What Happens To People In A Competitive Society: An Anthropological Investigation Of Competition 3030221326, 9783030221324, 9783030221331

Table of contents :
Preface......Page 5
Contents......Page 7
Competition in Society......Page 12
The Problem to Be Studied and the Goal of Our Investigation......Page 18
Competition—Clarifying the Definitions......Page 22
Anthropology—What Does This Mean?......Page 28
Material......Page 31
Methodology......Page 33
References......Page 40
Part I The Phenomenon of Competition......Page 43
Introduction......Page 44
Collaboration and Competition......Page 45
The Understanding of History and Competition......Page 47
The Structure of Society and Competition......Page 48
The Economic System and Competition......Page 50
Equality, Inequality, and Competition......Page 55
The Individual, the Group, and Competition......Page 59
Self-Confidence, Status, and Competition......Page 60
References......Page 64
Introduction......Page 67
Competition—A Natural Phenomenon?......Page 68
The Competitive Situation......Page 74
Self-Interest......Page 75
Human Individuality and Freedom......Page 76
The Human Herd Instinct and the Need to Compare Oneself with Others......Page 78
Inequality and Equality......Page 79
Scarcity......Page 84
Rules......Page 85
Individual Aspects......Page 88
Collective Aspects......Page 95
Competition, Performance, and Production......Page 98
Competition and Power......Page 102
Competition and Personal Relationships......Page 104
Competition and Health......Page 105
Competition and Society......Page 108
Competition and Anthropology......Page 110
References......Page 115
Part II Competition and the Economy......Page 120
Introduction......Page 121
Economic Classicism......Page 122
An Early Critic of Economic Classicism......Page 131
The Neoclassical Theory......Page 132
Institutional Economic Theory......Page 135
Microtheoretical Aspects of the Idea of Competition......Page 137
Macrotheoretical Aspects of the Idea of Competition......Page 142
The Idea of Competition in Some Alternative Economic Theories......Page 144
References......Page 155
Introduction......Page 159
What Is the Economy?......Page 163
The Agents of Competition......Page 166
Latent and Manifest Competition......Page 168
Perfect and Non-perfect (Monopolizing) Competition......Page 169
Free Competition......Page 177
Competition and Regulation......Page 180
Efficiency......Page 182
Creativity, Quality, and Growth......Page 188
Distribution......Page 193
The Goals of Competition......Page 196
A Market Economy Oriented to Competition—Two Approaches......Page 200
References......Page 218
Introduction......Page 222
The Homo oeconomicus......Page 226
Rationality......Page 230
Self-Interest......Page 233
Individualism and Freedom......Page 236
Who Is the Homo oeconomicus?......Page 239
Competition in the Economy and an Anthropology with an Instrumentalist Orientation......Page 242
Competition in the Economy and an Anthropology with an Egotistic Orientation......Page 249
Egotism as an Anthropological Category......Page 251
Egotism, Individualism, and the Competitive Economy......Page 254
Egotism, Self-Interest, and the Competitive Economy......Page 257
Competition in the Economy and an Anthropology with an Elitist Orientation......Page 263
Competition in the Economy and an Anthropology with a Humanist Orientation......Page 267
Competition in the Economy and an Anthropology with a Christian Orientation......Page 274
Economic Competition—Space for Human Dignity?......Page 280
References......Page 292
Ethics and the Economy......Page 296
Economic Competition and Ethics......Page 300
A Naturalistic (Ontological) Perspective on Economic Competition......Page 306
A Teleological Perspective on Economic Competition......Page 309
A Deontological Perspective on Economic Competition......Page 313
Competition and Human Rights......Page 314
Competition and Justice......Page 317
A Virtue Ethical Perspective on Economic Competition......Page 321
References......Page 328
Part III Competition and Anthropology......Page 332
Introduction......Page 333
A Relational Definition of the Human Being......Page 336
Competition and the Human Being’s Relationship to His or Her Own Self......Page 339
Self-Interest and the Satisfaction of Needs......Page 340
Individuality, Personal Structure, and Identity......Page 344
Freedom and Rationality......Page 346
Self-Realization......Page 348
Intrinsic Value......Page 350
The Human Person’s Well-Being......Page 351
Competition and the Human Being’s Relationship to Others......Page 352
The Significance of Interpersonal Relationships......Page 353
Interpersonal Relationships in a Competitive Context—Ethical Perspectives......Page 356
Compassion, Competition, and Collaboration......Page 363
Compassion, Competition, and Basic Human Values......Page 368
Compassion, Competition, Emotions, and Empathy......Page 370
Compassion, Competition, Justice, and Power......Page 371
The Human Being and Nature......Page 372
Competition, the Human Being and Nature......Page 373
The Human Being in Relationship to God......Page 378
Competition, the Human Being and God......Page 380
Competition, Human Relationships, and the Human Being’s Dignity......Page 384
References......Page 392
Introduction......Page 394
The Positive Contribution of Competition to the Realization of a True Humanity......Page 396
The Negative Contribution of Competition to a True Humanity......Page 398
Focus on the Material Dimension......Page 399
Ranking Human Beings......Page 402
A Means to Attain Something Else......Page 404
A Threat to Fellowship......Page 406
A Threat to True Humanity?......Page 408
A Future with Competition?......Page 409
“I Have Enough”......Page 412
References......Page 414
Author Index......Page 415
Subject Index......Page 418

Citation preview

What Happens to People in a Competitive Society

An Anthropological Investigation of Competition Svein Olaf Thorbjørnsen

What Happens to People in a Competitive Society

Svein Olaf Thorbjørnsen

What Happens to People in a Competitive Society An Anthropological Investigation of Competition

Svein Olaf Thorbjørnsen MF Norwegian School of Theology, Religion and Society Oslo, Norway Translated by Brian McNeil

ISBN 978-3-030-22132-4 ISBN 978-3-030-22133-1  (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22133-1 Translation by Brian McNeil from the Norwegian language edition: Vinn eller forsvinn! Mennesket I konkurransesamfunnet © Fagbokforlaget 2008. Published by Fagbokforlaget. English language translation published by Palgrave Macmillan, an imprint of Springer Nature Switzerland AG, © 2019. All Rights Reserved. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Walker and Walker/DigitalVision/Getty Images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

Why write a book about competition and anthropology? Quite s­imply, because there are scarcely any books of this kind published on the topic—a striking fact. Competition is something that we take for granted. It is a well-established and widespread process in our society, and it is mostly viewed in a positive light. It promotes efficiency and performance. It has significant entertainment value, especially in sport. The primary spheres of competition appear to be in the economy and in sport, but competition also exists in the world of education and politics, as well as in the family sphere and on a purely individual level. It is precisely the apparent naturalness of the idea of competition that calls out for a more critical investigation. There are good reasons to ask questions here, especially about the anthropology that is presupposed by the idea of competition and about the consequences it entails for human beings. What does competition mean for my relationship with myself, my neighbor, nature, and God too? Does competition mean that I use my neighbor merely as a means to achieve my own ends? Is there space for a truly human life in the context of competition? Economic competition offers an entry point into the discussion of the relationship between competition and anthropology. This is not a matter of chance: today, economic competition dictates the conditions of a great deal of the competition that takes place in our society, including what happens in sport, culture, and education. In this way, economic goals influence how people think about themselves and about the world in which they live. The deepest intention of this book is to investigate in v

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PREFACE

some measure, and to evaluate, the values with which we as a society and as individuals deal, and the values that we wish to make our priorities in the competitive society we live in. This book is a revised and translated edition of a book originally published in Norwegian in 2008. In addition to the revision needed when the reading audience changes, and new literature is published, I have deleted some original text and added some new, especially in Chapters 1, 5 and 8. I have dealt more extensively with method, with important economists and taken more into account the question of human dignity in its relation to competition. In this way the book’s argument is more profiled. For the realization of the two editions of this book I am indebted to my employer, the MF Norwegian School of Theology, Religion and Society, my colleagues and the librarians at MF. MF gave me leave for research and also contributed financially to the translation of the book. My thanks also go to my wife, Else Marit Løberg, being an excellent pathologist and scientist, but not of the competitive type! To her this book is dedicated. Oslo, Norway

Svein Olaf Thorbjørnsen

Contents

1 Introduction 1 Competition in Society 1 The Problem to Be Studied and the Goal of Our Investigation 7 Competition—Clarifying the Definitions 11 Anthropology—What Does This Mean? 17 Material 20 Methodology 22 References 29 Part I  The Phenomenon of Competition 2 The Phenomenon of Competition: Social Anthropological Perspectives 35 Introduction 35 Collaboration and Competition 36 The Understanding of History and Competition 38 The Structure of Society and Competition 39 The Economic System and Competition 41 Equality, Inequality, and Competition 46 The Individual, the Group, and Competition 50 Self-Confidence, Status, and Competition 51 References 55 vii

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CONTENTS

3 The Phenomenon of Competition: General and Contemporary Perspectives 59 Introduction 59 Competition—A Natural Phenomenon? 60 The Presuppositions of Competition 66 The Competitive Situation 66 Self-Interest 67 Human Individuality and Freedom 68 The Human Herd Instinct and the Need to Compare Oneself with Others 70 Inequality and Equality 71 Scarcity 76 Rules 77 How Competition Unfolds 80 Individual Aspects 80 Collective Aspects 87 The Consequences of Competition 90 Competition, Performance, and Production 90 Competition and Power 94 Competition and Personal Relationships 96 Competition and Health 97 Competition and Society 100 Competition and Anthropology 102 References 107 Part II  Competition and the Economy 4 Competition and the Economy: Historical Perspectives 115 Introduction 115 Economic Classicism 116 An Early Critic of Economic Classicism 125 The Neoclassical Theory 126 Institutional Economic Theory 129 Microtheoretical Aspects of the Idea of Competition 131 Macrotheoretical Aspects of the Idea of Competition 136 The Idea of Competition in Some Alternative Economic Theories 138 References 149

CONTENTS  

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5 Competition and the Economy: Economic Perspectives 153 Introduction 153 What Is the Economy? 157 The Agents of Competition 160 The Forms of Competition 162 Latent and Manifest Competition 162 Perfect and Non-perfect (Monopolizing) Competition 163 Free Competition 171 Competition and Regulation 174 The Functions and Goals of Competition 176 Efficiency 176 Creativity, Quality, and Growth 182 Distribution 187 The Goals of Competition 190 A Market Economy Oriented to Competition—Two Approaches 194 References 212 6 Competition and the Economy: Anthropological Perspectives 217 Introduction 217 The Homo oeconomicus 221 Rationality 225 Self-Interest 228 Individualism and Freedom 231 Who Is the Homo oeconomicus? 234 Competition in the Economy and an Anthropology with an Instrumentalist Orientation 237 Competition in the Economy and an Anthropology with an Egotistic Orientation 244 Egotism as an Anthropological Category 246 Egotism, Individualism, and the Competitive Economy 249 Egotism, Self-Interest, and the Competitive Economy 252 An Anthropology with an Egotistic Orientation? 258 Competition in the Economy and an Anthropology with an Elitist Orientation 258 Competition in the Economy and an Anthropology with a Humanist Orientation 262

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CONTENTS

Competition in the Economy and an Anthropology with a Christian Orientation 269 Economic Competition—Space for Human Dignity? 275 References 287 7 Competition and the Economy: Ethical Perspectives 291 Ethics and the Economy 291 Economic Competition and Ethics 295 A Naturalistic (Ontological) Perspective on Economic Competition 301 A Teleological Perspective on Economic Competition 304 A Deontological Perspective on Economic Competition 308 Competition and Human Rights 309 Competition and Justice 312 A Virtue Ethical Perspective on Economic Competition 316 References 323 Part III  Competition and Anthropology 8 Competition and Human Relationships 329 Introduction 329 A Relational Definition of the Human Being 332 Competition and the Human Being’s Relationship to His or Her Own Self 335 Self-Interest and the Satisfaction of Needs 336 Individuality, Personal Structure, and Identity 340 Freedom and Rationality 342 Self-Realization 344 Intrinsic Value 346 The Human Person’s Well-Being 347 Competition and the Human Being’s Relationship to Others 348 The Significance of Interpersonal Relationships 349 Interpersonal Relationships in a Competitive Context—Ethical Perspectives 352 Compassion, Competition, and Collaboration 359 Compassion, Competition, and Basic Human Values 364 Compassion, Competition, Emotions, and Empathy 366

CONTENTS  

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Compassion, Competition, Justice, and Power 367 Competition and the Human Being’s Relationship to Nature 368 The Human Being and Nature 368 Competition, the Human Being and Nature 369 Competition and the Human Being’s Relationship to God 374 The Human Being in Relationship to God 374 Competition, the Human Being and God 376 Competition, Human Relationships, and the Human Being’s Dignity 380 References 388 9 A Humane Competition? 391 Introduction 391 The Positive Contribution of Competition to the Realization of a True Humanity 393 The Negative Contribution of Competition to a True Humanity 395 Focus on the Material Dimension 396 Ranking Human Beings 399 A Means to Attain Something Else 401 A Threat to Fellowship 403 A Threat to True Humanity? 405 A Future with Competition? 406 “I Have Enough” 409 References 411 Author Index 413 Subject Index 417

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Competition in Society We live in a society that bears the imprint of competition. We use this word frequently, and in many different contexts—but what does it really mean? One provisional definition might be the following: Competition involves a societal process that is related to individual persons, groups, or institutions that share in the same event and are confronted with the same challenges. The achievements reached in this process are measured and ranked in relation to each other, and this ranking leads to an award for the best. Most people get involved in processes of this kind, either in competitions where they themselves are participants or through the tension that competition between others creates in their minds as they sit in front of the television. Competition belongs both to work and to play. It plays a prominent role in the private and the public spheres. It is linked to individuals as such, but also to the roles that individuals can play based on a status that is attributed to them, or of a status that they themselves have achieved. Competition in which we are participants takes innumerable forms. For some, it is fought out on the sports field; for many more, it can be observed in the fight to get admission to attractive branches of study at colleges and universities, the struggle to be the best (or one of the best) in the class at school, or in one’s year at university, to top the list of examination candidates, to get the best jobs, the best

© The Author(s) 2019 S. O. Thorbjørnsen, What Happens to People in a Competitive Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22133-1_1

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theater tickets, the highest salaries, the best houses, the most successful children … or to put it briefly, to be the winner in a competition with others. This is true in many contexts and in different societies. Some hold that American society ranks highest on this scale. Competition is “an American cultural addiction,” and “Resistance to competition is viewed as suspiciously un-American” (Kohn 1992, p. 3). The dictionary synonyms for “competitive society” are “career society” and “rat race.” In such a society, the idea of competition is integrated at a structural societal level.1 However, competition can be seen in close personal relationships too. A marriage can become a competitive arena between husband and wife. A competition can develop among siblings or groups of friends to see who can achieve the most. Some people do not need others as competitors: they are content to compete with themselves, improving their own achievements, whether jogging or at work. Radio stations and television channels compete intensively. In the political field, there is a continuous competition between nations and countries. The nuclear arms race in the 1950s and 1960s was a supreme form of competition, a competition for political hegemony in the world; the same was true of the race to put a man on the Moon. The global situation, with an unequal distribution of resources and goods between the North and the South, is another competitive situation, although this is more on paper than in reality. People struggle and compete to get hold of goods but also to obtain the right to control the resources that are often found in poor countries. In this competition, the poor nations in the South play in a completely different league than the rich countries. It is impossible for them to fight on equal terms for resources and goods, and they are heavily dependent on the generosity and kindness of the winners. Most people associate “competition” with human beings: individuals and groups of persons compete with one another. However, this phenomenon is not limited to the human sphere. It also takes place between institutions and firms, between human beings and animals (as in the competition between bulls and men in the Pamplona festival), and between human beings and inanimate natural elements (as in whitewater canoeing and mountaineering).2 The first thing many people associate with competition is sport, which plays a significant role in very many societies. The media are very interested in this form of competition and give it extensive coverage, both in print and television. However, this interest is concentrated almost exclusively on top-level sport. One important precondition for much ­

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top-level sport today concerns financial interests. On this level, sport is professionalized; some people pay to be entertained, while others pay to be identified with persons who are presented as positive and healthy winners. For others, competition is associated primarily with education and with the workplace. People compete for the best jobs and for admission to the best courses of study. For some, it is a question of what is challenging and rewarding; for others, competition is about money and salaries. This direct and indirect link between competition and the economy is characteristic. The idea of competition is undoubtedly one core aspect of the form of economic activity that plays a central role today in the global context.3 The principal task of the economy is to help cover the material needs of human beings. The idea of competition is vital in the economic system that was characteristic of Western societies in the past and that has now spread almost throughout the whole world. Men such as Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill laid the foundations of this thinking in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England; it went through subsequent developments, and lives on today among us in one variant of the neoclassical tradition of economic theory. Understood in this way, economic activity means that several actors compete. The best actors earn money and the winner earns most. This applies just as much to the supermarkets on each side of the street as to the firms that produce identical goods, whether in Norway, the United States, or other places. In order to earn as much as possible one must be competitive. One must have goods to sell and an image that is better than one’s competitors, because this increases sales. To outshine other actors, wholly or partly, with regard to price or quality, is important in an economic context. In some instances, it is a question of earning more money than one’s competitor; in others, the firm must acquire the financial resources that will allow it to survive. Some industries are particularly exposed, economically speaking, because they are influenced by a great number of factors outside their control. In an international perspective, we speak of sectors exposed to competition. Since the prices of wares are fixed on foreign markets, earnings are also dependent on the international economic climate and international conditions. To take one example, the international prices of raw materials make the smelting industry in Norway and Canada strongly exposed to competition. The sale of fresh salmon to Japan and China and to the European continent is another example.

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The economy, with its mechanisms and instruments, cannot be isolated today to one delimited area of society; and the same is true of economic competition. Indeed, some hold that it is precisely economic competition that is “the prototype of competition from which other varieties derive” (Kohn 1992, p. 70). The economy has grown in importance in the structure of society, where it now enjoys dominance.4 One aspect of this is the budgets that are adopted by politicians on the national, regional, and local levels. These establish guidelines that determine the priorities and choices in every area of society, including areas that are not traditionally associated with the economy. The link between sport and the economy is only one of several examples of the essential role played by the economy in the cultural field too; another example is sponsoring, which is a reality in most cultural areas today. The possibility of getting this kind of support for one’s causes or projects leads to competition for the limited resources that are available. And this in turn means that it is economic presuppositions that to some extent determine what wins through and is successful in the cultural sphere, although of course quality and other non-economic factors also play a role. But economic considerations also make their appearance in emotionally sensitive areas. Ought a damaged fetus to be allowed to live, if it is much cheaper for society to abort it than to let it grow up? This example shows how societal life is determined by the competition for resources. Should resources go to assist a sick child or should they be used for other goals that might benefit a greater number of persons? In exposed and very important areas of society, it was thought in the past that the state and local authority must have a special holistic responsibility: under all circumstances, a satisfactory offer of services must be ensured. The exposure of public transport and of hospital management to competition exemplifies areas where a change has taken place in recent years. This reflects the fact that competition is given weight in more and more spheres of politics and becomes an autonomous goal on the same level as other societal goals.5 In this way, competition in the context of society becomes an end in itself—it is no longer merely a means of creating effectivity and quality, and of preventing the formation of detrimental monopolies. Nor is it enough for competition to have a function in services with a general economic significance (public consultancy, development projects, the management of buildings, and so on); competition is also to function in public services that involve a special obligation, namely, health and social services, education, culture, the environment,

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public transport, the fire services, the judiciary, and the police. It is difficult for those who live in a modern society to choose not to use these services. They are necessary, and this is why they are sometimes called natural monopolies.6 Monopolies of this kind are useful to everyone. The costs involved in setting them up are often so huge that it is more sensible for one operator to have a monopoly on providing the service than to have several operators competing to do so. One other possible consequence of competition in these fields is a diminution in quality, because the desire to win the competition demands that the operator save money. The idea of competition can be legitimated in various ways. First, it is meant to motivate, and thus to increase achievements. Second, especially in an economic context, it is meant to help obtain and distribute resources and goods in a more effective manner. The legitimation will come about only if this is done more effectively in an economic competition than via state regulation or market monopolies. This result-oriented understanding of competition does not completely correspond to the basic meaning of this word, which is neutral with regard to the question of who reaches the goal first. A direct translation of concurrere, the Latin verb that underlies konkurranse, the Norwegian noun for competition, is “to run together with.” The English noun has a similar sense, if it is understood against its Latin background. Competere means “to fight together” or “to ask together” (Hyland 1995, p. 178). In our context, however, this basic meaning has not become established as the content of the noun. For us, as for human beings who have competed with each other since the days of antiquity, the important point is that there is a prize or reward at the goal, something that is worth striving for. In order to find out who is to have the prize, one must measure, compare, and rank the competitors. The prize motivates us to perform, to stretch a little further, to run a little faster, and to be the first to reach the goal (or at least to be one of those who get a prize). The slogan of the modern Olympic Games: citius, altius, fortius (“faster, higher, stronger”) encapsulates this understanding of competition. There appears at first sight to be no future for an understanding of competition that corresponds to the basic meaning of the term. Such an understanding would open the door much more widely to collaboration and solidarity between persons and institutions, perhaps in a common endeavor to do things better and more effectively. Like competition,

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collaboration too can be understood as a social process in which achievements are evaluated and rewarded based on what a group that works together accomplishes in order to reach a special goal. The apparent failure of such an alternative idea of competition to win acceptance is connected to the fact that the economic system that dominates the Western economy has no place for it. Here, the governing factors are self-interest and motivation, provided by the possibility of competing to earn more money than one’s neighbor or colleague, or other firms and other countries. This way of thinking is so entrenched, and takes so many forms that seem utterly natural, that there is only a limited will and ability to put a question mark against the result-oriented function of competition in society. In a sense, both society and its individual members have no alternative to competition, because society is in thrall to a competitive economy that very largely governs our lives. It is striking to see how seldom the question of competition and the competitive society is a topic of general public debate; it is simply taken for granted. Where critical voices are raised, they tend to be according to two perspectives. First, when firms are accused of cooperating with each other to keep prices high. It is the firms, not the customers, who gain from this kind of collaboration: the customers are obliged to pay higher prices for goods and services. The mechanism of competition is prevented from functioning. In order to avoid this kind of hidden monopoly (where one seller is alone in the market) or oligopoly (where a few sellers dominate a market), various bodies have been set up to ensure that competition is genuine. In the EU, the rules about competition are administered by the European Commission, in European Economic Area (EEA) countries by the supervisory organ of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and in the United States by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).7 Second, the question of competition is often raised in the evaluation of ownership and management by the state and local authorities as opposed to private bodies. I have already mentioned public transport, health services, and schools: a variety of actors take these over on behalf of the state and local authorities, with the intention of making them work more efficiently, more attractively, and more cheaply. Little attention is paid to the more fundamental questions linked to the whole spectrum of the ideological presuppositions on which the idea of competition builds, and to the effect this has on society and on interpersonal relationships. This fact is striking.

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The idea of competition plays a great role in very many societies today. As an element that structures society, does it contribute to ­making people in society happier? The English philosopher Bertrand Russell wrote The Conquest of Happiness in 1930. This book has two principal parts. The first deals with the causes of human unhappiness, the second with the causes of happiness. Competition is mentioned first among the factors that contribute to human unhappiness. Russell sees its dominant position as linked to a decline in civilization. The belief that being the winner in a competition is the path to happiness is completely erroneous (Russell 1930, pp. 50, 53). Although many years separate us from 1930, it would be difficult to affirm that the dominant position of competition in society has decreased. The opposite is true. The question whether competition leads to human happiness or unhappiness receives differing answers today, but irrespective of how it is answered, it is necessary to look critically at the connection between competition and the person or persons who are involved nolens volens in competition.

The Problem to Be Studied and the Goal of Our Investigation In the present context, I shall not discuss the entire question of competition and every aspect of the competitive society. Nor shall I make the ideological move of presenting an alternative program for society, something essentially different from what we know today. What I want is to go behind and beneath the version of the competitive society that we take more or less for granted, and that leaves its mark on our daily lives. We find here ideological, philosophical, and ethical problems that deserve to be tackled. I shall concentrate particularly on one special perspective: What do the competitive society and the idea of competition look like from an anthropological viewpoint?8 What understanding of the human being justifies the idea that his or her self-interest is the best motivation for achieving the maximum? What happens to the way I see my neighbor if he or she is my competitor? Does the idea of competition among human beings make it legitimate for me to use other persons as instruments, if it can promote my own interests and enable me to win or to earn more money than my competitors? An anthropology is one particular view of what the human person is, what he or she needs, and what is the purpose or the determination of

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human life. It is sometimes expressed explicitly in the form of answers to these central questions, and it is linked to various ideological traditions to which people adhere. In other cases, an anthropology is present in a more implicit fashion. The same answers can be read here out of preferred patterns of behavior, of the values that are given priority, of desirable attitudes, and of consequences. These reflect an anthropology by saying something about what is important in human life and how it ought to be and to be lived. A competitive society also reflects an anthropology. Although there is no explicit adherence to an anthropology here, the priorities, values, and attitudes that are both presupposed and made visible in a society that gives priority to competition reflect how one thinks about the human person. In other words, when a competitive society exercises its influence on us, what kind of humanity are we meant to presuppose and accept? The anthropology is thus actualized on the levels of presuppositions and consequences in relation to the idea of competition in society. There is a close link between anthropology and ethics. Our understanding of what a human life is, is decisive for the norms that must apply to human life and to the protection that must be given to this life. This is why anthropology has a completely decisive importance for the content of norms: different anthropologies generate different norms. Some tend to emphasize human beings’ natural, biological, and evolutionary presuppositions9; others give priority to the reality of human life and to the basic human experiences that leave their mark on this life. Phenomena in the lived reality of human beings make demands of the human person.10 This link between anthropology and ethics also applies to the question of competition. An analysis of the idea of competition from an anthropological perspective can, in a purely descriptive manner, show which anthropological presuppositions are operative. In many contexts, however, it is difficult—and in some contexts, it is also completely irresponsible—to limit the anthropological problems to the descriptive dimension. The normative question must also be asked: Is this how we want the conditions of human life to be? Are these the norms that we must promote in an ethical context? Does this reflect what we would see as a true expression of what a human life ought to be? The content of the answer to such questions is determined by one’s worldview. Different worldviews espouse different ideals with regard to what can be counted as a true and good human life. A normative

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anthropological perspective represents a useful critical potential in the competitive society; this applies both to its presuppositions and to its consequences. When we link the competitive society, anthropology, and ethics, the competitive society is not evaluated only based on its problematic but somewhat accidental manifestations. When we bring up the problems that are linked to anthropology, we go behind these accidental manifestations and ask what deeper factors create them. This is a valuable broadening of the analytical perspective, which helps us to identify problematic situations. Since proposals for adjustments and instruments will have a completely different basis, it will be easier to motivate people. An anthropological analysis of the idea of competition and the competitive society, and of the ethical demands to which this analysis leads, could thus make a constructive contribution. This task is particularly important, because there is a certain tendency to locate the idea of competition in a kind of ethical-free zone. Economists have a great deal to say about competition, but we hear little from an ethical perspective, and this allows it to be taken for granted and understood as something that functions quasi-autonomously. The discussion of competition in economic ethics in general, and specifically in business ethics, is often limited to an examination of the difference between healthy and unhealthy competition. One motive behind this discussion is the desire to kill off myths about the allegedly terrible effects of competition (e.g., Solomon 1993, pp. 65–73). However, the more fundamental presuppositions about the idea of competition are rarely discussed. Something similar applies to the two other areas of society where competition plays a central role, namely sport and school/education. Although it may seem difficult in today’s situation to envisage realistic holistic alternatives to our competitive society, this must not prevent us from adopting a critical perspective on it. Proposals that can prevent problematic phenomena must be put forward as well-founded choices for ethical behavior. A discussion of the relationship between competition and anthropology can make valuable and necessary contributions here. Against this background, we can say that the principal problem I wish to discuss in the present context is the relationship between competition and anthropology. I propose to define this problem precisely in (a) a descriptive and (b) a normative direction:

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(a) What anthropological values are the competitive society and the idea of competition built on, and how do these influence the human person’s life and circumstances? (b) Do the competitive society and the idea of competition help to realize a true humanity? We can also formulate this as follows: What is at stake, in anthropological terms, in a competitive society? We can go on to refine this question and look at partial problems, such as the following: What does the human person’s self-interest mean for the competitive society? Is there a genuine desire in the human person to be the best and have the most? Is the human being by nature more strongly oriented to the egalitarian than to ranking? Does competition break down good relationships between people? Is it more natural for the human person to compete than to collaborate with others? Does competition possess an intrinsic value for the human being, or is its usefulness ultimately the decisive factor? In competition, is the human person reduced to a kind of instrument, either for others or for the system? Do people become mere instruments for the upward climb of others and the desire of others to be the first to reach the goal? Is not the human person something more? Alternatively, is the human person something more only in other contexts than those in which a competitive society has us in its grip? This problem allows us also to formulate the intention of the present book, namely, to shed critical light on a competitive society more generally and on its anthropological aspects more specifically. A critical light will identify and draw distinctions between that which is problematic to the idea of competition from an anthropological perspective, and that which helps to realize a true humanity. A critical light of this kind can help to prevent the contemporary idea of competition from being accepted and taken far too much for granted. Against the background of the problem that will be studied and of the goal of this book, I wish to take my starting point in the following thesis, as an instrument that can sharpen the analysis and discussion: In our Western society, the phenomenon of competition is a threat to the possibility of realizing a true humanity, rather than something that can promote this. The predominantly commercial context of the idea of competition means that positive anthropological values that are linked to the competitive situation – such as love of one’s own self, self-realization, individuality, and

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freedom – easily can be twisted in a problematic direction characterized by an emphasis on the material dimension, by a ranking that threatens human equality, by an instrumental thinking that poses a challenge to the idea of the human person’s intrinsic value, and by an emphasis on the individual dimension and on the human being’s self-interest that is so strong that justice is not done to human fellowship.

Competition—Clarifying the Definitions The central concept here is competition. I have already given a preliminary definition of this concept and I have used expressions such as the competitive society and the idea of competition. Later, I shall also employ the concept of the phenomenon of competition. All these concepts are related to the primary concept of “competition,” from which their meaning is derived. Before I begin the discussion of definitions, I wish to indicate some problems on a higher level that are linked to the definition of a concept like competition. The fact that this concept is used over a wide spectrum raises the question whether it is possible to arrive at a reasonably strict definition that could cover the entire field. A definition of competition, as a concept, ought to be able to include many things: an interpersonal way of behaving; regulated patterns of action that are meant to contribute to a classification and a selection; a relationship among goods, services, or wares that can replace each other in a market; and so on. With such a broad range, there is a risk of overstretching the definition. Some writers therefore regard the concept of competition as a good example of an “‘essentially contested’ concept” (Fielding 1976, p. 125, cf. pp. 132–140).11 This type of concept is permanently unclarified and disputed. As with some other social concepts, one aspect of its continuity and identity is its subordination to “institutional argument, debate and conflict” (MacIntyre 1973, p. 5). The definition of this type of concept cannot be clarified by means of an “essentialist approach.” It must be understood by looking at the history of its use.12 In practice, this means that one definition can be just as valid as another, whether one argues on the basis of political, ethical, or societal traditions. How, then, are we to make a reasonably unambiguous definition of what “competition” means? This question seems rather complicated; but this does not deprive the individual of his or her right to make a definition based on historical, societal, and cultural contexts and to offer justification for such definitions.

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There are additional complicating factors here. The concept of c­ompetition is found in a number of academic contexts: politics/sociology, sport research, pedagogics, economics, philosophy, and social anthropology. The attempt has been made in each of these disciplines to clarify what the concept means. One aspect of such clarifications is the description of its content, which can vary both within each discipline and from one discipline to another. Another aspect is the value-laden, normative content that is attached already from the outset to this concept in some disciplines, so that the normative element is a part of the definition of the concept itself. In some cases, these are negative definitions13; but there are also positive definitions, for example, when the idea of competition is linked to the very core of American societal ideology: “Competition is almost our state religion” (Wachtel 1983, p. 284). These questions regarding the work of defining will accompany us as a critical ballast when we go on to discuss the definition of competition. My hope is that this will allow the identification of some “hooks” and demarcations that are helpful in the course of further work. This need not mean that I am taken captive by an essentialist approach, since the historical and academically differentiated perspective can intervene at any point to provide a supplement to a definitional starting point. Friedrich Fürstenberg defines competition as follows: … a social relationship in which the actions of the persons, groups, or institutions involved have the same goal. The actions are governed by specific rules, and their aim is to maximize one’s own share of the result.14 (Fürstenberg 1959, p. 1779)

The following elements in this definition are important: a goal-oriented action in a societal context, a certain regulation of this action, and a wish for maximum participation in the (limited) results of the action. Fürstenberg also adds that competition is important as a principle of selection and in view of the definition of the level of one’s achievements (Fürstenberg 1959, p. 1779). In his sociological essay Streit from 1908 (Conflict, 1955), the social philosopher Georg Simmel distinguishes three kinds of situations in which human beings strive to attain a goal (Simmel 1955). These are related to the goal, to the interpersonal relationship, and to the social value of what they do. Simmel (1955, pp. 57–60) draws a distinction between conflict, on the one hand, and two types of competition, on the

1 INTRODUCTION 

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other. In the situation of conflict, the central element is the fight and victory over the opponent. It is marked by hostility and, to some extent, by a desire to harm the opponent, if this is necessary in order to win. The battle is not fought in view of the reward, the prize and the honor that victory might entail: the reward consists of defeating the opponent. The nature of the battle is such that what is good for the one is definitively bad for the other. The situation of competition has a more indirect character than the situation of conflict. Competition is not present in a situation where one eliminates or harms one’s opponent. Competition involves parallel endeavors by both parties to get their share of the reward. In its pure form, competition is neither offensive nor defensive, because the prize or reward does not belong to any of the competitors: it is independent of them. In a conflict, one struggles with another person in order to get hold of his money, this is different from competing with the same person in order to get access to financial means that the state has advertised. Both types of competition in Simmel maintain this priority between the meaning of the competition itself and the goal of the competition. There are, however, some differences. In Simmel’s first form of competition, victory over the competitor has chronological priority and is necessary. However, the goal of the competition is access to a value that, per se, is completely independent of the competition itself. Simmel gives the example of a businessperson who succeeds in the public arena by ensuring his competitor is suspected of dishonesty. He wins nothing thereby, if the public’s needs suddenly take a different direction from the area of business in which he and his competitor work. The same is true of a lover who defeats or embarrasses his rival: the fact that there are no longer any rivals is of little avail, if the woman feels nothing for the winner. In this form of competition, there need not be any explicitly adversarial relationship among the competitors, whose relationship is thus largely a matter of chance. The identity of my competitor is not determined by relationships of a personal or sociological character. Moreover, in this form of competition, the prize or reward is exclusive. Only one competitor retains it, and it serves him alone. In Simmel’s second form of competition, the participants are extremely goal-oriented, and concentrate on what they want to obtain. The opponent plays a subordinate role. One is tempted to speak here of a kind of formal antagonism. One example is the runner who aims to reach his goal thanks exclusively to his own speed and concentration; another

14  S. O. THORBJØRNSEN

example is the businessperson whose entire attention is directed to the price of his own wares and to their significance in realizing the goal of his business activity. However, this markedly subjective structure, together with the almost formal character of the competition, opens the door to the realization of objective values. The competition can serve both parties and make it possible for the loser too to derive an advantage from the winner’s victory. For example, victory in an academic competition represents a common good that can also become a good and an advantage for the one who has lost. Simmel concludes from this that competition can possess a high value in the social context to which the competitors belong. In this way, it helps to increase values. Simmel claims that this form of competition “employs the generation of objective values to attain subjective satisfaction” (Simmel 1955, p. 60). Although Simmel’s differentiation between conflict and two forms of competition is a valuable aid to understanding what competition means, the sociological context of the discussion imposes limits on its applicability to a number of fields. Simmel too, sees competition as a goal-oriented interactive reality that is directed toward a reward or prize. In principle, the relationship among the participants in a competition is a matter of chance and does not include the deliberate wish to harm the other (or others) in order that one may win the prize. Simmel tones down the understanding of competition as a fight, and hence also the importance of defeating one’s opponent. It is precisely here that the difference between conflict and competition lies. Many of those who write critically about competition overlook this difference. Simmel’s second understanding of competition prompts the idea that competition has an autonomous value and that it can benefit both competing parties. Both Fürstenberg and Simmel speak of an interactive element in the understanding of competition, although this has a somewhat formal character in Simmel. But he cannot be accused of regarding competition against oneself as a genuine competition. In addition, this idea is misleading. It can be useful to compare one’s achievements over a period of time, but this is not a competition.15 Such an understanding of competition has been employed in some contexts to mitigate the criticism of the idea of competition, as a kind of semantic trick: for here, no one loses. Nor can the endeavor to achieve world records be called a competition against oneself, since it involves competing with the achievements of others, even if these are separated by time.

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In his article “Against competition” (Fielding 1976), Michael Fielding mentions some aspects of competition that can help define it more precisely. Several of these dimensions are also mentioned by Fürstenberg and Simmel. They reflect differing and partly antithetical positions in the definition of the concept. Fielding draws distinctions between direct and indirect competition, between voluntary and involuntary competition, between object-centered and opponent-centered competition, and between competition as a process and as a motif. In this way, he sketches the coordinates of the various understandings of competition and indicates essential aspects of a theoretical understanding of competition in general and of every real-life competition. Some of these aspects are more prominent in one field of competition than in others. For example, top-level sport is both a direct and a voluntary form of competition. One chooses personally to take part in a competition where other actors are involved in the same arena and at the same time. The competition between firms is definitely direct, but it is less voluntary: in a society such as ours, with the economic system that exists here, it is compulsory. Economic competition is object-centered (profitability), but it is also concerned with the actions of one’s competitors, although without a conscious desire to harm them. Some people—voluntarily, but perhaps more often, involuntarily—are in a situation of competition (in the process), although the motif of competition is utterly irrelevant to them. Fielding brings in two other elements. The first also includes an antithesis, but of a different kind than those mentioned above. The relationship between competition and collaboration is extremely antithetical, from one perspective; it is hard to imagine two competitors collaborating. On the other hand, many see a kind of interdependence between the two (e.g., Stewart 1972, p. 56), since they argue that to compete is also to collaborate, and to collaborate is also to compete. Fielding himself is highly skeptical of such ideas. He limits himself to saying that, in order to bring about one form of competition, the participants must in one sense collaborate to organizing it (Fielding 1976, pp. 129–130). The second element is the relationship between competition and regulation. Much of the debate—within sport, of course, but also in other fields— concerns the extent to which competition ought to be regulated, and which form of regulation is relevant and useful. Another differentiation that takes up some of what I have mentioned above, but this time looking at it and summarizing it from a somewhat different angle, can be found in Alfie Kohn’s book No Contest.

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He draws a distinction between structural and intentional competition (Kohn 1992, pp. 3–5). Structural competition is related to a situation; it concerns the framework around winning and losing. Competition is a kind of zero-sum game where the success of the winner (or winners) is balanced by the loss of the other (or others). In a competition of this kind, there may be an indirect interaction among the competitors, for example, when students compete for admission to medical studies, or in a bowling competition. But the competition can also be direct. In war and in tennis, one party must act in such a way that the other loses. Intentional competition concerns attitudes, the individual’s desire to be number one. This can happen even without structures for competition: some people try to show that they are the best even in contexts where there are no prizes, and where other persons do not see the situation as one of competition. The opposite alternative, a structural competition isolated from the intentional competition, corresponds to the abovementioned distinction between voluntary and involuntary competition, and to some extent to the distinction between competition as a process (conscious or unconscious) and competition as a motif. An element of scarcity is usually also linked to the understanding of competition, especially when resources are scarce, either ecologically or economically. Competition (or perhaps one should rather say a fight) for limited resources is frequent in nature, and some resources are scarce in human society too. These are the objects of competition. The economic system in a society helps to provide and share these resources. It is not without reason that some regard the concept of competition as hard to explain and define in an ahistorical, essentialist sense. Many strands come together here, and it is difficult to penetrate to the core of the concept and of the reality itself. In other words, it is difficult to give a definition that is sufficiently comprehensive and that does justice to the fact that this is a concept with a history. It is also important to note here that the various understandings of competition are partly antithetical. It is, nevertheless, possible to identify some elements as essential characteristics of competition, even if they do not include the entire spectrum of its use and do not pay attention to all the historical nuances. With the help of these elements, and against the background of the survey above, I shall attempt to elaborate what I would call a working definition. Like every definition, this definition of competition will have a normative character too.

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On the basis of my presentation of various possibilities and elements in the definition of competition, I believe that it is important to keep in mind that competition is a process of social action. It is characterized by object- or goal-centering rather than by centering on one’s opponents. The goal-oriented and exclusive aspects of the prize that is won are more important than the focus on the competition itself, although this too plays a role. The goal is to win, with the consequence that others lose. In this sense, competition is a zero-sum game, and collaboration is not a complementary concept in any definition of what competition is. The same applies to the idea that one form of competition is to compete against oneself. Competition always takes place between parties; it is per se interactive. This interactivity can vary from a situation where the competitors are in a sense isolated from one another, to a situation where they act in such a way that they harm each other or make things difficult for their opponents, in order to win the exclusive prize. Competition can be direct and indirect, voluntary and involuntary, intentional and structural. But although the most characteristic is direct, voluntary, and intentional competition, the indirect, involuntary, and structural have become more and more characteristic as society has gradually become increasingly influenced by the idea of competition. Competition can be subordinate to regulation, but it need not be so. There is no regulative element linked to the definition of what competition is. Bearing all this in mind, I define competition as follows: Competition is a goal-oriented, object-oriented, interactive process of action in which persons, groups, or institutions want to get a share in an exclusive reward to which their actions are directed and by which they are motivated. The process can involve the parties directly and indirectly, voluntarily and involuntarily, and can have both a structural and a functional character.

Anthropology—What Does This Mean? I have several times employed the concept of anthropology. What does this actually mean? Many academic disciplines—as varied as medicine and philosophy, biology and social anthropology, and theology and sociology—include anthropology in their discussions. Many of the disciplines that study anthropological questions share the desire to give a description of how the human being is, and of how he or she functions in the various relationships and contexts to which he or she belongs.

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At the same time, they wish to explain the connections among the different human facts that they observe. Most disciplines wish to have a descriptive relationship to knowledge of the human person. This applies to medicine and biology, and largely also to disciplines such as psychology and social anthropology. The aim is to describe and explain certain aspects of the human being. Disciplines such as philosophy and theology are not content only to describe aspects of the human being: they also wish to provide a more normative holistic view of the human being. Who is the human being? Based on their differing standpoints, theology and philosophy offer very different normative answers to this question. The Swedish theologian Anders Jeffner (1989) introduced here a distinction between what we could call menneskekunnskap (“knowledge of the human being”) and menneskesynskunnskap (literally: “knowledge of how the human being is viewed,” “knowledge of anthropology”). The first form of knowledge is descriptive and is to some extent objective. It is precisely this knowledge that physicians, social anthropologists, and psychologists discover with regard to the realities and processes that are linked to the human being. It is quantitative and comparative and can be tested empirically. It provides important premises for the elaboration of a view of the human being, but it is not itself an anthropology (Jeffner 1989, pp. 4–7). Knowledge of how the human being is viewed is a different kind of knowledge. The concept of anthropology, understood in this last way, is used a great deal, but it is not always sufficiently clear what is meant. It is employed in an explicit sense in at least two different ways. First, it is often applied unreflectively to a kind of holistic view of the human being, and it is expressed in very general terms. Second, it is employed in a more reflective form in theology and philosophy, as a more precise expression of what one regards as characteristic traits of the human person, understood holistically. The concept of anthropology can also be used about something that is implicit and unsaid. This happens when the human being is talked about without any direct indication that what one is talking about concerns an anthropology. Unlike knowledge of the human being, the theories around which anthropology is constructed are not direct empirical observations. Jeffner calls them empirically open theories. They include questions about what governs the human being’s action, and what motivates us to do what we do. It is impossible to test such theories empirically, but they lie in the border region between the empirical and the speculative. An anthropology typically contains these

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empirically open theories, alternative scientific theories, epistemological theories, metaphysical theories, normative theories, and theories about the salvation of the human being (Jeffner 1989, pp. 8–38). These theories are speculative, in the sense that we cannot decide on an empirical basis whether what they are talking about is true or false. A Christian anthropology and a humanist anthropology are anthropologies of this kind. The substance of the concept of menneskesynskunnskap is the understanding of how the human being is viewed. In simple terms, it is the knowledge of various views of the human being, and a comparison between them. Although there are many varied elements in anthropology, reflecting the special aspects of individual ways of viewing the human being, some factors or elements have become established as fundamental, and each anthropology must take a position with regard to these and offer an answer. The following factors are among the most central. They are formulated here as questions: a.  What is the basic reference for the human being’s self-understanding? b. Is there a qualitative difference between a human being and an animal? c. Is the human being’s value linked to what he or she is, or to what he or she does? d. What is more decisive for the human being’s existence—what one inherits or the milieu of which one is a part? e. Does the human being possess a free will? f. Is the human being ruled by reason or emotion? g. Is the human being an isolated individual, or is he or she dependent on other human beings? h. Is the human being basically egotistic or altruistic? i. What is a good life for the human being? j. How does the human being realize what he or she is fundamentally meant to be? The content and material for the elaboration of various anthropologies are supplied by the answers to questions like these. Not all the questions will be equally central in every context, and this applies to the present work too. Since our starting point is the idea of competition, some

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questions will be particularly important: namely (c), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i). But the other questions too can become relevant, directly or indirectly. I believe that anthropological factors are related to every sphere where competition occurs. However, these relationships cannot simply be taken for granted. There have been traditions, especially within economic theory, where anthropological considerations played no special role, since the economy was understood as something possessing a kind of logical and mathematical autonomy (e.g., Arrow and Hahn 1971). Something similar applies where competitive sport is thought of on the basis of strictly scientific ideals and the human person is understood, without any deeper reflection, as a machine (e.g., Magdalinski 2008). These, however, are exceptions. It is possible to claim, more generally, that there is a link between anthropology and the economy or sport, and this claim can be justified in terms both of presuppositions and of functions. It is the human actors’ presuppositions and abilities that are actualized in the situation of competition. At the same time, the competition is related to the consequences it creates. Seen in this light, competition actualizes a broad spectrum of anthropological values. The use of anthropology in this context will necessarily include several of these approaches. With regard to knowledge of the human being (menneskekunnskap), I shall draw on social anthropological, sociological, and psychological materials in order to shed light on the factors that are actualized in the situation of competition. This knowledge is primarily descriptive and claims the greatest possible measure of objectivity. A variety of labels can be attached to the other type of knowledge of the human being (menneskesynskunnskap), depending both on what one chooses to emphasize and on one’s starting point: examples of such labels are philosophical, moral, and theological anthropology. When the concept of anthropology is used in this way, the emphasis lies typically on the holistic and the normative. The descriptive too has its place here, as a description of various anthropologies, but these descriptions tend to have their function in relation to a subsequent normative discussion.

Material In order to discuss this problem, I have chosen material that sheds light from a variety of angles on the idea of competition and that focuses in particular on its anthropological presuppositions and consequences.

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Since the human person is a social being, and competition takes place in a societal context, we shall also look at the societal presuppositions and consequences. The material centers on the understanding of competition and anthropology in economic thinking—to some extent in relation to praxis, but especially in relation to contemporary and current economic theory, which has a neoclassical character. In order to shed light on it, I draw on both older and more recent thinking in economics. The primary emphasis in recent economic thinking lies with two influential representatives of this, Milton Friedman with a radical neoclassical thinking and John Kenneth Galbraith as a representative of a more institutional economic thinking. In addition to pointing out this link between the economy and anthropology, I attempt to integrate perspectives on competition from social anthropological and cultural analytical sources. In order to put into perspective the material that is generated from these analyses, and to acquire further elements for a normative discussion of the problem, I employ anthropological and ethical material from relevant and central philosophical traditions. I shall focus here particularly on questions about human dignity, human fellowship, and human self-realization. When taken together, these aspects of the human being are important presuppositions for the realization of a true humanity. The choice of the economy is one of several possible options; in the present context, one could also have chosen the fields of sport or pedagogy. I have chosen the economy because the material relating to competition is so extensive that it was necessary to apply a limit. The economy is a primary arena for competition in society, an arena that sets the tone for competition that takes place elsewhere. It is here that we can identify the most important presuppositions and consequences of the idea of competition, which are actualized in other spheres of competition too. Although some problems linked to competition are specific to other areas, many of the same problems are encountered, and this means that a discussion of economic competition can have a paradigmatic function. It would doubtless also be possible to make a fruitful comparison by discussing two separate areas of competition in relation to each other. For example, sport and economics thematize the individual and the institutional in somewhat different ways, and their relationships to the material presuppositions are also somewhat different. But I have chosen not to make a comparative analysis, partly because of the need to limit the material studied, but also because the various spheres of competition

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have individual features that are not compatible. The elements of play and entertainment in a sporting competition do not exist in the economic or pedagogical context. Nor does the time limit on sporting competition apply in the same way to economic competition.

Methodology The methodology employed in this work will be systematic. Systematic methodology has its primary background in philosophy and theology. For a philosopher like Nicolas Rescher, the systematic character means that situations that, to begin with, are remote from each other can be seen in one context, and that this makes it possible to maintain positions that are holistically adequate and coherent. The systematic parameters that contribute to this totality are above all coherence, consistency, simplicity, and regularity, all of which are based on a profound acceptance of the demands posed by rationality. They represent regulative ideals that one must endeavor to realize in a philosophical work—one cannot assume a priori that this will take place. The systematic element in philosophical thinking of this kind is thus a question of methodology, rather than of substance. This means that an account of a reality can be systematic, even if one is cautious about saying that this is how reality is per se (Rescher 2001, pp. 151–169, esp. pp. 153, 158, 161, 168). The methodological approach in the present book is influenced by this way of understanding a systematic method. I attempt to bear in mind the regulative goals that are characteristic of this method, and to see in one context matters that, to begin with, are remote from each other: in this case, competition and anthropology. In a theological context, a systematic method has a different, more normative character, although there are links to the philosophical systematic method. In both fields, a systematic method means more than systematizing material. Rescher’s requirement of a holistic perspective, coherence, and consistency offers a constructive and critical methodological perspective that is also found in a theological systematic method, where, however, the critical and evaluative elements are developed even more strongly in a normative direction. The first stage is a description of various possibilities. But although this is important, the normative goal means that one cannot be content with a description. This must be evaluated by means of discourse and argumentation, and it then constitutes the basis for the normative standpoints, in the form of a position

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for which arguments are presented. Such a position entails a combination of the constructive and the critical, and it can result either in the confirmation of what exists or in an argumentation in favor of change. The change can take place against the background of an argumentative clarification of misunderstandings, an uncovering of erroneous developments, an identification of abuses, and not least through the introduction of new elements into the evaluation. A systematic method that aims at normative evaluations does so in a concrete, contextually defined historical situation. Time, place, and situation influence the normative standpoint. In this way, normativity is closely linked to actuality. In a theological context (but not only there), tradition also plays a role; here, it has a particular weight, and very powerful arguments are needed if central elements in the tradition are to be changed. In today’s situation, however, tradition does not possess the same independent weight as in the past. The validity of normative standpoints is much more linked to the arguments that can be adduced in their support in the contemporary situation. This does not prevent tradition from being confirmed by means of argumentation and reasoning, but this is less a matter of course than it was in the past. How is this systematic methodological perspective realized in this book? The descriptive plays a significant role. We must identify what competition, economic competition, and anthropology are about. The relationship between economic competition and a broad understanding of anthropology is a challenge, but it is precisely challenges of this kind that a systematic approach is willing to accept, in order to identify thereby links, challenges, and possibilities that were hitherto unseen. Taken separately, the descriptions of competition, economic competition, and anthropology do not offer the same challenges, but they must be tackled if we are to have material that can be discussed and evaluated at the next stage. Contextual and tradition-related elements are also brought up to date. The theory of economic competition was elaborated in a period very different from our own, although it has proved both relevant and sustainable through many changing circumstances. This theory also contains elements of tradition that have become so much a part of it that one might think they have achieved the status of immutable givens. The idea of the autonomy of the economy is one example here. These descriptions include an elaboration of the presuppositions in terms of values and norms that are relevant to a systematic discussion and evaluation of competition as a societal phenomenon. Anthropological

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descriptions are relevant, both as a description of how the phenomenon of competition influences people’s lives and function, and as a description of various anthropologies and of how these give normative priority to fundamental human values. The systematic task and challenge sit precisely at the point where these two types of description of realities encounter one another: the phenomenon of competition, and its anthropological presuppositions and consequences. At this point of encounter, it is impossible to be neutral, since a definitive evaluation of the relationship between competition and anthropology presupposes a choice of those values that are to govern the position that one takes. In my own case, these will be values with a clearly Christian humanist character. This basis will influence the evaluations to some extent, but in the course of my path toward the definitive evaluations, I shall also integrate alternative anthropological approaches and identify what effects and consequences these have for the evaluation of competition in society. This method, which includes both a descriptive and a normative element, means that the questions I bring to the material will determine the choice of material, and that my presentation will aim to say something normative about the relationship between competition and anthropology. Since the historical and descriptive material forms the presupposition for a discussion that aims at a normative result, the presentation will switch methodologically between a descriptive and analytical element and a more discursive element. The object of our investigation is a phenomenon that deeply influences our society and our culture. This object itself, as well as the alternation between the analytical, the discursive, and the normative, means that the presentation will be marked by cultural analysis and cultural critique. I hope that it will be a contribution to a deeper understanding of our cultural and societal situation and make the reader aware of the values that come into play where the competitive society and the idea of competition take on a dominant position. The structure and material of this book necessitate a strongly interdisciplinary16 element in the presentation, and this is a huge challenge, especially when one single author is to take responsibility for the interdisciplinary element, and it is not possible to hold a cross-disciplinary dialogue among concrete persons from a variety of academic contexts. However, it appears necessary to draw on material from several disciplines, if one is to give an appropriate account of the relationship between competition and anthropology. This poses challenges that no

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discipline, taken on its own, has the presuppositions to resolve. The complexity of the problem demands a broad approach, with an understanding of what is meant by competition (especially as this finds expression in thinking about economic competition) and an understanding of fundamental human presuppositions (as these are thematized in the context of philosophical and theological anthropology). In addition, the social anthropological perspectives on competition make valuable contributions to understanding how competition has functioned, or has not been an important factor, in various human societies and cultures. The interdisciplinary challenge is to create possibilities of discussing the idea of competition based on anthropological presuppositions that go beyond the limited anthropological presuppositions that economic theory includes in its own discipline. This demands a process that integrates insights and produces an interdisciplinary understanding that is larger than the isolated disciplines are able to acquire. An analysis of the idea of competition in its relationship to anthropology is in itself an ambitious project; for a theologian, the orientation of this project to economic competition is even more ambitious, since it assumes specialist knowledge in fields that theology traditionally has not thematized, and that lie outside its area of competence. This applies particularly to knowledge of economic theory and praxis, but also to social anthropological and more culturally oriented insights. This means that what I write about the idea of competition largely will be dependent on secondary literature; it is only to a very limited degree that I can discuss contributions to research as such. In this context, the theologian’s special contribution will be the anthropological perspective in the analysis of the idea of competition that is generated by his or her anchoring in theology and philosophy. My investigation of the relationship between competition and anthropology has the following structure. In the first part (“The phenomenon of competition”), I will focus on this phenomenon more generally. The presentation will be mostly descriptive. The first chapter in this part will take a social anthropological approach: What is the status of the idea of competition in a broad cultural and societal context? The anthropological and economic aspects will be particularly interesting here (Chapter 2). The second chapter in this part will look at the present-day situation: I attempt to describe how competition functions in a Western society marked by wealth, a high level of knowledge, and an economic system that largely determines the development of society. The focus is on the

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presuppositions, the sequence of events, and the consequences of competition (Chapter 3). In the second part, entitled “Competition and the economy,” the focus is on the economic idea of competition, which is illustrated from a historical, a more inherently economic, an anthropological, and an ethical perspective. This presentation is initially descriptive, however, looking at economic competition from an anthropological and an ethical perspective is a move toward the more normative and systematic, although the definitive normative consequences are not yet drawn here. I wish first to clarify what economic competition means, both from a historical viewpoint (Chapter 4) and from the viewpoint of the academic study of economics (Chapter 5). This material then allows us to analyze economic competition with regard to the anthropological factors (in the sense both of menneskekunnskap and of menneskesynskunnskap) that are actualized (Chapter 6). On this basis, the more explicitly ethical questions can be asked in relation to the material (Chapter 7). In the third part of this book (“Competition and anthropology”), I will discuss systematically, on the basis of the material that has been studied, and of a theological and philosophical relational definition of the human being, the main focus of this work: the relationship between competition and anthropology (Chapter 8). The preceding analysis and discussion provides the basis for drawing some conclusions of an anthropological and ethical character in the concluding Chapter 9 (“A humane competition?”): What does the idea of competition entail for the human being, both in positive and in negative terms, and what is at stake when this idea acquires a wholly central and structuring role in society? The structure of the book is concave: it begins and ends in a broader, more general approach to the idea of competition. This general approach helps us to identify important problems, which are then set out and discussed in relation to one particular form of competition—economic competition—and from one special viewpoint—the anthropological. On this point, ethical perspectives help to deepen the anthropological perspective on competition. Based on this discussion, and in recognition of the fact that economic competition in our society plays an important role in most forms of competition, our perspective is further widened. The two final chapters in the book are dependent on the discussion of the relationship between economic competition and anthropology, but their scope goes beyond this specific form of competition.

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Notes





1. A distinction is often drawn between voluntary competition (where one participates on one’s own initiative) and involuntary competition (where the structures lead persons and institutions into competition with each other) between persons and institutions. Both forms of competition are basically regarded as positive. Competition is seen as one of society’s fundamental presuppositions and is largely viewed as anchored in human nature. It is difficult to determine empirically the extent to which any given society is in reality a competitive society. When are we entitled to state that there are so many competitive arenas in a society that it can be called a competitive society? To a large extent, this is a vocabulary based on trends and emotions. However, the increasing and sometimes comprehensive use of the concept of “competitive society” itself helps to consolidate the idea that we live in a competitive society. 2. On this broad understanding of competition, see Loy Jr. (1968, pp. 4–5). 3. The old distinction between the West and the rest (where the West was understood as Western Europe, North America, and Oceania) does not have the same meaning today as in the past, geographically, politically, or economically. The fall of the Berlin Wall created completely new presuppositions in Europe, including the eastward extension of the European Union (EU)/European Economic Area (EEA). In economic terms, the traditional economic presuppositions in the West, where the idea of competition is central, are no longer limited to these Western societies. The globalization of the economy (on this, see Huwart and Verdier 2013) means that such presuppositions are found almost everywhere. Academic literature nevertheless continues to employ the terms “the West” and “Western economy” to denote a region and an economy that have a dominant role in the world economy even today, although not in the same way as a few decades ago. Some also employ the expression “North Atlantic societies,” in order to hold onto the idea of that part of the world that has dominated the world economy for two centuries with its own forms of market economy (Hann and Hart 2011, pp. 3, 5). Against this background, it makes sense to use the expressions “the West” and “Western economy” in the present context too, where it refers primarily to the source of this thinking and to the place where it became most widespread and important; but these terms are no longer used in the same exclusive sense as in the past. 4. P. Sedgwick uses the term “economism” to express this dominance on the part of the economy. See Britton and Sedgwick (2003, pp. 12, 18). 5. On the question of the steadily increasing importance of competition in various spheres of society, see Heffernan (2014).

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6. On the definition of natural monopolies, see Study.com, http://study. com/academy/lesson/natural-monopoly-in-economics-definition-examples.html (access date 7.8.2018). 7. On these three institutions, see http://ec.europa.eu/competition, http:// www.eftasurv-int/, and https://www.ftc.gov/ (access date 1.11.2017). On the politics of competition more generally, see Hope (ed.) (2000). 8.  The terms “anthropological” and “anthropology” cover a wide spectrum of meanings. They are derived from two Greek nouns: anthrôpos (human being) and logos (doctrine). The basic meaning is thus a “doctrine about the human being.” In an academic context, distinctions are drawn between cultural anthropology, social anthropology, biological anthropology, medical anthropology, philosophical anthropology, etc., and these in turn have subgroups. The fact that these concepts are used differently in different languages makes it more difficult to use them unambiguously. In the United States, Anthropology (with a capital letter) denotes what others would call social anthropology, although the concept of cultural anthropology is also employed with the same meaning. The concept of social anthropology is used in England and in the Norwegian context (Hann and Hart 2011, pp. 9–10). In a philosophical and theological context, anthropology deals with the fundamental questions about the human person, his or her basic being and relationship to the world, and possibly also the significance for the human being of his or her relationship to God. Collins English Dictionary gives the following definition of anthropology: “The study of humans, their origins, physical characteristics, institutions, religious beliefs, social relationships, etc.” See https://collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/anthropology (access date 1.11.17). For a more comprehensive overview of various meanings, and anthropology as a science and its various branches, see the article “Anthropology” in the Encyclopedia Britannica (Kuper 2018). In the present book, anthropology is primarily understood as social anthropology and as philosophical and theological anthropology. 9. One representative of this kind of thinking is the sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson; see his book On Human Nature (Wilson 1978). For a presentation and a critical evaluation of Wilson, see Morgan (2010). 10. The French philosopher Emannuel Levinas and the Danish ethicist and philosopher Knud E. Løgstrup are classic examples of this kind of thinking. See Levinas (1992) and Løgstrup (1997). 11. This expression goes back to W.B. Gallie (see Gallie 1956). 12. On this, see Fielding (1976, pp. 125, 135–136). An essentialist approach to the question of definition seeks to discover the meaning of a word and to identify special characteristics that must be present wherever it is used. The idea is that the word has a substantial core that gives stability to the

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term and contains its referential link. The alternative is thus a more historical approach, where one is more open to changes in the use and the content of the concept. 13. M. Fielding (ibid., p. 134) records two such value-laden definitions of competition. The first is from S. Reeve: “The competitive relationship is not and cannot be a pleasant or a wholesome or an unselfish, Christian one, whatever may be the nature of the results. It is in its very essence an egoistical, overbearing thing, conceivable with the doer only in relation to the overcoming of other people.” The second is from I. Howerth: “All competition is essentially selfish. That is its condemnation.” 14. The author’s translation. The original German text reads: “… eine soziale Beziehung, in der sich die Handlungsweisen der beteiligten Personen, Gruppen oder Institutionen zwar an der gleichen Zielsetzung orientieren, zugleich aber auch unter Einhaltung bestimmter Verhaltensregeln auf die Maximierung des eigenen Anteils am Ergebnis gerichtet sind.” 15. For a dismissal of the idea that competition with oneself is a genuine competition, see Kohn (1992, p. 6) and McIntosh (1980, p. 178). 16. A definition of interdisciplinarity: “… a process of answering a question, solving a problem or addressing a topic that is too broad or complex to be dealt with adequately by a single discipline or profession … and draws on disciplinary perspectives and integrates their insights through construction of a more comprehensive perspective” (see Klein and Newell 1998, p. 3). Another, more research-oriented definition: “Interdisciplinary research is a mode of research by teams or individuals that integrates information, data, techniques, tools, perspectives, concepts, and/or theories from two or more disciplines or bodies of specialized knowledge to advance fundamental understanding or to solve problems whose solutions are beyond the scope of a single discipline or area of research practice” (see National Academy of Sciences et al. 2005, p. 2).

References Arrow, Kenneth J., and Frank Hahn. 1971. General Competitive Analysis, vol. 12. Advanced Textbooks in Economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company. Britton, Andrew, and Peter Sedgwick. 2003. Economic Theory and Christian Belief. Bern: Peter Lang. Fielding, Michael. 1976. Against Competition. Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 10 (July): 124–145. Fürstenberg, F. 1959. Konkurrenz. In Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Handwörterbuch für Theologie und Religionswissenschaft, 3rd ed., vol. 3., ed. Kurt Galling, 1779–1780. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

30  S. O. THORBJØRNSEN Gallie, Walter Bryce. 1956. Essentially Contested Concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56: 167–198. Hann, Chris. M., and Keith Hart. 2011. Economic Anthropology: History, Ethnography, Critique. Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity Press. Heffernan, Margaret. 2014. A Bigger Prize: Why Competition Isn’t Everything and How We Do Better. London: Simon & Schuster. Hope, Einar (ed.). 2000. Competition Policy Analysis. New York: Routledge. Huwart, Jean-Yves, and Loic Verdier. 2013. Economic Globalisation: Origins and Consequences. OECD Insights. Brusselles: OECD Publishing. Hyland, Drew A. 1995. Opponents, Contestants and Competitors: The Dialectic of Sport. In Philosophic Inquiry in Sport, 2nd ed., ed. William J. Morgan and Klaus V. Meier, 177–182. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Jeffner, Anders. 1989. Att studera människosyn. En översiktlig problemanalys, vol. 21. Tema T Rapport. Linköping: Universitetet i Linköping. Klein, Julie Thompson, and William H. Newell. 1998. Advancing Interdisciplinary Studies. In Interdisciplinarity: Essays from the Literature, ed. William H. Newell, 3–22. New York: College Entrance Examination Board. Kohn, Alfie. 1992. No Contest: The Case Against Competition, Rev ed. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. Kuper, Adam J. 2018. History of Anthropology. Encyclopædia Britiannica (13.7.2018). https://www.britannica.com/science/anthropology (9.8.2018). Levinas, Emmanuel. 1992. Totality and Infinity. Pittsburg, PA: Duquesne University Press. Løgstrup, Knud Ejler. 1997. The Ethical Demand. Notre Dame, IL: University of Notre Dame Press. Loy Jr., J.W. 1968. The Nature of Sport: A Definitional Effort. Quest 10: 1–15. MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1973. The Essential Contestability of Some Social Concepts. Ethics 84 (1): 1–9. Magdalinski, Tara. 2008. Sport, Technology and the Body: The Nature of Performance. London; New York: Routledge. McIntosh, Peter. 1980. Fair Play: Ethics in Sport and Education. London: Heinemann. Morgan, John Henry. 2010. Ethical Naturalism in the Thought of Edward O. Wilson. A Critical Review of His Major Works. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 9: 175–202. National Academy of Sciences et al. 2005. Facilitating Interdisciplinary Research. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. Rescher, Nicholas. 2001. Philosophical Reasoning: A Study in the Methodology of Philosophizing. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Russell, Bertrand. 1930. The Conquest of Happiness. London: Allen & Unwin. Simmel, Georg. 1955. Conflict. In Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations, 11–123. London: The Free Press of Glencoe.

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Solomon, Robert C. 1993. Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business. The Ruffin Series in Business Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. Stewart, Edward C. 1972. American Cultural Patterns: A Cross-Cultural Perspective. Chicago, IL: Intercultural Press. Study.com. What Is a Monopoly in Economics?—Definition & Impact on Consumers. Study now. http://study.com/academy/lesson/natural-monopoly-in-economics-definition-examples.html (7.8.2018). Wachtel, Paul L. 1983. The Poverty of Affluence: A Psychological Portrait of the American Way of Life. New York: Free Press. Wilson, Edward O. 1978. On Human Nature. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

PART I

The Phenomenon of Competition

CHAPTER 2

The Phenomenon of Competition: Social Anthropological Perspectives

Introduction Competition too is a theme in social anthropology. Analyses of the ­fundamental structures in a culture or a society ask whether it is marked by collaboration or competition among its members. The analyses also look at potential differences between town and countryside, between developed societies and less developed, partly primitive societies,1 and at what appears to be most effective and creates the best presuppositions for survival, competition or collaboration. Social anthropology also includes investigations of how people settle their economic disputes. Such investigations show that in some cases, the idea of competition is a part of the economic system, while in others, this idea is wholly alien. The question of competition in a society is especially related to how people regard equality and inequality between persons, both individually and societally. Understandably enough, competition is more relevant in contexts of societal inequality than in contexts where egalitarian ideals are prominent. The goal of this chapter is not to present a thorough social anthropological discussion of the abovementioned questions. Given the nature of social anthropology and the primary problem that is studied in this book, my wish is to say something about the occurrence and the presuppositions of competition in various societies and about the anthropological factors that accompany this occurrence, or about the factors that are characteristic of societies in which competition plays a subordinate role.

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One element in this context is the fact that the great breadth of social anthropology also gives us access to societies and contexts in which competition plays an important role without being commercialized as it is in our own society—in which competition is “pure,” so to speak. Social anthropology is not monolithic; a variety of theories govern the interpretation of the observations that are made. It is on this basis that we must understand the social anthropological perspectives that are presented in what follows. There is no one definitive social anthropological perspective on competition.

Collaboration and Competition Both in general terms and within social anthropology, competition exists in a context in which the most obvious alternative is collaboration. The relationship between collaboration and competition can be understood in several ways, but there are two main positions. The first is found inter alia in the athletic games of classical antiquity. The essential point of such competition was to bring out inequalities, namely, the difference between the winner and the loser. Collaboration and competition were mutually exclusive. What counted was honor and victory (McIntosh 1980, pp. 13–15).2 Where a coordinated collaboration is required in order to stage a competition, it is only a means that is subordinate to the competition itself; it does not influence the nature of the competition. The collaboration takes place, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the competition. The second position takes account of the fact that collaboration and competition are dependent on each other, but not only in a relationship of goals and means (Stewart 1972, p. 56). A competitive situation is unimaginable without some persons who collaborate. The dependence between the two can also be seen in the fact that collaboration can have a positive effect on the goals that people seek to attain in a competitive situation. In many countries, not least in traditional Western countries, the media are an important factor in the strong interest that large sectors of the population take in competitions and sport. At the same time, people are in thrall to an economic system that builds upon a continuously expanding idea of competition. Although the idea of collaboration has not withered away, the idea of competition seems to be gaining new ground all the time. This, however, is not the situation everywhere. In some societies, collaboration is more important than competition, both in

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institutional and individual spheres. One’s personal achievements are not as important as the achievements that people can create together. Paul G. Hiebert gives three examples of such societies (Hiebert 1985, p. 129).3 The first concerns the Hopi Indians in Arizona in the United States, who have no word for “competition.” Instead of rewarding individuals for their achievements, they reward actions that help the entire group. The second example concerns the Kikuyu society in Kenya. According to Gerald J. Wanjohi, who has analyzed a large collection of their proverbs, this group of people has “a metaphysical need of society, of living in company with their fellow-humans” (Wanjohi 1997, p. 142). Collaboration is important both generally4 and in the economic sphere. It is through collaboration that wealth is acquired.5 The motif of competition plays no role here, although the material also contains examples of antisocial attitudes, where self-interest and self-confidence contradict altruism and collaboration. One important point is that the threat not to collaborate does not entail competition between individuals; rather, it expresses a wish to manage on one’s own. In some cases, it also expresses hateful attitudes between individuals. The antisocial is also seen as an expression of the fact that it is genuinely difficult to realize life in society. However, the best way to do so is to give priority to collaboration, which may involve sacrifice, compromise, and adaptation.6 The third example concerns Thai people. From an early age, children are taught here not to compete or to say that they disagree with others—especially with those who are the same age or older. In school, priority is given to collaboration rather than to competition. In sport, participants are reluctant to act in such a way that they would beat others in their own group (Hiebert 1985, p. 129).7 From a social anthropological perspective, it is hard to claim that collaboration is found where there is ready access to resources, while competition is correlative to scarcity. Ethnoarcheologists maintain that competition can be explained on the basis both of scarcity and abundance (Widlok 2017, p. 49). Investigations have shown that there are societies in which competition occurs although there is a ready access to resources, and that collaboration takes place even under conditions of scarcity. This suggests that it is not access to resources that determines whether priority is given to collaboration or competition, but rather the structural presuppositions and the prevalent norms and values of the culture in question.8 It is easy for a citizen of the Western world to think that competition plays a larger role and is more effective than collaboration in a societal

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context. The first of these is doubtless true, but the second is far from certain. Social anthropology can point to many societies in which collaboration is much more important than competition, also in terms of effectiveness. In addition, competition has also been seen as ethically problematic in some instances.

The Understanding of History and Competition Different societies and ideologies look at time and history in different ways. One primary distinction occurs between a cyclical and linear understanding of history. A cyclical understanding thinks of history as a series of repetitions. There is no absolute beginning and no absolute end. These are typical of a linear understanding, which the Jewish and Christian tradition has communicated powerfully to Western civilization. The starting point is creation, and the end point is the final restoration of all things. This linear tradition has won greater acceptance in the Western world, which is marked by Jewish and Christian traditions; the cyclical understanding of history left a stronger imprint on ancient Greek thought and is characteristic of much Eastern thinking and religion.9 Different understandings of time and history find expression in different thinking about the future and about the significance of the future. A linear understanding makes the question of planning important: one must plan for the future, in order to avoid uncertainty and to experience an improved situation. The perspective here is instrumentalist and pragmatic: the means is employed in order to reach the goal and is evaluated in terms of whether it is the best (that is to say, the most effective) way to reach the goal. The time for reaching the goal is also important: one must realize as much as possible and as quickly as possible. Such a way of thinking paves the way for activism and goal orientation.10 In a cyclical system, where everything is repeated, what I do today will not have a lasting effect in the future. Everything will be reset to zero and then begin afresh. With such a starting point, there is limited motivation for making improvements, and little interest in finding the means that can bring these about. It is not so important to get things done and to create improved circumstances in the present day. It is better and more important to be a good person and to construct human relationships than to realize goals of various kinds.11 The distinctions between these understandings are not watertight, and it is easier to identify the differences on a meta-level and over a

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longer historical perspective than in people’s daily lives. Planning and a focus on goals and means will be an obvious concern even in a cultural context with a cyclical understanding of time. For example, the training of athletes for the ancient Greek Olympic Games was oriented toward the prize, the honor, the prestige, and, in the course of time, also to the material goods that they could win. Here, there was planning from a pragmatic point of view, and competition was a means both for reaching the goal and for ranking. The question of competition is thus not directly correlated to one particular understanding of history. Nevertheless, it seems that a linear understanding is more appropriate than a cyclical understanding when we think of a competition to attain a goal. A linear understanding also makes the idea of ranking meaningful. The connection between the understanding of history and competition thus shows us something of the significance that competition has had, and still has, in those societies that have been marked by a linear understanding of time and history.

The Structure of Society and Competition Different societies can be characterized on different scales. In the present context, important scales concern the material and non-material, the quantitative and qualitative, and the dynamic and static. What importance do these parameters have in a society? The answer to this question is also related to the importance of competition in these societies. In affluent Western societies, there is a strong emphasis on material values and on the consumption of material values. These enable health and physical wellbeing, but they are also important for the human being’s self-image and relationship to others (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2012, pp. 227–230). Such values are easily marketable and are suitable for competition. In societies that give priority to such values, there tends to be a scarcity of goods that represent these values. The focus on material values also implies a continuous development and a desire for more and better material things, although this need is not born of necessity. Since people’s needs are not always necessary, an attempt is made to create such needs, for example, through artificial means like advertising. This same material focus also has a comparative element: it creates a competition to see who has most. This competitive mentality presupposes, and is reinforced by, a widespread private ownership: the material values are my values, not those of the community.

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This is not the case in every society. In some, it is the non-material values that are truly desired, and the interest in comparisons is correspondingly reduced. This kind of focus does not open the door to competition, whether for goods or among persons. The non-material values are realized either individually or in collaboration with others— not in competition against them. Where things are owned in common, a similar consequence follows. In such societies, the material values are generally accessible, and there is no need to compete with others in order to get hold of various things, whether these are necessities or things beyond what is necessary. One who needs the thing uses it. In some cases, we have documentation of competition about material values in contexts that are not directly influenced by the presuppositions of the Western competitive economy, and here competition is seen in a negative light. George Foster (1965) noted that people in some agricultural societies regarded basic resources, such as land, wealth, health, friendship, power, status, and safety, as scarce resources, with the result that people in these societies had to compete for them. This created ­suspicion and uncertainty, since if one person, or several, reached the goal before others, this meant that someone else would lose. In such societies, it was bad to work hard in order to improve one’s life, and those who did so were often boycotted. The moral was: Stay where you are and take your place on the societal level to which you belong. Competition, therefore, was evaluated negatively. It disturbed or threatened the order of society, or the already-existing organization. There is a close link between the material and the quantitative, and between the non-material and the qualitative. A materialistic society is a society that quantifies. Everything is to be measured, and the results of the measuring are to be looked at and compared in relation to each other. A society that attaches weight to the non-material—such an ideal society does not in fact exist, but in this context we are talking about tendencies—is oriented to quality. “Soft values” and a static balance are the priorities here. The alternative is “hard values,” and an imbalance that generates not only dynamism, but also problematic antagonisms. The static and the dynamic constitute the final scale. It is important in Western societies to do something, to work. A person is defined to a large extent by what he or she does. Inactivity is regarded as a very grave failure, or as a sin. In other societies, this is not necessarily the case— with priorities of being and becoming carrying much more importance than doing. This offers space for contemplation and thinking, but it is a

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poorer soil for competition, which demands and presupposes activity and dynamism (Hiebert 1985, p. 121). No society is defined entirely in quantitative/material or qualitative/ non-material terms, but the center of gravity indicates the importance that competition has in a society. A material center of gravity is correlated to quantity, activity, and dynamism. In such a society, competition plays an important role. Quality, calm, standstill, and balance are qualities of a completely different society. The element of competition need not be absent here, but it does not determine the structure of society and the relationship among persons who make up this society.

The Economic System and Competition In a market economy system, which predominates in large parts of the world today, competition plays a central role as a means for acquiring and distributing resources and goods, as well as for fixing prices. This, however, is not the case everywhere, since there is considerable variation between all the economic systems used globally. Social anthropology12 distinguishes three principal ways in which various societies distribute resources and goods13: market exchange, gift exchange, and redistribution. These systems correspond to the ways in which different societies organize their economic activity. The boundary lines between the various models are not particularly sharp. Elements of several models are found in many societies, but with a varying emphasis. Organizing includes and is dependent on several factors, like the degree of technologization. This in turn is connected to another factor, namely, the degree of differentiation in work. In simple societies, there are no specialists; in complicated societies, they are a necessity, which finds its most extreme expression in the continually repeated movements of workers on a conveyor belt. This differentiation occurs just as much on the level of the family and the institution as on the individual level. From a social anthropological perspective, the dominant market economic system is characterized as market exchange, which is found not only in complicated Western industrial societies, but also in simpler societies. One central aspect of such a system is that the exchange of goods takes place in the framework of negotiations, which are based on a sense of the economic value of the goods that are the object of negotiation. Negotiations of this kind take place in a social context. Unlike an economic system based on the gift principle (see below), the exchange of

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goods is not intended here to build up social relationships. The social aspect of market exchange is limited to the transaction itself and does not include the longer lasting consequences that this transaction may have in social terms. This means that the economic agent is freer and can seek his own happiness to a greater extent, without needing to take heed of social, political, and religious circumstances. In simple societies, this market exchange takes the form of barter, which has two salient features. First, the wares that are on offer in the barter are not produced in order to be traded with. They are a surplus of what is produced for one’s own survival and existence. Second, people in a simple exchange economy trade with real economic values, not with economic symbols like money. The introduction of money to an economic system entails a great leap. Money represents the exchange value of real economic values. Where money takes the form of shells, gold, or packets of tobacco, it is the symbolic value of these wares that is decisive, not their value as wares in the normal sense of the term. The use of money has huge and far-reaching consequences. There is a greater distance between the production of wares and their consumption. In order to have something to sell, one produces more than one needs for one’s own consumption. Money makes saving possible, both for future use and in order to buy wares that one cannot personally produce. Money is flexible. Most types of money are easily transportable and can be divided up into smaller portions. In general, all marketable goods can be given a value related to a sum of money. We can therefore say that money creates markets. Such markets exist in simple societies too, but they have a limited function. This limitation takes various forms. First, the market system is limited to wares and money. Property, work, and investments play no role in such market systems. Second, there is a highly local limitation, since the trade or exchange of wares takes place with the nearest tribes or neighbors. If we can say that this is a form of market economy, this is because the prices of the goods are determined to some extent by local supply and demand. Nevertheless, the competitive element, where it in fact exists, differs from what is characteristic of the kind of market economy with which we are familiar. On the one hand, it is important to sell one’s products (whether produce, household appliances, or canoes) at an acceptable price. On the other hand, it is even more important not to price oneself out of the chain of the exchange of wares that exists between various tribes and

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societies in many places. Such isolation will often be a catastrophe. The wares that are exchanged in the chain are completely necessary for life, and this is why individual societies are willing to renounce their own profit, just in order to remain within such a chain. Here, it is other factors than supply and demand that determine the price at which wares are sold. This, however, does not mean that the usual market mechanisms are completely absent: they can enter indirectly. The Busama people in Papua New Guinea (Sahlins 1988, pp. 290–292) buy bowls in one place for between ten and twelve shillings and exchange them for jugs that they get made in another place, although the jugs have a value of only eight shillings. The Busama people give three reasons for this apparently “bad” deal. Those who produce the jugs are poor and hungry; these producers purchase the most important export article of the Busama people, namely, the taro plant; and the Busama people need the jugs in order to exchange them for mats and other necessities that can only be purchased with jugs at a third location. People in this third location are not interested in the taro plant. The need for wares and the necessity of having a place in the exchange system make people willing to sell and buy at prices that reflect a “low hourly wage” for the work that they put into their own products. If we look at the exchange system as a whole, therefore, we can say that rather classical commercial mechanisms are functioning, although this system functions somewhat differently. The link between price/value and supply and demand thus has a function even in such simple market systems, but it is important to note one difference. In the short term, variations in supply and demand have little influence on prices. But in the long term, the link between supply and demand is an important factor in establishing the level at which prices settle. This difference indicates that the competitive element does not have the same function in these forms of economy as it has in the dominant market economy thinking (Sahlins 1988, p. 297). This is connected to other factors too. Solidarity is not a prominent trait in a market-oriented competitive economy, whether on the demand side or supply side; nor is it prominent in the relationship between the two. Competition does not include this kind of element of solidarity. Trade between tribes is the opposite of this. Harsh competition is unthinkable in a trade that also includes internal relationships linked to family and friendship (Sahlins 1988, p. 298). Trade in such a context is not an activity for everyone. It is an exclusive activity undertaken by selected persons, and it takes the form of

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transactions between special parties. It often happens that the buyer and the seller are brought together by social relationships, not by prices. Without a trade contact, one is unable to get hold of wares, irrespective of the price one is willing to pay for them. Situations of competitive bidding are not reported from such contexts. On the contrary, there is evidence that they are forbidden. Haggling, where it exists, is not open to everyone; it is conducted only between specially appointed “traders” (Sahlins 1988, pp. 298–299). In such a context, we do not find the form of competition that we know from market economy thinking, a symmetrical and reverse competition between buyers and sellers, where supply and demand regulate the prices and one seeks a balance (cf. Chapters 4 and 5). Although elements of these mechanisms can be found, the function of competition—to regulate and establish prices—is assured by other means. An imbalance in the relationship between supply and demand is not corrected by changing the prices, but by putting pressure on one’s trade partners. Either one finds new partners, in order to maintain the price at its old level, or else one pays one’s trade partner extra for what he is selling, while obligating him to do the same in return and threatening him with loss of honor and of trade connections if he fails to do so. This makes it possible in the short term to defend the established price or exchange value. In this context, we cannot speak of a market, where this is understood on the basis of the concepts of competition and price fixing (Sahlins 1988, pp. 300–301). The second organizational method is called gift exchange.14 Although gifts are sometimes given without any expectation of receiving a corresponding gift in return, the gift system is an integral part of a social structure in which the gifts function as a means of exchange between groups and persons. They create and sustain relationships and networks. This essentially involves groups and persons with the same social status. It is expected that the gifts and services one renders will find a corresponding reciprocation. Where it is relatives who exchange gifts, the need to receive a gift in return is toned down. This reciprocal aspect15 also varies, depending on the person’s ranking in the family, on his wealth, and on whether the transaction involves wares or gifts that are necessary for one’s survival. Most notably, gift exchange plays a large role in societies using simple levels of technology.16 This praxis creates relationships between people. The reciprocity also contains an element of collaboration and solidarity between persons and groups. Surplus and

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wealth benefit other persons and society, so that the gift system also contributes to the redistribution of goods. This redistribution might also take place in a kind of competition associated with giving gifts or holding feasts at which gifts are handed out: the important thing being to outdo one another in terms of feasts and gifts. This praxis brings prestige to the leader or chief. Competitions of this kind may last for years and ensure that the chief, the tribe, or the village gain prestige, and that poor people received gifts in the form of food and other economic goods. The third model is characterized by the idea of redistribution.17 The central point here is that wares and services are gathered by an authority and are then redistributed. In one sense, the tax system in a country is an example of such a model. This model has two important presuppositions: a society with some kind of hierarchy and a central authority holding power. At the same time, there must also be an element of reciprocity. Those who deliver their wares and services to a distributing authority must have the certainty that this then leads to something in return. The money that I pay in tax must bring me some benefit. There is, however, always a measure of asymmetry, since the redistribution lies in the hands of the leader or person in authority, who distributes on the basis of his own priorities. There is no competition here to get goods that are handed out. The medieval feudal system, with its overlords and tenant farmers, is a historical example of such an economic model. In social anthropological terms, this would be characterized today as a patron/client relationship, but to the extent that redistribution functions in a modern democratic society, for example, in a tax system, it is also regulated by law and under parliamentary control. One may get the impression that market exchange has a more impersonal character than the other alternatives mentioned here, and that it gives the economic actors greater possibilities of realizing their own self-interest. But does not self-interest play a role in the gift exchange system, and in a system where a central authority hands out the resources? The difference does not concern the presence or absence of self-interest, since this is evenly distributed among human beings. The difference is that self-interest is much narrower in a market system than in the other systems, which include social, political, and religious factors in their understanding of the human being’s self-interest, especially in simpler sociological contexts. Good social relationships are regarded as a positive gain that is essential, if one is to survive and have a good life (Hiebert 1983, p. 310). From the perspective of

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a modern market economy, these systems are alternatives that also raise an interesting question about the way in which we think about the economy. According to Marshal Sahlins, it is worth asking how far one can get on the “heretical” economic path, a path where the economy is anchored in something other than the human being’s hedonistic tendency—that is to say, in something that lies outside the human being (Sahlins 1988, p. 230).

Equality, Inequality, and Competition Social anthropology has studied the question of equality and inequality among human beings both from a historical and a contemporary perspective. The following problems have been central here: Is there a basic egalitarian18 harmony in human societies? Has there been a development from egalitarian to less egalitarian societies? Is there a relationship between equality/inequality and power? Each of these problems is linked in its own way to the question of competition: Is competition something fundamentally human, something that has always existed? Does today’s competitive society reflect the fact that the link between power and inequality is societally given and necessary, and that it has to a large extent been made into an ideal? The question of societal equality is linked to two factors: equality in value among persons, and equality in the distribution of goods among people. Many people see a connection here: equality in value calls for equality in distribution. To what extent should this egalitarian tendency be seen as something natural? Here, views diverge (Béteille 1994, pp. 1010–1013). Those who emphasize the ideal of equality often restrict themselves to speaking only of a practical, not an absolute equality. Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau are exponents of the idea that equality (or almost complete equality) was one of the primary conditions of humanity; in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, this is linked to ideas about a primitive communism and the classless society. This position was later undergirded by the idea that the concept of property was not found, and is not found, in primitive societies; property is coupled here with inequality and competition. Although studies have shown that some societies with a fundamentally egalitarian structure do exist (Woodburn 1982), the main impression one gets is that the majority of today’s social anthropologists are generally skeptical about the existence of societies with a thoroughgoing egalitarian structure

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(Rogers et al. 2011).19 Inequality appears to belong to the core of all collective life. In many societies, this inequality also has an important societal function. The adherents of evolutionary paradigms like to propose the idea of a development from equality in primitive societies (not absolute equality, but a situation without class distinctions) to inequality in hierarchical agricultural societies, and then a return to the egalitarian in the formal commitment by the industrial states to equality instead of hierarchy. A. Béteille argues that two facts show how complicated this is in reality: first, there is no reason to believe that equality with regard to living conditions and equality with regard to the distribution of material resources develop in tandem with equality in the moral and philosophical sense; and second, it is not obvious that formal equality and economic equality change in parallel—on the contrary, they can change in opposite directions (Béteille 1994, p. 1014). Some writers, including the French philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville (1956 [1835, 1840]), have pointed out the link between individualism and equality. Here too, however, we must bear two things in mind. Where individualism promotes autonomy and human dignity, this takes place in opposition to every form of inequality. Where individualism focuses on achievement and competition, however, inequality is promoted and justified. The second alternative is utterly central in any modern organization of the relationship between equality and inequality in a capitalist society. In principle, the same possibilities are accessible to all, but not all can make use of these possibilities in the same way. The outcome is unequal. In economics and psychology, a methodological individualism20 is an important presupposition for explaining inequalities. Methodological individualism breaks down all actions, including collective actions, into actions performed by individual human beings. However, most sociologists and social anthropologists take a collective starting point for their models and evaluations. The individual cannot be understood independently of the society and culture that both give him possibilities and impose restrictions on his conduct (Béteille 1994, pp. 1016–1017). What, then, shall we say about inequality? It is necessary here to draw a distinction between differences and inequalities among persons. Not all differences count as inequalities. When we speak of “inequality,” this involves an element of evaluation that is not found in connection with differences: “difference” is a more neutral term. Where differences are also understood as inequalities, this is due precisely to the use of scales

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of evaluation. These are not inherent in nature but are the result of conventions. They are authorized in the course of history by people who employ them. In concrete situations, they function mostly on the unconscious level. In one and the same society, there can be variations with regard to the values that different people place, either high or low, on the scales of evaluation, and the potential conflict or competition among values to which this leads can also be resolved in various ways. One possibility is to resolve them on the level of argumentation, but it is more common for power to contribute to a decision. One important presupposition of this use of power is a desire for order and stability in society, and this situation builds on a measure of consensus about the fundamental scales of evaluation. This use of power occurs at the individual, collective, and state levels. While power is distributed unequally on all levels, the state is the most prominent example of this unequal distribution. The idea that the role of the state in this context underwrites every other unequal distribution of power has proved untenable from the perspective of social anthropology. It appears that the unequal distribution is generated by the structure of a state and by the problems and challenges that confront it, independently of whether or not there is a central state power (Béteille 1994, pp. 1019–1020). An example that can shed light on this inequality and make a direct link to the question of competition is the ranking of occupations in society (Béteille 1994, pp. 1028–1029). This ranking occurs in reality, although often unconsciously. We can think of many reasons for this, such as salary, function, scarcity, and so on; but the place an occupation receives on the more general scale of values of a society is probably more important than these other reasons. The more an occupation embodies values that are central and important in society, the higher it is on the scale. There is another element here, on which we have touched above, namely, the possibility of having power. An occupation that gives a person power is ranked higher than other professions. These factors come into play when young people choose what they will study, and in the competition for the most attractive places of study. The attractive places of study are those that incorporate most of these factors, especially those that are linked to power, to a high position on society’s scale of values, and to future salaries. What, then, about the real ideal of equality? We are told that the Western ideal of equality, an ideal that has a very strong position today, has a completely different content from the ideal of equality that is found

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in other cultural contexts. Many simple societies understand equality as equality in human living conditions—a distributive understanding of equality. The Western ideal of equality, which developed in connection with the great revolutions before and after Napoleon, is largely understood as equality in possibilities (Arneson 2013), but it has not necessarily led to a reduction in inequalities, for example, with regard to wealth and poverty. On the contrary, it has probably helped to increase inequalities, since those who were able to avail themselves of the possibilities have distanced themselves from those who were unable to do so. If such an ideal of equality is to function, it can only be in a society that is based on a genuinely free competition between individuals; the path from a common starting point is up to the individual himself or herself. It is only before competition begins—not afterwards—that equality exists. This is an equality marked by competition. There are few today who believe that market mechanisms can overcome the inequality that such an equality maintains. In the United States, economic inequality is seen precisely as the result of the economic competition that has its starting point in the idea of an equality of possibilities (Blim 2012, pp. 355–356). The desire to do something about this inequality demands interventions from within, and there are several possibilities here. One possibility is to employ the means that were used with a strong arm in the Soviet Union, namely, a thoroughgoing planning and direction by the state. In Western welfare states, the grip on the steering wheel has not been so firm, but here too, the possibility of realizing a form of distributive equality has been seen in connection with a distribution based on the use of state power. But positive gains of this kind have their price. We encounter here one of the paradoxes of the notion of equality: where equality must be promoted by means of power, it can generate new equalities next time round. There are further problems with an idea of distributive equality: if it can be realized only by means of power, then freedom is at risk. And in a free market economy, economic efficiency can also be at risk. Many people regard efficiency as such an important value that it must be given priority, even where it is related to, and comes into conflict with, values such as freedom and equality. We see in the adherents of a liberalistic economic ideology that inequality—or more precisely, an understanding of equality that is marked by competition—is the price that must be paid, if the economy is to function effectively (Béteille 1994, pp. 1033–1035). This means that not only inequality, but equality too generates competition. In many instances, equality is not perceived as a given ideal.

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Equality is realized in different ways, depending on the context in which it functions. Accordingly, an emphasis on equality between persons does not necessarily entail the marginalization of the idea of competition. On the contrary, several ways of understanding equality, including equality of possibilities, can promote the creation of competition among persons. In a distributive understanding of equality, however, there will be inbuilt factors that work against the emergence of competition.

The Individual, the Group, and Competition Individualism, the right to freedom, and the possibility of seeking happiness on one’s own are fundamental presuppositions of Western liberal thought. In the economic sphere, these are important presuppositions of a free market economy in which competition plays a central role. What if we now look at groups of people? Is there a form of competition here? We must draw distinctions between the function, the identity, and the status that various societies give to the group. In our Western context, the group, like the individual, is accorded value and identity to the extent that it helps us to attain something. When one assesses the relative importance of the individual and the collective for the group’s status, the individual is the winner. The entire liberal tradition, which has left its traces on the foundational historical documents of Europe and America, has given priority to the individual at the expense of the collective. In groups too, it is the individual who is given priority (Hiebert 1985, pp. 124–125). In such groups, the internal bonds are often weak; people take part in the groups as individuals who are united in a shared activity. This is not a corporate unity in which individual rights and duties are subordinate to those of the group. With such presuppositions, it is easy to break away from the group, if one can find something better elsewhere. Where individualism is prominent in fellowships, the concept of a “club” is a more suitable description than the concept of a “corporation.” Groups with presuppositions of this kind are located in a double situation of competition, both within the group itself and with other groups. Competition between groups is frequently the result of conflicts between them, often when they are geographically close to each other and are competing for the same resources or the same status. In contexts with a different balance between the individual and the collective, groups take on another status and another function. Corporative units of this kind are more viable as groups, and the idea of collaboration grows on a

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different soil, both within the group and with other groups. The element of competition is not necessarily absent, but it is always seen in connection with the possibility of collaboration and with what will be best for the fellowship, not only for the individual.

Self-Confidence, Status, and Competition In a competitive situation, participants often experience the importance of trust in oneself. It is I who am to attain something, and the possibility of reaching the goal first depends on my own effort. I cannot trust others. Self-confidence is a quality that is regarded as an important resource when tackling tasks of various types. A competitive situation also entails the possibility that self-confidence can be strengthened, since winning generates more self-confidence. The pleasure in competition increases, and self-confidence gives one the resources to hold on in other situations of competition. The experience of winning and the feeling of mastery strengthen one’s self-image. There is an obvious danger that self-confidence may turn into smugness, but this need not happen. This is how the situation of competence looks for many people in our society. Margaret Mead, however, points out that the possibility of collaboration is not limited to contexts where a weak ego development exists: “Although no competitive society was found without strong ego development, strong ego development is possible within a social structure which provides adequately for cooperation … Strong ego development can occur in individualistic, competitive, or cooperative societies” (Mead 1976a [1937], p. 511). In other societies, one who wants to manage on his own, one who trusts in himself and in his own abilities can be regarded as an eccentric with antisocial traits. Here, we see that we are dependent on each other. This dependency is also reflected in societies that are based on a patron/client relationship that initially has a hierarchical character. In such a situation, collaboration between them gives positive gains: the patron acquires power and prestige in society, while the client acquires safety. Competition plays no role here (Hiebert 1985, pp. 123–124). Competition is also related to the question of human status (social stratification). It is useful here to draw a distinction between status that has been achieved and status that is ascribed. Achieved status is linked to achievements, but it can also be the result of chance factors. Ascribed status is linked to gender, race, class, and geographical location, but also

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to social conventions and rankings that have become established in a society (e.g., the caste system). The possibility of achieving status is in focus most of all in Western societies, and perhaps in a special way in the United States. Status is achieved in competition with others, both on the family level and on the more general societal level. There is high social mobility in such a competitive situation. Some win status, others lose it, and others again succeed in improving it. In societies with weak group bonds, a competitive situation of this kind is correlated to insecurity for the individual. In societies that are more strongly marked by ascribed status, the element of competition is not so great. The status quo is more influential here, although even in such contexts there can be competition for wealth, power, and a kind of supplementary achieved status (Hiebert 1983, pp. 151–152). This social stratification not only exists on the individual level. It is also expressed in competition between individuals in a group. Different roles in the group can lead to different social rewards in terms of wealth, power, or prestige, and the outcome is a social hierarchy in which people are ranked according to their social status. This ranking in turn influences potential future rewards, and this gives the system a self-reinforcing function (Hiebert 1983, pp. 185–189). If we relate this kind of status-oriented society to competition, we see what an “explosively liberating force” competition is (Brockway 2001, p. 177).

Notes



1. M. Sahlins defines primitive societies as follows: “… ‘primitive’ shall refer to cultures lacking a political state, and it applies only insofar as the economy and social relations have not been modified by the historic penetration of states” (Sahlins 1988, p. 188). Such a definition was useful in a period when the “primitive” was associated with isolated tribal cultures without any relationship to a superior political institution. C. Hann and K. Hart indicate that the understanding of the “primitive” has developed in the direction of applying this term to “non-industrial” societies. See Hann and Hart (2011, p. 142). 2. See also Fisher and van Wees (eds.) (2011). The great emphasis on the winner, and the prizes and privileges that this entailed, are also reflected in the contemporary criticism of this praxis, especially by the poets. See Konstantinou (2014).

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3. In the 1930s, Margaret Mead and her collaborators undertook a largescale investigation of the relationship between collaboration and competition in various societies, which was published in 1937. Her own conclusion is that the question of competition and collaboration is culturally determined. It is not dependent on chance external factors: “… the most basic conclusion which comes out of this research [is] that competitive and cooperative behavior on the part of the individual members of a society is fundamentally conditioned by the total social emphasis of that society, that the goals for which individuals will work are culturally determined and are not the response of the organism to an external, culturally undefined situation, like a simple scarcity of food” (Mead 1976b [1937], p. 16; see also Mead 1976a [1937], pp. 481–482). On this, see also Ridley (1997). Taking his starting point in the idea of the important evolutionary function of collaboration, he indicates numerous social anthropological aspects of the primacy of collaboration vis-à-vis competition. See also the overview by A. Kohn (1992, pp. 33–39). 4.  See the proverb: “One finger does not kill a louse,” Wanjohi (1997, p. 239). 5. See the proverb: “Wealth comes by cultivating together,” ibid., p. 240. 6.  See the proverb: “Axes in the same basket are bound to knock each other,” ibid., p. 259. 7. See also other investigations referred to by A. Kohn (1992, pp. 36–39). 8. In his discussion of the relationship between work, leadership, and the state in an economic context, M. Blim refers to the difference between corporatist societies, including some in Western Europe and the United States. In the corporative societies, competition occurs, but it is directed outward against foreign actors. Competition is toned down within firms and in the relationship between employees and bosses, and even between industrial competitors. People think of what is good for the industry and for the nation. In the United States, the relationship between competition and collaboration has varied somewhat, often in relation to the priorities of various administrations. Blim also claims that there is a completely different emphasis in the United States on competition between economic actors, including in the relationship between employees and leadership. Collaboration is regarded as a lower value. See Blim (2012, pp. 354–355). 9. For an overview of various understandings of time and of history, see Whitrow (1988). 10. On the question of planning and pragmatism, see Hiebert (1985, p. 119). He makes no explicit link between this and a linear understanding of history.

54  S. O. THORBJØRNSEN 11. For further information about various understandings of time, both in a cross-cultural perspective and with regard to the relationship between the understanding of time and economic realities, see, respectively, Lewis (2005, pp. 53–62) and Reynolds (2017). 12. For a thorough introduction to the part of social anthropology that is called economic anthropology, see Carrier (2012). See also Cohen and Dannhaeuser (2002). 13. On what follows, see Hiebert (1983, pp. 300–310). C.A. Gregory (1982; see also Gregory 1994) draws a distinction between two types of economic systems: a gift system and a system where wares are exchanged. T. Widlok argues in his book about the economy of sharing that one must distinguish sharing from market exchange and gift exchange, and that sharing thus represents a specific theoretical approach. See Widlok (2017, pp. 1, 30). 14. For a presentation of an economic gift exchange system, see Yan (2012). On the gift exchange system in general, but with especial emphasis on its importance for the relationship between the economic, the social, and the reciprocal in primitive cultures, see Sahlins (1988, pp. 185–285, esp. pp. 191–196). On the question of reciprocity in connection with gift exchange, see Gudeman (2001, pp. 80–93). On the question of the reciprocal and the social, see also Gudeman (2016, pp. 52–68). 15. T. Widlok questions the exclusively reciprocal character of an economic system that is linked to the exchange of gifts. Many of these transfers are uneven, and we are “dealing with transfers that seem more like several one-way transfers going in different directions rather than a single two-way transfer linked into a single exchange” (Widlok 2017, p. 27). However, a certain mutuality is not absent here, and Widlok therefore recommends that we speak of a mutual recognition rather than of reciprocity (ibid., p. 28). 16. On the question of the significance of gift exchange in a modern economic context, see Britton and Sedgwick (2003, pp. 208–211). 17. For a general presentation of the relationship between distribution and redistribution, with the emphasis on tribal societies, see Patterson (2012). On this, see also the reference by C. Hann and K. Hart to Karol Polyani on this point (Hann and Hart 2011, p. 57) and in M. Sahlins (1988, pp. 188–191). 18. On the question of egalitarianism, see Arneson (2013). 19. We also find an example of an egalitarian ideal in the New Testament: “All who believed were together and had all things in common; and they sold their possessions and goods and distributed them to all, as any had need” (Acts 2:44f.). Historically speaking, however, it is clear that this ideal was short-lived. Both within the New Testament itself and in the subsequent

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development in Christian communities, property and societal inequalities are presupposed as something taken for granted. It seems to have been difficult to practice the ideal of equality in the context in which the Christian communities lived. At the same time, this ideal functioned— and functions—as a challenge to reflect on one’s societal and economic praxis. But this does not entail a commandment to copy what we read in Acts. See Hays (1997, pp. 302–303). 20. On the concept of methodological individualism, see Addis (1995). See also Chapter 4 of this volume.

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56  S. O. THORBJØRNSEN Gregory, Christopher A. 1982. Gifts and Commodities, vol. 2. Studies in Political Economy. London: Academic Press. Gregory, Christopher A. 1994. Exchange and Reciprocity. In Companion Encyclopedia of Anthropology, ed. Tim Ingold, 911–939. London; New York: Routledge. Gudeman, Stephen. 2001. The Anthropology of Economy. Oxford: Blackwell. Gudeman, Stephen. 2016. Anthropology and Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hann, Chris. M., and Keith Hart. 2011. Economic Anthropology: History, Ethnography, Critique. Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity Press. Hays, Richard B. 1997. The Moral Vision of the New Testament: Community, Cross, New Creation: A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics. Edinburgh: T&T Clark. Hiebert, Paul G. 1983. Cultural Anthropology. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House. Hiebert, Paul G. 1985. Anthropological Insights for Missionaries. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House. Kohn, Alfie. 1992. No Contest: The Case Against Competition, Rev. ed. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. Konstantinou, Zinon. 2014. Ancient Critics of Greek Sport. In A Companion to Sport and Spectacle in Greek and Roman Antiquity, ed. Paul Christesen and Donald G. Kyle, 320–331. Malden, MA; Oxford; Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. Lewis, Richard D. 2005. When Cultures Collide: Leading Across Cultures: A Major New Edition of the Global Guide, 3rd ed. Boston, MA; London: Nicholas Brealey International. McIntosh, Peter. 1980. Fair Play: Ethics in Sport and Education. London: Heinemann. Mead, Margaret. 1976a [1937]. Interpretive Statement. In Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples, ed. Margaret Mead, 458–515. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith. Mead, Margaret. 1976b [1937]. Introduction. In Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples, ed. Margaret Mead, 1–19. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith. Patterson, Thomas C. 2012. Distribution and Redistribution. In A Handbook of Economic Anthropology, 2nd ed., ed. James G. Carrier, 202–219. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Reynolds, Sana. 2017. Linear, Flexible, and Cyclical Time: Analyzing Time in Cross-Cultural Communication. Association of Professional Communication Consultants. http://consultingsuccess.org/wp/?page_id=1204 (1.2.2017). Ridley, Matt. 1997. The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Viking.

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Rogers, Deborah S., et al. 2011. The Spread of Inequality. PloS One 6 (9). Public Library of Science. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ PMC3177824/ (27.1.2017). Sahlins, Marshal. 1988. Stone Age Economics. London: Routledge. Stewart, Edward C. 1972. American Cultural Patterns: A Cross-Cultural Perspective. Chicago, IL: Intercultural Press. Wanjohi, Gerald Joseph. 1997. The Wisdom and Philosophy of the Gikuyu Proverbs: The Kihooto World-View. Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa. Whitrow, G.J. 1988. Time in History: The Evolution of Our General Awareness of Time and Temporal Perspective. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. Widlok, Thomas. 2017. Anthropology and the Economy of Sharing. London; New York: Routledge. Woodburn, James. 1982. Egalitarian Societies. Man New Series 17: 431–451. Yan, Yunxiang. 2012. The Gift and the Gift Economy. In A Handbook of Economic Anthropology, 2nd ed., ed. James G. Carrier, 275–290. Cheltenham, UK; Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar.

CHAPTER 3

The Phenomenon of Competition: General and Contemporary Perspectives

Introduction Up to this point, I have illustrated the idea of competition using the broad perspective of social anthropology. I shall now direct my attention to the contemporary context, namely, a Western society marked by great wealth, a high level of knowledge, and an economic system with a determinative influence on central aspects of societal development. How does the idea of competition look here? The aim of this chapter is to examine competition as a contemporary phenomenon that exists in our Western everyday life and is a part of our human existence. But what is competition, over and above what definitions and social anthropologists tell us it is? I wish to bring out various aspects of the phenomenon of competition by analyzing elements that are presuppositions of competition, elements that are activated in the course of competition, and consequences of competition. These analyses will be largely, but not exclusively, related to factors with an anthropological relevance. Competition as a phenomenon can be looked at from (at least) three sides: 1. What creates competition? Why do we compete with each other? What human presuppositions are activated in such situations? 2. What happens when we compete? What is it that finds satisfaction? What is put to the test, and what relationship do we have to those

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with whom we are competing? Does something happen to us when we compete? Is our character stimulated and built up? 3. What are the consequences of competing? What do winning and losing entail? Does competition generate better achievements? ­ What does competition do to our relationship with those with whom we are competing? What values does competition promote? Does it contribute to a distribution of resources? Does it contribute to a concentration of power? These three aspects of competition are not mutually exclusive; to some extent, they overlap. The presuppositions cannot be isolated from the activity of competition itself, and this in turn is linked to the consequences it has. This means that to distinguish the three aspects and to employ this distinction as a starting point that structures our investigation would be a systemic simplification. My presentation will reflect the fact that there are connecting links between these aspects. In the chapter considering social anthropology (Chapter 2), competition appeared as a reality that is related both to individuals and to groups. In a Western context, the institutional element (teams, firms, and nations) is also prominent. This distinction between the individual and the institutional is important, but the special character of the two aspects does not imply the absence of shared traits. Specific human values are actualized in a special way as soon as competition takes place on the individual and personal level. The idea of human dignity, linked to equality and to respect for others’ integrity, becomes particularly important here. This does not mean that such values are irrelevant in a situation of institutional competition—only that there, they are realized more indirectly. A competition between institutions also implies human beings and human actions in the course of the competition. Firms are run by human beings, and it is human beings who experience the consequences, for good or ill, of the competition that takes place.

Competition—A Natural Phenomenon? The discussion of competition from a social anthropological p ­ erspective allowed us to affirm that there is an element of competition in most ­cultures and human societies. There are some exceptions, but these basically confirm the rule. Competition spreads, and everyone is influenced by it, although some people consciously attempt to counteract it.

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Our Western societies are marked by differences between people with regard both to intellectual and mental abilities and to material resources. Every such difference—but especially the material differences—can be maintained, increased, or reduced. If these differences are linked to the idea that the human being is primarily interested in himself and in his own happiness and survival (an idea and attitude supported by a lengthy and broad tradition), one will readily suppose that competition is characteristic of central human and societal relationships. Such differences between people are found everywhere. The idea of competition is not linked only to highly developed societies that are influenced by an economic system in which competition is a supporting pillar. Those who have little will also compete for resources that are available to give them a better life, or indeed a life in the first place. Even on rubbish tips, people compete for the best things. The human desire for a continuous improvement in life, whether by small or large increments, and irrespective of where people stand on the societal, educational, or economic ladder, indicates that we must regard competition as something very central to the human person. This is why many see competition as a fundamental human phenomenon. But does this also mean that it is natural? Is the human being structured in such a way that being competitive is an aspect of human nature? Sociobiology understands a person’s social behavior to no small extent on the basis of biological presuppositions that are determined by evolution and linked to genes and the survival and transmission of the genes.1 Given such a starting point, the obvious next step is to claim that a competitive mentality too belongs to human nature. However, it is not so easy to verify that this is the case. In fact, the burden of proof lies on those who postulate a biological determinism of this kind, and their task is difficult. Often, they are content to say that this is how things are: the human being is genetically determined, and this means that very many human qualities are natural. The fact that this argument is very general, and relatively imprecise, shows how limited it is. And indeed, it is difficult to understand how such a claim about the human being’s nature could be verified definitively. An argumentation on this point presupposes that very difficult theoretical, and not least methodological, problems have been solved, and this does not realistically seem possible. The claim that competitive mentality is a part of human nature requires that we accept that this has always been the case, that this is the case everywhere, and that this will always be the case. And that is a rather

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ambitious project. Nevertheless, irrespective of whether this is difficult, the imprecise and general argument also has its function. In a context like ours, where competition has a central place, it is much more difficult to argue for the alternative position. The “naturalistic” argument confirms the status quo, and this gives it a certain, though limited, weight. Those who claim that the human being is by his nature competitive, argue2 in various ways: play, and the competition that is very closely linked to play, discipline the instincts and institutionalize them; indeed, there is something instinctive about competition itself (Huizinga 1955; Caillois and Barash 2001 [1961]); there is a competition code in our chromosomes (Ruben 1981, p. 22). Two other argumentative strategies have been employed in this context. First, where competition may perhaps not be openly present, it occurs either in a hidden manner or more indirectly. In this way, one verifies the omnipresence of competition, even if empirical data point in the opposite direction. Second, when the human being does not recognize the competitive aspect of his nature, this is because it is being suppressed. Mary A. O’Roark claims that this is because the human being fears this competitive aspect in himself (O’Roark 1984). Such claims and arguments have not gone unchallenged, although very many people take it for granted that the human being is by his nature a competitive being. The chief arguments put forward by those who point out the problems in this natural idea are that the human being is just as much a collaborative as a competitive being, and that competition is a phenomenon that is learned, not something given from the outset. The naturalistic argument about the human being’s competitive mentality is often presented with a reference to how things are in nature. There is a continuous, harsh struggle for survival between species and between animals. Charles Darwin’s (1809–1882) theory about natural selection is often given an interpretation along these lines: natural selection is identified with the survival of the fittest. Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) was the first to posit this identification, which was subsequently accepted by Darwin, but in a very specific sense that is much narrower than Spencer’s. Spencer’s linkage evoked competition as a driving force in evolution, but this has been questioned, since there is little evidence that competition was a driving force in the evolution of large groups of animals. Biologists today take the view that such groups developed by expanding into empty ecological niches (Sahney et al. 2010). There does not seem

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to be anything in natural selection that demands fight and competition. The possibility of survival in the animal realm is in fact associated more with collaboration and mutual aid than with competition. This applies both within species and between species. There exists a reciprocal dependence in nature that makes collaboration more important than competition. The biologist Vero C. Wynne-Edwards affirms that it is easier to understand evolution in the animal realm on the basis of the group than of the individual. Altruistic attitudes exist among animals, and these can be channeled toward the group and to what best serves the group, rather than the individual (Wynne-Edwards 1962). There appears to be more collaboration than competition in nature (Midgley 1993, pp. 5–6).3 One important reason for this is that collaboration is more productive than competition, and is more profitable to the individual. Matt Ridley claims that collaboration is worthwhile in evolutionary terms when it promotes the individual’s own interest (Ridley 1996).4 This is also supported by the social anthropological reality that we have mentioned: there are several societies in which competition meets with opposition, because it has a lower status than collaboration (Chapter 2). It is also reasonable to ask whether the individualism that the idea of competition presupposes has truly played, and continues to play, such a dominant role in human lives. This is a relevant objection, when we bear in mind that throughout their entire historical existence, human beings have lived in a society with others and have been dependent on others. A fundamental desire for survival makes it at least equally likely that several persons joined forces and worked together to achieve a desirable goal, as competed with each other to reach the goal first. Why do many people see this differently? There may be various reasons. Alfie Kohn (1992, pp. 22–23) suggests three: first, collaboration is often harder to get sight of than competition. Second, the concept of competition is often used in such a broad way that what it covers can scarcely be called competition in the sense of “beating others” or “being the best.” Third, the human being interprets nature on the basis of his world, a world in which competition indubitably occupies a central position. This makes it difficult to argue, on the basis of realities in nature, that competition is “natural.” A more obvious conclusion is that in the world of nature, collaboration has in general “far more survival value than competition” (Kohn 1992, p. 24, see also p. 66). What, then, about the idea that competitive mentality is something learnt? Research seems to confirm that, like collaboration, competition is

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something one learns.5 But the degree of learning is definitely dependent on the context in which one lives. In an American society, where competition is central both in the school and the family, the teaching of competition functions quite simply as a socialization into the society of which one is a part. In some instances, this emphasis is so strong, and competition is so much taken for granted, that even teachers misunderstand the noun “collaboration.” Some interpret it to mean following instructions— something completely different from what happens between persons who are attempting to reach a common goal together. Some demonstrate an even worse misunderstanding, and identify collaboration with cheating. The process of socialization related to competition can also be wordless (expectations, and the example of one’s parents) or indirect (there is no other choice, if you want to get ahead in the world). It can be self-reinforcing and function “imperialistically” vis-à-vis persons who are oriented to collaboration: “Competition … cannibalizes cooperation” (Kohn 1992, p. 30, see also pp. 26–30). It can also function as a self-fulfilling prophecy: people who are inclined to competition believe that this is true of everyone else, and this belief strengthens their inclination, although it has no basis in how human beings really are. The teaching people have received about competition and its human significance tends to reproduce itself. When one is confronted with such a comprehensive “socialization program,” the obvious response is to ask: Ought not such a program be unnecessary, if the competitive mentality is something with which the human being is equipped by nature? A more obvious answer seems to be that we compete because we have been taught to do so. Jean Piaget’s idea that children can neither collaborate nor compete until they have reached the operational stage, at the age of six or seven, has also been challenged. Other researchers point out that younger children too can collaborate, for example, in games that presuppose cooperation. Terry Orlick suggests that one reason for this is that children who are so small have been less socialized into the competitive culture, and are thus more open to collaboration (Orlick 1978, p. 176). There is also a psychological aspect to the question whether competition is a naturally given human phenomenon. Sigmund Freud and the psychoanalytical tradition take on a new relevance in this context, with a special link to the human being’s personality and development (see Mitchell and Black 1995, pp. 15–19). An understanding of human life as something that circles around needs, with an ego that unceasingly seeks its satisfaction and that looks at other people with a certain degree of

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aggressiveness, will affirm that human life must necessarily give priority to competition rather than collaboration.6 Where collaboration occurs, the aim is to satisfy one’s own needs. Other people are means that I use to my own advantage. If I cannot do so, they are nothing more than my competitors and rivals. The existence in the human being of such tendencies to collaborate is not natural; they are the result of a taming of the human being’s fundamental aggressive tendencies. The fight to gain parents’ love and the Oedipus complex (with the father as rival and the mother as reward) are two sides of the human being’s psyche that vitalize the competitive instinct in the human being. It is natural, and one can never escape from it. But it can be hidden or sublimated. These psychoanalytical insights too have not gone unchallenged. Objections to the understanding of the competitive drive in Freud’s theory of aggression and to the reductionism in his methodology imply an opposition to central aspects of the entire psychoanalytical theory. Such objections have come from the humanistic psychology that is linked to the idea of an authentic human life (Polkinghorne 2015), from the ego-psychologists (Mitchell and Black 1995, pp. 23–59, esp. pp. 48–53, see also pp. 66–68; Blanck and Blanck 1994, pp. 14–17), and from a Neo-Freudian like K. Horney.7 Some researchers with a psychoanalytical orientation have also problematized the idea that competition is a natural human phenomenon: life does not consist only of competition. Collaboration too is an unavoidable aspect of being and living as a human being.8 Is competition a natural phenomenon? Opinions clash on this point, and one can have the impression that the contexts of those who ask the question determine the answer they get. Research appears to show that it is impossible today to claim that competition is definitely a natural human phenomenon, completely independent of learning, whether intellectual or of a more specifically psychological kind. A fundamental orientation to collaboration can be regarded as equally natural—or equally learnt. What gets the primary place in a human being seems to be a question about context, and to some degree also a question about a person’s will. The fact that many experience competition as something inherited and fundamentally human shows first and foremost how deeply ingrained it is in our society. This does not mean that one can generally ascribe such a role and status to competition. There is a basis for saying that in our context, and in many Western contexts, the idea of competition plays a large and significant role. This is due primarily to the role it has acquired through its utter centrality in three areas that have almost a

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constitutive character in these societies, namely, the economy, education, and sport. In societies that have organized these areas, or given them priority, in a way that differs from us, the idea of competition is not so powerful, either in these areas themselves or on the broader societal level. It is difficult to attribute the idea of competition to fundamental presuppositions in the human being himself. After these remarks on the status of the phenomenon, I shall now turn to real-life competition and ask what characterizes the competition that we encounter in daily life at the individual and institutional level, in the workplace, at school, in the family, in leisure, or in one of the other arenas where competition is an important phenomenon.

The Presuppositions of Competition What creates competition? What presuppositions must exist, if competition is to occur? There are several types of presuppositions here. Some are connected with the situation itself, while others are directly related to the human person—both to how he or she perceives the competitive situation and to factors linked to the being of the human person. Others again are related to the human person in the sense that they belong to the context and the arena where human life unfolds. Finally, there are also some presuppositions of a more directly sociological kind. My presentation will, however, also include some critical perspectives. In the context of our own society, it is easy to take the same attitude to the presuppositions of competition as one does to competition itself, namely, to take them for granted. The Competitive Situation If we are to speak of competition, there must exist a situation with certain characteristics. First of all, there must be at least two individuals or two institutions in the situation. Where there is no one to compete with, it is meaningless to speak of a competition. Second, there must be a certain tension between actors; if the outcome of a match is arranged in advance, there is no competition. Third, some kind of equality is presupposed, since differences that are too great make a real competition impossible. Fourth, there must be a standard in the situation, which is used in the comparison between the individuals or institutions. Fifth, there must be something to compete for: money, honor, a place at university, and so on.

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An objective competitive situation of this kind also has a subjective aspect: How is it perceived by the individuals (or institutions) involved in it? There are three principal ways of relating to competing. Some people have a competitive attitude; they love to compete, and they put themselves into situations that include a competitive element. Others want to win. The most important thing for them is to win and be successful, rather than to improve their performance or to enjoy the competition itself. Others again are goal-oriented. Their primary wish is to improve their performance, not to win the competition. These subjective presuppositions in actors in a competition influence both its course and its consequences. Self-Interest Human self-interest may be the anthropological presupposition that most people associate with competition. The human being is an egotist who wants to be the best and to have the most. In many religious and philosophical traditions, this presupposition in the human being plays a very central role. It is included in their description of the human being, and one must take account of it if one wishes to create a society that will be good for everyone, and not merely reflect the interests of individuals. Self-interest explains many of the behavioral patterns that are characteristic of the human person. It is assumed that he is “put together” in such a way that he wants to be the best and to have the most. This view is not universal. Other religious and philosophical intellectual traditions hold that altruism and shared interests are just as characteristic, or even more characteristic, of the human being. Where this is the starting point, competition is not so self-evident. Collaboration is an equally obvious strategy for obtaining results and achieving something. Competition and collaboration need not be alternatives; I have already touched on this, and I shall return to it below several times. Every discussion of competition must be seen in connection with what can be attained through collaboration. But in a context where competition and its anthropological presuppositions are the topic, we cannot avoid speaking of the human person’s self-interest. If we look around in our society, we will be hard put to claim that self-interest and competition play only a marginal role here. One primary position that we shall see in the anthropological discussion of the idea of competition will be that s­elf-interest represents the fundamental identity of the human being, which has given, and still

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gives, competition the place and the endorsement it has in our society. This does not mean that its role and influence are something given, something that can neither be counteracted nor corrected; but at the very least, it cannot be overlooked. One who wishes to investigate and relate to a competitive society must be particularly aware of the most fundamental presupposition on which this society rests, namely, self-interest. The anthropological presuppositions of competition are not limited to the human being’s self-interest. Two other important presuppositions are very closely connected to self-interest, namely, the human being’s individuality and his or her freedom. Human Individuality and Freedom A state system that imposes strong limitations on the individual actions of the human being violates their freedom. This deprivation of freedom not only violates the human being’s integrity; it also poses a question mark against his or her ability to function as a competitive being, since the essence of competition is precisely that the human being personally, or the institutions that the human being operates, should have the ability—on the basis of their own decisions, and relatively independently of external influences—to improve, but also to worsen, their own situation. An understanding of freedom that is restricted to the sphere of action that serves the best interests of society also sets limits on the function and the possibilities of competition. In this sense, one can say that competition presupposes human freedom and individuality. Where freedom is restricted in this way, collaboration and collective functions are given a higher priority than competition, although the latter is not completely excluded, since groups can compete with each other. But the question of the individual dimension arises here too: Is it not individual presuppositions that also create this form of competition, which is channeled through the collective bodies? Here, there is a significant difference between contexts in which the collective is given a more general priority over the individual, and contexts in which people make use of institutional, collective frameworks in order to promote their interests. In the latter case, there is definitely more space for competition. This difference reflects the difference between a state system that gives priority to the collective over the individual, and a company or a team in which it is individual interests, channeled into a fellowship, that create the gains that the company or team, as a collective, makes its own.

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A discussion of competition in light of collective and individual realities must also bear in mind that competition, as a phenomenon, can be promoted on the basis of structural presuppositions in the human being’s context. I return here to the distinction between structural and intentional competition. There are important parallels here to the distinction between involuntary and voluntary competition (Chapter 1). In a competitive society, there will be structural presuppositions that sometimes make people compete against their own will (so to speak). We are in a winner/loser structure that promotes and strengthens those wishes in us that are about becoming “number one.” Such structural presuppositions have a decisive influence on our actions and make an individually oriented activity like competition something that is also determined by factors outside the individual. Paradoxically, human freedom as a presupposition of competition is determined in our context both by true freedom and individuality and by an external structural pressure to act on the basis of individual concerns that are oriented to freedom. It is absolutely necessary to take account of these structural freedoms; but the individual factors are nevertheless more important as a presupposition of competition. It is therefore relevant to ask here: What does individuality mean, when it is linked so closely to competition? According to Alfie Kohn (1992, pp. 128–129), there is only one type of individualism that is compatible with the phenomenon of competition. Kohn draws a distinction between two types of individualism, each of which is related to its own traditions. In one tradition, individualism is connected with independence, conscience, and autonomy. Important values here are freedom of thought, expression, and action, the commitment to one’s own values, and the courage to stand for something, independently of other people’s views. Kohn refers to the nineteenth-century American Ralph W. Emerson9 and to parts of the existentialist philosophical tradition as representatives of this kind of individualism. The second tradition is a vulgar variant of the first. Kohn locates it close to popular psychology and to some of the movements that emphasize human potential. It is characterized by a self-confidence that bears witness to alienation from other persons and to a lack of relationships. Its driving force, which makes it compatible with competition, is an undisguised self-interest. The one who is led by a pathetic self-interest to ask people to leave space for “number one” is himself attempting all the time to become “number one.” A competition of this kind is not based on a substantial and authentic individualism, nor does it promote it. Instead, it creates

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“conformist robots.”10 Competition presupposes that people aim at the same goal and follow the same rules. This linkage between a vulgar and almost parodic individualism and competition is not immediately obvious. We are justified in asking whether such an understanding of individualism is merely a negative foreign element in the tradition of philosophical individualism. At the same time, we should not overlook the fact that among the most zealous adherents of the idea of competition we find those who build on this kind of vulgar thinking about individualism. The Human Herd Instinct and the Need to Compare Oneself with Others There can be no doubt that the human being’s individuality is an important presupposition of competition. Nevertheless, there is no competition unless there are several competitors. This applies to all forms of competition (if we accept that competing against oneself is not a genuine form of competition). We are sometimes told that the human being is a herd animal, and that societal reality is an important presupposition for the realization of human life. In such a herd, there are always relationships between those who make up the herd. Although all belong to the same species, there can exist significant differences. In a societal herd context of this kind, which consists of persons with a developed self-consciousness, it is natural for them to compare themselves with each other. In many cases, the path from an individual “test” to a collective “contest” is short (Kretschmar 1995). Who is the first in the herd, the best, the biggest, the tallest, the quickest, and so on? There is little reason to think that the dynamic in such a herd will not go beyond merely noting differences of this kind. The combination of individuality and the human herd instinct will generate an act of comparing, and this is an important presupposition of competition. The same argument has been put forward from a more social psychological perspective too: our identity as human beings is dependent on the social world of which we are a part. Others help to define who we are. This means that we are all subject to a continuous reciprocal act of comparing that includes both our conduct and what we achieve as human beings. Here too, the human being is not content merely to describe: he wants to be better than the one or ones with whom he compares himself. The act of comparing has an aim. It opens up possibilities for self-enhancement and for self-improvement.

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Especially in an upward social comparison, where one compares oneself with others who are on a higher level, competition is natural for ambitious individuals. But competition is also related to a downward social comparison, where one compares oneself with others who are on a lower level. This opens up possibilities for strengthening one’s self-image (Sabiston and Pila 2014).11 Alfie Kohn seeks to demonstrate that this kind of linkage between comparing and competition is not necessary (Kohn 1992, pp. 41–43). To begin with, we do not always need to compare ourselves with others. He affirms that the basis of comparison need not necessarily be another person or group; it can be one’s own earlier achievements, or an idealized level of achievement. Neither of these cases involves a genuine competition, nor is it the case that human identity necessarily develops as a societal process of comparing. The development of identity is linked more strongly to what one actually does, and to the culture in which one lives. This means that the comparing that actually takes place need not inevitably lead to competition. It can function as a confirmation of one’s conformity, and it can give inspiration for improvement, without an explicit wish to be more successful than another person. Kohn may be right to claim that not every act of comparing creates competition. I can compare my garden or my car with my neighbor’s, and my hobbies with my colleague’s, without this creating a situation of competition between neighbors or colleagues. But it is difficult to ignore the fact that in many contexts, it is precisely the act of comparing that can create competition, and that intends to do so. Reality seems to confirm this. My neighbor’s garden, house, and car often create situations of competition, even if this does not always occur explicitly. Failure to recognize this possibility can have a negative effect with regard to controlling the function and extent of competition: an unwished-for competition, for example, in a pedagogical context, can be avoided only if one is aware of the mechanisms that create it. The tendency to compare oneself with others is an important factor here. Inequality and Equality Comparisons are made between persons, but also between acquired or available resources. This entails noting equalities and inequalities. The comparison and the inequalities are closely linked as presuppositions of the phenomenon of competition. The one who has least, wants to have

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more, either from the one who has more or from new resources. The one who has more wants to keep what they have, and most of all, acquire new resources. In our social anthropological survey, the question arose whether there existed an egalitarian tendency among people, and whether this has had consequences for the way in which they have thought about and practiced competition with others (Chapter 2). The various traditions in social anthropology all find it difficult to verify that an egalitarian tendency of this kind genuinely exists. Inequality seems to be a part of the core of all collective life. In the contemporary global situation with regard to resources, there is little doubt about the existence of inequalities, and egalitarian forms of distribution can exist on the more local level. The inequalities include the distribution of resources and of the biological and mental equipment in individuals. Both types of inequality can generate competition. On the individual level, for example, inequalities in mental faculties and school results are a presupposition of competition for admission to study. If everyone was equally equipped, and the places for study were limited, the choice would have had to be made by drawing lots. The same applies to material resources. Inequality creates the desire either to safeguard the larger amount of resources that one has acquired, or else to increase the amount of resources one already has. In a context with limited resources, one individual’s desire for more resources means that another individual or individuals must renounce their wishes. If they are not willing to do so, a situation of competition arises. A distribution that is prescribed and correctly administered does not create competition. The same mechanisms work on the level of an institution or a firm. Firms are unequal in their equipment, in the sense that they have different competence, different production processes, and different expenses linked to the goods that they compete with other firms to sell. Differences of this kind generate a competition to have the highest competence, the best production processes, and the lowest possible production expenses. At the same time, the selling situation is itself a competition for limited resources. The potential for profit is limited, and there is no law that stipulates that it must be distributed equally. This is an encouragement to try to get as much of this profit as possible. The one who sells the most goods most cheaply wins the competition for the resource—that is to say, for the profit. In many instances, this competition also creates a new competition: the competition to get bigger, which is realized through the investment potential and the possibility of expansion that profit gives.

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These inequalities, which are linked more generally to human presuppositions and resources, generate most of the forms of competition, which are characteristically obvious and direct. In our society, however, a competition occurs on another level too, a competition that is very characteristic of a consumer society that has the phenomenon of competition as one of its supporting pillars. This still involves things, but it is not the thing per se that is the object of competition or what matters most; rather, it is the symbolic value that the thing or the consumer good bears (the semiotic perspective on the thing).12 In other words, the consumer good expresses a text.13 It tells something that goes beyond the fact that it is a jacket one is wearing or a car that one uses as a means of transport. The thing14 is the bearer of a code that can be decoded by means of an interpretation. In this way, the thing acquires a symbolic or cultural meaning that goes beyond the concrete and the useful. This additional meaning, which often is communicated in a highly subtle way, helps to consolidate inequalities, and not least differences in status, in society. Such differences are in turn the starting point for competition to get hold of those goods that are bearers of the most desirable symbolic meaning. These differences can also be more explicitly located in a class context. The lower classes attempt to imitate the higher classes, who then in turn must create new bearers of desirable symbols in such a way that it is difficult for the lower classes to get hold of them—with the result that the difference is maintained. This can happen when it is the symbolic or cultural meaning, not the meaning in terms of financial capital, that constitutes the difference. The difference can also be constituted by the fact that only a few select persons have a qualified taste that is based on knowledge. The competition is based on inequalities, but on a more subtle level: it is not the utility value of the goods, but their value as bearers of symbols or of meaning, that is desired and that forms the object of the competition.15 An increased import of Mercedes automobiles—which were regarded in the past as “class automobiles”—from Germany to Norway has reduced their price and made them accessible to a greater number of people. This brand is no longer the bearer of the same symbols, and it does not have the same symbolic value. Those who wish to demonstrate their membership of one particular social class by means of their automobiles must therefore switch to other brands that can perform this function better. Competition on the basis of such subtle, symbolic, and culturally determined inequalities expresses the fact that it is not only material values and inequalities that are important in the competitive society.

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The objects of competition cover a wide spectrum. But it is difficult to avoid seeing that what genuinely gives power to the idea of competition is its material anchoring and material inequalities. This also applies to competition for the more symbolic and cultural values, as this functions in a consumer society. This is obvious in the economic sphere. In sport, it is obvious in modern top-level sport, but less prominent at other levels. In mental competition, for example, in competing for admission to study, the material anchoring is more indirect, but most of the desirable study places qualify one for professions with a good material income, and this is one reason why they are desired. The material anchoring reflects what is important and worth striving for in this society. The priority that society gives to material values gives a special impetus to the idea of competition. Such values also possess a special quality that makes them perfectly compatible with competition: they can be measured and they are easily put into practice. Other, softer values that can also be very important for human beings are not subject to the same competitive pressure. The inequalities can be significant, and some of these values can be highly attractive, but there is not the same competition with regard to them, nor is there a competition between individuals to see who can realize them the most. There are also other inequalities between persons, and in society, that are relevant to the understanding of competition as a phenomenon. I have already mentioned biological and mental differences, and the competition that mental differences in particular can create. The relationship between biological inequalities and competition has a double character. Sport can exemplify one side of this. In sport, it is the biological inequalities, but also the mental inequalities, that constitute the competitive situation. The biological inequalities include both what is genetically given and what a person has acquired physically. Differing achievements—that separate winners from losers—are related to these biological and mental inequalities. In many contexts, on the other hand, biological inequalities do not lead to any form of competition; it is enough to note that differences exist. But one should not overlook the fact that this situation, with little competition conditioned by biological presuppositions, can change in the future. Biological inequalities linked to one’s age and good physical functioning are an area where the degree of competition for resources may be greater in the future than it is today. In the past, resources were granted to these groups on the basis of given standards, thanks to the idea that society has a duty to take care of the

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elderly and the handicapped—perhaps related indirectly to competition, through the overall provisions for pensions in the state budget. In the future, however, the competition may become more real in relation to other groups in the population. The increase in number of elderly people in Norway and in several other Western countries, demands a huge expenditure that is not necessarily in keeping with the financial means that those who are in work can make available.16 Such a situation can lead to a large-scale competition based on the biological inequalities between people. And it is not impossible, in a future with an expected increase in population and limited resources, that the competition for these resources may also cross the borders between species. Up to now, competitions with starting points in gender d ­ ifferences have not played a great role. In the sphere of games, competition between genders occurs only in mental exercises like chess. This duality in the sphere of games also reflects a general situation in society, where there is scarcely any biologically determined competition, but many ­competitive situations related to mental presuppositions (in the broad sense of the term). In this context, the workplace is a special exception: frequently, even in situations where one would expect the presuppositions for equal treatment to exist, it does not. Here, there is an indirect form of competition, where biological and gender differences take on a function because they are linked to long-lasting cultural traditions. The inequalities that are relevant to an understanding of the assertive power of the phenomenon of competition in society are not limited to the individual and local, or perhaps to the national. People’s increased mobility and the development of modern communications technology have made the world smaller. It has become an arena where the inequalities have become manifest, and thus the awareness of competition has increased. The most pronounced inequality in this context is the discrepancy between the rich North and the poor South. There is a continuous competition for resources and influence here—a competition in which some competitors are handicapped. Their starting position is poorer. This applies to those from the South who attempt to assert themselves vis-à-vis their powerful and influential competitors from the North. This competition is generated by a marked inequality in what the two parties have been given. This leads to the conclusion that inequalities are an important ­presupposition for competition. But the same is true of equality. In a competitive situation, rules are meant to establish an equal starting point between persons, teams, or firms. It is hard to see how a meaningful

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competition can take place if the starting point is not equal. An unequal starting point in a game would eliminate the tension about who would be the winner. However, a game where the starting point is equality, but that nevertheless always ends with the same person winning, is uninteresting; in such a game, the starting point must be changed. Equality must be established on the basis of other presuppositions, which help to maintain the tension. One example would be that good race horses that are handicapped in relation to other horses. This is done both to maintain the tension in the race and to create greater uncertainty for those who invest money in betting on the winner. Accordingly, both inequalities and equality are important presuppositions for competition. One little question remains: Is it the inequalities themselves, or the meaning that we as human beings ascribe to them, that makes them generate competition? Is there an acquired disposition to establish a ­ necessary link between inequalities and competition? Is this connected to how often it happens, and to how strongly one feels a need to be better? Positive answers to these questions imply that inequalities do not necessarily generate competition, and that competition is not a trait common to all human beings. Scarcity Scarcity may seem an obvious presupposition for competition, and it underlies some evaluations of the importance of inequalities for competition. Scarcity, as a presupposition, applies to individual and collective competition (or to that between social classes) and institutional competition. In sport, people compete for first place. School pupils compete for a limited number of study places. History shows that social classes have competed with each other for power, but also for consumer goods. Firms compete to sell as much as possible at the highest possible price. Here, there is a kind of reversed scarcity: not all the firms can sell large quantities at the highest price, and demand is limited. Where resources and possibilities are scarce, there is competition for what exists. Here too, one can ask critically whether scarcity is something that exists of its own accord (so to speak), or something that is created for the sake of competition. In some instances, it seems that competition itself helps to create a scarcity or a unique situation (the most beautiful, the fastest, and so on) that did not exist previously. “Uniqueness seems to be invented by humans …,” claims the social psychologist Emmy Pepitone

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(1980, p. 296).17 Another similar critical question is: Does scarcity always really mean scarcity? Is it not just as much a question of distribution? Scarcity of goods in a country in the Third World is a scarcity that many people, there and then, feel acutely. In a larger perspective—either internally in the country itself or on the world scale—the real problem need not be scarcity, since a different distribution would have eliminated scarcity. Gandhi put this in his own way: “The world has enough for everyone’s need, but not enough for everyone’s greed.” The problem in a world that is marked by a huge difference between the rich and the poor, and between the North and the South, is not a problem of shortage, but a problem of distribution. But although scarcity can be created or can be understood as scarcity, even though this is not really the case, there are enough examples of competition taking place in relation to resources and possibilities that are in fact limited. The fact that scarcity can be created in some cases, or is not a genuine problem, does not give sufficient grounds to claim that scarcity must be maintained by a capitalist society in order to provide a basis for its existence, which is based on competition. In almost every society, there will be some areas where real scarcity is a presupposition for real competition. Rules Competition must be regulated, if it is to function as a competition. As I have mentioned, the possibility of equality is dependent on rules that define this equal starting point. The most obvious context where rules are needed is sport. These rules say something about the starting point of the competition and the course it takes. Some distinctions must be drawn here, however. First of all, we must distinguish between the external regulation and the non-regulation of competition, and between explicit and implicit regulation. Both of these can be exemplified from the economy, where we speak of perfect or pure competition, which is self-regulating in the sense that a large number of small sellers offer approximately the same product to a public market. The individual seller cannot influence the price; he is obliged to take due account of the price that is generated by the relationship between supply and demand. The large number of sellers makes it possible for them to reach a common agreement about price. Here, each one must act ­independently and adapt their price to what other sellers take and to what

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can give them the greatest possible profit. One example of an explicit regulation of competition is the activity of the various institutions that have the task of monitoring competition. This task is governed by legislation. The implicit regulation can occur in a market in which a small number of actors agree about a strategy for competition that will give the maximum profit to the maximum number; such a situation can also be called an “imperfect competition” or a “partial monopoly.” It can be caused by a lack of differentiation in the selection of products or by the geographical fragmentation of the market (see Bain 2018). One example is a situation in which the sellers in a market offer goods that the consumers regard as unique. Besides this, we must distinguish between the various functions that such rules can have, and are meant to have.18 Rules are important in competitive sport, even if they have no usefulness; from a perspective of usefulness, such rules are basically meaningless. From such a perspective, a high jumper would certainly jump higher if only he or she could use a springboard when jumping, but this is forbidden. Nor is a hurdle race a particularly good idea, if the aim is to get around the track as quickly as possible. The Canadian philosopher Bernard Suits claims, accordingly, that in a game—in this context, the participation in a sporting competition—it is up to the individual to decide whether to accept “unnecessary” hindrances in order to reach a goal (Suits 2007, pp. 11–12). In sport, these rules serve to distinguish various exercises from each other, and to give all participants the same external framework for the competition. In other contexts, the rules governing competition are not freely accepted, nor are they unnecessary: in many instances, they are necessary, and in some instances, they are imposed. This is particularly true in the economic sphere. Here, however, some differentiations are necessary. A set of rules is meant to ensure that a competition genuinely takes place in our economic system. As mentioned earlier (Chapter 1), there are institutions in many countries that are charged with overseeing competitive activity in society, especially economic competition. Their primary task is to see that the required competition takes place in agreement with certain rules. They are to supervise and to ensure that there is no secret collusion about prices; they are to prevent the development of monopolistic or oligopolistic situations, for example, through buying up firms. They are also to ensure that customers are given good information about the price and quality of goods and services (Chapter 5). There is no explicit legal framework in Norway to determine the form that a competition takes. As already mentioned, there is an obligation to

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provide information about price and quality, but the question of means employed in a competition is not regulated by law. The rules that do exist—apart from those aspects of competition that are affected by penal law because they injure people in one way or another—are more moral in character. Most people would hesitate to employ a means that the majority of the population regard as unreasonable or immoral. One example of a means that would cause negative reactions is the attempt to blacken the reputation of a competitor. In an economic context, this could also be directly counterproductive. Blackening someone’s name could also have legal consequences, but most of this area involves voluntary adherence to rules that have no binding legal force. It may seem that this difference between sport and the economy reflects the difference, already mentioned, between the function and ­status of the rules in a game and in the world. What happens in a game has no influence on the rules, since these are given. Things are different in nature and in the world. In nature, a mutation can create new presuppositions that make a change in the rules necessary. In addition, the world is not static: it exists in history and is subject to constant change. This process also influences the rules to which economic competition is related (e.g., Brockway 2001, pp. 180–181). The question of rules brings us to two other aspects of competition. In many cases, competition is defined by rules. In sport, this means that rules also define the way in which athletes can demonstrate their competence. Without rules, it is impossible to say anything about competence, either in sport where this concept is perhaps used most frequently, or in the academic world. There is a close relationship between competition and competence. The two nouns have the same root meaning: “to seek together” (see Brockway 2001, p. 177). One difference is that competition involves rivalry, while competence is assessed in relation to a standard. But such standards are also social and historical. The pursuit of competence is always related to a consciousness of what one is seeking and what has been sought by other persons to whom one might compare oneself. This establishes the connection. The second aspect concerns rules, competition, and collaboration. Rules presuppose agreement about the goal and the means, but also the acceptance of authority. This is impossible without collaboration, which must exist both within competing groups (such as teams or firms) and between groups. Where this presupposition does not exist, it is impossible to define the framework for competition and put it into practice.

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How Competition Unfolds Competition is found in many forms. When we describe how it unfolds, we must draw a distinction between competition between persons on the individual level and competition between collectives or institutions. The differences here can be very central, but competitions, whether individual or institutional, can give both individual and collective gains and profits. Consequently, the subsequent text is divided into two parts, one related primarily to the individual aspects of competition and the other to its collective aspects. My presentation will demonstrate that it is not possible to draw completely sharp boundaries between the two. Individual Aspects What characterizes a competitive situation? As I have mentioned, one important aspect of every competitive situation is that it contains a relationship of antagonism or tension, where two or more individuals or institutional groups face each other. Often, this is a zero-sum game marked by self-interest and a somewhat egotistic desire to achieve prominence and priority for oneself by inflicting various forms of loss on other persons or institutions (as a Scandinavian proverb says: “One man’s death [død] is the other man’s bread [brød]”). Where one ascends, another must descend, and so the end sum is zero. If we take for our starting point antagonisms, self-interest, and the possibilities of losing, it would seem obvious that competition is accompanied by many negative experiences and is based on problematic values. Some will also ­recognize here a basic kind of social Darwinist pattern (see Crook 2007) linked to the way in which one sees an opponent’s role in the competition: his or her function is to make it possible one to demonstrate one’s own strength at the cost of others. I would nevertheless like to ask: Can competition be experienced as something positive, something that is constructive in human terms? I shall now mention some elements that have been used to support this supposition. Has competition an intrinsic value? If one regards competition as a fundamental human phenomenon, it is easy to see it as an end in itself— something with an intrinsic value. In such a case, the point of a competition is not only what it gives—better health, enjoyment, money in the bank, and so on. This has been emphasized above all in relation to

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sport (McFee 2004). The value of a sporting competition is linked to the experiential values that are realized in the activity that takes place. It is a question of play and fun, experiencing mastery, the possibility of a higher level of achievement, the experience of tension in an equal contest, and so on. The activity itself, and the experiential values it mediates, are valuable (see Simon 2007; Russel 2007). Some call this value “the sweet tension of uncertainty of outcome” (see Loland 2002, pp. 148–149). It includes both a set of rules that lay down frameworks for the competition and an element of chance that makes the outcome uncertain. Such an activity has an intrinsic value. It is chosen, not out of necessity, but voluntarily. The same is true from the spectator’s perspective. It is not the profits and the usefulness of looking at sporting competitions that count, but the experience and the tension. One cannot simply transpose such considerations onto other forms of competition. Although the element of tension is present there too, it is not always experienced as a good tension: the spectrum is much wider. One can experience joy, mastery, and the improvement of one’s skills, but the tension can also be experienced as something that takes one’s breath away, something with negative consequences either for some or for all of the competitors. In this case, it is difficult to affirm that competition has an intrinsic value. It may still have a utility value. It can function as a maximizer of utility; it can have an educational value19; it can supply motivation, and so on—but it does not have any intrinsic value (see Keating 1995, p. 148; von Hayek 1944, p. 36). This is an important distinction. Competition can become an end in itself, but it can also be nothing more than a practical means of attaining what society and the individual person regard as desirable goals. Depending on which of the two alternatives is held to be weightier, there will be great differences in the value—and the place—one attributes to the phenomenon of competition. On one point, however, there is a link to the intrinsic value of competition, also from a more general perspective: this concerns the possibility of human self-realization and of building up a positive self-image in the competitive situation where one is challenged to do one’s best, irrespective of the level one is at. Quite apart from the usefulness this may bring, it is intrinsically valuable that a human being realizes his or her potential. Competition is a place for the fullest realization of the presuppositions with which a person or a group of persons is equipped. This primarily concerns the person’s individual presuppositions, but his or her

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self-realization in a competition can also be experienced in the context of a fellowship, and this self-realization has an intrinsic value. The intrinsic value of competition can be seen to some extent also in connection with the fellowship that is an aspect of the competitive situation itself. I shall return to this later in this chapter. While the intrinsic value of competition is preferably independent of the result, the meaning of the feeling of mastery in competition is much more dependent on the result. This does not mean that the feeling of mastery is reserved for winners; but if one ends up far down the list of results, one will likely ask questions about one’s own mastery. This feeling has both an individual and a social aspect. I prove to myself that I can achieve something, and I can see that my achievements can hold their own when compared with the achievements of others—I will not be the loser in such a comparison. The feeling of mastery is an important component in the construction of self-confidence; it goes without saying that a lack of mastery can have the opposite function. What about the motivating function of competition? It is customary to argue as follows: the competitive situation, with the possibility of gains or of becoming number one, has a motivating function for the competitor. The “carrot” that is dangled ahead gives a reason to stay the course. At the same time, competition is motivating in another way: as a “stick.” A desire not to lose, not to lag behind, gives renewed strength and a will to continue, even if the exertion is great and the opposition tough. When we look at the relationship between competition and motivation, it is helpful to draw a distinction between an extrinsic and an intrinsic form of motivation (Kohn 1992, p. 59). The former includes both a carrot and a stick. Money, good examination results, and the possibility of becoming number one, but also the fear of losing, can provide motivation for extra effort; competition contains an extrinsic form of motivation of this kind. The other form of motivation is independent of external factors: here, the activity itself is of such a kind that it motivates. One finds it meaningful, it gives pleasure, or it is for the good of another person. Accordingly, while the extrinsic motivation is linked to things or realities that are separate from the activity or competition, the opposite is true of intrinsic motivation. In one sense, this form of motivation makes competition superfluous. One concentrates on the activity itself, not on its outcome or on what others may gain from a similar activity. Investigations of persons who compete often on a high, demanding, and complicated level show that they are much more motivated by internal

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than by external factors, by the pleasure and the meaning that the ­activity itself can give a person. In the long run, an excessive emphasis on extrinsic motivation can have a directly negative effect on intrinsic motivation, reducing it and thus being counterproductive (see Kohn 1992, pp. 59–61). The research underlying this affirmation has mostly been carried out in the school system. It is difficult to know to what extent it can be generalized; all we can say is that the motivating function of competition is probably more limited than is usually thought. One more certain conclusion that can be drawn from this is that complicated and complex tasks demand more intrinsic than extrinsic motivation, and that when a competition emphasizes extrinsic motivation, this has less of a positive function as a motivating factor in such contexts. What about the directly negative factors that can accompany competition? Researchers have concentrated on the question whether a connection exists between aggression, hostility, and competition. Some see the link between hostility and competition as certain (see Horney 1937, p. 164; Deutsch 1985, p. 85). George Orwell called competitive sport “mimic warfare” (Orwell 1950, p. 152). Others argue that one must draw a distinction between aggression and aggressivity (Hyland 1995, p. 177). In one sense, the latter belongs to competition, but the former does not. In every competitive situation, where one seeks to beat or gain advantage over those against whom one is competing, there is an element of resistance and hostility. This has prompted the following question: Does competition make people behave in a more hostile and aggressive way? Older research, influenced by the early work of Sigmund Freud, took its orientation from a so-called catharsis theory (Freud 1955 [1895]): the aggression that a human being has in himself finds an outlet in connection with competition. This purging or purification (this is the meaning of the Greek word katharsis) ensures that normal life is protected from aggressive tendencies. In relation to competition, this means that the satisfaction that competition gave was a substitute that reduced the human being’s aggression. More recent research, especially related to sport, has not supported this understanding of the link; on the contrary, it has been pointed out that competition can promote aggression (Russel 2008; see also Gee and Potwarka 2014; Parry 1998). However, the aggression is not always unleashed immediately, and there can be differences in how and when it occurs in winners and in losers. Competition can create a kind of excitement that does not lead to directly aggressive behavior but can function as a latent disposition toward aggression.

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Frustration can be the triggering factor. The element of frustration is also linked to competition in another way: a competition is quite simply a frustrating situation in which to find oneself. The fear of losing and the uncertainty about the result create frustration, and this may be why some studies have shown an increased level of aggression in both winners and the losers in a competitive situation. In some special instances, winners were found to be even more aggressive than losers (Christy et al. 1971). Frustration can find expression in aggression, but also in anxiety. There is also a link between competition and anxiety. The psychoanalyst Rollo R. May claims that competition is “the most pervasive occasion for anxiety” in our culture (May 1977, p. 173). We can envisage the link between the experience of anxiety and competition in three different ways. First, anxiety can be created in a competitive situation when one is unable to stop anticipating a potential defeat, or when one remembers painful defeats from the past—this is a vicious circle. Second, and paradoxically enough, anxiety can be caused by an unease that is linked to the possibility of winning. There are examples of athletes who do not manage to stay the whole course, who make mistakes, who feel that they are suffocating, and who drop out, even though it is likely they win the competition. Why does this happen? It has been suggested that there may be guilt feelings vis-à-vis the losers, or a fear of potential hostile attitudes aimed toward the winner from those who lose (Kohn 1992, p. 122).20 Third, anxiety in a competitive situation can be due to a feeling of insecurity between the persons involved. The wish to beat others brings with it loneliness and isolation. One does not form close bonds with those whom one wishes to beat. This is where anxiety is born. Rollo R. May has emphasized this, claiming that “… competitive individualism militates against the experience of community, and … lack of community is a centrally important factor in contemporaneous society” (May 1977, p. 191). Competition blocks the feeling of security that is important for healthy human development. Anxiety in connection with competition can influence level of achievement. The type of anxiety, and the way in which it is interpreted, influences the level of achievement in different ways. Alfie Kohn emphasizes theories that limit the connection between anxiety and increased achievement (Kohn 1992, p. 63), while Stephen D. Mellalieu et al. point to theories that show that anxiety promotes achievement, especially in connection with sport (Mellalieu et al. 2009, pp. 33–37).21 Research into cross-country skiers and biathletes carried out by Thomassen et al. shows that there is a link between level of achievement and fear of competition,

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and also that those who compete on a national level have less anxiety than those who compete locally. This may indicate that higher achievements are less related to fear of competition, but this need not necessarily be the case: those who compete on a higher level have learned how to tackle anxiety better (Thomassen et al. 2013). One important point of view here is that a positive link between achievements and arousal, which can be indirectly linked to anxiety, holds true only up to a certain boundary, and varies depending on the tasks involved. If this boundary is crossed, the level of achievement drops. Complex and difficult tasks have a lower boundary than simple tasks. In some cases, competition generates a level of fear that crosses this boundary. And where fear of this kind leads to a reservation in relation to various forms of competition, a competitive society is quick to accuse: “Are you afraid of losing? Can’t you tackle the competitive pressure?”22 Such questions insinuate that these are people who are attempting to sneak out of competition in a rather dishonorable way and are reducing their own potential for achievement, which could have been realized through competition. However, these questions reflect just as much the fact that those who ask them are unwilling to look at the entire spectrum of what competition between people in a society entails. Another aspect of enacting a competition is the danger and risk that are sometimes connected with it. The spectrum here is wide. Some sporting competitions are inherently dangerous, simply by carrying out the exercises that are demanded (these include parachute jumping, rafting, off-piste skiing, and wrestling). In other sporting competitions, it is precisely the element of competition that creates situations in which participants are exposed to risk. Sometimes, this is because the desire to win leads them to take great risks; in other cases, it is the relationship to the other participants that can create dangerous situations. Motor sports in their various forms are in a class of their own here, but other forms of competition belong here too (including professional boxing, road cycling, and downhill biking). There are also comparable situations in the economic sphere. In a competitive situation, a firm that feels under pressure can discard not only quality, but also safety. This can apply directly to the workers and to their working environment: an improvement in working conditions costs money, and increased costs are not desirable in a difficult competitive ­situation. The dynamic of competition makes a firm willing to expose people both to materials that can damage their health and to physical

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harm. This seldom happens deliberately and with full consciousness. Often, it is due to an ignorance of the consequences; they neglect to follow the principle of “look before you leap.” Besides this, some exposures have a very long timescale, so that a firm can refuse to accept responsibility for what happens, while other exposures have more immediate effects. It is easier to live with the first type of exposures in a situation where there exist both competition and institutions charged with inspecting people’s work. This relationship between economic competition and risk relates to the time factor that makes much competition in this field stressful. A firm continues to trade by selling its products in competition with other firms that sell similar products. Often, this means getting into the market at the right time, the time that is best for selling one’s product. In the case of an automobile or an airplane, there can arise a conflict between producing something that is defensible in terms of competition and price, and something that is defensible in terms of safety. Compromises about safety need almost not be conscious—there is simply no time for the extra rounds that would have ensured the total quality of the product. Priority is given to keeping up with one’s competitors, acquiring a market share, and seizing the opportunities that are most favorable in economic terms. At other times, competition, time pressure, and the values that are at stake demand that people are “tricked” into performing actions that are truly dangerous to their health. One example is the action of diving to great depths, something that in the past represented part of the development of the Norwegian oil industry on the continental shelf in the North Sea. The diving had an experimental character; its aim was to demonstrate that it was possible to repair oil pipes at great depths. Something similar is found in the pharmaceutical industry, when the desire to be the first on the market with a new medical product leads—if possible—to a reduction in the breadth of testing of its effects and side effects. The link between competition and danger and risk is not, however, exclusively negative. For example, some people believe that various forms of risky sport have positive aspects. This refers to sport where “the athletes must reckon with death or serious injury as a real possibility in connection with the activity.” River paddling and hang gliding are examples of this kind of risky sport. Some people see positive values in this form of competitive sport, which makes possible an “existential self-realization” (Breivik 2010, 2011; Aggerholm 2015, pp. 156–157).

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This is understood as the possibility to achieve a deeper self-knowledge by encountering serious risks in existentially decisive situations. One final element in connection with the individual aspects of participating in competition is the question about the level of ethical reflection and anchoring in norms. Do these change in a competitive situation? Several studies (Bredemeier and Shields 1985; Johnson and Johnson 1985) show that the moral priorities in a competitive situation tend more definitively in an egotistic direction than is the case for the same persons in other situations. The participants in sport concentrate on winning, whatever price has to be paid. The significance of values such as justice and honesty is inversely proportional to the intensity of competition. And the keenest participants in a competition see no reason to hide this state of affairs.23 Such outcomes of the idea of competition are not confined to sport alone. The readiness to “cut corners,” where necessary, is also found in other fields, as shown in a number of examples in industry. If competition is great, and the prospects of huge profits dazzle to a great extent, then people become willing to make compromises with the basic ethical and business conditions to which they have previously committed.24 Collective Aspects There will be a collective element in every competitive situation. It is difficult to have a meaningful discussion about questions linked to issues like aggression without speaking about a competitor or opponent. The collective aspect occurs in another way in team competitions, where the formal competition is between collective units; but here too, there is a more formal individual level, since the team is made up of competing individuals. This makes it possible to see many aspects of a team competition in terms of individual aspects of the phenomenon of competition. Our task will therefore now be to supplement, with more collective approaches, the picture of the course of competition that we have drawn in individual terms. In a competition, the relationship between competitors is not marked only by aggression and hostility (see above). It can also be determined by other qualities. In many cases, a competition is both directly and indirectly a competition between persons. In the context of sport, a competition is not only a test of the abilities a person possesses, but also a test of persons. The question is what a person can do with the abilities he or

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she has. It is on this person-related level that sport is a reciprocal challenge to do one’s utmost.25 On this level, there exist certain obligations. One very important obligation is respect for the other person or persons against whom one is competing. In the competition itself, the participants react to the others’ choices, strategies, abilities, and qualities—such qualities include intelligence, motivation, courage, and audacity. All this reflects earlier choices concerning priorities and how to develop one’s own abilities. In a competitive situation, one does not face an “it.” This situation presents a special challenge to respect the others as persons, just as they are and as they have become because of their life stories. Good participants do not see their competitors as things to be beaten, but as persons. And if they are persons, their actions demand appropriate and mutually acceptable responses. This means that the idea of competition is not incompatible with respect for persons: on the contrary, it presupposes this respect. An obligation that accords with this principle and that reflects respect for the person has a reciprocal character.26 All the participants do their best, thus ensuring that their competitors too can get the best out of their own abilities and presuppositions. In its functioning, competition includes both an aggressive and a respectful relation between persons. The critics of this phenomenon highlight the former aspect, while those who regard competition as important and useful in society highlight the latter. This, however, is to picture things in excessively black and white categories. A competition is not always “gentlemanly.” Nor is it always something that presupposes and promotes negative human qualities. Most forms of competition lie somewhere between these extremes. Perhaps, however, we can say that where material values are involved in a competition, especially in the form of rewards (understood in a broad sense), it is harder for the more positive person-related presuppositions and values to “make themselves heard.” In sport, where positive values of this kind have traditionally played a significant role (fair play: see Loland 2002), financial rewards and commercialization have a reduced importance. The means that are sometimes employed reflect an aggressive competition between persons rather than a respectful competition marked by fair play. Although the participants in a competition are in one sense opponents, the situation is also an arena for fellowship. Even rivals can become comrades in a fellowship (Shields and Bredemeier 1994; Roberts 2001). This applies, of course, in the first instance to team sports (Evans et al. 2014), although the fellowship within a team is not a fellowship between

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competitors. It is possible in a team for a solidarity and comradeship to develop that is not only valuable per se but can also have an effect on performance. Naturally, the alternative possibility also exists, and can manifest itself as a destructive conflict or in identifying a scapegoat when things go badly for the team. Fellowship on the stands can also have its good and its less than good aspects; “hooliganism,” violence on the stands, is one example of the latter. National football matches, conceived of as ninety minutes of nationalism, should probably be regarded as an example of the former. Nor is fellowship between genuine competitors as impossible or unusual as many of the critics of competition would have us believe (Hyland 1995; Keating 1995, esp. pp. 147–148). Young people who compete against each other often come together in one and the same youth milieu. Young people who spend a lot of time training and who compete alongside attending school and other activities lead a life that is hectic, but also much more highly structured than many of their contemporaries. This discipline and structure does not suit everyone, but those who lead the same kind of life understand it and are interested in it, and this is how fellowship among competitors comes into being. Fellowships of this kind are not necessarily restricted to young people. Modern competitive sport, where the various “world cup circuses” travel from place to place and the participants are basically the same at each event, also has a place for fellowship among hard competitors. It is more difficult to know how far this applies to other competitive arenas, but there are reasons to believe that for small-scale competitions, economic competition and human fellowship are not incompatible. The owners of competing small shops in the local milieu know each other and have a fellowship with each other. It is hard to imagine that devious or rough competitive methods would be employed in such cases. The tendency to ever larger units, both in sales and production, probably help to push the more individual and personal aspects of these activities into the background. Where this happens, we also lose something of the stimulus to fellowship that presupposes closeness and familiarity, and this communal aspect of competitive activity can be so damaged that it withers away. One final element in this context is competition as entertainment. This is linked in a special way to sport. Competition for positions, prestige, and profit does not have the same entertainment value. Why does sport hold this magical attraction for people? Some argue that the entertainment value in sport is linked to its function as a game, rather than to its function as a competition, but reality appears to argue against

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such views, since it is precisely the competition itself that provides the entertainment. This is connected to the intrinsic value of sport and of competition. In the context of sport, this—as mentioned above—has been called “The sweet tension of uncertainty of outcome” (Loland 2002, p. 14). People want to be kept suspended in this state of tension for a certain period of time. Much is uncertain in this state, and one’s involvement, expressed in sympathies and antipathies, can last until the final whistle is blown. This tension is experienced as something good, and it can perhaps be compared to the feeling of sexual tension and the pleasure it gives, a pleasure that is not linked only to the release and the final satisfaction of desire.

The Consequences of Competition In our discussion of the various aspects of what happens in competition, it has been impossible to isolate them from the consequences of competition. This is because of the function that potential consequences have for the way in which competition is experienced. The possibility of winning, and of sharing in the consequences of a win, also influences the competitive situation. Competition, Performance, and Production The phenomenon of competition has gradually become so firmly ­integrated into our Western context that necessary nuances in vocabulary more or less disappear. Many people do not find the linguistic difference between “success” and “competition” particularly large, since competition means success: those who are victorious and win in the competition have success. It is easy to overlook the “little” reservation contained in the words “those who are victorious.” There are also other competitors in a competition, and other results—not everybody wins. This means that the equation between competition and success is more than a linguistic misrepresentation or slackness: it also reflects attitudes that characterize a competitive society. The linguistic equation of competition and success is not supported by empirical investigations. Research (see Kohn 1992, pp. 46–53) has concentrated particularly on measuring the “production” of school pupils and students with regard to their relationship to their fellow pupils and students. Such investigations often compare the significance of the

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competitive situation for production and performance with the obvious alternatives: the significance of collaboration or of working on one’s own without any special relationship to others. Many of these investigations indicate that competence is more of a hindrance than a help to good performance. Collaboration (but also working on one’s own) comes out better than competition. These investigations also suggest that the quality of performance tends to diminish in competitive situations and that it is much easier to resolve complicated and complex tasks with the aid of collaboration than with the aid of competition. Such results from a pedagogical context are supported by results from other areas of life and professional work, although the extent of such research here is much smaller than in the case of pedagogy. Robert L. Helmreich has carried out very extensive research in these fields in the United States, a society in which the idea of competition is probably more deeply integrated than in any other society in the West. Helmreich’s investigations included natural scientists, psychologists, male business leaders, pilots, and travel agency personnel. The results were identical: there was no positive correlation between competitive skill and performance. On the contrary, intentional competition was correlated to lower performance (Spence and Helmreich 1983, pp. 47–59). This thoroughly disproved his own supposition that the competitive element at least played an important role for a businessman’s performance. He pointed out that his results with regard to this professional group “… dramatically refute the contention that competitiveness is vital to a successful business career” (Spence and Helmreich 1983, p. 53). The negative correlation is confirmed by other investigations, dealing with artists and journalists. J. Winsten found that a competitive situation had a strong influence on journalists’ professional work and the assessments they made. In order to get more space in the newspaper, they exaggerated and twisted facts in their articles (Winsten 1985). This kind of competition is found among editorial staff, and not least among workers in various media. This increased media competition leads to lower journalistic performance (Jacobsson et al. 2008). The linguistic correlation between competition and success is thus not confirmed by empirical research. Indeed, the opposite is true: competition is negatively correlated here to performance. How is this to be explained? Alfie Kohn (1992, pp. 55–65) points to several factors. First, there is a difference between doing well at something and beating others. It is perfectly possible to do well outside of a competition against others.

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If one’s primary interest is in winning, this can affect the quality of what one does. Competition deflects one’s focus from the task at hand; the desire to win overshadows everything else. This can apply to a debater just as much as to a lawyer—they can be so obsessed by beating their “opponents” that the object of the debate and truth and justice in the courtroom take second place. An educational system can be so strongly oriented to competition and reward that it becomes more important to win than to acquire the knowledge that the school exists to supply. Strategical thinking is more important than a thinking that begins from what is intrinsically valuable, independent of whether it can be used to gain something else. Second, according to Kohn, collaboration makes possible a more effective use of resources than is possible in a competition. The connection between collaboration and the use made of resources applies especially at the individual level. One who works alone must personally employ time and energy on tasks that others have perhaps already resolved, or that others are better qualified to resolve; in collaboration, one could have drawn on the contributions of others. Those whose persona is strongly oriented to competition display an attitude that others can find alienating and threatening. This prevents useful suggestions with regard to one’s own projects from becoming known and being used. In collaboration, the use of resources is not restricted to this coordination between single individuals. One effect here is that the interaction between people appears to promote the skills of the individual in a different way than when the individual is on his or her own. A milieu that is marked by security and acceptance facilitates a freer exploration. It makes people able and willing to take risks and to make something positive even out of the mistakes that are made. A situation of competition limits these possibilities. Kohn’s third element concerns the unpleasant aspect of the ­competitive situation. This unease, which often takes the form of fear— especially the fear of losing, but also the fear of winning—can have a negative effect on performance and productivity. The empirical basis for this affirmation about a negative correlation between competition and performance is taken from a large segment of the population and many activities, but this picture must be supplemented. The first case here concerns sport.27 Both universal observation and research show that competitive situations lead athletes to perform better than if they had collaborated to achieve the same results. When

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the runners in a long-distance race make their final spurt toward the goal, the times of the winner and of the others in the first few places are better than if the race had been constructed as a collaborative project. The competition and the spurt situation bring out the best in athletes in terms of ability and will. One reason for the difference on this point between sport and pedagogical contexts may be that the desire to win is more prominent in sport, and that it therefore has a greater dynamic potential. Second, there is more to be said about competition and ­performance or production in the economy. Here too, it seems too easy simply to dismiss the idea that competition makes things more efficient. A competitive situation puts all the parts of a firm totally on their toes. People seek to improve their routines, their operating processes, and the way the workforce is used. All this improvement is intended to make it possible to earn more money, so that one’s own salary and the shareholders’ profits are safeguarded. At the same time, increasing efficiency on the basis of a competitive situation can be a matter of “to be or not to be” for workplaces and for a firm’s very existence. A lack of competitive power can make it difficult for a firm to sell its products, with the result that its economic viability becomes problematic. It is easy to envisage a combination of this kind of external competition and an internal collaboration: the external situation can create a dynamic that increases the external competitive power by means of an internal collaboration. Here, however, another problem arises, namely, the danger of ­overproduction. This is directly connected to the situation of economic competition and can be a consequence of it. The link between competition and achievement is presupposed here—it is not seen as a problem. The problem is that the mechanism of competition is so efficient and that it is supported by a kind of inherent dynamic. This mechanism makes workplaces insecure because the market cannot absorb everything that is produced. The positive counterpart of the negative correlation between competition and performance is the correlation between collaboration and performance, which presupposes that the human being’s individual orientation is not as general as it often purports to be. There are many social anthropological and ideological examples of an understanding of reality that anchors the human being primarily in a group. In other cultural contexts, the question of what I get out of something is both alien and problematic; and here, naturally enough, collaboration plays

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a much more important role than competition between individuals. The aim is not to promote one’s individual goals, but to identify what can serve everyone—the entire fellowship. Such a project is more efficient with regard to what the group achieves and what the individual in the group achieves. The best-known theoretical example of this is the game based on “the prisoner’s dilemma.”28 The structure and the point of the game are as follows. Two players can choose between two alternative scenarios: one entails that they collaborate with each other, while the other entails that they do not. Both players know each other’s alternatives, but they do not know which alternative their opponent has chosen. Typically, this game pays for individuals that do not collaborate, irrespective of what the other player does. The dilemma is that the winnings are greater if the two of them collaborate than if they do not. In other words, if an individual chooses his action on the basis of his own rationality, this generates a situation that, as seen from a collective perspective, is not rational. This constellation reflects in many ways the situation of competition and collaboration in the world. Collaboration is possible and efficient, but the perspective of self-interest, linked to individual rationality, prevents the possibilities of collaboration from appearing attractive. Nor is it always easy, in an individualistic context of competition, to perceive that collaboration improves performance. Given this situation, if we want things to change in this regard then more is needed than a simple assertion that collaboration is better than competition at improving performance. Competition and Power Our discussion of competition and performance has uncovered a certain ambiguity, and we also find something of the same ambiguity when we turn to the relationship between competition and power. On the one hand, competition is meant to be a counterweight to potential monopolistic concentrations of power in the economic sphere. On the other hand, however, the winner in a competition can easily come into a position of power, with possibilities of acquiring and of exercising power. This applies to most areas of competition, but especially to the economic sphere and to areas that are related in various ways to economic competition. An athlete can acquire power and influence through both the economic means that are made available to a winner and through the ability

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to influence others that comes from the idolization of winners. This potential for power is relevant both in an adult context and among children and young people. Status and power can influence the decisions people take. Star athletes are role models, and as such carry considerable potential to influence children’s and young people’s thinking and priorities. There are winners in economic activity too. Their influence and power can be linked to their skill at thinking strategically and making economic priorities, but the possibility of achieving power is more closely linked to the economic potential at the disposal of winners. Profit and money mean power. This can supply influence over others, and it can constitute a potential for power in relation to other businesses and even in relation to entire nations. Several multinational firms have economic potentials that far exceed the potentials of countries that possess small or medium sized economies. This potential has been built up over a long period of time, through “economic victories” in competitive situations. The relationship between power and competition is not restricted to sport and the economy. There are also winners among politicians, artists, and academics. They compete not only for fame but also for power. The possibility of power found here—which is seen as a legitimate power—also legitimizes competition as a path to power. In a democracy, it is assumed that the struggle for power is open and transparent. Competition is one way to structure and practice the struggle, and this is how competition is legitimized in political and cultural spheres. At the same time, there is a movement in the opposite direction. Competition ought not to be only a means to gain and exercise power. In an economic context, competition is thought of as a means to prevent large concentrations of power, whether through monopolizing or oligopolizing tendencies. By means of market mechanisms, competition is meant to ensure that individual firms or groups of firms are not allowed to control prices and supply on the basis of what best suits their own interests. Competition is meant to spread interest and the possibility of earning money in the best way possible—also from the consumer’s perspective. In many countries, there are authorities that supervise competition, and this is their primary task; this is the purpose of the so-called antitrust laws in the United States. In smaller countries with a limited number of actors, like Norway, it is harder to get competition to work as an instrument for sharing out power. This is particularly the case where there is also a tendency to establish ever larger economic units, at least

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within some economic sectors: here, competition takes place between such a small number of units that these units nevertheless gain great potential for power. Which of these movements is stronger? Historically speaking, it appears that the ability of competition to amass instruments and power in a small number hands has been greater than its ability to distribute. Karl Marx is partly right in his assumption that competition is a mechanism that propels and stimulates the struggle for (political) power, and that this is one reason why the distribution of power in society is largely determined by economic presuppositions. The ability of competition to spread interest, earnings, and power has not been as strong as the possibility of amassing capital (and therefore also power)—offered by competition motivated by self-interest. This may be because the freedom that is the presupposition for competition is so fragile and “plastic” that it can be used for many purposes, including goals that ultimately deny freedom’s own starting point. It can be useful here to listen to Thomas Hobbes: “But when private men or subjects demand liberty, under the name of liberty they ask not for liberty, but dominion; which yet for want of understanding they little consider.”29 Hobbes saw this use of freedom in a context of power, and the competition that built on this freedom, as a presupposition for the existence of a “dog eat dog” society. Today’s society is different, partly because there are counterforces to such an understanding of freedom, competition, and power. But the link between competition and power contains the potential for development to which we are well advised to pay close attention. Competition and Personal Relationships Good and valuable relationships between participants in competitions, and especially in sport, can be explained by reference to their interests and to their priorities in the way they use their time, but also by reference to the selection that such persons represent. Such participants have been successful in competitions at lower and higher levels, and they are on average better equipped ability-wise and socially than groups with which it would be natural to compare them. This explanation links the presupposition for fellowship to skills and qualities that the participants bring into the situation. It is hard to say how far the quality of such a fellowship is better or worse than in other comparable fellowships. The demanding duality of rivalry and comradeship is at any rate a special

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starting point for the fellowship, and this may indicate that it cannot be taken for granted: if it is to function, work is required. This can be a good starting point for a fellowship. How do things look, if we move away from sport? As I have mentioned, Rollo R. May holds that competition makes a person fearful, and that this threatens his or her fellowship with others. In order to reduce the fear, one then attempts to intensify one’s efforts to succeed and to win. This leads to a vicious circle (May 1977, esp. pp. 233–234). Following Morton Deutsch, Alfie Kohn claims that it is impossible to draw a distinction between intentional competition and hostility. One who intends to compete will look for meetings with other people in which the element of competition can be activated. Such presuppositions mean that competition has very negative consequences for interpersonal relationships: it poisons them.30 Is this really the case, or have the negative consequence been put too strongly? Those who are highly critical of every form of competition, and who are mostly writing against the background of the American competitive society,31 seem to put too strong an emphasis on the unfortunate interpersonal consequences of competition. Fellowship can be realized elsewhere than in the context of collaboration, although this context may perhaps offer a better starting point for the realization of fellowship. Competition can, but need not, be characterized by hostility. It can, but need not, create fear and aggression. This is confirmed by the factual existence of such fellowships, even in competitive arenas such as schools, places of study, and professional work. Competition and Health On the question of competition and health, there is similarly a clear dividing line between those who take a positive view of competition a priori and those who lack such a view. The former, while not elevating competition into a universal health project, affirm that it has a reasonably positive function, although they too are not blind to the more unfortunate consequences for health. A negative view of competition can be discerned in a strong emphasis on the negative consequences for health, both physical and mental. A peripheral question with regard to the relationship between competition and health concerns competition’s potential character-building function for the human being. This is a matter of dispute and is a special

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topic of discussion in sport. To some extent, it is taken for granted that competition possesses this kind of character-building function for the human being: it promotes qualities such as perseverance, strength of will, purposefulness, and concentration. These are taught, promoted, and internalized in persons who engage in competition. The link between sport and character building goes back to nineteenth-century England, where the sports arena was perceived as a place where one could learn a discipline necessary for future leadership in adulthood. The empirical basis for claiming the existence of a link between sport and character building is inconclusive. An earlier generation of scholarship indicates that there is no such connection. Bruce C. Ogilvie and Thomas A. Tutko found no empirical foundation for the assertion that sport is character building; on the contrary, it had a restrictive impact on human growth and maturity in some fields. The same researchers also concluded that persons who genuinely possessed a very strong character avoided participating in competitive sport (Ogilvie and Tutko 1971). Recent research points in both directions (Chandler and Goldberg 1990; Clifford and Feezell 2010). The limited amount of research that has been done in this area indicates that one should be cautious about drawing unambiguous and definitive conclusions. This means that an answer to the question of whether competition is character building is relatively unclear. On the one hand, experience says that a competitive situation can promote important character-building qualities, such as perseverance, strength of will, the ability to concentrate, and so on. On the other hand, it is easy for the desire to beat an opponent, in combination with the stressful situation of a competition, to tend in the opposite direction. In connection with this indirect relationship between health and competition, it is also relevant to ask what winning means for the winner’s self-image. When one wins, is this a confirmation of one’s competence? There is a difference between beating others and being successful; the former is not a certain indicator of the latter. But if the win confirms some kind of competence, what competence is involved? Is it a competence linked to internal qualities and presuppositions, or is it only a purely external competence? A desire to be good in a more fundamental sense cannot be realized along these lines. The competence that a win can confirm is only external, not internal. We find a more direct expression of the consequences of competition for health in Kohn’s reflections. His negative view of competition can be seen in his emphasis on its negative consequences for health (Kohn

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1992, pp. 104–105). He sees the only “healthy” aspect of competition in the fact that competitors are fulfilling what society expects of them. A competitive society gives positive feedback to those who submit to competition. However, this effect on their health must be put in quotation marks, according to Kohn: the most important consequence of competence is its undermining of a person’s self-respect. This applies first of all to the losers, who are the majority in most competitions. This means that the problem is very wide reaching: it also includes those who had a reasonably high self-respect before the competition. The competitive situation has a destructive effect on these very valuable qualities in human life, and thus has consequences for mental health. The problem with self-respect applies also to winners. Winning is demanding. The potential gain linked to the self-respect that a win gives cannot in any way compensate for the loss of self-respect that all the losers suffer. Winning is also demanding in the sense that the winner immediately becomes a goal for the other competitors to aim at. There is always a next time for a winner, a time when he or she may perhaps fail to win, thus losing what had been won. The feeling of being a winner is always transient. The new situation can lead to a feeling of discouragement, but it can also lend support to the desire to restore and to experience anew the fascination of winning. Repeated experiences of something that never gives a definitive satisfaction, but that must be renewed all the time—and winning can be experienced in this way—can in fact develop dependency: I must get back to the moment of victory. This becomes a vicious circle: the more we compete, the more we must compete. Another phenomenon must also be mentioned. New arenas for competition are continually being established; the winners move up onto a new level where they must perform anew. One who wins a competition for writing at school moves up to the competition to get published, and the winner on that level moves up again to the competition to get his book presented well by the marketing division of the publishing house; and so on. A “dependency” and a pressure of this kind can become a burden to one’s health. A more positive view of competition emphasizes other, more positive gains to one’s health from taking part in a competition, both generally and in the case of sport. It is obvious that physical exercise is beneficial to one’s health, both physical and mental, almost irrespective of the level at which one takes part. Well-being and a general feeling of energy are health qualities that are connected with a reasonably good physical form. The good experience of tension in a competitive situation can also have a

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positive effect on one’s mental health. For many people, these gains are linked to the desire to compete with others, either individually or in a team. This medal, however, has also a reverse side. When competition takes place at a very high level, there is an increased risk that the health gains may be reduced and, in some cases, that one’s health may be harmed, if the body cannot bear the pressure. Sometimes injuries are long-lasting; in the worst cases athletes end up as invalids. The link between sport and money—and in this context, also the temptation to engage in doping— has promoted a negative development here. The damage that competition can do to one’s health is observable in other fields too. A strong competition among school pupils or students can have serious psychological consequences. Competition at schools and colleges in Japan, with high numbers of suicides, is a well-known phenomenon. Participants in an economic competition can also find the dynamic of the situation so demanding that their health is put at risk. Competition and Society I have already touched on the consequences of competition for society, when I indicated the various consequences it can have for individual persons in society. I shall now point out two societal consequences with a more overarching character. The first concerns competition’s consolidating and conserving function in society; the second concerns the priority given to material values, which competition seems to facilitate. It is above all competitive sport that prompts the assertion that the idea of competition has a conserving function with regard to politics and society. According to Gai I. Berlage (1982, pp. 313–314), it not only reflects, but also helps to consolidate the competitive structure that permeates American society. The same values are promoted in children’s sports and in the competition between firms in the business sector. The fact that the loudest support for competitive sport is found among persons who take a very conservative political line is adduced in support of this thesis.32 In this way, sport and athletics become an instrument that is employed to socialize people into the basic pattern that exists in society, the pattern on which society wishes to build further. Sport promotes qualities that are serviceable in the present-day societal system, in which it is useful, and makes economic sense, that people should look on each other more as rivals than as partners. This promotes the economic

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growth on which Western capitalistic societies are dependent for their very existence. In this way, established societal structures are confirmed, consolidated, and promoted. Is this assessment correct? To some extent, no doubt, competition does function in this way, especially where its function is related, directly or indirectly, to an economic context. But we must also take account of other aspects of competition. Its creative and innovative aspects can ­generate the presuppositions for change. This is obvious in numerous contexts of academic competition. The race to the Moon created a whole range of products that did not consolidate the old order of things when they were introduced into society but established new presuppositions for parts of people’s daily lives. This is also true to some extent of the innovative and creative elements that are linked to economic competition. Not all such competition means a confirmation of the existing patterns of power and society. The possibility of expanding on the basis of innovative projects opens the door to a “disturbance” of the established patterns. In the long term, it may perhaps create the presuppositions for more fundamental changes. At a time when the idea of competition is conquering more and more ground, we should not overlook the potential that lies here. The possibility of making use of the presuppositions for change that are inherent in the idea of competition itself is greater where this idea is more widespread than where it is applied only on the basis of old presuppositions. Competition promotes material values rather than softer values because of its nature and its conserving function, mentioned above. Performances are measured and compared in a competition. In order to carry out this measuring in the best and simplest manner possible, the objects must be as concrete and measurable as possible. This aspect of the nature of competition means that emphasis on the idea of competition will be an emphasis on measurable, sometimes concrete, and material values. This priority is also supported by the system of rewards that is a part of every competitive system. The one who wins a competition wants more as a reward than merely words of acknowledgment. Glory can have its importance, but today’s competitive sport and today’s profit-oriented competitive economy are much more interested in concrete and material rewards. Competition’s conserving function and material values are linked because the societal structure that competition is meant to promote is a structure that emphasizes material values. If competition is to consolidate a material structure, it must itself be oriented to material values, build on these, and promote them.

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Competition and Anthropology What does this analysis tell us about the relationship between competition and anthropology? The first point is that competition cannot be said to be a basic anthropological datum. A second overarching point is that competition has an extremely ambiguous relationship to anthropological presuppositions. It can indeed promote good human qualities such as individuality, freedom, and a healthy self-interest, in some instances also in combination with a good human fellowship. It can open the door to good self-realization and a feeling of mastery. As a motivation, competition can promote good performance and help people to preserve good health. On all these points, however, there are also negative alternatives: exaggerated or egotistic self-interest, repression, rivalry that destroys fellowship, fear, and aggression, as well as competitions that destroy ­people both physically and mentally. In many cases, human collaboration is a better option, if one wishes to promote good human values. The ambiguity seems all-pervasive.

Notes

1. The classic work here is Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, by the father of sociobiology, Edward O. Wilson. See Wilson (1975); see also Wilson (1978). 2. For an overview, see Kohn (1992, pp. 15–19). 3. This perspective is not foreign to Charles Darwin himself. In The Origin of Species (1859), he employs the concept of the “web of relations” in his description of the natural world, linking this to the reciprocal dependence of the species (Darwin and Beer 1996 [1859], p. 61). In The Descent of Man (1871), he argues that collaboration between individuals and groups and altruistic behavior among human beings have contributed to their successful evolution (Darwin 1981 [1871], pp. 155, 157, 161–167). Darwin himself took this as a challenge, when he was asked to explain how there are sterile workers in beehives who worked “altruistically” for others and were even willing to risk their lives for the group. Darwin resolved this question by the idea that such praxis would be useful within a family, since it contributed to the continuation of the clan. Natural selection was understood, not on the individual level, but on the level of clan or family: a kin selection. This altruistic perspective linked to biology was later developed further, and a theoretical account was given in the so-called Hamilton’s rule. See Dugatkin (2006, pp. 1–11, 86–106).

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4. This point of view is programmatic for M. Ridley’s book as a whole; see, for example, pp. 1–7 with regard to P. Kropotkin’s objections to T. Huxley’s theory of evolution as a merciless struggle between egotistic creatures. See also S.J. Gould’s support for Kropotkin’s emphasis on the significance of collaboration for evolution. See Gould (1988). 5. The sport psychologists T. Tutko and W. Burns draw this conclusion from an investigation of athletes of all age groups: “Competition is a learned phenomenon … people are not born with a motivation to win or to be competitive. We inherit a potential for a degree of activity, and we all have the instinct to survive. But the will to win comes through training and the influences of one’s family and environment” (Tutko and Burns 1976, p. 53). In their meta-examination of scholarly literature as long ago as 1937, M.A. May and L. Doob reached the same conclusion: “Human beings by original nature strive for goals, but striving with others (co-operation) or against others (competition) are learned forms of behavior” (May 1937, p. 888). In this context, see also M. Mead, who reached the same conclusion when she published the results of her research in the same year (Mead 1976b [1937], p. 16). 6.  See Freud (1962 [1930], p. 58): “… men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved … they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness.” 7.  K. Horney came from an orthodox psychoanalytical tradition, but he gradually abandoned this for a theory with a greater social and cultural orientation. In a discussion of the importance of cultural factors for neuroses, he touches on the question of competition. The factors that contribute to neurosis include the circumstances that create emotional isolation, hostility, uncertainty, fear, and a fear of individual helplessness. In this context, she maintains that: “Among the factors in western civilization which engender potential hostility, the fact that this culture is built on individual competitiveness probably ranks first. The economic principle of competition affects human relationships by causing one individual to fight another, by enticing one person to surpass another by making the advantage of one the disadvantage of the other” (Horney 1999 [1939], p. 173, see also pp. 176–177). 8. Gorney (1972, p. 472). 9. R.W. Emerson’s philosophical profile was marked by a very strong emphasis on individualism and by a corresponding criticism of the pressure that society put on the individual human being. For a presentation of Emerson, see McDermott (1995). 10. This expression by the writer G.B. Leonard is quoted from Kohn (1992, p. 129).

104  S. O. THORBJØRNSEN 11.  For a classical social psychological presentation of the act of human comparing, see Festinger (1954). 12. A report delivered to The Norwegian Bishops’ Conference in 1992 gives an introduction to the semiotic perspective on the consumer society: see Conference (1995, pp. 18–26). The principal theorists on which this presentation builds are J. Baudrillard and P. Bourdieu (see Baudrillard 1983; Bourdieu 1984). 13. An investigation entitled Fattig eller rik – slik ungdom ser det (“Rich or poor—as young people see it”) shows the situation among young people in Norway today; and on this point, we may assume that there is no essential difference between Norway and other Western countries. Money is important because it gives access to important things or activities that possess a high symbolic value in the encounter with other young people. In competition with other young people, such symbolic values give status and identity. This competition also includes values of cultural capital, for example in connection with musical knowledge and education. See Marthinsen et al. (2004). 14. The possibility of a semiotic reading of this kind is not limited to goods. It can also be applied to larger units of an institutional kind and to behavior. When these (e.g., shopping malls and the layout of entire cities) are read semiotically, they too express basic attitudes and values that are supporting pillars of the society in which they are located. Shopping malls, which are important arenas in human beings’ lives, declare that consumption values are important values. 15. Bourdieu’s thinking is also an important element in one of the theories of consumption, the so-called diffusion theory. The movement from below, from those who want to imitate, is met with countermeasures from above. This entails a competition and a dynamic that continuously create renewal and change. There is a continual shift in what possesses status. Goods and status markers have a dynamic power to bring about change in society. On this, see Conference (1995, pp. 20–21; two other theories of consumption, the theory of displaced meanings and the theory of the Diderot effect, are presented on pp. 22–24. In these two theories, it is more the individual’s competition with himself that is central). 16. Norway is often called a welfare state where, on the one hand, people can expect the state to provide help where this is needed (children, illness, unemployment, care for the elderly, etc.) while, on the other hand, they must also contribute to society through a level of taxation that is higher than in many other countries. In the Norwegian state budget, the sum set aside for various pensions and aid in sickness amounts in 2017 to about one third the total state budget. Social economists often speak of the Scandinavian model, which is characterized by a stable economic

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governance with a strong emphasis on full employment, a regulated job market with strong bargaining parties, a coordinated wage growth, and an all-encompassing welfare state with a redistributive profile, financed by taxes. On the Scandinavian model, see Andersen et al. (2016). 17. We find in M. Mead a point of view that goes in the same direction, but on the basis of somewhat different presuppositions: “… it is not the actual supply of a desired good which decrees whether or not the members of a society will compete for it or cooperate and share it, but it is the way the structure of the society is built up that determines whether individual members shall cooperate or shall compete with one another” (Mead 1976a [1937], pp. 481–482). 18. The difference between competitive sport and games is connected to the question about rules. In a competition, there are rules; rules are found in games in some contexts, but not in other contexts. Some see the specific character of games precisely in their freedom from rules, while others hold that games too have rules and that precisely this means that games can be just as entertaining and challenging as competitions. See Kohn (1992, p. 94). 19. For some people, the simple fact of participating in a competition can have an educational effect, which will be independent of the result. The educational element means that one will be less afraid of comparing oneself with others; and one can learn both from losing and from winning. This can provide resources on which one can draw in other contexts later on. 20. A. Kohn refers to K. Horney’s dealing with this phenomenon among neurotic persons, but claim that what she describes also is something very widespread. See Horney (1937, pp. 167, 182). 21. On the connection between fear and sporting competition in general (see Mellalieu et al. 2009, pp. 7–31; Hanton and Mellalieu 2014). 22. M. Novak expresses this when he describes those who for various reasons have reservations about competition as persons who “deplore (and secretly dread) the intense competitiveness of American life” (Novak 1976, p. 158). 23. M. Novak puts it as follows: “The true practice of sport goes on, beneath the moralistic mythology of virtue and clean living. Basketball without deception could not survive” (ibid., pp. 311–312). 24. In the Norwegian context, the example that comes to mind is the involvement by the Norwegian oil company Statoil (now Equinor) in Iran. Statoil paid 115 million kroner via a straw company to an Iranian businessman, Mehdi Hashemi, the son of Iran’s former president Rafsanjani. When this became known in 2003, the chief executive and the chairman of the board of Statoil both had to resign. The Norwegian National Authority

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for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime fined Statoil ca. 20 million kroner for corruption, because in this way, Statoil gave the businessman an “inappropriate advantage” that would earn Statoil competitive interests in a phase of exploration and development that was extremely interesting in economic terms. Statoil accepted the fine, but without admitting that such advantages were linked to the transfer of money to the Iranian interests. The decisive point was that a lengthy legal trial would have damaged their interests in the concrete ­situation, where there was competition in terms of allocations in a huge oilfield in south-west Iran. 25. According to R.L. Simon, sport and athletics are a “mutual quest for excellence through challenge” (Simon 1995, p. 212). 26. See Keating (1995, p. 147): “Always conduct yourself in such a manner that you will increase rather than detract from the pleasure to be found in the activity, both your own and that of your fellow participants.” 27. It is true that there are some who believe that the cause-and-effect relationship between competitive sport and maximal performance—a relationship that is often taken for granted—is an expression of “the deepest-lying prejudice of civilized thought” (quotation from the philosopher John McMurty in Johnson [1979, p. 446]). 28. The background to this game is in psychological science, but it has been annexed and used as an illustrative model in both economics and philosophy. On this, see Ridley (1996, pp. 53–66) and also Chapter 4 of this volume. 29. Quoted from Mestmäcker (1998, p. 330). 30. Kohn (1992, p. 143). See also p. 134: “Competition acts not only to strain our existing relationships to the breaking point, but also to prevent them from developing in the first place. Camaraderie and comradeship – to say nothing of genuine friendship and love – scarcely have a chance to take root when we are defined as competitors.” 31. See, for example, ibid., pp. 149–155. 32. M. Novak is one example of this; see Novak (1976). A. Kohn quotes the following statement by the former American President Gerald Ford: “… outside of a national character and an educated society, there are few things more important to a country’s growth and well-being than competitive athletics” (Kohn 1992, p. 263, n. 4).

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References Aggerholm, Kenneth. 2015. Existential Philosophy and Sport. In Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Sport, ed. Mike MacNamee and Willam J. Morgan, 142–160. London; New York: Routledge. Andersen, Torben M., et al. 2016. Nordic Economic Policy Review: Whither the Nordic Welfare Model? Tema Nord Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers. Bain, Joe S. 2018. Monopoly and Competition. Britannica Academic (3.10.2018). http://academic.eb.com/levels/collegiate/article/monopoly-and-competition/106206 (15.11.2018). Baudrillard, Jean. 1983. Simulations. New York: Semiotext(e). Berlage, Gai Ingham. 1982. Are Children’s Competitive Team Sports Socialising Agents for Corporate America? In Studies in the Sociology of Sports, ed. Aidan O. Dunleavy et al., 309–324. Ft. Worth, TX: Texas Christian University Press. Blanck, Gertrude, and Rubin Blanck. 1994. Ego Psychology: Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Bredemeier, Brenda Jo, and David L. Shields. 1985. Values and Violence in Sports Today. Psychology Today 19 (10): 22–32. Breivik, Gunnar. 2010. ‘Being-in-the-Void’: A Heideggerian Analysis of Skydiving. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 37: 29–46. Breivik, Gunnar. 2011. Dangerous Play with the Elements: Towards a Phenomenology of Risk Sports. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 5: 314–330. Brockway, George P. 2001. The End of Economic Man: An Introduction to Humanistic Economics. New York and London: W. W. Norton. Caillois, Roger, and Meyer Barash. 2001 [1961]. Man, Play, and Games. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Chandler, Timothy J.L., and Alan D. Goldberg. 1990. Building Character Through Sports: Myth or Possibility? Counseling and Values 34: 169–176. Christy, Pauline R., et al. 1971. Effects of Competition-Induced Frustration on Two Classes of Modeled Behaviour. Developmental Psychology 5: 104–111. Clifford, Craig, and Randolph Feezell. 2010. Sport and Character: Reclaiming the Principles of Sportsmanship. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Conference, The Bishop’s. 1995. The Consumer Society as an Ethical Challenge: Report for the Norwegian Bishop’s Conference 1992. Oslo: Church of Norway Information Service. Crook, Paul. 2007. Darwin’s Coat-Tails: Essays on Social Darwinism. New York: Peter Lang. Darwin, Charles. 1981 [1871]. The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex: With an Introduction by John Tyler Bonner and Robert M. May. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

108  S. O. THORBJØRNSEN Darwin, Charles, and Gillian Beer. 1996 [1859]. The Origin of Species. Edited with an Introduction by Gillian Beer. The World’s Classics Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. Deutsch, Morton. 1985. Distributive Justice: A Social-Psychological Perspective. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Dugatkin, Lee Alan. 2006. The Altruism Equation: Seven Scientists Search for the Origins of Goodness. Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton University Press. Evans, M. Blair, et al. 2014. Building Cohesive Groups. In Routledge Companion to Sport and Exercise Psychology: Global Perspectives and Fundamental Concepts, ed. Anastasios G. Pappaioannou and Dieter Hackfort, 513–528. London; New York: Routledge. Festinger, Leon. 1954. A Theory of Social Comparison Processes. Human Relations 7: 117–140. Freud, Sigmund. 1955 [1895]. Studies on Hysteria: (1893–1895). In The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. Sigmund Freud, Josef Breuer, James Strachey, and Anna Freud. London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis. Freud, Sigmund. 1962 [1930]. Civilization and Its Discontents. New York: W. W. Norton. Gee, Chris J., and Luke R. Potwarka. 2014. Controlling Anger and Aggression. In Routledge Companion to Sport and Exercise Psychology: Global Perspectives and Fundamental Concepts, ed. Anastasios G. Pappaioannou and Dieter Hackfort, 650–667. London; New York: Routledge. Gorney, Roderic. 1972. The Human Agenda. New York: Simon and Schuster. Gould, Stephen Jay. 1988. Kropotkin Was No Crackpot. Natural History 97 (7): 12–21. Hanton, Sheldon, and Stephen D. Mellalieu. 2014. Coping with Stress and Anxiety. In Routledge Companion to Sport and Exercise Psychology: Global Perspectives and Fundamental Concepts, ed. Anastasios G. Pappaioannou and Dieter Hackfort, 430–445. London; New York: Routledge. Horney, Karen. 1937. The Neurotic Personality of Our Time. New York: Norton. Horney, Karen. 1999 [1939]. New Ways in Psychoanalysis, vol. 16: Psychoanalysis. International Library of Psychology. London: Routledge. Huizinga, J. 1955. Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Hyland, Drew A. 1995. Opponents, Contestants and Competitors: The Dialectic of Sport. In Philosophic Inquiry in Sport, 2nd ed., ed. William J. Morgan and Klaus V. Meier, 177–182. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Jacobsson, Eva-Maria, et al. 2008. The Impact of Market Competition on Journalistic Performance. Paper presented to the Journalism Research and education section of the International Association for Media and Communication Research, Stockholm, July 2008. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Eva-Maria_Jacobsson/publication/228639353_The_

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Impact_of_Market_Competition_on_Journalistic_Performance/links/00b7d525526e927aa4000000/The-Impact-of-Market-Competition-onJournalistic-Performance.pdf (16.3.2017). Johnson, William O. 1979. From Here to 2000. In Sport and Contemporary Society: An Anthology, ed. D. Stanley Eitzen, 442–447. New York: St. Martin’s. Johnson, David W., and Roger T. Johnson. 1985. Motivational Processes in Cooperative, Competitive and Individualistic Learning Situations. In Research on Motivation in Education: The Classroom Milieu, ed. Carole Ames and Russel Ames, 249–286. Orlando, FL: Academic Press. Keating, James W. 1995. Sportsmanship as a Moral Category. In Philosophic Inquiry in Sport, 2nd ed., ed. Willam J. Morgan and Klaus V. Meier, 144–151. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Kohn, Alfie. 1992. No Contest: The Case Against Competition, Rev. ed. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. Kretschmar, R. Scott. 1995. From Test to Contest: An Analysis of Two Kinds of Counterpoint in Sport. In Philosophic Inquiry in Sport, 2nd ed., ed. William J. Morgan and Klaus V. Meier, 36–41. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Loland, Sigmund. 2002. Fair Play in Sport: A Moral Norm System. Ethics and Sport. London: Routledge. Marthinsen, Edgar, et al. 2004. Fattig eller rik? slik ungdom ser det. Trondheim: NTNU, Institutt for sosialt arbeid og helsevitenskap. May, Mark A. 1937. A Research Note on Cooperative and Competitive Behaviour. American Journal of Sociology 42: 887–891. May, Rollo R. 1977. The Meaning of Anxiety, Rev. ed. New York: W. W. Norton. McDermott, John J. 1995. Emerson, Ralph Waldo. In The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi, 221–222. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McFee, Graham. 2004. Sport, Rules and Values: Philosophical Investigations into the Nature of Sport. Ethics and Sport London: Routledge. Mead, Margaret. 1976a [1937]. Interpretive Statement. In Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples, ed. Margaret Mead, 458–515. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith. Mead, Margaret. 1976b [1937]. Introduction. In Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples, ed. Margaret Mead, 1–19. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith. Mellalieu, Stephen D., et al. 2009. A Competitive Anxiety Review: Recent Directions in Sport Psychology Research. New York: Nova Science Publishers. Mestmäcker, Ernst Joachim. 1998. The Role of Competition in a Liberal Society. In The Social Market Economy: Theory and Ethics of the Economic Order, ed. Peter Koslowski, 329–350. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy. Berlin: Springer.

110  S. O. THORBJØRNSEN Midgley, Mary. 1993. The Origin of Ethics. In A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer, 3–13. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell. Mitchell, Stephen A., and Margaret J. Black. 1995. Freud and Beyond: A History of Modern Psychoanalytic Thought. New York: Basic Books. Novak, Michael. 1976. The Joy of Sports: Endzones, Bases, Baskets, Balls and the Consecration of the American Spirit. New York: Basic. O’Roark, Mary Ann. 1984. Competition Isn’t a Dirty Word. McCalls 66 (January): 121. Ogilvie, Bruce C., and Thomas A. Tutko. 1971. Sport: If You Want to Build Character, Try Something Else. Psychology Today 5 (5): 61–63. Orlick, Terry. 1978. Winning Through Cooperation: Competitive Insanity, Cooperative Alternatives. Washington, DC: Acropolis Books. Orwell, George. 1950. The Sporting Spirit. In Shooting an Elephant and Other Essays. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. Parry, S.J. 1998. Violence and Aggression in Contemporary Sport. In Ethics and Sport, ed. S.J. Parry and M.J. McNamee, 205–224. London: E & FN Spon. Pepitone, Emmy. 1980. Children in Cooperation and Competition: Toward a Developmental Social Psychology. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Polkinghorne, Donald E. 2015. The Self and Humanistic Psychology. In The Handbook of Humanistic Psychology: Theory, Research and Practice, 2nd ed., ed. Kirk J. Schneider, J. Fraser Pierson, and James F.T. Bugental, 87–104. Los Angeles, CA; London: Sage. Ridley, Matt. 1996. The Origins of Virtue. London; New York: Viking. Roberts, Glyn C. 2001. Advances in Motivation in Sport and Exercise. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Ruben, Harvey L. 1981. Competing. New York: Pinnacle Books. Russel, J.S. 2007. Broad Internalism and the Moral Foundations of Sport. In Ethics in Sport, 2nd ed., ed. Willam J. Morgan, 51–66. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Russel, Gordon W. 2008. Aggression in the Sports World: A Social Psychological Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sabiston, Catherine M., and Eva Pila. 2014. Social Comparison. In Encyclopedia of Sport and Exercise Psychology, ed. Gershon Tenenbaum and Robert C. Eklund. Los Angeles: Sage. http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ ehost/detail/detail?sid=373734c7-9a3a-4e94-b5ce-7899ddbd4971%40sessionmgr103&vid=0&hid=129&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#AN=713042&db=nlebk (14.2.2018). Sahney, S., et al. 2010. Links Between Global Taxonomic Diversity, Ecological Diversity and the Expansion of Vertebrates on Land. Biology Letters 6: 544–547. Shields, David Lyle Light, and Brenda Jo Light Bredemeier. 1994. Character Development and Physical Activity. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.

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Simon, Robert L. 1995. Good Competition and Drug-Enhanced Performance. In Philosophic Inquiry in Sport, 2nd ed., ed. William J. Morgan and Klaus v. Meier, 209–214. Champaign: Human Kinetics. Simon, Robert L. 2007. Internalism and Internal Values in Sport. In Ethics in Sport, 2nd ed., ed. Willam J. Morgan, 35–50. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Spence, Janet T., and Robert L. Helmreich. 1983. Achievement-Related Motives and Behaviour. In Achievement and Achievement Motives: Psychological and Sociological Approaches, ed. Janet T. Spence, 7–74. San Francisco, CA: W.H. Freeman. Suits, Bernard. 2007. The Elements of Sports. In Ethics in Sport, 2nd ed., ed. William J. Morgan, 9–19. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Thomassen, Tor Oskar, et al. 2013. Achievement Motivation, Achievement Goals, Competition Anxiety and Performance. In Psychological and Pedagogical Aspects of Motivation, ed. Herbert Zoglowek and Maria Alexandrovich, 11–21. Zürich; Berlin: Lit Verlag. Tutko, Thomas, and William Burns. 1976. Winning Is Everything and Other American Myths. New York: Macmillan. von Hayek, Friedrich A. 1944. The Road to Serfdom. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Wilson, Edward O. 1975. Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wilson, Edward O. 1978. On Human Nature. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Winsten, Jay. 1985. Science and the Media: The Boundaries of Truth. Health Affairs 4 (Spring): 5–23. Wynne-Edwards, V.C. 1962. Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd.

PART II

Competition and the Economy

CHAPTER 4

Competition and the Economy: Historical Perspectives

Introduction The history of the idea of competition is as old as the history of ­humankind. The events linked to Cain and Abel and to Jacob and Esau in the Old Testament1 show that rivalry and competition are an aspect of human life in common that has a long history. Similar stories and competitive relationships can be demonstrated in other ancient religions and cultures.2 The element of competition has followed human beings right from the start. This form of competition has a general character and a non-­organized form. It expresses the fact that competition has long been a part of human life. In some cases, it is linked to the human possibility of survival, and in other cases, with prospects of gaining power and influence. Anthropologically speaking, it is based on the knowledge that the human being thinks first of his or her own self and the possibilities of becoming better and having a better situation than others. An egotistic attitude to life raises the human being’s possibilities of life with regard to survival, prosperity, and power. Today’s competition to be the most wanted for important positions in a gang of young people represents a variant of this kind of general, non-organized competition for sought-after goods. In addition to this general form, there are also organized forms of competition, such as the competition for university places and in sport. The same applies to competition in the economic sphere. In today’s society, this competition too is general, since it influences many aspects of

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human life. It is organized in the sense that it is a result of a conscious choice of means and strategies in economic life. In this historical part, with my starting point in the dominant problem that this book studies, I shall primarily look at the history of the idea of competition in modern economics.3 The goal is to identify material that can shed a special light on the relationship between competition and anthropology. On the basis of a historical survey, I attempt to grasp both positive and negative views of the idea of competition in economic thinking and of its anthropological presuppositions and function. The presentation is rather broad, but emphasis lies with the thinking that finds expression in the development from the classical to the neoclassical and monetary economic tradition, because it is these traditions that play a decisive economic role today, first of all in a Western, but gradually more and more also in a global context (Britton and Sedgwick 2003, p. 16). In the course of the survey, I shall put this tradition into perspective by presenting some alternative and more critical traditions.

Economic Classicism In economic theory, the idea of competition is linked primarily to Adam Smith, who played an absolutely central role in the development of classical economic theory in the second half of the eighteenth century. There can be no doubt that it was here that the idea of competition had its decisive breakthrough; the ground had, however, already been prepared. One such preparation was Aristotle’s theory of value. He drew a distinction between utility value and exchange value. The former concerns the natural, material quality of the products, while the latter—expressed by the monetary value that is attached to the product—is the value that makes it possible to compare products and to choose between them. In a direct development from this distinction, Smith elaborated the idea of competition in the economy. Aristotle’s distinction between oikonomikê and krematistikê was, however, a critical comment on later development. For Aristotle, the former was the exchange that took place in a market in order to satisfy necessary and limited needs (natural exchange), while the latter exchange was related to the satisfaction of our unlimited wishes and was mostly linked to money as a means of exchange. An exchange of this kind is motivated by the desire for profit and increased wealth. It is generated by the human being’s desire, and this form of “the art of acquisition” is condemned by Aristotle (Aristotle and Ellis 2009, pp. 41–44).

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Another important preparation was the opposition to mercantilist protectionism in the first half of the eighteenth century. The idea that the economy must function on the basis of a state of equilibrium was particularly important here. Some held that this equilibrium had to be created through state intervention, since it could not be established as a consequence of the regulatory function of self-interest. Others, especially the so-called physiocrats (Landreth and Colander 2002, pp. 56–62), approved the idea that trade should look after itself, without state involvement. Their motto was laissez faire. It was better to trust in the natural strength of private interests than in coercion from outside. In this way, the market helped to achieve harmonious solutions to the conflicts that were caused by a relative scarcity. Freedom ensured that the consumer could get the best possible ware at the lowest possible price. It also gave positive encouragement to an experimental and innovative praxis. The latter alternative paved the way for economic competition. The view taken by Adam Smith (1723–1790) of the human being and of his or her place in society was decisive for the construction of his economic theory and for his view of competition as a factor in this theory. Smith parted company with the theory of the social contract (Thomas Hobbes), which was dominant at that time. Smith held that human beings had not chosen to integrate themselves into a societal relationship: they had always lived in societal relationships. Human society had developed spontaneously and had gone through four stages (hunter, pastoral, agricultural, and trading societies). This development, and the various ways of organizing society, were determined, in Smith’s eyes, by economic structures linked to the provision of support and to people’s livelihoods— that is to say, to the question of the meaning of private property. Smith’s goal was to describe the structures and principles that governed society. In Smith, the individual definition of human nature is not as clear as the societal definition, because he attaches differing weight in his two major works (Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith 2000 [1759]) and Wealth of Nations (Smith 1998 [1776])) to the significance of central human qualities. On one important point, however, there is a reasonable measure of clarity: to begin with, human beings are very similar. The differences are, in reality, smaller than one thinks. The differences that exist are due more to custom and education than to inheritance. If mature human beings in various professions are different, this is not a cause of the division of labor, but rather an effect of it (Smith 1998 [1776], pp. 23–24). There is less clarity about the question of egotism and self-interest.

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Later generations have often linked human egotism and self-interest4 to Smith. He saw these as the driving forces behind economic activity. The possibility that human beings see of improving their own position in society by means of trade, exchange, and the circulation of goods leads to division of labor and to specialization in economic life. The division of labor and specialization increase the possibility of profit. And Smith sees this possibility of profit, a profit that gives considerable satisfaction to one’s self-interest, as a motor that functions in economic life. In a celebrated passage in Wealth of Nations, he writes: It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. (Smith 1998 [1776], p. 22)

Human self-interest is, as it were, a factor promoting efficiency that is concerned with increasing a human being’s goods. When one needs other people’s help, one often chooses the most strategic path of appealing to their self-love: we argue that helping others is profitable.5 This is the basic picture of the economically active human being that is sketched in Wealth of Nations. This picture must, however, be complemented by the much more comprehensive discussion of what the human person is in his earlier work Theory of Moral Sentiments. The book begins with a discussion of the emotion of sympathy. This too is human, and it represents a kind of counterforce to human selfishness and self-interest. The human being is not only selfish; it is also in his or her interest that others should be successful, even if the only gain one has from this is the joy of seeing that it takes place. This is how Theory of Moral Sentiments begins: How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. (Smith 2000 [1759], p. 3)

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It may seem that there is a kind of balance in Smith between the selfish and the sympathetic, in such a way that the latter has a controlling or at least an adjusting function vis-à-vis the former.6 Amartya Sen has discussed the meaning of self-interest in Smith’s ­economic thinking (Sen 1987, esp. pp. 22–28). His starting point is the fact that very many economic theoreticians make self-interest the alpha and omega in both Smith’s economic universe and the general economic universe. Sen claims that this is not the case.7 First of all, Stoic thinking has a considerable influence on Smith. His Stoic understanding of “self-command” cannot be equated with “self-interest” or “selflove,” as some interpreters argue. He also learned from the Stoics that the human being is a part of a realm of nature, a citizen of the world who is at home here and who is willing to sacrifice his own small interest on behalf of the interests of the great fellowship. Second, some have read Smith in a highly selective manner. In many instances, his understanding of “prudence,” “self-command,” and “sympathy” is missing when Smith is interpreted in a one-sided manner in light of what he says about self-interest (Sen 1987, p. 23).8 Even Smith’s best known affirmation about the significance of self-interest for the economy (the passage about the butcher, the brewer, and the baker, quoted above) has often led to erroneous inferences. Smith’s point here is to explain why and how normal transactions in economic activity take place, and why and how the division of labor takes place (which is also the theme of the chapter from which the quotation is taken). Sen argues that there is a generalization here from an observation of what is customary (trade activity that is reciprocally advantageous) to what would be useful in a good society. In such a society, the question of what is a correct and good economic activity cannot be restricted to one single motivating factor (“self-love”). Third, Sen argues that we must not forget that what Smith writes about self-interest and self-love is expressed in specific contexts (including the historical context), as indeed Smith himself points out. One classic example in this context is Smith’s attitude to famine and the Poor Laws in England at that time.9 This ought to make interpreters more cautious about making self-interest an overarching and invariably valid principle in Smith’s thinking. Sen concludes that Smith’s thinking about human beings, motivation, and the market is not schizophrenic. On the contrary, the broad and nuanced view of the human being that we find in Smith is overlooked in modern economics, especially within a neoclassical framework.

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Smith puts forward a comprehensive economic theory that includes value, distribution, and economic growth. The question of competition is not equally relevant to all these points. Price determination, distribution, and the potential for economic growth in society in general are the most important, and these also largely belong together. At the same time, there are also other aspects of his theory that are important presuppositions for the very central position that competition has in his economic system. The division of labor is one example: where the division of labor and specialization increase, there are correspondingly larger presuppositions for competition among actors in the economic market. And in their connection with competition, these factors then open the door to economic growth and development. For Smith, there is a contradiction between monopoly and competition. A monopolistic situation, whether with only one or with a few actors in the market, is the enemy of good economic operations, which are promoted by free and universal competition (Smith 1998 [1776], p. 149). This is why Smith also opposes the imposition of political guidelines that restrict free competition: this creates undesirable inequalities. One example of such a guideline would restrict the number of actors who are given access to the market, in order to prevent a fall in prices that would lead to lower wages and profits. The alternative, which also leads to a reduction in competition, is to introduce so many actors that they are more numerous than would naturally be the case. This prevents the most efficient possible use of the workforce, and this can lead to significant differences in the wages earned by persons in the same profession and the same place (Smith 1998 [1776], pp. 117–118). Smith held that the regulation of merchants’ earnings that had been customary in England could be relevant if there were only one company in the market, and the products of this company were essential to life. But where this is not the case, “… the competition will regulate it much better than any assize” (Smith 1998 [1776], p. 144). The regulatory function of competition is absolutely central for Smith. This applies both to the number of actors in the market and to price determination. Competition between two merchants means that they sell their goods more cheaply than if only one of them had possessed the goods. If there were twenty sellers then competition would increase dramatically, and the possibilities of agreeing among themselves on an increased price would be greatly reduced. Some of the twenty might be ruined by such competition, but that is their problem; the important thing is that such competition, and perhaps such a ruinous effect, affects

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neither the purchaser nor the producer. On the contrary, it means that sellers must sell more cheaply and buy more expensively than if they had been in a monopolistic situation (Smith 1998 [1776], p. 215). Smith operates with two kinds of price, a market price and a natural price (Smith 1998 [1776], pp. 53–62). The market price is the price at which a ware is actually sold; the natural price expresses what such a ware is worth. This includes rent, wages, and what it costs to bring a ware to market, as well as the seller’s earnings. The market price varies in accordance with supply and demand. If the real demand is greater than supply, it will not be possible for everyone who wants to buy it to do so. In that case, something happens to the price. In order to make sure of getting such a ware, some will be willing to pay a price that exceeds the merchant’s outlay and the profit that he calculates in return for what he has done to bring such a ware to market. It is at this point that competition starts. According to Smith, the strength of competition can be related both to how great the lack of goods is and to how much wealth and luxury the competitors possess. In the opposite case, where supply is greater than demand, something will be sold for less than the price it cost to bring to market (that is to say, the natural price); and this price in turn will reduce the price of the entire offer of the ware. This is how competition regulates both the price and the profit that a seller can expect to make. In such a situation, the seller is also dependent on the extent to which he feels obliged to get the wares sold. Wares that could go rotten if stored create a much keener competition than ordinary wares. Where supply corresponds to demand, the market price will come closer to the natural price. The primary interest of the sellers is that supply should not exceed actual demand; this will avoid a fall in prices. The interest of purchasers is that supply should not be lower than this demand; this will avoid a rise in prices above the natural price. In this situation, producers and sellers can perhaps increase production. But once demand is satisfied, prices will again come closer to the natural price, which is “… the central price, to which the prices of all commodities are continually gravitating” (Smith 1998 [1776], p. 56). It is competition that is responsible for the dynamic in this gravitation. Somewhat later market economic theory calls this point of gravity the “competitive equilibrium,” which is regarded as ethically desirable (Collins 1997, p. 258). For Smith, the goal was not so much the realization of these limited economic ideals per se. His thinking about a free and competitive market began with the idea that this was a necessary guarantee of economic progress and development.

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I have mentioned several times Smith’s opposition to state intervention in economic activity. This applies both generally and in c­ onnection with the regulatory function of competition. This opposition is linked to at least three factors. The first concerns freedom. Under the i­nfluence of natural law philosophy, Smith held that everyone should be free to choose a profession and a dwelling place, and to conduct free trade both inside and outside the borders of the country. This freedom must be protected—also by the state. This, however, did not mean that he saw freedom infringed when the state demanded the payment of taxes, and when there were laws that protected workers. The presupposition was that these instruments were employed impartially by the state. Any state interventions that did occur must be well motivated. The second factor is connected with the question of who would exercise the regulatory function. Smith did not want economic life to be regulated by the king, supported by the rich and the aristocracy with the intention of protecting their own positions and increasing their wealth, since this was a monopolistic activity that hampered natural economic functioning. Naturally enough, a regulation conducted by responsible democratic organs was not on the agenda during that period. The third factor is linked to another aspect of Smith’s liberalism. He wanted economic life to be self-regulating. He justified this primarily on positive grounds: efficiency, and thereby the production of goods, are greater if the state does not intervene. Regulations harm workers and consumers and limit the possibility for the state to build up its wealth. Efficiency is created, not by steering, but by giving each individual the opportunity to attempt to realize his own economic interests. This allows individuals, without their being aware of it, to contribute in the best way possible to public good. It is here that the celebrated passage about the invisible hand has its place: They [the rich] are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life which would have been made had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants: and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species. When providence divided the earth among a few lordly masters, it neither forgot nor abandoned those who seemed to have been left out in the partition.10 (Smith 2000 [1759], pp. 264–265)

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Smith conceived of the invisible hand as an instrument for the distribution in equal parts of what human beings need in order to make a living. This distribution takes place on the basis of “providence,” not of a law like the laws of physics that steer the movements of nature. The invisible hand is the hand of providence, a hand that distributes impartially and justly. Smith also envisaged a form of reciprocity or mutuality in society: when its members help each other, society will blossom and be happy. A society in which people harm and destroy each other is a society doomed to destruction (Smith 2000 [1759], p. 124). Smith realized that a visible hand too could be necessary in some cases. There are aspects of the division of labor and trade that were not in the collective interests of society. Where freedom was used in such a way that it threatened the existence and prosperity of society, it had to be restricted (Smith 1998 [1776], pp. 78–79). Self-interest, freedom in the market, and the invisible hand: it is from these that Smith’s idea of competition derives its legitimacy.11 It contributes both to distribution and to make the market more efficient. In this sense, one can say that Smith regards economic growth (seen from the perspective of society as a whole) and competition as two realities that determine each other reciprocally. Competition promotes efficiency, and seeks to expand the market in order to earn more money, and this leads to economic growth; this in turn contributes to the accumulation of capital and to a division of labor that reduces prices and opens the way to new investments. Competition is one of the most important driving forces here. Economic growth is, in turn, a presupposition for the functioning of competition. In a stagnating market, competition cannot promote shared and individual goods in society. The utilitarian philosopher and national economist John Stuart Mill (1803–1873) is also regarded as an exponent of classical economics. He revised the classical national economy in keeping with the historical development, which took a somewhat different direction in the nineteenth century from what Adam Smith and others had predicted. Mill typically laid stronger emphasis on collective solutions, and he ascribed an important role to the state with regard to stabilizing the economy, ensuring good shared solutions, and protecting human beings. Although Mill belonged to the tradition that valued free competition and the market economy, he could also speak critically of the competitive society of mass production and of “… the trampling, crushing, elbowing and treading on each other’s heels, which form the existing type of social life …” (Mill et al. 1965, p. 754).

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Mill saw economic competition, for example, with regard to the determination of income, as something with an abstract theoretical anchoring. This was why it had to be modified on the basis of its factual relevance. Mill thus held that habit was a factor that played a very important role in the economy, both in the past and present. It was a societal power that modified and could even contradict predictions based on the theory of competition. He argued that if the idea of competition was nevertheless so central in economic theory, this was because it had a kind of scientific character. The academic concept of science, linked to exact and sure predictions and conclusions, was better suited to an abstract theory of competition than a theory, anchored in history, of the importance of habit (Landreth and Colander 2002, pp. 175–176). As a philosopher and economist, Mill made a particular contribution to the identification of the anthropological categories linked to economic activity. Although the expression “economic man,” which later became so important, cannot be traced back to Mill, it was he who created the idea of the “economic man” as an analytical category, and the expression arose as a consequence of Mill’s writings.12 In his economic analysis, Mill used a hypothetical subject that—precisely because it was characterized by narrow and well-defined motives—was suited to analytical purposes. These approaches in Mill (see Persky 1995, pp. 222–224), to the elaboration of the “economic man” as a hypothetical subject, subsequently came to dominate the field, especially in the shape this concept acquired in neoclassical economics: the “economic man” was one who desired wealth and who was capable of evaluating the efficiency of various means of obtaining this wealth. With reference to Mills himself, however, this picture needs considerable nuancing. If we look at his writings as a whole, his “economic man” is described as one with a somewhat broader spectrum of interests and somewhat more character. Four interests are central: amassing wealth, leisure, luxury, and reproduction. This indicates a rather restricted spectrum of motivations or interests, but Mill held that it was sufficiently realistic and operative for analytical purposes. We should note that rationality does not have the place here that it took on in later definitions of the “economic man,” where it almost became an identification. This does not mean that rationality played no role for Mill; but interests such as leisure and luxury do not simply accord with a rational determination to increase one’s wealth (Persky 1995, p. 223). On the contrary, they prevent such an increase. Nevertheless, Mill holds that they play a role for the “economic man.”

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Mill’s idea of the economic human being, gradually acquiring many qualities and characteristics that went beyond his original picture, became very important later on. Although there were some nuances in the classical period with regard, for example, to the significance of self-interest for economic choices, it was precisely this human motif that was to play a principal role in much economic thinking and that became integrated into many later theoretical constructions.

An Early Critic of Economic Classicism The classical economic theory gradually became the object of both criticism and further development. One critic must be mentioned especially: Karl Marx (1818–1883), who held that the dynamic in the market economy was linked to the innovative, and that this was also the arena where competition occurred. In this connection, Marx focused in particular on the importance of work (Landreth and Colander 2002, pp. 198–202). The price of a ware is not affected by whether it takes more or less time and work to produce, and this provides the basis for introducing machines that reduce the amount of work, since the ware can still be sold at the same price, and the profit increases. This functions as long as competitors have not copied the method (or gone bankrupt). That which is new soon becomes that which is normal. In that case, both prices and profit fall. The challenge in competition is to be so innovative with regard to methods of reducing the workforce and making new products that one is always ahead of one’s competitors. Marx’s critique of the competitive structure of the market economy was anchored in his theory of the value of work. The human being’s work is not related to capital, prices, or profit. Work gives the product a new value, which is created through the very work that is a presupposition for the product’s coming into existence. This is the intrinsic value of work, the basis for all creation of value in working life. And this is why salaries for work must be determined qualitatively, within certain quantitative boundaries. Accordingly, Marx regarded the competitive structure of the market economy as unethical: in order to maximize their economic self-interest, capitalists who own the means of production pay workers on the basis of what the latter need in order to survive, not on the basis of the value that their work has given to the product sold. This means that workers are alienated from their work and from their own selves. When innovative competition then means a reduction in

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the human workforce and in costs, the capitalists are left with the profit, while the workers face unemployment or the demand that they accept lower wages (or that they work more for the same salary). In this way, competition helps to increase alienation, and thereby also class conflicts. For Marx, this is also connected with the oppression and the lack of freedom that a capitalist system entails. Competition, and freedom as its presupposition, was the primary societal mechanism that stimulated, and was the driving force in, the struggle for power—first of all, economic power, and then also political power. Marx argues that the oppression and the inequalities that this brings can be overcome only if society takes over steering the economic system (Mestmäcker 1998, pp. 332–334).

The Neoclassical Theory A completely different form of criticism came from a quarter that was strongly dependent on the classical period, namely neoclassical economic theory.13 Neoclassical ideas were launched from ca. 1870 onward, and were developed by several generations of economists. Keywords for this school are the individual, marginal analysis, utility, need, rationality, and mathematics. The representatives of neoclassicism were convinced adherents of a free market economy, which would create an optimal and efficient allocation of resources in the market, via a price system in equilibrium. In order to optimalize the market economy, they oriented themselves to the individual and to the utility that the individual saw in a ware (methodological individualism). The focus was on price and value, and the perspective was microeconomic. They held that it was possible to employ mechanical, statistical, and mathematical models to arrive at ­ probable calculations of how the rational human being would act. Human ­self-interest and utility were to be investigated “mechanically.” The concept of utility was not understood in this tradition in absolute categories, but as marginal utility (Landreth and Colander 2002, pp. 227–232). Utility was related both to the quality and quantity of a ware. Increasing quantity led to a decrease in utility. In a region with abundant access to water, the marginal utility of water is small, and the price correspondingly low, although water is a necessity of life. The value of a ware was determined by this marginal utility (William Stanley Jevons 1835–1882), not by the value that the production of the ware gave it. In this way, the ware acquired a different value for the human

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being: it was shifted to the utility it had for the human being (subjective value theory). The utility was defined in relative terms. This entails a certain devaluation of the human being’s place and function in economic activity. Another neoclassicist (Carl Menger 1840–1921) linked utility to need: the value of a ware was linked to the utility it had in terms of satisfying the needs of human beings. The wares (which, logically enough, were also called utilities) were classified on the basis of this criterion. Given this starting point, if a ware was exchanged then this was not due to some inherent human tendency to trade and barter and to delight in doing so (as in Adam Smith: Smith 1998 [1776], pp. 21, 23–24), but to a varying assessment of the utility of such a ware and of the possibility of increasing utility reciprocally through exchange. The frequency of exchange depended on the various subjective values of the actors (utility and need). A third neoclassicist (Alfred Marshall 1842– 1924) elaborated a theory of prices with its starting point in neoclassicism’s ideas about utility and need; this theory has subsequently been a structural presupposition for a great deal of microeconomic thinking. The prices in the market are dependent on, and are formed through, the equilibrium between two factors: supply (production costs) and demand. One does not need a theory about natural prices (see Adam Smith) to explain market price, which is exclusively the result of a process toward equilibrium between supply and demand. In other words, it is the result of competition and the free play of market forces. This method of price formation also applies to the determination of wages, ground rent, and a firm’s profits, which are dependent on supply and demand in relation to workforce, property, and capital. The market forces could create a wished-for prosperity, but this is not automatically the case, since some negative social and economic consequences remained a possibility. Capitalism had a limited ability to distribute well, and a maximal satisfaction of needs could not always be attained through an equilibrium in the market. Nevertheless, state intervention was not the solution. Over the course of time, “disturbing” factors, like the formation of monopolies, would be broken down by competitive mechanisms in the market. Leon Walras (1834–1910) was the neoclassicist who emphasized free competition most strongly. He conceived of free competition as a kind of auction: an auctioneer called out the prices of goods, to which purchasers and sellers had then to react. Balanced prices emerge via a process of searching. These prices are related to the purchasers’ marginal utility

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and to the marginal costs of sellers or producers.14 Balanced prices of this kind cannot be isolated from other prices. Unlike Marshall, who argued methodologically that the problem of price formation could be solved by analyzing lesser components that were then aggregated (partial equilibrium analysis), Walras held that all the parts of an economy were dependent on each other and had to be included in one’s calculations from the outset (general equilibrium analysis).15 In order to do this, he developed a mathematical model. In Walras, we see an idealization of the free competitive economy as an optimal social system in which everyone is better off than in any other form of society. However, he could also point out that his idea of a general equilibrium presupposed a given distribution of resources in society. It was possible that another distribution of incomes and wealth could yield a better utilization of resources and an increase of the total utility of society. What is the significance of competition in neoclassical economics? It is particularly interesting here to look at its function in capital theory. In classical economics, profit was understood as the payment for risk, reimbursement for functioning as an entrepreneur, and payment for letting capital be used; now, economists began to speak of pure profit, which was what was left after the firm had received payment for all its expenditures. If the competition was perfect, and this situation continued over the course of time, so that there existed a long-term state of equilibrium, there were no such surplus means. If such surplus means did in fact exist, this was because there was no perfect competition, either in the absolute sense or in the sense that the development was en route from one state of equilibrium to another. In such a context, profit is called “unexpected profit” (“windfall profit”); that is to say, the profit is temporary and is related to market uncertainty: branches that yield returns will attract capital, competition will increase, and profit will fall. In terms of historical development, neoclassical economics is only one among several traditions. Its special characteristic is that it has been taken up again in the present day, thanks to various political prioritizations in influential Western countries. Its breakthrough makes it a dominant theoretical tradition in economics today, first of all in the West, but also on the global level, in parallel with the development of an integrated global economy.

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Institutional Economic Theory From the end of the nineteenth century onward, there emerged an ­alternative to anthropological thinking in the classical and neoclassical tradition. Here, the human being was interpreted in an institutional and cultural context. The human being is not an “economic man” determined primarily by individualism, self-interest, and rationality, but rather an individual marked by instincts, habits, and conventions that exist in his or her environment. This means that a cultural and societal relativism will be attached to every formation of an economic theory. Economics cannot be isolated to one area; rather, it is part of an ongoing societal process. Had these new presuppositions any consequences for how economic theorists related to the idea of competition? Three factors assumed particular importance in this context. They play an important role in the thinking of the leading American economic institutionalist, Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929), a man with Norwegian ancestry (Landreth and Colander 2002, pp. 327–340). First, human actions are determined by instincts, the most important of which are the group instinct and creative instinct. This is why the human being is oriented to a goal, enjoys creative activity, and cares for others. If these patterns of conduct are repeated, a pattern is established for the human being. This is how institutions arise, understood as ways of thinking that are customary for a majority of persons. Individual values cannot be isolated from the collective values. Veblen’s second point was a critique of psychological hedonism. Both classical and neoclassical economic thought built their theories about human behavior to a greater or lesser degree on psychological hedonism. Veblen criticized the idea that the human being is naturally characterized by the desire to maximize utility and happiness on the basis of self-interest. This characteristic is nothing other than societally annexed ideas, a motive force determined by groups in society that finds expression in norms and rules. In any given society, these can be so deeply accepted that there is a risk that they will be believed to be natural. Altruistic customs, norms, and rules are certainly also possible. And since such societal norms and rules are not natural, they can also be changed. Veblen wanted to use presuppositions from gestalt and social psychology to break the hegemony of self-interest and the maximization of utility in Western economics, for then people would have a better life in society.

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A third point was Veblen’s critique of rationalism, linked to the t­heory of “economic man.” He pointed out that irrational motivations and incentives also were significant for human conduct. Rationality was not the only decisive factor when people took their economic decisions; habits and established customs also played an important role. These elements—the theory of instinct that emphasized the human being’s group instinct and care for others, the critique of hedonism, and the emphasis on the significance of irrational elements for human conduct—indicated the problematic element at the very core of the idea of competition, and opened the door to an economic theory in which fellowship and cooperation were important categories. One consequence was a strong criticism of the exploitative capitalist system. Many people earned money without producing goods. At the same time, the monetary culture’s hunger for profit meant an enormous squandering of resources. There is a certain affinity here to Aristotle’s distinction between oikonomikê and krematistikê, and on some points also to the Marxist critique of capitalism. Veblen’s desire to create economic theories that could explain changes, and were more than simply analyses of states of equilibrium (cf. the importance of competition for the establishing of such states), was also a critical settling of accounts with the classical and neoclassical idea of competition. Veblen rejected the idea that one could expect socially advantageous results in markets that built on perfect competition and that realized a long-term state of equilibrium. Such a harmony does not exist, and this means that the idea of equilibrium cannot be used as a normative measure (as is done in classical and neoclassical theory). In economics, self-interest is and remains self-interest, not something that is then transformed into social interests. Veblen had some influence as a critic, but the lack of a holistic alternative and the limited acceptance of his anthropological concerns prevented his critique from being a genuinely transformative force vis-à-vis classical and neoclassical economic thinking (see Landreth and Colander 2002, p. 338). Veblen’s students developed his concerns to some extent (the importance of cooperation in the economy, and the need to reform capitalism), but they also represented a return to neoclassicism, by again underlining methodological individualism in the formation of theory,16 the significance of human rationalism for economic activity, the regulatory importance of the market, and the idea of competition (Rutherford 1994, pp. 162–163).

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Microtheoretical Aspects of the Idea of Competition It was not only institutionalism that problematized the ideas of perfect competition and the principle of equilibrium. The Depression in the 1930s and the Second World War had shown that the possibilities of perfect competition were limited. New formulations of theories about incomplete competition (monopolistic and oligopolistic) contributed new insights (Joan Robinson and Edward H. Chamberlain; see Brockway 2001, pp. 186–187). Some regarded the theory of maximization of profit as unrealistic as a general theory, and as inefficient in praxis (H. Leibenstein), while others claimed there was a contradiction between equilibrium and maximization, and replaced the concept of maximization with processual categories (Nelson and Winter 1982). Such viewpoints, however, lacked the inherent strength to overcome the theory of perfect competition. The fundamental theories and anthropological presuppositions of classicism and neoclassicism were in reality repeated and further underlined, with a corresponding importance for the view of competition in economic thinking. This applied among other things to the theory of expected utility. Some held that the starting point was not only that the human being wanted to maximize his own utility, but that he must do this, if he is a rational being (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947). One modification of the idea of competition between firms is linked to the cooperative networks that have developed and have been established at the so-called meso level (the level between the firms and the total market) in recent decades. With information technology and globalization as catalysts, various sectors of industry have felt the desire to cooperate in order to protect common interests and solve common problems. It has been recognized that a firm’s ability to survive is based not only on its own competitive power, but also on external factors, such as state intervention and legislation. Some parts of the element of competition are thus moved up one level to what are called “industrial clusters.” Within a cluster, there are elements of both competition and cooperation (Piore and Sabel 1984; see also Amdam and Bjarnar 2015). Some of the presuppositions of classical and neoclassical ideas of competition were also modified on the basis of so-called game theory (see Ridley 1996, pp. 53–66; see also Morris 1994; Vega-Redondo 2003), which has played an important role in economic thinking in the past fifty

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to sixty years. Game theory is a theory or analytical method that attempts to describe what happens in situations where various people’s actions influence each other reciprocally. Unlike the classical economic theories, the idea here is that there is always a mutual dependence between human beings. Rational individuals’ desire for maximization of their own expected utility cannot be isolated from the expected actions of other, equally rational human beings; rather, they must take account of them. The course of the game, the strategic human actions in a context involving several persons, depends on a number of factors: What information do the players have? Is it complete? Is it shared? What memory can be assumed to exist of decisions taken earlier on in the game? Is it a cooperative or a non-cooperative game? If all the players initially want to maximize their own utility, must one then take others’ choices into consideration, if one is to reach the same goal? The optimal strategy varies as a function of the strategic choices taken by other players. A solution is possible if the strategic choices of the various players are such that their expectations are reciprocally fulfilled (the so-called Nash equilibrium). If several such equilibria exist in a game, this promotes communication and coordination. Various theories have been elaborated to explain how solutions are to be found in this situation. The possibility of reaching a solution is strongly related to the question of the degree of information among the participants. In the real world, however, the lack of information is well known, and it constitutes a significant objection to the operationality of game theory. Its ideas of reciprocal dependence, of information, and of the reciprocal fulfillment of the players’ expectations, presuppose a somewhat different view of the human being than we find in classical and neoclassical economic theory. Game theoreticians also claim that a view of the human being that so strongly emphasizes the rational, the egotistic, and the maximization of one’s own interest does not accurately portray the real-life human being, who exists in a tension between the egotistic and the altruistic, who lives in a world in which cooperation between human beings actually takes place and where it can be more profitable to cooperate than to seek to get by on one’s own (cf. the “Prisoner’s dilemma” game; Chapter 3). An individual rationality in a situation of choice (one’s own interest, rather than cooperation) can lead to results that are collectively irrational (when all who are involved lose out by failing to cooperate). This, of course, does not mean that cooperation is a universal characteristic of human society. The scale of

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cooperation is wide. It is this view of the human being and this possibility of cooperation that are presupposed by game theory, which attempts to discover solutions in situations where several actors who are dependent on each other seek to maximize their own utility. This way of thinking does not, however, exclude competition. The starting point for game theory is a kind of methodological individualism that places people in a relationship of competition with each other. But the implementation of the competition and its impetus are modified by interdependence and by the possibility of cooperating in order to reach solutions. It is also important to note that these solutions often imply a greater profitability than individual, self-interested solutions. The question of human conduct, and of what determines it, is also actualized in another important economic theory, welfare theory. Human wellbeing and utility are utterly central here. The arena is not only the individual, but the individual in society. The goal in this theory is to maximize profit at the societal level. In utilitarian thought, which was used as a philosophical tool in this context, the goal is to maximize utility for as many persons as possible. It is, however, problematic to measure this utility on an individual level. It was thought that one solution might be the so-called Pareto criterion, which measured the utility of conditions in society and was thus independent of single individuals.17 This way of thinking has been criticized from two perspectives. First of all, a person’s wellbeing is not linked only to the result or effect of the acts they perform; it can also be linked to the act itself. In traditional welfare theory, this dual perspective is lost, since the act becomes only an instrument in the attainment of the goal. Second, can a person’s wellbeing be measured exclusively on the basis of utility? Are not the circumstances that influence a person’s life, such as relationships with others, also factors that determine the measure of utility—especially when it is a question of collective utility? Does not the question of utility also concern a person’s possibilities, freedoms, and rights? Besides this, an individual can be mistaken about what is useful, and the question of what is subjectively experienced as useful will be dependent on the level of his or her aspirations. An economic welfare theory that does not take these objections seriously shows that it refuses to accept the real plurality of what people regard as utility. This means that the theory has a problematic distance from the real world. Instead of holding fast at all costs to self-interest, the maximization of utility, and Pareto optimization, it is possible to think that in some cases, one can be content to establish

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a partial and incomplete hierarchy of various states (Sen 1970). This critique is also a critique of the presuppositions and parameters represented by competition as a means for the maximization of utility. It is not utility alone that can be seen as human wellbeing; this calculation involves several factors that cannot be included within the maximization of utility on the basis of competition and Pareto optimization. The plurality in the reality of human life in general, and in the motives that influence human activity in particular, make it problematic to understand competition from only one viewpoint, as a means for maximizing utility in economic thinking on the societal level. According to neoclassical theory, competition and the maximization of utility have a large and positive effect in relation to accumulating and allocating resources. I have already touched on several problems connected to the goal of utility and to the possibility of comparing personal utility in a societal context. In economic theory in general, and in welfare theory in particular, the Pareto criterion seems to have acquired a very central position. Here, however, there also arises the question of a just distribution. Is this important, and what criteria could be used in order to define what is just? Equality, understood as non-envy, has been suggested as one possibility, but this does not exclude the possibility of large differences in welfare; and it can easily come into conflict with the Pareto criterion. The same applies to justice as fairness (see Feldman and Kirman 1974). In general, we can also say that many economists are cautious about including considerations linked to justice, since they hold that the primary task of economics and of economists is to identify how an efficiency in allocation can be attained. Potential negative effects of this, for example, in connection with the distribution of income, must be left to politicians to resolve. This is caused partly by an aversion to explicit assessments of value and partly to the lack of an analytical apparatus that can tackle questions linked to justice. What does this tell us? It may indicate that economists’ use of the maximization of utility, the Pareto criterion, and competition as means of optimization include certain presuppositions (whether conscious or unconscious) that create a distance vis-à-vis ethical and normative guidelines. Since these normative matters are related to the question of distribution of resources, this entails the risk of excluding from one’s assessments important ethical considerations about the lives, values, and equality of human beings. One can have the impression that by limiting the attention paid to the ethical reflections of human beings and to the

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significance of ethics for human choices and actions, this national economic thinking has to some extent taken a position at a distance from reality and from the presuppositions that apply where human action takes place. The human being is determined by other factors than self-interest and the maximization of utility alone, and one’s choices do not always follow the solutions that are generated by applying the Pareto criterion. The human being is more than the neoclassical “economic man.” A similar criticism of the lack of closeness to reality has also been leveled against general equilibrium theory (see Blaug 1992). As I have pointed out above, this theory largely functions as the basis for a free market economy and competition, and very many economists regard it as an excellent way to solve fundamental economic problems. They believe that, without external intervention and planning, but with the aid of the invisible hand, this theory offers an instrument in economic activity where necessary information is treated and the efficiency in the market is assured. With the starting point in Leon Walras’ work on general equilibrium, an attempt has been made to identify the conditions on which this equilibrium builds. Some progress has been made, but it has never been successfully shown that the equilibrium is stable and unique. In other words, this theory has not succeeded in demonstrating that the market could be led to equilibrium on the basis of the acts of human beings and via the invisible hand. Despite many attempts, it has proved impossible to provide a scientific underpinning of the correctness of laissez-faire in economic thinking.18 This, however, did not mean, and does not mean, that the theory has been abandoned. The theory of general equilibrium, with its individualistic, almost atomistic and rationalistic point of departure, and the actors’ conduct within isolated and given limited conditions, still has a very central place in economic science. The atomistic, isolationist, and strictly rational presuppositions have, however, led more and more people to ask whether there exists any bridge between the world of theory and the real world. The theory represents a closed system. Its relevance to the open system of the factual economy has been questioned, even by some of its most important adherents. Milton Friedman’s thesis (Friedman 1953, pp. 3–43, esp. pp. 39–43)19 that the actual suppositions are devoid of significance as long as the predictions of this theory are correct, may reflect an attitude that explains why this discrepancy between theory and the real world and genuine human conduct has not been taken with full seriousness.

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Macrotheoretical Aspects of the Idea of Competition Macroeconomic thinking is likewise characterized by self-regulation and competition. The normal state of the economy is an approximate equilibrium and approximately full employment. A decrease in employment is compensated by reduced wages, which contribute to increased employment and a re-establishing of the equilibrium. In the same way, investments and savings keep each other in check. The state budget and the balance of payments in relation to foreign countries must both be in balance; a deficit in these areas is negative. In the 1930s Depression, many recognized that there was no agreement between this theoretical approach and the real world. The economy was far from a state of equilibrium, and employment sank dramatically. The mechanisms that, according to the theory, ought to have had a stabilizing function and improved the situation did not work. From a neoclassical perspective, however, this crisis was regarded as merely an expression of chance (and hence self-correcting) deviations from the perfect and efficient market ideal. John M. Keynes (1883–1946) was the economist who tackled this situation and launched an alternative, which was expressed above all in his book The General Theory (Keynes 1936; see also Landreth and Colander 2002, pp. 418–425). Keynes regarded state intervention as completely necessary in order to regulate and stabilize the economy, which was not self-regulating. Situations that lay outside the normal state of things envisaged by the theory—and there could be many such situations— had to be met in a completely different way than that envisaged by traditional neoclassical theory. It was necessary to fight against economic downturns; one could not just sit and wait until the swings postulated by the neoclassical theory would actually turn around. Nor was it necessary to balance the state budget every year; this mattered only in the long term. In this way, profound depressions could be avoided. Keynes prescribed a capitalism of a mixed economic type, in which state intervention was necessary in order to create stability in both the short and long term. These interventions were a presupposition of long-term economic growth and of the control of employment. The idea of a general equilibrium related to competition, as neoclassicism understood it, was rejected. There was no mechanism that could create such an equilibrium in all markets. Keynes saw this against the background of the factors of uncertainty linked to economic theory; in most instances, these were outside

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the control of individual actors. It was not possible to derive real effects from nominal effects. Assessments made by businesses of potential profits through investments were often nothing more than qualified guesses. The theories of Keynes and his successors won significant acceptance in the economic policies of the West after the Second World War. Full employment and economic growth were the result of an economic policy in which state interventions stabilized the economic situation and made the good aspects of capitalism fruitful in a social economic sense. The situation changed in the 1970s, especially as a result of so-called stagflation (the simultaneous emergence of inflation and rising unemployment). This development was not foreseen in Keynesianism’s economic theories. The criticism of Keynesianism was leveled above all by monetarism. Its most prominent representative, Milton Friedman (1912–2006) (see also Chapter 5), had a very positive view of the free market as a means to organize resources, and he was correspondingly skeptical about state intervention, which must be kept to a minimum. It was particularly important to avoid the inflation spiral to which expansive state actions against unemployment tended. Unemployment can be fought only by using the old instruments: efficient allocation of resources, ­ economic growth, and competitive power. This strategy implies cutting public expenditure, minimizing the budget deficit, and limiting the amount of money in circulation. These tightening measures would reduce inflation. Initially, unemployment would rise, but it was held that, in the long term, the reduced inflation would also cause unemployment to sink (Friedman 1956; Friedman and Friedman 1962; see also Landreth and Colander 2002, pp. 400, 425–426). This recipe was tried to no small degree from the 1980s onward in the West. Inflation sunk, but not unemployment, which remained at a permanently high level in many countries. Although there are some new approaches in monetarism, it is governed to a large extent by classical and neoclassical thinking. Economic competition certainly plays an important role in both the macro and the micro levels of the economy. A reduction in public expenditure is particularly important. This way of thinking about the economy of society entails that services that have been taken care of by the state in many countries (and perhaps most of all in Scandinavian lands) are to be taken care of by the private hand. It is thought that this is better and cheaper. Obvious examples from Scandinavia include exposing the running of hospitals and public transport to competition.

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Another form of the critique of Keynesianism is the so-called new classicism and its theory of rational expectations (Landreth and Colander 2002, pp. 428–430). This view holds that there is no point in conducting economic policies on a macro level. People learn to anticipate, and very quickly adapt to, the changes that state interventions entail, and this makes such interventions ineffective. This meant that macroeconomic theories underestimated human rationality. It was much easier to understand the macroeconomic dimension on the basis of traditional microeconomic suppositions. The human being’s rational expectations correspond to the predictions that are found in microeconomic theories. This, in combination with the idea that there is always equilibrium in the economy, means that every project of a systematic economic policy is dead at birth. For new classicists, the market is characterized by competition and equilibrium, and is hence completely self-regulating. To take one example: unemployment is explained by saying people do not want to work because their wages are not high enough. New classicism helped macroeconomic thinking to move further in the direction of traditional neoclassical presuppositions.

The Idea of Competition in Some Alternative Economic Theories One current in economic thought that is fundamentally positive to the classical and neoclassical idea of competition is the so-called Public Choice school (Calcagno 2010). The main point here is the application of economic theories about market decisions in the context of political science. The competition that functions as an efficient regulator in the market is also thought to have a function in spheres that traditionally have been looked after by the public sector, such as the health service. A praxis that takes its starting point in those structures that characterize private activity, including market competition, would have a significant inherent gain in terms of increased efficiency. Exposure to competition is regarded as an appropriate instrument here. One essential presupposition of this way of thinking is a methodological individualism that sees groups as nothing other than the sum of the individuals who make them up and of the preferences that they have as individual human beings. A group has no preferences beyond what can be derived from the group or the collective itself. The group and society are a mechanism where instruments from the economic arena can function instrumentally.

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We find a similarly positive attitude to the classical and new classical idea of competition in the Neo-Austrian school of economics, but with the desire to adjust the idea of perfect competition and understand equilibrium in a somewhat different manner. Equilibrium is a situation in which, ultimately, everyone is content. The idea of perfect competition is replaced by the idea of an entrepreneurial or dynamic competitive process. Competition is like a voyage of discovery in which new knowledge and information are diffused, creating a dynamic that tends to establish a harmonious equilibrium. Competition means moving boundaries between the known and unknown. Profit is to be found where the entrepreneur is alert and discovers possibilities of earning money, possibilities that others have not discovered (Landreth and Colander 2002, pp. 494–496).20 This theory functions in the framework of a strong individualism, and thus has points of contact with every form of liberalism. Free market choices create an optimal economic system and the best of all worlds. Another current in economic theory that seeks to modify aspects of neoclassical economics, with consequences for thinking about competition, is so-called behavioral economics (Camerer and Loewenstein 2004, esp. pp. 3–14). This approach is based on the following conviction: if we take the psychological presuppositions of economic analysis more seriously, there will be an improvement in economic reality, both theoretically and with regard to predictions and the elaboration of economic policy. This does not mean the complete abandonment of a neoclassical thinking based on maximization, equilibrium, efficiency, and competition. The significance of the psychological insights, which traditional neoclassical theory has usually rejected, is now seen. The work on problems linked to expected and discounted utility, choices under uncertainty, and so-called intertemporal choices21 led to the rediscovery of psychological insights that already existed in the classical tradition. Behavioral economics acknowledges an idea that was also found in Adam Smith, namely, that a loss triggers stronger feelings, relatively speaking, than a victory. In an economic context, this idea is more realistic than the traditional idea of a continuous concave utility function related to wealth. This way of thinking also has consequences for the significance of competition in economic activity. It is claimed, psychologically speaking (Fehr and Schmidt 2004), that it is untrue that everyone is concerned to satisfy material self-interest (as almost all modern economic models presuppose). Motifs linked to justice influence how some people act—also

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as economic actors. The same applies to cooperation: many persons are more prepared to cooperate than a competition-oriented self-interest model assumes. This is demonstrated by empirical investigations both in and outside the laboratory. How is it possible for things to point in such different directions? Behavioral economics gives the following explanation, on the presupposition that in addition to those who think on the basis of self-interest, there are also some persons who are motivated by justice or fairness. Fairness is understood here as completely different from inequality in the question of distribution. The desire is that profits may be distributed more equally, and some persons are willing to give up material gains in order that this can be realized. This aversion to inequality can certainly be self-centered: one is not concerned with inequality among people in general, but one holds that there ought to be equality in the relationship between one’s own profit and that of others. This offers an explanation of how competition and cooperation, equality and inequality, justice and injustice can be understood within one and the same coherent framework. The psychological basis for this is identified in the significance of comparison in society and in the human being’s strong disinclination to lose out. This in turn makes it possible to claim that the plurality of preferences is influenced by the circumstances in which the economic activity takes place. In some circumstances, a few self-interested persons can bring a large number of persons, who think on the basis of equality and justice, to act entirely on the basis of self-interest; the opposite is also true. In this way, the significance of competition in an economic context is relativized. It can contribute both to inequality and to equality. The result is dependent on the circumstances in which the economic activity takes place. We also find a similar expansion of the understanding of competition in endogenous growth theory (Romer 1994; 2012, pp. 101–149). With the focus on the possibilities and terms for economic growth, a complementarity is envisaged between competition and cooperation. Variations in growth are seen here in connection with private and public choices. In the real world, market situations are often imperfect. One must take account of the forces (both private and public) that are at work within the system itself. The fundamental driving force in the process of growth is knowledge, not capital. Economic growth is a learning process in which growth occurs in keeping with the ability to combine and apply the production resources that are available. Unlike technology and machine capital, knowledge, as a human capital, yields increasing

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returns. New knowledge spreads: it is true that the first one to initiate innovative projects has a time-limited monopoly on the products generated by knowledge, but it quickly spreads and creates new possibilities for others too. Such knowledge can be consumed free of charge, and the marginal costs for using it are therefore minimal. It is thus important to strike a balance between the importance of continual innovation and the spreading of established knowledge. Knowledge qua wares cannot be given a market price in the same way as other wares. An optimal price does not lead to optimal production and consumption. Knowledge is a kind of collective utility that cannot be shared. Here, however, there lies a risk: in a market-oriented system, knowledge can be given a lower priority, and the theory underlines the need for society to work against such a counterproductive praxis. There is, however, a potential here too: competition in the market does not disappear, but indirectly the market also remains characterized by an element of cooperation. This element of cooperation that is linked to knowledge as a collective utility contains an explicit productive and expansive element. Another economic current in which cooperation plays a role in the understanding and application of competition in the economy—in this case, via the idea of altruism—is feminist economics (Hewitson 2010).22 Feminist economics criticizes a fundamental category in neoclassical theory, namely, “economic man.” Women feel that they are not included in this model, which is too masculine and has insufficient contact with the real world. “Economic man” is also criticized for being a social construction marked by the historical period and the circumstances in which this model was created. A revision is desired, by way of deconstruction, which entails a critique of the foundations on which leading economic theories are built: rationality, individuality, and self-interest. Such qualities are ascribed primarily to the man. Since the man is the protagonist in the public sphere, these are also the presuppositions of the economics that belongs there. The woman’s arena is the private sphere and the home, which is the place for qualities such as emotions, altruism, and an orientation to fellowship. This dichotomization between a private, altruistic sphere and a public sphere marked by self-interest is not accepted, and it has no contact to reality. It is impossible to assume the existence of watertight partitions between the public and the private, between self-interest and altruism. The human being who cannot escape living with others in the public sphere cannot be thought of as completely isolated within a special area of the same sphere.

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This feminist protest is also directed strongly against much classical economic thinking, including its understanding of competition. Feminist economics wants a greater breadth in the definition of the presuppositions underlying the conduct of the human being as an economic actor. A duality of self-interest and altruism implies that competition cannot be isolated from the idea of cooperation. An economic thinking that includes care for others and human relations as presuppositions of conduct can surely not be content with the old classical or neoclassical solutions. A somewhat earlier critic of these solutions was equally dissatisfied with them. Joseph A. Schumpeter (1883–1950) (Landreth and Colander 2002, pp. 411–414)23 found the theories about actors who optimalize and create static equilibria (the classical theories) problematic. He held that there are forces in the economic process that alter the equilibrium. One such force is the innovative entrepreneur, who continually breaks the equilibrium in his hunt for profit. Another force is the bank. If the goals that the innovator finds most profitable are to be attained, capital is required, as well as someone who is willing to accept the risk that is linked to the time before the ware comes to market. The bank, which accepts this risk, is not in a circular flow of prices, and this means that the equilibrium is lost. But it is lost only temporarily; the process of innovation is an interval between the temporary equilibria of the circular flow. Schumpeter’s model is a kind of dynamic non-equilibrium model. Capitalist society can and should be thought of as an evolutionary process in which it is the innovations created by businesses that launch the process and drive it forward. In this creative process, the economic structure is revolutionized from within. All the time, something perishes and something new is created (a creative destruction). In this context, the understanding of competition is not determined by competition about prices and advertising, but rather by competition that is linked to the struggle between old and new, from new wares, new technology, new sources of raw materials, and new forms of organization. Schumpeter sees the possibility of profit in this competition, on the basis of innovation and investments made by the firm’s leader. We find a somewhat different critique in John K. Galbraith (1908– 2006) (Landreth and Colander 2002, pp. 483–489), who holds that the American competitive economy is not in fact a genuine competitive economy (to Galbraiths economy, see also Chapter 5). It is marked to a much larger extent by a balance between monopolies and oligopolies.24

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If large-scale production in America is to function effectively, it requires firms that are so large that a broad competition does not take place. The alternative is what Galbraith calls countervailing powers. In the modern American economy, classical and neoclassical economic bargaining had been replaced by a balance between massive market forces, such as trade associations, consumer organizations, and state regulations. When one consumer grew strong, this was countervailed by the power of a large retailer. Marxist economists too had similar views of capitalism: the price level was determined not by competition, but by monopolies and cartels. Competition consisted in raking in the largest possible market share via advertising and product differentiation. Any profits that came from improved productivity led not to lower prices but to increased profits for firms (Landreth and Colander 2002, pp. 472–474). The critique in ecological economics is much harsher (Daly and Farley 2011). Faced with today’s environmental problems, many adherents of neoclassical economics insist that these can be solved only through a stronger commitment to technological and economic development. Nature is strong and resilient, and it can heal the wounds caused by the destruction of the environment. Economists with an ecological orientation do not accept this. They maintain that a continued economic growth, with the impoverishment of nature that this presupposes and with competition as the central motor in development, will lead to irreparable damage to nature. They also express doubt about whether the economy is a stable system in which economic growth and the environment can be in harmony with one another.25 Other economists in this tradition broaden the perspective and claim that more and more economic growth not only creates environmental problems, but also prompts people to seek other non-material “wares” that are scarce precisely in a context of economic growth: space, silence, untouched nature, and so on. Growth also brings a banalization of societal morality, so that what was previously regarded as a means to achieve a better life now becomes the goal itself. The means are commodities to be sold, and they are used as such—not as they were originally envisaged, that is to say, as a means to attain something else. This survey of some economic theories has shown that, especially in the period after the Second World War, a number of alternatives to traditional neoclassical thinking about competition have developed. Its focus on marginalism and global rationality, its belief in the theory of marginal productivity, the equilibrium theory, its analysis of supply and

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demand, and a belief in the positive meaning of laissez-faire have all been challenged.26 This is connected in part with the importance that John Maynard Keynes’ theory acquired, but also with the fact that new societal presuppositions demanded other solutions. Modern economics seems to have a broader worldview as its framework of reference. Simultaneously the construction of models and mathematical analyses that go beyond pure assessments of the maximum and minimum play a larger role.27 Unlike neoclassical thinking, it sees the possibility of multiple models of equilibrium, or indeed of dynamic models that do not envisage any equilibrium at all. The idea of global rationality and of individuals who maximize their utility is replaced. In game theory models, the focus can be on group utility; other models can emphasize cognitive dissonance. In microeconomics, there is an openness to developing models based on altruism rather than self-interest. This development among scholars did not, however, make its way into textbooks about economics, or at least not into textbooks pitched at a lower level. Accordingly, neoclassical thinking was the dominant influence on practical economics throughout the entire twentieth century.28 It was easy to apply in many fields and was simpler than complicated model analyses. It offered positive possibilities for application in everyday economic praxis. It helped to resolve questions and problems that occurred. In this way, the idea of competition, which was anchored primarily in neoclassical economic thought, acquired an important and influential function in modern economic praxis too. And this function remains determinative in many Western economies even today. Something similar must also be said about what became the most important element in economic thinking, in anthropological terms. The emphasis on individualism, self-interest, and rationality that characterized both classical and neoclassical economics won wide acceptance, something it still retains today. The idea of “economic man” includes these qualities of the human being. This understanding has, however, been challenged by the claim that economic activity must also include fellowship and cooperative aspects, on the basis of collective and altruistic aspects of the human being. In reality, human beings are handed over to one another. To think in atomistic, isolationist, and strictly rational terms does not accord with reality, nor can human wellbeing be seen only in terms of what is useful. The spectrum is wider. In economic thinking, the anthropological presuppositions are sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit. The individual and self-interested

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elements appear very explicitly, but they can also be implicit because they are completely taken for granted. This can obscure the fact that economic activity and economic competition definitively presuppose anthropological values. Our look at the history of competition has revealed that the idea of competition actualizes a series of central anthropological categories, most of them in contrasting or dual frameworks. The various economic theories can be classified in relation to these categories, namely, the relationships between the individual and the collective, between self-interest and altruism, between freedom and being bound, between rationality and irrationality/emotionality, and between man and woman. When any one of these categories is given a one-sided emphasis, in terms of elaboration and putting into practice an idea of economic competition, this opens the door to a reductionist view of the human being. This happens when the price of wares are determined exclusively by competition in the market—and not in addition to the value that the human being adds through his or her work. And the same happens when an ideal about the highest possible efficiency, that aims to maximize utility, makes the human being nothing more than a means in the allocation of economic resources—and not also a goal in themselves.

Notes





1. See Gen 4 and Gen 27. On this, see Cohen (1983). 2.  See, for example, Kaplan and Schwartz (1998), where Jewish family rivalry (between Jacob and Esau) is compared with Greek family rivalry. 3.  This historical survey of the idea of competition in economic theory builds on historical presentations, but it is eclectic in the sense that it is read and used from a special perspective (competition and anthropology). On some decisive points, however, I go directly to the primarily literature; this is true especially of Adam Smith. 4. The concept of self-interest is relatively recent. It was first employed by natural law philosophers and liberal thinkers in the eighteenth century, whence it found its way into the burgeoning social economic thinking. The reality, however, has followed human beings from the dawn of time. On this, see Holmes (1997). 5. “He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them” (Smith 1998 [1776], p. 22).

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6. For an account of the debate about the relation between the two books and the question about Smith’s view, see Dixon and Wilson (2012, pp. 66–74). 7. Similar views have been put forward, for example, by P. Werhane, who holds that this one-sided interpretation of Smith is due to the influence of Herbert Spencer’s social Darwinism on liberal thinking in the twentieth century. Where we see that Smith attaches special emphasis to self-interest, the point is that economic and trade transactions are hampered by bureaucracy and by other causes. On this, see Werhane (1999). 8. In this context, it is useful to see Smith in connection with his teacher, F. Hutcheson, who was a utilitarian, but did not accept a one-sided thinking in terms of goals and means, with self-interest as the exclusive goal. The individual serves himself best by being a servant of totality. On this, see Taylor (1989, pp. 259–265). The utilitarianism that is often ascribed to Smith—although it is not in fact so straightforward to identify him with it—corresponds more to positions taken by J. Bentham, the classic utilitarian. However, Bentham’s principal work was published only one year before Smith’s death. 9. It was often held that famine was caused by traders. Sen’s point is that although Smith was opposed to steering and regulating trade, this does not mean he accepted that famine was due to trading activity, and that it was therefore meaningless to support the poor. Smith did not accept this link. Either famine was due to what he called a genuine scarcity, or else it was a consequence of a process that involved market mechanisms—but that lay outside the control of the traders themselves. This is why Smith could support the Poor Laws under certain conditions. See Sen (1987, pp. 25–27). 10. Quotation from The Theory of Moral Sentiments. The same point is also made in Wealth of Nations: “He [the individual employer] generally, indeed neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention … By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good” (Smith 1998 [1776], pp. 291–292). 11. On this, see also the point made by P. Werhane, that self-interest and competition in Smith cannot be isolated from his thinking about justice, and that competition and cooperation must be seen from a complementary perspective. Following Smith, Werhane affirms that the market functions best “under conditions of economic liberty grounded

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in commutative justice (the ‘rule of law’) when people are parsimonious and prudent, and cooperative as well as competitive” (Werhane 1999, pp. 337–338). See also Wells and Graafland (2012, pp. 326–341). 12. On the question of the literary origin of the expression, see Persky (1995, pp. 221–222). 13.  For an overview, see Landreth and Colander (2002, pp. 218–321). Around 1900, the economist T. Veblen was the first to employ the term “neoclassical” (see Aspromourgos 1986) as a negative designation of A. Marshall’s economics. At this time, neoclassical economics was not a designation of mainstream economics in the United States; institutionalism played a much larger role. It was only around 1930 that neoclassical thinking won acceptance among academics and researchers in the United States. According to Landreth and Colander, investigation of the neoclassical vision was complete at the end of the 1950s. After this, it was a question of applying the theory. This was successfully accomplished in many fields, although the ability of the theory to understand the contemporary economic reality gradually became more restricted, as a consequence of new societal presuppositions. 14. Marginal costs (or border costs) are the extra costs entailed by increasing the volume of production (or of sales), when this is set in relation to the last produced or last sold unit. 15. On this, see Landreth and Colander (2002, pp. 306–313). 16. The alternative to the methodological individualism in Veblen’s institutionalism was a form of methodological holism, that is to say, a theoretical approach in which collective customs, institutions, and the group to which a person belongs are determinative of his or her conduct. On this, see Rutherford (1994, pp. 27–50). 17. The Pareto criterion is an expression of the efficiency of a market. The focus is not on the utility of persons, but on different situations. The idea is that a situation is Pareto optimal, that is to say, it functions as efficiently as possible, when a change in the market does not mean that some are worse off, although others are better off. On this, see Chapter 5. 18. The expression laissez-faire goes back to eighteenth-century French physiocrats, who employed it to express ideals about free trade that differed from the protectionism of mercantilism. It has since become almost a technical term for a market economy characterized by free competition with no form of state intervention. As I have pointed out above, this thinking was also central for Adam Smith and for later economists, with ideological consequences for the whole of Western civilization. The expression itself must almost be thought to have the state authorities as its logical subject: “let things happen” (in the economic field) on the basis of their own presuppositions. See Landreth and Colander (2002, pp. 61–62, 81–85).

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19. This thesis has been strongly criticized by D.N. McCloskey and others. See McCloskey (1985, pp. 3–19). See also McCloskey (1983, pp. 484–491). 20. I.M. Kirzner examines and evaluates this approach, both in relation to the classical idea of competition and in view of the relationship between a market characterized by a competitive process and a market thinking that is more strongly characterized by monopoly. See Kirzner (1991; 1994, pp. 104–105). 21. An intertemporal choice means making economic assessments of the relative weight of costs and profit at different points in time. Examples are the choice between a hamburger now and an opulent meal later on, or the choice between increasing payments to one’s pension fund or taking a holiday in the warm south. We encounter such choices almost continually, and this makes them a central topic in both economics and psychology. On this, see Read et al. (2003, p. 2). 22. Feminist economics as a specific current in economics has emerged as a consequence of women’s increasing consciousness of their situation in the family and in society in a culture dominated by men. This situation made it necessary to take a critical position in the economic sphere too, not least because the discipline of economics has been dominated by men. Female economists have put new topics on the agenda of economics. They wish to unmask the discrimination of women and the processes that have made them invisible; to look after women’s interests; and to help create an understanding of reality in economic thinking that includes men and women on an equal footing. The representatives of feminist economics differ in their criticisms of the established economic theories, and especially of the neoclassical model. Some wish to supplement it by including women’s perspectives in the analysis, while others are much more critical and assert that it is unrealistic and gives a completely distorted picture of women’s lives. They therefore demand a paradigm shift in economic thinking. Important presentations that have clarified the profile of feminist economics are Ferber and Nelson (1993), Humphries (1995), Nelson (1996), and Hewitson (1999). 23.  Schumpeter is regarded as a kind of quasi-institutionalist, unlike the so-called modern institutionalists, for whom it is important to underline that economics is more than a market phenomenon. The market is steered by underlying institutions, and is also influenced to a high degree by power interests (Landreth and Colander 2002, pp. 477–479). 24. At a much earlier date, the economist Piero Sraffa (1898–1983) claimed that there is no perfect competition and equilibrium in the real world. In a system in which there is an element of non-perfect competition, equilibrium can be established only in the framework of a monopoly, not in the framework of competition. Sraffa deduced from this the theory of monopolistic competition. See Sraffa (1926).

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25. According to the economist N. Georgesçu-Roegen, the economy is a vast thermodynamic system in which entropy is increasing and the material basis of human beings is gradually disappearing. The neoclassical economists with their ahistorical models were, and are, incapable of grasping that the human being lives in a world that is irreversible (the second law of thermodynamics) and finite, a world in which there are boundaries both to energy and materials. The only hope for rescuing the world is a fundamental change in the economy in the direction of small-scale production, measures that spare resources, limited consumption, and a reduced consumption of luxury goods. The consumption of energy and materials must be reduced. See Georgesçu-Roegen (1971). 26.  Neoclassicism’s theoretical contribution culminated in an important study of the general equilibrium in a competitive economy (K. Arrow, G. Debreu; see Debreu 1959). For a comparison of neoclassical and modern microeconomics, see Landreth and Colander (2002, pp. 403–404). 27. Landreth and Colander (2002, p. 382). 28. On this, see ibid., p. 384.

References Amdam, Rolv Petter, and Ove Bjarnar. 2015. Globalization and the Development of Industrial Clusters: Comparing Two Norwegian Clusters, 1900–2010. Business History Review 89 (4): 693–716. Aristotle and William Ellis. 2009. The Politics of Aristotle: A Treatise on Government. Waiheke Island: The Floating Press. http://web.b.ebscohost. com/ehost/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzMxMzgwN19fQU41?sid= 0bb420b9-72b4-4fb8-a4db-91c71a7989e5@sessionmgr101&vid=0&format=EB&rid=1 (2.5.2017). Aspromourgos, Tony. 1986. On the Origin of the Term ‘Neoclassical’. Cambridge Journal of Economics 10: 265–270. Blaug, Mark. 1992. The Methodology of Economics, or How Economists Explain, 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press. Britton, Andrew, and Peter Sedgwick. 2003. Economic Theory and Christian Belief. Bern: Peter Lang. Brockway, George P. 2001. The End of Economic Man: An Introduction to Humanistic Economics. New York; London: W. W. Norton. Calcagno, Peter T. 2010. Public Choice. In 21st Century Economics: A Reference Handbook, ed. Rhona C. Free, 237–246. Los Angeles, CA: Sage. Camerer, Colin, and George Loewenstein. 2004. Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future. In Advances in Behavioral Economics, ed. Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein, and Matthew Rabin, 3–51. Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press.

150  S. O. THORBJØRNSEN Cohen, Norman J. 1983. Two That Are One—Sibling Rivalry in Genesis. Judaism 32: 331–342. Collins, Denis. 1997. Ethics of Competition. In The Blackwell Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Ethics, ed. Patricia H. Werhane and R. Edward Freeman. The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Management, 257–259. Oxford: Blackwell. Daly, Herman E., and Joshua Farley. 2011. Ecological Economics: Principles and Applications, 2nd ed. Washington: Island Press. Debreu, Gerard. 1959. Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium, vol. 17. Monograph/Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Dixon, William, and David Wilson. 2012. A History of Homo Economicus: The Nature of the Moral in Economic Theory, vol. 141. Routledge Studies in the History of Economics. London; New York: Routledge. Fehr, Ernst, and Klaus M. Schmidt. 2004. A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation. In Advances in Behavioral Economics, ed. Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein, and Matthew Rabin, 271–296. New York: Russel Sage Foundation. Feldman, Allan, and Alan Kirman. 1974. Fairness and Envy. The American Economic Review 64: 995–1005. Ferber, Marianne A., and Julie A. Nelson (eds.). 1993. Beyond Economic Man: Feminist Theory and Economics. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Friedman, Milton. 1953. Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Friedman, Milton. 1956. The Quantity Theory of Money—A Restatement. In Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, ed. Milton Friedman, 3–21. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Friedman, Milton, and Rose D. Friedman. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Georgesçu-Roegen, Nicholas. 1971. The Entropy Law and the Economic Process. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hewitson, Gillian J. 1999. Feminist Economics: Interrogating the Masculinity of Rational Economic Man. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Hewitson, Gillian J. 2010. Feminist Economics. In Twenty-First Century Economics: A Reference Handbook, ed. Rhona C. Free, 901–911. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Holmes, Stephen. 1997. Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Humphries, Jane (ed.). 1995. Gender and Economics, vol. 45. The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. Kaplan, Kalman J., and Matthew B. Schwartz. 1998. Jacob’s Blessing and the Curse of Oedipus: Sibling Rivalry and Its Resolution. Journal of Psychology and Judaism 22 (1): 71–84.

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Keynes, John Maynard. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Macmillan. Kirzner, Israel M. 1991. The Driving Force of the Market: The Idea of ‘Competition’ in Contemporary Economic Theory and in the Austrian Theory of the Market Process. In Austrian Economics: Perspectives on the Past and Prospects for the Future, vol. 17, ed. Richard M. Ebeling, 139–160. Champions of Freedom. Hillsdale, MI: Hillsdale College Press. Kirzner, Israel M. 1994. The Ethics of Competition. In The Ethical Foundations of the Market Economy: International Workshop, ed. Horst Siebert, 101–114. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Landreth, Harry, and David C. Colander. 2002. History of Economic Thought, 4th ed. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. McCloskey, Donald N. 1983. The Rhetoric of Economics. Journal of Economic Literature 21: 481–517. McCloskey, Donald N. 1985. The Rhetoric of Economics. Rhetoric of the Human Sciences. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. Mestmäcker, Ernst Joachim. 1998. The Role of Competition in a Liberal Society. In The Social Market Economy: Theory and Ethics of the Economic Order, ed. Peter Koslowski. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy, 329–350. Berlin: Springer. Mill, John Stuart, et al. 1965. Collected Works of John Stuart Mill: 2-3 2: Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy Books III-V and Appendices. Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Morris, Peter. 1994. Introduction to Game Theory. New York: Springer. Nelson, Julie A. 1996. Feminism, Objectivity and Economics. Economics as Social Theory. London: Routledge. Nelson, Richard R., and Sidney G. Winter. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. Persky, Joseph. 1995. Retrospectives: The Ethology of Homo Economicus. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 (2): 221–231. Piore, Michael J., and Charles F. Sabel. 1984. The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity. New York: Basic Books. Read, Daniel, et al. 2003. Introduction. In Time and Decision: Economic and Psychological Perspectives on Intertemporal Choice, ed. Daniel Read, Roy F. Baumeister, and George Loewenstein, 1–11. New York: Russell Sage. Ridley, Matt. 1996. The Origins of Virtue. London; New York: Viking. Romer, David H. 2012. Advanced Macroeconomics, 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin. Romer, Paul M. 1994. The Origins of Endogenous Growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives 8: 3–22.

152  S. O. THORBJØRNSEN Rutherford, Malcolm. 1994. Institutions in Economics: The Old and the New Institutionalism. Historical Perspectives on Modern Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sen, Amartya. 1970. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Mathematical Economics Texts. San Francisco, CA: Holden-Day. Sen, Amartya. 1987. On Ethics and Economics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Smith, Adam. 1998 [1776]. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Oxford World’s Classics. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. Smith, Adam. 2000 [1759]. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Great Books in Philosophy. New York: Prometheus Books. Sraffa, Piero. 1926. The Laws on Returns Under Competitive Conditions. Economic Journal 36: 485–504. Taylor, Charles. 1989. Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vega-Redondo, Fernando. 2003. Economics and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. von Neumann, John, and Oskar Morgenstern. 1947. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wells, Thomas, and Johan Graafland. 2012. Adam Smith’s Bourgeois Virtues in Competition. Business Ethics Quarterly 22: 319–350. Werhane, Patricia H. 1999. Business Ethics and the Origins of Contemporary Capitalism: Economics and Ethics in the Work of Adam Smith and Herbert Spencer. In A Companion to Business Ethics, vol. 2, ed. Robert E. Frederick, 325–341. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.

CHAPTER 5

Competition and the Economy: Economic Perspectives

Introduction The idea of economic competition plays an absolutely central role in the modern economy and social living, especially in the Western world. There are indeed differences between the function of the idea of competition under a conservative Republican administration in the United States and the system in a number of European countries, which is influenced by social democratic ideas. But these differences have concerned the degree of market freedom and state regulations, rather than more generally the importance of a free market and the positive functions of the idea of competition with regard to both regulation and efficiency. The political demise of the Soviet Union and communist Eastern Europe has given additional “market shares” to an economic thinking that is oriented to competition. From the early 1990s, communist China, the world’s most populous country, also turned to a market-oriented competition-based economy and is now the second greatest economy in the world. And for many other non-Western countries, there is no alternative to the competition-based economy. This applies both to the poorest countries and to those that are economically on the up, aspiring to be regarded as industrialized (e.g., Malaysia, Taiwan, and South Korea). In one sense, countries that are poor, but rich in raw materials, are at the mercy of the global competitive economy and its varying determination of the prices of raw materials. This seldom extricates them from

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poverty. For countries that are on the way up economically, competition is an instrument that is employed to the full: to become competitive and to produce a great deal of high-quality goods inexpensively provides a basis for entry into the club of industrialized and modern countries with modern economies. In very general terms, one can say that economic competition occurs where two or more firms or individuals attempt to buy—or sell—the same ware in a limited market,1 something that is accessible only to a limited extent. Competition among buyers tends to push prices up, and competition among sellers tends to push prices down. Such tendencies presuppose that they are competing on equal terms. A competitor who is stronger or better informed than another will be able to create conditions in which the price can be adjusted to his or her own advantage. Another presupposition of genuine competition is that competitors are small in relation to the size of the market, since this makes it impossible for one competitor, or a few, to fix prices. In this situation, the price moves around an equilibrium point: it cannot rise so high that customers refuse to buy the ware, or else new sellers will enter and sell the ware at a lower price, thus capturing the market. Nor can the price fall so low that it becomes less than the cost of production, since it then becomes impossible to stay in business. The basic function of competition is thus to coordinate or regulate. Supporters of economic competition focus on its many positive aspects. It stimulates production both qualitatively and quantitatively; it opens up a potential market and helps to preserve private initiative; finally, it helps to regulate prices on a level that is advantageous to all involved. Richard M. Salsman gives an almost panegyrical list of qualities that typify the function of economic competition in a capitalistic2 context (Salsman 2000b): it is oriented to reality and is innovative, and it helps to create something original. It aims, not to get hold of something that is limited, but rather to expand the amount of what is limited. It looks to the future. It aims, not at rivalry, but at the creative, at what acts as incentives to higher performance. It is not obsessed with raising prices, since that would attract new competitors; it wants to lower the prices by reducing costs and increasing efficiency. It includes collaboration and coordination. It presupposes a voluntary commitment and is practiced in peaceful forms: competition takes place on the basis of common sense and understanding, not with fists and weapons. The criticism of economic competition has tended to cluster around the following questions: Does it work as it is alleged to do: for example,

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with regard to prices and efficiency? Are the consequences for the losers too negative and problematic? Does the idea of competition contain an element of distribution that ensures that everyone gets what he or she needs? In the historical overview in Chapter 4, I located the starting point of the idea of competition in the history of ideas in classical economics, with a special relationship to Adam Smith and his one theoretical major work, The Wealth of Nations. The idea of competition and the principles linked to it were cultivated in a pure form in what came to be its second historical center of gravity, which is found in the neoclassical economic tradition (developed at the close of the nineteenth and start of the twentieth centuries) and in monetarism. Ira W. Howerth wrote in a 1912 article that for a majority of the American people, competition was “almost a sacred principle which it is next to sacrilege to question or criticize” (Howerth 1912, p. 399). The principle of competition was regarded at that time as an absolute precondition of success. A perfect mobility of capital and of the workforce, together with competitors’ complete knowledge of the market, created the theoretical presuppositions that allowed competition to exercise a regulative function in industry. According to Howerth, economists asserted that competition in the economy was a question of “the sanction of a natural (or divine) law” (Howerth 1912, p. 399, cf. p. 401). In the second half of the twentieth century, neoclassicism was further developed in a radical market economy, represented by the American economist Milton Friedman and others. In addition to its theoreticians, it has also had its political practitioners in our time. Reaganism in the United States and Thatcherism in the United Kingdom are often seen as two consistent political expressions of an economy that is oriented very strongly to the ideas of a free market and free (and ruthless) competition. It is held that with these instruments, industry can function best and human welfare can be maximized. Both past history and the present day offer many examples of alternatives to a strongly competition-oriented economy. As I have mentioned, we find this already in Adam Smith; but we find it above all in Marxism, institutionalism, Keynesianism, and some recent economic theories. The idea of competition has, however, also been criticized by milieus that might have been expected to be adherents of the market economy. Competition can be experienced as a problem by the really big industrial actors, perhaps more strongly in the past than today.

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During the golden age of neoclassicism in the early 1890s, the big capital units, like the steel industry in the United States, sought to avoid competition, since this entailed a waste of resources (e.g., on advertising and the entire sales apparatus) and a lack of stability with regard to prices. They aimed instead at legal mergers, cartels, and verbal agreements based on mutual trust.3 Economic activity based on mergers and collaboration is also found in our own times. This has become more difficult for the big firms,4 but it exists on a more limited scale, both among retailers and producers. This is true both of developed industrial countries and of more primitive cultures.5 At the other end of the scale, therefore, competition is replaced by collaboration, which is considered a more useful way to organize economic activity. Between the extreme points on the scale, there are forms of activity that combine competition and collaboration, and that are subject to various forms of state intervention, which are intended (with a greater or lesser degree of determination) to govern or adjust the relationship between competition and collaboration in the economic arena. The wish here is to take a more holistic view than a pure competitive economy would provide. These alternatives, however, seem less influential in today’s situation than the neoclassical tradition. This theory has largely become established as a standard theory in the economic context. When I analyze in this context the anthropological and ethical aspects of the idea of competition in the economy, it is therefore natural to emphasize the theoretical tradition in which competition has played, and continues to play, a very decisive role. This tradition can be cultivated in a pure form, ending up in a kind of “turbo capitalism” or “carnivore capitalism.”6 Such a position is regarded today as somewhat extreme. When I employ the terms “market economy” and “competitive economy” in what follows, this is a high-profile and rather consistent variant of neoclassical economic thinking, with the adjustments that are generated by a changed context. This thinking has been very influential right up to the present day. The main problem we shall investigate in this book is the relationship between competition and anthropology. In order to discuss this, I have chosen to build up a body of material related to economic competition, and this means that I am almost obliged in the present chapter to identify what economic competition means. This work is an essential foundation for analyzing the relationship between the economic and the anthropological (Chapter 6) and then for clarifying the ethical

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implications of these economic and anthropological presuppositions, in relation to dominant ethical traditions and approaches (Chapter 7). First of all, however, the idea of competition must be placed in a larger economic context. The first question, therefore, is: What is economic activity?

What Is the Economy? The question in this title can be presented and answered in many ways. One can begin with the meaning of the Greek nouns oikonomia and oikonomos, which contain the words oikos, “house,” and nomos, “law.” The common English translation of these words is “stewardship” and “steward.” In secular Greek, oikonomia referred originally to the administration of a household, but it gradually acquired a broad application, including the administration of a whole state, with an especial link to the military and economic spheres. In a biblical context too, oikonomos acquired a broad application, including this direct normative sense: the steward is to give the servants their food at the proper time (Luke 12:42). This understanding of oikonomos corresponds to a definition of economy that emphasizes the importance of this activity for human life. This definition points to an understanding of the economy as an anthropologically determined activity, related to the material reality that surrounds the human being. George Brockway defines the economy as follows: Economics is the study of principles whereby individuals and corporations of individuals and nations of individuals exchange goods and services for money (and vice versa) in order to maintain and enhance the quality of human life. The primal action of economic life is a bargain and sale. (Brockway 2001, p. 21)

Other definitions are likewise related to the human being, but with less focus on the normative. We find such a definition of the economy in Lionel Robbins: “… the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses” (Robbins 1984 [1935], p. 16). The point there being how the human being in praxis relates to the goals he has set himself, the limited resources that exist, and the fact that these resources can be used in various ways. The economy is a matter of goals, resources, and mechanisms.

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There are also normative ends here, but the emphasis in Robbins and in much of today’s economic thinking seems to lie with “scarcity”7 and “alternative uses” of the resources that are available. The assessments of this in economic thinking are linked to the material standard of living of a nation or of a group, which increases or declines in keeping with how economic decisions affect the allocation of scarce resources. One important point is to describe the various possibilities and to identify the factors that determine the result. These differences in the understanding of what the economy means are also expressed in the way in which economics is classified and understood as a science. Where does it belong? The most obvious answer is to see economics as a social science that is concerned with relationships and mechanisms in society. On the basis of how things have functioned in the past and function now, one attempts to uncover important connections between active factors; these connections can then provide a basis for saying something about how things will function in the future. Prediction is an extremely important project in all economic science. It is assumed that the economic agents are human beings who are determined by rational presuppositions and who allow these presuppositions to determine the choices they make in the economic sphere.8 An economic thinking that is primarily concerned with ensuring that its object of study is material, measurable factors, will analyze the economy with instruments that can determine these factors, and the connection between them, as exactly as possible. The rationality that is presupposed9 gives a basis for believing that mathematics can be a very important aid here.10 The task of economics is then to uncover connections and pursue the analysis in search of techniques or mechanisms that can realize material goals as well as possible, for example, by allocating resources in such a way that the greatest possible number of needs can be satisfied. Just as Newton employed mathematics in his description of the laws of nature, economic thinking employs mathematics in its uncovering of connections and laws in the economic sphere. When economics is understood in this way, it comes close to being a natural science. The alternative is to understand economics as a moral science.11 The central factor in this line of thought is not rational axioms, but living, free human beings as economic actors. It is they who determine prices, salaries, and interest rates. Economics is thus an evaluation of what is a correct human action in this sphere of life. And this in turn presupposes

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that economic action is a question of will and of human autonomy. John Maynard Keynes puts this concern as follows: If human nature felt no temptation to take a chance, no satisfaction (profit apart) in constructing a factory, a railway, a mine or a farm, there might not be much investment merely as a result of cold calculation.12 (Keynes 1936, p. 150)

Investments and the conduct of business activities are primarily a question of will. The fact that calculations can form a part of the background and the basis does not contradict the completely fundamental character of will. In this sense, economics is first and foremost a moral science, not merely a matter of natural science and technology. The question: “What is the economy?” is therefore also a question about what are the most central factors and categories of economics. Is it the productive businesses, the wares, the services, the division of labor, that contribute to increased effectivity? Is it the effectivity itself? Is it an invisible hand that contributes to the best distribution of scarce resources? Is it the competition between actors? Is it the human actors, or money, or prices? What is in fact truly central in the economy? In the present context, I focus on the idea of competition in economic activity. Competition is a regulative mechanism involving a number of actors (the consumer, the retailer, the producer), who are all related to the basis of the competition—that is to say, to what it regulates. This basis is first and foremost the price of wares and services. In our modern economy, prices are linked to money as the expression of values. Competition, therefore, just like the other important aspects of economic activity, is fundamentally related to the question of money13 and of prices. Prices, however, involve more than just handing over money. They also ensure financial incentives that influence behavior with regard to the use of resources and the products that are made from these resources. How does this influence work? Prices represent a worldwide communications network in which individuals or groups can signal to others how much they want a product and what they are willing to pay for it, while others signal what they are willing to offer on the market and what compensation they want to get for it. If more is available than the market requires, the prices go down, and the mechanism of competition functions. Correspondingly, the prices go up when what is on offer is less than the requirement. It is competition that allows such a coordination of prices to take place in a (market) economy.

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The Agents of Competition Economic competition occurs where firms or individuals attempt to buy or sell, in a limited market, one and the same ware, to which access is limited.14 This process functions to regulate the price of the ware. This definition allows us to identify several factors that form the starting point for our further discussion. Competition presupposes actors. Some engage in competition. Competition has an object, that is, a ware. Competition is a process that aims to function to regulate prices and to allocate resources in a good way. This process also entails various consequences. I begin with the actors. Who are the competitors in an economic competition? I have already mentioned firms and individuals. There are basically four types of competitors in the economic arena: persons, local firms, the nation, and transnational companies. These can in turn be classified on the basis of the individual–institution axis and of the merchandise or object they are competing for. Is this an article of consumption or a service? Or is it work? Competitors can be classified on the basis of the primary function they have in a competition. Are they consumers, traders, or producers? The personal competition is related primarily, though not exclusively, to the needs and the use of individual persons. This is true both in the material sense and with regard to services and work. Individuals, understood as consumers and purchasers, compete for wares and services that are scarce, in order to get hold of them and to acquire those that are of the highest possible quality at the lowest possible price. As an individual, however, one can also be on the seller’s side in the competitive situation. Many retailers are individuals, even if they are to be understood in the formal sense as one-man enterprises. Their aim is to sell as many wares as possible at the highest possible price, since this maximizes profit. On this level, the producer and the retailer are often identical, and there is no competition between the two. An employee (understanding this term as broadly as possible) has a double role here. On the one hand, he or she competes with others for the best and most interesting jobs and the highest salary. In this sense, he or she is a purchaser. On the other hand, an employee is a seller who aims to sell his or her labor as dearly as possible. Most employees see their salary as the primary object in the competition. Competition between institutions or firms focuses on what is best, or on what is better than something else, understood as an economic

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advantage. The advantage is of such a kind that not everyone who seeks to get it can actually do so. It is related both to quality and to price. In a competitive situation, one must sell as much as possible of the highest possible quality at the highest possible price. Therein lies the possibility of profit, which is the primary object in an institutional competition. Firms can be both producers and retailers. The retailers’ potential for making a profit is due to the fact that several producers are producing the same ware, so that the price can be squeezed, and that there is demand for the ware. Where several retailers are in the market for a ware that is in demand, prices will be pushed upward. The producers’ potential for making a profit lies in selling to retailers as many scarce wares or services as possible, at the highest possible price. The consumers’ potential for making a profit lies first and foremost in this competition between several retailers: in order to assert themselves in a competitive market, retailers have to buy at a high price, but then earn only a little when they sell. This nexus was already identified by Adam Smith (Smith 1998 [1776], p. 215). As I have said, there are no watertight partitions between the institutional and the personal or individual in competition. We should also note another factor in this context: institutional competition cannot be isolated from the persons who make up the institutions. It is not possible to isolate institutions, as subjects, from the will and the personal presuppositions of the persons in the institution. It is persons who want to win, who want to earn money, and who themselves can acquire both honor and money when a firm wins in a competition. The firm, as an economic or technical entity, has no will, and this observation must be accorded due significance in a competitive context where will and self-interest are so important. A firm in a competitive situation cannot be evaluated only on the basis of neutral economic and technical presuppositions. The institutional perspective of competition has been, and still is, linked both to local firms and firms in global competition. In the past, however, the global perspective was much more strongly related to national boundaries. This was basically because firms were nation-­specific, and customs and taxes were barriers that limited their function in a global market. These barriers have not disappeared, but the global economy today is much more strongly marked by firms that have a foothold in many countries (transnational companies) and that are so large that nations are obliged to take account of them in their own national economies. On this global level too, there is widespread competition and struggle, both among producers and retailers, to win consumers.

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Are some of these actors more important than others in a situation of economic competition? Or, to put the question differently: Is there one actor who propels the competition forward (so to speak)? It is hard to imagine there would be any economic competition at all without consumers searching for the lowest possible prices and the highest possible quality. This consumer attitude, which belongs on the “demand” side of the market, is the initial factor that propels producers, who make the “offer” into the competitive situation. Analysts speak here of consumer sovereignty.15 Although this sovereignty is limited to some extent by the power of firms in the market, the same firms are so conscious of the importance of the consumer that they attempt both to identify and to feed his or her longings. By means of advertising, they attempt to attract attention and even to create new needs in consumers, needs that they themselves steer. The consumer is to a large extent the propeller that drives forward the entire competitive process in economic activity.

The Forms of Competition In an economic context, competition exists in various forms and functions on the basis of very different mechanisms which, however, are coordinated and help competition to have a regulative function in economic activity. Latent and Manifest Competition Economic theories sometimes draw a distinction between latent and manifest competition. Latent or indirect competition denotes a competition that takes place even if a firm is apparently alone in the market. The competition is latent in the sense that a new firm can be established, or that existing firms can expand their activity and enter new fields. Another example of latent competition is the competition that is related to consumers’ budgets. One competes, not against other actors who are supplying the same product, but against the suppliers of other wares. The customer’s budget situation brings suppliers of different wares into a situation of reciprocal competition. Manifest competition in the economy is a factual and directly identifiable competition, which presupposes certain fundamental factors and structures. The factors were mentioned in the preceding section: money, prices, and actors. In the absence of these factors, it is difficult

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to see how competition, as an economic mechanism, can function. Competition is also related to certain structural presuppositions in the market in which it functions: the concentration of sellers, the degree of product differentiation, and the possibility for new actors to enter the market. The basic function of manifest competition is to regulate or coordinate. This applies both to the relationship between the actors and to the price on the merchandise. If a market is to function, the relationship between its various elements must be coordinated. On this point, people today still draw on the classical inheritance from Adam Smith: prices are formed on the basis of supply and demand; merchandise gravitates toward a natural price; the actors are governed by self-interest; and the invisible hand is a better, more efficient, and more welfare-oriented economic regulator than government intervention.16 In this way, therefore, the market is structured by means of competition. In a market economy that has individual freedom as its fundamental principle, and where motivation is based primarily on self-interest—and secondarily on the common good—the coordinating function of competition is absolutely decisive. This function is first and foremost as a source of knowledge: What factors influence the market, and what must be taken into consideration? It is in the relationship between these factors that the price on the goods on offer can be discerned. Perfect and Non-perfect (Monopolizing) Competition Manifest competition is presented in economic theory in two main forms: a perfect or pure competition, and a non-perfect or monopolizing competition.17 The idea of the perfect competition, which is linked in history particularly to neoclassical tradition, envisages a large number of small sellers who offer a homogeneous product on a common market. It is also presupposed that new actors can enter the market almost free of charge, that marketing and advertising are not necessary, and that everyone (the producer and investor, the seller, and the consumer) has complete and gratis information about price levels, production, employment, markets, and each other’s intentions. In such a situation, a seller cannot influence the price of the ware, but is obliged to accept a market price that is determined in a wholly impersonal manner by the total supply of goods that is offered by all sellers, and by the total demand for the product that is created by all purchasers. The large number of sellers makes it

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impossible for individual sellers to reach agreements among themselves about prices. Accordingly, each actor must act on his or her own. With a given market price (where both the seller and the producer are price takers, who must relate to a given price), every seller or producer must adapt production to the level that one believes will yield the highest possible profit, on the presupposition that the price will not change as a result of this level of production or supply. This, however, is an uncertain presupposition, if such adaptations take place collectively, since this can entail both increased and reduced prices. It is theoretically conceivable that this can continue until there is a market price that reflects a balance between what sellers and producers want to offer and purchasers want to buy. But this equilibrium is temporary, in the sense that it may need to be adjusted. If such an equilibrium means that the seller and producer recoup what they have spent on salaries and materials, and that they also get a return on their investments, sitting above the normal level, this can attract new actors. This in turn will increase supply, and prices will fall until a more final equilibrium is established. This price reflects average minimum prices for all supplies, including interest on investments. Correspondingly, one can conceive of a temporary equilibrium that is so low that suppliers will withdraw from the field. Since supply is reduced, the final price will be higher. It is unthinkable that there should be a profit over and above this minimum. It presupposes higher prices and an imbalance, and here we have a non-perfect competition. A market that is in perfect competition over a period of time is thus characterized by the following factors. The production or supply is at the maximum possible, and the price at which the merchandise is sold is at the minimum possible. All production is carried out at minimal average costs, and the competition forces prices downward. The distribution of income is not influenced by any surplus profit that accrues to sellers. An equilibrium is presupposed here, but unlike the idea of equilibrium in classical economics, it is not dynamic, but static. This means that competition is related, not so much to how the actors behave or act in the market, but to the structures of the market itself, for example, to the large number of firms or actors in the market. In such a competitive situation, we have consumer power: it is the consumer—not the seller or producer—who is the winner.18 One important theoretical basis for this understanding of competition was a law elaborated by one of Adam Smith’s immediate predecessors, Anne Robert J. Turgot. The law of diminishing returns was seen as

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providing support for the model linked to perfect competition and equilibrium. It was also regarded as a protection against a development in the direction of a monopoly. The point of this law is that when increased quantities of a variable factor (e.g., labor or capital) are combined with unchanged quantities of all other factors, the average dividend that can be ascribed to the variable factors, beyond one specific point, will decrease. Or, in more practical terms: at some point, there will be no advantage in sowing more corn on a limited piece of land. This came to play an important role in neoclassical economic theory: a continuation and expansion of what has been an economic success entails that one will gradually be obliged to employ people who are less qualified, and to use more expensive resources that are less suitable. There will be new producers (“sunrise producers”) who can ask lower prices than the original producer (“sunset producer”). This law was seen as a kind of support for the theory of the invisible hand. In this way, it promoted and undergirded the model of free and perfect competition (Brockway 2001, pp. 185–186). A completely different reason was also adduced in support of the superiority of this model. The perfect competition is related to a situation of equilibrium, where mathematical models can be employed. Given this presupposition of equilibrium, one can calculate mathematically the effects that various changes in individual factors will have on the totality (Brockway 2001, p. 338). A non-perfect or monopolistic model of competition is not essentially different from a pure or perfect model, although it was elaborated in the awareness that a perfect competitive situation is unrealistic, since all the sellers and producers are not completely independent of each other. By joining together, they acquire increased power and can to some extent influence both price and supply. This reduces the element of competition in the market. Besides this, a non-perfect model of competition has the following characteristics. First of all, there is a greater degree of differentiation here in the products that are on offer. The suppliers themselves can to some extent push prices up or down, although this possibility is limited. Here too, there are impersonal forces in the market that establish the parameters for a general level of prices. Second, the differentiation in the products makes it necessary to present one’s own product as the best. This entails financial outlays both to promote sales and to change the products in order to make them attractive to purchasers. On average, no one will make a profit through this kind of competition, but

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there will be a somewhat wider range on offer to purchasers. Some firms will end up with a result that exceeds a reasonable return on the capital they have invested; there will always be some who are better than others at gaining customers through their sales campaigns and their product policies. For an individual firm that does not succeed here, a non-perfect competition can turn out to be completely destructive, with overcapacity and too much stock in storage as the result. In addition to these two variants of the competition model (or, perhaps more correctly, as a development of the non-perfect competition model), economic theory knows two other regulative structures, which differ from each other in the way in which they take a distance vis-à-vis the idea of competition. For this reason, they can shed light on this idea. A monopolistic structure, which in practice is found rarely, represents the extreme point on the other side in relation to a perfect competition. Here, one or very few actors dominate the market and thus have the power to set prices as they choose and to adjust the production and the goods on offer accordingly. The roles are reversed: it is no longer the consumer who is lord of the market. Since a high price will reduce demand, however, a monopolist must find the balance between supply and price that will give the highest dividend. The price can be pushed up by reducing the supply of goods; this possibility does not exist in an ordinary competitive situation. In general, we can say that a monopolist will have a lower supply and a higher price level than would have been the case in a market characterized by perfect competition. The market will not be able to force prices down toward either the cost of production or marginal cost. A monopolist wants to maximize their dividend on the basis of a self-chosen balance between supply and price, and this dividend will usually exceed the ordinary dividend, seen in relation to the capital that has been invested. If a competitor should appear on the scene, the price can be lowered temporarily. In this way, one can demoralize potential competitors, so that they abandon their intentions. In the long term, a reduction of this kind will be profitable. An oligopolistic structure is located between a monopolistic structure and a non-perfect competitive situation. It typically involves few suppliers. The boundary between a tight oligopoly and a monopoly is fluid, and many characteristics and outcomes overlap. From the consumers’ perspective, the differences are almost meaningless. In both cases, goods are overpriced, and supply is deliberately adjusted in such a way that it falls below demand. From the producers’ perspective, both models offer

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possibilities of unusual rates of profit. While the perfect competition can be characterized as consumer power, monopoly and oligopoly are strongly marked by producer sovereignty. The goal is no longer (as in perfect competition) the maximization of profit in the short term, since that leads to consumer power; the orientation here is to the future and to the possibilities of maximal growth. This introduces a dynamic element that is not found in the same way in a neoclassical conception of a perfect competition in a static situation of equilibrium. In addition, an oligopolistic situation can be described as follows: the market shares of the small number of actors involved are so great that what one actor does will certainly influence the others and demand a reaction on their part. This applies both to the reduction and raising of prices. A one-sided raising of prices without any reaction from others will probably bring the first seller back into the fold. If others follow suit, the potential dividend for all is increased, unless increased prices seriously reduce demand. In an oligopolistic situation, actors’ guesses or suppositions about what their rivals will do play a considerable role. There are above all two contradictory considerations that strongly determine what the individual actor does: Should one attempt to maximize everyone’s dividend, or should one attempt to increase one’s own dividend, even if this happens at the expense of others? Which consideration is given priority? To some extent, this depends on how concentrated the oligopoly is, and how far the market is closed to other actors. In a situation with few actors, the reactions of rivals will have a more strongly deterrent function than in a situation with a greater number of actors, with smaller market shares. Where there is a core of a few big actors and a few smaller actors, the latter will be able to bring pressure on the former with regard to prices. These presuppositions for an oligopoly also entail, however, the possibility of secret or explicit, legal or illegal agreements between rival suppliers. Cartel activity of this kind is illegal in some countries (cf. the antitrust laws in the United States and the Competition Law in Norway) although legal in others. In both monopolistic and oligopolistic structures, therefore, the competition mechanism plays a role, either to demoralize potential new actors or as a limited means of adjusting prices. In a market economy, such structures will be attractive to those who wish to maximize the dividend. Monopolistic structures open the way to a maximization of profit that exceeds what is possible in a traditional competitive economy that is oriented to equilibrium. It may seem that the global market situation

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in today’s world, which includes an increased dismantling of protectionist measures, puts more and more limits on the possibility of monopolistic market situations; but the size and importance of transnational firms is one element that points in the opposite direction. What we see is a monopolistic situation on the world scale. Another factor points in the same direction: whereas the market was seen in the past as a static collector of resources, it should now be seen as a battlefield. Competition ends with a monopoly for the winner and annihilation for the losers. Here, a static competitive equilibrium has been replaced by a dynamic disequilibrium in which the idea of competition has triumphed (Lutz and Lux 1979, p. 113). This development also contains an implicit criticism of the function and usefulness of the idea of competition. This criticism is especially linked to the notion of a perfect competition (see also Chapter 3), and it has both economic and practical as well as ethical premises. In the present context, I shall concentrate on economic premises; I return to the ethical aspects later (Chapter 7). The criticism moves on several levels. On a meta-level, the perfect competition has been criticized on the premise of the idea of competition itself, on the grounds that this is not a genuine competition. What I do in competitions will influence my competitor, either positively or negatively. But is that the case here? Is not each seller so small and unimportant—in a perfect market, it is assumed that the number of sellers is large—that one’s influence is virtually nil in regard both to the market and to other competitors? They compete, not with each other, but with some impersonal forces that exist in the economic sphere. The interpersonal dimension, or the direct relationship among various firms, seems, in a sense, to disappear. The competition can be perfect only if each individual seller and purchaser takes the price for granted. This price information is the only thing that the actor really requires. Here there are no strategies to be pondered and no conscious rivalry; but equally there exists no altruism or collaboration. Such a situation is rather distant from what we mean in everyday language by “competition.” But the perfect competition, as a stable situation, depends on such presuppositions. Ironically enough, the consequence of this kind of criticism is that “genuine competition” exists only in more oligopolistic or monopolistic environments, where the individual firm can influence its competitors (Lutz and Lux 1979, pp. 114–115; see also Britton and Sedgwick 2003, p. 201).

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On a more concrete level, criticism concerned the anchoring of perfect competition in the real world.19 In the economic depressions in the 1930s, it became clear that competition did not work as it was supposed to.20 An incomplete or non-perfect (monopolizing) competition was closer to reality. The following elements make the situation of perfect competition problematic: first, it is impossible to satisfy the demands that all, or almost all, branches of industry should be in perfect competition, and that there should be a free and simple mobility of production factors from one market to another. The relative production in various industrial branches cannot give maximum satisfaction to consumers’ needs, and the equilibrium is distorted. Second, there has been a failure to take into account the monopolistic aspect linked to the fact that wares from each producer have their own characteristics with regard to products, the places they are sold, purchasers, and so on. Producers who compete to sell the same ware do not always sell wares that are completely interchangeable. Besides this, there are often substitutes that influence the market. Third, in an industry characterized by perfect competition and by prices at a final level of equilibrium, can producers earn enough to use some of the profits to renew equipment and to keep up with technological developments? Fourth, is it really the purchasers’ needs, rather than the needs supported by purchasing power, that govern things in the real world? In the last instance, this is not a question of consumer power, but rather of dollar sovereignty (Lutz and Lux 1979, p. 106). Fifth, questions have been asked about the anchoring of this model in reality, where perfect competition develops into a straightforwardly destructive competition, as examples in the coal industry and agriculture show. Here, there is a tendency to create an overcapacity that exposes both producers and sellers to permanent losses, among other things because the situation is not adjusted by decreasing the number of employees and production. It is difficult for society to accept this situation, and the consequence in some instances has been state intervention, both in order to limit the supply and to raise prices. Sixth, this criticism also applies to one of the most fundamental points in this model, namely, the setting of prices. The model is not able to explain market prices. As a model, it can merely suppose that everyone has guessed, correctly and in a spirit of self-sacrifice, what the market price will be (Kirzner 1991, p. 142). The attack on the theory of perfect competition not only accused it of a lack of realism. What we might call hardcore capitalists have also accused it of building on ideological premises that are incompatible

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with capitalism (Salsman 2000a). It is claimed that the idea of perfect competition builds on idealistic presuppositions about egalitarianism: that it is vulgar to market oneself, that it is impolite to present oneself as different from others, that genuine profit is a kind of theft, and that wealth belongs to society and therefore must be distributed altruistically. Competition that is understood in this way is not a competition. Genuine competition must take account of self-interest, differences, profit, and the right to private property. It cannot accept the idea that the object of competition is actually something that belongs to society. Behind these concerns, we note an opposition to all forms of regulation and to the so-called antitrust laws that restricted the possibility of an economic collaboration that could greatly enrich the few and the great. Another, and very different, critical approach to the idea of perfect competition compares competition in biological contexts with economic competition (Lutz and Lux 1979, pp. 115–116). In this regard, the first discovery in the animal world was that animals that compete perfectly (gaining their food from precisely the same resources) do not live long together. One animal survives, while the other disappears. Second, scientists have noted a tendency among those species that compete under perfect competition to avoid competition wherever possible. Each species will seek (through mutation and other means) to find its own niche, a place where it will be able to enjoy a natural advantage and defend its survival. It is held that something similar can be found in economic activity. Many business people want to avoid competition as far as possible, preferring to differentiate their products, to find niches, and thus avoid direct competition and ensure economic survival. It is not important whether a difference is in fact significant; but much more important to convince consumers, through advertising, that the difference is significant. Let us consider another situation where the products are raw materials or industrial goods, such as steel, cement, and so on. Here, it is harder to avoid competition, because it is much more complicated to create niches for one’s own products. The alternative is secret collaboration pacts, for example, an agreement not to compete with each other, or to agree on identical prices. This can ensure stability and reduce destructive competition. Since competition is regarded as so destabilizing and so threatening to the continued existence of society, the lesser evil (illegal collaboration pacts) is chosen in order to avoid a wider cut-throat competition in which each destroys the other.21

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Despite this criticism—in particular, the criticism of the idea of perfect competition—the idea and the principle of competition have largely held their ground in economic activity. One has the impression today that an economy based on an idea of competition that is close to the notion of perfect competition is regarded as a conventional kind of economic thinking. George P. Brockway points to three central arguments that are used to legitimize it, despite the criticism (Brockway 2001, pp. 181–184). First, the world functions as if perfect competition existed. This is the starting point for economic predictions, and it is held that these predictions are correct, whereas predictions on the basis of non-perfect competition are held to be indeterminate and free-floating. Second, the supposition of perfect competition is regarded as an axiom like those of Euclid; as such, it is non-dimensional and does not exist in the real world. Third, other sciences too, like physics, operate with similar non-existent but necessary presuppositions of their laws. According to Brockway, it is perfectly possible to counter such arguments. He makes the following points. The fact that people act as if perfect competition exists does not imply that it does in fact exist. Euclid’s axioms are necessary because they are about space; but this is not the case with an axiom about perfect competition. The laws of physics have an inductive basis where, for example, a non-existent state of vacuum is a presupposition of the validity of a law. It is precisely such a non-existent state that is the presupposition for the idea of perfect competition. But although it is possible to counter this idea, and it also appears to some extent to be unreasonable and unrealistic, it has held its ground. An analysis of today’s economic activity cannot avoid taking into consideration this imaginary presupposition about much economic theory. Free Competition In everyday language, we do not speak so much about perfect competition. We speak much more frequently about free competition and a free competitive or market economy. What does this mean? In an economic context, the concept of freedom is related to the market (in a broad sense of this term). Free competition is possible only where a market’s actors are free, and neither they nor the market itself are compelled by external factors.22 Freedom applies both on the side of the purchaser and on the side of the seller and producer. Those who possess resources,

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land, labor, and capital decide how these are to be used, and this is how competition becomes free. When this is combined with the presupposition that both individuals and firms act out of their own self-interest, it is possible to realize the goal of free competition, namely, the best possible allocation of resources. Although the function of the concept of freedom in an economic context is not limited to being one aspect of how efficiency is promoted in economics, it is certainly in this context that it has its greatest practical function. One dominant tradition in economics sees freedom for the actors, and competition between them, both on the side of the purchaser and seller, as the basis of an efficient economy. Coercion and state intervention will reduce efficiency, which is created when each individual economic actor is allowed to seek to realize their own economic interests. Freedom as a value plays an absolutely central function in the legitimation of the market economy in general, and of the competitive economy in particular. The point of the market and of competition is that these are instruments that coordinate without coercing. Each one is free to enter into this process or to refrain from doing so. Some also see here a link between freedom and the possibilities of choice in the market situation: the more goods that are accessible, the greater the freedom.23 Free competition has become a key word in economic theory, and this is why it is asserted even where it is incompatible a priori with realities. We find one example of this in connection with the theory of marginal utility (Chapter 4). In a mathematical sense, this theory states that the intensity of the satisfaction of the ultimate desire for a thing or a service is a declining function of the wares or services being consumed. This observation allows us to classify human utility values on the basis of infinitesimal differences, and then to employ mathematics to identify the needs that are greatest and—in sum—to ask where the demand is greatest. These differences can then form the basis of the choice between various investments.24 The sequence of such differences and investments over the course of time will represent a development in the direction of monopolistic situations. The idea of free competition, which lies implicit in the idea of marginal utility, and which is doubtless actualized in its initial phase, gradually becomes antithetical to a development that is based on marginal utility. This antithesis has been swept under the carpet, just as Adam Smith held fast to competition and to the invisible hand although he knew that sellers had much

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greater possibilities if their market shares were expanded and the competition decreased.25 At the same time, there also exists a correspondence or congruence between marginal utility and free competition: the theory of marginal utility aims at dominance, where one branch or firm is ahead of others. This can go to absurd lengths: one product, one owner, one employee, and one purchaser. Here, we may well ask: Are not these the ideals that are linked to free competition? Prices for goods that correspond to the cost price; only the firm that is best adapted will survive; every branch has its best product in terms of the market and of profit; and a stream of investors in the most profitable branch? The theory opens the door to absurdities of this kind. But the economy unfolds in a real and historical world in which the will of human beings cannot be captured using mathematical formulae. Nor can the human being live only from those goods that have the highest marginal utility and therefore offer the possibility of the highest profit (see Brockway 2001, pp. 207–208). Free competition based on an equilibrium that regulates prices, and that is a protection against monopolization, also falls short in the encounter with another reality that is an aspect of modern society. The law of diminishing returns, which we have mentioned, is incompatible with the large-scale production that is typical of modern economies. Production can expand so rapidly that there is no proportionality between the increased quantity of goods and increased expenses. More efficient machines and processes, and a more effective division of labor, make it possible to save money. The consequence is that the supply curve sinks, and the marginal costs sink below average costs, which determine the profitability of a firm over time. This makes it possible for a firm to expand drastically and cut prices and costs to such an extent that competitors disappear from the market. This kind of cutthroat competition can destroy not only the vanquished, but also the victors. The struggle is not only wasteful and ineffective; it also generates what competition was meant to prevent, namely, monopolies. When free competition runs amok in this way, it shows one of its negative aspects, and some argue that this clearly shows the limited applicability of the idea of competition in an economic perspective. In the real world, competition is not a protection against monopolies; there is no natural equilibrium; and there is no natural price (see Adam Smith) determined by the market (Brockway 2001, pp. 187–189; see also Rich 1990, p. 191).

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Competition and Regulation In its classical form, the idea of competition in the economy is a regulative, coordinating mechanism. This means that it can itself also be regulated ab extra and can be steered in a specific direction. In most of the societies where competition is an important factor in the economy, there is also a regulation of competition. The need for such a regulation is connected to the fact that non-perfect markets open the door to various abuses. In an imaginary perfect market determined by perfect information, consumer sovereignty, price competition, and free market access, one can ask whether there is any need for such regulation. But markets of this kind scarcely exist in reality. In a non-perfect market, consumer power, the relationship between price competition and equilibrium, and free access to the market are more limited, although competition and the freedom of actors remain to some extent intact. This makes possible strategies with the goal of realizing the largest profit possible, at almost any price. State authorities have found it necessary to intervene by means of regulations against such strategies. A regulation of this kind can be envisaged along two lines. First of all, it may involve a limitation of competition, that is to say, the prohibition of those forms of competition that have undesirable or directly harmful consequences for individual persons or for society. Let us consider some examples. A local store that is very important for the social life of a village risks being closed. Its prices cannot compete with stores that are more distant, but that serve a larger population and can therefore negotiate better agreements with suppliers. The theory of free competition stipulates that the local store must be closed. The authorities may perhaps intervene with financial aid that helps to keep it going, out of consideration for its role in the social life of rural communities. In this way, free competition is overruled.26 Another example would be where a merchant advertises his wares by speaking negatively about his competitor’s wares, hoping thereby to capture more customers in the market that both firms share. This form of competition is unreasonable, and authorities regulate such praxis by passing laws that are meant to prevent these forms and means of competition. Arthur Rich maintains that the idea that a perfect economic competition helps to equalize interests is not a compelling law of nature. The equalizing function depends on regulations made by human beings, which can be employed both for good and bad purposes.

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This is why the market economy needs legal and economic frameworks that ensure that those who are at work in the market achieve a balance between their own interests, the interests of others, and nature. They must not safeguard their own interests at the expense of others, nor do so in a way that imposes burdens on nature and the environment. Rich argues that the function that the state must have here is itself an indication of where the boundaries for a competitive market economy lie (Rich 1990, pp. 194–195). In most Western countries, where economic systems are characterized by free competition and a market economy, the state undertakes this kind of regulation of competition in the market. In the United States, this is the work of the Federal Trade Commission.27 It has two main tasks: to protect consumers and to promote competition to the best advantage of consumers, who are to be protected “by stopping unfair, deceptive or fraudulent practices in the marketplace.” It is to “conduct investigations, sue companies and people that violate law, develop rules to ensure a vibrant marketplace, and educate consumers and businessmen about their rights and responsibilities.” Competition is to be promoted because “[i]t benefits consumers by keeping prices low and the quality and choice of goods and services high.” By implementing the antitrust laws, the Federal Trade Commission also helps keep markets free and open. State bodies of this kind have the task of promoting and ­regulating competition. It is clear that both these tasks are oriented to, and anchored in, an understanding of the economy in competitive terms; they are the external aspects and the consequences of the factual competition that is to be regulated. Few questions are asked about the competitive economy itself. The state regulatory bodies have neither the authority nor the presuppositions to look at the deeper reasons why abuses occur, and then to elaborate alternative strategies to competition as an instrument in the economic system. We should note that Adam Smith already foresaw some of the unfortunate and problematic consequences that could ensue as a result of the function of competition in an economic context (Kurz 2016). This led Smith to argue that “… a regular administration of justice” was necessary in society: “Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom flourish in any state in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of government” (Smith 1998 [1776], p. 459). Such an administration of justice would involve society in some expenditure, but it would

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be worthwhile in the longer and broader perspective. It would create a flourishing trade and productivity, since it would be “a source of revenue” (Smith 1998 [1776], p. 449).

The Functions and Goals of Competition Economic competition occurs in various forms and has a variety of functions. What are these functions, and what goals are they meant to help realize? Efficiency Competition in economic activity is seen as a means of increasing efficiency. The dream or ideal of economists is that everything that is introduced into the economy is changed into goods and services in such a way that nothing is wasted with regard to consumer welfare—in other words, in terms of the production of the goods and services consumers want. In this sense, competition costs nothing; it only yields profits and is highly efficient. Efficient and efficiency come from the Latin verb efficere, “to implement” or “to carry out.” In modern usage, these words also indicate a certain quality of speed and use of resources in implementation. In an economic context, this means that one should use the fewest possible resources to allocate as much as possible. This applies both on the side of the buyer and the seller or producer. In the latter case, the aim is to produce and sell as many goods as possible, as cheaply as possible, with the highest possible quality. The division of labor and specialization are important factors here. On the buyer’s side, the aim is to buy as cheaply as possible and with the highest possible quality. Those who win in this competition are regarded as efficient. It is precisely because of competition that the seller presents his wares in such a way to attract customers. The price gives the seller a satisfactory profit, and it is acceptable to purchasers; the quality of the wares is also attractive. This is the primary way competition promotes efficiency in economic activity; and it is also, to no small extent, a legitimizing function (Arnsperger 1996, p. 11). In a more explicit economic vocabulary, free setting of prices and free competition entail an efficient allocation of limited resources. This is also expressed in the so-called first theorem of welfare economics.28 One must discover the most efficient means to satisfy the demand for

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goods that are available only in limited quantities. One such means is competition between actors in the market. The theoretically most efficient allocation of resources in a capitalistic economic system lies in the perfect market with its market mechanisms. Here, there is an equilibrium between supply and demand, and the prices are free in the sense that they can function as a coordinating mechanism for the many and varied decisions that are taken by buyers and sellers in the market. The market gives (perfect) information both about the preferences of a large number of consumers and about the technical possibilities for a considerable number of producers. This mechanism gives individuals the possibility to satisfy their needs efficiently without costly intervention by a central authority. The individual seeks his or her own advantage. In such a market, there is no need a priori for a plan. The system is self-organizing. However, the mechanism demands that one comply with certain legal presuppositions and norms regarding behavior. One important example of this is respect for property rights (Britton and Sedgwick 2003, pp. 197, 199). The way competition promotes efficiency in economic activity does not aim only at increased profit. In a classical economic context (which remains relevant even today), efficiency also concerns getting hold of the goods that people need in order to live, with the highest possible quality and at the lowest possible price. An efficient competitive economy can help to give people a measure of security (Lutz and Lux 1979, p. 122), that is, that they will get what they need for their daily lives. An altruistic element is thus also integral to this function. If competition really contributes to efficiency, we must find out when it functions most efficiently in the market. It is important here to identify the needs that the goods in the market are to satisfy, and the intensity of these needs. If one can discover when these needs begin to diminish, steps can be taken to prevent the production of goods that will not be sold, since that would mean a loss for a firm, instead of a profit. The abovementioned theory of marginal utility is one such instrument. It has been given a mathematical form that has made it operative in economic theory, and this has made it very important. By identifying infinitesimal differences (in mathematics, by means of differential calculus), one can quickly discover the direction in which the relationship between supply and demand is moving. Thanks to this information, one can alter praxis and thus prevent a reduction in competitive ability or efficiency.

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Vilfred Pareto (1848–1923) developed and expanded the framework for the evaluation of the efficiency of a market. He looked in a holistic economic perspective at the relationship between the products in a market and an individual’s welfare, and he discovered how to measure when a market is as effective as possible. Instead of comparing the utility of different persons, he attempted to evaluate various situations against each other from a perspective of welfare. This led him to introduce the concept of Pareto optimality (Landreth and Colander 2002, pp. 318–320). Pareto optimality or Pareto efficiency exists when a change in the market does not mean that some are worse off and others better off.29 A Pareto optimal allocation of resources in a market thus occurs where it is possible to improve the share or utility of one party or actor, without thereby reducing the share or utility of another party or actor. The point is that all profits or goods that a trade can give in the form of mutual advantages are attained in such a situation. This is the expression of a good and maximally efficient allocation. This measure of efficiency is also used in a welfare economy, with the intention of maximizing total utility in society. The way free competition promotes efficiency is not, however, without its problematic aspects. The Norwegian economist Gaute Torsvik (Torsvik 2003, pp. 84–86) mentions three factors that limit efficiency in this context: unwished-for and often unpriced external effects (pollution); an insufficient and inefficient production of collective goods (too few lighthouses are built); and the problem of asymmetrical information between market actors (the sellers and buyers do not possess the same knowledge about the ware). Such factors reduce the efficiency of the model or system in an economic sense. The question of efficient competition can be posed from other perspectives too. In competition itself, there are no preferences with regard to the needs that are to be satisfied, apart from the fact that it is the demand for goods that can satisfy these needs. Efficient competition thus makes it possible to satisfy useless needs, and in some cases, artificial needs. Goods are produced that otherwise would not have been produced, because they appear potentially profitable in an efficient competitive economy. Efficiency in a competitive economy must also be seen in relation to a possible waste of resources. This perspective is relevant in another way too: in a non-perfect competitive situation, it will be necessary to highlight one’s own products with the aid of advertising and other measures that promote sales. All competitors have these expenses, which must be

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calculated as a part of the costs; and this has consequences for prices. Some believe that a gigantic duplication takes place here, related both to the spreading of information and the production and distribution of goods. This duplication of activities can certainly be called counterproductive or counter-efficient (Howerth 1912, p. 409; Lutz and Lux 1979, pp. 117–120).30 The same applies to the abovementioned cutthroat competition that can arise in a large-scale economic context. This means that the link between competition and efficiency is not unambiguous. High efficiency, as the basis of an aggressive competition, can have a destructive function in the market (Brockway 2001, pp. 187–189). One can also pose the question about competition and efficiency from the perspective of distribution. Onora O’Neill (1989, pp. 101–102) maintains that competition can function efficiently, in the sense that it can increase the human being’s economic prosperity. This can apply to individuals; but it cannot be universalized to mean that a strategy of economic competition would maximize economic progress in general. If all compete in order to improve their economic prosperity, it is not possible for everyone to get an improved result. A competition consists of winners and losers. Competition can be efficient as an instrument only for some, not for all. A distribution takes place, but some experience this distribution as problematic. This argumentation has been countered, however: perfect competition implies general economic progress, because such a situation is Pareto optimal. There is no possible new state of affairs after the existing one, in which everyone’s situation gets better and no one’s situation gets worse. Competition generates maximum efficiency. Moreover, a universal efficient economic progress built on competition would be a collective project that was compatible with differences in society. From the individual’s perspective, avoiding a competition in which one risks losing—with the consequence that one would be prevented from developing the talents that one possesses—could be regarded as just as rational as participation in an economic competition. A theory of competition that also defends the authorities’ right to help losers by taking something from the winners would give additional support to a general theory about the link between competition and efficiency both on the individual and societal level (Bowie 1999, p. 29). In neoclassical economic thinking, the economic actor is seen to be steered by rationality. In everyday language, the rational and the efficient are often coupled together: that which is most efficient is also that which is most rational. This implies that the most efficient economic praxis is

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oriented to competition. But is this the case? Is it (for example) more efficient to compete than to cooperate? Or is the combination of the two the most efficient path? Adam Smith emphasizes (in Wealth of Nations and elsewhere) an ideal that combines the cooperative and the competitive. According to Patricia H. Werhane, however, this need not be interpreted to mean that Smith held that economic actors always deliberately intend to be cautious, upright, and willing to cooperate. As she interprets Smith, the point is that the market “… works most efficiently and competitively when prudent parsimonious actors act fairly in competitive and cooperative ventures, whether or not they deliberately intend to do so” (Werhane 1999, p. 338). Is it because this is in our own self-interest, at least in the long term? According to Werhane, Smith would have replied to this question with both a yes and a no. It is rational to act out of self-interest. But since it is natural for the human being to be interested in others, it is also rational to act in cooperation. For Smith, a rational person is one who is prudent and cautious, one who cooperates and is upright. It is rational to be like this, both because such qualities are admired and because being like this creates personal advantages. In Smith, therefore, rationality is linked both to the competitive and to the cooperative (Werhane 1999, p. 338). Some of those who are critical of competition, either generally or in the economy, emphasize even more strongly (and naturally enough) the rational and efficient qualities of cooperation, in antithesis to the irrational and inefficient qualities of competition. Ira W. Howerth, whom I have mentioned above, expresses this position in a striking manner. At the beginning of the twentieth century, a period that was familiar with neoclassicism’s theories and its emphasis on the idea of competition in the economy, Howerth contemplated the relationship between natural and industrial competition, claiming (Howerth 1912, pp. 411–412) that competition is primarily characteristic of inferior animals, where it is a necessity. Such animals cannot take into consideration the waste of energy that competition entails, nor the possibility of avoiding this waste by means of cooperation. Competition is a natural way of stimulating them to act, until thought develops to such an extent that the actor can be steered by higher motivations. Howerth argues that there is a higher competitive praxis that often eliminates waste and gets hold of valuable things. This is not competition in the usual sense; it is to be understood as a combination of cooperation and emulation

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(Howerth 1912, p. 414). Howerth understands emulation as “the struggle to approach, equal or surpass another in merit” (Howerth 1912, p. 416). In an industrial context, this is a question of productivity. This is a strongly motivating factor in production, but it differs from competition “since its object is the satisfaction of achievement, and not the selfish enjoyment of wealth. It involves no waste, and is therefore consistent with a maximum production at a minimum expenditure, or the law of economy” (Howerth 1912, p. 416). For Howerth, intelligent competition is a praxis (emulation) that lies between competition in the strict sense and cooperation, and that is continuously oriented on the deepest level to cooperation. The greatest possible industrial efficiency is realized where there is a shared endeavor to attain a common good. The need for competition will decline as “intelligence and public spirit” increase (Howerth 1912, p. 418). On the basis of Howerth’s ideas, the fact that the idea of competition has not declined since 1912—indeed, on the contrary, it appears to play a greater role today than at any time in the past—would be due to a regression in intelligence, or at least to a lack of progress in that field. Another alternative is that competition has proved to function efficiently, thereby falsifying Howerth’s theory. But a combination of competition and cooperation, evaluated from a rational perspective of efficiency, finds support in modern economic research too. We have one concrete example in a study of the salmon industry by the Norwegians Sven A. Haugland and Kjell Grønhaug. Traditional neoclassical economic theory maintains that stable relationships between buyers and sellers are found only in non-perfect markets, but the result of their investigation is that buyers and sellers can cooperate and develop good and advantageous relationships even in markets that are characterized by competition. Salmon importers tend to stick to one or a small number of exporters, although they can exceptionally purchase salmon from other exporters. This example shows that even from a perspective of efficiency (understood as a rational perspective), a combination of cooperation and competition can benefit both buyer and seller (Haugland and Grønhaug 1993). Another example is linked to the so-called Rhine capitalism, which focuses on the economies in Germany and Japan, and to some extent in Scandinavia—economies that are built more strongly than the AngloAmerican economy on both competition and cooperation (Crouch and Marquand 1993, pp. 1–2).

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Creativity, Quality, and Growth Economic efficiency is basically a kind of static optimization. One must make the best possible use of a given quantity of resources. Efficiency on its own does not create enduring growth. In neoclassical theory, growth in production is a result of external causes, including technical progress based on new knowledge and research. This gives the economy a dynamic element. When the competitive market economy is to be legitimated, the argument about efficiency is often backed up by the following reasoning: competition provides a stimulus to research and new development, and these are factors that will benefit economic development as a whole (Britton and Sedgwick 2003, pp. 132, 134). It is argued that one important aspect of competition in a market economy society is precisely its creative function.31 What is this creativity, and what generates it, if it exists? In terms of substance, many would say that it is a matter of openness to new possibilities and paths, combined with the will and the ability to make use of these. On the product side, it entails both the modification of old products and the creation of completely new products, either goods or services. At the same time, it includes new and improved methods of making products, as well as creative strategies for selling the goods and services that are produced. Behind this lies a dynamic linked to the preservation of individual initiative. The individual does not just sit down and rest content with the way things are. The competitive situation kindles a drive to make use of the resources and the initiative one has within oneself and that often needs this kind of external factor to trigger them. Economic competition triggers an individual initiative. Creativity involves discovering or presenting new ideas. In an economic context, however, it is just as important to sell these ideas or to turn them into things of value. The innovative element in economic activity consists first and foremost in creating new material values.32 It is the vitality that comes from creating new ideas, and creating material values out of these ideas, that makes a firm interesting and signalizes economic solidity to customers, shareholders, employees, suppliers, and ultimately to society more generally. At the same time, it is precisely here that the risk and the uncertainty in economic activity are greatest.33 An innovative process can often be both chaotic and unpredictable, even if one does all one can to avoid this through control and planning. One important reason for this is that the transformation of

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ideas into positive material values is probably one of the most complex societal processes in economic activity, involving all the functions in a firm on all levels from employee to CEO. What generates this kind of creativity? What is it in competition that creates it? Is it a natural and fundamental human attitude, a desire to be the best and to create as much as possible? Or is it the possibility of realizing and satisfying one’s own interests with regard to material and values, through the material values that are made possible by creative activity? Those who support economic competition as an appropriate instrument in an economic context will focus on both of these, thereby also legitimating the second answer, which is more exposed to criticism than the first. The creative function of competition has also been evaluated critically. First of all, there is a danger that creativity may become far too narrow. Much creativity, in economic activity as in other spheres, can advance the world and genuinely make it a better place to live. Some creativity can be triggered primarily by a desire to earn money. In this way, creativity can become a quasi-creativity that is oriented to goods and services that are not useful, but are a waste of resources; it is also possible that those who come into contact with products are exposing themselves to danger. In a well-developed, affluent capitalist society, there are enough examples of creativity applied in this way, a creativity that is generated by the desire to do well in economic competition. Second, a creativity related to economic competition and to the desire for increased profit can be questionable per se, both legally and ethically. According to Mark A. Lutz and Kenneth Lux, it is characteristic of a free market economy that actors are enticed (rather than forced) to act (Lutz and Lux 1979, p. 120). In such a context, the boundary between enticements and bribes can be unclear and fluid. This is particularly true when the incentives to action are financial and imply personal enrichment. The incentives generated by competition are so creative that they become problematic. Likewise, the distinction between enticing and forcing can become unclear. The ideal often associated with a free competitive economy—that no one is forced to do anything against his or her own will—can in reality involve coercion in the form of bribes and corruption. With regard to creating values, corruption can be regarded as an “… unrecorded business expenditure to buy an intangible resource, such as government goodwill …” (Lutz and Lux 1979, p. 121). The fact that there is a formal difference between a material incentive

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(such as a customary salary) and a bribe as an incentive—the former is a good both for the economic actors and for society, but the latter is a good only for the actors—does not mean that the difference is so real in practice. For the managers in a firm, both cases involve expenditure. A firm need not necessarily take into account the societal consequences of its actions. One characteristic of the market economy is that the actors do not need to think about social aspects, like questions concerning distribution. It is the market itself that settles these questions. Adam Smith held that this would be done by the invisible hand; there seems to be a different situation today.34 In this context, we must also mention that the innovative aspect of competition can destroy competition. Arthur Rich has pointed out that in a dynamic market, economic profits are primarily the result of innovative achievements, especially of novelties in the market that cannot immediately be copied. This intensifies competition, and creates problems for competitors who are less innovative, and who may in fact be squeezed out of the market. The consequence is a necessary reduction in the number of competitors. This leads to a concentration of production and capital, and hence to oligopoly and to monopolistic circumstances in the market (Rich 1990, p. 189). Competition does not only trigger creative innovation in the form of an expansion of the extent and variations of products. A development of the product’s quality is also envisaged as one link in this process. The demand for quality is also due to the desire of consumers to buy the best goods possible and at the lowest possible price, and the producers cannot overlook this. One side effect of this ability of competition to raise quality is a stronger confidence in the product. Those who believe strongly in the positive function of competition in an economic context see here a positive spiral of competition, creative innovation, quality, confidence, and increased earnings or economic growth. This means that creativity, innovation, and quality are related in an economic context to economic growth. Competition is a motor that helps this to happen. It provides stimulus to economic growth for individual persons, individual firms, and the economy as such. Profit creates possibilities of expansion, and the continuous need for more, and more varied, goods in the market means expansion and increased economic activity and selling. In a free competitive market, it is scarcely ever asked whether such growth actually occurs or is desirable: it is taken for granted and forms a basis for this way of thinking about the economy.

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There are, nevertheless, at least three relevant questions here: Does competition genuinely contribute to growth? If the goal is economic growth, is competition the best way to reach this goal? Is economic growth of this kind desirable? The question of how far competition can contribute to economic growth in a perfect market must receive a mostly negative answer. The concepts of equilibrium and consumer power indicate that prices find their level at a minimum and give producers and sellers few possibilities of expansion. This is true even if one takes into account the creative element that is traditionally ascribed to every competitive situation. In a perfect market, any new products and methods would be subject to the same limitations and would block the path to any substantial economic growth. In a non-perfect market, where there are fewer actors and the power of producers and sellers is greater—at the expense of consumers—there are greater possibilities for growth. In a dynamic market of this kind, the producer will have more control of prices and of what is on offer, and it will be easier to steer consumers by measures that promote sales. This can provide a basis for economic growth, understood as a possibility to increase profit. But is a larger profit the same thing as real economic growth? The question here is how growth is defined. If it is defined individually or related to an individual firm, we can indeed speak of “growth,” but such a growth need not be growth in a more societal sense, if that is the direction in which we define “growth.” Here, it is not merely a question of naked figures, but also of how one uses the profit that is created, and whether this creates relationships between the actors that are useful in a longer perspective. The alternative is that growth destroys human relationships, not least on the side of the producer and seller. The other two questions are also important, but they cannot be discussed in detail here. I have already touched several times on the relationship between competition and cooperation. This constellation is relevant here, too: does cooperation between actors create a better basis for economic growth than competition? An economic theory with a humanist orientation is inclined to believe it does (Lutz and Lux 1979, pp. 124–125; Brockway 2001, pp. 176–181). In a cooperation, one avoids many of the wasteful costs that are linked to a situation of competition. At the same time, a collaboration can also function creatively. A competitive situation cannot have a monopoly on creative possibilities and resources. In many contexts other than the economy, it is precisely

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in a collaboration, with various ideas and various approaches to the same topic, that a creative process can really get off the ground. The question of the desirability of economic growth can and must be answered from many perspectives. One of these is the economic perspective: it maintains the competitive economy. Another is the environmental perspective: economic growth requires resources. Does continued or stronger economic growth require so much in the way of resources that this is indefensible in the present-day perspective, and not least in a future perspective? Many economists have pointed out the problematic aspects of this premise of growth, which seems to follow the modern competitive economy like a shadow, and have suggested alternatives.35 Another approach is purely interpersonal. Paul Wachtel has drawn attention to the consequences for personal health and safety and for working life: we become unhappy, because we lose as producers the quality of life that we can achieve as consumers. There are also consequences for society in the form of inequality; and many people seek desperately (but in vain) to compensate psychological and social defects (Wachtel 1983, passim). Here, we encounter once again the question of the relationship between competition and scarcity. As we have seen, competition is often justified as the best means of distributing available resources in a good way. In an economic context, this is combined with the potential for growth that lies precisely in competition. Competition makes it possible to overcome scarcity. We should, however, bear in mind here that in some cases, the notion of scarcity has two special meanings in economics: to choose one ware rather than another means that one does not get hold of the second ware. But a “scarcity” of this kind is not real; it is merely relative, in relationship to getting another ware. Second, the basis of scarcity is the fact that people always want more of a thing than they actually have, and more than others have. If a link is made between scarcity and growth on these presuppositions, scarcity can be seen as a basis for growth, but some hold that it is extremely difficult to see a genuine causality here. This understanding of scarcity is abstract and remote from the question of a real scarcity of goods and resources. It looks like a definition that responds to requirements in a market economic system, rather than a definition that has the real world as its frame of reference. Scarcity becomes a presupposition that in many cases does not exist, but that a market economy must maintain, in order to assert the importance of economic growth and to create a basis for its own existence (Kohn 1992, pp. 72–75).

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Distribution Economic activity means the distribution of resources that can be used in various ways. This need for distribution presupposes limited resources, since there is no need to distribute unlimited resources. In this situation of scarcity, one must identify the most appropriate means to distribute resources. To what extent can economic competition help here? A market-oriented competitive economy combines two functions: to collect resources and to distribute these among those who are willing to buy them. Besides this, the profit that is gained from the competing economic activity is itself to be distributed among producers or sellers. In both cases, distribution depends on factors that are linked to the character of the competition and to the purchasing power of buyers. We have seen in a historical context that the classical economists consciously envisaged the distributive function of a competitive economy. Competition out of self-interest led to a societally useful distribution of those resources that the competition helped to collect. In Adam Smith, it was the invisible hand that was active here. What was useful for the individual was useful also for the community. As I have mentioned, Smith was familiar with the idea that it could be necessary in some cases to restrict freedom. Self-interest was not always identical to the common interest. In a modern competitive economy, it is difficult to discern such a virtually automatic function of societal distribution. A more obvious idea is that it is the invisible hand of the governing authorities that contributes to a distribution that is the most useful in a universal perspective. It has been claimed that it is illusory in a non-perfect, monopolizing competitive situation to believe that the economic process by itself can create a positive link between individual interests and common interests (Rich 1990, p. 193). If we first detach the question about distribution from an ethical context, and inquire in purely economic terms into the distributive function of competition, we seem to get the following picture. First of all, in terms of buyers, distribution depends on their purchasing power. It is obvious that one who has a lot of money can get hold of a larger portion of the resources on offer than one who does not have the same purchasing power. Second, in terms of sellers, distribution also depends on the kind of competition that is involved. If the starting point is an almost perfect competition with many producers, the price will be driven

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downward, and the resources or goods can become accessible to more of those who need them. Steep competition and a low price can contribute to a larger and wider distribution of resources. In a non-perfect competitive situation, the power of producers will be greater, and we may assume that they will set higher prices. In that case, the goods will be more strongly restricted to those with high purchasing power, and the distribution will be correspondingly low in one group of the population. This tendency will be intensified further in “competitive situations” that approximate oligopoly and monopoly. On the side of the seller or producer, one can speak, on the one hand, of a corresponding distribution of profit, where the degree of distribution will depend on the form of competition involved. An almost perfect competition will drive the price—and the profit—down, while at the same time distributing what is available to more persons. On the other hand, it is almost impossible, precisely on the side of the producer, to say anything about the significance of competition for distribution, because there is one factor here that makes it very difficult to get an overview of the question of distribution. In an almost perfect competitive situation, the price producers get for a ware or service will be identical. However, the distribution of profit is also dependent on the cost price for the individual producer, and this can vary considerably. Obviously, this will influence both the profit and distribution of profit among producers. It may be somewhat easier to get an overview in a non-perfect, oligopolistic, or monopolistic situation, where actors can have more control of the relationship between sales price and cost price, and can distribute the profit among themselves in a way that makes it possible for them to participate in the market. The distribution of profit is not broad, but it is easier for it to take place more equally or equitably than in a situation of almost perfect competition. This situation on the seller’s side shows that the distribution takes place here on the basis of one’s merits or gains, in the sense that the recompense will correspond to how far one succeeds in the competition. This is especially true in a situation of almost perfect competition: the relationship between sales price and cost price reflects the seller’s efforts. Poor efforts and a high cost price offer only small prospects of making a profit. This is how things look, based on what can count as gains in an economic sense. However, the situation can be characterized by great efforts (e.g., in the use of manpower) that produce no gains. The sales price is driven as low as it can be, and despite all of one’s effort, the cost

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price is not sufficiently reduced. This is a reflection of the fact that realities and ideals can be very different. The link between effort and profit is more a matter of minimizing the effort—that is to say, of getting as much as possible as cheaply as possible. If we compare the link between effort and profit in economic competition with the situation in sporting competition, we see that that latter has much less of the so-called alea element (the element of chance) than of the agon element (the element of struggle).36 Earning money in an almost perfect competitive situation is a question of hard work and great effort to drive down costs.37 There may possibly be space for the alea element in a non-perfect or monopolizing situation: sometimes, when buyers lack information about the realities in the markets, this can allow producers to charge prices that are not under pressure from any side. Up to this point, I have noted that one consequence of competition is a distribution of resources and goods. This distribution depends both on the actor who is involved and on the form of competition that we are evaluating. The next question is whether there is anything, in addition to resources, wares, and profit, that is distributed by means of economic competition. I shall focus here on the distribution of power. The competition for goods and services cannot be isolated from the relationship these resources have to power. The distribution of economic resources is also a distribution of power. Power can be related to several elements. One such is honor, which can indeed be significant in an economic context. Honor is due to a capable businessman for the job he does. However, the elements of influence and management are much more important. In most cases where a situation without competition generates a concentration of resources, there is also a concentration of power. The distribution of resources is also a distribution of power. This applies particularly where the resources do not simply continue to exist as concrete material resources, but are translated into money. There can quickly be too many concrete resources, like food, and it is difficult to make a profit out of a surplus. But one can never have too much money, and in this sense, money is pure power (Brockway 2001, p. 207). Money can give access to all desirable goods or services; and at the same time, it helps to realize the most important of all forms of power, namely, the power over the conditions in which one lives. Competition gives the individual actor less influence, and thus less power. Within the framework of a notional situation of perfect competition, there is no managed concentration of

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power. The power that the resources give is completely independent of the actors. The determinative factor is the automatism in the market, related to work, capital, and goods: the gravitation toward an equilibrium between supply and demand, and to a price that finds its level on the basis of this equilibrium. Where one can speak of “power” in a competitive situation of this kind, this is a power that lies with the consumer. The seller and the producer are squeezed with regard to price and profit, while the purchasers or consumers get goods that are as cheap as possible and as good as possible. As I have mentioned, the possibility for the producer and seller to get a greater profit, and thereby power and resources, lies more in a non-perfect or monopolizing competitive situation, in which consumer power is reduced and the market power of producers allows them to generate a power that creates increased profit. The hypothetical quality of a perfect competitive situation and the more realistic quality of a non-perfect competitive situation indicate that the potential for power and influence lies just as much with these actors as with consumers. The Goals of Competition What are the goals of economic competition? The principal goal of the consumer is utility; that of the producer and the seller is the greatest possible profit or surplus. For an individual consumer, there is a great deal that can be useful, and that thereby indirectly becomes a goal for competition. The spectrum runs from what is useful in a wholly practical sense to that which is comfortable, from the material to the psychological and the existential. Recognition by others and self-respect can be very directly linked to economic competition. For a producer, the goals have an even more material orientation. This also applies indirectly to many partial goals; examples being contracts and the workforce. A factor such as influence in the public sphere, which is supremely an object of competition, can likewise be very important for the material surplus of a firm or producer. The same is true of confidence, both in the market and on the part of public authorities. In a larger perspective, however, such goals too are oriented to the realization of the principal goal of profit. From the viewpoint of producers or sellers, the goal of competition is thus the greatest possible profit. In a societal context, one cannot be content simply to note that this is the goal of competition. Where the market and competitive economy functions, it functions in a society, and

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this society must pose the question of the societal function of competition. Such a question concerns the significance of competition for the wellbeing of society. From this widened perspective, we can say that there are two different goals for competition in economic activity: the maximization of profit and the wellbeing of society. As I have mentioned, some hold that these are compatible and can function positively in tandem. Others will claim that they are incompatible. Goals can have various characters and functions. Some goals have a concrete character, while others have rather the form of intentions to realize something. A goal can have a motivating and legitimating function in relation to actions that are meant to contribute to its realization. The goal of competition as an instrument in economic activity—whether this is the maximization of profit, the wellbeing of society, or a combination of these—can be seen, to begin with, as both a concrete goal and an intention. But are intentions of interest in an economic context? George P. Brockway has pointed here to the difference between the law and the economy (Brockway 2001, pp. 57–59). In law, intentions play a great role. In a criminal trial, different intentions behind people’s actions result in completely different verdicts. If someone dies as the result of another person’s deliberate action, the penal consequence will be completely different from a situation where death is due to an accident or to the action of a sick person. Here, the intention behind the action is completely determinative. The situation in the economy is completely different. It is indeed true that intentions play a role in the judicial evaluation of economic actions, but this does not apply in the economy itself. Good intentions play only a small role if the concrete economic result is poor. Intentions are important both in law and ethics. In the economy, it is concrete results, not intentions, that count. The goals in an economic context are primarily concrete. The motive or intention in economic competition is the maximization of profit. This is related to several realities: most obviously, to price, quantity, and quality. From the perspective of producers or sellers, price and quantity are the most important realities. The optimal situation is the highest possible price, lowest possible cost, and largest possible quantity, since this gives the highest possible profit. From the perspective of buyers or consumers, the optimal situation is the lowest possible price and the highest possible quality, since this gives the highest possible utility. In a perfect market, where competition has a regulative function, the

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price gravitates toward cost price, and the possibility of profit is limited. With a market price that approaches cost price, the question of quantity is first and foremost a question of selling so many units that the costs incurred in the production do not have the negative effect of tying down capital while goods remain unsold. The question of quality becomes a question whether the product is of such a character that it satisfies the requirements that consumers have associated with products of this kind. A producer will look first of all at price, costs, and quantity; but the need for quality cannot be overlooked. Quality influences quantity, and is thus also related to the possibility of maximizing profit. The central realities, however, are price and quantity. One must find an optimal balance between quantity—also in connection with the need for quality—and price. This balance will vary. One factor that influences the exact character of this balance is the type of market in which the competition takes place. In an almost perfect market, the balance will not be the same as in a non-perfect market. The result of competition can be measured in dollars and cents. This concrete profit also legitimates competition as an instrument in the economy. Competition is a concrete instrument, and profit is a concrete result. The fact that the intention behind competition is the maximization of profit does not of itself legitimate competition as an instrument in the economy. It is only concrete profit that can supply this legitimation, as well as the fact that this profit may perhaps be larger through competition than through other possible and comparable instruments (e.g., economic cooperation). This emphasis on the concrete does not, however, permit an ethical evaluation of economic competition to avoid looking at the intention behind competition. This evaluation must ask whether the maximization of profit as a goal or intention can be counted as an acceptable and good goal. Nor is it irrelevant from an ethical perspective whether this leads to the realization of the goal; this, however, is only one of several perspectives on the action or the economic strategy in question. I have mentioned several times that the wellbeing of society was a ­central goal for the classics of economics, like Adam Smith. The wellbeing of society, as a conscious goal or partial goal for economic competition, is probably less prominent in today’s world and today’s market situation than it was for Smith. Milton Friedman’s affirmation that the societal responsibility of economic activity is increased profit (Friedman 1970; see also Friedman and Friedman 1980, p. 133) indicates, at the

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very least, that in his pure market economy, the emphasis on the wellbeing of society is rather indirect. There are, however, some elements that suggest that even a modern competitive economy can promote the wellbeing of society. First of all, as I have said above, competition in an almost perfect market is a competition on the premise of consumers (consumer sovereignty). Here, there is a maximization of utility that is related to consumers, and therefore benefits more people than if maximization took place on the side of profit; in the latter case, far fewer persons would draw benefits from maximization. Second, competition thereby helps to prevent concentrations of power that would be able to steer the market, prices, and supply in a direction that only a small minority would think useful. Such a situation would find it much more difficult to realize a goal of societal wellbeing. Third, the creativity and expansion generated by competition will entail the creation of more values and products, which can benefit more people than would have been the case if such creativity had not been generated. It is a case, not of getting hold of small pieces of a given cake, but of creating more cakes and other cakes. Such an expansion occurs because it is profitable. If economic competition is to yield these gains in terms of a certain measure of societal wellbeing, an almost perfect competitive situation is definitely necessary. As I have mentioned, it is problematic whether this presupposition is realistic. This reduces to some extent the positive societal gain that some would attribute to the economic function of the idea of competition. A lack of perfection in the competitive situation leads to distortions in distribution and to the use of resources with sales in mind. In calculating societal costs, these expenses must be seen as unnecessary, and hence as reducing the contribution to societal wellbeing. Independently of the question of perfect and non-perfect competition, it remains true that every form of competition can create an intensity and a rapidity in sales and production that ultimately can pose a threat to physical and mental health. With a historical perspective too, the need to realize societal wellbeing as a goal has required other instruments than economic competition. The invisible hand has not succeeded in distributing broadly. This has prompted the call for a visible hand that could steer from outside and regulate the market, and much of institutionalism’s critique of the neoclassical economic theory concerns this issue. But although these institutionalist theories have won a measure of acceptance and have been tried

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out in practice, for example, in the Scandinavian welfare state systems (Veggeland 2016), the faith in competition’s ability to create societal wellbeing has survived. Indeed, this faith may perhaps be stronger today than it was before the institutionalist criticism began. This is confirmed by the place and significance of neoclassicism and the market economy of many Western economic systems that also wish to give priority to societal wellbeing. One example is the importance in many Western contexts of exposing to competition such tasks that traditionally belonged to the state: the logic of exposing these to competition is precisely the faith that, by means of competition, there will be a greater return in societal wellbeing for every dollar that is invested. Competition promotes societal wellbeing. This view is held more strongly today, to some extent even in contexts that in the past tended rather to believe that steering by the state ensured general wellbeing (Nilsson 2016). In this way, the two goals of economic competition are combined: a desire for profit leads to the greatest societal wellbeing. There is, however, no consensus about whether exposure to competition has such a positive effect in empirical reality.

A Market Economy Oriented to  Competition—Two Approaches Up to this point, I have described various aspects of competition in economic activity. This is necessary, if we are to grasp what economic competition is, and what it implies. On some points, I have also given an account of critical perspectives, but the emphasis has been on the presentation itself. In order to identify more exactly what characterizes competition as an economic instrument and what this entails in a societal context, I shall now contrast two major twentieth-century economists. Both belong to an American context in which market economy plays an important role, and both take account of this in the elaboration of their economic thinking; they do not think in terms of a planned economy. They part company in their evaluation of how the market economy functions, and of what might need to be done in order for it to have a good societal function. This difference can also be seen in their evaluation of competition and in the status and function they wish to attribute to it in economic praxis. The two economists are John K. Galbraith (1908–2006) and Milton Friedman (1912–2006).

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John K. Galbraith’s original economic background was the neoclassical tradition, but he was strongly influenced by John M. Keynes from the second half of the 1930s onward. Like Keynes, he claimed that the state must be able to regulate the economic use of society’s production capacity and thereby offset the autonomy of the market economy. Galbraith had a fundamental distrust of markets that had no form of regulation: the energies created by the capitalist market economy had to be steered and used for special purposes. He acknowledged the ability of capitalism to free people from hard work, but he was critical of the way in which people’s needs for protection and security were met in such markets. A certain measure of equality with regard to market power was also a necessary presupposition. If these concerns were addressed—preferably in a welfare state—capitalism would be adjusted in a more “softened and civilized” direction and made more “tenable” (Galbraith 1998 [1958], pp. 12–13; see also Galbraith 1968, pp. 32, 170–171; Parker 2005, pp. 198–199). Milton Friedman belonged to the so-called Chicago School of economics and became its most prominent representative in the 1960s. His academic contribution in economics was linked especially to his analysis of the importance of money in the economy, and in particular to the relationship between money, inflation, and unemployment (monetarism). In the general public, however, he was probably best known for his strong defense of the market economy, especially in two more popular books, Capitalism and Freedom (Friedman and Friedman 1962) and Free to Choose (Friedman and Friedman 1980). His enthusiasm for the free market economy is almost panegyrical.38 The element of competition was a fundamental presupposition in his understanding of the market economy. Indeed, this was taken so much for granted, and given such a positive evaluation with regard to the functioning of the market economy, that it was scarcely necessary for him to speak of it explicitly. This element is actualized to the greatest extent where it is challenged, for example, in connection with monopolies (Friedman and Friedman 1962, pp. 119–121). It is clear that his intention is to offer an apologia for the market economy. As a markedly competitive economy, it is superior to the alternatives, and it helps to promote a society in which it is good to live. It is the power in the market that fosters a welfare society of this kind. I shall now identify the differences between Friedman and Galbraith in relation to their views on four points: the character of competition;

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the necessity of competition; the consequences of competition; and competition and state regulation. The first point is the character of competition. For Friedman, there are some basic presuppositions that contribute to the success of the market economy. One absolutely central principle is cooperation through voluntary exchange (Friedman and Friedman 1962, p. 166, cf. p. 13). Individuals cooperate because this is how they can satisfy their own desires as efficiently as possible. The market economy is thus based on free choices, and the efficiency of the process is created by a competition among a large number of actors. Competition includes a price mechanism that very quickly and widely exchanges information about the wares on offer, the demand for such wares, prices, and the possibilities of entering and exiting the market. This process helps to allocate resources that can satisfy people’s needs and coordinates the activities of all those who are involved in producing and acquiring the product. It motivates them to do so on the basis of marginally higher prices. This is how a perfect competition functions. The idea of competition was definitively a presupposition of the neoclassical thinking that became dominant in American economics in the 1950s and 1960s. Galbraith called this thinking “the central tradition.”39 As in Friedman, the ideal was perfect competition. But did this exist? Galbraith held that development in industry was toward larger units. An ideal competitive situation, in which thousands of competitors who did not know each other sought their own best advantage, no longer existed (if indeed it ever had). Larger fortunes were gathered in fewer hands. There were fewer firms in the market. In modern capitalism, the steering institutions were the big limited liability companies: only these had the innovative power (the “technostructure”) that was necessary for a continuous improvement. As such, they also had a certain possibility— since competition also existed among these larger units—to steer what was on offer and thus also to steer the prices of goods that entered the market (Galbraith 1968, pp. 211–218). The appropriate description of this competition was non-perfect, rather than perfect. This competition was played out in a form of a balance of power among them, but also in relationship to other bodies like trade unions. This balance was a “countervailing power” that limited their possibility of acting entirely on their own presuppositions (Parker 2005, pp. 238–239, 659–660; see Galbraith 1952, p. 119).40

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Galbraith identified other factors too that made the idea of perfect competition problematic. Where was the product scarcity that was a fundamental presupposition for this idea of competition? A scarcity economy in the United States had been replaced by an economy that to a much larger extent presupposed wealth. Besides this, consumer sovereignty was presupposed in a strongly competitive economical way of thinking, such as we find in Friedman, where it is so much taken for granted that it is scarcely thematized. The free choices of the consumer steer the economy. But did this sovereignty exist? For Galbraith, the great potential in the market lay not with consumers, but with producers. It was gradually also recognized that political interests were very important factors in the functioning of the economy. Galbraith saw a confirmation of such views when even the adherents of the central tradition adapted to this development (Galbraith 1998 [1958], pp. 35–37). Did this mean that Galbraith wanted to downplay the role of competition in an economic context? He was skeptical to the function it had in the central tradition, with its emphasis on perfect competition and the ensuing consequences. Stephen Dunn (2011, p. 138) notes that Galbraith was more of an adherent of free competition in the tradition of Alfred Marshall. Free competition here means competition in a more everyday sense, that is to say, between similar matched competitors, free competition between buyers and between sellers. The price is determined, not by the large number of actors and by all the various things that have to be taken into account, but by the more limited relationship between actors. Dunn also notes that we find points of contact in Galbraith to the change that has taken place in the modern economy, from a pure competition based on perfect presuppositions in the direction of other forms of competition. What is involved nowadays is competition related to “advertising, mergers and acquisitions, product innovations as well as new sources of countervailing power” (Dunn 2011, p. 6, see also pp. 196–197). The second point that shows the differences between Friedman and Galbraith concerns the necessity of competition. For Friedman, competition is necessary because, in a market economy, it meets in a very special manner such needs and functions that are economically vital. First of all, he sees the way in which competition efficiently allocates resources as completely superior to every other system. Other factors likewise emphasize the necessity of competition in the economy (see Butler 1985, pp. 199–203). Second, a market economy

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process counteracts an arbitrary discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, gender, etc. It is difficult to practice discrimination in a chain of persons ensuring a product reaches market, since they do not know each other. Besides this, one who discriminates in this context will incur higher costs, since the possibilities of choice are reduced; in competition with others, one can be squeezed out of the market (Friedman and Friedman 1962, pp. 109–110). Third, such a market opens the door to variety, without creating chaos. In a market economy, people’s different tastes can be satisfied to a large extent. No political decisions are necessary either to determine which tastes are to be satisfied, how this is to be done, or how order is to be preserved despite completely individual preferences. Fourth, competition is necessary because there is no better protection of the consumer than a market that is oriented to competition. Every monopoly, whether state or private, is a threat to the consumer. Free competition and free world trade promote the consumer’s interests. Friedman sees regulations or monopolizations by the state, which are made with the aim of promoting the consumer’s interests, as in reality a restriction on these interests; moreover, they increase prices, since they entail costs. Friedman argues that the protection that often motivates regulations is also to be found in the free market. Here, he takes up Adam Smith’s idea (mentioned above) about the butcher, the brewer, and the baker. The consumer is protected in competition, not because businesspeople are kindhearted or altruistic, but because it is in the economic interest of businesspeople to protect the consumer (Friedman and Friedman 1980, p. 222). The market economy has other protective mechanisms too: the consumer can choose the product he or she trusts and can reject others. Products must be tested thoroughly and brought gradually onto the market, because otherwise the producer may be liable to damages. And it is in the seller’s own interest to acquire information about the products on sale, so that the consumer will not purchase an article that is inferior or dangerous (see Friedman and Friedman 1980, pp. 222–227). Friedman sees the possibility of realizing these gains in a competitive situation as linked to the possibility of losing. This possibility has a positive and necessary function. The desire to win, to become rich, and have a high income—and to avoid losing—is an important incentive in a competition, but this presupposes that losing is a genuine possibility, and that it is not excluded by structures that provide financial support

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or compensation. The possibility of losing is a price that must be paid, if one is to realize all the positive potential that lies in competition. Galbraith agreed that to downplay the aspect of losing in a competitive economy, and not to take it into account, would undermine the incentives that promote its positive gains. Increased efficiency presupposed that there was a genuine possibility of losing (Galbraith 1998 [1958], pp. 34–35). But he argued that one could not simply accept that this was a necessary aspect of a competitive economy, because that would mean putting people’s welfare—and ultimately, the basis of their livelihoods—at risk. There are many persons in society who never have the possibility of succeeding in a competitive situation in which they are hampered by their physical and mental presuppositions: the elderly, the handicapped, the sick, and those who in some way were less gifted, or who had completely different presuppositions with regard to achieving and producing. An efficient competition may be desirable, but that does not allow us to overlook those who are at the bottom. In this context, Galbraith also questioned one fundamental presupposition of a competition-oriented market economy, namely, the idea that the willingness to take risks was a virtue. This is not the case. For most people, it is difficult to live with risk, and they seek to avoid it and protect themselves against it. This is true in general terms, but also in areas related to the economy, like work. Besides this, it is difficult to conceive of “pure” risk. The risk in competition is continually “disturbed” by taxes, monopolies, trade unions, a certain slackness and a failure to get involved, as well as by legislation and, to some extent, by compassion. This difference in the evaluation of risk is connected to differing evaluations of some of the consequences of competition. Galbraith’s skepticism about the idea of competition in the central tradition also included the problematic consequences of this idea. In the wake of competition, there were both winners and losers. It created presuppositions for continuous changes in relation to the tastes and preferences of customers. Some of the needs that were met were fundamental, but others were created artificially and needed the help of advertising, if they were to be discovered and become attractive. Although the market economy idea of competition was praised by many for its precision and symmetry, and was occasionally exalted to the status of something beautiful, it had a downside characterized by insecurity.41 This insecurity, that was related to the risk entailed by competition, was not a problem for Friedman; on the contrary, it was a necessary presupposition for the dynamic function of a

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competitive economy. For Galbraith, on the other hand, it was a challenge. The insecurity included all actors, but especially those on the side of producers and sellers. Economic ruin and bankruptcy were one possibility; large financial gains were another. Galbraith notes that both large and small firms that compete on the premises of the market economy—where insecurity is a given premise—desire to reduce this insecurity, preferably by means of regulatory intervention by the state. The same is true of the worker who is worried about his job because of an insecurity that is due, not to the worker himself or to the effort he puts into his work, but to mechanisms in the competitive economy itself. This insecurity applies to the producer, but also to the worker, no matter how faithful he may be in his job. His fate was just as much dependent on the commitment or inadequacy of others, as on his own. Is insecurity a consequence of competition? Yes, competition entails drawing a distinction between winners and losers. Winners get a lot, and losers get little. One element in Galbraith’s critique of the competitive economy is that it does not sufficiently seek to realize an ideal of equality. One can, however, get the impression that he accepts that this is only an ideal. But this ideal can be more strongly effective (than in Friedman, for example) with regard to firms and their power, and with regard to the result that the individual is left with. The difference between winners and losers can definitely be too wide. As I have mentioned, Friedman sees the possibility of both loss and gain as inherent in the dynamic nature of competition. But he sees no contradiction between a market economy oriented to competition and equality; he understands equality as an equality of possibilities, not as an equality with regard to results (Friedman and Friedman 1980, pp. 131–134, see also pp. 128–149). We cannot get away from differences in results and in earnings; but such differences, which are caused by competition, are not antithetical to freedom. On the contrary: a society that prioritizes and enforces equality in results and earnings will lose both equality and freedom. The coercion destroys freedom, and despite its good intentions, it is possible that someone will employ it to achieve goals of his own (Friedman and Friedman 1980, p. 148). One presupposition for prioritizing equality of possibilities is mobility: in other words, the principle that one who starts on the bottom has the genuine possibility of working his way up. Friedman sees the decisive dynamic element in this equality of possibilities and this inequality with regard to results. The possibility of becoming rich and getting a high income, in competition

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with others, is the propulsive incentive in an economy that succeeds in producing what people need and in developing through innovation a technology that makes the working day less tiring (Friedman and Friedman 1962, p. 170). This incentive disappears when the state seeks to limit the inequality by means of regulations, and especially by means of progressive and high taxation. Friedman claims that a flat rate of tax helps to promote equality, and a negative taxation gives poor persons money to choose what they need, rather than only what other people think they need (Friedman and Friedman 1962, pp. 173–174; see also Butler 1985, p. 219). Against the background of Galbraith’s links to the Keynesian tradition and of Friedman’s clearly market economic approach, it is not surprising that the question of competition and state regulation brings to light clear distinctions between the two economists. When Galbraith confronted the problematical consequences of competition in the central tradition, he reacted by appealing for state intervention, not least in order to ensure a larger measure of security. This applied to all actors in the economic process. One way in which this could take place was through state regulations that helped to spread the risk and reduce its threat. The freedom of the individual must be balanced against a necessary coercion by the state, in order to protect fundamental human values. In keeping with the Keynesian tradition, Galbraith saw the state’s regulatory function as particularly important in depressions. He questioned the view that public expenditure should be reduced to a minimum—a position that was well established in the United States, where it was almost taken for granted. He argued that in many cases, it was necessary to use the instruments of the state in order to create good living conditions, especially for those who did not win in the competition with others; and this was particularly true in periods of depression, when many more people were affected by poverty. His argumentation was not without its moral overtones, but it was primarily economic in character, and more specifically, market economic: like Keynes, Galbraith posited that the state had to take measures to strengthen the efficiency in a market economy, which was inefficient in periods of depression (Parker 2005, p. 656). He was also willing to part company here with the idea that one should always aim at a balanced budget in society’s economy. Sometimes, it was necessary to deviate from this principle, in order to improve people’s situations in a temporary crisis (Galbraith 1998 [1958], p. 12).

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It is at the point of intersection between the function of the market economy and the need for state intervention that we can also locate Galbraith’s concern with the problematical differences between the rich and the poor in American society. In his book The Affluent Society, he addressed in particular the relationship between public poverty and private abundance. He saw this as also a moral challenge, although he was cautious about drawing explicitly moral consequences from this. He saw it as an important task of the state to implement measures to reduce this inequality.42 Friedman took a completely different approach to the role of the state in a competitive society. He saw government intervention in the field of the economy as destructive of the positive gains that can be harvested from a functioning market economy.43 However, not all the functions in a society can be carried out by a market. In keeping with the ideas of Adam Smith, Friedman claims that the state can and should give protection against violence and coercion; it must make laws and ensure that there is a legal system, and it must provide certain public services. Besides this, Friedman sees the state’s task as the protection of those members of society who cannot be regarded as responsible. A market cannot carry out these functions in the same way as the state. But such functions must always be subject to a critical evaluation (Friedman and Friedman 1980, pp. 28–33; Friedman and Friedman 1962, pp. 23, 27). Outside these specific fields, it is necessary to restrict as much as possible the power and influence of the state on the economy. Why does Friedman take this position? First of all, a free competition-oriented market economy very efficiently provides what people need—much more efficiently than in a state-regulated economy. Second, a state-regulated economic project is more exposed to the danger of promoting the interests of those who support it, rather than the interests of those whom it is meant to service. This gives the bureaucrats an influence that runs counter to democratic ideals (Friedman and Friedman 1980, pp. 294–298). Third, Friedman claims that free economic activity is a basic presupposition of both personal and political freedom (Friedman and Friedman 1962, pp. 7–21).44 For example, restrictions on imports and prices determined by the state represent a limitation of political freedom. In a market economy, power is given to the individual (consumer sovereignty) and is thus spread more widely than the power of the state. This in turn makes new ideas and a range of alternatives more acceptable.

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Another problematic aspect of the state’s regulatory role in the economy is its will to give itself monopolies and to establish arrangements that help others to create monopolies (Friedman and Friedman 1962, pp. 119–136). Irrespective of its form, a monopoly prevents competition and the efficient regulatory function that competition has on prices, supply, and demand. Monopolies take various forms: when domestic producers are protected against foreign producers through customs duties, when the state desires to organize and regulate the market, when price controls are introduced, and when occupational licensure is introduced (see Friedman and Friedman 1962, pp. 137–160). Monopolization reigns also in the labor market, linked to trade unions; according to Friedman, their struggle for higher wages has meant that the majority are worse off. What some get, the others must do without. Ultimately, this can create unemployment, since a higher wage than the market can support in financial terms is feasible only for a certain period (Friedman and Friedman 1980, p. 247). Monopolizations of this kind are also exposed to the risk of continuing to exist simply because they were established at some point in the past, although the presuppositions have changed. This is possible only because a monopoly excludes competition (Friedman and Friedman 1980, p. 246). Historically speaking, the state (or the local government authority) has had a monopoly on some services, such as the telephone, electricity, the post, water, and (in a European context) the health service. When Friedman wrote his books about market economy in the 1960s and 1970s, this was very largely the reality. The situation today is very different, not least because of enormous technological development, but also because the market economy is stronger today than it was at that time. Much of this has been privatized and exposed to the forces of the market economy, where various suppliers compete with each other. This development goes beyond the possible alternatives that he envisaged in the 1960s and later, but it is definitely a development in accordance with what Friedman wished. Where it was not possible to avoid some form of monopolization in these fields, Friedman was a supporter of the idea of an unregulated private monopoly. But does not the state have responsibility for those who are homeless or who live in poor-quality accommodation, for those who feel that their wages are insufficient to support them, and for farmers who cannot get a profit from their work and who demand subsidies or a restriction on the import of cheap agricultural produce? Would it not be

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irresponsible to let the market regulate such situations? And what about the social responsibility of firms? In a free market economy, according to Friedman, all these forms of responsibility are based on a misunderstanding, because in an economy of this kind “there is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition” (Friedman and Friedman 1962, p. 133). The social responsibility of firms is to acquire maximum profits for shareholders. This way of thinking about social responsibility and welfare is also reflected in Friedman’s view of the best way to care for those who need various forms of support: the method consists of letting the market work, since that produces the best and most efficient results. He holds that assessments by individuals and firms about how to get the most from available resources are superior to structures that are imposed from outside. Social support should not be earmarked, but given in the form of cash, and recipients should use the money where they themselves feel the need to be greatest. This avoids a paternalism that prevents good economic development. A minimum wage is a bad idea, since it increases both poverty and unemployment: one cannot compel an employer to hire people for a minimum wage, if this is higher than what the employer thinks defensible both economically and with regard to competition. Many people who would have had a job, if the wages were slightly lower, lose their job (Friedman and Friedman 1962, pp. 178–182). The welfare state, which includes many of these structures, represents paternalistic structures that have dramatically negative consequences for the whole fabric of our society: “They weaken the family, reduce the incentive to work, save, and innovate; reduce the accumulation of capital; and limit our freedom” (Friedman and Friedman 1980, p. 127, cf. pp. 97–127). Galbraith and Friedman belonged to the twentieth century. With their economic thinking, they stood on the shoulders of others, while also giving this inheritance their own special elaboration. The thinking they represented can be recognized in political concretizations, which are not necessarily related directly to Galbraith and Friedman. Although their shared standpoint in the context of a market economy gives a common framework, some points in their further elaboration are very different, especially regarding the degree of state regulation. However, one cannot say that Galbraith’s openness to regulation is radical. Regulation is a necessary safety valve in a society in which a competition-oriented market

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economy and changing economic situations bring forth both winners and losers. It is society’s task to care for the losers, and the gains of winners must make a contribution, so that society can do this. Galbraith represents the kind of mixed economy that is exemplified in the Scandinavian welfare states. It must nevertheless be said that in recent decades, the idea of competition as a means to get more out of every dollar that is invested has become more dominant. An increasingly direct emphasis on the market economy thus also becomes an argument for maintaining the welfare state. This does not mean that Friedman’s radical market economy holds the field. But the tendency in Scandinavia and many other regions seems to be a development that increasingly limits the state regulation of the market economy that we have known in the past. A market economy dominance, such as that expressed by Thatcherism in Great Britain, is not common today, although there are some countries where the cultivation of a pure market economy is following this path. We can say that the tendency is more toward Friedman than Galbraith.

Notes



1. “Market” means an arena consisting of consumers/buyers and producers/sellers. Wares are supplied in this arena. The market is a means of coordinating information about the costs and profits of a ware. The producer sends information about the costs via prices, and the consumer sends information about the profits via purchases or wishes with regard to demand. The supply side offers wares for sale. The demand side chooses from the wares that are on offer. This kind of decentralization of facts about purchases and sales is considered in a market economy to be an effective way of coordinating information. 2. Capitalism is frequently identified directly with the market economy, but there is no basis for this direct identification. Capitalism is first and foremost a social system built on the fundamental right to private property. Historically speaking, K. Marx’s understanding of a distinction between two classes of producers, the capitalists and the workers, has played an important role in this context. The right to property over the means of production belonged to the capitalists, giving them control over ­production and over the employment of the workforce. A. Britton and P. Sedgewick claim that the word capitalism does not actually play an important role in leading economic theory. The ownership situation can vary considerably in a market system, and capitalism as Marx understood the term is only one of several possible understandings of a “market economy.” See Britton and Sedgwick (2003, pp. 176–177).

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3. “So strong is the tendency among capitalists to combine that it has been said with truth that ‘where combination is possible, competition is impossible’” (Howerth 1912, p. 401). 4. In the United States, the so-called antitrust laws were already introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century, in order to forbid cartels and monopolies and to promote a competition that would benefit consumers. In other countries, like Norway, this was regulated by law somewhat later, with the focus on stable prices and the promotion of competition. The first Norwegian law about competition was enacted in 1993, and replaced by a new law in 2004. The goal being to promote competition in order to make the most effective use possible of the total resources of society. 5. On the latter, see Chapter 2. 6. On this expression, see Luttwak (1999). The reality and the content are expressed, for example, in the following metaphorical use related to falconry: “Rather, the precise scanning of a setting with utmost alertness for available prey possibilities, the aestheticization of a go-getting attitude and hence high, virtually supersonic velocity fits perfectly into the logic of carnivore capitalism. Not only is speed celebrated, it is also decisive to be quicker than others” (Krawietz 2014, p. 143). 7. For a critical discussion of this perspective in L. Robbins’ definition, see Buechner (2014). 8. A. Britton and P. Sedgwick claim that much of what economists believe and teach does not in fact satisfy the requirements of a genuine science. Predictions are based much too strongly on assumptions about human behavior and motivation that are not the object of contradictions, and that are sometimes seen as “articles of faith.” This is due above all to the problem of the relationship between facts and values when one seeks to investigate the human action itself. See Britton and Sedgwick (2003, p. 42). 9. See, for example, K.J. Arrow and F.H. Hahn: “In particular, it is supposed, in the main, that there is a perfect competition and that the choices of economic agents can be deduced from certain axioms of rationality” (Arrow and Hahn 1971, p. v). 10.  Economic thinking that emphasizes the central importance of mathematics is often called econometrics. One example of this is the book on mechanisms of competition in the economy by K.J. Arrow and F.H. Hahn (ibid.). A more classical example is found in W.S. Jevons: “… our science must be mathematical, simply because it deals with quantities. Wherever the things treated are capable of being greater or less, there the laws and relations must be mathematical in nature” (Jevons 1970 [1871], p. 78).

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11. Examples of this can be found in J.M. Keynes (1936, p. vii) and G.P. Brockway (2001, pp. 10, 24, 354). We should also note here that L. Walras, one of the pioneers of the neoclassical tradition (see Chapter 4), understood economics from three perspectives: as an ethical science, as art, and as pure science (the investigation of how the economy worked). We should especially note his emphasis on economy as an ethical science. There is much to suggest that not all of Walras’ heirs today would agree with his thinking on this point. See Walras (1977 [1874], p. 64). 12. See also G.P. Brockway’s interpretation of this statement (Brockway 2001, p. 353). 13. On the question of money, its character and function, see ibid., pp. 65–96. 14. In a price-regulated market, there will always be limits on what is on offer. In some cases, high prices will reflect the limited nature of what is on offer: it is this that creates high prices. In other cases, the offer can be large and the prices correspondingly low, but with the consequence that some people, because of the low prices, will get hold of more of the ware than they actually need, and that they may perhaps offer this for sale in the market later on. This means that some people will not get their share of something that exists in large quantities and is available at low prices— thereby experiencing the limitation of a market with a large-scale offer. This is experienced particularly strongly in a market with price control. See Sowell (2015, pp. 38–44). 15. M. Lutz and K. Lux have described this as follows: “Everybody is struggling to make it [the competitive equilibrium], cutting costs wherever possible in order to survive, but nobody is a winner except the consumer, who gets what he or she wants at the lowest possible cost. Here is the basis for the concept of consumer sovereignty. It means the consumer is king. He dictates production. […] The economist’s dream world of perfect competition is a world of profit maximizers struggling to satisfy the royal consumer” (Lutz and Lux 1979, p. 105). See also Arnsperger (1996, pp. 9–10). 16. The significance that Smith attached to specialization and the division of labor in the economy (Smith 1998 [1776], pp. 13, 21) likewise retains its relevance and justification in the competitive economic reality of the present day, as something that improves efficiency. It must, however, be pointed out that experience today shows that an excessively strong specialization of work can have a counterproductive effect. Variation and more holistic structures linked to work (including manual work) are factors that have also been shown to have improved production. On this, see, for example, Brakelmann (1988, pp. 81–84, cf. pp. 69–87). 17. On the main structure in what follows, see Bain (2018).

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18. M. Lutz and K. Lux give a picture in their book of an economist’s dream world built on the model of perfect competition. Their presentation continually tilts toward irony. This dream world is a world of “profit maximizers struggling to satisfy the royal consumer.” It is a world in which “government intervention is unnecessary,” “a world of desirable laissez-faire,” “a world where mass-production economies are assumed away,” “a world where there can never be excessive profits, or unearned income,” a world in which competition cannot produce “an equal distribution but it will certainly produce a fair one,” “a world of no economic power,” “a world of no inflation,” a world in which unemployment is impossible, because the salaries will be adjusted where unemployment threatens. This world marked by perfect competition is “the modern economist’s Utopia.” See Lutz and Lux (1979, pp. 104–106). 19. Even some of those who assert the usefulness of thinking on the basis of perfect competition see the limitations with regard to the anchoring in reality. Nevertheless, the idea of perfect competition is the model that is most useful for economists when they attempt theoretically to understand the variations that occur in a competitive market. An economy marked by market competition can be understood and dealt with from the perspective of systematic regularity only to the extent that it can be called an economy marked by perfect competition. On this, see Kirzner (1991, p. 103). 20. F. Hayek indirectly criticizes this lack of closeness to reality when he asks ironically for a scientific account of the elements that contribute to the emergence of this kind of situation of perfect competition. The answer is that it is impossible to give a scientific account. And this makes the theory itself problematic. See von Hayek (1948, p. 94). 21. One historical example of this is railway traffic in the United States in the nineteenth century. In many places, several separate rail tracks lay alongside each other. This was a waste of railway lines, and many trains ran half-empty. Some of this can still be seen along the Frazer River in British Columbia, Canada. Here, there are rail tracks on both sides of the river, operated on the one bank by the Canadian Pacific Railway and on the other bank by the Canadian National Railway. One may assume that there is no cut-throat competition there today. 22. See, for example, Rich (1990, p. 182). 23. A critical evaluation of the idea that one experiences freedom by purchasing emphasizes that this is an expression of an extreme materialism. At the same time, this freedom is limited to those who can afford to buy the quantity of goods that give this sort of feeling of freedom. The possibility of taking out a loan in order to buy now entails that one abandons future freedom in order to get freedom at the present time (Lutz and Lux 1979, pp. 135–136).

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24. This theory has been criticized from various angles: How is the marginal utility to be measured without thereby asking what a person is willing to pay for it? Is this not a circular argument? And is it the case that the last wish that was satisfied and its utility are a declining function of the quantity of goods consumed? Does this apply to those who seek knowledge, those who are collectors, and so on? Does this law also apply to money, when money is understood as an instrument of power? Is this a question of a curve that falls as the quantity increases? Is not the opposite true? On these objections, see Brockway (2001, pp. 206–207). 25. “To widen the market and to narrow the competition, is always the interest of the dealers … It [a proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce coming from the dealers] comes from an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the publick, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the publick, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it …” (Smith 1998 [1776], p. 157). 26. In this context, N.E. Bowie speaks of authorities who want to protect the losers in a competition by providing a welfare floor that is financed by taxes paid by the winners. Such interventions are necessary in some instances: “In a moral society we cannot let the market be the sole determinant of economic welfare” (Bowie 1999, p. 29). 27. On what follows, see the homepage of the Federal Trade Commission, https://www.flc-gov/about-ftc/what-we-do (retrieved 12.3.2018). See also “A brief overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s investigative and law enforcement authority,” https://ww.ftc.gov/about-ftc/whatwe-do/enforcement-authority (12.3.2018). There is a corresponding organization in Norway too, the Norwegian Competition Authority, http://ww.konkuransetilsynet.no/en (12.3.2018). Its principal task is to implement the law about competition (1994, 2004) by preventing concentrations of power and by ensuring that consumers get the lowest possible prices. 28.  This theorem runs as follows: “[A]ny allocation of scarce resources between competing ends that is Pareto efficient can be achieved by a competitive equilibrium” (Kay 2003, p. 180). If this is to be achieved, however, there are some market presuppositions that must be fulfilled: there must be many buyers and sellers; the right to private possession of all resources; actors who all maximize utility and profit; trade without barriers; and a free setting of prices. See Torsvik (2003, p. 82). 29. Pareto optimality also presupposes that three other criteria are met: there must exist an efficiency in exchange (wares must be distributed among buyers with the intention of satisfying their needs, and the price system must contribute to a continued exchange of wares right up to the point

210  S. O. THORBJØRNSEN where further trade is no longer possible); efficiency in production (the point where it is no longer possible to produce more of a ware, without this leading to a reduction in the production of other wares—the price system gives signals when there is a lack of production resources, and they must use resources more efficiently, thereby reducing prices); and efficiency in the assemblage of the products (the assemblage of sales products that best reflects the consumers’ preferences). On this, see Lenn (1998, p. 191). 30. M.A. Lutz and K. Lux call this a “mutual cancellation of efforts” (Lutz and Lux 1979, p. 118, cf. p. 120). 31. “To compete in a free economy means to create and offer better values to customers than rival firms” (Salsman 2000b, p. 1). 32. “As distinct from invention, which is the creation of new ideas, innovation is the development of new ideas into things of value: new or improved products, processes, or services” (MacAvoy 1998, p. 331). 33. T.C. MacAvoy refers to an affirmation by E. Roberts: “The farther a company tries to go in innovating, the greater the likelihood of that innovation effort failing; yet the less the company seeks to innovate, the greater the likelihood the company itself will fail” (ibid., p. 331). 34. M.A. Lutz and K. Lux reflect on the difference between the way in which competition functions today and the way in which Adam Smith thought it should function. They write that, for Smith, “[C]ompetition would serve to limit the inevitable selfishness and greed that did exist in economic agents. He did not really imagine that the force of competition could lead to a competition in selfishness and immorality” (Lutz and Lux 1979, p. 122). 35. Examples are H. Daly and J. Farley (Daly and Farley 2011, pp. 62–64). In the wake of the so-called Brundtland Report (Our Common Future; World Commission on Environment and Development 1987), the question of sustainability and economic growth has been raised. The Report presupposed a combination of these two, but this has since been problematized. On this, see, for example, Langhelle (1999, esp. pp. 135–138). 36.  R. Caillois held that sport is made up of two fundamental elements, an agon element and an alea element. The agon element concerns the goal-oriented struggle to realize a goal and receive a reward. The alea element is related to the fact that there is also an element of unpredictability, of chance and luck, in sport. The latter element is characteristic of play, while the former is characteristic of every serious competition. On this, see Caillois (1988, pp. 9–10). 37. G. Torsvik points out that the market does not draw a distinction between talent and effort. The wish for an equitable distribution demands that the state should intervene and redistribute incomes. With reference to the

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second welfare theorem, it is possible to envisage separating the goal of efficient production from the wish for an equitable distribution of material resources. It is possible to avoid a conflict between these two goals, if the state intervenes and redistributes on the basis of productive talent (tax to the one who has above-average talent) rather than on the basis of effort (progressive tax that changes a person’s effort at work). In that case, the market mechanism can still function as an effective allocation of resources (Torsvik 2003, p. 94, cf. pp. 91–95). 38. “Wherever we find any large element of individual freedom, some measure of progress in the material comforts at the disposal of ordinary citizens, and widespread hope of further progress in the future, there we also find that economic activity is organized mainly through the free market” (Friedman and Friedman 1980, pp. 54–55). 39. Galbraith drew a trajectory back from this situation to the influence that social Darwinism had had in the United States, where competition and the emphasis on the strong person were central. The idea that the United States was the country where everyone had a chance, despite the elevated positions of the rich and powerful, fitted easily into social Darwinism’s ideas about competition. This meant that compassion, and welfare for those in society who had financial difficulties, posed a threat to competition in the economy: this would disturb the play of free forces in the market. Under the influence of social Darwinism, the attempt was made in the economic context to withhold structures that could have prevented individuals from falling into destitution and poverty, and could have protected them from the dangers to which they were exposed in economic life (Galbraith 1998 [1958], pp. 47–53). 40. It has been pointed out that this direction toward big limited liability companies, which to some extent steered offers and prices, was reversed later in the twentieth century, and that Galbraith’s analyses are therefore out of date. This applies also to the development toward a much more globalized economy with big multinational firms. Galbraith himself appreciated the fact that presuppositions change, and he recognized that not all of his analyses would have the same relevance at a later date. Other interpreters of Galbraith have, however, pointed out that his thinking also includes elements that could be applied in a period with other presuppositions. See Dunn (2011, pp. 4–9). 41. On Galbraith’s view of insecurity in a competitive society, see Galbraith (1998 [1958], pp. 81–90). Galbraith affirms that although insecurity is a fundamental aspect in thinking about the competitive economy, and is praised there, it is also something that firms are concerned about. It is more natural for firms too think in a monopolistic direction than in terms of a competitive economy, in order to be able to control both supply

212  S. O. THORBJØRNSEN and prices, thereby avoiding uncertainty. Although some of those who are involved in economic activity are more concerned to maximize profit than to avoid risk and insecurity, most of those who are involved in modern business activity find it important to reduce this insecurity. 42.  Galbraith’s emphasis on this point won wide acceptance in American society, and his phrase “private opulence and public squalor” became a standard expression in the American vocabulary (ibid., p. 91; see also pp. 238–241). 43. “Wherever the state undertakes to control in detail the economic activities of its citizens, wherever, that is, detailed central economic planning reigns, there ordinary citizens are in political fetters, have a low standard of living, and have little power to control their own destiny” (Friedman and Friedman 1980, p. 55). 44. Political choices presuppose freedom, but in another way than the freedom that is accessible in a market. A political choice creates conformity without unanimity, while the market creates unanimity without conformity. This leads Friedman to wish that political choices should make specifications in areas where conformity is completely decisive. Other choices can be left to the market (ibid., p. 66). This link between economic and political freedom has been criticized by (for example) pointing out that lobbying in a capitalistic economic system like the United States is precisely an expression of the connection between economic and political power. There is no necessary connection between a free market system and political and personal freedom. The same critics have called attention to the danger that lies in Friedman’s understanding of freedom as the absence of coercion: this has the potential to develop into chaotic situations where such chaos can open the door to demands for a strict societal order of a fascistic character. The absence of coercion need not in the least lead to freedom. On this, see Lutz and Lux (1979, pp. 130–135).

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Bain, Joe S. 2018. Monopoly and Competition. Britannica Academic (3.10.2018). http://academic.eb.com/levels/collegiate/article/monopoly-and-competition/106206 (15.11.2018). Bowie, Norman E. 1999. Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective. Oxford: Blackwell. Brakelmann, Günter. 1988. Zur Arbeit geboren?: Beiträge zu einer christlichen Arbeitsethik. SWI-Studien. Bochum: SWI Verl. Britton, Andrew, and Peter Sedgwick. 2003. Economic Theory and Christian Belief. Bern: Peter Lang. Brockway, George P. 2001. The End of Economic Man: An Introduction to Humanistic Economics. New York; London: W. W. Norton & Co. Buechner, M. Northrup. 2014. A Comment on Scarcity. The Journal of Philosophical Economics 8 (1): 1–19. Bucharest: Bucharest University of Economic Studies. https://bibsys-almaprimo.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/ primo-explore/fulldisplay?docid = TN_doaj_soai_doaj_org_ar ticle_ 26478465d69a4d71837955fe978fccc1&context=PC&vid=MF&lang=no_ NO&search_scope=default_scope&adaptor=primo_central_multiple_ fe&tab=default_tab&query=any,contains,a%20comment%20on%20scarcity& sortby=rank&offset=0 (15.3.18). Butler, Eamonn. 1985. Milton Friedman: A Guide to His Economic Thought. Aldershot: Gower Publishing. Caillois, R. 1988. The Structure and Classification of Games. In Philosophic Inquiry in Sport, ed. William J. Morgan and Klaus V. Meier. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Crouch, Colin, and David Marquand. 1993. Introduction. In Ethics and Markets: Co-operation and Competition Within Capitalist Economies, ed. Colin Crouch and David Marquand, 1–5. Oxford: Blackwell. Daly, Herman E., and Joshua Farley. 2011. Ecological Economics: Principles and Applications, 2nd ed. Washington: Island Press. Dunn, Stephen P. 2011. The Economics of John Kenneth Galbraith: Introduction, Persuasion and Rehabilitation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Friedman, Milton. 1970. The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits. New York Times Magazine (13.9.1970). New York: A.G. Sulzberger http://umich.edu/~thecore/doc/Friedman.pdf (28.11.2018). Friedman, Milton, and Rose D. Friedman. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Friedman, Milton, and Rose D. Friedman. 1980. Free to Choose: A Personal Statement. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1952. American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power. Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press. Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1968. The New Industrial State. London: Hamish Hamilton.

214  S. O. THORBJØRNSEN Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1998 [1958]. The Affluent Society, 40th anniversary ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Haugland, Sven A., and Kjell Grønhaug. 1993. Cooperative Relationships and Competitive Markets. LOS-senter notat 9324. Bergen: LOS-senteret. Howerth, Ira Woods. 1912. Competition, Natural and Industrial. International Journal of Ethics 22: 399–419. Jevons, William Stanley. 1970 [1871]. The Theory of Political Economy. Edited with an Introduction by R.D Collison Black. The Pelican Classics. Middelsex: Penguin Books. Kay, John. 2003. The Truth About Markets: Their Genius, Their Limits, Their Follies. London: Allen Lane/Penguin Books. Keynes, John Maynard. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Macmillan. Kirzner, Israel M. 1991. The Driving Force of the Market: The Idea of ‘Competition’ in Contemporary Economic Theory and in the Austrian Theory of the Market Process. In Austrian Economics: Perspectives on the Past and Prospects for the Future, vol. 17, ed. Richard M. Ebeling, 139–160. Champions of Freedom. Hillsdale, MI: Hillsdale College Press. Kohn, Alfie. 1992. No Contest: The Case Against Competition, Rev ed. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. Krawietz, Birgit. 2014. Falconry as a Cultural Icon of the Arab Gulf Region. In Under Construction: Logics of Urbanism in the Gulf Region, ed. Steffen Wippel, Katrin Bromber, Christian Steiner, and Birgit Krawietz, 131–146. Farnham, Surrey; Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Kurz, Heinz D. 2016. Adam Smith on Markets, Competition and Violations of Natural Liberty. Cambridge Journal of Economics 40: 615–638. Landreth, Harry, and David C. Colander. 2002. History of Economic Thought, 4th ed. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. Langhelle, Oluf. 1999. Sustainable Development: Exploring the Ethics of ‘Our Common Future’. International Political Science Review 20 (2): 129–149. Lenn, D. Jeffrey. 1998. Efficient Markets. In The Blackwell Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Ethics, ed. Patricia H. Werhane and R. Edward Freeman, 191–192. Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell. Luttwak, Edward. 1999. Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy, 1st U.S. ed. New York: HarperCollins. Lutz, Christopher Steven. 2016. Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre (1929–). The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/mac-over/ (28.11.2018). Lutz, Mark A., and Kenneth Lux. 1979. The Challenge of Humanistic Economics. Reading, MA: Benjamin Cummings. MacAvoy, Thomas C. 1998. Innovation. In The Blackwell Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Ethics, ed. Patricia H. Werhane and R. Edward Freeman, 331–332. Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell.

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Nilsson, Jan-Evert. 2016. The Social Democratic Welfare Model: A Child of Times Past. In The Current Nordic Welfare State Model, ed. Noralv Veggeland, 21–41. New York: Nova Science Publishers. O’Neill, Onora. 1989. Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Parker, Richard. 2005. John Kenneth Galbraith: His Life, His Politics and His Economics. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Rich, Arthur. 1990. Marktwirtschaft, Planwirtschaft, Weltwirtschaft aus sozialethischer Sicht. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn. Robbins, Lionel. 1984 [1935]. An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 3rd ed. New York: New York University Press. Salsman, Richard M. 2000a. ‘Pure and Perfect’ Competition? By What Standard? Capitalism Magazine (12.2.2000). http://capitalismmagazine.com/2000/02/pure-and-perfect-competition-by-what-standard/ (15.3.2018). Salsman, Richard M. 2000b. What Does Competition Mean Under Capitalism? Capitalism Magazine (2.1.2000), http://capitalismmagazine.com/2000/01/ what-does-competition-mean-under-capitalism/ (15.3.2018). Smith, Adam. 1998 [1776]. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Oxford World’s Classics. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. Sowell, Thomas. 2015. Basic Economics. A Common Sense Guide to the Economy, 5th ed. New York: Basic Books. Torsvik, Gaute. 2003. Menneskenatur og samfunnsstruktur: ein kritisk introduksjon til økonomisk teori. Samlagets bøker for høgare utdanning. Oslo: Samlaget. Veggeland, Noralv (ed.). 2016. The Current Nordic Welfare State Model. New York: Nova Science Publishers. von Hayek, Friedrich A. 1948. Individualism and Economic Order. London: University of Chicago Press. Wachtel, Paul L. 1983. The Poverty of Affluence: A Psychological Portrait of the American Way of Life. New York: Free Press. Walras, Léon. 1977 [1874]. Elements of Pure Economics, or, The Theory of Social Wealth. Fairfield: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers. Werhane, Patricia H. 1999. Business Ethics and the Origins of Contemporary Capitalism: Economics and Ethics in the Work of Adam Smith and Herbert Spencer. In A Companion to Business Ethics, vol. 17, ed. Robert E. Frederick, 325–341. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell. World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987. Our Common Future. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 6

Competition and the Economy: Anthropological Perspectives

Introduction I have already touched several times on anthropological problems in identifying the significance of competition in economic theory and activity. With this starting point, I shall now thematize more directly how anthropological presuppositions are involved in the functioning of economic competition. These are primarily anthropological presuppositions of a philosophical and theological character. The relationship between economic competition and anthropology is one aspect of the more general relationship between economic activity and anthropology. We see this most clearly when we bear in mind that, in one sense, the economy involves acquiring and distributing what is valuable for the human being. Naturally, the question of what is good and valuable for the human being involves more than the economy alone. Historically speaking, this question has received a great variety of answers. Presuppositions regarding one’s worldview seem to be the most important in this context. It is, however, characteristic of our own age that this question is answered, more frequently than in the past, on the basis of what is economically valuable. Given an economic starting point, what is valuable will largely have a material and physical character; this may be linked to the symbolic value of a thing, or to specific services that can be valued in financial terms. This definition of value is not limited only to what is valuable for the human being, externally speaking, something that one would wish to fill

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one’s life with. This definition also influences what is valuable about the human being. This includes both the valuable, more operative aspects of the human being and the more fundamental presuppositions that influence his or her behavior. The latter include such presuppositions as rationality and the human being’s self-interest. In an economic context, some aspects of the human being are indubitably more valuable than others, quite simply because these aspects are important economically, if goals that the economy regard as important and superior are to be realized. Efficiency and energy are examples of valuable human qualities, seen in this perspective. This is how an economic notion of values influences how one thinks about oneself and about the world in which one lives. In a book with the subtitle The Theological Meaning of Economics, Robert H. Nelson claims that a “theological” understanding of the economy “… offers a set of principles and understandings that give meaning to, define a purpose for, and significantly frame the perception of human existence” (Nelson 1991, p. xxv). This applies perhaps more strongly to a “theological” economics than to a more secular economics, but it is also found in the latter. Here, the focus is on human rationality, on motivation on the basis of preferences, and on independent individual choices: all these are central aspects of human existence. A natural response may be to protest against such an economic definition of what is good and valuable for, and in, the human being. Is not the human being more than this? Many who take this position spend a great deal of energy on emphasizing other, less concrete and more idealistic aspects of the human being. What is valuable in the human being is one’s spiritual side, the ability to take care of others and to love one’s neighbor, and the willingness to put other people’s interests ahead of one’s own. There is a long tradition of prioritizing such values when one seeks to say something about what is valuable for and in the human being. The question, however, is what impact such values have today. Is not our society determined by economic presuppositions to such an extent that it is in reality the harder and measurable values that define what is valuable and good, both for and in the human being? This question must be asked today in a much more radical manner than in the past. Part of the background for writing this book is precisely this question. It is important to be aware of to what extent, and in what way, our own view and society’s view of the human being is determined in more general terms by economic presuppositions and more specifically

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by presuppositions connected to economic competition. In the deepest sense, therefore, this book is an investigation of the values that we as human beings and as a society are dealing with, and of the values that we wish to prioritize. The dominance of the economy in society and the importance of competition in economic activity make economic values to a large extent the object of competition. This is true both of the values for which people compete and of those aspects of the human being that are involved in competitive activity. In such a situation, it is easy to equate that which is valuable in human terms with that which is valuable in economic and competitive terms. In a competition, there are winners and losers. It is easy for what the winner receives, and what the winner is, to be seen as more valuable than what the losers lack, or what they have less of than the winners. As I have mentioned, there are various traditions in economic thinking about the relationship between economics and mathematics, and about the possibility of thinking of economics as a science that operates with measurable entities, and thus with advanced predictions. The adherents of this kind of econometric tradition play down the anthropological elements in economic thinking, and limit these as far as possible to the level of presuppositions: for example, to the affirmations that the human being acts rationally and is guided by self-interest, and that one desires to get the maximum profit for oneself. Human utility and human needs are the entities that are incorporated into mathematical calculations of the functions of the economy. Other economists play down this econometric dimension and understand economics to a lesser degree as a kind of social or natural science and more as a moral science (Chapter 5). With this starting point, human qualities such as wishes and desires become more relevant. These entities are less measurable, less objective, and less stable, and this reduces the possibilities of predicting. This view of economics as an academic branch and an activity actualizes anthropology and ethics in a completely different way than the econometric tradition. In purely factual terms, it is also much more concerned with the anthropological aspects of economic activity, where economics is regarded as a moral activity, not merely as almost a scientific activity. Economics is a question of money and material values. But it is also a question of human beings. Classical economics focused on human self-interest as the most relevant aspect of the human being in an economic context; others have identified this aspect as the human being’s

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self-survival or self-assertion. In any case, the human will is involved in all these cases. The will is especially important for the economy in three areas (see Brockway 2001, pp. 59–60). First, the will is a part of oneself as a human being. It is a very fundamental definition of who I am. I am a part of my world; my body is a part of this world; and the world is not something that does not concern me. Second, the will is limited. I am myself, and not you. But because you are a presupposition for my ability to define myself as myself, you are important for me. If I destroy something in you, I also destroy something in my own self. My autonomy presupposes that this is the case. The maintenance of my own existence is linked to the requirement that your existence too should be maintained. In one sense, the economy is also based on this requirement. Third, when the economy is defined in this way as a relationship between free human beings who possess a will, these persons can be both controlled and judged. That which is determined a priori need not be controlled. Human actors in an economic activity act on the basis of a will that is their own. It confronts them with demands from other people in the same arena and makes them responsible for their actions. The human being is related to the competitive element in the economy in another and more special way too (Arnsperger 1996, p. 11). Not only are the human being’s presuppositions and qualities involved; the competitive economy also wants to make the human being better and better. Competition unceasingly drives the material spiral further upward. Since the human being is continuously supplied with ever cheaper, ever better, and ever more varied goods and services, his living conditions, and ultimately the human being himself, are improved. Many are thus inclined to think that a better human life is realized on the basis of better material presuppositions. There is thus a close connection between the economy and anthropology. The actors in the economy are human beings, and their actions and dispositions have consequences for other people on every level. It is natural, in a context where the human element is so strongly involved, to ask about humane ideals and the realization of these ideals. How is humaneness realized today? Does true humanity mean being a free, competent, well-respected, and responsible actor in the world of the economy? Has this become one of the most important arenas for the realization of that which is truly human, in the absence of other, equally important arenas? What can be said in response to this question, on the

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basis of how economic thinking itself prioritizes and evaluates human presuppositions and qualities? The anthropological elements that are actualized in the relationship between economics and anthropology are linked to various anthropological traditions, most of which are the fruit of reflection and are well thought out. Here, however, one should be aware that for many people, such reflective ideas about who the human being is are alien. This does not mean that they lack a view of the human being; but their view is more superficial. This superficiality need not mean that we dismiss their view as unimportant. Although there is considerable variation among those who think of the human being in this way, we can nevertheless indicate some typical traits. First, this type of view of the human being often lacks the will to think through one’s own view, and to some extent shows a lack of interest in alternatives. One’s own view is indisputable and is taken for granted. People with such a view of the human being therefore focus often on the concrete and positive aspects of the human being, positive experiences, and the satisfaction of important and immediate needs. In many instances, this generates an element of glorification: the important element in the human being is what is positive, and the problematic and negative is thematized as little as possible. This is connected with a third trait: the absence of long-term thinking. What matters is the human being’s experience here and now. Insufficient attention is paid to potentially negative long-term consequences of immediate anthropological prioritizations. I shall return below in this chapter to these anthropological traditions, both the reflective and the unreflective. I begin elsewhere. The center of the present investigation is the interface between economic competition and anthropology. It is in the neoclassical economic tradition that competition plays a fundamental role in economic theory. An anthropological concept, the Homo oeconomicus (“economic human being”), is central here. Accordingly, this will be my starting point in the endeavor to grasp the relationship between the economy, competition, and anthropology.

The Homo oeconomicus I have discussed the economic human being in the historical chapter of this book (Chapter 4) in connection with John Stuart Mill, who created this idea as an analytical category, although the concept itself was created

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by others. I pointed out that the understanding of the Homo oeconomicus that has been handed down, and that acquired importance in neoclassical economic theory, had acquired some extra layers in comparison to Mill’s own starting point, for example, the quality of rationality did not play the same role in Mill that it came to have later on. Neoclassicism tended to understand economic activity as “… the mechanics of utility and self-interest” (W.S. Jevons; quoted from Lutz and Lux 1979, p. 45). This corresponded to the idea that all human activity is governed by the principle of a rational, calculating maximization of utility. The point of the economy is to maximize utility or pleasure. A human being of this kind was called the rational economic man. The neoclassical economists thought that the principles that governed the rational economic human being could be universalized and applied, more or less completely, to every human being. This understanding of the economic man was refined, so to speak, by Alfred Marshall. His neoclassical predecessors in the tradition of Jeremy Bentham had identified the good with pleasure and had therefore been blind to the possibility that the good could come into conflict with pleasure; but Marshall realized this point. Initially, he drew a distinction between pleasure and pain, but he gradually came to emphasize another distinction, between satisfaction or benefit and cost. In continuity with John Stuart Mill’s distinction between higher and lower needs, he too distinguished wants, on the one hand, and efforts and activities, on the other. Needs and wishes govern the lives of the lower animals; the possibility of changing one’s praxis through efforts is a unique characteristic of the human being. Although he thereby acknowledged in reality the human being’s personal structure as something higher, this insight did not have any consequences for economics (Marshall 2013 [1920], pp. 72, 76–77). For Marshall, the Homo oeconomicus is utilitarian, seeking satisfaction through using things. However, he finds it necessary to make utilitarian hedonism more palatable and accepted, and he does so by highlighting rationality: maximum pleasure or satisfaction is a result both of a desire for this and of a conscientious rational consideration of what efforts and expenditures are required in order to attain it (Marshall 2013 [1920], p. 99). Marshall’s rational Homo oeconomicus is a human being who knows what he wants and needs, independently of the societal system. The maximization of utility is not something that comes to the human being ab extra. It is a product of one’s rationality, and thus

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belongs to the very essence of the human being. It is then actualized in the economic arena (Lutz and Lux 1979, p. 50). The strongest attack on this way of thinking was launched by Thorstein Veblen (Chapter 4), but his arguments had no real impact on the dominance of the Homo oeconomicus in economic thinking. Veblen attacked the idea of the rational economic human being from two flanks. First, he attempted to demonstrate that the idea of a hedonistic individual, who is concerned all the time to weigh up pleasure and pain, and to choose the former, represented an understanding of the human being that psychologists have abandoned. The human being is not “… a bundle of desires that are to be saturated by being placed in the path of forces of the environment …”. On the contrary, the human being is “… a coherent structure of propensities and habits which seeks realization and expression in an unfolding activity” (Veblen 1961 [1919], p. 74). Second, Veblen claimed that the way in which the rich, and even the less rich, behaved and acted did not agree with what Marshall supposed. A very great deal of economic action is governed by social motives, not by a desire to maximize utility and satisfaction. These motives can sometimes appear highly irrational. The consumer is not only an isolated individual who is concerned to maximize utility. He or she acts and also reacts by taking into account the attitudes and behavior of other people in the social network to which one belongs (Veblen and Banta 2007 [1899]).1 In this way, Veblen put a question mark against the realism in the idea of the Homo oeconomicus. As I have mentioned, the Homo oeconomicus is only an (unnamed) analytical category for John Stuart Mill, a hypothetical subject that was useful for analytical purposes (Chapter 4). This hypothetical starting point has led to a long-lasting discussion of the status of the Homo oeconomicus: is this only a hypothetical construction, or does it also reflect how human beings are and how they behave in reality? Ralf Eriksson (1997, pp. 2–4) distinguishes three different positions here. The first position entails that there is a direct link between the Homo oeconomicus and the human being’s manner of existence. The human being genuinely acts on the basis of rationality and self-interest. The second position maintains the viewpoint that, while the human being genuinely is the Homo oeconomicus, he appears in a polished version from a social perspective. Social conventions, norms, and culture are human self-interest in a disguised form. The profit that the human person is hunting, at the root of his personality, is diverted for the sake of appearances from that which is oriented only on the basis of the individual to

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something that applies to a larger number of persons; or else it is conceived in terms of a somewhat more long-term maximization of utility. An apparently altruistic or cooperative action can in reality be very selfish. One example is the so-called Rotten Kid Theorem: it will be profitable for a selfish child to obey its altruistic father, because in this way, through its willingness to cooperate, it will be able to acquire a larger part of the family’s extended production than if it had been shortsightedly selfish (see Becker 1976). The adherents of a third position think that although the individual human being is not like the Homo oeconomicus, the average human being, or the human being as an ideal type, can be thought of in this way. Such ideal types are seldom encountered—just as seldom as one encounters a truly self-interested human being. There are always forces (altruism and irrationality) that prevent the Homo oeconomicus from appearing in his true form. This differentiation then prompts the question of the Homo oeconomicus’ link to reality (see Eriksson 1997, pp. 31–32, see also pp. 41–60). Some economic theoreticians claim that the real world truly accords with the idea of the Homo oeconomicus, which has an omnipotent ability to explain human behavior. Most people, however, both economists and others, would agree that the human being is not rational and influenced by self-interest—that is to say, the qualities that are typical of the Homo oeconomicus—in every situation: to a large extent, one acts out of habit. In some areas, however, rationality and self-interest can play a very dominant role. In some very special contexts, this is accepted and expected, and indeed encouraged, for example, in games and competitive situations. For many people, it is natural to think that this is also the case in economic activity, but they tend to forget that even such an acceptance builds on cultural traditions and on a historical development. A behavioral pattern determined by the Homo oeconomicus represents a conscious or unconscious choice and an internalization of values. We can say that human beings are inclined to behave like the Homo oeconomicus, but the strength of this inclination depends on what quality is involved, and on the context in which it takes place. This way of thinking limits the impact of the idea of the Homo oeconomicus. Nevertheless, those who think in this way maintain that the idea has a sufficient explanatory potential and that it can function as an operative approach to the analysis of human behavior. There are also two other ways of relating to the Homo oeconomicus. Some affirm that there is a certain link between the Homo oeconomicus as a model and what we know about the human being

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on the basis of sound reason. The limitation in this link justifies a critical distance vis-à-vis the model (a pluralistic view). Others, again, take the view that this idea can help to predict how the human being will act (a prescriptive view), but without directly answering the question whether there is an anthropological agreement between the Homo oeconomicus and the real human being. Different economic theories understand and employ the idea of the Homo oeconomicus in different ways. In today’s situation, however, it would be hard to describe the anthropology related to the Homo oeconomicus as only one of several equally important approaches to anthropological questions in an economic setting. Textbooks of economics, especially in microeconomics, seem largely to take the idea of the Homo oeconomicus as their point of departure for the presentation of factors and mechanisms that function in economic activity.2 It is therefore hard to overestimate the importance of the Homo oeconomicus and his influence on economic thinking and theory formation today. The problems that are raised do indeed find an audience in the academic debate, but the dominant place of neoclassicism in economic thinking seems to give the idea of the Homo oeconomicus an almost unchallenged place in the everyday work of economists. Evaluations of supply and demand, equilibrium and prices, have their starting point in an understanding of the human being that is very close to the view reflected in the idea of the Homo oeconomicus, which plays a dominant role in contemporary economics. This also applies to the understanding of economic competition. What are the typical characteristics of the Homo oeconomicus, this ideal economic actor? I have already suggested some of them. The classical characteristics are the human being’s rationality and self-interest. Rationality In economic theory, rationality is related to the patterns of human behavior. It is presupposed that the human being acts rationally and that such a rationality implies efficient actions.3 This applies both to the consumer and producer, but it can be expanded in a more societal economic perspective to apply also to the citizen or the bearer of public authority who evaluates economic questions. The project of economics or of economic theory in this context is to attempt to explain why the human being acts and chooses as he does. On this point, it is presupposed that the human being’s rationality plays a very decisive role.

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This then provides presuppositions for predicting future behavior. This knowledge is the absolute core knowledge for economic predictions and market analyses. The aspect of rationality in the Homo oeconomicus is therefore not merely one among several conditions, all other things being equal; it is the other conditions that must be regarded as such. Rationality is a given (Hollis and Nell 1975, p. 53). In his book about ethics and economics, Amartya Sen sees this aspect of rationality in the economy as related in a special way to what he calls the technical origin of economic activity (Sen 1987, pp. 4–5; see Eriksson 1997, p. 5). While economics, thanks to its ethical origin, is concerned with ultimate goals and with questions about what can promote a good human being, today’s economics is more oriented to the process that leads to the realization of goals and to the organization of this process. The goals are more or less taken for granted. The task of economics is to employ the reason to identify the best possible means to achieve these goals. To act rationally means to determine one’s choices and actions in a logical manner. In economic theory, there are two principal ways of understanding such choices. First of all, rationality is connected to the maximization of self-interest; I shall return to this in the next section. Second, a rational choice must satisfy the requirement of consistency (logical connection and consequences).4 This requirement is often understood in an economic context to mean that a set of values can be explained as a result of a maximization of a relationship with two variables. Since different things that a person wishes to do possess differing values for him or her, it is possible to rank them. In an economic context, this means that consumers rank their preferences.5 A contingent choice ensures a maximization of the relationship between preferences. This is taken for granted in neoclassical economic theory and constitutes a very important starting point for the understanding of the relationship between supply and demand, and thus also for the majority of Western economic thought.6 However, problems with this internal understanding of consistency have been pointed out. Consistency per se cannot be a sufficient guarantee of a person’s rationality. A person’s own view of what is a consistent choice will depend both on the interpretation of the choice and on factors external to the choice as such (Sen 1987, pp. 12–15). This then raises the question of how far human rationality can function—at least in an economic context—with such consistency and objectivity, and in such a value-neutral manner, as seems to be presupposed especially by a

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neoclassical theory.7 In any case, subjective value factors influence human choices, and it is impossible to define them totally on the basis of the idea of rational choices.8 It is also difficult to see that a human being really acts rationally in every situation on the basis of the criteria that a standard economic theory supplies. In uncertain situations, human beings have a tendency to choose as they have done in the past, or as others are choosing, even if this choice does not satisfy the strict criteria of rationality. The idea that rational choices are related to, and independent of, preferences presupposes that the preferences exist beforehand and independently of the choices. But this is not always the case. Sometimes, people discover their preferences in the course of the process of making the choice itself (Britton and Sedgwick 2003, p. 51). An excessively narrow understanding of rationality can also limit the possibility of planning and of committing oneself to something in advance. Such an understanding presupposes that all choices can always be taken anew and on the basis of given principles. This makes planning problematic. The use of advertising also presupposes in many cases that the human person is a being who reacts and lets himself be influenced by other factors than merely those that appeal to reason. Feelings are absolutely central factors that exercise influence here. Another central factor is influence by one’s friends and neighbors, an influence that need not be rationally based per se; nor is it necessary that those who let themselves be influenced should regard it as rational to let themselves be influenced in this way (Britton and Sedgwick 2003, pp. 52–53). Indeed, one can have the impression that economists, especially those with a neoclassicist background, have a tendency to define rationality in a way that does not completely correspond to how the word is otherwise perceived and functions in normal communication. It appears that most people understand “rational” to mean nothing else than the ability to give a coherent account of the reasons they have for acting as they do, and the ability to change behavioral patterns in light of new information, and to be open to let themselves be persuaded or convinced by others who have the same cultural background and values as they themselves have. To be “irrational” is to be blind, narrow-minded, inconsistent, or unable to see things in a context. A human being is not irrational merely because he does not function on the basis of the understanding of rationality that is typical of neoclassical economic thinking and that seems to determine how the Homo oeconomicus is perceived. It appears more likely that this understanding of human rationality differs from a more general understanding.

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The fact that the economic understanding of rationality is narrow, and can create problems, must not, however, lead us to admire the irrational, for that can create even greater problems. The human person, as a rational being, is situated somewhere between these poles, with a critical potential that goes in both directions. This potential applies first of all to economic theories based on a very narrow understanding of rationality; neoclassicism is one example here. But there is also a critical potential here for those who do not want to limit themselves to rational presuppositions in their work on economic questions and problems.9 Amartya Sen makes this point as follows: “The coolly rational types may fill our textbooks, but the world is richer” (Sen 1987, p. 11). Self-Interest Economic competition presupposes self-interest. At the same time, the desire to maximize self-interest presupposes a rational behavioral pattern, especially within the framework of a neoclassical economic tradition in which the rational aspect of the Homo oeconomicus receives particular emphasis. Self-interest in an economic context is related to both the producer and consumer. The producer’s (and the seller’s) self-interest lies in maximizing profit, while the consumer’s self-interest lies in maximizing utility. In everyday speech we call this earning as much money as possible and buying goods as cheaply as possible. Some people might also use a concept like “greed,” especially in connection with producers and sellers wanting to make a profit. This is more negative, especially if it is used about concrete persons and not only about a theoretical reality like the Homo oeconomicus. For who wants to be called greedy? People are not like that! George P. Brockway lists four strategies that can be, and often are, employed to escape this difficulty, given that there is a relationship between the Homo oeconomicus and the real-life human being (Brockway 2001, pp. 48–51). The first strategy is to say that whether people are genuinely greedy or not, they act at any rate as if they were greedy. The second strategy is to make a modification by asking whether greed is the only driving force in the human being. Are there not other motives too? The third strategy is to disguise the idea of greed by saying that what is involved is an economic system that gives human beings all the freedom they need in order to choose what they want whenever they want it. The fourth strategy is to use partial analyses in which various aspects of

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a situation or of a procedure are evaluated independently, without taking other aspects into consideration. Given this presupposition, every motive can in effect be true. All other things being equal (ceteris paribus), altruism can be just as true as greed.10 Brockway finds all these strategies problematic. The first is inadequate because it all becomes a question of unclarified facts. The problem with the second strategy is the plurality in the motives: without one guiding and decisive motive, every economic model will be exposed to contingencies. The third entails disguising something that in fact is identical: to give oneself exclusive privileges in making choices is the same as greed. The fourth means relativizing motives and thus being left with no result at all with regard to what, in general terms, provides the motivation in economic activity. This has consequences for the possibility of universalizing the Homo oeconomicus.11 But it is not only the strategies for avoiding being called greedy that are problematic. Brockway (2001, pp. 52–53) also considers as problematic the idea that it is possible to combine rationality and greed. A human being who is governed simultaneously by the rational and the greedy is a terminological impossibility. With his starting point in Aristotle, he claims that rationality cannot be reduced to a means to attain something else (as is the case in traditional economic theory). Rationality is itself the goal and the method, not only in economics, but also in all other sciences. The feminist economist Julie Nelson likewise finds this double emphasis on rationality and self-interest among economists problematic. It is the expression of a dualistic line of thought, a conceptual splitting between nature and the human being. At this point, nature and emotions part company, with the result that there are no correctives to rationally guided self-interest. The focus of self-interest is not that necessary requirements shall be met, but that an unlimited number of wishes shall be fulfilled (Nelson 1997; see also Nelson 2006). Amartya Sen (1987, pp. 18–19) takes a somewhat different perspective on the relationship between self-interest and rationality. Self-interest or selfishness, as a universal quality in the human being, is something that occurs; but it is absurd, in Sen’s eyes, to claim that rationality necessarily implies maximizing self-interest, or that a lack of self-interest implies that actions are governed by irrational presuppositions. Besides this, attaching too much weight to the link between rationality and self-interest as a motivating factor, means that more ethical

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considerations move into the background and have no influence on the choices of action. If someone attempts to do his best to achieve something—even if the goal does not reflect self-interest—it is difficult to define this as non-rational. As in the case of human rationality, here too we encounter the question of the relationship between the human being as an individual who wants to maximize self-interest and the human being as he or she is in reality. One of the fundamental presuppositions on which the dominant neoclassical economic theory builds is that there is an agreement between the two.12 In situations of an apparent conflict between the human being’s self-interest and ethical values to which many people say they wish to be faithful, self-interest will be the victor. But is this really the case? Amartya Sen believes that self-interest is not the victor. If this does indeed seem to be the case, this is due to a whole number of convictions that this is the case, rather than to empirical findings. Sen’s point is not to say that self-interest plays no role, but rather to affirm that in an economic context, just as in other fields, there are many different motives in the human being. Self-interest is not the only decisive factor.13 Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter also point to a lack of empirical agreement: human beings are generally more sympathetic and more willing to collaborate, than self-interested, and this can be seen in economic praxis: “… a sizeable proportion of economic actors act on considerations of reciprocity” (Fehr and Gächter 2000, p. 178, see also p. 159). We find a somewhat different protest against the domination of self-interest in Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), who opposed the isolation of the individual from the rest of the world that he found in a political economics that had its roots in Thomas Hobbes. In Hobbes, the human being is understood on the basis of an egotism that detaches him or her from the rest of the world. But Durkheim affirms that the individual cannot be isolated from his societal context. An understanding of human behavior on societal premises entails the integration of a moral component into the understanding of individualism, a “moral individualism.” Although this component is a supplement in Durkheim, rather than something that excludes self-interest, he believes that a broader and richer understanding of individuality has an inherent transformative power. This power concerns the way in which self-interest and a moral individualism can be coordinated; it is not a power that creates something completely new. Despite his criticism of neoclassical economic

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thinking from an external sociological perspective, Durkheim does not overcome Hobbes’ egotism (see Dixon and Wilson 2012, pp. 81–84). Self-interest plays an important role in the tradition of economic theory that employs the human being primarily as an analytical tool and as an expression of how one can think of the human being in economic assessments. Self-interest is often taken for granted, when the motivating factors that are decisive in economic theory are identified. Self-interest is also coupled with rationality, thereby finding support in a reality to which people have a more positive relationship than they have to self-interest itself. But this pairing is not causal, in the sense that one could provide a rational justification for self-interest. On the contrary, rationality enters in when an axiom is employed, namely self-interest, which functions as an axiom in economic theory. The critique of the importance of self-interest in economic assessments also concerns its status as an axiom and the question of the extent to which the human being is truly as selfish and self-interested as much economic theory presupposes. The alleged and presupposed self-interest cannot always find confirmation in how people are motivated and how they behave in real life, not indeed always, but often—also in the part of life that involves an economic dimension. Self-interest can be seen in connection with other motives; or it can be understood in its relationship to societal factors. It is difficult to prescind from the absolutely fundamental importance that self-interest has in economic praxis. This seems to be true of the present day as well. Individualism and Freedom Both rationality and self-interest are related to individual human presuppositions. This suggests that human individuality and freedom are also very important for understanding the Homo oeconomicus. Neoclassical economic thinking attaches weight precisely to individual and rational choices. What does individuality mean? James Coleman understands individuality as a fiction, as the view that society consists of individuals who seek to realize goals that each one has determined for himself, and that the societal system functions thanks to a combination of all these individual actions (Coleman 1990). Such a view corresponds to central ideas in neoclassical economics. The methodological individualism is expressed here when societal profit is a result of choices made on the individual

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level. Fellowship in society (e.g., the family) can be acknowledged for what it is, but its primary significance lies in how it can serve the interests of individual members. The social fellowship as such has no economic interest. The same concerns social interdependence and social inclusion. Societal realities of this kind may perhaps be redefined on the basis of the individual’s ability to gain access to them. The ideal of equality, which is often linked to such societal relationships, is regarded from a neoclassical economic perspective as a danger to the incentives that promote production. A goal of this kind demands a continual compromise between distribution and the level of gross income that is linked to the economic activity. This individualism, which is characteristic of neoclassicism but goes back to Thomas Hobbes, is seen as connected to a classic mechanistic worldview in which all of us are isolated individuals (see Dixon and Wilson 2012, pp. 74–75). It is indeed true that we exist in a context in which there are others too who think in the same way, but the main question is: How am I to find my own path? This means that all human collaboration is limited to a situation in which two autonomous actors come together or influence each other. It is always presupposed that the actor is autonomous, an atomic actor, antecedently to any collaboration. In principle, this understanding of human action is independent of interaction, which always comes at a secondary stage in relation to action (the one-man argument). Another aspect of this individualistic thinking, in the form it takes above all in a neoclassical economic context, is the strong link between individuality and self-interest. Critics of neoclassical thinking hold that this involves a fiction. The link is not inevitable but is one possibility. Individualism is basically concerned with choices, not with motives and intentions (Britton and Sedgwick 2003, p. 78). But even if it can be said that the relationship between individuality and self-interest is a fiction, it can have a function as a fiction. And it has a function in practice. Self-interest is thought of in standard economic theory as a decisive motivating element. At the same time, individual freedom is presupposed: there must be no guidelines or coercion with regard to an individual’s market preferences. In that case, however, is not this a freedom in appearance only? The only possible choices are those that promote self-interest. From one point of view, it may seem rather strange that freedom is given such prominence in this way of thinking about the economy. And indeed, the concept of freedom is integrated

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into one name for this thinking, that is, free competitive economics. Why is this the case, when the realities largely involve being unfree at the moment of decision? This is probably connected with the alternatives in other economic models: measured against these, there is indeed a certain individual freedom here. The title of Friedrich Hayek’s book The Road to Serfdom (von Hayek 1944) indicates a skepticism with regard to every kind of planning program and induced coercion in the economic sphere. Such projects, especially the threat posed by a “state dynamism” (von Hayek 1944, p. iv, in the preface by J. Chamberlain) represent a path to subjection that creates an unconscious fear in the producers and influences both their readiness to trade and the possibility of profit taking a negative direction. From this perspective, it is a question of affirming the individual’s freedom. Hayek thus also sees a close link between economic freedom and personal freedom.14 Within the framework of the economic system that requires a freedom of this kind, there is a lack of freedom, which is created by the fact that one must choose that which promotes one’s self-interest. Against this background, the next question is obvious: Has the strictly individual aspect of the Homo oeconomicus a reductionist function in anthropological terms? What is left of the human being who stands behind this individual who presents the appearance of one who chooses between the preferences he desires, but is not free to deviate from his mandate? Is this a human being who has lost essential aspects of his personality? In a special way, it is the competitive situation itself that makes the Homo oeconomicus appear in an apparently sterile, neutral, anonymous, and impersonal version. One aspect of the competitive situation is that a firm has an anonymous character; another aspect is that from the firm’s perspective, the consumers too are anonymous. The consumers are not interested in which sellers they buy from, and the sellers are not interested in whose products they sell, as long as there are enough products to sell. What does this tell us? A perfect situation of economic competition is characterized by impersonal relationships; the human contact is minimal. The actors relate to each other primarily as strangers. Relationships are regarded and negotiated at arm’s length, and are marked by anonymity (Britton and Sedgwick 2003, pp. 213, 245). This lack of personal relationships paves the way for the possibility of what has been called “commodification”: one buys a thing as a substitute for a personal relationship, and not only in an exceptional instance (in the way that

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flowers can function between people), but all the time. An impersonal market system with perfect competition would have no place for gifts as an expression of sympathy. The reciprocity of giving and receiving presupposes a context of close fellowship (Britton and Sedgwick 2003, pp. 213, 225). Who Is the Homo oeconomicus? Who is the Homo oeconomicus? One answer is that he is a rational being who maximizes utility, with an infinite number of wishes and with a focus on the quantitative and the material much more than on the qualitative, on belonging, and on meaning. His rationality is not only oriented to the satisfaction of genuine material needs; it is a continuous hunt for new things. As such, it provides a good starting point for economic predictions, and is an important presupposition for much economic theory and praxis. Martin Hollis and Edward J. Nell locate this way of thinking in a positivist philosophical tradition. In economics, this positivist starting point is linked to a utilitarian emphasis: the human being is understood as an individual characterized by desires and wishes. His actions can be explained as strategic attempts to get what he desires. The human being is like a complex animal and, like animals, can be investigated in order to identify the empirical laws that are the basis of his actions. In this context, value judgments are irrelevant, as are wishes of a metaphysical, religious, and ethical character. What counts in the scientific sense is that the human being seeks to satisfy his desires (Hollis and Nell 1975, pp. 48–49). Hollis and Nell see this as a very abstract and unreal human being, one who is always predictable. In economic terminology, he is one of the economic variables. Unlike the man in the street, the Homo oeconomicus “never misses an opening, ignores a price change, overrates the short-run or turns a blind eye to the unquantifiable.” Everything is governed by rationality. An oligopolist is just as rational in his praxis as one who thinks on the basis of the idea of a perfect competition. “Rational economic man is both the average and the ideal, abstracted from actual marketeers with the aid of general assumptions about human desires” (Hollis and Nell 1975, p. 54). Mark A. Lutz and Kenneth Lux (1979, pp. 78–80) see a conflict between such an understanding of the human being and very central humanist ideas about human personality, but also a conflict with

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empirical scientific investigations of how the human being is and how he functions. The human being is more than a one-dimensional creature with values that remain constant, completely independently of his experiences. He does not possess a stability that makes it possible to calculate mechanically what are the best means to realize the superior goal, namely, utility. The human world is not a joyless world of this kind, where the ultimate value of things is determined by how much utility they can supply, where everything is a means with a price tag, and values play a rather subordinate role. A similar criticism of the idea of the Homo oeconomicus appeals to Aristotelian ideas of the human person as a social being and of justice and respect as important presuppositions in human interplay. The fellowship of which the human being is a part is important, and this is why the human being organizes his own needs and interests in relation to it. Empirical investigations of patterns of human behavior are offered as proof that the human being is, and thinks, in this way. These include investigations that employ the so-called ultima game (Güth et al. 1982; Güth 1995; Dickinson 2002). Two persons each receive their own role. One is to suggest a way in which the two of them can share a special sum, while the other can agree to this suggestion and then receive the suggested share. If he says no, no one receives anything; nor is there a second chance for either of them. If we take our starting point in the idea of the Homo oeconomicus, we should expect that the one who suggests how to divide the sum will want to keep as much as possible for himself, and that the other one is fobbed off with a small part, which (however) is better than nothing. Here, however, the empirical data speak a different language. The person making the suggestion seldom makes a skewed offer. A 40/60 division is more common, but the most common of all is 50/50. The suggestion of a really askew division is almost always rejected. Nothing is better than only a few crumbs. If our starting point for the understanding of the human person is that he is self-interested and egotistic, these commonest divisions look irrational, because the person has not made use of the chance that was offered to maximize his gains, either because he was deluded or because he was governed by irrational sentimental presuppositions. Empirical data seem however to show that human self-interest is not as dominant as a traditional understanding of the Homo oeconomicus would indicate. The human being is sensitive to questions of justice and is concerned about the state of other persons. This is not irrational. In reality it is a result

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that shows that common sense is the most obvious approach to the question of how rationality influences our economic praxis. It is also rational to choose solutions in which the consideration of others is important— not only consideration for one’s own self. From an ecological perspective, it has been affirmed that the Homo oeconomicus needs a broader view that includes nature and attaches sufficient importance to nature in weighing up economic questions. Here, a self-interest that tends toward greed cannot rule the field. It is in this broadened view that the ecological human being is located, as a normative model for individual human praxis; at the same time, however, the ecological human being is part of a descriptive model that depicts the human relationship to nature in a non-instrumental manner. This broadened understanding of the Homo oeconomicus also includes morality and social responsibility, as well as the willingness to develop an ecological and humanistic consciousness. This presupposes that the Homo oeconomicus and the ecological human being are on speaking terms with each other (Nyborg 2000; Nyborg et al. 2006). The idea of the Homo oeconomicus also has a firmly established place in contemporary economic thought. Although it has encountered much criticism—a criticism that I have been able to touch on only very lightly in the present context—it has survived, and it continues to supply premises for how economic thinking is to be shaped. One can have the impression that the Homo oeconomicus has a tenacious vigor and vitality, which it demonstrates in the encounter with what many people would call a lethal criticism.15 Why does the criticism bounce off? Various explanations are possible. It is worth considering whether it may be because many people’s view of who the human being is, is partly unreflective and superficial (although this does not mean that it lacks substance). I mentioned above three characteristic traits in this context: the uncritical, the concrete and positive, and the shortsighted. One can have the impression that there is a strong correspondence between this way of thinking superficially about the human being and the idea of competition, as this is elaborated in relation to the understanding of the Homo oeconomicus. Such a view of the human being provides good soil for the idea of competition. It is shortsighted and uncritical and takes its orientation from the satisfaction of human needs and the desire to have good experiences. Self-interest is important to understanding the human being.

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I believe that this is one of the reasons why the idea of competition plays such a central role in our society today. Many people have a view of the human being that is partly superficial and unconscious, but that nevertheless has a function. This limited interest in reflecting on anthropological viewpoints and presuppositions thus establishes the conditions in which competition and a competitive mentality encounter little critical opposition in most people. On the one hand, the idea of competition is taken for granted. On the other hand, there is the idea that by giving oneself the priority in competition with others, one, as a human being, will succeed to the greatest possible extent in realizing intimate and positive human values. This, however, is not all that can be said. I shall now look at the relationship between various aspects of more reflective anthropological traditions and the idea of competition in the economy. This is necessary both in order to broaden the analytical perspective and in order to bring in traditions that represent confirmatory and critical contributions to the idea of economic competition. In the following discussion, the idea of competition will be brought into relation to some anthropological parameters that feature as topics in most traditions, although the normative definition of these parameters varies considerably. The central parameters will be individual/fellowship; the value and integrity of the human being, including his distinctive character, intrinsic value, and equality; human rationality and self-expression; and the question of realism in interpreting the human being. This last point also touches on the question of negative aspects of the human being, such as his evil tendencies, and how one is to take this into account in discussing the function of the idea of competition in our society.

Competition in the Economy and an Anthropology with an Instrumentalist Orientation The idea of competition has a fundamentally instrumental character. Competition is oriented to a goal and to a means that can be employed to reach this goal. In economic and other forms of competition, the human being is involved either directly (competition between consumers or sellers) or indirectly (competition between firms or institutions) and is related both to the goal and the means. His relationship to the goal is linked to profit, either utility for the individual or prosperity or societal goods for a larger group of persons. The human being in this capacity

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is part of economic competition in the sense that he is a means that is employed to reach a superior goal. In an economic context, the involvement of the seller or consumer in the competition is the means that is employed to increase earnings, or to get hold of a desirable ware. It is not unusual for a human being to be a means, either for something else or for other people. Through our work, for example, we represent means for other people, by providing them with the food they need to eat or by providing them with knowledge and skills. The decisive question in every context where the human being functions as a means is: Is he or she reduced far too much to the status of a means, so that he or she loses something of his or her status as a human being? The competitive economy cannot be dispensed from taking this question seriously. Philosophically speaking, an instrumentalist understanding of the human being is linked to a dualistic view of the world and of the human being. In a dualistic basic view, both the world and the human being are divided in two (duo). In classical antiquity, this dualistic thinking found its most explicit expression in Plato’s distinction between a world of ideas and the real and concrete world. That which is genuine and most valuable, both in the world and in the human being, had its place in the world of ideas; the world and concrete human beings were merely pale shadows of these ideal presuppositions. This distinction then led to a distinction in the human being himself, between a valuable spiritual part and a less valuable material or physical part. The goal was the spiritual world of ideas; the bodily element was merely a means for something higher and more valuable. René Descartes’ confirmation of this dualistic perception of reality (see Cottingham 1995, pp. 195–196) became particularly important for modern thinking. According to Descartes, the material part of the world follows the laws of nature, which can be identified in physics, chemistry, and biology. This part includes the things in the world, the human body, the animals, and nature. In the world of thought, one is not bound to the laws of nature: this is the place for reason, emotions, the will, and ideas. The human being is the only living creature with a part in both worlds. The ego, the spiritual aspect of the human being, belongs to the world of thought, while the body, which belongs to the material world, is only a means to realize things in the rational world. This is how the dualistic inheritance and the instrumental view of the human being were carried forward into the modern period. This view is also the basis of modern natural science, which understands

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the human being as an object, as a machine. In medicine, it is this object that is to be examined, so that it can be made to function and operate as well as possible. A dualistic basic view is governed by the idea that the material is of less value than the spiritual. This view is not as prominent today as in antiquity and in the Middle Ages, but something of it still lingers. We find it where white-collar work is ranked more highly than blue-collar work, and where the body is understood as a machine, as an organic means to ensure that the human being can live. This view is expressed radically in naturalism, where the human being is understood as a kind of biochemical machine. This machine contains nothing other than what is given in nature, and the human being is oriented to the satisfaction of his own needs. In other words, the human being is a means for his own survival. Other people too can perhaps be means, namely, as means for the satisfaction of one’s needs. Apart from the value they have as an object and as a means for the satisfaction of one’s needs, they have no intrinsic value. Although the philosopher Immanuel Kant belongs to the Idealist tradition that goes back to Plato, he rejects the idea that the human being is a means. He states explicitly in one of his formulations of the categorical imperative: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end” (Kant 1964 [1785], p. 96). Kant is fully aware that the human being is often employed as a means. His point is that if this happens, one must also at the same time see the human being as an end in himself, as one possessing intrinsic value independently of how he is employed as a means. In the period after Kant, his thinking on this point was an important breakwater that kept back an instrumentalist view of the human being; but it was not completely successful in this, as our present topic shows. When it is said that economic competition has an instrumental character, this is also linked to the relationship between competitive economic thinking and the importance of the utilitarian tradition for the development of a Western market economy that is characterized by competition. A basic idea in utilitarianism is the relationship between utility (whether understood in a hedonistic sense or otherwise) and the means that are employed in order to make this utility possible. Human actions, and human beings, are instruments for the realization of the greatest possible utility for the greatest possible number of persons.

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Economic competition is a kind of incentive mechanism. Competition “produces” incentives. In competition, this production is generated by a continuous, ongoing comparison. All competitive policy is an activity meant to ensure that this producer of incentives functions as well as possible. Goals such as prosperity and societal goods are meant to be realized through this mechanism. The human being’s function is to create, or to be the means that makes it possible to realize, the goal that the incentive prompts us to seek. In this sense, the human being is a means for the realization of a higher goal, and in an economic context, this means especially utility or profit. The human being becomes an instrument in view of a superior norm or value. “Mechanism” comes from the Greek root μηχανή (mêkhanê) and is thus best translated as “tool” or “instrument.” This meaning can be applied both to competition itself and to the human contributions that are required in order to realize the goal of competition. And this concept expresses something that is characteristic of competition. A mechanism can be described, and its functions can be calculated. When competition is understood in association with presuppositions of this kind, it becomes clearer that we have here a way of thinking in terms of means and ends that makes the human being a tool or instrument for another goal, thereby reducing the possibility of perceiving the human being also as an end in himself. A mechanism is a dynamic and pragmatic reality, where the goal is the primary thing. The means that are used to reach the goal are necessary, but they have no intrinsic value. This instrumental positioning of the human being in a competitive situation implies that mechanical efficiency is one of the human being’s most important functions. Efficiency is promoted by the anonymization of the human being’s personality that is characteristic of the Homo oeconomicus. Anonymity and belonging to a greater whole, combined with the depersonalizing possibility of exchangeability, are more useful and efficient than individuality and a personal profile.16 In this way, it is efficiency that determines what is important in the human being. Differences that are too large and personal traits that are too pronounced could prevent a flexibility that promotes efficiency in competition. In an anonymized world of this kind, it is easy to think of one’s competitors in a depersonalized manner, devoid of any relationship. The other—one’s competitor—is one who prevents one from reaching one’s goal and realizing one’s wishes or else a person that can be used as an instrument to attain the same goal. The other is no longer a person with

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a personality and subjectivity, with wishes, fears, and hopes. A situation in which people meet each other face to face is a situation that can reduce the function of competition as an efficient activity that allocates resources. This anonymization is also characteristic and necessary when situations with a non-perfect economic competition are analyzed from the perspective of game theory (Chapter 4). In another way, game theory makes it possible to combine collaboration and self-interest in the idea of competition itself, and to presuppose to some extent confidence as an input factor. In game theory, the strategies can even be linked to goodwill, when (for example) what one person experiences as good becomes a utility function for another (see Britton and Sedgwick 2003, pp. 228–234). In this way, game theory can provide an anthropological framework that differs from the customary framework for economic competition. Basically, however, the point is that here too, human beings are being treated as instruments, as objects, even if one encounters them with an attitude of goodwill and a desire to collaborate. These more positive goals are subordinate to a strategic regime in which the principal goal is to attain something by means of a calculating action on one’s own part that employs other people for this goal. There is very little empathy here. At most, it is limited to the fact that others think and act in ways that ultimately serve oneself. In this sense, the human element becomes a means both in competition and in strategical considerations that are game theoretical in character. As a means, the human element is also something that gets used. This applies especially to those who do not make the grade in competition: some lose and are sacrificed, becoming a means for the winner or winners, or for the more general result that the competition aims at, like an increase in general prosperity. This is true both of those who are in fact losers and of those who do not want to take part in the competition and thus indirectly become means for those who succeed. To say that the human element becomes a means in a competitive process entails that aspects of the human being that possess an intrinsic value are turned into utility values. This applies both to qualities in the human being and to what is the very essence of human life. In the former case, this can be the use and abuse of human qualities such as confidence and integrity, qualities that are not intended to be means for acquiring something, but that have an intrinsic value and therefore cannot be used by others. Something similar is true of the human being’s relationality and of his membership in a community. It is indeed the case

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that much competition is directed to the individual, the impersonal, and the anonymous; but it is not difficult to see that in some competitive situations, it would be possible to exploit and use (or use up) such aspects of human life too. These become means for other, higher goals. One special area here is human emotions. Although, in principle, rationality dominates the emotions in a competitive situation, these can also be pressed into service and turned into means. I have mentioned goodwill in connection with game theories. Goodwill or love can also play a role in competition, as a means to attain something else. Such a use of love is in conflict with the most fundamental essence of love. Human love is not about use or consumption, but about giving oneself to another person or persons; this is not a means for something else, nor does one expect to get something in return and thereby attain something. None of these partial aspects of the human being can be turned into a means for other goals, nor can they be isolated from the totality of what a human being is. These aspects acquire their content and their value precisely when they are understood on the basis of totality. This leads to the question whether the idea of competition contributes, in somewhat different ways in different contexts, to creating the presuppositions for an understanding of the human being’s totality and intrinsic value. Thinking in terms of means is so deeply integrated into the idea of competition that it must inevitably have a dominant place. The idea of competition does not necessarily imply a fundamental dethroning or rejection of the human being’s intrinsic value; it is more a question of giving priority in practice to the human being as a means. But since it is in fact a priority in practice, it can suppress the significance of the intrinsic value, and one important consequence can then be that, where thinking in terms of means gets the upper hand, the idea of intrinsic value exercises no critical function. This criticism concerns both the fundamental view of the human being as primarily a means, and the consequences that this has for him as a physical and mental being. To regard the human being primarily as a means entails seeing his work and his health only in terms of fulfilling a goal. This perspective on the human being does not give his intrinsic value any operative and guiding function in terms of value. Something similar applies to holistic thinking about the human being. The emphasis of rational aspects of the human being in economic thinking means that value is attached to a part rather than to the whole. The fragmentation and the prioritizing of individual aspects of the human

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being occur because this is appropriate in view of the goals one wants to realize. A holistic thinking need not be rejected in principle, but it is not actualized in practice. And this means that here too, the critical perspective that a holistic thinking could have contributed is not present. An instrumentalist way of thinking about the human being also includes a reductionist element, and there are good reasons to ask whether a neoclassical competitive economy succumbs to some extent to this kind of reductionist thinking. Human life is concentrated around human achievements and the commitment to achieve something. This commitment can often be oriented to the political and cultural spheres, but it is reductionist, because its value is assessed first and foremost on the basis of what one achieves. The cultural and political spheres have no intrinsic value, isolated from the results that I achieve in these areas. Andrew Britton and Peter Sedgwick put it as follows: “The fact that society also has a cultural, moral and political life is not so much denied as ignored” (Britton and Sedgwick 2003, p. 78). The effort put into work is also the only ethically relevant aspect of human action, at the expense of every other aspect of human life. The human being is thus understood on the basis of presuppositions and perspectives that capture only parts of what human life is, and this represents a simplification of reality.17 A link between economic competition and an instrumentalist view of the human being seems hard to avoid. The understanding and the use of the human being as a means is, however, problematic only where the human being is made exclusively a means. There are two questions here. First, is the human being understood in a competitive economy as something more than a means? In today’s situation, and bearing in mind the competitive economic systems that we know from the context in which we ourselves live, it is not easy to answer this question with a definitive “no.” The human being possesses an intrinsic value, and one cannot easily prescind from this even in economic evaluations. The human being is not seen exclusively as a means. The second question, however is this: Does the competitive economy contribute to an increasing and more exclusively instrumentalist thinking about the human being? This question must probably be answered with a “yes.” We have seen here the beginning of a development that can end in an understanding of the human being as a means, where his intrinsic value is displaced in the direction of a means. The human being receives his existence in order that he may accomplish something. This definition of human existence is very meaningful,

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independent of any ideological and religious starting point; but some would hold that it is meaningful only if that which is to be accomplished exists within the parameters that human life itself lays down. If that which is to be accomplished is thought of as existing to a large extent outside these parameters, human life loses something of its intrinsic value, and the human being becomes only a means for something else, something outside him. In this way, our existence is instrumentalized. The modern competitive economy operates with such external goals for the human being, and with the human being as a means to achieve these goals. In this way, it helps to promote an instrumental anthropology.

Competition in the Economy and an Anthropology with an Egotistic Orientation Self-interest and individualism play a central role in economic theories that emphasize competition. It is difficult to envisage a genuine competition that does not open up possibilities of personal gain and personal advantages. It may therefore appear clear that there is a relationship between an anthropology with an egotistic orientation and economic competition. But is there such a thing as an anthropology with an egotistic orientation? According to the Norwegian social anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen, the idea of human egotism has two roots (Eriksen and Hessen 1999, pp. 143–162): one is Darwinist evolutionary biology, while the other is liberal philosophy. The customary Darwinist view sees egotism, understood as the spreading of one’s own genes through procreation, as the most important driving force for behavior. In this context, Richard Dawkins has coined the expression “the selfish gene” (Dawkins 2016 [1976]). Liberal philosophy has often been accused of individualism and of seeing self-interest as the motor that drives and steers human behavior. It is true that one cannot accuse all liberal philosophy of holding that the human being has an inherent egotism, since there are liberal thinkers who combine the idea of human freedom with a socialist economy and a welfare state with a large measure of state intervention; but this is basically seen as the exception. This is particularly the case where liberal ideas are seen in connection with dominant economic theory and praxis. Eriksen draws a distinction here between more liberal thinkers, who balance human freedom against other considerations, and

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liberalists who prescribe individualism in every sphere. It is not hard to see human egotism understood in liberalist terms as a very important factor, or perhaps better as a catalyst in the growth of market liberalism that is dominant almost everywhere in today’s global world. By means of its distinction between the strong who win and the weak who perish, the competitive economy furnishes a good soil on which the idea of egotism can flourish.18 When it is said that egotism has its roots in Darwinism and market liberalism, this is mainly because that was the period for the more ideological and conceptual clarification of egotism; as an aspect of the human being’s functioning in the world, egotism is of course much older. If we broaden our perspective, it is hard to isolate the idea of egotism from the anthropological insight that is found in religions and worldviews that are far older than its “discovery” in the Age of Enlightenment. Egotism, as such, is not involved in only one anthropology: every anthropology must relate in one way or another to this aspect of the human being, and there is huge variation on this point. It is on the basis of this understanding that competition is seen here in relation to egotism as an anthropological category. The recognition that the human being is self-centered and prioritizes his own interests is found in anthropologies as diverse as the Christian and the Marxist, but there is a considerable difference with regard to the status that is accorded to these aspects of the human being. In a Christian context, egotism and self-interest are seen as something anchored in the human being (see Rom 7:15–20), whereas in Marxism, this is something that can be overcome. In a naturalistic anthropology, human egotism is understood in light of natural and instinctive presuppositions: that which serves human survival, the satisfaction of instincts, and the experience of pleasure. In humanism, egotism in recognized, but it has no anchoring in the essence of the human person. In what is sometimes called “the anthropology of the consumer culture,” human egotism and self-interest are actualized through an emphasis on the individual and the material. The self-realization of the individual is more important than taking the fellowship into consideration. The fellowship has a value only to the extent that it contributes to such a self-realization. Against this background, I shall therefore ask: Does the idea of competition, especially as it finds expression in prominent neoclassical economic theory, presuppose a fundamentally egotistic view of the human being?

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Egotism as an Anthropological Category Although it is possible to identify significant roots of egotism in this way, it is difficult to present an unambiguous picture of what is meant by “egotism,” and not least to evaluate egotism as a phenomenon. There is a considerable ambivalence here. Egotism can be seen as positive or negative. It is not always easy to identify the boundary between pure egotism and those aspects of human life that are in one sense related to egotism, but that many people regard as legitimate. It is here that the distinction between psychological and subjective egotism, on the one hand, and classical egotism, on the other, is actualized (see Machan 1998). The former focuses on what is useful for one’s own self, what gives satisfaction, what seems best for me. In subjective egotism, as a type of ethical egotism, the various wishes or preferences are prioritized on the basis of subjective presuppositions. In classical egotism, the egotism is governed by a rational self-interest that is related to the realization of a happy and good human life, which is possible if one follows the moral principles and virtues that promote it. Accordingly, the primary virtue in egotistic ethics is rationality, the human being’s special presupposition for interpreting the world and making choices. Informed selfishness is the proper attitude in life, not a pathological self-centeredness. “It is with regard to the sort of self that is proper to a human being that one ought to be selfish, not just any sort of self” (Machan 1998, p. 194). This means that, in the case of egotism, neither pure enthusiasm nor pure condemnation seems to capture how people relate to this important aspect of human life and to the question of what motivates human behavior. As I have just mentioned, the ambivalence is expressed by means of various pairs of concepts; and the number of such pairs could certainly be extended. There is an unclear boundary between self-realization and individualism, on the one hand, and egotism, on the other. The same applies to the relationship between having the ambition to achieve something and being greedy. A third example is the relationship between self-love and selfishness. Most people perceive one part of these pairs (egotism, greed, and selfishness) as something negative; the other part (self-realization, having ambitions, and loving oneself) is often perceived as something positive, indeed sometimes as morally necessary, and as an important aspect of the formation of one’s own autonomy and hence also of the feeling of one’s own moral responsibility

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(Nyeng 2001, p. 13). At the same time, this other part, sometimes called “egoity,” is related in some way to the first part. Self-realization, having ambitions for oneself, and loving oneself cannot be realized without a considerable amount of egocentricity. Historically speaking, one can see a partial link between societies that encourage their members to protect their own interests and societies that protect justice, the inviolability of life, and human equality. This may be because egotism is thought to be adaptive, that is to say, something that can give personal advantages. Malice is not adaptive; it is purely destructive. But although egotism gives personal advantages, it is not necessarily the case that all such advantages are negative merely because they are personal and lack an altruistic character. This one aspect reflects what most people would see as positive personal qualities. It is difficult to isolate the idea of egotism from this larger context, in which the picture becomes somewhat more nuanced (see Eriksen and Hessen 1999, pp. 10–11, 18). But can we be content to state that egotism is ambivalent? This is problematic, because it can prevent us from identifying the problematic aspects of egotism. This is why the attempt has been made to draw a distinction between a “destructive” and “non-destructive” egotism. The non-destructive egotism is conceived as the presupposition of precisely what we have just mentioned as the positive and necessary aspects of a healthy and good human personality development, egoity. The destructive egotism is understood as a self-centeredness so exclusive that one man’s meat is another man’s poison. There is no room here for collaboration or for any form of altruism (Eriksen and Hessen 1999, pp. 10, 232–233). We can identify more precisely what a problematic egotism is if we focus on the egotism that manifests itself as materialism. This is expressed today primarily in a consumer mentality on both the local and global levels, seeking to maximize personal gain and also national gain. The human being evinces an excessive urge to acquire things, and at the same time to use these material things to put himself on display and outdo his competitors. An egotism understood consistently in materialistic terms is also a hunt for status symbols. In terms of the conceptual pairs mentioned above, this involves both greed and a pronounced selfishness. There are connecting lines between this kind of destructive or materialistic understanding of egotism and a context of economic competition. Although not all economic competition entails that one man’s

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meat (profit) is the other man’s poison, the structure in the competitive situation is in conformity with this winner–loser relationship. Egotism, understood in the sense of personal qualities, such as self-realization and self-love, does not have the same potential in an economic competition as an egotism understood more strongly in materialistic terms, where the aim is to get hold of things and of material values, not to develop as a human being. It is, of course, not impossible that elements of self-realization and the possibility of realizing ambitions may also be a part of a situation of economic competition, since it is here that competition’s ability to unleash creativity is actualized. But in relation to the motive force linked to an egotism with a materialistic orientation, it is easy for these aspects to move into the background. Another element clears the ground in an economic context for an egotism that is understood materialistically: the radicality in egotism seems to be dependent on distance. There is a contextual element linked to egotism, which means that a destructive or materialistic egotism can be less problematic as a force that drives and steers behavior, especially in a situation of economic competition that is characterized by almost perfect competition: it evokes fewer negative reactions. Moral breaches in general, and a destructive egotism in particular, can be swallowed more easily if those affected by the consequences of my egotism are far away from me, or unknown and anonymous. This phenomenon is well known from social anthropology (Sahlins 1988, pp. 196–204), but it seems to be applicable to economic competition in a market too. Anonymity and a lack of lasting relationships between actors in a market opens the door to an egotism that has less need of being balanced by altruistic and reciprocal elements, or of being adjusted by means of state interventions in order to prevent the most problematical outbreaks of a materialistic egotism. In a market characterized by non-perfect competition, the distance between the actors will be shorter, and the relationships more lasting. These limitations will probably reduce the possibilities of putting a radically materialistic egotism into practice. On the other hand, such a market situation will also facilitate larger concentrations of power, enabling the strong to dominate those who are weaker (perhaps out of the desire to gain the highest possible profit), to exclude competitors, and thus to determine market mechanisms on the basis of their own egotistic preferences with regard to profit. The ambivalence in the definition of the concept of egotism is also reflected in the paradoxical way in which people perceive it. On the one

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side, as a concept, it has a negative sound; no one or, at most, very few people, want to be described as egotists. On the other hand, one can make considerable gains through egotism, so that practicing egotists can become the object of both admiration and envy—here is someone who has achieved something! How he achieved it, and the egotism that propels his conduct, are less important. This focus on the result, rather than on the path to the result, may also explain what can seem like a change or a slippage in the acceptance of egotism as a power that drives conduct. Dag O. Hessen (Eriksen and Hessen 1999, pp. 26–27) gives the example here of a cosmetic firm that launches a perfume for men called Egoїste. Behind the negative reputation that egotism has, there is an elegance and an energy, in combination with the cultivation of the individualist, that is also the object of a certain admiration. The name of the perfume plays on this admiration. The material gains in prosperity provided by a competitive society that takes its orientation from self-interest and egotism, combined with society’s focus on self-realization and a “love your own self” attitude, make it harder and harder to maintain a critical potential vis-à-vis egotism (including materialistic egotism) as an important driving force of the conduct and development of society. In one way, this involves a strategy of camouflage: egotism is presented as something ­different and better than its reputation. I shall come back to two other similar strategies below in this chapter. One of these is linked to using the word “self-interest” instead of “egotism,” while the other attempts to locate egotism in the closest possible proximity to altruism. Egotism, Individualism, and the Competitive Economy Economic theory of the neoclassical type presupposes to a large extent a methodological individualism that is characterized by a lack of decisions taken in common, even where several individuals act together; and indeed, even where they “care” about each other. Each individual determines the optimal strategy for himself as an individual, even in cases where this strategy is intended to serve other persons. An individualistic strategy can contain elements of bargaining. Where necessary, it can also demand a form of reciprocal trust. It has a rational character and can be analyzed on the basis of mathematical presuppositions; it has no space for emotions. The feminist critique of modern neoclassical economic thinking links this form of individualism to the phrase “the separative self.” An “I” of this kind is independent of others and cannot

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enter into a relationship with others. It acts and lives in a sort of social vacuum and is unable to express empathy. This “androcentric individualism” is connected in the feminist critique to the following presuppositions in neoclassical economics: preferences with regard to utility cannot be compared with each other; preferences and tastes are exogenous and unalterable; the human being is egotistic and has selfish preferences: altruism is the rule for interactions in the family, but not in the market situation (England 2002). Each type of individualism presupposes a prioritization of the individual. The individual, however, need not be understood as so isolated, so rationally calculating, and so emotionless as in androcentric individualism. The feminist economist Julie Nelson distinguishes two types of individuality (Nelson 1996, pp. 30–33). Positive individualism is characterized by a good self-insight and by the individual’s openness to being influenced by others. Negative individualism is characterized primarily by its isolation from the rest of society. Nelson also envisages a relational parameter: the negative attitude to one’s fellows eats up the human being’s “I,” so to speak, and one loses one’s identity and will. A positive openness to one’s fellows enables the human being to take prudent choices and act wisely. This positive openness, combined with a positive individuality, expresses what Nelson calls a positive complementarity. She writes that the Homo oeconomicus cuts a poor figure within both these parameters. He or she is “… the radically autonomous, isolated agent who is unneedful of social contact and uninfluenced by physical concerns …” (Nelson 1996, p. 33). This shows that individualism, as such, cannot simply be linked to egotism. It is hard to apply the term “egotism” to an individuality that is open in a positive manner and has an inclusive attitude to one’s fellows. It is, however, easy to see the connection between a methodological or negative individualism and egotism. It is precisely this individualism that shapes and is typical of the understanding of the Homo oeconomicus. Where everything, and every strategy, is directed toward the realization of what is best for one’s own self, the anthropological presuppositions on which this is based are egotistic. The relationship between the Homo oeconomicus and the competitive economy indicates that there is a very close relationship between competition as an instrument in economic activity and egotistic anthropological presuppositions. This landscape is not unambiguous, however. One important aspect of a positive individualism is the willingness to take other persons into

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consideration, which means, among other things, attempting to create equal (or at least, not excessively unequal) circumstances for different individuals. In practice, however, this kind of equality or societal balancing does not prevent egotism, and one can have the impression that individualism and competition are strongest in societies that emphasize and appreciate equality (Eriksen and Hessen 1999, p. 10). It is also conceivable that a strong focus on freedom and autonomy does not necessarily reflect egotistic anthropological presuppositions; this is the case only where my freedom, and my praxis of freedom, have negative effects or consequences for others. Such a praxis is an expression of self-centeredness and egotism. Another individual quality that forms a counterweight to egotism is trust. Trust is a completely fundamental presupposition in human relationships in general, and some see it as a fundamental ethical category (Løgstrup 1997, pp. 8–28). Trust is certainly important in an economic context too. Actors must be able to trust that agreements will be honored. We must, however, draw a distinction here between economic activity in an almost perfect and in a non-perfect market. In the former, usual relationships between people either do not exist or are reduced to a minimum; this has consequences for the need for trust. Competition regulates the behavior of actors toward each other. They do not need to trust each other; in one sense, egotism is completely free to act, and the counterweight to egotism that trust represents is not actualized. For the almost perfect market economic human being, trust is a foreign word. In a non-perfect market, where competition also takes place, the relationships are more real, and there are greater possibilities for trust, and there is to some extent a need for trust too. As I have already pointed out, however, egotism comes into its own even in a non-perfect market, especially where the actors are few and differ greatly in size. But trust as an individual quality can never be totally excluded in the same way here as in the almost perfect market. Although I have introduced a distinction between positive and negative individuality, in order to nuance the relationship between individuality and egotism in economic activity, there is nevertheless an inescapable link between economic competition and egotism. Economic theories with collective starting points and concerns, such as economic institutionalism, play down the meaning of both competition and egotism for the economic. Feminist economics has taken up this point in a special manner, thanks to its specific stance (e.g., Nelson 1996). A strictly

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individualistic “I” is rejected, primarily because it is unrealistic, but also because it implies that the relationships between people suffer and block the path to a realization of altruistic goals. Behind these concerns, one can glimpse an anthropology that is by nature much more humanistic than egotistic. Feminist economics does not want to reject in principle the idea of competition and its function of promoting efficiency and the allocation of resources. But the explicit need to keep competition under control shows that not everything can be left up to the market and to a negative individuality. Both the individual and the market must be controlled in such a way that resources can be distributed in a way that reflects the needs of the fellowship, not only those of the individual. Egotism, Self-Interest, and the Competitive Economy Few people would question the existence of some kind of connection between self-interest and competition, and hence also of a link between competition and egotism as an anthropological category. The competitive economy enshrines this connection in a special way. This close connection between self-interest or egotism and the competitive economy has raised the question: Which of these is dependent on the other? Is it egotism that has generated the market oriented competitive economy, or is it this economy as a system that contributes to egotistic human action? From one point of view, this is a discussion about the chicken or the egg, and hence a fictive discussion. Humans have existed from the dawn of time as beings with strong and weak sides. From another point of view, a different problem arises: Is the market economy as a system so strong and influential that it is capable of steering the human being in one special direction, thus helping certain aspects of the human to get priority over others? The evaluation of chicken and egg in connection with egotism and the market economy depends largely on one’s anthropological starting point. In this context, Dag O. Hessen (Eriksen and Hessen 1999, pp. 27–28) cites the philosopher Erich Fromm and the economist Matt Ridley, inspired by Adam Smith. According to Fromm (1956, pp. 3–4, 85–88), the human being is good per se, but is turned into an egotist by the cold consumer culture that is fixated on material things. Modern capitalism, in its competitive economic version, has suffocated genuine love and opened the doors wide to egotism. Ridley (1996, e.g., pp. 144–146, 261) takes the opposite view: capitalism is incapable of making the human being become

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once again something that he already is. There seems to be little doubt that egotism was the first on the scene. This makes Fromm’s extreme position problematic; but the same is true of Ridley’s position. Egotism is not merely something neutral in relation to capitalism. On the one hand, egotism is a force that helps to promote capitalism, while on the other hand, capitalism too, at least in various extreme versions, can contribute through its wide diffusion and its influence on legitimating and promoting egotism as the directive power in human action. Accordingly, not even this discussion of the “sequence” between egotism and capitalism seems to question the existence of a close relationship between a market-oriented competitive economy with a capitalist character and human egotism and self-interest. What are we to say about the very concept of self-interest? It seems that self-interest is perceived in a market-oriented competitive economy as simple, direct, and obvious. But is this the case? George P. Brockway (2001, pp. 44–45) points out that different people will have very different perceptions of what is in their own interest. One person will see a transaction as useful and in his own interest, while another will see the same possibility of trading as completely useless. Brockway claims that this is how things are, and that this is how things must be, since we are persons with differing abilities, backgrounds, needs, wishes, and interests. But what does this mean? Does it mean that the human being’s self-interest is as varied as humanity itself? And if people behave differently because they are different, what does one gain by affirming that they have the same nature because they are acting out of self-interest? Can one counter this objection by saying that that which unites human beings on this point is a kind of enlightened self-interest? Brockway holds that this is not possible. He sees the distinction between self-interest and enlightened self-interest as analogous to the distinction between the visible and the real. He argues that because we are accustomed to distrust the visible, we attempt, as prudent persons, to look for underlying or hidden realities. But is this anything more than an a priori judgment that begs the question? The assertion is that we will act in one special manner if we know what is good for us; if we do not act thus, it is because we do not know what is good for us. Brockway thus concludes that self-interest, as a reality common to all human beings, does not exist. The claim that there exists an enlightened, underlying self-interest is nothing more than a dogma.

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This pulverization of self-interest and of its significance for human action is too radical. The fact that people do not make the same choice in a given situation can scarcely be a definitive argument for the proposition that there are as many self-interests as there are human beings, and that it is therefore impossible to regard self-interest as a universal human quality. Even if we make different choices—since we have different views of what is useful, and different interests—the motivation for the choices, that is to say, what is useful for me, can nevertheless unite the two choices. Both choices are made from self-interest. This self-interest need not be characterized as enlightened. It is present even when specific choices differ. Julie Nelson has another differentiation here. In agreement with the humanistic economics of Mark A. Lutz and Kenneth Lux and their definition of altruism (Lutz and Lux 1979, p. 109), and with what she calls a gender-value compass,19 she draws a distinction between negative and positive self-interest and altruism (Nelson 1996, pp. 134–137, see also p. 19). Negative self-interest entails that one sees oneself completely independently of others and wishes only to satisfy one’s own interests and wishes. An individual with a positive self-interest looks after himself in a reasonable manner, but not in such a way that this genuinely happens at the expense of others. A negative altruism implies a problematic surrender of one’s own will and interests, while a positive altruism includes interest in, and attentiveness to, others. In Nelson’s gender and value compass, the negative is located in the masculine part of the horizontal axis, and the positive in the feminine part. This schema, or more correctly, this compass—as we know, a compass makes it possible to find the path somewhere among the four main directions—can be further nuanced with regard to the understanding of self-interest and its function. This nuancing goes in both directions. Altruism can be a hidden self-interest,20 and self-interest can include altruistic elements. This also holds good in a competitive situation, especially in an evaluation of the relationship between competition and collaboration. In neoclassical economic theory, especially where it is seen in connection with classical theory, it is held that one can do justice to altruism and self-interest simultaneously. Competition is an activity in which self-interest creates presuppositions for realizing a result that is the best for everyone: the most efficient possible allocation of resources takes place. The motivation is altruistic, and people get

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what they need. But as a means to realize this goal, competition builds on egotistic presuppositions.21 In principle (and as more direct empirical observation confirms), it is difficult to exclude altruism from the idea of competition. We can see, precisely on the level of motivation, that competition can have a good function vis-à-vis one’s neighbor. On the level of action, however, the egotistic or self-interested elements are much stronger in play. One can never completely separate competition and self-interest. This point must be made in greater detail. The function of self-interest differs somewhat in an almost perfect market and in a non-perfect market. In an almost perfect market with explicit competition, it is perfectly possible to envisage that competition in one sense, via the idea of equilibrium, keeps the specific satisfaction of one’s own interests in check. Even if one has entered the competition with self-interest as the motivating force, the competition functions to prevent the satisfaction of one’s own interests; this is where an altruistic element lies.22 The situation is different in a non-perfect market, especially where there is an imbalance in the strength of the individual actors in the market. The dynamic in the competition is not equally large here. It is possible to realize one’s own interests in a different way, and the impact of altruistic elements will be weaker. Arthur Rich has also drawn attention to another differentiation here (Rich 1990, p. 186). In a situation of almost perfect competition, individual interests are oriented to the actual market situation. Here, orientation will often be short-term: if cheap energy is available, in the form either of electrical power or oil, there is no reason to be restrained in one’s consumption. This makes it possible both to increase profit and to supply goods to the public at lower prices. In a longer term perspective, where energy can be a scarce resource and the production of energy can come to have serious ecological consequences, it will be in the interests of society to be sparing in this regard, even if this leads to increased prices for individuals and for individual firms in today’s situation too. A market economy will find it difficult to affect such a coordination of self-interest and public interest. It will be difficult to include a future situation of scarcity in one’s calculations, because the market economy is oriented to the present day and the short term. A potentially positive definition of the relationship between economic competition and altruism opens the door to two problematic consequences. First of all, it can mean that less attention is paid to the

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more egotistically oriented aspects of competition, and that these disappear from view to some extent. Second, situations can be legitimated by applying altruism merely as a varnish, because one wants to conceal what truly influences the action and its deeper intention. Actions that are apparently motivated by a love of one’s neighbor and that are full of sacrifice can turn out to be marked by a carefully calculated and camouflaged egotism. This relationship between apparent altruism and competition has a parallel in the relationship between collaboration and competition (see Eriksen and Hessen 1999, pp. 19, 150–151, 165–166, 169). Some maintain that collaboration can be profitable, both in evolutionary terms and in terms of game theory. Others think that collaboration too is motivated by self-interest and that the fact that something in this context is profitable concerns primarily the individual person and his or her own selfish interests. Does this close the discussion, or are there other anthropological categories that can add nuances to the picture? One presupposition of the very existence of human beings is the principle of reciprocity. This anthropological principle has space for both self-interest and altruism. Human beings are dependent on each other and must find ways to order their life in common that protect both the individual and the fellowship. In order to ensure efficiency and selection, orderings and institutions are employed that are selective and that are motivated by self-interest. On the biological level, collaboration too can be motivated in this way. This behavioral pattern, oriented by self-interest, is therefore not antagonistic to the interests of the fellowship. The members of the fellowship can receive help from one another, and this too is favorable in evolutionary terms. This reciprocity is not static but is a situation and an interest that develops in order to ensure what is needed, both for the fellowship and for individuals. In order to make this strategy of reciprocity efficient, trust is developed (see Britton and Sedgwick 2003, pp. 231–232; Eriksen and Hessen 1999, pp. 194–199). This trust includes the idea that my neighbor wishes me well and will take care of my interests. He will also think of himself, but not exclusively. We both profit from the care we have for each other. The principle of reciprocity creates frameworks and presuppositions that allow self-interest and altruism and competition and collaboration to be joined together in human existence, despite the antitheses they represent. Accordingly, the anthropological basis of the idea of competition cannot be thought of as existing exclusively in self-interest, because it is

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not possible to locate the human being exclusively in that category. The principle of reciprocity locates the human being in relationships in which both altruism and collaboration have their place, not only self-interest and naked competition. The antithesis that initially seems to exist between reciprocity and competition must therefore be more nuanced outside a market economic context than within such a context. Although the idea of collaboration cannot simply be dismissed where the competitive economy is central, and although it is possible at the same time to point to the potential for efficiency that lies in the idea of collaboration, self-interest is so firmly established, and so strongly determinative of the understanding of what competition is, that it is hard for collaboration to have a moderating function in the elaboration of economic competition. In his interpersonal relationships, the human being depends in many ways on reciprocity and collaboration; he needs these. In economic competition, this is not true in the same way, either for the individual or for firms. Selfinterest is the propulsive force and the motivating factor in economic competition. But precisely when our starting point is the idea of reciprocity, the domination of self-interest in economic competition must also be moderated to some extent. This moderation is due not to economic competition but to the human being himself. One who is an actor in an economic competition is not merely an economic actor: he is also present as a whole human being. In this sense the perspective is broader, even if the situation in itself is determinative and influential. Granted this presupposition, there will be elements of reciprocity and an orientation to collaboration even in a situation of economic competition, although there are strong forces that point in a different direction. We encounter here a duality that is also related to language and to its function. Language is a common framework of reference that is not created from strategic presuppositions. At the same time, it is language that creates presuppositions for an activity that creates trust, for the strategic maximization of utility, and for reciprocity or mutuality. Within the framework of language, it is impossible to isolate egotism and self-interest from the communicative presuppositions of these realities: the unselfish, the collective, and the fundamental communicative fellowship. One must also take into account this location of egotism when one investigates and discusses the anthropological presuppositions of competition.

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An Anthropology with an Egotistic Orientation? Does the idea of competition in the economy presuppose an anthropology with an egotistic orientation? Egotism and self-interest undoubtedly play a very central role here, especially in the case of economic competition in relation to material values. It is, nevertheless, difficult to establish an exclusive link between an idea of economic competition and egotistic anthropological presuppositions. This is not so much because egotism does not fit this idea of competition like a glove, but rather because it is problematic to understand the human being exclusively on the basis of this anthropological category. This affirmation can be supported on a biological, a societal, and a philosophical/religious level. The actual competition must also be understood in light of this broader perspective on the human being. In concrete terms, this means that it is hard to understand the idea of economic competition in complete isolation from its relationship to collaboration as an alternative strategy. And the various nuances of the link to the understanding of self-interest are important elements in this context. Self-interest can be understood within both positive and problematic frameworks. Competition, egotism, and altruism form a triumvirate here, and it is not always easy to see what is influencing what, and what is on top. It is, nevertheless, necessary to note that there is a basis of egotism in all forms of competition. The reason is simple: it is important that I win. It is hard today to envisage a society like ours without competition, and without a competitive economy. A change here would demand dramatic changes in society. This means that egotism has certainly not outlived its role. One interesting element in future development will be the extent to which egotism is influenced by the values and forces that moderate it. If the development in society were to go further in a materialistic direction—and most indications in today’s situation are that this will in fact take place—the link between egotism and material values can come to be strengthened, and a more destructive understanding of egotism can come to dominate.

Competition in the Economy and an Anthropology with an Elitist Orientation While egotism as an anthropological category is absolutely central in a discussion of the competitive economy, the elitist element does not play the same role. But elitism as an anthropological category is much more

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central in a discussion of areas such as competition in sport and in the world of education. When I thematize it in this context, this is because it actualizes some anthropological aspects that must necessarily be included in a discussion of the competitive economy. This applies especially to the idea of ranking. Elitism as a phenomenon has originally a societal background.23 The starting point for understanding it is the Latin verb for selecting, eligo. Elitism is understood as a selection of persons who are higher than the mass of people, thanks to certain characteristics such as ties of blood, age, wealth, knowledge, practical skills, organizational and artistic competence, or education. In a modern, functionally differentiated society, the concept of the elite is linked to a number of functional elites—the political, administrative, juridical, economic, scientific, and so on. Recruitment to the elite in today’s society is no longer connected to ties of blood, but to education, professional achievements, and choices. Besides this, it is limited in time. In this group, we find the experts, the avant-gardists, the celebrities, the rich, and those with prestige. In a sociological context, the idea of the elite and the functions that the “elite” are meant to have are regarded as necessary and indispensable moving forces in society (see Herms 1999). In addition to this sociological understanding, there is also a more general understanding of the elite and elitism. This term is used here to the position that gives priority to what distinguishes itself as advantageous, especially in the intellectual and cultural sphere: ideas, values, works of art, and cultures. Those who distinguish themselves, who get to the top and win, are given prerogatives or privileges that not everyone receives. The opposite is egalitarianism. In elitism, everyone does not get the same possibilities, and the individual is evaluated on the basis of results and achievements. The intention is not to promote envy or to increase the number of losers; but it is intended that the winners get a sufficient reward and sufficient support for ideas that have created progress and that can benefit the whole of society in the future. This form of elitism has, however, a fundamentally individualistic and meritocratic24 character. The expression “elite” has also other connotations in everyday language: it is associated with superiority, on the one hand, and with influence, on the other (Henry III 1994, pp. 19, 26). As with egotism, therefore, elitism too is not initially an understanding of the human being. But the more general understanding of elitism, which we have sketched here, shows that there is here an implicit view of the human being. What are its characteristics?

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Elitism highlights the differences between people. Differences linked to abilities and presuppositions, and to the development of these, become more important than the similarities that bind all human beings together.25 Accordingly, the human being is evaluated primarily on the basis of what he does and achieves, not of what he is. This is why the “number ones” are admired and prioritized in elitism. “Perfectionism” is a term that brings together many of the vital concerns in an elitist anthropology. Given these presuppositions, it is natural to emphasize the selection and ranking of human beings. The admiration of winners and the onesided emphasis on individual aspects of competition are a further consequence of this. It is legitimate that some people feel that they are better than others, and that they therefore are given better possibilities. This kind of difference in the value of human beings can then prepare the ground for a hierarchical thinking in terms of authority (Henry III 1994, p. 31), and even more radically, for the possibility of racial discrimination. Elitism’s emphasis on the selection and ranking of individuals also entails setting aside important values of fellowship. People are often ranked in society on the basis of differences. In one sense, all differences will mean exposure to ranking. In many cases, a ranking is not experienced as problematic; most people will see the ranking of people’s varying ability to do a high jump as unproblematic, and the same can apply to the ability to think logically or to learn a foreign language. But what very many people will not accept is making this ranking the primary evaluation of a human being, so that it is given greater importance than a fundamental equality. This difference is reflected in the difference between being enthusiastic about something and being “crazy” about something. One can be enthusiastic about getting a good ranking on the basis of one’s achievements. But to “go crazy” about the one who gets a good ranking (whether this is one’s own self or another person) means seeing the relevant ranking as superior to thinking about the person in question on the basis of all human beings’ fundamental and equal value. In such cases, one moves in the direction of a radical elitism in which the “number ones” and perfection are venerated, and in which simultaneously a possibility of despising the weak opens up. To what extent is elitism actualized in the economy and in economic competition? Economic competition presupposes individuals and actors, either directly or indirectly. Even if the result is linked more strongly to what

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one achieves economically and does not have the same focus on the person as (for example) in sport, the able businessman occupies the center of attention. A selection takes place, and a ranking takes place between those who win and those who lose. Differences are important. The emphasis is on achievement and on what one does. The qualities in attitude that may accompany the economic competition—that is to say, qualities linked to what one is—do not play the same role in the evaluation of what happens. One may indeed be conscious that competitors have the same value as human beings, but this need not have any function in the ranking of competing parties in terms of values. What counts is who wins the competition, whether this means getting the highest earnings or winning the contract. The focus on differences, on the difference between losers and winners, between those who are unsuccessful in competition and those who succeed, means that what divides becomes more important than what unites. This does not lay the ground for any fellowship among actors in a competition, either during or after. Some go on their way as victors, while others are left standing there as losers, and the losers have only themselves to thank for this result. It is easy to succumb to the idea that the victory was deserved, and that an attitude of superiority is fully legitimate. In this way, the losers disappear from view and become uninteresting. When elitism’s link between “number ones,” superiority, and influence is transposed to the field of the economy, it entails that a winner in an economic competition is to be prioritized and to be given the influence and power that belong to a winner. The winner of a sporting competition can also be given influence, but the influence and power that are linked to winning in an economic competition are very often much larger. This lays a great responsibility on the winner’s shoulders. In this context of economic competition, it is often difficult to see whether a sufficiently critical perspective, and the potential to evaluate the use and deployment of such power, have been developed. Elitism as an anthropological category has not played such a large role in the development and justification of economic competition as in (top-level) sport. In today’s situation, however, one can have the impression that a clearer focus is required on the anthropological relationship between elitism and economic competition. Elitist ideas seem to be gaining new territory in contemporary society; this is connected especially to the significance and the influence of professionalized top-level sport.

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Here, the dominance of sport in the media communicates in a strong and immediate manner the admiration of winners, and people learn to do so. The equally strong (and accelerating) commercialization of sport helps to create a bridge between sport and the economy, and this bridge also provides a passage for elitist and ranking factors into economic thinking. Self-interest and individualism, the basic anthropological categories of economic competition, do not necessarily include a ranking. A closer link between economic competition and elitism could promote a development in the direction of a more explicit ranking between actors and persons, including in the economic sphere. If we bear in mind that ranking is connected here too to the influence and power that money gives, this can unmask new divisions in society in the future. In this way, self-interest can get a legitimation and an instrument for its expansion that could part company with fundamental values that are linked to the equal value of all human beings. It could also be a threat to more fundamental democratic rights in society.

Competition in the Economy and an Anthropology with a Humanist Orientation From one perspective, it may seem unnecessary to thematize humanist anthropology in this connection, for is not the modern competitive economy concerned about anything other than humanist values? One indication of this is that various versions of a so-called humanist economics, an economic thinking that wishes to integrate humanist perspectives into the elaboration of economic theory, are very critical of neoclassical economic theory.26 However, the discussion of egotism above has also actualized elements of altruism and collaboration in thinking about economic competition, even if these elements were far from having the prominence that is linked to egotism and self-interest. Adam Smith’s idea of sympathy also includes a humanist element. This gives a certain signal: the relationship between a competitive economy and a humanist anthropology cannot only be described as non-existent or completely antithetical. What is meant by a humanist anthropology? It is difficult to give a precise definition of what ought to be included in this way of looking at the human being, because there are so many approaches, both of a philosophical and a religious kind, to the humanist tradition. A secular and

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a religious approach have gone side by side from antiquity onward. It was only in the nineteenth century that the link between humanism and secular and atheistic presuppositions became more explicit and dominant, especially in connection with the German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872). This was further developed in various ways in the twentieth century, for example, by the French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre (1905–1980) in an existentialist direction. In the humanist tradition (Lamont 1965; Davies 2008), the human being can be understood on both religious and secular presuppositions. In religious humanism, where Christianity has been particularly important, the human being is understood on the basis of what God has created him for, and what God intends with human life. In a special way, the human being’s greatness is emphasized—at the cost of, but not to the exclusion of, human limitation and sinfulness27—a greatness that also includes an eternal perspective on human life (Olson 2002, esp. pp. 247–261; see also Ritchie and Spencer 2014). In secular or natural humanism, which is more prominent in today’s situation, the human person is understood exclusively on the basis of this-worldly presuppositions: nature is the human being’s home. There is no reality outside the natural and material reality that has any significance for the human being’s self-understanding. There is nevertheless a dilemma in the anthropology of secular humanism. On the one hand, the human person is understood in material terms, as a physical system, and on the other hand, as an individual with consciousness. As something material, the human being can be investigated by the natural sciences and can be understood in the same way as every other physical system in the universe. As an individual with consciousness, the human being can recognize states of mind; he can have hopes and expectations about the future; can evaluate his actions; can choose in freedom; and can have self-consciousness (Norman 2004, pp. 56–65, see also pp. 86–96). Despite this broad spectrum in humanism’s background and contents, it is possible to identify some central characteristics of a humanistic anthropology.28 One very central element is the high value attached to respect for the human being: “the human being at the center” is often regarded as the fundamental maxim of humanism. This expression denotes a marked attention to the individual human being, and an equally marked respect for human life as the highest value that can be thought of. The human being is the measure of all things, with an inviolable dignity (Ritchie and Spencer 2014, pp. 45–61). This then

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generates a wish to protect the human being against every attack from supra-individual collective interests. This, however, does not mean that human fellowship is unimportant. Human happiness consists in uniting a personal satisfaction and development with a meaningful work for the good of the fellowship. Humanism’s highest ethical goal is the good of society, and this goal can be attained by individuals who are cooperative and socially conscious (Lamont 1965, pp. 248–249). To place the human being in the center is also a protest against every way of thinking that reduces him to being merely a means for something else, rather than being also an end in himself. The individual human being is to be respected as an intellectual being, a person who can shape his own life and his milieu in a unique manner. Therein lies the special dignity of the human being, which is irreplaceable (Norman 2004, pp. 103–104). The human being is neither a thing nor merely a creature of nature. He is always something more than all other living beings, and his capabilities are surpassed by none of them. Some hold that this implies a fundamental difference vis-à-vis all other beings, while others hold that there is a difference of degree, and that human dignity is related to differences in development and in capabilities. A humanism of this kind is close to the naturalistic tradition. Human freedom and rationality play an important role in the humanist tradition, although emphasis varies in religious and secular humanism. The true human being is the autonomous and rational human being, but this emphasis does not eliminate the importance of emotions. The reason must acknowledge the human being’s emotional life. In secular humanism, this is the basis for the idea that the source of the human being’s ethical knowledge is the human being himself (Lamont 1965, pp. 247–248, 258; Law 2011, pp. 77–78; Singer 2011, pp. 3–5), unlike a religious humanism in which presuppositions connected to revelation also play a role (Ritchie and Spencer 2014, pp. 62–76). With his reason— and to some extent with his emotions—the human being is to deduce what is right and wrong from what is called “the truly human” element in the human being. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights is often taken as an expression of what a humanist ethics amounts to, but this is not simply the case (Norman 2004, pp. 104–106). Of himself, the human being should and can realize what he recognizes to be right. The good life means realizing the good presuppositions that the human being bears in himself, and this means that self-realization is an important goal. Humanist anthropology is marked by optimism about the human being.

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A failure to realize the good is due, not to essentially negative presuppositions in the human being, but rather to a lack of knowledge and a weak will. The human being is fundamentally good (“intelligent altruism”; Lamont 1965, p. 244; see also Norman 2004, p. 24). In the present context, the next question is: What is the relationship between these humanist anthropological presuppositions and a competitive economic thinking? And what might be the significance of these suppositions in this thinking? In the historical survey of Adam Smith’s view of economics in general, and of competitive economics in particular, I pointed out that there are elements of humanist thought in Smith (Chapter 4). Smith’s idea of sympathy, and his ideas about the invisible hand and the need that he saw in some cases for the economy to be regulated by a visible hand, point in a humanist direction. In this sense, one can have the impression that the founder of classical economics was also the progenitor of an economic thinking that knew no antithesis between competition and humanist values, and where the primary function of self-interest— corrected by competition—was to contribute to the accumulation of resources to cover essential needs, to enlarge the workforce, and to increase wealth, not only for owners but also workers. These humanist ideals gradually moved into the background. The neoclassical development of the classical ideals was eclectic, and interpreted competition, self-interest, and regulation in a direction that much more strongly reflected an anthropology with an egotistic orientation. As I have mentioned, there emerged here a new understanding of what is meant by economic value, or what things are worth. This new understanding was linked to the idea of marginal utility, the measure of pleasure or utility that one could get from yet another produced ware. But although these ideals were largely forgotten in neoclassical theory and its heirs in our own days, there are representatives of this way of thinking who strongly claim that it preserves important humanist ideals. One such representative is Friedrich Hayek. His book The Road to Serfdom (von Hayek 1944), which I have already mentioned, is in many ways a political manifesto against every form of state control of economic activity. All such strategies entail coercion (cf. the term “serfdom”) and jeopardize the human being’s individual rights. It is at this point that humanist ideals are presented, especially in connection with the idea of competition. One aspect of this idea is the ability to coordinate human actions and thus create efficiency. Here, it is unsurpassed,

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according to Hayek. A precisely elaborated legal framework for competition helps it to work in an especially advantageous way.29 For Hayek, therefore, there is no antithesis between the competitive economy and central humanist ideals, such as individuality and freedom (von Hayek 1944, p. 14). The competitive economy prevents coercion and arbitrary interventions and allows people to live in harmony with their basic human rights. For Hayek, this commitment to the competitive economy envisaged a competition that was as pure or perfect as possible, since monopolies could not protect humanist concerns of this kind in the same way (von Hayek 1948, pp. 111, 114). The monopolist ought to be treated as a kind of scapegoat in economic policy (von Hayek 1960, p. 265). This led Hayek to oppose those whose desire to prioritize profit made them renounce pure competition. Unsurprisingly, one can note here too that humanist ideals seem to prosper better in the framework of a situation of almost perfect competition than where the situation is less perfect and where oligopoly and monopoly are possible. The question of human freedom is also related to state control. When this entails a coercion that thwarts the self-realization and freedom of the individual, it can come into conflict with a humanist ideal of freedom. However, this line of argument has its limits. First of all, we must ask about the realism in regulation that a perfect economic competition is meant to protect. Will this in fact be operative? Second, there will always be the matter of degrees of state control and of the corresponding infringement of an individual’s freedom. Third, in a number of cases, it is precisely state control that will entail frameworks that protect important human values. Fourth, a radical interpretation of freedom could be a threat to the humanist ideal: the liberal dilemma becomes visible where I do not take into account the fact that my freedom encounters its boundary at the point where it collides with other people’s freedom.30 A limited and limiting framework around the competitive economy is typical of so-called humanist economics. Adherents of the competitive economy thus seem to believe that, given certain adjustments, a competitive economic model protects important humanist values of an anthropological kind. This applies especially to the human being’s individuality and freedom; and many would argue that human rationality also plays a role in this context. The discussion of the Homo oeconomicus and of the significance of rationality in this context has shown that this aspect of the human being is important. From a humanist perspective, rationality is positive, since it is a presupposition that makes

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self-actualization or self-realization possible. To the extent that economic competition contributes to this (and here, we must bear in mind the creative and innovative function of competition), one can attribute humanist qualities to the competitive economy. Rationality, as a striving for material goods, will however be rational, from a humanist perspective, only as long as it is a matter of essential needs. Many would regard a continual wish for more and more material goods as irrational. The elements of altruism and collaboration that I have mentioned in connection with egotism are also relevant here, because they indicate that humanist presuppositions of this kind can also be identified within frameworks that are marked by the competitive economy. It is important to bring out this relationship between humanist anthropology and the competitive economy; but it must not blind us to the strong limitations that also exist. Let me mention two of these. First, there is considerable variation among neoclassical economists with regard to the emphasis they place on these humanist values. For some, they play an important role, and this entails an understanding of the competitive economy that is open to legal frameworks and represents a departure from various forms of inconsiderate competition. This “humanist” variant of the competitive economy attaches particular importance to an almost perfect competition and is skeptical about competitive situations that tend toward a monopoly. Values such as individuality and freedom will play a role for all competitive economists, but there will be a distinct difference here between those who wish to absolutize freedom and individuality for the sake of the economy, and those who would also see these values in relation to other important values. Second, there is a tendency in neoclassical competitive economics to attach importance to certain humanist anthropological values and to highlight these. Sometimes, this is done by disapproving of other humanist values; sometimes, it is more unconscious, and the other values are not actualized in the same way. A humanist anthropology that includes values such as fellowship, altruism, compassion, and even self-sacrifice is played down. The link to humanism is eclectic, adapted to the central guidelines and values that are present in the competitive economy. But by emphasizing certain humanist values, the competitive economy legitimates itself in a wider context. If these problems are detached from a direct relationship to the competitive economy, this actualizes some other factors that are then relevant to economic circumstances.

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There are areas of life in which the relationship between competition and humanist ideals for the human being is clearer than in economic competition. Sport is one such area. It has a voluntary basis, it places the individual human being at the center, it gives him the possibility of self-realization, and it takes place in frameworks that are characterized by fellowship and belonging. Where sport is at the service of the human being (and not vice versa), central humanist anthropological ideals are realized. If, however, the relationship between competition and humanist ideals is to be truly solid, both in sport and the economy, then adaptations are necessary either in the competitive or humanist aspect, or in both. An idea of competition that is understood radically, where the primary concern is to beat others or to amass profit, comes into conflict with humanist ideals. An understanding of humanist ideals that includes the protection of the individual and the individual’s intrinsic value, frameworks of belonging and fellowship, and the possibility of realizing one’s own indwelling possibilities and of having these appreciated, can easily come into conflict with various versions of the idea of competition (and not only with the radical ideas). A real link between competition and humanist anthropology seems to presuppose that the idea of competition is held in check and is understood within given parameters. To some extent, a positive linking of this kind also presumes that humanism is not understood too radically. A positive linking is desirable. Both the competitive economy and sport are very important areas in our society. However, this desire can entail a harmonization that risks being at odds with realities. The harmonization can be based in part on an idealization of realities, and partly on the fact that neither the idea of competition nor humanist anthropology exists in the form of agreed and reasonably precise realities. Superficially speaking, both realities can be understood in a broad manner, and this opens the door to a variety of interpretations, even if this does not provoke loud protests. The idealization is probably connected with a lack of realism about today’s realities, especially with regard to competition. It is easy to get entangled in old ideals about a competition that is honest, strengthens the character, and is fruitful in human terms—thus failing to perceive sufficiently the reality that is the product of today’s commercialized societal situation. In this way, traditions are handed down far too uncritically. This lack of realism can also be connected to a limited realism in humanism itself about the human being’s presuppositions. As I have

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mentioned, humanism’s anthropology envisages the possibility that the human being can do evil deeds. This, however, is because the human being lacks knowledge, not because he is in himself the bearer of negative anthropological presuppositions. It is perfectly possible to realize ideals (Lamont 1965, p. 227; Norman 2004, p. 157). This leads to the desire to think as positively as possible about the human being and to attempt to counter the negative with information and arguments. This is laudable per se, but it is open to exploitation, because the human desire to exploit and use other persons is not countered with sufficiently harsh means. The idea is that inhumane aspects of the idea of competition, whether in the economy or in sport, can be dealt with on the intellectual and argumentative level. But the question is whether a knowledge of what is problematic leads to the erection of barriers that establish real and operative boundaries for human conduct. If this is combined with the tendency to eclecticism that I have mentioned, the result can be a confusing relativism that lacks adequate normative power to encounter the challenges with which we are confronted by today’s thoroughly commercialized idea of competition. Humanism definitely has a critical anthropological potential, also with regard to the various concretizations of the idea of competition. This applies especially to the potential that is linked in humanist anthropology to the assertion of the human being’s inherent dignity and equality, independent of his or her achievements. This thwarts every use of the human being merely as a means and not at the same time—and always—as an end in himself.

Competition in the Economy and an Anthropology with a Christian Orientation When the competitive economy is evaluated in a Western cultural context, it is not hard to argue that Christian anthropological presuppositions too ought to be included in the picture (see Pannenberg 1985; Cortez 2010). On the one hand, Christian theological anthropology,31 together with humanist anthropology, has played a decisive role in thinking about the human being and society over nearly two millennia. On the other hand, Christian anthropological presuppositions have also played a role in the original elaboration of the competitive economy, especially as this is depicted in its classical representatives.

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Christian thinking in our own days has looked in detail at the competitive or modern market economy, from both an ethical and a theological– anthropological perspective. John Atherton distinguishes three principal positions here (Atherton 1992). The first position is conservative and represents an affirmation of the market economy. Although there is an awareness that thinking in terms of the market has its limitations, and that it needs some correction based on institutional, value, and political presuppositions, the basic attitude is one of acceptance. The market cannot be bettered in terms of efficiency, and it represents a support and a protection of fundamental human freedoms. Wealth is seen as something that is at the service of life and that is to be used to give glory to God. The modern economy is meant to contribute to this, and competition is meant to counteract monopolizing tendencies both in firms and in trade unions and other organizations. Democracy and the market economy belong together. The basic importance of freedom means that the state is reluctant to regulate economic activity.32 The second position rejects the market economy, just as it rejects capitalism with its negative consequences for people and society. This thinking is anchored in a special way in so-called liberation theology. A European variant is more moderate and sees some positive aspects in the function of the market; this is sometimes called Christian socialism. In its radical form, it is not only a critique of one economic system, but a current that in one way prescinds from the economic problems society faces, since it is a matter more of politics than of economics. Capitalism is a form of idolatry and an expression of heresy: capital takes the power in human beings’ lives, and God is pushed aside. The word capitalism is used almost consistently instead of market economy or competitive economy, and this clearly demonstrates the close relationship to the socialist tradition. The same thing happens when questions about the coordination of supply and demand and incentives for the producer and the consumer are turned into questions about ownership and participation. The third position is intermediate, with a liberal character, and has probably been the most influential of the three positions. Its profile reflects in many ways the social democratic mixed economies in the West. Its slogan is that the fabulous market mechanism can be a good servant, but definitely not a good master (Wogaman 1977, p. 97). Theologically, it is located in the center, and attaches special weight to the consequences of God’s mighty deeds in history, from the act of creation to

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the last things. For the human being, the relationship to God must be linked as closely as possible to the relationship to one’s neighbor. At the same time, it is held that the human being is involved as a collaborator of God in his actions in history, and that he is to work against everything that prevents God’s will from being realized. This entails the recognition that the human being’s limitation and sin must be taken seriously in the economy and in politics too. This has two consequences: on the one hand, everything in which the human being is engaged is provisional. The kingdom of God cannot be created here, and the moral judgments about the societal sphere must therefore also be relative. On the other hand, this entails that the world (or in this context, the question of the market economy in particular) is not thought of in black and white categories. This “both/and” thinking, in combination with the relative perspective on values, implies that the realization of the societal dimension must be an ongoing process. The state is seen as something that can put a check on sin, but first and foremost as something that can contribute to societal change. Within this framework of a strong state that functions on the basis of democratic ideals, the market, competition, thinking in terms of profit, and incentives can function together as a good mechanism. These economic means can be completely essential in the realization of societal goals, but they are subordinate to these goals. They are necessary but not sufficient presuppositions for a good life. These three positions actualize different aspects of a Christian anthropology that are relevant to an evaluation of the competitive economy. The Christian anthropology shares several of these aspects with a humanist anthropology; the difference is often more marked in their justification than in their content. All three positions agree in understanding the human being as created by God and as having a purpose in the world. This purpose includes administering what God has placed in the hands of human beings. The exhortation to till and keep the garden (Gen 2:15) is a call to cherish and use well the gift that the work of creation is for the human being. At the same time, it is a call to use the abilities that God has given the human being. This means, on the one hand, that the human being is to use the work of creation in such a way that he gets what he needs in order to live; this applies both to oneself and to those with whom one lives, those for whom one bears responsibility. On the other hand, it is also a call to self-realization and to manifest the creativity one bears in oneself as a human being. An economic means that allocates resources efficiently

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and responsibly, and that opens the door to creative and qualitatively good solutions, is positive a priori. Where the competitive economy, as an expression of tilling and keeping the garden, contributes to this, there are no special factors in Christian anthropology that can deny its legitimacy. Something of the same applies to freedom. Human freedom is fundamental in Christian anthropology too. This means a freedom that is anchored in the integrity of the human being and that has its basis in human dignity. In a Christian context, this freedom is not absolute. But a freedom that is limited by other people’s coercion is not a part of this limitation. The limitation on the level of creation is linked to the encounter with other people’s freedom. A competitive economy that is based on freedom, and that does not clash with other people’s freedom and exercise coercion on them, corresponds to this Christian understanding of freedom. The question, however, is whether such a positive approach involves an idealized, rather than a practical and concrete, competitive economy. The responsibility in the Christian idea of “administering” is the very antithesis of plundering nature for the sake of financial profit. Human self-realization was not envisaged primarily with the emphasis on the human being’s self; it meant rather that the human being should use his abilities and creativity for his own good and for that of the fellowship. Human freedom was meant to be a liberating resource, not a justification for refusing to take others into consideration. There are good reasons to ask whether today’s Western (and global) competitive economy does justice to these concerns. Does it not clash with central aspects of a Christian anthropology? In many instances, justice is not done to these concerns. On the contrary, they are corrupted. On the basis of a Christian anthropology, this will be interpreted with reference to another very fundamental aspect of the human being: his or her sin. The core of sin is human selfishness, both vis-à-vis God and vis-à-vis other people. Competition, and the anchoring of the competitive economy in self-interest, pose a special temptation here. A Christian anthropology recognizes the firm grip that self-interest and egotism have on the human being. They are very strong driving forces in the human being. Although Christian thinking emphasizes to some extent the positive element in human self-love (“You shall love your neighbour as yourself,” Matt 22:39), selfishness, and not least egotism, are seen primarily from the

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perspective of sin. When self-interest is given the central place, both the relationship to God and the relationship to one’s neighbor suffer harm. An instrument that is anchored in selfishness to such a degree as the competitive economy becomes problematic here. This also explains how two positive characteristics of the human being, his responsibility as administrator and steward and his freedom, can become servants of what is negative. This close, but also problematic link between self-interest and sin implies that where self-interest has a function in an economic sense (as is the case in economic competition), the function must be regulated. This is how undesired negative consequences can be prevented. A regulation would have to function above all as a protection of the individual human being. Self-interest, whether it is understood individually or institutionally, must not be the starting point for trampling upon the interests of individuals. The possibility that the human being is merely a means in an economic competition is just as problematic in a Christian anthropology as it was for Immanuel Kant. One can lose the status of being also an end in himself, thanks to other people’s desire to win in an economic competition. In that case, one loses something of one’s worth as a human being. The same is true where the competition helps to rank human beings in relation to one another. It is indeed true that there is an innocent ranking among human beings on the basis of competition; board games are one example. But an economic competition is not at all the same thing as a board game. The losers in an economic competition risk being left with a lower rank and worth. The winners will presumably attempt to claim that only a financial loss is involved, not a loss of human worth, and in some cases, this may be so. But the losers may experience the loss subjectively as something that includes the ultimate form of loss of worth. In a society in which money plays such a great role, economic success and lack of success also say something about worth. It is important—but not decisive in this context—that Christian anthropology has another scale of values. The decisive point here is that people subjectively link fundamental human values with economic values. The economic ranking then becomes an assault on the Christian (and humanist) idea of all human beings having equal dignity, independent of economic or other factors. The regulation must also include protection of the fellowship. Human fellowship is an essential definition of the human being in Christian anthropology. The human being is created for life in common.

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Where self-interest and individualism in economic competition threaten this fellowship, it is necessary to set up boundaries that prevent such a violation. In the three approaches to the market economy that I have presented above, these aspects of Christian anthropology are present in various ways. The first approach emphasizes the positive element in the market economy and downplays the need for regulation of economic activity; in the second approach, it is the negative aspects that are highlighted, because here the idea is that harm is done to human beings, both as individuals and as a fellowship. An economic system that functions in this manner makes a mockery of Christian anthropology. The third approach attempts a difficult balancing act. A market economy that employs competition to give people the possibility of a positive self-expression and helps to sustain the life of society and of the individual, is seen in a positive light. However, the recognition of human sin and the possibility of using self-interest in a negative way indicate that both stewardship and freedom must be balanced by regulation. These three positions also illustrate three different approaches to doing justice to the critical potential that is found in a Christian anthropology. The scale goes from very critical to almost acceptive. Just as in humanism, here too there is a risk that the critical potential can disappear in whole or in part. In practice, this is connected to the materialistic organization of the market economy and of economic competition. Seen from the perspective of the individual, such an economic system can give the human being important—and comfortable—material presuppositions for his life. It is in the human being’s own interest, so to speak, that the competitive economy functions to one’s own personal satisfaction. This individualistic perspective is an obvious temptation, but it can mean that justice is not done to the critical perspectives in a Christian view of the human being. Sin has been mentioned several times in connection with Christian anthropology. This is a point on which it parts company with the humanist anthropology. While the humanist tradition has often been accused of optimism and a lack of realism about the human being, the Christian tradition (and especially the Protestant tradition) has been accused of pessimism. Human sinfulness has moved into the foreground. It has been claimed that this sinfulness has functioned as a brake block, preventing the human being from realizing his indwelling abilities and presuppositions. Realism about sin has presupposed restrictions and

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regulation, in order to keep evil in check, and this attitude has restricted the possibilities of human self-expression, also in a context of competition where both freedom and self-realization are important. There are several examples of an emphasis in Christian theology on human sinfulness that is so strong that this itself has amounted to a violation of the human being as a creature with freedom and with abilities that are to be realized. One can thus have the impression that in Christian anthropology—unlike in humanism—there exists an excessive pessimism. However, the recognition of the human being’s sinfulness and the realism that accompanies this recognition need not trample on the presuppositions that the human being possesses in virtue of creation. On the contrary, such a realism can make important contributions by establishing necessary boundaries around the human being’s self-expression and also, in a more concrete manner, around competition and its function in society. There is no a priori answer to the question whether a Christian or a humanist anthropology best reflects the actual reality of the human being. If one looks around, and perhaps especially where one sees the possibility of obtaining something in material terms, it is often the less positive aspects of the human being that are laid bare. Perhaps we are justified in talking about realism here? If we recognize that the prospect of gain can lead the human being to use other persons to gain his own goals, and may do so with complete ruthlessness, then we grasp that it is necessary to set boundaries to freedom, and that competition must be regulated in such a way that its function does not harm people inappropriately.

Economic Competition—Space for Human Dignity? The presentation of various anthropologies in relation to the question of economic competition has given a variety of answers. In some cases, there are few or no points of conflict, while in others, these points are significant. The link between anthropology and competition can have very different starting points. Some see this question on the basis of the possibility of survival. The world is dominated by competition, especially for what is scarce. One must get hold of what is scarce, in order to have a good life. Human existence becomes an existence in struggle. Others see competition in general, and economic competition in particular, as a threat to a meaningful human existence, which ought to be determined by giving, forgiving, welcoming, and including (Meeks 2006, p. 205).

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Such a thinking in terms of reciprocity is a strong antithesis to the goal of the competitive economy, which aims to maximize utility and thereby to satisfy a desire. There are various alternatives between these extreme positions, and most of those who reflect on the competitive economy and anthropology are somewhere in the middle. One decisive point here, in my view, is the question of human dignity.33 To what extent is this protected in the framework of the competitive economy? I shall therefore go on to focus on what human dignity means, with the emphasis on two traditions, the humanist and the Christian. This will provide important premises for a concluding discussion of the legitimacy of human competition, both in general and in economic competition. I restrict myself to these two anthropologies because an instrumental, an egotistic, and an elitist view thematize this only to a small extent. There may be various reasons for this. It may be that it is simply taken for granted. When, however, we look at what these anthropologies focus on in terms of value, it makes more sense to think that what is being prioritized is one’s own value and the actions that help to strengthen and emphasize this. Shared human values, which are the basis that allows us to speak of a universal human dignity, move into the background. This prioritization may be due to the fact that such fundamental human values sometimes establish barriers to the prioritization of one’s own value. Dignity is not the same as value (Ritchie and Spencer 2014, p. 51). The fact that something has value may be connected to its abilities, its outward appearance, or to how much of it there exists. But there is nothing necessary about this way of thinking about value. It is more natural to think that the primary criterion for saying that something has value is that it has value for someone: someone esteems it. This applies to human beings, of course, but also to many other things and living beings. Dignity has not such a wide field of application. A thing can have value, but it need not have dignity. Only the human being has dignity and assumes as a matter of course that he has value. For whom does he have value? This varies, as does the justification for the human being’s dignity. The two principal alternatives are that I have value for other human beings or for God, or for both. In secular humanism, the human being is understood in light of evolutionary presuppositions. The human being is at the top of this developmental ladder, especially because of the development of the brain that distinguishes him from all other living beings. The human being’s

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rationality and consciousness are unique. In a biological sense, the human being has been an enormous success (Lamont 1965, p. 110); and in this sense, he is truly distinctive, but not superior (Norman 2004, p. 82). This biological aspect is supplemented by the social aspect. As a person, the human being is largely determined by his human environment, but he has at the same time a social ability, linked in particular to language, that makes him special in relation to other living beings. It is in the combination of the biological and the social that the human being’s possibility of realizing “a fully human life” lies (Norman 2004, p. 111). These presuppositions and possibilities give the human being a unique value and make up the basis for talking of a human dignity. This dignity is emphasized both in a secular humanism and in a religious humanism with a Christian orientation, and it corresponds to the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which begins by acknowledging “… the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family,” and emphasizes the belief of the members of the United Nations in “… the dignity and worth of the human person …”.34 It is characteristic of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights that it does not give any explicit justification of this belief in human dignity, apart from a mention of the need for such rights on the basis of historical experiences and as an ideal for the world that human beings share. This may perhaps have been necessary, if agreement about the rights was to be reached. But a pragmatic justification of this kind is vulnerable, and the same is true to some extent of a humanist justification of human dignity that is oriented to human qualities. The biological and social qualities vary from one person to another, and it is relevant to ask whether such a variation can provide a sufficiently firm anchoring and justification for the special dignity of the human being. One answer to this question affirms that the human being, despite differences in essential features, is qualitatively different from all other living beings and is thus the bearer of a special human dignity. Religious thinkers and others point out, nevertheless, that the desire and the will to avoid every transcendent anchoring of human dignity creates significant unclarities. It “… leaves the boundaries blurred” (Ritchie and Spencer 2014, p. 48; see also Law 2011, p. 88). Such unclear boundaries can have an important influence on what one means by speaking of human dignity in relation to other higher living beings, such as apes and dolphins. If this dignity is related to the

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cognitive and the conscious and social, these are features or qualities that are found to some degree in those animals—and that are found to a lesser degree in some human beings than in the so-called “normal” ones. Must one therefore introduce a distinction between the dignity of normal human beings and of the mentally handicapped, with a corresponding differentiation with regard to human rights? The ethicist Peter Singer problematizes the whole question of human dignity, especially where this is linked to the idea of the sanctity of human life (Singer 2011, pp. 48–53, 71–75). The claim that the human being’s value is unique or holy is a form of speciesism and must be avoided. There are other living beings with features and qualities that correspond to those of the human being: the ability to communicate, the consciousness of one’s own person, the ability to feel pain, and the willingness to look after others. Differences of level on this point provide the basis for lives that are better and worse, but the differences are not fundamental. Both animals and human beings have personal qualities. With such a starting point, the human being’s value is relativized, and the very concept of “human dignity” as something exclusive becomes problematic.35 To what extent does humanism’s emphasis on human dignity represent a critical and normative potential in relation to a way of thinking about economic competition in which the human being can become a means at the service of superior economic goals? Singer’s problematization of the idea of human dignity limits this potential by relativizing the value of the human being, which this idea implies. The humanism that maintains that the human being has a dignity of his own (whether it justifies this in transcendent religious terms, or more pragmatically in secular terms) is not exposed to this relativization. A secular justification that is oriented to human qualities can provide some support for this affirmation, but it is limited by the variation in qualities among human beings. Religious humanism links the justification and the anchoring to transcendent presuppositions and claims that this gives a greater potential to protect human dignity. Although even those who themselves are not religious can admit the strength in such an anchoring (Dunbar 2004, pp. 197–199), this is disputed, and it is not a position with a universally convincing character, precisely because of its transcendent presupposition. It is at this point that this position is vulnerable. In Christian anthropology, the question of human dignity is most closely linked to the human being’s status as created in the image of

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God. This understanding is anchored in biblical material, especially in Gen 1:27. This is repeated in the New Testament, where it is linked in a special way to Christ as the true image of God (2 Cor 4:4); believers are to be formed in accordance with this image. What precisely does it mean to say that the human being is the image of God? Theology has many answers to this question (see Cortez 2010, pp. 16–40), but there seems to be a certain measure of agreement that the human being, created in God’s image, “reflects” a divine reality. All human beings are the image of God, but sin has done something to them, and this is why a true expression of the image of God is found today only in Christ. Through the relationship to Christ, the human being, who is created in God’s image but is also a sinner, can be changed and renewed. There is, however, no consensus about what exactly it means to say that the human being is created in God’s image. Some link this to the unique qualities of the human being, such as his rationality, while others relate it to the human being’s functions, and in particular to his function as God’s representative in the world. The understanding that commands the greatest assent today seems to be relational: the human being, like God in his Trinity, is a relational being. The human being is in a relation to his fellow human beings, to God, and to nature. This relationality forms the basis of the human being’s communicative relationship to God, and thereby also of his responsibility. This understanding, however, is not related to human qualities in the same way as one variant of the humanist understanding. All human beings are created in the image of God and possess a dignity a priori. The aspect of qualities is linked to how this dignity finds expression. The image of God, which applies to all human beings and is the basis of their dignity, is superior to every difference between them. In this way, Christian anthropology gives the human being a unique status and dignity. The justification is connected on the one hand to the creation: the human being is created in the image of God. On the other hand, it is linked to redemption and salvation. The human being has such a high value for God that he sent his Son, so that through his death and resurrection he might lead the human being back to the trusting relationship he once had. The human being is beloved. He is not valuable to God because he is the bearer of God’s image—rather, he is a creature who bears God’s image because he is valued by God. The human being’s value in God’s eyes is completely independent of his accomplishments or of the qualities he may possess. This value is something that

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God ascribes fully to the human being, and is anchored in God’s relationship to him (Gushee 2013, p. 114). But the human being was not, and is not, able to live up the image of God that he bears. He is not as loving, as faithful, as forgiving, and generous as he ought to be. Sin leaves its mark on him. This, however, has no consequences for our value and dignity as human beings, and it therefore has no significance for our obligation vis-à-vis other people. The way in which we treat them and relate to them is meant to reflect the fact that they are created in God’s image and are loved by God, completely independent of their abilities and moral qualities. A humanist and Christian understanding of human dignity is more different on the level of justification than in regard to the understanding of human dignity itself. In both cases, it is generally affirmed that the human being has a dignity of his own, an inherent value that is unique to the human being and that entails a protection of the human being that is not extended to any other living being. In an ethical context, this understanding of human dignity has been particularly influential where human life is at stake, but also where it is threatened by forces that are abusive and can entail a devaluation of human life. The relationship between economic competition and human dignity belongs in this last category, although this does not mean that competition necessarily represents a violation and a devaluation of the human being. Let me conclude by saying something about some problems that arise in the relationship between economic competition and human dignity, with an emphasis on the understanding of human dignity that we find almost everywhere in the humanist and Christian traditions. The economy has a universal character. We are all related to economic activity, a few of us professionally, and most of us only on the level of everyday life. In one sense, the question of human dignity is also universal. Most people would claim that all human beings possess dignity, but we have seen above that some wish to relativize this and to extend dignity to include other living beings too. This actualizes ideological presuppositions. Different understandings of dignity—of what we can ascribe dignity to, and of how this is to be justified—are dependent on one’s view of the human being. Such justifications are difficult, not least if we look for something that could gain almost universal assent. The obvious temptation is therefore merely to note that this is how things are, and not to offer any reasons: the human being has a dignity of his

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own. With this kind of strategy (which, as we have seen, characterizes the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights), one will probably get further and convince more people than if one offers an ideologically anchored understanding (like a Christian understanding). We must nevertheless ask which type of justification is experienced as most convincing. In view of the universal character of the economy, if we wish to evaluate the relationship between economic competition and human dignity, it is important to identify a justification that appeals to as many as possible of those who are exposed to economic activity in general, and to economic competition in particular. The pragmatic strategy of the Declaration of Human Rights has proved to have a significant potential in this regard, and this ought to be an important warning to those who believe primarily in the convincing character of ideological justifications. The economy also has a rational character. Is this relevant to the question about dignity and competition? As we have seen, rationality is included in the understanding of what human dignity means, both by humanists and by Christians, although in different ways. The principal humanist position is that the human being has a dignity of his own precisely because he is rational. For Immanuel Kant, it is this rational quality, the fact that the rational human being can govern his will on the basis of freely chosen goals, that means that he exists as an end in himself, and not only as a means for arbitrary use by some other will (Kant 1964 [1785], p. 95). In this sense, human rationality is a part of what characterizes the human being qua a human being and gives him a dignity of his own. In economic activity, however, rationality has another function. It is anchored in the human being, but it is used in such a way that the maximization of profit and competition expose (or can expose) human beings to being used as means, rather than as an end in themselves, because the end is external in relation to the human being who is exposed to the instruments of the economy. This means that it is hard to employ the economy’s reference to rational presuppositions of its praxis in order to legitimate it as something that protects human dignity. It is possible that a rational economic praxis exists that can do this, but such a praxis does justice to the rational element in another way. When we say that the human being has a dignity of his own, we say that he has an intrinsic value. In an economic context, it is more natural to think of the concept of value than of the idea of intrinsic value. In other words, where the economy is thought of as a system that follows its own laws, the system as such has an intrinsic value, which, however,

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is related not to the human being, but to the economy itself. It is in this system that competition functions, in its relationship to supply and offer, and with reference to its functions of regulating prices and allocating resources. Such a system can be very closed, and it appears to offer little prospect of protecting human dignity, apart from the fact that the system helps people to get what they need in order to live. That is, of course, important, but it cannot be isolated from the question of the means that are employed to attain this goal. Here, we must ask how human dignity is to be protected. I shall pursue further the question of what chances human dignity has in a competitive context. Ultimately, this question is the principal concern of this book about the human being in a competitive society. Is there room for a true humanity in a society marked by competition? Before we conclusively discuss this, however, we shall shed light on competition from two other perspectives, the ethical and the relational.

Notes







1. M.A. Lutz and K. Lux also point out in this context how T. Veblen’s starting point torpedoes the established understanding of consumer sovereignty. Fashions, social trends, and advertising had a considerable influence on the consumer’s choices (Lutz and Lux 1979, p. 50). 2. M. Hollis and E.J. Nell point out that few textbooks give a direct portrait of the rational Homo oeconomicus, who is presented in a somewhat camouflaged manner, and little by little. It is not so easy to perceive exactly what the intention is, when the authors know that this human being will “maximize ruthlessly to get it.” In their view, this is something that may be able to explain why there is not a larger focus on the weaknesses, and why more critical questions are not raised. See Hollis and Nell (1975, pp. 53–54). 3. On the connection between rationality and efficiency, see Chapter 5. 4. On the question of consistency as a criterion in the philosophical sense, see Rescher (1973, p. 33, n. 22). The context in Rescher is the question of truth: what requirements must be satisfied, if the elements in a composite (among other things, various affirmations) are to be coherent? The requirement of consistency is one of these. This requirement entails that the elements must be logically compatible: one element cannot exclude another. See also Chapter 1. 5. The use of the concept of “preference” is itself an attempt to get away from the concept of utility as determinative of the patterns of consumers’

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actions in the market. “Preferences” is not an expression directly related to what serves the individual’s utility; it simply indicates what the individual prefers. 6. This understanding of the Homo oeconomicus in relation to preferences was elaborated above all by L. Robbins (Robbins 1984 [1935], pp. 94–99). Robbins represents a kind of behaviorist edition of neoclassical thinking. Here, the concern is not with whether the definition of the Homo oeconomicus corresponds to reality, but with whether the actions are in accord with predictions. If this happens, the Homo oeconomicus exists, whether or not one likes him. The Homo oeconomicus is nothing other than the manner in which he behaves. 7. In order to avoid this accusation of being dependent on subjective presuppositions and explanations, representatives of a neoclassical economic tradition claim that deviations from rationality on the individual level are small, and do not especially influence behavioral patterns on a larger and aggregated level. See Britton and Sedgwick (2003, p. 46), see also Lutz and Lux (1979, pp. 65–68). 8. “Thus economic theory describes rational choice, as we understand it from our own conscious experience of taking decisions; it is normative because it takes account of our own perceptions of what wise decisions require” (Britton and Sedgwick 2003, p. 47). 9. On the question of rationality and emotions in an economic context, see ibid., pp. 232–234. 10. The Latin ablative absolute ceteris paribus (“all other things being equal”) has become a standard term for this kind of partial analytical model. It indicates that parts are analyzed in isolation, without taking account of other conditions. In concrete terms, it means in this context that if we look at one aspect of the matter, it appears altruistic; but if we isolate another aspect, it can appear to be greed. 11. “Without the ceteris paribus disclaimer, the universality of economic man cannot be claimed; but with the rule, every sort of man and woman is universal” (Brockway 2001, p. 51). 12. Although A. Sen is critical of those who describe the state of things in this way (he also points to a number of ideas along the same lines), he admits that “the assumption of purely self-interested behaviour remains the standard one in economics, providing the behavioural foundation of standard economic theory and policy analysis, and the basis of much of what is taught to students of economics” (Sen 1987, p. 17, n. 12). 13. Sen’s position is one of those criticized in G.P. Brockway’s critique of pluralistic theories of economic motivation: every economic model that lacks one single governing and decisive motive falls victim to contingencies. Brockway finds it difficult to imagine that a person is motivated

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by self-interest on Monday, by altruism on Tuesday, and so on. See Brockway (2001, p. 54). For an evaluation of A. Sen on this point, see also W. Dixon and D. Wilson who claim that Sen expands the neoclassical view here, rather than departing from it (Dixon and Wilson 2012, pp. 84–85). 14. von Hayek (1944, p. 15). This link is in complete accordance with the corresponding link in M. Friedman. See Chapter 5. 15. M.A. Lutz and K. Luz put it as follows: “His [Homo oeconomicus’] scientific credentials may be lacking, his acting may be distasteful, but if we were to fire him much of the elaborately built stage show would collapse, endangering many dedicated and hard-working members of the crew” (Lutz and Lux 1979, p. 73). 16. To the question of anonymization, see also Chapters 7 and 8. 17. This assertion about reductionism is, of course, itself built on ideological presuppositions. It is perfectly possible to envisage an understanding of the human being similar to that of animals, that is to say, primarily as a means for something else and without any absolute intrinsic value. From this perspective, it is not a question of reductionism, since it does not represent a simplification of something higher and more complex. With regard to most views of the human being, however, this is a simplification, and thus a reductionist anthropology. 18.  Other factors too have, of course, promoted egotism in society. The Danish sociologist H. Jensen identifies one factor that is somewhat surprising here: even the Scandinavian welfare state can be an “… incubator for a more egotistic individual, who chose to a larger degree—felt obliged to choose—his own identity and strategy for life, and who no longer found much help in family, local society, and social class” (Jensen 2004, p. 40). 19. A gender-value compass is a multidimensional diagram that is meant to function as an organizational aid to thought. The principal dimensions are positive–negative and masculine–feminine. The horizontal dimension expresses complementarity, the vertical perversion, and the diagonal deficiency. It is meant to guide thought as a compass. Its multidimensional character also represents a broadening in comparison to a more simple dualistic metaphor. See Nelson (1996, pp. 9–13). 20. M.A. Lutz and K. Lux sharply criticize the idea that all altruism is in reality a disguised self-interest. This idea is logically inadequate for two reasons. First, it is a tautology; and second, it cannot explain the phenomenon of gifts, which can just as well be explained on the basis of a reciprocal schema as on the basis of a schema characterized by self-interest. See Lutz and Lux (1979, pp. 80–81).

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21. In general, sociologists will require an action to be altruistically motivated, if it is to be counted as altruistic. Where the starting point is in biology, a different line will be taken: the action can be altruistic per se, even if it is egotistically motivated. In biology, however, the question of altruism and altruistic motives is very complicated. Some hold (at least, if biology is defined rather strictly) that it is scarcely meaningful to speak of altruistic motives in biology. An apparent altruism on the level of motives has a selfish character in the long run, and is part of an egotistic strategy oriented to survival. On this, see Eriksen and Hessen (1999, p. 21). 22. A. Rich emphasizes that even in a situation of perfect competition, the convergence between economic self-interest and common interests is only relative. Rich points out that Adam Smith himself was aware of this limitation when he wrote about the invisible hand and the idea of sympathy. See Rich (1990, p. 185). 23. A sociological presentation of elitism as a phenomenon, with both historical and contemporary illustration, can be found in Elitism by G.L. Field and J. Higley. The concept of the elite and elitism is restricted primarily to persons’ political actions. The persons in question are either middle-aged or older persons who hold especially powerful organizational positions in a very complicated society for a longer or shorter period (Field and Higley 1980, p. 20). On elitism from this sociological and political perspective, see also Hayward (1996). 24. From the Latin merito (in accordance with what one deserves) and the Greek κρατεῖν (to rule). A society with a meritocratic character of this kind is often called an achievement society, a society in which the elite dominate. 25. “The core issue [here related to elementary and secondary schools] is our loss in faith in the right of every individual to fulfill his potential, stretch his talent, and chart his own course” (Henry III 1994, p. 59). 26.  Three examples of such presentations are: Lutz and Lux (1979), Brockway (2001), and Britton and Sedgwick (2003). 27. Within Christian humanism, the human being’s limitation and sinfulness are understood on the basis of concepts such as “distress” and “alienation.” The human being is alienated from his true “I,” from others, and from God. The concept of sin functions to explain human distress and wickedness, and why the world is not as it ought to be, and could be, and as God had envisaged it. The utterly fundamental problem of the human being “… is the pretense to divinity, expressed in one’s turning away from God (unbelief) toward a life centered in self (hubris), and resulting in ambiguity and suffering” (Olson 2002, p. 261, see also pp. 259–261).

286  S. O. THORBJØRNSEN 28. For an introduction to humanist anthropology, also as this often finds expression in the presentation of humanist ethics, see Lamont (1965, pp. 81–115), Olson (2002), Norman (2004, pp. 56–87), and Law (2011, pp. 71–92). 29. Hayek writes that, with such an understanding of competition, “… our activities can be adjusted to each other without coercive or arbitrary intervention of authority. Indeed, one of the main arguments in favor of competition is that it dispenses with the need for ‘conscious social control’ and that it gives the individuals a chance to decide whether the prospects of a particular occupation are sufficient to compensate for the disadvantages and risks connected with it” (von Hayek 1944, p. 36). 30. The liberal dilemma can be formulated as follows: when the liberal principles are made absolute, this can have implications that in practice restrict the individual’s freedom, and in the worst case, end up as absolute illiberality. On the philosophical problems here, see Skjervheim (1968). This is also the dilemma of democracy, which is expressed among others by A. de Tocqueville through his diagnosis of the future of democracy: democracy leads to a desire for an ever greater equality, which ends in a totalitarian mass society (Tocqueville 1994 [1835–1840]). On this, see also F. Hayek (1944), who claims that the logical conclusion of democracy is “serfdom.” 31. M. Cortez gives the following definition of theological anthropology: “… theological anthropology is the area of Christian reflection that seeks to understand the mystery of humanity by reflecting theologically—and, thus, Christologically—on the human person in constant and critical dialogue with the other anthropological disciplines” (Cortez 2010, p. 7). 32. A moderate and globally oriented version of this position is found in Brent Water’s book Just Capitalism (Waters 2016). 33. For a more detailed discussion of human dignity as a concept and as a principle, see Jämterud (2016, pp. 52–61). 34. See http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights (retrieved 18.06.2018). 35. R. Hays has objected, from a Christian point of view, to the idea of an inherent human value. He argues that the idea of the sanctity of life has no basis in the New Testament. In his discussion of abortion, he claims, with reference to the theologian S. Hauerwas, that human life is to be protected, not on the basis of an inherent value of this kind, but because God is the Lord of all life. This is why it is not up to us to take such a life. See Hays (1997, pp. 454–455).

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References Arnsperger, Christian. 1996. Competition, Consumerism and the ‘Other’: A Philosophical Investigation into the Ethics of Economic Competition. Discussion Papers (IRES—Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales 1996014) (19.12.2003). Louvain: Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). http://ideas.repec.org/ p/ctl/louvir/1996014.html (2.7.2018). Atherton, John. 1992. Christianity and the Market: Christian Social Thought for Our Times. London: SPCK. Becker, Gary S. 1976. Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology. Journal of Economic Literature 14: 817–826. Britton, Andrew, and Peter Sedgwick. 2003. Economic Theory and Christian Belief. Bern: Peter Lang. Brockway, George P. 2001. The End of Economic Man: An Introduction to Humanistic Economics. New York; London: W. W. Norton. Coleman, James S. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. Cortez, Marc. 2010. Theological Anthropology: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: T&T Clark. Cottingham, John. 1995. Descartes, René. In The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi, 193–196. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Davies, Tony. 2008. Humanism, 2nd ed. London: Routledge. Dawkins, Richard. 2016 [1976]. The Extended Selfish Gene, 40th anniversary ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dickinson, David L. 2002. A Bargaining Experiment to Motivate Discussions on Fairness. The Journal of Economic Education 33 (2): 136–151. Dixon, William, and David Wilson. 2012. A History of Homo Economicus: The Nature of the Moral in Economic Theory. Routledge Studies in the History of Economics. Abingdon: Routledge. Dunbar, Robin. 2004. The Human Story. London: Faber & Faber. England, Paula. 2002. The Separative Self: Androcentric Bias in Neoclassical Assumptions. In Readings in Economic Sociology, ed. Nicole Woolsley Biggart, 154–167. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, and Dag Hessen. 1999. Egoisme. Oslo: Aschehoug. Eriksson, Ralf. 1997. Essays on the Methodology and Ethics of Economics. Åbo: Åbo akademis förlag. Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gächter. 2000. Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14: 159–181. Field, G. Lowell, and John Higley. 1980. Elitism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

288  S. O. THORBJØRNSEN Fromm, Erich. 1956. The Art of Loving, vol. 9. World Perspectives. New York: Harper & Row. Gushee, David P. 2013. The Sacredness of Human Life: Why an Ancient Biblical Vision Is Key to the World’s Future. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans. Güth, Werner. 1995. On Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments—A Personal Review. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organisation 27: 329–344. Güth, Werner, et al. 1982. An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organisation 3 (4): 367–388. Hays, Richard B. 1997. The Moral Vision of the New Testament: Community, Cross, New Creation: A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics. Edinburgh: T&T Clark. Hayward, Jack. 1996. Élitism, Populism, and European Politics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Henry III, A. William. 1994. In Defense of Elitism. New York: Doubleday. Herms, Eilert. 1999. Elite III Ethisch. In Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Handwörterbuch für Theologie und Religionswissenschaft, 4th ed., ed. Jörg Persch, 1225f. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. Hollis, Martin, and Edward J. Nell. 1975. Rational Economic Man: A Philosophical Critique of Neo-classical Economics. London: Cambridge University Press. Jämterud, Sofia Morberg. 2016. Human Dignity: A Study in Medical Ethics. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet (Diss.). Jensen, Henrik. 2004. Min broders vogter? Om troen på velfærdsstaten. In 13 udfordringer til den danske velfærdsstat, ed. Jørn Henrik Petersen and Klaus Petersen, 29–45. Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag. Kant, Immanuel. 1964 [1785]. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Translated and Analysed by H.J. Paton. Harper Torchbooks. New York: Harper & Row. Lamont, Corliss. 1965. The Philosophy of Humanism, 5th rev. and enl. ed. New York: Ungar. Law, Stephen. 2011. Humanism: A Very Short Introduction, vol. 256. Very Short Introductions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lutz, Mark A., and Kenneth Lux. 1979. The Challenge of Humanistic Economics. Reading, MA: Benjamin Cummings. Løgstrup, Knud Ejler. 1997. The Ethical Demand. Notre Dame, IL: University of Notre Dame Press. Machan, Tibor R. 1998. Egoism, Psychological Egoism and Ethical Egoism. In The Blackwell Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Ethics, ed. Patricia H. Werhane and R. Edward Freeman, 192–195. Oxford: Blackwell. Marshall, Alfred. 2013 [1920]. Principles of Economics, 8th ed. Palgrave Classics in Economics. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Meeks, M. Douglas. 2006. The Economy of Grace: Human Dignity in the Market System. In God and Human Dignity, ed. R. Kendall Soulen and Linda Woodhead, 196–214. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans. Nelson, Julie A. 1996. Feminism, Objectivity and Economics. Economics as Social Theory. London: Routledge. Nelson, Julie A. 1997. Feminism, Ecology and the Philosophy of Economics. Ecological Economics 20: 155–162. Nelson, Julie A. 2006. Economics for Humans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Nelson, Robert H. 1991. Reaching for Heaven on Earth: The Theological Meaning of Economics. Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Norman, Richard. 2004. On Humanism, 1st ed. London: Routledge. Nyborg, Karine. 2000. Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus: Interpretation and Aggregation of Environmental Values. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organisation 42 (16.1.2001). https://ssrn.com/abstract=251375 (3.5.2018). Nyborg, Karine, et al. 2006. Green Consumers and Public Policy: On Socially Contingent Moral Motivation. Resource and Energy Economics 28 (4): 351–366. Nyeng, Frode. 2001. Egoisme: 7 sentrale begrepsmessige skillelinjer. TØH-serien 2001:7. Trondheim: Høgskolen i Sør-Trøndelag, Avdeling for økonomisk-administrativ utdanning. Olson, R. Paul. 2002. Christian Humanism. In Religious Theories of Personality and Psychotherapy: East Meets West, ed. R. Paul Olson, 247–324. New York: Routledge. Pannenberg, Wolfhart. 1985. Anthropology in Theological Perspective. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. Rescher, Nicholas. 1973. The Coherence Theory of Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rich, Arthur. 1990. Marktwirtschaft, Planwirtschaft, Weltwirtschaft aus sozialethischer Sicht. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn. Ridley, Matt. 1996. The Origins of Virtue. London: Viking. Ritchie, Angus, and Nick Spencer. 2014. The Case for Christian Humanism: Why Christians Should Believe in Humanism and Humanists in Christianity. London: Theos. https://www.theosthinktank.co.uk/cmsfiles/archive/files/ Christian%20Humanism%20FINAL%20combined.pdf (23.5.2018). Robbins, Lionel. 1984 [1935]. An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 3rd ed. New York: New York University Press. Sahlins, Marshal. 1988. Stone Age Economics. London: Routledge. Sen, Amartya. 1987. On Ethics and Economics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Singer, Peter. 2011. Practical Ethics. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

290  S. O. THORBJØRNSEN Skjervheim, Hans. 1968. Det liberale dilemma og andre essays, vol. 20. Ide og tanke. Oslo: Tanum. Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1994 [1835–1840]. Democracy in America, vol. 179. Everyman’s Library. London: Campbell. Veblen, Thorstein. 1961 [1919]. The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation and Other Essays. New York: Russel & Russel. Veblen, Thorstein, and Martha Banta. 2007 [1899]. The Theory of the Leisure Class. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. von Hayek, Friedrich A. 1944. The Road to Serfdom. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. von Hayek, Friedrich A. 1948. Individualism and Economic Order. London: University of Chicago Press. von Hayek, Friedrich A. 1960. The Constitution of Liberty. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Waters, Brent. 2016. Just Capitalism: A Christian Ethic of Economic Globalisation. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press. Wogaman, J. Philip. 1977. Christians and the Great Economic Debate. London: SCM Press.

CHAPTER 7

Competition and the Economy: Ethical Perspectives

Ethics and the Economy In today’s situation, there are probably few people who find it difficult to see that there is a relationship between ethics and the economy, and that it is necessary to work on economic questions from an ethical perspective too. Golden parachutes, pension agreements, bribes, and loans granted on very weak premises have all provided reasons for thinking along these lines, as has the debate about the exposure to competition of public services. In economics itself, this has not always been the case. Economic thinking and theory held that the economy followed its own laws, and that it was in fact a question of the relationship between goals and limited means that could be used in various ways. An economist does not say whether or not the goals are valuable: an economist studies facts that can be precisely defined, while an ethicist is concerned with evaluations and obligations.1 The consequence of this separation of ethics and economics was that it was unnecessary to pay special attention to ethics in an economic context. Where the economy and economic theory were shaped by the idea of the maximization of the utility of self-interested individuals, the result was ethically satisfying: the functioning of the economy created the best possible result for the greatest possible number of persons. This way of thinking was typical of the neoclassical theory of equilibrium, given the presuppositions of perfect competition, perfect information, and rational economic actors. A market in equilibrium was

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Pareto optimal with a given distribution of incomes and wealth, and this­ distribution was not problematized. It was irrelevant in this context to pose questions linked to justice and the possibilities of an equal distribution; and thus the ethical problems disappeared. The perfect market was thought of as a kind of ethical-free zone, or else the ethical was subsumed in, and became identical to, the economic (understood in this way). On one end of the scale, therefore, there was a fusion of economics and ethics as a kind of absolutized abstract economics. Typical of the other end was a gulf between ethics and economy, a gulf between an ethical ideal and an ideal of efficiency that was governed exclusively by facts and data, not by values (see Knight 1935, pp. 19–23; Koslowski 1994, pp. 118–119). Such ideas are not foreign in today’s situation, but they face greater challenges, both because of the ethically problematic decisions that many economists are involved in every day, and because the presuppositions on which the idea of the perfect market was built have been problematized. It has been asked whether self-interest is truly the driving force that leads to the greatest gains, since taking other people’s interests into account can also be economically profitable (Frank 1988). Competition is not always almost perfect or complete, among other things because it is not always possible to maintain the precondition that the various actors should have equal information. A varying quantity of information generates varying possibilities for successful and advantageous transactions. Insider trading is an obvious example here. Besides this, the question of fairness is actualized differently, with regard both to the actions of the economic actors and to the distribution of resources.2 A greater awareness of fairness in society influences the mechanisms that were assumed in the past to presuppose a kind of neutrality on questions of distribution. It is therefore the economists themselves, even those who are sympathetic toward neoclassical economic thinking, who are becoming aware of this. For example, Samuel Brittan urges that the debate about ethics among economists must be made more explicit: “The idea of technocratic value-free economics has had its day” (Brittan 1995, p. 50). It is impossible to isolate considerations of value from economic theory: they are present there, both implicitly and explicitly. John Maynard Keynes already emphasized one reason for this in his General Theory: economics is a question of the will (Keynes 1936, p. 150). A founder wants the enterprise that is to be created to continue to exist, and his will determines the guidelines on which it is to be run and the expression that it is

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to take. An enterprise of this kind is not simply a product of nature, nor is it God-given. The guidelines for business activity are not laid down by law, nor are they entirely determined by an economic analysis. In a business enterprise that is so strongly dependent on the human will, it is difficult to affirm that ethics is irrelevant.3 It is on this point that the distinction introduced by Amartya Sen between two different ways of understanding the economy— an ethical and a technical understanding—is actualized (Sen 1987, pp. 2–7). The technical approach takes its primary orientation from a means-and-ends thinking, where economic and business activity is a question of identifying the means that lead to the goal in the best possible way. This way of thinking has a logistic character. It is not a matter of ultimate goals, but of goals that present themselves en route, and of means that help one to attain them. The alternative is an ethical approach, which Sen traces back to Aristotle (cf. Aristotle 1934, pp. 2–16 [I.1–I.5]). Aristotle establishes the link between the economy and more basic human goals, namely, that which is good for the human being. Wealth is not an ultimate goal of this kind; it can be a means en route to the ultimate goal, but not more than that. In this way, Aristotle links economics, ethics, and politics. Ethical considerations become important when one enquires into the motivation for economic activity. Aristotle understood the question of what is good for the human being from a societal and political angle, which made it impossible for him to restrict the good to what was good for the individual. Ethics thus helped to integrate both a fundamental motivating element and a social element into economic thinking. Sen does not see these two ways of understanding the economy as pure alternatives. He does indeed argue strongly that the ethical approach must have a central place in modern economics, since this will have a positive effect on economic activity; but he does not fail to affirm that the technical approach has likewise much to contribute in economic thinking (Sen 1987, pp. 6, 8, 9). In this way, Sen legitimates both an ethical and a more traditional approach to the economic field—as well as the necessity of seeing the two as linked. In today’s situation, it is extremely difficult to exclude an ethical approach. There can be no doubt that ethics is much more important in an economic context today than it was a generation or two ago. One indication of this is the fact that courses on ethics are an integral part of the modern training of economics. I must, however, make two remarks and a comment here.

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First of all, the interest in ethics in economics seems largely to be restricted to various situations of conflict that the economist encounters, and that actualize ethical evaluations. The widespread work on creating ethical codices or basic ethical documents in firms is a deontological variant of this way of thinking about the relationship between economics and ethics; but teleological and virtue ethical perspectives are also integrated and actualized. The focus, however, is identical: How am I to act correctly in the situations in which I find myself? What seems to be lacking—and here comes my second remark—is a consciousness of higher level ethical problems that apply to economic activity as such. We cannot say that this consciousness is totally missing, but reflections on the function and the fundamental challenges and problems that are attached to the economy, as a societal activity, are less thematized, at least among practicing economists. Economic activity, understood as a Western market economy, is taken for granted, and what matters is to practice it in the best possible manner, both professionally and ethically. My comment concerns the present situation with regard to the relationship between economics and ethics. I have already mentioned that the neoclassical theory, in its more modern versions, plays a large role in the world economy. Although this way of thinking, and especially the idea of an almost perfect market and competition, has been criticized for a lack of realism, it is far from dead. It appears to function on the basis of premises that many find problematic and, in fact, non-existent. As I have said, such theories have a tendency to marginalize ethics, either because they see no need for any ethics that goes beyond the idea of maximizing utility and profit, or because it is thought that economics is a question of calculation and mathematics. Although the problematic aspects of such premises for thinking about ethics and economics have been pointed out, something similar happens with the neoclassical economic theory itself: it lives on, unaffected by the objections. This reality can to some extent explain why the interest in ethics, and especially in higher level ethical problems, is more limited than one might expect, and is integrated only to some degree as a topic with some importance, where economic activity is conducted. It is easy for ethics to be seen as an addendum, something in which certain persons are especially interested, while the others try to keep it in the back of their minds as long as this is advisable and useful in their daily work. We seem to be far from a situation in which ethical problems are perceived as something that belongs at the core of what economic activity is.

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Economic Competition and Ethics This reticence makes it even more important to work on ethical questions in an economic context. And here, it is especially the ethical aspect of the idea of competition in economic activity that is to be investigated. The central question is: What ethical argumentation can be presented to justify the legitimacy of the idea of competition in the economy? It is necessary here to draw a distinction between a concrete and a higher level plan. The first problem is highlighted by the following questions: How is one to behave ethically in a concrete situation of economic competition? What consideration should one have for competitors? What relationship should one have to the losers in the competition—or is this problem completely irrelevant? Can absolutely anything be exposed to competition? Second, we have the problem of the ethical legitimacy of the very idea of competition. Is it ethically legitimate to use competition as a means to get hold of the goods and services that society needs? Is the exposure to competition legitimate? Are there alternatives that are less problematic? Can it be ethically acceptable that people compete for goods that all competitors need in order to survive? When we discuss the ethical legitimacy of the idea of competition, it is necessary to distinguish almost perfect from non-perfect competition. I have already pointed out that an almost perfect competition (to the extent that this actually exists) has an inherent incentive to a “fair play” competition. Gary Becker (1971) has claimed that perfect competition eliminates differences in salary that are due to prejudices, but not differences that are related to effort and ability. Those who pay wages on the basis of prejudices will find that the market does not accept the combination of a high salary and low effort, keenness, and efficiency in production. Goods produced under such circumstances are too expensive and are not successful in the market. This is why there is no need for legislation to prohibit paying wages on the basis of prejudice: the market settles the matter. The same is true, however, of competition in a non-perfect market, or in a market in disequilibrium. Here, the one who is strong will be able to exploit the weakness of others. This means that the market does not have the same ethical means of coercion, aiming at some form of fair play in competition. The relationship between ethics and competition has also a very concrete aspect: What is the relationship between the degree of competition and the ethical integrity in the competitive situation? Investigations both

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in the laboratory and in praxis have shown that ethics is influenced by the intensity of a competition. A strong competition entails a greater willingness to accept bribes. Sellers who experience hard competition in their activity have a tendency to say no to demands that they behave ethically (Robertson and Anderson 1993, p. 637; Marnburg 1998, pp. 183, 201). This means that the topic of good ethics is more central for the winners in business life than for the losers. Those who are struggling to assert themselves feel less able to allow ethical guidelines to direct their activity. Measured against how people more generally experience difficult situations under pressure, these results from industrial life are not particularly striking, but they do show two things clearly. There is a link between the degree of competition and the ethical integrity in the actors in the market, and this integrity is especially exposed when the competition is particularly hard and the possibility of losing is overwhelming. This also reflects the fact that there is a greater possibility of violating the ethical integrity of actors in a non-perfect competition than in an almost perfect competitive situation. The relationship between competition and ethics, or the ethics of competition, has also been thematized in a more theoretical and higher level sense. I find an important and interesting approach to these problems in the celebrated articles published by Frank H. Knight in 1922 and 1923 (Knight 1935) and the discussion of them found in Israel M. Kirzner (1994) and Peter Koslowski (1994). Here it is not only the ethics of competition that is actualized, but the entire economic theory on which the idea of competition is based. Frank H. Knight belonged to the so-called Chicago School, and thus to a neoclassical tradition. In this context, he made important contributions, including to the understanding of the concept of competition in the economy. Knight also viewed the model of equilibrium and perfect competition as theoretically helpful for understanding the variations in a competitive market. Despite such concessions to a neoclassical way of thinking marked by competition, Knight took a very critical view of the ethical qualities in this understanding of competition and of the market. His project had a primarily analytical character, related to how ethics functioned or did not function in an economic context, to the presuppositions on which the competitive economy was built, and to the realism in these presuppositions. Knight makes three principal critical points in relation to a market economy marked by competition. First, he asserts that an economy marked by individualism and competition is unable to

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create an ideal use of social resources (Knight 1935, pp. 47–58). The human being is not as individualistic, socially independent, rational, and knowledgeable in regard to the market as this kind of economic theory supposes. Nor is the theory capable of establishing a helpful balance between the satisfaction of one’s own wishes now and future social needs. Above all, however, the theory lacks an ethical perspective on distribution that goes beyond the mere idea of earnings. Distribution takes place on the basis of productivity and does not sufficiently take into account the importance and integrity of the human being. A competitive system, understood as a mechanism marked by wishes and satisfaction, “… falls far short of our highest ideals” (Knight 1935, p. 57). It is the price of the goods that is to determine, in terms of value, the use of resources in production, and this is particularly problematic. Second, he asks, from an ethical perspective, what kind of game or competition economic activity actually is. He observes that “… the motive of business is to a large extent that of emulation as such” (Knight 1935, p. 46). It is when one begins to look into the motives linked to production (understood as an activity), rather than into the motives linked to the product itself that is produced, that the element of competition and game is actualized in economic activity too. Knight sees a link between much of the driving force in economic life and the establishing and maintaining of an interesting game. The game is, of course, interesting primarily for those who are in charge; its results are the fruit of the monotonous slave labor of the masses. In this game, power and prestige are the goal: equality as an ideal is completely out of place here, as is generally the case in competitive games. In relation to games in general, the economic goal also cuts a poor figure, because the results are a very imprecise measure of abilities, and the element of luck is much more important than abilities and efforts. Nor is there any allocation of handicaps in order to preserve the ideal of a good sporting spirit. Where handicaps do enter the picture, they are allocated to the advantage of the strong, not of the weak. Knight holds that, measured against universal ethical ideals (like equality), and in view of ethical ideals that are linked to games and competition (like good sporting spirit), it is difficult for economic competition and the economic game to stand their ground (Knight 1935, pp. 61, 64–65). Knight’s third point (Knight 1935, pp. 66–75) concerns the ethics of competition as such: Does competition, as a motive, possess a high ethical quality? Is success in a competition a noble goal? Knight affirms

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that it is probably the case that the introduction of competition into the economy has contributed more to efficiency than to utility. Behind efficiency—and competition—lie hidden the workers who long for their working hours to finish. Utility is reserved for those who see economic competition also as a fascinating sport. Efficiency likewise includes an aspect of power. The power in economic competition can be discerned in the way in which the human being has subordinated himself to the powers of nature and created the material progress that characterizes the modern period. Knight holds that it is primarily from such a perspective of power that one can legitimate both economic competition and a view of life in general that is more strongly marked by competition. A potential justification thus depends on a willingness to accept an ethics of power as the basis of the view of life that one takes. Is this the only possibility, or does there exist a legitimation with reference to another reality and another ethical ideal, something that goes beyond the fatalism of science’s philosophy of life and its understanding of ethics as a question of power (scientific naturalism)? Knight finds this neither in hedonism nor utilitarianism: competition cannot be justified by saying that it leads to increased activity. Such an observation cannot be isolated from what happens, and from the motivation for what happens. Nor does a Greek or a Christian variant of ethical eudemonism help, according to Knight. Although they are very different, the Greek with its emphasis on the aesthetical and the beautiful, the Christian with its emphasis on the spiritual, both come into conflict with the idea of competition. In Greek thought, the good is to be chosen for its own sake, not because others do it or because one can gain advantage by doing it. Ethics is about distinguishing true values from false, not about predicting changes and accommodating means to goals. Christian ethics is largely determined by the conscience, by doing what one believes to be right. Both these ethical ideals differ from more economic, scientific, pragmatic, or efficiency-oriented ideals, which are quantitative ideals, while the former are qualitative. Knight concludes that it is impossible to discover an ethical basis for competition, understood as a good relation between people and as a legitimate motivation for conduct. Despite this conclusion, however, he is obliged to admit that the scientific and economic ideals of competition and efficiency have the dominant position. The other ideals seem not to be strong enough to take up the struggle against science and economics (Knight 1935, p. 74).

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This attack on the competitive economy by one who stood in precisely this tradition became a kind of classic that is often cited. One of those who have discussed Knight’s opinions recently is Israel M. Kirzner, who likewise makes three main points. First, the object of Knight’s criticism, the perfect economic competition, does not exist in the real world, although this is where most thinkers take their starting point (Kirzner 1994, pp. 101–103). Knight’s critique of the competitive economy is directed to problematic aspects of a hypothetically envisaged world that is characterized by perfect competition, and this means that his critique lacks validity. It does not affect the idea of economic competition in general, but only the idea that builds on the model of equilibrium and perfect competition. Knight’s picture of the nature of competition and of its function in the market economy is, quite simply, lopsided (Kirzner 1994, pp. 107–110; cf. Kirzner 1991, pp. 141–143). This also applies to Knight’s criticism of the unsatisfactory perspective on distribution in an economy characterized by perfect competition (Kirzner 1994, p. 111). Kirzner’s second main point underlines the completely decisive significance of the idea of competition in an economic context. A market economy process in which the idea of competition does not play an important role is unthinkable. Competition is a perfectly natural trait of the capitalism that functions in the real world (Kirzner 1994, p. 103).4 The third main point seeks to show how an alternative idea of competition, based on entrepreneurial thinking, is the only realistic and ethically legitimate alternative to an unrealistic idea of perfect competition. Kirzner thinks about competition in a much more processual manner than Knight. The economy is governed by forces linked to entrepreneurs, and competition “is […] to be understood as exemplifying these dynamic, entrepreneurial forces …” (Kirzner 1994, p. 103). Competition means continually discovering new possibilities of profit. The perspective is open: it is not restricted to one given set of data, as in an economy influenced by the theory of an almost perfect competition. A dynamic competition of this kind widens the field of what is known, continually supplies new knowledge about where the most profitable possibilities lie, and continually inspires one to make new discoveries that broaden knowledge. The discoveries concern new goods, new methods of production, and new raw materials, as well as needs and wishes that one thinks it could be worthwhile and interesting to satisfy. In a market, this means inspiring people to make discoveries that can identify and clarify potential possibilities. A market that functions well is one

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that stimulates people to make discoveries that can give mutual profit for the actors in the market. In this way, the discoveries have a coordinating function, and the possibilities in the market are not limited only to achieving an efficient allocation of social resources. Kirzner claims that it is not possible for an ethical legitimation of a market system to be based on this allocative function. The ethical legitimation must be drawn from the coordinating function that provides mutual and maximal profit for the actors in the market (Kirzner 1994, pp. 105–106). In this processual thinking about the market, there is no direct antithesis between competition and a monopoly, as is the case in the framework of a market characterized by the idea of equilibrium and perfect competition. This is connected to the understanding of competition as something universal in an economic market process. Since the very definition of a market process includes the existence of competition, this must also be true of a market situation that includes monopolies. In a monopolized market, the competitive process contributes to the knowledge that one has arrived at an equilibrium characterized by a monopoly (Kirzner 1991, pp. 140, 146–148). Another voice in this ethical evaluation of a competitive economy is that of Peter Koslowski (1994), who supports both Kirzner’s critique of the theory of equilibrium and the importance of the idea of the entrepreneur. The uncertainty that attaches to all human action must mean that action in a market is to be directed toward the identification and reduction of uncertainty. There is, however, a very fundamental problem about this way of relating to the market, ethically speaking: Under what competitive conditions does the market process function best, or worst? Koslowski holds that Kirzner’s theory lacks the ability to say “no,” and that this can explain something of the success of the model of equilibrium, which can say when something is not in equilibrium, and can also say something about degrees of disequilibrium. There is a radical subjectivity inherent in Kirzner’s theory that implies that economics, as a theory of action, includes ethical motives as one set of subjective motives, but only as one set among many. In one sense, ethics is not assigned any coordinating function in the market. Koslowski praises Knight for his emphasis on the dangers that are inherent both in letting ethics be absorbed into economics and in operating with an excessive distance between ethics and economics. But Kirzner has a tendency to regard both ethics and factual preferences as subjective, and to identify them on this basis. This means that the ethical dimension disappears as

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something special, and as something that is higher than the purely subjective preferences, in Kirzner’s theory. This is problematic in competitive economics. The universalism of competition in the market does not correspond to a similar ethical universalism in the evaluation of the function of competition. These three approaches to higher level ethical problems linked to economic competition help to identify problems and also offer a starting point for the discussion of possible solutions. The following problems seem to be particularly central: the ability of competition to distribute, the consequences of competition (especially for those who are not winners), the ethical legitimacy of competition’s ideal of efficiency and power, the ethical significance of the form of competition that one encounters, and the possibility of establishing ethical criteria for a good and a bad competition. We have already touched on some of these problems. Others can be identified more precisely and studied in greater depth if we consider the question of economic competition in light of the traditional models or approaches in ethical thinking and argumentation. I will now turn to these.

A Naturalistic (Ontological) Perspective on Economic Competition Many people in the Western world today find that there is scarcely any alternative to a market economy characterized by economic competition. One may have one’s objections, but these are weighed and found wanting when compared with the profits from economic competition, especially in relation to the selection of goods, low prices, improved quality, etc. At the very least, this is seen as the best of all possible systems. In a social system like ours, people’s destinies are bound together and anchored in certain shared presuppositions, such as the economic system in society and the principle of economic competition. Many will hold that the entire societal system is called into question if these presuppositions are challenged. The possibility that this might happen creates a kind of unconditional acceptance of the status quo, roughly in the same way that the weather or other natural phenomena demand acceptance. This attitude is fundamentally conservative. However, an ethical legitimation of the status quo demands something more than this. Christian Arnsperger (1996, p. 4) presents and

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evaluates the kind of argumentation that is meant to legitimate the idea of competition in the economy. He asks whether the “market economy status quo” truly reflects ethical imperatives that are given in nature or have an ontological character. Is the market economy, with its competitive principle, an expression of genuine natural realities? And are these realities consequently also a pattern for the creation of an optimal society? If this is to be an ethical argumentation, there must be a connection between the ontological and the normative. In other words, the ontological must lead to normative guidelines; and this in turn presupposes that it is genuinely possible to identify the ontological, so that it can function normatively. Arnsperger holds that this almost Stoic inference from that which is to that which must be accepted is a very fundamental aspect of the ethical legitimation of competition in the economy.5 Competition is something natural, something around which the entire societal system is built. This is why it must be accepted, and this is why it is also right. Arnsperger also claims that there is an ontological basis to what look like teleological and deontological arguments for the positive function of competition in society (Arnsperger 1996, pp. 5–7). The teleological argument runs as follows: The goal of society is to maximize total prosperity, and a capitalism oriented to competition is the best way to create such a maximization. The deontological argument runs: The goal of society is to maximize the work or the effort put in by its members, and a capitalism oriented to competition is the best way to achieve this maximization of work and commitment, among other things because of the fear, in a competitive situation, of losing positions, jobs, and advantages. These arguments may at first sight appear to be very different from the direct ontological argument, and the teleological argument is also used to a far greater extent to defend economic competition from an ethical point of view. In reality, however, these arguments too have an ontological character: both the teleological and the deontological arguments presuppose the ontological, in the sense that the best way to achieve maximization is best because it reflects how things are. To maximize prosperity and human commitment is good, but this goodness has an ontological foundation that is based on the special ontological postulates of the economy. The three arguments for the ethical legitimacy of competition belong together. Economic competition is an instrument for the maximization of commitment. This commitment is good for society as a whole, and that which is good for society as a whole is to act in accord

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with its ontological presuppositions—that is to say, in the way that economists believe human beings act. In this way, competition is given an ontological justification: the best thing for people is to have a competition, because it gives them the opportunity to act naturally. This kind of ethical argumentation from an is to an ought is much disputed. Modern moral philosophy is challenged in this field by sociobiology with its ambition to explain all social behavior on the basis of genetic, not societal, presuppositions. The key word here is behavioral genetics and its development in the biologization of ethics by Edward O. Wilson, the father of sociobiology (Wilson 1975, p. 562; cf. Baxter 2007). In one way, this principle involves the autonomy of ethics: To what extent can moral inferences be drawn from non-moral premises? Naturalistic ethics’ pretension to truth is, however, dependent on the validity of such an inference from what “is” to what “ought to be.” David Hume was the first to point out the problematic aspects of this kind of inference. According to Richard M. Hare (1993), Hume’s concern is to ensure that moral conclusions cannot be drawn from nonmoral premises, since moral judgments are utterly and fundamentally different from claims about factual reality. Moral judgments do not describe how the world is, but how it ought to be. The inference from an “is” to an “ought” is often called the naturalistic fallacy. The English moral philosopher George E. Moore defines this as a confusion of the quality of goodness with things that possess this quality, or with other qualities that good things possess. Moore’s decisive point is thus that good is a non-natural quality to which one must relate differently than to what is natural (Moore 2004 [1903]; cf. MacIntyre 1998, pp. 249–253). Another potentially problematic aspect of this argumentation has a much more modest philosophical basis. A society and its economic life are related to, and based on, human behavior. In this sense, people in a society can influence the function of the economy, which is not immutably given once and for all. It can scarcely be said that a society is abandoned to the principle of competition as its fate. And Arnsperger maintains that there is no special weight in the argument that economic conflict, understood as economic competition, is a kind of sublimated version of armed conflict (Arnsperger 1996, p. 5). This argument is sometimes adduced in defense of economic competition, claiming that it is a means that the human being has invented in order to avoid bloody warfare. The problem with both this argument and other “ontological” arguments that are intended to provide an ethical legitimation for

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economic competition is their lack of an ontological status. Things are not as they are supposed to be. Things can change. As a matter of sheer fact, the human being is not abandoned to competition. On the basis of his own presuppositions and will, he can choose other strategies and arrangements for the economy in society. A naturalistic or ontological legitimation of the idea of economic competition thus seems difficult to justify.

A Teleological Perspective on Economic Competition Teleological arguments have played a great role in the ethical justification of the idea of competition in economic activity. One important factor is that both the classical and the neoclassical theoretical perspectives in economics belong to a utilitarian tradition. The focus has been on results and goals, and on the actions and means that could help to realize the goals one has set. In this context, the ideas of competition and equilibrium have been seen as useful means for the realization of both utility for the consumer and profit on the side of the seller and producer. Many have regarded an economic activity that made use of these means as the chief presupposition of industrialization and the development of prosperity that has characterized those countries that have allowed their economies to be governed by such presuppositions. The result of the alternative has been seen in the failure of the planned economy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. A teleological argumentation for the ethical legitimacy of the idea of competition thus involves the evaluation of results and goals on both a higher level and a more practical and concrete level. The results and goals that form part of such a teleological justification are numerous. Several of these have been presented and evaluated earlier (Chapter 5), but a brief list can be appropriate here too. The first issue is competition’s function in allocating resources. It helps to get hold of resources that are necessary for society and for individual human beings. It creates social prosperity. Some hold that it also creates an ethically acceptable distribution of this prosperity. This characteristic of competition can be squandered if one attempts to carry out distribution by means of external interventions. Milton Friedman (cf. Chapter 5) was one of those who thought along these lines.6 Second, it is a question of the more direct gains in price and value that competition provides, especially on the consumer’s side. Third, competition has

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positive effects in the form of quality and reliability. Fourth, competition increases efficiency, both on the level of the firm and on the level of the individual. Fifth, competition can have a sublimating function: conflicts, and even war in one or another form, can be avoided through competition’s sublimation of a potential for conflict. A sixth argument is of a completely different kind, and has a teleological character, in the sense that what gives competition an ethical value is the fact that the creation of material values grows. This argument is different because it is not competition, but ethics, that functions as a means. It has been shown that when a firm emphasizes ethical norms and attitudes, this can have a positive effect in the form of an enhanced competitive ability (Williamson 1985, p. 170). Ethical vigilance and good ethical attitudes are an advantage actualized in competition. In this way, competition too is legitimated indirectly. Where it goes hand in hand with ethics, it helps to realize desirable ethical goals. These teleological arguments for the legitimacy of the idea of competition are not undisputed. I have already mentioned several criticisms of their problematic aspects, both on a higher and on a more concrete level. It is, for example, far from certain that the argument about efficiency can bear the weight that the supporters of free market competition ascribe to it. In many contexts, collaboration, as an alternative to competition, has proved just as efficient, not least in the long term. The same limitations apply to the alleged ability of competition to ensure social distribution. Many of the other arguments have also been assessed above, but there is good reason to give some of them a special mention here. The first concerns the problem of pragmatism, which is expressed in the old slogan (often attributed to the Jesuit tradition), that “the end justifies the means.” The competition is the means; the “end” can be very various, but profit, prosperity, and utility are its most important expressions. The justification of the means seems seldom to have happened in a dishonest manner, by deliberately refusing something; more commonly, it was due to a failure to ask too many questions about the means. Competition is not regarded here as an action that demands a separate ethical evaluation (and hence in a more deontological sense). People have let themselves be blinded by the positive results and aims and have allowed their “justness” to apply also to the ethical evaluation of the means. Second, the use of teleological arguments by the competitive economy has a tendency to get stuck in Jeremy Bentham’s identification of

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the good and the pleasant. This is a very obvious move in an ­economic setting, and the ethical quality of competition is linked in such a utilitarian perspective to its ability to realize values of material enjoyment; it is easy for a hedonistic perspective to become dominant, so that one loses the critical perspective that opens up where one glimpses the possibility that the good is not necessarily to be identified with the pleasant. Third, there is an ethical reverse side to the gains in efficiency. There are negative effects on one’s health, and it is difficult to overlook these in an ethical evaluation of the competitive economy (Chapter 3). There are many examples here. Norwegian oil workers who experience restructuring, downsizing, and sackings are at greater risk of accidents. The focus on cost cutting and increased efficiency, and the fear of losing one’s job, keep the tempo at work high, while the many different tasks make it difficult to concentrate on each individual task.7 The demands for efficiency and speedy deliveries of fresh goods across national borders have forced drivers to break regulations about times of rest—with potential consequences for safety and for the health of drivers in general. One big challenge in the Norwegian context is competition with Eastern European companies, who are not bound by the same regulatory prescriptions as Norwegian firms. The link between the exposure of services to competition and increased absence due to illness is a part of the same picture. Fourth, it has been asked whether there may be a link between competition and corruption. Mark A. Lutz and Kenneth Lux maintain that one characteristic trait of a free market economy is that people are enticed, not coerced, to act (Lutz and Lux 1979, pp. 120–122). In some cases, it can be difficult to distinguish such enticements from something for which we use a different word, namely, bribes. Both “bait” and bribes involve incentives that, in relation to money, represent possibilities of personal enrichment. The means form part of a structure of teleological arguments. In a market that is free in principle, and where one is free to purchase whatever one wants, coercion is replaced by various forms of bait or bribes. As Lutz and Lux write, it is expected that good and keen competition will lead to lower costs and lower prices— and higher profit—but one finds it unproblematic to accept, precisely in such a situation, that one must attempt to prevent the introduction of restrictive legislation, and that one must make friends among members of government and legislators. There may in principle be a distinction in

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a competitive situation between a material incentive, a bait, and a bribe— the last-named benefits only two parties, while the first-named can benefit the whole of society—but the difference is not so great. We are also justified in asking whether a market that is oriented toward the attainment of results draws a sufficient distinction between acceptable material incentives and immoral bribes. Fifth, many see a problematic link between economic competition and economic growth, on the one hand, and the ecological and environmental consequences of growth, on the other (Daly and Farley 2011; Common and Stagl 2005). The dynamic character of competition presupposes a continuous expansion and differentiation with regard to the goods and services that are on offer. This creates economic growth and a continually expanding use of resources. Sixth, and finally, competition also has an effect on interpersonal relationships. A competitive situation is characterized by rivalry, and one aspect of this rivalry is the attempt to identify weaknesses in one’s opponent, in order to exploit them. This has consequences for the relationships between people. The same is true when rivalry has an impact on the possibilities of getting work. Competition means that some firms win, and this in turn means that jobs become insecure; in many cases, jobs are lost. And this has consequences for people’s self-image and self-respect, for societal relationships, and for relationships within families and groups of friends. Where a job is not lost, continuing to work for a firm can mean that one must work more hours than is considered healthy—in terms of both personal health and the health of one’s family. Competitive situations of this kind lead to many bitter experiences and a large number of broken homes. An ethical evaluation is often a weighing up between advantages and disadvantages. It is difficult to weigh up the various goals and consequences of economic competition. One difficulty is linked to the ambiguity of competition, and a special difficulty is the existence of a conflict on this point: the conflict between the consequences in terms of prosperity that we take for granted, on the one hand, and the consequences that this piling up of prosperity and the unrelenting pressure of competition have for the losers, either locally or in a larger global context, on the other hand. It is difficult to pronounce an ethical judgment about the competitive economy on the basis of teleological evaluations taken in isolation.

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A Deontological Perspective on Economic Competition In a deontological ethical approach, the focus is on the action itself. An action is legitimated as ethically correct when its qualities correspond to actions that one regards as correct and that are good in themselves, independent of whether they promote good goals and consequences. In relation to the slogan that the end justifies the means, here it is the means or the action itself, not the end, that is at the center and is evaluated ethically. In view of the theme of this book, therefore, the central question is whether economic competition, as an action or procedure, possesses ethical legitimacy. A deontological evaluation of economic competition has almost moved into the background, not least because of the importance that teleological and utilitarian thinking has had for the understanding, evaluation, and legitimation of the economic activity that is dominant in our Western context. In the encounter with deontological thinking, certain aspects of economic competition are particularly actualized. First of all, there is the question of rights: Does the enactment of economic competition, as an activity or action, take care of and respect fundamental human rights, such as freedom and human integrity? Second, there is the question of justice: Can economic competition, as an action, be said to be a just action? I will come back immediately to the questions of rights and justice as aspects of a deontological ethical evaluation of economic competition. But first, I shall ask whether there are other aspects of the action or activity of economic competition that demand to be evaluated deontologically. One characteristic of economic competition is that it helps people to exert themselves to the utmost, and this promotes qualities such as commitment and quality. These are regarded as goods: not only as goods that are meant to serve something else, something higher, but as goods in their own right. Since it is the element of competition in the economy that creates such a maximum commitment, it may seem that the competitive economy is given an ethical legitimation in this way too (see Arnsperger 1996, p. 6). Another deontological aspect of the idea of competition arises from the link between deontological ethics and rules for conduct. Deontological ethics is largely an ethics of rules. The idea is that the

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competitive economy is legitimated if the competition takes place in forms that correspond to rules that either reflect legal boundaries or have a more generally accepted character; examples of the latter are honesty and other more general ethical qualities. It is above all the so-called stockholder theory that has insisted on emphasizing the importance of such ethical boundary lines.8 Competition and Human Rights The link between deontological thinking and human rights is old. In modern times, it found an especial political expression in the American War of Independence and in the French Revolution. In philosophy, the deontological concern was particularly important to Immanuel Kant. What rights are we talking about in economic competition? If we take our starting point in the three rights of the French Revolution, equality and freedom are actualized. Fraternity, which points in the direction of collaboration rather than of competition, is more at home in other traditions of economic theory. The right to equality accompanies the idea of competition in economics. On the one hand, this means that all the participants in the competition are to have equal freedoms; on the other hand, it means that they are to have equal possibilities.9 In an economic competition, equality concerns primarily the presuppositions of the competition, not so much its results. As I have said above, the picture is very varied when we ask about equal results. The limited possibilities of equality in this field depend both on the actor and on the form of competition that are involved. In reality, such a goal also contradicts the idea of rivalry and of a winner and a loser that is present in every form of competition. Here, the goal is not equality, but the identification of differences. Freedom is also a right that is linked to the fundamental presuppositions in competition. The individual has the freedom to choose, whether he is a buyer or seller. In a competitive economy, this is because it is the individual (whether a person or a firm) who unquestionably has the best knowledge of his/its own needs and desires, as well as knowledge about accessible ways of satisfying these. The individual also has freedom to think about himself and to act on the basis of what he thinks to be best for him. In this sense, many would hold that a market economic thinking satisfies a fundamental principle of autonomy that corresponds to a deontological ethical thinking.

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Christian Arnsperger does not find it problematic that freedom is important in the framework of market economic thinking, but he finds that the freedom that is spoken of in this context is in reality a bound freedom. This is not a boundness that implies that the “free” choice is steered by self-interest. This boundness is the result of the fact that “[c]ompetition by its very constitution generates a negation of individual exteriority” (Arnsperger 1996, p. 13, his italics; cf. Chapter 8). Competition’s tendency to anonymize the actors conceals and denies the human being’s individual self and status as a person. The result is that persons exist only as exchangeable entities. Arnsperger finds it difficult, within these parameters, to maintain the idea of personal freedom and to have a personal and existentially anchored relationship to other people. The link to the totality that is represented by the competitive economy itself blocks the path both to real freedom and to a genuine relationship to other people. We find a similar criticism in Amartya Sen, but from a somewhat different angle. The problem is that the rights that are actualized in an economic context, in relation to absolutely fundamental economic realities, take on an instrumental function. In the utilitarian tradition, but also in welfare economics with its lack of interest in more complex ethical theories, rights are regarded as means for obtaining other goods, especially utility. Sen writes: “No intrinsic importance is attached to the existence of fulfilment of rights, and they have been judged by their ability to achieve good consequences” (Sen 1987, p. 49, cf. p. 71). For Sen, freedom is a fundamental right that possesses a value so great that it cannot be integrated into any context or be a means to obtain something else. It has an intrinsic value that a competitive economy influenced by utilitarianism finds hard to attribute to it. However, Sen’s own solution is not to abandon utilitarian lines of thought and make the complete transition to a deontological way of thinking about rights, but to attempt to combine the deontological and the utilitarian (Sen 1987, pp. 60, 74–78).10 One example of this conflict between a teleological and a deontological approach is the question of the sale of human organs on “The red market” (Carney 2011). From a teleological point of view, this can be profitable: those who sell their organs earn money. For poor persons, this can mean the possibility of paying back their debts, even if the gain in prosperity often turns out to be limited, and the consequences for their health are also negative. Those who receive such organs also benefit: in many cases, it is a matter of life or death. But is it right that wares of

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this kind should take their place in a market economic context and be submitted to competition’s allocative function? It is precisely the question of allocation that can be important here. Would the organ have been acquired in the first place, if there was not an extreme demand (in view of saving a human life) that made some people willing to pay large sums for the limited supply that existed? The alternative to buying and selling is donation, either from close family members or from persons who are victims of accidents or are incurably sick, in situations where it is impossible to save the donor’s life; most people believe that this is legitimate. This definitely has positive benefits for the recipient and a limited risk for the donor. Why, then, is it more problematic when such vital organs are acquired in a context of economic competition? 70% of the members of the American Economic Association support trade in organs, and only 16% are opposed to this (Whaples 2009). One can mention some problematic teleological aspects of such a praxis. Altruism and the sense of fellowship are marginalized; personal and professional freedom are reduced; the relationship between patient and doctor can suffer; and vital areas of medicine are exposed to the laws of the economy. For many people, a deontological understanding of rights is decisive here: they reject this trade as a form of sacrilege. To make human organs a ware in a competitive market violates the dignity of the human person and is intrinsically wrong. The idea of bodily autonomy (the ability to choose how one’s body is to be treated by others) amounts to treating the body as a piece of property, without bearing in mind that body and personality are a unity. To sell a part of one’s body is to sell a part of oneself, of one’s personality, and is thus a violation of human dignity. This kind of argumentation often has a religious basis (Stempsey 2000). But a reference to human dignity has also been seen as problematic, since decisions linked to one’s body confirm this dignity via the feeling of control and authority (Territo 2011). The question of trading in human organs exemplifies the relationship between teleological and deontological aspects of the competitive economy. Some writers emphasize the positive teleological aspects, in keeping with the principal trend in economic thinking, while others find the impersonal and self-interested manner of behavior that is characteristic of the market to be inappropriate. Money and the competitive situation destroy relationships between human beings—and this happens here in an area that touches that which is most deeply and truly human. It is reasonable to hold that for such thinkers, a deontological evaluation of

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the competitive economy will have the greatest weight, not only on this question, but also more generally. We find similar problems, albeit not pressed to such extremes, where the following questions are asked: Ought doctors and teachers to find motivation for their professional work in the possibility of private earnings? Ought hospitals to be private health companies? Ought the prison service to be partly privatized? It would be incorrect to say that such problems lack all contemporary relevance. The choice is a question, not so much of efficiency and saving money, as of whether a competitive economic market system is the best suited to allocate the resources that are needed in order to carry out such functions. Competition and Justice The idea of justice has a long history, going back to Aristotle and to the prophetic tradition in the Old Testament, where wrongdoing and injustice are strongly condemned. Justice is perhaps the most important norm in political ethics, and this is how it also enters into the ethical discussion of economic theory. The concept of justice is meaningful in a virtue ethical, a teleological, and a deontological context; in the latter case, laws and regulations are emphasized. One shared aspect is the definition of justice as a relational concept. It is meaningful to talk about justice only when it is related to the others. Justice is related both to individuals and to the individual’s relationship to society. In both cases, there are important elements of reciprocity. Justice is not a neutral concept but contains a normative element. The relationships to which justice is linked have a normative character. Justice requires just actors (the virtue ethical), actions that promote justice, and rules and principles that are just (the teleological and the deontological). There are two principle types of justice, the procedural and the distributive. The question of economic competition can be evaluated in relation to both these types: How is a just competition to be defined ethically, with reference both to the action itself and to its distributive function? With regard to the action, this concerns the justness in the course of the action itself; with regard to distribution, this concerns the function of competition in a just distribution of burdens and advantages. With his 1971 book (Rawls 1971, cf. Rawls 1999 [revised ed.]) and another book on the same topic (Rawls 1993), John Rawls has played a central role in modern thinking about justice. Although Rawls himself

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comes from the utilitarian tradition, he attempts to demonstrate from a Kantian perspective how the principles for correct action—at least, as far as justice is concerned—can be justified independently of how many goods the just action is able to bring about. Rawls believes that his view is much more capable than the utilitarian position of integrating into itself a commonsense conviction that the just takes priority over the good. Rawls has also contributed to a wider view of how justice can be realized. It is not only up to individuals to take a position on this realization: this is also a question of a kind of social contract among autonomous citizens in a society with regard to organizing societal institutions in such a way that society can function in a just manner. In this sense, Rawls combines a Hegelian concern (where priority is given to society) and a Kantian concern (where priority is given to the idea of autonomy). Rawls’ project seeks to identify principles that promote what he calls justice as fairness for rational, impartial, and autonomous individuals (Rawls 1999, pp. 10–15). He argues that, under certain conditions, free agents or actors will arrive at two important principles for conduct, which satisfy the demands of being goal-oriented, general, and public. The condition is that they are in what Rawls calls an original position, where they are cloaked in a veil of ignorance (Rawls 1999, pp. 118–123, cf. pp. 102–105). This veil prevents them from taking into account the context and their societal situation. These are the two principles, ranked in a lexical order: 1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they both are: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b)  attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (Rawls 1999, p. 266, cf. pp. 266–267). This gives Rawls a starting point for defining fair actions and a reasonable understanding of justice. These principles reflect the fact that one major issue in the discussion is: What inequalities could be accepted, and under what conditions? They also reflect the fact that freedoms have a

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special position as societal goods. These freedoms must be as large as possible, and everyone must have the same freedoms. In this sense, one can also say that Rawls is concerned about rights: the rights to freedom and equality. The ranking of these principles means that one can deviate from the first principle or demand only if this creates greater freedoms also for those who are worst off. One can also deviate from 2(b) if this creates advantages for those who are worst off. These principles also have points of contact to the question of what is an ethically legitimate competition. This question arises in “the original situation,” independently of whether one is a producer, consumer, public official, winner, or loser in the competition. From the procedural perspective, this is related to more general moral principles that must be followed, such as keeping promises, not being malicious, and respecting persons and property. Competitors who break promises, bring harm to others, exploit others, and destroy property are acting unethically and violating the principles of justice. This question is also related to the implicit morality or moral presuppositions of the market. A perfect competitive market is meant to offer perfect information; the consumer is to be in charge, there is to be price competition, and no one is to be prevented from entering the market. It is difficult to see how competitive circumstances characterized by false or incorrect advertising, price fixing, bribes, and market barriers could be compatible with a just or fair competition (see Freeman and Gilbert 1988, pp. 55–57, 112–117). What, then, about the distributive aspect? John Rawls himself maintains that it is very important in an economic context to draw a distinction between the allocative and distributive functions of prices (Rawls 1999, p. 241). The allocative function concerns the efficiency of the economy, and the distributive function concerns the definition of income or profit that individuals receive in return for what they have contributed. The distributive element thus reflects a distributive principle in which effort and earnings are governing factors. This is an important distributive principle in a competitive economy in which prices and the relationship between supply and demand play an important role. With a utilitarian starting point, the individual’s wish to maximize his own income or profit on the basis of his effort—and of his self-interest—also becomes a principle on the social economic level. The principle of utility means precisely that a society functions in a good and just manner when its institutions maximize a net balance of satisfaction. The best choices for the group are deduced from what are the

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best choices for individuals. Rawls claims (Rawls 1999, pp. 21–23) that one important reason why utilitarianism has won so many adherents on this point is its interpretation of the relationship between the good and the just: the good is defined differently from the just, and then the just is defined as that which maximizes the good. This theory has a considerable rational appeal because it is natural (and for some people, a matter of course) to think that rationality means maximizing something: in morality and ethics, this means maximizing the good. Given utilitarianism’s understanding of the relationship between the good and the just, the only criterion of distribution will be that the best distribution is that which maximizes the good; and this is understood as a just distribution. Rawls holds that this starting point completely determines utilitarianism’s understanding of justice. Against this background, we may now ask how a competitive economy can contribute to a just distribution of allocated resources. The utilitarian identification of the just, as the maximization of the good, means there is a correct and just distribution of the good in the competitive economy. This is connected to matters on which I have touched above (e.g. Chapter 5): the paradigm of the competitive economy is sketched on the basis of a model of almost perfect competition, in which the idea of equilibrium supplies elements that point in the direction of a distribution on the basis of equality. This, however, is an ideal situation. In reality, things function differently, and the gap between losers and winners must be envisaged on other presuppositions. It is primarily on the basis of this non-perfect competitive situation that we must evaluate the distributive qualities of the competitive economy. If we look at the competitive economy in relation to Rawls’ original position, and to his understanding of justice as fairness, the result can only be negative. There is a particular conflict with criterion 2. Under certain conditions, the social and economic inequalities that result from the fact that some win in the competition, while some lose, can be accepted. But are these conditions met? Where are the advantages for those who are least privileged? In principle, it is conceivable that the winners could have compensated the losers for their loss, and still have profited. In this way, the losers too could benefit, and a certain equality could be accepted. The reality in a competitive economy is that this does not happen. Justice, understood as fairness, seems incompatible with the kind of competitive economy that we find in the Western, neoclassical version.

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According to Andrew Britton and Peter Sedgwick, “No one has ever claimed that a competitive market will produce an optimal distribution of income” (Britton and Sedgwick 2003, p. 204). A desire for alternatives demands other instruments. In practice, this means an economic policy with a different distributive function on the basis of other criteria. The self-regulatory function of the market must then be corrected by state interventions, in order to create fairness more directly. The competitive economy seems largely to be tied to, and entangled in, utilitarianism’s understanding of distribution and of the necessary criteria. Here, distribution is based on effort and earnings. Where one can speak of distribution on the basis of equality, this criterion is linked to the starting point of competition, namely, equal possibilities. Equality with regard to the result seems not to have won acceptance. The relationship between economic competition and the principle of justice has a double character. On the procedural level in the understanding of justice, it is possible to integrate into economic competition principles that contribute to the realization of this value. On the distributive level, this is much more difficult, first and foremost because the competitive and market economy has its background in a teleological way of thinking that is influenced by utilitarianism, which sees the question of distribution as a subordinate part of the question of maximization.

A Virtue Ethical Perspective on Economic Competition The virtue ethical tradition concentrates on the actor and on the personal presuppositions that are significant for the moral action. A just action is determined on the basis of virtues and attitudes, which “leave their sediment” on the person’s way of acting. In some contexts, there are unclear boundaries between the virtue ethical and the teleological, since virtue ethics is regarded as a variety of the teleological approach. This is because, in both cases, the focus is on the intention or motive. The difference is that the intention or motive is linked in virtue ethics to presuppositions in the actor, whereas it is linked in teleological thinking to concrete results. Both the virtue ethical and the teleological tradition are concerned with the goal of an action. In teleological ethics, the goal is good effects; the good has an intrinsic value. In virtue ethics, it is the virtue that has an intrinsic value, so that both the action and the goal are important. The action is an integral aspect of the good life; it is not only

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a means to arrive at the good life. The path to the goal is also a part of the goal, namely, the good life (see Russel 2013). This tradition has a long history, all the way back to Aristotle and to the Jewish–Christian moral tradition. It has been very influential in the course of history, not least in religious–ethical moral traditions. In modern times, its importance has been somewhat reduced, but it blossomed anew from the last quarter of the twentieth century onward, and it has once again become very influential. One very significant contribution here is Alasdair MacIntyre’s book entitled After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (MacIntyre 1981). This new relevance is also due to the fact that the action-oriented ethical approaches, both the deontological and the teleological, appear to be gaining less acceptance today than in the past. This new position for virtue ethics does not mean that it contradicts the action-oriented approaches. The Norwegian theologian Ivar Asheim is a prominent advocate of elaborating virtue ethics in the direction of an ethics of attitude (Asheim 1997, pp. 269–304). In this case, conduct is a more explicit element in this ethical approach too, so that a onesided focus on the actor and on his or her personal presuppositions is toned down. This is because an attitude is a relational concept: attitudes are always something one has vis-à-vis other persons. The perspective is ex-centric, directed outward—not reflective, directed inward (as in some versions of virtue ethics) to personal qualities and self-development. This entails in many instances an altruistic element, linked to a form of reciprocity, to a mutuality in relationships. This gives the ethics of attitude a framework that is linked to a form or idea of fellowship. Fellowship, or primarily the human being’s praxis in fellowship, plays an important role in Alasdair MacIntyre’s version of virtue ethics too, but in his thinking, this is more as a context for the development and function of the virtues or moral goods, and for the definition of their content (MacIntyre 1985, pp. 181–203). If this dimension of fellowship in the ethics of attitude and the versions of virtue ethics that focus most strongly on the individual are seen in relation to the question of competition, we discover something interesting. The concern behind virtue ethics finds especial expression on the more procedural level. It is required of the actors in a competition that they have qualities that allow the competition to take place in a way that serves both the competition itself and the integrity of the participants. Honesty, trust, and fair play are qualities that are in demand here. This also involves attitudes. The focus of the ethics of attitude on fellowship

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and on the development of the fellowship also poses a problem in the encounter with competition. Altruism and collaboration, which manifest themselves as a consequence of an ethics of attitude that is oriented to the fellowship, are not simply compatible with competition. MacIntyre develops a similar skepticism about competition in connection with his idea that varieties of praxis create both external and internal goods. The external goods are something that the individual possesses, in one sense, and they entail that some have more of them, and others less (e.g., fame and money). These goods are thus something people compete to obtain. Internal goods are not something that one possesses, but something in which one receives a share by participating in the praxis. They are characteristically goods for the fellowship that participates in the praxis. Here, collaboration has priority over competition (MacIntyre 1985, pp. 188–191; see also Hartman 2013, pp. 254–260). In a situation of economic competition, this kind of focus on fellowship and collaboration is problematic. Let me recall my discussion of justice, above in this chapter: the position taken by this ethics of attitude corresponds to the lack of interest in theories of distributive justice on the part of the market and the competitive economy. The ethics of attitude indicates that one should allow the interests of the fellowship to take priority over the individual’s self-interest, and collaboration over competition. The perspectives of virtue ethics and the ethics of attitude have traditionally had little place in economic theory and thinking. This is also due to the dominant place of utilitarian and teleological arguments. This situation has, however, somewhat changed in the course of the past decades. An important contribution here was made by Robert C. Solomon, who has seen his special task as integrating virtue ethical arguments, especially in business ethics.11 Solomon belongs to an Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics. The title of his 1993 book, Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business (Solomon 1993), indicates a program, by focusing on excellence as a kind of collective designation of virtues, character traits, or professional qualities that are important—and useful—in a business ethical context. The emphasis on collaboration and human integrity points in the same direction. Solomon claims (Solomon 1993, pp. 22–33) that the view of business activity and of businessmen has been influenced by a macho language in which metaphors such as “the law of the jungle,” “war by all against all,” and the understanding of economic activity as a machine and a game have helped to create an impression that does not accord with reality. Business activity is primarily

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a question of collaboration in a fellowship in which the sense of fellowship and trust are basic presuppositions. This is more than a coordinated self-interest. Solomon elaborates his business ethics as a catalog of virtues (honesty, fairness, trust, toughness, friendliness, honor, loyalty, shame, competition, caring, compassion, justice; Solomon 1993, pp. 207–241), which are appropriate and necessary for the challenges that businessmen meet in the modern world. Two virtues are especially interesting here: competition and justice. Competition is a marginal virtue in a business context. It can come into play in the selection of leaders, both externally and internally in the organization. Besides this, it is collaboration and the desire for excellence, and not only the wish to win, that has a motivating function in a business context. It is a question, not of beating one’s competitors, but of impressing one’s colleagues and winning their respect. Challenges are welcome, but not all challenges involve competition. At the same time, Solomon affirms that every competition presupposes a basis of mutual acceptance and respect; and the best firms go even further than this. Mutual respect is important on a certain level, but what keeps good firms together is genuine care for each other, and the feeling that one belongs to a family that looks after its members (Solomon 1993, pp. 225–226). Justice too has a place in this context: “Justice is, first of all, a sense of compassion” (Solomon 1993, p. 240). He argues that even those political theories that build on justice begin with care: care for ourselves, for our reputation, for those with and for whom we work, for those with whom we have something in common, for those for whom we are responsible, and for those for whom we are responsible vis-à-vis the world. In this sense, justice is an absolutely necessary virtue. It is justice as fairness, the fact that all the employees get what they are entitled to, that keeps the firm together. It is a matter of recognition, rewards, bonuses, and promotions; people get the positions they deserve, in keeping with their abilities and the salary they get. It is important that they are treated equally, and that they are paid on time (Solomon 1993, p. 231).12 Solomon also appreciates the idea that justice is a matter of the wellbeing of society as a whole (Solomon 1993, p. 237, cf. pp. 180–181), but this is not the only way to understand justice. The general good is not always best served by equality or merit, or by the functioning of the market on its own premises. A holistic perspective, which corresponds to some extent to the normative stakeholder theory (Solomon 1993, pp. 179–186),13 leads Solomon to rise above simple dichotomies (business and ethics, profit and doing good).

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Business activity involves both increasing the wealth of society and putting something into the pay packets of those who contribute to this. With the exception of utterly extreme competitive situations, it is impossible to distinguish what one does out of self-interest from what one does in the interest of others. Collaboration is also an essential presupposition of competition. Solomon’s virtue ethical starting point likewise determines his understanding of competition and of justice as categories in an economic context. As ethical norms, their function is to regulate how the relationship between the businessman, the firm, and other actors is to be structured. Both norms are governed by Solomon’s understanding of the dimension of fellowship as completely decisive for business activity. He does not, however, deduce any significant social ethical force from his virtue ethical definition of competition and justice. Ivar Asheim takes a different position, at least theoretically. With his relational definition of virtue, inspired by Luther, he distances himself vis-à-vis an Aristotelian understanding of self-development. A virtue is “a positive attitude (= a firm, determined, and consistent position or behavior) that serves one’s fellow human being and preserves fellowship” (Asheim 1997, p. 283 [translated from original Norwegian text]; cf. Asheim 1998, pp. 255–257). This leads Asheim to hold that different societal fellowships ought not to be ranked in a moral sense, and he exemplifies this on the basis of market economic thinking, where the internal logic of the economic institution is given a superior stance in society as a whole. All values other than competitive ability and productivity are suppressed (Asheim 1997, p. 287). A virtue ethical perspective that emphasizes the relational and the orientation to the fellowship represents an important counterweight here, preventing the idea of competition in market economic thinking from having a governing function within the framework of human fellowship. The point Asheim is making is that fellowships must be seen in relation to each other as circles that partly lie within each other, partly lie on top of each other, and partly cut through each other—but not in such a way that they can work against each other or undermine each other. This makes possible a relativization, and to some extent a devaluation, of the importance of competition and the competitive economy in society. To what extent this will in fact happen—that is to say, whether virtue ethical perspectives will win the day—is another matter. At the very least, this represents a diagnosis and a possible therapy to create a change.

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In another sense too, this kind of relational understanding of virtue ethics is actualized in connection with competition. Morality is not a free-floating entity: it concerns culture and traditions that are shared by a fellowship. This is true on various levels: family, firm, religious community, nation, etc. From one point of view, we can say that traditions that emphasize the idea of competition and rivalry between human beings and institutions take their stance outside this long trajectory in which the values of fellowship and shared interests are important—not merely the individual and self-interest. To some extent, this applies also to the utilitarian tradition, although the dimension of fellowship is present there in an indirect manner, as a notional secondary gain from individual’s seeking their own interests. Robert C. Solomon speaks in this context of a “corporate culture” (Solomon 1993, pp. 125–135) and argues that the conservatism, and the lack of a will to change, that lie in cultural traditions are also the strength of these traditions. He claims that firms, like cultures, have inherent ethical attitudes. In some cases, it can be right to ignore the tradition, but there is a potential in these well-established senses of fellowship and in the values that they “produce.” This potential can be employed to confront an individualism that may promote people’s own interests but is problematic from a societal perspective. At the same time, it can be employed to promote society as a project, not only generally in society, but also as an alternative in an economic context. It may be important here to remember that the idea of competition as a regulator in an economic context is relatively recent in the history of humankind. It has demonstrated its strength, but it also has weaknesses. To learn from history’s emphasis on fellowship and collaboration is a useful supplementary perspective in a time and a context that are marked by a competitive economy that is sometimes aggressive. Virtue ethical perspectives on economic competition can supply valuable help here.

Notes

1. See L. Robbins: “Economics deals with ascertainable facts; ethics with valuations and obligations. The two fields of inquiry are not on the same plane of discourse” (Robbins 1937, p. 148); cf. Robbins’ completely value-free definition of economic activity (ibid., p. 16). An alternative way of thinking about this is presented by the Norwegian social economist G. Torsvik, who finds it dubious that sociological studies can give only knowledge of what exists, and claim that the normative (which includes

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morality and ethics) is only something subjective, and cannot be investigated scientifically. It is also important to find out about the “terrain of what ought to be” (Torsvik 2003, p. 12, cf. pp. 40–48). 2. J. Rawls’ 1971 book A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1971, republished in a revised edition, see Rawls 1999) has played an important role here, as has the entire debate this book launched. 3.  G.P. Brockway takes the same position, when he claims that “… all exchanges ipso facto involve other people and so by their very nature present ethical problems” (Brockway 2001, p. 242). 4. In another context, Kirzner writes: “There is no market process other than the competitive one” (Kirzner 1991, p. 140, cf. also pp. 147–148). 5. According to Arnsperger, this legitimation belongs to what he calls “the standard conceptual framework of economics” (Arnsperger 1996, p. 4, his italics). 6. The so-called stockholder theory, one of the most important normative theories in business ethics, also takes account of this viewpoint: It is both unnecessary and counterproductive to encourage businesspeople to act in order to promote a societal good, since it is the competitive economy itself that takes care of this. On this, see Hasnas (1998, p. 22). 7. On this Norwegian example, see Petroleumstilsynet (2015, p. 15). 8. In this context, it has been emphasized that “the ethical constraints society has embodied in its laws plus the general ethical tenet in favour of honest dealing constitute the ethical boundaries within which managers must pursue increased profitability” (Hasnas 1998, p. 22). J. Hasnas also points out that, in the framework of this theory, the ethical comes close to the legal, and can thus easily become a function of variations in legislation. This means that the theory is not self-sufficient: it is dependent on the political theory in which it is anchored. This theory is characterized by a desire to limit the legislative power of the state in the field in question. See ibid., p. 37, n. 12. 9. Given the institutions that are necessary in order to get the system to function, J. Rawls too accepts this aspect of a market system—equal freedoms and a genuine equality in possibilities—as an advantage and an asset (Rawls 1999, pp. 240–241). 10. Sen sees R. Nozick as an example of a thinker who pushes the idea of justice so far that it becomes inoperative. On this, see Sen (1987, p. 73) and Nozick (1974). On Sen’s understanding of the relationship between the market and freedom, see also Sen (1994). 11.  In this context, cf. also N.E. Bowie, who strongly maintains, from a Kantian perspective, the importance of trust for the functioning of economic activity (Bowie 2017, pp. 29–36). With support in older scholarship, he emphasizes that trust can provide a competitive advantage,

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because increased levels of trust reduce transaction and costs, and trusting relationships change the nature of monitoring and control in favor of competitive advantage (ibid., pp. 32–33). 12. “Justice is the demand that one is recognized and respected for what one is, that no one is neglected or short-changed, that no one is exploited or abused. Justice is the sense that one is being treated fairly” (Solomon 1993, p. 231). 13. The stakeholders are all those who have an interest (a stake), a share in a firm, or a claim on it. This applies both to buyers and sellers, to suppliers, shareholders, employers, the local society, and the management of the firm. The intention is to take all these persons into consideration in shaping economic activity. See Hasnas (1998, pp. 25–29).

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MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1998. A Short History of Ethics: A History of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Marnburg, Einar. 1998. Etikk i næringslivet: en teoretisk og empirisk studie av individets, organisasjonens og utdanningens betydning for atferd i etiske konfliktsituasjoner. Tano Aschehougs fonteneserie. Oslo: Tano Aschehoug. Moore, G.E. 2004 [1903]. Principia Ethica. Dover Philosophical Classics. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications. Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell. Petroleumstilsynet (Petroleum Safety Authority Norway). 2015. Risikonivå i petroleumsvirksomheten. Hovedrapport, utviklingstrekk 2015, norsk sokkel [Trends in Risk Level in Petroleum Activity. Main Report 2015. Norwegian Continental Shelf]. Oslo: Petroleum Safety Authority Norway. Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Rawls, John. 1993. Political Liberalism, vol. 4. John Dewey Essays in Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press. Rawls, John. 1999. A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Robbins, Lionel. 1937. An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 2nd ed. London: Macmillan. Robertson, Diana C., and Erin Anderson. 1993. Control System and Task Environment Effects on Ethical Judgment: An Explanatory Study of Industrial Salespeople. Organization Science 4: 617–644. Russel, Daniel C. (ed.). 2013. The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sen, Amartya. 1987. On Ethics and Economics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Sen, Amartya. 1994. Markets and Freedom to Choose. In The Ethical Foundations of the Market Economy: International Workshop, ed. Horst Siebert, 123–138. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Solomon, Robert C. 1993. Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business. The Ruffin Series in Business Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. Stempsey, S.J. William E. 2000. Organ Markets and Human Dignity: On Selling Your Body and Soul. Christian Bioethics: Non-ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality 6 (2): 195–204. Oxford: Oxford Academic. https://doi. org/10.1076/1380-3603(200008)6:2;1-7;FT195, https://academic.oup. com/cb/article/6/2/195/352473 (6.7.2018). Territo, Leonard. 2011. The International Trafficking of Human Organs: A Multidisciplinary Perspective. Hoboken: CRC Press.

326  S. O. THORBJØRNSEN Torsvik, Gaute. 2003. Menneskenatur og samfunnsstruktur: ein kritisk introduksjon til økonomisk teori. Samlagets bøker for høgare utdanning. Oslo: Samlaget. Whaples, Robert. 2009. The Policy Views of American Economic Association Members: The Results of a New Survey. Econ Journal Watch 6 (3): 337–348. https://econjwatch.org/articles/the-policy-views-of-american-economic-association-members-the-results-of-a-new-survey (6.7.2018). Williamson, Oliver E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting. New York: Free Press. Wilson, Edward E. 1975. Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

PART III

Competition and Anthropology

CHAPTER 8

Competition and Human Relationships

Introduction Up to this point, I have sought to identify various aspects of the idea of competition, with my main starting point in its functioning in the economy. Three important focuses guided my investigation. The first focus being to clarify what is meant by competition, both in general and more specifically in the economy. The second focus being concerned with the relationship between competition and anthropology, understanding the latter word primarily in philosophical terms as denoting various categories, approaches, and traditions that are actualized in connection with an analysis of economic competition. The third focus, linked to the second, being concerned with the various ways of providing ethical legitimation to this idea of competition. These approaches have been primarily descriptive. With these focuses being my starting point, I shall approach competition in this chapter in a more normative manner, one that is more detached from the special presuppositions that are linked to economic competition. With a philosophical and theological starting point, I shall evaluate more generally the anthropology that is presupposed by the idea of competition, and various ethical aspects that are linked to its legitimation. This kind of normative approach can take place on various levels. First, it can take place on a very general level where one asks whether the anthropology that is presupposed by the idea of competition corresponds

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to how people usually understand who the human being is and how one can promote a good human life. Accordingly, this includes both the anthropological and the ethical dimensions. Such an approach reflects important aspects and attitudes that are to be found in large segments of society. It can indeed be called “general,” but this adjective is not used in value terms. This approach reflects traditions that have been solidly established in society over a long period and that help to characterize this approach in terms of values. As such, it represents a normative standpoint. Typically, however, the anthropological parameters and the ethical values are not very specific, and one avoids focusing on the justification of these parameters and values. This makes possible a fairly general acceptance. A normative approach can also take place on a more specific level. In such a case, the differences will be greater, and the evaluations of the idea of competition will be more disparate. This kind of specification actualizes ideological presuppositions that are related both to content and justification. In what follows, I shall attempt to consider both these levels, but a stronger emphasis will be given to the more specific level. In a normative approach, one’s own priorities with regard to norms and values will to some extent color the evaluation of the idea of competition, so that the evaluation itself is determined by specific ideological presuppositions. Here, however, as in other contexts, persons with different worldviews and differing premises with regard to values can arrive at shared conclusions. This agreement on a level of general norms can be considerable, but it is often dependent either on avoiding an excessively clear specification of its contents or else by putting the focus on its justification. The main part of this chapter will consist of the normative anthropological discussion of the idea of competition, thus bringing into focus the second part of the major problem studied in this book. Methodologically, I shall proceed as follows. The anthropological parameters that I have identified as especially important for the idea of competition in the economy are seen in relation to the human being’s possibility of realizing a good life in the various relationships of which one is a part: to one’s own self, to one’s neighbor, to the rest of nature, and to God. This evaluation can provide the basis for saying something general about the relationship between competition and anthropology, but also for specifying and highlighting those aspects of human life that have the greatest exposure in connection with the idea of

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competition—as well as those aspects that can more easily be combined with it. With reference to the problem studied in this book, therefore, we shall investigate to what extent the idea of competition promotes or hinders the realization of a true humanity. This realization is also linked to the possibility of preserving the human person’s dignity. As we begin this decisive discussion of the relationship between anthropology and competition, it may be useful to remind ourselves of the important (and in some cases all-pervasive) realities that analysis up to this point has uncovered: • Since the idea of competition is perceived and presents itself as something taken for granted and useful, it escapes criticism, and problematic aspects are camouflaged. • In our society, the understanding of competition as a phenomenon is closely linked to material factors. • The focus on positive factors such as human self-interest, freedom, individuality, and rationality give the idea of competition a positive justification. In particular, we find the idea that freedom and the satisfaction that self-interest receives in various forms of reward contribute to actualization in the human person of values such as self-realization, creativity, improved achievement, and the maximization of utility and quality. • The problematic aspects of competition are linked especially to an emphasis on the hard, egotistic aspects of the human being; to the instrumentalization of the human being; to a reductionist narrowing down of what is important in the human being; to competition’s placing of the human being in a sphere of power; and to a distribution of goods on the basis of merit and effort. Although these aspects of the phenomenon of competition have emerged first and foremost from an analysis of economic competition, they have a significant potential for generalization, largely because economic factors and economic ways of evaluating are conquering more and more areas. It is true that one can still to a greater extent say that competition has an intrinsic value in sport, and that there are sporting activities in which money does not play such a great role; one can say that sport is not subject in the same way to a dynamic that is oriented to profit. Sport is governed to a greater extent by accepted rules. At the same time, however, we are obliged to note that sport, culture, and other areas in society

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are strongly influenced and determined by economic factors, and thus by economic competition. This means that the discussion of the relationship between competition and anthropology has consequences that go far beyond the purely economic sphere. In the subsequent discussion of the idea of competition, on a higher level, the most important point of reference will be economic competition; this is my material. To some extent, however, I shall also indicate other arenas where competition occurs, and draw examples from them. I believe that this will make the discussion more generally relevant.

A Relational Definition of the Human Being One can approach in many ways the question of who the human being is. There is a distinction between those who wish to give answers that illuminate partial aspects of human life and those who wish to offer a holistic view of the human person. Many of the academic disciplines with which we are familiar—the natural sciences, sociology, or more humanist approaches—seek to make contributions to the first category, and these descriptions of the human being are largely quantitative and oriented to details. However, the humanist tradition goes beyond this in the direction of the more qualitative and holistic, for example, through analyses of literature. Academic disciplines such as philosophy and theology take this step to the full and wish to offer a more holistic answer to the question of who the human being is. The various partial aspects have their function here too, but they are part of a large context and themselves represent only parts of the big picture. A holistic view of the human being is interested in the relationships within which the human person is understood, what is the core in his being, how he realizes his humanity, and what value he has in relation to other living beings. One problem connected to the question of who the human being is, is: What is the source of knowledge of the human being? Is it to be learned from the human being himself? Is the human being to use his reason and his emotions, and bring this knowledge to light with the help of introspection and various investigations of the human conduct of life and mental presuppositions? Positive answers to these questions mean that access to knowledge of the human being has an anthropocentric character. There is no source outside the human being or the human world from which knowledge of the human being can be acquired. It goes without saying that such knowledge is both appropriate and

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necessary; but the question is whether it is enough. The religious anthropological tradition has held that this knowledge must be supplemented by a source that lies outside the reality of human life. The ultimate knowledge of the human person, of his being, his origin, and his destiny, must be revealed to the human being. This can happen directly through persons or historical events, and it can be handed on through written sources—in the case of Christianity, the Bible. In Christian theology, this is called the special revelation. Such a revelation can, however, also happen indirectly, being communicated to the human being via his reason or conscience; this is the so-called general revelation.1 The idea is that all human beings are created by God. This God has equipped the human being in such a way that, created by God, the human being has access to a knowledge of God and of God’s will for human life. Much Christian theology would claim at this point that, although this is a limited knowledge, it is a true knowledge as far as it goes. Other traditions in Christian theology, including the Catholic tradition, would more strongly underline the human being’s competence in this area. They agree, nevertheless, that the human being cannot be understood exclusively on the basis of what can be learned from the human being himself (an anthropocentric perspective). A theocentric perspective, in which God reveals to the human being who he is and what he is destined for, is indispensable. On the holistic and fundamental level, the human being is understood on the basis of what God (or the Creator) has thought about human life. This division between an anthropocentric and a theocentric anthropology is also reflected in the answer to the question: What relationship is the basis for seeing and understanding human life? Where the perspective is exclusively anthropocentric, it is neither meaningful nor necessary to think that the human being is also to be understood on the basis of his relationship to God. Where the perspective is theocentric, this becomes a decisively important relationship that is significant also for the understanding of the other relationships in which the human being lives. A correct understanding of the human being’s relationship to his fellow human beings, to his own self, and to the rest of nature also involves the human being’s relationship to God. Accordingly, these two different ways of seeking knowledge of the human being—either from the human being himself or from a divine authority outside the human being—are significant to the question of how a good human life can and should be realized.

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We should not, however, exaggerate the difference. The distinction between a special and a general revelation implies that even with a theocentric starting point, the human being’s own reflection on himself and on his relationship to his fellow humans and to the rest of nature is very important. Anthropological parameters such as self-interest, self-realization, and freedom are parameters on the created level that can be considered and evaluated both on the basis of this level and of the human being’s own, not specially revealed, presuppositions. Given a theocentric starting point, however, one cannot isolate the specific weight attributed to these parameters, and their final evaluation, from the presuppositions that this starting point establishes. I have thus also indirectly touched on the fact that the same can be said of an anthropocentric perspective on the human being: it is neither neutral nor isolated from presuppositions dictated by one’s worldview. The spectrum is as broad here as it is with theocentric positions. Key words in this context are Marxism, liberalism, and humanism. The same applies to terms such as instrumentalism, egotism, and elitism, behind which lie presuppositions connected to one’s worldview and ideology. These presuppositions influence the answers that are given to the question of who the human being is, although they too are posed from a more anthropocentric perspective. In my treatment of the idea of competition in the economy, I investigated the relationship of the idea of competition to anthropological presuppositions that find expression in various anthropological frameworks: an instrumentalistic, an egotistic, an elitist, a humanist, and a Christian framework. This work made it possible to identify positive and negative relationships between the idea of economic competition and anthropological presuppositions of these kinds. I shall now take one step further and ask more generally: On what anthropology is the idea of competition built, and what anthropological values does it help to promote? I shall attempt to do this by relating the idea of competition to the relationships in which the human being lives. A relational definition of the human being—to his own self, to his fellow human beings, to nature, and to God—is present both in psychological and theological thinking. All human beings have three relationships, and some have four. My question therefore is: What does the idea of competition tell us about the human being’s relationship to his own self, to his fellow human beings, to the rest of nature, and (for those who believe in a god) to God? The

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answer to this question is inevitably value-laden and determined by an overarching view of what the human being is and what the human being is meant to be. In this context, the question of the human being’s dignity is necessarily also actualized (Chapter 6). The path toward a normative answer is a path on which different alternatives are discussed and evaluated. My choice is to analyze the idea of competition on the basis of four different relationships in which the human being lives, but this does not mean that the holistic perspective on the human being is missing. My theocentric starting point preserves the totality in two ways. First, the relationship to God is an overarching relationship that has a guiding function vis-à-vis the other relationships. This prioritization gives the human being’s view of himself, of his fellow human being, and of the rest of nature its decisive, normative presuppositions and guidelines, thanks to the understanding of the human being as one who is created by God to live in a relationship with him. Second, we are talking all the time about one and the same human being. The four relationships are united by the fact that it is a concrete, actual existing human being who lives in them. This also applies in an anthropocentric context, although there, the discussion concerns only three relationships.

Competition and the Human Being’s Relationship to His or Her Own Self The human capacity for self-reflection is unique and is characteristic of the human being in comparison to other living beings. The actions of animals are largely determined by instincts, and animals are incapable of taking up an evaluating position outside of themselves and of their actions—to do this is characteristic of the human being. The capacity for self-reflection and for having a relationship with oneself is thus also a presupposition of the freedom and ethical responsibility of the human being. Without this possibility, the human being too would be entirely governed by instincts, or by presuppositions that came to him from outside, and that would not to be subject to evaluation and deliberation in the human being himself. This ability to reflect on oneself and on one’s life gives the human being a freedom that allows him to act responsibly. And this is also true where the perspective on the human being has a theocentric character.

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The human being’s relationship to his own self has a content. How can one have a good relationship to oneself? And what does a good relationship consist of? To some extent, people with different backgrounds will part company here, but it is possible to indicate something that a large majority would regard as important presuppositions of this relationship. Such presuppositions include acceptance, care, and a healthy self-love. It is important that a human being accepts himself as he is, without wanting all the time to become and to be someone else than who he is in reality. This acceptance also means that it is important to show concern for oneself and take care of oneself. Both these elements belong to what can be called a legitimate and healthy self-love; in an unhealthy self-love, the perspective is restricted to the individual dimension. The exhortation to “Love yourself!”2 prevents acceptance, care for oneself, and personal freedom from being combined here with a corresponding acceptance of others, care for others, and restrictions on one’s own freedom, where this clashes with the freedom of others. The next question, therefore, is: Does the idea of competition contribute to the realization of this aspect of human life? Self-Interest and the Satisfaction of Needs I have already mentioned self-love as one important aspect of the human being’s relationship to himself. We have seen that human self-interest plays a great role in connection with competition. Can this self-interest be legitimated as a variant of a good and healthy self-love, or is this a form of self-love that conflicts with healthy self-love? In my discussion of egotism (Chapter 6), I drew a distinction between egotism and egoity, or between a more destructive and a more positive egotism. Mostly egotism is related to greed and selfishness, and is perceived as something negative, while egoity involves self-love and selfrealization. The former is also called a destructive egotism with a materialistic character, while the latter has a more constructive character. This distinction seems relevant in the present context too. Self-interest is actualized in several of the relationships in which the human being lives. Self-interest is less problematic in the human being’s relationship to himself than in other relationships. Greed and selfishness, which are expressions of a materialistic and destructive egotism, are manifested more strongly in one’s relationship to others than in one’s relationship to oneself. This means that there need be no antagonism

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between a healthy self-love and the function that human self-interest has in a competitive context. It is perfectly possible to channel self-interest in the direction of care for oneself and self-acceptance. However, the picture is somewhat more complex, because self-interest and care for oneself also involve the satisfaction of needs. To care for oneself means ensuring that needs are met and satisfied. It is characteristic of much competition, and especially of the form of competition that is relevant to the economy, that the needs to be met are material. To a large extent, we can observe that development in sport is heading in the same direction. In the past, sport was a matter of satisfying needs such as honor and prestige, but these have moved more into the background today, and have been superseded by much more material needs. This emphasis on the material dimension in thinking about competition is also related to the human being’s self-love and relationship to himself. Competition contributes to a more material definition of self-love, where the emphasis on other needs diminishes. It is relevant here to bring in humanist psychology, represented by Abraham Maslow and his idea of a hierarchy of needs in the human being (Maslow 1970; cf. Lutz and Lux 1979, pp. 9–15), which he sees as related to the development and maturity of the human being himself, to the inner feeling of who one is and what one feels and thinks. In a healthy person, this is a process of self-realization or self-actualization that lasts for an entire lifetime. The goal is to realize all the possibilities that one has as a human being. Maslow draws a hierarchical distinction between basic physiological and material needs (air, water, food, shelter, sleep, security, safety), social needs (belongingness, love, affection, acceptance, esteem from others, self-esteem), and moral and self-actualizing needs (meaningfulness, aesthetics, perfection, justice, service, truth, love). There is both a hierarchical and a dynamic link between the needs: the satisfaction of lower needs brings with it the need to satisfy higher needs. This is why the satisfaction of these higher needs is the best guarantee of the promotion of good human development. On the other hand, if a lower need is not satisfied, this will create a pressure and a preoccupation in the person who sets aside other needs; this applies first and foremost to physiological, material, and social needs, and Maslow accordingly calls these deficiency needs. The self-actualizing needs are called growth needs. The idea here, and the presupposition of healthy human development, is that one should move from an orientation toward basic physiological needs to an orientation toward self-actualizing

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needs. But what happens when such a development does not take place? If a “barrier to growth” (Lutz and Lux 1979, p. 14) of this kind arises, the human being remains on a lower level of needs than he would be ready for in terms of his development. This leads to a comprehensive preoccupation with things and experiences on this lower level; these may be material things or questions connected with status and power. And this means that lower needs come into focus in a way that does not contribute to good and healthy human development. In our present context, the question is whether competition contributes in any way to a development from a preoccupation with needs on a low level to a desire for self-actualization on a high level of needs, or whether such a development is blocked.3 Does competition create barriers against human growth, by keeping attention fixed on material needs? It is natural to think that such mechanisms can play a role in economic competition. In a society strongly marked by a competitive economy with a market orientation, there will necessarily be a strong focus on the material dimension and on the satisfaction of material needs. This does not mean that there is no desire to satisfy higher needs; but these do not get as much attention, since emphasis lies on the material dimension. This, however, prompts the following question: The competitive economy contributes to the satisfaction of material needs. Is there a path from here to the satisfaction of higher needs? One can have the impression that many become entangled in the material dimension, and do not get any further. This barrier to growth may be connected with the one-sided orientation of the competitive economy to utility and profit, which are measured by material criteria, not by various degrees of meaningfulness or justice. Once some material needs have been met, it is more natural to think that new material needs must be created, which economic activity can then fulfill. And if these needs do not immediately appeal to one, advertising can convince one that they exist and must be met. In this way, it becomes difficult to extricate oneself from the coils of materialistic needs; or, perhaps better (using Maslow’s terminology), to move on from physiological and material needs.4 Another need in Maslow’s hierarchy that is actualized in this competitive context is the need for security and safety. This does not refer primarily to the need to be protected against various kinds of violence. It means that life has a stability and a predictability that create a longer

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term framework of security. This need is connected to the question of economic competition among other things by its relationship to people’s work. A person’s work is a basic factor in the creation of security. Three elements are essential here. First, the function of work in human life is to create frameworks and points of reference for the individual’s daily life. Work provides a reason to get up in the morning; it creates a “before work” and an “after work” that structure the day. The importance of this is grasped most easily as soon as one no longer has any work; before that happens, it tends to be taken for granted. Second, work has a significant social function. Social contacts, both close and distant, both long-lasting and more transitory, are forged through the workplace. Third, work creates an economic platform in our society that establishes presuppositions of material security. Although the degree of this security will vary in terms of people’s income, work will always make an essential contribution to this kind of security. In a situation of economic competition, human work is not always a long-lasting and stable reality. As I have mentioned several times, the existence of workplaces depends on success in competition, getting contracts, and carrying on business preferably with a positive (rather than a negative) margin between expenditure and income. This potential lack of stability can create insecurity for the individual employee in a competitive economy; millions of people have known and know this insecurity in their own lives. When it occurs, it influences a person’s relationship to himself, and what he thinks about himself and about his situation in the world. In a competitive economic context, therefore, the human being risks coming into a problematic relationship to himself. The path toward the satisfaction of other, higher needs can to some extent be blocked, either because of an excessive focus on material needs, which are satisfied over and above what is necessary, or else because material needs are insufficiently satisfied. One does not do well in the competition. The inner feeling about who one is, what one wants to do with one’s life, and what one sees as important for oneself, can become blunted. If the economy contributes primarily to the satisfaction of lower material needs, the potential for human development is restricted. The influence of the competitive economy creates a risk that the human being may get stuck on the level of lower needs. In the encounter with the vested interest of the competitive economy, the good and healthy self-love risks being limited to a question of satisfying one’s own material needs. And there is a risk

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that the human being may lose something of the basic stability and security that represents another presupposition, if the human being is to have a clarified, constructive, and healthy relationship to himself. Individuality, Personal Structure, and Identity The human being’s relationship to himself is also related to his individuality and personal structure. The sense and the knowledge of being an individual and a person is the very basis for saying that the human being has a relationship to himself. The self is the individual and the person. In a competitive economy with a neoclassical character, individuality also plays a significant role. I have already pointed out (Chapter 6) that there is an element of fiction in the understanding of individuality in this context (the Homo oeconomicus), and that the form of individualism that is prominent in a competitive economic context is methodological individualism. This is a very radical form of individualism in which the individual is superior to the social. Societal institutions are evaluated in terms of how they can serve the interests of the individual. In an equilibrium economy of the neoclassical type, there is a tendency to combine methodological individualism with an extensive rational thinking about the human being’s preferences. This creates a split or atomized world for the human being. It is difficult to see the totality behind all the preferences. It is difficult to envisage that the human being can relate to himself with acceptance and self-love, if the object of acceptance and love is an atomized individual of this kind. That which is lovable in the human being is something else. Something similar finds an even more explicit expression if the idea of competition is seen in relation to the personal structure of the human being. The human being qua person is linked extremely closely to his identity.5 This identity is unique. There are not (or at least, not yet) two people with the same identity. It is this identity that makes the human being the one he or she is. This means that the human being can never be regarded merely as a thing. There is always something more than what can be used in various contexts for various goals. A person is always more than the person’s utility value. A purely instrumentalistic or functionalistic view of the human being comes into conflict with this way of thinking about him. In my discussion of the relationship between the competitive economy and anthropology, I observed that instrumentalistic anthropological

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presuppositions were important, indeed vital, for this form of competition. I reflected also on the connection between an instrumentalistic view of the human being and a corresponding reductionist view. It is clear that such a reductionist understanding comes into conflict with the view of the human being as a person with a unique identity. One way in which these problems find expression is the tendency toward depersonalization and anonymization of the human being that can be linked to a neoclassical competitive economy. The actors are anonymized because competition helps to negate an individual exteriority (Chapter 7). This kind of depersonalization and limitation of the human being as an individual with an individual identity makes problematic that which constitutes the human being’s relationship to himself: namely, the fact that he is a person with an identity. This criticism of the competitive economy may perhaps be exaggerated. People who are involved in various contexts of economic competition do not feel as depersonalized, anonymized, or deprived of an individual identity as this criticism asserts. Nevertheless, this criticism contains an important point. The idea of competition itself contains a potential for development in this direction. If we were to arrive there one day, the human being’s relationship to himself would be made problematic at its most central point. To whom am I to relate, if I cannot relate to myself as a person with an identity that I know, and a person who is not anonymized either for myself or for others to whom I relate? I shall return to the consequences that this perspective on competition has for the relationship to others. The question of the human being’s integrity is closely linked to his identity. The unique identity implies that the person has integrity and constitutes an autonomous totality. This integrity must be respected, first and foremost by others, but also by the person himself. One can violate one’s own integrity by putting oneself into situations and contexts in which one’s own private subjective space can be violated. This is a space that few have access to, bar oneself and those that one opens the space up to. To break in here is to violate or threaten the human being’s integrity and personal structure. To the extent that competition leads to, or tends in the direction of, a problematization of the human being’s own personal structure, his integrity too is violated. The person as a totality is depersonalized, and the totality is split up into parts that are integrated in various ways into different processes.

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Freedom and Rationality Another critical point with regard to the human being’s possibility of having a good relationship to himself is the space that is given to freedom. There are close links between freedom, the individual dimension, and the personal dimension. When a human being is called a “person,” this is a definition of his quality. A person is a human being who can obligate himself ethically. Such a definition presupposes that the human being has freedom and can grasp responsibility for his actions. What status can human freedom be said to have in a competitive situation? In one sense, freedom is infinite. The human being can choose whether to compete in many areas. In the economic field, one can choose what one wishes to compete for. When the matter is seen in this way, the idea of autonomy is guaranteed, at least in an external sense; but is this also the case in reality? In the economy, one can choose among various preferences. But there are structures in the competitive economy itself that push one toward choosing preferences that are of the greatest benefit to one’s own self, one’s own utility and profit. In this way, freedom is limited. The responsibility is not abolished, but is reduced by external circumstances. It is in this context that Christian Arnsperger (Chapter 7) speaks of the persons, the economic actors, as interchangeable realities. The anonymization of the actors helps to some extent to conceal human beings’ individual selves: they are integrated into a totality. Arnsperger claims that, given these presuppositions, it is difficult to envisage a personal freedom here, since the totality that the competitive economy represents is a barrier to real freedom: the freedom that exists is limited, and risks degenerating into loneliness or into merely a freedom to choose among the options in a consumer society. Arnsperger’s perspective is extremely pessimistic with regard to human freedom in a competitive society that is steered by the economy. He points out possibilities that are real, but he devalues too strongly the freedom that the human being has—and that he experiences himself as having. This freedom is indeed exposed to limitations that are linked to the preferences that play a central role in the competitive economy, but these are only limitations. They do not prevent one from experiencing a personal freedom. And this freedom is not only apparent or imaginary. It is genuine, and it is important for the human being’s possibility of having a good relationship to himself.

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The human being’s relationship to himself is also determined by his ability to relate to himself in a rational way. For Immanuel Kant, this was connected extremely closely to human freedom. It was precisely as a rational being that one could have the freedom that Kant saw as an absolutely necessary starting point for human ethical behavior. Although this view did not subsequently find universal consensus, the link between freedom and rationality can be a good starting point for understanding the role that rationality plays in the framework of thinking about competition. We have seen that rationality is important in a competitive context, and it is completely vital in the framework of thinking about the Homo oeconomicus. Here, rationality is a matter of being goal-oriented and consistent. At the same time, there is a close link between human self-interest and rationality. Kant’s concept of freedom and of rationality was broad. When the concept of rationality is employed in economic thinking about competition, it tends to become narrow and one-sided: rationality is a matter of maximizing utility, achievements, and profit. Where such an understanding of rationality wins acceptance by the human being, this can entail a link between self-interest and rationality that influences those aspects of one’s relationship to oneself that are related to freedom and rationality. Two other factors reinforce the consequences that this understanding of rationality has for the human being’s relationship to his own self. I have already mentioned the claim that the understanding of rationality that is characteristic of the Homo oeconomicus is different from the understanding that functions among people in a more normal communicative context (Chapter 6). It is difficult, on the basis of empirical investigations of how the human being actually is, to find any legitimation of the cool rational person who is a presupposition in much competitive economic theory. The human being experiences a discrepancy between how he thinks about himself, on the one hand, and the narrow basis for rational thinking, oriented to profit and achievement, that is found in the competitive economy, on the other. Such a situation opens the door to ambiguity in one’s understanding of oneself and in how one tackles one’s relationship to oneself. Which rationality is valid? This also reduces the possibility that human rationality could provide legitimation of the idea of competition (including economic competition). There is an additional reason that makes this legitimation problematic. One’s relationship to oneself is also determined on the emotional level. It is indeed true that not all competition is tied so strongly to the rational dimension that

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there would be no relationship between competition and the emotions. This relationship exists among both losers and winners, especially in sport, where enthusiasm and disappointment are very familiar. The same is true in the economy as well, but not in the same way or to the same degree. Rationality has a more dominant role here. In combination with what I have said about the anonymization and depersonalization of the economic actors, this means that the emotional dimension moves into the background. In this sense, the competitive economy helps to paint a somewhat one-sided picture of the human being. It is good for the human being, in his relationship to himself, when both the emotional and the rational dimensions are channeled in good ways. Economic competition is particularly effective in leading the human being onto paths that make it plausible that human life is largely steered by rational presuppositions. The sociologist Max Weber foresaw at the beginning of the twentieth century that, in a not too distant future, Westerners who lived in a capitalist context would be prisoners in a “steel-hard casing” of rationality, technology, and economy, a cage that they themselves had made (Weber 2011 [1920], p. 177). We are entitled to ask whether a market-oriented competitive economy has contributed to this development. Self-Realization Self-realization is another important aspect of the human being’s relationship to himself. In the tradition that goes back to Aristotle, this means realizing the potential or the presuppositions that the self has in its nature as a human being. To wish to realize oneself is to wish that the possibilities, ambitions, and abilities that the human being has and bears in himself may become reality. Self-realization can take place in infinitely many different ways, depending on people’s presuppositions, but some aspects are recurrent and apply to most people: self-realization involves the unleashing of one’s own creative powers, mastering challenges, and achieving something that accords with the presuppositions one has as a human being. Self-realization has a double character and a two-sided orientation. It can have both a mental and a more concrete, material character, often with connecting lines. The orientation is outward, since self-realization takes place in a social context, and mastering, creativity, and accomplishments can also benefit others and society as a whole. At the same time, the orientation is also inward, back to the self, which is

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confirmed and strengthened by succeeding in realizing its innermost presuppositions. This means that competition opens the door wide to self-realization. It is one of several arenas for self-realization. Mastering, achievement, and creativity are core elements in both self-realization and competition, but there is an important difference that also has anthropological implications. One essential element of self-realization is that its positive function depends to a significant degree on the results that are attained, when these are seen in a comparative light. And in this context, there may perhaps be only one comparison that counts: the comparison with one’s own achievements over the course of time. This is what I called “competing with oneself” in my discussion of the definitions of competition (Chapter 1). I concluded that this is not a genuine competition, since one characteristic of a genuine competition is that it takes place between parties. The almost universal independence vis-à-vis other persons’ results is due to the fact that self-realization means realizing one’s own presuppositions. If this happens, all is well, even if this particular realization may perhaps be inferior to that of others. In this way, self-realization helps to strengthen the self. With its extremely comparative structure, competition can have the effect on a person that the self becomes problematic or weakened. This comparative element in competition also reflects another factor that helps to create a distance between self-realization and competition. The measuring of achievements in a competition is based on criteria and values that are defined independently of the individual actor. These criteria or values can correspond to presuppositions linked to values that are present in the person himself, values that he can actualize by means of his self-realization; but this is far from always being the case. This difference allows us to identify another element that creates a distance between self-realization and competition. One can, of course, object that even if the criteria and values are different from one’s own, the realization of these (in other words, not a self-realization) takes place on the basis of some presuppositions that are present in the person himself. And there is something to be said for this. Creativity and mastering, as elements in self-realization, can also be found where things are realized or take place on premises established by others, not on one’s own. But this form of self-realization belongs to a different type that is more adapted to presuppositions in a competitive situation.

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It is not possible to give an unambiguous answer to the question of the extent to which competition, as an element in the human being’s self-realization, helps one to acquire a good relationship to oneself. From one angle, one can see a positive relationship between competition and self-realization, since competition creates an arena for the actualization of the human being’s own wishes and values. Here, one can realize important physical and mental aspects of one’s own self. From another angle, one can see conflict arising between the values of competition and the values that the human being wants to actualize in his realization of his own self. To the extent that competition does contribute to self-realization, this is a self-realization of a more limited kind, which therefore has less value with regard to the human being’s possibilities of establishing a good and constructive relationship to his own self. Intrinsic Value The human being’s relationship to his own self cannot be separated from the question of how the self defines its own intrinsic value. On this point, there is an important distinction, which is also a matter of ideological dispute, between those who link the intrinsic value to what the human being is, and those who link it to what the human being does. What is the place of the idea of competition in this picture? Does it help to promote the view that the value of the self is linked to what the human being is—or to what the human being does? The fundamentally utilitarian character of the idea of economic competition gives it an orientation to results. The human being has value thanks to what he gets done, to his achievements, and to the results he attains. The idea of competition promotes the position that the human being’s value has more to do with what he attains and achieves than with what he is, independent of all his activities. The one-sided orientation of the competitive economy to utility and profit creates a dynamic that means that it is the results that count and that are appreciated. The activities of the self are central, and value of the self, independent of achievements and results, is of only peripheral interest. In other forms of competition, the activity itself can possess an intrinsic value for the actor, independent of, or with less emphasis on, results. Here, it is still a matter of activities; but activity as an intrinsic value includes the person in a different way. This link between intrinsic value and activity helps to prevent the actor in the competition from

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limiting its value only to the result and achievement. One example of this is an idea of competition in sport that emphasizes the activity more than the result―the value is already present, so to speak, before the competition starts. I have already (Chapter 6) linked intrinsic value to dignity. That which has intrinsic value is especially valuable and cannot be placed on a scale that ranks it in relation to other values. Everything that possesses intrinsic value must be protected in a special way. The human being’s intrinsic value is protected by protecting his dignity, his unique and inviolable position. The human being’s unique possibility of having a relationship to himself—something that sets him apart from all other living beings— is also a part of this dignity. Where the competitive economy shifts the focus onto what the human being accomplishes and achieves, there is a risk that both the intrinsic value of the human being and that which is valuable in his relationship to himself may move into the background. In that case, the human being has no value in himself. His value is linked to his value as a means for the realization of other values than those that reflect the unique position and dignity of the human being. This kind of idea of competition is a threat to the specific character and integrity of the human being. The Human Person’s Well-Being There is another question that is closely linked to the question whether the source of the dignity of the self lies in what he is or in what he does: Where does the self anchor its well-being? One’s well-being is important, if one is to have a good relationship to oneself. Here too, if one looks at the human being in relation to the idea of competition, there are two principal possibilities. One can think that what creates a good situation is linked to the action itself: to take one example from an economic context, this may be the case in a hectic environment within a firm, where everyone’s attention is directed to the same goal and one feels that one is a significant part of a team. Here too, the alternative is for the well-being of the self to be linked to the result or the goal: well-being is generated by a result that confirms my own efforts. Both are possible in competition. In an economic competition, it is most natural to think that the emphasis will lie more on the well-being created by the result than on the goods that lie in the process itself.

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One aspect of human well-being is one’s health. Sickness affects a human being’s relationship to himself. To take care of oneself means also taking care of one’s health. Competition has both promoted and damaged people’s health. Sporting competition is not the only form of competition that has the function of improving health: to take part in a competition, whether in the economy or in other contexts, can provide a kick that makes one feel better, both physically and mentally. However, this kick presupposes a positive result. On the other hand, however, the same forms of competition can also severely damage one’s health. The stress factor linked to the desire to succeed in competition can sow the seeds of long-term health problems.

Competition and the Human Being’s Relationship to Others A person’s competition with himself may not be regarded as a genuine competition. In every competition, there is a relationship to others: there is always someone against whom one is competing. In sport, this applies to individuals or to teams (and teams also consist of individuals); something similar applies also in the world of teaching and education, where one competes against fellow pupils, fellow students, and colleagues. The situation in the economy is similar. Although institutions play a more prominent role here, they too are not without a relationship to human beings, since they consist of human beings and are directed by them. We must, however, mention one difference. In a competition between institutions (e.g., between firms), the distance between the human beings is greater than is the case in sport. In a small-scale economy, on the other hand, the distance is smaller. Shop owners who work in the same place, and compete against each other, know each other, and their relationships are frequently close. In general, interpersonal relationships are not marked by competition, either in the family or society. Most relationships between people are based on personal and institutional presuppositions that have nothing to do with competition. This is very important for the individual. One can have interpersonal relationships that do not make any special demands of one. These relationships are given, so to speak, and have a long-lasting character; they provide an anchoring and a security in one’s existence. In most cases, relationships to family and close friends are like this, although they can also vary in content and quality.

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It is both important and necessary to maintain that there are central relationships in human existence that are largely independent of the phenomenon of competition. This is particularly true of the family and of the relationships that belong there. At the same time, we see that the burdens that have been laid on the family situation in recent decades have changed this to some extent. In today’s situation, more areas of human life have become “exposed to competition.” It is difficult today to isolate completely the relationship between marriage partners, and other relationships in the family context, from the idea of competition. Parents compete about finding time for the development of their own careers. Divorced parents compete for children’s favor. Siblings compete with each other both about their position in the family and about school marks and the education they receive.6 Something similar happens between friends. What begins as an external material competition can develop into a competition about successfulness with regard to professional work, children, and connections with important persons in society. They may indeed remain friends, but the idea of competition enters in and changes the presuppositions for the course that the friendship will take. We must then ask what competition as a phenomenon does to interpersonal relationships. Does it have a positive function, in the sense that competition creates a fellowship that strengthens the relationships, or does it create frontlines and tensions that make good relationships problematic? This then leads to the question whether competition is beneficial. When a large part of people’s relationships to one another are influenced by competition, is this good for society? Would not collaboration create presuppositions for better relationships? Before I take up these questions directly, I must say something about the significance, for the way human life is lived, of the fact that the individual exists in relationships to other people. The Significance of Interpersonal Relationships The human being’s relationship to others involves the fundamental frames of reference for human life, in various senses. First of all, this involves the human being’s actual position. The human being lives in social contexts, as a herd animal who appears to thrive better in fellowship with others than in a completely isolated existence. The desire for such an existence is an extremely rare exception and is linked to very

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specific goals; examples are hermit monks and stylites. The great majority seem to prefer fellowship to isolation and loneliness. Second, relationships to other people are important for the development of the human being and for the formation of his identity. It is difficult to understand the human being independently of the context of human beings to whom he relates, both near at hand and farther away. The relationship to others is significant for the human being’s self-understanding. Third, the relationship to others is also significant for an understanding of the human being’s function and task in the world. The human being has a function in terms of caring for himself, but he is himself dependent on others, and others are dependent on him. His task in the world is related to how he relates to other people. For most people, the work they do will be a contribution in this context. Other people need what I do or create. The human being’s relationship to others is lived out in the framework of a tension between the individual and the collective dimensions in human life. The individual aspect of the human being has its clear legitimacy and necessity, but individualism can be understood within a variety of frameworks. One framework is existentialist, where an emphasis lies on self-sufficiency, conscience, autonomy, and nonconformity. The point here is that the individual should be able to think and act authentically, out of a commitment to his own, deeply anchored values. Another framework is a more vulgar and popular variant, which is characterized by a false self-confidence and bears witness to a certain foreignness or distance vis-à-vis others. The relationship to others is thus very strongly dependent on how one sees one’s own self. One vulgar variant of individualism ultimately reduces the relationship to others to nothing more than a charade, or to something that has a function only to the extent that it can function usefully for myself. The legitimacy, necessity, and limitation of individuality correspond to what we find on the collective level. Collectivity is the product of the human being’s social position in the world; this is expressed most explicitly in the consistent social function that the institution of family has in most societies. The necessity of collectivity is connected to people’s dependence on each other. This can vary from one society to another. In societies with a natural economy, individuals can be less dependent on others than in specialized societies where individuals are completely dependent on a whole number of other people to get what they need in order to maintain their life and health. In this sense,

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people are surrendered into each other’s hands. This situation also demands that the individual takes his place in such a way that interpersonal relationships can function as well as possible. Where this is not the case, the exchange of those services that the individual needs becomes problematic. There is a beneficial and important reciprocal relationship between the human being’s self and other people’s selves. It is important that this should be developed, to the good both of oneself and of the other or others. But construction of a positive and close relationship has its limits. I have pointed out earlier that the self has freedom in the way it lives, and this also applies vis-à-vis other people. They are not to determine what I shall do, because coercion gags human beings. But freedom has its boundary: where my freedom clashes with other people’s freedom, it has met its boundary, and this boundary demands respect. Coercion destroys relationships. My view of what is good for my neighbor—and it is this view that steers my actions in this relationship—can clash with a different perception. In relationships, one can live with differing perceptions and opinions, but it is difficult to maintain relationships where there is a one-sided steering and definition of what is good for those involved. The relationship between the individual and the other or others has also psychological and existential aspects that are important here. Individualism can lead to loneliness. Most people regard a solitary existence as a highly undesirable situation. An individualism that presents itself as complacency and as a wish to keep one’s distance from other people opens the door to this situation. It is true, from one angle, that this type of individualism entails a certain distance vis-à-vis the idea of competition, which involves others and thus does not accord with complacency and the solitary pattern. But the reality appears to be different. Competition is important, at least in a vulgar individualistic context, where it becomes a means to increase both complacency and one’s distance from others. Winning creates a distance from others—from the losers. In an individualism with a more existential orientation, solitude is not so obviously a negative consequence. Here, the individual dimension is given priority, first and foremost because it is on this level that the human being realizes himself and his presuppositions; a distance from others is no presupposition for this realization, nor is complacency a goal. This individual “solitude” is also open for good and fruitful relationships with others. The priority accorded to the individual dimension

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does not make the relationship to other people problematic. One can have the impression that, in this type of individualism, competition is in itself a threat both to individualism and to the values to which it is anchored. Interpersonal relationships are also strongly influenced by how collective and individual dimensions are weighed up against one another. What is to weigh more heavily, and why? Up to this point, I have highlighted the legitimacy and necessity of both dimensions; but we must look at questions of weighing up and of priority. There are profound ideological divisions on this point, with a scale from the explicitly liberalistic to the socialistic and Marxist. A liberalistic emphasis on the individual dimension very often problematizes relationships in fellowship and the possibility of collaboration; it is more natural for the individual to take care of his own concerns, thereby coming into a tense competitive relationship to other individuals. Giving priority to the collective entails finding solutions in fellowship and putting emphasis on building relationships. In some cases, however, there is a drawback to this kind of priority. The collective dimension can be forced on people, and relationships are created without the necessary presuppositions in individuals who enter into these relationships. Such relationships are artificial, and they can violate the human being’s individual presuppositions and rights. The relationship to other people is very important in human life. The tension that always exists between individual and collective dimensions, and the priority given to one or the other of them, is reflected directly in the question of the significance of competition between people. A strong individualization points in the direction of competition, whereas an enforced collectivity gives priority to collaboration rather than competition. What does this mean? Does it mean that competition can be legitimated only in relation to the individual human dimension, and that all competition conflicts with the human person as a relational being? Or, putting the same question in different terms, are good human relationships put under strain in a competitive context? Interpersonal Relationships in a Competitive Context—Ethical Perspectives The question of interpersonal relationships and their quality has an ethical character. Moral presuppositions are embedded in the definition of the relationship between collective and individual dimensions, and these

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presuppositions are important for evaluation of the function and status of the idea of competition. The idea of competition must be measured on the basis of moral standards or principles. In the present context, I shall limit myself to a brief presentation of the ethical presuppositions that are actualized in an interpersonal relationship of this kind. The key terms here are reciprocity, loving one’s neighbor, and trust. The problem thus is how the idea of competition looks when it is measured against these interpersonal ethical presuppositions. The principle of reciprocity is known as a moral principle in many very different cultural contexts. In our context, it is above all its elaboration in the Greek and Jewish/Christian contexts (the Golden Rule) that has been the most important.7 Its simple demand is that you should do to others what you wish them to do to you.8 We quickly note that this is a moral principle with a formal character. It says nothing about what actions satisfy the formal demand for reciprocity. In various traditions where the idea of reciprocity plays a role, the ethics and the demand are given a content from other texts; in Christianity, the source is the ethical material in the Bible.9 This principle stipulates that no distinction should be made in human relationships with regard to the treatment of different parties in the relationship. One example of a concretization of the principle is that one should not take advantage of other people’s weaknesses in order to promote one’s own interests. Since one wishes that others should take account of one’s own weaknesses, it would be wrong to exploit their weaknesses. The example shows that the principle of reciprocity can easily have a critical function vis-à-vis the idea of competition. In sport, but also in the economy, it is possible that one factor in the victory in competition can be linked precisely to the exploitation of other people’s weak sides. The idea of loving one’s neighbor is closely connected to the principle of reciprocity. In the Christian tradition, the Golden Rule is seen as an expression of the Christian idea of loving one’s neighbor. There is, however, a difference, related to the content in the imperative that lies in the idea of love. Reciprocity is meant to be marked by love and care. The idea of reciprocity as a measuring of what is given in comparison with what is received is out of place here. Equality in performance is not a presupposition—on the contrary, to make such a comparison would indicate that loving one’s neighbor was not at work. The idea of loving one’s neighbor is oriented to what my neighbor needs, and this need is not weighed up against what I can get from helping my neighbor.

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Accordingly, responsibility for the weak, for those who need care and love, is made even more directly explicit in this context. This idea of loving one’s neighbor, which is made concrete by the question of distribution, points clearly in the direction of prioritizing distribution on the basis of equality, but above all, on the basis of need. It is only at the next stage that effort and merit come into the picture. A regulatory principle that is colored by the idea of loving one’s neighbor is definitely closer to collaboration and to solutions taken in fellowship than to competition and to the ranking of people in the relationships in which they live. Competition can prevent relationships based on loving one’s neighbor from being realized among human beings. A very obvious question in this context is whether loving one’s neighbor can prevail and have a function in economic competition. Here, we are obliged to nuance the picture. On the one hand, economic competition is traditionally regarded as a means to promote efficiency and improve quality. As an efficient instrument for a good allocation of resources and for promoting quality, competition has a positive function, as it does when viewed from the perspective of loving one’s neighbor. To contribute to a competition is to help people to get what they need in order to live. On the other hand, it is difficult to see that the most central and decisive element in an economic competition is love and care for one’s competitor. Care is limited. This may be a question of respect, and a desire to follow the same rules of the game, which are (for example) concretized in the idea that all the competitors shall have equal possibilities at the start. In some cases, one cannot assume that even this presupposition will be met. In the course of the competition, the idea of looking after those who are left lying by the wayside, or who do not succeed in the competition, is very remote for most participants. The game is in course, and what counts is having ability and securing for oneself the best possible position. Thinking about other people’s possibilities and positions, and caring for them in their situation, is thus remote from most of the actors in situations of economic competition. Nor will competitors in business be willing to help their rivals achieve their goals, since that would almost always mean renouncing the possibility of achieving one’s own goal. It is here that we recognize the idea of economic competition from the neoclassical tradition. As I mentioned earlier in the book (Chapter 4), there was also an integral element of sympathy in Adam Smith’s classic account of the economy and competition. And this element of

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sympathy included an element of loving one’s neighbor, to a far greater degree than is the case in neoclassical thinking. The basic meaning of the word “sympathy” is compassion (literally, “suffering with”), that is to say, the will and desire to take care of those who are in a difficult situation. Since Smith saw this as an integral element in his economic theory, it necessarily influenced his understanding of competition. It is impossible to envisage a ruthless competition within a framework that also preserves the idea of sympathy for those against whom one is competing. Here, there is an element of care that is harder to perceive in today’s economic competition, but that Smith himself regarded as necessary in a correct understanding of how an economy should function and of the goals it was meant to serve. We find one modern variant of this thinking in Christian Arnsperger, whom I have mentioned earlier in the book (Chapter 7). Arnsperger (1996) is concerned about some of the same interests that we find in Smith, but he goes much further than Smith in seeing the negative consequences of the way in which the idea of competition functions in an economic context. Arnsperger’s starting point is Emmanuel Levinas’ theory of exteriority and responsibility for the other. In this sense, this directly concerns the significance of competition for interpersonal relationships. Arnsperger’s central point is that although economic competition can have positive functions with regard to efficiency and innovation, it helps to deny—on an ontological level—the “otherness” of individuals. Producers are subject to the forces of competition, which are propelled especially by the active search and demand of consumers. In this game, there is no space for exteriority (where the human being is understood as a unique person) and responsibility for others. The arena of competition is a warzone, and there are many “enemies” in economic competition. Firms can “kill” each other in a market; customers can “kill” a firm by abandoning it and having dealings only with another firm; individuals can “kill” each other by competing for jobs and positions. In economic theory, expenses of this kind are often called “adaptive costs.” Initially, one attempts to compensate for costs, for example, by transformation: those who lose their job in the steel industry are converted initially into textile workers, and then into warehouse workers, before they are finally given early retirement. These restructuring or adaptive costs are necessary on the path to economic equilibrium (Arnsperger 1996, pp. 14–15). This kind of “war” between actors presupposes distance and anonymization. Arnsperger, with reference to Levinas, claims that closeness and

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personal knowledge would make it impossible. He writes: “… entering a face-à-face with a person would make competition with that person—whether as an opponent or as a tool—impossible, or unbearable” (Arnsperger 1996, p. 15). If one truly looks into the eyes of another person, whether on the battlefield of war or in an economic competition, one cannot kill him (either literally or metaphorically). It is only on the basis of a strong anonymization of the human dimension and of human dimensions that one can see the possibility that economic competition has positive effects. Levinas’ project or vision gives Arnsperger a highly critical perspective on competition. It entails a denial of the other as a heteronomous, external individual, and in this sense Arnsperger sees economic competition as a means of destroying interpersonal relationships. He thus takes to a deeper level the criticism of economic competition that Frank Knight presented in the 1920s (Chapter 7). The fundamental element in Knight’s criticism was not only the problematic sociocultural consequences of competition, but its destructive function in interpersonal relationships. What, more precisely, causes this destruction of human relationships? Levinas affirms that the anonymization of human life, to which competition is one contributory factor, is caused by the economic character that influences the totality of life in society.10 In this economic system, we are all guilty, thanks to the fact that we are a part of it. By participating in it as consumers and keeping it alive as a system, we also bear responsibility for its negative consequences, including that which is the central driving force in the system, namely, competition (Arnsperger 1996, pp. 19–20). This is a fundamental human responsibility: a responsibility vis-à-vis the other.11 On this point, Levinas criticizes Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology: it is not intrinsically wrong, but it is incapable of stating in a satisfactory manner what it means to live as a human being. And this is highly unfortunate, because it means that the ethical dimension is neglected. It also opens the door to a legitimation of violence and war. This criticism implicitly also takes aim at an ontological legitimation of competition that is generated by the observation that the human being is as a matter of fact oriented to competition. Levinas wants to go behind the pre-ontological observation of how the human being is in the world, to get to the responsibility that the human being has vis-à-vis the other, a responsibility that encompasses much more than what the individual has done in purely factual terms. This is a constitutive responsibility of which the human being becomes conscious when he looks directly into the

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face of the other. This responsibility, which is a reflection of the infinite, of that which radiates out from the face of the other, is per se infinite. Accordingly, no one can say that he has done enough, has been sufficiently responsible, and can settle down in a kind of neutral state of existence. For Levinas, such a state does not exist. This criticism of competition as an economic motif is also connected to the criticism of the consumerist attitude that leads to an anonymous search for the best bargain. Arnsperger sees this kind of anonymous search as a radical dehumanization: I buy from another place, not from another person (Arnsperger 1996, p. 23). The relationships are not between persons, but between a person and a thing. How is one to break out of this consumer cage? Arnsperger claims that to some extent, it is a matter of breaking out of the circuit of work and consumption that determines human life to such an extent—a circuit that both increases competition and demands a continuous increase in growth and the use of resources. A breach with this circuit is also a breach with the consumer power that is itself a driving force in economic competition. One initial step out of this closed circuit is to become aware of how one has been held captive in this circuit of work and consumption. This can create the presuppositions for regaining a reasonable balance between work and leisure time. Making leisure time rather than consumption the priority would give human relationships a new possibility, as an alternative to the dehumanizing of the human being and of human relationships by the consumerist attitude. Arnsperger and Levinas see raising the awareness of the human being’s fundamental responsibility for the other as a way of preventing the idea of competition from destroying close and good human relationships. This then leads to the actualization of a central human phenomenon that is very important for interpersonal relationships: trust. Trust is a fundamental phenomenon in human existence, because without trust, no society would be able to function satisfactorily. Under normal circumstances, we meet with trust both those whom we know and those whom we do not know. We do not think that other people are thieves or liars, unless they have done things that show us this is the case. We also believe in each other’s words. We trust what the other tells us. Without such a trust, our lives and the relationships we have to other people would be “impaired” or “crippled.”12 How far a relationship can be said to be good depends in large part on whether it turns out to be a relationship of trust or distrust between parties.

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However, trust is not only a description of one important interpersonal relationship. Precisely as such, trust is necessary in human relationships. To display trust means exposing oneself. It is easy for trust to be misused, either by employing it against the one who has shown trust or by refusing to accept the other person’s trust; it may be that the latter is experienced as worse than the former. In one sense, to show another person trust is to put one’s life into the other person’s hands. The demand that this generates—and that, according to Knud E. Løgstrup, is given by the very fact of our existing in the way we do—is to take care of the life that is thus put into our hands. In every encounter between human beings, irrespective of the relationship and the external circumstances, there lies a demand of this kind. It is not explicitly stated, but it nevertheless has the function of a demand. It does not depend on a special revelation, nor on an agreement by anyone that it is necessary. It simply exists, as something given. Human life is led under such circumstances. The content of this demand is to take care of the life that trust puts into our hands (Løgstrup 1997, pp. 17–18). It is in this context that the idea of competition must legitimate itself. What place is there for trust in a competitive situation? I have mentioned above that trust is important in an economic context, especially in the framework of a non-perfect competitive situation (Chapter 6). Competitors need to have trust that agreements that have been made will be honored. If competition is to proceed in a good and useful way, actors must be able to rely on each other. Cheating prevents a competition from being honest and just. In this sense, trust is from the outset important in a competitive context. Where there is a focus on the orientation of competition to winning, trust is put more to the test. The trust that others show me—and that they expect to receive from me in return—can be sacrificed, if it becomes an obstacle to winning. To sacrifice trust is to sacrifice something that to some extent is invisible. This means that this does not leave a stain on the reputation of the one who sacrifices trust, unless the cheating is so crass that it is unmasked. The temptation to make this sacrifice is particularly great when the earnings or the prize of a competition are money or material values. For some people, these values compensate for the personal loss that is entailed in partly abandoning or in sacrificing the trust that is a fundamental presupposition for good human relationships. The ethical demand linked to trust is much more than a demand for honesty and a good competitive spirit: it is also a demand to take care

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of and protect what is weak. This can easily be neglected in a competition in which one important factor is the exploitation, to one’s own advantage, of other people’s weakness or lack of skill. The life or lives represented by one’s economic competitors are, in one sense, placed in other people’s hands, and they are not evaluated on the basis of their own intrinsic value and hence as something that one must take care of. This does not mean an explicit denial of people’s intrinsic value; rather, the intrinsic value and the need for care simply have no function where competition takes place and economic evaluations are predominant. When the intrinsic value and trust, as fundamental demands in human relationships, are divided up into different sectors, there occurs a devaluation of trust as a fundamental presupposition for all human life. At this point, the idea of economic competition finds itself particularly embarrassed, because the presuppositions inherent in the idea of competition mean that trust does not, and indeed cannot, be given the function it ought to have.13 The three ethical perspectives I have linked to the relationship between human beings are in reality three perspectives on one and the same reality. All three perspectives are oriented to the question of how we as human beings relate to one another. Reciprocity, loving one’s neighbor, and trust between people are concerned precisely with this. Competition has a function in the economy of allocating resources and improving quality, and this can be understood as taking thought for one’s neighbor. But the idea of competition cuts a poor figure when it is brought into relation to ethical values and norms that are meant to regulate well the relationship between people. This applies to the function of the idea of loving one’s neighbor in a concrete competition; to the presuppositions that competition establishes, if it is to function; and to the possibility of realizing trust as a fundamental value in relationships between people. Compassion, Competition, and Collaboration This focus on reciprocity, the relationship to one’s neighbor, and trust brings up once more the question of the relationship between competition and collaboration. Do these ethical perspectives lay down a more definitive guideline in the direction of either competition or collaboration than is indicated by our earlier discussions? Or is this a duality where both competition and collaboration are legitimate paths to a goal, and

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can be combined to some extent? George P. Brockway suggests the latter, when he formulates as follows the distinction and the connection between the two: “Competition is the mode of our individuality; cooperation is the mode of our humanity. The two modes are dialectical” (Brockway 2001, p. 179). It is not difficult to give examples of competitive situations in which interpersonal qualities fall short. Two groups are to put several jigsaw puzzles together. One group wants to compete among itself in order to get all the puzzles put together as quickly as possible; the other group wants to collaborate. The group with the competitive orientation is characterized by self-centeredness, closed communication, the potential for group conflict, and a measure of distrust. The collaborating group is marked by open communication, the will to share information, and the creation of friendships. The collaborative group does more than the competitive group to create good relationships, because the orientation to fellowship makes a greater contribution than self-centeredness; goodwill helps more than jealousy, openness more than a closed attitude, and trustful friendship more than distrust among competitors. But the picture is not unambiguous. Let us take another example. Two boys want to play in the same position in a football team and compete with each other to obtain this. In this situation, there are two possibilities. They can collaborate on physical and mental levels, so that both become better, and the team will be able to make a choice between two improved footballers. The alternative is that one attempts to exclude the other.14 Competition can be combined with collaboration; it is not related exclusively to aggression, jealousy, and battle lines between people. In general, however, it must be said that competition contributes to a lesser extent than collaboration to the realization of good interpersonal relationships. The intention of getting the best result, or of winning, relegates one’s neighbor and fellow human being to second place: I myself and my own interests occupy first place. At the same time, I have pointed to two aspects of self-interest that can have positive consequences for other people: the human being’s self-interest is very significant for the way in which one takes care of the relationship to one’s own self. A good and clarified relationship to oneself is very important for the relationship to other people. Second, self-interest creates a dynamic in a competitive situation. The goals that one sees in this situation can also be important for other people, especially in an economic competition.

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We must however also note that competition does not always correspond to the human being’s self-interest. The weight that competition places on the individual dimension can very easily lead to isolation, a lack of human contact, and reduced possibilities of meaningful human relationships. There is also a corresponding, albeit opposite danger in collaboration. This is meant to serve shared interests, and in many cases actually does. But sometimes, collaboration opens the door to strategies that serve, not the fellowship, but individuals or group interests. It is possible in a collaborating group for fractions to form, promoting special interests, and there is a risk that collaboration may function as a disguise for the more individual strategies and interests of strong persons. Shared interests are neglected here, and self-interest is concealed behind an outward show of collaboration. It is thus not always the case that competition furthers self-interests, while collaboration furthers shared interests that bring about good social relationships between people. The possibilities of competition and self-interest in an interpersonal context seem limited. The positive possibility is linked to one decisive question: Should self-interest be the primary thing, or ought it to be balanced and seen in connection with shared human interests? Where self-interest becomes primary and priority is given to competition, the possibilities of reciprocity, loving one’s neighbor, and trust are reduced. This opens up no space for close and developing fellowships among people. Where there is a balance between self-interest and shared interests, this makes possible the development of such fellowships, in which there is a close relationship between collaboration and competition. Competition is oriented above all to one’s own well-being, while collaboration focuses on the well-being of the group or fellowship. Working together as a group will only rarely be a strategy for the maximization of one’s own utility. From the perspective of competition, the obvious question is: Will I lose, if the focus is on what best serves the group? This question concerns the actual result; sometimes, or even perhaps most frequently, one will not do so well, even if one possesses ability. On the other hand, this question reflects the idea that individual human presuppositions are more important than presuppositions related to the fellowship. This is not the case everywhere. In some places, the question and the comparison are utterly foreign; it would be as if the feet were to ask whether it was right that the body as such, without “paying” for it, should benefit from the fact that it was the feet that did the jogging.

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Fellowship and collaboration are a completely established and organic aspect of what it is to be human. A comparison between the place and function of collaboration and fellowship in sport and the competitive economy will most likely show that sport has somewhat more space than the economy for such values. But this rule is not without its exceptions. There is a historical example in the Norwegian context of an economic actor who included the idea of collaboration in an economic activity in a special way. This activity was also related to presuppositions of the competitive economy. I have in mind here the Norwegian revivalist preacher and economic entrepreneur Hans Nielsen Hauge (1771–1824; see Ravnåsen 2013; Ravnåsen 2002).15 Hauge’s economic activity was wide-reaching, both in person and via his friends (Nodtvedt 1965, pp. 244–246). He saw no contradiction between a lively and intense concern with spiritual questions and making the most of one’s talents as a good steward (Aarflot 1979, p. 157). Spirit and hand, the spiritual and the practical economic activity, were highly compatible (Ravnåsen 2013, p. 15; Nodtvedt 1965, p. 52). He believed that human beings had a responsibility and an obligation to use the skills and resources that they had received. The individual should administer or take care of God’s work of creation in a good way, and his activity should serve a good goal. Hauge envisaged this goal in broad terms. The establishing of economic activities enabled people to get work, thus bringing relief to poverty and distress. Hauge saw trade and industry as implementing the commandment to love one’s neighbor. The economic activity of Hauge and the Haugeans was largely successful. It was carried out in a completely normal secular context, where Hauge and the Haugean merchants had to assert themselves in the competition with other actors in the market. As one such actor, Hauge too was concerned with competition and with the significance of acquiring competitive advantages on the basis of an idea of human freedom; in this sense, liberal Enlightenment motifs played an important role in his thinking. It is, however, characteristic of Hauge that his understanding of competitive advantages involved collaboration and fellowship. The advantage was linked to collaboration among the Haugeans. They supported each other both with professional knowledge and with money and loans, in order to start up and expand their enterprises. This created a network that many other actors did not possess. But the idea of fellowship went further: in a sense, the competition itself took place in the spirit of collaboration. Hauge took it for granted that one looked

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after one’s neighbor—and this applied both to the neighbor who could benefit from trade and to the neighbor with whom one competed in the market. This attitude was connected to the threat to the fellowship that Hauge identified in egotism: “We should beware of all outward appearance of pride and selfishness” (quoted in Ravnåsen 2013, p. 12). Hauge and his friends gave priority to the interests of the fellowship, rather than to the possibility of individual profits: “Whatever is entrusted to faithful stewards should be dedicated to the purpose of carrying on useful commerce for the benefit of all … The more we are entrusted with, the more diligent we must be, lest we become unfaithful and extravagant, and keep the profit ourselves” (quoted in Aarflot 1979, p. 161). Is this a relevant parallel to the idea of competition in our days? In one sense, this is not the case. Hauge was not acquainted with the neoclassical thinking about competition, nor is it possible to verify that he was familiar with Adam Smith and his ideas. Nevertheless, there are connecting lines here. Smith’s ideas of self-control, sympathy, and the importance of fellowship correspond to some degree to Hauge’s ideas (Thorbjørnsen 2001; Sejersted 1995). The actors in economic activity are responsible for more than just caring for themselves and their own interests. Hauge is an example of how collaboration can function even in an economic context in which competition plays a role, but where the alternatives between competition and collaboration do not become as sharp as they appear to be today. Hauge’s project, in which he united spirit and hand, has been called a “counter-culture” in his time. This counter-culture was marked by the preference given to concern for one’s fellow human being rather than to concern for one’s own power and winning (Ravnåsen 2013, p. 43). Today, one would have to underline, even more strongly than in the past, that this deserves to be called a counter-culture. In our economic and societal context, it can almost seem too much to ask that one should measure economic (and sporting) competition against the development of good and functioning human relationships, but this situation need not prevent us from finding inspiration, and something of a critical potential, in Hauge’s thinking and praxis.16 We should not forget here that Hauge’s ideas about collaboration and concern for one’s neighbor were located in a context characterized by competition between merchants and the owners of businesses. It is at least as important and necessary today as in the past to examine the significance of the idea of competition, and its consequences for interpersonal relationships.

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Compassion, Competition, and Basic Human Values The quality of interpersonal relationships also depends on the status and value that the parties accord to each other. Where there are great differences and divergent assessments of values between the partners in a relationship, it is harder for it to function well in interpersonal terms. Where there is an “above” and a “below,” it will be hard for the one who is “below” to establish a good relationship to the one who is “above.” Indeed, in many cases, the one who is “above” will not be interested in establishing a good human relationship to the one who is “below.” Necessary human relationships will then be established to others to whom one accords the same values and who are on the same level as oneself. Competition opens the door to some extent to this kind of ranking between people: the winner is looked at differently from number two and number three, and, of course, from the loser. The ranking that competition entails affects the relationships between people. If one starts from a position of feeling inferior, it is especially difficult to establish good and lasting relationships to those who are superior. Where these are established, this tends to be on the premises of the superior: the inferior adapts to him or her, and the relationship takes on a quality of submissiveness. This creates poor presuppositions for good interpersonal relationships. The ranking entailed by a competition will nevertheless usually not mean that human beings’ equality and intrinsic value are put at risk. The ranking takes place on the basis of differences in skills and performances. Where interpersonal relationships have their deepest anchoring in human beings’ equality and intrinsic value, competition will not reduce the basis of these relationships. We must not, however, close our eyes to the possibility that competition, and the ranking that is an element in competition, may sometimes attack equality and intrinsic value. The differences among competitors are determined on the basis of their varying skills and performances. Such a difference can be observed empirically, and most people are content with this. Others—and history offers many examples here—go one step further and hold that the one who is not good and has little ability is worth less than the one who is capable and skillful, the one who truly attains good results. The value of a human being is measured in terms of what he does, not what he is, and losers have less value than winners. This puts equality at risk. The same can happen to human beings’

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intrinsic value. One essential aspect of competition is its inclusion of some instrumental elements. In order to succeed and win, one obvious temptation is to use others, including one’s competitors, as means. In general, it can be said that we, as human beings, are often used as means for other people; nevertheless, one’s intrinsic value can be preserved, provided that one is always also an end in oneself. In a competitive situation, this duality can cease to apply, so that the only function my fellow human being has in my eyes is as a means that I employ. That is all that he signifies for me. Is my fellow human being still an end in himself? Under such competitive situations, the very foundation of interpersonal relationships, namely equality and intrinsic value, will be removed, or will at least be under threat. Competition can then pose a serious threat to good interpersonal relationships. At the same time, as I have said, it is a threat to the human being’s fundamental dignity, which is anchored in his intrinsic value and finds expression for one thing in the equality of all human beings. This is actualized in a special way in the global economic arena. There is very little in the way of economic competition between institutions or firms in the poor Third World and corresponding bodies in the rich Western world; the expansive economies in parts of Asia must gradually also be included in the latter category. There is no real competition here, because the relative strengths are too different. The problem is: What place is given to poor countries and poor persons in the Third World in the competition that goes on in the rich world? How are their fundamental human values preserved? A great deal of the raw materials and production on which the strength in the Western competitive economy is based involve poor countries and poor persons. Powerful economic actors from the West and East are concerned with profit; they want the cheapest possible raw materials and workforce. Since poor countries lack power and depend on others if they are to sell their raw materials and get work for their inhabitants, it is clear that they are not going to make excessively harsh demands. Putting pressure on a country or a human being that is weak and paying extremely low wages entails a problematic relationship to fundamental human values such as intrinsic value and equality. This also implies a marked tendency to evaluate human beings almost exclusively as means for others’ profit—not as individuals who also are an end in themselves.

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Compassion, Competition, Emotions, and Empathy Most forms of competition involve emotions—lots of emotions. This finds expression above all in sporting competitions, both among athletes and spectators. The emotions are involved in economic competition too, although this is more a matter of a calculating rationality, characterized by cool reckoning rather than by warm feelings. The Homo oeconomicus is marked much more strongly by rationality than by emotions. The emotions in competition are limited to some extent to the competitors, seen in isolation. Positive emotions are unleashed when things are going well for oneself, for the firm, or for the team that one follows. Negative emotions can be unleashed by misfortune, but also by what one regards as unjust decisions or perhaps as cheating by the other side. Positive emotions can create good relationships among the fans, and perhaps even a friendly attitude toward the losers. Negative emotions can create lines of conflict between competitors, and sometimes among their supporters.17 Such feelings in connection with competition do not generate good relationships among people. The essence of competition includes not only warm and enthusiastic feelings. For strategic reasons, competitors need to play their cards close to their chests. Isolation, coldness, and a lack of involvement are likewise aspects of competition. When one believes that something can contribute to victory, one does not reveal this to one’s adversary. In the economy, this can apply both to production and investment. Such strategies demand a general aloofness and distance vis-à-vis one’s competitors. In comparison to other human relationships, one would say that there is a kind of human coldness here. In this sense, one can say that empathy, understood from the basic meaning of the word as sharing in suffering, or compassionate concern for another person, is not a strong characteristic of a competitive situation, especially before and during competition, but to some extent also afterward. It is seldom that victorious competitors show losers the compassion and empathy that they might need. This, however, is not the whole picture. Both in the economy and in sport, there will also be competitive environments with good human relationships. Here, people meet in various professional and business contexts, and friendship and comradeship can develop despite the competitive situation in which they find themselves professionally. In sport, the World Cup circuses are one example of this. The competitive situation itself sets limits to how far such relationships can develop. The necessary

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goal-orientation and winner’s attitude—which are, of course, present in top-level sports, but are also found in the economy—demand considerable isolation, both in a physical and a more emotional and mental sense. The positive human relationship that can be found in professional meetings—in the case of athletes, in the time between specific competitions— will always be colored additionally by the need for distance that is entailed by competition and the desire to win. In a competitive situation (understood both narrowly and broadly), the empathetic element will always be limited and conditional. In most competitions there will be many feelings but little genuine empathy. This has consequences for the kind of human relationships that can be connected to competitive situations, and for the relationships that can be developed from these situations. Compassion, Competition, Justice, and Power Lack of empathy is connected with the calculating character that is typical of competitive situations. The most important thing is what can be measured in time and extent, and the surplus that can be counted. In one sense, this is accepted. With regard to interpersonal relationships, however, it is important that the differences and the ranking that this exposes should take place justly: in other words, the ranking must be done on the basis of differences in skill and effort. It is determined in a just manner on the basis of what is most obvious in a competitive situation, namely, the principle of merit. Although (as I have mentioned) there are strategic elements in competitive situations that limit interpersonal closeness, there is some space for this kind of closeness, if competitors feel that no injustice is being done. One accepts that others are better than oneself. If the result expresses the fact that justice has been fully done, there is a better likelihood that one can have a good interpersonal relationship to one’s competitors, even if one is among the losers. This is much harder if the result is determined by other presuppositions, for example, where it is power structures, rather than effort, skill, and merit, that help to determine the outcome of a competition. Such power structures are often linked to money and economic strength, and can steer the result in one particular direction. A sporting competition where only some of the participants have access to the economic resources that are decisive for the training and preparation for a competition will be felt to be unjust. An economic actor who is put under

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pressure by another who has greater economic or political power will also experience competition as problematic. Competitive situations of this kind, where some actors explicitly or implicitly use their power, are a further limitation to the possibility that competition will preserve good interpersonal relationships. In such situations, the front lines will be hardened, and it will be easy for actors to see each other as enemies. The increasing importance of economic power in various competitive situations weakens the possibility of establishing good and functioning human relationships. This aspect of power in economic competition is particularly prominent where the perspective is no longer only on internal competition in a Western context, but also has a global character. In such a case, economic power dictates the agenda in an all-pervasive and partly oppressive way. In reality, it is here that economic competition thwarts its own self. It ought to counteract the possibility of monopolies or oligopolies, with the potential for power structures that these entail in the market; but the unrealistic element in a situation of almost perfect competition means that power constellations play an important role in economic competition, with negative consequences for the relationship between actors.

Competition and the Human Being’s Relationship to Nature The Human Being and Nature The relationship to nature that surrounds us has always been important for the human being, first and foremost because it has been a presupposition of our survival. Although crop failures and natural catastrophes have sometimes made it difficult for human beings to survive, and religious ideas have created fear of natural phenomena, the human being’s relationship to nature has not been regarded as problematic. Nature has often been thought of as a kind of inexhaustible storehouse. Over a long period, it was not necessary for the human being to think about the balance between what he extracts from nature and nature’s own status and integrity; but it is the maintenance of this balance that makes the human being’s relationship to nature problematic today. An economic system based on a market-oriented competitive economy, both locally and globally, is an important factor here.

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There are various reasons why the human being’s feeling of responsibility for nature, both for its preservation and its integrity, is limited. Some people think that nature’s value is its value for the human being: it has no intrinsic value of its own, and the human being ought to be able to use it in accordance with his own wishes, to meet whatever needs may arise. This kind of anthropocentric thinking about nature is, at least implicitly, one presupposition of a modern and partly irresponsible attitude to nature and its resources as something that is to be used. But this is not the only attitude; it is challenged by more holistic perspectives on both nature and human life, where the human being is seen in a larger context. He is not thought of only as the lord of nature, but also as part of nature. As such, he must accept the presuppositions by which nature itself is governed. Nature has in many ways been so much taken for granted, so near at hand and so necessary for the human being, that it has to some extent been neglected as an object of reflection, especially among ordinary ­people. In today’s situation, with the climate crisis and its consequences, but also with the reduction in biodiversity and a growth in the global population, such a reflection is an absolute necessity. It must include the priorities of human daily living, but also the economic system that is the presupposition for the consumer society that is typical of the Western world and is gradually spreading to many other parts of the world too. What a human being uses strongly influences his relationship to nature and to nature’s own integrity. It is in this context that the idea of competition is actualized in many various versions. Competition, the Human Being and Nature Competition in a market economic context concerns the allocation and use of resources. This means that there is a clear link between competition and nature and the use of natural resources. The generation of growth is intrinsic to the idea of competition, and this makes it function expansively in relation to the use of natural resources, both those that are renewable and those that are not. This relationship to nature is special with regard to economic competition, but it can also be found in other competitive contexts in which economic circumstances have become a part of the competition at a secondary stage. This is particularly true of some sports, where a very comprehensive apparatus has been built up, demanding great resources. In

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football, there is an entire industry linked to equipment, paraphernalia for fans, and “experiences.” It can certainly be useful to construct buildings and arenas, but these may not be used very much after big events. This too can generate a problematic use of natural resources and natural spaces. Motorsport is another example where sport, economic interests, and the preservation of nature can clash with regard to the use of resources, pollution, and biological and aesthetic vandalism. The relationship between economic competition, the human being, and nature has far greater consequences than is the case in sport, because the human being’s relationship to nature concerns human livelihood and the satisfaction of fundamental human needs. As such, it is something that concerns all of us, unlike sport, which—whether seen from the athlete’s perspective or from the spectator’s—concerns only a small number of people. In our economic system, these human needs are taken care of in the framework of a competitive economy. Competition, as a very central driving force in the economy, means that the human being’s relationship to nature is largely determined by the presuppositions on which the competitive economy depends, on which it builds, and which it organizes. Every economic activity touches on the human being’s relationship to nature. Even in a natural economy, people will use nature in order to satisfy various needs. With regard to human survival and meeting fundamental needs, there is thus no difference in principle between different economic systems, and the competitive economy certainly also has a legitimate aspect, since it helps people to get what they need in order to live and to survive as human beings. The differences manifest themselves first and foremost when it is a question of which needs are to be satisfied, and of the dynamic that is built into various economic systems. The competitive economy is distinguished here by its expansive orientation. In a natural economy, one will be cautious about how one uses the resources of nature, for various reasons. One factor is religious: in today’s world, economies of this kind exist in contexts where development is not advanced and the religious element plays a decisive role in the understanding of reality. Nature is included in this religious universe. Nature gives gifts to human beings. In this way, the religious picture of the world stops human beings from exploiting and harming nature. A second factor is that such contexts are unacquainted with any use that goes beyond covering more fundamental needs. It is true that there are religious and aesthetic needs that also can demand a use of nature that

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goes beyond what is absolutely necessary to maintain life, but in a larger context, these are very modest needs. A competitive economy is much more expansive. It could not survive if it did not contain a dynamic that demanded the satisfaction of needs that went beyond the vitally important. This is because stagnation, the status quo, and regression are incompatible with a functioning competitive economy that demands growth: the actors are obliged to keep on discovering new wares or services for which they can compete. If the object of their competition cannot be derived from existing needs, the challenge is to create new needs that can maintain the expansive tempo in the economy. There is an element of wastefulness in the very nature of the competitive economy. On the one hand, the competitors must use resources in order to promote their concerns in the market (e.g., by means of advertising), and such a use of resources is unproductive. On the other hand, competitors operate in a given trading area or industry with products they claim to be different and better than those offered by a competitor. In some cases this will indeed be true, but in many cases the differences between wares are minimal. To produce and offer for sale wares that are more or less identical is also a wasteful use of resources. This praxis often means that many of the wares that are produced remain unsold and must therefore be destroyed. Such a praxis further underlines this aspect of the competitive economy: it really squanders resources. An economy that functions in this way makes great demands on resources, and this has consequences. The large-scale thinking that forms the basis of efficiency and profit focuses more on the product than on the consequences of production. There is, of course, an awareness in many countries that nature must be kept free of pollution, and the situation today is much better than it might have been. However, the competitive economy as a system is so strongly focused on economic profit that it is continuously on the lookout for loopholes in regulations; and where there are no regulations at all, it exploits this situation. It is not for nothing that polluting industries, which generally give higher returns than pollution-conscious industries on every cent that is invested, are located in countries where regulations are more lenient and where the need for workplaces is enormous. Sometimes, regulations do in fact exist, but they are often breached, since this can increase profit; perpetrators hope that this will go undetected. This expansive function of the competitive economy implies, from the human perspective, that we increasingly subdue nature to ourselves.

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An anthropocentric relationship to nature correlates with this way of thinking. There is an obvious temptation for the human being to understand his role as that of a lord over nature, who can do with it whatever he himself finds appropriate. And what is “appropriate” here is the satisfaction of his needs, both necessary and unnecessary. Presuppositions of this kind will influence one’s relationship to nature. What consequences does the competitive economy have for the human being’s relationship to nature? An expansive economy demands a very high use of resources, which approaches the limit that nature can sustain, or even goes over this limit; this applies both to resources that are extracted from nature and the consequences of using them, which exceed what is sustainable for nature. In many cases, nature cannot recuperate after large amounts of resources are extracted from it; one classic example here is the felling of tropical forests. Forests are felled in order to get income from selling timber, although sometimes the timber is burnt in order to get quicker access to soil; this also makes it possible to cultivate the ground and to use such cultivated ground as pasture for cattle. This process is possible over a short period. But since there is little soil in a tropical forest, its ability to recuperate after continuous grazing is limited. After a few years, the soil deteriorates and becomes unusable. If better conditions are available elsewhere, this particular piece of land becomes a desert. In this way, organic nature is exploited beyond its own sustainability and ability to renew itself—and it diminishes. And human beings, who live on the Earth and are dependent on nature, are left poorer. This applies to resources that are renewable in principle but that become non-renewable as a result of short-term economic thinking. With regard to the genuinely non-renewable resources, there is simply no choice: they are definitively non-renewable. Nevertheless, it is tempting to extract new resources, so that living standards and economic growth can be safeguarded in the present day. It is easy to think that resources are huge, and that there will be something for everyone. But such an idea cannot be taken for granted, nor is it responsible, especially in view of those who will live on this Earth after us. One can expect that new oil resources will be discovered in the future, but even so, we are speaking here of non-renewable, not of renewable resources. Such resources must be called input factors in human society. This is not the only aspect of human life on Earth today that is affected by economic development; this affects even more fundamental parameters.

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Today, we face a climatic development that can change these factors. A general warming of the Earth by even a few degrees would create completely different presuppositions for billions of people’s lives. The seas would rise, and there would be more severe weather. There appears to be little doubt that human beings themselves are guilty here, through their highly expansive industrial and economic development in recent decades.18 The market-oriented competitive economy, in all its breadth, is a motor in this development. The human need for transport on land, at sea, and in the air is an extremely important factor here. The basic presuppositions of the climatic crisis involve the products and services with which we in the Western world surround ourselves, that we use every day, and that we regard as a matter of course―and these are things that people in the truly populous parts of the world now want to get their share of. The consequences are the gradual reduction and lessening of the natural basis for human life as a whole: first and foremost the physical basis, but also the mental and aesthetic basis. The physical dimension is linked to a reduction in resources, both renewable and non-renewable, that the human being can extract from nature, but it also includes very serious consequences for people’s health and for the climate. Pollution causes grave damage to the health of millions of people. Extreme phenomena, such as rising sea levels and marine temperatures, destroy dwellings and the most basic presuppositions for dwellings; arable land is flooded and dries out; and fish resources are affected. All this results in climate refugees. The physical dimension also includes a reduction in biodiversity, which is one consequence of cutting down tropical woods and making other changes to nature’s own presuppositions. This is how the human being can deprive both himself and future generations of the possibility of developing healing medicines and new plants that produce food. The mental dimension concerns the element of recreation that untouched (and cautiously touched) nature has always offered the human being. Here, the soul can find rest when everyday life is hectic. Nature that is exploited or destroyed does not have the same presuppositions for this kind of mental restoration. The aesthetic dimension is linked to the mental. Nature has inspired not only painters, but also ordinary people, and it has provided aesthetic experiences that have helped to give a deeper meaning to their experience of existence. When nature’s own aesthetic presuppositions are disturbed, it is harder for the human being to get a share in a reality outside the given physical world.

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We have not yet reached that point, since there is still a great deal of untouched nature in the world, as one who writes from a Norwegian perspective can easily observe. This is more difficult for those who live in strongly industrialized regions, although much has been done to limit emissions and to redirect consumption and production in a more environmentally friendly and sustainable direction. However, the climate crisis is not restricted to places where human beings live—it is global. In this perspective, it is harder to speak of “untouched” nature. People are gradually beginning to wake up; but they find it extremely difficult to give up anything comfortable to which they are accustomed. Two important factors here are time and geography. The truly serious consequences still lie in the future, and the situation locally does not command attention. With the exception of a few floods and strong winds that blow the roofs off houses, make it dangerous to be out of doors, and deprive us of electricity for a few hours, we do not see much of the climate crisis, and it is tempting to think that this too could be solved in the same way as other challenges in a context of economic competition are solved. People trust that technological development will solve the problems. If economic development creates enough resources for a continued technological expansion, we can switch off the alarms. But is this true? New motors and new cleaning technology in the energy sector can certainly help to limit global warming, but the technology that is meant to develop this will itself demand some form of input. It will enable winning, but at the same time may also prevent us from adequately tackling the fundamental causes of the situation we have landed in. One of these is precisely a competitive economy that is essentially consumerist and very expansive, at a cost to both nature and human beings.

Competition and the Human Being’s Relationship to God The Human Being in Relationship to God The human being’s relationships to himself, to others, and to the nature that surrounds him, are in one sense given relationships that everyone has. They are not always recognized to the same degree, and priorities between them can differ largely from one person to another. The situation regarding the human person’s relationship to God is different. Some recognize that the human being is in a relationship to God because they believe in a God, while others do not do so. If the God in whom

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one believes is also understood as a creator God, all human beings are included in the relationship to God, even if they do not believe in God and therefore do not know him. Although the relationship to God is in one sense exclusive, it is also relevant in this context. Very many people believe in a God and find orientation for their life in this faith, although to varying degrees. In a Norwegian context—and to a great extent in a Western context too—it is natural to look at the question of the relationship to God on the basis of Christianity’s image of God and of those aspects of the idea of competition that are actualized in the encounter with this idea of God. This is true, even if the context that I have just mentioned is marked by increasing secularization and religious pluralism. The relationship to God is one of four relationships in human life; but once one begins to see the relationship to God as important for the human being, it is not only one out of four. It has a prioritized position, because it is on a higher level. It has a steering function vis-à-vis the other relationships and determines their content in moral terms. The human being’s relationship to God has consequences for his relationship to himself. The significances of the human ego are relativized in the encounter with God. The relationship to God makes the human being’s obligation vis-à-vis his neighbor very central in a person’s life. Love to God is to be reflected on the horizontal level, in the relationship to one’s fellow human being. It is God’s will that the human being should assume responsibility for his neighbor. The relationship to God also entails a human responsibility vis-à-vis nature: God is the creator of nature and wants the human being to take care of it, for the sake of the creator, for his own sake, and for his fellow human being’s sake, both now and in view of future generations. With regard to this last point, it is worth mentioning that belief in God generates different obligations in various religious contexts. Some obligate the human being in relation to nature in the sense that he is to take care of it as a steward. Nature is not divine in itself, and the human being is in principle both a part of nature and superior to it. This is the case in Christianity. Other religions accord nature a status that is almost, or wholly, divine. This greatly strengthens respect for the natural element and the moral obligation to keep nature untouched. And this means that the human being must accept his place in nature: he is not to be its lord.19

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Competition, the Human Being and God What does competition have to do with the reality of God? The Bible uses the image of a competition in several passages in order to express important spiritual realities in the life of a Christian. In classical Greece, the idea of competition was oriented to winning and to honoring the winner. It took on a new content in a Christian context, where the point was not to beat others in competition. The direction was reversed, toward the person himself. Paul uses the image of the runner here (see 1 Cor 9:24–27: Phil 2:16; 3:12–14), where the main point was the maximum effort that one should put into the race, and the victory prize that awaited one. And this victory prize was nothing other than salvation for the individual. This salvation never came at the expense of others’ salvation. The goal of the competition was not happiness and prowess, as in classical Greece, but salvation (see Hognestad 1994, pp. 84–85, 113; Treat 2018). However, this metaphor does not supply a direct legitimacy to the idea of competition in a Christian context. It is more natural to think that competition, as an activity in the concrete and material world, is antithetical to a wish to live in a spiritual relationship to God. Competition, whether in sport, the economy, or in an educational context, mostly concerns concrete and material values. As I have mentioned, there are some who hold that competition among human beings shows that we are related to animals. This relatedness shows that the distance between God and the human being is greater than the closeness; it also shows the significance of the idea of competition in this context. Competition’s closeness to the questions of self-interest, self-realization, and egotism also means that, to the extent that it concerns the relationship to God, it is linked more to the insight into human rebellion and opposition to God than to what promotes the human being’s relationship to God. This relationship need not, however, always be oriented outward and upward, so that it is external to the human being himself. Some people search for God and find him in their own selves. The whole of the mystical tradition has this orientation. With this starting point, self-prioritization and self-centeredness are means that can further the relationship to God. But given these presuppositions, it is doubtful whether competition can have a positive function in realizing the relationship to God. It is important in a Christian context to underline that the human being’s relationship to his own self is a legitimate concern. As God’s

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creature, the human being can and should think well and highly of himself. The Bible speaks of this in many passages, such as Gen 1 and Ps 8. Self-love is legitimate, and functions also as a goal for the intensity of loving one’s neighbor, as this requirement is expressed in the double commandment of love (Matt 22:36–39). This also makes human self-realization legitimate. Both self-love and self-realization are essential presuppositions of the idea of competition, but there are clear boundaries in Christianity for how far they can be stretched. These boundaries are present both in the relationship to God and in the relationship to one’s fellow human beings. Preoccupation with oneself, and with one’s desire to be the best and the center of all attention, conflicts with the adoration of God and with the preoccupation with God as the center of existence. Where other people, their fates, and situations are overshadowed by self-interest, the boundary for legitimate self-preoccupation and self-interest has been crossed. The human being is indeed meant to be able to realize himself and his presuppositions, but this realization is also meant to function as a part of God’s realization of his plan for the world. This means that my interests are seen in connection with the interests of others, that I have to take them into consideration, and that in some cases have to give priority to the interests of others at a cost to my own. The self-interest and egocentricity that are an important basis of competition do indeed have a relative legitimacy in Christian anthropology, but precisely because its orientation is always based on the human being’s relationship to God, there exist boundaries for self-interest and egocentricity. And these are also boundaries for the legitimacy of competition. The relationship between God and the human being is expressed in several religious contexts as trust and distrust. This mode of expression is understandable, if one looks at the relationship on the basis of the concept of faith. To believe, in a religious sense, means both holding that a religious matter is true and also having trust in him who, or that which, is the object of religious veneration. In Christianity, this relationship of trust is absolutely basic, if one is to understand both the relationship to God and who the human being is. At the creation, God had meant that the human being should live in a relationship of trust to God. The human being rebelled against God precisely by putting a question mark over this trust. The serpent in paradise asked: “Did God really say …?” (Gen 3:1). The entire project of salvation in Christianity is the reopening of this possibility of living in a relationship of trust or faith in God. It is here that one realizes one’s true humanity. And it is this fundamental

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relationship of trust that is reflected in the other relationships and obligations in which the human being lives: Do I trust that God’s will is the best for my relationship to my neighbor, my relationship to nature, and my relationship to myself? There are many other people and things that humans trust in life. If one goes up in a plane, one trusts that the pilots can handle it and that the plane has qualities that keep it aloft when it is meant to be in the air, and that allow it to land where one wants it to land. In a competitive relationship, the object of one’s trust is narrowed down. The focus is either on my own self or on things that can help me to win the competition. Where the absolute priority is the desire to win, other relationships of trust become less important. Martin Luther once said that “anything on which your heart relies and depends, I say, that is really your God” (Kolb and Wengert 2000, p. 386). Modern competition in various arenas prompts the question whether Luther was prescient with regard to the form of sacralization of some competitive activities that we experience today. The boundaries that the relationship to God posits for the human desire to prioritize one’s own self apply to the relationship to one’s neighbor too. People in general accord a varying priority to consideration of one’s neighbor, and this is true of Christians also. Theologically speaking, however, there is little doubt that consideration of one’s neighbor has a high priority in Christianity, even if this does not always appear to be the case. In relation to the idea of competition, this entails that responsibility for one’s neighbor is more important than the need for, and the possible legitimacy of, being better than one’s neighbor and beating him. The significance of the relationship to God for the understanding of one’s responsibility for one’s neighbor represents a considerable critical potential vis-à-vis various forms of competition. These limitations are also reflected in the understanding of the function of freedom for human life and action. Christianity affirms that the human being is free, in the sense that he can choose his actions (bearing in mind the contextual mechanisms that steer actions, and that influence every human being) and that he can also steer what he does. This freedom is absolutely essential for human ethical responsibility, both in a general and Christian context (see Thorbjørnsen 1999). The human being is also free in a more theological sense. The tie to the law, which was characteristic of the Jews, and was and is their path to salvation, is not found in Christianity. “For freedom Christ has set us free,” says Paul

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in his Letter to the Galatians (Gal 5:1). This freedom, which is a priori unlimited in relation to being tied to the law, is understood within special parameters, for the sake of the human being: “All things are lawful, but not all things are beneficial. All things are lawful, but not all things build up. Do not seek your own advantage, but that of others” (1 Cor 10:23–24; cf. 6:12)—and: “For though I am free with respect to all, I have made myself a slave to all, so that I may win more of them” (1 Cor 9:19). Although it can be said that freedom is important in every competition, not every choice that is taken in freedom helps one in a competition. Competition also limits freedom in its own way. Paul employs this as a metaphor when he says in 1 Corinthians that an athlete must deny himself everything in order to win a crown that withers (1 Cor 9:25). But these limitations are of a different kind from those that spring from the parameters that limit freedom in the Christian sense: these Christian parameters are meant to prevent me from doing something that does not benefit me as a human being, to prevent anything from gaining power over me, and to prevent me from forgetting my responsibility for my neighbor. Such parameters are not immediately compatible with the freedom and the parameters that apply to the various forms of competition. In another sense, the human being’s relationship to God has absolutely nothing to do with competition. In a Christian context, it concerns the question of the human being’s salvation and is closely linked to the theological understanding of his or her justification. Competition plays no role of any kind here. In the Christian understanding, the human being is justified, that is to say, saved, on the basis of what Christ has done, namely, his death and resurrection for the sake of the human being. Salvation thus takes place completely independently of the human being’s own effort and work. One receives something that one does not in any way merit. The “prize” is given to the human being without any contribution on his part, and this means that he is drawn into a context in which competition plays no role. On this fundamental level, the human being is accepted completely independently of his accomplishments and efforts. This is completely different from the level on which a person stands when he competes; and this means that it is also a level on which the human being can find a foothold and a basis for living in the situation of defeat and loss. In this situation, the human being has special presuppositions for seeing the value in being accepted and being given a gift—the gift of salvation—without any merit at all on one’s part.

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If the human being is understood on the basis of his relationship to God, especially as this is understood in Christianity, does this set strict boundaries to his competitive activity? Certainly, boundaries are set, but their strictness is open to discussion. These boundaries concern especially the necessity of limiting human self-interest for the sake of the relationship both to God and one’s neighbor. The self-interest that is presupposed in some competitive contexts can come into direct conflict with the human being’s possibility of living in a relationship to God that is marked by trust and responsibility within the parameters of freedom that serve both God and one’s neighbor.

Competition, Human Relationships, and the Human Being’s Dignity In this chapter, I have illustrated the idea of competition on the basis of how it is actualized and how it functions in the four basic relationships in which the human being always lives. “Function” designates here not the technical aspects, but the values that competition promotes. These values concern the following questions: Does the human being’s participation in various forms of competition allow him to maintain a good and beneficial relationship to himself, to his fellow human beings, to the nature that surrounds him, and to God? Or does competition make these realities very problematic? And do any of these realities become more problematic than others? And what is especially problematic? A definition of something as good and beneficial builds on presuppositions with regard to values, which vary from person to person and from one worldview to another. The recognition of this fact does not, however, entail that people’s value choices are completely relative and that it is impossible to identify values that are shared by many people. Many would support values linked to a good self-image and the possibility of self-realization, a good and beneficial relationship to one’s fellow human beings, and a desire to care for nature. It is, of course, true that the limited level of precision in such a definition of values helps to achieve this agreement. At the same time, however, this is not an agreement that is devoid of reality and clarity in terms of values. This tendency allows us to say something about which relationships are most compatible, and which are least compatible, with the idea of competition, in terms of values.

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If we assess the various relationships with regard to the idea of competition, we can to some extent divide them into two groups. In the first group, we find the human being’s relationship to his own self; in the second group, we find the three other relationships. My discussion above has shown that the idea of competition seems to have a greater legitimacy where one’s relationship to one’s own self is at the center, although the human being’s intrinsic value challenges this legitimacy. It is more difficult to discern a basis for such a legitimacy in the other relationships, although there are elements there too that point in this direction. This difference is due to the essence of the idea of competition, which finds its primary orientation in the self and the self’s own interests. This orientation creates problems in the three other relationships, in which consideration of one’s fellow human beings, of nature, and of God plays a central role that must always be balanced against the legitimate consideration of one’s own self. The idea of competition, especially in the sense of economic competition, makes this balance problematic. In many instances, collaboration seems a more appropriate instrument than competition to realize this balance. This applies primarily to one’s fellow human beings, but also to the nature that surrounds us, if taking care of nature is seen as something that benefits both human beings (now and in the future) and nature itself. The relationship to God, as a higher relationship, is in a different category; here, it is not a question of collaboration instead of competition, but of organizing a human life in such a way that it reflects God’s will for the human being and for the world, so that one can take care of oneself, of one’s fellow human beings, and of nature in a good way that is responsible vis-à-vis God. This means that the problematic aspects of competition with regard to the relationships the human being has to its neighbors and nature are relevant in the relationship to God too. Competition between people and competition as an instrument can prevent the realization of God’s plan for the world and for the human being. This relational approach actualizes in various ways the question of human dignity. Although the precise definition of this dignity is conditioned by one’s worldview, this is true more on the level of justification than on the level of contents. The human being’s dignity is anchored to the idea that the human being is something in himself, independent of his qualities and accomplishments: this dignity is linked only to the fact that one is a human creature. It is thus given a dignity, irrespective of whether one justifies this affirmation by saying that the human being is

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in principle qualitatively different from all other creatures, or by saying that this is a dignity bestowed by God. Such an understanding of human dignity represents a counterweight to those aspects of the human being’s relationship to his own self that often help to legitimate competition. Self-interest, the satisfaction of one’s needs, individuality, freedom, rationality, and self-realization cannot be isolated from consideration of the basic dignity of the human being but must be seen in connection with this. In some cases—and the competitive situation is one example—they will come up against a boundary that means they cannot be lived out to the full. Their significance for the realization of a human life in dignity is relativized. The human being can realize himself in a way that does not take care of his own dignity. This boundary is very closely linked to the human being’s relationship to his neighbor. The different forms of competition involve other people in various ways and on various levels. One must take care of their dignity too. Competition’s guidelines direct one to think first and foremost of oneself, thereby giving priority to individuality, distance, one’s own freedom, and one’s own interests, at the cost of other people, who can easily become a means for myself, without at the same time being an end in themselves. These guidelines are not binding, however. Competition can also exist in a framework that gives space for values such as reciprocity, loving one’s neighbor, collaboration, empathy, and closeness, and there is a better protection of other people’s dignity in such a framework than in a context where self-interest predominates. It may seem that such a framework is unrealistic in today’s market-oriented competitive economy, and it does not become that much more realistic when one points to historical personages such as Hans Nielsen Hauge who attempted to realize such a framework in his business activity, and succeeded in doing so; but this does at least indicate that this is possible. When we also bear in mind that there are currents in economic activity today that give priority to collaboration, and that one must give consideration to a wide range of stakeholders, there is some measure of realism in the hope that such economic frameworks can be realized—at least to some extent. The human being’s relationship to nature also actualizes his or her dignity. One can, of course, say that the competitive economy’s use of nature protects human dignity, in the sense that the human being has a unique dignity, and should therefore be given priority above everything else. He should get what he needs, and this presupposes the use of

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natural resources. However, the human being’s unique position and dignity can also be protected without inflicting damage on nature’s integrity and sustainability, for such a praxis can then turn into a threat to human dignity. If nature and its resources are emptied out and destroyed, this will then rebound on the human being, and the basis of his existence as a unique creature with dignity will no longer be present. What, then, about the human being’s relationship to God, seen from a Christian perspective? From God’s perspective, the human being possesses a given dignity, irrespective of the circumstances of his life. He is created in the image of God, and no one can take this away from the individual—not even the extreme conditions of a competitive economy that make the human being merely a means and a sacrifice for the benefit of ruthless profiteers. It is, however, possible for this dignity to be violated. Where the human becomes a means (and only a means); or where he loses in a competition and is deprived of the basis of his existence; or where a rationalization for the sake of profit condemns people to unemployment—this violates not only the individual human being, but also God, who gave him this dignity. This is a possibility in a competitive economy, where there is a strong focus on the concrete material dimension and on the services that ensure that we have access to this dimension and that it functions properly. The material dimension is relativized when it is seen from the perspective of the human being’s relationship to God. It is indeed important for the human being to get hold of what he needs in order to lead a good life, but a good life is more comprehensive and holistic than the life that is determined by economic and material presuppositions. Human dignity is not based on such presuppositions. One aspect of human dignity is precisely the fact that the human being is something in himself, independent of other presuppositions. This dignity is God-given, and its content and justification are higher than that which can be linked to an economic and material context. In a Christian context, the basis for the human being’s special dignity is his creation in the image of God, which is linked to the unique quality of the human being, namely, that he can exist in a communicative relationship to God. It is far from the case that all human beings live in such a relationship; but the Christian belief in creation affirms that all are created with this possibility. And this definition of the human being applies to all. The human being has been given a dignity that is exalted above all other human qualities and is therefore a point of reference for evaluating every form of violation of the human being. This applies to violations linked

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to competition in general, and to the competitive economy in particular, but also to many other fields. This happens especially where human life comes into play, either as a fetus or as human life after birth, in relation to human choices. In many cases, this involves not a limitation, but a breach: human dignity is not only violated but annulled too. It is largely in such contexts that the discussion of human dignity takes place; this occurs less in relation to competition and economic competition, and this can to some extent be seen as an act of omission. For some people who live in a communicative relationship to God, the competitive economy, and the society that is so strongly influenced by it, represent a further challenge. The human being’s focus is captured so strongly by the material dimension, as producer, seller, or buyer, that its possibility to realize the very core of its unique dignity, namely, its communication with and relationship to God, is limited. For those who do not understand their existence in relation to a divine authority, this material focus can also be a challenge to the possibility of leading a human life that is whole, true, and dignified. Against this background, we now have the presuppositions for drawing a more definitive conclusion about the relationship between competition and anthropology, thanks especially to the contributions that our analysis of the economy has made available. This entails a renewed focus on the problem studied in this book, and in particular on the normative part. At the same time, the thesis that formed the starting point for this work is actualized. Can it be verified on the basis of our analysis? Taken as a whole, this also gives an analysis of the cultural function that the idea of competition has in modern Western societies, Norway included. This indicates the most important topics for the concluding chapter.

Notes

1. In Christian theology, the idea of a general revelation is anchored in biblical passages such as Rom 1:20 and 2:14–15. 2. The exhortation “Love yourself!” was characteristic of the culture that became very prominent in the West in the 1980s. It was particularly linked to Wayne W. Dyer and his books. On this, see, for example, Dyer (1979). 3. M.A. Lutz and K. Lux (1979, pp. 17–19) point out that economists have consistently been skeptical about using concepts such as “needs” in an economic context. Instead, they speak of wishes. One reason for this is that needs tend in the direction of a hierarchical structuring of various needs

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on the basis of their relative importance; this is not the case with wishes. Traditional economists employ two other arguments here: (1) Needs are related to values, and as such, they have no place in a neutral and objective academic context. Since human beings disagree strongly about the ranking of needs, it is impossible to say anything about their needs in general— which is the primary task in economic activity. (2) A ranking of needs can lead to the insight that some of them are vital, and that it is important that everyone gets a share in them. Ranking opens the door to political consequences that economists are not always ready to accept. 4. As a humanist psychologist, A. Maslow himself saw a way ahead, even in an economic context. He linked this to the human potential and to the significance it takes on when it is made a priority. This was the most important presupposition of possible competitive advantages, whether in industry or in organizations and institutions. Where this human potential comes into its own, the needs that society has and the needs that the economy is meant to cover, will be so intertwined that if one of them fails to function, the other would experience the consequences of this. On this, see Maslow et al. (1998). 5. On the question of human identity, the development of identity, and theory of identity, see Burke and Stets (2009). On this, see also McLean and Syed (2015); Akerlof and Kranton (2000). The latter book discusses how the identity of a human being is significant for economic profit, with the emphasis on how identity influences individual interactions. 6. This intensified individualization at the cost of relationships seems to be a consequence of the reduced importance of the social relationship in which the individual was traditionally anchored—especially the family. Some people compensate for the reduced quality of personal relationships by giving greater importance to their relationship to the state; but here too, there is an element of competition. The state becomes a kind of sparring partner for the individual. H. Jensen has pointed out that in this situation, in a context where the welfare state is central, it is natural for the individual to understand himself as a sacrifice. One is incapable of admitting one’s own fault; everyone else owes me something. And it is the job of the state to ensure that I get what others owe me. The competitor is the state and its limited funds. Indirectly, there is also a competition with other individuals who want to get hold of the same state funds. See Jensen (2004, esp. pp. 41–43). 7. It is formulated in different ways in this area too. The principal difference concerns whether it is formulated positively (Jewish/Christian) or negatively. One variant of the principle of reciprocity is also found in I. Kant’s formulation of the so-called categorical imperative: You ought always to act in such a way that the rule governing your conduct can be made a

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universal rule of conduct. The reciprocal element lies in the reflection of your conduct in the universal rule of conduct, which will then determine how others behave in relation to you. 8. Cf. the formulation in Matt 7:21, where “the law and the prophets,” that is to say, the tradition of teaching from the Old Testament, is summarized thus. 9.  Kant’s categorical imperative has been criticized because of its formal character: What is the content of ethics? Kant was, however, content with this imperative as an ethical principle and a rule of conduct. There is indeed another formulation of the categorical imperative that is somewhat more open to a definition of the content of what the universal rule of conduct should be, the formula of humanity. But Kant’s ethics has repeatedly been criticized (by Hegel and others) for its lack of a material content. 10. E. Levinas does not discuss economic competition per se, but his understanding of the economic system as such, and his theory of responsibility vis-à-vis the other, make it possible to have a new perspective on economic competition. This is what C. Arnsperger does. 11. On this question of responsibility in E. Levinas, see Levinas (1981). 12. “Initially we believe one another’s word; initially we trust one another. This may indeed seem strange, but it is a part of what it means to be human. Human life could hardly exist if it were otherwise. We would simply not be able to live; our life would be impaired and wither away if we were in advance to distrust one another, if we were to suspect the other of thievery and falsehood from the very outset” (Løgstrup 1997, pp. 8–9). On K.E. Løgstrup’s understanding of trust as a fundamental human phenomenon, and of the ethical demand that this phenomenon generates, see ibid., pp. 8–28. 13. R.D. Putnam focuses on the relationship between trust and the competitive economy on the basis of the significance of collaboration in the economy. He sees a direct antithesis between trust and everything to do with competition and every praxis that rejects collaboration. Trust is a product of accumulated social capital. This capital is not generated where competition is a means employed to create it; it is generated only where collaboration takes place. On this, see Putnam et al. (1993, pp. 169–171). 14. There is a classic example of this in the rivalry between Tonya Harding and Nancy Kerrigan in connection with women’s figure skating at the Olympic Games in Lillehammer in 1994. Harding employed every available means to exclude Kerrigan, including one means that led to Kerrigan’s injury, which made it difficult for her to participate as a serious competitor for Harding. See Baughman (1995).

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15. Hans Nielsen Hauge was also influential in America, thanks to adherents and friends who emigrated there. On this, see Gjerde and Ljostveit (1941), where, however, the focus is mostly on his spiritual influence, by means of the presentation of a number of lay preachers and their activity. The authors touch only to a small extent on questions linked to Hauge’s economic activity and the importance that this may have had in the American context. 16. The foundation of the Hauge School of Management in Oslo in 2013 was based on ideas of this kind. This school offers a value-based education in economics and administration. Its point of departure is inspiration by H.N. Hauge and his ability to create profitable enterprises throughout the whole of Norway, motivated by a higher concern than his own wallet: he wanted to construct a better society. The school aims to promote the values that Hauge made the basis of the businesses he established: industriousness, personal responsibility, equality, care for one’s fellow human being, and social responsibility. These values are then linked to the best of modern academic knowledge and innovation, economics and leadership. The goal is more innovation—with a higher end in view. 17. In most cases, these front lines will be invisible, but there are some examples of negative emotions getting the upper hand and creating dangerous and very serious situations. The tragedy at the 1985 European Cup Final between Juventus and Liverpool in the Heysel Stadium, in which 39 people died, is one terrible example. 18. The question whether climatic changes are caused by human agency is discussed in both political and scientific circles, but there seems to be a greater agreement among scientists than among politicians that these changes are caused by human beings. The organization that continually monitors, updates, and discusses questions linked to climate changes is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Its most recent report was published in 2014. For a summary of its conclusions, see https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_ FINAL_SPM.pdfr (retrieved 27.8.2018). 19. This approach to nature is by some called “deep ecology.” This way of thinking is sometimes linked directly to religious presuppositions (see Barnhill et al. 2001). In other instances, it is expressed more indirectly, as in the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss (see Næss et al. 2005).

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References Aarflot, Andreas. 1979. Hans Nielsen Hauge: His Life and Message. Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg. Akerlof, George A., and Rachel E. Kranton. 2000. Economics and Identity. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (3): 715–753. Arnsperger, Christian. 1996. Competition, Consumerism and the ‘Other’: A Philosophical Investigation into the Ethics of Economic Competition. Discussion Papers (IRES—Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales 1996014) (19.12.2003). Louvain: Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). http://ideas.repec.org/p/ ctl/louvir/1996014.html (2.7.18). Barnhill, David Landis, et al. 2001. Deep Ecology and World Religions: New Essays on Sacred Grounds. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Baughman, Cynthia (ed.). 1995. Women on Ice: Feminist Essays on the Tonya Harding/Nancy Kerrigan Spectacle. London: Routledge. Brockway, George P. 2001. The End of Economic Man: An Introduction to Humanistic Economics. New York; London: W. W. Norton. Burke, Peter J., and Jan E. Stets. 2009. Identity Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dyer, Wayne W. 1979. Pulling Your Strings. New York: Avon Books. Gjerde, S.S., and P. Ljostveit. 1941. The Hauge Movement in America. Minneapolis, MN: The Hauge Inner Mission Federation. Hognestad, Olav. 1994. Løpet og seierskransen: sportsuttrykk og sportsbilder i Det nye testamente med bakgrunn i antikkens sport, vol. 34. Relieff. Trondheim: Tapir. Jensen, Henrik. 2004. Min broders vogter? Om troen på velfærdsstaten. In 13 udfordringer til den danske velfærdsstat, ed. Jørn Henrik Petersen and Klaus Petersen, 29–45. Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag. Kolb, Robert, and Timothy J. Wengert (eds.). 2000. The Book of Concord. The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press. Levinas, Emmanuel. 1981. Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence, vol. 3. Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Texts. The Hague: Nijhoff. Lutz, Mark A., and Kenneth Lux. 1979. The Challenge of Humanistic Economics. Reading, MA: Benjamin Cummings. Løgstrup, Knud Ejler. 1997. The Ethical Demand. Notre Dame, IL: University of Notre Dame Press. Maslow, Abraham H. 1970. Motivation and Personality, 2nd ed. London: Harper & Row. Maslow, Abraham H., et al. 1998. Maslow on Management. New York: Wiley.

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McLean, Kate C., and Moin Syed (eds.). 2015. The Oxford Handbook of Identity Development. Oxford Library of Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Næss, Arne, et al. 2005. The Selected Works of Arne Naess: Vol. 10: Deep Ecology of Wisdom: Explorations in Unities of Nature and Cultures: Selected Papers. Dordrecht: Springer. Nodtvedt, Magnus. 1965. Rebirth of Norway’s Peasantry: Folk Leader Hans Nielsen Hauge. Tacoma, WA: Pacific Lutheran University Press. Putnam, Robert D., et al. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ravnåsen, Sigbjørn. 2002. Ånd og hånd: Hans Nielsen Hauges etikk for ledelse og næringsliv. Oslo: Luther. Ravnåsen, Sigbjørn. 2013. Spirit and Hand: Hans Nielsen Hauge’s Ethical Framework for Management and Business. Kristiansand: S. Ravnåsen. Sejersted, Francis. 1995. Når markedet bestemmer moralen. In Hans Nielsen Hauge og det moderne Norge, ed. Svein Aage Christoffersen, 41–49. KULTs skriftserie. Oslo: Norges forskningsråd. Thorbjørnsen, Svein Olaf. 1999. Autonomi, teonomi og heteronomi: en analyse av Torsten Bohlins teologiske etikk med vekt på den etiske autonomis betingelser. Oslo: Det teologiske Menighetsfakultet. Thorbjørnsen, Svein Olaf. 2001. God etikk - god butikk? Noen synspunkter på lønnsomhetstankens etiske vilkår i næringslivssammenheng. In Det Kongelige Norske Videnskabers Selskap. Forhandlinger 2001, ed. Harald Nissen, 133–153. Trondheim: Det Kongelige Norske Videnskabers Selskap. Treat, Jeremy. 2018. Sports in the Biblical Narrative. In Global Perspectives on Sports and Christianity, Routledge Research in Sport, Culture and Society, vol. 91, ed. Afe Adogame, Nick J. Watson, and Andrew Parker, 29–44. London; New York: Routledge. Weber, Max. 2011 [1920]. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Translated and Introduced by Stephen Kalberg, rev. ed. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 9

A Humane Competition?

Introduction The phenomenon of competition is a central element in various cultural and societal arenas today. The value of this kind of phenomenon can be measured on many scales. I have been essentially concerned with the anthropological aspect of the matter. A central question has thus been whether competition has contributed, and contributes, to the promotion of a true and good humanity that preserves a holistic perspective on the human person, and where the human being’s dignity and intrinsic value, and respect for the human being’s integrity, are central. The analysis of the idea of competition has shown that evaluations and answers linked to anthropological presuppositions and implications have been dependent on traditions and worldviews. There is considerable variation in what is thought to constitute a true and good humanity, as discussions in Chapters 6, 7, and 8 have shown. It can nevertheless be affirmed that a majority of the traditional worldviews wish to maintain that the human being has an intrinsic value and thus also a dignity; that he or she has an equal dignity, irrespective of differences in abilities; and that human integrity is an aspect of the human being that must be respected and protected. This agreement is significant, since it also has consequences for the level of action. Its limitation is that a more precise definition of concrete strategies for action also involves, to a greater degree, elements of justification on a deeper level, and it is here that a number of differences emerge more clearly.

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My understanding of true humanity is marked by the tradition of the Christian worldview. This tradition is not exclusive in terms of its content, and I have pointed out the numerous connecting lines that exist between it and a humanist tradition. In a Christian tradition, this kind of understanding of the human being balances between two legitimate concerns, the concern for the human being himself and concern for one’s neighbor. This double obligation to love one’s self and love one’s neighbor has its genesis in the creation of the human being by God. This establishes parameters around human life that protect the human being’s intrinsic value and the equality of all persons, and that place the human being in a context of fellowship in which he can unfold his individual presuppositions and interests. Such a definition of the human being has a holistic character and is not exposed to individualism’s shortsighted switching between what serves the human being best at any particular point in time. It also possesses a critical potential, both in relation to the fundamental values it wishes to preserve regarding the human being’s status and with regard to the demands that my neighbor makes of me. As an important societal and cultural phenomenon, competition must be analyzed critically. I hope that I have made a certain contribution to this by means of this book, with my starting point in the fundamental significance that economic competition has for competition in general in today’s society, and with an emphasis on the anthropological aspects of competition. A phenomenon that involves people, to the extent that competition does, must be measured precisely on the basis of its ability to realize a true humanity, a humanity that both preserves dignity and gives good and serviceable living conditions in the context of both the present and future. This means identifying those aspects of competition that promote good presuppositions for the human person’s existence in the world, and those aspects of competition that make this existence problematic. The starting point of this book was a problem and a thesis. The problem had a descriptive and a normative element. Regarding the descriptive element, the relationship between competition and anthropology has already been broadly clarified. Regarding the normative element, the problem has been especially thematized in Chapters 7 and 8, where the most important premises for drawing definitive conclusions are found. These conclusions, however, remain to be drawn, and this will be done here.

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The thesis of this book (Chapter 1) was that the phenomenon of competition is more of a threat to the possibility of realizing a true humanity, than something that promotes this. I claimed that the economic aspects of the idea of competition entail that anthropological values linked to it, which are per se positive, were twisted in a problematic direction. The emphasis on what is material, on ranking, on instrumental thinking, and on self-interest meant that the phenomenon of competition became a threat to that which is truly human. The question now is whether it has been possible to verify this thesis by means of my analysis.

The Positive Contribution of Competition to the Realization of a True Humanity The good presuppositions of human life include the possibility of satisfying the fundamental human needs of food, clothing, and shelter. Since economic competition is an efficient means of getting such resources, it helps to ensure that these needs are met for many people. Besides this, economic competition creates pressure to raise the quality of goods on offer in the market. In this way, people obtain more and better means to protect themselves and the human fellowship of which they are a part. The realization of a true humanity also includes self-love and selfrealization, both in a general and a Christian sense. The human being is to realize the talents and the presuppositions with which he or she is equipped. Self-love is important, since it is important to take care of ourselves and recognize how valuable we are; and this recognition should inspire us to take care of others, who are equally valuable, and who need us. Competition opens the door to such a realization of self-love and self-realization because of its emphasis on the human being’s individuality and its openness to human freedom. Competition is an arena in which the human being can freely choose the solutions he himself finds useful and most suited to realize the goals he intends to pursue, and possibly goals for the fellowship too. Freedom opens the door to a creative praxis, but coercion can easily paralyze, oppress, and conserve. Coercion seldom unleashes an audacious openness to something new. That is the privilege of freedom―even if freedom also can be considered a doubleedged sword. Self-love, self-realization, freedom, and individuality are fragile realities in human life. Not much is required before that which is so valuable can become a threat to what is valuable. The phenomenon of competition

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exemplifies the fact that one is balancing on a knife-edge here, with an equal likelihood and danger of falling on the wrong side. Competition moves between an egotism with a constructive and an egotism with a destructive character (Chapter 6). Constructive egotism contributes to a true realization of good human presuppositions for one’s life; destructive egotism makes self-love and self-realization exclusive, isolates the individual, and absolutizes freedom in such a way that it turns against the human being as a compulsion. This means that competition’s potential for realizing important aspects generated by a positive and constructive human egotism always has a relative and provisional character. A positive understanding of competition and a competitive praxis are always the fruit of a struggle. And we must indeed struggle to attain them, if this positive understanding is to be a good thing for the human being. Competition and tension belong together, but tension is also an ambiguous reality in human life. There is a tension that is nourished by fear, but there is also a good tension that can generate resources and heighten the human being’s achievements. This can be seen in sport and in connection with examinations and competition in the world of education, and it is also found in economic competition. Competition can also create positive emotions, both during its course and at the moment it is decided. Competition entails uncertainty about the result. This uncertainty, together with the feeling that one must have confidence in oneself, that it is entirely up to oneself, and that one succeeds, can create a good feeling of tension. And this feeling of tension while the competition is going on colors the joy when the tension is released. This applies to the winner, but it can also be found in the one who does not win. The good feelings are in fact linked not only to winning, but also to taking part. In this way, the emphasis on competition is shared more equally between the competition itself and its result. Not infrequently, however, the tendency is for the goal of competition—the ranking and the identification of the winner—to dominate. The joy in the competition can take other forms too. To take part in a competition is to take part in a test of mastery. Do I master the athletic exercise? Do I master starting up a shop, and holding my own in relation to the other persons who sell similar goods? The experience of doing this in competition with others generates a good and legitimate feeling of joy at mastering the goal one had set for oneself. In other, perhaps less serious contexts, competition can be linked to a spontaneity and a

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playfulness that most certainly also includes joy: joy at the fact that I exist and that I function in a good tension vis-à-vis other persons. This is how a true humanity is realized, preserving the dignity and integrity of the human being even in a competitive situation. The competition does not harm people but helps to realize important and valuable aspects of what it is to be a human being.

The Negative Contribution of Competition to a True Humanity The description of positive aspects of the phenomenon of competition has already allowed us to see the ambiguity here. The negative aspects of competitive activity lie close to the positive aspects. It is important to highlight the positive aspects and accord them the legitimating function they deserve, since some unreflecting and superficial criticism of the idea of competition and of the competitive society omits to mention that there are nevertheless a great many positive aspects linked to competing. At the same time, it is equally important to focus on the problematic consequences. This task is becoming even more important today, because the phenomenon of competition has become so well established, and is taken so much for granted, that society has lost some of its critical power in the encounter with this phenomenon. The phenomenon of competition, especially economic competition, has come to dominate more of society. Its field of influence is no longer limited to services with a general economic significance; it also includes those services that traditionally have been the special responsibility of the public sector, such as social and health services, education, culture, the environment, and public transport. This integration of the idea of competition makes it easy to think of economic competition as something universally applicable, and not only as an instrument that can function usefully in a certain number of contexts. It is impossible today to think of our society independently of the idea of competition, and it is gradually also becoming difficult to think of this as only a part of society, rather than as one of its most important supporting pillars. This situation makes it ever harder to ask critical questions, but we cannot avoid doing so. Indeed, we have a moral obligation to do this. If we desire to realize a true humanity, what are the problematic contributions made by the idea of competition?

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Focus on the Material Dimension In our society, competition is linked especially to the economy, sport, and education. Naturally enough, economic competition focuses essentially on material values. Sport, especially top-level sport, is likewise marked more and more by commercialization.1 In an educational society, there is a fairly comprehensive link between winners, high salaries, and an increased access to material goods. In this way, the idea of competition as such is a kind of focal point in material values and presuppositions. This is understandable. The orientation of competition toward ranking requires that competition be about something that can be measured, and material and concrete realities are very suitable here. Economic profit, either in an economic competition or in the form of financial prizes paid in commercial sport based on concrete, measurable achievements, accords with this pattern. It is difficult to maintain that intellectual and existential realities are equally suitable. The scales for ranking such realities are not equally concrete, if indeed it is possible at all to speak of scales for such things. The strength in this orientation to the material is due to the link between the idea of competition and human self-interest and self-love. The distinction between a constructive and destructive egotism is actualized in this context. The positive and necessary significance of egotism for competition is not isolated from material factors. An economic competition that brings about a creative self-realization is necessarily linked to material, economic factors. Nor need the link between sport and money and commercialization be problematic; it is reasonable to expect a financial reward, if one is willing to use most of one’s time on perfecting one’s sporting ability. The problem arises when the material presuppositions of the competition dominate everything, since that opens the door to a more destructive egotism. Human self-interest takes many directions and is related to many forms of interest. To some extent, the important interests are connected to professional praxis and private presuppositions. A priest or a psychiatrist might be interested in being perceived as caring and inclusive: this is important for how others perceive them, and for the prospects of functioning well in a professional praxis. It is in a pilot’s own interest to be continually up to date regarding various new technical developments in the field of aviation. It is in a father’s own interest to have a good relationship to his children. It is in a teacher’s own interest to inspire

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pupils; this creates a good situation in the classroom and wins for the teacher the admiration of his or her colleagues. It is in a businessman’s own interest to be creative and to have a good relationship to his bosses in the firm. Many such interests have a non-material orientation; some are initially non-material but can subsequently change in a material direction. The non-material can also function as a means to obtain something material. A psychiatrist who builds up a good reputation will be able to acquire such a large number of patients that this yields considerable material gains, and functions in a satisfactory manner for his own interest in this context. A businessman’s interest in cultivating a good relationship to his bosses can be a means to do well in the next round of wage negotiations. Many of these self-interests are related to competition. In some cases, one competes against one’s own self, and in other cases, against colleagues. The competition takes place partly on a non-material, and partly on a material level. It is important to note that self-interest is not necessarily linked to material presuppositions in a competitive situation and that not every link between competition and material things is problematic. Some competition is, and must necessarily be, connected to material factors; one example is economic competition. At the same time, it is necessary to maintain that much competition is problematic precisely because it makes it possible to link self-interest so closely to material presuppositions. Self-interest is an important driving force in the human being. Although its field of interest is wide per se, the material field seems to occupy a special position for most people. The human being’s self-interest does, of course, entail obtaining the satisfaction of fundamental needs such as food, shelter, and clothing, and for many people in our world, that is as far as self-interest goes, since they know nothing that goes beyond this. But this is not the case for most of us who live in the Western world. These needs are already covered, and self-interest is directed toward other needs. Needs that are higher in Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs are indeed also important, but there sometimes seems to be an even stronger orientation toward other material needs than those that are regarded as fundamental. This is how the orientation seems to be, but is this the case? And if so, why is it the case? An answer to the first question must have both an empirical and an ideological component. Several investigations of

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human value preferences indicate that material values play an ever greater role, although the picture is not unambiguous.2 In terms of ideology, there are differences. In a Marxist understanding of reality, economic and material values have a decisive significance for the understanding of the world and of history. In a humanist framework, the human being is thought of primarily on the basis of non-material categories; the idea is that one realizes oneself and one’s deepest needs in other directions than the material. A Christian understanding of reality definitely also asserts the importance of a spiritual and non-material reality for the human being, while at the same time recognizing the great importance of material values and the danger that these may come to dominate spiritual values. The New Testament’s concern about the dangers of wealth gives clear signals in this regard. The story of the rich young man is a testimony both to the enormous importance of the material values for the human being and of how these values come into conflict with other non-material values. Despite leading a moral life, he was not willing to let go of his wealth for the sake of the kingdom of God (see Matt 19:16– 26; see also Luke 12:13–21). The continually increasing importance of competition in every area of society is linked primarily to economic competition. It is not the competition in games and the noble race in sport that are the starting point for competition that is conquering more and more areas of society, but rather economic competition. Its close relationship to material values helps a materialized understanding of our reality to win the day. This kind of development determines what is important both for the human being and society. What is important for the human being also has a determinative influence on important emotional aspects of human life. One consequence is that joy is linked more and more strongly to experiences that have a material anchoring. Joy can be linked to things or services that can be bought for money; these include experiences of fellowship. In this way, the phenomenon of competition in general, and of economic competition in particular, contributes to a strong focus on material aspects of human reality. The primary factor here is the role that self-interest plays in competition. Where the focus on material values is so strong, the problematic aspects of self-interest predominate in human choices of action. This materialistic emphasis in human life is unproblematic for those who think of human life within material parameters, as something

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governed by genetically bound presuppositions—since they see no alternative. Such a view of the human being and of the world is reductionist. Where one thinks about reality in a wider way, and human life is thought to include more dimensions than the material, the threat to important non-material aspects of human life certainly does become a problem. To the extent that economic competition contributes to this, it is also a problem that poses a threat to the living-out of a true humanity. True humanity and the preservation of the human person’s dignity presuppose that human life is lived out on a wider arena than the material. Ranking Human Beings Ranking belongs to the very essence of competition, and it also belongs to some degree to the conditions of human life. The differences between people are obvious. It is hard to imagine that these differences would not also lead to some kind of ranking, on the basis of criteria that can vary from one environment and historical period to another. With this in mind, the ranking among human beings that competition implies need not per se be problematic. If it is in fact problematic, this is due to a number of factors. First, the reality of competition in our society today means that the criteria for ranking are one-sided and are centered on special values. Competition in sport is traditionally oriented to a ranking that builds partly on talent and effort, and partly on an element of luck; in addition, in part it also has to do with the economic resources that are available to the best athletes and that enable them to continue to be the best. It is almost unnecessary to mention that the criteria for ranking have an economic and materialistic character in economic competition. Although most of the actors in economic activity are firms, that is to say, institutional actors, it is they who are ranked, and this too is a ranking that is related to anthropological presuppositions. The firms are made up of human beings. A ranking takes place internally, between those who succeed in promoting the concerns of the firm and those who do not. The firm’s leaders themselves are also representatives of those who succeed and those who fail, depending on whether or not the firm makes a profit. Second, competition helps to make the ranking and the differences between people more open and publicly accessible. In the past, ­winners in sport received public honor as their reward; but today’s prizes and rewards in top-level sport are dominated by material and economic

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values. This makes it possible for them to invest money, to get a good life for themselves, and to achieve economic security in view of the fact that their career will not last forever. Winners in business were able to invest their earnings in fine houses, fine cars, and a good and comfortable life. For a long time, those who acquired such positions did not indulge in much extravagance. There were some exceptions, but many of these economic winners were very modest with regard to themselves and the material trappings of their lives. Economic gains were not so much used to demonstrate one’s victories; they were reinvested, thereby expanding one’s business activity. The situation today is somewhat different. Many economic winners feel the need to demonstrate their victories, and this takes a variety of forms. Those in the uppermost division buy huge luxury yachts for hundreds of millions of dollars and private planes. Others in lower divisions demonstrate their economic success through palatial country homes and houses in the world’s metropolises. Celebrity magazines help to display such differences, with reports highlighting precisely the link between ranking and material values. Economic competition thus takes on a double function. Celebrity magazines show the material results of economic competition, and these magazines themselves are in a situation of economic competition, where they profit economically in terms of sales from finding the best way to illustrate ranking among people. Third, this form of ranking may entail a possibility of elitism. Where people win on economic and materialistic premises, these victories often confer a significant potential for power. This can then lead to the development of an elite who have built up their power on the basis of their economic and strategic skill and within the parameters of values that largely have a materialistic character. These positions of power are based on other presuppositions and have channels other than those that belong to the ordinary political system. They are based on the possibilities that are opened by economic competition and its ranking. In this context, it is important for a society to ask: Do we want such an elite? And, above all: Do we want their power to be anchored to such an extent in the power that they have as winners in an economic competition? The ranking of people need not come into conflict with their intrinsic value and equality; nor need it violate their human dignity. However, the ranking that is anchored in a competition related to the economy (whether in the economy itself or in sport) risks having a difficult relationship to these values. On the one hand, it is harder for these values

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to hold their own in a process of economic competition. On the other hand, the criteria that very often steer ranking in an economic competition are antithetical to these values. Although the importance of these values is affirmed in a formal sense and on a meta-level of values, the intrinsic value of the human being will be threatened by economic ranking criteria, and it will be hard for human equality to “make its voice heard” where the gulf between the economic winner and the economic loser is wide—and conspicuous. A Means to Attain Something Else Generally speaking, competition does not activate all the aspects of a human being. It is above all the physical aspects, and those aspects of the human being’s mental equipment that concern the rational and the emotional, that are activated. There is a further narrowing down in economic competition in particular. I have already pointed out the danger that this sort of competition can contribute to a depersonalization and anonymization of the human being who is a part of the competition (Chapters 6, 7, and 8). This development is inherently problematic from an anthropological perspective, and it becomes additionally problematic when it becomes an instrument in competition, oiling the wheels of competitive machinery. A depersonalized and anonymized human being is useful in promoting the supreme goal of the competitive economy, namely, profit. When the human being is thus turned into a thing, it is, to some extent, easier to include him or her in the competitive process as a means. Such a person obeys and asks few critical questions. Critical questions always take time, and they can lead to a wish for alternative strategies; both can be the sand that clogs economic machinery. A depersonalized and anonymized human being will be content with the results of competition, since things tend to mean a lot for a human being who has himself been turned into a thing. In this way, the parameters of what a human being is, and of what concerns him or her, are narrowed down. Where the human being can be thought of as a means to realize a goal, it is neither the activity itself, nor the human being who is part of it, that is most important, but the goal of the activity. This is the case in much thinking about competition, and especially in economic competition. The possibility of victory or profit allows one to think that everything that is a part of the competitive machinery, and that is meant to realize this goal, is a means. The human being is a part of this machinery.

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The status of the human being is, however, different from the status that is accorded to other parts of the machinery. In principle, the freedom and individuality of the human being are preserved, because both are important for the start and the function of competition: coercion is incompatible with human imagination, creativity, and innovation. These human qualities are important for competition, and it is in the development and application of such qualities that the supreme goal of competition can be attained. This, however, indicates the problem. Human freedom and individuality are also included as a means. In a competitive situation, their unbound status and integrity are not accorded a priori— although this is the necessary presupposition, if the human being is to steer his actions freely in the direction he himself desires. The individual’s creativity and innovation can be applied in various directions. Some possibilities are so problematic that they are punishable in national and international law. Other possibilities lie on the border of what is ethically defensible, but they have a considerable economic potential. In such situations, it is easy for individual freedom to come under threat. The goal of profit can dictate guidelines that marginalize ethical hesitations, with the result that freedom is only a freedom in appearance. It is a freedom that is free only as long as the choices a person makes serve the higher goal. Many would say that this is not a genuine freedom, but rather the sacrifice of freedom on the altar of profit and victory. In competition, and especially in economic competition, the human being can become a means that is used to achieve an end. The extent to which he is thought of as a means varies. It is, however, important to note that this way of thinking often goes beyond the unproblematic idea that in many contexts, the human being is in fact a means for something else and someone else: the problem is that the human being is not at the same time an end in himself. His essential function is as an instrument for a higher goal. Thanks to this orientation to a goal, it is only special aspects of the human being that are of interest, aspects that are far from reflecting the breadth in human living that the human being was intended and created to achieve. And this leads to a violation of the human being’s intrinsic value and dignity. A human being who is primarily and fundamentally a means for something else has not, however, lost his dignity. This is something given to the human being, and something that cannot be taken away from him. By no means can the human being himself create such a dignity. Nevertheless, to use a human being only as a means is a fundamental violation of this dignity.

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To maintain that the human being is an end in himself can be problematic when the higher goal is a reality outside the human being and is largely characterized by material presuppositions. In such a context, it can be difficult to win acceptance for the idea that the human being is always also an end in himself. A Threat to Fellowship The relationship between fellowship and competition is ambiguous. In some competitive arenas, fellowship plays a significant and positive role. It is possible in a sporting context for a fellowship to develop both among competitors and spectators; one example is the fellowship in team sports. Something similar applies to institutional competition in industry, and to the relationships among competitors where the economic units are small and the competitors know each other. Sellers in the market square are competitors, but this does not prevent them from experiencing a fellowship and a closeness that can be fruitful for their entire milieu. On the other hand, it is an essential fact of competition that competition and fellowship are antithetical. One must beat one’s competitor! This does not create good presuppositions for a functioning human fellowship. The ranking praxis in competition sets up barriers that drive competitors apart, and these barriers create the presuppositions for isolation. This isolation is often envisaged as an important presupposition for succeeding in a competition: one must not allow oneself to be influenced by others, and above all, one must not allow one’s competitors to wage crafty tactical warfare. Isolation acquires a value, in view of realizing the higher goal. Where there is an antagonistic relationship between competition and fellowship, there is only a limited possibility of collaboration. Competition and collaboration can indeed be thought of as complementary strategies to achieve a goal, as examples show. However, an understanding of competition that is anchored in a belief in competition’s own dynamic and in the idea of ranking, and that is strongly oriented to the individual or to the institution, does not have much space for collaboration. With this starting point, collaboration prevents competition from being an effective operative strategy, and this has consequences for interpersonal relationships and for human fellowship. Isolation and the refusal of fellowship are connected with the great importance that self-interest has for competition. Fellowship can pose a

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threat to the realization of competition’s self-interested goals. One indicator of this is the relationship between the idea of competition and the question of distribution. The frameworks of this distribution are strongly related to merits: the winnings go to the one who is the most skillful and the best. Such a distribution need not be an intolerable burden on a fellowship, but this can easily be the case if the differences in the fellowship are great a priori. In a good fellowship, one would prefer a distribution based on equality or of people’s needs. Some may find it natural to ask whether fellowship can be temporarily “suspended” for the sake of competition. Cannot competition be permitted to unfold to the full in areas where it is actualized, in order to get as much as possible out of its potential for efficiency? Fellowship can then be cultivated in other areas and at other times. This idea is enticing, but very unrealistic. The problem is that competition is not an activity that can be restricted to certain areas of society and to certain parts of human life. Competition meets the human being on arenas that belong to daily living, and it is in these arenas that he or she is to live in fellowship with others. If competition lays down the rules here, fellowship risks becoming only a conditional fellowship—conditional, in the sense that the fellowship too takes on a function in the orientation to a goal that steers competition. For most people, fellowship is a good thing. The relationship to others includes both human challenges and the possibility of caring for others in difficult situations. Fellowship is also a place where joy is deeply anchored. People are happier in fellowship with others than in isolation. A fellowship that is influenced by competition’s ranking and orientation to merit does not have the same space for joy. The materialistic orientation of competition also leaves its mark on joy, which becomes more a joy at achieving material goals than a joy that is generated by belonging, care, friendship, and one’s own growth in the fellowship with others. A Christian understanding of human dignity finds its deepest justification in the creation of the human being in the image of God. One central aspect of what this entails is the relationships in which the human being must live—above all the relationships to God and to one’s neighbor. Both these relationships are lived in forms of fellowship, and in this sense, there is a link between fellowship and human dignity. If a person is excluded for various reasons from living or taking part in a human fellowship, he is not deprived of his dignity; but he is deprived of

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value and all valuable qualities that fellowship represents in human life. This is not how human life was meant to be. When competition creates tensions, and sometimes direct antagonisms, between the competitors, fellowship and good relationships are put at risk, and the human being is prevented from realizing something that is very fundamentally human. The dignity that is the framework for leading a human life is violated when good fellowship between people is challenged by the domination of competition’s individualistic and self-interested perspective.

A Threat to True Humanity? The thesis of this book was that in our Western context, where the idea of competition flourishes in an overwhelmingly economic context, competition is more of a threat to a true humanity than something that promotes a true humanity. This poses a challenge to the fundamental dignity of the human being. Although it is possible to show that the idea of competition can make important positive contributions to the realization of true humanity, the primary emphasis lies on the negative. The close relationship between competition and the economy means that positive human values such as self-love, self-realization, individuality, and freedom—values that are linked a priori to competition—often manifest themselves in ways that pose a threat to the realization of a true humanity. The focus on the material, on the ranking of human beings, on an understanding of the human being as first and foremost a means, and on the cultivation of self-interest and individuality affects both the human person as an autonomous and integrated being and the human fellowship as an inalienable human value. In this sense, we can say that our analysis has confirmed the thesis. This confirmation also says something about how we describe our society and its cultural presuppositions. It is precisely because the idea of competition plays such an important role, and has such great consequences for the realization of a human life, that it must be integrated as an important factor into every analysis of the cultural situation on the societal level—the alternative is to paint pictures that are not true. Such pictures can easily become a threat to the human person as a cultural being. The human person is meant to carry out the commission to “cultivate the garden and take care of it” (Gen 2:15) in a way that serves both the individual and the human fellowship.

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A Future with Competition? Do we want a society in which competition is allowed to play a dominant role both among us as individuals and in our fellowship with each other? Some do indeed want this. Competition gives rewards. For those who stand on the winners’ podium and for those who think that material success and growth are the most important things in life (with all that this means in terms of access to things and services), competition is something to be desired. Others protest. There is too much room in competition for human self-interest; it divides people by ranking them; and it creates distance between people. The fellowship suffers. Would it not be better for us, and perhaps equally effective, if we collaborated instead of competing with each other? Is this realistic? In our Western context, it is difficult to envisage that time can be turned back to an age before competition existed, or that one could attempt to copy a primitive tribal culture where collaboration is so firmly entrenched that the concept of competition is unknown. The idea of competition is much too solidly established here, and the presuppositions are completely different. We are thus obliged to live with competition. The question is how we live with it. It does not help to paint a one-sided dark picture of the situation. Since competition is something given a priori, something to which one must relate, this scarcely leads to a better life and a better society. Competition also offers positive points of contact for a good human life. We must focus on these and use them to the full in order to draw a line separating them from problematic aspects of competition. The recognition of competition’s positive qualities in promoting achievement and quality, and its ability to allocate resources efficiently, must be linked to an understanding of competition in which collaboration and fellowship form an integrated part. We must test the waters. In the struggle for a society that is worthy of human beings, a society in which competition too will play a role, the supreme goal cannot consist in promoting values that are completely incompatible with competition and are an alternative to it. The strategy must rather be to focus on values that to some extent are compatible with competition and that at the same time can help to adjust it. Fellowship and collaboration are values of this kind.

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On one point, it may perhaps be necessary to mount a more forceful offensive—not in the hope of winning, but in the certainty that offensives in this field can contribute in a positive direction. The contemporary phenomenon of competition has a highly materialistic orientation. A society that is oriented primarily on the basis of materialistic presuppositions is cold and incapable of taking care of the entire spectrum of those who belong to it. An “anti-materialistic” offensive includes a desire to promote fellowship and collaboration, but it also demands the thematization of the entire understanding of reality. What does our reality consist of? Is it limited to that which is given in positive and material terms, or are there also valuable aspects of our reality that go beyond this? Are the most important values economic, or are experiences that do not cost anything, and that occur where people come together and mean something for each other, also valuable? I believe that most people would agree a priori that such values are indeed valuable; but they cannot be taken for granted in today’s society. We must fight for them. It is above all the economic thinking about competition, with its markedly materialistic attitude, that threatens them. And precisely because this markedly materialistic attitude is often joined to a destructive understanding of human egotism, one important part of the struggle is the attempt to promote a constructive self-interest that contributes to human self-realization and preserves legitimate human self-love—without allowing this self-love to become antagonistic to responsibility for one’s neighbor and for nature. Is an understanding of competition that is compatible with the preservation of true human values anything other than a rosy-hued utopian vision? Is this an attempt to harmonize precious human values and an idea of competition that is characterized ever more strongly by commercial and materialistic presuppositions? Is the idea of competition that is compatible with a true humanity an operative and realistic understanding of competition in our society today? In many cases, it is tempting to be eclectic in the formation of the idea of competition. In combination with a rather low level of precision about what the idea of competition actually involves, one can create an apparent harmony between the actual competition and an acceptable competition. Nevertheless, it is only the human being that is the loser, when such a strategy is applied. The question about painting a rosy picture of competition corresponds to a similar question about a possible rosy picture of the human being. I have shown that, on this point, there are differences among the

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various anthropological traditions. The humanist tradition seeks to preserve a strong faith in human ability and its will to realize good, where this is possible. The Christian tradition has a more realistic approach, seeing in the human being’s sinful presuppositions a possibility that in some (and perhaps in many) cases, the human being does not wish to realize what is good for others, but only what is good for oneself. Here, there are pitfalls on both sides, but a blind faith in the human being can be problematic, where this is exploited. And this is a genuine possibility in competition, especially in a competition that is steered by money and material goals. Blind faith reduces the possibility of setting up barriers that can sometimes be necessary in order to assert human dignity, equality, and integrity, and the importance of fellowship and collaboration in human life in society. Human life is lived by taking account of oneself, of other people, and of nature in a good and balanced manner. Such a balance also makes it possible for competition to be practiced in a good way. As a phenomenon and an instrument in the reality of human life, it can also give the human being something, both for his or her own sake and with regard to his or her relationship to other people and to nature. Only a balance of this kind, which from a Christian perspective also includes the superior function of the relationship to God, makes it possible for the dignity, intrinsic value, and equality of the human being, and the fundamental importance of fellowship, to flourish fully, even if the balance does not automatically guarantee this will actually happen. In many competitive situations, including those that apparently preserve true human values, there is a potential for development in a direction that would be destructive in human terms. This means that giving competition a chance always entails being on watch against such a development, where it is not possible to defend adequately the human being’s life, dignity, and integrity. In a humanist and a Christian anthropology, with their similarities and differences, there are resources for undertaking this “watchman’s service” vis-à-vis competition. With their emphasis on the human being’s unique dignity, equality, and integrity, and on human fellowship, these traditions offer counterforces to an understanding of competition that tends in a direction that is destructive for the human being. Does a competition that preserves and promotes true human values exist? The survey above has shown that competition in our society is located in a landscape where some paths are straight and efficient and others are more crooked and harder to take. The competitive society

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wants above all to take simple and efficient paths that lead quickly to a goal. The question, however, is to what goal they lead. The paths that are harder to take have space for competition, but on very specific conditions, which are oriented especially to protect fundamental human values that are put at risk when the path is straight, the speed is high, and the goal is defined primarily by material values. In a competitive society, the more crooked paths are a countercultural element, even if this does not mean that competition is rejected. This is a counterculture in the sense that competition does not determine how human life is to be formed; rather, competition is modeled on the basis of what best protects and cherishes true, sustaining, and long-term human values.

“I Have Enough” One of Johann Sebastian Bach’s cantatas is entitled “Ich habe genug” (“I have enough”).3 As a church cantata, it has a Christian content: the first-person singer is certain that he has embraced the Savior who is the hope of believers. This is enough. He (or she) cannot wish for anything better. Such a certainty is found among Christians even today, but can we dare to think that this could also be a universal motto for human lives? I have in fact enough. I need not struggle to get more; I am content with life as it is. It is almost difficult to envisage a more countercultural idea in our days. It runs fundamentally counter to the ideals in our competitive society: to reach out, to get better, to win, to get more, and to increase. These ideals are nourished by our experience of inadequacy, our desire for change, and our longing for things to be better and better. They are reinforced by the fact that powerful economic forces profit from this situation. I have enough! This ideal too can be experienced as a threat. It bears witness to a self-assurance, a contentment, and an independence that dismisses the logic on which our society is built. The path ahead is not the path forward and upward, toward better results and more and more glittering and attractive goals. I have enough! My thoughts and my attention need no longer be concentrated on getting more for myself and having a better life. My energy can be used in other ways: in serving others, in cultivating relationships to other people, relationships that are no longer disturbed by the idea that I am dealing with a potential competitor.

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We live in a competitive society dominated by the ideal: “I do not have enough!” It is difficult to escape being influenced by this, but for some people, there nevertheless exists a tension between going along on this competitive journey and drawing back and saying: I have in fact enough; I do not need anything more, I do not need to win. The former is certainly easier than the latter. But a good strategy—in the encounter with all the forces that want us to think in the opposite direction—may perhaps be to practice saying to oneself: I have enough. This reflects an attitude. Many people will see it as unrealistic and countercultural, or even anti-cultural. But others will see precisely here a future, both for culture and for nature—and for the human person.

Notes 1. To this see Szymanski (2009) and Thorbjørnsen (2011, esp. pp. 181–189). 2.  The Norwegian sociologist O. Hellevik has investigated Norwegians’ preferred values over a long period, as part of a large biannual European investigation of values (Monitor). Hellevik distinguishes four segments of value preferences: modern materialists and idealists, traditional materialists and idealists. He writes that a shift has taken place in preferred values between the situation in 1965 and the situation in 2013. From 1985 to the beginning of the 1990s, the situation was characterized by traditional idealistic value preferences. This was followed by development in the materialistic direction, initially traditional in character, but with a weak tendency toward a modern direction. From 1995 to 1999, there was a clear development in a modern materialistic direction, followed by a standstill in 2001 and 2003. From 2005 to 2013, the development again took an idealistic and modern direction. This kind of sociological and culture theoretical interpretation of the development of values in a society poses considerable challenges, as Hellevik himself admits. It is nevertheless meaningful as the expression of tendencies. See Hellevik and Hellevik (2016, esp. pp. 74–79) and Hellevik (2008b, pp. 218–221). See also Hellevik (2008a). 3. “Ich habe genug” (BWV 82). For the original German text and an English translation see: http://www.bach-cantatas.com/Texts/BWV82-Eng8.htm (retrieved 29.11.2018).

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References Hellevik, Ottar. 2008a. Assessing Long-Term Value Changes in Societies. In The Sage Handbook of Public Opinion Research, ed. Wolfgang Donsbach and Michael W. Traugott, 556–569. London: Sage. Hellevik, Ottar. 2008b. Jakten på den norske lykken: Norsk monitor 1985–2007. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Hellevik, Ottar, and Tale Hellevik. 2016. Verdier og verdiutvikling. In Det norske samfunn, 7th ed., ed. Ivar Frønes and Lise Kjølsrød. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk. Szymanski, Stefan. 2009. Playbooks and Checkbooks: An Introduction to the Economics of Modern Sports. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Thorbjørnsen, Svein Olaf. 2011. En plass på pallen. Konkurransen, idretten og mennesket. Kristiansand: Høyskoleforlaget.

Author Index

A Aristotle, 116, 130, 293, 312, 317 Arnsperger, Christian, 176, 220, 301–303, 308, 310, 342, 355–357 Asheim, Ivar, 317, 320 Atherton, John, 270 B Béteille, André, 46, 47, 48, 49 Britton, Andrew, 27, 54, 116, 168, 177, 182, 205, 206, 227, 232, 233, 234, 241, 243, 256, 283, 285, 316 Brockway, George P., 32, 79, 131, 157, 165, 171, 173, 179, 185, 189, 191, 207, 209, 220, 228, 229, 253, 283–285, 322, 360 C Darwin, Charles, 62, 102 Descartes, René, 238 Durkheim, Émile, 230–231

E Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, 244, 247, 249, 251, 252, 256, 285 Eriksson, Ralf, 223–224, 226 F Fielding, Michael, 11, 15, 28 Freud, Sigmund, 64, 83, 103 Friedman, Milton, 21, 135, 137, 155, 192, 194–205, 211, 212, 284, 304 Fürstenberg, Friedrich, 12, 14, 15 G Galbraight, John Kenneth, 21, 142, 194–205, 211, 212 H Hauge, Hans Nielsen, 362–363, 382, 387 Hellevik, Ottar, 410 Helmreich, Robert L. 91

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019 S. O. Thorbjørnsen, What Happens to People in a Competitive Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22133-1

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414  Author Index Hessen, Dag, 244, 247, 249, 251, 252, 256, 285 Hiebert, Paul G., 37, 41, 45, 50, 51, 52, 53 Hobbes, Thomas, 46, 96, 117, 230–231, 232 Hollis, Martin, 226, 234, 282 Horney, Karen, 65, 83, 103, 105 Howerth, Ira Woods, 29, 155, 179, 180–181, 206 J Jeffner, Anders, 18–19 Jevons, William Stanley, 126, 206, 222 K Kant, Immanuel, 239, 273, 281, 309, 343, 385, 386 Keating, James W., 81, 89, 106 Keynes, John Maynard, 136–137, 144, 159, 195, 201, 207, 292 Kirzner, Israel M., 148, 169, 208, 296, 299–301, 322 Knight, Frank H., 292, 296–300, 356 Kohn, Alfie, 2, 4, 15–16, 29, 53, 63, 64, 69, 71, 82–83, 84, 90–92, 97, 98–99, 102, 103, 105, 106, 186 Koslowski, Peter, 292, 296, 300–301 L Levinas, Emmanuel, 28, 355–357, 386 Loy Jr., John W., 27 Lutz, Mark A., 168, 169, 170, 177, 179, 183, 185, 207, 208, 210, 212, 222, 223, 234, 254, 282, 283, 284, 285, 306, 337, 338, 384

Lux, Kenneth, 168, 169, 170, 177, 179, 183, 185, 207, 208, 210, 212, 222, 223, 234, 254, 282, 283, 284, 285, 306, 337., 338, 384 Løgstrup, Knud E., 28, 251, 358, 386 M MacIntyre, Alasdair, 11, 303, 317, 318 Marshall, Alfred, 127, 147, 197, 222, 223 Marx, Karl, 46, 96, 125–126, 205 Maslow, Abraham H., 337–338, 385, 397 May, Rollo R., 84, 97 Mead, Margareth, 51, 53, 103, 105 Menger, Carl, 127 Mill, John Stuart, 3, 123–125, 221, 222, 223 Moore, George Edward, 303 N Nell, Edward J., 226, 234, 282 Nelson, Julie A., 148, 229, 250, 251, 254, 284 Novak, Michael, 105, 106 O O’Neill, Onora, 179 Pareto, Vilfredo, 178 Putnam, Robert D., 386 R Rawls, John, 312–315, 322 Rescher, Nicholas, 22, 282 Rich, Arthur, 173–175, 184, 187, 208, 255, 285

Author Index

Ridley, Matt, 53, 63, 106, 131, 252–253 Robbins, Lionel, 157–158, 206, 283, 321 Russel, Bertrand, 7 S Sahlins, Marshal, 43, 44, 46, 52, 54, 248 Salsman, Richard M., 154, 170, 210 Schumpeter, Joseph A., 142, 148 Sedgwick, Peter, 27, 54, 116, 168, 177, 182, 205, 206, 227, 232, 233, 234, 241, 243, 256, 283, 285, 316 Sen, Amartya, 119, 134, 146, 226, 228, 229–230, 283–284, 293, 310, 322 Simmel, Georg, 12–15 Smith, Adam, 3, 116–123, 127, 139, 145–146, 147, 155, 161, 163, 172–173, 175–176, 180, 184, 187, 192, 198, 202, 207, 209, 210, 252, 262, 265, 285, 354–355, 363

  415

Solomon, Robert C., 9, 318–321, 323 Sraffa, Piero, 148 T Torsvik, Gaute, 178, 209, 210–211, 321–322 Turgot, Anne Robert J., 164–165 V Veblen, Thorstein, 129–130, 147, 223, 282 Von Hayek, Friedrich A. 81, 208, 233, 265–266, 284, 286 W Walras, Leon, 127–128, 135, 207 Weber, Max, 344 Werhane, Patricia H., 146–147, 180 Wilson, Edward O., 102, 303

Subject Index

A Aggression, 83–84, 97, 102, 360 Alienation, anonymity, anonymization, 69, 126, 233, 240–241, 248, 310, 341, 342, 344, 356, 401 Altruism, 37, 67, 141, 142, 144, 145, 168, 224, 229, 247, 249, 250, 254–257, 258, 262, 265, 267, 285, 311, 318 Anthropocentricity, 332–335, 369, 372 Anthropology Christian, 19, 269, 271–275, 278–280, 377–380, 408 egotistic, 67, 244–258, 262, 265, 272, 276, 334 elitist, 258–262, 276, 334 general, 10, 18, 26, 217, 329 humanistic, 19, 252, 262–269, 271, 274, 275, 276–277, 334, 408 instrumental, 237–244, 276, 334, 340–341 Antitrust laws, 95, 167, 170

Anxiety, 84–85 Autonomy, 47, 69, 159, 220, 246, 251, 309, 311, 313, 342, 350. See also Freedom C Capitalism, 125, 126, 127, 130, 136, 137, 143, 154, 156, 170, 181, 195, 196, 205, 206, 252–253, 270, 299, 302 Collaboration, cooperation, 15, 17, 36–38, 50, 51, 53, 63–65, 67, 68, 79, 91–94, 131–132, 140–142, 146, 156, 180–181, 185–186, 196, 232, 247, 254, 256–258, 267, 305, 318–321, 352–354, 359–363, 403–408 Collectivity, 87–90 Community, fellowship, 11, 50–51, 69, 82, 84, 88–89, 94, 96–97, 102, 130, 141, 144, 232, 234, 235, 245, 252, 256, 257, 260,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019 S. O. Thorbjørnsen, What Happens to People in a Competitive Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22133-1

417

418  Subject Index 261, 264, 267, 268, 272–274, 311, 317–321, 349, 350–352, 360, 361–363, 392, 393, 403–409 Compassion, 355, 359–368 Competition actors 6, 66, 120, 159, 160, 168, 178, 180, 189–190, 355, 358 character building and, 97–98 definition, 11- 17, 142, 345 destructive, 99, 166, 169, 247–248, 408 free, 49, 120, 123, 127, 171–176, 197, 198, 204 goal of, 13, 172, 190–194, 240, 376, 394 latent and manifest, 162–163 monopolistic, 78, 94, 95, 120–121, 131, 165–169 motivation and, 5, 6, 17, 82–83, 102, 255 non perfect, 163–169, 188, 190, 193, 196, 248, 295 perfect, 77–78, 128, 163–171, 187–189, 193, 196, 197, 248, 255, 266, 292, 295, 296, 299, 315 power and, 46, 48, 51, 93, 94–96, 367–368 presuppositions, 9, 21, 66–79, 96, 120, 123, 126, 131, 138, 154, 155, 160, 163, 168, 171, 186, 193, 199, 254–258, 266, 296, 309, 319, 334, 359, 362, 372, 377 regulative function, 17, 154, 159, 162, 163, 174–176, 191 relation to reality, 132, 134–135, 136, 140, 141, 154, 165, 169, 173, 186, 193, 224, 299

rules and regulation, 15, 17, 70, 75, 77–79, 81, 170, 174–176, 204, 404 society of, 1–7, 9 structural, 16, 17, 69 Consumer culture, 245, 252 Consumer sovereignty-power, 162, 164, 174, 193, 197, 202 D Depersonalization, dehumanization, 341, 344, 357, 401. See also Alienation, anonymity, anonymization Dignity, human, 21, 47, 60, 264, 272, 275–282, 311, 381–384, 400, 404, 408 Distribution equal, 46, 123, 188, 292, 316, 354 fair, 134, 140, 292, 316 of power, 48, 96, 189 of profit, 140, 164, 187, 188, 189 E Earnings. See Profit Ecology, ecologic, 16, 143, 255, 368–374 Economic man. See Homo oeconomicus Economics classical, 116–125, 155, 177, 219, 265 and ethics, 9, 219, 226, 291–301 feminist, 141–142, 251–252 institutional, 21, 129–130, 136–137 neoclassical, 124, 126–128, 136, 138–139, 144, 155, 156, 165, 179, 221, 222, 226, 227, 228, 249–250, 254, 267, 294, 354–355

Subject Index

as science, 158–159, 219 Economy definition, 157–158 market-, 42, 50, 123, 126, 155, 156, 163, 167, 172, 175, 182, 183–184, 186, 193–205, 270, 271, 296, 306 mixed-, 205 natural-, 350, 370 Education, 3, 4, 9, 66, 259, 348, 394, 396 Efficiency, 49, 93, 118, 122, 123, 138, 145, 172, 176–181, 196, 199, 201, 240, 257, 265, 292, 298, 301, 305, 306, 312, 314, 354 Egotism, 117, 118, 230–231, 244–258, 262, 272, 336, 363, 394, 396 Elitism, 258–262, 400 Emotion, emotional, 118, 141, 229, 249, 264, 344, 366, 394 Empathy. See Compassion Employment, unemployment, 126, 136–137, 138, 195, 203, 204, 205, 383 Entrepreneur, 128, 139, 142, 299–300, 362 Equality, egalitarianism, 46–50, 60, 66, 71–76, 134, 140, 170, 200, 232, 259, 260, 269, 297, 309, 313, 314, 315, 316, 319, 353, 364, 365, 392, 400–401, 408 Equilibrium, 117, 121, 126, 127, 128, 131, 132, 135, 142, 143, 165, 168, 296, 299, 300 Ethics business-, 9, 318, 319 deontological, 294, 308–316 teleological, utilitarian, 294, 304–307, 308, 316, 318 virtue-, of attitude, 294, 316–321 Evolution, 61, 62–63

  419

Exchange of gifts, 44–45 market-, 41–45 Existentialism, 69, 263, 350 F Fairness. See Justice Fair play, 88, 295, 317 Freedom, 49, 50, 68–69, 96, 102, 117, 122, 123, 145, 171–173, 195, 200, 202, 231–234, 251, 264, 266, 267, 272, 273, 275, 309, 310, 311, 313–314, 331, 334, 336, 342–344, 351, 362, 378–379, 380, 382, 393, 394, 402, 405. See also Autonomy G Game, game theory, 16, 64, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 89, 94, 131–133, 144, 235, 241, 256, 297, 398 Gender, 51, 75, 198, 254 Greed, 77, 228–229, 236, 246, 336 Growth, economic, 100, 120, 123, 136, 137, 140, 143, 182, 182–186, 307, 357, 371, 372 H Hand, invisible, visible, 122–123, 135, 159, 163, 165, 172, 184, 187, 193, 265 Happiness, pleasure, 7, 42, 50, 51, 61, 82–83, 118, 129, 222, 223, 245, 265, 376 Health, 4, 39, 40, 80, 84, 85, 86, 97–100, 102, 138, 186, 193, 242, 306, 336–338, 339–340, 348, 350, 373, 395

420  Subject Index Hedonism, hedonistic, 46, 129, 130, 222, 223, 239, 298 Herd, 70–71, 349 History, understanding of, 38–39, 53 Holism, holistic, 4, 18, 22, 156, 178, 242–243, 319, 332, 335, 369 Homo oeconomicus, economic man, 124–125, 129, 130, 135, 141, 144, 221–237, 240, 250, 266, 340, 343, 366 Honor, 36, 39, 66, 161, 189, 319 Human being, its value. See Intrinsic value Humanism, humanistic, 19, 185, 234, 245, 252, 254, 262–269, 271, 273, 274, 275, 276–277, 278, 280, 281, 285, 332, 334, 392, 398, 408 Humanity, true, 8, 10, 21, 220, 282, 331, 377, 392, 393–405, 407 Human rights, 264, 266, 278, 308, 309–312

Inequality, 35, 46–50, 71–76, 140, 186, 200–201, 202 Innovation, 101, 125, 141, 142, 154, 184, 201, 210, 267, 355, 402 Instinct, 62, 65, 70, 129, 130, 245, 335 Institution, 12, 17, 37, 41, 60, 66, 68, 72, 80, 129, 160–161, 193–194, 196, 237, 251, 256, 273, 313, 314, 320, 321, 340, 348, 365, 403 Instrumentalism, instrumental, 11, 38, 237–244, 331, 334, 340–341, 393. See also Means Integrity, 60, 68, 237, 241, 272, 295– 296, 297, 308, 317, 318, 341, 369, 383, 391, 395, 402, 408 Intrinsic value, 10, 11, 80–82, 90, 125, 237, 239, 241, 242, 243– 244, 268, 281, 310, 346–347, 359, 364–365, 381, 391, 392, 400, 401, 402, 408

I Identity, 67, 71, 340–341, 350 Image of God, man as, 278–280, 375, 383, 404 Incentive, 154, 159, 183–184, 198, 199, 201, 240, 306–307 Individualism, 47, 50, 63, 69–70, 144, 231–234, 244, 249–252, 262, 274, 340, 350, 351–352, 392 Individuality, individual, 10, 50–51, 68–70, 80–87, 102, 230, 231–232, 240, 250, 251–252, 266, 267, 331, 340–341, 350, 355, 360, 382, 385, 393, 402, 405

J Justice, 11, 87, 134, 139, 140, 175, 235, 247, 292, 312, 316, 318, 319–320, 367–368 L Liberalism, liberal, 49, 50, 122, 139, 244–245, 334, 352 Loser, 14, 36, 69, 74, 83, 84, 99, 155, 179, 199, 200, 205, 219, 241, 259, 261, 273, 295, 296, 307, 314, 315, 344, 351, 364, 366, 367, 401, 407 Love of neighbor, 256, 353–355, 359, 361, 377, 382, 392

Subject Index

M Machine, machinery, 20, 125, 173, 239, 318, 401 Marginal analysis costs, 127, 128, 141, 166, 173 utility, 126, 127, 172–173, 177, 265 Marxism, 130, 143, 155, 245, 334, 352, 398 Mastery, 51, 81, 102, 394 Materialsim, material, 3, 11, 39–41, 61, 73–74, 101, 139, 143, 157, 158, 182–183, 190, 217, 220, 234, 238–239, 247–249, 258, 263, 267, 274, 305, 306, 331, 336–339, 376, 383, 384, 396–399, 400, 404, 407 Means, 4, 36, 38, 39, 41, 79, 95, 134, 143, 176–177, 187, 205, 226, 229, 235, 237–244, 264, 269, 271, 273, 278, 281, 293, 303, 305, 310, 347, 356, 365, 382, 383, 393, 401–403. See also Instrumentalism Methodological individualism, 47, 126, 130, 133, 138, 147, 231, 249, 340 Monetarism, 137, 155, 195 Money, 42, 159, 189, 311 Monopoly, monopolistic, 4, 5, 6, 78, 94, 95, 120, 127, 141, 142, 148, 163–171, 203, 266, 267, 300 Motivation. See Competition N Naturalism, naturalistic, 62, 239, 245, 264, 298, 301–304 Needs, 3, 39, 127, 160, 162, 177, 178, 222, 239, 336–340, 370–371, 393, 397, 398

  421

O Oligopoly, oligopolistic, 6, 78, 95, 142, 166–167, 184, 188, 234, 266, 368 Ontology, ontological, 301–304, 356 P Pareto, 133–135, 178, 179, 209, 291 Positivism, 234 Power, 48, 93, 94–96, 165, 166, 185, 189–190, 202, 261, 298, 367–368, 400 Prediction, 124, 135, 138, 139, 158, 171, 219, 226, 234, 298 Preference, 138, 140, 177, 178, 198, 199, 218, 226–227, 232, 233, 250, 300, 340, 342, 398, 410 Price, 42–44, 77, 120–121, 127–128, 154, 159–161, 163–164, 166–167, 187–189, 191–192, 314 Prisoner’s dilemma, 94, 132 Producer/seller, 43, 44, 77, 120– 121, 163–165, 167, 168, 169, 176, 185, 187–189, 190, 228, 237–238 Profit, 72, 118, 125–126, 128, 131, 161, 167, 188–194, 203–204, 281, 299–300, 363, 371, 383, 396, 399, 401–402 Q Quality, 40–41, 85, 126, 160–161, 176, 184, 186, 191–192, 331, 354, 393, 406 Quantity, 41, 126, 191–192

422  Subject Index R Ranking, 11, 39, 44, 48, 258–262, 273, 364, 399–401 Rationality, 22, 94, 124, 129, 143, 144, 145, 179–180, 222–228, 229–230, 234, 264, 267, 331, 342–344, 366 Realism, 169, 223, 237, 266, 268, 274–275 Reciprocity, 44–45, 123, 230, 256– 257, 276, 312, 353, 361, 382 Reductionism, reductionist, 145, 233, 243, 331, 341, 399 Relationship to God, 271, 273, 333, 335, 374–381, 383 human, 38, 185, 236, 251, 329, 348–368, 380–384 to nature, 236, 368–374, 382 to oneself, 335–348, 360 to one’s neighbor, 271, 273, 348–368, 378, 380, 381, 404 Relativism, relativize, 129, 140, 269, 278, 320, 375, 382, 383 Religion, religious, 12, 67, 198, 262– 263, 264, 333, 370, 375, 377 Resources allocation of, 126, 134, 137, 145, 158, 160, 172, 176, 178, 196, 197, 241, 252, 254, 271, 282, 300, 304, 311, 312, 315, 354, 359, 406 use of, 92, 159, 176, 182, 193, 297, 307, 357, 369, 370, 371, 372 waste of, 156, 178, 180, 183 Responsibility, 86, 192, 203–204, 236, 246, 271, 272, 273, 279, 335, 342, 355, 356–357, 362, 369, 375, 378, 379, 380, 407 Rich, poor, 75, 77, 122, 153, 200, 202, 365 Risk, 11, 49, 85, 86–87, 92, 100, 128, 142, 182, 199, 201, 273, 306, 339

S Scarcity, 16, 37, 76–77, 157–158, 186, 187, 197, 255 Security, safety, insecurity, 40, 52, 84, 85, 86, 92, 177, 186, 195, 199–200, 201, 204, 338–340 Self-interest, selfishness, 11, 37, 45, 67–68, 80, 94, 102, 117–119, 123, 125, 126, 129, 130, 139–140, 141–142, 144–145, 163, 180, 187, 223–224, 226, 228–231, 232–233, 235–236, 241, 244–245, 249, 252–258, 262, 265, 272–273, 274, 292, 310, 314, 318, 319, 320, 321, 331, 336, 343, 360–361, 363, 376, 377, 380, 382, 393, 396– 397, 398, 403–404, 406, 407 Self-love, 118, 119, 246, 248, 272, 336, 337, 339, 340, 377, 393, 394, 396, 405, 407 Self-realization, 10, 21, 81–82, 86, 102, 245–246, 247, 248, 249, 264, 266, 267, 268, 271, 272, 275, 331, 336, 337, 344–346, 376, 377, 380, 382, 393, 396, 405, 407 Self-respect, 99, 190, 307 Sin, 271, 272, 273, 274, 279, 280 Sociobiology, 61, 303 Solidarity, 5, 43, 44, 89 Sports, sport, sporting, 2, 4, 15, 20, 21–22, 36, 37, 74, 77–79, 81, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89–90, 92– 93, 96, 98, 100, 189, 261–262, 268, 331, 337, 347, 348, 353, 362, 366–367, 369–370, 394, 396, 399, 403 State, government, 6, 48, 122, 123, 131, 136–137, 171, 175, 194, 195, 198, 201–205, 244, 265, 266, 271 Stewardship, steward, 157, 362, 363, 375

Subject Index

Supply and demand, supply, 42, 43, 44, 77, 121, 127, 143, 163, 164, 166, 169, 173, 177, 190, 193, 225, 226, 270, 314 Sympathy, 118, 119, 234, 262, 265, 354–355, 363 T Theocentricity, 333–334, 335 Trust, 51, 117, 156, 198, 249, 251, 256, 257, 317, 319, 353, 357– 359, 361, 363, 374, 377–378, 380 U Utility, maximation of, 133–134, 135, 193, 222, 224, 257, 291, 331, 361. See also Marginal analysis V Value(s) exchange-, 42, 44, 116 fellowships-, 82, 245, 267, 321, 262, 403–406, 408 material, non-material, 39–40, 73–74, 88, 100, 101, 182–183, 219, 239, 248, 258, 305, 358, 376, 396, 398, 399, 400, 409

  423

symbolic, 42, 73–74, 217 utility-, 73, 81, 116, 127, 172, 235, 241, 340 W Wage, salary, 43, 48, 93, 120, 121, 126, 127, 136, 138, 160, 184, 203, 204, 295, 319, 365, 397 Welfare (-), 49, 133–134, 155, 163, 176, 178, 194, 195, 199, 204, 205, 244, 310 Well-being, 99, 347–348, 361 Winner, 13, 14, 16, 36, 50, 69, 74, 76, 82–83, 93, 94, 95, 98, 99, 164, 168, 179, 199, 200, 205, 219, 241, 248, 259, 260, 261–262, 273, 296, 301, 309, 314, 315, 344, 364, 367, 376, 394, 396, 399–401, 406 Work, labor, 1, 40, 43, 118, 119, 120, 123, 125–126, 138, 160, 176, 203, 239, 242, 243, 264, 297, 306, 307, 339, 350, 357, 365