Women and the Use of Military Force 9781685855611

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgments
1 Overview
Part 1 Theories, Concepts, and Attitudes
2 Feminist Perspectives on Women and the Use of Force
3 The Gender Gap in Popular Attitudes Toward the Use of Force
4 Women in Groups and Organizations: Implications for the Use of Force
5 Handgun Ownership Among U.S. Women and Its Consequences for Social Judgment
6 Women in Law Enforcement
Part 2 The Role of Women: The Evidence
7 Women in the Armed Forces
8 Women in Weapons Development: The Manhattan Project
9 Women and National Security Policy
10 Women and the Peace Movement
11 How Three Female National Leaders Have Used the Military
12 No Going Back: Women's Participation in the Nicaraguan Revolution and in Postrevolutionary Movements
13 Women, Resistance, and the Use of Force in South Africa
Part 3 Conclusion
14 The Impact of Women's Use of Military Force
References
About the Authors
Index
About the Book

Citation preview

Women and the Use of Military Force

Women and the Use of Military Force edited by

Ruth H. Howes Michael R. Stevenson

Lynne Rienner Publishers •

Boulder & London

Published in the United States of America in 1993 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1993 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Women and the use of military force / edited by Ruth H. Howes and Michael R. Stevenson p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-329-4 (alk. paper) 1. Women and the military. 2. Women and war. I. Howes, Ruth (Ruth Hege) II. Stevenson, Michael R. U21.75.W665 1993 355'.0082—dc20 92-46443 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

Acknowledgments

1

Overview

Michael R. Stevenson and Ruth H. Howes

Part 1 Theories, Concepts, and Attitudes 2

Feminist Perspectives on W o m e n and the Use of Force Berenice Carroll and Barbara Welling Hall

3

T h e Gender Gap in Popular Attitudes Toward the Use of Force Nancy W. Gallagher

4

W o m e n in Groups a n d Organizations: Implications for the Use of Force Jill M. Bystydzienski

5

H a n d g u n Ownership A m o n g U.S. W o m e n and Its Consequences for Social J u d g m e n t Nyla R. Branscombe and Susan Owen

6

W o m e n in Law Enforcement

Barbara Carson

Part 2 The Role of Women: The Evidence 7

W o m e n in the Armed Forces

Mady Wechsler Segal

8

Women in Weapons Development: T h e Manhattan Project Ruth H. Howes and Caroline L. Herzenberg

9

Women and National Security Policy Frances G. Bunnell and Meredith Reid Sarkees

vi

10

11

12

Contents

Women and the Peace Movement Patricia Washburn

135

How Three Female National Leaders Have Used the Military Jo A. Richardson and Ruth H. Howes

149

No Going Back: Women's Participation in the Nicaraguan Revolution and in Postrevolutionary Movements Barbara Seitz, Linda Lobao, and Ellen Treadway

167

13 Women, Resistance, and the Use of Force in South Africa Patricia T. Morris

185

Part 3 Conclusion 14

The Impact of Women's Use of Military Force Ruth H. Howes and Michael R. Stevenson

References About the Authors Index About the Book

207

219 239 243 247

A cknowledgments T h e editors wish to thank Dorothy Rudoni (Professor of Political Science, Emerita, Ball State University) for her role in initiating this project. T h e editors and the contributors are grateful for the s u p p o r t provided by Ball State University and the Midwest Consortium for International Security Studies (a program managed by the Midwest Center of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and f u n d e d by the J o h n D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation). The editors wish to give special thanks to Marian Rice of the Academy for her role in this project. The views, opinions, and findings contained in this book are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the supporting organizations or the authors' employers or affiliations.

Vll

chapter J_

Overview Michael R. Stevenson, Ruth H. Howes

N o o n e who watched television coverage of the Gulf War can fail to be aware of the i n c r e a s i n g role of w o m e n in t h e U.S. military. Although women are n o t formally p e r m i t t e d to be active in combat, they are contributing in almost every o t h e r capacity. S o m e w o m e n have b e e n p u n i s h e d f o r o p p o s i n g t h e war. For e x a m p l e , Lisa Swanholm, who j o i n e d the army reserves w h e n she was e i g h t e e n , came to question the morality of the war, r e f u s e d to participate, and was s e n t e n c e d to six m o n t h s in prison for military d e s e r t i o n (Sisco, 1992). S w a n h o l m ' s d e c i s i o n e x e m p l i f i e s a l o n g s t a n d i n g stereotype that w o m e n are i n h e r e n t l y m o r e p e a c e f u l (Tavris, 1991)—that they speak "in a d i f f e r e n t voice" that is m o r e c a r i n g a n d c o n n e c t e d to o t h e r p e o p l e a n d t h e e n v i r o n m e n t (Gilligan, 1982). If w o m e n a n d m e n are dramatically d i f f e r e n t in this respect, t h e n increased participation of w o m e n in the military s h o u l d lead to drastic changes in military policy a n d radical changes in the use of military force. This volume grew f r o m a series of workshops that were designed to b r i n g together a multidisciplinary g r o u p of scholars representing diverse points of view to discuss the i m p a c t that w o m e n have or could have on the use of military force in the p r o m o t i o n of national security. Although initially focused on political theory a n d the extent to which women were r e p r e s e n t e d in policymaking institutions, the project quickly e x p a n d e d to i n c l u d e psychological and sociological perspectives on sex d i f f e r e n c e s a n d social roles that provide a context for w o m e n ' s participation in the use of military force. In an a t t e m p t to predict the effects of increased participation of w o m e n , we d o c u m e n t what is known about women a n d the use of force a n d their involvement in m a k i n g a n d i m p l e m e n t i n g national security policy. T h e c o n t r i b u t o r s to this v o l u m e r e p r e s e n t a wide r a n g e of disciplines, i n c l u d i n g physics, psychology, sociology, p h i l o s o p h y , political science, a n d folklore. We write f r o m diverse points of view based o n such e v i d e n c e as e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h , interviews, a n d

1

2

Overview

p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e . W e d o n o t always a g r e e o n t h e answers to o u r q u e s t i o n s . In f a c t , at times we d i s a g r e e o n h o w to f r a m e t h e questions. However, we d o a g r e e that t h e i m p a c t of w o m e n on t h e use of military f o r c e can n o l o n g e r b e i g n o r e d . T h e b o o k is d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e p a r t s . T h e first p r o v i d e s a c o n t e x t , e x a m i n i n g f e m i n i s t perspectives, t h e g e n d e r g a p in p u b l i c o p i n i o n polls, w o m e n ' s i m p a c t in o r g a n i z a t i o n s , a n d t h e i m p a c t of stereotypical t h i n k i n g o n p e r c e p t i o n s of w o m e n ' s use of f o r c e b o t h in t h e i r h o m e s a n d as p a r t of t h e i r e m p l o y m e n t . P a r t 2 deals with d a t a o n the role w o m e n currently play in t h e use of f o r c e at a variety of levels, b o t h as m e m b e r s of t h e military a n d as policymakers; a n d Part 3 offers a critical conclusion to t h e twelve central chapters.

Part 1 Scholarly views of t h e i n f l u e n c e of w o m e n are strongly d e p e n d e n t o n t h e o r e t i c a l c o n t e x t . In C h a p t e r 2, C a r r o l l a n d Hall o u t l i n e how f e m i n i s t perspectives treat t h e q u e s t i o n of w o m e n a n d t h e use of f o r c e a n d s h o w t h a t t h e r e is n o t o n e f e m i n i s t o r w o m e n ' s p e r s p e c t i v e . T h e y d e s c r i b e a variety of f e m i n i s t p e r s p e c t i v e s , i n c l u d i n g liberal f e m i n i s m o u t of w h i c h t h e original q u e s t i o n of w o m e n ' s i m p a c t o n t h e use of military f o r c e grew. S o m e f e m i n i s t p e r s p e c t i v e s s e e t h e u s e of f o r c e as l e g i t i m a t e , at least in s o m e contexts; o t h e r s d o not. For e x a m p l e , radical f e m i n i s m e q u a t e s t h e use of military f o r c e with patriarchy, implying n o legitimate role f o r a r m e d struggle. T h e s t r a n d s of f e m i n i s m t h a t Carroll a n d Hall e x p l o r e a s s u m e that g e n d e r is relevant, if n o t central, to discussions of military force. O t h e r t h e o r e t i c a l f r a m e w o r k s , o u t s i d e of f e m i n i s t t h e o r y , d o not. For e x a m p l e , n e o r e a l i s m 1 is a perspective in i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations (Waltz, 1979) w h e r e issues of g e n d e r (as well as t h o s e of social structure, culture, a n d so o n ) are irrelevant to the use of f o r c e at the i n t e r n a t i o n a l level. Waltz (1979) p r o p o s e s a systemic theory of i n t e r n a t i o n a l politics, because h e believes t h a t t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l system is t h e most i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r in e x p l a i n i n g regularities over time. O n e c o u l d a t t e m p t to stretch Waltz's f o r m u l a t i o n a n d assert that issues of g e n d e r m a t t e r in that they affect t h e ability of a state to g e n e r a t e capabilities (e.g., t h e r o l e of w o m e n in t h e work f o r c e ) . However, that would n o t b e in k e e p i n g with t h e spirit of this theory, which strives to be c o m p l e t e l y c o n c e r n e d with t h e systemic level. Power

Overview

3

( d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s ) is a system-level a t t r i b u t e . G e n d e r is a unit-level a t t r i b u t e a n d is i r r e l e v a n t f o r a n e o r e a l i s t . G e n d e r is r e l e v a n t a t o t h e r levels of analysis, a n d this v o l u m e is a n a t t e m p t to discuss c o n t e x t s in w h i c h t h e c o n c e p t of g e n d e r h a s value. F o r e x a m p l e , C h a p t e r 3 asks c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g sex d i f f e r e n c e s in a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d t h e u s e of military f o r c e . Survey d a t a f r o m t h e political s c i e n c e l i t e r a t u r e i n d i c a t e n o g e n d e r d i f f e r e n c e in g e n e r a l a p p r o a c h t o f o r e i g n policy b u t a w i d e n i n g g e n d e r g a p in willingness to use military f o r c e t o i m p l e m e n t f o r e i g n policy. T h e e v i d e n c e f o r this g a p is c o m p e l l i n g , e v e n w h e n r a c e , p a r t y affiliation, or s o c i o e c o n o m i c s t a t u s is c o n t r o l l e d . O n t h e basis of e x i s t i n g r e s e a r c h , it is clear t h a t w o m e n a r e m o r e r e l u c t a n t t h a n m e n to u s e f o r c e as a n i n s t r u m e n t of f o r e i g n p o l i c y a n d t h a t t h i s g a p is b e g i n n i n g to i n f l u e n c e views o n s u c h policy. A l t h o u g h t h e r e is a m p l e e v i d e n c e t h a t a g e n d e r g a p exists, t h e causes a r e by n o m e a n s c l e a r . T h e o r i e s of its o r i g i n i n c l u d e t h e p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t w o m e n a r e m o r e c o m p a s s i o n a t e , t h e e f f e c t of t h e w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t , t h e e f f e c t s of s o c i a l i z a t i o n o n w o m e n ' s a t t i t u d e s , a n d t h e fact t h a t w o m e n ' s a t t i t u d e s a r e n o t well d e s c r i b e d on t h e survey i n s t r u m e n t s . G a l l a g h e r i m p l i e s t h a t t h e a p p a r e n t sex d i f f e r e n c e s may b e a t t r i b u t a b l e to a f e m i n i s t - n o n f e m i n i s t r a t h e r t h a n a male-female dichotomy. C a r o l Tavris's ( 1 9 9 1 ) analysis p r o v i d e s f u r t h e r s u p p o r t f o r this position. O n e of the constructive impulses behind cultural feminism is the dream of a world that will be egalitarian, peaceful, and ecologically balanced. This dream, and visions of how to achieve it, rest on a belief in the most basic male-female dichotomy: that men are the warlike, dominating, planet-destroying sex, and women are the peacemaking, nonaggressive, planet-saving sex. . . . The trouble is that . . . there is no evidence that women are naturally more pacifistic, empathic, or earth-loving than men. They are just as likely to depersonalize enemies into vermin and beasts, to be carried away with patriotic fervor, and to justify brutality (pp. 97-98). T h e y also c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s ( C h a p t e r 8) a n d l e a d t h e i r c o u n t r i e s i n t o a r m e d c o n f l i c t ( C h a p t e r 11). Tavris (1991), a m o n g o t h e r s (e.g., H u n t e r , 1991), a r g u e s convincingly that stereotyped expectations about characteristic d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n m e n a n d w o m e n h a v e n o basis in i n d i v i d u a l biology. In c o n t r a s t , C h a p t e r 4 p r o v i d e s a s t r u c t u r a l p e r s p e c t i v e o n t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t a n i n f l u x of w o m e n i n t o t h e U.S. m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t m i g h t l e a d to p o l i t i c a l c h a n g e s . T h e s t r u c t u r a l

4

Overview

a p p r o a c h implies that w o m e n ' s attitudes a b o u t the use of force may differ f r o m those of m e n because of their subordinate, less-powerful position in society, n o t because they are innately less aggressive or warlike. In c o n s i d e r i n g this viewpoint, Bystydzienski e x a m i n e s t h e i n f l u e n c e of g e n d e r on small g r o u p a n d organizational behavior. Although small g e n d e r differences are a p p a r e n t , women are typically f o u n d in low-level positions w h e r e they have little o p p o r t u n i t y to direct o t h e r s a n d to use f o r c e . T h e few w h o achieve high-level positions are likely to b e selected f o r t h e i r c o u n t e r s t e r e o t y p i c a l characteristics. Using the experiences of women in Norway a n d J a p a n as examples, Bystydzienski discusses how w o m e n have c h a n g e d politics a n d implies that c o m m i t m e n t to a particular point of view may be m o r e i m p o r t a n t than g e n d e r in successfully c o n f r o n t i n g the use of force. She argues that women as a g r o u p can make a significant d i f f e r e n c e in political agendas a n d governmental policies when they r e p r e s e n t at least 15 p e r c e n t of the total, have the s u p p o r t of well-organized w o m e n ' s groups that d e f i n e p e r t i n e n t issues, a n d bring those issues into the public realm. U n d e r these conditions, female politicians are likely to s u p p o r t policies that are peaceful and o r i e n t e d toward social h u m a n needs a n d that eschew the use of force. In the past, w e a p o n r y of all sorts a n d g u n s in particular were primarily a male d o m a i n , but in the last five years, U.S. women have been p u r c h a s i n g g u n s in u n p r e c e d e n t e d n u m b e r s . T h e m a j o r g u n m a n u f a c t u r e r s have b e g u n targeting advertising toward w o m e n — advertising in which a h a n d g u n is treated as an elegant accessory or an essential tool in the service of m o t h e r h o o d a n d the protection of c h i l d r e n ! C h a p t e r 5 e x a m i n e s t h e reasons A m e r i c a n w o m e n are increasingly p u r c h a s i n g g u n s f o r use in d e f e n s e of themselves a n d their homes. A l t h o u g h these data do not relate directly to military force, attitudes toward the use of h a n d g u n s clearly relate to women's attitudes toward the use of the military in foreign policy. Branscombe a n d Owen ( C h a p t e r 5) show that women who own a gun are seen as m o r e masculine than w o m e n who do not a n d that w o m e n w h o d o use f o r c e successfully are m o r e likely to be p e n a l i z e d by observers t h a n are w o m e n who d o not d o so. It is interesting to consider how w o m e n ' s increasing involvement in the military, as was the case in Desert Storm, may c h a n g e some of these expectations. It is also i m p o r t a n t to consider p e r c e p t i o n s of women who use force as a part of their jobs. In C h a p t e r 6, Carson defines force as the intent to cause pain or injury a n d argues that use of force is seen

Overview

5

as legitimate in some contexts, as in policing. Indeed, women had b e e n kept out of law e n f o r c e m e n t because of the p e r c e p t i o n that they could not use force; their e n t r a n c e into policing has frequently c h a n g e d the way the organizations function (much as Bystydzienski implies in Chapter 4). However, women account for less than 10 p e r c e n t of law e n f o r c e m e n t officers in t h e U n i t e d States. In comparison to men, they are less likely to use physical force and less likely to be cited f o r i n a p p r o p r i a t e behavior; a l t h o u g h t h e i r strategies are different, they are equally effective. It is difficult to d e t e r m i n e the e x t e n t to which the r e c e n t changes in policing organizations can be attributed to the influx of women.

Part 2 T h e second section of the book describes women's use of military force by d o c u m e n t i n g their role in the u n i f o r m e d military, in the d e v e l o p m e n t of nuclear weapons, in the national security policy establishment, and in the peace movement. We e x a m i n e the role r e c e n t female national leaders have played in the use of military force, as well as the role women have played in the Latin American guerrilla movements and the South African anuapartheid movement. T o introduce Part 2, Segal presents a summary of w o m e n ' s past a n d p r e s e n t participation in the U.S. military, including the roles they played in the Gulf conflict. In contrast to other authors, Segal does not expect that increased participation will change the way the military functions. She implies that the women and men who pursue military service are of like mind; this position is supported by a study c o m p a r i n g female a n d male West Point cadets (Adams, 1984). C h a p t e r 7 also examines some c u r r e n t questions a n d some longterm issues raised by events in G r e n a d a , Panama, a n d the Gulf. What will happen to women as military budgets shrink? Given that they were the last hired, will they be the first to be relieved of their duties? Do they p e r f o r m their duties differently, as has been f o u n d of women in law e n f o r c e m e n t (Chapter 6)? In C h a p t e r 8, Howes a n d H e r z e n b e r g d o c u m e n t w o m e n ' s i m p a c t on w e a p o n s d e v e l o p m e n t by f o c u s i n g o n w o m e n ' s participation in the Manhattan Project (the effort that led to what was certainly the world's single most serious a n d devastating use of military force). Traditional accounts of the Manhattan Project imply that the development of nuclear weapons was conducted entirely by males and that women are inherently unable to deal with nuclear

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Overview

devices. History contradicts this perception. T h e roles of several women pursuing technical work are described in detail. Many joined to support the war effort, were recommended to the project by a faculty adviser, or followed a husband. It is evident f r o m interviews with surviving participants (both male and female) and accounts left by those who have died that the women involved in the project made significant contributions to the development of atomic weaponry and were not unlike the men in their attitudes concerning the project. In contrast, empirical data on attitudes toward the threat of nuclear war show that women are more concerned about nuclear threat (Hamilton, Knox, Keilin, and Chavez, 1987). In Chapter 9, Burwell and Reid Sarkees examine the role of women in formulating U.S. policy toward the use of military force. Initially the discussion centers on the process of foreign policy decisionmaking within the U.S. government by the Department of State and the Department of Defense. Data are presented on the numbers of women working in these departments and the positions they hold. Attitudes of women engaged in making defense policy are examined and f o u n d not to differ significantly from those of their male colleagues. Clearly there are very few women engaged in formulating national security policy in the United States. The reasons for the absence of women at the highest levels of policymaking are discussed both in terms of traditional barriers to f e m a l e advancement, such as the glass ceiling, and in terms of the difference between the use of force and other foreign policy decisions. In contrast to the military establishment, women have traditionally Figured prominently in peace movements. These movements have influenced government policy on a n u m b e r of occasions—for example, during the negotiation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in the early 1960s and the Nuclear Freeze Movement of the 1980s. Despite the p r o m i n e n c e of female leaders in these movements, credit for the success of the movements has often gone to male leaders. Chapter 10 documents the leadership of women in the peace m o v e m e n t a n d their activity in the network of nongovernmental organizations that influence national security policy in the United States and elsewhere. Although their numbers are limited, outside the United States several women, by virtue of their executive offices, have held the position of commander-in-chief of the armed forces of a nation. Chapter 11 documents the abilities and behavior of three of these women. Golda Meir served as prime minister of Israel during the

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1973 Arab-Israeli war. T h e military decisions of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India during the war between West Pakistan and East Pakistan helped create the nation of Bangladesh. In Britain, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher led her nation into war with Argentina during the Falklands crisis. T h e authors conclude that t h e r e are virtually n o g e n d e r - r e l a t e d differences in military decisionmaking by chief executives. Chapters 12 and 13 consider women and the use of force in Latin America and South Africa. Women in Latin America have fought in the revolutionary armies that overthrew the government of Nicaragua and engaged in armed conflict in El Salvador. Historically the roles of women in Latin American societies have been defined by cultures that cultivate machismo and idealize women as wives and mothers. Recent social changes have challenged this view. The roles of women in the revolutionary forces are motivated by this historical context and by the continuing struggle between a landed elite and the masses, as well as the forces of industrialization a n d urbanization. The strategies of the revolutionary movements in Latin America have made use of women's organizations along with the traditional female interest in social reform. Chapter 12 describes women's roles in revolutionary struggles and discusses what happens to women after they have used force. In contrast, women have traditionally played a significant role in sociopolitical life t h r o u g h o u t Africa. In the political realm, they have fought alongside men against colonialism and, in the case of South Africa, many have f o u g h t a p a r t h e i d , repression, and oppression. Although their use of force has not been extensive, women in South Africa have occasionally resorted to force as an avenue of political protest. Chapter 13 traces the emergence of the use of force in the resistance movement in South Africa and the role women have played there. Morris suggests that violent and nonviolent protest are viewed differently, in that nonviolent protest is legitimate whereas violent protest is not, particularly for women. (It is interesting to consider the parallel between women's support of violent protest in South Africa and women's use of handguns to protect their homes, as described by Branscombe and Owen in Chapter 5. In both cases, women who step out of the stereotypical role get punished.) Finally, in Chapter 14, we review what we have learned from this multidisciplinary and multiparadigmatic team of scholars. We find that in many ways there is a lack of consensus on whether the use of military force is legitimate and on the extent to which women's participation in the use of force has ethical ramifications. We agree

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Overview

that women are capable (probably just as capable) of using force when given the power and opportunity to do so, in spite of their somewhat less enthusiastic support for forceful solutions to threats to national security. Most important, however, we argue that an influx of women into the military establishment will have an impact only to the extent to which the women are in consensus on a particular point of view. In other words, if change in the system is deemed appropriate and advantageous, an individual's attitudes and political views may be more important than her or his gender.

Note 1. This analysis was provided by Stacy Bergstrom.

part

1

Theories, Concepts, and Attitudes

chapter

Feminist Perpsectives on Women and the Use of Force

2

Berenice Carroll, Barbara Welling Hall

All books o n w o m e n , wrote S u z a n n e LaFollette, imply by t h e i r existence that women may be r e g a r d e d as a class in society; that they have in c o m m o n certain characteristics, conditions, or disabilities t h a t , p r e d o m i n a t i n g over t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l v a r i a t i o n s , w a r r a n t g r o u p i n g t h e m on the basis of sex (LaFollette [1926], in Rossi, 1973, p. 542). LaFollette's observation serves as a useful starting point to begin explorations on w o m e n a n d the use of force. T h e very title of this b o o k — W o m e n and the Use of Military Force—suggests that t h e r e is s o m e t h i n g distinct a b o u t w o m e n as a g r o u p that should i n f o r m o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of their collective relationship to the use of force. But the title reveals little else, because w o m e n still r e p r e s e n t a g r e a t u n k n o w n (even to ourselves). T h a t is, a r e a d e r in t h e socially constructed U n i t e d States of the 1990s e n c o u n t e r i n g a b o o k titled Men and the Use of Military Force w o u l d "know" t h a t t h a t b o o k e x a m i n e d how a n d why m e n use v i o l e n c e s u c c e s s f u l l y o r unsuccessfully to achieve personal, g r o u p , or national goals. T h e same r e a d e r e n c o u n t e r i n g this book c a n n o t know if the b o o k is a d e f e n s e of w o m e n using military force or an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r why w o m e n may not, cannot, or choose not to use it. T h e associations between g e n d e r a n d military force are prevalent, a n d yet full of confusion. This uncertainty arises in part f r o m the diversity of w o m e n ' s lives a n d of feminist perspectives. It is increasingly c o m m o n to dispute LaFollette's formulation, that "women may be r e g a r d e d as a class in society," a n d to e m p h a s i z e i n s t e a d d i f f e r e n c e s by race, class, ethnicity, ability, sexual orientation, a n d sociohistorical context. Moreover, the c o n c e p t of "feminism" has always b e e n elusive because of its u n b o u n d e d scope. As a mass social m o v e m e n t with a long history a n d a c o m p l e x political character, feminism t h r o u g h the centuries has e n g e n d e r e d a host of responses c o m p o u n d i n g the problems of definition. As Sandra H a r d i n g (1991) points out:

11

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Theories, Concepts &

Attitudes

In some subcultures in the West and more extensively in the Second and Third Worlds, the term "feminist" is an epithet used against women who defend women's interests publicly or their own interests in more intimate settings. Sometimes it is used to place distance between the speaker and bourgeois, racist, Eurocentric, and heterosexist tendencies in feminism. And in the United States and elsewhere, one frequendy finds women or men who insist that they are not feminists but who vigorously advocate agendas that are indistinguishable from those that have been advanced as specifically feminist. . . . Among feminists who claim the label, groups with varied and conflicting agendas compete to define what should be counted as feminism (p. 297). Paradoxically, we also e n c o u n t e r today the p h e n o m e n o n described by Susan Faludi in Backlash (1991, p p . 313-314, 319-321, 341) of w o m e n or m e n w h o insist that they are feminists while vigorously attacking feminism a n d advocating positions indistinguishable f r o m those of declared antifeminists. In this c h a p t e r we are d e a l i n g with feminist ideas, not all w o m e n ' s ideas o n t h e issues. T h o u g h feminist perspectives would s e e m to b e necessarily g r o u n d e d in " w o m e n ' s e x p e r i e n c e , " t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n " w o m e n ' s p e r s p e c t i v e s " or " f e m a l e e x p e r i e n c e " a n d "feminist perspectives" are not simple ( H a r d i n g , 1991, pp. 119-134, 2 9 8 - 2 9 9 ) . As Carroll argues (1987), t h e r e is n o i n h e r e n t b o n d b e t w e e n " w o m e n " a n d "peace"; t h e r e f o r e , issues a b o u t g e n d e r a n d the use of force are based on ideology, theory, a n d political action, n o t on biologically d e t e r m i n e d or naturally i m m u t a b l e tendencies. O n e way of d e a l i n g with t h e s e c o m p l e x i t i e s has b e e n to categorize varieties of f e m i n i s m u n d e r ideological labels a n d to apply these labels to individual writers or g r o u p s — s o m e t i m e s in ways that create opposition between them. This is not always salutary or i l l u m i n a t i n g , b u t it d o e s convey a sense of the diversity of feminism while o f f e r i n g orderly "frameworks" to manage some of its c o m p l e x i t i e s (see, f o r e x a m p l e , J a g g a r a n d R o t h e n b e r g , 1984; Donovan, 1986; T o n g , 1989). T h e c o n v e n t i o n a l c a t e g o r i e s of f e m i n i s m usually i n c l u d e at least t h r e e m a i n b r a n c h e s of t h e f e m i n i s t m o v e m e n t : "mains t r e a m " or liberal f e m i n i s m , socialist a n d Marxist f e m i n i s m , a n d radical f e m i n i s m . T o d a y we r e c o g n i z e many o t h e r s , includi n g A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n o r b l a c k f e m i n i s m , T h i r d W o r l d or " w o m e n of c o l o r " f e m i n i s m , w o m a n i s m , Jewish f e m i n i s m , ecof e m i n i s m , a n a r c h o f e m i n i s m , cultural f e m i n i s m , spiritualist feminism, lesbian f e m i n i s m , pacifist f e m i n i s m , p o s t m o d e r n feminism, a n d conservative f e m i n i s m . S o m e of these terms are disputed a n d

Feminist Perspectives 13 c o n t i n u e to be used either by choice or in the absence of a generally a g r e e d - u p o n substitute (see, e.g., the discussion of "third world" in Mohanty, Torres a n d Russo, 1991, pp. ix-x, 5 - 7 ) . T h e c o m p l e x i t i e s of a n d d i s p u t e s a b o u t t h e p r i n c i p l e s of feminism are c o m p o u n d e d by disputes a b o u t the n a t u r e a n d utility of theory. As Patricia Hill Collins n o t e s , "most t h e o r i e s a r e characterized by internal instability, are contested, a n d are divided by c o m p e t i n g e m p h a s e s a n d interests" (1990, p. xiv). Feminist t h e o r y , now a m a j o r a c a d e m i c field, is c e r t a i n l y all of this, sometimes e m b r a c e d with enthusiasm a n d s o m e t i m e s viewed with suspicion by feminists. T h e d e m a n d f o r theory may reflect an u n d e r l y i n g assumption that w o m e n ' s lives a n d e x p e r i e n c e a r e n o t worthy of study in themselves (Carroll, 1976, pp. x - x i ) or a diversion of energy f r o m the " m o r e pressing a n d interesting things to do," an intimidation a n d devaluing, a cooptation "into speaking a language . . . alien to a n d o p p o s e d to o u r needs a n d orientation" (Christian, 1988, p. 68). T h e c h a r g e has b e e n m a d e t h a t f e m i n i s t t h e o r y "addresses an a u d i e n c e of prestigious male a c a d e m i c s a n d a t t e m p t s to win its respect. . . . Mainly, feminist theorists e x c o r i a t e t h e i r deviating sisters. . . . theory is a form of policing" (Baym, 1984, p. 45, q u o t e d in Kramarae a n d Treichler, 1985, p. 448). T h e abstract, jargonistic l a n g u a g e of theory "blocks c o m m u n i c a t i o n , makes t h e g e n e r a l l i s t e n e r / r e a d e r feel bewildered a n d s t u p i d " (Anzaldua, 1990, p. xxiii). Yet theory is at the same time a strongly felt n e e d in feminist practice (in a n d out of the academy) a n d an inescapable activity of the h u m a n mind. We have long felt the n e e d for theory "as a guide to work in a field whose subject is full of p a r a d o x e s a n d does not c o n f o r m to the p a t t e r n s of [male] social e x p e r i e n c e with which historians [ a n d o t h e r scholars] have mainly c o n c e r n e d themselves in the past" (Carroll, 1976, p. xii). Marilyn Frye argues that theory can provide us with a comprehensive vision of w o m e n ' s condition: Consider a birdcage. If you look closely at just one wire in the cage, you cannot see the other wires. If your conception of what is before you is determined by this myopic focus, you could look at that o n e wire, up and down the length of it, and be unable to see why a bird would not just fly around the wire any time it wanted to go somewhere (1983, pp. 4-5; also quoted in Kramarae and Treichler, 1985, p. 448).

It is theory, Frye suggests, that gives us a picture of "the whole cage." Moreover, as Patricia Hill Collins e m p h a s i z e s , " T h e o r y a n d intellectual creativity are not the province of a select few but instead

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e m a n a t e f r o m a range of people" (1990, p. xiii). Barbara Christian u n d e r s c o r e s t h e p r e v a l e n c e of t h e o r i z i n g in everyday life: "For p e o p l e of color have always t h e o r i z e d — b u t in f o r m s quite d i f f e r e n t f r o m the Western f o r m of abstract logic. . . . And w o m e n , at least the w o m e n I grew u p a r o u n d , continuously s p e c u l a t e d a b o u t the n a t u r e of life t h r o u g h pithy l a n g u a g e t h a t u n m a s k e d the power relations of their world" (1988, p. 68). Drawing on both theory a n d everyday experience—as they i n d e e d mesh with each other—Collins a n d others argue convincingly f o r the d e v e l o p m e n t a n d recognition of self-defined theoretical standpoints. "An articulated, self-defined, collective s t a n d p o i n t is key to Black w o m e n ' s survival" (Collins, 1990, p. 26). T h e authors of the DAWN d o c u m e n t , p r e p a r e d for the Nairobi World C o n f e r e n c e f o r W o m e n , have a r g u e d a l o n g similar lines: There is and must be a diversity of feminisms, responsive to the different needs and concerns of different women, and defined by them for themselves. . . . This heterogeneity gives feminism its dynamism and makes it the most potentially powerful challenge to the status quo. . . . Few contemporary social movements have the mass potential, the freshness of vision, the courage to experiment with new methods for action, and the respect for diversity and challenge of the women's movement. It is time for us to assert this with clarity, rigor, and passion (Sen and Grown, 1987, pp. 18-19, 22).

Gloria Anzaldua, too, tells us t h a t theory " p r o d u c e s effects that c h a n g e p e o p l e a n d the way they perceive the world. . . . In o u r mestizaje theories we create new categories for those of us left out or p u s h e d o u t of t h e existing ones. . . . If we have b e e n gagged a n d disempowered by theories, we can also be loosened and e m p o w e r e d by theories" (1990, pp. xxv-xxvi). T h u s , f o r many feminist scholars today, c o m p r e h e n d i n g "the w h o l e cage" is a c k n o w l e d g e d to e n c o m p a s s "the i n t e r l o c k i n g oppressions based o n sex, g e n d e r , race, class, sexual p r e f e r e n c e , national origin, a n d ethnicity" (Kramarae a n d Treichler, 1985, p. 448). Nevertheless, in many widely used works on feminist theory, the concerns a n d intellectual contributions of African American and Latina w o m e n a n d o t h e r w o m e n of color have b e e n neglected or silenced, p r o d u c i n g t h e o r e t i c a l d i s t o r t i o n s based on t h e false assumption of "a g e n e r i c w o m a n w h o is white a n d m i d d l e class" (Collins, 1990, p. 8). This distortion is n o t easily overcome (see, e.g., the discussion by Alarcon in Anzaldua, 1990). Many feminist theorists in recent years have a r g u e d for critique of the gender-based, class-based, race-

Feminist Perspectives

15

based, a n d historical s t a n d p o i n t of p r e d o m i n a n t theoretical paradigms that often parade as "universal," "neutral," "objective," or "scientific" (most recently, e.g., Collins, 1990; Goetz, 1991; Harding, 1991). These paradigms underlie a wide spectrum of feminist writings ranging from conservative to radical in political ideology, yet s h a p e d by similar distortions emerging f r o m the writers' common standpoint of race, class, culture, and historical context. Though the message is beginning to be heard, the problem remains pervasive. In this context theory can offer g r o u n d i n g for a self-critical recognition of the standpoints represented in any given study. Chapters 12 and 13 in this book explore some aspects of the e x p e r i e n c e and agency of women engaged in revolution or resistance in Latin America and South Africa, but much work remains to be done to make books such as this one inclusive of the experience of women of color in this country and in other parts of the world. In the field of feminist theory today, radical and socialist feminism, black and Third World feminism, lesbian feminism, ecofeminism, and others are strong voices contending for place and hearing. Indeed, the many important works by writers reflecting these perspectives are arguably the most incisive and provocative feminist analyses of issues concerning women, war, peace, and "security." (See, for example, Robinson and Hayden, 1970; Cook and Kirk, 1983; Hooks, 1984; French, 1985; Brock-Utne, 1985; Bunch, 1987; Russell, ed„ 1989; Harris and King, eds., 1989; Eisler, 1987; Sen and Grown, 1987; Isaksson, 1988; Morgan, 1989; Diamond and Orenstein, eds., 1990; Enloe, 1983, 1990; Accad, 1990; Davis, 1990; Mohanty, Torres, and Russo, eds., 1991.) Some of these works analyze the issues through the lens of race, others through the lens of class, others through the lens of sexual politics. Some express d o u b t about taking a fully pacifist or nonviolent stance, arguing that armed struggle in national liberation movements may be necessary and taking pride in w o m e n ' s participation as leaders or members of armed revolutionary groups. Some also address violence against women and the torture and enslavement of women in the international sex trade, linking issues of sexuality, violence, and war. But all are strongly critical of the military establishments and the monstrous weaponry of the United States and other Western nuclear powers, the drain of military expenditures and armed conflicts on the world's resources, and the damage done to the earth. Some radical feminists have argued that the subjugation of

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Theories, Concepts (sf Attitudes

w o m e n u n d e r patriarchy is the oldest a n d most pervasive f o r m of oppression a n d the m o d e l f o r all o t h e r systems of social hierarchy, o p p r e s s i o n , a n d e x p l o i t a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g class society, t h e state, capitalism, racism, totalitarianism, a n d all f o r m s of militarism (e.g., R e d s t o c k i n g s M a n i f e s t o , in M o r g a n , 1970, p. 534). F r o m this s t a n d p o i n t , war a n d all systematic v i o l e n c e ( i n c l u d i n g r a p e , d o m e s t i c violence, a n d o t h e r f o r m s of violence usually seen as "private") a r e i n h e r e n t in p a t r i a r c h y as a social system. T h e implication is that war c a n n o t b e e l i m i n a t e d w i t h o u t e l i m i n a t i n g patriarchy, a n d that t h e r e can be n o t r u e or lasting "peace" o r "security" u n t i l t h e u n d e r l y i n g p a t r i a r c h a l social s t r u c t u r e s a n d g e n d e r relations are transformed. But in the public a r e n a s of politics a n d policy in the U n i t e d States, the prevailing f o r m s of feminism in the "mainstream" are n o t t h o s e a d v o c a t i n g extensive societal t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , b u t r a t h e r various kinds of conservative a n d liberal feminism. This is evident in public debates o n issues relating to w o m e n a n d the use of military force, such as w o m e n in military service, as well as in scholarship like this volume. S o m e f u r t h e r c o m m e n t s on the b a c k g r o u n d a n d premises of these two b r a n c h e s of feminism may t h e r e f o r e prove useful. T h e t e r m "conservative f e m i n i s m " m i g h t s e e m to be a n oxymoron that would be rejected both by conservatives like Phyllis Schlafly whose t r a d e m a r k is to attack a n d d e r i d e f e m i n i s m (e.g., Schlafly, 1991), a n d by feminists who find themselves attacked a n d d e r i d e d by conservatives or whose political s t a n c e is strongly o p p o s e d to conservatism. In Feminist Perspectives on Peace and Peace Education, Birgit B r o c k - U t n e suggests t h a t t h e c o r e of t h e conservative p o s i t i o n on w o m e n ' s o p p r e s s i o n rests o n biological determinism, a n d she rejects the claim that the conservative position can be "feminist" on t h e g r o u n d that it fails to recognize the n e e d a n d t h e possibilities f o r f a r - r a n g i n g e d u c a t i o n a l , c u l t u r a l , a n d political changes in society (1989, pp. 16-18). S a n d r a H a r d i n g (1991) implies t h a t a b r o a d d e f i n i t i o n of feminism is most fair. Some would argue that n a m i n g the world is a basic political right a n d that we o u g h t to accept the self-definition of all those who n a m e themselves "feminist." T h e r e is also the p r o b l e m of assigning t h e label to those w h o d o n o t claim it, or even consciously disclaim it, on the g r o u n d t h a t t h e i r position is in a c c o r d with s o m e set of abstractly c o n c e i v e d criteria f o r what deserves to be called "feminist." This point is currently disputed by historians studying feminism, who o f t e n use the term f o r w o m e n or ideas p r e c e d i n g its actual a p p e a r a n c e in E u r o p e a n languages in the

Feminist Perspectives

17

nineteenth century (Smith, 1982, pp. 4-9; Offen, 1988, 1989; DuBois, 1989). While problematic, such a practice may be valid in clarifying connections that can be obscured by oppositional labeling. In some respects, for example, the term "conservative feminism" appears appropriate for people such as J e a n e Kirkpatrick, who takes a conservative political stance but advocates increased political representation and participation of women (see Kirkpatrick, 1974). It may be less appropriate to apply the term to conservatives like Phyllis Schlafly who trade on antifeminism, even though their deeds do support "equal opportunity" and public political participation for women in the existing social structures. Schlafly vigorously opposes such policies as affirmative action (which she calls "reverse discrimination"), comparable worth, federally supported child care, and abortion rights. Yet, she claims to support "equal pay for equal work" and other policies that were once—not many decades ago— issues of feminist struggle (see, e.g., Schlafly, 1991). T h e feminism (whether or not so named) of conservatives is generally not seen as contrary to the prevailing policies of conservative political parties and governments on the issues of war, peace, and security. Conservatives may advocate increased representation of women in existing structures of government, foreign services, corporations, political parties, and military institutions. But they draw the line at the draft or combat duty for women, equal rights for gays and lesbians, a n d compensatory programs to overcome effects of past discrimination. In general, they do not call for the entrance of women into high offices nor see it as implying any major changes in policy, institutional structures, or analysis of issues relating to war, peace, security, and the use of force. In this respect and some others, liberal feminism has been closely related to conservative feminism. Many liberal feminists emphasize freedom of individual choice and trust in the competitive outcomes of those individual choices to provide the best outcomes for society. Thus, in The Subjection of Women (first published in 1868), J. S. Mill (1973) argues that "freedom of individual choice is now known to be the only thing which procures the adoption of the best processes" (p. 199). He continues, "Nobody thinks it necessary to make a law that only a strong-armed man shall be a blacksmith. Freedom and competition suffice to make blacksmiths strong-armed men, because the weak-armed can earn more by engaging in occupations for which they are more fit." Mill also argued that it was illogical to make laws that f o r b a d e women f r o m engaging in activities contrary to an assumed female nature, because "that which

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is contrary to women's nature to do, they never will be made to do simply giving their nature free play" (p. 205). C o n t e m p o r a r y advocates o f liberal f e m i n i s m , such as t h e founders o f the National Organization for W o m e n ( N O W ) , have built on the liberal values o f individual c h o i c e and f r e e d o m o f e c o n o m i c c o m p e t i t i o n and the liberal r e j e c t i o n o f essential d i f f e r e n c e s between men and women in c a m p a i g n i n g against discrimination based on sex in education and employment. T h e motivating goal of many liberal feminists—for the most part white and middle-class—has b e e n to provide women with rights and opportunities equal to those available to men o f their same class and race. Questions o f personal and institutional transformation are not a necessary element o f the liberal perspective. Women of color have pointed out repeatedly that white middle-class liberal feminists have traditionally b e e n satisfied with making the opportunities and achievements o f their male relatives accessible to themselves while otherwise protecting a racist and classist status quo. However, liberal feminism today goes beyond ideas o f "equal opportunity" and "equal rights" to call for policies (such as affirmative action) to correct the effects of past discrimination. It does not advocate the fundamental changes in our existing society that socialist and radical feminists envisage, but does recognize the need for significant alterations in policies and institutions to achieve "equality" b e t w e e n w o m e n and men a n d to o v e r c o m e t h e inequalities based on race and ethnicity. T h e liberal feminist position tends to assume that if women participate on an equal basis with men and are more fully represented in society's governing and military institutions, ameliorative changes will take place because of the "gender gap" between women and men on issues of peace and welfare. In general, this is seen not as a biologically determined difference but as a product of the long history of socialization o f women to more peaceful and nurturant activities and their relative exclusion from aggressive, competitive, and combative pursuits (e.g. Boulding, 1977). C o n c e r n e d a b o u t the lack o f e d u c a t i o n a l a n d e c o n o m i c opportunity i m p o s e d by sex-based discrimination, the liberal feminist can take pleasure in the fact that the military offers some degree o f e c o n o m i c equity to men and women (Moore, 1 9 8 9 ) . Liberal feminists have been vexed by the combat-exclusion law that has historically denied women the "plum" assignments that lead to the most prestigious j o b s . T h e discussion of the combat-exclusion law in Chapter 7 of this book is reminiscent of Mill's assertion that the natural constraints o f b l a c k s m i t h i n g require n o artificial

Feminist Perspectives 19 r e i n f o r c e m e n t s . T h e liberal feminist following Mill will n o t e n o t only that weak m e n a n d w o m e n are equally u n s u i t e d to soldiering, b u t also that technological changes have t r a n s f o r m e d the profession of soldier j u s t as blacksmithing as a profession has b e e n r e n d e r e d obsolete in the m o d e r n industrialized world. In short, the liberal feminist perspective challenges sex-based discrimination based o n t h e assumption that all m e n are suited to use f o r c e a n d all w o m e n are not. Researchers have a c c u m u l a t e d data c o u n t e r i n g the c o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom that m e n are naturally aggressive a n d w o m e n naturally passive. T h e y have d o c u m e n t e d discrimination based on g e n d e r rather than on achieved characteristics. They offer evidence that w o m e n have b e e n d e n i e d entry into public life based o n fallacious assumptions a b o u t their nature. This research is g r o u n d e d in a liberal f r a m e w o r k of a c a d e m i c theory or policy analysis with a basically ameliorative r a t h e r t h a n revolutionary p u r p o s e . Yet, the liberal feminist stance can imply a b r o a d e r transformation of society t h r o u g h significant challenges to existing institutions. F o r m e r J o i n t Chiefs of Staff C h a i r m a n J o h n W. Vessey, Jr., lent unwitting s u p p o r t to these w h e n h e stated to a Washington Post r e p o r t e r that "the influx of w o m e n has b r o u g h t greater c h a n g e to the U.S. military than the introduction of nuclear weapons" ( q u o t e d in M o o r e , 1989, p. A16). T h e kinds of changes Vessey means include r e s p o n d i n g (or not responding) to the needs of u n m a r r i e d , p r e g n a n t soldiers; couples in dual-career marriages; a n d single fathers. These needs challenge a world we have created in which m o t h e r i n g is "inherently" a f e m a l e activity a n d t h e work of soldiering makes "real men." A m o n g feminists, the a r g u m e n t that "the capacity to b e a r a n d n u r t u r e children gives w o m e n a special consciousness, a spiritual advantage r a t h e r than a disadvantage" (Barbara Deming, q u o t e d in Snitow, 1989, p. 42) has h a d a varied fate. T h e a r g u m e n t has sometimes motivated social m o v e m e n t s such as A n o t h e r M o t h e r f o r Peace a n d W o m e n Strike for Peace. But for o t h e r people, the argument has been u n p o p u l a r a n d labeled "essentialist" because it suggests a biological d e t e r m i n i s m r e p u g n a n t to liberals. Social constructionists such as Sara Ruddick (1989) a n d J e a n Bethke Elshtain (1987) have posed alternatives to the a r g u m e n t . Ruddick contrasts b i r t h i n g labor a n d t h e o f t e n conflict-ridden work of m o t h e r i n g (preservative love, n u r t u r i n g growth, a n d training) with the d e h u manizing abstractions a n d psychologically violent m e t h o d s of conflict m a n a g e m e n t that make war possible. Elshtain sees disastrous c o n s e q u e n c e s of the g e n d e r - t r a i n i n g of boys a n d girls to b e c o m e ,

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respectively, "Just W a r r i o r s " o r " B e a u t i f u l Souls." P a r a p h r a s i n g S i m o n e d e Beauvoir (1968, p. 3 0 1 ) , m e n a n d w o m e n a r e n o t b o r n b u t a r e m a d e . Few of us are t a u g h t how to b e c o m e adults c a p a b l e of n e g o t i a t i n g c o m p e t e n t l y , b e i n g passionately ( b u t n o n v i o l e n t l y ) assertive. W e all lose w h e n we t e a c h girls to t o l e r a t e n e e d s u n m e t a n d boys to destroy o t h e r s (figuratively m o r e o f t e n t h a n literally) in ord e r to m e e t t h e i r own goals. R u d d i c k ( 1 9 8 9 ) , q u o t i n g S i m o n e Weil, d e f i n e s f o r c e "as whatever ' t u r n e d a p e r s o n i n t o a t h i n g ' t r e a t i n g t h a t p e r s o n as if h e [sic] c o u n t e d f o r n o t h i n g " (p. 164). F o r c e , f o r f e m i n i s t s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t s , is a m o r e i n c l u s i v e c o n c e p t t h a n t h e u s e of s a n c t i o n e d violence in war. Force is c o e r c i o n . M o r e o v e r , war is s e e n as m o r e t h a n t h e use of s a n c t i o n e d violence by states in p u r s u i t of t h e n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . W a r a n d t r a i n i n g f o r war a r e s p e c i f i c a l l y d e s i g n e d to m a k e m e n t o u g h , to c h a l l e n g e t h a t w h i c h is s o f t a n d f e m i n i n e in t h e m . M e a n w h i l e , w o m e n a p p l a u d t h e i r own loss a n d h u m i l i a t i o n in t h e n a m e of patriotism. T h e use of sexual l a n g u a g e , r e i n f o r c i n g t h e "thingness" of w o m e n , to d e h u m a n i z e a n d to i n s p i r e military activity has b e e n p e r c e p t i v e l y i l l u s t r a t e d by C o h n ( 1 9 8 9 ) , E n l o e ( 1 9 9 0 ) , a n d o t h e r s . Filippo Marinetti o b s e r v e d a c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n militarism a n d misogyny in " T h e F o u n d i n g a n d M a n i f e s t o of F u t u r i s m " (1991, p. 50, first p u b l i s h e d in 1909): We will glorify war— the world's only hygiene— militarism, patriotism, the destructive gesture of freedom-bringers beautiful ideas worth dying for, and scorn for woman.

W h e n we talk a b o u t w o m e n a n d t h e use of f o r c e , t h e n , we are d i g g i n g at t h e roots of what s i m u l t a n e o u s l y m a k e s w o m e n f e m i n i n e a n d m e n masculine. N o t a biological d e t e r m i n i s m that m a k e s males aggressive a n d f e m a l e s passive, b u t how we as h u m a n b e i n g s have c o n s t r u c t e d a n d c o n t i n u e to i n t e r p r e t t h e world. W h a t t h e n w o u l d i n d i v i d u a l s w h o s e e g e n d e r as a social c o n s t r u c t ask a b o u t w o m e n a n d t h e use of force? W h e r e d o they g o w h e n c o n f r o n t e d by a p r e g n a n t soldier? W h e r e d o t h e s e intellectual j o u r n e y s take us? W i t h i n this f e m i n i s t f r a m e w o r k , a h u m a n b e i n g m i g h t m u s e o n t h e s e questions: 1. W h a t p u r p o s e s (social, p s y c h o l o g i c a l , e c o n o m i c , a n d political) a r e s e r v e d by m a k i n g / i m a g i n i n g w a r m a k i n g as a p p r o p r i a t e l a b o r f o r m e n a n d c h i l d r e a r i n g as a p p r o p r i a t e

Feminist Perspectives

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labor for women? 2. How is the use of force/coercion related to a consciousness that insists on dividing the world into categories of Self and Other, whether by race, gender, or other characteristics? 3. What are the stories we tell ourselves and our children about the different lives of men and women, and the differences among men and among women? 4. What are the needs of and issues raised by a p r e g n a n t soldier? What kinds of labor are central to her identity? Are there contradictions implicit in these different labors? Are such contradictions resolvable? These questions are not adequately addressed by poll data or traditional experiments in the social sciences. They are more often the stuff of philosophy, biography, psychoanalysis, and fiction. They may also be o p e n i n g s to t h e o r e t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g s a n d transformational perspectives. This chapter has attempted to introduce the reader to some of the issues of diversity a n d c o n t e n t i o u s n e s s in f e m i n i s t understandings of women and the use of force. Some "mainstream" liberal feminists may find a discussion focused on women in the military and women using violence informative. O t h e r feminists suspect that a focus on women and the use of (military) force may conceal as much as it reveals. T h e r e are still more feminist questions than feminist answers. At some level, each of the collective authors of this volume has asked from her or his own angle, "What do we want to know about what the use of force means for women?" or "What do we want to know about what the category 'woman' does to our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the use of force?" O n e of the most exhilarating aspects of participating in this undertaking has been the recognition of the extent of our differences. O n e of the most exhilarating aspects of feminist undertakings is the sense that we are in the process of defining and redefining who we are and why we do what we do. Succeeding chapters in this volume plant some seeds for partial answers.

chapter

The Gender Gap in Popular Attitudes Toward the Use of Force Nancy W. Gallagher

The perception that men and women have different ideas about the use of force in international relations is well rooted and widespread. As far back as early U.S. suffrage debates those proposing voting rights for women often claimed that there would be fewer wars if soldiers' mothers were consulted. O p p o n e n t s c o u n t e r e d that females had neither the mind nor the stomach for the brutal realities of international relations. For example, Carlos White (1870, pp. 155-163), an o p p o n e n t of women's suffrage, maintained that women would have no relevant information about most public matters and that they could easily be led astray by shrewder male politicians who played on w o m e n ' s m o r e sympathetic a n d emotional nature. Elizabeth Cady Stanton countered by arguing that women's natures and experiences as mothers suited them especially well to make life-and-death decisions: That great conservator of woman's love, if permitted to assert itself as it naturally would in f r e e d o m against oppression, violence, and war, would hold all these destructive forces in check, for woman knows the cost of life better than man does, and not with her consent would one drop of blood ever be shed, one life sacrificed in vain (1975, p. 64).

A more lighthearted supporter of votes for women answered the question, "Could women bear arms?" by saying: I do not see how anybody could ask that question after once seeing woman's success in getting into one of New York City's subways. . . . Anyway, most m e n would rather go to war than be left behind to do the hard work that women must do when taking the place of arms bearers (Allen, 1911, pp. 16-17).

Modern feminists emphasize the "gender gap" to publicize the view that women are a powerful voting block with distinct opinions on policy issues (Mueller, 1988). Meanwhile, c o n t e m p o r a r y

23

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conservatives use women's lack of c o m b a t experience to suggest that n e i t h e r U.S. soldiers a n d citizens n o r foreign leaders would expect a f e m a l e p r e s i d e n t to be a skillful a n d decisive l e a d e r in a crisis. C o m m e n t s m a d e d u r i n g the 1984 vice presidential d e b a t e between G e o r g e Bush a n d Geraldine F e r r a r o illustrate this tactic (Tobias, 1990). T o make reliable predictions a b o u t whether the world would be safer, riskier, or u n c h a n g e d if w o m e n h a d m o r e i n f l u e n c e o n foreign policy, o n e must answer several key questions. Do significant d i f f e r e n c e s actually exist b e t w e e n w o m e n ' s a n d m e n ' s a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d t h e u s e of f o r c e in f o r e i g n policy? If so, w h a t factors a c c o u n t f o r these d i f f e r e n c e s ? W o u l d w o m e n ' s o p i n i o n s c h a n g e if m o r e w o m e n j o i n e d t h e ranks of d e f e n s e a n d foreign policy elite? Finally, does grassroots o p i n i o n affect policy e n o u g h that i m p o r t a n t changes would occur if m o r e w o m e n voiced their ideas? T h i s c h a p t e r provides an i n t r o d u c t i o n a n d overview of t h e political s c i e n c e l i t e r a t u r e a d d r e s s i n g t h e s e q u e s t i o n s . W h i l e suggestive research has been d o n e , t h e r e are no consensual answers. M u c h of t h e c o n f u s i o n arises b e c a u s e s o m e s t u d i e s e x p l o r e the p u b l i c ' s g e n e r a l beliefs a b o u t i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations, while o t h e r s investigate o p i n i o n s a b o u t specific policy o p t i o n s . Alt h o u g h w o m e n ' s f o r e i g n policy belief systems have traditionally s e e m e d to r e s e m b l e m e n ' s , w o m e n have consistently s h o w n less s u p p o r t f o r forceful m e a n s of p u r s u i n g foreign policy goals. This d i f f e r e n c e has persisted over time a n d r e m a i n s even a f t e r c o n t r o l l i n g such factors as race, party affiliation, a n d socioecon o m i c status. R e c e n t e v i d e n c e shows t h a t the use-of-force g a p is widening a n d that splits are e m e r g i n g in general attitudes about f o r e i g n policy. Less is known a b o u t t h e reasons f o r g e n d e r related differences, although antiforce attitudes are more c o m m o n a m o n g w o m e n ( a n d m e n ) with feminist consciousness than a m o n g p e o p l e who u p h o l d traditional f e m i n i n e values. Correlations have been f o u n d between shifts in public attitudes a n d changes in policy, b u t little is c e r t a i n a b o u t t h e d i r e c t i o n of c a u s a t i o n or t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r which p o p u l a r o p i n i o n affects g o v e r n m e n t a l choices. T h e t e r m s " g e n d e r " a n d "sex" o f t e n cause c o n f u s i o n . This c h a p t e r will use "sex" to r e f e r to d i f f e r e n c e s that are primarily biologically based, a n d "sex roles" or " g e n d e r " to refer to those t h a t a r e l a r g e l y t h e r e s u l t of s o c i o l o g i c a l or i d e o l o g i c a l factors. W h e n r e p o r t i n g o n o t h e r s ' r e s e a r c h , however, I will use their terminology (unless this would h i n d e r comparability).

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Review of Basic Findings For many years, national leaders believed that the average citizen c a r e d little a b o u t f o r e i g n affairs a n d h e l d ill-considered, contradictory opinions when crises loomed. Women, these leaders assumed, were particularly uninterested and illinformed because their primary concerns centered close to home (Almond, 1950). Thus, policy decisions were based primarily on elite male opinion. On rare occasions when women tried to influence U.S. foreign policy—such as when the Women's Peace Party proposed mediation for World War I or Women's Strike for Peace protested atmospheric nuclear testing—policymakers ignored them, ridiculed them, or tried to "educate" them through public relations campaigns. Recent research has challenged each of these components of conventional wisdom. Although opinion surveys continue to show a lack of detailed knowledge about international events, they also reveal that U.S. citizens do care about the broad outlines of foreign policy. Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida (1989) f o u n d that "peace stands with prosperity as an outstanding example of enduring goals held by the public. . . . [W]ith the exception of the period between 1973 and 1980, foreign issues have been commonly cited as among the most important problems facing the nation" (p. 1114). Lack of knowledge about international relations may motivate citizens to develop a set of abstract beliefs to guide their reactions to world events (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987). In response to assertions that popular ideas about foreign policy resemble fickle moods more than rational opinions, some scholars have argued that general attitudes fit into one of several relatively stable and coherent "belief systems." Wittkopf and Maggiotto (1983) categorized elite and mass beliefs using a fourfold typology defined by level of support for militant and cooperative internationalism. A follow-up study (Wittkopf, 1987) showed that distribution of respondents among the four categories d e p e n d e d primarily on degree of involvement with foreign policy: elites and attentive public supported all forms of internationalism; mass audiences favored militant internationalism; and inattentive r e s p o n d e n t s subscribed to isolationist views. Comparison of data from the 1974, 1978, and 1982 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) polls led Wittkopf to conclude that the most important characteristic of post-Vietnam popular opinion was its "remarkable stability over diverse circumstances" (p. 153). These studies reported no meaningful differences in women's and men's ideas about foreign policy goals and guiding axioms.

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Wittkopf's 1987 follow-up does not explore g e n d e r differences because his data for 1978 and 1982 d o not i n c l u d e t h e sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents. Wittkopf and Maggiotto (1983) f o u n d that mean scores for white males were slightly negative for cooperative internationalism and vaguely positive for militant internationalism, whereas mean scores for white females and all nonwhites tended to be slightly positive. But race and gender explained less of the variance than the leader/mass distinction. This was supported by a second study (Bardes and Oldenick, 1978) that explored five dimensions of foreign policy attitudes and f o u n d no gender differences worth note. These conclusions are in sharp contrast to a n o t h e r body of research that finds large and stable gender differences about the use of force in specific situations. Tom Smith (1984) studied 285 questions on surveys given between 1937 and 1983 by six polling services. More men than women selected the forceful alternative in 87 percent of the cases. The largest gender gaps (up to 30 percent more men indicating approval) concerned questions about activities that are considered manly, such as gun ownership, hunting, and boxing. Direct use of force for law e n f o r c e m e n t and military involvement showed a 10 percent average difference. Questions related to what Smith termed "indirect use of force," such as military spending, showed a relatively small gap, while the few reversals mostly dealt with situations where women s u p p o r t e d forceful responses to interpersonal violence against other women. Shapiro and Mahajan's (1986) study of poll questions from the last three decades also found that the gender gap on policies for the use of force has consistently been moderately large, usually twice as great as sex differences on other types of issues. The gap became progressively smaller when they divided the questions into ones that obviously dealt with force, ones that were ambiguous, and ones where force was clearly irrelevant. Because the size of the difference on ambiguous issues (abortion, criminal punishment, and so forth) was closer to that for nonforce questions, Shapiro and Mahajan hypothesized that there must be an obvious choice between forceful and nonforceful options for a large gender gap to emerge. T h e f o r c e / n o n f o r c e choice is perhaps most obvious when military intervention is at issue. In 1981, the Roper Organization asked a series of questions about hypothetical situations where the president might use U.S. troops (Bensen, 1982). Scenarios in which intervention received more total support than opposition were (1) another group of U.S. embassy employees taken hostage, (2) Soviet invasion of Western Europe, and (3) Soviet invasion of West Berlin.

The Gender Gap

27

R e s p o n d e n t s divided evenly in t h e case of C o m m u n i s t takeovers in C e n t r a l A m e r i c a a n d d e f i n i t e l y r e j e c t e d military action in r e s p o n s e to a n A r a b invasion of Israel, a Soviet invasion of P o l a n d , a n d a N o r t h K o r e a n invasion of S o u t h K o r e a . W h e n t h e answers w e r e s e p a r a t e d by sex, h o w e v e r , w o m e n s h o w e d decisive s u p p o r t f o r i n t e r v e n t i o n only in t h e case of a n o t h e r h o s t a g e - t a k i n g (57 p e r c e n t f o r , 24 p e r c e n t against). A m e r e 2 p e r c e n t m o r e w o m e n a p p r o v e d t h a n o p p o s e d i n t e r v e n t i o n to p r o t e c t W e s t e r n E u r o p e (42 p e r c e n t for, 40 p e r c e n t against); in all o t h e r cases, t h e majority o p p o s e d use of f o r c e . Asking a b o u t hypothetical o r p o t e n t i a l uses of f o r c e is d i f f e r e n t f r o m i n q u i r i n g a b o u t o n g o i n g military a c t i o n . T h e R o p e r study of a t t i t u d e s toward i n t e r v e n t i o n f o u n d that military a c t i o n c a u s e d t h e p r e s i d e n t i a l approval r a t i n g to rise m o r e a m o n g m e n t h a n a m o n g w o m e n b e c a u s e " m e n s e e m to consistently favor m o r e militaristic solutions to p r o b l e m s t h a n w o m e n . " This has b e e n called t h e "rallyr o u n d - t h e - f l a g " effect, in w h i c h p r e s i d e n t i a l a p p r o v a l ratings j u m p dramatically a f t e r f i g h t i n g starts o r t h e U n i t e d States is involved in s o m e o t h e r type of s h a r p , dramatic, a n d f o c u s e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l event. D u r i n g t h e K o r e a n a n d V i e t n a m wars, w o m e n w e r e m u c h m o r e likely to t h i n k that military action h a d b e e n a mistake a n d to s u p p o r t U.S. withdrawal ( B a x t e r a n d L a n s i n g , 1983). G a l l u p polls s h o w e d only m o d e s t i n c r e a s e s in a p p r o v a l r a t i n g s by e i t h e r sex a f t e r t h e invasions of G r e n a d a a n d P a n a m a ( G a l l u p Poll Monthly, D e c e m b e r 1983, p. 18, a n d J a n u a r y 1990, p. 17). N e i t h e r c o n f l i c t lasted l o n g e n o u g h f o r us to know if w o m e n w o u l d have b e c o m e d i s e n c h a n t e d m o r e quickly t h a n m e n . A t t i t u d e s t o w a r d n u c l e a r w e a p o n s policies a r e m o r e c o m p l e x b e c a u s e s o m e p e o p l e t h i n k a large n u c l e a r a r s e n a l i n c r e a s e s t h e c h a n c e of war, while o t h e r s believe it r e d u c e s t h a t p r o b a b i l i t y . Several studies have assessed sex d i f f e r e n c e s in n u c l e a r attitudes, b u t n o c o n s e n s u s has b e e n r e a c h e d . S o m e e v i d e n c e suggests a " m a c h o pride" factor that increases support for nuclear weapons d e v e l o p m e n t a n d a " t e n d e r n e s s " factor that correlates with o p p o s i t i o n to n u c l e a r arms. Mark J e n s e n (1987) systematically tested hypotheses a b o u t s u p p o r t f o r n u c l e a r w e a p o n s use, n u c l e a r restraint in t h e f a c e of p r o v o c a t i o n , a n d n u c l e a r w e a p o n s d e v e l o p m e n t . H e f o u n d t h a t t h e only significant g e n d e r d i f f e r e n c e was a lower level of m a l e s u p p o r t f o r n u c l e a r r e s t r a i n t . An i n t e r e s t i n g s e x - r e l a t e d d i f f e r e n c e d i d show u p in a n o t h e r study t h a t asked p e o p l e why they h a d n o t s e l e c t e d " t h r e a t of n u c l e a r war" as t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t p r o b l e m f a c i n g the U n i t e d States in 1983. Men r e s p o n d e d that t h e r e w o u l d n e v e r b e a n u c l e a r war twice as f r e q u e n t l y as w o m e n d i d .

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W o m e n , by contrast, were twice as likely to say that they did not choose it because they t h o u g h t that nuclear war was out of their control. Defense s p e n d i n g is a n o t h e r policy d o m a i n where o n e f i n d s mixed results. In a study designed to assess sex d i f f e r e n c e s in support f o r g o v e r n m e n t s p e n d i n g between 1973 and 1984, Cynthia Dietch (1988) f o u n d that some years showed slightly greater female support f o r military s p e n d i n g and others somewhat higher rates of male s u p p o r t , b u t that in n o n e of the years was the d i f f e r e n c e statistically significant. T h i s result is consistent with S m i t h ' s a r g u m e n t that military spending does not trigger a large g e n d e r gap because it is a matter of "indirect force." However, it could also be seen as a n o t h e r instance w h e r e s u p p o r t f o r d e f e n s e s p e n d i n g fluctuates d e p e n d i n g on whether a person feels that arms provoke or deter conflicts. W o m e n in the United States are not unique. Welch and Thomas (1988) examined data from a 1983 British election study and f o u n d that a l t h o u g h t h e r e was n o m a j o r g e n d e r g a p on o v e r a r c h i n g ideology a n d partisan affiliation, there were substantial differences in attitudes toward the use of force. For example, 17 percent m o r e women t h a n m e n believed that Britain should remove its troops from N o r t h e r n Ireland, and 7 percent more women said that they felt less safe with U.S. nuclear weapons on their soil. Interestingly, women did not differ significantly f r o m m e n in their attitudes toward maintaining a British nuclear deterrent and reducing military spending. This, along with the finding that women s u p p o r t stiffer p u n i s h m e n t for criminals yet are less likely to advocate the death penalty, convinced Welch a n d T h o m a s that the gaps they f o u n d really did spring from different attitudes toward the use of force, rather than from a more "tolerant" or "appeasing" outlook on life (p. 35).

Current Trends T h e g e n d e r g a p in p o p u l a r attitudes toward the use of f o r c e c o n t i n u e s to grow in b o t h intensity a n d i m p o r t a n c e . In a longitudinal study of h u n d r e d s of o p i n i o n poll questions asked between 1948 and 1981, the editors of Public Opinion (1982) f o u n d that differences o n what they called the "force dimension" expanded over the years. Significant and sustained variations o n what they called the "compassion" and "risk" dimensions developed after the

The Gender Gap

29

mid-1970s, suggesting a new gender gap concerning the ends, as well as the means, of foreign policy. Fite, Genest, and Wilcox (1990) analyzed CCFR data f r o m 1975-1986, using instruments designed to measure both belief structures and attitudes toward force. They f o u n d some g e n d e r differences on both goals and means during the early years, but only those questions relating to use of troops showed substantial gaps. T h e gap on use-of-force questions increased slightly during the 1980s. More important, significant differences on policy goals e m e r g e d , with women being less c o n c e r n e d than men about containment and more interested in altruistic goals (keeping the peace, c o m b a t i n g world h u n g e r , and fostering i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation). But despite their more altruistic orientation, women were slightly less supportive of economic aid because they feared that it would hurt the domestic economy or lead to U.S. military involvement overseas. The Gulf War displayed the gender gap at its widest. In a Harris poll taken in early December 1990, men were evenly divided on the wisdom of attacking Iraqi forces (48 p e r c e n t for, 48 p e r c e n t against), whereas women opposed military action by 73 percent to 22 percent. Similar chasms existed regarding "surgical" air strikes. Men approved this tactic by 57 percent to 40 percent, whereas women rejected it decisively, 63 percent to 29 percent. The sexes did not differ significantly in support for less obviously lethal strategies, like giving economic pressures more time to work. In particular, women were no more willing than men to avoid a confrontation by allowing Saddam Hussein to keep a piece of Kuwait. Because 61 percent of the respondent pool opposed force before the Gulf War began, Harris concluded that "for the first time, women alone have turned public opinion about a war. They have swayed the polls against President Bush's using military force in the Gulf' (p. A35). Obviously, this negative public opinion failed to prevent the war. O n c e shooting started, women were not i m m u n e to the "rally-round-the-flag" effect. However, polls from the end of January 1991 showed that women were evenly divided on the wisdom of c o n t i n u i n g to fight or seeking a settlement (47 percent to 46 percent), whereas men strongly favored by 66 percent to 28 percent a continuation of the war (Hart and Teeter, 1991). When the emphasis was shifted from whether the United States should use the tools of war or diplomacy to whether it should pursue the objective of removing Saddam Hussein from power, an increased number of women supported the continuation of the war (56 percent for continued fighting to 36 percent for stopping the war once Iraq had

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left Kuwait). Looking at ends rather than means did not significantly alter the male response; support for continued fighting increased only slightly to 69 percent for and 25 percent against (CBS News Poll, 1991).

Cautions Modern opinion survey methodology presents a picture o f the similarities and differences in the sexes' thought patterns that seems m u c h m o r e s c i e n t i f i c than the impressionistic assertions characterizing the early suffrage debates. In many regards, being able to ask large numbers of people what they think about a particular issue is an improvement over a situation where politicians simply claim widespread silent support for whatever they are about to propose. However, there are several reasons to be cautious when generalizing from findings that women and men have usually held similar ideas about broad outlines of U.S. foreign policy, but do not always support the same specific means to reach those goals. Survey research designers must decide whether to give a few fixed alternatives, provide scales to indicate strength of feeling, or allow open-ended answers. Most of the studies cited in this chapter that dealt with attitudes toward the use of force offered three choices: "yes/approve," "no/oppose," and "don't know." This type of closed-ended research design makes it possible to process the data quickly and provide simple, striking figures. However, the results are not always meaningful. For example, knowing that a certain percent more women than men object to a particular policy does not say anything about the intensity of respondents' support or opposition. Nor is one usually told whether attitudinal differences between the sexes are greater or smaller than those within each group. Most important, summary statistics rarely give any indication of why respondents chose as they did. Yet, it seems crucial to know if those who oppose the use of force do so because they believe that it is unnecessary, ineffective, or inappropriate to the issue at hand. For example, one of the questions used by the editors of Public Opinion to illustrate the g e n d e r gap on the force dimension asked respondents: "Do you think it will be best for the future o f this country if we take an active part in world affairs, or if we stay out of world affairs?" Thirty-nine percent o f female respondents thought that the United States should be less active, while only 28 percent of the males thought that this was true (Opinion Roundup, 1982, p.

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31

29). T h i s q u e s t i o n is m e a s u r i n g s u p p o r t f o r activist o r isolationist f o r e i g n policies, r a t h e r t h a n s u p p o r t f o r f o r c e f u l o r d i p l o m a t i c f o r m s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l involvement. Surveys o f t e n use l e a d i n g q u e s t i o n s a n d oversimplify c o m p l e x issues. F o r e x a m p l e , a May 1990 G a l l u p poll i n c l u d e d a n i t e m t h a t read: Since WWII, the policy of the United States has been to maintain our military strength throughout the world in order to help governments that might be overthrown by communist-based forces. Do you think we should or should not continue to follow this policy? (p. 10).

In a d d i t i o n to e x a g g e r a t i n g t h e c o n t i n u i t y in postwar policies, this q u e s t i o n is a m b i g u o u s in several ways. It is n o t clear w h e t h e r it deals primarily with g e n e r a l values s u c h as a n t i c o m m u n i s m a n d militant i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m o r with t h e merits of using military f o r c e s as a tool to s t r e n g t h e n f r i e n d l y g o v e r n m e n t s . It is also i m p o s s i b l e to k n o w w h e t h e r m a i n t a i n i n g military s t r e n g t h r e f e r s p r i m a r i l y to d e f e n s e s p e n d i n g , U.S. c o n v e n t i o n a l i n t e r v e n t i o n , o r n u c l e a r w e a p o n s d e v e l o p m e n t . A s k i n g p e o p l e to reply "yes" o r " n o " to s u c h a n a m b i g u o u s q u e s t i o n may well m a s k i m p o r t a n t d i v e r g e n c e s in general beliefs about international relations or overestimate d i f f e r e n c e s in attitudes toward f o r c e as a tool of f o r e i g n policy. T h e w o r d i n g of survey q u e s t i o n s f r e q u e n t l y i g n o r e s views t h a t a r e o u t s i d e t h e m a i n s t r e a m of t h e c u r r e n t p o l i c y d e b a t e . A N o v e m b e r 1990 Gallup poll q u e r i e d t h e following: If the current situation in the Middle East involving Iraq and Kuwait does not change by January, would you favor or oppose the United States going to war in order to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait? (p. 16).

Asking " s h o u l d t h e U n i t e d States fight now?" i g n o r e d t h e d e e p e r issue of why t h e s i t u a t i o n was s t r u c t u r e d as it was, with massive t r o o p d e p l o y m e n t s a n d a m u c h - p u b l i c i z e d u l t i m a t u m . It also finessed i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s a b o u t what U.S. war aims actually were a n d w h e t h e r a war was t h e best way to p u r s u e t h e m . S o m e o n e w h o s e m a i n c o n c e r n was to p r e v e n t Iraqi n u c l e a r w e a p o n s d e v e l o p m e n t m i g h t s u p p o r t an attack even if Hussein started to withdraw, w h e r e a s o n e w h o s e p r i m a r y objective was to p r o m o t e lasting p e a c e in t h e M i d d l e East c o u l d easily believe that the way in which t h e war was c o n d u c t e d would be as i m p o r t a n t as w h e n it b e g a n . Part of t h e reason f o r t h e g e n d e r g a p o n q u e s t i o n s r e l a t i n g to t h e u s e of f o r c e is t h a t w o m e n select t h e " d o n ' t k n o w " o r " n o o p i n i o n " o p t i o n s m o r e f r e q u e n t l y t h a n m e n . In Smith ( 1 9 8 4 ) , f o r

32

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example, more women than men chose those options on 86 percent o f the questions. This has often been taken as a sign that women know o r care less about questions o f war and peace. However, the high rate o f "don't know" answers among women may indicate that women feel less compelled to hold an opinion regardless o f how illinformed they actually are. It also may reflect a serious design problem where unique features of women's world view are not well reflected by questions that are framed in terms that make sense to male pollsters and policymakers (for an expanded treatment of this idea in the context of research on moral development, see Gilligan, 1982). C o n c e r n i n g women's higher " d o n ' t know" rate, Shapiro and Mahajan ( 1 9 8 6 ) suggest that " S o m e of these responses may not occur because o f the low salience of the issue but rather because o f the difficulty that politically attuned respondents may have in making their opinion fit one of the categories offered in closed-ended survey questions" (p. 5 7 ) . This interpretation is borne out by the fact that while women's " d o n ' t know" rate declines significantly on most issues when they enter the labor force, working outside the h o m e has much less impact on the frequency of " d o n ' t know" answers for questions relating to the use of force (Fite et al., 1990; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986).

Explanations o f the Gender Gap Although methodological imperfections may mask or magnify the size and shape of gender-related differences regarding the use of force, some significant differences clcarly exist. Why women and men have disparate views of violence and what this implies for the future o f U.S. foreign policy are less clear. Subsequent chapters in this volume will provide a more detailed look at popular attitudes toward women who use force for private and public purposes and attitudes toward the use of force among women in the foreign policy elite. T h e remainder of this chapter will focus on opinion survey research about the causal relationships regarding gender, mass opinion, and foreign policy. O n e possible explanation for the gap is that more women than men oppose the use of force not because of a direct female/male difference but because being female increases the probability o f belonging to a group with its own reasons for disliking militant international policies. For example, if p o o r people tend to be

The Gender Gap

33

negative toward interventionist policies because of the cost or the risk to enlisted relatives, and if disproportionate numbers of women are poor, then g e n d e r would only be indirectly responsible for attitudes toward the use of force. There is little evidence that the opinion gap develops primarily from the effects of intervening variables such as i n c o m e or education level. These factors are frequently treated as background variables. However, it makes little sense to think of a sequence in which one's income or education level causes one to b e c o m e female. Instead, it is m o r e plausible to think in terms of a developmental sequence where women's life conditions lead to greater economic vulnerability or lower education levels and then to particular attitudes toward the use of force. Fite et al. (1990) found that controlling for socioeconomic status did not alter the gap. Holding partisanship and ideological self-identification constant reduced the gap slightly, but not enough to suggest that more women oppose the use of force primarily because more women are politically liberal. Welch and Thomas (1988) f o u n d similar results when they checked for intervening variables in their British sample. Structural factors (income, education, and occupation) did not have a significant impact either. Situational constraints (marital status, involvement in the paid labor force) also had little effect, possibly because working women have more exposure to political issues but less time to educate themselves about foreign policy matters. A study testing the hypothesis that men's much higher rate of military service accounts for their approval of forceful solutions (Schreiber, 1979) found a positive correlation between veteran status and positive attitudes toward the military and military spending. As a group, veterans were no more likely than other men to approve of public or private displays of force. However, World War II-era veterans were more likely than same-age nonveteran males to own guns, whereas Vietnam-era veterans were more likely than their nonveteran c o u n t e r p a r t s to approve of police violence against political demonstrators. The main debate about the source of the gender gap is between those who ascribe it to traditional female values and those who attribute it to progressive feminist views. Both groups agree that the gender gap is the result of a particular type of woman's social experiences, not of biological characteristics that all women share. But they differ both in their normative assessments and in their predictions about how the women's movement will affect the size and nature of the gender gap.

34

Theories, Concepts Ùf Attitudes

T h e first g r o u p maintains that w o m e n o p p o s e the use of f o r c e b e c a u s e t h e y have b e e n socialized to be passive, t i m i d , a n d apolitical. As w o m e n b e c o m e "liberated," t h e s e theorists e x p c c t t h e m to b e c o m e m o r e like men. For example, J o h n Mueller (1973) predicted: if the effect of women's liberation is to change the attitudes of women, making them more assertive so they can compete in a male-oriented society, a correlative result may make them more hawkish on war and foreign policy. . . . the quintessential dove among women is not the liberated activist, but the unassertive little old lady who can't bring herself to support wars because they aren't "nice" (p. 147). T h e a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n ( C o n o v e r , 1988) takes a m o r e positive stance. Fewer w o m e n advocate force not because they lack whatever a c c o u n t s f o r m a l e b e l l i g e r e n c e b u t because they have u n i q u e biological a n d / o r sociological factors that make t h e m more c a r i n g a n d c o m p a s s i o n a t e , m o r e c o n c e r n e d with p r e s e r v i n g i n t e r p e r s o n a l relationships, a n d less willing to believe that "might makes right." In this m o d e l , w o m e n ' s special values are usually s u b m e r g e d u n d e r the d o m i n a n t values of m a l e - o r i e n t e d society. W o m e n express the s a m e values a n d policy p r e f e r e n c e s as m e n unless they develop a s t r o n g e n o u g h feminist consciousness to allow t h e i r " w o m a n - c e n t e r e d p e r s p e c t i v e " values a n d p r e f e r e n c e s to e m e r g e . T h e s e theorists p r e d i c t that, as w o m e n b e c o m e m o r e "liberated," they will think less like male m e m b e r s of the d o m i n a n t culture, a n d the g e n d e r gap will grow. Several of the studies d i d try to test t h e traditional f e m a l e socialization a n d f e m i n i s t o r i e n t a t i o n hypotheses. Smith (1984) credited traditional socialization with having the greatest effect on the o p i n i o n g a p because t h e largest d i f f e r e n c e s in approval rates were o n activities such as h u n t i n g , which are socially a p p r o v e d for m e n . H e c o n c l u d e d that feminist ideology h a d n o impact because he f o u n d n e i t h e r changes in the m a l e / f e m a l e gap after the late 1960s nor significant opinion differences between feminists and n o n f e m i n i s t s of e i t h e r sex. However, he failed to specify what he used as an indicator f o r feminism or w h e t h e r he e x p e c t e d that the w o m e n ' s liberation m o v e m e n t s h o u l d have increased or decreased the gap. Welch a n d T h o m a s (1988) f o u n d t h a t socialization h a d a greater effect than i m m e d i a t e constraints or structural factors. This result d o e s little to resolve t h e t r a d i t i o n a l socialization versus f e m i n i s t - o r i e n t a t i o n d e b a t e , t h o u g h , b e c a u s e t h e i r socialization m e a s u r e s i n c l u d e aspects of traditional f e m a l e sex roles such as

The Gender Gap

35

n u r t u r a n c e , which s o m e feminists also e m b r a c e . F u r t h e r m o r e , because Welch a n d T h o m a s studied data f r o m a single election survey, it is impossible to know how changing levels of support f o r these values have affected attitudes toward the use of force. Data f r o m the 1984 National Election Study (NES) were exami n e d in a study d e s i g n e d specifically to test the i m p o r t a n c e of feminist orientation. Pamela Conover (1988) f o u n d that women who identified with the women's movement and supported its basic goals were responsible f o r the vast majority of the g e n d e r gap in public opinion. Apart f r o m the question of Central America, nonfeminist women did not differ significantly f r o m men on any of the foreign policy options, whereas feminist women stood apart on each foreign policy item. Conover concluded that "while it is not very surprising to find that feminist women are more liberal than men in general, it is startling to discover that t h e r e are e n o u g h feminists who are liberal e n o u g h to create almost on their own the a p p e a r a n c e of a widespread g e n d e r gap" (p. 1005). If there is a critical divergence between feminist and nonfeminist women's foreign policy preferences, it is possible that there are also crucial differences a m o n g men. Unfortunately, Conover's data did not include a direct measure of feminist identity for men, and her attempts to use indirect measures to study feminist and nonfeminist males' compassion levels p r o d u c e d contradictory results. Cook a n d Wilcox (1991) reanalyzed the 1984 NES data to d e t e r m i n e whether opinion differences are the product of a unique w o m a n ' s perspective or the result of values such as equality a n d political liberalism that could be held by men and women alike. They f o u n d that both "feminist sympathy" for men and "feminist consciousness" for women are strong predictors of values and policy p r e f e r e n c e s . However, g e n d e r still seems to i n f l u e n c e attitudes toward use of force. When the policy preferences of feminist women a n d m e n are c o m p a r e d , only the war a n d peace issues show a consistent pattern of g e n d e r effects.

Implications and Conclusions If the g e n d e r gap in opinions concerning the use of force is to be m o r e than a statistical curiosity, differences in p o p u l a r attitudes must be able to elicit changes in policy. T h e r e are at least t h r e e possibilities worth considering. First, the sociodemographic changes that are bringing more women into foreign policymaking positions

36

Theories, Concepts 6? Attitudes

could result in decisions favoring m o r e pacific behavior. S e c o n d , d e m o c r a t i c political process could translate w o m e n ' s attitudes into a m a n d a t e f o r policies t h a t resolve conflicts t h r o u g h n o n v i o l e n t means. T h i r d , w o m e n o p p o s e d to the use of f o r c e could explicitly a d o p t political strategies to publicize g e n d e r differences a n d insist that leaders d o m o r e to include feminist perspectives and values. T h e first possibility, that increasing the p r o p o r t i o n of w o m e n in t h e military a n d f o r e i g n policy b u r e a u c r a c i e s will lead to less belligerent actions, is the subject of several selections later in this volume. T h e way to reconcile the g e n d e r gaps in mass attitudes with t h o s e a u t h o r s ' g e n e r a l l y skeptical c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t w o m e n ' s impact in elite positions is to r e m e m b e r that t h e r e is n o single a n d distinct "woman's p o i n t of view." As long as the n u m b e r of w o m e n a d m i t t e d to the i n n e r circle is small, the few who self-select a n d are chosen will t e n d to share the d o m i n a n t perspective of those already in place. F u r t h e r m o r e , when the o p i n i o n gap is wrongly taken as evidence that the average female is unassertive a n d eager to avoid conflict at all costs, w o m e n who want to s u c c e e d will have an incentive to d i s t a n c e themselves f r o m these negative images by e x p r e s s i n g o p p o s i t e o p i n i o n s . O n l y if t h e p r o p o r t i o n of d e c i s i o n m a k e r s o p p o s e d to the use of f o r c e were large a n d t h e prevailing ideology a t t r i b u t e d their s u p p o r t f o r nonviolent conflict resolution to positive factors would o n e expect to see major changes in b e h a v i o r c o m i n g f r o m the t o p levels of t h e f o r e i g n policy institutions. T h e possibility that grassroots opposition to forceful action will automatically be translated into m o r e peaceful policies takes o n e into a large literature o n the relationship between public o p i n i o n a n d U.S. policy o u t c o m e s . (For useful overviews, see Kegley a n d Wittkopf, 1991, pp. 279-322, and Weissberg, 1976. For i n f o r m a t i o n specifically a b o u t w o m e n ' s ability to translate t h e i r o p i n i o n s into political action by elected officials, see Poole a n d Ziegler, 1985.) It can be briefly summarized by saying that whereas traditional models of d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g rely o n a n u m b e r of unrealistic assumptions, models that completely discount p o p u l a r o p i n i o n are also inaccurate. However, the role that mass opinions play in the policymaking process is c o m p l i c a t e d a n d poorly u n d e r s t o o d . A desire to avoid public opposition o f t e n constrains political leaders f r o m p u r s u i n g certain o p t i o n s , such as c o n t i n u i n g a t m o s p h e r i c nuclear tests or openly s e n d i n g a large American intervention force to s u p p o r t t h e c o n t r a s in N i c a r a g u a . L e a d e r s also use polls to decide when to p r o p o s e a new policy a n d what arguments to use to s u p p o r t it. In-house polling agencies may even manipulate questions

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37

to increase apparent support for their candidate's positions. In short, even though it is possible to find correlations between changes in opinion and changes in policy, it is difficult to d e t e r m i n e causality (Page and Shapiro, 1 9 8 3 ) . O n e could argue that President R e a g a n began r e s p o n d i n g to Soviet arms control overtures in t h e e n d o f his first term because he knew that many women opposed his arms buildups and o b j e c t e d to his talk o f winning a n u c l e a r war. However, this would r e q u i r e o n e to d e m o n s t r a t e n o t only that disp r o p o r t i o n a t e n u m b e r s o f women held these attitudes, but also that Reagan believed that h e n e e d e d their votes, sought their support by showing m o r e interest in arms c o n t r o l , a n d would n o t have taken t h e steps in t h e a b s e n c e o f t h e s e w o m e n ' s s t r o n g o p i n i o n s . Frankovic ( 1 9 8 2 ) f o u n d partial s u p p o r t f o r t h e first step in this causal chain when she showed that the g e n d e r gap in the 1 9 8 0 election c o u l d b e almost completely e x p l a i n e d by c o n t r o l l i n g for wome n ' s greater unwillingness to be m o r e forceful with the Soviet Union even if it increased the risk o f n u c l e a r war. However, m u c h work remains to be done. P r o b l e m s with the first a n d s e c o n d options lead to a d i l e m m a a b o u t w h e t h e r or n o t o n e s h o u l d a c c e n t u a t e those g e n d e r differe n c e s that do exist. T h e c h o i c e is between ( 1 ) increasing w o m e n ' s access to decisionmaking positions by reassuring conservatives that t h e r e are no relevant d i f f e r e n c e s in most m e n ' s and w o m e n ' s approaches, ( 2 ) increasing the size and strength o f the antiforce pressure group by f o r m i n g an alliance built on similarities between progressive women's and m e n ' s views, o r ( 3 ) increasing w o m e n ' s moral claim to leadership by emphasizing that they have distinctive views and values that would humanize domestic and foreign policy. Stoper a n d J o h n s o n ( 1 9 7 7 ) provide an e x c e l l e n t analysis o f t h e history, benefits, and potential cost o f arguing that women are naturally different from and morally superior to men. Ultimately, the c h o i c e between these options is a political and strategic decision that c a n n o t be answered by r e f e r e n c e to opinion survey statistics alone.

Note T h e author appreciates helpful suggestions on earlier drafts offered by Richard Boyd, Ellen Riggle, and Nancy Schwartz, as well as research assistance provided by Sarah Lewis and Karen Hultgren.

chapter

4

Women in Groups and Organizations: Implications for the Use of Force

Jill M. Bystydzienski This chapter discusses sociological knowledge that has implications for the extent to which women may use force against others. It focuses on women's status and roles in groups and organizations, and specifically on whether there are gender differences in group and organizational behavior. Studies of women in politics are then examined in an attempt to predict how greater participation of women might change government and military policy.

Women in Groups T h e r e is much evidence that all-female groups behave differently from all-male groups. R e s e a r c h findings from l a b o r a t o r y experiments and field observations indicate that women in female groups are more oriented toward immediate relationships and less toward achievement and are less aggressive and more cooperative and trusting than men in male groups (Cattell and Lawson, 1962; Constantini and Craik, 1972; Sikula, 1973; Kanter, 1981). Women's groups tend to be less hierarchical than men's groups (Kanter, 1977) and in work organizations tend to be less mobility-oriented (Kanter, 1977; Westwood, 1984). Conversations in women's groups typically focus on interpersonal relationships, whereas all-male groups tend to discuss action-oriented events (Spender, 1980). Women in female groups take turns talking or engaging in an activity, whereas men in male groups compete aggressively for the limelight (Brock-Utne, 1985, p. 100). Gender differences have been found to exist in groups of children and adolescents (Brock-Utne, 1985, pp. 9 9 - 1 0 1 ; T h o r n e and Luria, 1986; Eder, 1987) and to persist in adult groups (Schaffer, 1981, pp. 8 8 - 9 2 ) . Such differences may be interpreted as the result of socialization of women for family roles and men for the public sphere. However, as a number of feminist researchers have pointed out recently,

39

40

Theories, Concepts (sf Altitudes

w o m e n ' s o r i e n t a t i o n s a n d behavior in f e m a l e g r o u p s also can b e s e e n as realistic responses to w o m e n ' s s t r u c t u r a l situations: t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d limits of the status a n d role d e m a n d s women a r e subjected to in the family a n d in the world of work (Kanter, 1981, p. 412; Chase, 1987, p. 10). For instance, w o m e n in all-female work g r o u p s o f t e n indicate that they f i n d a d v a n c e m e n t undesirable, a n d this has b e e n i n t e r p r e t e d in the past as w o m e n ' s "fear of success" s t e m m i n g f r o m traditional sex-role socialization ( H o r n e r , 1972). A m o r e plausible e x p l a n a t i o n , however, indicates that in most cases w o m e n ' s c h a n c e s f o r a d v a n c e m e n t are very limited (Chase, 1987), a n d w h e n a woman does get p r o m o t e d to a supervisory position she is f r e q u e n t l y placed in the awkward position of mediating between m a l e m a n a g e m e n t a n d h e r f e m a l e f r i e n d s ( C o s t e l l o , 1985; Westwood, 1984). Similarly, w o m e n ' s e m p h a s i s o n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s in all-female g r o u p s may stem f r o m an a c c u r a t e p e r c e p t i o n of blocked o p p o r t u n i t i e s , which may result in seeking gratification t h r o u g h p e e r involvement (Richardson, 1981, pp. 2 0 7 210). W h e n w o m e n a n d m e n are t o g e t h e r in groups, the two sexes also t e n d to behave differently. In general, research shows that m e n t e n d to d o m i n a t e interaction in mixed-sex groups both verbally a n d nonverbally. W o m e n typically speak less t h a n m e n (Fishman, 1978; Spender, 1980); m e n are responsible, on the average, for m o r e than 90 p e r c e n t of i n t e r r u p t i o n s that occur, a n d w o m e n f r e q u e n t l y a b a n d o n a subject that interests t h e m in favor of what m e n wish to talk a b o u t ( Z i m m e r m a n a n d West, 1975; Kramarae, 1980; Kollock, Blumstein, a n d Schwartz, 1985). Men typically take u p m o r e physical space a n d s p r e a d their arms or legs sideways a n d outward m o r e than w o m e n d o (Robertson, 1989, p. 325). Men also are m o r e likely to touch w o m e n than to be touched by t h e m (Henley, 1973). In mixed-sex groups, men display m o r e aggression than women, a l t h o u g h s o m e studies have i n d i c a t e d t h a t w o m e n e i t h e r a r e l e a r n i n g to be m o r e aggressive or are b e c o m i n g m o r e willing to display aggressive behavior (Schafer, 1981, p. 90). Men a p p e a r to be more aggressive when initiative is required, but women also b e c o m e aggressive in response to direct aggressive behavior f r o m a n o t h e r p e r s o n (Taylor a n d Epstein, 1967; H o k a n s o n a n d E d e l m a n , 1966; Schafer, 1981). However, women express their aggression differently t h a n m e n do; they t e n d to display nonverbal aggression such as glaring, whereas m e n are m o r e likely to display verbal or physical aggression (Harris, 1974). Because m e n d o m i n a t e interaction in mixed-sex g r o u p s , they influence the agendas for discussion a n d the o u t c o m e of decisions.

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Research has shown, however, that n u m b e r s o f w o m e n in a g r o u p may make a difference in the e x t e n t to which w o m e n ' s i n f l u e n c e is felt. In groups with highly skewed sex ratios, when w o m e n are few, they b e c o m e isolated and invisible (Kanter, 1 9 8 1 ) . In groups where women c o m p o s e less than 15 p e r c e n t o f the total m e m b e r s h i p , they do n o t i n f l u e n c e g r o u p processes in any significant way ( S o u t h et al., 1 9 8 2 ; S p a n g l e r et a l „ 1 9 7 8 ; Y o d e r et a l „ 1 9 8 9 ) . However, in groups that are between 15 and 3 0 p e r c e n t f e m a l e , w o m e n "have potential allies a m o n g themselves, can f o r m coalitions, a n d can affect the c u l t u r e o f t h e g r o u p " ( K a n t e r , 1 9 7 7 , p. 2 0 9 ) . O t h e r researchers point out, however, that n u m b e r s a l o n e are misleading because w o m e n n e e d to be in the powerful (leadership) positions within g r o u p s in o r d e r to affect g r o u p d e c i s i o n s ( C o o k , 1 9 8 7 ; Epstein, 1983; Ferree, 1987). G e n d e r differences in behavior in mixed-sex groups are subject to a structural i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Even if the n u m b e r s o f w o m e n are nearly equal to those o f m e n , m e n and w o m e n may not, in fact, influence group processes equally, particularly if their status external to the group is inconsistent with their group position. T h e resulting behavior, i n c l u d i n g f r e q u e n c y of participation and leadership, may reflect status and power differences, in addition to, or even m o r e than, socialized sex-linked personality traits. T h e r e s e a r c h on w o m e n in groups indicates in g e n e r a l that women are less likely than m e n to use force against others, as, for e x a m p l e , giving o r d e r s o r u s i n g physical a g g r e s s i o n . W o m e n ' s groups are less h i e r a r c h i c a l , m o r e i n t e r p e r s o n a l l y o r i e n t e d , a n d m o r e c o o p e r a t i v e than m e n ' s , a n d in m i x e d - s e x g r o u p s , m e n d o m i n a t e i n t e r a c t i o n a n d d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . S e x - r o l e socialization and, m o r e i m p o r t a n t , w o m e n ' s lower status a n d relative lack o f power k e e p women from taking equal part with men in groups.

W o m e n in Organizations Studies o f women in organizations have focused largely on places o f work a n d , in p a r t i c u l a r , o n w o m e n in female-dominated o c c u p a t i o n s a n d in m a l e - d o m i n a t e d strata ( C h a s e , 1 9 8 7 ) . T h e r e also have b e e n s o m e studies d o n e on w o m e n ' s organizations (e.g., Bystydzienski, 1989a; F r e e m a n , 1 9 7 9 ) . In m o s t c o n t e m p o r a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s , w o m e n a r e f o u n d predominantly at the lower levels. In 1988, employed women in the United States were g r o u p e d largely in two occupational categories:

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administrative support (which includes clerical workers) and service (Rix, 1990, p. 357). While more women have been e n t e r i n g traditionally male domains in recent decades, women generally do not hold positions of power and authority within occupational hierarchies, and the relatively few women in management tend to be c o n c e n t r a t e d in lower-paying positions and in less-prestigious organizations (U.S. Department of Labor, 1991). For the most part, world labor markets continue to be sex-segregated, with women performing less-valued work and concentrated in support functions (Waring, 1988). Those who have studied women in modern organizations have pointed out that most are found at the bottom of hierarchies, in j o b s that o f f e r little room for advancement, typically b e i n g supervised by men, and working almost exclusively with o t h e r women (Benson, 1978; Costello, 1985; Melosh, 1982). In these female-dominated employment situations women tend to develop work cultures that help them cope with the structural constraints of the workplace (Chase, 1987). Do these female work cultures differ from those developed by men in male-dominated, low-level occupations? T h e r e is some indication that they do. While in both cases people seek creative ways to overcome the constraints of their work environments, and they both adapt to and resist imposed circumstances, women differ from men in the specific ways they interpret their tasks and form social relations at work. For instance, women's work cultures tend to be outwardly more cooperative and conformist than those fashioned by men. In the classic experiments at the Hawthorne Western Electric plant in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the groups that c o o p e r a t e d with management were all-female, whereas the g r o u p that established a production quota and was aggressively controlling and suspicious of management was all-male (Kanter, 1981, p. 411). Although women's work groups tend to be more conciliatory toward management and tend to define their work grievances more narrowly than male groups (Westwood, 1984), closer examination of women's work experiences has revealed that they also resist poor and oppressive working conditions (Chase, 1987). Women's resistance, however, is often manifested differently than that of male workers, who tend to respond in overtly aggressive ways such as restricting output or striking. Women are more likely to i m p o r t a "domestic" culture into the workplace by "celebrating major life events together and developing warm and familial friendships which both appropriate and extend beyond work time" (Westwood, 1984, p. 6). This is not to say that women

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never develop m o r e militant postures or go on strike, b u t that they t e n d to r e s p o n d to t h e constraints of t h e i r work situations by drawing o n their experiences outside of work a n d thus h u m a n i z i n g t h e workplace. In their more aggressive stance toward unsatisfactory working conditions, m e n are also drawing on experience. However, it is i m p o r t a n t to r e m e m b e r that because m e n hold h i g h e r social status t h a n w o m e n , they can use it to t h e i r a d v a n t a g e vis-á-vis m a n a g e m e n t , which is usually also male. H e n c e , f e m a l e a n d m a l e work cultures can be u n d e r s t o o d as responses to work conditions, responses that are shaped by the different experiences a n d positions of m e n a n d women. W o m e n also bring their life e x p e r i e n c e s ( f r o m p e r s o n a l a n d family spheres) into organizations they create for themselves. Studies of w o m e n ' s organizations (e.g., w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t organizations, F r e e m a n , 1979; battered women's shelters, Rodriguez, 1988; the Girl Scouts, Helgesen, 1990) have f o u n d that they t e n d to be low in hierarchy, have little role specialization, a n d have few formal rules. T h o s e organizations established by w o m e n f o r w o m e n t h a t are explicitly feminist 1 a r e the least b u r e a u c r a t i c ( F e r g u s o n , 1984; R o d r i g u e z , 1988), a n d t h e r e is e v i d e n c e that even in the m o r e f o r m a l l y r u n w o m e n ' s o r g a n i z a t i o n s f e m a l e executives e s c h e w traditional hierarchies in favor of a m o r e participatory, "circular" type of m a n a g e m e n t (Helgesen, 1990). Studies of women in male-dominated sectors of organizations, in m a n a g e m e n t a n d the professions, have shown that the s t r u c t u r e a n d c u l t u r e of these higher-level o c c u p a t i o n s create p r o b l e m s f o r w o m e n that m e n d o not have to face (Chase, 1987; Cook, 1987; Epstein, 1983; Kanter, 1977). For o n e thing, while n u m b e r s of w o m e n in t h e s e m a l e - d o m i n a t e d o c c u p a t i o n s are i n c r e a s i n g , w o m e n a r e n o t r e a c h i n g t h e top positions ( C o o k , 1987; U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of Labor, 1991). Because women, particularly at the top levels, are relatively scarce in these occupations, they are subjected to " p e r f o r m a n c e pressures because of their visibility, the h e i g h t e n i n g of b o u n d a r i e s a r o u n d m a l e c o l l e g i a l g r o u p s , a n d 'role e n c a p s u l a t i o n ' — t h e tendency of their male coworkers to treat t h e m in stereotypical ways" (Chase, 1987, p. 6). Moreover, as some have p o i n t e d out, organizational s t r u c t u r e s of t h e s e o c c u p a t i o n s a r e established to suit a traditional male lifestyle, with a wife at h o m e a n d thus with no extra responsibilities outside of work (Hochschild, 1975). This t a k e n - f o r - g r a n t e d aspect of m a n a g e m e n t a n d t h e p r o f e s s i o n s i m p e d e s the careers of w o m e n with families. Many r e s e a r c h e r s also have shown that the power of these o c c u p a t i o n s resides in m a l e collegial g r o u p s , "old boy networks," a n d in

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associations that generally e x c l u d e women in subtle and overt ways (Clark a n d C o r c o r a n , 1986; Kaufman, 1 9 8 4 ; L o r b e r , 1984; Reskin, 1 9 7 8 ) . G e n d e r discrimination, rooted as it is in the status o f w o m e n in a m a l e - d o m i n a t e d society, follows women into the world o f work and creates visible barriers to their advancement. T h e s a m e b a r r i e r s t h a t m a k e it d i f f i c u l t f o r w o m e n to d e m o n s t r a t e c o m p e t e n c e a n d to a d v a n c e in m a l e - d o m i n a t e d o c c u p a t i o n s i n f l u e n c e w o m e n ' s e x e r c i s e o f leadership. Given t h e existing sex-stratification patterns in organizations, when the rare woman o c c u p i e s a top position, she may n o t b e able to e x e r c i s e authority effectively (Kanter, 1 9 8 1 ) . W h e t h e r t h e r e are m a j o r sex differences in leadership style is still an o p e n question. S o m e studies have f o u n d n o n e (e.g., Crozier, 1965; Megaree, 1969; Powell, 1 9 8 8 ) , while o t h e r s have emphasized w o m e n ' s reluctance to assume visible leadership, t h e i r minimization of authoritative exercise o f power, and their maximization o f subordinate autonomy (Helgesen, 1 9 9 0 ; Kanter, 1981; West, 1 9 7 6 ) . Given t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r which w o m e n work in maled o m i n a t e d organizations, it is small wonder that studies dealing with the p r e s e n c e o f women find that it makes little d i f f e r e n c e to the functioning o f these organizations (Kanter, 1981; Frank, 1 9 7 7 ) . Since powerful p o s i t i o n s a r e o c c u p i e d largely by m e n , w o m e n have l i m i t e d o p p o r t u n i t y to i n f l u e n c e d e c i s i o n s a n d p o l i c i e s . Most research on women in c o n t e m p o r a r y male-dominated organizations suggests that w o m e n develop two m a j o r patterns o f a d a p t a t i o n : cooptation and segregation. T h e first applies to those structures and occupations where women work alongside men but which are maled o m i n a t e d . H e r e , w o m e n a c c e p t male definitions o f the situation and try to b l e n d into the male organizational culture. T h e s e c o n d pattern manifests itself in groups o f f e m a l e workers who b e c o m e effectively isolated from the organizational mainstream and cultivate female friendship, support, and c o o p e r a t i o n in o r d e r to c o p e with low status and p o o r working c o n d i t i o n s . B o t h patterns p r e c l u d e w o m e n as a g r o u p f r o m having an i n d e p e n d e n t e f f e c t on t h e structure and culture o f mainstream organizations. T h e implications o f these findings for w o m e n ' s use of f o r c e appear straightforward: women are e x c l u d e d largely from positions where decisions to use force would be made, and in the rare cases where they are in places of power, they are likely to go along with such decisions. Are we to c o n c l u d e , t h e n , that t h e i n c r e a s i n g p r e s e n c e o f women in m a l e - d o m i n a t e d organizations has m a d e n o d i f f e r e n c e ? S o m e r e c e n t feminist research appears to suggest otherwise. T h i s research attempts to u n d e r s t a n d women as "subjects" and thus tries

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to view their organizational existence from their own point of view (Chase, 1987). From this perspective, it becomes clear that the two patterns of adaptation developed by women to cope with their conditions of work are complex and contradictory. For instance, women who appear to have been coopted into male-dominated organizational strata are o f t e n painfully c o g n i z a n t of t h e contradictions in which they are involved. On the one hand, they are frequently aware of the structural impediments to their full integration and yet the only way they can function is to ignore that knowledge (Chase, 1987, p. 17). W o m e n are t h u s o f t e n simultaneously "immersed in and estranged from" (Westkott, 1979, p. 422) their occupations. The resultant tension arising f r o m a disjuncture between consciousness and behavior has the potential of transforming the workplace. Some recent studies of women in traditionally male occupations have begun to suggest that the influx of women may be changing some fields. A survey of many occupations by Cihon and Wesman (1987) revealed that women and men p e r f o r m e d the same occupations differently, with women placing more importance on c o o p e r a t i o n with coworkers and expressive aspects of work relationships. A study of women in architecture found that female architects used a more holistic, socially responsible, and flexible approach to design and planning than their male counterparts (Kennedy, 1989). A study of women prison guards showed that women did not p e r f o r m the role as men have p e r f o r m e d it traditionally; rather, they tended to be more flexible and to develop friendly relations with, and to provide s u p p o r t for, inmates (Zimmer, 1987). There is evidence that women may be changing some aspects of occupational and organizational structures, but the questions that remain are, what would constitute a meaningful transformation, and under what conditions can women bring about a significant change? In an organizational context, transformation of existing structure and culture would require a full integration of women, but not on men's terms. T h e association of managerial and professional qualities with maleness and of low-prestige occupations with femaleness would need to cc-asc as organizations would no longer advantage men over women (Chase, 1987, p. 20). Moreover, women would need to be able to bring into organizations a different perspective or point of view stemming from their own experience as women. Factors that would facilitate this integration might include significant numbers of women at all organizational levels and the extra-organizational existence of independent women's groups with

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a feminist consciousness and agenda. T h e next and last section of the chapter focuses on these questions by examining women's attempts to transform politics.

Women Changing Politics Politics is an important institution on which to focus, particularly in reference to the use of force, as it is within this realm that decisions are made about the utilization of power that affect entire nations. Historically, throughout most of the world, women have been excluded from the political realm and only in recent decades have made some inroads into this male domain. Researchers who have focused on the increasing numbers of women in political parties, caucuses, governments, and other political organizations have tried to assess the effects of the growing female representation on governmental and military policies (see, e.g., Bystydzienski, 1992a). It is widely assumed that women as a group have something different from men to contribute to politics. Because most human societies for at least the last two thousand years have had a division of labor by sex, women and men have developed different ways of acting and thinking. Thus, for example, women's life-sustaining and preserving activities performed in the realm of the family and immediate community might lead them to take a-stronger stance than men against the use of military force (Ruddick, 1989). It is expected that by bringing more cooperative, caring, and less hierarchical values into mainstream politics, women will transform the existing system into a m o r e responsive, democratic one. In politics, as in e c o n o m i c work organizations, the full integration of women would require not just their numerical or "descriptive" representation, but a "substantive" representation as well (Pitkin, 1967). Women, thus, would need to be able to express their views and concerns and to incorporate them into the agendas, policies, and decisions made by the political organizations they entered. In the United States, as well as in many other countries, feminists have placed considerable hope on the notion that getting more women into the formal political system would make a difference. For instance, in the United States, the coalition known as the Feminist Majority has actively encouraged women to run for office and women voters to vote for female candidates (Feminist

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Majority Report, 1991). In Japan, the last decade has witnessed a growth in the women's movement and an unprecedented support a m o n g women for women political candidates (Ling and Matsuno, 1992). But does greater numerical female political representation result in substantive representation? The answer, as we have seen in the discussion of women in male-dominated organizations, is that numbers alone are not enough for women to have an effect on policies and decisions. While some studies have suggested that female representation has to be at least 15 percent for women to influence group processes (South et al., 1982; Spangler et al., 1978; Yoder et al., 1989), there have b e e n g o v e r n m e n t s with substantially h i g h e r f e m a l e representation where women had no voice. For instance, in the governments of Communist Poland and the Soviet Union women m a d e u p a q u a r t e r and a third of political representatives, respectively, at the national level, but had no influence as women on the monolithic political structures. This was partly because of the inflexibility of the system and its lack of acceptance of diverse views, as well as because women did not occupy important positions of power and were only selected to fulfill the ideological principle of more equal gender representation (Regulska, 1992). Traditional views and unequal treatment of women persisted in these countries despite a public rhetoric of gender equality (Bystydzienski, 1989b). Most important, the Polish and Soviet women lacked training in grassroots women's movements and did not have a feminist agenda to bring with them into the realm of formal politics. Once the monolithic governments fell in these two countries, women did not enter the newly formed, more democratic structures as women's representatives; in fact, in Poland women got only 14.8 percent of parliamentary seats in the 1990 election, and there were no women at all in the ruling cabinet formed in 1991. T h e cases of Norway and Japan, on the other hand, illustrate that women can have an effect on politics whether their numbers are large or small, as long as there exist grassroots movements to train and encourage women to run for public offices and provide support and pressure for change from outside the existing political system. Norway has recently achieved a 47 percent female representation in the ruling cabinet, has a 35 percent female representation in parliament, and has over 30 percent at the local level (Royal Norwegian Embassy, 1990). J a p a n ' s f e m a l e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is minuscule by comparison: 5.9 percent at the national level and only 2.3 percent in municipal councils (Kubo, 1990). However, despite the e n o r m o u s difference in women's numerical representation, in

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b o t h c o u n t r i e s a s t r o n g w o m e n ' s p r e s e n c e has b e e n felt in t h e political realm. Although Norway historically has h a d some female involvement in politics, p a r t i c u l a r l y at t h e local level, w o m e n ' s p o l i t i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n did n o t b e c o m e significant until t h e 1970s. A wello r g a n i z e d w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t d e d i c a t e d to g e t t i n g m o r e w o m e n elected to Norway's local a n d national legislatures was the crucial f a c t o r in this a c h i e v e m e n t (Bystydzienski, 1987). M o r e o v e r , t h e m o v e m e n t recognized that women as a g r o u p had s o m e t h i n g u n i q u e to b r i n g i n t o politics by virtue of their d i f f e r e n t e x p e r i e n c e s as w o m e n living in a m a l e - d o m i n a t e d society (Bystydzienski, 1992b). B e g i n n i n g in the late 1960s, activist w o m e n , aided by most of t h e political parties a n d the g o v e r n m e n t , organized election c a m p a i g n s to get m o r e w o m e n into politics. These campaigns were so effective that in the course of two decades f e m a l e representation m o r e t h a n tripled at the national level, f r o m less than 10 p e r c e n t in the 1960s to 35 p e r c e n t in t h e late 1980s. At t h e m u n i c i p a l level, w o m e n ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n rose f r o m 5 p e r c e n t in 1963 to 30 p e r c e n t by 1986 (Forde a n d H e m e s , 1988). T h e increasing n u m b e r of w o m e n began in t h e 1970s to have an e f f e c t o n g o v e r n m e n t policies a n d legislation. In 1978, Norway a d o p t e d an Equal Status Act, which is the only legal provision of its type in the world because, unlike its equivalents in o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , it is n o t n e u t r a l a c c o r d i n g to g e n d e r . T h e o p e n i n g p a r a g r a p h of this d o c u m e n t states: "This Act shall p r o m o t e equal status between the sexes a n d aims particularly at i m p r o v i n g t h e p o s i t i o n of w o m e n " (Ministry of C o n s u m e r Affairs a n d G o v e r n m e n t Administration, 1985, p. 5). T h e Act also acknowledges that it is n o t possible to achieve equal status between m e n a n d w o m e n merely by p r o h i b i t i n g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d indicates that affirmative measures must be taken to rectify discrepancies between the sexes in education, at work, a n d in politics. T h e lack of g e n d e r neutrality of the Act is directly attributable to the i n f l u e n c e of the female politicians who were involved in d r a f t i n g the d o c u m e n t a n d to a strong w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t that insisted that the Act reflect a view of equality in accordance with w o m e n ' s interests (Bystydzienski, 1 9 9 2 b ) . T h e f u r t h e r e s t a b l i s h m e n t of an " O m b u d " (or commissioner's) office to e n f o r c e the provisions of the Equal Status Act a n d the addition in 1981 of a provision a i m e d at increasing the n u m b e r of w o m e n o n all publicly a p p o i n t e d committees, boards, a n d councils m a d e the Norwegian Act a d o c u m e n t with teeth, unlike those of most o t h e r countries. W o m e n ' s views a n d concerns have been reflected in many other

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political measures a n d policies in Norway. By the mid-1980s, several political parties officially a c c e p t e d sex quotas (at least 40 p e r c e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of each sex a m o n g party c a n d i d a t e s in elections), while the r e m a i n i n g parties did so unofficially. Despite a worsening e c o n o m y in the 1980s because of the fall of N o r t h Sea oil prices, t h e N o r w e g i a n g o v e r n m e n t i n c r e a s e d its e m p h a s i s o n families. Child-care subsidies have grown, a n d paid parental leave was raised f r o m sixteen to e i g h t e e n weeks. Provisions w e r e m a d e also f o r p a r e n t s to take u p to ten days each (single parents, twenty) f r o m work f o r family emergencies (Overholser, 1987, p. 16). T h e growing responsiveness of the Norwegian political parties a n d g o v e r n m e n t to w o m e n ' s issues c o i n c i d e d with the increasing n u m b e r of w o m e n in public offices. As m o r e w o m e n e n t e r e d the Norwegian P a r l i a m e n t a n d county a n d m u n i c i p a l councils, they b r o u g h t specific w o m e n ' s c o n c e r n s to g o v e r n m e n t a l discussions, d e b a t e s , a n d legislation. Many of t h e s e w o m e n received t h e i r political training in the w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t a n d were sympathetic to the views a n d d e m a n d s of w o m e n ; many c o n s i d e r e d themselves feminists. T h e y t h u s took a f e m i n i s t a g e n d a d e v e l o p e d by t h e w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t i n t o e s t a b l i s h m e n t politics, w h e r e it h a d a significant impact (Bystydzienski, 1992b). T h e r e is some indication that in Norway w o m e n in politics have been able to p r o m o t e a m o r e peaceful stance on a n u m b e r of issues t h a n did previous g o v e r n m e n t s a n d organizations that h a d fewer women as members. While the country has h a d a tradition of social j u s t i c e a n d peace, t h e g r o w i n g n u m b e r of f e m i n i s t w o m e n in politics have p i o n e e r e d as well as s u p p o r t e d s o u n d e n v i r o n m e n t a l policies, a n t i n u c l e a r p o w e r provisions, a n d d e v e l o p m e n t aid targeting women in T h i r d World countries. J a p a n has n o t h a d t h e s a m e steady i n f l u x of w o m e n i n t o political offices as Norway. In fact, the highest n u m b e r of w o m e n elected to the J a p a n e s e National Diet (about 8 p e r c e n t ) took place in 1947, t h e first election in which w o m e n were allowed to vote (Robins-Mowry, 1983, p. 95); J a p a n e s e w o m e n have yet to surpass this record. Nevertheless, w o m e n ' s political activism c o n t i n u e d after World War II and intensified in the subsequent decades. J a p a n e s e w o m e n h a v e h a d a h i s t o r y of p a c i f i s t a n d antimilitaristic actions. T h e r e was a s t r o n g feminist opposition to J a p a n ' s involvement in b o t h world wars a n d to the g o v e r n m e n t ' s military expansionism in C h i n a in the 1930s (Bingham a n d Gross, 1987). Although a full-fledged peace m o v e m e n t did not develop in J a p a n until the 1960s, w o m e n carried on their antiwar stance f r o m earlier in t h e century d u r i n g the p o s t - W o r l d War II period. T h e i r

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activism was renewed by the nuclear devastation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as by the postwar U.S. military occupation. During the late 1940s a n d the 1950s, women staged protests near U.S. military bases aiming to reclaim lost land and to stop prostitution (Caldecott, 1983). Later, as the Japanese peace movement took hold, women d e m o n s t r a t e d in large n u m b e r s against nuclear weapons and the use of nuclear energy (Pharr, 1981). By the 1960s, many Japanese women were involved in civic o r g a n i z a t i o n s such as the P a r e n t - T e a c h e r s Association or housewives' associations. These groups provided women with o r g a n i z a t i o n a l t r a i n i n g a n d b e c a m e i m p o r t a n t avenues f o r networking. Many women who had served in civic organizations subsequently j o i n e d political parties, became involved in political campaigns, and even ran for public office (Bingham and Gross, 1987, p. 296). Japanese women also became active in environmental and consumer movements. Women led the Anti-Minamata Disease campaign during the 1960s (Bingham and Gross, 1987, p. 296) and later spearheaded numerous demonstrations and protests against industrial pollution, deforestation, and disposal of hazardous wastes. Since the 1960s, J a p a n e s e women also have f o r m e d consumer cooperatives that at first focused on ways to increase the quality and reduce the cost of consumer goods and now increasingly serve as avenues for recruiting and promoting political candidates (Kubo, 1990). It is the co-ops, run and staffed mostly by women, that have b e c o m e centers of the grassroots J a p a n e s e women's movement. Japanese women thus have had three decades of social activism b e f o r e they began to focus on political offices, to organize campaigns to bring more women into politics as candidates, and to convince women to vote for their own sex. Several corruption scandals in the ruling governments and the introduction of a proportional representation system for elections to the U p p e r House of the Diet in 1980 aided Japanese women in their resolve (Ling and Matsuno, 1992). Research on women in politics in J a p a n indicates that female politicians have brought a different dimension into political offices. They focus more than their male counterparts on quality-of-life issues, including problems of everyday life faced by families and individuals. Their down-to-earth approach makes politics more understandable to the general public, and there is widespread belief, especially a m o n g female voters, that g e n d e r can make a d i f f e r e n c e in terms of how politics is c o n d u c t e d (Ling and Matsuno, 1992). T h e relatively few women politicians have given a

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great deal of attention to the problems of the environment, and in 1991, when the Japanese Diet was debating whether to give several million dollars to the United States to cover expenses i n c u r r e d by the Gulf War, it was the female representatives who argued most vehemently for spending the money on refugees from the Gulf region. T h e J a p a n e s e case clearly shows that in o r d e r f o r women to make a difference in politics, grassroots training a n d a recognition of a n d c o m m i t m e n t to w o m e n ' s views a n d c o n c e r n s must be f o s t e r e d a m o n g those r u n n i n g f o r political office. A l t h o u g h n u m e r o u s women with such backgrounds help immensely to bring about change, numbers alone will not suffice. T h e importance of a link between women's, especially feminist, organizations and female politicians should not be underestimated. T h e r e is evidence f r o m the United States (where female politicians are relatively few) that f e m a l e legislators who are involved with w o m e n ' s organizations are most active in r e p r e s e n t i n g w o m e n ' s issues and concerns in their work; they are notably more likely than men and than other women politicians to work on legislation aimed at helping women (Carroll, 1992).

Summary and Conclusion The sociological studies of women in groups and organizations have indicated that even though structures occupied by women only are substantially different f r o m those filled by men only, in mixed-sex situations women generally do not exert much influence as women on g r o u p processes and organizational decisionmaking because they are typically e x c l u d e d f r o m positions of power. Moreover, even when women d o attain more influential positions, their lower social status interferes with their ability to insert their views. It has been assumed widely that more equal numbers of women in male-dominated groups a n d organizations should bring about a balance of male a n d f e m a l e perspectives. However, as the case studies of women in politics reviewed here have shown, n u m b e r s alone are not a sufficient precondition for a "women's effect." It is clear that j u s t getting more women into elected offices will not bring about significant change. W o m e n entering the political realm n e e d to have training in grassroots w o m e n ' s movements and to have a feminist a g e n d a to bring with them. While in office, they need to work with o t h e r f e m a l e politicians a n d w o m e n ' s g r o u p s a n d organizations outside the system.

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As the cases of Norway and Japan indicate, women can make a d i f f e r e n c e in politics provided they are backed by women's organizations and see themselves as representatives of women's interests and concerns. Under such conditions women can insert more peaceful views into political agendas and perhaps even influence military policies in the direction of lesser use of force.

Note In this chapter, "feminism" refers to a general perspective that recognizes the oppression of women by men and seeks to reduce sex inequality. Thus an explicitly feminist organization is one that officially endorses this view.

chapter

H a n d g u n Ownership Among U.S. Women and Its Consequences for Social J u d g m e n t Nyla R. Branscombe, Susan Owen T h e United States has been designated the "gun culture" by one prominent historian (Hofstadter, 1970). Although the n u m b e r of weapons in private hands in the United States cannot be determined precisely, evidence from a variety of sociological sources indicates that as of 1980 there were approximately 120 million guns, with every other household possessing one (Wright, Daly, and Rossi, 1983). Approximately one-third of the guns owned by U.S. citizens are easily concealed handguns, purchased for the stated purpose of selfdefense. In the past, weaponry of all sorts, and guns in particular, were primarily a male-only domain (Arkin and Dobrofsky, 1978), but increasing numbers of U.S. women have been purchasing guns (Quigley, 1989). On the assumption that women are an insufficiently tapped consumer group, Smith and Wesson, the largest U.S. handgun manufacturer, began in 1989 to market a new line of w e a p o n s — t h e Ladysmith, a .38 caliber revolver—designed specifically for women. This company expects sales of handguns to women to continue rising (with another 15 to 16 million making this purchase during the early 1990s), and their advertisements, found in many national women's magazines, emphasize how a gun allows a woman to p r o t e c t herself and h e r family (Pero, personal communication, April 1989). Although estimates vary considerably across sources, somewhere between 12 million and 42 million American women currently own a gun (Quigley, 1989). This ongoing social change in the gender composition of gun owners in the United States has received little research attention, although what is known about the psychological and sociological factors involved will be examined in this chapter. Specifically, research on attitudes toward guns, the motivation b e h i n d their purchase, the characteristics of women who do buy guns, observers' inferences about women who own guns, and the judgments made about women who use guns will be examined.

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Attitudes Toward Guns Guns, and the violence that can result from their use, have received considerable media attention. Debates between anti-gun-control supporters and advocates of gun-control laws abound. The National Rifle Association, a prominent anti-gun-control organization, argues that guns protect their owners against crime. Pro-control advocates, on the other hand, suggest that guns do not protect their owners against criminal victimization but that they actually stimulate crime and other forms of aggressive behavior (Berkowitz, 1974). If guns were not so easily accessible, according to the pro-control advocates, then fewer gun-related violent deaths, including suicides (for which firearms usage is increasing; see Mcintosh and Santos, 1982), would occur. In an attempt to understand how individuals differ in their beliefs about guns, Branscombe, Weir, and Crosby (1991) developed a scale to measure these two perspectives on gun ownership—that guns provide their owners with protection and guns stimulate violence—as well as the more general issue of whether gun ownership is (or should be) a basic U.S. right. Men and women differed in their responses to these three attitude dimensions, with males displaying more positive attitudes toward guns, relative to females. This is consistent with prior research suggesting that men are more tolerant of aggressive stands on both domestic and international topics than are women (Eagly and Steffen, 1986; Kelley and Schmidt, 1989; Oskamp, 1977). Women are more likely to perceive guns as a stimulant to crime, and they are less likely than men to believe that guns protect their owners from victimization. In addition, women are less likely to endorse gun ownership as a general right that the U.S. public should possess. To understand why people differ in their attitudes toward guns, a variety of other factors were also assessed. People who believe that gun ownership is a basic right and who believe that guns are protection f r o m criminal victimization tend to be politically conservative; display pride in their U.S. identity; perceive themselves as sports fans; and possess more negative attitudes regarding women's roles, behaviors, and characteristics (e.g., believe an unmarried mother is morally a greater failure than an unmarried father, and a woman who refuses to bear children has failed in her duty to her husband). People who agree with the idea that guns stimulate crime tend to be politically liberal, have less pride in the United States, do not consider themselves sports fans, and strongly

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endorse feminist attitudes (e.g., believe that women have the right to compete with men in every sphere of activity). Political conservatism, high self-esteem, a n d p r i d e in o n e ' s national identity uniquely predict beliefs about gun ownership as a citizen's right. Believing that others are not trustworthy, having little self-perceived personal i n d e p e n d e n c e , and disagreeing with feminist ideas are the strongest predictors of agreement with the notion that guns provide protection f r o m victimization. Political liberalism and a low frequency of experiencing a n g e r are the best predictors of acceptance of the possibility that gun availability stimulates crime. Thus, we see a constellation of psychological characteristics that are related to attitudes toward guns a m o n g both m e n and women. However, men in general report more positive attitudes toward guns than women do. W h a t are the m a j o r factors that d i f f e r e n t i a t e between male and f e m a l e g u n owners? Why is the rate of U.S. w o m e n p u r c h a s i n g g u n s increasing, yet the rate a m o n g m e n remaining relatively constant?

Fear of Victimization and Actual Risk Fear of victimization may be o n e factor underlying the increase in gun ownership a m o n g women. Fear of criminal victimization is, however, n o t strongly related to actual vulnerability or risk (Maxfield, 1984). In the United States, young, single, minority males who live in u r b a n areas have the highest likelihood of being victims of interpersonal violence and of sustaining injury as a consequence of that victimization. T h e i r assailants are likely to have similar d e m o g r a p h i c characteristics ( G o t t f r e d s o n , 1984; H o u g h a n d Mayhew, 1983; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981). In contrast to their high level of actual risk of criminal victimization, these men report feeling reasonably safe or very safe on the streets alone after dark. Although fear increases with age a n d varies by area of residence, overall, m e n ' s r e p o r t e d fear is approximately one-third that of w o m e n ' s ( C h a m b e r s a n d T o m b s , 1984; H i n d e l a n g , G o t t f r e d s o n , a n d Garofalo, 1978; H o u g h and Mayhew, 1983; Maxfield, 1984; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981). Thus, even though m e n of all ages a p p e a r to be at greater risk of criminal victimization by strangers than are women, men report feeling safer than women do. Women actually constitute a "low-risk" population with respect to interpersonal criminal violence by strangers, according to the results of g o v e r n m e n t - s p o n s o r e d victimization surveys (Stanko,

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1987). T h e d e m o g r a p h i c characteristics of women and men who have been victims are generally the same, although t h e r e is o n e m a j o r d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e two. Men r e p o r t s a m e - g e n d e r assailants. W o m e n , on the o t h e r hand, are not victimized by o t h e r women; they are victimized by men, who frequently sexually assault t h e m in addition to the battering that male victims e x p e r i e n c e . Criminal violence for women takes on elements of sexual violence a n d is often an action by a man known to a woman. W o m e n are m o r e likely to be physically assaulted, beaten, and killed in their own homes "at the hands of a loved o n e than anyplace else or by anyone else in o u r society" (Gelles and Strauss, 1988, p. 5). Yet, stereotypical images a b o u t criminal violence remain focused o n violence occurring outside, on the street, or by h o m e intruders, all of whom typically involve strangers. Despite their reported low risk of such f o r m s of victimization, women constitute the g r o u p most f e a r f u l of such crime (Balkin, 1979; Dubrow, 1979; Rigor a n d Gordon, 1981; Smith a n d Uchida, 1988). Thus, for the most part, women have more fear of criminal victimization by strangers than do men, although the type of crime they fear f r o m u n k n o w n street assailants and burglars is actually where they are least at risk. W o m e n ' s f e a r of c r i m e is i n d e e d p r o p o r t i o n a t e to t h e i r subjective estimates of their risk of rape (Rigor and Gordon, 1981), a crime they are at considerable risk of experiencing by s o m e o n e known to them. Recent surveys estimate that between one-third and one-half of all U.S. women will be victims of rape or attempted rape d u r i n g their lifetimes (Russell, 1982; Koss, Gidycz, and Wisniewski, 1987). Again, however, j u s t as with o t h e r f o r m s of criminal victimization, the fear is primarily of sexual assaults from strangers, which are actually m o r e likely to be committed by s o m e o n e known to the victim. We will now e x a m i n e how women cope with their elevated fear of victimization.

Women's Strategies f o r Protecting Themselves f r o m Crime Precautionary strategies are mechanisms for coping with feelings of vulnerability a n d insecurity. Tyler (1980) f o u n d that perceived personal vulnerability of criminal victimization is strongly related to crime-prevention behavior. Individuals who have been victimized tend to perceive themselves as more vulnerable after the event than they did before, and they are likely to change their behavior as a

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m e a n s of avoiding f u t u r e victimization (Perloff, 1983). W o m e n ' s precautionary strategies for avoiding victimization have traditionally involved social isolation (i.e., n o t g o i n g o u t at n i g h t ) , t h e use of "safe" m e n (i.e., m e n known a n d trusted by that woman, who serve as escorts) as p r o t e c t i o n f r o m o t h e r m e n , a n d t h e use of o t h e r precautionary strategies when they are out alone at night (Rigor a n d G o r d o n , 1981). Conflicting r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g how a w o m a n s h o u l d r e s p o n d if a n d when she is attacked are r a m p a n t (Morgan, 1986). Despite t h e m i x e d messages c o n c e r n i n g t h e value of resistance versus passivity, e n r o l l m e n t in self-defense classes is rising, as is the n u m b e r of w o m e n purchasing guns to use as weapons (Bales, 1988; Gibbs, 1988; Quigley, 1989). T h e p u r c h a s e of a g u n for protection against criminal victimization is a precautionary strategy that many w o m e n r e p o r t they have already u n d e r t a k e n or they are actively c o n s i d e r i n g f o r the f u t u r e ( B r a n s c o m b e a n d O w e n , 1991). With m o r e w o m e n b e c o m i n g socially a n d economically i n d e p e n d e n t of m e n (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1979) a n d assuming the traditional m a l e roles of p r o t e c t o r a n d p r o v i d e r by b e c o m i n g h e a d s of h o u s e h o l d s a n d / o r homeowners, they are also taking responsibility f o r t h e i r own safety. Either these w o m e n are n o t willing to use traditional precautionary strategies, those strategies are not available to them, or they perceive the traditional precautionary strategies as unlikely to be successful. For example, it is difficult to differentiate "safe" m e n f r o m "unsafe" men, as evidenced by the fact that most rapes are c o m m i t t e d by m e n known to w o m e n (Koss et al., 1987). In addition, recent survey research indicates that u p to 67 p e r c e n t of d a t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s involve s o m e kind of violence (Gelles a n d Strauss, 1988), domestic violence is the m a j o r cause of injury to w o m e n u n d e r forty in t h e U n i t e d States (Basow, 1986), a n d a p p r o x i m a t e l y 14 p e r c e n t of w o m e n e x p e r i e n c e marital r a p e (Finkelhor a n d Yllo, 1985; Russell, 1982).

Characteristics of Gun Owners Smith a n d Uchida (1988) report that people who purchase guns for self-protection have had a household m e m b e r victimized in the last year, believe crime is increasing in their n e i g h b o r h o o d , believe that police service is p o o r in their area, a n d tend to live in u r b a n centers. Male g u n owners have been f o u n d to have a high n e e d for power, to be m o r e willing to approve of the use of force, to have h a d m o r e

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e x p e r i e n c e w i t h v i o l e n c e , a n d to b e m o r e f e a r f u l t h a n m a l e n o n - g u n - o w n e r s a r e (Lizotte a n d B o r d u a , 1980). M e n w h o d o n o t own g u n s a r e m o r e sociable a n d have a h i g h e r n e e d f o r affiliation, relative to m a l e g u n owners (Diener a n d Kerber, 1979). T h e little r e s e a r c h t h a t has e x a m i n e d t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of w o m e n w h o own g u n s suggests that single u r b a n w o m e n w h o own g u n s have a pessimistic p e r c e p t i o n of o t h e r s , favor t h e use of f o r c e to resolve societal a n d social p r o b l e m s , a r e P r o t e s t a n t , a n d have b e e n v i c t i m s of c r i m i n a l v i o l e n c e . T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t f e a r of victimization is a n i m p o r t a n t motivator f o r g u n p u r c h a s e s a m o n g w o m e n , as n e i t h e r o c c u p a t i o n n o r e d u c a t i o n d i s t i n g u i s h e d f e m a l e g u n o w n e r s f r o m f e m a l e s w h o d o n o t own g u n s (Williams, Marolla, a n d M c G r a t h , 1981). W h a t d e t e r m i n e s a w o m a n ' s choice of g u n o w n e r s h i p as a selfp r o t e c t i v e s t r a t e g y , a m o n g t h e m a n y possibilities t h a t c o u l d b e selected (i.e., h o m e burglary alarm systems, o w n i n g a large d o g , a n d so o n ) ? Lizotte a n d B o r d u a (1980) suggest t h a t family socialization d e t e r m i n e s g u n o w n e r s h i p , particularly a m o n g males. P e o p l e w h o have b e e n raised in h o u s e h o l d s w h e r e g u n s a r e p r e s e n t a n d w h o t h e r e f o r e have e x p e r i e n c e with firearms are most likely to c h o o s e a g u n f o r self-protection. T h i s d i f f e r e n c e in familiarity a n d e x p e r i e n c e with w e a p o n s a m o n g m e n a n d w o m e n m i g h t e x p l a i n why w o m e n a r e m o r e likely to believe that g u n s stimulate c r i m e as o p p o s e d to t h e n o t i o n t h a t g u n s p r o t e c t t h e m against c r i m e ( B r a n s c o m b e , Weir, a n d Crosby, 1991). W o m e n in general have simply h a d less e x p o s u r e to g u n s d u r i n g t h e i r early years t h a n m e n have. Even t h o u g h t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t h a n d g u n o w n e r s h i p d o e s a c t u a l l y p r o v i d e real p r o t e c t i o n f r o m c r i m i n a l victimization is inconsistent (Wright et al., 1 9 8 3 ) , g u n o w n e r s h i p m i g h t p r o v i d e a s e n s e of p s y c h o l o g i c a l security f o r s o m e p e o p l e (Yeager, 1976), especially t h o s e w h o have b e e n previously victimized. T o s u m m a r i z e , it a p p e a r s that, a m o n g w o m e n , c h o o s i n g a g u n f o r p r o t e c t i o n against c r i m e is a growing p h e n o m e n o n . T h i s c h a n g e in g u n o w n e r s h i p a p p e a r s to m i r r o r o t h e r social c h a n g e s t h a t have b e e n s i m u l t a n e o u s l y o c c u r r i n g (e.g., in w o m e n ' s i n c r e a s e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e w o r k f o r c e a n d the g r o w i n g n u m b e r of w o m e n w h o a r e h e a d s of h o u s e h o l d s ) . M u c h r e m a i n s u n k n o w n a b o u t t h e motivations underlying gun purchases a m o n g both women a n d m e n , h o w e v e r . F e a r of v i c t i m i z a t i o n ( r e g a r d l e s s of a c t u a l risk p o t e n t i a l ) a p p e a r s to b e a critical factor f o r w o m e n w h o c h o o s e to a d o p t this n o n t r a d i t i o n a l self-protective s t r a t e g y , b a s e d o n t h e limited l i t e r a t u r e t h a t is available. Familiarity with g u n s may also b e an i m p o r t a n t d e t e r m i n a n t in specifically c h o o s i n g a g u n f o r self-

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d e f e n s e purposes. It appears that a l t h o u g h a g u n may n o t provide any real protection against the most c o m m o n types of victimization events that women are likely to experience, it may act as a m e t h o d of calming fears related to vulnerability a n d victimization. Are t h e r e any i m p o r t a n t social c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r those w o m e n who choose a gun as a self-protective strategy? T h e n o t i o n that a woman s h o u l d not own a g u n for self-protection because it can b e easily taken away f r o m her and, as a c o n s e q u e n c e , b e used against her ignores the fact that women who d o own guns are m o r e likely than m e n to acquire professional training to learn to use t h e m safely a n d competently. Nevertheless, the issue of how w o m e n g u n owners are viewed by others is an i m p o r t a n t one. T h e following sections review a series of studies that investigated the p e r c e p t i o n s of male a n d f e m a l e gun owners, as well as the j u d g m e n t s m a d e a b o u t those who i n j u r e a n o t h e r person with a gun.

Consequences of Gun Ownership for Social Inferences Traditionally, g u n o w n e r s h i p has b e e n primarily male, a r o l e ranging f r o m playing with toy guns to e n a c t m e n t of actual military roles (Arkin a n d Dobrofsky, 1978). Men have almost exclusively occupied h u n t i n g a n d offensive roles, as well as that of p r o t e c t o r . F u r t h e r m o r e , as a result of Freud's i n f l u e n c e o n everyday c u l t u r e (see B r e n n e r , 1974), guns have come to be identified symbolically as the essence of masculinity (e.g., served as a penis symbol). Thus, gun ownership is inconsistent with stereotypes of American w o m e n . T h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of this deviation f r o m e x p e c t a n c i e s w e r e examined in two studies: o n e involving a college s t u d e n t sample a n d the o t h e r involving a larger community-based sample ( B r a n s c o m b e a n d O w e n , 1991). T h e i n f l u e n c e of g u n o w n e r s h i p o n social inferences c o n c e r n i n g three i m p o r t a n t c o m p o n e n t s of expectations a b o u t m e n a n d w o m e n — t h e roles they occupy, t h e i r physical attributes, and the traits they possess—were investigated. It was e x p e c t e d that because weapons o w n e r s h i p is consistent with social e x p e c t a t i o n s f o r m e n , o w n e r s h i p or n o n o w n e r s h i p would have less impact on how m e n are perceived t h a n on how w o m e n are perceived. Guns are symbols of aggression, a n d it is more socially acceptable for men to behave aggressively t h a n it is for w o m e n to d o so (Eagly a n d S t e f f e n , 1986). H e n c e , g u n ownership is consistent with expectations for m e n a n d s h o u l d have relatively little impact on the inferences m a d e a b o u t t h e m . T h e r e is

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one caveat to this reasoning, however. If respondents infer that a gun-owning male cannot defend himself without a weapon (he is an inadequate male), then gun ownership might reduce his perceived "masculinity" relative to a non-gun-owning male. In contrast to men, it was expected that relatively large differences would occur in the inferences drawn about women who own a gun a n d those who do not. Because gun ownership is consistent with male behavior, this type of stereotype inconsistency in women should lead people to assume such women also possess other masculine attributes. Thus, it was anticipated that female gun owners would be "masculinized" by gun ownership, taking on the psychological and physical attributes of males as a result of this violation of expectancies for females. Other research not directly involving the use of weapons has made the point that both men and women are closely scrutinized, are perceived differently, and are often penalized for behaving in a way that is stereotype inconsistent (Branscombe and Weir, 1992; Clary and Tesser, 1983; Costrich, Feinstein, Kidder, Marecek, and Pascale, 1975; Kelly, Kern, Kirkley, Patterson, and Keane, 1980; Fiske, 1982; Pyszczynski and Greenberg, 1981). Although the demographic characteristics of the two samples studied varied widely, the results were virtually identical, with the community sample showing slightly s t r o n g e r effects of gun ownership on social inferences than the college student sample. In both studies, participants were randomly assigned to indicate on scales of 0 to 100 percent the likelihood that either a male or a female who either owned a gun or for whom no mention of a gun was made possessed various traits, roles, and physical characteristics. Women who were said to own a gun were perceived as equally likely to possess male physical traits (e.g., they were broadshouldered, muscular, and tall), positive male traits (e.g., they were independent, bold, and decisive), and negative male traits (e.g., they were reckless, forceful, and aggressive), as were males who were described as gun owners. However, women who do not own guns were assumed to possess significantly fewer of these characteristics than were men who do not own guns. Thus, females who own guns gain in terms of the male stereotypic traits that they are believed to possess, while there is a tendency for males who own guns to lose some of these male stereotypic qualities. Females who are said to own a gun were also assumed to be just as unlikely as males to occupy female-dominated roles (e.g., secretary, h o m e m a k e r ) . Women who do not own a gun are, however, assumed to be more

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likely to occupy such roles, relative to m e n . Finally, g u n ownership reduces the likability of the owner, a n d this was particularly true for w o m e n . W h e n g u n o w n e r s h i p was n o t m e n t i o n e d , w o m e n w e r e perceived as m o r e likable than men. G u n ownership eliminated this difference. Both m e n a n d w o m e n with negative a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d g u n s m a d e m o r e negative inferences about g u n owners than a b o u t n o n g u n - o w n e r s , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e g u n o w n e r ' s sex. However, t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l effects of g u n o w n e r s h i p o n social i n f e r e n c e s drawn about women and men did not d e p e n d on the participant's a t t i t u d e toward guns. It a p p e a r s t h a t g u n o w n e r s h i p is i n d e e d inconsistent with the stereotype of w o m e n , a n d , of course, g e n d e r s t e r e o t y p i c e x p e c t a n c i e s a r e very w i d e s p r e a d t h r o u g h o u t t h e population. Thus, w o m e n w h o own g u n s are "masculinized," whereas g u n o w n e r s h i p has relatively little effect o n i n f e r e n c e s a b o u t m e n , although t h e r e was a tendency for male g u n owners to lose s o m e of their masculine qualities. It is possible that the image of a m a n with a g u n d e p e n d s on the motive that is i n f e r r e d f o r its ownership. If participants in the two studies assumed that the male g u n owners possessed the g u n because they were u n a b l e to d e f e n d themselves by simply relying on t h e i r own physical abilities, t h e n this perceived loss of masculinity relative to males w h o d o n o t r e q u i r e such e x t e r n a l assistance w o u l d be easily e x p l a i n e d . For t h e average woman, p e r h a p s the very idea of self-protection is inconsistent with social expectancies, l e a d i n g females with guns to b e perceived as d i f f e r e n t f r o m w o m e n who d o not own guns. Traditionally, w o m e n have relied on men to protect t h e m rather than assuming this role themselves. At any rate, the p e r c e p t i o n s of w o m e n w h o own g u n s resemble those of men a n d on the whole are less positive t h a n those m a d e about women who d o not own guns. It is likely that many w o m e n who already own a h a n d g u n , or who i n t e n d to purchase o n e in the future, implicitly realize that such ownership is inconsistent with stereotypes a n d that they m i g h t be socially penalized for it. T h e gun m a n u f a c t u r e r Smith a n d Wesson is p r o v i d i n g a toll-free a n o n y m o u s t e l e p h o n e service f o r w o m e n w a n t i n g to learn m o r e a b o u t how to use a n d w h e r e to buy their p r o d u c t . According to Smith a n d Wesson representatives, s o m e of these new female buyers d o not want anyone to know that they are buying a weapon because it would b r i n g shame a n d e m b a r r a s s m e n t (Pero, personal c o m m u n i c a t i o n , April 1989). We turn now to the issue of how m e n a n d women who actually use the gun they own to injure a h o m e i n t r u d e r are perceived.

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Social Judgment Consequences When a Gun Is Used to Injure Another Person People who use a gun against a burglar who invades their h o m e are very likely to receive considerable scrutiny f r o m the police, t h e media, a n d even the court system. With m o r e women p u r c h a s i n g h a n d g u n s to protect themselves a n d their families against h o m e intruders, making j u d g m e n t s of such events is an important social issue, particularly given that women who simply own a gun are less liked a n d are assumed to be more like men than women who do not own guns. Given the increase in g u n ownership a m o n g w o m e n , such j u d g m e n t s will p r o b a b l y be r e q u i r e d increasingly in the future. Does gun ownership provide any real protection against crime? Are h o m e o w n e r s who possess a g u n d u r i n g a burglary of their residence m o r e or less likely to be i n j u r e d by the intruder? Kleck a n d B o r d u a ' s (1983) review of interview studies with convicted burglars indicates that these prisoners do report being keenly aware of the possibility that a homeowner might possess a gun and use it to injure them. Although the percentage of burglars who are foiled by an armed homeowner is exceedingly small (2 percent), this risk is, if anything, slightly greater than the probability that a burglar will ever b e c o n v i c t e d a n d i m p r i s o n e d (Wright et al., 1983). Nevertheless, the likelihood of injury to the homeowner does appear to be somewhat elevated when the h o m e o w n e r is armed (Williams et al., 1981). Regardless of w h e t h e r widespread g u n ownership serves as an effective deterrent to burglars, many citizens believe that it does serve this function (Branscombe et al., 1991). T h e circumstances in which the use of deadly force by o n e h u m a n being against a n o t h e r is legally justified varies by state in the United States, although for the most part three conditions need to be met. Specifically, the shooting of a n o t h e r person (e.g., a h o m e i n t r u d e r ) can be d e e m e d j u s t i f i a b l e a n d legal if it can be d e m o n s t r a t e d that the i n t r u d e r had the ability, opportunity, and intention of causing grave bodily harm or death to the occupant of that residence (see Kates and Engberg, 1983, and Lafave and Scott, 1972, for f u r t h e r legal discussions on the use of deadly force). This section will p r e s e n t two studies that investigated the j u d g m e n t a l consequences of the use of a gun by a male or a female h o m e o w n e r ( B r a n s c o m b e , Crosby, a n d Weir, in press). It was assumed that because the stereotype of m e n is that they are more c o m p e t e n t than women, especially in a traditionally male domain

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such as use o f weaponry, a male h o m e o w n e r who used a gun incompetently would be more likely to be perceived as guilty o f a crime than would a male homeowner who was competent in the use o f a gun. In the first study the incompetent male gun user did not actually injure the intruder, but the competent male shooter did. T h a t is, the bullet was said to have hit the intruder or to have missed him. We e x p e c t e d that the i n c o m p e t e n t male s h o o t e r would be perceived as more guilty than the male shooter who was stereotype consistent and successfully used the weapon to injure an intruder. T h e o p p o s i t e was, however, e x p e c t e d for f e m a l e s h o o t e r s . Stereotypically, females do not own guns, and if they do, they are e x p e c t e d to be i n c o m p e t e n t in their use. T h e r e f o r e , f e m a l e homeowners who shot an intruder competently were expected to be perceived as more guilty of a crime than were incompetent female shooters. In both cases—that of the incompetent male shooter and the c o m p e t e n t female shooter—violation of p e o p l e ' s stereotypes were e x p e c t e d to increase perceived guilt and b l a m e for the outcome. In the first experiment this idea was tested by having either a male or a female homeowner hit or miss a burglar who was in the h o m e attempting to steal a stereo. In the second e x p e r i m e n t the scenario was altered slightly. In the later study, in all cases the homeowner's bullet always hit the thief who was breaking into a car in the h o m e o w n e r ' s driveway. T h e c o m p e t e n c e m a n i p u l a t i o n involved hitting the thief either as a result of skill in the use of a gun or because the bullet ricocheted off the ground and hit the thief (i.e., skill versus luck). Degree of confidence that the homeowner was guilty o f a crime and degree of perceived harm to the intruder were m e a s u r e d in the first study. In the s e c o n d study, b l a m e assigned to the homeowner for the incident, homeowner likability, and severity of the punishment advocated for the homeowner were measured. In addition, in the second study, the extent to which participants believed that guns provide their owner with protection was assessed several weeks before the experiment was conducted. As e x p e c t e d , results from the first e x p e r i m e n t showed that i n c o m p e t e n t female shooters were less likely to be perceived as guilty o f a crime, relative to competent female shooters. O n the o t h e r h a n d , c o m p e t e n t male shooters were less likely to be perceived as guilty o f a crime c o m p a r e d to i n c o m p e t e n t male shooters. T h e competent female shooter was perceived as producing more injury to the intruder than was the competent male shooter. T h e incompetent male was perceived as producing more injury than was the i n c o m p e t e n t female. In other words, people who deviated

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f r o m sex roles were perceived as producing more serious o u t c o m e s and as b e i n g m o r e guilty of a crime. R e s u l t s f r o m t h e s e c o n d e x p e r i m e n t also s u p p o r t e d o u r hypotheses a n d were consistent with what was f o u n d in the first study. F o r persons who strongly believe that gun ownership provides t h e m with p r o t e c t i o n f r o m crime, homeowners who violated those stereotypes, especially skilled f e m a l e shooters, were evaluated less positively, were c o n s i d e r e d m o r e to b l a m e for the o u t c o m e , a n d were perceived as deserving greater punishment than were e i t h e r o f the stereotype-consistent targets—the skilled male s h o o t e r o r t h e unskilled f e m a l e shooter. Previous r e s e a r c h ( B r a n s c o m b e , W e i r , a n d Crosby, 1 9 9 1 ) , reviewed e a r l i e r in the chapter, revealed that the b e l i e f that guns p r o v i d e p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t c r i m e is u n i q u e l y p r e d i c t e d by d i s a g r e e m e n t with feminist beliefs. Thus, it is likely that persons o f both g e n d e r s who agree with traditional gender stereotypes are the most likely to b l a m e a c o m p e t e n t woman s h o o t e r , relative to a c o m p e t e n t man who shoots an intruder. His behavior is consistent with g e n d e r and attitudinal expectancies, whereas hers is not.

Conclusions Stereotype-based e x p e c t a n c i e s guide j u d g m e n t and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g processes c o n c e r n i n g what women who own guns are like, how they s h o u l d be t r e a t e d if they do use deadly force with a g u n , a n d evaluations o f their actions. In this research, events involving guns were not simply j u d g e d based upon their consequences. If that were the case, in the first study both male and female homeowners who hit the i n t r u d e r should have been j u d g e d similarly. T h e y were not. In fact, perceived severity of the c o n s e q u e n c e s d e p e n d e d on how consistent t h e p e r s o n ' s actions were with g e n d e r a n d attitudinal e x p e c t a t i o n s . P e o p l e were also not j u s t using perceived threat o f bodily h a r m w h e n evaluating t h e a c t i o n s u n d e r t a k e n by t h e h o m e o w n e r . I f so, t h e n f e m a l e h o m e o w n e r s , by virtue o f their smaller size, should have been perceived as less likely to be guilty o f a c r i m e a n d as less blameworthy or punishable for their actions. Particularly in t h e s e c o n d h o m e o w n e r s h o o t i n g e x p e r i m e n t , we f o u n d t h a t s k i l l e d f e m a l e s h o o t e r s were c o n s i d e r e d t h e most blameworthy and deserving the highest punishment when the event was inconsistent with the perceiver's attitudinal expectancies. People are often unaware that their stereotypes are guiding their i n f e r e n c e

Handgun Ownership 65 a n d decisionmaking processes (see Branscombe a n d Smith, 1990), but n o n e t h e l e s s stereotype effects were clearly observed in t h e present research. W h e t h e r the conclusions drawn h e r e would hold for w o m e n whose roles require the use of force such as military or police officers is an o p e n question. Role-based e x p e c t a n c i e s may be s t r o n g e r than gender-based expectancies in s o m e cases. F u r t h e r experimental work involving the perception of military or police women and m e n who use guns to d e f e n d themselves in the course of their jobs could easily address this issue. In addition, we c a n n o t be certain whether the differential desire to punish a homeowner for using a weapon to injure an intruder would be observed a m o n g trial j u d g e s either in deciding guilt or innocence or in making sentencing decisions themselves. However, as Parisi's (1982) review of the research on s e n t e n c i n g decisions in the criminal justice system indicates, sentencing is generally equal for males and females when t h e s e r i o u s n e s s of t h e o f f e n s e is c o n t r o l l e d f o r , a l t h o u g h occasionally it a p p e a r s that "negative (punitive) t r e a t m e n t is a c c o r d e d females for 'manly' crimes" (p. 215). It a p p e a r s that although women may be treated more leniently when the crime is stereotype consistent, such as shoplifting or check fraud, t h e r e is evidence that when women commit crimes that are not expected of women such as violent crimes (e.g., m u r d e r a n d assault), their p u n i s h m e n t is more severe (Chesney-Lind, 1987). Not only are women p u n i s h e d more severely than men f o r these crimes, but when d e t e r m i n i n g their sentences, j u d g e s m o r e harshly punish women who d o not lit the societal n o r m s f o r w o m e n . In o t h e r words, women who are not married, who do not have children, or who are not economically d e p e n d e n t o n s o m e o n e such as a father or husband receive more severe sentences than d o married women with c h i l d r e n (Edwards, 1984). Ironically, t h e d e m o g r a p h i c characteristics of women who receive more severe sentences are precisely those of women who arc choosing guns as a self-protective strategy.

Summary I n c r e a s i n g n u m b e r s of women are c h o o s i n g h a n d g u n s as protective strategy against potential criminal victimization. Little known a b o u t the sociological and psychological characteristics these women. What is known is that many women who choose

a is of to

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arm themselves fear victimization and may have experienced an assault during the past year. While research suggests that possession of a gun provides little real protection against the kinds of crime that women are most at risk of experiencing, possession of a gun may provide psychological security for the owner. However, our research indicates that there are consequences for women who either own a gun or use one during a burglary of their home. Women who own guns are perceived as being psychologically and physically similar to men, compared with women who do not own a gun. Women who own guns are also disliked more than women who do not own guns. Women who skillfully use a gun to thwart a burglary are more likely to be viewed as guilty of a crime relative to women who are incompetent, particularly by perceivers who believe that guns should provide their owners with protection from such forms of criminal victimization. So, even though a gun may provide a sense of security against rape and other violent crimes, it can have potentially severe consequences for the perception of women, especially if they actually use it to protect themselves or their possessions. Women who violate traditional gender role stereotypes by using a gun may expect to be penalized by the legal system for doing so.

chapter

O

Women in Law Enforcement Barbara Carson

T h e legitimate use of force has b e e n described as acts causing pain or injury that are socially a p p r o v e d (Collins, 1974; G o o d e , 1971; 1972). Such acts are e n d o r s e d by o u r society w h e n force is used by individuals a p p o i n t e d to m a i n t a i n social control, such as military p e r s o n n e l , or, as is t h e f o c u s of this c h a p t e r , police officers. Historically, e m p l o y m e n t in these o c c u p a t i o n s has b e e n d e n i e d to females, a n d in the case of police officers, it is issues s u r r o u n d i n g the use of force that have been used to justify this exclusion. This c h a p t e r will trace the historical evolution of the role of police a n d the reasons that an emphasis on the use of force led to the conclusion that w o m e n were n o t suited f o r the j o b . It will b e seen how women in the early 1900s r e d e f i n e d the n a t u r e of police work by r e d u c i n g the i m p o r t a n c e of the use of force, thus allowing f o r t h e i r own e n t r a n c e i n t o t h e profession. A review of c u r r e n t practices will show that c o n t e m p o r a r y f e m a l e police officers use f o r c e differently t h a n male officers do. Finally, a brief review of c u r r e n t t h o u g h t on policing will show that w o m e n ' s a p p r o a c h e s to social c o n t r o l a n d t h e use of f o r c e a r e now b e c o m i n g t h e r e c o m m e n d e d standards for all police officers, regardless of their sex.

The Legitimation of Force in Policing Scholars analyzing the legitimate use of force, or as it is sometimes called, legitimate violence, argue that it is typically a rational h u m a n response. Such acts are usually goal-oriented a n d entail behavior i n c o r p o r a t e d into everyday systems of actions (Ball-Rokeach, 1980). T h e s e acts may be s a n c t i o n e d by laws, c o u r t systems, e c o n o m i c systems, a n d community n o r m s (Goode, 1971, 1972). Definitions of legitimate and illegitimate use of force tend to vary d e p e n d i n g u p o n historical period, context, a n d circumstances (Williams, 1981).

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Police officers in the United States are allowed to use more force than other citizens on the assumption that police are thereby enabled to maintain order and control. So, for example, police are authorized to carry guns and are allowed to use them in situations where most citizens are not. This access to legitimate force has been permitted ever since the establishment of modern policing in the United States. Police departments in this country were first formed after an experiment in London (Walker, 1992), where Sir Robert Peel established the first modern police department in 1829. The British had rejected the idea of police for more than five hundred years, fearing that a quasimilitary organization would deny citizens personal liberties, but by the early nineteenth century the desire for safety in the street and a civil society prevailed, and the London government agreed to try the idea of fulltime police officers (Reith, 1943). In this British model, j o b requirements to become a police officer were stringent. One had to be healthy, strong, literate, lawabiding, an outstanding citizen in the community—and male. Considerable screening ensured that these officers were men who refrained from any "ungentlemanlike" behavior, such as swearing or drinking alcohol (Lundman, 1980). When the first police departments were created in the United States (Boston in 1838, New York City in 1845, and Chicago in 1851), much of the organizational structure and j o b responsibilities were modeled on the London police force, but the criteria for hiring the first U.S. police officers were very different (Walker, 1977). In the United States, police work was a political patronage j o b (Miller, 1973). Men who supported the winning political party were eligible to be hired as police officers. Whenever there was a change in political rule (such as a new mayor from a different political party), a whole new police d e p a r t m e n t was hired (Walker, 1992). "Ungentlemanlike" behavior was common a m o n g police in the United States. Lack of intelligence, poor health, and a criminal record did not prevent a man f r o m becoming a police officer (Reith, 1980; Walker, 1977). The duties of the first police departments were much different f r o m those of police d e p a r t m e n t s today. They were neither responsible for nor concerned about the investigation of crime. Their purpose was to maintain order—to make the streets safe and to control groups of people defined by others as undesirable (Cox, 1974; Lundman, 1980)—and it was hoped that patrolling would prevent crime. The first police d e p a r t m e n t s in the southern slates were

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community organizations established to maintain the institution of slavery (Wintersmith, 1974). Their j o b was to arrest any slave who was not on the master's property and to inspect community houses, looking for runaway slaves. There was great concern that because black slaves outnumbered free whites, the slaves might organize and start a rebellion. Southern police departments were created to make sure this did not happen: i.e., to serve as slave patrols (Williams and Murphy, 1990). Local police departments in northern communities were also created to control undesirable segments of the population. There was a strong fear among property owners that the undesirables of their community might be dangerous and that they should be m o n i t o r e d and p u n i s h e d if necessary. Many n o r t h e r n police departments were created to stop race riots and to force labor back to work (Lundman, 1980; Walker, 1992). T h e first state police organization was created in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, with the specific purpose of getting rioting, striking members of labor back to work. From the beginning, police were not only allowed the legitimate use of force for social control. Adhering to the sexual division of labor at that time, when men were considered the protectors and women physically and morally weak, women were not allowed to be police officers (Martin, 1980).

Introduction of W o m e n into Policing

Women began to be hired as police officers in the late nineteenth century; they quickly appeared in departments t h r o u g h o u t the United States. However, the type of work done by women officers was much different from that d o n e by men, and this division of labor remained until the 1970s. Also, while most police departments today have female officers, the percentage of females is still extremely low. In 1893, the mayor of Chicago appointed the first woman to work in a police department. She was Maria Owens, the widow of a former patrol officer. Her duties were to assist male detectives when they were working on cases involving girls or adult women (Lunneborg, 1989). She had no arrest powers. The first woman to be a sworn officer with arrest powers was Alice Stebbins Wells, who was a graduate of a theology seminary and had been a social worker in several church-related social work

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positions. She felt strongly that social workers should engage in preventative and protective activities, particularly for the benefit of women and children. She argued with the chief of the Los Angeles police department that she could better achieve these goals if she had police powers of arrest. In 1910, she was hired with the duties of supervising and enforcing laws concerning juveniles and women at d a n c e halls, skating rinks, movie theaters, and o t h e r public recreational facilities. Although she could arrest people, she could not wear a uniform or carry a gun (Home, 1980). Wells lectured to women's organizations throughout the United States, arguing that all departments should hire female officers. She spoke to groups such as the American Female Reform Society, the Women's Christian Temperance Union, and the League of Women Voters. She argued that women were needed as police officers to save wayward youth and helpless women f r o m the evils of industrialism, alcohol, and other abuses. (Like other early advocates, she believed that women in policing were simply extending their roles as mothers by serving as guardians of children and protectors of public morals.) Wells also pointed out that for some police tasks, such as settling family disputes, doing clerical work, and performing certain kinds of undercover vice work, women were actually better suited for the j o b than men (Lunneborg, 1989). Communities across the country soon responded to Wells's call. In 1912, the New York Police Department hired Isabella Goodwin as its first female detective, and by 1915, 25 cities in 20 different states had female police officers. By 1929, the International Association of Police Women, created by Wells and some colleagues in 1915, had 593 women police officer members from 154 different cities in the United States and representatives from 29 different countries (Cox, 1974). T h e goal of this organization was to advocate that police departments hire women for duties concerning women and children as victims and offenders (Home, 1980). T h e trend of hiring at least one female police officer in all major U.S. city departments continued, but for many departments one female was considered enough. In 1960, there were only 2,400 female police officers nationwide, and in 1971 women still constituted less than 1 percent of all sworn officers in 16 of the 32 largest cities. In fact, some police departments at the time were under quota orders to hire no more than 1 percent female officers ( H o m e , 1980). For many decades, female police officers did different work than men did. Women officers remained focused on issues related to women and children, and these officers continued to emphasize

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providing services for the prevention of crime rather than merely responding to crime after it occurred—such an orientation to social welfare was a novel approach to law enforcement. Frequently, within police d e p a r t m e n t s there were separate women's bureaus or juvenile bureaus that were staffed primarily by female officers (Hutzel, 1933). Female officers were typically welleducated, white, upper-middle-class, reform-minded social workers. In some cities the officers were not actually called police even though they had the sworn powers of arrest. They were called safety workers (Lunneborg, 1989). Female officers did not compete with males for jobs. Women and men had separate promotion lists and different pay scales. Women received lower pay than men, even though they were typically required to have more education to qualify for a given j o b ( H o m e , 1980). Female police officers were rarely exposed to any aspect of police work involving the use of force. A general perception of women's inability to use force was the major reason for the rarity of female police officers. Some pretraining physical ability tests for becoming an officer were beyond the ability of women. Minimum height a n d weight requirements made it virtually impossible for most women to qualify for applying to be police officers. Most significantly, male police officers were strongly against allowing female police officers. Studies have found that male officers did not believe women were physically capable of doing police work or of providing adequate backup for male police officers. Male officers argued that because women are smaller and weaker than men, they were less able to perform the job, and that women did not have the emotional fortitude for the work. However, federal legislation in the early 1970s allowed these perceptions of women's abilities to become empirical questions. N u m e r o u s court cases resulted, o p e n i n g the way for more women to become police officers and for women to become integrated into mainstream police work, including the right to use force. In 1972, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color, sex, and national origin, and the 1972 Amendment extended this coverage to include public employees. This act also created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to enforce the new rules, to investigate complaints, and to sue on behalf of complainants. Another legislative act, the Crime Control Act of 1973, prohibited discrimination against women in the employment practices of any agency that received f u n d i n g f r o m t h e Law Enforcement Administration Agency (LEAA), at that time a major

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f u n d e r for most U.S. police d e p a r t m e n t s . U n d e r these new federal rulings, police d e p a r t m e n t s could still refuse to hire a w o m a n if they were able to show that she could n o t d o t h e j o b . For e x a m p l e , tests of physical s t r e n g t h m i g h t still b e lawful even t h o u g h they have d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e impact o n w o m e n as long as the tests measure skills essential to the j o b . These tests h a d to b e g o o d predictors of an employee's p e r f o r m a n c e on the j o b . More court suits were filed when females tried to gain e n t r a n c e into police work u n d e r these new rulings, a n d the results of the suits w e r e fairly consistent. First, it could n o t be d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t physical ability is essential to police work (White v. Nassau County Police Department, 1975; Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Commission, 1975; Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 1977). Much of police work is providing services to the public, a n d when force is necessary, g u n s can be used effectively by both males a n d females. Second, it could not be shown that physical strength is predictive of good police work (Harless v. Duck, 1980). T h i r d , h e i g h t a n d weight s t a n d a r d s f o r e m p l o y m e n t in police d e p a r t m e n t s were f o u n d to be unreasonably discriminating against females a n d their use to be in violation of Title VII (Smith v. Troyan, 1975; Smith v. East Cleveland, 1972; Hardy v. Stumpf 1974). (Research sponsored by the Police Foundation a n d t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Association of C h i e f s of Police f o u n d n o conclusive r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n h e i g h t a n d effective p o l i c e p e r f o r m a n c e [White and Bloch, 1975].) T h e s e cases h a d p r o f o u n d effects on police d e p a r t m e n t s t h r o u g h o u t the U n i t e d States. Because the legislative statute allowed courts to m a n d a t e increased e m p l o y m e n t based on judicial findings of denial of Title VII protections, many police d e p a r t m e n t s were given c o u r t - o r d e r e d quotas of specified p e r c e n t a g e s of new hires that must be female. These same c o u r t - m a n d a t e d federal guidelines also helped integrate p e o p l e of color into police work. Many quotas are still in effect today. After the federal rulings, the FBI r e p o r t e d that between 1972 and 1979 e m p l o y m e n t of w o m e n as police officers d o u b l e d , f r o m 1.5 p e r c e n t of all police officers to 3.4 p e r c e n t (FBI, 1981). By 1987, w o m e n c o m p o s e d 7.6 p e r c e n t of all m e t r o p o l i t a n o f f i c e r s , representing m o r e than thirty-six thousand women (FBI, 1988). T h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of w o m e n into mainstream police work was followed by a f l o o d of studies analyzing how female police officers' work c o m p a r e d with male officers', a n d even t h o u g h the courts ruled that the use of force was a very limited part of police work, many of the studies f o c u s e d o n w o m e n ' s ability to use physical force.

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When Women Entered Police Work C o n s i d e r a b l e research has d o c u m e n t e d that o n most issues t h e first w o m e n to e n t e r p o l i c i n g were effective as police officers (Bloch a n d A n d e r s o n , 1974; Milton, 1972; 1974; Sichel, Friedm a n , Q u i n t , a n d S m i t h , 1977). In a d d i t i o n , t h e r e has b e e n substantial c o n f i r m a t i o n that the public responds favorably to f e m a l e police officers o n patrol (Bloch a n d A n d e r s o n , 1974; Milton, 1972, 1974; Sichel et al„ 1977). For e x a m p l e , Bloch a n d A n d e r s o n ' s (1974) c o m p a r i s o n of f e m a l e a n d m a l e officers f o u n d t h a t w o m e n officers give fewer traffic tickets a n d m a k e fewer arrests t h a n m a l e officers. However, f e m a l e arrests a r e m o r e likely to result in convictions, i n d i c a t i n g a h i g h e r quality of a r r e s t s . In a d d i t i o n , w o m e n receive fewer citizen complaints regarding u n b e c o m i n g conduct. These researchers c o n c l u d e t h a t w o m e n officers in the 1970s were b e g i n n i n g to develop a style of policing d i f f e r e n t f r o m that of male officers b u t that b o t h successfully a c c o m p l i s h e d the r e q u i r e m e n t s of the job. Some research f o u n d that in specific aspects of policing, women were not as successful as m e n . Some of the first female officers tried to emulate the styles of male officers in interaction with citizens. For example, they a t t e m p t e d to be gruff, even to the p o i n t of lowering their voices. Frequently, these strategics were not effective for the female officers (Nieva a n d Gutek, 1981). This emulation of m e n is a c o m m o n reaction a m o n g the first women who e n t e r various maled o m i n a t e d work e n v i r o n m e n t s , a n d f r e q u e n t l y it fails (Kariter, 1977). T o u n d e r s t a n d the difficulties the first female police officers faced in creating a style f o r h a n d l i n g potentially violent situations, the context in which they were working must be analyzed. T h e m a j o r p r o b l e m c o n f r o n t i n g these f e m a l e s was their c o w o r k e r s — m a l e police officers. Typically male police officers, even in the 1970s a n d 1980s, did not agree with the federal court decisions that w o m e n were capable of d o i n g police work. Male officers had several views on the i n t e g r a t i o n of w o m e n into mainstream policing. First, they felt that women did not b e l o n g in all areas of policing. T h e y a r g u e d that the public wants an authority f i g u r e d u r i n g times of crisis a n d that females a r e too e m o t i o n a l a n d u n s t a b l e to p r o v i d e o n e (Bloch, A n d e r s o n , a n d Gervais, 1973; R e m m i n g t o n , 1983). As discussed e a r l i e r , r e s e a r c h o n t h e c o m m u n i t y ' s r e a c t i o n to f e m a l e o f f i c e r s d i d

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n o t s u p p o r t this c o n t e n t i o n . S e c o n d , male o f f i c e r s felt t h a t female p a r t n e r s were not skilled in the use of force and, t h e r e f o r e , it was risky to have females as p a r t n e r s (Cox, 1974; R e m m i n g t o n , 1983). A d d r e s s i n g this last point, G r e n n a n (1987) empirically t e s t e d t h e p r e m i s e t h a t having f e m a l e p a r t n e r s i n c r e a s e d p o l i c e v u l n e r a b i l i t y to victimization. H e analyzed m o r e t h a n t h r e e t h o u s a n d v i o l e n t c o n f r o n t a t i o n s e x p e r i e n c e d by p a t r o l t e a m s in New York City. He f o u n d that m i x e d p a t r o l s ( o n e f e m a l e a n d o n e m a l e ) w e r e n o m o r e likely to e x p e r i e n c e i n j u r i e s t h a n all-male patrols. Also, in m i x e d patrols n e i t h e r the female n o r the male suffered any more injuries than the other. Nevertheless, the existence of these stereotypes m a d e work for p o l i c e w o m e n extremely difficult. For example, Wexler a n d Logan (1983), i n v e s t i g a t i n g stress a m o n g f e m a l e officers in a l a r g e C a l i f o r n i a police d e p a r t m e n t , f o u n d the most c o m m o n l y cited p r o b l e m by f e m a l e officers was the negative attitudes of their male coworkers. T h e stereotypes probably also c o n t r i b u t e d to Garrison, G r a n t , a n d M c C o r m i c k ' s (1988) findings a b o u t w o m e n ' s a s s i g n m e n t to patrol duty. Patrol is considered the b a c k b o n e of policing a n d is usually r e q u i r e d b e f o r e advancing to higher levels of authority in police work. Garrison et al. f o u n d that the percentage of w o m e n in patrol work was 1.5 p e r c e n t in 1971 a n d only 4.5 p e r c e n t in 1985. More o f t e n than not, women were assigned to nonpatrol duties or, as also f o u n d by Steel a n d Lovrich ( 1 9 8 7 ) , n o n h a z a r d o u s assignments. Even f o r t h o s e few f e m a l e officers who w e r e given s o m e e x p o s u r e to potentially violent situations, o p p o r t u n i t i e s to gain e x p e r i e n c e a n d d e v e l o p a p p r o p r i a t e responses were f r e q u e n t l y restricted by the reaction of male coworkers. Substantial research d o c u m e n t s that m a l e officers were extremely protective of female officers w h o w e r e in potentially violent situations (Bloch a n d Anderson, 1974; Cox, 1974; Martin, 1980; Miller, 1973; Sichel et al., 1977). This protectiveness went so far as to actually block the female officers f r o m ever g a i n i n g experience. For example, several studies f o u n d that w h e n female officers indicated over the radio that they were a p p r o a c h i n g a potentially dangerous situation, they never had to call for backup. U p o n hearing that females were possibly going to b e involved in t h e use of f o r c e , several m a l e officers w o u l d automatically show u p w i t h o u t b e i n g d i s p a t c h e d . F u r t h e r m o r e , when males c a m e to the scene, they typically took over a n d sent the female officers to d o the paperwork ( H e f f n e r , 1979; Martin, 1980; R e m m i n g t o n , 1983).

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Women in Policing Today More r e c e n t research on female police officers' p e r f o r m a n c e has d o c u m e n t e d that women are now starting to find their own effective a p p r o a c h e s to social control. Even t h o u g h the style for many may be d i f f e r e n t f r o m that of male officers, t h e r e is now little discussion regarding w h e t h e r females are appropriate for police work. As n o t e d by L u n n e b o r g , "No o n e argues seriously today that t h e r e is n o role for w o m e n in the police" (1989, p. 13). Regarding physical strength, Diskin's (1985) analysis of w o m e n at the Federal Law E n f o r c e m e n t T r a i n i n g C e n t e r at Glyncoe, G e o r g i a f o u n d t h a t w o m e n e n t e r with lower levels of fitness, especially u p p e r - b o d y s t r e n g t h a n d c a r d i o v a s c u l a r e n d u r a n c e . However, w o m e n ' s improvement exceeds that of men. O n c e women b e c o m e habitual exercisers, there is a 38 p e r c e n t i m p r o v e m e n t in upper-body strength, and women usually can b e n c h p r e s s m o r e than 80 p e r c e n t of their body weight by the e n d of the training. Ironically, t h e r e is considerable evidence that female police officers' a p p r o a c h to their j o b does not require physical s t r e n g t h as m u c h as male officers'. In developing their own style of police work, female police officers are m u c h less aggressive t h a n m a l e officers (Bloch a n d A n d e r s o n , 1974; S h e r m a n , 1975; J o n e s , 1987). Female officers are skilled at d i f f u s i n g potentially violent situations t h r o u g h verbal means rather than by the use or threat of physical force. Recently, H u n t (1992) d o c u m e n t e d the fact that ideas regarding f e m a l e o f f i c e r s ' inabilities to use f o r c e still exist in p o l i c e d e p a r t m e n t s , a n d she provided new i n f o r m a t i o n on the persistence of these stereotypes in spite of contradictory i n f o r m a t i o n . In h e r participant-observer study of a large police d e p a r t m e n t , she f o u n d t h a t s o m e male officers still believe t h a t w o m e n a r e n e i t h e r physically strong e n o u g h nor brave e n o u g h to h a n d l e police work. T h e r e are still claims that women c a n n o t h a n d l e violent offenders or provide a d e q u a t e b a c k u p a n d coverage f o r a p a r t n e r . However, w h e n H u n t p u s h e d f o r f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n a n d asked f o r descriptions of actual events, she discovered that the accusations were disguises f o r o t h e r concerns male officers h a d a b o u t f e m a l e officers. H u n t f o u n d that male officers f e a r e d that because f e m a l e officers relied on verbal persuasion more than on physical force for conflict resolution, they would not c o n d o n e the use of extralegal force occasionally used by male officers. Male officers expressed fears that female officers might c o o p e r a t e with federal investigators

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and expose excessive brutality on the part of male officers. A related concern was that female officers might reveal other forms of police corruption, implying that women have higher moralities than men. Finally, Hunt documented that there was actually little c o n c e r n about female officers being able to do the j o b or being capable o f using force. Instead, male officers did not want females to be police because they were afraid it would destroy the public b e l i e f that policing is an exciting and dangerous j o b . Female officers might reveal the true nature o f contemporary police work: that it is primarily a service-providing occupation, that little time and effort are actually s p e n t on investigating c r i m e a n d a p p r e h e n d i n g criminals, and that, for the most part, the police are n o t very effective at solving or even stopping crime.

Conclusions Police d e p a r t m e n t s were first creatcd in the United States to maintain order and control undesirables. Much of the j o b focused on the use o f physical force, and, consistent with the gender-based division of labor at that time, women were seen as unable to engage in the use o f force necessary for the j o b . Women eventually gained e n t r a n c e to the profession by creating a specialized role for themselves, o n e which, again, was consistent with characteristics of gender roles at that time—to protect and help women and children. When women first entered policing, they were segregated from mainstream police work. While this allowed for their entrance into the profession, it also allowed them to develop new ideas on the nature o f policing. H o m e ( 1 9 8 0 ) states that in this isolated e n v i r o n m e n t , women were able to e x p e r i m e n t and b e c o m e innovators o f new policies and programs. T h e first women who entered policing were highly educated and dedicated to social reform. They focused on improving the welfare o f community members and preventing crime, as opposed to strictly maintaining public safety and controlling criminals. T h e s e innovations have b e c o m e the foundation for c u r r e n t thought on contemporary approaches to policing. For e x a m p l e , t h e r e is m u c h support today for what is called " c o m m u n i t y policing," which focuses on developing strong cooperative ties between police and citizens (Green and Mastrofski, 1988; Kelling, 1 9 8 8 ) . Also, "problem-oriented policing" is frequently advocated (Eck and S p e l m a n , 1987; Goldstein, 1 9 9 0 ) , an a p p r o a c h that

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r e c o m m e n d s addressing conditions that cause p e o p l e to b e c o m e criminals r a t h e r t h a n simply c o p i n g with t h e m a f t e r they have b r o k e n the law. Both approaches are similar to what Alice Wells a n d o t h e r female police officers were doing decades ago. A f u r t h e r trend in contemporary policing is to restrict the use of physical or deadly f o r c e as m u c h as possible ( B l u m b e r g , 1989; Walker, 1992). Police today are still g r a n t e d m o r e authority to use l e g i t i m a t e v i o l e n c e t h a n t h e o r d i n a r y citizen, b u t t h e r e is considerable effort in all areas of policing in the United States to use f o r c e only as a last resort. T h e emphasis on verbal skills a n d a less aggressive a p p r o a c h to policing, as is d e m o n s t r a t e d by many female officers, is now b e c o m i n g the standard for the way all police s h o u l d act.

part

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The Role of Women: The Evidence

chapter

/

Women in the Armed Forces Mady Wechsler Segal

T h e r e is a cultural ideal in most societies that m e n are the warriors. This ideal persists despite the fact that w o m e n in many nations have p a r t i c i p a t e d in military o p e r a t i o n s a n d even in w a r f a r e as combatants (Goldman, 1982; Segal, Li, a n d Segal, 1992; Stanley a n d Segal, 1992). Public discourse a n d o t h e r f o r m s of social life are socially c o n s t r u c t e d to s u p p o r t a p e r c e p t i o n that w o m e n are n o t combatants. T h e steadfastness of this belief demonstrates the social construction of reality. It is not the p u r p o s e of this c h a p t e r to p r e s e n t an exhaustive review of the historical evidence on women in military operations. Rather, a brief s u m m a r y is provided of s o m e of the conclusions of cross-national a n d historical research. Some of the highlights f r o m the history of w o m e n ' s involvement in t h e a r m e d forces of t h e United States are described. Special attention is given to the changes associated with the all-volunteer force of the past twenty years. These c h a n g e s are d r a m a t i z e d by the varied roles played by u n i f o r m e d women in recent military e n g a g e m e n t s in Panama, Grenada, a n d the Gulf region. T h e latter, in particular, has led to increased public visibility a n d policy d e b a t e with r e g a r d to w o m e n ' s military positions. Despite the increased n u m b e r s a n d roles for w o m e n in the U.S. a r m e d forces over the past twenty years, g e n d e r - b a s e d exclusions persist a n d military o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e still r e s i s t a n t to full i n c o r p o r a t i o n of w o m e n . As has h a p p e n e d in t h e past in many nations, the d i m i n u t i o n of military threat has led to a downsizing of the military, which in turn reawakens pressures to limit w o m e n ' s participation in the a r m e d forces. T h e resolution of c u r r e n t issues will affect w o m e n ' s f u t u r e military roles.

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Historical Overview of Women in the U.S. Military and Other Nations Although the military historically has been a masculine institution, when there are shortages of qualified men and especially during times of national emergency, most nations have increased women's military roles. W o m e n ' s involvement in military activities can be traced back to ancient times (see Stanley and Segal, 1992, for examples). Historical accounts document the participation of individual female soldiers in civil wars, revolutions, and partisan and resistance movements from the fifteenth through the nineteenth centuries in many nations, including the United States. In the twentieth century, responding to the demands of World War I, women were employed by military forces in both nursing and non-nursing capacities in unprecedented numbers. This was true, for example, in Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. T h e U.S. navy and marine corps established women's units in 1917 and 1918, respectively. T h e uniformed women were granted military status and were assigned to j o b s women normally held in civilian society, such as telephone operator and clerk; some were stationed overseas. Because these units were established to meet specific personnel needs in order to free men for combat, the units were temporary and the women were demobilized after the war. In World War II a major shift occurred in the nature of women's military participation. Not only did they serve in large numbers, but their roles expanded. Women worked in war industries and performed a wider variety of functions for the armed forces, such as medical personnel, drivers, and social workers. Nursing services were organized within the military of several nations. Women's corps were established to perform non-nursing functions, and some countries even enlisted women along with men in the regular branches of the armed forces. As the war progressed, women's activities expanded beyond the usual roles women play (health care, administration, and communications) to include technical and combat support jobs. In the United States, numerous women were employed in civilian industry essential to the war effort, as well as in uniformed military service (Campbell, 1984; Gluck, 1987; Holm, 1982; Treadwell, 1 9 5 4 ) . W o m e n ' s organizations were formed for all services, with their original designations implying their intended temporary nature (e.g., Women's Army Auxiliary Corps). Although

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w o m e n were mainly assigned to traditional fields, small n u m b e r s served in a l m o s t every specialty, e x c l u d i n g d i r e c t c o m b a t . For e x a m p l e , s o m e were a i r p l a n e mechanics, p a r a c h u t e riggers, a n d w e a p o n s instructors. U.S. w o m e n were p r o h i b i t e d f r o m serving as offensive c o m b a t personnel, but they were deployed to foreign theaters a n d were thus e x p o s e d to danger. Nurses stationed in the Philippines a n d G u a m were taken prisoner by the J a p a n e s e , a n d others were c a p t u r e d by the Germans. O n e g r o u p w o r t h y of special a t t e n t i o n was t h e W o m e n ' s Airforce Service Pilots. These women p e r f o r m e d the d e m a n d i n g a n d o f t e n d a n g e r o u s mission of t r a n s p o r t i n g military aircraft overseas. A l t h o u g h t h e pilots w e r e u n i f o r m e d a n d s u b j e c t to military discipline, they were regarded as civilians. In 1977 they were granted military veteran status. This is an interesting example of the social c o n s t r u c t i o n of what c o n s t i t u t e s a military r o l e — a n d how such definitions can be c h a n g e d after the fact. D u r i n g W o r l d War II, U.S., British, a n d Soviet w o m e n were involved in e s p i o n a g e a n d s a b o t a g e activities, a n d w o m e n were active in resistance o r g a n i z a t i o n s in France, Italy, Russia, a n d Yugoslavia. W o m e n were conscripted in Germany, the Soviet U n i o n , a n d the U n i t e d Kingdom. H a d t h e war not e n d e d in 1945, civilian nurses in the U n i t e d States would have b e e n d r a f t e d . T h e bill to conscript nurses h a d b e e n passed by the House a n d h a d cleared the Senate c o m m i t t e e (in March 1945). T h e termination of the war in E u r o p e in May 1945 reversed the shortage of military nurses that had led to the need for conscription. G e r m a n y d u r i n g W o r l d War II provides a n o t h e r i n t e r e s t i n g example of the m a i n t e n a n c e of social definitions of women as not in the military despite the roles they play in a r m e d services. Some of the w o m e n c o n s c r i p t e d w o r e u n i f o r m s , w e r e u n d e r military authority, a n d p e r f o r m e d f u n c t i o n s within the a r m e d forces that in o t h e r nations were considered military. However, these women were labeled civilians. In all these nations where World War II had increased w o m e n ' s military participation, t h e e n d of the war, like the e n d of o t h e r military crises in o t h e r times and places, saw a return to limitations on w o m e n ' s military roles. Generally, w o m e n serve as a reserve labor f o r c e , b o t h civilian a n d military. What has h a p p e n e d in the past in many nations is that when the a r m e d forces n e e d w o m e n , their p r i o r military history is recalled to d e m o n s t r a t e that they can p e r f o r m effectively in various positions. T h e r e is a process of

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cultural a m n e s i a r e g a r d i n g the contributions w o m e n m a d e d u r i n g emergency situations, until a new emergency arises a n d t h e n history is rediscovered. O n e c o m m o n p a t t e r n is for women to be involved in military a n d paramilitary activities in revolutionary m o v e m e n t s b u t to b e r e l e g a t e d to m o r e traditional female status a f t e r the revolution is successful. For e x a m p l e , s o m e Israeli w o m e n served in g u e r r i l l a activities a n d c o m b a t operations d u r i n g the War of I n d e p e n d e n c e (1947-1948), a n d this is probably the source of the c o m m o n l y h e l d m i s c o n c e p t i o n that Israel permits women to serve in c o m b a t . T h e reality is that since the formation of the state a n d the Israeli D e f e n s e Force, women have been excluded f r o m direct combat. Further, this policy was t h e result of cultural a n d political f a c t o r s a n d n o t because of any military failure resulting f r o m m e n ' s or w o m e n ' s actual b e h a v i o r in c o m b a t (Gal, 1986). (Israel d o e s c o n s c r i p t w o m e n , t h o u g h fewer w o m e n than m e n actually serve a n d t h e i r conditions of service differ from men's.) In the U n i t e d States, legislation after World War II provided f o r c o n t i n u i n g t h e w o m e n ' s a r m e d services but severely limited military w o m e n ' s n u m b e r s a n d activities. As in o t h e r areas of social life in the United States following World War II, women were e x p e c t e d to r e t u r n to m o r e traditional roles (Campbell, 1984). Despite s o m e modification of these laws in the 1960s a n d 1970s, U.S. w o m e n ' s c o n t e m p o r a r y military roles are still c o n s t r a i n e d by e x c l u s i o n s prescribed by this legislation. Since the combat exclusion laws were passed in 1948, w o m e n in t h e navy a n d m a r i n e c o r p s have b e e n p r o h i b i t e d f r o m b e i n g assigned to duty on aircraft engaged in c o m b a t missions a n d f r o m serving o t h e r than temporary duty on combat ships. W o m e n in the air force have b e e n prohibited from serving on aircraft e n g a g e d in a c o m b a t mission. T h e r e are e x c e p t i o n s to these e x c l u s i o n s f o r physicians, nurses, chaplains, and attorneys. T h e a r m y has n o statutory p r o h i b i t i o n against w o m e n in combat, but policy has b e e n developed to be consistent with what is viewed as congressional intent. This policy has b e e n c h a n g i n g in r e c e n t years. R a t h e r t h a n explicitly p r o h i b i t i n g w o m e n f r o m e n g a g i n g in c o m b a t , army policy prevents w o m e n f r o m b e i n g assigned to units or j o b s in which they would routinely be e n g a g e d in close combat. These exclusions, however, do not protect w o m e n f r o m the risk of exposure to combat. W o m e n in the air force are p r o h i b i t e d f r o m flying fighter planes b u t are permitted to fly tankers, which would be targets in the event of war. Navy women serve on s u p p o r t vessels,

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85

such as supply ships, which are also likely targets. W o m e n in the a r m y serve in military police, mechanical repair, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , intelligence, signal, and o t h e r s u p p o r t specialties that would b r i n g t h e m into battle.

Women in the U.S. Armed Forces in the Past Two Decades Despite the c o m b a t restrictions a n d the lack of wartime necessity, t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of w o m e n in t h e military has i n c r e a s e d dramatically since 1970. In 1971 t h e r e were approximately 43,000 w o m e n in uniform (30,000 enlisted a n d 13,000 officers), constituting only 1.6 percent of total active-duty military personnel. By the e n d of 1980, nine years later, there were about 173,000 women, or about 8.5 p e r c e n t of total active-duty forces. Table 7.1 shows the percentage of women in each of the services in 1989. Of the active-duty force of more than 2 million, 225,859, or approximately 11 p e r c e n t , were women. T h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was highest in the air force (13 percent) and lowest in the m a r i n e corps (5 p e r c e n t ) . T h e s e figures now provide a baseline of w o m e n ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in t h e military b e f o r e the c u r r e n t drawdown of f o r c e s . In D e c e m b e r 1990, w o m e n n u m b e r e d 2 2 3 , 2 9 7 a n d constituted about the same overall 11 p e r c e n t of active-duty forces (Rogers, 1991).

Table 7.1 Women as a Percentage of Active-Duty Military Personnel by Service Army

Navy

Marines

Air Force

Total

Officers

12.6

10.5

3.3

12.5

11.5

Warrant officers

2.9

1.4

4.4

Enlisted personnel

11.1

9.6

5.1

13.5

10.7

Total

11.1

9.7

5.0

13.3

10.7

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center

—

2.8

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The Role of Women: The Evidence

Differences a m o n g the services in the p r o p o r t i o n of w o m e n are primarily because of t h e differential occupational distributions in the services. Since w o m e n are e x c l u d e d f r o m s o m e c o m b a t positions, the larger the n u m b e r of such positions t h e r e are in a service, t h e fewer the n u m b e r of women t h e service can admit. Further, women are n o t equally distributed t h r o u g h o u t the j o b categories that are o p e n to t h e m . Table 7.2 shows t h a t a n u m b e r of e n l i s t e d w o m e n are e m p l o y e d in every o c c u p a t i o n a l a r e a b u t that they are c o n c e n t r a t e d in a d m i n istrative a n d medical specialties, which is to be expected, given t h e p r e p o n d e r a n c e of w o m e n in c o m p a r a b l e civilian j o b s . T h e a b s e n c e of m e d i c a l p e r s o n n e l in t h e m a r i n e s (which gets its m e d i c a l s u p p o r t f r o m t h e navy) c o n t r i b u t e s to t h e smaller p e r c e n t a g e of w o m e n in the corps than in t h e o t h e r services.

The Contemporary Situation in Other Nations Policies a n d p a t t e r n s of w o m e n ' s roles in the a r m e d forces of o t h e r nations show m u c h recent change. T h e United States was o n the f o r e f r o n t f i f t e e n years ago in i n t e g r a t i n g w o m e n i n t o the a r m e d forces. T h e U.S. military still has the largest p e r c e n t a g e of w o m e n ( a b o u t 11 p e r c e n t ) . However, t h e r e are now six N A T O n a t i o n s that have g o n e b e y o n d the U n i t e d States, in some ways, in integrating women into their a r m e d forces. S o m e or all c o m b a t roles, i n c l u d i n g direct-offensive c o m b a t positions, have b e e n o p e n e d to w o m e n (at least in p r i n c i p l e ) in Belgium, C a n a d a , D e n m a r k , the N e t h e r l a n d s , Norway, a n d the United Kingdom (Segal and Segal, 1989; Stanley a n d Segal, 1988). Some of the changes taking place in o t h e r countries and the rationales for the policy changes are interesting and relevant to the United States. For example, the United Kingdom is now allowing women to train as fighter pilots and to serve on all types of ships. In the course of developing this policy, an alternative considered was maintaining a g e n d e r exclusion for "combat" ships, while o p e n i n g "support" ships to w o m e n , in o r d e r to minimize the d a n g e r to women. However, the British experience in the Falklands War was that casualty rates a b o a r d "support" ships were greater than on combat ships, resulting in the Royal Navy considering all of its ships to be combat ships.

Women in the Armed Forces

Table 7.2 Occupational Areas o f Enlisted Personnel, J u n e 1989

Total Personnel

Women as a Percentage o f Total

7,544

304,871

2.5

3.9

Electronic equipment repairers

11,450

178,547

6.4

6.0

Communications and intelligence specialists

20,977

172,180

12.2

10.9

Health care specialists

25,872

100,308

25.8

13.4

4,338

42,469

10.2

2.2

Functional support and administration

68,301

277,473

24.6

35.5

Electrical/ mechanical equipment repairers

16,376

368,849

4.4

8.5

3,716

72,401

5.1

1.9

Service and supply handlers

18,771

163,975

11.4

9.8

Nonoccupational

14,921

113,375

13.2

7.8

107

431

24.8

0.1

192,373

1,794,879

10.7

100.0

Occupational Area Infantry, gun crews, and seamanship specialists

Other technical and allied specialists

Craftspersons

Unknown Total

Number of Women

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center

Percentage o f Women

87

88

The Role of Women: The Evidence

U.S. Women's Involvement in Recent Military Engagements T h e expansions in women's military roles in the previous two decades have led to greater likelihood that women would be involved in military engagements and in roles that are not "traditional" for women. In December 1989, women participated in the U.S. invasion of Panama during O p e r a t i o n J u s t Cause. Approximately 800 of the 18,400 soldiers involved in the operation were women (Moskos, 1990). Their roles were varied and included piloting helicopters to ferry troops—some while under enemy fire from the ground. T h e missions and experiences of some of the female soldiers involved in the Panamanian operation fueled a renewed debate about women in combat. For example, there was controversy over whether a military police captain was in combat when she led her unit in attempting to capture a military dog kennel believed to be occupied by armed and firing members of the Panamanian defense forces. But attention to the participation of women in Operation Just Cause pales by comparison with media coverage and potential policy impact of the roles played by women in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Further, the generally acknowledged high quality of women's performance in their jobs demonstrates the lack of validity of many recent arguments expressing reservations about women's abilities to perform their assigned missions. (See Mitchell, 1989, for a diatribe against the expansion of women's military roles in the 1970s and 1980s.) Some military women and civilian advocates are optimistic that these demonstrations will result in greater opportunities for military women, whereas others are more pessimistic based on the historical record (WIIS, 1991). As shown in Table 7.3, approximately 4 1 , 0 0 0 women were deployed to the Gulf region between August 1990 and February 1991 (Eitelberg, 1991). Women made up about 7 percent of all military personnel deployed (including all ranks and active-duty and reserve personnel combined). T h e army employed the vast majority of these women. One interesting aspect of women's representation in Gulf War operations was the difference between active-duty and reserve forces, especially among officers. Although women were 5.6 percent of

Women in the Armed Forces

Tabic 7.3 Women in the Active and Reserve Forces by Service: Percentage of Officers and Enlisted Personnel in Operations Desert Shield/Storm Service

Percentage Who Are Women* Active

Reserve

Total

7.9 3.1 1.6 5.6

14.7 12.3 0.1

9.4 3.6 1.5 6.4

5.6 23,481

12.2 10,858

6.8 34,339

7.1 1.4 7.3

22.4 26.7 1.5 21.0

12.4 9.4 1.4 10.2

7.3 3,585

21.3 2,858

10.3 6,443

7.9 3.5 1.5 5.9

15.7 14.9 1.0 12.4

9.7 4.2 1.5 7.0

5.8 27,066

13.4 13,716

ENLISTED Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force TOTAL Percent Number

10.1

OFFICER* Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force TOTAL Percent Number

TOTAL Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force TOTAL Percent Number

7.2 40,782

Source: Eitelberg, 1991 who used data provided by Defense Manpower Data Center. Includes military personnel in theater any time between August 1990 and February 1991. b Includes both commissioned and warrant officers.

a

89

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The Role of Women: The Evidence

active enlisted personnel in the theater of operations, they were 12.2 p e r c e n t of reserve enlisted forces. T h e contrast is even more m a r k e d a m o n g officers: 7.3 p e r c e n t of active-duty officers were w o m e n , c o m p a r e d to 21.3 p e r c e n t of reserve officers. T h e e x p e r i e n c e s of Operations Desert Shield a n d Desert Storm d e m o n s t r a t e that the policy excluding women from offensive c o m b a t roles does n o t provide complete protection f r o m d e a t h or capture: t h i r t e e n A m e r i c a n w o m e n were a m o n g t h e 375 U.S. service m e m b e r s w h o d i e d , a n d two w o m e n were p r i s o n e r s of war (Eitelberg, 1991).

Current Issues and the Future T h e i n c r e a s e d participation of women in the a r m e d forces in the past two decades clearly has been a response to personnel d e m a n d s associated with the all-volunteer force in the United States. Shortfalls in the enlistment of m e n b e g i n n i n g in 1973 led to several policy changes, i n c l u d i n g lowering accession goals, lowering standards for e n l i s t m e n t of m e n , g r e a t e r emphasis on personnel r e t e n t i o n , a n d increases b o t h in the n u m b e r s of women a n d in the occupational specialties o p e n to them. Similar shortages of men in o t h e r nations recently have had similar effects. C h a n g e s in t h e military itself, such as g r e a t e r e m p h a s i s o n technology a n d higher support to combat ratios, have contributed to w o m e n ' s greater representation (Segal and Segal, 1983; Segal, 1992). F u r t h e r , w o m e n p a r t i c i p a t e in the a r m e d forces to an e x t e n t compatible with cultural values and structural patterns of g e n d e r roles. Greater acceptability of military women is indicated by various social c h a n g e s . P e r h a p s most i m p o r t a n t is t h a t e q u a l i t y of citizenship rights a n d obligations is being e x t e n d e d to previously disadvantaged groups, including women. This can be seen in laws prohibiting g e n d e r discrimination. As b o t h a cause and a c o n s e q u e n c e of greater citizen equality between t h e sexes, t h e r e has been movement away f r o m traditional g e n d e r stereotypes and structural sex segregation in civilian society. T h e r e has b e e n decreasing emphasis on w o m e n ' s family roles a n d i n c r e a s i n g l a b o r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g p a r t i c i p a t i o n in traditionally male arenas. Research shows that a majority of the electorate favors e x p a n d e d military integration of women to include

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91

s o m e c o m b a t roles f r o m which they are e x c l u d e d (Davis, Lauby, a n d Sheatsley, 1983). Nevertheless, civilian occupational sex segregation is still strong, a n d resistance to e x p a n d i n g w o m e n ' s military participation remains. Given the historical tendency to view w o m e n exclusively as a reserve military labor source to b e t a p p e d w h e n m e n are in s h o r t supply, t h e c u r r e n t military p e r s o n n e l r e d u c t i o n s a r e likely to b e a c c o m p a n i e d by renewed debates on the benefits a n d shortcomings of female personnel. While Congress passed legislation as p a r t of the 1992 d e f e n s e authorization bill repealing the laws b a n n i n g women f r o m serving as pilots in combat, the services have not yet acted to train any w o m e n as fighter pilots. Further, the Senate version of the bill (to which the H o u s e a g r e e d in c o m p r o m i s e ) i n c l u d e d a p l a n to a p p o i n t a presidential commission to consider t h e issue of w o m e n in combat, i n c l u d i n g g r o u n d c o m b a t in t h e a r m y a n d m a r i n e corps. T h e commission was d u e to report back in November 1992. Some of the p e o p l e a p p o i n t e d to the c o m m i s s i o n have b e e n o u t s p o k e n o p p o n e n t s of e x p a n d e d military roles for w o m e n , especially combat, a n d n o n e has been an advocate of o p e n i n g c o m b a t positions to women. T h e issue of whether women should be allowed to volunteer for c o m b a t roles has been in public discourse in the U n i t e d States since the 1970s (Segal and Hansen, 1992). T h e a r g u m e n t s for a n d against allowing w o m e n in c o m b a t have not c h a n g e d m u c h since t h e n . T h e y include consideration of differences between m e n a n d women (on t h e average) in physical a n d psychological traits (especially a g g r e s s i o n ) , the potential impact of w o m e n on the c o h e s i o n of military units, a n d cultural values regarding g e n d e r roles (e.g., Feld, 1978; H o o k e r , 1988; Quester, 1982; Segal, 1982; T u t e n , 1982; Webb, 1979). P r o p o n e n t s of e x p a n d e d roles f o r military w o m e n stress citizenship equality a n d its relationship to military service. T h o s e who o p p o s e expansion stress negative impacts of women on military effectiveness or possibly on the w o m e n themselves (Segal a n d H a n s e n , 1992). T h e issue of women in combat also raises questions r e g a r d i n g w o m e n ' s family roles. T h e Gulf War d e p l o y m e n t b r o u g h t military family issues into the public eye, with particular attention to the fact that m o t h e r s can be sent to war, i n c l u d i n g those who are single p a r e n t s a n d those m a r r i e d to service m e m b e r s w h o also deploy. A l t h o u g h legislation was i n t r o d u c e d d u r i n g this p e r i o d to p r o h i b i t

92

The Role of Women: The Evidence

the deployment to a combat theater of sole parents and both members of a dual military couple, this legislation was opposed by the armed services and by military women's advocates, and it died. Even though there is a potential for public opinion to develop opposing the deployment of such parents, public attention to the issue was short-lived. T h e r e is also the potential for attention to the effect of pregnancy on military assignments. O n e policy that could be reinstated is the practice that existed until the 1970s of discharging women from service when they become pregnant. An alternative policy is to allow p r e g n a n t women and women with children to remain in service only after completing their first term of enlistment. In other words, u n d e r this policy first-tour military women who became p r e g n a n t would be discharged. At this time, there is no active consideration of such policies, but it would not be surprising for discussion to surface. The current downsizing of military forces has created pressure to find ways to choose who should be separated from the services and to retain those who are likely to cause the fewest problems; pregnancy may be seen as detrimental to optimum performance. Other aspects of downsizing and force structure decisions will have implications for the future role of women in the military. For example, because women are concentrated in some military specialties, especially in support units, the degree to which these positions are r e d u c e d will affect women. Decisions to transfer support functions more to the reserves than to active-duty forces will decrease the representation of women in the active forces and f u r t h e r increase their representation in the reserves—where they already account for larger percentages of personnel. It would be consistent with women's military history for the representation of women in the U.S. armed forces to be reduced during the downsizing, especially in active units. Although the Department of Defense and the services themselves have made public statements indicating that it is official policy to retain the current representation of women in the armed forces (Rogers, 1991), resistance to change has been evident throughout the past twenty years and may resurface during the drawdown. There are already indications that women's representation may decrease. Rogers (1991) reports a decrease during the first three quarters of fiscal year 1991 in the proportion of women among new enlisted accessions of 2 percent (compared to the same period the

Women in the Armed Forces

93

previous year) f r o m 15 p e r c e n t to 13 p e r c e n t . She n o t e s t h a t w o m e n ' s representation is affected by policies excluding t h e m f r o m s o m e specialties; f u r t h e r , the j o b s that w o m e n t e n d to fill are m o r e likely to be abolished in the downsizing. As in the past, women's new roles in the a r m e d services have n o t b e e n fully i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d a n d w o m e n have n o t c a u s e d any f u n d a m e n t a l c h a n g e in the masculine culture of the organizations. P r e s s u r e s to d e v e l o p policies t h a t w o u l d r e d u c e w o m e n ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the military may be n e g a t e d by vigilance a n d political pressure by advocates f o r military w o m e n . It r e m a i n s to be seen w h e t h e r such activism will be evident a n d how effective it will be.

chapter

O

Women in Weapons Development: The Manhattan Project Ruth H. Howes, Caroline L. Herzenberg In m o d e r n warfare, high-technology weapons symbolize national power. W o m e n have traditionally b e e n invisible in the d e f e n s e technology establishment and are thought to have played little role in designing a n d p r o d u c i n g m o d e r n weapons, notably n u c l e a r warheads a n d the systems that deliver them. T o determine whether women have i n d e e d played n o role or were simply overlooked in historical accounts, we have e x a m i n e d the research p r o j e c t that developed the first nuclear explosive.

T h e Manhattan Project Histories of the M a n h a t t a n E n g i n e e r District, the c o d e n a m e assigned to the massive secret research e f f o r t that led to the development of the U.S. atomic b o m b d u r i n g World War II, rarely mention technical work p e r f o r m e d by women on the project. Less formal accounts stress the lives of the wives who struggled to maintain a s e m b l a n c e of normal family life in secret cities that resembled military camps (Fermi, 1954; Wilson and Serber, 1988). T h e reader retains the impression that all of the technical work on development of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons was p e r f o r m e d by male staff members, while women filled s u p p o r t roles as wives a n d mothers. M e m b e r s of the W o m e n ' s Army Corps served as stenographers and supply clerks, and occasionally wives held parttime jobs in the lab. In actuality, women were involved in essentially all technical aspects of the development of the atomic bomb. No woman sat on the committees that directed the project, although in the s u m m e r of 1946, Gertrud Nordheim was appointed to a g r o u p of consultants to the theoretical division at Los Alamos, which included many of the major theoretical leaders of the project, such as physicists Fermi, Weisskopf, Feynman, and Teller (Truslow and Smith, 1961). O n the

95

96

The Role of Women: The Evidence

o t h e r h a n d , many w o m e n were directly involved with the scientific d e v e l o p m e n t s that led to the atomic b o m b , in roles r a n g i n g f r o m leading scientific projects to serving as highly skilled technicians. We have identified a n d studied about seventy of the women who worked in various scientific capacities in the M a n h a t t a n Project a n d related activities. A b o u t thirty of t h e m worked at Los Alamos, about twenty-four at O a k Ridge, a n d still fewer at the University of Chicago, Columbia University, H a n f o r d Reservation, a n d o t h e r sites. Several w o m e n w o r k e d at m o r e t h a n o n e of t h e s e locations. Significant c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the progress of the technical p r o g r a m s at these labs originated f r o m the work of these women. T h e data p r e s e n t e d h e r e on the roles filled by women d u r i n g the M a n h a t t a n P r o j e c t have b e e n collected f r o m a c c o u n t s in t h e p u b l i s h e d literature; f r o m interviews with individuals w h o worked on the Project a n d their family m e m b e r s , colleagues, a n d friends; a n d f r o m q u e s t i o n n a i r e s sent to lists of w o m e n who worked at the Clinton E n g i n e e r i n g Works (today Oak Ridge National Laboratory) a n d at Los Alamos. In t h e nearly fifty years that have elapsed since the M a n h a t t a n Project, many participants have died, m a r r i e d , or moved so o f t e n that the addresses on file f o r them are n o longer correct. T h u s , this a c c o u n t c a n n o t o f f e r a c o m p l e t e view of the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of w o m e n in the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the first a t o m i c b o m b ; however, the sample of female participants contacted is large e n o u g h to give a reasonable picture of the kinds of technical work carried out by w o m e n . The Manhattan

Engineer District

Following the discovery of nuclear fission in Europe, a n u m b e r of physicists rapidly realized that nuclear fission might provide a source of t r e m e n d o u s energy. Scientists such as Leo Szilard a n d Enrico Fermi r e c o g n i z e d t h a t it also m i g h t be possible to exploit this physical process to construct an entirely new type of s u p e r weapon, much m o r e destructive than any conventional one. They m a n a g e d to persuade the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t to establish a project to look into that possibility. F e r m i p e r f o r m e d initial e x p e r i m e n t s at C o l u m b i a University in New York, but moved to Chicago, where in D e c e m b e r of 1942 his g r o u p p r o d u c e d the first self-sustaining chain reaction. With the realization that only o n e isotope of u r a n i u m , the rare u r a n i u m - 2 3 5 , u n d e r w e n t fission, a s e c o n d aspect of the p r o j e c t began to investigate means to separate u r a n i u m isotopes in sufficient quantities to build a w e a p o n . T h e project grew, until by the e n d of

Women in Weapons Development

97

the war it consisted of three major laboratory sites as well as individual experiments in several universities, notably Columbia University, the University of Chicago (from which the research was moved to a site in the Chicago forest preserves and then to what is today A r g o n n e National Laboratory), a n d the University of California at Berkeley. Los Alamos Laboratory in New Mexico was charged with the engineering design of the atomic weapon. T h e Clinton Engineering Works (today Oak Ridge National Laboratory) produced enriched uranium-235 by the gaseous diffusion method, while the H a n f o r d Site in Richland, Washington held the giant nuclear reactors and fuel purification plants used to produce the radioactive fissile element plutonium. Women performed scientific work at all of these sites. Most of them were quite young, recent Ph.D.s or graduate students, so, although they were aware of the technical goal of the project, they did not work as senior scientists. The

Physicists

The most distinguished female physicist involved with the Manhattan Project was f u t u r e Nobel-laureate Maria G o e p p e r t Mayer. A theoretical physicist who taught half-time at Sarah Lawrence College, Mayer joined the isotope separation project at Columbia University in 1942. H e r work consisted of theoretical studies of t h e thermodynamic properties of uranium hexafluoride gas, which was used in the diffusion process for the separation of uranium isotopes. She also conducted theoretical investigations of the possibility of using photochemical reactions for isotope separation. Although a senior member of a research group, she was not given a full-time appointment (Dash, 1973; Sachs, undated). At least o n e of Mayer's students, Susan Chandler Herrick, obtained a j o b with the project through Mayer's influence. Herrick worked in Mayer's g r o u p on problems in u r a n i u m chemistry, including the synthesis and crystallization of compounds of uranium and the development of techniques to produce single crystals from a few h u n d r e d s of milligrams obtained from a mass spectrometer without losing any appreciable amount of the precious uranium-235. She f o u n d that it was possible to grow crystals of cesium zinc uranylnitrate from saturated solutions. She also did some work on the problem of the pinholes in the nickel barriers used in diffusion plants. Both Mayer and Herrick were aware that they were studying the separation of uranium isotopes for the purpose of constructing

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a bomb. Mayer's theoretical work also focused on the energy emitted by a nuclear explosion as electromagnetic radiation. She calculated the opacity of uranium and called attention to the enormous energy released as electromagnetic radiation. At the time, her results were considered unimportant; however, they provided the basis for the eventual successful design of the hydrogen bomb. At the University of Chicago after the war, she began the work on the origin of the elements that led to her recognition of nuclear magic numbers and the development of the shell model of the nucleus. In 1963, her accomplishments in clarifying the structure of atomic nuclei by the development of the theory of nuclear shell structure were recognized by the award of the Nobel Prize in physics (Brush, 1985; Hellmans and Bunch, 1988). Another physicist, Leona Woods Marshall, was completing her Ph.D. in molecular spectroscopy at the University of Chicago in 1942. Enrico Fermi's group moved to Chicago to begin construction of the first atomic pile (nuclear reactor), designed to prove that there were conditions under which a nuclear chain reaction would occur, with the ultimate objective of producing plutonium by a chain reaction (Brown a n d MacDonald, 1977). Leona Woods participated in the design and building of this first nuclear reactor as a member of the famous team of Enrico Fermi, working under the stands of Stagg Field at the University of Chicago (Libby, 1979; U.S. Department of Energy, 1982; Rhodes, 1988; Howes, in press). Woods was d r a f t e d to assist with construction of the boron trifluoride detectors used to monitor the flux of neutrons from the pile. She completed her Ph.D. after going to work with Fermi's group and was present on the memorable day (December 2, 1942) when the atomic pile operated to produce the first self-sustaining nuclear fission chain reaction. (Her name appears on the label of the Chianti bottle that records the celebration of this success.) Following its initial operation, the atomic pile was dismantled, moved, and rebuilt in a remote area of the forest preserves outside Chicago. Woods, who in July 1943 had married John Marshall, also a physicist, followed the pile. She continued to conduct experiments on the operation of the pile and the neutrons it produced until the birth of her first son in 1944. She hid her pregnancy under overalls and a denim jacket and worked until two days before the baby's birth. Then Leona Woods Marshall moved to Hanford to join her husband in overseeing the operation and construction of the plutonium production reactors there. Fortunately her mother was willing and able to accompany her to Hanford to help with child

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care. For the remainder of the war, Marshall devoted herself to assisting with the production of plutonium for the new weapon (Libby, 1979). A n o t h e r young Chicago Ph.D. in nuclear physics, Elizabeth Riddle Graves, who was nicknamed "Diz," moved in 1943 with her husband, A1 Graves, to Los Alamos, where she was assigned to work on the Cockcroft-Walton accelerator. Her husband had been recruited from the University of Texas at Austin, where she had not been able to find work because of nepotism rules, and he insisted that she be allowed to work at Los Alamos. Because she had worked on neutron-scattering experiments with Samuel Allison at Chicago during her dissertation, Diz Graves worked with colleagues on experiments designed to choose a neutron reflector to surround the core of the atomic bomb so as to scatter fast neutrons back into the fissioning core of the bomb and keep the neutron flux high. No one had measured the effectiveness of a variety of materials in scattering high-energy neutrons. As one of the few physicists in the country with actual experience in fast neutron scattering, Graves was a welcome addition to the group making those critical measurements. She is described by her colleagues as hard working a n d competent, capable of asserting herself when necessary, and an independent thinker with a basically conventional outlook. She had a sense of humor, and a tale circulated of her winning a bet that she could persuade a very proper European physicist to precede her through a door in spite of his unfailing insistence on p r o p e r manners—a trick accomplished by telling him that she had ripped her dress. A more telling story of her determination records her standing on the experimental floor, timing the labor contractions for her first baby with a stopwatch while trying to complete a set of experiments. Pregnant at the time of the test of the first atomic bomb, Graves was assigned to monitor radiation away from the test site. She and her husband checked into a cabin in Harry Miller's Tourist Court in Carrizozo, New Mexico, with baggage that included a seismograph, a Geiger counter, a short-wave radio, a n d a portable electric generator. The tourist court was forty miles east of the Trinity test site, and the needle of their Geiger counter shot off scale as the radioactive cloud passed over the small town at about four o'clock in the afternoon (Lamont, 1965, pp. 193, 227, 230, 252). Fortunately the cloud passed over and the town did not have to be evacuated. Following the war, Graves continued to do experimental nuclear physics at Los Alamos while raising a family. In 1946, eight men were involved in a severe radiation accident at a critical assembly test

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at Los A l a m o s , a n d E l i z a b e t h Graves was a s k e d to p e r f o r m calculations to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r the radiation exposure was lethal. She was n o t i n f o r m e d until afterward that h e r h u s b a n d h a d b e e n a m o n g those involved in the accident a n d that it was his radiation e x p o s u r e she h a d calculated (Rapoport, 1971). A third physicist, J o a n H i n t o n , h a d g r a d u a t e d f r o m B e n n i n g t o n College. H e r b r o t h e r was at Cornell, so H i n t o n went t h e r e d u r i n g two of B e n n i n g t o n ' s winter study periods. T h e cloud c h a m b e r on which s h e w o r k e d was in a b a s e m e n t lab n e x t to t h e C o r n e l l cyclotron. H i n t o n happily j o i n e d the cyclotron crew in their repair work. Cornell refused to admit a woman to its g r a d u a t e p r o g r a m in physics, so H i n t o n began study at the University of Wisconsin. She h a d started construction of a cloud c h a m b e r when she was recruited by the physicists f r o m the cyclotron crew at Cornell, who were by then at Los Alamos. Wisconsin c o o p e r a t e d by giving h e r a master's d e g r e e following a very informal e x a m i n a t i o n in which she claims she sat on the f l o o r of the lab, answered a few questions, a n d showed the c o m m i t t e e a picture of her cloud c h a m b e r . At Los Alamos s h e was assigned to work on b u i l d i n g an e n r i c h e d u r a n i u m reactor known as the "water boiler" for its cooling mechanism. H e r g r o u p also tested assemblies of e n r i c h e d u r a n i u m a n d later p l u t o n i u m . T h e first version of the e n r i c h e d u r a n i u m reactor was designed partly to provide a strong n e u t r o n source for e x p e r i m e n t s a n d partly to serve as a trial run in the art of building reactors. It was the first in a series of steps f r o m the slow reaction first p r o d u c e d in the Chicago pile to the fast reaction in a s p h e r e of active metal that makes a nuclear weapon (Brown a n d MacDonald, 1977). T h e reactor g r o u p was mostly young a n d worked hard at physics while playing h a r d along with its irrepressible leader, Enrico Fermi. A m o n g o t h e r exploits, H i n t o n s n e a k e d in to observe t h e first explosion of a nuclear device, the Trinity test in New Mexico, by riding t h r o u g h the army guards at sunset on the back of the m o t o r scooter owned by o n e of h e r fellow workers on the reactor. Following the H i r o s h i m a d e t o n a t i o n , H i n t o n was s t u n n e d by the destructive force of nuclear weapons a n d j o i n e d the m o v e m e n t to i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e a t o m i c e n e r g y . S h e actively l o b b i e d in W a s h i n g t o n as p a r t of t h e p e a c e m o v e m e n t . To c o m p l e t e h e r g r a d u a t e studies she selected Illinois b e c a u s e f r i e n d s f r o m t h e reactor g r o u p were going there. Illinois refused to admit a woman; however, Fermi a n d Allison invited h e r to Chicago, w h e r e s h e became part of an informal g r o u p that met to discuss new ideas in physics that interested Fermi.

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Disgusted by what she perceived as the militarization of physics, Hinton decided to leave the field and travel to China, where her brother was working as a dairy farmer for the Chinese Communists u n d e r Mao. Hinton has continued to live in China and is today a leading designer of dairy farms. Mayer, Herrick, Marshall, Graves, and Hinton are typical of female physicists in the Manhattan Project; of course, numerous other women physicists played interesting and important roles. Among them were the distinguished experimentalist Chien-Shiung Wu, later known for her work on parity, whose expertise in the nuclear properties of noble gases enabled her to help solve the problem of the "poisoning" of the chain reaction in reactors, by the buildup of noble gas fission products with extremely high neutron absorption cross sections (Lubkin, 1971; Yost, 1959; Brush, 1985; Howes, in press). Katherine "Kay" Way worked with Alvin Weinberg on the analysis of Fermi's data from the early atomic piles to see if the neutron multiplication factor could be made large enough to permit a self-sustained chain reaction, calculations that led to the construction of the historic pile u n d e r the University of Chicago football stands. Way later worked on poisoning of reactors and determination of reactor constants, collaborated in the development of the Way-Wigner formula for fission product decay, and did some theoretical work on reactor design that was used in the production reactors at Hanford (O'Neill, 1979; Artna-Cohen, Gove, and Martin, in press). Jane Hamilton Hall worked at the Metallurgical Laboratory at Chicago and then as a senior supervisor for the nuclear reactors u n d e r construction at Hanford. Following the war she worked at Los Alamos on problems in n e u t r o n cross sections, a n d she eventually became an associate director of Los Alamos. She also was a longtime member of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission (Sylves, 1987). Ella "Andy" Anderson participated in the Los Alamos cyclotron group and studied the actual fission process, including questions such as the number of n e u t r o n s p r o d u c e d per fission and the time delay before the emission of neutrons. She prepared the first sample of nearly pure uranium-235 received by the Los Alamos g r o u p for use in the experiments. After the war she did distinguished work in health physics at Oak Ridge. Mary Argo, with her husband, followed Edward Teller into the Manhattan Project and worked in the group at Los Alamos that Teller established to investigate the possibility of building a weapon based not on nuclear fission but on nuclear fusion. Argo did

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calculations on deuterium-deuterium and deuterium-tritium b u r n i n g . Mary Argo was the only f e m a l e staff m e m b e r officially invited to see the Trinity test. A n o t h e r theoretical physicist at Los Alamos, J a n e Roberg, also worked on the calculations f o r the fusion weapon. O t h e r f e m a l e physicists o n t h e M a n h a t t a n P r o j e c t i n c l u d e d Margaret Ramsey Keck, who was assigned to t h e implosion p r o j e c t a n d was i n v o l v e d in p h o t o m i c r o g r a p h y a n d g r a i n size d e t e r m i n a t i o n s f o r improving the explosives used in the d e t o n a t o r s of the weapons. G e r t r u d N o r d h e i m , a G e r m a n - e d u c a t e d theoretical physicist, worked at Oak Ridge on calculations of n e u t r o n diffusion in t h e a t o m i c piles, a n d later, in the s u m m e r of 1946, she was a p p o i n t e d as a consultant in physics to Los Alamos along with her husband. W o m e n physicists also worked in parts of the M a n h a t t a n Project located a r o u n d the c o u n t r y in universities. T h e y i n c l u d e d H e l e n J u p n i k , w h o in 1943 o b t a i n e d a leave of absence f r o m h e r j o b at American Optical C o m p a n y to go to P r i n c e t o n to d o e x p e r i m e n t s o n r e s o n a n c e a b s o r p t i o n of n e u t r o n s in u r a n i u m in o r d e r to ascertain the p r o b a b l e d e p e n d e n c e of fission probability on n e u t r o n energy. The Chemists and

Metallurgists

Nathalie Michel Goldowski received a Dr.Sc. d e g r e e in physical chemistry f r o m t h e University of Paris. Born in Moscow in 1908 to parents who were a m o n g the Russian aristocracy, she escaped with h e r m o t h e r f r o m the Russian revolution in 1917. H e r doctoral work c e n t e r e d on the corrosion of metals, a n d she went to work f o r the F r e n c h air f o r c e , w h e r e s h e b e c a m e c h i e f of m e t a l l u r g i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t at age 32. A m o n g h e r c o n t r i b u t i o n s was the idea of bolting strips of m a g n e s i u m to the fuselages of F r e n c h seaplanes. T h e air frames of the French planes were m a d e of a l u m i n u m , which c o r r o d e d badly. Because the m a g n e s i u m was electropositive, it c o r r o d e d b e f o r e the a l u m i n u m , m a i n t a i n i n g the integrity of the plane. As Hitler o c c u p i e d France, Goldowski again escaped with h e r m o t h e r , this t i m e to t h e U n i t e d States, w h e r e s h e w o r k e d as a research associate f o r Sciaky Brothers in Chicago until she j o i n e d the M a n h a t t a n Project t h e r e in 1943. H e r work in the Metallurgical L a b o r a t o r y was i m p o r t a n t in the d e v e l o p m e n t of an a l u m i n u m b o n d e d coating f o r the u r a n i u m slugs used in the H a n f o r d reactors.

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Uranium corroded too badly to be exposed to cooling water, so the uranium was canned in aluminum. Unfortunately aluminum covers for the slugs also corroded badly. The canning of the aluminum slugs had turned out to be one of the most significant problems faced at Hanford (Brown and MacDonald, 1977, p. 328). The new, n o n c o r r o d i n g a l u m i n u m coating f o r the slugs developed by Goldowski was critical to the success of the plutonium production project. Goldowski has been described as an interesting, intellectually uninhibited, flamboyant person. A large but very graceful woman, she wore her heavy straight black hair down her back and wore clothes bought in Paris. The purchaser of the car she used during the war remarked that it must have been one of her experiments in corrosion. Following the war, she left the project. Her Russian background could not be traced, and she did not become a naturalized U.S. citizen until 1947. Chemists in the Manhattan Project included Hoylande Young, who was recruited as a research associate to Chicago in 1942, worked as a senior chemist in the Metallurgical Laboratory in 1945-1946, and edited papers that were later published in the National Nuclear Energy Series. She became director of technical information at A r g o n n e National Laboratory (Nicholls, 1978; O'Neill, 1979). Isabella Lugoski Karle, now a distinguished crvstallographer, worked in Chicago on the Manhattan Project (Julian, 1990). With her Ph.D. from the University of Michigan, she followed her husband to Chicago and was hired into the group run by Glen Seaborg that was studying the chemistry of transuranic elements. Using the best microtechnology of the day, she grew crystals of plutonium chloride for the first time, and with repeated experiments she d e m o n s t r a t e d the stability of this plutonium compound. Mary Holiat Newman was directed to the Columbia University branch of the Manhattan Project, where she worked on the development of components for the gaseous diffusion plant for the separation of uranium isotopes. Ellen Cleminshaw Weaver, also a chemist, followed her physicist husband into the Manhattan Project at Oak Ridge in J u n e 1945, where she worked on fission fragment radioisotopes and on fission fragments from the atomic pile. She developed microanalytical techniques for separating rare earths. With a B.A. in chemistry, Rosellen Bergman Fortenberg joined the laboratory at Oak Ridge in March 1944 and worked in analytical chemistry. Similarly, Ada Kirkley Perry became a technician at the Y12 plant doing analysis of samples. At Hanford, Yvette Berry was

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recruited for work in the analysis of radioactive samples (Van Arsdol, 1958). Lilli H o r n i g was working toward a Ph.D. in chemistry and followed her husband to Los Alamos. There she was assigned to a group researching plutonium chemistry, where she worked with another female chemist, Mary Nachtrieb. Following the dissolution of t h e g r o u p w h e n plutonium-240 was discovered, H o r n i g transferred to the explosives division, where she worked on explosive lenses (Henriksen, 1986). The Biologists

and Biomedical

Scientists

Several w o m e n in t h e M a n h a t t a n Project made i m p o r t a n t contributions to the early studies of the biological effects of radiation. Grace Morgan Happer, a physician, was recruited by her brother, Karl Zeigler Morgan, who headed health physics at the Clinton Engineering Works. After the laboratory opened to produce enriched uranium for the b o m b program, Grace Morgan Happer became the first physician at the site (Goodwin, 1991). She participated actively in the development of early clinical studies of the effects of radiation and treated serious cases of radioactive contamination. Because she held an M.S. in organic chemistry from the University of North Carolina in addition to her M.D. from Women's Medical College in Philadelphia, she was able to work closely with the research community as well as to handle clinical and public health issues. Her husband remained in India, and her three- or four-year-old son lived with her while she worked at Oak Ridge during the war. At Oak Ridge she was constantly frustrated by the military mindset. In one instance, her efforts to reduce respiratory illnesses from dust by having a road blacktopped were met with refusal by the military commanders because it would draw attention to the operations—even though the dust clouds themselves could be seen all the way to Knoxville, a major city about twenty-five miles away. Miriam Posner Finkel, who had received her Ph.D. in zoology from the University of Chicago in 1944, was recruited by the Metallurgical Laboratory and, with her colleagues, took over all short- and long-term studies of the toxic effects of radiation on animals that had been injected or otherwise treated with samples of the nuclides, including in particular plutonium. Anne Perley, a biochemist, was recruited to the Health Physics group at Los Alamos in July 1944. There she joined the team

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charged with monitoring workers for exposure to radioactive nuclides such as plutonium and polonium. At the time of the radioactive accident that took the life of Louis Slotin, she was the only p e r s o n e q u i p p e d to d e t e r m i n e sodium a n d i n o r g a n i c p h o s p h o r u s in small amounts of blood and urine so that the radioactivity induced in these elements by the high neutron dose could be measured. Edith Hinckley Quimby, already a distinguished scientist at the time of World War II, worked part-time on the Manhattan Project at Columbia University in New York, where she studied the medical effects of radiation exposure. The Mathematicians

and Computing

Personnel

T h e theoretical division at Los Alamos was f o r m e d to develop nuclear and hydrodynamic criteria relating to the design of the atomic b o m b and to predict the detailed p e r f o r m a n c e of the weapon designed (Brown and MacDonald, 1977). The division was hungry for people who could do these tedious calculations with accuracy. Just as many of the early female astronomers began their careers by doing calculations for observatories, many of the women in the Manhattan Project and at Los Alamos in particular were involved in such calculations. O n e leader of the division said, "We hire girls because they work better and they're cheaper." The design of the implosion type of atomic b o m b involved complex calculations tracing the path of the shock wave from the detonation of the explosives through the Fissile core of the weapon, as well as many other kinds of calculations. Modern computers make such calculations easy, but during World War II, they were done using electric calculators, which did one step at a time. Later, the project used IBM electronic calculating machines, which could be programmed by a plug board to do one or two arithmetic steps and which were fed stacks of punched cards, thus greatly speeding up the calculations. Among the early computing personnel at Los Alamos were Mary Frankel, Josephine Elliott, Beatrice Langer, Kay Manley, Mici Teller, Jean Bacher, and Betty Inglis (Metropolis and Nelson, 1982). Some of the women involved in computations had backgrounds similar to that of Frances Wilson Kurath, who held a bachelor's degree in mathematics and had married a physicist on the project, Dieter Kurath. Most of these women (including E. De Le Vin, Josephine Elliott, Betty Inglis, Margaret L. J o h n s o n , Beatrice Langer, Mici

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Teller, F r a n c e s Wilson, a n d E. W r i g h t ) were in t h e t h e o r e t i c a l division's G r o u p T-5 ( c o m p u t a t i o n s ) , while o t h e r s ( i n c l u d i n g N a o m i Livesay a n d F. E. N o a h ) were in G r o u p T-6, IBM c o m putations (Brown a n d MacDonald, 1977). A typical w o m a n r e c r u i t e d to the c o m p u t i n g division, N a o m i Livesay held a B.A. in mathematics f r o m Cornell College in M o u n t V e r n o n , Iowa, a n d a Ph.M. in m a t h e m a t i c s f r o m the University of Wisconsin, which she o b t a i n e d in 1939. Following h e r g r a d u a t i o n , she took a j o b with P r i n c e t o n Surveys in P r i n c e t o n ' s School of Public a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l Affairs to work o n t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l analysis of survey data. T h e data were processed on IBM electrical calculating machines, which she l e a r n e d to p r o g r a m a n d o p e r a t e . A f t e r six m o n t h s , s h e f o u n d t h e j o b b o r i n g a n d o b t a i n e d a Rockefeller F o u n d a t i o n Fellowship at the University of Chicago. O n learning of h e r fellowship, her superiors at Princeton finally o f f e r e d h e r the c h a n c e to enroll in g r a d u a t e courses, but by t h e n Chicago was m o r e appealing. Following a year at Chicago, in the fall of 1940, Livesay was o f f e r e d a post as a t e a c h i n g assistant at the University of Illinois. ( W o m e n were hired f o r these j o b s because many male faculty were b e i n g p u l l e d i n t o war-related research.) In mid-1944, she was r e c r u i t e d to the Los Alamos c o m p u t i n g g r o u p (Metropolis a n d Nelson, 1982). A new g r o u p was b e i n g f o r m e d to d o calculations related to the implosion w e a p o n , a n d because the g r o u p would be using IBM m a c h i n e s , Livesay was ideal f o r its r e q u i r e m e n t s . She supervised a crew of GIs a n d civilians w h o kept t h e m a c h i n e s r u n n i n g twenty-four h o u r s a day. W h e n t h e shock wave hit an i n t e r f a c e b e t w e e n two materials, t h e calculations were c a r r i e d f o r w a r d by h a n d b e c a u s e it was not worth r e p r o g r a m m i n g t h e machines. Livesay a n d Tony Skyrmc of the British mission would do t h e calculations across t h e i n t e r f a c e by h a n d a n d c o m p a r e their results to correct errors. They would then take their results back to the machine. Locating errors m a d e by the machines was constantly necessary. They were located in a r o o m facing an u n p a v e d New Mexico road that carried heavy truck traffic, a n d dust was a constant p r o b l e m . As psychological pressure to c o m p l e t e the implosion calculation built, Livesay was a u t h o r i z e d to obtain extra h e l p , a n d she r e c r u i t e d E l e a n o r Ewing (Ehrlich), w h o m she h a d m e t at the University of Illinois. Ewing h e l d a B.A. a n d M.A. in m a t h e m a t i c s f r o m that university. As part of h e r mathematics p r o g r a m , she was e n c o u r a g e d to enroll in physics. As s h e walked into the classroom with a male acquaintance, the professor called out, "Miss Ewing, we d o not mix

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sexes in physics. W e have t h e girls' row down in f r o n t , please." N o t surprisingly, s h e was t h e only w o m a n in t h e class. Despite h e r ability in m a t h , h e r slower l a b p a r t n e r was m a d e t e a m l e a d e r . A f t e r a year of physics, s h e switched to an i n s u r a n c e c o u r s e , w h e r e s h e was still the o n l y w o m a n b u t t h e a c a d e m i c c l i m a t e was w a r m e r . A f t e r s h e o b t a i n e d h e r M.A. in 1943, Ewing was h i r e d by P r a t t a n d W h i t n e y Aircraft in H a r t f o r d , C o n n e c t i c u t , to teach e l e m e n t a r y m a t h e m a t i c s to w o m e n w h o w e r e i n t e r e s t e d in b e c o m i n g e n g i n e e r i n g aides to h e l p t h e war e f f o r t . O n b e i n g r e c r u i t e d by Livesay, in late A u g u s t 1944, h e r i n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e M a n h a t t a n P r o j e c t c a m e f r o m h e r i m m e d i a t e s u p e r i o r , w h o sat cross-legged o n t o p of a t a b l e a n d a n n o u n c e d t h a t s h e h a d c o m e to t h e m e s a to m a k e a n a t o m i c b o m b . Ewing's first impression was t h a t s h e m i g h t have to u n d e r t a k e the p r o j e c t a l o n e , a n d s h e c o u l d n ' t even r e m e m b e r what a n a t o m was. Nurses, Technicians,

and WACs

In a d d i t i o n to t h e w o m e n w h o w o r k e d in c h e m i c a l analysis at O a k R i d g e a n d H a n f o r d a n d t h o s e d o i n g t h e c a l c u l a t i o n s of t h e t h e o r e t i c a l division at Los A l a m o s , t h e r e w e r e f e m a l e n u r s e s involved in t h e c a r e of early cases of r a d i a t i o n e x p o s u r e . W o m e n w o r k e d as t e c h n i c i a n s in a variety of j o b s at Los A l a m o s a n d O a k Ridge, f r e q u e n t l y as t h e only w o m a n in a g r o u p . S i n c e w a r t i m e security insisted that p r o j e c t p a r t i c i p a n t s n o t discuss their work with a n y o n e , o t h e r w o m e n o n t h e p r o j e c t o f t e n did n o t know w h a t work their f r i e n d s were doing. Civilian w o m e n t e c h n i c i a n s i n c l u d e d E l e a n o r Eastin ( H a w k ) P o m e r a n c e a n d G r a c e M c C a m m o n Estabrook, w h o w o r k e d at t h e Y12 p l a n t in O a k R i d g e ; J e a n Klein ( H u r w i t z ) D a y t o n ; R e b e c c a B r a d f o r d Divan; a n d J e a n n e Brooks Carritt a n d F r a n c e s D u n n e at Los Alamos. T y p i c a l of t h e f e m a l e t e c h n i c i a n s , F r a n c e s D u n n e s t a r t e d t h e war w o r k i n g as a s e n i o r a i r c r a f t m e c h a n i c with a n A l i c e n s e at K i r t l a n d Field in A l b u q u e r q u e , New M e x i c o . S h e a t t e n d e d various colleges b u t o b t a i n e d no degree. H e r o u t s t a n d i n g m e c h a n i c a l ability a n d h e r s m a l l h a n d s p r o m p t e d G e o r g e Kistiakowsky to h i r e h e r f o r w o r k with t h e explosives g r o u p . With t h e title of e x p l o s i v e s s u p e r v i s o r , s h e was t h e first a n d o n l y w o m a n to actually w o r k at t h e e x p l o s i v e sites at Los A l a m o s , a l o n g with a g r o u p of t h i r t e e n t e c h s e r g e a n t s f r o m t h e Special E n g i n e e r D e t a c h m e n t . S h e d i d n o t realize until 1945 t h a t t h e i r

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p r o j e c t was an a t o m i c b o m b , but she u n d e r s t o o d t h e explosives e n d of t h e o p e r a t i o n ; h e r g r o u p did t h e explosives testing f o r b o t h Fat Man a n d Little Boy. She would reach inside the cavity of an explosive to assemble the trigger a n d t h e n serve as the technician in c h a r g e of t h e explosive test. She did t h e c o u n t d o w n a n d actually p r e s s e d t h e b u t t o n t h a t d e t o n a t e d t h e c h a r g e s . T h e m o c k u p s of t h e b o m b s w e r e t e s t e d f o r air, l a n d , a n d sea delivery by r u n n i n g t h e m t h r o u g h a large tank of water a n d s h o o t i n g t h e m off a w o o d e n f r a m e . T h e m o c k u p s u s e d in t h e test w e r e m u c h s m a l l e r t h a n t h e e v e n t u a l b o m b , a n d t h u s D u n n e ' s dexterity was essential. T h e g r o u p was the final assembly team f o r Fat Man a n d Little Boy, although D u n n e did not g o to the South Pacific. N o a c c o u n t of t h e w o m e n w h o w o r k e d on t h e M a n h a t t a n Project would be c o m p l e t e w i t h o u t m e n t i o n of the m e m b e r s of the W o m e n ' s Army Corps, the WACs. In the p e r i o d f r o m 1943 t h r o u g h 1945, t h e r e were WAC m e m b e r s assigned to u n i t s at C l i n t o n , H a n f o r d , Los Alamos, a n d o t h e r p r o j e c t installations, a n d some of t h e m were involved in highly technical a n d scientific work (Jones, 1985). A c c o r d i n g to t h e official history of Los Alamos (Hawkins, 1961), nearly half the WACs t h e r e in May 1945 w e r e w o r k i n g as scientists or t e c h n i c i a n s , a n d t h e p e r c e n t a g e e m p l o y e d as scientists was h i g h e r than the p e r c e n t a g e of civilian employees or m e m b e r s of the m e n ' s army in the Special E n g i n e e r Detachment. Probably the most accomplished scientist a m o n g the WACs was Mary L. Miller, w h o h e l d a Ph.D. in physical c h e m i s t r y f r o m C o l u m b i a University (1934). She was a research associate at the school of m e d i c i n e of Washington University in Si. Louis when the war b r o k e out. She d e c i d e d to enlist as a private in 1943 a n d was stationed at Los Alamos. H e r talent a n d qualifications placed her in c h a r g e of a laboratory g r o u p , but she insisted on m a i n t a i n i n g her low military rank. O t h e r WACs in the M a n h a t t a n Project i n c l u d e d Lyda Speck, w h o w o r k e d at the Van d e Graaff a c c e l e r a t o r at Los Alamos a n d s u c c e e d e d in p u b l i s h i n g s o m e of h e r technical work in the Physical Review a f t e r t h e war; Myrtle "Batch" B a c h e l d e r , w h o w o r k e d in analytical c h e m i s t r y a n d s p e c t r o s c o p y to d e t e r m i n e t h e purity of m a t e r i a l s u s e d in t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of u r a n i u m a n d p l u t o n i u m at Los Alamos; Evelyn S. Walker, w h o w o r k e d with metal o x i d e s a n d plastics; a n d Miriam W h i t e C a m p b e l l , who drew u p the detailed plans for the assembly of the b o m b , Little Boy.

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Conclusions The roles played by women in the scientific and technical work of the Manhattan Project were as varied as those of their male colleagues. This sampling of the women who were there clearly indicates not only that they were notably present, but also that they made significant contributions to the successful construction of the first nuclear weapons. Most of the women interviewed recalled their days in the Manhattan Project as a time of life when they felt terribly alive and vitally involved in their work. Nearly all of them expressed a desire to support the U.S. war effort. Few of them seem to have considered the consequences of their work until after the war. Manley (1990) quotes several women from Los Alamos who describe having concerns over the consequences of the work much later. They felt that the construction of a nuclear weapon was warranted by the wartime situation and that they would do the same thing again. Their attitudes are not unlike those of their male counterparts. Only Joan Hinton seems to have become active in the effort to obtain civilian control of nuclear technology. The absence of women from the leadership of the defense technology establishment is probably a result of social factors rather than an unwillingness of women to work on weapons development or a lack of ability to perform this type of physical research. Several of the women, such as Diz Graves, who rejected an appointment to the Atomic Energy Commission to care for her husband, and many who stopped working to raise children, a b a n d o n e d promising careers for family concerns. Others pursued their careers in universities or switched fields. The "glass ceiling" found in the defense technology establishment thus appears to be primarily an outgrowth of the social roles expected of women rather than an indication of female inability or unwillingness to participate in the construction of weapons of mass destruction.

Note Ruth H. Howes gratefully acknowledges the support of a Faculty Academic Year Research Grant from Ball State University.

chapter

y

Women and National Security Policy Frances G. Burwell, Meredith Reid Sarkees

National security policy refers to those objectives and programs whereby the government seeks to ensure the nation's security and survival in a potentially hostile international environment. It is a somewhat narrower concept than foreign policy, which refers to the totality of objectives and programs whereby the government seeks to cope with the external environment (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1987, p. 81). This duty of a state to protect its citizens a n d territory f r o m physical harm has long been seen as the basic tenet of international relations ( M o r g e n t h a u , 1990). Consequently, the use of military force against a n o t h e r country is o n e of the most m o m e n t o u s decisions a national g o v e r n m e n t can make. T h e c o n s e q u e n c e s , in terms of lives lost, m o n e y a n d resources spent, a n d i n f l u e n c e e n h a n c e d or d e p l e t e d , can be e n o r m o u s . As a result, t h e decision to use military force, w h e t h e r it involves a fullscale conflict or a single punitive b o m b i n g raid, is usually taken at the highest level of g o v e r n m e n t . In the U.S. system, such a decision is generally m a d e by the president, with the advice of the National Security Council. W h e n the involvement of women in this decision is considered, o n e fact t h a t b e c o m e s i m m e d i a t e l y obvious is the almost total a b s e n c e of w o m e n as significant players. Usually, t h o s e closely involved in the decision to launch a military operation are m e n . O n the o t h e r h a n d , it is also clear that a growing n u m b e r of w o m e n are e n t e r i n g t h e national security policy c o m m u n i t y . D u r i n g the last thirty years, w o m e n t h r o u g h o u t U.S. society have m o v e d i n t o "nontraditional" occupations (i.e., those previously restricted to, or d o m i n a t e d by, males). T h e U.S. government, including the national security agencies, has s e e n s i g n i f i c a n t c h a n g e s in t h e g e n d e r composition of its work force, as have most o t h e r sectors of society. T h e n u m b e r of w o m e n in the Foreign Service, on legislative staffs, a n d in the agencies generally has increased t h r o u g h o u t the past two decades. Lest this be overstated, iL must be n o t e d that fewer w o m e n are still e n t e r i n g t h e field t h a n m e n , b u t t h e c h a n g e is n o t insignificant.

Ill

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T h e focus of this chapter is to examine what effect this increase in the n u m b e r of w o m e n involved in the national security policy community might have on a decision to authorize the use of military force. T h e examination of the issue will focus on t h r e e subsidiary questions: How is national security policy currently b e i n g made? W h e r e are women located within this process? And what types of i m p a c t d o w o m e n have? In p a r t i c u l a r we will e x a m i n e t h e participation of women in the making of national security policy: to describe the extent of women's involvement; to detail the n u m b e r of women in different agencies and at different levels; and to examine some factors that may increase their participation rate or that may contribute to their career advancement or lack of it. Also, the views of female national security professionals will be discussed. Earlier chapters have described the widespread belief in a "gender gap" over the use of force. T h e r e is a significant body of research indicating that women, as part of the overall population, are less likely than men to favor the use of force. T h e corresponding assumption is that including more women in the process will necessarily result in more peaceful foreign and national security policies. This expectation will be addressed in the context of the perspectives of high-ranking women within the foreign policy establishment.

The National Security Process T h e decision to use force at the national level in the United States is a result of a process that includes a variety of agencies with disparate c o n s t i t u e n c i e s a n d f u n c t i o n s . T h e t e r m " n a t i o n a l security community" is very broad, with rather ill-defined b o u n d a r i e s . It could conceivably include not only those executive branch agencies concerned with d e t e r m i n i n g and implementing policy, but also the military forces c h a r g e d with actually providing security in the physical sense. It could include the Congress, with its extensive staff, which can greatly affect national security policy through its power to declare war a n d its b u d g e t a r y power. It m i g h t even i n c l u d e n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l groups, especially public interest g r o u p s , the defense industry, and research institutions, all of which certainly affect the debate over the use of force a n d at times have great influence on government decisions. However, since the military and the public have been addressed in other chapters, the focus on the n a t i o n a l security c o m m u n i t y in this c h a p t e r will b e r a t h e r circumscribed. It will include the National Security Council and its

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staff, the Department of State, the civilian sectors of the Department of Defense, and Congress, particularly the members of committees concerned with national security policy, their staffs, and the staffs of those committees. In gauging the extent of w o m e n ' s participation in major national security decisions, a critical question to ask is whether the process is centralized or decentralized. Are major decisions made primarily among a small circle of presidential advisers, perhaps acting on limited advice? Or is the involvement of large sectors of the bureaucracy e n c o u r a g e d , with advice and options flowing upward? In the first case, only the very top layer of the national security community will be involved, along with a few close personal advisers to the president. In the second case, analysts and experts who are relatively new in the bureaucracy can have a major impact by framing the terms of the debate and identifying potential courses of action. The extent to which women are active players in a government decision to use force will d e p e n d on an appropriate match between the type of policy process and the presence of women in the relevant positions. If the first case is applicable, women must be among the relatively small circle of presidential advisers; if the second case is applicable, they could be effective even at relatively junior levels in the bureaucracy. During the postwar period, many observers of the policy process have written about the increasing power of the presidency and the declining influence of other government forces in major foreign policy decisions. Particularly in national security policy matters, the president has relied increasingly upon his own personal staff and the Executive Office of the President (including the National Security Council) at the expense of both Congress and the bureaucracy (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1987). However, as Leslie Gelb cautions, in examining the policy apparatus, we find one stark truth: that personalities and abilities are far more important than structure and process, and that these factors will determine who will make policy and decisions under the president. . . . The only safe prediction o n organization is that however the formal system is constructed, actual power will gravitate to the person whose policy views and styles prevail with the president. . . . If a president wants to create a decisionmaking system that encourages competing views over which he presides and decides, he can do that. Similarly, if he wants to stress the image and the fact of harmony or professionalism or division of labor, he can do that as well (1988, pp. 236-237).

As a result, we shall restrict our examination to the Bush administration, examining how these agencies have interrelated in

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making national security policy. President Bush, as the consummate insider, seemed m o r e likely than his predecessor to use the bureaucracy, allowing the careerists an avenue for security policy input. On the other h a n d , Bush has also demonstrated a very "hands-on" style of leadership, which has reflected a willingness to override normal bureaucratic channels (Deibel, 1991). Along these lines, Bush has a d o p t e d a more restricted, hierarchical, policymaking model, which concentrates national security policymaking within the hands of a few close personal advisers and which tends to exclude both the bureaucracy and Congress. "The Bush White House seeks to exploit divisions in government to the advantage of the White House" (Rose, 1991, p. 313). In terms of the president's relations with Congress, during the first two years of the Bush administration there were no major national security nor foreign policy confrontations between the president and Capitol Hill. However, the seeds of potential conflict had b e e n sown by both the president's campaign to reassert presidential prerogatives and Congress' intention to play an assertive foreign and defense policy role (Sinclair, 1991). Bush had already proven willing to resist congressional initiatives, successfully vetoing more legislation than any predecessor (Rose, 1991). The president's desire to exclude Congress from national security policy decisions was particularly evident during the initial stages of the Gulf War. As commander-in-chief, Bush originally ordered 200,000 troops into the region, and later increased the force levels to more than 400,000 without first seeking the support of Congress (Rose, 1991). The president's failure to include Congress, and especially to take key Democrats into his confidence, led to a full-scale congressional debate on the looming conflict, and especially on the value of continuing economic sanctions. Although there was significant opposition in the Senate, where the administration's measure passed by only fifty-two to forty-six, the debate and vote came late enough in the process that it did not provide an effective challenge to the president's primacy on this issue. In terms of the national security bureaucracy, the Bush administration, unlike that of Ronald Reagan, has been for the most part devoid of officials with their own strong political agendas; instead, it has been characterized by insider politics (Rockman, 1991). Bush has treated the role and mission of career civil servants with respect, appointing cabinet officials who are not hostile to the statutory goals of their agencies. On the other hand, the president has also revealed a propensity for relying on a small group of personal friends (Aberbach, 1991). In general, Bush has followed

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the counsel of a limited group of advisers, including James Baker, Brent Scowcroft, and Dick Cheney, without bringing career officials or other legitimate players into the deliberations (Campbell, 1991). Bush's political style has been characterized by George Will as stemming f r o m his comfort with "a small set of entitled decisionmakers and his disdain for the politics of public persuasion" (Rockman, 1991, p. 26). As a result: Bush's inner sanctum has a fraternity air, what o n e top Republican calls "a male prep school, locker-room atmosphere." T h e president is very much a product of his upbringing and his generation, and in his closest councils h e makes many important decisions with a group of likeminded m e n (Dowd, 1991, p. 1A).

This collegial atmosphere shuts out the bureaucracy and places a premium on personal loyalty, further reducing the likelihood that any new actors will be involved. Moreover, as one observer noted: Such shortcomings may not be limited to the White House; for while the president relies on Baker, Cheney, Scowcroft, and Sununu, Baker has been criticized for ignoring the Foreign Service in favor of a few top aides, all of them veterans of Baker's previous cabinet or campaign posts: Robert Kimmitt, Dennis Ross, Margaret Tutwiler, and Robert Zoellick (Deibel, 1991, pp. 19-20).

Another commented: The strained relations between Baker and the State Department's career diplomats are no secret; Baker relies on a small group of insiders and rarely seeks advice on foreign policy from career officers. In addition, Bush and Baker often bypass Foreign Service Officers in favor of direct contacts and personal relationships with other heads of state (Roberts, 1991, p. C6).

This emphasis on personal relationships with foreign leaders has been characterized as "Rolodex diplomacy" (Deibel, 1991, p. 6), and was particularly evident in Bush's successful efforts to galvanize world leaders and build the coalition against Iraq (Campbell, 1991). Clearly, in the Bush administration, like others before it, national decisionmaking is centralized at the very top levels of the government. This is particularly true for a decision regarding the use of force, as was amply demonstrated during the Gulf War. Thus, whether individual women have any influence on this process will depend on their proximity to the president, either as members of his close circle of advisers or in some prominent role. For example, Margaret Tutwiler, the assistant secretary of state for public affairs,

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has a long association with Secretary o f State Baker. T h u s , it is likely that she does have an impact on policy beyond h e r public r o l e o f explaining U.S. decisions after the fact. W h e t h e r that role e x t e n d s to questions c o n c e r n i n g the use o f force is unclear.

W h e r e D o W o m e n Work? F o r w o m e n to b e involved in the national security d e c i s i o n m a k i n g process, they must first b e working in the relevant a g e n c i e s and offices. Also, they must b e p r e s e n t at the a p p r o p r i a t e rank. Staff aides may b e present as e x p e r t advisers or staff officers, but that is entirely different from b e i n g o n e o f the actual decisionmakers at the highest level. T h i s s e c t i o n will analyze s o m e o f the available data c o n c e r n i n g w h e r e w o m e n work in t h e v a r i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s responsible for national security policy. In discussing t h e data for the n u m b e r s a n d ranks o f w o m e n in the national security c o m m u n i t y , it is first necessary to distinguish between the legislative a n d executive b r a n c h e s , which play different roles in p o l i c y m a k i n g a n d utilize radically d i f f e r e n t p e r s o n n e l systems. T h e congressional system is not really a system at all, but is i n s t e a d c o m p o s e d o f p u b l i c l y e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s who r e t a i n considerable autonomy in the hiring of their own staffs and those of the relevant c o m m i t t e e s . T h e e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h , in c o n t r a s t , is divided into several i n t e r l o c k i n g p e r s o n n e l systems, c o m p l e t e with c o m p l e x hiring and p r o m o t i o n procedures, n u m e r o u s grade levels, a n d fairly r e g u l a r a c c u m u l a t i o n and r e p o r t i n g o f data o n the representation o f women and minorities. T h e primary p e r s o n n e l structure of the executive b r a n c h is the Civil Service. T h e portions of the Civil Service that are most relevant to o u r purposes are the GS system, the GM system, and the Senior Executive Service, or SES. In addition, the State Department includes the Foreign Service, which will be discussed later. T h e GS grades (with 1 b e i n g t h e lowest a n d 18 t h e h i g h e s t ) i n c l u d e mostly individuals with administrative, clerical, and technical responsibilities. T h e GM grades (which are parallel to GS 1 3 - 1 5 ) i n c l u d e those individuals with supervisory, m a n a g e r i a l , or policy responsibilities. Generally, there are far fewer GM employees than GS employees in any agency. High-ranking GS employees (grades 1 6 - 1 8 ) n u m b e r relatively few, a n d usually are lawyers, scientists, or t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t s with an advisory role in policy. Most o f the individuals formerly in the GS 1 6 - 1 8 ranks were transferred in 1978

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into the newly created Senior Executive Service, which comprises the high-level managerial a n d policy personnel t h r o u g h o u t government. Above the SES and the Civil Service as a whole are the Executive Schedule, or political a p p o i n t e e s whose positions r e q u i r e Senate confirmation. These individuals include the departmental secretaries, u n d e r secretaries, assistant secretaries, a n d o t h e r persons of similar rank. Across the entire civilian federal work f o r c e w o m e n are 44 p e r c e n t of employees. T h e GS and GM grades c o m b i n e d are 51 percent women, but within grades 13-15, where GM employees are f o u n d , the percentage of women drops to only 20 percent. In the SES, only 12 p e r c e n t of employees are women (U.S. Office of Personnel M a n a g e m e n t figures, as of S e p t e m b e r 30, 1991. No separate breakdown is available for GS and GM employees across the e n t i r e federal work f o r c e ) . This p a t t e r n , in which w o m e n constitute a significant percentage of the overall work force but only a small percentage of the high-level managerial grades, is repeated throughout the national security community. What follows is an analysis of the primary executive b r a n c h agencies involved in national security policy and the n u m b e r and rank of the women working in those agencies. Of course, having numerous women working in a particular agency, even high-ranking w o m e n , does not necessarily mean that those individuals are involved in a governmental decision to use force against a n o t h e r country. However, the absence of w o m e n , especially at the high levels, is a clear indication that women are not involved in such decisions.

The Department of State The Department of State advises the President in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. . . . The Department of State's primary objective in the conduct of foreign relations is to promote the longrange security and well-being of the United States. The Department determines and analyzes the facts relating to American overseas interests, makes recommendations on policy and future action, and takes the necessary steps to carry out established policy (U.S. Government

Manual, 1988).

The State Department has long had a reputation for being slow to hire a n d p r o m o t e w o m e n in its work force, especially in t h e diplomatic corps. In fact, State has been sued successfully for sex

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discrimination on several occasions, most recently in Alison Palmer et al. v. Baker (1988), leading to an exhaustive examination of hiring and promotion procedures. Some changes have been instituted, but too recently for the impact to be adequately judged. Today the State Department compares somewhat unfavorably with the federal work force as a whole, having, for example, a smaller percentage of women in the senior grades but a slightly higher percentage of women in the middle-level managerial grades. However, State compares favorably with the other major national security agency, the D e p a r t m e n t of Defense, with slightly higher percentages of women at both the senior and middle ranks. As of March 1991, the D e p a r t m e n t had 25,464 employees, divided into two separate spheres, the Foreign Service and the Civil Service (Federal Civilian Workforce Statistics, March 1991). T h e Foreign Service, comprising about 66 percent of all personnel in the State Department, sends individuals to represent the United States around the world: in embassies, at international organizations, and at various conferences and negotiations. Most of the professionals in substantive policymaking j o b s in the d e p a r t m e n t ' s Washington offices are f r o m the Foreign Service. Finally, the Foreign Service includes those communicators, security personnel, a n d o t h e r administrative specialists who serve overseas. The Civil Service, about one-third of State D e p a r t m e n t personnel, manages the communications, logistics, and domestic end of foreign relations, largely from Washington, D.C. The personnel systems of the Foreign Service and the Civil Service are quite different. The Foreign Service has a rather unique system that involves entrance exams, periodic reviews, and a series of short-term assignments. The Civil Service is on a GS grade system, like many government jobs, and retains a formalized step system for promotions. Table 9.1 details the distribution of women throughout the State Department's Civil Service. The percentage of women across the entire Civil Service is quite high—63 percent. But the vast majority of them are in grades GS 12 and below, with women representing 35 percent of GS 13-15. These numbers are higher, however, than comparable figures from the Department of Defense overall or from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. For grades 13-15, the State Department has a higher percentage of women than does the federal government as a whole. However, in terms of policymaking, the most influential positions are those in the SES. In 1970, there were t h r e e women in the Senior Executive Service of the State Department; in 1981 there were eight; in 1987 there were nine. However, taking into account the growth of the SES, there has been

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little or n o progress in the p e r c e n t a g e of w o m e n in it, fluctuating f r o m 15 p e r c e n t to 8 p e r c e n t in 1987 a n d back to 12 p e r c e n t of the SES in 1991. T h e s e statistics would seem to indicate that w o m e n e n c o u n t e r a "glass ceiling" that limits their entry into these levels.

Table 9.1 Department of State Civil Service Personnel Grade Undefined

Total Employees 105

Women

(percentage of total)

16

(15)

GS 1 - 4

442

340

(77)

GS 5 - 8

1,683

1,372

(82)

GS 9 - 1 2

1,737

1,160

(67)

GS 13-15

1,274

447

(35)

GS 16-18

0

0

GS Total

5,136

3,319

(65)

SES Total

104

12

(12)

5,345

3,347

(63)

Total

Snurce.U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, Multi-Year Affirmative Action Plan, FY 1990/92 (Washington: D e p a r t m e n t of State, April 1991). Figures are as of S e p t e m b e r 1990.

T h e Civil Service, however, represents only a portion of the State D e p a r t m e n t ' s work force. T h e Foreign Service is the m o r e visible p e r s o n n e l g r o u p , largely because of its role in r e p r e s e n t i n g the U n i t e d States a b r o a d . Also, m e m b e r s of t h e F o r e i g n Service generally t e n d to be m o r e involved in the making of foreign policy t h a n d o m e m b e r s of the Civil Service. T h e Foreign Service itself is divided into "generalists" a n d "specialists." Generalists are p e r s o n s usually r e f e r r e d to as diplomats or Foreign Service officers (FSOs). Specialists are those with specific skills, such as security p e r s o n n e l , b u d g e t a r y officers, a n d secretaries; they are not usually involved in f o r e i g n policy decisions. T h u s , the statistics f o r Foreign Service specialists a r e p r e s e n t e d in T a b l e 9.2 mostly to illustrate t h e c o n t i n u e d p a t t e r n of w o m e n in t h e lower a n d m i d d l e ranks a n d m e n in the senior grades.

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Table 9.2 Department o f State Foreign Service Personnel Generalists Grade

Total Employees

SFS-CM SFS-MC SFS-OC

Women

(percentage of total)

41 314 315

1 17 33

(2%) (5%) (10%)

670

51

(8%)

807 978 917 1,153 371 65 2 0 0

140 220 263 367 134 26 1 0 0

(17%) (22%) (29%) (32%) (36%) (46%) (50%)

Total FS

4,284

1,151

(27%)

Total Generalists

4,954

1,202

(24%)

Total SFS FS 1 FS 2 FS 3 FS 4 FS 5 FS 6 FS 7 FS 8 FS9

Specialists Grade

Total Employees

SFS-CM SFS-MC SFS-OC

Women

(percentage of total)

0 16 45

0 2 0

(13%) (0%)

Total SFS

61

2

(3%)

FS FS FS FS FS FS FS FS FS

192 352 438 783 761 504 405 290 45

11 38 88 151 254 320 310 224 18

(6%) (11%) (20%) (19%) (33%) (63%) (77%) (77%) (40%)

Total FS

3,770

1,414

(38%)

Total Specialists

3,831

1,416

(37%)

Total

8,785

2,618

(30%)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Source: U.S. Departmentof State, Multi-Year Affirmative ActionPUm, FY 1990/92 Department of State, April 1991). Note: Figures are as of September 1990.

(Washington:

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It is the Foreign Service g e n e r a l i s e w h o are m u c h m o r e relevant to a decision r e g a r d i n g t h e potential use of f o r c e . T h e y provide advice f r o m U.S. embassies a r o u n d the world, h a n d l e day-to-day o p e r a t i o n s with o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t s , a n d generally i m p l e m e n t U.S. foreign policy. T h e distribution of w o m e n t h r o u g h o u t the Foreign Service generalist corps is provided in Table 9.2. T h e p e r c e n t a g e of g e n e r a l i s e who are w o m e n is small (24 p e r c e n t ) c o m p a r e d with the GS p e r s o n n e l in the D e p a r t m e n t of State overall or with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In part, this is because some traditional f e m a l e o c c u p a t i o n s (i.e., s e c r e t a r y ) a r e n o t i n c l u d e d in t h e generalist g r o u p b u t rather with the Civil Service or the specialists. A m o n g the s e n i o r ranks of the generalists—the individuals most likely to b e o f f i c e d i r e c t o r s , d e p u t y assistant s e c r e t a r i e s , or ambassadors—only 8 p e r c e n t are w o m e n . This p e r c e n t a g e is lower than that for the SES grades in the State D e p a r t m e n t overall, the f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t overall, a n d the O f f i c e of the Secretary of Defense. It is higher, however, than the p e r c e n t a g e of w o m e n in the SES grades at the D e p a r t m e n t of Defense as a whole. Thus, the Foreign Service generalist corps continues the pattern of very few w o m e n in the senior levels. It differs f r o m the o t h e r agencies in n o t having a large g r o u p of s e c r e t a r i a l / a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p e r s o n n e l w h o are w o m e n . It also differs in having slightly h i g h e r p e r c e n t a g e s of women in the middle levels of FS 1 to FS 3 than are f o u n d a m o n g the GM 13-15 grades. This may have a significant i m p a c t o n f u t u r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of w o m e n in the s e n i o r ranks, because it represents an increasing percentage of women in the pool of individuals likely to be p r o m o t e d to the senior grades. Of course, such a d v a n c e m e n t is n o t assured, a n d the issue of p r o m o t i o n s was i n c l u d e d in the sex-discrimination case b r o u g h t against the State D e p a r t m e n t . In a recent appeal of a portion of Alison Palmer et al. v. Baker, t h e U.S. C o u r t of Appeals f o u n d that w o m e n in State were h a m p e r e d in p r o m o t i o n s because of discrimination in assignments, merit awards, a n d p e r f o r m a n c e evaluations (Havemann, 1990). A m o n g the Foreign Service generalists, the two groups likely to have m o r e opportunities to address issues regarding the use of force a r e a m b a s s a d o r s a n d p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r s . As t h e p r i m a r y representatives of t h e U.S. g o v e r n m e n t to a n o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t , ambassadors provide advice to Washington a n d carry W a s h i n g t o n ' s desires a n d c o n c e r n s to t h e o t h e r c o u n t r y . S h o u l d hostilities b e c o m e a possibility, the a m b a s s a d o r c o u l d b e a m a j o r player, a l t h o u g h that m i g h t take the f o r m of giving advice r a t h e r t h a n making decisions. In the case of Iraq, the U.S. ambassador, April Glaspie, was o r d e r e d n o t to return to B a g h d a d (she was in E u r o p e

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when Kuwait was invaded), and she spent the war working at the State Department. Glaspie was unusual, however, in being a woman assigned as ambassador to a country of major importance to the United States. Currently most female ambassadors serve in smaller countries that have been somewhat peripheral to U.S. interests. T h e difficulty that women have in rising through the career ranks to the ambassadorial level is c o m p o u n d e d by the increasing tendency of presidents to utilize ambassadorships for political patronage. For example, President Bush has cut the number of ambassadorial posts to career Foreign Service officers to 43 percent, down f r o m 63 percent under Reagan (Sciolino, 1989). Of the eighty-eight positions filled by career members of the Foreign Service officer corps, only six were filled by women, an abysmal 7 percent of the total. In sharp contrast, 13 percent of politically appointed ambassadors were women. In August 1989, Charles Untermayer, the White House personnel director, claimed that the administration's appointment policies for ambassadors were in fact adopted to supplement the State Department's affirmative action program. However, in her congressional testimony, Mary Lee Garrison, co-president of the State D e p a r t m e n t chapter of the Women's Action Organization, noted the tangential impact of this policy on women. Certainly from the standpoint of female Foreign Service Officers, it is galling that historically approximately two-thirds of the f e m a l e ambassadors have been political appointees. . . . We have no qualms about the inclusion of qualified w o m e n from outside the State Department ranks as ambassadors, but if you look at those w o m e n who have b e e n a p p o i n t e d from outside the Foreign Service ranks to ambassadorial appointments, in most cases, their lack of qualifications is s t u n n i n g . . . . It very m u c h affects morale and c h e a p e n s the accomplishments of those women and minorities who have worked darn hard to get to those levels. It tars everyone who has appearance of being a woman or minority candidate with a brush of incompetence, and even more tragically, it presents to young people looking at the possibility of careers in the Foreign Service a very warped picture (Hearings, 1989, p. 49).

As a result, she claims that the brightest women have realized that their likelihood of obtaining an ambassadorship is increased if they leave the State Department and concentrate on political activity. Political officers are those Foreign Service generalise who spend most of their careers analyzing political or military issues. The generalist corps is divided into four such groups ("cones" in State D e p a r t m e n t p a r l a n c e ) : political, e c o n o m i c , c o n s u l a r , a n d administrative. Economic officers deal primarily with trade and

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monetary issues, consular officers work on visa and immigration issues as well as assisting U.S. citizens overseas, and administrative officers manage facilities, budgets, and personnel. After taking the Foreign Service written exam, which now covers four functional areas, a successful generalist candidate is put on a list for one area, for which s / h e may be hired. It is quite rare, but not impossible, to switch cones mid-career. T h e r e f o r e , the assignment is of great importance. T h e State Department has been criticized for assigning these cones on the basis of the exam alone, especially since the exam itself has come u n d e r continued criticism. The political and economic cones are those most involved in substantive policy formulation and are considered the most prestigious and the most likely to lead to promotion to the Senior Foreign Service. At the end of FY 1990, women were disproportionately represented in the administrative and especially the consular cones. Although they are 22 percent of all generalists, women make up 35 percent of the consular cone and 29 percent of the administrative cone. Table 9.3 shows the distribution of officers across the cones, by sex.

Table 9.3 Cone Assignments for Foreign Service Officers

Total Foreign

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

78

22

Service Officers Political Cone

82

18

Economic Cone

80

20

Consular Cone

65

35

Administrative Cone

71

29

Source: U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f State, Multi-Year Affirmative Action Plan, FY 1990/92 (Washington: D e p a r t m e n t o f State, April 1991). Figures are as of S e p t e m b e r 1990.

Of all female Foreign Service officers in 1990, 28 percent were assigned to the political cone and 28 percent to the consular cone; whereas of all male Foreign Service officers, 40 p e r c e n t were assigned to the political cone and only 17 percent were assigned to

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The Role of Women: The Evidence

the consular cone. That women FSOs have been disproportionately assigned to the consular cone has been recognized publicly in at least two places. In Alison Palmer et al. v. Baker, lawyers for the plaintiff found that between 1975 and 1980, 16.9 percent more females were assigned to the consular cone than expected, based on the proportion of new hires. A more recent acknowledgment came in the recently released Government Accounting Office ( G A O ) report on the Foreign Service that was requested by Congress. It stated that there are a "disproportionate number of minorities and white women in functional areas that employee groups consider to be less desirable" (State Department, 1989, p. 30). This overrepresentation of women in the consular cone could be a further obstacle to women's career advancement, since, as the GAO c o n c l u d e d , political and e c o n o m i c officers had the greatest c h a n c e o f promotion. If political officers are those most likely to deal with issues regarding the use of force, then this distribution makes it even less likely that women will be involved.

The Defense Department T h e Department of Defense is responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our country. . . . Under the President, who is also Commander in Chief, the Secretary of D e f e n s e e x e r c i s e s d i r e c t i o n , a u t h o r i t y , a n d c o n t r o l o v e r the D e p a r t m e n t , which i n c l u d e s the separately o r g a n i z e d military departments o f Army, Navy, and Air Force, the J o i n t Chiefs o f Staff providing military advice, the unified and specified c o m b a t a n t c o m m a n d s , and various defense agencies established for specific purposes ( U.S. Government Manual, 1 9 8 8 - 1 9 8 9 ) .

T h e D e p a r t m e n t o f Defense is o n e of the largest federal bureaucracies. Overall, the civilian work force of the Defense Department in the categories relevant here—GS, GM, and S E S — totals 659,400. In addition, there are forty-one political appointees whose positions require Senate confirmation. This would include the secretary and deputy secretary, as well as the under secretaries, the assistant secretaries, and some other high-level positions. Also, a significant n u m b e r of military p e r s o n n e l work in D e f e n s e Department offices (the status of military women is examined in another chapter of this volume). T h e Defense Department also includes numerous agencies that deal primarily with the technical aspects of national security policy, ranging from the Defense

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Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to the Civilian Health a n d Medical Programs of the Unified Services (CHAMPUS). Most of t h e i r e m p l o y e e s a r e t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t s r a t h e r t h a n political decisionmakers. Table 9.4 details the n u m b e r of civilian w o m e n in the D e p a r t m e n t of Defense overall.

Table 9.4 Department of Defense Civilian Work Force Grade GS GS GS GS GS

Total Employées 1-4 5-8 9-12 13-15 16-18

GS Total GM 13 GM 14 GM 15 GM Total SES SES SES

1-2 3-4 5-6

SES Total Total

Women

(percentage