Women in contemporary Russia 9781571818850

The position of Russia has always been difficult. In spite of the Revolution in 1917, the legal, economic, social and po

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Women in contemporary Russia
 9781571818850

Table of contents :
Frontmatter
Introduction (page vi)
Chapter 1 Demographic and Ethno-Cultural Characteristics of Russia's Women (L.M. Drobizheva and L.V. Ostapenko, page 1)
Chapter 2 Women and Women in Russia (V.V. Koval, page 17)
Chapter 3 Women's Attitudes Toward Economic Reforms and the Market Economy (L. Rzhanitsyna, page 34)
Chapter 4 Women and Legal Rights in Russia (Ye. B. Klinova, page 47)
Chapter 5 Social Security for Women and Children in Russia (Ye. Azarova, page 60)
Chapter 6 Women, the Family, and Reproduction (V. Perevedentsev, page 73)
Chapter 7 The Rural Family Today and Tomorrow (M.G. Pankratova, page 87)
Chapter 8 Women and Religious Consciousness in Russia (M.G. Kotovskaya98, page 98)
Chapter 9 Women in the Arts (Olga Kuchkina, page 110)
Chapter 10 Young Women of Russia: Studies, Work, Family (T.Yu. Zabelina, page 121)

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~ Women IN CONTEMPORARY RussIA oO

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WOMEN IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA _

edited by Vitalina Koval | ,

Berghahn Books Providence *« Oxford

First published in 1995 by

Berghahn Books Editorial offices:

165 Taber Avenue, Providence, RI 02906, USA Bush House, Merewood Avenue, Oxford, OX3 8EF, UK

© Vitalina Koval 1995 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form or by any means without the written permission of Berghahn Books.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Women in contemporary Russia / edited by Vitalina Koval.

p- cm.

Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 1-57181-885-5 (alk. paper)

1. Women--Russia (Federation)--Social conditions. 2. Russia (Federation)--Social conditions--1991- —_ I. Koval, Vitalina.

HQ1665.15.W655 1995 95-20447 — 305.4’0947--dc20 CIP British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed in the United States on acid free, recycled paper.

CONTENTS

Introduction vi Chapter 1 Demographic and Ethno-Cultural Characteristics

of Russia’s Women L.M. Drobizheva and L.V. Ostapenko 1

Chapter 2 Women and Work in Russia V.V. Koval 17 Chapter 3 Women’s Attitudes Toward Economic Reforms ,

and the Market Economy = L. Rzhanitsyna 34

Ye. B. Klinova , 47

Chapter 4 Women and Legal Rights in Russia

Ye. Azarova 60

Chapter 5 Social Security for Women and Children in Russia

V. Perevedentsev 73 M.G. Pankratova 87 M.G. Kotovskaya 98

Chapter 6 Women, the Family, and Reproduction

Chapter 7 The Rural Family Today and Tomorrow

Chapter 8 Women and Religious Consciousness in Russia

Chapter 9 Womeninthe Arts Olga Kuchkina 110

T.Yu. Zabelina 121

Chapter 10 Young Women of Russia: Studies, Work, Family

INTRODUCTION

Women in Russia, by nine well-known experts on the issue of women and society, is about specific problems facing Russian society today. The position of women in Russian society always has been and still remains one of the most serious and difficult issues to resolve. The core of the problem is the inequality between men and women in the legal, economic, social, and political worlds. For more than seventy years the official propaganda of the Soviet system deliberately concealed from the public the difficult position of women, proclaiming that, under socialism, the issue of the position of women in society had been resolved. In fact, however, the role of women in every sphere of life was restricted, and they suffered from continual covert discrimination. They had virtually no representatives in the higher, decision making echelons of power. Their formal presence in elected bodies according to

fixed quotas had little effect, since they were deprived of openly defending women’s interests or of criticizing the oppressive aspects of their lives. They were allowed to speak only of the achievements of leading women workers and to propose toasts in honor of the Communist party. The discrepancy between the official and actual position of working women increased gradually through the years, and finally became an acute social problem. Changes began with the advent of democratic reforms in the mid1980s. Greater freedom of speech and perestroika revealed problems that people had surmised, but had not publicly discussed. Beginning at that time, the society had the opportunity to talk about these long-standing

problems. Access to information on the real position of women in Russia generated a sense of despondency for many people. Most of the

earlier information from official propaganda sources on the issue of women in society suddenly proved to be false. For the first time in many years, the ‘women’s issue’ became an urgent social and political problem requiring serious investigation and practical actions.

Women in Russia aims to put before the reader those aspects of the

lives of women in Russia today that are of the most immediate concern. The authors take into account the multiethnic composition of the Russian Federation, which includes more than 100 nationalities, and in which women constitute 53 percent of the population. Chapter 1, which deals with the specific features of the cultural life of each ethnic group, is the work of two authors, Leokadiya Drobizheva, an

ethnographer and Doctor of Historical Science, and Lyudmila Ostapenko, a research worker at the Institute of Ethnography of the

Russian Academy of Sciences.

Chapter 2, by Vitalina Koval, Candidate of Economics and a senior researcher at the Institute of Politics and the Labor Movement of the Russian Academy of Sciences, examines how the serious economic crisis in the country has affected the position of working women, and in particular of working mothers. Rising prices, money depreciation, and

other economic problems have created a drop in living standards for ~ most people. Female unemployment has become even more acute. Women’s labor has been unable to compete in the employment market. Taken overall, women are less qualified for many jobs than men are, and hence their pay levels are lower. However, the transition to a market economy and the emergence of democratic trends also have had certain positive results. There are greater opportunities for women to express themselves and reveal their creative abilities. For the first time women

are free to choose the kind of occupation they wish to undertake. Lyudmila Rzhanitsyna, Doctor of Economics and an authority on the issue of women in society, discusses in Chapter 3 how the changes in the political and social climate have brought changes in the values and criteria operating in women’s lives. But this presents serious challenges: how can women adapt to these changes in the course of shifting to a market economy? What steps should they take? What goals should they pursue? In the current situation, women are looking for new forms of economic activity. There has been a rise in the number of women employed in commercial structures, and new opportunities are appearing in the areas of entrepreneurialism, second jobs, farming, banking, insurance, etc. In Chapter 4, Yelena Klinova, Candidate of History and a research worker at the Institute of Information in the Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, looks at the impact of past labor law violations toward women workers. Many problems that burden women’s lives today are inherited from the past: the widespread employment of women in physically arduous work or work injurious to health, a high level of work-related illness,

Viil | Introduction the concentration of female labor in so-called “female” branches of industry with physically hard labor conditions and outdated equipment, the use of female labor in night shifts, etc. The transition to a law-governed society presupposes the clear definition of the social and legal status of women in Russian society, a sta-

tus that should ensure real equality of rights and opportunities for , women and men, rigorous adherence to existing legislation, and modification of that legislation to bring it into accord with the 1979 Inter-

national Convention on the abolition of all forms of discrimination

against women. ,

The adoption of the new constitution should also assist the process of resolving legal problems relating to equal rights. ' Yelena Azarova, a prominent expert in the field of social security, Candidate of Law, and a senior research worker at the Institute of the

State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, provides in Chapter 5 a detailed analysis of legislative acts relating to women and their social security .Over recent years the state has paid greater attention to social security and support for families. This alone, however, is insufficient, since these social benefits do not guarantee even a minimum level of subsistence. This section of the population also suffered from inadequate social security before the economic reforms, receiv-

ing minimum pension and benefit payments, and in many cases no benefits at all. Chapter 6 is by Viktor Perevedentsev, a well-known expert in demography and a research worker with the Institute of Politics and the Labor Movement of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The chapter reveals the demographic situation that emerged in Russia following World War II. In today’s tragic state of affairs, the death rate exceeds the birth rate, and population figures are falling. A variety of reasons

contribute to this situation: the consequences of war, the problems facing the family, the high divorce rate, and the high rate of infant mortality, the low level of medical service, and the high level of female

employment in physically arduous and unhealthy work, which often leads to infertility and other serious ailments. Chapter 7 is devoted to the problems facing women employed in agriculture. The author is M.G. Pankratova, supervisor of a research project on the rural family in Russia today and tomorrow, conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The structures of female employment in agriculture and industry differ considerably, and rural living standards are lower than in the city. In most cases women are employed in physically arduous auxiliary work

Introduction | 1x that brings little prestige and pays poorly. One aim of this chapter is to reveal the harsh conditions in which rural women live and work.

Chapter 8 analyzes changes in the religious outlook of women in Russia. The author is Maria Kotovskaya, candidate of history, and a

senior research worker with the Institute of Ethnography of the Russian Academy of Sciences. This is the first investigation of its kind to be undertaken in Russia; until perestroika, research into subjects related to religious belief was extremely difficult. Using historical data to analyze the situation in the past, and sociological research to evaluate the situation today, the author traces changes in people’s religious awareness, in particular among women belonging to different creeds and denominations. Chapter 9 looks at women and the arts by Olga Kuchkina, a journalist well-known in Russia and abroad, and the author of numerous articles on culture and art in Russia. Outstanding women of the arts are cited to illustrate the enormous role women have played in the development of Russian culture. The author also looks at the biographies, often tragic, of great female actors, poets, and writers who rank among the outstanding names of Russian culture. As the final chapter shows, the problem of the position of women in society can be resolved only through state policy. If we make the mistake of thinking that this issue can wait, we will find that any progress has become impossible. This problem must be tackled now, without delay. To make this possible, women must play an active role in political and economic decision making, and in the drafting of legislation, particularly regarding women. Women should be widely represented in national and local government bodies. Old stereotypes of women based on patriarchal attitudes toward them as inferior beings must be eliminated. The legal and social status of women in Russian society should ensure the practical application of equal rights for women and men, and this should be guaranteed in the new Constitution.

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Chapter 1

DEMOGRAPHIC AND ETHNOCULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RUSSIAN WOMEN L.M. Drobizheva and L.V. Ostapenko

The Russian Federation 1s a multi-ethnic state. More than 100 different nationalities live within its borders. The Russian Federation now comprises twenty republics, one autonomous region and ten autonomous areas, some of which have declared themselves autonomous republics. Women make up 52.7 percent of the population of the Russian Federation, some 78.4 million persons. Most of them are Russian (64.5 million, or 82.3 percent of the total number of women in the federation).'

The largest group of women belonging to a nationality with its own republic is the Tartar women (about 3 million women, or 3.7 percent of the federation’s female population), and second place in numerical terms is occupied by Chuvash women, with about one million people.* There are fewer women in the other ethnic groups. The largest groups among them—with one hundred thousand to several hundred thousand women —are the Bashkirs, Mordovians, Maris, Udmurts, Karelians and Jews.

One of the most ethnically diverse regions in Russia 1s the northern Caucasus. It is the home of Osset, Chechen, Kabardian, Ingush, and Lezghian women, who number several hundred thousand people each. There also are tens of thousands of Adyghian and Balkar women. 1. Chislennost naseleniya i nekotorye sotsialno-demograficheskiye kharakteristiki natsionalnostei

i narodov RSFSR (The Population and Some Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Nationalities and Peoples of the Russian Federation), (Moscow, 1991),

6, 13,|14, 15. | 2.pp.Ibid.

2 L.M. Drobizheva and L.V. Ostapenko Among the nations of the north there are groups of women totaling several tens of thousands (Nentsi, Evenks, Khanty, Chukchi, and some others), and some that come to no more than a few hundred (Aleuts, Negidals, and some others). In addition to the national groups that have their own state structures or territory within the Russian Federation, there are also sizeable groups of nationalities of other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. These include over. two million Ukrainian women, the third-largest ethnic group in numerical terms after Tartar women, and Belarussian, Kazakh, and Armenian women. Most people of these nationalities consider the language of their ethnic group to be their native tongue. For historical reasons, over 50 per-

cent of the population in many of the republics.of Russia consists of Russians, not people of the nominal nationality. Therefore, in inter-ethnic communication the lingua franca in these republics is usually Russian. The process of acculturation has had a far-reaching impact on several nationalities. For example, over 40 percent of Karelian, 25 percent

of Komi and Udmurt, over 30 percent of Nentsi, and about 30 percent of Chukchi women consider Russian their native language.°

Nevertheless, customs peculiar to each ethnic group have been retained in the lifestyles of the different nationalities. These customs are evident in their cultural values, modes of behavior and social interaction. According to the results of representative surveys conducted in Russia in 1972, 1981 and 1989 (in which the authors participated),* up

to 85 percent of Russian women living in cities consider having a fam- : ily to be the most important condition for a happy life. The figure was

90 percent and higher for women from Muslim ethnic groups. An overwhelming majority of Tartar, Bashkir, and Chuvash women and the women of the Caucasus consider the husband to be the head of the family. In the case of Slav women—Russians, for example—authority

in the family is shared by the husband and wife in no fewer than a third of families, and sometimes the woman is the head of the family.

Russian women are strongly oriented toward wanting to work, even when their husbands are in a position to provide for the family; up to 75 percent of them would like to have a job (this preference was voiced by no more than 60 percent of the men.)° 3. Ibid., pp. 40-47. 4. The sociological surveys were conducted by the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in particular, in Moscow in 1972, 1981 and 1989. The volume of selected aggregate was from four thousand to six thousand people. 5. According to sociological surveys conducted in 1970s and 1980s by the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology.

Demographic and Ethno-Cultural Characteristics of Russia’s Women 3

On the basis of the survey results, no more than half the women of the Caucasus or Muslim faith living in towns, and fewer in villages, approved of this desire to hold a job. Women’s attitudes toward work are related to their image of the ideal woman. For the nationalities of the Caucasus this image is above all one of the woman as homemaker. For Russians the image of housewife competes with that of career woman and cheerful and attractive companion. Associated with these attitudes

are differences of opinion on the most desirable professions: Russian women cited engineer, academic, and writer as desirable professions in addition to teacher and doctor. For the nationalities of the Caucasus and Tuvinians, teacher and doctor were named as most desirable professions.

In the dismal economic conditions, drab existence, and difficult psychological circumstances of today, the women of Russia are very resourceful in finding ways to make their homes warm and cozy, to feed and clothe their families, and to maintain a pleasant atmosphere in the home. It is the women who usually take the children to the cinema, museums, on other trips and outings, and who organize holidays

and celebrations. Moreover, they are the chief authorities on and guardians of the culture of their ethnic groups’ traditions and customs, which they pass down to their children, thereby preserving their ethnicity. Many aspects of the culture and lifestyles of different ethnic

eroups have disappeared. However, many customs have survived, largely thanks to mothers and grandmothers. The greatest ethnic diversity has been preserved in the area of food. The types and amounts of food served depend to a large extent today on what is available at the market. Nevertheless, each ethnic group has retained its favorite dishes and ways of preparing them. For example, fresh milk is rarely found on the tables of Bashkir and Kalmyk women; they prefer kumys, fermented mare’s milk. Characteristic first courses in the meals of many nationalities of the Volga region are soups with small

dumplings but no vegetables. Women of the northern nationalities know how to prepare fish dishes—the traditional food of the local population—with great flair. In contrast, women of many of the Caucasian nationalities cook fish dishes relatively seldom, because fish was introduced into the diet of these nationalities only comparatively recently. In the case of Russian women, most of whom live in towns and have fewer possibilities of varying their culinary repertoire with food from kitchen or allotment gardens, national dishes have been preserved mainly in the food prepared for festive occasions and rituals. Russian Shrovetide blinis, the Easter kulich, the kutia served at wakes, and so on are probably known throughout the world. Despite soaring prices, Russian women _ have kept up traditions of hospitality, which include treating guests to a

4 L.M. Drobizheva and L.V. Ostapenko lavish array of dishes. A festive meal is not complete without an assortment of hors-d’oeuvres; home-made kvass is often served as well. In a number of regions in the Russian north, Siberia, and the Caucasus, some traditional forms of housing still exist (chums, skin or bark tents, yarangas, skin tents, and yurtas, skin-or felt-covered tents, and so forth), and are specially suited to the local environment. In a number of places in the Caucasus, houses continue to be divided into separate quarters for the

men and women. In the villages of many ethnic groups some traditional household utensils are still used, such as leather pots in the north. It is true that the interior decoration of homes, especially in cities and towns, is dominated by urban factory-made furniture, crockery, and pictures. But carpets, runners, bedspreads, pillow cases, curtains, and so on are often made by women and they often incorporate ethnic color schemes. Elements of national dress have been preserved to a greater degree in women’s clothes than in men’s. The wearing of traditional dress is most

widespread among the peoples of the north. An important part of women’s dress for some northern ethnic groups is fur overalls. Very common in the north are fur shoes sewn from deerskin. They are light and comfortable, warm and, moreover, waterproof. For women in most other nationalities of Russia, the modern urban style of dress predominates. However, a certain section of the village population continues to wear the national costume as everyday clothing as well as for special occasions. Although many women do not wear their full national costume, they include some elements of it in their clothing, follow the tra-

ditional color scheme, draw on ethnic motifs in their needlework decoration, and adhere to the national dress style. ‘The female population of a number of Caucasian nationalities has a preference for dresses with fitted waists, and the skirts and jackets of some women in ethnic groups of the Volga region have in some cases retained the appearance of a fullfronted shirt. Women in the majority of nationalities of Russia have kept up various ethnic traditions of adornment, like necklaces made of coins in the case of the Volga peoples. The scarf has traditionally served as the basic form of headdress for women of many nationalities in Russia. In earlier times a married Russian woman could not leave her home with-

out covering her head. Today this practice has virtually disappeared.

However, it lives on among the women of the northern Caucasus, including the local intelligentsia. A female Chechen lecturer in a high school will still give lectures in a headscarf, even if it is just a token one. Some inhabitants of the Volga region, following traditional notions that the essence of feminine beauty 1s full legs, wear several layers of stockings. Among Russian women, national elements are present on the whole only in the dress of elderly village women. In northern Russian villages,

Demographic and Ethno-Cultural Characteristics of Russia’s Women _ 5

women continue to wear sheep- or hare-skin coats. It is noteworthy that

| most national costume features usually are done without any dress patterns or other aids. The sewing of national costumes is a form of artistic craftwork very common with all the nationalities of the Russian Federation. Throughout the federation women sew and knit; in the Russian north they make lace, in the south they weave carpets, make mats, and so on. A very large number of urban Russian women still enjoy knitting.

Even though ethnic characteristics are not always noticeable in everyday situations, at special celebrations they may be very much in evidence.

The mere existence of national celebrations shows how people are drawn to their national culture and ancestors’ customs. Women play a rather big role in all of this. Russian women, for example, continue to make much of celebrating occasions such as Shrovetide, which marks the passing of winter and is a time of national feasting and family gatherings. For many nationalities, celebrations coinciding with a certain stage in the farming cycle have retained a special significance; for example, sabantui marks the end of springtime work in the fields, and akatui is the wedding of the plough for Bashkirs, the Chuvash, and other peoples. Among the nationalities of the north, celebrations connected with the cult of the bear are widespread. Women are indispensable participants in and often the organizers of family festivities. They are the authorities on how the bride and groom should conduct themselves, what dishes should be served at weddings,

and how to protect the young couple from sinister magic forces. Women are frequently jealous guardians of ancient customs and rituals, including those that degrade women, refer to their “uncleanliness,” and so on. In Daghestan, for example, in accordance with old | customs, women did not sit at the same table as the men and were not allowed to walk in the street alongside their husbands. Elderly women ~ of some Siberian nationalities have kept up the tradition of not calling

their husband by name. At the same time, in many ethnic groups, thanks largely to women, such desirable standards of social conduct as deep respect for the aged, and rejection of drunkenness and swearing have been upheld. Special respect for the elderly is most characteristic of the nationalities of the Caucasus. Women play an irreplaceable role in keeping and passing on to the younger generation the oral literary

heritage of their culture. It is women who sing to the children, tell them fairy tales, help them gain an understanding of themselves as members of their national group. In recent years interest in folk art and ethnic culture has grown noticeably. In many cases today it is representatives of the intelligentsia who know best the songs, dances, fairy tales, legends, and traditions of their ethnic group. However, this cul-

6 L.M. Drobizheva and L.V. Ostapenko tural heritage is valued above all other forms of culture by villagers and

to a large extent by women.

The marked preference by women for traditional standards of behavior, culture and lifestyles often creates special problems for women, confronted as they are by the increasingly individualized way of life typical of urbanized society. At the same time women’s inherent conservatism fosters a certain stability in society, and ensures the .

survival of the national group.

Living in varied natural environments—from the harsh north to the

“warm northern Caucasus—the women of Russia differ from each other substantially in language, culture, religion, and outlook; nevertheless, they have a lot in common. All of them have, in one way or another, been participants in or victims of the vast experiments and transformations carried out in the country since October 1917. It was not all that long ago that lists of achievements of the Soviet state included references to the equal rights women shared with men, their high level of participation in the work force, independence from the family, the provision of kindergartens, free medical care, the freedom to divorce and have abortions, and so on. But have women’s lives

really improved? Have they attained the happiness they aspire toe Women of each of the nationalities have always believed their happiness lay in having a well-off and tightly-knit family, a loving husband, healthy children, and good health for themselves. However, in present-day Russia these elementary expectations are rarely achievable. The current ecological situation alone makes people doubt the chances of bringing up a new, healthy, and sizeable generation, and of preserving separate ethnic groups. The result of barbaric industrialization 1s

that today in most of the country’s regions the air, water and soil are contaminated by industrial waste. Due to the use of chemicals in agri-

culture, people are compelled to eat poisoned fruit and vegetables. Nuclear weapons tests over several decades have destroyed the natural environment in a number of areas in the north and Siberia. The explosion of the Chernobyl nuclear power station, which caught the attention of the whole world, has caused colossal damage to the health of the population, including women and children. But how many lesspublicized disasters detrimental to people and the environment have occurred in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union? For example, during 1991 at least once a month; on the average, some kind

of ecological disaster occurred 1n connection with accidents on the railways, at river or sea ports, or with the storage of chemicals.° The 6. G.I. Oksengendler, “Chemical Accidents,” Priroda, 2 (1992), p. 40.

Demographic and Ethno-Cultural Characteristics of Russia’s Women 7

urban population suffers most. In Russia there are almost no ecologically clean towns left where women do not have to be anxious about their children’s health. For example, traces of heavy metal, especially zinc, are found more often in the hair of Moscow children. Women of the Volga nationalities have long considered the Volga to be their main source of food; now they are afraid to drink its water and eat its fish. The women and children of many nationalities of the north and Siberia have found themselves in a situation of catastrophic dimensions; they have not only been victims of industrial development and pitiless exploitation of local natural resources, but also of the policies of war strategists. It was here that underground nuclear explosions, artillery or bombing ranges, and airfields were set up, supposedly in the interests

of the national economy. The River Ob—one of the biggest rivers in Siberia—is turning into a stinking open drain. The original inhabitants of its shores—Nentsi, Khanty and Mansi—now live twenty-five years less than the residents of central Russia. The impact of various dangerous substances on the health of the women of Siberia is three times greater than in the central regions, and their bodies start to age seven years earlier. Since the 1950s (following an explosion above this region of a rocket carrier), a new and mysterious disease connected with immuno-deficiency has appeared under the name: Vilyui encephalitis. Industrialization brought not only diseases and ecological disasters to the peoples of the north and Siberia. With its arrival the traditional lifestyle of the local population was disturbed, and populations were stripped of traditional food sources and means of farming. Fish disappeared from the rivers and reservoirs, and animals, such as domestic deer, receded

from the taiga. Many of them died under the wheels of the vast number of tractors and cars introduced into the region. It is possible that the female population of the northern Caucasus now lives in relatively cleaner ecological conditions, especially in the mountain area. Nevertheless, a large number of industrial enterprises already exist there, including oil drilling, oil refineries and chemical and gas industries, which are poisoning the local environment.

The fate of the women of the nationalities of Russia has been shaped not only by economic experiments, but also by political measures, for example, the resettlement of whole ethnic groups. For many years these nations were deprived of their natural environment, traditional lifestyle, and social circle, and were traumatized both emotionally and physically? The Kalmyk women are a case in point: from 1943 this nationality was expelled from its original territory in the lower Volga to various parts of Siberia. They were not allowed to return to their homeland until the end of the 1950s.

8 L.M. Drobizheva and L.V. Ostapenko Together with their husbands, sons, and fathers, Chechen, Ingush, Balkar, Crimean Tartar and Meskhet women were resettled. Many of their families were broken up, and history has not forgotten this woeful crime against the condemned nations. The memory of this gross offense lives on following rehabilitation and even after the return to

their homelands. Not all of them have been able to return to their homes, and some families are still involved in arguments over the territories and homes they left. Another consequence of resettlement has been deformation of these nationalities’ social structures. Among middle-aged and elderly women there are fewer with higher education; as is well-known, the mother’s level of education has a substantial influ-

ence on the social progress of the child. :

The way Russia was industrialized has harmed the environment and health of the people, while bringing about no significant improvement in the socio-economic conditions of the population, including women’s. Today an overwhelming majority of women are not satisfied with their wages and their family’s standard of living. In connection with the sharp rise in prices a significant proportion of families in all the nationalities of Russia have found themselves at or below the poverty line. According to the results of a 1989 survey of Moscow women (the 1,000 respondents were selected at random), almost two-thirds were in this category. However, in the past the material conditions of women were also rather difficult. At the end of the 1980s almost every other woman complained of

a lack of money, according to surveys conducted among working ~ women in Pskov (Central Russia).’ Furthermore, sociologists have established a rather close link between the birth rate and the material wealth of the families. The question, “Does the rise in prices and fall in income have any influence on the number of children you decide to have?” was answered in the affirmative by 84 percent of the women.®

Major problems affecting women’s lives apart from the low standard of living are difficulties in finding affordable goods and the lack of services; these conditions oppress women, make them irritable,

high-strung, and affect their health. Women suffer from a lack of many comforts, especially in remote regions, and this constantly com-

plicates their already difficult lives. For example, at the end of the 1980s on average only half of the villagers in Russia lived in houses with running water; only 37 percent of homes were linked to sewage systems and had central heating, and only 19 percent had hot running 7. Survey was conducted in 1989 with the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences for the Committee of Soviet Women. 8. V. Bodrova, “Social and Demographic Concerns of the Population Connected with the Transformation to a Market Economy,” Vestnik statistiki, 3 (1992), p. 16.

Demographic and Ethno-Cultural Characteristics of Russia’s Women 9

water. The corresponding figures for towns and cities were, of course, higher, but here, too, on average almost a third of housing blocks did

not have gas connections, and 20 percent were without hot water.’ Families living in the northern areas of the Russian Federation have the fewest conveniences of all. It is true that in many cases this is connected with the traditional form of settlement and housing there. But a number of areas in Siberia, including towns, also differ markedly from central Russia. For example, the women of Buryatia have practically no access to gas stoves; only 1 percent of homes have gas connections. The cities and villages of Khakassia, Karelia, the Altai region and Tuva are all poorly equipped with services and utilities. Women of various nationalities of Russia send their young children to preschool establishments that operate within the framework of some culture or another. Depriving children of the influence of their families for a relatively large slice of trme means cutting them off from their native culture and native tongue. Among the women, especially the elderly, of many nationalities in Russia, a substantial number still know the Russian language either badly or not at all, while their children and grandchildren are being educated in preschools and boarding schools, often in Russian.

In Daghestan, for example, where children of the native ethnic group make up more than 80 percent of all children in the population, only 40 percent of preschools use the native language.'° There are cases in which children of several nationalities of the northern Caucasus and the north

come home from boarding school for weekends or holidays, and find they cannot find a common language with their mothers and even more so with their grandmothers. As is well-known, it is the woman who is most responsible for bringing up the children. Moreover, she not only looks after them, struggles to keep them healthy and takes care of them when they are sick, but also influences their intellectual development, moral values, choice of job and so on.

Russia belongs in the group of countries with a relatively high number of medical personnel. The average number of doctors per 10,000 people in Russia in 1990 was 46.9; there were 122.6 other medical workers, 137.5 hospital beds, and 34.1 beds for pregnant women.'' Nevertheless, in many places, especially villages, there are clearly far from enough medical establishments, doctors, and other

medical staff. In Russia, doctors and other medical employees are among the lowest-paid professionals. A casualty doctor sometimes 9. Osnovnye pokazateli sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya natsionalnykh gosudarstvennykh ' obrazovaniy RSFSR (Basic Indicators of Social and Economic Development of National State

Entities of the Russian Federation), (Moscow, 1991), p. 51. Calculated by the authors. 10. Ibid., pp. 31-39. Calculated by the authors.

10 L.M. Drobizheva and L.V. Ostapenko earns several times less than an ambulance driver. In many towns and cities, hospitals are overcrowded, patients often have to sleep in corridors, and places cannot always be found in maternity wards. The Russian health care service continues to be characterized by its poor quality, badly equipped hospitals, lack of modern facilities and

instruments, insufficient supplies of medicines and linens, and substandard food. At the end of the 1980s, only 2 percent of clinics and 6 percent of hospitals were equipped to carry out ultrasound examina-

tions, and no more than 5 per cent and 13 per cent, respectively, could offer endoscopes. Many hospitals are unhygienic, which is particularly alarming for women giving birth. The danger to the child and mother of picking up infectious diseases exists even in Moscow maternity clinics. Medical staff are not always adequately qualified or experienced, which leads to a significant number of complications during childbirth; callous attitudes contribute to physical harm to the mother and child and also emotional suffering. Of course, not all medical staff

are guilty of neglect and malpractice, but the situations described above are not isolated cases. The low level of medical services is probably one reason why only a few women have gynecological checkups

- regularly; from 20 percent to 76 percent of women (depending on age) do not regularly use gynecological services.'? However, now more than ever, women in Russia need such care. Apart from purely physical diseases, they suffer from psychological and emotional trauma. According to sociologists’ investigations into the level of social stress in

affected by this.’ :

Russia in the 1990s, about one-third of women in relationships are

Nevertheless, women continue to strive for love, marriage, and

children despite all the difficulties in their lives. In the period between the last two censuses (1979 to 1989), the share of married women in Russia even went up from 57 percent to 60 percent.'* Among women of various nationalities aged fifteen and over the percentage of married women ranged from 66 percent, in the case of Belarussian women, to

47 percent for Ingush women. In this age group, 58.6 percent of Russian women were married.’ 11. SSSR v tsifrakh v 1989 godu (The USSR in Figures in 1989), (Moscow, 1990), . 142. 12. E Women in the Country,” Vestnik statistiki, 1 (1992), p. 54. 13. A. Kvasha, “Social and Demographic Problems Associated with the Growth in Social Tension,” Vestnik statistiki, 1 (1992), p. 5. 14. Itogi vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1989 goda. Raspredeleniye naseleniya otdelnykh nat-

sionalnostei (Returns of the 1989 All-Union Census. Population distribution of ethnic groups according to marriage, sex and age. The Russian Federation), (Moscow, 1990), pp.

5—244. Calculated by the authors. 15. Ibid., pp. 245-83. Calculated by the authors.

Demographic and Ethno-Cultural Characteristics of Russia’s Women 11

The accelerated nature of life today has lowered the age at which women marry. As in the past, this age varies noticeably from nationality to nationality. Early marriages are relatively widespread in a number of nationalities of the north and northern Caucasus, whereas the female

population of nationalities in many other regions of Russia prefer to. marry later, for example from ages twenty-five to forty-nine. There are relatively few early marriages in the ethnic groups of the Volga region and Siberia. However, by the time they are in their late forties an overwhelming majority of men and women have families. The proportion of people never married in the forty-five to forty-nine-year old group at the end of the 1980s was 3.7 percent in the case of men and 3.5 percent for women.’° The rate of unmarried people is much higher among

the nationalities of the north (with the exception of the Mansi) and Yakuts. The women of Daghestan and many northern Caucasian nationalities, in contrast, are the most oriented toward building families. Many young women, irrespective of nationality, more often than not choose for their life companions young men from the same social and ethnic group. Of course, in places where the ethnic and social makeup of the population is mixed, where there is greater contact between different social classes and groups of people, the number of mixed-nation-

ality marriages increases. In cities and towns, for example, there are ; more such unions than in villages. Among mixed-class marriages, in most nationalities it is more common for the husband to be a manual laborer and the wife to be a professional. ‘This bears some relation to the _ higher percentage of women engaged in jobs involving mental work.

Inter-ethnic marriages are most common in territories with ethnically mixed populations and with a relatively smaller proportion of representatives of the native national groups. In regions with a predominance of the native ethnic group, on the contrary, monoethnic families are more common. Russian women who live throughout the territory of Russia are more likely to enter into mixed marriages. The socio-cultural characteristics of women have a significant influence on

whether or not they choose to marry into another ethnic group. Working women enter inter-ethnic marriages in greater numbers than non-working women. In such marriages the woman is largely responsible for molding the ethnic identity of the offspring. Moreover, this influence is exerted chiefly through the transmission of those.elements of the culture which are part of direct interpersonal communication. This above all concerns language, codes of cultural conduct, food and songs and dances, which people are introduced to from childhood. 16. Ibid.

420 | -L.M. Drobizheva and L.V. Ostapenko : | The religion and traditional family values of the woman play a large role in determining whether a woman enters into an inter-ethnic

union. Based on research into families in Udmutrtia, it appears that _ more traditional families are less likely to include members from other nationalities.!? The results of many other investigations have shown

that it is far easier for a Moslem man to marry a woman of another faith than it is for a Moslem woman to wed a man of a different religion. A. -° similar phenomenon has been observed in several nationalities of the — north, for example, among Nanai. In this case Russian women marry oo

_ Nanais men three times as often as Nanai women marry Russians.'® | _ Marriage is naturally associated in the minds of most women with

| having children and continuing the family line. However, in recent _ , years even though the number of marriages has risen, the birth rate has ©

tended to fall. From 1979 to 1989 births per 100 women in the Russ- _ ian Federation dropped from 186 to 180.!9 In many regions, especially | Russian-populated ones, mortality exceeded the birth rate. In the view of Russian demographers, this is to a large extent linked to the fact that the generation of women who became fertile during this period was ©

smaller than earlier. However, the difficult conditions in which women | live and the state of their health have been significant. For example, the number of abortions has not fallen. In 1980, for every 1,000 women

| between ages 15 and 49 there were 70.9 abortions; in 1990 the corresponding figure was 69.8 abortions.2° Many women are unable to have | children because either they or their husband are infertile. The increase in the social activeness of women plays some part in this: the more active the woman’s working life the fewer children she has. A sizeable group of Russian, Ukrainian, and Jewish women are employed in the = __ professions and, as a rule, they have the fewest children. Conversely, in the nationalities with the highest numbers of children the lowest levels

of professional employment by women are found. In the group of _ ~. women with the fewest children there is a greater orientation towards social mobility and career advancement. For example, 50 percent of = Russian women with no children have higher education and voca- , | tional training, while among women with four children only 10 per| cent have the same qualifications. In a number of nationalities of Russia. (Russian, Ukrainian, Belarussian, Jewish, Karelian, and others) the birth , | 17. V.V. Pimenov, Udmurty. Opyt komponentnogo analiza etnosa (The Udmurts. Results of , _ a Componential Analysis. of the Ethnic Group), (Leningrad, 1977), pp. 78-79. 18. V.I. Boiko, Opyt sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniya problem razvitiya narodov Nizhnego Amura (Results of the Sociological Survey of the Development Problems of the Peoples of the

, Lower Amur), (Novosibirsk, 1973), p. 77. , 19. Chislennost naseleniya, pp. 90-91. | 7 20. “Women in the Country,” p. 57. oO , |

| Demographic and Ethno-Cultural Characteristics of Russia’s Women 13, rate has dropped so low that it cannot even sustain the current population. The situation is more favorable with the nationalities of the Volga region, the northern Caucasus, and some northern and Siberian nationalities. But here, too, the birth rate is not very high at a meager 270 to 280 births for every 10,000 women of childbearing age. In areas with

, relatively high birth rates child mortality is particularly high. One of the gravest problems in the socio-demographic development of many

regions in Russia 1s high child mortality. With Russia’s present standards of health care and poor ecological conditions this is no surprise. In 1990, for every 10,000 children born in Russia, an average of 174

| died, which is several times higher than child mortality rates in the - United States, France, the United Kingdom and Japan. The child mor-

tality rate is particularly high in a number of regions in the north, _ Siberia, Chechnya and Ingushetia at 290 to 300 deaths for every 10,000 births.*' In the northern Caucasus one of the fundamental causes of child mortality is infectious diseases and diseases of the respiratory sys-

| tem; in Chukotka and the Yamalo-Nenets republic it is congenital defects. The birth of mentally and physically disabled children isa mis_. fortune also borne by women in many other parts of Russia, including central Russia. In 1990 more than 400,000 children were enrolled in ,

~ special schools for children with mental and physical disabilities?” oe Despite the higher rate of child mortality for a number of national7 ities of the north, Siberia, and the northern Caucasus, the birth rate in these regions is higher and there are more children per family. In the ©

| case of Russians, Ukrainians, Belarussians and Jews, families with one | or two children predominate. Many families of the nationalities of the — Volga region, northern Caucasus, Siberia, and the north have from | four to six children. To a large extent the orientation towards large a families has survived among village women. In towns and cities the _ distinction between ethnic groups in reference to family size is disap-

| pearing. It is interesting to note that in nationalities where small fam- __ ilies predominate a significant number of very young women—below

| the age of twenty years—have had children. Among Russians, | Ukrainians, and Belarussians in this age group 6 percent to 7 percent

of women had given birth. In nationalities with higher birth rates the incidence of such young mothers was several times lower. Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarussian women aged thirty to thirty-four had one

| or two children, and many of them considered their childbearing over by that stage. Among nationalities with higher birth rates, by the age of thirty to thirty-four one-third of women were already raising three

21. Chislennost naseleniya, pp. 95-96. , 22. “Women in the Country,” p. 60. |

14 , LM. Drobizheva and L.V. Ostapenko or four children.” And there was also a sizeable number of women

who had children at older ages. | | The reduction in the number of children (who in one way or another bind families together), and the deterioration of women’s and

children’s health against a backdrop of general economic and spiritual crisis in the country has led to a rise in the number of divorces. The growing trend of unstable marriages is present to some degree in the

majority of nationalities of the Russian Federation. On the whole the | proportion of men who initiated divorce in Russia went up from 3.9 percent in 1979 to 5.7 percent in 1989, and of women, from 7.4 percent to 8.5 percent in that time period. The number of divorced men for that period grew from 1.8 million to 2.8 million, while for women

the figures were 4.3 million and 5.1 million. Russians, Ukrainians,and -Belarussians have a higher incidence of marriage annulment. Women from nationalities with more traditional values and larger families are

less likely to leave their families. In 1979 the proportion of the divorced and separated among Russian women was 7.6 percent and in 1989, it was 8.9 percent. Among Tatar women the respective figures

were 6 percent and 6.7 percent. For Bashkir women the proportion was 5 percent in 1979 and 5.4 percent in 1989.** Inter-ethnic mar-

riages are often less stable than monoethnic ones, although much depends on the nationality of the husband and wife. It is noteworthy that ethnically mixed marriages in which the wife is Russian fall apart

more often than others do. Among the more emancipated Russian women with higher levels of education and smaller numbers of children, divorce is widely accepted. In contrast, the strongest inter-ethnic marriages are those that include women of Caucasian nationalities. Prightening contemporary social phenomena, such as alcoholism,

drug addiction, and prostitution, are tightly interwoven with family | problems, including that of stability and the physical and. moral health of its members. Female alcoholism and growing drug dependency are two of the most serious problems facing Russia today. They particularly affect Russians and the nationalities of the north and Siberia. Because of poverty and frequently low moral standards, female alcoholism in Russia has taken on the ugliest of forms. In the vast majority of cases,

both men and women drink not in restaurants and cafes but at home | and in children’s playgrounds. Because of the high cost of vodka, many

use other substances with some alcoholic content—eau de cologne, glue, medicines, etc; and not surprisingly, such mixtures do great harm to the drinker’s health. Both male and female alcoholics usually drink

24. Ibid., p. 14. , 23. Chislennost naseleniya, p. 18, pp. 5-244. Calculated by the authors. ,

Demographic and Ethno-Cultural Characteristics of Russia’s Women 15

until they have run out of stuff to drink and money. Alcohol acts more strongly on women, and in many cases they become completely ine-

| _ briated very rapidly. In this state they are capable of the wildest and most inhumane behavior, including actions that affect members of their __ own families. Of course, there are fewer women alcoholics than men. However, female alcoholism is more hidden. Sometimes only the alcoholic’s closest relatives know the problem exists. The bulk of female alcoholics are older than thirty, they often live alone or with one dependent child, and have full or partially completed secondary education. Female alcoholics often provoke a sharply negative reaction in other people, even though many Russian women con-

sider alcohol an indispensable part of entertaining. In comparison the , incidence of alcoholism among the women of Caucasian nationalities

is three times lower. | | | : The problem of prostitution is to some extent linked to female

, alcoholism. In this case we are not referring to elite prostitutes who | dine in expensive restaurants, wear mink coats, and spend their summers at fashionable health resorts. There is a sizeable number of another kind of prostitute, women who are willing to serve their cus- : tomers simply for a bottle or glass of wine. Their work-place may be | _ arailway station bathroom, the basement. or attic of a block of flats, a park bench, etc. The age and appearance of these station prostitutes - varies greatly. There are women over fifty and twelve- to fourteen-

| _ year-olds. They find clients from among the tramps, beggars, workers,

men on business trips, and so on. In 1988 to 1989, fourteen- to sixteen-year-old girls from all areas of Russia streamed into Moscow ‘wanting to work as prostitutes.*? The mass media was partly responsible for this because of its stories about the chic lifestyle of hard-cur- — _ rency prostitutes.. However, only a small group of the girls realized this |

objective. The majority of them ended up at railway stations. The growth of prostitution leads, of course, to an increase in the incidence

of venereal diseases. In Moscow, for example, the number of infected , | people has tripled in recent years; moreover, 3 percent to 4 percent of | infected people were younger than eighteen. The number of abandoned children and dead babies found on rubbish dumps has gone up.

At the beginning of the 1990s there were more than 42,000 children | in orphanages, and about thirty thousand in boarding schools for orphans and deserted children.*° In cities there are more and more homeless children who sleep in basements or attics and steal to survive.

3 (1992), p. 41. | oo

| 25. Yu. Karpuchin, Yu. Torbin, “Prostitution: A Statistical Perspective,” Vestnik statistiki,

26. “Women in the Country,” p. 60. , :

16 L.M. Drobizheva and L.V. Ostapenko All of these miserable processes are connected in some way or another with the even more serious problem of loneliness. For many women loneliness means above all being without a man who is both | husband and friend. Even when she lives with her children, parents, or

other relatives, a woman can feel lonely. Currently, 40 percent of Russian women over age sixteen do not have husbands, and in the twenty-five- to forty-four-year-old age group 20 percent are husbandless. There are a lot of widows, unmarried, and divorced women among Karelians, Jews, Ossetians, and some other ethnic groups. Of

course, many of the lonely women are elderly. The longer life expectancy of women and the large number of husbands that died in World War II have led to a disproportionately high number of women to men in the older generation. There is a particularly large number of lonely elderly women in villages. In Chuvash villages, for example, almost every tenth woman is a pensioner living alone. There are many Russian villages with a predominance of aged women. However, village women are in a better situation than city women. They have their garden patches, and closer ties with neighbors and relatives. In cities elderly women often live without anyone helping them or paying any attention to them. When they die, even the neighbors across the landing may not find out about it for some time.

A certain group of young women also suffer from loneliness. In Russia, as in other countries, the problem of disproportionate numbers of men and women in cities with high concentrations of certain industries has existed for some time now. In one song the city of Ivanovo is aptly called the city of brides, where unmarried textile workers form

the majority. To find a life partner is difficult for women in other female occupations, such as teaching. A myriad of personal problems confronts young women who come to the cities from the provinces in search of better work, cultural facilities, a good marriage, and so on. In general, former village women are employed in traditionally female occupations, and live in hostels for single people without any hope of ever acquiring their own flats. Many of them simply have no chance of setting up their own home and family. It is true that quite a lot have

children all the same. In 1990, 14.6 percent of all children born in Russia were to women not in registered marriages.*’ In republics such as Tuva and Evenkia almost every third or fourth child is illegitimate. In nationalities with Islamic traditions the incidence of single mothers is markedly lower, for example in the case of 'Tartars.

27. Chislennost naseleniya, p. 90.

Chapter 2

WOMEN AND WORK IN RUSSIA

VV. Koval |

The slogan “He who does not work neither shall he eat,’ emblazoned on the banners of the October Revolution, delineated the position of wage laborers in this new socialist society.' With the abolition of private ownership of the means of production and the nationalization of all private businesses, including small handicraft and trade production, the Soviet state in effect became the sole employer and dictator of wages and labor conditions for workers, both men and women. Under the law, from the age of sixteen on, everyone had to work for the state or to be in school. Anyone who broke this law was labeled a parasite and liable for prosecution, including

imprisonment. The working week originally was set at forty-eight hours, then forty-six and then finally reduced to forty-one hours. Only women with children under the age of two were permitted to

work less than the full working week. , The right to work, which many earlier generations had only dreamed of, was now formally stated in the Soviet constitution in 1977. But in practice it often proved difficult to achieve. Millions of people were sent to uninhabited regions, often hundreds of kilometers from the nearest settlement. They went into the taiga, the steppe, the forests, to the great construction projects of communism, without any provisions there for them to live, let alone work. These young men and women lived year round in tents. Their health suffered. ‘Thousands of the weaker among them died from hunger and cold. However, the enthusiasm of at least one category of young builders of this 1. A socialist society never truly existed in the Soviet Union. In reality, a state-monopolist totalitarian state was created and existed more than seventy-four years.

18 VV. Koval ~~ new communist society was notable. Inspired by lofty ideas, young members of the Komsomol (Young Communist League), many of them women, voluntarily joined the great projects to develop the Far East, Siberia, and the Virgin Lands, often sacrificing their health, and sometimes even their lives. When volunteer work did not suffice, the government used political prisoners, on whose bones were built the Belomor Canal, the Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, and other large projects. The Communist party and Soviet government had set out to build a great industrialized power. The extensive development of the economy and industrialization of the country demanded an increasing num-

ber of workers. In pre-revolutionary Russia, women had not been trained in the industrial professions, but worked as servants, governesses, or secretaries. The majority of women in old Russia lived in rural areas and worked on farms. After the revolution, women began to move into every sphere of the economy, and especially into industry. The process of industrialization that began in the late 1920s was accom-

panied by a flow of labor from villages to cities. At the end of the ~ 1930s, 70 percent of women lived in rural areas; by the end of the 1960s about 60 percent of them lived in the cities; and by the late 1970s the proportion of women living in the cities had reached 62 percent.? Moreover, an industrialized society needed educated and qualified

workers. At the time of the revolution, more than 80 percent of women were illiterate, particularly in the villages. A genuine cultural revolution geared to eliminating illiteracy was put into effect. Women

were offered a free education at any level, the profession of their choice, and work matched to their qualifications. Only the children of bourgeois families were denied higher education.

: Between 1926 and 1939 the proportion of literate females between the ages of nine and forty-nine grew to 90.7 percent in the cities and 76.8 percent in the countryside.’ The elimination of illiteracy allowed thousands of women from the working and peasant classes to receive qualified and professional educations, and to study at professional-technical institutes, technical schools and universities. In 1941 there were 846,000 trained women working. This figure rose in 1960 to 5,189,000, in 1986 to 20,757,000, and in 1989 to 22,191 ,000.* In the period from 2. Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR v 198 g. (The Economy of the USSR in 1984) (Moscow,

1985), pp. 5, 6; Zhenshchiny i deti v SSSR (Women and Children in the USSR) (Moscow, 1985), p. 18. 3. Naseleniye SSSR za 70 let (The Population of the USSR Over 70 Years) (Moscow, 1988). 4. Goskomstat SSSR. Zhenshchiny v SSSR 1991 g. Statisticheskiye materialy (State Statistics Committee of the USSR. Women in the USSR, 1991, statistical materials) (Moscow,

1991), p. 10.

Women and Work in Russia oe 19 1929 through 1940 the number of working women rose fourfold and reached 12 million.° The figure has continued to grow. During World War II, millions of men who had gone to the front were replaced by women in the factories. As a result of wartime deaths, after the war women had to take men’s places and do work that traditionally had been men’s. It was during the war that women were first called on to do heavy physical labor. Even today about 50 percent of all manual

labor is done by women. In the 1950s the proportion of working women fell somewhat, to 49 percent in 1960 as compared to 54 percent in 1950.° However, in the next decade the proportion of women who worked rose to 51 percent and has remained at this level ever since. This phenomenon can be attributed to the extensive development of the economy, especially its service areas, and a drop in the pace of the growth of labor productivity over this period. — One factor drawing women into the working world was the exceptionally low wages paid by the state. One working parent could not pro-

vide even the minimum living standard for a family, and this forced women to take on any work available. The influx of women into the working world also responded to the basic postulate of Marxist-Leninist

theory that work outside the home should be the basic condition of women’s absolute emancipation, equality, and economic independence. Generations of women grew up under the Soviet regime with this attitude toward work as the guiding principle of their lives. The professional orientation of girls begins at an early age. By the age of five or six, girls

are being asked which profession they will choose when they grow older. Nevertheless, by high school, boys and girls are being given different career orientations. Girls are taught sewing and home economics, and boys learn skills ike operating machinery. This influences the separation of labor along gender lines in the future.

For women, work is also a determinant of social status. They are driven not only by economic stimuli but by a desire for self-respect and self-confidence. Work gives a woman moral satisfaction and economic

, independence from men. Education gives young women the opportunity to acquire a broad range of professional skills needed in technical areas. In specialized and post-secondary institutes, they study more than 1,000 professions out of a possible 1,500. Only professions dangerous to

women’s health are closed to them. Success in training women has been inspiring. Women comprise 58 percent of engineers, 67 percent of doctors, 87 percent of economists, 70 percent of teachers. Sixty-one percent of all specialists with higher and specialized secondary educa5. Naseleniye SSSR za 70 let, p. 197. 6. Goskomstat SSSR. Zhenshchiny v SSSR 1991 g., pp. 11, 14.

20 © VV. Koval tion are women.’ Their number has grown 24-fold over 1940 figures. Over the decade 1975 to 1985 another 7 million women were drawn into the economic arena.® More than 90 percent of all women in the Russian Federation who are capable of working, or 52 percent of the

total work force, have a job or are studying.’ The proportion of women in employment in Russia is the highest in the world.!° Most women are employed in industry. Between 50 percent and 90 percent of those employed in the light industrial, chemical, and oilrefining fields are women.'! A distinctive feature of the female labor force is its high concentration in “women’s” fields of industry, which includes both manufacturing and services industries. Women’s fields in industry refer to areas of light industry such as the sewing professions, where women make up 93 percent of the work force, textiles, where women comprise 83 percent of the work force, food processing (74 percent), and polygraphy (74 percent).'* However, in the last decade

| there has been a notable shift of the balance of the women’s work force from the productive to the nonproductive spheres. Table 2.1 — The Division of Women Among Economic Fields*

Absolute Percent of

number in 1989 as women in a thousands a percent given field

1979 1989 of 1979 1979 1989 All women employed in national economy 66,994 67,997 101 50 48 Women employed in material production 46,618 43,488 93 45 42

industry, transport and construction 25,448 24,934 98 40 38

farming and forestry 13,444 10,139 75 46 39 trade, food and supply 7,401 7,666 104 76 73 Women employed in nonproductive areas 20,282 24,076 119 65 65 health, physical education, social security,

education, culture, the arts, science, research 15,008 18,321 122 73 73 Source: Goskomstat SSSR. Zhenshchiny v SSSR (USSR State Statistics Committee. Women in the USSR), (1991), p. 11. *The figures given here refer to the whole of the former Soviet Union. Separate data for Russia are not

yet available. However, taking into account that Russia was the largest of the republics making up the Soviet Union, it can be inferred that the figures given here reflect the general tendency for structural shifts

in the Russian work force.

8. Ibid.

In the service industries practically every field can be considered women’s areas of work. Seventy-three percent of the work force in 7. Vestnik statistiki (Bulletin of Statistics) (Moscow, 1989), no. 1, p. 41.

9. Ibid. 10. Zhenshchiny v obshchestve: realii, problemy, prognozy (Women in Society: Reality, Problems, Prognoses) (Moscow, 1991), p. 3. 11. Ibid., p. 16. 12. Goskomstat. Zhenshchiny v SSSR 1991 g., p. 16.

Women and Work in Russia 21 health, education, social security, science and research, culture, the arts and physical culture are women.'? From 1979 to 1989 there was a 22

percent increase of women employed in fields of primarily -mental labor. The increases were: 68 percent in the legal professions, 47 percent in the arts, 37 percent of scientists, teachers and educators, 25 per-

cent of cultural workers, and 29 percent of medical workers.'* The proportion of women engineering and technical specialists rose over the decade from 48 percent to 50 percent.’? Rising education levels for women has increased their number in leadership positions in organs of state administration and their structural subdivisions, industrial enterprises, farming, forestry, transport and communications orga-

nizations. According to official statistics, the proportion of women amongst leaders at all levels was 26 percent in 1989.'© However at the decision-making level women constituted only 7 percent of leaders.'’ The role of women in science has risen significantly as the number

of women with scientific degrees has increased. In the Soviet Union in 1986, the number of women working in science reached 598,000, or 40 percent!® of the total number of workers in science. That is, there was an almost five-fold increase compared to 1960 levels. But this does not mean that women occupy the same positions in general

in science and the economy as men do. Even when a woman has higher education and scientific degrees than male colleagues, in the existing hierarchy of work relations she usually occupies a lower rung and does work that is relatively low-paid. Education is significant for the professional careers of both men and women. But a woman’s education level has to be higher for her to be paid the same as a man in the same profession. Scientific progress has increased the number of women employed in fields of mechanical processes and automation. Their proportion is growing with the wider application of technological innovations. By the mid-1980s about one-half of the work force servicing equipment in industrial fields, where new technology is

making broad inroads, were women. The number of women in jobs | demanding high qualifications connected with the use of new technology, electronics and micro-electronics—such as controllers, pro- grammers and operators—is also growing. The mastery by women of a great number of the most diverse professions, including those traditionally considered men’s work, has led to the growth of the propor13. Ibid., p. 11. 14. Ibid., pp. 17-18. 15. Ibid, 16. Ibid. 17. Pravda, 2 July 1988. 18. Zhenshchiny v SSSR (Moscow, 1988), p. 13.

22 VV. Koval tion of women in complex work demanding specialized qualifications

and preliminary professional preparation. Twenty-five percent of working women are now in these specialized fields, compared to almost 40 percent of professional working women in all occupations.” These statistics show the diverse level of representation of workers, men and women, in different occupations of varying complexity. However the majority of women in specialized fields are employed in auxiliary jobs, that do not demand specialized professional preparation. Two side effects of technical innovation need to be noted. New

technology affects women’s fields the least, but it often leads to a reduction in the number of women’s jobs where the newest technology is introduced, bringing with it a demand for high qualifications. As a corollary to this, the number of jobs for women increases where higher qualifications are not needed. This is especially important in the

service field, where there is a very high level of concentration of women workers. The service field is poorly developed in Russia. It satisfies no more than an insignificant part of the needs of the population and needs intensive development. In recent years, there has been

a noticeable flow of women workers into this area of the women’s economy. Eighty-nine percent of the total work force in trade, food | processing, housing and household services are women. Women monopolize the nursing and child care fields, constituting 97 percent __ of the total number of people employed in these areas.”° Although women have made remarkable inroads in education, their professional level on average remains lower than men’s, which 1s another characteristic of women’s work. The gap in the level of qual-

ifications in a number of fields can be on average two or three steps. In all fields of industry women constitute 80 percent of all workers with a low qualification level or no qualifications at all, but among highly qualified workers they comprise no more than 15 percent to 17 percent.*' The great proportion of women in auxiliary work requiring little if any qualifications or education is another characteristic aspect of women’s work. In the transport services, for example, the number of women in delivery services, where they tend to work as packers, has grown. With today’s transition to a market economy, changes taking place in the structure of the work force inevitably affect women’s work. 19. E.B. Grusdeva, E.S. Chertikhina, “The Professional Employment of Women in the USSR and Their Pay,” Rabochii klass i sovremenny mir, no. 3 (1986), p. 61. 20. Goskomstat. Zhenshchiny v SSSR 1991 g., p. 17. 21. Trud, semiya, byt sovetskoi zhenshchiny (Labor, the Family, the Life of the Soviet Woman)

(Moscow, 1990), p. 52.

Women and Work in Russia oe 23 With the appearance of various kinds of private, cooperative, and joint enterprises and other commercial structures, the work force, including

the women’s work force, is in flux in non-state sectors of the economy. Many women have begun their own businesses, in particular in the small business sector. Others have transferred to work in various kinds of non-state enterprises, where their incomes have increased significantly and are much higher than state wages. This trend highlights the growing need for professionally prepared workers. Whether

women can compete with men in the work place has become an acute question. The women’s work force has turned out to be less competitive for two reasons: the lower general level of their qualifications and the extra social pay of women with children, who must be

reimbursed by enterprise management. These costs have made women’s work less desirable for management. _ The increase in joblessness above all concerns women, who make up 80 percent of the unemployed. In the majority of cases, these are

people with higher or specialized secondary education between the ages of thirty and forty-five. Unemployment has led to a sharp fall in families’ living standards. The consequences of unemployment on famuies with single mothers has been particularly tragic. Unemployment

benefits fall far below the minimum living standard. A result in the growth of unemployment has been the worsening of the economic situation, even without this low qualification level of the women’s work force, on account of a significant reduction of specialists with higher and specialized secondary education. This has led to a drop in the rate of real pay for the remaining categories of working women who have lower qualifications. The number of women employed in low-skilled work that does not demand any specialized training is already growing. Unemployed and highly qualified women specialists have been forced to take work neither corresponding to their profession nor to their level of education, and consequently their social status has fallen. An emerging question is how to increase the competitiveness of the female work force. Specialists in the field of women’s employment such as Z. A. Khotkina and A. E. Kotlyar have attempted to answer this question. In their opinion, “changes of a qualitative character are needed. This can be achieved by raising the level of the professional preparation of the women’s work force, as a result of which a number of key problems can be resolved: a raise in pay levels, insofar as qualified work 1s higher paid; an improvement in work conditions—dqualified labor usually finds its way into better work conditions; an increase in the level of the mechanization of labor, insofar as low qualifications are characteristic of only manual labor, and, finally, and most importantly, the enrichment

24 VV. Koval of labor content, raising the creative character of work, without which the further development of the women’s personality is impossible.”

In short, there is an urgent need to create a broad system for the training of qualified women, particularly given the looming problem of

women’s unemployment. Unfortunately, the majority of women are not striving to improve their qualifications, even under terms that have been available to young mothers after their return to work following maternity leave. They have been given the right to one day a week in which to raise their qualifications during work hours with full pay until the child reaches the age of eight. However, only a few mothers are taking advantage of this opportunity. Following marriage, about 70 percent

of women do nothing to increase their qualifications They say that they do not profit from it, and that even if they were to increase their qualifications it would not advance their careers or lead to pay increases. This

is evident from the results of a survey conducted in February 1989 in which 64.3 percent of respondents said that at their work places the question of advancing one’s career was not always decided democratically. Of this group 68.1 percent said this observation applied to pay, and 61.6 percent said it applied to distribution of bonuses.”°

The question of training and retraining the women’s work force ~ and raising its level of qualifications must be decided at the state level. A program for improving the position of women and the family was

developed in 1990 by the Soviet Council of Ministers. It contained recommendations for bringing women into scientific-technological professions by removing social barriers to such a movement; the qualitative improvement and quantitative broadening of scientific-technical and basic training in specialist fields of traditional women’s work; and the creation of a state system for the training and retraining of the women workers released from administrative jobs by the liquidation of the union ministries. The program never got underway because of the collapse of the Soviet Union. New initiatives are being created today

by the Russian Supreme Soviet with the objective of defending the ‘interests of families and women.

Labor Conditions The labor conditions in which women work leave a lot to be desired. Technological innovations have had little effect so far in areas of work 22. A.E. Kotlyar, Z.A. Khotkina, Doctoral Theses at the All-Union Scientific Practical Conference, Oct. 31 to Nov. 2, 1988, part 1, p. 65. 23. Ibid.

Women and Work in Russia 25 occupied mainly by women. Small-scale mechanization is virtually nonexistent and its creation and development still lie ahead. The proportion of women doing heavy manual labor in industry reaches 58 percent, twice that of men. The life of female workers is especially difficult in agriculture, where the proportion of female manual labor in crop farming, vegetable growing, and horticulture reaches 98 percent.** Unfortunately, the member of women occupied in manual labor is decreasing at an exceptionally slow rate, no more than 1 percent a year,” about half the rate of decrease as that for men. In the

period from 1975 through 1985 the number of women occupied in heavy manual labor decreased from 73 percent to 70 percent in construction and from 88 percent to 83 percent in agriculture.*° If these rates are maintained, then the emancipation of women from heavy manual labor will take more than 100 years. In addition, one sees a srowing number of women involved in loading and unloading work. Another trend is that of women replacing unskilled manual labor in a number of industries, such as construction, timber- and wood-processing. Plans were made to reduce the number of construction workers performing manual labor by 6.9 percent by the end of 1990, but only 0.4 percent of these were women.”’ The emancipation of women from difficult and hazardous production is taking place so slowly because the reality of the problem has been ignored. Under the socialist system of management, which has not been completely wiped out, it was and is profitable for administration to use the cheap labor of women in difficult and hazardous jobs. The outlay is less than the cost of installing modern equipment. Only the privatization of production and the growth of competition will lead to the creation of modern production based on new technological achievements,

which, in turn, will lead to the replacement of manual labor by machines. Women occupied in heavy physical labor will become redundant and layoffs will begin. In the meantime, women themselves

do not want to leave their difficult and hazardous work because it offers : _ them several additional compensations for the risks they undertake. The State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation carried out a survey among 49,000 women on their living and work conditions. ‘Table 2.2 indicates how women evaluate their work conditions.

Among working women, 38.2 percent say the labor conditions in which they work are very physically demanding; 17.1 percent believe 24. Pravda, 9 March 1989. 25. Goskomstat. Zhenshchiny v SSSR 1991 g., p. 16. 26. Vestnik statistiki, 1989, no. 1, p. 41. 27. Rabotnitsa, no. 3 (1989), p. 11.

26 VV. Koval Table 2.2. — Evaluation of Labor Conditions by Working Women (as a percentage of the labor force)

Good Satisfactory Unsatisfactory All working women4.7 8.953.2 63.942.1 27.2 Factory workers Farm workers 4.96.2 51.1 44.0 — Collective farmers 57.8 36.0 Office workers 12.1 72.2 15.6 Source: Women’s Movement in the USSR, no. 1 (Oct.-Dec. 1990), p. 5.

their work is detrimental to their health; and 44.7 percent consider their work monotonous, boring, and repetitive.”° The lifting and carrying of heavy weights by women doing manual labor has the worst negative impact on their health. In 1981 a decree was issued by the USSR Council of Ministers and in 1982 a decree was

issued by the State Labor Committee and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions establishing new norms for the lifting and shifting of weights by women. Norms provided that a woman may

carry no more than 7 tons per work shift. The norm itself hardly acknowledges general notions of the physical capabilities of women and their childbearing function. Moreover, the massive violation of these decrees in the workplace is widespread. For example, a female brickworker lifts 28 to 30 tons per shift, while a pair of female workers together lift a railway tie weighing 100 to 120 kg. Women in agri-. culture, where they are employed mainly in manual labor, lift sacks weighing 50 to 70 kg, as do female clerks in shops. Since the advent of perestroika, when women became able to speak out about their problems and concerns, violations of government regulations and of the need to make managers responsible for this has been widely discussed. Another serious problem is the occupation of 4.8 million women in

conditions which do not meet the norms and rules of labor safety, in - premises polluted by gas and dust, and in chemical enterprises that are poorly lighted and lack basic hygienic conditions, in violation of every kind of sanitary norm. Another serious problem is women’s labor on night shifts. According to Article 69 of Soviet legislation, employing women on night shifts is forbidden. An exception is made for certain branches of industry and enterprises where technical processes call for a three-shift work schedule. This is permitted as a temporary measure. In contrast, the number of women working night shifts has reached 4 million. Furthermore, this figure is twice that of men working night shifts. And this trend continues. In enterprises controlled by the chemi28. Women’s Movement in the USSR, no. 1 (Oct.-Dec. 1990), p. 5.

Women and Work in Russia ae 27 cal production, state agricultural industry, and bread production ministries, the number of women working night shifts is constantly growing. Many women agree to and even prefer to work night shifts in physically

demanding jobs because they are striving to free more daytime for domestic duties and their children. As a rule, these are single mothers and

women with several children. It is widely known that night shift work has a detrimental effect on women’s health, particularly when added to family responsibilities in the daytime. Injury rates are 1.6 times higher in night shift work. Low labor productivity in night shifts is also notewor-

thy. Equipment is used at only 55 percent to 65 percent capacity.”’ Where a third shift is necessary in certain branches of industry, it should not use women workers. This concern was voiced in November 1988

at the all-union applied science conference, titled “Current Issues of Labor Safety and Women’s Health and Their Resolution,” and also at the First Congress of Peoples’ Deputies of the USSR. The participants in this conference also addressed a very important

question concerning the labor conditions of women in the period of technological innovation, namely developing equipment that takes into account the ergonomic and anthropological distinctions of the female organism, that allows women to feel physically comfortable. Currently all equipment is constructed according to the physical characteristics of the average male, even when it is intended for women to use. As a result, women who operate such equipment spend up to 80 percent of their working hours in uncomfortable, restricted, and very

tiring postures, which leads to fatigue, work-associated illnesses, including those of the nervous system, and reduced productivity. Up until this time no one has considered these factors when equipping work places. Lately women have been demanding that designers of new equipment take into consideration the special needs of the female organism when they design new machinery and workshops, keeping in mind that more than half the workers in the country are women. Women working in conditions that do not meet healthy medical standards are losing their physical as well as their spiritual well-being and consequently are losing the ability to bear and raise a new genera-

tion. Sociological studies carried out by G.A. Slesarev in NizhniNovgorod’s machine-building plants demonstrate the close connection

between poor working conditions and the resulting poor health of workers. Such work-related illnesses as dust-induced bronchitis, vibra-

tion illnesses, and hearing loss are widespread among female metallurgical workers. Poor working conditions affect the childbearing 29. Rabotnitsa, no. 3 (1989), p. 10.

28 VV. Koval function and lead to the disruption of the term of pregnancy and birth, and to toxicoses, hypotonicity, and birth anomalies.*° In connection with this, I. T. Fridland proposes the prohibition of female labor where it has a destructive effect on reproductive functions.*! It would be logical to expect that women themselves would demand these improvements in labor conditions. However, this is not the case because they receive various pay increases and work privileges, including extended

leave, for undertaking hazardous work. The proportion of women who receive compensation for unhealthy work conditions 1s especially high in the following industries: 71 percent in the oil extraction industry, 88 percent in oil-processing, 85 percent in the gas industry, 75 percent in coal, 81 percent in the metallurgical industry, 86 percent in the chemical industry, and 77 percent in printing.°? Women have to sell their health to maintain the material welfare of

their families and to provide for their old age, if they manage to live that long. Women do not contribute to the spiritual or material development of society doing this hard, dirty work. Neither do they receive any kind of moral benefit or achieve their potential. ‘This kind of work

makes a woman dull and does not develop her capabilities. As was shown in the sociological survey carried out in the metallurgical plants in the Donetsk area, 95 percent of women who are bent on receiving high wages and future pension benefits insist on working in hazardous and difficult conditions.°° Existing legislation and governmental decrees

prohibiting the use of the female work force in unhealthy working conditions and night shifts are not enforced. No sanctions are levied against those who violate this legislation. Regulatory bodies for overseeing the umplementation of these laws are virtually non-existent. In conditions where female workers are overworked the worst (thirteen to fifteen hours per day), and when the difficulties of the transition to

a market economy demand greater exertion from women, many female workers see part-time work or a floating schedule—while preserving the privileges for mothers with young children—as a way out

of the situation. For example, 70 percent of working mothers at the Tushino Stocking Factory expressed this desire.**

Some enterprises that have become self-supporting have offered workers the possibility of working part-time with a corresponding 30. N. Zybtsev, “On the Utilization of Women’s Labor in the Metallurgical Industry,” Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya (Sociological Researches) (1987), no. 4, (1987), p. 108.

~ 31. Ibid.

32. Women’s Movement in the USSR, no. 1 (Oct.-Dec. 1990), p. 5. 33. Zybtsev, “On the Utilization of Women’s Labor,” p. 110. 34. See results of a sociological research undertaken at the Tushino Stocking Factory

in May 1991, by V.V. Koval. |

Women and Work in Russia oe 29 reduction in their earnings. For example, at the Analitpribor plant 3.5

_ percent of the women work part-time. This figure is three times higher than the average for the entire republic. This change in working hours caused only three women to quit their jobs. ‘The remaining _ forty-nine women specialists who earlier had been intending to leave decided to continue working.*> Obviously, the demand to give all women the choice to work part-time is a protest of a law that offers this right only to women with children two years of age and younger. Currently only 1 percent of women have taken advantage of this right to work a shorter day.

However, the main reason so few women use this option is undoubtedly the difficult economic situation, especially for women

who must combine the roles of mother, wife, worker, and social being. The State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers representing government organizations supported the adoption of nonstandard forms of employment to help ensure that “the mobility and ereatest degree of adaptability of the labor force to the new demands of production call for the effective use of production capacity, an increase in labor productivity with a reduction of labor costs by lowering pay and significantly reducing spending on social programs.”°° However, it is important to note that adopting nonstandard forms of employment will lower living standards further for women working part-time. It is also necessary to keep in mind, drawing from the experience of Western countries, that part-time employment strengthens the existing inequality in pay and in the quality of male and female labor because most part-time workers are women.

Labor Remuneration According to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, women officially enjoy equal rights with men in all fields. Accordingly, any kind

of inequality in the amount of remuneration based on gender, age, race, or nationality is prohibited. In reality, however, women’s average

earnings are about 30 percent less than men’s. This situation arises from several factors: women’s lower skill level, the concentration of women in traditionally female branches of industry, and the enormous number of women occupying socially denigrated and low-paying jobs. Women mainly carry out subsidiary work in administration, in the service industry, and in trade. One of the basic reasons for pay inequality, 35. Rabotnitsa, no. 11 (1988). 36. Ibid.

30 VV. Koval however, was totalitarian command economy’s principle of distribut- | ing benefits on the basis of one’s status in society rather than on the basis of his or her labor. The pay gap between leading members of the nomenklatura and ordinary workers was enormous if one also considers the privileges enjoyed by the nomenklatura. These included the best flats

and dachsa rent-free, vouchers to the central committee sanatorium, special rations, special shops with pure products, and other benefits supplementing the budgets of these families. Because the proportion of women among decision makers at the enterprise level is only 7 percent, their income as a whole is much lower than men’s. It would have been utterly impossible to change anything in the system dominated by the nomenklatura.

The introduction of a market economy is leading to the marginalization of the population and, above all, of single mothers and families with several children. Rampant inflation has led to a sharp drop in real earn-

ings. About 80 percent of the population, most of them women and children, has been pushed below the poverty line. The people who find themselves in a particularly difficult situation are the millions of single women—unwed mothers and divorced women with children—who often are the sole means of support for the family. Although there is material assistance available to such families, it does not fully cover the expenses required to support the family. Why are traditionally female professions considered less prestigious and paid worse than men’s professions? This may be because 75 percent of women are employed in branches of light industry and in the service area, but the moving force of technological progress is to be found in heavy industry and machine building, where there is a con-

centration of the technological and engineering forces that mostly employ men. These branches were the foundation of the mulitaryindustrial complex; the wages in the branches of heavy industry were always higher than the wages in light industry. Although half the engineers in the Russian Federation are women and nearly half of those occupied in machine building are also women, they usually occupy positions of lower rank in comparison to men, and this explains their’

lower level of pay. But women’s labor in traditionally female jobs does not demand less physical, nervous, or mental expenditure than men’s labor in those jobs. Nevertheless, women are paid less than men. What can explain this? It is possible that the state, which has stipulated these wages, always undervalued female labor and its contribu-

tion to society, a testament to unjust attitudes toward women. A further testament is that until recently the state decreed that the same tariff rate and the same rate of pay for engineering and technical work-

Women and Work in Russia ; 31 ers applied to men and women. For similar labor levels, men and women were supposed to receive equal pay in identical conditions. However, if one takes into account that women are physically weaker than men yet output norms are the same for both genders and that 50

percent of women are employed in physical labor, there is one less reason to substantiate the inequality which exists in fact. The current trend to award increases in wages and salaries has its own peculiarities. As a rule, pay raises are allocated according to the

ability of a particular enterprise to do so. This means that there are more pay raises in heavy industry (“men’s work”) and fewer pay raises

in light industry and food processing (“women’s work”). Women once again end up the losers. The problem of regulating the pay scales among different branches of industry remains to be solved. However, even if the problem of fair pay for working women is solved, society

still will be forced to contend with a number of serious problems stemming: from the fulfillment by women of their basic functions, those of childbearer and homemaker.

Women’s Double Role Combining the two roles carried out by women remains an acute social problem. Domestic labor mainly falls on the shoulders of mothers and wives. In addition to her working week, a woman must spend another

forty hours doing domestic duties. This leads to serious nervous and physical overload. Social services cover only 15 percent of domestic labor and do not free a woman from her duties around the house. The contradictions between women’s professional activities and her obligations to the family and motherhood have become particularly acute in recent years, with no sign of improvement. Women expend twice as much physical and psychological energy as men do at the expense of their leisure time, which also reduces chances for personal development. The ongoing profound economic crisis has worsened the position of women with children. The time women spend standing in queues increases her domestic duties. Many families have cut back on the use of services as costs have risen. This, too, has added to the domestic burden on women. Unfortunately, social awareness remains at a level where it is considered natural to assume domestic work is women’s work. Men are making no move toward

sharing domestic duties. This real inequality in the discharge of domestic duties often leads to serious conflicts between spouses. The destruction of old stereotypes about women, leading to a more equal

32 VV. Koval division of domestic duties, would create the basis for real equality between the sexes. Official statistics show that on average the working woman has at her disposal only two hours and twenty-four minutes of free time (one hour and fifty-seven minutes for those who work on collective farms) in every day. Most women (76.8 percent) spend this time taking care of their families. On average women spend one hour and thirty-nine minutes a day watching television, listening to the radio, or going to theaters or movies. They spend eleven minutes a day raising their education level, and eight minutes a day with guests or visiting restaurants, cafes, and bars. As for the education of children, which incidentally fall under the category of “forms of rest”’ in official documents, women are left only sixteen minutes a day (in France this fig-

ure is two hours and fifteen minutes; in the United States it is one hour and twenty-three minutes).°’ Sociologists believe the necessary minimum for effectively educating children is ten hours a week. This discrepancy in the case of Russian women brings out most clearly the contradiction between her two roles of mother and worker. The basic task facing the Russian government and society in solving the women’s question is to create services that would facilitate the successful combination of women’s double role. Women have to have

advantages that would then give women real equality, taking into account her physical characteristics. The solution to many women’s problems will depend on how much free time can be given to women to raise their educational and cultural levels, to raise their competi-

tiveness on the labor market, and to raise the next generation of women. This all requires analysis and elaboration in a state program.

Conclusion The question of how women lead their lives in Russia remains one of | society’s most acute and debilitating problems. The position of women is difficult: her real status in society is humiliating; her position at work and her labor conditions remain extremely unsatisfactory; the volume of domestic labor is excessive; and the paucity of social services complicates her position even more. The attempt by the command-administrative system to turn every member of society into a cog in the social machine, without taking into account the particularities and interests of the person and the family, has led to a significant

37. Argumenty i fakty, no. 35 (2-8 September 1989).

Women and Work in Russia ee 33 devaluation of labor. In many cases any interest in work has been lost. The absence of material rewards and adequate level of material compensation for labor also contributes to this. Women find themselves in the difficult position of fulfilling two functions simultaneously, and at

the same time they find themselves in an unequal position vis-a-vis men at work, doing most of the difficult and debilitating work. In the absence of a good medical system, weak protections for mothers and children, ecological problems, low pay, a lack of housing, the difficulties of spending enough time with children, and the general economic and political crisis gripping the country leads many to ask what sort of future the society faces.°® The tragedy and scale of the problems fac-

ing Russian society are obvious. Women’s problems cannot be resolved in the absence of solutions to all these problems.

To create genuinely equal opportunities for men and women in every walk of life, inequality in their relative positions must end, and the status of women must be raised. For egalitarian relations in society,

men and women must have equal starting positions; in education, at work, in the choice of profession, and within the family. To achieve this a social transformation on a grand scale is required. Unfortunately, no single state conception for the resolution of the women’s question exists. World standards and international conventions are not applied in real life. Given this, women are trying to overcome the existing sit-

uation and adapt to the conditions of a transitional period to market

relations by creating independent women’s organizations and by entering the new commercial structures. _

38. Nekotorye voprosy trudovykh otnoshenii i sotsialnoi politiki (Several Questions Of Labor

Relations and Social Policy), USSR. Academy of Sciences, State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Economic Reform (Moscow, 1990), p. 107.

Chapter 3 3 WOMEN’S ATTITUDES TOWARD ECONOMIC REFORMS AND THE MARKET ECONOMY -

Lyudmila Rzhanitsyna

Social Attitudes During the Transformation Period } The transition to a market economy and all the problems it brought, like commercialism, inflation, and unemployment, came down upon Russian women like a bolt from the blue.’ In 1990, people’s worries about what would happen under a market economy boiled down to fears of high prices and commodity shortages. By the mid-1990s these wotries were aggravated by very real fears about job losses. A survey of Kostroma, a typical provincial Russian town, showed that in 1990 only 15 percent of the female population worried about unemployment, but by spring 1991 the proportion had increased to 29 percent. In autumn of 1990, 35 percent to 50 percent of the female population of the similar town of Vladimir feared the same threat.

The women in our country fear unemployment more than men do. The most threatened group among the women are office workers, who are twice as likely to become unemployed as their male counterparts are. When the official unemployment register was opened on 1 July 1991, 1. This analysis is based on sociological surveys carried out from 1989 to 1991 by the author under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics at a number of enterprises in Moscow, Vladimir, Kostroma, and Togliatti and at Labor Exchanges, The analysis also is based on information provided by the state statistics organizations of the USSR and the Russian Federation and included in the statistics bulletin, Labor and Living Conditions for Women (Moscow, 1992).

\

Women’s Attitudes Toward Economic Reforms and the Market Economy 35

these fears were shown to be fully justified; six to eight out of every ten persons signing on at the labor exchange were women seeking employment. And no improvements are likely in the foreseeable future: 51 percent of those questioned in the survey said they were facing job cuts to offset the higher wages being given to the remaining employees.

Furthermore, there are no clear plans afoot to put up any kind of resistance to this development. About 65 percent of those questioned did not believe it was possible to create any aid fund for the unemployed from money set aside for the social needs of the employed, or from personal contributions. Is there a way out of this situation? The survey found, interestingly, _ that most of the people interviewed were psychologically prepared to accept in principle the new idea of a market economy. In the sample surveyed, 73 percent spoke in support of the new system. This is an increase over responses from 1989, when 66 percent of those inter-

| viewed at automobile and electrotechnical plants, sewing and textile factories were in favor of retaining the old economic system, with the stability of its planned production, its centralized distribution and its

guaranteed prices and wages. Only 5 percent to 17 percent of the respondents showed any interest in 1989 in a new type of economic _ mechanism based on increasing personal and collective responsibility by privatizing or leasing the state-owned enterprise where they were employed. Thus we can see a significant change of attitude. But this general acquiescence to change reverses at the personal level, when there is radical change in real life, when labor is hired out to private individuals or concerns, when income differentials are increased, and when unemployment becomes a reality. These aspects of a market economy are something that the majority of the population, especially the women, resist. Table 3.1 — Support for Measures to Introduce a Market Economy (as a percentage of the total number interviewed)

Correlation

Women Men in Favor of Men Privately hired labor 22 31 1.4 to private ownership 21 29 1.4 and other securities54211 532.2 1.3 Unemployment goods and services 1628 26361.6 Increased income differentials 1.3 Sale of state-owned enterprises

Receipt of income from shares

Unrestricted prices for food,

36 Lyudmila Rzhanitsyna Time, of course, has modified and eased these figures, but the gen-

eral attitudes they represent, particularly by women, have barely changed. This is confirmed by the way women feel about their own roles in the new market economy. Most of the data received shows a greater conservatism among women than among men in their attitudes. to the new reforms. For example, only 18 percent of the women interviewed in 1991 expressed any desire to start their own business, though in 1990 this percentage was even smaller, at 11 percent to 12 percent. About half of the

women interviewed still rely for their employment on state enterprises that are to become independent or to be turned over to collective employee ownership. Women on the whole are more in favor of retaining the old economic system than men are. So, if they do not want to

start up their own businesses and do not think highly of the cooperatives, or of leasing, or of foreign investments, what do women want? It looks very much as though women are reserving the right to continue working, a subject of heated debate at the present. Only 17 percent of the women interviewed were ready to give up work, even if their husbands earned enough to support the family; even 54 percent. _ of those who were not working said they would rather be employed. — But women in general are quite sure they want to work in different

ways and usually this means working a half day so that they can find a | solution to one of society’s unsolved problems—the problem of com-

bining work with motherhood. |

Table 3.2 — Women’s Employment Preferences (as a percentage)

Women working Women wishing to Women unwilling to

1.2 , 81.2 17.6

a short day work a short day work a short day

Whether they work in industry on the farms or in offices, women show exactly the same distribution of preferences. It is interesting that women working in offices are particularly insistent on their preference for a short working day, even though their work is less labor-intensive _ and the conditions in which they work are generally better than in the other two categories. This is probably because women office workers have fewer opportunities to get their children into playschool and they therefore attach greater importance to personal contact in the upbringing of children. Furthermore, the woman office worker knows that her absence from her place of work for a few hours often has lit-

tle effect on the general running of the office.

Women’s Attitudes Toward Economic Reforms and the Market Economy 37

Women want not only to reduce the number of hours they work, but they also want to retire earlier. Ninety-seven percent of the women interviewed insisted on this. Of these, 41.5 percent believed that the working lives of all women should be shortened; 21.7 percent thought that shorter work lives should apply only to certain types of work; and 29.5 percent believed that this should apply only to those who were unable to continue working. Added to this was the opin-

ion of 62 percent of respondents that children should not attend playschool, but should be brought up at home, with government help, of course. This determination to cut down on the hours spent at work at a time of mass redundancy in the work force is extremely important, because it lays the foundations to raise the standards of female employment. The best solution is not to deprive women of the right to work, but to reduce their overall workload so that more time can be spent, with their families or at study. One way women hope to adjust to the

conditions of the new market economy is by self-employment. According to information provided by the State Statistical Committee and the survey’s findings, two-thirds of women agree on the idea of becoming self-employed. Thus, while still keeping their jobs as their

main source of livelihood, women are ready to do extra work at home. This. behavior has always been natural to them, but is now

likely to receive a powerful boost. ,

A final group of women does not usually figure in official surveys,

but is well-known to sociologists at a more detailed level of study. This preferred alternative for some women is to take wage cuts as long as they keep their jobs at a lower but steady income. This group is rep-

resented by 37 percent of the women interviewed in the Kostroma survey. Most families are economically underprivileged and this situation is getting worse due to the lack of cheap goods, particularly foodstuffs, and rising prices. In 1990 some 35 percent of the population of Russia was living below the poverty line, but this category applies in

1993 to the greater number, made up largely of families with young children and pensioners. For many of these people life is simply a matter of survival: one-third of all Russian families consume less than two

kilograms of meat products per person per month; one-quarter of families consume only two to three kilograms per person per month. One-third of all Russian families consume only 200 grams of animal fats per person per month, and another third consume only 200 to 400

grams of animal fats per person per month. Twenty percent of all Russian families eat fewer than 10 eggs per person per month, and 55

percent consume less than 200 grams of sugar. Current food consumption in the country is estimated as being at the same level as it was

38 Lyudmila Rzhanitsyna during the 1950s. Loss of earnings in these conditions, when child sub-

sidies provide small compensation, are catastrophic for a woman in Russia. Hence the desire among so many women to carry on working in the old, familiar way.

Like It or Not, We All Have to Work It is interesting to note that although women in general intend to con-

tinue working and earning as they always have, they are perfectly aware of the disadvantages of work in its present form. This shift toward an awareness of the real nature of their position in society must lead eventually to the next stage of development—increased activity by the women’s movement to improve the social and economic position of women. But how do we reconcile our assertion that

women are critical toward their work lives with the fact that their replies to questions on the subject of work reveal a high degree of satisfaction? This is connected to women’s fundamental attitude to the question of employment versus housework, bearing in mind the prestige that always has been attached to labor in the Soviet Union, and the fact that it still largely defines a person’s social status in the country. But there is also the plain fact that most women want to work to earn money because without the wife’s earnings today’s Russian family simply cannot get by. All these considerations spur women to reply that they are satisfied with their jobs.

However, when the question comes down to the specific jobs at which women are employed, either they don’t like the jobs much (50 percent) or they don’t like them at all (21 percent). Only 22 percent of women enjoy their work (the percentage is higher in the countryside than in the towns, and higher among industrial workers than among office workers). But this dislike is purely passive: only 23 per-

cent of women who said they did not enjoy their work actually intended to change their jobs, while 43 percent believed that a change

of job was impossible. Further, 34 percent could give no reply, because they simply had never given the matter a thought. Among those who wanted to change their jobs, the main reason was dissatisfaction with their pay; other reasons were far less important. Dissatisfaction 1s not always due to wage levels. Obviously many complex factors are involved, including the work’s complexity, intensiveness, and labor conditions. According to the survey, women recognize labor conditions as the most discriminatory factor in their work life. These were mentioned by 44.1 percent of the working women

Women’s Attitudes Toward Economic Reforms and the Market Economy 39 Table 3.3 — Reasons Given by Women for Job Changes (in order of importance)

Wages 46.7 Working Conditions 25.7

Reason Replies as a percentage of women questioned

Difficulties obtaining housing 15.4

they were trained 12.6 14.7 Work regulations Distance from home 11.1 Not doing work for which

Relations with management 3.8 Difficulties with’ playschool 2.6

Relations with colleagues | 2.5 who answered our questions. Another 42.3 percent believed unequal , pay to be the most discriminatory factor; 27 percent thought it was unequal opportunities; 20 percent saw it as lack of promotion opportunities; and 9.5 percent considered it was inequality in social and polit-

~ ical life. The inadequate pay for work in the difficult conditions in which women work was noted by 75 percent. Particularly inadequate, the women thought, was the pay for heavy work (81 percent) and for work involving harmful substances (75 percent). Monotonous work was also thought to be inadequately paid (70 percent), and yet boredom and monotony have been especially characteristic of women’s jobs. But if women believed a job is boring and the pay insufficient, then the common idea that women prefer this type of work because it is simple proves to be untrue. Rather, the harsh realities of life, particularly the lack of qualifications, force women into accepting such jobs. Recent surveys provide very informative material on this problem. Surveys show that women realize that they are less qualified, and for this reason they agree in principle to accept a relatively low level of

pay. Almost 75 percent of women questioned believe that their pay corresponds to their qualifications. This points to a certain degree of acceptance of the status quo on the part of working women, an observation that is supported by data showing their very modest interest in promotion and in raising their qualifications, especially since it is only

in this way that they can hope to overcome the differences between themselves and male workers. The explanations for these attitudes are clear and have been well-documented in sociological literature. They boil down to family needs. But what is less well known is that women themselves often explain their negative attitude to a career quite differently. They explain their attitude by the objective fact that they are unqualified for a managerial position. Thirty-nine percent of the working women interviewed claimed this.

40 Lyudmila Rzhanitsyna Table 3.4 — Women’s Attitudes to a Career and Professional Training

| (by percentage) Women wishing to Women wishing to undertake training obtain a better position in working and non-working hours

_Industrial All women 13.4 24.9 workers 12.3 23.6 Parm workers 7.0 24.5 Office workers 15.7 23.8

On the other hand, society is doing very little to improve women’s chances of promotion or moving up in their careers. It is not always pos-

sible to find suitable work near home, according to 25 percent of the women interviewed. Few working women are actually taking courses: less than one-third of the women who have been working for ten to twenty years have attended such courses over the last five years. Finally, the courses that some women do take at tremendous cost to themselves make them absolutely no better off from an economic point of view. Of

the women who attended training courses, 90.3 percent received no promotion; 89.1 percent received no extra qualification; and 81.5 percent received no wage increase. And since material well-being is the second most important thing to them after their families, where is the motivation to learn and improve their professional qualifications?

Lack of qualifications is one of the reasons women worry about changes in the future that require greater skills and efficiency. To a great extent they prefer a small but steady income in the knowledge that they

can feel confident about the future. According to data from the State Statistical Committee for 1990, this opinion was shared by 50 percent to

60 percent of the women questioned; according to our data from the survey in Kostroma in 1991 the percentage was a little lower at 40 per-

cent to 50 percent. Women are quite right to be concerned about the future. Our survey of the Moscow Labor Exchange confirmed that changes in employment patterns and the appearance of officially registered unemployment may be described as a totally female problem.

Unemployment With a Female Face The change from a centralized planned economy to a market economy brought with it mass unemployment, an entirely new phenomenon for state-run socialism, whose main victims so far have been women.

According to the official unemployment figures for those registered since July 1, 1991, four to five times as many women as men have lost

Women’s Attitudes Toward Economic Reforms and the Market Economy 41

their jobs. This, of course, was no news to experts, who had been pointing already to the contradiction between the high level of female employment and the low quality of the female work force. This low quality was due in many respects to lack of qualifications and experi-

ence, and time off the job to have children. Female unemployment rose in part because of the sheer numbers of women specialists (engineers, economists, managers, accountants) employed in the state-run

management organizations, which have seen the greatest cutbacks. Another contributor to female unemployment is the system of legislative social privileges, which is looked upon in a highly unfavorable light by the private employer, who, unlike the state, 1s interested in profitability, not employment figures. But the biggest problem is that all these objective factors caused by changed industrial goals do not, unfortunately, suit the nature of Soviet woman herself: Guaranteed employment, guaranteed wages, frequent proximity to her place of work, and the availability of playschool and housing resources have all combined over the years to make the Soviet working women relatively immobile. ‘The hardworking Russian woman, who has boldly assumed the double burden of keeping a job as well as a home and family, is nevertheless afraid of the changes, given the general denationalization of state-owned property and the consequences of reduced employment. According to government statistics, only one-fifth of the female population across the country approves of the sale of state-

| owned property. Forty percent of women openly oppose the sale of state-owned property, while a third cannot make up their minds. Our surveys in the provincial town of Vladimir gave approximately the same

picture: 55 percent of the working women still hope that their enterprise will remain stable, and still rely on its help to solve their problems; two-thirds of the women have no real interest in private or family ownership of the means of production (premises, freight transportation vehicles, or equipment needed to start up a business).

Women’s employment vulnerability during this time of change to a market economy has been confirmed by statistics provided by the Employment Services, which showed that across the Russian Federation as a whole women comprised 70 percent of those registered as unemployed during the first quarter of 1992, while in some places this

percentage was higher. When it comes to the question of age and unemployment liability, the highest risk groups are mothers of young children, young women without children, and women of pensionable age. Observations at one of the Moscow district labor exchanges* showed that 37 2. Labor Exchanges in Russia are officially called Employment Services or Employment Centers.

42 Lyudmila Rzhanitsyna percent of all registered unemployed people were women with children, particularly young children. Women of pensionable age comprised 15 percent of the total; women under the age of 35 without children comprised 18 percent; and women from age 35 to 50 (single, married, childless or with grown children) comprised 30 percent. The total number of unemployed young women with children amounted

to 50 percent of the unemployed, and women of pensionable age amounted to 21 percent of the unemployed. Another Moscow district showed a slightly different correlation of age groups: half of those signing on as unemployed were women of pensionable age and only | a quarter were young women. The employment problems facing young women looking for their first jobs and women with young children are largely the result of the policy pursued by businesses aimed at cutting back the female work force, while keeping on the most qualified and experienced workers, who often turn out

to be men. The difficulties facing women of pensionable age are of a dif-

ferent kind. It might be thought that this problem was resolved by the Law of the Russian Federation on Employment, which gave women the right to retire at age fifty-three instead of fifty-five. But this requires the agreement of the Employment Services, which have to confirm that further employment is not possible for the individual. Obviously it is practically impossible to employ the elderly. If they have been made redundant at the place where they worked for many years, it is highly unlikely that they will be offered employment somewhere else. Pur-

thermore, there is not usually much point in re-training workers of pensionable age. But even though they realize the pointlessness and unfairness of the present regulations, the staff at the Labor Exchanges are required by law to insist that all women wishing to obtain unem-

ployment benefits apply for at least two job vacancies and get two refusals before they can be registered as unemployed and receive the benefit. This practice is a typical infringement of human rights and it is a pity that in Russia there is no anti-discrimination board that could protect the rights of individuals. At present all we can turn to are gov-

ernment officials, who simply take various half-hearted measures instead of strongly upholding the legal rights of citizens to retire early. From the point of view of occupation it is female office workers, engineers, and other specialists with degrees and diplomas who suffer

most from unemployment, constituting more than 55 percent of all those signing on at labor exchanges. On the other hand, 90 percent of job vacancies are for manual labor; only 10 percent of vacancies are for desk jobs. This group of unemployed women could benefit from gov-

ernment re-training programs. Vast numbers of accountants, clerks,

Women’s Attitudes Toward Economic Reforms and the Market Economy 43

paralegals, and economists could be trained in commercial accounting and legislation, could learn to operate computers, could study a foreign . language and help meet the needs of the new privately owned businesses for Western-style office workers. This is particularly important because the vast majority of redundant workers—women aged thirtyfive to forty-five—do not want to radically change the kind of work they have been doing and hope to use the experience and education they already have. Apart from providing additional training in the traditional jobs it would also be sensible to develop state-sponsored social

work as a fundamentally new area of employment for educated women. Such work might involve providing a “meals on wheels” ser-

vice for the needy, giving help to the aged and infirm at home, or offering marriage and family counseling. In Russia, unlike the West, there is still very little of this activity, and yet a large number of girls and young women with higher education could be employed in the social services, with the right training.

But hired labor is not the only way for women to earn an independent living. There is no reason why the most energetic among them could not start their own businesses, which is now encouraged in the society. Small businesses, particularly in areas where women have always been employed, such as the retail trade, the sewing industry, the catering industry, preschool education, and caring for the sick, are now beginning to open up and will continue to expand as privatization accelerates. But opportunities for expansion are still small due to current shortages of cars, raw materials, work spaces, and initial capital. Por this reason it seems unlikely that entrepreneurial activity will replace hired labor for most women at present. But if the government

were more active in its support for small businesses, providing the means of production and credits, this could be a very useful means of improving the position of women, bearing in mind that it is they who would on the whole be filling the economic gap. : The situation will not change without a number of steps being taken in the area of social legislation. ‘These should include a law against lay-

- ing off women who are the sole breadwinners for young children, introducing female personnel quotas, and campaigning for a shorter work day

and compensation for employers’ expenditures on preventive health care and extended leaves of absence. The extension of maternity leave to three years would help to reduce pressure on the labor market from unemployed young women. One other step that could help counteract mass unemployment and the worsening conditions for working women is to protect the interests of those persons who are living apart from their ethnic motherlands due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. This devel-

44 Lyudmila Rzhanitsyna opment has had a particularly adverse effect upon women, who are now faced not only with sexual discrimination, but with ethnic discrimination as well, particularly in employment. An estimated 80 million Russian-language speakers in republics other than Russia are looked upon as displaced persons. Many of these have no rights to citizenship in the new

sovereign states that were once in the Soviet Union, and have been forced into becoming migrants. Millions of these people are women who left their native towns under the old centralized system of distribution, whereby college graduates were sent all over the Soviet Union to work, or went away under the government labor recruitment program, or followed their spouses when they were transferred to work in other republics, or joined their spouses in other republics. Apart from having their own civil rights protected as women, these unfortunates also need the kind of international guarantees that even migrant workers are provided with throughout the civilized world. In a word, the Russian Federation needs to apply a new strategy to employment in general and to the employment of women in particu-

lar. We need government-sponsored programs that look at what is done in other parts of the world and take into account the specific problems facing the country. And these problems are far from simple.

| There is crisis and confusion; traditional ties have broken down; little respect is shown for the laws of the land; production is falling and star-

vation threatens. In these difficult conditions our women must move from yesterday’s world of guaranteed work and roughly equal incomes and take a bold step into today’s labor market, with all its competition and hard struggle, but with all the opportunities it offers to those who

can adapt themselves to its demands. |

Lower Living Standards, Smaller Family Budgets The Russian family, to whose budget the working woman contributes an average of 40 percent, is facing great economic difficulty. Gigantic price hikes on consumer goods and services have led to a reduction in real consumption. In terms of the physical volume of trade turnover, this reduction amounts to approximately 50 percent. In spite of a certain increase in nominal income (wages, benefits, pensions), families with children suffer worst. Only single-child families in which both parents are working have experienced any slight improvement; the incomes of the rest are below a living wage. But others outside the usual categories have fallen below the poverty line. These include large families, single-parent families, and pension-

Women’s Attitudes Toward Economic Reforms and the Market Economy a 45

ers, but also able-bodied industrial and office workers in many differ- : ent types of employment, especially those where the work force is chiefly comprised of women, who are historically paid lower wages. _ Table 3.5 — Correlation Between the Wages of Male and Female Workers in 1990

Wages of female workers as a

Industry 8 ipercentage of male workers _

Manufacturing industries 68 including machine-building and

chemical and oil-processing 72-75 Textile and food processing 84—87

Manufacturing of construction materials 82 Health care, education, culture, and other areas with mainly female work force compared to manufacturing industries with mainly male

work force 73

The income gap between men and women has shown a tendency to increase as the government cuts back on its subsidies to the health service, education, and culture. Thus, the difference in men’s and women’s pay is closer to 50 percent. This largely explains why 80 percent of the population of Russia is not now earning a living wage. And

yet within this group as a whole there are categories that are in a far worse situation, which might be described as absolute poverty. Families with many children and single-parent families, pensioners living alone, invalids, the unemployed, and refugees from former Soviet republics can barely make ends meet; buying meager scraps of food and paying their rent constitutes a major problem for them. In 1992, the number of people on the verge of absolute poverty was estimated at 62 million, or 43 percent of the population. The number of people on the social poverty line, as defined by the official minimum consumer budget, was 119 million, or 80 percent of the population. In December 1991 foodstuffs accounted for 34 percent of the total spending of the families of industrial and office workers; by January 1992 this had risen to more than 47 percent. Spending on goods other than foodstuffs for these families fell during this period from 54 percent to 41 percent, and on services from 9 percent to 7 percent. ‘The trend

is continuing. The consumption of protein products fell over the period in question; use of milk products dropped by almost 25 percent;

meat products by 15 percent; and vegetables and fruits by 10 percent. Two-thirds of energy intake among the Russian population is from the consumption of bread and bakery products, potatoes, and sugar. Diet threatens to become increasingly dependent on carbohydrates. Astro-

46 Lyudmila Rzhanitsyna nomical prices for industrial goods have sharply reduced the numbers of those buying them. Sales of clothing and footwear in January and February 1992 were down by 2 to 2.5 times on sales of similar products at the end of 1991. Furthermore, in 1991 there was already a stable trend towards reduced sales of goods other than foodstufts.

Savings in the form of deposits and securities fell as more money needed to be spent on consumer goods. In December 1991 an aver-

age of 28 percent of all income went into savings in one form or another, but by January 1992 this proportion had fallen to 22 percent, and in February to 21 percent. More families became unable to save at all. This was aggravated by additional tax burdens of various kinds. In addition to income tax, in 1992 the Russian worker had to pay the government value-added tax, excise-taxes, and property taxes fifteen times higher than in 1991, although average incomes over that period rose only by a factor of seven to eight. This situation was worsened by the fact that new needs arose. Money

had to be found for the purchase of housing, land, and even one’s own : job, when the enterprise at which one worked became privatized, edu-

cation, and health care. And there were continued chronic delays in handing out paychecks; inflation began to wipe away the value of savings; and a wave of utter despondency swept over the country. The situation in the economically active section of the population is deteriorating. Since 1979, the number of families in which none of the adult members is employed in the national economy has increased by 15 percent. The overwhelming majority of members of these fam-

ilies are retired pensioners and recipients of pensions and monthly sovernment benefits. In these circumstances it is not surprising that women are more inclined to rely on their own efforts to overcome their difficulties by retaining their employment in the state sector. But many women are not afraid of the new entrepreneurial era and are ready to take up additional work at home, either making something or providing a service. The extra money is needed to survive. This has meant that questions of sexual discrimination have to a large extent dropped into the backsround. As has always been the case, when Russia has fallen on hard times, the woman is ready to do everything for her family and consequently for her country.

Chapter 4

WOMEN AND LEGAL RIGHTS :

IN RussIA Ye. B. Klinova

Radical reform of the legal system is one of the essential prerequisites for constructing a democratic and law-governed society in Russia. In particular this concerns the legal status of the individual, that is, the

rights, liberties, and obligations of the citizen. Here, considerable attention should be paid to ensuring the nights and liberties of women. In pre-revolutionary Russia, women were the least protected and most exploited section of the population. This is convincingly illustrated by their position in the family and in society. To a large extent, this attitude toward women is explained by the dominance over many centuries of the principles of Domostroi, a work that establishes rules governing everyday and domestic life, and which asserted the undivided authority of the father and husband within the family. Pre-revolutionary legislation made virtually no provision for women’s rights. Following the revolution in 1917, among the first legislative acts passed by the Soviet government were the Decree on Civil Marriage, on Children, and on the Registration of Births, Marriages and Deaths, and the Decree on Divorce. These decrees annulled earlier legislation that gave preferential nghts to the man within the family in relation to the children, and in questions relating to property, divorce, and place of residence. The decrees adopted by the Soviet government held out the promise of fundamental changes in the position of women in Rus-

sia, and the hope that later legislative acts would provide for and defend women’s rights. ‘The first Soviet constitution, adopted in 1918,

proclaimed the equality of men and women as regards political and

48 Ye. B. Klinova civil rights. At that time Soviet Russia was one of only a few countries that granted women the right to elect representatives and to be elected to representative organs of state government.

The next Soviet constitution, adopted in 1936, proclaimed the equality of men and women in every area of economic, civil, cultural, public, and political life. It granted women equal rights to work, pay, holidays, and education; protected the interests of mother and child;

and provided maternity benefits. Moreover, other normative acts applied to specific aspects of women’s rights in various areas of public life. Many of these legislative acts, however, were not enforced, and others were openly violated. With the passing years the situation deteriorated still further. A major factor that adversely affected the position of women over many decades was that women themselves had little knowledge of their rights under the law. Most women, particularly in rural areas and in the provinces, knew virtually nothing about their legal rights nor, therefore, how to defend them. During the postwar period, the Soviet Union also ratified many conventions and recommendations of the International Labor Organization (ILO) relating to women’s rights, but this information rarely was known by most Soviet working women. In the history of our state there have been periods of particularly gross violations of law and human rights. One was the 1930s, a period of mass repression. Women were sent to the camps on the basis of their social origins, and their husbands lost

the right to employment. The mass arrests of the 1930s destroyed families. Children were taken from their mothers and sent to different camps. Many wives of high-ranking party officials, scientists, scholars and engineers, and also the wives of ordinary workers and peasants, were shot. The position of women in society reflects the development of the society. Today, women account for over half of the population of Russia, and constitute a vast work force. Over the last ten years, the country ~ has experienced major changes in various areas of social and public life, a process known as perestroika. Nonetheless, the position of women in

Russia today still reveals a number of very serious and urgent prob: lems, mainly in the social and economic areas. However difficult the economic situation, and however painful the transition to a market economy, nothing should be allowed to justify the violation of the basic human right to work. In the view of E.M. Ametistov, a doctor of law and a member of the Constitutional Court of Russia, “the ability of a society to ensure human rights in the sphere of labor, and also rights and liberties in other socio-economic spheres forming the basis of free development, is the true criterion of democracy in the modern

Women and Legal Rights in Russia 49 world.”! The gradual expulsion of women from the work force may adversely affect the development of society as a whole, and in particular its economic development. A policy of expelling women from the work force would lead to a sharp reduction in family income, and also the loss of many specialists on whose education the state has expended considerable resources. Such a situation would then prepare the way for sexual discrimination in every area of public life. In order to prevent this from happening, radical legislative reform is needed, particularly reform of the labor legislation of the former Soviet Union. Much research has been done by leading scholars in Russia on legislation regarding labor and labor relations, including the labor rights of

women. Their general conclusion is that radical change is needed in labor legislation affecting the rights of women in order to bring it into line with the changes taking place in the society. Until recently, the official view was that Russian society had achieved equality between men and women, and this was supported by references to the constitution and current legislation. In practice, however, such legislation was often ignored, and it fell far short of addressing women’s real interests. It must be acknowledged, however, that the 1977 Constitution and the legislation adopted by the former Soviet Union in 1977 devoted particular attention to women’s rights in the political, economic, social,

and cultural areas. For example, Article 35 of the Constitution proclaimed the equality of men and women in all spheres of public and social life, and stated that “the implementation of these rights shall be ensured by providing women with equal opportunities in education and professional training; in employment, labor remuneration and promotion; in social, public, and cultural activity; and also by special labor

and health protection measures for women; by creating conditions which allow women to combine work with motherhood; by the legal protection of, and material and moral support for mother and child, including paid leave and other benefits for pregnant women and moth-

ers, and the gradual reduction of working hours for women with young children.” In Russia, which has inherited the legislation of the former Soviet Union, there are numerous legal norms regulating the rights of working mothers, the purpose of which is to enable women to combine domestic responsibilities with work outside the home.*

_ The 1970 Fundamentals of Labor Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics contain an article “On Support for Motherhood. 1. E.M. Ametistov, Mezhdunarodnoye pravo i trud: faktory implementatsii mezhdunarodnykh norm o trude (International Law and Labor. Factors of Implementation of International Standards on Labor) (Moscow, 1982), p. 152.

2. Working mothers constitute the majority of working women in Russia.

50 Ye. B. Klinova Guarantees of Health Protection for Mother and Child” (Article 38). This legislation was later amended and supplemented,° and today Article 38 states: “Motherhood shall be protected and supported by the state: conditions shall be created which enable women to combine

labor and motherhood; legal protection of, and material and moral support for mother and child shall be provided.” Health protection for mother and child is provided by a broad network of medical consultation centers, maternity clinics, sanatoriums,

and other health-support institutions, holiday homes for pregnant women and mothers with children, nurseries for small children, kinder-

gartens, and other preschool children’s institutions, paid maternity leave, special work breaks to allow the mother to feed the child, state payments on the birth of a child, allowances paid during care of a sick child, the prohibition on using female labor for heavy, dangerous, or unhealthy work, the transfer of pregnant women to lighter work at the same average rate of pay, improving elements in working and living _ conditions, state and public support for the family, and other measures.

In the Labor Code of the Russian Federation, amended and supplemented on 22 December 1992, a number of articles regulate the rights of working women (Articles 16, 46, 49, 51, 54, 77), and a special chapter entitled “Female Labor” (Chapter XI, Articles 160—172), pertains specifically to the nghts of working women. Article 160 forbids the use of women “on heavy work and on jobs

with harmful working conditions, and also on work underground (except for certain underground jobs, viz., non-manual work or work in the sanitary and welfare services).” This article continues, “A schedule of arduous jobs and jobs with harmful working conditions on which it is prohibited to employ women shall be confirmed in a statutory manner,” and, “It shall be prohibited to employ women in carrying or shifting weights which exceed the limits established for

female labor.” , Article 162 forbids the use of pregnant women in night work and

, overtime work, and also prohibits sending pregnant women and mothers of children under the age of three years on business trips. Article 163 establishes limits on overtime work and business trips for women with children aged from three to fourteen years (and for the mothers of invalids, up to sixteen years). These women may not be employed on overtime work or sent on business trips without their consent. Article 164 provides for the transfer of pregnant women and 3. New legislation on labor is currently being drafted in Russia; its aim is to guarantee and protect the rights of Russian citizens, and to ensure effective control over its implementation.

Women and Legal Rights in Russia ae 51 mothers of children up to the age of eighteen months to lighter work, and to work that avoids the effect of unfavorable labor conditions, while retaining their former average rate of pay. Article 165 deals with the protection of motherhood and the provision of maternity leave and leave for child care. Maternity leave is provided for a period of seventy calendar days prior to the birth of the child, and seventy calendar days following delivery. The length of maternity leave is calculated as a sum and is granted in full irrespective of the number of days used before the birth of the child. Article 166 also enables women to take their annual paid leave either prior to or immediately following maternity leave. Article 167 gives women with children under the age of eighteen

months the right to take a partly paid leave for child care and to receive an allowance under the state social insurance. In addition to such leave, the woman may apply for additional unpaid leave until her child reaches the age of three years. During the period of such leave she has the right to an allowance in accordance with the effective leg-

islation. Chapter XI of the Labor Code provides for leave to be granted to women who have adopted newborn infants (Article 168) and for work breaks to feed children (Article 169). It also provides women with guarantees of employment, and prohibits the dismissal of pregnant women and mothers of children under the age of three years. In the case of a single mother—this prohibition applies until the child has reached the age of fourteen years, or sixteen years if the child is an invalid (Article 170). This chapter also stipulates that pregnant women are to be given vouchers to stay at sanatoriums and holiday homes, and

to be given material assistance (Article 171), and that facilities for women are be to provided at businesses and institutions with large female staffs (Article 172). Article 49 of the code is of particular importance for working moth-

ers. This article relates to part-time employment, which may be arranged by the management with the agreement of the work force and

staff. The article states: “On the request of a pregnant woman or a woman who already has a child under the age of fourteen years (an invalid child, under the age of sixteen years) ... the management shall be obliged to allow her to work either a shorter working day or a shorter working week. In such cases pay shall be according to the amount of time worked, or the amount of work done. This part-time work shall not in any way affect the length of the next annual paid leave, the record of length of employment, or other factors relating to labor rights.”’ It is well-known that part-time work is very convenient for women, particularly women with children of preschool or school

52 Ye. B. Klinova age. This form of employment, widespread in the West, has gradually begun to appear in Russia over recent years, and the “Regulations on the Procedure for and Conditions of Labor for Women with Children

and Employed in Part-Time Work,” adopted by the former USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Questions and the Secretariat of the All-Union Central Trade-Union Council on 29 April 1980, deals with this issue.* Resolution No. 235, ““On Measures to Improve State Aid for Families with Children,” issued by the former Central Com-

mittee of the CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers on 22 January 1981, provided for the wider practice of part-time employment and flexible working hours to enable women to combine employment outside the home with raising children.> Other resolutions issued by the

former USSR Council of Ministers (for example, No. 127, dated 2 February 1984), also deal with these same questions of part-time work | and flexible working hours.° Such forms of employment, however, are

making little headway in Russia. Despite the enormous number of women who would like to find such part-time employment,’ management is unwilling to introduce it, and sometimes openly opposes it. Another form of employment which is very convenient for working mothers is work at home. Women employed in this fashion also work fewer hours in the day, or fewer days in the week. In the early 1980s, special measures were adopted to spread this form of work among women, and to protect the rights of those engaged in it. One example is the “Regulations on the Conditions of Labor at Home,” adopted in 1981 and confirmed by a decision of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Questions and the Secretariat of the All-Union Central Trade-Union Council on 29 September 1981, No. 275/17-991. These regulations give preferential right to conclude labor contracts for work at home to women with children under fifteen years of age (and also to invalids, pensioners, and others). At the beginning of the 1990s,

— more than 350,000 women in the Soviet Union were employed at home, and more than 700,00 worked part-time.® It is difficult to give an

unequivocal assessment of part-time work and work at home. On the 4. Bulletin of the USSR State Committee on Labor and Social Questions, no. 3 (1980), p. 3. 5. Sobraniye postanovlenii pravitelstva SSSR (Collection of Decisions of the USSR Govern-

ment), no. 13 (Moscow, 1981), Item 75. 6. Sobraniye postanovlenii pravitelstva SSSR (Collection of Decisions of the USSR Govern-

ment), no. 6 (Moscow, 1984), Item 30. 7. According to a survey carried out in 1990, 81 percent of the women questioned would like to find such employment. However, only 1 percent of those questioned were working part-time; 65 percent would like to have flexible working hours, but only 9 percent have the possibility to do so. 8. “Women and Children,” Vestnik statistiki, no. 1 (1990), p. 42.

Women and Legal Rights in Russia oe 53 one hand, these are undoubtedly the most convenient forms of employment for working mothers. On the other hand, in order to obtain such employment, women have little choice but to take work requiring little qualification, no social prestige, and low pay. Often they are obliged to work in unfavorable work conditions. If these forms of employment are to meet the needs of women, new labor legislation must lay down specific norms protecting this category of workers, and also must set up a mechanism for monitoring work conditions.

One of the most important elements in improving the position of women in the family and in society is improved legislation protecting mother and child, combined with effective implementation. Legisla-

tion passed over the last decade contains rules on the protection of motherhood. For example, Article 15 of the 1983 Law on Labor Collectives empowers labor collectives to take measures to improve working and living conditions for working women, and to raise the level of protection for mother and child. Article 13 of the 1987 Law on State Enterprises (Associations) requires labor collectives to help support the family, and to assist in creating conditions in which women may suc-

cessfully combine motherhood with employment. Article 25 of the Law on Cooperatives, adopted in 1988, requires strict observance of legislation pertaining to the nghts of pregnant women, and of mothers with young children. Article 25(5) states: “The cooperative may grant them additional leave. The conditions necessary for child care shall be provided for women with young children.” One of the documents adopted during the years of perestroika and intended to protect the interests of working mothers was the resolution

of the former USSR Council of Ministers and All-Union Central Trade-Union Council “On Extending Leave for Women with Young Children,”’ dated 22 August 1989. According to this resolution, unpaid leave to care for a child under the age of three years may be extended. However, the mother is not obliged to take such extended leave if she needs to continue her studies or if it is important for her to continue to work. The leave, or a part thereof, may be taken by the father of the child or by a close relative, if that person is looking after the child. The resolution also provides for the husband to take leave from work at his convenience during the period when his wife is on maternity leave.

These changes will serve to promote part-time employment for women with children under the age of fourteen years, and they are particularly significant in that this is the first time in Russia that such nghts also have been granted to fathers and close relatives.

Among the resolutions adopted over recent years on measures to improve the position of women and the family, to increase protection

54 Ye. B. Klinova of mother and child, and to provide social support for needy members of the population, special mention should be given to the resolution of

the Supreme Soviet of Russia “On Price Policy and Measures of Social Protection for the Population,” adopted on 8 February 1991. This resolution states that in order to ensure social provision for the population it is essential to ensure full compensation for additional expenditure on basic food products and on children’s food and cloth-

ing. Another resolution of the Supreme Soviet of Russia “On the Procedure for Implementing the Law on Improving Social Guarantees for the Working Population,” adopted on 19 April 1991, emphasizes

the need to establish a procedure for determining the minimal pay level and minimal income. The legal position of women in society is

determined to a large extent by the family legislation adopted by the former USSR and now inherited by Russia. The main legislative acts

regulating the rights of women and children in the family are the “Fundamentals of Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics on Marriage and the Family” (1968), and the RSFSR “Code on Marriage and the Family” (1969). Both these acts are currently under review, and new legal norms are being drawn up with a view to strengthening the legal guarantees for the protection of the rights of women and children in the family and in society. The aim of current family legislation, as defined in the Code on Marriage and the Family, is to ensure support for the family and facilitate the combination of public and private interests; to protect and encourage motherhood; and to provide the social and living conditions that make it possible to combine motherhood with employment outside the home and participation in political activity. This legislation seeks to free marriage from the burden of economic calculations, and to end the unequal position of women in daily life. The code provides

for the equality of men and women in the family, and for equal personal and property rights in family relations (Article 3). “Any direct or indirect restriction of rights, the introduction, on the basis of social origins, social and property position, racial and national identity, sex, education, language, attitude to religion, type of employment, place of residence and other circumstances, of direct or indirect advantages on entering marriage and in family relations, shall be inadmissible.” (Arti-

cle 4). Many of the ethnic groups living on the territory of Russia, however, have different customs and traditions that restrict the nghts of women in family life. Article 5 of the code, which is devoted to state support for the family and the protection and encouragement of motherhood, states that state support for the family shall be ensured “by creating and develop-

Women and Legal Rights in Russia a 55 ing a broad network of maternity clinics, nurseries and kindergartens, boarding schools and other children’s institutions, by organizing and improving consumer services and public catering, by paying allowances on the birth of a child, and also to single mothers and families with more than two children, and also by other benefits and support for the family. ... Protection of mother and child shall be ensured by special measures to protect women’s work and health, and by the creation of conditions enabling women to combine employment outside the home with motherhood.” Considerable attention is paid in the code to questions relating to the statute of limitations and to the procedure and conditions for entering marriage. Article 15 sets the legal marriageable age at eighteen years. Chapter 4 of the code is devoted to the rights and obligations of the spouses. Article 19 provides for joint decision by the spouses on questions relating to family life, choice of occupation, profession and place of residence. The code regulates the right of the spouses to own property jointly. For example, according to Article 20, “Property acquired by the spouses during their marriage shall be their community property. The spouses shall enjoy equal rights to possess, use and dispose of such property. The spouses shall also have equal rights to property in

the case where one of the spouses was employed in running the household and caring for the children, or had other valid reasons for not earning an independent income.” The last part of this article is of particular importance for women with children, and especially the mothers of large families, many of whom, for various reasons, were unable to take up employment outside the home. Article 21 of the code states: “In the case of a division of the community property of the spouses, their shares shall be equal.” The code also stipulates that the spouses have the duty of reciprocal maintenance (Article 25), a duty which continues after divorce (Article 26). Article 34 deals with the legal procedure for settling family disputes

| over the upbringing of children following divorce. Today, when many children are born outside marriage (and there are frequent cases of women preferring to have children while remaining unmarried), Article 50 of the code is acquiring far greater significance. It stipulates that children born outside marriage “have the same rights and duties with respect to their parents and their relatives as children born in wedlock.”

The code lays down the rights and obligations of parents with respect to the raising of their children, and stipulates that these rights - and duties are equal (Article 54); a parent who is living apart from the children has the right to see them, and the obligation to take part in their upbringing. The code forbids the parent living with the children

56 Ye. B. Klinova to prevent the other parent from seeing the children and taking part in their upbringing (Article 56). In order to protect the nghts of children, the code defines the con-

ditions on which parents may be deprived of their parental rights (Article 59). Article 19 of the “Fundamentals of Legislation on Marriage and the Family” provides for loss of parental rights in cases where there has been gross violation of the rights of the child, if the parents

neglected their obligations with respect to the upbringing of their children, if they abused their parental rights, maltreated their children,

exerted a harmful influence on their children by amoral, antisocial behavior, and also if the parents are chronic alcoholics or drug addicts. Restoration of parental rights is possible only by decision of the court, and only if this meets the interests of the children.

A special chapter in the code (Chapter 9) lays down the maintenance duties of parents and children. Article 67 obligates the parents “to support their under-age children, and children who have reached their majority but are incapable of work and in need of maintenance.”

Article 68 of the code determines the amount of maintenance for underage children as a percentage of the income of the parents: for the maintenance of one child it is 25 percent, for two children it is 33 percent, for three or more children it is 50 percent of the sum total of the earnings income of the parents. Article 77 states that “children shall be

obliged to care for their parents and provide them with assistance.” According to the same article, this obligation falls upon all children who have attained their majority, the amount to be paid each month being determined by the courts on the basis of the financial and family situation of the parents and the children.

Recent years have seen an increase in cases of withdrawal of parental nghts, highlighting the importance of those articles of the code that deal with guardianship and wardship “instituted for the upbringing of under-age children who, as a result of the death of their parents, loss by their parents of parental rights, the illness of their parents, or for other reasons, are without parental care, and also in order to protect the personal and property rights and interests of the children.” Special articles of the code are devoted to the obligations under civil law of the guardians and wards (Article 132), and to supervision of the activity of guardians and wards (Article 136). The code provides for “the termination of guardianship or wardship in cases where those

exercising guardianship or wardship fail to carry out their duties” (Article 138). A special place in the system of legislation regulating the rights of

working women goes to that part dealing with the protection of

Women and Legal Rights in Russia 57 female labor. In addition to special legislation on the protection of female labor (Labor Law Code of the Russian Federation), a number of resolutions and rulings also have been adopted with the purpose of ensuring that women actually receive the benefits, advantages, and protections laid down in law. Labor protection laws have existed for many years in the former Soviet Union. One example is the resolution on approving the list of industrial and professional work, and work in physically arduous or harmful conditions where it is prohibited to employ women. According to this list, female labor may not be used in a number of areas of the economy, and in various individual types of work. Altogether the list names thirty-seven areas of the economy in which female labor

may not be used. However, it has been repeatedly violated. In the 1980s, the problem of the use of female labor in physically arduous and harmful work remained no less acute than it had been over the previ-

ous decades. In order to resolve this problem, the former USSR Council of Ministers and the All-Union Central Trade-Union Council adopted on 5 December 1981, Resolution No. 1149 on the introduction of new norms for the maximum weight limits for women when lifting or transporting loads. This resolution was developed further in 1982, when the former USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Questions, and the Presidium of the All-Union Central Trade-

Union Council adopted another resolution, on the norms for the maximum weight limits for women when bodily lifting or transporting loads.” Nonetheless, in January, 1990, the former USSR State Statistics Committee was obliged to admit that “despite the system of special measures intended to improve the conditions of female labor,

and improve health protection for women, the number of women employed in arduous physical labor has increased.” The current level of industrial development in Russia, where there are still many types of work which are physically arduous or harmful to health, makes it necessary not only to retain existing laws protect-

ing female labor, but to improve them. No one could argue that Russia suffers from any lack of legal norms prohibiting the use of female labor for such work. However, laws and normative acts regulating the rights of working women are often ignored and violated. Legal or other measures are effective only if a rigorous check is kept on their implementation. Until recently the country had no govern-

ment body whose specific function was to improve the position of women and to monitor observance of laws and normative acts regu9. Bulletin of the USSR State Committee on Labor and Social Questions, no. 4 (1982), p. 3.

58 Ye. B. Klinova lating women’s rights. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR attempted to set up such a government body in the form of a Committee on Women’s Affairs, Protection of the Family, Mother, and Child. This committee drafted a resolution on urgent measures to improve the position of women, and the protection of the family, mother, and

: child. However, the committee had barely begun to function when its existence ceased due to the collapse of the USSR. One can only hope that a similar structure now set up under the auspices of the

Russian government will exercise strict control over the implemen- , tation of laws passed in this area. The success of legal reforms will largely depend on effective control over their implementation, and on how well the government reduces and finally abolishes the discrepancy between legislation and practice. The difficulties of the present situation have obliged the Russian government, and also experts, to recognize the need for urgent measures to be taken to improve the position of women in society, and above all at the work place. The seriousness of this problem is also due in part to the fact that women are among the first to lose their jobs in the course of the transfer to a market economy."® If this problem is to

be resolved, in addition to adopting the appropriate legal norms on protecting the rights of women in a market economy, it 1s also essential to create economic conditions in which businesses, while ensuring profitability, also have a stimulus to employ women.

International norms on human rights, including the rights of women, adopted by the United Nations and its institutions could be of enormous help to Russia in ensuring the legal protection of the interests of working women, and in carrying through a reform of its legal system. The most important and comprehensive document on women’s rights is the Convention on the Liquidation of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979). Of the documents adopted by the International Labor Organization, a large number are conventions and recommendations relating to the rights of working women. These documents contain many proposals that could be of use when revising Russian legislation, particu-

larly regarding the amount of benefit to be paid during maternity leave, and the form of child benefits. ‘The economic position of mothers, families with more than two children, and young couples in Russia is such that, at the end of the 1980s, 80 percent of the 42 million 10. For further details see: Trudovoye pravo i pravo sotsialnogo obespecheniya na putyakh per-

estroiki (Labor Law and the Right to Social Security During the Period of Perestroika),

Siberian Department of the Institute of Scientific Information in the Social Sciences, USSR Academy of Sciences, 1989.

Women and Legal Rights in Russia 59 people living below the poverty line belonged to these groups. In a situation of galloping inflation, rising prices, a sharp drop in living stan-

dards, and the difficulties of transferring to a market economy, it is particularly important to provide material support for the family. The normative acts adopted over recent years were aimed at improving the economic position of the family, but inflation has reduced the effect of these measures almost to naught. It would seem appropriate, therefore,

to turn to Article 3 of ILO Convention No. 103 on the protection of motherhood (amended 1952), which calls for “the payment of benefits sufficient to maintain the woman and her child in good health.”"!

, The ratification by Russia of ILO Convention No. 156 on workers with family obligations could also play an important part in improving the position of working mothers. Ratification by Russia of ILO convention No. 156 on workers with family obligations, and also recognition of ILO recommendation No. 123 on the same issue, would lead to a significant improvement in the position of working women with children. The ILO recommendation, for example, calls for the gradual reduction of the working day and working week; the development of a network of children’s institutions (nurseries, kindergartens, etc.) that children can attend at a modest cost or even, if necessary, free of charge; re-employment for women who have not worked for some time, usually for family reasons; the organi-

zation of public transport; the coordination of the working day, the school day and working hours of children’s institutions; courses of pro-

fessional training and retraining at times convenient for working women and not far from their place of work, and so on.

The legal position of women in Russia is one of the most acute social problems facing the country. Raising this status to a level that meets international standards, together with a radical reform of exist-

ing legislation, would constitute a major step toward ensuring and protecting women’s rights.

11. “Women and Children,” p. 41.

Chapter 5

SOCIAL SECURITY FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN RUSSIA Yelena Azarova

‘The changes that have taken place in Russia with the country’s reorientation toward a market economy have had the most direct effect on social security. For decades social security legislation was the same everywhere throughout the Soviet Union and changes in this legislation proceeded extremely slowly. But recent years have seen the rapid development of independent legislation among the different republics in the Russian Federation, although to a certain extent the old Soviet legislation is still effective. In the area of social security a number of disparate factors are in operation today. In particular, these include:

1. The need to fulfill obligations to the people that were undertaken by the previous Soviet and Russian governments. 2. The lack of material and financial resources due to previous economic inefficiency and to current industrial recession.

3. The severity with which economic reforms have been introduced, in which the need to balance the state budget has meant giving preference to certain social groups.

4. The power struggle between parliament and the government when both sides enacted their own laws without the agreement of the other and no clear, uniform concept of the ways, means, and speed for transition to a market economy. 5. Resistance to reform at various levels, expressed in uneven price rises, the squandering of state-owned property and humanitarian aid, and corruption.

Social Security for Women and Children in Russia ae 61 There can be no question that all the hardships of the transition period, piling up as they have one upon the other, have been particu-

larly burdensome for the weaker social groups. A factor of great importance, especially to the women in the society, is the very unpredictability of events, and the fact that it is impossible to rely on oneself or one’s resources even for as little as a few months ahead. The natural results of such a situation have been a sharp fall in the birth rate

! and a sharp increase in sickness, mortality, and violent death. Fear of the future is nationwide. In order to maintain a more or less acceptable level of social security at a time of economic recession both longterm and immediate measures are required. Pensions and other social benefits must be reviewed rapidly because of price rises. Reliable and stable sources of funding are needed to finance social programs. Supplementary benefits for the specially needy must be accurately assessed

and speedily introduced. A characteristic of present legislation on social security is that laws are passed on a federal level and placed in effect throughout the Russian Federation. But these federal laws could be supplemented by local ordinances or by social security plans offered

by individual businesses. This chapter looks at social security for women and children as it is currently in practice at the federal level.

Maternity Benefits In Russia, as in the other republics of the former Soviet Union, there was practically full employment for women. This was due to the fact

that men’s wages were far too low to be able to support a wife at home, particularly if there were children in the family. Full employ‘ment for women meant that they had to be paid social security in the event of maternity leave, which they received in the form of both prenatal and postnatal benefits aimed at protecting infants’ health. Under current legislation all employed women are entitled to prenatal and postnatal benefits, regardless of how many years they have worked or where they work. This benefit is also enjoyed by seasonal and temporary workers. Maternity leave is regulated by the Law of the Russian Federation of 4 April 1992 “On Additional Measures for Providing Security for Mothers and Children.” Under the terms of this law 70 days are provided for prenatal leave and 70 days for postnatal leave. In the case of complications setting in during or after birth, leave can be extended to 86 days, and in the case of the birth of two or more chil-

dren to 110 days. Maternity benefit is paid at the rate of 100 percent of the average monthly salary.

62 Yelena Azarova Infant Care Benefit up to the Age of Eighteen Months

Up to the early 1980s it was the usual practice for babies to be put in nurseries and working mothers given several intervals each day for feeding. Later, special leaves could be obtained to look after babies. At present this leave can be provided until the child reaches the age of three, but the benefit is paid only up to the age of eighteen months.' Benefit is paid in a fixed amount depending on the length of service of the mother and

amounts to approximately 50 percent to 60 percent of the minimum wage. This is lower than that established in 1990 by Soviet legislation, when benefit was raised to 100 percent of the minimum wage.

State Benefits for Children State material support in the form of lump sum, periodic, or regular payments is necessary if children are to be brought up and maintained. This support is provided through the services offered by various children’s institutions and child benefit payments. There are enough free places at various preschool establishments for most children who need the services. At the beginning of 1991 more than 6.5 million children in Russia used permanent preschool establishments. Another approximately one million families needed these services, but were unable to

obtain them due to shortages.* Parental contribution amounted to only 12 percent of the fairly low cost of maintaining the children. But when price restrictions were lifted, this cost rose sharply. In February 1992, the cost of keeping a child at a municipal playschool in Moscow was three times the minimum wage,’ and far too much for the municipal budget. Although under Soviet legislation parental contribution was approximately one percent of the necessary costs, parents were frequently charged the full costs for such services. This resulted in the closing down of many such establishments. On 6 March 1992 the Russian Parliament passed a resolution “On

Regulating Payment for the Maintenance of Children at PreSchool Establishments and Financial Aid for These Establishments.” Under the provisions of the resolution certain groups of parents were made exempt

from parental contributions. These were parents of physically or psy1. Leave of absence for the purposes of bringing up a child from the age of eighteen months to three years is granted without pay. 2. Zhenshchiny v SSSR. 1991. Statisticheskiye materialy (Women in the USSR. 1991. Statistical Data) (Moscow, 1991), pp. 46, 47.

3. Ibid., p. 43. 4. O. Plakhotnikova, “Living Standards,” Rossiiskaya gazeta, 7 May 1992.

Social Security for Women and Children in Russia | 63 chologically handicapped children, and parents of children suffering from tuberculosis. The resolution also states that parental contributions from parents of three or more underage children should not exceed 10 percent of the maintenance costs of each child. Parental contributions from the parents of other children should be limited to 20 percent of the costs.

On 16 February 1992 the Russian government passed a resolution “On Immediate Measures to Organize Summer Recreation for Children and Teenagers.” This resolution stated that part of the costs of staying at recreational and health centers for children should be met from social benefit funds. Local authorities were urged to allocate funds from their budgets for these purposes. Substantial support for families with children also comes from state benefits and other social allowances madg for children. At present a law on state benefits to cit-

izens with children is being drafted, and the introduction of a unified , system of federal family allowances has been proposed. But until the passage of this law, benefit entitlement is still largely determined by the

various laws and enactments that were passed in the Soviet Union, although benefit amounts now are assessed by the Russian government. Given the rapid rate at which prices are rising, the amounts are regularly reassessed. The following details on child benefit payments relate to legislation effective on 15 June 1992. Lump Sum Payment upon the Birth of a Child

This payment is made for the birth of every child, irrespective of any other conditions, provided that the child remains within the family and is not passed into the care of a state institution. The amount of the benefit is equivalent to three times the minimum working wage. This lump sum payment compensates in fact for less than half of the immediate expenditures required by the family.° Monthly Benefit to Single Mothers

Benefit is provided for children who are legally considered to be without a father. This refers to children born out of wedlock when there is no joint declaration by the parents on the paternity of the father and paternity has not been established by a court. In such situations the surname of the child is entered onthe birth certificate as the surname of the mother, while the child’s first name and patronymic are entered as the mother wishes. The amount of benefit for each child is approximately equivalent to 45 percent to 50 percent of the minimal wage. Benefit is paid until the child reaches the age of sixteen (or in the case of children still at school and not in receipt of a grant, until the age of eighteen). 5. G. Valyuzhkevich, “The Flowers of Our Life,” Argumenty i fakty, no. 20 (1992).

64 Yelena Azarova Monthly Benefit for the Children of Enlisted Men

Benefit is paid throughout the whole of the period in which the father is on active duty list and is equivalent to 60 percent of the minimum wage for each child.

Monthly Benefits for Children in Care | These benefits were established by the legislation of the USSR in 1985 and are maintained until the children concerned reach the age of sixteen (or eighteen, in the case of children still at school). The amount of the benefit is equivalent to 60 percent of the minimum wage. A child

shall be entitled to such benefit, if the alimony, pension, or benefits awarded for other reasons total less than the amount of the abovementioned benefit for children in care. If this benefit is awarded, all other benefits and payments cease. Monthly Temporary Benefits for Children Not in Receipt of Parental Alimony

In such cases benefits are regulated by a Soviet government resolution of

25 January 1989 “On Measures to Improve the Material Situation of Children Whose Parents Decline to Pay Alimony.” This benefit is awarded to children under the age of eighteen whose parents are being sought by the police for refusal to make alumony payments. The benefit also may be awarded to children whose parents have been sentenced to

terms at corrective labor institutions, where they are not in receipt of earnings from which alimony could be deducted, or in cases where the payment of alimony is impossible for reasons outside the control of the persons obliged to pay alimony. The amount of the benefits are set by the Russian government and are equivalent to 45 percent to 50 percent of the minimal wage for each child, depending on the age of the children.

Material Support for Families with Handicapped or Disabled Children In 1980 Soviet legislation introduced monthly state payments for disabled or handicapped children under the age of sixteen. In the Russian Federation today this benefit has been transformed into a social pension awarded on the basis of the law of 20 November 1990 “On State Pensions in the Russian Federation.” The resolution of the Soviet government of 27 March 1986 “On Measures for the Further Improvement of Conditions for Disabled and Handicapped Children,” which established a number of allowances for

disabled and handicapped children, including medicine and trans-

Social Security for Women and Children in Russia 65 portation allowances, is still effective in the Russian Federation. The Ministry of Social Security of the Russian Federation maintains special boarding schools for disabled and handicapped children, where such children may be kept if their parents wish it and if there are no reasons for them not to be there. In such cases no payment is charged.

Monthly Payments for Children from the Age of Eighteen Months to Six Years A Soviet government resolution of 2 August 1990 “On Supplementary Measures for the Social Security of Families with Children Due to the Transition to a Regulated Market Economy” introduced beginning on 1 December 1991 a single monthly payment for children from the ages

_ of eighteen months to six years. This payment was awarded on the condition that the average total monthly income per member of the family was not more than double the minimum working wage. In Russia this payment soon began to be made regardless of the size of the family income. At present the amount of the benefit is equal to approximately 45 percent of the minimum wage for each child. Compensation Payments for Children

Due to the centralized price increases that were brought in the early part

of 1991, the Soviet government published a resolution on 19 March “On Retail Price Reform and Social Benefits.” A similar resolution was passed on 20 March of the same year by the Russian government. The nominal amounts of all pensions and benefits were raised as partial compensation for price increases. At the same time new monthly compensation payments were introduced for children under the age of sixteen (or eighteen, if they are at school and without grants) who were not previously entitled to pensions and benefits. The amount of these benefits at present is equivalent to approximately 22 percent of the minimum working wage. The same legislative acts also set quarterly compensation payments for all families with children to help meet the increasing cost of children’s goods, and special yearly lump sum payments to be used for the purchase of school uniforms and children’s clothes. The amounts of these benefits were commensurate with the minimum working wage.

Benefits to Families with Several Children | Since 1944 a woman with three or more children was entitled under Soviet legislation to receive various state benefits and allowances

66 Yelena Azarova according to the number of children she had. Today large families receive state benefits not according to the fact that they are classed as having several children, but for all the other reasons given above. There can be no question of the particularly difficult economic circumstances of large families. And this fact is taken into account in the provision of social benefit, in the form of the presidential decree of 5

May 1992 “On Measures to Ensure the Social Security of Families with Several Children,” which went into effect on 1 July 1992. This: enactment does not contain the concept of a large family as such. Families with different numbers of children can be considered as large

or in need of social benefits according to the national and cultural characteristics implicit in the social, economic, and demographic development of the various regions of the Russian Federation. The decree provides considerable allowances for families with sev-

eral children. These include: 1. A reduction in the cost of public utilities and electricity. 2. Pree prescription medicine for children up to 6 years old. 3. Free meals for children at state schools and technical colleges. 4. Free school uniforms and sportswear for children at state schools

. throughout their school life.

5. Free use of city, suburban, and regional public transport for schoolchildren. 6. Once-a-month free family tickets to museums, exhibitions, and parks. Aid is also provided for families with several children to help them start farms and businesses, build their own houses, and acquire gardens and allotments. Unemployment Benefits

The transition to a market economy, accompanied as it has been by the

- closing of unprofitable businesses and economic restructuring, has resulted in redundancy in the work force and unemployment. Women, particularly women with young children and women of pensionable age, have been at highest risk. Unemployment benefits are regulated by the Law of the Russian Federation of 16 May 1991 “On Employment in the Russian Federation.” Unemployment benefits are paid to persons over the age of sixteen who have been registered by the Employ-

ment Services and have been officially classed as unemployed. An unemployed person is entitled to receive benefits not later than eleven days after applying to the Employment Services, up to the time the per-

Social Security for Women and Children in Russia a 67 son becomes re-employed. But there is a general rule that entitlement to unemployment benefits may not exceed one year. Unemployment benefits are fixed at a percentage of average monthly earnings over the last year spent in employment. In the case of persons seeking work for the first time, benefit is set at 90 percent of the minimum wage. Benefits are increased, if the unemployed person has dis-

abled dependents at the rate of 10 percent per dependent. But benefit may not be in excess of the person’s average monthly earnings at the last place of work. Unemployed persons are entitled at the suggestion of the Employment Services to take early retirement up to two years ahead of the legal retirement age. Old-Age and Other Pensions

The law “On State Pensions in the Russian Federation” was adopted on 20 November 1990 and made fully effective on 1 May 1992. The law contains a number of provisions that take into account the interests of women, particularly women with children. The law “On State Pensions” provides for two types of pension: the service pension and

the social pension. Old-age service pension entitlements depend on | length of service, with women able to retire five years younger than men. A woman usually becomes entitled to a service pension at the age of fifty-five after a total of twenty years of employment. A woman with fewer than the statutory number of years in employment (but no fewer than five years) may be entitled to a lower rate of pension.

Of considerable importance to women is the fact that service in employment for the purposes of pension entitlement includes periods spent taking care of disabled members of the family. Persons who have spent periods of time caring for a disabled or handicapped child, for a disabled or handicapped adult in the first disability group, or for an old person who needs to be taken care of in the view of a medical institu-

~ tion may include such periods in their employment service without any restriction on the length of such periods. Even if a person has spent his or her whole required employment service period in caring for disabled members of the family, he or she will still be entitled to a

service pension. Periods spent caring for children up to the age of three also are included in Employment Service. Under labor legislation a working mother or any other member of the family make take a leave of absence to look after a child up to the age of three years. Such periods are regarded as working periods and are fully included in

employment service. The pension law also includes periods spent looking after a small child by a mother who was not employed before that. In this case the seventy days of prenatal leave are added to the

68 Yelena Azarova three-year period of child care, but no more than nine years of such service can be counted. Two other conditions also may be included in assessing length of employment service for pension purposes. They are periods women spent with husbands enlisted in the armed forces in places where women

cannot find employment in their profession due to the lack of such employment, but for no more than 10 years; and periods spent living abroad as the wives or husbands of persons employed in Russian or international organizations, also for no more than 10 years. The pension law

provides for special old-age pension allowances to women who have had several children or who have had disabled or handicapped children. Women who have given birth to frve or more children and brought them up to the age of eight, and women who have brought up disabled or handicapped children to the age of eight are entitled to receive their old-age pensions at the age of fifty with a total employment service of fif-

: teen years. The law specifies two other categories of women who are entitled to early retirement at the age of fifty. They are women who have worked at least fifteen years as drivers of tractors, cranes, heavy vehicles or trucks; and women who have worked at least twenty years in the textile industry at jobs requiring exceptionally heavy or intensive work.

In the case of jobs where the conditions are dangerous or the work is heavy, where both men and women are entitled to retirement at an earlier age, the retirement age for women is five years earlier than it is

for men. Length of employment service for pension entitlement is similarly cut.° No sex distinctions are made in the case of disability pensions. Russian pension law also provides pension entitlement in cases known as “‘loss of the breadwinner.” As a general rule, members of the family of a deceased person who are incapable of working and

who have been dependent on the deceased person are entitled to receive pensions.’ A “breadwinner’s” children, brothers, sisters, and grandchildren under the age of 18, or older if they were disabled or handicapped before the age of 18, are entitled to this type of pension.

Those who are students at the age of 18 and older are entitled to receive this type of pension until they complete their full-time educa-

tion, but not past their twenty-third birthday. Step-children are equally entitled to receive this type of pension. 6. The pension law also provides pensions for long service in civil aviation, education, medicine or other forms of health care, and the theater or other forms of artistic

work. Among groups entitled to long service pensions, women predominate in such fields as education and health care. 7. Unlike previous legislation, the pension law no longer demands proof of the fact of

dependency when awarding pensions to the children of deceased parents. This makes it substantially easier for orphans to receive benefits.

Social Security for Women and Children in Russia 69 The parents, wives or husbands of the deceased are also entitled to receive a pension for “loss of the breadwinner,” if they are of pensionable age or disabled. One or another of the parents of the deceased, or

the wife of the deceased, or the grandfather or grandmother of the deceased, or the brother or sister of the deceased may be entitled to receive this type of pension, regardless of age or ability to work, if he or she takes care of children, brothers, sisters or grandchildren of the deceased breadwinner who are under the age of 14 and not working. In most cases, it is the children who receive this type of pension, but it is also received by women who have lost their husbands or children. Men, as a rule, receive old-age pensions and disability pensions. —

The amount of a service pension depends on the total length of employment and on the average earnings of the person concerned. Oldage pensions amount to 55 percent of the average monthly earnings. They are increased by 1 percent for every year of employment service above the minimum, to a maximum of 75 percent of average monthly earnings. The lifting of price restrictions in recent times has resulted in considerable increases in nominal wages. For this reason legislators have

introduced special formulas that are used to make the appropriate corrections when assessing pensions. But in all cases service pensions, given

full length of service, may not be lower than the minimum amount set

by the law and may not be higher than the maximum. Since 1 May 1992 the minimum amount of an old-age or a first-group or secondsroup disability pension has been equivalent to the minimum working wage, while the maximum amount is generally equivalent to double the minimum wage. The upper and lower limits of all other types of service pension are fixed in proportion to these amounts. All persons reaching a certain age (or disabled persons) who are not entitled to a service pension may receive a social pension. Women are entitled to receive a social pension at the age of sixty, men at sixtyfive. Disabled persons in any of the three groups may receive a social pension at any age. Children who ‘have lost the breadwinner of their family are entitled to a social pension, as are children who are classified as disabled or handicapped: The introduction of the social pension made benefit entitlements for old age and. disability universal for every citizen of the Russian Federation. In practice, women who have been dependent on their husbands throughout their working lives are the largest group receiving social pensions. The social pension is fixed in proportion to the minimum service pension; in the case of disabled and handicapped children and disabled persons in the first group it is equivalent to this amount. If the minimum service pension is increased, all social pensions are likewise increased.

70 Yelena Azarova A summary of this survey of payments provided by the state social

benefit system shows that most women and children are eligible to receive these payments. At first sight the amounts paid in pensions and

benefits seem high, since they are set according to the minimum working wage and sometimes above it. But this conclusion would be superficial in the current situation since it does not take real wage levels into account. But because prices are continually rising and the gap between price inflation and income rises is continually widening, the fact is that even the maximum pensions are insufficient for recipients to live comfortably. Further, child allowances for families with children

also are insufficient. ,

In recent years the diet of the people of Russia has become noticeably worse. The number of disorders associated with poor diet among children under the age of one year has grown, and doctors say parents

no longer have the time to take their children to clinics nor the resources to have them treated.® In such a situation the calls from certain politicians and officials to cut back on social programs seem strange.

Many specialists assert—correctly—that the economic crisis requires an expansion rather than a reduction of social protection measures for unemployed members of the population. If the minimum and even the average working wage is insufficient to ensure that the working man or woman can obtain the necessities of life, social benefits are essential for their dependents. If pensions are insufficient to guarantee

the necessities of life, then the pensions must be supplemented by communal, transport services allowances, and similar assistance.

Immediately before the economic reforms came into effect, the idea that personal help should be provided for people who found themselves in special need was rendered moot. In accordance with a presidential decree of 26 December 1991 “On Supplementary Social Benefit Measures for 1992,” special funds were set up in Moscow and

in the provinces. On 19 February 1992 the Russian government endorsed a Statute on Republican (Federal) and Territorial Social Benefit Funds. The Republican (Federal) Pund is controlled by the Ministry of Social Security. The territorial social benefit funds are controlled and organized by the appropriate local authorities and the social security branches. The resources for these funds come from: 1. Extraordinary state subsidies and other funding. 2. Income from the entrepreneurial and investment activity of businesses and organizations set up by the social benefit funds; 8. “Reform—92,” Moskovskie novosti, 24 May 1992.

Social Security for Women and Children in Russia ; 71 3. Part of the income from the privatization of state-owned and municipal property and from excise duties; 4. Voluntary contributions and humanitarian aid.

Benefits from these funds are granted to specially deserving pensioners, disabled persons, children, and other people unable to work, if the average monthly income in their families is less than the regional minimum. The social benefit funds may be spent on the following: 1. Provision of essentials either free or at specially reduced prices. 2. Provision of social services. 3. Organization of free food supplies. 4. Provision of subsidies for medicines and for artificial limbs and

orthopedic requirements, and payment for communal and domestic services. 5. Provision of material aid in the form of supplementary benefits. 6. Provision of night lodgings for homeless persons.

7. Development of vocational training and re-training plans. 8. Setting up of businesses to provide jobs for persons with limited abil-

ities and to manufacture essential items and other products to provide aid in kind and to increase the financial resources of the funds.

The social benefit funds have not yet been widely used. This is a new service in Russia and still in its early stages, although demand for itis very high. By far the greatest number of persons who receive pensions are women. Among the unemployed and needy the proportion of women is increasing. Therefore this kind of individual social assistance is of primary importance to women, particularly widows, single mothers, mothers with several children, and families with disabled or handicapped children. A public opinion poll taken in Moscow in April 1992 gives some idea of the need for supplementary assistance, the level of its present organization and its development. Of the people questioned, 7.2 percent needed free dinners and 7.3 percent needed free second-hand clothing. But only 1.5 percent of the Muscovites questioned knew where they could get free meals, and practically no one knew the

addresses of the centers that hand out free second-hand clothes. Another important result of the poll was that more than 12 percent of the Muscovites questioned were in a position to offer assistance to the

needy, but only 2.3 percent of these had the vaguest idea where to offer such assistance.

72 Yelena Azarova An analysis of the social and economic development trends in Russia makes it possible to state with a fair degree of probability that over the next few years social security and other benefits will not increase appreciably. Therefore efforts should be aimed at ensuring that the disabled, the unemployed, housewives with several children, and other persons with limited working capabilities have the opportunity to use what abilities they do have to earn a living, in addition to the pensions and benefits they receive. A letter from A. Bogatyryov, a disabled person in the first group, puts the matter succinctly. The help people need, he said, is not free food, but knitting machines, sewing machines, typewriters, lathes, equipment for watch-repair, and other equipment that can be used to earn money by working at home.’ One important development in solving the problem of self-help and mutual assistance is the recent emergence of numerous public organizations, like the Single-Parent Families Organization, the Organization of Families with Several Children, the Soldiers’ Mothers Organization, the Disabled and Handicapped Children’s Parents’ Organization, and the Organization of Former Alumni of Children’s Homes. ‘These orga. nizations can more easily and more effectively solve the problems that are common to all their members and uphold their rights and interests. But at the same time it is vital to bring about more rational use of the

resources, both centralized and decentralized, that are allocated to | social security needs, and to ensure that the people for whom they are intended have a greater say in the use to which they are put. Finally, we feel we must agree with the opinion expressed by academician L. Abalkin, which is directly applicable to the question of providing social security for women and children. In today’s conditions, programs of salvation and survival need to be given primary importance. “No one, whether they are old people or disabled, should feel that they are alone. Leaving them to the mercy of fate is not only immoral, it is a national

disgrace and the beginning of social degeneration. If we allow it to happen, then there is nothing that can save us.’’'°

9. A. Bogatyryov, “Charity Needs a Strategy Too,” Rossiiskaya gazeta, 18 February 1992.

10. L. Abalkin, “Look the Truth in the Eyes,” Trud, 11 June 1992. Since then no -

. major changes in social security for women and children have occurred in Russia.

Chapter 6

WOMEN, THE FAMILY, AND REPRODUCTION V. Perevedentsev

‘Women have always constituted more than 50 percent and at certain times a much higher percentage of the huge population of the Russian Federation, which was 149 million at the beginning of 1992. ‘This numerical dominance of the female sex is the result of brutal wars and the higher male death rate during peacetime. The disproportion between the sexes was particularly great at the end of the Second World War; however, it

has remained significant up to the present. For example, the number of women for every 100 men since the Second World War was 124 in 1959, 119 in 1970, 117 in 1979, and 114 in 1989.! The disproportion between the sexes is significantly greater among the adult population. Among children and adolescents there is a male predominance; in Russia, just as throughout the world, 105 to 106 boys are born for every 100 girls. As the Second ‘World War recedes into the past, the significant dis-

proportion between the sexes shifts to the older age groups. The ratios

between the sexes in reproductive age groups on the dates a demographic census was conducted are presented in Table 6.1. Male losses are much greater than female ones in age groups that were adults during the

Second World War. Toward the end of the 1970s, the war ceased to have a direct influence on the ratio between the sexes in the demoeraphically active age groups. The large predominance of women over age forty is a result of male “super mortality,” i.e., higher age-related coefficients of mortality in males compared to females. 1. Data from demographic censuses. Hereafter, census information will be presented without reference to the source.

74 V. Perevedentsev Table 6.1 — Number of Men to 1,000 Women

Age 1959 1970 1979 1989

15-19 —1,006 1,0061,055 1,0541,038 1,057 1,033 1,056 20—24 25-29 9383 1,004 1,026 1,031

30—34 626 835 931 1,012 1,013 35-39 966 950 993 40-44 616 852 936 971 45-49 598 602 901 900 Because of the vast losses during the war, there was no increase in the birth rate in Russia during the first postwar years; the birth rate fig-

| ures for the second half of the 1940s proved to be much lower than during the 1930s. The percentage of young married women during the first postwar years was extremely reduced, and the birth rate for unmarried women was much lower than for married women. The comparatively low number of births from 1942 to 1946 had an influence on the number of new marriages two decades later and, in turn, on the number of births during the 1960s. In addition, the birth rate also noticeably decreased during the 1960s (the frequency of births, number of children for the average woman, and number of children in

the average family). This resulted in a great reduction in the annual number of births during the 1960s and in a demographic depression. The average annual number of births dropped from 2,816,000 from 1957 to 1959 to 1,838,000 from 1967 to 1969, i.e., by 35 percent.* This depression is usually called the “echo of the war,” since it was a result of the low number of births during the 1940s. However, the main reason for this depression was not the small number of parents, but a drop in the frequency of births. Small families suddenly became the trend, encouraged by the nearly total enlistment of women into the work force, and by the state’s ill-considered demographic policy of that time.

During the 1960s, the number of married women significantly increased, and during the 1970s and 1980s, couples got married at a much younger age, as can be seen from Table 6.2. At the end of the 1950s, reproduction? of the Russian population was shightly expanded and close to the optimal. From the beginning of the 2. Naseleniye SSSR. 1973 (Population of the USSR. 1973) ( Moscow, 1975), p. 70. 3. Reproduction of the population means the process in which the adult population is replaced by children. When the number of mothers equals the number of daughters (every 1,000 adult women are replaced by 1,000 girls who live to the average age of their mothers when their mothers gave birth), a simple replacement of the population

occurs. If there are more daughters than mothers, reproduction of the population expands. If there are fewer, reproduction diminishes. When simple reproduction of

Women, the Family, and Reproduction _ 75 Table 6.2 — Number of Married Women per 1,000 Women, by Age Groups

Age 1959 1970 1979 1989

16-17 24 20 27 37 18-19 .143 20-24 479159 536 193 595 230 618

25-29 752 819 793 798 30-34 768 848 817 822 35-39 711 834 810 804 40-44 606 783 795 772 45—49 452 708 758 737

1960s, this indicator began to drop rapidly. Reproduction of the population in Russia began to diminish during the first half of the 1960s. The public usually assesses the demographic situation according to

the overall movement of the population, which relates to the entire population, not just to women of childbearing age. And if the overall birth rate (number of births per 1,000 inhabitants) is higher than the , death rate, there is a natural increase in the population, and the demographic situation is considered satisfactory. However, a natural increase in the population continues for a long time even when its reproduction is diminished. This is because newborn girls quantitatively replace not mothers in the population, but grandmothers and great-grandmothers. In recent years, the average age of mothers at the time their children are

born has been approximately twenty-six. When a girl is born, her grandmother is approximately fifty-two, and her great-grandmother, is approximately seventy-eight. However, the percentage of old people in the Russian population is still much lower than it would have been at

the recent reproduction indices. The comparatively low number of elderly people (older than sixty) and old people (older than seventyfive) in the population allowed a significant natural increase in the country’s population, even during a time of diminished reproduction. And only very recently, with a delay in the transfer to diminished reproduction for a generation, has the natural increase in Russia’s population ceased. So the covert, disguised nature of the severe deterioration in the demographic situation at the beginning of the 1960s was a major factor behind the long delay by the government in assessing the actual demographic situation. Measures to increase the birth rate were the population (a pure reproduction coefficient of 1) is maintained over an extended period, the population becomes stationary, that is constant in terms of numbers and age groups. Diminished reproduction of the population leads to its extinction. The level that marks simple reproduction of the population is the “red line.” Below this line the country is faced with great problems, not only demographic, but also economic and social, such as rapid aging of the population.

76 V. Perevedentsev implemented at the beginning of the 1980s rather than at the beginning of the 1960s. The indices for the reproduction of the Russian population over the past two decades have changed. Table 6.3 — Pure Index of Population Reproduction in Russia*

Years Entire population City residents Rural residents

} 1969-1970 0.934 0.816 1.218 1975-1976 0.921 0.807 1.310

1978-1979 0.882 Q.792. 1.177 1986-1987 1.038 0.9231.432 1.483 1988 1.005 0.896

1980-1981 0.8780.844 0.7831.375 1.223 1982-1983— 0.953 * Naseleniye SSSR (Population of the USSR) (1988), p. 114.

As we can see, during the 1980s there was a sharp increase in the

country’s population reproduction figures. The reasons for this included the measures to increase the birth rate implemented in 1981;

| the intensified campaign against drunkenness and alcoholism in 1985; and the great expectations that accompanied the beginning of perestroika.

The pure reproduction index for 1986 to 1987 was 18 percent higher than for 1980 to 1981. This demonstrates the significant potential of an effective demographic policy, which has been denied by some demographers. However, the reproduction of the city population of Russia continued to diminish during the 1980s as well. Since 1988, the indices of population reproduction have begun to drop rapidly again. Judging by some indicators, the pure reproduction index for the Russian population was lower in 1991 than the lowest figures at the

beginning of the 1980s. For the first time since the Second World War, Russia has come very close to a natural decrease in the population, that is, predominance of the number of deaths over the number of births. Whereas in 1987,

the natural increase in Russia’s population was 968,000 people,* in 1991 it was only 113,000.° In 1992, a natural decrease in the republic’s population began, and this decrease will continue at an increasing rate in the years to come. This is because the country is at the beginning of the next drop in the birth rate, at the beginning of a down slope on the

demographic curve. The demographic depression of the 1960s 1s , repeating itself, caused by a sharp drop in the number of births at that 4. Demografichesky yezhegodnik SSSR. 1900 (USSR Demographic Yearly. 1990) (Moscow, 1990), p. 91. 5. Data of the State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation.

Women, the Family, and Reproduction a 77 time, leading to the small number of women of child-bearing age. The

smallest number of annual births should occur in the middle of the 1990s (if there is not a severe reduction in the frequency of births, which could delay the lowest point on the down slope). According to the 1989 census, there are only 19.7 million people in the fifteen to twenty-five age group, whereas there are 25.4 million in the twentyfive to thirty-five age group.® At present, the overwhelming majority of children are born to young mothers (under age 30), so the severe decreases in the number of people in adjacent age groups are almost

exactly repeated in the number of newborns. The sharp shift in the birth rate to young age groups also can be seen from a comparison of the age-related birth rate at the end of the 1950s and late 1980s (Table 6.4), not to mention a comparison with prewar times when artificial regulation of the birth rate was not as widespread as it 1s today. Table 6.4 — Average Number of Births per Year for Every 1,000 Women*

Age 1958-1959 1988

under 20 28.4167.9 49.6 20-24 157.9 25-29 30-34 156.4 101.9114.1 61.8

35-39 57.7 25.6 40-44 19.9 5.6 45-49 3.0 0.2 15-49 82.9 64.5

Total coefficient

of the birth rate 2.615 2.130

* Naseleniye SSSR, p. 326. |

In Table 6.4, both periods are the peaks of the demographic curves.

However, in the first case, reproduction of the population is noticeably expanded, and in the second, it is simple. At the end of the 1950s, two-thirds of all the babies (65.5 percent) were born to young mothers, whereas in 1988, almost four-fifths of all babies (77.8 percent) were born to young mothers. Thus, reproduction of the Russian population is in the hands of young families and young women. In relation to this, it is worth looking at the young family and young women in our society, briefly touching upon the evolution of the family during the Soviet period. The typical Russian family today differs radically from the typical family of the 1920s. The transition from the traditional to the con6. Demografichesky yezhegodnik SSSR. 1990, p. 30.

78 V. Perevedentsev temporary family has been long, gradual, and smooth, but it is not yet

complete. Among all families a percentage still is closer in many respects to the traditional family than to the contemporary one. The traditional family is patriarchal, with the oldest male, either the husband or his father, assuming indisputable supremacy; the contemporary family is more balanced, with approximate equality between

husband and wife. :

In the traditional family, there is a distinct division of labor between husband and wife; the husband is the breadwinner, and the wife is the housekeeper and nurturer. In the contemporary family, the husband’s

and wife’s functions overlap; the wife usually is as much a worker and , breadwinner as the husband, while the husband participates in housework almost to the same extent as his wife does. In the traditional family, there are as many children as “God sends” and when He sends them; in the contemporary family, birth is planned and the number of children is strictly limited. The traditional family usually has many children, and the contemporary one has few. In the traditional family, girls usually do not have any premarital sex experience; a woman enters

her first marriage as a virgin. Today, most of the young Russian city dwellers have premarital sex experience. The traditional family is strong and stable; divorces and also separations without divorce are

rare. The contemporary family is contentious and unstable; divorce , has become extremely common.

: This is by no means an exhaustive list of the differences between the traditional and contemporary family; however, it covers the main differences. All the special features of the modern family noted here are in some

way related to the reproduction of the population. However, most of these connections have not been sufficiently researched. There are

myths in the public consciousness, and people ignorant of demographic science use these myths when trying to explain their own real or imaginary conclusions. For example, low income or difficult living conditions frequently are given as the reasons for the current trend in small families. Also, many people believe that an average of two children per family is all that is required for normal demographic development. In fact, this number would result in diminished reproduction, that is, extinction. Many believe that three children constitute a large family; in Moscow such families have been officially declared large by the city authorities. In fact, large numbers of three-child families are a

deciding factor in the healthy reproduction of the population; from the demographic point of view, families are not considered large until the birth of the fifth child.

Women, the Family, and Reproduction 79 The most widespread notion, that there is a direct connection between the level of material well-being and a large number of chil-

dren in a family, exactly contradicts reality. The opposite is true. There are much fewer children in the average family in the most economically affuent countries of the world than in Third World countries; the highly paid workers in Russia have fewer children than the unqualified workers; in Central Asia, with its extremely low standard

of living, the birth rate is much higher than in the most affluent republics of the European part of the former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, many people are inclined to believe that if they earned more

money or had a larger apartment, they would have more children. Demographers are well aware that during recent centuries the same process has been occurring throughout the world, gradually encom- , passing more and more countries. It is a transition from the traditional

pattern of population reproduction based on a high birth rate and equally high death rate to a new pattern based on a low birth rate and equally low death rate. The first stage of the new pattern is a decrease in mortality. This is followed, usually with significant delay, by a decrease in the birth rate. A more rapid decrease in the mortality rate leads to a rapid increase in population, called a demographic explosion. In the territory of the for-

mer Soviet Union, different regions are at different stages in this demographic transition. In the European part of the former Soviet Union, the transition is approaching completion, whereas in Central Asia it ‘is still in its first stage of demographic explosion, although recently the birth rate has been decreasing rapidly there also. There is no doubt that a decrease in the death rate is by itself'a very important factor leading to a decrease in the birth rate; as the death rate

drops, a high birth rate is no longer necessary and becomes burdensome for families. In fact, in former times, families did not have a great many children; they had a great many births, and a vast percentage of children did not survive to maturity. Furthermore, the family is losing economic need for its children. In

the not-so-distant past, children provided the guarantee of a certain amount of security in old age, because they took care of the elderly. The modern system of old-age pensions for elderly and old people in the former Soviet Union was not created until the mid-1950s. It is very likely that the great decrease in the birth rate in both Russia and the Soviet Union as a whole during the 1960s was closely related to the creation of this pension system. Moreover, the economic status of children in the family has changed considerably. Previously, in the farming family, children made a significant contribution to work on

80 V. Perevedentsev the farm from a very early age. But now they are just consumers until the age of about twenty, thereby sharply increasing family spending on the annual upkeep of each child.

Because of these and other factors, the status of children in the overall system of human and family values has changed: they have slipped from the pinnacle of the value pyramid. Although, as many serial studies show, it is rare that a woman does not want to have a child. However, many women now do not want to have two or more children; in the largest cities approximately half the women fall into this category. And-even those who still want to have two or more children would like first to acquire other valuables as well (a diploma, a country house, a car) before adding a child to the family.

As was mentioned above, the reproduction of the Russian population is now in the hands of the young family, so it is worth examining how it is formed, the conditions under which it lives, and how it performs its functions. In recent years, the average age for getting married has decreased. Women are beginning to get married from the age of eighteen, and men from the age of twenty to twenty-one. In first marriages, the husband is on average two years older than his wife (in second marriages, the husband is much older). Marriages between younger people are doubtlessly related to the fact that, until the mid-1980s, many parents of young couples had greater opportunities to provide their offspring with financial support. Special studies show that most young families take advantage of this support for a long time, and frequently in significant amounts. Economic independence ceased to be a necessary condition for creating one’s own family. Furthermore, young couples frequently enter into their first marriage with significant premarital sex experience, which was not the case in the relatively recent past. Here is an example from a specific study which shows the situation in a large Russian city at the beginning of the 1980s. In the Urals city of Perm, which has a population of over one million, all the cases of first pregnancies within one year were counted and the outcomes of the pregnancies were followed. For every thousand pregnancies, 272 ended in abortion, 140 babies were born out of wedlock, 271 were born during the first months after marriage, and

317 babies were born who had been conceived after marriage.’ According to all published demographic indices (marriage rate, birth rate, divorce rate, etc.), Perm is a typical large city for the European

part of Russia, so it is safe to say that the behavior of the young 7. M.S. Toltz, et al., “The Initial Stages of the Realization of the Reproductive Function in Women,” in Zdravookhraneniye Rossiiskoi Federatsii, no. 7 (1984), pp. 13-15.

Women, the Family, and Reproduction oo 81 women of this city with respect to love, marriage, and family is typical of the population of all large Russian cities. This data shows that the majority of young female city residents lead an active premarital sex life. And this shows that the former double sex standard—strict for women and liberal for men—is dying, that this standard is becoming the same for both sexes, that the new sex standard conforms to the former model for males. A significant part of the older generation, which on the whole is much more conservative than the younger, approves of this change. Here are some short excerpts from a letter written by V. Baranova from the large city of Nikolaev. “Strict morals for women became outmoded about twenty years ago. Why cling to them today? I am not an advocate of early marriages, especially very early ones: when one is young, it is very easy to make a mistake. However, I do believe that before getting married (and especially before starting a family), young people should test their love by living together. ... I am in favor of young couples

who intend to marry going through a sort of trial period, with the issuance of a temporary document which grants the right to coexistence. ... If female virtue were protected by the law and a document in our country, it would not damage morals; on the contrary, it would bring decency to. the sexual upbringing of young people and hygiene to life. ... The marriage could be registered after a year or more of living together, upon reaching the age of eighteen. If a young couple has a baby (or is about to) during this time, and the marriage has not been registered because one of them objects to it, the father will have to pay alimony.”® However, the administration of the education system of the former

Soviet Union proved to be much more conservative than the youth, certain teachers, and the public as a whole. Thus, despite all the efforts

of specialists, it proved impossible to organize sex education for schoolchildren. Sexual ignorance complicates the love-marriage-fam-

ily life of Russian young people. Young people also obviously are defenseless before the powerful flow of pornography, which has been

pouring through the mass media in recent years. Under the actual conditions of Soviet life of recent decades, the inevitable and, on the whole, progressive evolution of sex morals is having a very serious effect on family life and population reproduction. What significance do the data gathered in Perm have in this light? The high percentage of abortions in first pregnancies, extramarital births, and the premarital conception of babies that are born after mar8. Nedelya, no. 43, 1988.

82 V. Perevedentsev rlage registration proves that many pregnancies are unwanted; this demonstrates the poor state of sex education and the extremely low use of contraceptives. Until now, abortion has been the main form of birth control for women. Abortions during the first pregnancy quite frequently result in sec- ° ondary infertility, including for the rest of one’s life. This sidelines a percentage of women from the population reproduction process. The marriages of infertile women (including those temporarily infertile)

break up more frequently than others. An infertile wife was and remains one of the most legal and morally justified reasons for dissolv-

ing a marriage. Extramarital births give rise to the current very large numbers of children and adolescents living in one-parent, femaleheaded homes without sufficient male nurturing, although the main reason for this undesirable phenomenon is divorce. There is no doubt that extramarital births significantly complicate the lives of the single mothers themselves and their children. At the current proportion of marriageable males to females, extramarital births lower the level of population reproduction, since single mothers on average have fewer children than women in two-parent or families. The large number of marriages of pregnant brides is one of the main reasons for the breakup of young families. In such cases, the young husband often believes that he has been enticed and trapped into the marriage by the pregnancy. This circumstance greatly complicates the relations between spouses from the very outset of their mutual life, a time that is not easy anyway. Marriages stimulated by the bride’s pregnancy are especially contentious and difficult. ‘This is one of the main reasons for the extremely high divorce rate in recent years.

For every 100 marriages 39 ended in divorce in 1979, and 42 ended in divorce in 1989.’ The heterogeneity of many of today’s married couples, insufficient acquaintance before marriage, and many other circumstances like living with and depending upon parents, which is inevitable for many and

has a great effect on relations in the young family, its stability and the } number of children in it. In the distant past, people usually got married

to those “in their circle,” that is, the future spouses belonged to the same religious, national, and social groups. Parents of young couples arranged marriages (in the indigenous peoples in some regions of Russia this practice continues to a significant extent). The parents of future spouses usually knew each other and the future spouses very well. Now everything is very different. The question of getting married is decided 9. Demografichesky yezhegodnik SSSR, 1990, p. 220.

Women, the Family, and Reproduction oo 83 by the future spouses themselves, often without the consent of their parents, and the influence of social status, national affiliation, and other similar factors has decreased greatly. For example, in 1989 approxi-

mately half of young non-Russian men and non-Russian women in Russia married Russians: 9.6 per cent of all Russian men married women of other nationalities, and 11.1 percent of Russian women married men of other nationalities.'° In 1989, the non-Russian population in Russia constituted 18.5 percent, and more than 10 percent of people marrying Russians were of other nationalities. Studies have shown that marriages break up much more frequently and faster among couples who became acquainted not long before reg-

istering their marriage. According to one such study, the number of divorces among those who have known each other for less than six months proved to be three times as high as the average.'' However, the long acquaintance of young couples in large cities is now the exception rather than the rule. For example, a survey of 500 young married couples showed that only 9 percent of them had known each other since childhood. On the other hand, 27 percent of the couples had met each other not long before getting married at places of recreation, 6 percent at parties, and 5 percent while on vacation. Admittedly, 21 percent of acquaintances which led to marriage occurred at work and 18 percent occurred at a place of learning. However, even in the latter cases, the future couples usually knew each other only briefly before marriage.'* An old Russian saying advises men to find a

wife “not on the dance floor, but in the vegetable garden.” Now, however, husbands and wives are found most frequently precisely on the “dance floor,” i.e. in places of recreation and entertainment. These also are usually the places young people meet on dates. And this means that future married couples obtain an extremely one-sided impression of each other. It is very understandable and natural that in rushed marriages, the likelihood of every kind of unpleasant surprise is greatly increased in the transition to everyday mundanities. Also, the lovemarriage-family life of young people is complicated by the administrative regulation of population migration with the aid of the so-called “passport system,” which is the ban or restriction on place of residence registration for the entire population or certain categories in it. Even worse, registration is restricted in those very places which are attractive 10. Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR v 1990 godu (The USSR National Economy in 1990) (Moscow, 1991), p. 84.

11. A.G. Kharchev, Brak i semya v SSSR (Marriage and the Family in the USSR) (Moscow, 1979), p. 217. 12. Ibid., p. 215.

84 V. Perevedentsev to young people: capitals and other large cities. These restrictions are overcome in different ways: by means of bribes, connections, fictitious marriages, etc. More effective is the method chosen by most people—

intentional marriage to a resident of a place where residence is restricted and where many young people want to live. These unions stimulated by residency desires include not just fictitious marriages, but also real ones. A wife can be registered at her husband’s place of resi-

dency or a husband at his wife’s place of residency under practically any circumstances, whereas other conditions require a job, close relatives, or sufficient living space. Under current law, it is impossible to get a job without residence registration, and residence registration 1s not permitted without a job. The much higher divorce rate in places with the strictest residency restrictions is evidence that the administrative regulation of migration makes a noticeable contribution to the country’s unprecedentedly high divorce rate. In large cities, resorts and large ports, every other marriage ends in divorce, and sometimes the level is even higher. Divorce is a problem of young families in their early years. Unfortunately, state statistics provide a crudely distorted picture of divorce, basing their data on the actual receipt of the divorce certificate. The official date of a divorce is not the date of the court decision, but the date the certificate is recetved, which on average is two or three years after the court decision. However, from the demographic viewpoint, it is not even so much the legal divorce that is important, as the actual breakup of a married couple. And this, in turn, usually occurs several years before the legal divorce. In Russia, women are primarily the initiators of a divorce; however, they also value the marriage more than men. After the breakup of a family, many women still harbor the hope that things will work out again (the husband will stop drinking, and the family will be restored). Therefore, according to the official statistics, there are virtually no divorces during the first year of married life, although it is well-known that family life collapses during the first year most frequently of all. Like other living things, the family is weakest of all at birth. Special studies conducted several times in different places

throughout the former Soviet Union showed that one-third of all divorces occurred in families that had existed for less than one year, and another one-third of divorces occurred in families that had existed from one to five years. However, the official statistics on the number on divorces are not completely reliable. Not all divorcees pick up their divorce certificates. Certificates usually are only picked up when they are needed for the person to get remarried or for other matters

that require information on one’s family status. ,

Women, the Family, and Reproduction 85 In order to understand the reasons for the contentiousness and instability of a young family, it is necessary to take a look at its every-

day life. In the overwhelming majority of cases, both husband and wife work; sometimes one, or both, study with leave from work; sometimes one combines work with study at a correspondence or evening school. The wage of one of the spouses is usually not sufficient to meet a young family’s financial needs. The wife has to work primarily for economic reasons. However, the picture is not quite this simple. Many women work for the social stimulation it provides them and not just because of the money. Young women frequently have a hard time when they are forced to temporarily quit their jobs to have a baby. It appears that work makes life fuller, more diverse, and more

interesting for women. It should also be taken into account that in Soviet society the whole of social life revolved around work. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of women do not have a choice between working or fully devoting themselves to their family. And this means a double occupation, an extreme workload, great restriction of free time and over exhaustion. All of these increase with the arrival of the first baby and as the family continues to grow. However, even when both husband and wife work, income during the first years of family life is usually insufficient, especially since the items necessary for setting up a home must be bought at this time.

During this period, economic support of the new family from the couple’s parents is particularly important. However, a great many young families may not receive this support. Orphans, and the children of single mothers, divorced mothers, alcoholics, invalids, and pensioners usually cannot count on such assistance. In such cases, young families need government aid. This would be fair and advanta-

. geous for both the families themselves and the state and society. However, extended debates on this topic and proposals from researchers thus far have been in vain. Young married couples who, due to a lack of their own living space or for other reasons, are forced to live with their parents, use their parents’ furniture, refrigerators, televisions, and other durable items. However, life with one set of parents has significant difficulties and creates severe problems that frequently lead to the breakup of a young family. The housing problem is the most serious of all the external problems of the average young family. A family usually obtains normal liv-

ing space (in the present understanding of the word, this means an individual apartment with modern conveniences) by the time the husband and wife are over thirty, after all their children have already been born, and after many years of living with parents or in dormitories or

86 V. Perevedentsev rooms rented privately. This is because the overwhelming majority of city dwellers obtain housing by going on a waiting list at their place of work. Such lists are usually years long and one’s place on the list is primarily determined by length of service in a particular business or insti-

tution. Young people must wait. Young families suffer the most housing discrimination of any group in Russian society. This is due not only to the absolute shortage of housing, as people usually believe, but also to housing practices in the country such as gratuitous provision of

housing, lack of a housing market, and difficulties in building one’s own home. The transition to the market economy should lead to a noticeable improvement in the housing situation for young families. Thus, insufficient income, poor housing, and a double occupation for the women are characteristic of the contemporary young Russian family. All of this complicates the life of the young family, but these are not the main reasons for the contentiousness and instability of young families, as divorced couples themselves are frequently inclined to believe. All of these conditions have been even worse in the past than they were in the mid-1980s, but the divorce rate has been lower in the past. According to studies, in the 1960s and 1970s, drunkenness and alcoholism were the primary reasons for divorce. ‘The second most

common reason was psychological factors; the third was adultery.’ The large number of divorces and the significantly lower number of repeat marriages have led to the fact that even at the most favorable ages, of twenty-five to forty, every fifth woman was not married in 1989. This affects the birth rate and the upbringing of children and adolescents, millions of whom live in one-parent, mother-headed homes. Under the present difficult conditions, an effective government demographic policy 1s needed. Its main task should be to achieve

at least simple population reproduction, that is, a situation in which the number of children born will be sufficient to quantitatively replace the parent population.

13. L.V. Chuiko, Braki i razvody (Marriages and Divorces) ( Moscow, 1975).

Chapter 7

THE RURAL Famity TODAY AND TOMORROW M.G. Pankratova

The acute socio-economic crisis that Russia is experiencing has made it urgently necessary to raise the efficiency of agricultural production, to change the rural way of life, and to improve rural living standards and culture. The creation of a modern infrastructure and other facilities necessary to change the rural lifestyle requires a new type of rural resident who has a vital interest in the results of his labor, and who is able to run a modern, productive farm. Great hopes are placed on the creation of individual private farms. As a rule, however, a farm is a family enterprise founded upon the common interest and labor of all the members of the family, first and foremost the husband and wife, their parents, and their children. Therefore farm family relations, and the composition and size of the rural family, are of particular importance not only for themselves, but for the future of Russia.

Up to now, the socio-political changes taking place in the large cities have had little impact on the countryside. Rural family relations

are characterized by the interaction of contradictions. Subjected to repeated social cataclysms, and impoverished by experiments dictated by party and government leaders who had no interest whatsoever in the needs and aspirations of the rural population, the Russian village found itself at the cutting edge of history, stripped of many traditional values, but lacking any new, stable system of norms to fill the void. Not only has the demographic structure of the countryside changed,

but even the character of its population has altered. These changes include relations within the family, the division of duties, and relations

88 M.G. Pankratova among the generations. This cannot help but exert a major influence

on the development not only of the countryside, but of the whole country. This chapter examines the current problems of the rural population, their everyday life, and their prospects for the future.

The Rural Family and the Transition to Market Relations The economic importance of the rural family, an importance that stays constant despite the vagaries of history, has become obvious once again. Increasing difficulties with the food supply over recent years have made land reform an urgent issue. The economic basis of agricultural production needs to be restructured by the creation of independent, private farms. Down through the centuries the family was the basic work force of agricultural production, providing both a production unit and the emotional cement that bound people together. It was precisely this

combination of features that promoted the most rational division of labor and its maximum efficiency, and this provides yet another argument in favor of creating and supporting private family farms. However, the economic reform of agriculture will have little effect

if the diverse requirements of the rural family are not taken into account. It is essential to create the conditions necessary for the rural family to carry out its functions—emotional, demographic, and educational. If the rural family is unable to carry out these functions, this inability will damage its economic efficiency. To be successful, land reform requires as its basis a large number of families who have an interest in preserving the family as a small group and production collective. In particular, it is desirable that the members of the rural family have agricultural training, or, at very least, basic knowledge of this area. Thus the upbringing and education of children acquire special

importance. A farming family must make rational use of its labor, including the labor of its women.

Rural Women Today Particular attention should be given to the position of women in the countryside, and a crucially important factor is the level of education. According to census data,’ which coincides with data obtained in the 1. Here and hereafter the data cited is based on surveys conducted in the rural areas of the Orlovsk region, Udmurtia, and northern Ossetia between 1988 and 1991. The couples chosen were all thirty years old or younger, with selection based on the size

The Rural Family Today and Tomorrow ae 89 course of the author’s investigations, in a number of regions of the country women have overtaken men in the number of years they have spent at school and institutes of further or higher education. This fact has a variety of consequences for the family and for society.

Until now, women sought to use their educational qualifications

| to find work outside the home. The working woman enjoys greater independence vis-a-vis her husband, and this raises her own selfesteem, and the respect she receives from other members of the fam-

ily. The working woman is more able to understand the problems and interests of her husband, and this is of both material and psychological importance. She is also more able to encourage the cognitive abilities of her children. One should not underestimate the desire of

the working woman to preserve the family, but if a conflict arises between her and her husband, the working woman is not necessarily prepared to smooth it over at any cost. The families of many work-

ing women develop harmoniously and are even more stable than those of non-working women. Another factor is public opinion, which accords more prestige to the working woman. On the other hand, the working woman often faces a conflict between her family and professional roles, and this can lead to tension at the personal, family, and social level. Today the working woman usually limits the number of children in the family, and this alters their upbringing. It also leads to a sharp rise in the number of lonely elderly people, and other dramatic changes in society. Women still lag behind men in their levels of qualifications and pub-

lic activity, and this is particularly true of women with children. Employment outside the home creates a number of difficult problems for the working mother. Rural female labor also has its particular characteristics, and this affects the professional structure of rural life. One of the results of higher education among rural women is an inflated administrative apparatus. Having earned a school certificate, the young woman

does not want to undertake agricultural work, which is often dirty, arduous, and poorly paid. According to data gathered during an investigation by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, of the young women living in the Orlovsk.region, only 3 percent work as milkmaids; and in Udmurtia this proportion was 11 percent.

Among their mothers, the figures were 36 percent and 43 percent, respectively. It is not surprising that voices are raised on every side, bewailing the lack of workers in stock-breeding and dairy farming. of the family and distance from the district urban center. Within selected population

points, the survey included all the families. The author wishes to thank N.G. Kassyanov, A.A. Raizin and K.S. Dzagkoev for help in collecting materials.

90 M.G. Pankratova As her level of education increases, the rural woman also experiences a rise in her expectations for her work, her environment, her husband, and the conditions in which she must bring up and educate her children. In all of these she remains dissatisfied. Only a minority of the young rural women in the Orlovsk region are satisfied with their jobs, their pay, their qualifications and the opportunities for improving them. This, however, may be seen as a promising indicator that not all is lost, and that when working conditions in the countryside are improved, agricultural work may become a source of satisfaction. At present, about half the young women living in the Orlovsk region definitely wish to move to the city, and many of them (around 40 percent) replied “don’t know” when asked about plans to move away, a reply which can often be understood to mean “want to, but unable to.”” The main motive for leaving is dissatisfaction with living condi-

tions and the cultural level in the countryside. , Today, despite perestroika and other reforms, very little real change

can be seen in the countryside. Despite all the discussion and argument, private farming is still not very widespread, although it began to increase a little in 1992. Now, over a large area, one can usually find about ten farms. These face overt and covert resistance from officials at various levels and from the directors of many collective and state

farms. More important, perhaps, is the uncertainty of the would-be private farmers themselves, who are understandably concerned about where the fodder, agricultural machinery, fertilizers and all the other necessities are to come from. In such conditions there 1s little point in talking about the development of social processes and the creation of a new type of individual with an interest in hard work, a high level of professional skill, and initiative. The data from sociological research conducted from 1990 to 1991 did not uncover any significant change

in the social makeup of the average respondent. Comparisons with data from previous years revealed no noticeable differences. Indeed, how could differences be expected ifno changes or improvements had taken place in rural life? There has been a statistical rise in the pay of collective and state farm

workers. However, considering the inflation rate, these figures are - amazingly small. A more objective indicator of the real state of affairs for the average rural resident is the number of domestic appliances he owns. This indicator has shown a slight rise over the past two years. Even more important is how the rural population sees its own standard of living. Here one can detect a worsening of the situation in all the answers to - questions about the levels of satisfaction with transport, health service, opportunities to improve one’s qualifications or to provide one’s chil-

The Rural Family Today and Tomorrow | 91 dren with a better education, cultural life, and consumer services. Dissatisfaction with work, and in particular with levels of pay, has increased. Little has altered in the availability, design, and size of living accommodations, which are issues of considerable importance for everyone.

Dissatisfaction with work and living standards, and the consequent desire to move away, are obstacles to stable family life, create a feeling of purely temporary residence, and even of temporary family relations. Husbands and wives often differ in their attitude to moving elsewhere.

For example, in northern Ossetia, 44 percent of the young women want to move from the countryside to the town, whereas only 30 percent of the young men share this desire. Nowadays, women’s demands of rural living conditions are higher than those of men. In northern Ossetia, 20 percent of the women were not satisfied with living con-

ditions and cultural facilities, whereas only 13 percent of the men were similarly dissatisfied. The desire to improve living space was named as a reason for moving by 18 percent of the women, but only 12 percent of the men. Thus women are today a more mobile section of the rural population, and an active force behind migration. In Udmurtia the percentage of men and women who wish to move to the town is about the same, but their reasons differ. Dissatisfaction with pay levels is cited more often by men (19 percent, as compared with 13 percent of the women), whereas women more often wish to improve their housing conditions (20 percent of men, 32 percent of women). Both men and women are dissatisfied with living standards and cultural facilities (30 percent of men, 32 percent of women). Divergence of opinion over the question of moving often leads to divorce. Today the rural family is feeling the effect of many destructive factors, including, of course, the financial independence of women. Al-— though the average pay for women is less than for men, not as few women earn as much as, and even more than, their menfolk. Education and financial independence cause conjugal and family relations to develop on a qualitatively new basis. For example, a decision may depend more on the character of the spouses than on the material contribution of each to the welfare of the family. In northern Ossetia, 22 percent of the women handle the family budget; one in four decides how to bring up the child; and one in five decides how the family will spend its leisure time. However, northern Ossetia 1s still influenced by national traditions. Here the older generation continues to play a significant role (43 percent of the parents of young couples determine how to dispose of the family budget; 85 percent decide on economic questions; 40 percent have the decisive word in discussing other issues;

and 16 percent even decide on the upbringing of the children).

92 . M.G. Pankratova Although the young woman enjoys significant importance within the

family, the tradition of according wide-ranging rights to the older generation still holds sway here. Roughly one-half of the women of northern Ossetia live with their mothers-in-law. The picture is slightly different in the Orlovsk region. Here family relations are characterized by a high level of individualism, and the overwhelming majority of families are nuclear families. Only 18 percent of the young couples (up to the age of thirty years) share accom-

modation with the husband’s mother, and only 1 percent of the parents or other older relatives determine the use of the family budget. Seventy percent of young couples jointly dispose of their income; 62 percent determine how to bring up their children; 66 percent decide

jointly how to spend their leisure time; and 64 percent usually take part in deciding family budget issues. Only in this last case does the older generation play a more noticeable role—70 percent of them take part in deciding family budget questions. The husbands rarely have the decisive voice in the family. Only 2 percent of them dispose

of their income independently, and only 5 percent decide on the upbringing of the children. They also concede authority within the family to their wives on virtually every other family issue. The percentage of women who take the decisions within the family is considerably higher: 27 percent decide on the use of the family income; 26 percent have the decisive word on most issues; and one in five decides

on the upbringing of the children. The independent role of the woman within the family reveals her considerable opportunities, and the respect that she is able to earn both within the family and outside it. However, in such cases this divergence between the traditional and contemporary order within the family can lead to conflict and emotional instability in family relations.

The Transition to a Market Economy and the Rural Family The question of female employment outside the home takes on a new light as Russia transfers to a market economy, and certain aspects of this question are specific to the rural family. Today many young rural

women are employed in various kinds of office work that do not require a particularly high level of qualification. The closing of these administrative offices with the move to a market economy brings with it the urgent issue of re-training. Some women will switch to full-time occupation on the family farm, including performing the bookkeep-

The Rural Family Today and Tomorrow a 93 ing so essential for economic efficiency in a market economy. Some will prefer to continue in non-agricultural work, earning an income independent of farming. This may cause domestic problems due to divergent views of the role of the woman within the family, and also employment problems due to the gap between the supply of and demand for female labor in rural areas. The state and society can ease this situation by measures to raise the level of qualifications among the rural population, and by setting up a social consultation service. The measures to raise the level of qualifications must be based on listening to the views of producers. As to the social consultative service, the central question pertains to the emotional atmosphere within the rural family, which supports its stability, satisfaction with life, and production efficiency. Therefore, the main role must go to specialists able to identify in advance problems likely to bring the family to grief.

_ The Emotional Atmosphere and Division of Roles in the Rural Family The rural family has many functions besides that of production. Particularly important among them is the function of maintaining emotional equilibrium among the members of the family, and of preserving and developing the social and cultural achievements of society.

: When they work together, these functions help to consolidate the family and preserve it, and to maintain the functioning of society in its

current form.

To what extent are all these functions fulfilled by the modern rural family, and what social policy should be pursued at the state and local levels? How can modern society promote the healthy functioning of the rural family, without which society itself cannot exist? Despite the negative influence of many aspects of rural life today, the rural family still retains considerable stability, although this stability varies, depend-

ing on the level of urbanization and orientation on agricultural production. Of the regions surveyed, the most urbanized is the Orlovsk region, and here we find the lowest level of family stability, although it is still considerably higher than in large cities. In the Orlovsk region, 33 percent of the women see their marriage as successful, and 35 per-

cent see it as fairly successful. Roughly one family in ten is seen as unsuccessful, and 3 percent of the women describe their marriage as a failure. The rest did not reply. Thus it appears that about 70 percent of the families in the Orlovsk region are stable.

94 M.G. Pankratova In Udmurtia, 93 percent of the women and 97 percent of the men describe their marriages as successful or quite successful. Only 7 percent of the women and 2 percent of the men consider their marriages unsuccessful, or a complete failure. The idea of divorce occurs often to

3 percent of the women, and 2 percent of them are seriously considering it. Among the men, only 1 percent often consider divorce. In northern Ossetia, where national traditions are still strong, 10 percent of the women and 5 percent of the men view their marriages as unsuccessful or not entirely successful, and 9 percent of the women and 4 percent of the men think often or seriously about divorce. Although the figures for those who consider their marriage unsuccessful are not very high, they seem to reflect the true state of affairs. We shall try to substantiate this view on the basis of an analysis of the data relating to other indicators of family life from the same regions. What difficulties are encountered most frequently by the family? If we turn to the figures, then, respondents say that arguments in the family occur most frequently over “trivia.” This indicates above all an insufficient level of culture in family relations. For a historically long period of time, rural marriage was virtually indissoluble. The need to

preserve the family economy, the fact that the spouses needed each other, and the force of law and custom, ruled out the very idea of divorce. Moreover, there was a clear division of duties within the family hierarchy, reducing the likelihood of dispute and open conflict. In such conditions, there was little need to concern oneself with preserving emotional ties, reciprocal attraction, and other similar factors that

cement modern marriages. The family economy naturally created mutual interests, while the joint labor of all the members of the family bound them together. Therefore disagreement between the spouses, and even serious differences of opinion, could not serve as a basis for divorce. All these factors created the habit of ignoring the psychological nature of one’s partner, which is very dangerous in marriage today.

Spouses quite often allow themselves to pour out their irritation on their partner, particularly when suffering from weariness or difficulties at work. However, the main cause of the breakup of marriages is the failure to appreciate the importance of the emotional aspect of modern family relations, and the need to preserve emotional bonds. Other causes of family conflicts named by respondents are the raising of children, the division of family duties, and drinking by the husband. It is interesting to note that all these causes are listed in roughly

the same order in all the regions. What is the actual source of these conflicts? Arguments over the raising of children assume a variety of forms. Children quite often become an instrument by means of which

The Rural Family Today and Tomorrow 95 the parents seek to resolve their own psychological problems. Objective factors also render a marriage more fragile with the addition of a child. For example, couples with children have a lower average annual income, and this indicator falls further the more children they have. In addition, the domestic workload increases, most of it falling on the woman. This provokes irritation on her part, and additional complaints against her husband. It is no coincidence that, together with conflicts over the children, there are conflicts over the division of family duties. In the rural family of today people believe that housework is not the responsibility of the woman alone. Even in northern Ossetia only

7 percent of the men believe that housework is exclusively the woman’s concern. In the other regions surveyed, both men and women rejected this view. It is commonly thought that the husband should do a share of the housework, though views may differ as to how much. In Udmurtia, for example, both men and women link this quite clearly to the amount of work done by the spouses outside the home. This is also a decisive factor in other regions, where one in five people believe that the wife should do the housework, but that her

husband should help her. Only in northern Ossetia is the number holding this view higher, at 30 percent. Yet how do things stand in fact? Most of the housework remains essentially the responsibility of the woman everywhere. Preparing meals is the exclusive task of 69

percent of the women of the Orlovsk region, 58 percent of the women in Udmurtia, but considerably less in northern Ossetia, at only

6 percent. In this last case, a major reason is that the family here is more traditional, and young couples often live together with the older generation. As a result, in 36 percent of the families, the cooking 1s done by the parents or other female relatives (61 percent of the young couples live with the mother of one of the spouses). The situation is similar regarding most other forms of housework. In

more than 70 percent of the families it is the women who wash the dishes, do the washing, ironing, and mending, tidy up, clean the windows, and wash the floors. From 20 percent to 35 percent of the husbands help in this work. However, shopping is a task that men fulfill more frequently. In northern Ossetia, 25 percent of the men do the shopping themselves, and about the same number do with their wives. More than half the men in the other regions do the shopping. Shopping is inked with the use of family income, and thus symbolizes authority within the family. It is perhaps for this reason that men are more willing

to perform this task. Men also often undertake the physically more demanding and traditional tasks. For example, cleaning the yard and fueling the stove is the work of the men in 74 percent of the families in

96 M.G. Pankratova the Orlovsk region, and in 77 percent of the families in Udmurtia. Only in northern Ossetia does this figure drop to 35 percent, again thanks to the help of parents and other relatives who do this work in 30 percent of the families. In many families the men willingly take care of the children. More than half the husbands in the Orlovsk region and around 70 percent in Udmurtia help look after small children. In northern Ossetia, however, the figure is only 10 percent, and there around 50 percent of the women fulfill this task by themselves. Playing games and other activ-

ities with small children is more frequently the task of men than of women in all the regions. A permanent duty for many men 1s that of taking the children to the nursery or kindergarten. Thus the men’s involvement in looking after and bringing up the children is the most common form of their inclusion in domestic affairs.

Work on the family allotment, which continues to play an important role in the family budget, is very important for the rural family. Here the men play a major role. In the Orlovsk region, 87 percent of the men take part in allotment work, 65 percent in looking after live-

stock, and 63 percent in preparing feed. In Udmurtia this kind of work is even more widespread among the men, reaching 90 percent, and allowing for the few families that do not have an allotment or livestock, it is safe to say that in the rural family the man, as a rule, plays a most active role in such forms of work.

Thus we can see that there is considerable family cooperation in stable rural families. In regions where the younger generation continues to live in close proximity to the older generation, the latter’s involvement in domestic work is still high, but always less significant than the joint work of the couple.

Conclusion In Russia today, many problems surface in the rural family. These include contemporary trends affecting many countries: the democratization of family relations, their greater fragility, the increase in divorce, the drop in the number of children. The rural family, however, is also affected by problems specific to families in Russia: the fact

that almost all women are employed outside the home, difficulties with housing, domestic, and consumer services, and a low level of health service. These problems, common to all families, are further ageravated by the particular problems of rural life. The rural family today suffers from instability, from family and con-

jugal disputes, and from conflict between the generations. Whether

The Rural Family Today and Tomorrow 97 we experience nostalgia for the past or dream of an industrialized and urbanized future, the old family system that took shape through the centuries is not.adapted to modern life, while new family systems are only just emerging, and their defects are obvious to any observer. Dif-

| ficulties in bringing up children, increasing numbers of conflicts and divorces, and abuse of alcohol are features of many families. Sober voices can sometimes be heard warning about the sharply declining birth rate. Equally disturbing is the considerable difference in birth rate in different regions. A great deal has been written in the press and in academic literature on the drain of young people away from the countryside. The result is a depressing demographic picture: deserted villages, houses boarded up, and old people living alone, with nowhere

even to buy bread. There is also another side to the coin. The young people leave the villages in order to gain a better education, acquire

more qualified work, and make better use of their potential. The deserted villages could revive if the abandoned houses were put to effective use, for example as country cottages, shops, etc. Family problems—conflict between spouses, divorce, difficulties in bringing up the children, even drunkenness—could be reduced con-

siderably by the shared family goals and tasks required on a family farm. Increased labor efficiency could create the material conditions necessary to improve the upbringing and education of the rural child. Raising the level of interest in agricultural labor could help strengthen the rural family, and a strengthened rural family could, in its turn, raise agricultural productivity. However, nothing happens by itself. Society must be aware of the forces acting upon it, and bring them under control, on the basis of knowledge and understanding.

Chapter 8

WOMEN AND RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS IN RUSSIA M. G. Kotovskaya

Ir it is difficult to describe individual religious consciousness, it is nearly impossible to describe the religious consciousness of a people, a

nation. This pertains especially to countries whose people belong to different creeds. However, even in pre-revolutionary Russia, where Orthodoxy enjoyed total government support, spiritual and religious leanings were confusing and contradictory. Two basic tendencies could

be observed in society. On one hand, there was a profound belief in

Jesus Christ and his teachings, demonstrated by famous Russian philosophers like L.P. Karsavin or S.N. Bulgakov. On the other hand, literary critic V.G. Belinsky described Russian society as a place where “there is still much superstition, but ... not a trace of religion.’”’ In all probability, both phenomena could be observed in Russian society at the turn of the century. Profound belief and disbelief affected the Russian soul equally, especially the soul of Russian women. At one extreme, for example, is Sofia Perovskaya, one of the first Russian women to choose the revolutionary path of struggle against autocracy. A number of intelligent young women followed her, replacing beliefin Christ with belief in the revolution and its martyrs. Some of these women chose an active role and consciously espoused battle against reli-

gious belief and the church. At the opposite extreme are women for whom faith was an essentially personal, deeply hidden affair of the soul and

conscience. Out of this milieu emerged trailblazers such as the Sisters of 1. Russkaya kritika (Russian Critiques) (Leningrad, 1973), p. 183.

Women and Religious Consciousness in Russia 99 Mercy, guided by a sense of love and compassion for their neighbors. They nursed the sick and injured without pay, and founded orphanages and homes for the aged. In the nineteenth century, such communities arose all over Russia, especially in Moscow and St. Petersburg. A striking example is provided by the Sisters of Mercy from the community of the

Pokrov Church in Rybstov, who worked with the most critically ill in city hospitals for the poor. These nuns also undertook the regular care of people in the Moscow Trinity Home for Incurable Illnesses. These communities lasted until 1923, when, by order of the Soviet government, the Sisters of Mercy were evicted. The last to remain were the almost ninety-year-old Mother Antonia and her two co-workers. Deprived of provision cards and all civil nghts, they were forced to beg for alms outside their own church. No less tragic was the fate of many Sisters of the Iberian community, founded in 1869 under the auspices of the Russian Society of the Red Cross. ‘The nuns of this community displayed exemplary courage and mercy in times of war and peace. They fought the terrible cholera and plague epidemics that broke out in remote regions of Russia at the end of the nineteenth century. It was they who nursed back to health the injured, both Whites and Reds, in the frontline hospitals during the Civil War. Workers injured during the uprising

, in Moscow in 1917 were brought to their convent. However, in 1920, the Soviet government closed down this community. The hospitalcathedral of the Iberian Mother of God was given to a local hospital, which converted it into a warehouse. Only in 1988 was it returned to the church. Now a golden cross.shines again over its cupola. The Marfo-Mariinskaya Cloister was the last community of the Sisters of Mercy founded in Moscow before the revolution, and its history is of particular. interest. The community was established by Great Princess

Elizaveta Fedorovna, widow of Moscow’s governor-general, Great Prince Sergei Alexandrovich, who was killed in 1905 by the social revolutionary E. Kolyaev. Elizaveta Fedorovna, a strong believer in Christ, asked that the killer of her beloved husband not be punished, and for the

rest of her life she devoted herself with great zeal to helping those in poverty and distress. The Sisters of Mercy of this community helped the poorest regions of Moscow. They, along with one of the best hospitals of the time, built an excellent orphanage. The Sisters of Mercy cared for the

sick and the wounded on the front lines of the First World War. The community survived until 1928. On 3 Apnil of that year the repressions began. Some of the nuns were imprisoned while others were exiled to Central Asia, where many died from starvation or ended up in Stalinist prison camps. Elizaveta Fedorovna, together with two other sisters, was banished first to Perm, and then to the small Urals town of Alapayevsk.

100 M G. Kotovskaya In July 1918 she, along with five members of the Romanoff family and the nun-reclusive Varvara Yakovleva, whom she refused to leave, was

shot. In 1990, the Russian Orthodox Church and people of Moscow unveiled a monument to Elizaveta Fedorovna, a reminder of the hundreds of unknown, ordinary Russian women who perished for their beliefs. It was they who, during the active persecution of religious belief,

were able to preserve religious faith in their country. Thanks to these women, Russia is now experiencing a spiritual and religious renaissance. Today the majority of ardent believers are women. Many of them are setting up new religious communities, both Orthodox and non-Orthodox. Information is now available about the number of religious societies registered in the Soviet Union as of 1 January 1991, and listed in reports

by the deputy chairman of the Council on Religious Affairs under the former USSR Council of Ministers, M.A. Ivolgin? (see Table 8.1). Table 8.1

Denominations 1986 1988 1991

Russian Orthodox 6,745 6,740 10,267

Georgian Orthodox 52 591,465 297 Roman Catholic 1,071 1,079 Lutheran 589 600 657

Armenian Apostolic 33 3397 62 Reformed 86 86

Methodist 15 15 15 Old Believers’ 338 340 379 Muslims 394 402 1,602

Judaists 91 91 114 Buddhists 2 2 16 Christian Evangelical Believers 248 281 704 Seventh Day Adventists 347 37149 501 Molokans 45 44 Mennonites 54— 55 21 49 Krishnas —

Evangelical Christian-Baptists 2,316 2,325 2,249

Ukrainian Orthodox — — 811 Ukrainian Greek-Catholic (Uniate) — | — 1,912 Other religious groups 1 1 14 TOTAL 12,427 12,524 21,284

As we can see from this list, the Soviet Union experienced from 1986 onward regular growth in religious organizations of different denominations and creeds. During this period, the former republics of the Soviet Union, which were now sovereign states, passed a series of laws putting relations between the church and the state on a legal 2. M.A. Ivolgin, “The Last Interview,” Nauka i religiya, no. 1 (1992), p. 7.

Women and Religious Consciousness in Russia _ 101 basis. Now, that social institutions are being democratized and religious communities have the opportunity and right to take part in the political life of the country and to propagate their views, we should take particular note of the role of women in the campaign to abolish all the restrictions from the legislation of 1929, which seriously impeded religious organizations and societies.

Today parishioners are helping with the program by which the government is returning confiscated buildings to the church. In 1991, more than 3,000 buildings were returned to the church. In Moscow,

for example, masterpieces of Russian architecture such as the St. Danilov Monastery and many cathedrals in the Moscow Kremlin began to function as churches again. There is increasing support for the restoration of destroyed and desecrated churches. Hundreds of believers, primarily women, work without pay every Saturday and Sunday to clean and restore church buildings. Through the labors of nuns, once-glorious Russian convents are rising from the ruins. The transfer of buildings to the church is not always, however, a peaceful process. Sometimes there are brutal clashes between representatives of different communities, and women do not always play a peacemaking role in such conflicts. Cases of religious conflicts are occurring more frequently. And this is not wholly unexpected. As a rule, religious

rebellion in the former Soviet Union took place against the backsround of a sharp rise in nationalist sentiment. A specific feature of religious consciousness during these years was its fusion with nation-

alist movements. This occurred primarily in places where a heavy- } handed bureaucracy prevented religious communities from pursuing

- their activities. In the Baltic states, where the Roman Catholic and Lutheran Churches held stable positions in society even before pere_ stroika, a rising national sentiment was not accompanied by the emersence of new religious communities. In contrast, from 1986 to 1991

the number of Muslim communities increased by four times. The Georgian Orthodox Church increased six-fold, and Buddhist communities eight-fold. The issue of the involvement of different religious

communities and separate groups of believers, including women, in national and sometimes nationalistic movements, is still poorly studied. The revival of interest in the religious culture of one’s people is also revealed in the rapid growth of religious studies organizations. Table 8.2 contains statistics on the number of higher, middle, and specialized religious studies institutions and the number of students registered in the Soviet Union as of 1 January 1991.° 3. Ibid.

102 M.G. Kotovskaya # of#fcorrespondence ! With of

Table 8.2 — Religious Associations and Their Educational Institutions

1986 institutions students students

academies 23 187 786 seminaries 1732 — school — — —

Russian Orthodox

academies —— — seminaries— 1 32 seminaries 2 240 — seminaries 2 120 —

Georgian Orthodox

Roman Catholic Lutheran

academies seminaries 11 42 —— — schools — — — institutes —— medresye — 2 116 —

Armenian Apostolic

Judaists schools — — — Old Believers’

Muslims

elementary schools 1 9 —

Buddhists

seminaries 1 133 —

Evangelical Christian-Baptists

1988 Russian Orthodox

academies 2 1,935 209 905 seminaries 3 — school — — —

academies — —— — seminaries 1 50

Georgian Orthodox

seminaries 2 230 — seminaries 2 120 —

Roman Catholic Lutheran

academies 11 53 seminaries —— — schools — — — institutes —— medresye — 2 133 —

Armenian Apostolic Old Believers’

Muslims

elementary Buddhists . schools 1 9 —

Judaists

schools — — — seminaries 1 125 — -

Evangelical Christian-Baptists

Women and Religious Consciousness in Russia 103 Table 8.2 — (continued)

# # With

ofstudents of correspondence 1991 institutions students

academies 21,968 430 224 seminaries 7 697 school 12 200 — Georgian Orthodox academies11113 37 — seminaries — seminaries 4 343 — seminaries 2 155 —

Russian Orthodox

Roman Catholic Lutheran

academies 1 80 — seminaries 1 — —, Old Believers’ schools 2 22 — institutes medresye 56 414 510 — —

Armenian Apostolic

Muslims

elementary Buddhists . schools 1 3 —

Judaists |

schools 1 30 — seminaries 6 332 —

Evangelical Christian- Baptists

A large number of religious educational institutions belong to the Russian Orthodox Church, and the overwhelming majority of students in these institutions are men. Their mothers no longer object to such a choice, but in fact actively encourage the pursuit of a religious vocation. It is noteworthy that in many cases those who adopt the religious life have mothers who actively participate in charitable and educational church activities. The funds they raised were used to create medical,

health, cultural, and educational centers in and around Moscow, in Novosibirsk and other regions of Russia. A large number of sectarian communities and also various associations of non-Christian groups such as Krishna followers, Buddhists,

Yogis, and so on are now active in former republics of the Soviet Union. Taken overall, the spiritual spectrum of life in Russia is complex

and multi-faceted. Objective research requires that we expand our understanding of religious consciousness beyond the strict confines of church-based belief in order to include other, essentially religious forms of individual consciousness. But the study of deeply submerged forms of noninstitutionalized religious belief is extraordinarily complex. We have

104 M.G. Kotovskaya no research of this type. This is because until recently research into topics related to religious belief was extremely difficult in Russia. Among

the scholars who made a genuine contribution to the investigation of the complex question of religious consciousness are mainly people from

the Institute of Sociological Research and the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In 1987 and 1988, researchers at these institutes conducted studies in Moscow and in

the Kemerovo region of Russia. The Moscow survey, conducted in 1987, included 1,600 respondents chosen at random from the electoral list of the city’s executive committees. The results of this research reflect the objective situation in Russia in 1987. ' The questionnaire presupposed four possible types of answers: (1) I believe, (2) I don’t know, (3) I am indifferent, I don’t believe, 4) It 1s necessary to actively oppose religion. The resulting data showed that:

9.3 percent were believers; 11.1 percent were unsure; 70.5 percent were indifferent; and 9.1 percent were active atheists. In this particular case we can include the category “don’t know” within the group “religious population.” This is justified for the following reasons: (1) Fear among some believers of openly revealing their own convictions because of possible negative consequences at work and harassment by the KGB, and (2) people involved in non-traditional forms of religious belief include themselves in the “don’t know” category. These are primarily followers of mystical cults, yoga, tantric, etc. The social and

professional composition of this group reveals that they are mainly , urban intellectuals and young students. Women prove to be especially susceptible to such types of religious consciousness. According to the data of the 1987 poll, the religious population of the capital is three-

fourths female. .

Among women orthodox believers who regularly attend services and obey church rulings the oldest age group, that is, people over sixty, is the largest at 40 percent of the religious population. Some of them—usually the poorly educated—mix pagan prejudices and superstitions with traditional orthodoxy. Women of thirty to forty years of

age constitute the group with the lowest percentage of orthodox believers. In this age group a vague orthodoxy usually becomes intertwined with other forms of religious consciousness, such as mysticism and occultism. In Moscow a large percentage of women believers of

both the over-sixty and the thirty-to-forty age groups have higher education. On the basis of a comparative analysis of the data obtained from a number of research projects, in 1987 and 1988 the percentage of believers among the Russian population was between 20 percent and 23 percent, and the percentage of convinced atheists was between

Women and Religious Consciousness in Russia a 105 8 percent and 9 percent. The percentage of doubters outside the main institutionalized religions is around 70 percent. Looking specifically at the distribution of religious belief in terms of age and gender, the 1987 Moscow survey shows distinct patterns,‘ as illustrated in Table 8.3. Table 8.3 — (in percentages)

Under Over

Men Women 30 30-40 | 40-50 50-60 60

Believes 558.1 2.211.1 5.2 15.7 9.8 20.5 Vascillates5.1 6.312 14 .7.0 13.2

Indifferent 78.3 66 78.9 79.4 74.7 65.1 58.5 Convinced

atheist 10.3 8 8.6 10.3 9.0 9.4 57.8

As noted earlier, most believers are women. Further, the level of

religiousness among young working people is higher than among i: those of retirement age. To form an objective picture of processes operating among women believers of different ages, it is necessary to

analyze the data in terms of social and professional roles. The data from the Moscow poll reveals a relatively high percentage of believ- _ ers, that is, 18.2 percent among people with a higher education. But there is a wide variety of religious conceptions and beliefs among members of this group, from the churchgoer to the Zen Buddhist and

the Krishna follower. For some members of this group, including women, religion is merely a superficial acquaintance with dogmas and

rites. V.G. Nemirovksy, who carried out an investigation among young intellectuals in Krasnoyarsk, wrote, “Only 3.6 and 3.2 percent of respondents, respectively, believe in traditional religious values such as the immortal soul and divine revelation, while 19.8 and 15.3 percent, respectively, believe in clairvoyants and sorceresses who can cast the evil eye on someone.”? Women are more prone than men to believe in mysticism.

The desire to discover the meaning of life, to understand one’s individual destiny and that of the nation in general, is a characteristic

of the Russian mentality. As far back as 1905 M.O. Gershenzon wrote: “The people are searching for exclusively practical knowledge, and of two kinds specifically: the lower, technical kind, including edu4. The table was drawn up by A.V. Anikin, a research fellow of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences on the basis of a Moscow poll of 1978. See A.V. Anikin, “On the Question of Modern Russian Religious Consciousness,” Dukhovnaya Kultura i etnicheskoye samosoznaniye (Spiritual Culture and Ethnic Self-Awareness) (Moscow, 1991).

5. Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya, No. 4, 1987, pp. 70-75.

106 M.G. Kotovskaya cation, and the superior, metaphysical kind, which explains the meaning of life and gives one the strength to live.”®

Women are particularly inclined to seek spiritual knowledge. Today, women’s interest in the deepest levels of the psyche is especially strong. In their intuitional abilities women are far ahead of the male sex, and therefore it is no coincidence that the study of women’s subconsciousness attracted such eminent psychologists and psychiatrists as K. Jung, S. Freud, E. Fromm, T. Parsons, O. Wininger, P. Ganushkin and others. ‘The predominance of emotional and sensitive personalities is more pronounced among women than among men. Analysis of the latest statistical data from a new but highly promising branch of psychology—socionics—shows that logical psychotypes predominate among men, while emotional, or ethical types, as they are called by Augira Augustinavichute, prevail among women. The greater sensitivity of women was well known during antiquity and the Middle Ages. Pythians and vestal virgins left their mark on the

development of world civilizations. In later periods, a number of women’s names became famous in the history of certain churches. In our time, it is women who have headed the movement to restore the destroyed churches. This process often is considered to be a sign of

the rebirth of deep interest in spiritual national culture in general. Among women there is great interest in national history, including religious history, and in the restoration of the noblest ethical norms and rules of social behavior. A related phenomenon is the joint struggle by women and clergy to open Sunday schools. Usually it is mothers who

take the children to school. When asked why, most responded that they wanted to instill moral values in their children. In an atheist country where for over seventy years ideology exerted harsh pressure on the private lives of citizens, a passion for religious education has become to a certain extent a protest against the state. Another contributing factor is that the system of popular education totally neglected historical and religious training. However, along with convinced believers who seek

to give their children a fundamental moral training, there are parents who have simply succumbed to the fashion of the moment and who take their children to Sunday school to speed their general development, but who care little about the faith of their children. In such cases _ this external devotion to religious traditions and practices has nothing in common with true faith. Some interesting data relating to this was obtained during the celebrations in 1988 to mark the millennium of the Baptism of Rus. In the period following the Pomestny Sobor in 1971 6. M.O. Gershenzon, “The Creative Self-Cognition,” Vekhi (Moscow, 1909), p. 86.

Women and Religious Consciousness in Russia 107 there were 30 million baptisms in orthodox churches. According to the priests, many of the parents bringing their children for baptism did not go to church themselves.’

Wearing religious symbols or other tokens of religious belief has

become fashionable among young people. The development of national consciousness often ends in the “fashion of orthodoxy,” even

though the individual may remain spiritually unconnected to the church. Concessions to religion made by certain representatives of the

new state authorities are explained by personal political ambitions rather than by the stirrings of religious consciousness. The tendency to transform support for the church into a badge of honor for the ruling power seems as dangerous for the church as for the state. New models of a moral and religious outlook are only just beginning to take shape in Russian society. These include, for example, the endeavors undertaken by Moscow women believers, who have volunteered to work without pay in the psychiatric and surgical wards of Moscow city hospitals that are suffering from a shortage of medical staff. Providing compassionate aid for sick and needy people is also the

main aim behind the recent revival of the Martha and Mary nursing community attached to the parish church of the Icon of the Mother

of Joy to Mourners. | The status of religious practice that is developing now in several autonomous republics has its own particular and distinctive features. In

certain regions of Siberia, for example among the Ob Usgrians, the Samoyedic peoples, the Paleoasiatics of Northeastern Siberia, the Evenks and Tungus-Manchu of the Lower Amur, traditional beliefs, including shamanism, as well as Christianity are again finding a resurgence. In spite of the seemingly varied rites and customs of the Siberian peoples, there is a whole complex of ideas on individual destiny and on the causes of sickness and death. The most widespread concept is the idea that sickness is caused by a spirit entering a person’s body, bringing sickness or kidnapping the person’s soul. Since spirits can feed on animals as well as people, the simplest way to avoid attack is to offer up an animal sacrifice to the spirits. The shaman determines the type of sacrificial animal and the spirit to which it must be sacrificed. The shaman is expected to expel the spirit from the sick person’s

body, or to return the previously kidnapped soul. In order to prevent harmful spirits from entering the house, it is filled with the smoke of heather and fir trees; a bear’s skull should be displayed; and a bear’s claws and teeth should be fastened to the children’s cradle. 7. Na puti k svobode sovesti, p. 220.

108 M.G. Kotovskaya The well-being of the family is closely linked with home and hearth, and adherence to certain rules. Cult objects, and protective family talismans, are kept in special storehouses. The role of women as guardians of home and family is especially strong among the northern peoples. Every grown woman must know and fulfill simple rites centered on winning over the spirits of the home, and banishing illness. In cases of serious illness and unfortunate circumstances, they call upon a

shaman. These can be either women or men. Curing someone often demands offering a victim to the evil spirits. The ritual of sacrifice is enacted at sunset. A deer is placed with its head to the west, the direction whence the evil spirits come. During the sacrifice, the shaman leads the ritual in the sick person’s tent. He or she sings and uses spe- | cial dance and incantations while striking the sacred tambourine. The process of banishing the sickness sometimes continues for many hours. The shaman’s battle with the evil spirits reduces him or her to total exhaustion. After especially difficult battles, the shaman falls into unconsciousness for several hours. Shamans serve as guardians for newborn infants. Beads and all kinds of knots become talismans of security only with the help of a shaman. Shamans also play an important role in hunting rituals. For example,

the Khanty believe that the outcome of hunting and fishing depends on spirits, the masters of the home, forests, and water. Before begin-

ning a hunt, they offer a sacrifice to these spirits. The shaman is believed to be selected from birth by the spirits. In Siberia, it is believed that shamans are specially marked from the beginning of child-

hood. There is ethnographic proof that before becoming a shaman people contract the shaman sickness, as it is known. The symptoms of

this condition resemble several different psychological disorders. Clearly, a type of personality change occurs, and serves as an adaptation for journeys to other realities, and for existence in several realities at once. The sickness passes as the future shaman consciously accepts this gift. After this, follows years of training with another shaman, and only after this will the new shaman begin to practice. Every shaman has his or her own guardian, a defender against evil spirits. For some, this is the sacred tambourine. One famous shaman always brought with her to Moscow a huge tambourine from which she was never separated, not even for an hour. Siberian shamanism is

now being studied by ethnographers, psychologists, and doctors. However, many mysterious aspects of this phenomenon remain elusive, awaiting future researchers. Mahayana Buddhism (or “the big chariot,” the broad-path journey of salvation) has spread along with shamanism in several regions of

Women and Religious Consciousness in Russia 109 Siberia, where it is represented mainly by the gelugpa school. This type

of Buddhism exists in the Buryatia, Tuva, Chita and Irkutsk regions, and in Kalmykia. The language of worship in the temples is Tibetan. There are six main yearly holidays (in Buryatia they are called hurals). Men and women take part equally in these festivals. Many students of

Buddhism note that faith is especially strong among women. The famous Buryatian writer Svetlana Gyrylova expresses a typical sentiment: “If God himself were to ask me “Who on the earth do you absolutely believe?’ I would answer, putting my hand on my heart, ‘The Dalai Lama. I believe every word from the Dalai Lama like I believe myself.’”® Similar opinions are characteristic of young Buryatian women. It is a great honor for them to prepare their sons for the spiritual service of Buddha. The competition to enter the theological schools where future lamas study was very strong this year. One hun-

dred and thirty aspiring monks from Buryatia, Kalmykia, Tuva, and Moscow came to Ivolga Datsan (near the city of Ulan Ude), the main Buddhist monastery in Russia; many boys came to the monastery with their mothers and even grandmothers. It is not only in Buryatia or in Kalmykia, however, that mothers support their children in their decisions to begin upon a spiritual religious ascent. In Tatarstan, for example, where Islam. is at its height, mosque schools, where the teachings of the Koran are studied in depth, are always filled. The imam (priest) enjoys considerable authority. The fundamentalist tradition of Islam is once again moving into the public and family spheres.

It is still difficult to judge what Islam holds for women. On one hand, Islam supports the creation of a strong family with many children. It teaches respect for parents and elders. It calls upon husbands to.

respect and care for their wives. On the other hand, many Muslims believe that a woman’s place is in the home. It 1s not clear whether women want to give up their educations and jobs and retreat behind the walls of their houses. Will young women follow certain Islamic tenets which intrude into their personal lives (for example, the ban on the use of contraceptives and abortions)? It is still too early to say. It should be noted that now the rise of Islam, as that of other religious movements in Russia, is linked with an upsurge in national sentiment and pride in one’s people and national culture. The role of women in this process is enormous.

8. S. Gyrylova (Altan Gerel), “Dalai-Lama,” Nauka i religiya, no. 11 (1991), p. 11.

Chapter 9

WOMEN IN THE ARTS Olga Kuchkina

Large, hypnotic eyes opened wide, majestic movement across the stage, and amazingly eloquent hands; hands which have evoked our admiration for decades, arms spreading themselves like wings, cutting through the air, the fluttering in agitation, weakening, till their movement resembles a broken branch. They tremble, helpless, drooping,

life ebbing out of them forever. ... On that night the audience at the Bolshoi theater held its breath, and then shook with applause. Maiya Plisetskaya, the prima ballerina of the Bolshoi, had dedicated her “Dying Swan” to the great singer and famous emigré Galina Vishnevskaya. Having once vowed never again to cross the threshold of the Bolshoi, which had offended her with its slavish obedience to demands of the authorities, Vishnevskaya was now sitting in one of the

theater boxes and receiving congratulatory telegrams from the crowned heads of Europe as she watched the performances given in her honor by the stars of the Russian stage. A stunning event had hap- | pened: the Bolshoi theater had apologized. The Bolshoi asked Galina Vishnevskaya to forgive, and she did. Two Russian miracles, two destinies, and both marked by drama. The famous singer had been expelled from the country because she and her husband, Mstislav Rostropovich, had offered living space in their country house to the dissident writer Alexandr Solzhenitsin. ‘The prima

ballerina had been, in effect, deprived of the opportunity to work in her native land. Nor does it make any difference that in one case it was the authorities themselves who took the decision, and that in the other the cause was jealousy and egoism on the part of the theater management. The result was the same: Galina Vishnevskaya lives in France,

and Maiya Plisetskaya lives in Italy. Fortunately, nowadays no one is cut

off from Russian culture simply because he or she lives and works abroad. On the contrary, this sometimes evokes a wave of special sympathy, as in the case of Natalya Makarova. After having been absent for twenty years from Leningrad’s Kirov theater, the latter returned, and the public all but carried her in its arms. She came out onto the stage, and the audience rose to its feet, many with tears in their eyes. Artists themselves eloquently describe their feelings in exile. Karsavina wrote: “It is now three years since I took up permanent residence in France, and about five years since I lost contact with St. Petersburg.

How I miss home ... Send me in your letter some mountain ash leaves ... I want to smell my native, distant, dear Petersburg.”” The Soviet authorities did not welcome anything that did not fit the norm. From their point of view, this was understandable: talent gives independence, and that was not tolerable in the Soviet Union, where everyone must be dependent. From the point of view of state policy, there also were

good intentions, including good intentions that were translated into practice. However, the results also brought the exact opposite, leading to the impoverishment and distortion of culture, and also to many personal and social tragedies. It is more humane and more accurate to illustrate this problem through individuals and their sentiments. Marina Tsvetayeva, writing in exile, uses the image of the beloved

Russian rowan-tree: Homesickness! It’s pure vanity Of vanities, as ’ve long known. I feel it’s all the same to me Just where I will live all alone

There come seven more stanzas, and then the last: All homes are alien, temples void, All things are much the same to me.

But if a bush stand by the road, ) | And if it is a rowan-tree ...

| This unfinished sentence is comprehensible even without a completion. The unstated moves the heart. Perhaps only Vladimir Nabokov’s exclamation, “Let me go, I beg you! ...” achieved such a powerful expression of pain in the relentless grip of his native land. Public officials can be harsh; the people ruled by these authorities can be helpless, either unwilling or unable to oppose the state. However, the public loves its great performers. Love is a quality that imbues all the Russian arts, and it is a quality that women in particular bring to art. It is a fact of Russian history that

112 . Olga Kuchkina the actress has been either persecuted or adulated. The profession of acting was long considered shameful, almost comparable to prostitution. Indeed, the Russian woman artist is a phenomenon in itself, and something of a mystery. Under conditions of perennial inequality and a specific form of oppression, how did an entire constellation of talented women become the pride and fame of Russian culture? The well-known Russian playwright Alexander Ostrovsky, who created his own theatrical school, entrusted the best women’s roles in his plays to Paulina Strepetova, a small, quite unlovely and curious crea-

ture who underwent a transformation on the stage. “As an inborn talent, this is a rare phenomenon,” Ostrovsky wrote of her. “The pathos of her acting lies in powerful passions.” The power of passion opposing

Oppression is uniquely Russian. |

The theme of the woman endowed with noble moral qualities, capable of selfless love and sacrifice, and rejected by a dogmatic society or by the man she loves, who slavishly accepts the norms of that society, has always been among the main themes in Russian literature and art. This theme has been conveyed by various actresses, each using her own expressive means: the amazing Maria Yermolova, the gentle Vera Komissarzhevskaya, the tragic Alisa Koonen, the sweet soprano Antonina Nezhdanova, the rich contralto Lidrya Obukhova, in ballet the pas-

sionate Anna Pavlova, the exceptionally graceful Tamara Karsavina, and the perfect Galina Ulanova. In Ostrovsky and Chekhov, Glinka and Tchaikovsky, what is most precious and important is conveyed by female talent. Similar images were chosen from foreign repertoires: Joan of Arc, Madame Bovary, the images of Shakespeare, Marguerita in Faust, Giselle. The actor’s work is evanascent. It is only 1n this century

| that we have the means to make a permanent visual record. Before that, the art of the actor was born and then died each night, and could not be preserved and transmitted to coming generations except in descriptions. “The art of Pavlova was amazing; she gave enormous pleasure to everyone who had the good fortune to see her,” we read in the memoirs of the choreographer Mikhail Fokin. A year before she died, Yermolova received a letter from an admirer: “Once the artist leaves the stage, he is soon forgotten. Such 1s the law

of nature. Therefore I have decided to write these lines. Your great talent will be remembered not only by people of middle age, but also by the majority of the young. I am twenty-four years old, and for me your name is sacred. I shall not write my surname, for it is unlikely that

you will remember it, and others may not understand these sincere words as I intend them. Your portrait hangs on my wall, and I take it with me on almost all my trips. You, dear, great Maria Nikolayevna,

Women in the Arts oo 113 are that fire for which everyone should strive both on the stage, and in life itself. ... You are the ideal of art, the ideal of humanity, sacred fire.” It has always been the reader, the listener, the spectator, who helped the Russian artist unleash his amazing ability to grasp all the nuances of the author, to surrender simply and completely to the artistic image, and to communicate the kernel of the author’s message, transmitted heart to heart. “The Silver Age” which produced Marina Tsvetayeva and Anna Akhmatova changed the role of women in the arts, which up to then had been the role of performer rather than of author. This period liberated women, bringing into their lives a special level of freedom unknown in the “Golden Age” of the nineteenth century. Endowed with greater intuition than men, women also reacted to the freedom of the twentieth century more intensely, and took a greater stride forward. The new century opened up for her the doors to poetry, and to painting, which previously had been firmly closed. Alexandra Serebryakova, and Natalya Goncharova, the pride of Russia, immediately pursued this greater freedom, and were expelled. Among historians and journalists, democrats and their opponents, administrators and ordinary citizens, the arguments over Russia’s past continue. Was the October revolution of 1917 an imposed turn of events, or the inevitable outcome of circumstances? When was good replaced by bad? At what point came the fatal moment when history went the wrong way? In fact, people seeking these answers should examine not the last 70 years, but the last 500 years. Systems may be siven different names, but names are merely labels. The essence of life, with or without a label, changes more slowly than some might wish. This is very true about the essence of Russian life, whose virtues and

vices are deeply rooted. Though subjected to new forms, new influences, progress, and civilization, the roots remain, and this is especially true of the nature of relations between the Russian individual and his society, between the artist and the authorities. These relations were as . complex and tangled under the Soviet regime as they had been under the Tsarist regime, and as they were, moreover, in respectable bourgeois Europe. The differences lay in the nuances. Europe destroyed Van Gogh and Gauguin in its way, as the Soviet regime destroyed Zinaida Gippius and Marina Tsvetayeva in its way. Marina returned to rowan-tree homeland, and her life ended at the end of a rope in the grimy and hungry little wartime town of Elabuga. - Gippius died as a poetess while living in exile. After a brilliant begin-

ning, Anna Akhamtova fell silent. Her husband, the famous poet Nikolai Gumilyov, was shot, her son, Lev Gumilyov, a prominent

114 Olga Kuchkina scholar, was arrested and imprisoned. When, having at last overcome imposed and painful silence, Akhmatova again found her voice, she was struck down with a “Resolution of the Central Committee,” one of those lawless party decrees which regulated the life of the entire

country and every branch of its economy. A Resolution placed Dmitry Shostakovich, Mikhail Zoshchenko, and Anna Akhmatova on a par with a branch of the economy, or perhaps even with the whole country. Indeed, that had perhaps a certain validity. It is foolish, or

more accurately, criminal to strip an artist in public. Uneducated, uncultured party functionaries attempted to explain to artists whose stature they would never attain how they should or should not express their creativity. Moreover, anything that was criticized by the authorities was immediately prohibited, removed from circulation, neither

published nor performed. In addition to this, the very living conditions of the individual were restricted to the extreme. A word that Akhmatova had once used in her verse, which she alone had ventured to use, was returned to her by Zhdanov as a term of state accusation: “harlot.” No one troubled to consider that what is permissible in the frank self-examination of the fearless poet is not permissible in the lansuage of a state official of any rank, drawing his own speculative and shameless conclusions. No one troubled to consider that the one they were referring to in such terms was a woman—although, perhaps, this point reveals a bitter but sublime truth: a poetic talent such as that pos-

sessed by Akhmatova eliminates any distinction between poet and poetess. The resolution that abrogated this distinction toward those it named also unwittingly contained this admission.

Today, when the actress Alla Demidova reads the lines from Akhamtova’s The Sentence: Now the stone-hard word has fallen On my deadened, barely heaving breast. I was ready, though, I’d known it all,

( I shall cope with this as with the rest. There’s so much that I have to get done:

I must kill my memory quite dead, | I must turn my brittle heart to stone, I must learn to live, to look ahead. ...

the shaken audience bows its head not only before the brilliant poet, but before the moral exploit of a woman who indeed learned to live again, even though her nature doomed her to live as if stripped of her skin.

The women of Russia, those who were sent to prison and those who were not, those who waited for their husbands and children to return from the camps, and those whose husbands and children did not

Women in the Arts 115 return, described this portion of their life in piercing prose that long remained Samizdat, reaching the broad public only quite recently. These include Second Prose by Nadezhda Mandelstam, wife of the fine

Russian poet Osip Mandelstam, who died in one of Stalin’s camps, ' and Steep Descent by Yevgeniya Ginsburg, mother of the well-known writer Vasilyi Aksenov, who managed to secure release from prison. ...

Here is the equality so proclaimed—of course, in quite a different sense—by Soviet propaganda. It would not be true, however, to say that all Soviet women artists lived either in emigration or in the silence imposed by their semi-legal status. There are many examples ofa quite different and materially successful life. Thanks to their compromising? Sometimes. Nothing can

ever be reduced to mere black and white. In reality things are more complex. Alla Demidova, who played the role of Olga in the film Daytime Stars by Igor Talankin, a role based on the poetess Olga Berggolts, never compromised her art, yet nonetheless she enjoyed an outstanding and happy career as an actress. Her work made it possible to talk about Olga. Even that was a thaw. Soviet history is interspersed with periods of thaw, stagnation, and perestroika, indicating the climate of life.

Having lived through a drama common to many—her husband, the poet Boris Kornilov, was also declared an enemy of the people— Olga Berggolts came back to life at the beginning of the war because she realized that in these new and fatal circumstances the country needed her. A Leningrader herself, she had her own radio program for

Leningraders. Olga Berggolts’s radio broadcasts, together with the music of Dmitry Shostakovich under the noble baton of conductor Evgenyi Mravinsky, became one of the legends of the blockade, helping the city to survive 900 days of starvation, cold, and daily death. Everyone thought that the war and victory might put an end to Stalinism, that the people who had rescued the country from an invading enemy, and Europe from Nazism and Stalin from humiliating defeat had earned a life of dignity and justice. But nothing of the kind happened. After the war there were new repressions, new attacks on the © human right to dispose of one’s own life and thoughts. Olga Berggolts

headed into a future of alcoholism, rare bursts of poetic creativity, loneliness, and death. Such sad stories, however, were annulled by the will of Soviet leaders and their various special services and servants. Official reality had no place in it for personal and social tragedy. The fanfare of success and achievement drowned out the voice of the suffering individual. Even death, apparently, was an impropriety. While recognizing it as a physiological fact of life, death was refused recognition as the last act in a

116 Olga Kuchkina play performed on the eternal stage of life. The film Daytime Stars and the role played by Alla Demidova were a muffled attempt to lift the veil of official hypocrisy that had lain over the biography of Olga Berggolts.

The real and vibrant Bella Akhmadulina reached the reader with other poets of the thaw: Andrei Voznesensky, Evgeny Yevtushenko, Robert Rozhdestvensky. It was Bella who combined the need for a poetry read aloud to the public with a poetry whose content is profoundly intimate, lyrical, and philosophic. It is not surprising that

Americans, French, Italians, while not understanding Russian, are prepared to listen, as if hypnotized, to her verse. How could such delicate,

| wholly apolitical feminine lyricism be found unacceptable by the authorities? For the same reason as ever: its sense of truly unrestricted

- internal freedom. It is no coincidence that Bella, virtually the only Soviet visitor accepted by Vladimir Nabokov, simply decided to go to

see him, and went, regardless of the terrified KGB official who, of course, then hurried to put in his report. It was also Bella who was the

first to meet Iosif Brodsky, probably with the same consequences, since both were banned in the Soviet Union. The suspicions of the authorities proved to be justified when Akhmadulina contributed verse to the magazine Metropol, and the authorities immediately dis-

rupted the printing of the unwelcome magazine. It is fashionable nowadays among the younger generation to view with condescension,

and even irony, the sixtiers who paved the way for those who followed them. Akhmadulina, who essentially belongs to the generation of the sixties, invariably remains outside the line of critical fire. Her reputation as a person and as a poet lies beyond reproach. Any real appreciation of the position of talented women in Russia today, achieving success only at the cost of enormous effort, requires at least one portrait, of the singer Yelena Kamburova. In her own words she is “a long-distance runner.” She is also an anti-star. For many years she has held acting titles and awards, but titles as such mean little to her.

It is other things that matter to her, above all singing. In any other country she would undoubtedly have become a source of national pride, like France’s Edith Piaff; for example. Whoever has heard and appreciated her voice will call her a diamond among the many imita-

tion jewels of the concert stage. She is an actress, an entertainer, a clown, a phenomenon of Russian cultural life. The history and character of Kamburova the singer fuse with the character and history of the people. It is as if the songs she sings are born of her own inner nature, her artistic gift and the effort of self-knowledge. Kamburova began her career as a dramatic actress after graduating from the circus school and the State Institute of Dramatic Art. Therefore, the text of the song is,

Women in the Arts oe 117 for her, of exceptional importance. The image she creates on the stage srows out of the poetic content, and is continued and shaped by the music, the style, the intonation. Kamburova has not attempted to create any public image. She 1s natural, with her own particular grace. The road she traveled was the road to liberation, to the acquisition of complete and all-powerful freedom. When she was asked, “Did liberation come suddenly, like inspiration?” She replied, “No. It came like recov-

ering from an illness. It was a slow process, and the audience helped me. I see them as my equals and partners at a concert. Long ago I imag-

ined my ideal listener, and I sing for him. In fact, many proved even better, of even greater perception. For many years, thanks to officialdom, I had the most dreadful audiences. To this day I feel terribly sorry for them. The circumstances of life had made them what they were, and they themselves had done nothing to know anything more than two plus two equals four.” For all their weight of meaning, the words sung by Kamburova are comprehensible to the Englishman and the Frenchman, the Spaniard and the German. Her musicality and expressiveness know no boundaries. Yet she has not been exported. The radio and television have generously broadcast verbal and musical rubbish, impoverishing the public, and have rejected what might have enriched it. Only recently

has the situation begun to change slightly. Of those who were and continue to be responsible for musical policy, she said, “My friends advised me not to bother about it, that it should not affect me. But _ that is as if one were to say, ‘never mind that they are polluting the rivers over there, you sit here’ by your own little sea.’ The polluted river will nonetheless finally flow into your little sea! We all share a common history, and it is better to do something, however little, than to do nothing at all. I see myself as a tiny detachment, a small division continuing to put up resistance when the rest are surrendering without even a fight.” This artist serves as one reminder that Russia is rich in talent, and generous in squandering it. Talent in Russia has always achieved greatness not thanks to circumstances but in spite of circumstances. One illustration of this is ‘Tamara Sinyavskaya, People’s Artist of the USSR, who can be described as one

of fortune’s favorites. Nature has endowed her with a splendid voice, beauty, charm, temperament. She rose to fame, beginning with the well-known Loktev children’s choir, then music college, followed by training at the Bolshoi, then, a year later, a solo at the Bolshoi, brilliant success at competitions, including the Tchaikovsky competition, then a period at La Scala singing the best opera roles, recognition, and fame. She was a typical “Soviet Cinderella.”’ Her mother had only three years

118 Olga Kuchkina of education, and when Sinyavskaya was born she was working in a local housing management office. The mother invested all her energy and hopes in her daughter; Sinyavskaya’s early stage was the noisy entrance of an old Sretensky courtyard where she sang and danced. The story of Tamara Sinyavskaya—whom director Boris Pokrovsky once called, ““A wonderful instrument and a wonderful soul” —1is one of those

in which official support coincided with public affection. Such is also the case with Irina Arkhipova, Yelena Obrastsova, Zara Dolukhanova, Zinaida Troitskaya and Galina Vishnevskaya, until she was expelled. Perhaps life did not present Tamara Sinyavskaya and some others with a situation in which the choice lay between obedience, servility, and honors, or bared teeth. The appearance of Tatyana Tolstaya on the literary scene was abrupt and stormy. It took the form of a tale published in a serious journal.

Then came more. But who was she? People imagined a retiring woman, perhaps with an unsuccessful past, able to write pungently, in detail, perceptively. Her literary talent is precisely that, but she herself is a large, stormy, energetic young woman who bears a resemblance to

_ her grandfather, Alexei Nikolayevich Tolstoi, who was also large, stormy, and energetic. The grandfather had no love for the Soviet authorities, but was nonetheless able to flatter them, retain his noble lineage, and avoid arrest, and become famous. The granddaughter also found herself virtually at the very epicenter of literary scandal, having resolutely published left-wing, aristocratic-democratic, pro-Western views, and drawn the fire of home-grown, provincial-patriotic orators. Such an action was something new for women in the arts, who had previously considered it sufficient to express themselves in purely cultural terms, and nothing more. The material with which the talented Tatyana Tolstaya burst onto the literary scene existed, strictly speaking, in several copies. Her char-

acters are not at all the type of character commonly found in regimented Soviet literature, but the kind of people who had long since been the subject of emigre literature, from Vladimir Nabokov to his followers. It burst onto the pages of public journals only a couple of years later, when it was permitted. However, those couple of years were the years of Tatyana Tolstaya, a child of perestroika, who left for America. And that says all there is to say about the history of Russian culture.

Unlike Tolstaya, Lyudmila Petrushevskaya, who erupted onto the theatrical scene as convincingly as Tatyana Tolstaya burst onto the lit-

erary scene, remained at home in Moscow. |

Petrushevskaya’s characters inhabit the world of communal corridors, kitchens and landings in overcrowded housing blocks, the

Women in the Arts Sec e eee eee e eee en ee eenes 119 world. of the sick in overcrowded hospitals, of country cottages with

leaking roofs and no inside toilet, of unmarried women dehumanized , by lack of love, of men distorted by an absurd life they themselves make ugly, of sick children. These typical heroes in typical circumstances were the canons of honest classical realism, whose banner was seized by the most dishonest art the world has ever seen, socialist realism. Yet Petrushevskaya’s literature is indeed genuine socialist reality

as it really is, and not as it exists in the instructions issued by the authorities. The plays of Petrushevskaya, contemptuously termed “kitchen dramas,” had to run the gauntlet of prohibition before finally reaching the so-called average theatergoer. These theatergoers, however, had long since become Petrushevskaya’s enthusiastic admirers. This gulf between official and unofficial culture, official and unofficial recognition, is as much a feature of our lives as state-patronized arts. The first play by Petrushevskaya to be staged by a professional theater was Three Girls in Blue, directed by Mark Zakharov and premiered at the Lenkom Theater. It is, in its own way, a paraphrase of Chekhov’s Three Sisters brought down to street level. In Chekhov, the conflict unfolds around someone’s “misunderstood soul,” someone’s sadly but . proudly disorganized life. Petrushevskaya allows the drama to unfold around a public convenience that is never.actually built, calmly setting _as her level a pitiless analysis not simply of poverty but virtual destitu-

tion, and above all spiritual destitution. The main girl in blue was played by Inna Churikova with restrained exuberance, and with inner commiseration. This actress meticulously reconstructs and transmits the external and inner life of even the most downtrodden of her heroines. Indeed, the more hapless the heroine, the higher soars her spirit at the appointed hour. As to identifying this hour, Inna Churikova, with her enormous dramatic talent, does so unerringly.

Of the ten best actresses in the world accorded one of the most prestigious British awards, three are from the former Soviet Union: Veriko Andzhaparidze, Faina Ranevskaya, and Nonna Mordyukova. The Russian theatrical school is one of the best. Side by side, in no way eclipsing each other, each radiating her own unique and inimitable talent—generous, paradoxical, vivid, subtle, powerful, bright

and tragic—stand Inna Churikova and Marina Neyelova, Olga Yakovleva and Margaritia Terekhova, Yekaterina Vasilyeva and Svetlana Kryuchkova, Lyudmila Gurchenko and Nina Ruslanova, Alisa Freindlikh and Alla Demidova. These are the real stars of theater and —

cinema, without the unbelievable Western incomes, and with the ineradicable Russian habit of enormous inner rigor and great modesty. Until now their restricted, domestic existence has been offset by the

120 Olga Kuchkina unconditional and moving affection of the public. Times are changing, however. Having destroyed the old stereotypes, which were in some

ways outworn, restrictive, but in other ways valuable, change now

offers new possibilities. |

World art will benefit from closer acquaintance with the talents of the Russian theater, art, and literature, just as it benefited from closer acquaintance with Russian ballet and opera. In any case, as the father of perestroika used to say, “the process is underway.” The most recent news

is that Alla Demidova is to take part in an international tragic actress competition in Greece, in which all the competitors will play Electra. The star is so sudden, so’s this land of ours.

On canvas abruptly I also stand out. |

Thick clouds hurry west, on their flight homeward bound Just barely scratching the Kremlin’s high towers. This world’s like a sea of sad prayers unsung. So easy to perish in these roaring seas. Anxiety whispers—who knows what it says? And someone’s lost hope aches, as if it were stung.

The lines quoted above were written by an eleven-year-old girl, Vika Vetrova. Now she is thirteen, and she has already published a book of verse. For her, writing is as natural as breathing, and she breathes as

an adult possessed of a complex inner world, familiar with the depths and the heights. When she is asked to describe inspiration, Vetrova says, “I don’t know. I lie in bed, awake, and suddenly a line comes, and then a second, a third. I barely have time to remember and write them down, and I always call Mum to copy them out, otherwise I’ll forget, and the next day I won’t be able to make out my own writing. Usually Mum has normal handwriting, but she’s in such a hurry it becomes a big scrawl. The verses come very quickly, in threes and fours.” There was one day, so Vika’s father told us, when they took down thirty poems. I believe Vika Vetrova is a genius, and I believe that, if such girl-poets continue to appear, Russia need not fear for the future.

Chapter 10

YOUNG WOMEN OF RUSSIA: STUDIES, WORK, FAMILY

T: Yu. Zabelina |

Women make up more than half of the population of Russia, with fifteen- to twenty-nine-year-olds accounting for 10 percent of the total

population. Within this group, there are three subgroups of roughly ~ equal size: the fifteen- to nineteen-year-olds, the twenty- to twentyfour- year-olds, and the twenty-five- to twenty-nine-year-olds.* Society has an objective interest in giving young women the opportunity to adapt to new conditions; preparing them psychologically and physically to reproduce; and helping them fulfil their plans, realize their potential, and express their personalities.

Helping women, especially at their entrance into independent adulthood, either by leaving school, living apart from their parents, or beginning marriage and motherhood, is possible only if social and state

organizations work together through appropriate government proerams. During the Soviet period, the basic guidelines on women’s rights were laid down in the 1977 Constitution, in which Article 35 stated that “Women and men in the USSR shall enjoy equal rights.

_ These equal rights shall be ensured by granting to women equal Opportunities as regards education and professional training, employment, pay and promotion, political, social and cultural activities, by

, special measures to protect the health of women at work, and by creating conditions which enable women to combine work and motherhood.” ‘The USSR was among the first to ratify the UN convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. 1. Zhenshchiny v SSSR (Women in the USSR) (Moscow, 1990), pp. 5, 7.

122 T. Yu. Zabelina At the beginning of the 1990s, the leadership of the country passed several laws and resolutions to improve social protection for women, children, and young people. In September 1991, the extraordinary 5th Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR adopted a declaration on the rights and freedoms of the individual, in which Article 20 states that marriage is based on the free consent and equal rights of both men and women. Family, motherhood, and childhood enjoy the protection of the state.2 In accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On Urgent Measures to Improve the Position of Women, Protect Motherhood and Childhood, and Strengthen the Family,” passed on 10 April 1990, additional privileges were granted to women with children.’ This resolution is now recognized by the Russian Federation. In May 1992, the president of Russia issued a decree that increased child benefits, and raised benefits and grants for students.* The country is now moving from a system of numerous small benefits and allowances introduced at different tumes for mothers and young people to a single flexible system of social benefits and compensation payments. ‘This system is based on a minimum wage that changes with the cost of living.

_ An Institute for Scientific Research into the Family was set up under

the Supreme Soviet with the aim of helping to shape state policies concerning the social and legal protection of women and the family. A

Coordinating Committee for Problems of the Family, Women and Children was set up under the president of Russia in 1991. The Union

of Russian Women has drawn up a program “For Survival,” which involves the creation of new jobs, education programs, protection for women during the transfer to a market economy, training and retraining programs, and help for young couples. Another program, “Scientific and Technical Progress,”’ is intended to draw women into modern industrial production, to raise their educational levels and qualifications. Many of the measures proposed by the state and social organizations are intended to lighten the double burden that young women in

our country carry—the problems of youth and the problems of women. The transition from an administrative-command to a market economy, which has derailed the whole clumsy system of egalitarian social security, has also led to the active freeing and redistribution of the

work force and, as a result, to the “feminization” of unemployment. Full-time education has become an expensive luxury, and it is urgently necessary to help young women cope with these difficulties. 2. Pravovay* zashchita zhenshchiny i semyi (Legal Protection of Women and the Family) (Moscow, 1991), p. 10. 3. Ibid.

4. Komsomolskaya pravda, 23 May 1992.

Young Women of Russia: Studies, Work, Family oe 123

The Problem of Combining Roles Children in Russia of both sexes study together; from the age of six to seven years they take the same subjects, and girls often prove to be harder working than boys are. At primary and secondary school, girls marks are usually higher than those of their male peers. Even in nonacademic life they are more active, taking the lead in social work. Girls constitute the majority (58 percent) of students in educational institutions. At educational and arts faculties and institutes they make up 87 percent of the student body; at economics and law faculties and institutes they comprise 85 percent; at medical and physical culture facul-

ties and institutes females account for 91 percent of students.? An analogous picture emerges in institutions of higher learning. Young women make up 53 percent of all students, including 69 percent of those studying economics and law; 58 percent of those studying medicine; and 71 percent of those studying pedagogy and the arts. Consequently, the level of education among young Russian women is higher than among their male peers. When a young Russian woman enters the work force, she has an education or professional training equal to or higher than that of her male counterparts. Legally she enjoys equal Opportunities to advance and win promotion. In reality, however, a

decrease in professional and educational attainment occurs among women workers aged between twenty- to twenty-nine-years because this is the age at which they marry, have children, and often are forced to interrupt their work and study. Research on young working women and surveys of social attitudes show that, despite difficultiesinherentin combining work and family responsibilities, 80 percent of women want

to continue working. This desire to continue working is largely explained by the fact that the status of women depends on whether they work outside the home. Work, especially creative work in the fields of modern science and production, helps a woman to develop as an individual personality and to express herself; however, in practice the decisive role in this decision is played by financial imperatives. For half of all families, the woman’s pay is a necessary source of income.° The number of one-parent families in the USSR (concrete data for Russia was not available) in 1989 was 8.2 million. Another 1.2 million families consisted of the mother, her children, and one of the mother’s

parents.’ Thus the well-being of almost 10 million families in the Soviet Union depended almost entirely on the earnings of women. 5. Sovetskaya kultura, 12 December 1988. 6. Sotsialisticheskaya industriya, 16 July 1988.

7. Agitator, no. 3, 1989.

124 T. Yu. Zabelina Although they have grown considerably, social welfare payments cannot cover a young mother’s expenses. Moreover, because benefits and compensation payments now are paid from a firm’s profits, not from the state budget, as in the past; women with children, primarily young

women, are seen by employers as a burden. This is one of the main reasons for the “feminization” of unemployment in Russia. The desire and need to work expressed by young women poses the urgent question of how to ensure their right to work, at jobs that correspond to their moral and material needs, their physical and psychological capabilities, and that enable them to combine family and work responsibilities. Several courses of action appear possible here: (1) improving the professional training of the young before employment by a program of professional and technical training; (2) a substantial rise in the standards of general education, which will make it easier for women to be retrained at a future date, to raise their qualifications, and to suc-

ceed as teachers and mothers; (3) perfecting the system of retraining young women at work and making it more flexible, taking into account

the difficulties young women encounter when they marry. Marriage adds fifteen hours a week of housework to a woman’s work load, and she has eight fewer hours of leisure time than her husband. Under current legislation, women with children under eight years of age must be granted leave from work to raise their qualifications, and must be paid their average wage. These measures are insufficient, because other factors, which require further study, disrupt the professional development of the young. Statistics show that women comprise only 33 percent of

those who raise their qualifications annually, and only 29 percent of those who learn a profession or undergo retraining at work.® When designing retraining programs for the young, industrial managers should bear in mind that needs have risen considerably. Young people have an increasing desire for a creative dimension in their work, and the opportunity to show their capabilities and initiative. It is also important to consider the family status of young workers. At present, workers often are sent to another factory, to a distant educational center, or even to another city to retrain. If this form of retraining is offered

to women who have families, more often than not they will refuse. The management offers them no alternative, but sends a male worker in their place. As they begin to lag behind in qualifications and mastery of new professions, young women are forced to settle for more difficult

and often more harmful working conditions, as they place their hopes On monetary compensation and extended vacations. 8. Naseleniye SSSR (The Population in the USSR) (Moscow, 1988), pp. 58, 85. ,

Young Women of Russia: Studies, Work, Family a 125 Currently, the gap between men’s and women’s qualifications in a whole series of professions is such that women are two to three rungs lower than men. It is possible to redress this inequality only by moving from a system of uncoordinated, piecemeal measures to a coordi-

nated, effective system of professional orientation for women that takes into account their characteristics as a work force, their inclinations toward types of work, and possible future changes in professional

structures. As the women’s work force takes shape, it is essential to give women workers a broad-based professional training that enables them to quickly master any new or related profession, since a market economy stimulates professional mobility. In order to achieve these goals, it is essential to reconsider the list of professions covered by the system of professional and technical training, and in order to broaden the professional education of young women to include those linked to contemporary technology. Firms and other organizations are trying to create for young working women the opportunity to choose the form

of their training, either by correspondence, or full-time or part-time courses, or according to an individual plan. It also is essential to provide retraining opportunities for women who have returned to work from maternity leave, especially to qualified specialists (doctors, teachers, engineers, etc.) who lose their professional edge most when they

are inactive. Slowing down the loss of qualifications among young women specialists during their maternity leave will also broaden the range of intellectual work at home. These measures would contribute to the growth of women’s self-awareness, improve their status in soci-

ety and in the family, protect their health, and raise their level of material well-being. In the final analysis, they would also be betterequipped for their role as mothers.

Childbirth and Child-Rearing Statistics show that marriage in Russia is “getting younger”; the average age for newlywed husbands is twenty-three years old, and for newlywed wives is twenty-one.’ The birth rate among young women also

is rising. For every 1,000 births the majority are to mothers in the twenty- to twenty-four-year-old age group. This tendency coincides with the reported increase in younger marriages and is no cause for alarm. However, there are also some alarming developments, such as the increase in the number of births among girls age fifteen to twenty 9. Rabotnitsa, no. 6, 1989, p. 12.

126 T.Yu. Zabelina years old and the increasing number of births outside marriage. That is to say, the link between marriage and childbirth is visibly weakening. According to the data gathered by M. Tolts, the total number of births

between 1969 and 1986 rose by 37 percent, while the number of extramarital births rose by 54 percent, comprising 9.8 percent of the total. The data varies significantly depending on place of residence and on region (in the countryside, extramarital births are far less frequent).'°

Both trends—the growth in the number of young mothers and of extramarital births—are interwoven. Among sixteen- to seventeenyear-olds, 95.6 percent of all pregnancies are the result of extramarital

relationships. Research into the birth rate has shown that the living conditions and daily life of mothers who never marry is much worse than those of married or divorced mothers. Consequently a child in a one-parent family lives in worse conditions than he would if he were born and raised in a conventional two-parent family. The state has an interest in raising the birth rate, and is therefore attempting to find new resources to assist low-income families, and those with small children. In accordance with the presidential decree

published in May 1992, a single mother is paid a small allowance for each child under the age of sixteen years (eighteen for students), which she continues to receive even if she marries. ‘These payments also are

granted to unmarried women who adopt a child. Young mothers, © including unmarried women, receive maternity benefit on the birth of a child, and also receive paid pregnancy and post-pregnancy vacations. From 1981 partially-paid maternity leave of one year was allowed, and in 1990 this was extended to a year and a half. Now, maternity leave may be up to three years. Moreover, this leave is included in the overall work period, which is an important factor in calculating pensions.

Women have the right to return to their former job at any time they - wish during or at the end of the three-year leave. Paid leave to care for a sick child may be taken by any member of the family, not only the mother. In addition, if it is necessary to care for a sick child under the age of fourteen years, a temporary unemployment benefit is paid for up to ten days out of social security funds. If the family is recognized as financially insecure, that is, if the family income does not amount to the minimum wage for each member, then the family is granted aid from the state budget. In recent years, families also have been receiving payments for children who are serving in the army, and temporary payments for minors during the period when investigations are being made to locate parents who are failing to pay child maintenance. 10. Ibid., p. 13.

Young Women of Russia: Studies, Work, Family oe 127 According to the wishes of working women with children, flexible working schedules are being established, and the opportunity to work part-time is also being provided. This involves a corresponding reduction in pay, but the part-time worker retains the right to a full vacation, to a work period calculated according to specialization, and all other benefits and compensations. Certain tax benefits also have been introduced for mothers with young children. Thus from 1980 through the beginning of the 1990s, several steps were taken to improve the material conditions of mothers and children from poor famiultes. It is imperative to search for new methods to help young families, to stimulate the development of everyday consumer services, to speed up housing construction, to create more preschool institutions, and to broaden the system of loans and credits for young people and families. More emphasis must be placed on the moral and psychological preparation of young people for marriage, cultivating a sense of responsibility for marriage and children. Often young people marry while earning even less than the minimum wage. If these urgent measures to assist young families were implemented, young married women would be more able to pursue their plans to have children. One survey conducted among young people showed that at the time of marriage, the majority declared that they wanted two children. A similar survey of these couples five years later showed that only 20 percent of them had decided to have two children.'! Foremost among the reasons preventing family growth is the housing problem; most young people consider this their main problem. In Moscow, only 3 percent of young couples live in apartments apart from their parents; 30 percent live in dormitories,'* and the rest with the older generation. However, because of the economic crisis that began in the 1990s, many young women absolutely refuse to have children because of fmancial reasons. The average monthly income for one Russian industrial worker at the

beginning of 1992 was 2,157 rubles. In women’s fields such as public | health, the monthly salary was 974 rubles, and for women working in culture, art, or education, 688 rubles. The cost of items necessary for a newborn was 9,000 rubles. The number of abandoned children who are renounced by their mothers immediately after birth or given to orphanages later on is growing. Specialists note that 30 percent of those who give up their children cite financial reasons. ‘These same reasons explain the drop in the birth rate. In 12 regions of Russia the average number of births has decreased by 30 percent compared to 1989; further, in Moscow, in 1990 for every 100 births there were ninety abortions. 11. Nedelya, No. 15, 1987; Moskovsky komsomolets, 1 May 1992. 12. Vospitaniye v shkole (School Education), no. 5, 1987, p. 65.

128 T. Yu. Zabelina Poor housing conditions and a lack of money also add to the swelling number of divorces. In the 1980s every third marriage broke

down (in the 1960s it was one in ten), while in major cities today about 50 percent of all marriages are annulled. Further, a third of these divorces occur within the first year of married life. According to psy-

chological research, young women are first to suffer the enormous emotional consequences of divorce.’ There are also other reasons for the high divorce rate, reasons which have their roots in upbringing, when children form moral criteria and develop a view of life. In a 1986 opinion survey conducted among young women only 0.4 percent listed responsibility for family as a positive characteristic in men. When assessing their future partners, women do not consider the ability to support a family, naming love as the most important factor for marrying. In other words, they give more weight to emotion than to sensible reflection when considering whom to marry. According to statistical data, 90 percent of marriages are “based on love.”” However, this wonderful sentiment 1s

~ not underpinned by adequate moral and material foundation and it does not stand up to stress. About 770,000 children a year are deprived

of one parent through divorce. One of the main reasons for divorces in Russian families is alcoholism, which is shown by the joint research published in the magazines Krestyanka (USSR) and Women’s Day (USA). As a secondary reason for divorce, 40 percent of those surveyed cited “interference by parents in their family life,” a phenomenon that often occurs in shared living quarters. Often, young girls themselves are brought up in one-parent families. In a situation in

which the parents are alienated from each other, there is a lack of humane norms and mutual respect. ‘These women subsequently transfer these characteristics to their own families after they marry.

Their parents’ relationship and a goal-oriented upbringing in educa- | tion are both extremely important for the personal development of young women. Unfortunately, in Russia sexual and family education and socio-psychological help for young women, girls, and young families is —

just beginning. In the 1980s, a course on “Ethical and Psychological Family Life’ was introduced in secondary and in professional-technical schools; a similar course was included in a television educational program. Several weekly magazines devoted to sexual and moral development were published. In a number of cities, counseling centers were set up for those preparing for marriage, and “Telephones of Trust” offered services to minors and young people in stressful situations. In Moscow,

13. Komsomolskaya pravda, 9 April 1989. |

Young Women of Russia: Studies, Work, Family oo 129 production began on the program “Teenager,” an educational program targeted at young families with newborn children. The Commissions on Youth Affairs and Questions of Women’s Work and Life, on Security of Motherhood and Childhood, which operate under local governments, also attempted to find solutions to women’s problems. It is possible to protect the rights and interests of working women through professional organizations, but in a period of economic transition the effectiveness of these groups is limited. A more active position is being adopted in informal women’s organizations, such as the asso, Ciations of women entrepreneurs. New groups, in particular societies of families with many children, clubs of psychological help for women, the society for humanitarian initiative by women (City of Zhukovsky, the Moscow region), and ecological and charitable organizations, are striving to solve specific problems. A number of clubs and funds are now helping women’s enterprises and small businesses. Their efforts are

aimed at helping women, including young women with children, to integrate themselves into the market economy, and at resisting the ten-

dencies to exclude women from social production. Insofar as these efforts may help form a social structure that grants every person, regardless of sex, the opportunity for self-realization, they are very promising.

However, because of the different starting points of men and women, the current essential system of temporary measures will best help to build a modern society. For the young women of Russia to successfully combine studies, work, and family responsibilities, the whole of society must make considerable efforts, and government policy should fol-

low the recommendations made by UN experts. ,

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WOMEN OF PRAGUE Ethnic Diversity and Social Change from the Eighteenth Century to the Present Wilma A. Iggers For many centuries Prague has exerted a particular fascination because of its beauty and the richness of its culture and history. Its famous group of German and Czech writers of mostly Jewish extraction in the earlier part of this century has deeply influenced Western culture. However, little attention has so far been paid to the roles of women in the history of this ethnically diverse area in and around. Prague. Based on largely autobiographical writings and letters by women and enhanced by an extensive historical introduction, this book redresses a serious imbalance. The vivid and often moving portraits, which emerge

from the varied material used by the author, offer fascinating and new insights into the social and cultural history of this region. Contents: Introduction — Magdalena Dobromila Rettigova — BoZena Nemcova — Josefa Naprstkova — Ossip Schubin — Berta Fanta — Hermine Hanel — Gisa Pickov4-Saudkova — Grete Fischer — Milena Jesenska — _ Milada Hordkovd — Ruth Klinger — Jifina Siklov4 “Wilma Iggers offers English-reading audiences fascinating new perspectives ...

_ in a@ sensitive introduction to the citys modern experience and translated selections from the writings of twelve women ... This volume is particularly welcome since the work of most of these writers has not been readily available in

English before.” Gary B. Cohen, The University of Oklahoma ‘A book which brings together hitherto unpublished manuscripts and informed commentary, this is an invaluable resource for the field of Womens Studies as

well as for anyone interested in the culture of Prague.” Dr. Helen Epstein

Wilma Abeles Iggers, born and raised in Czechoslovakia, has taught a number of foreign languages in the United States. Her publications include a book on Karl Kraus (1967) and on Bohemian Jews (1993). She is Professor Emerita at Canisius College, Buffalo, NY. August * ca. 400 pages * 30 halftones ¢ Bibliography ISBN 1-57181-008-0 hb ca. $59.95/£44.00 ¢ ISBN 1-57181-009-9 pb ca. $25.00/£17.50

165 Taber Ave., Providence, RI 02906 ¢ Tel: 401-861-9330 ¢ Fax: 401-521-0046 E-Mail: [email protected] or [email protected]

Bush House, Merewood Ave., Sandhills, Oxford OX3 8EF ¢ Tel: (01865) 742 224 * Fax: (01865) 744 978 E-Mail: Berghahn UK @cityscape.co.uk

WOMEN, FAMILY AND SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE Historical Essays, 1978-1991 David Herlihy Edited and with an Introduction by Anthony Molho

Until his untimely death in February 1991, David Herlihy, dD Professor of History at Brown University, was one of the most prolific and best-known American historians of the European Middle Ages. Author of books on the history of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Italy, Herlihy published, in 1978, his best-known work in collaboration with Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, Les Toscans et leurs familles (translated into English in 1985, and Italian in 1988). For the last dozen or so years of his

life, Herlihy launched a series of ambitious projects, on the history of women and the family, and on the collective behavior of social groups in : medieval Europe. While he completed two important books — on the family (1985) and on women’s work (1991) — he did not find the time to bring

these other major projects to a conclusion. |

_ This volume contains essays he wrote after 1978. They convey a sense of the enormous intellectual energy and great erudition which characterized David Herlihy’s scholarly career. They also chart a remarkable historian’s intellectual trajectory, as he searched for new and better ways of asking a set of simple and basic questions about the history of the family, the institution within which the vast majority of Europeans spent so much of their lives. Because of his qualities as a scholar and a teacher, during his relatively brief career Herlihy was honored with the presidencies of the four major scholarly associations with which he was affiliated: the Catholic Historical Association, the Medieval Academy of America, the Renaissance Society of America, and the American Historical Association. _

Anthony Molho is Munro Goodwin Wilkinson Professor of European History at Brown University, and has written several works on the social, political, and economic history of late medieval and early modern Italy. 430 Pages, ISBN 1-57181-023-4 hb, ca. $59.95 /£46.00 ISBN 1-57181-024-2 pb, ca. $17.95/£12.95

165 Taber Ave., Providence, RI 02906 © Tel: 401-861-9330 © Fax: 401-521-0046 E-Mail: [email protected] or [email protected]

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SEXUAL SUBORDINATION AND STATE INTERVENTION Comparing Sweden and the United States R. Amy Elman One would expect a welfare state such as Sweden to compare favorably with the United States regarding the implementation of public policies and programs. Surprisingly, the author comes to quite different conclusions: in studying the treatment of battered, raped and sexually-harassed women in the two countries, she has found that, contrary to conventional expectation, the ability of the decentralized Amer-

ican state to innovate effectively has been consistently underestimated, whereas Sweden's ability to do the same has often been exaggerated. One explanation seems to be that the very structure of Sweden's centralized, cor-

poratist state does not permit women to make claims on it that do not directly relate to work-force participation. By contrast, the American state is more permeable to the interests of women (as women) in instances where those interests are not economically determined.

By focusing on issues specific to women, this study transcends the emphasis on class which is the traditional basis for social reforms and discussions of the state. Thus, it establishes a more comprehensive comparative political perspective than those presently offered by political analysts concerned with public policy and state structure. Contents: The Analytic Context: Gender Specification & State Structures — The Comparative Context: States, Structures & Movements — The States & Woman Battering — The States & Rape — The States & Sexual Harassment — Conclusion. R. Amy Elman is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Kalamazoo College, Michigan, where she also serves as the Director of the Women’s Studies Program and as Associate Co-Director of the Center for European Studies. September, 1995 * ca. 128 pages, bibliography, index ISBN 1-57181-071-4 hb, ca $35.00/£25.00 ISBN 1-57181-072-2 pb ca. $14.50/£10.50

165 Taber Ave., Providence, RI 02906 ¢ Tel: 401-861-9330 © Fax: 401-521-0046 E-Mail: [email protected] or [email protected]

Bush House, Merewood Ave., Sandhills, Oxford OX3 8EF ¢ Tel: (01865) 742 224 © Fax: (01865) 744 978

: E-Mail: BerghahnUK @cityscape.co.uk

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