What is a God?: Philosophical Perspectives on Divine Essence in the Hebrew Bible 9780567671677, 9780567671691, 9780567671707

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Foreword
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
1. Introduction: What Is an םיהלא
2. Whatness and a Socratic Definition of םיהלא - ness via Common Properties
3. Whatness and a Platonist Perspective on םיהלא - ness as Form/ Universal
4. Whatness and Aristotelian Essentialism about an םיהלא as Secondary Substance
5. Whatness and a Porphyrian Tree of םיהלא as Species/ Genus
6. Whatness and a Boethian Distinction between Essence/ Existence in an םיהלא
7. Whatness and an Avicennian View on the Quiddity of an םיהלא
8. Whatness and Abelardian Nominalism about the Status of an םיהלא
9. Whatness and a Thomistic Perspective on the Complexity of an םיהלא
10. Whatness and a Scotian Interpretation of an םיהלא’s Haecceity
11. Whatness and a Cartesian Notion of an םיהלא’s Principal Attribute
12. Whatness and Lockean Anti- essentialism about םיהלא as Sortal
13. Whatness and Leibnizian Superessentialism about Necessity in an םיהלא
14. Whatness and a Kantian Concept of an םיהלא as Thing- in- Itself
15. Whatness and a Hegelian View of the Essence of an םיהלא in Appearances
16. Whatness and a Nietzschean Interpretation of an םיהלא as Will to Power
17. Whatness and Wittgensteinian Family Resemblances among the םיהלא
18. Whatness and a Husserlian Reduction of an םיהלא’s Essence as Intentional Object
19. Whatness and a Heideggerian View of What Is Ownmost in an םיהלא’s Identity over Time
20. Whatness and a Sartrean Idea of Existence Preceding Essence in an םיהלא
21. Whatness and a Quinean Denial of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Being an םיהלא
22. Whatness and the Popperian Essentialist Fallacy in Defining an םיהלא
23. Whatness and Kripkean Modal Neo- Essentialism about םיהלא as Rigid Designator
24. Whatness and Derridean Differential Ontology for an םיהלא beyond Anti- essentialism
25. Summary and Conclusions
Bibliography
Index of Biblical References
Index of Philosophical Sources
Index of Subjects
Index of Authors

Citation preview

What Is a God?

What Is a God? Philosophical Perspectives on Divine Essence in the Hebrew Bible Jaco Gericke

T&T CLARK Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, T&T CLARK and the T&T Clark logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2017 Paperback edition first published 2018 Copyright © Jaco Gericke, 2017 Jaco Gericke has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. For legal purposes the Acknowledgements on p. xiii constitute an extension of this copyright page. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. The Scriptural quotations in English in this publication are my own adaptations from the text of the Revised Standard Version of the Bible copyrighted 1971 and 1952 by the Division of Christian Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States. Where applicable the Hebrew words on which the translation is based have been substituted. The verse numbering follows the English translation, not the Masoretic text editions of the BHS. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-0-5676-7167-7 PB: 978-0-5676-8359-5 ePDF: 978-0-5676-7170-7 ePub: 978-0-5676-7168-4 Typeset by Newgen Knowledge Works (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.

For Charlotte and Angie.

Contents Foreword

ix

Acknowledgements

xiii

Abbreviations

xiv

1 Introduction: What Is an ‫?אלהים‬ 2 Whatness and a Socratic Definition of ‫אלהים‬-ness via Common Properties 3 Whatness and a Platonist Perspective on ‫אלהים‬-ness as Form/Universal 4 Whatness and Aristotelian Essentialism about an ‫ אלהים‬as Secondary Substance 5 Whatness and a Porphyrian Tree of ‫ אלהים‬as Species/Genus 6 Whatness and a Boethian Distinction between Essence/ Existence in an ‫אלהים‬ 7 Whatness and an Avicennian View on the Quiddity of an ‫אלהים‬ 8 Whatness and Abelardian Nominalism about the Status of an ‫אלהים‬ 9 Whatness and a Thomistic Perspective on the Complexity of an ‫אלהים‬ 10 Whatness and a Scotian Interpretation of an ‫’אלהים‬s Haecceity 11 Whatness and a Cartesian Notion of an ‫’אלהים‬s Principal Attribute 12 Whatness and Lockean Anti-essentialism about ‫ אלהים‬as Sortal 13 Whatness and Leibnizian Superessentialism about Necessity in an ‫אלהים‬ 14 Whatness and a Kantian Concept of an ‫ אלהים‬as Thing-in-Itself 15 Whatness and a Hegelian View of the Essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in Appearances 16 Whatness and a Nietzschean Interpretation of an ‫ אלהים‬as Will to Power

1 13 19 27 35 39 45 51 57 63 69 73 79 85 91 97

viii

Contents

17 Whatness and Wittgensteinian Family Resemblances among the ‫אלהים‬ 18 Whatness and a Husserlian Reduction of an ‫’אלהים‬s Essence as Intentional Object 19 Whatness and a Heideggerian View of What Is Ownmost in an ‫’אלהים‬s Identity over Time 20 Whatness and a Sartrean Idea of Existence Preceding Essence in an ‫אלהים‬ 21 Whatness and a Quinean Denial of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Being an ‫אלהים‬ 22 Whatness and the Popperian Essentialist Fallacy in Defining an ‫אלהים‬ 23 Whatness and Kripkean Modal Neo-Essentialism about ‫אלהים‬ as Rigid Designator 24 Whatness and Derridean Differential Ontology for an ‫אלהים‬ beyond Anti-essentialism 25 Summary and Conclusions

103 109 115 121 127 133 139 145 151

Bibliography

157

Index of Biblical References

163

Index of Philosophical Sources

166

Index of Subjects

167

Index of Authors

170

Foreword However far man may extend himself with his knowledge, however objective he may appear to himself ultimately he reaps nothing but his own biography. Nietzsche, HATH, §513. The type of research done for this monograph is to be located at the far end of a sliding scale of the most obscure of interests. First of all, it links up with the relatively few studies concerned with the use of ‘god’ as common noun in the Hebrew Bible. Second, it differs from most of these in that it is exclusively so concerned (as opposed to it being part of, for example, a discussion actually focused on the nature of Yhwh or of monotheism in ancient Israel). Third, it seeks to contribute to a small patch of biblical scholarship wondering about what a god was assumed to be. Fourth, it is entirely focused on how the question (of what a god was) can be constructed, as opposed to attempting to provide answers thereto. Fift h and finally, it is the only study I know of that offers the reader a diachronic overview of a selection of related philosophical perspectives on potential differences in nuance that can attach themselves to various possible interpretations of that question. Combined, the aforementioned five concerns might seem off the chart to many of my peers, even controversial to some, intolerably boring to others, immensely interesting to those with like-minded interests, and even useful to a handful of fellow sub-sub specialists. Such is the predicament of contemporary Hebrew Bible scholarship that anyone who is not concerned with whatever happens to be currently in vogue but is instead concerned with what lies in the blind spots is fated to a future of talking to oneself. Yet perhaps in some way, someday, someone will come along who will recognize its far-reaching implications for the complacent ways in which we reflect on the question of divinity. Given its anomalous nature, this study, if approached with the wrong expectations, is bound to both disappoint and be misunderstood beyond fairness to its intended purpose. This might occur in both the interdisciplinary

x

Foreword

contexts involved here, namely Hebrew Bible scholarship and Philosophy respectively. First of all, in the context of Hebrew Bible scholarship, readers familiar with the question constituting the research problem of what a god was assumed to be should take cognizance of the fact that this study  –  being meta-philosophical  – is very different from the typical linguistic, literary, historical, comparative-religious, social-scientific, theological and other perspectives on divinity in the Hebrew Bible that they are used to. Hence the inevitable comparison and attempted linkage with what went before in the scholarly discussion might conjure up false expectations and critique, unless one thing is recognized: that this study is about reconstructing possible philosophical perspectives on essence already potentially present in the scholarly metalanguage. As such it has nothing to do with providing some sort of forced philosophical answer to that question or with identifying implicit second-order thinking on this topic in the Hebrew Bible itself. Even the quoting of biblical texts should not be misread as involving the exegetical fallacy of proof-texting (out of context) as all materials are inserted in the particular discussion purely for the sake of the given argument in a completely hypothetical context. Second, those philosophers proper familiar with the concepts under consideration in this study will look in vain for anything remotely similar to either analytic or continental type philosophical discourse purporting to have normative well-argued justifications in favour of a particular view and/or ideas of great sociopolitical relevance. This study is wholly experimental and open-ended, with no theory to justify or critique and concerned only with putting out there hypothetical possibilities for potential conceptual clarification. Hitherto no comprehensive meta-philosophical conceptual history of the concept of essence has been written with reference to asking what a god in the Hebrew Bible was assumed to be. Also, no philosopher, whose views on essence is discussed here, has themselves applied their related ideas in the particular manner (or thought of the divine in this way). As a result, every chapter’s reconstruction of the given possible perspective on essence in relation to the whatness of biblical divinity will inevitably be somewhat artificial, conceptually controversial, open to alternative interpretations, concerned with mostly outdated ideas, often contradictory in relation to the

Foreword

xi

other chapters and really done simply for satisfying a pedantic esoteric philosophical curiosity – it is as banal as that. On a more personal note, this is my second monograph and, though I have been thinking about the particular research problem and reading all that relates to it for over a decade now, deciding how to approach the matter and what to include in the presentation has been extraordinarily difficult. Its relatively short length, given how much could be said, belies the effort involved in order to creatively structure the data meaningfully, coherently and with sufficient clarity and simplicity. Aside from challenges pertaining to form and content, there have been many existential, personal and social challenges and traumas that have intruded on the writing process, especially over the past two years. There have been times when the question this study is concerned with seemed to me the most profound thing I could ever hope to reflect upon. Yet, as always, the nihilistic ghosts of sowhat and who-cares never failed to return. There is a sneaking suspicion that the following words of Antonin Artaud (1976: 85) are deconstructively profound. All writing is rubbish. People who try to free themselves from what is vague in order to state precisely whatever is going on in their minds are producing rubbish. The whole literary tribe is a pack of rubbish mongers, especially today. All those who have landmarks in their minds, I mean in a certain part of their heads, in well-defined sites in their skulls, all those who are masters of language . . . and who have given names to these currents of thought  – I  am thinking of their specific tasks, and of that mechanical creaking their minds produce at every gust of wind – are rubbish mongers. Those for whom certain words have meaning, and certain modes of being, those who are so precise, those for whom emotions can be classified and who quibble over some point of their hilarious classifications, those who still believe in “terms,” those who discuss the ranking ideologies of the age . . . those who still believe in an orientation of the mind, those who follow paths, who drop names, who recommend books – these are the worst pigs of all. You are quite unnecessary, young man!

Yes, whatever. If this book does not satisfy then I can only recommend the advice given in the title of a movie of the comedy genre:  Burn after Reading. But seriously, in the end, I guess I would have liked to say of this book as Michel Foucault allegedly once said of himself in another context,

xii

Foreword

that is, I am no prophet; my task is to make windows where once there were walls. The spoiler then is that I cannot answer the question of what a god in the Hebrew Bible was assumed to be, but I can try to philosophically complicate the interpretation of that question beyond all decent contemplation. For how would answers help if we never take a step back to look at what is meant or could be meant by the question itself? Surely, to contribute most to biblical scholarship in the long run, what we need is not only a new answer to an old question but also new ways of constructing the question itself. Jaco Gericke Pretoria 27 December 2015

Acknowledgements This study has taken shape over the past 10 years (2006–16). So many things, most wonderful and totally awful, have happened during this time and so many people and organizations have played a role contributing to the creation and destruction of an environment conducive for the production of various parts of this book. They include, in chronological order, my parents George and Ezette Gericke, Dirk Human, Jurie Le Roux, the University of Pretoria, Cas Vos, Marlize Willemse, the Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst (DAAD), Aaron Schart, the University of Duisburg-Essen, Hans van Deventer, North-West University (Vaal Campus), Tinie Theron, Phil Botha, Gerrie Snyman Charlotte Gericke and Angelique Trollip. A  very special word of thanks can and will also go to David Clines and the staff at Sheffield Phoenix Press on whose invitation this book was written. Last but not least, I offer my sincere gratitude to all of the staff at Bloomsbury T & T Clark who made the completion of the process of publishing this manuscript possible. Without them no one would be reading this. All of you have made my toiling in obscurity a little less so.

Abbreviations A AG APo. Apol. BGE BQ Cat. Charm. CPR (A/B) CSM DDD DEE EN Euphr. G Gen. et Corr. Gorg. GS HB Hipp. I. Lach. LI LLP Lys. Men. Met. OO OS Phdo. Phys. PI Prot. RB

Sämtliche Schriften (Leibniz) Philosophical Essays (Leibniz) Posterior Analytics (Aristotle) Apology (Plato) Beyond Good and Evil (Nietzsche) The Basic Question of Being as Such (Heidegger) Categories (Aristotle) Charmides (Plato) Critique of Pure Reason A/B (Kant) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Descartes) Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible De Ente et Essentia (Aquinas) Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle) Euthyphro (Plato) Die philosophischen Schriften (Leibniz) Generation and Corruption (Aristotle) Gorgias (Plato) Gay Science (Nietzsche) Hebrew Bible Hippias Major (Plato) Laches (Plato) Logica ‘ingredientibus’ (Abelard) Logical Papers (Leibniz) Lysis (Plato) Meno (Plato) Metaphysics (Aristotle) Opera Omni (Scotus) Opuscula Sacra (Boethius) Phaedo (Plato) Physics (Aristotle) Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein) Protagoras (Plato) New Essays on Human Understanding (Leibniz)

Abbreviations

Rep. SL ST TDOT THAT Theaet. Top.

Republic (Plato) Science of Logic (Hegel) Summa Theologica (Aquinas) Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament Theologisches Handwörterbuch zum Alten Testament Theaetetus (Plato) Topics (Aristotle)

xv

1

Introduction: What Is an ‫?אלהים‬

In the Hebrew Bible (HB), the word ‘‫ ’אלהים‬as well as the related terms ‘‫ ’אל‬and ‘‫ ’אלוה‬are not only used as proper names for Yhwh but, more interestingly, for the present context, also function in the generic sense as common names to refer to a specific kind of entity that Yhwh and a variety of other phenomena were assumed to be. And this is where things become complicated, particularly in view of the fact that: it should not be assumed that the ancient Near Eastern conceptions of ‘god’ are in perfect correspondence with those of modern people. (Van der Toorn 1999: 353)

Indeed, they are not, inasmuch as: the Israelite concept of divinity included all praeternatural beings, [and] also lower deities (in modern usage referred to as ‘spirits’, ‘angels’, ‘demons’, ‘semi-gods’, and the like) may be called ‘gods’. (Van der Toorn 1999: 353)

Examples of this intricate and alien diversity within the ‘extension’ of the words ‘‫אלוה‬/‫אל‬/‫ ’אלהים‬are evident in the way they can be used to denote an almost inordinate variety of phenomena. For example, consider what exactly is referred to as divine in the following texts from different literary and historical contexts. In the Pentateuch: (a) In the beginning ‫ אלהים‬created the heavens and the earth. (Gen. 1.1) (b) . . . the ‫ אלהים‬wind was moving over the face of the waters . . . (Gen. 1.2) (c) The sons of ‫ אלהים‬saw that the daughters of men were fair . . . (Gen. 6.2)

2

What Is a God?

Hear us, my lord; you are an ‫ אלהים‬among us. (Gen. 23.6) With ‫ אלהים‬wrestlings I have wrestled with my sister . . . (Gen. 30.8) Why did you steal my ‫( ?אלהים‬Gen. 31.30) ‫ אלהים‬called to him out of the bush . . . (Exod. 3.4) See, I make you as an ‫ אלהים‬to Pharaoh. (Exod. 7.1) . . . and on all the ‫ אלהים‬of Egypt I will execute judgments. (Exod. 12.12) (j) . . . his master shall bring him to the ‫ אלהים‬. . . (Exod. 21.6) (k) . . . he shall pay as the ‫ אלהים‬determine. (Exod. 21.22) (l) And he received the ‫ אלהים‬at their hand . . . (Exod. 32.4) (m) Do not turn to idols or make for yourselves molten ‫ אלהים‬. . . (Lev. 19.4) (n) They sacrificed to demons which were no ‫אלוה‬, to ‫ אלהים‬. . . (Deut. 32.17)

(d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)

In the Former Prophets: (o) (p) (q) (r)

. . . what Chemosh your ‫ אלהים‬gives you to possess? (Judg. 11.24) . . . and it became an ‫ אלהים‬panic. (1 Sam. 14.15) I see an ‫ אלהים‬coming up out of the earth. (1 Sam. 28.13) . . . the heritage of the ‫( אלהים‬2 Sam. 14.16)

In the Latter Prophets: He shall be called . . . mighty ‫ אל‬. . . (Isa. 9.6) As many as your cities are your ‫ אלהים‬. . . (Jer. 2.28) I will cause your multitude to fall by the swords of ‫ אלהים‬. . . (Ezek. 32.12) (v) Nin’eveh was an ‫ אלהים‬city, three days’ journey in breadth . . . (Jon. 3.3) (w) . . . guilty men, whose own might is their ‫אלוה‬. (Hab. 1.11) (x) . . . the house of David shall be like an ‫אלהים‬. (Zech. 12.8)

(s) (t) (u)

In the Writings: (y) (z) (aa) (bb)

You have made him a little less than ‫אלהים‬. (Ps. 8.6) Your righteousness is like the ‫ אלוה‬mountains . . . (Ps. 36.20) An ‫ אלהים‬fire fell from heaven . . . (Job 1.16) . . . the morning stars sang . . . the sons of the ‫ אלהים‬shouted for joy . . . (Job 38.7)

Introduction

(cc) (dd) (ee) (ff) (gg) (hh)

3

When he raises himself up, the ‫ אלהים‬are afraid. (Job 41.25) Your throne, oh ‫אלהים‬, endures for ever and ever. (Ps. 45.6) You greatly enrich it with the ‫ אלהים‬river . . . (Ps. 65.9) The ‫ אל‬cedars with its branches . . . (Ps. 80.11) ‫ אלהים‬has taken his place in the council of ‫ אל‬. . . (Ps. 82.1) . . . an ‫ אל‬is in your hand to do it. (Prov. 3.27)

To be sure, the precise grammatical function as well as the particular sense and reference of ‫אלוה‬/ ‫אל‬/‫ אלהים‬in each of these texts are open to debate. Even so, it should be clear that besides HB scholars busying themselves with the theologies of Yahwism: The question of what a god is is absolutely central. (Smith 2001: xi)

In this regard, examples of related research in the ongoing discussion on the subject in English and with reference to divinity in the HB vis-à-vis the ancient Near East as backdrop include, inter alia, Ringgren (TDOT1974: 267– 284), Schmidt (THAT 1994:  331–47), Van der Toorn (DDD 1999:  313–19), Burnett (2001), Smith (2001, 2004, 2010), Wardlaw (2008), Gericke (2009: 22– 45), Hundley (2011) and McClellan (2013). This list is but a sample; many other related studies exist but the work of these scholars should suffice to convey the general idea. A similar interest exists in specialist ancient Near Eastern and Classical Studies. In fact, the same question – what is a god? – appears in the titles of studies by, for example, Lloyd (1997 ) with reference to Greek divinity, and Porter (2009), whose edited volume focused on Mesopota mian concepts of deity. The same question also occurs in various publications in the philosophy of religion, as in Cupitt (1996 ). Yet, no matter how it has always been implicit in many fields concerned with religion, it will be very hard to find the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬is as the title and main (and only) theme of a book or article in HB studies. As far as popular methodologies involved in attempts to answer the question are concerned, Smith (2001: 6–9) once suggested that we are dealing with at least four, namely: 1. Taking inventory, that is, making a list of related entities/phenomena; 2. Explicating etymology, that is, noting the root meanings of related terms;

4

What Is a God?

3. Atomistic comparative description, that is, Yhwh vis-à-vis ancient Near Eastern deities; 4. Large-scale comparative description, that is, venturing a typology of divinity. As should be readily apparent, in each of these approaches some or other auxiliary discipline plays a major role. Included here are Hebrew linguistics, the comparative study of religion, the history of religion, anthropology, sociology, archaeology, literary criticism and perhaps even theology. In their own important way, each of these has allowed us to obtain a specialist perspective that was seen as providing some sort of answer to the question of what a god is (or was). So eager have some scholars been to respond to the research problem that what was meant by the question itself has not really received any attention. What is being asked – as well as what we are looking for – is assumed to be relatively clear and unproblematic. It is implied as something given and taken for granted, even if the answers may be hard to come by. The ontological and logical presumptions behind the interrogative sentence of this particular form (i.e. ‘What is X?’) have consequently not been regarded to be a matter of great concern and deemed worthy of closer consideration. In contrast, the present study represents a return to a conceptual space that, as Derrida (2007: n.p.) suggested in another context, comes ‘before the question’. In the present use of this idea, we stand back from the scholarly discussion of what an ‫ אלהים‬is in order to question the philosophical ‘authority of the question’ itself. This can only be done by examining the enabling conditions (here: metaphysical constructs) that have hitherto provided meaning for the particular way of inquiring into the nature of deity. For this I have decided to suggest a fifth approach to the concept of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB that can supplement the four existing ones mentioned above: 5. Philosophical perspectives on possible meanings of the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬is.

Surely this approach has epistemological priority as it inquires into the metaphysical assumptions taken for granted and presupposed in the metalanguage present when we ask the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬is. Viewed

Introduction

5

philosophically and diachronically, the latter ‘What is an F?’ format of the interrogative hides an immense wealth of conceptual complexity currently unavailable in any literature on the subject . Existing research does not even hint at the fact that the whole project of asking ‘what-is-it’ depends on making an impossible decision for the sake of temporarily fi xing the meaning of whatness and essence by taking advantage of the relat ed p hilosophical assumptions present in ordinary language. This happens, eith er in ignorance or through forgetfulness of the philosophical his tory of looking for the whatness of something. Asking what something (like an ‫אלהים‬, for example) is (or was) can be called a philosophical ‘question of art’. One reason is the sense of wonder such a question can evoke. As Joseph Campbell once noted in the context of a discussion on the power of myth: Today [and even in our time and into a hundred years from now] we tend to think that scientists have all the answers. But the great ones tell us, ‘No, we haven’t got all the answers. We’re telling you how it works – but what is it?’ You strike a match, what’s fire? You can tell me about oxidation, but that doesn’t tell me a thing. (Campbell 1988: 39)

If one looks closer at literature asking the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬is in the context of the HB, it will be clear that a lot has been written, and one gets a mass of information on the general subject of divinity in ancient Israelite religion and on Yhwh in Old Testament theology. It will be equally apparent to anyone who has consistently kept the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬is in mind, and in great anticipation of an answer thereto, that none of the material provides anything of the sort in so many words (i.e. An ‫ אלהים‬is . . ..). Perhaps the distinction between description and explanation made by Nietzsche (1974: 112) states the trouble with our notion of progress in research on this topic: We say it is ‘explanation’ but it is only in ‘description’ that we are in advance of the older stages of knowledge and science. We describe better we explain just as little as our predecessors.

But before faulting Hebrew Bible scholars for losing track of what they were trying to say, perhaps this state of affairs can be accounted for and

6

What Is a God?

might make more sense once the elusiveness of the precise meaning of what is being asked is considered more closely. For linguistic, literary, historical, social-scientific and theological perspectives either do not have a framework to deal with the problem directly or they must borrow one from the discipline that we will enlist in our quest to try and make sense of what, though prima facie appearing as unproblematic, is in fact complicated to an extent hitherto unappreciated. Enter philosophy as the auxiliary discipline. Here questions of the form ‘What is X?’ (or ‘What is an F?’) are connected to some of the most popular metaphysical interests in the history of that subject. In ontology in particular, such a structured interrogative is often associated with terms such as ‘whatness’ (‘quiddity’) and ‘essence’. As for the relationship between these two terms, the following may be noted as a preliminary remark on the concept of essence: The concept originates with Aristotle, who used the Greek expression to ti ên einai (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, literally meaning ‘the what it was to be’ and corresponding to the scholastic term ‘quiddity’) or sometimes the shorter phrase to ti esti (τὸ τί ἐστι, literally meaning ‘the what it is’ and corresponding to the scholastic term ‘haecceity’) for the same idea. (Fine 1994: 1)

However, as Bird (2009: 497) reminds us: What it is to possess a property essentially is a matter of debate.

Kelly (1997: 53) further reminds us how, to a large extent, the concept of essence has, however, fallen into disuse today not only because of the fulminations of Nietzsche. The notion, common to Greek and mediaeval philosophy, that things are what they are by virtue of their participation in some essential nature, is foreign to modern science, which abjures such qualitative analysis. For moderns, to know the nature of things is not to know their essence at all.

Against this backdrop, innumerable references to the essential nature or properties of divinity (or even Yhwh) can be found within the discourse of biblical theology and the study of ancient Israelite religion. As Gowan (1994: ix) shrewdly observed, here one frequently encounters what appears to be

Introduction

7

the traditional Christian method of distilling the Bible’s information into a list of “attributes,” a kind of ‘essence of divinity . . .’

Indeed, the following examples from the works of some prominent HB scholars should suffice as a small but eye-opening demonstration of such a claim (with the relevant terms being italicized for effect). 1. Since these body parts and bodily phenomena are images of qualities, the description of Jahweh’s appearance is, really, a description of his essence, of his spiritual personality as it is accessible to men. (Boman 1960: 106) 2. He learns about the nature of God by reasoning a posteriori from the standards and usages of law and cult . . . from the events in history . . . in short, from his daily experience of the rule of God. By this means he comprehends the divine essence much more accurately than he would from a number of abstract concepts. The result is that the formation of such concepts in the OT lags far behind . . . (Eichrodt 1961: 33) 3. It makes a difference whether one makes from God’s hiddenness a statement of being, such that it belongs to God’s essence, that he is a deus absconditus, or whether one can speak of the possibility of God to hide him from a person. (Westermann 1982: 172) 4. The name betrays something of the essential character of the deity, and declares his characteristics or the place of his appearance. (Schmidt 1983: 57) 5. One of the most basic issues related to the understanding of metaphor is the relation between metaphor and essential defi nition. On the one hand, there is the danger of positing no real essential relationship between the metaphor and God . . . the most natural procedure is to take the metaphor as adumbrating an essential character, which is analogous to the metaphoric vehicle, and not contrary to it. (Fretheim 1984: 7–8) 6. When the tribes, then, in the course of further historical developments suddenly experienced Yahweh’s power also in the sacral form of wars, that was a new revelation of his essence. (Von Rad 1991: 73) 7. . . . those rare attempts within the Bible to reflect on God’s essential nature, specifically Exod. 34: 6–7; Gen. 18: 22–33; Job 1–2; and Jonah 4.4. (Crenshaw 1995: 192)

8

What Is a God?

8. The poet can speak of the god that is to come only in relation to the departed gods and through the intermediary concepts of divinity and the holy: “Only from the essence of the holy can the essence of divinity be thought. These sentences can also stand in a book of ancient Near Eastern ontology!” (Knierim 1995: 192) 9. Thus YHWH has spoken to the prophets through what happened to them . . . Having to do with a state of affairs, the event becomes the essence of YHWH’s reality. (Preuss 1996: 74) 10. . . . regarded the reproductive member as the divine aspect of humans and, therefore, saw the essence of deity in generation . . . (Gunkel 1997: 149) 11. The very point of difference between humans and gods, then, is accidental rather than essential; it was not there from the beginning. (Van der Toorn 1999: 360) 12. God’s qodesh is his essence, that by which he swears. (Ringgren 2003: 541) 13. . . . the description of God’s essential character in Deut 10 vv. 14–15 moves from creation to history. (Miller 2003: 301) 14. The name of God, which like his glory and his face are vehicles of his essential nature, is defined in terms of his compassionate acts of mercy. (Childs 2004: 596) 15. . . . experienced immediacy to God in temple metaphors: the heart and the soul are now the place where God dwells, in the midst of a hostile world (explication of the “essence” of Yhwh in spatial categories). (Hossfeld and Zenger 2005: 3) 16. . . .was wholly incompatible with Yahweh’s essential character. (Mowinckel 2006: 136) 17. All the perfections of God’s freedom and therefore of his love, and therefore the one whole divine essence, can and must be recognized by saying that God is constant. (Goldingay 2006: 89) 18. . . . the kings were . . . representatives of the people before God’s judgement; sons of God, sharers in the divine essence. (Thompson 2007: 323) 19. In such a world, there is little reason to decide whether shem was the very essence of God, a local manifestation of God, or a hypostasis that overlapped with God while retaining a distinct nature. (Sommer 2009: 62)

Introduction

9

20. The words of verses 6–7 provide a summary from the essential characteristics of YHWH as Lord of the covenant. (Brueggemann 2010: n.p.) 21. If “oneness” becomes an essential feature of the deity, what might this mean in comparative terms? (Smith 2010: 146) 22. Like a divine statue, yet unlike the ark, the glory seems to be a metonymn that captures some of the divine essence. (Hundley 2011: 59) 23. In the case of holiness, which is the quintessential quality of divinity (Clines 2015: n.p.). Many more related examples from these and other HB scholars could be cited. All attest to the popularity of a fuzzy essentialist theological rhetoric that has become an unquestioned part and parcel of our metalanguage. To be sure, the different authors do not attach the same nuance to the concept, often use it descriptively rather than normatively, and for the most part do not assume it to function in a technical sense. Yet it is hard to believe that biblical scholars with a theological background are not somehow alluding to ‘essence’ in a systematic theological (and therewith ‘philosophical’) sense. In response to what can only be described as an understandable conceptual complacency, this study invites the reader back into the void of constructive chaos before connotative creation, where we shall purposefully and playfully look at the intoxicating complexity that has now become attached to asking the metatheistic question of what, according to the HB, an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be. In this regard, two related issues will constitute the overlapping foci of this study, namely: 1. The diversity and complexity of ontological perspectives on the question of what something is (and hypothetically applied to ‫ אלהים‬as a common name in the HB); 2. The diversity and complexity of philosophical perspectives on ‘essence’ as a technical term in metaphysics (and in experimental relation to the whatness of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB). In other words, this study is not another attempt at trying to answer the questions of what an ‫ אלהים‬was or what the HB (as a whole or in a given context) assumed to be its essential properties. Rather, as an experimental metatheoretical philosophical approach it is interested only in creating awareness

10

What Is a God?

of the need for a more nuanced way of pre-constructing the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬is. Consisting of a brief histor y of (anti- )metaphysical theories of whatness and essence from Socrates to Derrida, the relevant ideas are adapted and reapplied to the use of ‫ אלהים‬as common noun in the HB purely for the sake of the argument.

Assumptions and outline of the study The discussion to follow will feature a selection, adoption and adaptation of parts of the writings of prominent Western philosophers who have been stereotypically associated with the history of clarifying, justifying and criticizing the concepts of whatness and essence in logic, ontology and metaphysics. Given, however, the tense relations between HB studies and Philosophy in the past, the discussion to follow will proceed only after a number of disclaimers have been made. 3. This study is not primarily concerned with concepts of whatness and essence in the HB itself but with the philosophical history behind their use in our scholarly metalanguage. 4. It is not assumed that the HB is a philosophical text in the sense of second-order self-critical concerns with issues in Western metaphysics but that it does contain implicit folk-metaphysical assumptions related to aspects of the world in the text. 5. It is not assumed that the HB necessarily contains any explicit or clear answer to the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be in relation to the notion of divine essences. It is also not assumed that, if there is an answer, there is only one answer and, in case there are many, that they cohere. Any answers present may not be amenable to any of the discussed philosophical points of view, irrespective of whether the reader considers a particular philosophical perspective to be true/false, however the concepts happen to be understood. 6. It is not taken for granted that questions of the form ‘What is an X?’ are either grammatically meaningful or meaningless in the practice of philosophy proper.

Introduction

11

7. It is also not assumed that metaphysics in general, and whatness and essence in particular, denote defensible/illegitimate jargon, whether in the context of HB studies or of philosophy proper. 8. It is not assumed that the philosophical perspectives of each chapter, adopted for the sake of the argument and the selections of ideas reapplied therefrom, do justice to all the intricacies of philosophical reflection on the concept of essence, whether with reference to the particular philosopher or to biblical data quoted in relation thereto. 9. It is not assumed that the particular philosophical ideas were ever intended for the use to which they are put to here (hence ‘Socratic’, instead of Socrates’s, etc.). 10. It is not assumed that the philosophers discussed encompass the entire range of philosophical perspectives on whatness and essence possible, or that they are adequately representative of human thinking on the chosen topics in terms of gender, race, culture, history and geography. 11. It is not assumed that the views discussed in later chapters in this book are better than those of earlier ones (or vice versa). 12. It is not assumed that any particular text used as illustration from the HB does justice to all the details of the HB’s concepts of and contexts for the word ‘‫’אלהים‬. 13. It is not assumed that the interpretations of either the philosophical or biblical texts adopted are the only ones possible or even the best available. 14. It is not assumed that the texts quoted from the HB as illustrations are ‘proof-texts’ that function as some sort of justification for the particular point of view put forward in the chapter; rather, the philosophical perspective constructed to act as context is merely seen as potentially highlighting (or as differing from) some or other related aspect of a part of what might be the relevant folk-metaphysical assumptions of the given passage, irrespective of its historical and literary contexts. 15. It is not assumed that, in discussing possible ways of constructing the scholarly question of what an ‫ אלהים‬was, it is required to provide in-depth exegetical commentary on the related biblical data used as illustration. 16. It is not necessary for revealing some of the possible metaphysical complexities involved in asking the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬is to engage in-depth with related biblical scholarship, the intention of which was to provide some sort of direct or indirect answer thereto.

12

What Is a God?

17. It is not assumed that related scholarly research is hereby rendered necessarily presumptuous, meaningless, problematic or outdated – on the contrary, a lot of the findings of earlier research are taken for granted and it goes without saying so that this study is at best seen supplementary thereto, rather than contradictory. 18. It is not assumed necessary for a study of this type to offer normative guidance to biblical scholars or philosophers (whether metaphysicians or philosophers of religion) as to what they, given the various hypothetical perspectives reconstructed here, should do as a result when attempting to answer the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬actually is. 19. It is not assumed to be necessary for the purpose of complicating the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬is to also answer it; the point is to offer a prolegomenon to all future research involving the question by creating awareness for a more nuanced and open-ended way of conceiving and constructing the research problem. As regards the Hebrew terminology, this study will use the word ‘‫’אלהים‬ instead of ‘god’ to indicate awareness of differences in associative meaning and extension, both of which tend to get lost in translation. As we saw earlier, the Hebrew word ‘‫ ’אלהים‬in the HB can refer to more phenomena than the English word ‘god’ can. Also, ‘‫ ’אלהים‬is chosen over other related terms like ‘‫ ’אל‬and ‘‫( ’אלוה‬except in the quoting of texts from the HB where the latter alternatives occur in the generic sense) only because of a scholarly tradition of discussi ng the nature of generic deity specifically under ‘‫’אלהים‬. A good example of this tendency can be found in biblical- theological dictionaries and related encyclopedias (see THAT, TDOT, DDD, etc.). In sum the n, this study will be exclusively concer ned with multiplying purely expe rimental perspectives on hypothetical po ssibilities of meaning that can be attached (in theory) to the structure o f the question of what, according to the Hebrew Bible, an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be. In trying to make sense of what could be meant by asking this question in various contexts from the history of related philosophical reflection (and therewith wondering what in particular one is actually supposed to be looking for with reference to the HB) the reader is hereby enabled to ponder the metaphysical baggage inherent in the metalanguage of scholars of Israelite religion and Old Testament theology.

2

Whatness and a Socratic Definition of ‫אלהים‬-ness via Common Properties

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? Socrates (470–399 BCE), a largely fictional character in some of Plato’s writings, was famous for asking ‘What is X?’ questions. Of interest was a variety of abstract concepts, mostly of an ethical or epistemological nature. Examples include discussions on the nature of knowledge (in Plato [Th eaet]), piety (in Plato [Euphr.]), temperance (in Plato [Charm]) justice (in Plato [Rep. I]), courage (in Plato [Lach]), virtue (in Plato [Men]), friendship (in Plato [Lys.]), beauty (in Plato [Hipp. I]) and so on. What some philosophers call the ‘Socratic method’ (or elenchus) was an attempt to answer queries of the form ‘What is X-ness?’ (The ‘-ness’ part denotes a ‘universal’ or ‘abstract object’, more on which will be said below). Someone would be using a certain word and Socrates would claim to be interested in what is meant thereby. A dialogue aimed at discovering a adequate definition of the word or concept under consideration followed. These dialogues show Socrates asking a series of questions and posing possible answers via a dialectical process of sorts. In looking for a definition, however, Socrates is not just looking for a lexical explanation. Rather, he is inquiring as to the essential properties of a thing, with all instances of the thing having it in common. We might say Socrates was looking for an ‘intensional’ definition, that is, specifying individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being that thing. However, since Socrates is always able to identify counterexamples to the definitions

14

What Is a God?

offered, the exchanges finish open-ended with all parties unable to answer the ‘What is X-ness?’ question with which Socrates started out with. Adopting a nd adapting a Socratic point of view in this chapter, we may ask whether some texts of the HB assumed some sort of implied intensional definitions as to what ‫אלהים‬- ness was. Clearly no explicit definition of this type exists in the HB where a text would simply say an ‫ אלהים‬is P (where P denotes essential, unique and common properties of all things called ‫)אלהים‬. Moreover, the HB does not have a separate word for ‘divinity’ as abstraction. And yet surely it was taken for granted that it is known what an ‫ אלהים‬was, in some sense of ‘whatness’. For otherwise, as Socrates would point out, no one could have assumed to know, of any given thing, whether it was in fact an ‫ אלהים‬or not (cf. Lys. 223a). For instance, it seems meaningless to claim that Yhwh is an ‫ אלהים‬without also presupposing some implied idea as to what makes an ‫ אלהים‬what it is an d what something had to be to be called such. Especially, confessional a nd polemic texts of the HB stating that something is or is not an ‫ אלהים‬appear to have presupposed some unformulated answers to the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬was. For any affirmation or denial on the subject to make sense requires some idea of what it meant to call something an ‫אלהים‬ (cf. Hipp. I 304e). Also with regard to the properties of an ‫אלהים‬, if the texts of the HB did not pres up pose presumed knowledge of what ‫אלהים‬- ness is, it would not have made sense to claim to know that ‫אלהים‬- ness itself involved any of the particular properties it was commonly associated with (cf. Rep. I 354b). In other words, knowing what ‫אלהים‬- ness is appears to be presupposed in taking for granted that if something is an ‫ אלהים‬it is, for example, holy, powerful, immortal, et cetera (cf. Men. 71a-b). The sam e goes for typical actions an d dispositions of an ‫אלהים‬. If the texts of the HB did not assume knowledge of what an ‫ אלהים‬is, it would not have made sense to talk meaningfully about particular events involving it as agent (cf. Lach. 190b- c). Some knowing of what ‫אלהים‬- ness is (i.e. knowing an implied Socratic definition of ‫אלהים‬- ness) even seems to be required for assuming it to be warranted to hold the kind of very specific beliefs about the ‘divine condition’ (and regarding ‘innate’ or ‘instinctual’ behaviour among

Whatness and a Socratic Definition of ‫אלהים‬-ness

15

things called ‫ )אלהים‬that the HB seems to do. This despite the fact that we have little if any clear access to what exactly different texts in the HB might have assumed as being conditions of adequacy with regard to defining ‫אלהים‬ as common noun. The fact of the matter is that it seems impossible to answer the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be by way of specifying Socratic properties. Thus a Socratic view would not be satisfied with the noting of a few important ‘attributes of divinity’, such as size and strength, bodiliness and gender, immortality, and holiness (cf. Smith 2001: part II). Why not? Simply because some of the things called ‫ אלהים‬in the HB are likely to lack one or more of these characteristics. Also, texts that do list typical properties of an ‫אלהים‬ often have other properties in view (cf. the next chapter). In other words, despite the fact that the HB must have contained assumptions about what an ‫ אלהים‬is, there are no attempts at definitions of the type S =df P where S is the subject and P is a predicate specifying an essential property assumed to make an ‫ אלהים‬what it was. The closest the biblical texts come to ex pl icit propositional statements about whatness are found in Biblical Hebrew personal names of the form ‘My ‫ אל‬is (an) x’. Yet even here we are dealing only with quasi- definitional structures. Consider in this regard the following examples, all of which prima facie appear to be an answer to the question ‘What is your ‫’?אלהים‬ 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

‫‘ – אליאב‬My god is (a) father’ (see Num. 1.9; 1 Chron. 6.12) ‫‘ – אלימלך‬My god is (a) king’ (see Ruth 1.2) ‫‘ – אליעם‬My god is (a) kinsman’ (see 2 Sam. 11.3) ‫‘ – אלישבע‬My god is (an) oath (see Exod. 6.23) ‫‘ – אלידע‬My god is knowledge’ (see 2 Sam. 5.16; 1 Chron. 3.8) ‫‘ – אליעיני‬My god is my eyes’ (see 1 Chron. 26.3) ‫‘ – אליפז‬My god is fine gold’ (see Gen. 36.4) ‫‘ – אליחרף‬My god is winter’ (see 1 Kgs 4.3) ‫‘ – אליעזר‬My god is help’ (see Gen. 15.2) ‫‘ – אליפלט‬My god is deliverance’ (see 2 Sam. 5.16) ‫‘ – אליצפן‬My god is protection’ (see Num. 3.30) ‫‘ – אלישוע‬My god is salvation’ (see 2 Sam. 5.15) ‫‘ – אליצור‬My god is (a) rock’ (see Num. 1.5)

16

What Is a God?

Clearly, while appearing to say what an ‫ אלהים‬is, these apparent identity statements do not tell us what an ‫ אלהים‬is in any essential way but only express a notable property, function or relation of a particular ‫ אלהים‬at a given time. And while in the chapters to come we shall look at more texts with contents related to the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬was, it can safely be concluded that nowhere does the HB say what an ‫ אלהים‬is in a way that would satisfy Socrates’s demands. These can now be summed up to include the following: 1. There was in fact assumed to be such a thing as ‫אלהים‬-ness (roughly ‘divinity’ as opposed to simply ‘a god’) (cf. Protagoras Plato [Prot.] 330c-d, 332a, c; see also Hipp. I 287c). 2. The ‫אלהים‬-ness is something that all and only ‫ אלהים‬things have in common (cf. Euphr. 5d; Lach. 191e, 192b; Men. 73c, 75a; Hipp. I 300a-b). 3. If the ‫אלהים‬-ness is (correctly defined as) the something involving the properties P1…Pn, then ‫אלהים‬-ness and P1…Pn are everywhere intersubstitutable, that is, if something has properties P1…Pn it is an ‫אלהים‬, and if something is an ‫ אלהים‬it is a thing with properties P1…Pn (cf. Euphr. 7a-8b, and 9d-11a). 4. This ‫אלהים‬-ness was assumed to make ‫ אלהים‬things what they are, that is, ‫( אלהים‬cf. Euphr. 6d; Prot. 332a-c, 360c; Gorgias Plato [Gorg.] 520d; Hipp. I 287c, 292c-d, 294a-b, Men. 72c). 5. The ‫אלהים‬-ness must itself be ‫אלהים‬-ness (cf. Prot. 330c, 330e; Hipp. I 288c, 292e). 6. This ‫ אלהים‬-ness is one (thing) (cf. Euphr. 6d-e; Prot. 333b; Men. 72c). In the end, however, it is not just a Socratic perspective that sets impossible demands for the HB. It is also the HB, the contents of which set impossible complexity before a Socratic perspective. At least four primary reasons come to mind why the HB is an impossible source of Socratic definitions: 1. Different texts in the HB presuppose different extensions for generic ‫אלהים‬. 2. Different texts in the HB presuppose different intensions for generic ‫אלהים‬. 3. Most texts never make explicit their entire assumed extensions of generic ‫אלהים‬. 4. No text either specifies or clarifies all the assumed essential properties of generic ‫אלהים‬.

Whatness and a Socratic Definition of ‫אלהים‬-ness

17

If one cannot specify the precise extensions and intensions of the word ‫אלהים‬, a Socratic definition is out of the question. The HB is conceptually a rather diverse collection and always rather vague when it comes to what an ‫ אלהים‬is in terms of what was assumed to be essential properties. So while it might seem interesting to adopt such a Socratic approach to the concept of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, any such investigation is likely to end, like Plato’s dialogues, inconclusively.

3

Whatness and a Platonist Perspective on ‫אלהים‬-ness as Form/Universal

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? The next perspective, based on the ideas of Plato (424– 348 BCE), might wish to explain why Socratic ‘What is X?’-questions with reference to ‫אלהים‬ness in the HB end in vain. For one, on Plato’s account, in asking what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be, merely discovering common properties among all things called ‫אלהים‬, even if it was possible with reference to the HB (which it is not), would be unreliable as an answer to the question of essence. Anot her problem, at least according to some interpretations of a Platonist point of view, is that any inquiry seeking to answer the question of ‘what an ‫ אלהים‬is’ will be ultimately founded on an epistemological paradox (also called ‘Meno’s paradox’; see Men 80d-e). But what exactly is the problem here? Reapplied to the present study, what it boils down to is that, either one already knows the answer or Socratic definition of what the HB assumed an ‫ אלהים‬to be. This would mean scholarly inquiry is unnecessary. Or, alternatively, one does not already know what an ‫ אלהים‬according to the HB is in a way that satisfies all Socratic identity conditions. This in turn would mean that it is impossible to guarantee a correct Socratic definition of ‫אלהים‬- ness. One cannot compare one’s interpretation of what an ‫ אלהים‬is with what the texts suggest it actually is since any attempt to state the latter state of affairs will always be but one more interpretation. In re sponse to this problem, a Plato nis t perspective might wish to call attent ion to the so- called Theory of Recollection (see Phaedo Plato [Phdo] 65a-67a and 72e-78b). Reapplied to our present concerns, we can point to the

20

What Is a God?

fact that characters in the HB are depicted as able to recognize any instance of an ‫אלהים‬. Such is the case, even though they never attempt to say what it is. On a Platonist account, this is possible from knowing the essence of an ‫אלהים‬ intuitively (i.e. from birth). Using this idea purely for the sake of argument in an experimental context, we can offer a Platonist explanation of the assumed meaningful use of ‘‫’אלהים‬ as common noun in the HB’s constructions of intercultural communication. Everyone in biblical narratives is usually assumed to share the same generic concept (‘‫)’אלהים‬, despite often worshipping very different particular ‫ אלהים‬or ascribing divinit y to non- divine entities. Consider the following examples from various literary and historical contexts: 1. You will be like ‫אלהים‬, those who know good and evil. (Gen. 3.5) 2. See now that I, even I, am it, and there is no ‫ אלהים‬beside me; I kill and I make alive; I wound and I heal; and there is none that can deliver out of my hand. (Deut. 32.39) 3. If he is an ‫אלהים‬, let him contend for himself, because his altar has been pulled down. (Judg. 6.31) 4. And at noon Eli’jah mocked them, saying, ‘Cry aloud, for he is an ‫ ;אלהים‬either he is musing, or he has gone aside, or he is on a journey, or perhaps he is asleep and must be awakened’. (1 Kgs 18.27) 5. The Egyptians are humans and not ‫אלהים‬, and their horses are flesh and not spirit. (Isa. 31.3) 6. Tell us the signs of what will come after and make (them) known because you are ‫אלהים‬. (Isa. 41.23) 7. Can man make for himself ‫ ?אלהים‬Such are no ‫( !אלהים‬Jer. 16.20) 8. You have said, ‘I am an ‫אל‬, I sit in the seat of the ‫אלהים‬, in the heart of the seas’, yet you are but a man, and no ‫אל‬, though you consider yourself as wise as an ‫אלהים‬. (Ezek. 28.2) 9. It is the glory of ‫ אלהים‬to conceal things, but the glory of kings is to search things out. (Prov. 25.2) 10. The thing that the king asks is difficult, and none can show it to the king except the ‫ אלהים‬whose dwelling is not with flesh. (Dan. 2.11) 11. He answered, ‘But I see four men loose, walking in the midst of the fire, and they are not hurt; and the appearance of the fourth is like a son of the ‫אלהים‬.’ (Dan. 2.25)

Whatness and a Platonist Perspective on ‫אלהים‬-ness

21

In each of these contexts we find implied some or other typical properties of a n ‫( אלהים‬at least according to the narrator, or the particular character who is speaking). This is the case even if different texts may contradict each other, either in terms of what they assumed about the extension and intension of the generic term, or in terms of the properties they emphasize. So what is lacking in the HB is not assumed knowledge of what an ‫ אלהים‬is but instead an explicit and exhaustive systematic account thereof. Though the characters were thought to possess the concept of an ‫אלהים‬, it was not felt necessary to produce a proposition that expressed some sort of abstracted essence. But what is a Platonic ‘essence’ to which all generic uses of the word ‘‘‫’’אלהים‬ in the HB might supposedly refer? In Plato’s translated jargon, we may call this the ‘Form’ of ‫אלהים‬. The Form of ‫ אלהים‬can be seen as what the generic term alludes to in as much as ‘‫ ’אלהים‬is constructed as a so-called universal (as opposed to a ‘particular’). ‘Form’ as universal in this context does not refer to an ‫’אלהים‬s bodily figure, the highest god of monotheism, or merely a mental abstraction from particulars. ‘Form’ is philosophically similar to ‘Idea’, although as a technical term related to ‘essence’ neither are identical with the English equivalents. In the HB itself, the use of the concept of ‘form’ (ּ‫ )תמונה‬is at times mysterious and fuzzy, but does not seem to be Platonist in reference: 1. With him I speak mouth to mouth, clearly, and not in dark speech; and he beholds the form of Yhwh. (Num. 12.8) 2. He spoke to you out of the midst of the fire; you heard the sound of words, but saw no form; there was only a voice. (Deut. 4.12) 3. Beware lest you act corruptly by making a graven image for yourselves, in the form of any figure, the likeness of male or female. (Deut. 4.16) 4. It stood still, but I could not discern its appearance. A form was before my eyes; there was silence, then I heard a voice. (Job 4.16) 5. As for me, I shall behold thy face in righteousness; when I awake, I shall be satisfied with beholding your form. (Ps. 17.15) 6. And above the firmament over their heads there was the likeness of a throne, in appearance like sapphire; and seated above the likeness of a throne was a likeness as it were of a human form. (Ezek. 1.26)

22

What Is a God?

Clearly though these texts all in their own way speak of something related to the supposed ‘form’ of a(n) (particular) ‫אלהים‬, the English word ‘form’ used in each biblical passage appears to denote physical outline, thereby giving it a more Aristotelian rather than Platonic sense (see next chapter). This does not mean, however, that the presence of the Platonic concept is not presupposed in some texts’ use of generic ‫ אלהים‬in an altogether different way. Plato’s reapplied metaphysics is here taken to imply that the ‘Form’ of ‫ אלהים‬can be seen as something like the ‘archetype’ for – or ultimate origin of – all possible instances of things called ‫ אלהים‬in the HB (cf. Phdo. 65d4–66a3). This is meant both conceptually and historically. Plato’s views on essence does seem to offer one kind of possible solution to the so- called Problem of the One (word) and the Many. The question here is whether a text in the HB assumed the existence of a perfect original essence of ‫ אלהים‬to which all representations of an ‫ אלהים‬correspond to in a greater or lesser way. In this regard, as in Plato’s metaphysics, some texts of the HB (especially polemical and confessional ones) do presuppose that knowing what an ‫ אלהים‬is involved knowing whether it was a good example of the ideal of what it was thought to mean to be an ‫אלהים‬. This in turn would make sense of several anomalies usually encountered in the use of ‫ אלהים‬as common noun versus its use as proper name for Yhwh: 1. An entity such as Yhwh was not only called ‫( אלהים‬as proper name) but could also be taxonomically classified as being an ‫( אלהים‬as common name). 2. Was Yhwh called an ‫ אלהים‬because Yhwh’s nature was thought to adequately conform to what an ‫ אלהים‬was ideally assumed to be like? If so, can it be said that in such cases the text presupposes the notion of ‫ אלהים‬as archetype (as opposed to proxytype?). How else could one know that Yhwh is an ‫ אלהים‬to begin with? 3. In some texts of the HB, there appears to be the need to assert that Yhwh (as opposed to another ‫ )אלהים‬just is ‫ ;אלהים‬a claim which, from the perspective of a Platonist metaphysics was in fact a depersonification of earlier religious metaphysics, might be interpreted to mean that Yhwh was assumed to most fully participate in something analogous to the general ‘Form’ of ‫אלהים‬-ness.

Whatness and a Platonist Perspective on ‫אלהים‬-ness

23

4. Yhwh is also in some texts said to be a very specific kind of ‫אלהים‬, thus assuming other kinds of ‫ אלהים‬are in theory conceivable; this, in turn, once more confirms that the nature of generic ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be inclusive of – yet more extensive than – the nature of Yhwh. Every representation of Yhwh was assumed to involve an ‫אלהים‬, but not every representation of an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to involve an instance of Yhwh. 5. A Platonist perspective might also note that from the perspective of the HB as a whole Yhwh could be constructed in a plurality of ways, often with contradictory profiles (with different ‘essential’ properties). Yet all of them could be described with ‫ אלהים‬as common noun. This suggests that the latter was a single thing that nevertheless could be a property (to be an ‫ )אלהים‬that allowed for diversity and complexity among those entities that instantiated it. 6. There are many examples of texts in the HB referring to an ‫ אלהים‬in the generic sense, yet in doing so do not have in mind any particular ‫אלהים‬ but instead the idea of an ‫ אלהים‬as abstract object. From a Platonist perspective this presupposes an ideal Form (e.g. Isa. 43.10c) 7. Yhwh is depicted in some texts of the HB as prototypical of what it meant to be an ‫אלהים‬, but also as atypical in others (incomparability motifs; particular contrastive or exhortative properties), but never as archetypical (hence always being classified folk-taxonomically as an ‫ אלהים‬in the generic sense, even in monotheistic contexts). 8. The previous point is reinforced by the way in which some entities are described as being no ‫אלהים‬. This in turn could not refer to the obvious fact that they were not Yhwh or exactly like him. Rather, the problem was that they were seen as not conforming to what was taken for granted as the ideal (or the minimum) identity conditions for something to be classified as a real ‫אלהים‬. 9. Some entities in the HB that are called ‫ אלהים‬have very little (if anything) in common with Yhwh (or each other). From a Platonist perspective, this could be explained by postulating the existence of the Form ‫( אלהים‬as Universal), distinct from all particular ‫( אלהים‬including Yhwh). The ‫ אלהים‬in the text have in common the common name ‫אלהים‬ suggesting they all participate in the Idea. The latter can thus be seen as the unifying factor and that which warranted the classification of these things as ‫אלהים‬, without thereby committing the fallacy of equivocation. If this is correct, the HB customarily hypothesizes a single Form in each

24

What Is a God?

context’s implied collection of the many things to which it applies the same name (cf. Rep. 596a) 10. Even entities without vital ‫ אלהים‬properties (e.g. foreign idols) could be called ‫אלהים‬, thus implying that they participated in something like the Form ‫אלהים‬, but only as shadows and without being. In sum, for the entire set of things whose members are called ‫אלהים‬, there is assumed to be a Form ‫אלהים‬. A Platonist view therefore, contrary to stereotypes, may easily handle actual plurality and change in conceptions of what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be. This despite the fact that throughout Plato’s dialogues, the Form is indeed said to be one (cf. Phdo. 78b-84b), yet not to be equated with any one of the instances that participate in it. Applied to our context, it is one, not in the monotheistic sense of a single ‫ אלהים‬of which all ot hers (including Yhwh) are manifestations (as in some Mesopotamian multiple manifestation theologies of Marduk, e.g.) but as analogous to a proverbia l blueprint for the formation of one or more ‫אלהים‬. If the worship of Yhwh as an ‫ אלהים‬began at some point, it presupposes prior possession of the generic concept ‫אלהים‬. It is why entities like Yhwh is called an ‫ אלהים‬and not something else. In Plato, the Form of ‫ אלהים‬can also be translated as the essence of an ‫אלהים‬ in the HB. It also refers to the basic ‘whatness’ of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. Prima facie , it would also appear that this Form of ‫ אלהים‬is also an object corresponding to a Socratic definition. However, on Plato’s account such a ‘definition’ would only be correct if (and only if) it accurately described the Form behind all ‫אלהים‬, rather than seeking to describe any alleged essential or common properties of any of the individual things called ‫ אלהים‬in particular texts of the HB. Thu s , where a Platonist perspective differs from a Socratic one in the que st for a definition of ‫ אלהים‬is that the former involves postulating an ‫ אל ה י ם‬as transcendental object (which is not the same as an ‫ אלהים‬being transcendent). In other words, at least from a Platonist point of view, an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is whatever ‘participates’ in some way in the Form ‫אלהים‬. This Form’s extension – the nature of generic ‫ – אלהים‬is the same as that of the common noun, thus being inclusive of, but greater than, all things so called.

Whatness and a Platonist Perspective on ‫אלהים‬-ness

25

Epistemologically speaking, a Platonist definition of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is therefore not out of reach. The reason for such optimism is, as was hinted at earlier, the presumed presence of an innate notion of some standard of cl a s sification for being an ‫אלהים‬, and to wh ich things called ‫ אלהים‬must conform to be known as being ‫ אלהים‬to begin with. This in turn implies that a linguistic investigation into the common usage of the word ‘‫’אלהים‬ in the HB will in no way be a reliable guide to discerning the true nature of a n ‫אלהים‬. Only attention to the unambigu ous Form of generic ‘‫אלהים‬ will lead to real ‘knowledge’ of what an ‫ אלהים‬is, as opposed to arriving at mere ‘opinions’, inherently present in attempts seeking to merely restate the conceptual diversity.

4

Whatness and Aristotelian Essentialism about an ‫ אלהים‬as Secondary Substance

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? Whereas from our Platonist perspective generic ‫אלהים‬- ness could be seen as a ‘Form’ separate from and more real than variable entities called ‫אלהים‬, for Aristotle (384–322 BCE), in as much as generic ‫ אלהים‬denoted a universal, it was instantiated only in particulars themselves. Interestingly, he once wrote the following: The things about which we inquire are equal in number to the things we understand. We inquire about four things:  the fact, the reason why, if something is, what something is. (Posterior Analytics [Aristotle] APo. II 1, 89b23–25[emphasis mine])

Restated in the language of the present study, given that something called an ‫ אלהים‬is assumed to exist in the world of the text, we can now go on to inve s tigate its nature, that is, what it is. In fact, Aristotle himself actually asked the very question that concerns us, even if his interest did not lie with the concept of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB: Then what is a god? Or what is a man? (APo. II 1, 89b34–35)

Though also looking for a definition of sorts, the ‘What is X?’ question here is approached differently than in the arguments of Plato’s Socrates. In our adapted Aristotelian view we may say that there is a huge difference between saying why, according to the HB, something was assumed to be an ‫אלהים‬, and what, according to the HB, an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be. It is the why-question

28

What Is a God?

here that in Aristotle better approximates Socrates’s whatness-question. That is, one will answer the question of why something in the HB was called an ‫ אלהים‬by referring to the way in which it instantiates the essential properties of what in Aristotelian jargon might be called its genus (a taxonomic rank more general than species). F o r example, in contrast to the Platonist view adopted in the previous chapter, asking why Yhwh was called an ‫ אלהים‬here involves pointing to the fact that, on the assumption that P1-Pn are essential properties of the ‫ אלהים‬as genus in the HB, because Yhwh instantiates P1-Pn, it follows necessarily that Yhwh can be classified as being an ‫אלהים‬. Looking at the various writings of Aristotle, however, in asking what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be, an Aristotelian perspective becomes a bit more complicated. For one, it is de eply essentialist and offers a refined number of ways of asking what-is-it questions, each with a subtle difference in nuance (cf. Aristotle Apo 83a7; Top. 141b35; Phys. 190a17, 201a18–21; Gen. et Corr. 319b4; Met. 1003b24; EN 1102a30, 1130a12–13). These concern the following varieties of expressing whatness: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

to ti esti (the what an ‫ אלהים‬is); to einai (what being an ‫ אלהים‬is); ousia (what the being of an ‫ אלהים‬is); hoper esti (precisely what an ‫ אלהים‬is); to ti ên einai (the what it was to be an ‫)אלהים‬.

Th e idea of question (5) might be take n as being an Aristotelian perspective’s favourite manner of inquiring about the essence of generic ‫אלהים‬. It can also be restated as the question of what was assumed to make an ‫ אל הים‬what it is like. In speaking t his way, and like its predecessors, our Ar i stotelian point of view presupposes that if we wish to know what an ‫ אלהים‬is, we cannot be satisfied with describing transient or non-universal fe a tures of the ‫ אלהים‬as genus. Yet , neither can we rest with identifying wh a t are seen to be universal feature s of the ‫אלהים‬, as these too still do not explain why it is the way it is, or why it is at all. In other words, on Ar istotle’s terms, what we should be looking for is what makes an ‫אלהים‬ what it is by assuming that there is some property P x which all (and only)

Whatness and Aristotelian Essentialism about an ‫אלהים‬

29

‫ אלהים‬have in common, and which explains all the other features that we find across the entire range of things called an ‫אלהים‬. Aristotle also recognized the existence of what can be called ‘necessary’ properties (Cat 3a21, 4a10; Top. 102a18–30, 134a5–135b6). Yet, contrary to m o dern modal definitions of essence (on which, see later), these are in Aristotelian metaphysics a residue of non-essential properties that merely follow from the essence of ‫ אלהים‬as a genus. As such they are necessary to ‫אלהים‬ even while being non-essential. What has come to be known as ‘Aristotelian e s sentialism’ may ther efore be summ arized a s follows in the context of property-theory. Px is an essential property of an ‫ אלהים‬if and only if: (1) when an ‫ אלהים‬loses Px, then an ‫ אלהים‬ceases to exist as member of the genus; (2) Px is in an objective sense an explanatorily basic feature of ‫ אלהים‬as genus. The first of the points above tells us what it means to be an ‫ אלהים‬and the s econd why something is called an ‫אלהים‬. On this view, then, what it is to be an ‫ אלהים‬is just what it always has been and always will be, whatever that may be. Accordingly, Px is what we need to identify and restate when we are trying to describe the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB (cf. APo.75a42– b2; Met. 103b1– 2, 1041a25– 32). An Aristotelian perspective thus assumes that, for a broad range of cases of entities in the HB falling under generic ‫אלהים‬, there is an essence discoverable by proper philosophical inquiry. Yet it also denies the presence of essences for ‫ אלהים‬in many states of affairs where his predecessors like Socrates and Plato were prepared to grant it. Where Aristotle agrees with those who went before is in the idea that one can indeed seek to answer whatness questions by way of a definition. However, as regards specifics he once more differed from both Socrates and Plato. Wherea s for Socrat es a definition of an ‫ אלהים‬comes in the form of its common and essentia l properties, in Aristotle it comes by specifying both its ‘genus’ and also what can be called its ‘differentia’. Thus to define Yhwh might for Aristotle be to say that ‘Yhwh’ is an ‫( אלהים‬genus) of a particular t ype, for example, living (difference). But to define ‫ אלהים‬as common noun

30

What Is a God?

means locating an even more fundamental genus (spirit?), and then identifying its particular type of difference (e.g. immortal?). As for Plato, his point of view offered division as a method for establishing definitions for ‫אלהים‬. Also known as diairesis, it refers to Plato’s later method that suggested defining an ‫ אלהים‬extensionally based on a collection of candidates repeatedly divided into two parts with one part eliminated until a suitable definition is discovered. A complementary term is merismos involving parsing or the distinguishing of parts of an ‫אלהים‬. But for Aristotle, mere division without attention to essentials would not work in as much as it assumes the very thing it is supposed to be proving. Also from the perspective of Aristotle’s Logic, the notion of the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬is linked to that of definition (horismos). Here a definition is seen as being an account (logos) of an ‫ אלהים‬that signifies an essence (cf. Top. 102a3). This, in turn, can be linked to a certain kind of predication of ‫ אלהים‬in respect of itself. In an Aristotelian point of view, what gets defined is therefore ‫אלהים‬ in th e HB as a thing (via essential predication), not ‫ אלהים‬as the common noun in Hebrew (e.g. via grammatical, etymological or other type of lexicographical analysis). An Aristotelian definition of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB will therefore not tell us the meaning of generic ‫ אלהים‬but instead what it was assumed to be, that is, to be an ‫אלהים‬. Aris totle’s notion of definition is also, like Plato’s, related to the idea of form. Yet, here it is not with reference to a transcendent universal but to the i dea of a formal ‘cause’; to the question of what, according to the HB, is it that makes an ‫ אלהים‬what it is, as opposed to something else (i.e. what is it to be an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, as opposed to being anything other). For this purpose, Aristotle used another concept that is also related to the notion of essence; one already used by Plato and other philosophers before him, namely hypokeimenon. It refers to the underlying thing or substratum that an ‫ אלהים‬is essentially, despite the differences between individual ‫אלהים‬. In Aristotle, such a substratum can be described by the Greek word ousía, and i n our context would refer to what it was assumed to be (and to continue being) an ‫אלהים‬, that is, identity over time. The Latin equivalent for this phenomenon would be substantia, that is, the substance of an ‫ אלהים‬that superficial changes do not change. These latter changes involve so-called accidental properties of ‫אלהים‬, that is, properties an ‫ אלהים‬could lack and still be

Whatness and Aristotelian Essentialism about an ‫אלהים‬

31

an ‫אלהים‬. By contrast, the substance of an ‫ אלהים‬is all about its ‘essential properties’, defined as characteristics required for something to be called an ‫אלהים‬ and which, lacking these, can no longer be meaningfully described as being that kind of thing. In this regard, the HB can be noted for its use of accidental properties of generic ‫ אלהים‬to describe Yhwh. Also called accidental predication, the following examples will have to suffice: 1. So she called the name of Yhwh who spoke to her, ‘You are an ‫ אל‬of seeing’. (Gen. 16.13) 2. An ‫ אל‬of faithfulness and without iniquity, just and right is he. (Deut. 32.4) 3. For Yhwh is an ‫ אלהים‬of knowledge, and by him actions are weighed. (1 Sam. 2.3) 4. Yhwh is an ‫ אלהים‬of the hills but he is not an ‫ אלהים‬of the valleys. (1 Kgs 20.28) 5. Our ‫ אלהים‬is an ‫ אלהים‬of salvation; and to ‫אלהים‬, Yhwh, belongs escape from death. (Ps. 68.20) 6. For Yhwh is an ‫ אלהים‬of justice; blessed are all those who wait for him. (Isa. 30.18) 7. For Yhwh is an ‫ אלהים‬of recompense, he will surely requite. (Jer. 51.56) None of these properties P1-Pn of a particular ‫( אלהים‬as seen in the structured proposition of the form ‘an ‫ אלהים‬of x’, where x = P1- Pn) offers us a proper Aristotelian definition of what it means to be an ‫ אלהים‬in general (or even of Yhwh as an ‫ אלהים‬in particular). Yhwh could lack these properties and still be Yhwh. Yhwh could lack these properties and still be an ‫אלהים‬. The v ery fact that an ‫ אלהים‬c an be so qualified presupposes th at not all ‫ אלהים‬are necessarily such. In referring to particular types of ‫אלהים‬, these descriptions all assume that other types exist (or are folk-theoretically possible) and that the ‫ אלהים‬in question (Yhwh) just so happens to be an ‫אלהים‬ of the particular type. That being said, Aristotle’s metaphysics has been taken to imply a theory of identity that would suggest that the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬is its substance (the latter also being opposed to accidents in an ‫)אלהים‬. This refers to a substratum, and not to material composition as in modern scientific English. In

32

What Is a God?

Ari stotelian terms (category theory), Yhwh would be a primary substance (who it is) and ‫ אלהים‬a secondary substance (what it is). Fr om an Aristotelian perspective, in any true affirmative predication abo ut an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, the predicate either is or is not an acceptable answer to the question ‘What is it?’ asked of the ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. Since an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB ’s definition says what it is, the definition of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is essentially predicated. However, not everything essentially predicated of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB would be a definition. A definition of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB must not only be essentially predicated of it but must also be predicat ed only of it: a definition and what it defines must ‘counterpredicate’ with one another. The notion of predication should be seen in relation to what in Aristotle’s me taphysics is called The Categories (katêgoriai). Within the latter, what is referred to by ‫ אלהים‬as common noun would be classified as being a secondary substance, while a personal ‫( אלהים‬like Yhwh) that is the reference of a proper name would be an example of a primary substance. For this purpose, consider the following reconstruction of Aristotelian categories. Traditional name 1. Substance a. Primary b. Secondary 2. Quantity 3. Quality 4. Relation 5. Location 6. Time 7. Position 8. Habit 9. Action 10. Passion

Literally

Greek

Examples

Who it is What-it-is How much What sort Related to what Where When Being situated Possession Action Undergoing

ousia tode ti ti esti poson poion pros ti pou pote keisthai echein poiein paschein

e.g. Yhwh et al. e.g. an ‫אלהים‬ e.g. height/length of an ‫אלהים‬ e.g. appearance of an ‫אלהים‬ e.g. an ‫ אלהים‬vis-à-vis the other e.g. in heaven, in the temple, etc. e.g. in the beginning, forever, etc. e.g. standing, sitting, etc. e.g. is clothed, is armed, etc. e.g. kills, saves, heals, etc. e.g. is wearied, is worshipped, etc.

In the table above, only substances relate to essence with the other nine categories being concerned with accidents in an ‫אלהים‬. The table itself represents what are perhaps the most ten basic questions one can ask about what is involved in being an ‫אלהים‬. A lso part of Aristotle’s mereology (parthood theory) of an ‫ אלהים‬would be the concept of ‘ hylomorphism’, that is, the related philosophical idea that conceives the being (ousia) of an ‫ אלהים‬as a compound of matter and form

Whatness and Aristotelian Essentialism about an ‫אלהים‬

33

(even ‘spirit’ matter). Here we are seeking to discover the co- principles constituting an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as substance. And for Aristotle, the essence of ‫ אלהים‬as hy lomorphic compound is to be found in its form, not its matter (Met. 1032b1). In sum then, from an Aristotelian perspective the essence of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is complex. Reduced to a minimum it can be seen as concerned with discovering a group of structural features and causal powers in an ‫ אלהים‬that allow it to be the type of being it is in terms of its enduring identity. This in turn contributes to its membership of a more general kind, and explains the operations of its innate nature.

5

Whatness and a Porphyrian Tree of ‫ אלהים‬as Species/Genus

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? In our use of Porphyry (234– 305 CE), Aristotle’s notion of the definition of ‫ אלהים‬is replaced by the concept of ‫ אלהים‬as species. In the HB, there is no natural/ supernatural metaphysical distinction operative. Aside from a general classification or definition, Porphyry’s Isagoge (see Porphyry 1975) allows us to distinguish between the following, showing the exact location of essence and whatness in the particular schema: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

the genus of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB; the difference of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB; the species of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB; the properties of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB; the accidents of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB; the definitions of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB.

These distinctions are useful for any neo-Platonist way of answering whatis questions, that is, via division and demonstration. The implications of this way of thinking are also far-reaching for our discussion, even if the distinctions might seem pedantic. In this regard, it would seem to be clear that in some texts of the HB the ‫ א להים‬a re indee d a species, often taxonomically classified as such vis- à- vis humans: 1. ‫ אל‬is not human, that he should lie, or a son of a human, that he should repent. (Num. 23.19a)

36

What Is a God?

2. But the vine said to them, ‘Shall I leave my wine which cheers ‫ אלהים‬and men, and go to sway over the trees?’ (Judg. 9.13) 3. And also the glory of Israel will not lie or repent; for he is not a man, that he should repent. (1 Sam. 15.29) 4. The Egyptians are human, and not an ‫ ;אל‬and their horses are flesh, and not spirit (Isa. 31.3) 5. I will not execute my fierce anger, I will not again destroy Ephraim; for I am an ‫ אל‬and not a human, the holy one in your midst . . . (Hos. 11.9) 6. Yet you have made him little less than an ‫ אלהים‬and crowned him with glory and honour. (Ps. 8.6) 7. For he is not a man, as I am, that I might answer him, that we should come to trial together. (Job 9.32) 8. And Asa cried to the Yhwh his ‫אלהים‬, ‘o Yhwh, there is none like you to help, between the mighty and the weak. Help us, o Yhwh our ‫אלהים‬, for we rely on you and in your name we have come against this multitude. O Yhwh, you are our ‫אלהים‬, let not a human prevail against you.’ (2 Chron. 14.11) In Porphyry, what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be and the essence of an ‫אלהים‬ are connected, yet are not exactly the same thing. In this metaphysics, the world or cosmos is a hierarchy of genera with their differentiae, with an ‫אלהים‬ be ing pot entially classifiable as follows in terms of categories of being, for example: Substance > powers > spirit entities > immortals > holy ones > ‫ >( אלהים‬Yhwh) The sequ ence above represents an adaptation of the so- called Tree of Porphyry, which suggests that the complete taxonomic definition of ‫ אלהים‬as a species would consist of its differentia together with the differentiae of all of the genera under which it falls. On the hypothetical branch above an ‫ אלהים‬is a holy o ne (short definition) and a holy, immortal, sp iritual, substance of power (longer definition). Such a definition is taxonomic, rather than hierarchical or property-based. That is , all ‫ אלהים‬are holy ones, immortals, spirit entities, powers and substances, but not all substances, powers, spirits, immortals and holy ones are necessarily ‫אלהים‬. Holy ones are not before or higher than ‫אלהים‬. Rather, an ‫ אלהים‬is a species of holy ones, which is its genus, the super- genus being

Whatness and a Porphyrian Tree of ‫אלהים‬

37

immortal beings. This way of looking at what an ‫ אלהים‬is may not be what all biblica l texts assume on this matter, and biblical taxonomies of ‫ אלהים‬may be differently and variably constituted. Yet the illustration above gives the general idea of what a Porphyrian perspective on the question what an ‫אלהים‬ is might involve. On this view, the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬is is tied to defining it as species with reference to its genera. In other words, a Porphyrian point of view would not si mply list t he typical attributes associated with a particular species of divinity to answer the question of whatness. Things like power and immortality are here not so much seen as the properties of an ‫ אלהים‬but instead as a super-genus, which is something quite different. As for the essence of an ‫אלהים‬, from a Porphyrian perspective this cannot be equated with any genus or super-genera as such. Other entities might also share therein and therefore these are not unique to the species ‫אלהים‬. Instead, the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is, on Porphyry’s account, connected with the properties of its genus. For example, in the HB we often see the properties of divinity exemplified in the ‫‘ אלהים‬spirit’. An ‫ אלהים‬is not only a spirit (its metaphysical genus) but also possesses a spirit (its breath, as ‘mereological’ part) which, when active, instantiates fragmented properties P1-Pn ascribed to it which also seems to be (some of the) essential properties P1-Pn of an ‫ אלהים‬in various texts. These include properties P1-Pn for which an ‫ אלהים‬is worshipped qua ‫אלהים‬, for example, wisdom and knowledge, power, abilities and skills, life and vitality, counsel and judgment, salvific and destructive actions, leadership, and so on. These properties of the ‫ אלהים‬spirit, being assumed properties of the genus, can be seen as having been assumed essential (or at the very least rather important accidental) properties of the species ‫ אלהים‬in the given texts. In other words, a description of the conception of genus of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as an answer to the whatness question should contain nothing superfluous, nothing deficient in terms of being an ‫אלהים‬. As for the properties of an ‫ אלהים‬in relation to it as species (not genus), from a Porphyrian perspective, these can be pointed to in any one or more of four different ways: 1. P1-Pn = what happens to ‫ אלהים‬as species alone, though not to every individual ‫אלהים‬, e.g. ruling over nations;

38

What Is a God?

2. P1-Pn = what happens to ‫ אלהים‬as species, though not to it alone, e.g. being worshipped; 3. P1-Pn = what happens to ‫ אלהים‬as species alone, to every individual, but only at a certain time, e.g. receiving sacrifices; 4. P1-Pn = what happens to ‫ אלהים‬as species alone, to every individual, and always, e.g. being superhuman. These distinctions can be of aid in nuanced metaphysical descriptions of the properties of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. The implication here is that an ‫ אלהים‬is assumed to share with others of its type a particular ‘nature’ (physis) (a concept already in use since Homer and in the philosophy prior to Porphyry). This is seen as somehow a ‘law’ (nomos) driving an ‫ אלהים‬towards self- actualization and which is visible in the form of intrinsic characteristics that (a) make it what it is and (b) which characterizes it as a member of that specific ‘natural kind’. Having discussed all that were proposed, the following conclusions may be drawn: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

The notion of definition of an ‫ אלהים‬is linked to ‫ אלהים‬as species. The definition of ‫ אלהים‬concerns it as species of a genus. Whatness in an ‫ אלהים‬is found in genus, not species. What kindness in an ‫ אלהים‬is found in species, not genus. The essence of an ‫ אלהים‬is found in the properties of the genus. The accidental properties of an ‫ אלהים‬are related to the species. The essential properties of an ‫ אלהים‬are related to the genus.

While definition, whatness and essence are related and overlapping in a Porphyrian view, they are also distinguished, featuring on the levels of species, genus and properties respectively. So to say what an ‫ אלהים‬is, an ‫אלהים‬ will be constructed as a species, defined via genus (what it is) and differentia (what kind of its type it is) along with properties showing what its essential characteristics were assumed to be.

6

Whatness and a Boethian Distinction between Essence/Existence in an ‫אלהים‬

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (480– 524) is significant for the discussion of early mediaeval philosophical perspectives on our question of the whatness and essence of an ‫אלהים‬. Accord ing to Boethius’s metaphysics of essence adapted for the present, it is one thing for something to be (i.e. exist), and quite another for that thing to be an ‫( אלהים‬i.e. to exist as that which it is). In other words, we find here a distinction between essence (what an ‫אלהים‬ is) and existence (that an ‫ אלהים‬is). To see what adopting such an idea might imply for how we look at our research question, some of the ideas of tractates in Boethius’s Opuscula Sacra (OS) will be alluded to throughout this chapter. From a Boethian point of view, an ‫’אלהים‬s existence is all about the concrete ex isting thing, whereas its essence has to do with the specific nature shared by all members of the ‫ אלהים‬as species. In purely essentialist terms, that an ‫ אלהים‬exists is its ‘total essence’, whereas what an ‫ אלהים‬is but a constitutive part of that essence. A different way to state this distinction is to think of an ‫’אלהים‬s existence as its ‘concrete essence’, while an ‫’אלהים‬s essence or whatness (which in this context is roughly the same thing) can also be called its ‘abstract essence’ (or ‘formal essence’). On t he b asis of this interesting nuance d way of speaking in relation to our question we might conclude that ‫אלהים‬- ness itself is therefore what can be called either a ‘property’ of ‫אלהים‬, or a ‘principle’ of ‫אלהים‬. In light of the

40

What Is a God?

above, consider the following metaphysical (as opposed to historical and theological) question, asked from a Boethian perspective: 1. What about the postulated first ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to make it an ‫?אלהים‬ The same puzzle arises in the context of monotheism where the common name ‫ אלהים‬refers to a singleton in a class rather than to a member of a species or genus. From a Boethian point of view, only a first ‫ אלהים‬can be said to be what an by ‫ אלהים‬virtue of its very being. However, in some anomalous margins of ancient Israelite folk- metaphysics, this was not always the case. Consider, for example, an atypicaltext where even the first and only ‫ אלהים‬was not assumed to be such by virtue of its substance: ‘You are my witnesses,’ says Yhwh, ‘and my servant whom I have chosen, that you may know and believe me and understand that I am it. Before me no ‫ אל‬was formed, nor shall there be any [formed] after me. (Isa. 43.10)

On a close reading, this text appe ars to a ssume the existence of a time when Yhwh became the first and only ‫ אל‬who was formed. This in turn seems to presuppose a prior state of bei ng or reality, thus taking for granted the presence of primary matter precedi ng the d ivine matter and out of which the first ‫ אלהים‬emerged. It also explicitly mentions a time after Yhwh, that is, a time either after the existence of this first and only ‫ – אלהים‬thus implying its return to formlessness and somehow being ontologically dependent on the chaos matter itself, and not vice versa. This may explain Yhwh’s ‘ontotheolog ical’ (a Heideggerian not ion) status in the cosmos (as the ‘highest’ existing being rather than existence or being itself). If this is the case, even the so- called deutero-Isaiah’s allegedly advanced monotheistic theology did not mean leaving theogony behind. It also did not mean that an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be eternal, for it was taken to have a beginning in time, as well as an end (being the ‘first’ and ‘last’ presuppose a finite series). But now, in all of this, consider how both in Isaiah 43.10c and in the following text, there is reference to an ‫ אלהים‬as abstract object: 1. I am the first and I am the last; besides me there is no ‫אלהים‬. (Isa. 44.6b) The concept of there being ‘no ‫ ’אלהים‬besides Yhwh presupposes that it is conceivable to think of what an ‫ אלהים‬is without assuming that the object

Whatness and a Boethian Distinction in an ‫אלהים‬

41

referred to actually exists. What is denoted here clearly has no reality, yet the very same thing is assumed to have some sort of essence, that of ‫אלהים‬ness, which is never actualized. And while the two texts mentioned thus far never specify what exactly this essence of an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be, we do encounter one way of expressing something related in Isaiah 41.21-24. Here other ‫ אלהים‬are required to prove that they instantiate what might have been thought to be essential properties, functions and relations of the ‫ אלהים‬as a particular type of being (of which only one is then implied to exist!): Set forth your case, says Yhwh; bring your proofs, says the king of Jacob. Let t hem bring them, and tell us what is to happen. Tell us the for mer things, what they are, that we may consider them, that we may know their outcome; or declare to us the things to come. Tell us what is to come hereafter, that we may know that you are ‫ ;אלהים‬do good, or do harm, that we may be dismayed and terrified. Behold, you are nothing, and your work is nothing; an abomination is he who chooses you. (Isa. 41.21-24)

In the text above, the ability to interpret both past and future, as well as doing good and evil, are assumed to be individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being an ‫אלהים‬. What is clear is that these ‘essential properties’ of ‫ אלהים‬are here assumed to be indicative of the existence of the entities as ‫( אלהים‬total essence), yet could be conceived of separately as what makes an entity an ‫ אלהים‬and allows it to be called such legitimately (at least according to the speaker of the passage, which is assumed to be Yhwh himself). The se individually necess ary and jointly sufficient condit ions for being considered an ‫ אלהים‬are clearly not assumed to be derived from Yhwh’s nature as such. Rather, Yhwh can be called the first and last ‫ אלהים‬precisely because he is assumed to have these essential properties and to exist as well. Again the entities addressed are faulted for not being proper ‫אלהים‬, not for not being Yhwh. This implies that, while Yhwh is assumed to be the only ‫אלהים‬, it is possible to think about the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬without considering the actually existing first ‫אלהים‬, which is Yhwh. Yhwh has the ‫ אלהים‬essence, yet when alleged ‫ אלהים‬are denied participation therein, they could, so it is implied, be ‫ אלהים‬without being Yhwh. Hence even in a monotheistic context, the essence and existence of even Yhwh as only ‫ אלהים‬is conceptually distinct (for historical reasons of course, the one emerging from the many).

42

What Is a God?

Of course, when the rest of the HB is brought to bear on the issue, the complexities multiply exponentially. On a Boethian perspective, only the first ‫ אלהים‬is such by its very being. The rest of the ‫ אלהים‬are only ‫ אלהים‬by participation. But to what extent is this true of what is assumed in the HB it self, whether read synchronically or diachronical ly? For example, let us commence, again from a Boethian perspective, with the next set of metaphysical questions about the essence vis-à-vis the existence of an ‫אלהים‬, this t i me with reference to al l those contexts in the HB in which they can be asked: What about the sons of ‫ אלהים‬were assumed to make them ‫?אלהים‬ What about idols allowed them to be called ‫?אלהים‬ What about the deified dead made them ‫?אלהים‬ What about household gods made them ‫?אלהים‬ What about members of the divine council made them ‫?אלהים‬ What about the king made it an ‫?אלהים‬ What about demons allowed some to be called ‫?אלהים‬ What about messengers (angels) made them ‫?אלהים‬ What about some humans (e.g. Isaac, Moses, etc.) warranted the title ‫?אלהים‬ 11. What about superlative natural phenomena made these ‫?אלהים‬ 12. What about some abstract objects (like power) made them ‫?אלהים‬ 13. Et cetera. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Of course, depending on the context, various answers to the above can be given from both the history of religion and HB theologies. Also, as noted earlier, while the extension of ‫ אלהים‬as common noun in the HB as a whole may contain all these entities, it is arguably the case that no individual use thereof does so. Yet it can still be asked, how, from a metaphysical perspective (as opposed to historical or theological perspective) were all the different entities called ‫אלהים‬ assumed to be related to whatever was imagined to be the original ‫אלהים‬. To what extent can the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬be separated from its existence when it comes to other members of the extension? In other words, we are not interested in how the concept of ‫ אלהים‬evolved diachronically or sits together synchronically but in how one can imagine assumed relations of ontological dependency among the ‫ אלהים‬in any given context (which will, of course, vary).

Whatness and a Boethian Distinction in an ‫אלהים‬

43

The short answer to the above questions is that not everything was called an ‫ אלהים‬for the same reason. That is, not every entity had particular prope r ties which, in virtue of having these, made it an ‫אלהים‬. But here is the catch: from a philosophical or in this case, metaphysical, point of view, the properties, functions or relations that were assumed to make different types of ‫ אלהים‬divine, were not the same across the board. Moreover, some things that were called ‫ אלהים‬were not even assumed to exist as such (e.g. idols), while others were not assumed to have always been ‫( אלהים‬the king, the dead, etc.). Both of the above can be taken to presuppose some sort of essence/existence distinction Thus in some texts of the HB, the existence and essence of an ‫ אלהים‬cannot have been assumed to be the same thing. Again, historical or theological explanations are two ways to account for the state of affairs, but ancient folkmetaphysical assumptions will also (either earlier or later) have tried to make sense thereof. In sum then, from Boethius’s adapted view, when it comes to the HB we m ay say that, unlike in later philosophical assumptions with reference to ‘God’, there was assumed to be a difference between merely being some ‫אלהים‬ in a qualified way and being an ‫ אלהים‬in an essential way. In Boethuis’s scheme reapplied, if an ‫ אלהים‬is such by participation, then ‫אלהים‬-ness does not penetrate its inmost structure. In this neo-Platonic fashion, all things called ‫אלהים‬ that were assumed to have emerged as such after what could have been conceived of as being the first ‫‘( אלהים‬the Most High’?) can be interpreted to have been assumed to be such only by virtue of (perceived) participation in original ‫אלהים‬- ness. This despite the fact that, historically speaking, it is more likely that originally it was exactly that which later became lesser or no ‫אלהים‬, for example, deified ancestors, the king, humans, and so on, that were in fact the original things worshipped as such. That is, if the idea of an ‫ אלהים‬as creator of the cosmos and as first entity in existence is quite late (without implying anything regarding the value of the belief).

7

Whatness and an Avicennian View on the Quiddity of an ‫אלהים‬

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? Abū Alī ibn Sīnā or Avicenna (980–1037) is our next dialogue partner. He was the philosopher who in the al-Ilāhiyyāt part of Kitab al-Shifa (Eng. ‘The Book of Healing’) further and more fully elaborated Boethius’s distinction between essence and existence (see Avicenna 2005). One difference between t he two thinker s is that, in our ada pt ed Avicennian perspective o n ‫אלהים‬ (not in his own perspective on ‘God’), essence is said to preced e existence (Ilāhiyyāt I, 5, 31, 1–9). But what does that mean for us with reference to what was assumed to be the essence of an ‫?אלהים‬ Avicenna’s metaphysics is largely Neo- Platonist and Aristotelian. In our application of this tradition, the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬can be seen as that intrinsic property of an ‫ אלהים‬that defines it as an ‫ אלהים‬and without which it could not be identified as being an ‫אלהים‬. In other words, the Avicennian perspective on the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬represents a response to the question ‘What is it?’ and in this way is directly associated with the concept of whatness (or quiddity, via the Latin i nterrogat ive ‘Quid est? ’). More specifically, we find three related but distinct conceptions of essence in Avicennian metaphysics (cf. Ilāhiyyāt I, 5, 31, 5–6; cf. VI, 5, 292, 1–5). 1. Māhiyya is the quiddity (lit. ‘what-ness’) of an ‫ אלהים‬considered in itself and as Aristotelian secondary substance. It is thus the essence common to all ‫ אלהים‬as species or genus, for example, what was assumed to make an ‫ אלהים‬what it is.

46

What Is a God?

2. Hūwiyya refers to the ipseity (lit. ‘self-ness’) of Aristotelian primary substances in the ‫ אלהים‬as genus, for example, what was assumed to make Yhwh an ‫?אלהים‬ 3. Anniyya or haecceity (lit. ‘this-ness’) refers to the individual ‫ אלהים‬like Yhwh but in an abstract and removed sense of what it was assumed to be that was thought to make Yhwh Yhwh, for example, this particular ‫אלהים‬. From an Avicennian perspective, then, the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬is also the e ssence of an ‫ אלהים‬considered devoid of any relation to existing things or mental concepts, that is, an ‫ אלהים‬in itself (cf. Ilāhiyyāt I, 5 and VI, 2). It is that which in an ‫ אלהים‬is free of universality or particularity, potentiality or actuality, unity or multiplicity, for instance. This essence is thought to be by definition ineffable (see Ilāhiyyāt I, 5, 29, 5– 31, 9; cf. I, 2, 13, 8– 13). For this reason, what an ‫ אלהים‬is can involve both the universal idea of generic ‫אלהים‬ in a reader of the HB’s mind, and a particular ‫ אלהים‬like Yhwh in the world of the text, without creating a contradiction. In and of itself, the idea of the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬therefore precedes the notion of an ‫’אלהים‬s existence, whether this is thought to be external or mental existence (cf. Ilāhiyyāt I, 5, 31, 1–9). Consider the use of ‫ אלהים‬as common noun in the following text. Again we see what appears to be a clear case of the possibility of referring to the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬while clearly denying its existence: The word of Yhwh came to me: ‘Son of man, say to the prince of Tyre’. Thus says Yhwh ‫אלהים‬: ‘Because your heart is proud, and you have said, “I am an ‫אל‬, I sit in the seat of the ‫אלהים‬, in the heart of the seas”, yet you are but a man, and no ‫אל‬, though you consider yourself as wise as an ‫ – אל‬you are indeed wiser than Daniel; no secret is hidden from you; by your wisdom and your understanding you have gotten wealth for yourself, and have gathered gold and silver into your treasuries; by your great wisdom in trade you have increased your wealth, and your heart has become proud in your wealth – therefore thus says Yhwh ‫אלהים‬: ‘Because you consider yourself as wise as an ‫אל‬, therefore, b ehold, I will bring strangers upon you, the most terrible of the nations; a nd they shall draw their swords against the beaut y of your wisdom and defile your splendor. They shall thrust you down into the Pit, and you shall

Whatness and an Avicennian View

47

die the death of the slain in the heart of the seas. Will you still say, “I am an ‫”אל‬, in the presence of those who slay you, though you are but a man, and no ‫אל‬, in the hands of those who wound you?’ (Ezek. 28.2-10)

In this text existence is not a defining characteristic of the essence of the ‫ אלהים‬as genus. One can, in the abstract and without any reference to a specific ‫אלהים‬, say that wisdom is assumed to be a necessary but not sufficient essential property of being an ‫אלהים‬. All ‫ אלהים‬a re assumed to be wise, yet not everything that is wise is assumed to exist as an ‫אלהים‬. Immortality, by contrast, is here held to be a sufficient condition for being an ‫אלהים‬. If something is not immortal, then by definition it are not assumed to be an ‫אלהים‬. Thus, from the concept of what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be, it cannot also be inferred that it in fact exists. The diachronic distinction between essence and existence in an ‫אלהים‬ mentioned above can be taken to attempt to resolve two problems pertaining to ‫ אלהים‬as universal (cf. Ilāhiyyāt V, 1, 204, 4–5; cf. VII, 2–3). The first is a logical problem that has to do with the predication of the whatness or quiddity of ‫ אלהים‬as subject. If the quiddity of an ‫ אלהים‬as such included universality and particularity (but not both, since they are mutually exclusive), it would form part of the very definition of the ‫’אלהים‬s quiddity. In other words, if the notion of an ‫ אלהים‬includes universality (applicable only to all ‫ )אלהים‬in its definition, then we cannot predicate it of a particular ‫אלהים‬. If, on the other hand, particularity is included in the definition of an ‫אלהים‬ (applicable only to this or that ‫)אלהים‬, then this would not merely exclude the predication of ‫ אלהים‬as a universal subject, but of any individual ‫ אלהים‬other than the one specified in the definition of an ‫’אלהים‬s quiddity. This problem relates to how the conflation of ‫ אלהים‬as common name with ‫ אלהים‬as proper name has led to a logical pro blem in the H B. On the one hand, if Yhwh is assumed to be a specific kind of ‫אלהים‬, quite different from and incomparable to others, Yhwh’s nature was not assumed to represent the universal essence of ‫ אלהים‬as genus. On the other hand, Yhwh is thought of as being the only ‫אלהים‬, or the very essence of what it is to be an ‫אלהים‬, then all references to other ‫( אלהים‬and even the very classification of Yhwh as an ‫ )אלהים‬appear either meaningless or redundant. And what m ay help us in imagining a solution to this conundrum is the advanced Avicennian notion

48

What Is a God?

implying that essence in an ‫ אלהים‬might precede butnot necessarily include its existence (cf. Ilāhiyyāt V, 1, 204, 4–5; cf. VII, 2–3). The second problem that Avicenna strove to re solve is m eta physical. It relates to universals and concerns a puzzle we have already encountered in our discussion of Plato. It is the riddle of the one and the many in an ‫אלהים‬. That is, how can the selfsame quiddity of an ‫ אלהים‬be found in many ‫אלהים‬ and not be many? To answer this, an Avicennian perspective might involve invoking the concept of the quiddity of an ‫ אלהים‬to be considered as such. For although the quiddity of an ‫ אלהים‬is in the HB assumed to be able to exist in association with particular circumstances, it can be considered in itself and in complete dissociation from these circumstances. This problem can be seen in the HB i n contexts where the extension of ‫ אלהים‬as common name is diverse and complex, so that it includes entities, many of which have little if anything in co mmon other than being called ‫אלהים‬. The HB thus in a sense also has its own metaphysical ‘problem’ of the one and the many, for it remains conceptua lly difficult to see how ‫ אלהים‬as common name could be indicative of one sort of entity in light of the sheer variety of different things that can be called ‫אלהים‬. To some extent this can be explained historically and theologically. Even so, in the context of ancient Israelite folk- metaphysics reflection on this problem by those who used the term ‘‫ ’אלהים‬in the generic sense is likely to have been present. Hence the later need to modify and limit the very same extension. When thus considered, what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be can be said to exclude the ideas of unity and plurality in as much as these are inapplicable to the quiddity. For they concern only actual existence, and thereby do not render th e question of quidd ity o r whatness, here identified with essence, meaningless. Since existence and its concomitants are extraneous to the quiddity of an ‫ אלהים‬as such, the latter is existentially (in the ontological sense) neutral, so to speak. The implications of this are interesting and seemingly paradoxical. If unity was not assumed to be constitutive of an ‫’אלהים‬s essence per se, and ‫אלהים‬-ness as essence was neither one nor many, then existence itself (as well as essence in some cases) was assumed to be accidental property of the genus ‫אלהים‬. We see this not on ly when some things could be called ‫ אלהים‬and be perceived as representing members of ‫ אלהים‬without actually existing or instantiating

Whatness and an Avicennian View

49

what is deemed to be essential properties of an ‫אלהים‬. It is also evident in those rare cases in the HB where certain entities could become ‫( אלהים‬after not being such, though existing as something else), and others could lose their ‫אלהים‬- ness (without necessarily immediately ceasing to exist). In this way, the essence (whatness or quiddity) of an ‫ אלהים‬can be seen as an ontologically complex phenomenon in the metaphysical assumptions of some texts in the HB.

8

Whatness and Abelardian Nominalism about the Status of an ‫אלהים‬

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? In its simplest form, the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be is, as should be clear by now, also related to the problem of universals. At this point in the story, there is still the need to explain how two or more individual things called ‫ אלהים‬are metaphysically the same (or similar), despite many differences. Up to now, only strong and moderate realist interpretations of ‫ אלהים‬as universal have been considered. However, it is Peter Abelard (1079– 1142) who, in the texts of his Logica ‘ingredientibus’ (LI ), offers us a quite a different take on the matter (see Abelard 1994; LI 27.11.2–4) Abelard inhe rited the tradition of Porphyry’s Isagoge which put metaphysics in general – and the problem of universals in particular – at the centre of philosophy. Again the question arises: why was the thing in question called an ‫ אלהים‬in the first place? One possible and popular scholarly way of approaching this matter has been etymological. When we re- transcribe the three generic Hebrew words for divinity’s alphabetic consonants in their original pictographic form, the following imagery turns up (with pictographs obtained from http://www.ancient-hebrew.org.): 1. ‫ = אל‬ox / staff 2. ‫ = אלהים‬ox / staff / shout / hand / water 3. ‫ = אלוהּ‬ox / staff / hook / shout The precise denotations and connotations of each pictograph are matters of dispute. And yet it is surely valid to ask the question why not only thesewords with these letters were chosen (and whether it originated before or after

52

What Is a God?

the pictographic phase in the language). Also, is it merely coincidental that the pictographic imagery appears to represent what seems like a coherent micro-narrative expressing a pastoral motif, the components of which pop up all over the place in representations of divinity (e.g. bull statues, the shepherd metaphor for divinity, etc.)? On this issue, HB scholars of the past have been rather interested in the subject of roots in order to determine the possible original meanings than in pictography. Linguistic approaches often mention that for ‫ אלהים‬there are basically two possibilities, each of which in theory make for a host of alternative concepts of more or less plausibility (though many have fallen into disuse as functional suggestions): 1. ‫ אלהים‬as plural (p) derivative (⊢) of ‫ אל‬with root (√x) and possible (◊) meanings (=df) as (a) ‫( אלהים‬p) ⊢ ‫= ◊ אל ⊣√איל‬df (b) ‫( אלהים‬p) ⊢ ‫= ◊ אל ⊣ √אלה‬df (c) ‫( אלהים‬p) ⊢ ‫= ◊אל ⊣ √אלה‬df (d) ‫( אלהים‬p) ⊢ ‫= ◊ אל ⊣ √אול‬df (e) ‫( אלהים‬p) ⊢ ‫= ◊ אל ⊣ √אל‬df (f) ‫( אלהים‬p) ⊢ ‫(√ ⊢ אל‬x)l ◊ =df 2. ‫ אלהים‬as plural (p) derivative (⊢) of ‫ אלוה‬with root (√x) and possible (◊) meanings (=df) as (a) ‫( אלהים‬p) ⊢ ‫= ◊ אלוה ⊣ √אלה‬df (b) ‫( אלהים‬p) ⊢ ‫= ◊ אלוה ⊣ √אלה‬df There are other possible root derivations, yet the alternatives given above represent those that have been most commonly proposed. However, for various reasons most HB scholars appear to consider the options 1(a) and 1(d) most likely and therewith conclude that the ideas of ‘power’ or ‘leadership’ represent what presumably may have been the ‘essential’ sense of the generic concept (cf. Eichrodt 1961: 75). Now while from a diachronic aspect, such an attempt to arrive at a nominal essence might be interesting, it also involves the ‘genetic fallacy’ in that it presupposes that an original meaning remains as a perennial one. At this point, we need to return to Abelard’s perspective on the original signification of com mon nouns (cf. LI 32.37.8). Take, for instance, the two

Whatness and Abelardian Nominalism

53

‫אלהים‬, Yhwh and Ba’al. They are both classified in the HB as ‫אלהים‬, yet they are assumed to be, for many versions of Yahwism (and syncretism aside), at least two distinct individuals. Now in a realist view of universals, there might be something in the world of the text, namely ‘‫אלהים‬-ness’ or an ‫ אלהים‬nature, which is a universal that is shared by both Yhwh and Ba’al. It is what makes both Yhwh and Ba’al ‫ א להים‬and is the reason the word ‘‫ ’אלהים‬as common noun meaningfully applies to both entities, despite their differences. Abelard’s view, by contrast, denies the existence of any such universal item. His alternative is a semantic account of how words like ‫ אלהים‬as common noun can be said to apply to many discrete individuals, even though there is clearly no universal nature shared by those individuals. However, let it be admitted that it is not completely clear whether our adaptation of Abelard’s arguments against a realist view implies that we should opt for conceptualism or nominalism about the universal ‫אלהים‬. What is clear is that an Abelardian take on the matter might suggest that there cannot be any actual thing called ‫אלהים‬- ness present in many ‫ אלהים‬at once so as to constitute their substance (i.e. to make an ‫ אלהים‬what it is). Though in Abelardian metaphysics, universality in an ‫ אלהים‬can be spoken of, it is not an ontological feature of the world in the text. Instead, it is a semantic feature of the text’s language about ‫( אלהים‬cf. LI 36.56.4). To understand what is meant by this, consider, for example, the structure of an individual ‫ אלהים‬like Yhwh. In typical Aristotelian language and with reference to many contexts in the HB, Yhwh is constructed as a substance. He is a body and has life. He is an ‫אלהים‬, and a spirit. He is a male who speaks mostly in a Semitic tongue and so on. Now consider Ba’al, who, in the HB, was assumed to instantiate many of the same properties that Yhwh did, up to and including generic ‫אלהים‬- ness. In this regard, the following text actually presupposes a particular idea of what ‫ אלהים‬actually do all the time: And at noon Eli’ jah mocked them, saying, ‘Cry aloud, for he is an ‫;אלהים‬ either he is musing, or he has gone aside, or he is on a journey, or perhaps he is asleep and must be awakened.’ (1 Kgs 18.27)

The same knowledge of what is involved in being an ‫ אלהים‬is presupposed in another text and context:

54

What Is a God?

But Jo’ash said to all who were arrayed against him, Will you contend for Ba’al? Or will you defend his cause? Whoever contends for him shall be put to death by morning. If he is an ‫אלהים‬, let him contend for himself, because his altar has been pulled down. (Judg. 6.31)

Yet Ba’al was assumed to have some properties quite different from those of Yhwh, which differentiated the two ‫אלהים‬. Yet somehow both were assumed to be ‫אלהים‬. This seems to imply that ‫אלהים‬- ness was something potentially in – but distinct from – both of them. Consider, in this regard, the following text: And Eli’jah came near to all the people, and said, ‘How long will you go limping with two different opinions? If Yhwh is an ‫אלהים‬, follow him; but if Ba’al, then follow him.’ (1 Kgs 18.21)

The question presupposed above is not what an ‫ אלהים‬is; the latter is assumed to be common knowledge. Though in the context of 1 Kings 18 (and likely that of Judges 6) it might seem that only either Yhwh or Ba’al could be an ‫אלהים‬, if we read the next verses of the said passages we see both are called ‫ אלהים‬in the generic sense. Hence the question is not so much which one is an ‫ אלהים‬but rather which ‫ אלהים‬is the ‫ אלהים‬par excellence (even though it is not a proper name in this context): An d you call on the name of your ‫ אלהים‬and I will call on the name of Yhwh; and the ‫ אלהים‬who answers by fire, he is an ‫אלהים‬.’ And all the people answered, ‘It is well spoken.’ (1 Kgs 18.24)

Clearly, the word ‫ אלהים‬above is used in a most peculiar way: For how can something be both seen as being an ‫אלהים‬, and yet it has still to be determined whet her it is in fact an ‫ ?אלהים‬With this in mind, an Abelardian perspective would have us do the following thought experiment. First, we start with Yhwh and Ba’al and take away all their properties except their alleged ‫אלהים‬ness. Now the question is: Is the ‫אלהים‬- ness that remains one thing or two? In other words, is the alleged ‫אלהים‬- ness of Yhwh his own, and that of Ba’al his, so that if you were to strip away ever ything else you would have separate ‫אלהים‬- nesses – one for Yhwh and one for Ba’al? Or is there something singular that is shared, ‫אלהים‬- ness, so that when you pull off all the features

Whatness and Abelardian Nominalism

55

that distinguish Yhwh f rom Ba’al, you end up with one universal, namely, ‫אלהים‬-ness? On this kind of analysis, if you ask what the essence of ‫ אלהים‬is it will depend on how far one is willing to go to with the analysis. In short, there are two problems: First of all, there is the dilemma concerning ‫ אלהים‬as common name. The objection here was that there is nothing for ‘‫ ’אלהים‬as a universal term to name because there are no essential properties shared by all things called an ‫אלהים‬. Abel ard’s resp onse in this regard might be, ‘So what?’ Why can’t ‫ אלהים‬as universal term name individual things? After all, the objection works only if we think of the naming of ‫ אלהים‬as a kind of signification, and then argue that terms that signify more than one thing are equivocal. An Abelardian perspective thus in effect severs the notion of the naming of an ‫ אלהים‬from the notion of the signification of generic ‫אלהים‬. Sec ond, what things did the characters in the world of the text think of w hen t hey heard the word ‘‫ ’אלהים‬as a common name? In other words, what was the link-up between ‫ אלהים‬as universal term, that is, the concept of generic ‫אלהים‬, and the external worlds in the text? If ‘‫ ’אלהים‬was a universal, it was assumed to establish in the characters a single act of the understanding of an ‫ אלהים‬as object, that is, a single concept ‘‫’אלהים‬. That concept ‘‫ ’אלהים‬must have been presupposed as being general for interreligious polemics to appear possible. But then what was it a concept of? In Abelardian metaphysics of essence, there is no third thing that Yhwh and Ba’al have in common or can share (cf. LI 37.59.5). Nevertheless, there must be some community between them, or else there would be no sufficient reason for calling them both ‫אלהים‬. Moreover, one would be left with subjectivity and scepticism about what, as opposed to who, an ‫ אלהים‬is. And since Yhwh and Ba’al cannot ‘agree in’ or share any common third thing, and since they must nevertheless have some community, it follows that they must agree in or share some item that is not a thing. In other words, what an ‫ אלהים‬in the generic sense is, on Abelard’s account, is not some ‘thing’, that is, not a nature or property actually present in things called ‫( אלהים‬LI 40.77.3). This, however, does not mean that on this view being an ‫ אלהים‬involved nothing, that what is being spoken about was not assumed

56

What Is a God?

to be rea lly out there in the world of the text. It had to be, since there was assu med t o be an im portant epistemological function it had to fulfil. So instead of being some ‘thing’, to be an ‫ אלהים‬it is simply what an Abelardian point of view would call a ‘status’ (in a technical medieval philosophical sense of the word). Yhwh and Ba’al therefore agree in having the ‘status’ of being ‫אלהים‬. But what is this status of ‫ ?אלהים‬Is it another word for the whatness or essence of an ‫ ?אלהים‬It is, but only in the sense of actual or total essence since the status of an ‫ אלהים‬was just its assumed existence. It follows that the status not only cannot be predicated of many ‫אלהים‬, but also of even one. For existing as an ‫ אלהים‬is not itself a thing in the sense of being an object that one can go and look at. So to ask the question more precisely: What is it in the world of the text that ‘‫ ’אלהים‬as universal term established in an understanding of the concept of ‫?אלהים‬ The answer to this seemingly profound question is deceptively simply in the present context. From an Abelardian perspective, since the reference to an ‫ אלהים‬in general is not to any real thing, the common noun denotes a fictional object (cf. LI 43.96.5). That is, the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB or its whatness, in as much as it was a metaphysical universal, was purely an intentional object, a thought object. And how mind and body and idea and world were assumed to be related in the HB is another question for another time.

9

Whatness and a Thomistic Perspective on the Complexity of an ‫אלהים‬

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? In our adaptation of Thomas Aquinas (1225–74), we might say that knowledge of what an ‫ אלהים‬is is the same as knowledge of its essence (see Aquinas 1965: 33[DEE]). A Thomistic interpretat ion of essence is much like an Aristotelian one, yet simultaneously the outcome of having undergone many subtle and various nuances. It also involv es an assimilation of some ideas of Boethius and Avicenna. Consequently, essence came to signify something common to all ‫ אלהים‬natures through which the various ‫ אלהים‬are placed in the var ious ‫ אלהים‬genera and ‫ אלהים‬spe cies. Yet, it is first conceived by the intellect. Buildi ng on earlier notions of whatness attached to concepts like quiddity, definition, nature and form, a Thomistic perspective as understood in this chapter suggests that the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬can be found in the way the thi ng was ordered to the proper operation involved in being an ‫אלהים‬. The assumption is that no thing is without its proper operation. Yet our concern with essence at present will be mostly focused on quiddity or whatness, rather than on essence proper, which is to be found as a sub-theme in various answers that can be given to the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be. The parts of Aquinas’s writings involved in this chapter can be found in Aquin as (2008: n.p.). More specifically, we look to the Su mma Theologica’s (ST ) Question 3 ‘On the Simplicity of God’, sections 1– 8; and also various parts of Question 13 entitled ‘On the Names of God’. Though Aquinas himself was not critically-historically focused on ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as common name,

58

What Is a God?

the issues he dealt with are all related and relevant to a philosophical translation of some of the metatheistic assumptions attached thereto. Curiously, we can make some progress if we invert all his statements about ‘God’ to remove the anachronistic assumptions of perfect-being theology. Let us start with the first axiom that Aquinas lists (cf. ST Q3 i). Thus when asking what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be, one answer might be to say that it is some sort of body (cf. Sommer 2009; Hundley 2011). In Aquinas’s metaphysics a body is defined as that which has three dimensions, and indeed, some of the texts in the HB do attribute corporeal parts to an ‫ אלהים‬in ways that were not intended to be metaphorical only (some references to an ‫’אלהים‬s face, feet, etc.). In addition, in a Thomistic view posture belongs only to bodies and also in the HB happens to be ascribed to an ‫( אלהים‬e.g. sitting, standing). Moreover, for Aquinas, only of bodies can it be asked ‘wherefrom’ or ‘whereto’. Also on this subject, in the HB an ‫ אלהים‬is spoken of in relation to locative terms, for example, one can go to and away from an ‫ אלהים‬and vice versa. Therefore, a Thomistic reading would view an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as having been assumed to be a body. Second, it seems that another answer to the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be might be to say that it is something composed of matter and form (cf. ST, Q3 ii). Various elements of a composite being, such as the passions of anger, joy and the like are also attributed to ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. Also, an ‫’אלהים‬s composite nature can also be seen in the way its matter was believed to be in potentiality, presupposing that it was not pure potentiality. And since everything composed of matter and form is for Aquinas also assumed to owe its perfection and goodness to its form, on this view, ‫אלהים‬-ness in the HB was participated in analogous to the way in which matter participated in the form. Finally, Thomistic metaphysics implies that an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to act by its form and therefore as an agent. Third, another way of responding to the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be is to say that any individual ‫ אלהים‬was not assumed to be the same as the essence or nature of generic ‫( אלהים‬cf. ST Q3 iii). Thus the substance or nature of an ‫ אלהים‬was not assumed to be in it, analogous to the way in which any one human is not assumed to be the same as humanity. Being composed of matter and form, the nature or essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to differ from its so-called suppositum. This is because

Whatness and a Thomistic Perspective

59

the essence or nature connoted only what was included in the definition of the species ‫ אלהים‬.‫אלהים‬-ness thus connoted all that by way of which an ‫אלהים‬ in the HB was assumed to be an ‫אלהים‬. This means that, at least on this view, an individual ‫ אלהים‬in the HB’s matter, with all its individualizing accidents, cannot be included in definitions of the species, for example, Yhwh’s particular face, arm, brightness, or size. Fourth, we may answer the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was by saying that its essence and existence were not assumed to be the same as in later philosophical theism’s view of divine ‘simplicity’ (cf. ST Q3 iv). For example, in some of the worlds in the text things can be added to an ‫אלהים‬, the latter not being assumed as being identical with everything that exists. Thus, one could know ‘whether’ an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB existed in distinction from knowing ‘what’ an ‫ אלה ים‬in the HB was assumed to be. Moreover, translated in Thomistic terms, whatever an ‫ אלהים‬had besides its essence was assumed to be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence, or by some exterior agent. That means divine existence was assumed to be that which made every ‫’אלהים‬s form or nature actual; which is why in the HB an ‫ אלהים‬was not spoken of as actual only because they were thought to exist. And since the HB assumes that there is potentiality in an ‫אלהים‬, its essence could not have been equated with its existence. Finally, whatever had ‫ אלהים‬features, but was not itself an ‫אלהים‬, was assumed to be an ‫ אלהים‬by participation, hence not identical to its own essence. Fi fth, w hat an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be was, among others, something contained in a genus (cf. ST Q3 v). In an adapted Thomistic reading, an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB could be in a genus in two ways: first, as a species contained under a genus and being reducible to it; and second, as principles and privations. An ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was itself thus assumed to be a species, given that the species ‫ אלהים‬would be constituted of genus and difference. All ‫אלהים‬ in the HB in the same genus also agreed in the quiddity or essence of that genus. The latter was predicated of them as an essential, but they would have differed in their existence. Since the existence of every member of the genus to which an ‫ אלהים‬belonged to was not assumed to be the same, existence and quiddity (i.e. essence) must also have been different. Thus the genus was without an essential property, because it was not of the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB in general to have (or lack) it.

60

What Is a God?

Sixth, no essentialism is possible with regard to what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be since in the individual ‫ אלהים‬there were many accidents (cf. ST Q3 vi). Yet generic ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as substance was not assumed to be an accident. An ‫ אלהים‬in the HB’s accidents were not in themselves alone and therefore were not assumed to be themselves substances. Many properties such as light, power, holiness, wisdom, goodness, and the like would then be examples of what were not assumed to be the substantial form (here ‘essential properties’) of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, because these very same properties were assumed to be an accident in both the species and in other things that were not ‫( אלהים‬e.g. humans). Seventh, in the HB an ‫ אלהים‬was not assumed to be altogether something simple (cf. ST Q3 vii). For there was assumed to be a composition of quantitative parts in an ‫אלהים‬. Something composite could also be predicated of any single one of an ‫’אלהים‬s parts, as is evident in the way in which an ‫’אלהים‬s body was assumed to be made up of dissimilar parts. No part of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was itself assumed to be a separate ‫אלהים‬. Moreover, something that was predicated of the whole in an individual ‫ אלהים‬in the HB could not always be predicated of part of it (e.g. of its arm, face, robe, sword, etc.). And so, since an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is not an absolute form, or rather not an absolute being, it could also be seen as something composite. Eighth, an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be something that could enter into the composition of other things (cf. ST Q3 viii). It was assumed to be a form and a form was assumed to be part of a compound. Thus an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be part of some compound. Parts of an ‫ אלהים‬like its breath, image or hand could merge with the location occupied by other entities. Whatever things called ‫ אלהים‬were assumed to be could differ, and differ in various ways, thus implying that the thing it is was assumed to be composite. In these ways, transposing Aquinas’s metaphysics of divinity to contrary assumptions in the HB, we can try to express in the idiom of Thomistic metaphysics something about what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be. After the consideration of those things that belong to what we may call ‘divine complexity’ in the HB, we now proceed following Aquinas (ST Q13) to the consideration of some aspects of generic divine names (i.e. not names of God/Yhwh but alternative common names for an ‫)אלהים‬. Also here Aquinas’s

Whatness and a Thomistic Perspective

61

metaphysics is once again inverted so that, from our Thomistic perspective, we look at some recurring concepts as implicit answers to what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be. The first example comes from the HB’s concept of an ‫ אלהים‬as a rock. In the following two texts (among many others) it clearly acts as a substitute for ‫ אלהים‬as a common name. First, six verses in Deuteronomy 32: 1. [4] The rock, his work is perfect; for all his ways are justice. An ‫ אל‬of faithfulness and without iniquity, just and right is he. 2. [15] . . . he forsook the ‫ אלהים‬who made him, and scoffed at the rock of his salvation. 3. [18] You were unmindful of the rock that begot you, and you forgot the ‫ אלהים‬who gave you birth. 4. [31] For their rock is not as our rock, even our enemies themselves being judges. 5. [37] Then he will say, ‘Where is their ‫אלהים‬, the rock in which they took refuge?’ And in assorted verses in 2 Samuel 22 (cf. Ps. 18): 1. [2] He said, ‘Yhwh is my rock, and my fortress, and my deliverer’ 2. [3] my ‫אלהים‬, my rock, in whom I take refuge, [32] ‘For who is an ‫אלהים‬, but Yhwh? And who is a rock, except our ‫’?אלהים‬ 3. [47] ‘Yhwh lives; and blessed be my rock, and exalted be my ‫אלהים‬, the rock of my salvation’. Othe r typical substitutions for the generic term come to mind. These inclu de ‘holy one’, ‘mighty one’, and the like. In the signification of such names, that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify. For instance, the concept of a rock is imposed from the fact that an ‫ אלהים‬is a rock in some sense of the word. Yet it is not imposed to signify that which is rocky. Rather, the point is to signify a certain function. Otherwise, from a Thomistic point of view, all rocks would be ‫אלהים‬. Conversely, all names for an ‫ אלהים‬in the generic sense were assumed to signify operation. The operation of an ‫ אלהים‬was not assumed to be something in it; yet it was something temporal about an ‫אלהים‬. Thus even what has popularly seemed to be essential properties (like holiness, immortality or power) canno t be identical to an ‫ אלהים‬in itself. All of these only signify and

62

What Is a God?

also presuppose operations. And since an ‫ אלהים‬is something distinct from its operation, and operation as such is not really in an ‫ – אלהים‬but only in idea – it follows that, from a Thomistic point of view, it is prudent not to imagine that what an ‫ אלהים‬was is always something identical to what it i s called. That means, somewhat perplexingly, both ‫ אלהים‬as common name and its conceptually descriptive equivalents do not express the essence of the kind of entity involved.

10

Whatness and a Scotian Interpretation of an ‫’אלהים‬s Haecceity

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? In this chapter’s reapplication of the metaphysical perspective provided by the mediaeval scholastic philosopher John Duns Scotus (1266–1308), asking what ‫ אלהים‬is involves being concerned with the common nature of all ‫אלהים‬. However, expanding on a notion encountered in Avicenna, a Scotian reading suggests that, in asking what an ‫ אלהים‬is, we should also attend to what it was that was assumed to make an individual ‫ אלהים‬this particular kind of thing. This means more than just giving an account of the singularity of the common nature of the ‫ אלהים‬in general, that is, an explanation of the indeterminate unity by which the ‫ אלהים‬as a species is said to be one in number. What is required, instead, is an account of the individuality of a particular ‫– אלהים‬ that is, what an (particular) ‫ אלהים‬was. Such a take should show how an ‫אלהים‬ is at its core indivisible into additional subjective ‫ אלהים‬parts. A Scotian take might also refer to this phenomenon as an ‫’אלהים‬s ‘individual difference’, that is, the individual entity that an ‫ אלהים‬is. The technical term here, of Scotus’s own Latin invention, is haecceity (the use in the chapter on Avicenna to translate the Arabic was anachronistic). The concept of ‘haecceity’ or ‘thisness’ is also roughly equivalent to, but more specific than, Aristotle’s Greek to ti esti, rendered as ‘the what it is’. In the context of our discussion, it signifies ‘whatness’ or ‘essence’ (he re more or less the same thing), but in as much as it pertains to these aspects of an individual ‫( אלהים‬cf. Scotus, [OO], Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1. q. 2, n. 48). Yet in the end, the concept of haecceity should definitely be seen as

64

What Is a God?

referring to ‘whatness’ only in the sense of ‘thisness’. In our adaptation and reapplication of Scotian metaphysics there is no whatness of an ‫ אלהים‬without its thisness; and no thisness of an ‫ אלהים‬without its whatness. In other words, the question on this topic of individuation is: What is it in a particular ‫ אלהים‬by which it cannot be further divided into parts that are themselves ‫ אלהים‬in their own right. This notion is not the same as what is encountered in those rare occasions in the HB that refer to ‘‫’האל‬ (‘this god’) where the entity in question (Yhwh) is individuated via particular operations rather than with reference to some irreducible metaphysical part: This ‫ אל‬his way is perfect; the promise of Yhwh proves true; he is a shield for all those who take refuge in him . . . This ‫ אל‬is my strong refuge, and has made my way safe. (2 Sam. 22.31, 33)

Clearly, ‘thisness’ is not here meant to indicate metaphysical individuation. To see why this is the case, and also in order to pursue a different direction in relating the HB to the present discussion, consider how Scotus’s notion also has an antecedent in Aristotle’s notion of the ‘soul’ (psyche, ψυχή) as essence or form of any living thing. This was not assumed to be a substance separable from the body (as a later Christian notion came to view it). Moreover, it was the possession of soul (of a specific kind) that makes an entity that specific entity. In the HB, a related concept would be the nephesh of an ‫אלהים‬, even if the meaning thereof was not in every way identical to that of the Greek philosophical sense. More specifically, for the sake of the present argument we may experiment with the hypothesis that the closest the HB comes to making the thisness of an ‫ אלהים‬explicit is via the notion of its ‘self’, for example, the very thing that makes an ‫ אלהים‬like Yhwh this thing and not something else. Yhwh was indeed said to have a self or nepesh, an individuating phenomenon not shared with any other thing and which could not be metaphysically reduced to additional mereological parts. Consider, for example, the following references thereto: 1. And I will make my abode among you, and my nepesh shall not abhor you. (Lev. 26.11)

Whatness and a Scotian Interpretation

65

2. Your new moons and your appointed feasts my nephesh hates; they have become a burden to me. (Isa. 1.14) 3. Therefore my nephesh moans like a lyre for Moab, and my heart for Kirhe’res. (Isa. 16. 11) 4. Behold my servant, whom I uphold, my chosen, in whom my nephesh delights. (Isa. 42.1) 5. I have given the beloved of my nephesh into the hands of her enemies. (Jer. 12.7) 6. Yhwh tests the righteous and the wicked, and his nephesh hates him that loves violence. (Ps. 11.5) Clearly, in these texts the nephesh is, besides being the seat of emotions, also assumed to be the quintessential divine self, the innermost residue of particular ‫אלהים‬- ness, easily substituted with the pronoun ‘I’. In an adapted Scotian reading, then, haecceities as essences are distinct real properties of ‫ אלהים‬substances. If the (secondary) substance of an ‫ אלהים‬is its genus, for example, generic ‘ruach ’ (as opposed to the individual ‘ruach ’ or ‘breath’ of or in a particular ‫)אלהים‬, perhaps one could then say that the non-qualitative property is something approximating the nephesh or self. To be sure, this is not what Scotus had in mind, especially since the term ‘haecceity’ technica lly refers only to a non- qualitative property responsible for individuation and identity in members of a species. It is not exactly a bare particular in the sense of something underlying the properties of an ‫( אלהים‬such as a primary substance) – a view that would doubtless have struck Scotus as inconsistent with his variety of essentialism. If the substance of an ‫ אלהים‬is a collection of tightly unified properties, all but one are qualitative. This one non-qualitative property is its haecceity. Whatever the case may be, the idea of an ‫’א להים‬s haecceity is taken to explain the possibility of the distinction of one particular ‫ אלהים‬from another. The common nature or quiddity of an ‫ אלהים‬is thus thought to require a real property distinct from the ‫ אלהים‬nature, that is, its haecceity. As our adaptation of Scotus’s perspective takes it, it is the divisibility of the ‫ אלהים‬nature that allows its instantiability, and the unity of the ‫ אלהים‬nature that explains commonality of the ‫ אלהים‬kind. The obvious claim here is supposed to be that not all real diversity among ‫ אלהים‬is numerical. A Scotian perspective implies that, if the only way in which various ‫ אל הים‬differed were numerical, then

66

What Is a God?

all ‫ אלהים‬would be equally distinct. But even in the HB there are degrees of distinction: Yhwh and other ‫ אלהים‬were not as individuals distinguished in species. This shows the possibility of abstracting a common nature from the individual nature. On this to pic, m any texts from the HB can be quoted as examples, yet only a few must s uffice, particularly those referring to Yhwh being one of the ‫אלהים‬, instantiating typical ‫ אלהים‬properties, and yet, being incomparably different ( here i n a matter of fact sense, rather than in any metaphysically significant way): 1. ‘Who is like you, o Yhwh, among the ‫ ?אלים‬Who is like thee, majestic in holiness, terrible in glorious deeds, doing wonders? (Exod. 15.11) 2. And they forsook Yhwh, the ‫ אלהים‬of their fathers, who had brought them out of the land of Egypt; they went after other ‫אלהים‬, from among the ‫ אלהים‬of the peoples who were round about them, and bowed down to them. (Judg. 2.12) 3. There is none like you among the ‫אלהים‬, o Yhwh, nor are there any works like yours. (Ps. 86.8) Again, the reference here is not to Yhwh’s haecceity. Although the ‫אלהים‬ common nature is never without some features in extra- mental particular ‫אלהים‬, the ‫ אלהים‬common nature is not any particular ‫ אלהים‬of itself. Instead, from a Sc otian perspective, as is traditional in Platon ist metaphysics, it is prior to all ‫( אלהים‬cf. Scotus, OO, Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, n. 32). As we saw, this alone could explain the diversity of properties instantiated among things in the HB that, despite their differences, are all called ‫אלהים‬. For, to possess in itself a non-numerical unity, the reference of ‘‫ ’אלהים‬as common nature must have some sort of independent being too. Divisibi lity of an ‫ אלהים‬into subjective ‫ אלהים‬parts is, of course, different from the question of the division of Yhwh from all other ‫ אלהים‬things within the species. Here the following points should suffice: 1. A specific difference in ‫ אלהים‬is something indivisible into further ‫אלהים‬ species, and, indeed, explanatory of the ‫ אלהים‬species’ indivisibility into further ‫ אלהים‬species (as opposed to a plurality of types, cf. Scotus, OO, Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5–6, n. 177).

Whatness and a Scotian Interpretation

67

2. Equally, an ultimate specific difference in an ‫ אלהים‬is primarily diverse from any other, in the sense that the specific difference of an ‫ אלהים‬has a concept that is absolutely simple and thus cannot even overlap with the concept of any other such difference (cf. Scotus, OO, Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5–6, n. 183). 3. A negation of what an ‫ אלהים‬is that it is not in any way real: it is not an ‫ אלהים‬thing, or a real form or property of an ‫ אלהים‬type of thing. As our Scotian perspective sees it, claiming that individuation in ‫ אלהים‬could be by a negation is just a way of restating the problem of what an ‫ אלהים‬is, not of proposing an explanatory solution to it (cf. Scotus, OO, Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, n. 49). In this way, Scotus’s metaphysics of essences does not simply provide us with a po ssib l e explanation for individuation within the ‫ אלהים‬as species (i.e. what an ‫ אלהים‬is in relation to the common nature). It also presents us with the conceptual apparatus for an explanation of the identity conditions of being a ver y specific individual ‫אלהים‬. Since the haecceity of an ‫ אלהים‬is supposed to explain that property of what it means to be a particular ‫אלהים‬, Scotus’s adapted view is more fundamental than and differs radically from modern perspectives on haecceity, all of which might construe it as a primitive prop erty of being a particular ‫אלהים‬, or the concept of being identical with this or that ‫אלהים‬.

11

Whatness and a Cartesian Notion of an ‫’אלהים‬s Principal Attribute

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? In our perspectives from the early mediaeval period, the essence of an ‫אלהים‬ was still thought of as being located in extra-mental reality, and also that this could be known for a fact. However, in perspectives on whatness from the late mediaeval period and early modern age thereafter, such metaphysical realism and epistemological optimism will now begin to fade from the discussion. Although some philosophers at this point still imply that things like ‫אלהים‬ can be said to possess actual natures or essences, we will now invoke readings that call into doubt whether reason as such is capable of attaining an adequate conception thereof Like the scholastics before him, Rene Descartes (1596– 1650) suggested a view that we may adapt to assume that substances were the most basic units of existence. However, in our adaptation of a Cartesian perspective we come across the notion that the substance of an ‫ אלהים‬does not have a tight connection to the essence of an ‫אלהים‬. This in turn would mean that what counts as supposedly essential to being an ‫ אלהים‬becomes problematic. For (as can be seen from Descartes’s meditation of the essence of wax) we might only have a distinction of reason (and not in actuality) between the substance of an ‫אלהים‬ and any one of its (essential) attributes; or between any two attributes of its substance (see The Philosophical Writings of Descartes [CSM] 1: 214). In other wor d s, the most significant rational distinc tion here is that between the substance of an ‫ אלהים‬and its essence – or what, in the relevant terminology, can be said to be some or other ‘principal attribute’ thereof (see

70

What Is a God?

CSM 1: 210). What this means for our interpretation of the question of whatness is that, instead of responding thereto by hoping to describe all essential properties of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, we would do better to limit our concern to only whatever a text implies was assumed to be its main property, that is, the most important one. This distinction between the substance of an ‫ אלהים‬and a Cartesian principal at trib u te is, however, in a modernist epistemology, only conceptual. Despite having two concepts (i.e. the ‘principal attribute’ and the ‘substance’ of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB), they are not assumed to actually correspond to two different things in the world of the text. In this metaphysics, at least, there is no such thing as the substance of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB without its principal attribute. The implications of this for any investigation into the whatness of an ‫אלהים‬ is far-reac h ing. We can now, without going through every text of the HB, identif y at least two substances inherent in an ‫אלהים‬, (not in ‘God’ within Cartesian philosophical theology) each of which comes with their own principal a ttri b ute. On the one hand, there is the matter that constitutes substance in an ‫אלהים‬. The principal attribute of matter in Cartesian metaphysics is ‘extension’ (in space). Thus extension is one of the principal attributes of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. On the other there is the mind of an ‫אלהים‬, the principal attribute of which is ‘thought’. In this regard, we have already seen that the HB assumes an ‫ אלהים‬has a body. In the following examples it shows that, in some contexts, an ‫( אלהים‬like Yhwh) was also assumed to think (‫)חשב‬: 1. You have multiplied, O Yhwh my ‫אלהים‬, your wondrous deeds and your thoughts toward us. (Ps. 40.5) 2. How great are your works, O Yhwh! Your thoughts are very deep! (Ps. 92.5) 3. For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, says Yhwh. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts. (Isa. 55.8–9) 4. But they do not know the thoughts of Yhwh, they do not understand his plan, that he has gathered them as sheaves to the threshing floor. (Mic. 4.12) It does not follow that the texts quoted above assumed this to be the essence of an ‫אלהים‬. Yet, from a Cartesian perspective, in as much as an ‫ אלהים‬can be

Whatness and a Cartesian Notion

71

said to (also) be an embodied mind, and in as much as the essence of mind is thought, the latter becomes the new unlikely candidate for the essence of an ‫אלהים‬. In other words, extension of the body of an ‫ אלהים‬and the thought of the mind of an ‫ אלהים‬are also the Cartesian principal attributes of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, that is, that which, from this perspective at least, makes it what it is (or at least provides some sort of basic response to the question of what it is). Yet, clearly, these properties (basically synonymous with ‘attributes’) are not unique to a n ‫אלהים‬. Consequently, it cannot be these things in themselves that were assumed to be what makes an ‫ אלהים‬an ‫אלהים‬. What is, however, quite clear, is that in the HB each of the two postulated substances of an ‫אלהים‬ could not exist without their own essence or principal attribute (a metaphysical claim). In fact, the substances of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB (body and mind) cannot even be clearly conceived without their essences or principal attributes (an epistemological claim). In our adaptation of a Cartesian metaphysics of essence, besides there being the sub stanc es of an ‫’אלהים‬s principal attribute, there would also be noted what can be called ‘modes’, that is, other non-essential but typical attributes of the substances of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. These modes are much less intimately connected to the substances of an ‫ אלהים‬than its principal attribute is, which means that the latter could conceivably exist without any particular one of the former (though it could not exist without any modes at all). For instance, the substance of an ‫’אלהים‬s body in the HB could exist without being humanoid in form, but it could not exist without being shaped. The mode of an ‫אלהים‬ in the HB is therefore just a particular way of being the principal attribute of a substance of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. Broken down further, on this view, the essence of the material part of the substance of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is extension via the length of an ‫אלהים‬, the width of an ‫ אלהים‬and the depth of an ‫אלהים‬. The extended substance of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB also possesses additional modes such as the size of an ‫אלהים‬, the shape of an ‫אלהים‬, the position of an ‫אלהים‬, the motion of an ‫ אלהים‬and so on. All of these relate to accidental properties already noted in the context of category theory going all the way back to Aristotle. The same can be said of the other substance of an ‫אלהים‬, that is, its mind. From a Car t esian point of view, it was assumed to have two chief powers

72

What Is a God?

or faculties, that is, intellect and will. The intellectual (or perceiving) power of an ‫ אלהים‬can, on this view at least, be further divided into the modes of pure intellect, imagination and sense perception. Pure intellect in an ‫אלהים‬ in the HB in this sense operated independently of the body of an ‫ ;אלהים‬while imagination and sense perception depended upon the body of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB for their operation (as did corporeal memory). The will of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is, for an adapted Cartesian perspective, also divided into various modes, including desire, aversion, assertion, denial and doubt. These always require some intellectual content (whether pure, imagined or sensory) for an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB upon which to operate. In the midst of all this is postulated a latent rationality in the HB’s ideas about an ‫אלהים‬. Such ‘reason’ is nothing but the capacity to grasp the essences of an ‫אלהים‬, which in turn supposedly explain two things: 1. why an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB exists as ‫;אלהים‬ 2. why these patterns and regularities in ‫ אלהים‬rather than others exist. A Cartesian view takes for granted that to grasp the essence of the ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is to know a priori the structure and behaviour of the ‫ אלהים‬of which it is the essence. Such a rationalist perspective on the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬thus involves a strong reaction against Aristotelian empiricism. While from our Aristotelia n perspective we learned that the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB can be known by examining instances in the text and extracting the essence theref rom, a Cartesian view turns this formulation on its head. It suggests that characters and readers learn the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬solely through the intellect, and only afterward, if ever, can they look at all the entities in the world of the text and recognize what is an ‫אלהים‬. In sum then, Descartes’s metaphysics of essence can be adapted and reapplied to look at an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as something that has two inner essences or principal attributes, each linked to a substance of an ‫אלהים‬, and their presence explains the structure of an ‫ אלהים‬as it ordinarily appears. These essences of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, which are not the body and mind but rather their principal attributes, can be known by reason alone.

12

Whatness and Lockean Anti-essentialism about ‫ אלהים‬as Sortal

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? In this regard, John Locke (1632– 1704) is often seen as the father of antiessentialism. Of course, this is the case, as it is with everyone else in this study, not so much with regard to ‘God’ in his own philosophical theology but in our adaptation and reapplication of his metaphysics of essences. Based on the latter we can safely say that, with reference to the HB’s use of ‫ אלהים‬as common name, the properties of an ‫ אלהים‬are only essential to it insofar as one is thinking of it under a particular ‘sortal’ term. The latter can be identified as the way generic ‫ אלהים‬is used so that this use presupposes the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

a criterion for counting ‫;אלהים‬ a criterion of identity and non-identity among the ‫;אלהים‬ a criterion for the continued existence of an ‫;אלהים‬ an implied answer to the question ‘what is it?’ for an ‫;אלהים‬ an implied specification of the essence of ‫ אלהים‬as kind; not being applicable to parts of things that are of the ‫ אלהים‬kind.

The concept of generic ‫ אלהים‬as a ‘sortal’ can be discussed with reference to Locke’s 1690 Essay Concerning Human Understanding where he wrote: But it being evident, that things are ranked under Names into sorts or Species . . . the Essence of each Genus, or Sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract Idea, which the General, or Sortal (if I may have leave so to call it, from Sort, as I do General from Genus) Name stands for. And this we shall find to be that, which the word Essence imports, in its most familiar use. (Locke 1975, Bk III, Ch. iii, 15)

74

What Is a God?

It is important to take cognizance of the fact that when Locke thought of a species or genus, he was not thinking of these terms as applying exclusively in the biological realm, but rather as applying generally to any possible classification scheme that we create when the text organizes its world through naming, including things like the ‫אלהים‬. Adapted and reapplied, Locke’s view contributes the following important distinction: 1. The nominal essence of an ‫ אלהים‬is that abstract idea or concept implicit in a given text that assumed similar qualities shared by all or most members of that kind. 2. The real essence of an ‫ אלהים‬is whatever was assumed to make an ‫אלהים‬ what it is, and which a given text presupposed as being the underlying cause of the observable qualities of the substance of the ‫ אלהים‬as kind. As regards the first kind of essence, the term ‘nominal’ concerns only the ways in which words were used for the sort of entity an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be. A Lockean view indicates that such a classifying of ‫ אלהים‬substances based on their similar qualities is therefore not indicative of actual whatness in any real sense. It concerns only the names (nomina) applied to it, not the thing an ‫ אלהים‬as substance is. This nominal essence of the generic term ‘‫ ’אלהים‬in the HB allows in turn for the kind of nominal definitions found in scholarly lexicographic and theological dictionary entries there under. What made the nominal essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB an essence was that it conta i ned both the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be called or classified as being an ‫אלהים‬. This includes idols, and everything else in t he extension worshipped as ‫אלהים‬, even when it is denied that they are actually ‫אלהים‬. In this regard, consider the following examples of the use of ‫ אלהים‬as common name presupposing, from a Lockean point of view, the presence of some nominal essence through equivocation: 1. They sacrificed to demons which were no ‫אלוה‬, to ‫ אלהים‬they had never known, to new ‫ אלהים‬that had come in of late, whom your fathers had never dreaded. (Deut. 32.17) 2. They have stirred me to jealousy with what is no ‫ ;אל‬they have provoked me with their idols. (Deut. 32.21) 3. And have cast their ‫ אלהים‬into the fire; for they were no ‫אלהים‬, but the work of men’s hands, wood and stone; therefore they were destroyed. (Isa. 37.19)

Whatness and Lockean Anti-essentialism

75

4. Has a nation changed its ‫אלהים‬, even though they are no ‫ ?אלהים‬But my people have changed their glory for that which does not profit. (Jer. 2.11) 5. Can man make for himself ‫ ?אלהים‬Such are no ‫( !אלהים‬Jer. 16.20) These texts assume but do not spell out necessary and sufficient conditions for being called an ‫אלהים‬. In addition, the reading into these texts of the idea that Locke called a nominal essence explains why things called ‫ אלהים‬can also be denied to be ‫אלהים‬. The common name ‘‫ ’אלהים‬in the HB is in this sense therefore clearly only a word for an abstract, general Idea. It is also a concept into which individual things called ‫ אלהים‬in the generic sense were sorted, thus playing a role in the classification of the world in the text. Such a Lockean point of view on the whatness of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB can be called anti-essentialist because it is based on assumptions contrary to the tradition of so-called Aristotelian essentialism. According to Locke (1975, Bk III, Ch. vi, 4): That essence, in the ordinary use of the word, relates to sorts; and that it is considered in particular beings no farther than as they are ranked into sorts; but take away the abstract ideas, by which we sort individuals, and rank them under common names, and then the thought of anything essential to any of them instantly vanishes.

A Locke an under s tanding of the nominal essence of an ‫ אלהים‬can thus be seen as a critical response to neo- Aristotelian realism about essences in the scholasticism of late mediaeval and early renaissance natural philosophy. In our adaptation of Locke, the term ‘essence’ no longer only refers to what made an ‫ אלהים‬what it is, its ‘substantial form’. The use of the common name no longer refers to an ‫’אלהים‬s supposed imperceptible, immaterial principle that imposed order onto the matter that it was joined with and which made a particular ‫ אלהים‬a member of that species or genus, imbuing it with all of its relevant characteristics, that is, its essential properties. Yet a Lockean perspective would agree that knowledge of what an ‫אלהים‬ in the HB was required some sort of knowledge of a kind of essence. Yet, on his anti-realist terms, no real essences are to be known and, analogous to the state of affairs above, no real definitions of an ‫ אלהים‬as substance (Locke 1975, Bk III, Ch. vi, 18):

76

What Is a God?

Men can have no ideas of real essences. The real essences of those things which we distinguish into species, and as so distinguished we name, ought to be known; i.e. we ought to have ideas of them. But since we are ignorant . . . the supposed real essences of things stand us not in stead for the distinguishing substances into species.

With this denial of the possibility of attaining real definitions, the whole essentialist and realist philosophical tradition that began with Socrates with regard to what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be is brought into question. For to discover the real definition of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB one would need to recreate the impossible state of affairs where one could investigate the thing or things denoted by the word ‫ אלהים‬as common noun to say what it is. Unlike in the case of the Biblical Hebrew lexicographer, the HB scholar adopting a philosophical perspective on what it means to be an ‫ אלהים‬cannot anymore limit the inquiry to explicating the meaning and use of the common nouns in the HB. In addition to the above, a Lockean reading might also call to attention the related notion of what from this perspective may be called the ‘qualities’ of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. These, rather than some essence, are assumed to have ‘the power to produce any Idea in our mind’ (Bk II, Ch. viii, 8). Also, there are three distinct categories of qualities to be discerned on this scheme: 1. Primary qualities are what would be the inseparable features of an ‫אלהים‬ in the HB, e.g. its size, shape, solidity, mobility, texture, weight, etc. (Bk II, Ch. viii, 9). 2. Secondary qualities are what the HB assumes to be the colors, sounds, smells, etc., of an ‫אלהים‬. These features do not exist in themselves, but rather are the powers of the primary qualities of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as object to produce an idea of a certain kind in the characters (Bk II, Ch. viii,10). 3. Tertiary qualities of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB would be those powers assumed to be in it that, by virtue of the primary qualities, give it the power to produce observable changes in the primary qualities of other things, e.g. the power of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB to create things (Bk II, Ch. viii, 23). Th is s u gg ests that the ways in which the texts of the HB construct a nominal essence for an ‫ אלהים‬involved a cobbling together of a collection of

Whatness and Lockean Anti-essentialism

77

pa rtic u la r qualities that characters in the text observed together in an ‫ אלהים‬as substance. The choice of qualities involved made that collection definitive of the species or genus in a given context. In contrast, any supposed real essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB would be constituted by the insensible parts of its body, on which those qualities mentioned in the nominal essence depend (Bk III, Ch. vi, 2). And since we have no linguistic access to this (Locke 1975, Bk III, Ch. vi, 4), it can be taken to deny that, for us at least, there is anything essential to a particular ‫אלהים‬. For no matter what sensible properties, characteristics or attributes were assumed to be instantiated by an ‫ אלהים‬in the world of the text, however we may describe these in a meta-language: None of these are essential . . . till the Mind refers it to some Sort or Species of things; and then presently, according to the abstract Idea of that sort, something is found essential. Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and he will find, that as soon as he supposes or speaks of Essential, the consideration of some Species, or the complex Idea, signified by some general name, comes into his Mind: And ‘tis in reference to that, that this or that Quality is said to be essential.

S o t hat if it be asked, whether something is really essential to an ‫אלהים‬ it sel f, Locke would say no; no more than it is essential to this white thing I write on, to have words in it. Hence, one can only ever come up with potentially more or less accurate nominal definitions of ‫ אלהים‬as common name, but never with a real definition that could meaningfully specify the essence of that thing the common name was assumed to refer to.

13

Whatness and Leibnizian Superessentialism about Necessity in an ‫אלהים‬

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? Usua l ly this inquiry might be taken to assume that an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB has some properties that are essential and some that are accidental. Rarely, however, would it be claimed that all of an ‫’אלהים‬s properties as instantiated in various contexts of the HB are essential to it. However, what some have called ‘superessentialism’ or ‘maximal essentialism’ is sometimes attributed to some of the ideas of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716). In our adaptation of a Leibnizian point of view, we can also translate this kind of essentialism reconstructed here into modal terms, that is, what any given ‫’אלהים‬s properties were, they were assumed to be such necessarily (see Leibniz, Die philosophischen Schriften [G] II, 41–2/AG, 72–3). To make sense of what is happening here, let us retrace our steps. According to the history of the metaphysics of essence stated in this study, the concept of an essence of ‫ אלהים‬fell into disrepute after being subjected to a critique by both rationalist and empiricist points of view in the modern period. Yet, in the midst of this, a Leibnizian reading attempts to return to the Aristotelian tradit ion by way of a sustained attempt at progressively articulating what Aristotle meant (or should have meant) by the concept of ‘form’. Adapted and reapplied, a Leibnizian perspective on what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as substance was assumed to be appears to imply a very strong version of modal essentialism. In other words, for any individual ‫אלהים‬, there is a property P such that necessarily, if an ‫ אלהים‬is a character in the world of the text of the HB, it instantiates P. In other words, there is some property that

80

What Is a God?

is essential to being an ‫אלהים‬. Going further, let superessentialism regarding the properties of an ‫ אלהים‬in the generic sense be defined as the idea that for any individual ‫אלהים‬, and for any property P instantiated by it, necessarily, if an ‫ אלהים‬is a character in the world of the text of the HB, then an ‫ אלהים‬has P. Given t he above, it would appear that f rom a Leibnizia n perspective as adopted and adapted here, every property of an individual ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be essential to it. Moreover, in this metaphysical perspective at least, essential properties and necessary properties in an ‫ אלהים‬are clearly assumed to be more or less the same thing. This fol lows from the a ssumption within Leibnizian essentialism that each individual ‫ אלהים‬has a ‘complete concept’ containing all past, present and future predicates true of it, or from which all its predicates are deducible (cf. Leibniz G II, 15). In turn comes to mind Leibniz’s view on the so-called Identity of Indiscernibles; the failure of identical reference is the key to seeing that all of an ‫’אלהים‬s properties are essential to it. In this way, at least Leibniz’s New Essays can be taken to undermine Lockean ha rd a nti- essentialism that we saw in the previous chapter. His ideas here imply that if we could know the inner essence of an ‫אלהים‬, we would find it present in all ‫אלהים‬. And since we find no fixed inner feature that always and in every context of the HB generates a subdivision in an ‫אלהים‬, we have no ground s for thinking that the truth about their inner natures implies that there is any essential specific difference among the ‫( אלהים‬cf. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe [A] VI, vi, 325–6/ New Essays on Human Understanding [RB], 325–6). From an adapted Leibnizian point of view then, and in the context of the HB, each ‫ אלהים‬as substance has an infinitely complex complete concept that specifies everything that will ever happen to it. Thus, somehow, it is contained in the complete concept of an ‫ אלהים‬like Yhwh, for example, that this deity liberated Israel from Egypt (along with everything else that can be truly predicated of Yhwh as an ‫)אלהים‬. Interestingly, this seems to imply that all of an ‫’אלהים‬s actions are necessary and that, consequently, they are not free. Yet, Leibniz’s view can also be taken as a form of compatibilism, that is, everything an ‫ אלהים‬does is both determined and free. Part of a Leibnizian strategy for showing how such a view is coherent would be to say that an ‫ אלהים‬like

Whatness and Leibnizian Superessentialism

81

Yhwh had rea sons for liberating Israel from Egypt to which the deity was both inclined and which were necessary. In other words, instead of trying to probe the text for some supposed essential properties, all properties mentioned and implied with reference to depictions of the actions of any given ‫ אלהים‬in the HB can, on this view at least, be assumed as being both necessary and essential. Consider the following texts from the HB in this regard: Then he said, ‘I am the ‫אל‬, the ‫ אלהים‬of your father; do not be afraid to go down to Egypt; for I will there make of you a great nation’. (Gen. 46.3) Be still, and know that I am an ‫אלהים‬. I am exalted among the nations, I am exalted in the earth! (Ps. 46.10) Hear, O my people, and I will speak, O Israel, I will testify against you. I am an ‫אלהים‬, your ‫אלהים‬. (Ps. 50.7) ‘I am an ‫אל‬, and also henceforth I am it; there is none who can deliver from my hand; I work and who can hinder it?’ (Isa. 43.13)

In a Leibnizian metaphysics, an ‫ אלהים‬like Yhwh cannot but be, not only an ‫ אלהים‬but also this particular ‫אלהים‬, acting in these particular ways. Adapted to the present discussion, this view can be seen as an attempt to answer the question of why it is that an ‫ אלהים‬did, does and will do such and so? The reply is taken to be easy: otherwise it would not be an ‫( אלהים‬A VI, iv, 1576/ Phi loso phi cal Essays [AG], 61). This, in turn, is here interpreted to suggest some sort of superessentialism and therewith a denial of the doctrine of the transworld (in the text) identity of an ‫אלהים‬. In other words, every representation of an ‫( אלהים‬like Yhwh), no matter how idiosyncratic, stereotypical, or contradictory, is assumed to be essentially what it is. O n this vi ew, however, there seems to be a difficulty in distinguishing those properties of an ‫ אלהים‬that were traditionally thought of as being essential from those that were thought to be mere accidents. In other words, if all properties of an ‫ אלהים‬are essential, is there any difference between it being an ‫ אלהים‬and totally random features involved in its representation, for example, wearing a robe in Isaiah’s vision in the temple? That is, was it assumed that

82

What Is a God?

ever y property a particular ‫ אלהים‬instantiates at a particular time in a particular text is absolutely necessary for it to be an ‫?אלהים‬ A Leibnizian response to these questions might invoke the standard, Aristotelian distinction between essential properties and accidents in ‫אלהים‬. However, this time it involves saying that the thing which is called an ‫אלהים‬ cannot cease to be an ‫אלהים‬, but it can begin or cease to function in a specific manner, for example, being an ‫ אלהים‬to Israel (cf. Leibniz, A VI, iv, 740/Logical Papers [LLP], 47). Thus the ‫ אלהים‬as species contribute one level of prop erties held in common by all members to any individual ‫אלהים‬. But there are also individuating essential properties, that is, those that single out a particular ‫ אלהים‬from other members of the same ‫ אלהים‬species and which – here comes the curious part – are nevertheless such that, lacking them, that ‫ אלהים‬would no longer be an ‫אלהים‬. Thus, not all things in the HB called ‫ אלהים‬are by nature immortal (e.g. the king, Samuel, Moses, etc.), yet if Yhwh should cease to be so, some texts would assume that Yhwh would no longer be an ‫אלהים‬. In this way, Leibnizian superessentialism employs the distinction between ne ce ssar y a nd conti ngent properties in an ‫ אלהים‬within the conte xt of the essence/ accident binary opposition. Those properties that are said to be necessary are actually the same as specific essential properties in an ‫אלהים‬. Thus the properties that were assumed to make an ‫ אלהים‬the kind of thing it is are few, while the individuating essential properties that make an individual ‫אלהים‬ retain its particular identity are many. Also in many contexts in the HB, texts expressing the following confession can be taken to have possibly assumed as much: 1. Yhwh passed before him, and proclaimed, ‘Yhwh, Yhwh, an ‫ אל‬merciful and gracious, slow to anger, and abounding in steadfast love and faithfulness’. (Exod. 34.6) 2. But thou, o Yhwh are an ‫ אל‬merciful and gracious, slow to anger and abounding in steadfast love and faithfulness. (Ps. 86.15) A number of texts in the HB list more or less these same properties popula rly taken to be essential but which, from many a technical philosophical perspective, are actually accidental to Yhwh as an ‫אלהים‬. Yet, at least from a Leibnizian perspective, on the level of individuating essences, these properties

Whatness and Leibnizian Superessentialism

83

can be said to be essential to what an ‫ אלהים‬like Yhwh qua ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be. Yet, no biblical scholars I know of have used Leibnizian metaphysics to contextualize their essentialist claims, although perhaps it is precisely here that they could look for the possibility of a gradual elision of essential properties with necessary properties in an ‫ אלהים‬like Yhwh in the HB. It should be noted, however, that some philosophers have with good reason argued that Leibniz was not, in fact, a superessentialist. For example, in his other writings we also find that essential and necessary properties are sometimes assumed to be two different things. For example, some ideas of the philosopher imply that whatever is assumed to be necessary for an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB may not have been assumed to constitute its essence. For example, being worshipped is often assumed to be necessary for being an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, but an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is something other than everything that is worshipped. In other words, there are plenty of properties of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB which some texts might assume to be ‘necessary’, yet for us to call them ‘essential’ would lead to a very confused metaphysics. Still, Leibniz’s perspective is taken here, for the sake of the argument as part of a thought experiment, to imply that any account of the identity of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB can only be an essentialist one. Moreover, in addition to the essence/ accident and necessary/contingent conflations, a Leibnizian perspective also offers us three overlapping but distinct interpretations of the nature of the essence of an ‫אלהים‬, namely 1. The essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as a feature that is thoroughly natural and physical, that is, the intrinsic source of ‫ אלהים‬action; 2. The essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as a more abstract notion, caught in the concept of a ‘principle’ according to which an ‫ אלהים‬exists; 3. The essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as a way of conceptualizing what is primitive in an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as a substance, that is, force. The third notion above is typically Leibnizian, and distinguishes an adaptation of his views on whatness and essence from an Aristotelian perspective, the latter being less attentive to how the mind constructs the phenomenon in question. In this sense at least, a Leibnizian reading is already leaning towards the kind of epistemological limits and cognitive constructivism operative

84

What Is a God?

with reference to the idea of essence (and the question of what something as such is) that became popular through Kant. In sum then, in our adaptation of Leibniz’s metaphysics of essence we may say that, from this perspective at least, there are certain properties within an ‫ אלהים‬that necessa rily differentiate it from all other species and also other pro perties that dist inguish a particular ‫ אלהים‬from all other individuals within that species. On this point, our reapplied Leibnizian metaphysics is in a sense still traditionalist, implying a real, essential distinction between what an ‫ אלהים‬is as opposed to what other beings were assumed to be. Yet, insofar as this view has bee n taken to imply that all properties of an individual ‫ אלהים‬are essential to that individual, Leibniz’s metaphysics offers us a new, different and radical way of approaching the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be.

14

Whatness and a Kantian Concept of an ‫ אלהים‬as Thing-in-Itself

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? Consider the possibilities. One could learn about the use of ‘‫ ’אלהים‬as common noun in the HB from various linguistic perspectives. One could learn about the way an ‫ אלהים‬is depicted as a character in a biblical narrative. One cou ld learn about the evolution of the concept of ‫ אלהים‬in the history of Israelite religion. One could learn about how constructions of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB compare with similar entities in the ancient Near East. One could learn about ‫ אל הים‬against t he b ackdrop of social contexts from which texts of the HB arose in the legitimation of religious beliefs and practices. One could learn about the nature of Yhwh as ‫ אלהים‬in all the theologies of the HB. But even if you knew all of t his, at least according to our adaptation of the ideas of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), you still cannot actually say what an ‫ אלהים‬is (cf. Lectures on Metaphysics [LM] II, 137). Be that as it may, Kant’s view still allows us to speak of whatness in an ‫אלהים‬, even if we cannot directly elaborate on the details (cf. Kant 1999 [13: 67]). What an ‫ אלהים‬is, at least for us in this chapter, is not a Platonic Form but a (Kantian) ‘concept’. The latter is comprised of all essential components of an ‫ אלהים‬and consists of both the primitive and constitutive ‘characteristics’ (grounds of the essence) and ‘attributes’ (consequents of the essence) (cf. Kant 1999 [13: 144]). In the traditional jargon (e.g. of Locke), we might also speak of an ‫’אלהים‬s ‘real essence’, which is thought to contain ‘the first ground of possibility’. But in the end, as empirical concept in the HB, the concept ‫ אלהים‬can only be nominally defined (again Locke).

86

What Is a God?

Whatness for Kant can at best be given in terms of an ‫’אלהים‬s attributes and not by way of its constitutive characteristics (which are given in a real definition). The reason for restriction in the adapted Kantian point of view is because, instead of the traditional focus on ‫ אלהים‬as object in the ontological question ‘What is X?’, we turn our attention to everyone else, constructed as subjects of knowledge. Moreover, instead of trying to see how one was assumed to know what an ‫ אלהים‬was, we must instead take a step back and inquire as to what the HB assumed to be the conditions of possibility for – as well as the limits to – human knowing about an ‫אלהים‬. (cf. in the Critique of Pure Reason [CPR], Kant 1998a [I/5 A: 93–4]; 1998b [I/5 B: 126]). The relevant distinction to be drawn here is not so much between essential and accidental properties of an ‫אלהים‬. Instead, it is between an ‫’אלהים‬s essence and appearance. According to a Kantian reading, the appearance of an ‫אלהים‬ is not the manifestation of an objective essence. Instead, it is merely a subjective representation evoked by that essence. Thus, if I point to an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB and list its seemingly important attributes, this can never capture the full essence (or ‘being’) of an ‫ אלהים‬in the strict Kantian sense. Whatness and essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the reapplied Kantian point of view is neither what is only sensed nor what is only perceived. Only if I try to take out (abstract) everythi ng in an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB which has reference to the a priori conditions of knowledge, then I shall arrive at an unknown ‘something’, which itself will be indeterminate. A Kantian reading might speak of the latter as an ‘‫ אלהים‬in-itself’; this in order to distinguish it from an ‫אלהים‬as-it-appears to us (cf. Kant 1998a [A: 97– 8]). This distinction states the difference between an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as transcendental object or ‘noumenon’ as opposed to ‫ אלהים‬as appearance or phenomenon (all in the world of the text, of course). In other words, an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is not what it appears to be from the point of view of the biblical characters’ sense and experience, from the perspective of the language used by the narrator to describe it, or in its relation to other things in the world of the text. What an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is in itself would be some ineffable reality before sense experience, language and interpret ation perceives it as something. This we cannot know since we cannot leave the concept of ‫ אלהים‬behind so as to see what it refers to.

Whatness and a Kantian Concept

87

In other words, all we have access to when it comes to an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB are its language-wrapped relations to other things (i.e. its relational or extrinsic properties). We have no knowledge of an ‫’אלהים‬s non- relational constitution (i.e. its non-relational or intrinsic properties only) (cf. Kant 1998b [B: 67]). Indeed, when we turn to the HB, some texts can be taken to presuppose that being an ‫ אלהים‬is always a relational (even emergent) property of the thing itself (‘‫)’אלהיםל‬: 1. And Jacob swore an oath saying, if ‫ אלהים‬will be with me and protect me on the way I am going and gives me food to eat and clothes to wear and I return in peace to the house of my father than Yhwh will be an ‫ אלהים‬to me. (Gen. 28.21) 2. . . . and I will take you for my people, and I will be your ‫ ;אלהים‬and you shall know that I am Yhwh your ‫אלהים‬, who has brought you out from under the burdens of the Egyptians. (Exod. 6.7) 3. And I will walk among you, and will be your ‫אלהים‬, and you shall be my people. (Lev. 26.12) 4. . . . that he may establish you this day as his people, and that he may be your ‫אלהים‬, as he promised you, and as he swore to your fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob. (Deut. 29.13) 5. But this command I gave them, ‘Obey my voice, and I will be your ‫אלהים‬, and you shall be my people; and walk in all the way that I command you, that it may be well with you’. (Jer. 7.23) 6. You shall dwell in the land which I gave to your fathers; and you shall be my people, and I will be your ‫אלהים‬. (Ezek. 36.28) In these texts, the property of being an ‫ אלהים‬can be meaningfully stated only as a relational or extrinsic property. In fact, any allegedly quintessential properties of an ‫ אלהים‬can only be meaningfully expressed when there is someone or something in relation to which it is this or that. Of course, one may argue that it is not being an ‫ אלהים‬that is relational, only being someone’s ‫אלהים‬. This objection has merit, especially inasmuch as the HB assumes the ‫ אלהים‬is identified as a species vis- à- vis humans. But the texts quoted above reveal a second use of ‫ אלהים‬besides bei ng indicative of a taxonomic rank. Here it does not designate a natural kind but the role of a ruler vis- à- vis a nation. In this context, to think of an ‫ אלהים‬without functional relations is like thinking there could be a parent without children or a master without

88

What Is a God?

servants. So the HB knows two distinct uses of the common name – natural kind status versus functional role – and these two should not be confused. But even in contexts featuring ‫ אלהים‬as natural kind, it is still a relational being with a relative identity. Because of the limitations of reason, there is in our conceptual framework a need for there to be other beings in relation to which an ‫ אלהים‬must coexist to have power over, a lifeworld in which to live forever; a profane world in which holiness stands out; and contexts as objects of reference which divine wisdom and knowledge are about. The idea of a powerful, knowledgeable, sacred and good entity on its own, somehow residing nowhere and in relation to nothing and nobody makes no sense at all. The so- called essential divine properties all presuppose relations (and an other, if you will), and so without the latter an ‫ אלהים‬cannot be powerful, knowing and good. Not because it is the opposite (weak, ignorant and evil) but because in non- relational states the subject– object distinction breaks down and all talk of divine attributes in some pre-creation space-time is meaningless. And without a communal language and social values, even self- knowledge, selfmastery and self-love have no foundation or purpose. If we accept this rather pessimistic conclusion concerning what is a priori knowable about being an ‫ – אלהים‬and the fact that, in itself, an ‫ אלהים‬is not an ‫( אלהים‬cf. the French painting, the English title of which is ‘This is not a pipe’), we can marvel at t he unanswerable quest ion as to what the thing in itself could possibly have been assumed to be. We can also understand why making a list of supposed essential properties (whatever we say these are) cannot tell us what an ‫ אלהים‬is in itself. From a Kantian point of view, we will never be able to articulate the whatness of an ‫ אלהים‬with regard to its essence; we can only refer to appearances, which in turn will always only involve how we make sense of things through the categories of our thinking. Thus, instead of trying to say what an ‫ אלהים‬is, a Kantian perspective might wish to determine how our cognitive apparatus’s concepts provide us with categories through which we must necessarily think of an ‫אלהים‬. A Kantian reading does not want us to look down to see what an ‫ אלהים‬really is. Instead, it wants us to step back to ask what the conditions must be to make the construction of ‘‫ ’אלהים‬as concept possible in the first place. This does not imply that we create an ‫אלהים‬, only that our perception of it works less like a camera and more like a decoder. If we can identify all of the possible forms of

Whatness and a Kantian Concept

89

objective empirical judgment, we can then hope to use them as the basis to discover all of the most general concepts or categories that are employed in making such judgments, and thus those that are employed in any cognition of ‫ אלהים‬type objects. In an epistemological internalization of Aristotle’s ontological categories, an adap ted Kanti a n perspective offers us a different set of concepts for approaching an ‫ אלהים‬by enumerating all possible form of judgment (cf. A70/ B 95- A93/ B109). More specifically, a Kantian view might wish to distinguish twelve pure concepts of the understanding (A80/B106) whenever we wish to make sense of an ‫אלהים‬. These are divided into four classes of three concepts each (where ‘X’ refers to the structure of judgments pertaining to space/time contexts and ‘P’ to a perceived property). In sum, the following are what a Kantian point of view understands to be all the possible ways of speaking about an ‫אלהים‬: 1. Quantity of ‫אלהים‬ a. Unity of ‫( אלהים‬This X is an ‫)אלהים‬ b. Plurality of ‫( אלהים‬Some X’s are ‫)אלהים‬ c. Totality of ‫( אלהים‬All X’s are ‫)אלהים‬ 2. Quality of ‫אלהים‬ a. Reality of ‫( אלהים‬An ‫ אלהים‬actually is [in] X) b. Negation of ‫( אלהים‬An ‫ אלהים‬is not [in] X) c. Limitation of ‫( אלהים‬An ‫ אלהים‬cannot [be in] X) 3. Relation of ‫אלהים‬ a. Inherence/Subsistence (substance/accident) of ‫( אלהים‬An ‫ אלהים‬is P/p) b. Causality/Dependence (cause and effect) of ‫( אלהים‬An ‫ אלהים‬is P because . . .) c. Community (reciprocity) of an ‫( אלהים‬An ‫ אלהים‬is either P1 or P2) 4. Modality in ‫אלהים‬ a. Possibility in ‫( אלהים‬An ‫ אלהים‬could have P) b. Existence in ‫( אלהים‬An ‫ אלהים‬actually has P) c. Necessity in ‫( אלהים‬An ‫ אלהים‬must have P) In these categories, an ‫ אלהים‬as we perceive it is an object of cognition, not a thing ‘out there’. Moreover, the structures of the mind will determine and

90

What Is a God?

limit what we can possibly think about an ‫אלהים‬, and about what appears to us as its essential nature. Kantian category theory is therefore conceptualist rather than realist. In short, for us ‫ אלהים‬is a concept, and it is only through the concept that we have any access to whatever reality there may be. These categories represent the ways in which an ‫ אלהים‬will seem to us, given the way we cannot but reason. At this point it might be objected to by way of the question of whether and why describing relational features of an ‫ אלהים‬do not suffice in answering the questions concerning whatness and essence. For if one is told how an ‫אלהים‬ is constructed in the text, should one really bother to continue to ask what it is? In other words, if I tell you how the HB characterizes any particular ‫אלהים‬ in a given context, is not the further question of what this thing called an ‫ אלהים‬is, in itself, meaningless? Such was one of the questions asked by Moses Mendelsohn and put to Kant in another context (cf. LM, Kant 1992 [2: 153]). In response, a Kantian perspective would invite anyone to tell us whether she believes she can coherently and meaningfully state what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB in itself is without in the end resorting to constructions featuring external relations that clearly fail to describe more than appearances (cf. LM, Kant 1998b [2: 153–4]). So what is an ‫ ?אלהים‬The fact is, at least from a Kantian perspective, you can talk all you want about Hebrew linguistics, Old Testament theology or the history of Israelite religion, but that does not tell us a thing. All that such inquiries can deliver – all that any study can deliver – are at best descriptions of appearances, not essences; of external relations, not internal constitutions; and of relational properties, not non-relational characteristics that explain to me what an ‫ אלהים‬is in itself. In the end, care should be taken lest there arises a serious misunderstanding here. Simply because, on a Kantian reading, what an ‫ אלהים‬in itself is and its essence can never be properly described, this does not mean that the perspective reconstructed here is anti- essentialist. After all, even on this view we can speak of the existence of whatness and essence in an ‫אלהים‬, even if it is argued that due to limitations in the way our minds are structured we can never have unmediated access to it.

15

Whatness and a Hegelian View of the Essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in Appearances

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? In mediaeval philosophical views and in the perspective of Kant discussed in the previous chapter, the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was constructed as something utterly elusive – almost like an unattainable inner constitution hidden from all perception. In this chapter, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770– 1831) can be interpreted as offering a view that is, though related to what has gone before, distinctively ‘Hegelian’. We find the relevant ideas in Hegel’s Science of Logic (SL), which in several places is specifically concerned with the concept of essence. Other sections elsewhere in the Logic are at times also useful in elucidating the relevant issues (see Hegel 2010). Basically, while still assuming the existence of an essence in an ‫אלהים‬, our ada pted Hegelian perspec tive su ggests we reject all notions of transcendence in favour of appearances. In other words, the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬just is – or is found in – its appearances (Hegel 2010: §1036– 7).Consider again Kant’s notion of appearances as concepts and the essence or thing in itself as unknowable. On a Hegelian account the distinction between the unknowable ‫אלהים‬- in- itself and its appearances is itself only a distinction of the understanding, and therefore no more than a product of thought. In other words, we do not have the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB on the one hand, and its appearance on the other, so that the two could ever be meaningfully compared. Rather, as Kant suggested, all we ever know are appearances of ‫ אלהים‬all the way down (cf. Hegel 2010: §1038). Yet, for Hegel, that does not

92

What Is a God?

do away with a knowable essence, for there is no further fact about an ‫אלהים‬ beyond its appearance that is also somehow more essential yet hidden from and waiting to be uncovered. That is to say, any essence of an ‫אלהים‬, from an Hegelian perspective, just is whatever appears. On this view, any successful description of the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB cannot but involve references to appearances – and this is fine. Hegel thus further radicalizes the role of cognition in understanding what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be, while simultaneously opening up a way to once again conceive the essence of an ‫אלהים‬. The essence of an ‫ אלהים‬will always be something that must appear or shine forth (cf. Hegel 2010: §131). Substituting the concept of appearance for that of relations, we may say tha t He g e l’s col l apse o f the essence/ appearance di stinction in favour of appearances – while also retaining the notion of essence – allows us to consider the possibility that an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB and in-itself just is its relations. That is, there is no reason to go beyond how an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is related to everything else. In the context of extrinsic properties then, the very essence of an ‫אלהים‬- in- itself is thus the same as that ‫ אלהים‬in relation to the ‘Other’. For it is only an ‫’אלהים‬s relation to other things that evokes the properties of ‫אלהים‬-in-itself (cf. Hegel 2010: §219–24). In this regard, consider the following biblical references to the appearance of an ‫אלהים‬. 1. ‫ אלהים‬said to Jacob, Arise, go up to Bethel, and dwell there; and make there an altar to the ‫ אלהים‬who appeared to you when you fled from your brother Esau. (Gen. 35.1) 2. I appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, as ‫ אל‬shaddai, but by my name Yhwh I did not make myself known to them. (Exod. 6.3) 3. The king said to her, ‘Have no fear; what do you see?’ And the woman said to Saul, ‘I see an ‫ אלהים‬coming up out of the earth.’ He said to her, ‘What is his appearance?’ And she said, ‘An old man is coming up; and he is wrapped in a robe’. (1 Sam. 28.13) 4. And Yhwh was angry with Solomon, because his heart had turned away from the Yhwh, the ‫ אלהים‬of Israel, who had appeared to him twice. (1 Kgs 11.9) 5. It stood still, but I could not discern its appearance. A form was before my eyes; there was silence, then I heard a voice. (Job 4.16)

Whatness and a Hegelian View

93

6. He answered, ‘But I see four men loose, walking in the midst of the fire, and they are not hurt; and the appearance of the fourth is like a son of the ‫’אלהים‬. (Dan 3.25) Though the concept of ‘appearance’ in these texts is not used in the Hegelian philosophical sense, we can still look at these texts from a Hegelian point of view so as to say that the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was whatever appeared, that is, there was nothing beyond either what is in the text or its description for an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB to be. Of course, Hegel meant all relations to everything Other and not just explicit relations between two particulars. Still, from an adapted Hegelian point of view, we may say that being an ‫ אלהים‬referred to an essential property that emerged through relations within appearances (Hegel 2010: §833–45). However, from a Hegelian perspective not only is the essence of an ‫אלהים‬ in the HB its appearances and its relations, put differently, it is also its ‘determination’. But not only that; what an ‫ אלהים‬was in essence involved a process of determination through negation (Hegel 2010: §266). In other words, the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was itself determined by being not that (e.g. not a man). This is more a way of speaking than an absolute statement, since as we saw, humans can also be called ‫ אלהים‬in some texts so that the above should not b e t a k en as proof texts for mutually exclusive secondary substances. Yet in some sense, a religious concept such as ‘‫ ’אלהים‬can be understood as meaningful mostly inasmuch as it stands in opposition to – that is, over an against – an array of contrary religious objects, such as ‘idol’, for example, in Psalm 115.2–8: W hy shou ld the nations say, ‘Where is their ‫ ’?אלהים‬Our ‫ אלהים‬is in the heavens; he does whatever he pleases. Their idols are silver and gold, the work of men’s hands. They have mouths, but do not speak; eyes, but do not see. They have ears, but do not hear; noses, but do not smell. They have hands, but do not feel; feet, but do not walk; and they do not make a sound in their throat. Those who make them are like them; so are all who trust in them.

Clearly, by saying in a text what an ‫ אלהים‬is not like, the text implies what it assumes an ‫ אלהים‬really is. In saying that an ‫ אלהים‬is not on earth, not fake as gold and silver made by men’s hands, not lacking sensual operations through

94

What Is a God?

body parts, not nothing, we are supposed to infer that an ‫ אלהים‬is that entity which is in the heavens, actually shines by itself and has a non-human origin, has body parts that work (this point is easily missed, i.e. that the problem here lies not with sensual corporeality but with non-functioning bodies), and that, if an idol is no ‘thing’, then an ‫ אלהים‬is taken to be some ‘thing’, in a proper metaphysical sense. In a Hegelian logic of essence we can also look at the role of negation for ‫ אלהים‬in the HB on a variety of levels (cf. Hegel 2010: §195– 212). Typically, many problems of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB’s determination at one level are resolved by invoking the next more complex level: even if we could indicate contrastively what we meant by ‘‫’אלהים‬, by invoking the contrasting ‘not- an-‫’אלהים‬, we shall be reliant on the presupposed ability to refer to the kind of thing we have in mind. For a Hegelian reading, it is thus the complex modern, but pre- Kantian, versions of substance metaphysics, like that of Leibniz, which bring out in the most developed way that inherently contradictory nature of this form of thought about an ‫אלהים‬. Also, it is with the critique of ‘the law of identity’ and the postulation of a Hegelian version of the ‘law of contradiction’, also for an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB (i.e. everything about an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is contradictory), that a Hegelian perspective of what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is in terms of logical contradiction comes to the fore. Cognizance should be taken that, since a Hegelian logic of the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬is not a formal one, it is not claiming that the conjunct of a proposition about an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB and its negation can both be true. Instead, it only suggests that both sides of the discrepancy about an ‫ אלהים‬being both P and not- P can easily be held in thought, and only if the question of truth is removed. Thus when it comes to simply thinking about all the appearances of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB in a matter of fact way, instead of asking which if any of these are real, the law of non-contradiction is no longer normative (cf. Hegel 2010: §255–61). The law of contradiction regarding what (the essence) of an ‫ אלהים‬actual ly is as standardly understood presupposes the abstract self- identity and the enduring nature of an ‫ אלהים‬that is thought. This, as we have seen, appears to be incompatible with determinate negation through which thought about an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB achieves its determinate contents. The identity (a term

Whatness and a Hegelian View

95

some t i m e s use d analogous to essence) of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is therefore what a Hegelian perspective sees as the ‘negation of the negation’ (cf. Hegel 2010: §195–212). The first negation, negation in general, is simply to say what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is by showing what it is not (in Hegelian jargon this is ‘abstract negation’). This we saw earlier, occurring in the text of Psalm 115. When this negation itself is negated, which is called ‘absolute negation’, what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is becomes no longer dependent on what it is not for its own determination, but becomes an actual particular thing in its own right: a ‘being-within-Self ’. This is the desired effect that the rhetoric of Psalm 115 is also supposed to have on the reader: by stating what an ‫ אלהים‬is not, through a double negation, the audience is meant to comprehend what an ‫ אלהים‬actually is supposed to be (in the context of that particular text). Thus to ask what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is involves asking a question made impossible to answer in a non-complex or direct way. For stating what being an ‫ אלהים‬in the biblical text was assumed to be never involves describing an isolated object. Rather, it always comes into articulation in a manner that stands in both positive and negative relationship to the Other. This relationship, however, is then reflected back into the ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as isolated, that is, in- itself, and bestows upon it yet further determinations. In this way the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬is to be inferred from and seen in its appearance, which is also something by not being something else (cf. Hegel 2010: §233–5). In other words, if what ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is in opposition to an Other is its ‘determination’, what an ‫ אלהים‬is in relation to an Other is its ‘constitution’. However, what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was is entangled in the world of the text in a myriad other ways than just assuming it is, for example, holy, powerful or immortal. Also how an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB with all those properties reacts to external influence tells us what it is. Yet, even here, the categories between the self and other in an ‫אלהים‬, even if temporarily bounded, are quite fluid (cf. Hegel 2010: §219–24). The point at which an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB ceases to be itself and becomes an Other (whether spatial, where the presence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB stops in relation to the rest of reality; or temporal, as when an ‫ אלהים‬loses its status, as in Psalm 82) is what in a Hegelian view can be called an ‫’אלהים‬s ‘limit’. This ‘limit’ is also shared by its Other which is itself an other Something

96

What Is a God?

only insofar as it is on the far side of this limit. It is therefore by their common limits that an ‫ אלהים‬as ‘something’ and its Other are mediated with one another and so mutually define each other’s inner qualities (cf. Hegel 2010: §239). The flip side of this, though, is that the limit of an ‫ אלהים‬also takes its n egat i ve along with it back into itself (in typical Hegelian jargon). This means thatthis being the Other is now posited in an ‫ אלהים‬as that ‫’אלהים‬s very own determination. What is not an ‫ אלהים‬creates a context for what it is and in this way it is defined from the outside. What this means is that, in the face of its own limitation, the very quality that defined an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB in the first place becomes the Other to its own self, which is to say that i t in itself is no longer strictly this quality which is simply an external d eter m ination, for example, power, holiness, and so on (cf. Hegel 2010: §255–61). How then does one come to know what the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was in the context of its appearances? The initial moments of such probing can on ly lead the reader to partial, limited impressions. Yet the concept of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is infinitely complex and multisided, so what we think we see initially soon proves inadequate. What seems at first inessential, accidental, not bearing on the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be, may in fact prove to be essential, but can only be so perceived as we run into contradictions and are forced to penetrate deeper. In this way the ‘movement’ of the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB becomes ever more comprehensive and more and more adequate to actuality in the text, although one is not yet able to grasp the notion of the ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as the thing itself (cf. Hegel 2010: §179). On a Hegelian account, the essence of the ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is thus the sum t otal of the s howing itself, that is, in short, everything the HB appears to say about an ‫אלהים‬. This essence is to be found nowhere but in appearances, which is to say, in perceptions by characters in the world of the text, and in representations of an ‫ אלהים‬as encountered by readers in the world in front of it (cf. Hegel 2010: §131).

16

Whatness and a Nietzschean Interpretation of an ‫ אלהים‬as Will to Power

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? Whereas Kant opposed reality and appearances, and Hegel identified the two, in the context of our adaptation of some of the ideas of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900), there is no thing in itself, no essence. It is appearances all the way down. That, in turn, eventually gets rid of appearance itself, which is turned into a projection of the subject. In Gay Science (GS), Nietzsche formulates the idea in the following manner: What is it that is now ‘appearance’ to me! Certainly, not the antithesis of any kind of essence, what knowledge can I assert of any kind of essence whatsoever, except merely the attributes of its ‘appearance’! Certainly not a dead mask which one could put upon an unknown X, and which to be sure one could also remove! Appearance is for me the operating and living thing itself; which goes so far in its self-mockery as to make me feel that here there is appearance. (Nietzsche 1974: 54)

It should be noted, however, that from an adapted Nietzschean perspective, an ‫’אלהים‬s ‘appearance(s)’ is therefore not the same as its veiled revelation(s), that is, not a mask which, if removed, would tell us what it really is. We have only interpretations of an ‫ ;אלהים‬there are no facts waiting to be discovered about what it actually is. Any such attempt to try and separate the knower from the known so as to suppose we can compare our interpretation of what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is with what it actually is will always be self-refuting. The very attempt to state what ‫ אלהים‬actually is vis-à-vis our interpretation thereof is technically yet once again but one more interpretation.

98

What Is a God?

In other words, in a Nietzschean reading there is no such thing as an ‫’אלהים‬s thingness. What Plato thus saw as a ‘Form’, Kant as a ‘Concept’, Nietzsche has reduced to a ‘Word’. An ‫ אלהים‬is almost a by- product of a particular era’s Hebrew grammar. We have to invent the concept of a thing to create order, to define and to comprehend (Nietzsche 1967: 558). The ‘thing’ that we take to be such is therefore merely the linguistic const ruction of a subject in a sentence that seeks to answer the question ‘What is X?’ It is the difficulty in thinking about predicates without objects, and of effects without causes, that led to the construction of an ‫ אלהים‬as ‘thing’ (Nietzsche 1967: 558). The question ‘what is that?’ is an imposition of meaning from some other viewpoint. ‘Essence’, the ‘essential nature’, is something perspective and already presupposes a multiplicity. At the bottom of it there always lies ‘what is that for me? ’ (for us, for all that lives, etc.). A  thing would be defined once all creatures had asked ‘what is that?’ and had answered their question. Supposing one single creature, with its own relationships and perspectives for all things, were missing, then the thing would not yet be ‘defined’. In short: the essence of a thing is only an opinion about the ‘thing’. Or rather:  ‘it is considered’ is the real ‘it is’, the sole ‘this is’. (Nietzsche 1967: 301–2)

As far as writers and readers of the HB are concerned, an ‫ אלהים‬as thing is merely the sum of its effects, synthetically unified by means of a concept or image (Nietzsche 1967: 551). Accordingly, all we can know about what an ‫אלהים‬ as object is, is not knowledge about some ‘thing’; it is only awareness of our construction of the concept (not Kantian ‘Concept’) from various angles. An ‫ אלהים‬is thus the meaning of a word, created to unify and divide certain perceptions, giving the parts names and ascribing to them the idea of an ‫ אלהים‬as this or that particular kind of ‘thing’. In this interpretation, any apparent essence of an ‫אלהים‬, inasmuch as there is such a thing, is not the unchanging identity of an object but something that itself evolves; it is a continuing synthesis of appearances into what have, on the basis of past experiences and influences from other people, already become temporarily fixed by ‘‫ ’אלהים‬as common noun. Our Nietzschean view thus implies that because of the generalizability and superficiality of any language about and for ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, we are mistaken in believing that words like ‫ אלהים‬can themselves accurately represent ‘what

Whatness and a Nietzschean Interpretation

99

is really what’. Knowing this, but still dreaming of the illusive thing itself, HB scholars have adopted and adapted a philosophical meta- language with words like ‘god’, ‘divinity’, whatness, ‘properties’, ‘essence’, ‘necessity’, and the like. This has always been a second world above the text of our own creation; a world that does not mirror what is in the text nor represents it. It is in fact constructing a (pre-)text with its own associative meanings for and artificial distinctions with reference to an ‫אלהים‬. Yet for us, there is no other world in the text that we will ever know (cf. Nietzsche 1967: 556). And so we continue to imagine that in understanding the mere language about ‫ אלהים‬in the HB we possess knowledge of what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be. This does not mean that Nietzsche is lamenting the inability of our technical language, or signs, to accurately correspond to or capture a deeper level of individuality in ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. What our adapted Nietzschean perspective is hinting at here is that the reputation, name, and appearance of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, the ways by which scholars usually measure it, are arbitrarily thrown on it and will inevitably be foreign to it (Nietzsche 1974: 58). This includes not only philosophical approaches but also linguistic, literary, historical, socialscientific and theological ones. As our adaptation of Nietzsche’s interpretation sees it, if truth alone had been a deciding factor in the genesis of language about what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was, and if the standpoint of certainty had been decisive for designations of ‫אלהים‬, then how could we still dare to say ‘an ‫ אלהים‬is P’, as if ‘P’ were something otherwise familiar to us, and not merely a totally subjective stimulation (cf. Nietzsche 1999: 141–53). Let us consider some texts in the HB to illustrate the point of how, when an attempt is made to say what an (particular) ‫ אלהים‬is, it is often with reference to a utility function for (some) human beings. 1. For . . . your ‫ אלהים‬is a devouring fire, a jealous ‫אלהים‬. (Deut. 4.24) 2. for . . . your ‫ אלהים‬is a merciful ‫ ;אלהים‬he will not fail you or destroy you or forget the covenant with your fathers which he swore to them. (Deut. 4.31) 3. ‫ אלהים‬is a righteous judge, and an ‫ אלהים‬who has indignation every day. (Ps. 7.11) 4. ‫ אלהים‬is a refuge for us. (Ps. 62.8)

100

What Is a God?

5. Our ‫ אלהים‬is an ‫ אלהים‬of salvation; and to ‫ אלהים‬. . . belongs escape from death. (Ps. 68.20) 6. For . . . ‫ אלהים‬is a sun and shield; he bestows favor and honor. (Ps. 84.11) In other words, when we think we are describing the inherent properties o f ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, all we are really doing is naming the attributes of its appearance to us, attributes for which we ourselves (the authors, characters and readers) have given the names (as they appear relevant and of interest in relation to our species, its needs and its instincts). And it is only by a very gradual process that one comes to believe in a particular concept of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, and thereby come to see our beliefs about it as being a part of its very existence. As Nietzsche puts it, what at first were appearances of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB eventually come to be seen in the end by humans as the essence and is effective as such (cf. Nietzsche 1999: 148). In other words, it seems impossible to imagine an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB that is not inextricably tied to very particular human affairs. Consider the assumed primary moral utility function of prototypical ‫ אלהים‬in Psalm 82: A Psalm of Asaph. ‫ אלהים‬has taken his place in the council of ‫ אל‬in the midst of the ‫ אלהים‬he holds judgment: ‘How long will you judge unjustly a nd show partiality to the wicked? [Selah] Give justice to the weak and the fatherless; maintain the right of the afflicted and the destitute. Rescue the weak and the needy; deliver them from the hand of the wicked.’ They have neither knowledge nor understanding, they walk about in darkness; all the foundations of the earth are shaken. I say, ‘You are ‫אלהים‬, sons of the Most High, all of you; nevertheless, you shall die like men, and fall like any prince.’ Arise, o ‫אלהים‬, judge the earth; for to thee belong all the nations!

Of course, other texts may differ. But psychologically, from a Nietzschean perspective, the development of the biblical and scholarly concepts of an ‫אלהים‬ in the HB are not motivated by the desire to be free from deception as much as by a need to create a world in which one could live (Nietzsche 1990: 67). The function of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is to enable past and present forms of spiritual, social and intellectual life. Think about it: why, when writing about what an ‫ אלהים‬is or what its essence is, will the text and scholars mention what, from a narrator’s ‘view from nowhere’, would strike a complete outsider

Whatness and a Nietzschean Interpretation

101

as a seemingly selective and arbitrary list of properties as supposedly essential (i.e. making an ‫ אלהים‬what it is)? On a Nietzschean view, the reason is all too human. It is because to have these properties means an ‫ אלהים‬is greater than – and therefore able to help – humans. Thus what is thought to be typically notable properties of an ‫אלהים‬ are only what stands out in their relevance to the human condition, for example, power, knowledge, goodness, and so on. In addition, each of these are constructed in ways that are highly specialized in terms of scope and function. It is not about power in general, but about the power to govern things related to human existence (e.g. to create, judge, save; destroy, etc.) It is not about knowledge per se but about knowledge that is humanly unattainable (e.g. secret and hidden knowledge of the past, the future and the otherwise inaccessible and hidden present). It is not about loving- kindness as such but about displaying it towards humans and whatever interests them. The point a Nietzschean perspective makes should be clear. It also points to aspects of god-talk we tend to take for granted. In short, the HB does not know of something called an ‫ אלהים‬that is not perceived, correctly or not, as relevant and effective in relation to the human condition in some way, be it positive or negative. Also, the textual and scholarly compuls ion to construct concepts, species, forms, purposes, laws (a ‘world of identical cases’) in connection with ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is little more than an expression of the need to arrange the world in the text for ourselves so that our form of historical human existence is made possible (cf. Nietzsche 1967: 521). Yet, because there are other points of view in the world of the text, and because one is always learning and changing, there is nothing to guarantee that we will continue to believe the same things about ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. There can thus be no final answers to what an ‫ אלהים‬is; there are only new perspectives on the question and, in relation to these, whatever replies seem to make sense relative to the philosophical assumptions contained in the problem itself. What this means is that ‘‫ ’אלהים‬as common noun in the HB cannot be defi ned via essential predication. That is, we cannot say that an ‫ אלהים‬is P, where P lists all the essential properties or identity over time. From a Nietzschean perspective, only that which has no history is definable (cf. Nietzsche 20 06: 13). Yet ‫אלהים‬, like all other words, has a history; and the

102

What Is a God?

best argument against any dogma about it is its history. No further ‘proofs’ for or against are required. In this way, a Nietzschean reading can be used to make one sort of attempt to say why no universal characteristics will be found that unite all the institutions, practices, and beliefs normally associated with an ‫אלהים‬ in the HB. Whatever an ‫ אלהים‬is can never be explained; it can only be described based on descriptions arising out of inevitably human perspectives towards which we are predisposed by the way we, from need, frame our inquiries.

17

Whatness and Wittgensteinian Family Resemblances among the ‫אלהים‬

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? Look for example at the national ‫ אלהים‬that are prototypical of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB (i.e. it is usually what is in mind with reference to ‘other ‫)’אלהים‬. Consider also the various often contradictory representations of Yhwh, Chemosh, Ba’al, Dagon and so on – both in relation to each other and in relation to alternative constructions of themselves. Now pass to human entities called ‫ אלהים‬in the HB like Isaac, Moses, the dead Samuel, the Davidic king, and so on. Here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. Finally, consider other entities like stars, mountains, river s, im ages, idols, demons and other unspecified heavenly beings as well as superlative natural and psychological phenomena, all of which, on one or more occasions in the HB, are connected with the common noun (or adjective form taken to be a genitive, i.e. ‘of ‫)’אלהים‬. How, then, are all these things called ‫ אלהים‬in the generic sense alike and different from each other? Is there at least one property that they all share and that we can identify as essential to being an ‫ ?אלהים‬For example, how about the properties of power or immortality? These cannot be essential to calling an ‫ אלהים‬an ‫ אלהים‬since idols, some spirits and most natural phenomena – all called ‫ – אלהים‬do not qualify. Or what about holiness? This cannot be right since not only ‫ אלהים‬are called holy. Size perhaps? Obviously not. And so we can go through the many, many members of the extensions of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as common name and see how similarities crop up and disappear. And the result of this examination is: what we are dealing with has nothing to do with essential properties

104

What Is a God?

common to al l but rather a complicated network of overlapping and crisscrossing relations. The view just outlined represents and understanding of concepts often attributed to Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951). His later work can be interpreted to predict that there might arise serious problems with any attempt to give a ‘real definition’ of what an ‫ אלהים‬is. Wittgenstein’s contribution to our discussion comes from his later linguistic philosophy found in his Philosophical Investigations (PI ). Adapted, what it basically implies is that the related phenomena called ‫ אלהים‬have no one thing in common which explains why the same word is used for all cases (see Wittgenstein 1958: §65–71). Any particular ‫ אלהים‬is related to various others in many different ways, which is the only way to account for why they were all called ‫ אלהים‬despite not constituting what we would call a ‘species’, or being of the same ‘genus’. Our Wittge ns teinian perspective might use the term ‘family resemblances’ to c haracterize similarities among the ‫אלהים‬. That is, in the HB, things called ‫ אלהים‬form something analogous to a family. In this case, by ‘family’ is not meant a pantheon (as in a typology of divinity) but in the logical philoso ph ical sense of constituting a ‘polythetic’ class. In this context there need be no common feature among all things called ‫ אלהים‬in the HB to explain the use of the common noun, even if they all resemble each other in some way or another. With this idea a Wittgensteinian perspective can be adopted to try and replace the old Platonist metaphor of essence; which was why prototy pe theories of concepts came to replace classical (definitional) ones in the 1970s. What does this imply for a philosophical analysis of whatness? Ordinarily a text would use the word ‘‫ ’אלהים‬without trying explicitly to define it locally and provisionally. The narrator can just say or imply, ‘It is an ‫ ’אלהים‬and take it that characters will appear to understand it. At best then, in a local and provisional context, one text might imply that by the common noun ‫אלהים‬ in context C1 is meant something which has properties Pa, b, c. But in context C2 what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be may presuppose properties Pb, c, d and in yet another context C3, properties Pc, d, e. By the time we happen upon context C 4 we have properties Pd, e, f, which means that the ‫ אלהים‬in context C1 and C 4 share no common property thus specified (see Table 17.1).

Whatness and Wittgensteinian Family Resemblances

105

Table 17.1 The absence of an essential property in the extension of generic ‘‫’אלהים‬ Context

Things called ‫אלהים‬

Properties Px

C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7

Yhwh x The divine council The Davidic king The dead Samuel Stars Demons Idols

a, b, c b, c, d c, d, e d, e, f e, f, g f, g, h g, h, i

Of course, the same may be true even of a particular ‫אלהים‬: Context

Profi les of Yhwh

Properties Px

C1 C2 C3 C4 C5

Yhwha Yhwhb Yhwhc Yhwhd Yhwhe

a, b, c a, b, d a, c, d b, c, d b, d, e

Not only is the use of ‫ אלהים‬as common noun not everywhere circumscribed by rules; there are also no universal rules in the HB for how powerful an ‫אלהים‬ must be, how long it must live, how it must look, and what it must rule or prescribe as moral laws. Yet, only a certain kind of entity in the HB is an ‫אלהים‬. Of course, there will always be an unspecified and indefinite set of unwritten rules presupposed regarding the proper use of the common noun ‫ אלהים‬in a particular context. Yet the rules in one (con)text cannot be assumed as applying throughout the entire HB so as to allow one to predict what sort of properties were assumed to be essentially instantiated by any or all members of the local class of all ‫ אלהים‬elsewhere. There will always be a considerable amount of residual meta-theistic assumptions underlying a given passage that is idiosyncratic in terms of the representational contents involved. So how would we approach the problem of what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be on this view then? First of all, in a Wittgensteinian reading, the HB calls something an ‫ אלהים‬because it has a direct relationship with several things that have hitherto been called ‫ ;אלהים‬and this can be said to give it an indirect relationship to other things we call by the same name. However, while some texts in the HB do appear to give the concept ‫ אלהים‬often unspecified rigid limits, in other texts the extension of the concept is not closed by a borderline. This in turn implies

106

What Is a God?

that it is possible that some texts of the HB can locally and provisionally presuppose an intensional folk-definition of sorts for the common noun ‫אלהים‬. A Wittgensteinian point of view therefore would not deny the possibility or even the value of us attempting to give a contextual (and provisional, perspectival) intensional definition of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. Nor would it assume that the texts themselves may not at times presuppose such implied definitions by mentioning what was clearly assumed to be a necessary and sufficient condition for being an ‫אלהים‬. Consider for example the following texts, both of which appear to specify through the same merismus what is taken to be instinctive operations of an ‫אלהים‬. 1. See now that I, even I, am it, and there is no ‫ אלהים‬beside me; I kill and I make alive; I wound and I heal; and there is none that can deliver out of my hand. (Deut. 32.39) 2. And when the king of Israel read the letter, he rent his clothes and said, ‘Am I an ‫אלהים‬, to kill and to make alive, that this man sends word to me to cure a man of his leprosy? (2 Kgs 5.7) In these contexts, some sort of intensional folk- definition is presupposed inasmuch as an (prototypical) ‫ אלהים‬can be defined as the source of life and death. Conversely, if something is seen as a source of life and death, it may be called an ‫( אלהים‬whether ‘literally’ or ‘metaphorically’) to the extent that the conditions outlined here are assumed to be both necessary and sufficient for participating in the divine condition. But of course, in other texts in the HB such conditions are neither specified nor assumed and many (atypical) things are called ‫ אלהים‬which cannot (or do not) do either (e.g. Samuel). This leads to the next question of whether there is any way by which we can distinguish between what still counts as an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB and what no longer does? Can we give the boundary for ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as a whole? Of course, authors and readers like to draw one; but that is simply because none has been drawn by the HB (as a whole) itself. The situation is that we imagine that we have one term – ‘‫ ’אלהים‬as common name in the HB – here and the different senses are just variations on a common theme, but in practice we take these vague concepts of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB (even different profiles of the same ‫אלהים‬, e.g. Yhwh) that are loosely defined and we tie them down to more particular definitions. Yet in the end, only minimally essentialist theological or polemical

Whatness and Wittgensteinian Family Resemblances

107

specification of contextual boundaries is sometimes encountered (e.g. Gen. 3.6, Isa. 41.21–24, Ezek. 28.2–10, etc.) How should we then explain to someone what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is if we do not have a common thread running through everything the HB calls an ‘‫ ? ’אלהים‬On Wit tgenstein’s adapted view, the best we can do is to describe a parti cu lar i nst ance of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, yet this does not mean we have abstracted an essence from the phenomenon so called. For in Wittgenstein (1958 ), §43 of the PI, it may be implied that what is meant by an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is nothing other than the multiplicity of uses of the generic term in the Biblical Hebrew language. However, such a Wittgensteinian reading does not suggest that meaning is to be equated to and exhausted in usage. What is implied is that there is not just one thing that the word ‫ אלהים‬in the HB can mean. Rather, the generic term ‘‫ ’אלהים‬can have innumerable meanings, depending on its use in a particular context. In other words, a Wittgensteinian take opposes the idea of ‘proper original signification’ without denying that some sort of essentialism is at work in language about an ‘‫ ’אלהים‬as common name in the HB. With regard to the latter, Wittgenstein (1958: §66) might be taken to imply that the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬is not some inherent core of the thing the word refers to but is instead expressed by the grammar (roughly synonymous here with ‘usage’) of the generic sense. One must presuppose knowledge of some essence of the grammar of ‫ אלהים‬as common noun when one has become familiar with its use and can recognize that some questions featuring it would be considered as absurd. This is why a HB scholar would think that the question ‘Do ‫ אלהים‬in the HB swallow?’ makes no sense, though the question ‘Do ‫ אלהים‬in the HB speak?’ does. Thus to grasp the linguistic essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is not a specialized philosophical activity. It comes from becoming acquainted with the use of the common noun ‘‫ ’אלהים‬in Biblical Hebrew. The apparent presence of some essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is only mirroring the way the language in which it occurs represents it. This is not linguistic idealism with reference to the world in the text. The idea is that the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬is expressed in Hebrew grammar, not created thereby. Inside grammar, we speak about the nature of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, not only about words for ‫ אלהים‬in the HB and the way we use them. A Wittgenstein perspective does however reject ‘Platonism’

108

What Is a God?

to the extent that it assumes that the grammar of our language about ‫ אלהים‬in the HB must correspond to an independent reality. So w hi le th e q uestion of what an ‫ אלהים‬is may seem very profound or puzzling in the context of metaphysics, if we wish to make any progress in dealing with it, a Wittgensteinian reading might suggest that we rephrase it by replacing abstract nouns (like ‫אלהים‬-ness or divinity) with other parts of speech. So instead of asking what ‫אלהים‬-ness is, we ask: 1. When a character in the HB claimed to know that something is an ‫אלהים‬, was this assumed to be the same as knowledge of how to worship an ‫?אלהים‬ 2. Was knowing that an ‫ אלהים‬is P assumed to be the same as knowing an ‫?אלהים‬ 3. What was assumed to make the claim to know an ‫ אלהים‬is P legitimate? 4. What made the claim that ‫ אלהים‬is P meaningful and is there a difference? 5. When a text assumed it was true that an ‫ אלהים‬is P, what sort of claim was it making about ‫ אלהים‬and what was it saying about the proposition that an ‫ אלהים‬is P? In sum, in a Wittgensteinian account ‘‫ ’אלהים‬as common noun does not refer to some mysterious substance constituting everything that was called an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. We tend to become confused and perplexed when we ask what a n ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is, only because of our essentialist and realist Platonist assumptions. The meaning of ‫ אלהים‬as common noun in the HB is not an ideal or mental object that readers must have in mind when they speak about it, or that philosophers would be experts to discover behind the language in which ideas about an ‫ אלהים‬are expressed.

18

Whatness and a Husserlian Reduction of an ‫’אלהים‬s Essence as Intentional Object

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? According to our adaptation of some of the ideas of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), we will need to avoid two treatments of essence, both of which are here considered wrong-headed: 1. any form of ‘ontologism’ assuming that the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is some sort of real being ‘out there’; 2. any form of ‘psychologism’ assuming that the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is merely a mental object ‘in here’. Here Husserl’s phenomenology sets aside (‘brackets’) the question of the supposed ‘reality’ of the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB (see Husserl 1900; 1913). The es sence of an ‫ אלהים‬is for all practical purposes accepted as an ‘intentional object’. By the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬is therefore not meant an ‘individual essence’. No attempt is made to prescribe its ontological status. To ‘save the phenomena’, a Husserlian view would say the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬is something one appears conscious of, irrespective of whether it exists (Husserl 1913: 131). Fo r a Husserlian reading then, the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective consists initially in merely taking cognizance of the use of ‫ אלהים‬as common noun in a given context of the HB and without prejudging what it should mean based on personal dogmatic or secular beliefs, or in light of an accepted theory. The fact is that in the beginning the reader does not really have a clue as to what they are dealing with and which parts of the data are particularly significant. Describing the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is thus a clarification of the meaning of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as it is given; it

110

What Is a God?

involves an experimental approach to the text where everything is presumed to be potentially and irreducibly alien. How does one then determine the essence of an ‫ ?אלהים‬In this regard, it may help not to think of it as something posited. Rather, it arises within the description thereof. In this manner, a Husserlian perspective frees the philosophical inquiry to describe the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB without getting caught up in a mess of insoluble metaphysical riddles. Instead, the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB just is an ‫ אלהים‬grasped in its intentional character, as being this or that. And in some sense, it is not that hard: The truth is that everyone sees ‘ideas’, ‘essences’, and sees them, so to speak, continuously; they operate with them in their thinking and they also make judgments about them. It is only that, from their theoretical ‘standpoint’, people interpret them away. (Husserl 1998: 41)

In other words, contrary to some of the obscurantist views encountered hitherto, a Husserlian perspective suggests that we see the essence of an ‫אלהים‬ in the HB without fail. When a human character in the HB encounters an ‫אלהים‬, in order for that character to see a particular phenomenon as an ‫אלהים‬, is the same as seeing its essence. In other words, one cannot say that one sees an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB without coming to terms with the essence thereof which makes it what it is and not a human or an animal. One therefore cannot distinguish between an ‫ אלהים‬and its essence; to speak of the one is to speak of the other. Consider the following texts in which the biblical characters are able to identify Yhwh the ‫ אלהים‬as an ‫אלהים‬. 1. Know therefore that Yhwh ‫ אלהים‬is an ‫אלהים‬, the faithful ‫ אלהים‬who keeps covenant and steadfast love with those who love him and keep his commandments, to a thousand generations. (Deut. 7.9) 2. For Yhwh your ‫ אלהים‬is an ‫ אלהים‬of ‫ אלהים‬and Lord of lords, the great, the mighty, and the terrible ‫אלהים‬, who is not partial and takes no bribe. (Deut. 10.17) 3. . . . Yhwh your ‫ אלהים‬is he who is an ‫ אלהים‬in heaven above and on earth beneath. (Josh. 2.11) 4. . . . that all the peoples of the earth may know that Yhwh is an ‫ ;אלהים‬there is no other. (1 Kgs 8.60)

Whatness and a Husserlian Reduction

111

5. . . . this is an ‫אלהים‬, our ‫ אלהים‬for ever and ever. He will be our guide for ever. (Ps. 48.14) 6. Know that the Yhwh is an ‫ !אלהים‬It is he that made us, and we are his; we are his people, and the sheep of his pasture. (Ps. 100.3) 7. Yhwh is an ‫אלהים‬, and he has given us light. (Ps. 118.27) 8. For thus says Yhwh, who created the heavens (he is the ‫)!אלהים‬. (Isa. 45.18) 9. The king said to Daniel, ‘Truly, your ‫ אלהים‬is an ‫ אלהים‬of ‫ אלהים‬and lord of kings, and a revealer of mysteries . . .’ .(Dan. 2.47) All of these texts presuppose, according to a Husserlian reading, a grasping of the essence of being an ‫אלהים‬. There is not even a need to specify a list of supposedly essential properties. In describing Yhwh as an ‫אלהים‬, that is, as something to be known as this kind of entity, the essence of an ‫( אלהים‬here, what it means to be an ‫ )אלהים‬is for all practical purposes as an ‘intentional object’ overlapping with the common noun in the description. An adaptation by Husserl (1973, 1998, 2001) thus understands the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB to be the structure of essential meanings that explicate it as a phenomenon of interest. The essence of an ‫ אלהים‬is whatever makes the phenomenon to a particular intentional object and without which it would not be such. It is the unspoken reason as to why it makes sense to call something an ‫ אלהים‬to begin with. On a Husserlian account, however, it is likely that readers of the HB would enc ou nter an ‫ אלהים‬as intentional object in such an analytical way that its essence is ‘interpreted away’. This essence can be grasped only in the context of the world in the text that is already there. Consequently, in this approach the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is not something that we as readers could creatively add to the text. It already awaits us in the intentional relationship between an ‫ אלהים‬and what is not an ‫ אלהים‬in the everyday lived experience of the biblical characters. Our descriptions do not create this essence although, if they are sufficiently rich, the essence that is already part of the meaningful use of ‫ אלהים‬as common noun will come into view. This perspective does not, however, seek to do away with the diversity of phenomena called an ‫אלהים‬. The process of illuminating the essence of an ‫אלהים‬ in the HB begins with particulars and the imagined objectivity with reference to one text, turning it into an arbitrary example. The latter, in turn, receives

112

What Is a God?

the character of a guiding ‘model’, a point of departure for the production of an infinitely open multiplicity of variable ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. The essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is thus founded on a variation (Husserl 1973: 341). E ve n if these possible variations for the concept of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB sh ou ld be almost endless, there is, in Husserl’s words, a stereotypical and po pu lar “rough model’ that many biblical authors, characters and readers work with and which guides their interpretation of the variations and sets their boundaries. For example, there is a ‘stop’ in many texts of the HB when an ‫ אלהים‬in the example suddenly becomes an idol, a demon, a human, an animal, or something else. Thus, something was assumed to remain throughout, namely an ‫’אלהים‬s essence, which makes an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB an ‫ אלהים‬to differentiate it from other beings. Husserl explains: It then becomes evident that a unity runs through this multiplicity of successive figures, that in such free variations of an original image, e.g. of a thing, an invariant is necessarily retained as the necessary general form, without which an object such as this thing as an example of this kind, would not be thinkable at all. (Husserl, 1973: 341)

In a Husserlian reading then, there are general forms of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB that makes every presumed genus of the species what it is. This should explain why it made sense to call Yhwh and other beings an ‫אלהים‬, as well as what it was about the concepts of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB that made them all include Yhwh and even other phenomena in their extension. This does not mean that the essential meaning ever changes, as is evident from the fact that an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, however its properties, functions and kinds may vary, never becomes a different phenomenon. All theological pluralism and extensional diversity in this reading are thus assumed to be the result of either alternate accidental properties, or of multiple variability in an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. The essence and ex istence of an ‫אלהים‬, imaginary and real ‫אלהים‬, visible and invisible ‫אלהים‬, and so on are all mixed up together in what an ‫ אלהים‬happens to be in any given context.. An ‫ אלהים‬in the HB’s essence as ‘figure’ can be seen to stand out against its ‘background’, the particulars. In other words, one could say that an ‫’אלהים‬s essence is always understood against its ‘horizons’, that is, the phenomenon of an ‫’אלהים‬s inner and outer horizons. On the one hand, a particular ‫’אלהים‬s

Whatness and a Husserlian Reduction

113

mercifulness does not belong to the essential characteristics of generic ‫אלהים‬ in the HB, which could be variable. However, the mercy of Yhwh was certainly of interest. If an ‫ אלהים‬showed complete disinterest in the fate of people, it was doubted that it was actually a living ‫ אלהים‬and those involved tended to immediately look to other ‫ אלהים‬for salvation. An ‫ אלהים‬in the HB’s disposition could therefore be understood as the phenomenon’s inner horizons, and thus a background against which the essence of an ‫’אלהים‬s figure stands out. Part of the background of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, however, are also the outer horizons, for example, its heavenly abode, the temple, and perhaps a throne. All of these at times belong to the phenomenon’s milieu and helps the intentional subject to understand an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as an ‫אלהים‬. To an observer, these horizons could further contribute to an understanding of how an ‫אלהים‬ in the HB is worshipped and for what reason. The temple can also be made a figure against the heavens or the city, with an ‫ אלהים‬as background. Then one could see everything as part of a whole picture of what it meant to be an ‫אלהים‬ in the world of the HB. With reference to an ‫אלהים‬, everything related to it in some way also obtains a meaning. To work in terms of figure and background is also important for the methodical and concrete work with the narratives or other lifeworld descript ions that the HB uses. Searching for the essence of an ‫אלהים‬, we typically work with the different meanings that are present in the descriptions. We try to discover a pattern of meanings for an ‫ אלהים‬that is partly made up of differences and similarities among these meanings. However, in this traversing of a maze of multiple meanings of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, a Husserlian reading also attends to emerging meanings, taking up one meaning and watching it as a figure against the other meanings that become its background, then taking up another one and making it a temporary figure, and so on. In addition to the above, we could also talk about individualizations of t he essence of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, as Husserl (2001) does in another context w ith reference to phenomena in general. This essence can be seen in every textual entity that is in some way a constituent thereof. The description of the constituents gives a contextual flavour to the description of the essence. A Husserlian approach would, however, first seek to present the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB and then its constituents, otherwise it is hard to see what these constituents are constituents of.

114

What Is a God?

Lest misunderstanding arises, just as we as intentional subjects are not said to create the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬out of nothing, neither is the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB assumed to be something that only lays within the object that is called an ‫אלהים‬. Nothing is yet ready to describe; the meaning of an ‫אלהים‬ can only be disclosed in the act that takes place in depictions of an ‫ אלהים‬as intentional object in the text’s ‘lifeworld’. The essence thus belongs to the inbetween space, that is, to the connection between an ‫ אלהים‬and everything else in the world of the text. At this point it should be clear that we cannot talk about the relationship between an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB and the essence of ‫ אלהים‬in the same way as we t alk about the relationship between two distinct phenomena. In Husserl’s p henomenological approach the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬is not a characteristic of the thing in the same way as we talk about the properties of a substance. For whatever traits we may try to isolate and specify (be it power, holiness, immortality, etc.), we are not grasping its essence at all. The essence just is an ‫ אלהים‬whose nature can be intuitively grasped as it becomes apparent in its depictions. In conclusion, what additional insights might we have gained from our adaptation of Husserl’s views of essence, in the context of the question ofwhat an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be, when seen from this particular philosophical perspective? In short, phenomenology shows us that an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB – whether it exists or not and whether an essence is attributed to it or not – is always experienced as something with its own style. If we accept this, we can say that the Husserlian essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is simply its way of being which, as such, cannot be separated from the depicted phenomena that it is the essence of.

19

Whatness and a Heideggerian View of What Is Ownmost in an ‫’אלהים‬s Identity over Time

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? Another important figure who sought to rethink the foundations of a Western metaphysics of essence is Martin Heidegger (1889–1976). In some ways still traditional, however, at one point he goes so far as to say that: Philosophy is knowledge of the essence of things. (The Basic Question of Being as Such [BQ], 29)

A Heideggerian perspective on the essence or whatness of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB might suggest that Aristotelian attempts to show the difficulty involved in meeting a Socratic challenge of answering What-is-X questions had shaped the destiny of Western thinking. Yet from the point of view to be discussed in this chapter, we are encouraged to go beyond ideas of commonality (Socrates) and of genus (Aristotle). Even if we rephrased our question of what an ‫ אלהים‬is to ‘What is that which the HB calls ‫ ’?אלהים‬to try and reconcile the opposites in the so-called paradox of analysis (‘Meno’s paradox’), it would merely give us a historical answer. By contrast, what an Heideggerian interpretation is looking for is a proper philosophical perspective on the whatness of an ‫אלהים‬ in the HB. The philosophical perspectives adopted and adapted in this book, starti ng w i th S ocrates to Nietzsche and beyond, have often implied that the e ssenc e (or at least, the appearances) of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, in as far as s uch a thi ng there be (whether seen from a realist or nominalist point o f vi e w), could be sought through an accumulation of facts about it. In

116

What Is a God?

a Heid egge rian reading, however, what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is cannot be established by more or better information about the use of ‫ אלהים‬as common noun in the HB. The reason for this being that the essence of an ‫אלהים‬ in the HB is not at all something to be discovered in the language of the bibli c al t exts but must instead be ‘brought forth’ with the aid of philosophically adequate neologisms (BQ, 84). In other words, to take metaphysical inquiry to the next level, one needs to resort to the use of new metaphysical jargon within the metalanguage so as to facilitate the relevant philosophical clarification. The reason for t his i s th at the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is assumed as not being d irec t ly present in the sphere of immediate representing and intending (BQ , 83) . Hence we must ‘summon’ it via an act of ‘productive seeing’ (BQ, 84). What an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be can, in Heidegger’s terms, be said to consist in its ‘look’. This look, in turn, presents an ‫אלהים‬ in the HB ’s whatness (allows it to come to presence). Thus contra Husserl, t he k i nd of essence of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB that we encounter actually does d epen d on us in some way. This does not mean that we ourselves can simply decide what the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is. However, we shall have to bring it forth ourselves in a way that allows us to engage it in any meaningful way. One s mall problem for our adaption and reapplication of Heidegger’s v iews on t his particular issue is that they vary throughout his writings (cf. Heidegger 1993a: 115–38; 1993b: 369–91; 1993c: 139–67). For example, when we look from the perspectives of both the early and later Heidegger’s metaphysic s, in answering the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was a ssume d to be, one could in t heory respond by attending to any of the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

an ‫’אלהים‬s ‘essence’ (i.e. common properties); an ‫’אלהים‬s ‘whatness’ (i.e. quiddity and constitutive properties); an ‫’אלהים‬s ‘essentialsway’ (i.e. necessary properties); an ‫’אלהים‬s ‘inherent nature’ (i.e. intrinsic properties); an ‫’אלהים‬s ‘whole’ or ‘totality’ (i.e. consequential properties); an ‫’אלהים‬s ‘way of being’ (i.e. identity over time); an ‫’אלהים‬s ‘what is ownmost’ (i.e. haecceity and identity across possible worlds).

Whatness and a Heideggerian View

117

It s h ould be clear then that the themes of ‘whatness’ and ‘essence’ in Heidegger’s work relate to a multiplicity of things. This is analogous to the way in which the English word ‘essence’ has a broader usage than simply its connection to and derivation from a particular philosophical context. What i s pe r haps most interesting is that in many of Heidegger’s discussions of essence it is no longer necessarily equated with whatness. In other words, asking what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be is not to be equated with the question as to whether it has an essence and what the latter may be. Thus with Heidegger’s views, the scholastic concept of quiddity (as well as commonality in genus) cannot here be taken as being adequately representative of the relationship between the essence and appearance of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. But if the whatness of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is not thought of as the essential properties of a species to which all things called ‫ אלהים‬in the HB are alleged to belong, how are we supposed to think of it? (cf. Heidegger 1961; 1971).This is where Heidegger’s proposal for new jargon comes in. His metaphysics suggests that we try and get behind the assumptions and established formulations that shape traditional philosophical thinking about the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. And we can do this in Heideggerian style by relating the concept of essence back to the German noun ‘Wesen’, which in itself is thought to show that essence and whatness were not the same originally. In H e ideg ger’s view, ‘Wesen’ once denoted ‘enduring as presence’ (see Heidegger 1961: 59). Although ‘Wesen’ can be used to designate what is most proper to an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, that which is most proper to it is possibility or potentiality, which from a Heideggerian point of view cannot be adequately u nder s tood with the categorical apparatus that the metaphysical ‘essentia’ brings along, and that applies exclusively to the conception of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as primordially present-at-hand. Here at least a Heideggerian perspective still contains traces of the essentialism of Plato and Aristotle, yet only in the sense that the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is seen as that which remains permanently. Thus the ‘Wesen’ of an ‫ אלהים‬would not simply be seen as what an ‫ אלהים‬is; it is also the ways in which an ‫ אלהים‬endures in an almost teleological sense, that is, the way in which an ‫ אלהים‬remains through time as what it is (i.e. identity over time). Here a He ideggerian perspective calls into question Hegel’s notion that an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB’s essence can be interpreted in terms of what it ‘has been’.

118

What Is a God?

Heidegger further suggests that understanding what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be something we can only find in its future, in its ‘to be’. And that ‘to be’ is something that is inextricably bound to ‫ אלהים‬in the HB’s facticity – to where an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB finds itself. So again, the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is shown to mean more than just ‘what it is’. In t h is regard, several texts in the HB present their own perspective on s ome o r ot her property (usually different ones are emphasized) that is assumed to be consistently instantiated within the diachronic identity of an ‫( אלהים‬here, mostly Yhwh): The n Yhw h ‫ אלהים‬said, ‘Behold, the human has become like one of us, knowing good and evil; and now, in case it puts forth its hand and take also of the tree of life, and eats and live for ever’. (Gen. 3.22) He s hall be called: ‘Wonderful counselor, mighty ‫אל‬, everlasting father, prince of peace.’ (Isa. 9.6) Yhwh will be your everlasting light, and your ‫ אלהים‬will be your glory. (Isa. 60.19) But Yhwh is the true ‫ ;אלהים‬he is the living ‫ אלהים‬and the everlasting king. (Jer. 10.10) Are you not from everlasting, o Yhwh ‫אלהים‬, my holy one? You will not die. (Hab 1.12) . . . that this an ‫אלהים‬, our ‫ אלהים‬for ever and ever. He will be our guide for ever. (Ps. 48.14) O give thanks to the ‫ אלהים‬of ‫אלהים‬, for his steadfast love endures for ever. (Ps. 136.2) I will extol thee, my ‫ אלהים‬and king, and bless your name for ever and ever. (Ps. 145.1)

When these texts from the HB speak of what is assumed to be ‘ownmost’ i n a n ‫ אלהים‬over time, they tend to do so in the context of an ‫’אלהים‬s own being enduring. Of course, it is questionable whether the English ‘eternal’ or ‘everlasting’ is necessarily a correct rendering of the Hebrew words thus translated. However, it matters little if we are dealing here simply with an indefinite time, or with an eternity past or future (or both). The texts’ own foci are on what was in the particular context assumed to be an individual

Whatness and a Heideggerian View

119

essence expressed in an accidental property, function or relation of Yhwh, qua ‫אלהים‬. In these contexts, the particular predication is thought to suffice as indicative of personal identity over time, however long its duration was a ssu med to be. And while the need for predicating the property of being eternal of a specific ‫ אלהים‬can be taken to imply it was not assumed to be a necessary property of the genus (why say something is eternal if it is such b y d efinition?), it does seem to have been a typical trait of prototypical divine beings in many contexts. This despite the fact that what was understood thereby may vary from text to text (and should be distinguished from immortality). In this way, a Heideggerian metaphysics of essence enables us to connect the concept of what is ‘enduring’ with what is involved in the enabling conditions or the ‘granting’ of the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. The former i s t he traditional way of looking at it; the latter is a Heideggerian view’s innovative contribution to the model. What is quite interesting is that this way of approaching ‫ אלהים‬in the HB makes room for it being determined by an aspect or trait that it lacks. For example, on the traditional view of essence one might think of immortality as a common feature of the genus ‫ אלה ים‬in some texts of the HB. But for Heidegger this is the unessential essence and explains why we are puzzled when encountering examples in the text where this is not the case, for example, Yhwh killing other ‫אלהים‬ (see Exod. 12.12). But there is more. Also contrary to Plato (and Kant), one obscure implication of Heidegger’s metaphysics of essence is that the essence of an ‫אלהים‬ i n t he HB is not the same thing as an ‫ אלהים‬in itself. When questioning something like an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB with respect to its being, we ask what it is (what quality, what attribute was assumed to make it the specific kind of b eing it is). In other words, what makes an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB an ‫?אלהים‬ Yet, curiously, with this question our Heideggerian perspective does not follow a classical phenomenological method. It is not a case of meditating on the concept of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as denoting an object. We must pass through the use of the common name (and proper name) ‫ אלהים‬in the HB and arrive at a place beyond the linguistic and theological clutter that has accumulated around it before we can begin to get a sense of what is at stake in the question.

120

What Is a God?

However, ideally, one should not start with asking about the being of any particular ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, for example, of Yhwh. Even before the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be Heidegger would have us ask t he question of what it means to say that an ‫ אלהים‬is a thing (cf. Heidegger 1971). The question of the thingness of an ‫ אלהים‬thus comes before the question of what kind of thing an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be. No-thing is excluded (other ‫אלהים‬, angels, demons, kings, the dead, stars, as well as things t hat fail to appear, like false ‫ אלהים‬and the Kantian ‘‫ אלהים‬in itsel f’ or ‘the world of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as a totality’). Hav ing thus laid out the proper subject matter, goals, and methodology of a philosophical approach to what an ‫ אלהים‬is, a Heideggerian perspective anticipates the fact that one might still wonder ‘Why?’ Why is it important not to pass over the phenomenon of world outside the text? Or, Why should we adopt the attitude that unfolds the being of an ‫ ?אלהים‬In one of Heidegger’s writings, he admits that philosophy is immediately useless knowledge. With regard to ordinary urgent matters in everyday living, philosophical inquiry seems irrelevant (BQ, 29). In response, however, Heidegger would note our assumption that sees things as resources, only valuable or interesting insofar as they may be used for our advantage. That is why for many biblical scholars, what an ‫ אלהים‬was, is simply to be explained by looking at the social and psychological practices it is used in and which provide some benefit for the sake of ourselves or others. To even ask after the utility of a philosophical approach to the assumed essence of an ‫אלהים‬ shows the entrenchment of the technological understanding of being. In this way Heidegger saw philosophical questions like this as an illuminating process that cannot (nor is it supposed to) solve the very ‘real’ problems it brings forth. A Heideggerian point of view thus resists essence as whatness, that is, as a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for being an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB or qualities that distinguish it from other things. The essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is therefore not a stable ahistorical ground but a placeholder that gives rise to the question: How did things come to pass such that an ‫אלהים‬ in the HB came to be the thing it is. Thus we turn our attention away from t he contents of stories of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB and instead focus on how religious language in the HB works, and how it is able to construct an ‫אלהים‬ within its world.

20

Whatness and a Sartrean Idea of Existence Preceding Essence in an ‫אלהים‬

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? Ad apted and reapplied, the metaphysical perspective from some of the related writings of Jean Paul Sartre (1905–80) reverses the order of the tradit io nal essence/ existence distinction with r egard to what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be. Again equating essence with whatness, this chapter invites us to look at the world in the text on the assumption that an ‫’אלהים‬s existence is assumed to precede its essence. But how is this conceivable? The following out line is my ow n, but alludes indirectly to some themes found in Sartre (1948, 1957). In the HB, existence could (experimentally) be said to precede essence in an ‫ אלהים‬in five ways: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

in terms of creation and chaos; in the context of morality and values; in the context of meaning and purpose; in the context of functions and relations; in the context of definitions.

With regard to 1, unless we believe that there is an eternal Platonic Form ‫ אל הים‬which w as assumed to provide the blueprint and details for what an ‫ אלהים‬should consist of and how it should look, there is literally nothing for an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB to be ‘in the beginning’ (whether in theogonic or cosmogonic nar rative). Whereas in Genesis 1 humans are assumed to be created in the image of ‫אלהים‬, it can be asked whether it was also assumed that the first ‫אלהים‬ qua creator was formed according to a prior image (within a non- Platonist

122

What Is a God?

metaphysics), ‘according to its kind’. If the answer is ‘no’, at least with reference to Genesis 1, then in this text, the existence of an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to precede its essence which only emerged from its subsequent creative acts. There is no creator without a creation and to see existence and essence as the same thing in an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB could just be an anachronistic retrojection of the axioms of a Thomistic metaphysics onto the world in the text. Of course, texts that assume an ‫ אלהים‬is what it is and cannot but become what its intrinsic nature determines cannot be harmonized with such a reading. As for 2, in some texts in the HB it was assumed that an ‫ אלהים‬is not bound by any rules and norms but is always able to choose to become what it is by constructing its own values. These contexts can experimentally be read as possibly presupposing the absence of any higher authorities or prim or dial moral order to which an ‫ אלהים‬must submit. Examples of such texts include those that assume a strong version of divine command ethics in the context of Plato’s ‘Euthyphro’s Dilemma’. This would be present i n any text that assumes what is good is what finds favour in the eyes of a n ‫אלהים‬. In a Sartrean reading, this might be one of the ways in which the divine name in Exodus 3.14 – ‘‫ – ’אהיה‬could be understood, that is, as implying that an ‫ אלהים‬will be whatever it shows itself to be. Not because of being hidden and progressively revealing itself but in an assumed freedom to express itself in any way it chooses to. Of course, texts that assume a fixed nature of an ‫ אלהים‬and other metaphysical assumptions cannot be fitted into such a reading. With reference to 3, we may ask what, according to the HB, was the meaning of an ‫’א להים‬s life, that is, the purpose of its existence. This question is asked, with texts in mind that do not place ‫ אלהים‬within a larger teleological framework with which it must exist in harmony. Rather, the concern lies with texts that assume an ‫ אלהים‬creates rather than discovers or embodies its own meaning and purpose. In other words, there might be some texts that assume that no prior goal is given and that an ‫ אלהים‬constructs personal objectives as it goes along. It has no plan to which it must stick; instead, it reacts to each situation anew, even being able to change its mind, not to fulfil promises and regret what it has done. This is also evident in the assumption in some biblical texts that an ‫ אלהים‬like Yhwh did not have to relate to Israel in any preordained fashion, but could choose to do so freely. Of course, texts that are more

Whatness and a Sartrean Idea of Existence

123

deterministic in their metaphysical assumptions concerning the objective of particular ‫ אלהים‬characters cannot be fitted into this reading. With regard to 4, again consider as in 1 the fact that some texts like Genesis 1 and Deutero-Isaiah have at times being seen as presupposing the existence of an ‫ אלהים‬before the presence of the Other. Yet, as we have already seen in Kant, how can it even be said to be an ‫אלהים‬, inasmuch as it could only be such in relation to someone for whom it had this function? Still, in these metaphysically puzzling contexts, an ‫ אלהים‬first exists, yet was not called an ‫( אלהים‬in Hebrew!) by anyone. In that state one also cannot say it is powerful, holy, immortal, or anything else. All of the latter assumed essential properties of an ‫ אלהים‬presuppose relations to an Other, whether the Other is personal entities, language or simply background reality. It is for this reason that it can only be said that an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is merciful, not because it is such, existing all on its own before creation, but because it has only in time chosen to engage in acts of mercy to an Other. The same applies to other functions, rather than metaphors, of being an ‫אלהים‬. It is not by nature a king, lord, rock, or anything else; it chooses to be such. Of course, again alternative metaphysical assumptions may be present in other texts. With regard to 5, a Sartrean reading is not anti- essentialist as it does not deny that there is an essence to an ‫אלהים‬, that i s, something that an ‫אלהים‬ essentially is. From this point of view an ‫ אלהים‬still has an essence. The only difference b etween this view and traditional essent ialism is the inversion of the orde r in the essence/ existence distinction . Now existence precedes essence, so that an ‫ אלהים‬first exists with its essence only emerging over time based on how it chooses to act. So there are no common properties of the genus, yet it can be said that an ‫ אלהים‬is essentially a being that first exists and who must freely choose what it wants to be. Unlike created entities, its nature, if such can still be said to be a meaningful concept, is not something predetermined by the cosmic order, the latter being its own creation. Even if it appears to be bound by some natural law, many texts assumed it created these laws and chose them on its own prerogative. What kind of thing it is, at least in the world of the text, thus cannot be defined by religious tradition, or be legislated by political or social authority. Consequently, one cannot say what an ‫ אלהים‬necessarily is, and one cannot stereotype an ‫ אלהים‬by examining what other ‫ אלהים‬in the HB are like.

124

What Is a God?

What an ‫ אלהים‬is invites the retort, ‘Which one?’ and can be stated only in relation to what that particular ‫ אלהים‬in the HB has chosen to do. In other words, a Sartrean reading’s implicit idea is simply that if we define an ‫אלהים‬ in the HB as something, we deprive it of at least of some of its potentials; we nail it down to a particular stage within its existence or revelation or a role it might play and thus we betray the very core of an ‫ אלהים‬being what it was assumed to be (in some texts). If an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is said to be something, this label necessarily reduces it to a pawn of properties (irrespective of whether one sees it as a saviour, a holy one, a father or something comparable); as such it would be nothing but a well- positioned distributor of external goods. If in some texts what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is escapes any definition because it constant ly surpasses what it already is, one can say that it is in fact an ‘indefinite being’ – it is every next moment something else. It is not what it is and it is what it is not. Therefore an adequate definition of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB necessarily fails if it is complete, while an incomplete definition as such remains inadequate. This is why defining an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB for an existentialist thinker is a futile endeavour. What an ‫ אלהים‬is in the world of the text could be known only retrospectively, by stating what it is not any longer. Thus every definition of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB will miss its essence precisely by seeking to capture it. The implications of a Sartrean perspective are that in some texts of the HB we find a metatheistic Copernican revolution. That is: it is not that an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is holy because that is the nature of the species; rather, an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB has chosen to define itself as holy by choosing to relate to the Other in holy ways. In the HB, an entity was assumed to instantiate the property of being an ‫ אלהים‬in a way that is different from the way we think of essential properties. It even chooses to be an ‫ אלהים‬in relation to an Other, thus presupposing it did not have to be such with regard to the function it adopts. Especially with Yhwh in some texts we see that an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB ’s ‘project’ is not designed for ‫ אלהים‬beings as a collective, although it can formulate it so that it takes other ‫ אלהים‬into account, pertains to them and sends a certain message to all ‫אלהים‬. Consider the following examples:

Whatness and a Sartrean Idea of Existence

125

1. Now I know that Yhwh is greater than all ‫אלהים‬, because he delivered the people from under the hand of the Egyptians, when they dealt arrogantly with them. (Exod. 18.11) 2. For great is Yhwh, and greatly to be praised, and he is to be held in awe above all ‫( אלהים‬1 Chron, 16.25) 3. The house which I am to build will be great, for our ‫ אלהים‬is greater than all ‫( אלהים‬2 Chorn, 2.5) 4. For Yhwh is a great ‫אלהים‬, and a great king above all ‫( אלהים‬Ps. 95.3) 5. For great is Yhwh, and greatly to be praised; he is to be feared above all ‫אלהים‬. (Ps. 96.4) 6. All worshipers of images are put to shame, who make their boast in worthless idols; all ‫ אלהים‬bow down before him . . . For yo u, o Yhwh, are most high over all the earth; thou art exalted far above all ‫אלהים‬. (Ps. 97.7, 9) 7. For I know that Yhwh is great, and that Yhwh is above all ‫אלהים‬. (Ps. 135.5) In these polemical texts there is an interesting existential conceptual development taking place. First the assumption is that there is a class, the members of which are called ‫אלהים‬. These include, in the beginning, both Yhwh and all other related entities. But then, all members except Yhwh are denied to be actual ‫אלהים‬, thus demoting them to and creating a subclass of pseudo- or quasi- ‫אלהים‬. But instead of Yhwh now remaining as the only member of the class – a singleton – he is promoted to a superclass above all ‫אלהים‬. This move from the ‫ אל הים‬to idols and an ‫ אלהים‬like Yhwh to above all ‫ אלהים‬curiously leaves the class ‫ אלהים‬with no necessary and sufficient conditions for membership. Nothing is simply just an ‫ אלהים‬anymore, so there is nothing for an ‫ אלהים‬to be. In view of this we can say that an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is ‘not hing’ in the sense of not coinciding either with itself or its situation. Thus ‘nothing’ indicates a fundamental incongruence in an ‫ אלהים‬that makes it unique and unfinished. It is separated from itself by that ‘nothing’ which is also a hallmark of ‫ אלהים‬consciousness. And ‫ אלהים‬consciousness is thus always different and always strives for more. The above might be adopted experimentally to explain why questions such as why an ‫ אלהים‬wants to create, wants to appear awesome, wants to be hidden,

126

What Is a God?

wants to be worshipped, wants to be feared, wants to tell people how to live, and s o on, seem so strange. It is almost as if no answer can be forthcoming that does not seem awkward in some theological sense unless we assume an ‫ אלהים‬to be f ree subject. Even then motives appear all- too- human. It is therefore often assumed that there is no prior Principle of Sufficient Reason to account for why an ‫ אלהים‬is the way it is, or why it is at all – it is what it is and wants these things because it chooses to do so and be such. Indeed, this has always been one of the answers given for ‘why-questions’ related to divine being and action against the backdrop of the presumed absence of external causation and inner necessity. In the end, if the claim that existence precedes essence in an ‫ אלהים‬as in a Sartrean reading is taken as a point of departure, it implies that there is no predetermined essence to be found in an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, and in this sense only, there cannot be any final or correct answer to the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬is. It becomes what it is through what it will choose to be.

21

Whatness and a Quinean Denial of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Being an ‫אלהים‬

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? In the view of this chapter, adopted and adapted from Willard Van Orman Quine (1908–2000), an ontological question of this type is basically meaningless in that it inevitably involves circularity. This is not because of the paradox of analysis we have already encountered, rather, it is because of what Quine (1969) called ‘ontological relativity’. By the latter, Quine meant a combination of what he called‘the indeterminacy of translation’ and ‘confirmation holism’. In other words, scholarly theories (and the propositions derived from them) of what an ‫ אלהים‬is are under- determined by the textual data, While some theories can be falsified inasmuch as these fail to fit with the data or are ingeniously complicated, there will always be alternative points of view with roughly equal merit. A Quinean perspective will therefore dismiss any attempted classical conceptual analysis of ‫ אלהים‬altogether. This follows logically from a rejection of Kant’s interpretation of the analytic–synthetic distinction (i.e. between propositions about an ‫ אלהים‬that are assumed to be true by virtue of the word’s meani ng vs. propositions held to be true because of how they are thought to relate to the world in the text). One reason for doing so lies in the ways in which a Quinean perspective equates essence and necessity, yet ultimately rejects it:: Curiously, a philosophical tradition does exist for . . . a distinction between necessary and contingent attributes. It lives on in the terms ‘essence’ and ‘accident’. . . It is a distinction that one attributes to Aristotle (subject

128

What Is a God?

to contradiction by scholars, such being the penalty for attributions to Aristotle). But, however venerable the distinction, it is surely indefensible. (Quine 1960: 199–200)

Diff erently worded, Aristotle is said to have introduced ideas related to esse ntialism that Quine cites as a forerunner of the notion of ‘intension’ (i.e. necessary and sufficient conditions for being an ‫)אלהים‬. Also for Quine, an Aristotelian belief in essences means believing in the existence of certain properties instantiated by an ‫ אלהים‬which, should the particular properties for the sake of the argument be removed , one can no longer meaningfully call it an ‘‫’אלהים‬. That is, there are essential properties of an ‫ אלהים‬that are necessary for something to have if it is to be a part of the extension of the generic term. In his famous essay ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ Quine aligned the intension / extens ion dichotomy with the analytic/ synthetic distinction of postKantian philosophy, which he then proceeded to destroy by undermining the logical bases of the concepts of analyticity and synonymy (Quine 1953: 20–46). The implication is, as above, that intensions for ‫ אלהים‬are nothing more than cla ss ical A ristotelian essentialism transfer red to linguistic forms. Here on e finds an assumed parallel between the essential properties of an ‫ אלהים‬and the meaning of the word that denotes it as that object. Or as a Quinean view might suggest, what the HB means by ‫ אלהים‬is ‘what essence became when it was separated from the object of reference and wedded to the word’ (Quine 1953: 22). In other words, the meanings of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB are not ‘objects’. That is, the meaning of the common name ‫ אלהים‬must not be confused with the objects the name denotes, for meanings are not objects of references. If this is right, there are no necessary truths about an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. Also, any supposed essential properties as necessary properties of an ‫ אלהים‬do not exist in it as such. Rather the notion of necessity with reference to what is involved in being an ‫ אלהים‬only applies to the various descriptions thereof by the writers and readers of the HB. I n other words, what a given text in the HB might appear to assume to be essential properties of an ‫ אלהים‬is simply a reflection of what was deemed necessary in the language of a particular meta- theistic pre- construction of the charac ter type. Hence, when a text in t he HB seems to assume a need to associate an ‫ אלהים‬with predicates or attributes like ‘mighty’, ‘wise’, ‘holy’,

Whatness and a Quinean Denial for Being an ‫אלהים‬

129

‘merciful’, ‘great’, ‘eternal’ and so on, it actually implies that these must be ac cidental properties. The reason for this radic al claim is that, if an ‫אלהים‬ instantiated essentially or necessarily (i.e. by definition or default) any of the properties explicitly ascribed to it, it would have been superfluous to add the particular qualities in the construction. Consider the following example from a particular context, without assuming that other texts imply the same: But Joshua said to the people, ‘You cannot serve Yhwh, for he is a holy ‫;אל‬ he is a jealous ‫ אל‬. . .’ (Josh. 24.19)

This text clearly assumes not only jealousy (usually associated with Yhwh alone) but also holiness (usually associated with all ‫ )אלהים‬to be accidental properties of the genus generic ‫אלהים‬. For if an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be such essentially, it would be redundant to state these properties to qualify the kind of ‫ אלהים‬Yhwh was assumed to be. In fact, the text assumes Joshua is giving them information of the kind that was not taken for granted or went without say ing. A nd yet most scholars would assume that an ‫ אלהים‬is inherently at least holy, whereas this text in the HB does not. Let us consider another example to clarify what is meant here. In the following passage it is assumed that not all things called ‫ אלהים‬are necessarily great and mighty: O great and mighty ‫ אלהים‬whose name is Yhwh of hosts . . . (Jer. 32.18)

The fact that the text does not find it sufficient to only say Yhwh is an ‫ אלהים‬but also presupposes the need to specify that Yhwh is a great and mighty kind of ‫ אלהים‬again implies that an ‫ אלהים‬as such is not essentially or necessarily great and mighty. It makes little sense to say that an ‫ אלהים‬is a mighty or great ‫ אלהים‬if all ‫ אלהים‬are such by definition (i.e. if the claim is an analytic statement). The need to note these properties as being present implies that this particular ‫ אלהים‬is such and so, as opposed to other ‫ אלהים‬who are not. Hence in this text at least, being ‘mighty’ and ‘great’ cannot be seen as an essential or necessary property of an ‫ ;אלהים‬it is only required for this particular character’s construction in this particular context. In yet a third example from the HB, we find a text in which it is assumed that an entity did not have to be true, alive and eternal to be classified as an ‫אלהים‬:

130

What Is a God?

But Yhwh is the true ‫ ;אלהים‬he is the living ‫ אלהים‬and the everlasting king. (Jer. 10.10)

The tex t above assumes that (and only makes sense on the assumption that) a n ‫ אלהים‬is neither necessarily true, living, and everlasting. It also assumes that Yhwh can be described in these ways and that the description will be profound since they do not involve properties of an ‫ אלהים‬instantiated by default. Once again, therefore, the properties of an ‫ אלהים‬noted here are essential only to the particular description of a particular ‫ ;אלהים‬they are not intrinsic properties of the nature of the kind to which ‫ אלהים‬as common name was assumed to refer to. Hence the rationale for mentioning such properties can be said to be theological rather than ontological. Besides disagreeing then with so-called Aristotelian essentialism, a Quinean poi nt of view also rejected the emerging modal form of essentialism. According to the latter view, there are essential properties of an ‫ אלהים‬as object which it necessarily possesses if it is to exist as an ‫ אלהים‬at all, and accidental properties, which are possible properties that an ‫ אלהים‬as object need not possess in order for it to be an ‫אלהים‬. In rejecting modality, Quine examined the separation between so- called de re and de dicto statements and implied that we forget the idea of the former with reference to an ‫אלהים‬. Basically, the translation of the phrase ‘ de dicto’ with reference to an ‫ אלהים‬would be ‘about what is said of an ‫’אלהים‬, whereas ‘ de re’ statements about an ‫ אלהים‬are supposed to be ‘about the thing an ‫אלהים‬ is’. Th e reason a Qiuinean perspective avoids the distinction is b ecause it argues that it can only work for names that are used referentially (e.g. Yhwh). It cannot be applied in the context of common names like ‫אלהים‬. For a Quinean view the modal notion of necessity in an ‫ אלהים‬collapses if the notion of essence is withdrawn. Modal essentialists who believe in de re modality for an ‫ אלהים‬are obliged to tell us how to identify entities across possible worlds in the text. In other words, a Quinean metaphysics’ challenge for th e modal essentialist might consist in the demand for necess ary and sufficient conditions for the cross- world identity of ‫אלהים‬- type individuals. However, in the HB, a particular ‫ אלהים‬like Yhwh can have different properties essential to the description of his character in different texts. From this state of affairs it follows that modal essentialism is impossible.

Whatness and a Quinean Denial for Being an ‫אלהים‬

131

According to our Quinean perspective then, all talk of the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is, at bottom, incoherent. In this context it also suggests that any attempt at answering a what- is- it question about an ‫ אלהים‬in the traditional manner (i.e. associated with a thing’s essential properties) is impossible. A Quinean account also denies that a reference to some essence of an ‫אלהים‬, even if this was possible (or derived from a description), in itself supplies us with an answer to the what-is-it-question concerning an ‫אלהים‬. Since real essences or necessary properties do not exist in Quinean metaphysics, the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬i s (e ssential ly or necessarily) becomes both unanswerable and presumptuous. However, when separated from the notions of essence and necessity, the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be can still be taken as legitimate, even from a Quinean point of view. One should simply avoid trying to specify any essential or necessary properties of the genus. But if that is the case, what does one then look for? In this regard, consider that the ‘nature’ of an ‫אלהים‬ is taken to be the collection of properties that supplies us with an answer to the what-is-it question about it. Recapping what was said above, since Quine reje cts the intelligibility of de re modality, the nature of an ‫ אלהים‬can still be determined by the properties that an individual ‫ אלהים‬in the HB actually instantiates, rather than the properties it must or could instantiate. For a Quinean reading, the what- is- it questions about ‫ אלהים‬are thus not about modal issues but only about temporal ones, that is, concerning an ‫אלהים‬ in the HB’s identity over time. At the same time, Quine’s multidimensional framework precludes an ‫’אלהים‬s numerical identity over time. In other words, on a Quinean reading disagreements in the HB about the nature of an ‫אלהים‬ are problematically related to a subject matter separable from that of essence. It is the sparse properties of an individual ‫ אלהים‬in the HB – not its essences – which are assumed to determine its nature. Important for subtlety and nuance is a change of the way in which our ques tion i s fo rmulated. Instead of the what- is- it question being about ‫אלהים‬- ness in general (i.e. the question ‘What is X- ness?’ in a Socratic format), a Quinean approach involves a concern with an interrogative featuring an indefinite description (i.e. ‘What is an F?’). So even in the face of agreement about de re modal facts about an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, disagreement over common natures in the text is possible. For this reason, a Quinean

132

What Is a God?

pers pecti v e d iffers from others i n a manner that cannot be reduced to diverging takes on essences. It is also a new take on the nature of an ‫אלהים‬ in t he HB as a target of metaphysical inquiry and on how to answer the related what-is-it question. If this view is adopted then every property we encounter in descriptions of an ‫ אלהים‬is metaphysically an accident. Such ‘pan-accidentalism’ is basically the opposite of Leibniz if the latter is seen as a superessentialist and interpreted to claim that everything about an ‫ אלהים‬is necessary. A Quinean reading thus equates essentialism with the belief in necessity and rejects it whil e sim u lta n eous ly separating essence/ necessity from the concept of what ness. In t his way, Quine’s ideas allow for a different perspective on how to interpret and approach the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be.

22

Whatness and the Popperian Essentialist Fallacy in Defining an ‫אלהים‬

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? Adopting and adapting the relevant ideas of Karl Popper (1902– 94), the search for a definition featuring an essence as answer to the what- it- it question with reference to ‫ אלהים‬in the HB seems thoroughly mis guid ed (cf. Popper 1966: 185– 219; 1973: 130– 60; 1979: 195– 207). At least from a scientific point of view as understood by Popper, such a quest is useless. In the end it represents a return to some sort of philosophical animism explaining nothing. If one assumes that the meaning of the word ‘‫ ’אלהים‬is considered more important than questions of truth or falsity regarding its existence, we are courting anti- intellectualism and, as such, committing what he would call ‘the essentialist fallacy’ (cf. Popper 1979: 195). But why is this? And what does it imply for how we should understand what being an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB involved? At this point a little background is required. Here it is important to note that a Popperian approach (cf. Popper 1966: 85– 219) to the idea of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB might commence by distinguishing three approaches to classification. 1. Platonist 2. Aristotelian 3. Instrumental or practical With reference to the Platonist perspective, which a Popperian view rejects, one example of it would be the search for a Socratic definition of ‫אלהים‬- ness as discussed in Chapter 2 of this study. It involves any questions featuring abstract nouns, for example, ‘What is X- ness?’ On a Popperian account, the

134

What Is a God?

same tra dition of ‘error’ is being p erpet uated in the mainstream of (analytic) philosophy, the assumption of which is that progress in metaphysical inquiry consists of clarifying concepts (e,g. ‘‫ )’אלהים‬. This is seen as a form of ‘essentialism’ that would see us first look for ultimate explanations by way of constructing a classical definition of ‘‫’אלהים‬. This tendency is considered to indicate a pathological obsession with the Hebrew term (‘‫ ’אלהים‬as common noun). St ated differently, a Popperian perspective (see Popper 1966: 185–219) might speak of ‘methodological essentialism’ to characterize the view, implied by Plato and many of his followers, that knowledge of an ‫ אלהים‬requires discovering the true nature of the thing the word refers to. As an example of such erring Popper mentions Antisthenes who told Plato he could see horses but no horseness (to which Plato replied Antisthenes had eyes but not intellect). Now just substitute ‘‫ ’אלהים‬in the HB for ‘horses’ and ‘‫אלהים‬-ness’ for ‘horseness’ and one gets the general idea of the objection. In his account of Aristotle, the Popperian critique pertains to the assumption that there is only one ultimate way to describe an ‫ אלהים‬as object. Here the growth of knowledge about what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be is implied to involve little more than the compiling of an encyclopaedia containing the ent ire variety of implicit and intuitive folk- definitions of the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB (cf. Popper 1966: 185– 219I). But Popperian view rejects the idea that there is such a thing as a faculty of intellectual intuition. Aristotelian approaches cannot lead to certainty because there does not seem to be any way of distinguishing between a true and false intuitively essentialist definition (cf. Popper 1966: 300). After all, if an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB can be defined essentially in more than one way, how is the essentialist to say which, if any, is actually correct? (see Popper 1966: 292). A more detailed account of the Aristotelian method of definition by essences is also found in Popper (1966: 185–219). Though Aristotelian approaches are not the same as Platonic essentialism, they both agree that to attain knowledge of what an ‫ אלהים‬is one needs to discover the hidden nature or Form or essence of ‫ אלהים‬type things. Hence, both are examples of what a Popperian perspective would call ‘methodological essentialism’. Both therefore commit the essentialist fallacy in assuming, by implication, three very specific ways of understanding what an ‫ אלהים‬is:

Whatness and the Popperian Essentialist Fallacy

135

1. knowing an ‫’אלהים‬s unchanging reality or essence; 2. knowing a definition of the essence of an ‫;אלהים‬ 3. knowing the name ‫ אלהים‬as reference to an essence. Given these ways, two approaches can be followed in trying to answer the question of whatness with reference to an ‫אלהים‬: 1. A person may give the name and ask for the definition of an ‫אלהים‬. 2. One may give the definition of ‫ אלהים‬and ask for the name. In response to any philosophers who insist that we must first attend to the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬before one can even begin to wonder how the authors of the HB constructed the character, a Popperian point of view might point out that a modest degree of exactness is much to be preferred ove r the pretentious muddle of the essentialists (cf. Popper 1972: 105). Ult imately, however, for a Popperian approach statements like ‘An ‫אלהים‬ is X’ should instead be read from right to left, as an answer to ‘What shall we call something that is X’; never from left to right as an answer to ‘What is an ‫’?אלהים‬ For example, one can invert the following statements about how an ‫אלהים‬ like Yhwh was described to learn more about what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be (in the given context). 1. You shall remember Yhwh your ‫ אלהים‬for it is he who gives you the power to get wealth. (Deut. 8.18) 2. Yhwh your ‫ אלהים‬is he who is ‫ אלהים‬in heaven above and on earth beneath. (Josh. 2.11) 3. ‫ אלהים‬will give ear and humble them, he who is enthroned of old. (Ps. 55.19) 4. With ‫ אלהים‬we shall do valiantly, it is he who treads down our foes. (Ps. 60.12; 108.13) 5. He who forms the mountains and creates the wind, and declares to man what is his thought; who makes the morning darkness and treads on the heights of the earth – Yhwh, ‫ אלהים‬of hosts, is his name. (Amos 4.13) 6. Yhwh, ‫ אלהים‬of hosts, he who touches the earth and its melts. (Amos 9.5) To be sure, these texts may not appear to deal with an ‫ אלהים‬in the generic sense; every one features a description of a particular ‫ אלהים‬that was in some

136

What Is a God?

ways not only prototypical but also atypical. Yet, if one can assume that these tex ts themselves equated the species ‫ אלהים‬with Yhwh – and identified the extension of the common name with the proper one – one c an indeed say that, on a Popperian account, these texts provide partial and selective explanations of what it was believed to mean to be an ‫ אלהים‬in a generalizable way. If that is the case, what do these texts explain about being an ‫ אלהים‬without doing so in an essentialist manner? To answer this question, instead of looking at these texts and trying to define an ‫ אלהים‬as being X essentially, one goes about it the opposite way saying that an entity who is and does these things as described in the given text was assumed to be that kind of entity an ‫אלהים‬ was believed to be. In this way, methodological essentialism can be better understood when con trasted with methodological nominalism. The latter view would never suggest that a question like ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬is in any sense useful. Yet, it will want to ask a question like: ‘How were the texts depicting ‫ אלהים‬assumed to be useful for knowledge?’ or ‘How does an ‫ אלהים‬behave?’ or ‘Under what conditions does an ‫ אלהים‬appear?’ As for the Popperian view itself, it ultimately diverges from both methodological essentialism and methodological nominalism. Instead, it purports to be a third possibility that can be described as ‘modified essentialism’. As such it is still essentialist; yet it involves a radical modification of the core concept of essence. First of all, along with nominalism, a Popperian interpretation would, as should be clear by now, reject the idea of an ultimate explanation for the whatness of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. On this view, every attempted ultimate explanation of the kind of thing an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be can be seen as requiring a further explanation by a theory or conjecture of a higher degree of universality. Thus, there can be no explanation of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB that is not itself in need of a further explanation, for there is no such thing as a self-explanatory description of the kind of thing that an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be. Second, a Popperian view, in rejecting the traditional concept of essence also rejects all traditional ‘What-is-X? questions, for example, asking what an ‫ אלהים‬is (i.e. with reference to a supposed essence or true nature). On this reading one must forget about the idea that was typical of traditional versions of essentialism, that is, for every single thing called an ‫ אלהים‬in the

Whatness and the Popperian Essentialist Fallacy

137

HB there will be an essence, inherent nature or principle that necessarily causes it to be what it is, and thus to act as it does. This idea is based on an assumption that leads nowhere and has in practice meant the construction of relational properties for an ‫ אלה ים‬as sufficient explanation. Hence the essentialist fallacy of the belief, on grounds felt to be a priori valid, that a satisfactory account of the kind of entity called an ‫ אלהים‬must come by way of identifying its supposed inherent properties. Thirdly, in a final modification of essentialism, a Popperian approach asks of us to give up the view that only supposed essential properties that can be shown to be inherent in each individual ‫ אלהים‬are what one needs to appeal to in providing an adequate explanation of its behaviour. Such a reading would completely fail to throw any light whatsoever on the question of why different particulars called ‫ אלהים‬should be constructed to behave in like manner. If it is said, ‘because their essences are alike,’ the new question arises, i.e. ‘Why should there not be as many different essences as there are different things called ‫’?אלהים‬ In sum then, a Popperian perspective takes a stance against questions of the form this study is concerned with, i.e. asking what-is-it with reference to ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. It dismisses any claim that one should have to be able to say what an ‫ אלהים‬is before one can answer other questions regarding it, for example, whether it exists. It also debunks the claim that terms have to be – or even can be defined – before an inquiry can commence. In this way, a Popperian point of view, though still essentialist in its own modified manner, is yet one more voice in the growing line of thinkers who think the conc ern with whatness and ess ence as it typically ma nife sts itself is utterly misguided.

23

Whatness and Kripkean Modal Neo-Essentialism about ‫ אלהים‬as Rigid Designator

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? During the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, the analytic tradition in philosophy (often opposed to Continental traditions) became increasingly anti-essentialist. By the end of this period, essentialism practically vanished from the radar. However, since the 1960s with the rise of formal modal logic, Saul Kripke (1940–) was perhaps the most prominent philosopher to help revive a neo-essentialist perspective in analytic metaphysics. By the end of the twentieth century terms like ‘essential properties’, ‘necessary and sufficient conditions’, ‘identity conditions’ and so on became quite commonplace. And while other types of essentialism can be encountered in contemporary philosophy, Kripke’s variety is perhaps the most common. Enter Kripke’s notion of a ‘rigid designator’, which in this chapter will be of relevance to our attempt to look at yet another way of conceiving an alleged essence of ‘‫ ’אלהים‬as common noun. It follows from the way in which Kripke tried to move beyond a Fregean account according to which the meaning of ‘‫ ’אלהים‬would be seen in terms of sense versus reference. Kripke also attempted to leave behind the logical positivist view that would have us connect the a priori/a posteriori distinction with the analytic/synthetic distinction with reference to ‘‫’אלהים‬. R igid designation in the present context implies that ‘‫ ’אלהים‬as common noun refers to the same object across all ‘possible worlds’ (a Leibnizian way of basically saying that things could have been otherwise) in the context of a given text of the HB. While a Kripkean view might be more easily related

140

What Is a God?

to how proper names, like ‘Yhwh’ or ‘‫( ’אלהים‬in the absolute sense) get their reference, it was also expanded to include ‘natural kind’ terms (like ‘‫ ’אלהים‬as common noun) (cf. Kripke 1980 116–19). For example: 1. With general terms for ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as natural kind, as for proper names of individual ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, we must be careful not to confuse the contingent properties used to fix the reference of the kind as being part of the meaning of the general term for that kind (e.g. power). 2. Certain properties of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, perhaps discovered by exegetical investigation, can be used to classify new members of the ‫אלהים‬ as kind (e.g. members that were not in the original sample population, e.g. Samuel). 3. The properties originally associated with an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB might be neither necessary nor sufficient for membership in its kind. For example, it might not be necessary that something must be holy to simply be called an ‫אלהים‬, and being holy as such might not be sufficient for actually being one (e.g. idols, priests). 4. Philosophical investigation is the proper path to discovering the essence of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as natural kind. 5. General terms for ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as natural kind apply to new samples and their reference is determined by a historical chain of language users as in the case of proper names for individual ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. With the common noun in mind, some examples of a fixed reference for ‘‫ ’אלהים‬are found in a recurring theme in the HB involving a popular questioning of the whereabouts of a particular individual (or groups of) ‫אלהים‬. Though the exact entity or entities involved differ, it is assumed that what is being designated by ‘‫ ’אלהים‬is generic and therefore quite rigid. On this assumption we can explain the supposed intercultural translatability of the generic concept: 1. Then he will say, ‘Where are their ‫אלהים‬, the rock in which they took refuge?’ (Deut. 32.37) 2. Where are the ‫ אלהים‬of Hamath and Arpad? Where are the ‫ אלהים‬of Sepharva’im, Hena and Ivvah? Have they delivered Sama’ria out of my hand? (2 Kgs 18.34; Isa. 36.19) 3. But where are your ‫ אלהים‬that you made for yourself? Let them arise, if they can save you, in your time of trouble; for as many as your cities are your ‫אלהים‬, O Judah! (Jer. 2.28)

Whatness and Kripkean Modal Neo-Essentialism

141

4. Then he took the mantle of Eli’jah that had fallen from him, and struck the water, saying, ‘Where is Yhwh, the ‫ אלהים‬of Eli’jah?’ (2 Kgs 2.14) 5. Why should they say among the peoples, ‘Where is their ‫( ’?אלהים‬Joel 2.17) 6. Then my enemy will see, and shame will cover her who said to me, ‘Where is Yhwh your ‫( ’?אלהים‬Mic. 7.10) 7. You have wearied Yhwh with your words. Yet you say, ‘How have we wearied him?’ By saying, ‘Everyone who does evil is good in the sight of Yhwh, and he delights in them.’ Or by asking, ‘Where is the ‫ אלהים‬of justice?’ (Mal. 2.17) 8. But none says, ‘Where is an ‫ אלהים‬my maker, who gives songs in the night? (Job 35.10) 9. My tears have been my food day and night, while men say to me continually, ‘Where is your ‫( ’?אלהים‬Ps. 42.3, cf. 10) 10. Why should the nations say, ‘Where is their ‫( ’?אלהים‬Ps. 79.10, cf. 115.2) When the HB uses ‫ אלהים‬as natural kind term in these texts, the reference is not just to a particular thing, but to a particular kind of thing. The conceptual background preserves the kind ‫ אלהים‬by changing the features attributed to it. This suggests that the properties that texts in the HB attributed to the ‫ אלהים‬as a kind are in some sense less basic than the recognition of the kind. Even if what the one text assumes to be the properties of an ‫ אלהים‬is later thoug ht of differently, no text would as a result claim that because of such divergence, an ‫ אלהים‬does not exist. The reason for this has to do with the logic of kind terms (Kripke 1980: 118). Yet, this is not a point about the fundamental nature of the world outside the text. It is, rather, a point about the HB’s use of language – in particular about the grammar of ‫ אלהים‬as natural kind term. The term ‘‫ ’אלהים‬functions in a particular way in the Biblical Hebrew language where, though it rigidly designates a kind, it does this without a consistent commitment to any particular conception of what constitutes the kind in question. The term ‘‫ ’אלהים‬is thus meant to designate a kind, not to spell out what is essential to that kind. We can discover what is essential to the ‫ אלהים‬as kind, but this is not part of the grammar of the term. The original concept of ‫ אלהים‬is: that kind of thing, where the kind can be identified by paradigmatic instances. It is not something picked out by a qualitative dictionary definition (cf. Kripke 1980: 122).

142

What Is a God?

The point this perspective might wish to make is that the use of ‫ אלהים‬as natural kind term does not entail essence, it is essentialist. A Kripkean view of the HB’s use of ‘‫ ’אלהים‬is not begging the question against the anti-essentialist; it is about the way the reference for ‫ אלהים‬functions in biblical language. In the case of ‘‫ ’אלהים‬as natural kind term, it presupposes a kind of thing in a way so obvious that the question of what it is metaphysically is irrelevant. With this picture of the logic of ‫ אלהים‬as natural kind term, we see why it does not presuppose scientific essentialism in our analysis of the concept. It also again divorces whatness from essence. Yet, it does not do so with necessity. From a Kripkean perspective a statement about an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is said to be necessary if it holds in all logically possible worlds. This is the main difference between Kripkean and Aristotelian esse ntialism with reference to an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. On the one hand, both would agree that the ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is a natural kind that has certain properties that are essential to an ‫ אלהים‬being the kind of thing it is. Also, both views are realist in that they assume we discover facts about an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, we do not create them. On the other hand, Kripkean essentialism is concerned with the necessity in something’s being an ‫אלהים‬, that is, the necessary properties of an ‫ אלהים‬just are the essential ones. If a property is essential to an ‫ אלהים‬it is also necessary, and vice versa (see Kripke 1980: 118). By contrast, an Aris totelian perspective would want us to make an explicit distinction between what was assumed to be necessary as opposed to essential in an ‫אלהים‬ (cf. Kripke 1980: passim). Kripke’s view is also known as ‘modal realism’, and as such can be described as follows: P was assumed to be an essential property of an ‫ אלהים‬if and only if P was assumed to be a property that it must necessarily have; an accidental property of an ‫ אלהים‬would be one that it was assumed to happen to have but which it could also possibly have lacked and still be an ‘‫’אלהים‬. On this modal essentialist approach to an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, its essential properties cannot be said to determine the nature of any individual ‫ אלהים‬in a given text. In addition, as was noted above, they also are not assumed to provide us with an answer to our what- is- an-‫ אלהים‬question. Instead, a Kripkean reading is neutral with respect to methodological matters and committed only to an analysis of the concept of essence for an ‫ אלהים‬and cognate notions like

Whatness and Kripkean Modal Neo-Essentialism

143

‫אלהים‬-ness as a property that is instantiated essentially. Any objection to this account seeking to show that a Kripkean perspective fails to provide a suitable answer to the what-is-an-‫ אלהים‬in the HB question is therefore no objection to its views regarding essence. A Kripkean reading might also emphasize the essentiality of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB’s origin of composition (see Kripke 1980: 112–14). This might give the impression that Kripkean essentialism about an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB assumes the necessity of its identity. For example, a Kripkean view might imply that something that is superficially like an ‫ אלהים‬in appearance but lacks the property of, say, being alive, would not be an ‫אלהים‬. This establishes that, of necessity, being alive is necessary for being an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, but does not show that the possession of this property is sufficient for being an ‫אלהים‬. Similarly, in the case of the appearance of what was thought to be an ‫אלהים‬, but which turns out to be a spirit of a different species, some texts would deny that such creatures are actual ‫אלהים‬. Being some sort of spirit may in some texts of the HB be a necessary condition for being an ‫אלהים‬, but of course it is not a sufficient condition as not all spirits were assumed to be ‫אלהים‬. In this variety of neo- essentialism, it is natural to think of the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as presupposing both necessity and sufficiency, that is, the posse ssion of the e ss ence of an ‫ אלהים‬was neces sary for it and suffices for membership among the ‫א להים‬. Even so, a Kripkean reading cannot be expected to establish what the essence of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as kind was assumed to be. Rather, it establishes only what we may call its ‘partial essence’, that is, the identity conditions for being an ‫ אלהים‬that are necessary but not sufficient (see Kripke 1980: 118). Thus, only a partial essence is transferred via the religious-historical precursors from which an ‫ אלהים‬originates. A further question is whether there was also assumed to be a ‘ full essence’ for the particular individuals that had a partial generic essence. Just because a Kripkean reading asserts that something is an essential property of ‫ אלהים‬as natural kind in the HB it does not mean that everything with that property was assumed to be an ‫אלהים‬. For example, based on the ideas of Kripke (1980: 119), it can be said that in some texts in the HB an ‫ אלהים‬cannot have been assumed as being essentially or necessarily holy for the following reasons:

144

What Is a God?

1. In some texts, an ‫ אלהים‬is assumed to be of the genus spirit, whereas a holy being can exist also in the form of a human or an object/ structure. 2. Holiness is not a sample of an ‫ אלהים‬because it does not have the properties we can ascribe to samples of ‫( אלהים‬such as being a body). 3. An ‫ אלהים‬in some texts was not simply assumed to be a holy spirit but rather a potentially immortal substance enduring through power. Th is ar gument shows that many seemingly quintessential properties as socia ted with ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as kind are not in fact sufficient for kind membership. In most cases, perhaps some sort of Kripkean ‘microstructural properties’ were assumed to determine the perceived nature of ‫ אלהים‬as natural kind in a given context. Such essential properties may have been assumed to be unknown, even to competent users of ‫ אלהים‬in the generic sense. If this was the case, then a Kripkean perspective might also be taken to imply that many of the properties prototypically associated with ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as natur al ki nd may technically not in fact have been necessary for being in the ex tension of the common noun. Since there are many exceptions to a rule (f rom a given perspective in a given context), it can be concluded within a neo-essentialist or modal essentialist paradigm that ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as common noun was not characterized of necessity by the readily observable properties of its instances.

24

Whatness and Derridean Differential Ontology for an ‫ אלהים‬beyond Anti-essentialism

How might we interpret and approach the question ‘What is an ‫ ’?אלהים‬from a philosophical perspective? The adaptation of the views of our final dialogue partner, Jacques Derrida (1930–2004), offers us a perspective that can be thought to have undermined basically all of the traditional metaphysical approaches to what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be. In one interview about the concept of the ‘trace’ (a technical term in Derrida), we encounter a radical move relevant to our discussion. It involves what comes down to an outright rejection of the age-old philosophical priority of fundamental questioning as such. This is achieved by taking a closer look at the conditions for asking what-it-is itself. In the context of this study, we may say that already from Derrida’s early writings (1967), we are able to identify two problematic assumptions at the heart of the pursuit for conceptual clarification: 1. The sign ‫ אלהים‬in its generic sense has a stable identity. 2. The concept of the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬is clear enough to be affirmed or denied. Exposing these taken-for-granted complacencies, a Derridean perspective aims to be neither essentialist nor anti- essentialist with regard to what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be. It is almost as if both of these ontological accounts assume too much. Yet, our situation is one where there is no original, pure, unambiguous, clear, original, essential or permanent meaning for ‫ אלהים‬as common noun to have. Even with regard to our descriptions, since the metalanguage changes over time, and since the notions of whatness and essence have an ever evolving history of contingent meanings, no decisive

146

What Is a God?

and final meaningful reconstruction of what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be will ever be given. And while the religious language in which it occurs may be relatively stable (e.g. the use of the word ‘‫ ’אלהים‬as common noun), its actual use in the HB will always be open to the classic metaphysical procedures, especially their ontological moves that will seek to determine the being of an ‫ אלהים‬with the help of the metaphor of ‘presence’. ‘De c o nstruction’, a p opula r and familiar term typically associated with Derrida, can perhaps be taken to imply the need for more suspicion of questions of the ‘What is X?’ type. The reason for this caution is the way a Derridean perspective can be said to involve the delimiting of ontology, and above all of the third person present indicative, that is, propositional statements of the form ‘An ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is P’ where ‘P’ involves what is understood to be essential predication. In o t her words, a Der ridean point of view takes its position over and against conceptual analysis of the decompositional type that seeks to break up a generic term like ‫ אלהים‬into simpler elements (e.g. into properties or attributes of the phenomenon). Since on this view there is no conceptual core or structure to analyse, the meaning of generic ‫ אלהים‬in the HB in any given context is in the end inescapably unstable and undecidable. Only convention and tradition allows for a temporary sense of determinate contents for the common noun. The implication of this is that concepts like ‫ אלהים‬in the HB therefore cannot possibly have settled definitions. The essentialist tradition that attempted to locate the whatness of any given ‫ אלהים‬in the HB in some set of allegedly essential properties or within self-contained identities is therefore presumptuou s . Derridean ontology, by contras t, is radically differential. As such it understands the identity of any given ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as constituted on the basis of the ever- changing nexus of relations in which it is found, and thus, identity is a secondary determination. ‘Difference’ (i.e. the constitutive relations that temporar ily make up fuzzy identities), in an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, is primary. Technically, however, a Derridean reading would therefore not provide us wit h another philosophical method or type of analysis which, if followed, wil l tell us what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be. Instead, in the first phase of exposing our meta-text’s own deconstructive strategies, one merely needs to

Whatness and Derridean Differential Ontology

147

become aware of some of the binary opposites that we have been taking for granted so far within our historical overview of philosophical perspectives on ‫ א להים‬as common noun in the HB, for example, philosophical/ literary; essence/accident; substance/property; whatness/thisness; real/nominal; reality/appearance; literal/metaphorical; analytic/synthetic; intension/extension; necessity/possibility identity/difference and so on. For Derrida these are all in fact false dichotomies, breaking up as they do the world of the text into what is, in effect, ineffably one. Thus deconstruction first becomes visible as one is able to show how the opposites are created, with the former of the two binary opposites typically being privileged within the inquiry of what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be. After this has been achieved, one can postulate for the sake of the argument that the second term of each of the opposites is actually somehow repressively more original (e.g. in the beginning there were only accidents, appearances, possibility, difference, etc.). Finally, one gives up even that idea of the latter situation being how things rea lly and always are and simply maintain a critical undecidability between the poles. In this regard, let us now return to the incomplete extension of ‫ אלהים‬as common name in the HB as it was hinted at in Chapter 1 of this study. Thus, things that are called an ‫( אלהים‬or described as ‘‫ ’אלהים‬in its adjectival, if not genitive, use) in the generic sense include all of the following, albeit only in particular contexts: God (Gen. 1.1); wind/spirit (Gen. 1.2); divine offspring (Gen. 6.2); Isaac (Gen. 23.6); fierce struggling (Gen. 30.8); teraphim (Gen. 31.30); man/ angel/ spirit (Gen. 32.24); the ‘angel’ of Yhwh (Exod. 3.4); Moses (Exod. 7.1); household gods (Exod. 21.6); community judges (Exod. 21.22); the image of a golden calf (Exod. 32.4); metal statues (Lev. 19.4); demons (Deut. 32.17); Chemosh (Judg. 11.24); great fear (1 Sam. 14.15); the dead Samuel (1 Sam. 28.13); revered ancestors (2 Sam. 14.16); miraculous fire (Job 1.16); morning stars (Job 38.7); cosmic deities (Job 41.25); superhuman beings (Ps. 8.6); majestic mountains (Ps. 36.20); the king (Ps. 45.6); huge cedar trees (Ps. 80.10); the divine council (Ps. 82.1); ability (Prov. 3.27); the messiah (Isa. 9.6); trees and stones (Jer. 2.27); town patrons (Jer. 2.28); powerful warriors (Ezek. 32.12); a large city (Jon. 3.3); the power of people (Hab. 1.11); the Davidic dynasty (Zech. 12.8) and so on. Any ‫ אלהים‬in the HB will share some traits with other similar phenomena in the world of the text. Yet the boundaries are forever disturbed on an

148

What Is a God?

intertextual level. Since, there are no self-sufficient units of meaning for ‫אלהים‬ as common noun to have, it will always mean more than it is intended or understood to mea n. Not even contextualizing t he term ‫ אלהים‬can fina lly determine or fix the fullness of its meaning. It will always have fuzzy and artificial boundaries. Given such complexity, a philosophical approach to the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬then is can no longer take up its traditional, pre-Aristotelian project of arriving at the most basic, fundamental understanding of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB by way of conceptual analysis. The latter is inextricably rooted in the ontology of identity, whereas what is required is a pure ontology of difference. Such a Derridean deconstructive attack on what he calls ‘logocentrism’ is liberating in t he context of the present study in that, among other things, it frees us from the ‘tyranny’ of ‘essence’. We can now leave behind (inasmuch as it is possible) the entire history of Western metaphysics where ‘essence’ has been a term of art basically grounding all serious philosophical analysis. For the latter has operated with a delusional metaphysical presupposition that involved the belief that in the attempt to discover real knowledge of what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be we could proceed towards a definite identification of ‘the True’ with reference to the sign (which is denied to be a sign) we are dealing with. A Derridean perspective, by contrast, wants to get beyond even the metaphysical synthesis of Hegelian dialectics according to which whatness as an identity for an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was said to require the existence of a nonidentity. However, since the very existence of an identity of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is predicated on and within its nonidentity, the essence/non-essence dichotomy in talking about what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was still falls within the language of metaphysics of identity. Constant acknowledgment of nonidentity, reveals the ident ity of an ‫ אלהים‬as having nothing to do with essences, but rather involves the production of proper and non-proper, the erasure of nonidentity to produce identity. In thi s manner a Derridean account undermines both essentialist and anti- or post-essentialist views from Plato to Husserl; a tradition that Derrida labels as the ‘metaphysics of presence’. The latter is the belief in and desire for access to the meaning of words like ‘‫ ’אלהים‬as common noun in the HB, and the privileging of the presence of such meaning over its absence. With such

Whatness and Derridean Differential Ontology

149

philosophical assumptions present, a central bias of ‘logocentrism’ arises in the exegetical process in which the present in which the word ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is approached is taken to be more important than the future or past. In contrast, Derrida’s approach argues that because not only the concept of an ‫אלהים‬ in t he HB but also the reader is in a constant state of flux a general theory describing this phenomenon is unachievable. In the end there are only differences and traces that attach themselves to the sign ‫ אלהים‬in the HB; there is nothing perennial and stable. Contexts may appear to fix meaning, but contexts change, are constructed and artificially bounded, and even then require an undecidable metaphysical move in favour of identity which is not there. For a Derridean perspective then, the question of the whatness of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB is simply that: writing; and so is any literary perspective thereon. At best it can only lead to more writing; and so, inasmuch as ‫ אלהים‬in the HB as generic term or common noun does not mean any one thing in particular, in some sense it does not mean anything at all, even as it could mean many things at once. Like the concepts of essence and whatness, that of ‫ אלהים‬in the HB has a history rather than an identity. In this way, instead of answering our question of what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be, a Derridean point of view takes us back to the question itself. However, in doing so this perspective would like us to not merely try and understand what we mean by the question, but rather to see the assumptions on which any interpretation must inevitably be built so as to relieve us of the burden of trying to figure out what it really means. Thus, rather than feeling paralyzed because the question seems impossible to answer, we are allowed to rethink whether asking the question should be taken so seriously as we have done so far. For we have been doing nothing but playing all along, never getting closer to a solution but simply experimenting with moves and counter moves.

25

Summary and Conclusions

Hebrew Bible scholars and experts in cognate disciplines have for some time now asked the question of what a god is. In doing so, answers were sought for, though seldom if ever actually given in any clear-cut sense. One reason for this might be because, up to now, the assumed meaning (or possible meanings) of the question itself was (were) taken for granted and never satisfactorily clarified. In biblical theology in particular, the question of whatness with reference to (Yhwh’s) divinity was indirectly approached via the notion of the essence or essential properties of divinity. Yet, both the question of what a god is as well as talk about essences are part of the technical vocabulary of a discipline that has remained in the anamorphic blind spot of the continuing discussion, that is, philosophy. In response to this state of affairs, instead of trying to say what an ‫ אלהים‬is or was assumed to be, or going into dialogue with the work of those who have attended to this question or to the idea of a divine essence from linguistic, literary, historical, social-scientific and theological perspectives, this study has been undertaken for no other reason than as part of a purely experimental play with theoretical possibilities. In hoping to lend more nuance to the discussion of what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be, the discussion involved putting forward for the sake of the argument a history of possible philosophical perspectives available when attempting to make sense of the concepts of whatness and essence in relation to the use of ‘‫ ’אלהים‬as common noun in the HB. Supplementing rather than supplanting previous related research, the individual chapters in this study each presented a purely hypothetical adoption and adaptation of what has been considered major role players in the story of wr iti ng about whatness a nd essence. Though none of the philosophers

152

What Is a God?

discussed would have applied their own ideas regarding whatness and essence to divinity in the ways done here, with reference to ‫ אלהים‬in the HB, as generic term at least (as opposed to with reference to the ‘God’ of perfect-being theology), the reapplication thereof is perfectly possible. In no way was it assumed that any particular philosophical perspective is either true or indicative of what the HB itself supposedly necessarily always assumes. Both the particular philosophical viewpoint and the biblical texts referred to in the particular chapter were combined only for the sake of constructing a hypothetical perspective on possible meanings of the question of the whatness and essence of an ‫ אלהים‬as implicit in scholarly metalanguage. Reconstructed was a variety of essentialist, non-essentialist, anti-essentialist, neo-essentialist and post-essentialist points of view. In sum, the following may be considered imperfect and hopelessly oversi m pl i fi ed sum maries of wha t the individual philos ophical perspectives selected could be taken to imply as regards what we might be up to when we ask what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be. 1. A Socratic view suggests we should indeed ask ‘What was ‫אלהים‬-ness?’ and seek to answer it by way of looking for a definition listing all the essential properties common to all and only things that are called ‫אלהים‬. 2. A Platonist perspective suggests that knowledge of what ‫אלהים‬-ness was and the reason why so many and varied things could be so called can be found in its essence or Form in which everything related participate to a greater or lesser extent therein. 3. An Aristotelian reading might suggest that the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬was can be linked to the notions of definition through genus and difference, secondary substances, essential versus accidental properties, formal causes as well as things like hylemorphism and hypokeimenon. 4. Porphyry’s ideas were used to provide an experimental link between a definition featuring the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬and its species, while the concept of whatness was connected with that of genus, all with reference to a complex taxonomic tree of being. 5. Boethius’s writings were the first to allow us to make an experimental distinction between essence and existence in an ‫ אלהים‬and thus allowed us to separate the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬was from that of what it meant to be an ‫אלהים‬.

Summary and Conclusions

153

6. An Avicennian perspective expanded on Boethius’s distinction by considering various types of essence for an ‫אלהים‬, for example, quiddity, ipseity and haecceity, all in relation to various forms of being. 7. Abelard’s conceptualism/nominalism was taken to imply that what it is that ‫ אלהים‬have in common via the generic concept as universal was not a thing but a status that was itself a linguistic fiction, that is, semantics, not metaphysics. 8. Our adaptation of Aquinas tried to say that the question of what an ‫אלהים‬ was could be approached by relating the entity to concepts like body, complexity, substance and accident, essence and existence, matter and form. 9. In a reapplications of the ideas of Scotus we linked quiddity (or whatness) with haecceity (or thisness) and suggested that the latter could also be relevant in making sense of the question of what an ‫אלהים‬ (or its essence) was assumed to be. 10. Descartes’s view on essences was adopted to interpret the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be to suggest that it could be taken to focus mainly on a so-called principle attribute instead of all supposed essential properties. 11. Locke’s adapted anti-realist perspective was taken up to introduce the idea of an ‫ אלהים‬as sortal and to allow us to make a hypothetical distinction between its real and nominal essences/definitions. 12. Leibniz’s thought was interpreted to suggest the possibility of a need for what was taken to imply a superessentialist position in which all properties of an ‫ אלהים‬are assumed to be essential. 13. A Kantian perspective was used to wonder whether we can ever say what an ‫ אלהים‬is in itself (i.e. its essence) and to imply that perhaps we will never know its essence and will have to settle for appearances in the context of its relational/ extrinsic properties. 14. A Hegelian perspective was then put forward to theoretically overcome the essence/appearance dichotomy in asking the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬was by showing that its essence just is its appearances. 15. A Nietzschean take on the issue was reconstructed to say that what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be need no longer be seen as either essence or appearance and as having no definition because it has a history in all too human linguistic strategies.

154

What Is a God?

16. A Wittgensteinian perspective was adapted to suggest that when we ask what an ‫ אלהים‬is, instead of looking for common properties, essences or real definitions we are better off looking for family resemblances as seen in meaning obtained through use. 17. A Husserlian viewpoint on the question was taken up to imply that we bracket the question as to the reality of the essence of an ‫ אלהים‬and take it for granted that we all know it as intentional object. 18. A Heideggerian understanding of the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬was interpreted to divorce whatness from essence and to see the latter not necessarily as quiddity but according to the concept of Wesen as what is ownmost to its identity over time. 19. A Sartrean point of view was reconstructed to show that some contexts in the HB might have assumed that there is no such thing as an ‫אלהים‬ with a predetermined nature inasmuch as its existence was thought to precede its essence. 20. A Quinean point of view was adapted and is taken to imply that in asking what an ‫ אלהים‬was, we should see all properties thereof as accidental since so-called essential properties are only such relative to a particular description. 21. Popper’s radically modified essentialism was taken up to imply that we commit an ‘essentialist fallacy’ if we obsess with asking a what-isit question that in turn seeks to clarify the generic concept of ‫אלהים‬ through a definition. 22. A Kripkean neo-essentialist perspective was shown to view the ‫ אלהים‬as natural kind whose essential properties are identical with its necessary properties in the context of rigid designation of the common noun across possible worlds. 23. Our Derridean reading tried to argue that we adopt a vantage point beyond all questions presupposing either essentialism or antiessentialism since both wrongly presuppose the presence of a stable identity for the concept of an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB. In spite of the generalization inherent in all summaries, from these perspectives, each adopted purely in the context of experimental play with ideas and possibilities, we may surmise the following:

Summary and Conclusions

155

1. The meaning of whatness has been variable in the writings of different philosophers. 2. The relation between whatness and essence can be constructed in many different ways. 3. The sense and reference for the term essence in relation to other metaphysical terms are essentially contested. 4. The existence of essences cannot be taken for granted. 5. The relation between essence and existence is problematic. The application of these findings could involve the following conclusions: 1. The meaning of the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was means different things in different philosophical contexts. 2. The type of answer one gives to the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬in the HB was assumed to be depends on one’s assumptions about essences. Inasmuch as HB scholars’ use of related philosophical metalanguage has up to now lacked metaphysical/ontological awareness and nuance, these findings can be taken to represent a supplementary meta-theoretical contribution to all existing research (and a prolegomenon to all future inquiries) related to the question of what an ‫ אלהים‬was assumed to be, as well as to the established tradition of speaking of the essence or essential characteristic(s) of divinity in the world of the text.

Bibliography The strata of the earth preserve in rows the creatures which lived in former ages; and the array of books on the shelves of a library stores up in like manner the errors of the past and the way in which they have been exposed. Like those creatures, they too were full of life in their time, and made a great deal of noise; but now they are stiff and fossilized, and an object of curiosity to the literary palaeontologist alone. Arthur Schopenhauer, Essays and Aphorisms Abelard, P. 1994 Logica ‘ingredientibus’ (trans. P. Vincent; Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.). Aquinas, T. 1965 On Being and Essence (De Ente et Essentia) (trans. R. P. Goodman; New Jersey: Prentice Hall). Aquinas, T. 2008 Summa Theologica (trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Republic; New York: Benzinger Bros.). Aristotle 1984 The Complete Works of Aristotle (2 vols., ed. J. Barnes; Princeton: Princeton University Press). Artaud, A. 1976 ‘The Nerve Meter’ (1925), in A. Artaud, Selected Writings (New York: Farrar). Avicenna 2005 The Metaphysics of Healing (Kitab al-Shifa) (trans. M. E. Marmura; Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press). Bird, A. 2009 ‘Essences and Natural Kinds’, in R. Le Poidevin, P. Simons, A. McGonigal and R. P. Cameron (eds), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics (London and New York: Routledge): 497–506. Boethius, A. M. S. 1973 ‘De Hebdomadibus’, in H. F. Steward, E. K. Rand and S. J. Tester, The Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy (Loeb Classical Library 74. Cambridge: Harvard University Press): 38–51. Boman, T. 1960 Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek (trans. J. L. Moreau; Philadelphia: Westminster Press). Brueggemann, W. 2010 Old Testament Theology: An Introduction (Library of Biblical Theology. Nashville: Abingdon Press). Burnett, J. S. 2001 A Reassessment of Biblical Elohim (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press).

158

Bibliography

Campbell, J. 1988 The Power of Myth (ed. B. Moyers and B. S. Flowers; New York: Doubleday). Childs, B. S. 2004 The Book of Exodus: A Critical Theological Commentary (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press). Clines, D. J. A. 2015 ‘The Most High Male: Divine Masculinity in the Bible’ (Paper read at the Feminist Section of the International Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, Buenos Aires, Argentina. 22 July 2015) n.p. Crenshaw, J. L. 1995 Urgent Advice and Probing Questions (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press). Cupitt, D. 1996 After God: A New Theory of Religion (London: SCM Press). Derrida, J. 1976 Of Grammatology (trans. G. Spivak; Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press). Derrida, J. 1978 Writing and Difference (trans. A. Bass; Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Derrida, J. 2007 ‘What Comes Before The Question?’, from Youtube Interview (Uploaded on 26 December 2007), Viewed 14 March 2012. Online: https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=Z2bPTs8fspk. Descartes, R. 1988 The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (3 vols., trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch [CSM]; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Eichrodt, W. 1961 Theology of the Old Testament (vol. 1, trans. J. A. Baker, Old Testament Library Series; Louisville: Westminster/John Knox). Fine, K. 1994 ‘Essence and Modality’, in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives 8 (The Nous Castenada Memorial Lecture): 1–16. Fretheim, T. E. 1984 The Suffering of God: An Old Testament Perspective (Overtures in Biblical Theology 14; Philadelphia: Fortress Press). Gericke, J. W. 2009 ‘What Is an ‫ ?אל‬A Philosophical Analysis of the Concept of Generic Godhood in the Hebrew Bible’, Old Testament Essays 22 (1): 20 –45. Gericke, J. W. 2012 The Hebrew Bible and Philosophy of Religion (RBL 70; Atlanta: SBL Press). Goldingay, J. 2006 Old Testament Theology – Israel’s Faith (vol. 2; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans). Gowan, D. E. 1994 Theology in Exodus: Biblical Theology in the Form of a Commentary (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press). Gunkel, H. 1997 Genesis (trans. M. E. Biddle; Macon, GA: Mercer University Press). Guyer, P. and Wood, A. (eds) 1992- The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Bibliography

159

Hegel, G. W. F. 2010. The Science of Logic (SL) (ed. and trans. G. di Giovanni; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Heidegger, M. 1961 An Introduction to Metaphysics (trans. R. Manheim; New York: Doubleday). Heidegger, M. 1971 ‘The Thing’, in A. Hofstadter (trans.), Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper & Row). Heidegger, M. 1986 ‘The Basic Question of Being as Such (BQ)’, trans. P. Emad and K. Maly, Heidegger Studies 2: 4– 6. Heidegger, M. 1993a ‘On the Essence of Truth’, trans. J. Sallis, in Krell 1993: 115–38. Heidegger, M. 1993b ‘What Is Called Thinking?’ trans. F. D. Wieck and J. G. Gray, in Krell 1993: 369–91. Heidegger, M. 1993c ‘What Is Metaphysics?’ trans. D. F. Krell, in Krell 1993: 139– 67. Hossfeld, F. L. and Zenger, E. 2005 Psalms II: A Commentary on Psalms 51–100 (ed. Klaus Baltzer; Hermeneia. Minneapolis: Fortress Press). Hundley, B. 2011 Keeping Heaven on Earth: Safeguarding the Divine Presence in the Priestly Tabernacle (Forschungen zum Alten Testament II, 50; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck). Husserl, E. 1900 Logical Investigations (trans. J. N. Findlay; London: Routledge). Husserl, E. 1913[1998] Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy – First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology (trans. F. Kersten; The Hague: Nijhoff ). Husserl, E. 1973 Experience and Judgement (trans. J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks; London: Routledge). Husserl, E. 2001 Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic (trans. A. J. Steinbock; London, UK: Kluwer Academic Publishers). Kant, I. 1997 Lectures on Metaphysics (LM), in P. Guyer and A. Wood (eds) 1992: [2] (ed. K. Ameriks and S. Naragon). Kant, I. 1998a Critique of Pure Reason, in P. Guyer and A. Wood (eds) 1992: I. 5/A (1781). Kant, I. 1998b Critique of Pure Reason, in P. Guyer and A. Wood (eds) 1992: I. 5/B (1787). Kant, I. 1999 Correspondence, in P. Guyer and A. Wood (eds) 1992: [13]. Kelly, E. 1997 Structure and Diversity: Studies in the Phenomenological Philosophy of Max Scheler (Phaenomenologica Series Volume 141 Series; Rotterdam: Springer). Knierim, R. P. 1995 The Task of Old Testament Theology: Substance, Method, and Cases (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans).

160

Bibliography

Krell, F. (ed.) 1993 Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings (revised and expanded edition; London: Routledge). Kripke, S. 1980 Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). Leibniz, G. W. 1923 Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe (ed. the Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin; Darnstadt: Deutsche Akademie [A]. Leibniz, G. W. 1965 Die philosophischen Schriften (7 vols, ed. C. I. Gerhardt; Hildesheim: Georg Olms). [G] Leibniz, G. W. 1966 Logical Papers – A Selection (LLP) (ed. G. H. R. Parkinson, Oxford: Clarendon Press). Leibniz, G. W. 1981 New Essays on Human Understanding (RB) (trans. P. Remnant and J. Bennett; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Leibniz, G. W. 1989 Philosophical Essays (AG) (trans. and ed. R. Ariew and D. Garber; Indianapolis: Hackett). Lloyd, A. B. 1997 What Is a God? Studies in Greek Divinity (ed. , A. B. Lloyd and W. Burkert; London: Duckworth). Locke, J. 1975 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (ed. P. Nidditch in the Series The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke; Oxford: Oxford University Press). McClellan, D. O. 2013 You Will Be Like the Gods: The Conceptualization of Deity in the Bible in Cognitive Perspective (Unpublished Masters Dissertation; Langley: Trinity Western University). Miller, P. D. 2003 The Religion of Ancient Israel (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press). Mowinckel, S. 1962 The Psalms in Israel’s Worship (trans. D. R. Ap-Thomas; Nashville: Abingdon). Nietzsche, F. W. 1967 The Will to Power (trans. W. Kaufmann; New York: Random House). Nietzsche, F. W. 1974 The Gay Science, with a Prelude of Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs (GS) (trans. W. Kaufmann; New York: Random House). Nietzsche, F. W. 1990 ‘The Philosopher as Cultural Physician’, in Philosophy and Truth, Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebook of the Early 1870s (ed. and trans. D. Breazeale; Atlantic Highlands: Humanities): 67–79. Nietzsche, F. W. 1999 ‘On Truth and Lies in the Non-Moral Sense’, in F. W. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings (ed. R. Geuss and trans. R. Spiers; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 141–53. Nietzsche, F.W. 2006 Human, All Too Human (trans. R. J. Hollingdale, with an Introduction by R. Schacht; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Bibliography

161

Plato 1997 Complete Works with Introduction and Notes (ed. J. M. Cooper and D. S. Hackett; Indianapolis/Cambridge: Publishing Company). Popper, K. R. 1966 The Open Society and Its Enemies; Volume II: The High Tide of Prophecy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). Popper, K. 1972 Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Popper, K. R. 1973 Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 4th edn). Popper, K. R. 1979 Objective Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, rev. edn). Porphyry 1975 Isagoge (Introduction) (trans. E. W. Warren; Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies). Porter, B. N. (ed.) 2009. What Is a God? Anthropomorphic and Non-Anthropomorphic Aspects of Deity in Ancient Mesopotamia (Winona Lake, IN: Casco Bay Assyriological Institute). Preuss, H. D. 1996 Old Testament Theology (vol. 1; trans. L. Perdue. London: SCM Press). Quine, W. V. O. 1953 (1999) ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in E. Margolis and S. Laurence (eds), Concepts: Core Readings (Cambridge: MIT Press): 153–70. Quine, W. V. O. 1960 Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press). Quine, W. V. O. 1969 Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press. Ringgren, H. 1974 ‘elōhîm’, in G. J. Botterweck and H. Ringgren (eds), Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament (TDOT) (vol. 1; trans. J. T. Willis; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans): 267–84. Ringgren, H. 2003 ‘qds’, in G. J. Botterweck, H. Ringgren and H. J. Fabry (eds.) Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament (vol. 12; trans. D. W. Stott; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans): 527–30. Sartre, J. P. 1948 Existentialism and Humanism (trans. P. Mairet; London: Methuen). Sartre, J. P. 1957 Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (trans. H. E. Barnes; New York: Philosophical Library). Schmidt, W. H. 1983 The Faith of the Old Testament (Philadelphia: Westminster). Schmidt, W. H. 1994 ‘‫’אֱלהִים‬, in E. Jenni and C. Westermann (eds), Theologisches Handwörterbuch zum Alten Testament (THAT) (vol. 1; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag): 331–47. Schopenhauer, A. 1973 Essays and Aphorisms (trans. R. J. Hollingdale in the Penguin Classics Series; London: Penguin).

162

Bibliography

Scotus, J. D. 2013 Opera Omnia (‘The Vatican edition’ with The Ordinatio (vol. I–XIV; Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis). Smith, M. S. 2001 The Origins of Biblical Monotheism: Israel’s Polytheistic Background and the Ugaritic Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Smith, M. S. 2004 The Memoirs of God. History, Memory, and the Experience of the Divine in Ancient Israel (Minneapolis: Fortress Press). Smith, M. S. 2010 God in Translation: Deities in Cross-Cultural Discourse in the Biblical World (Grand Rapids: William B Eerdmans Publishing Co.). Sommer, B. D. 2009 The Bodies of God and the World of Ancient Israel (New York: Cambridge University Press). Thompson, T. L. 2007 The Messiah Myth. The Near Eastern Roots of Jesus and David (London: Pimlico). Van der Toorn, K. 1999 ‘God 1’ in K. van der Toorn, B. Becking and P. W. van der Horst (eds) Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible (DDD). Second Edition (Leiden: Brill): 313–19. Von Rad, G. 1991 Holy War in Ancient Israel (ed. M. I. Dawn; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans). Wardlaw, T. R. 2008 Conceptualizing Word for ‘God’ within the Pentateuch: A Cognitive-Semantic Investigation in Literary Context (New York: T&T Clark). Westermann, C. 1982 Elements of Old Testament Theology (trans. Douglas W. Stott. Atlanta: John Knox). Wittgenstein, L. 1958 Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell).

Index of Biblical References Gen. 1.1 1, 147 1.2 1, 147 3.5 20 3.6 106 3.22 118 6.2 1, 147 15.2 15 18:22–23 7 23.6 2, 147 28.21 87 30.8 2, 147 31.30 2, 147 32.24 147 Exod. 3.4 2, 147 6.3 92 6.7 87 6.23 15 7.1 2, 147 12.12 2, 119 15.11 66 18.11 124 21.6 2, 147 21.22 2, 147 32.4 2, 147 34.6 82 Lev. 19.4 2, 147 26.12 87 Num. 1.5 15 1.9 15 3.30 15 12.8 21 23.19a 35

Deut. 4.12 21 4.16 21 4.24 99 4.31 99 8.18 135 7.9 110 10.14–15 8 10.17 110 29.13 87 32.4 31 32.15 61 32.17 2, 74, 147 32.18 61 32.31 61 32.37 61, 140 32.39 20, 106 Josh. 2.11 110, 135 24.19 129 Judg. 2.12 66 6.31 20, 54 9.13 36 11.24 2, 147 Ruth 1.2 15 1 Sam. 2.3 31 14.15 2, 147 15.29 36 28.13 2, 92, 147 2 Sam. 5.15 15

164 5.16 15 11.3 15 14.16 147 22.31 64 22.33 64 1 Kgs 4.3 15 8.60 110 18 54 18.24 54 20.28 31 18.21–24 54 18.27 20, 53 2 Kgs 2.14 141 5.7 106 18.34 140 1 Chron. 3.8 15 6.12 15 16.25 125 26.3 15 2 Chron. 2.5 125 14.11 36 Job 1–2 7 1.16 2, 147 4.16 21, 92 9.32 36 35.10 141 38.7 2, 147 41.25 3, 147 Ps. (pl. Pss.) 7.11 99 8.6 2, 36, 147 11.5 65 18 61 18.2 61 18.3 61 18.32 61 18.47 61

Index of Biblical References 36.20 2, 147 40.5 70 42.3 141 42.10 141 45.6 3, 147 48.14 111, 118 50.7 81 55.19 135 60.12 135 65.9 3 68.20 31, 100 79.10 141 80.10 147 82 95, 96 82.1 3, 147 84.11 100 86.8 66 86.15 82 92.5 70 96.4 125 97.7 125 97.9 125 100.3 111 108.13 135 115 95 115.2 141 115.2–8 93 135.5 125 136.2 118 145.1 118 Prov. 3.27 3, 147 25.2 20 Isa. 1.14 65 9.6 2, 118, 147 16.11 65 30.18 31 31.3 20, 136 36.19 140 37.19 74 41.21–24 41, 106 41.23 20 42.1 65 43.10 23, 40 43.13 81

Index of Biblical References 44.6b 40 45.18 111 55.8–9 70 60.19 118 Jer. 2.11 75 2.28 2, 140, 147 10.10 118, 130 12.7 65 16.20 20, 75 32.18 129 51.56 31 Ezek. 1.26 21 28.2 20 28.2–10 47, 106 32.12 2, 147 36.28 87 Dan. 2.11 20 2.47 111

2.25 20 3.25 93 Hos. 11.9 36 Joel 2.17 141 Amos 4.13 135 9.5 135 Jon. 3.3 2, 147 Mic. 4.12 70 7.10 141 Zech. 12.8 2, 147 Mal. 2.17 141

165

Index of Philosophical Sources Abelard LI 51, 52, 55, 56 Aquinas DEE 57 ST 57– 60 Aristotle APo. 28 Cat. 29 EN 28 Gen. et Corr. 28 Met. 28, 33 Phys. 28 Top. 28 Boethius OS 39 Descartes CSM 69–70 Hegel SL 91 Heidegger BQ 115, 116, 120 Kant CPR A 86 B 86

LM 85, 90 Leibniz AG 79, 81 LLP 82 RB 80 Nietszsche GS 97 HATH ix Plato Charm. 13 Euphr. 13, 16 Gorg. 16 Hipp. I. 13, 14, 16 Lach. 13, 14, 16 Lys. 13, 14 Men. 13, 14, 16 Phdo. 19, 24 Prot. 16 Rep. I 13, 14 Theaet. 13 Scotus OO 66–7 Wittgenstein PI 104, 107

Index of Subjects Analytic tradition 139 Aristotelian essentialism see Essentialism Aristotelian philosophy 27–30, 32, 33, 72, 83, 34, 142 Assumptions 4, 5, 10 –12, 15, 28, 43, 49, 57–8, 60, 75, 80, 108, 117, 120 –3, 125, 130, 134, 137, 140, 145, 149, 155 Attributes 7, 15, 37, 77, 85– 6, 88, 100, 114, 119 essential 69–70, 153 principle 69–72, 153 Being 1, 7, 24, 32–3, 36 –7, 40 –2, 58– 60, 84, 99, 103, 109, 112, 119, 123– 4, 126, 144, 152, 153 Categories Aristotle 29, 32, 71, 89 Kant 88–90 philosophical 88, 95 Characteristics 7, 9, 15, 31, 38, 75, 77, 85 – 6, 90, 102, 113 Class 40, 104, 125 Concepts analysis of 127, 142–3, 146, 148 complete 80 and structure 15, 72, 89–90, 146 Conditions identity 19, 23, 67, 139, 143 necessary 139 of possibility 86 sufficient 139 Continental tradition 139 Deconstruction 146, 147, 148 Definition extensional 30, 112 intensional 13–14, 105– 6 nominal 74, 77 real 75–7, 86, 104, 154 Socratic 13–17, 19, 24, 104, 133

and species 35–8, 59 via genus and differentia 59, 152 Deity 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 80, 81 Difference 29–30, 146 –8 Divine condition 14 –15, 106 Divinity 1, 3–4, 5, 6–7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, 20, 37, 51, 52, 60, 99, 104, 108, 151, 152, 155 Essence and accident 31–2, 59–60, 81–3, 127–8, 147 and appearance 7, 32, 86, 88, 91– 6, 115, 117, 153 constitutive 39, 48, 85 and existence 39– 43, 45, 47, 59, 112, 152, 153, 155 and Form 21–5, 27, 85, 98, 134, 152 formal 39 full 86, 143 individuating 82–3 modal view of 29, 79, 130 –1 partial 143 and properties 37, 38, 41, 82–3, 116, 151 specific 39, 73, 82 and substance 30 –3, 36, 69–72, 75– 6, 83 and whatness 35, 117, 149 Essentialism anti-Aristotelian 75 definition of 29 explicit 142 implicit 152 modal 79, 130, 142, 144 neo- 139– 44, 152, 154 non- 29, 71, 152 post- 148, 152 super 79–84, 132, 153 Essentialist fallacy 133–7, 154 Essential properties and accidental properties 30 –1, 37, 38, 71, 86, 112, 129, 130, 152 constitutive 39, 48, 85– 6, 116 and definition 31

168

Index of Subjects

formal 39 individuating 82 and necessary properties 29, 80, 83, 116, 128, 131, 142, 154 and operation 33, 57, 61–2, 64, 72, 106 and relations 32 specific 82 and whatness 13–17, 27–33 Existence vs. essence 39– 43, 121– 6 Family resemblances 103–8, 154 Form and cause 30 and matter 32–3, 58, 153 Generic sense 1, 12, 23, 48, 54, 55, 61, 75, 80, 103, 107, 135– 6, 144, 145, 147 Genus 28–30, 36 –8, 40, 45–8, 59, 65, 73–5, 77, 104, 112, 115, 117, 119, 123, 129, 131, 144, 152 god as abstract object 13, 23, 40, 42 ancient Near Eastern view of 1, 3, 4, 8 as common noun 10, 15, 20, 22, 23, 24, 29–30, 32, 42, 46, 52–3, 56, 76, 85, 98, 101, 103–5, 107–9, 111, 116, 134, 139–40, 144–9, 151, 154 as sortal 73–7, 153 as substance 30 –3, 36, 40, 45– 6, 53, 58, 60, 64 –5, 69–72, 74 –7, 79–80, 83, 89, 93– 4, 108, 114, 144, 147, 152, 153 as universal 13, 21, 23, 27–8, 30, 46 –8, 51, 53, 55– 6, 136, 153 godhood generic 1, 12, 23, 48, 54, 55, 61, 75, 80, 103, 107, 135– 6, 144, 145, 147 modern ideas about 1, 67, 70, 79, 94 names 1, 15, 57–8, 60 –1, 73–5, 98, 100, 130, 140 Haecceity 6, 63–7, 116, 147, 153 Hebrew Bible 1, 5, 12, 151, 155 Hylemorphism 152 Hypokeimenon 30, 152 Identity across possible worlds 116, 130, 139, 142, 154

conditions 19, 23, 67, 139, 143 and difference 147 and essence 31–3, 83, 94 –5 and negation 67, 89, 93–5 over time 30, 101, 116, 117, 119, 131, 154 personal 119 relative 88 Ipseity 153 Israelite religion 5, 6, 12, 85, 90 Logic Aristotelian 30 dialectic 13, 148 formal 139 of identity 30, 101, 115–17, 119, 131, 154 of negation 67, 89, 93–5 Membership 33, 125, 140, 143, 144 Metaphysics analytic 139 classical 146 descriptive 38 and essence 9, 10, 11, 36, 39, 55, 67, 71–3, 79, 84, 115, 119 folk- 10, 11, 40, 43, 48 modal 29, 130 of presence 148–9 and whatness 10, 11 Meta-language 77, 99 Metatheistic 9, 58, 124 Metatheoretical 9–10 Modes 71–2 Names and essence 73–5, 98 Nature of divinity 6 –7, 37, 151 Necessary properties and contingent properties 82, 140 and essential properties 29, 80, 83, 116, 128, 131, 142, 154 Noumenon 86 Ontology 6, 8, 10 Differential 145–9 Phenomenon 30, 49, 63, 64, 83, 107, 110 –12, 120, 146, 149 Philosophical approach

Index of Subjects to essence 120 to questions 148 to the Hebrew Bible 9–10, 99 to whatness 120 Philosophy folk 10, 11, 31, 105, 106, 134 and Hebrew Bible 10 –11, 38, 51, 115, 120, 128, 134 history of 6 –10 of religion 3 Platonism 107 Predication 30 –2, 47, 101, 119, 146 Aristotelian 30, 32 Principle 39– 40, 59, 75, 83, 126, 137, 153 Properties accidental 30 –1, 37, 38, 71, 86, 112, 129, 130, 152 common 14, 19, 24, 116, 123, 154 essential 9, 13, 16 –17, 23, 28, 29, 31, 37, 38, 41, 43, 49, 55, 60, 61, 70, 75, 80 –3, 87, 88, 101, 103, 111, 117, 123, 124, 128, 130, 131, 137, 139, 142, 144, 146, 151– 4 extrinsic 87, 92, 153 intrinsic 87, 116, 130 microstructural 144 necessary 29, 80, 83, 116, 128, 131, 142, 154 relational 87, 90, 137, 153 unique 14 Qualities 7, 32, 74, 76 –7, 89, 96, 120, 129 primary 76 secondary 76 tertiary 76 Questions What is an F 5, 6, 131 What is it to be 30 What is X 4, 6, 13, 14, 19, 27, 86, 98, 115, 131, 133, 136, 146 What it is 6, 14, 20, 27–30, 32, 38, 45, 47, 53, 61, 63, 71, 74 – 6, 81, 90, 95– 6, 101, 110, 117–19, 122, 124, 126, 137, 142, 145, 153 What it means 29, 31, 67, 76, 111, 120 What makes something what it is 14, 28–9, 41, 53, 71, 119 Quiddity 6, 45, 47–9, 57, 59, 65, 116, 117, 153, 154

169

Reduction 109–14 Relations external 90 internal 93 Rigid designator 139– 44 Sortal 73–7, 153 Species and definition 35– 6, 59 and essence 35–8 Substance and accident 31–2, 60, 89, 153 and essence 27–33 primary 32, 46, 65 secondary 32, 45, 65, 93, 152 Theology 4, 40 biblical 6, 151 Old Testament 5, 12, 90 perfect being 58, 152 philosophical 70, 73 Thing 13–14, 16, 20, 30–1, 39, 53–7, 60, 63–4, 67, 74, 76, 82, 85–91, 94–9, 112, 114, 119–20, 122, 130, 136, 141–2, 149, 153, 154 Thisness see Haecceity Universals conceptualism 53, 153 moderate realism 51 nominalism 51– 6, 136, 153 realism 69, 75, 142 Whatness 5, 6, 9–11, 13–15, 24, 28–9, 35, 37–9, 45, 47–9, 56 –7, 63– 4, 69–70, 74 –5, 83, 85– 6, 88, 90, 99, 104, 115–17, 120, 121, 132, 135–7, 142, 145–9, 151–5 Yhwh accidents in 31, 59, 82, 119 essential properties of 23, 28, 31, 41 as a god 4, 8, 9 as God 9, 24, 36, 54 nature of 23, 85 plurality of profi les 23, 24, 66 relation to divinity 5, 6 –7, 151 as type 29–30

Index of Authors Abelard, P. 51– 6, 153 Aquinas, T. 57–8, 60, 153 Aristotle 6, 27–33, 35, 63– 4, 71, 79, 89, 115, 117, 127–8, 134 Artaud, A. xi Avicenna 45, 48, 57, 63 Bird, A. 6 Boethius, A.M.S. 39, 43, 45, 57, 152–3 Boman, T. 7 Brueggemann, W. 9 Burnett, J. S. 3

Knierim, R. P. 8 Kripke, S. 139– 44, 154 Leibniz, G. W. 79–84, 94, 132, 139, 153 Locke, J. 73–7, 80, 85, 104, 153 McClellan, D. O. 3 Miller, P. D. 8 Mowinckel, S. 8 Nietzsche F. W. 5, 6, 97–102, 115, 153

Derrida, J. 4, 10, 145–9 Descartes, R. 69, 72, 153

Plato 13, 16 –17, 19–25, 27–30, 35, 48, 98, 117, 119, 122, 134, 148 Popper, K. R. 133–7, 154 Porphyry 35–8, 51, 152 Porter, B. N. 3 Preuss, H. D. 8

Eichrodt, W. 7, 52

Quine, W. V. O. 127–32, 154

Fine, K. 6

Ringgren, H. 3, 8

Goldingay, J. 8 Gowan, D. E. 6 Gunkel, H. 8

Sartre, J. P. 121– 6, 154 Scotus, J. D. 63–7, 153 Smith, M. S. 3, 9, 15 Sommer, B. D. 8, 58

Clines, D. J. A. 9 Cupitt, D. 3

Hegel, G. W. F. 91–7, 117, 148, 153 Heidegger, M. 40, 115–20, 154 Hossfeld, F. L. 8 Husserl, E. 109–14, 116, 148, 154 Kant, I. 84 –91, 94, 97–8, 119, 120, 123, 127, 128, 153 Kelly, E. 6

Van der Toorn, K. 1, 3, 8 Von Rad, G. 7 Wardlaw, T. R. 3 Westermann, C. 7 Wittgenstein, L. 104 –8, 154 Zenger, E. 8