debt of gratitude.2 This a reference to the fact that throughout your life there have been favors and good deeds done to you by others. These are moral debts that cannot be repaid in money. Utang na loob is a profound moral duty regarding social relationships. It emphasizes gratitude as a debt which can never be fully paid. Failing to acknowledge and repay it damages your standing in the community. Such a person is shameless, the “scum of the earth” (11). Some scholars may object to the idea that an unwritten, indigenous philosophy may be uncovered through the simple expedient of attending to the linguistic terms through which a people express their philosophical views. As Quito scolds: . . . what ought to be philosophy if not the collective mind of a people interacting with its own universe? What should philosophy be if not the attitude of a people toward life and a Supreme Being? What is philosophy (literally, "love of wisdom") if not a people's concerted effort to acquire wisdom in order to live well? This collective mind, this general attitude toward life, this concerted effort to acquire wisdom which is manifest on the popular or grassroots level constitutes the folk spirit (Volksgeist) of the Filipino and it should (or will) eventually emerge as a formalized philosophy on the academic level. (Quito,1983c, p. 10)

21.3.5 The Future of Philosophy in the Philippines Quito knows that her analyses of indigenous philosophy was colored by her response to the political events in her country, especially during the Marcos era. She recognizes that she wears eyeglasses that she cannot remove: the lenses of

1 I am grateful to Professor Ma Theresa Payongayong (University of the Philippines Dilliman, Quezon City) for this clarification, as well as for her generous assistance reviewing this chapter. 2 I thank Professor Payongayong for this clarification.

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phenomenology, existentialism, and Thomism will always affect her analyses of ethics and within that context, the morality of political institutions. Quito’s scholarly interests expanded beyond the western philosophies she learned as an undergraduate, and in which she became totally immersed during her years in European universities. Although she maintained her interest in topics such as Louis Lavelle’s concept of freedom her new focus was eastward, examining Oriental philosophies and assessing their connections to a Filipino philosophy that was still in its early stages of recovering indigenous ideals, concepts, principles, and values. She sought to identify similarities, distinctions and connections between Filipino and other Asian thought. Could these well-known, ancient oriental philosophies provide a template within which Filipino philosophy would fit? Are some philosophical ideas shared by different peoples of the eastern hemisphere? Quito’s inquiries resulted in an article “A Short Introduction to Oriental Philosophy” (1975a), and a monograph, Oriental roots of Occidental Philosophy (1975b), followed by an article “Yoga and Christian spirituality” (1978a), until, in 1983 she would explore “A Filipino philosophy of value” (Quito, 1983a, 1983b). Quito’s search for a Filipino philosophy was not only for its indigenous origins, but also for its then contemporary development that took into account the westernizing influences of Scholasticism, of the influences of two colonizing cultures: Spain, and the United States. In this sense, Emérita Quito is both a non-western philosopher and a western philosopher. Not only was she the Philippines’ most important philosopher of the twentieth century, but she was among the first to sketch a methodology through which both indigenous and contemporary Filipino philosophy can be identified.3 However, as Quito explained, the task of identifying the former begins with the native tongue, and there are many, many “native tongues” amongst residents of its thousands of islands. The project of recovering authentic Filipino philosophy will be fraught with linguistic problems because, as Quito explains: . . .until the Filipino people recover the native tongue, it will not develop an indigenous philosophy, for the soul of a people is better expressed in a native language.” (Quito, 1983a, 1983b, 54.)

One important way in which she contributed to that quest was to become a co-editor of Ensayklopidiya ng Pilosopiya, (Quito, 1993a) an encyclopedia of philosophy written in Tagalog. This work includes a glossary that translates central terms and concepts into English. Another section is biographical and bibliographical details about Filipino philosophers and their published works. A third section

3  Professor

Payongoyang advises that “During the 1970s, many Filipino academics engaged in thinking about the indigenous knowledge systems. Pantayong Pananaw and Bagong Kasaysayan in History, Sikolohiyang Pilipino in Psychology and the many works that thought of Pilosopiyang Pilipino—Quito included—was very much present beginning in the 1970s.” (Personal communication).

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offers fuller discussion of philosophic topics. The final major section of this encyclopedia lists important quotations from the philosophers who are considered in this volume.

21.4 Conclusions Emérita Quito did not seek to enhance her status on the world stage of philosophy. She neither wrote for nor published in western philosophical presses and their journals. Instead, she wrote for Filipino academics and the public. This in part was her immense service to the profession itself. In addition, she contributed to founding a Filipino philosophical community by publishing exclusively, and regularly, in the presses and journals sponsored by Philippine universities. This ought not suggest that the quality of her work would fail to meet the standards of western philosophical presses. Had that been the case, Quito would not have been the recipient of the many grants, post-doctoral appointments, honors and awards made by some of the best western academic institutions. Trained in western philosophy and living in a post-colonial non-western society, Emérita Quito devoted her professional life to the reclamation of indigenous Filipino philosophy as one that shares resemblance with other eastern philosophies.

References Demeterio, FP. (2001). Re-Reading Emérita Quito’s thoughts concerning the underdevelopment of filipino philosophy, Diwatao (Vol. 1, no. 1). Accessed 2/11/19 http://www.geocities.ws/philodept/diwatao/emerita_quito.htm Demeterio, F. P., & Liwanag, L. A. L. (2018). Emérita Quito, Mary John Mananzan, and Filipina philosophy: A critical comparison of the thoughts of the two leading female philosophers of the Philippines. Humanities Diliman, 15(1), 108–138. Liwanag, LAL. (2016). Ang Pilosopiya ni Emérita S. Quito,” Kritike: 10:1:54–82. Quito, A. (2018). The Philippines Greatest Female Philosopher has Died, https://qz.com/ author/ annequitoqz Quito, E. (1956a). The will and its relation to divine causality and knowledge. Unitas 29. Quito, E. (1956b). The will and its relation to divine causality and knowledge. Master’s thesis, University of Santo Tomas. Quito, E. (1962). On Jean-Paul Sartre and Louis Lavelle. Journal of Education 5. Quito, E. (1966). The philosophy of Henri Bergson. Unitas 38 Quito, E. (1967b). Principles of existentialism. Philippiniana Sacra 2. Quito, E. (1967d). The meaning of existentialism. Unitas 40. Quito, E. (1967c). The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Unitas 40. Quito, E. (1968). The theme of absurdity in Albert Camus. DLSC Dialogue 4. Quito, E. (1969). Existentialism and phenomenology: an introduction. DLSC Dialogue 5. Quito, E. (1971a). Philosophy of life. Manila Chronicle, 2 May. Quito, E. (1971c). Robert Andrey: Scientist or philosopher? Unitas 44. Quito, E. (1971d). The Oriental mind. Manila Chronicle, 9 May. Quito, E. (1971b). Chance or necessity. Manila Chronicle, 19 May.

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Quito, E. (1973). The paradox of freedom in Louis Lavelle. Unitas 46. Quito, E. (1974). Regeneration of moral and social values. Beacon. Quito, E. (1975a). A short introduction to oriental philosophy. Σοϕια 4. Quito, E. (1975b). Oriental roots of Occidental philosophy. University of Malaya Press. Also published (1975) by DLSU as Occasional Paper No. 1. Quito, E. (1975c). Regeneration of moral and social values. Σοϕια 4. Quito, E. (1978a). The Role of the University in Changing Women's Consciousness. DLSU Dialogue: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Cultural Studies, 14(1). Retrieved 3/17/20 from http://ejournals.ph/form/cite.php?id=4272. Quito, E. (1978b). Yoga and Christian spirituality. Unitas 51. Quito, E. (1980). Process philosophy: an introduction. Σοϕια 9. Quito, E. (1981b). The philosophy of Avicenna in the twentieth century. Σοϕια 11. Quito, E. (1982a). An existentialist approach to ecumenism. Σοϕια 12. Quito, E. (1982b). Teaching and Research of Philosophy in the Philippines. UNESCO Commission Paper. Quito, E. (1983b). Review of Kasaysayan ng komedya sa Filipinas, 1766–1982, by Nicanor G. Tiongson. DLSU Dialogue 18. Quito, E. (1983c). The State of Philosophy in the Philippines. De La Salle University Press. Quito, E. (1984). Isang teorya ng pagpapahalaga. Malay 3. Quito, Emérita. (1985b. Philosophical conception of value. Sangguni 8. Quito, E. (1985a). A morality of ambiguity or the ambiguity of morality. Σοϕια 15. Quito, E. (1988a). Louis Lavelle’s concept of freedom. Σοϕια 18. Quito, E. (1988b). The ambivalence of Filipino traits and values. Karunungan 5. Quito, E. (1989b). Ang konsepto ng kalayaan ni Louis Lavelle. Karunungan 6; also: 1988. Σοϕια 18. Quito, E. (1990). Homage to Jean-Paul Sartre. Readings in Filipino Philosophy, by the DLSU Philosophy Department. DLSU Press. Quito, E. (1993a) Pilosopiyang Filipino. In Ensayklopidiya ng Pilosopiya (pp. 187–195). De La Salle University Press Quito, E. (1997). Philosophy of history: an introduction. DLSU Dialogue: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Cultural Studies, 13(1). Retrieved 9/18/21 from http://ejournals.ph/form/cite. php?id=4256. Quito, et al., (Eds). (2001). Phenomenology: Husserl and Edith Stein. De La Salle University Press. Quito, E. (1967a). Address on a new concept of philosophy. UST Press. Quito, E. (1981a). Homage to Jean-Paul Sartre. De La Salle University. Quito, E. (1986). Three women philosophers. De La Salle University Press. Quito, E. (1989a). A structural approach to Philippine ethics. Cultural Center of the Philippines. Quito, E. (1989c). Fundamentals of ethics. DLSU Press. Quito, E. (1991). The merging philosophy of East and West. DLSU Press. Quito, E. (1983a). A Filipino philosophy of value. Σοϕια 13. Quito, E. (1971–72). The historical concept of being and truth. Σοϕια 1. [With an Open Forum]. Quito, et al. (Eds.). (1990). A life of philosophy, festschrift in honor of Emérita S. Quito. De la Salle University Press. Santos, C. O, & Dainish, S. (2018). (Untitled) downloaded 2/7/20: http:www.PHLArchive.org.

Chapter 22

Sophie Olúwolé of Nigeria 1935–2018 Louise Müller

Abstract  Sophie Bósèdé Olayemi Olúwolé was a professor of philosophy at the University of Lagos, and a prolific author of the history of African Philosophy, particularly, that of the Yoruba. She was a formidable defender of the view that indigenous oral traditions legitimately are considered philosophy. Olúwolé was a vocal critic of professional philosophers who were to claim that only written materials can be evidence of philosophical reasoning. She explored the hypocrisy of implicitly racist claims that effectively denied that those who do not write cannot think abstractly. She is best known in the west for comparing the philosophical work of two philosophers who were contemporaries: the Greek, Socrates and the Yoruba, Òrúnmìlà. In this chapter I explore the above topics addressed by Olúwolé, her comparative philosophical work, as well as her contribution to African feminist philosophy and to addressing the social and political barriers to contemporary African women’s issues. For the latter, she urges a return to traditional Yoruban philosophy.

L. Müller (*)  Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_22

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22.1 Biography Sophie Bósèdé Olayemi Olúwolé was born in 1935 in the city of Igbara-Oke in the Ondo state of southwestern Nigeria. She was the last-born and, unlike the other children, she was blessed with two Yoruba names (Bósèdé means ‘born on Sunday’, Olayemi means ‘I feel comfortable with dignity’). Although ethnically she and her parents belonged to the Edo, Sophie’s maternal grandmother was a Yoruba and Sophie grew up in a Yoruba dominated state. It is, therefore, not surprising that Sophie became interested in Yoruba oral tradition at an early age. Her parents, who were Anglican Christians, were not pleased with her interest in this African traditional culture and they forbade their four children to attend Yoruba ceremonies. Sophie was encouraged to focus on Christianity and around the age of eight she was baptized as ‘Sofia’; an ancient Greek word that translates to being ‘clever, skillful, intelligent, wise’. Sophie’s local school headmaster, who was a family friend, chose this name for her, because of Sophie’s high intelligence (Beier & Olúwolé, 2001, pp. 360–361). After she attended St. Paul’s Anglican Primary School at Igbara-Oke, Sophie proceeded to the Anglican Girls modern school at Ile-Ife in 1951. In the period 1953–1954, she went to the British oriented Women Training College in Ilesha and became a qualified teacher. Until 1963 she taught in Nigeria, first in Ogotun and later in Ibadan (Beier & Olúwolé, 2001). Shortly after Sophie got married, she moved to Moscow where her husband was posted as a United Nations’ Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization scholar. In Moscow, she joined her husband in learning the Russian language in preparation for studying Economics. Unlike Sophie, her husband experienced great difficulties with learning Russian, which is why the couple emigrated from Russia to Germany. In the German city of Cologne Sophie had to start another preparatory year, this time learning German. She was a good student and as a consequence at the end of the year, she was offered a full scholarship in Philology. Despite that, she emigrated with her husband to the United States. After some time in the USA, however, she decided to separate from her husband, among other reasons, because he had thwarted her further studies. She moved back to Nigeria to continue studying at the University of Lagos  and enrolled in an Education program studying English. After switching to Philosophy, which well suited her critical and reflective nature, she had her first degree in this field of study in 1967. She then taught at a secondary school in Odo State for two years before returning to the University of Lagos to pursue her postgraduate studies (Godia, 2007). Only when choosing a topic for her master dissertation, was Olúwolé introduced to African Philosophy. At the time African Philosophy was not well developed as an academic discipline, which is why nobody could supervise her in this field. Sophie, therefore, changed her field of study from African Philosophy to the Philosophy of Language. In 1984 she obtained a Ph.D. in Metaethics in Western Philosophy and became one of the first and certainly the first female Ph.D. in Philosophy awarded by a Nigerian University.

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From then on, she was finally free to write and research on her field of interest in African Philosophy, which was the Ifá corpus in Yoruba culture and philosophy. Because the verses in the Ifá corpus were complex to understand, she took classes to improve her understanding of the Yoruba language. After that, she became a rising star in African Philosophy. Between 1989 and 1996, she wrote five books in this field of which the most noteworthy are Witchcraft, Reincarnation and the God Head (1992), Women in Yoruba Traditional Thought (1993) and Philosophy and Oral Tradition (1997) (Beier & Olúwolé, 2001). In 2014 she wrote Socrates and Òrúnmìlà: Two Patron Saints of Classical Philosophy; a book that became of great significance for the field of African and Intercultural Philosophy. For many years, Sophie Olúwolé headed the Department of Philosophy at the University of Lagos and was the chairman of the Nigerian Society for Philosophy. In 2000 after her retirement, she fully devoted herself to her self-founded Center of African Culture and Development (CEFACAD) which mainly focuses on the development of women in Africa (Müller, 2009). To sum up, Olúwolé did not only stand up for the study of African oral tradition as philosophy and the development of African and Intercultural Philosophy, but she also contributed significantly to the progress and development of women in Africa by her studies of Yoruba culture, and her writings and many public performances. Sophie Olúwolé was an active public philosopher with an impressive academic record, who received many awards and honors from institutions in Africa and beyond. She gave birth to eight children from two husbands. She died at 83 and went down in history as the Mamalawo or philosophical sage/priestess of classical Yoruba Philosophy.

22.2 Methodology of Classical African Philosophy 22.2.1 Critiquing the Oral Tradition In 1977, the Beniner philosopher Paulin Hountondji wrote Sur la “Philosopie Africaine”: Critique de l’Ethnophilosophie. In 1983, Henri Evans translated Hountondji’s book as African ‘Philosophy: Myth and Reality. In this book, Hountondji defined African Philosophy as ‘a set of texts, specifically the set of texts written by Africans and described as philosophical by their authors themselves’. By explicitly mentioning that texts could only be part of African Philosophy if they were written by Africans, Hountondji excluded oral traditions from the field of African Philosophy. In ‘How African is Philosophy in Africa?’, a relatively recent article in the journal Filosofia Theoretica, which was dedicated to the late Sophie Olúwolé, Hountondji reformulated his definition of African Philosophy. He mentioned that by ‘African Philosophy’ I mean a set of texts, specifically the set of texts produced by Africans and described as philosophical by their authors themselves (Hountondji, 2018, p. 12). With this reformulation of African Philosophy, Hountondji now acknowledges that so-called ‘oral texts’, the currently written, previously orally transmitted oral traditions are part and parcel

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of African Philosophy. As a protagonist of Yoruba oral texts, such as the Ifá corpus, Sophie Olúwolé has played a major role in the recognition by (African) Philosophers, including Hountondji, of African oral traditions as a source of classical African Philosophy.

22.2.2 The Ifá Tradition Olúwolé disputed the idea that there is one universal logic, which is the only method to practice philosophy, and that all texts with an underlying different type of logic are irrational and thus unphilosophical. She pleaded for the recognition of an African logic in oral traditions, which qualify these traditions as philosophy. In her book Socrates and Òrúnmìlà, she explains that the Ifá corpus is an oral traditional Yoruba text which is characterized by a different philosophical methodology than the one used by Western philosophers and most modern African philosophers. She makes the point that as an oral text and as a divination system, the Ifá corpus is rational and logical. In her opinion, the corpus was created by the Yoruba sage philosopher Òrúnmìlà and his disciples who lived in the Yoruba city of IleIfe around 500 BCE. Sophie thus opposes the idea that Western logic is universal and proposes that the binary complementarity behind the Ifá corpus should be acknowledged as a specific African logic that qualifies Ifá as being part of indigenous, pre-colonial or what Olúwolé calls ‘classical African Philosophy’. By quoting the Yoruba proverb Láko lábo ni Olórun dá gbogbo nnkan (every natural existence occurs in male–female antithesis), Sophie explains that Ifá follows a logical system, both mathematical and textual, that centralizes the binary but complementary nature of masculine and feminine energies in both the universe and the human consciousness (àṣẹ). In her view, binary complementary logic is to be found in the working of the cosmos, in the natural mechanism that causes movement, sustains and transforms. She explained that African Philosophy differs from the Western philosophical logical system, which is based on a binary opposition between paired entities, such as man versus woman, dark versus light. Yoruba logic is, instead, based on the idea that there is not an opposing but a complementary duality between entities. In Olúwolé’s view, the entities man and woman, for instance, are not opposed to one another and cannot exist without each other. A man is no man without a woman and vice versa. Men and women represent different but complementary aspects of reality, of the totality of consciousness. This implies that consciousness consists of polar, separate entities that are nevertheless interconnected. Olúwolé calls the Yoruba logic an “and/or logic”, because polar entities such as a valley and a hill, what we may call “heads or tails” of a coin, are separate but at the same time complementary to one another. They are independent (or/or) and yet together they are part of the same cosmic source. In comparison to Yoruba Ifá studies by social anthropologists, historians and literary scholars, Sophie Olúwolé most clearly articulated the rationality of the

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Ifá geomantic system and corpus. Yoruba oral historian Samuel Johnson, the American anthropologist William Bascom and Yoruba language and literature professor Wándé Abímbọ́lá instead departed from the mythical descriptions of the Yoruba people in their oral tradition, which did not become oral history before the 1890s. In their point of view, Òrúnmìlà might have existed as a semi historical figure and philosopher around 450 BCE but until Johnson’s ‘ A History of the Yoruba (1897) there was no human migration history of him and his disciples. Due to the emphasis of the semi-historical nature of Òrúnmìlà in the Ifá corpus, it not surprising that this group of scholars perceived this figure as a primal orisha, a Yoruba ancestor or a semi -historical figure rather than a real human being as Olúwolé did. As a compromise between scholars of different fields one could perhaps best speak of Òrúnmìlà as a semi-historical figure, comparable to Socrates, Jesus and Mohammed. None of these figures left us any self-written texts and so we only know of their existence by others. Our knowledge of Òrúnmìlà came to us because it was passed down from generation to generation by the Yoruba traditional priests, who were trained for years to learn the verses of the Ifá corpus by heart. Some of these verses mention that Òrúnmìlà had wives and that he came from Ile Ife, whereas other says that he received his knowledge from the Yoruba god Oduduwa. The Ifá corpus did not become an oral text before the nineteenth century. Socrates is known to us because of the written accounts of Plato, Aristophanes and Xenophon that were first orally transmitted and only published around thirty years after Socrates’ death. Our knowledge of Jesus and Mohammed came to us via the Bible and the Qur’an respectively. None of these three left us any self-written texts and so we only know of their existence through others. One could say that by comparing Socrates and Òrúnmìlà and describing them as both philosophers and patron saints, Olúwolé has either deified Socrates or has secularised Òrúnmìlà; one way or another she has smuggled religion into the philosophical discipline or contemporary Western philosophers have rustled religion out of ancient Greek philosophy. Sophie Olúwolé emphasizes the rationality of the Ifá corpus by focusing on its corresponding paired oral verses (odu méjìs). She explained that the sixteen odu méjìs which make up the primal méjìs of the Ifá divination system are specular in form and represent contrary energies. The seeming chaos of the Ifá texts, consisting of poems, prose, chant, litany and song, is structured according to the same binary complementary logic. In each odu méjì masculine and feminine expressions of reality are making up the totality of the story. It is, therefore, up to the listener, the client of the Ifá diviner, to decide what to take away from the oral texts in the Ifá literary corpus. The explanation of the one listener may be contrary to that of the other, since reality as a whole consists of contrary but complementary forces, encompassing both the order and chaos of the universe. The experience of Ifá, which is the repository of Yoruba traditional wisdom, differs from person to person depending on where they stand in their path of life and where they are going. Due to its different forms of wisdom, which assemble various aspects of the human experience, Ifá and the interpreter or diviner can help people to guide them in life and to develop a good character (iwa) (Olúwolé, 1997a, 2014).

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Olúwolé concentrated so much on the rationality of Ifá as a geomantic system and a literary corpus because she aimed to correct the assumptions that underpinned the colonial educational system and those of Western philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant, George Friedrich Hegel and David Hume. In their point of view, Africans were irrational beings, whose belief was no more than superstition, and who were unable to think let alone to philosophize. For that reason, these Westerners concluded that African Philosophy could not have existed before the colonial period or beyond. These ideas also resonated in the twentieth-century philosophy of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl in La Mentalité Primitive (1922), who made a distinction between the prelogical and mythical Africans versus the civilized and logical Westerners. Such views also appeared in the work of social anthropologist Edward Evans Pritchard, who categorized anthropology under the humanities and who copied the same mythos versus logos dichotomy in his book Theories of Primitive Religion (1965). Olúwolé went against the dismissal by Western and African philosophers and social anthropologists of oral traditions as a source of philosophy. Until the end of her life, she persisted in her argument that classical African Philosophy exists and that it has a specific logic. She was thus of the opinion that the method of practicing philosophy was particular: not universal but cultural. In Olúwolé’s view, in all cultures, there have always been philosophers or philosophical sages that reflect upon life and ask philosophical questions about what is good and evil (ethics), about life after death (metaphysics) or about how social and political organizations ideally look like (Social and Political Philosophy). She rejected the idea of a pre-logical phase in the thinking of any culture and thought that the Yoruba philosophical sage Òrúnmìlà, was as logical in his thinking as Socrates, who was his contemporary. Nevertheless, Sophie Olúwolé thought that the philosophical methodology of these philosophers did not need to be the same for both approaches to qualify as philosophy. And so where Socrates developed the method of the interrogation by using the dialogue to clarify philosophical concepts, Òrúnmìlà developed an original dialectic to help his disciples to find their path in life (Olúwolé, 2014). Olúwolé also followed her Kenyan colleague Henry Odera Oruka (1990) in reckoning with the belief of African Philosophers that there was no classical African Philosophy. Their belief is that Africans before the colonial period did not develop any individual thinking. Like Oruka, Olúwolé also criticized the belief of Westerners who were of the opinion that Africans were either superstitious or adherents of a ‘primitive’ religion. Like Oruka and the Ghanaian Akan philosopher Kwame Gyekye (1997), Olúwolé thought that individual philosophical sages had always existed in African societies. These philosophers argued that even though African cultural groups share a group philosophy, such as the one of the Akan, the Yoruba or the Bantu people, this philosophy originates from the mind of individual philosophers. The fact that their thoughts are shared collectively through proverbs, aphorisms and maxims, does not make them less philosophical. For these reasons, Olúwolé recognized Òrúnmìlà, who in one of the odus in the Ifá corpus

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is described as a philosophical sage who came from Ile-Ife and together with his sixteen disciples were the source of Yoruba philosophy. Even though Olúwolé did not object to classifying the Ifá corpus as the library of classical Yoruba philosophy, she did not regard herself as a so-called ethnophilosopher, which are those African philosophers who study the philosophical thoughts of a specific cultural group. Examples of African ethnophilosophers are, as the founding father, Placide Tempels who wrote about the Bantu people (1952 [Orig.1946, Transl. Collin King]), Alexis Kagame who focused on the people of Rwanda (1956), Makarakiza on Barundi (1959), Mudasiru and Oshodi on the Yoruba (2021), de Souza on the Fon of Dahomey (1975) and Sylla on the Wolof in Senegal (1978). Olúwolé’s vision of African Philosophy was close to that of Henry Odera Oruka, who had a deep knowledge of the Luo traditions of Kenya. Oruka identified four orientations in African Philosophy, which were ethnophilosophy (as mentioned), national-ideological philosophy (consisting of the political thought of African nationalists such as Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, L.S. Senghor, Sekou Toure, and Kenneth Kaunda), professional philosophy (as mentioned) and philosophical sagacity (Oruka, 1981). Oruka, who was the founding father of philosophical sagacity in African Philosophy, and Olúwolé shared the opinion that pre-colonial African Philosophy in oral traditions had emerged from the brain of individual African Philosophers, the so-called philosophical sages. Nevertheless, Olúwolé differs in opinion on the nature of Òrúnmìlà. Where Oruka classified him as the first traditional priest or babalawo, which, according to Oruka, are folk sages, Olúwolé believed that Òrúnmìlà and his disciples were not folk sages but philosophical sages or patron saints. She thought that these sages or saints were philosophical because the Ifá geomantic divination system and literary corpus consisted of rational structures even though, within those structures, Ifá was also irrational, emotional and associative. She thus plied a broader definition of philosophy than that of ‘systematical theoretical reflective thinking’ most common in Western philosophy and, therefore, believed in the existence of a specific classical African Philosophy based on the ideas of individual African philosophers. Although we can probably say that Olúwolé’s project best fits into Oruka’s orientation of philosophical sagacity, she did not use this terminology. Instead, she added another one possibly because, unlike Oruka, she mainly focused on sage philosophy in orally-transmitted texts and did not conduct empirical research on the ideas of living philosophical sages in African societies.

22.3 Critical Traditionalists Olúwolé identified another trend in African Philosophy, that of the so-called ‘critical traditionalists’ to which she added herself (Olúwolé, 2014). Like other traditionalists, but in contrast to the universalists, Olúwolé believed that writing cannot be a precondition for philosophy because philosophical ideas can be preserved and

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conveyed through mnemonic devices such as proverbs, maxims, myths and songs (Adegbindin, 2010). Olúwolé was critically analytical because, unlike other traditionalists, she regarded Ifá as a human institution founded by the sage philosopher Òrúnmìlà rather than by an eponymous god. In her view, Ifá is not the word of a god but of a philosopher. In line with the traditionalists, Olúwolé critically searched for philosophical ideas in African oral traditions, such as witchcraft, reincarnation and destiny, without glorifying them. She, therefore, distinguished herself from African literary theory philosophers of the Négritude movement, such as Aimé Césaire and Leopold Senghor. Olúwolé rejected Négritude philosophy, which emerged out of a reaction against Western colonialism, based on its’ essentialization of the African nature and the celebration of their alleged emotionality and irrationality. She recognized the irrational aspects of the Ifá corpus but stressed that classical African Philosophy was both rational and irrational. She recognized the dual nature of African Philosophy in oral traditions; that of a rational geomantic system and textual structure and a multi-interpretable literary content (Olúwolé, 2014). Olúwolé’s categorisation of African oral traditions as philosophy implies that the ability to read and write is not a necessary condition for being a philosopher. In Philosophy and oral tradition (1997a, 1997b, 1997c) Olúwolé points out that teaching someone how to read and write does not necessarily make him or her a better thinker. These are techniques that can be helpful to learn new things but that cannot turn a fool into a genius. On the contrary, some thinkers express ingenuity in the oral form, such as Òrúnmìlà and his sixteen disciples, whereas they have never learned how to read and write. In Olúwolé’s point of view, African oral cultures have brought forth brilliant, self-reflective philosophers and the oral traditions in these cultures are thus not inferior to written ones. Olúwolé, therefore, rejected the opinions of Kwasi Wiredu and Peter Bodunrin. These philosophers explained that African Philosophy with its methodology and linkage to oral traditions would only function as an evolutionary stage in the emergence of a written— and, therefore, superior and professional—African Philosophy based on western subject matter, logic and systematic reflective thought. (Ikuenobe, 1997; Olúwolé, 1997c). Olúwolé argued against the Eurocentric notion that logical and thus philosophical explanations depend on writing as, for instance, expressed by Popper (1992) and the historian and literary theorist Ong (1986). Such views also resonate in the thinking of African philosophers Bodunrin (1966), Wiredu (1996) and Hountondji (1996). She also spoke out against the notion by Western philosophers that colonial Christian education had improved the lives of Yoruba women and freed them from the so-called misogyny in African Indigenous Religion, philosophy and culture.

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22.4 Olúwolé’s Philosophy of Gender In her book Socrates and Òrúnmìlà (2014), Olúwolé argues that the position of women in ancient Ile-Ife was relatively good compared to that of those in ancient Greece. Whereas in the city of Ile-Ife around 500 BC men and women had equal rights as members of society, in Socrates’ Greece only rich men counted as citizens. This type of gender bias was absent from the ancient Yoruba society (Olúwolé, 2014). Olúwolé stressed that, nevertheless, there is no reason to glorify the position of African women in their pre-colonial societies. Real historical figures, such as the Asante queen mother Yaa Asantewaa who successfully fought a war against the British and the wise Ethiopian Queen of Sheba were exceptionally powerful. Nevertheless, Olúwolé’s research on gender relations in the Yoruba oral tradition reveals that there has been no equivalent to the Greek myth of Pandora’s box designating a woman as the cause of all evil in the world. Ancient Yoruba myths and proverbs, including those in the Ifá corpus, do not reason from the existence of permanent qualities of good or evil, which implies that women are not conceptualised as wrongdoers (Olúwolé, 2014). Instead, the Yoruba oral tradition describes the complementary but equal nature of women and the necessity of their tasks. In the Ifá verses, Olúwolé finds evidence that the public tasks carried out by women are highly appreciated in the Yoruba society, which cannot do without women. To support her statement, she offers a proverb in an Ifá verse (Olúwolé, 1997b, p. 110): ‘Da gike, da gike

Cutting alone, cutting alone,

Aakekanko le e da gike

The axe cannot cut alone,

Da’ gi la, Da’ gi la

Splitting alone, Splitting alone;

Eelekan o le ledagi la;

The wedge cannot split alone;

B’o s’erelu

without a female member (erelu),

Osugbo o le e da awo se’

the cult of Osugbo cannot operate

The Osugbo was a society that functioned as the legal arm of government in Yorubaland. In Sophie’s point of view, women in pre-colonial Yoruba culture were to some extent proverbialy oppressed by men, but at the time most women were economically independent and there were no suppressed gender roles. Women occupied titled positions as queen mothers or traditional priestesses, played significant intermediary roles in major trade centres, and accumulated wealth through farming, cloth production and specialized crafts. In the colonial period, the importance of the mentioned title positions declined by the shift to cash crop production, albeit women continued to flourish in the market place. Olúwolé thought that the colonial period worsened the position of women in Yoruba society as gender hierarchies became more articulated and the Western philosophy of oppositional dualism between the sexes won over that of

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Yoruba binary complementary logic (Olúwolé, 2000). Olúwolé shared her point of view with many so-called third-wave feminist scholars in Africa, such as Gwendolyn Mikell, Morolake Omonubi-Mcdonnell, Ifi Amadiume and Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyèwùmí. The African scholars Ogundipe, Salo Mama and McFadden, were opiniated differently (Du Toit & Coetzee, 2017). Historically, some additional remarks are necessary to contextualise Olúwolé’s ideas. On the one hand, she rightly remarked that in pre-colonial Yoruba society traditional female titleholders, such as queen mothers and traditional priestesses, were more powerful than in colonial times and that generally relations between men and women were more equal. The marginalisation of women in colonial Nigeria was the direct result of British colonial politics of indirect rule according to which only men were recognised in high ranked title holder functions, such as chiefs and priests. The situation is, nevertheless, more complicated than Olúwolé makes it appear because—as historians such as Cooper (2020) have demonstrated—colonial education also gave some women access to new means of gaining an income and a persona, mostly in the field of health care and education.

22.5 Olúwolé’s African Political Philosophy In addition to her study of the position of women in oral tradition-based classical African philosophic thought in ancient Yorubaland and in the Ifá literary corpus, Olúwolé was also a political philosopher. She focused on both traditional and modern African politics. Her academic contributions on socio-political philosophy include Culture, Nationalism and Philosophy (1997a, 1997b, 1997c), The Cultural Enslavement of the African Mind (2001) and The Centrality of Culture to Economic and Social Development (2008). In her discussion of the topic of democracy and human rights, she moves further away from Oruka’s four trends in African Philosophy and centralises a hermeneutic orientation. She makes the point that the ancient Yoruba society was ruled by democratic monarchs and that a gender-balanced system of political checks and balances was in place to control the democratically chosen rulers (oba). She then argues that modern African politicians should fall back on traditional Yoruba politics to learn from it and to create a modern Yoruba democracy that is based on the indigenous African rather than the Western political system and tradition (Olúwolé, 1996). (For historians, the question to what extent pre-colonial West African societies were democratic is part of an ongoing debate). Among the Asante people in Ghana, one can say that the pre-colonial political system was partly democratic, in terms of the election process of the new rulers and the committee of elders, but equal to the Yoruba people it was a society mainly ruled by royals of upper-class families and their appointment is by no means comparable with the election of politicians in modern political democratic systems (Müller, 2010, 2013).

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22.5.1 Intercultural Philosophy In the mentioned work Socrates and Òrúnmìlà, Olúwolé compares the two to clarify that both were philosophers and that Òrúnmìlà was falsely translated as ‘god of wisdom’ rather than a philosophical sage who received the ‘wisdom of god’. She stresses that Òrúnmìlà was once a real human being who lived in IleIfe at the same time as Socrates in around 500 BCE. After his death, Òrúnmìlà became an ancestral spirit and was deified, thereby attaining the same status as a Christian Saint. In search of an answer to the question of why Socrates became very well-known in Greek philosophy and Òrúnmìlà remained invisible in African Philosophy, she concludes that with the deification of Òrúnmìlà, the sage and his Ifá corpus were relegated to the academic fields of religious studies and social anthropology. In Olúwolé’s view, scholars in this field have deliberately misinterpreted the nature of Òrúnmìlà as they thought that Africans could not be rational. They were irrational beings and so they couldn’t possibly have known a tradition of philosophical sages that created wisdom literature. By demonstrating that Òrúnmìlà and Socrates have a lot in common, she makes the point that there is as much reason to qualify Socrates as a philosopher as there is to do so for Òrúnmìlà. Both were oral philosophers and their contributions were written down only after their death. Neither pretended to have absolute knowledge and were convinced that they proclaimed wisdom to guide others to know themselves (in Greek gnōthi seauton, in Yoruba mọ ara rẹ). Both ancient philosophers believed in reincarnation. But there where Socrates believed in a dualism between the spiritual and the material, Òrúnmìlà saw them as one and, therefore, the union between the living and the dead was felt quite strongly in ancient Yorubaland. Above all Olúwolé shows that both philosophers founded schools for the study of critical philosophy and that Western scholars were thus wrong to assume that Africans were incapable of philosophizing until they became educated by European Christian missionaries who came to Africa to religiously re-program and colonize the minds of Africans (Olúwolé, 2014).

22.5.2 Belief in  Witchcraft In her book Witchcraft, reincarnation and the God-Head (1992) in articles and public talks, Olúwolé wrote or said that for many Africans, spirits are as real as tables and chairs, people and places. For the Yoruba and other Africans, witches are believed to be people whose character is so strong that they can use their spiritual power to influence others. For many people, witches are thus real people who control and manipulate real cosmic powers. What does it mean when scientists say that these powers do not exist? Olúwolé asks herself. Scientists say that witchcraft is unreal because it is not observable with the naked eye. Nobody

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has ever seen a witch put a spell on a person causing him or her to die or those other things witches are accused of doing. There is thus no empirical justification of witchcraft. Scientists say that those who believe in witchcraft are incapable of separating the physical from the metaphysical, to distinguish the objects of the ordinary world of experience from those in the world of thought. They have long called Africans primitive people because of their belief in the reality of witchcraft. Olúwolé agrees with these scientists that one cannot find empirical evidence for the existence of witches. Nevertheless, she disagrees with their point of view that this means that witches are unreal. She finds this a narrow interpretation of reality and argues that witchcraft should merely be perceived as a phenomenon that is not yet understood. Olúwolé wrote: …Just as it is fraudulent to assert the existence of a power whose nature we know nothing about, so is it equally fraudulent to deny the occurrence of an experience just because we do not yet understand it. (Olúwolé, 1978, p. 16)

Olúwolé argued that what is not yet understood is different from what is unknowable. In her opinion, witchcraft is a phenomenon that is not ‘beyond explanation’ but that is ‘not yet explained’ (Olúwolé, 1978).

22.6 Conclusion: Olúwolé and the Future of an Oral Tradition and Gender Conscious African Philosophy Sophie Olúwolé devoted her academic life to address two issues in African Philosophy: the near absence of an oral tradition based or classical African Philosophy—a philosophy with a particular logic—and the marginalisation of women and women’s issues in African Philosophy. She put the figure of Òrúnmìlà, who first lead the priesthood of Ifá, on the map as a philosophical sage and a patron saint of philosophers, comparable to his contemporary, the Greek philosopher Socrates. She believed that Òrúnmìlà and Socrates had a lot in common and that on equal grounds both figures can be regarded as founding fathers in Ancient Philosophy. Olúwolé owed the unfamiliarity of Òrúnmìlà in the philosophical discipline (compared to Socrates) to the tendency of Western scholars to portray Òrúnmìlà as a god of wisdom rather than as a human being who was the first to receive the wisdom of Ifá geomancy from a Yoruba god. She opposed the presumption of non-existence of pre-colonial African philosophy (including its philosophers) and agitated against the appropriation of classical African Philosophy by Western and African religious studies scholars and social anthropologists. She was against the arguments of Western and African philosophers that did not believe that individualism, rationality and logic could be found in African oral traditions or ‘primitive’ thought and who, therefore, excluded classical African Philosophy from the study of African Philosophy. She believed that African Philosophers, such as Hountondji, were too Western and narrow-minded in their definition of the field, thereby denying the existence of a unique and particular African logic and philosophy. She also argued that Western Philosophers

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had been too eager to deny the rationality of Africans as a strategy to colonize their minds and to carry out their civilizing mission. Scholars in other disciplines, such as religious studies and anthropology, have argued that Olúwolé over-rationalised and secularized the Yoruba indigenous religious tradition of Ifá, whereas literary scholars have categorized the Ifá corpus as Dichtung and have argued that as oral text it is broader than philosophy. Still, Olúwolé’s mission was to make people aware that Yoruba philosophical sages and traditional priests had conveyed a rational philosophical oral tradition since pre-colonial times. This was powerful evidence that Africans were capable of thinking rationally before the Europeans colonised and allegedly ‘civilised’ most of the continent. Speaking of classical African Philosophy is as valid as making the claim for the existence of an antique Greek/Western philosophy. Olúwolé had many opponents in both Africa and the West and yet she kept fighting into old age against the denial of the existence of an African Philosophy before the colonial era. Of equal significance is that Sophie Olúwolé dedicated her professional and private life to putting African women on the map. She founded an organisation to address women’s issues and she set herself up as a feminist African philosopher. She delivered a black women’s critique of history; a story in which Christians had come from Europe to free African women from their oppressing husbands who adhered to very hierarchical gender relations and partriarchal traditional norms and values. In her own story, Olúwolé made the point that in traditional Yoruba thinking, as expressed in the Ifá corpus, women were complementary but not inferior to men. Their position in pre-colonial times was not utopian, but it worsened in the colonial period. This way, she increased her audiences’ insights into the consequences of the introduction of Western dichotomous thinking in the colonial period for women in both Yorubaland and the rest of Africa. Overcoming obstacles to education as a consequence of her race, gender and marital status, Sophie Bósèdé Olayemi Olúwolé rose to the top of her profession and became one of the foremost African philosophers of her time.

References Adegbindin, O. (2010). Ifá and the consequences of literacy: A philosophical analysis. Lumina, 21(2), 1–23. Beier, U., & Olúwolé, S. B. (2001). The making of a philosopher: Ulli Beier talks to Dr. Sophie Olúwolé. In F. Abodunrin, O. Obafemi, & W. Ogundele (Eds.), Character is beauty: Redefining Yoruba culture and identity (Iwalewa-Haus, 1981–1996) (pp. 357–372). Africa World Press. Bodunrin, P. O. (1966). The question of African philosophy. Philosophy, 56(216), 161–179. Cooper, B. (2020). Women in West African history. Oxford Research Encyclopedias of African History. Du Toit, L., & Coetzee, A. (2017). Gendering African philosophy, or: African feminism as a decolonizing force. In A. Afolayan, & T. Falola (Eds.), The Palgrave of African philosophy (pp. 333–349). Palgrave Macmillan.

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Godia, J. (2007). Kenya: African examples. Prof. Sophie Bósèdé Olúwolé, Philosopher par excellence. The East African Standard. Gyekye, K. (1997). Tradition and modernity: Philosophical reflections on the African experience. Oxford University Press. Hountondji, P. (1996). African philosophy. Myth and reality. Hutchinson. Hountondji, P. J. (2018). How African is philosophy in Africa? Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions, 7(3), 9–18. Ikuenobe, P. (1997). The Parochial Universalist conception of ‘philosophy’ and ‘African philosophy.’ Philosophy East and West, 47(2), 189–210. Kagame, A. (1956). La Philosophie Bantu-Rwandaise de l’être. Académie Royale des Sciences Coloniales. Makarakiza, A. (1959). La Dialectique des Barundi. Académie Royale des Sciences Coloniales. Mudasiru, S., & Oshodi, A. G. T. (2023). Beauty in African thought: Critical perspectives on the western idea of development. In B. Bateye, M. Masaeli, L. Müller, & A. Roothaan (Eds.), Omolúàbí: Understanding the Yoruba’s moral obligations in human well-being and its implications for political participation in Nigeria—insights from Ikorodu. Rowman and Littlefield. Müller, L. F. (2009). Sophie Olúwolé. In C. Ceton, I. V. D. Burg, A. Halsema, V. Vasterling, & K. Vintges (Eds.), Vrouwelijke Filosofen: Een Historisch Overzicht (pp. 441–446). Atlas. Müller, L. F. (2010). The persistence of  asante chieftaincy under colonial rule: Explanations of an enigma. Africana Studia: Revista Internacional De Estudos Africanos, 15, 61–85. Müller, L. F. (2013). Religion and chieftaincy in ghana: An explanation of the persistence of a traditional political institution in West Africa (Vol. 2). LIT Verlag. Olúwolé, S. B. (1978). On the existence of witches. In A. Mosley (Ed.), African philosophy. Prentice-Hall. Olúwolé, S. B. (1996). Democratic patterns and paradigms: Nigerian women’s experience. Goethe Institute. Olúwolé, S. B. (1997a). Culture, gender, and development theories in Africa. Africa Development /Afrique et Développement, 22(1), 95–121. Olúwolé, S. B. (1997b). Culture, nationalism and philosophy. In H. Kimmerle, & F. M. Wimmer (Eds.), Philosophy and democracy in intercultural perspective. Rodopi. Olúwolé, S. B. (1997c). Philosophy and oral tradition. African Research Consultancy. Olúwolé, S. B. (2000). Africa. In A. M. Jaggar & I. M. Young (Eds.), A companion to feminist philosophy (pp. 96–108). Blackwell Publishers. Olúwolé, S. B. (2014). Socrates and Ọ̀rúnmìlà: Two patron saints of classical philosophy. Ark Publishers. Ong, W. (1986). Writing is a technology that restructures thought: The written word. In G. Bauman (Ed.), Literacy in transition. Clarendon Press. Oruka, H. O. (1981). Four trends in current African philosophy. In A. E. Diemer (Ed.), Symposium on philosophy in the present situation of Africa (pp. 1–7). Franz Steiner Verlag. Oruka, H. O. (1990). Sage philosophy: Indigenous thinkers and modern debate on African philosophy. Brill. Popper, K. (1992). Objective knowledge: An evolutionary approach. Clarendon Press. Souza, G. D. (1975). Conception de “Vie” chez les Fon. Editions du Benin. Sylla, A. (1978). La Philosophie Morale des Wolof. Dakar. Tempels, P. (1946). Bantoe-Filosofie. De Sikkel. Tempels, P. (1952). Transl. Collin King. Bantu philosophy. Présence Africaine. Wiredu, K. (1996). Cultural universals and particulars: An African perspective. Indiana University Press.

Chapter 23

Viola Cordova Jicarilla Tribe, Apache Native American 1936–2002 Therese Boos Dykeman

Abstract The philosopher, poet and painter Viola Cordova was the first Native American woman to earn a Ph.D. in philosophy. Like all scholars, she rose on the shoulders of those who came before. Crediting the influence of both Western and Native American philosophical works, Cordova’s aim was to make clear the nature and benefit of Native American philosophy. To achieve this she explained Apache philosophy as well as that of the closely-related Navajo, distinguished the Native American worldview from that of Western philosophy, and demonstrated the beneficial consequences it offers. This introduction to Cordova reveals how significant her Native American philosophy with its dissimilar ontology would be to the philosophical canon, and how if admitted to it, the canon would be truer and more comprehensive.

T. B. Dykeman (*)  Fairfield University, Fairfield, CT, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9_23

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23.1 Biography Viola Cordova (1936–2002) was born and raised in Taos, New Mexico, the daughter of a Jicarilla Apache father and Spanish mother (Spanish settlers had arrived in New Mexico in the late seventeenth century). She received a B.A. degree from Idaho State University and an M.A. and a Ph.D. from the State University of New Mexico where along with Western philosophy she studied Eastern thought or non-discrete ontology and indigenous communalism (Waters, 2003b). She had in her own family always a confrontation between Western-Christian thinking and Native American thinking. When she first studied philosophy at university, she found it to offer but one kind of thinking, and so to her, a much less comprehensive and stimulating canon of ideas than she was expecting. All her life Cordova dealt directly with the ontological issue whether, on the one hand, the world is a static thing, or whether on the other, it is a dynamic continuum. Cordova realized that different methods of both ontological and epistemic understanding flow from each principle. Cordova taught Native American philosophy and comparative ethics at many universities, staying at each institution for about 3 years. The reason she gave for her short stays was that too many requirements would inevitably impinge on her actual teaching of philosophy. The benefit was that from the University of Alaska-Fairbanks, to Colorado State University, Idaho State University, State University of New Mexico, and Oregon State University, she left a legacy of diversity and inclusion in philosophical thought. Co-editor and co-founder with Anne Waters of the American Philosophy Association’s Newsletter on American Indian Philosophy, she was also co-founder of the journal, Ayaagwaamizin: The International Journal of Indigenous Philosophy. In her memorial to Cordova, Anne Waters summarizes Cordova’s philosophy with the Lakota expression, Mitakaye Oyasin, meaning interconnectedness and oneness (Waters).1 An independent spirit, Cordova married several times and left behind her last husband Denny Wilmore of 25 years. She had raised five children, who at the time of her death from an aneurysm, had expanded her family with grandchildren. Native American philosopher Vine Deloria, Jr. said of her, “she was one of the most brilliant people” that he had ever known, and Anne Waters called her “a gadfly of a Socratic Indian” (Waters 5). In Apache tradition, Cordova was an artist; not in Apache tradition, she was a poet. The Apache are a Native American people who live in Southwestern United States, mainly in Arizona, southern Colorado, New Mexico and Texas. Their great leaders of the past include Cochise, Geronimo, and nineteenth century Apache woman Lozen. Apaches engaged in battles with the Spanish and later with the Americans, eventually being placed on reservations. Bordering the Apache territory is the Navajo Nation. In World War II, the Navajo warriors and “code talkers”

1 The

Lakota are of the Sioux nation and live in North and South Dakota.

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successfully brought their language as an unbreakable code to the Asian-Pacific part of the war. Unfortunately Native American debates over water rights and judicial rights with the American government continue, as the Supreme Court rulings in June 2022 demonstrate. The complex ideas of the Apache and Navajo traditions were carried forward in oral renderings and in petroglyphs. Petroglyphs, or symbols reflecting abstract concepts, depicted such concepts as wisdom, friendship, and freedom, and so can be studied in order to discover Native American philosophy. Cordova has translated such philosophical representations into poetry, e.g. with themes about the concept of interaction with all things and transformation. The chief symbol, the sacred hoop/Ndee, symbolic of harmony, balance, and peace among other nations, was also interpreted by Cordova. Viola Cordova’s philosophical works are archived at the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque. Fortunately, some of her unpublished work was compiled in How It Is: The Native American Philosophy of V.F. Cordova. Now with her acclaim and her message acknowledged, future philosophers are being encouraged to delve further into her archived legacy, taking on her aim of making the philosophical canon more comprehensive.

23.2 Influences: Traditional Native American Women’s Public Philosophy In her essay “Why Native American Philosophy?” Viola Cordova pointed out that, “There were some literate societies in North America when the Europeans first arrived in Central America. Many of their written materials were destroyed for containing only ‘heathen’ ideas. Nevertheless, some have survived.”2 The surviving eighteenth and nineteenth century Native North American women’s literature preceding Cordova, however, is scant. Those Native American women who did write, necessarily used their talents mainly to rebuke the powers of White supremacists and racists whose policies cheated their people, lied to them, and forced them to abandon their identities and lands. These women were also compelled to explain what was not always understood, that Native Americans were not a monolithic group, meaning their identities expressed in their foundational philosophies, religions, and cultures differed from one nation to another as well as from the Europeans invading and conquering their land. In those Native American groups that particularly valued women, they listened to their wisdom, gave them positions of power, and ensured their equality.3 In

2 An

unpublished MS, n.d., Archives of Oregon State University, in Moore et al., (2007), p. 2. certain Indian cultures, the notion of equality meant separate but equal. S.C. Gwynne narrates a story of Comanches, Empire of the Summer Moon…2020, that demonstrates variation from one Indian nation to another. 3 In

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such groups Native American women were in these ways more advanced than the European women colonizing their land, for they had as much power and respect for their words and actions as did men, if not more. The colonizing women lived in a society which, having accepted male superiority, was dominated by men. But, in such Native American nations as the Cherokee, women were encouraged to rise to leadership positions before and after the arrival of Europeans. Western philosophy defines the world ontologically as matter. For western thinkers the difficulty in grasping Native American ontology is that it defines the world as motion. Generally, in most Native American thought all is not matter but motion, and therefore Native Americans tend to perceive ethics, aesthetics, and political philosophy from that viewpoint. However, those who have been schooled in western philosophy as well as those who simply lived within that tradition, may prepare to understand some aspects of Native American philosophy with the study of, e.g., American philosopher William James, phenomenology, existentialism, as well as introduction to Eastern philosophy. But, in the eighteenth century, to understand Native American thought was profoundly difficult for the European colonizers who had no preparation for it, both for their ontology and for their notions of space and relationality. In this section I will describe several women whose works and lives influenced Viola Cordova’s philosophy: Nanye’hi also called Nancy Ward (1738–1824), Catherine Brown (1800?–1823), and Sarah Winnemucca (d. 1891).

23.2.1 Nanye’hi One Native American woman, Nanye’hi (1738–1824), by clearly and concisely explaining the philosophy behind Native American demands and actions, attempted to bridge the chasm between the Native American way of thinking and that of the European. For her wise counsel, her centering force, and her leadership, Nanye’hi was called “Beloved” by her people.4 In her May 1817 Address in the role of a clan mother delivered to the chiefs, warriors, and children at the Amovey, Tennessee Council, she succinctly argued that what was being done to the Cherokee Nation—the forced removal from their land—was morally wrong if not from the perspective of the White Man’s values, at least from that of Native American values. (Ritchie 106–108)5 Cherokee values, she explained, were determined by Cherokee fundamental beliefs in the relationships between Creator, land, and family. Because the land was a source of spiritual inspiration, the Cherokee’s

4 Cf.

Joy Ritchie and Kate Ronald. Available Means: An Anthology of Women’s Rhetoric(s). University of Pittsburg Press (2001), pp. 106–108. This address is part of the Andrew Jackson collection at the Library of Congress. 5 At first the Cherokee were selling the land; then the 1830 Removal Act demanded the taking of their land. Nanye’hi saw the fundamental immorality in both acts.

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particular place on earth was a sacred mandate. To demand that Cherokees be removed from their land and be sent far away was an act against the Creator as well as against the Cherokee people.6 A warrior in a battle between Cherokee and Creek and a diplomat in negotiating a peace treaty, Nanye’hi brought to bear in her speeches and writings the philosophical differences between Native American’s and White Men’s thinking and how their political actions were derived from different fundamental beliefs. In a 1787 letter to Benjamin Franklin when he was Governor of Pennsylvania and in four speeches delivered in the 1780’s, Nanye’hi explained and debated the Cherokee situation to no avail against the White Men of power (L. Moore 178–182). Poignantly it had been pointed out by Chief Attakullakolla in negotiations with Henry Timberlake that there were never any White women participating (Ritchie 106). While Native Americans included women amongst their negotiators, the European settlers excluded women. Given mention by Theodore Roosevelt, fortunately, Nanye’hi and the role she played have been recognized by historians, and her eloquence has been acknowledged by academic rhetoricians (Roosevelt, 1889). But her succinct explanations and clarifying arguments about Native American fundamental beliefs have failed to be recognized by philosophers.

23.2.2 Catherine Brown In 1800?–1823, also a Cherokee, was converted to Christianity in Alabama territory. A translator and teacher at the Brainerd Missionary School, she focused on her own development as a Christian and on that of her community. The first Native American to have extensive publications, she wrote mainly on moral subjects: God and holiness, justice, goodness, the future state, and character in terms of duty and salvation. When her letters were published in New England magazines, one woman wrote “The effect produced by the sight of the writing of an Indian, has been considerable” (Brown, 2014). While Brown gained the sisterhood of her fellow teachers, she lost much of her identity as a Cherokee, this at a time when the entire Cherokee Nation’s identity was beginning to be shattered. Still, a play was written about her, “Catherine Brown, the Converted Cherokee” by A Lady of Connecticut (New Haven: S. Converse 1819). Lydia Sigourney, Brown’s friend, included her in the poem Traits of the Aborigines of America (1822). Brown’s popular Memoir written by Rufus Anderson in 1825 was followed by a book-length

6 With the “psychological architecture” removed, psychological and other negative repercussions from land removal exist still in the twenty-first century in Native American communities, so deep are the fundamental beliefs about their relationship with the land. Attempts to improve the status quo persist, e.g., Maria Pearson/Running Moccasins (1932–2003) convinced the State of Iowa to change its burial code.

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biography commissioned by the American Board. Catherine Brown left teaching to care for family members who were ill with tuberculosis, contracted it herself, and died of the disease at the young age of 23.

23.2.3 Sarah Winnemucca (d. 1891) A Shoshone and Paiute, Sarah Winnemucca, who also died of tuberculosis (d. 1891), wrote Life Among the Piutes: Their Wrongs and Claims in 1883 in which she pointed out the hypocrisy of Christians when the principles of justice, freedom, and righteousness were at issue in their treatment of Native Americans. Born in Nevada territory into an esteemed family of Chiefs, Winnemucca/ Thocmetony (shell flower) became an educator, political activist, interpreter for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and peacemaker. She delivered over four hundred speeches promoting better relations and communication between the Northern Paiutes and other Native Americans and Whites (Zanjani 2001).7 On a tour of the country she was aided, among others, by Elizabeth Peabody.8 She won the Nevada’s Writers Hall of Fame Award and has had a Nevada school named after her. Recently, she has been honored by a striking six-foot-four-inch bronze sculpture installed in the United States Capitol Visitor Center’s Emancipation Hall, Washington D.C., a gift from Nevada in 2005. An identical sculpture is displayed in the Nevada State Capitol Building. Historians have been discovering the rich heritage of Native American knowledge and culture and its powerful influence on the women of the United States, and indeed, on the founding of that country’s republican union. Harriet Maxwell Converse, having lived among the New York Iroquois, and been given the name Ya-ie-wa-noh meaning She Who Watches Over Us, investigated Iroquois literature; her husband did the same with Iroquois music. Converse declared in her 1908 writing on the Iroquois that “No people can long exist as an ethnic group without consciously or otherwise, creating a philosophy of things which becomes the common belief of that body of people—becomes their science and religion” (Converse 7). And so, she made known the myths, legends, and traditions of the Iroquois, their governmental system and social laws, which she admired. Also, she found impressive that they “loved to weave language in fine metaphor and delicate allusion and possessed a language singularly adapted for their purpose” (9). One example she offers is this: The sun talks to Earth, “Earth, Great Mother, holding

7 The

Shoshone from Idaho and Wyoming territory lived near the Paiute, who were settled in eastern California, western Nevada, and southern Oregon. Cf. Gae Whitney Canfield (1983). 8 Elizabeth Peabody (1804–1894), a Transcendentalist philosopher and translator of a Buddhist text is known for initiating the first kindergarten in the United States. Associate educator with Bronson Alcott, she aided the efforts of her fellow Bostonians, especially feminist philosopher and novelist Margaret Fuller.

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your children close to your breast, hear my power! listen” (48). The fundamental principle of the Iroquois faith, Converse claimed, was the immortality of the soul (133). In Iroquois culture Indian women are supreme in home authority, own land in their own right, and frequently continue their maiden name after marriage, marriage meaning a mutual agreement between man and woman, although a divorce may be appealed to and negotiated and that, by the authority of women. Long before the invasion of Europeans, women’s rights were included in the Confederacy of the Long House, also called The Iroquois Confederation, both meaning and called Haudensosaunee—Ho-de-no-sau-ne. Women, as deciders of nominations, could depose of a negligent chief and were keeper of certain wampum belts by which law was interpreted.9 The Iroquois Confederation or Haudenosaunee, was a six-Nation Confederation: Onondagas, Cayugas, Senecas, Mohawks, Oneidas, and Tuscaroras. It was in the territory of the Haudenosaunee that the woman’s rights movement was born. Matilda Jocelyn Gage explained the governments of these Nations and their system of matriarchy or “Mother Rule” in her 1893 Women, Church and State (Wagner, 2001). Nineteenth-century feminists held intimate association with these Native Americans: Lucretia Mott visited the Cattaraugus, Matilda Joslyn Gage was adopted and named Sky Carrier, and Elizabeth Cady Stanton spoke the Onandago language. Frances Wright wrote pro-Indian editorials in the Free Enquirer. Lydia Maria Child from her work on behalf of the Cherokee and her research noted that, for example, Indian men did not rape. So the Confederation’s views became part of these women’s vision, for they saw how Haudenosaunee women were more respected and had more rights than they did living under English Common Law codified by Blackstone. A Cayuga chief, Dr. Peter Wilson in 1866 encouraged men of the United States to give women the vote.10 Gage claimed that under the Haudenosaunee, “the science of government reached the highest form known to the world” and so it came to be that the United States government was in part patterned after the Iroquois Confederacy (Wagner 16). The Haudenosaunee, having developed the oldest living participatory democracy on earth, were visited by Benjamin Franklin who printed proceedings of their councils. Jefferson, too, was attracted to their democratic society, free from the woes of the oppression and intolerance. The Iroquois’s laws and customs were inclusive and so allowed for free political discussion and free religions. And so, the political concepts practiced in the Haudenosaunee way of living as witnessed by Franklin and Jefferson, contributed to the forming of the United States

9 Cf. Johansen (1982) and also Kelsey (2014) wampum belts were woven with shells and beads to deliver messages and tell stories, and were used as a record of history and culture and of “international diplomacy and treaty agreements as well,” xii, lxiii. 10 Wilson, one of first Native Americans physicians, graduated from Geneva Medical College in 1844 and often delivered speeches to various assemblies.

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as a confederation, or federal union and the liberties guaranteed to the citizens by the government (Johansen, 1982). Haudenosaunee leaders were invited to the Continental Congress in 1776. But in 1778 Washington gave orders to destroy the “Six Nations of Indians.” Negotiations over payment of land, however, continue to present day.11 These Native American women presented here are among those who preceded Viola Cordova. In their interactions with Euro-persons, aware of the differences, they attempted to make Native American moral and political philosophy known and understood.

23.3 Philosophy It was not the political or feminist philosophy of these forerunners that led Viola Cordova to the study of philosophy but rather the view that ideas had origins. Cordova was curious about “concepts of human nature rather than identity constructs” (Waters, 3). Concepts of human nature differ and so, she argued, must be understood within their particular philosophical structure, otherwise they will be inaccurately perceived. Yet, she found in Western history of philosophy that concepts of human nature and culture of the Other were examined only through its own lens. This Western lens was developed and sustained from Sumerian, Babylonian, Egyptian, Greek, Roman and later traditions. The concepts that this lens affected are the nature of the universe, of man, of time, etc. So Cordova asked, could we not examine Other thinking in a way that attends to that thinking in itself rather than only through the lens of Western thought? (Cordova, 1994a and K. Moore 57). The canon of Western philosophy begins with Greek and Roman texts and moves forward in time to philosophy influenced by Christian religion and European culture. Native American philosophy was not included in the twentieth century canon presented to Cordova, though other philosophies which have some similarities with Native American concepts were included, e.g. existentialism’s world of becoming and Benedict de Spinoza’s concept of oneness. While Cordova focused on Native American philosophy, she commented at length on the continuing political injustices aimed at Native Americans which reach not only into their daily living but into academe. The Native American philosophy Cordova set out to discern and disseminate centered on Navajo thought rather than on her native Apache. The reason was that more Navajo sources were available, and the language, Athabascan, was the same for both, making the difference between Navajo and Apache ways of thinking,

11 The

New York Times, “Apologies to the Iroquois Are Not Enough,” 27 May 2000, for example, reported that in January 2001 another long in coming price negotiation over Cayuga land will take place; the last price had fallen short.

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minimal.12 What Cordova aimed to do was to make Native American philosophy better known and to dispel the ignorance and false assumptions that surrounded it. Since conceptual frameworks or sets of presuppositions become a lens through which we examine the world (1992a, p. 1), problems arise in attempting to fit alien thought into our own lens and in so doing distort it—or, replace alien beliefs as the missionaries had done, rather than present them with understanding (2). Only now has real insight been gained into the distortions that the European framework caused when Europeans saw Native people as mere “humanoids” and their thinking primitive. What Cordova wanted to have known and understood, first, was the ontological foundation of Navajo thinking and the result of that thinking in relation to Western thought. Thus Cordova explained the origin of the world, how that made necessary reverencing the world, and how such theory makes no distinction between the sacred and mundane. Navajo philosophy reaches into the foundations of human’s profound relation to the earth, to all creatures, and to one to another. Cordova’s understanding of Native American views led her to consider, therefore, the nature of the universe, the nature of human beings, the nature of time and space, which all entailed the ontological concepts of spirit or energy and matter, being and becoming, in Native American thought.

23.3.1 Ontology and Epistemology Viola Cordova’s ontology and epistemology have a reflexive relationship. Observation leads to the making of conceptual frameworks. Ontological concepts become foundations for knowing. From knowledge of the origin of the universe comes knowledge of the nature of the universe. In Native American philosophy, our world began in absolute mist, that is, motion or energy, called Sacred Wind.13 The nature of the universe initiated in absolute mist is motion or energy. As absolute mist, the universe is, and so is always something, i.e. the world did not come from nothing.14 Fluctuations of Wind result in things; things mean fluctuations of Wind. The sun is a fluctuation from which mother earth derives creative energy; life comes from this, and from life comes life. All is Holy Wind. Things are vortices and vortices are fields and fields are vortices of Wind. Vortices connect us 12 The

Athabascan people arrived in America 10–30,000 years ago from across the Bering Sea land bridge. (K. Moore 43). Cf. John R. Farella (1984), Donald Fixico (2003), Anne Waters (2003a) and Gary Witherspoon (1977). 13 Cordova discussed Sacred Wind mainly in her 1992 dissertation “The Concept of Monism” which credits especially James Kale McNeley’ (1997). She uses his concept of Wind to explore the philosophical theory of monism and the universe as “one thing” as a means to explain Navajo perspective. 14 Cordova points to Anaximander’s indefinite infinite. Cordova published her philosophical ideas first in (1984) and (1985), but mainly in (1994a), (1994b), (1994c), (1994d), the last being in (1995).

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to other things. While in Native American philosophy things are wind defined as energy; in Western philosophy they are defined as matter. Seen as one, rather than as two things (matter and motion) in Native American philosophy, the term that may be used is materialized energy.15 Thus the Native American philosopher is a monist, seeing all as one—all as Sacred Wind or materialized energy, like Einstein’s matter/energy. So the nature of the universe is both oneness and motion. Consciousness is a characteristic of the universe, and so, consciousness is “everywhere” (K. Moore 147). Cordova was intrigued by such questions as where do beliefs originate and what is implied about those who hold them? (1992a). Answers to such questions, she believed, would come from analysis of concepts and concept formation as well as from the identifying and clarifying of those concepts. For her, original conceptions come from observation. In the case of the Navajo, wind was observed as metaphor for primary and all-pervasive Wind, Wind making of all, one and sacredness. The observation of wind and the meaning of Wind make clear to Cordova the unitary quality of the Navajo Wind. The Western philosopher who “best illustrates” Navajo Wind in this sense of oneness,” to her mind, is Spinoza.16 Unlike air, wind implies motion. Motion, then, affects the nature of the concepts of space and time. Cordova noted that Benjamin Whorf (1897–1941) concluded through linguistics that Native American Hopi words had different meanings for the concepts of space and time than had been assumed to be the concepts by Western philosophy. Western philosophy had assumed time and space to be universal concepts. So if one took into consideration Native American concepts of space and time as different, there could be no universal concepts of space and time. A Navajo notion of space and time rests on the notion of a universe defined as motion and thus differs from the notions of static space and time in e.g. Isaac Newton’s world view. Cordova pointed out that unlike the Native American interested in origins, the pre-Socratics were rather concerned with what is. The “what is” differed elementally: as things—water or air, as motion—like a river, as indefinite, infinite etc. (1992a, pp. 25–27). While the pre-Socratics held differing focuses or interests from Native Americans, their two main divergences, things and motions, remained in Western philosophy. From Aristotle forward philosophy centered on “what is” as things; whereas, Native American philosophy centered on “what is” as motion. Native American ontology of the universe in Cordova’s philosophy comes closer to Eastern philosophy than Western. But it demands its own conceptual framework in order to be understood and appreciated. If one has been subjected to only one way of looking at the universe, e.g. the Western way, it is very difficult 15 Apropos:

In Lik Kuen Tong’s philosophy, Field-Being, field means activity within which matter and motion, being and non-being are interchanged at the Non-substantialist Turn. In this, Eastern philosophy acknowledges Western in that becoming cannot exist without being, as being cannot exist without becoming. 16  Sacred Wind unlike the Christian extra-terrestrial Being, is one with the universe, earth, humans, rather than apart from it (1992a, p. 14).

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to see and understand from another’s conceptual framework or point of view.17 Native American persons, to live in a Westernized land, have had to understand two very different world views and to know how the languages work. This leads some persons to be curious about the process of determining the nature of Native American world views and thus to Native American philosophy (K. Moore 56, 57). Viola Cordova was such a person. As much as Native American motion concepts differed from Newton’s static concepts, their linguistic habits differed as well. Cordova credits Whorf’s work on native or indigenous languages for making possible insight into the Navajo’s universe of thought, i.e., for creating a window through language into the conceptual framework. Native languages depict a universe of motion as opposed to Western “thing.”18 In Western languages, nouns dominate; in Eastern and Native American, verbs dominate (K. Moore 100). The universe means events, all being in flux, happening: the universe means “dynamic manifestation” in both Hopi and Navajo conceptual frameworks (1992a, pp. 3–5). This non-Western conceptual framework of a world essentially of becoming rather than of being has been missing, and hence understanding the philosophy of indigenous people has been missing from the American philosophical canon.19 Cordova argues that the reason philosophers should explore “alien ideas, is to expand our understanding of the diversity of human thought” and so philosophy departments must open their doors to those who have been denied entrance (K. Moore 56). Cordova’s definition is that “Philosophy as it is practiced is an examination of ideas. Ideas, however, exist in context,” and so a philosopher must know both ideas and context (K. Moore 54). This means that one must know the cosmology of the Navajo in order to understand e.g., their ethics, their aesthetics. For instance, the concepts of “beauty” and “balance,” arise from within their conceptual framework. Higher levels of ideas and thinking depend on language. The context of language provides a window. This explains why the damage in eradicating a language is so great (72). (Native American languages have, unfortunately, been for centuries subject to ill treatment.) So, to understand the ideas of Navajo philosophy, one must consider the conceptual framework and the language. Cordova makes clear that people come to philosophy with in-articulated assumptions and so want to pick and choose what fits into their conceptual framework. And so

17 This

difficulty in relation to Eastern and Western ways of defining the universe ontologically is discussed in Dykeman (2018). 18 In his Philosophy of Field Being, Lik Kuen Tong, similarly compared the Chinese universe as motion with the Western universe of static “thing.” One way of looking at the universe cannot exist, however, without the other—Being Becomes, and Becoming exists. 19 When Bryan van Norden asked philosophy professors “Have you considered teaching Chinese philosophy in your department?” he found his colleague’s answers amusing and frustrating, e.g. one answer was “Philosophy is by definition the tradition that goes back to Greece.” (In interview, “What is it like to be a Philosopher?” with Clifford Sosis, Vassar). http//dailynous. com/2020/10/12.

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rather than coming to another’s philosophy to communicate, they come to mirror their own (K. Moore 56). Philosophy is thus a discipline that through language examines ideas within a conceptual framework. Thus, “philosophy is an activity” (K. Moore 50) and a “methodological endeavor” (3). The same method must always be employed whether in the analysis of Native American thought or Western. What will be revealed through language, conceptual framework, and method are the philosophical assumptions evident in the approach of one foundational conceptual framework in contrast with that of another. Wind/nikh’i as the underlying “principle” of oneness differs from the word and concept of air, air being a concept of stasis. As oneness Wind means an “underlying monism that ties together or links the Navajo ideas of balance, harmony, beauty and other noted aspects of Navajo’s thought” (1992, pp. 57–61). The Navajo people are thus “wind people.” The metaphysical concept of wind is that of pervasive force, “a unitary” concept. In the creation story, the air-spirit people, “fly like the wind” (65–72). Cordova claimed that “The wind standing within one is the same as that which is in everything” (94). The universe being like an “energy field,” matter and energy are a unit and holy, so logically what must follow is that the human being, too, is essentially good (95–98). “Usen,” a term derived from the Jicarillo-Apache is, perhaps, a pan-Indian concept. It means something beyond comprehension, a mystery, a potential (K. Moore 107). This concept, Cordova believes is close to Spinoza’s one thing, which he called God, Nature, Substance. Usen, for Cordova, is not a personal God but is the “ultimate of abstractions,” is oneness, is sacred (109). It is the ultimate creative force (113). Native Americans through their systems of thought understand the universe as dynamic, always happening (K. Moore 111). Space is the disconnecting of the in-between which means that space is bounded with boundaries. This notion becomes consequential when Native Americans are born into a space or place and so occupy that space which is “their rightful home” (188). They are then part of “bounded space” and are aware that that bounded area or place as land becomes their means of survival. Hence, the importance of land is derived from an understanding and awareness of Native American philosophy’s definition of space. Motion and existence are interrelated in balance and harmony. Time is the counting of motion, a measure, which is not a thing (K. Moore 118). Time “means something different when it is based on a concept of an infinite universe” (118). The present, ever adding a layer to past, has no “preexistent ‘future’ into which the present moves,” for “actions bring the ‘future’ universe into existence” (118–119). Human actions may be both ethical and aesthetic, and so these areas of philosophy, as they are derived from the ontological nature of Native American philosophy, are unique.

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23.3.2 Ethics and  Aesthetics World views have been threatened in Western philosophy by those such as Galileo, Copernicus, and Darwin who upended thinking about astronomy and biology, and by the introduction of Judeo/Christian thinking about God and humanity. Native American philosophy defines the nature of earth differently from Western philosophy, i.e. as a “living organism” (K. Moore 105), seeing the earth not as “hostile, stingy, unstable, and dangerous,” but as divine, a She, a producer of all things, and on which all things are dependent. Necessary in this view of earth is tolerance for difference, each manifestation being unique but equal in oneness, as in Wind and its fluctuations. Cordova pointed out that unless one has lived within a conceptual framework, it is difficult for those living outside it to understand. A “world-view is like the concept of a soul;” a “world-view is the lens through which we look at and interpret the world” (1994a, p. 7). Soul, a “non-physical” characteristic, is yet embodied within a very specific individual with a unique world view within a conceptual framework. Different worldviews or conceptual frameworks result in clashes of value systems, that is, about what is valued or what is valued as sacred. In Native American philosophy, humans are a group, not an isolated unit, and live in a reciprocal relation with mother earth. “Persons act ethically,” Cordova argues, “because they want to maintain their membership in a group,” and so they must be “mindful” of what they do, for instance, to their environment, for they “are dependent on it” (K. Moore 183–184). Our ethical system includes not only our relationship with others but includes the earth and everything in it. Reciprocity means of equal value. Cordova narrates an example: her father tells his daughters that cold water is good on a hot day. They bring him a glass of cold water. He did not tell them to get it for him, for that would have communicated a hierarchy, server and recipient, rather than maintaining reciprocity. The notion of hierarchy leads to competition. So, unlike in Western thinking, in Native American ethical thinking, “competition with others is wrong because it leads to disharmony—isolation, selfishness, and pain of others” (K. Moore 123). Hence, ethics is taught in a family indirectly. As soon as a child can walk, she begins to learn the consequences of her actions. Being mobile and free to explore, she comes to see that she is herself, inter-relational, rather than an individual with relationships (K. Moore 147, 148). Thus she is taught to be aware of others and to share. She is unlike Aristotle’s “rational animal” which implies division, rational and animal, but she is like Aristotle’s social animal, born as family and community, which implies unity. Born, however, as a humanoid, the child becomes human only with the cooperation of others. The child is thus not a thing but a becoming. She is taught that she is not above other creatures, not superior despite her intelligence. All are sacred: the butterfly that pollinates the corn, the corn that feeds the human, and the human herself. So the human duty is to cause no disruptions to the beautiful whole. If one thinks he is superior to the earth, then, he most likely will, in Native American philosophy, treat it unethically, subjugate it, pave it over, disregard it, or be hostile to it. In essence, for its understanding of values and

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performance, Native American ethics, Cordova insists, should be a worthy subject of inquiry for all philosophers. Being of Sacred Wind, the human being is essentially good—although goodness is also a process. But what is it that is good? When the Native American child goes to school with Western priorities and values, the experience is confusing. By that time, the child has already been inculcated with Native American assumptions about the world, and the teacher may not realize the clash of her own Western assumptions with those of the child. Thus what is not articulated may lead to ineffective methods and false conclusions about what is good. A child, who sees sitting alone as isolation, or being made demands of as cruel, is often misunderstood and consequently devalued, and so, perhaps seen only as a child who is primitive and stubborn. The child eventually has to make sense of and learn to live with two sets of philosophy, and two sets of ethics. It would be ideal if the teacher had been trained in both philosophical worldviews. Cordova’s experiences are woven into her philosophy in order to articulate its abstract notions in practical ways. She tells stories about how she learned ethics from a father who used logic rather than precepts.20 For her, as a child and as a teenager, rational discourse was followed by learning responsibility for consequences. Attaining virtues and values was considered a process beginning in specific situations, e.g., like using a bed as a trampoline or driving with too many people in a car. Ethics, Cordova believed, “are based on what it is to be human” (K. Moore 56). Humans are co-creators of beauty: BEAUTY I can make it But what is it?

Pride, but not arrogance, Strength, but not forcefulness, Courage, but not foolhardiness, Caution, but not cowardice, Softness, but not weakness. That is beauty.21 Beauty sounds almost like ethics. It is action, creation, and goodness. Balance is often a quality in Native American aesthetics. For Cordova balance means bringing stable motion to a random universe (70–71). This meaning is true in the universe of art as well. Style, she claims is not something you can choose outside your time and place (73).22 So it is always within a certain time and place that beauty is created.

20 The

eighteenth century American philosopher Judith Sargent Murray wrote a catechism in which the child is to ask the questions, a process closer to Cordova’s Native American teaching of virtues and values than to that of Western philosophies. 21 From her poem “How Is It: A Native American Creation Story,” in K. Moore, 95. 22 Simone de Beauvoir makes this point in her Ethics of Ambiguity, castles e.g. not a twentieth century style.

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Defining a person as an individual rather than as group—family, community, universe—defining the universe as static rather than dynamic, and defining a human as being rather than becoming, as has been made clear here, makes a difference in the practical choices we make and in determining what is good, what should our values and morals be, and as well determining the nature of aesthetics and the meaning of beauty.

23.3.3 The Nature of Human Cordova’s poem, “Who Are We: An Exploration of Identity” begins with acknowledgement of existence. It should be understood that before 1492 Native Americans existed. Then it should be acknowledged how that existence was demeaned, converted, and annihilated. But they, the white people with power, did not understand Native Americans. Nor do they know or understand how Native Americans came into existence, or what Native Americans meant by having the capacity “to live in specific places for specific reasons” (K. Moore 137). Born “WHOLE, COMPLETE, GOOD” with built-in tolerance for difference and uniqueness, Native Americans have survived without despoiling Mother Earth. Children of sun and earth, they belong where they were placed. We are a part of a whole The “I” is a unique combination of the group that brings the “I” into existence (141)

Reality is history. History is events. It is what happened and is continuing to happen. The subject of this reality is the human being. The nature of the human being is its coming into existence in this particular way and with these particular human values. “I” become “I” when I have learned my place in the group when I become aware of the fact that my actions have consequences on others on the whole (141).

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Human nature is a becoming, a past that in the present makes future. The past which exists in memory “is the present.” We are who we are by self-definition: WE will tell YOU who we are… (143). which makes no two things exactly alike (144).

Cordova points out a paradox: a human defined as “group” always knows she is part of something larger than herself; whereas, a human defined as “individual” may, when in a “mass,” be submerged as anonymous, a number, her individuality threatened. Thus, such an individual, like the infant, is but a humanoid, who “must be shown how to be a human being” (K. Moore 147).23 Kant, Cordova claims, said it was necessary for an individual to go through “a period of heteronomy— of dependency…guided by external rules and authorities—before one can become truly autonomous;” for Native Americans once a child is mobile, it is allowed autonomy (148). Autonomy means safely given freedom to explore and offered opportunities to make decisions and to experience consequences, rather than being “dependent and controlled.” The concept of “person” involves understanding oneself as “a part of,” an inter-relationship, rather than “apart from,” a relationship with the “other” (K. Moore 149). Therefore, a Native American sense of person is more extensive than a Western sense of person. The Native American is “two aspects of one same thing,” a “matter-energy,” a “‘soul’/mind and body at the same time, both “spiritual” and non-spiritual at the same time” (ibid.)—one state cannot exist without the other (ibid.). Hence Native American philosophy defines human nature as extensive, of having an enlarged sense of self. Viola Cordova always looked both ways in her philosophy—toward the metaphysical and to the practical reality with each informing the other of the nature of a universe of oneness. The “weltanschauung” or metaphysical description of the universe affects, e.g. implicit structures of community which a Navajo child confronts as her own when sent to school. Children are taught at home to see themselves as existing in one way and at school as existing in another. The notions of existence involve an individual’s connective membership in community, relation to land, the concept of earth mother who makes all people brothers, and the process of putting together rather than taking apart (1994a, pp. 48–50). Notions of existence also affect how one learns: do you take the bird to the lab and take it apart,

23 In

fact this insight might explain the situation of those far-right individuals in the United States who believe in individuality as isolated self and an isolationist to the point of disparaging his being part of a country and his country part of global community.

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or do you observe a bird so to enter into bird life, see how it fits into the environment? The first way of learning celebrates the whole and the part like Aristotle did, the second celebrates wholeness, oneness (53–56). Of course, this is a matter of emphasis. A hunter sees the parts of the bird’s internal anatomy when he dresses it for eating, but his thought is about his relation to the bird which has thankfully given its life so he might eat. Beginning with the worldview of a child entering a community, it becomes evident that the notions of individual and group differ in Native American and Western views. For the Navajo, the baby and young child bear resemblances to members of the group, mother, father, relatives, but the child is not considered to be a person until age five. The reason is that each human is seen to bring special gifts, but those special gifts are not revealed enough until the child is older. When those gifts are apparent, opportunities are given to children to exhibit their gifts and talents, their uniqueness. The responsibility of the group is to then develop in the child awareness of the consequences of his/her actions on others (Cordova, 1984). Native American names are often changed as a child grows and reveals herself and changes herself. An individual is unique but through group intercession, language, tradition, values, place, and family becomes a modification of the whole. Through knowledge the individual can control his/her life and see that actions affect all others and the environment, and so participate in the dynamic process. Rituals, too, help individuals change themselves. A human’s relation to the universe is not one of superiority, and so for what it is that they know of the universe, they are responsible. Ultimately, humans are vortices in a field of Wind. For the Navajo, nature and humans are sacred as Wind, Wind is sacred, and so human beings walk in beauty.24

23.4 Conclusion Viola Cordova said that at the dinner table, her Apache father would not say “eat your spinach,” without explaining that “it gave its life so you might live” (K. Moore 36). Philosophy for her began in discussions at the table. Philosophy was lived. The world she came to believe in was one and relational, holy, and beautiful. Cordova in her writings often inter-related philosophy with cosmic religion and human experience. She chose various genres—poem, story, and essay—to articulate and communicate Native American philosophy. This philosophy divulges both abstract theory and quotidian practice. For Cordova, legends and myths are meaningful. They are not superstitions or imaginations but purveyors of philosophical foundations (K. Moore 56). The myths of the Greek gods had a purpose even after the advent of logical and

24 While

the Chinese achieve the path through directive, the Native American finds the eternal through the transient.

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scientific thought. She introduced her metaphysics with the poem, “How it is: A Native American Creation Story.” Through story, she shared the joyful experience of seeing wild horses; wild horses provide glimpses into the connectedness of the universe, we and horse united in joy and ontologically in the sacredness of nature, the oneness. The questions Viola Cordova thought a philosopher should pose were three: What is the world? What is a human being? What is the role of a human being in the world? “What is the world?” for Cordova, the ontological answer begins in Native American mythology. The universe originated in mist or Holy Wind, i.e. something, and that something is sacred. Mist and wind are ever changing, and so the world is ever changing, ever becoming, is not a thing but is energy, a dynamic whole. The earth is mother of all manifestations of that dynamic whole, humans being a manifestation along with everything else. Earth is home. And so in short, the answer to the question, “What is the world?” is that the world is a sacred dynamic oneness. The human being, defined as being one with the universe and all it contains, is like the universe, Holy Wind, not individual, yet unique. Born as social or group-being, the human being becomes unique individual through direction from the group situated in a home place. Native Americans see themselves as a people occupying a place (K. Moore, 222). Cordova claims that the Western definition of what it means to be human, “seeks not to adapt to the Earth, but to adapt the Earth to a vision of what human beings should be” (226). In their desire to create a “monoculture world under the guise of ‘bringing people into modernity’” there can be no tolerance, for the only framework allowed is the adoption of the Western conceptual framework (226). Cordova said, “we have come to take Euroman for granted as a part of our landscape” (K. Moore 52), and Euroman has come to see us as “a living fossil” (61). Neither having the dominant culture nor the dominant philosophy, not even being accepted as equal, Native Americans in the United States of America are on the “verge of extinction” (221). Their languages and the concepts “engrained in their languages” are becoming lost or “undergoing subtle changes” (221). The EuroAmericans, from their arrival to this day, have dismissed, mostly without knowing or understanding the different philosophy of Native Americans, and so have lost the opportunity for enrichment of their own lives. Native American philosophy and culture bring the practice of exogamy or toleration and acceptance of difference, rather than the Euro-American way of see Other as competitor or one to dominate in a warring relationship (224). They bring the understanding that intermarriage does not extinguish the one or the other, as their Hispanic and Indian intermarriages have proved (222). And, too, they bring a different understanding of what it means to be human, human meaning group being, a person never singularly selfmade (227). A child becomes a person when it is mobile or capable of encountering its world, a world he is “a part of” rather than “a part from” (148–149). One of the most devastating Euro-American philosophies has been its notion of human beings as “rightful owners of the world” and whose “mythology encourages

23  Viola Cordova Jicarilla Tribe, Apache Native American 1936–2002

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them to “subdue and dominate,” resulting in colonialism and climate change. In contrast, the Native American philosophy identifies people as born for and of a particular place. The earth is mother, the earth is a natural home, and so it must be reverenced and adapted to—neither the earth nor others are to be misused or annihilated. As one with others and the universe, the human being’s role in the world is to develop her own talents. In order to perform this role she must not leave the universe and others in any way damaged. Humans have “survived and thrived” by adapting to “the environments offered by the earth” attested to by their “proliferation of cultures and languages” (226). Yet of the 500 languages once spoken by Native Americans, a few hundred are now extinct. When a language disappears, myths and legends disappear for the glue is no longer there for group identity. Cordova is very strong in her belief that the “Native American has more to offer the world” with their sense of “bounded space” than does the Westerner, who has little “sense of our utter dependence on some very specific planetary conditions for our survival” (227). But without justice allowing Native Americans to fully exist through their philosophy and their example of living that philosophy, this world will be bereft of both. If acknowledgment and acceptance of Native American’s conceptual framework does not happen, the Native American population is doomed. Without their framework as a guide, both humankind and the earth are doomed. Human thinking needs diversity of perspectives in order to be vibrant and wise; the philosophical canon needs to include a range of thinking for the same reason. This is the philosophy of Viola Cordova.

References Brown, C. (2014). Cherokee sister: The collected writings of Catherine Brown 1818–1823 (Theresa Strouth Gaul ed.). University of Nebraska Press Canfield, G. W. (1983). Sarah Winnemucca of the Northern Paiutes. University of Oklahoma Press. Converse, H. M. (1908). Myths and legends of the New York State Iroquois. In A. C. Parker (Ed.), New York state museum. State University of New York Press Cordova, V. (1984). A sense of place: The philosophical roots of ecological crisis. A Colloquium sponsored by the Philosophy Department, Colorado State University, Fall Cordova, V. (1985). Conceptual frameworks as a source of cultural distinction, MA Thesis, University of New Mexico Cordova, V. (1992). The concept of monism in Navajo thought. Dissertation, University of New Mexico, 1992. University of New Mexico Digital Repository Cordova, V. (1994a). Western thought: An outsider’s perspective. Colloquium sponsored by the Philosophy Department, Colorado State University Cordova, V. (1994b). Hearing other voices: A series of talks and lectures. Colorado State University Cordova, V. (1994c). Ethics: From an artists point of view. Colorado State University. Cordova, V. (1994d). Who we are: An exploration of identity. Center of Applied Studies in American Ethnicity: Colorado State University Cordova, V. (1995). Ways of seeing. Colorado State University

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Cordova, V. (1999). How it is: A native American creation story. Center of Applied Studies in American Ethnicity: Colorado State University. Dykeman, T. B. (2018). Rhetoric at the non-substantialistic turn: The East-West coin. Lexington Press. Farella, J. R. (1984). The main stalk: A synthetics of Navajo philosophy. University of Arizona Press. Fixico, D. (2003). The American Indian mind in a linear world. Routledge. Johansen, B. E. (1982). Forgotten founders: How the American Indian helped save democracy. Harvard Common Press. Kelsey, P. M. (2014). Reading the wampum: Essays on Hodinohso: Ni’Visual code and epistemological recovery. Syracuse University Press. McNeley, J. K. (1997). Holy wind in Navajo philosophy. University of Arizona Press, reprint of 1981 edition Moore, L. L., Brooks, J., & Wigginton, C., (Eds.). (2012). Transatlantic feminisms in the age of revolutions. Oxford University Press Moore, K. D., Peters, K., Jojola, T., & Lacy, A. (Eds.). (2007). How it is: The native American philosophy of Viola Cordova. The University of Arizona Press. Ritchie, J., & Ronald, K. (2001). “Cherokee women” in available means: An anthology of women’s rhetoric(s) (pp. 106–108). University of Pittsburg Press. Roosevelt, T. (1889). The winning of the west. G.P. Putnam’s Sons. Wagner, S. R. (2001). Sisters in spirit: Haudenosaunee (iroquois) influence on early American feminists. Native Voices Waters, A. (Ed.). (2003a). American Indian thought: Philosophical essays. Wiley-Blackwell. Waters, A. (2003b). Memorial in honor of Viola Cordova, Ph.D., A Traditional Indigenist Woman’s Agenda. In A. Waters (Ed.), APA newsletters: Newsletter of American Indians in philosophy (Vol. 2, p. 2). Spring Witherspoon, G. W. (1977). Language and art in the Navajo universe. University of Michigan Press.

Appendix

Brief Overview of Select Non-western Philosophical Theories and Concepts The philosophers included in this volume came from varied philosophical and religious traditions. Many of their writings and teachings reflect one or more of the following philosophical perspectives. 1. Polytheism: Ancient Mesopotamian cosmology, metaphysics and ethics harbored philosophical views about the nature and development of the universe out of cosmic dust, with different gods and goddesses influencing (or, if their powers were strong) controlling or constituting subsequently occurring natural events. Some deities are beneficent towards humans, others bring pain, suffering, disaster. Some compete with others for hierarchy. Most demand worship and/or gifts and sacrifice. With a polytheistic foundation guiding mesopotamian philosophy, thinkers like En Hedu’ Anna conceived of a world in which human needs were met to the extent that humans cultivated strong moral characters, ruled each other justly, contributed to the wellbeing of their neighbors and their empire, appreciated the bounty and beauty of nature, and perfected their own natural talents for the benefit of their extended families and communities. 2. Shinto: The distinction between Mesopotamian polytheism and ancient Japanese Shinto may seem small, but it is substantial. In Shinto, everything that exists—human and non-human—is alive with spirit. All things in the natural world are related and Japanese language reflects these assumptions. Kami, divine spirits, inhabited not only every natural being, but also certain philosophical concepts including growth, creation, reason, beauty and judgment. Clans often were named for a flower: to date, the Emperor or Mikado— the greatest earthly kami—is referred to impersonally in the third person as “the Chrysanthemum throne”. Personal worship included treating the environmental kamis with great respect for their ability to provide plenty of life’s necessities. That is to say, a sense of relationship between ordinary persons

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. E. Waithe and T. Boos Dykeman (eds.), Women Philosophers from Non-western Traditions: The First Four Thousand Years, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28563-9

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and living aspects of the environment inspired people to engage in practices like frugality, generosity, loyalty, industriousness, etc. The close conceptual relationship between principles of morality, politics, religious belief and ancestral worship, and Shinto’s animism1 reveals itself in Japanese language. The Japanese term for government means “things related to worship. In the Heian period the crown was served by the courtiers, lawyers, poets from the Fujiwara clan. The Mikado is Emperor of the physical empire’s people, lands and waterways, but “Mikado” also means “supreme moral leader” who must exemplify sagacity and be a moral exemplar to the public. Shikibu Murasaki was from the powerful Fujiwara clan of poets and courtiers. Another animist philosophy is that of many indigenous people of Australia, New Zealand and the Torres Strait Islanders, the largest civilization of which are the Australian Aborigines who are represented in this volume by the chapter on Oodgeroo Noonuncal. All celestial, land and water forms, all plants, animals, weather systems are alive and for that reason only are entitled to be treated with respect, but also ought to be treated with reverence and sensitivity to its feelings. Respect for others is a moral principle that functions to protect and therefore to preserve people and land. In some groups a person is born as some natural feature: an eagle, plant, fire, insect, fruit, tree, wallaby, etc. They are human, but also e.g., a honeybee. During their youth, they will be educated by other villager honeybee persons in the secret ways of the bees so as to maximize the amount of wax, honey, pollination of desirable plants, and bee population management. They will become experts whose identity as bee is every bit as real as is their human identity. Note the absence of religious connotations in this form of animism. Native Americans were largely animist also. Most viewed all the world—animals, plants, weather systems—to be alive and each thing in it to have a spirit that could be helpful to humans (and therefore ought to be treated with respect and reverence) or could turn harmful and vindictive (and therefore ought not be angered) if rudely treated. These ancient, indigenous nations held a stewardship view of human duty to the earth. On this view humans were morally required to avoid any waste of natural resources. In addition, they were morally obligated to conserve natural goods by refraining from over-cultivating, over-fishing, indiscriminate hunting and other forms of waste. There is strong reverence for Mother Nature and a belief that behaving morally brings moral luck in hunting, trapping, gathering, fishing and other activities. Viola Cordova, a Native American philosopher, discusses this theory of ecological ethics. 3. Hinduism: Among the earliest of philosophies, the term “Hinduism” refers to a substantial number of diverse schools of thought bearing in common a core literature, the Vedas (including the Puranas) which also form foundational

1In

the interests of space, we do not in this chapter explain the similarities and differences between animism and vitalism.

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literature for Jain and Buddhist philosophies. Hinduism’s major schools are Sankhya, Yoga, Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Mimamsa and Vedanta (Nicholson, 2013) Hindu metaphysics holds that individual souls are trapped in a never-ending cycle of reincarnation until the soul reaches enlightenment. Morally exceptional individuals may be reborn as the avatar or incarnation of one of religious Hinduism’s many gods or goddesses. Atman is the soul, the true inner self that characterizes every living thing. The concept Brahman refers to the material, efficient, formal and final creative cause of all that exists. Brahman is everywhere and always, infinite. It is a state of unchanging, eternal, blissful truth. It is the common substrate of all that exists. It underlies all change. Brahman is the single binding unity behind the diversity in all that exists in the universe. Brahman is that which all diverse things share. A set of interrelated concepts constitutes Hinduism’s moral epistemology: Nibbana, Moksha, Samsara and other core concepts. Once your soul reaches the identification of Atman with Brahman it will be in a condition of perfect knowledge, truth, and bliss. From this point onward you have escaped the cycle of rebirth. There will be no karmic effect on your soul’s next reincarnation because there will be no further rebirth. In this volume, we introduce several Hindu women philosophers including Sulabhā, Gargi Vachanavi and Maitreyi. 4. Daoism: Daoism is a metaphysical theory that is at the foundation of its moral philosophy and has strong implications for social and political philosophy. A core assumption of Daoist philosophy is that there is a Dao, or way, or path, that is the natural, proper way for an object to behave. The greater Dao is the way of the universe which encompasses the entire scope and history of all performance, doing, and coming-into-being in the universe. The greater Dao includes the lesser or natural Dao: the constant natural processes of choices and selections of each person. The greater Dao continually corrects and rebalances itself, preserving the pre-existing harmony of the universe. The Dao as activity means “to guide” but is usually translated as “way” or “path”. It resists individuation and is broader than moral philosophy alone, involving guidance, interpretation, behavior, path, opportunity and opening for action. Daoism’s major texts are the I Ching, and the Dao te Ching by Lao Tze. Sun Bu’Er, whose works are discussed in Chap. 14 was one of seven Daoist Masters. Yin/yang theory emerged within Daoist philosophy. It is the theory that all forces in the universe contain opposite, complementary forces in their seed. Each force is active, changing, always growing as the other diminishes, or diminishing as its complement grows. It is always coming into being or going out of existence. Each thing is by its nature either yin (female) or yang (male). Their fusion as physical matter creates the phenomenal universe. Ban Zhao’s philosophical orientation includes Yin/Yang theory as it was incorporated into Confucianism. 5. Theravedic Buddhism is the earliest form of Buddhism, founded in India by a Nepali Hindu, Siddartha Gotama, commonly referred to as “the Buddha.” Theraveda relies upon a Daoist metaphysics and adds the Four Noble Truths

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and the Eightfold Path to enlightenment. The former taught that life is suffering, and that suffering is the outcome of craving that which one lacks. Suffering can be ended by ending the craving, the wanting of that which one lacks. The Eightfold Path, grounded in the concept the Middle Way outlined the background conditions required for reaching enlightenment. The Eightfold Path is a group of principles that guide a person’s life. The person must have the right views, i.e., understand the Four Noble Truths. The person must act from right intentions, not from selfish motives. The person must speak the truth, eschew harmful speech such as libel or slander and speech that is angry, rude or disrespectful. The person must follow the path of right action no matter how difficult. This relates to the fifth path: one’s occupation or means of living must be in accord with the Dao. On the one hand, one must not support oneself by exploiting others and on the other hand, one must not become attached to the benefits and privileges that one’s occupation might bring. In this and all other activities the person must make the “Right Endeavor,” i.e., take the appropriate steps towards and expending sufficient effort at achieving enlightenment. “Right Mindfulness” requires total, undisrupted focus on one’s every activity. Lastly is the path of right concentration or meditation. The Middle Way is a general guideline to human moral behavior that avoids all extremes of thought, emotion, action, and lifestyle. Unlike Hinduism, some ascetic divisions of which advocate severe mortification of the body (extreme fasting, etc.), Theravedic Buddhism eschews such extremes of behavior as much as it does a life of indulgence in sensory pleasures. The Middle Way advocated by the Buddha is a moderate, balanced, peripatetic lifestyle during which one cultivates mental and emotional balance in equanimity. This earliest form of Buddhism, Theraveda spread rapidly, resulting in numerous divisions, each of which places slightly different importance upon one aspect of Buddhism, or on the teachings of any disciple of Siddhartha Gotama. Mahapajapati Gotami and Khema of Great Wisdom are two early Theravedic Buddhist philosophers. As Buddhism spread to Tibet, it acquired some unique characteristics. Tibetan Emperor Trisong Detsen had assembled a multinational collegium of Buddhist scholars. About half were Indian, and the other half were Tibetan, Nepalese and Bhutani. They were charged with creating a library of translated and transcribed Buddhist texts. But Tibet had no written language at the time. Many, many dialects were spoken. Unrelated local languages found in the extreme remote Himalayas also lacked a written form. The assembled scribal community of monks and lay scholars invented Tibetan script to preserve written copies of the Buddhist teachings. The Tibetan Emperor “gave” his wife, Yeshe Tsogyal, the Princess Kharchen, to a Buddhist master, Padma for education in these newly-translated sutras. Merging some tantric aspects of indigenous Bon philosophy with some aspects of tantric Hinduism’s Kama Sutra, Ye she Tsogyal developed such expertise that she became known as the “Mother of Tibetan Buddhism.”

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6. From Theraveda to Mayahana: The form of Buddhism that was founded on whichever sutras had been borrowed or purchased by the Tibetan Emperor was heavily influenced by Tibetan Pre-Buddhist belief in a panoply of deities and demons, by the construction of mandalas and by many other nuances of Tibetan philosophical life. It later became known as Mayahana Buddhism. Other forms of Buddhism that were to spread to China, Korea and Japan lacked some of the most significant Buddhist artifacts that continued an already ancient tradition of the creation and use of Mandalas. Theravedic Buddhism retained the Hindu belief in reincarnation and held the view that when a person reaches the state of enlightenment, they no longer experience death and reincarnation. This belief was widely shared by indigenous populations in much of Asia. Mayahana Buddhism differs from Theravedic Buddhism in many respects. The name itself means “Oxcart”—a reference to the ability of ordinary people to reach enlightenment in this life by acting morally. Followers of Mayahana Buddhism vow not to reach enlightenment themselves until they have first taught ordinary people to achieve nirvana in their present life. Confucianism, initiated by K’ung Fu Tzu (Confucius), is a humanistic philosophy which promotes a sociological conception of ethics and the practice of virtues centered on ren (humaneness) and li (ritual). It required viewing the other person as we ourselves would want to be viewed and treating them with the same consideration that we would want to receive from others. Related virtues include filial piety: the respectful treatment of others based upon their social or family standing and obedience to one’s superiors. Right naming reflected the ideal that persons live up to the titles they held (whether King, mother or an occupational title such as “cook”). Consequently, addressing others using proper titles and proper etiquette was a moral duty. With “right naming,” performance of appropriate rituals of etiquette, and his own “right action,” the ruler, like a parent, guides the people. The Confucian virtue of humaneness is achieved not only through moral behavior but through the aesthetics of music and language in harmony. MENG MU is a Confucianist. Her likeness is preserved in several public monuments. Her Confucian thought, in part reflected by lessons she gave to Mengzi, is described by Ann Pang-White in Chap. 7 of this volume. 7. Tendai: This branch of Buddhism came to flourish in medieval Japan. All things (dharmas) are empty (lack ontological reality), yet at the same time they have a temporary existence. Therefore, they are simultaneously unreal and temporarily existing; this is the “truth of the middle way,” which includes and yet surpasses the others. The three truths are considered to be mutually inclusive, and each is contained within the others. Every sense phenomenon just as it is, is the expression of Dharma. 8. Shingon is a division of Tendai that focuses on the use of practices such as mandala-building to achieve enlightenment. MURASAKI SHIKIBU of Japan was a Buddhist philosopher who was highly influenced by Japanese

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animist Shinto, Mayahana and Tendai and Shingon, lived when Ch’an Buddhism was becoming popularized in Japan. 9. Ch’an (Zen) Buddhism: Originating in the school of Mahayana Buddhism during the Tang Dynasty, Zen Buddhism emphasized meditation, and so also self-restraint, mindfulness, and breathing. Meditation texts in China became groundwork for Zen meditation on inner nature and its interest in the nature of mind. 10. Sufism: Sufism is mystic Islamism originating from the time of the prophet. Concerned with the spiritual over the ego and materialism, it emphasizes presence and openness to love. Sufi philosophers Rabi’a Al’Adawiya and Nana Asma’u each relied upon Sufi aesthetic and educational principles in their writing and teachings.