Whitehead's Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity 088706261X, 0887062628

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Whitehead's Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity

SuNY Series in Philosophy Robert C. Neville, Editor

Whitehead's Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity

Jorge Luis Nobo

State University of New York Press

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Published by State University of New York Press, Albany © 1986 Jorge Luis Nobo All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For information, address State University of New York Press, State University Plaza, Albany, N.Y., 12246 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Nobo, Jorge Luis, 1940Whitehead's metaphysics of extension and solidarity. (SUNY series in philosophy) Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Whitehead, Alfred North, 1861-1947--Contributions in metaphysics. 2. Whitehead, Alfred North, 1861194 7--Contributions in ontology. 3. Metaphysics. 4. Ontology. I. Title. II. Series. B1674.W354N63 1986 110'.92'4 85-25040 ISBN 0-88706-261-X ISBN 0-88706-262-8 (pbk.) 10 9 8 7 6

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4 3

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A la memoria de mi padre, ya mi madre-juntos me ensenaron el amor a la sabiduria yla sabiduria de/ amor.

Contents PREFACE

Xlll

ONE

Solidarity and the Categories 1.

2.

3.

+ 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

1 2. 1

3.

Solidarity and the organic categoreal scheme Concerns, limitations, and plan of this essay Memory: a key to the relevant categories Becoming and being: the actual entity as subject-superject Repetition and immediacy: objectification and subjective form Objectification, immanence, and the extensive continuum Repetition and immediacy: some relevant categoreal terms Repetition and immediacy: transition and concrescence The principles of creativity, relativity, ontology, and process Becoming and being: 'actuality' and the principle of process Succession and anticipation: supersession and the future Solidarity, the extensive continuum, and the formative elements Brief preview of remaining chapters

Two The Principle of Relativity 1• 2.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

To be is to be repeatable Repetition in experience Repetition in the dative phase Repetition in the conformal phase Repetition and novelty in the mental phas�s Conceptual novelty and God's primordial nature Autonomy, physical novelty, and the integrative phases The ubiquity of repetition

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2

7 9 15 18 19 23 29

33 34 44 50 58

61 62

69 73 76 83 87 90

92

VIII

9.

10.

Contents

Causal objectification, conformation, and self-formation Causal objectification as the reproduction of particulars

93 99

THREE

The Principles of Ontology and Creativity I. 2.

3· 4·

5.

6.

7.

8. 9.

IO.

I I. I 2.

I 3.

14.

The principle of efficient, and final, causation Causal objectifications as efficient causes The subjective aim as final cause Causation, autonomy, and the arbitrariness of history The free initiation and free conclusion of each concrescence The primordial counterpart of the initial subjective aim Causes, causation, and creativity The Category of the Ultimate Solidarity, the Ultimate, and the Categoreal Scheme Transition and the principles of ontology and creativity Transition distinguished from concrescence Threefold causation, decision, and the ontological principle Decision, objectification, and actuality Summary

107

107 110

114 117

122

123 129

131

135 137 138 152 158 161

FoUR

Creativity, Eternal Objects, and God I. 2.

3· 4·

5.

6.

7.

8. 9.

IO.

Creativity: its reality as a potentiality for the becoming of actualities Eternal objects: their individual and relational essences Eternal objects: abstractive hierarchies and connexity God: abstractive hierarchies and his primordial nature God: his consequent and superjective natures Eternal objects: novelty and contrasts, or particular modes of . . mgress1on Eternal objects: their general modes of functioning Eternal objects: subjective and objective species Eternal objects: their connectedness or ideal solidarity Solidarity and the formative elements: a revealing review

165

166 175 178 181 186 191 195 197 200

200

FIVE

The Extensive Continuum I. 2.

The metaphysical extensive continuum or receptacle Extension contrasted with actualized extension

205

207 211

Contents

3. 4· 5. 6.

7. 8.

9.

IO. I I.

Extension and the spatio-temporal continuum Extension and solidarity The theory of organic extensive aspects (a) Separativeness (b) Modality (c) Prehensiveness The theory of organic aspects in SMW Modal presence and objectification The extensive continuum: as one, and as many A comment on the theory of extensive connection Brief comment on physical space-time . Summary

IX

214

21!) 222

223 224 2Jl 234 2J!) 241 243 246 248

Suc

Objectification, Position, and Self-Identity I. 2.

3 4· 5. 6.

7. 8.

9.

Three objections refuted The twofold reality of actual entities: intrinsic and extrinsic The multiple location and unique position of an actual occasion Position and the indicative scheme Self-identity and positional uniqueness Aboriginal position and acquired definiteness From bare particular to fully-clothed individual Self-identity and self-diversity Summary

251

252 25!) 267 273 278 281 285 28g

JOO

SEVEN

Extensional Solidarity and the Dative Phase I. 2.

3·

4· 5.

6.

7.

8.

The The The The The The The

relevance of attained actualities and extension relevance of creativity and envisagement relevance of eternal objects of the objective species relevance of eternal objects of the subjective species relevance of God's primordial nature occasion as internally related to a knowable universe dative phase as the real potentiality fo� subjective expenence The dative modal scheme as the real potentiality for aesthetic integration

3°3

3o4 3o7 310 p8 320 326 33° 332

Contents

X

9. IO.

The dative scheme's relevance to genetic and coordinate analyses Extensional solidarity and the philosophy of organism

34° 346

EIGHT

Solidarity and Individuality I.

2.

3·

4·

5. 6.

The conformal phases: from objectivity to subjectivity The integrative phases: extension and the modes of perception Perception, knowledge, and objective solidarity Functional solidarity and autonomous individuality Autonomy and the evaporation of indeterminacy Concluding remarks NOTES SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

349 349 357 367 380 3g 1 396

399 417 42 5

List of Abbreviations

The influence of the journal Process Studies has helped to standardize the abbreviations for Alfred North Whitehead's major books. The standard abbreviations, with one addition, are here used in all citations and also in the text after the full title of a book has appeared at least once. But, except as noted below, I have not followed the recent practice, by Process Studies, of citing Process and Reality by a double-reference to the Corrected Edition of 1978 and the original edition of 1929. Since the Corrected Edition parenthetically incorporates the pagination of the original edition, citing the latter (original) edition alone saves space without sacrificing informa­ tion. I do cite both editions, however, when quoting a corrected passage. To achieve conformity with my text and modern philosophical practice, I have taken the liberty, when quoting from Whitehead's works, of placing any punctuation that follows an emphatic use of single quotation marks outside the closing quotation mark.

AI CN CPR ESP

FR

IS MT PNK

PR R

Adventures of Ideas. New York: Macmillan, 1933. The Concept of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964. Process and Reality, The Corrected Edition, New York: Free Press, 1978. Essays in Science and Philosophy. New York: Philosophical Library, 1947. The Function of Reason. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. The Interpretation of Science. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961. Modes of Thought. New York: Macmillan, 1938. An Enqui ry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge. Cam­ bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1_919. Process and Reality. New York: Macmillan, 1929. The Principle of Relativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 192 2.

Xl

xii

RM

s

SMW

list of Abbreviations

Religion in the Making. New York: Macmillan, 1926. Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect. New York: Capricorn, 1959. Science and the Modern World. New York: Macmillan, 192 5.

Preface

Whether the metaphysical ideas underlying Alfred North Whitehead's philosophy of organism are conceptually coherent, logically consistent, and empirically adequate is rightfully a matter for continuing philosophi­ cal debate. But the general importance of those ideas for philosophy, science, theology, religion, art, and civilization is now more than suffi­ ciently well-established. Witness, in this respect, the variety and sheer bulk of the secondary Whiteheadian literature. Witness, too, the vitality and growing influence of Whiteheadian-based process theology. Witness, finally, the significant number of scientists-such as Charles Birch, David Bohm, Karl Pribram, Ilya Prigogine, Henry Pierce Stapp, and W. H. Thorpe-who find Whitehead's metaphysical ideas significantly relevant to their own specialized investigations, or whose own philosophical spec­ ulations exhibit remarkably Whiteheadian overtones. The general agreement concerning the importance of Whitehead's phi­ losophy has not led, unfortunately, to a comparable agreement regarding how best to understand, develop, and apply the metaphysical ideas at the base of that philosophy. The received interpretations of Whitehead's metaphysics are many; the areas of agreement in those interpretations are few, particularly so when the discussion goes beyond paraphrasing vague doctrinal generalities. Admittedly, the novelty and complexity of White­ head's metaphysical doctrines go a long way towards explaining the number, extent, and depth of the received disagreements. But there are, I think, other reasons. One such reason, perhaps the most important, is the general neglect of the fundamental vision of reality that, as I will argue, Whitehead's meta­ physical conceptuality was designed to convey and elucidate. Accord­ ingly, this book reflects my conviction that the difficult tasks of correctly interpreting, constructively criticizing, coherently developing, and sys­ tematically appplying Whitehead's metaphysical ideas presuppose, one and all, a truly adequate understanding, not heretofore achieved, of

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Preface

Whitehead's most fundamental vision of the ultimate nature of reality. The vision in question is the vision of universal solidarity: that the entire universe is somehow to be found within each of its ultimate concrete components or, equivalently, that the final real actualities of which the universe is composed are each in all and all in each. The solidarity of the universe is the fundamental thesis of Whitehead's metaphysical philosophy. Achieving an adequate elucidation of that thesis is the chief goal of this book. But in order to fulfill that goal, I have found it necessary to develop a number of metaphysical doctrines that White­ head neglected to make sufficiently explicit in his published writings, but which are truly central to the philosophy of organism. Chief among those neglected doctrines is the organic theory of eternal, or metaphysical, extensive continuity. Thus, this book derives its title from the conjunction of the fundamental organic vision of reality and the fundamental organic doctrine intended to elucidate that vision. By the solidarity of the universe, Whitehead ultimately understood the holistic functioning of the universe in each of its concrete constituents. Accordingly, this book's investigation of solidarity indirectly underscores the relevance of Whitehead's metaphysics to the holistic conception of reality, and to the attendant holographic paradigm, that a small but growing number of scientists seems increasingly to favor. But I have found it neither possible nor desirable here to explore the implications of my discussion for what some see as the emerging science of wholeness. Whenever possible, however, I have tried to present my interpretation and development of Whitehead's basic metaphysical principles in a man­ ner suggestive of those implications. My attempt to be suggestive in this last respect is but a special case of my more general attempt to develop the elucidation of solidarity in a manner strongly suggestive of new ways and new areas in which White­ head's metaphysical conceptuality may be successfully employed. For I would like this book to serve not only as a point of departure for my subsequent philosophical efforts, but also, for those interested readers persuaded by its arguments, as a sort of prolegomenon to their own future interpretation, criticism, development, and employment of Whitehead's metaphysics. To paraphrase Whitehead, then, the ideas here put forth may have been born privately, but they are intended to have public careers. To the extent they do, I will have partially repaid the immense debt I owe to those without whose help I would have never completed this book. I owe the greatest immediate debt to Lewis S. Ford, who strongly

Preface

xv

encouraged me to write this book, which expands and revises themes I first treated in my doctoral dissertation, and who recommended it to SUNY Press. Given our many differences in respect to the approach to, and the interpretation of, Whitehead's philosophy, Ford's efforts on be­ half of this book's publication are all the more significant of his nobility of character and fairness of mind. No irritable philosopher he but, in the words of Robert C. Neville, "a critic of great mind and soul and without ego." Less immediate but more extensive and deeply rooted is the debt I owe to my philosophical mentors, Douglas Browning, Charles Hartshorne, and the late David L. Miller. As my teachers, all three provided personal and professional inspiration, guided my philosophical development, gave impetus to my interest in metaphysics, and facilitated my initial under­ standing of Whitehead. My interpretation of Whitehead's metaphysics now differs significantly from theirs, but the years have lessened neither the influence of these men nor my admiration for them. I am indebted to my employer, Washburn University of Topeka, for awarding me an academic sabbatical in the Spring semester of 1984, which gave me the free time needed to write much of this book, and also for a research grant to cover the cost of word-processing the manuscript's final draft. I am particularly grateful for the encouragement and support provided by Provost Sheldon Cohen, Dean Paul Salter, and by my chairman and good friend, Harold J. Rood. My thanks to Vivian McCormick and Rhonda Boose, who shared the task of word-processing the text, to Michelle Hubach for typing the notes and bibliography, and to LaJean Rinker for typing this preface, other front matter, and the index. The last two and Dr. Rood also helped with the tedious task of proofreading the galleys, as did Pam Griebat and Vickie Jacobs. I am grateful also to William Eastman, Director of SUNY Press, for his trust and infinite patience, and to Peggy Gifford, Production Editor, for her expert and cheerful assistance. Finally, I am greatly indebted to my wife, Pat, for preparing the bibliography, for proofreading the book's manuscript, and for her constant support. Jorge Luis N obo Topeka, Kansas February 17, 1986

Acknowledgements I am grateful to Lewis S,. Ford, editor of Process Studies, and to Vincent G. Potter, S. J. , editor of International Philosophical Quarterly, for permission to incorporate in this book materials which first appeared as articles in their journals. The articles in question are "Whitehead's Principle of Process," Process Studies, 4 (1974), 275-84; "Whitehead's Principle of Relativity," Process Studies, 8 (1978), 1-20; and "Transition in Whitehead: A Creative Process Distinct from Concrescence," International Philosophical Quarterly, 19 (1979), 265-83.

XVII

ONE

Solidarity and the Categories The fundamental thesis of Alfred North Whitehead's philosophy of or­ ganism is that the final actualities of the universe cannot be abstracted from one another because each actuality, though individual and discrete, is internally related to all other actualities. This mutual involvement of discrete actualities is what Whitehead meant by the solidarityor connected­ ness of the universe. 1 Whitehead's thesis appears to be logically inconsi­ stent, for it posits final actualities that are at once mutually transcendent, as entailed by their discreteness and individuality, and mutually imma­ nent, as required by their reciprocal internal relations. Most interpreters of Whitehead have avoided this problem by conveniently interpreting the solidarity of actualities to mean simply that earlier actualities are imma­ nent in later ones. Any other sense of immance-such as that of later actualities in earlier ones, or of contemporaries in each other-they tend either to ign ore altogether, or to explain away by the claim that Whitehead was being careless whenever he spoke of the mutual, or reciprocal, imma­ nence of the universe's final actualities. 2 This last claim, I hold, is entirely without justification. I am quick to admit, even insist, that Whitehead was a far from careful writer. But we are not talking here of an occasional phrase or passing remark. Rather, numerous explicit references to the mutual immanence of the universe's final actualities are to be found in each of Whitehead's metaphysical works. One book, Adventures of Ideas, even devotes almost an entire chapter (Ch. XII) to discussing the immanence of-later actualities in earlier ones and of contemporaries in each other. Thus, to ignore or to explain away Whitehead's pronouncements on the mutual immanence of discrete actualities is a tacit admission that no one has yet made complete sense of

Whitehead's Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity

the fundamental metaphysical vision animating the philosophy of organ­ ism . For that vision , I shal l argue, is that anytwo actualities, regardless of their temporal relationsh ip, are internally related to each other by reason of their immanence in one another. Accordingly, one major goal of this essay is to elucidate Whitehead 's thesis of universal solidarity , while recognizing its paradoxical nature but also trying to exonerate it from charges of logical inconsistency.

z.

Solidarity and the organic categoreal scheme

Let me begin by emphasizing the central role that the doctrine of sol i­ darity plays in the organic philosophy. This can be done by inspecting a few passages taken from Whitehead 's writings and from his lectures at Harvard . To understand the full import of these passages , however, two things must be borne in mind. First, for Whitehead the final actual ities of the world-what he terms actual entities , actual occasions, or events-are, one and all , happenings or events having all the necessary or metaphysical characters of occasions of experience (Al 2 84 , 30 3) . Second , to say that actual entities, or occasions of experience , are the final actualities is to say that whatever exists in the universe by wayof actuality is an actual entity , a constituent aspect of an actual entity , or an interrelated group-tech­ nically termed a nexus or society-of actual entities (PR 2 7-30). With those two observations in mind , let us first examine Victor Lowe's account of what Whitehead took to be the six basic principles of his metaphysics . Since these principles jointly provide a bird's-eye view of Whitehead's philosophy, I quote in its entirety the account Lowe gives of them : I can also report what Whitehead gave out in his regular Harvard lectures of 1 926-2 7 as "the six main principles of my metaphysics". These were the principles of Solidarity (every actual entity requires all other entities in order to exist) , Creative Individuality (every actual entity is a process and its issue comes from its own limitations), Efficient Causation , the Ontological Princi ple (the character of Creativity is derived from its own creatures , and expressed by its own creatures), Aesthetic Individuality (every actual entity is an end in itself and for itself, involving its own measure of individual self­ satisfaction), and Ideal Comparison (every creature involves in its constitution an ideal reference to ideal creatures in ideal relationships to each other, and in comparison with its own satisfaction) . Wh ite­ head added that these principles apply to all actual ities , includ ing God . 3

Solidarity and the Cate gories

When Whitehead says that every actuality requires all other entities for its existence, we must understand him to mean that all other entities are constituents of that actuality. This follows necessarily from the hypoth­ esis that the final actualities have the metaphysical properties of occasions of experience; for, as construed by Whitehead, "experience is not a relation of an experient to something external to it, but is itself the 'inclusive whole' which is the required connectedness of 'many in one' " (Al 299). Accordingly, for Whitehead, "every item of the universe, in­ cluding all the other actual entities, are constituents in the constitution of any one actual entity" (PR 2 24 ) . The problem posed by the thesis of solidarity now becomes obvious: How can the universe, or world, be composed of actual entities and yet be itself contained in each of its component actualities? Whitehead, however, is fully aware of the problem; indeed, he makes it explicit in more than a few passages of his works, referring to it sometimes simply as 'the problem of solidarity' and at other times as 'the paradox of the connectedness of things' (PR 88; AI 293). To cite but one example, in Modes of Thought we find Whitehead saying that there is a dual aspect to the relationship of an occasion of experience as one relatum and the experienced world as another relatum . The world is included within the occasion in one sense, and the occasion is included in the world in another sense. (MT 2 24)

This bond between world and occasion, Whitehead immediately admits, is a "baffling antithetical relation" (MT 2 24) ; but, for him, when we examine our everyday experience of the world, or when we inquire into the presuppositions of common practice, into the presuppositions of the natural sciences, or into the pn:.suppositions of basic epistemic claims, we run again and again into this paradoxical relation of mutual immanence (MT 218-27): For example, consider the enduring self-identity of the soul . The soul is nothing else than the succession of my occasions of experience, extending from birth to the present moment. Now, at this instant, I am the complete person embodying all these occasions. They are mine. On the other hand it is equally true that my immediate occasion of experience, at the present moment, is only one among the stream of occasions which constitutes my soul. Again, -the world for me is nothing else than how the functionings of my body present it for my experience. The world is thus wholly to be discerned within those functionings . Knowledge of the world is nothing else than an analysis of the functionings . And yet, on the other hand , the body is merely

4

Whitehead's Metaphysics of fatension and Solidarity

one society of functioni ngs within the universal society of the world . We have to construe the world in terms of the bodily society , and the bodily society in terms of the general functionings of the world. (MT 2 24-2 5)

This compelling character of human experience-that it is a constituent of the universe and that the universe is a constituent of it-suggests to Whitehead that the togetherness of all final actualities somehow involves their mutual immanence: "In some sense or other, this community of the actualities of the world means that each happening is a factor in the nature of every other happening" (MT 2 2 5). By thus generalizing what is man­ ifest in our experience of the world into a necessary feature of every final actuality, Whitehead arrives at what I have termed the thesis of solidarity (MT 2 2 7). The thesis maintains that "any set of actual occasions are united by the mutual immanence of occasions, each in the other" (A l 2 54). It asserts, in effect, that any two actual entities, regardless of their temporal relationship (Al 2 54), are at once mutually transcendent and mutually immanent. The problem is to find a sense of 'mutual immanence' wholly consistent with the discrete individuality of actual entities. It is precisely in respect to this problem that the importance of the solidarity thesis-its pivotal role in Whitehead's philosophy-