Women, Feminism and Fundamentalism 9789066658721

Table of contents :
Introduction: Women, Feminism and Fundamentalism - Ireen Dubel and Karen Vintges, p.6

Section I - Concepts and Theories, p.11
- Dutch Muslim Women and Fundamentalism: Experiences, Results and Strategies - Ceylan Pekta-Weber, p.12
- On Stony Grounds: Female Religious Subjectivities in the Battle over Modernity - Sarah Bracke, p.25
- ‘A woman of valour, who can fi nd her? Far beyond pearls is her value…’: Fundaments and Feminisms in Contemporary Orthodox Judaism - Chia Longman, p.40
- The Life of Rabia al-Adawiyya: Refl ections on Feminism and Fundamentalism - Karen Vintges, p.43

Section II - Islamic Feminism, p.61
-International Islamic Feminism Revisited - Margot Badran, p.62
- Gender Jihad - Abdennur Prado, p.72
- Islamic Women’s Manifesto (IW/M), p.75

Section III - Strategies, p.79
- Iranian Women’s Voices Across Borders - Halleh Ghorashi, p.82
- The Politics of Dissent: Th e Role of Catholics for a Free Choice in Latin America - Juan Marco Vaggione, p.98
- Christian Fundamentalism and Curtailment of Women’s Sexual and Reproductive Rights - Maria de Bruyn, p.114
- I Am Glad They Have Banned The Vagina Monologues - Sarah Mukasa, p.134
- Muslim Women and Feminist Strategies in Times of Religious Fundamentalisms -Anissa Hélie, p.141

About the editors, p.159

Citation preview

Women, Feminism & Fundamentalism

WOMEN, FEMINISM & FUNDAMENTALISM

Edited by Ireen Dubel and Karen Vintges

The issues surrounding women, feminism and fundamentalism are currently being debated throughout the world at every level and by every segment of humanity. In this volume a broad spectrum of views and perspectives are presented. What the authors have in common, however, is that they all distance themselves from what is known today as ‘secular fundamentalism’, an approach that claims that only secular Reason brings truth and progress, such as equal rights for women. In contrast with strongly secularist feminists like Susan Moller Okin and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the authors in this volume argue that a struggle for women’s rights is possible within non-secular contexts. Several articles explore the lives of orthodox religious women and reflect on the relationship between fundamentalism and feminism in religious contexts, discussing among others Saba Mahmood’s path-breaking study on women in the Egyptian Women’s Mosque Movement. On a more concrete level, a diversity of strategies and discourses of women and women’s organisations on how to relate to religious fundamentalism is discussed such as the recently emerging movement of ‘Islamic feminism’ that strives for ‘gender justice’ within Islamic contexts, and the struggle of women in Latin America who plead for women’s rights while at the same time retaining their Catholic faith and beliefs. As one of the authors concludes, feminists have to be pragmatic about the choice of their strategies, overtly and covertly, anonymous and public, gradual and confronting, and incidental and continuously. The fight against fundamentalism can also mean simply to continue living your own life as a woman.

ISBN 978 90 6665 872 1 / NUR 745

Humanistics University Press is een imprint van Uitgeverij SWP voor uitgaven van de Universiteit voor Humanistiek

Edited by Ireen Dubel and Karen Vintges www.swpbook.com

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Women, Feminism & Fundamentalism

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WOMEN, FEMINISM & FUNDAMENTALISM Edited by Ireen Dubel and Karen Vintges

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This book was also published as Issue 27 (October 2006) of the Journal for Humanistics (ISSN 1567 - 7117).

Cover illustration: Demonstration International Women’s Day, Iran, 8 March 2006. Photo made by Amir Kholoosi. Translation of the pamphlet on the front cover: ‘We are children of Kourosh (Cyrus), founder of human rights’ [Kourosh / Cyrus (580 - 529 BC), the first Achaemenian Emperor].

Women, Feminism & Fundamentalism Edited by Ireen Dubel and Karen Vintges ISBN 978 90 6665 872 1 NUR 745

© 2007 SWP Publishers, Amsterdam All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without the written permission of SWP Publishers, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Any person who does or relate to any unauthorised act with regard to this publication is liable to prosecution and civil claims for damages.

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CONTENTS

Introduction: Women, Feminism and Fundamentalism - Ireen Dubel and Karen Vintges

Section I - Concepts and Theories Dutch Muslim Women and Fundamentalism: Experiences, Results and Strategies - Ceylan Pekta -Weber On Stony Grounds: Female Religious Subjectivities in the Battle over Modernity - Sarah Bracke ‘A woman of valour, who can find her? Far beyond pearls is her value…’: Fundaments and Feminisms in Contemporary Orthodox Judaism - Chia Longman The Life of Rabia al-Adawiyya: Reflections on Feminism and Fundamentalism - Karen Vintges

Section II - Islamic Feminism International Islamic Feminism Revisited - Margot Badran Gender Jihad - Abdennur Prado Islamic Women’s Manifesto (IW/M)

Section III - Strategies Iranian Women’s Voices Across Borders - Halleh Ghorashi The Politics of Dissent: The Role of Catholics for a Free Choice in Latin America - Juan Marco Vaggione Christian Fundamentalism and Curtailment of Women’s Sexual and Reproductive Rights - Maria de Bruyn I Am Glad They Have Banned The Vagina Monologues - Sarah Mukasa Muslim Women and Feminist Strategies in Times of Religious Fundamentalisms -Anissa Hélie About the editors

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INTRODUCTION Women, Feminism and Fundamentalism Ireen Dubel and Karen Vintges

The issues surrounding Women, Feminism and Fundamentalism are currently being debated throughout the world in every way imaginable. We are pleased to present a broad spectrum of views in this volume: many authors deal explicitly with the concepts of feminism and fundamentalism and express different approaches on the issue. What they have in common, however, is that they distance themselves from what is known today as ‘secular fundamentalism’; an approach that is prominent in western European countries, and that claims that only secular Reason brings truth and progress such as equal rights for women. In contrast with strongly secularist feminists like Susan Moller Okin and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the authors in this volume argue that a struggle for women’s rights is possible within non-secular contexts.

The term fundamentalism has numerous definitions and is nowadays applied to a broad range of phenomena; to religions, cultures, traditions, neo-liberal economic policy, and also to strains of thought originating in Enlightenment and secularism. In many contexts the term has become synonymous with fanaticism, dogmatism, extremism and even terrorism. As such it has become a concept that evokes much confusion. The definition of fundamentalism that we use as editors is: the belief in absolute Truths and the urge to disseminate these and impose them on others. Feminism to us stands for the struggle against all forms of violence against women, and for equal rights and full citizenship for women, within any context, secular or religious. Our volume is divided into three sections. In the first section which is entitled ‘Concepts and Theories’, the concepts ‘feminism’ and ‘fundamentalism’ are discussed and analysed in various ways. In this section several articles explore the lives of orthodox religious women and reflect on the relationship between fundamentalism and feminism in religious contexts, discussing among others Saba Mahmood’s path-breaking study on women in the Egyptian Women’s Mosque Movement. The second section which is entitled ‘Islamic feminism’, provides a link between

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theory and practice. In this section the emerging discourse of Islamic feminism is discussed and presented in three articles. One of these is the ‘Islamic Women’s Manifesto’. Islamic feminism strives for ‘gender justice’ within Islamic contexts, ‘gender justice’ standing for the principle that women are full citizens and are not inferior to men. In the third section which is entitled ‘Strategies’, a diversity of actual strategies of women and women’s organisations are discussed with regard to religious fundamentalisms in various societies (including Iran, Latin America and Uganda). The articles in this section put forward a multitude of practices and discourses about feminism, women’s liberation and religion. In the 1980’s, at a time when the dominant feminist discourse in Europe and North America assumed anti-religious or secular strategies, in Latin America women pleaded for separation of church and state while at the same time retaining their Catholic faith and beliefs. The past decade has seen scholars from the Middle East and South Asia arguing for reinterpretation of religious texts with the aim of overcoming the apparent contradictions between religion and feminism. Throughout the world the issue of ‘women and Islam’ is a terrain for political struggle. This applies to Iraq where the new regime, propped up by the American occupation, introduced a new constitution based on the Shari’a. It also applies to Iran, where activism by women is no longer tolerated under the rule of the conservative president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (In March 2006 and 2007 women’s demonstrations in Teheran were violently dispersed.) In Western countries, including the Netherlands, the debate with regard to women and Islam takes place (unrelentingly) without the inclusion and participation of Muslim women. The debates are about radicalization of Muslim girls, whether or not to ban the oppressive veil and the need for a third wave of women’s liberation. Muslim women in the Netherlands who make a distinction between religion and tradition or express the ideals of liberation and equality in religious terms are seldom heard. The first section of this volume therefore opens with an article by Ceylan Pekta Weber which examines the issue of women, feminism and fundamentalism from the point of view of Dutch Muslim women. Ceylan Pekta -Weber is chairwoman of the Dutch organisation for Muslim women Al Nisa, and published Moslima’s. Emancipatie achter de dijken (2006) (Muslim women: Emancipation behind the dykes). She discusses various concepts of fundamentalism, both the Muslim and the non-Muslim variety, and the misunderstandings resulting from that difference. She also examines the manifestations of Islamic fundamentalism in the Netherlands and the actions of women both on its behalf and against it. Sarah Bracke’s article is based on her thesis, Women resisting secularisation in an age of globalisation (2004). Bracke researched Muslim women in Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, women of the Catholic movement Comunione e Liberazione in Italy,

Introduction

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women of Milli Görü , the Turkish movement of political Islam in the Netherlands, and women in a Dutch white evangelical community. Bracke also examines various concepts of fundamentalism, concepts that in her opinion are hindering an adequate understanding of the experiences and subjectivities of women in these movements - a task that most certainly belongs to the domain of women studies. Chia Longman gives a historical overview of the variety of movements within Judaism and discusses the position of women in these movements. Like Bracke, she emphasises the personal experiences, actions, and aspirations of women within these movements, instead of portraying them as passive and oppressed beings. Karen Vintges explores the findings of Longman, Bracke and in particular the work by Saba Mahmood, about the lives of orthodox-religious women. She asks what those lives can tell us today. Vintges tries to clarify the relationship between feminism and fundamentalism by looking at the lives of these orthodox religious women, particularly the life of the eighth century Sufi-mystic, Rabia al-Adawiyya. The second section of this volume opens with an article by Margot Badran, which provides an overview of the emerging movement of Islamic feminism. According to Margot Badran, Islamic feminism wants to return to the old revolutionary concept of gender-equality that was introduced by the Qur’an in the patriarchal Arabic societies of the seventh century. She discusses the most recent developments in Islamic feminism and states that it is a dynamic worldwide phenomenon, both diverse and revolutionary. The Internet-published text by Abdennur Prado is written as an announcement and introduction of the first international conference on Islamic feminism in Barcelona in 2005. The ‘pamphlet-like’ character of this text reflects this effort. Prado points out the need for a ‘Gender Jihad’ in the Islamic world - a fight for equal rights for women. The Islamic Women’s Manifesto was presented in November 2006 in Amsterdam in the Cultural Centre De Balie, on the occasion of a lecture by Asma Barlas, the first woman signing the manifesto. The third section of this volume opens with an article by Halleh Ghorashi. It is on the various streams of women’s activism and feminism in Iran after the Islamic revolution of 1979. She discusses the sharp contrasts between secular feminists in the Diaspora and the women that try to work towards improvement of the position of women within Iran. Ghorashi emphasizes the importance of mutual exchange and communication, provided that the different points of departure are taken into consideration. The initial successes of the women’s organisations during the 1990’s, however, have become more strained by the recent political changes in Iran, particularly the 2005 election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for president. In his article, Juan Marco Vaggione discusses the political, prominent and privileged position of the Catholic Church in Latin America with regard to the regulation of sexuality. Abortion and homosexuality are issues the Catholic Church uses

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to position itself in society. The counter-strategy of the organisation of Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir, is based on the reinterpretation of Catholic doctrine and strives for women’s liberation in a religious idiom. Maria de Bruyn’s essay indicates that Christian fundamentalists often ally with fundamentalists of other religions to restrict the sexual and reproductive rights of women at a global level. Therefore, protest against this global strategy requires a global co-operation of feminists of different religions in return. In her article, Sarah Mukasa describes the adventures of the Ugandan version of the play, The Vagina Monologues. She criticises the arguments of culture, tradition and religion that led to the prohibition of the play. Mukasa also takes a stand against the Ugandan feminists who voiced objections against the play. Finally Anissa Hélie’s essay discusses the diversity of feminist strategies with regard to religious fundamentalism as practised by women active in the worldwide network, ‘Women Living Under Muslim Laws.’ She concludes that feminists have to be pragmatic about the choice of their strategies, overtly and covertly, anonymous and public, gradual and confronting, incidental and continuously. The fight against Islamic fundamentalism can also mean simply to continue living your own life as a woman.

Drs. Ireen Dubel is Programme Manager Gender, Women and Development at Hivos, the Humanistic Institute for Co-operation with Developing Countries. Dr. Karen Vintges is university lecturer Political and Social Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam.

Introduction

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Hivos People unlimited. This motto symbolises Hivos’ trust in the entrepreneurship, capacity and creativity of people. Together with local social organisations in developing countries, Hivos seeks to contribute to a free, fair and sustainable world. A world in which citizens - men and women - have equal access to the opportunities and resources for their development, and where they can actively and equally participate in decision-making processes that determine their lives, their society and their future. Self-determination, freedom of expression, diversity, democracy, and pluralism are not just central humanistic values but also necessary ingredients for a dynamic society that can face the future with confidence. Fundamentalism is in defiance of Hivos vision and mission. Striving for pluralism and diversity runs like a red thread through Hivos programmes, particularly in the areas of human rights, women and gender equality, media, arts and culture. This book contains contributions of Hivos partner organisations and relations from the worldwide Hivos-network. More information about Hivos can be found on www.hivos.nl

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Section I - Concepts and Theories

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SECTION I - CONCEPTS AND THEORIES

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DUTCH MUSLIM WOMEN AND FUNDAMENTALISM Experiences, Results and Strategies Ceylan Pekta -Weber

Debates in the Netherlands about Islamic fundamentalism and the position of Muslim women are obscured by misunderstandings and stereotypes. In recent years, fundamentalism has become an isolated concept that is used to identify all aspects of Islam that are considered undesirable. Furthermore, it appears that both Muslims and non-Muslims in the Netherlands react differently when fundamentalism is brought to the table. Before I discuss the ways Dutch Muslim women may come in contact with Islamic fundamentalism and the strategies they develop to defend their rights, I would like to address the confusion that occurs over the use of the concept of fundamentalism.

Misunderstandings Firstly, the confusion is caused by a few tenacious misunderstandings, most notably, the mixing up of fundamentalism and orthodoxy. Often, fundamentalism is put on a par with the strict severity of the doctrine. The stricter somebody lives according to religious regulations, the more fundamentalist he or she is. But strictness in the doctrine refers much more to the concept of orthodoxy. Although fundamentalism often goes hand in hand with a strict religious conviction, it is not the same as orthodoxy. Fundamentalism usually comes about as a reaction to the experiencing of a threatening of suppression or destruction, for example. In the Islamic world the first fundamentalist movements came about in the twentieth century as a political counter-movement against injustice, economic and social extortion or against political suppression. Middle East and Islam researcher Thijl Sunier defines fundamentalism as ‘a form of political activism, inspired by Islam and directed to changes in the organisation of society’. (1) Orthodoxy on the other hand is usually not a (political) reaction to a certain situation, but rather a fairly constant factor that manifests itself through all eras. Another important difference between fundamentalism and orthodoxy is that fun-

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damentalists deal more selectively with the Qur’anic texts and Hadith. These texts are often used in a one-sided way to express or legitimise their ideology and program. Fundamentalist groups refer more often to texts that are about the differences between believers and non-believers and about the contact with other-believers and non-believers. The tendency to know only one truth and leave no room for other views or interpretations is probably the most distinctive characteristic of fundamentalism. When meeting followers of another religion, for example, orthodox Muslims will often revert to the principle of ‘your faith is yours and my faith is mine’; and not make a big issue out of it. While, on the other hand, fundamentalists more often have a tendency to ‘fight for the truth’. (2) The Islamic orthodox legacy exists in much wider circles than Islamic fundamentalism, including outside the politically or socially engaged spectrum. Both fundamentalism and orthodoxy carry a number of comparable risks for the liberation of women. A second misunderstanding is the idea that Islamic fundamentalism distinguishes itself from other Islamic movements by a strong leaning towards the Qur’an and the Sunna. (3) The cry to revert to the original sources of Islam appeals to almost all Muslims, from liberals to the most orthodox. Ali Lazrak says: ‘the concepts of fundamentalism and Islamism have completely different overtones in the Islamic world. Every self-respecting Muslim in Morocco, Tunis, or Algeria will call himself a fundamentalist; that is, somebody that reverts to the sources of the religion.’ (4) And the Suisse Muslim philosopher Tariq Ramadan, currently very popular amongst Muslim youths, constantly refers to the true meaning of the word Shari’a, which is ‘the path of the faithful’, or ‘back to the source’. Hamza Zeid Kailani, one of the first Imams in the Netherlands, who is well known for his liberal position in inter-religious dialogue, finds the use of the term fundamentalism awkward. ‘Fundamentalism is a nice word. It suggests that you revert to the foundations. But [in the Dutch debate, CPW] it points to a group of fanatics that use the religion for their own purposes; a movement that grows in a climate of poverty and social injustice.’ (5) Even progressive Qur’an researchers like Asma Barlas and Amina Wadud and the Turkish Hadith expert Hidayet Tuksal, appeal to the original texts in their fight for restoration of women rights. Many Dutch Muslims adhere to the theological idea of the word fundamentalism, - which is revert to the sources - to try to find pure guidelines for life, while the non-Islamic person in the conversation usually means the political form of fundamentalism. The use of different definitions is the greatest obstacle to a clear discussion. For the remainder of this article I will use the definition of Sunier and interpret fundamentalism as a form of political activism that is directed to a (partial) rearrangement of society. A final misconception that I would like to mention here is the idea that all fundamentalist groups revert to violence. This is certainly not the case. The majority of fundamentalists reject the use of violence, in particular in situations where there is no direct threat of life, home or faith. Member of Parliament Farah Karimi, who

Dutch Muslim Women and Fundamentalism

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experienced Islamic fundamentalism up close in her native country Iran, makes a distinction between the political Islam and the violent political Islam. The two cannot be compared according to her. (6) Therefore, it is recommended that another specific term for activism that involves violence be used.

Cautiously critical The fact that many Dutch Muslims interpret fundamentalism to mean ‘returning to the sources’, instead of ‘a form of political activism based on the Islam’, like nonIslamic people presuppose, is without doubt the most important reason that within public debate Muslims don’t distance themselves from fundamentalism beforehand. Furthermore, many Muslims know better than the people with whom they are talking that Islamic fundamentalism is not a sum of cold legal considerations. It also has a softer side that is more appealing. Matters such as ‘dedicating oneself to God without the expectation of any reward or success on earth, the striving for improvement of character and striving for good’ are examples of this. Another reason of the cautiousness with which Muslims speak about fundamentalism is the appeal that the Islamic concept of ‘umma’ has to Muslims. This concept contains an inspiring ideology of a worldwide Muslim community of like-minded religious brothers and sisters. Solidarity is experienced by a warm welcome of Muslims in the countries one visits. This universal desire for solidarity and equality is shared by many Muslims, but also involves the risk of an unjust appeal to loyalty without criticism. However, most Muslims in the Netherlands are aware of the need to make a distinction between solidarity and lack of criticism. Finally, the basic principle that final judgement over people can only be done by God lingers in the background as well. This leads to a situation where Muslims would rather not judge other Muslims. In the extreme spirit this is liberating to everybody. Muslims that are going through a development process toward a personal religious awareness are conscious of tolerance for personal views and positions this principle offers. It is in everybody’s interest to foster this tolerance as long as possible.

Fundamentalism in the Netherlands Young (and new) Dutch Muslims in particular go through a process where they develop a personal view and position with regard to Islam. They were born here, or at least grew up here, and therefore became more detached from the culture and religious conviction of their parents. The new surroundings and circumstances, and the life in a country where Muslims are a minority, force them to reflect on Islam; to ponder the question of what Islam means to them and how they want to relate to Islam. The individual considerations of Muslim youth lead to differ-

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ent choices. Where one chooses to join a (international) fundamentalist network, another chooses a more reform-minded direction, and yet another joins the Sufi movement that also experienced strong growth in recent years. Remarkably enough, (new) fundamentalist and reformist movements within the Muslim community are both results of the same individualisation process. The return to Islam by youth can even lead to strong differing choices and position within one’s family, as proven in the story of author Yasmine Allas, who fled Somalia. While she developed a position with regard to Islam that she describes as ‘liberal’, her sister chose an opposite position. She started wearing the niqab, and considered leaving the Netherlands to be able to live more comfortably according to her strict interpretation of Islam. The following of fundamentalism is growing most amongst groups that are striving for a certain social growth that they see as hindered. In Islamic countries economic, social or political factors often play the most important role. In the Dutch context, in addition to frustrations over tenacious social-economic deprivation, the current political-social climate regarding migration, integration and Islam plays a role as well, a climate which is characterised by sometimes rather oversimplified and harsh statements by politicians of various parties. Worldwide, and as in all religions, a minority strives for the creation of a theocracy. Islam expert Van Koningsveld, describes this as ‘a political ideology to subject society to religious standards’. (7) According to him one can speak of a theocracy in optima forma when the entire state is subject to religious values and laws, and when the power of government is exercised by officials that can speak with doctrinal authority in name of the ruling religion. In the Netherlands, few followers of Islamic fundamentalism speak out openly for such political activism. Statements about the ‘poisonous western society’ and about ‘the ideals of the original Islamic society’ however create the impression that within a marginal group there is a latent need for such a (partial) change in the organisation of society. The Dutch Christian political party SGP explicitly endorses a form of government that is subject to God and the bible. The arguments this small opposition party uses for considerations with regard to certain governmental propositions show that quite clearly. In a recently published pamphlet, Islam at Home, the SGP shows that their religious points of view are the deciding factor when evaluating state affairs. With regard to jurisdiction, it states: ‘It can’t be denied that with an increasing number of Muslims in the Netherlands, at a certain point in time there will be a claim that elements of Shari’a law should find official recognition in Dutch justice.’ (…) The SGP rejects an official recognition of Islamic justice as a source because Shari’a law contains elements that are contrary to Christian legal sources.’ (8) Chairman Bas van der Vlies stated numerous times that the SGP pursues the letter of the bible and therefore can be called orthodox, but not fundamentalist. However, in Islam at Home, sufficient arguments can be found to contradict this. The expressed view about the infliction of gender-specific positions and roles to men and women would have far-reaching consequences for society if SGP should get

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the opportunity to turn these into policy. If similar texts would appear in Islamic publications - which does happen - many Dutch people wouldn’t hesitate to call them fundamentalist.

Muslim women and fundamentalism Islamic fundamentalism as a form of political activism is barely developed or noticeable in the Netherlands. In the media, reports about Islamic fundamentalism are almost always regarding matters that take place abroad. Dutch Muslim women don’t come in contact with fundamentalism often in their immediate environment, unless they look for it themselves. In some Islamic countries this is also the case. These are often countries with a theocracy or where Islamic fundamentalist groups became an influential force. In these countries, strict doctrines have been turned into general social protocol or even law. Compliance with the rules is strictly monitored and there are sanctions in place for their breach. In all countries where this phenomenon currently takes place, it has a negative effect on the freedom of action and self-determination of women. Stipulations with regard to appearance and the extent to which they are allowed to enter public life, are common examples of restrictions imposed upon women. The Afghan light bleu burqas and the black Iranian chadors are rooted deeply in our minds. It is unfortunate that for many people they have become symbols of the oppression by Islam as such, instead of a manifestation of a politically oppressive system. There are probably very few Dutch Muslim women that consider an Islamic theocracy or the introduction of (part of) the Shari’a as a realistic possibility. Many religious Muslim women find the present political-social climate more of a threat to their own individual position and possibilities (and rightfully so) than Islamic fundamentalism. Members of the limited amount of fundamentalist groups in the Netherlands mostly meet each other in their own closed circles. In addition to the pamphlets and booklets that are mostly distributed in their own immediate surroundings, websites, forums and msn-groups on the Internet do exist where fundamentalist-tinted texts and calls can be read. These are often texts in which a significant decisiveness comes forward, and in which many isolated texts from the Qur’an and / or Hadith and often a lot of Arabic terms are used: ‘A group of my Umma will always be helped to conquer as long as they persist in the Truth; they won’t be aggrieved by those leaving them or those resisting them.’ (Hadith, from the collection of Imam Moeslim) ‘This Ummah will be separated in seventy-three sects, all of them will go to Hell, except for one; the one that follows the same path my current fellows and me follow.’ (Hadith from the collections of amongst others Aboe Dawoed and at-Tirmidhi) The texts above are also read by non-fundamentalist Muslims and sometimes used.

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In fundamentalist publications, however, they are often followed by a call to ‘so’ join this group and be ensured of victory and personal salvation. Some texts are followed by a call to jihad, usually referring to the fight against infidels. Some Muslim leaders make an effort to enter a conversation with youth that read these texts. Abdulwahid van Bommel made himself available for a while as a ‘cyber-Imam’ and writes columns for magazines and websites for Muslim youth on a regular basis. Haci Karacaer, who up until 2006 was the director of Milli Görü Noord-Nederland, never shied away from a good discussion with strongly convinced youth. ‘These youth have no room for doubts and sometimes there is no room for mercy. They have become detached from all sense of reality.’ In Religie en Verdraagzaamheid (Religion & Tolerance) he tells how he is sometimes confronted with stories from young people that have been elevated by them to absolute truth in spite of their strong mythical character. (9) The fact that these youths approach people going to Mosques to tell them that they are on the wrong track, Karacaer sees as a way to bridge gaps. Both he and Van Bommel realise that one discussion is not enough to convince these youths. The current alienation that many of them experience requires a stable environment in which a long process of developing a coherent Islamic identity can take place instead of groundlessly following - via Internet-compounded - black and white views. It is not just boys that are interested in such texts and views. Girls and young women also visit these websites and forums on a regular basis and sometimes become part of one of the small activist groups that came into being in recent years. Besides these fundamentalist texts there are many more books and publications available on the Dutch market that reflect the orthodox or otherwise strict views of the position and role of the Muslim woman. Although in the Qur’an and Hadith together there are no more then ten authentic texts that refer to the appearance of women in any way (there are many more authentic texts that refer to the appearance of men), over the course of many centuries bookcases full have been written about the ideal appearance and behaviour of Muslim women. In the Netherlands, for example, a ‘Handbook for Muslim women’ has been published. This states, amongst other things, that the woman should always obey her husband. This does not only apply to sex, but also to other matters. The only time a woman can disobey her husband is when he opposes Islam. In that case, obedience to the laws of Allah prevails over the desires of a man. It is worth mentioning that if you don’t want to comply with one of the non-obligatory days of fasting, you need permission from your husband because of the right of the man to fulfil his desires whenever he wants to. And: ‘Women may go outside for every legitimate necessity such as education, work, medical treatment etc., but the life of a Muslim woman should be concentrated on the home. As soon as you are done with your tasks outside of the home you should go home. Hanging around on the street, the market or places of amusement is not acceptable behaviour for a Muslim woman. Our homes are not meant as prisons, but they are the basis of our life.’ (10)

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Books such as ‘Vrouw in de Sjari’a’ (Woman in the Shari’a), ‘De Hijab’ (The Hijab) and ‘Het Huwelijk in de Islam’ (Marriage in Islam), describe such regulations of behaviour for women. These prescriptions are more often based on the Hadith than on texts from the Qur’an, where there is not always agreement over how trustworthy the concerning tradition is and to what extent it may be an isolated text that could have applied only in a particular circumstance. With the exception of the first-mentioned work above, these books were written by men. It is striking, though, that Dutch Muslim women often do the translation into Dutch. In the Netherlands, quite a few Muslim women (by estimation between ten and twenty percent of practising Muslim women) chooses with conviction to comply with a strict form of Islam, including a strict described position and role for themselves as women.

Radicalisation Because of its limited size, Islamic fundamentalism has little influence on daily life of most Muslims in the Netherlands, and the possible risks for the position of Muslim women are therefore small. The most important risk group are perhaps the girls and young women that, through others, join a group in which they stimulate each other to live according to ‘true Islam’. They consistently point out to each other better rules with regard to life and behaviour that usually come from a literal interpretation of events from the era of revelations and pronouncements of the prophet Muhammad. Some girls go through a complete metamorphosis in a short period of time. The ones working frequently with Muslim youth state that the current social climate increases the risk of radicalisation significantly: ‘I see a trend amongst young girls where they are into Islam, not from a personal need, but more so to react against this society. That can take scary forms, such as that we saw with Mohammed B. It is just too awful to think what might happen. They don’t feel accepted. Some girls have had a good education and are dressed according to the latest Western fashion. They live like Dutch girls, go out, and spend the night with friends. They don’t have anything to do with Islam, but still they don’t get a job. They don’t understand that and get frustrated. They have no words or instruments to express those frustrations. They then turn to Islam and go through a very radical identity change that nobody understands.’ (11) Alia Azzouzi, teacher of social studies and board member of a cultural youth association is also worried: ‘I sometimes hear people say that the non-Islamic world is the world of evil. They view themselves as chosen ones. That group is growing; youth from certain neighbourhoods are particularly sensitive to it. They blindly follow somebody and feel safe in a group. The bond is strong; everybody is brother and sister to each other; solidarity is stimulated because there is a lot of caring for each other. When youth doesn’t feel accepted in society this brings along extra risks. You have to give youth the feeling that they are accepted, or they will find a group

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where they are welcome. Youth do need recognition. And if you only get that feeling within such a small radical group, you are probably prepared to make a lot of concessions. You are prepared to adopt your entire life style to become part of it.’ (12) Most youth workers, however, indicate that it is usually a passing phenomenon that belongs to a certain phase in life. That also applies to Alia Azzouzi herself, who a few years back was part of such a group: ‘it is a phase that I went through myself. I didn’t listen to music and certainly wouldn’t shake hands with a man. I wouldn’t enter cafes where alcohol was served and I didn’t go to parties where Islamic rules weren’t respected. Although I didn’t wear clothing that covered everything, I did wear dark colours. That was because I was part of a group in which we reinforced each other. That lasted up until I was about twenty - until I didn’t want to go on like that. During my “radical period” I did everything with that group of women. At a certain moment I didn’t go to them anymore. I figured that it couldn’t be right that a religion would restrict me so much. And now I even find it awful when the term ‘sister’ is used. It indicates a closed group and it implies a claim. I can’t handle it very well when somebody consistently uses Arabic terms with everything, either.’ (13) Some Muslim women come in contact with Islamic fundamentalism through their partner and some seek alliance themselves. It is commonly known that women within fundamentalist groups are sometimes more fanatical than their male soul mates. But they hardly have executive positions and usually maintain a supporting role.

Results of patriarchal thinking Many more Muslim women in the Netherlands have to deal with the harmful consequences of the patriarchal way of thinking that is still characteristic of most Muslim communities, but not necessarily of Islam. Islam was revealed in an era and environment in which patriarchy strongly dominated. Historically, a number of verses of the Qur’an and pronouncements of the prophet Muhammad can be identified as serious endeavours to reinforce the position of the woman. Other texts (and paradoxically enough, sometimes the same ones) seem to confirm and sometimes even reinforce the privileged position of men. One of the current discussions within the Muslim community concerns the question of how these texts should be interpreted and applied. Are they ‘only’ a reflection of reality back then, without prescribing the role and position of women throughout all times and circumstances? Or are they texts which, because of their heavenly origin, encompass universally applicable rules? Qur’an researchers like Riffat Hassan, Asma Barlas and Amina Wadud have been occupied with these questions for already some decades. (14) Riffat Hassan indicates that the Qur’an, for many Muslims, is the most important reference point for human rights. But she notices that, like in other religions, there is also a large gap between what are considered normative ideals and actual practice: ‘In spite of the importance given by Qur’anic doctrines to self-realisation of man-

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kind, Muslims were taught that they were created to serve God by obeying their leader and by patiently enduring everything God intended for them. For hundreds of years, masses of Muslims patiently endured poverty and the unscrupulous oppression by their leaders. They were told that they did not have any rights, only responsibilities.’ (15) According to Hassan, this has lead, amongst other things, to serious and structural subordination of girls and women. ‘Girls are discriminated against from birth. In Islamic societies it is still customary to consider a son a gift and a daughter a testing of God. The description given in the Qur’an about men and women in marriage is, “They are raiment for you and you are raiment for them”, meaning closeness, reciprocity, and equality. The Islamic culture, however, reduced many, if not all, women to puppets, to servile beings whose only goal in life is to meet men’s needs and desires. The husband is basically considered the gate to Heaven or Hell for the wife, the person deciding over her final fate. That such a notion can exist within Islam, a religion that rejects the theory of any mediator between the worshipper and God, is ironic, and at the same time, a huge tragedy. Islamic societies are hiding many women behind veils, coverings and closed doors under the pretence of protection of their purity.’ (16) Over the centuries a number of oppressive traditions arising from the patriarchal line of thinking have become strongly intertwined with Islam. Honour killings, for example, came into existence before the Islamic revelations in the Middle East and the Mediterranean areas, and are absolutely forbidden according to Islamic doctrine. Nowhere in the Qur’an is it stated that the preservation of honour rests on the shoulders of women and that they have to be protected (or guarded) for this (although some translations and interpretations do suggest so). Everybody bears his own responsibility with regard to honour according to Islam. Moreover, Islam forbids taking justice. But the fact that honour is an important value within Islam creates confusion amongst Muslims about the question of whether or not honour killings are an Islamic custom. In authentic Islamic scriptures, patience is often named as a valuable characteristic of Muslims. Over time the interpretation of this concept has become harmful for women in particular. Women that are dealing with injustice, oppression or violence in the family circle often hear that ‘a good Muslim woman bears her fate with patience’, so the problem can persist for a long time. This is similar to the prohibition in the Catholic doctrine of arguing with your parents, which leads to many young girls suffering abuse in the family. In these and other cases it is always about an entanglement of local customs and notions with concepts of Islam, which makes these traditions even more tenacious and hard to break through. The above-mentioned texts about obedience and the restricted freedom of action that are often published as ‘guidelines for Muslim women’ also carry a certain risk with regard to self-realisation of women. In communities where the prevailing notion is that women should grant men at least some obedience and are not allowed to enter society in the same way, pressure is put on women to conform. Also, in

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circles where Islamic religion isn’t practised with that much conviction, it appears that these notions also exist. In some Dutch neighbourhoods this leads to a situation where boys are monitoring the movements of the girls. In countries or regions where Islamic fundamentalist groups have a lot of influence, it is proven that such notions are often imposed by force - and sometimes with violence - to women. Hierarchy and power play big roles within these activist groups, which renders the possibilities for women to make their own choices and to claim room for their own development nearly impossible. It is only a question of whether or not Muslim women in the Netherlands that are making free choices now, would still side with this lifestyle if they or their ‘Muslim sisters’ were forced into it.

Strategies of muslim women in the Netherlands The ease with which is spoken about ‘the’ oppression of women in Islam presumes that the position of Muslim women is the same everywhere. Of course, nothing could be further from the truth. There are big differences in possibilities for Muslim women to develop themselves according to their own personal needs and potential. These differences are related to the society in which they live and the local laws and customs, legal status and her social-economic position. Class and environmental factors appear to be the most qualifying for liberation possibilities. Of course, a lot also depends on the woman herself - her character, potential and willpower. The most important explanation for the fact that Muslim women in the Netherlands, with few exceptions, are not engaged in developing strategies against Islamic fundamentalism (at least not consciously), is the fact that there is no immediate need to do so. In countries where this need does exist, women developed numerous strategies to protest the results of this fundamentalism. In Afghanistan, during the years the Taliban were in power, women organised secret meetings and very carefully created home school groups to offer girls at least some sort of education. In Iran, for many years there was a quiet form of protest by ‘accidentally’ leaving a lock of hair from the veil. Currently, religiously and secularly motivated Iranian feminists organise spontaneous mini-demonstrations to express their fight for women rights. Over the years it appears that women in such oppressed situations are consistently able to keep up their protests, albeit in the smallest of margins. In the Netherlands, Muslim women don’t need these strategies to protect themselves against possible threats of fundamentalism. Still, Dutch Muslim women do see problems and dilemmas. These are mostly the result of the migration of their parents to a country where the cultural traditions and religious customs of the country of origin don’t apply. They find themselves confronted with choices that are a result of conflicting expectations at home, in the social sphere and in broader society. So far, most Muslim women that came to the Netherlands at a young age or who were born here, liberate themselves along social lines through school and

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work. Many young Muslim women discover that there is a big difference between tradition and religion. Tradition often brings along more tenacious barriers than religion. The surrounding society could support Muslim women more effectively if they would focus more on cultural and social problems and the results of discrimination that these women are faced with, instead of consistently expressing criticism about the religion. Muslim women often have their own ideas about how to approach the problems they or the women in their environment run into, and dedicate themselves to handling these problems. The fight for (the restitution of) women rights is an important part of that. This happens in different ways. A large number of women organisations were created in which Muslim women actively try to improve their position and circumstances. Some organisations are culturally (or ethnically) qualified, others religiously. They organise meetings, defence courses, self-help groups, readings, workshops and debates. Some organizations are created to tackle a particular problem. IDEA, an inter-cultural women-organisation in Utrecht, the Netherlands, and the national Muslim-women-organisation Al Nisa started a debate about ‘I demand my own place’. Muslim women from different social settings spoke about the limited place for women in mosques, and the consequences of this for their position in the Muslim community. New institutions were set up to tackle this specific problem. In Amsterdam Saïda el Hantali established Het Spiegelhuis, an open house for Muslim-girls, who are victims of incest. At an individual level Muslim women seem to use different strategies to extend their personal space and possibilities. Pursuing studies appears to be a constructive way to develop themselves and, at the same time, lessen any possible pressure to marry young. Study is, for many Islamic parents, a good reason to adjust personal expectations. Choosing the right friends and leisure activities can also produce more space. Economic independence, the use of new means of communication (such as the Internet and mobile phones), and learning to quickly switch between cultural norms of behaviour that apply in different groups, also contribute to the increase of independence and individual scope of Muslim women in the Netherlands. An increasing number of Muslim women make use of the possibility that writing books and articles offer to raise sensitive issues. In 2006, Yasmine Allas and Fadoua Bouali published books in which they voiced criticism over the abuse they observed in their immediate surroundings. It is noteworthy that the intensified scrutiny of Muslims in Dutch society is painful, but they do not use it as an excuse for problems in their own community. Nahed Selim wrote various books in which she voices criticism about the position of women within the Muslim community. Naema Tahir and Naima el Bezaz finally incorporated personal impressions and experiences in novels. Until recently there was no organised fight for women’s rights by Muslim women in the Netherlands. In November 2006, however, the Islamic Women’s Manifest (IW/

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M) was introduced. The aim of the creators of this manifest, about twenty Muslim women, is to, in cooperation with other (Muslim) women and men, start a movement to raise awareness of discrimination against women and unfriendly ideas and practices that are taking place in Dutch Muslim communities, and to try to change these ideas and practices. Next, a number of actual objectives were formulated. Over a hundred men and women immediately signed the IW/M. Keeping the proposed follow-up activities in mind, it appears that a serious initial impetus was given to the creation of a Dutch Muslim movement for equality and gender justice. In comparison with some groups of women in the Netherlands, Muslim women still have some catching up to do when it comes to liberation and equal rights. But the liberation process of Muslim women is well under way.

Ceylan Pekta -Weber converted to Islam in 1989. She is the chairperson of the national Muslim women organisation Al Nisa and author of Moslima’s. Emancipatie achter de dijken - Bulaaq, 2006). The past years she was dedicated to the fight against domestic violence and honour killings within the Muslim community. She also expressly engages in the stimulation of dialogue between Muslims and other members of Dutch society.

Notes (1) (2) (3)

(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)

Sunier, 2001, p. 34. This refers to a verse from the Qur’an, Soera Al Kafiroen, 109:6. The Sunna is the example of the prophet Muhammad that can be read in the so-called Hadithcollections. These are mostly about pronouncements of the prophet, his actions or matters he tacitly permitted. Lazrak, in: Moslim in de polder, 1997, p. 101. (Muslim in the polder) Zeid Kailani, in: Bijbel, Koran, Grondwet, 2002, p. 51 (Bible, Qur’an, Constitution). Karimi, in: Religie en verdraagzaamheid, 2005, p. 113 (Religion and tolerance). Van Koningsveld, p. 163. Brouwer, De Islam in huis, 2005, p. 25 (The Islam at home). Karacaer, in: Religie & verdraagzaamheid, p. 66 (Religion and tolerance). Khattab, in: Het handboek voor moslimvrouwen, respectively p. 76 and p. 42 (The handbook for Muslim women). Fatima, in: Moslima’s. Emancipatie achter de dijken, p. 230 (Muslim women. Liberation behind the dykes). Azzouzi, in: Moslima’s. Emancipatie achter de dijken, p. 231 (Muslim women. Liberation behind the dykes). Azzouzi, in: Moslima’s. Emancipatie achter de dijken, p. 180 (Muslim women. Liberation behind the dykes). See amongst others ‘Believing Women’ in Islam by Asma Barlas and De Koran en de vrouw by

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Amina Wadud. (15) Hassan in Mensen, rechten en islam, p. 57-58 (People, rights and Islam). (16) Idem, p. 70-72.

Literature Allas, Yasmine, Ontheemd en toch thuis, Amsterdam, De Bezige Bij, 2006. Amdouni, Hassan, De Hijab. De juridische regels betreffende de kleding en de opmaak van de moslimvrouw, Brussel, Editions Le Savoir, 2004. Barlas, Asma, ‘Believing Women’ in Islam. Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur’an, The University of Texas Press, 2002. Brouwer, E.J., De Islam in huis. Een politieke positiebepaling, Den Haag, SGP-fractie Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, 2005. Bolkestein, Frits, Moslim in de polder. Frits Bolkestein in gesprek met Nederlandse moslims, Amsterdam / Antwerpen, Contact, 1997. Bouali, Fadoua, Bevrijd door Allah. Waarom een moslimvrouw haar mannen niet hoeft te gehoorzamen, Amsterdam, Van Gennep, 2006. El Bezaz, Naima, Minnares van de duivel, Amsterdam, Contact, 2002. El Djezeïri, AboeBakr Djaber, Het huwelijk in de Islam, Project Dien, Leiden, 2000. Harrewijn, Ab, Bijbel, Koran, Grondwet. Gesprekken over godsdienst en politiek, Amsterdam, Boom, 2002. Hassan, Riffat, ‘Gelijk voor God, ongelijk op aarde? Islamitische vrouwen en mensenrechten’, in: Katja Noordam, Roemer van Oordt & Coskun Çörüz (eds.), Mensen, rechten en islam, Amsterdam, Bulaaq / SBLI, 1998, p. 53-79. I. Doi, Abdoerrahman, Vrouw in de Sjari’a, Uitgeverij Noer, Delft, 2004. Islamitisch Vrouwen Manifest (IV/M), http://www.alnisa.nl, Amsterdam, 2006. Khattab, Huda, Het handboek voor moslimvrouwen, Delft, Noer, 2004. Koningsveld, P.S. van, ‘Godsdienstvrijheid, theocratie en Islam in West-Europa’, in: J. Frishman, K.D. Jenner & G.A. Wiegers (eds.), Godsdienstvrijheid en de religieuze identiteit van joden, christenen en moslims. Verwachting en realiteit (=Leidse Studiën van de Godsdienst 3), Kampen, Kok, 2000. Pekta¸s-Weber, Ceylan, Moslima’s. Emancipatie achter de dijken, Amsterdam, Bulaaq, 2006. Selim, Nahed, De vrouwen van de profeet. Wat heeft de koran over de vrouw te vertellen? Amsterdam, Van Gennep, 2003. Sunier, dr. Thijl, m.m.v. drs. Teuni Looij, Fundamentalisme in de islam, Tandem Felix Uitgevers in opdracht van Landelijk Selectie- en Opleidingsinstituut Politie, Instituut voor de Basispolitiefunctie, Kenniscentrum Vreemdelingenzorg te Apeldoorn, 2001. Tahir, Naema, Kostbaar bezit, Amsterdam, Prometheus, 2006. Top, Bart, Religie & verdraagzaamheid. 10 Gesprekken over tolerantie in een extreme tijd, Kampen, Ten Have, 2005. Wadud, Amina, De koran en de vrouw. Herlezing van een heilige tekst vanuit een vrouwelijk perspectief, Amsterdam, Bulaaq, 2004.

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ON STONY GROUNDS Female Religious Subjectivities in the Battle over Modernity Sarah Bracke

Gramsci said: ‘Turn your face violently towards things as they exist now.’ Not as you’d like them to be, not as you think they were ten years ago, not as they’re written about in the sacred texts, but as they really are: the contradictory, stony ground of the present conjuncture. Stuart Hall, Out of Apathy: Voices of the New Left. Thirty Years On.

When we’re having a conversation about women and religious fundamentalism, turning your face violently towards things as they exist and not as you might like them to be, encompasses a wide array of inquiries and positions. Within the research project which preoccupied me over the last eight years, it came to mean grounding (at least a part of) my analytical focus in the narratives of women involved in movements that are conservative in political and theological terms and actively resist the secularisation of society, i.e. movements that go by the shorthand ‘fundamentalist’ (see Bracke, 2004). Such movements have interpellated feminists, notably because of the gender arrangements they sanction but perhaps even more because of women’s participation in them.

The risk of comprehension: putting paradox to work The wide-spread participation of women in contemporary religious revival in general and so-called fundamentalist movements in particular has been noted (Göle, 2003) and even put forward as a characterising feature of these movements (Klatch, 1994). Valentine Moghadam has characterised women’s engagement within fundamentalist and communalist movements as ‘vexing theoretically as it is perplexing politically’ (Moghadam, 1994, p. ix). Other feminist scholars framed women’s engagement within religious fundamentalist groups in terms of a paradox, which

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remains difficult to account for, in social theory in general and feminist scholarship in particular (see e.g. Saghal & Yuval-Davis, 1992; Bracke, 2004). The notion of paradox might serve us well. In its common sense understanding, as something that runs counter the doxa or hegemonic paradigms, it opens up a space of investigation that equally brings into play the established frameworks through which we look at the world. Paradox de-stabilises hegemony, to the extent that it highlights those elements that resist totalisation and invokes the difference that cannot be equalized or cancelled (Deleuze, 1994). Paradox also remains indissolubly linked to hegemony, as it is precisely in relation to an established framework that a particular element is connotated as ‘paradoxical’. Here the work of Saba Mahmood (2005) pushes us to think further, as she problematises the assumptions that lead us to frame women’s engagement in Islamic movements as a fundamental contradiction, i.e. as a case of subjects supporting movements that are inimical to their ‘own interests and agendas’ at a historical moment when more emancipatory possibilities are available to women. Something intrinsic should predispose these women to oppose the practices, values, and injunctions of Islamic movements, is the underlying assumption of our surprise, yet, Mahmood asks, ‘is such an assumption valid? What is the history by which we have come to assume its truth? What kind of political imagination would lead one to think in this manner? More importantly, if we discard such an assumption, what other analytical tools might be available to ask a different set of questions about women’s participation in the Islamist movement?’ (Mahmood, 2005, p. 2) This line of investigation clearly puts a secular ‘us’ at risk; it invokes the ethnographic risk of letting one’s self be affected by others’ ways of viewing, inhabiting and making the world. The kind of risk which, Donna Haraway insists, does not imply identification with the subjects of study but on the contrary puts self-identity into question: ‘One is at risk in the face of serious non-identity that challenges previous stabilities, convictions, or ways of being of many kinds.’ (Haraway, 1997, p. 190-191). Our conversations about women and fundamentalism need such risks as the things that concern us as feminists - such as the gender arrangements that new religious movements advocate, the structural importance of women’s participation in this religious revival, and the centrality of both women’s bodies and the notion of fundamentalism in the new geopolitical hegemonic frameworks - are multi-layered and complex.

Devils of a foreign kind: the problem with fundamentalism The notion of fundamentalism might seem useful when speaking about different cross-cultural and cross-religious empirical realities of religious revival that appear to be related by a similar impulse. Such a notion of fundamentalism is a relatively new one: as a transversal category it emerged and was consolidated during the last two decades of the 20th century (see notably Marty & Appleby, 1991-1995). Its

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transversal character is informed by a sense that ‘something happened on the way to the 21st century’ (Lawrence, 1989, p. 6) and by a genealogy of a ‘historical coincidence’ in the way that from the 1970s onwards, religious discourses with strong claims with respect to the organisation of society have surfaced in the public sphere (Kepel, 1991). (1) A feminist transversal perspective, moreover, insists upon the ways in which fundamentalist movements discipline women’s bodies and are characterised by patriarchal agendas on gender, sexual difference and sexuality (Saghal & Yuval-Davis, 1992; Pollit, 2002). As soon as we seek to articulate with more precision the analytical grounds upon which such a notion of fundamentalism would rest, however, we get into troubled waters. What exactly happened on the way to the 21st century, i.e. what is the similar drive of those movements called fundamentalist? In my research I have found the differences between four so-called fundamentalist settings / movements (Christian and Islamic) in three locations in Europe too significant to accommodate within existing descriptions of notions of fundamentalism. Take the disciplining of women’s bodies. My point is not that so-called fundamentalist movements would not be marked by patriarchal agendas; the ones I studied clearly were. But I found little evidence of one particular kind of patriarchal arrangement that 1) they would all have in common, and 2) would differ substantially and specifically from other religious and non-religious movements. I agree with Bobby Sayyid that the disciplining of women’s bodies cannot be considered outside of more general questions of governmentality, i.e. of how a modern paradigm of power is bio-political in nature, with the body as a crucial site of the exercise of power (Sayyid, 1997). Discussing the example of forced veiling and unveiling, Sayyid argues that from the angle of disciplining bodies, identifying one of these forced practices as ‘emancipation’ or ‘progress’ and the other as ‘fundamentalism’ implies a fundamental misrecognition of the operation of modern power. Both are disciplinary acts focussed on women’s bodies, which are a crucial site of focus, projection and battle in projects of community, nation or civilisation building (Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989). It is vital to understand what exactly happens in disciplinary practices and how they affect social relations of sexual difference, and a general notion of fundamentalism hinders rather than enables an analytical (and political) grip on the differences that matter. Collapsing fundamentalism with gender disciplining within religious formations for instance would qualify the entire official Catholic Church as fundamentalist, and cease to bear special reference to the significance of novel tendencies such as Comunione and Liberazione. And collapsing fundamentalism with gender violence tout court, as for instance Giddens (1994) does in a discussion on fundamentalism that bears no specific reference to religion, leads us into a tautological argument: fundamentalism is gender violence and gender violence is fundamentalism. Another common transversal understanding of fundamentalism emphasises ‘literal’ readings of the scriptures or sacred texts. Such an understanding, however, is based on a problematic and reductive account of the complexities of how believers,

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scriptures and truth relate: it wipes out the processes of construction and indeed interpretation that necessarily take place. ‘Literal readings’ and ‘strict adherence to the text’ do not exist: even the most so-called fundamentalist readings are selective and gloss over the scriptures’ contradictions, as many authors points out (e.g. Saghal & Yuval-Davis, 1992). Numerous examples can be mobilised to illustrate the point; Sara Maitland mentions for instance that ‘the biblical text is absolutely clear that the consumption of prawn cocktails is totally contrary to the Law of God, while homosexuality is barely mentioned and the few references to it are contradictory and uncertain’, while neo-evangelical public statements would clearly lead us to believe otherwise. Of course human beings can, and do, call their own way of reading ‘literal’. But from an ethnographic perspective such a self-designation cannot be taken at face-value. The fact that commentators on religion often do so, is symptomatic for the way in which various hermeneutic insights developed in relation to a whole array of cultural practices are simply ignored once religion is the subject. With the result that scholars are often complicit in co-constructing what Willy Jansen (1993) has called ‘the myth of the fundament’. A last transversal understanding of fundamentalism I wish to briefly pause upon puts the mixing of religion and politics forward as its defining characteristic. One problem with this perspective is its implicit and sometimes explicit suggestion that there would be ‘non-political’ forms of religion; a suggestion that runs counter the ways in which feminist and post-structuralist insights have put the circulation of power and the political in everyday life and practices on the agenda. Moreover, a wide range of religious and social movements (such as Liberation theology, Civil Rights movements, etc.) have affirmed and assumed connections between religion and politics while they have generally been recognised as progressive, and not fundamentalist. Maitland (1992, p. 26) opens her essay on biblical scripturalism with a teasing quote from Desmond Tutu: ‘When people say politics and religion don’t mix, I wonder which Bible they are using?’ Clearly something more is at stake in this perspective on fundamentalism than the actual mix of religion and politics. An emphasis on the separation between politics and religion is indeed a central tenet of the political doctrine of secularism, in which this separation is articulated with that between public reason and private belief and conviction. As a doctrine, however, secularism is increasingly questioned, precisely ‘because the categories of “politics” and “religion” turn out to implicate each other more profoundly than we thought, a discovery that has accompanied our growing understanding of the powers of the modern nation-state,’ Talal Asad (2003, p. 200) argues. Secularism, in other words, is profoundly involved in the debate over religion in contemporary society; it is one of the invested parties so to speak and in analytical terms it functions poorly as the standard against which fundamentalism could be assessed. If a cross-religious notion of fundamentalism has little analytical consistency, as I have argued up till now, then what made the term nestle itself so easily in our vo-

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cabulary? Its contemporary use thrives on two grounds. A first one is geo-political. The scholarly attempt to come up with a definition of fundamentalism that would operate along cross-religious lines was preceded by political commentaries on the emergence and threat of fundamentalism in the wake of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Those commentaries were often marked by a profound sense of incomprehension or ‘impossibility’, i.e. the sense of an event that was not supposed to happen (Jeurgensmeyer, 1993). But as the Cold War script lost its explanatory and performative grip on our world, the geo-political arena opened up for re-configuration and a new set of hegemonising forces or a global ‘definition of the situation’ emerged. The ‘new strategic era’ of the last two decennia became defined along civilizational lines (cfr. Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ paradigm), in which the West is cast against the Rest, and in particular Islam, depicted as the barbarian threat at the gates of civilisation. Fundamentalism and terrorism, Edward Said (1993) argues, emerged as key-terms in a 1980s geo-political context with its securitarian logic and infrastructure, and flourished since then as ‘figures of an international or transnational imaginary made up of foreign devils’ which became structurally indispensable in the contemporary geo-political script, i.e. they became code-words for the global enemy, the non-civilised abject other. A second ground, not unrelated, is the story of what happened to modernity and its relationship to religion. In his reflections on postmodernity Fredric Jameson (1991) points out that religion operates as modernity’s difference or ‘other’. Susan Harding’s study of North American Protestant fundamentalism substantiates such a claim. Fundamentalism has not only always been inside of the modernity of North American society, Harding (2000) argues, but it has also helped to produce that modernity. Precisely through representing and enacting what it was not, it made modernity seem distinct and better and real. Harding elaborately shows how in a crucial conflict about religion in modern society, namely the Scopes trial (1925) on evolutionary theory in the biology curriculum in public schools, the public rhetorics fashioning North America as a modern secular nation were elaborated and stabilised. In this process a range of conservative Protestants were constructed into a unitary cultural ‘other’, and a social contract was produced that exiled fundamentalists from public life. Harding calls this narrative encapsulation, i.e. ‘a moment in which the cultural story of one people was subordinated to and reframed by the terms of another’. In other words, the production of modern secular hegemony and the definition of modern America as secular was co-produced through the cultural exile of the fundamentalists. ‘As long as they remained in exile, accepting their pariah status as outsiders, as inferior, backward “others”, they enabled other Americans to see themselves as modern, superior and progressive.’ (Harding, 2000, p. 21) Harding’s account of fundamentalism in the U.S. draws attention to a structural dynamic between the formation of modern society and (trans)formation of religion, which is one of narrative encapsulation involving the incorporation, containment and (co-)construction of religious formations within a hegemonic story of the

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making of the secular modern nation. If the notion of fundamentalism makes any sense in its contemporary cross-religious use, then it is not as a set of characteristics which could be attributed to certain movements - that is the kind of notion that continues to fall short analytically. Rather, fundamentalism tends to signal those movements and positions that trespass the established lines and status quo of the secular contract (which was one of incorporation, containment and (co-)construction of religion) of the modern nation-state. This kind of trespassing, moreover, is not considered as fundamentalism in a symmetric way, as the term operates within current geopolitics to designate ‘global enemies’ and ‘religious others’ and bears a particular reference to Islam in this respect.

Snapshots of female religious subjectivities (2) Recognising the realm of religion as a constitutive player in the formation of modernity gives us a lens to look at how religious revival and so-called fundamentalism relate to postmodernity, or in the expression of Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan which I prefer, the ‘scattered hegemonies’ of modernity, i.e. ‘the effects of mobile capital as well as the multiple subjectivities that replace the European unitary subject’ (Grewal & Kaplan, 1994, p. 7). Accounting for structural oppression and violence within hegemonic formations of modernity, many authors have characterised the postmodern condition as a ‘return’ of modernity’s oppressed. Rosi Braidotti (2002, p. 117) argues in this respect: ‘Postmodernity is marked by the return of the “others” of modernity: woman the sexual Other of man, the ethnic or native Other of the Eurocentric subject and the natural or earth Other of techno-culture emerge as counter-subjectivities. Given the structural importance in the constitution and affirmation of the “same” in His dominant subject-position, their “return” coincides with a crisis of the structures and the boundaries of classical subjectivity, which challenges its very foundations.’ It is not difficult to argue, in a similar vein, that postmodernity implies a return of religion and religious subjectivities. But clearly this is a more uncomfortable ‘return’ than the subaltern and counter-subjectivities grounded in gender, ‘race’, class, ethnicity, citizenship or migration that many of us have been joyfully affirming as instances of resistance and struggle for new worlds possible. In the case of religious subjectivities, we find ourselves much more hesitant, puzzled and uncomfortable, if not straightforwardly repulsed (Bracke & Schmitt, 2006). We are indeed urged to further complicate questions of resistance and agency in this respect (see notably the work of Saba Mahmood). In the following pages, I will draw upon empirical material to illustrate some of the negotiations involved in the articulation of female religious subjectivities in different ‘fundamentalist’ movements or settings in Europe. A first snapshot comes from a case-study involving young Muslim women in Kazan, Tatarstan (Russian Federation, 1998) and addresses the tension between ideals of

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domesticity and professional life. This was in fact the only case-study in which the women I had conversations and interviews with explicitly upheld domesticity as a foundational part of female subjectivity. This position wasn’t rare in a post-communist context: young women and men in Tatar society as a whole displayed a marked tendency to idealise female domesticity. Some commentators have situated this tendency in terms of the ‘return of the repressed’ of the communist regime in which the official ideology emphasised women’s equality in the public sphere and in the labour market - an ideology which, as feminists clarified, continued to foster and consolidate gender inequality in different ways (Lapidus, 1978). Larisa Lissyutkina (1993) also connects a sentimental nostalgia for the kitchen to the image of the Russian kitchen as a ‘front of massive resistance to the totalitarian regime’. At the same time, the liberalisation of the market and the establishment of civil society depends on a creation of a sphere of domesticity, as many authors convincingly argue (Funk, 1993; Watson, 1993; Gal, 1997). The young Muslim women I interviewed added yet another dimension to the ways in which women’s domesticity was played out in the society in which they live. When women’s domesticity came up in our conversations, it was usually embedded within the disenchantment of family life under the communist regime. The figure of their exhausted mothers, with a shift of housework waiting for them after a full day of paid work, was a recurrent point of concern. Their argument rested on the assumption that no change could be expected with regard to more equal distributions of domestic work. Instead, they saw a solution in diminishing the pressure on women to participate in the labour market in a similar way as men. Gulnara expressed the structural problem she believed women were faced with like this: ‘When they [women] try to imitate men, they take on men’s obligations, but that doesn’t take away their own obligations. So they have a lot of obligations.’ In Islam the young women found the contours of a system that sanctioned a division of labour that, while not equal, was far more sustainable for women. Another (and somewhat more burning) point of concern was their own feeling of having missed on out time with their mother as they grew up, and their wish that the generation of their children would grow up in different conditions. When we talked about the dreams and visions for their own lives, and as we moved away from ‘she’ (the ideal-typical Muslim woman) to ‘I’ (the respondents) the tone and content of our conversations would radically change. After elaborations on the value of housekeeping and criticism of how housekeeping is generally disqualified by society, I asked Irina, a medical student, whether she saw herself as a housekeeper in the future. ‘Oh no, no, no, no. I think a woman must work. Especially when she has such a useful profession - a doctor. For example a gynaecologist.’ Another student, Nailia, in her fourth year of mathematics, responded: ‘But of course, [I don’t want] to sit at home. What am I studying for then? In order to do what? To sit at home means to stop my development completely, it means to lag behind. But I say, you have to work to develop. Because Islam teaches to study all your life, to gather knowledge, grow, to go with your time, but not to lag behind!’ As much as they

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embedded their ideal-typical vision on women and the division of labour in society in Islamic references, they also anchored their desires and dreams of continued education and a professional life in a religious perspective, notably through insisting on the Islamic imperative of education and the particular usefulness of certain professions within the gender segregation they (partly) advocated (e.g. a gynaecologist). Probing into the contradictions between this ideal of domesticity and their own dreams didn’t lead us very far. The young women tried to bring pieces of the puzzle together, without much success. Some of them elaborated on the need for Muslim crèches, which were indeed emerging in Tatarstan at the time, but admitted that it didn’t bring them very far with respect to the initial concern of children growing up with their mother. Others mentioned that they honestly didn’t know, that they hoped that the future and God’s will would bring some kind of solution. A second snapshot is taken from a conversation with a senior member of the Catholic movement Comunione e Liberazione (CL, Italy, 2000). Throughout my fieldwork I was confronted with a difficulty to address and interpellate the students as women and to raise questions of gender or sexual differentiation within the movement. At first my questions surprised them. ‘I never really thought of myself as a woman’, was a recurrent refrain in the interviews, and another young woman who had recently graduated and was in full preparation of her marriage added that: ‘Perhaps only now I’m beginning to get convinced that the concept [of woman] could apply to me.’ An informant explained that these were the wrong questions, emphasising what others had already told me: sexual difference and gender matter in the ‘outside world’ but precisely not in the movement (which also explains its attraction, she added), where at the end of the day everybody was addressed as a soul in relation to God. This resistance to ‘the women’s question’ was in line with the movement’s strong opposition, from its very inception, to what they called the particularised treatment of souls. (3) A position which, in preconciliar times, got the movement into trouble with the ecclesiastic authorities in the Church, who considered the movement’s gender mixity as ‘too modern’, inappropriate and potentially sinful. As I shared these difficulties with a senior professor at the Catholic University of Milan who was also a member of CL, she insisted once more that a discourse on ‘being a woman’ or female subjectivity was never of much relevance to the movement. CL, she explained, is about ‘a personal encounter, which concerns a person as a Christian, indifferent of being a man or a woman’. In religious terms, such an experience is rooted in a notion of a universal soul, and on a more sociologically note she added that ‘CL was there before the feminist movement [of the 1970s] and therefore the logic of parity simply does not enter the movement’. While dismissing a feminist framework from the discussion, she didn’t dismiss the question of gender: ‘It might not be relevant for the movement, the fact of being a man or a woman, but it is for a sociologist,’ she argued, invoking a shared identity between us. Her insistence on gender, however, clearly reached beyond the realm of sociology. Times have changed

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since the movement’s inception, she added, and ‘at the dawn of a new millennium, the question of women in CL should be asked’. She continued to shift between religious and sociological discourses. From a religious point of view there was no discrimination between the sexes within CL as everybody was considered as a universal soul, and hence the question of gender simply fell out of the movement’s framework. From a sociological point of view gender was relevant with respect to how CL manages sexual difference and how (young) women in its midst relate to female identity, i.e. more specifically the fact that they do not recognise and problematise it. These different logics did not meet, she insisted, but what emerged between them was a paradox that she found disturbing: ‘There is no discourse on gender within the movement, but all the leaders are male.’ Her framing of the problem somehow implied that CL’s emphasis on a universal soul free of sexual difference should entail that sexual difference would be absent from the movement’s organisation and practices. But in sociological terms sexual difference clearly mattered; something she did not know how to account for. Her response to the situation introduced, after a previous dismissal of the feminist movement, the logic of parity. But a notion of parity, she insisted, should not interfere with that of subjectivity: parity should remain a corrective operation on the surface that stays clear from religious beliefs and self-understandings. The entire argumentation took place on the grounds of the paradox of universality and difference. For her, the leaders of the movement were male despite the emphasis on a universal soul free of sexual difference, a position which is not unrelated to liberal and equal opportunityoriented frameworks. In feminist sexual difference theory the argument and causality is reversed: the leaders are male precisely because of the absence of a discourse on sexual difference. A third snapshot comes from a case-study of women connected to the movement of ‘political Islam’ in the Turkish diaspora, Milli Görü , in the Netherlands (2002). Among the women I talked to Yasemin displayed the most ‘strict’ religious practice; her appearance alone would immediately strike people on the street but also within the movement as such. Her parents feared that she would don the niqab (face veil) - an idea that definitely attracted Yasemin - and unnecessarily blow her chances to get ahead in Dutch society. Yasemin insisted on covering herself very strictly and preferably in black, which continued to provoke the lamentations of her mother (who wore a traditional headscarf, Turkish rural style and not very strict) about how inappropriate and sad her attire was (for a young woman). The story of Yasemin’s faith was filled with great spiritual yearning, accompanied with insisting self-discipline aimed at reaching a higher level of spirituality. Her strong devotional interest was grounded with a ‘mythical origin’ in stories from her (early) childhood. That was the time when she first heard about the figure of Rabia al-Adewiyya, an early important female mystic in Islam, who came to provide Yasemin with a spiritual role-model which she aspired to follow and in which image

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she sought to construct herself. Rabia al-Adewiyya was born in Basra, Iraq, around 717 A.D. and became a spiritual authority in the emerging Sufi tradition at the time. She lead an ascetic life with nights of prayer as a way of finding communion with God, with whom she wanted to melt her own being. God’s love was central to her life, that was set on fire with love and longing. The story goes that she once walked the streets of Basra with a torch and a bucket of water, in order to burn heaven and extinguish the flames of hell, so that people could see that the only reason to love God is God itself. The figure of Adeviye (in Turkish transliteration) took on an overwhelming importance in Yasemin’s life: ‘And of course our prophet Muhammad is also our example. But that woman, also because she was a woman, was a great example for me.’ Yasemin’s strong devotion was rather exceptional within Milli Görü . Her engagement within the movement was not without reservations, which had to do with a tension between the pious and the political, and she clearly situated her own passion on the side of the pious while the movement’s stakes were more political. At the same time she considered these tensions as symptomatic for contemporary Dutch society, where a political battle was needed in order to create the conditions that would enable her to lead the pious life she longed for. Besides a spiritual example, Adeviye’s devotion gave Yasemin more worldly directions in how to shape her life. It made her understand that marriage and children would lead her away from the piety and spirituality she longed for. Adeviye was never married, she emphasised, ‘also because of Islam, because she loved Allah so very much’. Because if she loves Allah so very much, she said, she could not fulfi l her duties towards a husband and children in a good way. Therefore she only wanted to commit herself to Allah. Praying in the morning, sleeping very little and living Islam in a very spiritual way.’ Moreover, the figure of Adeviye inspired Yasemin to seek for a position of spiritual authority that would be socially recognised. Initially she wanted to do theological studies in Turkey, as there was no higher education in Islamic theology in the Netherlands at the time she finished secondary school. Her parents objected and did not let her go, insisting she should get a ‘useful’ diploma in the Netherlands instead. She went on to study languages, but not after having taken up more responsibility in a local mosque as an alternative way to build up spiritual authority. ‘Yes, because most of the time you only hear male imams in the mosque, or references to other important men, our Prophet, and as a woman you might start believing that there are few female imams that play an important role in Islam. But she [Adeviye] was someone like that. And it is mentioned [in the books], but some imams pay less attention to it. For me it is very important to know that a woman could also reach this. Apparently we women can also achieve a lot, in terms of Islam, in terms of spirituality, but usually you don’t really realise this. Other women to whom I talk about her [Adeviye], are also very pleased, that women can achieve such high positions within Islam. In the world, within education and so on, all that is different, but with respect to the spiritual we do lag a bit behind. For me it was very important that she is a woman. (…) You do feel some kind of connec-

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tion.’ Instances of women achieving positions of religious authority were precious to Yasemin, and reclaiming spiritual authority of women within Islam was crucial to her. It was precisely the scarcity of female role-models and female authority, she argued, that account for the realm of religion, spirituality and Islam to lag behind other sectors in society. A last snapshot comes from a case-study of a (white) Evangelical community and network in the Netherlands (2001-2002). Most of the young women I talked with were raised in a strict Orthodox Protestant environment and articulated their evangelical position against that background. Strict Orthodox Protestants are classically portrayed as experiencing no hermeneutic or cultural distance between the world of the Bible and the contemporary world (Stoffels, 1995, p. 64). While I believe the point is more complicated for reasons touched upon above, the Evangelicalism of the young women I talked to engaged explicitly with questions of religion, culture and the inerrancy of the scriptures. The Bible was a central point of reference in the constitution of the young women’s selves and religious beliefs, just like it was for their parents. Their point of departure, however, was not a conservative one; the Bible in fact provided a ground for the process of re-articulating their faith: ‘Where is it written that you cannot bike on Sundays, or that you cannot watch television?’ - the kinds of things that for their parents would be sinful - they would consistently ask. Some respondents also added: ‘And does the Bible say anything about the pill?’ Their line of questioning generated a notion of culture distinct from faith, as they attributed some of the religious practices with which most of them grew up to the ‘culture’ of that world, and not the heart of their religious tradition. While they recognised that this culture supported a religious experience under certain historical circumstances, they emphasised that it could turn against genuine faith in a different context. The point for them was about creating a culture that could sustain a contemporary religious (in opposition to nominal or cultural) Christian identity. The culture argument, moreover, was not only used in relation to religious practices but also with respect to the status of the scriptures. Their arguments proceeded rather timidly, and not in the context of conversations directly on the inerrancy of the scriptures, but rather in relation to specific issues that most often had to do with women and gender. ‘Once I read a book about women in the Bible, and in that book the text was literally translated from Hebrew and I learned that a great number of things in the Bible are not adequately translated. I sometimes read from the Statenvertaling (4), and we know that this text is written by men and they looked at the Bible with their vision of the world, and subsequently, almost logically, they translated from their own vision. That is logical. But I learned that many things are not written as they are presented to us.’ Esther located cultural elements not in the Bible itself, but in its translation. In this realm she felt confident to claim that since men (in the 17th century) had translated the text, ‘logically’ the translation is coloured by their (male, 17th century) vision on the world. At the same time the

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principle of inerrancy remained safe-guarded in the reference to an original Hebrew text. Moreover, positioning the book on women in the Bible as a ‘more literal’ translation of the original text was functional in giving that particular vision on women, which pleased her so much, more authority. However timid Esther’s reasoning, a classic sense of inerrancy was mitigated; or rather, it was located in a space - ‘the original text’ - to which she affirmed she had no direct access. Nor did she plan to seek that kind of access; Esther had no intentions of learning Hebrew or other Biblical languages, nor of looking for a Church based on the texts in the original languages and not the Dutch translation. At the same time, she also did not consider her book on women in the Bible as a more authoritative or inerrant text because it would be a better translation from Hebrew, i.e. the notion of inerrancy was not extended from ‘the original text’ to ‘a more literal translation from the original text’. Rather, her reference to ‘the original text’ came to function as a horizon that opened up and also constrained a set possibilities of different ‘translations’ of the Bible without needing to make arguments on grounds which she very quickly deemed too subjective. This was different for Judith who actually challenged a notion of inerrancy. Sure enough, the Bible was the inspired word of God, but at the same time she formulated doubts whether that means it would be true ‘from cover to cover’. ‘Well, I want to take the Bible very serious as the word of God, in the sense that I really do believe that the Bible is the inspired word of God. But does that mean that I totally believe everything that is written in it from cover to cover…? I would like to do that, and subsequently I should take those things seriously and look at how they are meant. And as I think about it now, I really do think the cultural fact is simply quite high, the role of women in that time was quite different from now.’

Conclusion These snapshots give some insight in negotiations involved in the construction of religious subjectivities of women, who are situated within different social contexts and religious traditions and who are engaged in so-called fundamentalist movements in a European context. These negotiations encompass elements and concerns that do not seem all that far from the things feminists struggle with: the tension between identification and dis-identification with gendered subjectivities (including a drive to transcending them, in this case through an insistence on a universal human soul in the eyes of God or through an excessive love for God), a history of marginalisation of women and a need to reclaim that history, women’s (spiritual) authority, the structural reality of women’s double burden and what can be done, patriarchal practices and ideologies in their movements, and so on. Yet at the same time, these stories cannot be ‘domesticated’ within existing feminist frameworks and willingly or unwillingly turned into icons of feminist resistance of another kind. Although some of the women considered feminism as a relevant struggle in their own lives,

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feminism was not a site of identity or engagement in their lives. The movements the women were involved in clearly had patriarchal agendas, and part of these were reproduced in the negotiations the women were invested in. Something crucial eludes from a focus on what constitutes resistance (and what doesn’t) in the women’s narratives and practices, namely the fact that these subjectivities are constituted on grounds that differ radically from the liberal (understood in its broad sense as connected to Enlightenment frameworks) and secular ones that underly our feminisms to a great extent. It is also in this respect that the term fundamentalism does not serve comprehension. What qualifies the movements or settings in the four snapshots as fundamentalist is indeed their opposition to an established modern secular contract, which in concrete terms takes very different shapes in the three countries where this study took place. No doubt, the case-studies are connected through the ways in which the movements and women’s narratives sit (very) uncomfortable with a hegemonic secular framework. But from there on ‘fundamentalism’ tells us little about the kinds of beliefs - religious and otherwise (e.g. about gender) - these women hold. Comprehending so-called fundamentalism does in fact require to recognise that the articulation of new ontological grounds for religious movements and subjectivities is at stake; an ontology which profoundly challenges, if not breaks with secular liberalism. What is the point of understanding, what does it contribute to our political action, some may ask. I find much truth in these words of Hannah Arendt (1948): ‘Comprehension does not mean denying the outrageous, deducing the unprecedented from precedents, or explaining phenomena by such analogies and generalities that the impact of reality and the shock of experience are no longer felt. It means, rather, examining and bearing consciously the burden which our century placed on us - neither denying its existence nor submitting meekly to its weight. Comprehension, in short, means the unpremeditated attentive facing up to, and resisting of, reality - whatever it may be.’

Dr. Sarah Bracke holds a postdoctoral Marie Curie Fellowship based at Utrecht University (gender studies) and affiliated with the University of California Santa Cruz (anthropology). Her doctoral thesis looks at how women’s engagement within religious movements which question secularisation in Europe challenges (secular) feminist frameworks. She writes about religion, modernity, and the secular, and does ethnographic investigations into (female) religious subjectivities.

Notes (1)

Examples of such historic coincidences are the election U.S. presidents who draw upon bornagain discourses and constituencies (starting with Jimmy Carter, in 1977, and still ongoing), the Iranian Revolution in 1978-1979, the election of Karol Wojtyla as Pope John Paul II in 1978, the formation of the Moral Majority in 1978, etc.

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(2) (3)

(4)

I borrow the term snapshots from Nilüfer Göle’s article ‘Snapshots of Islamic Modernities’ (2000). See e.g. Giussani (1988) where the leader of the movement argues: ‘To be a woman, a man, a student or an engineer does not constitute an ideal. Only the realisation of the human condition is in itself an ideal to attain: everything else is a circumstance and a particularity that only has sense when it is attached to the whole, to the fundamental problem.’ The Statenvertaling (literally ‘The Translation of the States’, also known as the Authorized Version), was ordered by the States General at the Dordrecht Synod in 1618-1619, as a reformational Bible translation based on the most original sources available at the time (for some books this were still Latin translations). It was completed in 1637 and remains up till date the authoritative Bible within Dutch reformational circles.

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Haraway, Donna (1997), Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium. FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouse™. Feminism and Technoscience, New York, Routledge. Harding, Susan (2000), The Book of Jerry Falwell. Fundamentalist Language and Politics, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Jameson, Fredric (1991), Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, New York, Verso. Jansen, Willy (1993), Mythen van het fundament, Inaugurale rede, Nijmegen, SUN. Jeurgensmeyer, Mark (1993). The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State, Berkeley, University of California Press. Kepel, Gilles (1991), La Revanche de Dieu. Chretiens, juifs et musulmans à la reconquete du monde, Paris, Seuil. Klatch, Rebecca E. (1994), ‘Women of the New Right in the United States: Family, Feminism, and Politics’, in: Valentine M. Moghadam (ed.), Identity Politics and Women. Cultural Reassertions and Feminisms in an International perspective, Boulder, Westview Press. Lapidus, Gail Warshofsky (1978), Women in Soviet Society. Equality, Development and Social Change, Berkeley, University of California Press. Lawrence, Bruce B. (1989), Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age, San Francisco, Harper and Row. Mahmood, Saba (2005), Politics of Piety. The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Maitland, Sara (1992), ‘Biblicism: A Radical Rhetoric?’, in: Gita Saghal & Nira Yuval-Davis (eds.), Refusing Holy Orders. Women and Fundamentalism in Britain, London, Virago. Marty, Martin E. & R. Scott Appleby (eds.) (1991), Fundamentalisms Observed. [The Fundamentalism Project, Volume 1], Chicago, Chicago University Press. Moghadam, Valentine M. (1994), Identity Politics and Women. Cultural Reassertions and Feminisms in an International perspective, Boulder, Westview Press. Oxford Socialist Group (eds.), Out of Apathy: Voices of the New Left. Thirty Years On, London, Verso. Pollit, Katha (2002), ‘Introduction’, in: Betsy Reed (ed.), Nothing Sacred. Women Respond to Religious Fundamentalism and Terror, New York, Thunder’s Mouth Press / Nation Books. Saghal, Gita & Nira Yuval-Davis (eds.), Refusing Holy Orders. Women and Fundamentalism in Britain, London, Virago. Said, Edward (1993), Culture and Imperialism, New York, Vintage. Sayyid, Bobby (1997), A Fundamental Fear. Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism, London, Zed. Stoffels, Hijme (1995), ‘Survival Strategies of Conservative Protestants and Dutch Society. The World as Threat and Challenge’, in: Lieteke van Vucht Tijsen, Jan Berting & Frank Lechner (eds.), The Search for Fundamentals. The Process of Modernisation and the Quest for Meaning, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publications. Watson, Peggy (1993), ‘Eastern Europe’s Silent Revolution: Gender’, in: Sociology, vol. 27, nr 3. Yuval-Davis, Nira & Floya Anthias (1989), Women-State-Nation, Basingstoke, Macmillan.

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‘A WOMAN OF VALOUR, WHO CAN FIND HER? FAR BEYOND PEARLS IS HER VALUE…’ Fundaments and Feminisms in Contemporary Orthodox Judaism (1) Chia Longman

In her book, Standing at Sinai (1991, p. xvii), feminist Jewish theologian Judith Plaskow wonders to what extent patriarchal Judaism can be reformed from a feminist perspective: ‘At what point in the reinterpretation of Judaism does the Jewish tradition cease being Jewish and become something else?’ This question touches upon the matter of unchangeable fundaments on one hand and room for interpretation and negotiation about a religious tradition on the other.

Plaskow is of the opinion that an adjustment of the Jewish law (the Halacha), as it applies within rabbinical Judaism as a fundamental pillar of the tradition, will not be enough to achieve gender equality because the Halacha can be identified as intrinsically patriarchal. Nothing less than a radical and completely new Jewish feminist theology will do. Throughout Western history of the impact of women’s liberation in religion, and within the feminist theology of the last decades in particular, different points of view have been put forward about the way religious traditions can be either more gender-inclusive, or conversely can be characterised as intrinsically androcentric or even as hopeless and ‘irreparably’ patriarchal (Christ & Plaskow, 1979). While some religious feminists chose to implement alternative interpretations of doctrine or theology, or institutional or ritual changes within their tradition, others broke away and founded new, exclusively feminist forms of religion. To what extent can changes to traditional gender roles and ideologies take shape so certain ‘fundaments’, without which the tradition in its entirety would be lost, will not be threatened? This contribution will focus on the relationship between fundaments and feminisms in Judaism.

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Jewish fundamentalism In order to identify certain movements and tendencies in today’s Jewish world as ‘fundamentalist’, both terms ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘Judaism’ need to be placed in their respective historical and actual contexts. Although Judaism dates back more than 3000 years, the diversion into different segments only dates back to modern times of our history. Up until the modernisation tendencies in Europe, for most Jews, being a minority group living almost separated from the rest of society, observing the Jewish laws, rituals and traditions was considered the standard. This changed radically during the Jewish Enlightenment (the Haskala) and liberation (equal rights and citizenship for Jews for the first time) at the end of the eighteenth century, which started a process of assimilation, secularisation and diversification of Jewish identity. Religion became a choice of the individual. Within the religious Jewish communities a split into different denominations took place, in line with the Christian model. The new ‘progressive’ movements raised the matter of the status of the Halacha (2) or the Jewish laws as a foundation for the Jewish religious experience and identity. Reform (or liberal) Jews were very critical of the Halacha as the general religious way of expression, while the conservatives acted more selective by stating that the rabbinical tradition could be reinterpreted in different and drastic ways. ‘Orthodox Judaism’ developed around the end of the nineteenth century as a reaction to these new movements. Orthodox Jews did not just want to redefine and adjust the Jewish religion and way of life to the surrounding non-Jewish culture, yet hold on to the Halacha according to the rabbinical tradition. The process of further commentary, interpretation and codification based on the statements of the Talmudic rabbis and later authoritative figures, endures today under orthodox Jewish scribes. For orthodox Jews, the Halacha is the foundation of the Jewish religion. There are differing opinions as to what extent and from today’s perspective - and that of modernity - the term fundamentalism can be legitimately applied to Jewish orthodoxy, or a return to the sources. From an orthodox Jewish perspective it is more about historical continuity than ‘going back’. Furthermore, today’s orthodox Jewish identities are characterised worldwide by an enormous diversity. The Halacha is considered binding, but is interpreted and observed in various ways by individuals and communities along a descriptive continuum from ‘modern’ to ‘strictly’ (or ultra) orthodox. (3) According to Charles Liebman (1998), modern Jewish orthodoxy can be broadly defined as ‘the effort to adapt Orthodox Judaism to modernity and to avoid the social and / or cultural isolation which living in strict accordance with halacha would seem to impose’. Modern orthodox Jews can hardly be called fundamentalist because of that. Orthodox Jewish communities and philosophies on the more ‘strict’ side of the continuum show a large variation amongst themselves in the manner and the extent to which they reconcile the Halachic way of thinking and living with

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all aspects of modern life. However, academic and journalistic publications usually identify them as fundamentalist. To this, usually two mainstream movements are taken into account; the Charedim (4), including several Chassidic movements and certain groups or varieties of religious nationalists or (5) Zionists in Israel, such as the settler movement Gush Emunim. Differentiation is possible, however, by considering religious Zionists as the active innovative radical type of fundamentalists, while the Charedim can be categorised as more acquiescent and peaceful (cf., Friedman, 1993).

The position of women in different Jewish religious movements Like Abrahamic and other religious traditions, Judaism, and Halachic Judaism in particular, that is still practised today by orthodox Jews, can be characterized as gender-traditional and androcentric; or from a secular, liberal point of view, as patriarchal. Hierarchical gender relations permeate Jewish theology, liturgy and rituals. In the newly created more ‘progressive’ denominations, a number of improvements for women were already introduced in the first half of the twentieth century, particularly with respect to participation in the synagogue. The Reform movement removed the blessing of God for ‘not making me a woman’ from the Morning Prayer. Girls were, just like boys, considered to reach an age of religious maturity (at age twelve) and could be counted into the minyan (quorum of ten religious adults - read: men - that are necessary for a prayer service) and they were admitted to the choir. These and other adjustments, such as the abolition of the mechitzah (partition between seats for men and women in the synagogue) and parallel birth and transition rites for boys and girls (for example the bar mitzvah and bat mitzvah) were not directly introduced, but gradually. For the more conservative denomination, Tamar Ross (2004) states that the discussions about women in the synagogue had more to do with the desire to simply adjust the Jewish worship to the socially dominant Christian model than it did with any feminist aspirations. The second wave of feminism clearly had an influence on both movements with respect to religious leadership. In 1972, in the US, the first female rabbi was ordained. In conservative Judaism, women were officially admitted to the minyan in 1973 and to the rabbinate in 1979 (Umansky, 1999). As in many areas of today’s Western society, these modernisation tendencies that have been geared towards obtaining equal rights, have not (yet) led to a situation of actual gender equality or parity. In spite of the fact that the Halacha can be considered a dynamic law system where adjustments are implemented as a reaction to social changes, by far, most communities within Jewish orthodoxy since the nineteenth century show a more conservative inclination with regard to the position of women. Changes according to a liberal model of equality, such as that practised in the more progressive movements, are considered a threat to their identity. Either conservative inclination or progressive-

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ness, when it comes to gender roles, seems to be one of the main characteristics upon which both movements base their identities. Within halachic, or orthodox Judaism, legal moral religious practice is more the central foundation than doctrine, theology or belief. This ‘ortho-practice’ is characterized by the fulfilment of certain obligations according to one’s role, and not a rights-based system that characterizes modern secular thinking. According to the Halacha, women are exempt from a number of commandments or mitzvot (there are 613 commandments in total) that are absolutely incumbent upon men. Women should not practise certain rituals, such as wearing the tefillin (phylacteries or prayer straps) and the tallit (prayer shawl) during the Morning Prayer. The most commonly applied justification for such exemptions, amongst those that are still accepted by most orthodox rabbinical authorities, is that certain ritual obligations are bound to set times and that the practise of these obligations would interfere with the woman’s daily family and household responsibilities. However, women are also exempt (and according to some interpretations even barred) from the study of Talmud (oral law), which is considered the most central religious activity for the practising ‘normative’ (male) Jew. The result of these stipulations is that women are also historically excluded from various public rituals and leadership positions. Since they did not study the Talmud, they were not able to participate in halachic discussions and legal processes. For women, there are no official positions such as Rabbi or judge, and they are not allowed to testify within a religious court. Just like in many other patriarchal religious societies, in traditional Jewish family law, women usually have a dependent, inferior position with regard to regulations in marriage, divorce, custody, financial status and inheritance.

Charedi and religious Zionist women: bearers of the collective Feminist-inspired scholarship during the last few decades shows how not only fundamentalists, but also nationalistic, ethnical and other traditionalist movements, cross-culturally, share a number of characteristics with regard to gender ideology and roles. In order to define and continue the identity of the collective in space and time, often the women in those communities are assigned the role of ‘symbolic boundary marker’. Women not only symbolize the group identity figuratively, but literally as well; they ensure the continued existence of the group by bearing and raising children. This often goes side by side with the control of female sexuality, linked to chastity, morality, privacy, an emphasis on the motherly and caring roles. Although such patriarchal hetero-normative gender ideologies characterize many old cultures, traditions and movements, they may take extreme forms in today’s fundamentalist movements when rights and the room to move are reduced to nil for women (see Afghanistan). Fundamentalist movements within contemporary Judaism, such as the Charedim

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and the religious Zionists, are also characterised by an intensifying of the patriarchal hetero-normative ideology, although the extent to which this has practical implications for the rights and freedom of movement for women can vary. The Jewish orthodoxy that relies on the Halacha contains elements in which the woman acts as the bearer of the group identity. (In Judaism, it is the mother that passes on the Jewish identity to the child.) As stated above, it is the area of personal law where the control of female sexuality and reproduction takes place. Among the religious Zionists in Israel, women are encouraged to bear as many children as possible in the service of the Jewish people. Following the rites with regard to the menstrual period (sexual abstinence during menstruation and the following seven days, followed by a purification in a mikveh or ritual bath) is strongly encouraged. According to religious Zionist propaganda, if women pursue the regulations, they not only ensure the purity of the family but that of the ‘entire nation’ (Yanay & Rappoport, 1997). Although interpretations and practices vary in orthodox Jewish circles, differing forms of modesty are practised; such as covering the hair after marriage and not wearing clothing that reveals too much of the female body. Within the religious sphere, central public rituals are granted to men (in the synagogue), while those for women take place in the domestic, private sphere. In strictly orthodox Jewish communities such as the Charedim, daily life is completely religiously defined and outside influences by the surrounding secular society are avoided as much as possible. As stipulated in the traditional interpretation of the Halacha, the most important mitzvah, or religious commandment, the normative (male) Jew can fulfi l is the religious study (of the Talmud) beside the daily prayer. Strictly orthodox Jewish boys start to learn Hebrew and visit the cheder, where they learn the first stories and texts of the Jewish tradition at age three. Later, the boys go to the yeshiva for Talmudic studies, and even for ‘graduated’ adult men, professional activities are considered a survival necessity, for studying and praying is the highest priority. Although girls in orthodox Jewish schools (beside the common secular subjects) are educated in religious subjects such as bible study, Hebrew and ethics, they learn about Jewish law to the extent that they will practically apply it in their future role as a mother, wife and housewife (for example knowledge about the dietary laws or kashrut). In many Charedi circles, some women bear ten or more children. The upbringing (with the exception of the family context) is done gender-segregated and arranged marriages take place between young people that often lived in different worlds and who received little or no sexual education. In some circles, the standards go much further than those stipulated by the Halacha. Depending on the group or tradition, styles and colours of the modest-style clothing vary, which is also the case for men among the Chassidim (length of the peyos or side locks, type of hat, etc.). Women are expected to wear long skirts and stockings, and cannot show their neckline, or bright and conspicuous colours. Clothing must not be too tight fitting, but still has to be distinctly feminine and therefore not like men’s clothing (no trousers, men’s

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shoes etcetera). In Chassidic groups, at the time of marriage, the hair is completely covered by a kerchief or wig. The extreme Satmar women, for example, even shave their heads. For men, the most important commandments are those with respect to study and prayer. In such circles, the notion of tzniut (modesty) is the true definition of female religiousness. Modest and moral behaviour does not only concern appearance, but also the way women behave; it is determined by the way she speaks (not too loud, conspicuous, loud laughing, do not attract attention to themselves), what she reads etc. Both men and women avoid too much exposure to popular media, cinema and profane literature when these exceed the established norms of modesty, sexuality and morality.

Oppression or agency? Social-scientific research of the life of orthodox Jewish women is limited and varies with regard to interpretation, depending on the exact status that women have in which particular of these gender-conservative societies. Because they reject outside influences, strictly orthodox Jewish communities, such as Chassidim, are hard to access for outsiders. Since most of the ethnographic studies of the last decades have been conducted by men due to strict gender-norms, they were hardly able to gain access to Charedi women. Therefore, up until a short while ago, there was very little known about how they view themselves, their daily life and their position within their respective community. Since the early 90’s, a number of empirical studies have been carried out in which the stereotypical image of strictly orthodox Jewish women being ‘oppressed’ - with an abundance of household drudgery and condemned to bearing many children has been adjusted. As in all communities, living conditions and lifestyles of Charedi women vary considerably, depending on the country they live, the community they belong to, the traditions followed within that community, and factors such as class, financial status and ethnicity. Taking into account the fact that the strictly orthodox Jewish man ideally is not to be occupied too much by worldly activities, but is committed to Talmudic study, there is even a tradition where wives support their family, and contrary to their husbands, participate in the workforce outside. In fact, Charedi girls enjoy a more ‘worldly’ education than men because their curriculum contains more profane subjects than that of men. In many aspects, their youth can be marked as ‘more free’, since they are not obliged to follow the same rigorous religious studies education that men are. Furthermore, the exemption of adult women from official positions of power in the public, religious sphere does not mean that they cannot be publicly active. Many women are involved in community life by their profession as a teacher, for example, and also in broadly organised volunteer work. The influence of the

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rebbetsin (wife of the rabbi) on her husband and in the community should not be underestimated either. In my own interviews with women in the Charedi community of Antwerp, they stated that they did not at all feel inferior, but subscribed to a gender ideology of ‘different but equal’. The role of the woman is perhaps less public, but not less important or less religious. The woman in the role of housewife and mother takes care of ‘the house’, the preparation of food, the rituals and holidays, the religious upbringing of small children and creating a religious atmosphere, which is indispensable for the preservation of continuity of religious identity. Strictly orthodox Jewish women themselves claim that the fact that their husbands fulfi l more public religious functions does not mean that their role in domestic life is inferior, but rather that this role, from a religious perspective, is equal to study and public prayer. The woman, after all, bears the great responsibility for building the house that represents the centre of Jewish life, and that some even call an institute, a fortress or a miniature temple (Longman, 2004a & b). Although there is no religious prohibition to higher studies or a career for strictly orthodox Jewish women, the possibilities are limited, particularly within the Diaspora, because mixed education and current contacts between men and women (outside of the family circle) are to be avoided. These days they can follow higher education at specialised institutes (often abroad) and afterwards work within the community as a teacher at Jewish orthodox schools. In the last few years in Israel, with rabbinical consent, special higher education is created where women can achieve higher diplomas in secular subjects, from engineer to ICT-specialist. This revolutionary development will undoubtedly lead to a larger participation of strictly orthodox Jewish women (sometimes more than men) in the broader secular society. A number of studies on Chassidic women focus on a very particular movement, Chabad, which is a movement that tries to bring back secular Jews to a Charedi lifestyle (Davidman, 1991; Kaufman, 1993). In interviews with women who were not raised according to a strictly orthodox Jewish lifestyle, but at a certain point in their lives made a choice to ‘return’ explain their choice for traditional gender roles because they were personally disappointed in the way in which the family, motherhood and femininity are devaluated in today’s society. In a gender-traditional way of life they find more appreciation for motherhood and the domestic sphere, against the dominance of liberal feminism where women are supposed to meet the male standard. Furthermore, these women often derive elements from the Jewish mystical traditions to point to specific female spiritual values, such as the idea that women stand naturally closer to divinity. Also, the menstrual stipulations are sooner interpreted as non-chauvinist than disadvantageous; the emphasis is placed on the ritual and not on the physical connotation of the notions of pure and impure. Monthly sexual abstinence is seen as a means to arouse the mutual sexual attraction; the cleansing ritual is experienced as a very feminine ritual; a moment of solidarity with other Jewish women and ‘fore-mothers’.

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Some researchers ask themselves the question if these developments in strictly orthodox Jewish circles may be seen as a form of religious feminism based on the idea of ‘difference’, where inherent differences (biological, psychological and spiritual) are emphasised more than the similarities between men and women (cf. Kaufman, 1993). Some women that are active within Chabad do call themselves ‘Chassidic feminists’. They desire no adaptation of the male norm as in Reform Judaism, where women gained access to the male public sphere, but specific female rituals such as the menstrual rites are no longer practised. Such interpretations of religious-traditionalist or fundamentalist movements by feminist researchers are symptomatic of a post-colonial and / or post-modern trend within feminist theory where the possibility of a cultural diversification of feminism beyond the dominant secular liberal model is studied (cf. Mahmood, 2004). Contexts that at first sight seem patriarchal and oppressive to women, may contain room for and forms of empowerment and agency within which women constantly negotiate their lives, choices and identities. Other feminist researchers are critical with regard to analyses that assume the empowerment of women in patriarchal contexts. Although women can feel empowered by participating in gender-traditionalist movements, this is by no means equivalent to the liberation of these women from the norms and regulations that are ultimately defined by men. Problems such as domestic violence and child abuse often occur in Charedi circles. Nira Yuval-Davis (1999) refers to the double tasks of women that can result in exhaustion and depression in some of the strictest Chassidic households. Where the religious Zionists in Israel are concerned, women often take militant and public roles. At the same time as ‘culture-bearers’ they serve pro-natal and pro-family values according to the nationalistic and sometimes even colonial ideology (cf. Feige, 2002). A number of women from the modern orthodox Jewish community are also critical of a romanticizing apologetic approach within Charedi circles, where the woman is placed on a symbolical sort of pedestal in order to legitimise outdated inequalities. More modern orthodox feminists plead for changes they deem possible within a halachic framework that nevertheless was historically and socially implemented according to patriarchal norms In the last paragraph of this contribution a number of these forms of feminism or ‘gender-activism’ will be introduced.

Orthodox Jewish feminism Although the majority of orthodox Jews, contrary to the strict, fundamentalist movements, do not completely exclude modernisation and integration, it took a relatively long period of time before the ‘women-question’ was brought to the agenda in the modern orthodox Jewish circles. During the 80’s, a feminist movement gradually came about, particularly in the US and other English-speaking countries, as well as in Israel. These first feminist criticisms came from the least traditional

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quarter. They directed themselves to the inequality and difficulties that were a result of the status of women within the Halacha. Although, because of the patriarchal inheritance, gender-inequality is contained within the halachic system, this does not exclude more gender-equality. From a feminist orthodox Jewish perspective, it is not so much the halachic system itself, which is dynamic and allows for interpretation according to a current context - like the women’s emancipation movement - that is the problem. Rather, the problem lies in the often conservative and patriarchal attitude of halachic (exclusively male) authorities. According to Blu Greenberg (1998), founder of the Jewish Orthodox Feminist Alliance, which pleads for a ‘dialectic’ between feminist and Jewish values, it is more a question of institutional and power struggles. As was the case in the past, Greenberg claims that also for now: ‘Where there is a rabbinical will, there is a halachic way.’ One of the main concerns within Orthodox Jewish feminism is the issue of the agunah or ‘chained woman’ (plural: agunot). This may concern the woman who wishes a divorce but whose husband denies her this request. While in the old days a Rabbi could exert some pressure on an unwilling husband, or was willing to search for a creative solution within the Halacha to grant a woman her divorce, in modern times the situation of the agunot is becoming more complicated because of globalization and the instability of marriage. Men can deny women a divorce as a form of financial blackmail. These women can be hindered from remarrying within an orthodox framework and her future children will be considered mamzerim, or bastards. Furthermore, orthodox Jewish feminists state that the way in which women were exempted from certain commandments, has led in historical practice to a situation where they are unjustifiably excluded from a large number of public religious practices and responsibilities. Today, women everywhere step out of the private domain and therefore the core identity in orthodox Jewish circles has been transferred from the domestic sphere to synagogue and study-house, and women are increasingly demanding a place in the synagogue and the community-policy. Pioneers like Blu Greenberg nonetheless do understand how feminism is often perceived in orthodox Jewish communities as threatening to fundamental orthodox Jewish values, such as the family. With regard to the exemption for women of certain public forms of public prayer and study, Greenberg suggests exemption for a limited time rather than a complete exemption. This way, women that are in a stage of their life where they are not committed to nurturing or domestic activities can, on one hand, still participate in the traditional male activities. On the other hand, mothers with young children cannot be expected to adjust to the male standard. This would imply a confirmation of the feminist model of liberal equality where the upbringing of children and family life are devaluated. Furthermore, the upbringing of children can be considered an important expression of female religious dedication of and by itself. While Greenberg pleads for the possibility for women to become Rabbis and fulfi l other positions of leadership, she thinks that other practices such as the mechitza

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(separation between men and women in the synagogue) or the menstrual laws, are not necessarily illustrative of the secondary status of women. Non-hierarchical differences between men and women can be emphasised in other areas, such as the woman’s responsibility to light the Sabbath candles every week. Because of their limited role in public prayer, in many modern orthodox Jewish communities women have started separate prayer groups (Haut, 1992). In this manner, they can lead in prayer and read from the Torah amongst women without breaking the norms of modesty. Another innovation in the synagogue are so-called ‘partnership minyanim’. Remaining within the halakhic requirement of a minyan counting 10 men, separated from the women by a mechitza, women may nevertheless participate fully during a service by publicly reading from the Torah and leading certain prayers, without violating ‘the dignity of the congregation’ (cf. Shapiro, 2001). In spite of the possibilities within Halacha regarding these prayers and readings, more conservative Rabbis have shown a resistance towards such initiatives. In the realm of ritual, the celebration of transitional life stages for girls have been introduced, such as the bat mitzvah and baby naming ceremonies, for which new prayers have been introduced that add a specific ‘feminine’ experience to the practice of orthodox Judaism. Other feminists demand the right to individually wear a prayer shawl and phylacteries (tallit and tefi llin) like men do. One of the most remarkable and controversial movements of religious women that has claimed public attention in recent years, are the ‘Women of the Wall’ (WOW), who, in Jerusalem, plead for women’s equal rights in prayer at the Kotel or ‘Wailing Wall’. Although in the old days men and women prayed together at the Kotel, in 1928 a mechitza (separation as in the synagogue) was introduced. WOW is a group of women of different denominations (including orthodox women) that wear a prayer shawl at the wall in the women’s section and read from a real Torah scroll. Their actions have led to violent protests on the side of strictly orthodox Jewish men and women (Shakdiel, 2002). One of the biggest challenges for the future of orthodox Jewish feminism lies in the area of equal access for women to Jewish religious education and the study of the Talmud, which according to Jewish tradition is considered the most important religious and spiritual activity. During the past several years, more women have been educated in the halachic tradition and more possibilities have arisen for higher (post-secondary) religious studies (at the level of the yeshiva); for example, the Drisha Institute in New York and various institutes in Israel such as Kolech. Also, amongst other religious Zionist women who do not identify with the feminist label, a ‘silent revolution’ is taking place. Amongst them, the number of women studying the Talmud is increasing (El-Or, 2002). Recently, in the US and in Israel, a number of orthodox women (who follow the Halacha) have been ordained as Rabbi or appointed as rosh kehilla (leader of a congregation). However, the greater part of the orthodox establishment does not accept these communities as ‘orthodox’. This new phenomenon of orthodox Jewish women who are increasingly more proficient in religious knowledge and halachic practice, can nevertheless only lead to more

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discussions about ancient patriarchal structures of power, ways of thinking and interpretations. Only the future will tell what the implications of this will be and what answers can be offered to the question of theologian Judith Plaskow, at what point in the reinterpretation of Judaism, the Jewish tradition ceases to be Jewish.

Dr. Chia Longman is postdoctoral fellow of the Research Foundation Flanders and affiliated with the Centre for Intercultural Communication and Interaction at Ghent University, Belgium. She obtained her doctorate in 2002 in the comparative science of culture. Her research interests lie in the feminist study of religion from a socialscientific perspective and the position of women in ethnic-religious minority groups, including orthodox Jewish women in Antwerp and London. She has published in various international and Dutch language journals and is co-editor of Culture & Politics: Identity and Conflict in a Multicultural World (Pinxten, Verstraete & Longman, Oxford & New York: Berghahn, 2004) and with G. Coene of Own liberation first? On the rights and representation of women in a multicultural society (Gent: Academia Press, 2005) (Dutch: Eigen emancipatie eerst? Over de rechten en representatie van vrouwen in een multiculturele samenleving.)

Notes (1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Fragment from the poem ‘Eshet Chayil’ (Mishlei or Proverbs 31:10-31 in the Tenach or Hebrew Bible), which traditionally is read out by husbands on Friday night (before Shabbat) as a tribute to their wives. A fundament for the Jewish tradition is the Halacha, or the law, an entity of living and behavioural regulations that were included in the oral law during the first five centuries of the common calendar. It contains rabbinical interpretations and codifications of biblical commandments, including the priestly code of 613 commandments that were derived from the ten commandments, revealed by God to the Jewish people through Moses on Mount Sinai. This rabbinical Judaism ultimately became the normative tradition, founded on the belief that the law or teaching (Torah) was revealed in the written law (in the five books of Moses in the Torah, the first part of the Tenach or the Hebrew bible) as well as in the oral law, which was written down later (in the Talmud). In the US Heilman & Cohen (1989) distinguish three segments within the Jewish orthodoxy: traditionalism (ultra orthodox, contra-acculturative); centrists (adaptive, pro-acculturative, modern orthodox) and finally nominally orthodox. This term is used in particular in Israel for traditionalistic Jews who by outsiders are also called ‘ultra’ or the less pejorative ‘strictly’ orthodox. The Hebrew ‘charedi’ (and charedim, plural) is etymologically derived from the passage from Isaiah 66:5: ‘Hear the word of the Lord, you who tremble [charedim] at His word.’ The word refers to the ones to whom ‘the Lord will address’, the ones who defend the faith and the law in their special relationship with God (Heilman & Friedman, 1991, p. 198).

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(5)

Originally Chassidism is a mystical movement with roots in eighteenth century Eastern Europe and can be divided in various Chassidic groups each with their own spiritual leader, the Rebbe, such as the Belzer, Satmar, Ger, Bobover…

Literature Christ, C.P. & Plaskow, J. (1979) (ed.), Womanspirit Rising: A Feminist Reader in Religion, New York, Hagerstown, San Francisco & London, Harper & Row. Davidman, L. (1991), Tradition in a Rootless World: Women Turn to Orthodox Judaism, Berkeley, Los Angeles & Oxford, University of California Press. El-Or, T. (2002), Next Year I Will Know More: Literacy and Identity among Young Orthodox Women in Israel, Detroit, Wayne State University Press. Feige, M. (2002), ‘Do Not Weep Rachel: Fundamentalism, Commemoration and Gender in a West Bank Settlement’, in: The Journal of Israeli History, 21 (1-2), p. 119-138. Friedman, M. (1993), ‘Jewish Zealots: Conservative versus Innovative’, in: Silberstein, Laurence J., (ed.), Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective: Religion, Ideology and the Crisis of Modernity, New York & London, New York University Press, p. 148-163. Greenberg, B. (1998 [1981]), On Women and Judaism: A View from Tradition, Philadelphia & Jerusalem, The Jewish Publication Society of America. Haut, R. (1992), ‘Women’s Prayer Groups and the Orthodox Synagogue’, in: Grossman, S., & Haut, R. (eds.), Daughters of the King: Women and the Synagogue, Philadelphia, New York & Jerusalem, The Jewish Publication Society, p. 135-157. Heilman, S.C. & Friedman, M. (1991), ‘Religious Fundamentalism and Religious Jews: The Case of the Haredim’, in: Marty, M.E. & Appleby, S.R. (eds.), Fundamentalisms Observed, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p. 197-264. Heilman, S.C. & Cohen, S.M. (1989), Cosmopolitans and Parochials: Modern Orthodox Jews in America, Chicago, Chicago University Press. Kaufman, D.R. (1993), Rachel’s Daughters: Newly Orthodox Jewish Women, New Brunswick NJ, Rutgers University Press. Liebman, C. (1998), ‘Modern Orthodoxy in Israel’, in: Judaism 47 (4), p. 405-410. Longman, C. (2004a), ‘Engendering Identity as Political Practice: Gender Discourse among Strictly Orthodox Jewish Women’, in: Pinxten, R., Verstraete, G. & Longman, C. (eds.), Culture and Politics: Identity and Conflict in a Multicultural World, Oxford & New York, Berghahn Books, p. 49-88. Longman, C. (2004b), ‘Priesteres van de miniatuurtempel. Joods-orthodoxe vrouwen: onderdrukt, empowered of geëmancipeerd’, in: Tijdschrift voor genderstudies, 7 (1), p. 18-29. Mahmood, S. (2005), Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, Princeton & Oxford, Princeton University Press. Plaskow, J. (1991), Standing again at Sinai. Judaism from a Feminist Perspective, San Francisco, Harper. Ross, T. (2004), Expanding the Place of Torah: Orthodoxy and Feminism, Waltham MA, Brandeis University Press.

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Shakdiel, L. (2002), ‘Women of the Wall: Radical Feminism as an Opportunity for a New Discourse in Israel’, in: The Journal of Israeli History, 21 (1-2), p. 126-163. Shapiro, M. (2001), ‘Qeri-at ha-Torah by Women: A Halakhic Analysis’, in: The Edah Journal, 1 (2), p. 1-52. Umansky, E.M. (1999), ‘Feminism in Judaism’, in: Sharma, A. & Young, K.K. (eds.), Feminism and the World Religions, Albany, State University of New York Press, p. 179-213. Yanay, N. & Rapoport, T. (1997), ‘Ritual Impurity and Religious Discourse on Women and Nationality’, in: Women’s Studies International Forum, 20 (5/6), p. 651-663. Yuval-Davis, N. (1999), ‘The Personal is Political: Jewish Fundamentalism and Women’s Empowerment’, in: Howland, C.W. (ed.), Religious Fundamentalisms and the Human Rights of Women, Houndmills & London, Macmillan Press, p. 33-42.

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THE LIFE OF RABIA AL-ADAWIYYA Reflections on Feminism and Fundamentalism Karen Vintges

The life of Rabia al-Adawiyya is the subject of many legends and stories. Rabia was an eighth century mystic who is generally known as one of the founders of Sufism. (1) Her life is still a source of inspiration for many Muslim women. Muslim feminists like Leila Ahmed make references to her (Ahmed, 1989, 1992), but so do women from ‘fundamentalist’ movements. (2) Although I am not a Muslim I also find the life of Rabia intriguing, as well as the lives of the Orthodox women that are the subjects of case studies by Chia Longman, Sarah Bracke and Saba Mahmood. (3) Drawing from these lives and particularly the life of Rabia al-Adawiyya, I will discuss the relationship between feminism and fundamentalism in religious contexts.

I want to start out with the question as to why I as a non-believer find it interesting to read about the lives of female Sufi-saints of long ago and of today’s orthodox-religious women. It is often stated that the loss of religion and tradition has left modern human-beings too much to their own devices and because of this we live in a ‘time of discontent’. (See Verbrugge, 2004) Needless to say, a return to religion is not possible for everyone, let alone necessarily desirable considering the positions that were granted to women by these religions in the past. What then can I learn from these strongly religious women today? To answer this question I will examine the elements of which their lives are composed of. For this I make use of the concepts of the philosopher Michel Foucault and the intellectual-historian Siep Stuurman, and draw from an article by Saba Mahmood about the Egyptian Women’s Mosque Movement. (Stuurman, 2004, 2005; Foucault, 1997; Mahmood, 2001) Foucault in his later works (1976-1984) studies vocabularies that offer the tools for what he called ‘ethical self-formation’. Through all kinds of exercises, or ‘self-techniques’, people in history have strived for a coherent ethical way of life, thus forming themselves as ethical subjects. Foucault pointed these traditions and practices of ethical self-formation out in different contexts: not only within the context of Greek antiquity, but also within the contexts of Christianity and Islam. (4) Cultural anthropologist Mahmood builds on the latter in her study of women in the Egyptian Women’s Mosque Movement (2001). She argues that Foucault’s theoretical

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framework allows for a conceptualization of women’s ‘agency’ in this type of Islamist movements. Mahmood demonstrates that these women, far from being the passive oppressed creatures Western feminists hold them to be, are active agents which practice an ethical ‘self-fashioning’ that engages their entire way of life. For Mahmood, these Islamist women show that there are more ways of ‘human flourishing’ than Western feminists can imagine. According to her, Western feminism, with its key assumptions of individual freedom and autonomy, should stop wanting to rescue women like the ones from the Egyptian Women’s Mosque Movement, since they strive for completely different values. But what are these values? In the following section, I let some of Mahmood’s respondents speak for themselves. (5) One of these respondents, Nadia, answers the question of whether or not she found it hard to cope with the fact that she did not get married until the age of 34, in a country where marriage is the standard for women, and life as an independent person is almost impossible. Nadia answers: ‘You have to have a very strong personality for all of this to not affect you because eventually you also start thinking that there is something deeply wrong with you that explains why you are not married.’ Next, Mahmood asks her what she means by ‘strong’. Nadia answers: ‘You must be patient in the face of difficulty, trust in God, and accept the fact that this is what He has willed as your fate; if you complain about it all the time, then you are denying that it is only God who has the wisdom to know why we live in the conditions we do and not humans.’ Mahmood then asks Nadia about her own experiences since she got married quite late. Was she able to achieve such a state of mind? Nadia: ‘O Saba, you don’t learn to become patient or trust in God just when you face difficulties. (…) You practice the virtue of patience [sabr] because it is a good deed, regardless of your situation: whether your life is difficult or happy. In fact, practicing patience in the face of happiness is even more difficult.’ (Mahmood, 2001, p. 219-220) Sabr (patience or modesty) is stipulated as virtuous by some traditions of Islam. It is a virtue that constantly has to be exercised and practised. Piety is such a virtue too and must become an ‘embodied habit’ by simultaneous exercise of the body, the emotions, and reason, according to Mahmood. (p. 212) One of her other respondents, Amal, tells us: ‘I used to think that even though shyness was required of us by God, if I acted shyly it would be hypocritical because I didn’t actually feel it inside of me. Then one day, in reading verse twenty-five (…) I realized that shyness was among the good deeds and given my natural lack of it I had to make or create it first. I realized that making it in yourself is not hypocrisy, and that eventually your inside learns to have shyness too.’ (p. 213) So acting and practising is crucial. With regard to the veil the same principle applies. Again I cite a respondent of Mahmood, Nama: ‘It’s just like the veil. In the beginning when you wear it, you’re embarrassed, and don’t want to wear it because people say that you look older and unattractive, that you won’t get married, and will never find a husband. But you must wear the veil, first because it is God’s command,

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and then, with time, your inside learns to feel shy without the veil, and if you were to take it off your entire being feels uncomfortable about it.’ (p. 213) Are we only dealing here with internalisation of women’s subordination?, Mahmood subsequently asks. She concludes to the contrary that we are dealing with ‘agency’ in the form of a conscious self-cultivation by ‘repeated bodily acts’, through which ‘one trains one’s memory, desire and intellect to behave according to established standards of conduct.’ (p. 214) Mahmood borrows a number of concepts from Foucault’s later works in which he approached ethics as something to be exercised and practised, through ‘self-techniques’. Foucault brought forward this practical type of ethics as an alternative to Western Enlightenment thinking and to the current liberalism that wants to turn every person into a rational, autonomous individual. For an alternative concept of the self he mainly referred to the ancient Greek type of ethics in which one strives, by means of continuous exercise, to an ethical formation of one’s entire way of life i.e. not just of one’s thinking, but of one’s mind, body, heart and soul - this also being the reason why Foucault occasionally used the term ‘spirituality’. Mahmood in this respect rightly refers to a Foucaultian framework to indicate the concept of the self that she found among the women she interviewed, which clearly differs from the one of Western liberalism. But Mahmood works selectively. She leaves out the normative horizon of Foucault’s concepts. For Foucault it makes all the difference ‘that in antiquity this work on the self with its attendant austerity is not imposed on the individual by means of civil law or religious obligation, but is a choice about existence made by the individual.’ (Foucault, 1982, p. 244) They create a beautiful existence ‘for a politico-aesthetical choice’. (p. 241) Ancient ethics in Foucault’s view did not impose metaphysical truths on people that should be obeyed through selfpractices, but to a large degree consisted of vocabularies that offered the tools and techniques to freely create a personal ethos. Although Foucault discusses several kinds of self-practices in history, his preference clearly lies with the ones that involve this type of free ethical ‘self-creation’, or ‘selfgovernance’. His normative horizon was that all people should have access to this type of ‘freedom practices’. (See Vintges, 2004; Thompson, 2003) According to Foucault all truth regimes entail totalitarian dangers and tendencies. Instead there has to be as much space as possible for self-governance in the shape of ethical self-creation or a ‘care for the self’, which is relatively autonomous in relation to metaphysical, religious or secular truths. With these concepts, Foucault has created an interesting criterion for an actual validation and approach of religions in general and for our theme of women and religion in particular. First of all, we can conclude that the orthodox-religious women that Mahmood interviewed clearly practice ethical (-spiritual) self-formation, in the sense that body, mind, heart and soul are all involved in their ‘self-fashioning’. The ethical formation of their entire life includes a different concept of the self than the one of Western liberalism, which is grafted to a Cartesian dualism of body and mind and a separation

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of public and private life, and which for many, as such, does not have enough to offer on a normative level. In contrast, ethical(-spiritual) self-formation, in terms of Foucault, is all about being a person ‘of moral integrity’, a person ‘of blameless principle and integrity,’ whose acts and thoughts are in accordance. (Foucault, 2001, p. 69) It is this concept of the self which appeals to many and such different people today, including myself as a non-religious person. Next, we can conclude that Mahmood’s women practice a type of ethical self-formation which does not work on the limits of the tradition of male domination that is imposed upon them in the name of religious truth; they in other words obey the structures that are imposed on them and do not practice ethical self-creation or self-governance. Examples of the latter can been seen in Islamic contexts, among others in the shape of the emerging movement of ‘Islamic feminism’ (see the articles in part II of this volume; see also Vintges, 2006 and Mir-Hosseini, 2006), and in the shape of the lives of Muslim women in the history of Islam, which challenged and transformed the limits of male domination and which as such contained egalitarian elements. According to Stuurman (2004, 2005) a history of equality can be written which focuses on ‘equality-effects’ in discourses and texts that express notions and thoughts of equality without necessarily using the term equality as such. Referring to a concept of Wittgenstein, Stuurman argues that there are ‘family resemblances’ between equality-discourses and concepts in different languages and historical contexts. Equality can be expressed in a rational Enlightenment discourse, but also in mythical or religious discourses. ‘We can recognize affinities and parallels. (…) Stories may suggest similarity and equality without any explicit reference to them.’ (Stuurman, 2004, p. 24-25) Stuurman adds that there is a difference between equality effects and egalitarianism. ‘(I)t is useful to distinguish between equality and egalitarianism. Egalitarianism denotes the conscious pursuit of some specific variety of equality, while discourses and concepts of equality refer to specific senses in which persons are deemed equal in particular respects. The relation between equality and egalitarianism is one of potentiality: concepts of equality are not necessary egalitarian. On the other hand it is obvious that ideas of equality can easily spill over into egalitarian discourses,’ which hold that when things are alike they should ‘receive similar treatment’. (p. 26; and see Stuurman, 2004a) In line with Stuurman we can thus argue that egalitarian- and / or equality-effects can be brought about through a diversity of texts and stories in different historical contexts. However, building on Foucault’s thoughts on ethical self-formation, we can add that it is not only possible to bring these effects about through texts and stories, but through a life as well. From this perspective the life of the eighth century mystic Rabia clearly expresses egalitarian effects. Rabia was a slave freed at later age, and as such could lead an independent life as a woman. Gradually, she developed into a highly respected spiritual and intellectual leader. She consistently rejected the many marriage proposals

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she received, with words such as: ‘God can give me all you offer and even double it. It does not please me to be distracted from Him for a single moment. So farewell.’ (Smith, 1984, p. 11) Rabia thus consciously pursued an independent lifestyle as a woman, a path that many female Sufi mystics followed. Her own contribution to Sufism lies in her call to not be lead by traditions, but to develop a personal, unselfish relationship with God. To a male Sufi mystic that tried to surpass her piety she said: ‘You traversed [the desert] in ritual prayer, but I with personal supplication.’ (p. 9) About another Sufi she said: ‘(Y)es, Sufyan would be a good man, if he did not love the Traditions.’ (p. 16) She tried amongst other things, to realize her ideal of a personal and unselfish relationship with God through a severe asceticism, but in actual fact made her whole life into ‘her plainest teaching on this subject’. (p. 59) There is a well known story of how she walked the streets of Basra with a torch in one hand and a bucket of water in the other. ‘She said: I am going to light fire in Paradise and to pour water on to Hell so that both veils (…) may completely disappear (…) and the servants of God may see Him, without any object of hope or motive of fear. What if the hope of Paradise and the fear of Hell did not exist?’ (p. 99) Here again Rabia emphasizes that all people should love God not as a matter of calculation but on the basis of a personal, unselfish relationship. (p. 98) With all its strict asceticism and emphasis on submission to God, the life of Rabia obviously entails egalitarian effects. Not only her careful preservation of her life as an independent woman, but also her position as a female intellectual and spiritual leader, her standing up for this position, and her emphasis on everyone’s personal relationship with God, imply an egalitarianism because the equal status and a similar treatment of men and women are validated. The high-spiritedness with which Rabia put the men around her in their place also has an egalitarian effect. Rabia did not literally speak about the equality of men and women and it would be foolish to identify her as a feminist. (See also Van Beek, 2002) However, her life did not fit the patterns for women in the context of Islam in her time, but followed its own free path. This is also the conclusion of Muslim feminist Leila Ahmed, who argues that Rabia lived a free life, retaining ‘full control and legal autonomy with respect to herself in that she is neither wife, nor slave, nor under any male authority’. Ahmed concludes that ‘the beliefs on which feminism rests are an endemic part of Islamic civilization (just as they are an endemic part of Western civilization before the development of the political idiom of democracy)’. (Ahmed, 1989, p. 149, p. 144) She reports on how feminism was imported since the beginning of the last century in Egypt and Iran by Western colonizers in opposition to the Islamic tradition. (Ahmed 1992) The emerging discourse of Islamic feminism wants to get rid of the colonial history and connotation of the feminist project. From this perspective the Qur’an is reread by women scholars who emphasize equality notions in the text, notably in passages in which women are explicitly addressed as spiritual and responsible beings, and in which women are called upon to educate themselves. (See Wadud, 1999; Barlas, 2002) The egalitarian movement of ‘Islamic feminism’ makes use of such readings of

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the Qur’an but can also make use of exemplary lives of women throughout the history of Islam which express egalitarian effects, such as that of Rabia, as is shown by Ahmed. Concrete research could reveal that egalitarian-effects such as these, might be found in the lives of a number of women in Islamic contexts. (6) If we turn, finally, once again to the lives of the orthodox women that were studied by Mahmood, Bracke and Longman, we can conclude that even if these lives do not contain egalitarian effects, they do express certain equality-effects. The orthodox religious women in these studies live according to a system of absolute truths, to which they subject themselves and others. In that sense we are dealing here with ‘fundamentalism’. (7) But we also find practices and vocabularies among these women that show that they don’t feel themselves inferior to men on a spiritual level and that as such do express notions of equality of men and women. However, these equality-effects don’t spill over in the belief that women are entitled to receive similar treatment as men do. Women in these orthodox movements as well as those in outspoken political-religious movements can be labelled agents rather than feminists, as they actively subject themselves and other women to the authority of men. The emerging discourse of ‘Islamic feminism’ is outspoken in its demand for the egalitarian treatment of men and women, fighting for ‘gender justice’ within the context of Islam. The women that spoke in the studies of Mahmood and Bracke will perhaps be influenced by these new notions, and extend their ethical self-formation to an ethical self-governance, such that their lives will entail not only equality- but egalitarian-effects as well.

Dr. Karen Vintges is a university lecturer of Political and Social Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy of the University of Amsterdam. She is co-editor of a book about feminism and Foucault (D.Taylor & K.Vintges (eds.), Feminism and the Final Foucault, Illinois University Press, 2004), author of Philosophy as Passion. The Thinking of Simone de Beauvoir (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1996, originally in Dutch, 1992), and of several other books in Dutch. She was (co) organiser of the conference ‘Women and Islam: New Perspectives’ with Amina Wadud, Ziba Mir-Hosseini and others, in Amsterdam 2005. Currently she is working on a project entitled: ‘Rewriting The Second Sex From a Global Perspective’.

Notes (1)

(4)

Rabia’s life and works are discussed by Margareth Smith, Rabi’a the Mystic and her FellowSaints in Islam, 1984, originally published in 1928. As is shown by Sarah Bracke in her article in this volume. See Longman, 2004, Bracke, 2004, and Mahmood, 2005 and 2001, and Bracke and Longman in this volume. See Vintges, 2003.

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(2) (3)

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(5) (6)

(7)

In the quotes that follow I have omitted the Arab terms which Mahmood inserted in her text. We find Muslim women throughout the history of Islam, as scholars, politicians and spiritual leaders. (See Bewley, 1999) More in depth research on their lives is necessary from this perspective. Secular fundamentalism equally is about the belief in absolute Truths and the urge to disseminate these and impose them on others.

Literature Ahmed, Leila (1989), ‘Feminism and Cross-Cultural Inquiry: The Terms of the Discourse in Islam’, in: E. Weed (ed.), Coming to Terms, New York & London, Routledge. Ahmed, Leila (1992), Women and Gender in Islam, New Haven & Londen, Yale University Press. Barlas, Asma (2002), ‘Believing Women’ in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur’an, Austin, University of Texas Press. Beek, Mariette van (2002), ‘Images of Lâlla cAwîsh, a Holy Woman from Marrakech’, in: M. Marín en R. Deguilhem (eds.), Writing the Feminine. Women in Arab Sources, Londen, IB Tauris, p. 199-219. Bewley, Aisha (1999), Islam: The Empowering of Women, London, Ta-Ha-Publishers. Bracke, Sarah (2004), Women Resisting Secularisation in an Age of Globalisation. Four Case-studies within a European Context, Universiteit van Utrecht, dissertation. Foucault, Michel (1982), ‘On the genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in progress,’ in: Michel Foucault: beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. Foucault, Michel (1997, ed. P. Rabinow), Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984. Volume One, New York, The New Press. Foucault, Michel (2001, ed. J. Pearson), Fearless Speech, Los Angeles, Semiotext(e). Longman, Chia (2004), ‘Priesteres van de miniatuurtempel. Joods-orthodoxe vrouwen: onderdrukt, empowered of geëmancipeerd’, in: Tijdschrift voor genderstudies, 7 (1), p. 18-29. Mahmood, Saba (2005), Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, Princeton & Oxford, Princeton University Press. Mahmood, Saba (2001), ‘Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival’, in: Cultural Anthropology, 16, nr. 2, p. 202-236. Mir-Hosseini, Ziba (2006), ‘Islamitisch feminisme’, in: Filosofie en praktijk, vol. 27, 1, p. 14-24. Schimmel, Annemarie (1975), Mystical Dimensions of Islam, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press. Smith, Margaret (1984, orig. 1928), Rabi’a the Mystic and her Fellow-Saints in Islam, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Stuurman, Siep (2004), ‘How to write a history of equality’, in: Leidschrift, vol. 19, nr. 3, p. 23-38. Stuurman, Siep (2004a), ‘The Voice of Thersites: Reflections on the Origins of the Idea of Equality’, in: Journal of the History of Ideas, 65, p.171-189. Stuurman, Siep (2005), ‘De meerstemmigheid van de gelijkheid’, in: J. H. Gerards, S. Stuurman, R. de Lange (eds.), Moderne gelijkheid, Den Haag, Boom Juridische uitgevers, p. 40-62.

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Thompson, Kevin (2003), ‘Forms of Resistance: Foucault on Tactical Reversal and Self-Formation’, in: Continental Philosophy Review, 36, 2, p. 113-138. Verbrugge, Ad (2004), Tijd van onbehagen [Time of Discontent ], Amsterdam, SUN. Vintges, Karen (2006), ‘Feminisme en Islam: over contexten en concepten’, in: Filosofie en praktijk, vol. 27, 1, p. 6-13. Vintges, Karen (2004), ‘Endorsing Practices of Freedom. Feminism in a Global Perspective’, in: D. Taylor & K. Vintges (eds.) Feminism and The Final Foucault, Urbana & Chicago, University of Illinois Press, p. 275-299. Wadud, Amina (1999), Qur’an and Woman, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

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INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC FEMINISM REVISITED Margot Badran

Surveying the most recent developments in Islamic feminism, Margot Badran finds an increasingly dynamic global phenomenon that is as varied as it is radical. Al-Ahram Weekly, 12-2-2006

I gave a talk in Cairo in 2002 entitled: ‘Islamic Feminism: What’s in a Name?’ There I explored the paradigm shift in feminism occurring within the Muslim umma at various locations during the 1990s that Muslim observers led in the process of naming Islamic feminism (see Al-Ahram Weekly, 17- 23 January, 2002). Now, four years later, I look at the current chapter in Islamic feminism.

In 2002 I offered a concise definition of Islamic feminism gleaned from the writings and work of Muslim protagonists as a feminist discourse and practice that derives its understanding and mandate from the Qur’an, seeking rights and justice within the framework of gender equality for women and men in the totality of their existence. Islamic feminism explicates the idea of gender equality as part and parcel of the Qur’anic notion of equality of all insan (human beings) and calls for the implementation of gender equality in the state, civil institutions, and everyday life. It rejects the notion of a public / private dichotomy (by the way, absent in early Islamic jurisprudence or fiqh) conceptualising a holistic umma in which Qur’anic ideals are operative in all space. Islamic feminism aims to recover the notion of gender equality, radical in its day, that the Qur’anic revelation introduced into 7th century (CE) patriarchal Arabia. Insan-ic equality, from which gender equality cannot be separated, did not sit well with the patriarchal cultures into which Islam was first introduced and spread. Patriarchal thought, institutions, and behaviours largely remained resistant over time to the revolutionary Qur’anic notion of gender equality to the extent that the equation of ‘patriarchy and Islam’ became axiomatic.

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Islamic feminism has taken on the two-fold task to expose and eradicate patriarchal ideas and practices glossed as Islamic - ‘naturalised’ and perpetuated in that guise - and to recuperate Islam’s core idea of gender equality (indivisible from human equality). For this Islamic feminism has incurred enemies from within and without the Muslim community: 1) from within: men who fear the loss of patriarchal privilege and women who fear the loss of patriarchal protection, and 2) from without: those whose pleasure and politics are found in denigrating Islam as irredeemably anti-women. The new Islamic feminist paradigm began to surface a decade and a half ago simultaneously in old Muslim societies in parts of Africa and Asia and in newer communities in Europe and North America. I give three examples. In Iran, immediately post-Khomeini, Muslim women, along with some male clerics, associated with the then new paper Zanan, as Muslims and citizens of an Islamic Republic called, in the name of Islam, for the practice of women’s rights they found being infringed upon or rolled back, grounding their arguments in their readings of the Qur’an as the virtual constitution of the republic. In South Africa, Muslim women and men, who had engaged as South Africans in one of history’s fiercest battles for human dignity and justice, in the immediate post-apartheid period focussed their attention upon questions of justice, and especially gender justice, within their own Muslim community. Having been shunted around and cordoned off, conscientised (to use the expression from the Struggle) South African Muslims were sensitive to issues of access to space and the injustices and indignities attendant upon selective use of space and mandatory cordoning off of some human beings (on the basis of physical attributes) from ‘preferred others’. These sensitised South African Muslims fought equal access to mosque/communal space for all Muslims, women and men alike. In North America, women in immigrant (especially the second-generation) and convert communities turned to the Qur’an as a guide to life in new complex environments in which they did not have ready-made life-templates as Muslims. Patriarchal patterns of life in the villages and cities from which first-generation Muslim immigrants had come, which they tried to re-impose on women as Islamic, jarred in their new environments. Convert women in western societies were faced with a painful contradiction between what they understood to be Qur’anic ideals of justice and equality and various patriarchal notions and practices urged upon them as novices by self-appointed custodians of Islam. Islamic feminism is an inter-Islamic phenomenon produced by Muslims at various locations around the globe. There is no East / West fault line. We cannot speak of Islamic feminism and the West. Islamic feminism, like Islam today, is in the West as it is in the East. Muslim detractors allege that ‘the West’ has foisted feminism, first secular and now Islamic, upon Muslims to the detriment of Islam and society.

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Muslim proponents, on the other hand, hold that Islamic feminism promotes the enjoyment of social justice within the umma while it will also contribute to the creation of a more pluralistic and socially just West where all insan will be treated equal whatever their ethnic, religious, and gender affi liations. The triumph of Islamic feminism will also be part of the enhancement of social justice and equality in the African and Asian societies where Muslims live. Turning to the older Muslim societies in Africa and Asia, Islamic feminism appeared first in countries where (patriarchal) Islamism got its earliest start, countries which had a large and expanding educated and professional female middle class, and countries with a history of homegrown feminist thought and activism. Islamic feminism appeared on terrain prepared by Muslim women’s earlier secular feminisms that were an amalgam of Islamic modernist, secular nationalist, and humanitarian (later human rights) discourses. Islamic feminism gave paramount attention to the Islamic modernist strand of secular feminism and, through engaging in new Qur’anic hermeneutic work, articulated an Islamic doctrine of the full equality of women and men across the public / private spectrum. As such, it was more radical than the secular feminisms that had accepted the notion of gender complementarity, not gender equality, within the sphere of the family. It is important to note that Islamic feminism is the creation of women and men for whom religion is important in their daily lives and who are troubled by inequalities and injustices perpetrated in the name of religion. Islamic feminism continues to spread because it is relevant. It is engaged and enlightened. It is also controversial and unsettling. Islamic feminism circulates globally with great speed and penetration. If early secular feminist thought circulated with the advent of the printing press and the rise of print journalism in Muslim societies, Islamic feminism is spreading infinitely faster and globally via the Internet and the Satellite. It has a vibrant presence in cyberspace reverberating in what Fatima Mernissi colourfully calls the ‘digital Islamic galaxy’. The theoretical core of Islamic feminism continues to be grounded in Qur’anic interpretation or tafsir. The central focus remains the explication of gender equality in Islam. There is increased evidence of the application of Islamic feminist theory in practice. This is seen in the revision of the Moroccan Mudawwana or Civil Code, now the most gender-egalitarian sharia-grounded civil code. It is also evident in the new draft revision of the Family Code in Indonesia, devised by a commission of religious scholars (half of whom are women) appointed within the Ministry of Justice. Another example of the application of gender-just interpretation of Islam is found in the arguments marshalled, through a dynamic investigation of fiqh (jurisprudence), that led to the acquittal of two Nigerian women accused of adultery and condemned to death under the new hudud (criminal laws) instituted in their northern Nigerian states while their partners were never held accountable. The terms Islamic feminism and Islamic feminists are now more widely accepted.

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Islamic feminism is also part of the philosophy and politics of the movement of Progressive Islam. The term Progressive Islam first appeared in South Africa in the 1990s. Two years ago the Progressive Muslim Union was formed in the United States and recently the Progressive British Muslims group was launched in London at the House of Commons. Islamic feminism and progressive Islam are trans/nationally organised. The first international conference on Islamic feminism, held last fall in Barcelona, drew participants from old and new Muslim societies. Muslim women are moving beyond passive knowledge of religion by engaging in ijtihad (independent investigation of religious sources) and becoming new authorities. In my historical investigation of Muslim women’s early (secular) feminisms it was clear that Islam was salient in their gender thinking and activism. In the early decades of secular feminism (the late 19th and early 20th centuries), and let me take the Egyptian example, some women from within their gender-segregated worlds accessed the ideas of Islamic modernism advanced by Shaikh Muhammad Abduh (the famous late 19th and early 20th century Egyptian reformer) that were relevant to their lives as female Muslims. However, women’s limited education at the time did not equip them to undertake their own interpretation of the Qur’an (Nazira Zain al-Din being an exception that proves the rule). Since the final years of the 20th century women started to become part of new interpretive communities, producing compelling tafsir (analysis) and treatises on gender issues. While new female exegetes have commanded considerable respect in the global umma, they have also, not surprisingly, been discredited and maligned. However, if the messenger and her authority are attacked, the new gender-sensitive exegesis itself is becoming an authority. Meanwhile, it is becoming increasingly apparent that it is difficult to square Islamic notions of equality and justice with (secular) patriarchy still supported by conventional male religious authorities. The new Islamic feminist theorists and interpreters include Asma Barlas (Pakistani), Riffat Hassan (Pakistani), Amina Wadud (African-American), Ziba Mir-Hosseini (Iranian), Qudsiyya Mirza (Iranian), and Aziza al-Hibri (Lebanese), to name just a few. Muslim women are moving beyond patriarchal protection and re-figuring obedience. Islamic feminist tafsir elaborates a compelling explication of the equality of all human beings, male and female alike, while at the same time recognising gender difference. (There is a male / female duality in all creation, reflected in the grammatical construction of the Qur’anic language in reference to humankind and animals, which are rendered in the dual form: insan and hayawan.) Recognition of biological duality in no way diminishes the idea of fundamental equality of all human beings. Neither sex is superior to the other. Neither sex is ordained to rule over the other. Patriarchy, as ideology and practice, with its stringent hierarchal ordering, fundamentally disrupts the Qur’anic ideal and practice of human equality. In explicating human equality Islamic feminist exegetes focus on the Qur’anic no-

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tions of khilafa and tawhid. The Qur’an speaks of khilafa, or the trusteeship of God on earth, delegated to all human beings, a divinely ordained human agency. This trusteeship or agency, logically and morally cannot be diminished, or ‘de-equalised’, by the biological attributes of insan - sexual, racial, or whatever. Islamic feminist exegetes connect the idea of equality of all humankind in its (biological) duality with the idea of tawhid - the one-ness of God. No human being can partake of this one-ness. No human being can or should act like a God or exact what is owed only to God. Ta’a, or obedience, is due to God alone. Within the patriarchal universe women owe obedience to men, and younger males to older males. This obedience has often been so starkly constructed and stringently imposed that male human beings have made themselves into virtual gods. The new gender-sensitive exegetes have focussed attention on male supremacy in marriage and the family imposed in the name of Islam that is fundamentally disruptive of the Qur’anic principle of human equality. In 4:34 of the Qur’an, the term ‘qawwamuna ‘ala’ has been used to justify and perpetuate male authority over and protection of women as a prerogative and duty of men. The new women exegetes offer a rereading that affirms the Qur’anic ideal of human equality. They place the statement that men are qawwamuna ‘ala women in the context of childbearing and nursing when women exert labour that men do not and cannot, and read this as men having responsibility ‘a degree above’ in this context in a way that acts as a balancing or equalising of labour. Patriarchal interpretation reads this verse as ordaining that the male is in charge of the woman or has authority over the woman and he is a ‘degree above’ her. The patriarchal reading has been so firmly and pervasively held over time and place that it is seen as ‘Islam itself’. This reading has promoted and entrenched the notion of male protection of women, the fundamental duty of a husband to support his wife materially and take charge of her spiritually and morally. Many women have welcomed this notion of male protection and material support as intrinsic to Islam and a decided benefit. But with this protection and material support have come exaggerated forms of obedience to men, to the point that it became a commonplace notion that a woman’s path to heaven lay through obedience to her husband, thus detouring her obedience to God and rendering her khilafa second-class. Along with deconstructing the notion of female dependency and male protection, Islamic feminists elaborate the idea of mutual support / protection of males and females embodied in the notion of awliya enjoined upon male and female believers, specifically citing the two genders. (Qur’an 9:71: ‘The believers, male and female, are protectors of one another.’) Why has this idea historically not been made the touchstone of gender relations? Islamic feminist interpreters work at the intersection of idea and reality. Gendertuned interpreters of the Qur’an are mindful of changing social and economic realities as they approach the sacred text for guidance. Today in the greatly expanding

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middle classes in Muslim societies, husbands and wives have increasingly to pull their joint weight in the economic support of the family and in the everyday running of its affairs. Ideas of socially and religiously ascribed gender roles give way to practical imperatives. The Qur’anic notion of mutuality of spousal support is becoming increasingly operative in the middle strata of society as it has always been among the urban and rural poor who have historically constituted the majority of Muslims. The Qur’anic notion of gender equality, expressed in the notion of the mutual protection of the spouses of each other, has recently been legally established in the idea of dual headship of the family affirmed in the revised Moroccan Mudawwana and the new Indonesian draft family law, both of which are sharia-grounded. Muslim women and men together are revamping ritual life. It is in Muslim minority communities, especially but not only in the West, that moves toward new ritual practices have been most apparent recently. In Muslim minority communities, participation in mosque-centred activities - especially congregational worship - has an intensity of meaning and social significance different from that found in Muslim majority societies. In minority contexts, individual and collective Muslim identity is expressed and re-affirmed within mosque space. If they are made unequal in religious space it casts them as second-class Muslims. In Muslim majority societies, Muslim identity prevails in society at large. However, while they may be part of the religious majority, women have acquired greater equality in secular space than in religious space. Muslim women find themselves equal in the larger national / secular society and unequal in their own communal space. To return to the South African Islamic feminist contexts, in Cape Town in the mid-90s a woman (visiting theologian Amina Wadud) gave the first-ever pre-khutba talk at the Claremont Mosque. The ‘mosque movement’ in South Africa was a fulcrum for Islamic feminist demands for gender equality, or ‘gender jihad’ - a term coined by an imam (Rashied Omar) in South Africa - within the Muslim community. Now, a decade after the start of mosque activism in South Africa, mosque-centered movements are underway in the United States and Canada with women and men supporting the demand for female access to main mosque space during congregational prayer and women beginning to assume the role of imam, leading gender-mixed congregational worship. Within the past year (2005) women have acted as imams in Friday services in the United States (the first time in a New York church when mosque space was refused them) and at a mosque in Canada. Women’s demands for equal access to common mosque space and the ability to lead the congregational prayer for one American male convert conjured up sit-ins in the mid-20th-century United States by AfricanAmericans who were demanding equal access to public institutions and space, denied to them simply on the basis of race. This, in turn, reminds me of Muslims’ post-apartheid demands in South Africa for non-discrimination of Muslims in mosque space on the basis of gender.

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The mosque movement continues to spread and appears to be un-stoppable. The first-ever International Islamic Feminist Conference that took place in Barcelona last October, organised by the Junta Islamica Catalana, reaffirmed the call for women’s free access to the mosque as a Muslim women’s right. We note that here in Egypt ninety-four years ago among the secular / nationalist feminist demands presented to the Muslim National Congress meeting in Heliopolis (1911) was the call by women for access to mosques for congregational prayer. This was at a time when women of the middle and upper urban strata were segregated from public space; thus their entry into religious space would become part of their entry into public space. Here I have only been able to touch the surface of the current chapter in the story of Islamic feminism. As seen from the presentation, the further elaboration of tafsir / theory and proliferation of activist projects are part of the dynamism of contemporary Islamic feminism. There are contradictions that Islamic feminist theorists and interpreters have to work through but they always keep their eyes on the highest Qur’anic ideals. There are practical roadblocks Islamic feminists face that not even the shield of unmarked discourse (the blotting out of the term Islamic feminism) can protect from. But, observation confirms that women as Islamic feminists remain committed to elaborating and living a gender-egalitarian Islam that they understand to be at the very core of the religion - a notion radical at the time of revelation and still radical today.

Prof. dr. Margot Badran, a historian of the Middle East and Islamic societies and specialist in gender studies, is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Muslim Christian Understanding, Georgetown University, Washington DC. She has a diploma in Arabic and Islamic religious studies at Al Azhar University in Cairo in addition to M.A. in Middle East Studies from Harvard University and a D. Phil. in Middle East history from Oxford University. Badran has lectured on feminism and Islam in the US, Europe, Middle East, and Africa. She writes for numerous newspapers in the Middle East, for International Herald Tribune, and contributes regularly to Al Ahram Weekly. Here she speaks on issues related to Islamic feminism. Her books and articles on feminism and Islam have been translated into many languages. A version of this article, which appeared in Issue No. 781 of Al-Ahram Weekly (9 - 15 February 2006), was presented as a talk at the Netherlands / Flemish Institute in Cairo.

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GENDER JIHAD Abdennur Prado

Bismil-lâhi ar-Rahmani ar-Rahim As salamu aleykum

The term ‘gender jihad’ is used to describe the struggle against male chauvinistic, homophobic or sexist readings of the sacred texts of Islam. Throughout the 20th century an extensive movement in favour of overcoming patriarchal readings developed, carried out mainly by women demanding equal rights as full members of the Muslim faith. This movement has the interesting feature of having arisen spontaneously and simultaneously in a number of countries with a Muslim majority. Its origin can usually be found in the first decades of the 20th century in Egypt, when some Egyptian feminists posed the majority of the questions which are still being debated today.

Despite the progress to date, at the start of the 21st century the gender question continues to be one of the pending issues in societies with a Muslim majority. It is akin to a Gordian knot around which a conservative reading of the religion has grown, a reading which discriminates, restricts individual liberties and tends to perpetuate hierarchical power structures which exclude the majority of these societies’ citizens. Today there is an extensive theoretical debate about ‘Islamic feminism’ which includes arguments about the appropriateness of this term. Feminism, as the struggle for women’s liberation, has no specific label. The qualifier ‘Islamic’ cannot be defining of a type of feminism distinct from Western feminism, but rather it is a way of placing in context the problem of liberation in relation to Islam. In no way should it be a ‘limiting’ qualifier, in the sense of reducing the value of the basic claim to female equality. Despite the terminology, the fact is that there is a broad movement which, by confronting the male chauvinistic, homophobic or sexist interpretations that dominate in many areas of the Islamic world, can truly be called feminist.

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In addition to being a writer and poet, Abdennur Prado (1967) is secretary of the Catalan Islamic Council and one of the organisers of the first international conference on Islamic feminism October 2005 in Barcelona. He was also involved in the organisation of the second conference in November 2006. The first conference dealt with the emancipation movements within Islam and their theoretical and practical methods for trying to achieve emancipation. A number of modern thinkers on the issue came together, including Riffat Hassan (professor of religious studies), Amina Wadud (associate professor of Islamic studies), Asma Barlas (professor of political science), Valentine Moghadam (UNESCO) and Lily Zakiyah Munir (a human rights activist), as well as a number of different international self-organisations such as the successful organisation called Sisters in Islam from Malaysia. The organisers of the conference hoped that, through an introduction to these movements, it would be possible to make clear to women in the West the importance of context in emancipation processes. In addition, another objective of putting these movements in the limelight was to strengthen self-organisation and to build up an international network. The first conference concluded that Islamic feminism should be taken seriously as a phenomenon which is quickly gaining momentum. It was proposed that in the future reference be made to various feminisms (plural), in order to emphasise the diversity in the struggle for women’s emancipation within different cultures, while at the same time stressing the common aim of equality between women and men on a worldwide level. Practical suggestions were made for self-organisations to start networking on an international level, thus producing a muchneeded exchange of experience and offering the chance to support one another in the process of interpreting or reinterpreting the Islamic faith. Simultaneously topics such as discrimination against women, the struggle for women’s rights and the promotion of women’s participation in society were covered. In 2006 the second conference on Islamic feminism took place in Barcelona. In addition to the aim of the first conference of fostering international networks and collaboration, the second conference prominently featured family and shari’a law in Muslim countries. Many of the organisations and participants of the first conference were present as well as, among others, Shaheen Sardar Ali (professor of jurisprudence), Nayereh Tohidi (professor of women’s studies), and Amina Teslima al-Yerrahi (female Sufi leader in Mexico). This time the conclusions also referred to the many feminisms in the world, and the need for this term to be in the plural: Islamic feminism is just one part of the worldwide feminist movement. There was also a call to condemn all forms of violence and punishment committed in the name of Islam. The faith, it was maintained, offers no justification for such practices. Rather, as at the first conference, emphasis was placed on the

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egalitarian message of Islam, with the note that the struggle to rediscover the meaning of this message must be continued. For more information see: http://www.feminismeislamic.org/eng/ (on the first conference) and http://www.islamicfeminism.org/ (on the second conference).

Piek Knijff (student of Philosophy, the University of Amsterdam)

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Overcoming patriarchy There are those who take it for granted that Islam oppresses women and that this is a state of affairs which cannot be changed by any means. From this perspective, Westernisation, understood as the renunciation of Islam, is the only path to the liberation of the Muslim woman. Opposing this reading, there is a women’s movement that claims that it is possible to achieve liberation within the framework of Islam. For the most part these are women who do not want to give up their traditions and reject the male chauvinism and sexism that now prevail in Muslim societies. This movement concludes that a degradation of Islamic tradition and distortion of the sacred texts have taken place. Moreover, this movement affirms that true Islam contains important elements of liberation and calls for the recovery of these elements as a framework for social emancipation. Discrimination against women has gone from being thought of as an essential part of Islam to being condemned as a distortion of tradition. Women’s liberation cannot be achieved by attacking Islam as a whole, but rather by attacking those views which require the subordination of women, destroying their arguments and offering Muslim women the tools and insights necessary for their liberation. A new understanding of the Islamic tradition is needed in order to assess this movement’s significance. It involves an attempt to recover the spiritual dimension and the feeling of belonging in the world in the face of those who seek to reduce Islam to an ideology. This is an understanding based on the concepts of complementarity, justice and balance, and rooted in The Message of the Qur’an. Islam, as a cosmic view that provides for the integration of all forces that govern life, should not entail the subordination of women to men. In the indivisible cosmos, all the forces of nature are found integrated, in constant movement, in equilibrium. Within this view, the equilibrium between the two poles of a couple (the masculine and feminine forces) is a determining factor. Masculine and feminine do not correspond to man and woman, but they are rather an internal part of every creature. That which is feminine is in equilibrium with that which is masculine just as much in a man as in a woman. To try to limit that which is feminine to women and subordinate it to that which is masculine as being the exclusive essence of men is to upset the internal equilibrium of men and women, a polarity which is present in all creatures. Patriarchy upsets this equilibrium established by Allah in nature, fostering a society based on oppression and authority. Male chauvinism is the destruction of Islam as a well-balanced way of life. It breaks with the very order of creation and imposes an artificial order which we call patriarchy. It must be said that the ideological foundations of patriarchy are not found in the Qur’an or the Sunna. A fresh reading of the sacred texts is needed in order to expose the inconsistencies in the male chauvinist interpretation of the tradition. So we believe that Islamic feminism is not only a political or social movement, but a spiritual restoration of the Message of the Qur’an.

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The dichotomy of the Muslim woman In relation to those countries which are experiencing a large growth in Muslim immigration, Islamic feminism could constitute an effective part of their integration. It involves an attack on the very roots of discrimination and injustice. An attack, based on the sources of Islam, which refutes the totalitarian interpretation forcibly imposed as the only one and true version of Islam. Opposing this internal criticism (deconstruction of the patriarchy based on the sources of Islam), we believe that Western culture’s claim to superiority is not an effective argument against fundamentalism, as this attack fails in its objective and tends even further to inflame these opposing stances. The more aggressive the proWesternisation stance is and the more it relies on arguments based on a fear of Islam, the more strength is gained by the fundamentalist movements that present themselves as defenders of their religion in the face of these attacks ‘from outside’. Nor are attempts of ‘social engineering’ effective, such as that of Kemal Ataturk, put in practice in Turkey - banning the veil, closing the sufi associations, replacing the Arabic alphabet by the Latin alphabet, repressing all public expression of religious acts, etc. This policy was a spectacular failure. The social engineering and spread of anti-religious secularism carried out have not achieved their aim. In fact, Turkey has gone from being a region characterised by syncretism, the mixing of cultures and religious pluralism, to being a country in which traditional Islam is threatened by political Islam (Islamism). Confronted with this Westernisation / Islamism dichotomy, we offer the recovery of and giving of priority to the numerous elements of traditional Islam that are compatible with a democratic system and human rights. Islamic feminism is having a powerful influence in some countries. This is not an isolated matter, but rather involves the lives of millions of people. It is crucial for the positive development of Islam and the defeat of fundamentalist interpretations that this movement is made known and supported on an international level. It is a common error in the West to point continuously to the dark side of Islam and ignore those Muslims who do face up to this. In the fight against discrimination, we ought to unite our efforts and go beyond cultural or religious barriers, these being barriers that the very fundamentalists seek to establish as immovable. To go beyond these barriers is the task of all those who desire a globalization that respects diversity and that does not become the hegemonic plan of one state or part of the world over another.

Muslim immigration In the context of modern societies, where the weight of the media is so great, it is necessary to make room for pluralistic expressions of Islam. Establishing a different

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viewpoint breaks with the monolithic belief that the fundamentalists seek to introduce. It is important to offer alternatives, to make room for discussion and to facilitate the breaking of patriarchal and unilateral models. One of the goals that the Junta Islámica Catalana (Catalonian Islamic Board) has set itself for the following years is to offer an Islamic interpretation of the gender question that is compatible with the modern world and constitutional values. We need this feminist reading to reach Muslim women, so that they can know there is an alternative to the eradication of patriarchal readings of their traditions. We need to make known this extensive movement in favour of the recovery of women’s rights in Islam. In this, as in every task of integration of Muslims in society as a whole, the activities of one organisation alone are not enough. Each social sector involved in the task of integration and construction of pluralism is able to provide its own platforms for action and communication in its attempt to make sure this message reaches society in general as much as it reaches the Muslim population. It is a message of coming together, in which a multicultural society may have the chance to develop without loss of the freedoms so painfully gained, in an organic and sensible manner, avoiding pitfalls and offering consensual solutions.

Abdennur Prado is Secretary of the Catalonian Islamic Board. Barcelona, September 26st 2005.

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ISLAMIC WOMEN’S MANIFESTO (IW/M)

Worldwide, women everywhere are faced with inequality based solely on their gender. The Islamic Women’s Manifesto (IW/M) concentrates on the situation of Muslim women in the Netherlands. Inequality and injustice based on gender originates from patriarchal structures and is apparent in many forms such as subordination of women, little or no right to self-determination, violence and/or oppression. Living in a male community or a community in which the male is the norm, means for women having an inferior position compared to men, solely on the basis of their being women. This situation has been maintained by both men and women.

Equality between women and men is an acknowledged principle within Islam. Patriarchal ideas, however, manifest themselves in different ways among Muslims, including within the present Dutch Muslim communities. Together with other Muslim women in the Netherlands, the drafters of the Islamic Women’s Manifesto (IW/M) want to set a movement in motion in order to create awareness and to change the ideas and practices that occur within the present Dutch Muslim communities, which are discriminative against and disadvantageous to women.

Basic principles •

•

•

•

The Islamic Women’s Manifesto is based on the conviction that Islam calls for justice between and equality of women and men, and that the Qur’an does not justify patriarchal ways of thinking and practices. On the basis of Qur’an and Sunna, Islam supports the aspiration to improve the position of Muslim women and to liberate oppressed women. The right to self-determination, freedom on the basis of equality, physical safety and integrity, education and economic independence are basic rights of Muslim women, which are legitimate according to Qur’an and Sunna. It is necessary for women - alongside men - to occupy themselves with the study and methods of interpretation of Islamic sources in order to remove the historically one-sided approach to Islamic sources from a male perspective. Women should also be represented in other fields of Islamic theology in order to restore the power relationship between Muslim men and women. In order to achieve justice and equality between Muslim women and men, idjtihaad (formulating legal judgments on the basis of reason or independent

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•

•

reasoning) by contemporary Muslim scholars and researchers (w/m) is urgently needed. Within the context of our present-day societies, various frames of reference and research methods should be taken into consideration. In order to advance justice and equality between Muslim women and men, a clear distinction has to be made between religious (Islamic) principles and cultural traditions. The position of Muslim women in the Netherlands cannot be separated from the position of Muslim women in other parts of the world, from the position of Muslim men or from the position of other women and men in our society. This calls for a mutual, active, open and participial attitude, in which dialogue, cooperation, support and solidarity are possible. Mutual recognition of plurality and individuality are basic conditions. Inclusion strengthens, exclusion weakens.

That is why we strive for: •

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• • • • •

• •

•

Strengthening the position of Muslim women in the Netherlands by eradicating inequality, injustice and oppression on the basis of gender or personal implementation of faith. We focus on addressing the patriarchal structures both within and outside the Dutch Muslim communities. The egalitarian and just message of Islam is the basis for this view. Raising awareness of both women and men about the different ways and levels in which ideas and practices exist within the Dutch Muslim communities that are discriminative against and disadvantageous to women. Allowing Muslim women to formulate and run their own agenda, based on their own needs, wishes, force and quality. Stimulating an open discussion within the Dutch Muslim communities about equality and justice between men and women. Cooperating with men from Muslim communities in realizing the principles, aims and aspirations of the Islamic Women’s Manifesto. Enhancing the visibility of the commitment and the quality of Muslim women in the Netherlands and in Dutch Muslim communities. Promoting education for women at different levels with regard to the independent reading of Islamic sources and other parts of Islamic-theological science. This also includes looking for provisions to make this kind of education possible. Promoting education for women in other relevant social and scientific areas. Increasing the influence of Muslim women and the female perspective in existing Islamic educational institutes or Islamic departments of other educational institutes. Increasing the influence and authority of Muslim women in decision-making

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•

• •

•

• •

bodies of Islamic institutes in the Netherlands (f.e. mosques, educational institutes, trusts, relief organizations, service organizations and interest groups). Increasing the influence and authority of Muslim women in decision-making bodies of general institutes and organizations in the Netherlands (and abroad). Creating (Muslim) women networks in order to exchange information, join forces and promote solidarity. Building and maintaining international contacts with (Muslim) women movements and organizations that have similar aspirations, with the intention of cooperation and mutual solidarity. Drawing attention to and adjusting laws, rules and systems in Dutch society that obstruct the self-determination and equality of Muslim women in any way. Looking for and applying methods in the education of Dutch Muslim children that make better use of the principles of the Islamic Women Manifesto. Developing strategies at different levels in society in order to strengthen the position of Muslim women in the Netherlands.

May Allah help us in our aspirations. Amsterdam, November 21st 2006.

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SECTION III - STRATEGIES

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Recent history of Iran • • • • • • • • •

• • • • • • • •

• • •

Pahlavi regime (1926-1979); Reza Shah until 1941 and Mohammad Reza Shah after that, until the revolution. 1963: women’s suffrage. 1967: the Family Protection Act. Iranian Revolution (1979). In this same year the Family Protection Act was repealed. First premier after the revolution: Mehdi Bazargan (1979); a moderate Muslim. First president after the revolution: Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr (1980); a moderate / secular believer. 1979-1981: a relative ‘spring of freedom’. From 1981 to the end of the 1980s: years of severe oppression and absolute power of the Islamic fundamentalists. Barzargan was marginalised and Bani-Sadr fled the country to an exile in Paris. During this period Iran was ruled by Islamic hardliners, and all opposition parties were one by one attacked and banned. From 1980 onward Islamic dress codes were gradually introduced (for example, the wearing of the headscarf) and made obligatory for women. Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). In 1985 a new family act was adopted which limited women’s rights with regard to divorce and custody of children. Khomeini dies (1989). In the beginning of the 1990s the calls for reform grew stronger. In 1997 a reformist named Mohammad Khatami was elected president due to the great support he received from women and young people. The middle of the 1990s onward saw a very limited civil society developing in which cautious criticism could be heard. In 1999 the student protests in Tehran and other large Iranian cities became violent and suppressed with force. After this President Khatami lost a great deal of his popularity, as he had let the students down. Reformists acquire the majority in the sixth parliament in Iran in 2000 for the first time since the 1979 revolution. The end of the 1990s and the start of the new century saw the tensions between reformists and hardliners in Iran grow. More than fifty percent of the Iranian students at Iranian universities are women. In 2004 the number of women who took the entrance examination amounted to more than 1,160,000; the number of men who took the examination was 766,000.

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• •

• • • •

Around seventy percent of the Iranian population is younger than thirty. Based on official reports, in 2001 more than 400,000 people used the internet in Iran. This number has grown in recent years, and the vast majority of users are women. It is estimated that there are between 12,000 and 20,000 Farsi weblogs in Iran, a number which is extremely high for the Middle East. An estimated one to four million Iranians live abroad, with the largest expatriate Iranian community being in the United States. In 2003 Shirin Ebadi, Iranian lawyer and fighter for women’s and children’s rights, won the Nobel Peace Prize. In 2004 the Conservatives once again won the majority in parliament. In 2005 Mahmud Ahmadinejad, a hardliner, was elected president of Iran.

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IRANIAN WOMEN’S VOICES ACROSS BORDERS

(1)

Halleh Ghorashi

In spite of its initial ideals of freedom and equality, the Iranian revolution of 1979 turned out to be oppressive both to its political opposition and to women. The first half of the 1980s can be considered as one of the oppressive periods in the recent history of Iran. In that same period, the war with Iraq (1980-1988) started. Combined with the political oppression of the revolutionary regime, the war resulted in the closing of national borders for several years. When the borders reopened in the mid 1980s, a large number of Iranians had been smuggled across borders and had started new lives elsewhere. (2) The physical opening of the Iranian borders did not result in much more trans-border movement either physically or virtually. During these years the image of the new Iran was so negative that it became almost impossible for Iranians to obtain travel visas from any western country, even if they were able to acquire legal travel documents from the Iranian regime. The result was that a large number of Iranians left Iran either with illegal exit documents or with illegitimate entry documents. In addition, its isolation meant that Iran was left behind by much of the rest of the world in terms of technological developments. The war, the regime, and the isolation of Iran, resulted in a kind of ‘forced’ physical and virtual separation from the rest of the world. This had undeniable effects on the Iranians who left Iran and the ones who stayed.

In the 1980s, the nation state significantly limited the transnational space for activism in Iran. In those years of isolation and suppression, activists in Iran did not have much access to the world beyond their limited locality. Limitations were eased in the years following the end of the Iran-Iraq war. By the 1990s, access to developing transnational spaces restricted the forces of the nation state through the ways that local protest were empowered and organized. Transnational space meant an opening to a new world for women activists who felt limited for years in their rather closed local environment. Access to the Internet and a newly formed connection with the Iranian diaspora were responsible for opening this new transnational space. By the end of the 1990s, the borders of the nation state started to open up both physically and virtually. This opening of the transnational space had been both enabling and limiting for the local protest movements in Iran.

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The limitations produced by the newly opened transnational space were partly a result of the deep gap between local Iranian activists and the Iranian diaspora caused by the ‘forced’ years of separation during the 1980s. Hatred of the Iranian regime for years served as the binding factor for a rather heterogeneous Iranian diaspora. For women, anger against the regime was political as well as gender-related because of gender-specific violence. Hatred and anger towards the Iranian regime long remained an essential part of diasporic identity. Iranians inside Iran, however, struggled in many ways to improve their positions within the limiting space of the Islamic republic. In the 1990s, this resulted in the formation of a limited form of civil society within the context of the political reformist movement in Iran. NGOs started their struggle to become independent of the state, and activists started to claim, although with fear, as much space as possible to express their ideas. Despite the changes in Iran, the gap between Iranians inside and outside remained wide in the 1990s. On the one hand, the diaspora’s memory of a suppressive situation in Iran made them suspicious of any kind of activism from within the country. On the other hand, Iranian activists inside felt ignored and distrusted the judgment of those living in the diaspora because they believed that this group had been away too long and was too far away to know the true situation. This mutual distance and distrust hindered contacts for some time. In this piece I will show how and why these positions have changed over time. To do so, I start with the impact of the revolution on the women’s movement in Iran, elaborate on activities inside and outside Iran, and describe the shifting patterns of transnational connections over the past decade.

Women before and after the revolution of 1979 The modernization efforts of both Reza Shah and his son Mohammad Reza resulted in some - albeit controversial - benefits for women. The most controversial of those has been the compulsory unveiling of women in public in 1936. Iranian women were to become the symbol of the modern Iran Reza Shah had in mind. In the 1960s, Mohammad Reza Shah continued these modernization policies for example by, in 1963, extending the right to vote to women. The Family Protection Law of 1967, which offered increased protection in cases of divorce and custody of children, was revised to allow free abortion on demand (1974), install a restriction on polygyny, and give women the right to alimony after divorce (1976). But the suppressive character of this regime did not allow for independent women’s activities. In spite of limitations, women’s activism did not stop in Iran when independent women’s organizations were abolished. This activism prior to the revolution led to a considerable participation of women in the revolution and their social, intellectual, and political involvement in those years. Women played an important role in protests against the Pahlavi dynasty (19261979). The images of thousands of women with their children shouting slogans

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against the Pahlavi regime in the streets of Iranian cities surprised many around the world. A month after the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime, women were marching again. The first and largest protest by Iranian women was against compulsory veiling. Compulsory veiling was the first step, other restrictions followed. The Family Protection Law for example was abolished and this meant that women not only lost the limited legal benefits that they had enjoyed during the former regime, but were also subjected to diminished legal rights in matters of divorce and inheritance. Moreover, polygyny was again legalized and all female judges and lawyers were dismissed (Saadatmand, 1995). These changes made the majority of women even more progressive and vocal in claiming their rights. They did their best to maintain their presence in social life and continued to combat exclusion. Women knew that if they were excluded they could be easily subjected to the most violent law codes. Thus their first combat was to maintain their presence in the public arena. During their participation in the revolution women experienced a taste of freedom to decide about the political, social, cultural, and sexual aspects of their lives. These experiences also led to a redefinition of gender identity. Hence, Iranian women, who were ‘modernized’ before the revolution and empowered during the revolution, struggled to stay present in the public domain.

Years of suppression and women’s voices inside During 1979-1981, the two years following the revolution of 1979 that are often referred to as ‘the spring of freedom’, a number of political groups came into existence. At that time those groups were permitted by law. These groups advanced a wide range of ideologies, including forms of Marxism, Islamism, liberalism, and women’s rights. Both the extent of the freedom enjoyed during these years and the opportunity for political involvement meant that Iranian women were extensively participating in the political changes of their country for the first time. After the revolution, scenes in the streets changed drastically. This was especially true in front of the University of Tehran. Bookshops were fi lled with books that were previously illegal. In front of these shops, stands displayed newly printed books, tapes of revolutionary music, and a multitude of newspapers from diverse political groups. In front of almost every stand a group of people discussed political issues and plans for the future of the country. Men and woman of all ages and classes took part in passionate debates. Those years of freedom were beautiful, but they did not last. Years full of hope and optimism changed to years full of fear and emptiness: a period called ‘the years of suppression’ by many. In the first months after the revolution, various political groups began clashing. Although people were free to demonstrate and discuss in the streets, disagreements gradually took on more virulent forms. Occasional violent confrontations led to a decisive change of power in June

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1981. From that time onwards, brutal and bloody scenes dominated the streets of Iran, especially in Tehran. This change from years of activity and possibility to years of silence, fear, and passivity had a strong psychological impact on women. Many expressed feelings of depression: saying they felt dead or lost. The years of repression resulted in postponing the women activities but it could not stop it totally. The fact that the political space of many women became limited should not imply that this stopped women from being active. Participating in the revolution and becoming politically active, gave many women the awareness of the importance of decision-making and about their gender (see also Ghorashi, 1996). Many leftist activists, for example, who would not call themselves feminists during the revolution, had become strong advocates of women’s rights later on, either inside or outside Iran (Ghorashi, 2003a). These strong secular feminists transferred their political passion partly into passion for feminism. However there was a difference between the one’s who stayed inside and the others who left Iran. Within the Iranian Islamic framework it has been impossible for these secular feminists to come out with their secular identity in the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. For this reason many of these activists used the label Islamic feminism because of their limitations in Iran, when their counterparts outside Iran referred to themselves as secular feminists. The women’s movement in Iran has of course not been limited to the activities of these secular feminists. Islamic women have also been busy voicing their protest against anti-women policies of Islamic republic. However it is important to distinguish between two groups within this Islamic women’s movement: Islamist women’s activists and Muslim feminists. (3) The first group are Islamist women activists who have positioned themselves against Western concepts such as feminism and modernist concepts such as equality. These women believe that Islam as a religion is in favour of women and that if there are laws against women it is a matter of wrong interpretation of Islam by men. For these women activists, Islam and women’s rights are not contradictory. Actually they bring forward that the situation of women within true Islam is most effectively protected, if the men let it. Islamist women activists position themselves within the framework of political Islam and are willing to improve women’s position within this given framework. They see women’s role as complementary to men’s; equality is not considered an emancipating principle but rather a false term, implying a negligence of women’s natural strengths and abilities. According to these activists ‘women should be treated respectfully by their husbands’, but they accept that certain Islamic laws may be applied differently to men and women. In this sense this group has been one of the closest allies of the Islamist regime in Iran. But this does not mean that they have blindly endorsed all of the regime’s decisions concerning women. They have contributed in changing women’s condition within the framework of Islamic law and belief. In their criticism of the West and Modernist thoughts this group has been using post-modern criticism of Western feminism (in its attention for different voices and positioning within

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women’s movement) in their favour. A good example of this positioning is the work of Mahboobeh Ommi (4) as the chief editor of the journal Farzaneh, in the beginning of the 1990s (see Najmabadi, 1998). The other group is the group of Muslim feminists or Islamic feminists who believe in equality between the sexes within an Islamic framework. However while the previous group makes the women’s rights to fit in the Islamic framework, this group is stretching the limits of Islamic framework in favour of women’s rights. This group chooses the label feminism consciously and believe that Islam needs to be reformed in order to protect women’s rights. In contrast to the Islamist women’s activists, these Islamic feminists resist any attempts to deny equality on the basis of the Islamic discourse. They have become very strong advocates of reform and improvement of women’s condition in Iran. Good example of this movement is the magazine Zanan (Women). (5) It was only from the mid 1990s that a space was created for secular feminists to claim secularism publicly. Women’s Cultural Centre which has been founded in 1991, claimed secularism only later on in the 1990s. Many of the members of this group have been active within different women’s magazines such as Jens-e Dovom (Second Sex) and Fasl-e Zanan (the Season of Women). Women’s Cultural Centre has been extremely active on various issues related to women’s conditions. To name a few: Celebrations of International Woman’s Day on 8th of March each year, seminars and conferences regarding such issues as ‘the killing of Street Women’, ‘Afghan women in Exile (in Iran)’, ‘Domestic Violence’ and publication of a Newsletter ‘Nameye Zan’. One of the most important activities of the Centre has been the call for the establishment of the first, non-governmental library specializing in women. Also from 2003, after the ban on their Newsletter, the Centre started with the online version of their Newsletter, IFTribune. (6) By the end of the 1990s, feminists inside of Iran, both Islamic and secular, started to collaborate and became strong advocates for reform and the improvement of women’s conditions in Iran. For example in Zanan, Shirin Ebadi (as an Islamic feminist) and Mehrangiz Kar (a secular feminist) (7) wrote many articles in which women were informed about their legal rights. In those years secular feminists and scholars have attempted to highlight the differences among Islamic women’s activists (Afshar, 1996a, 1996b; Mir-Hosseini, 1996a, 1996b; Tohidi, 1995). This line of cooperation through Zanan reached also the feminists outside Iran such as Nayereh Tohidi (8) (a scholar living in the U.S.): ‘Zanan’s willingness to join forces with secular feminists to protest against the gender biases of a law which is derived from the shari’a is indeed novel in post-revolutionary politics.’ (Mir-Hosseini, 1996a, p. 306) From the beginning of this century, we observe a shift towards feminism even from the first group, Islamist women activists, who initially positioned themselves against feminism as concept. A good example of this is one the most famous theorists of Islamist women’s activists mentioned before, Mahboobeh Abbas Gholizadeh

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(Ommi). (9) Next to being chief editor of the magazine Farzaneh, Ommi has also been coordinator of Non Governmental Organisations on women’s issues during the mid 1980s. In her editorial in the early 1990s, she strongly positions herself against feminism and the equality concept (Najmabadi, 1998). However later in 2000 she took another position when she gave a lecture in Leiden, invited by the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World. During that lecture she called herself a feminist and openly criticized her earlier standpoints. (10) In 2001, during a conference organized again by ISIM in Soesterberg, she went even one step further by mentioning that women’s movement worldwide should mainly emphasize on the communalities instead of different ideologies or religions. (11) This new positioning brings her even much closer to secular feminists distancing even further from her standpoints in the beginning of the 1990s as Islamic woman activist opposing feminism. This shift in positions in case of Ms. Ommi is very interesting, not as a single example but as a symbol in showing the change of positioning within women’s activism in Iran after the revolution. It makes clear that the developments inside Iran have been as such that the strong Islamic tendencies of the beginning of the 1990s make place for more secular ones within the women’s movement. This means that many women, who would search the limit of their activism for women’s rights within the Islamic framework in the 1980s, are more and more inclined to challenge and stretch this Islamic framework claiming space for women’s rights. This has led to the prominence of feminist ideas, be it secular or Islamic from the 1990s, pushing the number and the presence of the anti-feminist approach of Islamic women’s activists into the margin.

What about the women in the diaspora? The activities and changes that have taken place in Iran prove that women have claimed their space through tireless struggles on a variety of fronts. That said, many members of the Iranian diaspora did not witness these changes because they left Iran during the 1980s: the years characterized by many as ‘the dark years of suppression’. As mentioned earlier, the fact that the physical and virtual borders of Iran were closed during that time resulted in limited communication between activists abroad and activists within Iran. As a result diaspora Iranians were unaware of the developments in Iran. The memories of those years of suppression remained vivid in the minds of diaspora Iranians. They could not imagine that there had been any changes. It was this image of Iran as ultimately suppressive that held sway over the Iranian diaspora and influenced their understanding of the changes in Iran. These earlier experiences of many women now in the diaspora affected them in diverse ways. For many, new ideals replaced old political ideals. These new ideals include the wish to make at least a small contribution to changing the world. For this reason many Iranian women in the diaspora are quite active in human, women, and

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children’s rights issues. The majority of women activists in the diaspora are secular in their choice of activism and most of them oppose any kind of religious feminism and in this case Islamic feminism. It is those memories of the years of suppression in Iran and the urge for activism in the present that characterizes the majority of Iranian women in the diaspora and it is from this context that their reaction to activism in Iran can be understood. Shared political pasts could have served as a possible binding factor between Iranian women activists inside and outside Iran. Instead it is the years of separation during the 1980s that have dominated the interactions between the two. Even though both groups of activists claim women’s rights and feminism as their driving force, this assumed communality has not been enough for a healthy interaction between the two. In the following part I will illustrate this by presenting the case of a transnational Iranian women’s organization in which, over the past decade, the tensions between the activists inside and outside have been central.

Iranian Women’s Studies Foundation (IWSF) (12) One of the most active Iranian diaspora initiatives on women’s issues has been the transnational activity of the Iranian Women’s Studies Foundation (IWSF). The aim of the foundation has been to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas on issues related to Iranian women. The first IWSF conference was in 1990 at Cambridge in the United States. Since then, the foundation has been involved in organizing annual conferences on women’s issues all over the world. Every year hundreds of Iranian women residing in various countries attend this three-day conference. The conference took place in various cities, primarily in the United States and Canada (Los Angeles, Berkeley, Denver…), but recently in European cities as well (Paris, Stockholm, London, Berlin…). The program of the conference consists of lectures, discussions, cultural presentations, and informal gatherings. Depending on the theme of the conference, activists from Iran or from its diaspora as well as wellknown non-Iranian feminists were invited to give lectures. The themes of the IWSF conferences, the programs, and the location change each year. What has remained consistent is the passion of the organizers and the great tension between diverse points of views on women’s issues. Since the first conferences there have been several incidents in which activists from Iran were verbally attacked by some of those living in the diaspora. These attacks were mainly based on positions taken but were also partly due to the fact that those participants from Iran were wearing headscarves. In addition, there has been a growing gap between activists and scholars during IWSF conferences. This gap has grown because most of the Iranian scholars living outside Iran have begun to notice the activities and the space created in Iran as a new opening and as a result started to write about Islamic feminism. Some of the Iranian activists living in diaspora did not

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appreciate the position taken by the scholars. After presenting their work some scholars were openly attacked, labelled as postmodernist and marginalised by the activists. (13) This tension has grown, and every year there has been a new occasion for conflict in the conference. The 2004 IWSF conference, which also marked its fifteenth anniversary, took place in June in Berlin. The most intriguing part of this conference was that the whole program was broadcasted through Internet via ‘Paltalk’. (14) In the past decade, Iranians have proven to be one of the most active groups using the Internet (Graham & Khosravi, 2002). Many organizations are involved in arranging interviews and discussion programs on the Net, for example via ‘Paltalk’. An example was Women’s day in 2004, when prominent Iranian feminists from all over the world used the Net to discuss issues related to women and science, art, politics, and sexuality. As mentioned above, the Berlin IWSF conference was broadcasted through ‘Paltalk’ which made it possible for Iranian women from all around the world to be part of the conference. Unlike for activists living in the diaspora, it is rather difficult for Iranian activists living in Iran to attend the conference if they are not invited as a guest of the conference. This has to do with difficulties obtaining visas and providing the expenses related to the conference. The Internet broadcast brought a new dimension to the transnational character of the conference, making it much more available for Iranians inside Iran. Next to this, many participants considered this IWSF conference in Berlin to be the best IWSF conference, because there were less conflicts compared to other conferences. From different conversations and observations made during the conference in Berlin I felt and was told that more room had been created within the Iranian diaspora for different opinions: especially in regard to the developments in Iran. ‘Leftist radicals’ were still present but their presence had become somehow marginalised compared to previous years. At that time it seemed to me that this change could be explained by two factors: increasing interactions with Iran during the course of the last decade and a major event that occurred in the year 2000.

Localized impact of transnational links In April 2000, the Heinrich Böll Foundation and the Haus Der Kulturen Der Welt in Berlin organized the conference ‘Iran after Elections’ on civil society and the reform process in Iran. The aim of the conference was to bring Iranian intellectuals, politicians and artists inside and outside Iran together and review the latest developments in Iran. The conference soon changed into a violent political arena when a group of Iranian opposition from the diaspora, disrupted the meetings by shouting slogans and preventing the participants from speaking. This act of opposition was followed by other actions such as a striptease by one woman and one man; a scene that was repeatedly shown on the national television in Iran. The conservatives in power in

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Iran used this incident to show that during the conference, Islam and the Islamic republic were offended. Among the participants of the conference from Iran were human rights activist and lawyer Mehrangiz Kar, journalist and the editor of Zanan Shahla Sherkat, outspoken reformist cleric Hojatoleslam Hasan Yusefi-Eshkevari, elected MP (of the sixth parliament) from Tehran, journalist Jamileh Kadivar, journalist and researcher Akbar Ganji, publisher and human rights activist Shahla Lahiji, in addition to the famous writers Mahmoud Dolatabadi and Mohammad Ali Sepanlou. Upon their return to Iran, a revolutionary court in Tehran punished these participants for attending the conference in Berlin. Many of these activists were sentenced to several years in prison; some are still serving their sentences. This clash between Iranian reformists and activists from Iran and Iranian ‘radicals’ in the diaspora resulted in a very painful situation. Iranian activists who had been risking their lives in Iran were attacked both by Iranian activists living in diaspora and the conservative powers in Iran. This event resulted in many discussions, which in turn, led to reflections on the positions by many members of the Iranian diaspora. The price was high, but this incident alerted the Iranian diaspora to the changes in Iran, and some factions started to re-evaluate their previous positions. Since the end of 1990s, the changing political sphere in Iran, encouraged or simply tolerated by the reformists in power such as ex-president Khatami, contributed to a limited physical and an active virtual openness towards the rest of the world. The West became hopeful of the possibility of fulfi lling Khatami’s promise of a ‘dialogue between the civilizations’ and watched patiently for political change in Iran. Yet, recent developments in Iran are rather gloomy again. During the last parliament election in Iran in 2004, conservatives won the election. This political loss for reformists in Iran had to do with the incapability of the reformist ex-president Khatami (who won the majority of the parliament at the end of 1990s) to fulfil his promise of reform. Since his election as president in 1997, Khatami’s authority had been curtailed by the conservatives holding the key positions of power in the country, such as: religious leader, juridical power, national media etcetera. This power struggle showed that the hand of the reformers was tight. Reformists who enjoyed the symbolic power of presidency and majority of the parliament were quite limited by the actual power of conservatives such as the religious leader or other religious bodies holding key positions. This process resulted in a growing disbelief of the population in change and so they became less supportive of the reformists. Also many parties boycotted the parliamentary election, when conservatives in charge, disqualified a large number of reformist candidates for election. All this resulted in the positive results of the election for the conservatives in 2004. Since then, there is a growing attack towards activists on various fronts. Many newspapers have been shut down and several activists have been arrested or forbidden to leave the country. Also the new media, like Internet and ‘weblogs’ have been attacked. A new era is starting in Iran in which the limited form of civil society is in a great danger. This

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fear is increasing even more since the election of the new conservative president of Iran, Ahmadinejad in 2005. Yet, it is essential now to be wary of the negative consequences of transnational space for local activism. This is especially true in the light of the new era, which is dominated in Chomsky’s (1999) term by ‘military humanism’. Military humanism justifies the transnational ‘export of democracy’ to other parts of world. In light of this, it would be naive to ignore the possible clashes of frameworks and discourses formed by contextual positioning in different parts of world and the endangering and patronizing side of transnational space for local protest.

IWSF 2005: clashing discourses A very clear example of the clash of discourses are the strong attacks towards the two invitees from Iran in last IWSF 2005 conference in Vienna. As I explained earlier in this paper, during the IWSF 2004 the power struggle between the ‘radical leftists’ and the rest was for the first time in the history of IWSF equally divided. This balance was not present in the IWSF 2005, Vienna conference at all: nearly the entire conference was dominated by the insults and conflicts. The guests of the conference from Iran were this time not just activists, but also scholars who were not directly part of the women’s movement in Iran. These scholars living and teaching in Iranian universities had adopted the particular discourse in Iran, with its religious connotations. This, of course, did not mean that they were spies of the regime (as it was suggested) or insensitive to the women’s cause in Iran. They were, however, definitely talking from an Iranian Islamic context. One of the invitees, dr. Shamsolsadat-e Zahedi was in my view a quite eloquent speaker yet her rhetoric was very much part of the current Islamic Iranian discourse. For example she was talking with an eloquence that a clergyman would have when addressing the audience. This eloquence was misplaced within the IWSF conference for various reasons. First, most of the participants of IWSF have for too long been ‘too’ far from Iran. They had not been part of this somewhat religious discourse and could not understand it in any other way than as a link to the Iranian regime. Second, the speech was too academic or even too much of a kind of university lecture. Conference participants often expect a kind of activist lecture even from academics. Third, there were also some problems in the case of time management which meant that the lecture took too long and as a result there was not enough time for Q and A (which is the most essential part of IWSF conferences). All these factors together resulted in a terrible outburst of anger from the public and some even went so far as to insult the speaker openly by calling her ‘mullah’ (clergy) or even a ‘fascist’. Next to this, strong emotional reactions were part of the scene as well: many women fainted or started crying and the atmosphere got somewhat out of control. This highly emotional event led to an intensive discussion on the Net after the con-

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ference from different positions, starting with an open letter from one of the young participants of the conference, Golbarg Bashi. (15) The least we can conclude from these discussions is that recent changes in Iran towards conservatism have created a new shadow of fear even outside the Iranian borders. IWSF has been a place for the Iranian women diaspora where kindred souls meet. Hundreds of Iranian women from all over the world gather to share their ideas, ideals, feelings, and experiences. Many have found old childhood friends, old comrades, and families at these conferences. Thus IWSF is a transnational reunion for many Iranian women who find energy, love, and power through participating in this conference. As mentioned earlier in this paper, these women with horrible memories of post-revolutionary Iran displayed for years strong resistance towards any action that could even slightly be construed as a compromise to the Iranian regime. For these women, the IWSF conference served as a fortress from which they fought against the injustice to women and against the Islamic regime in Iran. Now that conservative power is back in Iran again, it seems that there is urgency in defending this safe fortress even more than ever before in the past decade. Having said that, now it is also certainly the time for Iranian diaspora to reflect upon the possible impact of their actions within transnational space for activism in Iran.

A new challenge for the diaspora Despite the limitations in Iran, it is shown in this article that during the past two decades Iranian women have been able to organize themselves in various ways to protect their rights. The political shift from the mid 1990s made it possible for these women to break out of the limiting space of their country and access the rest of the world either physically or virtually. For the Iranian diaspora, it took some years to accept the existence of activism in Iran. After the years of ‘frozen images’ of Iran, the Iranian diaspora have recently become conscious of their role as possible allies for local activists in Iran. However, the Iranian diaspora needs to tread carefully when it seeks to export its own version of democracy and secularism to Iran. It also needs to guard against becoming too enthusiastic about inviting Iranian activists abroad for lectures and an exchange of ideas without taking into account the fact that these activists have to go back to Iran where they may face penalties for their actions abroad. When local activists get involved in transnational space they often have to pay a price, especially when their entrance to transnational space involves the physical crossing of the national borders of Iran. Since the fall of 2004, many activists who have gone to international conferences or meetings are either arrested upon their return to Iran or are forced to limit their activities. Some, such as Emaddedin Baghi (human right activist), are not even allowed to leave the country once their imminent departure from Iran becomes known. (16) Another example is that Mahboubeh Abbasgholizadeh (Ommi), the editor of Farzaneh magazine (wom-

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en’s magazine), was detained on November 1st, 2004 upon her return from London, where she took part in the European Social Forum. The police searched her Tehran home, confiscating her computer hard drive and other items. (17) She was released on bail about a month later. In a recent example, the Iranian-Dutch MP of the Dutch parliament, Ms. Farah Karimi was interrogated and insulted in the Tehran airport in May 2005 as she was leaving Iran after a short stay. Now that the new conservative shift is a fact in Iran, it shows even more the importance of the transnational space for the women’s movement in Iran. This transnational space is the guarantee that the voices of these activists will be heard worldwide. Yet, access to this new space seems to be less free and open than often assumed. Many writers of diverse weblogs who felt a sense of freedom in cyberspace were arrested and their blogs were closed. In addition the transnational connection with the Iranian diaspora seemed to be anything but uncontested. The gap between the two groups created misunderstandings and distrust from both sides. Yet, in light of recent attacks from the conservative power towards activists in Iran and the election of a conservative president in June 2005, the Iranian diaspora is challenged to be even more aware of the consequences of their actions towards Iran. Activists within the Iranian diaspora need to be reflective about their standpoints on democracy and freedom. Activists in Iran need to be aware of the paradoxical effects of transnational space for their local activism. Transnational space can be a factor in redefining local power relations. As a result, the forms of action also need to be constantly redefined. After years of physical and virtual separation, the impacts of transnational space are new challenges for Iranian activists when it comes to reshaping their local actions.

Prof. dr. Halleh Ghorashi holds since September 2005 the PaVEM-chair in Management of Diversity and Integration in the Department of Culture, Organization, and Management at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam. She was born in Iran and came to the Netherlands in 1988. In 1994, she completed her MA degree in Anthropology at the Vrije Universiteit. She received her Ph.D. in 2001 from the University of Nijmegen. She is the author of Ways to Survive, Battles to Win: Iranian Women Exiles in the Netherlands and the US (2003, Nova Science Publishers, New York) and several articles on questions of identity, the diaspora, and the Iranian women’s movement.

Notes (1) (2) (3)

Parts of this article are based on earlier work presented in: Ghorashi, 2003b and Ghorashi and Tavakoli, 2006. The estimated number of Iranian diaspora varies from one to four million. For differentiating Islamic women activism I am inspired by the stimulating work of Karam, 1998.

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(4) (5) (6) (7)

(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)

(15) (16) (17)

Later referred to as Mahboobeh Abbas Gholizadeh. See for elaborate analysis of Zanan, Najmabadi, 1998 and Mir-Hosseini, 1996a. See for more activities of the Centre, www.iftribune.com. Shirin Ebadi is the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize 2004 and Mehrangiz Kar is a lawyer living in those years in Iran who is now living in abroad because of her medical condition (for more see: Mir-Hosseini, 1996 and Najmabadi, 1998). Zanan, 1995, 4 (25). Abbas Gholizadeh is the same as A. Golizadeh in this article. See also A. Golizadeh, 2000. Based on personal participation during the discussions at the conference. See for more www.iwsf.com. This information is based on several informal talks with different scholars by the author throughout the years, and her observations during the conference in Berlin. Paltalk is a new electronic medium which allows the users to see, hear and share files with anyone, anywhere in the world. This program is used by Iranians all around the world to participate and organize discussions on various themes. http://www.iranian.com/Women/2005/July/Crisis/, also my piece on the discussion: http:// www.iranian.com/Opinion/2005/September/Ghorashi/. For more information about this event see: http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE1 30392004?open&of=ENG-IRN. Information obtained from the action by Reporters without Borders.

Literature Abbas-Gholizadeh (A. Golizadeh), M. (2000), ‘The Experiences of Islamic Feminism in Iran’, in: Farzaneh: Journal of Women’s Studies and Research, 5(10), p. 7-15. Afshar, Haleh (1996a), ‘Islam and Feminism: An Analysis of Political Strategies’, in: M. Yamani (ed.), Feminism and Islam: Legal and Literary Perspectives, London, Ithaca Press, p. 197-216. Afshar, Haleh (1996b), ‘Women and the politics of fundamentalism in Iran’, in: H. Afshar (ed.), Women and Politics in the Third World, London, Routledge, p. 121-141. Chomsky, Noam (1999), The new military humanism: lessons from Kosovo, London, Pluto Press. Ghorashi, Halleh (1996), ‘Iranian Islamic and secular feminists, allies or enemies? A question rethought by participating in the NGO Forum during the Fourth International Women’s Conference in China’, in: MERA Occasional papers no. 27, Amsterdam, Middle East Research Associates. Ghorashi, Halleh (2003a), ‘From Marxist Organizations to Feminism: Iranian Women’s Experiences of Revolution and Exile’, in: The Journal of the Study of Religions and Ideologies (J.S.R.I.), special issue on Gender and / in Ideologies, no. 6, p. 89-107. Ghorashi, Halleh (2003b), Ways to Survive, Battles to Win: Iranian Women Exiles in the Netherlands and the United States, New York, Nova Science Publishers. Ghorashi & Tavakoli (2006), ‘Paradoxes of transnational space and local activism: Iranians organizing across borders’, in: Focaal: European Journal of Anthropology, no. 47, p. 90-102.

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Graham, Mark, & Shahram Khosravi (1997), ‘Home Is Where You Make It: Repatriation and Diaspora Culture Among Iranians in Sweden’, in: Journal of Refugee Studies 10 (2), p. 115133. Karam, Azza M. (1998), Women, Islamisms and the State: Contemporary Feminisms in Egypt, New York, Macmillan Press. Mir-Hosseini, Ziba (1996a), ‘Stretching the Limits: A Feminist Reading of the Shari`a in PostKhomeini Iran’, in: M. Yamani (ed.), Feminism and Islam: Legal and Literary Perspectives, London, Ithaca Press, p. 285-319. Mir-Hosseini, Ziba (1996b), ‘Women and politics in post-Khomeini Iran: Divorce, veiling and emerging feminist voices’, in: H. Afshar (ed.), Women and Politics in the Third World, London, Routledge, p. 142-170. Najmabadi, A. (1998), ‘Feminism in an Islamic Republic: “Years of Hardship, Years of Growth”’, in: Y.Y. Haddad & J.L. Esposito (eds.), Islam, Gender and Social Change, New York / Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 59-84. Tohidi, Nayereh (1995), ‘More action, less dissension than Nairobi’, in: AMEWS Newsletter, Association for Middle East Women’s Studies, X (3), p. 11-13.

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The Catholic Church and the State The Catholic Church continues being a significant socio-political actor throughout the region with a great influence on the society, political parties and rulers. At a legal level, however, several ways of regulating the relations between the State and the Church coexist. A minority group of constitutions still considers Catholicism as the official religion closer to a confessional system. These are the cases of Bolivia, Costa Rica or El Salvador. Most constitutions grant a privileged status to the Catholic Church that becomes apparent by guaranteeing a special legal status and / or economic assistance for its support. Examples of this are the Constitution of Argentina that in article 2 states that the ‘Federal government supports the Catholic, apostolic and Roman cult’ or article 82 of the Paraguayan Constitution that ‘… recognizes the leading role of the Catholic Church in the historical and cultural formation of the Nation’. Finally, there are constitutions such as those of Mexico or Uruguay, which are examples of secular constitutions, which represent a clear separation between the State and the Church and avoid recognizing a special status for the Catholic Church. The Uruguayan Constitution states in article 5 that ‘all religious cults are free in Uruguay. The State does not support any religion’.

Abortion Latin America in general has a legal penal system that criminalizes the voluntary interruption of pregnancy with low recognition of allegations for non-punishability. Latin America and the Caribbean present a plurality of regulations that can be summarized as follows (1): Abortion is penalized on all grounds in four countries (El Salvador, Chile, the • Dominican Republic, and since 2006 Nicaragua). Therapeutic abortion when the life of the woman is at risk is allowed in • twelve countries. Abortion when the health of the woman is at risk is not punishable in six • countries and in eight states of Mexico. Abortion due to woman’s mental health problems is not punishable in two • countries (Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago). Eugenesic abortion is not sanctioned in two countries and in seven states • of Mexico. Abortion due to rape is not punishable in six countries • Abortion without restrictions is allowed in Puerto Rico and Cuba. • Strong penalization of abortion in the region generates the existence of an increased number of illegal abortions, many of them carried out in precarious conditions. The number of unsafe abortions in Latin America and the Caribbean is

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calculated to be approximately 3,700,000 of which nearly 3,000,000 take place in South America where the number of maternal deaths caused by unsafe abortions is estimated at 3,000 cases per year (twenty percent of all the causes for maternal deaths). (2)

Sexual diversity A consensual homosexual relation between adults is not penalized in Latin America, with the exception of Nicaragua where, contrary to the general trend, it amended its penal code in 1992 to include sodomy as a criminal case. In any case, the region is generally characterized by a strong homo/trans phobia that materializes in the violation and inexistence of several sexual minority rights. Legislations that grant some degree of recognition to couples of the same sex are exceptions in Latin America. In the year 2003, Buenos Aires, Argentina, recognized the civil union of couples of the same sex, being the first legislation of this type in Latin America. This reform was followed by the recognition of civil unions in the Province of Río Negro, also in Argentina, and in the state of Río Grande do Sul, Brazil.

Notes (1)

Data taken from Anika Rahman, Laura Katzive & Stanley K. Henshaw, ‘A Global Review of Laws on Induced Abortion, 1985-1997’, in: International Family Planning Perspectives, Vol. 24, No. 2, June 1998, complemented with information from several countries.

(2)

World Health Organization (WHO), Global and regional estimates of the incidence of unsafe abortion and associated mortality in 2000 (4th edition), Geneva, 2004.

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THE POLITICS OF DISSENT The role of Catholics for a Free Choice in Latin America (1) Juan Marco Vaggione

Religions have moved forward in fields where they were meant to withdraw, generating political dynamics which force the prevailing conceptual frameworks to be rethought and to design new strategies. One of these fields, sexuality, which is particularly connected to women and sexual minorities, is one of the dimensions were the political violence of religions is more evident. Latin America, as well as several other regions of the world, is going through a significant point in time regarding this religious politicization. On the one hand, the sustained presence of democratic systems during the last decades, in spite of their limitations and exclusions, has enabled a higher level of pluralism concerning sexuality-related topics that becomes apparent in citizen opinions and public agenda discussions. On the other hand, the Catholic Church has intensified its position of being the sole source of regulatory principles concerning sexuality at a religious, cultural and legal level. Thus, bishops, civil society organizations and politicians have formed alliances with the foremost purpose of resisting, or in cases, to revert the sanction of sexual and reproductive rights.

The main purpose of this article is to analyse two opposed dynamics that make the complex politicization of religion vis-à-vis sexual and reproduction rights apparent. In first place, we must take into consideration the role played by the Catholic hierarchy as the main obstacle in the sanction and effective validity of rights in favour of women and sexual minorities, an obstacle that does not only exist at a religious/ moral level but also at the level of public and legal discussions. The thesis of this article is that the Catholic Church has managed a strategic adaptation in its defence of the traditional family because without renouncing to its privileges as a religious institution, it claims rights as a political actor. The strong influence, but paradoxically, the greatest weakness of the Church as a sector of power in Latin American democracies lies greatly within this duality (religious / political). Secondly, this article rescues the existence of religious pluralism in Latin America as a political phenomenon, particularly, the one that takes place within Catholicism

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in the form of religious dissidence. Compared with a Church that politicizes its dogmatic defence of a particular family model, where patriarchy and hetero-normativity are camouflaged, a significant number of believers build their religious identity opposing the official doctrine in sexuality-related issues. For the most part, we must take into consideration the activities of the organizations named Catholics for a Free Choice, which have established an original antagonism to the Catholic Church hierarchy in Latin America. Catholics for a Free Choice exposes the existing fractures between the hierarchy, which is increasingly obsessed with a particular sexual morality, and a significant number of followers who assert their religious identities in a plural and autonomous way. These fissures are significant political spaces that permit going more profoundly into women’s liberation and into the liberation of sexual minorities in Latin America.

The Catholic Church: between politics and religion The Catholic Church, its hierarchy and discourses continue to exist as the main obstacle for going more profoundly into sexual and reproductive rights. Throughout time, it seems that it has not given up its intent to control the bodies of its followers, mainly women’s bodies, as a means of controlling social order in general. The Church led by Karol Wojtyla and Joseph Ratzinger has reaffirmed the centrality of sexual morals in their agendas and alliances. As a reaction to the growing pluralism and liberalization of sexuality, the Catholic hierarchy intervenes by reaffirming its dogmatism at the level of religious teachings and legal principles, which must be followed by the state. Even though the official Church has not modernized its position regarding sexuality, it has modernized the channels that it uses to make sure the doctrine continues to play a leading role in cultural and legal regulations with regard to sexuality. It has adjusted to the democratic systems and it moves as a political actor, who as part of the civil society puts pressure on the branches of government in defence of its doctrine. (2) In addition to being a religious institution, the Church appeals to its right to become a political actor. This duality becomes one of the main challenges, not only at an analytical level but also at the political strategy level since it is essential to understand and confront the actions of the Catholic Church without reducing it to one of its basic components. Traditionally, the Church has been and still is a religious institution that in the case of Latin America has a strong historical and cultural presence, forging a privileged status in comparison to other religious institutions. (3) In Latin American countries, which were used to the monopoly of the Catholic Church for years, it has been a common practice of the State to delegate the regulation of the moral order to the Church, thus forming a powerful alliance. Religion, public morality and juridical regulations on sexuality were translations at various levels, which reflected the official doctrine of Catholicism in general. The Church offered discourses where sin

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was the established limit for the population’s behaviour, a limit that at the same time was accepted and transformed into a crime by the State. The sin / crime relation operated as a mechanism where the State and the Church met as institutions for the social control of sexuality. Even though modernity largely implied a rupture in this articulation, the residual tendency remains (which has not lost power due to the latter reason) and by which the Church utilizes its preferential status as a religious institution to wield an influence on the states in several manners. For some rulers and legislators, the Church is the only legitimate voice with authority to dictate moral contents regarding sexuality, and these contents should be the basis for legal regulation. Either as a consequence of the religiousness of the rulers and legislators or Church lobbying, the direct influence of the Church on decision-making is not infrequent. For others, the Catholic Church in Latin America represents the majority of the population and, as such, provides the rules to be followed by the branches of government. Finally, some follow the dictates of the Church as a governance strategy: the high degree of legitimacy that the Church maintains in the region serves as a symbolic asset for negotiation. (4) These influences of the Church over the State show that the separation between the Church and the State is still an unfinished process in Latin America. The capacity for autonomy of the State vis-à-vis the Church is an important dimension of liberal democracies, which in the case of Latin America has a long and complicated history that goes through different stages. (5) Even though, on the one hand it is possible to observe at least at a formal level, an increasing separation between Church and State, on the other hand, it has not been exceptional in the region that in the actual political practice the Church is still affecting the contents of the legislations and public policies. Precisely, issues relating to sexuality are the most likely to be decided by the ecclesiastic hierarchy. The type of relationship existing between the State and the Church (alliance or conflict) is still the fundamental dimension for the recognition and effective legality of sexual and reproductive rights. (6) However, the Church activity cannot be reduced to a problem concerning the lack of separation between Church / State, insufficient laicism or incomplete secularization. Even if this separation were perfect, it would not mean that the Church would renounce to being an influential actor at a political level. On the contrary, as the Church accepts laicism as a rule of the democratic game, it reaffirms itself as political actor appealing for the common good of the society. Under this role, the Church says that it does not advocate for a particular doctrine or group of persons (its followers) but for a public morality of the civil society, and in this struggle, appeals to all citizens beyond their beliefs. As political actor, the Church sustains that issues such as the marriage of individuals of the same sex or the depenalization of abortion are not relevant to a specific religion but to all legislators and citizens: ‘the Church has the responsibility of promoting the public morality of the entire civil society based on fundamental moral values and not on simply protecting itself from the enforcement of detrimental laws.’ (7)

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The institutional decision to accept the separation from the state and religious freedom reinforced during Vatican Council II did not mean the privatization of the Church or its followers. (8) The Church established a new stage in which it claims to rescue mankind morally by combatting ‘pluralism as being motivated purely by moral relativism’. (9) Sexuality is in a privileged position on the list of Church concerns. The Vatican and several national Episcopal conferences have published a series of documents and declarations against the recognition of sexual and reproductive rights. Even though these arguments include religious and doctrinarian principles, it should be pointed out that they are increasingly based on moral, legal and scientific reasoning. Opposition to depenalization of abortion or legal recognition of couples of the same sex is not only based on religious arguments, but also on the inscription of complex secular discourses. (10) In this political activism, the Church appeals not only to the clergy but also to its followers in order that in their role as citizens or legislators they oppose to sexual and reproductive rights (11), which generates the growing participation of civil organizations advocating for the official position of the Church (generally called pro-life or pro-family). (12) This double inscription, as a religious institution and political actor, enhances the power of the Church to pressure governments and impede the sanction and validity of sexual and reproductive rights. Currently, in Latin America, there is a complex and everchanging structure of relations between the hierarchy of the Church and the governments. On the one hand, there is a group of countries where the presence of governments, which in principle can be considered as being centre left, could generate political feasibility for reforms regarding sexual and reproductive rights (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela and, more recently, Ecuador). The Latin American left wing is not necessarily anti-patriarchy, but undoubtedly, it is an alternative with inherently greater possibilities for Catholic Church autonomy, and which is why leftist governments can, in principle, offer a more ample window of possibilities for legal reforms related to gender equality and sexuality. On the other hand, and especially in Central America, during recent years there has been a deterioration regarding the situation of women and sexual minorities. In that sense, Nicaragua is a paradigmatic country. In 1992, the National Assembly of the Republic of Nicaragua adopted diverse reforms of the Penal Code concerning sexual crimes. The crime of ‘sodomy’ was established in article 204, of the amended version. More recently, in October 2006, the repeal of Therapeutic Abortion from the Penal Code was unanimously approved, which constitutes an embarrassing backward step for human rights. This regression groups Nicaragua, with El Salvador and Chile, as countries with the most restrictive legislation concerning abortion. The case of Nicaragua serves as an extreme example of the complex relations between the Left and the Catholic Church in Latin America: the abolishment of therapeutic abortion in that country had the support of the Sandinista group, led by Daniel Ortega, identified with the Left, who approached the Church leaders as a manner of ensuring his electoral success.

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This duplicity as a religious institution and a political actor constitutes the Church activism and should not obscure or be reduced to only one of its manifestations. While it is correct to affirm that in its hegemonic nostalgia the Catholic Church may weaken the necessary separation between State / Church or act in a fundamentalist way, it should also be considered that in the defence of a particular morality the Church intervenes as a legitimate actor using democratic procedures. This Church duality as a religious and political actor, which is obscure to secular constructions, constitutes an analytical and regulatory dimension to be rescued in order to go deeper into sexual and reproductive rights. If as a religious institution the hierarchy may argue from a particular position through the official doctrine, when it becomes a political actor this claim disappears and its arguments and actions become part of the public democratic spheres, and as such, subject to criticism and debate. If as a religious institution the hierarchy can decide who to grant recognition as religious subject (followers) and even expel some of them (excommunication) as a political actor it is forced to respect others as political subjects (citizens) with rights and dignity. As a political actor, the Church is subjected to a series of external rules and waives, willfully or not, to the privileged status that it enjoys as a religious institution. Better than insisting on the privatization of religions, defending the principles of secularization or laicism, it would be advantageous to submit the Church to the democratic rules. Particularly, this article considers that the pluralism that exists within the religious communities offers a fundamental political space to confront the Church as a political actor.

Pluralisms and dissidences Not all religious sectors have reacted in the same way to the demands of feminist and sexual minority movements. While important and powerful religious sectors are re-dogmatized as a manner of resisting these demands, others, on the contrary, have modified their positions incorporating such demands as part of their official position. The position towards women and homosexuals has been one of the most discussed areas within the different religious creeds, thus producing greater and significant advances towards increased equality in many of them. Even when the two most controversial topics (abortion depenalization and recognition of couples of the same sex) are considered, some religious sectors approve them. (13) Pluralism in sexuality-related matters goes beyond the religious / secular duality. But even in those religions that are supporting a dogmatic position at an official level, pluralism finds an alternative form of manifestation: that of dissidence. (14) Catholicism, as well as the major religions in general, is not a homogeneous religion when it takes into consideration the varied attitudes and behaviours of its members regarding sexuality. (15) On the one hand, a strong hierarchical centralism imposes or intends to impose a particular position. On the other hand, various sectors recon-

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cile their religious identity with respect to favourable positions toward the feminist and sexual minority demands, and set into motion to generate changes inside the religious communities as well as inside the society in general. It is not innovative to suggest that religious communities are heterogeneous in terms of moral sexuality matters since the distance between what has been prescribed and the actual practices has been confirmed in several historical instances. What is new, however, is that these negotiations / adjustments come out into the public arena in search for legitimization. Followers react in numerous ways and by dissenting, they constitute a significant politicization of the religion, but while belonging to a religious community is reaffirmed, the existence of an alleged consensus is discontinued. A dissident seeks to break alleged or assumed consensus and build pluralism ‘from within’ that rules out religious traditions as homogeneous realities. Dissidence is more than a mere disagreement; it is the breach of consensus that generates the tendency toward exclusion. It is common that religious traditions consider dissidents as infi ltrated individuals and establish mechanisms for their exclusion. (16) Instead of getting too far from traditional religions as a prerequisite to combat patriarchy and / or hetero-normativity, dissidents find the foundation that fosters mobilization in the reaffirmation of their religious identity. They go back to the patriarchal contents of the major religions, taking ownership of their egalitarian and inclusive tradition. The politicization of religious identities serves as the basis for mobilization in favour of feminist demands and demands for sexual differences. The concept of religious dissidence captures the importance of these internal schisms not only at an identity level but also, and more significantly, as a political phenomenon. Marginalised people confront the official position of their religions from within their religious communities, but without abandoning their religion. Instead of integrating religious beliefs, more or less harmoniously and secretly or at a private level, with liberalized positions towards sexuality, dissidents transform such integration into a political and public issue. They register identities considered impossible as legitimate identities: Catholic men and women who believe that abortion can be a moral option and Catholic men and women who live together with a partner of the same sex etcetera. Dissidences not only make these identities apparent but also politicize them as a constituent of contemporaneous pluralism. At a time when significant religious revitalization occurs, the phenomenon of dissidence opens crucial analytical and regulatory spaces for gender and sexuality democratization. These dissidences become apparent in two interconnected ways. On one hand, they start from the creation and circulation of feminist and sexual minority theologies. These alternative theologies exist in most religions and their common ground is that they seek to prevail over the patriarchal and / or hetero-normative contents of the main religious traditions. (17) On the other hand, starting with the creation of non-governmental organizations, which have the main objective of putting pressure on religious hierarchies and governments thus to generate a change in the situation

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of women and sexual minorities. (18) Catholics for a Free Choice, an organization present and active in the U.S., Latin America and Spain, constitutes a significant case of religious dissidence.

Catholics for a Free Choice Catholics for a Free Choice (CDD, for its acronym in Spanish) is a kind of organization that is opening significant channels for activism in Latin America. In its double role as part of the feminist movement and as part of the religious community, CDD is in a far-reaching political position in the struggle to go deeper into sexual and reproductive rights. At present, there are seven CDD groups in six Latin American countries: Argentina (one in Córdoba and one in Buenos Aires), Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. While each group works independently and because they share common objectives, they are coordinated by a Latin American Network that organizes international campaigns and collaborates with the work at a national level. The CDD groups and Network carry out many activities and adjust to numerous contexts, but have as a common goal ‘the search for social justice and a change of the current cultural patterns’ (19), within the Church as well as in the societies in general. More specifically, CDD works to achieve the effective existence of sexual and reproductive rights, abortion depenalization and legalization being a priority issue. Latin American countries regulate abortion in different ways, but share a restrictive position where depenalization is exceptional if it exists. A series of structural factors contributed, in several ways, to the CDD emergency in Latin America. The globalization of the social movements is one of these factors since feminist and sexual minority movements need to be understood as part of international and regional networks that generate strategies and collective action in numerous contexts. Particularly, the creation of the CDDs in Latin America acknowledges Catholics For a Free Choice, an organization created in 1973 in the United States, as a background and a significant ally. Another contributing factor typical for the various Latin American countries is the consolidation of democratic regimes. For organizations such as CDD to exist, the existence of a democratic system that allows citizens to form groups at the level of the civil society is necessary, in order to articulate their demands and identities, and from there, to influence the decision-making process with regard to public policies and legislative regulations. Finally, the aforesaid strong antagonism toward sexual morality and hierarchy redogmatization issues within the Church is also a cause that promotes the creation of organizations that coordinate the voices that cannot find internal channels to express themselves. Of course, it is necessary to add to these factors the personal biographies of several women, who with their insight and courage were able to envision that the creation of an organization such as CDD was the key to achieve cultural and legal changes in favour of women and sexual minorities. Women knew how to understand the message

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of liberation and equality of Christianity, in spite of the fact that they were pushed to the margins of the institutional Church. Women affirm that gender equality is ingrained in religions, which is the main objective of feminism, even though the hierarchy wants to obliterate it. One of the main objectives of feminist theologies is to rescue the women’s liberation message contained in the main religions in spite of the strong influence that the patriarchal interpretations have had. To this effect, the patriarchal arguments must be identified and deconstructed, rewriting the religious discourse from a gender approach. As Ivone Gebara states: ‘I think that in the last years, the feminist theology was the most open reflection in the direction of embracing diversity and, as a consequence, toward the criticism of religious dogmatism. The mere fact that throughout the centuries they have always been considered as second-class citizens, wombs for reproducing men and gods, today allows women to see the ideological and manipulative nature of the patriarchal theologies more clearly.’ (20) Not without contradiction, these women created a political space for the organization of feminist and religious identities. Activism between religious and secular

The characteristic of CDD’s activism is that it fights for the demands of feminism through claiming the Catholic identity. A combination of identities, Catholicism and feminism, that for many is an oxymoron, among these organizations is considered as part of a homogeneous identity that serves as the foundation for a demand for equality and social change. In this way, the CDDs redefine the limits of two types of communities. On the one hand, they repeatedly discuss the meaning of being Catholic based on revisits to these traditions; emphasize the egalitarian spirit and social justice considering that the patriarchal or hetero-normative components are historical constructions that are not the essence of the religions. On the other hand, the various CDDs are part of the feminist movements and as such, they mobilize to legitimate sexual and reproductive rights at the level of the society and in the governmental agendas. Religious and moral justifications, which are of vital importance in a context of religion repoliticization, contribute to these movements. The fact of belonging to two community sectors allows CDD antagonizing with the Catholic Church from two different positions. On the one hand, CDD participates in regional and national campaigns to go deeper into the laicism process in Latin America. Activities such as demanding an increased Church / State separation, denouncing the fundamentalist features of Catholicism or developing investigations that will make apparent the religious influence on public policies have the main objective of defending the secularization process at the level of formal arrangements as well as concrete policy practices. (21) CDD is working toward reducing the influence of the Catholic Church in public laws and policies, with the separation between the Church and the State being a strategy shared by the sectors that demand a more comprehensive approach to sexual and reproductive rights. The various CDD groups seek to reduce the privileges of the Churches in the region as religious insti-

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tutions and denounce political practices that weaken the laicism of the system. But, on the other hand, the highlight of organization activism such as CDD is that they antagonize the Church by challenging its religious arguments. While the feminist and sexual minority movements tend to give up religious arguments because they consider them inevitably oppressive, groups such as CDD politically intervene by presenting the rereadings of such arguments. The Church has been a powerful actor in the regulation of sexuality in Latin America; to this end, it has intended to become a monopolistic repository of religious and moral principles. CDD, on its part, is in line with religious and moral principles which, by recognizing the same roots, justify a pluralist conception of sexuality. The visualization of ‘internal’ pluralisms is, therefore, a political strategy of dissident groups.

Pluralism visualization Plurality of opinions and behaviours

To a great extent, the power of the Church in Latin America lies in broad sectors of the population that identify themselves with Catholicism. At a formal level, the great majority of the population is classified as Catholic, and that gives the Church a significant symbolic value. (22) These percentages, however, should be qualified in two fundamental manners. On the one hand, it is necessary to take into account that many of those who are considered Catholic do not maintain that religious identity. Rituals such as baptism, have been demystified to a great extend and are more cultural than religious indicators. On the other hand, many of those who are still identified as Catholic reaffirm their religiousness in more reflexive ways and with more independence from the official doctrines. Modernity did not necessarily imply a decrease in religious identities, but a strengthening of individual autonomy in building such identities. (23) A CDD intervention strategy stems from the visualization of the Catholic heterogeneous composition in so far as sexuality-related issues are concerned. Precisely, by rescuing this important mass of believers that disagrees with the doctrine that represents the hierarchy at the level of opinions and behaviours. Being either through the analysis of pre-existing surveys or through the preparation of its own surveys, one of CDD’s activities is to disseminate scientific data through publications, thus providing clear evidence of the existing fragmentation within Catholicism. (24) These data have the tendency of confirming that the Catholic population has an autonomous position regarding the official doctrine and ecclesiastic hierarchy concerning sexual moral issues. In view of a hierarchy that takes action to defend Catholic moral as being universal, CDD makes it evident that not even inside Catholicism are these moral rules strongly supported (to a great extent in opposition to sexual and reproductive rights). The attitude of numerous Catholics toward issues such as birth control, abortion

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or homosexuality, among others, differs from the attitude sustained by the hierarchy. Vis-à-vis a Catholic doctrine that insists on relating sex with procreation (within the bonds of marriage) forbidding all artificial contraceptives, in contrast, the population tends to overwhelmingly accept contraceptive practices. (25) Even a high percentage accepts emergency contraception for the victims of rape and those who have had unprotected sex. (26) The abortion issue has been built under absolute terms by the Catholic hierarchy: in no case and under no circumstance. However, the Catholic population tends to differentiate various situations showing a complex and plural construction since nearly half of the Catholics think that abortion should be depenalized under one or several circumstances. (27) Together with abortion, the other issue that has been the target of rejection and the most generalized obsession of the ecclesiastic hierarchy is homosexuality; the majority of the Catholic population, instead, tends to affirm that gays and lesbians have the right to express their sexual orientation openly. (28) Politicizing these disagreements is a significant strategy since the ‘double discourse’ system, which is a characteristic of Latin America, is a central obstacle for social and legal change in the direction of sexuality. The existing gap between public discourse (generally repressive) and private actions (generally more permissive) corresponding to sexuality and reproduction strengthens the status quo (29), since the sectors holding the power to change the legislation have the material resources to have access to contraception or safe abortion. Religious dissidence fractures the double discourse system. On the one hand, they substantiate the form in which important sectors of the society accommodate their religious identity to a more liberalized position. There is a great percentage of Catholics who do not comply with the official religious position of sexuality. On the other hand, these religious dissidences place these negotiations out of the private ambience and place them in the public domain. This plurality of behaviour and attitude is against the plans of the Catholic hierarchy to represent believers and embody a homogeneous moral discourse. Plurality of discourses: feminist theologies

Theological discourses have become important tools to confront the power of the religious hierarchies. In particular, a significant corpus of feminist theologies, which aim to liberate women from oppression (30), seek to rise above the patriarchal and/or hetero-normative concepts of the main religious traditions. It is possible to refer to several stages in the development of the feminist theologies in Latin America that refer to alternative forms of feminist theology. At the first stage during the 1970s, women came out as individuals who were excluded from liberation as well as from theological production; for the period of the second stage, during the 1980s, women were able to be incorporated as subjects of theological production through a hermeneutic gender approach; the third stage that has taken place during the past years, implies theological reconstruction through the creation and circulation of new religious discourses. (31)

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For organizations such as CDD, these theologies provide an important language for the goal to antagonize the Catholic Church as well as for the intention to empower broad sectors of the population. Hence, one of CDD’s proposals is to ‘create opportunities for ethical-religious reflection with an ecumenical perspective, developing public dialogues in the societies as well in the churches’. Not only an opportunity for the creation of feminist theologies but, and probably the most relevant, an organization that publicizes these theologies within the Catholic community as well as within the society in general. This process of publicizing the feminist theologies has at least two exceptional consequences in the struggle for delving deeper into sexual and reproductive rights. In the first place, these theologies offer a religious discourse that could empower broad sectors of the population. Rights in general, and particularly those connected with the free exercise of sexuality, do not disappear in their formal scope, because they require another series of requisites ranging from material conditions to cultural constructions for their validity. The necessary legal change in regions such as Latin America implies more than the formal sanction of new rights since it also requires cultural changes allowing the appropriation of such juridical instruments by the marginalised sectors. Guilt or sin is a cultural construction in the official doctrine that makes it more difficult for women and sexual minorities to become subjects capable of exercising rights. Such theological discourses generate an interpretative framework where pleasure, women’s own bodies or maternity as a choice (among others) are rights that can be defended and substantiated from the individual’s own Catholic identity, thus generating an increased individual liberty at the moment of choosing and exercising sexuality. As important as the sanction of sexual and reproductive rights is the circulation of discourses allowing certain population sectors to appropriate such rights through the deblaming process. (32) In the second place, these theologies propose a rereading of the Catholic doctrine that disputes the interpretative monopoly of the ecclesiastic hierarchy. Feminist theologies offer political discourses that deconstruct the official arguments used for rejecting sexual and reproductive rights. On the one hand, these theologies make the existence of pluralism and heterogeneity within the Catholic community evident, thereby undermining the power of the ecclesiastical hierarchy to speak collectively. On the other hand, these theologies provide religious arguments that disagree with what the hierarchy sustains are the reason to reject sexual and reproductive rights. For the legal or public health arguments, CDD adds moral / religious arguments justifying the feminist and sexual minority demands. An example is the construction and circulation of Catholic arguments in favour of abortion depenalization and / or legalization. (33) Compared to the inflexible position of the hierarchy, feminist theology presents arguments, which through the relativization of the official position, are open to a more complex position in relation to abortion. One of the strategies consists in demonstrating that abortion has been a historical topic where the Church has upheld several interpretations. At first, abortion was punished as a sin

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against procreation and not against life; afterwards and due to the influence of Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225 - 1274), the Church adopted the thesis of late hominization according to which there is no human person in the first stages of fetal development. Hominization is the moment when an embryo becomes a human being; the concept of late hominization is when the infusion of the soul occurs sometimes after the moment of conception. (34) Another strategy that characterizes feminist theology in general is rescuing the concrete experience of women, their bodies, as a point of departure for reflection. By doing so, abortion and its morality are no longer an abstract principle, and need to be considered within the schemes of oppression and exclusion from contemporary societies. In these cases, theologians open a moral space for abortion as a choice that women must make based on ‘reconstructing images of God imposed by patriarchy and rescuing the experience and images of a God of love and tenderness, close to women, a friend during difficult times, a safe companion when we find ourselves at the “edge of life”’. (35)

Conclusions The Catholic Church remains as the main obstacle to the recognition of sexual and reproductive rights. Far from becoming exhausted as a power factor, the Church has learned to adjust to the new Latin American scenarios. Without relinquishing its purposes to control sexuality, it intervenes with a dual role: as a religious institution and as a public actor, thus generating activism that goes beyond the boundaries that lie between the religious and the secular, sin and crime or the congregation and the citizens. This complexity fades away when they insist on the privatization of what is religious as the only alternative to allow the sanction and application of sexual and reproductive rights. Undoubtedly, a productive and necessary change is defending the laicism of the system since in regions such as Latin America unpleasant memories still exist (sometimes of significant magnitude) of times when the Church and the State were merged. But religions still play political roles in contemporary societies beyond the autonomy of the state, sometimes even because of it, and as such, they struggle to influence public legislations and policies. More than insisting that the Church retakes its exclusive role as a religious institution, becoming depoliticized, it should take advantage of its role as political actor. If as a religious institution, the Church can demand certain privileges and build the ‘only’ truth, whenever it submits to the rules of politics, it does so at a level of equality with the other institutions and must respect pluralism as a constituent dimension of contemporary societies. Instead of reducing all public intervention of the Church to that of a problem centred on incomplete secularization or laicism, it must be understood that religiousness will remain an important political dimension, and from there efficient strategies must be outlined to delve into sexual and reproductive rights. Whenever it intervenes politically, the Church gets ‘trapped’ (36) and opens an

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important window of opportunities since its mutation from a religious institution to a political actor implies submission, voluntary or not, to the rules of the democratic game. When it becomes a political actor, the Church loses the prerogatives that it seeks to maintain as a religious institution. Rather than insisting on laicism or secularity, it should be insisting on the need that the Church acts following certain democratic rules to protect pluralism. Religious pluralism, particularly that which manifests itself in the form of dissidence becomes a fundamental political factor in the struggle for sexual and reproductive rights. These dissidences are generating and publicizing the most sophisticated arguments to counteract the hegemonic intent of the Church. These dissidences succeed in transcending the religious / secular dichotomy and generate an activism that antagonizes with the Church at several levels. Religious and moral pluralism is in opposition with the Church’s intents to become the sole bearer of political and moral principles on sexuality. Opposition to the Church’s hetero-normative intention to control the behaviour of its followers and the citizens, is the construction of an autonomous subject. Contrary to the Church’s establishment of illegitimate pacts with governments where the regulation of sexuality is the exchange currency, are the campaigns and publications that demonstrate how these pacts weaken the democratic system.

Prof. dr. Juan Marco Vaggione ([email protected]) is a Doctor of Law graduated from the National University of Córdoba, Argentina, and a Doctor of Sociology graduated from the New School for Social Research (United States). Presently, he is working as a Researcher for the Consejo de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas de Argentina (CONICET) as well as a professor of Sociology. Likewise, he is a research advisor for Catholics for a Free Choice of Córdoba, Argentina. He has investigated and published on religions in contemporary societies, particularly, their influences on sexual and reproductive rights. His articles have received awards from the Comité de América Latina y el Caribe para la Defensa de los Derechos de la Mujer (Cladem) and the Red Latinoamérica de Académico/as del Derecho (Red Alas). Because of the strategic roles that both organizations carry out in promoting women’s rights in Latin America, Hivos provides support to the organizations of ‘Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir’ and CLADEM. http://www.catolicasporelderechoadecidir.org http://www.cladem.org

Notes (1) (2)

I’m grateful to Marta Alanis and Gabriel Giorgi for their suggestions and recommendations. Refer to Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1994.

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(3) (4)

(5) (6)

(7) (8) (9) (10)

(11) (12) (13) (14) (15)

(16)

(17)

At the level of juridical recognition as well as the level of economic sustainability. While trust in the Church decreased during the 1995-2005 decade, it still maintains about seventy percent of the trust in practically all Latin American countries (refer to ‘Informe de Latinobarómetro 2005’ at: www.latinobarometro.org). Anthony Gill, Rendering unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and the State in Latin America, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998. For a comparison analysis, refer to Htun, Mala, Sex and the State: Abortion, Divorce, and the Family Under Latin America Dictatorships and Democracies, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003; and Claudia Dides (ed.), Diálogos Sur-Sur sobre Religión, Derechos y Salud Sexual y Reproductiva, Universidad Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, Chile, 2004. Congregación para la Doctrina de la Fe, ‘Consideraciones para la respuesta católica a propuestas legislativas de no discriminación a homosexuales’, 1992. Refer to José Casanova (note 2) who proposes the concept of ‘deprivatization’ of religions to analyse this phenomenon. Congregación para la Doctrina de la Fe, ‘Nota doctrinal sobre algunas cuestiones relativas al compromiso y la conducta de los católicos en la vida política’, November 2002. For further details, refer to Juan Marco Vaggione ‘Nuevas formas de activismo religioso. La iglesia católica frente al reconocimiento legal de las parejas del mismo sexo’, in: Orientaciones: Revista de homosexualidades. For an example refer to Congregación para la Doctrina de la Fe, ‘Consideraciones acerca de los proyectos de reconocimiento legal de las uniones entre personas homosexuales’, 2003. Refer to Juan Marco Vaggione, ‘Reactive Politicization and Religious Dissidence: The Political Mutations of the Religious’, in: Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 31, No. 2, April 2005. For a list of religious denominations that accept, directly or indirectly, abortion and couples of the same sex, please consult www.religioustolerance.org. This article focuses on the dissidence issue but does not ignore that there are several forms of pluralism within religions. Refer to Juan Marco Vaggione, ‘Los Roles Políticos de la Religión: Genero y Sexualidad mas allá del Secularismo’, in: En nombre de la Vida, Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir, Córdoba, 2005; and Katzenstein, Mary Fainsod, Faithful and Fearless: Moving Feminist Protest Inside the Church and Military, Princeton University Press, 1998. In 1998, Pope John Paul II modified the canon law to facilitate the ‘prosecution and punishment of dissidents’. Refer to Mark Jordan, The Silence of Sodom. Homosexuality in Modern Catholicism, The University of Chicago Press, 2000, p. 215. These theologies are being created in practically all religious traditions. For a general analysis, please consult: Russell, Letty M. & J. Shannon Clarkson (eds.), Dictionary of Feminist Theologies, Louisville, Westminster John Knox Press, 1996; or Comstock, Gary David & Susan E. Henking (eds.), Que(e)ring Religion: A Critical Anthology, New York, Continuum, 1997. With regard to Catholicism, please consult Aquino, María Pilar, Virginia Fabella & Mercy Amba Oduyoye (eds.), With Passion and Compassion: Third World Women Doing Theology Maryknoll, New York, Orbis, 1988; Elsa Tamez (ed.), Through Her Eyes: Women’s Theology from Latin America, Maryknoll NY, Orbis, 1989; Elina Vuola, Teologia Feminista: Teologia

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(18)

(19) (20) (21)

(22)

(23) (24)

(25)

(26)

(27)

de la Liberacion, Madrid, Iepala, 1996; Althaus-Reid, Marcella María, Indecent Theology: Theological Perversions in Sex, Gender, and Politics, London, Routledge, 2000. The following are an example of this numerous list of organizations: Dignidad (Catholic), Somos Iglesia (Catholic), Al-Fatiha (Moslem), Good News (Evangelic) or Keshet (Jewish) which integrate religious identities with a position in favor of a pluralistic definition of sexuality. Carta de Principios de la Red Latinoamericana de Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir (see www.catolicasporelderechoadecidir.org). Yvone Gebara, Intuiciones ecofeministas. Ensayo para repensar el conocimiento y la religión, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, 2000, p. 120. CDDs organizations and the Latin American Network participate in the Campaign against Fundamentalism, Campaña 28 de Septiembre - Día por la Despenalización del Aborto en América Latina y el Caribe, Campaña por una Convención Interamericana de los Derechos Sexuales y los Derechos Reproductivos. Likewise, the CDD develop and publish research on the conservative religious sectors (as an example, consult the book published by CDD Córdoba En Nombre de la Vida (see note 15). In formal statistics, it is deemed that in most Latin American countries, about ninety percent of the population is considered Catholic; while eighty percent is considered for the Latin American region (see CIA World Factbook, 2005). A phenomenon sufficiently analysed in the last years refers to the significant growth of Evangelical Protestantism in the region. Particularly, the following documents: A World View: Catholic Attitudes on Sexual Behavior and Reproductive Health (Panorama Mundial: Actitudes católicas hacia el comportamiento sexual y la salud reproductivo). Washington, DC. Catholics for a Free Choice, 2004; and Actitudes de los Católicos sobre Derechos Reproductivos, Iglesia-Estado y Temas Relacionados. Tres Encuestas Nacionales en Bolivia, Colombia y México, Catolicas por el Derecho a Decidir, December 2003. Virtually, all those polled, people who identify with Catholicism, indicate that they are in favour of its use and access to, and approximately eighty percent confirm that health centres and public hospitals should offer them. Refer to Actitudes de los Católicos sobre Derechos Reproductivos, Iglesia-Estado y Temas Relacionados (see note 24). In cases of rape, more than eighty percent is in favour of EA. In the case of unprotected sex, 58 percent is in favour in Bolivia, 65 percent in Colombia, and 77 percent in Mexico. Consult: Actitudes de los Católicos sobre Derechos Reproductivos, Iglesia-Estado y Temas Relacionados (see note 24). In general, the Catholic population tends to depenalize those causes where a woman’s willingness to abort is more justified because it obeys to difficult or external reasons such pregnancy as a result of rape or pregnancy that puts a mother’s life at risk. Also, half of the Catholic population believes those women who abort and / or those who support them can still be good Catholics; an even higher percentage manifests against expulsing a woman from Church because she aborted. Consult: Actitudes de los Católicos sobre Derechos Reproductivos, IglesiaEstado y Temas Relacionados (see note 24).

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(28) The rights of homosexuals and lesbians to openly express their sexual orientation receive more support in Mexico, 66 percent, while in Bolivia, 53 percent, and in Colombia, sixty percent. Consult: Actitudes de los Católicos sobre Derechos Reproductivos, Iglesia-Estado y Temas Relacionados (see note 24). (29) Consult: Bonnie Shepard, ‘The Double Discourse on Sexual and Reproductive Rights in Latin America: The Chasm between Public Policy and Private Actions’, Health and Human Rights, 4 (2), p. 110-43, March 2000. (30) The plural form is used since there are different types of feminist theologies. Even though it is not expressly mentioned, the queer and / or sexual minority category is also included. For bibliographic examples, consult: note 17. (31) Elsa Tamez, ‘Hermenéutica feminista latinoamericana. Una mirada retrospectiva’, in: Sylvia Marcos (ed.), Religión y Género, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, 2005. (32) Precisely, one of CDD’s objectives is to succeed in deblaming women from the decisions made in the reproductive field, even when they decide to abort. Carta de Principios de la Red Latinoamericana de Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir. (33) There are several documents published regarding this topic that can be consulted in the Web pages of the Red Latinoamericana de Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir and Catholics For a Free Choice. For a summary, please consult: Aborto. Argumentos Católicos a Favor del Derecho a Decidir. Edited by CDD-Córdoba, Argentina. (34) Jane Hurst, La historia de las ideas sobre el aborto en la Iglesia Católica: lo que no fue contado, Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir, Montevideo, 1994. You can also consult: Luis Pérez Aguirre sj., ‘Aspectos religiosos del aborto inducido’; and Teresa Lanza & Ivana Calle, ‘Pensamiento Católico y Aborto: Una historia poco conocida’, both in CDD webpage www.catolicasporelderechoadecidir.org. (35) Silvia Regina de Lima Silva, ‘En los límites de la vida: un acercamiento teológico a la problemática del aborto’; you can also consult: María José Rosado, ‘Pensando éticamente sobre concepción, anticoncepción y aborto’; or Regina Soares, ‘Igreja Católica e Aborto: Pluralidad de posicionamentos’; the three articles are included in CDD webpage www.catolicasporelderechoadecidir.org. (36) The idea of a trap comes from Guillermo Nugents article ‘De la Sociedad Doméstica a la Sociedad Civil: Una Narración de la Situación de los Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos en Perú’, in: Diálogos Sur-Sur (see note 6).

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CHRISTIAN FUNDAMENTALISM AND CURTAILMENT OF WOMEN’S SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS Maria de Bruyn

In the decades since the Second World War, various movements around the world have acted to recognize and increase respect for women’s human rights, including their sexual and reproductive rights. Feminists, men’s groups against violence, peace activists and members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) movement have all challenged gender-based norms that prevent women from exercising their rights. As a result, changes in policies and laws have given women and girls tools with which they can claim their rights and seek compensation for violations of their rights. In the last decade, however, another movement - comprising Christian fundamentalists (1) in alliance with other conservatives - has increased its efforts to turn back the clock and again restrict female rights. The expansion of this movement - both geographically and regarding the issues they address - requires that progressives increase their vigilance and work to preserve the sexual and reproductive rights of women around the world.

After giving a few examples of how gender-based biases have been socially and legally challenged, this article will briefly review some of the actions that Christian fundamentalists are taking to once again curtail women’s and girls’ sexual and reproductive rights. It then ends with a description of counter-measures which need to be more strongly promoted.

Challenges to gender-based norms and national advances in women’s rights Throughout history and in different societies and cultures, women’s sexual and reproductive rights have been restricted by prevailing gender-based norms that favour male control over women’s and girls’ bodies and behaviours. Similar examples of such restrictions are found in societies with different predominant religions. While

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male sexual activity with female partners other than wives has been tolerated, accepted and even encouraged, expressions of female sexuality with anyone other than a husband have been denounced, stigmatized and ‘punished’. This may even occur when a woman is raped; in some societies, the crime against her is considered an insult to family honour. The sanctions range from acts that are socioeconomic in nature (e.g., denial of marriage possibilities, abandonment, divorce, disinheritance) to violent acts such as beatings, other physical injuries and even murder. Women have been prevented from having control over their bodies by men who do not permit them to use contraceptives or even seek medical care without consent. Women’s social status has further been dependent in most societies on their roles as wives and mothers who are responsible for maintaining the home and rearing children. Such patriarchal control has been justified by relegating issues related to women to the domestic or ‘private’ sphere, implying that what happens to individual women and girls is of no interest to anyone other than family members. Laws and regulations have codified and legitimized notions and restrictions such as those mentioned above. The idea that a woman could be raped by her husband was long considered inconceivable because wives were ‘supposed’ to be always sexually accessible to their husbands. Some Ministry of Health regulations have made it impossible for women to obtain health services without spousal or parental consent. Laws and regulations have prevented pregnant women from continuing their schooling or staying employed and a lack of child care has made it difficult for mothers to work outside the home or in certain types of occupations. Many such ideas, regulations and laws still persist in various parts of the world. Fortunately, however, such gender-based biases are being challenged in all regions and leading to more gender-equitable societies. In more and more jurisdictions, laws are recognizing the crime of marital rape and are criminalizing all types of violence against women. Requirements of spousal and parental consent for health care and medical procedures are being replaced by requirements of informed consent on the part of women. Policies providing for maternity or parental leave and subsidized child care services are enabling women to remain in the workplace and for men to share in child-rearing responsibilities.

Support for women’s rights in international policy and law Developments in international health policies and human rights law have been instrumental in creating a normative and legal environment that supports more gender-equitable societies. The Programme of Action from the United Nations’ (UN) 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) stressed the need to respect women’s rights: ‘Advancing gender equality and equity and the empowerment of women, and the elimination of all kinds of violence against women, and ensuring women’s ability to control their own fertility, are cornerstones of pop-

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ulation and development-related programmes. The human rights of women and the girl child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights.’ (2) A UN-sponsored review of the Programme of Action in 1999 emphasized that: ‘Governments, parliamentarians, community and religious leaders, family members, media representatives, educators and other relevant groups should actively promote gender equality and equity.’ (3) The UN Treaty Monitoring Committee that monitors State compliance with the international Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) has explained that traditional attitudes which view women as subordinate to men perpetuate domestic violence, including marital rape. (4) The CEDAW Committee has also said that the Convention makes it ‘discriminatory for a State party to refuse to provide legally for the performance of certain reproductive health services for women’ and that women’s access to health care should not be contingent on the approval of third parties. (5) The Treaty Monitoring Committee that oversees State observance of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has said that: ‘The realisation of women’s right to health requires the removal of all barriers interfering with access to health services, education, and information, including in the area of sexual and reproductive health. It is also important to undertake preventive, promotive, and remedial action to shield women from the impact of harmful traditional cultural practices and norms that deny full reproductive rights to women.’ (6) Paul Hunt, the UN Special Rapporteur on Health, has stated that indicators used to monitor the progressive realization of the right to health should include measures related to health issues of particular importance to women such as maternal and newborn care, family planning, abortion and post-abortion care, prevention and treatment of sexually transmitted infections (STIs), harmful practices such as female genital cutting, sexual violence, and prevention and treatment of cervical cancer and other gynecological disorders. (7) And the Organization of African Unity recently reiterated that women have a right to sexual and reproductive health, including the right to make decisions about reproduction, to choose any form of contraception, to protect themselves against HIV/STIs, and to abortion in cases of sexual assault, rape, danger to the fetus, and danger to the mental and physical health or life of the woman. (8) Most UN conventions acknowledge the important role that religious leaders can and should play in promoting respect for human rights, but they view them as one among many social groups that should do so. In societies without clear separation of religion and state, religious leaders have been able to influence laws and regulations to at least some extent. This has also happened where certain religious leaders have had powerful political connections (e.g., the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy in Latin American countries). Nevertheless, more and more people are demanding laws and regulations that reflect universal human rights concepts, rather than specific religious teachings. For example, Roman Catholics who favour contraceptive

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use and a woman’s right to abortion have banded together in Catholics for a Free Choice groups. (9) Polls have indicated that large numbers of Roman Catholics in both industrialized and developing countries follow personal beliefs allowing contraception rather than official Church teachings against it. (10) Various groups of religious leaders, including Christian clergy, have issued position statements promoting more gender-equitable and progressive views on issues such as marriage, contraception, condom use and abortion. (11) Since 2001, when the Netherlands became the first national government to legalize marriage between gay men and between lesbian women (12), same-sex marriages and civil unions with the same rights as civil marriages for heterosexual persons have been given legal recognition by the governments of Belgium, Canada, Denmark and other Nordic countries, Germany, Great Britain, New Zealand, South Africa, Spain, the Swiss canton of Zurich and several US states. (13) Polls taken during the US presidential election in November 2004 showed that, while 37 percent of voters felt same-sex couples should have no legal recognition, the large majority - sixty percent - favoured some kind of legal recognition. (14)

Traditional beliefs and Christian fundamentalism In response to the aforementioned social changes, Christian fundamentalists have begun speaking out more publicly. Their efforts to institutionalize their views through policies and legislation first gained significant support from the Bush Administration and groups such as Focus on the Family and Human Life International (HLI) in the United States; since 2000, they have increased their actions and links to groups in other countries. Focus on the Family began mission work on ‘biblical family values’ in 19 Caribbean and Latin American countries and now has offices in at least 14 countries, including the Netherlands. (15) They propagate their message through the Internet, policy papers, seminars and the mass media. HLI has 59 offices in 51 countries of Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Europe and Latin America with the goal of fighting the ‘evils of abortion, contraception, sex education and family breakdown’. (16) It is striking that the Christian fundamentalists have promoted increasingly restrictive policies as their political power has grown. Their major efforts have focussed on defining the ‘family’ from a narrow viewpoint, opposing expressions of sexuality other than heterosexual relationships, and restricting safe legal abortion insofar as possible. However, they have also expanded their actions to opposing birth control and assisted reproduction, increasing use of ‘conscientious objection’ in health care (e.g., allowing refusals to fill prescriptions for contraceptive pills), promoting abstinence-only family life education, and limiting promotion of condom use. Their latest move along the slippery slope of curtailing women’s rights has been to equate sex work with sex trafficking, demanding that non-governmental organiza-

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tions (NGOs) endorse ‘anti-prostitution pledges’ in order to access development assistance funding from the USA (the world’s largest sexual and reproductive health funding agency). Examples of these activities are described below. Narrow definitions of the family

Christian fundamentalists believe that the family should comprise a monogamous male-female couple and (ideally) biological children; husbands are viewed as leaders and decision-makers for other family members and the main purpose of marriage is considered to be procreation. (17) They view homosexuality as a behavioural choice that is abnormal at best and evil at worst. In the USA, the Christian Medical and Dental Associations use biblical, ‘medical’ and social arguments to oppose homosexuality. They state, for example, that homosexual relationships are usually brief and help destroy healthy marriages, families and society. They also claim that some homosexual behaviours are linked to increased health risks that will lead to significantly shortened life expectancies. (18) Such beliefs are defended in a way to make it appear that respect for human rights and support for family values are incompatible. For example, the previous Pope has said that: ‘It is legitimate and necessary to ask oneself if [recognition of same-sex marriage] is not perhaps part of a new ideology of evil, perhaps more insidious and hidden, which attempts to pit human rights against the family and against man.’ (19) A Protestant Christian fundamentalist writer has stated that: ‘The goal of most influential gay leaders is not to broaden the benefits of marriage. … They see redefining marriage in this way as the first step toward abolishing marriage and the family altogether thus eliminating the benefits of marriage for everyone.’ (20) United Families International states that: ‘By institutionalizing same-sex marriage/adoption we would purposely and intentionally strip children of their fundamental right to a father and mother.’ (21) In their view, that right is bestowed by nature, because a child cannot be born without the union of male sperm and female eggs. Such biassed statements contribute to an atmosphere in which legislators act to ‘preserve traditional values’. A conservative US Congress adopted a Defense of Marriage Act in 1996, which defines marriage as a ‘legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife’. (22) Money allocated to a Healthy Family Initiative in the USA must be spent on activities that promote heterosexual marriage and responsible fatherhood within such marriages. (23) In 2006, the government of Nigeria drafted a law that would not only ban same-sex marriages, but also criminalize individuals who witness, celebrate with or support couples involved in homosexual relationships; adoption by homosexual persons would also be banned. (24) Opposition to abortion

Many Christian fundamentalists oppose abortion because they believe it interferes with ‘God’s plan’ for the family by ending a human life they say began at conception. Accordingly, they attempt to prohibit abortion altogether (e.g., in Chile, El Salvador,

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Malta and Nicaragua) or to increase restrictions on legal abortion. In El Salvador, the constitution was amended to protect life from the moment of conception. (25) In Liechtenstein, Archbishop Wolfgang Haas strongly campaigned in favour of a referendum to make a similar constitutional change but the proposal was defeated by eighty percent of the voters. (26) Fundamentalists have also increased their efforts to introduce anti-choice measures in the European Union (EU). One aspect of their activities includes organizing seminars and other events at the European Parliament to influence parliamentarians. For example, in 2006, the League of Polish Families organized an exhibit entitled ‘Life and Children in Europe’, which equated Nazi extermination of Jewish children with abortion today. (27) Five parliamentarians introduced a proposal to declare that EU health policies should always be superseded by national policies and laws, as part of an effort to ‘protect’ abortion bans and restrictions in member states (e.g., in Ireland, Malta, Poland). (28) The first day of the George W. Bush administration in the USA was marked by reinstatement of the ‘global gag rule’, which requires NGOs in developing countries to refrain from using any funding (even from other governments or private donors) to advocate for or provide legal abortion services if they want to receive family planning assistance funds from the United States. (29) NGOs that have refused to endorse the gag rule have lost USAID and US State Department funding, which has resulted in decreased sexual and reproductive health services in various countries. For example, in Kenya, Marie Stopes International and the Family Planning Association of Kenya have had to close eight clinics that provided contraceptive services, voluntary HIV counselling and testing, diagnosis and treatment of STIs, maternal and child health services, pap smears and post-abortion care. The two organizations also are no longer able to provide up-to-date information on contraceptives to community health workers. (30) In Zambia, loss of US funding led to the Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia losing forty percent of its staff and having to end community-based distribution of health information and contraceptive supplies. (31) In the United States, the federal Supreme Court legalized abortion more than thirty years ago but legislators have introduced numerous bills to restrict the procedure, both at the federal and state levels. Since 2001, a growing number of these proposals have passed into law and evoked legal challenges in the courts. They include measures such as: requiring that adolescents notify their parents of an intention to have an abortion (32); stipulating that abortion providers tell women abortion may increase their risks of breast cancer (33), a claim rejected by the World Health Organization and cancer specialists (34); and mandating that women who request an abortion be told a fetus might feel pain, an assertion which is also contested by researchers regarding at least the first two trimesters of pregnancy. (35) In Italy, the Health Minister mandated that state-funded advice centres for women seeking abortions must include Roman Catholic volunteers who would discourage women from ending their pregnancies. (36)

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Opposition to birth control and promotion of conscientious objection

It is not only in relation to abortion that Christian fundamentalists are attempting to restrict women’s autonomy. An increasing number of fundamentalists erroneously say that emergency contraception is a form of abortion; some say that all forms of modern contraception are potentially abortifacient because they can disrupt fertilization and conception. These anti-choice proponents argue that preventing the development of an embryo is a form of murder. The terminology they use (the unborn child, the child to be born) is calculated to promote legal arguments that embryos and fetuses are equivalent to human beings. The current Bush Administration bases its opposition to stem cell research on this rationale and has spent over $1 million in grants to promote ‘embryo adoption’ (donation of embryos from in vitro fertilization (IVF) procedures to infertile women). (37) This stance has also led to efforts to oppose IVF, since it may result in the destruction of unused embryos. (38) Where opponents of abortion and birth control are unable to make such services illegal, they are increasingly turning to the concept of ‘conscientious objection’ to restrict availability. Conscientious objection is supposed to enable health-care providers to refuse participation in medical procedures that they feel contradict their personal ethical and religious beliefs, as long as that medical procedure is not needed to save a patient’s life and they refer the patient to another health-care professional who will provide the medical care requested. However, fundamentalists’ use of the concept is causing women great harm. In one Polish case, a pregnant woman was denied emergency medical care for a fistula and abscess by her doctors because they thought that the treatment might harm the fetus; the woman died of infection. (39) Another woman from Poland submitted her case to the European Court of Human Rights after she lost much of her eyesight after denial of a therapeutic abortion. Three ophthalmologists had concluded that carrying a pregnancy to term could pose serious risks to her eyesight, but they and other physicians refused to issue a certificate for pregnancy termination on therapeutic grounds. (40) In Colombia, a 34-year-old mother of four children was diagnosed with ovarian cancer at two months’ pregnancy but denied an abortion so she could begin treatment; doctors said radiation and chemotherapy could harm the fetus. The lack of therapy ultimately led physicians to say nothing could be done to cure her terminal cancer when her youngest child was 22 months. (41) The government of Slovakia has been negotiating a treaty with the Vatican that not only would ensure a right of conscientious objection in relation to military duty, but also would allow Roman Catholics to invoke it in relation to issues such as provision of comprehensive sexuality education, provision of contraceptives, abortion and euthanasia. An EU Expert Group advised that the treaty would most likely contravene several international human rights instruments. (42) In the USA, not only physicians, but also ambulance workers, other hospital staff and police have invoked conscientious objection to refuse any tasks related to abortion care in any way. (43)

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More recently, an increasing number of pharmacists are refusing to fi ll prescriptions for emergency contraception and regular birth control. Some state legislatures are passing laws that will give these individuals legal support and that would allow objections to other medical procedures (e.g., sterilization) on all kinds of religious grounds. (44) For example, experts testifying before one state committee said that a proposed law could enable Muslim pharmacists to refuse filling a prescription that includes alcohol and allow Hindu pharmacists to refuse dispensing prescriptions tested on animals. (45) The European Court of Human Rights ruled against an appealed conviction of pharmacists in France who refused to sell contraceptive pills, stating that the right of freedom of religion ‘does not always guarantee the right to behave in public in a manner governed by that belief’. The Court noted the pharmacists could not impose their beliefs on others when the sale of contraceptives is legal and available through medical prescriptions that can only be filled at pharmacies. (46) Abstinence-only family life education, fidelity and opposition to condom use

In addition to opposing homosexuality, parenting by non-heterosexual couples, abortion, contraception and assisted reproduction, Christian fundamentalists also advocate that young people only be educated about abstinence from sex and fidelity within marriage as methods to prevent unwanted pregnancy and HIV/STI infections. They frequently say that these two behaviours are ‘the only 100% safe prevention methods’, ignoring the fact that many monogamous married women have been infected by their husbands, as have sexually inexperienced young women who have suffered sexual assault. Various organizations and curricula in the USA try to persuade young people to sign ‘virginity pledges’, in which they promise to remain sexually inactive until marriage. (47) Proponents of such pledges promote them in other countries as well, such as Uganda. (48) Their view that adolescents should abstain from sex has even led some groups to oppose inclusion of new vaccines to prevent human papillomavirus (HPV) infection among the mandatory or routine immunizations given to children. (49) Although HPV is a leading cause of cervical cancer, these groups fear that vaccination might be seen as license for young people to engage in sexual activity because they believe they are protected. However, one US study showed that, while participants in such virginity pledge programs abstained from sex for 18 months on average, they were less likely than non-pledging peers to use contraceptives when they did become sexually active. (50) Another researcher found that 52 percent of the youths who signed a pledge had had sex within a year. (51) Many of the very conservative Christian groups oppose condom use, say only married couples should use condoms, or believe condom use is only for persons who engage in ‘morally questionable behaviour’, which has led HIV-positive people who promote condom use to feel stigmatized. (52) (The other groups whom these conservatives feel should use condoms include sex workers, homosexual men, and drug users.)

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Abstinence-only curricula and educators not only propagate gender-biassed stereotypes of how women and men should behave but also give inaccurate sexual and reproductive health information. A review of such US curricula found that, in 2003, more than eighty percent of the documents used by over two-thirds of grantees in the largest federal abstinence-only program, contained misleading or distorted information about reproductive health. They reported false risks associated with abortion, underestimated the effectiveness of condoms and gave erroneous information about reproduction. (53) In Russia, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church backed a parliamentary request to the president to limit the activities of foreign anti-AIDS organizations because they teach youth about condom use. (54) These views ignore the fact that many women and girls are not in a position to practice the recommended behaviours. In many communities, girls are married off to older men at a very young age and have no power to ‘negotiate’ condom or contraceptive use with their husbands. Their in-laws may also have a voice regarding their sexual and reproductive behaviour, insisting that they have unprotected sex and bear children even when they want to avoid or delay this because they are HIVpositive. Many women feel pressured by poverty and lack of legal protections for property and inheritance rights to engage in transactional sex to gain extra income. Other women are forced to have unprotected sex and if they have been prevented from using contraceptives, they may not only have an unwanted pregnancy but also be infected with HIV and/or another STI. Nevertheless, the current US administration has been especially vigorous in promoting abstinence and fidelity approaches through funding mechanisms. In 2001, they allocated $80 million to abstinence education programs for US schools; the 2007 federal budget will spend $204 million on this. (55) The policy is also applied to development assistance. One-third of specified HIV prevention funds for developing countries must be used for abstinence until marriage and fidelity programs, leading to problems in developing integrated, cohesive prevention campaigns. (56) Christian fundamentalists promote the abstinence / fidelity agenda, together with efforts to oppose programs that support sexual diversity, harm reduction efforts and abortion services, by forming alliances with conservatives of other religious persuasions at the United Nations. (57) Under the Bush Administration, representatives of conservative Christian groups have served as civil society members on US delegations to the UN. Together with governments of countries such as Sudan and Iran, the United States has protested the use of terms like ‘reproductive health services’ in UN declarations and resolutions because this could be interpreted to include abortion care. (58) ‘Anti-prostitution pledges’ and silencing alternative views

The most recent expansion in Christian fundamentalist activism has focussed on influencing how and even whether others can talk about certain sexual and reproductive health services and rights. In June 2005, the US Administration made HIV/AIDS

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development assistance funding for NGOs contingent on their willingness to sign an ‘anti-prostitution pledge’. NGOs that work with commercial sex workers protested that sex trafficking (a clear violation of human rights) and voluntary sex work are not the same and that efforts to empower and educate sex workers on HIV/STI prevention would be compromised by a requirement to ‘oppose prostitution’ since this would contribute to stigmatizing people engaged in paid transactional sex. (59) Three international US-based NGOs sued the US government, claiming that the anti-prostitution pledge constituted a violation of their right to freedom of speech. In May 2006, a judge concurred, ruling that withdrawal of US development assistance funds from these organizations due to refusals to sign the pledge was illegal. (60) The judge’s ruling unfortunately did not apply to NGOs in developing countries that receive US funding; they still are required to sign the pledge. In the USA, the fundamentalists are also acting to silence those who do not share their views. One example: the National Conference on STIs in May 2006 had scheduled a panel discussion that would review the (lack of) evidence regarding the success of abstinence-only education programs; all the panellists’ submissions had been peer-reviewed. A conservative Congressman, irritated because no pro-abstinence advocates were on that panel, influenced the conference organizers to replace two panellists with speakers who favour abstinence-only programs, even though their presentations were not reviewed. (61) In a similar vein, a performance of The Vagina Monologues, a play regarding violence against women, was cancelled in Uganda through the efforts of Christians who oppose comprehensive sexuality education and condom use.

Counteracting the attempts to restrict women’s reproductive rights To counteract the efforts of Christian fundamentalists to restrict women’s reproductive rights, progressive groups must challenge the restrictions and offer alternatives. For example, when NGOs working on human rights, sexual and reproductive health, and HIV/AIDS form coalitions to lobby governments at UN events, they can work to maintain references to women’s sexual and reproductive health and even rights in resolutions and declarations. Another effective strategy is for NGOs to submit shadow reports to the Treaty Monitoring Committees that highlight how violations of rights are still occurring in different countries. The Committees often address these issues in their Concluding Observations (recommendations) to governments. For example, the Human Rights Committee (HRC, monitoring the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), the CEDAW Committee and the CESCR Committee have all linked illegal and unsafe abortion and maternal mortality. (62) The HRC and CEDAW Committee have criticized laws that criminalize or severely restrict access to abortion, for example in Chile and Poland. (63)

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Another important way to respond to Christian (and other) fundamentalists’ efforts to restrict women’s sexual and reproductive rights is to use the legislative system. Women’s rights groups have actively campaigned for criminalisation of marital rape in countries around the world. From 1995 - 2005, fifteen countries expanded indications for legal abortion, including Nepal which had totally banned the procedure, as opposed to five countries that increased restrictions (led by conservative Christian governments in El Salvador, Hungary, Poland, Russian Federation, and the United States). (64) The judicial system can also be used to challenge restrictions both nationally and internationally. In Colombia, the NGO Women’s Link and lawyer Monica Roa argued before the country’s Constitutional Court that the penal code criminalizing abortion in all cases was a violation of women’s rights. On 20 May 2006, the Court ruled that abortion should be legalized in cases of rape, incest and danger to the health or life of the woman or danger to the fetus. (65) In Poland, the Supreme Court ruled that a couple could receive compensation to cover the costs of caring for a child with a serious genetic disorder because they were not offered antenatal exams or the possibility of therapeutic abortion. (66) In the same country, the Supreme Court ruled that a woman who was denied a legal abortion after rape has the right to sue the hospital for costs related to raising the child. (67) In November 2005, the Human Rights Committee ruled that the government of Peru was responsible for violating a 17-year-old woman’s rights to privacy, special protection as a minor, and the right to be free from cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment because doctors at a public hospital refused to give her a therapeutic abortion when it was discovered she had an anencephalic fetus. The Committee ordered the government to provide her with reparations and to adopt the necessary regulations to guarantee access to legal abortion. (68) It is not only in the legal sphere that Christian fundamentalists can be opposed, however. The actions they undertake to promote their own values and restrict sexual and reproductive health services often receive considerable press coverage and may create the impression that they represent majority public opinion. When nonreligious organizations speak out and form alliances with progressive faith-based groups, they can prove that fundamentalist notions do not represent ‘the Christian viewpoint’. Publicizing a broader definition of family that respects diversity and acknowledges different forms of families is one place to start. The Sanya Declaration, issued in December 2004 with the support of governmental agencies and NGOs around the world, acknowledges the existence of different types of families and affirms the importance of ensuring the human rights of families and their individual members, especially women and children. (69) The Humanist Declaration on the Preservation of Families affirms that: ‘All societies have long recognized that the family commitment is not merely biological, but rests on a complex foundation of contract, custom, and emotional commitment. Families have taken many forms - some, we

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have outgrown. The core of the modern family is two or more individuals who see themselves as a family, and who accept long-term responsibility for one another’s health, security, independence, and happiness.’ (70) Attention should further be given in the print and broadcast media to declarations on women’s sexual and reproductive rights issued by progressive religious leaders. In 2004, clergy and social leaders of various Christian faiths (including Roman Catholics), Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam and the Humanist movement issued a joint declaration supporting various forms of families as well as respect for human rights and gender equality (71): ‘… we also recall that many influential leaders of the world’s religions lived in different family structures than those advocated by many contemporary religious leaders: Abraham had a concubine; Prince Siddhartha (who became the Buddha) left his family to follow his spiritual path; Jesus chose not to marry; Lao-Tzu, the founder of Taoism, had no children; and Muhammad had more than one wife. Many families today reflect more closely the families of these heroic religious leaders than the male-led model of family that is more rooted in a late-Victorian, Anglo-Saxon vision than any religious tradition.’ In 2006, Physicians for Human Rights gathered fifteen evangelical health professionals with experience working on AIDS in the USA and elsewhere to affirm that a moral approach to dealing with HIV/AIDS should be based on science and include condoms. The group, which included a Roman Catholic bishop from South Africa, spoke with US congressional representatives and their staffers about the need to support comprehensive approaches to HIV prevention. (72) In the current political climate, wherein some people find it easy to demonize other religions as being inherently opposed to women’s rights (e.g., Islam), it is further essential to highlight the human-rights based values held by members of those faiths. The Coalition for Sexual and Bodily Rights in Muslim Societies has called on others to endorse their statement affirming that women will only realize their human rights when they can decide freely and responsibly about their own sexual and reproductive lives. (73)

Conclusion We must acknowledge that religious beliefs remain an important framework for thought and action among millions of people in the world today. But we must ensure that the beliefs of one group, such as Christian fundamentalists, are not imposed on others. We must also ensure that religion is not used to justify limiting women’s rights. In this sense, it is important that individuals and organizations with secular philosophies collaborate with progressive members of various faiths. Together with those advocates, as well as organizations working on human rights and sexual and reproductive health, humanists can contribute to a more gender equitable and socially just world for women and girls, as well as men and boys. As the International

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Interfaith Network for Development and Reproductive Health has said: ‘… while religion can be a positive force to promote peace, justice and human rights, we recognize religious extremism can be used as a force to crush peace, justice and human rights … we believe that promoting reproductive health and rights upholds freedom of thought, conscience and religion for all members of the human family.’ (74)

Maria de Bruyn is consultant on sexual and reproductive health, policy advisor, researcher, editor, writer and trainer. Areas of expertise and interest: • Policy formulation & advocacy from a gender- and rights-based perspective regarding sexual & reproductive health, especially HIV/STIs, adolescent sexual and reproductive health, violence against women, family planning. Desk / literature research and development/coordination of small-scale research • projects. • Curriculum and workshop design and development. • Information dissemination (newsletters, resource centres). • NGO networking and coalition building.

References & notes (1)

(2) (3)

(4)

(5) (6)

The term ‘fundamentalism’ is usually used in relation to religious beliefs. Originally, the term ‘Christian fundamentalism’ was reserved in the USA to refer to certain Protestant churches and movements. Recently, members of such religions began collaborating with Catholics on various topics. In this paper, ‘Christian fundamentalism’ is defined as a rigid and literal interpretation of words and principles in Christian religious texts that form the basis for a worldview which does not tolerate divergent opinions. Also see: 1) Fundamentalism, no date, http://www.wordreference.com/definition/fundamentalism, 2) ‘fundamentalism, Christian’, Encyclopaedia Britannica. Encyclopaedia Britannica Premium Service, 16 July 2006, http:// www.britannica.com/eb/article-2530, 3) Fundamentalism, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, 16 July 2006, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fundamentalism. United Nations, Programme of Action, International Conference on Population and Development, Principle 4, 1994. United Nations General Assembly, Key actions for the further implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development, A/RES/S-21/2. New York, United Nations, 8 November 1999. CEDAW Committee, Violence against women: 29/01/92. CEDAW General Recommendation 19. A/47/38, paragraphs 11 and 23, 29 January 1992, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/ (Symbol)/300395546e0dec52c12563ee0063dc9d?Opendocument. CEDAW Committee, Women and health (Article 12), General Recommendation 24, UN GAOR, Doc. No. A/54/38/ Rev.1, paragraphs 11 and 14, 1999. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The right to the highest attainable standard of health, General Comment 13, 04/07/2000. E/C.12/2000/4, paragraph21, 7 April 2000.

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(7)

(8) (9) (10)

(11)

(12) (13)

(14) (15) (16) (17)

P. Hunt, Economic, social and cultural rights. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, Paul Hunt, E/CN.4/2006/48. Geneva, UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 3 March 2006. Organization of African Unity, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, Article 14, 2003. Catholics For a Free Choice. International partners, 2005, http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/ about/international/internationalpartners.asp. Kaiser Daily HIV/AIDS Report: Many Catholics reject church ban on birth control, condoms for HIV prevention; new pope unlikely to have differing views, 11 April 2005, http://www. kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/print_report.cfm?DR_ID=29245&dr_cat=1. Statement by world religious leaders on the occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the International Year of the Family, Washington DC, Catholics For a Free Choice, 2 December 2004, http:// www.cath4choice.org/lowbandwidth/whatsnew.htm. See also: Religious Institute on Sexual Morality, Justice and Healing, An open letter to religious leaders on abortion as a moral decision, Norwalk, CT, 2005, http://www.religiousinstitute.org. Religious Tolerance, Same-sex marriages (SSM) & civil unions, no date, http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_marr.htm. See: Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, Same-sex marriages, civil unions, etc. in other countries, Kingston, Ontario, no date, http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_ mary.htm. Associated Press, A look at gay marriage in some countries, 4 March 2004, http://www. recordonline.com/archive/2004/03/04/worldtim.htm. Red Hispana de Derechos Humanos, En Nueva Zelanda reconocen uniones entre homosexuales. Boletín Informativo, 65. Bogotá, 13 January 2005. CBC News Online, The Supreme Court and same-sex marriage, 29 June 2005, http:// www.cbc.ca/news/background/samesexrights/. BBC News, South Africa to have gay weddings, 1 December 2005, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/africa/4487756.stm. Nolo, Same-sex marriage: developments in the law, no date, http://www.nolo.com/article. cfm/objectID/6DF0766E-C4A3-4952-A542F5997196E8B5/118/304/190/ART/. AFP. Central Europe sees its first gay marriages, 1 July 2006, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ afp/20060701/lf_afp/afplifestyleczech_060701205032. Pew Forum, Canada aims to legalize gay marriage, no date, http://pewforum.org/gay-marriage/. Focus on the Family, 16 July 2006, http://www.family.org/ and http://www.family.org/welcome/intl/netherlands/netherlands/a0022323.cfm. Human Life International, 16 July 2006, http://www.hli.org/international.html. Focus on the Family, Statement submitted by Focus on the Family, a non-governmental organization in special consultative status with the Economic and Social Council, E/CN.6/2004/ NGO/29, Commission on the Status of Women, 48th session, New York, United Nations

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Economic and Social Council,19 January 2004. See also: Catholic Women’s League Australia, Statement submitted by Catholic Women’s League Australia, a non-governmental organization on the Roster, Commission on the Status of Women, 48th session, E/CN.6/2004/NGO/9, New York, United Nations Economic and Social Council, 14 January 2006. And: R. Knight, When did defending marriage become an act of bigotry? Concerned Women for America, 10 April 2006, http://www.cwnews.com/news/viewstory.cfm?recnum=43396. And: R. Shorto, ‘Contra-contraception’, In: New York Times Sunday Magazine, 7 May 2006. Christian Medical and Dental Associations, Homosexuality, 2003, http://www.cmdahome. org/index.cgi?BISKIT=186780456&CONTEXT=art&art=2553. Reuters, Pope calls gay marriage part of ‘ideology of evil’, 23 February 2005, http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1253687,00110004.htm. G.T. Stanton, Is marriage in jeopardy?, Colorado Springs, CO, Focus on the Family, 2003, http://family.org/cforum/pdfs/fosi/marriage/is_marriage_in_jeopardy.pdf. United Families International, Guide to family issues. Sexual orientation, Gilbert, AZ, 2006, http:www.unitedfalies.org/marriagesexualorientation.pdf. PFLAG, Federal opposition to marriage equality, no date, http://www.pflag.org/index. php?id=176. US Government, ACF Healthy Marriage Mission, no date, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/healthymarriage/about/mission.html#ms. Ozoemena, ‘FG bans gay marriages’, in: Vanguard, 19 January 2006, http://www.vanguardngr. com/articles/2002/north/nt419012006-2.html. See also: The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders. Press release. Nigeria: New Bill puts human rights defenders of sexual rights at risk, 7 April 2006. And: E. Aziken, ‘Obasanjo proffers stringent measures against gay marriages’, in: Vanguard, 12 April 2006, http://www.vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/north/ nt412042006.html. S. Varela and L. Cabal, Persecuted. Political process and abortion legislation in El Salvador. A human rights analysis, New York, Center for Reproductive Rights, 2001, http://www.crlp. org/pub_bo_perse.html. FOCUS News Agency, Liechtenstein legalized abortion, 27 November 2005, http://www.focusfen.net/index.php?catid=135&newsid=77451&ch=0#. I. Lejman, Ultra conservative Polish MEPs in pro-life scuffle, Polska Radio, 16 November 2005, http://www.radio.com.pl/print/defaultutf.asp?schema=17&iID=29704. Euro-Fam, Written declaration to protect subsidiarity in reproductive health policies, April 2006, http://www.euro-fam.org/actions/virtuel/A.php?LG=EN&LJ=FR&XMLcode=200604-17-1421&AP=A. Center for Reproductive Rights and Ipas, Myths and realities: debunking USAID’s analysis of the global gag rule, New York and Chapel Hill, October 2003. D. Bogecho, The impact of the global gag rule in Kenya. 2006 Updates. Washington, DC, Access Denied/Population Action International, 2006. D. Bogecho and S. Haddock, The impact of the global gag rule in Zambia. 2006 Updates, Washington, DC, Access Denied/Population Action International, 2006. C. Dailard and C.T. Richardson, ‘Teenagers’ access to confidential reproductive health serv-

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ices’, in: The Guttmacher Report on Public Policy, November 2005. (33) S. Ertelt, Breast cancer rates and deaths to increase, women’s group blames abortion, 20 February 2006, http://www.LifeNews.com. (34) National Cancer Institute, United States National Institutes of Health, Summary report: early reproductive events and breast cancer workshop, 2003, http://www.nci.nih.gov/cancerinfo/ereworkshop-report. See also: World Health Organization, Induced abortion does not increase breast cancer risk, Geneva, 2000, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs240/en/print. html. And: Collaborative Group on Hormonal Factors in Breast Cancer, Breast cancer and abortion: collaborative reanalysis of data from 53 epidemiological studies, including 83,000 women with breast cancer from 16 countries, The Lancet, 2004, 363: 1007-1016. (35) S.W.G. Derbyshire, ‘Can fetuses feel pain?’, in: British Medical Journal, 2006, 332: 909-912. See also: S.J. Lee et al., ‘Fetal pain. A systematic multidisciplinary review of the evidence’, in: JAMA, 2005, 294: 947-954. (36) J. Hooper, ‘Row over pill may see pro-life activists in Italy’s abortion clinics’, in: The Guardian, 16 November 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,5334252-111093,00.html. See also: Agence France-Press, Italian health minister seeks to discourage abortions, 20 November 2005. (37) L. Harris, Clump of cells or ‘microscopic American’?, Salon.com, 5 February 2005, http://www. salon.com/mwt/feature/2005/02/05/embryos/index_np.html. (38) Center for Reproductive Rights, Center joins couples’ legal battle against Costa Rica’s IVF ban. Case before Inter-American Commission could have repercussions in U.S., New York, 10 December 2004, http://www.reproductiverights.org/pr_04_1210costarica.html. (39) T. Micha_owicza, ‘Caring for the fetus at the expense of mother’s life’, in: Gazeta Wyborcza, 5 February 2005. (40) Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2006/ Feb/AnnouncehearingsFebruary2006.htm. See also: BBC News, Polish woman fights abortion case, 7 February 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4688128.stm. (41) C. Vieira, Colombia: Magistrates excommunicated for partially lifting abortion ban, Bogotá, Inter-Press Agency, 11 May 2006. (42) E.U. Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Opinion No. 4, 2004: The Right to Conscientious Objection and the Conclusion by EU Member States of Concordats with the Holy See, European Union, 14 December 2004, http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/justice_ home/cfr_cdf/index_en.htm. See also: N. Watt, ‘EU challenges Vatican’s draft abortion treaty’, in: The Guardian, 5 Januari 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/eu/story/0,7369,1678189,00. html. (43) A. Sonfeld, ‘New refusal clauses shatter balance between provider “conscience”, patient needs’, in: The Guttmacher Report on Public Policy, Augustus 2004. (44) The Alan Guttmacher Institute, State policies in brief: refusing to provide health services, Washington, DC, 1 October 2004. (45) Rachel E. Stassen-Berger, Under bills, pharmacists could refuse some orders; But employers would have to find another route to provide patients with prescriptions, Pioneer Press, 16 April 2006.

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(46) E.U. Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Opinion No. 4, 2004: The Right to Conscientious Objection and the Conclusion by EU Member States of Concordats with the Holy See, European Union, 14 December 2004, http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/justice_ home/cfr_cdf/index_en.htm. (47) SIECUS, Summary: SIECUS review of Worth the Wait, 2005, http://www.communityactionkit. org/reviews/WorthTheWaitSummary.html. (48) E. Sanders, ‘Uganda takes up abstinence campaign; Activists say the nation’s shift away from encouraging condom use threatens one of the world’s most successful anti-AIDS programs’, in: Los Angeles Times, 31 October 2005. (49) Focus on the Family, Focus on the Family position statement: human papillomavirus vaccines, Colorado Springs, CO, 2005. (50) P. Bearman en H. Brückner, The relationship between virginity pledges in adolescence and STD acquisition in young adulthood. After the promise: the long-term consequences of adolescent virginity pledges, paper presented at the National STD Conference, 9 March 2004, Philadephia, PA. http://www.iserp.columbia.edu/people/faculty_fellows/faculty/curiculum_vitae/bearman. pdf. (51) E. Mehren, ‘Many youths disregard their virginity pledges, Harvard study says; according to interviews, more than half have sex within a year. But one pro-abstinence group disputes the findings’, in: Los Angeles Times, 7 May 2006. (52) Anonymous, ‘Churches prefer abstinence to fight HIV / AIDS’, in: Daily News online (Botswana), 4 May 2006, http://www.gov.bw/cgi-bin/ news.cgi?d=20060504&i=Churches _prefer_abstinence_to_fight_HIVAIDS. See also: E. Sanders, ‘Uganda takes up abstinence campaign; Activists say the nation’s shift away from encouraging condom use threatens one of the world’s most successful anti-AIDS programs’, in: Los Angeles Times, 31 October 2005. (53) H.A. Waxman, The content of federally funded abstinence-only education programs, Washington, DC, Committee on Government Reform Minority Staff Special Investigations Division. US House of Representatives, December 2004, http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov. (54) Agence France-Presse, Russians take aim at Western anti-AIDS methods, 23 April 2006. (55) R. Shorto, ‘Contra-contraception’, in: New York Times Sunday Magazine, 7 May 2006. (56) US Government Accountability Office, Global health spending requirement presents challenges for allocating prevention funding under the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, Washington DC, April 2006. (57) J. Butler, ‘For faith and family. Christian right advocacy at the United Nations’, in: The Public Eye, 2000, 9/2-3. (58) Center for Reproductive Rights, UNGASS on HIV/AIDS: women’s empowerment embraced, reproductive rights slighted, New York, December 2001, http:// www.reproductiverights.org/ pub_bp_hivungass.html. (59) S. Singson, USAID sued for requiring pledge against commercial sex work, 9/18, 21 April 2006, http://www.thefactis.org/ default.aspx?control=ArticleMaster&aid=1524&authid=11. See also: Center for Health and Gender Equity, Legal and policy restrictions on U.S. global AIDS and trafficking funding, Takoma Park, MD, CHANGE, November 2005. (60) Z. Hudson, Federal court holds ‘anti-prostitution pledge requirement’ violates first amendment,

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(61)

(62)

(63)

(64)

(65)

(66) (67) (68)

(69)

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New York, Open Society Institute, 9 May 2006. See also: V. Marrero, Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. et al. plaintiffs against United States Agency for International Development et al., defendants. Decision and order, 05 Civ. 8209, New York, US District Court, Southern District of New York, 9 May 2006. H.A.Waxman, Letter to US Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, DC, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, Congress of the United States, 9 May 2006. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations to Chile, paragraph 15, United Nations, 1999. See also: CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations to the Dominican Republic, paragraph 337, United Nations, 1998. And also: CESCR Committee, Concluding Observations to Cameroon, paragraph 25, United Nations, 1999. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Poland, paragraph 8, United Nations, 2004. See also: CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations to Chile, paragraphs 28 and 29, United Nations, 1999. Center for Reproductive Rights, As world eases restrictions on abortion, U.S. becomes more restrictive, study finds, New York, 4 March 2005, http://www.reproductiverights.org/pr_05_ 0304abortion.html. Women’s Link, High impact litigation in Colombia: the unconstitutionality of abortion (LAICIA), 10 May 2006, http://www.womenslinkworldwide.org/proj_laicia.html. See also: Associated Press, Abortion partially legalized in Colombia, 11 May 2006. ASTRA, ‘Poland: Wrongful birth verdict’, in: ASTRA CEE Bulletin on Sexual and Reproductive Rights, 11/33, 13 October 2005. Federation for Women and Family Planning, Poland, ‘Child support in case of the denial of legal abortion’, in: ASTRA CEE Bulletin on Sexual and Reproductive Rights, 5/39, 2006. Human Rights Committee, 57 Communication nr 1153/2003, Karen Noelia Llantoy Huamán v. Peru, final views of 17 November 2005, CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003, United Nations, 2006. See also: Center for Reproductive Rights, Woman forced to carry fatally impaired fetus to term wins case, 17 November 2005, http://www.reproductiverights.org/pr_05_1117KarenPeru.html. It is also important that laws permitting abortion be enforced. Health-care providers, members of the judicial system and members of the general public must be informed about the legal indications and how services can be obtained; the health system must be prepared to offer the services in a manner that is respectful of women’s rights. Sanya Declaration - The World Declaration for a Comprehensive Family Policy, Achieving the Millennium Declaration With and For the Family, Sanya, China, 8 December 2004, http:// www.worldfamilyorganization.org/Summit/ Declaration_ofSanya.htm. Council for Secular Humanism, Humanist Declaration on the Preservation of Families. A Vision of Families for the Twenty-First Century, no date, http://www.secularhumanism.org/ family/declaration.html. Statement by world religious leaders on the occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the International Year of the Family, Washington DC, Catholics For a Free Choice, 2 December 2004, http:// www.cath4choice.org/ lowbandwidth/whatsnew.htm. The Globe Newspaper, editorial, Perspective: Abstinence and AIDS, 29 April 2006.

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(73) The Coalition for Sexual and Bodily Rights in Muslim Societies, A call by The Coalition for Sexual and Bodily Rights in Muslim Societies on the 10th anniversary of the Fourth Women’s World Conference, Turkey: Women for Women’s Human Rights (WWHR) - New Ways, 2005. (74) International Interfaith Network for Development and Reproductive Health, A faith-filled commitment to development includes a commitment to women’s rights and reproductive health religious reflections on the Millennium Development Goals. Prepared for World Summit, 14-16 September 2005, Washington, DC, Catholics For a Free Choice.

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The V-Day Campaign in Uganda, 2005 The V-Day Campaign is a global campaign to end violence against women. Its flagship programme is the award winning play, The Vagina Monologues. Its author, Eve Ensler conducted a series of interviews with over 200 women worldwide about their bodies. These interviews formed the basis for the play in which women discussed intimate details of their experiences. The play uncovered the extent to which women experience violence and the ways in which the violence is condoned and tolerated by society. In 2005, Akina Mama wa Afrika in association with three other organisations - Uganda Women’s Network, Isis-Women’s International Cross Cultural Exchange and ActionAid International, Uganda - decided to adopt the campaign in Uganda. The campaign aimed to raise awareness of the impact of the conflict in Northern Uganda on women and girls. The twenty year insurgency waged against the government by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony has left over one million people internally displaced, and about the same number of deaths. Women and girls have been targeted as sources of slave labour and sexual exploitation. The campaign sought to highlight the plight of these women, and to raise funds for initiatives that support them. The campaign took the form of a high profile media campaign, and the staging of The Vagina Monologues. Almost immediately after the campaign began, opposition against the play was mounted. The Minister of State for Information announced that he would instruct the organisers not to stage the play. This culminated in the matter being referred to the Media Council, a statutory body established to monitor the activities of the print media, radio, television and film. The Media Council on February 16th 2005 issued a ruling to ban the play on the grounds that the title is alarming and that it promotes ‘homosexuality and other unnatural acts such as masturbation…’. This ruling marked the first time since the regime of Idi Amin (1971 - 1979) that a play had been banned in this country. Although the play was banned by the Media Council, the campaign raised Ugshs 20,000,000 million (approx 10,000 euros) to support women’s initiatives in Northern Uganda. The recipients of these funds were The Lira Women’s Peace Initiative and also The Kitgum Women’s Peace Initiative, both of which are using the funds to build shelters for the women.

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‘I AM GLAD THEY HAVE BANNED THE VAGINA MONOLOGUES’ Sarah Mukasa

‘I am glad they have banned The Vagina Monologues,’ said a colleague who walked into my office the day after the news of the play’s ban by the Media Council. ‘Why?’ I asked her very quietly. ‘Because now we can clearly see what we are up against. How dare you women celebrate your womanhood, condemn sexual oppression, and the abuse of women’s bodies. And you not only dare to do this, but in public also? What? You look at it from their point of view. Don’t you know that your vaginas are dirty, obscene, distasteful, vulgar and evil? Don’t you know that these “things” (read vaginas), no matter how much they suffer should be kept private? Haven’t you yet understood that the only ones who can talk with authority on these matters are men who think that way about you and women who think that way about themselves? Really you women, where do you get the nerve to talk about vaginas in public? Don’t you know this is not how “respectable” women behave? A respectable woman is supposed to be stoical, suffer in silence, with dignity and humility. You have embarrassed good women everywhere. For above all else, our cultures are the sacrosanct. They should never be questioned or challenged. You who have done so are morally corrupted!’ We laugh. So is it our cultures or our religions we are worried about? Well both. We should safeguard our African Christian, cultural values against the surge of western immorality! I will at this point resist the temptation to challenge the notion that Christianity, or to be more specific, the Judaeo-Christian religion we practice today in Africa, heavily influenced as it is, by the Victorian social mores and traditions of our colonisers, is in fact African.

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So let us move on. So when for example, the Christian religion says we are all made in the image of God (every single part of our bodies that is), it means that it is wrong for us to refer to the vagina as vulgar, dirty and distasteful, because we are denigrating the image of God? Well no, because culturally this is how we refer to these parts of the body. Oh, so it is wrong for us to challenge these socially constructed practices, even though we may be dishonouring God in doing so? Well, yes. In this case yes. We think. Which case is that? The case in which the issue touches on the rights of women of course. That which sits comfortably with patriarchal notions of what a woman’s place should be. Women are used to this (even those who were opposed to this play). They have steadfastly challenged cultural practices and norms. They have gone to school, own property, left abusive marriages; some have chosen not to marry. But now many of them turn and point the finger on those who dare to challenge the last and most insidious bastion of patriarchal oppression. The notion of women’s bodily integrity and autonomy; the idea that a woman’s body is hers and hers alone to do with as she chooses is so scary to so many of us, that we quickly hide behind some of the very defence mechanisms we have so long challenged. Culture. African cultural values. Women’s rights are okay, but this has gone too far! We will go part of the way with you, but not the full mile. Well, each to his/her own. But let us not get in the way of those who seek to take the cause the full distance. I think that we should be very careful how we fashion our arguments. For hiding behind cultural relativism has been the very tool used to stamp our oppression in the past. We pander to racist and sexist stereotypes about what African culture is when we do this. We paint a picture of this fossilised, immovable, intolerant, reactionary, monolithic culture. Let us also not forget that in the past these arguments have been used to safeguard dictatorial regimes. Concepts such as human rights, democracy, and gender equality are all once referred to as ‘western and alien concepts’. So whilst we Africans were stuck in oppressive, repressed, dictatorial, cultural systems, the west was showing us the way forward? What absolute garbage. The fact of the matter is that the oppression and exclusion of people, on the basis of race, gender, and ethnicity and so on is a universal practice, which each society justifies with slick explanations of culture, religion and what have you. And just as it has been practised in every society, so has it been resisted.

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‘Corruption of our values by western immorality is one of the biggest challenges of our time.’ So said the good minister of State for Information Dr Nsaba Buturo in his press briefing statement. I am sure he believes it. But really some of us think that compared to the subjugation of our economies to the west, this is a stroll in the park. But there you have it. This is where the Minister concentrates his energies. And not very well one might add. Well let’s look at subscription TV and what it frequently beams into our homes. No ban there. Let’s look at all the salacious print media that is around for everyone to see? No ban there. What about all those watering holes dotted around the city, perhaps the minister passes some of them on his way to and from work, which feature goodness knows what. No, no ban there. What about the corruption that is endemic in our society and which denies so many their right to basic social welfare? Nope. No moves there either! Has he managed to get all those government officials and employees who have abandoned their children to at least pay child support? Last I heard, that was not on his radar. In fact no action anywhere except for where some women want to stage a play called The Vagina Monologues. Of course we have heard from a number of those who have seen the play and condemn it as pornography from the west. I cannot argue with their experiences, it is pointless to do that. Because in doing so, I silence them; relegate them to the back of beyond; as somehow completely unimportant. Their view is important, and they can exercise their right to stay away. I hasten to add, that several others have seen the play, myself included and have been liberated by it. The play has a different effect on different people. It is as simple as that. In the cast of the Uganda production, were young women who had experienced sexual abuse – incest and rape. They wanted to be a part of this production because they felt it affirmed and empowered them. Their views and experiences have simply been ignored and silenced by the bully-boy tactics of some of our ministers (whose backgrounds we are all really keen to know) and their cronies. (1) ‘The message is good but you should have packaged it differently.’ Some now say. Hello? Have you been on the moon? What have women’s organisations been doing all these years? 16 Days of Activism Against Gender Violence. Seminar after seminar. Tree after tree chopped down, to produce report after report, which presents these issues to fit comfortably with people’s sensibilities. And where are we? As I write this, these reports sit, gathering layers of dust in a number of people’s offices. In the meantime, the crisis escalates (this is by the government’s own reckoning). ‘Yes but you will cause a backlash against the women’s movement.’ My sisters. That backlash already exists. Don’t take my word for it. How long have we been pushing for The Domestic Relations Bill here in Uganda? (2) The truth is, there is no serious political will to address violence, especially that of a sexual nature, because so

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many are implicated. When we understand patriarchy, and how it instrumentalizes women’s bodies; their sexuality, we understand why violence against women is such an acceptable practise, condoned by reinforcement (patriarchal culture), inaction (failure by the state to enact laws that protect women from gender based violence), and obstruction (as in the case of the banning of this play). The entire patriarchal thesis is predicated on the use of women’s bodies for the purposes of reproduction, ensuring the continuity of the male progeny, and for cheap labour. Men must be certain of their paternity, and to ensure this, they must adopt all kinds of measures (enshrined in our legal, cultural, religious, social and economic institutions), which include violence. It is not by accident, that efforts such as campaigns for the enactment of laws that enforce the rights of women within the context of family relations, have met with stiff resistance throughout the continent. Not for nothing, is the resistance strongest when attempts are made to accord women’s sexual and reproductive rights and autonomy. For these efforts challenge patriarchy at its very core. They shake its very roots and foundations. These campaigns assert women’s rights to personhood, to autonomy and to bodily integrity. Therefore in taking the stand that we will only address the issues that ‘will not cause a backlash against the women’s movement’, we are in fact accommodating the very system we are supposed to be challenging! ‘Say it in vernacular!’ Many scream. This they scream as the biggest defence against staging the play. Well, as I recall, a number of this same group argued for gender sensitive language in the drawing up of the 1995 Constitution. This principle document now uses ‘he’ and ‘she’, ‘woman ‘and ‘man’ as the case warrants. Why did they do this? Language they argued, is patriarchal in nature It is socially constructed and it reflects societal, cultural norms. Quite right too. And by the same token I say that any language that refers to the essence of womanhood, the vagina (by that I mean, that which distinguishes a woman from a man) in ways that are derogatory should be questioned and challenged. Not protected and defended. Would these same women defend proverbs in our languages that lament the birth of a girl instead of a boy for example? And then there are the ‘Pastor’ Sempas of this world (he as we recall was one of the most vociferous and rabidly vocal opponents from the religious right, of this play). With them, one should waste as little energy as possible. So I will not bother much, except to say, that someone from police please enforce the ban and throw this man in jail. He has been reading at will, the very excerpts from the play that were banned by the Media Council for all and sundry to hear. And boy does this man shout! ‘The bandit is enjoying this!’ laughed members of the cast as we listened to him read the script on the radio a few days after the play had been banned (He actually reads quite well!). But here’s the thing. This man has had the opportunity to read the book from cover to cover. And having done so, he has arrived at his own conclusions about the

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play. Fair enough. But what he then seeks to do is to deny others the same opportunity to make up their own minds, by calling for the play’s ban. Well this is after all in keeping with the tradition in the wave of charismatic churches that is sweeping this nation. Any man (for they are usually men) who can shout beyond a certain decibel, can set up a ‘church’. And in this so-called church he is free to preach what he chooses in the name of God. Many a wealthy lifestyle by our ‘Pastors’ has been funded from the proceeds of the congregation’s sweat. ‘Bring no coins here!’ they shout. ‘God only wants notes!’ They expect absolute obedience from their followers. They tell the congregation what to think, do and say - some even who to marry. They have killed their congregations in Kanungu, and have hoodwinked women into believing they are carrying miracle babies in Kenya. (3) They hold night vigils for ‘healing’ and ‘curing’ the sick of HIV/AIDS to exorcisms. The term ‘Born Again’ becomes the new mantra and license to engage in some of the most iniquitous and scandalous behaviour imaginable. But no matter. If people choose to go to these churches, I do not have the right to stop them. I recognise and respect their right to do it. That they do not extend me the same courtesy to watch The Vagina Monologues is neither here nor there. One of us has to be principled. Incidentally someone called up on one of the TV stations to ask the ‘good Pastor’ Sempa, why his church is littered with used condoms every time he has night prayers. I have never seen anyone look as pitiful as did this man. Actually for a moment he looked like a frightened mouse. But only for a moment. For this man is nothing but a slick performer if you like that sort of thing. Quickly he regrouped and hid behind a barrage of slanderous attacks on Isis-Women’s International Cross Cultural Exchange. This is a very morally upright man of God after all. I regret very much the government’s handling of this play. But I also know that you cannot keep a social movement down, certainly not through actions such as these. Those in power forget very quickly that the generation of ideas, their examination, debate and dialogue are the hallmarks of a democratic society. Drunk with power, they use the long arm of the state to silence people in ways that are so transparently unfair and unjust (and incidentally very highly immoral). And they plant a seed that germinates quietly underground. You cannot suppress ideas, just because they upset your sense of propriety. And then to lean on the apparatus of the state to do this is so outrageous and in the long term highly damaging. Leaders who pander for cheap popularity at the expense of principled governance, lose very quickly, the respect even of their most ardent supporters. For intrinsically, deep in the recess of their subconsciousness echoes that tiny but persistent voice: Today, it has been the turn of so and so. Tomorrow, might it be me? Don’t take my word for it. Examine your histories very carefully. The positive side to all this, is that this play and the issues it is trying to raise has reached a wider audience than would ever have been possible had the state not in-

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terfered in the way it did. ‘You mean these ministers and all have banned the play? Ahh, then there must be something good in it for women!’ Radio stations, email list serves, arguments, counter arguments, discussions in living rooms, on matatus, in the market place, with aunts and uncles, it is everywhere. The discussions have gone underground - a very difficult place to stop a revolution. Young people have been exposed (as it were) to the hypocrisy of the older generation. They have watched as scoundrels, wife batterers, runaway dads, adulterers, extortionists and playboys have formed a most unholy alliance with men of the cloth to see this play banned. And they have watched in utter disbelief, those in the women’s movement, who have joined this band of merry men. It is the pedagogy of the oppressed, we try to explain. Oh no it is not, say they. It is downright dishonesty, opportunism and immorality. But all that is by the by. The play has been banned and that is all that matters right now. Or is it? (4)

Sarah Mukasa is currently employed as the Director of Programmes at the Pan African organisation, the African Women’s Development Fund in Ghana. This is an African grant making and fundraising initiative for African women. Until the end of 2006 she has been the Programmes Manager for the East and Horn of Africa Office of Akina Mama wa Afrika in Uganda. Sarah Mukasa has worked in the local and health authorities in the UK for several years as a community development officer, developing services for ethnic minority communities in London, and in particular, for refugees. She is a feminist activist with a special interest in the areas of sexual and reproductive rights of African women, race and gender and the rights of refugee women, asylum seekers and Internally Displaced Persons. Hivos provides support to Akina Mama wa Afrika and to Isis-Women’s International Cross Cultural Exchange given their strategic role for advancing women’s rights in Africa. http://www.akinamama.org http://www.isis.or.ug

Notes (1)

(2)

A key strategy used by those who wanted the play banned, was to attack the play’s author, Eve Ensler. Nsaba Buturo issued a press statement in which he made a number of slanderous attacks against Eve, insinuating that she is of questionable moral character. In the statement, he wondered whether the organisers had, ‘any idea about the author’s background?’ The Domestic Relations Bill, is proposed law that protects the rights or women within the context of marriage, separation and divorce. The campaign for this legislation has been in existence for over forty years in Uganda, with successive governments shelving it for one reason or the other.

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(3)

(4)

In 2000, in Kanungu, a district in SW Uganda, Joseph Kibwetere, Angelina Mugisha, Credonia Mwerinde, Joseph Kasapurari and Dominic Kataribabo the leaders of a cult Christian denomination, The Ten Commandments of God, murdered over 500 members of their congregation in the belief that they would go to heaven. It was later discovered that many in the congregation had handed over their property and assets to that church. Similarly, Gilbert Deya, a pastor from Kenya was arrested in the UK suspected of being involved in trafficking of babies and giving them to women in the congregation (who were previously unable to conceive), claiming that they are miracle babies. Charismatic and evangelical religious institutions are largely unregulated; follow an extremely right wing, fundamentalist doctrine that is extremely retrogressive on the rights of women. The Dutch media paid attention to the banning of The Vagina Monologues in Uganda. Bossema, W. (2005), ‘Verbod Vagina Monologen heeft averechts effect’, in: De Volkskrant, 5 March 2005.

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MUSLIM WOMEN AND FEMINIST STRATEGIES IN TIMES OF RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISMS Anissa Hélie

Women around the world design and adopt different strategies for change, based on their own (individual or collective) interests, and depending on the socio-political circumstances in which they live. Women get involved in initiatives that are informed by their multiple, overlapping identities, and shaped by their differences in class, caste, age, culture, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, health status - or political beliefs.

Over the last few decades, the rise of religious fundamentalisms (1) is one political trend that has affected countless women, albeit in different ways. The response to fundamentalist movements has been diverse - ranging from resistance to active endorsement, with some women involved in organisations or political parties which promote an agenda opposed to gender equality, and at times endorse violence as a political tool. Women supporters of Hamas in Palestine, women elected representatives of the Hindu supremacist BJP in India, anti-abortion activists in the USA provide examples of the appeal fundamentalist forces can exercise over female constituencies. Such appeal is indeed a crucial question for feminist scholars and activists to address. (2) However, this paper aims at documenting women’s progressive initiatives (for lack of a better word), while focussing specifically on Muslim contexts. It explores some of the strategies of resistance women’s movements have designed or adapted in their struggle towards gender equality. It offers concrete examples of how women have responded to the specific challenges posed by two related issues: widespread violence against women and the rise of religious fundamentalisms. In doing so, this paper wants to pay tribute to the women human rights defenders from Muslim contexts, and to their sisters elsewhere, who continue to hijack the spotlight or to struggle anonymously. Yet it also shares the dark skepticism expressed by Algerian feminist Louisa Aït Hamou: ‘Since 11 September 2001, the world, and particularly the United States, seem to have suddenly realised that Muslim fundamentalism, in its extreme form of terrorism, is a real threat. It is only now that

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the US and many European countries recognise that they have to build strategies across the world to “fight terrorism”. Many of us cannot help feeling bitter about such a new attitude, for we have fought fundamentalism and terrorism in isolation with our bare hands for a good number of years, while those fundamentalists who committed the most atrocious crimes in our countries were getting support from the same governments that are now dictating to the rest of the world how to “fight terrorism”.’ (3)

Questioning the label: the social construction of ‘Muslim women’ Before exploring various instances of women’s organizing, some assumptions surrounding two of the main themes this paper deals with need to be discussed - namely, the category of ‘Muslim woman’ and the meaning of ‘strategies’. How do these get constructed? I have been referred to as a ‘Muslim writer’ - did I say I was Muslim? Maybe I am, maybe I am not. How can you tell? Are my skin colour, the country where I was born, the issues I am raising or the way I dress such infallible indicators? This personal example highlights the fact that, from an average Western perspective, people are assumed to be Muslims if they simply happen to come from contexts where Islam is the state religion (or, for that matter, if their grandmother happened to have come from such utterly foreign lands). Hence individuals and entire ‘migrant’ communities are defined, and labelled, on the basis of their presumed faith, at the expense of all other identities. This privileging of religion as a primary maker does not arise in all contexts. No one refers to white women in, e.g., the Netherlands as ‘Protestant women’. Nor do people generally feel entitled to assume that a white female audience in, e.g., the US will necessarily be composed almost entirely of ‘Christian women’ or ‘Jewish women’. For such groups, the difference between identifying with a cultural tradition or with a religion is a given: celebrating Christmas or Passover does not single one out as a believer. Yet being born in a ‘Muslim country’ or ‘Muslim community’ automatically categorizes a woman as a ‘Muslim woman’. In addition, the assumption is that she is a devoted Muslim woman (no matter whether or not she actually celebrates Eid). In response to this stereotyping, the Women Living Under Muslims Laws network (WLUML) insists on two, fairly common sense, facts. First, that there are (and there always have been in the past) non-Muslim women who live and struggle in Muslim contexts. Second, and importantly, that there are women from Muslim backgrounds who - whether they are believers or not - choose other markers of identity than religion. A woman might primarily look at herself as a mother, a professor, an athlete, a composer or (God forbid?) a lesbian. Indeed, she can define herself as a devoted lesbian Muslim mother, or as a secular professor: life is full of options. (4)

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But these realities are often ignored. What are initially relatively innocent assumptions are translated into the political realm and produce yet more stereotyping. This, in turn, can limit the potential for collaboration between women from different cultural backgrounds. One such barrier to transnational and trans-cultural alliances is that women from Muslim countries and communities are assumed to be fundamentally, if not inherently, more oppressed than any other group of women. This assumption requires to be further problematised. First, the status of women in Muslim contexts is extremely diverse, and shaped by a complex web of customary traditions and legal frameworks. (5) Second, the concept of intersectionality applies to ‘Muslim women’ as well. In other words, it would be difficult to demonstrate that a prominent figure such as Queen Noor of Jordan is, by virtue of her being a ‘Muslim woman’, more oppressed than a homeless Hindu Dalit woman. Another barrier to alliances is that, in the eyes of many in the West, ‘Muslim women’ are seen as more passive and less able to resist gender oppression. While mainstream portrayal of women from Muslim backgrounds revolves around images of powerless victims, their achievements are rarely publicized. This is no accident: there is a continuum between nineteenth century colonial stereotypes (especially as they pertained to the Middle East) and Western contemporary constructs of ‘Muslim women’. The myth of the passive oriental, a slave to oppressive traditions and in need of rescuing, is by no means a recent construct. Nor has it become more accurate than at the time of the West’s glorious ‘civilizing mission’. Because indeed, women resist - as they have always done. (6)

‘Living is Resisting’ - strategies in context Current women’s initiatives (either in contexts where Islam is the state religion, or in contexts where Muslim communities represent significant segments of the population) provide examples of a diverse range of struggles. Given Islam’s wide geographical spread and the reality of migration, it is useful not only to envisage women’s efforts deployed on different continents, but also to include those fostered by diaspora communities in the West. With these parameters in mind, case studies from Jordan, Nigeria, the UK, Israel / Palestine, Algeria and Malaysia are explored below. But, first, what might ‘resistance strategies’ entail? The term suggests images of large-scale, organized protests, even mass mobilization. However there is a crucial need to take into account the apparently ordinary ways in which women stand in defence of their rights. Sometimes, ‘living is resisting’. This formula was coined by Aït Hamou, who evokes some of the everyday strategies used by women who refused to bow to the diktats of fundamentalists in Algeria in the 1990s: ‘During the most terrifying period of the fundamentalist terrorism, women tried to live their lives as they used to. Even [as] they were threatened with

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death if they went to work or if they refused to wear the hijab, they resisted these violent pressures: most of them carried on going to work and sending their children to school in spite of the bombings in schools and colleges (…) When teachers and students were asked not to resume school in 1994, many of them still went to college and university, but they would carry their books in plastic bags instead of using school-bags.’ In addition, despite the ban on what were deemed to be sacrilegious activities, ‘many women continued going to the Turkish baths, to tailors and hairdressers; they also celebrated weddings’. (7) While such subtle, individual, acts of rebellion are more difficult to document than collective initiatives, they are not necessarily less significant. In Iran, daily assertions of defiance towards fundamentalist rule include the wearing of lipstick and nail polish. (8) Who would have thought that what are regarded as tools of patriarchy in one context can be used to challenge patriarchy in another? Severe enforcement of dress codes by the Iranian ‘morality police’ is also challenged by students whose chadors open up on legged jeans, or whose hijabs allow strands of hair to escape. These are forms of resistance that are also significant, and that require courage. Providing both material and emotional support to friends and relatives threatened by fundamentalists is another strategy that matters. In Algeria, feminist spokeswoman Khalida Messaoudi recalls the help extended to her by her siblings when she was sentenced to death by islamist armed groups. She makes it clear that their backing was crucial in terms of her being able to survive and to continue being politically active. (9) Rebellious acts can take many forms: however low key they might appear, they constitute a form of resistance against the imposition of a fundamentalist ideology. They illustrate that strategies are shaped by the political and social environments from which they arise. The diversity of initiatives therefore reflects the diversity of women’s status in Muslim contexts, as well as the strength of local women’s movements. How one defines ‘success’ also depends on the space available for dissent in any given context. Merely to raise the visibility of an issue can represent a valuable achievement and constitutes a goal in itself in some places, while in others it might be seen as only a first step.

Activism, contestation and resistance The modes of enforcement of fundamentalist ideologies (ranging from increased social pressure to enacting legal changes to mass murders) affect women’s abilities, and ways to resist. For example, the 2006 curtailing of abortion rights in South Dakota (USA), thanks to the efforts of the Christian religious Right, is prompting women’s responses that are necessarily different from those available to Iraqi women, who operate in a context marked by both foreign occupation and armed Islamic

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factions. The significance of local contexts is the key - and activists with thorough knowledge of the (beneficial and obstructive) factors at work in a specific situation are best placed to assess which strategies appear most appropriate. Strategies also differ depending on whether women chose to engage in time-limited interventions or in ongoing initiatives; and on whether they rely on local / national expertise or build on solidarity with allies, within and outside the Muslim world. Finally, in Muslim contexts as elsewhere, social actors operating in the same context might favour different approaches, depending on their means, constituency and political aims. For example, some groups operate from a secular standpoint, while others opt for reform within a religious framework, while still others ‘negotiate a strategy that is neither wholly secular nor completely circumscribed by religious discourses’. (10) Some groups work at a community level, some target higher spheres of power, others combine a variety of approaches. Such a diversity is by no means counterproductive: varied strategies can play complementary roles. The organizing efforts described in this text highlight a number of issues that women struggle with: • violence against women in ‘peaceful’ times (Jordan); • bodily rights / reproductive and sexual rights (Nigeria, the UK, Israel / Palestine); • wars and conflicts (Algeria), and • blasphemy (Malaysia). The rationale behind selecting these specific issues is linked to their direct relationship with fundamentalisms. Nowadays, violence against women, bodily rights, wars and conflicts, and blasphemy are often woven together against a background of religious fundamentalisms - when they are not in actual fact manifestations of the fundamentalist phenomenon. The first case-study explores efforts aimed at confronting conservatism in Jordan. In that country (as in other contexts), the issue of ‘honour’ crimes is one example of violence against women. (11) Violence against women is a worldwide phenomenon that predates the rise of the religious Right, but it is nevertheless further legitimized when fundamentalist leaders are able to spread their ideology. The second case-study focuses on bodily rights. While this question encompasses numerous issues, it is clear that policing women’s sexual behaviour is at the heart of all fundamentalist projects. Reproductive rights have been a site of struggle between the religious Right and women’s rights advocates for decades, from the community level (as the Nigerian example shows) to the UN arena. (12) Within the bodily rights framework, sexual rights include many different levels of human experience. But alternative sexuality is especially important to consider as an emerging arena of struggle in Muslim countries and communities, as recent initiatives by lesbians in the UK and Israel / Palestine demonstrate. The third case-study looks at wars and conflicts. This has become an almost unavoidable issue everywhere: not only because ethnic and religious fundamental-

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isms lead to a globalization of conflicts, but also because civilian populations are increasingly affected, with women being specifically targeted. (13) Algeria provides an example of a civil war with over 120,000 casualties and disappearances, and of a conflict in which women were - and still are - at the forefront of the resistance against the fundamentalist project. Finally, the early 2006 controversy over the publication of the ‘Danish cartoons’ calls for a careful examination of the notion of blasphemy, the focus of the fourth case-study. While the cartoons published in Danmark promoted racist representations of ‘Muslims’ (including a stereotypical post 9/11 depiction of Muslims-asterrorists), the Muslim religious Right instrumentalised the issue to further their political aims (14) - which include introducing the concept of blasphemy into UN language and human rights bodies. (15) As the Malaysian example demonstrates, the same issue was used in order to silence dissent and discredit an outspoken women’s rights advocate.

Violence against women in ‘peaceful’ times: strategies against ‘honour’ crimes in Jordan Crimes committed in the name of honour are by no means a ‘Muslim woman’ issue: they derive from Mediterranean customs (16) and are prevalent in the Middle East, Latin America and some parts of South East Asia. ‘Honour’ crimes are linked to notions in which ‘a man’s honour lies in the control of the bodies and sexual practices of women in the same family’ (17), (‘honour’ crimes are also referred to as ‘crimes of passion’). They can take many forms but are mostly directed against women; they include murder (‘honour’ killings), forced marriage, assault, acid attack, coerced marriage to an alleged rapist, abduction and unlawful confinement / restriction of movement. (18) For years, Jordanian activists have sustained a broad campaign against ‘honour’ killings. Aiming to change existing laws (specifically to repeal Penal Code articles 340 and 98 that exempt perpetrators from prosecution and allow them to benefit from a reduced sentence), their strategies are multiple. They cultivate the media as well as involve communities and civil society at large. For example, towards the end of 1999, they had collected 13,000 signatures calling for a new bill introducing more severe penalties for perpetrators. They secured public statements by influential clerics denouncing ‘honour’ crimes as un-Islamic (19), and enlisted the support of influential people whose involvement could influence public opinion. (20) However in September 2003, the Jordanian Parliament rejected an amendment proposing a harsher punishment for men who kill their female relatives. Among a total of 85 MPs, sixty argued that this would ultimately ‘destroy social values, violate religious traditions and generally damage the fabric of Jordan’s society’. (21) Despite the failure to enact legal change in Jordan itself, international networking

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has proven more successful. Jordanian advocates joined efforts with others from different regions who had been lobbying the UN since 1998. As a result, there was a major breakthrough in October 2004 when the UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution entitled ‘Working towards the elimination of crimes against women and girls committed in the name of honour’. (22) This shows how activists can inform the UN system about local realities and how, in turn, local contexts can be positively affected by international human rights instruments. Back in Jordan, national and community-based organizations are still pushing the issue on the public agenda.

Bodily Rights: organising against ‘zina’ crimes in Nigeria ‘Zina’ crimes refer to adultery or extra marital sexual relations - in some Muslim contexts, these carry the death penalty. While there have been several such cases, there was national and international outcry in September 2002 when a Nigerian woman, Amina Lawal, was sentenced to death by stoning by a lower Shari’a court on a charge of adultery. Her case was contested in appeal by the Women’s Right Advancement and Protection Alternatives (WRAPA) and BAOBAB for Women’s Human Rights. The outcome was successful: on September 26, 2003, the Katsina State Shari’a Court of Appeal upheld Amina Lawal’s appeal. The court held that pregnancy outside of marriage is not proof of adultery, that Ms. Lawal’s alleged confession was not a confession in law, and that her rights of defence had not been properly recognised in the lower courts. The approach chosen (a criminal defence strategy as opposed to a human rights one) saved Ms. Lawal’s life - a most crucial outcome and undeniable success. On the other hand, it also risked legitimizing Shari’a courts at a time when patriarchal interests in Muslim contexts are trying to enforce further gender oppression by using the conservative interpretations of religion. It is indeed important, as BAOBAB Director Sindi Medar-Gould stated, to ‘understand and support our strategy and the nuances of working on rights in the context of Nigeria’s religious and ethnic identity politics’. But critics within the Nigerian women’s movements emphasize that going through the Shari’a court did not preclude challenging the very basis of the ‘crime’ by acting at another judicial level, and trying to lay the foundation for a better law. Yet the courage of BAOBAB and WRAPA advocates, and the intimidation they faced, ought to be acknowledged. Braving increasing pressure in the Nigerian press and email death threats, they stood in defence of Safiya Husseini Tungar-Tudu, Amina Lawal and others. They also remain keen to acknowledge community members’ roles in proactively protecting the women accused.

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Bodily rights: claiming sexual autonomy - lesbian / bisexual initiatives The Safra-Project (Safra meaning ‘journey’ or ‘discovery’ in Arabic, Farsi and Urdu) is devoted to lesbian, bisexual and / or transgender (LBT) women who ‘identify as Muslim religiously and / or culturally’ (23) - particularly those based in the UK. It has grown since its birth in 2001, when the group set out to challenge the complex and overlapping webs of prejudices experienced by Muslim LBT women ‘based on [their] sexual orientation, gender identity, gender, religion, race, culture and immigration status’ (ibid). Warning that it ‘does not seek to provide ultimate answers or solutions, and is not a faith group’ (ibid), Safra achieves the difficult task of bringing together women from varied cultural, ethnic, educational, class and age backgrounds and creates a welcoming platform for both believers and the secular minded. Safra has increased the visibility of Muslim LBT women among their peers and in the community at large through organising women-only meetings, building an online network, and asserting its presence in the media. To highlight issues affecting Muslim LBT women, Safra carried out research, especially with regard to UK-based service providers and how they could better address the specific needs of the Safra community. Mapping access to (or lack of) appropriate social and legal services provided the initial impetus to its first research project, followed by another focussing on Sexuality, Gender and Islam. The Safra website, launched in 2003, has been instrumental as an organizing and community building tool, as well as a means of publicizing research findings. Groups such as the Safra-Project (or the more male-dominated Al Fatiha in North America) are often set up by ‘second’ or ‘third generations’ from migrant communities settled in the West. These groups play a pioneering role in terms of increasing the visibility of LBT Muslims. This is crucial as it allows others who live in more threatening environments (politically or socially) to connect and experience solidarity. Ultimately, it often inspires them to launch their own initiatives ‘back home’ - as the example of Aswat below testifies. Another example of struggle for bodily rights is Aswat, a support and lobby group based in Israel / Palestine. Founded in 2003, Aswat addresses the concerns of ‘one of the most silenced and oppressed minorities’ in the region - i.e. Palestinian lesbian, bisexual and trans women (including those who are Israeli citizens). Aswat’s advocates define their dual aim in a context marked by gendered as well as political oppression: ‘In addition to our feminist struggle for equal rights (…), we are very much part of a national struggle for recognition of our civil minority rights.’ (24) Aswat (meaning Voices) exposes on its website the complex challenges faced by LBT activists, denouncing both Israel’s discrimination against Palestinian communities and patriarchal violence within Palestinian society: ‘The moment women want to focus their energies in establishing independence from the male occupation and structure, they are transformed instantly into enemies. The competition between

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different, sometimes clashing needs and struggles, puts us in peculiar situations where we are demanded to prioritize one struggle over the other or to choose our ideological “loyalty” in a multi-layered reality and among potential partners.’ Women’s sexuality and gender identity remain such taboos that most Arab women’s organizations avoid dealing with these issues ‘for fear of risking their legitimacy and their possibility to negotiate Arab’s women’s status with the “male stream”’. (ibid) On the other hand, the more established Jewish LGBTQI (25) organizations are still ‘ignoring cultural differences, nationality and race and do not relate to the Arab culture’s structures and imperatives’. The doubly oppressive environment in which Aswat operates explains the need to maintain anonymity, yet also advocates building alliances at the local, regional and international levels. This approach includes recognizing ‘the possibilities and power of cooperation with Jewish social change movements, especially gay rights groups and organizations, in order to introduce multi-national/cultural layers to this struggle’. (ibid) To address the diverse needs of LBT Palestinians, Aswat has launched several programs that mostly aim at either support (help line, crisis assistance and regular members meetings) or educational outreach. Such outreach includes making the presence of LBT Palestinians visible publicly in the media, among service providers, and through lectures and participation in conferences. Cutting across these constituencies, an effort is made to translate and produce texts reflecting the ‘experiences of queer women’, Palestinian and others. This endeavour goes beyond simply addressing the lack of adequate information: it also contributes to the creation of an ‘alternative [Arabic] glossary’, a language that offers ‘positive, un-derogatory and affirmative expressions of women and lesbian sexuality and gender’. (ibid) The courage required to carry on this pioneering work is further highlighted by the fact that, among the roughly seventy women members of the online Aswat forum, only one is publicly ‘out’. Such courage was recognized when Aswat was presented with the 2006 International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) annual award. While many advocates struggling against various forms of discrimination and violence are paying the price for their activism (ranging from social ostracism and harassment to sexual violence and murder), research done by Urgent Action Fund explicitly points out that sexual orientation and tackling religious fundamentalisms are among the issues presenting most danger. (26)

Wars and conflicts: Algerian women in the belly of the beast The rise of religious fundamentalism and the need to organize in the face of extreme, and large scale, violence against civilians has dominated the Algerian landscape for most of the last two decades. Politico-religious extremism began to grow in the mid-1980s, culminated in the ‘bloody decade’ of the 1990s, and continues to affect the political agenda to this day.

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Women were, and remain, at the forefront of the struggle against fundamentalisms. They have engaged in a variety of activities: arranging hiding places and collecting funds for those sentenced to death by islamist armed groups, providing support and counselling to women and girls survivors of sexual slavery (many of whom had been forcibly impregnated and were rejected by their families) and resisting by simply attempting to survive. In terms of collective mobilization, women have held numerous public meetings and demonstrations as well as cultural activities when such events were banned by fundamentalist groups. On March 8 1993, the RAFD (27) organized a People’s Tribunal Against Terrorism in the centre of Algiers. The largest ever demonstration took place at that time, with almost one million women taking to the streets of the capital. Louisa Aït Hamou testifies: ‘These were powerful moments of solidarity which gave courage to women to continue their fight against fundamentalism. Because they were public, they showed women’s determination not to yield to fundamentalism.’ (Aït Hamou, 2004) These efforts were supported by Algerian women from the diaspora: large numbers of (mostly middle class) women had to go into exile, but remained active from abroad. They publicized the crimes perpetrated by fundamentalist forces (through press conferences, demonstrations, film screenings) and lobbied for mainstream human rights organizations whose reports tended to focus unilaterally on violations by the military state. They also raise funds to support initiatives back home and networked with feminist organizations and women’s groups in Algeria, in the Maghreb and in Europe. When the worse of the violence abated, another strategy was to document human rights violations and domestic abuse. In 2002, the Wassila network produced a ‘White book’ focussing on violence against women and children. (28) Other groups celebrated the multi-cultural character of Algerian society, in defiance of a pervasive ideology that emphasizes Arab and Muslim identity over all others. In 2004, the ‘20 ans Barakat’ Collective (29) produced a video and a CD (aimed at mobilizing the public for a less restrictive legal status), with songs in three languages: Berber, Arabic and French. The legacy of the decade long civil war and the fact that the government made a deal with some former perpetrators of the violence have kept women activists busy in recent years. They now focus on two main fronts: countering the authorities’ project of ‘concorde civile’ (‘national reconciliation’), and improving women’s legal status. In 1999, various associations of families’ victims of islamic terrorism and women’s groups formed the National Committee against Forgetting and against Betrayal. (30) This coalition came about to denounce the agreement between the Algerian government and the AIS (Armée Islamique du Salut / Islamic Salvation Army), which provides impunity to perpetrators of violence. Along with other fundamentalist groups, the AIS carried out for years a terror campaign against civilians, specifically murdering independent journalists, progressive intellectuals, and women

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activists. (31) The ‘concorde civile’, which offers amnesty to numerous fundamentalist fighters, is therefore seen by Algerian progressive forces as a betrayal of victims. In memory of the countless people - and especially women - who resisted, RAFD created the ‘Award of women’s resistance against fundamentalism and against forgetting’. (32) In 2001, it was awarded posthumously to eleven women teachers assassinated in 1997, a time when the AIS and its allies denied a girl’s right to education and a woman’s right to exercise her profession. In terms of women’s legal rights, the Family Code enacted in February 2005 offers limited gains (such as an amendment to polygamy and provisions for divorced women’s housing). But the new Code has also been denounced by women activists as a concession to the Muslim religious Right: the principle of gender equality is not stated and a husband’s unilateral right to initiate divorce (talak) remains unchallenged. Furthermore, when feminists called for the abolition of the provision that subjects adult women to the authority of a tutor (wali), fundamentalist parties launched a signature campaign to oppose this amendment. (33) Indeed, fundamentalist forces continue to affect the Algerian political agenda.

Blasphemy: sisters in Islam fighting back in Malaysia In 2003, the founder and director of Sisters In Islam (SIS), Zainah Anwar, and five other Malaysian writers, were accused of insulting Islam - a most serious charge that can lead to an accusation of apostasy. In the case of Ms. Anwar, the attack focussed on specific public statements she had made, declaring, for example, that the Ulama (34) do not have a monopoly on religion, and that polygamy is not a right in Islam. The accusation was launched by the Ulama Association of Malaysia (representing those Ulama aligned with the Islamist party), which first submitted a police report. When the police failed to react, they approached the Religious Department and, finally, submitted a memorandum to the Conference of Rulers. (35) Media coverage meant that the Ulama’s strategy of intimidation provoked broad public discussion and raised significant concern. Ms. Anwar has subsequently looked back on the means adopted to defend herself: ‘To me, the important lesson in dealing with this was the need to go public, to mobilise wide-based support and to put our opponents on the defensive. The support we got [succeeded in that] they were portrayed as intolerant, dangerous people who want to criminalize freedom of expression and thus a threat to our democratic space.’ SIS’s strategy was geared to several levels: involving NGOs to strategise collectively; issuing a press statement signed by key NGOs and prominent public figures (including almost all members of the Human Rights Commission, some Islamic scholars, ex-judges and constitutional lawyers); holding a press conference and submitting counter argumentation and documents to the Prime Minister and selected rulers. This course of action proved successful, as Ms. Anwar explains: ‘The Conference of

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Rulers called on the government to deal with the issue as it deemed this was a political matter and not a religious matter. We were called in for a discussion by the Head of the Religious Department who actually became enlightened by the arguments we presented and even became an ally to our work.’ When SIS was later attacked for its campaign in favour of monogamy, he ‘came out in our support - after we provided him with research on differing interpretations, juristic opinions and practices in Muslim countries - and went on TV to say that polygamy is not a right in Islam’. It is worth remembering that ‘the notion that all men in Muslim societies are misogynistic is as much a myth as the notion that women are only silent victims’. (36) While Ms. Anwar’s supporters managed to secure a successful outcome, the accusation of blasphemy is increasingly used by fundamentalist leaders to assert their political power. This is a trend that women’s rights and progressive advocates must monitor. More recently, in January 2006, a prominent Malaysian who was a practising Hindu (and whose relatives claimed he had never converted to Islam in the first place) was denied burial according to his belief: the state intervened and enforced a funeral according to Muslim rites. In March of the same year, an Afghan man accused of converting to Christianity was threatened with execution for blasphemy, although the magistrates dismissed the case on technical grounds. These two instances illustrate what can happen when values such as freedom of religion and expression are hijacked by fundamentalist ideologues.

Ongoing threats The examples envisaged above in their various contexts show some of the initiatives with which women in Muslim contexts are engaged to confront the rise of fundamentalisms and to secure their rights. Their strategies challenge the dual stereotype of ‘Muslims’ as barbarian terrorists, and of ‘Muslim women’ as passive and powerless. Yet, women’s struggles against the Muslim religious Right are made tougher because of a number of external factors - some of which public opinion in the West might be able to influence. One such factor is hard to challenge, but nevertheless needs to be further publicized. Muslim fundamentalism is sometimes constructed by scholars as ‘no more than a spontaneous indigenous response to profound social, political and economic crises’. (37) But far from being ‘spontaneous’ and ‘indigenous’, the global rise of fundamentalisms is actually the result of sustained organizing, from the community and neighbourhood level up to the international arena - from the streets to the state to the United Nations. Furthermore, fundamentalist leaders of various creeds engage in transnational collaboration, especially with regard to enacting a common agenda against reproductive rights. If nothing else, we all ought to be aware that Vatican, Mormon and Muslim fundamentalist leaders do strategize collectively, and regularly, to limit women’s rights. (38)

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Other trends offer opportunities for resistance outside the ‘Muslim world’: people in the West can express solidarity by lobbying the mainstream media. Progressive women’s voices are often silenced because ‘rigid, unforgiving and sexist voices are considered valid voices by Western media’. (39) I have noted elsewhere this tendency: ‘Conservative voices, it seems, are seen as the most authentic. Liberal ones, somehow, lack the sweet perfume of exoticism. Hence, dangerously rigid standpoints are offered as the “true” expression of all Muslims. Space for dissent becomes monopolized by fundamentalists, at the expense of secular, feminist, and pro-democracy advocates.’ (40) By denouncing Western media biases, our allies in the West could assist in both promoting the voices of progressive women, and in restricting fundamentalists’ discourses being spread further. To do so also requires to recognize fundamentalist politics even when it comes in disguise of ‘moderate’, toned-down arguments promoted by men who do not necessarily fit the Western stereotype of sanguine islamists. Another crucial area of intervention is to pay attention to the rise of fundamentalisms within the West (with the Christian Right’s assault on the UN for example). (41) And to also expose the linkages being woven among constituencies in the West and forces associated with fundamentalist projects elsewhere. Increased alliances between Western democracies, institutions and social actors and Muslim fundamentalists pose a risk to women’s and minority rights. Different factions within the Muslim religious Right target potential supporters in the legislative, political and economic arenas in the West. Lobbying to enact legal changes that are ultimately detrimental to women is often justified, in Western contexts, by reference to ‘respect for cultural diversity’ or ‘respect for freedom of thought’. When successful, such strategies can impact large segments of the Muslim diaspora / migrant communities settled in the West. One recent example is the attempt to introduce religiouslybased arbitration councils - or ‘Shari’a tribunals’ - in different Canadian states in 2004-2005. (42) Tentative diplomatic ‘dialogue’ - as currently envisioned by the ruling Labour government in the UK - makes the threat of political alliances between Western governments and the Muslim religious Right more tangible. A January 2006 leaked document reveals that the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office had decided to develop ‘working level contacts’ with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. (43) This is a political organization whose gender ideology is worrisome to say the least, and whose members at times advocate resorting to terrorist tactics. Such a step by the British authorities represents without a doubt a victory for what is diplomatically referred to as ‘political Islam’. The appeal of fundamentalist groups has not only been heard by the British government, but also by conservative activists in the US. Three decades ago, the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) started annual gatherings of right-wing activists. It is now the largest such event in the United States and boasts

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up to 3,500 participants every year. A few Muslim groups whose leaders allegedly hold extreme right beliefs are now exploring this venue by acting as CPAC co-sponsors. The Islamic Free Market Institute first appeared in 2005, and has been joined in 2006 by the Muslim Public Affairs Council. Last but not least, some segments of the left in Europe and the Americas are now also seeking to engage in collective endeavours with extremely conservative Muslim organizations, some of which pursue, discretely or overtly, a fundamentalist agenda. This has been especially noticeable in the organizing against the Iraq war in North America, the UK or France, where anti-imperialist stand leads to flirting with dangerous branches of the Muslim religious Right. For example, British-based Socialist Workers Party and the anti-racist/minority group Respect are organizing common public events with the Muslim Council of Britain who stand against women’s rights and sexual diversity. Similarly, Left spoke-person Tariq Ali celebrates the Iraqi ‘resistance’ as champions of anti-US hegemony - while ignoring the fact that some factions murder women who do not observe their injunction to wear the so-called islamic dress code (abaya). (44) In the Latin American context, the aim of countering US economic domination is paving the way for other dubious alliances. At a May 2006 summit held in Brasilia (where representatives of the Arab League and of twelve South American countries gathered), Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez held talks with the emir of Qatar who in 2005 hosted a gathering of conservative Muslim, Mormon and Vatican representatives to ‘uphold family values’ in the wake of the Beijing+10 review (Whitetaker, 2005). These developments suggest a worrying trend for advocates of gender equality and of sexual and reproductive rights, both those resisting the religious Right within Muslim countries and communities, and those struggling elsewhere. It is a worrying trend as well for secular voices from within Muslim contexts, which are increasingly dismissed and stifled as non-representative bystanders. And it is, finally, a worrying trend for Western democracies - as they appear to construct male religious conservatives and so-called ‘moderate’ islamists as more legitimate spoke-persons than a feminist, progressive opposition.

Dr. Anissa Hélie studied Women & Development (MA) as well as contemporary history (MA, PhD), and specialized in feminist history. She grew up in Algiers, Algeria, and has been involved with various women’s organizations and transnational networks including as Coordinator for the Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML) International Coordination Office (2000-2004). She is currently visiting associate professor in the Gender Studies department at Mount Holyoke College, MA, USA. Dr. Hélie is a frequent speaker on issues of sexuality, wars and conflicts, religious fundamentalisms and violence against women. She has also widely published on these topics.

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Notes (1)

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While there are different understandings of the term, the Women Living Under Muslim Laws network (WLUML) defines fundamentalisms as a global phenomenon that affects all major religions and involves the ‘use of religion (and, often, ethnicity and culture as well) to gain or maintain political power’. WLUML, Plan of Action - Dhaka 1997, 24 p., p.9 ; see also www. wluml.org See Paola Bachetta & Margaret Power, Right-Wing Women - from conservatives to extremists around the world, Routledge, NY / London, 2002. Urvashi Butalia, ‘Women and Communal Conflicts: New Challenges for the Women’s Movement in India’, in: Moser & Clark (eds.), Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence, Zed Books, London, 2001, p. 99-114. Tanika Sarkar, Women and the Hindu Right, (Co-edited, along with Urvashi Butalia) Kali for Women, Delhi / Zed Press , London, 1995. Ann Bower, ‘Soldier in the Army of God’, in: The Body Politic, Vol. 6, No. 2, February 1996, p. 25-36. Louisa Aït Hamou, ‘Women’s Struggles against Muslim fundamentalism in Algeria; Strategies or a Lesson For Survival?’, in: Imam, Morgan & Yuval-Davis (eds.), Warning Signs of Fundamentalisms,, WLUML, 2004, p. 117-124, (p. 117). One option that is least seen as legitimate is to identify as a secular person from a Muslim background. Nevertheless, some do reclaim this forgotten identity. See for example, ‘A Secular Muslim Manifesto: We are of Muslim culture; we oppose misogyny, homophobia, antiSemitism and the political use of Islam. We reassert a living secularism’, 2004, http://www. iheu.org/glossary#term252 . See also [in French] ‘France: Des musulmans français contre la censure au nom de l’islam’, March 10, 2006, http://www.redacnomade.com/article.php3?id_ article=581&id_auteur=4 A decade long field research undertaken by Women Living Under Muslim Laws makes this point by comparing women’s legal status as well as customary practices in over twenty Muslim countries / communities across Asia, Africa and the Middle East. WLUML, Knowing Our Rights - Women, family, laws and customs in the Muslim World, 2003, 360 p.. A recent WLUML publication documents the words and deeds of women’s rights advocates from the early days of Islam till the mid-Twentieth century: Farida Shaheed, with Aisha LeeShaheed, Great Ancestors - Women Asserting Rights in Muslim Contexts, 2 volume Kit (Training Manual: 133 p.; Narratives: 193 p.) Shirkat Gah/ WLUML, 2005. See also Book review and interview with Prof. Vivienne Wee (Hong Kong): Anissa Hélie, ‘Our Great Ancestors: Women Asserting Rights in Muslim Contexts’, in: WomenHRNet: Challenging Fundamentalisms - A Web Resource for Women’s Human Rights, AWID, March 2006, http://www.whrnet.org/fundamentalisms/docs/issue-ancestors-0603.html Louisa Aït Hamou, ‘Women’s Struggles against Muslim fundamentalism in Algeria; Strategies or a Lesson For Survival?’, in: Imam, Morgan & Yuval-Davis (eds.), Warning Signs of Fundamentalisms, WLUML, 2004, p. 117-124, (p. 121). Teams of female staff check on women coming to courts, and enforce the rule stipulating that women should not wear make up. Visitors are therefore asked to remove any trace of make up before entering the court - and are sometimes complimented afterwards: ‘Good: you look like a real lady now.’ (Longinotto & Mir-Hosseini, Divorce Iranian style, 1998, Women Make Movies).

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Khalida Messaoudi & Elisabeth Schemla, Unbowed - An Algerian woman confronts Islamic fundamentalism, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998. Ayesha Imam, ‘Fighting the Political (Ab)Use of Religion in Nigeria: BAOBAB for Women’s Human Rights, Allies and Others’, in: Warning Signs of Fundamentalisms, WLUML, Dec. 2004, 200 p., p. 133. The ‘honour’ crimes could indeed ‘fit’ into several of the above mentioned categories: ‘honour’ crimes as an expression of violence against women, as well as a sanction against exercising sexual rights (or freedom of movement, etc). All other examples (except the Malaysian one) can also be considered as instances of violence against women by either state or non state actors. Freedman, Lynn, ‘The Challenge of Fundamentalisms’, in: Reproductive Health Matters, No. 8, November 1996, p. 55-69. The UN High Commission for Refugees states that, in the last decades, ‘the proportion of war victims who are civilians leaped from five per cent to over ninety per cent of casualties’. Attacks on non-combatants have become a strategy of war and civilians are no longer a ‘collateral damage’. In this context, women are primary targets, and also form the majority of people displaced by conflicts. The Muslim religious Right’s role in bullying secular voices and Western leaders was exposed in an Egyptian blog - which shows that the same cartoons were published on 17th October 2005 in Cairo (Al Fager), in the midst of Ramadan, without provoking any reactions. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was instrumental in manipulating demonstrators as was the Organization of Islamic Countries, after its meeting in Mecca in December 2005. See Amir Taheri, ‘Culture clash - Bonfire of the pieties’, Feb 8 2006, http://www.iran-press-service.com/ ips/articles-2006/february-2006/cartoons_10206.shtml See also Hassan M. Fattah, ‘At Mecca Meeting, Cartoon Outrage Crystallized’, in: NYT, Feb 9 2006. The Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) used the ‘Danish cartoons’ controversy to try to insert ‘anti-blasphemy’ language in a draft resolution defining the role of the new Human Rights Council. The draft preamble includes a clause (PP7) demanded by 56 Islamic states that would impose demands on the media to respect religion, but that omits any mention of freedom of speech or freedom of the press. See Mark Turner, ‘Cartoons dispute hits creation of UN body’, in: Financial Times, London, Feb. 10, 2006; and ‘Muslims want anti-blasphemy clause in rights body’, Feb. 9, 2006, http://www.stuff.co.nz/stuff/0,2106,3567029a12,00.html Prominent Jordanian lawyer Asma Khader challenges myths that ‘honour’ killings are a religious practice, or in accordance with the Shari’a (the standard interpretation of Muslim jurisprudence). She points out that the ‘honour defence’ actually derives from European criminal codes prevalent 200 years ago. See ‘Report of the panel held in December 1999’, in: Crimes Against Women Are Crimes Against Humanity, Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, New York, 2000. Ayesha Imam, ‘The Muslim Religious Right (“Fundamentalism”) and Sexuality’, WLUML, Dossier No. 17, September 1997, p. 7-23 (p. 10). CIMEL/Interights, Roundtable on Strategies to Address ‘Crimes of Honour’ - Summary Report, WLUML Occasional Paper No. 12, November 2001, 33 p., p. 4. For example, Shaykh al-Tamimi’s statement in July 1999 ‘took the view that “honour” killings

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were not supported by Islamic law because of the warnings in the Qu’ran against acting on the basis of unproven doubt and suspicions’. CIMEL / Interights, Roundtable on Strategies to Address ‘Crimes of Honour’ - Summary Report, WLUML Occasional Paper No. 12, November 2001, 33 p., (p. 8). Queen Noor and Princess Rania pledged their support while Prince Ali and Prince Ghazi - respectively brother of Jordan’s King Abdullah II, and the King’s cousin - participated in a public march in Amman in 2000. BBC World News, September 8, 2003, quoted in ‘Jordan rejects laws on honour killings and Khuloe’, Shirkat Gah/ Women Living Under Muslim Laws, Newsheet, Vol XV, No. 3/4, December 2003, p. 25-26. UN General Assembly, Advancement of Women, A/C.3/59/L.25. www.safraproject.org http://www.aswatgroup.org/english/ Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Queer, Transgender, Intersex people. Urgent Action Fund for Women’s Human Rights / Jane Barry, Rising Up in Response - Women’s Rights Activism in Conflicts, 2005, 183 p.. Rassemblement Algérien des Femmes Démocrates / Algerian Gathering of Democratic Women. This combined focus was motivated by the fact that, in Algeria as elsewhere, armed conflict brutalizes civil society - with increased incidences of violence specifically directed at women, and children or teenagers tortured by relatives. The Réseau Wassila (Réseau de Reflexion et d’Action en Faveur des Femmes et Enfants Victimes de Violence / Network for Reflexion and Action on Behalf of Women and Children Victims of Violence) is a women’s group that focuses on denouncing domestic violence. See Livre Blanc - Violences Contre les Femmes et les Enfants, 2002, 97 p. (in French and Arabic). The collectif 20 ans Barakat (‘twenty years is enough’) was created in 2003 as a coalition of several women’s organisations and solidarity networks in both France and Algeria. Its main aim is to coordinate a campaign denouncing the impact of the Algerian Family Code enacted in 1984 (or Code of Personal Status Law) that regulates women’s status and issues such as inheritance, children custody, marriage, divorce etcetera. The Comité National contre l’Oubli et la Trahison (CNOT) includes associations such as Somoud, Djazaïrouna and the Tahar Djaout foundation - groups in which women are in leadership positions - as well as women’s organizations such as Tharwa and RAFD. For violence against women, see, for example Zazi Sadou, ‘Algeria: the Martyrdom of Girls raped by Islamic Armed groups’, in: Niamh Reilly (ed.), Without Reservation: the Beijing Tribunal on Accountability on Women’s Human rights, Center for Women’s Global Leadership, New Jersey, 1996, 190 p. p. 28-33. ‘Prix de la resistance des femmes contre l’intégrisme et contre l’oubli’. In this respect, the one innovation in the new Family Code is that women can choose their own tutor when they reach eighteen; as opposed to being assigned by law a male relative as tutor (preferably their father or brother if they are unmarried or divorced; or their husband for the duration of the marriage).

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(34) Literally, Ulama means ‘scholar’ in Arabic. The term has come to also refer to a body composed of Muslim scholars or religious leaders; or to member(s) of such a body. (35) The Sultans are the heads of religion in the different states in Malaysia. (36) See note 6, ‘Narratives’, p. xvii, Shaheed, 2005. (37) Gerrie ter Haar, ‘Religious Fundamentalism and Social Change - A Comparative Enquiry’, in: Gerrie ter Haar & James J. Busuttil (eds.), The Freedom to Do God’s Will - Religious Fundamentalism and Social Change,, Routledge, London / New York, 2003, p. 2 (in reference to An-Na’im standpoint). (38) Whitaker, Brian, ‘Fundamental union - When it comes to defining family values, conservative Christians and Muslims are united against liberal secularists’, in: The Guardian (UK), January 25, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,,1398055,00.html (39) Raheel Raza, ‘Muslim Women Raise Voices Worldwide’, in: Toronto Star, March 25, 2006. (40) Anissa Hélie, ‘The U.S. Occupation and Rising Religious Extremism: The Double Threat to Women in Iraq’, in: Different Takes, No. 35, Summer 2005, Hampshire College, Amhurst MA. (41) Jennifer S. Butler, Born Again: The Christian Right Globalized, Pluto Press, 2006, 224 p. (42) Behind Closed Doors - How Faith-based Arbitration Shuts Out Women’s Rights in Canada and Abroad, Montreal, Rights & Democracy, 8 p. See also the Canadian Council of Muslim Women’s website www.ccmw.com (43) Ewen MacAskill, ‘UK to build ties with banned Islamist group’, in: The Guardian (UK), February 17, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/egypt/story/0,,1711892,00.html See also Martin Bright, ‘Talking to terrorists’, in: New Stateman, January 2006, www.newstatesman. com/brotherhood (44) ‘Tariq Ali talks to Socialist Worker about empire and those who fight against it’, Socialist Worker, Issue No. 239, March 26 2005 - April 12 2005.

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ABOUT THE EDITORS

Drs. Ireen Dubel is Programme Manager Gender, Women and Development at Hivos, the Humanistic Institute for Co-operation with Developing Countries. In this capacity she is responsible for the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of Hivos Gender, Women and Development programme in support of women’s rights and gender equality in developing countries. She studied human geography and worked a number of years in Southern Africa. She is a member of the editorial team of the Dutch Journal for Humanistics and has co-edited two publications: Global civil society, world citizenship and education (2005) and Cosmetische humanisering? (a critical reflection on corporate social responsibility - 2005). She is co-author of the publication Gender and organizational change: Bridging the gap between policy and practice (1997).

Dr. Karen Vintges is a university lecturer of Political and Social Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy of the University of Amsterdam. She is a member of the editorial team of the Dutch Journal for Humanistics. She is co-editor of a book about feminism and Foucault (D.Taylor & K.Vintges (eds.), Feminism and the Final Foucault, Illinois University Press, 2004) and author of De terugkeer van het engagement (Boom, 2003) and of Philosophy as Passion. The Thinking of Simone de Beauvoir (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1996, originally in Dutch, 1992). She was (co) organisor of the conference ‘Women and Islam: New Perspectives’ with Amina Wadud, Ziba Mir-Hosseini and others, in Amsterdam 2005. Currently she is working on a project entitled: ‘Rewriting The Second Sex From a Global Perspective’.

About the editors

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Colophon

Women, Feminism & Fundamentalism Edited by Ireen Dubel and Karen Vintges ISBN 978 90 6665 872 1 NUR 745

Translation of articles was made possible by Hivos, the Dutch Humanist Institute for Co-operation with Developing Countries, in The Hague (http://www.hivos.nl) Translations Vertaalbureau LinguaFidelitas, Hilversum, the Netherlands Text editor drs. André Hielkema Cover design Maryam Afshar Lahoori (Tangerine - design communicatie advies, Rotterdam) Cover photo Amir Kholoosi Typesetting Merel van Dam, SWP Publishers Publisher Paul Roosenstein

For information on other SWP publications; SWP Publishing Company, PO box 257, 1000 AG Amsterdam, the Netherlands Tel. + 31 (0)20 3307200 e-mail: [email protected] internet: www.swpbook.com

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