Women in Turkey: Silent Consensus in the Age of Neoliberalism and Islamic Conservatism 9781138542327, 9781351009126

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
List of figures
List of tables
Acknowledgments
List of abbreviations
Introduction
A note on data
Outline of the book and the chapters
Note
References
1 Theoretical framework
Limits of exclusive focus on identity politics
Critical political economy: An alternative approach
Neoliberalism and neoconservatism
Theoretical roots of neoliberalism and gender
Contemporary neoliberalism and the gender predicament
Neoliberalism in Turkey
AKP’s Islamic conservatism and gender
Data and method
Notes
References
2 Competing visions of gender
Secular patriarchy
Islamism and Islamic conservatism
The rise of Islamism in Turkey
Re-envisioning women under AKP rule
Conclusion
References
3 Employment
Women’s employment from a historical perspective: 1920s–1970s
Early neoliberalism and the rise of private enterprise: 1980s–1990s
Pillars of the AKP government’s policies for female employment: 2002–present
Conclusion
Notes
References
Periodicals
4 Education
Principles of education
Characteristics of the education system under the AKP: An overview
Conclusion
Notes
References
5 Health
Healthcare during the early Republican years (1920s–1950s)
Growing population and the health challenges: 1960–1970s
Beginning of the neoliberal era: 1980s and 1990s
Characteristics of health policies under the AKP (2002–2018)
Conclusion
References
6 Looking global, looking ahead
Looking ahead
References
Index

Citation preview

Women in Turkey

This book provides a socio-­economic examination of the status of women in contemporary Turkey, assessing how policies have combined elements of neoliberalism and Islamic conservatism. Using rich qualitative and quantitative analyses, Women in Turkey analyses the policies concerning women in the areas of employment, education and health and the fundamental transformation of the construction of gender since the early 2000s. Comparing this with the situation pre-­2000, the authors argue that the reconstruction of gender is part of the reshaping of the state–society relations, the state–business relationship, and the cultural changes that have taken place across the country over the last two decades. Thus, the book situates the Turkish case within the broader context of international development of neoliberalism while paying close attention to its idiosyncrasies. Adopting a political economy perspective emphasizing the material sources of gender relations, this book will be useful to students and scholars of Middle Eastern politics, political Islam and Gender Studies. Gamze Çavdar teaches Comparative Politics and Middle East Politics in the Department of Political Science at Colorado State University, USA. Her research interests include Islamist movements, gender, social policy and the politics of food. Yavuz Yaşar is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Denver. His research interests include health economics, social policy, development, macroeconomics and political economy.

Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics

89 Party Politics in Turkey Edited by Sabri Sayari, Pelin Ayan Musil and Özhan Demirkol 90 The Religionization of Israeli Society Yoav Peled and Horit Herman Peled 91 Participation Culture in the Gulf Networks, Politics and Identity Edited by Nele Lenze and Charlotte Schriwer 92 Patterns of Nationhood and Saving the State in Turkey Ottomanism, Nationalism and Multiculturalism Serhun Al 93 Power Sharing in Lebanon Consociationalism Since 1820 Eduardo Wassim Aboultaif 94 Israel in a Turbulent Region Security and Foreign Policy Edited by Tore T. Petersen 95 Women in Turkey Silent Consensus in the Age of Neoliberalism and Islamic Conservatism Gamze Çavdar and Yavuz Yaşar 96 The Decline of Democracy in Turkey A Comparative Study of Hegemonic Party Rule Kürşat Çınar For a full list of titles in the series: www.routledge.com/middleeaststudies/series/ SE0823

Women in Turkey

Silent Consensus in the Age of Neoliberalism and Islamic Conservatism

Gamze Çavdar and Yavuz Yaşar

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 Gamze Çavdar and Yavuz Yaşar The right of Gamze Çavdar and Yavuz Yaşar to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-­in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-138-54232-7 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-351-00912-6 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne & Wear

For ADA

Contents



List of figures List of tables Acknowledgments List of abbreviations



Introduction

1 Theoretical framework

viii ix x xii 1 8

2 Competing visions of gender

47

3 Employment

75

4 Education

114

5 Health

146

6 Looking global, looking ahead

181



Index

192

Figures

3.1 Official versus broad unemployment rates (2000–2016) 3.2 Types of unemployment as a percentage of broad unemployment by gender (2003–2016) 3.3 Part-­time employment as a percentage of official employment by gender (2003–2016) 4.1 Total number of İmam Hatip schools (1923–2017) 4.2 Total number of students in İmam Hatip (Middle and High) schools (1923–2017) 4.3 Index of number of students: Secular versus İmam Hatip (Middle and High) schools (1923–2017) 4.4 Number of female and male students in İmam Hatip schools (2002–2017) 4.5 Percentage of pay-­free staying students at boarding schools (2006–2017): Total versus İmam Hatip 4.6 Private schools (2006–2017) 4.7 Out-­of-pocket expenditures for education as a percentage of household income without any transfers by income distribution (2004–2012) 5.1 Total fertility rates (per 1000 women) (1924–2013) 5.2 Distribution of out-­of-pocket medical care expenditure as a percentage of household income including social and welfare transfers by income quintiles (2003–2013) 5.3 Distribution of out-­of-pocket medical care expenditure as a percentage of household income without social and welfare transfers by income quintiles (2003–2013) 5.4 Contraception methods by women (1988–2013)  5.5 Desired versus actual total fertility rates (1998–2013) 5.6 Femicide in Turkey (2008–2017)

84 85 89 126 126 127 128 130 135 136 149 155 156 159 162 168

Tables

3.1 Basic indicators of employment for men and women (1990–2000) 3.2 Basic indicators of employment for men and women (2005–2015) 3.3 Decomposition of employment and unemployment (2003–2016) 3.4 Laws and regulations concerning women’s employment (2003–2017) 3.5 Attendees of select İŞKUR courses and employment (2009–2014) 4.1 Laws and policies concerning women’s education (2002–2017)  4.2 Annual growth rates of various education indicators in 8- and 12-year mandatory education systems (1997–2018) 4.3 Annual growth rates of number of students by grades and gender (1999–2018) 5.1 Selected laws and regulations concerning health (2002–2018)

80 82 83 86 96 121 123 125 152

Acknowledgments

This book, like all other books, could not be written without the help of others. We met with many colleagues and technocrats during the fieldworks in two summers. Gülay Özkök, Ayşe Akın, and Emel Memiş provided the most valuable, first-­hand knowledge about the women’s issues over the last few decades. Serdal Bahçe, Özgür Avcı, Mete Can Özçörekçi, Elene Murvanidze, Neslihan Rugancı, and Özgür Yaşar helped us find some of the key resources that are used in this book. We visited many libraries, including the Library of the Public Administration Institute for Turkey and Middle East (Türkiye ve Ortadoğu Amme İdaresi), Bilkent University Library, National Library (Milli Kütüphane) as well as the libraries of the AKP and the CHP headquarters. Countless anonymous librarians, copy machine operators, and scanners helped us during these visits. We also visited the Ministry of Family and Social Policy, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health and met with many anonymous technocrats who provided us with valuable documentation and briefed us on the legal changes. We are grateful to them all for the incredibly useful assistance and support. Our fieldwork also included conversations with women’s activists in many civil society organizations. Mor Çatı, Ankara Girişimci Kadınlar Derneği, and Eğitim-Sen particularly gave us the much needed optimism. What was striking in these meetings was their utmost confidence in our ability to make a change in the lives of millions of women by writing this book. They shared their documents, experiences, insights, and, most importantly, opened their warm hearts. We are grateful to their confidence in us. Ebru Kongar, Yeşim Arat, Günseli Berik, and Nilüfer Cağatay also played key roles in either inspiring us or helping us refine the parts we needed. Ebru was always available to help, even in the earliest hours of the day, and supportive from the beginning of this project. We are always grateful to her unconditional support and resourcefulness. This book reminded us again of the personal sacrifice that goes into the researching and writing of a book. Although the fieldwork was completed much earlier, the book was written between 2017 and 2018, spanning over 18 months. The writing took place in various parts of the world including Vancouver, Beijing, Karfas, Playa del Carmen, Pedigree Park, and Fort Collins, in airports,

Acknowledgments   xi and even during flights. We missed many gatherings with our dear friends and family members, who, we hope, will forgive us. The support we received from Peter Sai-­wing Ho, Tracy Mott, David McIvor, Marcela Velasco, Dimitris Stevis, Mary Van Buren, Mary Vogl, Andrea Williams, Sue Ellen Charlton, and Stephen Mummee deserves much mentioning. The writing would be impossible without the lunches with Valerie Assetto and the cappuccinos at local cafes. This book also took away many hours that could have been otherwise spent with our son, Ada, and our dog, Grahambo, who, we know, will forgive us.

Abbreviations

AGIKAD AKP CEDAW CHP DİB DYP EHRC ES EU FP GREVIO HDI HTP ILO IMF İŞKUR KADER KOBI KOSGEB LGBTI MEB MENA MNP MSP NGOs

Ankara Foundation of Entrepreneur Women—Ankara Girişimci Kadınlar Derneği Justice and Development Party—Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Convention on the Elimination of All Types of Discrimination Against Women Republican People’s Party—Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Directorate of Religious Affairs—Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Right Path Party—Doğru Yol Partisi Equality and Human Rights Commission Public Employees Pension Fund—Emekli Sandığı European Union Virtue Party—Fazilet Partisi Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence Human Development Index Health Transformation Program—Sağlıkta Dönüşüm Programı International Labor Organization International Monetary Fund Public Employment Agency of Turkey—İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu Foundation to Support Female Candidates—Kadın Adayları Destekleme Derneği Small and Medium Size Businesses—Küçük ve Orta Ölçekli İşletmeler Small and Medium Enterprises Development Organization— Küçük ve Orta Ölçekli İşletmeleri Destekleme ve Geliştirme İdaresi Başkanlığı Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex Ministry of Education—Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Middle East and North Africa National Order Party—Milli Nizam Partisi National Salvation Party—Milli Selamet Partisi Non-­governmental Organizations

Abbreviations   xiii OECD RP ŞÖNİM SSK TESK TÜİK WPTPC WWHR UN UNICEF UNDP

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Welfare Party—Refah Partisi Creation of Violence Prevention and Monitoring Centers—Şiddet İzleme ve Önleme Merkezi Social Security Institution—Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu Turkish Confederation for Self-­employed Artisans and Small Businesses—Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar Konferasyon Turkey Statistical Institute—Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu Women’s Platform on the Turkish Penal Code Women for Women’s Human Rights United Nations The United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund United Nations Development Program

Introduction

This book deals with government policies concerning women in Turkey, specifically in the areas of employment, education, and health, and the fundamental transformation of the reconstruction of gender since the early 2000s. The reconstruction of gender is part of the reshaping state–society relations, the state–­ business relationship, the welfare system, and the cultural change that the country has been going through over the last two decades. This wide-­ranging transformation undoubtedly takes place within the context of the neoliberal globalization that Turkey has been part of in the post-­1980 period. Thus, the book situates the Turkish case within the broader context of international development of neoliberalism while paying close attention to its idiosyncrasies. Interest in identity politics has surged since the 1990s in many disciplines, and has also dominated studies on women in Turkey. Turkey undoubtedly presents a unique example, with deep cleavages through identities, such as ones along Islamists and secularists. Since the Adalet and Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party—AKP) came to power in 2002, academic studies as well as journalistic commentaries mostly concentrated on identity politics to explain contemporary politics in Turkey. While this study does not deny the significance of identity politics, it believes rather that the exclusive focus on identity will lead to incomplete analyses. It is our deep conviction that the analyses should be located within a feminist, critical political economy context as a reference point. This study, therefore, is an attempt to bring the political economy back in.1 How does the feminist political economy approach bring the political economy perspective back in? This book starts with a commitment to gender equality; it believes that a more equitable distribution of power between men and women is a sine quo non for healthy and sustainable societies. This approach believes that at the center of gender inequities lies the unequal distribution of material power between men and women, both in the market (production) and at home (reproduction). The feminist political economy perspective then offers an explanation for gender inequities by addressing the unequal distribution of material power between men and women. Starting from these premises of feminist political economy, this book examines how the intersection of global neoliberalism and Islamic conservatism, as

2   Introduction two distinct ideologies, takes shape within the Turkish context, reshaping gender relations. The process of global neoliberalism began in the early 1980s in Turkey, two decades before the AKP came to power. What remained incomplete at the beginning of the 2000s were the further institutional reforms that would institutionalize the changes made and finalize the process. The AKP inherited this mission and implemented the reforms, as it had the political mandate that the previous governments of the 1990s had lacked. The privatization of public schools, the subcontracting of many government services, the elimination of public jobs and the comprehensive healthcare reforms implemented during the 2000s have all been part of this process of institutionalizing neoliberalism. This process is closely intertwined with a crony system of public procurement. In other words, this is a case of global neoliberalism as much as a system of cronyism. Islamic conservatism is not conceptualized as a system that has much in common with global neoliberalism, especially concerning gender. Islamic conservatists themselves advocated their projects as a cure to the injustices caused by neoliberal policies and a way to reclaim their authentic, indigenous identity: Neoliberalism causes poverty, which they fix by providing extensive socio-­ economic services, they claim. Neoliberalism destroys communities, which they build, they argue. Neoliberalism leaves women either unemployed or employed but be vulnerable to sexual harassment or long working hours away from their families. Islamists instead encourage women to work in gender-­segregated settings or at home so that they are at the service of their families, they assert. Neoliberalism also undermines families, Islamists claim, by encouraging husbands to be allured to other women via social media or to become addicted, such as to drugs and alcohol, or by making men work lengthy hours instead of spending time with their wives and children. Neoliberalism, on the other hand, emphasizes the individual power and choice that belittle cultures, customs and structure. What on earth do Islamism and neoliberalism have in common? Islamism has evolved over the last three decades to incorporate neoliberal values. Islamists’ program has moved from criticizing capitalism to embracing and advocating it. This gradual shift is present not only in the Turkish case, but also in other regional cases, in Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon, etc. This transformation of Islamist ideology, however, is most obvious in the Turkish case since the political system has allowed Islamists to come to power and implement their policies rather than staying in opposition. The central thesis of this book is that global neoliberalism and Islamic conservatism, although distinct ideologies, do share common assumptions concerning gender. These assumptions, discussed in detail in Chapter 1, include deep and implicit convictions about the nature of men and of women: (1) men and women are fundamentally different; (2) women’s primary domain of activity should be confined to the home; and (3) a natural division of labor exists between men and women (and attempts to change it would be detrimental). Chapter 1 delves deep in to the roots of neoliberalism, and the founders of the neoclassical theory, by examining their original work and identifying their

Introduction   3 gender assumptions. Although contemporary neoliberalism does not explicitly hold these assumptions and instead encourages women to be employed alongside of men in the name of individual empowerment, the ideology of neoliberalism is not gender-­neutral but rather holds deep gender-­bias in its original and contemporary forms. This bias can be seen in the fact that structural obstacles, such as the patriarchy, are not recognized, that outcomes are only explained as individual choices and preferences, and that what the theory really means by “the individual” is male (e.g., individuals are autonomous, rational, informed, etc.) as many women are constrained by the social roles imposed on them and lack the material power necessary to make these informed, rational and autonomous decisions assumed by the ideology (England and Kilbourne 1990, 156–171). Furthermore, women’s contribution to the economy, in the forms of reproduction at home or care, is completely dismissed as irrelevant. Islamic conservatism, on the other hand, does not have a single source or “founding fathers.” This ideology is deeply context-­dependent as it evolves and is subjected to different interpretations depending on the domestic context. It is impossible to talk about a single version of Islamic conservatism across those countries that share the same convictions towards gender. Indeed, the Islamic interpretation of gender vastly differs, as a rich body of literature has already shown. This book does not discuss Islam and gender in abstract terms; is only interested in Islamic conservatism as expressed by the top party leadership in the AKP in Turkey. Therefore, the book does not claim to explain the Islamic conservatism outside this context. As explicitly expressed by the top AKP leadership, women and men clearly belong to different realms of life. Family and women are almost identical as the latter does not exist outside the family. Many policies that AKP implemented since it came to power are advocated as intended to protect women: Bills to criminalize adultery and abortion were justified to protect women, family and women’s health, as well as the flexible market policies that encourage women to stay home and work part time, online or in the informal economy and in segregated settings. The education policies are specifically tailored to prepare women for the “women’s sphere,” that is care, motherhood and “women’s work” such as the service sector. These policies go beyond being ad hoc and instead they address a new gender system that constructs women as mothers and wives, pious, segregated, family-­centered, dependents, and volunteers. In other words, in addition to the theoretical congruence between the assumptions of neoliberalism and Islamic conservatism, the specific policies they advocate also converge. Thus, neoliberalism and Islamic conservatism complement each other and reinforce, institutionalize and justify traditional gender roles. Following David Harvey’s (2005) conceptualization of neoconservatism, this book also sheds light how the AKP implements some of the most comprehensive neoliberal policies in the history of the country, on the one hand, and promotes itself as the solution to the problems caused by these very policies, on the other. Examples abound. Economic policies to eliminate agricultural subsidies and

4   Introduction other types of assistance have been pursued since the 1980s, but significantly intensified during the AKP era and do not even constitute 1 percent of the gross domestic production (GDP) as of 2016 (Oyan 2009, 237–254). There are also gender implications of the policies long advocated by the European Union, the IMF and the World Bank. Women’s employment has been concentrated in the agricultural sector, and therefore the weakening state support for agriculture has resulted in fewer farms and businesses. The fact that women’s employment rates have been steadily declining for decades in Turkey is closely related to this fact. Many of those women who used to be employed in agriculture and are now unemployed, are moving to cities where they are separated from their communities and face isolation and alienation. The largest recipients of the AKP’s social welfare assistance are thus these women who live in cities and are unemployed. This assistance can take various forms, ranging from cash transfers to in-­kind, and has been an important survival strategy for the receivers. Here, one sees the problem and the solution created by the same government. Similarly, as Chapter 3 discusses, the privatization of the public education system has been intensified during the AKP era, and paying for education currently constitutes a significant percentage of the household budget for the poor. The same era witnessed nationwide campaigns to distribute free textbooks, snacks and even tablets to all students attending public and private institutions alike. The bidding for these public procurements, of course, is a major source of cronyism: Only those who agree to a clientelist and close relationship with the government can win the bids. Another example comes from the skyrocketing numbers of femicides, the murder of women. The patriarchal structure prominent in Turkish society has been advocated and supported through various government policies as well as discourse. Accordingly, the undemocratic family structure that dumps the responsibility of care on women and legitimizes this structure as the ideal system is also advocated by Islam. In this family structure, women’s only role is to serve the rest of the family at their own expense. Obedience is valued and awarded more than anything. In case of abuse of power at the hands of their husbands, brothers, or fathers—the male members of the family—women are left with nothing to assert their rights and defend their well-­being. It is not a coincidence, therefore that the femicide rate has been sharply increasing since the 2000s. Women are left at the mercy of men, who are the providers. Domestic violence and femicide finally attracted the attention of the government who created the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Directorate of Religious Affairs—DİB) to offer consultation to families considering divorce. Thousands of “experts” were hired to provide this service. Here we see the AKP again “solving” the problems that it strongly contributed to, if not created.

A note on data This book is rich both in theory and empirical evidence. Years of research in Turkey have contributed to the data and article collection, observations, library

Introduction   5 visits, and interviews, in addition to the two summers of fieldwork (2013 and 2014) that were specifically spent on this project. In addition to the qualitative sources in Turkish, English and Ottoman we have used, this book heavily relies on statistics published by Türk İstatistik Enstitüsü (Turkish Statistical Institute— TÜİK). Some of the data that we used are publically available on TÜİK’s website. What makes this study distinct is the specific data sets that we used, namely (1) Hane Halkı İşgücü Anketi Mikro Veri Seti (2010–2014) (Household Labor Force Surveys Micro Data Set); (2) Hane Halkı Bütçe Anketi Mikro Veri Seti (2003–2016) (Household Labor Force Surveys Micro Data Set); and (3) Türkiye Nüfus ve Sağlık Araştırması 1998, 2003, 2008 and 2013 (Turkish Population and Health Survey). The first and the second micro data sets are not publicly available except in their aggregated forms published by TÜİK. We chose not to rely only on the aggregated data, and, instead made our own calculations by using the micro data sets. It is important to explain the significance of micro data sets here. For instance, according to the aggregated data provided by TÜİK, women’s employment rates began to increase from 2013. A close reading of the definitions would suggest that this increase is probably a result of a redefinition of employment adopted by the government, which takes the informal sector employment into account in the calculation. The aggregated data do not allow the researcher to refine the data based on more meaningful and precise definitions. Moreover, it is impossible to make comparable tables in the aggregated data before and after the new definitions are adopted. Our micro data allowed us to adopt more precise definitions and make comparable time series accordingly. This was an extremely time-­consuming endeavor, but it sets our study apart from many other analyses.

Outline of the book and the chapters The book consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 examines the literature on Turkish politics over the last two decades and lays out the theoretical framework. After criticizing the identity politics that have dominated the recent literature on Turkey, the chapter offers an alternative framework of analysis, namely the critical political economy. This analytical framework concentrates on the material while not neglecting discursive efforts and identity. Borrowing from the early feminist critique of neoclassical economics, the critical political economy framework identifies the gender biases embedded in the current economic system. The chapter then discusses the AKP’s understanding of gender and demonstrates the similarities between the AKP’s understanding of gender and neoclassical economics. The chapter highlights the conceptualization of gender behind the AKP policies that are located between neoliberalism and conservatism. The critical political economy framework allows synthesis between the two, arguing that, at the fundamental level, neoliberalism and Islamic conservatism share a similar gender bias despite their different origins. Chapter 2 compares and contrasts the AKP’s understanding of gender with that of the earlier period. It has been argued elsewhere that the AKP period is

6   Introduction characterized by a new type of patriarchy. This chapter aims to demonstrate the peculiar characteristics of the new Islamic patriarchy while revealing commonalities with the previous periods. Chapter 3 focuses on the first substantive topic, the employment policies, and compares the AKP policies with previous employment periods. The chapter is empirically rich as it draws on both qualitative and quantitative data from numerous sources. The chapter argues that the AKP’s employment policies are marked with a continuation of and a departure from the previous periods. The continuity has to do with the fact that the neoliberal policies that began in the early 1980s and intensified during the 1990s were enhanced and institutionalized under the AKP. The AKP not only kept promises to international organizations to intensify neoliberal policies, particularly in the area of labor, but also took extra steps in legislating new policies that fundamentally shaped the labor market. However, the AKP policies also diverge from the policies of previous periods. The divergence comes from the AKP’s main concern with female employment, which is to draw women into the labor market while strengthening their traditional roles through constant references to tradition and religion. An inevitable implication of this commitment is that women are employed in low-­paying, low-­status informal jobs in their own homes or in segregated areas and that they receive no social security benefits. The empirical data in fact demonstrate unequivocally that both male and female unemployment has increased since 2002, with the increase higher for women despite the increasing percentages of total employment for men and women. The increase mostly took place in the part-­time jobs. Chapter 4 examines the education policy under the AKP and provides a historical overview of the education policies starting from the early republican years. Some sources in Ottoman script published prior to the alphabet reform were utilized in this chapter. Although the chapter mostly relies on qualitative data and interviews, TÜİK micro-­level data were again used for descriptive statistics. The chapter argues that the education policy of the AKP reveals some idiosyncratic characteristics of the AKP’s gender policies. A careful examination of policies, statements, and textbooks reveals the specific gender relations that are promoted through education. The role of Islam has significantly increased and carries an explicit and unequivocal message for the promotion of women’s roles away from public life and in segregated areas. As with employment, the neoliberal policies, such as privatization of educational institutions, and the conservative Islamic message go hand in hand. Chapter 5 depicts the silent consensus on women in health. The AKP era has experienced comprehensive health reforms, promoted as bringing equality and increasing efficiency in the mostly publicly owned health system of all of the eras. With an eye on gender, this chapter discusses the reform in detail and reveals that the reforms produced a system that is neither egalitarian nor efficient for users. Instead, the reforms played the crucial role of privatization of the healthcare system and included some constraints on women’s control over their bodies. Through meticulous policy changes, the AKP era has promoted and

Introduction   7 institutionalized the limitations on reproductive rights, particularly abortion and contraception. Chapter 6 concludes the discussion with some general observations about the synthesis between neoliberalism and conservatism that goes beyond the Turkish case. The synthesis has emerged in other regions of the world including the Middle East, Europe and the United States. The future of these syntheses and its implications for women are discussed.

Note 1 This is a reference to Peter Evans, Dietrich Reuschemeyer and Theda Skocpol. 1985. Bringing the State Back in. New York: Cambridge University Press.

References England, Paula and Barbara Stanek Kilbourne. 1990. “Feminist Critiques of the Separative Model of Self: Implications for Rational Choice Theory.” Rationality and Society, 2: 156–171. Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Oyan, Oğuz. 2009. “IMF ve Dünya Bankası’nın Tarım Reformu Uygulama Projesi’nin Bilançosu.” Mülkiye, XXXIII(262): 237–254.

1 Theoretical framework

On August 13, 2001, 74 politicians along with supporting independent parliamentarians met in the Conference Room of the Bilkent Hotel in Ankara to declare the establishment of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-­AKP) (“AKP Kuruldu” 2001). Before the watchful eyes of journalists, the founding members of the new party read the party program declaring their unequivocal commitment to a market economy, a Western-­ oriented foreign policy, and individual liberties, which the program characterized as “the foundation of a free society.” These commitments represented a declaration of an ideological reorientation within the Turkish Islamist movement, a process that began in the early 1980s. The Turkish Islamist movement had historically criticized Turkey’s pro-­Western foreign policy, calling the European Union and NATO “Western clubs,” and had been opposed to capitalism, at least in rhetoric, and barely mentioned individual liberties (Teşhis n.d.). The AKP founded on that day has won four consecutive elections (2002, 2007, 2011, and 2015), each of which led to the formation of majority governments and the fundamental restructuring of the political, economic, and social life, including gender, in Turkey. The AKP’s era encompassed both executive posts (President and Prime Minister) and the legislature, among other top bureaucratic units. The party’s power was consolidated when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the former prime minister and the party chairman, was elected as president in 2014 and a referendum of constitutional amendments instituted a presidential system in 2017. Since the day it was founded, the AKP has received considerable attention from political analysts both inside and outside of Turkey. One of the major topics drawing scholarly attention has been the party’s Islamic identity: A political party that came out of the Islamist movement was forming a majority government in a secular, Western-­oriented regime of Turkey, and at the same time openly challenging that regime. This new government was going to attempt to reshape many characteristics of the Turkish republic, and, without question, gender was at the forefront. Indeed, as soon as the election results declared the AKP’s victory in 2002, the headscarf became the focus of attention for both academics and the media. “What will happen to the headscarf ban?” newspapers wondered, counting those

Theoretical framework   9 MPs from the AKP whose wives wore headscarves. The headscarf had never been present at the official ceremony. Similarly, the headscarf had been absent from campuses since the late 1980s. While the media busily speculated about the role of the headscarf, Bülent Arınç, then spokesperson of the Grand National Assembly, brought his headscarf-­wearing wife to the official ceremony—setting up a prelude to a headscarf crisis among the top brass (“Ve Türban Protokolde” 2002). This event began a period of prolonged tension at the top until the ban finally ended in 2013.1 The centrality of the Islamic–secular identity conflict in any discussion related to gender in general, and women in particular, was also apparent in academic studies. Scholars paid close attention to the new headscarf crisis (Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu 2008). Some were much more optimistic about the prospects of women’s empowerment under the AKP rule, arguing that thanks to the AKP, Turkey will feel much more comfortable in its Islamic skin. Others argued that the “triple issue of the headscarf, the public sphere, and secularism are the three obstacles to the [AKP’s] gender policies” (Sözen 2006, 277), and the AKP can be said to be the party that has “extensively dealt with women’s issues more than any other political party in the last fifty years” (Sözen 2006, 277). The common feature of these analyses is their exclusive attention to the issue of women’s identity. Some focused on the headscarf ban; others criticized the Kemalist elite for having created “the other,” while still others discussed the legal implications. In any case, identity, its formation and the clash of different identities have remained the focus of attention, concerning gender, for many academics and pundits. However, a closer look at the recent history of Turkey over the last decade reveals that, with respect to gender, not one process but multiple processes have been present all at the same time. First, a curious and less-­noted development has taken place over the last decade that cuts across the Islamic–secular dichotomy and questions the exclusive attention to identity politics the AKP governments have implemented in the most widespread and in-­depth economic liberalization programs in the history of the country. These programs were announced during the 1990s but their implementation had been delayed owing to the volatile economy, unstable coalition governments, economic crises, and war with the Kurdish separatists. Under the AKP’s majority governments, a relative stability in the economy and a reduced level of conflict with Kurdish separatists (1999–2015) enabled the process of economic liberalization to be expanded, consolidated, and institutionalized while the neoliberal principles, such as privatization, individual responsibility, merit-­based promotion, flexible market conditions, privatization of care, and supremacy of private enterprises were extended to almost every government program, including those pertaining to women and family. For instance, to attain the goal of increasing women’s employment rates, the AKP governments focused on entrepreneurship as a major policy. Large numbers of projects have been funded by various state agencies to train women (as well as men), providing them with logistical, financial, and legal support for their start-­up businesses.

10   Theoretical framework Between 2005 and 2012, the European Union sponsored 23 of these projects for women entrepreneurs alone (“Kadın İstihdamı Projeleri” 2012). The AKP, in other words, emerged from the ashes of the Turkish Islamist movement, which was long anti-­Western and anti-­capitalist, and became the cheerleader for neoliberal policies that extended to people’s daily lives, particularly those of women. Except for a small body of scholarship, much of the recent research on gender in Turkey has neglected this political economy aspect of gender. Here, one finds the AKP governments, which promote neoliberalism while at the same time legitimizing women’s traditional roles through references to Islam, tradition, and custom. The focus on the headscarf fails to highlight the fact that the AKP period has seen the most comprehensive promotion of traditional gender roles through public policies. The party program introduced at the Bilkent Hotel meeting revealed the limits of the new party’s interpretation of individual liberties by emphasizing women’s traditional roles as mothers and characterizing the family as “the essence of the Turkish society” (“AKP Kuruldu” 2001). The steps taken by the government indeed followed the footsteps of this program. As one of its first legislative initiatives concerning women, the AKP introduced a bill to criminalize adultery, only to withdraw the bill in the face of the EU’s strong opposition. Later, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the AKP’s leader, the prime minister (2003–2014), and the president (2014–present), openly, unequivocally, and regularly advised women to have three children (later revised to four)—advice that was subsequently turned into a law in 2015 (Law #6637). Accordingly, to promote the three- or four-­child policy, couples would receive interest-­free loans and women would get longer maternity leave and enjoy “flexible working conditions” that would allow them to stay home while working. While some of the changes seem progressive—for instance, because they allow longer maternity—they in fact reinforce the traditional gender division of labor and women’s predicament as men’s dependents as the home-­based flexible work does not come with benefits. It is also striking that these policies are accompanied by increasing religious discourse. In fact, the size of the 2013 budget of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı—DİB) exceeded the budgets of 12 ministries, including the Ministry of the Interior, the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry of Health. In addition, the DİB was designated by the Ministry of Family and Social Policy as the main institution to educate the family. Clearly, the AKP period attempts to synthesize two seemingly exclusive ideologies: global neoliberalism and Islamic conservatism. This book addresses the following two questions: (1) What have been the AKP’s gender policies over the last decade? And (2) How has the AKP reconciled the two seemingly distinct and alternative ideologies of global neoliberalism and Islamic conservatism? Answering these questions is significant for two reasons. First, the rise of Islamist and conservative politics in Turkey, especially since the 1980s, has been a subject of intense scholarly discussion. This discussion has mainly concentrated on issues such as the construction and reconstruction of Muslim women’s

Theoretical framework   11 identity, the headscarf, the departure of the new Islamic identity from the Kemalist one, tension between the Muslim and secular identities, and resistance to and accommodation of different identities. Beyond the concerns with the identities, however, there remains a strong need to examine the socio-­economic dimension of gender over the same period. Specifically, what has happened to the material conditions of men and women during the AKP rule? How have the gender roles in production and reproduction changed over the last decade? Second, the existing studies that examine the AKP’s ideology have either under-­theorized the relationship between neoliberalism and Islamic conservatism or identified these as mutually exclusive. This study is an attempt to better develop a theoretical framework between the two, especially with respect to gender. Starting from the premise that an exclusive focus on identity is insufficient to understand the gender policies of the AKP over the last decade in Turkey, this book aims to bring a critical political economy perspective back into the study of gender, a dimension of gender long neglected owing to the almost exclusively scholarly focus on identity since the early 1990s. As explained in detail below, the strength of the critical political economy approach comes from two main premises. One premise is that this approach pays particular attention to the material while not neglecting the discursive, and the second premise is that it is concerned with the gender division of power not only in production that takes place in the market, but also in reproduction in the household. However, the critical political economy neither deems identity completely irrelevant nor completely neglects the socio-­cultural factors in the analysis. For instance, the study uncovers the role identity plays in the way those in power justify public policies and the way those individuals are perceived by the constituency, thereby playing crucial roles in “marketing” and justifying the government policies. These points will be highlighted as they become relevant throughout the rest of the book. By taking both dimensions of gender into account, this book specifically examines gender policies in the areas of employment, education, and health since the early 2000s. These areas constitute some of the fundamental pillars of the socio-­economic conditions for both men and women. The Global Gender Index, designed by the World Economic Forum to measure gender equality, takes these overall areas (in addition to the political empowerment) as the main indicators of gender well-­being. Each of these areas is meticulously examined to demonstrate the reshaping of the material conditions of men’s and women’s lives as well as the redistribution of power between men and women and how these changes are tied to the issues of identity. This book argues that under AKP rule, gender politics has been meticulously and fundamentally reshaped as a unique blend of neoliberalism and Islamic conservatism. This new mode of patriarchy (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu 2011) was made possible because neoliberal globalization and Islamic conservatism, although different ideologies, are harmonious in both theory and practice with respect to the societal roles they assign to genders. This “silent consensus” between neoliberalism and conservatism to a large degree holds the same fundamental

12   Theoretical framework assumptions concerning gender: (1) men and women are fundamentally different; (2) women’s primary domain of activity should be confined to the home; and (3) a natural division of labor exists between men and women (and attempts to change it would be detrimental). In addition to this theoretical congruence, the specific policies these ideologies advocate also largely overlap. For instance, “flexible market conditions” serve both neoliberalism and conservatism because they promote both ­efficiency—by employing women temporarily and with no social benefits—and gender segregation—by allowing them to work at home. Therefore, these seemingly alternative ideologies actually work in concert with each other, strengthening, reinforcing, and further institutionalizing traditional gender roles. These policies, although originating outside the country, are mitigated through a system that operates at multiple levels. Therefore, the AKP’s blend of neoliberalism and Islamic conservatism operates at three interrelated levels with respect to gender: (1) The neoliberal policies at the global level, often advocated by the IMF, World Bank, and the European Union; (2) conservative policies adopted at the national level; and (3) administrative units such as municipalities operating along with civil society organizations at the local level. The AKP governments ensure that the neoliberal policies are wrapped with a conservative discourse that often appeals to custom, religion, history, and authentic Islamic values while advocating and justifying these policies. It is important to state at the outset that this study makes a normative commitment to gender equality, viewing the maldistribution of power between men and women on the global scale as unjust and unnecessary rather than taking it as “given,” a type of social phenomenon that is “natural” or “unavoidable.” Thus, this normative commitment uses gender as an analytical category and examines the socio-­economic conditions of men and women as the necessary requirement for gender equality.

Limits of exclusive focus on identity politics During the 1960s and 1970s, with the rise of identity politics in advanced capitalist societies, academic studies began moving away from economic-­based explanations. Identity and culture gained prominence not only as topics of interest, but also as conceptual frameworks of examination. Especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the preponderance of economic issues in academia has further declined, and instead, post-­structuralist, non-­economic, cultural, and at times micro and individual-­based approaches have taken over. Although originating in Western scholarship, this trend has deeply influenced the analysis of non-­Western countries, including Turkey. A large body of literature on identity politics in Turkey has emerged since the 1990s (Kadıoğlu 1996, 1999; Ayata 1997; Bozdoğan and Kasaba 1997; Göle 1997a, 1997b, 2000; Keyman 1995; Keskin-­Kozat 2001; Gülalp 2003; Yavuz 2003, 2009; Saktanber 2002; Güneş-Ayata and Tütüncü 2008; Paker 2009; White 2014; Cinar 2014; Doğan and Kenar 2016). This perspective considers

Theoretical framework   13 many of Turkey’s political, economic, and social problems to be instances of identity crisis, which are often argued to result directly from the modernization and Westernization processes that the Turkish republic initiated at the turn of the century. Accordingly, the new republic’s promises for modernity were false, misguided, and unwarranted. The process was authoritarian, and the particular trajectories taken were unfit for the majority of the society who showed resistance in every possible way. Therefore, the argument goes, as the authoritarian Kemalist establishment began to lose its control over society from the 1980s onwards, the conflicts around the previously suppressed identities began to emerge. As Fuat Keyman (1995, 116) puts it, A quick glance at these positions in cultural struggles, which have been organized around a binary logic, first between secular identity and Islamic identity, second between Turkish identity and Kurdish identity, and third between European identity and Turkish national identity, illustrates the resurgence of nationalist ideology in the form of (ethnic) identity politics in the 1990s. These arguments, which flourished throughout the 1990s, continued in the 2000s, extending the same analytical framework to the rising power of political Islam. For instance, according to White (2002, 3), what mainly distinguishes the Kemalists from the AKP leaders, which White calls “Muslim nationalists,” is the matter of identity: “Kemalist national identity has been challenged by new forms of nationalism emerging from increasingly powerful and self-­confident Muslim networks rooted in economic and political life that privilege Muslim identity and culture over race.” Similarly, Çınar (2011, 539) argues that “the AKP’s Islamism is most evident in its national ideology and the new national identity that it has forged for Turkey since the 1990s.” Others have extended the identity framework to foreign policy and international affairs (Gülalp and Seufert 2013; Karakoc 2014; Kirdiş 2015). Likewise, the literature on gender has largely focused on construction and reconstruction of identities and conflict between the secular and Islamic identities as well as their respected discourses. Many of these studies discuss the early republican period and its gender policies as the period that profoundly shaped gender relations in general and women’s lives in particular (Durakbaşa and İlyasoğlu 2001; White 2002; Eslen-­Ziya and Korkut 2010). Some scholars have criticized Kemalism for suppressing women’s sexuality (Müftüler-Bac 1999). Others have blamed the republic’s modernization policies for the ongoing patriarchal practices, including the customary honor killings of women (İnce et al. 2009). Still others have engaged in a detailed critique of the reconstruction of Turkish women’s identity as modern, virtuous, and sacrificing during the nation-­ building process. These critiques differed significantly from the earlier feminist critiques of the republican reforms as being correct in direction (i.e., Western modernization) but limited in scope (Kandiyoti 1987; Arat 1989; Tekeli 1990). Rather, the new

14   Theoretical framework scholarship on identity began to question the very existence of the republican reforms. For instance, Kadıoğlu called the Kemalists “native Orientalists” who were “influenced by what Edward Said calls Orientalism, the manufactured Western image of the Muslim world” (Kadıoğlu 1994, 649). Just like colonialists, who saw “Islam as innately oppressive to women,” Kadıoğlu (1994, 651) continues that  Native Orientalists rearticulated in their own languages the colonial thesis, pointing to the inferiority of the Muslim tradition and incorporating the issue of women into the center of their modernization projects. Such rearticulation of the colonial thesis in native voice represented the gradually emerging self-­hatred of the native Orientalists. Therefore, Kadıoğlu argues, “In the aftermath of the proclamation of the republic in 1923, many steps, including the abolition of the caliphate and the closure of the sharia courts, represented the republic’s ‘clear distaste for religion’ ” (Kadıoğlu 1994, 651–652). These reforms “constituted an onslaught on existing cultural practices” (Kadıoğlu 1994, 652), and the “exaggerated, militant Westernization efforts expressed in the modernization projects unleashed by native orientalists promoted the public visibility of women as emblems of civilization” (Kadıoğlu 1994, 660). No topic has received as much attention in the literature as the issue of the headscarf (Göle 1996; Özdalga 1998; White 1999; Secor 2001, 2002; Atasoy 2005, 2009; Aldıkaçtı-Marshall 2005; Çınar 2005; Kalaycıoğlu 2005; Shively 2005; Genel and Karaosmanoğlu 2006; Atakav 2007; Bora and Çalışkan 2008; Cindoğlu and Zencirci 2008; Kılıç et al. 2008; Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu 2008; Borovali 2009; Bayram 2009; Gökariksel 2009; Toprak and Uslu 2009; Çarkoğlu 2010; Çetin 2010; Kavakçı Islam 2010; Seggie and Austin 2010; Cindoğlu 2011; Jelen 2011; Güveli 2011; Güven 2010; Seggie 2011; Vojdik 2010). Although some studies examined the technical and legal aspects of the controversy (Bayram 2009; Çarkoğlu 2010), much of the literature focuses on the Kemalist ideology and its construction (Özdalga 1998; Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu 2008; Seggie and Austin 2010; Seggie 2011). For instance, Özdalga (1998, 2) wrote, “As though intoxicated by the philosophy of the Enlightenment and the positivistic thought of the nineteenth century, the Turkish nationalists, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, identified their own secularist ideology with the secularization process.” Others argue that headscarved women faced unique discrimination and challenges not experienced by other women in Turkey (Cindoğlu 2011; Güveli 2011; Jelen 2011). This vast literature was undoubtedly fueled by the political tension during the 1990s between the Kemalist establishment and the rising power of the Islamist parties. The headscarf ban of the late 1980s was uniformly implemented across campuses and public institutions at the time, and the attention given to the headscarf in the literature almost entirely sidelined the other topics. A significant segment of the headscarf-­related literature aimed at demonstrating its multiple meanings and significance for those who wear it (Göle 1996;

Theoretical framework   15 Özdalga 1998; Jelen 2011). In The Forbidden Modern, Nilüfer Göle (1996, 16) examines the Islamist veiling in terms of the agency’s identity, which faces a “choice” and a “polarity embedded within it that generates cognitive dissonance around the separate value systems of the elites and the rest of the populace and thus raises the issue of competing legitimacies.” According to Göle, Islamist ideology “promotes the return of the Muslim actors to the historical scene in terms of their own religious morality” and “the veiling of women emerges as the most visible symbol of this Islamization of the self and society” (Göle 1996, 16). In fact, “the direction in which Islamist movements evolve will hinge significantly on the elaboration and recognition of women’s identity and agency” (Göle 1996, 21). Göle seems to have some reservations about these movements: “Paradoxically, Islamic politics can delimit women’s individuality and visibility at the same time that the politicization of women within Islamic politics empowers Muslim women” (Göle 1996, 21). Despite this reservation, however, Göle argues that “Islamism, as the ‘politics of recognition,’ empowers Muslim women, providing intellectual and political tools for asserting their long-­silenced difference, by questioning the equation between civilized and Westernized” Göle (1996, 21–22, emphasis in original). The focus on women’s cultural identity within the Turkish context has recently extended to the intersection of Islamic identity and neoliberal globalization (Kılıçbay and Binark 2002; Gökariksel and Secor 2009, 2010, 2012; Gökarıksel 2012; White 1999; Sandıkçı and Ger 2001, 2002; Genel and Karaosmanoğlu 2006; Sandıkçı and Ger 2007; Kuran 2010). Some have argued that veiling has gained a new meaning within the consumption context. According to Kılıçbay and Binark (2002, 499), for instance, “the practice of veiling is inseparable from consumption, commodity, even pleasure patterns, and is stimulated by global and local trends of the market economy.” Veiling is interpreted as evidence for the complexity of political Islam, which “empowers and promotes the return of Muslim actors, ethics and aesthetics to the public sphere, the lifestyles of Muslim actors are correspondingly changing due to their encounter with modernized lifestyles” (Kılıçbay and Binark 2002, 499). Therefore, the authors argue, this new meaning is a testament for the complexity of “Islamic other” and evidence that “there is a compound relationship between the identity politics of Islamic communities and the global forces of consumerism and of market economics” (Kılıçbay and Binark 2002, 499). Similarly, Gökarıksel and Secor (2009, 6) argue, “Veiling-­fashion crystallizes a series of issues about Islamic identity, the transnational linkages of both producers and consumers, and the shifting boundaries between Islamic ethics and the imperatives of neoliberal capitalism.” In fact, they continue, What veiling-­fashion does is to reveal the sliding gap between the signifier (the veil) and its desired signification (Islamic womanhood). When the headlines cry, “From prayer to the catwalk”, the very impossibility of fixing the veil becomes a spectacle itself. With fashion, the already multivalent veil becomes, in Baudrillard’s conception, a free-­floating signifier. (Gökarıksel and Secor 2009, 15)

16   Theoretical framework Although this inclusion of the political economy dimension is welcome, the main focus of the literature remained limited to, for example, discourse, the identity constructions and reconstruction. The identity framework, which has dominated many disciplines over the last few decades and became the main theoretical framework applied to both Western and non-­Western contexts, has been criticized by scholars on various grounds (Elshtain 1995; Fraser 2000; Fraser and Honneth 2003; Nelson 2000; Benería 2003a; Mogdaham 2003; Pearson and Tomalin 2008). This book benefits from this body of literature while at the same time expanding on it, arguing that more attention to socio-­economic context would significantly enrich the analysis in a way that has been neglected for a while. This books’ critique of identity politics can be summarized as the following: (1) It pays attention to identity at the expense of the socio-­economic context; (2) it reduces the politics to a single secular/non-­secular dichotomy; and (3) it depicts Muslim societies or “the East” as completely distinct and separate from Western societies, or “the West.” Each point is discussed in detail below. First, although identity politics rightly articulates the need to be recognized and acknowledged by others, it fails to locate the discussion in a socio-­economic context. Sexual politics—such as the rights of gay, lesbian, and transsexual persons, the right to control one’s own body including abortion rights, the right to choose one’s clothing including the headscarf, and the right to keep one’s maiden name after marriage—are all part of the struggle for recognition in gender politics. While these issues are pressing and need to be pursued politically and legally, exclusive attention on the politics of recognition sidelines the (mal)distribution of economic power between men and women both in the labor market and at home (Fraser 2000; Fraser and Honneth 2003). Discussion and discourse analysis are not insignificant; rather, in most cases they simply come at the expense of the material, which much of the literature commonly does not mention. As Benería (2003a) notes, this type of analysis gained promises in parallel to “the resurgence of neoliberalism across countries and to the globalization of markets and of social and cultural life—generating rapid changes that need to be understood and acted upon” (Benería 2003a), yet manages to discuss identity politics as if it takes place in a vacuum. The problem, therefore, is “a growing imbalance between the urgent need to understand economic reality—since distribution is about social sharing of things material—and the more predominant focus on ‘words,’ including issues of difference, subjectivity, and representation” (Benería 2003a). Unfortunately, the exclusive focus on identity thus gives the mistaken impression that once legal and political recognition is achieved, the struggle for gender equality will largely be over. The reality is otherwise. The significance of this misguidance can be clearly discerned in the overwhelming attention given to the headscarf ban in Turkey, which was lifted in 2013 under the AKP’s third term, in the face of almost complete disregard of other conditions that were affecting the daily lives of men and women. Second, in parallel to the political developments since the 1990s, gender analyses tend to be made along a simple Islamist–secular dichotomy only. This

Theoretical framework   17 dichotomy is especially significant in countries, such as Turkey, which have experienced rapid secularization and Westernization. Indeed, the Islamist–secular tension was prominent in understanding certain types of political and social tension that arise at certain conjunctures, such as the tension along the secular– Islamist dichotomy during the 1990s. In particular, contemporary politics in Turkey cannot be understood without referring to the Islamist–secular tension. However, it is our conviction that although this dichotomy is significant, this is by no means the only process that shapes women’s lives. One of the interests of this book, for instance, is the division of labor in the market and at home, a process that deeply shapes women’s lives regardless of this dichotomy. This book pays attention to these often-­understudied processes in women’s lives. Third, another problem with identity politics also relates to how identities are conceptualized—that is, mostly as mutually exclusive, unchanging, and even essentialist. The focus on identity tends to exaggerate the cultural differences among societies, especially between Western and non-­Western ones, underestimating commonalities and ignoring emerging syntheses. This effect is particularly true for the conceptualization of Islamic identities in relation to the West. It is striking how many of the analyses in the literature conceptualize Islamic identities as distinct from and mutually exclusive of the Western identities, characterizing the Islamic ways of lives as parallel modernities. These studies portray the Islamic ways of life and ideologies as incompatible with Western ways and view them as developed in response to the Western modernization and Western economic and cultural systems. Undoubtedly, advocates and ideologues of these identities have an interest in promoting such identities as alternative or parallel modernities. However, a closer look at the actual practices of Islamist groups reveals significant convergence. For instance, Islamist hostility toward capitalism is no longer the case, at least for the Turkish Islamist movement within which the AKP emerged. Yalçın Akdoğan, one of the ideologues of the AKP and Erdogan’s close confidant, openly declared in the early 2000s that a new conservatism had recently adopted lassie faire economics and therefore largely overlapped with liberalism in opposing the welfare state and supporting a market economy, private property, and a limited state (Akdoğan 2003, 39–40). Cases in point are Islamist groups’ behaviors, ranging from consumption patterns to globalized capitalist ventures. If the conceptualization of Islamic and non-­Western identities as parallel and never meeting is not satisfactory, what other conceptualization might be provided? What convergence might be taking place between the neoliberalism and conservatism? What framework provides a better understanding of gender politics under the AKP rule? These questions may be answered by using the insights from the critical political economy. An exclusive focus on identity falls short in uncovering the intricacies as such since it considers only the peculiarity and specificity of the Islamic identity. In sum, the body of literature that exclusively focused on identity falls short of providing sufficient analyses, for the following reasons. First, the examination of identities came at the expense of other processes that we consider are of

18   Theoretical framework utmost importance, such as the production in the market and the reproduction at home, the gender division of labor, the global neoliberal process, etc. Second, analyses pay exclusive attention to the Islamist–secular tension while ignoring other processes. Third, the same body of literature tends to treat identities as mutually exclusive categories, as Western vs. Islamic, etc. Our approach proposed below neglects neither other processes nor the examinations of identities come at the expense of a socio-­economic context, and neither are identities defined in exclusive terms. As discussed below, the critical political economy engages in discursive analysis but does so with close attention to the processes of production and reproduction.

Critical political economy: An alternative approach The critical political economy—also called the feminist political economy— offers three main premises in comparison with the identity framework: (1) Unlike identity politics’ exclusive emphasis on the discursive, the political economy perspective focuses on the material that directly affects men’s and women’s daily lives; (2) it pays attention to both production (which mainly takes place in the market) and reproduction (which mainly takes place in the household); and (3) because it does not get caught in the analysis of cultural differences, it has the potential to provide an alternative conceptualization for the overlap of neoliberalism and conservatism, which is a main contribution of this book. Each point is explained in detail below. First, the political economy of gender starts with the premise that “gender is constituted not only in the realm of culture or ideology; it is also produced and reshaped in the material practices of ‘making a living.’ This construction, in turn, shapes the outcome of those practices” (Çağatay et al. 1995, 1827). Thus, the economic system and public policies that affect and shape these material practices are of great concern for the analysis. These might include specific economic principles, such as those of neoliberalism, that reinforce and enhance the wage gap—an issue that is more relevant to feminist economics than the discourse analysis of female interviewees who wear the headscarf and those who don’t. The former treats the material distribution of power as the main source of inequality and does not disaggregate women along their specific ways of life. The latter, however, considers such practices as the basis of the differences between the two. Our emphasis on the material practices finds its best expression in the words by Elson and Pearson (1981). They write that Although ideology plays a role, we would argue that the subordination of women as a gender cannot be understood simply as a matter of “patriarchal attitudes”. Rather it is a material process which goes on not just in our heads, but in our practices. In claiming that it is a material process we do not intend to reduce it to an economic process, to be analysed only in terms of labour; but rather to emphasize that it cannot be changed simply through

Theoretical framework   19 propaganda for more “enlightened” views, and that it requires practical changes in daily living. (Elson and Pearson 1981, 94) In other words, it is not that we believe that the discursive is insignificant, it is that the discursive must be accompanied with the material practices for changes to occur. Second, key to material practices is the distinction between the two types of activities, which are conceptualized as productive and reproductive. Productive activities generate income and mostly take place in the market (Çağatay et al. 1995, 1828). On the other hand, reproductive activities are unpaid responsibilities involving food preparation, cleaning, and household maintenance as well as the care and development of people, including children, the sick, and the elderly. In this sense, the critical political economy not only moves beyond what is discursive, to center its analysis on the material, but also expands its analysis beyond the “macroeconomic aggregates, public expenditure and revenue, public debt, GNP, the money supply” (Elson and Cağatay 2000, 1360). The critical political economy framework justifies this expansion of scope: It is not the real resources of a country which set the functioning limits to how much revenue a government can raise or how much it can borrow or how much it can spend … [What matters most] is the balance of social power, the pattern of social norms, the structure of social institutions, the degree of social consensus, the perceptions of the key players and the framework of market regulation that prevails, both nationally and internationally. (Elson and Cağatay 2000, 1360) With its focus on the material in the process of production and reproduction, the critical political economy of gender goes beyond prioritizing women’s access to formal employment, a focus of the liberal feminist perspective. The critical political economy insists that for gender equality, full employment policies must be accompanied by “entitlements for those in informal or part-­time paid work and entitlements for the providers of unpaid caring labor as citizens in their own right” (Elson and Çağatay 2000, 1155). The approach is therefore critical of the policies of neoliberal globalization, and not only because they limit formal employment opportunities through the creation of part-­time, low-­wage, low-­ status, and insecure jobs. Criticism also arises because of the policies’ prescriptions to reduce state-­based entitlements and replace them with market-­based, individualized ones that are available only to those who can afford them, leaving the rest in poverty and overwork (Elson and Çağatay 2000, 1155). Furthermore, the neoliberal restructuring has profound and harmful implications for women who provide the unpaid care within the Turkish context (Dedeoğlu 2002, 2012; Dayıoğlu 2008; Kümbetoğlu et al. 2010; İlkkaracan 2012; Toksöz 2016). Thus, the framework helps one understand and study the gender policies of the AKP by examining both production and reproduction. This study therefore pays

20   Theoretical framework p­ articular attention to this distinction when examining the three areas of employment, education, and health. Lastly, the critical political economy of gender attempts to develop a better conceptual framework by questioning that conservatism and neoliberalism are mutually exclusive ideologies. A premise of this study is that a conceptual framework could be developed to explain the overlaps and agreements between the two in a way that has not previously been considered. Some scholars regard the synthesis between open market economy and conservatism as “unusual” (Öniş 2009). Others see neoliberalism and Islamism as mutually exclusive: “By these indications, the ‘Islamist’ AKP has placed Turkey on the path to globalization, not Islamization … [O]ne does not see an Islamist faction, but rather a globalist, market-­oriented, pro-­ Western, and populist political party” (Dağı 2008, 29–30). Öniş and Keyman (2003) characterize the AKP’s ideology as a “third way”: third-­way thinking represents an alternative approach to modernization that sees the political order, the economic order, and the question of social justice (including minimal standards of social welfare, distributive fairness, and respect for cultural differences) as cooperating parts of a dynamic whole governed according to the principle of liberty under law. (Öniş and Keyman 2003, 97) These foundations of the political economy make it similar to the assumptions and premises of socialist feminism. Unlike socialist feminism, however, the critical political economy that this book proposes to develop does not exclusively focus on the material and completely ignore the discursive. Rather, the implications of Islamic identity and the discourses expressed by the top leadership are often discussed throughout the book, especially as they significantly contribute to the envisioning and reimagining of women during the AKP era. This is the main contribution of this book. We have to emphasize that the critical political economy approach is not free from weaknesses. First, the framework remains underdeveloped when it comes to class. How does class influence the system of reproduction, for instance? This is particularly evident in fundamentally different lives of upper-­class women who can subcontract the household responsibilities to other women and the lower-­class women who have to undertake both the low-­paying market employment as well as household responsibilities. Second, the relationship between the political economy forces and the identity (both religious and ethnic/racial) need to be further developed.

Neoliberalism and neoconservatism Neoliberalism can be defined in various ways. According to David Harvey (2005, 2), neoliberalism is a theory that claims that humanity can best advance “by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets,

Theoretical framework   21 and free trade.” The role of the state is limited to the provision of the legal and institutional framework that enables these practices. The state must create the markets if they do not exist. The state must also make sure that the private property is secured, the money is circulated freely and the defense of the country is guaranteed. Apart from these tasks, the role of the state should be minimum because any intervention would be disruptive to the natural system that occurs as a result of individuals pursuing their interests (Harvey 2005, 2). Dean (1999) compares the post-­World War  II mentality with the mentality that emerged in the late 1970s. After the war, Government was understood as an activity undertaken by the national welfare state acting as a unified body upon and in defence of a unitary domain, society. The purposes of this government were conceived as enframing society within mechanisms of security by which the state would care for the welfare of the population “from the cradle to the grave”. (Dean 1999, 150) Dean explains how this conceptualization of the state and the individual’s relationship to the state were transformed in the 1970s. Margaret Thatcher, for instance, argued that individuals need to take care of themselves rather than waiting to be taken care of by the government. Society, according to Thatcher, was nothing but a sum of individuals, so there was no such thing as a society, but only individuals. The examination of the body of literature on neoliberalism reveals that there are three main arguments about the origins of neoliberalism (Dados and Jonnell 2018). The first argument is that neoliberalism is a shift in the dominant ideology of capitalist society (Harvey 2005). The second is that neoliberalism is described as governmentality based on Foucaultian interpretation (Larner 2000). The final one is that neoliberalism is a series of economic policies and mechanisms applied since the 1980s, such as the free trade, deregulations, privatization and the like. When we examine the key figures and the institutions who contributed to the birth of neoliberal ideology, two dominant schools of thought stand out, namely The Chicago School and the Austrian School in economics. The notable members of the former school are Milton Friedman (1912–2006), George Stigler (1911–1991) and Gary Becker (1930–2014), while the main figures for the latter school include Friedrich Hayek (1899–1992) and Ludwig von Mises (1881–1973). There are significant theoretical differences between these schools, such as the measurement of capital and the underlying assumptions about the market economy. Yet these individuals, as the leading figures of neoliberal thought, agreed with each other that the welfare state was fundamentally flawed. The solutions they agreed constitute the foundations of neoliberal policies, namely deregulation, privatization, entrepreneurship, free trade and the like. When the main political figures of the neoliberal era, such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, came to power with the premise of applying these neoliberal policies,

22   Theoretical framework both the domestic and international institutions were filled with neoclassically-­ trained economists, although they subscribed to different factions of the neoclassical theory, such as the new classical school and the new Keynesians. These two factions within the neoclassical theory agreed with each other about the specific economic policies that characterized the neoliberal era. In other words, from the beginning, various interpretations of neoclassical theory were involved in the development and implementation of neoliberal principles. In essence, however, they shared three basic creeds of classical liberal ideology, namely, (1) humans are defined as selfish, rational, autonomous, and maximizing individuals; (2) laissez faire capitalism; (3) and the state’s power should be limited to the provision of national defense, justice and some public works (Hunt 2003). It is true that the relationship between neoliberalism and conservatism has been subjected to scholarly inquiry with respect to the Western context, particularly in response to the rising power of conservatism in the United States and the United Kingdom. The literature so far has not developed a detailed implication of this relationship for gender. One of these scholarly discussions belongs to David Harvey (2005), who starts by questioning the premises of neoclassical economics, the economic theory that the neoliberal ideology is based on. Harvey argues that the neoclassical distrust of the state is unjustified because “if necessary, coercive state will defend the rights of private property, individual liberties, and entrepreneurial freedoms” (Harvey 2005, 21). For Harvey, because conservatism favors “corporate power, private enterprise, and the restoration of class power” (Harvey 2005, 82), it is “entirely consistent with the neoliberal agenda of elite governance, mistrust of democracy, and the maintenance of market freedoms” (Harvey 2005, 82). However, Harvey maintains that the anarchy of the market, of competition, and of unbridled individualism (individual hopes, desires, anxieties, and fears; choices of lifestyles and sexual habits and orientation; modes of self-­expression and behaviors towards others) generates a situation that becomes increasingly ungovernable [leading conservatives to portray themselves as] an antidote to the chaos of individual interests [and] highlight threats, real or imagined, both at home and abroad, to the integrity and stability of the nation. (Harvey 2005, 82) In other words, in Harvey’s conceptualization, neoliberalism and neoconservatism are in essence not entirely different, and are distinguished only by the latter’s portrayal of itself—perhaps strategically—as a solution to the problems caused by the former. In fact, the neoliberalism and neoconservatism tend to coexist in many parts of the world, as discussed in Chapter 6. Wendy Brown (2006) examines the neoconservative and neoliberal trajectories within the context of the United States. Arguing that they are two distinct rationalities, Brown contends that they converge in their de-­democratization impacts in the United States:

Theoretical framework   23 Their respective devaluation of political liberty, equality, substantive citizenship, and the rule of law in favor of governance according to market criteria on the one side, and valorization of state power for putatively moral ends on the other, undermines both the culture and institutions of constitutional democracy. (Brown 2006, 690) Neoliberalism is salient because it is no longer only about the market; rather it is a “specific form of normative political reason organizing the political sphere, governance practices and citizenship” (Brown 2006, 692). Brown asks, How does a rationality that is expressly amoral at the level of both ends and means (neoliberalism) intersect with one that is expressly moral and regulatory (neoconservatism) [and] how does a project that empties the world of meaning, that cheapens and deracinates life and openly exploits desire, intersect one centered on fixing and enforcing meanings, conserving certain ways of life, and repressing and regulating desire?  (Brown 2006, 692) Brown argues that neoliberals and neoconservatives share many commonalities in that they are both statists: they support state regulation of morality, state steerage of the economy, and of course, building a mighty state military enterprise. However, for Brown, this synthesis, especially for the American context, undermines the principles of liberal democracy. Although these studies have discussed the areas of convergence between neoliberalism and neconservatism, the question of gender is left out. Melinda Cooper (2017) offers a more intimate relationship between neoliberalism and conservatism. Cooper argues that the family, rather than the individual, was always at the center of the neoliberal project within the American context. Cooper argues that neoliberals are particularly concerned about the enormous social costs that derive from the breakdown of the stable Fordist family: the costs that have been incurred, for example, by women who opt for no-­fault divorce, women who have children out of wedlock or those who engage in unprotected sex without private insurance, and the fact that these costs accrue to the government and taxpayer rather than the private family. (Cooper 2017, 9) Cooper continues that  If American welfare reform has been singularly focused on the question of marriage promotion and responsible family promotion in the past few decades, it is thanks to the ongoing collaboration between neoliberals and social conservatives on this point in particular. (Cooper 2017, 9)

24   Theoretical framework For the Turkish context, scholars have attempted to theorize the relationship between global neoliberalism and Islamic conservatism (Atasoy 2009; Coşar and Yeğenoğlu 2011; Dedeoğlu 2012; İlkkaracan 2012; Özbudun 2012; Acar and Altunok 2013; Moudouros 2014; Toksöz 2016; Korkut and Eslen-­Ziya 2017). This book develops a framework that benefits from this prior literature using the critical political economy and further builds on it. Specifically, the book asks how the critical economy sheds light on the synthesis between neoliberalism and conservatism, and attempts to provide a theoretical framework to illustrate the convergence. By adopting the interpretation of Harvey (2005), this book identifies the relationship between neoliberalism and conservatism as a mutually-­reinforcing relationship. By also using Islamism and Islamic conservatism interchangeably, we consider Islamic conservatism as mainly fed by the destructive effects of neoliberalism. This mutually-­reinforcing relationship between the two will be demonstrated in all policy-­areas this book will examine. The next section is an attempt to examine the relationship between the two by demonstrating the conceptualization of gender roles that they commonly share, a point of convergence. For this purpose, the discussion first centers on the gender conception of neoliberalism as revealed in the historical writings of the founders of neoclassical theory. These scholars include Francis Y. Edgeworth (1845–1926), Alfred Marshall (1842–1924), and W. Stanley Jevons (1835–1882). A further theory, developed by Gary Becker and constituting a theory of the household built on the foundations of neoclassical theory, is also included. This section will shed light on the theoretical roots of neoliberalism. Lastly, the section examines the conceptualization of gender by Islamic conservatism as understood by the AKP, highlighting the similarities and overlap with neoliberalism.

Theoretical roots of neoliberalism and gender The theoretical roots of neoliberalism go back to the dominant economic theory of today, neoclassical economics. Neoclassical theory (like classical liberal theory) starts with abstract individuals who are characterized as autonomous, rational, self­interested, and goal-­oriented. These individuals are basically homo economicus, whose main objective is to pursue their interests in a way to maximize their benefits and minimize their losses. Individuals perform best if no intervention is present, because intervention would limit their freedom and undermine their autonomy, whereas the lack of intervention allows them to acquire enough freedom to both pursue their individual interests and create a harmonious society. Put differently, a natural order will emerge that is best for both individuals and society as a whole if individuals are left alone to pursue their interests. This justification for economic liberalism is theorized by neoclassical theory, beginning from the late nineteenth century onward. Mostly by using equations and quantitative data, neoclassical economics advocates certain economic policies, such as the privatization, deregulation, and reduced public services, and assigns a greater role to private enterprise. The proponents of neoliberal

Theoretical framework   25 g­ lobalism have advocated that this rationale be applied to all aspects of life, including the politics, social relations, culture, and personal affairs. Historically, the neoliberal rationale emerged in the UK and the US during the 1970s and it has spread to the rest of the world since then. The founders of neoclassical economics, who included Francis Y. Edgeworth, Alfred Marshall and W. Stanley Jevons, drew scholarly attention away from production and distribution (an emphasis existing in the works of classical economists such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill) and directed it to exchange and consumption. The neoclassical economists were interested in creating a scientific field of economics, believing that the market operates according to a set of universal and unchanging principles driven by human selfishness. They championed the market economy and lived by the credo of “free trade.” Edgeworth insisted on establishing a scientific approach by applying statistics to economics, showing the utility functions in numbers; Jevons insisted that the value of a product comes directly from its utility rather than the labor embedded in it (as the theory of labor previously claimed); and Marshall contributed to the elaboration of the utility theory as an alternative to the theory of labor. How can an economic theory that takes individual freedom and autonomy as the starting point be gender-­biased rather than gender-­neutral? Although neoclassical theory makes no mention of gender and refers only to abstract individuals, gender bias can become apparent through the examination of the theory’s assumptions and arguments, as critics have commonly noted (England and Kilbourne 1990; Benería 2003b; England 2003; Pujol 1992, 1995; Nelson 2003). Critics express their disapproval of the theory’s characterization of individuals as autonomous and independent, arguing that the social and interdependent aspects of life, such as that most women engage in unpaid work, are commonly ignored. Furthermore, they criticize the theory for ignoring the cultural practices and sexist biases that keep women out of leadership positions, political office, and traditionally male professions, making the lower status of women look like a choice. They also address conflicts of interests within the family, which the theory treats as a bastion of solidarity and selflessness. Critics also note that the theory is detached from history, since gender relations and markets are the products of specific historical processes (Benería 2003b). The discussion below particularly focuses on the founders of neoclassical theory, who were quite forthcoming about their conceptualization by openly and explicitly discussing the “proper” gender roles in the market and at home. A close reading of their work finds the following arguments repeated.2 1 2 3

That men and women are fundamentally different from each other. That women’s primary domain of activity should be confined to the home. That a natural division of labor exists between men and women (and attempts to change it might be detrimental).

Each point will be discussed before demonstrating the commonalities with the Islamic conservatism.

26   Theoretical framework 1  Men and women are fundamentally different Francis Y. Edgeworth asks in his famous essay of 1922, “should men and women receive equal pay for equal work?” (Edgeworth 1922, 431). Edgeworth answers his own question by adversely arguing that the work of men and women can never be equal, either qualitatively or quantitatively. Edgeworth argues “the actual value of a woman as a worker was about 30 per cent,” a number not clear as to how it was calculated (Edgeworth 1923, 440). The “minimum of requirements for efficiency of actual as distinct from conventional necessaries,” writes Edgeworth (1922, 436), “is less for a woman than a man.” In other words, according to Edgeworth, women are not as efficient, a fact that is already known by the market. Furthermore, Edgeworth argues that men’s wages should be more than women’s because men have to support their families: “the woman worker has not acquired by custom and tradition the same unwillingness to work for less than will support a family, the same determination to stand out against a reduction of wages below that standard” (Edgeworth 1922, 436). Thus, men are determined to resist lower wages, an attribute that women lack because women are also not as organized: “Men, being generally better organized than women, have exercised an unsymmetrical pressure on the employer to their own advantage” (Edgeworth 1922, 438). At times, Edgeworth (1923) also accuses men of being responsible for the concentration of women in certain low-­paid jobs: “The pressure of male trade unions appears to be largely responsible for that crowding of women into a comparatively few occupations, which is universally recognized as a main factor in the depression of their wages” (Edgeworth 1923, 449). However, Edgeworth assures women that they have nothing to fear because the market that he praises so much can effectively employ their “smaller hands”: “Superiority is claimed for them, too, in typewriting and in telephoning” (Edgeworth 1923, 442). Because of these fundamental differences between men and women, competition, which Edgeworth staunchly believes in, is strongly discouraged between men and women. Edgeworth strongly opposes regulations such as those imposing that the earnings of men and women should be the same, stating that these “could not be maintained without tyranny of a Russian scale” (Edgeworth 1923, 440). One can find a similar division of labor between men and women in Marshall’s writings. When calculating the cost of production in his famous book, originally published in 1890, Alfred Marshall warns that efficiency must be taken as part of the broader problem of the cost of production of efficient men together with the women who are fitted to make their homes happy, and to bring up their children vigorous in body and mind, truthful and cleanly, gentle and brave. (Marshall 1920, 325) These examples from Edgeworth and Marshall indicate that the founders of neoclassical economy shared a biological understanding of gender—that is, a belief that the gender differences in the labor market, such as lower wages for

Theoretical framework   27 women, gender segregation, and the like, are a direct and natural outcome of the physical differences between men and women. Women therefore seem to be operating outside the rules of the market where, they believe, all individuals act the same under all conditions. However, their arguments about gender at the same time make an exception. The fundamental (and biological) differences between men and women for them make the traditional division of labor at home and in the labor market natural, justified, and indispensable. 2  Women’s primary domain of activity should be the home A natural extension of the first argument, that men and women are fundamentally different, is that women (mostly owing to their biology) are not equipped for the labor market; rather, they are by nature equipped for the home, which should be their primary domain of activity. Edgeworth (1923) justifies exempting women from the rules of the market economy by often referring to the physical differences, such as women being not as strong and efficient as men. Furthermore, Edgeworth argues that women make unreliable workers in the labor market. “For a woman, unlike a man, it is viable to go off and get married just as she is beginning to become of use” (Edgeworth 1923, 444). Edgeworth’s wholehearted commitment to free competition is marred by his staunch opposition to equal pay for women. Equal pay is not good for families because low-­paid women would replace high-­paid men, which would be disastrous for the families (Edgeworth 1923, 493). Other champions of competition, like Marshall and Jevons, share the same contradiction. Edgeworth also favors those barriers against the entrance of women workers into certain occupations [since they] appear to subserve the purpose of preventing the debacle, ultimately ruinous alike to wealth and family life, which the hasty substitution of low-­paid female operatives for well-­paid men threatens to bring about. (Edgeworth 1923, 493) Jevons (1883) goes so far as to argue that “child-­bearing women” should be excluded from the labor market. In defense of his argument, Jevons refers to “the mass of misery, and, especially, the infinite, irreparable wrong to helpless children, which is involved in the mother’s employment at the mills” (Jevons 1883, 157). Jevons admits that this exclusion cannot apply to all women since some of them have to support their families, but it “is the class ‘child-­bearing women,’ that legislation must deal with, if at all” (Jevons 1883, 161). He goes so far as to advocate legislation to exclude women from work. Otherwise, Jevons argues, “It seems impossible, then, not to concede that the employment of child-­bearing women leads to great abuses; and when these abuses reach a certain point, they may become all that is needed to warrant legislation” (Jevons 1883, 172). In the writings of the founders, women appear to be “natural housewives”; their work outside the home (if any) is and should be auxiliary to their primary

28   Theoretical framework responsibilities at home. Edgeworth (1922) further warns that women in the workforce would bring wages down, which in turn hurts the entire society because men are providers. Marshall (1920) and Jevons (1883) express concern that women’s employment will affect household duties and infant mortality rates. In his examination of the different infant mortality rates of various cities in the UK, Jevons concludes that “the remarkable differences in regard to mortality which the great towns exhibit” are due to “the employment of child-­bearing women away from home” (Jevons 1883, 159). The ideal division of labor is the traditional one: men working full-­time outside the home and women working full-­time within the home. This arrangement provides the optimal utility to the family. In Marshall’s meticulous calculations of the wealth of a nation, the unpaid labor of women is ignored and does not matter unless “the carpet is cleaned by domestic servants or at steam scouring works” (Marshall 1920, 54). Although he admits the inconsistency of this omission, he endorses this anyway. Women should not work outside home; if they must, then the wages should be lower. Edgeworth, in his famous essay of 1923 titled “Women’s Wages in Relation to Economic Welfare,” discusses what women’s and men’s wages should be so that the optimum welfare is produced in a society. It will be remembered that the presumption in favour of equal pay to men and women encountered the objection that the bulk of men are subject to a charge from which the bulk of women are exempt, the support of families. (Edgeworth 1920, 493) In his objection to equal pay for equal work, Edgeworth argued and objected women’s entry into certain industries. 3  There exists a natural order between men and women (and attempts to change it might be detrimental) That the traditional patriarchal division of power between men and women refers to a natural order in the gender relations is often repeated by the founders of neoliberalism, some of whom consider women’s labor market participation to be threatening and to hold severe consequences for national welfare and household utility. In other words, any attempts to change this divine-­like order will face significant consequences. These theorists apply a biological concept of gender, which holds that women and men should be subscribed to different social roles owing to their biological differences (and the resulting gender differences). Edgeworth (1923) discusses this point, referring to the danger of “the degradation of labour” that is “aggravated by the competition for women” (Edgeworth 1923, 451). Edgeworth adds that even the “endowment of motherhood would not suffice to remove this danger” (Edgeworth 1923, 451) and insists that this natural order should not be subject to revisions and modifications based on the changing social roles: “it may be objected that men, freed from the obligation of supporting a family, would no longer have a reason for not

Theoretical framework   29 c­ ompeting á l’outrance with equally free women” (Edgeworth 1923, 451). However, Edgeworth adds, “they might not have any reason; but they would surely long retain the habit, the ‘social custom’ ” (Edgeworth 1923, 451). Edgeworth notes that his warnings are real: “It should be remembered, however, that many of the prohibitions and prejudices here mentioned as contravening fee competition were adapted to avert that catastrophic competition” (Edgeworth 1923, 440). The argument about the degradation of labor is also made by Alfred Marshall in his chief work, Principles of Economics, originally published in 1890: If we compare one country of the civilized world with another, or one part of England with another, or one trade in England with another, we find that the degradation of the working-­classes varies almost uniformly with the amount of rough work done by women. The most valuable of all capital is that invested in human beings; and of that capital the most precious part is the result of the care and influence of the mother, so long as she retains her tender and unselfish instincts, and has not been hardened by the strain and stress of unfeminine work. (Marshall 1920, 324–325) Marshall identifies women as exceptions to the abstract individuals who are selfish and goal-­oriented, which he championed throughout his career. For Marshall, women’s work outside the home paves the way for them to lose their “tender and unselfish instincts.” Marshall (1920) finds the same danger in the rising wages for women, which he calls a great gain in so far as it tends to develop their faculties; but an injury in so far as it tempts them to neglect their duty of building up a true home, and of investing their efforts in the personal capital of their children’s character and abilities. (Marshall 1920, 393) Here, the employment of women outside the home hurts not only themselves but also their families and entire societies. Marshall states that the  family is, in the main, a single unit as regards geographical migration: and therefore the wages of men are relatively high, and those of women and children low where heavy iron or other industries preponderate, while in some other districts less than half the money income of the family is earned by the father, and men’s wages are relatively low. (Marshall 1920, 609) Marshall endorses such “natural adjustment” against the minimum wage (Marshall 1920, 609), and implies that there are significant consequences if this natural order is not followed:

30   Theoretical framework The higher wages, the greater intelligence, and the better medical facilities of townspeople should cause infant mortality to be much lower among them than in the country. But it is generally higher, especially where there are many mothers who neglect their family duties in order to earn money wages. (Marshall 1920, 115) The founders of neoclassical economics are not the first nor the last nor the only theorists to write with what Pujol (1995, 17) calls “patriarchal condescension.” Yet, the implementation of the neoclassical theory’s basic premises has widely become a common practice and the economic policies based on these principles have spread to the world since the 1980s thanks to neoliberalism.

Contemporary neoliberalism and the gender predicament Apart from the founders’ explicit references to men and women, much of economic theory actually remained silent on gender, arguing that the assumptions for the abstract individuals are applicable across men and women. However, for the highly abstract individual and his society to work, there seem to be other requirements that are never discussed. As England (2003, 45) put it, “even the rugged ‘autonomous’ individuals valorized in liberal economic and political theory would seem to require a selfless altruist to take care of their dependency needs when they are very young, very old, sick, or disabled.” However, women and their work at home remained invisible until Becker not only acknowledged women’s invisible work at home but also justified the traditional gender division of labor as the optimal and most rational decision for the family (Becker 1973, 1974, 1976, 1981). Becker’s “new home economics” is an attempt to illustrate the universality of homo economicus by extending its focus to the family, a traditionally neglected topic within neoclassical economics. Becker adds the household to market discussions by arguing that utility “depends directly not on the goods and services purchases in the market place, but on the commodities produced ‘by’ each household” (Becker 1973, 816). These commodities “include the quality of meals, the quality and quantity of children, prestige, recreation, companionship, love, and health status” (Becker 1973, 816). Marriage occurs because both spouses increase their utility (Becker 1973, 816). Becker argues that the extensive specialization and division of labour in households, especially between women who bear and raise children and men who participate in the market sector, encourages shirking of responsibilities and other efforts to improve own wellbeing at the expense of other members. (Becker 1981, 10)  The ruthlessly selfish individuals in the markets turn into selfless altruists within the family. According to Becker,

Theoretical framework   31 Since an altruist and his beneficiaries maximize family income and do not shirk their responsibilities or otherwise increase their wellbeing at the expense of others, altruism encourages the division of labour and efficient allocation of resources in families … I believe that altruism is less common in market transactions and more common in families because altruism is less “efficient” in the market place and more “efficient” in families. (Becker 1981, 10) Everybody is an altruist within the family—men, women, and children—since this is the best strategy for them. There is solidarity among family members. Becker finds no problem with an unequal distribution of power within the family, nor does he discuss the implications of this unequal distribution of power in the case of divorce. Unequal distribution does not seem to be a rational outcome for women, but Becker still considers it rational because “[b]eneficiaries of his altruism consider all indirect as well as direct effects of their behavior on his own consumption” (Becker 1976, 821). Seeking employment is not an individual decision for women; their wages are low and their specialization is housework. Working outside is a non-­optimal use of their abilities and not optimal for the family (then men have to compensate for the housework women no longer perform; they are not as efficient, work takes more time, children suffer, they all suffer). Contemporary neoliberalism has evolved into a set of principles that result in complex and sometimes contradictory outcomes for women. Unlike the founders of the neoclassical theory, contemporary neoliberalism as globally implemented by most of the countries in the world, does not exclude women from the labor market. Rather, As Benería et al. (2000, ix) put it, “The resurgence of neoliberal economics has been one driving force behind the rapid integration of countries into the global economy, the unprecedented extension of markets, and the deepening of capitalist relations on a global scale” and “the processes of globalization operate through gendered institutions and structures of the economy and thereby affect the lives and well-­being of women, men, and their families” (Benería et al. 2000, vii). Benería et al. (2015) summarizes the complex and at times contradictory outcomes of neoliberalization on women. The neoliberal process is characterized by the internationalization of production, factory employment, outsourcing, and subcontracting. Accordingly, women’s entry into the paid labor force is influenced by the strength of demand for their labor as well the nature of gender norms. These norms are shaped by a number of factors, such as “culture, class, caste, ethnicity, religious group, and life cycle stage, so that women’s wage labor participation can lead to differential effects on women’s bargaining power and gender relations in the household” (Benería et al. 2015, 124). These various impacts can be summarized as the liberating effect, intensifying effect and the effect of reconstituting gender inequities. The liberating impact refers to the ability to be economically independent for women so that they can defend and pursue their interests. This might release women from constraints of patriarchal relations. The intensifying effect means the intensifying

32   Theoretical framework of patriarchal relations as a result of women’s participation in labor work. These practices include ones that hierarchically place men and women at work and place women under the control of male supervisors. Or, in some cases, women have to give their earnings to their husbands and families. Furthermore, women’s participation in the labor market does not necessarily decrease their household responsibilities, leading to “double work.” Women’s working outside home also might mean sexual harassment in the workplace (Benería et al. 2015, 127–129). Lastly, women’s paid work could lead to new forms of inequality. Dependence on paid work might make women more vulnerable to the income they receive and therefore might cause them to accept jobs that are not desirable. In sum, neoliberal globalization has not been gender-­neutral, leading to new forms of gender inequalities in some cases, and reinforcing the old ones, in others. Undoubtedly, neoliberal globalization has expanded employment opportunities for many women. In her study on small-­scale, family-­centered and export-­ oriented factories in Taiwan, Hsiung (1996) demonstrates how the Taiwanese development policy drew married women’s productive and reproductive labor. These women, as promoted by the Taiwanese government “were expected to be pretty women, lovely wives, responsible mothers, and diligent workers” (Hsiung 1996, 145). This is the principle of Living Room as Factories, as Hsiung’s book is entitled. Hsiung demonstrates how these family-­based small factories exploit women as a result of the patriarchal order and the operation of capitalism; however, “the workers are neither naïve nor passive about the exploitative aspect of their relationship with the owners” (Hsiung 1996, 148). Similarly, Berik’s (1987) study on women carpet weavers in rural Turkey demonstrates how female workers are caught between the requirements of their jobs and their social roles, as mothers and daughters. In their article about the employment of women in the service sector in the developing world, Elson and Pearson (1981) shed light on the belief that women “naturally” fit into certain jobs: Women are considered not only to have naturally nimble fingers, but also to be naturally more docile and willing to accept tough work discipline, and naturally less inclined to join trade unions, than men; and to be naturally more suited to tedious, repetitious, monotonous work. Their lower wages are attributed to their secondary status in the labour market which is seen as a natural consequences of their capacity to bear children. The fact only young women work in world market factories is also rationalized as an effect of their capacity to bear children—this naturally means they will be either unwilling or unable to continue in employment much beyond their early twenties. Indeed the phenomenon of women leaving employment in the factory when they get married or pregnant is known as “natural wastage”, and can be highly advantageous to firms which periodically need to vary the size of their labour force so as to adjust to fluctuating demand for their output in the world market. (Elson and Pearson 1981, 93)

Theoretical framework   33 Elson and Pearson (1981, 93) argue that “to a large extent, women do not do ‘unskilled’ jobs because they are the bearers of inferior labour; rather the jobs they do are ‘unskilled’ because women enter them already determined as inferior bearers of labour.” Undoubtedly, these less-­than-minimum wage paying jobs created by the neoliberal policies do open some doors to women who otherwise would have had no access to money. However, the types of jobs they end up working in, do not provide them with the opportunity to fundamentally alter the patriarchal relations. Instead, in many cases, the neoliberal globalization reinforces women’s secondary position by employing them in low-­paying, low-­status, part-­time, and no-­benefit jobs, that are often referred to as “flexible jobs.” Critics of neoliberalism have noted that men and women have been positioned differently with respect to the transformation caused by neoliberal globalization. The literature has extensive discussions of the concentration of women’s work in caring and nurturing and otherwise unpaid work (Folbre 1994). In the market, women have mostly concentrated in the service sector, while at home they almost exclusively carry the burden of household responsibilities, which in some cases extends to the elder care provided to family members. In sum, although the body of literature since the 1980s has demonstrated that the markets might have positive impacts on women’s lives, such as giving women the material power to challenge patriarchal traditions, critics also note that “on the cultural side, it can accelerate the diffusion of both ‘liberating’ and ‘sexist’ practices” (Benería 1999, 73). In the Turkish case, women were mostly traditionally employed in the agricultural sector. The garment industry, largely dominated by women, became the engine of the open economy in the 1980s. Despite their central role in this export-­oriented economy, women remained largely “invisible” in official numbers because of their employment in the informal economy and family-­owned businesses, a trend accelerated during the AKP era (Cağatay and Berik 1990; Toksöz 2007, 2016; Dedeoğlu 2012). Women’s employment will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

Neoliberalism in Turkey The balance of payment problems that Turkey faced during the 1970s was an early sign that the import-­substitution industrialization that the country long pursued was no longer viable. Turgut Özal, educated as an engineer in the United States and who previously worked at the World Bank, was appointed as an undersecretary in 1979 and played a key role in developing the economic reform program known as 24 Ocak Kararları (January 24th Decisions) of 1980. The reform package advocated devaluation and privatization, lowered the subsidies in agriculture and transportation, and loosened the trade barriers. Thus, one of the first policies was to remove some of the barriers on imports. Then, the value of Turkish lira was let to fluctuate against the dollar on a daily basis, which resulted in a 32 percent devaluation of the Turkish lira overnight, bringing one dollar to the equivalent of 70 Turkish lira (“Devalüasyon” 1980). These policies

34   Theoretical framework marked the end of the import-­substitution industrialization and the beginning of neoliberalization coupled with export-­led growth policies in certain sectors. In the meantime, a bloody confrontation between the right-­wing and left-­wing groups was taking place, claiming thousands of lives. Against this background, the military launched a coup on September 12, 1980. The full implementation of neoliberal policies took place under the 1980 coup regime, which remained in power for three years. The 1980s were therefore marked with the implementation of neoliberal policies one after another, particularly the massive privatization of the public enterprises (“Devalüasyonu Zamlar İzliyor” 1980). The last major step of the neoliberalization process of the 1980s was the liberalization of capital account. This allowed free movement of financial assets in and out of the country. The process of neoliberalization was closely scrutinized by the IMF and the World Bank and continued for the next 30 years regardless of the ideologies of the political parties that came to power—most of which were right-­wing parties who wholeheartedly supported these ideologies anyway. The neoliberal policies implemented during the 1980s were mostly economic in character and had not made any institutional changes yet. However, high unemployment and low wages resulting from the implementation of these policies led to political discontent. Coalition governments of the 1990s and the populist policies they implemented are manifestations of this discontent. These governments did not last long and, as a result, failed to adopt necessary institutional changes. The 1990s also witnessed the first financial crisis in 1994, followed by the one in 2000–2001. The latter crisis brought Kemal Derviş, then one of the World Bank’s chief economists. Derviş laid out the necessary institutional changes to further deepen neoliberalism, commonly referred to as “good governance practices.” The implementation of the Derviş plan concerning “good governance” was materialized thanks to the AKP’s majority government formed in 2002. As mentioned above, on the day it was founded, the party had declared its commitment to neoliberal policies. As expected, one of the major reforms the AKP first adopted was the public administration reform—decentralization—in line with the IMF, World Bank and the EU. Again, as requested by the international and supra-­national institutions, the public procurement law was passed to allow transparency and prevent corruption. Furthermore, reforms in the healthcare system as well as the pension system were also materialized during the AKP era. These examples of institutional changes are a testament to the final phase of neoliberal transformation in Turkey.

AKP’s Islamic conservatism and gender The claim that Islam constitutes a major explanatory variable in Muslim women’s lives is a controversial but long-­standing allegation. Some argue that Islam is inherently oppressive, thereby laying the foundation for many discriminatory clauses and practices common in the Muslim world. Believing that all monotheistic religious texts are oppressive to women, Winter (2001, 12), for

Theoretical framework   35 instance, argues that “even if the occasional verse or liberal interpretation thereof may offer women some protection against disinheritance or male violence.” Others criticize this body of scholarship, often referred to as “orientalist.” Lazreg (1988, 84) sees Islam “as a self-­contained and flawed belief system impervious to change” and states that “the academic work on women’s work on Middle Eastern and North African women is dominated by the religion/tradition paradigm.” Consequently, Lazreg (1988, 85) argues that the orientalist view is flawed because it holds that “like tradition, religion must be abandoned if Middle Eastern women are to be like Western women.” In response to those who view Islam as inherently oppressive to women, another group of scholars (Cooke 2001; Mernissi 1991; Ahmed 1992) addressed the positive aspects of Islam that they believed significantly improved women’s lives compared with the pre-­Islamic period. As an example, Ahmed (1992) argues that Islam emerged in a region where highly patriarchal and misogynistic practices predominated and that Islam advanced women’s positions in certain aspects while limiting women in other aspects. Ahmed distinguishes between ethical and establishment Islam, the former of which is egalitarian while the latter is highly hierarchical and sexist, and argues that ethical Islam was silenced during the Abbasid period (759–1258), when a highly misogynistic male elite monopolized the interpretation of Islam. “Had the ethical voice of Islam been heard,” Ahmed argues, “it would have significantly tempered the extreme androcentric bias of the law, and we might today have a far more humane and egalitarian law regarding women” (Ahmed 1992, 88). Ahmed holds that the colonial experience and its ostensible concern with the liberation of Muslim women adopted the “oppressed Muslim women” discourse merely to justify its imperialist policies. To get out of this trap of “oppressive Islam” and the establishment’s misogynistic and sexist interpretation as well as Islamism, which “would institute authoritarian theocratic states that would undoubtedly have a devastatingly negative effect on women” (Ahmed 1992, 231), Ahmed proposes an indigenous feminist discourse that is embedded in Islam. In addition to examining the historical trajectory of discourses on women, this body of literature also often engages in theological discussions by examining Qur’an and hadith (deeds and sayings of the Prophet Mohammad) to identify gender discourses and discuss their relevance for today. Regardless of the diversity of arguments, regardless of their inclination to consider Islam oppressive or liberating, the common feature of this body of literature is the enormous magnitude that it gives to Islam in determining women’s lives. This book does not engage in theological debate, nor does it discuss Islam in abstract terms as a major determinant of women’s lives independent from the political context. The enormous diversity of Muslim women’s lives is a testament to the insufficiency of assigning Islam a role as a constant and independent variable. As Moghadam (2003) argues, Muslim societies (just like others) do change over time and show great variation among themselves, illustrating that “the status of women in Muslim societies is neither uniform nor unchanging nor unique” (Moghadam 2003, 6). This perception does not imply that Islam, or

36   Theoretical framework r­ eligion in general, is irrelevant to women’s lives. Rather, it means that “it is less central or problematical than it is often made out to be” once one takes into account the broader political, social, and economic context within which Islam is practiced, interpreted, and experienced (Moghadam 2003, 8). Instead of engaging in debate on Islam, this book starts by distinguishing between Islam, a religion, and Islamic conservatism, a political movement (Moghadam 2001). This book explores how the AKP’s understanding of Islam has been used to legitimize state policies, daily practices, and statements, rather than arguing that conservatism is an essential characteristic of Islam. An examination of the AKP’s gender understanding is necessary to understand the rationale behind its policies as well as to highlight the overlap with the neoliberal conceptualization of gender. This conceptualization is not uniform and has many sources. Furthermore, the Islamic conservatism that the AKP represents lacks an ideologue that one can examine. Therefore, the relationship between the AKP’s Islamic conservatism and gender is examined through party documents, the organizational structure of the party, and the statements of its leaders. The examination of these three sources aims to demonstrate to what extent they share the traditional assumptions about the societal roles for men and women: Men and women are fundamentally different; women’s primary domain is the home; there is a natural order between men and women and attempts to change this natural order would be detrimental for the society. The AKP’s main documents, including the founding documents, by-­laws, party visions and election statements, depict an understanding in which men and women are compartmentalized in separate worlds. A typical party document makes no mention of men or women. Although this absence might give the (false) impression that these documents are gender-­neutral and address the concerns and problems of both men and women, a closer reading reveals that these documents actually address only men and their domains. Indeed, women are systematically mentioned in other sections, such as women, family, or society. For instance, the only place where women were explicitly mentioned in the by-­laws is the place where the women’s branches (discussed below in detail) are explicitly classified under the category of “subsidiary.” The program states that “the grades of the Party’s organization also include women and youth branches as well as other subsidiaries and foreign liaison offices” (AKP’s By-­Laws 2012, 18). Similarly, another document that discusses the AKP’s future vision mentions women only in the section of “family” (AKP’s 2023 Political Vision 2012, 32). Overall, the main party activities and the programs seem to be reserved as a male domain; women’s domains are confined to their homes or the domestic sphere. In a similar fashion, the Party Program makes no mention of women with the exception of stating that “Universal standards for rights and freedoms of women, children and labor shall be fully implemented in our country” (AKP Program n.d.). This progressive statement is overshadowed by the contents of the other sections, namely “women” and “family.” The section on women starts by stating that women should be considered individuals, followed by the second part of the

Theoretical framework   37 sentence that qualifies the first: “Not because women make up half of our population, they should be considered as individuals before everything else primarily effective for the raising of healthy generations.” In other words, considering women as individuals is not inherently good; rather, that consideration is an instrumental objective for enabling them to raise healthy generations. The same section then goes on to list “women’s problems” and promises to take measures to solve them. These problems include the limited participation of women in public life, honor killings, sexual and economic exploitation of women, gender discrimination of all forms, and so on, which are ironically considered “women’s problems” rather than problems of the society as a whole. The next section on family adopts a protective tone toward women, promising to protect them from domestic violence and promising public services targeting women. Again, the ideas that women and men are indeed different and that women’s domain is primarily the home are implicitly embedded in various sections of the Party Program. Women’s branches provide the quintessential example of the gendered party organization at the AKP and another testament of assigning separate and hierarchical domains for men and women. The active role of women in Islamist politics (Arat 2005) and the AKP’s women’s branches have been previously discussed (Çavdar 2010). However, a brief review of the AKP’s women’s branches is significant for shedding light on how the party organization creates segregated gendered spaces and reinforces the view that men and women are different and therefore engage in separate and hierarchical activities. AKP’s women’s branches are self-­promoted as the largest women’s organizations in the world and are a product of creating a parallel party organization exclusively for women. As the main party organization throughout the country is overwhelmingly male-­dominated, a separate parallel organization called women’s branches exists just for women. Just like the main party, women’s branches are organized at national, regional, and local levels, aiming to have women mobilize women. Reaching female voters and recruiting volunteers and new members for the party constitute the main areas of activity for the women’s branches. Despite the crucial role they play in reaching other women, the status of the women’s branches within the main party organization is auxiliary, or as the party program states, “subsidiary,” along with the “youth organizations.” This standing is clear in the hierarchical order within the party organization. The head of the women’s branches is now allowed to serve in the main decision-­ making mechanisms of the party, but only as a non-­voting ex officio. Statements of party leaders shed light on the AKP’s gender vision with more explicit language. The statements also demonstrate the party’s strong resistance to redefining men’s and women’s domains or revising the idea of a natural order, and reveal that any attempts at such a redefinition would be dangerous and unacceptable. A notable example of this has been articulated repeatedly by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. At a summit on women and justice, Erdoğan criticized efforts to make men and women equal, arguing that they can never be equal because their natures differ fundamentally (“Kadın ve Erkeği” 2014). Instead of equality,

38   Theoretical framework complementarity offers a better objective, Erdoğan argued. In the same speech, Erdoğan criticized domestic violence against women and argued that a pious, good Muslim should never resort to violence against women. In his argument, Erdoğan invoked the idea of a natural order that is impossible to overcome. Starting with the fact that women can bear children and nurse their babies while men cannot, Erdoğan moved from this natural difference, which nobody would dispute, to reach questionable conclusions concerning social roles that are socially constructed, and he criticized feminist efforts to achieve gender equality. In another meeting on women, Erdoğan articulated similar views about complementarity (“Kadın ve Erkeğin Eşit Olması Mümkün Değil” 2010), criticizing those who “exploit the idea of equality” and arguing that the AKP prioritizes motherhood because women are better at giving compassion, something fathers cannot do. “It is not a coincidence that heaven was laid beneath the feet of mothers”—a reference to a famous saying attributed to the Prophet Mohammad. Undoubtedly, neither the AKP’s understanding of gender in general nor Erdoğan’s understanding in particular is representative of all conservative views in the country. Importantly, conservative women’s views have changed significantly over time through constant revision of their interpretation of Islam and their ideal society Examination of the conservative movement reveals that women are no longer interested in living a life confined to the home and do not think that talking with men is sinful, nor do they consider themselves as only mothers but instead would like to participate in public life and hold jobs (Eraslan 2004). Thus, the AKP’s understanding of gender should not suggest that the conservative views of gender are homogeneous or constant and therefore congruent with the implicit and explicit gender bias of neoliberalism. Details of the AKP’s construction of gender and how it differs from the previous periods are examined in detail in Chapter 2.

Data and method This book relies on both qualitative and quantitative data collected during fieldwork in 2013 and 2014. Interviews constitute a major source of the qualitative data, and interviewees were primarily experts ranging from technocrats to academics. Many civil society organizations, including labor unions, faith-­based organizations, and women’s organizations, were visited and further interviews were held with activists. The headquarters of the AKP as well as the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi—CHP) were visited along with their libraries. The libraries included the Library of the Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East (Türkiye ve Ortadoğu Amme İdaresi), Bilkent University Library, the National Library (Milli Kütüphane), and the libraries of the AKP and the CHP headquarters. Also, a large number of periodicals and newspapers were reviewed. The research uses sources in both Turkish and English as well as a small number of documents in the Ottoman language, which were utilized for the chapter on education. Among the ministries visited were the

Theoretical framework   39 Ministry of Family and Social Policy, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health. In sum, the qualitative data included books, articles, and newspapers serving as secondary sources to support a rich variety of primary sources. A unique characteristic of this research is the type of quantitative data employed. Among researchers, the TÜİK’s Household Budget Surveys and Labor Force Surveys are the most commonly used surveys. The key official figures for determining basic social and economic indicators, such as employment, unemployment, and literacy rates, are mainly based on these surveys. Some results of these surveys are available online, providing easy access to researchers inside and outside Turkey. However, the publicly available information is in aggregated summary form. In addition, a major difficulty with using the TÜİK’s survey data is the ever-­changing content of definitions and categories, which significantly impedes accurate and meaningful examination of the panel data. For these reasons, instead of relying on publicly available summarized aggregate data, this research utilizes the raw, individual-­level data of TÜİK’s Household Budget Survey Micro Data and Household Labor Force Survey Micro Data from 2002 to 2014. The raw data are typically not available to researchers who mostly use the aggregate data prepared by TÜİK. We obtained the data through personal connections established during the fieldwork. Working with the raw data is an extremely time-­consuming endeavor, requiring the investment of many hours to prepare the data for analysis in the areas of employment, education, and health. However, the outcome of this method was much more detailed and interesting than the aggregate data could possibly provide.

Notes 1 Wearing a headscarf in public institutions was banned in 1989 by the Constitutional Court. The lifting of the headscarf ban took place over time. First, in 2007, the Institution of Higher Education (YÖK) lifted the ban on campuses. The ban on public personal was lifted as a result of a package accepted in the parliament in October 2013, when a group of female parliamentarians from the AKP entered the Grand Assembly with their heads covered. 2 Pujol (1992) categorizes the neoclassical assumptions about women as follows: (1) All women are married; (2) all women are dependent on a male relative; (3) women are housewives; (4) women are unproductive; (5) women are irrational and are unfit as economic agents.

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Theoretical framework   43 Gökarıksel, Banu and Anna J. Secor. 2012. “ ‘Even I Was Tempted’: The Moral Ambivalence and Ethical Practice of Veiling-­Fashion in Turkey.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 102(4): 847–862. Göle, Nilüfer. 1996. The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Göle, Nilüfer. 1997a. “The Quest for the Islamic Self within the Context of Modernity.” In Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba (Eds), Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 81–94. Göle, Nilüfer. 1997b. “Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-­Elites.” The Middle East Journal 51(1): 46–58. Göle, Nilüfer. 2000. İslamın Yeni Kamusal Yüzleri. Istanbul: Metis. Gülalp, Haldun. 2003. “Whatever Happened to Secularization?: The Multiple Islams in Turkey.” The South Atlantic Quarterly 102(2/3): 381–395. Gülalp, Haldun and Günter Seufert. 2013. Religion, Identity and Politics: Germany and Turkey in Interaction. New York: Routledge. Güneş-Ayata, Ayşe and Fatma Tütüncü. 2008. “Party Politics of the AKP (2002–2007) and the Predicaments of Women at the Intersection of the Westernist, Islamist and Feminist Discourses in Turkey.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 35(3): 363–384. Güveli, Ayşe. 2011. “Social and Economic Impact of the Headscarf Ban on Women in Turkey.” European Societies 12(2): 171–189. Güven, İsmail. 2010. “Globalisation, Political Islam and the Headscarf in Education, with Special Reference to the Turkish Educational System.” Comparative Education 46(3): 377–390. Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hsiung, Ping-­Chun. 1996. Living Rooms as Factories. Class, Gender, and Satellite Factory System in Taiwan. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Hunt, Emery Kay. 2003. Property and Prophets: The Evolution of Economic Institutions and Ideologies (7th Edition). New York: M.E. Sharp. İlkkaracan, İpek. 2012. “Why So Few Women in the Labor Market in Turkey?” Feminist Economics 18(1): 1–37. İnce, Hilal Onur, Aysun Yaralı, and Doğancan Özsel. 2009. “Customary Killings in Turkey and Turkish Modernization.” Middle Eastern Studies 45(4): 537–551. Jelen, Brigette. 2011. “Educated, Independent, and Covered: The Professional Aspirations and Experiences of University-­Educated Hijab in Contemporary Turkey.” Women’s Studies International Forum 34(4): 308–319. Jevons, Stanley. 1883. Methods of Social Reform and Other Papers. London: Macmillan. Kadın İstihdamı ve Girişimciliği Konusunda Yürütülen Projeler. 2012. Kadın Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü, Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı. “Kadın ve Erkeği Eşit Konuma Getiremezsiniz Çünkü o Fıtrata Terstir.” Milliyet November 24, 2014, available at www.milliyet.com.tr/erdogan-­batsin-bu-­dunya/siyaset/ detay/1974189/default.htm (accessed June 30, 2017). “Kadın ve Erkeğin Eşit Olması Mümkün Değil.” Habertürk July 31, 2010, available at www.haberturk.com/polemik/haber/537849-kadin-­ve-erkegin-­esit-olmasi-­mumkundegil# (accessed June 30, 2017). Kandiyoti, Deniz. 1987. “Emancipated but Unliberated? Reflections on the Turkish Case.” Feminist Studies 13(2): 317–338. Kadıoğlu, Ayşe. 1994. “Women’s Subordination in Turkey: Is Islam Really the Villain?” Middle East Journal 48(4): 645–660.

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2 Competing visions of gender

The nascent republic of 1923 aimed to transform gender relations along the republic’s main political ideals of nationalism and secularism. A large number of reforms were launched to achieve this transformation: Education and alphabet reforms, women’s right to vote and hold public office, and the Civil and Penal Codes that replaced the Islamic law, just to name a few. Indeed, in about two generations, the rapid transformation of gender relations was clearly observable in the number of educated women holding prestigious occupations and managerial positions both in the private and public sectors. This impressive record in employment and education, coupled with an egalitarian discourse, however, remained limited due to a major weakness in this transformation. This limitation had a lot do with the inability and the disinterest of these reforms in transforming the gender relations in the domestic realm. Women, to a large extent, are expected to maintain their traditional roles at home; women’s newly-­acquired public roles remained auxiliary and women continued to be defined primarily as mothers and wives. The AKP rule since 2002 has reshaped the republican construction of gender in a number of ways. First, based on the statements given by party leaders, the policies adopted, and the goals identified, the roles assigned to women are exclusively as mothers and wives. This re-­envisioning of women takes such a strong tone that it would not be an exaggeration to state that women do not exist outside the family for the AKP. Therefore, during the AKP’s era, women’s natural place is clearly and unequivocally defined as their homes. This clear-­cut gender division of labor is the best and a natural one according to the AKP’s construction of gender relations. In case women have to work outside the home, this is temporary and their workplaces are best to be gender-­segregated. Second, the AKP promotes an image of pious women as the ideal women while devaluing non-­ pious women by ignoring them, at best, and putting them down at worst. Any women’s activism that challenges the AKP’s gender construction is often ridiculed by the top leadership. Third, the AKP uses Islam to legitimize its unique envisioning of women and the traditional gender division of labor through Islamic references and the assistance the government receives from the public institutions, particularly the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (DİB). Lastly, the AKP encourages women’s free labor, as in the form of volunteer work, through many

48   Competing visions of gender campaigns and programs, the most visible of which is a party organization called the women’s branches, or a nationwide project named Gönül Elçileri (Messengers of Heart). The objective of this chapter is twofold. First, it examines the re-­envisioning of women under the AKP rule by highlighting its differences from and similarities to the conceptualization of the republican women as part of the secular nation-­building. Although both conceptualizations are patriarchal, they differ from each other in the nature of specific roles they assign to men and women, the gender ideals that they promote, the justification they provide, and the context within which they emerge. The chapter argues that the re-­envisioning of women by the AKP rule as mothers and wives, pious, segregated, family-­ centered, dependents, and volunteers goes beyond the short-­term and ad hoc policies of a political party in power. Rather, it indicates a new regime with long term implications for both gender relations and politics.

Secular patriarchy A long list of reforms concerning women marked the initial years of the republic. One of the most important legal changes came with the first Civil Code of 1926. The Civil Code replaced the Islamic law, which had governed the personal status for Muslims under the Ottoman legal system. The Civil Code fundamentally changed family relations by abolishing polygamy and granting women almost equal rights to divorce as well as inheritance and child custody. According to the previous Islamic law, only men had the absolute right to divorce and women did not obtain the right to divorce until 1915. Even then, women’s right to initiate divorce was limited to the conditions of contagious disease (Çarkoğlu and Kafescioğlu 2014, 242). The Civil Code of 1926 clearly reflected some patriarchal bias as well. For instance, the head of the family was the husband, who also had the right to choose the place of residence (Arat, Z. 1994; Arat, Y. 2010; Ilkkaracan 2010; Çarkoğlu and Kafescioğlu 2014). The wife had to use her husband’s last name as the family name and she needed her husband’s permission to work outside the home. The gender relations restructured along the national-­secular modernization of the nascent republic later came under scrutiny by feminist work, which addressed both incomplete and patriarchal aspects of the secular-­republican re-­envisioning of women. Firdevs Helvacıoğlu (1996) finds in her detailed examination of textbooks since 1928 that the initial textbooks are marked with more egalitarian language while she identifies a significant shift in the post-­1950 textbooks. Helvacıoğlu writes that  First, there is collaboration and mutual support. The relationship [between husband and a wife] is based on affection. Second, there is no hierarchy between men and women. Both are the foundations of the family. However, starting from the 1950s, most textbooks identify husband as the foundation of the family and women are assigned the task of making them happy.

Competing visions of gender   49 Women are—almost always—shown as those cooking, sewing, doing laundry and dishes. (Helvacıoğlu 1996, 22) Tekeli writes that “women have begun to question more and more vigorously their gender status, their long-­term oppression and their traditional feminine identity” (Tekeli 1995, 3). Kandiyoti (1987, 324) argues that “The changes in Turkey have left the most crucial areas of gender relations, such as the double standard of sexuality and a primarily domestic definition of the female role, virtually untouched.” Arat, Z. (1994) argues that the Civil Code of 1926 replaced the Islamic patriarchy with the Catholic patriarchy since the Civil Code was translated from the Swiss Civil Code in its entirety. Kadıoğlu (1994) writes that the initial envisioning of women was mainly based on motherhood. Sancar (2012) criticizes the arguments that the Turkish modernization process initiated by the nascent republic has resulted in an impressive and unprecedented “women’s revolution.” Sancar writes that the fact that the newly emerging women’s activism’s demands to be independent from the state faced rejection at the outset revealed “the warrior male mentality that grew out of the years of wars and migration” (Sancar 2012, 193). As a result, Sancar writes, women were excluded from the political decisions at the time and forced to engage in charity-­ type work. This was a turning point in women’s lives because they got stuck in the charity work, a trend that still continues through the women’s branches of political parties to today. Sancar argues that the creation of this nation-­state brought new tasks and responsibilities to both men and women. However, while men were assigned the task of founding the state, women were given the task of forming a family (Sancar 2012, 207). As a result, women at the outset were educated to carry out certain roles, such as nutrition, child care, sewing, cooking, internal design, etc. (Sancar 2012, 221). Thus, Sancar argues that the fact that the nascent republic was born out of “years of wars and migration” means this “warrior male mentality” has fundamentally shaped every aspect of the new republic, including the gender roles. Tekeli writes that the feminist wave of the 1980s was not the first one that came onto the agenda in Turkey. Rather, the first-­stage feminist movement was during the second constitutional period, after 1908. The movement questioned the traditional roles assigned to women as mothers and wives, among others: The first-­stage feminist movement was sensitive, on the one hand, to the aspirations of the modernizing bureaucratic elites of the time; on the other, to the nationalist movement developing in face of the crisis of the declining empire; and finally to the Western feminist movement, which had become visible in many countries with the actions of the suffragettes. But what is most striking to present-­day feminists is that the analysis that these well-­ educated, middle-­class Ottoman women developed was based on their own experience. (Tekeli 1995, 11–12)

50   Competing visions of gender In the second stage that began with the new republic, Tekeli argues that the first grassroots movements disappeared by giving way to state feminism. Their integration into the new state had a lot to do with the fact that many of their demands were incorporated into the new system, such as the Civil Code reform of 1926, universal suffrage, alphabet reform, etc. Furthermore, more equal gender relations were adopted as women were encouraged to get educated, and the modern Turkey “wanted to end women’s domestic confinement and give them new responsibilities in the development of modern Turkey by opening careers to them like teaching” (Tekeli 1995, 12). In other words, the early republican period dominated the political arena and monopolized the women’s demands. In her detailed analysis of Nezihe Muhiddin’s life (1889–1958), Yaprak Zihnioğlu (2003) sheds light how women’s attempts to be independent from the nationalist movement and to defend feminist rights were crushed in the early years of the republic. Despite Muhiddin’s active role in leading a women’s grassroots movement, little is known and taught today about her as a leading voice in feminist activism. Zihnioğlu argues that the reason why she was excluded from the history books was because the male founders of the modern republic found her movement dangerous and crushed it. These were highly authoritarian, single-­party years, which sought to monopolize the women’s movement (Zihnioğlu 2003, 23). The third stage of feminism in Turkey had to wait until the end of the 1980 coup era because the coup banned all political activism (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu 2011). The secular, nationalist patriarchy of the Turkish republic is characterized by, first, its interest in monopolizing the feminist demands of women’s grassroots organizations and forcing them to integrate into its nationalist ideology. Second, the republican patriarchy is marked by its uninterest in directly trying to restructure the gender relations inside home. Despite greater integration of women into public life, universal suffrage, the relatively egalitarian legal system and women’s rapidly increasing educational attainment, their private roles were not targeted by the nationalist-­secular ideology of the nascent republic. No question that their increasing public roles indirectly helped them question the traditional division of labor at home but this transformation was most limited to the urbanized and educated women who could afford to subcontract their household responsibilities to the women from lower classes. Third, women’s traditional roles as mothers and wives are also emphasized and advocated along with their public roles, assigning women double-­responsibilities. Undoubtedly, the secular-­nationalist patriarchy of the republic does share similarities with Islamic conservatism. Nevertheless, there exists significant differences between the two. The most significant difference is the context within which each type of patriarchy emerges and operates. The comparison between the two against the same feminist ideals is necessary and significant but comes with a caveat: The secular-­nationalist patriarchy existed during a time when feminist consciousness and international standards were not fully developed, neither in Turkey nor in the world. This was the period of authoritarian, single-­party regimes, including the ideology of fascism, which is not

Competing visions of gender   51 known for progressive gender practices. Democratic regimes were non-­existent, with the exception of the Anglo-­Saxon world. Even then, progressive gender norms by today’s standards did not exist, let alone international treaties that developed global gender norms. In sum, although undoubtedly patriarchal and unacceptable by today’s standards, these reforms were considered progressive and welcomed by women at the time. The exception to this was an Istanbul-­ based feminist movement, which was crushed at the time.

Islamism and Islamic conservatism The term “Islamism” first became popularized around the time of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The 1970s witnessed the rise of Islamist movements as a major political force, exerting pressure on the existing regimes in a large number of countries, especially in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Despite the fear on the part of some pundits that the Iranian Revolution would create a domino effect in the MENA region, leading a series of revolutions, the Iranian revolution remained isolated and endured as the only one among the Muslim-­ majority countries. In the rest of the MENA countries where Muslims are in the majority, Islamists mostly remained in opposition rather than coming to power through elections or revolutions. Despite their failure in seizing power, Islamist movements have exerted political pressure in a number of other ways—mostly as outsiders of the existing political systems. These include participating in elections at the local and national levels whenever they are allowed, participating in the activities of professional organizations (syndicates), and providing socio-­ economic services. Thus, whether they have changed the regimes through a revolution, as in the case of Iran, or exerted pressures as outsiders, as in the case of most MENA countries, Islamist movements constitute the most organized opposition groups that effectively challenge the status quo in the MENA region. A contested term, Islamism has been defined in vastly different ways. Perhaps one of the earliest characterizations was that Islam is a uniquely political and encompassing religion, thereby defining Islamism as a natural extension of Islam (Ben-­Dor and Pedahzur 2003; Lewis 1996). Some others define it as “all who seek to Islamize their environment, whether in relation to their lives in society, their family circumstances, or the workplace, may be described as Islamists” (Roy and Sfeir 2007, X). Others emphasize the identity demands of Islamists characterizing them as part of identity politics (Fuller 2003). Still others define it quite broadly as synonymous with Islamic activism, “the active assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, laws, or policies that are held to be Islamic in character” (International Crisis Group 2005, 1). Like the definitions of Islamism, characteristics of Islamist groups are various and seem to be highly context-­dependent. While those who operate in non-­ Muslim majority and secular legal systems emphasize their Islamic identity while they accept the non-­Islamic political and legal systems, others aspire to implement the Islamic law, as they see and interpret it, to various aspects of the social, economic and political worlds. Still others actively seek to attain political

52   Competing visions of gender power. Most groups have already accepted the national context defined by the nation-­state within which they operate, while others, such as the Islamic State (ISIL), try to appeal to all Muslims regardless of their nationality. While a small minority resorts to violence, such as the Algerian GIS, the majority, such as the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, has never resorted to violence, even temporarily. In sum, Islamists are largely shaped by the national settings within which they operate and show vast differences among themselves when it comes to their objectives, interpretations of the Islamic law, their strategies and tactics as well as their relationships with their respective regimes. Islamist movements also change and evolve over time, adding further complexity. This book characterizes Islamist movements as social movements, part of an emerging body of literature (Wickham 2002; Clark 2004; Clark and Schwedler; Wiktorowicz 2004; Tuğal 2009). Accordingly, Islamic activism shares many characteristics of social movement activism. The social movement approach to Islamism significantly differs from the arguments of “Islamic exceptionalism” (Ben-­Dor and Pedahzur 2003). For the social movement theory: … the dynamics, process, and organization or Islamic activism can be understood as important elements of contention that transcend the specificity of “Islam” as a system of meaning, identity, and basis of collective action. Though the ideational components and inspiration of Islam as an ideological worldview differentiate Islamic activism from other examples of contention, the collective action itself and concomitant mechanisms demonstrate consistency across movement-­types. In other words, Islamic activism is not sui generis. (Wiktorowicz 2004, 3, emphasis in the original) This characterization of Islamist movements clearly makes the theoretical framework different from the arguments that identify Islam’s unique aspects as the reasons behind the rise of Islamic activism. The social movement theory is not interested in theological discussions nor does it find them useful in understanding Islamic activism. Islamic actors are not considered as religious zealots or fanatics, but as rational political actors who calculate and strategize. The ebbs and flows in Islamic activism does indeed raise questions about the plausibility of theological explanations. The theory does emphasize the significance of socio­economic factors. However, unlike the typical social-­economic explanations (Tessler and Robbins 2007), the social movement theory argues that grievances such as poverty and oppression, by themselves, do not lead to mobilization and political activism. What the social movement theory emphasizes is that “other factors are inextricably linked to mobilization processes, including resource availability, framing resonance and shifts in opportunity structures” (Wiktorowicz 2004, 4). The term Islamism is used in this book with these assumptions and considerations in mind and refers to Islamic activism as defined and understood by the social movement theory.

Competing visions of gender   53

The rise of Islamism in Turkey The establishment of the Turkish Republic and the subsequent reforms were a radical departure from the Ottoman system in many respects (Toprak 2005). First, religion ceased to be the common denominator in defining the citizenship. A more inclusive definition of citizenship was adopted in the first 1924 constitution, defining “Turkishness” broadly with the intention to transcend religion and ethnicity. Second, the Islamic legal system, which governed the personal affairs of the Ottoman’s Muslim population, was replaced by a secular one. Both the Penal and Civil Codes were imported from European countries and the 1928 amendments to the constitution (Article 2) took off the previous statement that Islam is the religion of the state, followed by another amendment in 1937 that the state was secular. Third, Islamic brotherhoods, which are informal religious networks, were outlawed, stripping their leaders of their privileges. Lastly, the office of khalifat (halife in Turkish) was abolished, bringing 400 years of Ottoman leadership in the Muslim world to an end. These were, among others, significant changes that undermined the power of the brotherhoods and caused great concern for those who had allegiance to the khalifat and the sultanate. However, as the series of wars, starting in the late nineteenth century, caused economic hardship and claimed many lives, the victory of the independence war and the subsequent reforms were welcomed by many, if not all. Many of these reforms were part of nineteenth-­century intellectual discussions and part of the modernization process of the late Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, for the opponents, their reaction mostly took the form of passive resistance by not allowing the reforms to take root in their lives. Despite these grievances, however, Islamic activism did not fully develop until the late 1970s. Buğra and Savaşkan also argue in New Capitalism in Turkey (2014) that the rise of Islamism is not due to these “formerly oppressed” segments of society; but, rather, due to “incomplete secularization” (emphasis in original). According to Buğra and Savaşkan, the fact that that the public expenditures for education and achievements in literacy was small suggests the modernization process was bound to remain limited. In the same way, they argue, radio, as an important instrument for propaganda, reached only a small percentage of the population. Thus, the early republication modernizers could not “mobilize people around shared aspirations for a better life. Large segments of the population remained excluded from the economic benefits of modernization, and no significant change in the lifestyles of the majority could materialize” (Buğra and Savaşkan 2014, 40). The religion-­centered system of public morality continued to exist and “the separation of the state and religion remained incomplete” (Buğra and Savaşkan 2014, 41). Indeed, for certain segments of society, Islam continued to play a central role despite the secularization efforts mentioned above. As expected by the social movement theory, however, these grievances are not automatically transformed into Islamic activism, which was practically absent for decades in the political arena of Turkey. Those who resented the secular reforms politically aligned

54   Competing visions of gender themselves with the central and right-­wing parties, the first of which was the Democrat Party (1946–1961). The Democrat Party came to power in 1950 and remained in power until it was overthrown by the 1960 military coup, which adopted a more progressive and labor-­friendly constitution, in line with the spirit of the 1960s civil rights movements in the United States. Indeed, thanks to the new constitution, the left-­wing labor and student movements flourished. The counter-­force to the left-­wing at the time was the anti-­communist, nationalist and pro-­American right-­wing movement. The two eventually ended up in a head-­to-head confrontation during the 1970s, resulting in the loss of thousands of lives. The death toll was as high as 1606 in eight months right before the coup d’état (“8 Ayda” 1980). Nonetheless, despite this highly active political environment, Islamism as a viable political force was practically absent during the 1970s. How did a political movement emerge and become the strongest opposition movement in less than 20 years? This question is significant but it should be noted that the rising power of Islamism in a relatively short period of time is not unique to the Turkish case. The MENA region has many similar cases in which the Islamic activism that emerged in the 1970s became the most prominent political force in a short period of time. Egypt is the best example within the broader MENA region. The nationalist and pan-­Arabist politics dominated the Egyptian political scene up until the 1970s while Islamists, definitely stronger and more active than the Turkish case, remained as a relatively weak political force. What explains this rapid rise of Islamist power? By applying the social movement theory, it is possible to answer this question with special attention to three considerations: (1) Institutions; (2) resources; and (3) discourse. The institutional context, commonly called the political opportunity structure, describes how open and welcoming the institutional structure is to the specific social movements at hand. The more the institutions are receptive to the movement, the more likely the movement will emerge at that given time at a given national context (McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1996). The role of the Turkish state, as the most important institution, goes beyond the passive role assigned by the social movement theory. Indeed, the Turkish-­Islamic synthesis adopted by the 1980 military regime has actively supported Islamic activism in the name of bringing the nation in line with its roots and thereby pre-­empting a perceived threat coming from the left-­ wing labor and student movements. Turkish-­Islamic synthesis was an ideology put together by a group of conservative scholars who belonged to Aydınlar Ocağı (Intellectuals’ Heart) (Akin and Karasapan 1988) but was adopted by the military regime and actively promoted through the media, leaders’ statements and the curriculum in public schools. As Akin and Karasapan put it  The synthesis, however, sent an ambiguous message. On one hand, under the 1982 constitution, Turkey was defined as a secular state. On the other hand, the role of religion was strengthened in schools and education as a

Competing visions of gender   55 means of reinforcing Turkish nationalism, which tended to weaken the emphasis on secularism. (Akin and Karasapan 1988, 18) As Toprak (1991, 154) put it “the Turkish-­Islamic Synthesis, in emphasizing state authority, military values, and the primacy of the family was accepted as an alternative world-­view which, coupled with restrictions on political participation, would eventually give way to a more obedient generation.” In sum, the role of the Turkish state here is twofold: First, the state let Islamist groups flourish and take root in state bureaucracy, campuses and the media, and the state pressure on Islamists was loosened. Second, the military regime also indirectly contributed to the rise of Islamism by eliminating major political actors, that is the left-­wing movement: One of the first actions of the military regime was to close down the labor unions (“Türk İş’e” 1980). Other actions included the leaders of student organizations being jailed, left-­wing publications being restricted, left-­leaning university professors being fired, and labor unions being closed down. It is this twofold role of the Turkish state that goes beyond providing Islamists with a “window of opportunity.” The promotion of the Turkish­Islamic synthesis and the subsequent political environment provided golden opportunities for Islamists to flourish and even penetrate top bureaucratic positions inside the Ministry of Education, the Interior Ministry as well as the security forces. The political opportunity structure is therefore helpful in explaining the domestic institutional structure. It falls short, however, in incorporating the international structure, particularly the one brought by the global neoliberalization trends. The second dimension of the social movement theory is the resources, commonly referred to as resource mobilization, which include money, labor, networks and the leadership. A major economic development that took place in the post-­1980 coup era was the implementation of the neoliberal policies and the export-­oriented growth, which put an end to the previous import substitution industrialization (Öniş 2000). Announced about eight months prior to the 1980 coup d’état, the neoliberal policies accelerated in the post-­coup era, leaving the interest rates to the market and eliminating the quotas on imports (“Dışalımlarda Kota” 1981). The open market policies provided unique opportunities to conservative, small and medium-­sized shopkeepers (esnaf ) who effectively seized the opportunity to establish trade relations with non-­European countries as well as forming their own domestic networks. As Öniş and Türem (2002, 448) put it “The term ‘Anatolian tigers’ largely signified a pattern of growth based on relatively small but externally competitive firms that prospered under the neoliberal policy regime after 1980 but with surprisingly little or no help from the state.” At the same time, due to the loosening state control over their resources, their charity activities were subjected to less restrictions. The third dimension is the successful, strategic construction of the Islamic message that resonates among people. This is called framing. The Turkish Islamist movement long framed itself as anti-­capitalist, anti-­NATO, anti-­European

56   Competing visions of gender Union and anti-­West up until the early 2000s—even though its actual practices were not necessarily so. Its discourse was subjected to a major shift with the emergence of the AKP. This transformation can be traced by going over the party documents since the beginning of the first Islamist party in the early 1970s. Examples abound, such as the following. After having supported right-­wing parties for decades, the Turkish Islamist movement established its first political party, Milli Nizam Partisi (1970–1971, MNP). The party was short-­lived, however, due to the authorities’ concern that it violated the constitutional principle of secularism. The Milli Selamet Partisi (1972–1980, MSP), established next, was ideologically an extension of the first one. The MSP vehemently opposed Turkey’s Western orientation by criticizing Turkey’s membership application to the EU (then, European Community) and advocating a Muslim economic union, instead (Erbakan 1971, 7). In response to the closure of the MSP during the 1980 coup, the Islamist movement established its third party, this time under the name of Refah Partisi (1983–1998, RP). The RP’s party program can be summarized in two words, adil düzen (just order). Adil düzen promised an equitable economic system that protected the poor, promised to build a corruption-­free political and economic system and promised to end the Western influence in Turkey. Adil düzen’s message was appealing to many, especially among the poor. Fazilet Partisi (1997–2000, FP) were founded by 33 people right after the closure of the RP (Fazilet Partisi Faaliyet Raporu 2000). The FP did try to reform itself by distancing itself from the RP by proposing changes such as the public administration reform (“İdarenin Yeniden Yapılandırılması 1998”) and a Euro-­Asia centered foreign policy (Fazilet Partisi Genel Başkanı 1999, 24–25). Yet, it could not escape from the perception that the party was simply a reincarnation of the RP. Representing the reformist faction within the Islamist movement, the founders of the AKP were initially careful with using a conciliatory and pro-­ establishment discourse. The founding leaders declared at the outset that “they have changed” (“Gül’den Savunma” 2001). The new party’s program promised a pro-­capitalist as well as pro-­NATO and pro-­EU foreign policy and identified the party ideology as “conservative democracy” rather than Islamism (“Erdoğan” 2001). More specifically, the AKP was described as a party that is “conservative democrat, progressive, inclusive, promotes participation, and favors localism” (Erdoğan 2002, 87). Erdoğan emphasized that: While the AKP values religion as a cultural value, it does not approve making politics through religion or getting organized through religious symbols. Making politics via religion, make the religion a tool for political activism, and pursuing an exclusionary politics in the name of religion not only harms the social peace but also pluralism and ultimately the religion itself.… Establishing a political party or portraying oneself that way would give the biggest harm to a religion. (Erdoğan 2002, 16)

Competing visions of gender   57 In addition to these evolving aspects of the Islamist discourse, one should also address the enduring features of the Islamist discourse as well. A common theme in Islamist discourse that seems to remain constant is the discourse victimization at the hands of the oppressor, the secular regime. Accordingly, secularism lies at the center of the imposition of an immoral and unjust world that has caused ­tremendous suffering, injustice and victimization for the pious. In fact, secularism is the source of all evils including moral decay, underdevelopment, and imperialism. Examples abound, such as the following. Recai Kutan, the Chairman of the Fazilet Partisi stated during his introductory speech in 2000 that the country has paid too greater price for the Westernization process that, he argued, started in 1839 (2000 Yılı Bütçe Müzakereleri 2000, 2–3): At times we denied our own history; we cut our ties with our past. At times, we denied our own values, and looked down upon our wonderful culture and civilization and at times, we even rejected our cultural inheritance.… At times, we accused our great religion and their followers of ‘being obstacles to Westernization and backwardness.’ … At times, in the name of this Westernization, we launched military coups, executed people and resorted to imposition by force. Kutan often expressed the common Islamist argument that Turkish secularism is nothing but an anti-­Islam dogma imposed on Muslims (2000 Yılı Bütçe Müzakereleri 2000, 51). Eight-­year mandatory education is also considered part of the imposition. Kutan stated that parents should be solely responsible in deciding where to send their children (2000 Yılı Bütçe Müzakereleri 2000, 52). Anti-­secularism discourse is a popular theme often articulated within Islamist circles. Yusuf Kaplan, a columnist in a pro-­government newspaper, argues that secularism is an overflow that the West put on the necks of Muslims to control them (Kaplan 2016) and that secularism is a dogma that cannot be still discussed in Turkey (Kaplan 2017). According to Aslan, the best formula for the peaceful existence of various religions, cultures and civilizations was the millet system of the Ottomans, invented by Muslims (Kaplan 2017). Another common theme is that Muslims would be the most politically and economically developed in the World if it was not for the Western intervention. According to Necmettin Erbakan, the former leader of the Islamist movement, the group of Masonaries–Zionists–Christians aims to dominate, control and assimilate Muslim Turkey because they fear Turkey’s power (Erbakan 1971, 7). Erbakan argues that the custom union of the European Union was nothing but a new form of imperialism of a Judeo-­Christian alliance. In other words, the secret objective of the European Economic Community was in fact political—to dominate and assimilate non-­Christians, particularly Muslims in Turkey (Erbakan 1971, 20). As an alternative, Erbakan proposed establishing a custom union with Muslim-­majority countries, such as Pakistan.

58   Competing visions of gender

Re-­envisioning women under AKP rule As Chapter I explains, the relationship between Islam and women is one of the most contested issues in the literature on gender. Discussions are often made through abstraction, such as “what is the position of Islam on women?” or “is Islam oppressive towards women?” etc. This book clearly distinguishes itself from this body of literature as it does not engage in any theological or theoretical discussion on the relationship between women and Islam, but rather it provides an empirical analysis of the gender policies of a series of governments formed by a specific political party, during a particular period of time, and in a particular country. It is this contextualization of the gender relations that separates this book from the aforementioned literature on women and Islam. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the conservative Islamic ideology as it appears within the Turkish context does not uniformly agree on gender issues and the “proper” role of women in society. The diversity of opinions on women is rarely reflected in the statements of top party leaders or in the public policies, although at times disagreements appear in the media among the advocates of conservative Islamic ideology (Arat, Y. 2016). For instance, Ayşe Böhürler, one of the founding leaders of the party and a journalist, expresses some critical issues in her columns in Yeni Şafak, a pro-­government newspaper. In one of her columns, Böhürler wrote that many educated and successful conservative women feel that what they have achieved was not thanks to Muslim men, rather, despite them. “The discrimination” Böhürler wrote “ranges from health to strategic planning, academic studies and the administration of big companies (“Mecliste Kadın Olmak” 2010). In another piece, Böhürler criticized a religious scholar’s advice to women about how to escape from rape (Böhürler 2011). Böhürler strongly disagrees with the advice because, she argues, the advice only tells women what to avoid so that they don’t “provoke” men and it never blames men as being guilty (Böhürler 2011). Böhürler wrote that “although as conservative women, we are familiar with this type of interpretation of rape, but we can no longer tolerate this mentality.” Such critical voices rarely exist among the top party leadership; at least, they are not made public. With these two considerations in mind, the next section examines the AKP’s conceptualization of women according to party documents, statements and policies. The AKP era experienced some progressive developments, at least initially. For instance, the Civil and Penal Codes were revised in 2001 and 2004, respectively. A National Action Plan was prepared in 2009 to fight against gender discrimination. The same year, the Grand National Assembly established a commission named Fırsat Eşitliği Komisyonu (“Commission on Equal Opportunity between Men and Women”). Another two significant positive steps that the AKP governments took were the signing of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, also referred to as Istanbul Convention, and the passing of the follow up domestic law called Ailenin Korunması ve Kadına Karşı Şiddetin Önlenmesine

Competing visions of gender   59 Dair Kanun (“The Law Concerning the Protection of Family and the Prevention of Violence Against Women”) (No: 6284). More specifically, the Civil Code changes included the following: The husband is no longer the head of the household, the household responsibilities are held together, and decisions are shared by husband and wife. Women no longer needed their husbands’ permission to work outside the home (Arat, Y. 2010). The Penal Code revisions also included significant improvements towards gender equality. The revision process of these legal changes also highlighted a period of more active political activism for civil society. For instance, the revision process of the Penal Code of 2004 witnessed a successful campaign by civil society organizations. The Penal Code prior to the revisions did not recognize crimes against the individual, such as marital rape, sexual harassment at work, virginity tests, discrimination based on sexual orientation or sexual crimes by security forces (Çavdar 2010). Civil society organizations by women and LGBTI communities formed a coalition called the Women’s Platform on the Turkish Penal Code (WPTPC) to provide their input at the beginning of the committee discussions. The NGO Women for Women’s Human Rights—New Ways (WWHR) acted as the coordinating body throughout the campaign (Ilkkaracan 2010). Initially, the new drafted code was not allowed by the government to be reviewed by the WPTPC representatives, who secretly obtained the copy. In response to the government’s draft, the WPTPC drafted an alternative code with the list of changes they demanded and distributed it to the members of the parliament as well as the media (“Kadın Bakış Açısından” 2003). Their draft was simply ignored for months. The WPTPC finally decided to hold a press conference, which was a turning point in the revisions. This change of tactics finally worked and some of their demands were accepted by the sub-­commission. As a result, the criminalization of marital rape and sexual harassment were included in the Penal Code and the distinction between virgin and non-­virgin women and the previous claim that child sexual abuse could be consensual were eliminated. Thanks to the successful campaign of the WPTPC for almost two years, nearly all demands were accepted in the final code, which also included better protection against crimes committed against the LGBTI communities (“Kadın Bakış Açısından” 2003). For instance, according to the Penal Code revised in 2004 (Article 122), those who discriminate on the basis of language, race, color, sex, political views, philosophical beliefs, religion, sect and the like will be subjected to prison for up to six months. The draft law also included the explicit reference to “sexual orientation,” which was eliminated by Cemil Çiçek, then Minister of Justice (“TCK ve Cinsel Yönelim” 2004). Despite this defeat, the process during which the revisions took place marked a turning point for women’s and LGBTI activism. There were also setbacks during the process. The government’s last-­minute attempt to criminalize adultery was both unexpected and posed a serious threat to the civil society organizations’ attempts to reform the Penal Code. Erdoğan, then prime minister, argued that the plans to criminalize adultery were only meant to protect women’s rights against cheating husbands (“Kadının Hakkını

60   Competing visions of gender Koruyoruz” 2004). The draft law was finally withdrawn in response to the harsh criticism from the latter as well as the pressure from women’s organizations. The final version of the Code excluded many discriminatory clauses, such as the elimination of punishment for sexual predators if they marry their victims. However, the reduction for “provocation” in domestic violence cases remained in the law despite the organizations’ strong opposition. As discussed in Chapter 5, this reduction is often used by men involved in domestic violence and contributed to the ever-­increasing number of femicide cases. It should be emphasized that these positive changes came from two major sources, Turkey’s commitment to either EU or other international treaties or from civil society organizations, such as women’s and LGBTI’s. The international commitments include the EU’s admission criteria and the UN treaty on Convention on the Elimination of All Types of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) that Turkey previously signed. As the time passed, however, the AKP’s initial accommodating attitude faded and its gender policies were increasingly shaped by its Islamic conservatism, as the next three chapters detail. With these caveats in mind, the AKP’s gender discourse as well as the policies advocated during the AKP era are examined in four major groups below. Despite the evolution of the Islamist movement as a way to incorporate neoliberalism over time, the envisioning of gender within the Islamic conservative ideology shows resistance and demonstrates long-­term patterns (Çavdar 2010). Çavdar, therefore, calls gender a “core” issue that defines Islamist ideology, as opposed to the auxiliary issues, such as economy and foreign policy, which are proven to be relatively easier to change. Similarly, Dedeoğlu (2015, 266) argues that conservatism of the Islamist movements finds its best expression with respect to gender since other areas are largely transformed. The four major patterns, below, shed light on the Islamic conservatism’s construction of gender, which has significantly shaped the AKP’s policies and discourses in every issue area, including employment, education and health. 1  Women’s only permissible roles: Mothers and wives Among the many roles and identities women have, being a wife and a mother seem to be the only roles and identities acceptable to the AKP. Considering women as wives and mothers only means that women are defined in reference to either their children or their husbands only, and do not exist independently on their own. Women’s multiple identities and functions are reduced to these two functions and their individuality is denied altogether. Furthermore, failing to see women as human beings also means that their existence is closely associated with sex and, as a result, controlling their bodies becomes of utmost importance. The AKP openly and unequivocally refuses to see women as humans and individuals. Women’s political activism, asserting their rights to exist as individuals and human beings, is ridiculed at best, and suppressed at worst. The AKP’s reduction of women’s multi-­roles, functions and identities found its simplest expression in the 2001 version of the party program. The original

Competing visions of gender   61 program, dated 2001, states that “Women are important not because they constitute half of the population, but because they play a primary role in raising healthy generations” (AK Parti Programı 2001, 34). Similarly, in another party document entitled 2023 Siyasi Vizyon (2013 Political Vision, AK Parti 2013), women are discussed after the subtitle of “family” and before “our children” and “the disabled.” As the first goal for women, the vision states, the program aims to help women well adapt to work life and family life, by giving aid such as the provision of the daycare assistance to working women (AK Parti 2013 Siyasi Vizyonu n.d.). Again, according to the AKP’s envisioning, women do not and cannot possibly have any other concerns. Nowhere in the party documents does the AKP commit to gender equality. Erdoğan often appeals to mothers whom he speaks of highly and asks for help about some complicated topics, such as the Kurdish question. In reference to the need to solve the conflict in the southeastern region, Erdoğan stated that the conflict needs to be solved so that “mothers don’t cry” (“Erdoğan Anaların Diliyle” 2010). When asked about women’s rights, Erdoğan repeats the infamous hadith (sayings of the Prophet Mohammed) that “heaven lies at the feet of mothers” arguing that when women become mothers, according to Islam, they are promised and guaranteed the highest level of honor a human being can reach (i.e., heaven). In other words, it is both ungrateful and redundant to ask for other rights for women. Erdoğan criticizes women’s rights advocates for doing so, and not appreciating what Islam already promises women. He also accuses them of being insincere because “they never care about the killings of women in Syria and other parts of the world where women suffer” (“Kadın Hakları” 2018). Apparently for Erdoğan, women’s rights are identical with Muslim’s rights and one cannot demand better rights for women in Turkey without asking for the same rights for all other Muslim women in all other countries. The article Erdoğan wrote for the celebration of Women’s Day on March 8, 2015 is also significant in exemplifying the top party leadership’s position on women’s rights (“Cumhurbaşkanı Erdogan’dan” 2015). In the article entitled “the Women of New Turkey” Erdoğan states that since the nineteenth century, major changes have taken place affecting both men and women and undermining the traditional family structure. He frames AKP policies as the ones that reverse this trend and heal the wounds. As examples of progress, Erdoğan lists the elimination of the headscarf ban and the AKP’s anti-­domestic violence law, called “The Law Concerning the Protection of Family and the Prevention of Violence Against Women (#6284)”. Clearly, the latter was passed despite intense criticism from the women’s rights groups who criticized the party’s inability to consider taking anti-­violence measures without thinking about the family first. Also clearly, neither Erdoğan nor the AKP members of the parliament find any contradiction in achieving these two objectives at the same time despite the fact that domestic violence against women is committed mostly by one of the family members, usually the husband or the ex-­husband. Erdoğan also openly and repeatedly criticizes women’s rights activists’ demands for gender equality, arguing that it is against nature (fıtrat) for men and

62   Competing visions of gender women to be equal. What Erdoğan probably means is that because men and women are biologically different, they cannot be socially, politically and economically equal; the best they can be is to be “complementary” to each other. This concept of complementarianism between men and women, has been advocated as an alternative to the concept of equality by faith-­based movements all over the world, not only in Islamic circles. Accordingly, social, political and economic equality between men and women is neither feasible nor desirable due to the biological differences. Because women can reproduce, it means that a perfect gender division of labor is not only legitimate but is also dictated by God and nature: More specifically, women are the ones who need to stay at home, cook, clean and take care of the children and the elderly. Men are completely free from these responsibilities except that they need to provide for the family. That women do not always reproduce, nor is it the only thing they can do, seem to be minor details. Furthermore, it is not clear how the fact that men cannot biologically carry babies in their wombs and give birth, conveniently absolves them from the responsibility of performing housework and providing child and elderly care. As Chapter 1 discusses, any gender division of labor that does not take into account the reproductive roles women play in the domestic sphere would fail to tackle the challenge of gender inequality. This point lies at the center of the feminist political economy approach. While identifying what is not acceptable, Erdoğan also defines the boundaries of permissible political activism for women. Accordingly, at best, women may demand to be equal with other women (eşdeğer olmak) while men may demand the same thing. However, men and women may not demand to be equal to one another (“Cumharbaşkanı Erdoğan” 2011). The type of women’s activism that does not follow this AKP-­approved gender roles has faced not only strong criticism by the top of the state leadership, but has also been subjected to brutal police force and even detention. International Women’s Day, on March 8, has become a day in which women protestors repeatedly face detention as well as police brutality and beating (“Kadınlar Günü” 2018; “Kadıköy’de Dünya Kadınlar Günü” 2016). Denying women’s individuality has many policy implications, such as abortion rights. The AKP tried to criminalize abortion in 2012, as will be discussed in Chapter 5. The bill was later withdrawn for reasons unknown to the public to this day. However, even after the AKP withdrew the bill and never officially tried to criminalize abortion again, statements by the top brass unequivocally made clear their disapproval and practically ended the procedure in public hospitals. This was done through intense and repeated anti-­abortion language: For instance, Erdoğan stated in his speech in a conference in İstanbul that “abortion was a murder” (“Erdoğan: Kürtaj Bir Cinayettir” 2012). Shortly after Erdoğan’s statement, not surprisingly, Mehmet Görmez, the President of the DİB, made a statement supporting his position on abortion stating that “unless there is a legitimate reason, abortion is haram [forbidden by Islamic law] and a murder” (“Diyanetten Kürtaj Açıklaması” 2012). The anti-­abortion statements by the top brass continued, even concerning rape cases. Recep Akdağ, then Minister of Health, initiated a major public discussion

Competing visions of gender   63 in 2012 by arguing that even rape victims should not resort to abortion because the children who resulted from rape could be taken care of by public institutions, such as the orphanage (“Bakan Akdağ” 2012). Akdağ argued that it is not acceptable that women can terminate their pregnancy without any reason until the tenth week of pregnancy and claimed that, in Turkey, abortion is being used as a method of birth control, which he argued, violates the baby’s right to live (“Bakan Akdağ” 2012). Akdağ’s statement initiated a national discussion on abortion. Soon after, others from the AKP joined the fray. Ayhan Sefer Üstün, Chairperson of the National Assembly’s Commission of Human Rights and AKP legislator, gave support to the Minister of Health by stating that “abortion is a crime against humanity” (“AK Partili Üstün” 2012). These public condemnations of abortion by the top brass encouraged some court decisions as well. In 2014, a court denied a 16-year-­old rape victim’s application to have an abortion on the basis that the fetus’s right to live is more important than the mother’s psychological well-­being (“Çığlığını Duydular” 2014). The decision was finally overturned by a higher court, which allowed the abortion to take place (“Çığlığını Duydular” 2014). The AKP’s abortion policy is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Another implication of the failure to see women as human beings but consider them only as sexual objects is to deny women their sexuality. These two seem to be contradictory, but actually they reinforce each other. That’s the reason why women’s very existence needs to be controlled by, and they need to be segregated from, men, and their behaviors require strict control: Any provocation, such as a smile or laughter, can cause a serious threat to public order, according to then Deputy Minister, Bülent Arınç. In a public speech, Arınç stated that namus (sexual integrity) is of utmost important for both men and women and added that women should know the difference between mahrem (people with whom marriage is prohibited) and namahrem (people with whom marriage is allowed) and should not laugh in public places, where namahrem is present, because this would be provocative to men (“Arınç: Kadınlar” 2014). Arınç’s statement is directly related to the mentality of the AKP’s top brass that while women do not own their sexuality, they are always associated with sex one way or another. Although they lack the agency to control their bodies, the fact that they are always related to the sexual act, necessitates strict control of them for a moral society. 2  Family-­centered The AKP’s concept of “sacred family” lies right at the intersection of Islamic conservatism and neoliberalism. Akkan argues that “The AKP’s gender politics assign women the role of blessed mothers, protected wives, and devoted care providers within the discursive framework of sacred familialism” (Akkan 2018, 72). The party constructs the concept of “sacred family” by frequent references to Islamic history, hadith and sunnah (the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Mohammed). This religious reference makes it almost impossible for the party

64   Competing visions of gender to see the family critically, accept that women could exist independently from their families and that women could be harmed by their own families. Because of its insistence that women should be defined either in reference to their children (as mothers) or their husbands (as wives), the AKP resisted establishing a ministry devoted to women’s issues with a commitment to gender equality, as long demanded by women’s activists. The previous ministry that came close to being a Ministry of Women was the Ministry of Woman and Family. Instead of meeting the activists’ demand to establish a ministry just for women, the AKP instead replaced the Ministry of Woman and Family in 2011 by another ministry called the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, thereby completely eliminating the word “woman” from the title. Women’s organizations launched a petition to collect signatures against the abolishment of the Ministry of Woman, emphasizing that this would be against the international conventions that Turkey had already signed. Nevertheless, the government continued with its initial plan: The General Directorate of the Status of Woman was placed under the ministry along with other directorates, such as the ones on youth and the disabled. This decision institutionalized the AKP’s envisioning that women may only be considered within the context of family (Nas 2016). The decree of law (#633) that established the Ministry of Family and Social Policies states that the first objective of the new ministry is to produce policies at the national level while the second objective is to “protect the family against the social and cultural erosion” (Kanun Hükmünde Kararname #633). Its first objective was defined in the decree of law as being to produce social policies at the national level while the second objective is “to protect the family against social and cultural erosion” (Kanun Hükmünde Kararname #633). The prevention of gender discrimination and the protection of women’s rights are listed as the fourth objective. Women activists’ objection to envisioning of women only within the context of family were responded to by Erdoğan himself, who stated that “we are a conservative party. Family is of utmost importance for us” (“Bize Tezgah Kuruyorlar!” 2011). The AKP’s understanding of women only within the family is flawed on at least three grounds. First, women do face many problems beyond those they face in the family. These problems include the lack of political participation, violence, gender segregation, the wage gap, sexual harassment, discrimination in hiring and promotion, mobbing at the workplace, etc. This is because the patriarchal structure influences every institution, ranging from political to social and to the legal system. An exclusive focus on the family belittles the secondary status women experience on a daily basis and offers nothing as a solution. Second, the idealization of family as a backbone of the conservative ideology falls short in the promotion of gender equality. The Islamic conservatism—as well as conservatism in general—expects women to sacrifice themselves for the family, not the other way around. Girls are prepared to do so starting from their childhood. If necessary, they are even expected to give up their own education and occupation to take care of the family. Respect for the husband as well as for the elderly whom they need to take care is particularly emphasized. This patriarchal

Competing visions of gender   65 structure clearly is not one that supports women’s rights nor does it allow women to make decisions just for themselves independently from the family. In particular, when there is a contradiction between the protection of women and the protection of the family, the family is almost always prioritized according to the AKP’s morality. This is a serious shortcoming given that one out of every three women has experienced domestic violence at the hands of their spouses. In other words, protecting the family and protecting women are often contradictory goals. A good case in point is the law entitled “The Law for the Protection of Family and the Prevention of Violence against Women” (#6284) that was accepted in 2012 by the parliament. Article 1 of the law states the purpose as “to protect women who are under threat of violence and those who are subjected to violence.” Prevention of violence is not one of the objectives of the law. The implementation of this law is undermined “by the government’s failure to better prevent abuse in the first place, change discriminatory attitudes, and effectively address the barriers that deter women and girls from reporting abuse and accessing protection” (“He Loves You; He Beats You” 2011). Furthermore, under this law, women who have experienced domestic violence have to prove the violence and convince the police that they were victims of violence (Ayhan 2017, 148). Women’s shelters do not have sufficient numbers of beds nor do they prepare women to be economically independent (Ayhan 2017, 148). More importantly, these legal measures are not sufficient to prevent violence against women. Because the AKP does not fulfill its duty to prevent gender-­based injustices and adopt an egalitarian discourse and policies, the implementation of these laws has been limited and violence against women has skyrocketed. As the name of the law suggests, for the AKP the protection of the family comes before the protection of women. Third, the sacred family concept of the AKP, paradoxically, has also been subjected to major transformation at the hands of government policies. As Çarkoğlu and Kafescioğlu (2014, 20) write, The family also becomes vital to the functioning of neo-­liberal rationality. The welfare and social security services of the state that are weakened under neo-­liberal policies are largely compensated for by mechanisms of the social and political domain, namely the family and charity organizations. This is exactly what makes the AKP’s “sacred family” different from the emphasis on family in the previous periods. Akkan (2018, 82) argues that “as a political imaginary construct that stands at the axis of cultural conservatism and economic liberalism, the sacred family differs from the implicitly familialist framework that marked the social policy environment prior to the AKP’s ascension to power.” Akkan (2018, 82) argues that The emerging model of familialism continues to reflect a politics of care that supports the family in its caring function but in changing circumstances.… In

66   Competing visions of gender the emerging politics of care in Turkey, public documents that address care, new policy initiatives such as the cash-­for-care schemes, newly introduced labor market policies addressing work and family reconciliation, and the intrusion of the private care services have opened up a space for care politics. This may appear to be a paradox: while AKP’s sacred familialism, built on conservative gender politics, is evident in their political discourse, care is now receiving more public recognition than in any other. In other words, while constructing the family as sacred and untouchable, the AKP paradoxically undermines the very foundation of it by subcontracting the family care and privatizing family relations. 3  Sanctioned by Islam The AKP uses Islam as the ultimate legitimacy to back up its gender discourse and policies. The institution that is actively involved in legitimizing the AKP’s gender ideology has been the DİB, an institution that was initially founded to serve the needs of a secular regime. Under AKP rule, however, the DİB moved away from its initial mission and became the backbone of AKP policies that inject a particular version of Islamic consciousness, and by doing so it has undermined the secular system through various means. Currently, the DİB acts like an office that accompanies, legitimizes, approves, and carries out almost every public service, ranging from the preparation of textbooks to the provision of childcare and couple’s therapy to legal discussions. The DİB gets involved in this wide range of activities through signing collaboration protocols, as discussed in the next three chapters. This can be summarized in DİB’s own newsletters: In addition to giving sermons, our religious clerics have reached out beyond the mosque to integrate with the society and contribute to its unity. For that purpose, they visit prisons, nursing homes, day care centers, hospitals and households, organize visits to offer condolences, and participate in engagement and marriage ceremonies and organize picnics, kermises, theaters, trips and TV-­radio programs. (Kadın ve Aileye Yönelik Çalışmalar 2010, 12) According to the DİB’s own reports, the number of religious sermons increased from 20,011 in 2007 to 53,485 in 2009 (Kadın ve Aileye Yönelik Çalışmalar 2010, 13). The DİB also issues fatwas (religious rulings) legitimizing certain policies and discourses while delegitimizing others. For instance, the DİB supported Erdoğan’s anti-­abortion statement only a few days after, whereas it took the institution years to condemn under-­age marriages and domestic violence. In other words, what the DİB says is as important as what it does not. In sum, the institution that was envisioned to control conservative interpretation of Islam

Competing visions of gender   67 has, over time, become the one that promoted it under AKP rule. The DİB also pursues this role with impunity as the organization is not subject to any kind of scrutiny. This “above politics” role of the DİB gives the kind of privilege to the institution that no other public institution currently enjoys. The DİB’s interpretation of Islam does not reflect the plurality of Islamic consciousness, neither within the Islamic traditions nor inside Turkey. The DİB rather acts as if it holds a higher moral ground by denying all other Islamic approaches and consciousness. Not surprisingly, this attitude, too, is in line with the AKP’s authoritarian and patriarchal gender ideology. Therefore, the DİB has acted as a key institution that complements the AKP’s gender ideology and policies, giving the clear message that how it interprets Islam is the only legitimate interpretation, and therefore leaving no room for its followers to disagree. The exponential growth of the DİB budget is a testament to its growing role and power. The budget of the DİB increased from 1.472 billion Turkish Lira in 2006 to 6.867 billion Turkish Lira in 2018. This puts the DİB’s budget ahead of 12 ministries as well as the intelligence agency (“Diyanet’e 8 Yılda” 2018). 4  Women as volunteers As the Islamist political parties have become prominent in attracting more voters in elections, a more active role was assigned to the party’s women’s branches as the main actor in recruiting other women. During electoral campaigns, the number of women volunteers reaches hundreds of thousands; these volunteers work for the party and mobilize the constituency, only to return to their homes once the elections are over. This type of women’s activism reached its peak during the 1990s. The Welfare Party, then representative of the Islamist movement, launched some of the most effective women’s political activism, during which women of the women’s branches worked tirelessly in recruiting and mobilizing other women through segregated programs. These women-­only meetings were crucial for women to feel comfortable in talking and interacting with each other (Arat 2005). This was the most successful example of Islamist women’s mobilization by women. These women’s branches exist in every political party, but they rarely function at this level of success. Following the footsteps of the Welfare Party’s successful women’s branches, the AKP organized its own women’s branches, which the party argues to be “the largest women’s organization in the world” (Şahin 2009). It is claimed that the branches have more than a million members and are organized in 896 districts and 81 provinces (Şahin 2009). The Women’s Branches of the AKP are a parallel party organization. What this means is that the organization of women’s branches exists in every city and town, in parallel to the party organization. The women’s branches have their own leadership, staff, volunteers and agendas, although at the top they are connected to the party organization. This is done through the leader of the women’s branches, who serves as an ex officio at various decision-­making committees of the party. The

68   Competing visions of gender main party organization is mostly run by men while the women’s branches are only filled by women. With the exception of occasional male speakers, the activities of the women’s branches are by women, for women. These activities range from seminars addressing the issues women deal with on a daily basis to charity work to help the elderly. They also visit homes to meet other women, listen to their problems and offer various types of social assistance. By doing so, they recruit and mobilize them. Women’s branches have therefore become a major vehicle in the provision of social services to women because during these visits they identify the ones in need. All these services are provided by women activists working within the women’s branches on a voluntary basis. During the electoral campaigns, the network of women’s branches specifically tailor their activities around the party’s political goals. These visits adopt a political tone mobilizing their base. The language of the Women’s Branches is much more conciliatory, progressive, and egalitarian than the main party publications. For instance, there are more references to republican reforms concerning women, and the aims are to “remove all forms of discriminations towards women, to solve healthcare, education, and employment problems, to prevent them from any kinds of aggression and to let them join the political, economic and social decision-­making mechanisms in larger numbers” (Kavaf n.d., 3). According to the party documents, the roles of the women’s branches are summarized in two major categories: (1) get organized at various levels, including village, town, city and district and help the organization become institutionalized, function better and provide guidance; and (2) increase women’s participation in the social, political and economic fields, and raise awareness through national and international projects and activities (“Genel Merkez” n.d.). In sum, the women’s branches have established and mastered a system of female volunteers. It should be emphasized that those women volunteers who are quite active within the organization of the women’s branches are never awarded appointments within the general party organization. In other words, regardless of their hard work, women of the women’s branches do not climb up the organizational ladder. They are expected to provide their labor to serve God (“Allah rızası için”) without expecting any monetary or occupational recognition. The AKP initiated other projects that are also solely based on volunteerism. The project of Gönül Elçileri (Messengers of Heart) is sponsored by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies and promoted by Emine Erdoğan, the wife of President Recep Erdoğan. Gönül Elçileri is a program that generates volunteers, who are channeled towards the charity work that is advocated and legitimized by the religious authorities. Although both male and female volunteers are involved, those who volunteer more and do the actual work by cleaning the houses of the sick and the disabled, cooking for the elderly, entertaining the orphans and helping out in women’s shelters are female volunteers. Gönül Elçileri is not only a case where the state subcontracts its duties to women for free, but also is a case

Competing visions of gender   69 through which the government expands its political base with the program’s thousands of volunteers and beneficiaries. In the AKP’s envisioning, women are therefore expected to provide volunteer services through which the party’s male counterparts enjoy the benefits. Women, as envisioned by the conservative ideology, are expected to work tirelessly for the family as well as for the party under the promise of heaven.

Conclusion The four characteristics of the AKP’s gender constructions, unfortunately, are not meant to equip women to challenge unfavorable power terms. Rather, if anything, policies made with this mentality make women dependent on their families or the socio-­economic services they receive as part of the AKP’s network of assistance programs. These assistance programs are those carried out by the Ministry of Family and Social Programs. The assistance takes a number of forms, including in-­kind transfers, cash transfers to families with school-­aged children, and food assistance programs. Women are prioritized in these assistance programs as many of them lack the ability to live independent lives. Indeed, according to the Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation, women received 70 percent of the social contribution (“AK Parti 2013 Siyasi Vizyonu” n.d.; “Modern ve Büyük Türkiye” n.d.; AK Parti Sosyal Politika Uygulamarı n.d.). These assistance programs are an example par excellence for the AKP’s twin policies of neoliberalism and Islamic conservatism. On the one hand, the public services that provide these services are undermined as well as the women’s ability to provide for themselves due to the reduction of decent-­paying, full-­time jobs with benefits. Also, many women have no option but to provide care to their family members because these services are not provided by the state. Thus, while the AKP undermines whatever is left from the social welfare system, it creates a system of almsgiving, a faith-­based assistance program, which undoubtedly provides political advantages to the governing party. One might argue that women in Turkey faced greater hardship in living independent lives in previous periods as well, and that the AKP is not the only period that contributed to gender inequality. The above discussion has also identified the limitations of the secular-­nationalist construction of women that largely neglected to challenge the unequal gender division of labor at home. Criticizing the secular-­nationalist reforms of Turkey, Kandiyoti writes that: In Turkey, the critical relationships in the household are between in-­marrying women to the male-­headed household. A girl comes to her husband’s household, as her title gelin (literally, the “one who comes”) dictates. In her own socialization as a little girl, it is made quite clear to her that she will have to leave her house of origin and go to el (strangers). This may not be as extreme a break with her past if she marries within her kin group. However, she starts out her married life under extremely unfavorable power terms. (Kandiyoti 1987, 331)

70   Competing visions of gender The AKP’s Islamic conservatism, different from that of previous periods promotes a system in which women, at the outset, are not presented with any option beyond being wives or mothers and existing outside the family. The secular-­ nationalist system’s discourse of equality between men and women was misleading since it did not challenge the private realm, as demonstrated through research that examined textbooks (Helvacıoğlu 1996; Ders Kitaplarında Cinsiyetçilik 2000). The promises were accessible to only a small group of privileged women leaving many more behind. The AKP’s construction of gender hierarchies has broader implications. Violence against women has always been a challenge for Turkey. It is not a coincidence that since the AKP came to power, the number of women murdered by an intimate partner has climbed sharply. According to a women’s rights group named Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu (Platform to Stop Femicide—KCDP), 409 women were murdered by men in 2017 (KCDP Veri Raporu 2018). At the time of writing, the number of femicides since 2010 is almost 2000. These women were subjected to violence as a result of their demand for independence: “One out of every two women killed since 2010 was murdered either by their husbands or boyfriends, with at least 396 taking place at the stage of breaking up or divorce” (“Nearly 2000 Women Killed” 2017). As reported in Hürriyet Daily News, Some 62 percent of women were killed by their husbands, boyfriends, former husbands or former boyfriends, corresponding to 1,193 femicides. At least 213 women were killed either by their fathers, sons or brothers and 114 were killed by male relatives. Among the “justifications” for these murders are suspicion of being cheated on, divorce requests, refusal to get back together, and so-­called “honor killings.” Among the men who committed the killings were those who reportedly complained that their wife “didn’t put tomato sauce in a meal,” “made fun of my manhood,” “complained about me,” and “refused to give her phone’s password to me.” (“Nearly 2000 Women Killed” 2017) Next three chapters will discuss in detail how the AKP’s Islamic patriarchy has fundamentally shaped three policy areas, namely employment, education and health, along the lines identified above. As the long-­term policy changes imply, AKP’s gender ideology does not indicate temporary and ad hoc policy changes. Instead, they address a fundamental restructuring of gender relations with long-­ term implications for future generations.

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3 Employment

Employment and labor relations policies in Turkey have evolved in parallel with the macroeconomic policies implemented in the country at any given time. In the early years of the republic, for instance, a female labor was crucial for the country’s economy because of the reduction of the male population through wars. Therefore, educating women and drawing them into the labor market was of utmost significance. At that time, this goal was relatively easy to achieve owing to the very limited number of educated people in Turkey. Furthermore, a growing population’s nutritional demands enabled many to be successfully employed in the agricultural sector. These early years, therefore, were marked by a significant increase in employment numbers for both men and women, especially in agriculture. The same period also saw the passage of legal measures for the protection of female labor. However, starting from the mid-­1950s, the role of the agricultural sector began to lessen within the larger economy, leading to a steady decline in employment numbers, especially for women. This decline in women’s employment accelerated during the 1980s and 1990s, against the global trend of increasing female employment. While in the late 1970s women’s participation in the labor force, at 51 percent, was comparable with some other OECD countries, by 2015 women’s labor force participation had dropped to 30.5 percent, the lowest among the OECD countries. This chapter offers a comparative examination of the AKP governments’ policies concerning women’s employment. The analysis compares and contrasts the most recent employment policies with earlier ones, highlighting general trends prior to the AKP era and their unique consequences for employment. In addition, the analysis examines women’s employment in relation to men’s to highlight the different impacts of these policies on gender. The following discussion demonstrates that the AKP’s employment policies since 2002 constitute both continuity with and a departure from the employment policies of the 1990s. On the one hand, the AKP policies continued to comply with the neoliberal commitments of the 1990s to further liberalize the economy, because the AKP, at least initially, was committed to meeting the requirements of the treaties previously signed as part of the accession criteria of the European Union (EU). Among the requirements were restructuring of the labor market,

76   Employment lowering the high unemployment rates, and taking the measures necessary to liberalize the economy. On the other hand, these policies constitute a departure from previous employment policies. The AKP governments’ policies are mainly centered on preserving women’s traditional roles as housewives and caregivers under the justification of cultural authenticity and religious duty while also trying to increase their participation in the labor force. These seemingly contradictory objectives have been resolved through a synthesis of neoliberalism and Islamic conservatism in which the traditional gender division of labor was maintained, reinforced, and justified both in the workplace and at home. More specifically, congruence between neoliberalism and Islamic conservatism was possible thanks to flexible market conditions, through which women are employed in segregated settings in “women’s work” or in their own homes where they work without disrupting their “primary” roles as caregivers and homemakers. This chapter provides the specifics of this synthesis achieved during the AKP era. The chapter is divided into two sections. First, a brief summary examines the early republican policies regarding employment up to the 2000s. Then the chapter examines the policies of the AKP government in detail. The focus will be on the main trends in employment, especially in relation to production and reproduction.

Women’s employment from a historical perspective: 1920s–1970s Women’s labor began playing a major role in manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire in parallel with the industrialization trend of the nineteenth century (Makal 2010; Önder 2013). Women’s involvement therefore mostly took the form of relocating women’s labor from home-­based textile weaving and carpet-­ making to workshops. Until the First World War, work in factories and workshops was limited to non-­Muslim women. Later on, owing to the considerable reduction of the male population through the wars, Muslim women also began working in workshops and factories (Makal 2010, 18). While agriculture was the primary sector for female workers, the service sector also employed women, and during the First World War women were employed as public employees. In sum, women actively participated in the labor force during the Ottoman Empire, especially in agriculture, textile weaving, and carpet-­making. Their participation remained limited to these occupations particularly because of the less than ideal working conditions and the low wages (Kılıç and Öztürk, 2014). Although these characteristics of female employment clearly were inherited by the new republic, a lack of census data precludes providing the exact quality and quantity of female labor in the early republic. A major source of information is the 1927 census for the industrial sector. At that time, women constituted 23.73 percent of the total labor force for those 14 years and older. For those younger than 14, the female labor force participation was 35.74 percent. Women’s participation for all ages was about 25 percent. Administrative ­positions were not held by Muslim women, while for non-­Muslim women

Employment   77 employment in such positions was as high as 26 percent (Makal 2010, 21). The total number of female workers remained roughly the same throughout the early 1930s, but between 1937 and 1946, women’s labor force participation increased by 12 percent. This sharp increase might be related to the fact that men were mostly employed in the military in preparation for a possible war. As a result, in 1943, women and girls constituted as much as 42 percent of the overall labor force. The republic period also provided rights and protection to workers. Some significant principles concerning women’s employment were as follows: It was decided in the Izmir Economy Congress that certain occupations, like mining should be off limit for women, that women should get three days off every month and that they should be entitled to an eight week-­maternity leave. With the 1930 Public Health Law (Umumi Hıfzıssıhha Kanunu), some protections were provided and some issues, such as the age limits for male, female and child workers, yearly vacation, content of the work, and the working conditions were regulated. The 1936 Labor Law (#3008) did not identify the jobs where women cannot be employed. The law also failed to provide some protection for motherhood. These were achieved with the 1945 Law of Work-­Related Accidents and Occupational Hazards and Motherhood Insurance. (Önder 2013, 39–40) Urbanization was quite prominent between the 1920s and the 1960s, and the role of the agricultural sector within the gross national product declined from 67 percent to 42 percent as a result (Kalkınma Planı 1963, 9). Despite this decrease, however, an overwhelming percentage of the country’s population continued to live in villages in the 1960s (71.3 percent compared with 82.2 percent in 1927), and the main economic activity for the village dwellers was agriculture (Kalkınma Planı 1963, 7). The country also experienced other changes: The population doubled, and literacy rates, population growth rates, and the gross national product significantly increased. In the 1960s, as a result of high population growth, unemployment rates began to climb while the need for a qualified labor force remained unmet. The increase between the male and female labor forces differed markedly during this time. For instance, in the approximately 20 years between 1947 and 1965, the male labor force increased from 217,000 to 961,000 but the female labor force increased from 51,000 to 110,000 for the same period (İkinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı n.d., 136). Despite the numerical increase, however, the percentages of the labor force participation began to decline starting from the 1950. This decline was directly related to the urbanization, during which the village dwellers failed to find employment in urban areas (Tan 1979; Makal 2001). Education, a closely related topic, is examined in detailed in the next chapter. However, in brief, in the early years of the republic, the education of women was concentrated in particular types of schools (kız teknik eğitim) that prepared them for motherhood and for jobs that are traditionally considered “women’s jobs”

78   Employment (İkinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı n.d., 169). This focus had significant consequences for women’s employment. Other educational programs also aimed at helping women with their household duties and motherhood. Therefore, despite exponential growth in literacy rates and the female labor force, women’s roles in the labor market remained confined to certain sectors and occupations. For instance, according to the 1960 census, women constituted 43 percent of the total labor force but 88 percent of these women were family workers, which meant they were mostly employed in the agricultural sector as unpaid family workers (İkinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı n.d., 211). In sum, both the late Ottoman and the early republican years saw significant changes with respect to women’s employment. Starting from the early republican years, women began to be employed in the public sector and laws were adopted to regulate the working conditions of women workers and provide them with certain rights and protections, such as breast feeding time off and maternity leaves (Makal 2010, 36). Furthermore, legal changes improved working conditions and hours.

Early neoliberalism and the rise of private enterprise: 1980s–1990s The early 1980s were also the beginning of the neoliberal policies for Turkey. The 1980 military coup allowed the implementation of the IMF ’s structural stabilization policies (1980–1983). Since then, regardless of where they are located in the political spectrum, the civilian governments have institutionalized these policies and deepened them. To attract foreign direct investment, Turkey initially relied on liberalization in trade and then on capital accounts. To be compatible with these policies as well as the EU accession criteria, Turkey needed to achieve flexibility in labor markets (Özdemir and Yücesan-Özdemir, 2006). This flexibility was accomplished by replacing state corporatism with the regulation of collective labor (e.g., the Law on Trade Unions (No. 2821), the Law on Collective Bargaining (No.  2822) in 1982, and the new labor law, No.  4857, of 2003) to eliminate rigidities, rules, and legislation that make hiring and firing difficult (Özdemir and Yücesan-Özdemir, 2006). These efforts resulted in dramatic reductions in Turkey’s employment protection legislation index, which was the second highest among the OECD countries in the late 1990s and paved the way for acceleration in temporary and informal employment (Taymaz and Özler, 2005). The import substitution industrialization was replaced by export-­ oriented growth, leading to significant consequences for employment. The same period also saw significant restrictions to labor rights, such as in union membership and unions’ political involvement under the 1982 constitution. As Ayşe Buğra notes, while during the early 1980s the ratios of female employment for a few OECD countries—including Turkey, Greece, Spain, and Portugal—were more or less similar, since that time the labor force participation for women has steadily declined, with Turkey currently being the lowest among the same group of countries (Buğra 2010). As discussed in the previous section,

Employment   79 this decline was closely related to the urbanization trend, which failed to provide employment for the new city dwellers. This trend continued through the 1980s and the 1990s. In fact, the share of agricultural employment in total employment fell from 46.5 percent in 1988 to 24 percent in 2000 and from 76.8 percent in 1988 to 13.2 for women (Buğra and Yakut-­Çakar 2010). However, beginning in the 1980s, another important factor, neoliberalism, began to contribute to the climbing unemployment rates for both men and women, as explained below. Therefore, Turkey does not follow the trend in developed countries in which, as the country experiences economic growth, women’s employment increases. Table 3.1 provides an overall picture of the labor market in Turkey between 1990 and 2000. In this period, the labor force grew much more slowly for women (0.04 percent per year) than for men (1.71 percent per year), as labor force participation declined on an annual basis more rapidly for women (2.26 percent) than for men (0.71 percent). These trends were similar to those in the 1980s, except that the 1990s saw a relative improvement in employment growth (i.e., 1.83 percent for men versus 0.26 percent for women per year) while the rate of unemployment was declining (i.e., 1.52 percent for men versus 2.72 percent for women per year). However, these trends must be seen in their context: that is, the relative improvements in employment and unemployment figures were due to declining labor force participation1 and an increase in the size of the population that is not in the labor force. Table 3.1 also shows that increasing employment opportunities for women existed in service and industrial sectors while such opportunities shrank rapidly in agriculture. Again, this was the legacy of similar trends from the 1980s. For example, the implementation of the structural adjustment policies of the IMF led to a reduction in subsidies, particularly for agriculture, and swung the import-­ substitution economy toward export-­oriented growth, emphasizing the textile industry. This major shift, termed “the feminization of labor,” had consequences for gender and was characterized by greater employment of women because the worsening economic conditions required women’s economic participation (Çağatay and Berik 1990; Çağatay 1995). As the export-­led growth was not sufficient to absorb the employment demands of a large population, both men and women who were previously employed in the agricultural sector became unemployed at an increasing rate beginning in the early 1980s. The migration of the unemployed to urban areas did not produce the expected results, especially for women, who ended up becoming housewives in big cities. As İlkkaracan (2012, 8) put it, “Overall, the nonagricultural employment generation capacity of export-­led growth fell short of absorbing the labor surplus emerging from natural urban population growth plus rural–urban migration, and subsequently, two-­digit unemployment rates have become the top policy agenda item.” Dedeoğlu (2012, 277) states  In general terms, in moving from agricultural activities as unpaid family laborers, women became increasingly inactive in cities as the Turkish economy did not create enough jobs, and patriarchal values placed constraints on women’s mobility by limiting their movement into the labor market.

13,990 79.7 12,902 3289 2360 881 4372 6511 6390 7.8 3566 17,556

6160 34.1 5637 819 487 12 4319 1204 4433 8.5 11,885 18,045

15,858 77.8 14,628 5864 2740 1,213 4811 7778 6850 7.8 4530 20,388

Men

Men

Women

1995

1990

6427 30.9 5958 1086 557 25 4270 1613 4344 7.3 14,360 20,787

Women

Source: Authors’ calculation, TÜİK, available at www.tuik.gov.tr (accessed January 9, 2019)

Labor force Labor force participation rate (%) Employed   service    industry    construction    agriculture    urban    rural Unemployment rate (%) Population not in the labor force Non-institutional population

 

16,890 73.7 15,780 7108 3080 1,331 4261 9034 6746 6.6 6025 22,916

Men

2000

Table 3.1 Basic indicators of employment for men and women (1990-2000) (age 15+, thousands)

6188 26.6 5801 1530 730 33 3508 2070 3731 6.3 17,108 23,295

Women

1.71 –0.71 1.83 7.01 2.42 3.75 –0.23 2.98 0.49 –1.52 4.77 2.42

Men

0.04 –2.26 0.26 5.68 3.68 9.2 –1.89 4.93 –1.57 –2.72 3.31 2.32

Women

Annual growth rate (%) (1990–2000)

Employment   81 Those who found jobs ended up in the informal economy where the wages are low and the benefits are non-­existent. During the 1990s, while trade liberalization policies undermined income distribution and social protection, the liberalization of capital accounts attracted exclusively short-­term speculative foreign capital (i.e., “hot money”) rather than long-­term foreign direct investment, ultimately leading to the financial crises of 1994, 2000, and 2001 (Yeldan 2009). Particularly in times of crisis, short detours occurred through populist policies, such as increasing wages and reducing the retirement age, but any gains were quickly lost (Yaşar 2013). Therefore, increasing job insecurity, rural–urban migration, and jobless growth were all characteristics of the 1990s (Buğra and Keyder, 2006; Lordoğlu, 1998; Yeldan, 2009). As is discussed below, the AKP inherited these neoliberal policies and deepened them through decentralization of public administration and social polices (Yaşar 2012, 2013). Characteristics of female employment in Turkey: 2000s onward The declining female participation in the labor force that began in the 1950s ­continued to trend upward in 2009. Table 3.2 provides a summary of the basic employment indicators by gender between 2005 and 2015. One striking characteristic of this period is the rapid annual growth in the female labor force and the female labor force participation rate, calculated as the labor force divided by the total number of women eligible to participate in the labor force. The female labor force participation rate for 2005–2015 increased from about 23 percent to 35 percent. The same rate for males increased from about 71 percent to 77 percent. Female employment increased particularly in the service and industry sectors, mostly in urban settings. In a similar vein, women’s employment grew faster than men’s: per year, it was 4.14 percent for females but 1.96 percent for males. On another positive note, unpaid family work, seasonal unemployment, and informal employment as a percentage of official employment declined for both men and women over time (Table 3.3, rows 7, 8, and 14). The picture that emerges from these numbers seems impressive, especially when compared with the numbers of 1990–2000, as shown in Table 3.1. These figures are the reasons the AKP governments announced success in increasing female labor force participation. However, a close reading of these figures reveals a less than rosy picture for the following reasons. First, the unemployment rates between 2005 and 2015 significantly increased for both men and women simultaneously. For instance, female unemployment grew 1.07 percent per year during the same period while male unemployment grew 0.75 per year. This difference means that the percentage of those who actively seek labor has significantly increased especially for women. In other words, looking only at the total number of labor force participants is misleading because part of the increase in the labor force comes from the unemployed. This is not impressive at all. Moreover, the official unemployment rate fails to capture the actual unemployment, called “the broad unemployment,” as shown in Table 3.3.2

16,704 70.6 14,959 7728 3364 1080 2787 10,441 4518 10.5 6969 23,673

5750 23.3 5108 1894 819 28 2367 2685 2423 11.2 18,935 24,685

18,257 70.8 16,170 8307 3528 1376 2959 11,104 5514 11.4 7544 25,801

7383 27.6 6425 2679 966 56 2724 3575 2850 13 19,357 26,740

Women 19,910 77 18,562 9662 4101 1843 2956 – – 9.2 5932 25,842

Men

2015

– – 12.6 16,720 25,739

9019 35 8058 4220 1230 71 2527

Women

1.6 0.79 1.96 2.03 1.8 4.86 0.54 1.03 1.81 0.75 0.72 0.78

Men

4.09 3.7 4.14 7.28 3.7 8.46 0.59 4.77 2.71 1.07 –1.13 0.38

Women

Annual growth rate (%) (2005–2015)

Source: Authors’ calculation based on TÜİK’s Labor Force Survey Micro Data between 2002 and 2014, available at https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/isgiciapp/isgucu.zul (accessed July 26, 2017).

Labor force Labor force participation rate (%) Employed    service    industry    construction    agriculture    urban    rural Unemployment rate (%) Population not in the labor force Non-institutional population

Men

Men

Women

2010

2005

Table 3.2 Basic indicators of employment for men and women (2005–2015) (age 15+, thousands)

6.4 24.9 7.3 21.8

5.8 9.4 24 6.2

43.6 7.3 2.5 53.2

10.6 18.1

14,933 7947 1779 3264

12 36.9 5.7 11.7

60.7 35.5 20.9 35.5

11.2 27.7

5403 1920 684 2027

11.4 14.2 19.2 2.4

39.9 5.1 5.7 57.3

10.2 17.9

15,382 8816 1755 3322

12.6 35.9 8.8 2.4

58.2 35.2 25.2 34.9

12.8 27.3

6423 2244 941 2332

F

12.2 13 13.7 0.5

37 5.1 7 57.8

11.5 17.8

16,238 9383 2103 3471

M

2009–2011

9.4 41.4 7 2.1

51.5 31.5 23.9 39

11.5 25

7546 2945 985 2457

F

13.6 17 12.6 0.6

30.7 4.7 7 61.8

8.8 14.7

17,880 11,055 1721 3060

M

2012–2014

–

8.9 40.4 4.9 2.3

45.1 27.3 19.8 –

13.2 26.3

1246 2869

8185

F

–

12.5 17.7 10 0.8

28.6 4.6 6.6 –

9.4 15.1

1949 3297

18,728

M

2015–2016

Notes (a) Decent employment is defined as full-time and formal employment at least 40 hours work per week which excludes unpaid family work/employment. Note also that for 2003–2005 period, we had data for only 2004 and 2005. (b) Broad employment (4) = official unemployment (3) + discouraged workers (11) + ready to work (12) + underemployment (13) + Seasonal unemployment (14). (c) Broad unemployment rate (6) = 4/ (1 + 4–13). (d) Until 2009, it is the sum of time-related underemployment and inadequate employment. After 2009, it is only time-related underemployment.

Source: Authors’ calculation based on Labor Force Survey Micro Data between 2002 and 2014, available at https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/isgiciapp/isgucu.zul (accessed July 26, 2017).

Discouraged workers (11) Ready to work (12) Underemployment (13)d Seasonal unemployment (14)

Types of unemployment as % of broad unemployment

10.4 23 65.4 42.3 9.2 27.5

Unemployment rate (5) Broad unemployment rate (6)c

%

5556 1528 642 1621

Types of Informal (7) employment as % of Unpaid family work (8) employment Part-time (9) Decent employment (10)

Employment (1) Decent employment (2)a Unemployment (3) Broad unemployment (4)b

(Thousands)

M

F

F

M

2006–2008

2003–2005

Table 3.3 Decomposition of employment and unemployment (2003-2016) (averages per period)

84   Employment Calculations here of broad unemployment include four categories that are not considered in the official calculation of unemployment. These categories are (1) those who gave up looking for a job but are able to work (“discouraged workers” in row 11); (2) those who are not actively seeking a job but are ready to work (row 12); (3) those who work less than 40 hours in their primary and/or secondary jobs and are willing to work more (underemployed in row 13); and (4) those who are seasonally unemployed (row 14). When these categories are also taken into account, the broad unemployment rate for both males and females rises significantly, an increase that the official unemployment figures underestimate. Moreover, the broad unemployment rate for females has risen by at least twice as much as that of the males during the same period. Thus, the gap between the official and the broad unemployment is widening for females, whereas it is more or less constant for males. Figure 3.1 demonstrates the comparison of the official and broad unemployment rates for both men and women. Moreover, among all types of unemployment listed in Table 3.3 (rows 11 through 14), females have a higher rate than males except in the category of underemployment.3 An increasing percentage of females who are categorized as outside the labor force are either discouraged workers or are not looking for jobs at the moment but are ready to work (see Figure 3.2). Between the two groups, the number of those who are ready to work steadily increases during the AKP years. These women are usually housewives.

Figure 3.1 Official versus broad unemployment rates (2000–2016). Source: Authors’ calculation based on TÜİK’s Labor Force Survey Micro Data between 2002 and 2014 & TÜİK, available at https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/isgiciapp/isgucu.zul (last accessed July 26, 2017).

Employment   85

Figure 3.2 Types of unemployment as a percentage of broad unemployment by gender (2003–2016). Source: Authors’ calculation based on TÜİK’s Labor Force Survey Micro Data between 2002 and 2014 and TÜİK, available at https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/isgiciapp/isgucu.zul (last accessed March 25, 2019).

A second concern that arises with respect to the seemingly rosy picture of female employment is the lack of long-­term sustainability of these newly created jobs because some of these jobs were created by temporary policies implemented to contain the impacts of the 2008–2009 crisis. For example, during this period, the AKP deployed Employment Incentive Packages (İstihdam Teşvik Paketleri), such as Law #5763 in 2008, Law #5838 in 2009, and Law #6111 in 2011. Under these laws, businesses were granted exemptions for social security contributions, particularly for young (18–29) and female workers (Lordoğlu and Koçak 2015). While these laws create the necessary incentives for businesses to hire females, their effectiveness expires with the deadlines. The latest law (Law #6111), for instance, set the deadline for expiration as 2015 but later extended it until 2020. Table 3.4 lists the legal changes made during the AKP period. Another major temporary policy to help create employment for females— echoing the New Deal policies of the Great Depression—was called “Working for the Benefit of the Society Program” (Toplum Yararına Çalışma Programı), which targeted those who lost their jobs owing to the economic crisis, natural disasters, privatization, and restructuring of the economy. The state temporarily assumed responsibility for creating employment opportunities. However, this action comes at the expense of the unemployed because the funds the state uses to create these job opportunities come from the unemployment insurance funds. In other words, the state refrains from allocating extra resources to temporarily fund this program but still takes credit for the job creation that comes at the expense of the unemployment insurance. Furthermore, in addition to being temporary, these programs created only a small number of jobs: About 45,000,

Constitutional Amendment

Amendments to the Income Tax Law

Changes to the Labor Law and Other Laws

Constitutional Amendment (through referendum)

Memorandum to Increase Women’s Employment and to Ensure Equal Opportunity

Promotion of Employment

Protocol Between the 2011 Ministry of Family and Social Policy and the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı-DİB)

5170

5615

5763

5982

27591

6111

 

2011

2010

2010

2008

2007

2004

2003

Labor Law

4857

Date

Name of the law/ regulation

No

Wide ranging responsibilities are assigned to DİB including the protection and the strengthening of the Turkish family; the education of the society to eliminate all discrimination against women, the enhancement of women’s rights, preparation of TV programs concerning the content of the protocol to name only a few. Source: http://sgb.aile.gov.tr/ data/545235d7369dc3369409bd46/aile_dib.pdf

Social Security payments for the newly hired women will be made by the state until 2015 (later it was extended until 2020) Source: www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2011/02/20110225m1. htm&main

Measures include on-the-job training about equal opportunity in all public institutions, all bills, regulations and policies have to consider equal opportunity principles; gender-sensitive statistics will be recorded, etc. Source: www.resmigazete. gov.tr/eskiler/2010/05/20100525-12.htm

Article 10 is amended to state that the measures taken to ensure equality between men and women cannot be interpreted as violation of the principle of equality; Article 41 is amended to state that the family is based on the equality between spouses.

Reductions in businesses’ social security contributions with additional reductions for “young (age 18 to 29) and female” workers, increases in unemployment insurance, increases in incentives for hiring disable people. Source: www. resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2008/05/20080526-5.htm

Article 9 provided exemption for the income raised by women through handcrafts, festivals, and in locations temporarily provided by the public institutions.

Article 10 states men and women have equal rights and the state is responsible for ensuring the equality; Article 90 is reorganized in a way to state that in case of contradiction, international agreements supersedes national laws

Articles 5, 11, 13 and 14: Flexible job conditions are created. Article 5 states that employers cannot discriminate based on sex, among other things; Article 72: Women cannot be hired for certain jobs, such as mining, etc.; Article 74: Maternity rights; paid leave for a total of 16 weeks. Source: www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/06/20030610.htm

Summary

Table 3.4 Laws and regulations concerning women’s employment (2003–2017)

Protocol Between the 2013 Ministry of Family and Social Policy and the Foundation of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Vakfı)

Amendments to Various Laws

Amendments to Labor Law and İŞKUR (Public Employment Agency)

 

6637

6715

The amendments further enhance and regulate flexible market conditions; İŞKUR authorizes private employment businesses to help find jobs; enhances the conditions under which temporary workers could be employed; temporary working conditions de facto curtail many labor rights, such as collective bargaining and the right to strike.

Women will receive the following financial assistance for having children: For the first child, 300 TL, for the second, 400 TL and the third and more children, 600 TL (these amounts might increase over time); women will be able to work half time while receiving full-time salary. For the first child, two months, for the second child, four months and for the third child, six months (public employees will receive six months of maternity leave regardless of the number of children); fathers will be able to take five days paternity leave; women will be able to work half time until their children turn 5.5 years old. Source: www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k6637.html

The Ministry of Family and Social Policy outlines the content of collaboration with the Diyanet Vakfı, a faith-based civil society organization. Accordingly, wide ranging responsibilities are assigned to Diyanet Vakfı including the psychological, sociological, economic, legal, cultural and religious education of family members, providing assistance concerning the programs such as Gönül Elçileri ve Foster Family and raise awareness of the religious significance of these programs, etc. Source: http://sgb.aile.gov.tr/data/545235d7369dc3369409bd46/Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı ile Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Arasında İşbirliği Protokolü (29.05.2013).pdf

Certain rights were given to the nursing mothers and pregnant women including the requirement (Article 13) that business that hire more 100–150 women have to have a nursing room and that hire more than 150 have to provide child care. Source: www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2013/08/20130816-8.htm

The objective of the law is to protect the women who were subjected to domestic violence. Source: www.resmigazete.gov. tr/eskiler/2012/03/20120320-16.htm

Source: www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k6715.html

2016

2015

Decree Concerning the 2013 Employment of Pregnant and Nursing Women

28737

2012

The Law Concerning the Prevention of Violence and the Protection of Family

6284

88   Employment 192,000, and 197,000 jobs in 2009, 2012, and 2013, respectively (Lordoğlu and Koçak 2015, 115). A third concern with respect to the seemingly positive female employment number is the trend toward “proletarianization,” especially for females, with the increase in the share of the wage earners and salaried employees within official employment. For example, in 2003, the share of female wage earners and salaried employees was about 37 percent (Table 3.3). This share jumped to about 61 percent in 2014, an increase of about 65 percent of the original share. This trend was also the case for male workers, albeit at a lower level. The share of male wage earners and salaried employees jumped from about 56 percent in 2003 to about 69 percent in 2014. A related trend in the share of employers and the self-­employed confirms this proletarianization of the labor force. The share of this group among the females was about 12 percent in 2003 and declined to about 10 percent in 2014. For males, it was about 36 percent in 2003 and declined to about 27 percent in 2014. This trend is significant and especially telling for women, as a staggering share of the overall female employees are wage earners and salaried. Fourth, the quality of female employment created during this time raises additional concerns. The quality of employment between 2003 and 2016 is examined here though a category called “decent” employment, which is full-­time, formal employment with social security benefits and at least 40 hours of work per week (see row 10 in Table 3.3). Accordingly, on average, only one-­third of the jobs created for females can be considered decent during this period. With 50 percent on average, this percentage is higher for males for the same period. Although between 2003–2005 and 2012–2014 the percentage increase of decent employment creation is higher for females (12 percent) than males (9 percent), within the total number of employed females, decent jobs constitute only 33 percent. Therefore, despite increasing female employment, decent jobs for females have only modestly increased and still lag significantly behind those of males. Instead, the numbers suggest that the increase in female jobs took place mostly in the form of part-­time and informal jobs. Figure 3.3 demonstrates that the percentage of part-­time jobs within the total employment was 10 percent for females in 2003–2005. This percentage reached a peak of 25 percent in 2009–2011, falling to around 20 percent in 2015–2016. This exponential growth in the percentage of part-­time jobs for females is not matched by the figures for males: The percentage of part-­time employment for males ranges from 2.5 percent to 7 percent during the same period. This shows that the exponential growth of part-­time jobs is unique to females. A closely related topic is the use of informal jobs. As mentioned above, as a positive development, the share of informal jobs as a percentage of official employment for females was reduced from about 65 percent in 2003–2005 to about 45 percent in 2015–2016 (Table 3.3). The same reduction also applies to male jobs: the shares for males for the periods were about 44 percent and 29 percent, respectively. The reduction in both female and male informal jobs was a result of a reform adopted recently, according to which Turkey introduced

Employment   89

Figure 3.3 Part-time employment as a percentage of official employment by gender (2003–2016). Source: Authors’ calculation based on TÜİK’s Labor Force Survey Micro Data between 2002 and 2014 and TÜİK, available at https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/isgiciapp/isgucu.zul (last accessed March 25, 2019).

citizen numbers in 2000—much like social security numbers in the US—and required them to be used in all official transactions between private parties and between the state and citizens. This practice was followed by reforming the fragmented and corporatist pension system of Turkey by consolidating three pension systems into one in 2008.4 These factors, together with increasing numbers of wage earners among the employed (Lordoğlu and Koçak 2015), led to a reduction in the numbers of those who were informally employed (see Table 3.3). This positive development of reducing informal jobs for both females and males also needs to be taken with a grain of salt. Two points are particularly significant. First, the share of informal jobs for females, despite the reduction, remains quite high, and significantly higher than that of males. Second, the exponential growth of the female part-­time jobs and the relative stagnancy in the number of decent jobs for women suggest that the reduction in the informal jobs has not fully led to job security, social security benefits, and high wages for women. Rather, the trend seems to be that because of the introduction of the citizenship numbers, the economic transactions are now being watched more closely by the state. However, many jobs are now moving from the informal sector to the formal but in the form of part-­time jobs. The reasons for the reduced percentage of seasonal and unpaid family work for females also require elaboration. Both are closely related to the neoliberal policies implemented since the 1980s, which significantly undermined the agricultural sector by liberalizing trade and cutting subsidies in agriculture. This trend gained momentum during the AKP years.

90   Employment Fourth, as Tables 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate, all sectors are dominated by men across the years covered. Within each sector, women typically work in low-­paid, low-­status jobs with little to no job security. For example, a closer examination of increasing urban employment of females (68 percent) between 2005 and 2013 reveals that while one-­half of the increase was due to women with higher education degrees, 70 percent of the other half was due to unskilled women with high school or lower levels of education (Gürsel et al. 2010 in Lordoğlu and Koçak 2015). As a result, a representative female in an urban setting is someone who is middle-­aged, unskilled, and working in “administrative and support service activities” and “accommodation and food service activities” (Gürsel et al. 2010 in Lordoğlu and Koçak 2015). Even within the women-­dominated occupations and sectors, such as education, health, and agriculture, the managerial positions are typically held by men (Cudeville and Gurbuzer 2010, 434). This point has implications for the gender wage gap as well, as the gender wage gap is especially high in the private sector but is also present in the public sector. According to OECD data, Turkey ranked 30th among the 35 OECD countries in 2014 with respect to the gender wage gap in full-­time employees, “unadjusted and defined as the difference between male and female median wages divided by the male median wages” (OECD Gender Data, 2014).5 In sum, the main characteristics of female employment in Turkey have not changed despite seemingly positive developments. Rather, women continue to suffer disproportionately from job insecurity even if they are considered to be employed. Moreover, women typically continue to make up the majority of those employed in the informal sector and in part-­time jobs, where benefits do not exist, wages are lower, and job security is non-­existent. The AKP period has not only succeeded in maintaining this inferior status of women in the labor force, but has also justified it through a number of policies, discussed in detail below.

Pillars of the AKP government’s policies for female employment: 2002–present 1  Neoliberal globalism The first AKP government, formed in 2002, came under intense international pressure to promote labor market participation for women. As previously explained, the new government had inherited a declining labor force for both men and women. During the 1990s, the problem of the declining percentage of female employment had been raised by a number of international organizations, including the EU, the UN, the IMF and the World Bank. The pressure coming from the EU was especially significant because many foundational treaties of the EU declared commitment to gender equality, and women’s employment is considered to be a major way to achieve women’s material well-­being (Gender Equality Law in Europe, 2016). Therefore, during the membership negotiations, a number of EU documents had repeatedly identified the declining percentage of female employment as a major problem and recommended measures to reverse

Employment   91 it. As the details below demonstrate, the AKP’s interest in promoting female employment was therefore instrumental, as it was an effective way of improving the country’s record—especially with the EU. The trend of neoliberal globalism has significantly increased during the AKP years. Turkey entered the 2000s with both economic and political crises. The financial crisis of 2001 took its toll by leading the collapse of the coalition government and paving the way for the AKP’s succession. In 2001, however, the previous coalition government invited Kemal Derviş, a World Bank technocrat who served as the Minister of Economy, to implement a set of IMF and World Bank approved stabilization policies. These policies, later adopted and continued by the AKP, deepened and institutionalized neoliberal policies in two stages (Yasar 2012). First, the governments were forced to stop conducting populist activities by means of specific neoliberal policies, such as targeting a budget that could be sustained by increasing indirect taxes and reducing social expenditures and transfers (Boratav and Özuğurlu 2006, 179–180). Second, the policies advocated deregulation measures and administrative reforms to decentralize governmental functions by promoting “good governance.” The purpose was to leave either no or very narrow room for governments in their discretionary populist policies. Various market-­oriented reforms in labor market, agriculture, healthcare, and the social insurance system have been implemented since the early 2000s. The main theme for the changes in labor laws and regulations was singularly about flexibility of labor markets. In fact, from the mid-­1990s on, governments started implementing a series of changes in the laws regarding labor, unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts and so on that aimed to make labor markets less rigid (Topak 2012). The AKP continued to implement these and make further changes in the name of flexibility (Lordoğlu and Koçak 2015). Reforming the social security system, implementing mandatory individual retirement savings accounts, and legalizing private employment bureaus6 are just a few examples of these changes. The watchword of AKP in this period and the driving force for most of the changes in the labor laws was always flexibility (Toksöz 2012; Yeldan 2012; Çelik 2016; Lordoğlu and Koçak 2015). The instrumentality of the goal of increasing female employment can be seen in the Eighth Five-­Year Development Plan (2001–2005), already accepted by the parliament prior to the AKP’s first government in 2002 (Eighth Five-­Year Development Plan 2001). Nevertheless, the report set a number of objectives that significantly shaped the policies of the AKP era. The Eighth Five-­Year Development Plan (2001–2005) warrants detailed examination to demonstrate the continuity between the pre- and post-­AKP eras. First, the report highlighted that the total unemployment rate increased to 7.3 percent in 1999 and, owing to both the unemployed and underemployed population, the “idle” labor force jumped to 14.2 percent (Eighth Five-­Year Development Plan 2001, 112). The total labor force participation was reported as 51.8 percent, with a goal of increasing it for the next five years. Thus, one of the main goals for the economy during the 2000s was that the employment rate “shall be

92   Employment increased and unemployment reduced, by way of increasing the rate of productive investments and achieving a stable economic growth” (Eighth Five-­Year Development Plan 2001, 113). Similar objectives were stated in the next plan, the Ninth Five-­Year Development Plan, which identified the objective for women’s employment as 29.6 percent for 2013 (Ninth Five-­Year Development Plan 2007, 74). Second, the report noted the need to raise the quality of the labor force because unqualified labor is expected to decrease production and productivity (Eighth Five-­Year Development Plan 2001, 113). The report identified the active labor policies as the remedy for ensuring quality and increasing employment for both men and women. These policies are mainly concerned with the supply side of employment under the assumption that a major reason for unemployment is insufficient qualification of the labor force. Globally, these policies have replaced passive labor policies such as unemployment insurance and compensation (Ecevit 2010, 13). Active labor policies aim to increase the skills and qualifications of the labor force by training the labor force, vocational education, and labor force harmonization programs, provision of vocational directing, vocational consultancy and counseling services, development of job searching strategies, providing disadvantaged groups such as the unemployed, the disabled, women and the young with opportunities to find jobs, entrepreneurship training and employment-­guaranteed education programs.  (Ninth Five-­Year Development Plan 2007, 49) As part of the global neoliberal trends, active labor policies have thus dominated the labor policies of the AKP and have been especially advocated “to reduce the unemployment risk for the unskilled and the poor who have migrated to the cities as a result of structural transformation in agriculture” (Ninth Five-­Year Development Plan 2007, 103). Third, the Eighth Five-­Year Development Plan also recommends restructuring employment in favor of the non-­agricultural sector, a trend that began with the neoliberal policies of the 1980s and the promotion of small and medium-­ sized enterprises and individual undertakings (Eighth Five-­Year Development Plan 2001, 114). The report adds that Value-­added creating projects towards unpaid family workers in the agricultural sector, housewives and young people in the cities shall be developed. Incorporating new and other nonstandard working types into legal arrangements that conform to the domestic conditions and international conditions shall ensure an increase in the employment rate. The development potential of employment shall be enhanced by upgrading labor force quality within the framework of harmonization with the EU and in line with technological developments. (Eighth Five-­Year Development Plan 2001, 114)

Employment   93 Fourth, the Eighth Five-­Year Development Plan of 2001 and 2005 specifically discusses women’s status under the section of “Women, Family and Children.” The goals for women mostly concentrated on the area of education. The report notes that for “removing gender prejudices in society, written and visual means of communication shall be used in conjunction together with formal and adult education” (Eighth Five-­Year Development Plan 2001, 103). The report listed no specific goal for employment for women except for stating that … in order to expand the role of women in society and to ensure that women can benefit from equal chance and equal opportunity, measures shall be taken to improve the status of women in the fields of education and enable greater participation in the development process, working life and decision making process (Eighth Five-­Year Development Plan 2001, 253) and “Measures will be taken towards reducing unemployment, especially for the youth, women and disabled persons” (Eighth Five-­Year Development Plan 2001, 254). In sum, the Eighth Five-­Year Development Plan significantly shaped the AKP’s employment policies in that promotion of female employment became a key tool to increase the general employment indicators, and active policies regarding the labor force were identified as the main avenue for promoting employment. Put differently, the main types of policies to promote women’s labor market participation were the types that directly emanated from neoliberal globalism. The Eighth and the Ninth Five-­Year Development Plans set the stage for the main trends of employment for the next decade, during which the AKP governments were in power. The two subsequent development plans—the Tenth and Eleventh plans, which were prepared and approved under the AKP governments—continued to emphasize the same objectives. The Ninth Five-­Year Development Plan set a more specific goal, which was to increase women’s employment rates to 29.6 percent by 2013 by promising “equal opportunities” for women, the young, and the long-­term unemployed and by ensuring women’s “access to childcare and other similar services” (Ninth Five-­Year Development Plan 2007, 98). In line with this goal, the AKP government adopted a memorandum potentially significant for women’s employment: the Memorandum to Increase Women’s Employment and Ensure Equal Opportunity (Table 3.4). The memorandum considers women’s employment and the guarantee of equal pay for equal work as major ways to strengthen women’s socio-­economic status and to ensure gender equality as well as sustainable and social development. Both public and private workplaces can be inspected to check whether they are meeting the criteria. The memorandum also requires collection of statistical data for both men and women, as well as that equal opportunity is considered in all laws of public institutions, that no gender discrimination is allowed in the promotion of employees, that women are employed in managerial

94   Employment p­ ositions, that the gender equality is considered in job training, and that, in private sectors, daycare will be established in accordance with the 4857 Work Law. Table 3.4 lists the major legal arrangements made during the AKP governments. Many of the arrangements are examined below as relevant policies are discussed. When it comes to legal changes, the AKP era does not have a regressive period. Out of the changes proposed to the government, about half were adopted as the law, which is a significant percentage. This success rate is closely related to the majority governments where the ruling party has enough representatives to make laws on its own. The law of 6111 (Teşvik Kanunu) is one of the progressive laws proposed by the Directorate. The remaining characteristics of the AKP era’s employment policies concerning women are mainly based on these legal arrangements, but also take into account other indirect policies as well as discourses. 2  Vocational training Following global trends, vocational training and women’s entrepreneurship (discussed in the next section) have gradually gained more prominence in Turkey, eventually becoming two of the main pillars of public policies. Ironically, the public policies of vocational training and female entrepreneurship reflect the declining role of the public sector in employment and are meant to encourage trainees to pursue employment outside the public sector. While both types of policies have been uniformly implemented worldwide since the 1990s, they are rarely carried out in a centralized fashion. Multiple government institutions, civil society organizations, and agents of international organizations are involved without necessarily coordinating their distinct and at times contradictory efforts.7 Moreover, since the projects that are funded and promoted are mostly ad-­hoc with little to no follow-­up and evaluation, no data exist to evaluate the overall effectiveness of these policies and to discuss their successes and failures. For this reason, the discussion and evaluation below are based on material collected during fieldwork and interviews and reports of individual projects of discrete governmental and non-­governmental institutions. Vocational training is often provided through courses that give job-­specific and hands-­on training. These courses, which typically provide successful trainees with certification, are often offered by İŞKUR (Public Employment Agency of Turkey) as the Ninth Five-­Year Development Plan 2007–2013 identified the institution as the main one to provide vocational training. The courses aim to teach attendees the necessary qualifications to facilitate their employment and are offered throughout the year as training for many occupations, such as security personnel, call center attendant, cashier, clerk, account, tailor, cook, and hair designer, to name only a few. These courses are free and open to anyone interested, and typically require the participants to earn certain credit hours to receive a certificate. Some courses offer practical experience, such as an internship.

Employment   95 A major problem with the vocational training programs is that despite the promises they make and the hopes they raise among the participants, the overwhelming majority of these training programs do not guarantee employment. Rather, with a few exceptions, participants are expected to find employment on their own using their newly gained skills and knowledge. İŞKUR also offers a few courses with the promise of employment, and pays participants a small stipend for each day they attend. However, among the overall vocational training courses, the number of these courses is quite limited (İŞKUR Mesleki Eğitim Kursları 2017). Table 3.5 reports the employment data based on the İŞKUR annuals. In 2009, for instance, 11.4 percent of male graduates and 9.3 percent of female graduates found jobs after the vocational courses. The percentages seem to improve over years. In 2011, for instance, the percentage increased to 38 percent for males and 25 percent for females. Of the years covered, the highest year seems to be 2013, with 67 percent for males and 40 percent for females. These figures need to be read with two considerations in mind. First, the data presented in Table 3.5 report only İŞKUR courses. As explained above, a large number of courses are offered by various institutions that do not provide any data on the success rates. Second, the quality of the jobs is not reported. In other words, it is unknown how many of these jobs are temporary or operate in the informal sector with no benefits. A report prepared by the World Bank evaluating the İŞKUR vocational courses attests to this point by stating that İŞKUR training courses considered under this study are found to have no significant impact on the likelihood of working, the number of hours worked per week, or the monthly income received. However, courses are found to have a small but statistically significant impact on the quality of employment. In particular, İŞKUR training increases the probability of working in the formal sector by up to 3 percentage points, which is equivalent to a 10 percent increase in formal sector employment. And training increases income from formal employment (by up to 13 percent) and occupational quality. The impact of training on employment appears larger for men over 25 years of age, but the differences by age and gender are not significant, nor are the differences by level of education. (Turkey: Evaluating the Impact 2013, X–XI) Second, the male dominance in the labor market is also reflected in the courses. Table 3.5 shows that between 2009 and 2012, the majority of the attendees were men. In 2011, a total of 16,594 courses were given with enrollment of 41 percent women and 59 percent men. In 2012 alone, a total of 27,351 courses were given by İŞKUR with 40 percent of the participants being female (İŞKUR Yıllığı 2012, 184). Third, the İŞKUR data also show that males are more likely to find jobs than females. For instance, in 2012, while 45 percent of the male training participants found employment, only 29 percent of the female participants found jobs

13,671

NA NA 968 114 1489 2395 656 27 26 681 16 78 120,099 8706

39,451

NA 3526 NA 918 3101 66 151 50 449 836 1012 1863 2551 NA 4603 67 1227 59 4 NA 769 NA 669 NA 93,753 114,321

M

M

F

2010

2009 M

F

M

2012 F

M

2013 F

15,635

55,270

25,914 124,723

55,188

Note * 2015 statistics do not include the data on vocational courses or the total employment.

71,368

44,744

2598 11,467 8674 12,094 10,745 NA NA 2140 1353 2991 3953 7689 2397 5861 866 1109 4747 1785 7609 1594 6362 91 325 824 137 222 1051 1646 365 1487 558 1508 700 963 1257 575 1746 853 898 418 NA 245 947 60 3754 253 736 4028 16 1663 15 1548 0 875 1129 26 1164 306 1094 58 2186 NA NA NA 594 6 NA NA NA NA NA 3 603 NA NA NA NA NA 332 1197 229 966 27,495 147,109 102,907 276,901 187,744 107,001 113,074

F

2011

Source: İŞKUR Yıllıkları, 2008–2015, available at www.iskur.gov.tr/kurumsal/istatistikler/ (accessed January 9, 2019).

Business manager Call center attendant Manufacturing Accounting Waiter Mechanic, electronics Nurse for old and sick people Babysitter Skin care Plumber Child development staff Fashion designer Total attendees (all courses) Total employment

Select courses

Table 3.5 Attendees of select İŞKUR vocational courses and employment (2009–2014)*

F

24,615

24,321

16,669 15,209 4251 7783 694 2014 1068 2123 1697 722 268 166 102 352 158 1561 NA NA NA NA 1 413 NA NA 94,951 105,819

M

2014

Employment   97 because of their vocational training (İŞKUR Yıllığı 2012, 97). This ratio was similar in 2011, with 27 percent females and 73 percent males. This observation is true for every year covered in the annual reports.8 Fourth, the vocational training programs also seem to be contributing to the gendered nature of the labor market by reinforcing and justifying job segregation and the accompanying pay gap. As Table 3.5 demonstrates, men and women tend to concentrate on certain types of jobs that are considered “gender-­ appropriate.” In 2012, for instance, fashion designer courses had a total of 1197 women and 332 men, and patient acceptance officer had 787 women and 129 men, while child development staff had 603 women and only three men; hair care and dresser had 1094 women and 306 men; machine operator had 1066 men and 196 women; baby sitter had 1548 women and 15 men. Those who receive vocational training are not necessarily expected to be entrepreneurs. However, the İŞKUR statistics report in 2012 that 75 percent of those who were employed after the training found jobs in the private sector while 25 percent were in the public sector (İŞKUR Yıllığı 2012, 80) and in 2011 this ratio favored the private sector even more, with 83 percent and 17 percent (İŞKUR Yıllığı 2011, 76). The gender pay gap is closely related to the job segregation that the courses are contributing to because, generally, the female-­dominated sectors, such as child care and elder care, tend to pay less than the male-­dominated jobs, such as machine operator. 3  The promotion of entrepreneurship As discussed above, promotion of entrepreneurship has been explicitly stated as a goal in government programs since the 2000s. The program of the 65th government stated that increasing the number of women entrepreneurs was one of the objectives of the new government (65. Hükümet Programı 2016, 16). The promotion takes a variety of forms, ranging from courses to grants and consultation services. Entrepreneurship courses aim to inspire candidates to become entrepreneurs and open their own businesses as well as to train existing business owners to enhance their businesses. A number of government institutions work collaboratively with civil society organizations and international organizations to promote entrepreneurship. Three of the main institutions are İŞKUR, KOSGEB (Small and Medium Enterprises Development Organization), and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (İŞKUR Home Page). In many cases, public banks are also involved by providing loans.9 The unit of Economic Status of Women at the Ministry of Family and Social Policy also has programs that directly target women entrepreneurs, for whom the Ministry provides funds that women entrepreneurs are exempt from repaying. Interested trainees could apply to the directorates available in all 81 cities for the İŞKUR courses. İŞKUR provides training in developing an entrepreneurship idea, market planning, marketing, production, management, finance, and business planning. Trainees also receive a daily stipend and get health insurance during the programs (İŞKUR Girişimcilik Broşürü n.d., 2). KOSGEB courses

98   Employment during the 1990s targeted only already existing businesses. Since 2009, these courses have been restructured to include those who start a business and to provide training and interest-­free loans and grants. New business owners receive a maximum of 50,000 TL grant and 100,000 TL interest-­free credit (KOSGEB Home Page, 2017). Women entrepreneurs can receive higher financial aid. Since the early 2000s, promotion of entrepreneurship has been the backbone of the AKP government’s employment policies. In addition to the public institutions that actively promoted entrepreneurship, the AKP governments have also initiated a series of projects to inspire and encourage women entrepreneurs. These projects were directly planned and advocated by the government or its agencies. One major project of that kind was called “I Cannot Fly with a Single Wing” (Tek Kanatla Uçamam), which was sponsored by the EU, the İŞKUR, and the MLSS from 2009–2013. The program had the joint budget of over €27  million and operated in 43 cities in Turkey (İŞKUR Kadın İstihdamının Desteklenmesi Operasyonu, 2017). The project’s title, “I Cannot Fly with a Single Wing,” refers to the working male population while the other half, the female population, remains unemployed. The title implies the unsustainability of the single-­income family arrangement and the project aims to help women join the labor market and contribute to the national economy. Through the project, 9856 women received vocational and entrepreneurship training. A glance at the list of courses offered shows that almost all projects are in what is considered “women’s work,” such as food preparation, child care and elder care, tourism, animal care, and textiles. A summary of the projects reveals that women are especially encouraged to work from home, where they could prepare food, or to engage in handcrafting to sell in the market. Of the women, 914 were employed in various sectors, 113 initiated their own businesses as entrepreneurs, and 631 began working at home (İŞKUR Kadın İstihdamının Desteklenmesi Operasyonu, 2017). No long-­term assessment of these programs exists. In another project, the government initiated a pilot study to increase women’s employment through grandmothers’ involvement in childcare. The project was implemented in 10 cities for 12 months under the leadership of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. The project aimed to pay grandmothers who were to provide child care to their grandchildren under the age of three. Thus, the project hoped to release women from child care responsibilities and thereby increase their labor market participation (Büyükanne Projesi Uygulama Rehberi n.d.). Many other projects were carried out jointly with international institutions. For instance, one project, sponsored by the World Bank and the Swedish ­International Development and Cooperation Agency, aimed to increase the number of women-­led co-­ops. Another project, sponsored by the UN Development Program and Sabancı University, aimed to accelerate the implementation of the policies of gender equality and encourage women to participate in local politics. Another project, called Equal Work, was jointly sponsored by the World Economic Forum and the Ministry of Family and Social Policy to minimize gender discrimination at work (Türkiye’de Kadın İstihdamı 2013, 67–68).

Employment   99 Apart from the entrepreneurship programs directly sponsored by public institutions, the government sought ways to promote women’s entrepreneurship through some joint projects with some civil society organizations. For instance, the Turkish Confederation for Self-­Employed Artisans and Small Businesses (Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar Konferasyonu—TESK) carried out a giant project called the Project to Support Women Entrepreneurs (2002–2004) (Kadın Girişimcilerin Desteklenmesi Projesi). The project took 24 months and was initiated with EU grant assistance, receiving support from the governors as well as ministers (TESK Kadın Girişimcilerin Desteklenmesi-­1 2017). In 25 cities, 6291 women received vocational training and 2755 women received consultation. A total of 10,684 women received an entrepreneurship certificate, with 255 of the trainees opening their own businesses (TESK Kadın Girişimcilerin Desteklenmesi-­1 2017). One of the many civil society organizations that actively promotes women’s entrepreneurship is the Ankara Foundation of Entrepreneur Women (Ankara Girişimci Kadınlar Derneği—AGIKAD). The foundation collaborates with other civil society organizations and cooperates closely with those organizations in the area of assistance to women. The Ministry of Family and Social Policy has collaborated with many civil society organizations. Among various ways of assisting disadvantaged women, one is to encourage them to become entrepreneurs. The foundation, too, works closely with the Ministry of Family and Social Policy and KOSGEB in helping women open their own business by providing legal assistance and helping them build networks and open their businesses. For instance, the foundation often organizes women living in shelters to make and sell handcrafted items. These activities are typical for civil society organizations that participate in this endeavor. As part of the broader entrepreneurship programs, microcrediting has often been promoted nationally and globally (Mallick 2002; Weiss and Montgomery 2007). The goal of microcrediting has been to help the poor through the economic activities that they initiate. The credits available are small, as the name of the program suggests, and the target audience is particularly women. Women who receive the small credits initiate some economic activity, which is expected to generate some profits, some of which pays the credits back. Some common jobs women use microcrediting for include bakeries, laundry services, textile and dairy products, handcrafts, sewing, and hair dressing. Microcrediting goes hand in hand with the promotion of entrepreneurship, the mainstay of the promotion of women’s employment. The Turkish program started in 2003 by providing millions of credits to thousands of women (Turkey Grameen Microfinance Program 2007). According to the Directorate of Women’s Status under the Ministry of Family and Social Policy, “to benefit from microcredit, at least five women who have a business idea need to get together” (İstihdam Broşürü n.d., 21–22). The women then get a week of training prior to receiving the credit. The credits range between 100 TL and 1000 TL in the first year, with larger credits available in the following years. As critics have noted, microcrediting does not question the role of women within the family, but rather builds on it. The program specifically targets

100   Employment women because they are considered more likely to repay the credit. However, the program ignores the fact that what makes women oppressed is closely related to the gender division of labor within the family, which perpetuates, reinforces, and recreates the gender hierarchies. In sum, microcrediting is far from being a magical tool to create employment for women and help them get out of poverty. It contributes to their unpaid labor at home and in the informal sector as well. Therefore, the attempts to empower women without challenging the patriarchal mechanisms are likely to fail to challenge the women’s status (Öneş et al. 2013). In fact, only a few of those who use microcredit can initiate their own businesses and become independent. How effective have the entrepreneurship programs been in promoting women’s employment? As Turkey keeps no record of new businesses, reliable information about the success of these entrepreneurship programs is not available. Each campaign and program keeps its initial record of participants, but no follow-­up programs exist to gather the long-­term implications of these programs. Despite the lack of reliable data on the success of these programs and the success of the promotion of entrepreneurship as an employment policy, a few academic studies have evaluated these programs. One study found that the number of businesses closing down has steadily increased since the late 1990s, although businesses opening since then fluctuate (Sönmez and Toksoy 2014). Of the total businesses opened in a given year, the percentage of women-­owned businesses remains extremely small (6.9 percent). Also, the analysis of entrepreneurs reveals that the majority of the women (59 percent) have education beyond high school, which reveals the limitations of relying on entrepreneurship as a major employment policy (Sönmez and Toksoy 2014). The data gathered by KOBİ (Small and Medium Size Businesses), a civil society organization, demonstrates the increasing number of businesses opened between 2010 and 2014 (TOBB Türkiye Girişimcilik Stratejisi ve Eylem Planı 2015–2018, 21). Accordingly, the number of businesses during this period increased from 50,423 to 58,715. The number of closed businesses, on the other hand, increased from 11,400 to 15,822. In other words, in 2010, 23 percent of the businesses closed down while this percentage went up to 27 percent in 2014. These numbers do not specifically tell the success rates for male and female entrepreneurs. It is quite likely that the number of closed businesses changed in the five-­year and longer periods. 3  Promotion of flexible jobs The AKP government adopted a project as part of the women’s employment policy to adopt flexible market conditions in women’s employment. The goal of the project, as explained by Fatma Şahin, then Minister of Family and Social Policies, is two-­fold: Main obstacle against improving women’s employment in our country is the incompatibility of the work life and the family life. Because of this imbalance and mismatch, women are forced to make a choice between their work

Employment   101 and their family life. Many women prefer to stay home given the existing social, economic and societal structure. The main reasons why women make this preference are because the working hours are not flexible, that there is not sufficient amount of paid and unpaid time off and that workplaces do not offer good child care opportunities. (Her Alanda Kadın İstihdamının Arttırılması Komisyon Raporu 2013, 36) The Commission report emphasizes that flexible job conditions do not have to mean part-­time jobs, but rather can include other measures to ensure equality and prevent informal jobs. Şahin’s main concern, however, seems to be that flexible jobs should not cause any disruption in women’s traditional roles at home. Şahin states that “if the working hours are ensured to be flexible, women would be able to fulfill their traditional roles while improving their labor participation” (Her Alanda Kadın İstihdamının Arttırılması Komisyon Raporu 2013, 37). Creating flexible market conditions is a multi-­dimensional policy. One aspect is to establish home-­based jobs so that women could work without ignoring their household responsibilities. Another aspect is the flexible contracts that give employers a window of opportunity to reduce hours and lay off workers easily. A further dimension is to make the wages flexible, which means that employees are paid according to their productivity and motivation. In addition to the Labor Law (#4857), listed in Table 3.4, the AKP government made another major legal arrangement that set the conditions for further ensuring the flexibility of the labor market. This was the Amendment to the Labor Law and the Turkish Institution of Labor (#6715), passed in June 2016. With the new law, many amendments were made to the previous labor law and created further conditions for creating flexible jobs. Accordingly, after receiving authorization from the İŞKUR, private companies match the businesses with workers. In other words, the ISKUR subcontracts its main duty of helping find jobs to private companies. These companies will operate in every area, such as seasonal agriculture, home services, temporary expansion of companies, and cyclical jobs with the exception of public jobs. These types of jobs will be primarily short-­term jobs with no long-­term job guarantee; other labor rights, such as benefits, time off, parental leave, sick leave, and the right to strike are also absent from these types of jobs. These flexible jobs are overwhelmingly filled by women. In 2013, an important article appeared in Biz Bir Aileyiz (“We are a Family”), a magazine by the Ministry of Family and Social Policy. The article is significant in further demonstrating the rationale behind the policy of the flexible market because it introduces the concept of the flexible market by arguing that today’s economies are fundamentally and qualitatively different from the previous economies. Production demands constantly change, and market competition is not confined to the boundaries of a country. As a result, the article argues, mass production is no longer a good strategy. Rather, small-­scale demand-­based production is essential (Esneklik Tartışmaları Bağlamında 2013, 58). Furthermore, these changes also require a different type of working force

102   Employment that needs to be organized and to be flexible according to the ebbs and flows of demands. The vast majority of those who work under flexible market conditions are women (Esneklik Tartışmaları Bağlamında 2013, 58). The article admits that a major problem with this type of work is the lack of social security benefits, which makes women more vulnerable (Esneklik Tartışmaları Bağlamında 2013, 59). As İlkkaracan (2012, 15) puts it, Given that three-­quarters of adult women are nonparticipants, and half of the participants are unregistered, a majority of women are excluded by definition from direct access to the social security system. They have only indirect access as dependents in their status as wives, daughters, or mothers of men, to the extent that men are eligible for social security benefits. The flexible market conditions are likely to increase women’s dependence on the male members of their families under the guise of empowering them through employment. 4  The primacy of family Challenges such as the low level of labor market participation for women, the wage gap, gender segregation, and the employment of more women in the informal sector cannot be discussed independently from the traditional roles assigned to women. That is, the gender role assigned to women is confined to home, their primary role is child care and elder care, and women often have the sole responsibility for housework. Such a division of gender roles undoubtedly affects women’s participation in the labor market. As Ecevit (2010, 9) argues, that many women lack the skills and the education for employment is a significant reason—but not the only reason—for their exclusion from the labor market. The expectations of a patriarchal society are a major factor as well. When women work outside the home, the expectation is that they work nearby, that they do not work long hours, that they do not work in male-­dominated settings, that they leave their jobs after getting married, and that they work without disrupting their duties for the household. Indeed, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute’s Household Budget Surveys, women consistently list their household responsibilities as the main reason for their lack of labor market participation (İstihdam Broşürü n.d., 5). Therefore, this tension between women’s individual rights and the patriarchal responsibilities lies at the heart of the women’s employment challenge. The issues surrounding women’s labor market participation have to be understood and discussed within this context. Since the establishment of the Ministry of Family and Social Policy, the primacy of family for women has been institutionalized and the woman as an individual has become even less visible in policies. Ironically, the publications of the Ministry and the speeches of its Ministers often state the necessity of treating women as individuals. However, a closer look reveals that the Ministry unequivocally chooses family interests over women’s interests under all circumstances. The

Employment   103 very fact that women’s issues are explored within the Ministry of Family and Social policy is a testament that women are considered to be a sub-­category of family and do not exist independent from the family. Fatma Şahin, former Ministry of Family and Social Policy (2011–2013), had no problem with bragging about the fact that the Ministry considers women within the context of family: “We pursue family-­based policies for the children, disabled and women” (Aile Bülteni 2013a, 2). Şahin often expressed pride that this approach was unique to Turkey and suggested that it is a virtue lacking in the West. Family values are lost during the process of modernizing, and as a result, Western societies face serious social problems, she argues (Aile Bülteni 2013a, 3). The activities of the Ministry are therefore devoted to the protection of the family, the education of its members, the promotion of family values, and the glorification of the family. The primacy of the family and the argument that the family is unique to the Turkish–Islamic civilization is a common theme articulated in speeches not only by Fatma Şahin, but also by her successors (Aile Bülteni 2013a, 2). The primacy of family over women as individuals appears in various forms in the publications of the Ministry. Women’s education, women’s legal rights, reproductive health, and even entrepreneurship have all been discussed in the category of family education in the Ministry’s publications. Particularly striking is the understanding of civil rights, which are by definition individual rights but are categorized and examined as part of publications on “family education” (Alpaydin 2012, 5). Ayşe Keşir, now an AKP representative serving in the parliament, writes that instead of being advised to put distance between them and their mothers-­ in-law, young girls should be advised on what a blessing it is to have an elder around while taking care of a baby or dealing with a teenager (Keşir 2012a, 20). In another article, Keşir again argues that women’s rights advocates conceptualize women’s household responsibilities and their individual rights as opposite objectives and argues that women’s individual rights are violated owing to their household responsibilities and the traditional family roles (Keşir 2012b, 21). Keşir disagrees that these objectives are mutually exclusive and believes that communication would be able to resolve this conflict. According to Keşir, at the root of the family conflict is the fact that the members of the family fail to develop a common language, history, and discourse. In other words, family conflicts occur solely because of a misunderstanding. According to Keşir, “Concerning women’s rights, we need to create a unique model and discourse that make women in peace with the elderly, the children and the household, keeping the family together but allowing every person to express himself or herself freely” (Keşir 2012b, 22). With the exception of “marginals,” there would be only consensus with respect to women’s human and citizenship rights (Keşir 2012b, 23). How has the construction of women as a sub-­category of the family affected the concrete policies? The AKP’s employment policies seek to increase women’s labor market policies without disrupting the traditional gender division of labor at home or in the labor market, as women’s matriarchal roles are considered

104   Employment worth preserving and are portrayed as the root of cultural superiority. Pre-­ emptively, therefore, the cultural uniqueness argument makes it difficult to question the family and women’s traditional roles. This specific construction of women has been reflected in many public policies. For instance, the decree concerning pregnant and nursing women does not allow fathers to take some time off but gives the sole responsibility of child care to women (Table 3.4). This point was raised by women’s rights advocates during the deliberations at the parliament; however, their concerns were ignored. In surveys, women’s child care and household responsibilities are listed by women as the primary reason for not being in the labor market. İlkkaracan states, The Turkish State assumes no legal responsibility for provision or subsidy of childcare or preschool education.… For the majority of women with low education and household income, access to childcare support is virtually impossible. A survey by the Turkish Statistics Institute in 2006 (TSI 2006) found that in 91.3 percent of the urban households with children age 0–5, the mother is the primary caregiver, while paid care makes up for as little as 2.8 percent (1.2 percent in kindergarten; 1.6 percent with a nanny). (İlkkaracan 2012, 16) In addition, as raised by Kongar and Memiş (2017), AKP’s family policies also include gender asymmetries, such as childcare and parental leave policies. According to Kongar and Memiş (2017, 377), polices such as granting a parental leave just “for mothers, not for fathers, are built on the patriarchal and heteronormative assumptions about women’s role as caregivers and, exacerbate gender inequalities in paid and unpaid work.” Women’s unpaid care responsibility also includes the elderly care: “Like the child care, there is defamilization of elderly care in Turkey. However, there are not enough facilities and certainly not enough of them that are affordable” (Kongar and Memiş 2017, 379). The AKP reinforced women’s roles as caretakers, and the government initiated a cash transfer policy “conditional on taking care of a disabled or ill family member in low-­income households) (Kongar and Memiş 2017, 379). This policy perfectly fits into the AKP’s construction of women as segregated, caretaker, sacrificing mothers in a neoliberal context. Women’s roles within the family are further justified and legitimized through the references to Islam and the Turkish–Islamic culture. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı—DİB), which often adopts a conservative interpretation of Sunni Islam especially under the AKP rule, is directly involved with many policies by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies. As this involvement of the DIB is discussed in the newsletters and magazines of the Ministry, it has apparently become a routine matter. It is telling that the cover of the first issue of the Aile Bülteni, the quarterly newsletter of the Ministry of Family and Social Policy, pictures the Director of the DİB posing with the Minister of the Ministry of Family and Social Policy (Aile Bülteni 2013b).

Employment   105 The first issue also informs the reader about a protocol signed with the DİB concerning foster care, which is promoted to replace adoption on the argument that foster care is more in line with Islamic history. According to the protocol the Ministry signed with the DİB, the parties pledge to collaborate on a number of issues. These issues are the identification of the family-­related problems and organization of training, consultation, education, and social services; highlighting the defining characteristics of the Turkish family structure and determining changes that took place in this structure10 (Table 3.4). Most striking is that the roles and responsibilities assigned to the DİB belong to other public institutions and clearly go beyond the responsibilities expected from a religious institution. As discussed in Chapter 2, an interesting example of the AKP’s conceptualization of gender that reinforces the traditional gender division of labor is the project called the Embassy of Heart (Gönül Elçiliği), sponsored by the Ministry of Family and Social Policy and promoted by Emine Erdoğan, the wife of Tayyip Erdoğan, and advocated by the DİB. According to the project’s manual, the Embassy of Heart refers to serving the humanity without expecting anything in return.… The reason why the concept has deep meanings is because the work being done includes reason, thought, experience, skills and professionalism as much as faith, values and compassion. (Gönül Elçileri Çalışma Rehberi 2013, 8) Ambassadors apply to the program through the Ministry and serve the targeted groups identified as women, children, the disabled, the elderly, veterans, and the relatives of the martyrs and the poor, on the basis of volunteerism. The services expected from the ambassadors are listed as education and consultation, social services and assistance, health, employment, and entrepreneurship. The examples of volunteerism that one can do in employment and entrepreneurship include teaching skills, such as computer use or a foreign language; forming networks for employment; informing others about the İŞKUR vocational courses; providing marketing opportunities for handcraft; providing assistance concerning microcrediting and bank credits; and providing financial education (Gönül Elçileri Çalışma Rehberi 2013, 14). As of June 2017, the number of ambassadors is reported as 691,036 on the project’s home page. According to the assessment report of 2013, the number of volunteers was 516,394. The percentage of female and male participants is almost the same; however, women seem to dominate the project “due to their wide experiences in social services, health and education” (Gönül Elçileri Faaliyet Raporu 2013, 27). Strikingly, examination of the participants according to their education shows that those participants with little to no education are mostly women while those with a Bachelor and postgraduate degrees are mostly men. Gönül Elçileri is a program that generates volunteers who are channeled toward the charity work that is advocated and legitimized by the religious authorities. Although both male and female volunteers are involved, those who volunteer more and do the

106   Employment actual work of cleaning the houses of the sick and the disabled, cooking for the elderly, entertaining the orphans and helping out in women’s shelters are female volunteers. Thus, Gönül Elçileri is not only a case where the state subcontracts its duties to women for free, but also is a case through which the government expands its political base with the program’s thousands of volunteers and beneficiaries. Thus, the program reinforces, recreates, and justifies the traditional division of labor by expanding it beyond the household. This is another example of the reconceptualization of women by AKP rule as religious, segregated, family-­oriented, and caretaker volunteers. In sum, Islamic conservatism, as one of the reasons behind women’s declining employment rates cannot be ignored. A study conducted by İdil (2013), by using the 2006 Household Structure Survey, indicates that in addition to the market conditions, there are “increasing conservative attitude and norms in Turkish society in which women are seen as obedient wives and mothers” (İdil 2013, 47). This is an important finding because it demonstrates in empirical terms how social beliefs and behaviors about socially-­accepted gender roles play an important role in women’s decision to seek employment. İdil (2013, 53) explains that: Women do not make their decisions in isolation, but are influenced by their environment. In conservative and traditional areas, in which men have a greater decision-­making power, and in which there is greater gender inequality, women tend to remain in the home, as expected by society, and become housewives.

Conclusion Turkey’s national employment policies toward women are largely shaped by the EU accession criteria and the IMF-­sanctioned policies of neoliberalism, both of which were set long before the AKP came to power. The defining characteristic of these policies is an exclusive focus on the quantity of employment. Specifically, two major trends in employment deserve attention under global neoliberalism: flexible market conditions and private enterprise. Both of these policies were championed during the AKP era as the main pillars of the public policies to increase female employment. As Gülay Toksöz argues, by following the dictates of global neoliberalism, the governments are basically transferring what is primarily a responsibility of the public sector to the private sector (Toksöz 2007, 73). As the role of the public sector declines in employment, the creation of the flexible market conditions and the encouragement of women to move into entrepreneurship have become not supplemental but rather substitute policies. Owing to its concern with profit, the private sector is not interested in the creation of decent jobs but in the creation of the kinds of jobs that bring little to no job security, no benefits, and low wages. Interestingly, however, the public policies themselves directly contributed to the lack of quality in job creation for  females. For

Employment   107 instance, as part of the measures to increase employment, the government decided to pay salaries to those women who are care-­givers of the elderly. Toksöz (2016, 78) explains, Most of these care givers, who prove to be mainly women (88.8%), have not been covered under the social security system. While the provision of such a form of support to poor households is an improvement, the exclusion from the social security network of people who provide care services all their lives, and the negligence of institutional and public care services, are both unacceptable from the perspective of gender equality and equal access to social rights and services. This example demonstrates the AKP’s dual objectives set for women. On the one hand, women are encouraged to participate in the labor force. On the other hand, they are supposed to maintain their traditional roles. As Özlem Altan-­ Olcay put it, “The expectation of women to become entrepreneurs, whose rationality is defined by self-­sufficiency and market savvy, reproduces neoliberal norms for citizens. Yet, the same women are also expected to take care of their families” (Altan-­Olcay 2014, 253). These seemingly contradictory goals are indeed made possible through the emphasis on the primacy of family and religion. The increasing overtone of religion even in a seemingly irrelevant topic such as employment is undeniable. This takes the form of cooperation with the DİB in preparing, implementing, and introducing the government policies toward family in general and women in particular. Moreover, the Ministry of Family and Social Policies also increasingly relies on religious foundations and charities. Although neither of these directly and explicitly tackles women’s employment, their indirect impact cannot be ignored. The lower levels of female employment compared with the employment of men are closely related to the gender division of labor and women’s responsibility in taking care of children, the elderly, and the sick, and housework in general. The result is what Dedeoğlu (2013) calls “a veiled Europeanisation”: Hence, Turkey presents a veiled Europeanisation model of gendered welfare regime, in which only a small fraction of women enjoy the equality guaranteed in the legislation and have a strong class-­based nature, as most women remain outside the reach of the laws and regulations as there are no active policy measures to bring those changes into women’s lives. In contrast, Dedeoğlu argues, “the conservative approach of the AKP government to women and its focus on three children … and the restrictions applied on abortion, have served to foster women’s roles in the domestic sphere as home-­ makers” (Dedeoğlu 2013, 12–13). Thus, the sporadic progressive legislation of the AKP era is overwhelmed by the remaining conservative Islamic politics that encourages women to give birth to many children at the expense of their work

108   Employment life. The trend toward proletarianization, the exponential growth in part-­time jobs, and unemployment rates are cases in point.

Notes   1 Labor force is the sum of employed and unemployed.   2 This study used the Labor Force Survey Micro Data between 2003 and 2014. For 2015 and 2016, we used publicly available data on TÜİK website. In addition, three-­ year averages of the indicators were used to avoid year-­to-year fluctuations and smooth the impact of the 2008–2009 crisis during which official unemployment rate was at the peak, 13.9 percent for men and 14.3 percent for women.   3 Obviously, this category is more relevant for males since time-­related underemployment is officially not considered as unemployment and females are employed less than males (see Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3).   4 This was a long overdue reform that had been pushed by the IMF and the World Bank (WB) since the early 1990s and began with the help of the International Labor Organization (ILO) by targeting its parametric aspects (e.g., retirement age, minimum contribution for eligibility, unemployment insurance, etc.) in 1999. It consisted of four different programs: the Social Security Institution (Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu), established in 1945 and covering those working in private firms and blue-­collar public workers; the Public Employees’ Pension Fund (Emekli Sandığı) established in 1949 and designed for civil servants; the Social Security Organization of Craftsmen, Tradesmen and Other Self-­Employed (Bağ-Kur), established in 1971 and covering the self-­employed; and private funds, which played an insignificant role in the whole system (Yaşar 2013). Please see Chapter 5 for details.   5 No single institution shapes the employment policies, making the task of discussing the policies rather daunting. A number of national institutions, such as ministries, as well as international ones, such as the World Bank, the European Union, and the United Nations, are all involved. Owing to a lack of a single source, policies may be implemented by various institutions at a given time without knowing long-­term impacts or a having a semblance of collaboration.   6 Private employment bureaus are for-­profit private companies that started as mediators helping employers and employees to find and meet each other. Over time, they turned into entities that hire workers temporarily with no job security and benefits and who are not subject to the related aspects of the labor law (Çelik 2016).   7 The public institutions include the İŞKUR (Turkish Institute of Employment), KOSGEB, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, public banks such as the Halk Bank, and international institutions including the European Union, the UNDP and the ILO. The EU is the institution that is most often directly involved owing to the membership negotiations. According to the Directorate of Woman’s Status, between 2005 and 2008, the European Union itself has funded about 13 vocational training and entrepreneurship projects (Kadın İstihdamı ve Girişimciliği Konusunda Yürütülen Projeler 2012). No data showing the total number of the participants in these courses are available.   8 Data for 2016 were not available at the time of writing.   9 See a list of projects co-­sponsored by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the EU at www.remote.ikg.gov.tr/openform/Projeler.aspx?ProgramKOD=ISKURPWE (accessed June 18, 2017); see also the Halk Bank’s campaign for women’s entrepreneurship at www.dunya.com/halkbanktan-­kadin-girisimcilere-­destek-210447h.htm (accessed June 19, 2017). 10 The tasks assigned to the DİB includes training the Ministry staff in determining research and publication topics; education of the family member towards their responsibilities, and education of them in psychological, sociological, economic,

Employment   109 legal, cultural and religious issues and training the staff who will carry out education programs concerning child care, domestic violence, home economics, etc.; helping reduce the negative impacts of immigration, divorce, neglect and abuse; organizing joint projects in national and religious holidays; organizing media programs in these issues. 11 See the full list of protocols between the Ministry of Family and Social Policy and other public institutions and civil society organizations: at http://sgb.aile.gov.tr/ mevzuat/protokoller.

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112   Employment TESK Kadın Girişimcilerin Desteklenmesi Projesi-­1, TESK Home page, available at www.tesk.org.tr/tr/proje/yurutulen/kadin.php (accessed April 27, 2017). TOBB Türkiye Girişimcilik Stratejisi ve Eylem Planı 2015–2018, available at www. sanayi.gov.tr/DokumanGetHandler.ashx?dokumanId=493ac1cc-1115-4eba-aa7b771aee977189 (accessed June 19, 2017). Toksöz, Gülay. 2007. “Kamu, Özel Sektör, Mesleki Örgütler, Sendikalar, Ulusal ve Uluslararasi Sivil Toplum Kuruluslarının Kadın Emeği ve İstihdamı Alanındaki Uygulamalarının Değerlendirilmesi.” In Serap Güre (Ed.), Kadın Emeği ve İstihdamı Toplantısı Raporu, KEIG, 57–76, available at www.keig.org/content/raporlar/ kadin%20emegi%20ve%20istihdami%20toplantisi%20raporu.2007.pdf (accessed April 27, 2017). Toksöz, Gülay. 2012. “Ulusal İstihdam Stratejisi Kadınlar ve Gençler İçin Ne Getiriyor?” In ULUSAL İSTİHDAM STRATEJİSİ: ELEŞTİREL BİR BAKIŞ, symposium by TÜRK-İŞ (Türkiye İşçi Sendikalarý Konfederasyonu). Toksöz, Gülay. 2016. “Transition from ‘Women’ to ‘Family’ An Analysis of AKP Era Employment Policies from a Gender Perspective.” Journal für Entwicklungspolitik XXXII(1/2): 64–83, available at www.academia.edu/32036966/Transition_from_ Woman_to_Family_An_Analysis_of_AKP_Era_Employment_Policies_from_a_ Gender_Perspective (accessed June 30, 2017). Topak, Oğuz. 2012. Refah Devleti ve Kapitalizm: 2000’li Yıllarda Türkiye’de Refah Devleti. İletişim. İstanbul. Turkey: Evaluating the Impact of Iskur’s Vocational Training Programs. 2013. World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/17561 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO (accessed June 30, 2017). Turkey Grameen Microfinance Program. 2007. Home Page, available at www.tgmp.net/ en/haberler/2 (accessed June 30, 2017). Türkiye’de Kadın İstihdamı ve Yapılan Çalışmalar. 2013. Biz Bir Aileyiz 1(3): 64–68, available at http://eydb.aile.gov.tr/data/54534ab7369dc340d8e9a18d/aile_dergi_3_ tum_lr.pdf (accessed June 30, 2017). Uluslararası Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Zirvesi Bildirileri (Proceedings of the International Summit on Family and Social Policy). 2013. available at http://ailetoplum.aile.gov.tr/ data/54293ea2369dc32358ee2b25/Uluslararas%C4%B1%20Aile%20ve%20 Sosyal%20Politikalar%20Zirvesi.pdf (accessed April 27, 2017). Weiss, John and Heather Montgomery. 2007. “Great Expectations: Microfinance and Poverty Reduction in Asia and Latin America.” Oxford Development Studies 33(3–4): 391–416. World Bank. 2013. Turkey: Evaluating the Impact of Iskur’s Vocational Training Programs. World Bank, available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/ 17561 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO (accessed June 30, 2017) Yaşar, Yavuz. 2012. “Turkey’s Environment and Public Health in the Neo-­liberal Age: An Inconvenient Truth.” The Arab World Geographer 15(1): 20–44. Yaşar, Yavuz. 2013. “The Crisis in the Turkish Pension System: A Post Keynesian Perspective.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 36(1): 131–152. Yeldan, Erinç. 2009. “Patterns of Adjustment in the Age of Finance: The Case of Turkey as a Peripheral Agent of Neoliberal Globalization.” Monthly Review available at http:// networkideas.org/working/feb2009/01_2009.pdf (accessed April 27, 2017). Yeldan, Erinç. 2012. “Ulusal İstihdam Stratejisi” Belgesi Üzerine Makro Ekonomik Bakış.” In ULUSAL İSTİHDAM STRATEJİSİ: ELEŞTİREL BİR BAKIŞ, symposium by TÜRK-İŞ (Türkiye İşçi Sendikalarý Konfederasyonu).

Employment   113 65. Hükümet Programı (65th Government’s Program). May 24, 2016. Available at www. basbakanlik.gov.tr/forms/_global/_government/pg_governmentprogram.aspx (accessed April 27, 2017).

Periodicals Biz Bir Aileyiz (2012–2014). Aile Bülteni (2013–2014).

4 Education

Turkey pursued one of the earliest examples of developmentalism with respect to female education during the early years of the republic. In fact, female education constituted the backbone of the Turkish modernization project. These policies were quite ambitious both due to their content and the extraordinary pace of their adoption and implementation. The Unification of Education Law (Tevhidi Tedrisat Kanunu), for instance, united the education system in 1924 and placed it under the control of Ministry of Education (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı— MEB) ending the dichotomy between secular and religious schools that emerged towards the end of the Ottoman Empire. Similarly, the Turkish Civil Code of 1926, provided better rights for women, improving their status. Turkey’s ambitious policies toward a more egalitarian education system continued in the consecutive years as well. In 1948, the country signed The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 26 of which guarantees the education rights for all humans. Furthermore, different from many other Muslim-­majority countries, which still oppose its full implementation because it contradicts with their Islamic law, Turkey signed in 1980 and ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in its entirety.1 Article 10 of CEDAW brought the responsibility of achieving gender equality in education to the signature countries. Turkey is also one of the few Muslim-­ majority countries that signed the Beijing Declaration of 1995, Article 69 of which defines education as a human right and a way of achieving gender equality. Also, by signing the United Nation’s International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ın 2000, Turkey promised to provide education to all sexes, guaranteed gender equality and mandatory education (Articles 3, 13 and 14) (Özaydınlık 2014, 96–97). Despite these progressive steps in committing to women’s education, Turkey’s actual record has always been mixed: Women always lagged behind men in access to education as well in as in completing formal education. Female students were channeled towards particular occupations, which resulted in gender segregation. Widespread modernization attempts failed to penetrate especially rural, conservative towns where families resented the idea of sending their daughters to schools. Graduation rates for females lagged, especially in higher education. As Acar et al. (1999, 42) argue, “Gender discrimination in education

Education   115 has existed at many levels in education ranging from the fact that administrators were almost exclusively men to the wage gap and the negative attitudes of teachers towards female students.” This chapter examines education policies since the early 2000s, after briefly examining the major trends earlier. The policies of the AKP era in education are marked by two simultaneous trends: On the one hand, a closer look at the numbers suggests that the percentage for school attendance increased for both male and female students although a major gender gap still continues for both K-­12 and higher education. This increase is also true for the graduation rates for both groups while some regions have higher gender gaps than others. On the other hand, the AKP policies of education are marked by a significant decline in the quality of education coupled with a discourse that emphasizes women’s traditional roles as home makers and care givers. The AKP governments since 2002 have pursued an active policy towards increasing the number of İmam Hatip (preacher) schools, the types of schools that emerged in the early 1920s to educate and train the Muslim population’s needs for functionaries and clerks. The number of these schools has grown exponentially since the beginning of the AKP era, faster than any other period before, and, at a higher rate than secular schools. This period also witnessed an increase in Islamic references in the curriculum of secular schools. Regardless of the school type, therefore, pupils since the 2000s have systematically received the explicit and implicit message through education that men and women belong to different realms of life by nature and that this difference—as well as the hierarchy—has been dictated by Islam.

Principles of education Early Republican years (1920s–1940s) The early years of the education policy reflect the new principles of the nascent republic, such as Turkish nationalism and secularism. A major step taken to promote secularism in education was the Unification of Education Law (Tevhidi Tedrisat Kanunu) of 1924, which united all schools under the Ministry of Education by closing down religious schools. The Latin alphabet was adopted in 1928 to break from the Ottoman past, which came under the influence of Islamic civilization, and to remove a major obstacle in increasing the literacy rate, which was about 6 percent in 1926. Increasing the literacy rate was a major challenge due to the incompatibility between the Arabic alphabet and the Turkish language.2 These changes adopted early on facilitated education for both men and women, a major goal for the leaders of the new republic. Women’s education received particular attention among the leaders, particularly Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Koçer 1972, 106–109). How the republican leadership prioritized the principle of secularism and attempted to construct alternative secular values can be clearly seen in the first textbooks. This type of reconstruction was made possible through the textbooks on Islam which were in effect until 1930 (Kaya 2007). For instance, a third grade

116   Education textbook, published in Arabic script, provides general information about mosques, imams, the Muslim community along with religious holidays and the pillars of Islam (Abdulbaki 1928a). The tone of the textbook is descriptive and neutral toward Islam rather than promoting or endorsing it. A fourth grade textbook goes a step further and describes the foundations of Islam as (1) to be a good human being; (2) to work; (3) to be grateful; and (4) not to allow religious exploitation. The listed foundations of Islam differ from the typical five pillars of Islam (Abdulbaki 1928b, 3–4). Patriotism, critical thinking and reasoning were among the common topics emphasized throughout these textbooks. A fifth grade textbook similarly starts by stating that “The religion of Islam gives highest importance to human intelligence” (Abdulbaki 1928c, 3). Here, one can clearly see the attempts at constructing a worldly, progressive and Turkish Islam that places an emphasis on secularized morality rather than Islamic consciousness (Osmanoğlu 2015). With the same spirit, köy enstitüleri (village institutes) opened in the early 1940s, particularly to meet the needs of rural development. These schools were meant to teach the rural population everything they needed, ranging from agriculture to carpentry and music while undermining reactionary values and superstitious beliefs. A major and ambitious undertaking, köy enstitüleri is significant to demonstrate how widespread and transformative were the educational goals of the new republic. Yet, the same attempt is also significant to demonstrate the resistance to these transformative policies. The köy enstitüleri experiment ended in 1954 after the first elected government turned them into regular schools. As Emine Evered wrote in relation to late Ottoman education policy, education “cannot be viewed simply as the state’s imposition of its will on powerless and passive populations. Rather, it must also be viewed with regard to local adaptation, negotiation, acceptance, and resistance” (Evered 2012, XIII). The köy enstitüleri experiment was discontinued but the early years of the republic were able to produce significant growth in school attendance for both men and women based on the principles that governed education: national, scientific, secular, mixed-­gender and applied. Nevertheless, despite the progress made, illiteracy rates remained high, at 87.1 percent for women and 63.8 percent for men in 1941 (Demiray and Curabay 2004, 14). Democrat Party and the aftermaths (1950s–1970s) After the single party period (1923–1945), the Democrat Party won the multi-­ party elections in 1950 and formed the majority government. Although the party leadership had repeatedly expressed its allegiance to what is known as Atatürk’s principless, the Democrat Party quickly turned into a party for those who opposed both the speed and content of the early reforms, particularly secularism. During its 10 years in government, therefore, the Democrat Party tried to restructure education by emphasizing Islam under the principle of “national and moral values” (milli ve manevi değerler). Technical education and training were particularly emphasized as part of the education goals, especially in agriculture (Tangülü 2012, 392).

Education   117 The Democrat Party period is therefore characterized by a number of significant changes: First, the İmam Hatip schools, that were initially opened in the early 1920s and closed down later on under the single party period, were reopened in 1951 (Ozgur 2012). Second, Islam as a course was introduced as mandatory into the fourth and fifth grade curricula in elementary schools and, later on, the same courses were introduced as electives into middle schools (Tangülü 2012, 399). Under the conditions of the Cold War, for the Democrat Party, Islamic education became the magical measure against the threat of communism. Third, considering the village institutes a major departure from “the national and moral values” the Democrat party closed them down and turned them into ordinary schools in 1954. In sum, many principles that govern the education system of the previous period were reversed or undermined during the Democrat party rule. The Democrat Party experience came to an end when a military coup took over the government on May 27, 1960 ending the Democrat Party period. After the Democrat Party period, the education policy again went through another period of restructuring by keeping some Democrat Party policies in effect, such as the İmam Hatip schools, and eliminating others, such as mandatory religious education. The 1970s are characterized by a sharp increase in schools and teachers responding to the needs of high population growth rates. Coupled with the relative freedom of the 1961 constitution, women’s literacy rates significantly increased. According to the 1965 census, literacy rates among women in five cities (Eskişehir, İstanbul, Kırklareli, İzmir, and Tekirdağ) were above 50 percent. Regional discrepancy remained great though, with the lowest female literacy rates being 1.3 percent and 2.8 percent in Hakkari and Siirt, respectively (Koçer 1972, 113). Islamism as a political ideology was not the most prominent political force during the 1970s despite the Democrat Party experience; political conflict took place among the left-­wing and right-­wing nationalist groups while the Islamist forces were still marginalized and unorganized. Neoliberal turn in education (1980s–1990s) The rise of Islamism as a systematic political ideology cannot be explained without understanding the unique roles played by the states, as explained in Chapter 2. The Turkish case is no exception. The Cold War years in the 1970s in Turkey took the form of violent clashes between left-­wing and right-­wing groups, eventually leading to the 1980 military coup. Differing from the previous military coups, the military regime established in the aftermath of the 1980 coup stayed in power the longest—three years—fundamentally shaping the political, economic and social institutions at the time. From the perspective of the military regime, Turkish society was too influenced by left-­wing ideologies, posing dangers to the cultural roots of the nation as well as the country’s close relationship with the Western alliance. Thus, the Islamist movement in Turkey thrived in the post-­1980 coup period within the context of the military regime’s interest in counter-­balancing the left.

118   Education As a remedy to this perceived predicament of the country, the military regime introduced what is called “the Turkish-­Islamic synthesis” (Güven 2005, 195). This was the name of a broad policy to undermine the left by reminding the society of its Turkish-­Islamic roots. Although it is often argued that the military regime “break of the extreme left and right” (Güven 2005, 195), the left was particularly targeted. The Turkish-­Islamic synthesis entailed a number of policies, the main one of which was to integrate the Islamic and nationalist groups into the existing political and economic system. Furthermore, mandatory religious education was adopted in school curricula, Islamic discourse was adopted as a source of national identity, and new İmam Hatip schools opened. The neoliberal policies announced right before the military coup were adopted by the military regime as well. Islamist penetration into the civil service, particularly the Ministry of National Education and the Ministry of Interior, as well as the military and police reached its peak. In other words, as discussed in Chapter 1, the rise of neoliberalism and Islamism as a systematic and persistent political force has strong roots in state policies in the post-­1980 era. The restructuring of the state and society in the aftermath of the coup was so radical and widespread that the impacts only became clear in about a decade. The Ministry of Education, for instance, was one of the few Ministries that Islamists ­targeted to penetrate and shape. Demands for legalizing and normalizing headscarf-­wearing women and female students reached its peak in the late 1980s and Islamist cells in the military were also established in the meantime. The electoral impacts of the Islamist influence were felt for the first time in the 1994 elections. This period was the period during which privatization of the education system began and flourished in line with the neoliberal policies first adopted shortly before the coup, and accelerated in the early 1990s. Private schools, private tutoring centers (dershane), which prepared students towards standardized national exams, as well as private dorms grew exponentially in numbers during this period. These private schools and the tutoring centers provided Islamist groups with ample opportunities to make money and recruit students. By providing free or inexpensive dorms, free transportation, textbooks, and the like, Islamist organizations have lured in thousands of low-­income students, especially from rural areas, who struggled to fit in and establish networks. The Islamist networking initially looked utterly innocent and did not require much from the students in return. However, these safety networks became impossible to leave for students because they provided the much-­needed social networks that helped them socialize, find jobs and even spouses. The window of opportunities created by the neoliberal era for the Islamist movement began to pay off when the mid-­1990s arrived. About a decade and a half later, the Islamists had already become the strongest political party carrying the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi—WP) to government in the 1996 elections. However, the party still lacked the minimum number of seats required to form a majority government. Thus, the Welfare Party formed a coalition government with the Right Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi—DYP).

Education   119 In the meantime, the growing power of the Islamist establishment and the concentration of the Islamist-­leaning servants in top bureaucratic positions as well as the security system were causing some concerns among the seculars, including the military. February 28th measures were adopted in 1996 at the National Security Council, which was dominated by generals who forced the Welfare Party-­led coalition to take extensive measures against the Islamist establishment. The adoption of eight-­year mandatory education was agreed as part of these anti-­Islamism measures. The new education policy closed down İmam Hatip middle schools. To further limit the power of the İmam Hatip high schools, the measures adopted the coefficient factor in the university entrance exam. Accordingly, İmam Hatip graduates were actively discouraged from studying subjects other than theology in the university by having them lose some points if they chose other subject areas. As expected, these measures significantly reduced the number of İmam Hatip pupils, as discussed below. Education programs, campaign, and policies under the AKP (2002–2018) The AKP years are characterized by major changes targeting the education system. As detailed below, the AKP governments undertook campaigns to increase the access of female and male children’s to schooling. The sources of these campaigns were multiple, ranging from public to private to national and international. These years are also characterized by general education programs targeting adults and families, provided with a religious and conservative tone. Below is the brief description of the education statistics during the AKP years. Since the beginning of the republic, the illiteracy rate has significantly declined for both men and women over time. Yet, the gender gap has remained. For example, 45 percent of the females were illiterate in 1980 while the figure was 20 percent for males (Ulusal Eğitim İstatistikleri Veri Tabanı). These figures have dropped gradually to about 7 percent for females and about 1 percent for males, around 2010 (Ulusal Eğitim İstatistikleri Veri Tabanı). The ratio has remained static since then. Put differently, the illiteracy rate for women is seven times higher than that for men. Net schooling ratios for primary and secondary schools increased until the 2011–2012 academic year, during the mandatory eight-­year education system (Ulusal Eğitim İstatistikleri Veri Tabanı). For instance, in primary education, the overall net schooling ratio jumped from 84 percent in the 1997–1998 academic year to 98.5 percent in the 2011–2012 academic year. There is a similar trend in secondary education: It increased from 38 percent in the 1997–1998 academic year to 67 percent in the 2011–2012 academic year. As discussed below, the education system was radically transformed as a result of a new education system (commonly referred to as 4 + 4 + 4) adopted in 2012. The net schooling ratio for the second four years, which is the equivalent of middle school, was 93 percent in the 2012–2013 and increased to 94 percent in the 2017–2018 academic year. The last four years, which is the equivalent of

120   Education high school, has shown a steady increase since the 2012–2013 academic year, jumping from 69 percent to 83 percent. These are impressive numbers demonstrating significant improvement in the overall schooling ratio. Also, it is important to note that during the eight-­year mandatory education system, the net schooling ratio gap for female and male students narrowed over time. For instance, at the beginning of the eight-­year mandatory education system (1997–1998), the net schooling ratio for females was 79 percent while for males it was 90 percent. The gender gap in the schooling ratio was 11 percent, which almost disappeared, declining to 0.21 percent in the 2011–2012 academic year (Ulusal Eğitim İstatistikleri Veri Tabanı). Similarly, the gender gap in the net schooling ratio declined for the middle school although the gap remained greater. It was 7.23 percent at the beginning of the eight-­year mandatory education system (1997–1998) and it declined to 2.39 at the end of the eight-­year mandatory education system (2011–2012). New education system: 4 + 4 + 4 The General Assembly of Turkey passed one of the most controversial laws in education on March 30, 2012 (Law #6287, Table 4.1). The law established a new system of education for K-­12 by ending the 1997 Law of eight-­year mandatory education. Instead of the previous mandatory eight-­year education, the new law divided the 12-year education into three sections as follows, (1) a four-­year elementary education; (2) a four-­year middle school; and (3) a four-­ year high school education, commonly referred to as 4 + 4 + 4. Adopted by the General Assembly only ten days after the bill was introduced, the law was not properly discussed by the public before its adoption. After the vote, however, the new law became subject to staunch criticism among educators, politicians, parents, and civil society organizations, making it the most controversial education policy of the AKP years (Gün and Gülsün, 2014; “AKP’nin Eğitim Düzenlemesi”). According to the 4 + 4 + 4 system, the first four years are mandatory. The first four years begin in the first September after the child turns five. The next four years, also mandatory, are the equivalent of the middle school. Here, however, students have the option of choosing between regular middle schools and vocational schools, many of them are İmam Hatip type (Law #6287, Article 9). Thus, the new law reopened the İmam Hatip middle schools that the 1997 law of eight-­ year mandatory education closed down. Furthermore, the law allows for home schooling (open education) starting from the age of 12. This is particularly a concern for female students in conservative towns where it is not unusual for families to resent sending their daughters to school and force underage girls into marriage. The law also stated that schools with regular curriculum will have electives and then goes on to state one elective explicitly: “in middle and high schools, Quran and the life of Prophet Mohammed are taught as electives” (Article 9). This explicit reference to one of the elective courses gave it preferential treatment as no other electives are mentioned in the law.

Regulations Concerning the Holy Birth Week

Amendments to the Primary Education Law (4+4+4)

Decision by the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DİB) concerning Qur’an Courses

Protocol Concerning the Collaboration Agreement Between the Ministry 2013 of Family and Social Policies and the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DİB)

Amendments to the law on Private Education Systems

Protocol Concerning the Collaboration between the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DİB) and the Ministry of Education

Notification Made by the Talim ve Terbiye Kurulu (Committee of Education and Manners) of the Ministry of Education

 

6287

 

 

5580

 

 

2017

 

2016

2014

2012

 

2012

2010

2009

Decision by the Institute of Higher Education (YÖK) to Eliminate the Co-efficient Factor

 

Date

Name of the Law/Regulation

No

Table 4.1 Laws and policies concerning women’s education (2002–2017)

The mandatory religious schools in 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th grades increased to two hours a week while the biology classes for the 11th and 12th grades and the philosophy classes for the 9th and the 12th grades are eliminated. Source: tebligler.meb.gov.tr/index.php/tuem-sayilar/finish/85-2017/52692717-haziran-2017

The financial aid system to private schools was introduced in March 2014 with the additional articles to the Law #5580, the Law on Private Education Institutions, which was passed in 2007. The protocol established that all publications and visual resources by the DİB are included among the Ministry of Education’s educational resources. Source: www.meb.gov.tr/diyanet-kulliyati-ebada/haber/10713/tr

Source: www.aep.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/diyanet-protokol.pdf

The main purpose of the program is to educate individuals to strengthen families. Preventing divorce is one of the goals of the program.

With this decision, no age limitations for Qur’an Course pupils; courses are only operated by the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DİB). Source: www.memurlar.net/haber/261380/yeni-kur-an-kurslari-yonergesiyayimlandi.html

Elementary and middle schools are four mandatory years; the high school is also four year. İmam Hatip middle schools are reopened; students choose between regular and İmam Hatip schools in middle school. Source: www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2012/04/20120411-8.htm

The regulations do not make any reference to K-12; however, the Ministry of Education has begun celebrating the week at schools as of 2015. The name and the exact date of the celebrations have been modified later. Source: www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2010/02/20100213-7.htm

Elimination of co-efficient factor, a major obstacle against İmam Hatip graduates from studying any subject in university. www.milliyet.com.tr/artik-katsayi-yok-gundem-1469920/

Summary

122   Education Apart from resulting in overcrowded classrooms and the difficulty with instructing young children, the law caused great controversy among educators, parents as well as politicians and civil society organizations alike. Criticism of the new law concentrated on two issues, namely the increasing emphasis on religious education and the impact of the new law on female students. Interrupting the eight-­year mandatory education would allow girls, critics argued, to be forced into marriage at an early age and the increasing social pressure on religion would increase the number of those who choose the İmam Hatip schools. Furthermore, although the law did not make the religious courses mandatory in the regular curriculum of secular schools, the social pressure would make it impossible not to elect to do them (Eğitim İş 2016–2017). Indeed, the new education system of 4 + 4 + 4 has not helped with the challenge of underage marriage of girls, which is as high as one out of six marriages in certain cities. According to the marriage statistics of TÜİK, the percentage of 16–17 year old girls within overall marriage dropped from 5.2 percent in 2015 to 4.6 percent in 2016 (TÜİK Haber Bülteni 2017). However, in the southeastern region, those who marry under 18 years old is as high as 46 percent of all marriages however (Soru Önergesi 2013). In Kilis, for example, the percentage of child brides out of all brides in 2015 was as high as 15.3 percent, followed by Kars with 15.2 and Ağrı with 15.1 percent. Although these numbers are already high, actual numbers might be even higher because many underage marriages are informal and therefore unrecorded, as the marriage takes place through religious ceremonies. Despite the increasing influence of the DİB through its official statements and comments, the DİB refused to condemn underage marriages until 2018. The DİB came under intense pressure because it responded to a question on its website and stated that girls as young as nine years old could marry. The Directorate finally made a public statement in 2018 condemning underage marriages and recommended the ­marriage age be 18 (“Diyanet İşleri Başkanı” 2018). The negative impacts of the new education law on women’s education have become clear over time. We can show this negative impact by looking at two indicators, namely student sex ratio and graduate sex ratio. Table 4.2 compares these two indicators before and after the new education law of 4 + 4 + 4. Table 4.2 shows the annual growth rates of various education indicators in the mandatory eight-­year education system and the new education system of 4 + 4 + 4. For instance, in the eight-­year mandatory educations system, the student sex ratio (female to male) in the first eight years was 85 percent in 1999–2000. This means that there were 85 females in the first eight-­year schooling compared with every 100 male students. This ratio jumped to 95 percent in the 2011–2012 academic year. This meant about 1 percent annual average growth for the student sex ratio. For the same period, the graduate sex ratio jumped from 68 percent to 92 percent with a 2.25 percent average annual growth. The sex and graduate sex ratio for the high school are also worth comparing. In 1997–1998, the sex ratio was 71 percent, jumping to 88 percent in 2011–2012. This means that the female-­to-male ratio grew 1.3 percent on average every year

–1.67 0.18 2.43

–1.76 (2012–2013) to (2017–2018)   0.08   2.6

2.79

–1.86 –0.02

1.17 1.3 –0.31

7.97

– –0.26

3.21 1.3 –0.08

7.72

– –0.6

2.22 1.3 –0.17

8.21

– 0.09

4.47 1.3 0.03

F

0.36

–0.19 –0.2

0.9 1.3 –0.06

F/M

Student sex ratio

0.49

– 0.69

2.25 1.3 0.2

F/M

Graduate sex ratio

Source: Authors’ calculation based on the national education statistics, available at http://sgb.meb.gov.tr/www/resmi-istatistikler/icerik/64 (accessed April 27, 2017).

0.27 1.3 –0.26

(1997–1998) to (2011–2012)   0.7 (1997–1998) to (2011–2013)   1.3 –0.28

8-year Primary 8-year Secondary 12-year Primary and Lower    Secondary (4 + 4 years) 12-year Primary (first 4 years) 12-year Lower Secondary    (second 4 years) 12-year Higher Secondary    (third 4 years)

M

Total

F

Total

M

Graduates

Students

Time periods

Education system

Table 4.2 Annual growth rates of various education indicators in 8- and 12-year mandatory education systems (1997–2018)

124   Education during this period. The graduate sex ratio was about 77 percent in 1997–1998 and jumped to 105 percent. In other words, at the end of the eight-­year mandatory education system, 105 female students graduated from high school for every 100 male students. This means a 1.3 percent average annual growth for the graduate sex ratio in high school. Let’s compare these indicators under the new education system. In the first four years, the student sex ratio was about 96 percent in the 2012–2013 academic year, dropping to 95 percent in the 2017–2018 academic year. The same ratio for the second four years declined from about 98 percent to 97 percent for the same period. The graduation sex ratio increased from 92 percent to 94 percent in 2016–2017. This means the average annual growth in the graduation sex ratio between 2012–2013 and 2016–2017 was 0.7 percent, much smaller than the average increase under the eight-­year mandatory education system. These indicators for high school are as follows: The student sex ratio for 2012–2013 was about 89 percent, increasing to 91 percent for 2017–2018 with about 0.4 average annual growth. The graduation sex ratio for high school increased from 101 percent to 103 percent for the same period. In other words, the female-­to-male graduation ratio declined significantly at both middle and high school levels in the new education system of 4 + 4 + 4 compared with the eight-­year system. Similarly, Table 4.3 shows the annual growth rates of the number of students by grades and gender in the former and new education system. As critics feared, the new 4 + 4 + 4 system led to more homeschooling for female students. The annual growth of the number of female students who are homeschooled is at an alarming rate of 27.5 percent per year since the beginning of the new education system. This rate is negative for male students for the same period. In other words, the number of female students who are homeschooled increased at a rate of 27.5 percent every year while it declined about 11 percent per year for male students. Thus, these trends seem to be clear signs of the concerns of those who have been critical of the 4 + 4 + 4 system. As expected, the new law contributed to the exponential growth of İmam Hatip schools and their students in the following years. According to Figure 4.1, in the 2002–2003 academic year, the number of İmam Hatip high schools was 452. The number jumped to 4123 in the 2016–2017 academic year with an increase of 912 percent since the beginning of the AKP era. As Figure 4.1 shows, most of this increase took place after the adoption of the new education law. Figure 4.2 demonstrates the total number of students in İmam Hatip schools since the 1920s. The total number of students attending these schools began to gradually increase starting from the mid-­1960s. A significant jump took place in the mid-­1970s and the numbers continued to rise in the post-­1980 coup era. The number of students in İmam Hatip schools eventually reached its peak in the 1996–1997 academic year with 611,502 students in both middle and high İmam Hatip schools. This was the beginning of a sharp decline as a result of the eight-­ year mandatory education system. The lowest number of students attending

99/00–11/12

Mandatory eight-year education Primary (1) Secondary (2) Total (3) New Education System (4 + 4 + 4) Primary (4) Lower secondary (5) Primary + lower secondary (8-year) (6 = 4 + 5) Higher secondary (7) Lower + higher secondary (8 = 5 + 7)) Total (9 = 4 + 5 + 7)) Open secondary education Open secondary-total (10 = 12 + 13 + 14) (Lower + higher secondary) – (open secondary-total) (11 = 8 – 10) Open-lower secondary (12) Open-higher secondary (13) Open-vocational secondary (14)

4.01 0.61 –11.19 6.63 0.96

0.27 1.3 1.41

2.31 0.9 –10.88 5.81 –4.03

 

–1.67 0.18 –0.26 2.43 1.09 0.25

0.7 1.3 1.87

Male

–1.76 0.08 –0.28 2.6 1.09 0.23

 

Total

Students

–1.86 –0.02 –0.31 2.79 1.1 0.21

1.17 1.3 2.39

0.37 1.21 27.5 4.7 –10.99

 

Female

Source: Authors’ calculation based on the national education statistics, available at http://sgb.meb.gov.tr/www/resmi-istatistikler/icerik/64 (accessed April 27, 2017).

12/13–17/18

12/13–17/18

Academic year

 

Table 4.3 Annual growth rates of number of students by grades and gender (1999–2018)

126   Education

Figure 4.1 Total number of İmam Hatip schools (1923–2017). Source: National education statistics by TÜİK, and Çakmak (2009).

Figure 4.2 Total number of students in İmam Hatip (Middle and High) schools (1923–2017). Source: National education statistics by TÜİK, and Çakmak (2009).

İmam Hatip high schools was 71,600 in the 2002–2003 academic year. The numbers began to climb rapidly especially after the introduction of the new education law, which reintroduced the İmam Hatip middle schools. As of the 2016–2017 academic year, 1,297,272 students attended İmam Hatip middle and high schools.

Education   127 Figure 4.3 compares the indexes of secular and İmam Hatip middle and high schools. Accordingly, if we consider the number of students for both types of schools as 100 in 1923–1924, that number reached its peak, 26,135 in 1994–1995 for İmam Hatip schools. This number is 29,951 for secular schools for the same period. Figure 4.3 clearly demonstrates the sharp decline for the İmam Hatip schools, going down to 5029 in 2000–2001, then jumping to 71,200 in 2016–2017. In the same year, the index for the secular schools is 83,286. What is striking most within the student composition is the increase in the number of female students attending İmam Hatip schools since the beginning of the AKP era (Figure 4.4). This increase is highly noticeable after the introduction of the new education system. According to our calculations, the average annual growth of the number of female students attending İmam Hatip schools was 21 percent between 2002–2003 and 2016–2017. For male students, this average growth was 18 percent. The percentage change in the number of female students was 2354 percent while for males it was 1282 percent. In other words, the comparison in Figure 4.4 clearly demonstrates the gendered impact of the new education law disproportionately attracting more female students to İmam Hatip schools. İmam Hatip schools are Islamic schools first established in 1924 for training prayer leaders (imams) and preachers (hatips). These schools were established as exceptions within the secular school system and the number of their students so low that they were closed down in 1931 (Türkmen 2009, 85). As explained above, the revival of the İmam Hatip schools was not until the early 1950s when

Figure 4.3 Index for number of students: Secular versus İmam Hatip (Middle and High) schools (1923 and 2017). Source: Authors’ calculation from national education statistics by TÜİK, and Çakmak (2009).

128   Education

Figure 4.4 Number of female and male students in İmam Hatip schools (2002–2017). Source: National education statistics by TÜİK.

the multi-­party period began, and the right-­wing Democratic Party came to power. A second leapfrog of these schools came in the aftermath of the 1980 coup, during which the Turkish-­Islamic synthesis was adopted. Islam was used by the junta leaders as a way of creating social cohesion that they considered was of absolute importance due to their perceived threat from left-­wing ideology. A major setback against the popularity of the schools was the eight-­year mandatory education adopted through a so-­called soft coup in 1997, referred to as the February 28th measures. A major objective of the mandatory eight-­year education was to prevent children from being enrolled in İmam Hatip middle schools. Furthermore, due to the adopting of coefficient, the graduates of İmam Hatip high schools were not allowed to study any topic in the university, a decision that significantly undermined the popularity of İmam Hatip high schools.3 In other words, preventing children from being enrolled in İmam Hatip schools, the main goal of the compulsory eight years of schooling and the coefficient factor, did work (Figure 4.2). The popularity of these schools significantly declined as a result of these policy changes. In no other time in the history of the republic did İmam Hatip schools grow as much as they did under the AKP rule. About 90 years after their establishment, they have made significant headway in being the main type of school in the education system. All previous obstacles against their growth have been eliminated through the 4 + 4 + 4 education law. The most important obstacle against the İmam Hatip schools was the coefficient factor, which the AKP has been trying to abolish since 2002. The coefficient made it very difficult for graduates of Imam

Education   129 Hatip high schools to major in subjects other than divinity at university. In 2004, the AKP representatives introduced a bill in parliament that would permit the practice of acquiring a second diploma from a general high school. Finally, in 2009, the YÖK (Yüksek Öğrenim Kurumu, Institute of Higher Education) changed the coefficient system, allowing graduates to study any subject. In other words, originally envisioned as preacher schools and as an exception to the secular education system, the İmam Hatip schools have now become the mainstream, replacing many regular schools. Only a small percentage of their graduates actually enter into the religious profession, with the overwhelming majority ending up in other professions as there is currently no obstacle in preventing them from doing so. İmam Hatip schools fundamentally differ from the other vocational schools in that the religious education is compulsory. What are the gender implications of the exponential growth of the İmam Hatip schools? Recent research has examined the unique characteristics of the pupils and the teachers of İmam Hatip schools. For instance, students and graduates consider themselves holding “superior morality” in comparison with ordinary secondary school pupils. They consider their Islamic morality as a remedy to the declining moral values in Turkish society (Akpinar 2007, 163). Akpinar interviewed some principals and teachers who agreed that “single-­sex schooling was better for pupils, as they got the chance to concentrate on their courses rather than being distracted by a girl’s or boy’s physical presence” (Akpinar 2007, 167). Also, İmam-Hatip school pupils were found mostly to read Islamist and nationalist newspapers and to follow Islamist channels on TV. All of these findings point to the formation of an Islamic and nationalist identity within the framework of an Islamic lifestyle. (Akpinar 2007, 172) According to the Islamic view of gender, differences between men and women come from nature and they are fixed. There is a clear gender division of labor between men and women and women’s roles are mostly confined to home as the sole care giver. The nationwide surveys also demonstrate conservative gender roles assigned to men and women by Turkish society in general. Male pupils hold much more conservative views about gender roles arguing that women’s primary domain is the home. Akpinar (2007, 175) noted that “principals and teachers of religious subjects at İmam Hatip schools, the majority of whom are males, seem at the same time to be gatekeepers in the interpretation of Koranic serves and the Prophet’s words from a patriarchal perspective.” Undoubtedly, as İren Özgür (2012, 4) put it, “İmam-Hatip schools and their communities constitute one of the key institutions from which Turkey’s Islamic movement in general, and the ruling AKP in particular, draw their strength and resilience.” As Acar and Ayata (2002, 108) wrote: The culture of the Imam-­Hatip lycees, on the other hand, also carries the undertones of a universal ideology, that of Islam. This universal ideology

130   Education leads especially the male teachers to be over-­confident of their world-­view. Religion legitimizes their demands for cultural conformity, expressed in terms of Islamic order and harmony. This form of social control is best exercised by sexual segregation, and stresses chastity and honour of girls. The ideology of harmony with nature and creation leads to an idealization of motherhood and modesty for women and girls. It is obvious that there is no need for a search for any other type or level of knowledge in the school. Islam provides the ultimate knowledge, and leads to ultimate harmony. Thus, the hierarchy of knowledge is very clearly conceived and transmitted. All curricular and extra-­curricular activities have this purpose. Anything that is not conceived as serving Islam is deemed unproductive, unnecessary and to be avoided. Undoubtedly, the AKP values İmam Hatip schools and supports them in every possible way. The AKP government’s policies and practices to prioritize the İmam Hatip schools could be also discerned in the scholarships provided to middle and high school students. These scholarships are significant, especially for the lower classes in rural areas who cannot send their children to schools. These scholarship allow the pupils to stay in public dorms for free. Although the number of these scholarships has significantly decreased since the 2010s, the percentage of the scholarship receivers from İmam Hatip schools has increased (Figure 4.5). While the percentage for the total declined from 98 percent to 95 percent between 2006 and 2017, the percentage of İmam Hatip students staying free has increased from 11 percent to 17 percent. The numbers suggest a preferential treatment towards İmam Hatip students.

Figure 4.5 Percentage of pay-free staying students at boarding schools (2006–2017): Total versus İmam Hatip. Source: Authors’ calculation from national education statistics by TÜİK.

Education   131 Education campaigns for girls One of the earliest examples of campaigns for increasing the access to schooling for girls was led by Emine Erdoğan, wife of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (“Emine Erdoğan” 2004). The project was jointly sponsored by UNICEF and the Ministry of National Education and supported by many in the top brass, businessmen, and celebrities. Emine Erdoğan got personally involved with the campaign, visiting many families in her hometown, Şanlıurfa, and other cities in the region. The campaign emerged out of the realization that “more than 50% of girls between 6 and 14 are out-­of-school in some provinces” and it aims to “close the gender-­gap in primary school enrolment by the end of 2005 through the provision of a quality basic education for all girls in 53 provinces with the lowest enrolment rates” (“Haydi Kızlar Okula!” n.d.). The campaign specifically uses social networks to reach families and tries to convince them to send their daughters to school. Another project to increase girls’ attendance was coordinated by the Ministry of National Education and the EU, beginning in 2011, to encourage families to send their daughters to school. Especially in the southeastern part of the country, girls are sometimes held back by their families and the ratio of school attendance is lower for girls as a result. The project picked 15 pilot cities located in the southeastern part of Turkey. The project aimed to reach girls through their families and the leaders of their communities. It is reported that about 5022 girls returned to school thanks to the project (Homepage for “Kızların Eğitimi” 2018). In 2015, the program initiated a second stage, this time to increase the retention rates for female students and make sure they receive quality education through their families and teachers. The second phase of the project also focuses on the same 15 cities of southeastern Turkey and aims to reach the families of as many as 10,000 female students (Homepage for “Kızların Eğitimi” 2018). These are two projects that successfully increased female students’ access to education. Vocational training for women AKP governments have pursued education and training programs not only for K-­12 but also for other segments of the population, targeting women, singles, and families, etc. The project of Vocational Training for Women (Kadınlar İçin Mesleki Eğitim) is one of those projects created and administered in 81 cities by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies. Similar projects were funded during the 1990s, and a center was created by the General Directorate of Status and Problems of Woman, which became part of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies in 2011. The very purpose of this center was to direct women “to income creating activities, encouraging their entrepreneurship and handicraft productions” (Eighth Five-­Year Plan 2001, 102). The project directly targeted women who do not have secondary and high school degrees, citing that the highest unemployment rates are among those holding elementary school degrees only. According to the Minister of the Family and Social Policies, the project aimed at increasing women’s labor market

132   Education p­ articipation, empowering them individually and socially, and widening the occupational, economic, social, and cultural opportunities for women (“Kadınlar” n.d.). Those women who have “better educational opportunities participate in the labor market, better express themselves, and become active in the decision-­making positions” (“Kadınlar” n.d.). The project’s brochure identifies the rationale, in three categories, that women’s education is necessary for employment purposes: “The main causes behind the gender inequality as they exist in almost every country is the women’s low levels of labor participation, the limited employment opportunities, and the wage gap” (“Kadınlar” n.d., 8). It is clear that the more education a woman has the more likely it is she gets employed. The report documents that according to the 2013 indicators of the Institution of Turkish Statistics, only 16.1 percent of the illiterate women are employed while the ratio jumps to 39.4 percent for high school graduates (“Kadınlar” n.d.)). The project gives an opportunity for many women who, for whatever reason, could not complete their education. It uses the slogan “it is never too late!” To reach a larger number of women, the project also provides online courses. The project was part of a program called Gönül Elçileri (Messengers of the Heart), a voluntary-­based program initiated by Emine Erdoğan, the wife of the President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, under the Ministry of Family and Social Policies. Thus, similar to employment policies, voluntarism plays a crucial role in the education-­related projects for women. Perhaps the most interesting part of the project was the publicity for this project: Interestingly enough, the publicity of the program was assigned to female spouses of governors regardless of their occupations. This was another example of AKP policies that were for women by women based on voluntarism. Family education programs The 10th Development Program (2014–2018) entitled Action Plan for Protecting the Family and the Dynamic Population Structure (Ailenin ve Dinamik Nüfus Yapısının Korunması Eylem Planı) listed the Family Education Program (Aile Eğitim Programı) and Pre-­Marriage Education Program (Evlilik Öncesi Eğitim Programı) as part of the AKP’s education programs outside the systems of K-­12 and higher education (Onuncu Kalkınma Planı 2015, 6). This program targets family members, particularly women, to educate them concerning certain topics based on to the party’s conservative gender and religious agenda. The main sponsor of the Family Education Program is the DİB, who signed a protocol to collaborate with the Ministry of Family and Social Policies in 2013 (Table 4.1). Accordingly, the main purpose of this collaboration is “to increase the effectiveness of protective and preventive social services through especially women’s education, to educate women, children, the youth, the elderly and the disabled individuals and help problems be resolved through social support networks” (Onuncu Kalkınma Planı 2015, 6). Among the targeted issues, the protocol states, there lies the goal to prevent divorce. The Family

Education   133 Education Programs are free, and anybody could participate. The programs reach a large number of participants, especially through mosques and Qur’an courses. A hint about the content of what the Family Education Program advocates can be discerned from the brochures that the Ministry of Family and Social Policy prepared. These brochures cover broad topics, such as economics, law, health and finance that are not only related to family. And, yet, one has to go through the family program to reach and benefit from the knowledge. Furthermore, the programs promote, justify and reinforce the traditional division of labor. In one of those brochures, entitled “Marriage and Family Life” although women employed outside their homes were advised to talk to their husbands and ask for help for the housework, they are nevertheless assigned the task (Canel 2011). To avoid stress, the brochure encourages them to schedule their household responsibilities according to an effective plan, such as doing the laundry on Monday evening, and cooking Sunday evening. Also set clear limits to the activities you would like to finish, for instance. Preparing meals will be between 6:00 pm and 7:00 pm. (Canel 2011, 66) In sum, more than anything, the Family Education Program is teaching that there exists no reality outside the family, that there exist a gender hierarchy imposed by Islam, and women’s “proper” status within that hierarchy. As part of the 10th Development Plan, DİB was assigned the task of organizing conversations (sohbetler) at various places and preparing short media advertisements concerning public interests (kamu spotu). The institution provides wide-­ranging programs that target various segments of society to “educate” them about the DİB’s worldview as the correct and appropriate way of interpreting Islam. These “conversations” (sohbetler) target the public employees, police forces, and even apartment sakinleri work, Ramadan programs, family visits, etc. (“Diyanet Artık” 2018). These attempts might be one of the most aggressive education programs in the history of the country. Among the topics covered are the perils of divorce—explaining the negative impacts of divorce to the married couples and encouraging them to reconsider their decisions—the proper way of wearing a headscarf, and women’s employment. These conversations just demonstrate that the divorce-­related conversations that the DİB had been organizing (irşad büroları) just enhanced its content (Ergin 2013). The Pre-­Marriage Education Program, like the Family Education Program, is carried out by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies with the direct involvement of DİB. The program covers a number of topics including communication skills, family law, and health. The seminars of the program are held all over the country, reaching thousands of people. The participants are often pupils of Qur’an courses organized and carried out by DİB’s local branches (müftülük) (Aile Bülteni 2014, 9). The Pre-­Marriage Program aims to improve the communication

134   Education and problem-­solving skills and provide sexual education, all of which contribute to avoiding marital problems. “A happy marriage requires pre-­marriage plans so that the couples can function in harmony and pursue a healthy relationship” (www.aep.gov.tr). Education programs are very much needed for families as well as singles who are getting ready to marry. These programs could potentially contribute to solving various widespread social problems. And, yet, the specific marriage and pre-­marriage education programs addressed here raise questions on a number of grounds. First, they allow no room for the individuals’ well-­being outside the marriage, as if all knowledge is acquired to the extent that it is related to the family. This is particularly a point of concern for women because their individuality has been denied and they only exist in the imagination of Islamic conservatism as mothers and wives, not as individuals. Second, hints about what is exactly being taught in these courses raise serious questions as well as questions about those who are involved in the preparation of the courses. What credentials do DİB employees hold in providing divorce- or marriage-­related therapies to couples, for instance? Also, the fact that these programs are taught by non-­ experts at local levels all over the country raises further questions about the quality and accuracy of what is being taught.

Characteristics of the education system under the AKP: An overview Decentralization and neoliberalism The trends of decentralization and neoliberalism in education began much earlier than the AKP but accelerated during the AKP era. This can be clearly seen in the increasing number of private schools as a percentage of the total number of schools (Figure 4.6). Owing to the unavailability of data, we can only show the trends for private schools after the 2006–2007 academic year. Figure 4.6 shows two important trends. First, the private sector apparently invests more heavily in pre-­primary and higher education relative to primary education. Second, especially after the new education law, the percentage of private schools as a percentage of total schools has significantly increased. For instance, almost 3 percent of primary schools were private in 2012–2013, whereas it became 4 percent in 2016–2017, which was not a major increase. However, during the same period, the share of the private sector in pre-­primary education increased from 7 percent to 14 percent, while it increased from 6 percent to 13 percent in high school education. Moreover, the percentages of both female and male students attending private schools at all levels increased significantly since the introduction of the new education system. During the period we examined (2006–2017), the percentage of male students attending private schools was always higher than the percentage of female students. Interestingly, however, since the beginning of the new education system, the percentage of male students attending private schools has increased faster than the

Education   135

Figure 4.6 Private schools (2006–2017) (percentage of total). Source: Authors’ calculation from TÜİK Ulusal Eğitim İstatistikleri.

percentage of female students, increasing the gender gap. For instance, the percentage of male students attending private schools was about 3 percent and 2.6 percent for females in 2011–2012; this jumped to 6.3 percent for males while it increased to only 5.6 percent for females. The data this book rely on to trace the number of private tutoring centers (dershane) go back to 1975. These tutoring centers mainly prepared students for standardized tests that students take to attend prestigious schools or universities. Some of these private tutoring centers also help students with regular course work. Accordingly, the number of private tutoring centers was only 157 in 1975–1976 (Tansel 2013). The number reached 2122 in 2001–2002. It has doubled since, then reaching 4262 in 2007–2008. After this, the number slowly decreased to 3858 in 2012–2013. A similar trend can be also observed in the number of students attending private tutoring centers. For instance, the number of male students attending these private tutoring centers was 308,157 for males, and 248,125 for females in 2000–2001. The number of students reached its peak in 2012–1013, with 644,059 males and 636,238 females. In other words, the highest average annual growth in the number of students was 12.4 percent between 2012 and 2016. The increase in the number of private schools that the AKP experienced had a lot to do with the political alliance that the AKP governments established with the hizmet movement led by Fethullah Gülen. In other words, the privatization of the public education system is a highly political process that cannot be understood without understanding the broader political developments. The Gülen

136   Education schools and private tutoring centers were prominent, dominating the private schooling system in some cases. Once the alliance between the Gülen leadership and the Erdoğan government collapsed, turning into a head-­to-head collision in the fall of 2013, the government specifically targeted these schools and the tutoring centers, and eventually closing down the latter. These private tutoring centers are all converted into high schools now. The share of out-­of-pocket expenditures for education in household income is also important to mention here. Based on our calculations using TÜİK household budget surveys micro data between 2014 and 2012, we observed that the share of out-­of-pocket expenditures for education declined for all income groups, as shown in Figure 4.7.4 On the other hand, the bottom 20 percent quintile experienced the lowest decrease, of 6 percent. Despite this decrease, the share of out-­of-pocket expenditures for education within household income is the highest for the poorest of the poor. As Figure 4.7 demonstrates, the share of these expenditures for education is still as high as one-­fifth of the overall household income for the bottom 20 percent. Erosion of secularism through education Nowhere in the Turkish bureaucratic system can the erosion of secularism be seen as clearly as in education. In fact, even a brief examination of the current education system unequivocally reveals a system that fails to keep its distance

Figure 4.7 Out-of-pocket expenditures for education as a percentage of household income without any transfers (i.e., social insurance + welfare) by income distribution (2004–2012). Source: Murvanidze (2017) based on calculations from TÜİK Household Budget Surveys Micro Data.

Education   137 from Islam. Examples abound: Holy Birth Week (Kutlu Doğum Haftası) refers to a week-­long celebration of the Prophet Mohammed’s birth has been adopted by the Ministry of Education since 2015. Celebrations took an entire week for a number of years before they were reduced to a few days. K-­12 pupils are involved at various levels of these celebrations. Furthermore, as a major blow to scientific education, the Ministry of Education has removed the evolution from the textbooks (“MEB” May 14, 2017). Evolution had never been explicitly presented in the textbooks in a way that directly contradicts the Islamic doctrine of creation, but it was nevertheless present in the curriculum. Another practice that contributes to the erosion of secularism is the fact that the DİB is actively involved in the education system at every level. This involvement goes beyond curriculum-­related issues, such as the preparation of textbooks on the life of the Prophet Mohammed, a course listed as an elective course for the regular, non-­religious schools in the 4 + 4 + 4 Education Law. Rather, the DİB’s involvement in the education system extends to students’ academic activities and even dictating to these students what to do in their spare time and during summer. The DİB, for instance, organizes umre,5 a type of Islamic pilgrimage during school-­out days for pupils and teachers.6 K-­12 teachers and pupils (ages 13–17) as well as university students (ages 18–27) could participate in these Islamic visits (“Diyanetten” 2014). Pupils and teachers apply through their schools, a system which clearly identifies the teachers and the pupils who participate by placing social pressure on those who don’t. The DİB-organized umre visits thus provides an example par excellence for the public policies that turned education institutions into the type that aims to produce one-­type of pupils. Furthermore, more recently, DİB began operating daycares (“Diyanet Anaokulu İşleri Başkanlığı Anaokulu Açıyor” 2016). The provision of childcare services by DİB first began as a summer camp and later extended to a regular academic period involving children aged three to six. According to İsmet Yılmaz, the Minister of MEB, the number of childcare centers directed by the DİB increased from 600 to 1448 during the 2016–2017 academic year (“Diyanet ve Belediye Kreş Sayısı” 2018). This number further increased to 1552 by the end of the same academic year. The total number of students attending these childcare centers reached 51,327 (“Eğitim Diyanet’e Emanet” 2018). These numbers show a steep increase given that the program only began in 2016. With a decision in 2012, the DİB reversed the age limitation on Qur’an course pupils by lifting the limit altogether (Table 4.1). The same decision also gave the DİB exclusive authority to govern all Qur’an courses instead of co-­governing them with the MEB. Shortly after the decision, the DİB offered courses to those as young as 4–6. According to the DİB’s own records, millions of children have taken these courses (“DİB 4–6 Yaş” 2017) since they were first offered in 2013. At times, the DİB involvement becomes formal through protocols, as in the case of a recent one in 2016 (Table 4.1). Accordingly, MEB listed some DİB publications among the MEB resources. This agreement makes the Qur’an and books concerning Islamic history and theology part of the K-­12 curriculum. This

138   Education can be clearly seen in the textbooks named Hazreti Muhammed’in Hayatı (The Life of Prophet Muhammed) taught in 11th and 12th grades (Yapıcı et al. 2014; Binici et al. n.d.). These textbooks are taught in regular, non-­religious high schools as electives and are prepared by the DİB. A careful examination of the books, however, reveals some curious observations. First of all, these textbooks do not only tell the life story of the Prophet Mohammed by highlighting the most significant events. The contents of the textbooks reach well beyond that purpose, and rather aim to construct a new, Islamic lifestyle and consciousness by “drawing” lessons on the behalf of the reader from the stories told in the books and even explicitly giving advice. These lessons are carefully selected and presented as the facts without leaving any room for interpretation. The 12th grade textbook only allocates the first 44 pages to the life of the Prophet Mohammed. The rest of the book, 83 more pages, is devoted to such topics as “knowledge and change,” “affection and compassion,” “social relations,” “marriage,” and “international relations.” These topics highlight the Islamic consciousness of a new society and its creation through the education system and give examples from Mohammed’s life, sayings and deeds to justify it. It should be also emphasized here that these so-­called electives are rarely so. The life of the Prophet Mohammed and Qur’an courses were the only so-­called electives listed in the 2012 law of 4 + 4 + 4, giving them a preferential treatment. It is clear that those pupils who wish not to select these course will face social pressure. Furthermore, the Friday sermons prepared by the DİB explicitly recommended that families should make sure that their children take these so-­called electives (“Cuma Hutbesinde” 2017). The Friday sermon given at all mosques in Turkey, in 81 provinces, stated that We should encourage that our children who are the guarantors of our future choose the electives in the life of Prophet Mohammad and Qur’an in their studies. We should remember that as parents it is our responsibility to make sure that our children to teach Islam, our supreme religion, Qur’an, our book, and the model life of our prophet, Prophet Mohammad. (“Cuma Hutbesinde” 2017) While the pupils in non-­religious schools are being exposed to this type of Islamic propaganda, further changes took place in their curriculum. In June 2017, for instance, a new notification was issued by the Talim ve Terbiye Kurulu (Committee of Education and Manners) of the MEB (Tebliğler Dergisi 2017). Accordingly, the number of religious courses increased from one to two hours a week (Table 4.1). These courses are called Din Dersi ve Ahlak Bilgisi (Religion and Morality), first introduced by the military regime of the 1980 coup as part of the Turkish-­Islamic synthesis. Although the course title implies nothing about Islam, these courses have only taught Sunni Islam. In other words, the pupils of non-­religious schools have to take two hours a week mandatory Sunni Islam classes during 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th levels. These mandatory courses in non-­ religious courses are in addition to the so-­called “electives” in “the life of

Education   139 Prophet Muhammad,” and “the Qur’an.” Given that the latter is de facto mandatory, most students in regular high schools receive a total of six hours of religious courses a week. These courses come at the expense of other courses: The same Committee decreased the number of biology and philosophy classes (Table 4.1). As has been discussed in detail above, the exponential growth of the İmam Hatip schools is another contributor to eroding secularism in the education system. İmam Hatip schools would only exist—along with similar schools for minority religions—to train and educate worship leaders in a truly secular system. There is no justification for spending public resources to support one particular interpretation of Islam at the expense of others. Furthermore, non-­ Islamic religious minorities are completely deprived of the same opportunity— using public resources to advocate their religions. There is also no justification in a secular system for graduates of İmam Hatip schools to study the subjects that are not related to Islamic leadership positions. Lastly, a secular system would not be able to justify female pupils at İmam Hatip schools because women are not allowed to become imams or hatips. Despite this, however, as discussed above, the increase in the number of female students attending İmam Hatip schools has been greater than the increase in the number of male students (Figure 4.4). Redefining gender roles Restructuring the curriculum according to the AKP’s conceptualization of gender has been a major objective of public policies concerning education since the early 2000s. The characteristics of this new structuring are as follows. First, women are perceived as mothers and wives only. The education system’s primary role then is to prepare girls to fully embrace these “natural” roles and develop skills to fully fulfill those roles. Second, and related to this, women’s primary domain is confined to the home through taking care of household responsibilities, children, and the elderly, while men are the providers and the heads of the households. This clear-­cut gender division of labor dictates more than being “different” for men and women and also includes a hierarchy between them. Men are clearly in an advantageous position in this hierarchy, as the leaders both in society in general, and in the family in particular, while women largely depend on men. Third, this conceptualization of gender is the correct and natural one and is forcefully advocated by Islam. Put differently, all Muslims need to fully embrace this conceptualization of gender as it is the God-­given order. This is the key for a harmonious and happy family as well as a healthy society. Some specific textbooks adopted during the AKP era shed further light on this peculiar understanding of gender. The fifth-­grade teacher’s manual for social studies exemplifies many of these characteristics in a single simulation (Ersöz 2011). This classroom activity, kına gecesi (henna night), is included in the fifth-­ grade teacher’s handbook as a simulation for female students. The textbook describes the simulation as one in which a female student plays the role of a

140   Education bride while the rest of the female students in the class sing and clap their hands, representing the female guests in a wedding. Kına gecesi is part of the traditional marriage ceremony that includes, amongst other things, coloring the bride and groom’s hands with henna. The bride’s household organizes the activity, followed by food and dancing for female guests while the groom’s household does the same thing for males. It takes places the night before the marriage ceremony. By itself, covering the traditional rituals concerning marriage as part of the cultural heritage is not wrong. However, one obvious question this simulation raises is whether or not this activity is the most appropriate one for fifth-­grade female students. Instead of including other activities that would help them gain self-­confidence, learn about science, and engage in critical thinking, teaching marriage rituals in the elementary school curriculum is hard to justify. Instead, unfortunately, in many different ways and repeatedly, female students are given the message that the best they can be is wives and mothers. This mentality unfortunately applies to girls as young as 10 years old. Furthermore, how kına gecesi simulation is introduced and justified in the book is most alarming. The book instructs the teachers to tell students that “henna is used to symbolize that the bride will be loyal to her new family and that the new bride will sacrifice her life, if necessary, for her new household and her husband” (Ersöz 2011, 83). This simulation demonstrates the extent of which the education system aims to define the gender roles: Full compliance and obedience to the conservative gender roles. Although these conservative roles are assigned to both female and male students, the education system places an extra burden on girls: They are the ones who are expected to sacrifice themselves to their families and society. Further examples, from the 12th-grade textbook on the life of the Prophet Mohammed, give clear ideas about the AKP-­promoted gender roles in education (Binici et al. n.d.). In Chapter 5 on marriage, it is advised that the most significant criterion in the selection of a spouse is piousness. A woman who is aware of the Prophet’s advice for reaching happiness and serenity would know how to behave. Her interest in being a good person would lead her to the best behavior. She would know that having a happy marriage, making her spouse and her children happy would be one of the requirements of worshiping and that would make her a lady in this world and the afterlife. (Binici et al. n.d., 91) Islamic practices that are part of the Islamic law, such as mehir, are advocated in the same book (Binici et al. n.d., 95). Mehir refers to an amount of money paid to the bride by the groom at the time of the marriage. This was a practice that emerged during early Islamic history to protect the once married women against the death of her husband or a divorce. It appears to be a progressive practice at the time, especially given that other social protections, such as spousal alimony, or retirement benefits through their spouses, were absent. What role could this practice possibly play in today’s society remains questionable, however.

Education   141 The 11th grade textbook on the life of Prophet Mohammed provides further examples (Yapıcı et al. 2014). The textbook openly and unequivocally advocates the idea of “compatibility,” rather than equality, between men and women (Yapıcı et al. 2014, 73) by arguing that the concept of compatibility originated in the Qur’an and the hadiths (sayings of the Prophet Mohammed). Accordingly, the book writes “while the father is the provider, mother is in charge of the household responsibilities. That way, they complement each other” (Yapıcı et al. 2014, 73). The textbook also give advice to female pupils and encourages them to marry only pious Muslims and stay away from those who are non-­Muslims (müşrik), who are born as Muslims but rejected Islam later on (mürted), and those who are atheists (Yapıcı et al. 2014, 95). Pupils are advised to form pious families (Yapıcı et al. 2014, 91) and form them as soon as possible because marriage is characterized as “consoling the sound of the heart that keeps the mind busy” and “serenity and calm” (Yapıcı et al. 2014, 91). This specific Islamic morality leaves no room for critical thinking nor does it recognize the presence of other interpretations of gender relations within Islam. The above-­mentioned books on the Prophet Mohammed’s life go beyond describing his life and the conditions within which Islam emerged. Rather, they are written with the purpose of constructing a specific Islamic consciousness and forming the gender relations accordingly. Female students are given the message that their only option is to get married, become mothers and spouses. This message is colored with Islam through carefully picked examples from the life Mohammed lived in the seventh century, without even raising the possibility of interpretation or the need to adopt them to today’s context. Women are always mentioned and examined within the context of family, which they don’t exist outside of. The description of family relations is idealized. This system offers no solutions to women in cases of domestic abuse, other than giving advice to men that the Prophet Mohammed never hurt any women, and advising women to be respectful and patient with their husbands. Given that domestic abuse is widespread in Turkey and violence against women has been rising quickly, the efficacy of this advice is obviously in question.

Conclusion The above discussion should make it clear that the Turkish education system aims to produce pupils that unquestionably follow a particular Islamic consciousness with a particular understanding of gender. Accordingly, one of the goals of the education system is to prepare women and men, who are constructed to belong to different realms of life, to fully adopt these roles. As such, women’s primary roles as mothers and wives are tailored by the education system so that they are fully prepared to embrace these roles (Arat 2010). The DİB has become the main institution that sets up the foundation of this unique Islamic consciousness and systematic effort to restructure this system. As discussed above in detail, the DİB’s role goes well beyond the K-­12 curriculum and higher education. Rather, the DİB expands and redefines its original role as an institution that

142   Education informs and educates the public about Islamic worshiping and morality. The DİB’s new, self-­assigned role includes involving in every aspect of life ranging from the provision of child care services to the service of family therapy for estranged couples. Despite these all-­encompassing and multi-­pronged roles, the DİB is not accountable. Unlike the political institutions and the MEB, both of which are—at least in theory—accountable, the DİB serves with impunity by being above any and all type of political, bureaucratic, and judicial scrutiny. The exponential growth of the İmam Hatip schools and their pupils has been a deliberate attempt to install the foundations of this new education system. The number of İmam Hatip schools has been systematically increased by conservative governments since the 1950s to satisfy the demands of their conservative constituencies and to secure their voting base. Despite these efforts, however, the increase in the number of these schools and their students has never been greater than under the AKP era in the history of the republic. This increase becomes even greater when one considers the declining number of secular schools and their students. If the education system continues to work the way it does right now, it is not inconceivable to imagine that most, if not all, schools will soon become İmam Hatip schools. This, by itself, will produce significant implications for politics and social relations, particularly gender. The education system also mirrors the political and economic changes that have taken place since the early 2000s. A major development has been the increasing pace of neoliberal policies that began shaping the education system since the 1990s. The public education system has been weakened since the 1990s with the deepening of neoliberal policies with ever-­increasing private schools, private tutoring centers and the privatization of the publication of textbooks, which are given for free to students, all of which has become a source of clientalist relations for the government. Education is no longer a basic human right because, first, the system is filled with many private schools, and, second, the existing public education also requires thousands of Turkish lira as out-­of-pocket spending. None of these changes have taken place independently from the ebb and flow of the AKP’s political alliances, particularly with specific faith-­based groups. The infiltration of the Gülen community to the education system in various ways is a case in point. Gülen-community-­run private schools and private tutoring centers first grew exponentially when the AKP and the Gülen-community were in good terms, and then were eliminated when the alliance turned into confrontation. The education system has not been immune to these shifting alliances, rather, being a part of it, it has been directly shaped by it. Furthermore, the education system has also become a vehicle to establish clientalist relationships with selected members of the business community.

Notes 1 CEDAW reported in 2011 that only a total of 44 Muslim-­majority or significant minority countries implement the Convention, partially due to the perceived conflicts between the Convention and their respective Islamic Law.

Education   143 2 Turkish language has eight short vowels (a, e, i, ı, u, ü, o, and ö) while Arabic has three long vowels only (‫[ أ‬alif], ‫[ و‬waw] and ‫[ ي‬ya’a]). Writing Turkish with an Arabic alphabet therefore presents unique challenges including non-­standardized spelling. 3 The coefficient works in the following way: Students’ high school GPAs are included in the way the scores of the nationwide university placement exams are calculated. The contribution of the İmam Hatip graduates’ GPAs was significantly lowered if they wanted to study any subjects other than theology, which, as intended, undermined the number of İmam Hatip students. 4 Household income is officially calculated by including the monetary value of in-­kind transfers, as well as monetary ones. We excluded the value of all transfers in our calculation because out-­of-pocket expenditures are made in cash while most of the transfers for the poor are in-­kind, such as food, blankets, clothing, coal, etc. 5 Umrah in Arabic. 6 Umre could be performed at any tıme throughout the year as opposed to hac (hajj in Arabic), one of the pillars of Islam, which could only be performed during certain days of the Islamic calendar.

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5 Health

Women’s reproduction has always been an interest for the state. For instance, when the nascent republic in its initial years faced the question of how to increase the population, which was important for the emerging economy, no contraception was allowed because women were encouraged to reproduce. Indeed, in such a short period of time, these policies resulted in doubling the population: It grew from 13 million in 1927 to 27 million in 1960 (TÜİK). These pro-­natalist policies of the republic continued until the mid-­1960s when the high growth rates began posing serious challenges, such as high unemployment rates, lack of access to education, insufficient provision of healthcare as well high maternity death rates and risky pregnancies. As a result, Turkey aligned its policies with the global trends to control population and shifted to anti-­natalist policies in the mid-­1960s by encouraging family planning and making contraception widely available. Women’s demand for the legalization of abortion in the 1970s got delayed due to the 1980 coup and finally materialized in 1983. The anti-­natalist policies continued until the AKP era’s famous campaign of “at least three children” on the basis that the population growth is declining. One way or another, the state has thus demonstrated a strong interest in setting the parameters of women’s reproductive rights since the beginning of the republic. Health is one of the areas where gender discrimination has always been great in Turkey (Akın 2010; Çerkezoğlu 2010; Çiçeklioğlu 2010; Özdemir 2010). For instance, the healthcare system was fragmented until the 2013 healthcare reform, called the Health Transformation Program (Sağlıkta Dönüşüm Programı—HTP) and it depended on the type of employment one had. The quality of healthcare service varied accordingly. Since most women were either unemployed or employed in the types of jobs that did not provide benefits, this insurance system made women dependent on their husbands or fathers (in the case of singles or widows) for access to healthcare. Furthermore, women’s physical and emotional wellbeing came under threat by the ever-­increasing levels of domestic violence. These are just to name a few examples of the lack of gender equality in the former system of healthcare. To its credit, the AKP era attempted to address some of the flaws of the healthcare system through the adoption of the HTP (Health Transformation

Health   147 Program—Sağlıkta Dönüşüm Programı). Initiated in 2003 and fully implemented in 2013, the HTP, to this day, remains the most widespread reform of the public sector in the history of the country, as it radically restructured the healthcare system, its providers, financing and the beneficiaries. As discussed below, the new system united the fragmented healthcare provision and therefore ended the injustices emanating from having different healthcare providers and coverages. The program also introduced universal healthcare, which prioritized preventive care in the form of family medicine (aile hekimliği) as opposed to expensive curative care. Although some of the initial premises of the new system materialized, the HTP has largely fallen short in keeping its promises and also producing a gender-­sensitive program (Ağartan 2012, 262–273). For instance, although the HTP united different types of employment-­based insurance systems, it did not halt women’s dependence on men because the insurance system remained employment-­based. As discussed in the chapter on employment, most women do not work outside the home at all or work in the informal sector, which makes them rely on their husbands or fathers for coverage. Furthermore, despite its premise of low cost due to the emphasis on preventive care, the system increasingly relied on expensive curative services, which in turn led to higher public cost. Over time, the out-­of-pocket expenses also significantly increased and this increase particularly places extra burden on the lowest income group. In addition, women and the lowest income groups are overrepresented when it comes to unmet health needs due to high cost. The AKP’s restructuring of the healthcare system is not limited to the HTP. More recently, the AKP introduced an ongoing project called şehir hastaneleri (city hospitals), in which the government promises to rent privately-­built mega hospitals and purchase the services provided by them, such as labs, parking lots, food services, etc., for 25 years (Ataay 2018). Furthermore, during the AKP era, Turkey has given up on the policies of population control thanks to the AKP’s so-­called discourse of “at least three children.” The justification of this rhetoric has been that Turkey’s population is getting old and that the growing economy needs more labor. The insurmountable body of evidence, as discussed below, demonstrates that the population continues to increase at a high level. The AKP’s justification also goes against common sense because the economy is unable to meet the basic needs of the existing population and because Turkey consistently ranks low in the world in terms of the quality of life, including gender equality. Moreover, the AKP’s pro-­ natalist policies come at the expense of women’s lack of desire to have more children, the materialization of which would only add more burden on women in the form of unpaid labor, specifically through household responsibilities—child, adult, and elderly care. The AKP era also witnessed an unprecedented anti-­abortion rhetoric and a bill to criminalize abortion in 2012. Finally, while the abortion law, adopted in 1983, remained intact because the party withdrew the anti-­abortion bill, the AKP’s concerted anti-­abortion discourse has de facto ended the abortion services

148   Health provided by public hospitals. The AKP also adopted other administrative measures against abortion, such as first excluding the reimbursement that hospitals receive for the procedure, and then including it in the reimbursement system but this time lowering the coefficient (score) according to which providers are reimbursed. After a brief discussion of the main principles of health until the AKP era, this chapter examines the AKP’s gender policies pertaining to health. The chapter argues that these policies have largely failed to reverse the gender inequities in health and even created new ones. The AKP’s advocacy of the traditional gender division of labor and its resistance to empowering women as individuals have essentially failed in ensuring women’s well-­being and in stopping violence against them.

Healthcare during the early Republican years (1920s–1950s) One of the three main policies of the early republic was centered on pro-­ natalism. Due to a series of wars since the late nineteenth century, the remaining population was small (13 million) and the labor force was even smaller. Legal arrangements were made to encourage birth rates, there were incentives to those having more than five children, tax exemption, and the ban on the import of contraceptives (Akın 2012, 323). Technological and political developments, such the successful prevention of malaria, the invention of antibiotics and the lack of war following the aftermath of the Second World War all contributed to the rising population growth in Turkey. For instance, in 1924, the fertility rate was 5.6, which peaked at 7.1 in 1933 and 6.9 in 1948 (Figure 5.1). The second major policy for the nascent republic was to build the healthcare system from scratch. The foundations of the contemporary medical system in Turkey were built in the early years of the republic. A new law concerning the health and safety of blue-­collar workers was passed in 1945 that paved the way for the Social Security Institution (Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu, SSK). The SSK started financing and providing healthcare services in 1952 independently from the Ministry of Health (Bulut 2007, 114). Similarly, the Public Employees Pension Fund (Emekli Sandığı, ES) was established in 1949 to provide social insurance for civil servants. These were the first major steps toward building a coporatists and fragmented social insurance system in modern Turkey. The third main policy of the republic was fighting against infectious diseases. An effective fight against communicable diseases was of utmost importance to both increase and sustain the population (Bulut 2007; Evered and Evered 2011). Some of the early health planning attempts included training doctors, nurse and midwives, establishing hospitals as role models (numune hastaneleri), appointing a medical doctor representing the state (hükümet tabibi) in each county (ilçe), among others. The task was great while the number of medical personnel was insufficient: As of 1923, there were 344 medical doctors (per 30,000), 60 pharmacists, 560 medical officers (sağlık memuru); 136 midwives, and therefore 1100 medical staff in total. This number increased to 3766 in 1935 (Bulut 2007, 113).

Health   149

Figure 5.1 Total fertility rates (per 1000 women) (1924–2013). Source: Türkiye Nüfus ve Sağlık Araştırması–2008-İleri Analiz Çalışması (2010).

Growing population and the health challenges: 1960–1970s By the end of the 1950s and the early 1960s, it had become clear that the previous pro-­natalist policies had paid off and the population had grown significantly. In 1960, those who were younger than 15 years old constituted 41.5 percent of the overall population (Akın 2012, 324). Lack of contraception and the ban on abortion led women to end unwanted pregnancies themselves on their own or under unsterile conditions, significantly increasing the chances of the death of the mother. In fact, in a study conducted in 1959, 53 percent of all women’s deaths were caused through the termination of unwanted pregnancies (Akın 2012, 324). It became clear that the pro-­natalist policies needed to be halted and that there was an urgent need for modern contraceptive methods to prevent pregnancy. Even before the anti-­natalist law was passed, the Ministry of Health established the organization of “family planning” and trained healthcare personnel about it. The law that initiated the anti-­natalist population policy was accepted by the Grand National Assembly in 1965 (#557). Women’s demand for the legalization of abortion however would not be answered until the early 1980s. Another significant development of the 1960s was the establishment of health stations (sağlık ocakları) through a program called the Law of Socialization of Health Services (Sağlık Hizmetlerinin Sosyalleştirilmesi Hakkında Kanun, #224) passed in 1961 (Birinci Aile Hekimleri 2015, 41). The law made reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a justification for the public provision and financing of healthcare that promised to provide the free and universal

150   Health healthcare. As a result, health stations opened all over the country especially in the rural areas. By 1977, the health stations were available in 36 cities. It should be emphasized however that, despite this law’s promise to provide universal healthcare, this never materialized. Almost 25 years after civil servants and blue-­collar workers, self-­employed people gained coverage for healthcare services through the establishment of the Social Security Organization of Craftsmen, Tradesmen and Other Self-­Employed (BağKur), established in 1971. The rest of the population, such as farmers, in rural setting and the poor did not have any coverage, with the exception of an insignificant number or privately covered segment who worked for banks, foundations, and the military.

Beginning of the neoliberal era: 1980s and 1990s The military regime established after the 1980 military coup finally accepted the women’s groups’ demands for the legalization of abortion in 1983 (#2827). The purpose of the law was “to determine the principles of population planning, termination of pregnancy, sterilization and contraception” (Article 1). Accordingly, pregnancies could be terminated until 10 weeks, but the illegal termination of pregnancy would face greater consequences than before. Furthermore, married women needed their husbands’ permission while underage girls needed their parents’ permission for abortion (Birinci Aile Hekimleri 2015, 45–46). The 1980s and the 1990s witnessed a number of international treaties to improve women’s conditions. The United Nation’s CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women) is the most comprehensive international treaty that guarantees women’s rights and requests the prevention of discrimination against women in every area and every level. Turkey ratified the Convention in 1985. In line with the liberalization process of 1980 and the structural adjustment programs of the IMF, a number of healthcare reforms were introduced. Health was no longer defined the way the 1961 constitution defined it—health as a human right and health required the state to finance and provide healthcare services. The recognition of healthcare as a human right was one of the major obstacles for reforming the system along neoliberal principles. The 1982 constitution, however, relaxed the state’s responsibilities in the area of medical care by defining the state as a facilitator and monitoring agency (Belek 2012). This change paved the way for Sağlık Hizmetleri Temel Kanunu (The Basic Health Law, Law # 3359) in 1987. The new law aimed at decentralization of governance and financing of state hospitals. The law also opened the door to allowing contractual employment (rather than public employment) at Ministry of Health institutions by allowing Ministry of Health institutions to operate as for-­ profit, private businesses based on competition and price-­setting. The Constitutional Court struck down some parts of the law, including contractual employment, but maintained decentralization and operation of public health entities, according to private business principals in 1988 (Ataay 2006, 81–87).

Health   151 As the number of the poor in the population with no social insurance increased significantly since the implementation of neoliberal policies in the 1980s, the coalition government of the time introduced a healthcare insurance coverage called “the green card” (“yeşil kart”) for this particular group in 1992. It provided access to healthcare for 1.7 million people in 1995 and 10 million in 2010 (“Yeşil Kart’ın Hikayesi” 2014).

Characteristics of health policies under the AKP (2002–2018) The AKP fully supported the previous governments’ commitments in reducing women’s deaths during birth. This was clearly stated in the Cinsel Sağlık ve Üreme Sağlığı Sağlık Sektörü İçin Ulusal Stratejik Eylem Planı (Sexual and Reproductive Health: National Strategic Action Plan for the Healthcare Sector) prepared by the Ministry of Health for 2005–2015, which outlined the ministry’s objectives for lowering women’s deaths during birth, preventing unwanted pregnancies, educating youth about sexual health and reproductive health, and lowering sexually transmitted diseases (Cinsel Sağlık ve Üreme Sağlığı Sağlık Sektörü İçin Ulusal Stratejik Eylem Planı 2005). These are good examples of gender mainstreaming in the areas of health and healthcare. Another target for the AKP was the reform of the old, corporatist, and fragmented social insurance system that was characterized by a number of weaknesses. First, access to healthcare in the previous system was not universal because the unemployed remained uninsured. Second, the system was fragmented, resulting in inequality as well as confusion. As such, there were three social insurance programs providing retirement and health benefits. Those who were employed in the public sector had their own social insurance program, called the Emekli Sandığı. Private sector employees were part of Sosyal Sigorta Kurumu (SSK) and the self-­employed belonged to the Bağkur. Again, anyone outside these three categories remained uninsured until the introduction of the yeşil kart (green card) insurance for the poor (Buğra 2010). The old social insurance system was a corporatist social insurance system whose benefits were extended for family members, particularly wife and children (Keyder 2007, 16–17). Put differently, the system treated the population according to a hierarchy based on gender and employment. The right for medical care was given to males of the households; females and children benefited from the right through the male. The IMF and the World Bank have been demanding the reform of the Turkish social insurance system since the 1980s. Accordingly, the neoliberal policies that the AKP governments have implemented in the areas of employment and education are also extended to the healthcare system through the introduction of the HTP of 2003–2013 (Law # 5510 and Law #5502, see Table 5.1). The HTP had four main objectives: (1) improving Turkey’s health outcomes in comparison with the OECD and middle-­income countries; (2) correcting inequities in access to healthcare; (3) unifying the fragmented financing and delivery of healthcare services to achieve efficiency; and (4) improving quality of care

Ministry of Health decrees

Law #5502

2006

Covering outpatient prescription drugs with copayments for Green Card holders; Closure of SSK pharmacies; Allowing SSK enrollees access to private pharmacies and public hospitals; Ending SSK’s provider function and transfer of SSK hospitals to the Ministry of Health; Start of the Family Medicine pilot-program. Integration of social security institutions; Separation of retirement and health insurance; Guaranteeing that all Turkish citizens receive primary health care services free of charge irrespective of insurance status; Global budgeting implemented for Ministry of Health hospitals; Establishment of pharmaceutical expenditure tracking system; Public and private partnership health law adopted.

Gradual implementation of HTP via decrees

Sosyal Sigortalar Kanunu (Law on Social Security)

Gradual implementation of the Health Transformation Program (HTP) via decrees

Ministry of Health decrees

2005

Ending the Ministry of Health’s mission as provider and responsibility of financing medical care by assigning only stewardship role; Except university research hospitals, turning all other Ministry of Health providers into autonomous business entities by severing their ties with the Ministry of Health; Consolidation of existing social insurances under one roof; Provision of primary and preventive care services via family medicine model; Financing via premiums determined according to earning level and a few out-ofpocket contributions. Covering Green Card holders for outpatient care; Implementation of individual, performance-based supplementary payment system for Ministry of Health institutions; Introduction of right to choose a physician system; Establishment of Reimbursement Commission.

Sağlık Kanunu Tasarısı Taslağı (Draft Design of Health Law)

Draft Laws

2004

Content 10-year program (2003–2013) including the introduction of a universal health insurance.

 

2003

Name

Conception of the Health Transformation Program (HTP)

Action

Date

Table 5.1 Selected laws and regulations concerning health (2002–2018)

 

Ministry of Health Communiqué #28945

2013

2014

Communiqué about the Changes in the Health Implementation Communiqué of Social Security Institution (Sosyal Guvenlik Kurumu Sağlık Uygulama Tebliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Tebliğ)

Re-introduction of coverage for termination of pregnancy; however, the Ministry of Health determined the coefficient as 150.8—this is the score the hospital receives for abortion. Source: www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/03/20140318-10.htm

Ailenin Korunması ve Kadına Yönelik This protocol allows the DİB staff to work with families to advise them about Şiddetin Önlenmesinde Din peaceful family relations. Görevlilerinin Katkısının Sağlanması Source: https://tinyurl.com/y7hkgrmk İşbirliği Protokolü (Protocol for Collaboration with the DİB Concerning the Protection of Women and the Prevention of Violence against Women)

Ailenin Korunması ve Kadına Karşı This was the first domestic legislative measure taken by Turkey to comply with the Şiddetin Önlenmesine Dair Kanun Istanbul Convention of 2011. The implementation of the law requires three national (Law Concerning the Protection of action plans to be completed until 2010. Women and the Prevention of Violence against Women) Source: www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2012/03/20120320-16.htm

6284

2012

This is the first international agreement concerning domestic violence. The Convention was open for signature by the member and non-member states in 2011 and became effective in 2016. It requires the signatures to take all measures against femicide and all other types of violence against women. Turkey was the first to sign the convention. Source: www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/210

Decree in Force of Law # 663 on the Establishing the Public Health Institution and Public Hospitals Union; Organization and Duties of the Ministry Finalizing transformation of the Ministry of Health into a stewardship role and of Health and its Affiliates passed away from provision and financing.

Exclusion of the coverage of the voluntary termination of pregnancy by Ministry of Health Source: www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2007/05/20070525M1-3.htm

Exclusion of coverage for termination of pregnancy by Social Security Agency.

The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention)

Law # 663

The coverage of termination of pregnancy The coverage of the voluntary termination of pregnancy

2011 CETS No:210 (effective as of 2016)

2011

Ministry of Health Communiqué Ministry of Health Communiqué #26532 (May 25)

154   Health and patient responsiveness (OECD and World Bank 2008, 48). To address these issues, two important laws, Law #5502 and Law #5510, were introduced and adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 2004 (OECD and World Bank 2008). Although the law was passed in 2006, the full implementation did not take place until 2013 (Table 5.1). The HTP also made changes to the previous retirement systems and together they constituted some of the most widespread reforms introduced to the public sector. Below, details of the new healthcare system are provided along with a discussion on their implications. The new healthcare system The HTP that the AKP introduced did indeed address many weaknesses of the old system: The new system united the fragmented social insurance programs as well as the healthcare provisions under one single system. The new system united the fragmented social insurance programs by separating retirement and medical insurance. The new retirement system did not create categories based on type of employment. The new system also introduced a mandatory health insurance program with universal coverage. The new universal health insurance system is financed through the premium collection based on earnings. The premium rate is determined as 12.5 percent of earnings; 7.5 percent by employer and 5 percent by employee (Yardım and Uner 2018, 446). The government pays for those whose personal income is less than one-­third of the monthly gross minimum wage. At the center of this program, there is the family medicine model introduced in 2004 replacing health stations (sağlık ocakları). In the family medicine model, patients see general practitioners for free but only pay co-­payments for prescription drugs. The Ministry of Health reimburses general practitioners more generously when they provide care for pregnant women and children (Ökem and Çakar 2015). The secondary and tertiary care are provided by three different types of hospitals, namely public, private and university research hospitals. The Ministry of Health remains in charge of the university research hospitals while the remaining public hospitals are granted financial and administrative autonomy. Unlike the old system then, the Ministry of Health is no longer responsible for the provision of care and the funding of the healthcare system. The HTP suffers from serious shortcomings, which can be examined in five major categories: (1) the financial unsustainability of the new system; (2) the unequal distribution of financial burden among income groups; (3) the increasing role of the private sector in the provision of care; (4) the inequality in distribution of health outcomes across the country; and (5) the introduction of the contract-­based system and its implications for women. First, the finance of the health insurance under the new system depends on (1) the collection of insurance premiums from those who have regular jobs, and (2) the correct reporting of the employers about the number the employees and their wages. Those employees who do not pay their premiums for more than 60

Health   155 days and the unemployed who have depleted their unemployment insurance beyond six months lose their coverage. In other words, the success of the premium-­based financing depends on the capacity of the overall economy to create employment. Thus, the system works only during the time the economy grows and creates a sufficient number of jobs. Indeed, the premium collection faced no problems during the years of economic growth between 2003 and 2009. However, economic growth slowed later on, increasing the percentage of non-­covered groups who failed to pay their premiums to 15 percent in 2010. Recently, it was reported that 9 percent of the overall population failed to pay their premiums in 2016 (Adaman and Erus 2017). In the meantime, as  a result of the increasing unemployment rates, the number who qualified for government support increased, raising the financial burden on the government. Second, the financial burden of the out-­of-pocket expenditures is not equally distributed among income groups. It is true that for all income groups, the overall share of out-­of-pocket expenditures in household income declined during the 2003–2013 period. For instance, households in the bottom 20 percent of income distribution experienced about a 43 percent decline between 2003–2005 and 2010–2013 on average (Figure 5.2). The second 20 percent of the income quintile experienced about a 27 percent decline for out-­of-pocket expenditures for the same period. For the top 20 percent of the income quintile, the decline was about 31 percent. However, one should consider the fact that household income in the surveys, especially of those who are poor, consists of both in-­kind and monetary transfers from both public and private sources. In-­kind transfers include such items as food, clothing, coal as fuel, etc., while monetary transfers include the payments

Figure 5.2 Distribution of out-of-pocket medical care expenditure as a percentage of household income including social and welfare transfers by income quintiles (2003–2013). Source: Özçörekçi (2016) based on calculations from Hanehalki Butce Anketi-Mikro Veri Seti (2003–2013).

156   Health from social security payments and cash transfers for the poor. Such transfers to the households—especially in-­kind transfers—have increasingly become a significant portion of poor household incomes because these transfers have been the most crucial social policy tools for the AKP to manage poverty. Thus, if one excludes such transfers and considers only the incomes earned by the households, the share of out-­of-pocket expenditures for healthcare rises considerably for all income groups during this time period (Figure 5.3). It is true that the decline of the share of out-­of-pocket expenditures in household incomes can still be observed after the exclusion of the social and welfare transfers. However, what is noticeable here is the burden that the bottom 20 percent income quintile experiences with these out-­of-pocket expenditures. According to Figure 5.3, for the poorest income group, the out-­of-pocket expenditures constitute about 21 percent of their earned income in the 2010–2013 period. Although prior to the health transformation reforms the share of burden as was high as 42.2 percent, which is an improvement, the table demonstrates that this group pays the highest percentage of share among all income groups. Put differently, despite its premises, the reforms have established a regressive financing system by unequally distributing the financial burden of the out-­ofpocket expenditures and placing the heaviest burden on the poor. The regressivity of out-­of-pocket expenditures has further implications for gender groups. According to Income And Living Condition Surveys of Turkey, conducted in 2006, 2010 and 2013, females in all age groups reported that they could not meet their healthcare needs because of cost (Yardım and Uner 2018, 649). Females between 35 and 54 reported the highest percentage rate of unmet

Figure 5.3 Distribution of out-of-pocket medical care expenditure as a percentage of household income without social and welfare transfers by income quintiles (2003–2013). Source: Özçörekçi (2016) based on calculations from Hanehalki Butce Anketi-Mikro Veri Seti (2003–2013).

Health   157 healthcare needs for these years (Yardım and Uner 2018, 649). Apparently, when families struggle to pay for the healthcare costs, women’s health needs are not considered a priority for the family. Third, the share of private providers has significantly increased in the profitable segment of the healthcare system since the beginning of the reforms. The private providers are typically private hospitals that are particularly concentrated in curative care rather than primary care since the former is more profitable. The rapidly increasing number of private hospitals and their beds can demonstrate this clearly. For example, according to the Ministry of Health statistics, the number of public hospitals increased from 824 to 945, by growing annually by about 1 percent, while private hospitals jumped from 271 to 565 at a growth rate about 5 percent per year between 2002 and 2016 (Sağlık Bakanlığı İstatistik Yıllıkları 2016, 2017). During the same time period, the number of total hospital beds increased from 133,735 to 170,628 with an annual 1.6 percent growth rate for the public sector whereas the figure climbed from 12,387 to 47,143 at a growth rate of about 9 percent per year for the private sector. On the other hand, primary care service providing public entities, such as Health Centers, Family Medicine Units, Family Health Centers, Community Health Centers, Health Houses, Mother Child Health and Family Planning Centers, grew only about 2.4 percent per year in the same period. In other words, the rate of growth of curative care providing hospitals—especially private ones—grew more and faster than primary care providers. An immediate outcome of this trend has been that public healthcare expenditures increased at the national level. One of the primary contributors has been payments for excessive and unnecessary curative care provided by private sector (Yılmaz and Yentürk 2017). This, in turn, increases the share of public healthcare expenditures at the national level because the initial referral system did not properly work, because the Ministry of Health loosened the requirements and patients were referred to hospitals for more expensive curative services. These services are all paid for by public funds due to the universal health insurance system in place. Fourth, it should be emphasized that the new system has improved health outcomes in general. However, the benefits of such improvements are not equally distributed across regions, genders and income groups. Most of the improvements in health outcomes took place in urban and western parts of the country (Hamzaoğlu and Yavuz 2009; Belek 2012; Ökem and Çakar 2015). This discrepancy can be measured through some of the conventional health indicators. For instance, in general the infant mortality rate declined, with the exception of the southeastern region. With respect to infant mortality rate, the gap between the lowest (in Istanbul) and the highest (in the southeastern region) infant mortality rates was 1 to 1.5 in 2000, 2.0 in 2014 and 2.2 in 2016, respectively. Furthermore, the share of the preventable infant mortality rate increased for the entire country (Hamzaoğlu 2017). For instance, the share of preventable infant mortality increased from 18 percent in 2009, to 26 percent in 2013 climbing to 34 percent in 2014. It should be noted that the officially announced infant mortality deaths are much lower due to the recent changes in definitions.

158   Health The Ministry of Health began counting infant deaths of “28 weeks and after or 1,000 gram and over” in 2012 (Hamzaoğlu 2017, 289) instead of counting any death after a live birth. This new definition clearly contradicts the definition of the World Health Organization. As a result of this redefinition of infant mortality, the infant mortality rates for Turkey were underestimated by 36 percent in 2009, 57 percent in 2012, and 36 percent in 2016 (Hamzaoğlu 2017, 292). Another example of poor health outcome is the unmet family planning need. The unmet family planning need is unequally distributed between the regions and income groups according to the statistics reported in Türkiye Nüfus ve Sağlık Araştırması (“Research on Population and Health in Turkey”) in 2003, 2008, and 2013. For instance, the percentage of females whose family planning needs were not met in the southeastern region was 13.8 percent as opposed to 2.3 percent in the western region in 2003. This percentage went down a little to 11.8 percent in 2013, however, the gap remained with that of the western region, with a percentage of 2.9. The unmet family planning need also demonstrates a great discrepancy between income groups. For the lowest income group, the percentage was 12.5 percent while for the highest group, it was 3.7 percent in 2008. This percentage went down a little to 10.2 for the lowest income group while it was 3.5 percent for the highest income group in 2013. Despite the decrease, the gap remained high. A similar trend can be seen with respect to the percentages of children who were never vaccinated. For example, the percentage of females who were not vaccinated was 2.9 while it was 2.7 for males in 2003. It went up for females to 4.1 percent while it went down for males to 1.6 percent in 2013. It should be noted that the areas of discrepancy listed above are all part of the primary and preventive care. Thus, despite increasing healthcare expenditures and the greater role assigned to primary and preventive care through family medicine under the new system, basic health status indicators have worsened for some regions, income and gender groups. Family planning has been undermined by the changes brought by the HTP. As a result of the introduction of family medicine, the family planning service was subjected to major transformation. Starting from 2009, the Mother–Child Health and Family Planning Centers were transformed into Family Health Centers (Eren et al. 2013, 148). The impact of closing down these centers, which provided family planning, has been significant. In research conducted with 1641 women in Ankara, Erden et al. (2013) find that although the number of women who use contraception has increased over time, the number of women who use modern methods has decreased as a result of the closure of the Mother–Child Health and Family Planning Centers. According to Eren et al. (2013, 150), “the fact that withdrawal and condom are the two most commonly-­used techniques than before suggests that women began choosing the contraception methods that do not require medical service.” We were able to find a similar conclusion by using Türkiye Nüfus ve Sağlık Araştırması (Turkey Population and Health Survey) results. As Figure 5.4 shows, the number of women who use no contraception has gone down from about 37 percent in 1988 to 29 percent in 2003. There is no data available for “no prevention option” in 2008 and 2013.

Health   159

Figure 5.4 Contraception methods by women (1988–2013). Source: Türkiye Nüfus ve Sağlık Araştırması (TNSA) 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, and 2013. TNSA2008 EKG-Özet Göstergeler.

Figure 5.4 also shows that the number of those women who use any type of contraception has increased from 64 percent in 1998 to 71 percent in 2003 and again to about 99 percent since then. The survey groups the contraception methods into modern and traditional. Modern methods include pills, condoms, female condoms, vasectomy, implants, etc., while the traditional ones include using calendar, withdrawal, and other traditional methods. The data show that the use of modern methods steadily increased between 1998 and 2003, rising from 31 percent to 42.5 percent. Then it significantly increases up to 99 percent in 2013. The use of traditional methods gradually declined between 1998 and 2003 from 32 percent to 28.5 percent. After 2003, the use of traditional methods rapidly went up to 94 percent in 2008 and then declined to 84 percent in 2013. In other words, the previously-­declining trend of traditional methods began increasing during the AKP years. Fifth, the health policies of the AKP since the early 2000s have failed to fight against the former gender inequities and have added new ones. The neoliberal policies have affected the workers of the healthcare system, most of whom are women. The healthcare employees have lost guaranteed employment with benefits, due to the contract system. The contracts could be unilaterally ended by employees and opened door for the types of jobs with no benefits. Finally, şehir hastaneleri (city hospitals) should be mentioned as part of the neoliberalization process in the healthcare system, which will have significant implications for how healthcare is provided. In this AKP-­introduced ongoing project, the government promises to rent privately-­built mega hospitals and to purchase the services provided by them, such as labs, parking lots, food services,

160   Health etc., for 25 years. At the end of this period, the government owns these mega hospitals. Since these mega construction projects require borrowing from abroad, the treasury guarantees to pay the debt in the case of default. Additionally, the lands on which the hospitals are to be built are public lands given away for free and the companies enjoy tax deductions and tax relief (Ataay 2018). Pro-­natalist policies Since the mid-­1960s, measures against a population increase have been in place, as discussed above. The measures were not fully successful, however, leading to an uncontrollable increase in the population, which reached about 81 million in 2017 (TÜİK 2018). Turkey is currently one of the most populous country in the Euro area considering its population density: 104.9 (Turkey) versus 127.5 (Euro Area) (World Bank Databank 2018). Assessment of the size of the population requires an assessment of the country’s abilities in ensuring quality of life. Indicators include, but are not limited to, the distribution of wealth and income, gender equality, access and quality of education, infant mortality and even food security. The discussion below will take many of these indicators into account when assessing the country’s ability to support and serve its population. Since the AKP came to power, it has taken many concrete and discursive measures to attack the previously established policies of population control. These policies were attacked by then Prime Minister Erdoğan himself, starting from 2008. Erdoğan, in a speech in March 2008, criticized the former policies of population control, stating that the country should keep its young population growing because “the main driving force behind a healthy economy is the labor” (“Erdoğan: En Az Üç Çocuk” 2008). Referring to the West, in general, and the European Union (EU), in particular, Erdoğan argued that they “hope that the Turkish nation [becomes] extinct,” and urged women to reverse the trend of declining youth population by having at least three children (“Erdoğan: En Az Üç Çocuk” 2008). This rhetoric, repeated by Erdoğan and other politicians since that time, is known as the “at least three children” policy. At times, the number of recommended children even increased: In a wedding ceremony in which he participated in 2014, Erdoğan increased the recommended number of children “to three and even beyond,” stating that God would take care of them (“Erdoğan’dan Gülümseten” 2014). Ahmet Davutoğlu, who became Prime Minister after Erdogan’s election as president, argued that giving birth is equal to serving in the military (“Davutoğlu: Doğum Yapan” 2016). Emine Erdoğan, Tayyip Recep Erdoğan’s wife, also joined the calls by arguing that  we are a country whose population is increasingly getting old. Between 2023 and 2050, Turkey’s population will increase seven times, but this will stop after that. We have to keep our population young because that’s what the new world order requires. We have to promote at least three children to keep our strength as a country.  (“Güçlü Türkiye” 2018) 

Health   161 She also argued that controlling population on the grounds that the country’s sources are limited is baseless and harmful to Turkish culture and families because these policies shrink the family size and limit the number of relatives, both of which are crucial for children’s socialization (Emine Erdoğan 2018). Tayyip Recep Erdoğan, at times, also resorted to religious references to justify his party’s pro-­natalist policies. Erdoğan stated that, God’s and Prophet Mohammed’s command is clear: Get married and reproduce. Muslims should not compromise on this God-­given order of increasing their population. The violent organization [referring to PKK] encourages having 5, 10 and even 15 children. I believe that we will follow the God’s order. (“Terör Örgütü” 2017) A closer look at the “at least three children” policy demonstrates that it is based on a number of assumptions that are not supported by empirical evidence. First, the main justification of the AKP’s pro-­natalist policies has been that the young population has been in decline in Turkey and the population will become “too old” very soon. The population between 15–24 years of age constitutes 16 percent of the overall population in Turkey while it is 10 percent for EU countries on average. To control the exponential growth of the country’s population, population control policies have been in place since the mid-­1960s. Figure 5.1 demonstrates the decreasing fertility rate since the mid-­1960s. However, this also demonstrates that the growth of population has not declined since the early 2000s. In other words, the population continues to increase significantly with the growth rate having stagnated for almost two decades. The AKP’s argument that the population will become too old soon is just not substantiated. Second, the pro-­natalist policies of the AKP and the “at least three children” discourse disregard women’s preferences about the number of children they wish to have. In fact, data demonstrate that Turkish women continue to have more children than they would like to have. Figure 5.5 shows the desired and the actual total fertility rates for 2013 between 1998 and 2013. Accordingly, while the desired number of children, on average, was 1.9, Turkish women on average had 2.3 children in 2013. Given the patriarchal social relations and the lack of affordable childcare, it is obvious that having more children means more household responsibilities and fewer opportunities outside the home for women. In other words, the “at least three children” policy results in a heavier burden on women’s shoulders and comes with gender implications. Lastly, the pro-­natalist policies also disregard the fact that the current economy of Turkey is unable to provide a decent quality of life for its current population. Examples abound, as measured by global indicators. For instance, as of 2017, Turkey ranks 64th out of 188 in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI), calculated based on the Gross Domestic Product, education and infant mortality rates at birth (UN Human Development Report 2017). Turkey’s gender ranking is even lower: According to the Gender Development Index

162   Health

Figure 5.5 Desired versus actual total fertility rates (1998–2013). Source: Türkiye Nüfus ve Sağlık Araştırması (2003, 2008, 2014).

(GDI), which is the ratio of female and male HDI values, Turkey ranks 118th out of 164 countries for the same year (UN Human Development Report 2017). As a poverty measure, the proportion of employed people who live on less than $3.10 a day—in terms of purchasing power parity—expressed as a percentage of the total employed population aged 15 and older, is 1.1 percent, making the ranking 110th out of 134 for 2017 (UN Human Development Report 2017). The young unemployment rate is also alarming: According to the UNDP data, Turkey’s youth unemployment, defined as “the percentage of the labor force population ages 15–24 that is not in paid employment or self-­employed but is available for work and has taken steps to seek paid employment or self-­employment” was 20.3 percent in 2017. This makes Turkey’s rank 129th out of 180 countries (UN Human Development Report 2017). Turkey’s food security ranking is relatively better. Nevertheless, according to the Global Food Security Index, Turkey ranks 48th out of 113 countries in the overall food security category, while it ranks 47th, 53rd, 39th and 23rd in terms of affordability, availability, equality and safety, and natural resources and resilience, respectively, in 2018 (Global Food Security Index 2018). In sum, discussions about a country’s population growth should be made in conjunction with the data about its ability to provide a decent quality of life to its citizens. The indicators listed above clearly demonstrate that Turkey’s record has been poor—to say the least—in this regard, which questions the government’s arguments that a bigger labor force is required to sustain the country’s economy. Anti-­abortion measures Rising women’s activism of the 1970s demanded the legalization of abortion much earlier than the 1980s, but the military coup of 1980 delayed the legal

Health   163 changes. Finally legalized in 1983 by the military regime, abortion had never been subjected to public discussions along similar—pro-­life versus pro-­choice— lines to those in the United States. Abortion became commonly accepted and practiced across regions and classes. The anti-­abortion rhetoric framed by the AKP government in 2012 was therefore unprecedented in the history of the country. The rhetoric clearly aimed at creating different camps, calling abortion “murder” and even a “crime against humanity.” The AKP’s previous programs concerning reproductive health gave no clue about the upcoming anti-­abortion rhetoric. In fact, the Strategic Plan prepared by the Ministry of Health for 2005–2015, which outlined the ministry’s objectives for sexual and reproductive health, does not raise any concern about abortion rights (Ulusal Stratejik Eylem Planı 2005). On the contrary, the report emphasizes at the outset that that every person has the right to determine “whether or not they would like to have children, how many and when by their own free will” (Ulusal Stratejik Eylem Planı 2005, 32). The report also notes that 20 percent of the total births for the ages between 15 and 49 are unwanted pregnancies. More specifically, 11.3 out of every 100 pregnancies are unwanted (Ulusal Stratejik Eylem Planı 2005, 17). The report notes that “these numbers demonstrate that unwanted pregnancies, unwanted births and termination of pregnancy are a common problem in the country” (Ulusal Stratejik Eylem Planı 2005). The report emphasizes that these numbers are too high and that lowering the total number of unwanted pregnancies is listed as a goal to achieve by 2015. Starting from 2012, however, the speeches initiated by the top brass directly challenged abortion rights and practices. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan took the lead by giving an unexpected anti-­abortion speech in June 2012 in the International Conference on Population and Development (“Erdoğan’dan” 2012). Erdoğan called abortion “murder,” adding that he likes children and urging every family to have three children: I consider abortion equal to murder. Nobody should have the right to intervene in [a pregnancy]. There is no difference between killing a child in a mother’s womb or after birth as both are murders. We have to be sensitive to this issue and united against this practice [abortion]. (“Erdoğan’dan” 2012) Shortly after Erdoğan’s speech, Recep Akdağ, then Minister of Health, announced that the Ministry of Health had already begun working on a report on abortion that would lead to a bill, adding that “abortion should not be used as a method of contraception and we should be talking about the fetus’s right to live rather than women’s rights here” (“Bakan Akdağ’dan” 2012). Minister Akdağ alleged that abortion also poses health risks to women, such as heavy bleeding, tears and possible infertility afterwards (“Bakan Akdağ’dan” 2012). For Akdağ, abortion also has moral, ethical and political dimensions because the 1983 law that allowed abortion was a law passed during the military regime and should be questioned, like other things that the military regime introduced: “If pregnancy

164   Health occurs as a result of rape” the Minister added “then the state would be responsible for taking care of the baby,” clarifying that no exception should be present for abortion (“Bakan Akdağ’dan” 2012). In the upcoming days, Erdoğan gave further speeches arguing that the state has to take “our cultural values” into account in making laws and the state has the right to regulate this issue because of “our cultural values”: “Just like we do not allow suicides, we cannot allow women to harm themselves either” (“Erdoğan: Sezaryenle” 2012). Erdoğan criticized those who defend abortion rights and argued that “those people have no moral values” (“Erdoğan: Sezaryenle” 2012). Ayhan Sefer Üstün, then the Head of the Human Rights Commission of the Grand National Assembly, joined this unexpected anti-­abortion choir by arguing that abortion is a crime committed against humanity because abortion takes away the right to live from the baby, and adding that those who commit this crime should be punished (“AK Partili Üstün” 2012). Melih Gökçek, then Mayor of Ankara, particularly criticized feminists who defend abortion rights on the basis that women themselves hold the exclusive right to decide what they will do with their bodies (“Melih Gökçek” 2012). According to the Ministry of Health records, Gökçek argued, hundreds of thousands of abortions take place every year in Turkey: “What does that mean? It means hundreds of thousands of murders happen yearly. Why does the child die because of the mistakes of those women? Those women should kill themselves instead!” (“Melih Gökçek” 2012). Echoing other opponents of abortion, Gökçek stated that “Nobody can take away the life that Allah has given. When somebody kills a child after the child is born, it is called murder, but it is OK to kill that child before they are born. This is nonsense” (“Melih Gökçek” 2012). Mehmet Görmez, then Director of Religious Affairs joined the fray by arguing that “abortion is both illicit and sinful” and that it should be allowed only in exceptional cases, such as danger to mother’s own life and rape (“Diyanet’ten Kürtaj” 2012). Erdoğan directly targeted feminism, framing it as propaganda that denies motherhood:  Some [feminists] claim that “this body is mine and I could do anything I want”. This is what feminist propaganda claims. What about the right to live? Our starting point is pro-­life. There is no difference between killing humans after or before birth. (“Erdoğan: Kürtaj Yasağına Karşı” 2012) Erdoğan argued that those women who “resent being mothers because of their work are denying their half. I would even argue that they are denying their humanity. Reproduction and participation in every aspect of life is not an obstacle to being a mother” (Erdoğan: Anneliği Reddeden Kadın” 2016). Despite the statements among the AKP’s top brass, other party members, particularly female ones, expressed their disagreements about the unexpected anti-­abortion agenda of the government. Public announcements of intra-­party disagreements are not common because of the party’s highly hierarchical and authoritarian

Health   165 structure and political culture. Nevertheless, Fatma Bostan Ünsal, one of the founders of the AKP expressed her disagreements with the abortion bill, which she characterized as a “wag the dog strategy” to divert public attention from some other serious issues. She argued that she herself is against abortion; however, making public policies criminalizing abortion takes away women’s autonomy and victimizes women (“AKP’nin Kurucu Üyelerinden” 2012). Nursuna Memecan, a member of parliament from the AKP, also expressed her disagreement with the bill arguing that a ban on abortion will never make abortion go away but will only make it happen illegally under non-­sterile conditions and jeopardize women’s lives (“AKP Partilili Memecan” 2012). Gynecologists joined the fray as well. Some argued that no type of contraception is 100 percent effective, which makes the option of abortion a fact of life and that criminalizing abortion would increase the number of women’s deaths (“Kürtajı Herkes Konuşuyor” 2012). Others suggested that preventing unwanted pregnancies should also target men rather than only focusing on women’s bodies (“Türkiye’de Kürtaj” 2016). Still others argued that some doctors are determined to never terminate a pregnancy and yet they can be subject to legal punishment when they refuse to end a pregnancy (“Şoke Eden Kürtaj” 2012). Pro-­ government newspapers claimed that abortion rights have been abused by some women resorting to it as many as 17 times and that Turkey is among the top three countries in the world that have the highest number of abortions (“Şoke Eden Kürtaj” 2012). A new women’s activism to support abortion rights has emerged in response to these anti-­abortion discourses and the possibility of criminalizing abortion (Özkaplan 2012). Ankara Women’s Platform, an umbrella organization for various women’s organizations, organized a protest asking the government to take its hands off women’s bodies, and recommending the use of contraception for women (“7 Şehirde Eş Zamanlı Kürtaj” 2012). Simultaneous demonstrations were held in other cities as well (“7 Şehirde Eş Zamanlı Kürtaj” 2012). Women’s rights activists demanded amendments to the existing law to expand women’s rights to end pregnancy from 10 weeks to 12 weeks and even beyond in cases of rape. According to the current law, pregnancy could be terminated until 20 weeks in cases of rape. In the meantime, newspapers reported a rape case in which a 29-week pregnant woman’s request for abortion was denied by a court because it was beyond the statutory period of 20 weeks (“Tecavüz Mağduru Kadına Kürtaj” 2012). The case drew national attention thanks to the media’s extensive coverage because the rape victim had also killed the suspect and she was determined not to have the baby (“Tecavüz Mağduru Kadına Kürtaj” 2012). The “Women’s Platform for Abortion is a Right” demanded that the legal abortion period should be expanded to 12 weeks while pregnancies in cases of incest and rape should be able to be ended up to 24 weeks, and that the required permission from the Prosecutor’s Office to prove rape and incest should be eliminated as well as the husband’s permission. The platform also highlighted that there exist de facto obstacles against abortions in public hospitals despite the fact that it is legal (“Kürtajda Yasal Süre” 2013; “Kürtaj Hakkı İçin Mor Mesaj” 2014).

166   Health After these intense discussions and the determination of the government to limit abortion, one would expect the law to pass as planned. However, the anti-­ abortion bill was withdrawn by the government, ending the discussions abruptly and unexpectedly, just like the way the bill began. It was stated earlier that the AKP’s Central Executive Committee decided to prepare the anti-­abortion bill by the end of May 2012 and to bring it to a vote in June. It was also announced that the new law was going to reduce the legal abortion period to four weeks only if in case mother’s life is in danger. There was no consensus concerning abortion in cases of rape. About a month after Erdoğan initiated the abortion controversy, however, the spokesperson for the AKP representatives announced that the bill was not going to be sent to parliament and the abortion issue was no longer on the government’s agenda (“Kürtaj Gündemden Kalktı” 2012). While the anti-­abortion bill of 2012 was taken off the government’s agenda, however, anti-­abortion rhetoric and administrative obstacles against abortions did not end. Since the AKP came to power in 2002, newspapers have often reported certain obstacles against practices pertaining to the termination of abortion. Shortly after the AKP came to power in 2002, a communiqué was issued by the Ministry of Health that women will have to pay for their abortions at public hospitals. In another communique in 2007, abortion-­ related reimbursements to hospitals by the Social Security Institute (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu) were excluded, as shown in Table 5.1. In 2014, another communique was issued by the same ministry, this time covering the abortion-­related expenditures (Table 5.1). In the 2014 regulation, however, the coefficient or score that the doctors receive in response to the abortion service they provide was identified as 150, which is clearly quite low considering the risk involved (Table 5.1). The low score is clearly meant to disincentivize the doctors and limit the number of abortions. Abortion remains legal in Turkey; however, the government has taken many measures to limit the practice in public hospitals. The low coefficient assigned to abortion is one of those measures. Public hospitals have practically halted abortion voluntarily in response to this anti-­abortion rhetoric coming from top politicians and the added extra obstacles not mentioned in the law. Newspapers often report that, despite the legality of abortion until 10 weeks, abortion is de facto non-­existent in public hospitals (“Yasa Yok Ama” 2014). Journalists who made phone calls to a number of public hospitals in various cities received inconsistent responses. Some hospitals asked for permission from women’s husbands while others stated that no abortion service is provided by the hospital because abortion is no longer legal (“Yasa Yok Ama” 2014). In 2015, newspapers reported again that only two out of 28 public hospitals in Istanbul responded affirmatively to abortion requests that journalists called to make (“Kürtaj Olmak İsteyen” 2015). These are not the types of obstacles that one can find in legal arrangements; rather, public hospitals are self-­imposing anti-­abortion measures as a result of the anti-­abortion discourse repeatedly expressed at the top of the state leadership. One reported obstacle, for instance, is to delay the abortion so that the 10 weeks of the

Health   167 p­ regnancy during which the termination of the baby is legal is passed. Another obstacle is to outright refuse to terminate pregnancy even during the statutory period of 10 weeks. Journalists who made the phone calls to make an appointment also received the response that the hospital staff received an order from the hospital administration to decline abortion requests (“Kürtaj Olmak İsteyen” 2015). Another obstacle is to refuse to see unmarried women (“Kürtaj Olmak İsteyen” 2015), a clear violation of the 1983 law. More recently, it was reported that out of the public hospitals located in 12 cities, only nine conduct abortion according to the rules outlined in the 1983 law (“12 İlde Sadece” 2016). A civil society organization discovered, through its own research, that out of 30 public hospitals in Ankara, only three were willing to see abortion cases (“Devlet Hastanesinde Kürtaj” 2015). The current practices regarding abortion have been best documented in research conducted by Kadir Has University. The report entitled Legal but Inaccessible (“Yasal Ama Ulaşılabilir Değil”) best summarizes the predicament of abortion under the AKP rule (O’Neil et al. 2016). Accordingly, only 7.8 percent of public hospitals agree to terminate pregnancy upon request by women within the legally allowed 10-week period. In fact, 53 cities out of 81 have no public hospitals providing abortion services (O’Neil et al. 2016). In sum, the anti-­abortion rhetoric clearly created a significant obstacle against abortion practice in public hospitals. Although the AKP decided not to pursue de jure criminalization of abortion, abortion is de facto not being implemented in most public hospitals (“İşte Türkiye’nin” 2012). Emphasis on family and the failure to prevent violence against women As a pressing public health challenge, violence against women in general, and femicide—defined as the intentional murder of women because they are women—along with violence against children have skyrocketed over the last decades. Unfortunately, no official statistics exist about the exact numbers of femicides. Civil society organizations’ databases and newspaper reports are the only sources. According to a women’s organization, between 2008 and 2017, 2271 women were killed by either their husbands/significant others or victims’ relatives, such as sons and fathers (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu). The alarming trend of femicide can be clearly seen in Figure 5.6. In 2017 only, 409 women were killed. This is a significant jump from 80 femicides in 2008. Despite this increase over the last decade, we do not have enough data to make a comparison with the prior years, although violence against women and children has always been quite common in Turkish society. According to a study that examined 162 events resulting in 161 femicides in 12 cities between 2000 and 2010, the typical intimate partner perpetrator, “is close to his victim’s age, has a paid job, has no mental disability, owns a gun, and has threatened his partner or ex-­partner previously because of jealousy/infidelity/honour or separation” (Toprak and Ersoy 2017, 1). During the same period, violence and sexual harassment targeting children have also shown an

168   Health

Figure 5.6 Femicide in Turkey (2008–2017). Source: Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu.

increasing trend. For instance, in 2017 only, 387 children were sexually assaulted (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu). The AKP governments have unfortunately done little to keep a record of femicides, identify the reasons behind femicide, and take the necessary measures to prevent it. The existing legal framework is not only insufficient to effectively prevent femicide, but, as discussed below with respect the Penal Code, it includes some discriminatory clauses, such as the “unjust provocation.” Among the positive steps the AKP governments took are the signing of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, also referred to as the Istanbul Convention, and the passing of the follow up domestic law called Ailenin Korunması ve Kadına Karşı Şiddetin Önlenmesine Dair Kanun (“The Law Concerning the Protection of Family and the Prevention of Violence Against Women”) to begin taking measures to comply with the Istanbul Convention (#6284, see Table 5.1). The shortcomings of the AKP governments in fighting against femicide have been documented by GREVIO (Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence). As part of the Istanbul Convention, GREVIO was formed to follow up the legislative and other measures that the member countries are under obligation to take. The first GREVIO report on Turkey was issued in October 2018 (GREVIO Baseline Report 2018). GREVIO consists of 10 independent experts and its first report on Turkey provides some of the most comprehensive examinations on violence against women. The report

Health   169 acknowledges a number of positive actions taken by the state to comply with the Istanbul Convention since 2012: These include Law #6284 (Table 5.1), the decision to collect data related to gender equality, the creation of Violence Prevention and Monitoring Centers (ŞÖNİM) and women’s shelters, and the promise to take other measures in three parts spanning to 2020. The GREVIO Baseline Report also offers a major criticism to Turkish authorities that have “the tendency to emphasise women’s traditional roles as mothers and care-­givers, which do little to challenge discriminatory stereotypes concerning the roles and responsibilities of women and men in family and society” (GREVIO Baseline Report 2018, 7). Thus, the report notes, “these factors could divert from the country’s endeavours to enhance women’s rights and equality and that they might work against Turkey’s efforts to prevent violence against women effectively” (GREVIO Baseline Report 2018, 7). Furthermore, the report notes that: The unavailability of judicial data on investigation, prosecution and sentencing of perpetrators of criminal offences constitutes a serious obstacle to the authorities’ ability to monitor conviction rates and thus effectively monitor the implementation of laws by law-­enforcement agencies, prosecution services and courts. (GREVIO Baseline Report 2018, 7) A major legal obstacle against the sentencing of perpetrators, unfortunately, comes directly from the Penal Code itself. The Penal Code went through a major reform in 2004 thanks to the involvement of civil society organizations whom the government was determined to exclude (İlkkaracan 2010). A coalition by women’s and LGBT organizations finally managed to convince the government to work with these organizations towards getting rid of the discriminatory clauses. Despite the coalition’s objections, two major discriminatory clauses remained in the Penal Code. As Çavdar (2010, 353) put it: The new code eliminated reduced sentences for “custom killings” [töre suçları], which refers to the practice of “family assembly”, but kept the category of “honour killings” [namus suçları], which refers to individual practices. The latter is not included in the category of “aggravated homicide”, which would make it subject to imprisonment for life, while the former is. Women’s groups argued against this distinction, insisting that it would be almost impossible to prove that a family decision lay behind a killing and that this category would only benefit the killers by reducing their sentences. The New Penal Code also brought more reductions for those crimes committed under the influence of “unjust provocation” (haksız tahrik). As feared by the women’s organizations, the “unjust provocation” is often resorted to perpetrators to get reduced sentences. These discriminatory clauses have undoubtedly contributed to the high number of femicide cases.

170   Health Women’s organizations in Turkey closely follow the necessary measures that the government has to take to prevent violence against women in general, and femicide in particular. In one of their joint announcements made on August 1, 2018, a total of 153 women’s organizations expressed their disappointment and frustration with what they perceive as the AKP’s systematic efforts to prevent gender equality and instead exclusively define women in terms of their responsibilities to society and their families, which the organizations consider lie at the heart of the violence against women (“153 Kadın Örgütünden” 2018). The joint statement drew particular attention to a so-­called civil society organization, called Aile Platformu (“Family Platform”) that organizes meetings and makes demands from the government to reverse the gains made towards women’s rights. The demands of the Aile Platformu include the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, the reinstallation of men as the head of the family, the cancellation of the Law #6284 as well as all other laws that “undermine the family” (Aile Platformu). The Aile Platformu is a civil society organization, which is obviously independent from the government and state institutions. However, a similarity between the inability to comprehend women’s complex roles and identities in society and the obsession to reduce them to women’s traditional roles and responsibilities are commonly shared. Indeed, the Aile Platformu’s concerns with so-­called “high divorce rates” in Turkey and its “solution” to this fabricated problem are meant to reverse the progress made in the legal system over recent years. The platform criticize recent legal changes made to the Civil and Penal Codes and would like to reverse them. One example is the concept of “marital rape” adopted as part of the amendments to the Penal Code of 2004. The platform is also critical of the legalization of the foundations for LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual) rights and the Directive issued in 2006 by the Prime Minister to prevent “honors killings.” The platform strongly criticizes the AKP’s policies and the legal measures that the platform considers undermine the traditional family values. Despite these differences, there are also similarities between the AKP’s conceptualization of gender and that of the Aile Platformu. Instead of dealing with other pressing issues, such as femicide or the sexual violence committed against children, the Grand National Assembly formed a committee to recommend measures against divorce. The report was issued in May 2016 under the title of Boşanma Komisyonu Taslak Raporu (“Initial Report by Committee on Divorce”). The report’s purpose was explained at the outset trying to reduce the “unstoppable” divorce rates that undermine the Turkish family (Boşanma Komisyonu Taslak Raporu 2016, xxi). Paradoxically, however, the same paragraph reports that the marriage rate was 7.8 per 1000 while the divorce rate was 1.7 per 1000 in 2014 (Boşanma Komisyonu Taslak Raporu 2016, xxi). In other words, the fact that the committee is mainly concerned with the supposedly alarming divorce rates, as opposed to other factors, by itself suggests a patriarchal bias. Indeed, during the writing of the report, women’s organizations reported that women’s and children’s rights organizations have been sidelined and the input of civil society organizations that defend the rights of these groups

Health   171 were consistently excluded (“Kader’den” 2016). Women’s organizations, including KADER (Kadın Adayları Destekleme Derneği [the Foundation to Support Female Candidates]), criticized that violence against women, although it is one of the most important reasons for divorce, is not even discussed in the report and mentioned only once. Indeed, patriarchal bias can be detected throughout the report: The report also touches upon an issue that is often raised in conservative circles as well as the Aile Platformu, that is, alimony paid by divorced men to their former wives. Alimony has recently being criticized by these circles on the grounds that it provides “unjust benefits” to women and places too much burden on men. The report recommends limiting the year of the nafaka (alimony) in accordance with the duration of the marriage. The report also often refers to solving family problems with adalet ve hakkaniyet (“justice and fairness”) and nowhere mentions the word “equality” when referring to the relationship between men and women. Another striking example comes from a family therapy model recommended by the committee (Boşanma Komisyonu Taslak Raporu 2016, 369). The report uses vague language while describing those who are qualified to provide such consultation services, as raised by critics who attended the committee meetings, in a way to allow graduates of İlahiyat Fakültesi (Islamic Theology). Furthermore, the section ends by stating that “those who work as consultants for families should go through training programs to enhance their sensitivity to our culture” (Boşanma Komisyonu Taslak Raporu 2016, 369). In sum, the AKP tries to get away with its responsibilities towards gender equality emanating from the international treaties, such as CEDAW and the Istanbul Convention, by either completely ignoring them or by replacing them with their “culturally sensitive” interpretations that only exacerbate the problems. Thus, apart from the insufficient legal and administrative measures to address violence against women and children, the AKP’s glorification of family and its insistence of envisioning women within the context of family should be mentioned as a major reason behind this increasing trend of violence. The previous chapters on employment and education have demonstrated how the government policies as well as discourses failed to acknowledge women’s existence outside the family and the necessity of empowering them as individuals. In the case of violence against women, too, this shortcoming is prevalent. The AKP has consistently and unequivocally demonstrated that it fails to comprehend the fact that the traditional family structure, with its inequitable gender division of labor, unpaid labor, and the gender hierarchies that place men at the top, is an undemocratic structure that fails to serve the interests of women. Data on violence against women and children have repeatedly demonstrated that the perpetrators—more often than not—are family members. The AKP, unfortunately, does not even entertain the possibility that the traditional family roles that the party glorifies so much are the ones that take away women’s independence by placing them as inferiors and that these roles are also responsible for femicide and forever undermining women’s well-­being and personal dignity as a result of sexual harassment, rape or incest. Instead of aiming to democratize family relations, the AKP’s solution is, ironically, strengthening the traditional

172   Health family structure, idealizing it, and sealing it with Islam. The AKP has done this in the area of health in various ways: The above mentioned report, the Grand National Assembly’s Initial Report, is only one example. Other examples pertaining to health include the pro-­natalist policies that basically dump the entirety of unpaid labor on women, as well as the hostile anti-­abortion discourses and administrative measures aimed at taking away women’s autonomy and their rights to control their own bodies. Thus, the trending violence against women and ­children, as a public health problem, cannot be understood independently from the broader patriarchal legal system, administrative measures and hostile discourses. Greater role for the directorate of religious affairs (DİB) The Directorate of Religious Affairs (DİB) signed a protocol to collaborate with the Ministry of Health in 2015 as part of a series of similar collaborative agreements with other ministries and institutions (Table 5.1). The purpose of this protocol, as described in Article 1, is to assist patients better, motivate them and provide moral support, and guide them about religious, motivational spiritual guidance (DİB 2105). With this new agreement, the DİB is also granted the right to examine the religious books at the library of the Ministry and Health and identify the ones that are “inappropriate.” The DİB will thus have the opportunity to replace these “inappropriate” books with “appropriate” ones. The protocol will be in effect indefinitely so there is no time limitation on this task. Later, the Ministry of Health and the DİB issued a Directive in 2017 detailing this religious service (Table 5.1). According to Article 4 of the Directive, moral and spiritual guidance includes the following conditions: Those who receive the service are provided with religious references for the purpose of consoling them and helping them cope with unhappy, frustrated, scary, lonely and hopeless conditions, or deal with unexpected and sudden crises so that they develop skills to adopt to changing conditions. The Directive also notes that a number of books published are identified as ones that are not in “compliance” with the basic principles of Islam. According to DİB’s own reports, between 2015 and 2016, more than 6000 patients received “spiritual” guidance (“6 Binden Fazla Hastaya” 2016). According to the director of DİB’s Social and Cultural Religious Services, this type of service has been provided in the West for centuries through churches (“6 Binden Fazla Hastaya” 2016). For this purpose, hospitals have designated spaces and hospital rooms are provided with a copy of the Quran upon request. What these agreements signify is that they aim to expand the role of the DİB in the provision of public services while at the same time monopolizing its unique and specific interpretation of Islam. In other words, the AKP’s effort is not only to color public policies with Islam but also do this with a particular tone. All other Islamic and non-­Islamic interpretations are deemed dangerous, illicit and even condemned. The problem with the DİB’s monopoly over Islamic interpretation is that the DİB’s approaches to violence against women are far from addressing the challenge. The DİB seems to have adopted a number of various responses violence

Health   173 against women. At times, the DİB’s response is to condemn the violence by stating that domestic violence is “un-­Islamic” (“Diyanet İşleri Başkanı Erbaş’ın” 2018) or that Islam disapproves of violence against women (“Kadına Şiddetin” 2018). At other times, the DİB acknowledges the problem of violence, but it belittles it by drawing attention to other and even “greater sufferings.” For instance, during the signing of the Protocol to prevent violence against women, Mehmet Görmez, then director of DİB, criticized the UN for “unnecessarily focusing its attention on violence against women and ignoring the crimes committed against humanity” (“Diyanet Başkanı” 2013). Görmez defended his statement by arguing that “all defenders of women’s rights, their activists and foundations suffer from a legitimacy crises” because “if women, both eastern and western, and all humanity, are not moved when a 17-year-­old young lady is killed in Rabia square [in Egypt], then what is the point of sitting in these conference rooms and defending women’s rights?” (“Diyanet Başkanı” 2013). Görmez vowed not to ever use UN funds again and recommended the organization use the money for the prevention of crimes committed against humanity instead. Ironically, these statements coming from the director of DİB took place in a meeting concerning the prevention of violence against women. One can detect a similar attitude in a book entitled Ailemde Şiddet İstemiyorum (“I do not want Violence in my Family”) prepared by a DİB expert, Elif Arslan, against domestic violence. The book states that although women are the first group that comes to one’s mind when thinking about the domestic violence, this is only one type of violence; other groups such as children, the elderly, relatives as well as men might be subjected to violence (Arslan 2014, 14). The most often and detailed response to violence against women provided by the DİB is to recommend traditional family values as a solution. One can find the best examples of this in a book prepared by the DİB against violence. The book states out the outset that “the subject of the domestic violence is mostly women, unfortunately” (“Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığının Ailenin Korunması” 2015, 5) and that “violence is a product of wounded consciousness” and that the DİB is against “everything that harms and threatens the unity of the family.” It also offers as a solution “Islam’s message of compassion and justice” (“Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığının Ailenin Korunması” 2015, 6). The book then goes on to provide numerous stories from Islamic history to demonstrate how Islam’s messages are against domestic violence and how much the Prophet Mohammed valued women and their rights during his lifetime. In other words, “cultural practices,” such as violence and other forms of discrimination against women, occur only because pre-­Islamic practices continue to remain powerful in Muslim societies and also because the Islamic messages have been misunderstood and misinterpreted (“Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığının Ailenin Korunması” 2015, 9). Put differently, the solution to domestic violence is not less Islam, but more, because apparently for DİB Islam is the solution to all worldly problems ranging from unemployment, spiritual guidance, educational attainment as well as gender inequality. Finally, like the AKP, the DİB’s solution to violence against women and children is to

174   Health do nothing but recommend more traditional family values but this time justified by Islam. What is clear is that the level of domestic violence is the greatest in the country despite the abundance of fatwas, brochures, and Islamic statements. Only in 2015 did the DİB undertake a total of 533 anti-­violence actions, which included sermons, on-­the-job training, fatwas, statements, publications, and Friday sermons and seminars (“Şiddetle Mücadelede Dini Destek” 2015). Perhaps it is this mentality that demonstrates one more time why, after so much influence from DİB, its fatwas, trainings, consultative services and advice, violence has not declined. In fact it has skyrocketed. Apparently, DİB’s strategy is not working. The same institution, as reported in the media, also issued some of the most embarrassing fatwas and statements, including that it is acceptable for a father to experience sexual arousal towards his daughter, or that a husband can divorce his wife on the phone, through sending a fax or a letter or texting, or that feminism is immorality (“Son 10 Yılda” 2018). These statements were denied by the director of DİB or called mistranslations.

Conclusion The healthcare system of Turkey went through a major restructuring during the AKP era. The HTP united the previously fragmented insurance programs that led to inequitable health outcomes depending on one’s coverage. This positive development, however, was overshadowed by the increasing cost of the system due to the fact that curative care as opposed to preventive care has been emphasized over time. The increasing cost has been distributed inequitably across income levels, with the poor carrying the biggest burden—out-­of-pocket payments constituting about 20 percent of the poor’s income. The health outcomes also show great variability across income and gender groups. Furthermore, although contract-­based employment types that guarantee no job security remain limited, the new system and its performance-­based system target women in particular, as the majority of those employed in the healthcare sector are women. The commodification of healthcare has taken place, with the number of private providers skyrocketing, and most of whom are concentrated in the profitable curative services. Furthermore, the HTP failed to create a gender-­equitable healthcare system by ending women’s dependence on men. Women still have to rely on their spouses or fathers to have access to healthcare since the system is employment-­ based and most women either do not work outside home or work in the informal economy. Furthermore, women also depend on men for income to pay for out-­ of-pocket expenditures. In other words, the new healthcare system ensures women continue to be defined by men, a phenomenon Özar and Yakut-­Çakar (2013) call the “invisibility of women without men.” Özar and Yakut-­Çakar argue that this invisibility becomes obvious, as “women who are not under the protection of any form of social security face increased vulnerability when they are divorced, deserted or widowed” (Özar and Yakut-­Çakar 2013, 25).

Health   175 The abortion discussions were perhaps strategically introduced to divert public attention away from other issues, set the parameters of “what is permissible when it comes to the abortion services provided by public hospitals. Although both the timing was highly unexpected, and the discussions were unprecedented, the attack on abortion rights had significant implications.” Acar and Altunok (2013) argue that, in this new system of neo-­liberalism and Islamic conservatism,  regulation of sexuality becomes a central concern of the neo-­conservative rule. As the treatment of issues such as abortion, homosexuality or the sexuality of youth or unmarried women shows, any challenge to the heterosexual and patriarchal family structure is strongly rejected. (Acar and Altunok 2013, 20) The highly critical discourse expressed by the top brass practically ended the abortion service in public hospitals due to fear and confusion.

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6 Looking global, looking ahead

Turkey’s 1980 decision to move towards neoliberalism was not unique, but was part of a rising global trend. One of the earliest examples from the developed world came from the United Kingdom. Since the mid-­1970s, Margaret Thatcher with her ruthless criticism of the British welfare system had already been on her way to fundamentally reshaping the British politics. During her visit to the United States in 1975 as the leader of the Conservative Party, Thatcher appeared on national TV harshly criticizing Britain’s post-­war redistributive policies, commonly referred to as “progressive consensus,” and advocated what was called at the time “new conservatism” (“Margaret Thatcher” 1975). This trip was meant to demonstrate her foreign affairs competency and also to enable an American audience to get acquainted with her. New conservatism was Thatcher’s solution to the UK’s economic problems at that time: High inflation and unemployment rates, a weakened currency and almost non-­stop labor strikes, to name a few. Utterly impressed with Hayekian economic philosophy, Thatcher identified the villain responsible for the country’s turbulent economic conditions as the British welfare system: It was indeed Keynesian logic that was weakening Britain, argued Thatcher. It was the inefficient British system that was holding back the power of the individual. Thatcher even went as far as arguing that there was no such thing as the society, only individuals. Reversing economic policies and eliminating the “socialist economy” would bring British power back to the international stage again. The best and most effective economic reform would thus be to let the individual triumph: Lower government spending, lower taxes, and let business and consumers lead the economy (“Margaret Thatcher” 1975). Her deep convictions and self-­confidence resonated among the electorate. On May 4, 1979, Margaret Thatcher was elected as the first woman Prime Minister and later became the longest serving British Prime Minister in the twentieth century. Her policies, called “Thatcherism,” have reshaped politics both at home and abroad. Across the Atlantic, Ronald Reagan, a former actor who entered the 1980 presidential electoral campaign as the 10th candidate, unexpectedly set the stage for a different kind of politics for the US (Pemberton 1997, 85). Instead of giving the electorate a list of what he would do if elected, Reagan touched upon the power of the individual against the state: He claimed that the laws of history

182   Looking global, looking ahead didn’t apply to the United States, whose power, many Americans feared, was declining on the global stage. Reagan gave hope to ordinary Americans by claiming that nothing is impossible and that men are capable of improving their conditions against the odds. He told the electorate that the American predicament, marked with declining economic conditions, such as the ever-­growing balance of payments and rising unemployment, could be resolved by fixing the problem that caused it, which was overspending and overregulating. The government needed to be small, taxes should be cut, and entrepreneurs and their creative ideas should take over (Pemberton 1997, 85). The shrinking government spending, however, would never mean less military spending. Although his liberal critics labeled him an “empty suit” and some historians thought he was a “below average” president, Ronald Reagan fundamentally shaped American politics, imposing a strong precedence for his successors. After Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan took power, wide-­ranging changes were introduced: Massive tax cuts for the rich, the crushing of trade unions, privatization, deregulation, and outsourcing, among other things. Thus, Thatcher and Reagan, combined, effectively moved the entire political spectrum to the right both at home and abroad. Indeed, the neoliberal trends set by the United States and the United Kingdom were not meant to remain within the national boundaries of these countries. The neoliberal logic was there for others to emulate, voluntarily or by coercion— thanks the structural adjustment policies of the IMF and the World Bank. The neoliberalization then popularized had four features (Harvey 2005, 161–165): (1) Privatization and commodification; (2) financialization; (3) the management and manipulation of crises; and (4) state redistribution. The neoliberal logic did not only spread to the rest of the world but also spread to all areas of life, ranging from culture to technology, from security to the environment, by turning everything into a commodity that could be bought and sold in the market for the purpose of making money. Not unexpectedly, some of the first followers were their allies or soon-­to-be-­ allies on the periphery. Egypt under Anwar Sadat initiated an economic reform called infitah (“opening”), which was quite limited in scope, and yet put an end to the staunch statist policies of Gamal Abdul Nasser. By doing so, Sadat cut Egypt’s ties with the Soviet Union and allied the country with the Western world, particularly the United States. Turkey, thanks to Turgut Özal under the Süleyman Demirel government (1979–1980), initiated the economic reform program known as 24 Ocak Kararları (January 24th Decisions) in 1980. An unlikely follower came from the Far East, China. Following the death of Mao Zedong in 1979, and the catastrophic defeat of the policies of Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping moved away from the Moaist thought and initiated economic reforms by first dividing the land of public communes into private plots and then allowing public enterprises to increase productivity. For the next three decades, dominos fell, one after another, all over the world, even in the most unlikely places, such as the Scandinavian countries, which did not remain completely exempt. The biggest surge for the neoliberalization trend, however, came after the collapse of the Eastern bloc and

Looking global, looking ahead   183 eventually the Soviet Union. The capitalist world no longer had to deal with an existential threat from the left-­wing ideologies, no longer had to compromise, or try to find common ground. There was also no longer a need to make propaganda or hold international conferences to establish consensus. Rather, it was the time to silently construct neoliberalism as “the way things are,” a supposedly natural and desirable global order. The application of neoliberal logic was not without a price. It required legal arrangements to curb the power of the opposition, mostly labor unions and civil society organizations. Governments resorted to intimidation in some cases, violence or the threat of the use of violence in others. Extreme examples include the mass killings in Indonesia (1965–1966) under Suharto, Pinochet’s bloody coup in Chile in 1973, and the suppression of protests against structural adjustment and the legal changes allowing multinational corporations in operate in many developing countries, such as Nigeria, Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. The full implementation of the neoliberal policies was carried out by the military regime in Turkey (1980–1983), which closed down the labor unions, all political parties, student organizations, left-­wing publishing houses, executed many leaders of the left-­wing factions and jailed many others, practically eliminating the challengers, or at least significantly weakening them. Regardless of who implements it and how, one of the first outcomes of the implementation of neoliberalization is the removal of subsidies on basic items, such as food, water, electricity, and social services, whose prices go up significantly and become unaffordable for the poor. These services provide a high profit margin for a few private providers who had the capital to purchase the public enterprises in the first place. Thus, the most visible consequence of implementing neoliberal principles has been the growing income inequality in every single country that implemented them. According to the Global Wealth Databook of 2018, the richest 1 percent owns 45 percent of the world’s wealth (“Global Inequality” 2018). By 2017, just 42 billionaires had as much as the bottom 50 percent in the world (“Global Inequality” 2018). The consequences of neoliberal policies were not gender-­neutral either, as discussed Chapter 1, although there is no single impact on women. With respect to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), for instance, Moghadam (2005) writes that the impacts of neoliberalism on formal female employment depended on a number of factors, including the type of development policies each country pursued—the paucity of data on the informal sector makes it impossible to come up with a reliable analysis. A major policy difference took place during the 1960s and the 1970s when a number of MENA countries, such as Egypt, Turkey, and Algeria, pursued import-­substitution industrialization, while the oil rich Gulf states did not because of the rentier income they were able to generate from oil. While the former produced many jobs in the public sector, including jobs for females, the oil-­rich countries failed to do so. In addition, the fact that relatively poor countries, such as Tunisia and Jordan, were exporting migrants to the oilrich countries resulted in shortages in the labor markets of the sending countries. This, in turn, led to higher demands for female labor (Moghadam 2005, 115).

184   Looking global, looking ahead Moghadam states that “the oil boom era and the neoliberal era have had positive and negative effects on women’s livelihood and entitlements” (Moghadam 2005, 139). Bahramitash (2005) demonstrates that poverty among rural women in Southeast Asia has increased more than poverty among men. Harvey (2005) notes that the loss of social protections in advanced capitalist countries particularly hurt women, as did the rapid liberalization (“shock therapy”) of the ex-­communist countries (Harvey 2005, 170). In highly liberalized developed countries—in the UK, for instance—the number of working women has significantly increased since the 1970s, thanks to a series of legal changes. However, it is reported that the “there appears to be discrepancy between the quantity of work available for women and the quality” and that “higher gender inequalities at work may be linked to neo-­liberalism in Britain” (Dalingwater 2018, 1). The UK’s labor market is highly flexible, which makes it easier for firms to hire and fire, and the country has the third highest number of female part-­time workers among the OECD countries (Dalingwater 2018, 4). The gender consequences of neoliberal policies depend on a number of factors, including the level of economic development for the country as a whole, the presence of externally-­generated revenues (rentier economy), specific government policies, the culture, specific features of the cleavages, such as class and ethnicity, the presence of wars, and the like. Undoubtedly, certain neoliberal policies, including the outsourcing of many factories in the developing world, have expanded the job opportunities for women. However, these jobs are characteristically low-­paying, and they do not provide any social security and job security because the employer could easily hire and fire. In other ways, the types of jobs that have been created thanks to neoliberalization have certainly benefited some women, by giving them access to income, although the same types of jobs are unable to challenge the structural gender inequities and reverse the disadvantaged positions of women. While there is no single impact of neoliberalism on women, in many places where neoliberalism has been implemented, women’s unemployment rates remain disproportionately high; typically it is called the feminization of unemployment. Poverty levels also tend to increase as a result of the policies of neoliberalism. More recently, neoliberalism has begun targeting young women, identified as transformative consumers. In her qualitative study, Christina Scharff finds that it is not that young women are unaware of gender inequalities: “They are gender aware, but live in an era of individualisation where inequalities are individualised and it is up to the individual to navigate them” (Scharff 2012). Indeed, the latest example of this is the Girl Effect, a non-­profit founded by Nike Foundation in 2004 (www.girleffect.org). Girl Effect basically creates “youth brands and mobile platforms that millions of young people love and interact with” and it operates in a total of eight African and Asian countries (Scharff 2012). The foundation claims to empower a girl to express herself, value herself, and build the relationship she needs. In tangible, measurable ways. When she has the widespread belief and support of

Looking global, looking ahead   185 others, and when there are millions of girls like her, these changes become a new normal. Where she can seek out the things she needs—from vaccination to education to economic opportunity. Neoconservatism, an ideology that is entirely consistent with the neoliberal agenda of market fundamentalism, has emerged against this background and in the absence of strong opposition from the left. As Harvey (2005) argues, neoliberalism and neoconservatism share many characteristics, but the latter veers away from the principles of pure neoliberalism and has reshaped neoliberal practices in two fundamental respects: first in its concern for order as an answer to the chaos of individual interests, and second, in its concern for an overweening morality as the necessary social glue to keep the body politic secure in the face of external and internal dangers. (Harvey 2005, 82) Neoconservatism promises to fix what neoliberalism breaks: A weakening sense of community, a chaos caused by the ever-­competing individual interests and a political and economic system that becomes ungovernable (Harvey 2005, 82). And yet, neoconservatism does not have a solution to offer against the neoliberal agenda of deregulation and privatization except for creating a flawed sense of community along the lines of “us versus them,” which is potentially dangerous to all societies. Unlike neoliberalism, neoconservatism defends the nation, against the neoliberal village. In other words, neoconservatism has been a response—a wrong one—to the destructive impacts of neoliberalism all over the world. One needs to have one in order to have the other, so they can be considered the “yin and yang” of the right-­wing philosophy, or two tones of the same color within the right-­wing rainbow. Thus, it should not come as a surprise that neoconservative parties have been on the rise in many parts of the world after the full and unchallenged implementation of neoliberalism since the early 1990s. Examples include the rise of right-­ wing parties in Europe, the rise of Hindutva and Bharatiya Janata Party in India, and the rise of authoritarian leaders in Brazil, Russia, Turkey, and lastly the United States. The brief description of the characteristics of neoliberalism and neoconservatism above, as they appeared in many parts of the world, should not suggest however that there is only one single type. Rather, both of neoliberalism and neoconservatism take different forms depending on the local contexts. In Turkey, for instance, neoliberalism did not emphasize individualism, at least not explicitly. The neoliberalization process that had begun about eight months prior to the 1980 coup was entirely adopted by the junta regime and presented as an inevitable solution to the country’s growing problems of unemployment, the balance of payment problems and the inability of public services to meet the demands of the growing population. Because the 1980 coup restored order and put an end to the violent confrontation between the left-­wing and right-­wing

186   Looking global, looking ahead groups, many approved of what was introduced by the military junta, including the 1982 constitution. The coup also practically liquidated the opposition by executing some leaders and jailing others and banning all the activities of political parties until 1983. Despite all these efforts, many civil society organizations, including women’s organizations and the labor unions, resisted in the forms of a series of strikes and demonstrations during the 1980s, demanding better protection for their interests. As discussed in Chapter 2, the same years witnessed a rise of Islamism as a viable opposition and the transformation of Islamist ideology along capitalism and neoliberalism. The more the role of the state declines, the more people turn to religion as protection, a savior. It was also during this period that the proliferation of religious sects took place, including the rise of Fethullah Gülen’s hizmet (service) community. All this suggests a concern for social protection, in general, and job securities, in particular. The AKP’s Islamic conservatism did not have a strong nationalist tone either, at least initially. The “us versus them” cleavage was mostly along conservative versus secular lines. This was due to the fact that the Kemalist construction of the nation went directly against the Islamist idea of umma, the Islamic community. The cultural and political demands of Kurdish nationalism, initially, were welcomed by the AKP partly because Kurds, the AKP leadership considered, are Muslims and therefore “one of us.” The emphasis on Turkishness got stronger over time, however, particularly after the ceasefire with the PKK ended. The increasing emphasis on the Turkish nation continues and there exists some tension between the AKP’s emphasis on the Turkish nation and the umma. Another characteristic of Turkey also makes it different from the neoliberal trends in the developed world. That is, the neoliberal policies are deeply ingrained with institutionalized corruption. Turkey has undertaken all necessary measures to open its economy to foreign capital, including the international capital flow that was behind the crises in both 1994 and 2001. The progress of the liberalization of Turkey’s markets has been gradual since the early 1980s but has been completed with public administration reforms (good governance) since the AKP came to power. The economic systems, including the financial system, have remained quite liberalized since then. However, that Turkey is an example par excellence for neoliberalization does not make it immune from crony capitalism, a system in which the economic system is based on favoritism and corruption. Ironically, the Islamist movement that first began its experience with governing in municipalities was careful in crafting an image of corrupt-­free, clean politics. In her study of public procurement, Esra Çeviker Gürakar (2016) showed how public contracts with private companies are distributed among a network of AKP-­affiliated companies. In fact, the public procurement law, which was demanded by the EU and the IMF as part of good governance practices, was amended over 150 times, Gürakar notes. This is a centralized system of public favoritism making it quite different from the many examples of previous corruption. In sum, as Adaman et al. (2017, 252) argues, the neoliberal project “has been operationalized within and through a context molded by the (historical) making of the state-­society relationships, class relations and the management of tensions therein, and cultural specificities.”

Looking global, looking ahead   187 The AKP era is also marked by a new implementation of neoliberal principles in Turkey. Instead of privatizing public enterprises and public services, as it was done in the early phase of neoliberalism in Turkey, the AKP developed a new strategy. Accordingly, the right of construction of facilities and/or the provision of public services are transferred to the private sector, which in turn sells or rents back to the state. For instance, the right to publish textbooks is transferred to private companies, which of course enjoy close relations with the government. Another example comes from the healthcare sector with city hospitals (şehir hastanaleri). It should also be emphasized that the neoliberal process in Turkey started about two decades before the AKP came to power, as discussed in Chapter 1. The 1990s were a period of political fragmentation partly because of massive political and economic changes brought by neoliberalism. No single party was able to receive enough voters to form a majority government. Unstable coalition governments lacked the political will and the mandate to further deepen the neoliberal process and institutionalize it. As a result, the neoliberalization process stalled during the 1990s. The 1990s also experienced a major economic crisis in 1994 as a result of the financial liberalization introduced in 1989. By the time the AKP came to power, the economic program prepared by Kemal Derviş, then senior economist of the World Bank, was already set in place in 2002 but was waiting for a strong political mandate, which came with the AKP. It should not be surprising therefore that the AKP’s solution to the declining women’s employment rates is nothing but more neoliberalization: Vocational training, female entrepreneurship, flexible jobs, and on-­the-job training. In response to the destruction comes the implementation of neoliberalization, the AKP also promised conservatism, a sense of community, a false and misleading sense of social protection, especially for women. In other words, with the AKP, the problem and the solution are nicely and conveniently packed together. The AKP’s twin strategy of neoliberalism and Islamic conservatism works best wıth respect to family. On the one hand, the AKP has undermined the welfare and social security services of the state. These services are privatized, as in the case of the increasing reliance on private education by the public, or require a significant amount of out-­of-pocket expenditures, as in the case of both education and the new healthcare system. On the other hand, the AKP constructs the family as sacred and untouchable, and yet it paradoxically undermines the very foundation of it by subcontracting family care and privatizing family relations. Furthermore, the AKP justifies many of its conservative policies in the name of protecting the family and defending women’s rights. For instance, the AKP’s justification for proposing to criminalize adultery was that it was meant to protect women. The disintegration of family in the face of social media, materialism and Westernization is a common theme in conservative circles. The AKP lures women by arguing that they will be empowered through the party networks because both material—such as employment for their husbands—as well as ­non-­material benefits—such as compassionate husbands and well-­behaving ­children—will be at their service.

188   Looking global, looking ahead The same applies to the social services that the AKP largely privatized, but instead established the types of assistance programs from which mostly women benefit. These assistance programs are mostly carried out by the Ministry of Family and Social Programs alone, by municipalities, or in conjunction with faith-­based civil society organizations. According to the AKP’s own documents, the majority—70 percent—of those who receive cash transfers or in-­kind assistance are women. How these programs are different from the welfare state’s programs is significant. First, many of these programs are not systematic and institutionalized. These programs are also advertised as such by the AKP. In other words, the AKP strategically frames these programs as “temporary” to give the message that these programs would end if the AKP is not in power. Second, these services are provided as part of the AKP’s discourse of serving God (Allah rızası) rather than the types of systematic social services that one is entitled to through citizenship (Buğra 2010). This type of almsgiving marks a new understanding of social services that directly benefits the political party in power. In other words, the employment policies that are responsible for the large percentage of female workers in the informal sector are a product of the AKP’s market-­ based solutions to female unemployment: Most women are either unemployed or employed in low-­paying, low-­prestige jobs with no benefits. It is also the government that develops social assistance programs to deal with poverty, and most of the social assistance is received by women. Although these social assistance programs are absolutely necessary for the survival of the poorest segments of society, these programs ensure they are “stuck” in that situation with no prospect of improvement, owing to the failing employment policies. Here, again, one finds the AKP receiving the political credit for providing a temporary solution to a problem that it created itself. Now, the hard-­won rights of women are under threat from the rise of authoritarian, right-­wing regimes in many parts of the world. The EU’s Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) prepared a report warning that Brexit could mean that employment rights and funding for women’s services might be at risk (“Women’s Rights Under Threat” 2018). A UN report also raised concerns about the rise of religious fundamentalism and the far right posing a risk to global gender equality (“Women’s Rights Threatened” 2017). In another report, the UN again warned that “alarming pushbacks have been progressing across regions of the globe” through the Working Group on Discrimination against Women in Law and in Practice (“Women’s Rights Face Global Pushback” 2018). “Rising authoritarianism, economic crises and rocketing inequality” are particularly cited in the report as the risk factors. Women’s demand for dignity and freedom are squeezed between the empty neoliberal promises of empowerment and women having to return to their traditional roles. Thanks to women’s organizations’ successful campaigning, Ireland finally approved abortion for the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. In many parts of the world, however, women fear for abortion rights, including women in the United States. A number of legal arrangements for women’s protection came under threat after Donald Trump’s election as president, legal arrangements such as reproductive choice, sexual harassment at work,

Looking global, looking ahead   189 equal pay, domestic violence and women’s health. What the US case signifies is that a shameless sexism can be normalized as part of daily political discourse.

Looking ahead This study is about the public policies and discourses concerning women’s employment, education and health in Turkey since the early 2000s. The societal forces that challenge and resist these policies and tirelessly work to modify them, by definition, are not examined as part of this study. The reader should be reminded, therefore, that the picture this study draws is inherently incomplete. Ideologies, especially those as controversial as neoliberalism and neoconservatism, are not known for existing without opposition. Since the 1970s, Turkey has witnessed increasing women’s activism, which has closely watched government policies and developed counter strategies—successfully, in many cases. In other words, it is one thing to construct policies in a particular way and it is quite another to have them lead to the consequences as planned. A positive development that took place during the era of neoliberalism in the post-­1980 coup in Turkey was the rise of feminism, in conjunction with the rise of global feminism, which has encompassed nearly all the MENA countries. In one respect—a pronounced role for independent NGOs—neoliberalism and global feminism agree, but on other issues, such as socioeconomic or human rights, the two diverge. (Moghadam 2005, 132) Women’s activism has been quite diverse because while on the one hand, numerous NGOs have formed in connection with privatization or to compensate for the contraction of public sector employment, other NGOs have formed to criticize these trends or to advocate for enhanced civil, political, and social rights for women. (Moghadam 2005, 132) Since the late 1970s, women’s activism in Turkey has contributed to improvements for women’s lives by making changes in the political and legal systems. For instance, although the legalization of abortion is sometimes mentioned as an initiative taken by the junta government, in reality women’s activists were behind this legislation since the late 1970s. In fact, the legislative process had already started prior to the coup but was delayed by the military intervention. Cumhuriyet, a Turkish daily, reported as early as January 10, 1977, that the legalization of abortion was discussed in the budget committee (“Sağlık Bakanlığı” 1977) and the first bill was submitted to the Grand National Assembly on February 24, 1979 (“Kürtajın Serbest Bırakılmasına” 1979). Many feminist groups, including İlerici Kadınlar Derneği (“Progressive Women’s Foundation”) were behind this legislative initiative (“İKD Kürtaj Yasal Olmalı”

190   Looking global, looking ahead 1980). It is important to note the feminist movement that rose during the post-­ 1980 era defined itself as independent from the state, unlike the republican women’s movement closely associated with Kemalism. As Eslen-­Ziya and Korkut (2010, 321) wrote, “During the 1980s and 1990s, the liberal women’s movement grew substantially, in part as a result of being inspired by increased international attention to gender equality and women’s human rights ideology.” One major concern for feminist activism was the then Civil and Penal Codes, which included many discriminatory clauses against women. KEİG (Women’s Labor and Employment Initiative), Mor Çatı (Purple Roof ), Uçan Süpürge (Flying Broom), KA-­DER (Foundation to Support Female Candidates), Pazartesi (Monday), Kadının İnsan Hakları (Women for Women’s Rights) are a few from a long list of NGOs. These groups have significantly diversified their tactics over time by working with media groups, other civil society organizations, such as the LGBTI communities, lobbying the parliamentarians, and, more recently, by effectively using social media (Eslen-­Ziya 2013). As discussed with respect to the revisions of the Penal Code in 2001 and the Penal Code in 2004 in Chapter 2, many of these tactics worked, resulting in successful legislative changes. None of these developments should deny deep ideological differences between secular and Islamist women’s organizations as well as other tactical and ideological divisions among feminist and human rights groups. Nor should this suggest that these women’s organizations have always been successful, especially in the face of rising authoritarianism. Yet, the determination of activists to defend women’s positions has proven many times that such activists will continue to challenge discriminatory policies in every possible way. The fight goes on.

References Adaman, Fikret, Murat Arsel and Bengi Akbulut. 2017. “Conclusion: Neoliberal Modernisation Case in Concrete.” In Fikret Adaman, Bengi Akbulut and Murat Arsel (Eds), Neoliberal Turkey and its Discontents. New York: I.B. Tauris. Bahramitash, Roksana. 2005. Liberation from Liberalization: Gender and Globalization in South East Asia. New York: Zed Books. Buğra, Ayşe. 2010. Kapitalizm, Yoksulluk ve Türkiye’de Sosyal Politika. 4. Baskı. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. Dalingwater, Louise. 2018. “Neoliberalism and Gender Inequality in the Workplace in Britain.” French Journal of British Studies (XXIII-­1): 1–14. Eslen-­Ziya, Hande. 2013. “Social Media and Turkish Feminism: New Resources for Social Activism.” Feminist Media Studies 135): 860–870. Eslen-­Ziya, Hande and Umut Korkut. 2010. “Political Religion and Politicized Women in Turkey: Hegemonic Republicanism Revisited.” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 11(3–4): 311–326. “Global Inequality.” 2018. Available at https://inequality.org/facts/global-­inequality/ #global-­wealth-inequality (accessed December 19, 2018). Gürakar, Esra Çeviker. 2016. Politics of Favoritism in Public Procurement in Turkey. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Looking global, looking ahead   191 Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. “İKD: Kürtaj Yasal Olmalı ve Kamu Sağlık Kuruluşlarında Ücretsiz Yapılmalı.” January 28, 1980. Cumhuriyet. www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com/monitor/index.xhtml (accessed December 20, 2018). “Kürtajın Serbest Bırakılmasına İlişkin Yasa Önerisi Verildi.” February 24, 1979. Cumhuriyet, available at www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com/monitor/index.xhtml (accessed December 20, 2018). “Margaret Thatcher at the National Press Club.” September 19, 1975. Available at www. loc.gov/rr/record/pressclub/pdf/MargaretThatcher.pdf (accessed December 20, 2018). Moghadam, Valentine. 2005. “Women’s Economic Participation in the Middle East: What Difference Has the Neoliberal Policy Turn Made?” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 1(1): 110–146. Pemberton, William E. 1997. Exit with Honor: The Life and Presidency of Ronald Reagan. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. “Sağlık Bakanlığı Bütçesinde Görüşüldü, Kürtajın Serbest Bırakılması İstendi.” January 10, 1977. Cumhuriyet, available at www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com/monitor/index.xhtml (accessed December 13, 2018). Scharff, Christina. 2012. Repudiating Feminism: Young Women in a Neoliberal World. New York: Routledge. “Women’s Rights Face Global Pushback.” June 22, 2018. UN News. Available at https:// news.un.org/en/story/2018/06/1012892 (accessed March 25, 2019). “Women’s Rights Under Threat After Brexit, Warns EHCR Report.” 23 July 2018. Guardian, available at www.theguardian.com/law/2018/jul/23/womens-­rights-under-­ threat-after-­brexit-warns-­ehcr-report. “Women’s Rights Threatened by Fundamentalism and Far Right UN Says.” October 25, 2017. ABC News, available at www.abc.net.au/news/2017-10-26/womens-­rightsthreatened-­by-fundamentalism-­and-far-­right-un-­says/9085310 (accessed December 20, 2018).

Index

Page numbers in bold denote tables, those in italics denote figures. abortion: AKP’s anti-abortion rhetoric 163–164; criminalization bill 3, 62, 165–166; legalization with conditions 150, 162–163; public hospital limitations 166–167, 175; rape victims 62–63, 165; self-induced abortion deaths 149; Western policy changes 188–189; women’s rights activism 165, 189 Acar, Ferida 114–115, 129–130, 175 Adaman, Fikret 186 adultery, criminalization attempts 3, 10, 59–60, 187 Ahmed, Leila 35 Aile Platformu 170 Akdağ, Recep 62–63, 163–164 Akdoğan, Yalçın 17 Akin, Erkan 54–55 Akkan, Başak 65–66 Akpinar, Aylin 129 AKP, Islamic conservatism and gender policy: abortion rights 62–63; antiwomen’s rights 62; assistance programs and dependency 68–69, 99–100, 188; Directorate of Religious Affairs (DİB)’s central role 66–67, 104–105, 137–139; divorce rights 170–171; domestic violence, attitudes and laws 61, 65, 168–174; family priorities and inequalities 64–65, 102–104, 107, 171–172, 187; female students, genderspecific curriculum 139–141; femicide increases 70; “sacred family” 63; “sacred family” and care politics 65–66, 187; sexual integrity 63; women as mothers/wives 37–38, 60–61, 69–70, 107–108; women as volunteers 67–69, 105–106

AKP (Justice and Development Party): “conservative democracy” policy 56; Derviş plan implementation 34; employment trends misrepresented 81, 82–83, 84, 84–85; formation 8; gender relations, initial reforms 58–60; government corruption 186; headscarf ban crisis 8–9; identity politics conflicts 9, 13, 17; neoliberal/Islamic conservative policies 2, 3–4, 11–12, 20, 186–187; pro-natalism’s economic risks 161–162; traditional gender role policies 3–4, 9–10; Women’s Branches 67–68; women’s subsidiary position 36–38 Altan-Olcay, Özlem 107 Altunok, Gülbanu 175 ‘Anatolian tigers’ 55 Ankara Foundation of Entrepreneur Women 99 Ankara Women’s Platform 165 Arat, Zehra 49 Arınç, Bülent 8, 63 Arslan, Elif 173 Austrian School 22 Ayata, Güneş 129–130 Bahramitash, Roksana 184 Becker, Gary S. 30 Benería, Lourdes 16, 31–32 Berik, Günseli 32 Binark, Mutlu 15 Binici, Mutlu 140 Böhürler, Ayşe 58 Brown, Wendy 22–23 Buğra, Ayşe 53, 78 Cağatay, Nilüfer 19

Index   193 Canel, Azize Nilgun 133 Çarkoğlu, Aslı 65 Çavdar, Gamze 60, 169 Chicago School 22 Chile 183 China 182 Çiçek, Cemil 59 Çınar, Alev 13 Civil Code 1926: AKP initial reforms 59; women’s selective rights 48, 49, 50 complementarianism 62 Convention on the Elimination of All Types of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 60, 114, 142n1, 150 Cooper, Melissa 23 critical political economy 18–20 data research 5–6, 38–39 Davutoğlu, Ahmet 160 Dean, Mitchell 21 Dedeoğlu, Saniye 60, 79–80, 107 Democrat Party 54, 116–117 Deng, Xiaoping 182 Derviş, Kemal 34, 91, 187 Directorate of Religious Affairs (DİB): domestic violence, attitudes to 172–174; education, major involvement 10, 108–9n10, 121, 137–139, 141–142; family education programs, role in 132–134; family related issues 104–105, 107; gender policy and compliance 66–67; patient’s services 172; underage marriage criticisms 122 divorce 170–171 domestic violence: Directorate of Religious Affairs (DİB), attitudes to 172–174; femicide increases 70, 167–168, 168; Istanbul Convention compliance 168–169; women’s limited rights 61, 65, 169–171; women’s organizations protests 169–171 Edgeworth, Francis Y. 25, 26–29 education, national: AKP’s 4+4+4 system controversies 120, 122; Directorate of Religious Affairs (DİB) involvement 137–139, 141–142; early republican secularism 115–116; eight-year mandatory policy 119–120, 128; İmam Hatip schools 117, 118, 119, 124, 126–128, 127–130, 130; out-of-pocket expenditure 136, 136; private education trends 134–136, 135, 142; Republic era

interchanging policies 116–119; secularism, exclusionary actions 136–139; village institutes 116, 117 education, women’s: AKP’s 4+4+4 system, negative impacts 120, 122, 123, 124; eight-year mandatory policy, positives 122, 123, 124; family education programs, conservative bias 132–134; gendered Islamic curriculum 139–141; girls schooling campaigns 131; İmam Hatip schools 127, 128, 129–130; laws and policies (2002–2017) 121; Republic era policies 77–78; Vocational Training for Women project 131–132 Egypt 54, 182 Elson, Diane 18–19, 32–33 employment, women’s: administration, limited positions 76–77; agricultural sector decline 77, 79; AKP’s positivity, misleading statistics 81, 82–83, 84, 84–85; Becker’s opposition 31; Eighth and Ninth Five-Year Development Plans 91–93; entrepreneurship promotion 9–10, 97–100; equal opportunities memorandum 86, 93–94; EU pressure for reform 90–91, 106; family prioritized over individuals 102–104, 107; “feminization of labor” 79; flexible market jobs, benefit restricted 100–102, 106–107, 188; gender wage gap 90, 97; laws and regulation under AKP 86–87, 93–94, 101; neoclassical economists’ discouragement 25–30; neoliberalism’s contemporary inequalities 31–33, 187; neoliberal restrictions and job insecurity 78–79, 80, 81, 106; part-time/informal, socio-economic impacts 88–90, 89, 108n4; pre-Republic labor 76; “proletarianization” impacts 88; Republican occupations and rights 76–78; temporary job creation 85, 88, 108n6; vocational training, limitations and inequalities 94–95, 96, 97, 108n7; volunteerism and divisions of labor 105–106 England, Paula 30 entrepreneurship: AKP promotional programs 9, 97–100; civic society support 99; EU support 10, 98; microcrediting and inequality 99–100 Erbakan, Necmettin 57 Erdoğan, Emine 68–69, 105, 131, 132, 160–161

194   Index Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip: adultery criminalization 59–60; anti-abortion stance 62, 163–164; anti-women’s rights and activism 61, 62, 64; “at least three children” policy 10, 160, 161; “conservative democracy” 56; domestic violence 61–62; gender, fundamental differences 37–38, 61–62; presidential system 8 Eren, Deniz 158 Eslen-Ziya, Hande 190 European Union (EU) 8, 10, 57, 60, 90–91, 108n7, 188 Evered, Emine 116 Family Education Program 132–133 Fazilet Partisi 56, 57 femicides 4, 70, 167–168, 168, 169–170 feminist movements 49–50, 189–190 gender relations: AKP’s divisions of labor and power 47–48; AKP’s initial reforms 58–59; AKP’s Islamic conservative constructions 60–70; complementarianism 62; critical political economy approach 1–2, 11; identity focus critiques 16–17; ideological assumptions 2–4; Islamist– secular dichotomy 9, 16–17; Kemalism critiques 13–14; republic’s secular patriarchy 13, 47, 48–51 Girl Effect 184–185 Global Gender Index 11 global neoliberalism: AKP policy incorporation 2, 3–4, 11–12, 20; AKP policy reform pressures 90–91; employment inequalities 19, 31–33; gender, shared Islamic assumptions 2–4; Western-led implementation 182–183; see also neoliberalism Gökarıksel, Banu 15 Gökçek, Melih 164 Göle, Nilüfer 15 Gönül Elçileri program 68–69, 105–106, 132 Görmez, Mehmet 62, 164, 173 GREVIO 168–169 Gülen, Fethullah 135–136, 186 Gürakar, Esra Çeviker 186 Harvey, David 3, 20–21, 22, 184, 185 headscarf controversy 8–9, 14–16, 39n1 health, national services: AKP’s Health Transformation Program 146–147, 151,

152–153, 154–160, 155–156; early republican reforms 148; privatization and insurance plans 150–151 Health Transformation Program: city hospitals 159–160; family planning inequalities 158–159, 159; funding and recipient burdens 147, 154–156, 155–156, 174; Health Transformation Program exclusion 174; improvement inequalities 157–160, 174; infant mortality rates 157–158; laws and regulations 152, 154; main objectives 151, 154; privatization issues 157, 174 health, women’s: abortion, public hospital limits 166–167; AKP’s anti-abortion bill and reactions 62–63, 163–166, 175; domestic violence, AKP attitudes and laws 61, 65, 168–174; family planning inequalities 158–159, 159; femicides 4, 70, 167–168, 168, 169–170; Health Transformation Program exclusion 147, 156–157; natalism policies and fertility trends 146, 147–148, 149, 160–161, 162; self-induced abortion deaths 149 Helvacıoğlu, Firdevs 48–49 Hsiung, Ping-Chun 32 identity politics: critiques 16–18; headscarf controversy 14–16; Kemalism/ nationalism conflicts 9, 12–13 İdil, Göksel 106 İlkkaracan, İpek 79, 104 İmam Hatip schools: female student rise, AKP era 127, 128; growth under 4+4+4 system 120, 122, 124, 125, 126, 128–129; Islamic conservatism promoted 129–130; military led closure 119, 125, 128; Republic era openings 117, 118, 127–128; scholarships 130, 130; secular growth comparison 127, 127, 139, 142 IMF (International Monetary Fund): employment equality concerns 90; good governance 186; neoliberal logic 182; Turkey’s stabilization policies 34, 78, 79, 91; Turkish social security reforms 89, 108n4, 151 import substitution industrialization 33–34, 55 Indonesia 183 Intellectuals’ Heart 54 Iranian Revolution 51 İŞKUR (Public Employment Agency of Turkey) 94–95, 96, 97–98, 101

Index   195 Islamic conservatism: AKP policy incorporation 2, 3–4, 11–12; antineoliberalism claims 2; gender, shared neoliberal assumptions 2–4; women’s employment 106 Islamic women, varied discourses 34–36 Islamism, Turkey’s re-emergence: antisecularism discourses 57; Islamist movement’s political framing 55–57; neoliberal economics 55–56, 186; secularization, opposition activities 53–54; Turkish-Islamic synthesis’s impact 54–55 Islamism, varied definitions 51 Islamist movements: characteristics, context-dependent 51–52; social movement theory 52; Turkish parties’ framing practices 55–57; women volunteers 67 Istanbul Convention 168–169, 173 Jevons, W. Stanley 25, 27 Justice and Development Party see AKP (Justice and Development Party) KADER (Foundation to Support Female Candidates) 171, 190 Kadıoğlu, Ayşe 13–14, 49 Kafescioğlu, Nilüfer 65 Kandiyoti, Deniz 49, 69 Kaplan, Yusuf 57 Karasapan, Omer 54–55 Kemalism 12–14 Keyman, Emin Fuat 13, 20 Kılıçbay, Barış 15 Kongar, Ebru 104 Korkut, Umut 190 KOSGEB (Development Organization) 98–99 Kurdish nationalism 9, 13, 61, 186 Kutan, Recai 57 Law for the Protection of Family and the Prevention of Violence against Women 59, 61, 65, 168 Lazreg, Marnia 35 LGBTI activism 59 Marshall, Alfred 25, 26–27, 28, 29–30 material practices and gender 18–19 Memecan, Nursuna 165 Memiş, Emel 104 MENA region (Middle East and North Africa) 51, 54, 183–184

microcrediting 99–100 military coup 1980; regime changes 34, 55, 117–118, 128, 150, 183 Milli Nizam Partisi 56 Milli Selamet Partisi 56 Ministry of Family and Social Policy: assistance programs 69, 188; Directorate of Religious Affairs (DİB) links 10, 104–105, 107, 132; entrepreneurship services 97, 98, 99–100; family education programs, role in 132–133; family prioritized over individuals 102–103; flexible market policy 101–102; formation and objectives 64; Gönül Elçileri volunteer program 68, 105–106, 132; Vocational Training for Women 131–132 Ministry of Health 154, 157, 158, 163–164, 166, 172 Ministry of Labor and Social Security 97, 98, 99, 100–101 Ministry of National Education 118, 131, 137–138 Moghadam, Valentine M. 35–36, 183–184 Muhiddin, Nezihe 50 neoclassical theory and gender bias: Becker’s altruist families 30–31; fundamental differences 26–27; home, women’s primary duty 27–28; labor and economic priorities 28–30 neoconservatism 185 neoliberalism: concepts and ideologies 20–21; conservatism links, Western context 22–23; neoclassical theory and gender bias 24–31; Thatcherism and Reagan’s US vision 181–182; Turkey’s export-led economy 33–34, 55, 185–186; Turkey’s labor market trends 78–79, 80, 81; women as transformative consumers 184–185; women’s employment inequalities 31–33, 183–184 Önder, Nurcu 77 Öniş, Ziya 20, 55 Özal, Turgut 33, 182 Özar, Şemsa 174 Özdalga, Elisabeth 14 Ozgur, Iren 129 Pearson, Ruth 18–19, 32–33 Penal Codes, gender revisions 59, 169, 190 Pre-Marriage Program 133–134

196   Index Progressive Women’s Foundation 189 Pujol, Michele A. 30, 39n2 rape 58, 59, 62–63 Reagan, Ronald 21–22, 181–182 Refah Partisi 56 Right Path Party 118 Sadat, Anwar 182 Şahin, Fatma 100–101 Sancar, Serpil 49 Savaşkan, Osman 53 Scharff, Christina 184 Secor, Anna J. 15 social movement theory: Islamism, approach to 52; Islamism in Turkey 54–56 Social Security Institution 108n4, 148, 166 Tekeli, Şirin 49–50 Thatcher, Margaret 21–22, 181 theoretical framework: critical political economy approach 11, 18–20, 24; identity politics critiques 12–18; study premise and objectives 10–11 three/four child policy 10 Toksöz, Gülay 106, 107 Toprak, Binnaz 55 TÜİK (Turkish Statistical Institute) 5, 39 Türem, Umet 55 Turkish-Islamic synthesis 54–55, 118 Turkish Islamist movement 8, 55–57, 67, 117–119 Turkish Republic 1923–1940s: feminist movements 49–50; gender relations 13–14, 47, 48–51; healthcare reforms 148; identity politics conflicts 12–13; pro-natalism policy 148, 149; secularization, reform limitations 53–54; women’s employment 76–78 Turkish Republic 1940s–1970s: education, secular to Islamic 116–117; national health policies 149–150; political movements and conflict 53–54; Turkish Islamist movement 8, 55–57, 67, 117–119

Turkish Republic 1980s–2000s: labor market, neoliberalism’s impact 78–79, 80, 81, 86–87, 91–94; military coup 1980; regime changes 34, 55, 117–118, 128, 150, 183; neoliberal stabilization policies 33–34, 91, 182, 185–186; pension reform impacts 88–89, 108n4 Unification of Education Law 115 United Kingdom (UK) 21–22, 181, 182, 184 United Nations (UN) 60, 98, 114, 188 United States (US) 22–23, 181–182, 188–189 Ünsal, Fatma Bostan 165 Üstün, Ayhan Sefer 63, 164 Vocational Training for Women project 131–132 Welfare Party 67, 118–119 White, Jenny 13 Wiktorowicz, Quintan 52 Winter, Bronwn 34–35 Women for Women’s Human Rights— New Ways (WWHR) 59 women’s activism: abortion legalization 165, 189; AKP’s objection and suppression 60, 61–62, 64; AKP’s Women’s Branches 67–68; early republican dismissal 49–50; Penal Codes revisions 59, 190; Welfare Party’s volunteers 67 Women’s Platform on the Turkish Penal Code (WPTPC) 59 World Bank: employment equality concerns 90, 91, 95, 98; neoliberal logic 182; Turkey’s stabilization policies 34, 91; Turkish social security reforms 108n4, 151 World Economic Forum 11, 98 Yakut-Çakar, Burcu 174 Zihnioğlu, Yaprak 50