Women and Power on Capitol Hill: Reconstructing the Congressional Women's Caucus 9781685855277

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction: Before and After the "Republican Revolution"
1 Origin and Early Years: 1977-1981
2 Transformation and Growth: 1982-1992
3 Before the "Republican Revolution": 1993-1994
4 The Republicans Take Control: 1995-1996
5 Coping with Change: 1995-1996
6 Reclaiming the Initiative: 1997-1998
7 Congresswomen and the New Millennium: The Future of the Caucus
List of Interviewees
Bibliography
Index
About the Book

Citation preview

Women and Power on Capitol Hill

WOMEN AND POWER ON CAPITOL HILL Reconstructing the Congressional Women's Caucus

Irwin N. Gertzog

LYN NE RIENNER PUBLISHERS BOULDER LONDON

Published in the United States of America in 2004 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2004 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved by the publisher

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gertzog, Irwin N., 1933Women and power on Capitol Hill : Reconstructing the Congressional Women's Caucus / by Irwin N. Gertzog. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 1-58826-283-9 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues—History. I. Title. JK1417.G47 2004 328.73'076—dc22 2003020612

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

@

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5 4 3 2 1

To the memory of my parents, Sadie and Benjamin Gertzog

Contents

Acknowledgments Introduction: Before and After the "Republican Revolution" 1 Origin and Early Years: 1977-1981 Strategic Goals 9 Workways 13 Policy Goals 14 Extending the ERA Time Limit 16 Organizational Strains 19 2 Transformation and Growth: 1982-1992 Membership Change 23 Countering the Reagan-Bush Agenda 25 Caucus Viability 29 3 Before the "Republican Revolution": 1993-1994 Inside the Numbers 35 Gaining Leverage 37 Aspiring to Power in the House 40 Promoting the Feminist Agenda 43 Tackling the Abortion Issue 50 The Unraveling of Bipartisanship 53

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Contents

viii

4 The Republicans Take Control: 1995-1996 Consolidating Power Abolishing the LSOs The Revolutionaries The Contract and the

57

58 67 71 Role of Government 74

5 Coping with Change: 1995-1996

77

Life as a CMO 77 The New Women 86 Abortion Rights Redux 92 A Tale of Two Sessions 103 The Erosion of Strategic Premises 109 6 Reclaiming the Initiative: 1997-1998

117

Recruiting New Members 119 Reinforcing Bipartisanship 121 Strengthening the Caucus Infrastructure 125 Promoting Consensus 127 Improving Rapport with House and Administration Leaders 139 Two Contested Elections 143 Assessing the Caucus in the 105th Congress 157 1 Congresswomen and the New Millennium: The Future of the Caucus

161

Recruiting Feminist Cochairs 162 Attracting Committed Congresswomen 164 Changing the Caucus's Structure 166 Finding a Usable Agenda 169 Adjusting to Competing Claims on National Resources 171 Connecting with the President and Congressional Leaders 172 List of Interviewees Bibliography Index About the Book

179 181 187 197

Acknowledgments

A

s is the case for most studies of this kind, the publication of this book is in substantial measure the product of the ideas, the expertise, and the goodwill of many people willing to share their time and thoughts without regard for the credit or benefits they may receive. The topic of this book emerged out of my conversations with Ruth Mandel and Deborah Walsh of the Eagleton Institute and the Center for American Women and Politics (CAWP). When I decided to undertake the project, they made available to me transcripts compiled by CAWP staff members Debra Dodson and Kathleen Casey, who did a superb job of questioning congresswomen and congressional aides about the role of women in the policymaking process. Their taped conversations were supplemented by interviews I conducted with congresswomen and staff in 1993 and 1994, and between 1997 and 2003. (The names of representatives and staff who agreed to share their thoughts with the CAWP and with me appear in the List of Interviewees on p. 179.) When gathering information for this book in Washington, I relied on the guidance and insights of Cindy Hall, first in her capacity as an aide to Congresswoman Constance Morella, and then later, after she had become president of Women's Policy Inc. (WPI). The policy expertise of WPI issue specialist Jennifer Lockwood-Shabat was unusually helpful. On Capitol Hill, I benefited especially from the assistance of Michael Gerber, Kathleen Havey, Cindy Pellegrini, Erin Prangley, Gail Ravnitsky, and two of my former students at Allegheny College, Susan Lexer and Derrick Owens. Anne Womeldorf and Larry Pearl provided me with a home away from home during my visits to Washington. Two specialists in women and politics, Susan Carroll and Cindy ix

X

Acknowledgments

Simon Rosenthal, gave me helpful advice when the manuscript was ready to be sent to a publisher. I also thank my wife, Alice, who read chapter drafts and who is my best critic and my best friend. —Irwin N. Gertzog

Introduction: Before and After the 'Republican Revolution"

T

his book traces the origin, development, and legislative contributions of the Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues (CCWI), and portrays the women who, since 1977, have been instrumental in championing C C W I priorities. It also describes the shifting institutional and political environment within which the caucus has sought to exert influence, and analyzes the tactics and strategies its leaders have devised to adjust to environmental changes.

The most significant of these changes by far occurred after the 1994 election, when, for the first time in forty years, Republicans seized control of the House and eliminated the offices, staffs, and finances of twenty-eight legislative service organizations (LSOs), the Congressw o m e n ' s Caucus among them. Denied the resources that had helped make the 103rd Congress ( 1 9 9 3 - 1 9 9 4 ) the most successful in C C W I history, caucus leaders scrambled to find alternative means by which to advance their women-friendly agenda. The task was daunting, and the 104th Congress ( 1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 6 ) saw the C C W I falter and almost dissolve. The disparity in C C W I fortunes reflected in the 103rd compared with the 104th Congress could not have been more dramatic, and the consequences of these developments are still being felt in the first decade of the twenty-first century. What follows is an account of these changing f o r t u n e s — a description and analysis of how the C C W I carried out its mission before and after the "Republican revolution." *

*

*

The 1994 election for the U.S. House of Representatives was the most consequential midterm contest since the end of World War II, arguably 1

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Women and Power on Capitol Hill

since the b e g i n n i n g of the twentieth century. T h e election e n d e d forty years of D e m o c r a t i c d o m i n a n c e , and it installed a zealous R e p u b l i c a n majority d e t e r m i n e d to enact a conservative agenda, c h a n g e the culture of C o n g r e s s , and alter f u n d a m e n t a l l y the w a y politics w o r k e d in the nation's capital. T h e undisputed architect of this " r e v o l u t i o n " was N e w t Gingrich, a once b a c k b e n c h Georgia maverick who, after years of attacking D e m o crats, m a i n s t r e a m Republicans, and the H o u s e itself, b e c a m e the leader of his party and S p e a k e r of the H o u s e . T h e new m a j o r i t y seized its responsibilities enthusiastically, energized by the exhilaration of victory and g u i d e d by an u n p r e c e d e n t e d c o n g r e s s i o n a l party p l a t f o r m — t h e Contract with A m e r i c a — t o w h i c h virtually all R e p u b l i c a n s had sworn fealty in the m o n t h s preceding the election. For Gingrich and G O P leaders, the Contract was the centerpiece of their dramatic victory and the template for their g o v e r n a n c e strategy. It p r o v i d e d an a g e n d a f o r the 104th C o n g r e s s and served as the c e m e n t h o l d i n g R e p u b l i c a n s to a c o m m o n p u r p o s e . It also represented a s y m bolic e m b o d i m e n t of the claimed Republican m a n d a t e . A n d b e c a u s e its ten " c o m m a n d m e n t s " could be expressed succinctly on an index card, it b e c a m e a theatrical p r o p that c o u l d b e w h i p p e d out of j a c k e t p o c k e t s and flashed before sympathetic audiences. Essential though the Contract was f o r m o b i l i z i n g and m o t i v a t i n g the new majority, it w a s only the first step in the drive to repeal N e w Deal and Great Society social welfare programs. To e n a c t the C o n t r a c t in the p r o m i s e d 100 d a y s , G i n g r i c h and his lieutenants c h a n g e d H o u s e and party rules in order to centralize p o w e r within their own hands. At the same time, they stripped the D e m o c r a t i c minority of r e s o u r c e s that c o u l d be used to delay, dilute, or d e f e a t the m a j o r i t y ' s initiatives, and they silenced or eviscerated more than a score of partisan and bipartisan L S O s that m i g h t stand in their way. T h e s e i n f o r m a l H o u s e g r o u p s w e r e a particularly vulnerable target, and were eliminated soon after the 104th C o n g r e s s c o n v e n e d . T h e L S O s w e r e m a d e up of H o u s e m e m b e r s w h o shared c o m m o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s — i d e o l o g i c a l orientations, racial or ethnic b a c k g r o u n d s , regional ties, or c o n s t i t u e n c i e s with similar e c o n o m i c interests. M e m bers of each met periodically to explore ideas, c o m m o n problems, and l a w m a k i n g possibilities. T h e y used their groups to raise issues insufficiently addressed by H o u s e c o m m i t t e e s , to d e v e l o p policy expertise, to obtain voting cues, and to f o r m u l a t e legislative strategies. A m o n g the larger, better-known L S O s were the D e m o c r a t i c Study G r o u p , a collection of liberal and m o d e r a t e D e m o c r a t s typically n u m b e r i n g more than

Introduction

3

150, the Congressional Black Caucus, the Republican Study C o m m i t t e e , and the Congressional C a u c u s for W o m e n ' s Issues. 1 T h e L S O s coexisted with a m u c h larger n u m b e r of another type of i n f o r m a l g r o u p — c o n g r e s s i o n a l m e m b e r s h i p o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( C M O s ) , as they c a m e to be k n o w n b e g i n n i n g in 1995. A m o n g the latter w e r e the Asian C a u c u s , the C o n s e r v a t i v e O p p o r t u n i t y Society, the S p o r t s m e n ' s C a u c u s , and the C h o w d e r and M a r c h i n g Society, the last of which was m a d e up of m a i n s t r e a m Republicans. L S O s and less f o r m a l H o u s e groups served m a n y of the s a m e purp o s e s for their m e m b e r s , but there were f u n d a m e n t a l structural d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e m . U n l i k e the latter, the L S O s hired staff w h o w e r e separate and distinct f r o m m e m b e r s ' o f f i c e w o r k e r s and w h o f u r n i s h e d research assistance, public relations initiatives, and c o m m u n i c a t i o n netw o r k s . L S O m e m b e r s used f u n d s f r o m their e m p l o y e e a l l o w a n c e s to c o m p e n s a t e the g r o u p s ' staffs. A n d their organizations were given Capitol Hill o f f i c e space, furnishings, and e q u i p m e n t , in m u c h the same way that m e m b e r s were serviced to run their individual o f f i c e s . Other informal g r o u p s b e n e f i t e d f r o m n o n e of these perquisites. O v e r the years, L S O s had b e e n u n d e r attack, o f t e n b e c a u s e critics believed their use of public f u n d s , space, and e q u i p m e n t was an u n w a r ranted drain on the public treasury. O t h e r c o m p l a i n t s g r e w out of the parochial policy goals they pursued, and their readiness to serve as conduits f o r special interest lobbyists. T h e m o s t p e n e t r a t i n g criticism of L S O s w a s that m a n y did not k e e p accurate records of f u n d s raised and spent. S o m e t i m e s the g o o d s and services L S O s p u r c h a s e d s m a c k e d of p a t r o n a g e , and had little r e l e v a n c e to m e m b e r s ' p r o f e s s i o n a l responsibilities or to legitimate congressional objectives. In spite of charges that they played fast and loose with public f u n d s , L S O s m a n a g e d to s u r v i v e and e v e n p r o s p e r t h r o u g h the early 1990s. T h e y had been in place for a generation or more, they had b e c o m e valued c o m p o n e n t s of the H o u s e structure, and virtually all boasted m e m b e r s h i p s that i n c l u d e d i n f l u e n t i a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of o n e party or the o t h e r — a n d s o m e t i m e s both. D e m o c r a t i c leaders, w h o m i g h t h a v e v i e w e d these g r o u p s as c o m p e t i n g centers of power, w e r e n o n e t h e l e s s willing to allow t h e m to be f u n d e d . T h e y saw t h e m as i n s t r u m e n t s f o r institutionalizing and m a n a g i n g H o u s e diversity, and as instrumentalities t h r o u g h w h i c h R e p u b l i c a n and D e m o c r a t i c b a c k b e n c h e r s c o u l d b l o w off steam. A f t e r R e p u b l i c a n s seized H o u s e control, c h a r g e s of fiscal p r o f l i gacy would have been a m p l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n for r e f o r m i n g or eliminating L S O s . But the n e w m a j o r i t y also f e a r e d that t h e s e p u b l i c l y f u n d e d ,

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Women and Power on Capitol Hill

well-staffed groups had the potential for derailing the Contract with America, and ultimately the Republican revolution. LSOs had championed affirmative action (the Congressional Black Caucus), more robust social and economic reform (the Democratic Study Group), stricter environmental controls on extractive industries (the Environmental and Energy Study Conference), and family and medical leave and abortion rights (the Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues). Gingrich and other Republicans realized that if these and other L S O issues became salient, alternative agendas would divert attention f r o m the Contract with America, and the narrow Republican m a j o r i t y — t h e smallest House majority since 1954—would have difficulty passing Contract proposals expeditiously. Consequently, in January 1995, as the 104th Congress got under way, the LSOs were denied their offices, furnishings, and equipment. House rules were changed to stop m e m b e r s from using their salary allowances to pay L S O staffs, and the groups were prevented f r o m charging m e m b e r s fees to support newsletters, information packets, and public relations initiatives. The LSOs exhibited a variety of responses to the challenge. For the influential Democratic Study Group, the rules changes were a death knell, and some of its staff were hired by the Congressional Quarterly publishing company. Most other LSOs, including the Congressional Black Caucus and the Hispanic Caucus, became C M O s . Their members continued to meet regularly to discuss issues of common interest, establish policy priorities, and map legislative strategies. But as CMOs, they were deprived of permanent, stand-alone staff. Support responsibilities were now shifted to o f f i c e personnel of Representatives who were named C M O officers. Gone were the research talent, the specialized expertise, and the institutional memories that had made the L S O s important policy entrepreneurs—which is precisely what Contract proponents intended. These changes were particularly painful for the Congressional Caucus for W o m e n ' s Issues. The C C W I had risen f r o m a relatively small, obscure coterie of 15 congresswomen and a single staff member in the 1970s to a visible and effective group of more than 4 0 women, nearly 120 dues-paying men, and a full-time staff of 6 by the mid-1990s. In the 103rd Congress, the caucus had for the first time established task forces on such issues as domestic violence and w o m e n ' s health. And it had worked with Bill and Hillary Clinton to promote a feminist agenda, successfully sponsoring family and medical leave legislation, appropriating hundreds of millions of dollars to finance research on diseases unique to w o m e n , and supporting abrogation of many of the anti-abortion rules adopted in the Reagan and Bush years. 2

Introduction

5

These dazzling successes in 1993 and 1994 made reverses in the next two years all the more dramatic. The C C W I went f r o m a resourceful, aggressive, confident advocate for w o m e n - f r i e n d l y policies to an understaffed, reactive, and desperate d e f e n d e r of the status quo. Its members suddenly found themselves working frantically not so much to promote new feminist initiatives but to salvage past legislative gains once thought to be beyond the reach of detractors. The change was so f u n d a m e n t a l that it took more than a year for the caucus simply to recover its equilibrium. At this writing, it has yet to regain the full measure of influence it exerted b e f o r e 1995. Nevertheless, the C C W I never stopped posting legislative milestones in selected policy domains, notably in the field of w o m e n ' s health, and to appreciate fully how it has affected public policy and congressional behavior, its history before as well as after the Republican revolution is worth exploring.

Notes 1. The group called itself the Congresswomen's Caucus when it was created in 1977, but changed its name in 1982 to the Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues after it admitted men as associate members. 2. Unless otherwise indicated, the President Bush referred to in the Introduction and Chapters 1 through 6 is George Herbert Walker Bush, the forty-first president. The President Bush referred to in Chapter 7 is George Walker Bush, the forty-third president.

1

Origin and Early Years:

I

1977-1981

T

he Congresswomen's Caucus was formally launched in March 1977,

but not before a series of false starts. During the early 1970s, several w o m e n Representatives, including Patsy Mink ( D - H a w a i i ) , Margaret Heckler (R-Mass.), and Bella Abzug (D-N.Y.), had independently tried to organize women House members. These earlier efforts had been stymied by a combination of obstacles, the most troublesome of which was the reluctance of other congresswomen to join such a group. Those w h o believed in the utility of such a caucus reasoned that unless all w o m e n were members, this legislative service organization (LSO) would not be taken seriously by key decisionmakers inside and outside of Congress. Critics would label the upstart group as "unrepresentative" or a product of "marginal" congresswomen. M e m b e r s h i p of the most senior c o n g r e s s w o m e n was especially important to organizers, yet three veterans w h o would have added the most gravitas to a fledgling caucus were the least amenable to affiliation. Convincing someone like Julia Butler Hansen ( D - W a s h . ) to join would have been a major coup, inasmuch as she chaired a subcommittee of the powerful Appropriations Committee and had won the abiding respect of her colleagues. Hansen was sympathetic to the w o m e n ' s movement, but she was an integral part of the prevailing power structure, and she had neither the time nor the need to identify with an informal House group whose durability and purposes were in doubt. Two other c o n g r e s s w o m e n w h o would have given the proposed caucus greater credibility were Edith Green ( D - O r e g . ) and Leonor Sullivan ( D - M o . ) . But Green was hostile to the idea of a w o m e n ' s caucus. She had been instrumental in promoting the 1963 Equal Pay Act, which mandated equal pay for equal work; in passing Title IX of the 1972 7

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Women and Power on Capitol Hill

Education Act, w h i c h prohibited g e n d e r discrimination in schools; and in p r y i n g the Equal Rights A m e n d m e n t ( E R A ) out of the H o u s e Judiciary C o m m i t t e e , thereby f o r c i n g an u p - o r - d o w n vote on the H o u s e floor. But G r e e n believed that a c o n g r e s s i o n a l w o m e n ' s c a u c u s would call attention more to divisions within the country than it would address w o m e n ' s needs, and she would have nothing to do with early e f f o r t s to create such a group. S u l l i v a n c h a i r e d the M e r c h a n t M a r i n e and F i s h e r i e s C o m m i t t e e and, like H a n s e n and G r e e n , w a s identified with i m p o r t a n t legislative a c h i e v e m e n t s — p a r t i c u l a r l y in the field of c o n s u m e r p r o t e c t i o n . But unlike her t w o senior colleagues, she was openly c o n t e m p t u o u s of the goals of the f e m i n i s t m o v e m e n t . She was the only w o m a n in the H o u s e to vote against the E R A , she urged the H o u s e to adopt a dress code that w o u l d prohibit w o m e n f r o m w e a r i n g pant suits, and she insisted on being identified not as " L e o n o r S u l l i v a n " but as " M r s . John Sullivan," a p r e f e r e n c e rooted in her conservative social orientation. Insistence on this traditional f o r m of address may also have been related to her having succeeded her h u s b a n d in the H o u s e after he died, and her desire to perpetuate his m e m o r y . Mrs. Sullivan was secretary to the D e m o c r a t i c H o u s e C a u c u s and she agreed to use her access to the party leadership to help D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n s e c u r e d e s i r a b l e c o m m i t t e e a s s i g n m e n t s . But she r e f u s e d to c o u n t e n a n c e f o r m i n g a w o m e n ' s caucus. Senior c o n g r e s s w o m e n were not the only w o m e n harboring doubts a b o u t the v a l u e of a w o m e n ' s g r o u p . J u n i o r c o l l e a g u e s q u e s t i o n e d w h e t h e r such an o r g a n i z a t i o n c o u l d a d e q u a t e l y serve a coalition of m e m b e r s w h o s e political interests and c o n s t i t u e n c y d e m o g r a p h i c s differed significantly. T h e y also disagreed about the p u r p o s e s a w o m e n ' s c a u c u s could serve. S o m e saw it as exerting a united f o r c e to p r o m o t e u n a n i m o u s l y approved agendas, others as a catalyst for processing and r e f i n i n g legislative m e a s u r e s , and still others as simply a f o r u m f o r e x c h a n g i n g ideas. S k e p t i c s w e r e u n s u r e a b o u t w h e t h e r c o n c e n t r a t i o n on w o m e n ' s issues w a s a w o r t h w h i l e or e v e n an a p p r o p r i a t e i n v e s t m e n t of their time. Several f e a r e d that their c o n s t i t u e n t s and f u t u r e election o p p o nents w o u l d q u e s t i o n the propriety of a c a u c u s d e v o t e d exclusively to w o m e n ' s interests. I n f o r m a l H o u s e g r o u p s p r o m o t i n g e c o n o m i c , r e g i o n a l , or ideological goals w e r e c o m m o n l y a c c e p t e d , and m a n y of these g r o u p s already existed in the House. G e n d e r issues, on the other hand, had not yet b e e n given the l e g i t i m a c y e n j o y e d by other socioe c o n o m i c c o n c e r n s , and public o f f i c i a l s in most j u r i s d i c t i o n s risked election defeat if they were branded as " f e m i n i s t s " — a charge that could

Origin and Early Years: 1977-1981

9

a l i e n a t e traditional w o m e n as well as m e n . F o r c o n g r e s s w o m e n f r o m c o m p e t i t i v e districts, the potential risk was especially high. Reluctance to affiliate with a w o m e n ' s g r o u p was d e e p e n e d by their belief that m e m b e r s h i p would j o i n them at the hip with one of the most c o n t r o v e r s i a l and, in s o m e circles, d e s p i s e d m e m b e r s of the H o u s e — Bella A b z u g . A b z u g w a s a h i g h - p r o f i l e a d v o c a t e of a half d o z e n hotbutton issues, including abortion rights, a f f i r m a t i v e action, gay rights, an i m m e d i a t e end to the V i e t n a m War, and military d o w n s i z i n g . Her stances resonated with her u p p e r - W e s t s i d e M a n h a t t a n constituents, but m u c h of the rest of the U n i t e d States w a s d e e p l y c o n f l i c t e d on t h e s e issues. A b z u g ' s outspoken advocacy (critics called it strident), her f l a m b o y a n t style, and her ability to attract national m e d i a attention m a d e R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s f r o m M i d d l e A m e r i c a think t w i c e b e f o r e a g r e e i n g to b e c o m e a m e m b e r of any coalition of which she h a p p e n e d to be a part. C o n g r e s s w o m e n invited to j o i n a w o m e n ' s c a u c u s in the early 1970s had to weigh the elusive advantages of m e m b e r s h i p against the prospect of sharing an organization with a w o m a n w h o s e d o m i n e e r i n g personality, a p p e t i t e f o r c o n t r o v e r s i a l c a u s e s , and radical f e m i n i s m c o u l d b e c o m e political liabilities. Consequently, the C o n g r e s s w o m e n ' s C a u c u s was created only after c o n g r e s s w o m e n w h o w e r e seen as s t a n d i n g in its w a y had left the H o u s e . By 1977, the start of the 95th C o n g r e s s , H a n s e n , G r e e n , and S u l l i v a n had retired, and A b z u g had r e l i n q u i s h e d her seat to run an u n s u c c e s s f u l c a m p a i g n f o r the U.S. S e n a t e . At the s a m e time, t w o w o m e n e m e r g e d w h o had the energy, leadership skills, and motivation to f o r m a c o n g r e s s w o m e n ' s c a u c u s — M a r g a r e t H e c k l e r ( R - M a s s . ) and E l i z a b e t h H o l t z m a n ( D - N . Y . ) . T h e s e c o n g r e s s w o m e n , w o r k i n g with like-minded colleagues, adopted a series of strategic goals calculated to b l u n t c h a r g e s that the g r o u p w a s illegitimate and o v e r c o m e d o u b t s about its purpose.

Strategic Goals T h e most important strategic goal adopted by f o u n d e r s of the C o n g r e s s w o m e n ' s C a u c u s was to m a k e the g r o u p ' s m e m b e r s h i p bipartisan. T h e y reasoned that unless both Republican and D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n j o i n e d the c a u c u s and p r o m o t e d policies supported by l a w m a k e r s in both parties, their f l e d g l i n g L S O w o u l d be d i s m i s s e d as narrowly partisan and selfserving by c o l l e a g u e s , w o m e n ' s special interest organizations, and the m e d i a . A c c o r d i n g l y , H o l t z m a n and H e c k l e r e s t a b l i s h e d a l e a d e r s h i p

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Women and Power on Capitol Hill

structure i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n m e m b e r s of the t w o parties. T h e y created D e m o c r a t i c and R e p u b l i c a n " c o c h a i r " positions, and ensured that at least one c o n g r e s s w o m a n f r o m each party would fill the f o u r r e m a i n i n g E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e p o s i t i o n s — t r e a s u r e r and three at-large m e m b e r s . H e c k l e r ' s d e c i s i o n to serve as G O P c o c h a i r w a s expected to help persuade o u t n u m b e r e d H o u s e Republicans that the new group would not b e c o m e an instrument of the D e m o c r a t s ' liberal wing. A second strategic goal was to m a k e the caucus as inclusive and as representative as possible. All c o n g r e s s w o m e n were urged to j o i n , and those selected for the E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e posts collectively spoke for a broad cross section of w o m e n . H o l t z m a n and H e c k l e r had the c o n f i dence of m a j o r e c o n o m i c groups, inasmuch as they respectively e n j o y e d the c o n f i d e n c e of labor u n i o n s and the b u s i n e s s c o m m u n i t y . Shirley C h i s h o l m (D-N.Y.), the first A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n w o m a n elected to C o n gress, w a s c h o s e n as an at-large m e m b e r , thereby a s s u r i n g o b s e r v e r s that the c a u c u s w o u l d not c o n f i n e its attention to the needs of m i d d l e class, white w o m e n . Barbara Mikulski ( D - M d . ) was also an at-large member. T h e M a r y land D e m o c r a t had established excellent rapport with leaders of prominent w o m e n ' s organizations, groups that for years had been urging form a t i o n of a w o m e n ' s c a u c u s t h r o u g h w h i c h they c o u l d try to a f f e c t policy d e c i s i o n s . She also had the respect of S p e a k e r T h o m a s " T i p " O ' N e i l l and other H o u s e p o w e r brokers. Y v o n n e B r a i t h w a i t e B u r k e ( D - C a l i f . ) and Shirley Pettis ( R - C a l i f . ) rounded out the caucus leadership. Burke, a black l a w y e r f r o m Los A n g e l e s (and the first w o m a n to give birth while serving in C o n g r e s s ) , was n a m e d treasurer. Pettis had succeeded her husband in o f f i c e after he was killed in a plane crash and, w h i l e not a part of the G O P p o w e r structure, was n o n e t h e l e s s c o n s i d ered a reliable conservative w h o took her cues f r o m Republican leaders. A third goal was to a c c o m m o d a t e the diverse views c o n g r e s s w o m e n held about w o m e n ' s roles in society, and to help them realize their disparate o b j e c t i v e s . To meet these o b j e c t i v e s , c a u c u s leaders agreed to honor m e m b e r s ' policy differences, even if it m e a n t diluting the g r o u p ' s impact on the legislative a g e n d a . T h e y v o w e d to be what o n e f o u n d e r called a " p l u r a l i s t i c " g r o u p . She a d d e d , "We d o n ' t h a v e c o m m o n l y shared ideas a b o u t what w o m e n should be, and, c o n s e q u e n t l y , d o not e x p e c t or require a united f r o n t on all i s s u e s . " M e m b e r s w e r e determ i n e d to search for c o n s e n s u s on p o l i c i e s a f f e c t i n g w o m e n , but a c k n o w l e d g e d that they would not find one on all issues. Each congressw o m a n would decide for herself w h e t h e r to support other c o n g r e s s w o m e n on an issue-by-issue basis. A n d leaders adopted a " u n a n i m i t y

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r u l e , " assuring m e m b e r s that no action w o u l d be taken in the n a m e of the caucus unless it had the support of each and every one of them. T h e issue of abortion was treated differently, with organizers agreeing to k e e p this m o s t c o n t r o v e r s i a l of social issues off the c a u c u s agenda. H o l t z m a n was pro-choice, Heckler pro-life. T h e y believed that taking abortion off the table would e n h a n c e their m e m b e r s h i p drive and obviate the prospect of having the c a u c u s b o g g e d d o w n on a fractious, intractable issue. E l i m i n a t i n g this s o u r c e of c o n t e n t i o n w o u l d m a k e it easier for liberals, moderates, and conservatives to f i n d c o m m o n cause on other matters. In the m e a n t i m e , individual m e m b e r s could p r o m o t e their p r o - c h o i c e or pro-life p r e f e r e n c e s independently. A fourth strategic goal was to erase all doubt about the p u r p o s e s the caucus w o u l d fulfill. S o m e believed that a w o m e n ' s c a u c u s should use its n u m b e r s in c o n c e r t e d e f f o r t s to i n f l u e n c e the c h a r a c t e r and f a t e of legislation. T h e model for this vision was the Congressional Black C a u cus ( C B C ) , an L S O w h o s e m e m b e r s acted in a highly d i s c i p l i n e d , united f a s h i o n , c o l l e c t i v e l y t h r o w i n g their w e i g h t b e h i n d legislative m e a s u r e s to exert leverage and p r o d u c e o u t c o m e s h e l p f u l to their constituents. But the C B C was m a d e up entirely of D e m o c r a t s w h o s e constituencies tended to be o v e r w h e l m i n g l y black, and for w h o m broad c o n s e n s u s , if not u n a n i m i t y , on issues was relatively easy to a c h i e v e . T h e C o n g r e s s w o m e n ' s C a u c u s , by contrast, was a more diverse group, and p r o s p e c t s of its being a p l a y e r in the d e a l s b r o k e r e d by coalition builders were unrealistic. N e v e r t h e l e s s , there w e r e several p u r p o s e s the C o n g r e s s w o m e n ' s C a u c u s c o u l d serve. O n e w a s as a catalyst and facilitator. M e m b e r s were e n c o u r a g e d to air their priorities, discuss p e n d i n g m e a s u r e s , and p r o p o s e new initiatives. W h i l e d o i n g so, they c o u l d b e n e f i t f r o m the p o s i t i v e r e i n f o r c e m e n t of other c o n g r e s s w o m e n , enlist c o s p o n s o r s , r e c e i v e p o i n t e r s on h o w to i m p r o v e their p r o d u c t , gain insights a b o u t how better to market the product, be alerted to unintended c o n s e q u e n c e s of their initiatives, and d e v e l o p a p a r l i a m e n t a r y strategy best suited to s e c u r i n g c o n g r e s s i o n a l a p p r o v a l . By w o r k i n g with a g r o u p of s y m p a thetic c o l l e a g u e s , c o n g r e s s w o m e n c o u l d m o r e e f f e c t i v e l y (and m o r e c o n f i d e n t l y ) p r o m o t e their w o m e n ' s agenda. A n o t h e r service the c a u c u s c o u l d p r o v i d e was that of a repository and incubator for ideas that had not yet obtained c o n v e n t i o n a l acceptance, but could one day ripen. By keeping these ideas alive, their emerg e n c e in a digestible f o r m at a propitious m o m e n t b e c a m e m o r e likely. With staff to help provide a clearinghouse and an institutional memory, the caucus would be in a position to salvage, store, and resurrect feminist

12

Women and Power on Capitol Hill

proposals that Congress had initially been unwilling to take seriously. Finally, on policies attracting broad membership consensus, the caucus could also play an advocacy role. A fifth goal of the Congresswomen's Caucus was to maintain good relations with House leaders, particularly majority Democrats. They informed Speaker Tip O'Neill of their plans, were awarded L S O status, and encountered no resistance to using room H-235 in the Capitol for weekly meetings. The space had been set aside for congresswomen in 1962, and although its official name was the "Congresswomen's Suite," it was used occasionally for meetings of other groups. After formation of the Congresswomen's Caucus, it was made available to women members only. This suite is a few steps away f r o m the House floor and across the hall f r o m the S p e a k e r ' s "working offices." It was renamed the "Corinne 'Lindy' Boggs Congressional Women's Reading R o o m " in 1990, in part to honor a much-loved member prior to her retirement, in part to discourage covetous House leaders from one day claiming this desirable space as their own. The caucus also was able to persuade House leaders to make available an office on the top floor of the Rayburn building. Room 2471 was among the least conspicuous facilities in the marble-laden, cavernous House o f f i c e building, but it served the g r o u p ' s purposes well. It became caucus headquarters, housing its executive director. By the mid1980s, it accommodated a full-time staff of five and a steady stream of college interns. (It was this space—together with its furnishings—that, no longer under the protection of a succession of Democratic leaders, was expropriated after the "Republican revolution.") A final strategic goal was that of establishing rapport with the newly installed Carter administration. Caucus leaders were interested not only in promoting legislation designed to help women, but also in ensuring that statutes already on the books would be administered in a w o m a n - f r i e n d l y way. A good working relationship with Carter appointees meant that c o n g r e s s w o m e n would obtain direct access to White House and cabinet officials. These contacts would allow them to press their requests for new legislation, oversee executive agency behavior, encourage administration studies addressing w o m e n ' s unmet needs, and urge appointments of more women to executive and judicial branch vacancies. The extent to which these six goals have been realized over the years has affected the amount of influence the caucus exerted in the House. When its efforts were genuinely bipartisan, when its membership was inclusive, when its agenda was broadly supported by members,

Origin and Early Years: 1977-1981

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w h e n its financial, staffing, and physical resources were abundant, and w h e n the support of H o u s e leaders and the W h i t e H o u s e was solid, then its organizational integrity was secure and its policy a g e n d a was viable. All of these c o n d i t i o n s w e r e in p l a c e in 1 9 9 3 - 1 9 9 4 , w h e n the C o n g r e s s w o m e n ' s C a u c u s was at its most effective. In 1995, f o l l o w i n g the Republican revolution, the caucus had all but lost its bipartisan coloration. A large p e r c e n t a g e of R e p u b l i c a n w o m e n r e f u s e d to j o i n , w h i l e others were m e m b e r s in n a m e only. At the s a m e time, the highly controversial abortion issue c a m e to d o m i n a t e deliberations in the C o n g r e s s w o m e n ' s C a u c u s . A n d a f t e r f i n a n c i a l , p h y s i c a l , and staff resources evaporated, H o u s e leaders ignored the group. In the m e a n t i m e , a sympathetic administration was too busy c o m i n g to terms with a hostile Republican C o n g r e s s to pay attention to the c a u c u s ' s policy goals. T h e contrast b e t w e e n the c a u c u s ' s vitality in the 103rd C o n g r e s s and its w e a k n e s s in the 104th could not h a v e been starker. T h e d i f f e r e n c e s will be d e s c r i b e d in C h a p t e r s 3 - 5 . S u f f i c e it to say here that the nature of the strategic goals initially established and the extent to which they are realized continue to affect the c a u c u s ' s influence.

Workways T h e first f o r m a l meeting of the C o n g r e s s w o m e n ' s C a u c u s was held on April 19, 1977, in H-235, w h e n f o u r c o n g r e s s w o m e n discussed the high incidence of domestic violence, contemplating r e m e d i e s C o n g r e s s could p r e s c r i b e . D u r i n g the r e m a i n d e r of the 95th C o n g r e s s , the c a u c u s met weekly w h e n the H o u s e was in session, with an average of nine of the f i f t e e n m e m b e r s attending. H o l t z m a n and H e c k l e r alternated as chairs, and d i s c u s s i o n s w e r e i n f o r m a l and w i d e - r a n g i n g . M e m b e r s b r o a c h e d p r e s s i n g issues, shared c o n c e r n s a b o u t p r o b l e m s w o m e n f a c e d , requested support or c o s p o n s o r s h i p of legislative proposals, and speculated about parliamentary strategies they might employ. F o r m a l votes were rarely taken at these meetings, with m e m b e r s usually reaching c o n s e n s u s on how to advance their agenda. Individual c o n g r e s s w o m e n volunteered to take the lead in contacting party or c o m mittee leaders, calling the White House, or working with caucus staff to draft a letter or a press release. T h e s e loosely structured exchanges characterized almost all of the meetings during the early years of the caucus, and even after written agendas were prepared in subsequent years, freewheeling give-and-take has been the predominant m o d e of discourse.

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Women and Power on Capitol Hill

D u r i n g the first t w o years of its o p e r a t i o n , the c a u c u s invited a d o z e n m e m b e r s of the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to attend its m e e t i n g s . G u e s t s m a d e short p r e s e n t a t i o n s about w o m e n - r e l a t e d p r o g r a m s they w e r e a d m i n i s t e r i n g , and r e s p o n d e d to q u e s t i o n s . S e s s i o n s with secretaries of c o m m e r c e and labor f o c u s e d on o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r w o m e n in b u s i n e s s and in the labor f o r c e . T h e secretary of the D e p a r t m e n t of Health, Education, and W e l f a r e (a d e p a r t m e n t about to spin off a separate e d u c a t i o n p o r t f o l i o ) was asked about c i r c u m s c r i b e d o p p o r t u n i t i e s for w o m e n in h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n , the limited a m o u n t of r e s e a r c h b e i n g c o n d u c t e d on breast cancer and osteoporosis, and p r o g r a m s designed to assist w o m e n and children on welfare. And the director of the O f f i c e of M a n a g e m e n t and Budget was periodically quizzed about the impact the p r e s i d e n t ' s p r o p o s e d b u d g e t w o u l d h a v e on w o r k i n g w o m e n , p o o r w o m e n , aged w o m e n , minority w o m e n , divorced w o m e n , and w i d o w s . Guest a p p e a r a n c e s b e c a m e a staple of caucus m e e t i n g s in 1977 and 1978. T h e y were well attended, and the f a c e - t i m e c o n g r e s s w o m e n spent with key d e c i s i o n m a k e r s rivaled any e n j o y e d by H o u s e c o l l e a g u e s . T h e s e sessions c o n t i n u e d during the 96th C o n g r e s s , the last t w o years of the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , but at a r e d u c e d rate. T h e y w e r e largely discontinued in the Reagan years, partially resuscitated during the Bush administration, and fully restored after Clinton b e c a m e president. T h e y all but d i s a p p e a r e d a f t e r the election of G e o r g e W. Bush. T h e ebb and f l o w of these interactions continues to be i n f l u e n c e d primarily by how m u c h the caucus and its a g e n d a are valued by the administration. G r o w t h in the size of caucus staff allowed its m e m b e r s to undertake more ambitious legislative and public relations initiatives. T h e g r o u p ' s executive director played a critical role in coordinating caucus meetings and f o l l o w i n g up on p r o p o s a l s g r o w i n g out of these m e e t i n g s . T h e director also kept m e m b e r s apprised of the status of legislation, relevant u p c o m i n g events, and new research f i n d i n g s generated by c a u c u s staff and o u t s i d e specialists. She w a s r e s p o n s i b l e for h e l p i n g the c o c h a i r s poll the m e m b e r s h i p to d e t e r m i n e the extent to w h i c h a p r o p o s e d caucus a c t i o n — a letter to the president, a press release, explicit e n d o r s e ment of a bill—had the support of rank-and-file c o n g r e s s w o m e n .

Policy Goals Several w e e k s b e f o r e the first caucus meeting, Barbara Mikulski sent a q u e s t i o n n a i r e to the other s e v e n t e e n w o m e n H o u s e m e m b e r s a s k i n g them to identify w o m e n ' s issues worthy of caucus attention in the 95th

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Congress. Thirteen responded. Leading the list of priorities was the need to p r o v i d e m o r e high-level j o b s for w o m e n in the federal g o v e r n m e n t . Other frequently mentioned goals were a less discriminatory social security system, i m p r o v e d health care, increased availability of child care, and help f o r d i s p l a c e d h o m e m a k e r s — w o m e n a b a n d o n e d by h u s b a n d s and left with scant financial resources and no marketable skills. During the next five years, caucus m e m b e r s struggled to m a k e these and o t h e r issues part of the c o n g r e s s i o n a l a g e n d a . T h e tactics they adopted during the late 1970s, while not always s u c c e s s f u l , were serviceable e n o u g h to warrant continued use into the 1990s. O n e a p p r o a c h was to f o c u s upon a feminist policy that had already received legislative sanction and to call f o r m o r e v i g o r o u s e n f o r c e m e n t of its p r o v i s i o n s . Title IX of the 1972 E d u c a t i o n Act, a m e a s u r e f o r b i d d i n g g e n d e r disc r i m i n a t i o n in e d u c a t i o n , is a c a s e in point. C a u c u s m e m b e r s argued that the s t a t u t e ' s g o a l s w e r e not b e i n g a c h i e v e d q u i c k l y e n o u g h and asked the administration f o r more conscientious e n f o r c e m e n t . A s e c o n d tactic was to e x t e n d the b e n e f i t s of l a w s a f f e c t i n g one g r o u p of w o m e n to w o m e n in similar but legally e x e m p t e d c i r c u m stances. A f t e r the c a u c u s h e l p e d p u s h t h r o u g h a law p r o v i d i n g f o r m e r w i v e s of Foreign Services o f f i c e r s with pro rata shares of their f o r m e r h u s b a n d s ' p e n s i o n s in d i v o r c e s e t t l e m e n t s , it w o r k e d to p r o m o t e the same b e n e f i t s f o r w o m e n w h o had been divorced by military and civil service personnel. A third tactic w a s to b u n d l e legislative p r o p o s a l s d e a l i n g with related s u b j e c t s u n d e r a single rubric and i n t r o d u c e it as an o m n i b u s bill. This practice allowed each caucus m e m b e r to add one or more legislative priorities to a c a u c u s - s p o n s o r e d measure, thereby enlarging the stake each had in the p a c k a g e and increasing the likelihood that at least s o m e of the items in the grab bag would be enacted. O n e such m e a s u r e was labeled the E c o n o m i c Equity Act. It was introduced soon after the caucus was established, with variations o f f e r e d in every C o n g r e s s therea f t e r t h r o u g h 1996. A n o t h e r p a c k a g e of bills, the W o m e n ' s Health Equity Act, appeared first in 1990 and it, too, took on a life of its o w n . In any given year, only a f e w of the a c t ' s c o m p o n e n t s r e c e i v e d c o n g r e s s i o n a l attention. But m o r e and m o r e w e r e a d o p t e d o v e r time, and the c a u c u s retained within its institutional m e m o r y v e r s i o n s of unsucc e s s f u l p r o p o s a l s , p o i s e d to r e s u b m i t t h e m in s u b s e q u e n t C o n g r e s s e s until they w e r e e n a c t e d as ideas w h o s e time had c o m e or until c a u c u s o b j e c t i v e s had been achieved through other means. 1 A typical E c o n o m i c Equity Act included a score or more of items, i n c l u d i n g a s s i s t a n c e f o r w o m e n in b u s i n e s s , i m p r o v e d social security

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Women and Power on Capitol Hill

b e n e f i t s , p r o h i b i t i o n s on d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against w o m e n in the w o r k force, more entitlement aid for poor w o m e n , increased opportunities for w o m e n in the military, and financial incentives for w o m e n contemplating specialization in m a t h and science. C a u c u s m e m b e r s w e r e also interested in finding w a y s to help w o m e n w h o were fulfilling traditional responsibilities. They maintained that such w o m e n were at a disadvantage b e c a u s e , w h i l e willingly p e r f o r m i n g tasks m a n d a t e d by cultural n o r m s , w o m e n s u f f e r e d i n a s m u c h as society a s s i g n e d no m o n e t a r y value to the tasks they p e r f o r m e d . W h e n w o m e n were divorced or wido w e d , neither the social security s y s t e m nor private p e n s i o n s y s t e m s c o m p e n s a t e d t h e m to a degree c o m m e n s u r a t e with their familial contributions. M a n y were poorly served in divorce courts as well. O n e other tactic c a u c u s m e m b e r s e m p l o y e d was to seize on a dramatic d e v e l o p m e n t or revelation to p r o m o t e a feminist cause. An administration study d o c u m e n t i n g the high incidence of spousal abuse sparked a spate of m e a s u r e s to help battered victims and i m p o s e stiffer penalties on batterers. W h e n the Treasury D e p a r t m e n t a n n o u n c e d it was minting a new silver dollar, c a u c u s m e m b e r s s u c c e s s f u l l y urged that the coin bear the i m a g e of suffragist Susan B. Anthony. A n d after d e f e n s e attorneys in high-profile rape cases asked rape victims about their prior sexual history, the caucus rallied around rape shield legislation prohibiting that line of questioning in federal courts. During these early years, caucus-sponsored bills were aired in committee hearings, and a few, like the one creating the Susan B. Anthony silver dollar, were enacted into law. But most caucus proposals were given little serious attention by leaders of the standing committees, and while their reintroduction in each Congress became a ritual, most were regularly relegated to the back burner. According to Congresswoman Pat Schroeder ( D - C o l o . ) , " T h e w o m e n in C o n g r e s s had to w a g e virtually every battle alone, whether we were fighting for female pages (there were none) or a place where we could pee. . . . There were m e n ' s bathrooms right off the main floor of the House, but the ladies room was at the end of the earth" (Schroeder 1997, p. 31). The most important exception to this pattern was the caucus's successful drive to extend the time period during which the Equal Rights A m e n d m e n t could be approved by the states.

Extending the ERA Time Limit Congress passed the Equal Rights A m e n d m e n t in March 1972, fifty years after the measure was first introduced. The vote was o v e r w h e l m i n g — 3 5 4

Origin and Early Years: 1977-1981

17

to 24 in the House, 84 to 8 in the Senate. But the size of these margins belied both the intensity of the half-century struggle and the fact that the resolution reached the H o u s e floor only after a discharge petition freed it f r o m the g r a s p of an a n t a g o n i s t i c J u d i c i a r y C o m m i t t e e c h a i r m a n . 2 N o w the m e a s u r e was in the h a n d s of state legislatures, three-quarters of which had to approve it within a seven-year period b e f o r e it could be a d d e d to the Constitution. T h e states' initial reaction was o v e r w h e l m i n g l y positive. B e f o r e the year e n d e d , t w e n t y - t w o had a p p r o v e d the a m e n d m e n t . Eight more followed suit in 1973, bringing the total to thirty, eight shy of the n u m b e r n e e d e d f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n . But s u c c e e d i n g years saw a d e c l i n e in E R A m o m e n t u m , as more conservative legislatures—mainly in the South and W e s t — b e g a n r o u t i n e l y v o t i n g the m e a s u r e d o w n . B e t w e e n 1974 and 1977, f i v e m o r e states w e r e a d d e d to the list, but p r o p o n e n t s b e c a m e increasingly uncertain about which three of the remaining f i f t e e n would help t h e m reach the thirty-eight-state threshold. Organizations opposing the E R A were g r o w i n g in number, size, and i n f l u e n c e , and they w e r e s u c c e s s f u l l y p r o m o t i n g a r g u m e n t s that state legislators and their c o n s t i t u e n t s f o u n d c o m p e l l i n g . C l a i m s that the a m e n d m e n t w o u l d send w o m e n into c o m b a t , that it w o u l d lead to unisex b a t h r o o m s , and that it would give constitutional p e r m a n e n c e to the reproductive rights c o n f e r r e d by Roe v. Wade swelled the ranks of E R A critics ( M a n s b r i d g e 1986). To complicate matters, f o u r state legislatures had r e j e c t e d the a m e n d m e n t a f t e r h a v i n g initially v o t e d f o r it, and o b s e r v e r s w e r e in d o u b t a b o u t w h e t h e r C o n g r e s s w o u l d c o n s i d e r the first or the second of these actions controlling. With time r u n n i n g out, c a u c u s leaders d e c i d e d to try to e x t e n d the period d u r i n g w h i c h states c o u l d c o n s i d e r the E R A . In O c t o b e r 1977, caucus cochair Elizabeth Holtzman introduced a resolution extending the M a r c h 1979 deadline by seven years. Sponsors of the measure maintained that since their p r o p o s a l did not a f f e c t the s u b s t a n c e of the a m e n d m e n t , merely the span of years during which it could be considered, m a j o r i t y votes in the H o u s e and Senate, rather than the two-thirds majority normally needed to pass constitutional a m e n d m e n t s , would be e n o u g h to extend the time limit. T h e y also argued that C o n g r e s s should i g n o r e state a c t i o n s to rescind their initial a p p r o v a l of the E R A , and recognize earlier adoption of the a m e n d m e n t as binding. C a u c u s m e m b e r s were under no illusions about the difficulties they f a c e d . H o u s e D e m o c r a t i c leaders p l e d g e d their c o o p e r a t i o n , but a d v i s e d H o l t z m a n that c h a n c e s of p a s s a g e in the f o r m she p r e f e r r e d w e r e d i m . T h e r e w a s no p r e c e d e n t f o r e x t e n d i n g the t i m e p e r i o d for

18

Women and Power on Capitol Hill

state consideration of a constitutional amendment, and opponents were determined to require passage of the extension by a two-thirds vote. They also asserted that if states were given more time to consider the amendment, a state's right to reverse earlier approval of the measure during the expanded time period should be recognized as well. To get the measure out of the House Judiciary Committee, a panel on which she sat, Holtzman was forced to compromise on the length of the extension. Seven years was adjudged too long, even by some E R A supporters, and the committee shortened the proposed time span to three years and three months—which set the expiration date at June 30, 1982. On the other hand, the committee recommended that a simple majority vote be sufficient for the resolution's passage. It also refused to acknowledge the right of states that had passed the E R A to reverse that decision during the expanded time frame. This generally positive outcome for E R A proponents was, in large measure, a product of caucus efforts. Holtzman, Heckler, Mikulski, Gladys Spellman ( D - M d . ) , and Pat Schroeder helped mobilize w o m e n ' s groups all over the country, meeting with their leaders on Capitol Hill and urging supporters to write or call key Representatives. Caucus m e m b e r s conferred with w o m e n ' s delegations three and four times a week in their own offices and their Rayburn building headquarters. Representatives of the National Organization for Women and the National Women's Political Caucus were joined in Judiciary Committee hearings by the heads of less politically oriented organizations, like the Young Women's Christian Association and the Girl Scouts of America. And at this first stage of the deliberation process, they prevailed. But the Judiciary C o m m i t t e e version evoked strong protests f r o m E R A critics, who promised to defeat if not seriously weaken it when it came to the floor for debate. For a time it appeared as if the opposition would succeed. Sentiment seemed to be running in favor of requiring a two-thirds vote and of allowing states to rescind previous E R A approval. Caucus leaders responded by conducting an intensive lobbying campaign among House and Senate colleagues. They began another round of meetings among themselves and with supporters, identifying lawmakers who could be converted to their cause, and w h o could be reached by White House or interest group appeals. When a congressman advised them that constituency opinion made it impossible for him to vote for the ERA, they acknowledged this political necessity, but asked for his vote against amendments that would weaken the measure, suggesting that the vote against final passage would give him the political cover he needed.

Origin and Early Years: 1977-1981

19

Ultimately, their tactics w o r k e d . A m e n d m e n t s to require a t w o thirds vote and allow rescissions were d e f e a t e d , and the extension was p a s s e d — 2 3 0 to 189 in the House, 60 to 36 in the Senate. All but one of the eighteen c o n g r e s s w o m e n voted in f a v o r of the a m e n d m e n t , with the lone dissenter " p a i r e d " against it. T h e closest call was on the rescission a m e n d m e n t . A switch of sixteen w o u l d have g i v e n states explicit authority to reverse prior approval of the a m e n d m e n t . T h i r t y - f o u r Representatives w h o voted against E R A extension also voted against allowing state l e g i s l a t u r e s to rescind earlier E R A a p p r o v a l . A l m o s t all had been lobbied actively by c a u c u s m e m b e r s . T h e r e s o l u t i o n ' s a d o p t i o n r e p r e s e n t e d the m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t c a u c u s a c h i e v e m e n t in its early years. It had forced the H o u s e to m a k e the E R A part of the legislative a g e n d a e v e n t h o u g h party leaders had little appetite for a battle that was unprecedented and likely to fail. Moreover, it had built a w i n n i n g coalition and d e v i s e d a legislative strategy to allow the coalition to w o r k its will. Largely t h r o u g h c a u c u s e f f o r t s , a p r o b a b l e d e f e a t turned into a signal victory, no small a c h i e v e m e n t for an organization barely a year old. But in the end, the c a u c u s ' s legislative victory proved to be hollow. Not a single additional state legislature a p p r o v e d the E R A d u r i n g the e x t e n s i o n period, and on J u n e 30, 1982, the proposed a m e n d m e n t died.

Organizational Strains T h e c a u c u s ' s organizational integrity during these early years was f r a g ile. Obstacles to achieving strategic and policy goals surfaced soon after its f o r m a t i o n , and they recurred i n t e r m i t t e n t l y e v e n a f t e r the g r o u p gained greater stability. Most t r o u b l e s o m e were challenges to enroll all c o n g r e s s w o m e n , to achieve fiscal viability, and to establish a reputation for b i p a r t i s a n s h i p . T h r e a t s to all three of these o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i m p e r a tives f o r c e d c a u c u s leaders to limit their policy agenda. Not all c o n g r e s s w o m e n w e r e p r e d i s p o s e d to j o i n the c a u c u s , and concessions were made to attract m e m b e r s . Fifteen of eighteen j o i n e d in 1977, with the skeptics a m o n g t h e m reassured that no d o c u m e n t would be d i s t r i b u t e d u n d e r the c a u c u s ' s i m p r i m a t u r unless it had the unanim o u s s u p p o r t of the m e m b e r s h i p . T h e y w e r e also a d v i s e d that a n n u a l d u e s r e q u i r e m e n t s ($50) and e x p e c t e d c o n t r i b u t i o n s f r o m c l e r k - h i r e a l l o w a n c e s ($2,500) could be understood as discretionary. R e t i r e m e n t s and election d e f e a t s in 1978 m e a n t that six c a u c u s m e m b e r s would not return for the 96th Congress. However, the midterm

20

Women and Power on Capitol Hill

election produced three new congresswomen—Democrats Beverly Byron (Md.) and Geraldine Ferraro (N.Y.), and Republican Olympia Snowe (Maine). Cochairs Holtzman and Heckler, together with Lindy Boggs (D-La.), met with the three first-termers and later with the three women who had not joined the caucus in the preceding Congress—Republicans Marjorie Holt (Md.) and Virginia Smith (Nebr.), and Democrat Marilyn Lloyd (Tenn.). Each of the six subsequently affiliated with the caucus. This meant that all fifteen congresswomen serving in 1979 and 1980 were caucus members and that the goal of total inclusivity had been reached. But this achievement came at significant cost. The unanimity rule led to inordinate amounts of time being devoted to persuading hesitant members that proposals cleared by the cochairs were worthy of caucus sponsorship. It forced the group to water down and limit caucus-sponsored initiatives, and even benign legislative measures, press releases, and letters to the president were delayed by nitpicking disagreements over wording and tone. In the meantime, proposals having majority but not unanimous support were denied organizational authorship. Before long, the percentage of members attending meetings fell off sharply, and many fewer members of the Carter administration were invited to these weekly sessions. The decision by Holtzman to cut back on her caucus activities while campaigning for a Senate seat in the 1980 election further slowed the group's momentum. Lax enforcement of members' financial responsibilities threatened timely compensation of staff. Betty Dooley, the group's first executive director, and her immediate successors, Susan Scanlan and Ann Charnley Smith, struggled with limited resources to coordinate caucus activities. In 1980, Smith worked with the caucus cochairs to devise a remedy for the problem. She inaugurated a biweekly newsletter, Update, which was designed to provide timely information on the status of legislation affecting women, information until then unavailable in a single, easily accessible source. The newsletter summarized bills salient to the caucus, announced pending hearings, reported federal regulations adopted by government agencies, and presented special reports on issues that had ripened in recent months. But Update's raison d'être was more financial than informational. The publication was free of charge to caucus members, but other Representatives, along with Senators and interest groups tracking women's issues, paid an annual subscription fee of $125. Corporate subscriptions were priced at $1,000. By mid-1981, the newsletter had generated revenue that, together with contributions from congresswomen who met their financial obligations, was enough to cover staff costs.

Origin and Early Years: 1977-1981

21

In the 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , p r o b l e m s a s s o c i a t e d with inclusivity w e r e a c c o m p a n i e d by c a u c u s difficulties maintaining a bipartisan image. T h e 1980 election saw the addition of f o u r m o d e r a t e R e p u b l i c a n c o n g r e s s w o m e n , all of w h o m the c o c h a i r s b e l i e v e d c o u l d be i n d u c e d to affiliate. T h r e e of the f o u r had r e c e i v e d c a m p a i g n s u p p o r t f r o m w o m e n ' s groups, and each represented a constituency w h o s e d e m o g r a p h i c s would not n o r m a l l y threaten a R e p u b l i c a n i n c u m b e n t interested in w o m e n ' s issues. H e c k l e r and S c h r o e d e r , w h o had r e p l a c e d H o l t z m a n as the D e m o c r a t i c cochair, w e r e o p t i m i s t i c w h e n they b e g a n r e c r u i t i n g the f o u r first-termers after the 97th C o n g r e s s c o n v e n e d . But all f o u r r e j e c t e d the c o c h a i r s ' o v e r t u r e s . T h e y e x p l a i n e d that adjusting to legislative and representational responsibilities would leave t h e m little time for caucus activities and, further, that they were not sure an annual contribution of $ 2 , 5 0 0 f r o m clerk-hire allowances was worth the b e n e f i t s c a u c u s m e m b e r s h i p c o n f e r r e d . O n e G O P f i r s t - t e r m e r also volunteered that g e n d e r might not be an appropriate criterion for evaluating legislative p r o p o s a l s i n a s m u c h as all p o l i c i e s ultimately a f f e c t both men and w o m e n . But the f o u r w o m e n could not help but have been i n f l u e n c e d by the e l e c t i o n of a c o n s e r v a t i v e R e p u b l i c a n p r e s i d e n t . R o n a l d R e a g a n left no d o u b t about w h e r e he stood on most i s s u e s — h e strenuously o p p o s e d the Equal Rights A m e n d m e n t , for e x a m p l e , asserting that equality f o r w o m e n c o u l d be o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h other m e a n s — and new c o n g r e s s i o n a l R e p u b l i c a n s , regardless of their gender, tended to withhold c o m m i t m e n t s that could conceivably put t h e m at o d d s with the W h i t e House. Decisions by the f o u r to decline m e m b e r s h i p was a b l o w to the reputation of the caucus, and especially galling to Heckler. T h e M a s s a c h u setts R e p u b l i c a n was often torn b e t w e e n the conservative o r t h o d o x y of her party and the progressive orientations of most c a u c u s activists. She had hoped that the addition of the new G O P c o n g r e s s w o m e n would bolster the b i p a r t i s a n c h a r a c t e r of the o r g a n i z a t i o n and h e l p her steer a m o d e r a t e course. T h e prospect of recruiting R e p u b l i c a n r e i n f o r c e m e n t s , therefore, was e n o r m o u s l y appealing, and w h e n none of the f o u r signed on, she was deeply disappointed. By the s u m m e r of 1981, frustrations of the cochairs and the Executive C o m m i t t e e b e c a m e intolerable. A f t e r e x a m i n i n g the new a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s b u d g e t p r o p o s a l s , they had c o n c l u d e d that R e a g a n ' s p o l i c i e s would wreak h a v o c on w o m e n w h o were least able to help themselves. T h e W h i t e H o u s e was p r o p o s i n g cuts in f o o d s t a m p s , Aid to F a m i l i e s with D e p e n d e n t Children, Medicaid, the Social Security M i n i m u m Benefits p r o g r a m (three-quarters of w h o s e b e n e f i c i a r i e s w e r e w o m e n ) , the

22

Women and Power on Capitol Hill

Women, Infants, and Children program, and the Legal Services Corporation (two-thirds of whose clients were poor women). But criticism of the Reagan administration in the name of the caucus was impossible. The unanimity rule allowed the opposition of a single caucus member to block it. Delays necessitated by requiring all caucus members to sign off on proposals were just as obstructive. As a result, those wishing to speak out against the administration were forced to act either individually or through the collective voices of smaller combinations of congresswomen. The cochairs gave up trying to meet regularly, partly because of poor attendance, and most of their invitations to cabinet and other Reagan advisers were either refused or ignored. A session with Social Security Administrator John Svahn became acrimonious and, from the caucus's perspective, counterproductive. And then, in July 1981, the Executive C o m m i t t e e decided to end the inertia. First, it repealed the unanimity rule, thereby allowing initiatives to go forward with less than full caucus concurrence. Second, it imposed a seventy-two-hour time limit on how long m e m b e r s could delay a proposed caucus action by withholding approval. Finally, the committee voted to require, rather than simply "urge," $2,500 annual contributions. The response was immediate and predictable. The four most conservative m e m b e r s of the caucus, two Democrats and two Republicans, resigned. Their departure permitted remaining members to be more aggressive in promoting a feminist agenda, and consensus on most issues became routine. Having sacrificed inclusiveness and size for greater homogeneity and fiscal integrity, the caucus was now poised to adopt a more comprehensive agenda and to articulate its goals more forcefully during the remainder of the 97th Congress. But in the fall of 1981, the House Administration Committee adopted new rules governing the operations of LSOs, and the caucus was forced to change both its fundraising procedures and its criteria for determining who could join its ranks.

Notes 1. Kingdon (1995) offers a seminal discussion of "an idea whose time has come." 2. The Democratic chair of the Judiciary Committee, Emanuel Celler of New York, adamantly opposed the proposed amendment, and had it not been for the efforts of Martha Griffiths ( D - M i c h . ) and other pro-ERA members, it would have been bottled up indefinitely.

2

Transformation and Growth: 1982-1992

Membership Change The 1981 House rules-change altered the ways in which legislative service organizations (LSOs) could raise funds to pay their staff and meet other costs. Under the old guidelines, these groups could occupy space in House office buildings, use office supplies and equipment, and raise funds from sources inside Congress (members' contributions from their clerk-hire allowances) and outside Congress (donations and subscription fees f r o m interest groups). Under the new rules, LSOs could continue to depend on public office space and furnishings, but only if they stopped accepting funds from outside sources. For the Congresswomen's Caucus this meant that if it wished to continue operating on Capitol Hill—using the Rayburn office and all its furnishings—it would have to end its reliance on Update subscriptions paid for by private interest groups. Elimination of this source of funding would once again threaten the group's financial viability inasmuch as contributions from fewer than a dozen members could not sustain a staff. Consequently, the caucus was faced with a dilemma: move its staff operations out of public space on Capitol Hill and continue to benefit from interest group subscription fees, or keep its Rayburn Building quarters and furnishings and retain a token staff. The former would affect the quality of the interaction between staff and members. The latter would sap the group of its vitality, and some members feared the caucus would have to be abandoned. Faced with a Hobson's choice, the caucus decided to open its membership to congressmen. Update subscription payments from men willing to join the group would replace revenue contributed by interest groups. Congressmen would pay annual dues as well. 23

24

Women and Power on Capitol Hill

E v e r since the c a u c u s had b e e n l a u n c h e d , m e m b e r s had intermittently discussed the virtues of admitting men. T h e y a c k n o w l e d g e d that s o m e c o n g r e s s m e n w e r e m o r e ardent f e m i n i s t s than s o m e c o n g r e s s w o m e n , and that the f o r m e r could do more to help achieve caucus goals because more of them were close to the H o u s e ' s centers of power. But some feared that c o n g r e s s m e n would try to take over the organization if a d m i t t e d and use it f o r their o w n p u r p o s e s . S k e p t i c s also p o i n t e d out that an o p e n invitation to c o n g r e s s m e n w o u l d possibly attract colleagues w h o would try to trade on their affiliation while actively opposing policy goals c o n g r e s s w o m e n considered sacrosanct. T h e s e a r g u m e n t s b e c a m e a c a d e m i c w h e n the caucus b o w e d to fiscal necessity and o p e n e d its doors to c o n g r e s s m e n . T h e new recruits did not h a v e the s a m e s t a n d i n g as c o n g r e s s w o m e n , h o w e v e r . T h e y w e r e c o n s i d e r e d " a s s o c i a t e " m e m b e r s and, as such, w e r e ineligible to vote for c a u c u s o f f i c e r s or on policy. T h e y were also barred f r o m positions on the E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e . 1 A c c o r d i n g to C o c h a i r Pat S c h r o e d e r , " W h e n men were admitted to the C a u c u s , . . . w e basically said ' w e ' l l tell you what the issues are. H a v e a nice d a y ' " (Schroeder 1997, p. 30). T h e new m a l e m e m b e r s w e r e not billed the full $ 2 , 5 0 0 annual subscription costs f o r Update, the sum paid by c o n g r e s s w o m e n . Instead, they w e r e assessed $600, a f i g u r e later raised to $ 9 0 0 w h e n w o m e n ' s dues were reduced to $1,800. T h e c h a n g e in m e m b e r s h i p r e q u i r e d a c h a n g e in the n a m e of the c a u c u s as well, and on M a r c h 2, 1982, the C o n g r e s s w o m e n ' s C a u c u s w a s r e n a m e d the C o n g r e s s i o n a l C a u c u s f o r W o m e n ' s Issues ( C C W I ) . Within two weeks, 66 c o n g r e s s m e n affiliated, and the n u m b e r reached 100 b e f o r e y e a r ' s end. A m o n g the m o r e illustrious n e w c o m e r s w a s H o u s e Speaker Tip O ' N e i l l , a colleague w h o s e "associate" m e m b e r s h i p c o n g r e s s w o m e n were quick to point out when they sought new m e m b e r s after each election. It helped that O ' N e i l l was the most approachable of H o u s e leaders. S c h r o e d e r later o b s e r v e d , "I rarely needed a f o r m a l a p p o i n t m e n t with him. H e was a l w a y s s c h l e p p i n g through the cloakroom, stopping to chat and smoking a cigar" (Schroeder 1997, p. 206). Precipitate growth in m e m b e r s h i p toward the end of the 97th C o n gress w a s f o l l o w e d by i n c r e m e n t a l g r o w t h in s u b s e q u e n t years. By 1992, all D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n and two-thirds of Republican w o m e n were m e m b e r s of the g r o u p (see Table 2.1). T h e small n u m b e r of R e p u b l i c a n w o m e n in the H o u s e during this period tends to e x a g g e r a t e the percentage-point changes revealed in the table. Nonetheless, that the m e m b e r ship of Republican c o n g r e s s w o m e n went f r o m three of nine in 1984 to six of nine in 1992 suggests that the c a u c u s ' s attraction to G O P w o m e n

Transformation and Growth: 1982-1992

25

Table 2.1 Caucus Membership, 98th-103rd Congresses (1983-1994) % of Democrats Congress

Female

98th ( 1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 4 ) 99th ( 1 9 8 5 - 1 9 8 6 ) 100th ( 1 9 8 7 - 1 9 8 8 ) 101st ( 1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 0 ) 102nd ( 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 2 ) 103rd ( 1 9 9 3 - 1 9 9 4 )

Source:

Male

85%

42%

(11) 83% (10) 92% (11) 93% (14) 100% (19) 97% (35)

(107) 39% (94) 33% (83) 42% (102) 53% (130) 49% (111)

% of Republicans

% of House

Female

Male

Female

Male

33% (3) 36% (4) 55% (6) 55% (6) 67% (6) 58% (7)

5% (8) 6% (5) 7% (12) 8% (13) 8% (13) 3% (5)

64% (14) 61% (14) 74% (17) 77% (20) 89% (25) 87% (42)

28% (115) 24% (99) 23% (95) 28% (115) 35% (143) 30% (116)

Congressional Caucus for W o m e n ' s Issues 1983-1994.

was stronger than the antifeminist signals sent out by a R e p u b l i c a n - c o n trolled W h i t e House. G r o w t h in the p e r c e n t a g e of D e m o c r a t i c c o n g r e s s m e n , albeit irregular, is also evident. T h e early rush to affiliation by these R e p r e s e n t a tives was f o l l o w e d by little c h a n g e in their proportions until 1992, w h e n m o r e than one-half (53 percent) in the 102nd C o n g r e s s w e r e associate m e m b e r s . U n w i l l i n g n e s s of Republican c o n g r e s s m e n to j o i n is perhaps the most significant pattern revealed in the table. F e w e r than one in ten affiliated during this period, a proportion that reflects not only the failure of f e m i n i s t issues to r e s o n a t e with R e p u b l i c a n c o n g r e s s m e n , but also the d a n g e r s the f e m i n i s t a g e n d a w o u l d f a c e if t h e s e m e n e v e r b e c a m e a H o u s e majority.

Countering the Reagan-Bush Agenda The c a u c u s ' s a u g m e n t e d n u m b e r s did little to head off the R e a g a n - B u s h assault on landmark gains w o m e n had m a d e during the preceding twenty years. A c t i o n s taken by the R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n b e t w e e n 1981 and 1988 had the effect of rolling back feminist a c h i e v e m e n t s in such areas as a f f i r m a t i v e action, educational equity, social w e l f a r e , and f a m i l y planning. T h e W h i t e H o u s e proved to be resourceful in crafting legislation, issuing e x e c u t i v e orders, and m a k i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and j u d i c i a l a p p o i n t m e n t s that had the e f f e c t of restricting w o m e n ' s s o c i o e c o n o m i c opportunities to those available in the years just after World War II.

26

Women and Power on Capitol Hill

A f f i r m a t i v e action and equal e m p l o y m e n t p r o g r a m s w e r e a m o n g President R e a g a n ' s p r i m e targets. T h e Justice D e p a r t m e n t filed a series of S u p r e m e C o u r t briefs s u p p o r t i n g narrow interpretations of a f f i r m a tive action legislation and j u d i c i a l rulings, and sought to r e o p e n affirmative action consent decrees entered into by more than f i f t y cities and c o u n t i e s in order to dilute or end t h e s e n e g o t i a t e d s e t t l e m e n t s . At the s a m e time, R e a g a n a p p o i n t e e s on the Federal C o m m u n i c a t i o n s C o m mission ( F C C ) voted to a b a n d o n a f f i r m a t i v e action g u i d e l i n e s w h e n a w a r d i n g broadcast licenses, in one case forcing a w o m a n to relinquish a license granted her by an earlier F C C ruling. T h e president fired critics on the Civil Rights C o m m i s s i o n , replacing t h e m with c o n s e r v a t i v e allies. A n d his appointee to chair the Equal E m p l o y m e n t Opportunities Commission, future Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, abandoned use of numerical guidelines and timetables to help settle e m p l o y ment discrimination cases, which resulted in the resolution of f e w e r discrimination claims. T h e administration's attack on Title IX of the Education Act, legislation p r o h i b i t i n g g e n d e r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in e d u c a t i o n , led to both an i m p o r t a n t S u p r e m e C o u r t decision and a Civil Rights Act o v e r t u r n i n g that decision. D u r i n g the Carter years, P e n n s y l v a n i a ' s G r o v e City College d e n i e d that it d i s c r i m i n a t e d against w o m e n , but r e f u s e d to sign a pledge to that effect, a requirement of the law. T h e college claimed that inasmuch as it was not the beneficiary of federal f u n d s , except as they were m a d e available to students in the f o r m of tuition loans and grants, Title IX strictures did not apply to G r o v e City. T h e Carter a d m i n i s t r a tion thought otherwise and advised the college to either f o r m a l l y a f f i r m its nondiscrimination policy or risk the loss of the federal f u n d s students used to pay tuition. G r o v e City c h a l l e n g e d the ruling, and the c a s e had not yet b e e n d e c i d e d on appeal w h e n R o n a l d R e a g a n b e c a m e president. His Justice D e p a r t m e n t a b a n d o n e d its p r e d e c e s s o r ' s position and sided with the college. It now argued that since none of the institution's p r o g r a m s benefited f r o m f e d e r a l assistance, it w a s not a f f e c t e d by Title IX requirem e n t s . Federal f u n d s s u p p o r t i n g student tuition, asserted the J u s t i c e D e p a r t m e n t , w e r e b e n e f i t s c o n f e r r e d directly on students, not the college, and therefore should not be construed as federal aid to G r o v e City. T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n , Grove City v. Bell (1983), g a v e a narrow interpretation to Title IX. It held that federally supported tuition p a y m e n t s m a d e the c o l l e g e subject to Title IX. But the C o u r t went on to say that the l e g i s l a t i o n ' s reach e x t e n d e d only to t h o s e p r o g r a m s s u p p o r t e d by the f u n d s , w h i c h in a c a s e of tuition s u p p o r t m e a n t the

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a d m i s s i o n s p r o g r a m . Since no f i n a n c i a l aid went, f o r e x a m p l e , to its a c a d e m i c programs, the college was under no obligation to abide by the Education Act when organizing and administering its curriculum. C C W I m e m b e r s were outraged by the decision and successfully p r o m o t e d the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to overturn it D u r i n g this p e r i o d , the c a u c u s battled scores of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n attempts to cut back w o m e n - f r i e n d l y social w e l f a r e programs, including social security b e n e f i t s and aid to new m o t h e r s and their c h i l d r e n . A t r o u b l i n g p r o p o s a l o f f e r e d by the O f f i c e of M a n a g e m e n t and B u d g e t ( O M B ) threatened to e l i m i n a t e standard c e n s u s q u e s t i o n s dealing with h o u s i n g , e m p l o y m e n t , and social services. T h e ostensible j u s t i f i c a t i o n for paring d o w n the questionnaire was to expedite administration of the 1990 census and, as a result, save money. C a u c u s m e m b e r s charged that the O M B was motivated not by financial considerations but by a political agenda. T h e y argued that if these s o c i o e c o n o m i c data were not collected, there would be no i n f o r m a t i o n base upon which to build a case f o r i m p r o v i n g and e x p a n d i n g p r o g r a m s to a d d r e s s h o u s i n g , e m p l o y ment, and w e l f a r e needs. Within weeks, the O M B b a c k e d off and most of the disputed census questions were restored. E v e n t h o u g h the c a u c u s took no o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n on a b o r t i o n , it s u p p o r t e d f a m i l y p l a n n i n g , and d u r i n g the R e a g a n - B u s h years it was embroiled in more than a dozen battles to preserve p r o g r a m s w h o s e purpose was to help w o m e n and their spouses prevent u n w a n t e d p r e g n a n cies. F e d e r a l l y s u p p o r t e d f a m i l y p l a n n i n g clinics w e r e serving on the front line of these efforts, using trained medical and social service personnel to c o u n s e l clients. T h e R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t h r e a t e n e d their c o u n s e l i n g r o u t i n e s w h e n the D e p a r t m e n t of Health and H u m a n Services declared that private c l i n i c s — m a n y of which were run by Planned P a r e n t h o o d — m e n t i o n i n g " a b o r t i o n " as a f a m i l y p l a n n i n g option f o r p r e g n a n t w o m e n w o u l d be denied federal f u n d s . C a u c u s m e m b e r s and other critics labeled the prohibition a "gag rule." A similar directive, referred to as the " M e x i c o City policy," denied U.S. financial assistance to international f a m i l y planning agencies that f u n d e d or otherwise encouraged abortions, even when the bulk of an agency's resources were devoted to promoting and administering practices having nothing to do with abortion. The caucus added its weight to efforts to overturn the "gag rule" through a friend-of-the-court brief in a case before the U.S. Supreme Court, and it distributed a "Dear Colleague" letter to other House m e m b e r s calling for abandonment of the M e x i c o City policy. Neither effort succeeded, and repeal of both rulings did not occur until President Clinton annulled them by executive order in 1993.

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C a u c u s frustrations did not end with the election of a "kinder, gentler" president, George Herbert Walker Bush. Officials in the new administration were more sympathetic to the caucus than Reagan advisers had been, and d o z e n s attended c a u c u s m e e t i n g s b e t w e e n 1989 and 1992. T h e s e years also saw f e w e r attacks on past feminist gains. But the new president was just as antagonistic to family planning proposals that could be interpreted as c o u n t e n a n c i n g abortion, and his administration was almost as tight-fisted w h e n distributing f u n d s supporting programs prom o t i n g g e n d e r equity. N e v e r t h e l e s s , the c a u c u s could claim credit for helping to authorize a $10.5 billion block grant f o r child care dev e l o p m e n t to help states i m p r o v e the accessibility and quality of child care and help low-income families pay for such care. It could also claim credit for making it more difficult for noncustodial parents to avoid child support p a y m e n t s . And the Small B u s i n e s s Administration was authorized to help w o m e n and minority entrepreneurs obtain low-interest loans. But most c a u c u s successes were recorded on matters that required little or no m o n e y , that w e r e at the m a r g i n s of its a g e n d a , or that restored gains that w o m e n m a d e in the 1960s and 1970s but that had been u n d e r m i n e d later by the administration or the federal courts. T h u s the group persuaded C o n g r e s s to proclaim a National W o m e n ' s History W e e k ; to a p p r o v e p l a c i n g a statue of the first w o m a n H o u s e m e m b e r , Jeannette Rankin, in the Capitol R o t u n d a ; to authorize $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 to help designate the residence of Alice Paul, a radical suffragist and feminist, a National Historic Site; and to create a c o m m i s s i o n to study the "glass ceiling"—attitudinal and e c o n o m i c barriers preventing w o m e n f r o m rising b e y o n d m i d d l e m a n a g e m e n t positions in the w o r k p l a c e r e g a r d l e s s of their talents or quality of p e r f o r m a n c e . T h e 1991 Civil R i g h t s Act passed, but it sparked a bitter battle in C o n g r e s s and within the a d m i n istration, and placed a h u g e b u r d e n on c a u c u s r e s o u r c e s . R a t h e r than c o n f e r r i n g new rights on w o m e n and minorities, however, the act overturned court d e c i s i o n s that had m a d e proof of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in the w o r k p l a c e more difficult to establish than had once been the case. S o m e of the c a u c u s ' s greatest d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s were s u f f e r e d in the area of w o m e n ' s health. P r e s i d e n t B u s h v e t o e d a bill that w o u l d h a v e m a d e p e r m a n e n t a then t e m p o r a r y O f f i c e of R e s e a r c h on W o m e n ' s Health in the National Institutes of Health (NIH), a proposal caught up in a dispute over fetal tissue research. M o r e disturbing was his veto of the Family and Medical L e a v e Act ( F M L A ) , even though he had p r o m ised to support such a m e a s u r e during the 1988 election c a m p a i g n . T h e proposed law required larger c o m p a n i e s to offer twelve w e e k s of unpaid leave to e m p l o y e e s w h o w e r e parents of n e w b o r n , n e w l y a d o p t e d , or

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seriously ill children, or w h o were n e e d e d to care for an incapacitated f a m i l y member. T h e bill applied to men as well as to w o m e n , and seniority and other e m p l o y m e n t b e n e f i t s w e r e p r o t e c t e d d u r i n g their a b s e n c e . In spite of s t r e n u o u s o p p o s i t i o n f r o m m u c h of the b u s i n e s s c o m m u n i t y , it p a s s e d b o t h the H o u s e and the S e n a t e on t w o s e p a r a t e o c c a s i o n s . T h e presidential vetoes w e r e d e v a s t a t i n g to c a u c u s morale, and most m e m b e r s c o n c l u d e d that the F M L A would never see the light of day as long as G e o r g e Herbert Walker Bush was in the W h i t e House.

Caucus Viability Even during these frustrating years, however, caucus m e m b e r s harbored little d o u b t a b o u t the viability of their o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e y u n d e r s t o o d that f e w H o u s e c a u c u s e s had clout s u f f i c i e n t to win m a j o r battles on their o w n , and that it o f t e n took a d e c a d e or m o r e b e f o r e the political climate was f a v o r a b l e e n o u g h for passage of g r o u n d b r e a k i n g measures. L e g i s l a t i v e l o s s e s — e v e n terrible l o s s e s — i n o n e C o n g r e s s c o u l d be r e d e e m e d in a later C o n g r e s s . This mixture of realism and h o p e characterized the m i n d - s e t of m o s t c a u c u s m e m b e r s d u r i n g the 1980s and early 1990s, and it w a s r e c o g n i z e d , as well, by the g r o u p ' s c o c h a i r s , D e m o c r a t Pat S c h r o e d e r and R e p u b l i c a n O l y m p i a S n o w e . T h e p a r t n e r s h i p b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o leaders was as h a r m o n i o u s as any that had obtained between caucus cochairs. T h e two had vastly different personal and political styles. S c h r o e d e r was an uninhibited, often c o m b a t i v e w o m a n , the kind of f e m i n i s t traditional m e n loved to hate. O n e c o m m e n t a t o r r e m a r k e d : " S h e goes out of her way to alienate men. She e n j o y s giving it to the good old b o y s " ( R o c k y Mountain News, January 24, 1994). S n o w e w a s no less of a f e m i n i s t , but she w a s m o r e diplomatic and m a n a g e d to m a k e her points without upsetting men she privately c o n s i d e r e d N e a n d e r t h a l s . T h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s were not e n o u g h to u n d e r m i n e their shared emotional c o m m i t m e n t to f e m i n i s t goals and their d e t e r m i n a t i o n to m a k e C o n g r e s s address neglected issues central to w o m e n ' s lives. T h e m o n t h l y m e e t i n g s they alternately chaired were well attended, and they supervised an e x p e r i e n c e d c a u c u s s t a f f — n u m bering six f u l l - t i m e administrative and policy specialists by 1 9 9 0 — w h o c o n d u c t e d r e s e a r c h , p u b l i s h e d the Update newsletter, c o m m u n i c a t e d with r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of w o m e n ' s groups, and d r a f t e d policy p r o p o s a l s , " D e a r C o l l e a g u e " letters, and press releases. At the same time, they clung to the strategic goals adopted in 1977. A b i p a r t i s a n a p p r o a c h to policy o b j e c t i v e s w a s w o v e n t h r o u g h the

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g r o u p ' s p r o c e d u r e s . All bill e n d o r s e m e n t s and strategic o p t i o n s w e r e c o n s i d e r e d by the E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e . If the two cochairs agreed on how to proceed, their decision was usually approved by the committee. T h i s a p p r o v a l was a signal f o r the staff to set in m o t i o n a c a u c u s sponsored "action," an event that could take the f o r m of a press release, a " D e a r C o l l e a g u e " letter, t e s t i m o n y b e f o r e a c o m m i t t e e , an invitation to meet with the c a u c u s , or an e n d o r s e m e n t of legislation. In the absence of cochair or E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e approval, no action could be taken in the n a m e of the caucus. T h e cochairs and staff often negotiated o n e - o n - o n e with m e m b e r s to learn what, if any, c h a n g e s could be m a d e to gain their consent. But nothing of importance could bear the c a u c u s ' s i m p r i m a t u r unless it had bipartisan support. S e c u r i n g the m e m b e r s h i p of all c o n g r e s s w o m e n c o n t i n u e d to be a c a u c u s priority, but S c h r o e d e r had an easier time r e c r u i t i n g f e l l o w D e m o c r a t s than S n o w e had persuading R e p u b l i c a n s to join. T h e r e were never f e w e r than 80 p e r c e n t of w o m e n D e m o c r a t s in the c a u c u s , with all nineteen affiliated in 1991. S n o w e ' s task was more difficult b e c a u s e more w o m e n in her party were unprepared to associate themselves with a women's agenda; because Republican congresswomen who joined risked losing l e v e r a g e with a n t i f e m i n i s t R e p u b l i c a n m e n , m a n y of w h o m were ranking m e m b e r s of c o m m i t t e e s and gatekeepers to leadership positions; and b e c a u s e they believed that affiliation with the caucus would all too o f t e n put them at o d d s with first the R e a g a n and then the B u s h W h i t e H o u s e . T h a t there w e r e so f e w R e p u b l i c a n c o n g r e s s w o m e n m a d e their affiliation all that m o r e visible. N o n e t h e l e s s , an i n c r e a s i n g p r o p o r t i o n of R e p u b l i c a n w o m e n c o n c l u d e d that the risks were worth taking, and by 1991 two-thirds had b e c o m e m e m b e r s . T h e cochairs continued to a c c o m m o d a t e the diversity in m e m b e r s ' legislative and g e n d e r orientations, while at the same time maintaining an e m b a r g o on the a b o r t i o n issue. E a c h c o n g r e s s w o m a n w a s e n c o u r aged to p r o m o t e priorities she b e l i e v e d best served w o m e n , with the understanding that not all c a u c u s m e m b e r s would support or even agree with her. T h e unanimity rule was no longer in place, and most decisions to take an action were negotiated by the cochairs, in consultation with their respective partisan constituencies. T h u s the o m n i b u s e c o n o m i c and health equity bills i n t r o d u c e d in each C o n g r e s s were ideal vehicles for p r o m o t i n g collective, even if not fully integrated goals. Each caucus m e m b e r was invited to attach one or m o r e p r o v i s i o n s to a catchall bill and then articulate support f o r the entire m e a s u r e even though it contained sections about which they were u n e n t h u s i a s t i c . T h e a b s e n c e of a u n i f y i n g , central t h e m e c o n n e c t i n g

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these p r o p o s a l s was not necessarily a d i s a d v a n t a g e . T h e b i l l ' s m a n y subjects fell within the jurisdiction of different c o m m i t t e e s , and consequently each would be considered on the basis of its o w n merits. M o r e over, c a u c u s m e m b e r s did not expect all c o m p o n e n t s of the p a c k a g e to be given a c o m m i t t e e hearing, let alone consideration by the full House. But they k n e w that proposals u n a d d r e s s e d in one C o n g r e s s would reappear in the reintroduced o m n i b u s bill in the next C o n g r e s s . T h e E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e ' s decision to k e e p abortion off the table also contributed to the c a u c u s ' s continued viability—not only because it prevented fissures within the g r o u p f r o m surfacing, but also b e c a u s e it a l l o w e d the m e m b e r s to invest their time, energy, and e m o t i o n into w o r k i n g on less controversial, m o r e attainable goals. T h e issue intruded into caucus deliberations only w h e n broad f a m i l y planning p r o g r a m s at h o m e and abroad were threatened by abortion opponents. M o s t pro-life a d v o c a t e s b e l i e v e d it was m o r e i m p o r t a n t to stop the use of f e d e r a l f u n d s to u n d e r w r i t e a b o r t i o n s and a b o r t i o n c o u n s e l i n g than it w a s to c o n t i n u e f i n a n c i a l aid to national and international a g e n c i e s w h o s e abortion services were only a part of a b r o a d r a n g e of f a m i l y planning services. As has been noted, caucus efforts to end the "gag r u l e " and the M e x i c o City policy were unavailing during the R e a g a n - B u s h years. T h e g r o u p ' s permanent staff played a key role in keeping the caucus f o c u s e d on its principal p u r p o s e s — t h o s e of catalyst, facilitator, repository, incubator, and a d v o c a t e . C a u c u s m e e t i n g s w e r e used to air and r e f i n e m e m b e r s ' priorities, and m o b i l i z e s u p p o r t f o r t h e m . T h e y also p r o v i d e d a v e n u e in w h i c h to d e v i s e legislative strategies d e s i g n e d to enact a g e n d a items into law. In the m e a n t i m e , the c a u c u s c o n t i n u e d to serve as an incubator for f e m i n i s t initiatives upon which no national or c o n g r e s s i o n a l c o n s e n s u s had yet f o r m e d . Staff r e s e a r c h and r e c u r r i n g articles in Update kept ideas alive long a f t e r their legislative shelf life in a given C o n g r e s s had expired. C a u c u s ties to the H o u s e D e m o c r a t i c l e a d e r s h i p r e m a i n e d r e a s o n ably strong, with m a n y veteran c o n g r e s s m e n , i n c l u d i n g party leaders and c o m m i t t e e chairs, retaining their a s s o c i a t e m e m b e r s h i p in the organization. Their support of the C C W I often went b e y o n d lip service and marginally i m p r o v e d H o u s e receptivity to caucus proposals. M o r e over, the status of the c a u c u s as an L S O r e m a i n e d u n c h a l l e n g e d , its facilities and resources on Capitol Hill were kept intact, and Democratic leaders, with help f r o m C C W I m e m b e r s , were able to f e n d off serious threats to the i n d e p e n d e n c e of all L S O s . C a u c u s relations with the W h i t e H o u s e during this period were not nearly as g o o d as they had been in the Carter years. Carter aides went

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out of their way to a c c o m m o d a t e caucus requests, taking s o m e of their unorthodox ideas seriously. R e a g a n advisers, on the other hand, ignored the C C W I . R e a g a n never met with the c a u c u s a f t e r t a k i n g o f f i c e , in spite of repeated requests f r o m the coleaders, and even though he met with the Black and Hispanic Caucuses. N a n c y R e a g a n lunched with the g r o u p , but not b e f o r e calls f r o m the W h i t e H o u s e m a d e clear that she e x p e c t e d no policy issues to be raised. S c h r o e d e r r e m e m b e r s going to the W h i t e H o u s e with a gold E R A pin in her lapel and being asked to take it off (Schroeder 1997, p. 74). President Bush also r e f u s e d to meet with C C W I leaders, failing on several occasions to return p h o n e calls, but his aides regularly accepted invitations to attend C C W I m e e t i n g s . O f f i c i a l s h o l d i n g h e a l t h - r e l a t e d p o r t f o l i o s — N I H d i r e c t o r B e r n a d i n e Healy, S u r g e o n G e n e r a l A n t o n i a N o v e l l o , and Health and H u m a n S e r v i c e s secretary L o u i s S u l l i v a n — w e r e particularly attentive to the C C W I ' s interests. T h e y also h e l p e d mobilize administration support for several provisions in the W o m e n ' s Health Equity Act. But they o p p o s e d research on fetal tissue and on the abortion pill R U - 4 8 6 , and they were either unwilling or unable to protect f a m i l y p l a n n i n g p r o g r a m s f r o m attacks by p r o - l i f e m e m b e r s of C o n g r e s s and by a president w h o believed that even a hint of s o f t n e s s on abortion would j e o p a r d i z e his 1992 reelection. Sustained realization of its strategic goals was not the only reason the c a u c u s retained its viability. M e m b e r s h i p satisfaction was another. In spite of their f r u s t r a t i o n s , c o n g r e s s w o m e n e n j o y e d p a l p a b l e advantages f r o m affiliation with the C C W I . For one thing, they b e c a m e better i n f o r m e d about w o m e n ' s issues. M e e t i n g s a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s and with cabinet officials allowed t h e m to e x c h a n g e specialized i n f o r m a t i o n economically. A d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s p r o v i d e d current data on scores of w o m e n - r e l a t e d p r o g r a m s they oversaw, and sent c a u c u s m e m b e r s additional material w h e n discussions pointed up information gaps and ambiguities. Ideas m e m b e r s e x c h a n g e d with one another, o f t e n touching on m e a s u r e s b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d by their r e s p e c t i v e c o m m i t t e e s , w e r e also valuable. T h e s e e x c h a n g e s provided an early warning signal about proposals in the pipeline, a perspective on breaking d e v e l o p m e n t s , and an a s s e s s m e n t of the c o n s e q u e n c e s legislative p r o p o s a l s c o u l d h a v e for w o m e n . T h e bipartisan character of these meetings also allowed participants to learn about attitudes "on the other side of the aisle." Apart f r o m generating specialized information at relatively low cost, the c a u c u s p r o v i d e d a f o r u m f o r m e m b e r s to articulate their political and personal priorities. M e e t i n g s g a v e c o n g r e s s w o m e n an opportunity to e x p r e s s policy p r e f e r e n c e s a m o n g c o l l e a g u e s w h o w e r e g e n e r a l l y

Transformation and Growth: 1982-1992

33

supportive, and b e f o r e cabinet m e m b e r s w h o were in a position to prom o t e t h e m in the e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h . P a r t i c i p a n t s o f t e n acted as s o u n d ing boards, m a k i n g constructive suggestions, signing on as c o s p o n s o r s of proposed legislation, and b r a i n s t o r m i n g to introduce fresh ideas and r e i n v i g o r a t e neglected ones. C a u c u s m e e t i n g s also p r o m o t e d n e t w o r k ing a m o n g m e m b e r s and their staffs, w h i l e at the s a m e t i m e a l l o w i n g attendees to vent their frustrations. By affiliating with a g r o u p and pooling collective resources, m e m bers w e r e a b l e to r e d u c e p r e s s u r e s on t h e m to speak on behalf of all w o m e n on m a t t e r s a b o u t w h i c h they had only m o d e s t e x p e r t i s e — o r n o n e at all. B e f o r e the c a u c u s w a s created, e a c h c o n g r e s s w o m a n w a s expected to provide c o n g r e s s m e n with the " w o m e n ' s point of v i e w " on all m a n n e r of issues w h e n they f o u n d t h e m s e l v e s the lone w o m a n in a deliberative setting. T h e y f a c e d a frustrating task, because m e n ' s expectations required t h e m to have at their disposal more i n f o r m a t i o n covering a w i d e r r a n g e of legislative c o n c e r n s than w a s h u m a n l y p o s s i b l e . I n v o l v e m e n t with the caucus e n c o u r a g e d w o m e n to adopt a process that had been institutionalized in the H o u s e f o r d e c a d e s — n a m e l y the division and specialization of labor. Each c a u c u s m e m b e r began to f o c u s on t w o or t h r e e w o m e n ' s issues, o f t e n c h o s e n b e c a u s e the issues w e r e within the s u b j e c t - m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n of her c o m m i t t e e s . C o n g r e s s w o m e n began to rely on one another to a greater extent than they did in the past, referring q u e s t i o n s on matters outside their expertise to other c a u c u s m e m b e r s and their staffs. A f f i l i a t i o n with the c a u c u s helped m e m b e r s i m p r o v e their rapport with w o m e n ' s groups in their constituencies. T h e H o u s e has never had a s t a n d i n g c o m m i t t e e s p e c i a l i z i n g on d i v e r s e issues directly a f f e c t i n g w o m e n , as it has had c o m m i t t e e s f o c u s i n g , for e x a m p l e , on f a r m e r s and veterans. As a result, there was no p o l i c y - s h a p i n g congressional agency to w h i c h R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s c o u l d p o i n t w h e n p e r s u a d i n g w o m e n c o n stituents that their n e e d s w e r e being a d d r e s s e d . A f t e r the c a u c u s w a s f o r m e d , a f f i l i a t i o n a l l o w e d m e m b e r s c r e d i b l y to c l a i m that they w e r e c o m m i t t e d to issues of concern to w o m e n . It was in improving their representative i m a g e more than in any other respect that men capitalized on their a s s o c i a t e m e m b e r s h i p in the c a u c u s . Their $ 9 0 0 s u b s c r i p t i o n s to Update entitled t h e m to 100 c o p i e s of the p u b l i c a t i o n f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n to constituents and interest g r o u p s within their districts. C o n g r e s s is a social as well as a political institution, and m a n y m e m b e r s derive emotional satisfaction f r o m interacting with m e m b e r s of the groups they choose to join. In the past, w o m e n had f e w opportunities to establish close personal ties with other w o m e n . T h e c a u c u s partially

34

Women and Power on Capitol Hill

filled this void. Its m e e t i n g s p r o v i d e d an agency for conviviality and mutual social support. T h e sense of c o m m u n i t y m e m b e r s e x p e r i e n c e d offered a respite f r o m the frantic pace they ran each day. T h u s congressw o m e n derived personal satisfaction f r o m their m e m b e r s h i p in the group, with the single-sex character of its Executive C o m m i t t e e not the least appealing quality. Said one m e m b e r in an interview: " T h e m a j o r b e n e f i t s of the C a u c u s are cultural in nature. W o m e n meet with other w o m e n in an all-female setting, and you d o n ' t have to explain what you mean when you say something. Everyone present 'gets it' the first time." T h e usages of the c a u c u s as an instrument for generating i n f o r m a tion and ideas, f o r a l l o w i n g m e m b e r s to articulate their priorities in a s y m p a t h e t i c f o r u m , f o r d i v i d i n g the w o r k l o a d m o r e equitably, f o r i m p r o v i n g their i m a g e as w o m e n ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , and f o r p r o v i d i n g social and emotional support helped it retain its organizational vitality during a time w h e n it w a s struggling simply to hold on to gains m a d e b e f o r e 1981. It e x p e r i e n c e d s o m e successes in w o m e n ' s health, particularly in the B u s h years, and they, too, p r o v i d e d r e a s o n s f o r c a u c u s leaders and rank and file to c o n c l u d e that m e m b e r s h i p w a s w o r t h the financial and political costs. Motivating m a n y of these w o m e n was the hope that f a v o r a b l e political c i r c u m s t a n c e s would one day c o m e together and the caucus would e m e r g e as a p o w e r f u l engine m o v i n g w o m e n ' s issues on to the national agenda, f o r c i n g C o n g r e s s to address c o n c e r n s it had so far successfully d o d g e d . A n d with the 1992 election, they thought their time had c o m e .

Note 1. A f t e r men w e r e a d m i t t e d , the E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e was reconstituted to i n c l u d e all w o m e n m e m b e r s , not simply the c o c h a i r s , the treasurer, and the three at-large m e m b e r s .

Before the "Republican Revolution": 1993-1994

T

he 103rd Congress witnessed unparalleled success for the Congressional Caucus for W o m e n ' s Issues. The 1992 election sent twentyfour new women to the House, twenty-two of whom joined the organization. These women brought with them a more diverse range of social experiences than any previous group of fledgling congresswomen. Several secured key committee appointments, and some senior caucus members, exploiting the dramatic rise in women members, prevailed on party leaders to gain choice assignments of their own.

Leverage at the committee level and with the new administration led to significant policy triumphs. During the 103rd Congress, sixty-six caucus-sponsored measures were passed, nearly as many as had been adopted in the preceding ten years. Some broke new ground in the fields of domestic violence, health, education, and employment. At the same time, the caucus changed its bylaws to limit cochairs to a single, twoyear term, and abandoned its neutrality on the abortion issue. The first decision did not always serve the caucus well. T h e second had a profound impact on the organization after the "Republican revolution."

Inside the Numbers The 1992 election produced unprecedented increases in the number of w o m e n serving in Congress. Women Senators went f r o m two to six, dramatic growth in that, until then, no more than two women had ever served in the upper chamber simultaneously. The influx of women Representatives was also remarkable. The twenty-four new congresswomen increased the number of women in the House by almost 70 percent. 1 All 35

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Women and Power on Capitol Hill

t w e n t y - o n e of the new D e m o c r a t i c and one of the three R e p u b l i c a n w o m e n affiliated with the C C W I , bringing the m e m b e r s h i p of the Executive C o m m i t t e e to forty-two. 2 At the same time, f e w of the ninety new c o n g r e s s m e n j o i n e d the caucus. T h e H o u s e Bank and Post O f f i c e scandals m a d e s o m e of t h e m unwilling to use o f f i c e a l l o w a n c e s to pay the m e m b e r s h i p f e e s of legislative service o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( L S O s ) . T h e y planned to turn back a portion of these f u n d s to the federal treasury and head off f u t u r e charges of fiscal profligacy. Consequently, w h e n f e m a l e m e m b e r s h i p grew f r o m 25 to 42, male m e m b e r s h i p dropped to 116 f r o m 143 (see Table 2.1). A l m o s t as n o t e w o r t h y as the n u m b e r of new c o n g r e s s w o m e n w a s their diversity. Five A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n w o m e n j o i n e d the three already serving in the House. Two new Latina D e m o c r a t s were elected, and they b e c a m e the first Hispanic c o n g r e s s w o m e n to j o i n the caucus. D e m o c r a t Carrie Meek, a black c o n g r e s s w o m a n f r o m Florida, was a granddaughter of a slave and had o n c e w o r k e d as a c l e a n i n g w o m a n . Lynn W o o l s e y ( D - C a l i f . ) had been a w e l f a r e m o t h e r b e f o r e going back to school and entering politics. A n d the addition of these t w e n t y - f o u r new w o m e n to the t w e n t y - f o u r r e t u r n i n g c o n g r e s s w o m e n m e a n t that t w e n t y - s e v e n states f r o m all sections of the c o u n t r y w e r e now r e p r e s e n t e d in the H o u s e by at least one w o m a n . T h e forty-eight w o m e n breached the 10 percent threshold of H o u s e m e m b e r s h i p , and by all a c c o u n t s f u n d a m e n t a l l y c h a n g e d the H o u s e a t m o s p h e r e . Pink, red, f u c h s i a , and s a l m o n - c o l o r e d suits and d r e s s e s were now liberally sprinkled a m o n g the dour garb of c o n g r e s s m e n . T h e bright colors m a d e the w o m e n a p p e a r m o r e n u m e r o u s than they w e r e and p r o m p t e d one veteran c o n g r e s s m a n to a d m o n i s h c a u c u s cochair Pat S c h r o e d e r : " L o o k w h a t y o u ' v e d o n e . T h e p l a c e looks like a s h o p p i n g c e n t e r , " w h i c h p r o m p t e d S c h r o e d e r to w o n d e r w h e t h e r there was a s h o p p i n g c e n t e r he p a t r o n i z e d w h e r e 9 0 percent of the s h o p p e r s w e r e men (Schroeder 1997, p. 122). T h e first-term A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n w o m e n brought a new d i m e n s i o n to the largely white, male H o u s e . All w e r e s e a s o n e d politicians, and they readily affiliated with the caucus. O n e remarked, " W o m e n ' s issues are a l m o s t like A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n issues. You a u t o m a t i c a l l y support them without thinking about it." A n o t h e r said: " I ' m an A f r i c a n A m e r i can. If s o m e o n e brought in legislation to reinstate slavery, I would fight it tooth and nail. Well, it's the s a m e with w o m e n ' s issues. . . . It's more or less a given that w o m e n ' s issues are a part of my a g e n d a . " Accordingly, the new black w o m e n coalesced around issues touching the lives of minority w o m e n and rallied behind President C l i n t o n ' s

Before the "Republican Revolution": 1993-1994

37

nominations of black women to the executive and judicial branches. Cynthia McKinney ( D - G a . ) , the youngest of the new black women, claimed, "We're shaking up the place. If one of the godfathers says you can't do this, my next question is 'why not?' And who are you to say we c a n ' t ? " North Carolina's Eva Clayton, who was elected president of Democratic first-termers for the first session of the 103rd Congress, articulated a similar view: "We'll stand up quicker [to protect our rights]. I think the traditions of society have not inhibited us as much [as they have others]. There are just some indignities you are not conditioned to take" (Washington Post, August 2, 1993). Caucus affiliation of the twenty-two new women resulted in crowded Executive Committee meetings, making them clamorous affairs, with members often competing with one another for colleagues' attention. The disadvantages of disorder at early meetings were offset by the heady exhilaration caucus members experienced in the company of a record number of w o m e n — a number that most had concluded before the 1992 election was beyond their reach in the foreseeable future. The atmosphere was electric as they proposed new policy initiatives, plotted parliamentary tactics, and explored strategies calculated to promote feminist goals. After lively meetings among themselves or with administration aides, many congresswomen reconvened in small groups in the House corridors to expand on arguments aired moments before. The satisfaction, the sheer joy, the buzz of excitement and laughter exhibited in one of these minimeetings prompted one observer to remark that the congresswomen sounded like a bunch of "giggly high school girls."

Gaining Leverage Election of a president sympathetic to caucus priorities was central to its success. Also important was improved rapport CCWI members established with the Democratic leaders, as well as the choice committee assignments many of them secured. Caucus leaders established issue-specific task forces, thereby permitting a more economical division of labor in an organization whose size now rivaled that of a standing House committee. And before long, some senior caucus members set their sights on party leadership positions. President Clinton met with the CCWI shortly after he took office— the first time in twelve years a chief executive had done so. He spent two hours discussing issues affecting women and children, exhibiting a

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Women and Power on Capitol Hill

better understanding of these matters than any of his predecessors, and g i v i n g m o r e time and attention to the w o m e n ' s a g e n d a than any had anticipated ( S c h r o e d e r 1997, p. 82). In the m o n t h s that f o l l o w e d , the c a u c u s met with scores of presidential a d v i s e r s , and p h o n e calls to the White House and executive agencies were reliably r e t u r n e d — a practice all but u n k n o w n during the Reagan years. T h e p r e s i d e n t ' s approval of the F a m i l y and M e d i c a l L e a v e Act, and his i s s u a n c e of a series of p r o - c h o i c e e x e c u t i v e orders, were early d o w n p a y m e n t s on assurances he had given the caucus. Hillary Clinton also met with the group. O n e m o n t h after her husb a n d ' s i n a u g u r a t i o n , she c a m e to Capitol Hill to discuss health c a r e r e f o r m . C o n v e r s a t i o n s with the c o n g r e s s w o m e n w e r e not c o n f i n e d to health care, h o w e v e r , even t h o u g h it w a s the c e n t e r p i e c e of the presid e n t ' s a g e n d a . Violence against w o m e n , r e p r o d u c t i v e rights, and increased federal support for research on osteoporosis and breast cancer w e r e also discussed. T h e m e e t i n g was the first held with a p r e s i d e n t ' s s p o u s e since the s u b s t a n c e - f r e e l u n c h e o n with N a n c y R e a g a n in the early 1980s. Later, the first l a d y ' s staff c o n f e r r e d regularly with c o n g r e s s w o m e n , and Pat Schroeder credited the c a u c u s ' s stunning success in the 103rd C o n g r e s s to the " H i l l a r y f a c t o r " : "We c o u l d not have d e s i g n e d a better a d v o c a t e f o r w o m e n ' s issues than Hillary R o d h a m C l i n t o n " ( S c h r o e d e r 1997, p. 84). W h e n the first session of the 103rd C o n g r e s s e n d e d , the C o l o r a d o D e m o c r a t stated that the first l a d y ' s i n f l u e n c e and popularity had given w o m e n " m o r e c l o u t " than they had exerted for s o m e time ( M i n n e a p o l i s Star Tribune, D e c e m b e r 12, 1993). C a p i t a l i z i n g on a u g m e n t e d n u m b e r s , c a u c u s m e m b e r s b e g a n to d e m a n d m o r e f r o m H o u s e leaders. T h e i r a s s e r t i v e n e s s was e x p r e s s e d first during the c o m m i t t e e assignment process, when more than one-half of the t w e n t y - f o u r f i r s t - t e r m e r s listed the A p p r o p r i a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e , the Ways and M e a n s C o m m i t t e e , or the B u d g e t C o m m i t t e e as their first c h o i c e — n o t b e c a u s e they expected to secure positions on these panels but b e c a u s e they believed that, e v e n if they f a i l e d , similar r e q u e s t s in subsequent Congresses would be given greater weight (Gertzog 1995, p. 222). T w o f i r s t - t e r m D e m o c r a t s , Lynn W o o l s e y and C a r r i e M e e k , g a i n e d a p p o i n t m e n t s r e s p e c t i v e l y to the B u d g e t and A p p r o p r i a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e s . T h r e e other f l e d g l i n g D e m o c r a t s won a s s i g n m e n t s to the coveted Energy and C o m m e r c e C o m m i t t e e . In the m e a n t i m e , three veteran c o n g r e s s w o m e n won seats on the A p p r o p r i a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e , bringing the total n u m b e r of w o m e n m e m b e r s to a record high of seven. T h e sharp increase in the n u m b e r of caucus m e m b e r s ensured representation of at least one c o n g r e s s w o m a n on every H o u s e c o m m i t t e e .

Before the "Republican Revolution ": 1993-1994

39

This allowed w o m e n ' s perspectives and experiences to find expression on virtually e v e r y issue raised in the H o u s e . A l t h o u g h no w o m a n c h a i r e d a H o u s e c o m m i t t e e , several h e a d e d key s u b c o m m i t t e e s , and Patricia S c h r o e d e r and M a r i l y n L l o y d used these p o s i t i o n s on the A r m e d S e r v i c e s C o m m i t t e e to help secure $ 2 0 million f o r a W o m e n ' s Health R e s e a r c h C e n t e r in the D e p a r t m e n t of D e f e n s e , and to repeal a prohibition on w o m e n ' s service on c o m b a t ships (Angle 1994). T h e e n h a n c e d size of the caucus had c o n s e q u e n c e s for the g r o u p ' s structure as well. S o o n a f t e r the 103rd C o n g r e s s c o n v e n e d , the C C W I E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e created f i v e task f o r c e s , e a c h f o c u s i n g on an important a g e n d a item, and each chaired by a c o n g r e s s w o m a n possessing the relevant e x p e r t i s e . L o u i s e S l a u g h t e r ( D - N . Y . ) w a s t a p p e d to lead the task f o r c e on w o m e n ' s health, and Patsy M i n k ( D - H a w a i i ) c h a i r e d a task f o r c e on e c o n o m i c and e d u c a t i o n a l equity. C o n s t a n c e Morella ( R - M d . ) was task force leader on violence against w o m e n , and Nita L o w e y ( D - N . Y . ) w a s n a m e d to lead a task f o r c e on r e p r o d u c t i v e rights. M a x i n e Waters ( D - C a l i f . ) helped establish and direct a task force on c a u c u s bylaws, believing that the size and potential influence of the C C W I required m o r e f o r m a l rules g o v e r n i n g l e a d e r s h i p selection and succession. She also believed that the w o m e n chosen as cochairs should reflect the c a u c u s ' s ideological and d e m o g r a p h i c diversity. Later, t w o additional task f o r c e s were created, o n e f o c u s i n g on older w o m e n , the other on children, youth, and families. T h e s e s u b g r o u p s p e r f o r m e d s o m e of the responsibilities of H o u s e s u b c o m m i t t e e s , although without the all-important staff, budget, and institutional forum. Nonetheless, they allowed caucus m e m b e r s and their personal staffs to concentrate on a bounded, m a n a g e a b l e range of problems facing w o m e n . The task forces also provided additional leadership opportunities for congresswomen, some of w h o m had been inclined earlier to view themselves as generalists in the field of w o m e n ' s issues, often working on the margins of several unrelated feminist policies. N o w their task force agendas often dominated Executive Committee discussions. T h e C C W I ' s decision to adopt a pro-choice position represented an important c h a n g e in its strategic goals. A f t e r years of keeping the issue off the table, the caucus, swollen with m o r e than a score of new w o m e n w h o k n e w nothing about the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s origins, created a task f o r c e on reproductive rights. T h e life of the new s u b g r o u p would be brief, but f o r f o u r years it g a v e no q u a r t e r in p r o t e c t i n g a w o m a n ' s right to choose, and d o g g e d l y tried to f e n d off attacks f r o m pro-life proponents. A b a n d o n m e n t of o f f i c i a l neutrality on the issue w o u l d c o m e b a c k to haunt the caucus in the 104th C o n g r e s s .

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Women and Power on Capitol Hill

Aspiring to Power in the House The CCWI's visibility and influence were reinforced in the 103rd Congress when three of its more active members—Connecticut Democrat Barbara Kennelly, New York Democrat Louise Slaughter, and New York Republican Susan Molinari—decided to seek party leadership positions. Kennelly had already won the respect of fellow Democrats, gaining a seat on the Ways and Means and Budget Committees, and working her way up through the party whip system to an appointment as one of four chief deputy whips. She was regularly consulted by Democratic leaders, and was frequently asked what position the caucus had taken on pending legislation. In 1991, Kennelly ran for vice chair of her party, compiling a respectable vote total while losing to California's Vic Fazio. In November 1993 she announced she would run for vice chair again when Fazio was required by term limits to relinquish the post. Several months later, Slaughter publicly declared that she, too, would seek the vice chair position, and ultimately the contest was fought out between the two congresswomen. A Kentuckian by birth, Slaughter moved to New York and represented residents of the Rochester region, first in the state legislature and then in the House. In 1989, she was handpicked by House Speaker Tom Foley to serve on the House Rules Committee, only the third Democratic woman ever appointed to this strategically important panel, and like Kennelly she served on the Budget Committee. The battle between the two feminists forced Democratic Caucus members to make a difficult choice, and ultimately the more senior, better-connected Kennelly eked out a 9 3 - 9 0 victory to become the first Democratic woman vice chair. Susan Molinari announced she would run for Republican vice chair in June 1994. Molinari had succeeded her father, Guy Molinari, in the House after he had been elected borough president of Staten Island, New York City's most Republican enclave. She had previously been elected to the city council, and had served in that body as her party's sole representative. Although an outspoken feminist, and ardently prochoice, Molinari generally avoided identification with women's issues during her early years on the council. She believed that as the lone Republican she should exhibit interest in a wider range of issues, including such bread-and-butter concerns as road maintenance as well as waste disposal in the waters that wash Staten Island shores. She later regretted shying away from women's issues, noting that "they are the very issues that voters most need women in politics to care about because the men won't touch them" (Molinari 1998, p. 63).

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I m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r her election to the city c o u n c i l , she had d e c i d e d to ask the e l e c t i o n s b o a r d to c h a n g e the l a n g u a g e instructing voters h o w to " w r i t e i n " the n a m e of a c a n d i d a t e not printed on the ballot. T h e instructions referred to such a candidate as " h e . " She a c k n o w l e d g e d that this politically incorrect locution was small potatoes, especially w h e n c o m p a r e d with the truly gross inequities contained in N e w York's election laws. But she said that the slight to w o m e n "stuck in her craw," and she planned to send out a press release a n n o u n c i n g her complaint to the elections board. Her advisers d e m u r r e d , however, and urged her not to go public on this kind of issue so soon after her election, lest she be marginalized by friend and f o e alike as a single-issue feminist. Molinari a b a n d o n e d the effort, but later c o n c l u d e d that she had been mistaken to do so. " I t ' s not j u s t l a n g u a g e , " she said. " I t ' s child care, and a b o r t i o n , and v i o l e n c e against w o m e n p r o g r a m s , and child a b u s e . A n d too m a n y w o m e n , m y s e l f i n c l u d e d , get scared a w a y f r o m t h e m by h a n d l e r s w h o d o n ' t have a c l u e " (Molinari 1998, p. 63). W h e n she w a s elected to the H o u s e in 1989, she w a s d e t e r m i n e d n e v e r to d i s t a n c e herself f r o m w o m e n ' s issues a g a i n . She j o i n e d the C C W I early in her first t e r m and later noted, " O n e of the j o y s of my first y e a r s in C o n g r e s s w a s the easy c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n D e m o c r a t i c and Republican w o m e n active in the W o m e n ' s C a u c u s " (Molinari 1998, p. 92). H e r spirited d e f e n s e of a w o m a n ' s right to c h o o s e p r o m p t e d s o m e of the m o r e conservative m e m b e r s of her party to label her "Bella A b z u g without the hat." M o l i n a r i ' s attachment to the C C W I had begun to wear thin by 1994, w h e n she decided to seek her p a r t y ' s f i f t h highest ranking H o u s e position. Part of the d i s a f f e c t i o n can be e x p l a i n e d by the C C W I ' s increasingly partisan orientation in the 103rd C o n g r e s s . M o r e i m p o r t a n t w a s M o l i n a r i ' s belief that she could not be elected to high party o f f i c e as a thirty-six-year-old m o d e r a t e unless she persuaded senior c o n s e r v a t i v e s that she was a team player and that she was flexible e n o u g h to m o d i f y or m a s k s o m e of the socially p r o g r e s s i v e , f e m i n i s t p o s i t i o n s she had already articulated. Her m a r r i a g e to C o n g r e s s m a n Bill P a x o n in July 1994 a f f e c t e d her b e h a v i o r as well, i n a s m u c h as P a x o n was the chair of the R e p u b l i c a n C o n g r e s s i o n a l C a m p a i g n C o m m i t t e e and a principal t r i b u n e f o r the p a r t y ' s c o n s e r v a t i v e s o c i o e c o n o m i c p l a t f o r m . A c c o r d ingly, M o l i n a r i d i s t a n c e d herself f r o m the c a u c u s , r e t a i n i n g n o m i n a l membership. W h e n the N e w Yorker a n n o u n c e d her c a n d i d a c y f o r R e p u b l i c a n vice c h a i r — d a y s b e f o r e her marriage to P a x o n — s h e entered a race that

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Women and Power on Capitol Hill

her leading Republican opponent, Florida's C l i f f Stearns, had begun the previous November. This meant that she had to play catch-up, and she saw her "road to v i c t o r y " as "paved with the I O U s I could c o l l e c t by helping Republican candidates all over the c o u n t r y " (Molinari

1998,

p. 160). Earlier, she had sought and won seats on the House C o m m e r c e C o m m i t t e e and Republican C o m m i t t e e on C o m m i t t e e s because they both provided opportunities for placing R e p u b l i c a n s in her debt. S h e also contributed campaign funds to a number o f G O P candidates, and a c c o m p a n i e d her husband from one congressional district to another, meeting with House candidates, speaking on their behalf, and playing an especially supportive role for Republican aspirants who also happened to be women. B y election day Molinari had barnstormed in eighty-four House districts, promoting the candidacies of some conservative pro-life men who were running against liberal or moderate pro-choice women. S h e later explained these efforts as necessary for b e c o m i n g vice chair. S h e also said that she had no choice but to support the objectives o f her husband (Molinari 1 9 9 8 , p. 142). S o m e o f her caucus colleagues deplored her support o f the Contract with A m e r i c a , and she was labeled a " f e m i Newtie"(Molinari 1998, p. 186). Molinari defeated Stearns and b e c a m e the first Republican C C W I member who was also part of her party's top leadership. 3 After her victory, she assured the caucus that, as a member o f the G O P hierarchy, she was now in a better position to promote women's issues. T h e power plays by the three women reflected palpable attitudinal changes about the leadership potential o f women in the House. Interviews in 1978 with thirteen o f the eighteen congresswomen and a dozen randomly selected congressmen revealed that few anticipated selection of a woman for important leadership positions in the foreseeable future. C o n g r e s s m e n based their j u d g m e n t s on the small number o f women then serving in the House, a b e l i e f that virtually all were "unqualified" for responsible party posts, and a conviction that too many of their colleagues were unwilling to take their legislative and political cues from a w o m a n — a n y woman. Congresswomen interviewed at the time were not much more optimistic about their own leadership prospects. T h e y noted that women generally did not seek out these power positions, concentrating on policy c o n c e r n s and constituent relations instead. T h e y also pointed out that few had enough seniority to be taken seriously, and that, as in so many other pursuits, a woman would have to be twice as good as competing congressmen to pull it off. One Republican congresswoman was

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especially pessimistic: " W o m e n will never get a n y w h e r e in the R e p u b lican party b e c a u s e the men in the H o u s e in my party c a n n o t c o n c e i v e of the p r o s p e c t of sharing p o w e r with a w o m a n and taking d i r e c t i o n s f r o m her" (Gertzog 1995, p. 113). Interviews with H o u s e m e m b e r s f i f t e e n years later revealed a sharp reversal in expectations. M o r e than three-quarters of the dozen men and twenty-eight of the thirty-three w o m e n venturing a guess believed that chances were good to excellent that a w o m a n would be in a top leadership position of one or both parties by the beginning of the next millennium. W h e r e a s c o n g r e s s m e n interviewed in 1978 went out of their way to d i s p a r a g e the political skills of the w o m e n with w h o m they served, naming names, in 1993 their successors mentioned the n a m e s of w o m e n w h o could b e c o m e party w h i p or f l o o r leader or e v e n Speaker. K e n nelly, Slaughter, N a n c y Pelosi, N a n c y Johnson, and J e n n i f e r D u n n were a m o n g those singled out. A t t i t u d e s t o w a r d w o m e n c o l l e a g u e s had c h a n g e d substantially, said one c o n g r e s s m a n , and if at least one w o m a n were not elected to a top position, he added, "it will not be b e c a u s e of g e n d e r " (Gertzog 1995, p. 117). A large m a j o r i t y of the c o n g r e s s w o m e n in the 103rd C o n g r e s s agreed. M u c h of their o p t i m i s m was based on the u n p r e c e d e n t e d n u m bers then in Congress, and the belief that the percentage of w o m e n in the H o u s e w o u l d only grow. T h e y also underlined the a p p e a l i n g personal qualities and political skills p o s s e s s e d by their c o l l e a g u e s , and m a i n tained that m a n y w o u l d be o u t s t a n d i n g l a w m a k e r s in the t w e n t y - f i r s t century even if they did not emerge atop of the party hierarchy. And one G O P w o m a n predicted, with r e m a r k a b l e prescience, that the w o m e n in her party could receive the recognition they d e s e r v e in the next C o n gress, the 104th, when Republicans gained control of the House. T h u s , a u g m e n t e d n u m b e r s of c o n g r e s s w o m e n with m o r e p o l i s h e d political skills p r o d u c e d a large talent pool, out of w h i c h able w o m e n leaders could e m e r g e . T h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s fed the a m b i t i o n s of w o m e n like Kennelly, Slaughter, and M o l i n a r i , and g a v e credibility to their a s p i r a t i o n s for party l e a d e r s h i p p o s i t i o n s . T h e 1992 election also i n c r e a s e d the l e g i t i m a c y of the f e m i n i s t a g e n d a , and C C W I leaders seized their u n p r e c e d e n t e d opportunities.

Promoting the Feminist Agenda T h e 103rd C o n g r e s s produced more legislation addressing the needs of w o m e n and their children than any C o n g r e s s in history. D u r i n g the first

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Women and Power on Capitol Hill

session alone, thirty bills promoting the feminist agenda were passed, three times the number of such measures approved in the combined first sessions of the 101st and 102nd Congresses. At the end of the year, C C W I cochair Pat Schroeder said that the caucus has "never had such a productive year" (Washington Post, D e c e m b e r 3, 1993), and her Republican counterpart, Olympia Snowe, remarked: "For families with new babies or elderly parents who need care, for women who are afraid to walk down to their cars at night, for all who fear that breast cancer will deprive them of a mother, sister or daughter, this Congress has made a difference" (USA Today, December 3, 1993). By the time the 103rd Congress adjourned in October 1994, sixtysix measures endorsed by the caucus had been adopted (Houston Chronicle, N o v e m b e r 23, 1994). Democratic majority leader Richard Gephardt remarked that the caucus had made a "big impact" on the House's legislative record. He added, " T h e y ' v e brought a lot of idealism and energy to issues important to them." And one British observer noted: "Not only has the long ignored Congressional C a u c u s for W o m e n ' s Issues seen its family-oriented agenda take centre stage, but women lawmakers also have made a difference on a broad range of other issues, from initiating institutional reforms to providing decisive votes on the top issues of the current Congress" (The Independent, [London] October 6, 1994). The political influence exerted by the caucus in the 103rd Congress was not exhibited solely or even principally in the bloc of votes members could deliver for endorsed legislation. To be sure, the votes of forty-two women sometimes made the difference between success and failure. They helped provide the margin needed to pass an assault weapons ban when only 46 percent of congressmen supported the measure ( U S A Today, November 7, 1994) But the caucus was most effective in shaping the agenda indirectly by raising problems and legitimating arguments that past, male-dominated Congresses had either dismissed or ignored. There were now more c o n g r e s s w o m e n who could recount instances of discrimination and humiliation suffered on the job. More of them could recall private struggles with health problems encountered by their families, including breast or ovarian cancer, osteoporosis, and eating disorders. As principal caregivers in their homes, they could provide intimate, firsthand accounts of the anguish and guilt they felt trying to find a way to care for ill children and parents while continuing to earn a living. Marge Roukema pointed out, "Families are thrown into crisis when serious illness strikes. I know. When my son Todd was stricken with leukemia and needed home care, I was free to remain at home. But

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what about the millions of mothers who work? I don't think you would have a man plead for family leave the way I did" (USA Today, May 4, 1993). These accounts were very different f r o m those offered by generations of congressmen whose experience in fighting hot and cold war, and in conducting financial and commercial transactions, defined what was relevant and therefore what was irrelevant to the business of Congress. The sheer weight of these w o m e n ' s ' testimonies in committees and on the House floor shifted the terms of the ongoing national debate about what was and what was not a legitimate national concern. This is what Pat Schroeder may have had in mind when, at the close of the 103rd Congress, she said: "While the number of measures passed in this Congress is historic, . . . the other story is the one behind the numbers: the cooperation among congresswomen, their persistence in working to bring legislation important to women to the House floor, and their political savvy in making this a record-setting Congress" (Update, SeptemberOctober 1994).

The Ripening of the Social Agenda The most substantial gains made by the caucus were in social policy. T h e 103rd Congress adopted more than a score of measures dealing with w o m e n ' s health, education, battered women, and problems facing mothers and their children. Most of the bills enacted had been in the caucus memory bank for as long as a decade. They had been introduced in the 1980s, ignored by the Reagan and Bush administrations, denied a place on the agenda by sympathetic but realistic Democratic House leaders, and recycled for the next Congress—when they would suffer a similar fate. A m o n g the first bills passed by 103rd Congress in 1993 was the Family and Medical Leave Act ( F M L A ) . Initially introduced by Pat Schroeder in 1985, the measure sought to allow both women and men to take unpaid leave f r o m their j o b s immediately before and after they became new parents without fear of losing their e m p l o y m e n t and collateral benefits. The proposal languished in committee for several years. In the meantime, its language was changed to allow leave during the illness of family members. These added benefits appealed to a broader range of House and Senate members, and the F M L A passed Congress twice during the Bush administration. Twice President Bush vetoed it. President Clinton was on record as supporting the legislation, and when 87 percent of c o n g r e s s w o m e n and 58 percent of congressmen

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Women and Power on Capitol Hill

approved it in the weeks following his inauguration, he enthusiastically signed it. The new law gave workers in businesses with more than fifty employees the opportunity to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave each year to care for a newborn or newly adopted child, to minister to a seriously ill family member, or to recover from serious illness, without losing their jobs or health benefits. Later, the president approved a related caucus-supported measure allowing federal employees to either receive donated annual leave from coworkers or voluntarily donate leave time to a "leave bank" to be used for family or medical emergencies. Although the president's comprehensive health care reform package was never enacted, a half dozen new laws addressing w o m e n ' s health needs did pass. These measures had their roots in the W o m e n ' s Health Equity Act, the omnibus bill introduced initially in 1990. It had been inspired by a General Accounting O f f i c e report revealing that women were routinely excluded from government-sponsored clinical studies of maladies ranging f r o m heart disease to the overuse of prescription drugs. The findings of these studies, many conducted by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), were considered by investigators to be applicable to w o m e n as well as men, even though not a single woman had participated in the experiments. When caucus members learned that the tests had been limited to men, they "went ballistic," as one congresswoman put it, and drafted a package of measures that would prevent w o m e n ' s unreasonable exclusion from future clinical tests. The CCWI reintroduced a Women's Health Equity bill in the 103rd Congress, and several of its thirty-two provisions were incorporated in the 1993 National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act. One section of the measure strengthened and codified NIH policy requiring the inclusion of women and minorities in clinical research. Other provisions authorized an additional $400 million for basic and clinical research on breast and ovarian cancer. The same act required the National Institute on Aging to conduct research on w o m e n ' s aging process, with particular emphasis on menopause, and it authorized $40 million for research on osteoporosis. Congress also reauthorized the 1990 Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Breast and Cervical Cancer Mortality Prevention Act, legislation to provide mammograms and pap smears for low-income women. Other language extended the a g e n c y ' s responsibility for reducing the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases. Later, a Department of Defense (DOD) reauthorization bill provided for delivery of primary and preventive health care services to women at military hospitals and clinics, and established a D O D clearinghouse to gather information and conduct

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research on the health care needs of w o m e n in the military. Health conc e r n s of w o m e n v e t e r a n s were also r e c o g n i z e d with the creation of a W o m e n ' s C e n t e r in the D e p a r t m e n t of Veterans A f f a i r s (VA). T h e center was authorized to distribute information on VA p r o g r a m s for w o m e n , c o n d u c t research and o u t r e a c h activities, and m o n i t o r c o m p l a i n t s . T h e c a u c u s s u f f e r e d a s e t b a c k w h e n S e n a t e - a p p r o v e d l a n g u a g e to p r o v i d e w o m e n veterans with prenatal and postpartum care, as well as delivery services, was d e f e a t e d in the H o u s e by pro-life leaders w h o feared that t h e s e p r e g n a n c y p r o v i s i o n s w o u l d be c o n s t r u e d so as to p e r m i t abortions at VA facilities. C o n g r e s s approved a half dozen C C W I - s p o n s o r e d m e a s u r e s to help mothers, w o u l d - b e mothers, and their children. O n e created a new entit l e m e n t p r o g r a m to allow states to p r o v i d e f r e e v a c c i n e s to M e d i c a i d e l i g i b l e c h i l d r e n , N a t i v e A m e r i c a n c h i l d r e n , and c h i l d r e n w h o lacked health insurance. A n o t h e r helped establish three satellite health centers for m o t h e r s and i n f a n t s in the District of C o l u m b i a , w h i l e a third a l l o w e d n u r s e - m i d w i v e s to be r e i m b u r s e d by states with M e d i c a i d f u n d s even w h e n their services fell outside of the maternity cycle. Other p r o v i s i o n s p e r m i t t e d the N I H to c r e a t e three c o n t r a c e p t i v e and t w o infertility research centers. Thus, m u c h of the health a g e n d a the caucus had put t o g e t h e r in the late 1980s and early 1990s was e n a c t e d by a C o n g r e s s w h o s e policy f r a m e of r e f e r e n c e and priorities had b e e n altered by w o m e n m e m b e r s . T h e s a m e was true in a related a r e a — p h y s i c a l a b u s e of w o m e n . D u r i n g the closing w e e k s of the 103rd C o n g r e s s , the Violence Against W o m e n Act (VAWA) w a s passed as part of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s c r i m e prevention bill. U n d e r VAWA, $1.62 billion was authorized over a sixyear period to create rape crisis centers and w o m e n ' s shelters, to require restitution to victims in sex o f f e n s e cases, to e x p a n d r a p e shield laws, and to train j u d g e s u n a c c u s t o m e d to hearing c o m p l a i n t s brought against m e n w h o r e g u l a r l y battered s p o u s e s and c o m p a n i o n s . T h e n e w law m a d e it easier to prosecute batterers w h o stalk w o m e n across state lines, and it allowed victims to prove by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e of the evidence that c r i m e s against t h e m w e r e not r a n d o m — m o t i v a t e d , instead, by an anim u s toward the victims' gender. T h e C r i m e Control Act m o d i f i e d federal rules of evidence to allow p r e v i o u s acts of v i o l e n c e to be i n t r o d u c e d as e v i d e n c e in the trial of s o m e o n e c h a r g e d with sexual assault or child m o l e s t a t i o n . It also granted $30 million to help officials in rural areas investigate and prosecute domestic violence and child abuse. T h e act increased penalties for hate c r i m e s in w h i c h the victim w a s targeted b e c a u s e of race, gender,

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Women and Power on Capitol Hill

religion, or sexual orientation. A n d s a f e g u a r d s were established to protect the c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of i n f o r m a t i o n kept by state m o t o r v e h i c l e b u r e a u s , w h i c h c o u l d be used by stalkers and other c r i m i n a l s to f i n d intended victims. T h e new law also gave victims of a federal c r i m e of violence or sexual abuse the right to address the court prior to the sentencing of a d e f e n d a n t , and it restricted gun purchases by persons guilty of domestic abuse. Legislation p r o m o t i n g equality for w o m e n in e d u c a t i o n was also enacted. M o r e m o n e y was authorized to m o n i t o r sex discrimination in federally f u n d e d education programs, and to develop innovative curricula to p r o m o t e g e n d e r equity. O n e section of the 1994 E l e m e n t a r y and Secondary Education Act authorized teacher training in gender-equitable t e a c h i n g m e t h o d s , w h i l e a n o t h e r e n c o u r a g e d both the r e c r u i t m e n t of w o m e n t e a c h e r s in m a t h and s c i e n c e and g e n d e r - n e u t r a l strategies in teaching these subjects. In the m e a n t i m e , the position of special assistant for g e n d e r equity was created in the D e p a r t m e n t of Education. L a w s were passed to d i s c o u r a g e pregnant and parenting teens f r o m dropping out of school, and f u n d s were m a d e available through the Safe and D r u g - F r e e Schools Act for both sexual h a r a s s m e n t and child abuse prevention programs. Statistical studies completed by the National Center for Education Statistics were required to cross-tabulate data by sex, as well as by race and s o c i o e c o n o m i c status. A d d i t i o n a l legislation directed c o l l e g e s receiving federal f u n d s to disclose participation and f u n d i n g rates for m e n ' s and w o m e n ' s athletic programs. The caucus's deep commitment to Head Start helped expand the prog r a m ' s reach to a larger number of children, and embedded in the School to Work Opportunities Act were provisions stipulating that young w o m e n should be given opportunities to receive training for high-skill, nontraditional j o b s . In the meantime, the president's high-priority Goals 2000: Educate America Act was edited to include gender-equity language to ensure that the needs of girls and women were met. The law also authorized the O f f i c e of Educational Research and Information in the Department of Education to analyze and report its data by sex whenever possible.

Promoting Economic Equity T h e c a u c u s ' s E c o n o m i c Equity bill contained thirty provisions addressing the c o n c e r n s of w o m e n in the w o r k p l a c e . P o r t i o n s of the m e a s u r e affected w o m e n running small businesses, divorced mothers with y o u n g c h i l d r e n , w o m e n in the military, and w o m e n w o r k i n g on Capitol Hill. For b u s i n e s s w o m e n , o n e m e a s u r e e s t a b l i s h e d a p e r m a n e n t O f f i c e of

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W o m e n ' s B u s i n e s s O w n e r s h i p within the Small B u s i n e s s A d m i n i s t r a tion ( S B A ) and a l l o c a t e d $4 million f o r training and a s s i s t a n c e to w o m e n interested in launching or e x p a n d i n g a business enterprise. O n e provision of the S B A reauthorization required federal agencies to establish a 5 percent goal for contracting with w o m e n - o w n e d businesses. T h e E c o n o m i c Equity Act m a d e it easier for a single parent to collect p a y m e n t s f o r child support. A f e d e r a l registry f o r r e p o r t i n g child support orders was created to streamline the collection process, and new p r o c e d u r e s were put in place to establish the paternity of children entitled to f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t . C o n g r e s s also e n a c t e d legislation r e q u i r i n g states to i m p o s e criminal penalties on d e a d b e a t parents, and to e x p a n d medical coverage children receive f r o m noncustodial parents. Two additional child support provisions were part of the Bankruptcy R e f o r m Act. T h e new law required the courts to rank child support obligations as a priority debt to be paid w h e n i n d i v i d u a l s d e c l a r e b a n k r u p t c y , and it m a d e it m o r e d i f f i c u l t f o r a d i v o r c e d p e r s o n c l a i m i n g b a n k r u p t c y to m a k e a f o r m e r spouse liable for the outstanding debt. Other legislation required persons applying for Small Business Adm i n i s t r a t i o n loans to c e r t i f y that they w e r e not in violation of a child support order. Two additional measures established procedures for background c h e c k s of child care providers, and allocated $48 million in fiscal 1994 to f u n d state p r o g r a m s h e l p i n g children in troubled f a m i l i e s . T h e Special S u p p l e m e n t a l Food P r o g r a m for w o m e n , infants, and children ( W I C ) e x p e d i t e d the p r o c e s s by w h i c h p r e g n a n t w o m e n and new mothers receive W I C nutritional services. W o m e n in the military r e c e i v e d a b o o s t w h e n the D e p a r t m e n t of D e f e n s e reauthorization bill r e m o v e d remaining statutory limitations on w o m e n serving on c o m b a t ships—restrictions that affected their earning c a p a c i t i e s . T h e s a m e m e a s u r e r e q u i r e d the Air F o r c e , Navy, and M a r i n e s to a d o p t an E q u a l E m p l o y m e n t O p p o r t u n i t y C o m p l a i n t prog r a m already b e i n g i m p l e m e n t e d by the A r m y . U n d e r the p r o g r a m , claims of gender- or race-based discrimination had to be investigated by o f f i c e r s outside the c o m p l a i n a n t ' s direct chain of c o m m a n d . Legislation calculated to p r o m o t e status and pay equity for w o m e n w o r k i n g on Capitol Hill was also passed. T h e Congressional E m p l o y e e s Fairness Act was sponsored by the caucus cochairs and by Washington, D.C., delegate Eleanor H o l m e s Norton. It authorized collection of information about pay scales and e m p l o y m e n t practices by H o u s e m e m b e r s , while controlling for sex and race. T h o s e c o n d u c t i n g these studies were instructed to publish annual reports and to c o m p a r e each y e a r ' s findings with f i g u r e s c o m p i l e d for previous years.

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T h e success of all of these social and e c o n o m i c bills should not be c o n f u s e d with the a m o u n t of clout the c a u c u s w a s able to exert in the 103rd Congress. S o m e would almost certainly have passed even without the support of w o m e n affiliated with the caucus. A better measure of the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s influence is the n u m b e r of issues the new laws addressed that had languished, unattended, in H o u s e committees. T h e p o w e r of the caucus could not be measured solely by the n u m b e r of wins and losses on roll call votes, but by the fact that f l o o r votes on s o m e issues w e r e c o n d u c t e d at all. Feminist values and the l a n g u a g e of f e m i n i s t legislative discourse were given a legitimacy that until 1993 they had lacked. G r o u n d b r e a k i n g t h o u g h m a n y of the w o m e n - f r i e n d l y m e a s u r e s were, however, they were often obscured by the recurring, bitter battles caucus m e m b e r s f o u g h t over a w o m a n ' s right to choose.

Tackling the Abortion Issue O n e of the C C W I ' s most i m p o r t a n t and f a t e f u l d e c i s i o n s in the 103rd C o n g r e s s was to abandon f o r m a l neutrality on the abortion issue. It was no secret that m o s t m e m b e r s w e r e p r o - c h o i c e and that they actively c h a m p i o n e d w o m e n ' s r e p r o d u c t i v e rights in the H o u s e . But c a u c u s leaders and staff a v o i d e d g r o u p identification with what was arguably the most volatile domestic issue f a c i n g the country, and no official caucus statement took a position on the subject. T h e 1992 election cracked this f a c a d e of neutrality. T h a t all t w e n t y - f o u r n e w l y elected w o m e n w e r e p r o - c h o i c e , and that t w e n t y - t w o of t h e m j o i n e d the c a u c u s , h e l p e d trigger the c h a n g e . B e f o r e the new C o n g r e s s c o n v e n e d , the t w e n t y - f o u r met to d e t e r m i n e the legislative issues upon which they could m a k e c o m m o n cause. Four w e r e selected. A m o n g t h e m were support f o r the F a m i l y and M e d i c a l L e a v e Act, full f u n d i n g f o r H e a d Start, and the application of f e d e r a l sexual h a r a s s m e n t prohibitions to congressional offices. T h e f o u r t h was e n d o r s e m e n t of the F r e e d o m of C h o i c e Act ( F O C A ) , a m e a s u r e unsucc e s s f u l l y p r o m o t e d in p r e v i o u s C o n g r e s s e s to c o d i f y the S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s 1973 Roe v. Wade d e c i s i o n . D u r i n g the R e a g a n and B u s h administrations, f e m i n i s t s were c o n c e r n e d that new j u s t i c e s appointed to the Court would p r o d u c e a pro-life majority and overturn the l a n d m a r k d e c i s i o n . T h e i r f e a r s w e r e partly realized w h e n the Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) decisions upheld state actions to limit w o m e n ' s accessibility to abortion services. C o n c e r n e d that this whittling a w a y of r e p r o d u c t i v e rights

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w o u l d end with the e v i s c e r a t i o n of Roe v. Wade, p r o - c h o i c e H o u s e m e m b e r s were d e t e r m i n e d to give the decision the legitimacy of a congressionally approved statute. T h e p r o - c h o i c e f i r s t - t e r m w o m e n f u r t h e r s k e w e d an already lopsided b a l a n c e b e t w e e n p r o - c h o i c e and p r o - l i f e C C W I m e m b e r s . O v e r w h e l m i n g l y D e m o c r a t i c , and u n a w a r e (or d i s m i s s i v e ) of the g r o u p ' s past neutrality on the issue, most n e w c o m e r s simply a s s u m e d that reproductive rights would be a part of the C C W I ' s agenda. Their n u m bers and the strength of their c o m m i t m e n t to abortion rights m a d e it e a s i e r f o r C C W I v e t e r a n s w h o had b e e n i m p a t i e n t with the c a u c u s ' s past position on the issue to abandon one of the g r o u p ' s strategic p r e m ises. S o m e veteran c o n g r e s s w o m e n d e m u r r e d , but their d o u b t s c o u l d not w i t h s t a n d the m o m e n t u m g e n e r a t e d by n e w m e m b e r s , and their reservations were ignored. W h e n the c a u c u s decided to create task f o r c e s on issues central to its mission, r e p r o d u c t i v e rights, together with w o m e n ' s health, w o m e n in the w o r k p l a c e , and violence against w o m e n , was given a p r o m i n e n c e that until then had been denied it. D u r i n g the C C W I ' s initial meeting in January 1993, Louise Slaughter formally m o v e d to m a k e abortion rights part of the C C W I ' s a g e n d a . N o o b j e c t i o n w a s heard, and Nita L o w e y was n a m e d to head the pro-choice task force. Slaughter later explained the reason for the unanimity: " S o m e w o m e n w h o o b j e c t e d so violently in the past are g o n e " (Glasser 1993). O n e first-term D e m o c r a t said she was shocked, not by the decision, but by the revelation that the c a u c u s had not been p r o - c h o i c e all along. She recalled: W h e n I w a s first elected in 1992 and attended the first C a u c u s meeting in 1993, a vote w a s held to m a k e the C a u c u s p r o - c h o i c e . I w a s stunned. What in the world has the W o m e n ' s C a u c u s b e e n d o i n g all t h e s e years. I thought that's what they had been d o i n g . I c o u l d have fallen o f f the face o f the earth. I think it happened b e c a u s e w e had so many new recruits, all of w h o m were pro-choice. But I really feel for the [ C a u c u s ] p i o n e e r s w h o were there for s o m a n y years. It's tough now; it must have been incredibly tough then.

C a u c u s m e m b e r s w e r e t r i u m p h a n t w h e n P r e s i d e n t Clinton highlighted the importance of w o m e n ' s right to c h o o s e by targeting the issue in his first o f f i c i a l acts as p r e s i d e n t . D a y s a f t e r b e i n g s w o r n in, he issued a half d o z e n e x e c u t i v e o r d e r s r e v e r s i n g a d e c a d e of a b o r t i o n restrictions i m p o s e d by the R e a g a n and Bush administrations. T h e new p r e s i d e n t r e p e a l e d the ban on abortion c o u n s e l i n g at f e d e r a l l y f u n d e d clinics (the so-called gag rule), and e a s e d the policy on a b o r t i o n s in

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military hospitals. He also reversed a R e a g a n administration's prohibition on aid to international f a m i l y p l a n n i n g p r o g r a m s that p e r m i t t e d abortion-related practices. At a W h i t e H o u s e ceremony, the president lifted restrictions on federal f i n a n c i n g of research using fetal tissue, and directed federal regulators to reassess w h e t h e r the abortion pill R U - 4 8 6 was safe and e f f e c tive. T h e e x e c u t i v e orders were issued on the day that a t h r o n g of 7 5 , 0 0 0 pro-life advocates, w h o had c o m e to Washington on the twentieth anniversary of Roe v. Wade, were d e m a n d i n g that the Court decision be overturned. E n c o u r a g e d by the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s initiatives on the issue, C C W I leaders began to work closely with the W h i t e H o u s e to d e f i n e and promote an abortion rights agenda. D u r i n g the 103rd Congress, the caucus threw its w e i g h t behind p r o p o s a l s to restore abortion c o v e r a g e to f e d eral e m p l o y e e s and d e p e n d e n t s under their health benefits program, and to m a k e abortions available to w o m e n in federal prisons, a service eliminated in 1983. T h e g r o u p also worked to lift a 1988 ban on municipally f u n d e d Medicaid abortions for District of C o l u m b i a w o m e n . And a provision was inserted into the 1994 Foreign Operations Appropriation bill to restore the U.S. contribution to the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, an allocation that had b e e n b l o c k e d e a c h year since 1985. All of these m e a s u r e s b e c a m e law. E v e n t h o u g h 77 p e r c e n t of c o n g r e s s w o m e n voted to d e f e a t the H y d e A m e n d m e n t — a provision passed each year to prohibit the use of federal f u n d s to f i n a n c e abortions for w o m e n entitled to M e d i c a i d — t h e m e a s u r e passed 2 5 5 - 1 7 8 . N e v e r t h e l e s s , p r o - c h o i c e f o r c e s m a n a g e d to h e l p m a k e a b o r t i o n s m o r e a c c e s s i b l e to poor w o m e n , a l l o w i n g t h o s e w h o had been victims of rape or incest, as well as t h o s e w h o s e lives were e n d a n g e r e d by their pregnancy, to pay for abortions with Medicaid f u n d s . Violence and deaths at abortion clinics gave the Clinton a d m i n istration and the c a u c u s the leverage to pass the F r e e d o m of A c c e s s to Clinic E n t r a n c e s Act, m a k i n g it a federal c r i m e to intentionally injure, i n t i m i d a t e , or i n t e r f e r e with s o m e o n e w h o is o b t a i n i n g or p r o v i d i n g reproductive health services. T h e president signed the bitterly contested m e a s u r e in May 1994. But s o m e C C W I - s p o n s o r e d abortion m e a s u r e s failed. T h e F r e e d o m of C h o i c e Act was p a s s e d by both H o u s e and S e n a t e c o m m i t t e e s , but f u r t h e r action was blocked w h e n o p p o n e n t s a n n o u n c e d they were prepared to o f f e r scores of d a m a g i n g a m e n d m e n t s when the m e a s u r e c a m e to the floor for debate. In May 1993, L o w e y had sent Hillary Clinton a letter signed by thirty-three C C W I w o m e n urging that a c o m p r e h e n s i v e

Before the "Republican Revolution": 1993-1994

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reproductive health care benefit be part of the administration's health reform package. But when the centerpiece of the president's domestic program failed, the CCWI-supported provision died with it. The C C W I ' s about-face on the abortion issue, and the aggressive role played by Lowey's task force, were not lost on pro-life supporters inside and outside the House. For years they had been suspicious of CCWI neutrality. Cochairs Schroeder and Snowe were among the most outspoken champions of reproductive rights, and their leadership on this issue persuaded many that the group was pro-choice from top to bottom. The caucus's 1993 decision to adopt a pro-choice stance ended all doubts about where it stood on the issue, and when a pro-life Republican leadership assumed power in the 104th Congress, it had one more reason to undermine the CCWI's viability.

The Unraveling of Bipartisanship The dramatic increase in the number of Democratic CCWI members and their unmistakable dominance in group activities induced many of them to come to believe that what was good for the Democratic Party was good for the CCWI. Appointments of women to top administration positions, including attorney general, reinforced the view. Republican members began to feel uncomfortable with the invective Democratic women directed against Republican House leaders. Now that their party controlled the White House for the first time in twelve years, Democratic congresswomen vented an accumulation of bottled-up frustrations Looking back on the 103rd Congress, Susan Molinari observed: "The tragedy of women's politics within the House was how frequently we were divided not by ideology, but by pure partisanship, by the pressures and politics from within our own caucuses" (Molinari 1998, p. 95). The New York City Republican believed that the Democratic president was also at fault, recalling, "After Clinton was elected, the Women's Caucus became increasingly partisan, making any cooperation, and thus gains for women, more difficult" (Molinari 1998, p. 99). Relations between Republican and Democratic women were further strained when partisan differences led to personal animosities. A Ways and Means Committee hearing on health care in March 1994 witnessed a dispute between California Democrat Pete Stark and Nancy Johnson over health care reform, during which Stark asked the Connecticut Republican, whose husband is a physician, if she had acquired her claimed expertise through "pillow talk." Stark apologized for his remark

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later that day, but Republican women Representatives circulated a letter criticizing him for his sexist comments, and observed that when Hillary Clinton had appeared before the committee to discuss the administration's health care bill, no one suggested that she had derived her knowledge of the subject from "pillow talk." The letter was signed by thirty-five Republicans, eleven women and twenty-four men. Democratic women were accused of applying a double standard by failing to sign the letter, and Ohio's Deborah Pryce, who was not a CCWI member, asserted that the women on the other side of the aisle would have been appalled if the remark had been made by a Republican congressman. Some Democrats considered endorsing the statement, but found the reference to Hillary Clinton too partisan. Later, Johnson registered regret that no Democratic women had signed on, but Pat Schroeder and other Democratic w o m e n said that they had never even heard about the letter (Foerstel 1994). Molinari complained that she had received no support from Democratic w o m e n on a bill that would require colleges to inform student rape victims of their right to go to the police. The bill required annual reports documenting the incidence of campus crime so that prospective students and their parents, in assessing colleges, could c o m p a r e the potential dangers present at each. These Democrats, she said, were overly concerned about o f f e n d i n g the committee chair, w h o opposed these measures (Molinari 1998, p. 96). She also blasted the caucus for allowing the abortion issue to become "center stage" and using it as a litmus test for blocking C C W I admission of Republican congressmen who had generally supported their party's pro-life platform. She later recalled: "Little by little, even while I remained active on w o m e n ' s issues, I moved out of the caucus. I was no more interested in spending time with women who bashed men than with men who bashed women. I was no more inclined to use my time fighting Republican-haters than I was to use it fighting women-haters" (Molinari 1998, p. 100). G O P Congresswomen Nancy Johnson and Tillie Fowler (Fla.) also concluded that the caucus had become too partisan. But Republicans were not the only C C W I members to question the g r o u p ' s efficacy. Democrats w h o believed that the C C W I was not sufficiently singleminded and f o r c e f u l also complained. Eva Clayton observed that the women were "not as u n i f i e d " as she had hoped they would be, and although she acknowledged that "in the final analysis that may not be unhealthy, it does mean that y o u ' r e not going to be as effective as you could be." And Barbara Kennelly concluded that the increase in women's membership meant that the time was ripe to form a separate, Democratic

Before the "Republican Revolution": 1993-1994

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w o m e n ' s c a u c u s . " W e should start o n e next year," she said (Christian Science Monitor, July 30, 1993). Friction b e t w e e n black D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n and s o m e white Republican w o m e n also eroded C C W I solidarity. A senior D e m o c r a t i c c o n g r e s s w o m a n r e m a r k e d in an interview: The new w o m e n o f color brought different concerns to the table, and it strained the bipartisan community. T h e s e w o m e n made Republican w o m e n a little u n c o m f o r t a b l e b e c a u s e they were very o u t s p o k e n and very clear about what our agenda should be. It really wasn't that their agenda w a s all that much different than what the C a u c u s had stood for in the past. It w a s just that they were a little a g g r e s s i v e in asserting it . . . and they were w i l l i n g to attack s o m e of the C a u c u s members, asking " H o w c o m e you're hiding on this issue?"

O n e of the new black c o n g r e s s w o m e n o f f e r e d her o w n perspective on c o n f l i c t s within the H o u s e : If I didn't represent what I am, then I w o u l d n ' t be true to m y s e l f and true to the p e o p l e w h o e l e c t e d me. T h e y e l e c t e d m e b e c a u s e I am an A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n w o m a n w h o has a certain set o f life e x p e r i e n c e s that differentiate me from the typical m e m b e r of Congress. Therefore, I bring that to the institution, and the institution is c h a n g e d and enhanced b e c a u s e of the difference I bring. S o if I try to blend in and b e c o m e o n e of them, then that is a disservice to the p e o p l e w h o support me.

T h e s e partisan d i v i s i o n s were not h e l p e d by a C C W I d e c i s i o n to c h a n g e its b y l a w s and r e q u i r e a t w o - y e a r limit on the service of its cochairs. As has been noted, the c h a n g e was sparked by M a x i n e Waters, w h o rightly believed that term limits would give more w o m e n an opportunity to serve as cochair. But a n o t h e r A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n c o n g r e s s w o m a n stated her s u p p o r t f o r the c h a n g e m o r e bluntly. She said in a c o n f i d e n t i a l i n t e r v i e w : "Pat S c h r o e d e r and O l y m p i a S n o w e are w h i t e ladies w h o ran the caucus like their little personal tea party. They set the a g e n d a , they called the meetings, they had the staff. A n d even t h o u g h both of t h e m had the p r o p e r attitude and desire to do right, there was not very m u c h input w e could m a k e . " T h e b y l a w s change meant that S n o w e and Schroeder would be stepping d o w n a f t e r a d e c a d e of p r o v i d i n g m u c h of the glue h o l d i n g the c a u c u s together. T h e y would be replaced in the 104th C o n g r e s s by C o n stance Morella and Nita Lowey, w o m e n w h o had the highest regard for one a n o t h e r and w h o w e r e c o m m i t t e d to a f e m i n i s t a g e n d a . But they had no e x p e r i e n c e in r u n n i n g the c a u c u s . A n d w h e n the C C W I lost its

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space, its f u r n i s h i n g s , and its p e r m a n e n t staff early in 1995, it b e c a m e apparent that the practice of rotating cochairs would i m p e d e the g r o u p ' s ability to make smooth transitions f r o m one C o n g r e s s to the next.

Notes 1. T h e largest increment of n o n i n c u m b e n t w o m e n sent to the H o u s e in a single election b e f o r e 1992 was six, in 1974. 2. T h e t w o f i r s t - t e r m R e p u b l i c a n w o m e n d e c l i n i n g to j o i n the C C W I were J e n n i f e r Dunn (Wash.) and Deborah Pryce (Ohio). This figure e x c l u d e s District of C o l u m b i a d e l e g a t e E l e a n o r H o l m e s N o r t o n , w h o was a nonvoting m e m b e r of the H o u s e and w h o was elected caucus cochair in the 105th Congress. T h e n u m b e r fell to f o r t y - o n e w h e n firstterm Missouri D e m o c r a t Pat D a n n e r resigned f r o m the c a u c u s in mid1994. 3. Lynn Martin of Illinois had held the position f r o m 1985 to 1989, but Martin never j o i n e d the c a u c u s . N a n c y J o h n s o n ' s 1992 c a n d i d a c y for G O P vice chair had been u n s u c c e s s f u l .

4

The Republicans Take Control: 1995-1996

T

he 1994 elections produced a f u n d a m e n t a l change in the H o u s e ' s

composition, leadership, policy orientation, and political culture. The new majority chose as their leaders conservatives who had spent their congressional lives excoriating liberal-leaning Democrats, antagonists whom they believed had been conspicuously uncaring about the frustrations of a " p e r m a n e n t " Republican minority. Although past Democratic leaders had consulted their G O P opposite numbers regularly—compromising occasionally when they needed Republican votes— G O P priorities were largely ignored. Leading the Republican charge was the man nearly everyone believed was responsible for the election o u t c o m e — N e w t Gingrich. For many, Gingrich was arguably the most charismatic figure to emerge on the Washington scene since Ronald Reagan. Moreover, he was able to persuade many Americans that the 1994 election constituted a continuation of a conservative revolution begun by the f o r m e r president. For him, the stunning G O P triumph was the product of an ongoing party realignment that would culminate in the election of a Republican president and even larger Republican congressional majorities in 1996. He believed that a change in the way people thought about government would accompany the realignment and vowed he would "reinvent" government. Gingrich began the process by changing the culture of the House itself. An admirer of the parliamentary form of government, especially as embodied in the leadership of former British prime ministers Winston Churchill and Margaret Thatcher, Gingrich sought to use the Republican House majority to institutionalize and capitalize on partisan differences. For forty years, Republican leaders had grudgingly acknowledged that 57

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they had no choice but to cooperate with D e m o c r a t i c majorities. Gingrich believed this was a failed strategy. He insisted that Republicans had received little of value for their willingness to c o m p r o m i s e . Indeed, the a p p e a r a n c e of b i p a r t i s a n s h i p had g i v e n the voters no basis for distinguishing between the parties—thereby perpetuating D e m o c r a t i c m a j o r i ties. H e w o u l d r e p l a c e the H o u s e ' s m o d u s o p e r a n d i of l a w m a k i n g t h r o u g h d e l i b e r a t i o n with o n e of c a m p a i g n i n g t h r o u g h partisan c o n f r o n t a t i o n , m a g n i f y i n g the issues that d i v i d e d the t w o parties. On the day the Republican-led H o u s e was sworn in, the new Speaker v o w e d he would not c o m p r o m i s e the conservative principles that now constituted his p a r t y ' s m a n d a t e . A n d he e n c o u r a g e d his rank and file to s a c r i f i c e constituency concerns in the interests of party advantage. T h e c o n t e n t of the m a n d a t e w a s e m b e d d e d in the C o n t r a c t with A m e r i c a , a series of ten broad policy proposals virtually all G O P H o u s e c a n d i d a t e s had e n d o r s e d in the w e e k s p r e c e d i n g the election. T h e y i n c l u d e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t s to require a b a l a n c e d b u d g e t and term limits for m e m b e r s of Congress, c h a n g e s in the fiscal relationship b e t w e e n state and f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t s , tort r e f o r m , a s t r e a m l i n e d national security policy, a f u n d a m e n t a l restructuring of tax policies, and a r e v a m p i n g of social security, welfare, and criminal j u s t i c e programs. To achieve these goals within the promised 100 days, Gingrich and his lieutenants had to control virtually every aspect of the legislative process. This meant reshaping the rules by which the H o u s e c o n d u c t e d its business, controlling the composition, scheduling, deliberations, and r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s of H o u s e c o m m i t t e e s , and ensuring that f l o o r debate and roll call votes w o u l d result in p r e d e t e r m i n e d o u t c o m e s . It also m e a n t p r e v e n t i n g the e m e r g e n c e of c o m p e t i n g a g e n d a s , w h e t h e r f r o m the W h i t e H o u s e , the D e m o c r a t s in C o n g r e s s , or legislative service o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( L S O s ) , and G i n g r i c h m o v e d q u i c k l y to m o n o p o l i z e power.

Consolidating Power In the w e e k s immediately f o l l o w i n g the election, the Speaker-designate laid the g r o u n d w o r k for his revolution. A m o n g the objectives claiming his attention, three were particularly important. Gingrich w a n t e d above all to exercise undisputed control over the policy agenda. H e had p r o m ised that the ten items in the C o n t r a c t w o u l d be a d d r e s s e d d u r i n g the first 100 days, and that the H o u s e c o m m i t t e e s responsible for processing a g e n d a items would m o v e with more than ordinary speed.

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S e c o n d , R e p u b l i c a n leaders had to a c k n o w l e d g e their debt to the s e v e n t y - t h r e e f i r s t - t e r m e r s to w h o m they b e l i e v e d they o w e d their majority. T h e f l e d g l i n g l a w m a k e r s m a d e up the second largest g r o u p of majority party n e w c o m e r s since the end of World War II, and their loyalty had to be cultivated and r e i n f o r c e d . All but eight r e p r e s e n t e d districts held by D e m o c r a t s in the 103rd C o n g r e s s , and they r e q u i r e d H o u s e r e c o g n i t i o n a d e q u a t e to v o u c h s a f e their r e e l e c t i o n . G i n g r i c h scheduled weekly lunches with them, and m a d e a point of meeting oneo n - o n e to listen to their c o n c e r n s . T h e S p e a k e r saw to it that most received c o m m i t t e e a s s i g n m e n t s c o m p a t i b l e with district needs, and he reserved a p p o i n t m e n t s to the c h a m b e r ' s most p o w e r f u l panels for those likely to f a c e stiff reelection c h a l l e n g e s . A total of t w e n t y - f o u r w e r e a s s i g n e d to the f i v e most i n f l u e n t i a l c o m m i t t e e s , o n e of w h o m , Enid G r e e n e Waldholtz ( R - U t a h ) , was appointed to the Rules C o m m i t t e e , the first Republican n e w c o m e r to receive that p l u m since 1915. Third, Gingrich sought to capitalize on the devastating defeat dealt to the Democrats and undermine their ability to challenge Republican control of the agenda. Because the G O P majority was smaller than any comm a n d e d by either party since 1954, Republicans had to be highly cohesive if they were to prevail on controversial items, and Democrats had to be denied opportunities to o f f e r policy options attractive to Republicans w h o were less imbued with revolutionary fervor. Failure by Democrats to present viable policy alternatives would augur well for Republicans in the next round of H o u s e elections. T h e G O P would be well positioned to improve on its tenuous majority, discredit a hapless opposition, and create a national political climate conducive to recapturing the White House. To secure these o b j e c t i v e s , G i n g r i c h first had to alter H o u s e and party rules that could be e m p l o y e d to threaten his hegemony. Control of the s t a n d i n g c o m m i t t e e s was crucial to his success, and he m o v e d quickly to o v e r r i d e the seniority c l a i m s of R e p u b l i c a n veterans w h o m he believed could not effectively advance the party's policy goals. Fifthranking B o b Livingston of L o u i s i a n a was tapped to head the A p p r o p r i ations C o m m i t t e e , and w h e n the m o r e s e n i o r J o h n M y e r s of I n d i a n a t h r e a t e n e d to c h a l l e n g e the d e c i s i o n , he w a s told that he w o u l d be denied a s u b c o m m i t t e e chair if he persisted. M y e r s backed off. Californ i a ' s C a r l o s M o o r h e a d , a t w e n t y - t w o - y e a r veteran w h o s e seniority would ordinarily entitle him to chair either the C o m m e r c e or the Judiciary C o m m i t t e e , was denied both, presumably because he would not be a reliable, energetic proponent of the Contract. G i n g r i c h p e r s u a d e d his party to i m p o s e a three-term limit on h o w long a m e m b e r could chair a committee, while simultaneously imposing

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an e i g h t - y e a r limit on his o w n tenure. A c c e l e r a t e d t u r n o v e r of chairs meant that j u n i o r Republicans loyal to the Speaker would accede to top c o m m i t t e e p o s i t i o n s m o r e rapidly. T h e f o u r - t e r m restriction on the S p e a k e r ' s tenure meant that if the R e p u b l i c a n s maintained their m a j o r ity over the next three elections and Gingrich served out his f o u r terms as Speaker, he w o u l d be able to control selection of a new c o h o r t of c o m m i t t e e chairs t w o years b e f o r e he himself would have to relinquish the S p e a k e r s h i p , thereby increasing the likelihood that the c o m m i t t e e s w o u l d c o n t i n u e to h a r v e s t the f r u i t s of the r e v o l u t i o n in the postG i n g r i c h era. R e p u b l i c a n s a g r e e d to these p r o p o s a l s , partly b e c a u s e they believed they would never have gained control of the H o u s e without G i n g r i c h , partly b e c a u s e a n u m b e r of f i r s t - t e r m e r s had m a d e term limits for c o m m i t t e e chairs a plank in their c a m p a i g n platforms, partly because no Republican was forced to give up a position of p o w e r he or she had f o r m e r l y o c c u p i e d , and partly b e c a u s e a c o h e s i v e f r e s h m e n class w o u l d e m p o w e r both the class and the leaders f r o m w h o m they planned to take their cues (Barnett 1999, p. 62). Gingrich also altered the m e a n s by which R e p u b l i c a n s filled c o m mittee vacancies. H e eliminated the long-standing C o m m i t t e e on C o m mittees and replaced it with a "Steering C o m m i t t e e , " a title that implied p o l i c y m a k i n g as well as c o m m i t t e e a s s i g n m e n t responsibilities. T h e C o m m i t t e e on C o m m i t t e e s had been m a d e up of senior R e p u b l i c a n s f r o m the largest states and regional r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , t o g e t h e r with a h a n d f u l of party leaders. State and regional d e l e g a t e s cast w e i g h t e d votes w h o s e m a g n i t u d e was d e t e r m i n e d by the n u m b e r of R e p u b l i c a n controlled H o u s e districts within the areas they represented. Thus, the California representative cast t w e n t y - t w o votes, 11 percent of the total. Party leaders, by contrast, accounted for 6 percent. U n d e r the new system, a total of thirty-one votes would be distributed a m o n g Steering C o m m i t t e e m e m b e r s , with the S p e a k e r ' s vote valued at six, and nine other G O P leaders casting ten m o r e — a majority of the total votes. T h i s m e a n t that no R e p u b l i c a n could be appointed to a c o m m i t t e e w i t h o u t the a p p r o v a l of at least s o m e party leaders. T h e c h a n g e permitted Gingrich to secure valuable assignments for vulnerable f i r s t - t e r m e r s and f o r his loyalists, one of w h o s e roles w o u l d be to prod hesitant chairs to act e x p e d i t i o u s l y and f o r c e t h e m to stay on the R e p u b l i c a n m e s s a g e . An aide to the S p e a k e r r e m a r k e d , "We r e c o n f i g ured [the c o m m i t t e e ] to give N e w t absolute p o w e r " (Drew 1996, p. 37). G i n g r i c h ' s willingness to violate the seniority system and his c o m m a n d of the a s s i g n m e n t p r o c e s s a l l o w e d him to threaten R e p u b l i c a n s with loss of seniority, removal as chair of a c o m m i t t e e or subcommittee,

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or r e m o v a l f r o m a c o m m i t t e e a l t o g e t h e r if they f a i l e d to s u p p o r t the l e a d e r s h i p . B e f o r e the new C o n g r e s s c o n v e n e d , he d e m a n d e d written assurances f r o m all c o m m i t t e e chairs and f r o m the thirteen " c a r d i n a l s " c h a i r i n g A p p r o p r i a t i o n s s u b c o m m i t t e e s that they w o u l d support the Contract with A m e r i c a . He told s o m e rank-and-file m e m b e r s they were granted one c h a n c e to deviate f r o m the party line. A second " m i s t a k e " would exact denial of a place on a c o n f e r e n c e c o m m i t t e e or a task f o r c e (Drew 1996, p. 57). Later, he a d v i s e d s o m e w a v e r i n g R e p u b l i c a n s on the A g r i c u l t u r e C o m m i t t e e that he would r e m o v e t h e m f r o m the panel, and even recruit primary o p p o n e n t s to run against t h e m in the next election, if they continued to ignore leadership voting cues (Drew 1996, p. 180). As the new C o n g r e s s w o r k e d its will, the S p e a k e r f u r t h e r placed his s t a m p on the c o m m i t t e e process by establishing timetables each panel was to follow, controlling the size and character of c o m m i t t e e staffs, and d e t e r m i n i n g the a m o u n t of m o n e y available to each c o m m i t t e e to c o n d u c t its business, all the while monitoring c o m m i t t e e c o m p l i a n c e . But Gingrich was prepared to circumvent c o m m i t t e e s if he believed they were going off course or dragging their feet. He f o r m e d a S p e a k e r ' s A d v i s o r y G r o u p ( S A G ) m a d e up of his closest c o n f i d a n t s to c o n s i d e r the entire range of issues facing the new majority. This g r o u p approved a p p o i n t m e n t of R e p u b l i c a n task f o r c e s to study and m a k e policy reco m m e n d a t i o n s on issues cutting across c o m m i t t e e j u r i s d i c t i o n s ( D r e w 1996, p. 37). W h e n suspicious of the direction a c o m m i t t e e was taking, G i n g r i c h created a task f o r c e to c o n s i d e r i n d e p e n d e n t l y the legislative m e a s u r e in question and generate a proposal he believed would be more in keeping with preferences of the rank and file—particularly G O P firstand second-termers. T h e S A G also settled d i s p u t e s about w h e t h e r p r o p o s e d legislation was consistent with the G O P m a n d a t e . Bills sent to c o m m i t t e e s s o m e times arrived with an injunction against language changes. W h e n s o m e w e r e , in fact, m o d i f i e d , party leaders ignored the c o m m i t t e e - a p p r o v e d version and restored the original language. Judiciary chair Henry Hyde, w h o s e c o m m i t t e e was responsible for considering one-half of the items in the Contract, referred to himself as the " s u b c h a i r m a n , " often clearing c o m m i t t e e d e c i s i o n s with party leaders. Later, one R e p u b l i c a n c o m plained, " B e i n g a C h a i r m a n in the N e w t C o n g r e s s m e a n s not being in the r o o m w h e n deals are d o n e " (Cook 1996). Like D e m o c r a t i c leaders b e f o r e him, G i n g r i c h m a d e extensive use of the R u l e s C o m m i t t e e as an i n s t r u m e n t f o r s h a p i n g the m e a s u r e s r e p o r t e d f o r d e b a t e . B e c a u s e c o m m i t t e e s w e r e w o r k i n g at b r e a k n e c k

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speed, often holding cursory hearings (or none at all), and because measures emerging f r o m them were frequently loaded down with illconsidered, technically flawed provisions, the legislative product was vulnerable to challenge during floor debate. Consequently, Gingrich and his lieutenants freely altered committee-approved language and sent the revised measures to a generally accommodating if not compliant Rules Committee. The Rules Committee, in turn, had more than the usual number of opportunities to be creative. During the 100 days, Gingrich allowed and even encouraged members to attach riders to hastily approved appropriations bills. Many were directed against policies considered too liberal by recent G O P arrivals, and the House defunded or limited programs authorized only weeks earlier. In this way, restrictions were imposed on abortions, and environmental regulations—and some social programs—were vitiated. Most of the riders were later dropped by the Senate, vetoed by the president, or subsequently defeated in the House. But they proved to be a useful instrument by which Gingrich satisfied the goals of his more revolutionary supporters when committees were apparently not doing their bidding. Most new Republicans were staunchly conservative on economic issues, and they had sworn to cut federal spending for welfare and other entitlement programs. They were also determined to reduce the size and intrusiveness of the Washington bureaucracy, and to cut taxes. G O P first-termers were socially conservative as well, eager to end abortion, promote prayer in public school, allow use of federal funds for private and church-related schools, and reverse the growing acceptance of unconventional sexual orientations. Gingrich made it clear that he, too, supported these goals, but persuaded his revolutionaries to delay introduction of their social agenda until after the e c o n o m i c and political objectives in the Contract were realized (Rae 1998, p. 9). Predisposed to support the Speaker, the new m e m b e r s agreed, and they exhibited unusual party cohesion in the early months of the 104th Congress. During the first session, a majority of one party voted against a majority of the other party on more than seven of ten roll calls, and the mean party unity score for Republicans rose to 93 percent (Owens 1996). Destruction of Democratic influence in the House was arguably Gingrich's most successful initiative. Already shell-shocked and demoralized by the suddenness and magnitude of their loss, Democrats were further weakened by significant changes in the H o u s e ' s structure and procedures. Without consulting Democrats, the new majority eliminated three standing committees, all of which served predominantly D e m o cratic constituencies. Gone was the Committee on Merchant Marine and

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Fisheries, a panel of special interest to mostly D e m o c r a t i c coastal districts. At the same time, responsibilities of the District of C o l u m b i a and Post O f f i c e and Civil Service C o m m i t t e e s w e r e shifted to the G o v e r n ment R e f o r m and O v e r s i g h t C o m m i t t e e ( k n o w n until then as the G o v e r n m e n t O p e r a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e ) , w h i c h m e a n t that D . C . r e s i d e n t s , postal w o r k e r s , and other f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t e m p l o y e e s w o u l d h a v e less direct access to H o u s e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . T h e y could no longer count on the u n d i v i d e d attention of H o u s e p a n e l s e n j o y i n g a m o n o p o l y on matters affecting them. A c o m m i t t e e n a m e - c h a n g e dealt a b l o w to a n o t h e r D e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u e n c y w h e n the t e r m " L a b o r " w a s d e l e t e d f r o m the title of a c o m m i t t e e k n o w n until then as E d u c a t i o n and L a b o r . T h e panel w a s r e n a m e d E c o n o m i c and E d u c a t i o n a l O p p o r t u n i t y . At the s a m e time, o v e r w h e l m i n g l y D e m o c r a t i c large cities lost b o t h r e c o g n i t i o n and political clout w h e n the C o m m i t t e e on B a n k i n g , Currency, and U r b a n A f f a i r s b e c a m e the C o m m i t t e e on B a n k i n g and F i n a n c i a l S e r v i c e s . B a r b a r a - R o s e Collins ( D - M i c h . ) , a central-city black c o n g r e s s w o m a n w h o had b e e n a m e m b e r of the c o m m i t t e e , r e m a r k e d : " A s s o o n as I saw the c h a n g e , I k n e w I w o u l d no l o n g e r be a b l e to h e l p the p e o p l e I r e p r e s e n t e d . " T h e s e and other n a m e c h a n g e s , she said, w e r e d e s i g n e d to r e f l e c t the p r i o r i t i e s of the n e w m a j o r i t y , but by a d o p t i n g t h e m b e f o r e i n f o r m i n g D e m o c r a t i c leaders, R e p u b l i c a n s w e r e also d i s p l a y ing c o n t e m p t for the new minority. T h e R e p u b l i c a n d r i v e to cut g o v e r n m e n t s p e n d i n g i n c l u d e d proposed reductions in the size of H o u s e o f f i c e and c o m m i t t e e staffs. Ultim a t e l y the n u m b e r of p o s i t i o n s a l l o c a t e d to H o u s e m e m b e r s to staff Washington and district o f f i c e s r e m a i n e d u n c h a n g e d , in spite of a f r e s h men-led e f f o r t to cut them. But c o m m i t t e e staffs were cut by one-third. A n d while, in principle, both parties w o u l d suffer, R e p u b l i c a n s c o u l d anticipate large net increases in most c o m m i t t e e staff at the s a m e time that D e m o c r a t s experienced devastating losses. T h e r e a s o n s f o r this a s y m m e t r i c o u t c o m e w e r e r o o t e d in grossly unequal allocation of staff resources that had obtained in past years. For e x a m p l e , in the 103rd C o n g r e s s , 82 of the 100 W a y s and M e a n s C o m m i t t e e staff w e r e D e m o c r a t i c a p p o i n t e e s . In the 104th, the total staff size was cut to 75, with 50 to be appointed by Republicans. As a result, 57 D e m o c r a t i c appointees lost their j o b s while Republicans were able to add 32 n e w aides. L o s s of D e m o c r a t i c staff s u p p o r t w a s particularly debilitating b e c a u s e of the s w e e p i n g policy p r o p o s a l s their d i m i n i s h e d ranks would be forced to c o n f r o n t and b e c a u s e of the procedural shortcuts the new majority would later adopt to process legislation.

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Bills e m b o d y i n g Contract goals were rushed through c o m m i t t e e and o n t o the floor, o f t e n with no hearings. T h e r e was little opportunity for e f f e c t i v e dissent and e v e n m a n y R e p u b l i c a n s w e r e not f u l l y a w a r e of the implications of the m e a s u r e s they were approving. Proposed constitutional a m e n d m e n t s received less attention than ordinary laws had in the past, and m a n y of the bills d e b a t e d had never r e c e i v e d c o m m i t t e e approval. A G O P leader later r e m a r k e d : " [ T h e opposition] was still o f f b a l a n c e f r o m the surprising election returns . . . and w e n e e d e d to c h a n g e the t e r m s of the d e b a t e definitively b e f o r e [they] . . . c o u l d be e f f e c t i v e in the m i n o r i t y " (Molinari 1998, p. 180). O n e D e m o c r a t i c Judiciary C o m m i t t e e aide observed: We'd have a one-day hearing on a constitutional amendment and then w e ' d be voting on it in the full committee the next day. . . . We didn't have the votes to try to change things we saw as egregious errors, not necessarily policy differences, but things we thought were ill-conceived. . . . We would point things out saying, "This just doesn't work" or "I don't think this is what you intended to do," or "There are problems here that you are not accounting for." And very often they replied "Sorry, we can't worry about that now. The Senate will fix it."

C i r c u m v e n t i o n of traditional p r o c e d u r e s d e p r i v e d b a c k b e n c h Republicans, as well as D e m o c r a t s , of their best c h a n c e to i n f l u e n c e policy. O n e reason f o r the haste w a s to meet the 100-day t i m e t a b l e f o r passage of the Contract. A n o t h e r was to prevent D e m o c r a t s f r o m organizing a national opposition to a menu of ten priorities that most A m e r i c a n s had never heard of w h e n they cast ballots in the 1994 election (New York Times, N o v e m b e r 10, 1994). O n e first-term D e m o c r a t c o m mented on the treatment D e m o c r a t s on her c o m m i t t e e received f r o m the c o m m i t t e e chair: " T h e C h a i r m a n was really a gentleman, but the ranking m e m b e r was not a l l o w e d to get a n y t h i n g p a s s e d . N o t h i n g . A n d many times we w e r e n ' t even recognized to speak. That was the atmosp h e r e . T h e w h o l e a t m o s p h e r e was, ' W e ' v e got to get e v e n . A f t e r 4 0 years w e ' v e got to show these p e o p l e . ' " R e p u b l i c a n s a d o p t e d t w o other practices that put D e m o c r a t s at a d i s a d v a n t a g e . First, they e l i m i n a t e d p r o x y voting, an a r r a n g e m e n t w h e r e b y majority party c o m m i t t e e m e m b e r s delegated to their c o m m i t tee chair the authority to cast their votes in the event that they were not present f o r c o m m i t t e e roll call votes. For years, D e m o c r a t i c H o u s e m e m b e r s had given blanket approval to chairs to cast proxy votes, and m a n y i n t r a c o m m i t t e e d i s p u t e s w e r e d e c i d e d by D e m o c r a t s w h o w e r e not present. T h e new R e p u b l i c a n l e a d e r s h i p b a n n e d the practice,

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required m e m b e r s to be present if they w a n t e d their votes to count, and ordered that c o m m i t t e e attendance and the "yeas and n a y s " be recorded. T h i s policy a f f e c t e d R e p u b l i c a n s as well as D e m o c r a t s , and the former were just as i n c o n v e n i e n c e d as the latter as they hurried back and forth b e t w e e n the c o m m i t t e e s to which they were assigned and b e t w e e n c o m m i t t e e meeting r o o m s and the H o u s e floor. M e m b e r s suffered f r o m a w o r k o v e r l o a d as d e m a n d s on their time m o u n t e d , and they w e r e s o m e t i m e s e x p e c t e d to be in t w o (or three) p l a c e s at the s a m e time ( D r e w 1996, p. 99). But D e m o c r a t s w e r e e s p e c i a l l y i n c o n v e n i e n c e d b e c a u s e they did not control H o u s e and c o m m i t t e e a g e n d a s , and bec a u s e they w e r e w o r k i n g with d i m i n i s h e d c o m m i t t e e s t a f f s . T h e i r efforts to rebut and o f f e r substitutes to R e p u b l i c a n m e a s u r e s were h a m pered by insufficient time, expertise, and opportunity. G i n g r i c h a l s o o r d e r e d that the f i f t e e n - m i n u t e t i m e p e r i o d d u r i n g w h i c h m e m b e r s w e r e r e q u i r e d to arrive on the H o u s e f l o o r to v o t e — a f t e r the s o u n d i n g of bells s i g n a l i n g a roll c a l l — b e strictly e n f o r c e d , albeit with a t w o - m i n u t e grace period. This rule was put in place a f t e r the H o u s e , years earlier, had adopted electronic voting, but D e m o c r a t i c leaders had been casual about observing it. T h e y allowed m o r e time for m e m b e r s to arrive on the floor, and used the a d d e d m i n u t e s to p e r s u a d e w a v e r i n g rank and file to s u p p o r t party p o s i t i o n s . B e l i e v i n g that R e p u b l i c a n s w o u l d be m o r e c o h e s i v e than the D e m o c r a t s , but m i n d f u l of his n a r r o w m a j o r i t y , G i n g r i c h w a s d e t e r m i n e d to give the D e m o cratic leaders less time to switch votes within either their or his party and t h e r e b y r e v e r s e w h a t w o u l d o t h e r w i s e be a G O P victory ( D r e w 1996, p. 148). But the most p e r v a s i v e threat to D e m o c r a t i c l e v e r a g e was the exclusion of their leaders f r o m d e c i s i o n m a k i n g councils. W h e n D e m o crats d o m i n a t e d the House, they sought frequently to h a m m e r out bipartisan c o m p r o m i s e s , with leaders of the two parties c o n f e r r i n g regularly, and with c o m m i t t e e chairs and r a n k i n g m i n o r i t y m e m b e r s w o r k i n g together closely. On m a n y if not most issues, D e m o c r a t s i m p o s e d their will on a frustrated minority, but bipartisanship was a strategic premise even if not a l w a y s realized. By contrast, Gingrich arrogated p o w e r to himself in a m a n n e r rarely seen in the twentieth century. And he delighted in rubbing salt in D e m o crats' w o u n d s . P h o n e calls to the S p e a k e r f r o m minority leader Richard G e p h a r d t w e n t u n r e t u r n e d , and G i n g r i c h strongly urged R e p u b l i c a n c o m m i t t e e and s u b c o m m i t t e e chairs not to w o r k with or consult their D e m o c r a t i c opposite n u m b e r s . W h e n c o m m i t t e e chairs and Republican m o d e r a t e s were invited to the W h i t e H o u s e to meet with the president,

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they were told by Gingrich to reject all such invitations, at least through the first 100 days (Drew 1996, p. 61). Driven by his belief that "politics is bloodless war," Gingrich had come to despise the Democrats and to treat them as mortal adversaries. He rejected the norm of "collegiality" that had often, even if not always, characterized the relationship between the two House parties, and he viewed congressional politics as a zero-sum game. To win, you had to destroy rather than placate or accommodate the opposition. The implications of these developments for the effectiveness and even survival of the Congressional Caucus for W o m e n ' s Issues were far-reaching. Forced to work on the margins of political p o w e r even under the best of circumstances, the C C W I would now have to try to promote its agenda under conditions more problematical than even during the Reagan era. This bipartisan organization would have to adjust to a House in which partisanship has become the defining imperative. It would have to work with a House leadership that had replaced accommodation and cooperation with confrontation and vilification. It would have to c o m e to terms with a monolithic power structure that had replaced one allowing for multiple access points. Caucus leaders' efforts would be further complicated by their need to appeal to a large group of new Republicans whose commitment to a conservative agenda was as strong as any exhibited in recent years, whose collective experience in legislative settings was minimal, whose impatience with c o m p r o m i s e and the give-and-take of the bargaining process became f a m o u s , and whose contempt for the federal government and its programs was unabaiting. And they would have to try to inspire C C W I members and promote the feminist agenda while the Republican legislative schedule was extracting every ounce of intellectual and emotional energy f r o m members who also had constituency, committee, and personal demands to worry about. Thus the portents were not favorable for an informal House group that was most successful when a bipartisan spirit of a c c o m m o d a t i o n and civility prevailed, when majority party leaders and c o m m i t t e e s were willing to take seriously a smorgasbord of relatively inexpensive, progressive proposals that expanded the role of the federal government, when pragmatic rather than ideological values s u f f u s e d House debate, and when m e m b e r s were prepared to subordinate partisan necessity to constituency interests and problem solving. C a u c u s prospects became bleaker still when the new majority eliminated legislative service organizations.

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Abolishing the LSOs A m o n t h b e f o r e the n e w C o n g r e s s c o n v e n e d , R e p u b l i c a n leaders decided to rid the H o u s e of legislative service organizations. T h e decision did not require a vote of the full H o u s e i n a s m u c h as regulation of L S O s had been delegated to the H o u s e Administration C o m m i t t e e , and especially to the c o m m i t t e e chair. For years, D e m o c r a t s had exercised a virtual m o n o p o l y on accreditation of new LSOs, on their f u n d i n g , accounting, and reporting procedures, and on the ground rules under which they o p e r a t e d . F r o m the time N o r t h C a r o l i n a ' s C h a r l i e R o s e b e c a m e c o m mittee chair, he had brooked little interference in the supervision of the H o u s e groups. In January 1995 the c o m m i t t e e ' s n a m e was c h a n g e d to H o u s e Oversight, and R o s e w a s replaced by R e p u b l i c a n William T h o m a s of California, w h o now c o m m a n d e d a five-to-three G O P majority on the panel. A m o n g the other R e p u b l i c a n s on the c o m m i t t e e w a s Pat R o b e r t s of K a n s a s , a strident critic of the L S O s w h o had d e v o t e d m o r e than a d e c a d e trying to i m p o s e stricter r e g u l a t i o n s on their activities and f i n a n c i n g . Just w e e k s into the new C o n g r e s s , the c o m m i t t e e f o r m a l l y stripped the L S O s of the o f f i c e space assigned t h e m on Capitol Hill. It also barred H o u s e m e m b e r s f r o m p o o l i n g p o r t i o n s of their a n n u a l $ 5 5 7 , 4 0 0 c l e r k - h i r e f u n d s to pay L S O staffs, and f r o m u s i n g part of their $ 1 2 2 , 5 0 0 o f f i c e e x p e n s e allowance to pay for L S O e q u i p m e n t and supplies. Denied space, staff, and equipment, the L S O s officially passed f r o m the scene, although T h o m a s assured their m e m b e r s they could reorganize as congressional m e m b e r s h i p organizations ( C M O s ) — j o i n i n g m o r e than 100 i n f o r m a l H o u s e g r o u p s o p e r a t i n g w i t h o u t direct b e n e f i t of public f u n d s . M e m b e r s could continue to meet regularly in H o u s e space to discuss business, but coordination of g r o u p activities was expected to be carried out by the p e r s o n a l o f f i c e staff of m e m b e r s w h o o c c u p i e d C M O leadership positions. Even for some Democrats, the c h a n g e was long o v e r d u e — a l t h o u g h m a n y f a v o r e d f u n d a m e n t a l r e f o r m to outright elimination. Reports of L S O financial abuses had surfaced regularly. Collectively they had spent $35 million in the preceding decade and, according to Roberts, more than $7.7 million had never been accounted for. Moreover, financial reporting deadlines were chronically ignored (Love 1994). Receipts for $10,000 in petty cash controlled by the C o n g r e s s i o n a l Black C a u c u s could not be f o u n d , for example, and Gingrich remarked that the sloppiness of L S O

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accounting procedures was another "scandal waiting to explode." He and other critics compared the irregularities to the Bank and Post Office scandals that had earlier embarrassed the Democratic leadership and cost scores of Republicans, as well as Democrats, their House seats (.Atlanta Constitution, December 7, 1994). Some LSOs used funds allotted to them to cover food and entertainment expenditures that the offices of individual m e m b e r s were not allowed to spend. The New York State LSO, for example, spent $1,620 on three lunches in the spring of 1993, and $2,646 on gifts for retiring House members and staff (Jacoby 1993b). Critics also claimed that LSOs promoted the interests of parochial elements within the society rather than helping Congress foster a broader vision for the country as a whole. "LSOs are specialization run amok," said one former congressman. They take "solution-seeking away from the committees and put it in the hands of advocacy groups," thereby serving as "outsider's inside groups" (New York Times, December 7, 1994). Some Republican ire was directed against L S O staff members, who over the years had aggressively resisted restrictions on C C W I activities, and against Rose, who was seen as high-handed and excessively partisan. They believed the North Carolinian had too often ignored Republican recommendations to reform the LSOs, and that some of his decisions were arbitrary. In 1993 he approved formation of three LSOs devoted to social issues—hunger; narcotics abuse; and children, youth, and f a m i l i e s — b u t claimed budgetary constraints a year later when denying accreditation to three other potential LSOs to which he was less sympathetic—constitutional issues; national defense; and terrorism and unconventional warfare (Jacoby 1994e). But the most serious charge leveled against LSOs concerned the intimate ties nine of them had to nonprofit "foundations." These outside organizations bore names similar to the caucuses, their boards of directors were made up of caucus members, but spending by the foundations was not subject to congressional control. They raised money from foreign as well as domestic sources, and their f u n d s were often spent to hire staff and underwrite travel, entertainment, and campaign costs of House members in ways that, if the caucuses had spent them, would have violated House rules (Jacoby 1993d). During the Gulf War, for example, the Congressional Human Rights Caucus held a hearing on Iraqi atrocities in Kuwait at the same time that its affiliated Congressional Human Rights Foundation was taking $50,000 from a front group for the Kuwaiti government (Jacoby 1994a). The subcommittee on Africa, on which several members of the Congressional

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Black C a u c u s served, a p p r o v e d a n o n b i n d i n g resolution r e c o g n i z i n g a claim to the presidency by a Nigerian political leader w h o f u n n e l e d tens of t h o u s a n d s in contributions to the Congressional Black C a u c u s F o u n dation. T h e F o u n d a t i o n ' s board of directors included eleven m e m b e r s of the H o u s e c a u c u s , o n e of w h o m w a s the b o a r d c h a i r (Jacoby 1993c). A n d m e m b e r s of the C o n g r e s s i o n a l H i s p a n i c C a u c u s served on the b o a r d of the C o n g r e s s i o n a l H i s p a n i c C a u c u s Institute w h e n the latter asked c o r p o r a t i o n s for a $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 f e e to j o i n its " C o n g r e s s i o n a l Circle." O n e b e n e f i t of m e m b e r s h i p was private l u n c h e o n s with H i s p a n i c R e p resentatives (Roll Call, July 29, 1993). S o m e steps had b e e n taken to end t h e s e a b u s e s . In July 1993 the H o u s e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n C o m m i t t e e a d o p t e d new regulations to i m p r o v e o v e r s i g h t of L S O s . T h e y w e r e p l a c e d u n d e r the s u p e r v i s i o n of the H o u s e F i n a n c e O f f i c e ( H F O ) , eliminating extracongressional individual b a n k a c c o u n t s , and all e x p e n s e s w o u l d h a v e to be d o c u m e n t e d w h e n r e i m b u r s e m e n t v o u c h e r s w e r e s u b m i t t e d to the H F O . T h e y c o u l d not s p e n d m o r e than $ 2 , 5 0 0 a n n u a l l y on f o o d and b e v e r a g e s , and they would have to submit annual b u d g e t and activity reports to the A d m i n istration C o m m i t t e e chair. T h e reports w o u l d h a v e to a f f i r m that the L S O p r o v i d e d its m e m b e r s with " b o n a f i d e research and/or legislative service or a s s i s t a n c e " b e f o r e it c o u l d be r e c e r t i f i e d . In the m e a n t i m e , the full H o u s e a p p r o v e d a m e a s u r e s p o n s o r e d by C C W I m e m b e r Jan M e y e r s ( R - K a n s . ) to give L S O staff the s a m e f r i n g e b e n e f i t s e n j o y e d by m e m b e r s ' o f f i c e staffs, i n c l u d i n g c o v e r a g e u n d e r the Federal E m p l o y m e n t Retirement system. T h e staff would now be paid through the House Finance Office. But the c h a n g e s did little to r e g u l a t e the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the L S O s and their c o m p a n i o n f o u n d a t i o n s . R e p u b l i c a n d e m a n d s that the full A d m i n i s t r a t i o n C o m m i t t e e , not j u s t the chair, a p p r o v e b u d g e t requests were rejected by C h a i r m a n Rose and c o m m i t t e e D e m o c r a t s , as was a p r o p o s a l f o r r a n d o m audits of L S O b o o k s by the G e n e r a l A c c o u n t i n g O f f i c e . M e a s u r e s to require r e c e r t i f i c a t i o n of L S O s every t w o years, to prohibit t h e m f r o m a f f i l i a t i n g with o u t s i d e f o u n d a t i o n s , and to p r e v e n t o u t s i d e o r g a n i z a t i o n s f r o m a d o p t i n g n a m e s similar to their c o m p a n i o n L S O s were also d e f e a t e d . Even if these r e f o r m s had been adopted, chances are that the L S O s would have been eliminated as soon as they were no longer under D e m o cratic (and R o s e ' s ) protection. T h e i r potential threat to the R e p u b l i c a n agenda, the blatant abuses that had by then b e c o m e c o m m o n knowledge, and the possibility of future scandal were persuasive reasons to terminate them forthwith. Critics also claimed that L S O elimination would result

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in ninety-six f e w e r staff to pay, sixteen more offices on Capitol Hill that w o u l d b e c o m e available f o r m o r e w o r t h w h i l e p u r p o s e s , and $5.5 million in savings derived f r o m the sale of a building then h o u s i n g L S O s (New York Times, D e c e m b e r 7, 1994). To a p h a l a n x of first-term revolutionaries obsessed with the need to cut spending, these prospects were irresistible. D e f e n d e r s of the L S O s f o u g h t a losing battle to p r e s e r v e t h e m . Black, Hispanic, and w o m e n H o u s e m e m b e r s interpreted the decision as an assault on diversity in C o n g r e s s , and, a c c o r d i n g to the head of the Black Caucus, as an attempt to disempower their constituencies "through racial, ethnic, and g e n d e r c l e a n s i n g . " Under the new rules, these groups w o u l d h a v e d i f f i c u l t y d e v e l o p i n g and articulating policy p o s i t i o n s at o d d s with t h o s e p r e s e n t e d by H o u s e c o m m i t t e e s that had traditionally treated t h e m as "other." T h e r a n k i n g D e m o c r a t on the A p p r o p r i a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e , David Obey, charged that eliminating the D e m o c r a t i c Study G r o u p ( D S G ) would give the majority party a m o n o p o l y on legislative i n f o r m a t i o n in the 104th C o n g r e s s . H e said, "I d o n ' t h a v e a p r o b l e m with centralized p o w e r within an institution, but centralizing i n f o r m a tion is a very d a n g e r o u s thing. It invites manipulation of i n f o r m a t i o n by c o m m i t t e e s , it invites rationing of i n f o r m a t i o n " (Love 1994). S u p p o r t e r s of the C C W I w e r e no less vocal. O u t g o i n g C C W I cochair Pat Schroeder said, "It is ironic that one of the first initiatives of the n e w R e p u b l i c a n l e a d e r s h i p . . . is to abolish the o n e o r g a n i z a t i o n that exists to give w o m e n a s t r o n g e r voice in the policy p r o c e s s . " Republican O l y m p i a S n o w e , w h o was also relinquishing her leadership role in the caucus, was more circumspect i n a s m u c h as her party had at long last g a i n e d control of the H o u s e . N o n e t h e l e s s , in r e m a r k s s o m e c o n s i d e r e d a eulogy, she said, " T h e legislative c h a n g e s p u s h e d by w o m e n m e m b e r s of C o n g r e s s touched the lives of every w o m a n and her f a m i l y in the c o u n t r y t h r o u g h e x p a n d e d r e s e a r c h on w o m e n ' s health, better p r o t e c t i o n against d o m e s t i c v i o l e n c e and sexual assault, and i m p r o v e d e c o n o m i c opportunities for w o m e n " (St. Louis Post Dispatch, D e c e m b e r 28, 1994). Schroeder took particular issue with Pat R o b e r t s ' s charge that L S O s spent public f u n d s irresponsibly, eating and drinking their way through public relations events at the e x p e n s e of the U.S. Treasury. Roberts had told a reporter that elimination of the L S O s would m e a n there would be " n o m o r e l a u g h i n g and c h o r t l i n g , no m o r e p a s s i n g the g o o d i e s out b e h i n d closed d o o r s . " S c h r o e d e r ' s r e j o i n d e r noted that the C C W I , w h o s e m e m b e r s h i p totaled 160, had spent $ 1 6 2 . 5 0 during the first f i f teen m o n t h s of the 103rd C o n g r e s s . " B y c o m p a r i s o n , " she told Roberts,

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" y o u r o f f i c e spent $ 1 , 5 2 1 . 1 7 , a l m o s t 10 t i m e s w h a t the C C W I s p e n t " (Chicago Tribune, January 8, 1995). I n c o m i n g D e m o c r a t i c cochair Nita L o w e y tried to put the best f a c e on the diminution of C C W I resources: " T h e y can abolish our Caucus, but they cannot ignore our a g e n d a " (New York Times, D e c e m b e r 7, 1994). In the 104th Congress, the R e p u b l i c a n majority d e m o n s t r a t e d how unprophetic she could be.

The Revolutionaries N o t all G O P f r e s h m e n in the 104th C o n g r e s s explicitly targeted the f e m i n i s t a g e n d a , but their priorities, intensity, and political h e f t c o m bined to threaten the C C W I ' s past a c h i e v e m e n t s and to block new initiatives at a l m o s t every turn. First, they had strength in n u m b e r s . T h e s e v e n t y - t h r e e new R e p u b l i c a n s elected in 1994 m a d e up the largest class of majority party n e w c o m e r s since 1974, w h e n s e v e n t y - f i v e D e m ocratic first-termers c a m e to Washington f o l l o w i n g the Watergate scandal. Second, because sixty-five of the seventy-three had either d e f e a t e d D e m o c r a t i c i n c u m b e n t s or captured a seat vacated by a D e m o c r a t , and b e c a u s e no R e p u b l i c a n H o u s e or Senate i n c u m b e n t had been d e f e a t e d , G O P f r e s h m e n considered partisan c o m b a t to be part of their mandate. Third, they were politically inexperienced. Nearly 60 percent were under the age of forty-five, and while more than 60 percent had served in federal, state, or local o f f i c e (Rae 1998, p. 66), only 42 percent had been elected to their o f f i c e s — c o m p a r e d with 62 percent of the holdover Republicans. A m o n g those with political experience, eighteen had been m e m b e r s of l a w m a k i n g b o d i e s , but only seven had b e e n part of a R e p u b l i c a n m a j o r i t y responsible f o r r u n n i n g and controlling a legislature (Fenno 1997, p. 23). T h e inexperience of so m a n y was not coincid e n t a l . N e w t G i n g r i c h had s u c c e e d e d in r e c r u i t i n g b u s i n e s s - o r i e n t e d political a m a t e u r s w h o were d e t e r m i n e d to cut spending and taxes, and get g o v e r n m e n t off the backs of entrepreneurs. T h e c o m b a t i v e Georgian w a s not interested in attracting c a n d i d a t e s skilled in political negotiation and c o m p r o m i s e . Instead, he w a n t e d c o n s e r v a t i v e s w h o had the courage of their convictions, w h o were idealists, and w h o would reject p r a g m a t i c solutions (Barnett 1999, p. 137). F o u r t h , the new g r o u p d e v e l o p e d an a f f i n i t y with the f o r t y - t h r e e R e p u b l i c a n s initially elected to the H o u s e in 1992 ( D r e w 1996, p. 27). W h i l e m a n y of the latter were more politically experienced and less radical than the 104th R e p u b l i c a n class, they were collectively m o r e conservative than the H o u s e m e m b e r s they had replaced ( D o n o v a n 1994),

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and they shared the ideological and policy predilections of the Republicans who came after them. Most members of both classes were committed to internal reform and the restructuring of government priorities. In fact, G O P first-termers in 1993 had perhaps unwittingly given Washington a taste of what it could expect two years later. In the weeks following the 1992 election, for example, their votes had been pivotal in electing Texan Dick Armey as chair of the Republican Conference, defeating California moderate Jerry Lewis. They had also helped establish a six-year limit on how long a Republican could serve as ranking m e m b e r of a standing committee (Donovan 1992). And most had favored constitutional amendments requiring a balanced budget and a line-item veto for presidents (Duncan 1992). John Linder of Georgia, who was later handpicked by Gingrich to chair the National Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, remarked at the time, " W e ' v e moved the Republican Conference to the right" (Donovan 1992). Together, the freshman and sophomore Republican classes made up one-half of their party's House membership in the 104th Congress, and while there was considerable diversity between and among the two classes, c o m m o n political experiences trumped whatever differences divided them. They had developed their political sensibilities during the Reagan administration, many had been inspired to run by Newt Gingrich, and almost all believed in the wisdom embodied in the Contract with America. Finally, freshmen class members shared a strong sense of community. They bonded with one another because their candidacies had emerged out of common policy orientations and because they were critical of how Washington was addressing the country's problems. They had campaigned using similar national themes, even b e f o r e they pledged fidelity to the Contract, and the euphoria triggered by their historic political victory, together with a conscious awareness of their extraordinary collective achievement, reinforced the sense of mission they brought to Washington. Feelings of community and common cause were buttressed, in turn, by their treatment as "a unique collectivity" by the press and by their colleagues (Barnett 1999, p. 62). For the CCWI, this large collection of cohesive, politically inexperienced Reagan conservatives committed to a Contract whose clauses ignored or subverted most of the c a u c u s ' s goals was devastating. According to a caucus member, one of the most consequential attributes of the new class was its legislative and representative inexperience. She said:

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Many new members come from vocations which did not require them to deal with people who are different f r o m themselves; people who have different perspectives, different experiences, and different backgrounds, and they bring a tunnel vision to the legislative process. Another casualty is the personal relationships that usually develop between members after they come to the Hill. Throughout the 104th Congress, they never established the bi-partisan links that help build consensus and make good legislation possible.

E v e n s o m e v e t e r a n R e p u b l i c a n s v i e w e d their n e w c o l l e a g u e s insulated, s o m e t i m e s arrogant g r o u p . O n e r e m a r k e d , " [ F o r t h e m ] is no o t h e r way but t h e i r way. T h e i r lack of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n is p r o b l e m . T h e y d o n ' t realize you have to f o r m a m a j o r i t y " ( D r e w p. 174).

as an there a big 1996,

N o single p o s t e l e c t i o n e v e n t p r e s a g e d the u n y i e l d i n g i d e o l o g i c a l mind-set of the revolutionaries more than their rejection of an invitation f r o m H a r v a r d ' s K e n n e d y School of G o v e r n m e n t to attend a w e e k - l o n g policy orientation in C a m b r i d g e . T h e decision had important symbolic, as well as practical c o n s e q u e n c e s . For years, f r e s h m e n m e m b e r s of both parties had j o u r n e y e d to C a m b r i d g e a month after their election to hear specialists in d o m e s t i c and f o r e i g n policy discuss issues the new C o n gress was likely to address. T h e speakers were normally a c a d e m i c s and advisers to p r e v i o u s administrations, w h o together p r o v i d e d s o m e ideological balance. A f t e r the 1992 election, three conservative o r g a n i z a t i o n s — t h e Heritage F o u n d a t i o n , the Free C o n g r e s s F o u n d a t i o n , and the F a m i l y Research C o u n c i l — j o i n e d f o r c e s to sponsor an alternative set of seminars in Annapolis. T h e three-day event overlapped with the Harvard orientation, but it was possible for f r e s h m e n to attend the A n n a p o l i s meetings and later participate in most of the K e n n e d y School sessions. G O P w h i p N e w t G i n g r i c h and other party leaders had m a d e it clear that Republican f r e s h m e n were expected to attend policy sessions sponsored by the conservative groups, and thirty-five of the forty-six did so. Six of the t h i r t y - f i v e then j o i n e d s i x t y - n i n e D e m o c r a t s in a t t e n d i n g the H a r vard p r o g r a m . In A n n a p o l i s , they heard f r o m a string of u n i f o r m l y cons e r v a t i v e s p e a k e r s , with C o n g r e s s m e n C h a r l e s S t e n h o l m of Texas the only D e m o c r a t i c participant. In C a m b r i d g e , H o u s e D e m o c r a t L e e H a m i l t o n and such liberal a c a d e m i c s as J o h n K e n n e t h G a l b r a i t h and R o b e r t R e i c h w e r e j o i n e d by R e a g a n e c o n o m i c a d v i s e r M a r t i n F e l d stein, f o r m e r e d u c a t i o n secretary L a m a r A l e x a n d e r , and B u s h national security aide C o n d o l e e z z a Rice (Jacoby 1994b).

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Following the 1994 election, the Heritage Foundation and its two cosponsors scheduled another series of orientation sessions, inviting all newly elected House members. Sixty Republicans traveled to the Baltimore meetings, and although two Democrats said they would attend, neither appeared (New York Times, December 11, 1994). Speakers were again limited to conservative policy specialists, and included Jack Kemp, Lamar Alexander, Ralph Reed, Jeane Kirkpatrick, William Bennett, and Rush Limbaugh. In the meantime, the Kennedy School, having once again planned an orientation, canceled it after receiving only a handful of acceptances. As a consequence, freshmen of both parties were denied early exposure to a range of policy perspectives from which their predecessors had benefited, and the cancellation reinforced beliefs held by Republican revolutionaries in the Tightness of their cause and in the sea change that was taking place in American politics. So deep was the gulf between the parties that even traditionally bipartisan administrative briefings given by the Capitol Police and the House Clerk's Office were offered separately to Democrats and Republicans.

The Contract and the Role of Government The threat to CCWI priorities was not limited to the language of the Contract. The document's dangers were implied in subjects unmentioned, as well as those spelled out. Almost all of the ten items addressed political and legal reform (term limits, unfunded mandates, the line-item veto, tort reform, criminal justice, reduced government regulation) or economic issues (a balanced budget amendment, tax reform). Only two, social security and welfare reform, dealt directly with social issues, but not in ways calculated to further CCWI goals. And yet, it had been social issues that most occupied the caucus's attention in recent years, whether it was women's health, the safety and care of children, education, special problems of the aging, or sexual discrimination and harassment. Omission of these and other womenfriendly proposals was deliberate. Susan Molinari later recalled: I b e l i e v e d more w o m e n ' s issues should be included [in the Contract], e s p e c i a l l y a provision for more a c c e s s to day care for all Americans. I argued that such a provision w o u l d be a concrete demonstration of the value that w e placed on f a m i l i e s . . . but w e c o u l d not agree on h o w to fund it. In the end, I lost that and a number of other battles to the argument that singling out w o m e n ' s issues, or children's issues, or any

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other sub-group's issues would defeat the point of the Contract. I bowed to the consensus that we should concentrate on reforms that would affect every American. (Molinari 1998, p. 179)

A f t e r the new C o n g r e s s c o n v e n e d , the C o n t r a c t ' s generalities were t r a n s l a t e d into c o n c r e t e fiscal and p r o g r a m m a t i c o p t i o n s , and it soon b e c a m e c l e a r that c a u c u s - s u p p o r t e d social g o a l s w e r e to be s a c r i f i c e d on the altar of the C o n t r a c t ' s political and e c o n o m i c objectives. Threatened w e r e H e a d Start, school l u n c h e s , and the Special S u p p l e m e n t a l Nutrition P r o g r a m f o r W o m e n , I n f a n t s , and C h i l d r e n . All w o u l d be placed in block grants to the states, w h e r e they could be vitiated. A l s o u n d e r attack were f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t f o r j o b training, and s u m m e r j o b s f o r l o w - i n c o m e y o u t h ; f u n d s f o r h o m e h e a t i n g a s s i s t a n c e to the p o o r ; the D e p a r t m e n t of E d u c a t i o n ; the national service p r o g r a m ; f i n a n c i a l aid f o r d o m e s t i c and international f a m i l y p l a n n i n g p r o g r a m s ; f e d e r a l s p e n d i n g on health and low-cost h o u s i n g ; and civil rights and a f f i r m a tive action p r o t e c t i o n s in the w o r k p l a c e — a l l of w h i c h had b e e n high C C W I priorities for a d e c a d e or more. E f f o r t s to strengthen or even sustain these social policies generally failed. T h r e e - q u a r t e r s of Contract-inspired cost-cutting m e a s u r e s were reported out of c o m m i t t e e in the f o r m p r e s c r i b e d by R e p u b l i c a n leaders ( O w e n 1996). D u r i n g the first 100 d a y s , not a single a m e n d m e n t p r o m o t i n g e x p a n d e d health care, e d u c a t i o n , j o b training, or w o m e n ' s rights and opportunities was passed (Drew 1996, p. 180), with f r e s h m e n roll call s u p p o r t of their G O P leaders a v e r a g i n g 97 p e r c e n t (Curren 1995). T h e f i r s t - t e r m e r s r e m a i n e d m o r e reliable s u p p o r t e r s of party leaders than n o n f r e s h m e n d u r i n g the r e m a i n d e r of the first session ( C o n w a y and D e G r e g o r i o 1998). Their m e m b e r s h i p on the R e p u b l i c a n " T h e m e T e a m , " a g r o u p selected by G O P leaders to p u b l i c i z e the party's message, was out of proportion to their n u m b e r s in the Republican majority (60 percent of the team were f r e s h m e n ) . A n d six of the top ten t e a m m e m b e r s d e l i v e r i n g daily, C o n t r a c t - r e l a t e d , o n e - m i n u t e speeches were first-termers ( C o n w a y and D e G r e g o r i o 1998). Perhaps the most p e r v a s i v e and insidious threat to C C W I goals was e m b e d d e d in the c o n t e m p t G O P f r e s h m e n had for Congress, for the federal g o v e r n m e n t generally, and for national policies that restricted state and local g o v e r n m e n t discretion. F r o m the m o m e n t c o n g r e s s w o m e n created their c a u c u s in 1977, virtually all of its e f f o r t s had b e e n d e v o t e d to g i v i n g C o n g r e s s and the federal g o v e r n m e n t more, rather than less, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y in h e l p i n g w o m e n i m p r o v e the quality of their lives. W h e t h e r the issue w a s raising m o r e m o n e y to h e l p i m p o v e r i s h e d

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w o m e n , forcing schools and businesses to treat w o m e n and men equally, or p r o m o t i n g such new initiatives as f a m i l y and medical leave, C C W I proposals increased the presence and reach of the federal government. N o w W a s h i n g t o n w a s o v e r w h e l m e d by H o u s e n e o p h y t e s w h o s e missionary zeal, cohesiveness, and antigovernment bias threatened policies that C C W I leaders b e l i e v e d had b e e n settled years ago. L o o k i n g back on 1995, one G O P m e m b e r of the 104th f r e s h m e n class later said that w h e n he arrived in the n a t i o n ' s capital he saw the city as "a world filled with p o w e r , m o n e y and sex . . . all the evil spirits," and he was d e t e r m i n e d "not to b e c o m e a part of W a s h i n g t o n . " He saw C o n g r e s s as "a b u n c h of greedy, egotistical m e m b e r s w h o w e r e out of t o u c h " (Doherty and Katz 1998). Anti-Washington outsiders like this f r e s h m a n c o n s i d e r e d the c o n c e p t of " e f f e c t i v e g o v e r n m e n t p r o g r a m s " to be an oxymoron. F o r m a n y of this f r e s h m a n ' s peers, H o u s e rules, p r o c e d u r e s , and n o r m s were obstacles that had to be o v e r c o m e in order to realize partisan and policy objectives. T h e y a s s u m e d that the c o m m i t t e e system and c o m m i t t e e specialization w e r e used to c i r c u m v e n t the p o p u l a r will. R e p u b l i c a n task forces, an active T h e m e Team, and f o r m a t i o n of such informal s u b g r o u p s as the N e w Federalists and the C o n s e r v a t i v e Action Team were e f f e c t i v e antidotes to what they believed were retrogressive c o m m i t t e e practices. T h i s v i e w e x t e n d e d to m e m b e r s ' d e a l i n g s with c o n s t i t u e n t s . O n e c o n g r e s s m a n , G e o r g e R a d a n o v i c h of C a l i f o r n i a , stopped responding directly to the content of constituent mail, replying instead with a f o r m letter railing against the c o s t l i n e s s of the a v e r a g e m e m b e r ' s mail operation (Chappie 1996). M a n y said they had no plans to m o v e their families to Washington, p r o m i s i n g to leave the Capital as soon as their j o b s were done, and several imposed term limits on their H o u s e tenure. S o m e looked askance at the e v e r y d a y courtesies and d e f e r e n c e they received f r o m Capitol Hill staff. Steven S h a d d e g g of A r i z o n a r e m a r k e d that he " r e f u s e d to g o through the door b e f o r e my staff. . . . I ' m going to do everything I can to resist t h o s e t r a p p i n g s of p o w e r b e c a u s e I think they corrupt y o u " (New York Times, D e c e m b e r 11, 1994).

S

Coping with Change: 1995-1996

Life as a CMO Legislative service organizations (LSOs) were eliminated as the 104th Congress got under way. They were advised that they had until January 30, 1995, to stop spending money and move out of their quarters, and were given until March 30 to pay all outstanding bills. Most of the twenty-eight affected groups, including the Congressional Caucus for W o m e n ' s Issues, reorganized as congressional m e m b e r s h i p organizations (CMOs). 1 Four were disbanded, including the Environmental and Energy Study C o n f e r e n c e , which became a private organization. The Congressional Hunger Caucus was absorbed by the House Democratic Caucus, and the Republican Study C o m m i t t e e was shut down, its research responsibilities transferred to the House Republican Conference (Washington Post, March 23, 1995). The Democratic Study G r o u p (DSG) succumbed, following a lastm i n u t e struggle to survive. In the 103rd C o n g r e s s , the D S G had e m p l o y e d eighteen staffers on a b u d g e t of $1 million. A b o u t 250 H o u s e m e m b e r s received its fact sheets, legislative schedules, and special reports, paying $ 4 , 2 0 0 annually f r o m their o f f i c e e x p e n s e a c c o u n t s f o r the privilege (Jacoby 1993a). M o r e than t h i r t y - f i v e of those availing themselves of the D S G ' s highly regarded services were R e p u b l i c a n s , a c i r c u m s t a n c e that vexed G O P leaders. In D e c e m b e r 1993, R e p u b l i c a n C o n f e r e n c e chair Richard A r m e y had written to G O P subscribers pointing out that they were providing the opposition with $ 1 5 8 , 9 0 0 annually to u n d e r w r i t e special reports that regularly attacked Republican policies. This constituted nearly 12 percent of the D S G ' s r e v e n u e . He asked them to drop their subscriptions and rely 77

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instead on Republican Digest, a periodical that would not cost them a dime (Burger 1993). Faced with the loss of staff, space, and equipment, the DSG improvised means to stay afloat. Its staff established DSG Publications, a private, nonprofit company that would continue to produce daily and weekly reports on proposed legislation and pending floor action. An annual subscription price of $5,000 was established, a sum that would be used to sustain the service and replace House members' clerk-hire money formerly used to pay its staff. Subscriptions were to be paid out of members' office expense accounts, accounts normally used to pay for newspapers, magazines, and other periodicals that Representatives believed would improve performance of their official duties. But when, at the end of January, 120 Representatives asked the House Finance Office to pay the $5,000 subscriptions to DSG Publications, House Oversight Committee chair William Thomas intervened and ruled that House members could not pay more than $500 from official funds for new publications, unless it could be shown that fledgling publications charging more than that sum could be sustained independent of House members' subscriptions (Washington Post, March 23, 1995). The ruling destroyed the D S G ' s financial base, and the thirtyfive-year-old organization expired. Its staff accepted a buyout from Congressional Quarterly Inc., and a dozen were hired by the company. In the meantime, the Democratic Caucus assumed some of the D S G ' s research and reporting activities (Kahn 1995). The House Ethics Committee, too, prevented former LSOs from salvaging some of their perquisites. Four months into the new Congress, it ruled that House members could not raise funds on behalf of private, nonprofit foundations they had founded or controlled unless the organizations conducted activities entirely unrelated to members' official duties (Love 1995a). Money raising for traditional charities was not affected, but the new guideline meant that the foundations with which LSOs like the Black and Hispanic Caucuses had once been linked could no longer depend on House members' financing (Love 1995d). Savings produced by the change were difficult to document. Dues and subscriptions supporting LSOs had varied from $25 for the Congressional Automotive Caucus, to $200 for the Rural Caucus, to as much as $35,000 for membership in the Republican Study Committee (Jacoby 1994d). Many members simply channeled clerk-hire and office funds once used to support LSOs into salary increases for their staff and subscriptions to other publications. Some said they planned to return the unspent sums to the Treasury. The claimed windfall savings varied,

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d e p e n d i n g on the n u m b e r of L S O s to which m e m b e r s b e l o n g e d and the sum e a c h c h a r g e d . D e m o c r a t i c leader R i c h a r d G e p h a r d t " s a v e d " $ 1 3 , 0 0 0 in f u n d s he would otherwise have distributed a m o n g ten L S O s , w h i l e i n c o m i n g R e p u b l i c a n c o c h a i r of the C C W I , C o n s t a n c e M o r e l l a , had to decide how to distribute $18,000 once contributed to L S O s (Love 1995e). T h e alleged a d v a n t a g e s of d o i n g a w a y with L S O s w e r e lost on M o r e l l a and other C C W I leaders. As soon as w o r d s p r e a d a b o u t their i m m i n e n t d e m i s e , the M a r y l a n d R e p u b l i c a n a s k e d R e p u b l i c a n w o m e n to lobby the G O P transition t e a m and leaders to p r e s e r v e the C C W I , w h a t e v e r the f a t e of other L S O s (Jacoby 1994c). S h e argued that the C C W I , u n l i k e s o m e other g r o u p s , had m a n a g e d its f u n d s responsibly, that its e x p e n d i t u r e s always c o n f o r m e d with H o u s e rules, that in 1981 it had severed ties with a f o u n d a t i o n created by its m e m b e r s , and that, u n l i k e s o m e of the other L S O s , it was a b i p a r t i s a n o r g a n i z a t i o n with D e m o c r a t i c and R e p u b l i c a n cochairs w h o tried to c o o p e r a t e fully with leaders in b o t h parties. S o m e G O P w o m e n n o t e d that w e a k e n i n g the caucus was the w r o n g m e s s a g e to send w h e n their party was having difficulty attracting w o m e n voters. For several w e e k s the C C W I twisted in the wind, with m o r e sang u i n e m e m b e r s h o p i n g these a r g u m e n t s w o u l d prevail. But C h a i r m a n T h o m a s and his O v e r s i g h t C o m m i t t e e c o u l d not be m o v e d , and as the new C o n g r e s s c o n v e n e d , C C W I sponsors gave up the ghost. T h e caucus d i s m i s s e d its staff, e n d e d the practice of c o n f e r r i n g associate m e m b e r ship on c o n g r e s s m e n — t h e i r d u e s and subscription p a y m e n t s no longer readily a c c e s s i b l e — m o v e d out of its suite of o f f i c e s in the R a y b u r n Building, and reconstituted itself as a C M O . Lesley P r i m m e r , the staff director, m o v e d quickly to establish an o f f i c e in private q u a r t e r s and created W o m e n ' s Policy Inc. ( W P I ) , a n o n p r o f i t research o r g a n i z a t i o n devoted to providing i n f o r m a t i o n and legislative analysis on issues facing w o m e n and their f a m i l i e s (Washington Post, M a r c h 23, 1995). O f f i c e s p a c e was p r o v i d e d f r e e of c h a r g e by the A m e r i c a n C o l l e g e of Obstetricians and Gynecologists in its quarters two miles f r o m the Capitol, and by y e a r ' s end W P I was publishing The Source, a weekly s u m mary of congressional actions a f f e c t i n g w o m e n , and the m o r e c o m p r e hensive periodical, Quarterly Update. Both publications were f u r n i s h e d to subscribers for $ 4 9 5 a year, a sum c h o s e n b e c a u s e it fell j u s t under the $ 5 0 0 O v e r s i g h t C o m m i t t e e limit. Shortly thereafter, C C W I leaders asked the H o u s e Ethics C o m m i t tee for an a d v i s o r y o p i n i o n a b o u t w h e t h e r c o n g r e s s w o m e n c o u l d h e l p raise m o n e y for W P I without violating the c o m m i t t e e ' s prohibition on

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fundraising by L S O members whose organizations were linked to private, nonprofit foundations. The committee concluded that since no m e m b e r of the C C W I had had a role in W P I ' s incorporation, and inasmuch as new cochairs Morella and L o w e y were the only c o n g r e s s w o m e n on W P I ' s f i v e - m e m b e r board of directors, c o n g r e s s w o m e n affiliated with the new C M O could participate in W P I ' s fundraising efforts (Love 1995d). Similar requests by the Black and Hispanic Caucuses were denied. P u b l i c a t i o n s p r o d u c e d by W P I eventually met s o m e C C W I needs, but m o n t h s passed b e f o r e it was up and running. A n d even then, m a n y C C W I m e m b e r s r e f u s e d to subscribe, d e c i d i n g they had better use f o r the $ 4 9 5 . W P I ' s location was an i m p o r t a n t d r a w b a c k , with the t w o miles separating their d o w n t o w n o f f i c e and Capitol Hill translating into light years in intellectual and emotional support. M o r e important, Ethics C o m m i t t e e rulings m a d e it i m p o s s i b l e for the small W P I staff to coordinate C C W I activities, to t a k e the f o l l o w - u p action n e e d e d to i m p l e ment a C C W I initiative, and to consult regularly with the cochairs. T h e loss of the half dozen Rayburn Building professionals was devastating. T h e staff had given continuity to the C C W I as its leaders and m e m b e r s arrived and then passed f r o m the scene. T h e caucus had never been a highly cohesive, well-coordinated group of c o n g r e s s w o m e n prepared to act in lockstep. T h e cochairs were not so m u c h coordinators as r e f e r e n c e p o i n t s f o r c a u c u s m e m b e r s , the H o u s e , the m e d i a , and w o m e n ' s special interest g r o u p s . T h e y articulated their vision f o r the C C W I and for A m e r i c a n w o m e n , while at the same time providing the sound bites attaching m e a n i n g to u n f o l d i n g e v e n t s . C a u c u s m e m b e r s could invoke its n a m e and reputation to build, proclaim, and exploit a consensus. T h e y often acted as individual entrepreneurs specializing in subjects b o u n d e d by their c o m m i t t e e responsibilities, all the while relying on the half d o z e n p r o f e s s i o n a l staffers to p r o v i d e the research, the continuity, and the organizational ballast needed to p r o m o t e the feminist agenda. Elimination of the L S O s c h a n g e d all that. T h e s t a f f ' s d e p a r t u r e created a v a c u u m in C C W I o p e r a t i o n s that lasted f o r m o n t h s and that was never c o m p l e t e l y filled. S o m e of the responsibilities were assumed by staff m e m b e r s in the offices of the two c o c h a i r s , C i n d y Hall f o r M o r e l l a , S h a r o n L e v i n for Lowey. F r o m all reports, they rose to the occasion and did a splendid j o b , m e e t i n g each M o n d a y with the staff liaisons f r o m C C W I m e m b e r s ' o f f i c e s , and i m p l e m e n t i n g cochair decisions. Said one liaison: The staffers in Lowey and Morella's offices were great. They seemed to know everything. I called them when I had a question about any

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w o m e n ' s issue and they gave me great background. They were a great resource. T h e y tracked legislation and knew what was happening all over the Hill. They drafted testimony and circulated letters for m e m bers to sign. They did a great j o b even though they were terribly overworked. They were inspiring. B u t e v e n the p r i n c i p a l s a c k n o w l e d g e d that there w e r e tasks t h e y c o u l d not a d e q u a t e l y a d d r e s s or p e r f o r m in a t i m e l y w a y . O n e D e m o c r a t i c c o n g r e s s w o m a n l a m e n t e d the c o n s e q u e n c e s o f the c h a n g e : T h e d e f u n d i n g had a m a j o r impact, as it did on all LSOs. The research and i n f o r m a t i o n we were deprived of was considerable. It was not only the absence of research, but the ability to distribute findings in an integrated way, in a way that would be u s e f u l , was u n d e r m i n e d ; as was the ability to use that information to promote your own priorities. The message just d o e s n ' t get out. S o m e o f the broader i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s w e r e r e v e a l e d in the o b s e r v a t i o n s o f another staffer: Abolition of the L S O s meant you d o n ' t have a staff structure, you d o n ' t have f u n d i n g , you d o n ' t have an office, and everything the Caucus staff is doing is now d o n e by the staff of the co-chairs. And that has a big impact. In a m e m b e r ' s office, there are eight or nine people. Everything these people have to do for the Caucus is on top of everything else they have to d o every d a y — m e e t with constituents, meet with lobbyists, a n s w e r mail, track legislation on the floor, introduce legislation, review it for co-sponsorship, prepare for committee markups and e v e r y t h i n g else that goes on each day. T h e staff the C a u c u s lost was able to devote full time and energy to Caucus business without having to worry about matters that c o m e up in m e m b e r s ' personal offices. A w o m a n w h o had o n c e b e e n a m e m b e r o f the C C W I staff remarked: Perhaps the most important loss associated with moving the staff off the Hill is the loss in continuity, in a sense of history and Caucus tradition. In the past, staff w h o worked for Caucus m e m b e r s would often call and ask, " W h a t did my boss do on this issue the last time it c a m e u p ? " It's more difficult to a n s w e r that question now than w h e n the C a u c u s staff was on the Hill with its files intact and accessible. We controlled the records up through the 103rd Congress. We knew which a d v o c a c y groups were involved with previous legislation. We knew who the contact people were. W h e n we moved off the Hill some information was lost and now it is less accessible.

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Changes in the partisan and ideological complexion of the House, together with the diminution in CCWI resources, vitiated the caucus's task forces. Several possessed no Republican cochairs, as GOP congresswomen assumed key leadership and committee positions within the new majority. Others fell into disuse because they were responsible for matters unlikely to be addressed by Republican power brokers. Limited staff resources meant that the caucus leadership could not effectively encourage already overworked task force leaders to develop an agenda. Loss of LSO status also meant that the CCWI would be denied the nominal support of the 120 male auxiliary members. Asked to join the caucus out of financial necessity, these congressmen, almost all of them Democrats, often lent more than their names to CCWI causes. Several had occupied influential committee positions, and they had often been prevailed upon to insert women-friendly language into the bills they were considering. They could now pay WPI $495 for The Source, and about a dozen subscribed. But few former auxiliary members exerted much leverage in the 104th Congress. Rank-and-file CCWI members had little time or opportunity to ponder the plight of the caucus. Many Democratic women were too busy fending off Republican attacks on landmark New Deal and Great Society legislation. "We were under siege," said one congresswoman, "and there was simply no time to think about the Women's Caucus." In the past, congresswomen would receive calls from CCWI staff urging them to testify before a House committee or to hurry to the House floor to defend CCWI priorities in an unfolding debate. This task now fell to the overburdened people working in cochair offices. At the same time, several congresswomen were scrambling to secure new committee assignments to replace those they had lost when the Republican majority adjusted committee ratios. For them, women's interests could not be given much attention when their own congressional influence was hanging in the balance. Attendance at CCWI meetings fell off. Said one previously active member, "We try to get together . . . but the availability of information and the staff support are gone. It's just not the same." The drop-off was partly due to a downgrading in the perceived value of the organization. Many were not persuaded that their attendance would mean much for either their own legislative aspirations or for realizing feminist goals. Newcomers had no idea that the CCWI had sometimes made a difference, especially in the 103rd Congress, and its frustrations in the 104th gave them no reason to think they had joined an organization with political heft.

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Several Black C a u c u s m e m b e r s w e r e a m o n g the m i s s i n g , s o m e times because C C W I activities conflicted with events sponsored by the C o n g r e s s i o n a l B l a c k C a u c u s , but also b e c a u s e , like the n e w c o m e r s , they w e r e not sure why they s h o u l d attend. O n e s e c o n d - t e r m e r r e m a r k e d in retrospect that the 104th C o n g r e s s r e p r e s e n t e d t w o of the w o r s t years of her life, and that the " r a c i s m and g e n d e r b i a s " she had e n c o u n t e r e d all of her life was poisoned f u r t h e r by the " m e a n - s p i r i t e d n e s s " of the d e b a t e and the t y r a n n y of the s c h e d u l e i m p o s e d by the m a j o r i t y party. B e i n g active in the c a u c u s , she i m p l i e d , w o u l d not c h a n g e the things that needed to be c h a n g e d . E v e n s o m e veteran D e m o c r a t s b e c a m e less i n v o l v e d in C C W I activities. T h e y c o n c l u d e d that losing H o u s e control to c o n s e r v a t i v e r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s m e a n t that the f e m i n i s t a g e n d a had b e c o m e irrelevant. As a result, they d e v o t e d less e n e r g y to C C W I - r e l a t e d activities and m o r e to w o r k in their c o m m i t t e e s . O n e l o n g t i m e R e p u b l i c a n C C W I m e m b e r r e m a r k e d m i d w a y t h r o u g h the 104th C o n g r e s s , " M y i m p r e s sion is that in the 104th Congress, the C a u c u s is generally a small g r o u p of D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n meeting and m a y b e C o n n i e M o r e l l a . " T h e c a u c u s w a s f o r t u n a t e to h a v e M o r e l l a as a cochair, not least because, with O l y m p i a S n o w e ' s election to the Senate, there were f e w e x p e r i e n c e d R e p u b l i c a n w o m e n left w h o w e r e willing to serve in that position. But M o r e l l a ' s record in the H o u s e placed her a m o n g the most liberal of R e p u b l i c a n s . T h i s limited her ability to reach out to other R e p u b l i c a n w o m e n , and f e w were a v a i l a b l e to give her the moral and political support any leader w o u l d need in a p u r p o r t e d l y bipartisan C M O . As a c o n s e q u e n c e , with the D e m o c r a t s m a r g i n a l i z e d and the R e p u b l i c a n s o t h e r w i s e engaged, on most issues "the C a u c u s was nothing m o r e than a lot of ' b a c k g r o u n d n o i s e , ' " according to one Republican staffer. T h e d i s e n g a g e m e n t of R e p u b l i c a n C C W I m e m b e r s was a result of several d e v e l o p m e n t s , the most i m p o r t a n t being the elevation of s o m e of t h e m to key c o m m i t t e e and l e a d e r s h i p p o s i t i o n s . Jan M e y e r s and N a n c y J o h n s o n were n a m e d chairs of c o m m i t t e e s , and Susan Molinari w a s elected vice c h a i r of the R e p u b l i c a n C o n f e r e n c e . M o l i n a r i also b e c a m e chair of a s u b c o m m i t t e e , as did M a r g e R o u k e m a and Morella. J o h n s o n secured a s u b c o m m i t t e e c h a i r m a n s h i p on the Ways and M e a n s C o m m i t t e e , and she was the second ranking Republican on the influential s u b c o m m i t t e e on health. O n e veteran G O P c o n g r e s s w o m e n regretf u l l y e x p l a i n e d her p a r t y ' s e s t r a n g e m e n t f r o m the C C W I in this way: "The senior Republican members didn't have the time, and the first termers didn't join. We just didn't have the guns. Susan was in the leadership.

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Jan and Nancy were tied up in committee work. There were too few of us, so we did not participate to the extent that it would have been healthy." Several G O P w o m e n may not have been active in the C C W I even if their H o u s e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s had been less c o m p e l l i n g . T h e y had been little m o r e than nominal m e m b e r s , j o i n i n g because O l y m p i a S n o w e had asked t h e m to, but k e e p i n g the organization at a r m ' s length. O n e G O P moderate r e m a r k e d : "I h a v e n ' t been a w f u l l y active in the Caucus. Technically I ' m a m e m b e r , but I h a v e not been greatly involved in it. I see no real a d v a n t a g e to being a member. I have not w o r k e d on its a g e n d a or f a s h i o n e d my o w n a g e n d a a f t e r the C C W I a g e n d a . " S o m e R e p u b l i can w o m e n were unwilling to identify closely with the C C W I because, historically, the m e n in their party w e r e u n s y m p a t h e t i c to " w o m e n ' s i s s u e s . " T h i s i n d i f f e r e n c e , if not hostility, was r e f l e c t e d in h o w f e w G O P men had j o i n e d the c a u c u s as auxiliary m e m b e r s a f t e r 1981, and by Republican failure to address explicitly even a single C C W I priority in the Contract with A m e r i c a . The increased distance Republican women placed between themselves and the c a u c u s d o v e t a i l e d with the d e s i g n s of N e w t G i n g r i c h . T h e new S p e a k e r sought actively to w e a k e n the b o n d s G O P w o m e n had e s t a b l i s h e d with w o m e n D e m o c r a t s , and to integrate t h e m m o r e f u l l y into the R e p u b l i c a n Party. A c c o r d i n g l y , he e n c o u r a g e d selection of M o l i n a r i and J e n n i f e r D u n n to s e c o n d a r y party l e a d e r s h i p positions. G e n d e r was also a factor in his decision not to eliminate the Small Business C o m m i t t e e , a step he seriously considered, b e f o r e concluding that by s c r a p p i n g the panel Jan M e y e r s w o u l d not b e c o m e one of the f e w R e p u b l i c a n w o m e n ever to chair a s t a n d i n g c o m m i t t e e of the H o u s e . A n d he scored a first by setting aside a r o o m just off the H o u s e floor to allow Susan Molinari to breast-feed her infant daughter. Gingrich strengthened his rapport with Republican w o m e n by meeting with t h e m p e r i o d i c a l l y to hear their priorities and, in turn, i n f o r m them about emerging developments. O n e reason Republican w o m e n had a t t e n d e d C C W I m e e t i n g s in the past w a s to learn f r o m D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n what m a j o r i t y party leaders w e r e c o n t e m p l a t i n g . R e g u l a r sessions with the Speaker, w h o s e i n f l u e n c e a p p r o a c h e d that of the president in 1995, m a d e participation in the caucus less c o m p e l l i n g . L o o k i n g back on the 104th C o n g r e s s , one lobbyist o b s e r v e d in an interview: Democratic women tend to be representative of the "women's groups," and they're quite proud of it, and they are not afraid of being type-cast as representatives of those groups. By contrast,. . . Republican women

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are probably concerned about being type-cast by their male colleagues. . . . What there d o e s n ' t yet seem to be is a comfort zone within the Republican party with the fact that women look at issues differently than men.

But one moderate Republican c o n g r e s s w o m e n who valued her many years of CCWI membership looked at the differences between w o m e n in the two parties as resting on a fundamental disagreement about the role government should play in addressing feminist concerns. She defended her party's record in the 104th Congress, observing: I think Republican women feel a greater responsibility to attend to the issues of economic opportunity for women. The Democratic women tended to look at social services for women. That's important, but if these social services end up disempowering women, then they are a negative in their lives. You have not done them a service; y o u ' v e done them a disservice. The Republican women have been trying to turn that around, to look at service to women as a lever to empower them to fulfill their own potential. So we were very instrumental, very instrumental . . . on welfare reform to leverage [women's] independence. . . . We have really refocused the C o n g r e s s ' s attention on w o m e n ' s access to credit, w o m e n ' s access to training for their own business development—all those services that provide economic opportunity that young men tend to get f r o m their fathers or their f a t h e r ' s friends or the guys at Rotary. . . . Republican women have really focused on economic equality and opportunity for women, both in terms of welfare services and day care and earned income tax credit, . . . [a]nd in terms of small business issues and family issues in the military. I think we have done extremely responsible work and work that wasn't as popular in preceding Congresses.

Defunding of other L S O s also affected the CCWI. From time to time its staff had worked with the staffs of the Black and Hispanic Caucuses as well as the Human Rights and Hunger Caucuses to promote c o m m o n interests. That so many congresswomen were members of one or more of these other groups facilitated cooperation among them. Elimination of LSO permanent staffs curtailed the CCWI's ability to establish alliances with other members on legislation whose appeal both included and transcended feminist goals. Predictably, it took months for legislation formerly championed by the CCWI to be introduced, and much of it languished in committee. The caucus failed to introduce a Women's Health Equity Act (WHEA), or a Women's Economic Equity Act (WEEA), until well into the second session. Minutes of caucus meetings reveal the tortuous path these

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m e a s u r e s f o l l o w e d b e f o r e they saw the light of day. T h e April 1995 minutes noted that the W H E A would be introduced "this spring." Later notations s c h e d u l e d the m e a s u r e for the s u m m e r . In October, the minutes a n n o u n c e d that the bill would appear in the fall. In December, the C a u c u s h o p e d to i n t r o d u c e the W H E A and the W E E A early in 1996. Ultimately, the f o r m e r appeared in M a r c h , the latter in June. A n d m a n y proposals that did not fall under the health or e c o n o m i c rubrics and that a d d r e s s e d less tractable w o m e n ' s c o n c e r n s w e r e simply n e g l e c t e d by o v e r w o r k e d C C W I m e m b e r s and their staffs. Organizational ground rules also fell victim to loss of a p e r m a n e n t staff. B y l a w s approved by the c a u c u s at the tail end of the 103rd C o n gress led to biennial rotation of the caucus cochairs, and a p p o i n t m e n t of D e m o c r a t i c and Republican vice chairs. But most of the new procedural c h a n g e s w e r e n e v e r i m p l e m e n t e d , partly b e c a u s e there was no staff director in place on Capitol Hill prodding the organization to live up to bylaw requirements. Consequently, annual meetings of the caucus open to the public, a l t h o u g h called for by the new d o c u m e n t , were never c o n v e n e d . F e w required a n n u a l reports by the c o c h a i r s and by task f o r c e s were submitted. Minutes of monthly E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e meetings w e r e m a n d a t e d , and w h i l e they were p r e p a r e d regularly t h r o u g h m u c h of 1995, they were increasingly neglected during the second session. A n d the r e q u i r e m e n t that m e e t i n g s take p l a c e with a q u o r u m of o n e - t h i r d of the m e m b e r s present w a s routinely i g n o r e d . With the e x c e p t i o n of m e e t i n g s f e a t u r i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i o n guest speakers, f e w e r than one-third of the m e m b e r s typically s h o w e d up. C h a n c e s are, the C C W I agenda would have fared badly even if the L S O s had not been eliminated. C o m m i t m e n t to the Contract with A m e r ica by the new Republican majority left little room for other legislative initiatives. True, the C C W I was more robust than most other d e f u n d e d L S O s . Its c o c h a i r s c o n t i n u e d s i n g l e - m i n d e d l y to p r o m o t e its c a u s e s . A n d the staffs of C C W I rank and file took it u p o n t h e m s e l v e s to meet weekly to discuss feminist goals, to consider legislative initiatives, and to try to m a i n t a i n the m o m e n t u m e s t a b l i s h e d by earlier c a u c u s e s . But their e f f o r t s w e r e inhibited significantly, not only by the G O P H o u s e control but also by the ardor, the energy, and the ideological c o m m i t ment of the new Republican w o m e n .

The New Women T h e 1994 election sent eleven new w o m e n to the House, seven R e p u b licans and f o u r D e m o c r a t s . C a u c u s leaders invited t h e m to j o i n the

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C C W I , and all f o u r D e m o c r a t s and a single R e p u b l i c a n , N e w Y o r k ' s Sue Kelly, a c c e p t e d . That the r e m a i n i n g R e p u b l i c a n c o n g r e s s w o m e n declined the o f f e r c a m e as no surprise. Several were militantly a n t i f e m inist, and their postelection c o m m e n t s signaled their a n t a g o n i s m toward all that the c a u c u s stood for. Several p r e s e n t e d c o n s e r v a t i v e c o m m e n tator R u s h L i m b a u g h with a p l a q u e a s s u r i n g h i m that " T h e r e ' s not a F e m i - N a z i a m o n g u s " ( Washington Post, D e c e m b e r 11, 1994), and one, B a r b a r a C u b i n of W y o m i n g , a n n o u n c e d that she wanted "to be considered a contrast to [outgoing C C W I c o c h a i r ] Patricia S c h r o e d e r and to the m o r e m i l i t a n t - t y p e f e m i n i s t s " ( U S A Today, D e c e m b e r 17, 1994). T h e depths of their hostility to gender-oriented w o m e n ' s organizations was revealed w h e n one of them referred to the traditionally nonpartisan L e a g u e of W o m e n Voters as the " L e a g u e of W o m e n V i p e r s " ( U S A Today, N o v e m b e r 11, 1994). T h e s e c o n g r e s s w o m e n were not the first to ignore or reject offers of c a u c u s m e m b e r s h i p , but they w e r e the first to work actively to underm i n e its influence. In the 103rd Congress, for e x a m p l e , support for the V i o l e n c e A g a i n s t W o m e n Act had b e e n w i d e s p r e a d , and R e p u b l i c a n w h i p N e w t G i n g r i c h had b e e n a c o s p o n s o r . But w h e n it c a m e time to pay for the p r o g r a m in the 104th Congress, many, including outspoken f i r s t - t e r m G O P c o n g r e s s w o m e n , d e m u r r e d . A C a p i t o l Hill s t a f f e r referred to t h e m as the " f o o t soldiers recruited by the R e p u b l i c a n leadership to roll back past progressive gains," although it was evident that the f l e d g l i n g G O P w o m e n needed little prodding in that direction. E v e n w h e n they a g r e e d in p r i n c i p l e with a C C W I - s u p p o r t e d p r o p o s a l , they o f t e n f o u n d r e a s o n s f o r o p p o s i n g it. Said o n e c a u c u s leader, these w o m e n w o u l d say s o m e t h i n g like, "We w a n t m o r e r e s e a r c h on breast cancer, but w e cannot support this particular bill, or too m u c h m o n e y is being r e q u e s t e d . " T h e n e w w o m e n d i s t a n c e d t h e m s e l v e s f r o m the c a u c u s , in part, b e c a u s e they w e r e f a r m o r e interested in r e f l e c t i n g the r e v o l u t i o n a r y elan a s s o c i a t e d with their f r e s h m e n class than they w e r e in calling attention to their gender. As a result, several r e f u s e d to be called "cong r e s s w o m a n , " p r e f e r r i n g " c o n g r e s s m a n , " and they took pains to avoid being associated with issues understood to affect w o m e n primarily. O n e veteran G O P w o m e n H o u s e m e m b e r observed: There are women on Capitol Hill who refuse to accept the nomenclature "congresswoman." "I'm a congressman," they'll come back. They refuse to get involved in women's issues because they are so afraid to admit that they are women and that they can be strong on women's issues and still be strong on crime, balancing the budget, and tax issues.

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One consequence of their behavior was a diminution of caucus credibility. For the first time the House contained a group of women who were prepared to stymie CCWI initiatives at every opportunity, and congressmen who might otherwise have supported caucus proposals grew skeptical about the extent to which the CCWI spoke for all women. Other male members now had reasons to give voice to the doubts that they had harbored all along. One CCWI leader described the changed circumstances in this way: Women elected in the late 80s and early 90s were joining the Caucus, were working together, and it m a d e a terrific d i f f e r e n c e in the congressional agenda because w o m e n were speaking with one voice across party lines. T h a t ' s how we got f a m i l y leave, the W o m e n ' s Health Equity Act and E c o n o m i c Equity passed. We kept moving forward on Title IX—all of those things. But then c a m e the 1994 election in which you get this g r o u p of w o m e n w h o d i d n ' t want anything to d o with the C a u c u s , and c a m e with an entirely d i f f e r e n t agenda. At that point, everything stops. B e c a u s e when you stand up and talk about any [ w o m e n ' s ) issue, the opposition can get a w o m a n on the floor taking the opposite side. And what happened was that people said, "Oh, the women haven't made up their minds yet, so I d o n ' t have to pay attention. I d o n ' t have to think about this until all the w o m e n m a k e up their m i n d s . " . . . But when y o u ' r e such a small minority, the only way you get a priority position—when you really get people to take what y o u ' r e saying seriously, is for all the w o m e n to look like they have a consensus. So the 1994 election blew us out of the water.

Another member noted that the new Republican women "stayed away from the women stuff because they wanted to be seen as individuals, not as representatives of women." Several members of both parties commented on the new women's style. A liberal Democratic congresswoman remarked: "Some of these women are bad old girls who what to be good old boys." A Democratic colleague observed: Y o u ' v e heard the story of Rose Red and Rose W h i t e . W h e n one of t h e m spoke, d i a m o n d s and pearls c a m e out of her m o u t h ; w h e n the other spoke toads, snakes and frogs c a m e out. C o n g r e s s w o m a n [name withheld] is the one with toads and snakes. Every time she opens her mouth vituperatives [sic] c o m e out. Even the men look at each other and say, " M y God, she's mean."

Some senior Republican women also commented on the harshness of the new women's style, attributing it in part to their inexperience. One said:

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One of the things that surprised me about our Republican women is how harsh they are. They are worse than some of our Republican men on the welfare issue. [During the debate] they were awful. . . . Most of the moderate Republican women were trying to get their Republican male colleagues to see how important it was to pass a bill that would not harm people. But most of the new Republican women had little patience for this approach. Because they were still so new, they hadn't found their way [to seeing things in this light].

O n e A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n c o n g r e s s w o m a n e x p r e s s e d an alienation f r o m the new w o m e n that was shared by several of her black colleagues. She r e m a r k e d : This crowd of Republican women really doesn't have much in common with me, and I will not pretend that I have anything in common with them. When one of them tells me how lucky I am that I survived slavery, and when another mentions slavery whenever we are in the elevator together, then I think I have a problem with them.

T h e d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n black D e m o c r a t i c c o n g r e s s w o m e n and the new R e p u b l i c a n s may have been f o s t e r e d by Ku Klux Klan claims that the 1994 election victory of I d a h o ' s H e l e n C h e n o w e t h w a s a " v i c t o r y f o r r a c e d - b a s e d c a m p a i g n s . " T h e Klan had distributed v i d e o t a p e s during her c a m p a i g n , s o m e of w h i c h d e p i c t e d her saying that a f f i r m a t i v e action and other g o v e r n m e n t p r o g r a m s m a d e white men "an e n d a n g e r e d species" ( N e w York Times, January 11, 1996). C h e n o w e t h subsequently disassociated herself f r o m the Klan, but for m a n y black colleagues the distancing was too little and too late. T h e b e h a v i o r that p e r h a p s best e n c a p s u l a t e s the policy orientation and style of the new w o m e n was reflected in their reaction to a proposal to install the "Portrait M o n u m e n t " in the Capitol R o t u n d a . T h e m o n u m e n t is a m a r b l e s c u l p t u r e f e a t u r i n g three n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y w o m e n s u f f r a g e l e a d e r s — S u s a n B. Anthony, Lucretia Mott, and Elizabeth C a d y Stanton. T h e rendering of the three had been sculpted by Adelaide Johnson in 1920, the year the N i n e t e e n t h A m e n d m e n t w a s p a s s e d , and d o n a t e d to C o n g r e s s by the N a t i o n a l W o m e n ' s Party ( N W P ) in 1921. C o n g r e s s ' s Joint C o m m i t t e e on the Library at first r e f u s e d to accept the b u l k y statue, but A l i c e Paul, N W P p r e s i d e n t , had it d e l i v e r e d to the Capitol a n y w a y . A f t e r brief negotiations, it was agreed that the seventon Italian m a r b l e statue would r e m a i n in the Capitol R o t u n d a f o r t w o d a y s , a f t e r w h i c h it w o u l d be p l a c e d a m o n g other statuary one f l o o r below in a section of the Capitol k n o w n as "the C r y p t . "

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During the next seventy-five years, periodic efforts by w o m e n ' s groups to restore the Portrait M o n u m e n t to the Rotunda were unsuccessful. And then in April 1995 a group called the W o m e n ' s S u f f r a g e Statue Campaign, after receiving positive feedback f r o m m e m b e r s of Congress, expressed hope that the statue would be moved by August 26, in time to mark the seventy-fifth anniversary celebration of w o m e n ' s suffrage. The occasion would be observed by a rededication of the statute, to be followed by a w o m e n ' s rights march and rally on the Mall. Proponents of the move argued that the country needed public symbols depicting w o m e n who were instrumental in nation building. They pointed out that visitors to a Rotunda housing statues of men alone were left with the impression that women played no role in the process. Said one of the celebration's planners, "It's not nice to put your forefathers in the living room and your foremothers in the basement." Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska, chair of the Rules Committee, responded by introducing a joint resolution instructing the Architect of the Capitol, George White, to move the monument to a more prominent display site. Stevens said he was leading the way because Alaska had played an important role in the suffrage m o v e m e n t , and because his grandmother, Elizabeth Stevens, who had raised him, had been an active suffragist. He noted that most Rotunda statues honor presidents and that all, to date, have been men, adding: "Someday I hope the Rotunda will be graced with a statue of the first female president. Until then, it is my hope to honor the role women have played by moving the w o m e n ' s suffrage statue up to the place of honor it should have in the R o t u n d a " (Love 1995c). T h e Senate passed S t e v e n s ' s resolution by voice vote, but the measure ran into serious obstacles on its way to the House. Perhaps the most daunting challenge appeared in a m e m o written by Architect White and circulated in the House even as the Senate was approving the resolution. In it, White, a longtime o p p o n e n t of the move, listed reasons why the statue should remain in the Crypt. T h e sculpture's massive weight would make relocation difficult and expensive, he argued. Moreover, a statue already in the Rotunda would have to be sent to the Crypt to make room for the Portrait M o n u m e n t . To a proposal that the heavy marble slabs in the base be replaced by lightweight steel with a marble veneer to meet cost and logistical objections, he demurred on historic and aesthetic grounds: "It is generally not acceptable to make such c h a n g e s . " He made no r e f e r e n c e to an offer by the Capitol Preservation Commission, a private organization, to fund the project (Love 1995b).

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White's memo gave many House members pause, and Speaker Gingrich, already pressed to put off some appropriations bills until after the pending August recess, declined to bring the resolution to a vote in time for the August 26 rededication ceremonies. Caucus cochair Constance Morella voiced disappointment, but promised to urge the House to consider the resolution after the recess (Love 1995b). In the meantime, women's groups celebrated the occasion in the Crypt, believing, like Morella, that the proposal would receive speedy approval when Congress returned. But they were unprepared for the strenuous opposition they encountered f r o m first-term Republican women. W h e n the resolution arrived on the House floor in the fall, the new congresswomen objected to the $75,000 that would be authorized to pay for the move, arguing that the government should not subsidize the project. Several suggested that if women were to be represented in the Rotunda, radicals like Anthony, Mott, and Stanton did not deserve the recognition, and that less controversial w o m e n should be considered. 2 Pat Schroeder, then in her last House term, was dismayed by these objections, wondering in an interview, "[I]s this the 1990s or the 1890s[?] What century are we in?" T h e dispute led to further House-Senate negotiations, and in June 1997, after $83,000 had been collected by the Women Suffrage Statue C a m p a i g n , and after twelve hours of heavy lifting, the statue was returned to the Rotunda. During rededication ceremonies, former CCWI cochair Senator Olympia Snowe said that women members of Congress never dreamed the relocation would encounter so many obstacles. She called the experience "Tales f r o m the Crypt," adding: "We thought it seemed like a little thing to ask. In many ways the struggle to move the statue was emblematic of w o m e n ' s struggle for justice and equality throughout the history of this country" (Eilperin 1997b). The new Republican women were not the relocation's only opponents, but they played a prominent role in forcing the delay beyond the August 1995 celebration date, as well as in demanding private funding for moving the statue—a condition not normally insisted upon when Capitol statuary is shifted. That their position on the issue was consistent with that of the Capitol Architect gave their arguments considerable weight. That they succeeded in withholding public money for what they believed was an unnecessary project meant they were in synch with their class's revolutionary zeal. When Connie Morella pointed out that the sum involved was relatively small given the statue's symbolic importance, North Carolina's Sue Myrick said, "Yeah, it's not a lot of money, the way they throw money around up here. But that's what w e ' r e trying to stop (Washington Post, April 4, 1997).

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But their opposition can also be explained in terms of gender as well. The statue issue gave the new women an opportunity to demonstrate to male colleagues that they would not associate themselves with even relatively benign women's issues, that they would aggressively oppose the legislative agenda of the CCWI, that they would not bend to the blandishments of outside women's lobbies, and that they could be as hard-nosed and tough as any of their male colleagues. And when the statue was finally rededicated, Helen Chenoweth, one of the original resolution's fiercest opponents, put the best face on the decision. She pointed out that a keystone of Susan B. Anthony's legacy was her opposition to abortion (Eilperin 1997b).

Abortion Rights Redux The new women had many reasons for not joining the caucus, but the C C W I ' s pro-choice orientation was among the most important. Their arrival in the House markedly diminished the pro-choice tilt among Republican women. Before the 1994 election, ten of the twelve Republican congresswomen had been pro-choice. After the election, eight of seventeen were pro-life. Admonitions from G O P leaders to shun the CCWI almost certainly influenced the newcomers' decision, but the caucus's position on reproductive rights gave these women a reason for declining membership that would trump all others. One veteran Democratic congresswoman said she understood the newcomers' decision, but lamented it nonetheless: What weakened the Caucus was not so much the defunding in 1995, as much as it was the attitudes of the [Republican] women elected in 1994. They refused to join because they viewed the Caucus as being single-minded and too focused on abortion. And yet, over the years the progress made on women in the military, domestic violence, financing women's businesses and home ownership—all of that came about because of the Caucus. So what happened in 1994 was to me very disconcerting.

Several of the newcomers said they rejected invitations to join the caucus not to make a political statement, but to keep from spreading themselves too thin. But most also made clear that they found their social philosophy incompatible with the C C W I ' s official position on abortion rights. Sophomore Jennifer Dunn, a non-CCWI member who was pro-choice, but who opposed federal funding to pay for abortions,

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concurred, noting, "If they got rid of that [the official pro-choice position] I'd be happy to j o i n " (Washington Post, February 15, 1995). For another Republican congresswoman, "Everything the Caucus does is in terms of bashing Republicans and advancing the abortion lobbyist's agenda. So it is really uncomfortable for me to participate." The caucus's identification with abortion rights was strengthened by the uncompromising pro-choice agenda of its two newly elected cochairs, Nita Lowey and Constance Morella. Lowey was chair of the House Pro-Choice Task Force, a bipartisan group of both men and women. The task force was not a new House group, but after the 1994 election it raised its profile, in part to fill the gap left when the CCWI was stripped of its staff. Lowey sent packets of information to House members claiming that women's reproductive rights were being threatened in the new Congress. And when Henry W. Foster Jr., an obstetrician who had acknowledged performing legal abortions as a part of his practice, was nominated as surgeon general, Lowey called a press conference and, surrounded by other task force members, enthusiastically endorsed the nomination (Washington Post, February 15, 1995). At the same time, Morella and her staff were active in the Congressional Coalition on Population and Development, a group that addressed international family planning issues and that often coordinated public relations strategy with members of the CCWI and the Pro-Choice Task Force. Consequently, distinctions between leadership of the CCWI and these other pro-choice groups were blurred, and Lowey and Morella were seen as speaking for the CCWI on reproductive rights, even when they were wearing a "different hat." But even if the cochairs had tried to place the abortion issue on the back burner, they would have been blocked by other CCWI members. Those elected for the first time in 1992 were members of a class more liberal than many Democrats, and virtually all supported the rights of gays in the military, affirmative action, and abortion rights, positions that made some senior Democrats uncomfortable. They expected abortion rights to be an integral part of the group's mission, largely unaware that the deliberate exclusion of this issue from the C C W I agenda had been one of the caucus's initial strategic calculations. They could not have agreed more with a veteran Democrat who observed: It is the right to choose that gave women the freedom to develop into the wonderful human beings they are. By giving them that choice, they are able to determine everything else about their lives. If we lose that, we go back to what we used to be. We could even go so far back

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that—because of the great nostalgia for the 19th century—pregnant women could not work or go to college, or, if married, they would have to leave. And I remember that. And that is my greatest fear.

Weeks into their first term, they had rallied behind the first prochoice president in twelve years when he issued executive orders lifting restrictions on abortion and abortion counseling, and they were delighted when Clinton's comprehensive health care bill included abortion coverage, designation of obstetricians and gynecologists as primary care physicians, and preventive screening for breast cancer, cervical cancer, and other diseases. After African American Joycelyn Elders was nominated as surgeon general and conservatives attacked her position on abortion rights, sex education, and condom distribution, it was the C C W I that came to Elders's defense (Washington Post, February 15, 1995). When the 1994 election produced a pro-life House, CCWI members circled the wagons, determined to hold on to gains made in the 103rd Congress. They fought every effort by the new House majority to eliminate or dilute abortion protections, and when some pro-choice Republican m e m b e r s of the C C W I , intoxicated with being a part of the first Republican majority in forty years, appeared to abandon the caucus, a handful of Democrats, believing the C C W I would not survive, formed a new group and began working with the Democratic Congressional Campaign C o m m i t t e e to recruit progressive women candidates for the House. One sophomore Democrat, Elizabeth Furse of Oregon, did in fact resign f r o m the C C W I , concluding it had lost its pro-choice identity. Furse felt betrayed when a pro-choice Republican m e m b e r of the C C W I , Susan Molinari, appeared in her district late in the 1994 campaign and endorsed Furse's male, Republican, pro-life opponent. After she was reelected by 301 votes, Furse decided that membership in the organization had been cheapened by what she saw as Molinari's betrayal (Washington Post, February 15, 1995). The Staten Island Republican later acknowledged that she had endured bitter criticism f r o m such organizations as the National Organization for Women ( N O W ) and the National Abortion Rights Action League ( N A R A L ) because she campaigned for anti-choice candidates. She explained: "I refused to be a single-issue campaigner. . . . T h a t ' s bad for America. Anyway, what did they want me to do? Campaign against my husband and father?" (Molinari 1998, p. 142).3 But F u r s e ' s decision was understandable in light of her own encounter with abortion proscriptions thirty-five years earlier. In 1961

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she was a thirty-five-year-old p h y s i c i a n ' s w i f e and m o t h e r of two. A f t e r she b e c a m e p r e g n a n t again, d o c t o r s told her that there was a g o o d c h a n c e her third child w o u l d be born with d e v a s t a t i n g disabilities, i n c l u d i n g brain d a m a g e . She and her h u s b a n d c o n s i d e r e d an a b o r t i o n , but r e j e c t e d the option of u n d e r g o i n g an illegal p r o c e d u r e , largely b e c a u s e so m a n y of them e n d e d in p e r m a n e n t injury to the m o t h e r and even death. Her obstetrician advised her that an abortion could be perf o r m e d only if it could be j u s t i f i e d on " l i f e - s a v i n g " grounds. H e added that i n a s m u c h as she had only one kidney, she could possibly p e r s u a d e a hospital panel that this physical i m p a i r m e n t would be potentially lifet h r e a t e n i n g if she carried the f e t u s to term. T h e panel g r a n t e d her request, but insisted that she also u n d e r g o a hysterectomy, which would assure the panel that she would never again put her life in j e o p a r d y by b e c o m i n g pregnant. Her anguished decision was to go ahead with both procedures, a choice she believed no w o m a n w h o wanted m o r e children should have to m a k e ( N e w York Times, M a y 7, 2001). D e m o c r a t i c doubts about the pro-choice purity of the C C W I placed e n o r m o u s p r e s s u r e on the c o c h a i r s , especially M o r e l l a . S h e w a s o f t e n the lone R e p u b l i c a n attendee at caucus meetings, speaking for the slender a b o r t i o n rights w i n g of her party. A c c o r d i n g to one staff m e m b e r privy to c a u c u s deliberations, if she had w a v e r e d in her c o m m i t m e n t to the p r o - c h o i c e position or if she had m o v e d to d r o p the issue f r o m the C C W I a g e n d a , the D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n w o u l d h a v e resigned in d r o v e s and the eighteen-year-old caucus " w o u l d have been history." But D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n w e r e not a l o n e in k e e p i n g the a b o r t i o n issue alive. R e p u b l i c a n leaders and first-term c o n s e r v a t i v e s f o r c e d the H o u s e to address abortion with e x h a u s t i n g regularity. A c c o r d i n g to one abortion rights lobbyist, for the first time since Roe v. Wade the H o u s e e n v i r o n m e n t w a s c o n t r o l l e d by men w h o w e r e unalterably o p p o s e d to w o m e n ' s reproductive rights. C o m m i t t e e and s u b c o m m i t t e e chairs welc o m e d a m e n d m e n t s and riders to bills prohibiting abortion or e m b a r g o ing the use of s p e c i f i e d a p p r o p r i a t e d f u n d s to u n d e r w r i t e their costs. D u r i n g A p p r o p r i a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e d e l i b e r a t i o n s d o z e n s of riders were introduced, and according to one c o m m i t t e e m e m b e r , " a n y t i m e it c a m e up there was a battle." L o w e y w a s a m e m b e r of the c o m m i t t e e and her c l a i m s that t h e s e legislative riders did not belong in Appropriations bills were unavailing. Pro-life c o m m i t t e e chair B o b Livingston ( R - L a . ) allowed the proposals to c o m e to a vote, and the p r o - l i f e position a l m o s t a l w a y s p r e v a i l e d . Later, R u l e s C o m m i t t e e chair G e r r y S o l o m o n ( R - N . Y . ) , w h o was also strongly pro-life, structured rules allowing floor votes on anti-abortion riders, virtually all of which p r o d u c e d pro-life majorities.

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Many attributed the H o u s e ' s obsession with abortion rights to the aggressiveness of C C W I members. But most committee and floor actions on the issue were initiated by anti-abortion Republicans. They capitalized on their leaders' ability to define the agenda, control the terms and forum of the debate, and determine the ground rules governing its disposition. And when critics advised C C W I members to lower their voices on the issue, exasperated congresswomen heatedly pointed out that they had no choice but to respond to the unremitting challenges launched by the new Republican majority. One staff member explained C C W I behavior in this way: In previous years, there had been a general feeling of support for freedom of choice. But the 104th Congress developed a strong anti-choice environment. As a result, the Caucus's focus on abortion was not a matter of congresswomen being proactive. Caucus members were responding to conservative challenges to abortion rights, and they were reacting defensively to try to head these challenges off.

Pro-choice forces almost always lost because, according to one staff member, there were now at least 221 rock-solid abortion opponents. She added: The new mood in the House encouraged members who had been with us 50% of the time to turn against us 90% of the time. Some Republicans were so excited about being in the majority that they went down the line with the leadership. Leaders also put pressure on some who could have gone either way on the issue. In the meantime, some male Democrats were so spooked by the 1994 election that they began to exercise greater caution on women's rights issues.

During the 104th Congress, 104 bills considered by the House Judiciary Committee had the word "abortion" in them. More than fifty roll call votes were taken on reproductive rights issues, more, calculated one staff member, than in any Congress in the preceding ten years. Pat Schroeder later observed: "It seemed the conservatives had a fast breeder anti-abortion amendment reactor that kept producing amendments prohibiting abortions on interstate highways, federal prisons or whatever else they could cook up" (Schroeder 1997, p. 112). Pro-choice forces lost all but four abortion-related roll call votes, two in 1995, two in 1996. All four dealt with appropriations for Title X of the Public Health Service Act, a family planning measure. Because its impact was to decrease conception, and thereby decrease demand for abortions, some pro-life members supported it. In the process, feminists

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had to f i g h t off an e f f o r t by A p p r o p r i a t i o n s c h a i r B o b L i v i n g s t o n to eviscerate Title X by transferring its f u n d i n g to the states through block grants. T h e proposal would have given states discretion in d e t e r m i n i n g h o w (or w h e t h e r ) f a m i l y p l a n n i n g f u n d s w o u l d be used. L i v i n g s t o n ' s critics saw it as a way of a l l o w i n g the states to limit the c o u n s e l i n g clients w o u l d r e c e i v e on c o n t r a c e p t i o n and a b o r t i o n , and L o w e y and M o r e l l a w o r k e d with R e p u b l i c a n s J a m e s G r e e n w o o d of P e n n s y l v a n i a and John Porter of Illinois to revive Title X on the H o u s e floor. Other H o u s e a p p r o p r i a t i o n s m e a s u r e s c o n t a i n i n g abortion restrictions were approved, although many failed in the Senate or were vetoed by the president. N e w limits on abortions w e r e attached to the 1996 T r e a s u r y and Postal bill, and similar p r o v i s i o n s w e r e inserted in bills f u n d i n g the D e p a r t m e n t of D e f e n s e and the District of C o l u m b i a . T h e A p p r o p r i a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e prohibited federal m o n e y f r o m being spent on biomedical research involving h u m a n embryos, and assured medical schools they would not lose Medicare f u n d i n g if they chose not to teach students how to p e r f o r m abortions (Wells 1995). T h e H y d e A m e n d m e n t w a s o n c e again attached to the Health and H u m a n S e r v i c e s appropriations bill, and O k l a h o m a Republican Ernest Istook persuaded the Appropriations C o m m i t t e e to give states the option of w i t h h o l d i n g M e d i c a i d f u n d s f o r abortions on any g r o u n d s other than to save the life of the m o t h e r — a provision ultimately stripped f r o m the bill on the H o u s e floor. In the m e a n t i m e , the International Relations C o m m i t t e e , chaired by m o d e r a t e p r o - c h o i c e r B e n j a m i n G i l m a n of N e w York, failed to report out a F o r e i g n O p e r a t i o n s bill b e c a u s e it was so bitterly d i v i d e d on w h e t h e r to authorize f u n d s for international f a m i l y p l a n n i n g organizations o f f e r i n g abortion as an option. Rather than submit a measure that w o u l d be d e f e a t e d on the f l o o r by c o n s e r v a t i v e R e p u b l i c a n s , s o m e of w h o m w e r e p r e p a r e d to oust him as c h a i r m a n , G i l m a n c h o s e to allow the d e c i s i o n s to be m a d e in a n o t h e r f o r u m . T h e v a c u u m w a s filled by the A p p r o p r i a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e , w h i c h v o t e d to cut s p e n d i n g to international f a m i l y p l a n n i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n s that c o u n t e n a n c e d abortion c o u n s e l i n g — w h e t h e r or not resources used to underwrite the counseling were supplied by the United States. O n e pro-choice veteran Republican c o n g r e s s w o m a n saw the issue not as f u n d i n g abortions, but as f u n d i n g obstetrical and g y n e c o l o g i c a l c a r e for w o m e n . H e a l t h y m o t h e r s , she a r g u e d , p r o d u c e healthy b a b i e s . S h e d e s c r i b e d the a g o n i z i n g d e c i s i o n she faced: B i l l s on international f a m i l y planning s h o u l d h a v e c o m e f r o m G i l m a n ' s International Relations C o m m i t t e e , but w e have not got one

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Women and Power on Capitol Hill for years b e c a u s e o f the [abortion] issue. A n d s o e v e r y t h i n g w a s tossed into the appropriations bill and debated on the floor. That's w h y these appropriations bills e n d e d up b e i n g a disaster. You c o u l d not deal with them b e c a u s e they had t h e s e anti-abortion p r o v i s i o n s in them. A n d yet, s o m e o f the other p r o v i s i o n s were s o g o o d , that I wanted to vote for them. S o I did, e v e n though I didn't like the strong anti-abortion language.

T h e r e were so m a n y votes on issues with abortion rights implications that C C W I m e m b e r s f o u n d t h e m s e l v e s struggling simply to k e e p other priorities alive. P r o g r a m s that had been around for years, such as Aid to F a m i l i e s with D e p e n d e n t Children, H e a d Start, and school lunches, competed for time with the abortion fights, which was one reason the caucus did not get around to submitting W o m e n ' s Health Equity and Equal E c o n o m i c Opportunity bills until well into the second session. A b o r t i o n o p p o n e n t s p r e v a i l e d in c o m m i t t e e and on the floor, in part, b e c a u s e for the first time they were able to rely on the high-profile e f f o r t s of p r o - l i f e c o n g r e s s w o m e n . P r e v i o u s d e b a t e s on the issue had been led largely by men, notably N e w J e r s e y ' s Chris Smith and H e n r y H y d e of Illinois. T h e s e s a m e c o n g r e s s m e n w e r e p r o m i n e n t in 1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 6 , but they were j o i n e d by first-term Republican w o m e n w h o were e n c o u r a g e d by G O P leaders to put a " w o m a n ' s f a c e " on anti-abortion a r g u m e n t s . R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s L i n d a Smith (Wash.), B a r b a r a C u b i n , A n d r e a S e a s t r a n d (Calif.), S u e M y r i c k , and H e l e n C h e n o w e t h m a d e speeches on the subject, and if Chris Smith, Hyde, and Charles C a n a d y of Florida w e r e the "stars of the show," d e v i s i n g w i n n i n g strategies, these G O P w o m e n were an important " s u p p o r t i n g cast," i m p l e m e n t i n g tactics. T h e y w r o t e " D e a r C o l l e a g u e " letters, lobbied other H o u s e m e m b e r s privately, and w e r e as f o r c e f u l in m a k i n g their c a s e as prochoice w o m e n were in m a k i n g theirs. A c c o r d i n g to a lobbyist for a prochoice organization: Their role w a s s i g n i f i c a n t every time the issue c a m e up. T h e y s p o k e out on the f l o o r and that g a v e s o m e credibility to their side that they never had w h e n I started w o r k i n g on the i s s u e 15 years a g o — w h e n there were no w o m e n on their side speaking. They make up a cadre of w o m e n w h o are representing C o n c e r n e d W o m e n for A m e r i c a , the R i g h t - t o - L i f e C o m m i t t e e , and various Christian organizations. T h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s n o w have w o m e n a d v o c a t e s w h e n years a g o they had mainly male s p o k e s m e n .

T h e a d v a n t a g e s of h a v i n g vocal pro-life w o m e n in the H o u s e w a s driven h o m e d r a m a t i c a l l y d u r i n g d e b a t e on a bill b a n n i n g a late-term

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abortion procedure that pro-choice partisans referred to as "intact dilation and extraction" and pro-lifers called "partial-birth abortion." The battle centered not on whether to adopt the ban, but on whether protecting the health as well as the life of the mother should be grounds for an exemption from the ban. Pro-life forces were hugely successful in turning the public against the procedure—principally with graphic portrayals of how physicians abort a late-term fetus. And even members who defined themselves as pro-choice were revolted enough to vote against the health exemption. The demoralization of one pro-choice Republican staffer reflected the frustrations felt by like-minded allies: From the day, from the instant I l o o k e d at the bill, I k n e w w e were w h i p p e d . We w o r k e d with other R e p u b l i c a n o f f i c e s and with the W o m e n ' s C a u c u s . . . to get o u t s i d e groups to run a "big picture" thing, and they e v e n t u a l l y started getting [ h e l p f u l ] editorials around the country, but w e just k n e w w e were d o o m e d . . . . [I] w a s running this desperate battle, trying to think h o w I c o u l d structure [our position], what kind o f m e s s a g e I c o u l d structure, and w h e r e I c o u l d run the m e s s a g e s o that I c o u l d turn this thing around, k n o w i n g that it l o o k e d bad, and it did. It l o o k e d really bad the w h o l e w a y through.

Under L o w e y ' s leadership, the C C W I played a leading role in trying to defeat or modify the measure. The caucus held press conferences, orchestrated floor strategies, and wrote "Dear C o l l e a g u e " letters. Women who had undergone the procedure were invited to Washington to meet with the president, administration officials, and legislators. They testified before committees, pointing out that some were pro-life, that they were mothers several times over, and that the late-term abortion procedure was deemed essential by their physicians if they were ever to have additional children. Rosa D e L a u r o ( D - C o n n . ) and Pat Schroeder were especially passionate about the issue. S c h r o e d e r ' s p o w e r f u l pro-choice orientation was partly due to her near-death experience during the birth of one of her own children. She and others on the Judiciary Committee cited data compiled by the Health and Human Services Department revealing that one in four women encounter complications during their pregnancy and that the maternal mortality rate was habitually underestimated. The undercount occurred because the states applied narrow criteria to define "maternal death." Most considered death during labor or on the delivery table as the only circumstance under which a pregnant w o m a n ' s death could be attributed to "childbirth." In other Western countries, if a woman dies within a year of having a baby, authorities are obligated to

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explore the possibility that childbirth contributed to her death (Schroeder 1997, p. 124). During committee debate, the Colorado Democrat offered a health exemption amendment, but it was rejected on a 13-20 party-line vote. Opponents of the ban tried to contextualize the issue as one affecting a w o m a n ' s health, not her reproductive rights, but their support of a procedure seen as gruesome did not lend itself to thirty-second sound bites. Many rallied behind the Newborns and Mothers Protection Act of 1995, a measure requiring a minimum forty-eight-hour hospital stay for new mothers, but it proved to be a weak counterpoint to the massive criticism being directed against late-term abortions. A m o n g pro-choice Republicans, C C W I members Nancy Johnson and Jan Meyers were particularly active, speaking out during debate and button-holing m e m b e r s one-on-one to make their case. J o h n s o n ' s description of what it is like to have lost a child was especially affecting but, in the end, unavailing. Pro-choice forces were playing against a stacked deck. Henry Hyde and Charles Canady were respectively chairs of the committee and subcommittee responsible for shaping the legislation, and rank-and-file committee members, disproportionately from the South, were solidly pro-life. One aide observed: [The pro-life] people controlled the debate; they controlled the hearing; controlled w h o spoke. It was very frustrating. [They] controlled the issue, the legislative language in the b i l l — e v e r y t h i n g about the bill. We played the hearings every which way. We went, participated, got frustrated. We didn't get the best press either. People kept saying, "Why did you bring this up?" We didrt't bring it up [speaker's emphasis]. We were trying to defend late-term abortions. But when there's millions of dollars poured into a public relations effort and when you don't have the enviable grassroots resources of the right-to-life forces, you're stymied. . . . [They] portray w o m e n w h o have late-term abortions as frivolous, as morally depraved. . . . We were arguing for w o m e n w h o were pregnant and wanted to be pregnant—but for w h o m something went wrong. [Late-term abortions] were the only w a y to rectify the problem so they could b e c o m e pregnant again, so their health w o u l d not be imperiled. We had a very difficult time making that argument.

The six first-term Republican congresswomen made the C C W I ' s task even more forbidding. They were all active in promoting the ban, and Representative Enid Waldholtz played a unique role. She was pregnant when the bill reached the floor, and the personal experience she brought to bear, an experience that her physical appearance authenticated, was

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telling. Her healthy pregnancy made it easier for colleagues so disposed to minimize such things as S c h r o e d e r ' s brush with death. Male colleagues could now infer that there were many w o m e n of childbearing age who supported the ban. Although Waldholtz was not initially prominent in debate, she later discounted arguments that the bill provided inadequate protection for w o m e n ' s health, suggesting, as did her male allies, that a health exception would render the ban meaningless. She later managed floor debate on the rule, and one Democratic staff member observed that "Enid's impending motherhood gave her much greater credibility on the issue." Another remarked in an interview: "[W]ith her being pregnant, here she comes, waddling down on the floor with her stomach sticking way out to talk about unborn children. I mean, on the other side of the aisle you can't attack her too much because here is this big pregnant woman." Perhaps even more credible support for the ban came f r o m prochoice C C W I m e m b e r Susan Molinari. The New Yorker often m i f f e d Republican colleagues by her outspoken support for abortion rights. But after agonizing over the proposed ban, she embraced it. The sources of her ambivalence were reflected in later recollections: There are many people . . . w h o are opposed to abortion, but have no wider a g e n d a when they a d v o c a t e that w o m e n lose their right to choose. . . . There are too many w h o use abortion and religion to hide their misogyny, and who have an agenda that goes well beyond ending abortion. They are " p r o - l i f e " and " a n t i - e v e r y t h i n g else," f r o m birth control to sex education to day care. (Molinari 1998, p. 139)

But Molinari ultimately voted for the ban because she was pregnant at the time and, as she said, "I knew that things felt different at eight months than they did at three" (Molinari 1998, p. 142). Pro-choice C C W I members had tried to persuade the New Yorker to use her position in the Republican leadership to defeat or m o d i f y the prohibition. But according to one Democratic congresswoman, Molinari responded that, because she was in the leadership, "she could not stray too far off the reservation." Republican women who opposed or had doubts about the ban, like Johnson and Meyers, worked independently of the C C W I to limit its application. Aides in their offices cooperated with N A R A L , Planned Parenthood, NOW, and the Center for Reproductive Law and Public Policy to ensure that pro-choice literature found its way into the offices of moderate Republicans. These groups were also advised about which

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Republican House members could not be moved from the pro-life position, a prohibitively large number according to one source who added that "their phones were ringing off their hooks" with calls from abortion foes, and "even if they d o n ' t like the bill, they are going to do what their constituents tell them to do." Under the terms of the bill, doctors performing late-term abortions could be arrested, jailed, and placed on trial before being given an opportunity to claim that the procedures they performed, or the circumstances under which the abortions were performed, were exempted from the ban. Johnson fought unsuccessfully to make the plight of doctors less daunting. S o m e G O P women opposing the bill worried that their party's uncompromising pro-life stance was alienating Republican women and causing them to abandon the party. One aide remarked that her boss believed that "the party was hemorrhaging internally and creating rifts between good, loyal party members." A G O P congresswoman who ultimately voted against the ban, looked back on the struggle as one of the most wrenching of her career: I found m y s e l f at the epicenter of the debate on abortion. I'm prochoice. I believe in "choice" but I don't believe in willy nilly abortion. I never have. . . . In the 104th Congress leaders of my party, recognizing the district I represented, honored my right as a human being to believe what I believe and they stood 100% behind me, an act which I will never forget because there were [constituents] so vitriolic [that] it made me feel perfectly horrible. And s o m e of these people have a hard time right now dealing with me as a human being. S o m e of them have never talked to me again. So it's a good thing I sit on the Republican side as a w o m a n e s p o u s i n g w o m e n ' s interests, and e s p e c i a l l y this one particular interest. Because I don't represent the enemy, I represent a lot of women.

Pro-choice Republican Deborah Pryce, w h o ultimately voted in favor of the bill, nonetheless tried to soften some of its sterner features. Using her position on the Rules Committee, she succeeded in prolonging debate on whether the measure should contain a health exception, and she was the only Republican on the committee who voted to allow the full House to consider an amendment to that effect. Pryce also urged that the House be allowed to vote on a proposal permitting doctors to defend their decisions to save the life of the mother before being jailed and tried for allegedly violating the act. Her motion failed on a 6 - 6 committee vote (Dodson 1998). At the end of the day, the CCWI failed to block the ban on late-term abortions, just as it failed to head off almost all other proposed abortion

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restrictions. Even though a presidential veto of the bill was ultimately sustained in the Senate, the measure's failure gave CCWI members little comfort. They now served in a House with a decidedly pro-life orientation. They had failed to persuade almost all new Republican women to join their organization, and claims that the caucus spoke for American women were now in doubt. For the first time, measurable numbers of Republican congresswomen were voicing pro-life opposition to what was arguably the most controversial issue directly affecting women. And senior pro-choice Republican women who worked behind the scenes to influence party leaders had little to show for their labors. At the same time, Democratic congresswomen were demoralized, and some concluded that the C C W I was not doing enough for reproductive rights. They succeeded for the first time in placing the issue prominently in the 1996 Women's Health Equity Act, but were frustrated when the bill was delayed and ultimately ignored. Many believed that abortion was not the only (or even the central) w o m e n ' s concern requiring their attention, but its reappearance time and again in different contexts made it, for them, the tar baby of the 104th Congress. They expended gobs of political capital on a cause that was defeated in vote after vote, all the while losing confidence in the viability of a caucus that had already been crippled by the loss of its staff. But perhaps most important, their preoccupation with abortion rights—a preoccupation forced on CCWI members by both hostile external forces and by internally grounded passions to keep "choice" alive—sapped energies needed to fight other feminist battles. After the 104th Congress adjourned, one senior Democratic congresswomen remarked: "There is so much we haven't done. Bladder incontinence is the number one reason women have to drop out of the military. The whole area around amenorrhea we really don't know a lot about. On eating disorders we haven't scratched the surface yet." Given the political complexion and preoccupations of the 104th Congress, CCWI members could not realistically promote new feminist issues. But they could try to preserve past gains, which meant that the CCWI had to abandon its agenda for change, and resort to strategies of defense and incrementalism.

A Tale of Two Sessions For the CCWI, the two sessions of the 104th Congress were starkly dissimilar. During the first session, caucus leaders fought tirelessly to defeat

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threats to prior feminist gains, encountering defeat after defeat, sometimes reveling not because of a victory but because they had staved off challenges to policies once thought to be secure. In the second session, they recouped earlier losses and recorded some modest victories. Overall, the 104th Congress was arguably the most challenging and difficult the organization encountered during its twenty-year history. By virtue of their newly won leverage on committees and their access to House leadership, Republican women were, for the first time since the caucus was created, more instrumental than Democratic women in securing feminist policy goals. Caucus activities in the 104th Congress followed scripts similar to those adhered to in past years. Its leaders testified before House committees, especially the Appropriations and Rules Committees. They sent letters to committee chairs, to House conferees, to the Speaker, and to Senate leaders. They arranged for a series of one-minute speeches on selected subjects at the start of daily House sessions, and they reserved time during Special Orders for extended debate at the end of these sessions. The cochairs regularly called press conferences to help dramatize the group's policy agenda, and they scheduled a half dozen briefings on such topics as teenage pregnancy, educational equality, and reproductive rights. At the same time, they worked closely with such organizations as the National Breast Cancer Coalition, the Osteoporosis Foundation, the Older Women's League, and Amnesty International, and they met regularly with administration cabinet officials, including the State Departm e n t ' s Madeline Albright, and Health and Human Services secretary Donna Shalala. Caucus leaders led forums on child care, contraception, Title IX, and women in small business, and during the closing weeks of 1996 they questioned top Army brass in secret to learn more about accusations of sexual assault and harassment of women trainees at Aberdeen Proving Grounds and other Army bases. Reproductive rights had never been a settled issue and the persistent defeats in the first session, though unremitting and demoralizing, were predictable. More unexpected were attacks on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), Title IX, the Women's Educational Equity Act, the Legal Services Corporation (LSC), and affirmative action. Some crippling bills were enacted. The LSC, which provides free legal aid in divorce, custody, child support, and domestic violence cases, lost one-third of its funding for fiscal year 1996, and it was forced to close 100 offices and dismiss 20 percent of its staff. Educational Equity Act programs were

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cut f r o m $4 million to zero in fiscal year 1995 budget, with only $2 million restored the f o l l o w i n g year. P o r t i o n s of the VAWA w e r e vitiated u n d e r an A n t i - T e r r o r i s m A c t that m a d e it e a s i e r f o r i m m i g r a t i o n o f f i cials to d e n y entry to u n d o c u m e n t e d aliens w h o had b e e n v i c t i m s of domestic violence. First-session f u n d i n g cuts f o r the Equal E m p l o y m e n t O p p o r t u n i t y C o m m i s s i o n and Title IX were only partially restored in the second session. Without a spirited e f f o r t by Susan Molinari, C o n n i e Morella, and Nita Lowey, a m o n g others, the bulk of p r o m i s e d f u n d i n g for the VAWA in the first session w o u l d h a v e b e e n lost. T h e s a m e C C W I p l a y e r s w o r k e d hard to d e f e a t an attempt to shift Title X f a m i l y p l a n n i n g prog r a m s to the states under a block grant. T h e c a u c u s also contributed to r e j e c t i o n of w h a t s p o n s o r s S e n a t o r B o b D o l e and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Charles C a n a d y called "the Equal Opportunity Act of 1995," a m e a s u r e designed to end a f f i r m a t i v e action in e m p l o y m e n t and the a w a r d i n g of g o v e r n m e n t contracts. T h e c h a l l e n g e s d o g g i n g C C W I leaders w e r e s u m m e d up in the c o m m e n t s of a f e m i n i s t interest g r o u p representative: What w e faced [in the 104th C o n g r e s s ] w a s a climate that w a s so different from the 103rd and f r o m e v e r y other C o n g r e s s in m y l i f e t i m e that it w a s very d i f f i c u l t for m y organization and the C a u c u s to be truly e f f e c t i v e . We all had to learn h o w to function in a climate where there w a s virtually no h o p e of getting anything p o s i t i v e through, o f advancing our agenda at all. T h e only hope w a s to hold the line so that not a lot of d a m a g e w a s d o n e to our i s s u e s . T h e 104th C o n g r e s s reopened everything that any of us cared about and had w o r k e d on for years and years. Whether it w a s in the field of education, in the field o f poor w o m e n , whether it w a s reproductive rights, health care, civil r i g h t s — e v e r y t h i n g y o u can think of w a s under attack.

A c c o r d i n g to W o m e n ' s Policy Inc., only two m e a s u r e s of special benefit to w o m e n b e c a m e law in 1995, a f i g u r e d w a r f e d by the thirty bills e n a c t e d in 1993. L o w e y was a p p a l l e d by the C C W I ' s r e c o r d , noting, "This year has been the bleakest for w o m e n in my seven years in C o n gress. We h a v e seen the rights of w o m e n rolled b a c k w a r d in nearly every area" (Houston Chronicle, M a r c h 20, 1996). T h e second session witnessed a t u r n a b o u t in f e m i n i s t f o r t u n e s . By early 1996 the " R e p u b l i c a n r e v o l u t i o n " s e e m e d to have lost m u c h of its energy (Bader 1996, p. 203). G O P H o u s e m e m b e r s b e c a m e more independent, and the proportion of roll call votes on which a majority of one party voted against a m a j o r i t y of the other d r o p p e d f r o m 73 percent in 1995 to 56 p e r c e n t in 1996 (Rae 1998, p. 111). At the s a m e time,

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R e p u b l i c a n conservatives s u f f e r e d a decline in credibility after forcing a governmental shutdown. Also important were first-termers' growing fears that they might have misread what they thought was a m a n d a t e for c h a n g e — a concern a c k n o w l e d g e d by about half of t h e m — i n the f a c e of a l o o m i n g midterm election (Barnett 1999, p. 45). N e w t G i n g r i c h ' s dismal public o p i n i o n ratings and i n c r e a s i n g i m p a t i e n c e with C o n g r e s s p r o m p t e d the S p e a k e r to strike a m o d e r a t e tone, p u l l i n g his party to the center (Barnett 1998, p. 194). But the second session also saw the C C W I recover its equilibrium after a year of frantically dousing one fire after another, and some of its agenda items gained acceptance as Republican c o n g r e s s w o m e n w o r k e d closely with m o d e r a t e G O P men. T h e most r e m a r k a b l e f e m i n i s t gains were m a d e in w o m e n ' s health. T h e H e a l t h I n s u r a n c e Portability and A c c o u n t a b i l i t y ( K a s s e b a u m / K e n n e d y ) Act was signed in August 1996 and provided continued health c a r e c o v e r a g e for w o r k e r s w h o c h a n g e d or lost their j o b s . It also narr o w e d the g r o u n d s u n d e r w h i c h c o v e r a g e c o u l d be d e n i e d b e c a u s e of p r e e x i s t i n g m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s . I n c l u d e d in the act were t w o W H E A p r o v i s i o n s . O n e , v i g o r o u s l y s p o n s o r e d by M o r e l l a and M o l i n a r i , prohibited insurers f r o m d i s c r i m i n a t i n g against v i c t i m s of d o m e s t i c violence. T h e s e c o n d , p r o m o t e d by L o u i s e S l a u g h t e r in the H o u s e and O l y m p i a S n o w e in the Senate, prevented insurers f r o m using a p e r s o n ' s genetic m a k e u p as a p r e e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n or as a basis f o r d e n y i n g insurance. Other measures e x p a n d e d insurance coverage for postpartum hospital stays, and required insurers w h o o f f e r e d mental health c o v e r a g e to set c o m p a r a b l e c o v e r a g e limits for both physical and mental ailments. W o m e n veterans were h e l p e d by legislation requiring periodic inspection of m a m m o g r a p h y p r o c e d u r e s at D e p a r t m e n t of Veterans A f f a i r s facilities. Legislation barring f e m a l e genital mutilation f o r girls under eighteen included a S c h r o e d e r - s p o n s o r e d provision to direct the I m m i gration and Naturalization Service to advise i m m i g r a n t s about the legal c o n s e q u e n c e s of p e r f o r m i n g the p r o c e d u r e in the U n i t e d States. A n d i n c r e m e n t a l gains were m a d e in a p p r o p r i a t i o n s f o r r e s e a r c h on breast cancer, ovarian cancer, and o s t e o p o r o s i s . O n e G O P c o n g r e s s w o m a n attributed m a n y of these c h a n g e s to R e p u b l i c a n w e a k n e s s a m o n g w o m e n voters: " T h e g e n d e r gap h e l p e d p r o m o t e health i n s u r a n c e r e f o r m in the 104th. T h e polls indicated that the top three issues w e r e e d u c a t i o n , health c a r e and the e n v i r o n m e n t , and that the R e p u b l i c a n s were failing miserably. . . . T h e party leaders had to do s o m e t h i n g . " T h e most d r a m a t i c e c o n o m i c victory f o r w o m e n d u r i n g the 104th C o n g r e s s was not brought about by the C C W I , although it had c h a m p i -

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oned such legislation for years. Paradoxically, the engine driving the change was the new Republican majority. On the first day of the 104th Congress, the House passed a measure granting to congressional employees on-the-job civil rights protections that American workers in the private sector had enjoyed for years. Capitol Hill employees would now be covered by such laws as the 1937 Fair Labor Standards Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the two-year-old Family and Medical Leave Act. During the second session, an additional half dozen measures that had been part of the 1996 Economic Equity Act were enacted. The minimum wage was increased to $5.15 an hour, and the limit on how much money nonworking spouses could save in a tax-deferred individual retirement account was raised f r o m $250 to $2,000. The same legislation required that steps be taken to ensure that parties to a divorce as well as survivors of spouses entitled to annuities were made aware of their rights—before they unwittingly signed away their benefits. The 1996 D e f e n s e Authorization Act protected military pension benefits for former spouses of military retirees who joined the civil service and rolled their military pensions into civil service pensions, a practice that had the effect of delaying distribution of benefits to spouses. An attempt by California Republican Robert Dornan to end this program altogether, and require f o r m e r spouses who had already received these benefits to give the money back, was blocked by the House National Security Committee. Schroeder, a committee member, promised an all-out gender war if the measure ever got to the floor (Schroeder 1997, p. 161). Caucus members were sharply divided on the second session's welfare reform law, but under the leadership of w o m e n on the Ways and Means Committee they coalesced effectively to help insert several key provisions. One significantly increased the amount of money states could spend to help welfare recipients and the working poor secure child care. A second strengthened the procedures by which child support payments could be collected from delinquent, noncustodial parents. Although the new law dealt severely with legal and undocumented aliens, it nevertheless allowed battered immigrant w o m e n who would have been legal immigrants were it not for the behavior of their abusers to receive benefits to the same extent as legal immigrants. In other legislation, the Legal Services Corporation was given authority to use nonfederal funds to assist undocumented victims of domestic violence who are married to their abusers. M i n d f u l of C h i n a ' s strict policy on birth control, Congress extended political asylum to victims of coercive pop-

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ulation control policies. S e x u a l assault, d o m e s t i c violence, and child a b u s e were also a d d r e s s e d in the s e c o n d session. M o l i n a r i , M o r e l l a , and L o w e y beat back efforts to cut VAWA f u n d i n g , and the antistalking provisions of the act were extended to apply to federal p r o p e r t y — w i t h restraining orders against stalkers a u t o m a t i c a l l y m a d e e f f e c t i v e in all states. I n d i v i d u a l s c o n v i c t e d on m i s d e m e a n o r c h a r g e s of d o m e s t i c v i o l e n c e were b a r r e d f r o m o w n i n g f i r e a r m s . C o n g r e s s also directed the F B I to create a national d a t a b a s e to help k e e p track of t h o s e c o n v i c t e d of sex c r i m e s against minors, and it extended N e w J e r s e y ' s " M e g a n ' s law," requiring all states to i n f o r m c o m m u n i t y law e n f o r c e m e n t agencies of the whereabouts of sex o f f e n d e r s after they had been released f r o m prison. Immigration legislation added stalking, domestic violence, and child abuse to the list of crimes for which aliens could be deported. In r e s p o n s e to a f e d e r a l court f i n d i n g that sexual assault d u r i n g a c a r - j a c k i n g did not constitute " s e r i o u s bodily injury," a c o n d i t i o n that increases the severity of the penalty for such crimes, C o n g r e s s clarified existing law by p l a c i n g sexual assault u n d e r the h e a d i n g of " s e r i o u s bodily injury." It also m a d e it a federal o f f e n s e to use a controlled substance, like R o p h y n o l , to f a c i l i t a t e a violent c r i m e , i n c l u d i n g rape. R o p h y n o l , w h o s e m a n u f a c t u r e and i m p o r t into the U n i t e d States w a s illegal, had been used to drug and disarm unsuspecting w o m e n and render t h e m vulnerable to sexual assault. Most of these victories could not have been won without the help of R e p u b l i c a n m e n . T h e health i n s u r a n c e p r o v i s i o n s w e r e ultimately c r a f t e d by an all-male task f o r c e led by Chief D e p u t y W h i p D e n n i s Hastert. It was Harold R o g e r s of K e n t u c k y to w h o m Morella appealed to h e l p k e e p VAWA p r o g r a m s alive. A n d it was A p p r o p r i a t i o n s subc o m m i t t e e chair J o h n Porter of Illinois and P e n n s y l v a n i a ' s J a m e s G r e e n w o o d w h o provided m u c h of the clout to save Title X. C o m m e n t ing on the d y n a m i c by w h i c h R e p u b l i c a n w o m e n and men c o m b i n e d f o r c e s on the w e l f a r e r e f o r m m e a s u r e , a W a y s and M e a n s C o m m i t t e e staff m e m b e r observed: The male members were persuaded to vote for child support for political reasons. T h e y did not feel that they had to be tough on dead-beat dads to b a l a n c e t o u g h n e s s on f e m a l e s in the w e l f a r e bill. That w a s never a consideration. Rather, I b e l i e v e the m a l e s had a certain willi n g n e s s to g i v e extra w e i g h t to what w o m e n said about i s s u e s like child care and child support—social issues. N o t all males, but a major-

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ity were prepared to defer to female members because they are women and therefore more sensitive to and knowledgeable about these issues.

The Erosion of Strategic Premises The C C W I ' s frustrations and policy failures in the 104th Congress stemmed fundamentally from an inability to realize most of its six strategic goals. Bipartisan cooperation between Republican and Democratic women was the exception rather than the rule. Claims of inclusivity had a hollow ring when so many congresswomen either refused to join the caucus or were members in name only. The group's organizational integrity was threatened by bitter policy disputes among members and by the loss of its professional staff. It was unable to establish a close working relationship with a hostile Republican House leadership, in sharp contrast to the ready access the group had had to Democratic leaders. And while White House support never flagged, the Clinton administration was so busy blocking threats to settled policy that it had little energy remaining to promote CCWI priorities. Elimination of the LSOs exacerbated antagonism between Republican and Democratic women. Partisan hostilities, largely latent in the past, became palpable soon after the 104th Congress convened. Democrats blamed Republican women for allowing Gingrich and company to undermine the CCWI, and Republican women began to have less to do with the caucus. One black Democratic congresswomen remarked in an interview: "Republican women are a distinct breed; they are in fact so different that sometimes I wonder where they came from and if they are truly women." Republican congresswomen, in turn, were keenly aware of Democrats' animus, and one observed: "I was stunned at the lack of [Caucus] support for any Republican legislative issues. I felt I was looked at by the Democratic women . . . as an odd person because I am a very strong Republican and fiscally conservative. . . . They wondered what I was doing in the Women's Caucus. Well I ' m in the Women's Caucus because I believe in women's issues." Antagonism between the two also grew out of predispositions shared by Democratic women first elected in 1992. They had never served with either a Republican president or a Republican House majority. During their first two years, they ignored Republican leaders and tended to treat G O P women as junior partners. Republicans had, after all, been in the minority for so long that they were not to be taken seri-

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ously. D e m o c r a t s , on the other h a n d , had o f t e n acted as if the C C W I was an instrument to p r o m o t e their o w n partisan and ideological objectives. In the 104th C o n g r e s s , these D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n were overw h e l m e d by their loss of access and i n f l u e n c e , and their distrust of R e p u b l i c a n s e x t e n d e d to G O P w o m e n with w h o m they had o n c e w o r k e d toward c o m m o n goals. Sour relations i n d u c e d s o m e D e m o c r a t s and s o m e R e p u b l i c a n s to think a b o u t a b a n d o n i n g the C C W I and create s e p a r a t e w o m e n ' s cauc u s e s . Patsy M i n k , a m o n g the most liberal of C C W I D e m o c r a t s , l a u n c h e d a " D e m o c r a t i c W o m e n ' s G r o u p , " w h i c h b e g a n to m e e t on Thursdays. Its m e m b e r s shared the view that Republican destruction of the L S O s had so w e a k e n e d the C C W I that it was pointless to continue the charade of bipartisanship. M i n k stated, " T h e R e p u b l i c a n s did a w a y with our other [ w o m e n ' s ] caucus by m a k i n g it very difficult to exist in a m o d e w e had b e c o m e a c c u s t o m e d to." R e p u b l i c a n w o m e n w h o c o n s i d e r e d b r e a k i n g a w a y c o n c l u d e d that since their party now c o n t r o l l e d the H o u s e , there was no need sit at a D e m o c r a t i c table w h e r e they had f o r m e r l y e n d u r e d indignities associated with s e c o n d - c l a s s m e m b e r s h i p . Said o n e R e p u b l i c a n s e c o n d termer, " B e i n g a m e m b e r of a C a u c u s that is a small m i n o r i t y of the H o u s e is i n c o m p a t i b l e with being a m e m b e r of the m a j o r i t y party, which after all sets the a g e n d a . " W o m e n in both parties credited L o w e y and Morella with o v e r c o m ing t h e s e c e n t r i f u g a l f o r c e s . T h e i r c l o s e p e r s o n a l ties t o g e t h e r with a d e t e r m i n a t i o n to resist the alienation and d e f e c t i o n s of other m e m b e r s helped salvage the organization during its darkest hours. Morella, particularly, was credited with keeping the group alive b e c a u s e she had so f e w allies within her o w n party. O n e black c o n g r e s s w o m a n o b s e r v e d that even under these difficult circumstances, "the C a u c u s meetings fostered a sense of sisterhood for those of us w h o did go to the m e e t i n g s and they e n h a n c e d my respect for C o n n i e Morella because she was literally carrying the load for her entire party." M o r e l l a ' s task was especially c h a l l e n g i n g b e c a u s e the R e p u b l i c a n leaders w e r e hostile to the C C W I and did w h a t e v e r they c o u l d to persuade Republican w o m e n to quit. Speaker Gingrich was no fan of bipartisanship, apart f r o m the lip service he paid it for tactical reasons, and, continuing a practice he had begun in the 103rd Congress, he met with R e p u b l i c a n w o m e n periodically to brief them and thereby m a k e C C W I a f f i l i a t i o n s e e m s u p e r f l u o u s . First-term G O P w o m e n w e r e especially p l e a s e d with the a r r a n g e m e n t . But s o m e R e p u b l i c a n c o n g r e s s w o m e n were u n i m p r e s s e d by an accessibility that d e c l i n e d as the 104th C o n -

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gress u n f o l d e d . O n e veteran explained the m e e t i n g s with Gingrich as an attempt by the leadership to address the g e n d e r gap, believing that cong r e s s w o m e n w o u l d p r o v i d e the " m a g i c f o r m u l a " f o r c l o s i n g the gap. A n o t h e r skeptic referred to the m e e t i n g s "as a pathetic attempt to m a k e it s e e m as if w o m e n w e r e b e i n g i n c l u d e d fin the d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e s s ] , w h e n , in fact, they w e r e b e i n g c o - o p t e d . " Still a n o t h e r d o u b t e d the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the meetings, noting that " t i m e a f t e r time b e f o r e w e k n e w it the new w o m e n had b r o u g h t u p the a b o r t i o n issue and I would just think, ' O h the hell with this. I ' v e been here before. Just let m e go h o m e . ' " B e f o r e long, m e e t i n g s with the S p e a k e r stopped. Threats to the bipartisan character of the C C W I were c o m p o u n d e d by the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s difficulties in recruiting new m e m b e r s and in sustaining the interests of w o m e n w h o retained their affiliations. Six of the seven n e w R e p u b l i c a n w o m e n not only r e f u s e d to j o i n the c a u c u s but w o r k e d actively to u n d e r m i n e its credibility. Their attacks on the caucus w e r e u n p r e c e d e n t e d , driven in part by a desire to gain the respect of their f e l l o w Republican revolutionaries, and they planted doubts in the minds of male colleagues about the extent to which the C C W I spoke for American womanhood. At the s a m e time, the n u m b e r of w o m e n w h o w e r e m e m b e r s in n a m e only grew. O n e D e m o c r a t i c c o n g r e s s w o m a n r e m a r k e d : The Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues is not an organization I am active in. I belong, but I don't feel it is really useful to me. . . . I'm not sure what it is supposed to do. I know the issues that are coming up. My staff and I research them and understand them, and I understand my constituents' views on them. So I don't know what the Caucus would provide to me beyond that.

T h e s e s e n t i m e n t s w e r e w i d e l y held by m e m b e r s of both parties, but were especially prevalent a m o n g w o m e n w h o c a m e to the H o u s e a f t e r the legislative service organizations had been eliminated. First-termers in the 104th C o n g r e s s had no w a y of k n o w i n g j u s t h o w v a l u a b l e the c a u c u s ' s p r o f e s s i o n a l staff services c o u l d be. T h e y had n e v e r had a c h a n c e to capitalize on the expertise, institutional m e m o r y , or entrepreneurial skills of in-house f e m i n i s t s w h o s e sole p u r p o s e w a s to address the n e e d s of C C W I m e m b e r s . A n d their i n d i f f e r e n c e tended to contradict claims that c o n g r e s s w o m e n w h o belonged to the caucus were fully c o m m i t t e d to its policy objectives. C a u c u s efforts to balance respect for diversity with consensus building o f t e n f o u n d e r e d . T h e R e p u b l i c a n a g e n d a and legislative strategies had the e f f e c t of polarizing m e m b e r s of the t w o parties. Proposed wel-

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fare legislation, for example, inflamed partisan divisions and triggered disputes among Democrats as well. Differences on whether job training for recipients should be made explicit in the bill and whether assistance should come in the form of block grants to the states prevented the CCWI from presenting a united front on the measure. Democratic women were shocked when moderate Republican CCWI members asserted that many poor women did not want to get off "the dole." And they reluctantly acknowledged that the only issues on which consensus could be reached were a few dealing with women's health. A liberal Democrat remarked, "There is no way the Caucus can coalesce around almost any issue. There is such a split between Democrats and Republicans on priorities that it poisons our discussion of almost every issue." No policy setback subverted CCWI effectiveness as much as its losing battles over reproductive rights. Because abortion debates recurred with dizzying frequency, and because CCWI leaders were forced to pour so much fruitless energy into countering attacks on Roe v. Wade, other priorities received less attention. At the same time, the caucus was increasingly associated with losing causes. In 1977 the CCWI had pointedly spared itself from such risks, declaring abortion to be the one issue on which the caucus would not take a position. By abandoning that strategic calculation, the CCWI left itself open to attack from a critical mass of new, pro-life members who made abortion the signature issue of their social revolution. No structural change in the 104th Congress undermined the avowed purposes of the caucus as much as the loss of its permanent staff. The slack was picked up by staff in the offices of the CCWI cochairs, and by Women's Policy Inc. Each cochair appointed a staff member to handle communications among offices of caucus members, keep them informed about breaking developments, advise them about the agenda for CCWI meetings, and help frame actions to be taken in the name of the caucus. WPI began to prepare weekly, quarterly, and annual reports designed to keep members conversant with the scheduling and legislation bearing on caucus interests. But these alternative arrangements did not fill the void left by the departing permanent staff. During the 103rd Congress, six professionals assisted by interns gave their undivided attention to caucus needs. Their budget topped $250,000 annually (Washington Post, February 15, 1995), and they used the office equipment and the furnishings and space in the Rayburn Building, much as any House member would. For years they had helped the caucus realize its objectives as catalyst, facilitator, incubator, and advocate for House feminists. Their departure meant that

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s o m e of these responsibilities would be neglected. A f f e c t e d was the C C W I ' s ability to build c o n s e n s u s on key issues. T h e time, i m a g i n a t i o n , and e x p e r t i s e n e e d e d to d i s c o v e r and r e f i n e the ideas on w h i c h c a u c u s m e m b e r s could a g r e e — a n d w h i c h c o u l d conceivably attract support f r o m n o n m e m b e r s — w e r e sharply curtailed. C a u c u s m e e t i n g s w e r e f e w e r and less p u r p o s i v e than they had b e e n . O p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r c o n g r e s s w o m e n to raise issues u n a d d r e s s e d by the s t a n d i n g c o m m i t t e e s , f l o a t ideas, r e i n f o r c e p r e f e r e n c e s , e x p l o r e lawm a k i n g possibilities, enlist cosponsors, and discover unintended consequences were diminished. Loss of a permanent staff also meant that task force activities were uncoordinated, and the viability of these subgroups b e g a n to deteriorate. Productive alliances with the Congressional Black C a u c u s , the H u m a n Rights Caucus, and other H o u s e groups were rarely struck. Links to f e m i n i s t groups outside the H o u s e were w e a k e n e d . And legislative strategies were less systematically devised and i m p l e m e n t e d . In the m e a n t i m e , the p r o d u c t of past C C W I research, the c a u c u s ' s reservoir of ideas, and its historical artifacts, now largely in the care of W P I , b e c a m e less accessible in a timely way. M e m b e r s and their staffs would have to rely on sources and materials no longer on Capitol Hill. Lost, too, w e r e the s u b j e c t - m a t t e r expertise, e v a l u a t i v e j u d g m e n t , and interpretive skill of people w h o had spent years developing these assets. In short, the basis f o r the g r o u p ' s institutional m e m o r y w a s seriously eroded. T h e c a u c u s ' s f a i l u r e to establish a g o o d w o r k i n g relationship with H o u s e majority leaders in the 104th C o n g r e s s was unique. F r o m its creation, c a u c u s c o c h a i r s had a l w a y s had the ear, e v e n if not a l w a y s the s u p p o r t , of D e m o c r a t i c S p e a k e r s and f l o o r leaders. S p e a k e r s Tip O ' N e i l l , J i m W r i g h t , and Tom Foley w e r e at least a p p r o a c h a b l e , and O ' N e i l l and Foley had j o i n e d the C C W I w h e n it o p e n e d its d o o r s to c o n g r e s s m e n . By c o n t r a s t , S p e a k e r G i n g r i c h and other G O P leaders s o u g h t actively to d i m i n i s h both its m e m b e r s h i p and its i n f l u e n c e . C o m m i t t e e chairs did the same, and even if the R e p u b l i c a n agenda had not c r o w d e d out other legislative initiatives, c a u c u s priorities w o u l d have received little attention. E f f o r t s to work through D e m o c r a t i c leaders w e r e equally h o p e l e s s i n a s m u c h as R e p u b l i c a n s r e f u s e d to consult minority party leaders on most matters. E l e v a t i o n of t w o G O P w o m e n , S u s a n M o l i n a r i and B a r b a r a V u c a n o v i c h , to s e c o n d a r y l e a d e r s h i p roles g a v e the c a u c u s little c o m fort. V u c a n o v i c h had never b e e n a C C W I m e m b e r , and her g e n e r a l l y c o n s e r v a t i v e positions m a d e her an unlikely c o n d u i t to G O P councils. M o l i n a r i , on the other h a n d , had j o i n e d the c a u c u s the m o m e n t she

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arrived in W a s h i n g t o n , but loyalties to S p e a k e r G i n g r i c h and other R e p u b l i c a n H o u s e leaders, w h i c h i n c l u d e d her h u s b a n d , inhibited aggressive promotion of caucus causes. S o m e claimed that since w o m e n m a d e up only a b o u t 7 p e r c e n t of R e p u b l i c a n H o u s e m e m b e r s (they m a d e up 16 percent of the D e m o c r a t s ) , f e m i n i s t c o n c e r n s could not be e x p e c t e d to c l a i m the m a j o r i t y p a r t y ' s attention. But o n e R e p u b l i c a n o b s e r v e r r e m a r k e d that it was not the n u m b e r s that m a d e w o m e n less influential. It was that the " t h i n k i n g " of the two w o m e n chosen for leadership positions " w a s just like the thinking of the guys at the head of the table." Molinari later described the d i l e m m a s she faced as a nominal m e m ber of the leadership while trying to p r o m o t e — a l l at o n c e — t h e interests of her party, feminist issues, concerns of her urban constituents, and her own political ambitions: I'd become the Vice Chair of the Republican Conference . . . but that was as far as a moderate female from the northeast could go in the Republican Conference. While my input was accepted and sometimes even acted upon, I could never feel like a real player. I was a member of the leadership, but I was not, for example, a member of N e w t ' s inner circle, the Speaker's advisory group, which is where ninety-nine percent of the decisions that are supposed to be made in leadership meetings are actually formulated. . . . Once I hit the woman wall, then how much could I really have accomplished? I was getting ahead, but I still hadn't been offered a place on any of the really important committees. The Republican Conference didn't care much about urban issues, so I couldn't accomplish as much as I would have liked for my district. The conservatives would never embrace me since I was immovable on my abortion position and bucked the party line too frequently on social policy issues they consider the sine qua non of trueblue conservatives. The liberals w o u l d n ' t call me one of their own because I believed fervently that the federal government was too big and unwieldy to right the wrongs of modern day America. (Molinari 1998, p. 260)

A m o n g the strategic objectives that traditionally guided the C C W I , c u l t i v a t i n g the support of the p r e s i d e n t was the one it c a m e closest to achieving in the 104th Congress. For all of President C l i n t o n ' s b a c k i n g and sliding, he was generally f i r m in p r o m o t i n g f e m i n i s t values. In his first two years, he had signed scores of m e a s u r e s endorsed by the caucus, and he had issued a half d o z e n e x e c u t i v e orders m a k i n g abortion m o r e accessible. F r o m the perspective of most f e m i n i s t organizations, he was the most empathetic president ever to occupy the W h i t e House. T h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o n t i n u e d to v o i c e support for c a u c u s policy

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goals during the second two years of the president's first term, but the humiliation Democrats suffered in the 1994 election sharply limited the extent to which he could add substantively to feminist gains. His efforts to defeat a balanced budget amendment, to head off elimination of federal agencies, and to prevent cutbacks in social programs sapped much of the administration's resources. Democrats used filibuster threats in the Senate and the president's veto power to frustrate Republican policy goals, but they were left with precious little political credit to be effectively proactive on most issues, including feminist issues. Consequently, although the caucus maintained a healthy rapport with the president, its failure fully to achieve other strategic objectives made developments in the 104th Congress a greater threat to its organizational vitality than any encountered since the caucus was established. The two cochairs selected to lead the C C W I in the 105th Congress were mindful of the group's vulnerabilities, and they acted quickly to try to secure its future.

Notes 1. According to regulations issued by the House Oversight C o m mittee on February 8, 1995, a C M O is "an informal organization of Members who share official resources to jointly carry out activities. . . . [It has] no separate corporate or legal identity apart from the Members who comprise it. . . . [It] is not an employing authority, and no staff may be appointed by, or in the name of a C M O . A C M O may not be assigned separate office space." 2. The matter was further complicated by the demand of Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney and other national black leaders that a statue of Sojourner Truth, a nineteenth-century black abolitionist and suffragist, also be placed in the Rotunda. They claimed that Truth's likeness had been part of the original sculpture, but was dropped prior to its completion. McKinney's objection was not acted upon (Bradley 1997). 3. Molinari was not the first congresswoman to campaign actively against another C C W I member. In 1982, Geraldine Ferraro campaigned against Margaret Heckler in a race against Barney Frank. That same year, she worked to defeat Millicent Fenwick when the N e w Jersey Republican ran against Bill Bradley for a Senate seat, although by then Fenwick had resigned from the C C W I (Ferraro 1985, p. 48).

6

Reclaiming the Initiative: 1997-1998

T

he 105th Congress served up an unprecedented challenge to the

Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues. The 104th Congress had reversed past achievements, shredded its agenda, and threatened its survival. Its resiliency would be tested during the next two years. Leading the caucus were the District of Columbia's Democratic delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton and C o n n e c t i c u t ' s Nancy Johnson. T h e new cochairs ran unopposed, and were joined in C C W I leadership positions by New Yorkers Carolyn Maloney (D) and Sue Kelly (R) as vice chairs. Norton had served as vice chair during the 104th Congress and, even though her selection as Democratic cochair was widely expected, she campaigned actively to secure unanimous support. Her status as a nonvoting delegate had limited her influence in the House. Caucus leadership now promised increased opportunities to publicize D.C. needs, the w o m e n ' s agenda, and her own policy priorities in ways not normally available to a "second-class congressional citizen." As one Republican staffer remarked, "Norton has no vote in the House, she's a minority member of the minority party, and the Republican leadership is inclined to ignore her." Her role as C C W I cochair would increase her visibility, better showcase her considerable skills, and possibly offer more hope to her mainly black constituents and to women of color generally. Johnson was the unanimous choice of Republican C C W I members, but was not at first certain she wanted the job. She was completing a two-year term as chair of the House Ethics Committee, and had been badly bruised by the panel's struggle with allegations against Speaker Newt Gingrich. The Connecticut c o n g r e s s w o m a n had been excoriated by Democrats who believed she was protecting her party leader through dilatory tactics while at the same time playing a complicit role in the 117

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decision to "reprimand" the Georgia Republican—a decision that grew out of a plea bargain with an independent counsel who was considering the more serious punishment of House censure and removal as Speaker. Many of Johnson's constituents identified her with both the protracted investigation and the tarnished Speaker, and in the 1996 election came within 1,600 votes of ousting her from a traditionally Republican seat. Ultimately, Johnson agreed to join Norton as C C W I cochair, and she solicited the support of G O P congresswomen. The position offered a relief from the hothouse atmosphere of the Ethics Committee, and as a leader of the C C W I she could increase her personal contacts with a wide range of executive branch officials. But the most important reasons she became cochair grew out of a belief in the efficacy of the caucus, concern that the organization was in danger of being disbanded, and the realization that her seniority, her moderate political orientation, and the high regard in which she was held by Republicans and Democrats alike made her the natural if not the only choice for the job. Norton and Johnson worked well together, exhibiting mutual respect. Both were enthusiastic, committed, and cerebral. Their styles differed markedly, but by each doing what she did best, the caucus endured. Norton worked tirelessly to promote the organization and its goals, paying close attention to detail, and ensuring that meetings and other planned events were adequately advertised and attended. She regularly followed up on the product of these events to try to reap the policy and public relations benefits implicit in their being held. Johnson, on the other hand, was less involved in day-to-day activities. Her strengths lay in persuading doubtful Republican w o m e n that caucus membership was worthwhile, in finding and defining the issues on which bipartisan consensus was more likely, in serving as a conduit between the caucus and majority party leaders, and in employing an impressive intellect and force of personality to try to secure feminist policy goals. The cochairs' complementary skills were maximized because the two women shared a common view about how to recover credibility the C C W I had lost in the 104th Congress, and how to make the organization more relevant in the 105th. They agreed to focus on a range of issues that would not deeply offend any congresswoman, regardless of her party or ideological orientation, and that would persuade Republican leaders that the caucus should be taken seriously. They also agreed to try to strengthen Women's Policy Inc. (WPI), and to restructure the C C W I ' s system of task forces. They concluded that all of these goals could be achieved by adhering more steadfastly to the strategic objectives

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that, until the 103rd Congress, had been faithfully pursued. This meant a membership that embraced all congresswomen, bipartisanship in pursuit of collective policy goals, more steadfast sources of information and analysis, exclusion of highly controversial issues, like abortion, from its agenda, and good working relationships with House leaders and the administration. Norton and Johnson set out to address each of these goals.

Recruiting New Members A more inclusive membership was the first objective the leaders tackled, each asking party colleagues to either retain their affiliation or join anew. Forty of the forty-nine congresswomen had belonged during the 104th Congress, and Norton and Johnson were determined to do better in the 105th. Norton had little difficulty persuading all Democrats to sign on. Few needed coaxing, although for some their membership was meaningless. She sent a memo to each highlighting the importance of the CCWI, promising committed leadership during the next two years and requesting full participation. She further proposed a special membership task force to assist with recruitment and improve the quality of participation. Two of its collateral goals would be to explore resumption of male membership and advance the prospect of drawing women Senators more fully into "our work," thereby increasing the likelihood of passing caucus priorities in both chambers. 1 The special task force was never formed, and the two related proposals never got off the drawing board. Johnson had the more daunting task. Accordingly, she approached each Republican congresswoman individually, noting the advantages of joining forces with other women. She believed that the last Congress "had been an anomaly" and that it was important for the CCWI to be inclusive during the next two years (Dallas Morning News, August 24, 1997). She told wavering colleagues that "abortion" would not be a caucus priority and that their membership would neither embarrass them nor prevent them from pursuing their own legislative goals. Reproductive rights would not be raised in the name of the caucus, she said, and members could take any position they chose during committee and floor deliberations. These assurances resonated with at least one veteran Republican who had never been a member. She remarked in an interview, "I joined the Caucus because Nancy Johnson asked me to join and she said she was not going to use [the caucus] as an abortion platform—

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which it has been in the past. I have nothing against joining and I like to join, but I ' m not going to be an apologist for my pro-life views." In the end, all but the two Republican first-termers, Jo Ann Emerson of Missouri and Kentucky's Ann Northup, affiliated with the CCWI. All four of the remaining conservative women first elected in 1994 signed on. 2 Johnson's effectiveness was evident in the observations of one of the four: "Nancy is an incredible woman . . . she hasn't allowed party lines to affect relationships. And she has been very instrumental in bringing women together." These once distant Republican conservatives were not prominent caucus members during the 105th Congress, but they now had reasons for being associated with the group. They were no longer overwhelmed by the furious tempo maintained during their first two years in the House, and as sophomores they could better manage their time. One of the four was considering a Senate race and sought a higher profile on w o m e n ' s issues. Another regretted that conservative women had not participated in the past, leaving a policy vacuum that she believed she could now fill. Several Republican women, new and old, viewed their identification with the C C W I as a way to improve their images with female constituents and possibly help their party narrow the gender gap. None was under the illusion that she could significantly affect caucus priorities, and a few did not go out of their way to publicize their membership. But they had no regrets. O n e sophomore c o n g r e s s w o m a n observed: "I haven't been able to attend as often as I want to . . . but, you know, there is a lot that we women share in the way we view [ w o m e n ' s ] problems. And the camaraderie that is created in the j o b s that we set out to do in representing our various constituencies means we have an awful lot in common; and its fun and comfortable to be with [other women]." The two first-term w o m e n w h o declined m e m b e r s h i p attributed their decisions to the C C W I ' s pro-choice reputation. Northup found the caucus a "divisive" rather than a harmonious presence in the House, adding: " I ' m against the politics of dividing people on teams. But that doesn't mean I don't think women are very important. There's a difference between each of us trying to walk in one another's shoes and being confrontational" (Dallas Morning News, August 24, 1997). She later became one of the most active proponent's of a constitutional amendment to ban late-term abortions. Even without the two first-termers, the CCWI could now boast the largest number of women members in its twenty-year history, fortynine, a figure that grew to fifty-three when all four of the women

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elected to fill vacancies created after the 105th Congress convened— Lois Capps (D-Calif.), Mary Bono (R-Calif.), Barbara Lee (D-Calif.), and Heather Wilson (R-N.Mex.)—affiliated with the group soon after they were sworn into the House. (These figures do not include nonvoting House members.) Mindful of its record numbers, the caucus seized on opportunities to call attention to itself and raise the profiles of present and former members. Norton and Johnson asked the House clerk to publish an updated edition of Women in Congress, a compilation of biographies and photographs of all the women who served in the House or Senate, and whose most recent edition had appeared in 1991. Hundreds of Washington notables attended WPI's gala marking the caucus's twentieth anniversary in October 1997, and later, Jennifer Dunn and Juanita Millender-McDonald organized a Women's History Month reception honoring caucus founders Elizabeth Holtzman and Margaret Heckler, as well as others who had played a prominent role in the group's development. Norton and Johnson worked with the House staff to improve the amenities of the Lindy Boggs Reading Room to help accommodate the caucus's increased numbers. And they joined WPI and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists in sponsoring a champagne reception for congresswomen filling vacancies in special elections. Their goals were to pump up the caucus's image, and to strengthen the esprit of its members.

Reinforcing Bipartisanship Norton and Johnson next turned their attention to devising means by which Republicans and Democrats could work together more closely. Among their first acts was to eliminate the task forces initially established in 1993 and replace them with legislative "teams." The step was taken, in part, because the term "task force" was being used to describe influential ad hoc groups that party leaders had been appointing to supplement or circumvent the work of standing committees. Consequently, using the same label for CCWI policy groups was both presumptuous and misleading. Moreover, several CCWI task forces had gradually become inactive, surfacing mainly at press conferences, when members would simply announce the bills they were introducing as part of a caucus omnibus package. Some of these caucus subgroups, like the one on reproductive rights, had been associated with controversial policies, and the cochairs believed that structural change would defuse the acrimony exhibited in the past among ideologically heterogeneous congresswomen.

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P e r h a p s most i m p o r t a n t , the " t e a m " c o n c e p t m o r e aptly c h a r a c t e r i z e d the bipartisan w o r k i n g relationships Norton and J o h n s o n hoped w o u l d d e v e l o p a m o n g caucus m e m b e r s . Team titles and jurisdictions were determined largely by J o h n s o n in consultation with other Republican w o m e n and with Norton. T h e C o n necticut R e p u b l i c a n met with all G O P c o n g r e s s w o m e n , e x p l o r e d the policies they believed the caucus should address, and asked each to sign on as a c o l e a d e r of a c a u c u s t e a m . T w e l v e of the thirteen R e p u b l i c a n s agreed, a f t e r which N o r t o n j o i n e d J o h n s o n in creating f o u r t e e n teams, two of w h i c h initially p o s s e s s e d no R e p u b l i c a n coleader. 3 T h e subject m a t t e r to be a d d r e s s e d by each t e a m (e.g., w o m e n - o w n e d b u s i n e s s e s , w o m e n and the military) was selected not only b e c a u s e it had occupied past caucus interests, but also because it was likely to be taken seriously by Republican leaders. There were no teams on, for example, improving the Family and Medical L e a v e Act, or on f a m i l y planning, reproductive rights, or equality for gays and lesbians. M e a n w h i l e , N o r t o n was c h o o s i n g f o u r t e e n D e m o c r a t i c c o l l e a g u e s to serve as team coleaders, selecting several j u n i o r m e m b e r s and a relatively large n u m b e r of racial and ethnic minority w o m e n . A m o n g the f o u r t e e n w e r e six A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n s , t w o H i s p a n i c s , and one Asian. Virgin Islands d e l e g a t e D o n n a C h r i s t i a n - G r e e n , f o r e x a m p l e , was tapped to lead the team on p r e v e n t i v e health services for w o m e n . A n d first-termer Loretta Sanchez, w h o spent m u c h of her time fighting off a protracted c h a l l e n g e to her 1996 H o u s e election, w a s n a m e d leader of the team on the H i g h e r Education Act. S o m e of N o r t o n ' s choices were c o n t r o v e r s i a l , but they g r e w out of s e n t i m e n t s e x p r e s s e d in a M a y 7, 1997, m e m o she and Johnson sent to m e m b e r s : In c h o o s i n g Team Leaders, w e have been mindful of the fact that l o w participation in s o m e Caucus activities is related to the fact that opportunities to offer leadership have not a l w a y s been available. Therefore, with f e w e x c e p t i o n s , w e have tried to i n v o l v e M e m b e r s w h o did not already have leadership r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s in other C a u c u s e s or H o u s e activities, e s p e c i a l l y since there are only a limited number of spots.

Later, r e m a i n i n g c a u c u s p a r t i c i p a n t s w e r e asked to a f f i l i a t e with one of the t e a m s . A l t h o u g h most c h o s e a t e a m , the great m a j o r i t y b e c a m e m e m b e r s in n a m e only, and most t e a m s rarely, if ever, c o n vened. N o n e t h e l e s s , t e a m j u r i s d i c t i o n s and responsibilities w e r e caref u l l y spelled out, and t e a m leaders w e r e e n c o u r a g e d to k e e p c a u c u s m e m b e r s i n f o r m e d about new d e v e l o p m e n t s within their subject-matter areas, m a k e f o r m a l r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s on bills under consideration, and

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organize b r i e f i n g s . T h e y w e r e also e x p e c t e d to suggest guest speakers f o r C C W I E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e m e e t i n g s , hold press c o n f e r e n c e s , s p o n s o r e v e n t s h i g h l i g h t i n g the i m p o r t a n c e of their policy priorities, and c o m m u n i c a t e C C W I positions to H o u s e and Senate c o m m i t t e e s and to the administration. T e a m s ' collective activities would help d e f i n e the C C W I ' s agenda. T h r o u g h o u t 1997 and 1998, m o s t legislative t e a m s barely met expectations. T h e y did little more than arrange for Special Orders, circulate " D e a r C o l l e a g u e " letters, and hold press c o n f e r e n c e s . S o m e did even less than that. O n the other hand, n o t a b l e success w a s scored by the t e a m on w o m e n - o w n e d b u s i n e s s e s , led by N e w York R e p u b l i c a n Sue Kelly and California D e m o c r a t Juanita M i l l e n d e r - M c D o n a l d . During the first session, they hosted a C C W I E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e meeting i n f o r m i n g c o n g r e s s w o m e n about the issues they planned to address, and later held a hearing on opportunities available to b u s i n e s s w o m e n interested in securing g o v e r n m e n t contracts. A C C W I - s p o n s o r e d p r o v i s i o n in a law p a s s e d in 1994, the F e d e r a l A c q u i s i t i o n S t r e a m l i n i n g Act, a s k e d f e d e r a l a g e n c i e s to e a r m a r k at least 5 p e r c e n t of their c o n t r a c t s for w o m e n - o w n e d firms. T h r e e years later f e w e r than 2 percent of federal c o n t r a c t s had g o n e to f e m a l e e n t r e p r e n e u r s . T h e h e a r i n g s highlighted the shortfall, p r o d u c e d r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s f o r r e d u c i n g it, and g a v e Kelly and M i l l e n d e r - M c D o n a l d j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i n t r o d u c i n g a " S e n s e of C o n g r e s s " resolution calling on federal agencies to live up to the 1994 goal. " T h e federal contracting issue," said Kelly, "is a glaring e x a m p l e of a good ol' b o y s n e t w o r k " (Roll Call, S e p t e m b e r 25, 1997). D u r i n g the m o n t h s that f o l l o w e d , they lobbied these a g e n c i e s and distributed " D e a r C o l l e a g u e " letters requesting support for the m e a s u r e w h e n it c a m e to the floor. On International Working W o m e n ' s Day, they held a press c o n f e r e n c e and s p o n s o r e d a Special O r d e r c e l e b r a t i n g W o m e n ' s History M o n t h to r e c o g n i z e b o t h the a c h i e v e m e n t s of busin e s s w o m e n and the g e n d e r - r e l a t e d o b s t a c l e s their c o m p a n i e s e n c o u n tered. Later the t w o c o n g r e s s w o m e n c o o r d i n a t e d a W o m e n ' s B u s i n e s s R o u n d t a b l e , and M i l l e n d e r - M c D o n a l d subsequently introduced legislation increasing Small Business Administration f u n d s for W o m e n ' s Business Centers, then operating in thirty-six states. T h e range of actions taken by Kelly and M i l l e n d e r - M c D o n a l d , and their periodic progress reports submitted to the caucus, were precisely what Norton and J o h n s o n had in mind w h e n they adopted the team conc e p t — n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the f a c t that Kelly, as a s u b c o m m i t t e e chair on the H o u s e Small B u s i n e s s C o m m i t t e e , cleared all important t e a m activities with her c o m m i t t e e chair, M i s s o u r i ' s J a m e s Talent, so that the

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C C W I would not work at cross-purposes with the c o m m i t t e e or subvert the Republican agenda. Few other teams were as energetic and resourceful. M u c h depended upon the extent to which team leaders were c o m m i t t e d to their cause, whether they were prepared to take the time to pursue team goals, and the degree to which they shared mutual respect with their coleaders. T h e team on j o b training and vocational education, for e x a m p l e , f o u n d e r e d because Republican coleader Susan Molinari resigned f r o m the H o u s e during the first session, and because Democratic coleader Patsy Mink had earlier distanced herself f r o m C C W I activities and was leader in n a m e only. T h e team on higher education hardly got off the ground because the energies of Democratic coleader Loretta Sanchez were consumed by the Republican challenge to her 1996 H o u s e election, and because coleader Marge R o u k e m a allocated little time to C C W I activities. S o m e Republican w o m e n participated minimally, choosing to invest their time in c o m m i t t e e and party leadership responsibilities rather than in C C W I activities. A f e w were hesitant to bring w o m e n ' s issues to the caucus because it had been led in the past by w o m e n w h o did not share their v i e w s , and several believed they c o u l d p r o m o t e w o m e n - r e l a t e d goals without caucus help because they were in the majority. A n u m b e r of D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n thought that the teams had been created without sufficient consultation. They believed that N o r t o n ' s criteria for selecting t e a m leaders had b e e n arbitrary, and that their political and p e r s o n a l interests had b e e n ignored. Nita L o w e y was d i s a p p o i n t e d b e c a u s e the task force on reproductive rights had not been replaced by a c o m p a r a b l e team. L o u i s e S l a u g h t e r was d i s p l e a s e d b e c a u s e she had been denied a leadership position on a team she preferred, and was assigned to head a t e a m w h o s e G O P c o l e a d e r was a c o n g r e s s w o m a n with w h o m she had little in c o m m o n . J o h n s o n and N o r t o n irritated s o m e socially c o n s e r v a t i v e m e m b e r s when they later created and led a team on contraceptive technology. T h e caucus cochairs addressed the issue of u n w a n t e d pregnancies, called for r e n e w e d g o v e r n m e n t r e s e a r c h on c o n t r a c e p t i o n , and urged i n s u r a n c e c o m p a n i e s to i n c o r p o r a t e c o n t r a c e p t i v e p r e s c r i p t i o n costs into health plans. T h e s e steps, they argued, w o u l d r e d u c e the i n c i d e n c e of abortions. S o m e c o n g r e s s w o m e n did not see it that way and accused J o h n son of resurrecting the issue of reproductive rights even though she had assured them the issue would be off the table when she invited them to j o i n the c a u c u s . O n e R e p u b l i c a n r e m a r k e d in an i n t e r v i e w : " I ' m h a v ing my r e s e r v a t i o n s [about the C C W I ] , T h e y are d o i n g m e e t i n g s on r e p r o d u c t i v e health, w h i c h is their way of s h o w i n g their [pro-choice]

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bias. So I ' m going to share my reservations with Nancy. But I think the reproductive health meeting will be a one-time seminar and I hope they are going to move on to other things." There were no resignations, however, even after Johnson and Norton conducted a high-profile hearing on contraception. Caucus members ultimately concluded that efforts to improve bipartisanship were generally successful, even if far from optimal. After her first year as cochair, Johnson boasted that the caucus was the only bipartisan group in Congress that met regularly "to talk about things, to coordinate and cooperate. That is very healthful in a legislative body, and women are good at that. The clear commitment to bipartisanship has enabled us to get things done" (Washington Post, October 22, 1997). Sue Kelly noted that attendance at caucus meetings was "way up," and that a greater range of substantive issues was being addressed. Florida Democrat Carrie Meek saw the increased participation of Republican women as strengthening the organization "to the point where it is truly a bipartisan Caucus and we are doing some good things together, particularly in women's health." Some participants noted the marginally increasing presence of some of the newly affiliated conservative Republicans. Johnson remarked that "these women have become better integrated into the Caucus than I expected . . . and they are making positive connections with the Caucus that many Democrats are unaware of." A G O P staff member said: I've been at these c l o s e d - d o o r meetings with just members and [these conservative] w o m e n have more of a c o m m o n bond with other w o m e n than y o u might think. . . . It w a s e a s y for the D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n to write these right-wingers off. They b e l i e v e d these conservative w o m e n did not care at all. [But] n o w they're sitting in the same room, and they say, "Oh, c o n g r e s s w o m a n so and so supports child care funding. I had no idea." Before, it w a s easier to call her a right-wing gun nut.

Strengthening the Caucus Infrastructure Weeks before the 1996 election, Norton sent a memo to Democratic congresswomen outlining the goals she would pursue if chosen CCWI coleader in the 105th Congress. 4 She began by asserting that the Democrats must retake the House and reestablish legislative service organizations (LSOs). As a congressional membership organization (CMO), Norton wrote, the CCWI was dogged by inefficiency, duplication of effort, and insufficient resources. The permanent staff, the research

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capabilities, and the institutional m e m o r y a v a i l a b l e to the c a u c u s in years past had to be recaptured, she argued, and this m e a n t restoration of L S O s . N o r t o n r e c o g n i z e d , h o w e v e r , that the return to D e m o c r a t i c ascend a n c y was by no m e a n s e n s u r e d , and the m e m o stipulated steps she w o u l d take in the e v e n t that R e p u b l i c a n s retained H o u s e control and r e f u s e d to resurrect L S O s . A b o v e all, she wrote, W o m e n ' s Policy Inc. had to be s t r e n g t h e n e d . S h e noted that W P I ' s f i n a n c i a l viability had b e c o m e tenuous. It had raised $ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 to p r o d u c e its biweekly, quarterly, and annual p u b l i c a t i o n s d u r i n g the past eighteen m o n t h s but, by the end of 1996 it had less than $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 in the bank to f u n d f u t u r e issues and to pay its three p e r m a n e n t staff m e m b e r s . Only thirty f e m a l e m e m b e r s of C o n g r e s s ( t w e n t y - s e v e n R e p r e s e n tatives and three S e n a t o r s ) and thirteen m a l e m e m b e r s (eleven in the House, two in the Senate) paid the $495 subscription price for W P I publications. A n d f e w e r than a dozen w o m e n ' s organizations were regular subscribers, a huge drop f r o m the 7 , 0 0 0 groups and individuals receiving caucus newsletters b e f o r e L S O s were abolished. T h e staff had little time to solicit c o n t r i b u t i o n s or market their product to w o m e n ' s advocacy groups, and the scarcity of resources left them without health benefits. Had it not been for the f r e e o f f i c e space provided by the A m e r i c a n C o l l e g e of O b s t e t r i c s and G y n e c o l o g y , W P I w o u l d h a v e g o n e b r o k e m o n t h s earlier. Moreover, its u s e f u l n e s s to caucus m e m b e r s had continued to be p r o b l e m a t i c , with one senior D e m o c r a t r e m a r k i n g that the n o n p r o f i t o r g a n i z a t i o n was seriously " s t r a p p e d f o r cash, and we h a v e n o b o d y we can call and ask, 'Can you get us a little r e s e a r c h ? ' " H o u s e Ethics C o m m i t t e e restrictions on h o w W P I might serve the C C W I placed a greater burden on the c o l e a d e r s ' staff and on the liaison staffers in m e m b e r s ' offices. It was these staffers w h o largely sustained the m o m e n t u m for m e m b e r s ' initiatives and helped the caucus maintain its role as a catalyst on w o m e n ' s issues. T h e y c o n t i n u e d the p r a c t i c e begun in the 104th C o n g r e s s of leading luncheon meetings attended by o f f i c e liaisons, sharing i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t p e n d i n g bills, o f f e r i n g insights about legislative strategies, and alerting participants to new initiatives that C C W I m e m b e r s were considering. M e m b e r s ' o f f i c e staffs, in turn, urged support for their b o s s e s ' priorities, and collectively constituted a n e t w o r k of policy specialists w h o c a m e to rely u p o n one a n o t h e r to a n s w e r q u e s t i o n s about legislation within their areas of expertise. But staff meetings were underattended, with no more than twelve to fifteen o f f i c e s represented at most, and with the n u m b e r of staffers f r o m

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D e m o c r a t i c o f f i c e s d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y h i g h e r than the n u m b e r f r o m Republican offices. O v e r time, m e e t i n g s b e c a m e pro f o r m a , shorter, and less e n m e s h e d in legislative b u s i n e s s . W P I r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s c o u l d not always be present, m a n y w h o attended were interns rather than p e r m a nent staff m e m b e r s , and the aide Norton had hired specifically to help her handle C C W I affairs, Erin Prangley, had to work o v e r t i m e to maintain the g r o u p ' s viability, e x p e r i m e n t i n g with different meeting times to try to increase turnout. It was this tenuous infrastructure that had earlier led Norton to propose giving W P I more responsibility, while simultaneously bolstering its f i n a n c i a l l y viability. To m a k e it m o r e u s e r - f r i e n d l y for m e m b e r s , and thereby increase the likelihood of their subscribing to W P I services, Norton proposed that it prepare reports on w o m e n ' s issues broken d o w n by c o n g r e s s i o n a l districts and states. She also suggested that W P I distribute a weekly fax to subscribers and establish an online Internet service. Norton r e c o m m e n d e d that W P I be allowed to affiliate with a university, an affiliation that w o u l d m a k e o f f i c e facilities and e q u i p m e n t m o r e accessible, give it greater recognition and prestige, and p r o v i d e health and other fringe benefits to W P I employees. Increased financial support, she argued, could c o m e f r o m an annual fundraising lunch or dinner. In O c t o b e r 1997, W P I affiliated with M o u n t Vernon College (which subsequently b e c a m e a c a m p u s of G e o r g e Washington University), and its staff g a i n e d a g r e a t e r m e a s u r e of f i n a n c i a l security. Later, it c o m piled a report, The Status of Women in the States, p r o v i d i n g state-bystate d a t a on w o m e n ' s political p a r t i c i p a t i o n , e c o n o m i c a u t o n o m y , e m p l o y m e n t earnings, and reproductive rights. M o r e detailed reports on w o m e n ' s status in a d o z e n states w e r e also p u b l i s h e d . W P I w o r k e d closely with N o r t o n and J o h n s o n to s p o n s o r the t w e n t i e t h - a n n i v e r s a r y fundraiser, f o r which h u n d r e d s turned out to see Bill and Hillary Clinton, to hear Secretary of State M a d e l i n e A l b r i g h t ' s keynote speech, and to r e m i n i s c e with A B C c o m m e n t a t o r and gala e m c e e C o k i e R o b e r t s , d a u g h t e r of f o r m e r c o n g r e s s w o m a n and C C W I stalwart L i n d y B o g g s . T h e gala was a resounding success, bringing in e n o u g h m o n e y to k e e p W P I up and r u n n i n g f o r a n o t h e r year or two. S h o u l d a f u t u r e H o u s e restore L S O s , W P I was prepared to m o v e back to Capitol Hill.

Promoting Consensus A m o n g the f a c t o r s i m p e d i n g the C C W I in the 104th C o n g r e s s was the u n r e m i t t i n g attention it was f o r c e d to give to the a b o r t i o n issue. T h e

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pro-life majority that e m e r g e d after the 1994 election forced pro-choice activists to counterattack forcefully, frequently, and ultimately in vain. A l t h o u g h the C C W I was not the only d e f e n d e r of r e p r o d u c t i v e rights, it w a s a m o n g the m o s t visible, and its e n e r g i e s and r e p u t a t i o n w e r e sapped by its repeated losses to conservative majorities. Even as the 105th C o n g r e s s c o n v e n e d , Johnson and Norton decided to scratch abortion rights f r o m the c a u c u s a g e n d a . T h e y b e l i e v e d that to do o t h e r w i s e would u n d e r m i n e their e f f o r t s to bring m o r e congressw o m e n into the organization, thwart what they hoped would be a resurg e n c e of b i p a r t i s a n s h i p , and s q u a n d e r c a u c u s r e s o u r c e s that c o u l d be better invested in other, winnable policy disputes. In an interview, Johnson later observed: I would say the Caucus was least effective in the last f 104th] Congress, the least effective it has ever been. . . . Reproductive rights was a very polarizing issue. . . . [But] w o m e n ' s issues are not just about abortion; they are across the board. So we consciously made that decision, and we have consciously [pursued] that issue in the Pro-Choice Caucus and not the C o n g r e s s w o m e n ' s Caucus. That has made a big difference both in our ability to focus on other things and our ability to get things done.

A f t e r r e m o v i n g a b o r t i o n f r o m c a u c u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n , the c o c h a i r s agreed to abandon their traditional reliance on o m n i b u s bills. For years, the C C W I had put together p a c k a g e s of policy proposals on " e c o n o m i c e q u i t y " and " w o m e n ' s h e a l t h , " a l l o w i n g each m e m b e r to i n c o r p o r a t e her legislative priorities into these catchall m e a s u r e s . Little attention was given to h o w p r o p o s a l s related to one a n o t h e r or e v e n to w h e t h e r they had a r e a s o n a b l e c h a n c e of being c o n s i d e r e d by a c o m m i t t e e , let alone by the full H o u s e . A f t e r the bills were i n t r o d u c e d , i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r s would use their entrepreneurial skills and connections, along with the caucus i m p r i m a t u r to try to pass one or more of the bills' provisions. O v e r time, m a n y w e r e a d o p t e d , especially d u r i n g the 103rd Congress. But as the 105th C o n g r e s s got under way, J o h n s o n and Norton concluded that the increasingly conservative character of the H o u s e r e n d e r e d dead on arrival o m n i b u s bills loaded d o w n with t w e n t y or more feminist priorities. A staff m e m b e r close to the leadership observed in an interview: The point was to focus on things we can actually achieve in this Congress, rather than trying to do these "big blanket things" that are useful for public relations purposes but really aren't necessarily any more

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effective. We may be better advised to [more narrowly] pursue some things we think we can get done. The big packages were very effective in the women's health debate in the late 1980s and early 1990s, . . . [but] we may be better off being more narrow in our scope these days.

Replacing the o m n i b u s bills was what Norton called "a more focused approach" (Congressional Record, August 3, 1998, p. H6881). She and Johnson initially had a general idea of the programs deserving attention, but only gradually did they identify seven specific legislative measures whose passage they believed was feasible. Selection of the seven evolved out of the judgment and priorities of the cochairs, the activities of C C W I teams, calculations about how receptive the full House and the Senate would be to each, and the strength of bipartisan support each e n j o y e d among C C W I members. Norton came to call these measures the " M a g n i f i c e n t Seven," remarking that " f o r the first time the Women's Caucus . . . has chosen not a wish-list, but a real list for passage" (Congressional Record, July 22, 1998, p. H6076). By most standards, almost all of the seven measures were relatively uncontroversial. They called for small (or no) expenditures, and were closely linked to legislation that Congress had already passed. One, for example, simply reauthorized the M a m m o g r a p h y Quality Standards Act, a law first passed in 1992 but about to expire. The act required all facilities performing m a m m o g r a p h i e s to meet national quality control standards in order to receive accreditation, and to undergo regular inspections. Reauthorization of the expiring Violence Against Women Act was also one of the "Magnificent Seven." Two others included the Kelly/Millender-McDonald Resolution, expressing the sense of the House that federal agencies should make the federal procurement process more accessible to w o m e n - o w n e d businesses, and a bill sponsored principally by Connie Morella to establish a temporary commission to study the recruitment, retention, and advancement of w o m e n in the science, engineering, and technology fields. O n e of the seven would bar insurance companies f r o m using genetic testing when deciding who to insure, at what rate, and with what benefits. Separate bills sponsored by Linda Smith, Louise Slaughter, and Nita Lowey addressed the issue in different ways, and rather than choosing from among the three, C C W I leaders concluded that passage of any one would be acceptable. The two most contentious proposals on the list urged passage of a comprehensive child care measure, and inclusion of the costs of contraceptives in coverage offered federal employees by health insurers. The

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first was supported vigorously by the cochairs, and by Democrat Ellen Tauscher o f California, although no specific bill on the subject was endorsed by the caucus. W h a t did receive C C W I support was a set o f goals that members hoped to insert in all apposite bills considered by the House. T h e goals, said Norton, were to increase funding for lowi n c o m e families needing child care, reduce taxes for working families and stay-at-home spouses, and raise federal and state standards when evaluating the quality o f child care. T h e second, controversial proposal, championed primarily by Nancy Johnson and Nita Lowey, required that insurance plans underwriting health benefits for federal

employees

cover the full range o f contraceptive drugs and devices if they covered other medication. Caucus leaders helped promote each o f the seven by staging events calculated to dramatize their urgency. Hearings, the first ever orchestrated by the C C W I , 5 were conducted on child care for preschoolers, contraceptive technology, businesswomen's access to federal contracts, and breast cancer. T h e first drew the largest turnout, and featured specialists from the National Institutes for Health, Head Start, state agencies, academia, and the business community. J o h n s o n and Norton presided over the second o f the four and heard testimony on the limited contraceptive options available in the United States, the factors contributing to the paucity o f research on the subject, and A m e r i c a n w o m e n ' s inadequate understanding o f available contraceptive devices. T h e hearing on women-owned businesses jump-started the agenda promoted by the Kelly/Millender-McDonald team. A final hearing examined how the drug Tamoxifen affects women at high risk of breast cancer. Participants included Surgeon General David Satcher, representatives o f the F o o d and Drug Administration ( F D A ) , the National Cancer Institute, and the O f f i c e of W o m e n ' s Health, along with women who had used the drug. Norton and Johnson capitalized on the expert testimony, on publicity generated during National B r e a s t C a n c e r Month, and on the issuance o f a breast c a n c e r prevention postage stamp to boost passage of the Mammography Quality Standards Act. Norton maintained that each of the seven legislative objectives was an essential component o f the c a u c u s ' s family-friendly platform. S h e believed that the C C W I ' s performance in the 105th Congress would stand or fall on the fate o f the " M a g n i f i c e n t S e v e n , " and she implored her colleagues to approve them. S h e said: " T h e r e ought to be some bills at the end o f the day that wouldn't have passed if our 5 0 members had not made them a priority" (The Hill, October 2 2 , 1997).

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By the time the 105th C o n g r e s s a d j o u r n e d , h o w e v e r , three of the seven c a u c u s goals r e m a i n e d u n f u l f i l l e d . L e f t h a n g i n g w e r e all three m e a s u r e s r e q u i r i n g health insurers to a b j u r e the use of genetic tests w h e n m a k i n g d e c i s i o n s a b o u t p r o s p e c t i v e clients. A l s o lost w e r e the resolution asking federal agencies to consider a w a r d i n g m o r e contracts to w o m e n - o w n e d businesses, and child care legislation. Norton was particularly f r u s t r a t e d by the f a i l u r e to p a s s a c o m p r e h e n s i v e child c a r e bill. She lamented: There is the one issue we hoped would be passed this year. This should have been the year of the child. . . . The Women's Caucus put together what we thought was a bipartisan set of principles that would produce child care in this session. Something for each side of the aisle. For Democrats who tend to be concerned about working families, more low-income certificates. . . . And then, for [Republicans] . . . we said we would accept a bill for tax relief for stay-at-home spouses, and then we would accept quality that was state imposed and the Federal Government would assist the States to bring up the quality of child care. Mr. Speaker, anybody who cannot get a bipartisan bill for our children out of that is not trying hard enough. (Congressional Record, October 14, 1998, p. HI0882)

T h e c a u c u s ' s f o u r legislative victories i n c l u d e d r e a u t h o r i z a t i o n of both the Violence A g a i n s t W o m e n Act and the M a m m o g r a p h y Quality S t a n d a r d s Act. C o n g r e s s also established a c o m m i s s i o n to p r o m o t e the a d v a n c e m e n t of w o m e n and m i n o r i t i e s in science, e n g i n e e r i n g , and technology, and a f t e r a bitter p a r l i a m e n t a r y struggle and w h a t s e e m e d like certain d e f e a t , C o n g r e s s required health i n s u r a n c e plans c o v e r i n g f e d e r a l e m p l o y e e s to i n c l u d e the costs of f i v e d i f f e r e n t m e t h o d s of contraception. T h e legislative history of this last of the " M a g n i f i c e n t S e v e n " illustrates the d i f f i c u l t i e s C C W I leaders f a c e d w h e n they e n d o r s e d a proposal that could be construed as p r o m o t i n g reproductive rights. A p p r o p r i a t i o n s f o r federal e m p l o y e e s ' health i n s u r a n c e are h a n d l e d by the s u b c o m m i t t e e on the T r e a s u r y and Postal S e r v i c e . T h e s u b c o m m i t t e e normally addresses m o r e than its share of controversial issues, f u n d i n g such a g e n c i e s as the B u r e a u of A l c o h o l , T o b a c c o , and F i r e a r m s , the Internal R e v e n u e S e r v i c e , the F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n s C o m m i s s i o n ( F E C ) , and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. In 1998 it also considered $2.5 billion in emergency funding to help executive branch agencies address potential Y 2 K glitches in their c o m p u t e r networks, a cost-ofliving salary increase for m e m b e r s of Congress, and a measure allowing federal agencies to use some of their money to help l o w - i n c o m e w o r k e r s

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pay for child care. Other proposals the subcommittee considered included one allowing 40,000 Haitian immigrants to gain permanent residence in the United States, and another placing term limits on the staff director and general counsel of the FEC. Strangely, the fate of all of these issues became linked in one way or another with the survival of Nita L o w e y ' s language on contraceptive devices. The s u b c o m m i t t e e ' s recommendation to the full Appropriations C o m m i t t e e did not include L o w e y ' s proposal, but in mid-June 1998, during full committee deliberations, the New York Democrat's amendment unexpectedly won approval, 2 8 - 2 6 (Taylor 1998a). The measure required companies providing health insurance for federal employees to cover w o m e n ' s costs for five FDA-approved contraceptive m e t h o d s — birth control pills, diaphragms, interuterine devices, Depo-Provera, and Norplant. Insurance companies objecting to contraceptive devices on moral grounds were exempted from the requirement. The Treasury/Postal Service bill then went to the House Rules Committee, which issued a rule protecting the Lowey provision and about fifty other riders from being subjected to points of order. Under House rules, language changing existing law may not be appended to funding resolutions, unless exempted by the rule governing debate, and virtually all of the riders qualified as " l a w m a k i n g " rather than as "spending." But when the rule came up for a vote, it was defeated overwhelmingly, 125-291, the victim of Republican opposition to the Lowey provision and Democratic objections to omission of administration-backed emergency f u n d s of $2.25 billion to help prevent governmental computer shutdown on January 1, 2000. Most Democrats were not assuaged by Republican assurances that the money would be provided in a supplemental Appropriations bill. Embarrassed by the defeat, Republican leaders returned the measure to the Rules Committee, and crafted a rule that removed protection f r o m all but one of the legislative riders previously accepted by the Appropriations C o m m i t t e e — t h e exception being language to block an automatic cost-of-living salary increase for members of Congress. According to Republican Rules C o m m i t t e e m e m b e r John Linder of Georgia, the new rule was designed to attract the support of conservative Republicans, who could now move to strike the Lowey language from the bill, and to bully Democrats to vote for it lest they be accused of trying to increase the size of their paychecks. The strategy seemed to work, and the rule was narrowly adopted (Gruenwald 1998a). Soon after debate on the Appropriations bill began the next day, the legislative riders were stricken one-by-one on points of order, the Lowey

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a m e n d m e n t among them. But minutes later the New York Democrat, with the support of Norton, Johnson, and other C C W I members, outmaneuvered her opponents, introducing an amendment containing contraceptive coverage for federal employees, the language of which could be construed as " s p e n d i n g " rather than as " l a w m a k i n g . " Her earlier proposal had imposed a requirement on health insurers to be enforced by federal officials, a legislative act. Her eleventh-hour substitute barred the use of federal f u n d s to renew contracts with health care plans for federal employees that provided coverage for prescription drugs but not contraceptives. When asked to rule, the House Parliamentarian rejected a point of order, noting that House rules allow Appropriations measures to place limits on how money is to be spent. The new Lowey language did not, he said, "affirmatively mandate coverage" or require new determinations by "federal officials." Proponents of the amendment were triumphant when it passed 2 2 4 - 1 9 8 (Gruenwald 1998a). But they had to marshal their efforts once again later in the day when New Jersey Republican Chris Smith offered an amendment to bar insurance coverage of contraceptives that induce abortion chemically. During debate he implied that any of the five methods could affect "implantation" of the fetus rather than simply preventing fertilization, upon which Lowey accused Smith of "saying to every woman who may take a birth control pill or use one of the five accepted methods of contraception that they are abortionists" (Congressional Record, July 16, 1998, p. H5720). Nancy Johnson insisted that all five contraceptive methods be available to women, maintaining: S o m e w o m e n cannot take the pill. It is too disruptive to them. S o m e w o m e n depend on intrauterine devices and other such contraceptives. W h e n w e get to the point when w e have the courage to do more research in contraception, w e will have many other options to offer w o m e n so that they can have safe contraception. . . . For us to imagine here tonight that it is either right or proper or possible for the gentleman [Mr. Smith] to impose his determination on others at this level is extraordinary. A s a Republican w h o b e l i e v e s that government should stay out of our lives, I oppose this amendment with everything in me. ( C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record, July 16, 1998, p. H 5 7 2 1 )

The House rejected the Smith a m e n d m e n t 1 9 8 - 2 2 2 , with only seven C C W I members (six Republicans and one Democrat) supporting it. Days later, Norton took the House floor and said: I c o m e to the floor today in the name of the bipartisan Women's Caucus to thank the House for the vote . . . to cover contraceptive prescriptions

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for Federal employees. . . . Without contraception, of course, abortions are promoted, and s o m e of these d e v i c e s in fact lead to abortions because they are not as e f f e c t i v e as others. That is why w o m e n need these choices, at least these choices when deciding something as central to their health as preventing abortions and deciding whether or not to bear a child. Every woman has had some contraceptive device that does not work for her. With this bill, w e have passed one of the most significant w o m e n ' s health bills in many years. (Congressional Record, July 20, 1998, p. H 5 8 6 5 )

In the meantime, Senate Appropriations Committee chair Ted Stevens of Alaska indicated he supported the Lowey amendment, and ranking Democrat Harry Reid of Nevada planned to offer it on the Senate floor if the Appropriations bill did not already contain it (Gruenwald 1998a). True to his word, Reid, together with Maine's Olympia Snowe, cosponsored the provision in the Senate. It was approved by voice vote, and the Appropriations bill passed 9 1 - 5 (Gruenwald 1998b). With both chambers agreeing to the provision, it was not surprising to find the Lowey language included in the House-Senate conference committee report. But opponents were not ready to acquiesce. When the House met on October 10, it defeated the House Rules Committee resolution defining the ground rules under which the final version of the Appropriations measure would be debated. Conservative Republicans objected not only to the contraceptive provision, but to measures allowing 4 0 , 0 0 0 Haitians to gain permanent residence in the United States, and permitting federal agencies to use funds to help low-income federal workers pay for child care. They were joined by Democrats who protested the term limits placed on the FEC staff director and general counsel, officials who many Republicans believed spent too much time questioning election campaign practices employed by GOP-leaning organizations (Gruenwald 1998c). Defeat of the rule forced House-Senate conferees to meet again, and House subcommittee chair Jim Kolbe (R-Ariz.) offered a compromise. He suggested that the three provisions dealing with Haitian immigrants, child care, and FEC term limits be removed from the bill, while retaining the language on contraception for federal workers. But the Democrats balked, insisting that since the FEC provision was the only one of the four that did not have bipartisan support, it should be the only one cut from the bill. Kolbe and other Republican leaders would not yield, however, and they struck all four from the bill. Caucus m e m b e r s were devastated, and several spoke with unconcealed anger. Lowey noted that the leadership's arbitrary removal from

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the bill of a provision that passed the H o u s e and Senate and was in the c o n f e r e n c e report . . . is an extraordinary way to run the s h o p " (Gruenwald 1998c). Norton referred to the action as "a case study on h o w victory can be stolen f r o m w o m e n . " It was, she said, "a m o v e that deserves r e m a r k for its p r o f o u n d anti-democratic tactics" (Congressional Record, O c t o b e r 14, 1998, p. H I 0 8 8 2 ) . H o u s e D e m o c r a t s tried to send the bill back to c o n f e r e n c e with instructions to restore the contraceptives provision, but f a i l e d on a 2 0 2 - 2 2 6 vote. M o d e r a t e R e p u b l i c a n s , in turn, b l a m e d the D e m o c r a t s , m a i n t a i n i n g they should h a v e s w a l l o w e d the F E C p r o p o s a l on term limits and a d o p t e d the c o m p r o m i s e H o u s e rule o f f e r e d by Kolbe. N a n c y J o h n s o n a c c u s e d D e m o c r a t s of d e c i d i n g that "contraceptive coverage was e x p e n d a b l e " in e x c h a n g e for other items in the bill. Along with virtually all Republican C C W I m e m b e r s , she voted f o r final p a s s a g e of the A p p r o p r i a t i o n s bill. It w a s a d o p t e d 2 9 0 - 1 3 7 , with almost all D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n o p p o s e d . O b i t u a r i e s f o r the L o w e y a m e n d m e n t w e r e already written w h e n events in the Senate gave its proponents an u n e x p e c t e d opportunity for r e s u r r e c t i o n . D u r i n g final d e b a t e on the T r e a s u r y / P o s t a l S e r v i c e bill, Reid o b j e c t e d to r e m o v a l of the c o n t r a c e p t i v e p r o v i s i o n and stalled a final vote on the m e a s u r e . W h e r e u p o n it w a s s w e p t up in the larger a p p r o p r i a t i o n s p r o c e s s and the rush to a d j o u r n on the eve of the 1998 election. T h e u n f i n i s h e d T r e a s u r y / P o s t a l S e r v i c e m e a s u r e , along with seven other p e n d i n g appropriations bills, were l u m p e d into an o m n i b u s bill, and an intensive closed-door discussion began b e t w e e n Republican congressional leaders and a team of W h i t e H o u s e advisers. M u c h of the action took p l a c e in S p e a k e r G i n g r i c h ' s o f f i c e , and the size of the bill together with the covert nature of the deliberations allowed m e m b e r s of both parties to insert h u n d r e d s of provisions p r o m o t i n g parochial interests (Doherty 1998). A f t e r eight d a y s of n o n s t o p n e g o t i a t i o n s , p a r t i c i p a n t s had distributed $ 5 0 0 billion a m o n g the agencies f u n d e d by the eight bills, in m a n y cases e x c e e d i n g the expenditure limits that C o n g r e s s had i m p o s e d only a year earlier. It was during this process that the contraception provision w a s a d d e d to the bill, a m o n g the last of the sticking points to be r e s o l v e d ( D o h e r t y 1998). S t r o n g s u p p o r t f r o m the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , A p p r o p r i a t i o n s chair Ted Stevens, and other Senate R e p u b l i c a n s surely helped. But there is reason to believe that Gingrich, too, threw his support behind it, in part the result of passionate p r o d d i n g by N a n c y Johnson. T h e two had a strong personal rapport, not least because J o h n s o n ' s Ethics C o m m i t t e e had earlier r e c o m m e n d e d a r e p r i m a n d f o r Gingrich, rather than c e n s u r e , t h e r e b y s a v i n g his S p e a k e r s h i p . T h e s u p p o r t of

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H o u s e D e m o c r a t i c leaders w a s p r o b a b l y less i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e they were denied direct access to the closed-door discussions. On the other hand, L o w e y ' s role was crucial. T h e nature of her contribution s u r f a c e d a f t e r c o n s e r v a t i v e s R e p u b l i c a n s e x p r e s s e d outrage w h e n details of the o m n i b u s p a c k a g e b e c a m e k n o w n . T h e y criticized their leaders for profligate spending and for caving in to the d e m a n d s of a w e a k e n e d president w h o s e i m p e a c h m e n t s e e m e d i m m i n e n t . Gingrich responded by asserting that the o m n i b u s measure reflected many conservative goals, and cited, as an example, a modification of the L o w e y language that e x e m p t e d doctors with moral objections f r o m being forced to prescribe contraceptives under the requirement that federal e m p l o y e e s ' health insurance plans cover such devices. T h u s the Speaker tried to put the best f a c e on the adoption of a contraceptive policy unacceptable to most Republicans by highlighting a change that L o w e y almost certainly signed off on, but that, given the importance of the underlying issue, was relatively insignificant. Initial passage of the measure by both chambers, the rush toward a d j o u r n m e n t , and the imminent midterm elections probably all contributed to the survival of the N e w Y o r k e r ' s initiative. As H o u s e Democratic C a u c u s chair Vic Fazio remarked: " W h y the Republicans would want a debate on contraception three weeks before an election is b e y o n d my c o m p r e h e n s i o n " (Taylor 1998b). Subjects e m b r a c e d by the C C W I ' s seven legislative priorities were not the only matters claiming the c a u c u s ' s attention. T h e g r o u p scored what one staffer called "a huge victory" w h e n it helped e x p a n d M e d i c aid c o v e r a g e to annual m a m m o g r a m s f o r w o m e n over age thirty-nine, with the deductible waived. T h e c h a n g e was part of the 1997 Balanced B u d g e t Act, w h i c h also e x t e n d e d M e d i c a r e c o v e r a g e to b o n e - d e n s i t y m e a s u r e m e n t s for w o m e n at high risk of developing osteoporosis. C o n g r e s s w o m e n also s u c c e e d e d in e d u c a t i n g their c o l l e a g u e s and the public about legislation that was not yet ripe for full H o u s e debate. A C C W I - s p o n s o r e d f o r u m was held on the issue of lactation in the w o r k p l a c e , during which panelists explored the benefits of breast-feeding, d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and legal o b s t a c l e s e n c o u n t e r e d by b r e a s t - f e e d i n g mothers, and success stories at c o m p a n i e s that provide lactation facilities. Norton later held a "town m e e t i n g " on bills to narrow the w a g e gap b e t w e e n m a l e and f e m a l e f e d e r a l e m p l o y e e s . S h e e x p l a i n e d that the "fair p a y " bills did not have the level of bipartisan c o n s e n s u s accorded the seven " m u s t p a s s " m e a s u r e s , a d d i n g that " t h e m o r e the W o m e n ' s C a u c u s d e m o n s t r a t e s an ability to pass actual legislation, the greater will be our capacity in the f u t u r e " to pass legislation m a n d a t i n g equal pay for men and w o m e n . 6

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D u r i n g the 105th Congress, the C C W I addressed sexual h a r a s s m e n t in the military services, and the integration of w o m e n in basic-training units. T h e issue of w o m e n in the military had claimed national attention f o l l o w i n g revelations that male drill sergeants at M a r y l a n d ' s A b e r d e e n P r o v i n g G r o u n d s and, later, M i s s o u r i ' s Fort L e o n a r d W o o d , had sexually h a r a s s e d f e m a l e trainees u n d e r their c h a r g e . H o u s e leaders a s k e d I n d i a n a ' s Steve Buyer, chair of the Military Personnel S u b c o m m i t t e e of the National Security C o m m i t t e e , to f o r m a task f o r c e and investigate the A b e r d e e n a l l e g a t i o n s . He c h o s e R e p u b l i c a n Tillie F o w l e r and D e m o c r a t Jane H a r m a n (Calif.), ranking w o m e n on the National Security C o m m i t t e e , to r o u n d out the task f o r c e . T h e t w o were c o c h a i r s of the C C W I ' s t e a m on w o m e n in the military, and as the inquiry progressed they and Buyer kept the caucus apprised of new d e v e l o p m e n t s . In the end, the task f o r c e d i v i d e d on the issue of w h e t h e r m a l e and f e m a l e recruits s h o u l d train in integrated units. H a r m a n and F o w l e r leaned toward continuation of the status quo. Buyer w a n t e d a return to segregated training. H e was supported by r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s of a c o m m i s s i o n set up by the D e p a r t m e n t of D e f e n s e to study the issue. T h e c o m m i s s i o n was led by f o r m e r R e p u b l i c a n S e n a t o r s N a n c y K a s s e b a u m and H o w a r d B a k e r and it urged the Army, Navy, and Air Force to adopt the segregated system e m p l o y e d by the M a r i n e s . Later, S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e W i l l i a m C o h e n rejected the proposal (New York Times, M a y 21, 1998), but the f a i l u r e to p r o d u c e c o n s e n s u s in the H o u s e d r e w F o w l e r , H a r m a n , and the C C W I into a h e a t e d c o n f l i c t with H o u s e leaders, B u y e r , and a m a j o r i t y of the N a t i o n a l Security C o m m i t t e e . T h e r e s p o n s e of C C W I activists was pointed. Norton r e m a r k e d : The bipartisan Women's Caucus disagrees that women should be separated in training. We think all you do is delay the problem. If women are separated in training, you are going to get women and men coming together for the first time when they are in fact in the field. Rather work these problems out in training, than bring them to the field. (Congressional Record, March 5, 1998, p. H895)

S h e alluded to the fight for racial integration in the military to bolster her position: If anybody had looked closely at the integration of blacks and whites in the services after World War II, I can tell you that there were many incidents, and that it was very hard to get southern white men under the command of black men. But in a command structure, you can do it, and we did it successfully in the military with blacks and whites,

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But N o r t o n and the c a u c u s lost the fight, and the H o u s e p a s s e d a bill calling f o r s e p a r a t e basic training for m e n and w o m e n in all military services. T h e d e f e a t was particularly d i s a p p o i n t i n g b e c a u s e one of the p r o p o s a l ' s authors, N a n c y K a s s e b a u m , had been s y m p a t h e t i c to m o s t C C W I initiatives w h e n she had served in the Senate. T h e upper c h a m ber c a m e to the rescue, h o w e v e r , and r e f u s e d to include the c h a n g e in its version of the D e f e n s e appropriations bill, f o r c i n g H o u s e c o n f e r e e s to back off. Perhaps the most interesting and consequential d e v e l o p m e n t in the 105th C o n g r e s s was not legislative in nature. It was, instead, the emerg e n c e of a n e w m o d u s o p e r a n d i by w h i c h the C C W I c o u l d exert legislative influence. A f e w of the caucus t e a m s were led by cochairs w h o w e r e also m e m b e r s of H o u s e c o m m i t t e e s e x e r c i s i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n over their t e a m ' s subject matter. This a r r a n g e m e n t allowed the caucus to rely upon c o n g r e s s w o m e n in both parties w h o w e r e integral participants in the H o u s e ' s established d e c i s i o n m a k i n g process. M e m b e r s h i p of Tillie Fowler and Jane H a r m a n on the Military Security C o m m i t t e e , for e x a m ple, m a d e t h e m m a j o r players w h e n issues relating to w o m e n in the military surfaced. T h e y were in a position to represent caucus perspectives w h e n dealing with the c o m m i t t e e , and to represent c o m m i t t e e perspectives w h e n dealing with the c a u c u s . Small B u s i n e s s C o m m i t t e e m e m bers Sue Kelly and Juanita M i l l e n d e r - M c D o n a l d p l a y e d a similar role when, as team cochairs, they sought to increase opportunities for f e m a l e entrepreneurs. T h e s e d y n a m i c s were not entirely new, inasmuch as the C C W I had always relied on men as well as w o m e n serving on relevant c o m m i t t e e s to act as p r o p o n e n t s of its priorities. W h a t was new was the f o r m a t i o n of teams, a f e w of w h o s e cochairs served on a c o m m i t t e e c o m m a n d i n g jurisdiction over matters mirroring those of their teams. T h e s e c i r c u m stances could not have o c c u r r e d w h e n there were f e w e r w o m e n in the H o u s e and when m a n y H o u s e c o m m i t t e e s did not include at least one w o m a n in each party willing to reflect feminist values. By the end of the 105th Congress, however, caucus m e m b e r s were able collectively to claim direct access to House consideration of any and all national policies

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affecting women. Moreover, many of these women had acquired a level of seniority that allowed them to be more than marginal players at the committee level. Ironically, one consequence of this development has been a weakening in the ties many congresswomen have with the CCWI. As their responsibilities and influence in the House has increased, their need to work through the caucus has decreased, a consequence that will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.

Improving Rapport with House and Administration Leaders During their two years as CCWI cochairs, Johnson and Norton attempted to improve working relations with congressional and administration leaders, or at the very least maintain reliable avenues of communication between them. Unsurprisingly, they received a warmer welcome at the White House than they did among Republican House leaders. The caucus's reputation as a liberal redoubt was surely one reason the Republican House hierarchy held it at arm's length. Moreover, when the 105th Congress got under way, Republicans were still reeling from a 1996 election that had returned their nemesis to the White House and nibbled away at their majority. The momentum built up after the 1994 election had dissipated, and the influence Republican leaders could exert in Congress and with the public was noticeably diminished. This meant that they were unprepared to extend much magnanimity or even respect to a group for which they had harbored deep suspicion. But CCWI leaders, too, were responsible for House leaders' neglect. Months of delay in organizing, while recruiting new members and establishing teams, slowed formulation of their agenda and postponed opportunities to reach out to the Speaker and other G O P influentials. Gingrich met with the Congressional Black Caucus two months after the new Congress convened. His first and only meeting with the CCWI, on the other hand, occurred almost eighteen months later. During discussions with members of the Congressional Black Caucus, Gingrich said he would revisit the decision to eliminate legislative service organizations (Eilperin 1997a). An early meeting with CCWI members might conceivably have strengthened that resolve, although it is difficult to believe that G O P conservatives who were already criticizing their leader for meeting with Jesse Jackson and other black Democrats before conferring with groups of black Republicans would have countenanced restoration of LSOs. In any event, the idea died aborning.

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To be sure, G O P leaders were in daily contact with Republican cong r e s s w o m e n occupying key party and c o m m i t t e e positions. Even b e f o r e the 105th C o n g r e s s c o n v e n e d , S p e a k e r G i n g r i c h had o f f i c i a l l y m o v e d C o n f e r e n c e vice c h a i r S u s a n Molinari and C o n f e r e n c e secretary Jennifer Dunn into his leadership circle. H e said at the time that he wanted to m a k e sure that G O P policies r e f l e c t e d the v i e w s of w o m e n , A m e r i c a n s w h o m a k e up nearly half of R e p u b l i c a n voters ( U S A Today, D e c e m b e r 10, 1996). W h e n M o l i n a r i later r e s i g n e d her H o u s e seat, Gingrich e n c o u r a g e d D u n n ' s elevation to vice chair and the election of Deborah Pryce as secretary. In c l o s e d l e a d e r s h i p m e e t i n g s these w o m e n s o m e t i m e s c h a s t i s e d male c o l l e a g u e s f o r p r o p o s i n g ideas in l a n g u a g e b o u n d to f r i g h t e n w o m e n voters. On one occasion Dunn interrupted a tax-cutting diatribe by M a j o r i t y L e a d e r Richard Armey, urging him to consider the impact of tax cuts on the p r o g r a m s m a n y w o m e n w e r e f i n d i n g i n d i s p e n s a b l e . P r y c e later observed: " P e r h a p s w e [ w o m e n ] are m o r e sensitive to h o w deeply troubling our harsh rhetoric is to s o m e p e o p l e , especially w o m e n . " Both c o n g r e s s w o m e n were acutely a w a r e of their p a r t y ' s difficulty in attracting w o m e n , and Pryce f o u n d e d a political action c o m m i t t e e — V I E W P A C — t o support f e m a l e G O P candidates regardless of their ideology. D u n n , in the m e a n t i m e , led a drive to attract m o r e w o m e n to the R e p u b l i c a n Party, c o n v e n i n g a t h r e e - d a y c o n f e r e n c e of G O P leaders to help achieve that end ( W a s h i n g t o n Post, April 29, 1998). B a t neither D u n n nor Pryce was prepared to serve as a conduit for C C W I priorities. Moreover, their i n f l u e n c e as C o n f e r e n c e o f f i c e r s was d o u b t f u l b e c a u s e they w e r e u n a b l e to establish a t h o r o u g h l y t r u s t f u l w o r k i n g relationship with C o n f e r e n c e chair John B o e h n e r of Ohio. T h e two c o n g r e s s w o m e n wanted some control over the c o m m i t t e e ' s finances and its public relations and c o m m u n i c a t i o n s strategies, and B o e h n e r told t h e m he did not k n o w w h e t h e r he had the authority to d e l e g a t e m o r e p o w e r to t h e m (Roll Call, M a y 25, 1996). O t h e r G O P w o m e n w e r e p o s i t i o n e d to transmit the c a u c u s m e s s a g e to their party leaders, notably Deputy W h i p Barbara C u b i n , Sue Myrick, w h o was s o p h o m o r e class representative on the S p e a k e r ' s leadership council, and Ways and M e a n s s u b c o m m i t t e e chair N a n c y J o h n s o n , but with the e x c e p t i o n of Johnson, none was predisposed to do so. It w a s not until m i d w a y t h r o u g h the s e c o n d session that C C W I leaders f u l l y orchestrated a strategy d e s i g n e d to secure support f o r its " M a g n i f i c e n t S e v e n . " On J u n e 10, 1998, they held a press c o n f e r e n c e unveiling their seven-pronged agenda, and met the next day with D e m o cratic minority leader Richard Gephardt. Two months later, they hosted

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N e w t G i n g r i c h at an E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e m e e t i n g , and o n c e again tried to drive h o m e the virtues of their legislative goals. G i n g r i c h was r e s p o n s i v e but not a l t o g e t h e r e n c o u r a g i n g . He a d v i s e d t h e m to ask M a j o r i t y L e a d e r Richard A r m e y to schedule H o u s e debate on the legislation c o n c e r n i n g m a m m o g r a p h y and w o m e n in science, i m p l y i n g that t h e s e t w o m e a s u r e s w o u l d be readily a d o p t e d o n c e they r e a c h e d the floor—which is what h a p p e n e d . But he also indicated that bills increasing o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r w o m e n e n t r e p r e n e u r s , p r o m o t i n g child care, and preventing insurance c o m p a n y discrimination based on genetic m a k e u p were unlikely to receive H o u s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , either b e c a u s e h e a r i n g s had not yet been held or b e c a u s e the Senate was unlikely to act on them b e f o r e the 105th C o n g r e s s a d j o u r n e d . But the bulk of the m e e t i n g was spent d i s c u s s i n g the role of the C C W I in the House. Gingrich praised the caucus for d r a w i n g up its list of s e v e n , m u s t - p a s s legislative priorities, s o m e t h i n g no p r e v i o u s caucus had d o n e , and o f f e r e d t w o s u g g e s t i o n s f o r the f u t u r e . First, he advised m e m b e r s to d e v e l o p an a g e n d a m o r e expeditiously, giving the H o u s e m o r e time to c o n s i d e r and digest their p r o p o s a l s . S e c o n d , he asked the c a u c u s to appoint one of its m e m b e r s to serve as a liaison to the R e p u b l i c a n leadership to k e e p him i n f o r m e d about C C W I activities. D e b o r a h Pryce and J e n n i f e r Dunn were likely candidates, he said, since they already held l e a d e r s h i p positions. 7 C a u c u s leaders took no action on the S p e a k e r ' s second proposal, but they did contact M a j o r i t y L e a d e r A r m e y to urge him to speed up floor consideration of the bills addressing m a m m o g r a p h y and w o m e n in science. C a u c u s relations with the president and his administration began on a strongly positive note, d e t e r i o r a t i n g only a f t e r the W h i t e H o u s e sex scandal broke in January 1998. Two m o n t h s after the new C o n g r e s s got u n d e r way, the p r e s i d e n t invited C C W I m e m b e r s to j o i n him in the W h i t e H o u s e State D i n i n g R o o m f o r a r o u n d t a b l e d i s c u s s i o n of w o m e n ' s issues. Nearly f i f t y H o u s e and Senate w o m e n in both parties p a r t i c i p a t e d . Present, too, w e r e o f f i c i a l s f r o m the W o m e n ' s Initiatives and O u t r e a c h O f f i c e , a W h i t e H o u s e agency President Clinton had created to cultivate and respond to the needs of w o m e n ' s a d v o c a c y groups, the f e m a l e electorate, and w o m e n l a w m a k e r s . C a u c u s leaders subsequently capitalized on the rapport established with the administration, inviting almost a dozen presidential a d v i s e r s — c h i e f l y specialists in health, military training, and l a b o r — t o C C W I E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e meetings. T h e c a u c u s j o i n e d the W h i t e H o u s e in sponsoring a c o n f e r e n c e on child care, and N o r t o n ' s " t o w n m e e t i n g " on the w a g e gap between men and w o m e n and the "glass ceiling" received

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strong support f r o m Labor Department officials. In his remarks at the twentieth-anniversary gala, the president noted the pivotal role the C C W I had played in securing a balanced budget agreement, and in bringing about more funding for breast cancer research and osteoporosis prevention. Moreover, the presidential couple's appearance at the event almost certainly increased the evening's take. But C C W I members began to distance themselves from the White House after accusations about the president's affair with an intern claimed the media's undivided attention. Clinton's initial denials did little to diminish attacks from critics, and his supporters were often forced to respond with carefully hedged defenses of the president. Discussions at CCWI Executive Committee meetings consciously skirted mention of the scandal, but in extramural conversations c o n g r e s s w o m e n could scarcely avoid the topic. Republican women found themselves in a delicate position. They wanted to attack the president for his outrageous behavior, but were inhibited by an initial G O P strategy of allowing revelations emerging f r o m Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's investigation to inflict the damage. Their leaders also worried that by calling attention to the president's flagrant indiscretion they would be making "marital infidelity a legitimate part of political discourse and further erode the ever-shrinking zone of privacy accorded elected officials" (Kirchoff and Cassata 1998). Instead, Republican women tried to force Democratic women to speak out against their president, and thereby head off charges of partisanship that would inevitably be leveled against their own remonstrances. Two months after the president's affair was made public, Deborah Pryce and Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison helped organize a meeting in Speaker Gingrich's office. There, a dozen House and Senate women considered asking w o m e n ' s groups around the country to speak out about the sexual allegations and to pressure Democratic women in the House and Senate to be as critical of the president as many of them had been about Clarence T h o m a s after Anita Hill's allegations and about Senator Bob Packwood following a flood of similar accusations. "Sexual harassment is not a partisan issue," said CCWI vice chair Sue Kelly, w h o attended the meeting. " W e ' d like to see our Democratic sisters speak out on the floor . . . only everyone seems to be ducking for cover." She recalled the strident tones Democratic women had used in the Thomas and Packwood cases, noting that these women "were there then, and they're not here now, and I wonder, why the silence?" (Contiguglia and VandeHei 1998). But not all Republican women were circumspect when prodding Democratic colleagues and attacking the president. Marge R o u k e m a

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took f e m i n i s t g r o u p s to task, asserting that " c h a r a c t e r [in the W h i t e H o u s e ] c o u n t s , and I think the so-called f e m i n i s t s are c o n s p i c u o u s by their a b s e n c e " (Kirchoff and Cassata 1998). N o n - C C W I m e m b e r A n n e N o r t h u p d e n o u n c e d the president publicly and lashed out at D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n . T h e K e n t u c k y f i r s t - t e r m e r m a d e the r o u n d s of television talk shows, and her views appeared in leading n e w s p a p e r s . "This isn't [the p r e s i d e n t ' s ] private l i f e , " she said. " [ T h e W h i t e H o u s e ] is his w o r k p l a c e . " N o r t h u p p o i n t e d out that leaders of the w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t ought to be "asking questions about the fact that there's a w h o l e class of interns. . . . D o they have a c h a n c e to get a p e r m a n e n t j o b in the W h i t e H o u s e ? . . . H o w did all the other w o m e n feel w h o d i d n ' t h a v e that c h a n c e ? Like m a y b e they s h o u l d h a v e g o n e a r o u n d in d i f f e r e n t style c l o t h e s ? " ( N e w York Times, February 17, 1998). R e s p o n s e s by D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n were either cautiously protective of the president, or directed against the Starr investigation. T h e y maintained that the charges against the president were allegations only, that they had yet to be proved, and that Clinton had steadfastly denied them. M a x i n e Waters f o u n d nothing wrong with the way in which the president w a s c o n f r o n t i n g the issue. " T h e r e is nothing u n f a i r in his r e f u t a t i o n s , " she said. " E v e r y o n e has a right to d e f e n d t h e m s e l v e s in a f a s h i o n they think will get people to listen" (Contiguglia and VandeHei 1998). Calif o r n i a ' s N a n c y Pelosi r e m a r k e d : "We d o n ' t k n o w w h e t h e r it took place or not. But, if it did, it c o m e s as a great big surprise to a great m a n y people. I d o n ' t think for one minute there's an atmosphere of sexual harassment in the W h i t e H o u s e " {New York Times, February 17, 1998). Decisions by C C W I leaders to keep the scandal out of its deliberations and by Republican w o m e n to exercise restraint permitted the group to stay o n - m e s s a g e and maintain at least the a p p e a r a n c e of bipartisanship. But there is little doubt that just as the parade of tawdry revelations f r o m the Starr investigation poisoned the atmosphere in the House, they served as n u m b i n g distractions for C C W I m e m b e r s , i m p e d i n g the g r o u p ' s agenda and affecting relations between Democratic and Republican w o m e n . T h e W h i t e H o u s e scandal was not the only distraction, however. Bitter r e c r i m i n a t i o n s f o l l o w i n g t w o close 1996 election cont e s t s — o n e for the Senate, the other for the H o u s e — a l s o sapped the cauc u s ' s productive energy and further divided the group along party lines.

Two Contested Elections All congressional elections p r o d u c e a f e w results that are so close that initial tallies are followed by contested recounts and sometimes lawsuits.

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The 1996 election was true to form, except that the two closest contests featured razor-thin victories for Democratic women over Republican men who, with the vigorous support of G O P allies, were prepared to go to unusual lengths to challenge the certified outcomes. As a result, Senate candidate Mary Landrieu of Louisiana, and California House candidate Loretta Sanchez, spent their first year in office trying desperately to hold on to small margins of victory. Their struggles became famous, and the acrimony they generated subtly affected the working relationship between Democratic and Republican members of the CCWI. Jenkins v. Landrieu Disputed Senate elections do not generally affect relationships within the House, and vice versa, but the 1996 contest for the upper chamber in Louisiana reverberated unmistakably in the lower chamber. The race had ended with Mary Landrieu defeating Republican Woody Jenkins by fewer than 6,000 votes out of 1.7 million cast. Jenkins vigorously contested the result, and asked the Senate not to seat Landrieu until it had investigated election-law violations he alleged had produced her margin of victory. These violations, he said, included the buying of votes, multiple voting by Landrieu partisans, phantom voting (i.e., votes cast by the dead), votes cast by persons w h o were either unregistered or w h o had registered fraudulently, and the use of voting machines that had been tampered with or that worked improperly. Landrieu was also accused of countenancing "vote hauling," that is, paying campaign workers to transport people to the polls, an illegal practice under Louisiana law. Jenkins further alleged that New Orleans gambling interests and a political organization controlled by New Orleans Democratic mayor Marc Morial, the Louisiana Independent Federation of Electors (LIFE), had illegally f u n n e l e d large sums of money into Landrieu's campaign (Cook 1997). Jenkins's charges were referred to the Senate Rules Committee, led by Republican John Warner of Virginia, and the committee appointed two lawyers, Bill Canfield, a Republican, and Bob Bauer, a Democrat, to conduct a preliminary investigation into the allegations. Both were specialists in election law, and both had helped the Senate resolve a challenge brought by California's Michael Huffington to Dianne Feinstein's narrow but ultimately insurmountable margin of victory in 1994 (Cook 1997). In the meantime, Landrieu was allowed to take her Senate seat, until such time as that body was prepared to declare an undisputed winner or call for a new election.

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In April 1997 the two lawyers completed their report and recommended that the Rules Committee limit its inquiry to three allegations— that the Landrieu campaign organization had paid people to vote, that it had inspired multiple voting, and that it had benefited from fraudulent registration. The report advised the committee to focus on allegations that vans had picked up poor New Orleans residents and paid them to vote n u m e r o u s times for Landrieu. It went on to propose that other charges be dismissed, including phantom voting and voting-machine tampering and malfunctioning. The report recommended that all allegations of financial improprieties be dropped, concluding that efforts to link illegal campaign contributions by gambling interests and by LIFE to vote totals would be impossible (Sheffner 1997c). Warner, strongly influenced by conservative Rules C o m m i t t e e Republicans, including Majority Whip Don Nickle, Campaign Committee chair Mitch McConnell, North Carolina's Jesse Helms, and Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania, rejected that advice, and announced that his committee would look into not only the three recommended areas, but also the allegations of voting-machine error and tampering, phantom voting, and campaign finance violations. On a 9 - 7 party-line vote, the Rules Committee agreed in mid-April to appoint a team of investigators consisting of four attorneys, three Republicans and one Democrat, to explore the full range of Jenkins's allegations. They would be aided by agents of the FBI and the General Accounting Office, as well as by the two attorneys whose recommendations the committee had largely ignored. Warner said he expected the entire matter to be wrapped up by Memorial Day (Sheffner 1997d). Democrats were incensed by the committee's decision to expand its inquiry beyond the three areas singled out in the preliminary report, and vowed to take whatever floor action was necessary to help Landrieu retain her seat. Veteran Democrat Robert Byrd intoned: "I take it that the majority has decided to go to war. So be it." Dianne Feinstein, citing the ongoing fight over the House seat held by Loretta Sanchez (and with her own 1994 travails against Huffington in mind), railed against the disproportionate frequency with which women were targets of contested elections. "Hell hath no fury like a man beaten by a woman," she said. When appearing before the Rules Committee, she stared directly at its Republican members, her voice rising to a shout, and said, "You have no idea how hard it is for a woman to be elected to the U.S. Senate" (Sheffner 1997d). Feinstein vowed to use all of her power to block a Senate resolution to authorize the Rules C o m m i t t e e to subpoena witnesses and to allow

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staff m e m b e r s and o u t s i d e c o n s u l t a n t s to take d e p o s i t i o n s (a p r o m i s e she was later unable to keep). She added, "I will filibuster, I will fight it every step of the way b e c a u s e I think it is plain w r o n g " ( S h e f f n e r 1997d). S u b s e q u e n t efforts by Minority L e a d e r Tom Daschle to stall or end the inquiry were unavailing, although w h e n the Rules C o m m i t t e e ' s Republican majority voted in July to continue the investigation, D e m o cratic Senators began to boycott c o m m i t t e e m e e t i n g s — w h i c h Republicans said had the e f f e c t of prolonging the investigation. The decision of the Senate Rules C o m m i t t e e to e x p a n d the investigation received strong s u p p o r t f r o m H o u s e R e p u b l i c a n s , h o w e v e r . W h i l e the c o m m i t t e e c o n s i d e r e d w h e t h e r to reject the C a n f i e l d - B a u e r r e c o m m e n d a t i o n to limit the inquiry, f i v e H o u s e m e m b e r s f r o m Louisiana, led by the chair of the p o w e r f u l Appropriations C o m m i t t e e , R o b e r t L i v i n g s t o n , urged a f u l l - b l o w n i n v e s t i g a t i o n . In a letter to Warner, they said: "We are especially concerned that counsel r e f u s e d to e x a m i n e the role played by g a m b l i n g interests and the political organization L I F E in the election. T h u s we urge you to undertake a fully c o m plete, fair and unlimited investigation. T h e very integrity of the Senate and indeed the entire C o n g r e s s hinges on your action" ( S h e f f n e r 1997c). D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n in the H o u s e bitterly resented efforts by Livingston to u n s e a t a D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n in the S e n a t e at the s a m e time that H o u s e Republicans were trying to do the same thing in the lower c h a m ber. But s o m e C C W I D e m o c r a t s also r e s e n t e d what they saw as Livi n g s t o n ' s thinly veiled a t t e m p t to use his A p p r o p r i a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e c h a i r m a n s h i p to t h r o w his w e i g h t a r o u n d a m o n g S e n a t o r s w h o s p e n d m u c h of their political capital trying to i n c r e a s e f e d e r a l e x p e n d i t u r e s within their states. By the time C o n g r e s s returned f r o m its s u m m e r recess, the R u l e s C o m m i t t e e had learned that there was little evidence to suggest that the election result should be o v e r t u r n e d . T h e G e n e r a l A c c o u n t i n g O f f i c e had f o u n d s o m e u n e x p l a i n e d votes, but n o t h i n g like the tens of thousands that J e n k i n s and L o u i s i a n a R e p u b l i c a n s had c l a i m e d w e r e illegally cast ( C a s s a t a 1997). W a r n e r had by now lost his taste f o r the i n v e s t i g a t i o n and w a s q u o t e d as saying, " M y g u y s w a n t b l o o d — w e l l , not my g u y s — b u t I d o n ' t care a n y m o r e " ( N e w York Times, S e p t e m b e r 17, 1997). T w o w e e k s later, the c o m m i t t e e voted 1 6 - 0 to end the inquiry, a l t h o u g h s o m e R e p u b l i c a n " a y e " votes w e r e h a l f h e a r t e d (New York Times, O c t o b e r 4, 1997). L a n d r i e u ' s victory was not c o m p l e t e , h o w e v e r . Her request to be r e i m b u r s e d the $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 spent to r e s p o n d to J e n k i n s ' s c h a l l e n g e was d e n i e d on a n o t h e r 9 - 7 party-line R u l e s C o m m i t t e e vote. T h i s final

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chapter in the dispute reflected the partisan divisions within the "hardcharging Senate, w h e r e s o m e view the divide b e t w e e n the majority and m i n o r i t y as a d e m i l i t a r i z e d z o n e " ( C a s s a t a 1997). T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n W a r n e r and K e n t u c k y ' s Wendell Ford, the r a n k i n g D e m o c r a t on his c o m m i t t e e , w a s bruised, and s o m e S e n a t o r s b e l i e v e d the interp e r s o n a l c o m i t y n o r m a l l y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the institution had been t h r e a t e n e d . But the t e m p o r a r y lapse in S e n a t e civility w a s t a m e c o m pared to the all-out w a r g o i n g on in the H o u s e over the 1996 election result in C a l i f o r n i a ' s forty-sixth district.

Dornan v. Sanchez R e p u b l i c a n Robert D o r n a n had represented his O r a n g e County, California, c o n s t i t u e n c y for eighteen years. He was first elected to the H o u s e in 1976, served three terms, g a v e up his H o u s e seat to run u n s u c c e s s fully for the Senate, and returned to the H o u s e in 1985. D u r i n g the next t w e l v e y e a r s he w a s the s c o u r g e of D e m o c r a t s , e s p e c i a l l y the liberal variety, and he regularly blasted t h e m as supporters of gun control, gay rights, and abortion, tarring s o m e o p p o n e n t s as c o m m u n i s t s y m p a t h i z ers and draft dodgers. A f o r m e r fighter pilot, his repeated e n d o r s e m e n t s of e x p a n d e d A m e r i c a n air p o w e r earned him the sobriquet " B - l B o b , " a f t e r the b o m b e r of the s a m e n a m e , and his u n v a r n i s h e d c o n s e r v a t i s m m a d e h i m a f a v o r i t e of l i k e - m i n d e d t a l k - s h o w hosts, i n c l u d i n g the r e d o u b t a b l e Rush L i m b a u g h — f o r w h o m he s o m e t i m e s substituted. A c o m b a t i v e partisan, D o r n a n nonetheless did not allow party loyalty to prevent him f r o m berating G O P colleagues w h o were not sufficiently conservative, and he once outed a gay Republican on the H o u s e floor by referring to the "revolving door on his closet" ( N e w York Times, D e c e m b e r 18, 1996). But throughout the 1990s, D o r n a n ' s most caustic invectives were reserved for Bill Clinton. D u r i n g the 1992 presidential c a m p a i g n , he called Clinton a " w o m a n i z e r - a d u l t e r e r , " a "sleazeball w h o c a n ' t k e e p his p a n t s o n , " and a " d i s g r a c e d d r a f t d o d g e r , " and later a c c u s e d the p r e s i d e n t of h a v i n g acted as a K G B agent w h e n visiting R u s s i a during his d a y s abroad as a R h o d e s scholar. A f t e r D o r n a n gave up a brief a t t e m p t to s e c u r e his p a r t y ' s presidential n o m i n a t i o n in the 1996 p r i m a r i e s , he a n n o u n c e d he w o u l d seek to retain his H o u s e seat and v o w e d he would press for i m p e a c h m e n t hearings against the president because of apparent campaign contributions f r o m foreign individuals and corporations ( U S A Today, N o v e m b e r 14, 1996). D o r n a n ' s shortlived run for the presidency d i m i n i s h e d his treasury and p o s t p o n e d the start of his H o u s e campaign, but these were not seen as serious setbacks.

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A f t e r all, he had been r e e l e c t e d by 20 p e r c e n t a g e points in 1994, and he would be facing a political u n k n o w n in the c o m i n g contest. T h e novice was a thirty-six-year-old b u s i n e s s w o m a n , Loretta Sanchez. She was one of seven children of Mexican immigrants, and had earned a b a c h e l o r ' s d e g r e e in e c o n o m i c s and a m a s t e r ' s in b u s i n e s s administration. She worked as a financial consultant, d e f i n e d herself as a fiscal conservative, and in 1992 had c h a n g e d her allegiance f r o m the Republican to the D e m o c r a t i c Party because she believed the G O P was w r o n g on most i m m i g r a t i o n and w o m e n ' s issues (New York Times, D e c e m b e r 18, 1996). Her lone prior foray into politics occurred in 1994, when, in an at-large election, she tried to capture one of five seats on the A n a h e i m city council. She f i n i s h e d eighth a m o n g sixteen c a n d i d a t e s . N o n e t h e l e s s , t w o years later she won the D e m o c r a t i c primary f o r the House seat by defeating two better-known, better-financed opponents. T h e forty-sixth congressional district had been politically conservative and reliably R e p u b l i c a n o v e r the years, not unlike virtually all of O r a n g e County. At the s a m e time, it was e x p e r i e n c i n g seismic d e m o graphic shifts. T h e 1990 c e n s u s revealed that the H i s p a n i c p o p u l a t i o n had d o u b l e d in ten years, and now m a d e up 50 percent of the district's population. Residents with Asian b a c k g r o u n d s increased f r o m 6 percent to about 13 percent ( U S A Today, N o v e m b e r 14, 1996). T h e s e c h a n g e s were not expected to m a k e a d i f f e r e n c e in the e l e c t i o n — D o r n a n w a s a heavy favorite—but Sanchez doggedly began a house-to-house campaign talking a b o u t the m i n i m u m w a g e , e m p l o y m e n t , e d u c a t i o n , and crime, hoping to improve turnout a m o n g blue-collar, ethnic voters. She w a s h e l p e d by the a p p e a r a n c e on the ballot of a r e f e r e n d u m t h r e a t e n i n g a f f i r m a t i v e action in state hiring, c o n t r a c t i n g , and e d u c a tional p r o g r a m s , and e x p e c t e d to b e n e f i t f r o m c a m p a i g n visits to the district by t w o of the n a t i o n ' s b e s t - k n o w n H i s p a n i c s , F e d e r i c o Pena, secretary of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , and H e n r y C i s n e r o s , secretary of h o u s i n g and u r b a n d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e p r e s i d e n t also c a m p a i g n e d f o r S a n c h e z , savoring the prospect of shooting d o w n " B - l B o b , " and he helped her raise part of the $ 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 she used to f i n a n c e her c a m p a i g n and outs p e n d her o p p o n e n t . D o r n a n , in the m e a n t i m e , w a s c l a i m i n g that S a n c h e z ' s pro-choice position m a d e her " a n t i - C a t h o l i c " and a "pretend Hispanic." He called her a " c h a m p i o n of h o m o s e x u a l s " and alleged that she was a " c a r p e t b a g g e r . " D a y s b e f o r e the election, one of his g r o w n sons tried to m a k e a " c i t i z e n ' s arrest" of S a n c h e z ' s h u s b a n d as he was posting " S a n c h e z " signs (New York Times, D e c e m b e r 18, 1996). On election night, it appeared as if Dornan had narrowly prevailed, holding a 233-vote lead. But w h e n mail-in ballots were c o u n t e d in the

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days that followed, Sanchez forged ahead, ultimately winning the race by 984 votes and pulling off one of the biggest upsets of the decade. Dornan refused to concede, however, characteristically reviling his opponent as "an inarticulate, flaky, non-qualified person." He demanded a recount, charging that the margin of victory was a product of fraudulent registrations and illegally cast ballots ( U S A Today, N o v e m b e r 14, 1996). He accused Sanchez of having used illegal aliens to stuff ballot boxes, and asserted that pro-Sandinista communist interlopers organized "motivation troops" to send Sanchez voters to the polls in low-turnout neighborhoods ( N e w York Times, December 18, 1996). A recount did not change the result. Sanchez was sworn in with the new cohort of House first-termers and assigned to the Education and Workforce Committee. Undaunted, Dornan continued to press his case, alleging that an immigrant-rights group, H e r m a n d a d Mexicana Nacional ( H M N ) , had induced Hispanic immigrants to register and vote b e f o r e they were legally eligible. Over the years, H M N had received $35 million in state and federal government f u n d s to conduct classes for immigrants, help them understand naturalization procedures, tutor them for citizenship tests, and prepare them to take advantage of their rights as Americans, registering and voting among them ( S h e f f n e r 1997a). Dornan claimed that its leaders had conspired against him, and that the absentee ballots of more than 100 people had been illegally submitted by a third party. In early February, his lawyer announced that 1,789 illegal votes had been identified, adding, "We are frankly astounded by the magnitude of the voter fraud and irregularities uncovered . . . at this early date," whereupon Dornan called upon Sanchez to resign her House seat and join him in calling for a new election—a request she ignored (Sheffner 1997a). Dornan lodged his complaints with the House, and they were referred to the Oversight Committee, chaired by California Republican Bill Thomas. The committee, in turn, chose a task force of two Republicans and a Democrat to investigate the charges. It was chaired by Michigan Republican Vern Ehlers. The inquiry dragged on for more than a year, with the California secretary of state, the Orange County District Attorney's Office, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) ultimately drawn into the controversy. At issue was how many illegal voters had participated in the House contest, how many had been encouraged to do so by H M N and other organizations, and how many had voted for each of the two candidates. The last question could never be confidently answered, given the secrecy of the vote. But answers to even the first two questions were difficult to nail down

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because of uncertainties that arose when trying to match INS worksheets of Orange County residents who were possibly noncitizens with registration and turnout records for the forty-sixth district. The unreliability of whatever findings would emerge, together with the intensely political character of the issue, poisoned the atmosphere in the House and exacerbated the already strained relations between the two parties. Republicans, particularly those f r o m California, rallied to D o r n a n ' s side. Five G O P m e m b e r s f r o m Orange County wrote to the chair of the Government Reform and Oversight Committee asking him to investigate the charges against H M N . At the same time, they encouraged the California secretary of state, Republican Bill Jones, to conduct investigations into possible criminal wrongdoing by H M N and any other group that might have been complicit in fraudulently adding to Sanchez's vote count (Sheffner 1997a). The chair of Sanchez's Education subcommittee, another California Republican, was loath to give her presence in Congress public exposure, and reneged on a promise to allow her to hold field hearings in her district on postsecondary education. According to disappointed Education Committee Democrats, the change was made because of the ongoing contested election (Sheffner 1997b). Republicans responded that a hearing had already been held in California and that the committee could support no more than one field hearing in each state. W h e n Democrats pointed out that two hearings had been conducted in Pennsylvania and Indiana, their objections were explained away. Bill T h o m a s was among the most unrelenting supporters of Dornan's cause, partly because the election occurred in a California district, and partly because memory of a previous election dispute in which he was a frustrated m a j o r player continued to haunt him. In 1984 he was the lone Republican on a three-member subcommittee investigating a close election in what came to be called Indiana's "bloody eighth district." In spite of the fact that the Indiana secretary of state certified the victory of G O P candidate Richard M c l n t y r e over Democrat Frank McCloskey, McCloskey was seated after a protracted recount—during which subcommittee members painstakingly examined individual ballots. The decision outraged Republicans and became a rallying cry when important partisan disputes arose in ensuing years. Consequently, when some Republicans began to lose interest in the Sanchez investigation—largely because definitive proof of fraud was hard to come b y — T h o m a s refused to close down the inquiry (Greenblatt 1997). Even after it was reported that the Orange County district attorney would not prosecute H M N and that its leader, Nativo Lopez,

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had never been a target of the investigation, T h o m a s and a majority of the task f o r c e d e c i d e d to s u b p o e n a L o p e z a n y w a y . T h e C a l i f o r n i a R e p u b l i c a n r e f e r r e d to H M N as a g a n g of " c r i m i n a l s , " asserting that "this organization is not a m o m - a n d - p o p struggling local organization. For half a century, they have laundered federal f u n d s , " adding that " w e are trying to find out the extent of their activity" (Van D o n g e n 1997c). W h e n D o r n a n ' s c h a l l e n g e was finally r e j e c t e d , T h o m a s a c c e p t e d the decision reluctantly. In fact, some C a l i f o r n i a n s v o w e d to take retribution on their o w n c o l l e a g u e s . O r a n g e C o u n t y c o n s e r v a t i v e D a n a R o h r b a c h e r said: " W e placed our faith in our leaders to h a v e the c o u r a g e and e n e r g y to do w h a t is right. It a p p e a r s they did not." R o h r b a c h e r went on to predict that f u t u r e Republican candidates would pay a political price for H o u s e leaders' failure to back the D o r n a n challenge. He w a r n e d that " w h o e v e r c o m e s to California, either looking for m o n e y or support, w h o has p e r m i t t e d an e l e c t i o n to be stolen by the D e m o c r a t s , is g o i n g to have trouble gaining the trust of the C a l i f o r n i a R e p u b l i c a n p a r t y " (Van D o n g e n 1998a). But D o r n a n ' s o w n b e h a v i o r p r o b a b l y p r e o r d a i n e d the o u t c o m e . A f t e r the H o u s e ' s A u g u s t 1997 recess, he c a m e to Washington to plead his c a u s e directly. As a f o r m e r c o n g r e s s m a n , he w a s allowed access to the H o u s e floor, a privilege granted under H o u s e rules as long as those claiming it did not have any direct personal or pecuniary interest in legislative matters then p e n d i n g b e f o r e the chamber. D e m o c r a t s cried foul, arguing that the election dispute had not yet been resolved and that Dorn a n ' s lobbying on the H o u s e floor violated the spirit if not the letter of the rules. T h e C a l i f o r n i a R e p u b l i c a n d e n i e d he was using the H o u s e floor to lobby f o r m e r colleagues, but critics were u n c o n v i n c e d and N e w Jersey D e m o c r a t Robert M e n e n d e z introduced legislation to prohibit all f o r m e r m e m b e r s f r o m lobbying on the H o u s e floor on their o w n behalf. D a y s later he w a s a p p r o a c h e d by D o r n a n on the f l o o r and a s k e d w h e t h e r he t h o u g h t the C a l i f o r n i a n was "stupid e n o u g h " to violate H o u s e rules. A c c o r d i n g to M e n e n d e z , D o r n a n " c a m e after me. He verbally a c c o s t e d m e , " uttered a profanity, and "called m e a n t i - C a t h o l i c and a liar." H e then taunted the N e w Jersey D e m o c r a t to take "the fight o u t s i d e " by calling him a " c o w a r d " (Van D o n g e n 1997b). D o r n a n vigorously denied this account, calling it a "foul lie," maintaining that he had told M e n e n d e z that the spin D e m o c r a t s were putting on the e l e c t i o n p r o b e w a s "vile, d i s g u s t i n g , and a n t i - C h r i s t i a n and is itself racist." M e n e n d e z later o f f e r e d a p r i v i l e g e d resolution requiring the H o u s e sergeant at arms to bar D o r n a n f r o m the floor until the H o u s e O v e r s i g h t C o m m i t t e e c o m p l e t e d its investigation (Van D o n g e n 1997b).

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The next day the House, in an unprecedented action, banished Dornan from the floor by a vote of 289 to 65, with 111 Republicans, including most G O P leaders, voting "aye" (Carney 1997). This rebuff signaled the beginning of the end for Dornan. The Oversight C o m m i t t e e continued its probe, but leaders of both parties were working behind the scenes to bring closure and allow Sanchez to retain her seat. Nonetheless, Dornan believed he would prevail and continued to raise funds for the special election he believed would be called after the House voted to throw out the 1996 result and declare Sanchez's seat vacant (Van Dongen 1997f). (Although the Federal Election C o m m i s sion had written Dornan advising him that he could not lawfully raise f u n d s for a 1997 special election that was not expected to take place, he continued to prepare for it.) Later, he denounced his party's leaders, asserting, " I ' m as angry at my country's government as I ' v e ever been in my life." He declared that he would challenge Sanchez in the November 1998 election, dedicating his campaign to the patron saint of Mexico, Our Lady of Guadalupe. He said he would take Sanchez to task for being "flaky" and "pro-abortion," and that he would attack her for being the poster-child for voter fraud (Van Dongen 1998c). The unremitting assault on Sanchez by Dornan and conservative colleagues was countered at every turn by Democrats, especially Minority Leader Dick Gephardt and Menendez, with salvos from antagonists on both sides of the aisle further eroding the rapport between the two parties. When Sanchez was denied the opportunity to hold a hearing in her district, Gephardt issued a statement calling it an outrage. He added: The conduct of the Republican leadership . . . and the Education C o m mittee in this matter has been vindictive and mean-spirited. . . . Although many on the other side of the aisle may like to pretend that B o b Dornan is still a Member of Congress, the reality is that Loretta Sanchez was elected and should be allowed to fulfill her responsibilities without interference. (Sheffner 1997b)

As the inquiry dragged on, Gephardt threatened to "shut the House d o w n " by employing such dilatory tactics as demanding roll call votes on innocuous matters and offering motions to adjourn. "If they continue this immoral pursuit," he said, he would do whatever he could to end the investigation (Bradley and Van Dongen 1997a). During debate on legislative branch spending, Democrats charged Republicans with targeting Sanchez because she was Hispanic, and denounced the use of INS immigration lists to identify illegal voters as an invasion of an ethnic minority's privacy. The lone Democrat on the three-member task

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f o r c e , M a r y l a n d ' s Steny H o y e r , d e c l a r e d that "this is the first t i m e in history the I N S has been asked to c o m p a r e the n a m e s of voters to lists. T h i n k of the m e s s a g e this is s e n d i n g to the A m e r i c a n s , A m e r i c a n s I stress, of Hispanic b a c k g r o u n d . " R e p u b l i c a n s shot back that the D e m o crats w e r e " w a v i n g the b l o o d y shirt of e t h n i c i t y " and called t h e m "racist" for e v e n raising the issue (Bradley and Van D o n g e n 1997a). D e m o c r a t s b e g a n w h a t G e p h a r d t called " g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e " in the w e e k s l e a d i n g up to a d j o u r n m e n t , i n t r o d u c i n g p r i v i l e g e d r e s o l u t i o n s calling for an i m m e d i a t e end to the election probe. G e p h a r d t ' s motion in late O c t o b e r failed on a nearly party-line vote, 2 0 4 - 2 2 2 , but that did not stop other D e m o c r a t s f r o m o f f e r i n g m o r e than forty similar resolutions, w h i c h f o r c e d the R e p u b l i c a n leadership to take the highly unusual step of c h a n g i n g H o u s e rules by p r o h i b i t i n g a n y o n e but the m a j o r i t y and minority leaders f r o m submitting privileged resolutions for the r e m a i n der of the legislative session (Bradley and Van D o n g e n 1997b). In the m e a n t i m e , D e m o c r a t i c H i s p a n i c m e m b e r s met with such organizations as La Raza, the Puerto Rican Legal D e f e n s e Fund, and the H i s p a n i c B a r A s s o c i a t i o n to m o b i l i z e national s u p p o r t f o r S a n c h e z . R e p u b l i c a n s with relatively large n u m b e r s of H i s p a n i c c o n s t i t u e n t s , i n c l u d i n g G O P leaders R i c h a r d A r m y and T o m D e L a y , w e r e put on n o t i c e that protests and press c o n f e r e n c e s w o u l d be held in their districts (Van D o n g e n 1997a). S a n c h e z s y m p a t h i z e r s b e g a n to wear "Free S a n c h e z " o r a n g e ribbons, and w h e n R e p u b l i c a n s later decided to delegate the nuts and bolts of the recount to California secretary of state Bill J o n e s , H o y e r and other D e m o c r a t i c leaders v i g o r o u s l y o b j e c t e d (Van D o n g e n 1997a). In time, D e m o c r a t s began to c o n d e m n the "prohibitive c o s t " of the investigation, w h i c h at s u m m e r ' s end they estimated to be $ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 and climbing (Los Angeles Times, S e p t e m b e r 30, 1997). W h e n the investigation was completed, Republicans a n n o u n c e d that it had cost $254,000. D e m o c r a t s claimed that the f i g u r e was more like $1 million. T h e s e figures do not include legal fees incurred by Sanchez and Dornan, which may have together exceeded $1 million (Van D o n g e n 1998b). In the end, the task force u n a n i m o u s l y r e c o m m e n d e d shutting d o w n the inquiry, the O v e r s i g h t C o m m i t t e e accepted the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n , 8 to 1, and the H o u s e v o t e d 3 7 8 to 33 to r e j e c t D o r n a n ' s c h a l l e n g e . For m o s t R e p u b l i c a n s , the f o u r t e e n - m o n t h investigation p r o d u c e d too f e w possibly f r a u d u l e n t votes to o v e r c o m e S a n c h e z ' s 984-vote margin. T h e task f o r c e had identified 7 4 8 illegal votes, w h i c h its chair indicated was not e n o u g h to call f o r a new e l e c t i o n , but m o r e than e n o u g h to p r o v e that D o r n a n ' s claim of fraud was not frivolous and that his party had not unfairly targeted H i s p a n i c s ( K o s z c z u k 1998). T h e protracted character

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of the investigation, said R e p u b l i c a n s , as well as its i n c o n c l u s i v e n e s s ( m a n y believed m o r e illegal voters could have been discovered), were largely d u e to D e m o c r a t i c f o o t - d r a g g i n g and i n s u f f i c i e n t c o o p e r a t i o n f r o m the INS and the Justice D e p a r t m e n t (Van D o n g e n 1998a). For D e m o c r a t s , e v e n the 748 f i g u r e w a s an e x a g g e r a t i o n . T h e y pointed out that the task f o r c e had produced no evidence that these voters had not been citizens at the time they cast ballots, that there was no way of k n o w i n g for w h o m they had voted (or that they had even m a d e a c h o i c e for the H o u s e , as distinct f r o m votes cast f o r p r e s i d e n t and other offices), and that almost 4 0 percent were not registered D e m o c r a t s (Van D o n g e n 1997d, K o s z c z u k 1998). T h e y also a c c u s e d R e p u b l i c a n s of trying to intimidate Hispanic voters, with G e p h a r d t stating: The actions of Republicans on this issue have been shameful. [The investigation] was the largest waste of congressional time and money I have seen. . . . They impugned the integrity and standing of Loretta Sanchez's victory—and then cast aspersions about the political participation of Latinos who exercised their constitutional rights in the 1996 election. (Van Dongen 1998a)

T h e f e r o c i t y of the partisan struggle over S a n c h e z ' s H o u s e seat a f f e c t e d the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n C C W I D e m o c r a t s and R e p u b l i c a n s . Few r e f e r e n c e s to the dispute surfaced at caucus meetings, with w o m e n in both parties inclined to avoid discussion of so f r a c t i o u s a topic. But D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n w e r e i n c e n s e d by the assault on S a n c h e z . T h e y v i e w e d the attack as sexist as well as racist. O n e R e p r e s e n t a t i v e f r o m N e w York remarked: "We [the C C W I ] d o n ' t even call the press c o n f e r e n c e s w e used to. W e ' r e all very m u c h c o n c e r n e d right n o w with Loretta S a n c h e z . We see the c h a l l e n g e as a w o m e n ' s issue. C e r t a i n l y had she been a man this would never have h a p p e n e d . " A Florida C C W I m e m b e r attributed m u c h of the divisiveness in the H o u s e to the S a n c h e z investigation. " T h e r e is so m u c h anger," she said. And just as Republican w o m e n were disturbed by the silence of D e m o cratic w o m e n after revelations of the Clinton affair with M o n i c a L e w i n sky, D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n were critical of Republican w o m e n ' s failure to s u p p o r t S a n c h e z . Said one, " I t ' s hard f o r s o m e of us to b e l i e v e that Republican w o m e n w o n ' t stand up for other w o m e n in a case like this." T h i s c r i t i c i s m was not entirely j u s t i f i e d . N i n e of f o u r t e e n G O P c o n g r e s s w o m e n voted against tabling the motion to deny D o r n a n access to the floor, and ten voted with most G O P leaders to banish him f r o m the floor until his challenge to S a n c h e z was resolved.

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D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n w o r k e d collectively as well as individually to s u p p o r t S a n c h e z ' s c a u s e . Just b e f o r e the A u g u s t recess, m o r e than a score s p o k e during Special O r d e r s d e m a n d i n g that the c l o u d cast over her e l e c t i o n be r e m o v e d . M a n y later participated in a j o i n t press conf e r e n c e with S e n a t e w o m e n to d e n o u n c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s of both the S a n c h e z and Landrieu elections and urged the Senate Rules C o m m i t t e e and the H o u s e O v e r s i g h t C o m m i t t e e to r e j e c t c l a i m s of f r a u d in both disputes (Van D o n g e n 1997e). As their frustration grew, D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n coordinated radio and n e w s p a p e r interviews with m e d i a outlets in C a l i f o r n i a , Florida, and Texas, d e f e n d i n g Sanchez before heavily Hispanic audiences (Los Angeles Times, S e p t e m b e r 30, 1997). S o m e of the same w o m e n were driven to meet collectively with Newt Gingrich to request an i m m e d i a t e end to the probe. A l t h o u g h placated by a p r o m i s e of greater e x p e d i t i o u s n e s s , they w e r e not e n c o u r a g e d by the S p e a k e r ' s s u b s e q u e n t s t a t e m e n t that "[t]his investigation will not end until all the facts have been uncovered and a fair, impartial review of all the evidence has taken place" (Bradley and Van D o n g e n 1997b). A m o n g the D e m o c r a t s introducing privileged resolutions calling a halt to the investigation, t w e n t y - t w o were m e m b e r s of the C C W I . A Republican motion to adjourn effectively nipped them in the bud, and a s u b s e q u e n t rules c h a n g e prohibited their reintroduction later in the session (Bradley and Van D o n g e n 1997b). B a r b a r a Kennelly was a m o n g S a n c h e z ' s most sympathetic supporters. In the p r o c e s s of p r e p a r i n g a c a m p a i g n f o r g o v e r n o r , the veteran C o n n e c t i c u t D e m o c r a t n e v e r t h e l e s s took S a n c h e z u n d e r her wing. She invited S a n c h e z to m o v e into her a p a r t m e n t as a r o o m m a t e , an invitation the embattled C a l i f o r n i a n accepted, and she was one of m a n y w h o d e m a n d e d that the election c h a l l e n g e be r e j e c t e d . K e n n e l l y d e c l a r e d : " S i n c e the polls c l o s e d in N o v e m b e r , one of our c o l l e a g u e s — L o r e t t a S a n c h e z — h a s been subjected to unprecedented harassment. It's time for it to s t o p " ( B r a d l e y and Van D o n g e n 1997a). Later, she d e f e n d e d S a n c h e z against D o r n a n ' s a t t e m p t s to belittle and trivialize the new m e m b e r . "You d o n ' t get to C o n g r e s s as a w o m a n , " K e n n e l l y said, "unless you are successful in other a r e a s " ( N e w York Times, O c t o b e r 5, 1997). In the m e a n t i m e , w o m e n D e m o c r a t s , especially H i s p a n i c s and C a l i f o r n i a n s , c o n d u c t e d a f u n d r a i s i n g d r i v e to h e l p raise m o n e y for S a n c h e z ' s legal expenses. T h e anger a m o n g D e m o c r a t i c c o n g r e s s w o m e n was reflected in the c o m m e n t s of the usually r e s t r a i n e d Z o e L o f g r e n of C a l i f o r n i a . She a d d r e s s e d the H o u s e , saying: "Mr. Speaker, I a m k n o w n here in the

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H o u s e as s o m e o n e w h o is not a ranter and raver. But I f i n d m y s e l f unable to remain silent any longer about the S a n c h e z race. . . . I think there is s o m e t h i n g w r o n g with an investigation that p r o d u c e s nothing, but c o n t i n u e s in what looks to be a plan to c o n s u m e the entire term of the p e r s o n ' s o f f i c e " (Van D o n g e n 1997e). T h e p e r v a s i v e bitterness u n l e a s h e d by S a n c h e z ' s election can be understood as a product of the narrow majority Republicans held in the H o u s e and by partisan enmity. But it can be explained in terms of differences in gender orientations as well. California Republicans had long held a m o n o p o l y on congressional seats in O r a n g e County. Robert Dornan had b e c o m e a fixture in the forty-sixth district, territory he had easily r e c l a i m e d a f t e r he had r e l i n q u i s h e d it to run for a n o t h e r o f f i c e in 1982. His hard-right, c o n s e r v a t i v e politics w e r e e m b l e m a t i c of the county d e l e g a t i o n ' s ideological orientation, and w h e n he narrowly lost in 1996, neither he nor his l i k e - m i n d e d c o l l e a g u e s w e r e p r e p a r e d to a c c e p t the o u t c o m e . T h e y had g o o d reason to believe that s o m e votes were cast by ineligible residents, and they were convinced that the n u m ber clearly exceeded the margin Sanchez purportedly compiled. According to a S a n c h e z staffer, " T h a t a D e m o c r a t had broken the R e p u b l i c a n h a m m e r l o c k on the C o u n t y w a s a shock. That the D e m o c r a t was Hispanic and a w o m a n was an insult." A i d e d by C a l i f o r n i a n s in key c o m m i t t e e positions, D o r n a n allies were able to drag out the investigation for fourteen months. T h e y hoped the f r a u d would be widespread e n o u g h to f o r c e a special election. Failing that, they e x p e c t e d the inquiry to sow d o u b t s a b o u t the o u t c o m e , doubts that were compelling e n o u g h to m a k e S a n c h e z vulnerable in her race for reelection. T h e y were sorely disappointed. In a 1998 rematch, S a n c h e z defeated D o r n a n by 16 percentage points. T h e clashing g e n d e r orientations of the two candidates aggravated the already tense battle they were w a g i n g . T h e t w o had very d i f f e r e n t u n d e r s t a n d i n g s about the role and responsibilities of a H o u s e m e m b e r . D o r n a n said that S a n c h e z was " p r o b a b l y the least e f f e c t i v e C o n g r e s s man [s/c] in the entire U.S. H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . . . . Her idea of w o r k is to go h o m e to read to g r a d e - s c h o o l c h i l d r e n " (Van D o n g e n 1998c). That m a n y congressional and even presidential candidates meet with school children and read to them was clearly b e y o n d D o r n a n ' s ken. It seems fair to infer that the priorities of " B - l B o b " resided in m a k i n g military and d e f e n s e policy, and in v o u c h s a f i n g law and order at h o m e and abroad. His characterization of S a n c h e z as principally interested in e d u c a t i n g and n u r t u r i n g children i n t r o d u c e d a traditional g e n d e r distinction f r o m w h i c h he b e l i e v e d he w o u l d profit. But by d o i n g so, he g a v e voters in the f o r t y - s i x t h district a c h o i c e not only b e t w e e n c o m -

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peting parties and ideologies but also b e t w e e n t w o people w h o had very d i f f e r e n t ideas about what constitutes legitimate public service.

Assessing the Caucus in the 105th Congress T h e W h i t e H o u s e scandal and the c o n t e s t e d elections, especially the p r o t r a c t e d i n v e s t i g a t i o n of S a n c h e z ' s victory, d r a i n e d s o m e of the C C W I ' s p r o d u c t i v e energy. T h e d i s t r a c t i o n s did not seriously strain relations between the cochairs, but they threatened the fragile bipartisan spirit the leaders were trying to nourish and reduced the a m o u n t of time and e m o t i o n a l c o m m i t m e n t m e m b e r s were able to invest in the g r o u p ' s legislative and public relations efforts. E v e n so, the C C W I ' s track r e c o r d d u r i n g the 105th C o n g r e s s was not seriously a f f e c t e d by t h e s e events, a l t h o u g h by m o s t s t a n d a r d s it w a s i n a u s p i c i o u s . T h e c a u c u s c o u l d point to several legislative successes, but its inability to m o v e f o r w a r d on most feminist priorities was, for some, demoralizing. In the closing days of the 105th Congress, Norton, b e l i e v i n g w o m e n had lost the f i g h t o v e r i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e f o r contraceptives, was bitterly disappointed with her g r o u p ' s p e r f o r m a n c e . On the eve of a d j o u r n m e n t , she said: Whatever we do, including the must-pass victories of the Women's Caucus, will be overwhelmed when the gavel goes down in this Congress. As delighted as I am by passage of three of our seven priorities, we of the Women's Caucus of the 105th Congress will have to answer the question: "What did you do for women in the 105th?" The answer from American women will be: Not much. (Congressional Record, October 14, 1998, p. HI0882) In the e y e s of s o m e , she w a s b e i n g too hard on h e r s e l f , on her cochair, and on C C W I activists. A f t e r all, f o u r of the c a u c u s ' s seven legislative priorities had b e e n a d o p t e d , and s o m e h i g h - p r o f i l e m e a s u r e s — e x t e n d i n g M e d i c a i d b e n e f i t s , p r o m o t i n g r e s e a r c h on w o m e n ' s health, e n f o r c i n g child support, a m o n g t h e m — h a d also passed. The caucus had f a i l e d to stop the H o u s e f r o m s e g r e g a t i n g w o m e n in military basic training, but its v e h e m e n t opposition had h e l p e d spur the Senate to reject the proposal. A n d some m e m b e r s chose to e m p h a s i z e structural i m p r o v e m e n t s rather than legislative gains w h e n evaluating the C C W I ' s p e r f o r m a n c e . In an interview, J o h n s o n r e m a r k e d : "It has really been f u n to see p e o p l e ' s g r a t i f i c a t i o n at r e b u i l d i n g [the C C W I ] , E l e a n o r and I have really m a d e a lot of c h a n g e s and done things in a way that include people, and it is f u n to see all that c o m i n g back and a r o u n d . "

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M o s t i m p o r t a n t , the c a u c u s r e v i v e d a c o m m i t m e n t to its initial strategic objectives and would begin the 106th Congress with more conf i d e n c e and vitality than it b e g a n the 105th. Its m e m b e r s h i p had ballooned to fifty-six, almost f o u r times the n u m b e r w h o had inaugurated the c a u c u s twenty years earlier, and virtually all c o n g r e s s w o m e n were now affiliated. Creation of teams had fostered the bipartisan spirit Norton and J o h n s o n sought to engender, and even though m a n y t e a m s did not live up to expectations and some existed on p a p e r only, a structural f r a m e w o r k had b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d to a c c o m m o d a t e f u t u r e c o o p e r a t i o n between D e m o c r a t s and Republicans. In the m e a n t i m e , W o m e n ' s Policy Inc. had b e e n given a f i n a n c i a l shot in the arm, and although its subscriber list r e m a i n e d small, it was n o w better poised to p r o v i d e r e s e a r c h and public relations support, in short supply ever since L S O s had b e e n e l i m i n a t e d . D e c i s i o n s to shun such c o n t e n t i o u s issues as r e p r o d u c t i v e rights, and to c o n c e n t r a t e on consensus building, promised to m a k e the caucus a more credible player in H o u s e politics. Its more m a i n s t r e a m positions, together with its n u m bers and bipartisan cast, now m a d e it more difficult for the Republican majority to write it off. But perhaps the most p r o m i s i n g d e v e l o p m e n t was the e m e r g e n c e of several t e a m s led by R e p u b l i c a n s and D e m o c r a t s w h o also served on the standing c o m m i t t e e s w h o s e jurisdiction e m b r a c e d their t e a m s ' subject matter. C a u c u s priorities could now be d e f i n e d by team leaders w h o had direct access to the c o m m i t t e e c o u n c i l s in w h i c h national policy r e c e i v e d f o r m a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . T h e t w o p e r s p e c t i v e s these leaders b r o u g h t to b e a r — t h a t of the c a u c u s and that of the c o m m i t t e e — p r o vided t h e m with greater opportunities to discover public policy innovations likely to be acceptable to each. Of course, much depended on team leaders' e n d o r s e m e n t of feminist goals. But even in the event of a tepid c o m m i t m e n t , and e v e n if t e a m s w e r e u n d e p e n d a b l e and the system of t e a m s was unstable, as it proved to be, N o r t o n and J o h n s o n had n o n e theless established a blueprint to guide ever-changing cohorts of f u t u r e c o n g r e s s w o m e n on how to address w o m e n ' s issues in w a y s that could m a k e a d i f f e r e n c e . All of these d e v e l o p m e n t s m e a n t that the f u t u r e of the C C W I was secure, at least in the short term.

Notes 1. T h e s e p r o p o s a l s a p p e a r in t w o m e m o s , d a t e d S e p t e m b e r 10, 1996, and J a n u a r y 7, 1997, sent by N o r t o n to D e m o c r a t i c c o n g r e s s women.

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2. T h e other two, A n d r e a S e a s t r a n d and Enid G r e e n e W a l d h o l t z , were not returned to the 105th C o n g r e s s . Seastrand was d e f e a t e d in the 1996 election. W a l d h o l t z d e c l i n e d to run again, f o l l o w i n g reports of financial improprieties in the 1994 election. 3. O n l y I d a h o ' s H e l e n C h e n o w e t h r e f u s e d to head a t e a m . C o n stance Morella and Sue Kelly agreed to lead two. 4. T h e goals appear in a m e m o Norton sent on S e p t e m b e r 10, 1996. 5. T e c h n i c a l l y , the C C W I is not p e r m i t t e d to hold h e a r i n g s . Its l e a d e r s d i s g u i s e d the b r e a c h in H o u s e rules by c a l l i n g their h e a r i n g s "briefings." 6. N o r t o n ' s r e m a r k s appear in a letter to the National C o m m i t t e e on Pay Equity dated A u g u s t 18, 1998. 7. A description of the meeting with the S p e a k e r appears in a m e m o f r o m J o h n s o n and Norton to C C W I m e m b e r s dated S e p t e m b e r 11, 1998.

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Congresswomen and the New Millennium: The Future of the Caucus

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ongressional c a u c u s e s are not immortal. Unlike congressional c o m mittees, they are easily created and regularly abandoned. They may d i s a p p e a r b e c a u s e the i s s u e s s p a w n i n g them l o s e their salience, or b e c a u s e a standing c o m m i t t e e co-opts their m i s s i o n and m e s s a g e . S o m e t i m e s c a u c u s m e m b e r s find that their group is no longer useful and they d i s a f f i l i a t e . A n d o c c a s i o n a l l y , a shift in the political and policy context out o f which a c a u c u s emerged m a k e s it irrelevant ( H a m m o n d 1998, pp. 6 2 - 6 3 ) . A m o n g the approximately 150 c a u c u s e s operating in both the S e n a t e and the H o u s e in 1993, ten had been d i s b a n d e d by 1995. Another two dozen remained in p l a c e but were dormant ( H a m mond 1998, p. 21).

The Congressional C a u c u s for Women's Issues, which celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary in 2 0 0 2 , is among the more long-lived informal g r o u p s in the House. Its robust size, its elastic agenda, its faithful membership, and its attentive constituency s u g g e s t that the organization will probably carry on for a while. But nothing is certain in these uncertain times, and the future of the c a u c u s will depend on how well it m a n a g e s a half dozen c h a l l e n g e s . They include ensuring a reliable supply of c o c h a i r s f r o m each party, continuing to recruit as m e m b e r s a critical m a s s of c o m m i t t e d c o n g r e s s w o m e n f r o m both parties, and reconfiguring an organizational structure w h o s e v a l u e has been i m p a i r e d by the c a u c u s ' s increasing size and shifting legislative objectives. T h e C C W I ' s a g e n d a - s e t t i n g p r o c e s s is a l s o a matter of concern, especially in light of the new claims being m a d e on the federal government's attention span and resources by wars and terrorism. And finally, the c a u c u s ' s working relationship with the White H o u s e and with party and committee leaders in C o n g r e s s will have to be addressed. 161

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Recruiting Feminist Cochairs T h e C C W I could not have lasted as long as it has if m e m b e r s of each party had been unable to recruit c o m p a t i b l e cochairs c o m m i t t e d to f e m inist goals. At first, c o c h a i r s w e r e largely s e l f - s e l e c t e d and served as long as they r e m a i n e d in the H o u s e . E l i z a b e t h H o l t z m a n , M a r g a r e t Heckler, O l y m p i a S n o w e , and Pat S c h r o e d e r w e r e a r g u a b l y the m e m bers most interested in sustaining the caucus and a m o n g the most willing to be the g r o u p ' s public voice. For each, the position presented little or no political risk. Since 1995, C C W I leaders have been limited to a single t w o - y e a r term, a l t h o u g h they m a y run f o r c o c h a i r again a f t e r at least a one-term hiatus. Producing a cochair f r o m each party gives the organization its credibility as a bipartisan voice f o r w o m e n , and therein lies an i m p o r t a n t challenge to the c a u c u s ' s survival. W h e r e a s D e m o c r a t s have had no difficulty i d e n t i f y i n g w o u l d - b e leaders, s o m e t i m e s c h o o s i n g f r o m a m o n g several aspirants, R e p u b l i c a n s h a v e had to w o r k hard to f i n d willing colleagues. T h e n u m b e r of Republican c o n g r e s s w o m e n has been f e w e r than one-half the n u m b e r of D e m o c r a t s in recent years, leaving the form e r with a c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y s m a l l e r pool of potential c a n d i d a t e s f r o m which to choose. Moreover, ambitious G O P w o m e n w h o seek i n f l u e n c e within their o w n party, m o r e than D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n , risk a l i e n a t i n g m a l e colleagues w h o have little sympathy for f e m i n i s t causes. For a Republican w o m a n to accept the c o c h a i r position, not only m u s t she h a v e a m o r e than passing interest in w o m e n ' s issues, even if not the passionate c o m m i t m e n t p o s s e s s e d by such early leaders as M a r g a r e t H e c k l e r and O l y m p i a S n o w e , but she must also be confident that a high-profile identification with the caucus will not d a m a g e later efforts to exercise influence within her party. To date, able and willing R e p u b l i c a n w o m e n h a v e a n s w e r e d the call, but s o m e did so only a f t e r lingering d o u b t s w e r e put to rest by G O P predecessors. A l m o s t a year b e f o r e Sue Kelly was to step d o w n as c o c h a i r in 2000, she recruited first-term c o n g r e s s w o m a n J u d y Biggert of Illinois to r e p l a c e her in 2 0 0 1 . A f t e r the 2 0 0 0 e l e c t i o n , Biggert succeeded in persuading first-termer Shelley M o o r e Capito of West Virginia to b e c o m e C C W I vice chair and the Illinois R e p u b l i c a n ' s replacem e n t in 2 0 0 3 . C a p i t o , in turn, recruited n e w l y elected G i n n y B r o w n Waite ( R - F l a . ) to serve as vice chair in the 108th Congress. S o m e c a u c u s - w a t c h e r s argue that senior rather than j u n i o r m e m b e r s should a s s u m e f u t u r e l e a d e r s h i p roles, b e c a u s e the v e t e r a n s ' electoral

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security, their b r o a d e r e x p e r i e n c e with H o u s e w o r k w a y s , and their m e m o r i e s of j u s t h o w e f f e c t i v e the c a u c u s o n c e w a s are likely to be m o r e c o n d u c i v e to g r o u p m a i n t e n a n c e . D e m o c r a t L o u i s e S l a u g h t e r ' s selection as c o c h a i r in 2 0 0 3 is their m o d e l . But most senior m e m b e r s are u n w i l l i n g to take on c a u c u s tasks b e c a u s e of w e i g h t i e r c o m m i t t e e and party responsibilities. And, as one Republican insider put it, " E v e n if you w o r k hard as a co-chair, you get little credit in your district. You get no extra staff and you get lots of hassles." T h e s y s t e m of m a k i n g vice chairs in one C o n g r e s s c o c h a i r s in the next has generally w o r k e d well. But vice chairs have typically a s s u m e d no more than nominal responsibilities, and the process has not necessarily m a d e it easier for G O P c a u c u s leaders to recruit successors. Texan Kay G r a n g e r served as vice c h a i r in 1999 and 2000, with the u n d e r standing that G O P w o m e n would have to find s o m e o n e else to be chair in 2001. Decisions by C a p i t o and B r o w n - W a i t e to accept the vice chair p o s i t i o n s in the 107th and 108th C o n g r e s s e s w e r e i n f l u e n c e d by their electoral vulnerability. Both w o n close contests to gain H o u s e seats and they and their m e n t o r s c o n c l u d e d that a C C W I leadership position and identification with selected w o m e n ' s issues would raise their profiles in districts p r e v i o u s l y held by D e m o c r a t s . Only a sharp increase in the n u m b e r of Republican c o n g r e s s w o m e n and/or the emergence of a D e m o cratic m a j o r i t y in the H o u s e are likely to m a k e selection of c o m m i t t e d G O P cochairs less problematic. T h e first d e v e l o p m e n t would, of course, increase the size of the pool f r o m w h i c h R e p u b l i c a n leaders could be d r a w n . T h e s e c o n d w o u l d d e c r e a s e the i n c i d e n c e of H o u s e leadership opportunities available to Republican w o m e n and perhaps induce more of them to use the C C W I to achieve personal and political goals. D i f f e r e n c e s in the styles of cochairs have occasionally d o g g e d the caucus, but never for very long. S o m e t i m e s these d i f f e r e n c e s strengthe n e d the g r o u p . In the 105th C o n g r e s s , f o r e x a m p l e , N a n c y J o h n s o n o f t e n p r e s s u r e d R e p u b l i c a n leaders b e h i n d the sccnes, c o m p l e m e n t i n g Eleanor H o l m e s N o r t o n ' s public articulation of C C W I priorities. A similar d y n a m i c e m e r g e d in 2001, w h e n the caucus was led by a cautious, d e l i b e r a t e R e p u b l i c a n , J u d y Biggert, and a s p o n t a n e o u s , e x p a n s i v e D e m o c r a t , Juanita M i l l e n d e r - M c D o n a l d . T h e caucus can be well served by c o c h a i r s with i d e o l o g i c a l and stylistic d i f f e r e n c e s as long as they exhibit mutual respect. L e a d e r s h i p r e c r u i t m e n t may never have b e c o m e a concern had the c a u c u s not b e g u n the p r a c t i c e of m a n d a t o r y c o c h a i r rotation. T h e s t r o n g e s t a d v o c a t e f o r c h a n g e , C a l i f o r n i a ' s M a x i n e Waters, b e l i e v e d that diversity a m o n g D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n was not b e i n g s u f f i c i e n t l y

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reflected by cochairs whose tenure was indeterminate. Term limits have since illuminated that diversity, and the biannual change has allowed more women to hone and display their leadership skills, while validating perspectives and ideas that had formerly been given less emphasis. African American women Eleanor Holmes Norton and Juanita Millender-McDonald rotated to the Democratic cochair position in 1997 and 2001, respectively, and Hilda Solis, Democratic vice chair in the 108th Congress, is in place to become the first Hispanic cochair in 2005. On the other hand, with each new Congress, discontinuities in leadership and staff delay, often for many months, emergence of the CCWI as an effective presence on Capitol Hill. Membership mobilization and agenda-setting suffer as inexperienced cochairs and their staffs try to get up to speed. Consequently, reliable, expeditious recruitment of committed leaders is essential if the caucus is to be sustained.

Attracting Committed Congresswomen Persuading a critical mass of women in both parties to join the CCWI has never been difficult. Even when six first-term Republicans declined to affiliate in 1995, two-thirds of their G O P colleagues and virtually all Democrats were members. Apparently most congresswomen have believed it is in their interest to join the group, and those who thought otherwise were pressured by the cochairs to change their minds. Between 1995 and 2002, Connie Morella, Nancy Johnson, Sue Kelly, and Judy Biggert worked assiduously to corral Republicans, while Nita Lowey, Eleanor Holmes Norton, Carolyn Maloney, and Juanita Millender-McDonald had an easier time recruiting all Democrats. In 2003, Slaughter and Capito as cochairs chose to assume that all congresswomen were CCWI members unless they explicitly opted out. JoAnn Davis (R-Va.) and Anne Northup did so. Some congresswomen have been tentative about their membership, acknowledging affiliation under some circumstances and keeping their distance from the caucus when it seemed prudent. But the staffs of women who are not members are regularly kept up-to-date on caucus activities. The blurring of membership boundaries is unlikely to be a positive development for the CCWI. If affiliation is devalued by congresswomen, by other Representatives, and by advocacy groups, the reputation and integrity of the group are threatened, as is the relevance of its message. On the other hand, a more fundamental challenge confronting the caucus is not simply to attract women, but to encourage members

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to contribute actively to their g r o u p ' s collective mission. This means that C C W I affiliation must continue to satisfy members' political, professional, and personal needs. It also means that congresswomen must continue to believe that circumstances impinge on the lives of women differently than they affect men, that they do so in a way that puts women at a disadvantage, and that a w o m e n ' s caucus in the House is a p o w e r f u l instrument for invoking the authority of the federal government to level the playing field. The cochairs have their work cut out for them. Republican leaders must persuade colleagues who tend to be uncomfortable with many caucus initiatives that an investment of time and energy is personally and politically worthwhile. These leaders cannot readily count on their followers' sense of sororital solidarity. As one senior G O P staffer remarked: "Republican women do not see the Caucus as having as much value as Democratic women. . . . Republican women are not much interested in the sisterhood aspect of the Caucus." At the same time, Democratic women, although more favorably disposed to the idea of a w o m e n ' s caucus, are impatient with the progress the C C W I has made in recent years, and critical of the policy compromises Democratic cochairs have had to make to retain the organization's bipartisan character. Their frustrations were especially apparent after their party lost its majority in the House in the 1994 election. Since then, several have considered the possibility of starting a Democratic w o m e n ' s caucus, one that would showcase mostly liberal policies and allow them to promote abortion rights. Toward this end, a score or more of Democratic women have convened unofficially about once every two months (Republican women have found no reason to meet even irregularly). Caucus unity and bipartisanship have been threatened further by the growing disaffection of black c o n g r e s s w o m e n with a White House whose Republican occupant, they believe, won the state of Florida in the 2000 election only after the votes of tens of thousands of African Americans were w r o n g f u l l y invalidated. California's Maxine Waters said she was personally offended by Speaker Hastert's remarks in January 2001 urging members of both parties to "get over" the bitterness of the presidential election dispute. She responded: "This attempt to send a message that despite what happened that everyone will lock arms and have a love fest, it's not real. Some of us will not 'get over i t ' " (Foerstel and Ota 2001). If the caucus is to survive in anything like its traditional f o r m , Democrats will have to continue to believe that bipartisan pursuit of a limited set of feminist goals is preferable to disaffiliation or fomenting

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a schism. And rank-and-file Republican women will have to continue to believe that there are at least some feminist i s s u e s — w o m e n ' s health, violence against w o m e n , women-led business enterprises—that make joining the caucus worthwhile. In the spring of 2003, these thresholds were met when women in both parties found c o m m o n cause in persuading the D e f e n s e Department and private contractors that w o m e n entrepreneurs should receive a larger share of federal contracts—in keeping with a 1994 statute that authorized federal agencies to earmark at least 5 percent of their contracts for w o m e n - o w n e d businesses. On this affirmative action issue, at least, CCWI-led negotiations held out the potential for a bipartisan success story.

Changing the Caucus's Structure Assuming the C C W I continues to recruit willing leaders and followers in both parties, its next challenge is to adapt its structure to its increased size and shifting agenda. Whereas there was once a time when the cochairs, assisted by a permanent staff, could use Executive Committee meetings as an instrument for building consensus, this is no longer the case. The permanent staff is gone, and the number of meetings, having fallen to fewer than a dozen in recent Congresses, has plummeted to zero in 2003. Declining attendance and the difficulties of finding a consensus on which issues to address, drove cochairs to conclude that most plenary C C W I meetings were a waste of time. In 2001, for example, it met on only three occasions, the last of which featured a discursive discussion of the role the caucus could play in a Congress struggling to find responses to the September 11 terrorist attack. But even if the caucus resumes regularly scheduled meetings and even if attendance becomes more robust, it is doubtful that, in the absence of extensive, preliminary staff work, this highly diverse group of threescore women, each with her own political and personal priorities, will be able to rally around a set of mutually acceptable feminist objectives. The cochairs meet often, as do their staffs, but a membershipwide Executive Committee is too large and too diverse to be an efficient vehicle for defining and driving the caucus agenda. Its use as a forum for invited administration policymakers has also atrophied. Invitations to these officials dropped sharply during the tail end of the Clinton administration and fell into virtual disuse after George W. Bush took office. Decline in the Executive C o m m i t t e e ' s efficacy was anticipated as early as 1993, when twenty-two first-term women joined the group and

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increased its membership to forty-eight. Realizing that this was too large a number to deal efficiently with w o m e n ' s concerns, the caucus created five task forces, each having jurisdiction over specified subject matter—a rudimentary division of labor, but not unlike Congress's committee system. Task force members were expected to generate ideas for legislation and public relations events, submit proposals to the cochairs and, through them, to the full caucus, and do whatever was needed to promote their initiatives. In 1995, Nancy Johnson and Eleanor Holmes Norton as cochairs dropped the "task f o r c e " designation and established " t e a m s " instead. Their immediate successors retained this format, even though the number of such units declined. The division and specialization of labor embodied by the "team" framework was expected to give the CCWI the structural arrangement needed to organize the energies of a large number of overburdened w o m e n — w o m e n w h o were forced to give only limited attention to the caucus, but whose collective efforts were expected to increase the likelihood of achieving a wide range of feminist objectives. Between 1999 and 2002, most of the teams existed on paper only. Caucus cochairs prodded team leaders to press their legislative priorities, but no team meetings were ever convened, and coleader contacts to devise an agenda and plan strategy were infrequent. S o m e meetings were held at the staff level, but few ideas emerging from them got much further. With some exceptions, notably the team on women and business in 1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 0 , few teams held briefings for advocacy groups, or promoted policies beyond announcing support for them. Staff who worked for C C W I cochairs tried to fill the vacuum left by team inaction, but they were already overworked and they lacked the authority of the congresswomen on whose behalf they were prepared to act. When attending the few Executive C o m m i t t e e meetings called by the cochairs, they had the daunting task of trying to distill member preferences from the j u m b l e of overlapping, sometimes contradictory proposals offered by congresswomen, some of w h o m came to the meeting late, left early, and were indisposed to follow an agenda. In 2001 both cochairs lost their principal caucus aides, and it took months for replacements to settle in. Weekly meetings with representatives of members' o f f i c e staffs were of little use. Attendance rarely rose beyond twenty-five participants. Almost all who c a m e were f r o m Democratic offices, and most were junior staff or interns. More helpful were e-mail messages alerting congresswomen to pending events and keeping their staffs informed about C C W I priorities.

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In the end, apart f r o m the issues promoted by the cochairs themselves, few team-generated initiatives found their way onto the legislative agenda. As a result, House attention given to most w o m e n ' s issues could not be attributed principally to the efforts of the c a u c u s ' s subunits. One CCWI insider remarked in the spring of 2002: "The teams do not work well. They virtually do not exist. They have done nothing. There has been no progress on any issue other than the ones advanced by the co-chairs." It is no wonder then, that Capito and Slaughter as cochairs decided not to establish teams when they took over in 2003. Even the once weekly meetings of staff have become bimonthly events. Failure to breathe life into a team or task force system could undermine the caucus's effectiveness. It has grown too large to operate efficiently without a structure facilitating division of responsibilities among its members. And most teams have not worked well because their members and even the coleaders have not had the time and the incentive to make them work well. Hope for their revitalization may rest on selection of coleaders for each team w h o serve on a House standing committee having jurisdiction over subject matter similar to that of the team they lead. The role played in 1997-1998 by the coleaders of the team on women and the military, Jane Harmon and Tillie Fowler, could be a model. Both women served on the House Armed Services Committee. They were familiar with feminist issues arising out of national defense policies, they were trusted by committee m e m b e r s and caucus colleagues alike, and they had access to the decisionmaking councils addressing these policies. Although Harman and Fowler lost the battle in the House to preserve integration of men and women in military basic-training units, they helped win the war when a Senate-House c o n f e r e n c e committee later decided that resegregation was not the way to address sexual harassment of female recruits by male drill instructors. Fowler and Harman were doing the work of the caucus and their committee simultaneously, economizing on their available resources. Now that no House committee is without at least one woman in each party, a set of teams roughly paralleling selected standing committees could help restore and energize something like the team system. Finally, the C C W I ' s mission might be better served if the staff of its vice chairs were integrated earlier and more fully into group activities than has been the case since vice chair positions were created. Much of caucus life is affected by cochair aides. Turnover of cochairs every two years has meant that the staff of their replacements have had to negotiate a steep learning curve to minister effectively to the g r o u p ' s needs.

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By allowing them to begin their apprenticeship two years earlier, w h e n the m e m b e r s for w h o m they w o r k are vice chairs, the discontinuity in c a u c u s l e a d e r s h i p m a n d a t e d by term limits c o u l d be m i t i g a t e d — a l t h o u g h high t u r n o v e r of H o u s e staff may limit the u s e f u l n e s s of this proposal.

Finding a Usable Agenda C o n g r e s s i o n a l c a u c u s e s c o m e into being w h e n c o n c e r n s believed by their putative m e m b e r s to be important are receiving insufficient attention. T h e s e groups then try to influence the national agenda by increasing the saliency of their issues and by lifting these issues to the level of c o m m i t t e e c o n s i d e r a t i o n and policy f o r m u l a t i o n ( H a m m o n d 1998, p. 81). T o w a r d that end, they also set out to e d u c a t e c o l l e a g u e s and the public, reflect and reinforce the values of friendly advocacy groups, and serve as a catalyst to mobilize the energies of other congressional forces. T h e C C W I has generally f o l l o w e d this d e v e l o p m e n t a l pattern and it, too, has s o u g h t a b o v e all to i n f u s e the legislative a g e n d a with its o w n , f e m i n i s t objectives. To be sure, it has been an active educational, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , and catalytic a g e n c y as well, but all of t h e s e activities have been e m p l o y e d in the service of its agenda-setting mission. W h e n it uses Special O r d e r s to h i g h l i g h t the i n c i d e n c e of breast cancer, or w h e n it c o s p o n s o r s a briefing on retirement security for w o m e n led by W o m e n ' s Policy Inc. ( W P I ) , or w h e n its m e m b e r s t e s t i f y b e f o r e an A p p r o p r i a t i o n s s u b c o m m i t t e e to i n c r e a s e f u n d i n g for the W o m e n , Infants, and Children Act, the caucus is e m p l o y i n g t i m e - h o n o r e d congressional rituals d e s i g n e d to educate, represent, and catalyze. But its primary goal is to realize the objectives on its legislative agenda. G i v e n this o v e r r i d i n g m i s s i o n , it is i n c u m b e n t on the c a u c u s to s t r e a m l i n e its a g e n d a - s e t t i n g p r o c e s s at the start of e a c h C o n g r e s s , a c h a l l e n g e as s i g n i f i c a n t as any it will e n c o u n t e r in the c o m i n g years. Loss of a p e r m a n e n t staff and rotation of cochairs every two years since 1995 have m a d e f o r m u l a t i n g an a g e n d a p r o b l e m a t i c . Priorities of each set of new c o c h a i r s d i f f e r f r o m t h o s e of their p r e d e c e s s o r s , and their s t a f f s m u s t invest s c a r c e r e s o u r c e s r e d u n d a n t l y w h i l e d e t e r m i n i n g w h i c h o b j e c t i v e s of p r e v i o u s c a u c u s e s are viable. T h e i n c r e a s i n g size and diversity of the C C W I m a k e the search f o r a c o n s e n s u s that m u c h more c o m p l e x with each new C o n g r e s s . D e s c r i p t i o n s of a g e n d a - s e t t i n g C C W I m e e t i n g s held early in the 106th C o n g r e s s illustrate the d i f f i c u l t i e s the c a u c u s has f a c e d w h e n

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d e t e r m i n i n g j u s t w h i c h c a u s e s to a d o p t . O n e c o n g r e s s i o n a l aide observed: "We tried to set up an a g e n d a at the first meeting, but it was a f r e e for all. We tried to get the m e m b e r s to agree on a list of top ten issues but it was like pulling teeth and the meeting was a disaster. A n d s o m e c o n g r e s s w o m e n had unkind w o r d s for one another." A staff m e m ber p l a c e d s o m e of the b l a m e on what she called the " f l o a t i n g attend a n c e " : " T w o m e m b e r s w o u l d arrive late at the s a m e time that three left. O n e m o r e w o u l d c o m e and t w o w o u l d leave. W h e n the m e e t i n g was over, it w a s not clear what, if a n y t h i n g had b e e n a g r e e d o n . " In time, the task of determining the caucus a g e n d a for the 106th C o n g r e s s was left to the staff, w h o had to " f i g u r e out what had taken place at that first m e e t i n g . " But they k n e w that w h a t e v e r legislative priorities they settled u p o n , there w o u l d be s o m e c a u c u s m e m b e r s (especially t h o s e w h o did not attend the meeting or w h o had left early) w h o would c o m plain that they had not been fully consulted. Delay in d e f i n i n g the agenda, along with its uncertain support and its questionable provenance, has limited the c a u c u s ' s effectiveness. O n e l o n g t i m e o b s e r v e r of the c a u c u s said in an interview: " W o m e n have c o m e such a long way in the last 25 years. But the incremental gains we have m a d e during the last five years seem insignificant c o m p a r e d with gains m a d e b e f o r e 1995. T h e c o m p a r i s o n m a k e s it seem as if the C a u cus is not d o i n g nearly as m u c h as it could be d o i n g . " A n d a top staff m e m b e r of a f o r m e r c o c h a i r r e m a r k e d : "We h a v e d o n e s o m e g o o d things but I s o m e t i m e s w o n d e r if the return had b e e n great e n o u g h to j u s t i f y all the energy we p o u r e d into the C a u c u s . L e g i s l a t i v e a c h i e v e ments have been skimpy. T h e C a u c u s claims credit for passing w o m e n friendly bills that would have passed a n y w a y . " C a u c u s leaders o f t e n have a better sense of which issues they may not address than they do about which initiatives to undertake. W h a t they may not do is pursue feminist goals that could fracture the often fragile bipartisan coalition that helps d e f i n e the C C W I . T h i s m e a n s that proposals touching on reproductive rights, even if only tangentially, would a l m o s t certainly be d e n i e d support by either the R e p u b l i c a n or the D e m o c r a t i c cochair, or both. Other m e a s u r e s likely to receive the same t r e a t m e n t are p r o p o s a l s to spend truly large a m o u n t s of m o n e y to achieve f e m i n i s t o b j e c t i v e s or to cut large s u m s f r o m w o m e n - f r i e n d l y p r o g r a m s already in place. A c c o r d i n g l y , the c a u c u s m u s t c o n t i n u e to e n c o u r a g e its m e m b e r s to c h a m p i o n their own, individual policy goals without implicating the g r o u p as a whole, while at the same time relying on its a r m ' s - l e n g t h relationship with W P I , the C C W I ' s institutional memory. W P I , led by Cindy Hall, formerly an aide to C o n n i e Morella,

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supervises a small professional staff who are able to identify approaches to issues that resonate with the feminist community and, at least potentially, with the House of Representatives. In these ways, once controversial feminist proposals may become a part of the discourse that precedes and sometimes triggers congressional action.

Adjusting to Competing Claims on National Resources The C C W I ' s effectiveness depends on more than overcoming obstacles that have traditionally stalled feminist goals. The search for a usable agenda has been complicated by profoundly important developments occurring at the start of the twenty-first century. Decline in the state of the economy, loss of confidence in the business community, and the aggravation of seemingly intractable international conflicts have fundamentally changed the environment in which the caucus is accustomed to pursuing its goals. Congresswomen have been able to hold their own in times of peace, prosperity, and trust in the capitalist system. In the 1990s the United States was unencumbered by Cold War threats, while at the same time enjoying the longest uninterrupted period of economic growth in the country's history. Not coincidently, the CCWI was able during this time to claim significant legislative successes in the fields of education, health, spousal and sexual abuse, military service, employment and business opportunities, and family planning. These advances occurred because lawmakers were prepared to approve new domestic programs, create agencies to administer them, appropriate tens of millions of dollars to fund them, and encourage (or coerce) state and local governments to do the same. The CCWI, much like other congressional caucuses, thrives when government distributes resources to underwrite its agenda. In the years since 2001, however, the economy has faltered, the budget surplus has evaporated, corporate managers have been found to have violated the public trust, and a pervasive campaign against terror has been launched. These developments have changed the political and policy context within which Congress and its caucuses must operate, and lawmakers have had to alter the frame of reference within which they define and respond to national imperatives. As a result, the CCWI can no longer assume that feminist initiatives considered viable in the past will be given sympathetic treatment in the future. Its most daunting challenge may well be to couch its agenda items in language that squares with legislative initiatives to improve domestic security, restore

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economic confidence, and foster international tranquillity. Even if it is able to adapt well to a changing political context, the caucus may have to be satisfied with progress at the margins for the foreseeable future. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq may also have the effect of inhibiting growth in the number of women elected to the House. Wars produce military veterans who are overwhelmingly male, and who go on to capitalize politically on the sacrifices they made while serving their country. Disproportionately large numbers of men who served in Congress after the Civil War, World War I, and World War II were veterans, and the Vietnam War produced its share of congressmen as well. Inasmuch as the vast majority of women seeking national office will be unable to speak of military experience (and the attendant willingness to risk life and limb) among the qualities they offer to voters, they are likely to be at a disadvantage. As a consequence, for a time the caucus may have to pursue its objectives with modest (or no) increases in the size of its membership.

Connecting with the President and Congressional Leaders Just how much progress the CCWI is likely to make depends in some measure on the rapport it establishes with political leaders in Washington. The group achieved its most significant legislative successes when it had ready access to the White House and to congressional leaders. Its influence was palpable when President Clinton and his staff listened to caucus concerns, and when Speakers Thomas "Tip" O'Neill and Tom Foley were themselves auxiliary CCWI members. Consequently, the group's future will turn on how well its members, particularly its cochairs, can exert influence in high places. During the Clinton years, congresswomen were regularly invited to the White House, and their staffs were continually in touch with the White House Office on Women's Initiatives and Outreach. Caucus policy priorities were received sympathetically because Clinton was arguably the most feminist of presidents and because he could not have been elected without the double-digit advantage he enjoyed among women voters. Accordingly, he established cordial, empathetic, and productive relations with most congresswomen. The president's sexual improprieties, together with the impeachment that followed, strained the relationship, although White House and cabinet aides continued to lean over backward to support the caucus, notably while helping to renew the Violence Against Women Act in 2000.

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Caucus relations with the George W. Bush White House have been distant. The president has not met with the group as of this writing, and one of his first acts was to eliminate the Office on Women's Initiatives and Outreach. The large number of influential w o m e n in the White House, the president's staff argued, made the office unnecessary. President Bush also considered eliminating the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services ( D A C O W I T S ) , ten regional offices of the Labor D e p a r t m e n t ' s W o m e n ' s Bureau, the Department of Veteran Affairs' Advisory Committee on Women Veterans, among other womencentered administrative agencies. Vacancies on these panels remained unfilled well into 2002, and some scheduled meetings were canceled. A f o r m e r military director of D A C O W I T S , Barbara Brehm, observed that "the failure to continue such advisory groups showed a significant lack of interest in addressing w o m e n ' s issues" (New York Times, December 19, 2001). Most of these offices were retained, however, in part because of pressure brought to bear by women veterans, other w o m e n ' s advocacy groups, and C C W I members. Although C C W I members have been summoned to the Bush White House several times, they came not to share their policy concerns with presidential aides but to serve as a conspicuous audience for orchestrated events to promote administration policy. They attended a briefing by the president's Commission to Strengthen Social Security, listening to f o r m e r Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan and others announce reco m m e n d a t i o n s for c h a n g e — i n c l u d i n g partial privatization of the program. They were invited to the White House and the Pentagon as well, to be briefed by Secretary of State Colin Powell and D e f e n s e Department officials on the progress of the war in Afghanistan. Later, the cochairs stood behind the president when he signed the Afghan Women and Children Relief Act. Much of the impetus to pass the bill came from the White House, however. The president's staff had asked Representative Deborah Pryce and Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison to introduce the measure, assuring Speaker Hastert and the cochairs that, if it passed, the president would readily sign it. In the meantime, the State Department asked such feminist groups as the Feminist Majority to address the plight of Taliban women. Some observers saw the outreach as a way for the president to improve his standing among women voters (New York Times, November 19, 2001), but vice presidential aide Mary Matalin insisted that the campaign to highlight Taliban oppression of w o m e n was "a justice issue, not a w o m e n ' s issue" (Newsweek, November 26, 2001). By framing the issue in these terms, Matalin put the C C W I on notice that it had a long way

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to go before it could induce the W h i t e H o u s e to pay attention to its f e m inist priorities. In the H o u s e of Representatives, the C C W I ' s principal challenge is to p e r s u a d e leaders, especially m a j o r i t y party leaders, that the g r o u p warrants inclusion in the coalitions they build. T h e C C W I has to m a k e clear that a l t h o u g h it has an a g e n d a of its o w n , it is not an incipient threat to t h o s e w h o run the H o u s e , and its m e m b e r s are p r e p a r e d to w o r k with party leaders w h e n they can. At the s a m e time, c a u c u s cochairs should expect to be consulted and insist that its legislative initiatives be given a hearing. T h e strength of this r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p has varied over the years, but it has never been fatally impaired. D e m o c r a t i c leaders have generally been m o r e a w a r e of the c a u c u s ' s p r e s e n c e than R e p u b l i c a n leaders, but even G O P Speakers N e w t Gingrich and D e n n i s Hastert listened to C C W I v o i c e s — G i n g r i c h by r e l y i n g p r i m a r i l y on R e p u b l i c a n c o n g r e s s w o m e n , Hastert by scheduling m e e t i n g s with the full m e m b e r ship and by c o n f e r r i n g f r o m time to time with Republican cochairs Sue Kelly and J u d y Biggert. 1 T h a t B i g g e r t r e p r e s e n t s a district abutting H a s t e r t ' s in Illinois probably increased the i n f l u e n c e they were able to exert on o n e another. T h e S p e a k e r has not met with the c a u c u s in the 108th C o n g r e s s , but he c o n f e r s with C a p i t o f r o m time to time and has visited her district for a fundraiser. T h e fine line Republican w o m e n must walk w h e n trying to a d v a n c e the C C W I ' s agenda while at the same time keeping party leaders happy was d r a m a t i z e d in 2 0 0 3 when officials at the D e p a r t m e n t of E d u c a t i o n , at the urging of college athletic directors, decided to reconsider the way Title IX was being i m p l e m e n t e d . Critics claimed that interpretations of guidelines d e s i g n e d to end discrimination based on sex in college athletics had had the e f f e c t of f o r c i n g c o l l e g e s to e l i m i n a t e such l o w profile sports as wrestling and gymnastics. T h e Republican H o u s e leadership and the administration generally s u p p o r t e d r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the criteria Title IX m a n d a t e d for determining w h e n a school is in c o m p l i a n c e . But the C C W I cochairs, along with most c o n g r e s s w o m e n , declared that no c h a n g e was needed. L o u i s e Slaughter introduced a H o u s e resolution to block guideline changes, but discovered that almost all G O P w o m e n would not c o s p o n s o r the measure or publicly d e c l a r e their support f o r it, even t h o u g h they felt as strongly a b o u t the issue as she did ( N a n c y J o h n s o n w a s a p r o m i n e n t exception and signed on as a cosponsor). S o m e stayed on the sidelines b e c a u s e they did not want to o f f e n d S p e a k e r Hastert, a o n e t i m e wrestling coach and a proponent of change. Others, including a f o r m e r

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C C W I cochair, w o r k e d b e h i n d the scenes, m a k i n g their v i e w s k n o w n privately to c o m b a t a n t s on both sides. J o h n B o e h n e r , c h a i r of the E d u c a t i o n and W o r k f o r c e C o m m i t t e e , r e f u s e d to hold h e a r i n g s on the S l a u g h t e r r e s o l u t i o n , and the H o u s e never had a c h a n c e to act on it. But neither did it have the opportunity to c h a n g e Title IX, not least b e c a u s e of the p u b l i c o u t r a g e of D e m o cratic w o m e n and the a d a m a n c y of R e p u b l i c a n w o m e n w h o quietly c h e e r e d on their c a u c u s c o l l e a g u e s . B o t h g r o u p s h e l p e d m o b i l i z e the l o b b y i n g e f f o r t s of a vast array of interest g r o u p s representing w o m e n and girls, and they arranged for the a p p e a r a n c e on the Hill of celebrated w o m e n athletes, soccer star M i a H a m m a m o n g t h e m , w h o urged C o n gress to leave Title IX alone. In this way, most Republican C C W I m e m bers realized personal and political o b j e c t i v e s without publicly e m b a r rassing their party leaders. In the 1980s and 1990s, H o u s e leaders saw fit to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e their relationship with the caucus by helping to elevate c o n g r e s s w o m e n to leadership positions, and subsequently relying u p o n t h e m for advice on w o m e n ' s issues. S p e a k e r O ' N e i l l p o i n t e d l y t a p p e d at least o n e C C W I m e m b e r to fill an at-large position on the D e m o c r a t i c S t e e r i n g and Policy C o m m i t t e e . A f t e r her e l e c t i o n as vice chair of the D e m o cratic C a u c u s , B a r b a r a K e n n e l l y w a s regularly c o n s u l t e d by S p e a k e r F o l e y and other party leaders. S h e w a s f r e q u e n t l y a s k e d , " D o e s the C a u c u s have a position on this bill?" S p e a k e r Gingrich e n c o u r a g e d the successful candidacies of J e n n i f e r D u n n , D e b o r a h P r y c e , and Tillie F o w l e r f o r R e p u b l i c a n l e a d e r s h i p posts, and after D e m o c r a t Rosa D e L a u r o lost her battle for D e m o c r a t i c C a u c u s vice chair in 1998, M i n o r i t y L e a d e r G e p h a r d t c r e a t e d a new party post, " a s s i s t a n t to the l e a d e r , " and installed D e L a u r o as its first o c c u p a n t . H e also e s t a b l i s h e d a f i v e - m e m b e r L e a d e r s h i p C o u n c i l , to consist of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the C C W I , the C o n g r e s s i o n a l B l a c k and Hispanic C a u c u s e s , and two m o d e r a t e D e m o c r a t i c congressional m e m bership organizations to meet with him each week on p e n d i n g party and policy matters (Roll Call, January 7, 1999). T h e beginning of the twenty-first century has witnessed even more i m p r e s s i v e a c h i e v e m e n t s for c o n g r e s s w o m e n . Two R e p u b l i c a n w o m e n , D e b o r a h P r y c e and B a r b a r a C u b i n , w e r e elected vice c h a i r and secretary, respectively, of their p a r t y ' s c o n f e r e n c e . Pryce was chosen chair of the R e p u b l i c a n C o n f e r e n c e in the 108th C o n g r e s s . In the m e a n t i m e , D e m o c r a t N i t a L o w e y h e a d e d her p a r t y ' s c a m p a i g n c o m m i t t e e , a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w h o s e i m p o r t a n c e is d i f f i c u l t to o v e r e s t i m a t e g i v e n the n a r r o w m a r g i n s e p a r a t i n g the parties and the h e a t e d election c o n t e s t s

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that biannually determine H o u s e control. But by far the greatest accomplishment recorded by a C C W I m e m b e r was Nancy Pelosi's election as Democratic whip in 2002 and as leader of the minority party the next year. At the s a m e time, C C W I m e m b e r s h a v e risen to key c o m m i t t e e positions, with seven of the t w e n t y - o n e Republicans chairing and eighteen of the thirty-eight D e m o c r a t s serving as r a n k i n g m e m b e r s of subc o m m i t t e e s in the 108th Congress. W o m e n ' s progress may best be illustrated by c o m p a r i n g the current proportion of w o m e n assigned to f o u r highly c o v e t e d H o u s e c o m m i t t e e s with the share of seats w o m e n held on these panels twenty years earlier. In 1981, no w o m a n served on the Ways and M e a n s C o m m i t t e e ; in 2003, three c o n g r e s s w o m e n served on that panel, constituting 7 percent of the c o m m i t t e e . W o m e n ' s c o m p o s i tion on the A p p r o p r i a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e has risen f r o m 4 p e r c e n t to 14 percent, on the R u l e s C o m m i t t e e f r o m 6 percent to 23 percent, and on the Energy and C o m m e r c e C o m m i t t e e f r o m 5 percent to 16 percent. All of these d e v e l o p m e n t s s u g g e s t that the C C W I ' s r a p p o r t with influential H o u s e m e m b e r s is b o u n d to i m p r o v e , i n a s m u c h as c a u c u s activists and H o u s e leaders are, in i n c r e a s i n g n u m b e r s , b e c o m i n g o n e and the same. T h e r e h a v e b e e n f e w m o r e c o m m i t t e d c a u c u s m e m b e r s than L o w e y and Pelosi, for e x a m p l e , and it is hard to i m a g i n e that they c h e c k e d their f e m i n i s t o r i e n t a t i o n s at the d o o r w h e n they e n t e r e d the l e a d e r s h i p inner s a n c t u m . (The first public speech d e l i v e r e d by Pelosi a f t e r she b e c a m e D e m o c r a t i c w h i p was b e f o r e the N a t i o n a l A b o r t i o n and Reproductive Action L e a g u e at its annual Roe v. Wade dinner on the anniversary of that court decision [Foerstel 2002].) As a result, f e m i n i s t priorities not yet in the m a i n s t r e a m , along with those that have already gained w i d e s p r e a d acceptance, may yet b e c o m e a part of the c o u n t r y ' s received w i s d o m . Just as e c o n o m i c equity, educational equality, f a m i l y and m e d i c a l leave, and i m p r o v e d health and r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s f o r w o m e n w e r e m o v e d by c o n g r e s s w o m e n f r o m the u n t h i n k a b l e to the plausible, proposals to provide m o r e g o v e r n m e n t - s u p p o r t e d child care, to f u n d f e d e r a l anti-rape p r o g r a m s , to help shatter the " g l a s s c e i l i n g , " and to pay w a g e s to m o t h e r s and f a t h e r s on f a m i l y and medical leave could one day m o v e f r o m the periphery to center stage. In short, the g r o w i n g n u m b e r of w o m e n elected to the House, their increasing seniority (Gertzog 2002, p. I l l ) , and their selection for key party and c o m m i t t e e p o s i t i o n s will a l m o s t certainly h e l p v a l i d a t e an e x p a n d e d f e m i n i s t a g e n d a — e v e n in the f a c e of n e w and i m p o r t a n t national priorities. A c c o r d i n g to C o n g r e s s w o m a n M a x i n e Waters, the f a c e of w o m e n ' s issues c o n t i n u e s to e v o l v e : "I really d o b e l i e v e that w o m e n ' s issues enjoy a better f o c u s today than they have in the past and

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this will c o n t i n u e . " D . C . d e l e g a t e E l e a n o r H o l m e s N o r t o n c o n c u r s , o b s e r v i n g that "there is no question there has been an e x p o n e n t i a l rise in the f o c u s on w o m e n ' s i s s u e s " as m o r e w o m e n h a v e b e e n e l e c t e d . " T h e issues b e c o m e m o r e irresistible the m o r e of us t h e r e a r e " ( T h e Hill, April 15, 1998). As a c o n s e q u e n c e , "the w o m e n ' s point of v i e w " has c o m e to p e r m e a t e the halls of C o n g r e s s . But this d o e s n ' t m e a n that the C C W I as an i n f o r m a l H o u s e g r o u p will benefit f r o m these d e v e l o p m e n t s . It may, in time, atrophy, a victim partly of its o w n success as well as that of its m e m b e r s . T h e C C W I was c r e a t e d to bring m o r e attention to the inequities w o m e n e x p e r i e n c e b e c a u s e of their gender, and to use its m e m b e r s ' collective energies to p e r s u a d e the federal g o v e r n m e n t to r e m e d y this condition. At the time, the g r o u p was too small to serve as an e f f e c t i v e voting block, and none of its m e m b e r s occupied influential party or c o m m i t t e e positions. As a result, c o n g r e s s w o m e n were forced to rely on "clueless," often u n s y m pathetic male colleagues to realize their objectives. P r o g r e s s w a s a g o n i z i n g l y slow, but p a l p a b l e all the same, and beg i n n i n g in the 1990s a rush of s u c c e s s e s m a d e the e f f o r t s e e m w o r t h while. O w i n g in part to elimination of legislative service organizations, the diminution of C C W I resources, less sympathetic H o u s e leaders, and later, e c o n o m i c decline and a c a m p a i g n against terror, policy t r i u m p h s since 1995 h a v e been m o r e limited. N o n e t h e l e s s , the b e g i n n i n g of the twenty-first century f i n d s a nearly s i x t y - m e m b e r C C W I that need no longer rely quite as m u c h on the goodwill of male colleagues w h o are often otherwise engaged. C o n g r e s s w o m e n are a far more formidable voting block than they were in 1977, they tend to vote the same way on selected equity and w o m e n ' s health issues, they share the H o u s e with m a n y male colleagues w h o are positively oriented toward feminist concerns, and they can claim credit for scores of legislative achievements. Moreover, issues that at one time did not seem to have important implications for w o m e n are currently understood within a feminist perspective. T h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s , t o g e t h e r with the rise of C C W I m e m b e r s to positions of p o w e r in the H o u s e , m e a n that the conditions that gave rise to the g r o u p ' s creation are not nearly as c o m p e l l i n g today as they were in the 1970s. A larger percentage of c o n g r e s s w o m e n than was once the c a s e f i n d that they need not be c o m m i t t e d C C W I m e m b e r s to a c h i e v e their f e m i n i s t goals, while more senior c o n g r e s s w o m e n are unable to be active in the c a u c u s b e c a u s e they h a v e taken on key l e a d e r s h i p and c o m m i t t e e responsibilities. Consequently, one of the challenges the caucus must address is how to retain its identity, if not its integrity, in the f a c e of a less c o m m i t t e d m e m b e r s h i p , a record of a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s that

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Women and Power on Capitol Hill

has d i m i n i s h e d its raison d ' ê t r e , the rise to p o w e r of m a n y of its m e m bers, and the i n c r e a s i n g n u m b e r of c o n g r e s s m e n w h o s e f e m i n i s t perspective needs relatively little tweaking. It s e e m s ironic that despite the increase in the n u m b e r of w o m e n in the House, their rise to m o r e p o w e r f u l positions, the realization of s o m e f e m i n i s t goals, and a H o u s e e n v i r o n m e n t generally m o r e r e c e p t i v e to C C W I priorities, the role of the C o n g r e s s i o n a l C a u c u s f o r W o m e n ' s Issues as an i n f o r m a l H o u s e g r o u p has been diluted. That role may continue to ebb, and w h e n 40 or 50 percent of the H o u s e m e m b e r s h i p , as b e f o r e the end of the twenty-first century, the cus may be just as compelling as the need for

c o n g r e s s w o m e n m a k e up they almost certainly will need for a w o m e n ' s caua m e n ' s caucus.

Note 1. L e a d e r s ' meetings with the C C W I have not always turned out as well as c o c h a i r s had a n t i c i p a t e d . In the 106th C o n g r e s s , H a s t e r t ' s a p p e a r a n c e b e f o r e the caucus occurred while roll call votes were being cast on the floor, and f e w c o n g r e s s w o m e n were present. A larger turnout greeted M i n o r i t y L e a d e r R i c h a r d G e p h a r d t , but only t w o R e p u b l i c a n c o n g r e s s w o m e n attended.

List of Interviewees

Congresswomen Helen D. Bentley

Elizabeth Furse

Constance Morella

Corrine Brown

Eddie Bernice Johnson

Eleanor H o l m e s Norton

Leslie Byrne

Nancy Johnson

Lynn Rivers

Maria Cantwell

Marcy Kaptur

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen

Helen C h e n o w e t h

Sue Kelly

Marge R o u k e m a

Eva Clayton

Barbara Kennelly

Lucille Roybal-Allard

Barbara-Rose Collins Marilyn Lloyd

Pat Schroeder

Cardiss Collins

Nita Lowey

Karen Shepherd

Pat Danner

Carolyn Maloney

Louise Slaughter

Rosa D e L a u r o

M a r j o r i e Margolies-Mezvinsky Olympia Snowe

Jennifer Dunn

Cynthia M c K i n n e y

Karen T h u r m a n

Karen English

Jan Meyers

Jolene Unsoeld

A n n a Eshoo

Patsy Mink

Barbara Vucanovich

Tillie Fowler

Susan Molinari

Lynn Woolsey

T h o m a s Bantle

Cynthia Hall

Peter Muller

Ross Brown

Kathleen Havey

Libby Mullin

Andrea C a m p

Gretchen Hitchner

Jennifer Parzmark

Congressional Staff

Lillie Coney

Kirra Jarrett

Kathryn Pearson

Cynthia Dailard

Roberta Jeanquart

Cindy Pellegrini

Val Dolcini

James John

Craig Powers

Laura E f u r d

M a r y a n n e Leary

Erin Prangley

179

180

List of Interviewees

Genet Garamendi

Sharon Levin

Michael Gerber

Jason Mahler

Krista Sheets

Don Green

Terri McCullough

Conwell Smith

Nicholas Gwynn

Carole McGeehan

Howard Wolfson

Kira Haas

Lynsey Morris

Gail Ravnitzky

Bibliography

Angle, Martha. 1994. "Women and Minorities Enjoy a Power Surge." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, May 21. Avid, Rachel, Dena Levy, and Charles Tien. 1997. "Why Differences Matter: The Impact of Women in Congress." Paper delivered at the ninety-third annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 28-31. Bader, James. 1996. Taking the Initiative: Leadership Agendas in Congress and the Contract with America. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. Barnett, Timothy J. 1999. Legislative Learning: The 104th Republican Freshmen in the House. New York: Garland. Bradley, Jennifer. 1997. "Suffragist Statue Finally Heading to New Home in Capitol Rotunda." Roll Call, January 30. Bradley, Jennifer, and Rachel Van Dongen. 1997a. "Democrats Blast GOP for Probe of Sanchez." Roll Call, July 28. . 1997b. "House Shuts Down Effort to Shut Down Floor over California Probe." Roll Call, November 10. Burger, Timothy J. 1993. "Republicans Urged to Get Out of DSG." Roll Call, December 9. Carney, Don. 1997. "Dornan Barred From Floor After Verbal Altercation." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, September 20. Cassata, Donna. 1997. "Landrieu Election Probe Yields Little Besides Partisan Animosity." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, September 27. Chappie, Damon. 1996. "Race for Frosh Presidency Reflects Division in Class." Roll Call, February 1. 181

182

Bibliography

Clemmitt, Marcia, Lesley Primmer, and Marjorie Sims. 1996. The Record: Gains and Losses for Women and Families in the 104th Congress (1995-1996). Washington, D.C.: Women's Policy Inc. Contiguglia, Francesca, and Jim VandeHei. 1998. "GOP Women Urge 'Democratic Sisters' to Stop Ducking for Cover on Clinton." Roll Call, March 19. Conway, Kevin J., and Christine DeGregorio. 1998. "Republican Newcomers to the U.S. House of Representatives: A Resource to Party Leaders?" Paper delivered at the ninety-fourth annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, September 3-6. Cook, Charles E. 1996. "Lack of Leadership, Followership Produces House GOP Paralysis." Roll Call, March 11. . 1997. "After Countless Claims, Report Due Soon in Contested La. Seat." Roll Call, March 24. Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues. 1983-1994. Update on Women and Family issues in Congress. Congressional Record. 1977-2002. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Curren, Tim. 1995. "97 Percent Solution: GOP Frosh Stay with the Program." Roll Call, June 5. Dodson, Debra. 1998. "Speaking for Women? Gendered Voices in the Debate: The Partial Birth Abortion Act of 1995." Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 23-26. Doherty, Carroll J. 1998. "Riding the Omnibus Off into the Sunset." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, October 17. Doherty, Carroll J., and Jeffrey L. Katz. 1998. "Firebrand GOP Class of '94 Warms to Life on the Inside." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, January 24. Donovan, Beth. 1992. "Freshmen Throw Weight Around, Make Their Parties Listen." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, December 12.

. 1994. "Freshmen Toed Party Line but Helped Cut Spending." With Thomas H. Moore. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, January 15. Drew, Elizabeth. 1996. Showdown: The Struggle Between the Gingrich Congress and the Clinton White House. New York: Simon and Schuster. Duncan, Phil. 1992. "Quietly Assertive Freshmen Arrive for Orientation." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, December 5.

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Eilperin, Juliet. 1997a. "Gingrich M e e t s with Black C a u c u s , Says H e ' l l C o n s i d e r R e v i v i n g L S O s . " Roll Call, M a r c h 24. . 1997b. ' " I t S e e m e d Like a Little T h i n g to A s k ' : S e v e n t y - s i x Years Later, W o m e n Celebrate M o v e Upstairs of Suffragists Statue." Roll Call, June 30. . 1998. "Sanchez Wins, Fight Still Rages." Roll Call, February 19. F e n n o , Richard F., Jr. 1997. Learning to Govern: An Institutional View of the 104th Congress. Washington, D.C.: B r o o k i n g s Institution. Ferraro, Geraldine A. 1985. Ferraro: My Story. With Linda Bird Franke. N e w York: B a n t a m Books. Foerstel, Karen. 1994. " W o m e n D e m o c r a t s W o n ' t Sign Protest Letter to Stark." Roll Call, M a r c h 21. . 2002. "Pelosi Plans Quiet M o v e to H i s t o r y - M a k i n g Post." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, January 12. Foerstel, Karen, and Alan K. Ota. 2001. "Early Grief for G O P Leaders in N e w C o m m i t t e e Rules." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, January 6. G e r t z o g , Irwin N. 1995. Congressional Women: Their Recruitment, Integration, and Behavior. 2nd ed., revised and updated. Westport, Conn.: Praeger. . 2 0 0 2 . " W i d o w s , Elites, and Strategic Politicians: W o m e n ' s P a t h w a y s to the U.S. H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . " In C i n d y S i m o n Rosenthal, ed., Women Transforming Congress. N o r m a n : University of O k l a h o m a Press. Glasser, S u s a n B. 1993. " W o m e n ' s C a u c u s Is N o w P r o - C h o i c e . " Roll Call, January 14. G r e e n b l a t t , Alan. 1997. " D o r n a n Election C h a l l e n g e D r a g s O n . " Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, S e p t e m b e r 27. G r u e n w a l d , Juliana. 1998a. " H o u s e M e m b e r s Shoot Holes in TreasuryPostal Bill." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, July 18. . 1998b. " S e n a t e P a s s e s T r e a s u r y - P o s t a l Bill A f t e r G O P Postp o n e s D e b a t e on T e r m L i m i t s . " Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, S e p t e m b e r 5. . 1998c. "Treasury-Postal Bill Stalls E v e n A f t e r S e c o n d C o n f e r e n c e Yanks D i s p u t e d P r o v i s i o n . " Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, O c t o b e r 10. H a m m o n d , S u s a n W e b b . 1998. Congressional Caucuses in National Policymaking. Baltimore: J o h n s H o p k i n s University Press. Jacoby, Mary. 1993a. "Energy Institute Illustrates Tricky Link B e t w e e n L S O s and Their F o u n d a t i o n s . " Roll Call, July 8.

184

Bibliography

. 1993b. "Former Selects Bid to Return as LSOs." Roll Call, October 7. . 1993c. "In a Twist, Nigeria's Abiola a Center of House Debate." Roll Call, November 22. . 1993d. "Raucous House Administration Meeting Leaves New LSO Rules Stalled, Some in 'Kleczka Gulch.'" Roll Call, August 9. . 1994a. "Flying Under the House's Radar." Roll Call, June 27. . 1994b. "House Republicans Threatening to Boycott Harvard Portion of Freshmen Orientation." Roll Call, June 23. . 1994c. "LSOs to CMOs." Roll Call, December 1. . 1994d. "A Shopper's Guide to House LSOs." Roll Call, January 24. . 1994e. "Three 'LSO' Hopefuls Rejected." Roll Call, July 11. Kahn, Gabriel. 1995. "Remnants of DSG Will Go to Caucus." Roll Call, May 29. Kingdon, John W. 1995. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. 2nd ed. New York: HarperCollins College Publishers. Kirchoff, Sue, and Donna Cassata. 1998. "Long List of Its Own Trespasses Tempers Congress' Judgment." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, January 31. Koszczuk, Jackie. 1998. "Proof of Illegal Votes Falls Short, Keeping Sanchez in House." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, February 7. Love, Alice A. 1994. "LSO Money: Where Will It Go?" Roll Call, December 8. . 1995a. "Black Caucus Foundations' Request for Grant Gets Flak." Roll Call, June 1. . 1995b. "House Skips Its Chance to Relocate Women's Suffrage Statue; Architect's Memo Is Blamed." Roll Call, August 10. . 1995c. '"Ladies in the Bathtub' Headed for the Rotunda." Roll Call, July 20. . 1995d. "LSO Foundations Take Financial Hit." Roll Call, April 27. . 1995e. "Money That Once Went to LSOs Is Windfall for Members' Offices." Roll Call, March 20. Maloney, Carolyn B. 2000. The Status of Women: Wins During the 106th Congress, October 17. Mansbridge, Jane J. 1986. Why We Lost the ERA. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Molinari, Susan. 1998. Representative Mom: Balancing Budgets, Bill, and Baby in the U.S. Congress. With Elinor Burkett. New York:

Bibliography

185

Doubleday. Owens, John E. 1996. "Gingrich's House Has Something in Common with British Parliament." Roll Call, January 29. Rae, Nicol C. 1998. Conservative Reformers: The Republican Freshmen and the Lessons of the 104th Congress. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe. Roll Call. 1993. "LSOs: Less Loose." Editorial, July 29. . 1997. "Morning Business: Women's Work." September 25. . 1998. "Morning Business: More Power." May 25. . 1999. "Morning Business: Leadership Expansion." January 7. Schroeder, Pat. 1997. 24 Years of House Work . . . and the Place Is Still a Mess: My Life in Politics. Kansas City, Mo.: Andrews McMeel. Sheffner, Benjamin. 1997a. "California Official Vows Jail Time if Voter Fraud Proven in Calif. 46." Roll Call, February 17. . 1997b. "Republicans Nix Sanchez Field Hearing, Citing Election Challenge in Her District." Roll Call, May 19. . 1997c. "Republicans Want Broader Probe of Louisiana State Election Case." Roll Call, April 14. . 1997d. "Rules Panel Approves Unlimited La. Probe." Roll Call, April 21. Taylor, Andrew. 1998a. "Fiscal Hawks Fight Effort to Skirt Budget Caps for Year 2000 Computer Fix." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, June 20. . 1998b. "This Year's Surplus-Spending Binge Will Compound Next Year's Headaches." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, October 17. Van Dongen, Rachel. 1997a. "Congressional Investigators to Hand Sanchez Election Probe Back to State." Roll Call, October 23. . 1997b. "Democrat Moves to Ban Dornan from House Floor." Roll Call, September 18. . 1997c. "Democrats Again Demand End to Probe of Sanchez." Roll Call, October 13. . 1997d. "Democrats Dismiss Report on California Election." Roll Call, December 15. . 1997e. "Democrats Make Sanchez an Hispanic Cause Celebre." Roll Call, July 31. . 1997f. "To Get His Honor Back Dornan Declares He Will Run Against Sanchez Once Again." Roll Call, October 20. . 1998a. "Dornan Election Case Dismissed." Roll Call, February 9. . 1998b. "House Votes Down Dornan Case and Horn Legislation." Roll Call, February 16. . 1998c. "Seething Dornan Wants Rematch with Sanchez. Roll

186

Bibliography

Call, February 12. Wells, Robert Marshall. 1995. "Bill's Abortion Funding Limits Attest to GOP Control." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, July 22. Women's Policy Inc. 1996. The Women's Health Equity Act of 1996: Legislative Summary and Overview, July 12. . 1997a. Quarterly Update: Women and Family Issues in the 105th Congress, Summer. . 1997b. Quarterly Update: Women and Family Issues in the 105th Congress, Winter. . 1998. Quarterly Update on Women's Issues in Congress, Winter. . 1999. Quarterly Update on Women's Issues in Congress, Winter. . 2000. Quarterly Update on Women's Issues in Congress, Winter. . 2001. Quarterly Update on Women's Issues in Congress, Winter.

Index

Aberdeen Proving Grounds, 137 Abortion: change, coping with ( 1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 6 ) , 9 2 - 1 0 3 , 112; future of the C C W I , 176; late-term, 9 8 - 1 0 3 ; origin/early years ( 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 8 1 ) , 11, 13, 17; partialbirth, 9 8 - 1 0 3 ; pill (RU-486), 32, 52; reclaiming the initiative ( 1 9 9 7 - 1 9 9 8 ) , 119-120, 1 2 7 - 1 2 8 ; before the Republican revolution ( 1 9 9 3 - 1 9 9 4 ) , 39, 5 0 - 5 3 ; transformation/growth ( 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 9 2 ) , 27, 30, 31 Abuse, child, 108. See also Domestic abuse/violence; Legislation, Violence Against Women Act; Sexual abuse/assault/harassment Abzug, Bella, 7 Administration Committee, 69 A f f i r m a t i v e action, 4, 26, 105, 148 Afghanistan, 172, 173 African American c o n g r e s s w o m e n , 3 6 - 3 7 , 55, 63, 89, 165 Agenda, and future of C C W I , 169-171 Agriculture C o m m i t t e e , 61 Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 21, 98 Albright, Madeline, 104, 127 Alexander, Lamar, 73, 74 American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 79, 121 A m n e s t y International, 104

Anthony, Susan B „ 16, 89, 91 Antigovernment bias of G O P freshman, 7 5 - 7 6 Appropriations Committee, 38, 9 5 - 9 7 , 104, 108, 132-136, 146, 176 A r m e d Services Committee, 168 Armey, Richard, 7 7 - 7 8 , 140, 141, 153 Asian Caucus, 3 Athletics, w o m e n and college, 174-175 A u t o m o t i v e Caucus, 78 Baker, Howard, 137 Banking, Currency, and Urban Affairs Committee, 63 Banking and Financial Services Committee, 63 Bank scandal, House, 36, 68 Bauer, Bob, 1 4 4 - 1 4 6 Bennett, William, 74 Biggert, Judy, 1 6 2 - 1 6 4 , 174 Bipartisanship: change, coping with ( 1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 6 ) , 109-112; future of the C C W I , 1 6 5 - 1 6 6 ; origin/early years ( 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 8 1 ) , 9 - 1 0 , 21; reclaiming the initiative ( 1 9 9 7 - 1 9 9 8 ) , 121-125; Republicans take control (1995-1996), 53-56; transformation/growth (1982-1992), 29-30

187

188

Index

Boehner, John, 140, 175 Boggs, Lindy, 20, 127 Bone-density measurements, 136 Bradley, Bill, 115 Breast cancer, 130 Breast-feeding, 136 Brown-Waite, Ginny, 162, 163 Budget Committee, 38 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), 131 Burke, Yvonne B„ 10 Bush, George H. W„ 4, 14, 25, 28-29, 32, 45, 50, 51 Bush, George W„ 14, 165, 166, 173 Buyer, Steve, 137 Byron, Beverly, 20 Canady, Charles, 98, 100, 105 Canfield, Bill, 144-146 Capito, Shelley M„ 162-164, 174 Capps, Lois, 121 Carter, Jimmy, 12, 14, 20, 31-32 CCWI. See Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues Census questions, 27 Center for Reproductive Law and Public Policy, 101 Change, coping with (1995-1996): abortion rights redux, 92-103; congressional membership organization, 77-86; erosion of strategic premises, 109-115; new women, 86-92; two sessions, 103-108 Chenoweth, Helen, 89, 92, 98 Child abuse, 108. See also Domestic abuse/violence; Legislation, Violence Against Women Act; Sexual abuse/assault/harassment Child care, 28, 130-132, 141, 176 Child support, 28, 49 China, 107 Chisholm, Shirley, 10 Chowder and Marching Society, 3 Christian-Green, Donna, 122 Cisneros, Henry, 148 Civil Rights Commission, 26 Civil rights protections for congressional employees, 107 Clayton, Eva, 37, 54 Clinton, Bill, 4, 14, 36-38, 45,

51-52, 94, 109, 114-115, 127, 142-143, 147, 154, 166, 172 Clinton, Hillary, 4, 38, 52, 54, 127 Coalition on Population and Development, 93 Cochairs, future of CCWI and recruiting feminist, 162-164 Cohen, William, 137 Collegiality, Gingrich/GOP freshman rejecting norm of, 66 Collins, Barbara Rose, 63 Congressional Black Caucus, 3, 4, 11, 67-69, 78, 80, 83, 85, 113, 139 Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, 69 Committee on Committees, 60 Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues (CCWI): catalyst/facilitator role, 11; Executive Committee's efficacy, 166-167; goals, strategic, 109-115, 118-119, 158; infrastructure, 125-127, 166-169; leaders/power structure, 12, 14, 20, 31-32, 113, 139-143, 172-178; "Magnificent Seven" (legislative measures), 129-131, 140-141; men, 23-25, 33, 82; overview of, 1, 3-5; recruiting feminist cochairs, 162-164; staff, 80-81, 86, 109, 113, 166, 169; task forces, 39, 82, 113, 118, 167, 168; team concept, 122-124, 158, 167-168; twentieth anniversary, 121; vice chair positions, 168-169. See also Change, coping with (1995-1996); Future of the CCWI; Origin/early years (1977-1981); Reclaiming the initiative (1997-1998); Transformation/growth (1982-1992) Congressional membership organizations (CMOs), 3, 4, 67, 77-86, 125-126 Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 4, 78 Congresswomen's Caucus. See Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues Conservative Action Team, 76 Conservative Opportunity Society, 3 Contested elections: Dornan v. Sanchez, 147-157; Jenkins v.

Index Landrieu, 144-147; overview, 143-144 Contraception, 47, 124-125, 1 2 9 - 1 3 6 Contracting issue, federal, 123 Contract with America, 2, 4, 58, 61, 64, 7 4 - 7 6 , 86 Court cases: Grove City v. Bell (1983), 2 6 - 2 7 ; Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), 50; Roe v. Wade, 17, 50, 51, 95, 112, 176; Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989), 50 Cubin, Barbara, 87, 98, 140, 175 Danner, Pat, 56 Daschle, Tom, 146 D e f e n s e Advisory C o m m i t t e e on Women in the Services ( D A C O W I T S ) , 173 D e f e n s e Department, U.S. (DOD), 46-47 DeLauro, Rosa, 99, 175 DeLay, Tom, 153 Democratic influence in the House, and G i n g r i c h / G O P f r e s h m a n , 62-66 Democratic Study G r o u p (DSG), 2 - 4 , 70, 7 7 - 7 8 Democratic W o m e n ' s Group, 110 District of C o l u m b i a Committee, 63 Division and specialization of labor, 33 Dole, Bob, 105 Domestic abuse/violence, 4 7 - 4 8 , 106-108, 171 Dooley, Betty, 20 Dornan, Robert, 107, 1 4 7 - 1 5 7 DSG. See Democratic Study G r o u p Dunn, Jennifer, 43, 56, 84, 9 2 - 9 3 , 121, 140, 141, 175 Economic and Educational Opportunity Committee, 63 Economic equity, promoting, 4 8 - 5 0 Education, Department of, 174 Education, equality for w o m e n in, 2 6 - 2 7 , 48, 171. See also Legislation, Title IX of the Education A m e n d m e n t s of 1972 Education and Labor Committee, 63 Education and Workforce Committee,

189

149, 175 E E O C . See Equal E m p l o y m e n t Opportunity Commission Ehlers, Vern, 149 Elders, Joycelyn, 94 Emerson, Jo Ann, 120 Energy and C o m m e r c e Committee, 38, 176 Environmental and Energy Study Conference, 4, 77 Equal E m p l o y m e n t Opportunity C o m m i s s i o n (EEOC), 26, 104, 105 Equal e m p l o y m e n t programs, 26 Equal Rights A m e n d m e n t (ERA), 8, 16-19, 21 Ethics Committee, 7 8 - 8 0 , 118, 126, 135 Family-oriented agenda, 44, 47. See also Feminist agenda, promoting a Family planning, 27, 28, 52, 93, 9 6 - 9 7 , 105, 171 Family Research Council, 73 Fazio, Vic, 136 FEC. See Federal Elections Commission Federal C o m m u n i c a t i o n s C o m m i s s i o n (FCC), 26 Federal Elections Commission (FEC), 131-132, 134, 135 Feinstein, Dianne, 1 4 4 - 1 4 6 Feldstein, Martin, 73 Feminist agenda, promoting a, 4, 15-16, 4 3 - 5 0 , 1 7 6 - 1 7 7 Fenwick, Millicent, 115 Ferraro, Geraldine, 20, 115 Fetal tissue research, 32 Financial abuses, legislative service organizations and, 3, 6 7 - 6 9 Foley, Tom, 40, 113, 172 Food stamps, 21 Fort Leonard Wood, 137 Foster, Henry W„ Jr., 93 Fowler, Tillie, 54, 137, 138, 168, 175 Frank, Barney, 115 Free Congress Foundation, 73 Furse, Elizabeth, 9 4 - 9 5 Future of the C C W I : agenda, 169-171 ; committed c o n g r e s s w o m e n , 164-166; creation and a b a n d o n m e n t of caucuses,

190

Index

161; increases in number/power of women, 177-178; leaders/power structure, 172-178; overview, 161; recruiting feminist cochairs, 162-164; resources, adjusting to competing claims on, 171-172; structure, 166-169 Gag rule, 27, 31 Galbraith, John K„ 73 General Accounting Office (GAO), 46, 69, 146 Genetic tests, 131 Genital mutilation, 106 George Washington University, 127 Gephardt, Richard, 44, 65, 79, 140, 152, 154, 175 Gilman, Benjamin, 97 Gingrich, Newt, 2, 4, 57-62, 65-68, 71-73, 84, 87, 91, 106, 109, 110, 113, 117-118, 136, 139-141, 155, 174 Girl Scouts of America, 18 Glass ceiling, 141-142, 176 Government Reform and Oversight Committee, 149 Government shutdown and decline in Republican credibility, 106 Granger, Kay, 163 Green, Edith, 7 - 9 Greenwood, James, 97, 108 Grove City College, 26-27 Gulf War, 68 Haitian immigrants, 132, 134 Hall, Cindy, 80, 170-171 Hamilton, Lee, 73 Hamm, Mia, 175 Hansen, Julia B., 7 - 9 Harman, Jane, 137, 138, 168 Harvard University, 73-74 Hasten, Dennis, 108, 165, 174-175 Hate crimes, 47-48 Head Start, 48, 50, 7 5 , 9 8 , 130 Health, women's: abortion, 97-103; consensus in, 112; disappointments in, 28-29; gains made in 104th Congress, 106, 108; "Magnificent Seven" (legislative measures), 129-131; mammograms, 136; omnibus bills, bundling proposals,

15; reproductive, 124-125. See also Abortion; Contraception; Family planning; Legislation Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of (HHS), 27, 99 Healy, Bernadine, 32 Heckler, Margaret, 7, 9-11, 13, 18, 20, 21, 115, 121, 162 Helms, Jesse, 145 Heritage Foundation, 73, 74 Hermandad Mexicana Nacional (HMN), 149, 150-151 HHS. See Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of Hill, Anita, 143 Hispanic Bar Association, 153 Hispanic Caucus, 4, 69, 78, 80, 85. See also Sanchez, Loretta Hispanic Caucus Institute, 69 Historical background on CCWI. See Origin/early years (1977-1981) HMN. See Hermandad Mexicana Nacional Holt, Marjorie, 20 Holtzman, Elizabeth, 9-11, 13, 17, 18, 20, 21, 121, 162 House Finance Office (HFO), 69 Hoyer, Steny, 153 Huffington, Michael, 144 Human Rights Caucus, 68, 85, 113 Human Rights Foundation, 68 Hunger Caucus, 77, 85 Hutchison, Kay B„ 143, 173 Hyde, Henry, 61, 98, 100 Hyde Amendment, 52, 97 Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 106, 131, 149, 152-153 Inclusiveness, 10, 20, 22, 109, 119, 127-139 Individual retirement accounts (IRAs), 107 Infertility research centers, 47 Infrastructure, CCWI strengthening its, 125-127, 166-169 INS. See Immigration and Naturalization Service Insurance, health, 106, 108, 129, 131-136 Intact dilation and extraction, 98-103

Index Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 131 International Working W o m e n ' s Day, 123 Iraq, 172 Istook, Ernest, 97 Jackson, Jesse, 139 Jenkins, Woody, 1 4 4 - 1 4 7 Johnson, Adelaide, 89 Johnson, Nancy, 43, 53, 54, 56, 83, 84, 100, 101, 117-119, 121, 122, 124, 125, 128, 130, 133, 135, 139, 140, 157, 158, 163, 164, 167, 174 Jones, Bill, 150, 153 Judiciary Committee, 18, 96, 99 Kassebaum, Nancy, 137, 138 Kelly, Sue, 87, 117, 123, 125, 129, 130, 138, 143, 162, 164, 174 Kemp, Jack, 74 Kennedy School of G o v e r n m e n t (Harvard), 7 3 - 7 4 Kennelly, Barbara, 40, 43, 5 4 - 5 5 , 155, 175 Kirkpatrick, Jeane, 74 Kolbe, Jim, 134, 135 Ku Klux Klan, 89 Landrieu, Mary, 1 4 4 - 1 4 7 La Raza, 153 Leaders/power structure, C C W I relations with, 12, 14, 20, 3 1 - 3 2 , 113, 1 3 9 - 1 4 3 , 1 7 2 - 1 7 8 League of Women Voters, 87 Lee, Barbara, 121 Legal Services Corporation (LSC), 104, 107 Legislation: A f g h a n Women and Children Relief Act, 173; Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 136; Bankruptcy R e f o r m Act, 49; Centers for Disease Control Breast and Cervical Cancer Mortality Prevention Act of 1990, 46; Civil Rights Act of 1964, 107; Civil Rights Act of 1 9 9 1 , 2 7 , 28; Congressional E m p l o y e e s Fairness Act, 49; Crime Control Act, 4 7 ^ 4 8 ; D e f e n s e Authorization Act of 1996, 107; Economic Equity Act of 1996, 49, 107; Educational

191

Equity Act, 104-105; Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1994, 48; Equal Pay Act of 1963, 7 - 8 ; Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937, 107; Family and Medical Leave Act ( F M L A ) of 1993, 2 8 - 2 9 , 38, 4 5 - 4 6 , 50, 107, 176; Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, 123; Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 52; Goals 2000: Educate America Act, 48; Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 106; M a m m o g r a p h y Quality Standards Act of 1992, 1 2 9 - 1 3 1 ; National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, 46; N e w b o r n s and Mothers Protection Act of 1995, 100; Safe and DrugFree Schools Act, 48; School to Work Opportunities Act, 48; Title IX of the Education A m e n d m e n t s of 1972, 7 - 8 , 15, 26, 104, 105, 1 7 4 - 1 7 5 ; Title X of Public Health Service Act, 9 6 - 9 7 , 108; Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 47, 87, 104, 105, 108, 129, 131, 172; W o m e n ' s Economic Equity Act, 86, 87, 106; W o m e n ' s Educational Equity Act, 104; W o m e n ' s Health Equity Act, 32, 8 5 - 8 6 , 103 Legislative service organizations (LSOs), 1 - 4 , 23, 6 7 - 7 1 , 109, 125-126, 139, 177. See also Congressional m e m b e r s h i p organizations Levin, Sharon, 80 Lewinsky, Monica, 154 Lewis, Jerry, 72 Limbaugh, Rush, 74, 87, 147 Linder, John, 132 Lindy Boggs Reading Room, 12, 121 Livingston, Robert, 59, 97, 146 Lloyd, Marilyn, 20, 39 Lofgren, Zoe, 1 5 5 - 1 5 6 Lopez, Nativo, 150-151 Louisiana Independent Federation of Electors (LIFE), 144 Lowey, Nita, 39, 5 1 - 5 3 , 55, 71, 80, 93, 95, 97, 99, 105, 108, 110, 124, 129, 130, 132-136, 164, 175

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Index

Maloney, Carolyn, 117, 164 Mammograms, 46, 106, 129-131, 136 Matalin, Mary, 173-174 McCloskey, Frank, 150 McConnell, Mitch, 145 Mclntyre, Richard, 150 McKinney, Cynthia, 37, 115 Medicaid, 21, 47, 52, 97, 157 Medicare, 136 Meek, Carrie, 38, 125 Megan's Law, 108 Men, opening up CCWI to, 23-25, 33, 82 Menendez, Robert, 152 Mental health insurance coverage, 106 Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, 8, 62-63 "Mexico City policy," 27, 31 Meyers, Jan, 69, 83, 84, 100, 101 Midwives, nurse, 47 Mikulski, Barbara, 10, 14-15, 18 Military, women in the, 46-47, 49, 104, 106, 107, 137-138, 168, 171-173 Millender-McDonald, Juanita, 121, 123, 129, 130, 138, 163, 164 Mink, Patsy, 7, 39, 110, 124 Molinari, Guy, 40 Molinari, Susan, 40^13, 53, 54, 74-75, 83, 84, 94, 101, 106, 108, 113-115, 124, 140 Moorhead, Carlos, 59 Morella, Constance, 39, 55, 79, 80, 83, 91, 93, 95, 97, 106, 108, 110, 129, 164 Morial, Marc, 144 Motor vehicle bureaus, confidentiality of information, 48 Mott, Lucretia, 89, 91 Mount Vernon College, 127 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 173 Myers, John, 59 Myrick, Sue, 91, 98, 140 National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL), 94, 101, 176 National Breast Cancer Coalition, 104 National Cancer Institute, 130 National Center for Education Statistics, 48

National Institute on Aging, 46 National Institutes of Health (NIH), 130 National Organization for Women (NOW), 18, 94, 101 National Security Committee, 137 National Women's History Week, 28 National Women's Party, 89 National Women's Political Caucus, 18

Native Americans, 47 New Federalists, 76 Nickle, Don, 145 Nigeria, 68-69 Nonprofit foundations and legislative service organizations, 68-69 Northup, Anne, 120, 143, 164 Norton, Eleanor H„ 49, 56, 117-119, 121, 122, 124-130, 133, 135, 137139, 141, 158, 163, 164, 167, 177 Novello, Antonia, 32 NOW. See National Organization for Women Obey, David, 70 Office of Educational Research and Information, 48 Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 27 Office of Research on Women's Health, 28 Office of Women's Business Ownership, 49 Office of Women's Health, 130 Office on Women's Initiatives and Outreach, 172, 173 Older Women's League, 104 Omnibus bills, bundling proposals, 15-16, 30-31, 128-129, 136 O'Neill, Thomas "Tip," 10, 12, 24, 113, 172, 175 Orange County District Attorney's Office, 149 Orientation seminars for new House members, 73-74 Origin/early years (1977-1981): doubts about value of a women's group, 8 - 9 ; Equal Rights Amendment, 16-19; goals, policy, 14-16; goals, strategic, 9-13; organizational strains, 19-22;

Index recruiting members, 7 - 9 ; workways, 13-14 Osteoporosis Foundation, 104 Oversight Committee, 149, 1 5 1 - 1 5 2 Packwood, Bob, 142 Paul, Alice, 28, 89 Paxon, Bill, 41 Pay equity for w o m e n working on Capitol Hill, 49 Pelosi, Nancy, 43, 143, 176 Pena, Federico, 148 Pettis, Shirley, 10 Planned Parenthood, 27, 101 Population control polices, asylum to victims of coercive, 107 Porter, John, 108 Portrait M o n u m e n t , 8 9 - 9 2 Post O f f i c e and Civil Service Committee, 63 Post O f f i c e scandal, House, 36, 68 Powell, Colin, 173 Primmer, Lesley, 79 Pro-Choice Task Force, 93 Proxy voting, 6 4 - 6 5 Pryce, Deborah, 54, 56, 102, 141, 143, 173, 175 Puerto Rico Legal Defense, 153 Quarterly

Update,

79

Radanovich, George, 76 Rankin, Jeannette, 28 Rape, 108, 176 Reagan, Nancy, 32, 38 Reagan, Ronald, 4, 14, 2 1 - 2 2 , 2 5 - 2 8 , 32, 50, 51 Reclaiming the initiative ( 1 9 9 7 - 1 9 9 8 ) : assessing the caucus in the 105th Congress, 157-158; bipartisanship, 121-125; consensus, 1 2 7 - 1 3 9 ; contested elections, 143-157; infrastructure, 125-127; leaders/power structure, 139-143; overview, 117-119; recruiting new members, 119-121 Reed, Ralph, 74 Reich, Robert, 73 Reid, Harry, 134 Republican Conference, 77 Republican c o n g r e s s w o m e n :

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abortion, 9 2 - 1 0 3 ; contested elections, 144, 154-157; disengagement f r o m C C W I , 8 3 - 8 5 ; future of the C C W I , 164-166; Gingrich strengthening his rapport with, 84; and governm e n t ' s role, 85; 1993 C C W I membership, 30; 1994 elections, 8 6 - 9 2 ; Portrait M o n u m e n t , 8 9 - 9 2 ; reclaiming the initiative, C C W I ' s attempts at, 119-125; recruiting feminist cochairs, 162; relations between Democratic and, 109-112; and the Republican Party, 140; Title IX of the Education A m e n d m e n t s of 1972, 1 7 4 - 1 7 5 Republican Digest, 78 Republican revolution, before the ( 1 9 9 3 - 1 9 9 4 ) : abortion issue, 5 0 - 5 3 ; bipartisanship, 5 3 - 5 6 ; economic equity, 4 8 - 5 0 ; feminist agenda, 4 3 - 5 0 ; leverage, gaining, 3 7 - 3 9 ; power in the House, 4 0 - 4 3 ; social agenda, 4 5 ^ 1 8 . See also Transformation/growth (1982-1992) Republicans take control ( 1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 6 ) : consolidating power, 5 8 - 6 6 ; Contract with America and the role of government, 7 4 - 7 6 ; legislative service organizations, abolishing, 6 7 - 7 1 ; overview, 1 - 5 . 5 7 - 5 8 ; the revolutionaries, 7 1 - 7 4 Republican Study Committee, 3, 77, 78 Rice, Condoleezza, 73 Riders attached to appropriation bills, 62, 95, 1 3 2 - 1 3 3 Roberts, Cokie, 127 Roberts, Pat, 67, 70 Rogers, Harold, 108 Rohrbacher, Dana, 151 Rophynol, 108 Rose, Charlie, 6 7 - 6 9 R o u k e m a , Marge, 4 4 - 4 5 , 83, 124, 142-143 Rules, G i n g r i c h / G O P f r e s h m a n altering House and party, 5 9 - 6 5 , 76, 95 Rules Committee, 40, 6 1 - 6 2 , 95, 102, 104, 132, 134, 144-146, 155

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Index

Sanchez, Loretta, 122, 124, 144, 145, 148-157 Santorum, Rick, 145 Satcher, David, 130 SBA. See Small Business Administration Scanlan, Susan, 20 School lunches, 98 Schroeder, Pat, 16, 18, 21, 24, 29, 32, 36, 38, 39, 44, 45, 54, 55, 7 0 - 7 1 , 87, 91, 96, 99, 101, 106, 107, 162 Seastrand, Andrea, 98 Seniority system, G i n g r i c h / G O P f r e s h m a n altering, 5 9 - 6 1 September 11 terrorist attack, 166 Sex scandal, President Clinton, 142-143, 154 Sexual abuse/assault/harassment, 48, 50, 104, 108, 137-138, 142-143, 171. See also Legislation, Violence Against Women Act Shaddegg, Steven, 76 Shalala, Donna, 104 Slaughter, Louise, 39, 40, 43, 51, 106, 124, 129, 163, 164, 175 Small Business Administration (SBA), 28, 49, 123 Small Business Committee, 123, 138 Smith, Ann Charnley, 20 Smith, Chris, 98, 133 Smith, Linda, 98, 129 Smith, Virginia, 20 Snowe, Olympia, 20, 29, 44, 55, 83, 91, 106, 162 Social policy/agenda of C C W I , 45_48, 7 4 - 7 5 Social Security, 21 Social support and affiliation with CCWI, 33-34 Solis, Hilda, 164 Solomon, Gerry, 95 Source, The, 79, 82 S p e a k e r ' s Advisory G r o u p (SAG), 61 Specialization and division of labor, 33 Spellman, Gladys, 18 Sportsmen's Caucus, 3 Staff, C C W I ' s loss of professional,

8 0 - 8 1 , 86, 109, 113, 166, 169 Staff support, G i n g r i c h / G O P f r e s h m a n and loss of Democratic, 63 Stalking, legislation dealing with, 108 Standing committees, 5 9 - 6 0 Stanton, Elizabeth C „ 89, 91 Stark, Pete, 5 3 - 5 4 Starr, Kenneth, 142, 143 Status of Women in the States, 127 Stearns, Cliff, 42 Steering Committee, Republican, 60 Stenholm, Charles, 73 Stevens, Ted, 9 0 - 9 1 , 134, 135 Sullivan, Leonor, 7 - 9 Sullivan, Louis, 32 Supreme Court. See Court cases; Legislation Talent, James, 123 Taliban women, 173 Tamoxifen, 130 Task forces, 39, 82, 113, 118, 167, 168 Tauscher, Ellen, 130 Team concept at C C W I , 122-124, 158, 1 6 7 - 1 6 8 T h e m e Team, 76 Thomas, Clarence, 143 Thomas, William, 67, 78, 79, 149-151 Time period on House floor and voting, 65 Training, j o b , 111-112, 124 Transformation/growth ( 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 9 2 ) : increases in number of w o m e n serving in Congress, 3 5 - 3 7 ; m e m b e r s h i p change, 2 3 - 2 5 ; Reagan-Bush agenda, 2 5 - 2 9 ; viability, caucus, 2 9 - 3 4 . See also Republican revolution, before the (1993-1994) Treasury and Postal Service, subcommittee on the, 1 3 1 - 1 3 6 Unanimity rule, 10-11, 20, 22 United Nations Fund for Population Activities, 52 Update, 20, 23, 24, 31, 33 Vaccines, 47

Index Veterans Affairs, Department of, 47, 106, 173 Vice chair positions, 168-169 VIEW PAC, 140 Vocational education, 124 Vucanovich, Barbara, 113 Wage gap between men and women, 49, 141-142 Waldholtz, Enid, 59, 100-101 Warner, John, 144-146 Waters, Maxine, 39, 55, 143, 163-165, 176-177 Ways and Means Committee, 38, 53, 63, 108, 176 Welfare reform, 107, 108, 111 White, George, 90-91 WIC. See Women, Infants, and Children program Wilson, Heather, 121

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Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program, 21-22, 49, 75 Women in Congress, 121 Women-owned businesses, 123, 129, 130, 138, 171 Women's Business Centers, 123 Women's Economic Equity Act, 86, 87, 106 Women's groups in members' constituencies, 33 Women's History Month, 123 Women's Policy, Inc. (WPI), 79-80, 105, 112, 118, 121, 126, 158, 169, 170-171 Woolsey, Lynn, 36, 38 WPI. See Women's Policy, Inc. Wright, Jim, 113 Young Women's Christian Association, 18

About the Book

T

he Congressional Caucus for W o m e n ' s Issues (CCWI) was the most

effective bipartisan organization in the House—until changes wrought by the "Republican revolution" of 1994 threatened its very survival. Irwin Gertzog analyzes the origin, development, and influence of the C C W I and explores how the w o m e n associated with it have emerged f r o m near oblivion to reassert their role in the legislative process. Assessing the caucus within the contexts of legislative decisionmaking, competing policy agendas, partisan politics, and legislativepresidential relations, Gertzog demonstrates that it has evolved and survived despite substantial challenges to its integrity and mission. Although the definition of " w o m e n ' s issues" has changed significantly since 1977, he concludes, the C C W I continues to coalesce around strategic policy goals, thus ensuring its enduring niche in the legislative power structure.

Irwin N. Gertzog is emeritus professor of political science at Allegheny College and adjunct professor of political science at Columbia and Rutgers Universities. His publications include Congressional Women: Their Recruitment, Integration, and Behavior.

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